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QUEER TECHNOLOGIES

OF RELATING BODIES, VOICES, AND

PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

by

JONATHAN SANDERS LANG

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2000

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Abstract

QUEER TECHNOLOGIES OF RELATING

BODIES, VOICES, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

by

Jonathan Sanders Lang

Adviser: Professor Joseph Glick

Worried that academic writing about sexed and gendered identities might result in the silencing of minority voices, I consider how the development of gays & lesbians may challenge the disciplinary structures of academia in the dominant culture. Foucault said, to learn about the dominant culture, study those it has marginalized. What I have done with Foucault's legacy is to show how a queer standpoint may expose the "closeted" nature of bodies and voices in psychological inquiry. In doing this I develop a symptomatic reading of non-gay identified academic discourse, thus showing that the activity of queer bodies and voices may be understood as a(n unconscious) location where disguised and symbolic problem-solving can transpire to the benefit of all.

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The nature/nurture controversy, a founding dichotomy of psychology, has been writ large in the humanities and social sciences wherein debates occur as to whether human nature has an essence determined by biological endowment, or is socially constructed. Post-structural thinking claims that nature is just another socially constructed concept. Reducing nature to culture is reminiscent of effacing the body in favor of the mind: the history of psychology is marked by this tendency, manifesting recently in discursive psychology and in queer theory. Criticizing these approaches, I develop queer technologies that examine the ritualizing and performing of queer desire, and analyze the structural, discursive, cybernetic, and semiotic coding of queer bodies showing how gay longing for community expressed in queer embodied voices and manifested in the situation of dark body erotics may permit the recovery of materially significant others. Although differences in colonized bodies/voices are described/portrayed within a linguistic context or discursive order, our identities are not merely an effect of language-not solely a matter of concepts alone-but, rather our development is a complex set of material processes of adjustment and self-production and self-regulation resulting from our historical constitution in evolved species contexts and the onto-genetic

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specificity of our individuated lives. The histories of oppression make our bodies materially distinct from each other. Though semiotically significant (i.e., readable), different oppressions make experience of our respective identities opaque and in their extremes of development, incomprehensible to the minds of the colonizers.

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Chapter 1

1. INTRODUCTION

The Problem and Its Background:

At least since the Holocaust in which Nazis killed Jews, Gypsies, and Homosexuals, it has been the mark of the latter part of the twentieth century to herald "the end of Ideology," "the end of Philosophy," "the end of History," and even "the end of Man." Though each of these announce the end of something distinctive and worthy of discussion in its own right, they are also related proclamations. Michel Foucault heralded the end of the Man of Reason; Francis Fukuyama the end of History; and Jacques Derrida the end of Philosophy. One way of connecting these three endings is as follows: All three may be understood as responses of disillusionment with Enlightenment values. How could we still embrace the Enlightenment value of progress when such horrendous crimes against humanity transpired in the Nazi genocide and with the dropping of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima? The traditional moorings that had served to anchor us, guide us in our development, and encourage belief in progress toward the realization of a society that would coincide with Reason, Truth, Beauty, and Goodness were put asunder with the advent of these horrific events in 1945.

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The world has been shaken, and continues to be shaken by other tragedies of large proportion. Genocide is more easily recognized when it is blatant and out in the open as national policy; when, as is more often the case, it is subtle and disguised as with the institutional forms of racism, sexism and homophobia of contemporary times, it penetrates its victims existence nonetheless. Its impact, whichever form it takes, is always brutally destructive of those who are its target.

One philosopher argues "that the events of the Nazi genocide compel reconsideration of such fundamental moral concepts as individual and group responsibility, the role of knowledge in ethical decisions, and the conditions governing the relation between guilt and forgiveness" (Lang, 1990, p. 260). Anyone, engaged with the Holocaust, should agree that the presence of such extreme evil in the world calls for a total reconsideration of the possibility of being able to think morally about this crime against humanity with the usual ethical categories of Western Civilization. Constant evaluation of how it is possible to act ethically is required as well. In light of such heinous acts as the genocide of six million Jews (and countless others), we can't help but wonder how it is possible to recover something of the all too quiet and subtle sense of our

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belonging to the same human species. It is right to ask about the causes of such crimes against humanity. The least of the reasons for the inquiry being to excuse the immensely evil acts of those who performed them by making them appear rational as a result of explaining their occurrence. Furthermore, we should not entertain this enterprise of analysis so as to define and limit ourselves as separate and apart from such activity. That is to say that we should not look to construct evil as inhabiting an absolutely different realm from that of our humanity. Instead, we should investigate the existence and performance of evil so as to bring the problem home, to have it come to rest no matter how uneasily within our own hearts, minds, and bodies.

It is a mistake to construct the possibility of evil as if it were a visitation from outside our human communities. To set ourselves apart from this problem of good and evil is no less a crime against our humanity than the unarguably more egregious acts of extermination conducted by those in the charge of the Nazi concentration camps. We must examine ourselves as culprits, to understand how we collude in the construction of evil throughout the world today, and we must do this even as we speak and write ourselves into and out of history in the stories we tell and retell about the meaning

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of our existence. To remain silent about these things is tantamount to condoning them.

In my judgment, it is a defensive maneuver to conceptualize the evil as absolutely other than whom we are. No less a part of this maneuver is holding the good up as absolutely good. Claiming the good as that which exits in-itself and for-itself may have until now been the mark of how we construct human values. But since two events in particular, the end of the death camp in Auschwitz (January 1945) and the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima (August 1945), we should question how valuation may be performed without the habitual result of idealization. In establishing values through idealizing the objects that represent them, we have heretofore in this process of making norms, ideals, and values held them out as goals. But these goals are in their nature necessarily unattainable. For once we achieve them, they deconstruct themselves as goals worthy of pursuit. Once achieved they no longer sustain us for they no longer retain the power of animating our existence. An example to which almost everyone can relate is the idealization of a lover: in the grip of infatuation, the beloved is idealized; s/he is constructed in such ways that s/he is iconic, and as such is no longer human. Or, if s/he is still considered to be human, it is only insofar as s/he represents the perfection

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of humanity. And within the historical transpiring of the process of confronting the image which is idealized with the reality of the person as experienced within our relatedness, s/he must be destroyed in the idealized form with which we first launched our loving of her/him. The transformation of love into hate is all too easily accomplished in the playing out of our ambivalence that is contained in this movement between Platonic, idealized love, and the lusty, down and dirty carnal eroticized love. Perhaps therein lies the problem, historically captured in the framing of Western Civilization, and inaugurated by Plato himself.

Interesting that the culprit I have found was what we would call today in the political correctness of our naming-a differently-sexually-oriented person. Targeting Plato's homosexuality as partly responsible for the ways in which he wrote himself into the conversation of Western Civilization will be offensive to some. Nonetheless, I think that this is where we must go in bringing home to ourselves the place of evil in certain forms of conceptualization that have become the dominant forms of thinking prevalent in today's world. Although the approach of social construction has objected to thinking that homosexual applied to personal identity as an essential property prior to the nineteenth century, still the binary and dichotomized concepts of heterosexual and

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homosexual persons structures the categorization of these ways of thinking about being sexual. Making clear this duality of hierarchically structured social relationships affords the opportunity of deconstructing the two-termed relation between heterosexual and homosexual. And this itself is enlightening because it shows us how deconstruction is a process of coming to terms with reality through taking up and inhabiting our embodiment in the thickness of our social, cultural, and historical circumstances.

But to bring the problem of valuation home in such a way that we might uncover and expose one of the iconic figures, in Nietzschean parlance Plato is one of the monumental figures of the tradition of Western Civilization, is the direction we must take. It is in the shadows of Plato's work that our existence has played itself out. And it is precisely in the shadows that we will find our liberation from the darkness of our thought that his conception of truth has cast upon our lives. The direction that Plato had encouraged us to follow is that which comes to be through leaving the shadows of the cave to embrace the light of day. To encounter the Platonic Eternal Forms of Truth, Beauty, Justice, and the Good, we must deny the value of the existence of those things most connected with the sensuous

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realm of our embodiment. This is the first mistake, and everything follows from taking up this direction in the wrong way. I do not wish to be understood as saying that since Plato there have been no cultural traditions that respected human embodiment. Daniel Boyarin (1995) argues that Rabbinical Judaism (Talmudic Culture) before Christianity viewed the body as the essence of the human person, whereas after Christ the material body is depreciated and the non-material soul is believed to be the essence of the person. However, European Civilization has been dominated by Plato's philosophy. And, I am claiming that his "homosexuality" animated and informed his taking the direction that denies, depreciates and desecrates our embodiment.

Remarkable is the possibility of recovery within the Platonic writings of the correct relationship between speech and writing. In Plato's *Phaedrus* (1972), Socrates is revealed as arguing with the sophists that writing has the potential for evil, by just playing the games of the rhetorician. The Socratic method entails the earliest recorded type of dialectic in which the speaker asks a question, perhaps what is justice? And then goes on to entertain different answers until finally the essence of an answer is discovered. But of course Socrates discovered his

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answers in the activity of dialogues and discussion with others in his class/community. This has become the model for twentieth-century Anglo-American Analytic philosophy that focuses on the conceptual clarification of terms that have become the tools of science. Analytic philosophy has disconnected its investigations from any living dialogue, except in the distant sense of a conversation among those who are considered members of their analytic tradition. Their philosophical specialization is thought of as a good thing, just as specialization among the sciences, both physical and social (behavioral), has become accepted as common place. There has been little recognition that this segmentation of event-fields has compromised our understanding of reality. It could be argued that this specialization is itself the result of processes of idealization. And it is idealization that has turned us away from reality. But surely, scientists understand that any exploration which involves the construction or building of models is a kind of idealization, tolerated only if in the end it proves useful in the pursuit of explaining and understanding reality. A danger lies in mistaking these constructions and models for the real thing, for that which exists.

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Psychology has undertaken to interpret this form of cognitive activity that utilizes idealization. In concerning myself with these issues that I have touched upon above, my question begins to take shape in the form of the following: how can we discover value in what exists? How can we do this without denying the goodness that already exists in the reality that is ours? Why must the creation of the good always be of another realm that denies, depreciates, and desecrates what is already in existence? In what follows I will occasion a particular inquiry that I understand to be related to these previous investigations but in areas with which I am more familiar. I will look to see how the employment of this form of theorizing and storytelling has transpired in the history of psychology. Specifically I will examine the controversy between explanations of human behavior as either determined by genetic, biological factors or by social, cultural factors. Psychology has assumed that either form of explanation provides adequate treatment of history. I think that neither alone is sufficient. But most of all I find that analyzing the determinants of the field of human behavior in such ways extricates the individuals from having (taking) responsibility for their actions. Figuring out how academic writing requires such distancing from its subject matter will be one goal of my investigations.

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Berel Lang has declared that so much has been written on the Holocaust. He maintains that unless new documentary evidence is in hand, nothing more should be published. He is afraid that the kind of writing that scholars produce will only detract from the real horror of that event. Of course, one way that humans come to terms with such horror is to replay it in their minds, or as the case seems to be with the adolescents of today, to experience the terror repeatedly as it is played out in the genre of horror/suspense films. But does this not detract and desensitize us to the real despair and suffering, even the evil that I have suggested looms in the very constructions of our thinking, theorizing, and storytelling? I think it does. And, so I too have asked myself: what kind of writing is worth doing especially in the midst of the immense loss, pain, and suffering that the AIDS Crisis has wrought and continues to generate in those touched by this recent plague of gigantic proportion? We might even claim that there is a quiet genocide being conducted by those who were slow to respond to this health crisis that has disproportionately affected people of color in developing countries of Africa, homosexuals world-wide, and in the United States intravenous drug users. Even if not in agreement with that claim, perhaps the weaker claim that the impact of the AIDS Crisis is selectively affecting those

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groups I mentioned in ways that though the intention to exterminate them is missing, the outcome might as well merit being called that of genocide. So, in the climate of AIDS, I have asked about the purpose of writing. And have come out in agreement with Berel Lang who claims that though he has tried to live up to the following constraint on writing, he has not always met his standard.

> Writing … meant to convey the common or personal sense of horror, serves too often as rhetorical incentive for memory, assuming a role of surrogate in which voice substitutes for conscience so that the need to feel displaces reflection, or substitutes even for feeling itself. Even for writers conscious of this danger, moreover, there remains the divided challenge of justice and sentiment; they can hardly balance their own imagined lives against the histories of those who spoke-or for that matter, who were silent-within the events of the genocide.
>
> It may seem that writing in general, not only writing about moral enormity on the scale of the Nazi war against the Jews, faces this challenge. Wherever it appears, literary representation imposes artifice, a figurative mediation of language, and the contrivance of a persona- that is, a mask-on the part of the writer. To this extent, *all* writing requires justification; it is at the very least an obtrusion on its subject. But if these conditions hold in general, they are especially compelling when the occasion for writing makes its own mark, when the facts "speak for themselves." (Lang, 1990, p. XI)

Lang in keeping with his desire to construct a moral discourse about the Nazi genocide rejects the typical theoretical discourse that looks <u>through</u> its own prose and abstractions. In his own words, "a premise of the written word is its intention to be read <u>through</u>; it is designed to

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enable readers to see what they would otherwise see differently or perhaps not at all" (Lang, 1990, p. XII). In the spirit of Roland Barthes, Lang chooses a writerly-discourse that reflexively hovers between the objects and subjects of the writing process. Objects are the things represented in the writing, and subjects are both author and readers. According to Lang, this "is intransitive (in Barthes's term), where an author does not write to provide access to something independent of both author and reader, but 'writes-himself'" (Lang, 1990, p. XI).

In drawing out this distinction between prosaic and reflexive writing, Lang says in favor of the latter that

> This conception of writing denies the distances among the writer, text, what is written about, and, finally, the reader; they all converge on a single point. In the traditional account, the writer is conceived as first looking at an object with eyes already expectant, patterned, and then, having seen, as representing it in his writing. For the writer who writes-himself, writing becomes itself the means of vision or comprehension, not a mirror of something independent, but an act and commitment-a doing or making rather than a reflection or description. (Lang, 1990, p. XI)

In a passage that follows, Lang (1990) finds precedents for this kind of writing in the "Passover Haggadah and the requirement which accompanies it of the recitation, on each anniversary of Passover, of the history of the Exodus from Egypt" (p. XII). It seems as though Lang is placing this form of writing and expression in the realm of what John Austin

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(1975) called performative statements. A prototypical example of a performative is an utterance in which a person makes a promise. It is the speech act itself that creates, constructs, and brings forth the promise. Such acts of speaking are generative of social commitments. They are made in the saying; marriage vows, pledges of allegiance, and oaths of office are other examples that fall within the category of making promises.

In the passage that follows it is apparent that Jews especially but all readers of Lang's text are being asked as readers to engage in the historical retelling of the Nazi genocide so as to perform a moral discourse-to fulfill a moral obligation.

> The consequences of historical events extend both backward and forward, and in retelling the Nazi genocide, the narrator tells himself not only as a speaker in the present but also as a character of the narrative, living in the text recited. Writers do not usually think of their readers as themselves writers. For me in this writing, however, the greater failing would be to have readers who did not do this, who might think to avoid retelling what was written because they were reading. Even if what emerges in such revisions moves away from or against what is said in these pages, this would be more consistent with the ideal of moral discourse-discourse not about moral issues, but *as* moral-than would writing which requires that writer and reader distance themselves from their subjects, as aesthetic expression (poetry, fiction) distances itself from the immediacy of will and emotion, or as the generalization of scientific or philosophical theory distances from their specific objects. (Lang, 1990, p. XIII)

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How far from this sense and understanding have the participants, writers and readers, of academic writing strayed from this commitment to engaging in writerly-discourse that is unashamed of its moral intention?

In today's world, 'publish and perish' has come to pervert the sense of its original formulation as 'publish or perish.' Recently, it has been used as the title of a work of fiction that collects three novellas about life in academia (Hynes, 1997). We must wonder how, what originally represented a choice between 'publishing and perishing' (losing one's chance of being sustained in an academic career versus gaining the coveted prize of tenure), it has come to represent dark humor. Rather than signaling a choice, the collocation of the two conditions in the conjunction 'publish and perish' seems to foretell our demise, even death.

When I first heard the conjunctive form mentioned at the community college where I teach it was used to make an insider's joke. The remark in which 'publish and perish' found expression was meant sarcastically. In the hierarchy of academia, the community college lies near, if not on, the bottom. Since research and scholarship are more highly valued activities in academia than teaching, and teaching

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loads are heaviest at community colleges and lightest at research universities, status accrues with keeping one's distance from teaching and immersing oneself in research and scholarly publishing. In making fun of the higher value placed on research and scholarly pursuits, the remark 'publish and perish' makes a joke out of the activity of community college faculty who aspire to publish. The remark even conveys the sense that at community colleges publishing will actually hurt one's chance for tenure rather than bolster it.

There is some truth in the phrase 'publish and perish.' This may be understood by asking: why with the publication of so much writing which has warranted being called "good writing" has so little change been achieved in the problem-solving activities that academics have pursued? And what worries me most is that this has been the case with the work of progressive intellectuals. What impact has publishing this so-called "good writing" had besides benefiting those with ambitions to better their careers? It behooves us to ask what has gone wrong. Perhaps nothing has gone wrong; I shudder to think that perhaps how things have gone is exactly how they were meant to go-how they were wanted to go. But then this should lead us to ask more penetrating questions about writing and its effects or effectiveness.

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We should also concern ourselves with the nature of the problem-solving activities in which we as academics have been engaged. For thoughtful persons these are not new considerations.

In 1947, Jean-Paul Sartre (1965) asked: What is Writing? Why Write? And, For Whom Does One Write? Good writing would be considered by Sartre as reflective of our existential condition of struggling to construct ourselves (our identities as authors/writers) in historically constituted circumstances not completely of our own choosing. Furthermore, Sartre would characterize our situation as combative because for him being human is always a constructive activity of a combative type; this because it takes place under the gaze of "the Other". Since our condition as human beings is always and essentially social, we are always and everywhere under the gaze of "the Other" even when that Other is not physically present. The gaze of "the Other" is a battle in which interpretations clash as the meaning of one's existence is established, sometimes preserved and sometimes changed.

In Hegel's (1967) conception of struggle for emancipation, an irreducible dyad of self and other competes unto death in a classically modeled relationship between master and

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servant. Through Karl Marx (1970) standing Hegel's system of objective idealism on its head, so to speak, we have come to understand the master-servant dyad as a relationship in which the roles of master as dominator and servant as dominated are reversed. For Marx (1964), work as an activity is valorized in his system of historical materialism. The outcome affected through the Marxist role reversal is such that, servant as worker is able to achieve freedom with the independence afforded her or him by the creative or constructive nature of work. Work is characterized as transforming those historically founded conditions in which the master would coerce the servant to work for the benefit of the master. But, as Marx revealed, the master is the one who is truly dependent, and the servant independent. The servant is independent with measure because she or he has the power to transform historical circumstances through the capacity of producing what is needed to preserve life. Marx's analysis of the relationship between the master and the servant is perhaps the first example of deconstruction: this entails the interpretation of a pair of dichotomous terms so as to produce a reversal of the dominance and subservient hierarchical relations that were originally inscribed in their meanings. Though this activity was no doubt for Marx a risky and highly serious one, it has a recreational sense to it.

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In a manner of playfulness *pace* Martin Heidegger or Jacques Derrida, I hasten to say that in enacting the rigors of any professional discourse there is the risk of rigor mortis. Academic discourse has tended to run this risk of being deadly, rather than risk challenging or occasioning genuinely critical thought about the nature of disciplinary writing. Could it be that lurking behind the mask of rigorous writing we will find the face of a "deadly being?" I have no wish-death wish-to assume the position of "deadly being." That combination of wording is an oxymoron. But when placed in the context of discussions of an ontological sort [where ontology is, as Quine (1969) suggested, about what constitutes the furniture of the world], it is no oxymoron to say that deadly is a possible state of being or even a condition that makes our being possible. It has been said of death that it is the limit condition against which all meaning and value of life achieves its measure.

In my response to this, and to the threat of death that has arisen from the AIDS crisis in the past decade or so, I have presumed to challenge through critical thought the nature of disciplinary writing. With AIDS informing the surrounding circumstances of my life, I have found no other way of being philosophical. And now in this work, as my title suggests, I

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consider the relating of bodies, voices and psychological inquiry in what I call "queer technologies." I shall orient my investigation through the lens of a sub-field of psychology, namely developmental psychology. All psychological inquiry should be understood as about development, if not about change then about preserving of identity.

All psychological inquiry is after all about tracing changes that individuals undergo throughout a lifetime. And in that sense, psychological inquiry should be understood as historical and, as we will see, as cultural and social, moral and political, but most of all it should be understood as reflexive. That is to say it includes an analysis and deconstruction of the subject as writer/speaker. Reflexivity under postmodernism can reek havoc on the social sciences; but also it can be its salvation, as I will show.

The term, "postmodernism", is used as a popular way of characterizing our present intellectual and discursive formation. Agreement varies. According to some thinkers, we are still in transition from modernism to postmodernism. For other thinkers, modernism is over and done with, but still for others, postmodernism is understood as a stage of development in late capitalism that is still contiguous with

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modernism (Jameson, 1991). One of the best ways to get a grip on the difference between modernism and postmodernism, and a useful way for the present discussion about writing as an intellectual activity, is to highlight the distinctions which mark the contrasting ways of conceiving labor. Under modernism, the labor theory of John Locke (1974) is most appropriate. Yet, for postmodernism, most apt is Karl Marx's characterization of labor under capitalism with the exchange theory of labor. In the latter Marxian analysis use value and exchange value are distinct. Exchange value arises from commodification of labor. Capitalists buy labor power. Although used by the capitalist in the production process, it is not a value calculated according to its use in the production process. This mystification of the actual creation of value through exchange covers up the relationship of labor and our embodiment. This is explained below.

Labor, in Locke's theory, is an activity in which human beings act upon raw materials so as to transform them into some product. The value of the resulting product is greater than the value of the raw materials. The value of the product of laboring has been enhanced through the mixing of human labor with the raw materials. Under modernism, the relationship between laborer, labor, and product was clear.

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This was the basis of our understanding of ownership. The mixing of one's labor with raw materials, (i.e., land and other material things), created a relationship between laborer and thing known as property.

Whereas the value of the products of one's labor, as theorized by Marx in a capitalist economy, lies not in its connection with or derivation from human activity but in the exchange of the market. No value that meant anything to the laborer-that is, anything of consequence-was recognized as inherently of value in the product because of its derivation from the skills of the laborer. In the exchange theory of value, something has value according to its reception-or quite simply-value of product is what profit it brings in the market. Of course, Marx criticized this making of profits from the selling of commodities and he retained the appreciation of the value of human labor. But of importance to our understanding of capitalism is his analysis of the commodification of labor. In abstracting labor as labor power the capitalist creates conditions in which the laborer is forced to sell his labor power at an hourly rate of exchange. In other words, the laborer gives his time to the capitalist who then uses it in its form as labor power to increase the value of the commodities that are produced in the manufacturing process. What the laborer gets for his

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labor power is what he can in the market of buyers. If they offer less this week than last and the laborer must replenish his biological capacity to work, i.e., provide shelter for rest and food for nourishment, he has no choice but to accept the going wages. What controls the wage or rate of payment to the laborer is not any inherent value which has been mixed with the raw materials of the manufacturing process but the field of competition among other manufacturers. The need and willingness to pay for the needed labor is determined by factors about which the laborer knows little or nothing.

Knowing this makes it difficult to understand how Hegel was able to valorize the activity of the servant in his conception of the master-servant relationship. Marx stresses this point precisely. Unless workers organized themselves there was little hope of gaining independence especially under the conditions of feudalism that marked the German States of Hegel's time. It is well known that, under Lenin's revisions of the intellectual activity of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, the masses of workers needed organization by a vanguard of the communist party-by its intelligentsia. We must then ask ourselves how the hopes of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and many others, who have called themselves communists, have been dashed by intellectuals. For is not

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the lack of effectiveness of the problem-solving activity of intellectuals connected with the dashing of their hopes for a revolt of the proletariat? Instead of facing this problem of the nature of the intellectual activity head on from the attack point of accusing intellectuals of siding with the interests of the bourgeoisie, I have another approach in mind.

Together, the relationship between the comparatively few members of the ruling class and the greater number that make up the working class (the relationship between capitalists and their workers), and the relationship between intellectuals and those people of the class or classes that they provide guidance, direction, and interpretation may stimulate our curiosity to ask: throughout history, how have the few been able to dominate the many? It is the distinctive hope of a democratic society in comparison to all other forms of political organization that the great number of people-or citizens-will govern themselves. But so far no society of any size has managed to organize its people in a participatory democracy. The best that has been achieved are the representative democracies exemplified in the United States, Great Britain and France.

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Those progressive intellectuals who embrace the dream of communism of Marx, Engels, and Lenin have relinquished their hope of revolution. Simone Weil (1973) has "critically examined … the ideas of revolution and progress"(p. 134). She has captured something of the necessity of failure of change brought about through revolt. At least she says that revolution cannot be perpetual. The people cannot tolerate such upheaval in the support of their lives. There are certain necessities such as food, shelter, and rest that mitigate progress evolving through permanent revolt. And so she concludes that though thoughts about the sanctity of human life are always subversive, the social order must be maintained in order to meet the basic needs for survival. In the following passage, she succinctly characterizes the benign relationship between the rulers and the ruled in the hierarchy that she considers the 'lesser of the evils':

> The social order, though necessary, is essentially evil, whatever it may be. You cannot reproach those whom it crushes for undermining it as much as they can; when they resign themselves to it, it is not through strength of character but, on the contrary, as the result of a humiliation which extinguishes the virile qualities in them. Neither can you reproach those who organize it for defending it, or make them out to be forming a conspiracy against the general welfare. The struggles between fellow citizens do not spring from a lack of understanding or goodwill; they belong to the nature of things, and cannot be appeased, but can only be smothered by coercion. For anyone who loves liberty, it is not desirable that they should disappear, but only that they should remain short of a certain limit of violence. (Weil, 1973, p. 146)

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This passage concludes her critical examination of revolution and progress. Although I agree with her idea argued earlier in the course of her critical examination that revolt usually comes after much has already been done to make possible the finishing touches being added through violent upheaval, I am uneasy with the notion that the social order is a necessary evil. It reminds me of Freud's claim that human satisfaction in particular, human pleasure must be sacrificed. The vehicle that makes civilization possible is the repression and/or sublimation of libidinal energies that seeks its own path of least resistance to the fulfillment of pleasure that Freud considered instinctual. How perverse of our creator to have designed us in such a way that we crave the fulfillment of desire-of pleasure as the key end of our existence-and yet mitigates that very end through the constitution of ourselves as inextricably intersubjective in our being human. I cannot say whether Simone Weil had any similar reservations. Though her blend of Christian mysticism with her marxism would suggest that she had to find a way to temper and channel her concern, even outrage, over the plight of those who lived at the bottom of the hierarchy of the social order. I like what she has done to eliminate the tendency to make demonic both those who rule and those who are ruled. That is compatible with what I have argued above about not seeking to construct

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human values in such a way that we make the source of evil into something other than ourselves.

Acceptance of the necessity of a 'lesser evil' in the form of the social order makes me uncomfortable. It may very well be that Freud has put his finger on the pulsation that generates evil. Herbert Marcuse (1966) for one has rejected the necessity of the hypothesis of repression. We must question whether the social order will always be the 'lesser evil;' Is it not conceivable that the social order could become the embodiment of the good? What I have in mind is a social order that does not repress human bodily nature, but would encourage the intersubjective embodiment of our species being so as to establish human community everywhere to the greatest extent possible.

What role do psychologists play in the establishment or upholding of the social order? Psychologists produce through their activity of inquiry, the subject matter of Psychology. From this assumption, it follows that there are in the event fields of reality, agents. To say that there are agents is to claim and to locate sources of action; it seems that this way of knowing or understanding is constitutive of our species. Whether the world is that way without us cannot be decided. Scientific discourse and moral discourse utilize

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the terminology of agency. In science there are human and non-human agents, special types of causes. Chemicals are agents when they are determined to have causative powers. So too are plants and other living things capable of agency. This is argued in works on auto-poesis, a biological account of life that rehearses the emergence of living things from inanimate matter. I shall have occasion to discuss this in my concluding proposal for postdisciplinary psychological interventions. For now let me provide a quote from Maturana and Varela (1998) concerning the intricate relationship between knowing and doing:

> Underlying everything we shall say is this constant awareness that the phenomenon of knowing cannot be taken as though there were "facts" or objects out there that we grasp and store in our head. The experience of anything out there is validated in a special way by the human structure, which makes possible "the thing" that arises in the description.
>
> This circularity, this connection between action and experience, this inseparability between a particular way of being and how the world appears to us, tells us that *every act of knowing brings forth a world.* This feature of knowing will invariably be our problem, our starting point, and the guideline of all that we present … can be summed up in the aphorism *All doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.* (Maturana and Varela, 1998, p. 25-26)

My reason for bringing this up now is to clarify the targets of my criticism. I shall variously criticize psychologists, psychological inquiry, and Psychology. All three are tied up in the organization of power/knowledge that constitutes the social order.

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Seymour Sarason (1981) has addressed the connection between psychology and the social order. And so has J. F. Brown (1936). In a work published twenty years ago, Sarason discussed the path that Psychology has pursued since the start of the twentieth century. He characterized this path of Psychology as "misdirected." His book dedication reads, "To John Dewey Prophet With Honor." In honoring Dewey, he intends on correcting an error that the profession of psychologists made. Though they invited him to address the American Psychological Association to clarify the role of the reflex in psychological inquiry, even made him its President, he was never fully accepted as one of them. Dewey was not recognized as a psychologist; he was always held at arm length by the psychology profession and considered by it as a philosopher and educator.

Sarason (1981) has several complaints about Psychology, Psychological Inquiry, and Psychologists. The exclusion of Dewey from its own ranks was one of them. It was symptomatic of what he diagnosed as a larger problem: the design of the discipline that ignored the social aspects of psychological development. This also characterized all the Social Sciences following the end of World War II.

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At the outset of his inquiry he asks in regard to mainstream social science: "How can the social scientists understand the very society into which the social scientist was born and reared (Sarason, 1981, p. 7-8)?" And he immediately answered:

> The social scientist's understanding will at best have a tunnel-vision quality that focuses elsewhere than on the unverbalized assumptions and world view on which the society is based, even though that person seeks to see things whole and to get below the social surface. At worst the social scientist will be occupied with trivia, smugly unaware of any problem other than the one "out there."(Sarason, 1981, p. 7-8)

In contrast to the multitude of social scientists that deserve being characterized with the above passage, Sarason marks off for distinction, C. Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, and J. F. Brown. There has always been a small minority such as these three who were capable of resisting and questioning their own socialization. He declares that they are able to do this "for reasons by no means clear" (Sarason, 1981, p. 8).

Furthermore,

> Far from recognizing the problems inherent in understanding the society into which one has been socialized, and far from confronting directly the underlying assumptions of capitalist society, social scientists in the immediate post-World War II period turned outward rather than inward: that is to say, they became preoccupied with formal theory building (there seemed to be as many "models" or "paradigms" as in the world of fashion), method, and quantitative analysis. The enthusiasm with which they greeted the advent of

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> the age of computers was but one instance of how social science had absorbed the science-technology view of its subject matter. (Sarason, 1981, p. 8)

Sarason (1981) did not want to be misunderstood as criticizing "science, theory, research, or computers" but rather "the unbridled eagerness with which social science took on all the trappings of what it thought was hard science" (p. 8). And this he found objectionable because it "inhibited the pursuit of the bedeviling issues" (p. 8) captured in the following question:

> To what extent and in what ways was social science uncritically accommodating to the dominant outlook of the society, i.e., to an outlook that defined not only what was a legitimate problem but also what were the ways such problems should be attacked. Put another way: was there not a real cause for concern when social science found itself in basic agreement with the ways in which the society (in the form of federal policy and support) was defining problems and solutions? (Sarason, 1981, p. 8)

Sarason (1981) was not being coarse and dismissive of social policy as capricious or mindless, nor did he intend on presenting policy as "in any way a conspiracy by special-interest groups to foist something on the citizenry"(p. 9). Instead he claims that

> The policy has its roots in two beliefs (among others): economic growth is necessary and good, and whatever contributes to economic growth contributes to individual well-being. In short, *that* is progress and how can one be against progress? These beliefs were part of the basis for the policies we adopted in our efforts to help "underdeveloped" countries, i.e., to make their societies like ours, to substitute our beliefs for theirs, to take them off the road of

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> primitivism and direct them on the road to progress. (Sarason, 1981, p. 9)

As an example of the blindness that social scientists had toward the movement forward that they believed as inevitably good-what was good for all would be good for individuals, Sarason mentioned the highway policy. He claims that early after the war few, if any, social scientists could see the specific benefits that they stood to gain from improved transportation. It never entered their minds that only those who enjoyed economic prosperity would "enjoy the benefits of fast, efficient, transcontinental travel" (Sarason, 1981, p. 9) that "they belonged to those strata in society that could take maximum advantage of the system"(p. 10). For Sarason, "Social scientists, like almost everyone else, had been too effectively socialized to resist the lures and imagined benefits of technology, bold engineering, and economic growth"(p. 10). In an interesting note to this last statement of Sarason's is the following:

> Other societies, other views. About ten years ago the Norwegians found oil under their seas. Far from having visions of a bountiful future, Norwegian leaders reacted with a kind of fear. What could happen to their society if they plunged into the development of the oil fields and began to collect billions of dollars from the sale of the oil? What would be the consequences for Norwegian culture, for their sense of continuity with their past, for their sense of community? A decision was made to go as slowly as possible, to give priority to what they regarded as the important issue in living. The Norwegians know that they live in a world they cannot control, that they will be subject to pressures within and without their society to develop the oil

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> fields quickly and fully. They may not be able to have it their way. But *their* way in regard to oil is in startling contrast to our way in regard to thousands of miles of concrete ribbons. (Sarason, 1981, p. 10)

Sarason compares the social scientists after the war to the *nouveaux riches* who play down (or flee from) their backgrounds to embrace the values and status of the superior social class to which they have arrived and with which they wish to quickly become assimilated. Applied to social scientists this meant that they were all too ready to flee from their own fields in favor of the history of the hard sciences.

From Sarason's analysis we find that social science and psychology perform an ideological function insofar as they are animated by a brand of enlightenment values. Psychology as a subject matter played and continues to play a role, even a large one, in covering up the way that the social order favors the interests of some at the expense of others. Despite the judgment that a great malaise permeates the social sciences, little seems to have been done by well educated professionals to pull themselves up with their own intellectual bootstraps and find a way to muster the resources at their disposal to treat their own disillusionment (Sarason, 1981, p. 12-13). Why is this such

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a recalcitrant problem? And where can we look for resolution of their alienation?

First we need to understand what is meant by alienation from the social order. For this we read in Sarason that according to Nisbet,

> By alienation I mean the state of mind that can find a social order remote, incomprehensible, or fraudulent; beyond real hope or desire; inviting apathy, boredom, or even hostility. The individual not only does not feel a part of the social order; he has lost interest in being a part of it. (Sarason, 1981, p. 12-13)

It should be noted that this description of alienation depicts a subjective experience of the alienated individual as well as suggests some of the behavioral consequences of being in an alienated state or condition. We may gain assistance in locating this problem of alienation in intellectuals from Sarason and Nisbet by reading further.

> Through the prevailing reactions of intellectuals to social and economic issues; Schumpeter, in his great book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,* wrote that one of the flaws of capitalism is its inexhaustible capacity for alienating the intellectuals. This is true, but it needs qualification. For a long time capitalism at least supplied the motive power for revolt among intellectuals. This was not only an important manifestation of social energy but also a subtle form of identification. (No one revolts against what he is totally alienated from.) I am thinking of such matters as the struggle for the rights of the under-privileged, labor unions, ethnic equality, and the like. But it is hard to miss the fact that today there is a kind of alienation even from the ideological issues of capitalism, leading one to wonder what is to supply the friction in the future for social change. (Sarason, 1981, p. 12-13)

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Important is the attribution of the loss of motive power to work toward social change to the condition of complete alienation. We should ask ourselves: how is it possible for individuals to remain so highly alienated even when those same individuals are highly literate? And a related question that arises from all that has been said above concerns whether there is fault to be laid at the feet of the rulers for the damage done through their system of capitalism to the working class. We can look to Skinner (1987) for an answer to these questions. He explains what is responsible for alienation in both rulers and those ruled, and offers an answer as to how we might recover from this condition in two essays entitled "Why We Are Not Acting to Save the World," and "What Is Wrong with Daily Life in the Western World."

In a nutshell, Skinner (1976) complains that instead of being regulated by immediate consequences as they impact on our bodies, thereby affecting our feelings and actions, we are guided less adequately by the social rules that have structured our institutional lives. I would suggest that we distinguish between immediate consequences and mediated consequences (though all consequences may be mediated in accord with the causal mechanisms that comprise our bodily, auto-poetic systems). In this way we can understand Skinner

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to be suggesting that cognitive psychology, which embraces purpose and meaning as its trademarks, is concerned with behavior and action mediated through speech and thought (in Cognitive/Behavioral Theories, thought = covert speech).

With those necessary prefatory remarks said, this is why we are not acting to save the world: Skinner (1987) argues that we are alienated from the lively consequences that perform the second biologically/physiologically impacting form of selection. Different from Natural Selection that impacts on the evolution of inherited characteristics of our species being is Selection by Consequences. The latter, according to Skinner, facilitates adjustment and adaptation to less constant, large and enduring, or parametric variations affecting populations of species in the world. Our immediate social and physical environment is in flux (in minor ways that don't need to be incorporated into the genetic composition of our species). Skinner argues that reinforcing consequences have been selected out so that a certain degree of flexibility and plasticity of the nervous system (brain) makes us sensitive and capable of adjusting our selves in the course of our ontogenetic development. This juxtaposition of Natural Selection and Selection by Consequences is a trademark of Skinner's system of behavioral principles that relates respondent or classical

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conditioning and operant conditioning. These are also the first two stages of the three stage explanatory model of behavior that Aleksandr Luria and Lev Vygotsky (1998) laid out in their *Ape, Primitive Man, and Child: Essays in the History of Behavior*. Skinner's position with respect to the elimination of purpose in psychological explanation in favor of understanding our behavior as shaped and conditioned by past and present reinforcement history is well known, but his connection of environmental consequences with our bodies has been less recognized.

Skinner (1987) opens his first essay "Why We Are Not Acting to Save the World" with the following: "Most thoughtful people agree that the world is in serious trouble"(p. 1). He illustrates some of the problems that make for serious trouble, among them are: nuclear war could mean nuclear winter, large family size, environmental pollution and a wasteful lifestyle"(p. 1). After listing the steps that we could take to rectify our seriously troubled situation Skinner says that from the list of steps alone we can tell how far we are from taking them. He succinctly states that

> Traditional explanations of why we are doing so little are familiar. It is said that we lack responsibility for those who will follow us, that we do not have a clear perception of the problem, that we are not using our intelligence, that we are suffering from a failure of will, that we lack moral strength, and so on. Unfortunately, explanations of that sort simply replace one question with another. Why are we not more

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> responsible or more intelligent? Why are we suffering from a failure of will? A better strategy is to look at our behavior and at the environmental conditions of which it is a function. There we shall find at least some of the reasons why we do as we do. They are also explanations of the bodily conditions we call feelings and states of mind. (Skinner, 1987, p. 2)

Since Skinner proposes that our past behaviors were selected by consequences operative under past conditions, we will be best prepared for futures that resemble most closely our past conditions. Skinner (1987) says "the repertoire of behaviors that can be acquired without help by a single organism in a single lifetime is not very large"(p. 3). Lucky for us, evolution has corrected for that fault. Evolution of processes has made it possible for us to be "affected by the selecting pasts of other members of the species. Imitation is an example"(p. 3). Skinner elaborates on this with the following:

> When members of a group imitate each other and model behavior to be imitated, they acquire much larger repertoires, which are effective under a greater variety of conditions. The human species went far beyond imitation and modeling with the evolution of verbal behavior, or language. People not only show each other what to do-they tell them. (Skinner, 1987, p. 3)

And Skinner goes on to expand the context of consequence further by bringing the evolution of culture within the scope of his theory. He says that

> A language is the product of a third kind of selection by consequences, the evolution of cultures. A culture evolves when new practices, introduced for perhaps irrelevant reasons, are selected by their

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> contribution to the survival of the practicing group. Cultural practices are also said to have purposes. For example, the purpose of education is said to be the production of informed members of a group, but again, we should speak only of selecting consequences. Educational practices evolve when they contribute informed members to the group. (Skinner, 1987, p. 3)

Skinner distinguishes between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance." This is a useful distinction; it roughly coincides with a distinction that Gilbert Ryle articulated in his *The Concept of Mind* (1949) as a difference between "knowing that" and "knowing how." The latter signals a difference in propositional knowledge and practical knowledge. My interpretation of Skinner's distinction between these two forms of knowledge is that knowledge by acquaintance creates the more lively impact on our future. Knowledge by description is less potent, yet often prevails in the form of social rules that have out lived their harmonic connection or integration with our bodily being in community. The latter is not Skinner's terminology, but mine. I will explain this later.

Skinner said the following of social science or what he prefers to call behavioral science:

> Political science, economics, anthropology, and sociology is confined to what people have done throughout history or are doing now in environments in which they live. It is knowledge by acquaintance. With one exception, the same can be said of psychology, which has turned more and more to case histories, questionnaires, inventories, and other records of what

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> people have said or done. The behavior studied by all these sciences is the product of the genetics of the species, and of past or present cultures. Moreover, the behavioral scientists are themselves the products of their cultures. As it is often said, they are not free of ideology. (Skinner, 1987, p. 9)

We find corroboration in Skinner of the view that I have introduced using Sarason and Nisbet, namely that social scientists cannot escape, or rarely escape their own socialization. For Skinner there is one exception, and that is the experimental analysis of behavior. He wants to claim that the experimental analysis of behavior avoids ideological context of "knowledge by acquaintance" and provides a more adequately objective and non-ideological "knowledge by description." I will show later that even the animal studies of Skinner's experimental analysts cannot escape conveying something of the personal history of the intellectual's socialization and autobiography.

He notes that the experimental analysis of behavior is hardly ever invoked in discussions of the world's problems and for reasons that are in fact its strength. In defense of his system of analysis, Skinner claims:

> Because it has been most successful in studying the behavior of non-verbal human subjects-young children or the retarded or psychotic-it is said to neglect cognitive skills. But there are reasons for those strategies. In any field of science, one begins with facts that can be predicted and controlled with some precision and then moves on to more complex facts only when the increasing power of the analysis permits.

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> Where prediction and control are not yet possible, one must turn to interpretation. That is standard scientific practice. Most of the facts of evolution, for example, are out of reach of prediction and control. The theory of evolution is an interpretation, but it is strongly supported by a science in which prediction and control are possible-the science of genetics. The experimental analysis of behavior is the "genetics" of the behavioral sciences.
>
> There is another reason why most scientific accounts of human behavior remain a matter of interpretation. The species is distinguished by the fact that its members engage in verbal behavior. They not only *respond* to contingencies of reinforcement as rats and pigeons do; they *talk* about them. (Skinner, 1987, p. 9-10)

Skinner goes on to tell us that we will probably have to be satisfied with interpreting human behavior rather than being able to predict and control it. But disappointing as that may be to an experimental analyst of behavior, Skinner says that important in its own right is the fact that people "formulate rules and give each other, and themselves advice"(p. 10). Furthermore, for Skinner (1987)

> They are taught to do so at an early age and continue to do so throughout their lives. In any given setting, therefore, whether in daily life or the laboratory, human behavior must be treated as a joint product of the prevailing contingencies of reinforcement and of what a person says about them. (p. 10)

Surprising to some readers may be the compatibility of Skinner's understanding of the prediction and control of human behavior and what we say about the contingencies that relate behavior and its consequences. One other person has connected these traditions of interpretation in the

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behavioral science and the humanities with greater comprehension than Skinner, and that is Morse Peckham (1979). I would conclude with two things concerning Skinner: a) his vision of the future, and b) why rulers and those ruled are each alienated and hence neither is to blame for the condition of the other.

With regard to his vision of the future, Skinner says that

> If human nature means the genetic endowment of the species, we cannot change it. But we have the science needed to design a world that would take nature into account and correct many of the miscarriages of evolution. It would be a world in which people treated each other well, not because of immediate face-to-face consequences. It would be a world in which people produced the goods they needed, not because of contingencies arranged by a business or industry but simply because they were "goods" and hence directly reinforcing. It would be a beautiful and interesting world because making it so would be reinforced by beautiful and interesting things. It would be a world in which the population was kept at a safe level because all social and economic incentives for having children had been removed and conception was easily preventable or freely revocable. It would be a world in which the social and commercial practices that promote unnecessary consumption and pollution had been abolished. It would be a way of life that would give the species a much longer lease on the planet Earth. It could all be done without "raising consciousness." *Only those who designed the relations between behavior and its consequences would need to take the remoter consequences into account.* (Skinner, 1987, p. 11)

The catchy point is the qualification at the end of this passage, otherwise I am not troubled by his suggestion of our future. Skinner limits the necessity of raising consciousness. And of course this stems from his assessment

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that to change behavior it is more expedient to alter the environmental stimuli that control it. He cannot be faulted with not recognizing that our genetic endowment provides us with structural limitation or parameters that are not readily alterable. And he holds out the hope that there are things that we can do to transform our behavior. But he fails I think to let us appreciate the connection between consciousness and our bodies. It seems he is fighting ghosts of the body-mind problem; he sounds, I would conjecture, sympathetic to the theory that mind is an epi-phenomenon. That is to say, mind is not causally efficacious. For Skinner, we know that reinforcement contingencies include verbal behavior as discriminative stimuli but they gain their ability to control through their relationship to more primary reinforcing stimuli. Those that have more impact on our bodily genetically structured being.

I want to come back to this, but first I wish to say that Skinner makes room for recognizing the role of intellectuals in his qualification that "only those who designed the relations between behavior and its consequences would need to take the remoter consequences into account"(p. 11). This captures two important things: 1) that intellectuals are designers with understanding of the deep structural features of reality, and 2) this makes them especially responsible to

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those in the culture at large for representing and reporting accurately the nature of these features for the public record.

But as I have shown above intellectuals are victims of their own processes of socialization, of their own reinforcement histories to use the Skinnerian terminology. In Skinner's sketch of the world, there are three classes of people: capitalists, workers, and intellectuals. Those that own and manage-perform the executive function in the standard Marxian distinction between rulers and ruled--are the capitalists. Capitalists and workers seem to be most directly in control of the salient forces that determine production. According to Skinner, workers are the group that doesn't need to have full comprehension of the remoter consequences. And Skinner makes room it seems for a third group, the intellectuals. They are delegated the power to design and to predict the future.

Intellectuals gather, analyze, and synthesize information to be used in the construction of theories, models, and explanations of social and behavioral phenomena. As mentioned above, Skinner thinks that the scientist who practices the experimental analysis of behavior is least inclined to formulate hypotheses that are drawn from

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ideologically inflected theories representing their own human history in a particular culture. I am less confident in this assertion. Though I agree that capitalist and workers are alienated from the lively consequences of primary reinforcement. They are more governed by the social rules than by the selection by consequences that have amore immediate impact on their bodies.

But the conspiracy theory, which maintains that rulers divide and conquer the masses by commodifying their labor power, distancing them from the products of their labor, and thereby alienating workers, fails to take account of the alienation of the capitalists. According to Skinner, Simone Weil, Seymour Sarason, and Robert Nisbet the capitalist is also alienated. This is in accord with the Hegelian-Marxist analysis of the relationship between master and servant. With the servant more connected to the lived experience and more capable of producing the goods that sustain life, the master is left in the position of dependency on the worker. But as we have seen under capitalism the worker too is alienated. That leaves the intellectuals as our hope of liberation.

But it has been argued that intellectuals do not have the necessary distance from their social situations merely as a

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result of their position as intellectuals. According to Antonio Gramsci (1971) intellectuals developed as a class in relationship to ruling class interests that authorized them as a class to perform critical analysis. At least that is the ideological explanation of intellectuals. They are really functionaries of the ruling class interests. For Gramsci intellectuals are thereby understood as performing an executive function for their class of origin. Intellectuals become co-opted into the interests of the ruling class because that is where the money and resources are. In addition, Gramsci developed a concept of organic intellectuals; they are identified with their class of origin. So there may be intellectuals associated with the working class as well as with the ruling class. I discuss this further later in this manuscript.

The point I wish to emphasize is that for intellectuals associated with the ruling class to be able to act critically of their social situation and then remove themselves from the ideologically mystifying work they usually perform for their employers, they must be sufficiently disgruntled with the social order, not merely with the working conditions and their place in the hierarchy of social scientific institutions. They must lack a goodness of fit with the social order so as to be able to criticize

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it. Whether this alone will succeed in reforming or transforming the social order is a question that should be kept separate from whether they can first become critical.

The group that I believe comes closest to lacking adequate fit with the social order is that of queers. Queers have the additional feature of transcending the limits established under traditional analyses of social and economic classes. Queer is a contemporary term. In postmodern times recognition of the diversity of ways of expressing sexuality, or ways of having sex shows itself in the term "pomosexuals"(Queen & Schimel, 1997). (For Foucault sex and sexuality are not the same; sex is an activity, whereas sexuality developed to sustain the connection of sex with one's identity). According to the editors of a book by that name: "PoMo [is] short for PostModern: in the arts, a movement following after and in direct reaction to Modernism; culturally, an outlook that acknowledges diverse and complex points of view"(backcover). And, "PoMoSexual [is] the queer erotic reality beyond the boundaries of gender, separatism, and essentialist notions of sexual orientation"(backcover). This term affords recognition of the fluidity of gender and sexuality among individuals. And it also recognizes that categorizing of gender and sexuality is a social construction rather than revealing some set of

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natural kinds or properties that are essential to the identity of the individuals so classified. Knowledge of gender and sexuality is produced under conditions that are themselves informed by class-social and economic-interests; as knowledge categories the various classifications were produced in situations that were both discursively and structurally conditioned to perform an ideological function, namely to maintain and preserve the social order. Queer technologies will be the term I use to name the kind of interpretation I perform in this manuscript of the relationship between bodies, voices, and psychological inquiry.

In the recent history of psychology, since 1969 in what is called the post-stonewall era (Duberman, 1993), Queers have taken on the established categories of gender and sexuality that were used to control their freedom of sexual expression and engagement. The new social movements (Adam, 1987) have perhaps had the greatest impact in challenging the social order, and rightly so because racism, sexism, and homophobia are the forms in which evil or destructiveness has been generated in our lived social relationships today.

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Huey P. Newton, leader of the Black Panther Party, expressed the radical nature of the homosexual situation in the following:

> I know through reading, and through my life experience and observations that homosexuals are not given freedom and liberty by anyone in the society. They might be the most oppressed people in the society.
>
> And what made them homosexual? Perhaps it's a phenomenon that I don't understand entirely. Some people say that it is the decadence of capitalism. I don't know if that is the case; I rather doubt it. But whatever the case is, we know that homosexuality is a fact that exists, and we must understand it in its purest form: that is, a person should have the freedom to use his body in whatever way he wants.
>
> That is not endorsing things in homosexuality that we wouldn't view as revolutionary. But there is nothing to say that a homosexual cannot also be a revolutionary. And maybe I'm now injecting some of my prejudice by saying, "even a homosexual can be a revolutionary." Quite the contrary, maybe a homosexual could be the most revolutionary. (Newton, 1995, p. 153)

The passage from which this quote was taken was written in August 1970. At that time Newton recognized that the Black Panther Party (BPP) should invite groups representing the women's movement and the gay movement to engage with the BPP. Both movements were considered worthy of inclusion in the black civil rights movement of which the Black Panther Party appears to have been the most radical group. Newton understood the pitfalls of segregating communities off from each other who would otherwise have a shared identity; an identity that was socially constructed through various forms of oppression. This is in contrast with much of what has

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characterized the identity politics of the 1990s. It is good that each group solidify its own ranks and write its own history of struggle, but it is better that these oppressed groups find an identity in each others history that affords the chance to struggle together. The strategy of divide and conquer of the dominant culture is all too familiar throughout the history of the ages. That there should be more than one kind of resistance goes along with the fact that there are different forms of oppression.

The conflict between queers and those in the psychiatric, psychological, and mental health professions represents a fight with the dominant culture and the practices that maintained its social order-privilege extended to some, namely heterosexuals, and was withheld from all others who were different from what was sanctioned as the heterosexual norm. The challenge of our status as queers in society needed to take on a more reflexive encounter within the discourse of psychology, the practice of psychological inquiry, and ultimately against those psychologists whose authority included the power to label individuals as deviant and to prescribe and administer treatment of deviance from heterosexuality, the norm of the social order. This would seem to limit my investigations to clinical psychology; that may have satisfied Foucault in his attacks on disciplinary

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practices that administered control of queer bodies. But I don't think that will do justice to the critical approach that is wanted in transforming the social order. Psychology as clinical specialty and as scientific practice serves the social order. The specific encounter between queers and those intellectuals that represent, even enforce the normative preference of heterosexuality in the social order takes the form of a contest between two kinds of knowledge: the vernacular knowledge of the gay and lesbian-now queer-community, and the discursive disciplinary knowledge of the profession of psychology. (Escoffier, 1998) There are intellectuals located in both camps. Gramsci's term of organic intellectual fits the queer intellectuals who help to construct and interpret the vernacular knowledge of the queer community; the writing to follow engages with both forms of knowledge.

It also locates the mind in the body. Another way of saying this that shows my rejection of Skinner's dismissal of the necessity of "raising consciousness" in all but those who will design the culture of the future, is to say that I agree with Sartre's location of consciousness within the realm of bodily awareness. In an interview when he was around seventy years of age, "Sartre suggests that the body

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can be an expressive medium for consciousness"(Butler, 1987, p. 138):

> SARTRE: For me there is no basic difference between the body and consciousness.
>
> INTERVIEWER: Isn't it true that we only yield our thoughts totally to the people to whom we truly yield our bodies?
>
> SARTRE: We yield our bodies to everyone, even beyond the realm of sexual relations; by looking, by touching. You yield your body to me, I yield mine to you: we exist for the other, as body. But we do not exist in this same way as consciousness, as ideas, even though ideas are modifications of the body.
>
> If we truly wished to exist for the other, to exist as body, as body that can continually be laid bare-even if this never actually happens-our ideas would appear to others as coming from the body. Words are formed by a tongue in the mouth. All ideas would appear in this way, even the most vague, the most fleeting, the least tangible. There would no longer be the hiddenness, secrecy which in certain centuries was identified with the honor of men and women, and which seems very foolish to me. (Butler, 1987, p. 138)

Interestingly, Sartre doesn't consider the appellation of "intellectual" warranted of any other political group than left-wing intellectuals. He thinks that people who stand on the right politically speaking write and publish, but that they are no different from workers who also perform intellectual activity. It might be best if we distinguish between intellectual activity as intersubjective and cognitive activity as intra-subjective. Though that will have its faults also. I think we run into difficulty if we go along with Sartre in qualifying the intellectual in this

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way, though I am sympathetic with his arguing that true intellectuals should perform a critical function. As I hope to show later Gramsci's term of "organic intellectual" can be reinterpreted as meaning those who are aligned with the body, especially with the body's individuality and material distinctness from other bodies. I will argue that queers are in the position with respect to the social order to take up, even invent organic intellectuals in the bodily sense.

Since my concern in the remainder of this manuscript is informed by values that call forth a practice of participatory democracy, I shall not be satisfied to learn just how it is possible for queers to become critical, but more so to extend this critical ability and capture it as a practice that will have generality for others than the group in which I have discovered the possibility of a critical psychology. I wish to make clear that I do not intend the body to be a black-box or merely the physical body. In the following quote, I have found a working definition of the body:

> When I speak of the body I'm referring to the shape of our experience; not the collection of fixed, anatomical parts inherited from the Cartesian discourse. The body is not a machine; its boundaries are not clearly defined. Our experience is subjective, self-responsive, and at the same time constantly responding to the world. We are self-contained *and* we merge with others and the environment. We are our bodies when we're engaged with the air, our neighbors,

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> the landscape, making promises, planning our future, thinking of loved ones.
>
> The way we expand towards warmth and recoil from pain is too complex to understand in a diagram or mathematical formula. Moreover, our bodies produce a language and a thinking by which we coordinate with others to build a mutually committed future, or not. When we allow ourselves to be touched by the rhythm of life, by sensations, streamings, waves of excitation, and fields of energy, we grasp the possibility of becoming self-healing, self-educating, and self-generating. (Heckler, 1997, p. xiii)

Psychology should make this a practice available to all people. It is nascent and available in the relatively unmediated materiality of our embodied contact with each other in the intersubjective realm of community. Psychology should as a technoscientific research practice discover the meaning of embodied knowledge. This is the kind of knowledge that leads to significant change, unlike the weak change that occurs as a result of insight or through theoretical knowledge. To get an expanded sense of what I mean by embodied knowledge, read the following:

> Embodied knowledge is the skill to act appropriately at the appropriate time. Embodied knowledge has a historical and rigorous formal training behind it. It lives in present time in its immediacy, availability, and directness. It anticipates and corrects for breakdowns in the future. Skillful performers such as athletes, dancers, equestrians, teachers, musicians, and pilots are exemplars of embodied knowledge. (Heckler, 1997, p. xiv)

The quest for creating my own individuality as a person and as a thinker has lead me along this path that I lay out in

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the manuscript that follows. It is a crisscross path that attempts to connect vernacular knowledge and disciplinary knowledge so as to live a more creative life of embodied knowledge. I consider disciplinary knowledge as non-embodied knowledge (itself the accomplishment of a kind of skill-call it intellectualizing); whereas vernacular knowledge is more akin with embodied knowledge. It is so because vernacular knowledge of being queer represents a knowing that is also a doing, and our doing is reflexively conditioned through an embodied knowing which results from non-instrumental desiring. Though I would argue that all knowing stems from desiring or affective relations between our bodies in community. That is, a kind of natural community that arises from our very materiality. The starting point is in the non-instrumental arena in which our bodies find each other in the nakedness of our desire. Although, according to Judith Butler,

> When Sartre takes the spectatorial view of consciousness, we seem to have an inverse phenomenological description of experience, one that takes the epoche as constitutive of everyday experience and views the entrance into the natural attitude as a philosophical achievement. (Butler, 1987, p. 149)

I will take the position that the intellectual attitude and the natural attitude are co-existent in the human community. This is consistent with the approach that Vygotsky and Luria take with respect to developments in the human species. For

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them, Engels captures something of the myth/history of our origins when he describes our earliest hominoid ancestors as coming down from the trees because of some environmental changes-perhaps catastrophic alterations that made tree living obsolescent. As the story goes these ancestors then had need of using their hands to carry things, thus the thumb became opposed to the fingers, and we invented tools for our survival, etc. In appropriating the Marist/Engels theory of hominoid tool making, Vygotsky and Luria embrace the marxist view that what distinguishes humans from apes (chimpanzees) is humans have the ability to engage in labor. Labor has two properties: it utilizes a system of signs, namely speech, and it transforms the environment in ways and through means that also have the distinctive effect of changing our bodies and brains. We develop coordination-even perhaps embodied knowledge/practices-that has permanent effects on us through three forms of development: evolutionary, historical/cultural, and onto-genetic. Further along in the construction of this story of our origins, Vygotsky and Luria claim that we developed psychological tools as well; among those that are most important were: speech, writing, and counting/numbering. These three systems have the technological feature of giving us distance from our immediate context of sensation. Embodiment is thus made complex yet also more mobile in the

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sense that we can develop and use embodied knowledge to plan for a future that is different from our past. It would be more correct to say that without extrication from our immediate context of sensation we would not have a future. And there would be no such "conditional" attitude as desire. By conditional attitude I mean to stress the fact that desire conditions all other modes of our existence.

To continue with developing what constitutes the natural attitude that is non-instrumental, I would say that desire should be understood in the Sartrean sense as follows:

> In the desiring attitude … I am sensitive not so much to the form of the object and its instrumentality, as to a matter (gritty, smooth, tepid, greasy, rough, etc.). In my desiring perception I discover something like a flesh of objects. My shirt rubs against my skin, and I feel it. What is ordinarily for me an object most remote becomes the immediately sensible; the warmth of air, the breath of the wind, the rays of sunshine, etc.; all are present to me in a certain way, as posited upon me without distance and revealing my flesh by means of their flesh. (Butler, 1987, p. 150)

In Butler's estimation, "The world of instrumentality is clearly opposed to the world of sexual desire. For Sartre, the usual orientation toward the world is that of an unreflective instrumental engagement which presupposes and reconfirms the distance between agent and object"(p. 150). She furthermore concludes that

> Desire is … a relaxation of the instrumental mode; it is the emergence of the world not as a field of purposes and ends, but, rather, in its *presence*.

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> According to Sartre, the Other is the occasion of the appearance of the world as present. The world as flesh only appears to the body that has been transformed into flesh, and this latter transformation is only possible through the look of the Other. We will recall that "the Other's look fashions my body in its nakedness, causes it to be born." The body is no longer an instrument once it is desired; it becomes a creation, a presence which, in turn, makes present the flesh of Others, and the world. (Butler, 1987, p. 150)

Another way of understanding what Sartre is lending appreciation of is to say that through the contact of one body with another desire yields the human quality of community. The historically developed necessity of coordinating our movements as bodies through our speech makes it possible for us to take on the roles of agents and not merely as physical objects. Through desire we constitute our humanity, by transforming ourselves into mutually desiring flesh.

Some may perhaps see what I have tried to do in this manuscript is to turn the tables and reverse the relations of domination. I have not intentionally tried to trade places with those who have dominated my kind. Though, were that possible, it would certainly tempt some queer people who are into S/M (sado-masochistic) relations. Instead I have sought to deconstruct the dichotomized heterosexual/ homosexual relations. Nonetheless, we must move to those who are the rule breakers with the hope that through them we may

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recover an expanded sense of community. According to Clifford Geertz (1973),

> Becoming human is becoming individual, and we become individual under the guidance of cultural patterns … which give form, order, point, and direction to our lives. [But] we must … descend into detail, past the misleading tags, past the metaphysical types, past the empty similarities, to grasp firmly the essential character of not only the various cultures but the various sorts of individuals within the culture, if we wish to encounter humanity face to face. (Duberman, 1993, p. ix)

I would like to say something about why it is important to get down to the details of thick description of our human faces as Geertz puts it. My argument is that if permanent change (either reform or transformation) of institutional arrangements is desired, this can only be brought about by individuals interacting in personally revealing and engaging ways. When applying this to the discourse of intellectuals, this means that we should try to be as personally engaging as possible. What's possible will depend on the agent/writer's ability in manipulating discursive structures, and familiarity with the targeted audience for reception, as well as the degree of courage and risk that a writer is able to muster and endure. By courage I mean the capacity to act in the face of fear. Challenging systemic structures is not without punishment or undesirable consequences.

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I will draw upon two psychologists: Seymour B. Sarason for support of my claim that personal engagement is most persuasive and convincing in theoretical arguments, and Lillian B. Rubin for the claim that theoretical discourse is always and inevitably structured by the interests, if not, I would argue, by the desires of the investigator/researcher. In my judgment both of these psychologists understand that it is an important first step toward change that we find the personal within the intellectual. It is after all through the personal that real political change can impact the social institutions that structure our lives.

Seymour B. Sarason apologizes for his failure to carry through with his belief that only through sharing something of the personal nature of his investigations can real understanding and change occur. But as will be seen in the following quote, Sarason is ambivalent about the use of autobiographical writing.

> Initially, this book was to be part of a larger work that would be autobiographical in nature, not because the world needs or wants my autobiography but because that genre would permit me in a concrete and personal way to illustrate themes and concepts that somehow lose force when handled more abstractly. I have been told by my students that it is not until I use my own experience to make a point that they can identify something in their lives with that experience. This is particularly the case when I am trying to get them to see how much of history is in the present, unrecognized and unverbalized. The autobiography got derailed. Preparing … [a] paper convinced me that psychology's unreflective dependence on a theory of the individual

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> organism required a separate effort. Besides, the arrogance implied in writing an autobiography continued to present a problem to me. (Sarason, 1981, p. xii-xiii)

Lillian B. Rubin (1994) confesses that

> For many years now I have been writing about those in our society whose voices are muted or silent. The subject matter has been diverse-class, race, and gender-but always the intent has been to give voice to the voiceless. Scratch the intellectual pre-occupations, however, and there's almost always a personal source. So although these issues have been at the heart of my professional concerns for nearly a quarter of a century, my interest and involvement in them grows out of personal experiences long before I was old enough to think about such concepts as "the voiceless." As a child whose first language wasn't English, I didn't have to *think* about not having a voice that could be heard. I experienced it viscerally each time I stepped outside the small, dark apartment my family called home. (p. xiv-xv)

Although Rubin qualifies her claim about scratching the intellectual preoccupation by saying that we will almost always find a personal source, I will argue that the personal is necessarily the basis of the intellectual. And I will use the figure of the closet to show how even non-gay identified academic discourse may usefully be considered a form of disguised, symbolic problem solving.

One role that queers can perform for the larger culture is to show how the intellectual public realm affects the personal embodied structures that are in the more private and personal realm, and vice-versa. Sex is a form of

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embodied knowledge, and queers are in a position to express-give voice to the limits that our bodies place upon-the extent to which discursive structures may administer, police, and inform our bodily source of affects. These are the currency that others have referred to as our life force. And so, we should proceed to explore what I have called "queer technologies." Queers have been historically in the position to challenge the extent to which public professional and intellectual discourse may invade and inflect the private spaces of our affective personal lives. We have lived this relationship between the personal and the intellectual through our struggles for liberation. I am able to venture forth in what follows because of the work of other queers who have gone before me into the tangles of vernacular knowledge and professional knowledge. It is my hope that out of these tangles we may weave a cloth of understanding that will bring us closer together rather than further apart.

My investigations should find a place within the field of psychology since as early as 1981, Sarason diagnosed the swelling tide of discontent among psychologists with their field's preoccupation with the decontextualized individual organism. According to Sarason (1981),

> Many psychologists (and other social scientists) are disenchanted with and disaffected from the field but,

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> for understandable reasons, have difficulty publicly stating their feelings. We define ourselves, and society defines us, largely in terms of what we do, our work, and if we come to have serious doubts about the underpinnings, thrust, social meanings and uses of our endeavors we tend to still those doubts with a variety of stratagems that permit us to keep going, albeit with an undercurrent of dysphoria. If I felt that this was the case for a very small number of psychologists I would not have felt justified in writing this book. But my experience has taught me it is true for an undetermined but significant number of psychologists. (p. ix)

Sarason says that

> The thrust of my argument is that psychologists have to *review* themselves but from the special standpoint of how their society is organized, how it works, how it socializes different groups in different ways, and how it specifically has influenced the theories and practices of psychologists. If I intended to emphasize anything in this book it is how ahistorical, ignorant, and naïve psychologists have been about their society and how it is reflected in them. (p. xii)

My complaint will be that psychology and social science research more generally has swung too far in the opposite direction with the invention of theories of social construction. No doubt knowledge is socially constructed, but surely reality is larger than and partly independent of the theories that we have created in order to control and predict the future of our shared, social and physical reality.

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Chapter 2

2. QUEERNESS AND BODIES, VOICES, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

The Project and Its Theses:

This project interprets academic, abstract theoretical discourse through the figure of "the closet". Social geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan and others have described the origins of private spaces in the houses of working class people as late developments following the original earlier divisions between public and private spaces in the homes of the ruling class. The closet referred originally to the private sleeping chambers of the monarch. Eve Sedgwick (1990) reports that according to the Oxford English Dictionary the meaning of the closet as early as 1370 was "a room for privacy or retirement; a private room; an inner chamber … always a small room"(p. 65).

According to AIDS activist, Douglas Crimp,

> [Sedgwick] gives us what the debate on 'outing' has lacked: a theory of the closet. By showing us that the closet is no place, but a structural relation-in our culture, the primary structural relation of knowledge/ignorance--Sedgwick has sharpened the edge of Foucault's work on sexuality and power. (Sedgwick, 1990, p. 264)

And Wayne Koestenbaum says that Sedgwick "proves that modern cognition itself hinges on the hetero/homo impasse"(Sedgwick, 1990, p. 264). Sedgwick and the social

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geographers who map the structural relations between the physical geography of segmented worlds, group life, and the development of cognition, consciousness, and the self have influenced my reading of the closet.

Quite simply, the closet as I intend its use to describe the development of gay sexuality is effected through cultural and social silence concerning homosexual behavior, development, and identity. By the closet I mean a set of interrelated technologies, such that technologies of the self utilize technologies of power. Michel De Certeau (1997) called this transformation of technologies of power into technologies of the self "tactics." The utilization of power imposed by dominant cultural discourse practices is turned to the benefit of the self in political resistance. In the stigmatized person who is capable of homosexual behaviors, there is a *prima facie* tendency to respond to the stigmatizing of homosexual behaviors, so that the punitive and costly effects of stigma dispose the person at risk of being stigmatized to manage information about their homosexual identity. This is accomplished by disguising their authentic bodily generated and self-consistent desires and attractions for same sexed/gendered individuals. Punishment of homosexual behaviors and the subsequent concealment of homoerotic desires and attractions are what

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led to the constitution of a homosexual identity. Necessitated by socially imposed rejection leads to self-monitoring in addition to vigilance in others. This surveillance having both an external and internal focus on homoerotic signification and expression represents a fear of homoerotic affects, gestures, and behaviors. Once homophobia takes root in the body/self system of a person, s/he operates in self-hating, despising, and destructive ways. The origins of homophobia are clearly social before they take on a more personal internalized nature. The operation of homophobia sets up a strong separation between outer and inner or between public and private.

The use of "the closet" metaphor facilitates drawing an analogy between gay development and non-gay identified abstract academic discourse along the dimensions of public and private. Through this comparison, academic discourse can be understood as constructing a division between public and private which excludes such important matters as the materiality of bodies and the social class positioning of the voices of academic subjects/persons. In the manuscript, I develop an understanding of abstract theoretical discourse as a form of problem solving that has a more personal, private and disguised symbolic meaning than has heretofore been acknowledged by academic subjects/persons. It serves

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to suggest a new location for the reading of unconscious thought, namely in the material construction of our bodies and the discursive activities that such placements as those in academic institutions afford. Marginalized groups such as gay men and lesbians have had to struggle to achieve an articulation of voice in their writing/activism and an understanding of their differently embodied selves and experience which constitutes their lives. It is the contention of this project that such a lens, as may be constructed from the closeted gay and lesbian experience, will illuminate the nature of the ideological, oppressive contribution. A contribution that even the "new paradigm of conversational analysis," (as defended by such psychologically minded people as: Rom Harre, John Shotter, and Kenneth Gergen), makes to the continued oppression of marginalized groups as gay men and lesbians.

The present work is concerned with the relationship between bodies and voices and in turn with their relationship to psychological inquiry. Readers deserve answers to the following questions: what is psychological inquiry? And, what do bodies and voices have to do with it? Another, perhaps more refined way of posing the first question which, in adding specificity, colors the answer, is to ask: what kind of <u>activity</u> is psychological inquiry? In framing my

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investigation in this way, I intend to examine the nature of psychological inquiry, but not in the usual philosophical manner that yields an explanation of the essential nature of the object of study. Rather, in entertaining the nature of psychological inquiry, I will propose a psychological research program, and in the course of doing this I will examine several theses which, I will argue, can serve as a guide to conducting psychological inquiry.

One rather banal thesis is that psychological inquiry is an activity. Moreover, instead of falling into some of the usual conundrums of trying to discover or interpret the relationship between bodies and minds, psychological inquiry may be understood as an activity in which knowledge of bodies and voices rather than bodies and minds are socially constructed, or better socially mediated. In this way, many of the troubling aspects of the relationship between mind and body that arise from within other traditions of philosophy can be avoided, and thus much more fruitful directions for psychological research may be followed. Another thesis to be examined is a claim about unconscious problem-solving, namely that psychological inquiry, construed as an activity in which bodies and voices are socially constructed among a web of objectivizing and interpretive practices, is the proper location of

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unconscious processes. In order to support this claim about unconscious problem solving, my investigations will examine a particular case of this type of symbolic, and disguised, cognitive and affective activity.

Another thesis claims that academic discourse can be understood as structured by the figure of "the closet" in the sense that closetedness suggests a concealment of certain issues. The two issues that I take up in this work are the concealment and exclusion of bodies and of the socio-economic class structure of voices from academic discourse. If bodies and voices were to take more central importance in psychological investigations, we should be able to understand the social processes of production that are building the basis of global capital.

Recent work in social geography has analyzed the structural relations that effect closeting of bodies, but with particular interest in the ways that working class bodies become the site of struggle against the social and material conditions that have led to the present development of those very same bodies. In an article by F. J. Callard (1998), the author states that

> Geographers are now taking the problematic of corporeality seriously. The 'body' is becoming a preoccupation … a central figure around which to base political demands, social analyses, and theoretical

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> investigations. … I stage my argument by looking at how on the one hand Marxist and on the other queer theory have commonly conceived of the body, and propose that the legacies of materialist modes of analysis have much to offer current work focusing on how bodies are shaped by their encapsulation within the sphere of the social. I conclude by examining the presentation of corporeality that appears in the first volume of Marx's *Capital*. I … suggest that geographers working on questions of subjectivity could profit from thinking further about the relation between so-called 'new' and 'fluid' configurations of bodies, technologies, and subjectivities in the late 20th-century world, and the corporeal configurations of industrial capitalism lying behind and before them. (p. 387)

David Harvey (1998), in an article entitled "The body as an accumulation strategy," sets this recent work apart from the social constructionist views that largely ignore Marxist material analyses by saying that

> Over the past twenty years … it is presumed that the body is some kind of social construct at the same time as it is a locus and a measure of both the material and the social world we inhabit. [Harvey] situates this idea against the background of Marx's representations-too often by-passed in recent literature-in order to show how Marx's concept of variable capital contains a theory of the body formation under capitalism at the same time as it lays the groundwork for understanding how political persons act as moral agents to try to change the conditions under which laboring occurs. The struggle for a living wage in Baltimore is then used as a concrete example of how this form of body politics operates under contemporary conditions, illustrating how the body that is to be the measure of all things is itself a site of political-economic contestation over the very forces that create it. (p. 401)

Another article by J. Binnie (1997) demonstrates how queers are turning the tides on the field of geography itself. In

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"Coming Out of Geography: Towards a queer epistemology" the author argues that

> in order to challenge the marginalisation of lesbians, gay men, and other sexual dissidents within the discipline, we need to pay more attention to how geography has been studied. … While positivism has been particularly guilty of ignoring the interests of lesbians and gay men, the new cultural geography, and feminist geography, though enabling a limited amount of work on the geography of lesbians and gay men, may also reproduce heterosexism. (p. 223)

The figure of the closet is widely applicable to academic discourse, rather than just in the sphere where it has taken hold (in queer discourse), because the use of such a figure captures the intentional structure of desire when desire is in need of concealment. Thus, the case of closetedness in academic discourse may in fact emerge as a model with more generality than just for queer discourse and academic discourse, but also for its sociality across diverse cultural zones.

Actually there are parallels between queer discourse, or discourse about the origins and construction of queer sexualities, and academic discourse, or discourse about the origins and construction of sociality and subjectivities, that might be worth examining. By discourse about the origins and construction of sociality and subjectivity, I am referring to the new paradigm for psychology, which is based on a conversational model and discussed by proponents such

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as Rom Harre, Kenneth Gergen and John Shotter. Both the discourse about queerness and the discourse about sociality are framed within a larger sea of currents between the two types of reductionism -- biological and cultural. In keeping with my claim about the usefulness of the figure of the closet as an analytic tool of comparison to elucidate the development of gay and lesbian identities through the discourse about "queers" and the development of academic identities through the discourse about sociality and subjectivity, I hasten to point out that each of the different and complementary types of reductionism may likewise be thought of through the figure of the closet. This is to say that in accepting the baton and running in the direction of biological reductionism and hence biological determinism, the runner is constructed within a field of discourse that closets the nature of cultural influences. From the alternative standpoint, then, of the cultural determinist acceptance of the baton and heading in the direction of cultural reductionism, the cultural runner is constructed within the field of discourse, in such a manner, that closets the nature of biological influences. In other words, I see the conflict between contemporary biological reductionism and cultural reductionism as modern day versions of the old debate among determinists of the nature/nurture controversies that have plagued, but also

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animated, psychological discourse from its very inception. In fact, it may be that psychological discourse is enabled, constituted or instituted through this fracturing. Most useful for current debate is to understand this fracturing as constitutional along the lines of Michel Foucault's discourse theory or even according to Jean-Francois Lyotard's (1984) notion of paradoxology. The latter sets forth a theory of the institution of discourse and knowledge through inherently contradictory or paradoxical relations between nodes which are juxtaposed, and mutually conflicted, however not resolvable. Neither node can be decided without dissolving itself along with the other node. Thus, within the realm of discourse and knowledge the only positivities are those constructed out of an inherently contradictory or antithetical relationship. This is rather like the Hegelian emergence of concepts out of the void and through the constitutionality of opposites that are mutually or relationally defined and thus so constituted. This is in accord with John Dewey's (1983) definition of thought as that which arises out of conflict between previously established habits and the particular social and physical environment that has emerged. Thought is the body's way of attempting to navigate these new uncharted territories of the evolving world.

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My argument will show that neither type of reductionism, either biological or cultural, is possible, for each is mutually or relationally defined and thus constituted within the parameters of the domain of discourse and psychological knowledge. I would go further still and say, that the emergence of psychological knowledge is made possible through the use of the figuration that I have called "closetedness". Closetedness, or the interiority of and constitution of subjectivities about which psychological knowledge purports to be about, is made possible through a conflicted relationship that is nominalized within the psychological field of discourse as either a node of the biological or the cultural. The discipline of psychology has, according to Foucault, arisen as an aid and constitution device of administration of the discourse and construction of identities of criminals and juvenile delinquents.

My argument for the usefulness of the figure of the closet as an analytic tool will make apparent that this discursive move permits, within the domain of psychological discourse, a revelation of what has heretofore been excluded. What has been excluded is precisely the nature of the knowledge/power relations that are being constituted, instituted and protected through the paradox of reductionism between the

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biological and cultural types. We need to ask what social formation has been the context of such exclusionary practices. It is through the recognition and elucidation of the parallel structuring of the relationships between the development of gay and lesbian identities and the development of academic discourse and subjectivities that it will be possible to shed light on the knowledge/power relations that have been disguised. Even as these procedures of disguise are enacted to affect the identities of gay men and lesbian women, they present the possibility of reading the paradoxical nodes of knowledge/power relations in this other non-marginalized area of discursive production through which academic discourse and subjectivities are realized.

On a positive note, what the new psychological paradigm of conversational analysis has contributed to our understanding is the inherent nature of the sociality of psychological discourse and knowledge. This has been an important contribution and has followed from the work of the Russian psychologists, who, I think, have still more to contribute to modern day discussions of the nature/nurture controversy. Though the obstacle to cultivating this appropriated knowledge is still alive in the constructed discourse on sociality and academic subjects, I am claiming that, the nature of psychological discourse is such that it intends to

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disguise the nature of bodily participation in the construction of our discourse and subjectivities, and hence, of our identities. It intends this disguise whether it is desired or not by those so constructed. The option of choice of being constructed otherwise is effaced through the exclusionary practices that are part of the discursive forms through which psychological discourse is constituted, instituted, and perpetuated.

It could be stated that, just as the revelation of the workings of the discursive formations required some counterpoint from which to disclaim the universality of the procedures for construction of the kind of sociality which was developed within the social formations that comprised the political economy of capitalism, so also will the further explication of the workings of psychological discourse and knowledge, in the political economy of late capitalism, depend upon understanding the outcome of the application of the analytic tool of the figure of the closet to those recent conversational psychological discourse which purport to utilize and appropriate the work of Vygotsky and Bakhtin. Further work is needed than that begun in this investigation in order to supply the ethnographic depiction of the actual workings of the figure of the closet in outing the discourse of the academic scene of psychology and

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especially of the conversational analysis of Harre, Gergen and Shotter. Shotter may prove the most useful in later stages of this investigation since his writing does reveal his pre-academic origins in the working class of Great Britain. It should be sufficient for my readers to have the argument laid out and have some plausible yet still suggestive directions for further study along the lines of what I shall call "a symptomatic reading" of the works of Shotter and others. In the chapters that follow, we shall understand how these exclusions are brought about through the disciplining of our bodies and voices, with particular attention, of course, to psychological inquiry.

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The Approach and Method of Analysis:

Prior to examining the theses mentioned in the overview section or the problem as it was introduced and elaborated upon above, I should like to consider the placement or location of this kind of investigation within today's postmodern context of inquiry. For now, I have chosen to defer consideration of the theses set forth above, in order to place my activity within the contemporary scene of academic writing. Examination of the placement of my inquiry is necessary because I wish to establish a genealogical heritage for others and myself with kindred interests. The present work is an investigation into an area that transgresses the conventional boundary drawn between the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. That such an area of inquiry exists will come as no surprise since modern psychology has developed historically as a discipline from the considerably older field of philosophy. Discussion of the breakaway history of psychology will be developed later in this chapter. For now, all that need be said is that attempts have been made to name the area of inquiry, which lies between psychology and philosophy. When subtlety is applied an array of names is generated. The names among which it is possible to choose from are: Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, and Philosophical Psychology. This sequence of names follows an

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order, which is no accident. This ordering of names can be thought of as falling along a continuum whose end points are philosophy, on the extreme left, and psychology, on the extreme right.

From the outset, I reject the placement of this inquiry under the name of philosophy of mind. The traditional philosophy of mind stems from the work of Rene Descartes in Seventeenth Century France. Though Descartes' philosophy is interesting in its own right, when it is situated within its proper historical and cultural context, Cartesian thought, with its metaphysical dualism between substances physical and mental, produced a host of problems that might be considered fundamental, concerned as they are with the foundations of the field. Such problems are founded in the sense that the dichotomous rendering of body and mind as substantially distinct, actually generates and perpetuates conundrums whose fallout makes problematic: the mind-body identity, other minds, privacy, consciousness, and the like. Although Descartes was well intentioned in drawing the distinction between body and mind, he wanted to set forth a domain for the articulation of the mechanical nature of physical things. He wanted to reserve a modicum of freedom so those traditional churchly concepts of moral responsibility would still apply to things mental and

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spiritual. When displaced to different spatial and temporal circumstances, namely present-day multicultural America, the Cartesian legacy becomes "much ado about nothing."

Recent developments in philosophy's relationship to various sciences have produced an interdisciplinary field called cognitive science. Participants in this field bring with them training and interests in philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, computer engineering and information science. As one of the new breed of cognitive scientists, Ned Block attempts to rescue philosophy of mind from its obsolescence by drawing attention to the convergence of work of contemporary philosophers and psychologists. For Ned Block (1980),

> Progress in philosophy of mind is greatly facilitated by knowledge of many areas of psychology and also that progress in psychology is facilitated by knowledge of philosophy. What makes this interrelationship most obvious to practitioners in these fields is that in order to keep up with the current literature on the problems on which they work, they find that they must be able to read the technical literature of one or another field. The simple fact is that lines of research in many areas of philosophy and psychology have tended to converge on the same cluster of issues. This convergence reflects a deeper mesh of the fields. … [And] the problems will yield only to philosophically sophisticated psychologists or to psychologically sophisticated philosophers. (p. v)

Thus in these words, Block flatters both philosophers and psychologists, while challenging them to do more than just nose around in each other's fields. Block's call for the

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serious study of the technical literature in both fields behooves us to establish, rigorously, the nomenclature appropriate for designating this newly constituted interdisciplinary field of study. And so, we should have a hand at examining the second name for this kind of inquiry-philosophy of psychology.

Conceptually speaking, returning to the above ordering of names along a continuum makes sense because the emergence of philosophy of psychology is logically dependent on the distinction between philosophy and psychology as separate disciplines. Thus, philosophy of psychology could be taken to mean a study of the foundations of psychology, just as philosophy has taken as its object of study other sciences. That philosophy can be applied critically, as a mode of analysis, to the foundations of other disciplines is, however, a view criticized by Richard Rorty (1979) and others in the tradition of American Pragmatism. They criticize this view because it privileges epistemology-the theory of knowledge-as a master discourse. This is a residue of the Cartesian tradition.

One aim of the present work is to distance itself from this view of philosophy. This is, in part, accomplished by emphasizing the active and constructive nature of inquiry,

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and by embracing a view of philosophy as an activity (or dialogue) in which participants carry on a conversation. Under this view, philosophers are cultural critics whose discourse do not take the form of a master narrative, but is a social practice that needs to be considered reflexive.

More suitable to my aims than having philosophy serve as the foundation of psychology would be the definition and understanding, proffered by Ned Block (1980), of philosophy of psychology as

> the study of conceptual issues in psychology. For the most part, these issues fall equally well in psychology as in philosophy. But this is not to say these issues are always on the borderline between philosophy and psychology, peripheral to both fields. (p. 1)

Block is quick to deny that these conceptual issues are always on the borderline and peripheral to both disciplines. As a member of the philosophical community, Block is concerned with demonstrating the interest of these conceptual issues to other philosophers. His definition is telling of the tendency among academic scholars to avoid engaging in border disputes. Better to build on one's cultural capital that has been acquired from working in a well-respected field, than to wander off into some barely recognized intellectual space between the disciplines. Since both philosophers and psychologists are concerned with conceptual issues, it would appear that Block's definition of philosophy of psychology is of no help in rigorously

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distinguishing the nature of inquiry arising from the convergence of the two disciplines.

In a work more recent than Block's, Malcolm Budd (1988) turns our attention to Wittgenstein's conception of the philosophy of psychology. What Wittgenstein understood by philosophy of psychology Budd summarized as:

> the aim of the philosophy of psychology is the construction of perspicuous representations of everyday psychological concepts; this aim is achieved by the delineation of the grammar of psychological words; the importance of the philosophy of psychology derives from its underlying purpose, which is the dissolution of philosophical problems about the nature of the mind; these problems can be treated successfully only by attaining a synoptic view of the ordinary language of psychology; the philosophy of psychology is purely descriptive and in no way explanatory. (p. 1)

Wittgenstein is notoriously skeptical about the proliferation of metaphysical entities, and he especially disdained their use for explanatory purposes. As Budd's remark discloses, Wittgenstein conceived of philosophy of psychology as an activity of rendering clear the philosophical grammar of psychological words. That rendering is accomplished by describing the usage of our everyday psychological concepts in ordinary language.

Discovering the way in which they are used captures Wittgenstein's (1953) notion of the meaning of words. The function that words perform is portrayed or exemplified in

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the "language-games" he so skillfully invented for precisely this purpose. Wittgenstein had intended the term "language-game" to refer to a device for constructing perspicuous representation of the grammar of word usage. However, in relating the concept of "language-game" to another term he coined, "form of life", he made possible the abuse of this concept by others who take the notion of language-game to be a term that refers to real life activities. Instead of the metaphorical sense that Wittgenstein had intended for this crafted device, others have construed it quite literally.

Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical problems has been likened to conducting a kind of therapeutic analysis. After rendering a perspicuous representation of the grammar of word usage, Wittgenstein maintained that metaphysical conundrums tended to disappear. He and others thought of, Wittgenstein's approach, as making possible the breaking of the spellbound attraction that metaphysical problems held over thinkers who entertained them seriously. Thus, I am inclined to say that Wittgenstein would be sympathetic to my disparaging reference to the Cartesian tradition of philosophy of mind as "much ado about nothing." But, even with these affinities in mind, I am nonetheless disinclined to accept the name of philosophy of psychology for designating the nature of my present inquiry.

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There are several reasons for distancing my inquiry from that of Wittgenstein's: (1) Unlike Wittgenstein's aversion for constructing theories for explanatory purposes, the present inquiry will project a narrative, which is both descriptive and explanatory. (2) Unlike Wittgenstein's neutrality, but rather like Plato, Machiavelli, Bacon, Hobbes, and recently, Skinner, this work makes a connection between psychology and politics. Since an adequate psychology "will contain a theory of the most general and basic human aims, interests, and aspirations, and the mechanisms whereby these aims, interests, and aspirations can be satisfied," and since "an adequate political philosophy will contain a theory of how best to maximize, systematically and collectively, the satisfaction of human aims, interests, and aspirations," (Flanagan, 1984, p. 84) psychology and political philosophy are inquiries that are related in obvious and synchronized ways.

Since criticism is always launched from a political position or perspective, philosophers as cultural critics perform a political function. Psychologists do not as readily recognize that psychology is also politicized in the manner mentioned above. Nonetheless, because psychology and political philosophy are kindred inquiries, it might serve

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the present inquiry well to embrace the name ***philosophical psychology.*** Though this term, as well, is not free of difficulties. Much of the Anglo-American work in the area of philosophy of mind since 1945 has been referred to as philosophical psychology. Most of the work performed in the Anglo-American tradition, psychology included, denies its political nature. Perhaps I should borrow part of a recent title *Knowledge and Power: Toward a Political Philosophy of Science* (Rouse, 1987) and choose a more cumbersome name for my inquiry such as *"toward a political and philosophical psychology."* Tempting as this is, it may be better to remain with just the name philosophical psychology, since post World War II developments in this area are increasingly seen as constituting an interdisciplinary field called: Cognitive Science.

Though feminists have been ambitious enough to even politicize the natural sciences, I think it is best not to take on such a big undertaking as trying to convince everyone of the political nature of their intellectual work. So with the advent of Cognitive Science, as a new and separate discipline, we can let the cognitive scientists remain mystified insofar as they believe their work is not political. Thus, it seems reasonable to use the name philosophical psychology as a designator for the kind of

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psychological inquiry that is concerned with the constructive relational activity of bodies and voices. But we must also note that, to be designated as well by this name is reflexive understanding. An understanding achievable under conditions that serve up a critical account of the contribution of constructive inquiry to the nature of those very terms that are taken as constitutive, relationally speaking. And so, any discussion of the relationship between bodies and voices must be understood as occurring within a specific lived context of inquiry that has both existential and conceptual aspects (Dewey, 1991).

When viewed from the perspective of developments in the English-speaking world since 1945, bodies and voices are appropriate terms of inquiry. According to Jenny Teichman (1988), two of the most prominent trends in philosophical psychology that have been discerned in the English-speaking world since 1945 are (1) materialism, especially the two forms of behaviorism and physicalism, and (2) so-called linguistic analysis. And, "there is some overlap between them"(p. 1). Teichman explains these two trends as follows:

> To some extent, materialist philosophers like to see themselves as sharing the aim of science, which they perceive as a search leading to the discovery of general laws. Thus, they seek wide and simple, general accounts of the nature of the mind. Materialist theories are 'nothing but' theories. For instance, behaviorism is the theory that the mind is nothing but the body in action, and physicalism is the theory that

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> mental events are nothing but brain events. In other words, materialist theories are both scientistic and reductive. (p. 1-2)
>
> If we conceive of linguistic philosophy as a kind of philosophy which, broadly speaking, has to do with language then it too takes on more than one form. One variety consists of constructing theories about language, as Wittgenstein did *in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Another type takes the form of searching for a logical solution to a particular problem or set of problems. This kind of linguistic philosophy often leads to the recognition of previously unnoticed distinctions, and may involve inventing new logical terms, or even a whole new formal language, in order to adumbrate them. Russell's Theory of Descriptions is an example. And, finally, some linguistic philosophy seeks to solve problems by undertaking detailed, but non-formal, analyses of ordinary language.

In positioning the terms bodies and voices within the context of work in philosophical psychology in the English-speaking world since 1945, it can readily be seen that bodies and voices are more appropriate terms than bodies and minds. The reason for this is that bodies and voices rather than bodies and minds fits better with the materialistic and linguistic trends that Teichman marks as major within this period. The added advantage to considering the relation between bodies and voices is that the analysis of bodies and voices turns out to be both materialistic and linguistic. Quite obviously, the term "bodies" whether from the pairing of bodies and minds, or the bodies and voices dyad, is the same in being consistently understood, materially speaking. The significance of changing the dyad from bodies and minds to the bodies and voices is that the focus of our analysis

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is no longer on the metaphysical nature of mind. Since speaking of voices is understood in a material manner, the dualism between bodies and minds is lost. An added benefit is that the theory of bodies and voices does not have to be understood in the way that Teichman has characterized materialistic theories of mind as both reductionist and physicalist. Voice is a term that designates a phenomenon that is not reducible to the purely physical. It is not reduced to the notion of physical body since voice is interactive between the body and society, something that transcends the physical. It seems that on the surface, the conversion from minds to voices benefits us more than just in losing the problematic of relating the dualism of distinct and separate substances of bodies and minds.

Also lost, is the exaggerated individualism that marked the Cartesian subject. The conversion opens up the possibility of exploring the construction of bodies and voices, both materially and socially speaking. The humanities and social and behavioral sciences, as well as, the neuroscience of developmental neurobiology and chemical biology, all jointly become relevant participants in the exploration of bodies and voices. This had been missing in principle under the dualism of bodies and minds, and especially missing under the Cartesian construal of the mental or spiritual as a

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separate and distinct substance from the physical. There was no possibility of tracing out mechanisms or processes of any kind. No science of mind was attainable under these constraints. Lastly, there is the distinctive benefit of avoiding the quality of materialistic theories of bodies and minds as being "nothing but" theories of minds.

By using the terminology and conceptualization of bodies and voices in my analysis of psychological inquiry, it is possible to combine the best of both trends in the term: ***philosophical psychology***. The dyad of bodies and voices works as well within the trend of linguistic philosophies of the two varieties that Teichman mentioned in the above quoted passage. In the event that it is deemed desirable, both the formal logical analysis of Russell and Wittgenstein's ordinary language analysis can be applied instrumentally in the psychological inquiry that is constructed by the terms bodies and voices. The advantage of seeking an understanding of the manner in which bodies and voices are socially constructed is that personal identity and discourse practice become amenable to semiotic analysis and specification.

In locating my work in an international context, or at least in the English-speaking countries such as Great Britain,

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Australia, and New Zealand, my work has an affinity with recent trends in developing a sub-field of the discipline of Psychology known as Critical Psychology. Valerie Walkerdine marks the beginning of her work in this sub-field with the publication of *Changing the Subject* (Henriques, et. al.) in 1984. She describes her interest in the field of Critical Psychology in the following:

> My particular interest has always been how to understand the relationship between subjectification and subjectivity. If the subject is created as a textual relation, positioned in apparatuses of power/knowledge and regulation, it is not co-terminus with lived subjectivity. However, hardly any post-structuralist work addresses this question: it simply neatly sidesteps it. Indeed, most work has turned to psychoanalysis to fill this gap, though the relation between post-structuralism and psychoanalysis is uneasy. I have explored ways in which it might be possible to understand our selves as formed within apparatuses of social regulation but also to be able to move, to shift and change. If there is no underlying person to be set free as in humanism, what is the status both of the inquiry and of the stories that can be told about our selves? If, when we try to say something different, we are not setting free some suppressed inner voice, what are we doing? This work has led me to examine, among other things, my own subjectification and to use it as a point of questioning. I have tried to focus on the relation between regulation and the gaps and silences, the places in which material/discursive relations can be spoken another way, so that another story of our subjectivity may be told. While this kind of work has been important for feminism and is common in the humanities, it has certainly placed me at the very margins of what could be considered acceptable psychology, with its scientific narratives, and at times I shift uneasily between kinds of stories that I tell. However, I do feel strongly that it is important for us to be able to address these issues at this time: a time in which we are already post-crisis but in which the regulative power of normative stories continues unabated. (Walkerdine, 1997, p. 169-170)

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Walkerdine has worked in a post-structural mode that is heavily inflected with the work of French structuralism of Claude Levi-Strauss, and Louis Althusser. But her work also has great affinity with the work of Michel Foucault, especially his research into what he called "technologies of power" and "technologies of the self." For Foucault these technologies are two of four major types of technologies. He claims that

> Each [is] a matrix of practical reason: (1) technologies of production, which permit us to produce, transform, or manipulate things; (2) technologies of sign systems, which permit us to use signs, meanings, symbols, or signification; (3) technologies of power, which determine the conduct of individuals and submit them to certain ends or domination, an objectivizing of the subject; (4) technologies of the self, which permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality. (Foucault, 1988, p. 18)

Foucault recognized that these four types of technologies rarely operate individually. They are intertwined in social contexts, though they are often distinctive in academic contexts, especially in segregating the sciences and the humanities.

Foucault contrasted the difference between the methods used in the sciences and the methods of interpretation used in

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the humanities by the fact that in fields of interpretation, such as psychoanalysis, the founding thinker is always taken as the starting point for developments in that field. Even if there is resistance to the ideas of the founder, critical interpretations must go against them. Critical Psychology seems to fall within the later of the two types of method. And Foucault is the seminal thinker that most critical psychologists take as their point of reference for the sub-field. Walkerdine admits that in the quotation above.

I would argue that the juxtaposition of subjectification and subjectivity can be encompassed within the field of Semiotics. As I entertain the relationship between bodies, voices, and psychological inquiry through queer technologies, semiotics incorporates the distinct, though interrelated realms of the materiality of bodies, and the discursive nature of speech and thought. Critical Psychology may be considered one location with the discipline of Psychology that contributes to this larger trans-disciplinary field of semiotics. Certainly, cultural psychology would be another.

But for my purposes, I wish to interrelate the forms of technologies in order to interpret non-gay identified academic discourse, particularly the scientific discourses

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of psychology and biology, from the perspective of a specifically queer technology. That of interpreting the ways in which so-called scientific discourses inevitably is inflected with the particular personal aspects of the individual writers. In order to make headway in this direction we need to transgress the normally invoked distinction between science and technology. Working after Foucault this is somewhat easier to accomplish. And so I move on to discuss the use I plan on making of psychological knowledge which is technoscientific, bridging and interrelating the terms of 'science' and 'technology' and integrating the fields of 'basic' and 'applied' research. In the following I try to lay out a definition of ***technoscience***.

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Technoscience Defined:

Technoscience will be shown to contest the usual distinction between biology as a science and its application in medicine to function as a technology of power, and psychology as a science and its application in psychoanalysis to function as a technology of the self. In proceeding to look at the relations between the materiality of our bodies, and the social constructed discursive nature of our voices, one rather important focus of psychological inquiry, inflected semiotically, can then develop along the lines of psychoneuroimmunology. This makes the mapping of the relationship of beliefs/attitudes, as engendered by social practices, to neural and immune events of our bodies possible. These events are also to be considered as constructed by social and technoscientific practices. The concept of voice becomes available, as does the literary, deconstructive and hermeneutic analyses of the humanities for the understanding of identity. Since the focus of discovering the nature of the mind has been replaced with a focus on our bodies and voices, significant progress on pressing problems that fall within the scope of psycho-oncology and psycho-immunology may become possible as a result of the work that is to follow. These fields of medicine have been of particular interest to the gay community, especially since the advent of Acquired-Immune-

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Deficiency-Syndrome (AIDS). In AIDS the immune system is comprised, thereby subjecting the person-with-AIDS to various opportunistic infections and certain forms of cancer.

The fields of psycho-oncology and psycho-immunology are refinements resulting from specialties within the domain of psychosomatic medicine. Since both of these fields have a clinical component, they have, if not arisen from, then at least been incorporated into, the clinical practice of behavioral medicine. The earlier term of psychosomatic medicine had received bad press because of its perceived antagonism with psychiatry and medical practices that were understood as grounded in the biological, chemical, and physical sciences. The genealogy of behavioral medicine is probably as intricate as micro-social accounts of complex networks are, generally. No doubt, if not already existent in some published or pre-publication form, such accounts will soon be documented by scholars in the field of the history, anthropology, and sociology of medicine.

However, I am reluctant to reinforce the traditional distinction that has been drawn between basic research and applied research. In the case that is currently under consideration, the former is denoted by the term of

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biomedical sciences, and the latter is roughly referred to by the term of clinical medicine and its supporting medical technologies. Behavioral medicine would then be viewed as: the clinical practice of applying theoretical knowledge to particular case studies of individuals who come to practitioners presenting problems requiring treatment, if not prompt attention.

The ethnographic investigations of Bruno Latour (1978) and others (Fleck, 1979; Knorr-Cetina, 1981) have made problematic the distinctions between "basic research and applied research," "theoretical and practical knowledge" (or theory and practice generally), and "science and technology." Briefly, the difficulty with distinguishing between science and technology stems from privileging science over technology. Technology is taken to be the application of the theoretical knowledge of which science is understood to consist. Technology is the material embodiment of scientific knowledge in social and cultural practices. Much attention has been focused on the role of technology as a result of the influence of contemporary social movements; especially important are the women's movement and AIDS activism. The women's movement has, since the 1960s, brought long needed challenges to the institutions of medicine and health care. AIDS activism has, since the

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1980s, been embattled with the same institutions as the women's movement, but has strategically attacked the established research protocols of government sponsored research agencies, among which are the National Institute of Health (NIH) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as well as lobbying the Executive Branch and Congress. AIDS activists have established support services for People-With-AIDS (PWA) and People-With-AIDS-Related-Complex (ARC), and have implemented under the practice of democratically run town meetings numerous chapters, nationally and internationally, of the organization known as ACT-UP (AIDS Coalition To Unleash Power). ACT-UP, more than any other group fighting AIDS, has politicized the activities comprising the institutions of medicine and health care. ACT-UP has brought attention to the necessary inclusion of members of the affected communities in the entire planning and research process that, before the women's and AIDS's movement, science had been left to bask in its own illusion of detachment from political and personal interests.

Without delving into the sociology of how it was possible for John Dewey to challenge the distinction between science and technology, suffice it to say that every social movement has begun with the inclinations of at least one person seeing the need for change. Dewey is one such individual who

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had realized the artificial nature of the distinction between science and technology. Better said, Dewey recognized the particular class interests that were met by distinguishing science from more applied activities such as technology. And appropriately, writers (Hickman, 1990) have recently plucked Dewey from the tradition of American pragmatism and have rightfully crowned him with the distinction of being the contemporary philosopher, par excellence, of technoscience.

Although Dewey is not cited in Latour's work, I shall show how Dewey's notions of logical inquiry and conduct are the basis for Latour's definition of technoscience. Two terms of invention that are pertinent for discussing the relationship between technology and science and technology and culture are, respectively, technoscience and techno-culture. The term "technoscience" is found in the book, *Science In Action,* by Bruno Latour. He notes in introducing the term that "the remainder of this book will more than justify this rather portentous name." In a trivial way, Latour coins the term, "technoscience", so that he could use it more elegantly throughout his book rather than the more cumbersome terminology of "science and technology." Not until Chapter Four does Latour give us a definition of

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technoscience. This definition, however, cannot be easily understood outside of the context of Latour's method.

Latour (1987) poses the problem of understanding the activity of scientists and engineers in *Science in Action*. Only after much of, what Geertz would call, "thick description" of the activities of scientists and engineers does Latour pose the problem clearly. This is done in a section called "The fifth rule of method" in a chapter named "Insiders Out." He summarizes his earlier findings at the beginning of this chapter by asking, "… who the scientists and engineers were"(p. 173)? Latour explains that he had to keep adding people, and that in fact "the few people called 'academic scientists' were only a tiny group among the armies of people who do science"(p. 173). His realization in the end was "that when the large armies-in the literal sense-that defended either the body politic or the body were not behind them, scientists were invisible"(p. 173). In addressing his reader, Latour says that he:

> hope[s], to the eyes of the attentive reader: the *enlisting* scientist endowed with the demiurgic power of enrolling and controlling millions of others may now appear as an *enlisted* employee working in industry on military matters. Which one of the two pictures is the more accurate, and which one allows us to learn more about technoscience? (p. 173)

Latour refuses to answer either question because neither is precise enough. In a review of those cases he has studied

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and reported in earlier parts of his book, he says that some scientists were indeed enormously powerful, and those like Lyle, who was only latter recognized as a founder of the modern scientific field of geology, looked weak at the start of their career. Latour (1987) tells us that what gave us those impressions of strength or weakness was whether or not there were already present, or absent, aligned interest groups. His conclusion is that "the few people officially called scientists and engineers seem to carry the day only when most of the groundwork has already been done *by others*"(p. 173).

Thus, a methodological rule for Latour (1987) would be that to understand the work of the few who get designated as the "personnel of science", we should study those others whose work enables those at the bench; those who are given the responsibility for discovery (this accorded by a secondary mechanism rather than the primary mechanism which enlists people) and designated as the "few elements among the enlisted allies as the cause of the general movement"(p. 174). These few "elements" are involved in a paradox, which Latour (1987) explains as a reversal of technoscience in the following:

> Among the million people enlisted by scientists or enlisting them, and among the hundreds of scientists doing applied research and development for defense and industry, only a few hundred are considered, and to

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> them alone is attributed the power to make all the others believe and behave. Although scientists are successful only when they follow the multitude, the multitude appears successful only when it *follows* this handful of scientists! (p. 174)

For Latour this is why scientists can look as though they have demiurgic powers, whether regarded as good or bad at one time or another, where they appear without any clout at all.

His ultimate conclusion, which bears on my inquiry into the definition of technoscience, is that the distinction between "science and technology", with which he began in his introduction, "is a figment of our imagination, or, more properly speaking, the *outcome* of attributing the whole responsibility for producing facts to a happy few"(p. 174).

The problem of mistaking science as distinct from technology is, for Latour (1987), due to the confusion over what he described as "the two mechanisms". The primary one, which enlists others in the activity of science making, and the secondary one, which allows a circumscribing of responsibility so that a few leaders emerge as controlling the beliefs and behavior of the multitude of others whose activity makes science, in the circumscribed sense, possible. In the end, once the secondary mechanism has done its work, "the recruitment drive remains invisible"(p. 174).

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This effacing of responsibility of the multitude, for the sake of the appearances of the few hundreds, must become largely suspect. This must be so, even though Latour does go a long way toward understanding the operations of science as distinct to be the result of highly established social practices. In the image of Latour's Janus figure, who speaks two opposite languages, Latour (1987) reminds us that we may have escaped the belief in the existence of a science on the one hand and of a society on the other. If our insight remains at that, we have missed the point. Janus, in speaking two languages, is at once saying that "scientists are the cause that carried out all the projects of science and technology," while the other side of its mouth says, "scientists are striving to position themselves inside projects carried out by many others"(p. 174).

I would only mark this figure of Janus, with its two-sided face and contrasting appearances, as assimilable to the figure of "the closet" with which I will interrogate the academic discourse of psychology and other fields. But for now our attention need only focus on the difficulty that arises when we try, as Latour does, to examine the working of the actions of multitudes in concert. Either we cram their activity into the mold of an individualistic

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psychology with its apparatus of desires, intentions, and motives as explanatory constructs for their observable behavior, and thereby retain the language of moral evaluation and attribution of responsibility for results or resulting states of affairs. Or we lose this capacity for assessment, in the moral sense, and gain a herd mentality of large chains of integrated actions for which the metaphorical buck of responsibility stops nowhere. Its currency remains in circulation except for the secondary mechanism, which only yields an appearance of responsibility for show, or should we say for exploitation. But just who are the exploiters and who are the victims in this complex operation called technoscience?

Perhaps now I should explain Dewey's understanding of the nature of the logic of inquiry and how his conception of inquiry might help us to understand this effacement of responsibility of individuals in the activity of technoscience. For Dewey (1988), the separation between theory and practice was always an enemy of satisfactory inquiry. This was adequately exposed in his early work, *Human Nature and Conduct* in which he shows how the concept of habit is inextricably bound up with the conduct of inquiry. Habits are social functions.

> Habits may be profitably compared to physiological functions, like breathing, digesting. The latter are,

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> to be sure, involuntary, while habits are acquired. But important as is this difference for many purposes it should not conceal the fact that habits are like functions in many respects, and especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and environment. (p. 15)

Just as breathing concerns the lungs and air, so too for Dewey do voluntary actions such as walking concern the legs as well as the ground. The organism-environment relation is always interdependent and reciprocally modified, adjusted and orchestrated. Dewey (1988) shows this best when he shifts from the biological notion of function to the mathematical use of the word function. He says:

> Natural operations like breathing and digesting, acquired ones like speech and honesty, are functions of the surroundings as truly as of a person. They are things done *by* the environment by means of organic structures or acquired dispositions. The same air that under certain conditions ruffles the pool or wrecks buildings, under other conditions purifies the blood and conveys thought. The outcome depends upon what air acts upon. The social environment acts through native impulses and speech and moral habitudes manifest themselves. (p. 15)

This material is suggestive of how we might go about resolving the effacement of responsibility of individuals for their activity in technoscience. The problem, I claim, arises from Latour's dichotomous understanding of the working of two mechanisms, the primary one of enlistment and the secondary one of circumscribing leaders as causes of technoscientific movements. Dewey (1988) in a further

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statement of the interaction of organism-environment leads us there when he claims:

> There are specific good reasons for the usual attribution of acts to the person from whom they immediately proceed. But to convert this special reference into a belief of exclusive ownership is as misleading as to suppose that breathing and digesting are complete within the human body. To get a rational basis for moral discussion we must begin with recognizing that functions and habits are ways of using and incorporating the environment in which the latter has its say as surely as the former. (p. 15)

Dewey (1988) turns from the biological context to a less technical one and calls habits arts involving "skill of sensory and motor organs, cunning or craft, and objective materials"(p. 15). By assimilating objective energies, these habits or artistic skills eventually result in commanding the environment through an ordered, disciplined and manifest technique. For Dewey (1988), moral conduct is no different, except that we are not used to such fatuity. Instead, we are accustomed to treating moral dispositions as if they belong exclusively to the self. A whole school of morality capitalizes on the encapsulation of the moral character within the self by "separating character from conduct, motives from actual deeds"(p. 16). Whereas "recognition of the analogy of moral action with functions and arts uproots the causes which have made morals subjective and individualistic"(p. 16).

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I find the following statement by Dewey (1988) to carry with it the power of his analysis of morals as habits and habits as social functions. Of this approach he says that,

> It brings morals to earth, and if they still aspire to heaven it is to the heavens *of* the earth, and not to another world. Honesty, chastity, malice, peevishness, courage, triviality, industry, irresponsibility are not private possessions of a person. They are working adaptations of personal capacities with environing forces. All virtues and vices are habits, which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the out-door world. They can be studied as objectively as physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements. (p. 16)

The fictional "Robinson Crusoe" character stranded on a Pacific Island would, if it were humanly possible to survive or develop in such surrounding, have his habits formed purely in relation to the physical surroundings. According to Dewey (1988), he would after all be living in a moral vacuum.

> Responsibility and virtue would be his alone. But since habits involve the support of environing conditions, a society or some specific group of fellow men is always an accessory before and after the fact. Some activity proceeds from a man; then it sets up reactions in the surroundings. Others approve, disapprove, protest, encourage, share and resist. Even letting a man alone is definite response. Envy, admiration, and imitation are complicities. Neutrality is non-existent. Conduct is always shared; this is the difference between it and a physiological process. It is an ethical "ought" that conduct *should* be social. It *is* social, whether good or bad. (p. 16)

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I think an acceptable way of summarizing Dewey's thoughts on moral conduct might be to say that we would only be as good or as bad as our communities allow. This thought brings me to take up the challenge of finding ways in which we might publish and not perish. This may be accomplished by communicating and acting to build and preserve our communal life through what might be named as "joint action." Joint action is a term coined by John Shotter in his discursive analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of psychological inquiry.

Shotter's earlier work had been informed by a certain concept of human development. A gloss on the nature of development shows it to be a transformation of "natural powers" into "personal powers." According to Shotter (1993), under this interpretation of development, the possession of natural powers is in the "nature" of the child, and what requires explaining is how children are helped by those around them, to "appropriate" their natural powers and to bring them under their own control as personal powers. This is a modernist conception in that it assumes natural powers as the source of an individual's talent. From a postmodern or social constructionist perspective, the possibility of "joint action", which is modeled after genuine dialogue, makes this original understanding of

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development as transforming natural powers into personal powers problematic. For in conversation that is unrehearsed, what you say is influenced by what others have said. Meaning is constructed and negotiated among participants present and past present in shaping a future that is nascent in our bodily interrelations and not yet conceived in thought. This is hardly typical of academic discourse that is controlled and controlling in its attempt to harness and direct untamed (unwanted) energies of people who do not share the culture of academic insularity. Explanations of meaning and discourse are telling about the problem of academic discussions in which meanings are accorded explanations around the concept of rule following. But people do not just follow rules they also create them and break them. I will push or blur the distinction that Gilbert Ryle (1949) constructed in his famous analysis of category mistakes between "knowing how" and "knowing that" in my appropriation of it in a parody of a lesson following that which Peter McLaren (1993) gives of "making workers" and "making Catholics." In doing so, I will parody whether we are capable of "making gays or lesbians." Ryle's distinction may prove useful after all in discussing "knowing how to be gay" and "knowing that one is gay." The question will be raised and an answer sketched as to whether one knows how to be gay before one knows that one is gay.

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But for now, in raising this question of whether the postmodern ushers in a new possibility of "joint action" as a tool of analysis and understanding of our development, I mean to issue a challenge. Dare we push the integration of different sexualities and different social classes further by understanding development as self-regulation emergent in joint action? Together we follow rules, break and create them in practices (habits), not just in thought, as Wittgenstein reminds us, and this is learned within the context of community for the benefit of one and all.

Following in the path made possible by Dewey and perhaps tread upon by John Shotter, I wish to make clear that I am writing in a corrective fashion, from the perspective of a gay man whose development has been intensely inflected and informed by the figure of the closet. In order to recuperate a sense of belonging to the human community, I have, in what follows, tried to correct the exclusion of gays and lesbians from communal life. I hope that by showing the ways in which our perspective is informed by the closet, and used to effect our marginalization from the normative circles of society, one can begin to understand how harm is perpetrated in larger circles than just my own gay life. The moral of this story, as I tell it, will

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become apparent: If you want to understand yourself look for the truly other or alienated embodiment and to those whom you have excluded from your communities and from whom your voices have evolved and developed. I look to instill in others what I have come to respect with reverence in my own being, namely, the tyranny of an irreducible otherness and strangeness of our bodily selves. But for now let the reader rest in the words of Dewey (1988), which probably will carry no comfort though they are conveyed without malice:

> Washing one's hands of the guilt of others is a way of sharing guilt so far as it encourages in others a vicious way of action. Non-resistance to evil, which takes the form of paying no attention to it, is a way of promoting it. The desire of an individual to keep his own conscience stainless by standing aloof from badness may be a sure means of causing evil and thus of creating personal responsibility for it. (p. 17)

This brings us to explore the relationship between what I am calling "queer technologies" and academic discourse, the topic of my next chapter.

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Chapter 3

3. QUEER TECHNOLOGIES AND ACADEMIC DISCOURSE

Figuring Out the New Discursive Psychology:

Although the title selected for this chapter uses nouns in stating the direction that its content will take, I could have expressed it with the active voice which would have emphasized the processes that shape the transformation of the old psychology into the new. The subtitle uses the active voice in its activity of figuring out the new discursive psychology, and this is appropriate as a way of exemplifying the transition in thinking that will occur. Better still would be to say that the subtitle forecasts what will be embodied in the writing of this chapter. While reading through this material a felt shift in the nature of psychological inquiry should be experienced by the reader. This prediction is based on a premise that does not accept the typical distinction in orthodox Marxism between base and superstructure. In that orthodoxy, base refers to the substantial material means of production and its relation to the forces of production. Superstructure is a term whose referent is of such a nature that whatever is to be signified depends upon, for its origination and existence,

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the base which has determined it (and perhaps continues to determine its possibility of existence).

Raymond Williams (1992) has rejected this orthodoxy. And in his writing about literature and politics, culture and society, communication, and technology and cultural forms, Williams persuasively maintains that whatever is conceived of as superstructure is no less substantial in its materiality than either of the two components of the originator base of orthodox constructions. In a firm move away from, or perhaps against, even such strong forms of idealism as Hegelian absolute idealism, Williams recognizes the significance of being cognizant of the materiality of cultural forms for a truly revolutionary or transformative practice capable of material change. By ignoring the materiality and non-deterministic nature of cultural forms, orthodox Marxism missed the opportunity of examining its own revolutionary power, that which is embodied in the discursive practices that the founding fathers of Marxism relied upon in their own initiation of a poetics of change. In other words, the rhetorical nature of the argumentative writings of Marx and Engels lies dormant in and hidden by the scientism of a Marxism that animates the orthodox and hierarchical distinction between the so-called concrete

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economic base and the epi-phenomena (ideational) or theoretical superstructure.

A little imaginative exercise will make this last point about the materiality of cultural forms clear. While washing some dishes last night I was musing about this notion when I heard the rumblings of thunder well up within the skies outside my window. I thought that if it were not for the power of scientific explanations and the beliefs that they engender I should be no less terrified than my distant ancestors who were cave dwelling inhabitants of this earth and of the psychological realm of fear and terror. How innocent were those early cave dwellers in their superstitions that bodied forth from the all too human need to understand and to predict in order to prepare for or even to avoid any impending danger or doom. If not for the benefits of scientific concepts and explanations of the event of thundering, I should be as harried and scared by those thunderous rumblings which served in my case as substance for contrasting my own relatively freer situation with the cave dweller. A cave dweller would have had to be deaf to avoid the impact of such thunderous noise. Or perhaps a benevolent God would have to be invented who, in His love for His own creation, would protect the cave dweller from the awareness of the assaults on and limits of

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his human senses and the psychological apprehensions such an event might have otherwise produced. For myself, I felt comforted in the thoughts that I had nothing or, at most, little to fear. My scientist ancestors had prepared the way for such differences in the bodily experience engendered through my own understanding. I offer this example as a way to clarify the materiality of cultural forms.

The privileging of science over technology through the distinction between the more basic and primary nature of scientific activity over technological activity is, as the orthodox Marxist privileging of the base over the superstructure is, a method of disguising the effectiveness of material constructions in the cultural form that this scientism takes in the promotion of psychological science. Science has two major functions, that of description and explanation. Both are for the purposes of control and of prediction. A psychological science, that accepts these conceptions, lets lie dormant, if not disguised, within its own ideological nature, distinctions that are not innocent. What lies dormant is the nature of the constructive processes through which our bodies are disciplined in their dispositions.

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In drawing out the similarity of forms shared by the orthodox Marxist distinction between base and superstructure, and the distinction between science and technology upon which the institution and privileging of psychological science depends, I am relying on the parallels to then construct an argument that claims that psychology as technoscience functions as an ideology which is not merely formal, but enjoys relative autonomy in its materiality, and thus warrants different placement among the disciplines than it has received before now. In order to get to the point of constructing this argument, setting up the parallels between the base/superstructure distinction and the science/ technology distinction was necessary. So, to repeat slightly this preparatory step, I should say that, just as in the case made by Raymond Williams against the distinction between the base/superstructure, so too in the case made by Bruno Latour against the distinction between science and technology, we must recognize that the privileging accomplished through setting up a hierarchical relationship between the two pairs of terms is illegitimate and part of another form of life or, as I prefer to call it here, of another ideological stance. Though clarification of what is meant by ideology as I use the term is needed, I shall postpone this until after I explain why this challenge is important for my investigations.

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Challenging the Base/Superstructure Distinction:

The necessity of challenging the privileging of the distinction between base and superstructure is made clear when it is realized that in positing too strong a deterministic system of explanation we run into the problems that have been hashed out *ad nauseam* in the debates between philosophers and psychologists over determinism and free will. But more specifically, we set up an insurmountable dilemma. This dilemma marked the misfortune of B.F. Skinner's performance in the televised debates that were conducted with other academic intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky and various spokespersons of humanistic psychology. Skinner was on to something important in maintaining the connection between psychology and political theory, but he fell into the trap of having to defend how it was possible to decide upon the truth of his claims for behavioral conditioning and the laws of learning. If his own speaking were subjected to the scrutiny of his experimental and deterministic framework, then neither he nor other experts should be privileged in laying out the plans for a utopian society. Their claims and beliefs would have to be as determined as any false claims and beliefs. Hence, there was no point outside of the deterministic system from which we could make an impartial and considered evaluation of the

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merits of one or another manner of setting up the conditions of our utopian society. I should spell this out more clearly.

According to a deterministic psychological science such as Skinner's, every system of claims and beliefs would have to have been determined and conditioned. Consider Chomsky's beliefs and claims about transformational grammar or Freud's beliefs and claims for the existence and functioning of dreams and the unconscious; both of these would have been brought about by conditioning, according to Skinner, but the nature of their appeals to truth or of their validity remains opaque. Just because conditioning can be said to have rewarded the holding of either of these systems of beliefs, it cannot be decided which one is correct. All that conditioning theory makes possible to say is that along some path or history of events, each of the proponents and followers of the respective systems have been rewarded for believing that things are so, and reality is as they claim, because of whatever explanation or beliefs they hold. From that perspective, Skinner was jettisoned from the realm of scientific claims and discourse into the treacherously slippery terrain of values and moral discourse. Skinner opened what was viewed as a can of worms in bringing up questions of responsibility and especially of the

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responsibility of scientists. For likewise with the different psychological theories, and perhaps more so with different values, it becomes amazingly complex and difficult to decide which or whose values should be given primacy of place. Or when values clash, as they always do, what ranking should be given in order to implement the solutions for resolving such clashes, and setting things "right". Skinner deserves admiration for raising these issues but certainly then, as it is now, scientists experienced a contradiction in their practice as scientists.

It should be evident why Marx wanted to give deterministic import to the base over the superstructure. He at least wanted to address the nature of exploitation and of the class struggle in history. Skinner, perhaps foggily on the same track as Marx, developed a system of explanation that was based on an examination of the power of economics to influence, shape, and perhaps even determine an organism's responses. I would, however, substitute for responses the terms actions, activity, and acts. The term, "responses", emphasizes the arbitrariness of the behavior enacted and minimizes the meaningful or semiotic nature of the things done. Whereas actions, activity, and acts allows the highlighting and revelation of the embedded and embodied nature of human behavior in its contexts or within varying

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forms of life. Regardless of these criticisms, Skinner shared, whether purposely or knowingly, in the concerns of Marx. To have undertaken an analysis of the contingencies of rewards and punishments, or of environmental influences on human behavior, in the 1950's was a bold step.

We should probably ask why it was so dangerous to openly explore the nature of these powerful motivating forces, namely, economic rewards (Skinner's reinforcements) or deprivations (Skinner's punishments). Dangerous is my supposition, for what else can account for the resistance that confronted the work of Marx and Skinner. Thorsten Veblen's work at the turn of the century is another example of explorations of the power of economic forces to shape our lives. Yet on inspection of the form that such investigations of these matters takes in Veblen, we see that this required some disguise in order to avoid open confrontation with the rich capitalists who would be exposed and attacked had these writings taken a more open form. I would claim that something must be happening to permit more open questioning of the relationship between rulers and ruled than has heretofore been possible. What circumstances are shaping the interrogation and criticism of the disciplinary matrix that comprise intellectual institutions?

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Arguing for Psychology as Technoscience:

Before suggesting answers to these questions, I should finish the construction of my argument about psychology as technoscience. I have maintained that both Marx and Skinner had problems that were intrinsic and extrinsic to their formulations. For now I return to the intrinsic difficulties with which Marx was confronted. As Raymond Williams no doubt understood, it was crucial to recognize the materiality of the superstructure. For Williams (1992), communication and its form and content were not merely ideational things. Communication is substantial in informing the texture of the surfaces and depths of our bodies and the context of our concrete material existence. Williams knew this. He also knew the importance in participating in dialogues, talks, and debates in gaining perspective on reality. Williams was committed to instituting democratic forms of life. Of course he would agree that whoever has the ownership of the economic means of production also if, they so choose, gain control over the forces of production. In addition, along the chain of command or along the lines of influence, the powerful captains of capitalism have the means of directing communications. Through controlling the forms and content of communications, they are in effect able to determine the material reality and through this the consciousness of the masses they so influence. It is this sort of understanding

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of the chain of command that led Marx and Engels to assert that there were beliefs that had an ideological purpose. These would be not truly reflective of reality but rather distorting or clouding of the reality as lived, experienced, perceived and understood, by those not in command. Those who were not capitalists but who were workers. It is, after all, the commodity that organizes the form of life characteristic of the capitalist/ruling class. Note that the institution of contractual agreements is predicated on there being a situation in which both parties to the contract enter it freely without coercion. This aspect of how commodification turns on the relationships of others besides the parties to contracts will be returned to later.

The work of Raymond Williams helps to elucidate the ideological nature of communications. Though as I shall explain next, without Williams' concept of the materiality of communications it is possible to slip into the kind of thinking that has been prevalent in psychological science. Building on Williams' work in criticizing the form which communication takes can be facilitated by appealing to the work of A. Leontiev that is even more pertinent to criticisms of the ideological nature of psychological science. Through the work of Leontiev on activity theory it becomes clear that orthodox Marxists probably incorrectly

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understood Marx. Though Marx did emphasize in his analyses the economic aspects to the forms of life, he was, in his criticisms of Feuerbach, firmly in the location of understanding of communicative activity that Williams mapped out. I introduce at this point in my discussion some of what Leontiev (1978) said about the nature of human activity. This may serve to strengthen our understanding of the integration in Marx's thought about the materiality of communication.

Leontiev discussed the significance that Marxism's teaching about human activity, its development and its forms has had for psychology. He wrote that:

> As is known, Marx begins his remarkable theses on Feuerbach with the indication of the "principal inadequacy of everything that preceded materialism." He believes that reality was taken by Feuerbach only in the form of an object, in the form of contemplation, and not as a human activity, not subjectively.
>
> Speaking of the contemplation of the old materialism, Marx had in mind the fact that cognition was considered then only as the result of the effect of objects on the recognizing subject, on his sense organs, and not as a product of the development of his activity in an objective world. Thus, the old materialism isolated cognition from sensory activity, from living, practical ties of man with the world that surrounded him.
>
> Introducing the concept of activity into the theory of cognition, Marx gave it a strictly materialistic sense: For Marx, activity in its primary and basic form was sensory, practical activity in which people enter into a practical contact with objects of the surrounding world, test their resistance, and act on them, acknowledging their objective properties. This is the radical difference of Marxist teaching about activity as distinguished from the idealistic teaching that

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> recognizes activity only in its abstract, speculative form. (Leontiev, 1978; 12)

If these thoughts of Leontiev are taken together with Williams claim that communication is thoroughly material in its cultural forms, we can understand that the orthodox Marxism need not privilege the base over the superstructure in attempting to criticism the commodifying of the forms of life in bourgeois society. All that is required is that a close proximity to the understanding conveyed by Marx about sensuous activity performs an integrated and constructive link between human beings and an objective reality. For Marx our form of life is inextricably intertwined with the notion of human practice.

According to Leontiev (1978),

> In reality the philosophic discovery of Marx consists not in identifying practice with cognition but in recognizing that cognition does not exist outside the life process that in its very nature is a material, practical process. The reflection of reality arises and develops in the process of the development of real ties of cognitive people with the human world surrounding them; it is defined by these ties and, in its turn, has an effect on their development.
>
> "The prerequisites with which we begin," we read in *German Ideology*, "are not arbitrary, they are not dogmas; they are genuine prerequisites from which we can escape only in imagination. They are the actual individuals, their activity, and the material conditions of their lives." These prerequisites also make up three indispensable features, three links, dialectical ties that form a single, self-developing system.

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> Even bodily organization of individuals incorporates the need that they participate in an active relationship with the external world; in order to exist they must act, produce the necessary means of life. Acting on the external world, they change it; at the same time they also change themselves. This is because what they themselves represent is determined by their activity, conditioned by the already attained level of development, by its means and the form of its organization. (Leontiev, 1978, P. 13)

It should be evident from reading these quotes from Leontiev that Marx's system is one in which the materiality of the bodies of individuals, their activity, and the conditions of their existence are dialectically related, even we could say mutually implicated in their own construction.

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Comparing Base/Superstructure With Science/Technology:

At this point we need to return to the parallel construction that I started to build and discuss above concerning the distinction between base and superstructure and the distinction between science and technology. It should be noted that under Marx's notion of activity, with its dialectical relation to the human individual and its surrounding conditions of existence, there can be no separation between base and superstructure. This is of course a conclusion happily made by a psychological science such as the one Leontiev constructed and for the continuation of my argument that psychology as technoscience functions as an ideology which is not merely formal but enjoys relative autonomy in its materiality, and thus warrants different placement among the disciplines than it has received before now.

Toward that end, consider how recognizing psychological science as a cultural form of communication leads to the conclusion that the discourse of psychological science, though in Marxist terms still part of the superstructure, is relatively autonomous from its economic base by virtue of the materiality of its cultural form. For the purposes of my argument it is necessary that psychological science as discourse is understood to be part of the three elements of

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Marx's dialectical system mentioned in Leontiev's material quoted above. In order to reach the point of seeing that psychology as technoscience plays a material part in the construction of our everyday sensuous activity, the relative independence of psychological science from other sciences must be granted and a measure of autonomy must be extended to psychological science as part of the superstructure from its economic base. Even more to the point is the necessity of seeing that psychological science in its functioning as an ideology evolved through a terrain of a contest in argumentation and must now be taken as various and not comprehensive or consistent in its field of applications. In short then, it will turn out that psychological science needs to be reevaluated and reconstituted as a technoscience. Achievement of this status has occurred through a complex path of contestation.

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Locating the Argument for Psychology as Technoscience:

I shall try to explain how I think it can be construed so as to make this claim about psychology's status as technoscience more plausible, if not acceptable. In breaking the orthodox distinction between base and superstructure, it is possible, even necessary to reconfigure what is meant by ideology. Since superstructure is not strictly determined by the economic base, though conditioned by it nonetheless, we can see that ideology need not be defined as a cloudy or false belief that mystifies and interferes with the recognition of the true nature of reality. I am proposing that we construe the superstructure as a construction that, when not performing ideological functions, is still promoting the views and privilege of the capitalist/ruling class. Well, they are not solely or necessarily the views of the capitalist/ruling class. Years of analyses of popular culture by those critics working in the field of cultural studies have made it implausible to think that ideology is solely the view of the capitalist. Though working class people may in fact get fed the dominant views or ideology of the ruling class, that does not mean that they are not also experiencing, through organized practices of resistance, a different point of view which constitutes their own ideological standpoint. Psychology as technoscience, in its positioning within the superstructure,

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performs the function of helping to organize the bodies of human individuals. Their relational activities are enacted within the system of an ongoing basis as a sensuous and self-developing practice. Thus, taking psychology as technoscience permits various constructions, systems of beliefs and differently organized modes of ideological practices to emerge because it is relatively autonomous from the economic base. It would be wise to remember that the economic base is the major contributing factor in the conditioning and mediation of the forms that life can take among society's various and diverse constituents.

Some of the terrain of contest that psychological science has traversed since its inception some hundred years ago is beginning to be written about and discussed among historians of psychology. An important contribution to such discussions is Kurt Danziger's *Constructing the Subject* (1990), which begins to show how psychology transforms its self when appropriated into different cultural contexts. Beginning with the work of Wilhelm Wundt and the introspective psychology that developed in his laboratory in Germany, Danziger traces the evolution of psychological science as it was appropriated and reshaped in the cultures of France, England, and finally the United States. I can only speculate about the reasons for the particular shape that psychology

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took in the laboratory of Wundt. According to Danziger's description, it was apparent that the method of introspection had to be highly developed almost in the manner that Freudian dream interpretation as a method required that analysts be instructed in the technique through their own induction into the analytic process. Wundt and his laboratory mates practiced the method of introspection among themselves. Could it be that social life being so constrained in the larger culture led Wundt and his mates to seek and create expressive forms of a more intimate nature than was available in the strict and formalistic cultural forms that prevailed in Germany of their day? Perhaps this was so for Freud as well. I am assuming, what I hope later to argue, that certain social circumstances force individuals into an exploration of options when prevalent patterns or habits are no longer successful in generating the desired satisfactions. But for now we need only take from Danziger a thumb-nail sketch of the direction of change and transformation that psychology underwent in its travels from Germany to France and England, and finally upon its arrival in America.

Although Danziger's book is a work of the new sociocultural historians, it leaves an important part of the story untold. The part that is lacking might have been if he had traced

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the evolution and adaptation of psychological science in the opposite direction. Rather than following the drift toward the West to France and England, if he had taken his investigations in an eastern direction across the borders of the USSR, a different understanding would have emerged. I know that he is not to be chided for his direction of exploration because many a story has been told of how intellectuals in the United States were denied tenure or had careers dashed abruptly as a result of publishing material which was self-consciously Marxist. Some of these cases have been resurrected in recent months in the obituaries of several City University of New York (CUNY) psychologists that were fired during the McCarthy period in the 1950's. Something though seems to be changing in the United States now that communism is no longer a perceived or real threat following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war. Intellectuals are writing more freely, though admittedly in a spirit of celebration, of the demise of communism.

Some serious attempts to address the Marxist thinking and psychological science that developed in the USSR has been prominently a part of the work of psychologists in the sociocultural historical tradition in the U.S. over the past thirty years. But even these attempts have yet to address

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fully the differences that emerge when psychological science is embedded in diverse socioeconomic contexts. The comparison that I have in mind, and will discuss in chapter five on queer voices, is between the forms that psychology has taken in the U.S. and the USSR. Naturally, it is hoped that a different reception, more positive and less condemnatory, can be made in relation to the present investigations. This, however, is not a criticism of Danziger whose work on how the subject of psychology has been constructed is an antecedent that has made the present undertaking possible.

It is not my objective to do a thorough research piece of historical scholarship concerning the exclusion of Marxist thinking from psychology that appeared in Germany, France, England, and the U.S. Instead, I shall construct a more general picture of how the necessity of establishing psychology as a science mitigated the chances of it taking a more radical and Marxist form in one of those contexts. In the writing of Mary Midgley, namely in her book, *Science as Salvation*, we can find mention of the avoidance of the Marxist voices of intellectuals as Needham, Bernal, and Haldane, to name a few that she mentions. In her attempt to retrieve a more general understanding of science as a modern myth she retraces or even fabricates the retreat among

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scientists into their highly technical and specialist cubbyholes. Though Midgley (1992) claims that it is still a prevalent view among people in British society that they owe respect, even adulation, to science for its enormous contribution to enhancing and making possible the kind of life that Britains have, she argues that scientists for the most part, except the great Marxist polymaths mentioned before, shied away from the excess of intellectual thinkers that cared to stroke their brush broadly in attempting to encompass an especially wide ranging view of reality.

Midgley (1992) stated that

> It is easy to see how the specialists' rather frantic modesty arose. It was a reaction against excess. Philosophers of science invented it as a way of disqualifying the Marxist and Freudian sages who claimed the prestige of science for their vast metaphysical systems. (p. 4-5)

Midgley (1992) goes on to report that Bernal's (1967) response to this was to argue "that communism was simply the logical conclusion of the whole scientific enterprise"(p. 5). She also maintains that Bernal could have been answered, but that this would have conflicted with their self-consciously chosen specialized work. Instead of answering Bernal or others like him, the preferred manner of dealing with them was to narrow what could be counted as "science"

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so as to deprive them of access to its status. In her own words,

> They therefore contracted science and pulled up the drawbridge. A disturbance followed when it was noticed that they had accidentally left the whole of evolutionary theory outside in the unscientific badlands as well. But special arrangements were made to pull it in without compromising the principle. That principle was to minimize the business of 'science'-to define it as narrowly as possible, confining its prestige to detailed, provable, specialized work. (Midgley, 1992, p. 5)

Admittedly, Midgley does not offer us much insight into what this narrowing of the definition of science had to do with class position. Others could help us, but for now we will set this aside and go on to consider why it is necessary and how it is possible to move away from this separatist notion of science in order to establish psychology as technoscience and then work our way toward and through the rhetorical figuring of academic discourse with the device of queer technology and of establishing the significance of how the construction of the paradigm for a new conversational or discursive psychology enacts the epistemology of "the closet".

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Embracing Psychological Inquiry as Technoscience:

At the outset of this chapter I had said that two things were important in moving toward the argument that psychology as technoscience performs ideological functions that are constructive rather than cloudy, mystifying, and false with regard to understanding reality. Above I have tried to open up the question of psychological science's uniformity and comprehensiveness by referring to some of the work of the sociocultural historians and cultural analysts in psychology, both in the U.S. and abroad in the USSR. A truly comparative analysis of the social, cultural and historical nature of psychological science is a step in disrupting the notion of science as other than ideological. In creating this sort of disruption, psychological science, especially when treated from the perspective of discourse and its communicative functions, becomes available for reconceptualization as more integrated with the Marxist thinking concerning sensuous activity and self-developing practices.

Although through Bruno Latour's work we can arrive at an understanding of technoscience as what had previously been the distinction between science and technology, that path is one that is fraught with the hazard of rejecting the Marxist practice of ideological analysis. Latour makes the same

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error as psychologists whom, in their rush to gain respect for their activities by aligning themselves as scientific, throw out what is really, in a proper sense, essential to their enterprise. This can be explained with more detail. Consider first the case of Latour. In order to get his operation off the ground it is necessary for him to reject the strictly deterministic conception of his practice. That conception recall involves the orthodox Marxist distinction between the economic base and superstructure. Latour wishes to engage in exploratory openings of black boxes that are assumed innocent by the agents in their various fields of scientific and technological practice. As someone who wants to take up the tools of the anthropologist, namely those of ethnographic and narrative analysis, he tries, perhaps in a different yet still related way as the phenomenologist, to bracket the conceptions and prejudices of the dominant culture. He does this in order to appreciate, through thick and rich descriptions, what is actually transpiring within the various fields and their black boxes that he has targeted for cultural analysis. Cultural anthropology, it has been argued, is in its construction and operation a tool of capitalist colonization. Examinations of the institution's structures, through which funding has been derived in both England and the U.S., reveals the ideological perspectives and economic interests that such

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interventions, perhaps even invasions, has served. Even within the field of practice of anthropology, it can be observed that there is no strict, determined understanding that evolves from participating in such interventions as fieldwork. This slippage between the sociocultural and historical conditioning that shapes the interventions of ethnographers is expressed in the rejection that Latour makes of the orthodox Marxist distinction between economic base and superstructure. Think of it: how else would it be possible to make the kind of critical, even reflexive, analysis of one's own practice if it were not for the non-deterministic nature of the investigation processes. For now the temptation is to dive right in to an exploration of this phenomena but this will come later in the last three chapters where I lead up to a thick and rich description of an example of one way of doing post-disciplinary practice of socioculturally and historically inflected psychological inquiry.

For now it will be good enough to stay with the understanding of how Latour's ethnographic practice developed out of a historically necessary activity germane to the capitalist enterprise of colonization. Latour and the anthropologists led the way for psychologists especially, but for sociologists as well to follow. This

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comes as now a surprise, I hope, that social science, in its modernist forms of practice, is made possible, if not animated through and through, with the ideological and communicative functions of the liberal individualism of the enlightenment thought. Although, as I have argued elsewhere, self-reflective activity has been around since ancient times, it is in an innocent and naive sense part of what humans have always done in self-corrective and self-regulatory fashion. There is a history of the transformations that self-reflective activity has undergone. The chronology of establishment or of the American invention of the social sciences is, concerning those we have taken up so far, first anthropology, then sociology and last psychology. As far as the general purpose of the social sciences we can mention the claims of Dorothy Ross (1991):

> The social sciences began in America by importing and adapting models of political economy, political science, and sociology developed in Europe in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. These were new ways of understanding the historical world, born out of a new kind of historical consciousness and shaped by the emerging contours of capitalist society. The social sciences originated in the eighteenth century in an effort to understand the character and future of modern society. And thinkers such as Montesquieu, Adam Smith, Condorcet, and J. G. Herder envisioned social sciences that would guide modern society into the future. The effort to create social sciences was bound up with the discovery that history was a realm of human construction, propelled ever forward in time by the cumulative effects of human action, and taking new qualitative forms. (p. 3)

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It has long been understood that the social sciences reflect something of the ideological character of the dominant social class. Recent social events, such as the demise of the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics, and the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, which divided communist East Germany from its democratic West German counterpart, has been used to cast doubt on the credibility of Marxist class analyses. Perhaps this has been an overreaction. Though a possibility, I will not pursue that line of argument here. Instead I should claim that something different is happening across and within cultural zones and national borders. Globalization is having its way and its day. Nationalistic borders are now interpreted as artificial and anachronistic. Though these borders may, in fact, have been created and sustained through the delineation of national and international laws, the cultural zones are not so easily effaced. According to Francis Fukuyama (1995), explanations of a cultural sort are needed in order to understand a country's success in building corporate strength, so that its capital might transcend and obliterate its nationalistic borders within which its progress had its period of incubation. Culture is defined in Fukuyama's terms as inherited ethical habits. The thickness of such habits is not so easily effaced or destroyed, as are the legalistically construed borders that shape the nations. It

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is across such borders that inherited ethical habits weave their patterns, promoting the health and existence of globalization efforts and their constituent processes.

Something very different is required today to produce the globalization processes that are leading us as citizens of the world into the 21st Century. Skinner had the right idea about wanting to connect his psychology of contingency relations of rewards and punishments with a broader political philosophy but he regrettably relinquished his attempted linkage. No doubt, as an ethnographic and historical analysis would reveal, the McCarthy hearings and Communist extirpation of the 1950's must have had something to do with shaping Skinner's own intellectual behavior. His consequent shying away from pursuing such lines of analysis and investigation that might have built upon his early programmatic speculations regarding the connection between psychology and political philosophy would lead one to believe it to be so. Most psychologists, like Skinner, were perhaps silenced by the early reward of assurance that their research programs could ensue, though as covert enterprises, by the acceptance of methodological individualism. This principle, which is at the foundation of the free market moralities that were constructed by such Austrian philosophers of economics as von Mises and Hayek, is very

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much a constituent building block of the ideology that suited the capitalism of those earlier days of the first half of the 20th Century. Psychology, with its historical origins in the German laboratories of von Helmholtz, Fechner and Wundt, was always closely affiliated with this Germanic cult of individualism. Fukuyama no doubt has in mind to capture such proclivities of long standing as the methodological individualism of this cultural zone by his definition of culture as inherited ethical habits. I wonder if his appropriation of this term and its definitions will not turn out to be something of a reproduction of the political individualism of the liberal or conservative traditions.

Musing aside, we should ask whether the shifts in production are demanding now that a more collective and interdependent thought be instituted in order to effect the kinds of problem-solving required of a technologically advanced globalization. Production is always a social process never merely an automated and mechanical set of procedures. A study of current thinking on the nature of technology will yield a rather broader understanding of technology than just having to do with machines or mechanization. We shall have the occasion to take up in the next chapter whether or not, and if so in what ways, the human body may be the basis for

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the creation of machines. But certainly it should be acknowledged now that by mechanization we mean a wide application of routine procedures that are perhaps governed by steps or stages that approach a goal through prescribed patterns of means. In the machine age, or technocracy, it may be that cultural values and systems have been threatened or displaced so that only means-end determinations such as that of efficiency have come to rule in the guidance of mechanization.

But to return to the shaping of the problematic, we need to ask ourselves whether and how psychology has come to now revise itself from its prior emphasis. An emphasis in which the individual is the locus of thought and agent of political empowerment and actions generally engaged with, but definitely independent of, its social and material environment. Rather than articulate a set of relations that would provide us with a theory that is abstracted from a location about which we know nothing. I should like to attempt to model my initial assumptions and speculations through the formulation of a general psychological theory that follows what the Russian psychologists had intended by the term "general psychology". Note that the American variety of general psychology is typically divergent from the Russian kind. We find general psychology in America

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taught as a smorgasbord of representative sampling from the entire range of psychological investigations. So rather than a student of an introductory course, entitled "General Psychology", getting a comprehensive and coherent theory of the psychological terrain, the student gets more of a bag of unrelated or competing conjectures which are psychological theories only in the sense that Wittgenstein considered a term to be of the same kind when referred to as "having a family resemblance."

Actually the major difficulty for such approaches to psychological theory arises from an inherent assumption of commonality in the subjects of psychological knowledge. Here by subjects I mean human subjects about which the theories are intended to explain the thought and action of such individuals as have been studied, and of those to which application or generalization may be extended. The assumption that I am calling to mind here is that which claims the mind of the subject is built like a central processing unit of a modern electronic computer. The assumption that all the forms of individualistic psychology makes is that the individual mind has, as its organizing principle, a machine type of processor which gives unity and orderly governance to its productive activities whether these are thought or action. Without digressing into an

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analysis of what thought is, let me say for now that a workable understanding of thought may be sustained by taking thought as ontologically of the order of actions or activities which are represented by metaphor and at times by metonymy. This assumption of the mind as consisting of a central processing unit, is the biggest stumbling block for imparting consistency to the disparate constituents that comprise the smorgasbord variety of general psychology. And it is the largest point of contention for anything that might properly be called "cultural psychology"(Schweder, 1991).

I would make an even larger claim that the assumption of the mind as a central processor is also an obstacle to constructing a new psychological theory that would help to layout the workings of the social processes of production that are manifesting themselves in the globalization of capital. In short, we need to eliminate this assumption and thereby clear the way for a psychology that has its grounding in a properly clarified and emphatically realized political philosophy. In pursuit of this goal, let us look at whether some of the earlier investigations of people like John Dewey were able to make headway towards a properly cultural analysis of thought and action. One which does not fall victim to the skeletal infrastructure of methodological

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individualism and the denials of the political nature of psychological research and which was ensured, for the most part, under the scare of the influence of McCarthyism on academic life in America. Before we look at Dewey and whether or not in his writings *Human Nature and Conduct* and *Logical Inquiry* we will find firm grounds for carrying this investigation further, we need to understand in what way the figure of the closet, or the closetedness of academic discourse, has become the vehicle for disguising the political nature of psychological discourse.

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Reading Academic Writing Symptomatically:

But before approaching those exclusions and effecting their recovery through an analysis of the figure of the closet, we should consider an issue that may be weighing on the reader's mind after the conclusion of the previous chapter. I left off with mention of a procedure for rendering a symptomatic reading. Rather than call it a procedure, it should be referred to as a technology of symptomatic reading: a queer technology of reading. I owe the reader an introduction to this technology. This can be best accomplished by providing one such reading of a book by Lorenzo Simpson (1995) entitled *Technology, Time and the Conversations of Modernity*. He purports to disrupt the manner in which technology, guided with the aide of instrumental reason, dominates nature and attempts to place human beings in an external relation to time, thus to extrude ourselves from our lived condition of temporality and thereby enacting our fear of our own mortality.

Since a major task of Simpson's work in the early part of his book is to effect a distinction between science and technology, it is convenient to the argument for psychology as a technoscience to show that such a break in the hierarchical location of science over technology is not possible even if it were desirable as Simpson seems to

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believe. Other reasons for the selection of this book will be made apparent as the symptomatic reading unfolds. It is not an arbitrary choice; there are good reasons to come.

When I first undertook the task of reviewing this book for a colleague, I had doubts as to the nature of any contribution that I might make because it seemed to me that the book had received substantial accolades from such luminaries as Seyla Benhabib of Harvard, Sabina Lovibond of Oxford, Thomas McCarthy of Northwestern, Marx W. Wartofsky of CUNY, and Cornel West of Harvard. But once immersed in reading Simpson's book, I was confronted with an unwelcome surprise. I did not find myself in agreement with the accolades of those five original readers. A bit discomposed, I accepted the necessity of declaring and expounding the nature of my disagreement. So as not to risk accusation of making ad hominem arguments, I have chosen to frame my criticisms within what I am calling "a symptomatic reading". A symptomatic reading is conducted from within a hermeneutic framework in which the rhetorical position of the author/writer is understood and interpreted from the rhetorical position of its audience/readers. I take up and construct myself as one such member of the book's audience.

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Sounds simple, but it is a position not without problems and yet perhaps, according to Simpson's own self-avowal, an acceptable position to read from since he, too, professes to locate himself in the hermeneutic tradition. He therein takes up a position of resistance toward the post-modernist movement and fragmentation of social subjects within the cultural postmodern climate and its various post-structural theories, especially those of Foucault, Luhmann, and Richard Rorty. Simpson constructs himself as a hero, championing the rescue of his audience/readers from the deleterious effects of philosophical nihilism and what he calls "the values-perspective in general". The latter is explained as without context and adrift. It is a product of various forms of relativism against which Simpson juxtaposes his own favored remedy of meaning or meaningfulness that stems, we learn, from participation in a democratic public sphere which is ever expanding so as to become more inclusive of humanity's potential. Humanity's potential is signified by what Simpson calls "the virtual we", which, he claims, may serve as a regulative ideal.

Though Simpson's accolades praise his depth, subtlety, and refinement of the tradition of critical theory, I find his analysis a repetition of much that has gone before especially in the work of Habermas. Indeed, he has mastered

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the discourse of his predecessors and takes on some worthy opponents at least from the position of mourning the loss of, or threat to, the public sphere that Habermas has championed so well. But, I think that others have said what Simpson means to say more clearly and simply, and in more accessible and popular forms. One in mind is Neil Postman's (1992) *Technopoly: The Surrender of Culture to Technology,* which makes clear its intention to distance itself from the polar opposites of technofile and technophobe.

Postman draws the lines of debate through a terse but accurate historical presentation of the invention of science through the developments in technology that made its 17th Century European incarnation possible. After all, if not for the inventions of the telescope, printing press and the clock, there would not have been any science to speak of in that time period.

Technopoly is used, in Postman's term, to pick out the 20th Century in the United States which, he claims, has lost any possibility of moderating the march of technological development toward ever greater efficiency and improvement by any heretofore existing cultural and social belief systems. This climate of technology gone wild is meant to be captured by writers of our postmodern condition. Postman

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clearly states that human communities need to recapture a sense of tradition in order to harness the reigns of technology, whereas Simpson, I am afraid, repeats the mistake of the Frankfurt School condemnation of mass mediated society, including technology, and joins them in their style of techno-phobia. Someone needs to write a corrective historical analysis of the differences between the class situated nature of the Frankfurt School Critical Theory and the American (Luddite) working class critique of technology. What we need is a more subtle class structured analysis of the effects of technological development in today's society. This analysis needs to show how ridiculous it is to maintain on the one hand an appreciation of the contributions of modern day science and on the other a categorical condemnation of technology in general. Though it intentionally ignores the class structuring of technology by rejecting the wholesale appropriation of any master-narratives such as Marxism, Bruno Latour's ethnographic work brings out the necessity of bridging the distinctions between science and technology through renaming the enterprise as technoscience. This reclassification makes possible the critical study of the everyday working of networks of laboratories and counter-laboratories in the pervasive system, in which knowledge is constituted, produced and reproduced today. At least Latour's approach of

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disregarding master-narratives is justified by his method of making present what had previously been dismissed because of the explanation of science and technology as driven by the military-industrial-complex.

It needs to be said that not all of the members of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory were technophobic. Steven Vogel (1995) clarifies the dispute between Jurgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse regarding technology. Vogel wrote:

> Although the earlier Frankfurt School texts, especially Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, has taken a deeply pessimistic view of the modern project of science and technology, connecting it with an attempt to "dominate nature" that inevitably ended in "enlightenment's" own self-destruction, Marcuse's position of the 1950s was considerably more ambiguous. Technology appeared to him to provide, if not a guarantee of human freedom, then at least a necessary condition for it. In *Eros and Civilization* Marcuse argued that the development of automation had finally made it possible to reduce the labor time necessary for the satisfaction of human needs to a bare minimum, and in so doing had opened up the possibility of an end to the repression of labor had made necessary. His vision of a new society thus depended essentially on the virtual abolition of labor (and scarcity) by technology. Freedom is identified with the liberation of the repressed "inner nature" that Horkheimer and Adorno had described, but this is now seen as being made possible precisely by the completion of technological development. (p. 24)

Marcuse (1991) wrote in his *One-Dimensional Man*,

> Science, by virtue of its own method and concepts, has projected and promoted a universe in which the domination of nature has remained linked to the domination of man-a link which tends to be fatal to

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> this universe as a whole. If this were the case, then the change in the direction of progress, which might sever this fatal link, would also affect the very structure of science-the scientific project. Its hypothesis, without losing their rational character, would develop in an entirely different experimental context (that of a pacified world); consequently, science would arrive at essentially different concepts of nature and establish essentially different facts. (p. 166-167)

According to Robert Pippin (1995), Andrew Feenberg attempted "to revise Marcuse's insights without the unacceptable utopianism and romanticism"(p. 50).

> This involves showing the ways in which the design, implementation, and organization of technology are, in various ways, historically contingent, that they, at least partly, reflect the interests of "elites" who do the designing and implementing, and that some form of democratization of the workforce can make the best, most just, social use of the now critically revealed "contingencies' in design and implementation. (p. 50)

It seems a closer reading of the Frankfurt School reveals a different picture of the relationship between science and technology, and the domination of nature and of man. This is a far cry from Simpson's unqualified claim that technology serves human kind in its attempt to extract itself from temporality is offered as if it were original, without any prior history. Simpson's claim might be bounded and nuanced by a recognition of the feminist tradition in which this accusation of man dominating nature has been substantiated quite thoroughly in the work of feminist writers. How is it that Simpson has been able to overlook or ignore this

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tradition? This oversight or omission is followed later in the book by Simpson's use of the feminine pronouns she and her in his construction of and reference to the antagonist position against which he has set himself as he writes in the narrative and heroic voice of the protagonist. The feminist voice has made prominent, in contemporary moral discourse, the question of whether the masculine domination of forces of nature is right within an ecologically framed understanding of the interaction between organism and environment. In addition, it has made present the rendering and relegating of the feminine subject to the position of antagonist. For these reasons, I find Simpson's lack of recognition of the feminist voice peculiar and unacceptable. To my mind a symptomatic reading of the Simpson book is necessary in its own right as well as advantageous or opportunistic for my purpose of demonstrating what I mean by a symptomatic reading.

I would maintain that Simpson's book cries out for the kind of deconstruction that a symptomatic reading can render. In Derridean form, a deconstructive reading shows that, what is claimed as true in the content of the text under consideration, is nested within an interpretive scheme that also contains its own contradictions. The most general form that this deconstructive activity can take is its

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metaphysical one offered by Nietzsche. Namely that, truth is a vehicle of our understanding that depends upon the march of an army of falsehoods. That truth is fixed, or can be once and for all, is for Nietzsche an illusion of our grammar that produces the appearance of objects independent of our bodily connection. Quine (1969) agrees with this, as well, in his theorization that the objects of science are myths on a par with Homer's gods. Nietzsche's insight, which I have roughly represented in the preceding statement, is basically that our linguistic activity is itself conducted through the use of metaphors in the construction of meaning. Even the language in which I write about the meanings of our words is constructed out of the metaphoric comparison of words serving as vehicles that carry meaning from its sender/speaker/writer to its receiver/auditor/reader. Though I have not claimed to be applying a strictly deconstructive analysis of Simpson's book, I borrow slightly from Derrida so as to suggest the nature of a symptomatic reading which I intend on providing in what follows.

The way in which a Derridean style of deconstruction serves partly to frame my interrogation of Simpson's book is through bringing into focus the juxtaposition of the absence of recognition of feminism's critique of the domination of nature by Simpson and of the irritating presence, at least

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to me, of the feminine voice in the construction of the antagonist position against which Simpson poses himself as champion. As a colleague suggested, it is possible that Simpson's copy editor chose to use the feminine pronoun throughout instead of, or as compensation for, the more typical sexist language convention of using only the masculine pronoun. Nevertheless, a writer/author would have had to agree to this, and thus, would make himself the target of the charge of insensitivity for the absence of recognition and the presence of a peculiar derogation of the feminine voice to that objectivist position or location in contemporary moral discourse against which it has been most firmly opposed. So, the borrowing of Derridean terminology is only meant to bring into focus this peculiar and irritating juxtaposition. We should expect more from a writer who claims to be on top of the debate among discussants of modernism and post-modernism to commit such an oversight. But to further engage with the symptomatic reading of the Simpson book, I should say that there are other peculiar things happening in the argumentative structure of his writing. Among them is the attempt on Simpson's part to save "Science" from the charge that he levels against technology to which I now turn.

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I have already mentioned above the a-historical appreciation of the development of science through the technologies of telescope, printing press and the clock, but more can be said of Simpson's appreciation. In fairness, he does lay out an important contrast between scientistic projects and hermeneutic ones. Of course he approves of the latter. And yet I find him inconsistent in rejecting the objectivizing practices or reductions of positivism (scientism) because he has assumed that the failure of some of our pre-reflective anticipation is the substance that a hermeneutic project needs in order to understand the falsification (limits) of certain possible meanings of human experience. After all, is not Simpson's criticism of science's two reductions, the reflection of one such example of the falsification necessary to uncovering the meaning of experience or of who we are?

I am concerned that he commits the same error as that of what he accuses science of committing. And as is generally the case with academic discourse, there is too much valuing of words and taxonomies and too little attention or neglect of our bodies' participation in what is called mimetic (pre-linguistic) culture (Donald, 1991). An alternative direction would elaborate upon Dewey's dialectic of imaginative problem-solving and habitual communal patterns, necessitated

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by the breakdown of previously adaptive negotiations between organism and environment. From this perspective that develops Dewey's conception of inquiry as dialectic, we can explore the dialectic of bodies and voices, through which we attempt to transform obstacles to a future in which we emerge as alive and satisfied. Or, at the very least we would emerge as ready to imaginatively surmount our frustrations. Engaged theory has the capacity through its being situated in and among the multitude of constituents to allow us to emerge out of disagreement into ever passing moments of cooperation or harmony. To me, in my most charitable grasp of Simpson's project, this seems to be what he is arguing for. But in the trap of the universalizing discourse of rationality, Simpson is a hanger-on from the Enlightenment project of liberation, the best of which was the emphasis on rescuing opportunities for creation of individuality from oppression and the worst of which is what has become the tyranny of hyper-individualism that threatens to self-destruct under postmodern and postindustrial consumerist exploitation. Simpson was right in taking up some of the existential anxieties of Kierkegaard but should have paid more attention to the fear of having a self. I find much of academic discourse, Simpson's included, rift through and through with this anxiety of revealing the nature of one's self and the commitments through which that

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self becomes known to ourselves and to others. Had Simpson listened to, or perhaps heard, the voices of feminism he might have found supportive allies with which to carry on the kind of dialogue he seems to hanker for.

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Situating Theorists in Situated Theory:

In addressing some of the difficulties that she has found in responses to her choice to avoid "academic reformulation of feminist insights" [because it] "has too often added little of substance"(p. xv), Catharine MacKinnon (1989) says the following, in her preface to *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State*. This statement, I think, can be useful in helping us to find our way out of the old style of philosophizing:

> If perspective participates in situation and if situation is divided by power, how will we talk to each other? The fact that some people do not like an argument or observation, or feel threatened or uncomfortable or find it difficult, does not make it wrong or impossible or untrue. Many readers (in the Kantian tradition) say that if a discourse is not generalized, universal, and agreed-upon, it is exclusionary. The problem, however, is that the generalized, universal, or agreed-upon never did solve the disagreements, resolve the differences, cohere the specifics, and generalize the particularities. Rather, it assimilated them to a false universal that imposed agreement, submerged specificity, and silenced particularity. The anxiety about engaged theory is particularly marked among those whose particularities formed the prior universal. What they face from this critique is not losing a dialogue but beginning one, a more equal and larger and inclusive one. They do face losing the advance exclusivity of their point of view's claim to truth--that is, their power. And we continue to talk about it. (p. xv-xvi)

Very well said, and within her statement, lives a lesson for all of us who aspire to construct a democratic public sphere. I believe Simpson is committed to this also but his error is his attempt to be heroic. That is, he attempts to construct once and for all a space even if only an

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argumentative space in which all voices might be safely heard. That shall never be for us human beings. It is the nature of our condition, and I think it's permanent or enduring, to live among the unsettling social relations that are enlivened by and bring to bear an evolving network of power/knowledge relations. It is our lot in life to struggle and negotiate more equitable positions for our selves both in our communities and among communities. To engage in the kind of argumentation that Simpson does, belies its own anxiety of entering the fray and fracas of a power/knowledge without guarantees.

Further criticism of Simpson's book could be developed along the line of his lack of dialogical appreciation of the disparate nature of the gendered positions of men and women. This is foretold in his wholesale acceptance of just joining the moral and relational approach of women as caregivers, with the rights-based and highly individualistic moral approach of men. To attempt this ignores the constructed influences of these historically constituted approaches. We might also discuss the lack of appreciation of the dialectical way in which organisms and surroundings are constantly being created and recreated by their environment. But this would take us to far a field. For our purposes, it

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should be sufficient to have shown how we can read a text symptomatically.

But we may conclude that the writer is, in a special sense, contained within his or her texts. Though perhaps not specifically represented therein, they are, as authorial selves, constructed in the activity of writing. This writing may be deconstructed and read symptomatically in the manner that I have done with the Simpson text. Best would be if all serious writing contained, in its presentation and publication, a confessional component in which the author attempts a reflexive and critical analysis of his or her own writing. This symptomatic reading has promise for a number of traditionally excluded standpoints such as gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality other than heterosexual and socio-economic class.

I think that Catherine MacKinnon has stated her position clearly about what may be gained from entering into such a dialogue as would permit moving to a level of more complete expression or exposure of our personalities, our selves, and our identities. That position is summarized in her quotation above.

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MacKinnon (1989) also, in the above quotation, makes clear what people wedded to science have raised as objections to the engaged theory and writing she has set forth. In attempting to clarify her concern for those who believe that "adhering to science as a standard for theory," means "that the theorist must be stripped of commitments, community, experience, and feelings to know the truth about society"(p. xvi), she writes that:

> If knowledge is located instead in a critical embrace of those same commitments, a recognition of community context, a skeptical grasp of the roots and consequences of experience as well as its limitations, and an attempt at awareness of the social determinations of emotions, these factors are made accessible to theory. Such a theory does not deny that the theorist is determined by the very factors the theory documents for everyone else. Theory becomes a social endeavor inseparable from collective situation. Situated theory is concrete and changing rather than abstract and totalizing, working from the viewpoint of powerlessness to political understanding toward social transformation. This posture places the theorist inside the world and the work, not above or outside them- which, to be frank, is where the theorist has been all along. (MacKinnon, 1989, p. xvi)

Concerned to respond to those who fear "that speaking from inside runs the risk of being compelling to those who are already convinced"(p. xvi), she says that:

> This may be because much prior theory has adopted the position of dominance and needed to disguise that fact to support the illusion that it was speaking for everyone. Whatever its disabilities, speaking from the position of subordination does not have this one. In any event, I accept the risk of the engaged theorist without really believing that many readers are thereby excluded. The alternative has too often been compelling to no one. (p. xvi)

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I agree entirely. And I hope by the end of this work to have shown how the working of the text or of writing can be understood fruitfully as a location for unconscious or closeted problem-solving, especially so in the kind of writing produced in academia under the regimes of disciplinary rule. But before that, we need to recover the really significant materiality of our bodies, or at least show the way to such recovery. It is the absent body that may be read symptomatically in our texts but this will require quite a lot of excavation. As we proceed now, think of yourself as an archaeologist, sifting through the artifacts of our socially constructed lives and selves for clues to the origins or sources of production of our, as yet, little understood identities. As Quine (1960) has described his radical translator, who visits an entirely foreign community of natives, as needing to decipher the codes of the natives in the full context and surroundings of their actions and activities and according to the experience of them and their actions afforded by his own mediating activities, namely his language and its ontological assumptions, so will we be asked to take up the standpoint of a gay man: the one who is writing and dreaming himself into existence. The one, namely myself, who wishes to offer a way of understanding gay identity as a standpoint of the

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oppressed but nonetheless as a standpoint that does not exclude others but helps to establish an appreciation and respect for that truly other state of being that is irreducible to intellectual understanding. This has come about through my own experience of living for a while at least, if not permanently, in exile from my fully other self. My embodiment as ego-syntonic rather than ego-dystonic to use an appropriate Freudian term. That exile came from being born into a family which was heterosexist. It dictated my development in life as informed by the figure of the closet. I had no choice as a young child but to hide my gayness, or potential for gayness, from those who would ridicule and punish me for being different. Through that history of living in a family, I learned to reject the grounding of my biological existence and to distrust the body through which my existence was achieved and sustained. Some have said, powerfully, that ethnic minorities at least have their families to support them when ostracized and oppressed by the larger community, but lesbians, gays and bisexuals-the sexually different, and for now considered deviant-are born into the enemy camp. We are utterly alone, without the solace and comfort of our families of origins. We must rely on the enemy, metaphorically speaking, to survive, and as anyone who looks closely and sympathetically enough will see, we have many wounds from this arrangement.

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But my interest does not lie in carping and complaining-I do not look for sympathy and certainly not for pity-instead I hope to offer the perspective of a gay man as a vantage point from which to understand the pluralism of our lived communities. The end goal is to begin a reverential stance toward our bodies as the ground of our being. This is, as any good agnostic should vent, his or her need for worship. If God is dead, as I think must be so, then all that remains is our bodies. And those are in need of recovery at least in the work of theory and in the situated theorist, we may have hope of beginning this recovery.

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Chapter 4

4. QUEER BODIES AND MATERIALLY SIGNIFICANT OTHERNESS

Introducing the Task of Recovering Real Material Bodies:

The task which lies ahead for me is to substantiate my claim that the new paradigm for a discursive psychology, or plainly said, a psychological inquiry based on such a conversational analysis as Harre, Gergen and Shotter have proposed and developed, does not allow for consideration of bodies or, in Foucauldean terms, excludes the materiality of bodies. Whereas my argument criticizing the new paradigm for psychology based on conversational analysis also claims that besides the body issues of socio-economic class structure are also closeted and thereby excluded from the field of discourse, both bodies and issues of socio-economic class must be examined. But, even though both of these exclusions are contemporaneously effected through the figure of the closet, the operative effects of the latter are achieved through the disciplining of bodies. So, it makes sense to tease apart these effects and consider them one at a time in this and then the following chapter.

In the next chapter, it will be shown how the structuration of social and economic class can be recovered by using the concept of voices to interrogate the notion of

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discursiveness. A notion which tends to evaporate or mystify the cultural and historical patterns of struggle that play themselves out upon, and through, materially significant bodies. Once discursiveness is understood in this manner it will become clear why the new psychological paradigm of conversational analysis is inadequate as a basis for psychological knowledge. After which it will be possible to perform a symptomatic reading of the work of one or more of the contributors to this new paradigm.

In this chapter I want to discuss Marx and the use of class as a tool for analyzing the determinants of history. I will utilize Nietzsche on the distinction between master and servant mentalities. The lead in to these topics comes from the previous chapter that ends with embracing psychological inquiry as technoscience. To recapture Marx and Nietzsche, we must discuss further the work of Bruno Latour who claims that there is no outside context for the determination of the activity of the technoscientific enterprise. This move of denial is anti-Marxist or contra-Marx. From this disclaimer of Latour, I want to reopen the question of the importance of class and servant mentalities for psychology in particular. Also, I want to discuss the approach that Nietzsche makes possible. Namely, a framework in which the

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philosophy of science becomes a broad enough space in which to analyze culture and the body.

As the chapter heading suggests, the discussion and argument to follow will attempt to convince the reader of the possibility of the materiality of significant otherness. The necessity to argue for such a conclusion stems from the manner in which contemporary academic discourse closets the body and thereby excludes it from the field of discourse. Although some postmodern writers speak of it as the mute ground of our being, it has no real significance of its own making. I shall try to convince the reader of the strangeness that may be realized by considering the nature of queer bodies. I depend very much on the notion that understanding is drawn from the lived experience of our bodies and not just from our cognitive capacities to conceptualize possible states of affairs.

This means to suggest a connection between bodies as living semiotic processes that are constructive of our abilities to imagine and conceive. These three levels are derived from the developmental psychology of Heinz Werner (1984). The levels of (1) lived experience of our bodies, (2) imagining, and (3) conceiving correspond with Heinz Werner's three levels of (1) sensori-motor affective experience, (2)

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perceptual, and (3) conceptual. Later, the microgenetic processes discussed by Werner will be useful for understanding the symbolic problem solving activity that is made possible through the closeting of our academic discourse.

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Finding a Genealogy of Embodiment; Spinoza Not Descartes:

We will be helped in establishing a genealogy of embodiment by starting with Spinoza rather than Descartes. According to Spinoza (1930),

> No one has hitherto laid down the limits to the powers of the body … But, it will be urged, it is impossible that solely from the laws of nature considered as extended substance, we should be able to deduce the causes of buildings, pictures, and things of that kind which are produced only by human art; nor would the human body, unless it were determined and led by the mind, be capable of building a single temple. However, I have just pointed out that the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power, or say what can be concluded from a consideration of its sole nature. (Part III, Postulate 2, Scholion, p. 207)

By taking the words of Spinoza out of context, something of a problem arises upon first reading. The problem seems to ride on this: Spinoza first suggests that the body's power is unlimited. Next, he raises the objection of others that without the help of mind "no buildings, pictures, and things of that kind" would arise because they "are produced only by human art." But then, he insists that "the objectors cannot fix the limits of the body's power." Well, is he or is he not favoring a type of interaction between body and mind?

As is well known by students of philosophy, Spinoza created one of the great systems of modern metaphysics. His variety of metaphysics finds substance in being singular and as such is an example of monistic thinking. And, as is also known,

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Spinoza is an aspect dualist insofar as body, the only substance, exists and is apprehended according to two modes, one as extension and the other as thought. Thus, there is no problem of mind and body interacting. Bodies are modally understood from the perspectives of extension and thought. The body's powers are unleashed within both of these realms of possibility. This is of course in contrast to Descartes' dualistic system in which mind and body are distinct and separate substances.

Though Descartes is known for his mind/body dualism, technically his metaphysics of substance treats three, not two substances. The third kind, which is less interesting for a science of psychology, is spiritual substance, that of which the human soul consists. I said that this third kind was less interesting for psychological science because the soul's substance is technically not detectable by means of the other two substances. Neither mind nor body is capable of bringing forth knowledge or understanding of this mystery of human mysteries. Speculation aside as to whether Descartes was a crafty fellow, looking to avoid the wrath of Churchly Inquisitors, he crafted his system of metaphysics according to the prejudice of his day. The significant aspect of his mind/body dualism for those of us interested in a science of psychology is that bodily substance was such

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that it could be studied scientifically, which is to say that it was amenable to mechanistic explanation. Mental substance was such that it could not be studied scientifically, which is to say that the prejudice of Descartes's day placed limits on the scope of explanation that could take the form of mechanism.

The reasons for circumscribing the scope of extension of mechanical explanation have been thoroughly interrogated by philosophers and psychologists alike. At stake (no pun intended) for Descartes was avoiding the inquisition and, more positively, he desired that there be a field in which scientifically minded curiosity could prevail. The Churchly Inquisitors guarded the quality of mind and soul that is responsible for absolute freedom. This freedom is of a curious sort since our soul was governed if not by God, then by His Laws. Not to mention the curiosity in that God has also predestined our fates, so that this absolute freedom, which is necessary for overcoming the imperfections of the body, is also its own propellant to see itself in the image of God, if not short of being God. The need for distance from the body and hence the subsequent need for absolute freedom is that the soul must aspire if not achieve perfection in its lifetime of embodiment. This perfection was such that only God knew its possibility.

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The imperfect body was polluted for many reasons but those that need mentioning here are 1) bodies are machines of desire, they exude sex, and 2) bodies are short lived, they are perishable. If normal bodies, those that could be mentioned in churchly circles, exude sex and are perishable, then what can be said of the homosexual body, which is animated by an unspeakable desire? For Descartes and others, desire is problematic because it taints knowledge, but without desire would any knowledge at all be possible? In trying to frame my inquiry from the perspective of queer bodies, I take the position that Michel Foucault instantiates. For Foucault, an understanding of society, or social phenomena, is best derived from examining those groups that have been marginalized by that society. And so we have a string of such investigations in which Foucault uncovered that which has brought understanding to the archaeology of knowledge within the human sciences. He examined such phenomena as the asylum, the clinic, and the prison. Perhaps more so than Foucault, De Certeau (1997) has made prominent the advantages of exploring the discourse of marginalized groups and the discursive practices that institute the divisions between the normal and the pathological and constitute the domain of the exclusionary.

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In asking what's queer about bodies, voices, and psychological inquiry, I aim to take up the standpoint of the body as an excluded object. It is, after all, through the division of bodies and minds that the churchly discursive practices instituted the normal and the pathological or, in the preferable litany of the Church, the virtuous and the sinful. Since the time of Descartes, much has moved forward by way of the classification of homosexual desire, or more preferably, the desire of queer bodies, through the effects of medicalization. That it is permissible, let alone thinkable, to take up this inquiry from this previously unspeakable position is testimony to the breakdown of the discursive practices that made a certain kind of knowledge and understanding possible.

That there were utterances that could have afforded a more tolerant embrace of the desire of queer bodies and of the body in general is not contestable. For even as early as Benedict Spinoza, queer theory finds some benefit. The metaphysical turn taken by Spinoza is doubly advantageous from the perspective of queer theory. First, as we should conclude from Spinoza's monism, the body's powers are unlimited and, as such, the body's powers are to be thought of as generative of the desire of queer bodies as well as so-called normal bodies. Support for this conclusion can be

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gleaned from a reading of the following. I quote at length from Spinoza's *Ethics* (1930), in the Third Part, entitled: "On the Origin and Nature of the Affects."

> Most persons who have written about the affects and man's conduct of life seem to discuss, not the natural things, which follow the common laws of nature, but things, which are outside her. They seem indeed to consider man in nature as a kingdom within a kingdom. For they believe that man disturbs rather than follows her order; that he has an absolute power over his own actions; and this he is altogether self-determined. They then proceed to attribute the cause of human weakness and changeableness, not to the common power of nature, but to some vice of human nature, which they therefore bewail, laugh at, mock, or, as is more generally the case, detest; whilst he who knows how to revile most eloquently or subtly the weakness of the mind is looked upon as divine. It is true that very eminent men have not been wanting, to whose labour and industry we confess ourselves much indebted, who have written many excellent things about the right conduct of life, and who have given to mortals counsels full of prudence, but no one so far as I know has determined the nature and strength of the affects, and what the mind is able to do towards controlling them. I remember, indeed, that the celebrated Descartes, although he believed that the mind is absolute master over its own actions, tried nevertheless to explain by their first causes human affects, and at the same time to show the way by which the mind could obtain absolute power over them; but in my opinion he has shown nothing but the acuteness of his great intellect, as I shall make evident in the proper place, for I wish to return to those who prefer to detest and scoff at human affects and actions than understand them. To such as these it will doubtless seem a marvelous thing for me to endeavor to treat by a geometrical method the vices and follies of men, and to desire by a sure method to demonstrate those things which these people cry out against as being opposed to reason, or as being vanities, absurdities, and monstrosities. The following is my reason for so doing. Nothing happens in nature, which can be attributed to any vice of nature, for she is always the same and everywhere one. Her virtue is the same, and her power of acting; that is to say, her laws and rules, according to which all things are and are changed from form to form, are everywhere and

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always the same; so that there must also be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever, that is to say, by the universal laws and rules of nature. The affects, therefore, of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from the same necessity and virtue of nature as other individual things; they have therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood, and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known as the properties of any other thing in the contemplation alone of which we delight. I shall, therefore, pursue the same method in considering the nature and strength of the affects and the power of the mind over them which I pursued in our previous discussion of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes, or bodies. …

Definition III. --- By affect I understand the affections of the body, by which the power of acting of the body itself is increased, diminished, helped, or hindered, together with the ideas of these affections.

If, therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand the affect to be an action, otherwise it is a passion.

Postulate 1. --- The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which make its power of acting neither greater nor less.

Postulate 2. --- The human body is capable of suffering many changes, and nevertheless, can retain the impressions or traces of objects … and consequently the same images of things. (Spinoza, 1930, p. 205-207)

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Making Bodies Queer:

I should like to make use of Spinoza's two postulates concerning the human body by making his account of the affectedness, (or the capacity of the human body to be affected in many ways and especially its capacity for suffering), my starting point for criticizing the account of queerness that has emerged recently in the writing of queer theorists, in particular Judith Butler (1990). Butler (1993) refuses, as part of a political stand, to answer the question of sexual orientation, she refuses or resists being labeled. We all know that to answer calls for choosing between the binary options of heterosexual and homosexual. I would agree with Butler if her position were to argue that sexual identity is surely more fluid than what falls within those two dichotomous categories but it seems to me Butler goes too far and "throws the body out with the bath water" of heterosexism. This seems true of queer theory more generally.

Steven Seidman (1995), an avowed queer social theorist, has characterized the agenda of queer theory as follows:

> The point of departure for queer theory is not the figure of homosexual repression and the struggle for personal and collective expression or the making of homosexual/gay/lesbian identities but the hetero/homosexual discursive or epistemological figure. The

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> question of its origin is less compelling than a description of its social textual efficacy. (p. 130)

For Butler (1993),

> We may seek to return to matter as prior to discourse to ground our claims about sexual difference only to discover that matter is fully sedimented with discourses on sex and sexuality that prefigure and constrain the uses to which the term can be put. (p. 29)

According to Mariam Fraser (1999) "The assumption that any sexual identity formation is embodied casts an interesting light on the implications of Butler's analysis as it has been taken up elsewhere. Butler herself warns of the dangers of leaving 'matter,' and its relation to sexuality, untheorized"(p.33).

Perhaps we can understand Butler's caution by consider what Wittgenstein (1961) meant when at the end of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he said that all that has gone before was meant as a ladder by which the reader would climb to the height of understanding. In the last two sections of the *Tractatus*, he said:

> 6.54 My propositions serve as elucidation in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them- as steps-to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
>
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

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> 7.00 What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. (p. 74)

And most important for us here is that he said that which cannot put into words could be pointed to with words, and that what cannot be said must be passed over in silence. As applied to the context of the body as untheorized matter, we might think of the body outside of discourse as that of which we cannot speak, but though we might have to pass over it in silence, we need not remain trapped in the silence of mysticism. I would argue: Although we may lack the ability to formulate our knowledge of the body as matter in theoretical or propositional knowledge, Ryle's (1949) "knowledge that," words or theories do in fact point to what cannot be said but can be **demonstrated**, namely embodied knowledge of sex and sexuality. The latter is Ryle's "knowledge how" or knowledge by acquaintance which is always a priori or before discourse that expresses "knowledge that" or knowledge by description. Demonstration involves gestures and other non-verbal signs, some of which are acquired through socialization and enculturation, but some are natural. These will be evolved in species contexts that though social in nature utilize biological mechanisms that are not themselves social but natural and physiological.

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Now I want to grant that verbal distinctions can be made that are truly social constructions, I consider promise-making a prototype. Though there is no natural basis from which the distinction of promise making and promise breaking is derived, there are other distinctions that have natural bases as their origins. Although heterosexual and homosexual are binary conceptual distinctions that have a somewhat arbitrary character, there must be some basis in our physiology for deciding what is the operative basis for choosing and enjoying pleasure that is formed through embodied knowledge of either type to which these two distinctions correspond.

What I will argue is that Butler seems to rely on her early commitment to speech act theory in analyzing the binary conceptual distinction between heterosexual and homosexual; being a lesbian entails more than just avowing that one is lesbian. Avowing or disavowing one's sexual orientation is not equivalent to other speech acts that through their utterance creates or breaks a promise, for example. And, though Butler suggests that sexual identity is distinct from self she remains silent about the body, which is capable of acting as an agent. She seems to only discuss what she has called the materialization of the body through the utterances of persons in social contexts. The body is mute

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except for its occasion of speaking through the interpolated spaces of the social sphere. In her desire to get rid of the confinements of gender roles she eliminates any bodily characteristics that have been developed into the stylistic roles of feminine or masculine. Perhaps, lesbians want to do this. Neither the masculine role nor the feminine role seems adequate for the range of affective expression that people would want to avail themselves of. For Butler, the body, which is expressive, is a non-theorized and even incapable of being theorized; it is an object that hides in the outer regions of discursive production and remains a distant object at the limits of discourse.

In a recent newspaper article Judith Butler is described as believing that "sexuality-like gender-is a fiction" (Goldstein, 1997, p. 38). Actually this was Butler's (1990) position in her *Gender Trouble* which was criticized for its being uprooted from material grounds or its philosophical idealism. But even in Butler's (1993) later work, *Bodies That Matter,* I find that her position is still a problem for understanding the material contribution of our bodily being to our sexual being. So I agree with Butler. Our sexual identity is in part socially constructed. Minimally, the meaning or evaluations of our specific sexuality is constructed in an inextricably social context through the

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use of linguistic categories which have become sedimentary through their development in socio-cultural historical backgrounds, or contexts of usage, and carry the flavor of those who lived and interacted before us. I do, however, object to the still too harsh effacement of the body as a real existing referent, an object, if you like, with which we can only partly alter our dependency upon it for the very existence of our socially constructed (and understood) selves/identities. Perhaps we should borrow or pervert the sense of Sartre's claim that we make our own history but not exactly as we would like or please because the conditions with which, or against which, we make it are not of our own choosing. We could apply this to our selves and our sexual identities; then we would say that our selves, in particular our sexual identities, are made in relation to or against bodily conditions that are not of our own choosing. Even if it is only through the evolutionary history of our species preserved in the human genome or more so in the developmental, biological and socio-cultural, histories of our families of origin that we construct our selves and our identities, these are surely materially significant forces with which, through which, and against which, as the case may be, we make our selves. Now I think that the significant political question is to ask in what way(s) are we made queer. This should be understood as a complex process

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interrelated with other aspects of identity such as gender, class, race, ethnicity, age, and ability.

In fairness to Butler I should point out that though much of her academic writing disavows having a lesbian identity, (she writes against such a label) she has made statements that have political value in the struggle against society ignoring the AIDS crisis. She said

> The hyperbolic 'performance' of death in the practice of 'die-ins' and the theatrical 'outness' by which queer activism has disrupted the closeting distinction between public and private space have proliferated sites of politicization and AIDS awareness throughout the public realm. (Butler, 1993, p.232-233)

This links the performativity of death and of queerness. In discussing the Aestheticisation of identity, of politics Mariam Fraser (1999) says that

> The theatrical performance of death serves a political aim: it politicises the division between the public and the private sphere in order that AIDS become a highly visible concern for everyone, rather than a stigmatised and private affair. In this respect, the visibility of the queer body itself assumes a political value wherein the theatrical is not *opposed* to the political but rather emphasises 'the increasing politicisation of theatricality.' (p. 34)

And the political value of the lesbian who "acts butch" is captured in the following:

> Lisa Walker argues that one of the reasons that the figure of the butch has been celebrated is because her "blatant" representation of sexual deviance stands in stark contrast to the assimilation or the imitation of heterosexual stereotypes for the purpose of camouflage,

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> that is, closetry, being "in the closet." The butch lesbian renders her sexuality visible (through clothes, gestures, perhaps through bodily physique) by putting it on 'display.' She, like the drag artists that Butler analyses in *Gender Trouble* destabilizes the inside/outside binary that is productive of coherent gender identities. That is, drag is a double inversion of the assumption that the 'outer' male or female body is an expression of the 'inner' masculine or feminine self. (Fraser, 1999, p. 34-35)

So we are left with a number of distinctions that should be clear: For Butler, sexual identity and gender identity is not coextensive with the self. And the self is not an essential one or spatially equivalent to the body. It would seem as though for Butler (1993) "Bodies That Matter" are bodies materialized through speech/discursive formations.

Another criticism of Butler has been made of her focusing on 'the specific and the local.' Hennessey argues that this focus disallows a broader historicizing. According to Fraser (1999),

> Hennessey argues that queer theory too, like queer activism, reduces the question of social change to that of cultural representation. … Queer theory does not 'historicise' the signifier 'queer' so much as (merely) place it in a historical context. The work of historicising, she suggests, requires establishing and tracing connections between social life on a number of different levels (rather than on the discursive level alone). (p. 38)

This basically corroborates my analysis of Butler as closeting the lived body by making it something that must be materialized through language or else it must be something

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about which we will know nothing and so about which we should remain silent. I have explained my position as one that calls for understanding our bodies through our embodied knowledge. This embodied knowledge goes in the direction that Hennessey calls for in that it historicizes our bodies in the social relations of community.

That said, I would like to quote from lesbian law professor, Ruthann Robson (1998), whose project is the development of a lesbian legal theory. In her book *Sapho Goes To Law School*, Robson claims that

> Sexuality has been fertile ground for the post-modernist contestation of the coherence of identity categories, in part because lesbian and gay theorizing has been profoundly influenced by all aspects of postmodernism. Such contestations can be rather grandiose. For example, lesbian theorist Judith Butler argues that the incoherency of sexual categories like lesbian are precisely their appeal. She states that she is "skeptical about how the 'I' is determined as it operates under the lesbian sign" and argues that identity categories such as lesbianism are "sites of necessary trouble." (p. 6)

Robson (1998) thinks that Butler's position rejects any predetermined connections between lesbian identity and politics, except for instability. She claims that in accord with such theorizing as Butler's "any sexuality that might be named *lesbian* is precisely too unstable to be named anything at all"(p. 6). I would call that a self-serving policy in which ones academic position is being exploited as

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a privileged one without responsibility to the functions of the university in the larger society.

Robson goes on to discuss her rejection of the bifurcation of options concerning lesbianism into either essentialist or social constructionist. In the following, Robson (1998) generalizes her criticism beyond Butler and makes her own position clear:

> It is postmodernism that relentlessly objects to the term *lesbian*. Thus it is necessary to continually clarify any project that might be thought of as lesbian legal theory. For as soon as the word *lesbian* is uttered, the speaker is relegated to essentialism and assumed to be theorizing from the place of "biological force." On the other hand, the oppositional theory of constructionism (or social constructionism) puts *lesbian* in scare quotes and generally theorizes from the place of culturally defined constructs and labels. Concurrently, postmodernism generally theorizes from the place of fragmentation, while modernism generally theorizes toward the place of culminated unity.
>
> Yet it must be remembered that social constructionism and essentialism are both potentially dangerous to the existence of lesbian legal theory. Social constructionism may reinforce attempts to eradicate lesbianism: if sexual identity is constructed, it may also be deconstructed or reconstructed. Essentialism may also reinforce attempts to eradicate lesbianism: if sexual identity is inherent, it is separate and other, and aberrant-a defect to be cured. Likewise, postmodernism and modernism are both potentially dangerous to the existence of any lesbian legal theory. Postmodernism may effectively silence by its insistence on relentless fragmentation, while modernism may effectively silence by the exclusion of lesbians or by the imposition of a monotonal definition of lesbianism. (Robson, 1998, p. 43-44)

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Though it would take us too far a field to explain the nature of lesbian legal theory in any detail, suffice it to say that the necessity of lesbian legal theory is so that rights may be attributed to those who warrant the label of, or, of being named lesbian. I hope this has shown that lesbians themselves are not unified in their positions with respect to how their bodies are made queer. Personally I favor Robson's position which sees neither essentialism nor social constructionism as providing an adequate answer, politically speaking.

It has seemed a natural question for psychologists, ethologists, and developmental biologists to ask about how bodies that profess to be queer or gay or lesbian have come to be that way. Though in saying that this has been a natural question I do not wish to be taken as ignoring the political nature of such inquiry. Foucault has made clear the ways in which the social sciences have been implicated in the implementation of the normalizing practices, i.e., medical and other forms of bureaucratic surveillance. Psychology has perhaps, more than most of the social and behavioral sciences, been all too ready to engage in this dissemination of bureaucratic power. The power is one of defining and surveillance so as to control the deviance or abnormality of bodies, which stray from the norm of

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heterosexism. Heterosexism is a term used to refer to the discriminatory practice of hierarchical valuation of heterosexuality over any other form of sexuality. This is precisely the normalizing practice that Foucault (1978) has aimed to confront in his works on the *History of Sexuality*. More on this will be discussed later when I take up the question of queer voices and discursive formations in the following chapter. But for now it was necessary to mark a place for Foucault in the discussion of the role that psychology, and ultimately discursive psychology, will play in this normalizing and exclusionary practice of queer bodies. From the outset I should like to say that it is difficult to proceed in a linear fashion with respect to bodies and voices because the two are really dialectically constructed, or better, imploded.

There are two ways I could go about discussing the subject of "making bodies queer." One would be to ask, as has been asked in the title of a recent book concerned with issues in biological essentialism and social constructionism in gay and lesbian identities, "If you seduce a straight person, can you make them gay?" The other would be to ask how we are made queer? I find them both to offer interesting possibilities in that they each take something of the form of the argument of *reductio ad absurdum*.

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Start by assuming (a) the conditional statement that "if you seduce a straight person, you can make them gay is true." But you can show how it results in a contradiction, hence it must have been false. Or assume (b). The conditional statement "if you take a human child and control sufficiently the circumstances of their sexual experience and development, it will make them queer (gay or lesbian) rather than straight" is assumed as true. But then it is shown to result in a contradiction, it must then be false, not true. Of course the choice of adhering to a framework in which our logical analysis is predicated on the premise of bivalency or only of two choices, clearly true or clearly false, and not some polyvalent logic of true, false and indeterminate might be a problem. Especially so because we may recognize that in assessing the fit of our dichotomous categories of straight and gay to what is found in so-called nature, that is our field of observation and our objects of study, there is really no fit except for a forced fit. People, such as Alfred Kinsey and others, whose sample size approaches sufficiency in terms of statistical prediction, have found that when surveyed people often don't fit themselves neatly into one category or the other. There have been people of sequential (because monogamous) and concurrent bisexuality in the subject pools. Indeed

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sexuality seems to be a thing of fluidity or lacking in containment, categorically speaking (DeCecco & Elia, 1993).

Many "good" Marxists or social democrats raise their hands at this point and shrug off the question as not of a serious nature. Some will say that homosexuality is just a decadent distraction of a bourgeois mentality to divert people from the really significant arena requiring attention and political praxis. Or more benign, others of this ilk will say: "So what, so you like to do this and I don't. You are free to express yourselves as you please as long as you don't hurt anyone in the doing." The latter actually is more liberal sounding than Marxist. But then some of the liberals I have met perhaps profess to be Marxist as an apology for being atheists or they feel just plain guilty for being liberal and ineffective when the political going gets tough. It is doubtful that there is nothing substantial to the dispute between the biological essentialists and social constructionists; between those who wish to reduce our sexual choices to being determined by our genetic endowment or inheritance, and those who resist this reduction of our sexuality, and, in an equally absurd move, push us to understand our sexuality as socially constructed or produced by environmental circumstances. The old dilemma between nature versus nurture never gets resolved it seems, rather

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they always persist and find ways to rear their ugly heads again and again. Should we be surprised that in such a vital or politically volatile area as our pleasure-ridden sexuality, we find again this hopelessly unacceptable set of alternatives?

After considering, at some length, the question of whether our sexuality is explained by biological essentialism or social construction, Richard Posner (1992) in his magnum opus entitled *Sex and Reason* concludes that:

> There may be little at stake in the debate between social constructionists and essentialists. The extreme positions have deservedly few adherents. On the one hand, no one except Cucchiari and a few other radical feminists believes that human sexual drive and preference are purely social artifacts-that heterosexuality, for example, is the invention of patriarchy. The proposition is not only counterintuitive but also contrary to the biological and anthropological evidence. (p. 29)

According to Posner's assessment, social constructionists-and here he is thinking of Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of scientific revolutions but conspicuous is Foucault as well have a fondness for discontinuity among historical periods. As examples of this fondness, he refers to the distinction between Greek homosexuality and homosexuality in today's societies. He, in a cordial fashion, agrees that we should call Greek homosexuality Athenian homosexuality out of deference to our ignorance of homosexual practices outside

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of ancient Athens. His reasoning being that we know little else of Greek city-states and surely there were no sub-cultures in Athens as there are in modern cities of New York, San Francisco, and Amsterdam.

Posner (1992) identifies more with the biological essentialism but admittedly his position really straddles the two extremes. He agrees with "Freud, who believed that we are born bisexual and that infants are polymorphously perverse"(p. 29). And again with Freud, Posner (1992) does "not think it a mere social contingency that our parents guide us (or most of us) into heterosexual channels"(p. 29). Furthermore, Posner (1992) maintains that "no one really believes that human sexual behavior is invariant to incentives, norms, and other features of the social environment, and is therefore constant across societies; plainly it is not"(p. 29). In conclusion, he says that "almost all students of sexuality, therefore, are-and for good reasons-both essentialist and constructionist, though in different mixtures"(p. 29).

For Posner (1992),

> Homosexuality does mean something rather different in ancient Athens and modern Amsterdam, but not completely different, because in both societies there were (are) persons who felt an erotic attraction to, and engaged in unequivocally sexual relations with, members of the same sex as themselves. (p. 29)

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And he characterizes his approach to sexuality as follows:

> The economic approach that dominates [*Sex and Reason*] is more constructionist than a purely biological theory would be, but more essentialist than an approach which denies that there have always been some men who preferred sex with men to sex with women, a far greater number of men who preferred sex with women to sex with other men, and in this group of men a fair number quick to substitute a man or (preferably) a boy for a woman if women were unavailable. (p. 29-30)

In elaborating on this approach, Posner (1992) reveals that "the economic approach does not concern itself much with power, exploitation, malice, ignorance, accident, and ideology as causes of human behavior" as does the constructionist one, but rather looks more to "incentives, opportunities, constraints, and social function"(p. 30). Although he uses an economic theory to explain human choices in the area of sexual commerce, he clearly intends to shy away from a Marxist analysis of the political economy of sexuality. His will be a narrow economic theory of sexuality in that he will confine his analysis to standard "cost-benefit analyses." Criticisms of this narrow approach have shown that there are shadow costs or unintended consequences of even the most carefully planned technological activity and enterprises. This is precisely what will be captured below when I provide a sketch of what may be gained from thinking about sexuality from this more politicized

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perspective on psychological adjustment that I am denoting with the idea of a political economic analysis of sexuality.

Faithful to Posner's call for a synthesis in explaining human sexuality would be another synthesis between a Freudian and broader economic analysis. Both of those are needed in understanding the political economy of sexuality. This has been attempted by Richard Lichtman (1982) in *The Production of Desire* where he tries an integration of psychoanalysis into Marxist Theory. Others have tried to radicalize psychology by a marriage with Marxism; a few names of those who have are Herbert Marcuse (1955) and Norman O. Brown (1966). We should consider why it is so volatile for academic psychologists (or academics in general) to take a Marxist standpoint, (i.e., the standpoint of working class individuals). For now I want to explain a little of what is gained by integrating Freud and Skinner (understood as a technological description of psychological functioning in capitalist society).

Together a psychoanalytic approach and the classical and operant conditioning of, respectively, Ivan Pavlov and B. F. Skinner, are useful in explaining sexuality. Consider the following case study of an Italian-American man I had occasion to counsel. He told me that as a boy of around ten,

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he and his slightly older brother had fellatio performed on them by their blond, fair-skinned, and full bodied/overweight Italian mother. I say this to mark the difference in physical traits between the boys who had dark hair, taking after their father in coloring, and to note the rejection of blond, light-skinned, full figured women, in favor of women with dark hair, dark complexion, and of a slight body frame with whom he dated as a man in his twenties. Their mother also would typically shame them if they were bad by sending them into the backyard of their suburban home stark naked. Quite a strict disciplinarian!

In conversation, this young man asked me about some difficulty he was having with his present girlfriend who was, in accordance with his aforementioned preference in physical appearance, of Indian (sub-continent) descent. His presenting problem: He was only able to have oral sex with his girlfriend, whereas she wanted more, in particular sexual intercourse. At first I was surprised that he had sex at all, of any kind, since he had previously described himself as a devout Catholic. But as the story unfolded, I began to get the picture that his religious involvement was serving more as a cover-up or diversion from the hostility that he was repressing; hostility that was most definitely expressed in his withholding of sexual intercourse from his

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willing and eager female partner. When I pointed out that Freud thought that it was helpful to understand that our mothers or primary female care-givers set the tone and pattern for our affectionate bonds in the future, predictably he denied this saying that he was attracted to women who were quite different in physical appearance from his mother. But I gently pointed out that, though they were indeed quite opposite in physical features, he in fact repeated the sexual act of oral sex with them that his mother had done to him as a boy. Later we did get to explore the connections among feelings for girlfriends and his history of sexual abuse by his mother.

To make the case study palatable to Skinner, we should hypothesize, specifically, that covert patterns of avoidance result in the ambivalence, or approach-avoidance, the young man exhibits in his current sexual contexts as a result of the memories he has of his mother's abuse. These new contexts, though partly distinguished from the stimuli of the traumatic situation, are nonetheless still eliciting, partially, the scene of abusive relations. For Skinner, in his new encounters, this young man would be attempting to master what had been painful earlier experiences. Freud, and other psychoanalytically minded therapists, believed that we have the compulsion to repeat emotionally troubling

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situations from our past by bringing them into our present and future relationships. Though we might find lively debate among different therapeutic approaches as to the way to rehabilitate people who repeat earlier traumas, agreement between Freudians and Skinnerians may be found with regard to the effects of the stimulating conditions in this and other cases of repetition compulsion.

I think that some sort of grieving must be undergone in the letting go of the self that was abused. Repeating early traumatic situations makes conscious the bodily remembrance of the pain, disappointment, and suffering of having lived through an experience about which society has made us troubled, especially morally speaking. This reenactment is always done within the social context of an audience whether real or imagined (as is captured in George Herbert Mead's notion of the generalized other). Part of what I will be arguing is that we all go through a political economy of self-regulation, specifically in the regulation of our self-esteem, which is one of many social goods for which we must rely on other people, and our relationships with them, to fulfill. I have found this kind of economic analysis sorely missing in academic writing but feel, intuitively, that this is precisely what is operating in the writing and the lives of academics. It is the same for all of us who deny the

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existence of a self while engaging in scurrilously hidden attempts at managing our self-esteem within an academic context, which is, at times, even more cut-throat than some business contexts are.

I have, myself, thought that the debate between the extremes of biological essentialism and social constructionism was a case of "much ado about nothing." Or just another instance of academics trying to see how many angels could sit on the end of a pencil or fly through an eye of a needle. Pick your metaphor. But what really is at stake? It is the political and moral issue. Are lesbians, gays or bisexuals-really all your so-called sexual deviants/minorities-to be held morally responsible for choosing to act in the deviant ways they do? And whether the State or Society has the political right to punish with sanctions or to force corrective procedures against them?

Here again I have found that lesbians, gays and bisexuals have not, unlike myself, turned away from psychology because it had been a player in the application of sanctions against the very ways we have felt comfortable in establishing bodily and erotic intimacy which is so fundamental in procuring the social good of self-esteem that is most powerfully produced in and through sexual commerce and

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exchange. To explore this further we will have to return to my project of trying to determine how we might make bodies queer, and what that means for understanding real bodies as materially significant.

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Contrasting Ways of Sexualizing Bodies:

But having noted this point for possible deconstruction of the dichotomous choice between the two sexual categories of heterosexual and homosexual, we can proceed with this line of inquiry, namely the assumption of one of the two alternatives as in a) or b) described above. My reason for refusing to ask "if you seduce a straight person, can you make them gay?" is not solely because of my thinking it has been explored before or of wishing if only it were that easy! My reasons are that it is the hardest case because it may be recognized that once established or learned adult sexuality may no longer in its entrenchment afford opportunity for change, even if we assume that the original potential for bisexuality is still dormant. Perhaps the hardest case should be the one chosen, but I think not. Better to think through how someone who is gay or lesbian or queer has been made queer. That is, to embrace the social constructionist position on Butler's own terms: "sexuality-like gender-is a fiction."

This is done with the recognition that Butler's political program is alien to such AIDS activists as Larry Kramer. As Richard Goldstein in his article mentioned above said: "it [Butler's *Gender Trouble*] is not the sort of book [he] would

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keep on his night-stand." Goldstein goes on to say why Kramer might not have this book ready to hand:

> For one thing, it's about as dense as a black hole; for another, she insists that the gay identity so heroically constructed over the past century actually works against the legitimation of homosexuals. It does so, Butler maintains , by providing a stable set of images-a look, a sensibility, a set of poses and symbols-that can easily be read as gay. This creates a category against which straightness can cohere. So the unintended consequence of gay pride is to bolster the very "regimes" it seeks to contest. (Goldstein, 1997, p. 40)

In relating Butler's position to other queer theorists, Goldstein says that other queer theorists are not as dissatisfied with the rubric of gay and lesbian studies as Butler is. But, at the same time, many question the usefulness of what he calls the "triumphal identity" and in support of this he quotes Lee Edelman as saying:

> To believe in the possibility of liberation is to believe there is a trapped identity struggling to get out. But it's not a matter of liberating something that is repressed; it's a matter of inventing ways of becoming something that has not been. It's less a matter, in that sense, of coming out than of coming into-and one can't know in advance what that will be. (Goldstein, 1997, p. 40)

Are we to place so much hope-dare I say-for liberation on the distinction between "coming out" and "coming into"? My answer would be: not any at all. There is something captured with the subtlety between "out" and "into." The first sense of coming out suggests that the person knows or experiences themselves as already lesbian, gay or bisexual-as different

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from others who are straight. The second suggests that this difference is not known or experienced until the person has enacted some gay behavior through which they come to have this knowledge or experience of themselves for himself or herself. That is to say that being lesbian, gay or bisexual requires the judgment of others not merely oneself. This understanding stems from the performative model of sexuality. Or as Richard Mohr (personal communication) commented to me, Butler's theory of gender is a postmodern form of behaviorism. Our sexuality is to be understood according to the dramaturgical theory of role-playing. As I hope to show later, there is something profoundly perverse about the queer theory of performance. If there is no basis in our physical being, in our bodily materiality, how is it possible to enact such a "queerness"? Why take up a stand of difference from heterosexual? Why would people undergo so much pain and all the tiresome labor that comes with stigma management, if it were solely an act? I definitely agree with the involvement of the audience in the selection and activity of self-labeling but what are the grounds for queer desire under the queer theory of performance? Surely, it could not be just a fiction. And for that matter, why would women live in agreement with their gendered roles if there were not something more to it than some assignment? Are we to accept that the assignment is arbitrary? Surely there are

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real differences in women's bodies and men's bodies material and significant differences. But these are not arbitrary, for evolutionary or developmental processes. Of course the use of "woman" and the use of "man" are, linguistically speaking, as arbitrary as Saussure claimed. But, that we make evaluative distinctions between "woman" and "man" must be done within the language making activities that are discerned according to criteria. There must be some criteria that we use in making such distinctions. There must be some apparent, noticeable or even real and recognizable differences that we agree with in the common usage of these terms. Otherwise there could be no meaning to these words. We are free to express whatever we like, but we must use the conventional forms that our language community makes available to the speakers of that particular language. This is what Wittgenstein (1953) meant when he rejected the representational theory or mental-copy theory of meaning in favor of the "meaning as use theory" of his latter work: the *Philosophical Investigations*. If meanings were dependent upon private objects that only our minds could witness then there would be no meanings at all. Thinking that one is following a rule is hardly following at all. We must ground our meanings in the forms of life that show our agreement in our usage of linguistic tools.

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I think that some of what has gone on in academic discourse is reverting to the closet, though the subtle gestures cover enough, still much is exposed. That I recognize as significant some of the differences between my body and yours is due to the conceptions that make some of the distinctions discussible but that they are there must be accepted, otherwise all is fiction and we have nothing-literally no thing-to talk about. Even words are material or really existent. Because their meanings are dependent upon the construing of context, does mean that clarification or negotiations of meanings take place on a regular basis but it does not mean that there are no things about which the discussion purports to be about. It is the "about-ness" that we negotiate but the meanings we convey are instructive or tentative for our purposes. I think it is as it is with counting or calculation; for Wittgenstein we compute or calculate and we know we are right because we can go on with the series. Understanding the series is not just any way we please, it is as others perform and understand the series of numbers whether it is in addition, multiplication, etc. So, too, there is a language game in which we make distinctions between "woman" and "man." Though this may not be commands uttered in building a brick wall or house, as Wittgenstein was fond of saying, but rather the distinction is made in a form of life that places value or necessity in the parts

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that "woman" and "man" can perform. We need not rehearse that story of reproduction here.

Everything cannot be arbitrary, just as everything cannot be fiction. And that applies to the distinctions between the genders and sexual identities. Though they are both socially and historically developed, that does not make them any less real or significant materially speaking.

In a major review of psychology and sexual orientation, Janis S. Bohan (1996) claims that "the bottom line [is that] identity is individual." Furthermore, she writes that:

> The intertwined tasks of identity development, stigma management, and coming out lie at the very heart of the LGB [lesbian, gay, bisexual] experience; this complex process creates who one is and negotiates a place for that identity in a painfully hostile world. Despite its social roots, identity is a uniquely singular construction, and its creation is distinctive for each individual, as the demands of this identity interact with the unique psychological realities of each person. To understand a given individual's experience as she or he comes to an LGB identity, one must first understand that individual; LGB identity formation is an addition to and not a substitute for the developmental process we all pursue. (p. 121)

In comparing the positions of Butler and Bohan, the differences are stark. Butler wants to claim that gay identity is, like gender, a fiction and her political program rejects gay liberation, claiming in fact that the adherence to specific gender or sexual identities is what

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allows us to be hurt in the first place. Rather than contributing to our freedom it constrains us. Whereas, Bohan defends the use and construction of lesbian, gay, and bisexual identities as supplemental to our developmental process, not as a substitute but an important addition to that which we all pursue. How are we to make sense out of such different approaches?

My first inclination is to look at what each of them does, occupationally speaking. Butler is professor of comparative literature and rhetoric at University of California-Berkeley, and Bohan is professor of psychology at Metropolitan State College in Denver, Colorado. Both are writers, but one makes her living writing about language and discursive formations, and the other makes her living writing about individuals and identity formation. From a Marxist perspective of historical materialism each appears to reify their subject matter. Butler reifies language, in her latest book she writes in a subtle fashion about how language wounds. And perhaps Bohan might be judged as reifying the activities or actions of the people that she studies. Both seem to me to regularize the patterns they detect and mark them as powers of the things that they have reified. Given a chance each might try to reduce the other's position or occupational activity to the terrain of the

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other. I am not sure how Bohan would go about this but I do have a sense of the way Butler would attempt it.

But first we should make clear through Bohan's own words what she take the business of psychology to be and with specific reference to sexual identity. For this we read Bohan (1996) as saying that,

> Psychology is primarily concerned with individual experience, and our understanding of the individual is centered on identity-the individual's unique sense of who she or he is. Clearly, we must understand the individual within her or his social context; identity is chiefly forged by social experience, and each person's sense of self is framed by the meanings provided by the culture. Still, psychology is most interested in the product of that process, in identity itself. Thus, at the heart of sexual orientation is found in attempts to understand the impact on individual identity of one or another position in the matrix of sexual orientations. (p. 92)

But according to Butler's analysis, identity, whether sexual or personal, is just a fiction as is gender. One is tempted to ask why such ado about nothing if these attributions we make of each other are just fictions. For Butler, fictions are products of speech acts and actions of language are powerful-indeed speech excites, and, in particular, hate speech excites and also harms. Butler's philosophical approach to language is much mired in the vein of the structuralism of predecessors such as the French structural marxist, Louis Althusser and the French psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan. I am not a fan of either of them. Though

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radicals of sorts, that alone does not gain them acceptance. But Butler is free to choose her genealogical tree and its branches; so be it if she finds a philosophical kinship in Althusser and Lacan. She has written about others whom I do admire. But admiration is not sufficient reason; we must look more closely at her argument.

Butler seems to give over the power of action to external things like that of language. Power is just the point of contact for examining and placing Butler and Bohan. The person we need here to carry through our analysis is John Shotter. He is a member of the team of players, of whom I have mentioned numerous times previously, who have "invented" the new discursive psychology.

Shotter near the end of an interesting confessional passage partly made to pay tribute to his connection with and influence from Rom Harre, explains his old view of development and then exposes what his new discursive psychological position is after or during postmodernism. Shotter (1993) says that,

> The nature of the development involved could be seen as a transformation of "natural powers" into "personal powers." The possession of natural powers is, one can say, in the 'nature' of the child, and what requires explaining is how children are helped by those around them, to 'appropriate' their own natural powers and to bring them under their own control as personal powers. (p. 92)

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In attempting to describe how he went from a natural orientation to a thoroughly social one, Shotter (1993) points out a difference between himself and Harre: "Harre centered his initial attention upon what might be called the *already* socially aware person"(p. 92). This Shotter attributes to Harre's being

> influenced by the whole movement in the philosophy of human action in support of the supposedly Wittgensteinian, "rule-following model," and Chomsky's brilliant work on syntax, he took it that self-directed and self-monitored behaviour, performed by reference to rules, "is the prototype of behaviour in ordinary daily living. (Shotter, 1993, p. 92)

Whereas Shotter (1993) describes,

> One of my reasons for my depression with the computer metaphor was the feeling that the rule-following model of meaning was inadequate: people do not just follow rules; they also create them (as well as challenge, change and correct them; and in applying them, check out with others whether they have applied them correctly). (p. 92-93)

Shotter was, as he says, thinking along quite different lines from Harre. He was concerned "with how one became able to take *responsibility* for the outcome at least some of the actions in which one is involved"(p. 93). Furthermore he was

> worrying about *moral* issues and how they affected what Macmurray called the (logical) form of the personal. [He] was concerned to formulate a *developmentally sensitive* account of it, to provide an opening for rule-creation, meaning, at the same time, not so much the creation of rules *de novo*, as the re-creation in the child of already existing rules in the possession of adults. (p. 93)

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Thus for Shotter (1974), psychology became independent of the natural sciences,

> and placed among the moral sciences. This alters its character entirely. It becomes concerned with *negotiations* … Values, opinions, beliefs, feelings, intentions, etc., once again assume a crucial role in human affairs … While classical science demands that everything be studied as if it were matter in motion according to an absent God's pre-established laws, *persons* seem able on occasions to act from a belief, a mere *conception* of a law … and in attempting to live thus, according to the conception of a law, people may fail; they may act inappropriately, rightly or wrongly, legitimately or illegitimately, etc., for conceptions decree only what *should* or *might be* the case, not what is. Attempting to live according to laws inevitably involves the judgment of other people. (p. 217-218)

This sounds good. I agree with much of it. Natural Science is concerned with laws of such generality because the physical universe is thought of as homogenous. Space is space wherever you go. But why does Shotter fall back on the distinction between nature and culture as demarcating psychology from natural science? Why must this be done in order to mark psychology as belonging with the moral sciences? Should we be consistent and recognize that knowledge of nature and of culture are both products of human inquiry? And that means essentially that what we come to know about nature or culture is the result of the application of the kinds of investigative practices we exercise or use to produce the knowledge discovered or constructed. I think that the distinction between nature and

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culture is not a useful one when speaking of the knowledge of natural science or of psychology and the moral sciences. Inquiry is inquiry. Human beings exercise agency in the course of their social activities, and so, too, do technological artifacts have an impact or status as agents or actors as in Latour's actor-network theory of science in action. Important as it is to extend actor status to non-living things as machines, it is also important not to go too far and eliminate the agency from the human actors. Although we should take care not to give them too much or too little power in this regard, we should not minimize either the effects of sedimented actions as texts or the literary and linguistic repositories of power/knowledge. The main caution is not to reify that which is historically and socially constructed. The whole point, politically speaking, is to show that our natures, as humans living and maintaining ourselves in social relations, are modifiable; not fixed in our DNA structures or in the human genome. But the point is to show the workings of self-regulating processes all the way up and down the levels of development. Starting with the cellular and DNA structures, we have shown how DNA is self-repairing and in conjunction with the cell metabolism and its structures are self-replicating, in a manner of speaking. If we need to we can go further down in showing stability among atomic and sub-atomic elements. And

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though there are intermittent or interspersed periods of chaos, order emerges nonetheless. But somehow those who are politically most radical seem to have thrown a wrench in the works at this time as to the possibilities of transforming natural powers into personal powers. Why do academics become conservative in their radical ways? By this I mean that this makes the rejection of self-regulation in the social, cultural and personal ways of being in the name of distinguishing psychology as a moral science. And in the name of radical movement there is a conservative impact of effacing our power of agency.

When I first dealt with this phenomenon of radical thinkers throwing out the concept of personal agency, it was with contemporary French philosophy, especially in the work of those who are labeled structuralists (Claude Levi-Strauss, Jacques Lacan, Louis Althusser, Roland Barthes, and even the early Foucault). I came to understand this group as being affected inordinately by the ordered life that is expected, more so tolerated, in the French University system. The Academy is so regimented in its organization and is highly controlled by the State (Government). Exams for baccalaureate degrees and licenses, and especially the Doctoral defense, an open public event at which any person with the doctorate may examine and question the person whose

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dissertation is to be defended, are all controlled by the State. I found ambivalence among these scholars who were nourished by the positions they held and privileged by the life they were afforded in the university system. Despite all this there was a cost for their freedom and in no one do we see this more than in Michel Foucault. He was closeted in much of his intellectual life in France and found refuge only in his escape to the U.S. where he was indeed outrageous in his behavior and attire. I heard of his giving a lecture at the New School totally dressed in drag. Although Foucault radicalized our thinking, in many ways he was a very traditional academic. By this I mean that he was the epitome of a library researcher, pouring over an astounding amount of material and abstracting two different systems of thought about these primary sources, one his archeology and the other his genealogies. I am commenting on him because I will want to return to him later. But for now I want to suggest that perhaps the people who have borrowed his work in the U.S. are also ambivalent about their positions and privileges of academic life. Foucault fits the kind of person that I would claim meets the closeted academic. He was out in his personal life yet did not, until the history of sexuality, concern himself with his own sexual identity in his public writings. American intellectual/academics like Judith Butler borrow from him

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and repeat in some measure the ambivalence of being queer and being an intellectual.

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Mediating the Ambivalence of Academic Writers:

I should explain that this closeting of one's sexual orientation or sexual identity is not due to any character flaw in the individuals who are forced into it by the nature of the costs one must pay for being queer and for being an intellectual. It is indeed socially constructed, their ambivalence arises out of the historical context of previous intellectuals being empowered and/or privileged, depending on your point of view, to represent the condition of others mostly from a generalized, universalized and objective perspective like the one described above by Catherine MacKinnon. The kind she hopes to replace with standpoint writing that speaks from the perspective of specific aspects and oppressed conditions of human individual and group identities. For gay or lesbians individuals, who as scholars/intellectuals choose to use their own lives as testimony for illustrating or exemplifying what the gay life is like, they are immediately challenged as to the validity of their epistemological authority. It is as if the closeting of their personal lives from their public intellectual lives is necessary otherwise they will not retain any authority as analysts, intellectuals and scholars.

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This hypocrisy is scary: why are heterosexuals not brandished for their perspective of being straight in the way gay men and lesbians are for discussing how their perspectives inform their work? This reeks of stereotyping, the lecherous gay man waiting to entrap young boys or something in that vein. Why is it assumed that if a person admits to, or acknowledges, even analyzes his or her status as sexually different from the norm of heterosexuality, they are compromised (or not to be trusted) in their work. And why have prominent gay and lesbian scholars been challenged in this way? Has Judith Butler gone through tough times? Is it fair to her to argue ad hominem? Not only is it not fair, but as the only point against the political position she promotes (of avoiding self professed lesbian identity), it is insufficient criticism. But if only part of a more complete or comprehensive criticism, it is fair to use personal history to help explain present intellectual positioning. Isn't that what informs and constrains Butler's work? She has been quite clear about the State apparatuses making specific subject positions available for individual starting points. I find the imprisonment of subject-positions too confining and pessimistic.

This, or something of this flavor, is the background of the new discursive psychology that takes the all-encompassing

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position that reality is socially constructed in the conversational contexts of our everyday lives. There is no extra-linguistic reality, or little to none of which we are capable of addressing. Shotter (1993) wrote in a confessional style in the preface to his book, *Cultural Politics of Everyday Life*. He described his first work experience after leaving school as an engineering apprentice in an aircraft factory. I was impressed upon first reading that he noted the differences in treatment afforded the workers who in mass had to file through narrow doors at the back of the factory, they were all required to punch a time clock at precisely the same hour or were docked for lateness. The enormous front doors were meant for the high brass of the military that were the company's customers. His telling of the different levels in the cafeteria that set apart the managerial staff from the factory laborers amused me. He illustrated his understanding of differences in social and economic class well, but I am not sure he carries through with this in the formation of his contributions to the new discursive psychology. Though this we will examine later.

Perhaps the ambivalence of the academic scholars and theoreticians, Foucault, Butler and Shotter are the result of competing discursive formations which have structured the

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historical antecedents of their lives. This, too, may have to wait for later. Our attention needs to return to the absorption of contemporary so-called radical writers in rhetoric and the effacement of the body. We can do this by thinking again about how sexual orientation and specifically how the closeting that informs the development of gays and lesbians has been materially produced. To go forward with this task of analysis requires that we first define our terms.

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Defining the Terms of Analysis:

It may be helpful to define some terms and for this I shall rely on the contemporary work of Donald M. Lowe who nicely outlines, for my purposes, the interrelationship of three concepts: 1) language, 2) body practices, and 3) the social. In his own words, we can catch the drift in this recent work of his earlier work on the history of bourgeois perception that relied on a combination of Marxism and phenomenology. Lowe's (1995) self-description is:

> This work takes into account the Marxists problematic of the reality of practices which code bodily needs, the structuralist and poststructuralist distinction between sign and its referent, and the postmodernist concern with the new simulatory, semiotic reality. (p. 3)

In further distinguishing the difference in this later work he says of his earlier treatment of bourgeois perception that he

> drew heavily from Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of perception. The major difference between that work and the present one is that a phenomenology of perception presupposes an embodied existential being, and describes social reality from the standpoint of that embodied existence, while contemporary Marxism and poststructuralist semiotics propose a new problematic which questions the very possibility of a Logos of social phenomena to establish embodied being. The body has become problematical, a construction of changing social practices. (Lowe, 1995, p. 3-4)

Before discussing further the problem of making bodies gay, let us use the terminology of Lowe and adapt it to our

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present undertaking. Borrowing from Lowe (1995), we may understand "language as a system or structure of signs [responsible for] the categorical ordering of social reality"(p. 4). And in accord with de Saussure:

> a sign is a correlation between signified and signified. The signified is a concept which refers to something; the signifier is the sound-image conveying the signified; and the referent is what the sign refers to. Often, the referent of a sign may not be a real object or subject, but the signified may be another sign. (Lowe, 1995, 4)

Lowe explains that this is a view of language taken synchronically, as a slice of language, spatially speaking, abstracted out of continuity in any temporal dimension of any significant duration. This web of language is something static and the meanings of signs are relationally and differentially constituted. Of this spatial order he claims that language does not repeat equivalencies between signs, so there would be no redundancy. The meanings cohere in that there are no contradictions either.

He points out correctly that practices in the world which are based on language go beyond the synchronic order to interact with existing, sedimented practices and, in so doing, transform the world across time. This is reminiscent of Merleau-Ponty's idea of our praxis or collective activities as having historically become sedimented. As the metaphor suggests, language is itself a product in real time

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of the accumulation of meanings. Language development is made through alterations in context and juxtaposition with other signs (Lowe, 1995).

In Lowe we find what we might call the concept of "the deferred body", one which can be referred to but never known in its actuality. For him, "the body referent, our lived body, is not one half of a Cartesian body/mind dualism, nor even a psycho-bio-physiological unity." These are second order and not primary or primitive in that they are constructions and conceptualizations of an already social scientific community. It may be worthwhile to quote Lowe at length on his definition of body practices:

> Body practices are the social practices, which code the body. We can never know an actual lived body in the world. There is always an unbridgeable gap between the concept (a signified) of a body, and its referent (what the signified or concept refers to), which is the lived body in the world. The actual lived body is therefore the referent of the signified (or concept), what I call the body referent. However, in this case, unlike all other referents of signifiers, the body referent is our own body. This body referent, the actual, lived body in the world, i.e., our own body, is coded and realized by language, yet concurrently and in spite of that it is nevertheless always more than any concept, image, or representation of it. (Lowe, 1995, 5)

Here we have a clear statement of the body as having a place in the world and one that is never fully absorbed, constructed or represented in the web of language. Neither is it just a figment of our imagination. "The body

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referent," according to Lowe, "as a human body living in the world already utilizes language for the sake of living, is already coded by the social practices in the world." Of course the body is the source of language. Its activities of speaking and writing are just ways of meaning that derive from the qualities abstracted from our lived relationships in the world of our bodies; a world of our own making in the deepest and most profound sense of making. Once we die there is no longer a world for us because there is no live body (and hence no body) through which the world may be made, spoken of, written about, experienced or understood. It is our very bodily existence that sets the possibility of there being a world that will be communed with and experienced. For Lowe (1995), "the concept of body practices seeks to approximate the language-mediated practices undertaken by the lived body in the world to satisfy its needs"(p. 5).

The third conception of the social is also like that of the body referent merely suggested or hinted at through gesture. The gesture accomplished again through a metaphorical pointing in language. In Lowe's (1995) words,

> The Social is an empty, abstract sign. It is the naming of the world, in order to avoid the functional, rationalist assumptions implicit in such existing categorical terms as "society" or "totality." (p. 5)

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I am in agreement with Lowe that the world is neither functional, nor rational, nor even orderly. Since the older terms such as society and totality suggest otherwise, Lowe rejects them. In his justification of this rejection, he appeals to the point of view of the post-Marxist political theorists, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985). They argue that,

> The incomplete character of every totality necessarily leads us to abandon, as a terrain of analysis, the premise of "society" as a sutured and self-defined totality. "Society" is not a valid object of discourse. There is not a single underlying principle fixing-and hence-constituting-the whole field of differences. (p. 111)

In Lowe's (1995) work he proposes "that production and consumption, social reproduction, gender construction and sexuality, and psychopathology constitute different terrain or contexts of body practices in late capitalism"(p. 6). And he concludes "there is neither social equilibrium nor functional rationality in the world, despite the attempts of social scientists to impose such rationalistic frameworks on the 'societies' that they study"(p. 6).

Indeed, Lowe's (1995) is an ambitious project following from the simple statement: "Practices code, construct, and determine the satisfaction of bodily needs"(p. 6). He goes on to ask and answer,

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> But how do we conceptualize and analyze body practices? Specifically, are late-capitalist body practices *structural* (in the Marxian, not linguistic, sense), *discursive* (in the Foucauldian sense), *systematic* (in the sense of cybernetic systems with feedback mechanisms) or *semiotic* (at once signifying and communicative, as Eco would define it)? Or are they varying, differential combinations, in different locations and specific instances? Structure, discourse, systems, and semiotics are not equal, distinct, comparable entities. They combine and recombine in actual practices. (I assume that the analytics of practices in other social formations require other combinations of paradigms.) (p. 6-7)

My question then may be framed as follows: if homosexuality is constructed who or what is doing the constructing? Following up on Lowe's lead we may begin to ask: what are the contexts in which children are taught to recognize, label or express their bodily needs? And are these coding practices, as he says, structural, discursive, systematic, or semiotic?

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Ritualizing and Performing of Queer Desire:

I was motivated to ask the question above about how we might make bodies queer because I thought that it was actually quite absurd to think that we did this. I was stirred to ask the question this way because this seemed to be the best way to capture what our mute bodies might be wanting or attempting to express in their primitive and untutored gestures. It does make sense to me to have asked, as Peter McLaren did, how we make workers, and how we make Catholics but it seems strange or odd (perhaps queer) to suggest that this concept of making, as in socially constructing, homosexuality must be really perverse unless there is some bodily inclination that leads a person to eventually identify themselves as falling within a category of a different sexuality than the norm of heterosexuality. I believe that we may have something to learn about the body referent of our linguistically coded and determined body practices. And about what ways "the closet" informs the academic discourse of intellectuals such as Foucault, Butler and Shotter.

At the outset of this excursion in which we will be asking how each of the four types of body practices codes and determines the lived experience of embodiment, I should make it clear that I have, as of yet, only an intuition of how

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the body referent, i.e., the actual lived body, influences the content of what gets encoded and hence in part determines the experience of embodiment and subsequently the development of our sexuality. Here the emphasis will be on asking in what ways bodies are made queer, and can this sense of making be the same as it is for making workers and making Catholics. I have no doubt that it is valid to say of each of the last two that they are socially constructed in the sense that Butler means us to understand that gender and sexuality are fictions. But I will attempt to explain my resistance to going along with her extreme position of making the body mute. I hope to end this chapter with an argument that compels the reader to understand what I mean when I have called the performance theory of queer sexuality a perversity.

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Structural Coding of Queer Bodies:

Is there something structural about the social construction of queer bodies? To answer this we need to grasp what is meant by structure in the Marxist theory of class conflict. If anything counts as structural for Marx it is class. And though Marx never really considered to any degree of precision what defines a class, for our purposes we may take class, in the Marxist sense, to be constituted in a dialectical relationship between groups and forces of production. The motor of a social formation is in Marx's view the generative processes, which are responsible for the reproduction of the goods needed to sustain the form of life which has engaged in this self-sustaining economy. Under capitalism, the division of labor constructs the relations of these forces of production in such a way that there is a specialization of functions. This specialization distorts the work process heretofore of the crafts guilds which was more of an integrated and continuous unfolding of a set of procedures that, when followed, would result in the completion of manufacturing of a product. In short, the claim upon which this division has been effected distinguishes between manual and intellectual labor. One form of labor predominantly done using the hands and body, and the other more mysterious in its nature, conducted in

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the head as it has been proposed as a mental or cognitive activity of the brain. Few today doubt that schooling is fully implicated in the reproduction of the labor pool. For generations under capitalism, the working class has been kept in the dark as to the political nature of the kind of education that trains and disciplines their bodies in preparation for their locations of employment in the system of production. It is only with the advent of late capitalism and the alterations in the needs of a labor pool, less in manufacturing and more in service and knowledge sectors of the economy, that we have a new vantage point from which to understand the ritualized activities that have made workers.

It would take us too far a field to go into depth about those practices. But I will say in marking the importance of class structures in the development of sexuality that both sexism and heterosexism operates powerfully to coerce the labor pool to remain in its pre-selected or planned place of employment. The difficulties of surmounting one's social class origins have been well documented since the early study of Sennett and Cobb (1993) called: *Hidden Injuries of Class*. With the great majority of working class children remaining within the ranks of their working parents upon attainment of adulthood, and the same proportion of

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middle class children retaining the ranks of the social class of their parents, it must be concluded that movement from one social class to another is not easy. Though there are no doubt influences in the determination of sexuality in the subtle sense that social constructionist theoreticians have described, there is something which is found enough in common to call the sexual phenomena across classes as heterosexual. This is conditioned with the early gender training that little girls and boys are given. The strictest gender training has been found among the working classes, though oddly enough, I have found in my inquiries a greater acceptance of deviant sexual practices among the working class. Here I mean to suggest that in the lives of gay men it was very often their mothers who questioned them about their sexuality and brought them "out of the closet". Whereas in those gay men who are from families at the border of middle class or newly middle class it appears that such deviance threatens the newly acquired or aspired to status of the family, and subsequently their families show less inclination to support and assist their gay children in the coming out process. Also of interest for what it might tell us about the relationship between working class and managerial class is the phenomenon among gay men of fetishizing men of blue collar/working class occupations. Foucault and some of his disciples in U.S. elite academic

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institutions, [Leo Bersani (1995) at UC Berkeley and David Halperin (1995) of MIT], have even gone further in elaborating-perhaps making it into an art form-the dominance relations among managers and subordinated workers into a fetish of theatrics of sadistic and masochistic performance in gay public sex. I will comment on this later. For now I wish to conclude that to understand the development of gay men, lesbians and bisexuals we should have to explore the interrelations between these different contributory standpoints. But I think that we can say nonetheless, without this much needed elaboration of the intricacies of these interrelationships, that there is something structural about the development of queer bodies and that is the structural effects of the heterosexism. Heterosexism has been described as biased and discriminatory practices of dividing the wide range of diverse and overlapping sexual practices according to whether they are opposite sex/gender relations or same-gender sex relations. There is indeed under patriarchy, here noted as rule by the father, a differential evaluation of which is preferable and hence set apart from and above the other in a hierarchy of dominance and discrimination.

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Discursive Coding of Queer Bodies:

Discursively speaking, Foucault was prominent in helping us to address the question of the validity of purely structural forms of analysis. Because I will have occasion to explore this approach most thoroughly in the next chapter on voices and discursive formations, I will say only little here about Foucault's position. He was not satisfied with the Marxist analysis according to which such large structures as class conflict were the major ways of explaining the course of history. Foucault was perhaps unique in setting us on the path of discovery of the workings of a more diffuse set of power operations than the economic exploitation of workers by owners of the means of production. He recognized that the newer forms of production were being structurally affected by a new middle class who were, though not owning the means of production, nonetheless influential in the increasingly important knowledge industries. These knowledge industries sprang up with the greater involvement of scientists working to diversify and improve the means of production including developing techniques for managing workers in manufacturing, service and knowledge sectors of the economy. In his history and genealogy of the prison, he masterfully exposed a plausible series of transformations, in which the human sciences became involved in a type of "governmentality", as

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he called it. Power was for Foucault not merely a force of oppression imposed by one group upon another from outside, rather it also included the dispersion of power through techniques of surveillance. His analysis of the Panopticon of Jeremy Bentham's invention shows that the power of the state became extended through the establishment of practices for disciplining deviant bodies that transgressed the normal-what was prescribed as acceptable forms of behaving. The study of human intercourse in all spheres of life became the productive activity of the new researchers who took as their subject matter people in society.

Foucault's analysis of the construction of homosexuality in the introductory volume of the three part, *History of Sexuality,* is incomplete or if not incomplete then perverse. He proposed that sexuality was not biologically determined as in Freud's psychoanalytic theory of the instinctual origins of our libidinal (sexual/psychic) energy, but stemmed from an excitation caused or determined by the methods of surveillance that were implemented by the nurses and care-givers in the Victorian homes of Freud's Vienna. According to Foucault, sexuality is different in each epoch and we are not capable of retrieving an understanding of the way that that sexual behavior of an earlier time was experienced because our categories are entirely different.

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Foucault's notion of episteme is important in grasping how it is possible for earlier times to remain opaque to those of another epoch whose understanding is structured by their own set of first principles or epistemes. One finding that was important to the constitution of the human sciences occurred in the 17th Century. Before the Age of Reason or Science, properly defined language was not separate from things. A more mystical and integrated universe informed the pre-scientific mentality. Signs were God's way of communicating with his creations. All meaning was fluid and interpenetrating of everything else. The human sphere was not considered as arbitrary as it is with our later scientific enlightenment period-sort of post-Cartesian split between mind and body, if you like. Humans were not yet in exile from nature, and the Book of Nature was all that there was and was all potentially meaningful or decipherable to humans.

But this changed, and with Christianity's search for ways to reclaim its forms of dominance and power, the church personnel used its power of literacy to control the masses of those not literate. Power was, is, and has always been in the hands of those that can read and use the word to organize and control their own activities and the activities of others. Foucault knew this from the inside. He has

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perhaps, in the French circle, co-invented the Pavlov and Skinner systems for the understanding of the influence of second order signal systems on the body/physiological systems of energy. All three, Foucault, Pavlov, and Skinner, were wise in the ways of transforming energies across and throughout the bodies of their subjects. It is curious that Skinner's operant conditioning stirred up such a ruckus in American intellectual circles and yet Foucault's analysis, which is actually the same kind of analysis of control and manipulation through different methods of stimulation, was so readily absorbed into academia and into those few remaining spheres for public intellectuals.

We will come back to that question in the next chapter. But to complete the Foucauldian way of interpreting and theorizing the constitution of sexuality, he rejects the Freudian repression hypothesis in favor of a hypothesis of stimulating or intensifying the erotic quality of sexual behavior through sanctioning its occurrence. That is the outlaw theory of sexuality-something is made attractive through its being made criminal and sinful. Now I would agree that our sexuality (straight, gay, transsexual, etc.) has developed within the context of these modes of surveillance but I do not accept that we would not engage in any sexual behavior at all under different conditions.

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Let me explain where I agree with Foucault, or a Foucauldian analysis, and where I do not. I would agree that the realm of places in which sexual conduct is possible, (i.e., in bedrooms, back rooms, alleys, parks, beaches, YMCA showers, etc.), does contribute to the manner of sexual commerce and exchange. Places contribute to shaping the forms of expression that our bodies' engagement with self or others will take. But that our bodies show, through its gestures or urges, an inclination to make contact and especially that our bodies reach orgasm (and for males ejaculate semen) as a matter of fact and as a capacity, is the stuff out of which the socially constructed forms and categories of sexual conduct are made. It is merely a contingent fact that our ignorance of the body's ways of being is so great at this time. Our knowledge of sexuality is socially constructed, but that there is something sexual at all is the given attribute of our bodies. It is a transcultural, yes even universal, fact that our bodies are brought to orgasm through touching and stimulating our sex organs with pressure. Here the Pavlovian model of classical conditioning is useful and adequate for theorizing the development of sexual fetishes. The Unconditioned Stimulus (US) for bodily orgasm (the Unconditioned Response or UR) is always tactile. You must be touched or touch someone or something in order

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to generate the physiological response of bodily orgasm. Of course what this means, socially speaking, is going to vary from one culture to another. The language habits of a particular culture are going to provide the concepts, however rich or limited, with which to describe and discuss the experience of orgasm. Its evaluation may be measured, even facilitated, by our linguistic categories; not that the orgasm is anything to talk about in the first place. Our appreciation of this difference in the socially constructed understanding and knowledge of sexuality and its ontological possibility would be enhanced by thinking about the set of circumstances leading to a person's first orgasm. Perhaps we should even study what has been the scope and nature of their first time experiences in order to help show the limitation of the socially produced categories or, as Foucault might prefer to call them, "the regimes of power" that have shaped and influenced our sexuality through the administration of knowledge practices and all that those practices entail, (i.e., disciplining of our bodies and what we do with them and to them).

I am definitely in agreement with Foucault regarding how we, as gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and even heterosexuals, have come to express our sexuality. The shaping and influences on our bodily development have been thoroughly

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social. If there were not the sanctions and evaluative preferences that exist which continue to inform our sexuality, things would be much different than they are now. However, we would, and I challenge someone, anyone, to imagine it otherwise, always have a disposition to maintain sensuality as part of our sexual make-up. Of that I am sure. To have let the voices of the social constructionists reach the extremes that it has in a contest with biological essentialism is not something we should be proud of. Common sense, in its most profound generation, should temper the enthusiasm of reductionism in either direction. Finding ways of giving voice and expression to our bodies is imperative. For now, however, it may be useful to explore the construction of the bodies that have been made queer. Even with the depreciation of our queer bodies, or their being made queer to keep the relational spirit of analysis and production or orientation model, we have something to learn from the resistance that queer bodies make toward the domination practices of heterosexuality.

Does not the queer body learn to experience this pleasure of orgasm in a relatively untutored environment? I recall my first experience: I was about ten and had the habit of parading and playing in front of the bathroom mirrors in the master bathroom of my parents' split level suburban home. My

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first self-stimulated ejaculation was through active manipulation, (as it happened it was by finger penetration of my anus; it wasn't until later that I had the notorious nocturnal emissions). I was lying on the floor fantasizing that I was being held captive and tortured by Indians. (I'm not sure whether Native American Indians or Sub-continent India Indians-I had watched both on television programs, The Lone Ranger and Tonto, and that Saturday Morning Show about the Indians in India riding on elephants on safari). As a friend said in reporting his first ejaculation, who wouldn't be frightened by the appearance of this liquid? Though he self-identifies as straight, he also recalls being afraid and thought that he had done something wrong. Like a sneeze, ejaculation is a bodily reflex brought on by stimulation. That I was lying on the floor of my parents' bathroom and accompanied the self-stimulation with fantasies of torture by natives was entirely contingent upon the course of events that have colored and shaped my life. But that I ejaculated at all was due to the possibility afforded by my ontological condition. No one taught me to play as I did. I had never had an older sibling or anyone else in the family or in my gang of neighborhood friends that was more precocious than I, or at least no one who shared their knowledge of what I experienced. We could almost imagine another slogan imitating or parodying of Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* (I

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think therefore I am) and say I ejaculate (cum to use the slang) therefore I am. This event is private in its experiential aspect but public in its leaving material signs. This experience perhaps more than any other, (for sneezes we are too young to remember whether they frightened us or not), helps to manifest the manner in which our bodies can be made queer or foreign to us. All bodies, or at least male bodies for those are the ones I understand the most, are capable of serving as the source of surprise and materially significant otherness.

Foucault has helped to make us attend to the nature of our sexuality as being an activity that is determined and influenced by multiple aspects of our historically and socially constructed lives. In so doing he has helped to make us aware that things could have been otherwise. The famous conditional in philosophy that is counterfactual comes to mind, "if such and such had been so and so, then such would have been so". The such and such and so and so are meant to be the divisions between heterosexuality and homosexuality and their circumstances of cultural and social development. This differentiation does not have to be this way, as is apparent from studies of Native American Indian (indigenous) culture in which a distinction between heterosexual and homosexual is made but not within a

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hierarchical devaluation of the homosexual. The well studied phenomenon of the *berdache,* (the berdaches are males who do not conform to a society's normative expectations for masculine behavior and dress recognized by tribes as neither male or female but an alternative gender), shows that at an early age the tribal members may spot a child who shows signs of developing the sensitivity of a gay man. This child will be given a place of honor within the tribe. When they are grown up they serve as an intermediary for opposite sex/gender relations, helping to advise couples or mated pairs with problems in their relationships. It appears that these Indian tribes valued the different perspective that could be offered by those who were not blind by their sources of difficulty because of their confinement in a gender divided way of being. The berdache must have better understood the ways in which the body's activities contributed to structuring and limiting the knowledge or understanding that one sex/gender position could have on the other excluded or differently informed position (Williams, 1986).

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Cybernetic Coding of Queer Bodies:

Cybernetics is defined as the study of human-control functions and mechanical and electric or electronic systems made to replace them. From a cybernetic perspective on bodily practices, we would expand on the Pavlovian model of classical conditioning and integrate it within a Skinnerian analysis of the conditioning of operant behavior through rewards and punishment. The Pavlovian paradigm provides us with an analysis of the local operations of control over the reflex actions of our bodies. Through the classical conditioning model of pairing originally neutral stimuli with stimuli which, according to our best lights of determination, naturally elicit unconditioned reflex actions, it is possible to extend the operations of control over our bodily (physiological/biological; species-specific in Marxist terms) reactions. With cybernetics or systems thinking deriving from the invention of servomechanism, it is possible to see the connection to the human interest (perhaps even need) in controlling or ordering one's activity so as to optimize the outcome of our adaptive maneuvers.

With regards to sexualizing or eroticizing our bodily desires, the classical conditioning model can be used to

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explain the power to excite that originally neutral stimuli acquire through their pairing with the unconditioned reflex action of physiological orgasm. Suffice it to mention that if the young man whose mother performed oral stimulation of his penis, which I described above, had been excited repeatedly by his mother while observing her purple lip gloss, he would no doubt have become excited by other women who wore purple lip gloss. As was the case with his denial and covert rejection of seeing himself as repeating the scene of sex with his mother, we might expect that the second signal system of speech/language would come to control his behavior, especially his orienting reflex, in such a manner that he would actually avoid women wearing purple lip gloss. My interest here is not in laying out in great detail a classical conditioning of sexual excitation but merely to show how suggestive such an analysis is for explaining the generation of fetishes and other variations of sexual desire. The Pavlovian model with its hypothesis of materially significant encoded neural networks is enough of a suggestion to make the claim that our bodies are made queer through the original dispositions of our species-specific capabilities. Here I postpone discussing the nature of the regulation of behavior by speech until the next section on semiotic coding.

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More relevant to this discussion on the cybernetic coding of queer bodies is to think of homosexuality as made possible because it is indeed a human possibility. Our bodies are susceptible to the pleasures of touching regardless of the gender of the initiating person (animal or thing?). However, this touching must occur before the acquisition of the inhibitory regulation of our orienting reflex actions. Once this regulation is initiated, the stimulation is no longer pleasurable. It can also be stated here that since most of us are being raised by two differently sexed parents, biologically speaking a female and a male, we are provided with developmental opportunities of internalizing models of a mother and a father. In the language of object-relations, psychoanalytic theory, psychological objects as imaginary figures are representing the real and fantasized parents of each parent.

I was impressed with the analysis of Eric de Kruyper (1993) who attempted to extend our understanding of the Freudian construction of sexuality in "The Gay Foundations of Heterosexuality and Straight Homophobia." He reasons that the history of experience with the father in a straight child is the "repressed (other) of erotic attachment" and constructs the quality of the child's future mature heterosexual adjustment. Kuyper shows that by logical

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extension or parity of reasoning a child raised with two parents will have had a history (varied to the extent that parents are willing to fondle or cuddle the child) of touch and erotic/pleasurable stimulation created out his experience with both of them. What precisely guides the child who becomes heterosexual to ignore or disorient himself to the erotic/pleasurable possibilities of same-sex/gender body contact is not known, nor according to gay scholars should it be important.

I agree that tracing the origins of sexuality, for purposes of seeking how to change or control it because it is regarded as deviant from the heterosexual norm, is inappropriate as a goal of a science of sexuality. However, understanding the beginnings of our body's history of pleasurable experiences is desirable not so as to change it but to document that it is among the range of dispositions of the human species. There are times when naturalism is acceptable in arguing for moral tolerance. This orientation, of course, has lead to the debates between essentialists and constructionists. My concern remains with correcting what I consider to be the confusion of social constructionist thinkers who seem to think that history is something that overrides, effaces, or even supplants any pre-dispositions of our bodies.

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In case the reader doubts that there are such thinkers I offer the following quote to document this confusion:

> The idea that sexual identities are not simple expressions of bodily truth but are historical phenomena-and therefore constantly changing-is a relatively recent one, pioneered largely by feminist and lesbian and gay scholars (see for example, Duberman, Vicinus, and Chauncey 1989). Its origins were largely political, demonstrating the historicity and potential ephemerality of the categories we take for granted as natural and inevitable, even as their power was acknowledged. Behind this position is a clear assumption that, as Laclau put it, 'the constitution of a social identity is an act of power and that identity as such is power' (1990, p. 30). Sexual identities embody power relations, products of imposition *and* agency, and are rooted in many histories. (Weeks, 1995, p. 92)

Why does the writer of the above passage believe that history and the body's truth are two separate and unrelated things, one is to be revered and the other discarded. This passage gives the reader the impression that gay identity was just a consequence of a political regime that labels some people as gay and subsequently treats them badly as a result of the deviant label. Sexuality is not a fiction, except in the subtlest sense; when writers distinguish between the production of literary artifacts such as autobiographies, and the lived experience of bodily existence. Our existence is no fiction, on the other hand our ways of representing it may take many forms and that is where the fictional part comes in. But to trivialize the

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painful and disgusting treatment of people so marked with such deviant sexual identities is not helpful to those people. To them their experience and pain is very real. I do not know what such theorists think they are accomplishing by minimizing the consequences of a life of oppression and stigma management. We ought not to disregard the natural and naturalized history of our bodies, that is the lesson we might learn if a sufficient understanding was achieved about the queerness of our attractions for same-sex/gender partners. But by following the disregard that is proposed, as if this brand of Stoicism, a "just say no" approach to oppression, might be sufficient enough to equip the oppressed sexual minorities living through a historical epoch when homophobia is a real practice stemming from ignorance and moral deficiency, we will accomplish nothing. And to go further, as the criticisms of some postmodern skeptics would have us, and to reject the idea of a liberating politics and its attempted practice is as the British might say just gassing, blowing in the wind with wind.

We need something more substantial in an analysis of homophobia. We need to understand how cybernetic coding of queer bodies plays a part in the institutionalization of homophobia and the consequences to be found in the work of

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academic and intellectual persons. In fairness to the author of the quote, I should say that Weeks recognizes, as do I, the ineptness of claiming that there is a plurality of sexual desires and identities. This obscures the violence of hierarchical evaluation of better and worse forms of sexual desire and sexual identity. In summarizing the effects of categorizing people as "homosexual" over the last century, Jeffrey Weeks (1995) claims that this has been to reinforce the normality of heterosexuality. He quotes Eve Sedgwick (1985) to show that this has recently changed:

> The importance-an importance-of the category "homosexual" ... comes not necessarily from its regulatory relation to a nascent or already constituted minority of homosexual people or desires, but from its potential for giving whoever wields it a structuring definitional leverage. (p. 86)

Playing off Sedgwick's assessment, Weeks further portrays her position as captured in the following:

> The emergence since the eighteenth century, she argues, of an institutionalized homophobia and homosexual panic, brutally separates men from men, but more crucially serves to confirm and consolidate male (heterosexual) power not only over other men but over women, for the 'domination offered by the strategy is not only over a minority population, but over the bonds that structure all social form' (Sedgwick, p. 97). In other words, the apparently neutral description of men as either homosexual or heterosexual conceals the intricate play of power, of domination and subordination, which minoritizes the homosexual experience, and consolidates male power in a new, effective pattern. In the same fashion, the categorization, in psychology, sexology and a variety of other social practices, of some women as homosexual and others as very definitely not, breaks the continuum of all women, and hence serves further to consolidate

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> the sexual power of men (Smith-Rosenberg 1985). (Weeks, 1995, p. 93)

This passage was worth quoting at length for it clearly articulates the interconnected effects of an institutionalized homophobia. The phenomenon of "homosexual panic" may be inferred from the brutal spread of physical beating, bashing, and often murdering of gay men, which is well documented in today's newspapers and news reports. This "panic" is also evident in the well-known studies of different reactions that have been found in gay men versus straight men in pupil dilation as an indication of interest. Here I am thinking of the studies by Hess in which interns were shown slides of naked men and naked women. Predictably the heterosexual men's pupils dilated when shown naked females and homosexual men's dilated when shown naked men. The interesting difference however was in the constriction of heterosexual men's pupils when exposed to naked men and the unaltered (neither dilation nor constriction) pupil size of homosexual men when shown naked women. Pupil constriction is an indication of fear. It is interesting that gay men do not show (with this indicator) fear of naked women but straight men do show fear when exposed to naked men. This, I would say, is a subtle indication of homosexual panic in straight men who learn to fear being attracted to same-sex/gender persons.

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Of course, this homophobic training and conditioning of bodies to queer desire begins in families. The worst of the effects of such training is in its impact on the potentially gay child. This is what I referred to previously as being born into the enemy camp. I think that the treatment of potentially gay children in heterosexist and homophobic family environs is tantamount to child abuse. Not only is needed information for adequate understanding of the development of the child's sexuality (and sexual options) withheld in most instances, for fear of turning a child into the socially and morally undesirable category of homosexual, but punishment and negative conditioning of one's own bodily dispositions and desires is imposed. These are internalized and difficult to remove or remedy as therapeutic interventions have shown.

The pursuit an adequate understanding of the adverse effects of institutional homophobia whether in the family or other legal, political and social institutions is important. This understanding will only be achieved if we do not efface the contribution of our bodily truths as they are woven and developed in the course of our personal histories. The tendency of literary critics to be caught up in the fictional possibilities of self-life-writing, that which

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excludes knowledge of our bodies, is perhaps a defect or hazard of their profession.

A healthy course in the affects of conditioning aversive behaviors and its resistance to extinction, once established, would help to remedy the occupational myopia of critics of essentialism and promoters of social construction. The study of gay desire and the making of queer bodies, in the sense of the development of their sexual histories both physiologically and socially conditioned, would contribute to clarifying the violence perpetrated upon the victims. This would also apply to violence that is even self induced, such as homophobic self-laceration and self-effacement. The latter is what I think is happening in gay, lesbian and bisexual writers who wish to exclude the body's contribution to our development of sexuality.

I should say a little about how this is to be understood. I have intended this discussion to be one of how queer bodies are coded in cybernetic systems. In raising the control of the family and institutions on the development of sexuality, I meant to extend the history of effects that have a more local effect on our bodies physiology of pleasure. There are interesting possibilities for the refurbished

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understanding of the Freudian hypothesis of the homosexual child as having a strong mother and a weak father. In a heterosexist society, few fathers are weak but sadistic relationships have many causes and not just in male dominance of heterosexuality, though this is surely a strong source but not in the brow beaten husband who might turn out to be a weak father. Instead of blaming women for their sons turning out to be homosexual we should, (and I will in the next chapter), look at the family of a potentially gay child as having something interesting to say about the development of feminism. I mean couldn't the gay child be seen as an ally of his mother and as such achieve a different voice morally speaking? Wouldn't it be interesting if the phenomenon of homosexuality where to become understood as implicated in the emergence of a more feminine moral voice? After all things are not always as they appear. More later. What is left to do is to let our study of bodily coding practices be carried into the fullest arena in the sense of its being most pregnant with possibility of providing an integrated theory of interpretation of sexuality of bodies and voices in a semiotically constructed system.

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Semiotic Coding of Queer Bodies:

In a semiotic system I expect to find a continuum or medium in which physically or materially significant others may be understood and not reduced to a fictional or imaginary otherness. How would a semiotic approach permit us to read the queerness of certain bodies? Are we to consider queer bodies to be a species of human bodies?

To answer the second question first, I will appeal to Henning Bech (1997) who has already posed and answered that question affirmatively. Bech added specificity to this question in a section called "The Homosexual Form of Existence":

> Is there any basis whatsoever for speaking of and describing homosexuals as a 'species', as people who have something in common other than a particular sexual preference? I think so. For existing as a homosexual is synonymous with existing under existing certain *conditions* (such as disapproval, medical practice and the city) which bear on that existence in at least three ways. In part, *they are there as conditions one is forced to relate to*, 'answer', in some way or other. And finally, *they invite certain specific answers*, though it would be incorrect to say they have rendered them necessary. And once these 'answers' (e.g. associations or signals) have been provided and have assumed a more or less stable form, they themselves eventually form part of the series of conditions that exert an influence. In these ways, the conditions *form* the homosexual existence, molding it into a specific *form of existence*. (p. 102-103)

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Bech goes on immediately to offer qualifying statements lest he be understood as offering an essential notion of homosexual.

He offers four qualifications. They are: "1. I do not maintain that all homosexuals are identical." By this he means to recognize that "they are very different … but as men with strong erotic interests in other men, they are subject to certain conditions that they cannot help being affected by and relating to." Since he has delineated precisely the "modern conditions of life, without which this form of existence would not be possible," his second qualifying comment is obvious: "2. I do not maintain that there always have been and always will be 'homosexuals' with features like those I describe." Having taken account of the historical drift in the "self-description from 'homosexual' through 'homophile' to 'gay' (and, indeed, to 'queer')" as not "superficial but altogether expresses a modified historical situation" we can see his reason for saying; "3. I do not maintain that the homosexuals, since entering the world in the nineteenth century, always have been and always will be the same." He uses the term "homosexual" here because of something like Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblance." Across the span of history, since the inception of the "homosexual", there are fundamental

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attributions held in common among people so labeled; not all people have the same but there is sufficient overlap to warrant being called by the same name, thus they carry the species character of the homosexual form of existence. Recognizing that men who are homosexual have not been the mere helpless subjects of these conditions but that the homosexual form of existence is a creative *answer* to specific conditions." He concludes his qualifying statements with: "4. I do not maintain that the homosexuals are simply the results of certain conditions that have a bearing on them and saddle them with a particular life." (Bech, 1997, p. 103-104)

After quoting Walt Whitman, from "Song of the Open Road" (1856), "Do you know what it is as you pass to be loved by strangers? Do you know the talk of those turning eyeballs?" Bech (1997) discusses the gaze of homosexuals. In opening his discussion of the gaze, he says:

> At gay bars many things go on, but making sexual contact is certainly one of them, whether it's intended to end in orgasm or not. However, you don't go up to the person you're interested in, raise your hat and introduce yourself. Or, if you do, you're asking for the consequences. You *can* have a drink served to the object of your attentions, though these days at least that's regarded as being somewhat over the top, or in any case it's unusual. You *use your gaze;* but in the right way, for a right way there is.
>
> Naturally, you have to let your eye wander around until it finds something attractive or at least acceptable, but then there are certain rules of good form which you

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> do well to follow; this requires delicacy, self-control and practice, i.e., good manners-a qualification in itself. Without it a person is either innocent-which may be very charming; or stupid, which definitely is not. (p. 104-105)

From Bech's introduction to the manner of using our gaze, it is plain that the eyes are performing a double function, both reading and being read. This is a starting point for recognizing that the body's activity, which in this case is the gaze, takes on significance in a specifically homosexual context. Among straight men who are also very much interested in looking at men, even looking them over, the initial gaze must be averted from the other once the eyes meet. Unless there is a moment of recognition, in the case where each has met the other in some previous situation, it is customary for straight men to nod, and even in friendlier places, (like California), to say hello, or g'day (as in Australia) but usually the gaze is averted and eyes never again meet. Otherwise, the coded message is clear-to caress one gaze with another is to openly invite further contact and to show further interest.

Proper etiquette is given. According to Bech (1997), there is a subtle dance of eyeing each other, even among gay men. He instructs:

> You must *never* start letting your gaze rest on the man you're after. You look away *almost* as soon as his eyes hit yours; and after a moment, you look back to see if

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> he's looking at you. Now it's his turn to shift his eyes; this must happen quickly, in any case, and the very speed of it-i.e., whether the pace is a little slower or a little faster-will map out the likelihood of further developments. It can easily happen that he merely glances back just to make sure he's being looked at; in that case it will lead nowhere. He just wants your gaze, but won't give anything in return. If these reciprocal glancings repeat themselves, however, you can start fixing your gaze a little longer and see what happens. (p. 104-105)

I want to accomplish two things at this stage of my discussion on the semiotic coding of queer bodies: 1) to address how the gazing upon objects, even inanimate objects, is never passive. That is, the eyes of the human observer are not merely receiving impressions; there is what we might call a structural coupling that has evolved in our species being, and there are further developmental (socially/ culturally and historically informed) processes in which the species form of gazing and relating to objects look at is actively constructed by the things themselves. This is to make a realist claim about the world of objects which is a sine qua non of semiotic theory from Charles Sanders Pierce (Sheriff, 1994). Our Gaze is not merely the result of our own activity, as if we were free to look at things any which way that pleases us. The objects that we look at have the power to inform, that is to constrain, shape and influence, the way(s) in which we can look at them. The "can" of the last statement is an existentially significant operation: a modal qualifier that suggests how we may or how it is

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possible to look at something, even something physical and inanimate. There are differences in the possibilities that constrain our looking when the objects of our gaze are other human beings or even other animals. This is not always an ethical possibility but in the case of humans this is certainly one way in which our bodies know and understand the constraints of our humanness. I will be helped in this part of what I want to accomplish by Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (1994) who discusses the gaze as a demonstration of power in her book about animate forms and gendered bodies.

Toward achieving those two things and generally sketching out the approach that a semiotic analysis provides to understanding queerly embodied beings, I will begin in the reverse order, going over Sheets-Johnstone's (1994) contribution to understanding "a particular dimension of our animateness-the roots of power and of power relations"(p. 2). Next I will consider how Peircean semiotics is the most productive framework for understanding something of the corporeal nature of queer bodies; then I will return to some examples of how to read queer bodies in some of the contexts (social institutions and settings) discussed by Bech which I began with above.

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Sheets-Johnstone, though appreciative of Catherine MacKinnon's point about how feminism's connection between the personal and political "is not a simile, not a metaphor, and not an analogy," wants to take the political further back to its evolutionary roots. Whereas MacKinnon said that,

> the personal as political … means that women's distinctive experience as women occurs within the sphere that has been socially lived as personal-private, emotional, interiorized, particular, individuated, intimate-so that what it is to know the politics of woman's situation is to know women's personal lives. (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 534-535)

Sheets-Johnstone (1994) derives her meaning of the personal-political equation from

> an all-pervasive human bodily personal that has a history, which is to say that the political is at root a corporeal built-in dimension of our primate heritage that is expressed in that repertoire of 'I cans' that define us both as creatures of a natural history and as culturally and individually groomed bearers of meaning and agents of power. … what is political is distinctively concrete in both a corporeal ad inter-corporeal sense. It is at the root part and parcel of animate form. (p. 2)

> Indeed, the human body in postmodern thought is often little more than an accoutrement of language, one of the many possible trappings of discourse, another text to be read as any other. In the skillful hands of some postmodernists, the living body may even be trashed, and wasted, and this because, as the title of the hallmark book-*Our Bodies, Ourselves*-implicitly indicates, subjecthood can be denied only if the living body is denied. … where subjecthood is celebrated through the body, as in some postmodern French feminist writings, it is celebrated as a certain kind of anatomy. It is not recognized and elucidated in the basic and at the same time far broader context of ***animate form***. (p. 3)

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Sheets-Johnstone thinks this is why linguistically dominated feminist writings are blinded and beguiled by language, and thereby

> lack pan-cultural understandings of the body, understandings rooted in an appreciation of our evolutionary and even ontogenetic heritage, linguistically focused writers cannot see those formal and comportmental aspects of bodily life that in the most fundamental sense shape our concept of power and of power relations. They do not see that gendered bodies are related to animate form, that animate form is the common denominator of cultures, and that that common denominator is the spawning ground of corporeal archetypes more ancient than we are. (p. 3)

She thinks it is little wonder that the profound significance of our corporeality for understanding our common humanity runs aground with the postmodern construal of the personal-political equation as rather that "the social is political and the political is social." Expected of these deeper corporeal soundings is something which runs contrary to the idiosyncratically personal or theoretical subject." It is "a concrete locus of 'I can's'"(p. 3).

> They would furthermore attest to the fact that this *I* who *can* is part of a natural history, and is thus unequivocally linked to others in a common creature-hood, a common humanity … [postmodernism] denies the living body in devious ways which redefine it and, in so doing, distort or occlude its evolutionary heritage and concomitant repertoire of 'I can's.' The redefinitions preclude the semantics of animate form and the intercorporeal semantics that anchors socio-political life from coming to the fore. (p. 4)

Sheets-Johnstone (1994) tries to uncover powerful corporeal archetypes as the basis of our conceptions of power and of

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power relations that are at the heart of these semantics. She intends nothing less than to "show that there are meanings to be fathomed outside of language, meanings that are indeed more ancient than language and more ancient than we"(p. 4).

Before saying what Sheets-Johnstone means by animate forms and corporeal archetypes, and then what relevance these have for a semantics of the body, I should hasten to let the reader know that she finds as much fault with sociobiology as she does with the postmodern approaches in the humanities. She claims that "what the postmodernist does with words-cultural relativism-the sociobiologist does with adaptations-and biological absolutisms"(p. 4). She says that in terms of academic practice,

> what the human sciences do to the living body in the name of sociobiology is the reverse of what the humanities do to the living body in the name of postmodernism: not biology-that is, evolutionary history-but culture is denied. Whatever might be the sexual practice or aggressive act in question, for example, the sociobiologist consistently explains it as 'adaptive.' In essence, all behavior is squeezed through an adaptive filter to emerge at the other end as 'good,' a benefit to the individual and/or his/her kin. … animate forms-living bodies-are simply instruments of behavior, and behavior is simply the outward form taken by a particular constellation of genes. … What matters-all that matters-is adaptation. (p. 4)

Without going into the details of Sheets-Johnstone's development of her discussion of Sartre on the "Look" and

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Foucault on the "optics of power", I will summarize what she establishes that is useful in my present discussion of the role of the gaze in the semiotic coding of queer bodies. She diagnoses the existential psychoanalytic understanding of woman as an empty hole that Sartre provided as rightly tainted with misogynist color. With care she shows that in a patriarchal social setting when a man looks at a woman, sometimes he experiences a desire for her. Sartre concludes that she represents for the man an empty hole. But this is because it is his desire which is experienced as a lack in the man's own being that is attached or projected onto her since it is through her, (through filling her hole), that he will be able to overcome this momentary lack in his own being by satisfying his desire for her. In Sartrean ontological terms, the in-itself of man is incomplete. He thus must, of necessity, seek to complete himself through the for-itself. This coupling between man and woman is for Sartre an ever-renewable cycle. Because men's lives are incomplete projects, they can't help but experience this lack in self-sufficiency as irritating. Hence I would argue the reason for the "Look" having an aggressive quality. By engaging in acts of domination, men hope thereby to establish control over women. And women are objectified under these conditions because men do not realize the developmental course of their own needs are based in the

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alienated social relations that have constituted them as patriarchal.

Sheets-Johnstone moves skillfully to show how Foucault's optics of power, as in the model of the "panopticon", (borrowed from the eighteenth century British utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham), is a generalization of Sartre's more individualized analysis of the "Look." Foucault's optics of power is the Sartrean Look writ large. These techniques of surveillance that Foucault has described are applied by each of us, on each other, as well as on, or within, ourselves. To be vigilant is at one and the same time established as equivalence between others and us. While on guard for the culpable stimulus to arise in our inspection of others, we cannot help but be self-inspecting while on watch for the fault finding in others. Our nervous systems, when on alert, make no distinctions between self and other. To be vigilant then is to be sensitized for a particular energy pattern regardless of the location of the body in which it originated. An example would be audition; when we are cocked to listen for a sound, our nervous system registers/hears whether it is a sound that is made by us or by others. Sound is just audible. To treat others differently from how we treat ourselves, as in hypocrisy, requires that additional patterns be set in operation after

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a differential curbing of our initial evaluation that was prompted at the moment of detection.

This may sound overly determined, but it is distinctive of the developmental approach to understanding the structural coupling of organism and environment that I have accepted by taking as my project the objective of exploring in what way it might be useful for understanding non-gay identified academic discourse to look comparatively between gay and lesbian development (a marginal sub-culture) and the larger academic culture. This was a method that Foucault encouraged; to learn about dominant cultural formations it will be useful to examine those divided off from or made marginal. To use a term of art that Henning Bech prefers, homosexuals are categorically divided off from the dominant culture though they pervade and are peppered through out it, often disguised or closeted so as not to bear the mark of stigma. Patriarchy, too, throws a disparaging "Look" at homosexuals because they are taken as men, rather gendered as men, but ignore or reject the privileging of their desires that straight men exercise when dominating women as objects for their own pleasure.

Sheets-Johnstone (1994) develops an interesting picture of men as members of the primate evolutionary chain that I can

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not rehearse for the reader. But I will report something of the nature of her conclusions: with a comparative approach she is able to explain:

> why a major sociobiology text about the evolution of human sexuality can render female sexuality a "service" to males and not once mention, much less elucidate, aspects of the hominid living body as it evolved, neither in terms of primate genitalic modifications nor in terms of the relationship between bipedality and sexual signalling behavior.(p. 4)

Her criticism of this sociobiological text is that "instead, an adaptational view is put forth, a specifically *male* adaptational view" (p. 4) that might as well have carried its devotional stance regarding the adaptiveness of male promiscuity to include the whole range of human male sexuality. With humor she says:

> It is indeed remarkable that early morning penile erection was not turned into both a sociobiological justifications for males to start each day with a song, as it were, and a sociobiological proof of the "male desire for sexual variety." (p. 5)

Sheets-Johnstone is making a powerful criticism of the undesirable and morally reprehensible consequence of sociobiology, namely to erase the sphere of the personal entirely from reality. This can only be done, she claims, through totally ignoring the evolution of animate forms. As a result of this ignorance, she claims that certain corporeal archetypes develop which perform a social function rather than have an evolutionary value. Hiding behind the selfish nature of our genes permits the domination of women

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by men in her estimation. So what would have been considered an act of power, (i.e., to choose to service or not to service males), under sociobiology is really illusory and not beyond moral reproach. Upon succeeding at servicing males, women cannot rest easy with the proverbial pat on their own backs, saying something like that was for the good of humanity, according to Sheets-Johnstone.

Although I have read independently in Simon LeVay's (1994) *The Sexual Brain* and in popular magazines intended for young gay readers a rationale for why gay men tend, just as straight men do, to lean toward promiscuity, I agree with Sheets-Johnstone and I think that the anthropological evidence supports in the balance a rather less sexist view of the role of women in the evolution of human sexuality. While I think that the survival of the human species is a good thing, I do not think that just because certain traits, (i.e., male dominance and aggression), have arisen among human groups and have survived as tendencies in their progeny that we are justified in claiming that dominance and aggression are good. It seems to me that wondering whether survival of the species is good is of a different category from whether aggression, which may have made survival possible, is good in itself. It would depend on how and to what ends aggression is used in the future. Just because

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aggression served the interests of survival at one point in human evolutionary history does not guarantee that it will always be good for humans to possess aggression or to use it in the same way as its original circumstances warranted.

It seems problematic that straight and gay misogynists are cloaking male promiscuity in the guise of "good". The typical biological reason given for promiscuity is drawn from the tendency of a male who has been sated by a particular female to show no interest in a repeated orgasm with the same female but will exhibit interest based on readiness to copulate with a different female. Believe it or not, Simon LeVay instructs young gay men that they should respect this tendency in themselves and in their sexual partners because it has evolved in the service of the propagation and survival of the human species. Perhaps, in straight males, we might consider that the evolutionary demand for variety in sexual partners serves the interest of their particular genes. But since males have less possibility of knowledge of which offspring are their own progeny than do females who give birth to them, it makes me wonder how the selection of this behavioral promiscuity was accomplished. First, we do not accept that there was a deliberate design or omniscient designer of our human structural coupling between our individual selves and our

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social and physical environments. And second, there has yet to be the discovery of a gene to behavior correspondence that would support such a claim concerning the survival value of promiscuity.

It does, however, follow certain logic to say that if survival is a desired end, then passing on one's genes is a byproduct of enhancing the survival of those who will be cared for and for those who provide the care. It is one thing to discover bodily, even brain, mechanisms that orient males away from the female that they just climaxed with, but it is a rather long stretch to claim that these mechanisms were preserved in those who survived because they promoted the survival of the species. It is really only a matter of accidental circumstances. Of course, if environmental circumstances exclude, (by death), certain members of the species and yet allow, (by survival), others to live, those that live may be able to procreate and pass on their set of genes via their offspring but there is no intentional deliberation here. That is, there was no foresight on the part of genes, only the luck of being bearers of a certain kind of genes that were able to survive rather than die. And it is not as if those that died did not share some of the genes of those that survived. Sometimes you are just in the wrong place at the wrong time; for example, when a

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natural disaster occurs, as in volcanic eruptions, those who run fast are more likely to survive but only when circumstances cooperate with this ability to run. You are doomed if you are located too close to the source of the lava spray or flow; in this case, distance would favor survival together with fast running ability.

To look at the claim of promiscuity: In gay men, it is certainly suspect to think that there are genes that pass on sexual orientation and other genes that pass on promiscuity as a behavioral trait in all males, gay and straight. Some gay men may have the one regarding sexual orientation but lack the other. The same may be said of straight men. But the real consideration is: monogamy and promiscuity may be the result or goal of specific cultural practices that together with the occurrence of environmental assaults, (i.e., such sexually transmitted diseases as HIV/AIDS), will favor members who practice monogamy over promiscuity. (I have left out the option that people can be serially monogamous while going rapidly through numerous sexual partners in a lifetime). There was no intention, either in nature, or, in the social group practicing monogamy, to decide in an omniscient fashion, that it will be better for survival if we have fewer sexual partners. All of this speculation seems ungrounded in logical consistency.

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What seems to be operating in terms of favoring the evolution of certain kinds of sexuality in humans over others is that there should first of all be considerable knowledge of just how reproduction is accomplished. Next the survival of humans could be enhanced if children and adults could be more sensitive to touch. Through touch it is possible to make one's way around the social and physical environment in ways that would ensure one's survival, so as to be able to procreate. Humans have never survived without the proper amount of touch. Stimulation of the skin produces the necessary growth and development of our brains and these brains do not grow in a social vacuum but in societies of brains (Freeman, 1995).

Humans who have a highly developed sense of touch are more likely to survive intelligently. They can make their way around the world more easily; skillful at maneuvering and agile in avoiding hazardous conditions, they will outlive their neighbors. Also, need I remind us that touch is the royal road to orgasm; of course, our tastes get cultivated through touch so that certain forms of pleasure are possible and others are not. Though I will be arguing for the normality of homosexuality as a option for pleasurable engagement, I must first show that in the gaze of

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homosexuals there is the manifestation of certain animate forms. Living bodies are making the coding of queer bodies possible. Through the performance of rituals, the satisfaction of bodily appetites for pleasure becomes possible.

In the course of working toward that end of normalizing homosexuality by showing that it grows naturally out of the body's disposition toward pleasurable activities, I have been considering the critical remarks of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone against sociobiology. Under the sociobiological mode of interpretation, of what counts as "having survival value", I have raised concern about some of sociobiology's labeling of promiscuous behavior. Sheets-Johnstone has made the general criticism that sociobiology neglects the significance of animate forms in favor of the survival of genes. She adds that this distortion of viewing all behaviors as of survival value for genes only is what accounts for

> why a major sociobiological text on the evolution of human sexuality can render female sexuality a "service" to males and not once mention, much less elucidate, aspects of the hominid living body as it evolved, neither in terms of primate genitalic modifications nor in terms of the relationship between bipedality and sexual signaling behavior. Instead, an adaptational view is put forth, a specifically *male* adaptational view as the text quickly show in such chapter headings as "The Female Orgasm: Adaptation or Artifact?," "The Desire for Sexual Variety," and "Copulation as a Female Service." (Sheets-Johnstone, 1994, p. 4-5)

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In a serious and chiding manner, Sheets-Johnstone wonders why, "given the standard sociobiological devotional stance toward the adaptiveness of male promiscuity"(p. 5), has there been a curtailment of exploring the full range of male sexuality? Her intentions are humorously posed by noting how

> remarkable [it is] that early penile erection was not turned into both a sociobiological justification for males to start each day with a song, as it were, and a sociobiological proof of 'the male desire for sexual variety.' (p. 5)

She makes the speculation that "the phenomenon might even be affirmed to coincide with the mission of females to provide ever-ready servicing, i.e., to the fact that human females are 'continuously copulable'"(p. 5).

I have found corroboration for Sheets-Johnstone's claims that sociobiology overshoots its goal of finding adaptational value in the evolution of human sexuality in a work by Timothy Taylor (1997). Taylor corroborates what Sheets-Johnstone refers to in her quote about a major sociobiological text as an over-interpretation, or even fabrication, of the evidence for supporting the claim that the female sexual anatomy evolved in the interest of servicing males. Taylor agrees that female anatomy developed as a result of hominids establishing an upright posture and walking on two feet rather than their predecessors who had

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been "walking-on-all-fours". With the advent of an upright posture, several concomitant bodily changes arose. A muscle of the buttocks increased in mass to help with the bipedal's ability to walk with speed and agility. Genitals shifted toward the front of the female torso (somewhat out of view in comparison with the earlier location that had exposed them at the rear). Breasts developed in greater proportion to provide balance in relation to the larger buttocks (smaller breasts were just as capable of producing milk for suckling the young as larger ones). I find all this reconstruction of our evolutionary past fascinating. Taylor reports that bipedalism produced an upright posture that actually permitted our very distant ancestral australopithecine's to effect a greater ability to withstand the heat of the Savannah climate. With just the surface of the head exposed to the sun's heat, they were able to cool off more easily than if hunched over with the surface of their backs collecting the heat of the sun's rays. This too paved the way for larger brains that had to develop in order to control and effect the greater manipulations that our free hands permitted (Taylor, 1997, p. 39. The real story behind the increase in brain size is one in which language development and social communication are major contributing factors. We are all familiar with the distortions of female sexuality resulting from male biases and ignorance, among

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the culprits: Sigmund Freud and Alfred Kinsey. Taylor (1997) notes that "the physiology of female orgasm has been hotly debated over the past hundred years"(p. 58). Freud claimed that in healthy women orgasm should shift from clitoris to the vagina, and Kinsey argued that vaginal orgasm was not possible. Taylor considers that "…with appropriate training and focus, all sorts of different parts of the body can be stimulated to result in orgasm, so it seems strange to rule out the vagina"(p. 58). Drawing on Hippocrates of Cos and his followers, Taylor says that they got the facts right though their explanations were far fetched. According to Hippocrates,

> during intercourse the vagina is rubbed and the womb is disturbed, an irritation is set up in the womb which produces pleasure and heat in the rest of the body. A woman also releases something from her body, sometimes into the womb, which then becomes moist and sometimes externally as well, if the womb is open wider than normal. Once intercourse has begun, she experiences pleasure throughout the whole time, until the man ejaculates. If her desire for intercourse is excited, she emits before the man, and for the remainder of the time does not feel pleasure to the same extent. (Taylor, 1997, p. 59-60)

Taylor (1997) takes this to be a clear reference to female ejaculation, and he notes that "the existence of which has often been questioned in modern medicine (mostly by men), though it has always been real enough for those who experience it"(p. 60).

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Taylor also reports how Hippocrates, a truly keen observer in comparison with this century's medical experts, believed a woman was capable of manipulating her cervix to regulate the uptake of sperm. In the following we get a sharp description of this ability.

> When a woman has intercourse, if she is not going to conceive, then it is her practice to expel the sperm produced by both partners whenever she wishes to do so. If however she is going to conceive, the sperm is not expelled, but remains in the womb. For when the womb has received the sperm it closes up and retains it. …If the woman is experienced in matters of childbirth, and takes note of when the sperm is retained, she will know the precise day on which she has conceived. (Taylor, 1997, p. 60)

Taylor (1997) reports that today's experience attests to this process.

> During orgasm the top of the vagina balloons out to form a kind of pool for the semen, into which the cervix dips, drawing it up into the uterus. This action is aided by the semen itself, which contains the fatty acid prostaglandin that causes the vaginal spasming. (p. 60)
>
> The Hippocratic description of women's active manipulation of their anatomy to facilitate or inhibit reproduction, according to Taylor fits with the findings of the Liver-pool based researchers, Robin Baker and Mark Bellis, who have studied the way in which women can manipulate sperm within their bodies, rejecting it ("flow-back") when they do not want to conceive and sucking it up ("up-suck") when they do. (p. 61)

It is also believed by these modern investigators that female masturbation can be made to play a part in the retention of semen, even to help through spasms to move

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around a particular man's sperm over a period of days thereby enhancing the likelihood of conception with his sperm. According to these researchers, women possess the knowledge and control of orgasm and up-suck and thus have the ability to choose among multiple partners who will be the father of her children. Further consideration of the functional dimension of clitoral self-stimulation by these researchers leads them to conclude that masturbation by clitoral stimulation allows pleasurable experience without the risk of infection of the vagina. It is noted by Taylor that this is in marked contrast with "Gould's idea of the clitoris and the female orgasm as functionless" it "can in fact be reversed, so that male orgasm becomes the spandrel"(p. 61). Taylor (1997) informs us that:

> While a penis seems necessary for normal insemination, it does not need to spasm to ejaculate; it could just produce a directed flow, as with urine. The characteristic spasming of male orgasm may therefore be a pale neuromuscular reflection of vaginal "up-suck." Nevertheless, the comparability of women and men's sexual organs probably indicates a fair degree of overlap between their inner experiences of sex. Sex, after all, is mostly in the head. But are women and men's minds the same? (p. 61)

Rather than pursue further this provocative line of reasoning I wish to conclude that there is indeed much to concern us here. That our bodily physiology, for both women and men, has evolved in concert should be no surprise to modern thinking shaped by the evolutionary mold. But the

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subtlety of the research cited above should help us pause and reconsider how sociobiology is tainted with male bias. It is in the adaptational view of sociobiology that females are made to service males. From the above information one should conclude that there is more adroitness in the female's dexterity of her orgasmic experiences than the male-biased view of female adaptation to male interests would have suggested. In this way, we should also consider that the male's spasming is, as was stated above, "a pale reflection of the female orgasm." For my purposes, the fact that men and women share a common basis for their inner experiences of sex, due to their evolved and compatible sexual anatomy and physiology, is of much significance. This information is so significant that it is the cornerstone of a bodily derived, body-based knowledge of experience. Experience that becomes, as will be shown later, culturally colonized and distorted to serve special interests of the dominant culture, namely the pleasure-phobic program that the semiotic coding of queer bodies intends on disrupting.

For right now, I wish to pursue the notion that sociobiology and social construction are both equally biased. They both produce distortions that serve the interest of the pleasure-phobic program. It will remain to be shown that a semiotic

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coding of queer bodies is the necessary course for us to take in order to open up the cultural arena for better integration of pleasure in the living embodiment of person in human communities. To do this I should like to present a statement by Bruno Latour about the value of Isabelle Stengers' approach to science and technology studies. But Stengers is especially irreverent when it comes to science and to politics which is precisely why I include her approach in my discussion of the distortions contributed by taking either the sociobiological or the feminist postmodern social construction approaches to our understanding of human sexuality, in particular, the ways that each of these approaches closets the lived body. Latour, then, in introducing Stengers (1997) work, says:

> Going from science to politics is not, for her, going from stringent constraints to more relaxed ones, but keeping exactly the same objectives with a total indifference to what is science and what is society. Domination in politics has many of the same ingredients it has in the laboratory, that is, the inability to allow he people one deals with any chance to redefine the situation in their own terms. If this principle subverts many disciplines from the inside, it subverts even more political stands from the outside, and especially so many of the "standpoint politics" where the outcome of the analysis is entirely determined from the start by the position of the speaker. If Milgram is taken as the emblematic bad experimenter, not giving the students he is torturing a chance to become torturers, what should be said of those thousands of radical tracts where the things to be studied-science, art, institutions, medicine-have no chance to say anything other than that they have been marked by the domination of White male capitalists? Like most critical thinking, they reproduce exactly at the outcome that was expected from the beginning, and if

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> they have to be rejected, it is not because they are political, and not because they are not scientific enough, but simply because the writer incurred no risk in being kicked out of his or her standpoint in writing them. The application of Stengers's criterion on "cultural studies" remains to be seen, but it will be even more entertaining than what it did at the bench. The equation is simple, although very hard to carry out: no risk, no good construction, no invention, thus no good science and no good politics either. Such is the first plank of a party that does not have many members yet! (Stengers, 1997, p. xviii-xix)

Latour concludes his foreword to Stengers' work by saying that her "request to be cosmopolitically correct cuts both ways, and cuts hard." Latour continues:

> In the obscure science wars, one can safely predict, she will be seen as a traitor to all camps, not because she is "in the middle"-no one is less of a middlewoman than her, no one is less an adept of the golden mean!- but because she imposes on all protagonists a criterion that they will do their utmost to escape. Although this book appears in a series called 'Theories Out of Bounds,' no theory is more binding than Stengers's new demarcation criterion. (p. xix)

In my discussion of the semiotic coding of queer bodies, I wish to use Latour's appropriation of Stengers's cosmopolitical understanding of the relationship in the experimental context between inquirer's presuppositions and the constitution of the object of study for my own congruent purpose. That is to say, I believe Stengers has an important contribution to make to the current domination of social construction as an interpretative strategy in the field of queer theory and sexual politics.

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Her approach is a critical one; she may even be offering an old criticism that has found expression in Buddhist psychological contexts; namely that for the Zen Buddhists there is a path of development through what has been called "the four phases of the moon." In order to "highlight some of the important features of the four phases of meditation as described by the Buddha and by the Zen master Lin Chi who lived about seven hundred years later"(Brazier, 1996, p. 59), I offer the following material which summarizes the qualitative shifts in the relationship among the breathing, the breather and the things surrounding the situation of just sitting:

> The Buddha said, First prepare by finding a secluded place. Somewhere quiet, spacious, clean and beautiful is ideal. Conducive space enhances any kind of therapy and zazen is our own therapy for ourselves, so we make a good place for it.
>
> We sit in a stable posture. Perhaps, initially, we focus upon an object, rather like a child at play, just as I, as a child, looked at stones. Thus, if one learned to concentrate by paying attention to the breathing, one might start to ask, 'Who breathes?' One observes the air come in, the abdomen rise, the air go out, the abdomen fall. 'Who is doing the breathing?' One starts to become aware of space between the breaths, and space within the breath itself. 'Who breathes?' We become happily absorbed. This playful absorption is piti, the first zen. Lin Chi called this the state in which 'circumstance is, self is not'. One loses oneself in thinking about a matter or observing an object single-mindedly. This is pleasant (sukha) and tantalizing.
>
> The first dhyana can easily fade, just as a child's mind can wander away from the game. Samadhi requires a more complete stillness. The question 'Who breathes?' or, at least, its essential sense, remains palpable,

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> and supremely important. One is now experiencing the question continuously, but no longer thinking *about* it. Rather, one is in it. The demandingness of the question still maintains a certain tension, or rapture. The feeling of pleasure increases, quietly approaching ecstasy. One remains very still, with a sense that even the slightest twitch would break the gradual build-up. This is the second zen. Lin Chi called this 'circumstance is not, self is.' One is self-possessed and attention has naturally withdrawn from the object.
>
> Gradually one lets go of the tension of the question. Calm completely replaces rapture. It is not so much that we are *in* the question as that we *are* the question. We are the mystery of who breathes, yet the breath goes on. We are at peace with it and everything seems beautifully pure and complete just as it is. It is lovely that the breath is a mystery. Our whole being is suffused with ease. Self-consciousness has faded and we do not need to know anything, as if sitting on the edge of a dead calm lake, which extends as far as the eye could see and beyond. We are at peace with everything in the world. Body and mind fall away. We are simply aware, mindful. This is the third zen, a samadhi which Lin Chi call 'neither circumstance nor self'.
>
> Finally, the question is no longer there at all. I am here. So is the breath. And the stones. Everything simply is. What is, is perfect just in itself. Stillness is no longer dependent upon body and mind. Lin Chi says: 'Neither circumstance nor self are missing.' This is the state of equanimity in which one returns to the world 'with bliss bestowing hands'. It is, in some ways, to have the naïve mind of a child. …A person in this state enjoys life and can readily become happily absorbed in helping others or in wonderment at the miracles of life: a leaf blowing in the wind, cold water on one's hands, the taste of an orange, whatever. (Brazier, 1997, p. 59-60)

To reiterate the four phases are:

1. Circumstance is, self is not,

2. Circumstance is not, self is,

3. Neither circumstance nor self, and

4. Neither circumstance nor self are missing

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I have quoted this passage at length and reiterated the phases because I want to draw upon these four phases to explain, from a different angle, what is problematic about the absorption of everything into the framework of social construction. My main criticism is that social construction has become reductionistic. In precisely the way that Stengers's idea of a cosmopolitically correct approach will, according to Bruno Latour, make all participants on all sides in the science wars unhappy.

The four phases may be correlated with four different metaphysical positions; the first with naïve realism, the second with idealism and most forms of unrestricted social construction, the third with nihilism and many forms of postmodernism, and the fourth with interdependent realism of both subjects and objects. This last is realism properly achieved. As social construction has been conceived it has often strayed from its useful purpose. It becomes applied too widely to encompass more than just the formulation of knowledge. And then it runs the risk of falling under the kind of criticism of Stengers and Latour. It is one thing, and the correct thing, to assert that our knowledge is socially constructed. It may also be correct to speak, in a more limiting sense, of how objects that are manufactured

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and designed by human minds are socially constructed. That is their shape or form, and use or purpose, were conceived and manufactured in a socially meaningful context. But to claim that the materiality of the objects is also socially constructed is to overstep the proper logical and physically warranted grounds.

I make this criticism of theories of social construction that have tried to maintain that queer sexuality is socially constructed. It may, or, may not, have been a great insight that the category of homosexual is a distinct and separate category from heterosexual, and that persons so labeled were by their biological (and possibly spiritual) nature predetermined to have this essential quality of deviant sexuality. It is, of course, true that to have said "that there are homosexuals is an invention of the nineteenth century" is useful in understanding the way in which experts were enlisted in governing the phenomenon of homosexuality. This is to say that the medical establishment got involved in managing and mediating the stigma that homosexuals as social deviants were made to bear. But, it is ludicrous to claim that this was the invention of the phenomenon of homosexual desire, namely, desire for members of the same gender category to which one also belongs. It is, of course, also helpful to criticize the dichotomous ways in

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which people have tried to conceptually separate the gender categories into male and female, both categories being used to refer to mutually exclusive and exhaustive logical domains.

I am trying to show in this section on the semiotic coding of queer bodies that we need semiotics because it is the only signification system that allows for and recognizes the encoding of naturally occurring signs. That we are humans also belonging, historically, in evolutionary historical time chunks, to the branch on the evolutionary tree of hominids, to other animal species, is an important place from which to begin a well thought out conception of human sexuality and desire. I am well aware of the way in which our animal nature has been distorted and used to rationalize patriarchal and sexist perspectives, but that is precisely the point that social construction has made, and it has been worth making. But now it is time to get on with understanding the development of human sexuality. Especially so as to make further inroads on the cosmopolitical spectrum, we need to put social construction in its place. To do this we need to recognize that neither circumstances nor self are missing. Social construction gets stuck within the third phase of Zen meditation: "neither circumstance nor self." This phase can be surpassed and needs to be.

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Otherwise, we are stuck with a nihilism that cannot even recognize that fundamentally our species being is committed to the maintenance, development, and, when necessary, transformation of our species nature.

To give credit to a plausible and sensible social construction theory of the body, we need to look at the field of law. Alan Hyde (1997) makes one of the most intelligible statements on the social construction of the body that I have come across.

> Bodies are, among other things, the ways we represent other people to ourselves. Bodies are, at least in part, the linguistic, discursive devices for representing that aspect of people, indeed of ourselves, which is not opaque and inaccessible to us. We may or may not know other people. We believe we can see, touch, measure, sense, evaluate their bodies. In doing this, we often fail to appreciate our own agency in constructing those very bodies that we claim to see, bodies that, we claim, represent others. Out of our ignorance, as Vico says, we make things out of ourselves, and among the things we make up are the discursive bodies of others. We construct these bodies that are distanced from us, unlike us, far from us, and treat our own constructions as if they were the people they purportedly represent.
>
> Everyone does this. Law, perhaps, does it particularly well. (p. 3-4)

Now this statement may sound innocent enough, but there are two points in which the author constructs openings that prove fatal for his own purposes. The first such opening occurs at the start, where he says, "bodies are, among other things, the ways we represent other people to ourselves"(p.

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4). He has opened his claim to being qualified. Bodies are not just ways we represent other people to ourselves. This is one "among other things" that bodies are. A second opening occurs in the next sentence, where he says that "bodies are, at least in part, the linguistic, discursive devices for representing that aspect of other people, indeed of ourselves, which is not opaque and inaccessible to us. Here the opening comes in the phrase, "at least in part." What do I make of these two openings? The author recognizes that this is only one way of construing bodies because he suggests this in using the two phrases: "among other things" and "at least in part." Bodies are most definitely "other things". The emphasis should be on *things*. Here he has chosen "things" rather than the alternative word, "objects." The difference between things and objects in the philosophical sense is that things denotes a material existence apart from the conscious viewer/interactor/knower, including perhaps, that a thing lacks consciousness. So we use thing in contrast with persons. It is curious then that Hyde uses "thing" to refer to our bodies. These may very well be the source of our consciousness. The alternate word, "object" is generally used in discussing that which is visible and tangible to a conscious being. What else can see, feel or touch? Humans are conscious of that which they are capable of transducing and transforming into

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representations. Let me unpack that last statement. It is through our senses that we convert one type of energy that emanates from things in interaction with our senses into nervous system enervation and eventually into information that takes the form of representations. Representations might mean either concepts (mental representations) or spoken words (physical manifestations of these representations). Both types of representations are constructions that substitute for the things that they denote. Hyde presents confusion between things that have independent existence and material being and objects, which are the ways we have interacted with such things. It is a logical confusion that will have telling consequences for his attempt to reduce bodies into representations. But let me proceed with still other errors that I have found and eventually I will explain why these errors are made in the interests of the legal profession.

Where Hyde goes wrong is in suggesting that Vico believes that we make things out of ourselves and among these things we "make up" representations. There is a second error that may arise from looseness in the vocabulary Hyde promotes in conveying his ideas. Vico meant by making things that knowledge can only be had from things that we produce or interact with. This is a profound sense of making things

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"out of" us. Our whole bodily, mental, and spiritual (collective or social existence) selves participate in the production of knowledge. Perhaps in more modern day parlance, we construct models that permit us to shed light on things and how they affect us (our senses, visible and tangible). But for Vico he meant not only in models but in the very affected and embodied ways we can interact with things. The can is important here; how we can interact with things is just as much a part of our species being as of the material being of things. I think that Stengers's sense quoted above about the dual existence of the knower and things known is in keeping with Vico's sense of making out of ourselves. Hyde, distorts the importance of real live bodies by saying that Vico thought "we make up representations." I believe that we do "make up" some representations; some are arbitrary not of natural origin. Some are discursive objects constructed within the very discourse about the discourse itself. But the ground or bedrock, to use Wittgenstein's term for "forms of life", of these more arbitrary representations flows from our natural interactions with things.

To elucidate this I would appeal to the four phases of the moon above: breathing is an activity that constitutes the breather and the breath, but simultaneously breather,

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breathing and breath are all components of one process. It is simple to see why a lawyer would want to make the body into a thing that can be manipulated for the lawyer's own purposes. Alan Hyde shows that in the surrounding text from which I took the first quote. I am afraid that lawyers do not know enough about the biological nature of the subjects that they try to manipulate in going after the verdicts that they desire. So, what I hope the reader will make out of the three points I referred to in the first Hyde quote is that he himself recognizes that representations are just one of the things that can be made of the bodies that we are.

By going further into the material surrounding the opening quote on Hyde, we will be able to understand the occupational hazard that Hyde commits about social construction of bodies. He turns to knowledge as constructed and with that I can agree but bodies must remain in the sphere of potentially understood through means other than the termination of the transduction of material energies. But where does Hyde go wrong? He went wrong, as the whole legal profession must, namely in the prototypical cases that new law students must address. Hyde describes the manner in which students are introduced to law school through consideration of a particular case in which a doctor has promised to repair a boy's scarred hand through surgery. The

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boy, named Hawkins, was injured in a farming accident, and the doctor repeatedly solicited the boy's parents for surgical treatment. The doctor cannot make good on his promise to make it better than it looks after the accident and accumulation of scar tissue. As a matter of record,

> the operation resulted in a hand less attractive and functional than it had been in the preoperative state. In the court's opinion… 'The present case is closely analogous to one in which a machine is built for a certain purpose and warranted to do certain work. (Hyde, 1997, p. 4-5)

The boy's guardians sued for damages, including pain and suffering. Hyde analyzes this court case, which was decided in favor of the boy, an admittedly unusual case; it is unusual in precisely the manner that the judge instructed the jury to think of the failure to repair the boy's injured hand. The judge asked the jury to compare the failure to satisfactorily repair the hand with a failure of a company that sells machines under warranty to deliver a working machine as guaranteed. Hyde considers this comparison to favor the plaintiff (the Hawkins boy) rather than the defendant (doctor).

Hyde explains that what was effected through the use of the machine/hand analogy was to situate the decision to award damages in the context of farming. Apparently, to have analogized the hand to a lived sensuous body that feels

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pains and perhaps might suffer loss of desire because of the impaired aesthetic appearance of the boy's scared hand would not have worked in favor of the plaintiff. This would be because in farming territory many boys are injured in accidents of the type the boy experienced. The comparison with a machine places the decision about the boy's loss and damage in a framework that farming people are more likely to show the boy sympathy. They are all in a position to understand and appreciate the necessary protection that machine's warranty accords.

Hyde claims that there are numerous ways of representing the body in legal discourse and in no way are any of the contrasts between legally constructed bodies and natural bodies. What I can see, and what I believe Hyde qua lawyer would be reluctant to see, is that though there may not be a single representation of a natural body that other representations can be held up against and measured as to their value in terms of correctness or truth, there are nonetheless a natural bodies which all representations purport to represent. Hyde is wrong in eliminating the lived and natural body; it is the basis for his discourse, and the origin of his constructions. Why I think that Hyde is invested in not seeing this, or in not incorporating this natural body into the legal discourse, is that legal

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discourse intends or aims at persuading the judge/jury to reach a decision that favors, in the Hawkins case, the plaintiff. But, no doubt, the surgeon's attorney would have constructed his defense in ways that used other constructions of bodies so as to effect sympathy for the surgeon. The objective of all legal discourse is to win. However, the interrelationship and reciprocity of the natural body (Hawkins's hand) and the descriptions or representations constructed through analogizing is missed in legal discourse. The legal discussion intends on presenting the comparison of the hand with a machine so as to effect a decision that values the hand in ways appropriate to customary evaluations and cost determinations. What is missed in all social constructions that masquerade as metaphysics, is how knowledge, which is a social process of negotiation and judgment, relies upon and interacts with the lived bodies about which evaluative judgments are made. These judgments are socially constructed according to the analogizing speech acts, that is, according to the contexts and comparative frameworks that people are being asked to think through. The body just <u>is</u>. We, or the jury in the Hawkins case, are being asked to think of the body as a machine because to think of the hand as an aesthetic sensuous part of the body that expresses desire or gentleness would invoke in the jury, and in us, a reaction

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that empathetically fosters our own feelings of pain and suffering. Feelings that most likely would be accompanied with facial grimaces and bodily retraction. It is our bodies' natural reaction, untutored and unmediated through mitigating circumstances, to react and recoil at the sight/site of injured bodies in sympathy for the injured. Bodies have their own language that is not completely captured in the socially constructed rules that generate what people call "discursive practices". The latter are culturally produced out of the natural repertoire of living bodies and their instinctual processes. It is instinctual for the hand to withdraw itself from circumstances that are painful. This is not something we learn to do, but something that evolutionary processes, or as Skinner called them, "contingencies of survival", have causally selected in us; those who survived have done so because these mechanisms are our nature. If we had to think of what to do in hazardous circumstances we would not live long. The wisdom of millions of years of species being is carried as properties and propensities of our lived bodies. But this would be too complicated for the legal discourse to entertain. Furthermore, it is something that the legal discourse uses in its attempts to manipulate our emotions and sympathies so as to effect decisions that favor their case as winning out against their adversary. Treating the

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body as if it were a machine is an example of law's cold metaphors. The "cold metaphors of the law" are not innocent as I hope to have shown in discussing Hyde's presentation of the Hawkins case as a prototypical case for new law students' induction into legal discourse. They are meant to effect decisions in the direction desired by the client.

Read this to learn more about Hyde's (1997) confusion and good intentions gone astray.

> When I began to think about legal constructions of the body some years ago, my goal was to replace these cold metaphors with a new discourse of the body. In this alternative world, everyone would have a "right to bodily integrity" that would replace what we now call the "right to privacy' and would provide more protection for individuals than that beleaguered right. ... A new right to body integrity would accomplish little if it merely took its place in the cavalcade of legal bodies---including those that exist *only* as constituted by their relations with others, bodies defined by their very accessibility to the gaze, by "intrusion." Perhaps what we need is not a new right, but a bringing into consciousness of the multiple constructions already immanent in law, including alternatives to the body as property or privacy right or machine, alternatives that always treat people as embodied, that do not shy away from pain, sex, or other embodied experiences, that replace the metaphors of property, machine, or privacy right with a language of bodily presence or embrace. Any lawyer who, for some instrumental purposes, wishes to construct an alternative discourse of the body, immanent in legal materials, will find alternatives here from which to choose. (p. 5)

Hyde is almost there in his understanding that there is a lived body that must be captured in the legal discourse. He is very aware and appreciative of the way in which legal

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discourse develops in and in accordance with its historical context. To which the above description of the choice of treating the hand of Hawkins as a machine is a case in point.

I am not a legal scholar and so I can only speculate on the emphasis or primacy of the legal discourse over and against the experience of the lived body, of embodiment. Perhaps, lawyers are always ready to try their cases in appeals proceedings where it is only the written word, and hence, only knowledge that represents the body. Also, the nature of legal decisions which relies upon the written law and prior court decisions as precedents for considering the outcome of their new proceedings may have something to do with what I think is an occupational hazard. But there is more.

Lawyers know that they must control the understanding of the judge/jury. This can only be effected through manipulations that constrain and influence our bodies in ways that will encourage them/us to reach the desired outcome of said attorneys. To curb this discussion, rich and interesting as it might be, I should mention that there is a book and a course taught by a lawyer, Mac Fuller, J.D. (1994) on

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"Reading Amazing Faces." In a foreword to Mac Fuller's book, Dean Schlecht tells us that

> Emotions, temperament, attitudes and potentials all show through on our faces. How it works is only beginning to be understood. Leslie Brother's (1989) research on the universal connection between major emotions and certain facial expressions is a highly regarded study that helps validate what we have all already unconsciously assumed to be true. (Fuller, 1994, p. v)

The return to physiognomy was foreshadowed in the organismic-developmental approach of Heinz Werner (1984) to the psychology of language. Consistent with the position I am developing here, against the ungrounded bias of social construction of bodies in legal representations, is an idea well developed in the work of Werner. He believes that language or symbol vehicles have a developmental origin in the organism's interrelated and reciprocal dynamic process within its social and physical environment. For Werner, there is not in the earliest and early stages of development a strict and experienced differentiation between the self and its environment. This is made possible through development in perceptual levels where distance senses such as the eyes and hearing permit a partial separation between self and its environment. This detachment together with living in what are called "carpentered environments" or a geometrical-technical world helps to establish the basis for abstraction that is accomplished with the development of

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organism-environment in the conceptual level of organization of experience.

Hyde (1997) does say that he recognizes the materiality of the body, the problem is what does he make of it. He says,

> To say, as I do, that we know the body only through its discursive representations is not, I think, to deny the materiality of the body. At least, I do not wish to deny the materiality of the body, though in my attention to its discursive constructions I have been influenced by recent feminist scholarship that does indeed deny it. … If people, say health professionals, find it a helpful and useful account of what they do to describe a material body that actually exists apart from our discursive representations of it, as a pragmatist I can't really argue against them; the body is material for them. For myself, then, as a philosophic pragmatist, I don't doubt that there are physical bodies that exist in the world, independent of our representations of them, bodies that are therefore "real," as a philosophical realist like John Searle. (p. 7-8)

Though the ontological status of real bodies does not interest him, Hyde prefaces his conclusion on the topic of the discursive nature of bodies in legal discourse with a quote from Mary Douglas:

> Most symbolic behavior must work through the human body. … the human body is common to us all. Only our social experience varies. The symbols based on the human body are used to express different social experiences. (Douglas, 1970, p. vii)

Hyde (1997) goes on to say that:

> The body is a kind of master symbol, the foundation of all symbolizing or representational activity of any kind, so it would be quite impossible to have any sort of politics or human interaction without body

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> constructions. In any case, my goal throughout is rarely the suppression of any particular discursive construction of the body. It is rather the proliferation of competing discursive constructions and the acquisition of a particular psychological attitude toward our constructions, under which they come to be experienced as made, not natural. (p. 8)

I understand the need to open up discussion and investigation in the fields of cultural anthropology and legal studies, but to take it to the extreme in thinking that all discourse describes things made and not natural is an occupational error, perhaps even a blindness. Barthes has masterfully attacked the tendency to hide the political nature of many symbols that are taken as natural but he would not have had us totally disregard the natural signs that surround us in environmentally virgin territory as well as in the architecturally contrived surroundings of our large urban cities that are indeed man-made. I consider it a good thing to have opened the question of what constitutes the natural but to reduce it to the cultural is just as mistaken as reducing the cultural to the natural. But this I have argued in an earlier chapter.

For my purposes now, I have engaged in this legal discourse because I wanted to show that faces indeed are to be read as not merely conventional, but that they have a natural signification upon which, and sometimes against which we try to enact, or perform disguises of our natural inclinations

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to reveal our emotions. There is a hereditary, or better, an evolutionary history to our reading of faces. This is a knowledge of our natural being, one upon which our cultural activities are based. Though discovery of these patterns of recognition requires the cultural invention of ways of knowing that become codified in the various natural and social sciences, they must nonetheless be understood as fundamentally handed down to us in our biological/phylogenetic lineage. If we were not, in some fashion, physical and material copies of our biological parents, how else would we be able to comprehend our past and predict our future?

Another point needs to be drawn out from the look at the material evolution of animate forms, the gay gaze, and the reading of faces, namely that a semiotic analysis of queer desire must take place within an enhanced framework that includes all the actors in the field of events called life. First I shall suggest that the work of Bruno Latour does embrace this enhanced framework. Without going into details of his definitions, I will quote his general remarks about semiotics, and sketch in broad strokes his set of terms that permit the filling out of this framework. Last I will claim that Latour and my own analysis of queer desire calls forth

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a return of the work of Aristotle on causality, namely his theory of the four causes.

In a co-authored chapter that appears in a collection of studies in sociotechnical change, Latour provides a definition of semiotics that achieves the enhanced framework required for an adequate treatment and understanding of queer desire. Madeleine Akrich and Bruno Latour (1992) define semiotics as:

> The study of how meaning is built, but the word "meaning" is taken in its original nontextual and nonlinguistic interpretation; how one privileged trajectory is built, out of an indefinite number of possibilities; in that sense, semiotics is the study of the order building or path building and may be applied to settings, machines, bodies, and programming languages as well as texts; the work socio-semiotics is a pleonasm once it is clear that semiotics is not limited to signs; the key aspect of the semiotics of machines is its ability to move from signs to things and back. (p. 259)

Akrich and Latour (1992) assert in this summary that "A machine can no more be studied than a human, because what the analyst is faced with are assemblies of humans and nonhuman actants"(p. 259). They conclude from this that we must study settings in which the actants, human and nonhuman, have their competences and performances distributed. This is what is meant by the French term "dispositif." Various other terms are defined for us, and though I will not rehearse them here this is a short chapter

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that deserves to be read. "A setting is thus a chain of H(umans) and N(onhumans), each endowed with a new competence or delegating its competence to another; in the chain one may recognize aggregates that look like those of traditional social theory: social groups, machines, interface, impact"(p. 262).

In conclusion, they define "ascription" as follows:

> The attribution process through which the origin of the activity cf the setting is finally decided in the setting itself; it is not a primary mechanism like all the others but a secondary one; for instance, the movement of the setting may be ascribed to the autonomous thrust of a machine, to the Stakhanovist courage of the workers, to the clever calculations of engineers, to physics, to art, to capitalism, to corporate bodies, to chance, etc. ... Who or what is the designer of a setting is the result of a process of ascription. (Akrich & Latour, 1992, p. 262)

Of course there is a history of attribution theory in psychology, e.g. Herder, which overlaps somewhat with Akrich and Latour's term ascription. What is of interest for my discussion is that people have recognized that there is a process out of which we come to identify things as *things*. And that what appears primary is the activity that we are caught up in. These events that strike us as worthy of our attention and analysis are subsequently partitioned according to our understanding of what has, is or will happen.

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The vocabulary of assemblies applies to our highly technical environments but also to our human interactions that appear to us on first gloss to be virginal when it comes to technological interventions. But this is not so: our language, our activity of speaking, is a technological invention of the first order. There are debates in the history of deciding whether tools came first and then the need for speaking in order to foster cooperation among human subjects. For example, Marx and Engels are proponents of the primacy of tools coming first and then language. Whereas Lewis Mumford takes exception to this order and claims that language arose before the use of tools by humans. I do not mean to rehearse that debate here but call it forth in recognizing that Akrich and Latour's semiotics carries with it a richness in debates that go even farther back than Marx and Engels. It harkens back to the time of Aristotle in which it was understood that knowledge was of different orders. There was contemplative knowledge, and applied or, what the Greeks called, "techne." Although Aristotle distinguished these two forms of knowing, they are really intertwined. Just to mark a need to return, let me say here that contemplative knowledge enacts the primacy of the aesthetic attitude wherein a thing is appreciated for what it is and not for what it may be used. Applied or practical knowledge known by the term techne is knowledge that comes

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from our interaction with or use of things. Most of our contemporary understanding stems from the use of human subjects as things and therein lies a great moral criticism of scientific knowledge that has been reduced to instrumental, or manipulative.

Aristotle had a better approach to understanding causality. Attribution theory in psychology, and Latour's approach to technoscience in sociology both are attempts to lay out how we come to attribute causes, or to ascribe what or who are the actors/actant in a setting. I think that the fault of narrowing our understanding of causality lies with the doctrine of "individualism." Most of psychology's troubles stem from embracing this narrowing whereby the only valid actors are human subjects and the only actant, or set of competencies and performances, are those that are consciously and deliberately enacted. By returning to Aristotle's theory of the four causes, we can appreciate that psychology is really a technoscience, and may begin again to try to understand our sexuality as developing in settings with assemblies of both human and nonhuman actants. To recall the theory of four causes, they were: 1) material, 2) formal (two causes but nonetheless inseparable for Aristotle the empiricist but not for Plato the idealist), 3) efficient, and 4) final.

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To summarize and distinguish these causes: matter and form are inherent in substance; there is no substance without both material and formal causes. For Aristotle, matter is always in the shape of something. Plato thought that forms needed to be of another realm if there was to be any knowledge it had to be eternally true, and thus for Plato the forms existed in a spiritual or immaterial realm. But to my mind this is all metaphor, or as Wittgenstein might have said, when concepts are not engaged as cogs in a mechanism, nothing turns and so he might have argued that Plato and subsequent idealists were just gassing into the void!

Interestingly Aristotle thought that understanding natural things and processes required distinguishing efficient from final causes. Final causes were the contents of teleological analysis; they were what gave direction in a meaningful way to the participation of the thing or process in its larger whole or context. Efficient causes were akin to what our modern day science has limited itself to: those things that drive or determine the energetic conduct of things and processes. They are the only legitimate causes since they are necessary and sufficient in scientific terms.

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In psychology, as in many other fields that have been shaped by modern science, the doctrine of individualism works its madness, or less condescending, its myopia, so that Aristotle's field of four causes is narrowed to just the efficient cause. What, with capitalism driven by the necessity of improved profits, is it any wonder that efficiency would come to rule the day? But seriously, psychology has been hampered in its eagerness to make itself in the image of the sciences of the day that provided instrumentality to the corporate processes of efficiency. Also, as I think about this distinction of things from human subjects that transpires in the assemblies that Akrich and Latour would have us recognize in more holistic or contextual terms, I realize that cleaning up the intermingling of human and nonhuman actants serves the interest of capitalism. Capitalism must be able to separate these objects so as to create its system of commodities. If human beings and their products are really intertwined, as John Locke's labor theory of value had asserted, then it would no longer be possible to appropriate the value created in laboring to that of profit belonging to the owners.

My conclusion is that psychology modeled after the doctrine of individualism would have us ignore both our connections with, or better development out of, our unconscious material

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bodies, and our Freudian psychological understanding of the nature of our sexuality as rooted in our bodies. What is called for is the use of this enhanced framework to interrogate queer desire. In addressing these difficulties that arise from embracing the doctrine of individualism and thereby siding with the profit motive, psychology produces only instrumental knowledge. The fault is not with the production of instrumental knowledge but with its quality. That it is decidedly partisan, such as representing the interests of the ruling class rather than showing us how to understand the assemblies involved in the production of ideas that would have greater currency for all the human actors that are involved in the semiotic processes called life. This should not surprise us given that psychology in the form its has taken in America had its roots in the three great industrial nations of Europe-Germany, France, and England (Danziger, 1990). At the time of its inception psychological science served those in regional locations and that service was for the sake of capital and its interests in distinguishing causality, as solely of the type Aristotle called efficient.

Although psychological inquiry has been a part of analysis in every historical period, the antecedents of present day scientific psychology were shaped by Charles Darwin's theory

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of evolution. Lamarck's version with its belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics no doubt reflected the social and political interests that inflected the research of Darwin's time. Understandably, Darwin was cautious in publishing his observations of fossils and his interpretations of their relationships across species. He understood the threat that his theory of natural selection would pose for religious interests. Pushed nonetheless by the desire not to be outdone by Alfred Wallace, he published his findings with Wallace in 1858 under joint authorship.

The Psychology that emerged as a science and profession was developed within the framework of the evolution of the species, and was shaped by evolutionary arguments for natural selection and adaptation. Psychology in the U.S. has its origins in such European countries as Germany, France and England. Distinctive marks of its disciplinary nature are: 1) that it is founded on the measurement of individual differences, and 2) that group behavior is the aggregate of the performance of individuals. Psychology is very social in its origins; it was constructed as a discipline to perform vital functions for society. Despite its emphasis on the free standing "individual," its history is ridden with attempts to cover up its bureaucratic nature, in Foucault's terms, its "govern-mentality".

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This may be brought out when placed in the context of Social Darwinism, developed by Herbert Spencer as a tool for covering up or explaining away the differences between the wealth of the British ruling class and the poverty of its working class. Spencer maintained that it was just to reward natural talent of the fittest with money and status. Social Darwinism was an ideology serving the ruling class' political interests, not a science. And though we may rightly try to keep the line clearly drawn between ideology and science, government interventions in assessing the work of scientists, i.e., accountability, makes appeal to ideology necessary.

Psychology is not inherently obligated to serve (only) the interests of the ruling class. Though in Marxist terms, the new managerial class of intellectuals arose under social conditions that favored this allegiance to the interests of Capital, psychology can be aligned with other interests. As a matter of fact in a democracy the science of psychology should serve everyone's interests equally well. That is a concern that informs my project about Engineering Human Learning which calls for an improvement of knowledge-transfer in classrooms by using an engineering model of education called "science shops". However, before this is

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possible we must understand how the reticence of academic institutions to change its knowledge-producing activities from abstract inquiry that is objective and theoretical to community oriented problem-solving that is interventionist and practical is rooted in episodes that provide painful punishments of those so inclined.

My investigation of psychology's relationship to technology as an applied science or technoscience is informed by Utility Theory. Psychological science studies causes and effects. Utility theory and its parent, ethical theory of utilitarianism, have shaped psychology. Thus, those interested in appreciating subjective experience will take hold of a phenomenological standpoint and will want to resist the following reductions of the causes of the effects studied and measured by psychologists; causes may be any of the following:

1) Biological/genetic
2) Environmental
3) Social norms

These three sets of causes represent the attempt to place the origins of influence outside the organism's sphere of freedom and choice, to efface or explain away the notion of the subject as agent, as such they are moves away from

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subjectivity and toward objectivity. And as such they have important ethical and political consequences.

The tension of the nature/nurture controversy struggles on in new terminology, namely that of essentialism and social construction. Though many psychologists have come to rest easily with a compromise in the dichotomy between nature and nurture, that being an interaction of biological/ genetic determinism and environmental/social construction, in wider intellectual circles the debate over potent and unalterable essences versus forceful environmental influences and persuasive social conditioning rages on.

In the struggle that manifests within psychology between the nature and nurture groups, the narrowing of the conditions for understanding causality, which I described above using Aristotle, arises in both camps. This should not surprise us, as they are managers regardless of their theoretical leanings. In order to pursue the influences of class on intellectual analysis, first I will turn in the next chapter to an analysis of what has been represented and expressed by queer voices. In the following chapter I shall make connections between embodiment and the kind of queer analysis of academic writing in order to redefine sexuality. I will argue for limiting the notion of what sex is. By

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redefining sexuality, the focus upon bodily pleasure becomes possible. My hope is that in re-conceptualizing sex and giving prominence to bodily pleasure real revolutionary possibilities may be embraced. This will show the necessity of changing the university to serve the needs of its bioregion.

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Chapter 5

5. QUEER VOICES AND DISCURSIVE FORMATIONS

From Linguistic Relativity to Classified Embodied Voices:

In this section I intend on showing how we can move from linguistic relativity to a class consciousness around the different registers to which individuals complete the thoughtfulness of their body's energies in their speech acts of communal existence. The process of transformation from thought to speech is what I am calling voice. Voice is both concrete and abstract. It is concrete as speech of a body that converses, and it is abstract in as a category within a range of phenomena bearing the marks of origination in specific class locations within a society. Voice as a category is always marked by class distinctions. This is what I mean by classified embodied voices. But first we must consider linguistic relativity as our starting point.

The following is one of the most famous formulations of the Sapir-Whorf idea of linguistic and cultural relativity.

> Human Beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is

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> that the "real world" is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group... We see and hear and otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community predispose certain choices of interpretation. (Agar, 1994, p. 66)

This quote suggests the influence of what has become known, through the work of Foucault, as "discursive formations". On first gloss, reality is portrayed as linguistically relative to the socio-culturally sedimented practices of speaking. Our language habits, our manners of speaking, are set forth as a connective medium between any so-called objective world and a subjective experience of an isolated personal reality. However, according to this formulation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of linguistic relativity, these two poles or limits framing our interpretative activity are really fictional or hypothetical constructs. To take this line of thought is to become thoroughly ensconced in the web of language. As the synchronic, (slice of time), structural conception of language dictates, there are no substantive knobs of meaning plain and simple but a network of differential relations among the interstices of this multi-dimensional space of meaningful relations between signifiers and signified. The actual material signs that inscribed as marking the metaphorical gesticulating which human beings secrete through the cords and caverns of the vocal apparatus of their speech-making factories, housed within their mute,

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and, according to linguistic relativity, our forever muted, materially significant bodies or body referents, are conceived as merely trace phenomena-always and forever deferred. The value of the acoustic images-analogized as a double-sided coin of signifier and signified-can never be cashed in for the gold of olden days when currency had a backing in precious materially existing standards. The comparison between this synchronic conception of linguistic structure and the vacuous interstitial galaxies of the realm of sub-atomic particles is striking. There are no absolute, existent, material worlds outside of the prison house of language.

This is the moment, or at least one of them, that has set in motion the relativistic world of the post-modern. The contrast that has most impressed me between the modern and post-modern was mentioned in the introductory chapter of this dissertation where the Lockean labor theory of value was contrasted with the Marxist exchange theory of value. Out of this contrast arose the view of communication, the dominant form of laborious production, as negotiation of meanings with the value of an exchange being relative to the profit that is made in the end. We should call this the communicative law of exchange of linguistic commodities.

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What has surprised me about the work of John Shotter in contributing to the new discursive psychology is that the "conversational realities" he proposes as a better way of understanding the social and political reality of everyday life conserve the distinction between public and private that I have claimed are enacted by the figure of the closet. Shotter misses the opportunity of radically transforming and challenging these conserving power-knowledge structures because he has closeted the body referent of psychological body practices. Although he comes fantastically close to realizing this more radical potential for understanding the closeted nature of situated theorists in situated theories, he does nonetheless pass up this opportunity.

Let me explain something of the difficulties that mitigate Shotter against availing himself of this opportunity: the major one arises from his acceptance of the personal realm of relationships as requiring different theories than those that are set forth in the realm of the natural sciences. I have already discussed this with reference to his text in sections above-just to remind the reader, Shotter favors placing psychology among the moral sciences and, in so doing, he misunderstands the integrated nature of inquiry. Morality is not something separate imposed from the outside of personal/intimate relationships and governing public

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civil arrangements. I do not really understand how he has missed the opportunity to see the "critical tool-making" he borrows from some of his intimate textual friends, such as Giambattista Vico, in the technological manner of Dewey. For Dewey all knowledge has this technological or practical nature. And all inquiry whether about things that are more or less like us, as in other moving, living beings, (human, animal, etc.), or different from us, as in inert matter, are the same. In the words of a Dewey scholar,

> The principle reason for calling inquiry technological, then, is that it is the means of effective control of an environment that is not what we wish it to be. Inquiry is in this way differentiated from other forms of activity. It produces something new as a means of changing situations that are not what we wish them to be. Hickman, 1990, p. 41)

But for all of Shotter's professed alignment with the working class ideals through the engineering apprenticeship of his young adulthood, it appears that academic influences have managed to closet his understanding of our bodies participation in the "knowing of the third kind" which he puts forth, (I am sure), in good faith as a special and important kind of knowledge that psychology has as its new domain. This will take some explanation and digression to preliminary material that will render the voice as extending the relational complexity of the bodies and, when sufficiently abstracted, a variety of discursive formations as well.

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Before going this route of explanation, let me try to formulate Shotter's problem. In a conclusion to a chapter which concerned itself with "What is a 'personal relationship'?", Shotter reveals the dichotomous nature of his take on theory and on public and private life. There he summarizes what he has done in this chapter in the following:

> What I have argued above, then, is that on certain, extraordinary occasions, people can relate to one another within special (non-argumentatively structured) speech genres, but that these have been formed historically as a common but unusual resource within a whole Western tradition of accountability and argumentation. Indeed, the forms of personal relationship within the different regions of our modern (and post-modern) societies are clearly many and varied. Thus, to return to our point of departure, we can now begin to see the complexity of the claim that personal relationships are both constituted and mediated by talk. (Shotter, 1993, p. 183)

In discussing the nature of this talk, Shotter (1993) notes the diversity of speech genres found within what he refers to as society's "ecology of different interdependent regions and moments, containing different forms of social life sustained by different speech genres, constituting different forms of social and personal relationship"(p. 183). Those various genres that are constitutive of the personal or intimate have something in common:

> Rather than being public discourses-in which one feels oneself accountable to the discourse's Other-they can all have a 'conversational' character, that is, the

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> participants have no sense of having a 'position' in public life to sustain in the responsive nature of their exchanges. Indeed, as Bakhtin notes, the speech genres created for use in genuinely intimate exchanges not only operate in a 'private' sphere, removed from public life, but also 'open up' a special 'inner', self-conscious aspect of life, separate and different from the genres used in public life. (p. 183)

Of course according to Shotter (1993) "these two realms of the private and the public are related to one another and people can 'move' from the intimate interpersonal realm into the realm of public affairs in a (careless) instant"(p. 183). When the breakdown occurs, the need for accounting to the other for one's actions arises; each must resort to moral principles to justify themselves as socially competent individuals, whereas in the intimate embrace there is ample resource within their personal history for understanding and, I would add, acceptance. As an example of this transgression from private to public, Shotter (1993) stated that a couple might resort to the realm of public accountability and say, "*You* always do that when *I* try to be helpful," instead of saying, "Oops, there we go again. *We've* got overtired again. Let's talk about it in the morning when *we're* not so tired"(p. 184).

I wonder why Shotter does not relate his example to the difference in principles that feminists have distinguished between those that govern men's commerce in the market

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place, or some such public sphere, where contracts are taken as the prototype for modes of relationship and exchange, and those that typically govern women's concerns for keeping personal and familial relationships in tact. The former is based on the protection of individual rights modeled after the partners in contractual obligations. Whereas the latter pertains to, and is generated within, non-obligatory exchange relationships that are formed in fluid circumstances in which the parties are relationally bound through love and, in the case of children, attachment. For Shotter (1993), nevertheless, the personal is a relationship even when transgressions occur in which identities have indeed "merged in their love (in pure joint action) into an 'us', the participants re-emerge into their separate individualities, into still a personal relationship, but now one of a more publicly accountable kind"(p. 184).

The lesson Shotter (1993) wants us to learn regarding

> the unsatisfactory state of 'theory' in understanding of what a personal relationship 'is', does not arise out of a continual failure yet to formulate 'the correct' theory, but that it arises out of a failure to understand what 'theory' in this area should be. It is still thought that it should copy natural scientific theory, as this is the only sort, which is respectable. (p. 184)

After crediting the work of Billig whose proposals "to do with the rhetorical, argumentative two-sided nature of

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thought, as well as with the oscillation between the general and particular, the decontexted and contexted" Shotter (1993) lets his reader know that he thinks these should be applied "reflexively to our thinking about personal relationships"(p. 184). In this way he maintains "we can perhaps see that theory in the natural sciences and theory in the understanding and study of personal relationships must differ fundamentally"(p. 184). He further explains why he thinks this:

> For if we are to be of any assistance at all in helping people to discover their own 'way about' inside their own knowledge of personal relationships, then it is not a theoretical science but a practical science we need- where a practical science is to do with creating/discovering aids to living with indeterminacy *in practice*. (Shotter, 1993, p. 184)

The difficulty that Shotter might find himself in is captured by the work of Fred Newman and Lois Holzman (1997). In recent work, Newman and Holzman attempt to bring about an end to the epistemological turn that has dominated analytic philosophy and much of Western intellectual history. They attempt to rescue us from the domination of and compulsion to ask: "how do we know?" Using Wittgenstein and Vygotsky, Newman and Holzman help us to see that those intellectuals in analytic philosophy and, insufficiently, developmental psychology have inappropriately appropriated these "godfathers".

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Newman and Holzman (1997) move to an activity based, tool-and-result way of organizing their developmental community. However, it seems to me that they embrace a dialogue model of interaction, which involves only one level of activity, namely speaking, and they leave out the way in which speech helps to organize and regulate our bodily, non-verbal actions. Perhaps this is the result of there still being academics though in a non-institutional setting. Their location provides a counterpoint to the academically invested positions that are the locus of origination of the typical discourse that I have claimed is closeted. But they still seem to commit the intellectual fallacy of absorbing everything other than discourse into discourse. This may be because they have moved to eliminate the subject-object dichotomy that is the sine qua non of the epistemological turn since Descartes. It would be more useful if they had kept something that is not absorbed or reduced to discourse. In their interest to remain scientifically rigorous they shy away from evaluation or moral frameworks by making everything socially constructed. It sounds to me as though all that exists in their ontological toolbox is the discussion that may be, in an elementary way, material but they seem to assume that the material is completely capable of being rearranged just in case we say it differently. A trite example of what I have in mind is that we might call

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ourselves the opposite of what we are but that does not make us different. If you are a boy and call yourself a girl, what have you changed? Unless you have rearranged yourself in bodily terms, the history in which society has brought you up to behave as a boy (granted this is not totally distinguishable from how girls behave) is not erased because it has materially significant embodiment as your habits or dispositions of interacting in ways that can be classified as boyish rather than girlish. Just because there is a description in discourse does not mean there is nothing that is described. I guess I just don't get the thinking that Newman and Holzman perform. As Wittgenstein had argued, just because you think something is correct does not make it correct. There are usually, even and especially in mathematics, right ways of doing computations and wrong ways, and this is not merely because you follow a verbal rule. It is correct because, procedurally, it is materially significant as to how the calculation is performed; it has to mesh with other operations that will eventually butt up against some concrete reality, some objects that belong to the not-self and non-discursive realm of materially existing things. You can, after all, encounter things without preconceptions and then it is a puzzle to figure out how to fit existing categories and concepts into this new something or other. I appreciate the activism behind the construction

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of the community of dialogue that Newman and Holzman have created, but I am puzzled as to how this has really changed the forms of production that those in their communities rely on, materially speaking, for the re-creation and re-production of their bodily selves that Karl Marx so effectively analyzed in political economic terms. Even if we consider much of the suffering that people who come to the socio-therapeutic communities that Newman and Holzman run for support, they suffer sometimes from how they have learned to think of themselves. But this activity of thinking reflects the deep-seated bodily habits that effect a body that is in pain. Though speaking about the suffering may help insofar as you have shared it, the origins of suffering will still exist and when encountered will produce the painful condition once more. Problems such as these arise because semiotic understanding is limited to just words, whereas the kind of semiotics of embodiment I have in mind is an activity which relates the empirical/scientific with the moral/evaluative, and again with the aesthetic/cultural judgments that inform our bodily existence as selves that are co-inhabiting this planet.

My argument will take off from the dividing of scientific and moral, and dividing of the natural from the cultural. As I have argued above I do not wish to have my argument take

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the form of a reduction either to the biological or to the cultural. This divide between the scientific and the hermeneutic is represented in the analytic philosophy of psychology of Donald Davidson (1984). He has argued for the distinction between causes and reasons. Causes explain natural scientific phenomena and reasons explain psychological phenomena. Davidson's framework is too limiting because reasons must produce or be a part of a coherent rational sphere. Rationality is too restrictive. It has been argued that what is needed in psychological analysis is that we make, for instance, regarding psychopathologies such as autism, multiple personality disorder, and schizophrenia appear intelligible. That means that we must find something of ourselves in the other who is considered pathological. They do not have to have their motives thoroughly rationalized as in a normative account of rationality; their condition merely must be such as we can make sense of it. This I would say requires that the condition be able to be formulated as a social practice. Though this kind of social practice is parasitic upon the normal social practices that guide those members of the non-pathological population. Normal and abnormal states or conditions of the psyche are determined or assessed according to normative criteria, and these are not supposed to be natural ones according to the standard distinction

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that Davidson and others have applied to psychological states of mind. That is natural means not as ones that are either socially conditioned in their origination or socially constructed in our knowledge of them. Problems are produced by this too narrowly defined criterion for what constitutes psychological phenomena. And I see Shotter, and Newman and Holzman following in the problematic path of Davidson. Although both Shotter and Newman and Holzman have managed to capture something of the negotiated quality of democratic life, they are still cordoning off the activity of conversation and its ontological status from the activities of the natural sciences.

My way of seeing this is that each of the fields of inquiry is constituted in the discourse. According to Foucault, discourse is the activity in which objects are constructed; we used to call such things in psychology hypothetical constructs. These were psychological tools, which were created and used in the solving of problems of inquiry. The objects of psycho-pathological inquiry are those that are made in the activity of talking and writing about the relational dimensions to social interaction. Foucault invents a term, govern-mentality, which is promising to do some work in effacing the distinction and segregation of the natural sciences from the moral sciences. Govern-mentality

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arises after Foucault's discussion of docile bodies in his *Discipline and Punish*. In an unpublished lecture, Foucault (1980) said,

> I think that if one wants to analyze the genealogy of the subject in Western civilization, [one] has to take account … the points where the technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself … and conversely, [one] has to take into account the points where the technologies of the self are integrated into structures of coercion or domination. The contact point, where the way individuals are driven by others is tied to the way they conduct themselves, is what we can call, I think, government. (p. unknown)

The notion of "points of contact" between technologies of domination and technologies of the self establish a correlative process relating individual conduct and larger social practices. I shall make much of this notion in what follows.

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Speaking of the Situation of Dark Body Erotics:

I want to argue that what is longed for is not merely the superficial contact that is established in conversation but real bodily contact. It is only through touch that we can escape the alienation of modern life. Even the pastiche of post-modern communicative activity is inadequate for real satisfaction. It is only through establishing a context in which Foucault's "contact points", (or as I prefer "points of contact"), where technologies of domination and technologies of self-production intersect so that we can achieve a recuperation of embodiment. This will establish a lived understanding of the "affordances" that our ecological selves may grow into and may experience through the integration of self and other, or more generally, the developmental niche of the organism-environment. This will take some elaboration, but first I should like to offer a starting point for understanding, what I have called in my chapter subtitle of this section: "the situation of dark body erotics."

In his opening section called "The Fear of being Touched", Elias Canetti's (1984) *Crowds and Power* provides my starting point for introducing the concept of dark body erotics.

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Canetti captures the ambivalent relationship we have towards crowds and power in the following:

> There is nothing that man fears more than the touch of the unknown. He wants to *see* what is reaching towards him, and to be able to recognize or at least classify it. Man always tends to avoid physical contact with anything strange. In the dark, the fear of an unexpected touch can mount to panic. Even clothes give insufficient security: it is easy to tear them and pierce through to the naked, smooth, defenseless flesh of the victim.
>
> All the distances which men create round them are dictated by this fear. They shut themselves in houses, which no one may enter, and only there feel some measure of security. The fear of burglars is not only the fear of being robbed, but also the fear of a sudden and unexpected clutch out of the darkness.
>
> The repugnance to being touched remains with us when we go about among people; the way we move in a busy street, in restaurants, trains or buses, is governed by it. Even when we are standing next to them and are able to watch and examine them closely, we avoid actual contact if we can. If we do not avoid it, it is because we feel attracted to someone; and then it is we who make the approach.
>
> The promptness with which apology is offered for an unintentional contact, the tension with which it is awaited, our violent and sometimes even physical reaction when it is not forthcoming, and the antipathy and hatred we feel for the offender, even when we cannot be certain who it is-the whole knot of shifting and intensely sensitive reactions to an alien touch-proves that we are dealing here with a human propensity as deep-seated as it is alert and insidious; something which never leaves a man when he has once established the boundaries of his personality. Even in sleep, when he is far more unguarded, he can all too easily be disturbed by a touch.
>
> It is only in a crowd that man can become free of this fear of being touched. That is the only situation in which the fear changes into its opposite. The crowd he needs is the dense crowd, in which body is pressed to body; a crowd, too, whose psychical constitution is also dense, or compact, so that he no longer notices

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> who it is that presses against him. As soon as a man has surrendered himself to the crowd, he ceases to fear its touch. Ideally, all are equal there; no distinctions count not even that of sex. The man pressed against him is the same as himself. He feels him as he feels himself. Suddenly it is as though everything were happening in one and the same body. This is perhaps one of the reasons why a crowd seeks to close in on itself: it wants to rid each individual as completely as possible of the fear of being touched. The more fiercely people press together, the more certain they feel that they do not fear each other. This reversal of the fear of being touched belongs to the nature of crowds. (p. 15-16)

I had found this passage astonishing when I first read it; yet I felt a resonance with its meaning. Always fearful of standing in New York City's Times Square on New Year's Eve, the passage struck me as incomprehensible. But as I let down my guard I remembered another situation that had far more power to frighten me.

Years ago, in the early 1980's, at the dawn of the AIDS crisis, perhaps at the time of its christening as "AIDS", I had gotten up the courage to explore some of those back-room settings in bars that cater to gays that I had only read about in gay porn. I recall the first time I ventured down the steps towards the back of the bar where a pool table was ritualistically covered over after a certain hour perhaps to signal that the playing field had moved elsewhere. In the dimly lit basement I gazed across the room towards a corner where, in amazement, I was struck by the comedy of bodies

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moving majestically as one. It appeared to me that these men were reminiscent of bees clustered around the honeycomb, all vibrating, dancing and trying to nestle against the hive. Naturally my upbringing warded off any possibility of my joining in this strange yet haunting ritual of … of what? I had no name for this spectacle for I had as yet been initiated into such wonders. To cut the story short, it was a mere few weeks before I returned and, resistance worn away by curiosity and desire, I plied my body in the welcome of this gathering of strangers.

This is one of those situations that warrant the saying: "don't knock it until you have tried it." But seriously, I think that my personal reaction and experience is important in the validation of knowledge of such an embodied kind. Part of my meditation in this chapter will be to capture in words something of the relationship between our speaking or telling and its grounding in our bodily being. Need I say that I thoroughly enjoyed this communion with others in this unrehearsed dance in which I had been freely drawn into dancing with strangers in what I should like to call "the situation of dark body erotics".

Toward explaining what is meant by "dark" in my expression for this gathering of bodies, again Canetti (1984) can be of

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value. He distinguishes between two types of crowds: the open and closed crowd. In this passage he describes the formation of the open crowd:

> The crowd, suddenly there where there was nothing before, is a mysterious and universal phenomenon. A few people may have been standing together five, ten or twelve, not more; nothing has been announced, nothing is expected. Suddenly everywhere is black with people and more come streaming from all sides as though streets had only one direction. Most of them do not know what has happened and, if questioned, have no answer; but they hurry to be there where most other people are. There is a determination in their movement, which is quite different from the expression of ordinary curiosity. It seems as though the movement of some of them transmits itself to the others. But that is not all; they have a goal, which is there, before they can find words for it. This goal is the blackest spot where most people are gathered.
>
> It is everywhere spontaneous. As soon as it exists at all, it wants to consist of *more* people: the urge to grow is the first and supreme attribute of the crowd. It wants to seize everyone within reach; anything shaped like a human being can join it. The natural crowd is the *open* crowd; there are no limits whatever to its growth; it does not recognize houses, doors or locks and those who shut themselves in are suspect. "Open" is to be understood here in the fullest sense of the word; it means open everywhere and in any direction. The open crowd exists so long as it grows; it disintegrates as soon as it stops growing. (p. 16)

Canetti (1984) goes on to declare that the crowd's "openness which enables it to grow is, at the same time, its danger"(p. 16). The threat of disintegration is carried within and though Canetti does not call it self-consciousness, I think that is what arises once the crowd stops growing. I will explain this further but first let me

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go back to Canetti (1984) for what is meant by the closed crowd:

> In contrast to the open crowd which can grow indefinitely and which is of universal interest because it may spring up anywhere, there is the *closed* crowd.
>
> The closed crowd renounces growth and puts the stress on permanence. The first thing to be noticed about it is that it has a boundary. It establishes itself by accepting its limitation. It creates a space for itself which it will fill. … Once the space is completely filled, no one else is allowed in. Even if there is an overflow, the important thing is always the dense crowd in the closed room; those standing outside do not really belong.
>
> The boundary prevents disorderly increase, but it also makes it more difficult for the crowd to disperse and so postpones its dissolution. … It is protected from outside influences, which could become hostile and dangerous and it sets its hope on *repetition*. (p. 17)

I had been completely struck upon reading this material by how well Canetti captures the experience of dissolution of identity I had experienced in the gay orgy I referred to above as my own point of reference for understanding the release of belonging to the crowd in the back-room of the bar. Is Canetti gay? I do not know, and perhaps it would be better for my purposes if he were not. For then the generality of my argument would be better supported.

In constructing the parallel between the closeted development of gays and lesbians and the closeted nature of academic discourse, I need to make available to me and my reader what is the nature possibilities that may arise as a

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result of the disruption of such closetedness. I have invoked the distinction between Canetti's open and closed crowds and his group psychology, if I may call it that, to help articulate the benefits that may be cultivated by generalizing from the gay case of closetedness. The benefits are of two types. The first benefit is to call attention to the deleterious effects of closetedness on the political economy of self-esteem and on the functioning and commerce of our lived bodies in the networks we like to call communities. The second benefit is to open us to the recuperative path that has already been opened in the gay community but forestalled as a more general possibility for genuine community among the people of the world because of the AIDS crisis.

According to Canetti (1984) "[t]he most important occurrence within the crowd is the *discharge*"(p. 17). However, not only is this the most important occurrence but it is also constitutive in its creation of the crowd. He goes on to say of the discharge, that "before this the crowd does not actually exist; it is the discharge, which creates it. This is the moment when all that belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal"(p. 17).

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But what is the nature of these differences? From whence do they come? And how do they originate? Canetti (1984) is helpful in suggesting where to look for answers to these questions.

> These differences are mainly imposed from outside; they are distinction of rank, status, and property. Men as individuals are always conscious of these distinctions; they weigh heavily on them and keep them firmly apart from one another. A man stands by himself on a secure and well-defined spot, his every gesture asserting his right to keep others at a distance. (p. 17)

Canetti captures, in the above quoted passage, the sense of vigilance that men have had to keep with regard to others since the advent of Enlightenment thinking of the 18th Century. Though he does not claim that that is its source or point of origination, I do. It is no oversight that I have used the term "men" instead of gender-neutral terms as "individuals" or "persons." For as I shall argue below, it is precisely the operation of the Enlightenment Image of Man that creates this vigilance. It is through the body image that this cultural norm works its magic in the creation of modern masculinity. It is the social conditioning of/in/on our bodies that is responsible for the form of life that we inhabit even to this time.

But modern masculinity is not cultivated in all of us (men) by the same self-image. There is a distinction first of all according to gender. Men and women are differentiated;

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there is a difference in social conditioning of the male and female body. In the making of sex, a relatively innocent distinction of genitalia made biologically into gender is hardly innocent. Feminists are right to have argued that "woman", as a category, does not represent the variety of differences among women from various ethnic and class backgrounds. Feminists have been right again to declare that our knowledge of "women" has been predicated on what "man" is not. So strictly speaking, what we know about women has been constructed as a deficiency that has accrued advantages for real men who have been the referent of the constructed conception of "man," the antecedent and more primary construction in comparison to real women who are the referent of the constructed category "woman." Important for us here is the feminist recognition of differences in women depending on the location of their lives within the socially and economically inflected determination of "class."

Before I raise the issue of class in relation to image of modern masculinity, let me return to Canetti for an elaboration of what he considered representative of the experience of men under vigilant conditions. Canetti (1984) stated that furthermore,

> All life, so far as he knows it, is laid out in distances-the house in which he shuts himself and his property, the positions he holds, the rank he desires-all these serve to create distances, to confirm and

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> extend them. Any free or large gesture of approach towards another human being is inhibited. Impulse and counter impulse ooze away as in a desert. No man can get near another, nor reach his height. In every sphere of life, firmly established hierarchies prevent him touching anyone more exalted than himself, or descending, except in appearance, to anyone lower. In different societies the distances are differently balanced against each other, the stress in some lying on birth, in others on occupation or property. (p. 18)

Notice Canetti uses a geographical or spatial model for describing the alienation that modern men experience. Further recognized in this above passage is the fact that Canetti makes real the lived context of socially and economically marked possessions which represent the class background of the subjects of distance operations and measures.

I want to continue by connecting Canetti's notion of distance and its geographical imposition of class markers and distinguishing marks of class location to the "points of contact" conception that I referred to above in the Foucault quote. I want to introduce how we must understand the solution by calling our attention to the manner in which our lived bodies guide our existence through cultural waters. Remember that, for Foucault, points of contact are the meetings of technologies of domination or oppression and technologies of self-production. The spatial location of the meeting of these differently ordered technologies is on

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the surface and across, through, and within our bodies. And though individuals can learn to transform themselves by rehearsing their bodies in different regiments of activity (self-care) in order to change and overcome the burdens of distance that Canetti describes we must act in socially orchestrated practices, learning to dance and move in different patterns or rhythms. Only through a change in the harmonics of bodily activity can we achieve the discharge that Canetti (1984) says is creative of the open crowd. He states that:

> Only together can men free themselves from their burdens of distance; and this, precisely, is what happens in a crowd. During the discharge distinctions are thrown off and all feel *equal*. In that density, where there is scarcely any space between them and body presses against body, each man is as near the other as he is to himself; and an immense feeling of relief ensues. It is for the sake of this blessed moment, when no one is greater than another, that people become a crowd. (p. 18)

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Gay Longing for Community and Dark Body Erotics:

In this section, I want to show how this situation of dark body erotics works in the lives of gay men. I will offer two descriptions: both are sought after as therapeutic moments. Perhaps one offers more lasting change whereas the second offers only temporary relief from troublesome feelings. The first is a constructive use of dark body erotics because it is an opening out and the second is destructive because it is a repetition of the culture of getting rather than of giving.

Before I present the two descriptions, I should like to offer the multi-voiced conclusion of one contemporary writer of the history of gay men's sex lives. He is speaking from an analytical, that is a Jungian depth psycho-analytical, position not at all informed by class consciousness. But he will serve as a gay-identified writer concluding his study of gay men's sex lives, in his own voice, but also with other voices mixed in, at a reflective and controversial moment in the on-going AIDS crisis, he says that:

> Gay men have so far put the majority of their energies behind projection and extroversion. But if the laws of nature and physics apply as well to the laws of the psyche, chances are a little swinging back to the opposite pole could bring new energies to the sexual question. "The liberation movement that has been carrying gay people collectively forward through the last half of the twentieth century is about to run out

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of gas," cautions Mark Thompson. "What is needed to refuel our progress is not more spirit but a deeper understanding of soul."

Introversion does not suggest celibacy or enforced loneliness. It does suggest that at least as much energy is given to the subjective valuing of an experience as to the hunting for that experience itself. But for those who hate owning feelings, pursuing Mr. Right may remain the foremost goal.

All the same, gay men seem to resist inertia. Just as a person can be said to have a sexual instinct, observation shows that there is also an instinct to individuate. While everyone has a definition of what individuation is, few would disagree that the development of personality is an important goal, or that sex lies at the heart of it, in part because sex won't be banished, and will punish any efforts that seek its banishment.

"The history of trying to stop any pleasurable behavior is abysmal," said Michael Callen just before he died. "Look at Prohibition, gambling, dance halls. You cannot stamp out pleasure with a jackboot, so the second best alternative is using what you know about yourself and your society."

There is simply no question that gay people have an enormous role to play in transforming libido. "I feel that homosexuals," writes Edmund White, "now identified as the element of our society most obsessed with sex, will in fact, be the agents to cure the mania. Sex will be restored to its appropriate place as pleasure, communication, an appetite, an art; it will no longer pose as a religion, a reason for being. In our present isolation we have few ways besides sex to feel connected to one another; in future there might be surer modes for achieving a sense of community."

For all men who have given their lives in the struggle to figure out what it means to be a gay man in modern times, we are still in the earliest stages of consciousness-a fact that both humbles and emboldens. "When we look back on this time," explains Greg Scott, "we will be judged on how valiantly we tried to prevail against the forces that extend beyond our conscious control. I'd like to see us return to the full intimacy of sex but that means learning how to talk to each other well enough that condoms don't become a crutch

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> for poor communication of feelings, fears, and needs. Some young gay men seem to be one step ahead-courting each other, treating male-to-male love as a gift. I think this is part of a process of creating a new culture. We are evolving still. The amount of self-examination that is required of all of us at a time of so much pain is mind-boggling."
>
> Self-examination? For too long, moralists have equated wisdom with the renunciation of hot sex. What a scam. The odyssey of gay life over five decades proves at least this much: that a magical thread links one's third eye with one's cock. Yes, a man must go out of himself to find the stud he dreams of: *Whenever I'd touch Chris, I felt safe, at home: he showed me how two bodies could become one.* And yes, often the search throws the person back into his own unfathomable depths: *When I think of the men I loved, I feel terribly lonely and yet oddly at peace.* Whatever the dangers in sex, gay men's innate drive to make love to other men (one or many) corrects, redeems, and intervenes on a world gone mad with man-to-man violence. There may be a greater intelligence in Eros than we can grasp-for now. Desire seizes that man whose soul has been brushed by another man's kiss and, holding him by the collar says: This is your existence-and it is natural, it is positive, it is good, and it is spinning a new way to be. Developing greater and greater mindfulness about this powerful inner call seems likely to become the emergent gay myth for the future. (Sadownick, 1996, p. 241-242)

I want to use this quote to bring out the dualism that informs the analytic way of thinking. But I want to use the relation between mind and cock to create a new discourse of the body-mind in Attunement through the body. How does this rethinking, in terms of activity, move us beyond the old dualism? I also want to use it as a digression to examine the ways in which the body is related to culture, and to talk about the figure of the closet as informing this distinction between public and private self. Of course this

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is also the time to set up further the difference between speaking and writing within the academy and from outside. Mieli is outside, and the issue of class needs to be removed from its closeted condition. But this will come after Mieli marries Freud with Capitalism through Marx. Therein lies the return to Freud in Mario Mieli's material in the section that follows below.

Binary distinctions abound under the linguistic theory of structuralism (Saussure), and appear consistent with the direction of movement away from materiality of linguistic relativity. But I hope to have shown that the triadic relations among sign, object, and interpretant, as in Peircean semiotics, is a more useful way of distinguishing and marking meaningful differences. And of salvaging a materially significant body, not just "body" as an empty signifier. However, the dichotomy between analytically culled poles, as in Jungian analytic psychology, between feeling and thought, and between sensing and acting is troublesome for my purposes. Although Jung meant them to be oppositions in the sense that they were tendencies that pulled in opposite directions in the personality of individuals, they are end points on continuums that blend in the formation and constitution of human character traits. But as used in the quotation from Sadownick it appears as

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though gay men have been living an exaggerated life of one pole to the exclusion of the other. It is this kind of dichotomous thinking that I reject. Besides being overly simplistic, it reminds me of the seesaw model of relating in and out-groups. Those marginalized are held to be expressive of those traits that are projected on to them by the dominant group that disowns these very same traits.

Perhaps a digression into the work of Frantz Fanon (1963) might help to clarify the proper relationship between the colonized and the colonial forces of domination. Fanon (1967) dissects the relationship between French oppression and the colonial inhabitants who are oppressed. In Fanon's account of the relations between White and Black, most famously captured in his title "Black Skin White Masks," the colonial inhabitant who is Black learns to, because they are forced to by the colonizers/oppressors, hide his true nature. The colonized/oppressed actually learns how the Whites want them as Blacks to behave and to react accordingly. But the quality of the expected behavior is an exaggeration of disowned qualities that exist in the Whites as well. These are disowned and thereby transferred through expectations that carry sanctions if the Blacks do not adhere to the White programming.

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Recently, I have come across the emergence of a new literature on Whiteness. A philosopher who is White himself, but who grew up and was schooled in the ghetto of Washington DC claims that the oppressed is in a much better position to tell what the oppressor is like than the oppressor themselves are. This advantage arises because the oppressed must be eternally vigilant of both the enforcers of the code of behavior that they are expected to enact and of their own performance of this projected system of colonization. The White oppressor does not need to be self-conscious of his or her own characteristic ways of oppressing because they enjoy the privilege of not having to consider whether they deserve to be treated with deference or reacted to with appropriate demeanor.

By studying slave narratives, the autobiographical writings of DuBois, Malcolm X, Zora Neale Hurston, and the lyrics of rap music, Crispin Sartwell (1998) has been able to understand his own Whiteness. In arguing for the importance of examining the construction of Whiteness as well as Blackness, Sartwell invokes Hazel Carby (1992) on the racial structure of society.

> We need to recognize that we live in a society in which systems of domination and subordination are structured through processes of racialization that continuously interact with all other forms of socialization. Theoretically, we should be arguing that everyone in this social order has been constructed in our political

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> imagination as a racialized subject. In this sense, it is important to think about the invention of the category of Whiteness when viewed as the normative state of existence: the (White) point in space from which we tend to identify difference. (p. 193)

Sartwell (1998) confesses that "[He] cannot be an authority on African-American experiences, but [he] is an authority on the phenomenology, the inside view, of White racism"(p. 8). And furthermore he disclosed that:

> I have a fairly extreme self-loathing about the self-constructions that go into making a racist social structure, but by the same token I can neither shed those self-constructions by an act of will nor cease to experience the pleasures of power-even the pleasures of the "objectivity" or "neutrality") the hallucinated detachment of the voice from the body, of autobiography from theory) that mark the White authorial fiction. (p. 8)

I especially like his comment about objectivity as a hallucinated detachment of the voice from the body. This remark allows me to place the so-called detachment of the investigator from his subjects under suspicion; this will be discussed later. Sartwell elaborates on what he thinks about autobiography and theory, that they may "be loosely distinguished as literary forms." Sartwell (1998) says that he

> only insist[s] that every work of theory is also the trace of some particular life, and I seek for ways to acknowledge that in my own work, which would also be ways of compromising "Whiteness" in one of its aspects. (p. 8)

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In developing his position, Sartwell exemplifies how the so-called neutral culture, which is according to him, really "raced White" offers minorities are the same neutral culture "that justified your enslavement, your exclusion, your systematic impoverishment"(p. 8). Concisely, Sartwell diagnoses that problem as follows:

> We White folks can't see ourselves as having a race, as taking up by virtue of our skin-tone a perfectly precise place in the ongoing systemic racism of America. Thus, our welcome becomes an assault that seeks to expunge African-American culture; our offering to you of our culture becomes, in terms to which I will return, a premonition of cultural annihilation. (p. 10)

I want to argue that there is a parallel case to be developed for the gay and lesbian person. Gays and lesbians are welcomed into the fold of American culture by some who identify themselves as heterosexuals but my question will be two fold. First, can heterosexuals do this when they themselves are participants in the homophobic culture of our American society? We need to consider in what ways their own self-constructions as heterosexuals contribute to the colonization of gay and lesbian identities. Second we will have to consider whether there really is something that might be called gay and lesbian culture? But before addressing those questions I wish to continue a bit more with Sartwell's contentions about race relations in America. After rehearsing what has become commonplace in its acceptance among proponents of multicultural positions that

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are not merely disguised forms of the traditional melting pot strategy of taking in new immigrants to America by absorbing their lives into an already established urban environment of minimalism in which neighborhoods are the only real locations for cultivating and preserving remnants of the older traditions of cultures. In the superficial multiculturalism, these older traditional cultures are supposedly integrated with others but are really expected to be left behind, and are thus not a living practice or form of life. In short, we are each correlatively constructed in epistemological transaction that limit and define what is White and what is Black, but especially what we can know of each other and of ourselves is limited in this defining of identities. Sartwell (1998) concludes

> I will, thus, contend that the truths of American culture are permeated thoroughly by race relations. The division of inner life and outer enactment, of authentic and inauthentic living, of mind and body as they play out in our culture are incomprehensible outside the structure of Black/White relations. In my view, racism is a form of what I will term *ejected aestheticism;* White Americans practice the purification or the mortification of the body by ejecting the body imaginatively into Black persons, who become associated with the physical *per se:* sport, sex, violence, and dance, for instance. … The American self is made in a racial transaction. (p. 10-11)

Sartwell provides an apt characterization of the technology of domination in which and through which the bodies of White raced people are transposed to the identity screen of the other Black raced people. In his words all the less desired

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qualities are "ejected" from the identities of the dominant group and the subordinate group is made to carry the burden of those disowned and unwanted qualities, among them are bodies, sexuality and anything natural. The favored qualities are mind, intellect and anything properly understood as cultural.

This Manichean thinking is problematic wherever it is found to be in operation. Frantz Fanon spoke of this in his diagnosis of negrophobia. In a popularization of Fanon's analysis, Deborah Wyrick (1998) summarized his analysis in what follows:

> On the level of individual psychology, the Black man symbolizes repressed (and therefore feared) desires: "The civilized White man retains an irrational longing for unusual eras of sexual license … projecting his own desires onto the Negro, the White man behaves 'as if' the Negro really had them" (BS 165) Similarly, White women can invest Black men with the aggressive sexuality they have been taught to abhor. On the level of cultural psychology, Negrophobia is a florid manifestation of what Fanon calls the "manicheism delirium" (BS 183) infecting Western thought. Just as the Manichean religion divided the world into forces of light and forces of darkness, Euro-American culture arranges concepts and values into binary oppositions, each pair containing a positive term and a negative term. The master pair under which other binaries are gathered is White vs. Black. Therefore, Fanon concludes, "The archetype of the lowest values is represented by the Negro … in the remotest depth of the European unconscious an inordinately black hollow has been made in which the most immoral impulses, the most shameful desires lie dormant" (BS 189-90). (p. 50-51)

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Fanon's analysis operates on both an individual and a cultural level. The homosexual, White and Black raced, is similarly placed in Manichean thinking. I like Sartwell's term "ejected aestheticism." I plan to use it to discuss the relationship between heterosexism and homophobia. These latter terms are operative in the masking of the polymorphous perversity of our human sexual desires.

In order to understand the situation of dark body erotics and the effects of colonizing or oppression on gay men and the interaction of technologies of domination and technologies of self-production, in what Foucault called "contact points", I shall present two rather abbreviated case studies. Both of these men are gay identified and both may be understood as suffering from impotence of one kind or another. Actually, both should be understood as suffering from insufficient self-esteem and self-regard. Another perspective would allow us to say that they are deficient in self-care that would be brought about through activity that Foucault would have referred to as the result of the technologies of self-production. But as we will see after describing the two cases, there is really no deficiency, only differing ways of developing further from the places that they are, to the places that each will inhabit. In discussing them, we will be building a "queer geography", to

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use a term of Frank Browning (1996). He describes himself and his collage of expressions as a geographer would in what follows:

> Entering Brooklyn, I began to map a new geography of desire and intimacy.
>
> A peripatetic wanderer, I look at desire as a geographer. I seek its contours, its ragged shorelines, its mud and crystals, the arrangement of its caves and hiding places, the artifacts of its pasts, the sketch pads of its imaginings, the moorings of its departures. As physical geographers know, none of these features are fixed. Shorelines erode. Caves collapse. Desire is the enemy of identity, of certainty, of indelible maps. This new geography did not erase past geographies. Early on, I learned the value of carting rugs, pictures, and modest tchotchkes with me in my movings. They are more than sentimental attachments. They are visual, physical objects that have caught the light and shadow of all the places I have lived. In the memory of that light and shadow, they become paths across time and space: they recall conversations, embraces, penetrations with the dead and distant. They are locators that make of my body a bridge between the kiss of a young bicyclist twenty years past in Washington and the caress of a sailor carpenter today in Brooklyn-even as the mahogany bed that Gene's dead lover Kevin built brings some trace of Kevin's boyish, blond body in touch with mine each night. (p. 14-15)

Browning captures rather poetically the drifting of thought from things present to things past, from places inhabited to places no longer seen, across the emotional landscape of lived and dead bodies. He invents an expressive language that plays across the shapes and contours of bodies and voices, mapping a tapestry of meaning and memory, and identity and desire.

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Using Sex Clubs for Validation; the Case of "Alex":

The first scenario is about a gay man whose alias is "Alex" and who has suffered impotence in its metaphorical sense of 'a loss of power' and self-esteem. Actually he engages in actions that are meant to ward off the damaging effects of negative evaluations of his self-worth by using his sexual potency. In his own words, Alex says, to his interviewer Michangelo Signorile (1998), "I think I use my body a lot as a way of feeling good about myself"(p. 20).

In a discussion concerning the ways in which gay men can be both victimizer and victim, Michangelo Signorile uses "Alex" as an example of a gay man acting out both of those roles. Earning a living as a journalist, Signorile is the author of two previously published books about gay life. The material about Alex is found in a third book described as a National Bestseller and entitled, *Life Outside: The Signorile Report on Gay Men: Sex, Drugs, Muscles, and the Passage of Life.* Signorile mentions anecdotal material drawn from a survey he gave to men in gay communities. His summary and some of the remarks of his respondents are telling; he is bent on discrediting the obsession with physical beauty among gay men and the gay men themselves are variously cautious in

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their responses so as not to damage the fragile reputation of their already blemished communities.

> Many gay men who said in surveys that they saw little or no difference between the gay and straight worlds regarding male physical beauty seemed very concerned about the gay community being stigmatized as "narcissistic" or falling prey to negative stereotypes, and they expressed strong feelings about this, … the fear of stigmatizing the community seemed to … outweigh answering the question honestly. (Signorile, 1998, p. 14)

A majority of men who saw no difference between gay and straight focuses on beauty and youth, says Signorile, "were making their decisions based on comparing gay men to straight women (not straight men), noting the equal pressure put on the two groups to look a certain way"(p. 14). Quoting a molecular biologist from Short Hills, New Jersey who "when younger was considered attractive in a non-pumped up, masculine-but-not-macho, hunkish sort of way", Signorile (1998) lets us know, "that men, gay and straight, have tended to objectify their sex objects so as to create an idealized, fragile, ephemeral form of beauty that few can attain and none can retain"(p. 15). Signorile reports furthermore, that

> This was the impossible standard that feminists saw as causing self-dissatisfaction-self-loathing-in so many women, and against which feminists rightly rebelled. What feminists failed to address-like the heterosexists they were raised to be-was that gay men typically held up analogous, impossible standards for their own objects of desire. (p. 15)

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Signorile found agreement among gay men "that the majority of straight men were not generally as focused as they were on attaining the 'ideal' male body." Some of his respondents thought that this was changing and reflected the influence of gay culture on straight men. But, general agreement was found with this statement: "while our larger American culture is obsessed with physical appearance and body image, the onus seems to be greater on straight women and gay men"(p. 15).

Although there are similarities and exceptions to the trend found in gay men to objectify themselves as sex objects in terms of physical appearance among other gender and sexual orientation groupings, none of these other groups had this trend as a predomination. Only gay men, it appears, suffer to such an extent from the powerful effects of this kind of colonization through their body images. This would be the conclusion of Signorile's survey and interviews. And, according to cultural critic Michael Bronski (1998) in gay pornography

> while it is true that the viewer, sexually aroused, lusts after the object, it is equally true that he may also want to be that object. This element of identification with as well as desire for the sexual object distinguishes gay from straight porn. (Signorile, 1998, p. 16)

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Playing off this idea of Bronski's, Signorile (1998) wants us to generalize to all visual elements of gay sexual culture. In speaking for and about gay men, he asserts that

> it is not difficult to see that many if not most of us become both the rigidly objectified as well as the rigid objectifier, holding ourselves and *each other* to rigid standards of physical beauty. These standards become a significant, if not most important, characteristic in choosing a mate or sexual partner. For many of us the preoccupation with physical appearance and the cult of masculinity become the mechanisms that drive most aspects of our lives. (p. 16)

I accept this marking of all gay sexual culture but will, in a later section, show how this narrowing of the application of an obsession with physical appearance to only gay men is not acceptable. It will be shown to be representative of the colonization of the body images of all men, and of them since the time of the Enlightenment in Eighteenth Century European culture. But for now I wanted to frame the example of Alex as a gay man who acts the roles of both victim and victimizer.

To continue then with Alex. In an interview with Signorile (1998) reported in a section of *Life Outside* called "Straight-Acting and [Straight]-Appearing", Alex tells Signorile about himself. "Sometimes I feel like I'm maybe depressed," … "No, let me clarify that: I *definitely* feel *really* depressed, and it's not just *sometimes* - and then I

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look at all of this and I say to myself, Hey, quit your complaining"(p. 16-17)

According to Signorile, Alex is telling him this while standing on the balcony of his spacious two bedroom apartment overlooking lower Manhattan. And he made a gesture with his hand, waving it over the city below his twentieth-floor apartment as if to suggest that all that lay beneath and around him was his empire. Apparently, Alex is quite well off, having bought his apartment three years ago, and earning a six-figure income. His career as a consultant took off two years ago. He works in a specialized field and has the freedom to work at home. Signorile describes Alex as "an attractive thirty-two-year-old man with sandy blond hair, golden skin … and bright green eyes." He works out daily and is proud of his well-developed body, which he refers to as his best asset. In describing his personality, Alex uses the expression "a happy go lucky guy." But he seems to bring the conversation back to his body: "I'm the kind of person I am because I feel good about my body. It makes me confident, self-assured, and happy because I wouldn't be confident if I didn't feel good about my body." When that feeling is lacking, Alex admits to being pretty miserable. The relationship between being physically toned or worked-out and feelings of self-confidence are fairly

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widespread among all human beings. I think that the ease and steadiness, perhaps even grace, with which we move about is linked to feelings of confidence. Why wouldn't the ability to move about in the physical environment be connected to our comfort in the social environment, especially when physical agility or body-ableness is generally of value in our culture?

Alex describes the kind of guys he is attracted to as: "Big, built, strong. I definitely like *very masculine* guys; I don't want to use the politically incorrect term 'straight-acting' and I don't think it applies anyway ..." He goes on to say that being masculine is not the prerogative of straight men only. To Signorile, and to others, Alex may appear to lead a pretty comfortable life. But according to him, sometimes things break down and he does things that he regrets later on. The following is an account of one such incident:

[The Circumstances]

> I went out with a friend. We went to a nightclub; I was in the mood to dance, but I was also in the mood to cruise. But when I think back to it now, I wasn't in the mood for *sex*. I really wasn't horny-I was just into *cruising*. I wanted attention. And when I think about it even further, I think I wanted that kind of attention because I had a bad day: I lost one job to a competitor, someone I've been going head-to-head with. On another job, the client wasn't pleased with my work and dumped me, told me that was it and they weren't using me. Then, while I was on the phone with someone, I found out that a close friend tested HIV-positive.

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That was the second friend in six months, and I was even more upset because he didn't tell me himself-I found out through someone else, who was like, *gossiping*, you know, and who didn't know that this was a really good friend of mine. Basically, you could say I felt like shit. (Signorile, 1998, p. 19)

[The Setting]

Alex decided to go out to a gay nightclub, the kind that plays nonstop house music and where pumped-up men dance to all hours of the morning, snorting Special K, an animal anesthetic that is popular in the clubs, and downing hits of Ecstasy, the psycho-pharmacological designer drug popular on the party circuit. Alex wanted simply to have a few drinks and loosen up. He was stressed and needed some old-fashioned fun. But instead of relaxing him, the atmosphere seemed to make him more stressed and a bit anxious. (p. 19-20)

[Assessing the Club]

No one was looking at me, he says, I mean, no one that I really thought was *hot*. And I guess that made me think I wasn't looking good that night, and then it's kind of like down-hill from there. You're not feeling good already, and then feeling worse because no one is paying attention to you, and sometimes you're not sure if it's all in your mind. Maybe people really *are* looking, but you're not picking it up. I think my mind plays tricks on me in that way.

I think I use my body a lot as a way of feeling good about myself, Alex continues. I'm sure other people go out, just have a drink, and maybe shrug off the problem, but me, I go out, I think, sometimes, to feel desired and wanted and that makes me feel superior, and then it offsets my feeling bad. (p. 20)

[The Quest Carries Him Further]

In his quest, Alex decided to go to another bar, hoping his luck would be better. He drank some more. And some more. But even there, he says, no one was cruising him, and he could not get his validation fix. He went to still another bar, but to no avail. Finally, he went to a sex club, a small place near his house where men meet

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in the near darkness and have sex with each other in cubicles and corners. (p. 20-21)

[Getting What He was after]

He met a man 'almost immediately' who took him in a corner and performed oral sex on him. "He wasn't totally hot, didn't have the hardest body, but he was cute enough." Alex says. "And he worshipped my body the whole time, which is what I needed. When it was over, he stood up and put his hand over my chest, and said, 'You remind me of why I go to the gym-because I want to have a body just like yours.' That was really weird and unnerving, because it felt great to hear that made me definitely feel superior. So I guess I'd finally gotten what I really wanted. But I also realized at that moment that I was making him feel lousy or, rather, contributing to his making himself feel lousy. I got over my own negative feelings, got past my feeling bad about my body-but it was at the expense of someone else, making someone else feel inferior about his body. It's like a contagious disease-you just pass your insecurity on to the next guy. (p. 21)

[Evaluating the Outcome]

Alex explains that he sometimes goes to sex clubs simply for "fun" and with what he considers a good attitude; he is not 'against' sex clubs and seems to have a relatively high regard for them. "Look I don't want to put down sex clubs, because I've gone to them and met guys and had hot sex and it was all great and made me feel good," he says. "But this wasn't like that, and this does happen often these days with me it seems. It's not something I feel good about because it's motivated by my feeling bad about myself, and later I realize that the fix is really empty. It doesn't really end the problem, my feeling insecure about myself and how I look-it only comes back. I don't know what would really do that, actually. Maybe just drop out of the system that we're all in, you know, the gay system: 'Look like this. Look like that. Always look great. Always look better than the next guy. Make them look at you, but don't look at them. Treat everyone like shit.' Sometimes I wonder what the hell I'm doing." (p. 22)

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Giving Sexual Arenas Another Try; the Case of "Gary":

This second case study represents a man whose name is not really "Gary", but who has suffered from a condition that is often not thought of as a problem for gay men, namely sexual impotence. As reported by Guy Kettelhack (1996) who was the interviewer of "Gary":

> After about a year of being on medication and going to his therapist, Gary decided, now that the worst of his depression seemed to have lifted, to give the gay urban sexual arena another try. "By this time, jack-off clubs were the new hot thing, and I began to fantasize out loud to my therapist about what a sexy idea that was- all these guys, like kids in my school locker rooms, just walking around playing with their dicks. It just didn't seem as intimidating as the rest of gay male sex. Eventually my therapist said, 'Why don't you go sometime?' And so I did. (p. 131)

Gary went to a jerk-off club. Such clubs often move from one person's apartment to another especially when these are private or when the clientele are selected on some physical basis such as the size of your cock. Then private or closed gatherings are hosted. But many of the bars and gay clubs offer the opportunity for group sex, mostly of the safer sex kind in the age of AIDS and sex policing. These public places advertise in gay magazines that are widely distributed at no cost to the readers who pick them up in all the urban gay bars and clubs.

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Because I want to provide some commentary and analysis about the relationship between the mind's eye and cock, (this was mentioned in the quote above by Sadownick "that a magical thread links one's third eye with one's cock"), and to make as familiar as possible for the uninitiated reader, I quote rather freely from Kettelhack's account of Gary's adventure. The following is richly descriptive and will give some depth to the therapeutic experience that Gary had at the jerk-off club, one of today's urban sexual arenas that somewhat approximates the experience of the open crowd defined and described by Canetti. As will be seen, it lacks the discharge impulse that a truly open crowd, allowed to build without limitation or confinement, would be driven by.

In Kettelhack's (1996) *Dancing Around the Volcano*, Gary continues to tell of his adventure:

[Gary's Preparation and Entrance]

> One Saturday night I took a shower, put on my favorite pair of Calvin Klein briefs-I've got a thing for them, ever since I saw how Buck looked in them-and wore them de rigueur T-shirt, jeans and boots costume that constituted gay male mufti. I told myself that I didn't have to take my clothes off, that I could just sit there with a can of soda and watch if I wanted to. I kept chanting reassurances to myself as I took the bus to the sex club: it's gonna be all right, you don't have to do anything. … I got there fairly early and was horrified to find that there was a mandatory clothes check. I managed to stammer to the guy at the door, 'Could I keep on my underwear?' He nodded yes, and suddenly I found myself in a dark room with little side hallways and cubbyholes, too dark at first for my eyes to make anything out. I stripped out of my jeans and T-

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shirt and boots and handed them to a guy behind a desk marked Clothes Check and wandered into the room.

[The Spectacle]

What I saw was amazing. It wasn't crowded yet, but already, groups of men were sort of huddling into each other in the corners, exactly like dogs sniffing each other out. I love watching dogs smell each other's asses-they do it as such a matter of course. It's just how they greet each other. Well, something similar was going on here. Tentatively I walked over to one of the larger groups, standing at its periphery. As my eyes adjusted, I saw about ten men, a couple of them old and potbellied, a couple young college-type kids, the rest sort of normal-looking guys in their thirties-no pornographic princes, which put me at some sort of relative ease. But the feeling I got looking at these guys stroking their dicks, sometimes stroking each other's chests or asses, moving in close so that their dicks were all pointing inward and it sort of didn't matter whose dick was whose: ah! That was it. It was like all these men's bodies sort of melded into a larger unit. It didn't matter who touched whom, there was nothing but a kind of animal clustering, like babies exploring each other in complete innocent, curious wonder.

[The Initiation]

Then one of the mid-thirties guys reached out and caressed my ass, gently slipping his hand under my briefs. Another older man reached over and played with my left nipple. I was ushered into the center of the group. It was the most wondrous feeling: the smell of these men, a heady mix of deodorant and cologne and a faint smell of sweat, the warm male animal caressing, so gentle, so undemanding, and yet so eager and hungry and curious-it was like my whole body was learning to be erotic.

[What it Meant for Gary]

As much as this was a jack-off club, the focus was, for me, for once, not on the dick. It was on male flesh meeting male flesh. I got so into feeling the muscular shoulder of a college kid next to me, and getting off on someone's gentle, warm, strong hand on my back, another man brushing my thigh with his thigh, that I didn't notice, at first, my own growing erection. Some door had opened. It was as if my dick, for the moment,

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> had become too curious about this new erotic feeling not to respond. There was no reason not to. But I guess it came about because, finally, for once, I wasn't requiring anything of my dick. My whole body had eroticized, as did the whole bodies of the men brushing and nuzzling me now. Sex wasn't a matter of penile acrobatics: it was a pure matter of touch.
>
> [Future Projected]
>
> I'm seeing that my fear of touching and being touched by another man-whose name I know, who is not part of some anonymous group-isn't just that my dick won't pop up when I want it to. There's something about being seen by someone that scares me: it's like I can't help but feel I'll be judged as inadequate. This feeling of inadequacy isn't going to go away overnight. But somehow the feeling of sexual release and joy and connection I found at the jack-off club has given me a glimpse of a larger goal: to learn to feel that same easy, wide permission about the rest of who I am. It's this: I know connection is possible now, even if I still can't always achieve it. But I *am* a part of the human race. I can learn to touch and be touched, too. (p. 131-133)

From this experience Gary took comfort in feeling hope which he never thought was possible. Following the work of the master, Michel Foucault, Guy Kettelhack (1996) concludes the presentation of the case of "Gary" with a commentary on de-phallicizing sex, which in his own words

> is something a variety of gay man and queer theorists have thought about and explored. It is a liberating idea-that can be displaced from the phallus onto other parts of the body or bodily activities that don't directly involve the penis. Partly because so many gay men have been so fixated on The Cock, the invitation to sexualize-take equally intense pleasure in-other body parts and functions [to] widen the canvas, expands libidinal possibility, promises a larger field of sexual exploration. Diffusing sex onto non-genital areas of the body can jostle and free the sexual imagination. … Gary's experience shows us his route to this wider realization; he tells us from his experience

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> that much more can become erotic than the penis-something of course, most gay men know, from the urgings of their fantasies, on their own.
>
> But the freedom to eroticize other parts of the body or the animate or inanimate world (as in fetishism) does not always, or perhaps ever, at first feel free. When Apollo shoots up out of a gay man's chthonian darkness, his destination can seem very peculiar to those who don't share that gay man's particular section of chthonian muck. Once again the sexual fantasies and fixations are psychics attempts, at self-cure, as peculiar to our needs and drives and defenses as our handwriting. Gary's story gives us a principle that I think speaks to many of us-that sex can involve much more than getting a hard dick on demand, and that much more is potentially erotic than the penis-but the roots of Gary's fixations and fears and attempts at self-cure are unique to him. Respecting that our own psychic/sexual routes are just as urgently individual can make it a lot easier, not to say a lot more fun, to review, for example, the hold fetishes have on us. These neosexual choices … may force themselves on us unconsciously, but by taking a step back and looking at them, we can learn to feel more awe about their mission and enjoy more of the sheer damned pleasure they can give. (p. 133-134)

I was struck in typing this lengthy passage as to how many times the term 'each other' occurred. I just counted; there were six occurrences, all in the section I marked off under the heading of "the Spectacle." The psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan would note this as a repetition that represents some significance. I would say that 'each other' is a term that picks out the separation between subjects in the spectacle, or visual field, of Gary the spectator. Perhaps its being repeated reveals some anxiety which he experiences at first being in an unfamiliar, though pleasant to his senses, situation. I would claim that the separation occurs because

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it is a visual array that he is witnessing, and he is experiencing the distance that only vision, in contrast with touch, can make manifest.

The importance of Gary's projected future lies in his realization and anticipation of touching and being touched as his rightful entitlement as a member of the human race. This is precisely what I should claim is the draw or pull of the situation of dark body erotics. In places above, I mentioned that the experience within this situation could make available, the heretofore eclipsed, "affordances." This is a term of art from the Gibsons, J.J. and Eleanor, and derives from their work in perception, specifically, on constructing an understanding of the (visual) optic array and the formation of one of many senses in which we can be said to have a "self," namely the ecological self. The ecological self for the Gibsons, and as interpreted by Dick Neisser, is the experience an infant has from the very first glances out of their visual field of having their body within the visual field of their perception. In other words, according to the Gibsons and Neisser, the child develops an ecological self as a feature of their perceptual experience. Quite simply, the infant sees her mother at the same moment that she sees her arms reaching for her mother. Both mother and parts of the baby's body are simultaneously

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present in the infant's perception. Her memories of body movement, and of seeing others, are tied together and ever present as long as the child can see her body/self and others.

I found it helpful, in thinking about sexual development, to use the Gibsons' term, "affordance". I asked Neisser if he was aware of anyone using the term to think of sexual development, he was not, though he certainly admitted that the Gibsons, as well as others in the field of perceptual development, had no doubt thought about sex. This arose in my thinking during a discussion of phantom limbs and body image. Work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is groundbreaking in understanding the distinction between the body-schema and the body image. The manner in which I think affordances can be usefully applied in the analysis of sexual development is as follows: Just as the optic array is considered an objective set of possibilities for the kind of organism or species, being we humans are, so it can be applied to the possibilities that our bodies might take as directional developments in the course of seeking, experiencing, and enjoying pleasure. This will need some elaboration as well as some unpacking.

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Bringing the reader back to the context in which I first realized the usefulness of the term for understanding the development of bodily based pleasure, it was in thinking about phantom limbs that I understood its generality. I should proceed to discuss body-schema and body image here; also I will bring in how these concepts help to explain the kinds of signals that homosexual men produce in order to gain attraction among each other. In concluding this section I will quote from *When Men Meet* telling how a semiotic analysis would have to show the connections between the verbal regression of explanations to the nonverbal signs that constitute the medium of euphoric embodiment.

First with respect to the distinction between the body-schema and body image: The inception of this distinction has its origins in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, especially in *Phenomenology of Perception* (1962), but also in his last unfinished book, *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), in which he launches the concept of the flesh in order to bring about a philosophy of sensitive space. This permits the connection of emotion, depth, and flesh to construct an understanding and appreciation of lived experience that plays across our bodies as if it were a musical instrument capable of conducting and playing itself so as to produce

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the ongoing stream of semiotic expression, that is our communal life (Cataldi, 1993). For Merleau-Ponty (1962),

> There is a logic of the world to which my body in its entirety conforms, and through which things of intersensory significance become possible for us. … To have a body is to possess a universal setting, a schema of all types of perceptual unfolding. (p. 326)

Shaun Gallagher (1998) attempts to clarify the difference between body image and body-schema before answering an interesting question: "What constraints are placed *by* one's own body on perception in general and on the conscious experience *of* one's own body in particular"(p. 225)?

Gallagher works within the traditional phenomenological framework in which consciousness is defined as a relational dyad; it is always about something. In considering the body-schema and body image, he follows this distinction and says that we want to understand both sides of the relationship, both the body that experiences, perhaps limits what is experienced, and that which is the content of our consciousness, what is filtered through the bodily perceptual mechanisms and becomes articulated as what I perceive, remember, imagine, conceptualize, study, love, hate, etc. My own body is in all these acts of intentionality taken as the object of consciousness. Gallagher (1998) enumerates the following three aspects as included in the body image:

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- The subject's *perceptual* experience of his body
- The subject's *conceptual* understanding of the body in general (including mythical and/or scientific knowledge
- The subject's *emotional* attitude toward her own body

According to Gallagher (1998),

> Less well known, however, is the role of the body as it functions on the other side of the intentional relation, that is, as it functions to make perception possible and to constrain intentional consciousness in various ways. Here I refer to the body's nonconscious appropriation of habitual postures and movements, its incorporation of various significant parts of the environment into its own experiential organization. Head (1920) called this nonconscious postural model, which actively monitors body posture and movement, the *body schema*.
>
> The body schema, I will argue, is neither reducible to neurological functioning nor equivalent to the body image, i.e., an intentional object of consciousness. (p. 226)

Gallagher (1998) finds neurological explanations of the human body inadequate for they do not "capture the schematic operations in which the body acquires a specific organization or style in its relations with a particular physical and social environment"(p. 226).

Gallagher (1998) provides a careful analysis of the contrast between body image and body-schema, which I have highlighted in the following by quoting part of his more elaborated distinctions:

- Body image has an intentional status; … it is either a conscious representation of the body or a set of

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> beliefs about the body. … In contrast, … a body schema involves an extraintentional operation carried out prior to or outside of intentional awareness. …
>
> - In the body image, the body is experienced as an owned body, one that belongs to the experiencing subject. In contrast, the body schema functions in a subpersonal, unowned, anonymous way. … this distinction involves the issue of control [I can move my arm at will but] Various muscle groups make automatic schematic adjustments that I remain unaware of, and in this sense do not control.
>
> - The body image often involves an abstract, partial, or articulated representation of the body insofar as conscious awareness typically attends to only one part or area of the body at a time. The body schema … functions in a holistic way. A slight change in posture … involves a global adjustment across a large number of muscle systems. (p. 228-229)

Gallagher does not rule out the body image and the body-schema working together in complimentary ways. But he does insist on the differences between the two, which for my purposes are convenient here.

I want to claim that in understanding homoerotic desire and arousal we need to use both the body image and the body-schema. Bech maintains that there is a semiotic analysis that permits one homosexual to recognize another. Above I have tried to represent, in summary fashion, how the gaze operates in a carefully choreographed, even ritualized, fashion. Bech (1997) oddly quoted Himmler who is reported as having said the following in a "speech in February 1933 to the SS squad leaders on the problem of homosexuality and

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its solution"(p. 109). Himmler apparently asked his men, "How do they go about it?" Bech quotes the answer as, "from another", by way of explanation and exemplification of the mythical lure that gay men have an uncanny ability to recognize each other. Some have called this gay radar!

> Antagonized by society, threatened by laws, most homosexuals club together, making themselves mutually recognizable by means of a series of signs which-heaven alone knows how-are the same in every country … Very often, however, these signs are not necessary at all. Homosexuals can recognize one another, literally, before they have seen one another's faces. I myself do not comprehend it, but it is a fact. It is as if some electrical current connects them. A homosexual is capable of identifying another person as homosexual even if he only sees the person from behind at a great distance.
>
> Thus, the media involved extend from distinct signs to extrasensory perception, it seems. Or perhaps it is simply a matter of signs so subtle that even homosexuals have difficulty acknowledging them as such? In fact, they might be the subtler manifestations of what I have called uneasiness: clumsiness, anxiousness, acting-'natural signs', so to speak, not consciously intended. (Bech, 1997, p. 109)
>
> Even in these anonymous park 'bangs', in these semi-anonymous one-night stands, or even in the pure eye contacts, a *being-together* is established, overstepping the border between one and the other, or at least playing with it, balancing on it and swaying from side to side, opening and closing. There is intensity between them that transcend beyond them to others; an excitement or vibration beyond what is normal. Time stands still.
>
> The observer, Mr. X, another middle-aged man, and two youths stood face-to-face within the small, dimly lit leafy enclosure. The two young men reached out and fondled one another without regard for the others present, obviously resuming a transaction that our arrival interrupted. One pinched the other's nipples, while the latter concentrated energies on the penis.

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> Grabbing each other, they kissed vigorously, grinding pelvises together.
>
> X walked over to them and without forewarning touched the buttocks of each. They parted slightly, looked at X, and gradually absorbed him into the action. The two youths opened each other's trousers and pulled out respective cocks. They turned to X and did the same. X grabbed both penises. Meanwhile, the older man had commenced rubbing his penis through the trousers. His head turned inquisitively toward the observer who, anticipating a 'rush,' maintained a studious visual involvement with the evolving threesome to cue the middle-aged man that he was not interested. However, the man slowly inched his way around the narrow area so that he stood within touching distance of the observer. From the corner of his eye, the observer noticed the guy's hand slowly reaching for his groin. Equally paced, the observer cupped his genitals with both hands. The man 'read' the message and transferred his attention to the threesome. Rather than close in on them immediately, he moved to about 18 inches from one youth. He pulled out a large penis and stood motionless masturbating. He waited to be seen by one of the three. By this time, however, they were too engrossed to notice, alternating between fellatio and kissing. X pulled one of the youth's pants down to the knees and tried to penetrate the anus with his penis while the other youth fellated him. Receiving little notice, the older man closed in on the side of X and thrust his penis into X's hand. X grabbed it, turned toward the older man, squatted on his knees and lustily fellated him. Noting the orgasm would no doubt conclude this four-cornered arrangement, the observer terminated his observation.
>
> The intensity spreads to the scientific observer and onwards; science turns into pornography. (Obviously, in situations where two people close around each other, the intensity cannot spread to an observer in the same way. Here, the corresponding literary genre is confession rather than description, fiction rather than sociology.) (Bech, 1997, p. 113-114)

I have used this quote because it is something of a repetition of the material that I have used above from Canetti's work on Crowds and Power. Earlier I had tried to

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show how there is a basic, even natural, disposition to return to a primal embrace that is brought out in the open crowd. With this material, and that with which I shall conclude this section, I move further into the homosexual experience of this natural disposition of our bodies to touch and be touched.

Before concluding, I must deliver on the promissory note above to connect the distinction between body image and body-schema with the proposed understanding of homoerotic desire and arousal. For the most part, what a person is willing to admit and accept about himself in regards to having and acting upon his same-sex desires will be contained in the body image. This is what a person is conscious of. Since even in a potentially homosexual person, there is a delay in coming to realize their latent desires, there must be something deeper that has not as yet arisen into consciousness. Sure enough, the emotionality may be felt, even the perception of what attracts him may begin to materialize with greater clarity, but only much later will the application of the conceptual distinctions be applied to himself. Because to be homosexual in today's society is, for the most part, still something that is taboo. We must ask later whose interest does this taboo serve, but for now I want to suggest that the body-schema must be operative

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beneath the surface of what floats in our conscious minds. Better said if I was to say that which might be articulated in the reigning discursive formations; those forms that our statements, explanations, and understandings may take up, and are limited by as well.

I think the body-schema needs to be investigated. It has been excluded by the social constructionist approaches and by the new discursive psychology. As I have tried to show, these approaches are very limited in providing an understanding of why people would choose to be homosexual when it carries such obvious stigma and punitive action by others. There must be something deeper, more "natural", to the origins of homoerotic attraction, arousal and desire.

I have been building the components of an argument that claims that homoeroticism is available in all people but something happens probably as Freud thought very early in life to preclude access to these variations in our sexual expression. My thoughts about how the body-schema can also add to clarifying the operation of this preclusion center on the notion that our body-schema as something we are born with. In its rudimentary form, our body-schema is the map of connections between our bodies, within the body's anatomy and physiology, and our physical and social environments.

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From conception, we develop in interconnected and reciprocal ways with the environments that make us possible and complete us. As we navigate through the physical space, we are also building a more complex and subtle body-schema that is responsible for carrying each of us through the many maneuvers that are called upon in living the complexity that is characteristic of our auto-poietic existence. We are self-producing organisms, but not only of our own making. Our bodily organisms are perturbed and able to respond, even adept, as the case might be, to much of the stimulation that perturbs our internal bodily environment. But exactly how we become erotically developed is not fully understood because it has not been the subject of study. I have argued throughout this work that the reason for ignoring these questions is prejudice. Patriarchy has limited our understanding because society in the past has had to be a warring one. We have not had the courage to raise good men to borrow from a book by that title (Silverstein & Roshbaum, 1994). By this, I mean, we have continued to engage in the practice of emotionally traumatizing boys by forcing them to separate from their mothers. Thankfully, this is no longer necessary. But we have also deprived them of the full love and brotherhood of their fathers. According to the author, whose title I have borrowed, we make boys separate from their mothers and keep them distant from their fathers

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because this is the way we know how to condition them to be fighters. How else could men go to war and fight and kill each other in face to face and hand to hand combat? Why else does the athletic industry of combative sports hold such attraction for men? In the future, I hope to explore some of these questions of the suppressed homoeroticism that is a part of sports and competitive games. For now I want to say that gay men are speaking to us about something deeper than their own self-satisfaction of homoerotic desire. The body-schema holds promise for connecting and explaining heretofore unexplained or unrelated phenomena.

My take on the development of the body-schema is that we are constantly developing within the network of bodily affordances that are the very fabric of the possible directions for pleasurable development that resides in our physical make-up from birth onwards. If you think about how a blind person can learn to incorporate a stick into their maneuvering about, you will gain some insight into how we learn to use our body parts in the erotic attachments we form. Blind people come to extend their body schema to include the tip of the cane or stick that they use to feel around themselves. Another example of how things not readily attached to our bodily selves come to be is to consider driving a car. But in particular take the way in

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which when parking a car you have, after much practice, come to feel the space in which you might be attempting to back into with the extended knowledge of the shape of the car that you are driving. In backing into a parking space, as in parallel parking, you are aware of the fenders of the car and its trunk or its hood as though it was your own body. We learn to incorporate these originally strange parts as one with our own bodies.

Now, you may be wondering how am I going to connect these rather ordinary commonplace understandings of the blind person using his cane as an extension of his arm, and the ease with which an experienced driver can adjust his steering according to the feel he or she has as to the tightness of fit that he or she experiences as he or she backs into and pulls forward to park the car in between other cars or objects? I would suggest that our body's parts are not really parts until we learn to use them in the various ways that we do. In specifically addressing the way our bodies become erotically aroused, I would claim that a man who is predominantly heterosexual has come to learn to experience his penis and other parts of his body (though mostly his dick) as related to a woman's anatomy to such an extent that he feels the goodness of fit that he might have established between his own body and his car for example.

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The social conditioning helps to guide men in the development and expression of appropriate sexual desires. His body becomes mapped into his body- schema with a kind of stream lining of its more full potential for bodily pleasures.

Whereas a straight man might not allow touching of his anus a gay man usually will. As was illustrated in the excerpts above from Bech and in the two case studies that I offered about how gay men use sex clubs for their enjoyment but also for their correction of self-esteem, as in the case of Alex who seemed to look for validation in the passages that I shared with the reader. Gary, in the second example I gave, seemed to widen his use of his body as is the tendency in gay sex clubs; some will stick to their routines but many seek variation and new experiences. It is my suggestion that body-schema be used as a theoretical device for organizing and bring about the similarities in our lived experiences. It is along with the situation of dark body erotics that I tried to depict about a representation of our long for community.

To return to this theme before going on in the next section to deepen our understanding of homoerotic desire and to find other ways that it expresses itself in the building and/or

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bonding of social beings in community, albeit in disguised ways, I would like to conclude this section with a passage that suggests that gay coupling in the group scenes I have shown you is animated by a strong urge to democratization. To return then to Bech (1997) who says:

> Insofar as the intensity spreads, opens up to and embraces others present, these meetings are democratic, solidarity, 'comradely'. The formal equivalence and equal right to participate, prevailing in the modern world on the market, in politics and in the city, becomes more real here.
>
> Thus, the meeting is often more democratic than the gaze establishing it; this is related to the closeness and intensity that arise, as opposed to the distance and strangeness of the gaze. Meetings confined to two persons often also bear this mark of democracy, fellowship, friendliness, which is not just 'common courtesy' to ward off embarrassing incidents and ensure that everything runs smoothly, but also has to do with the feeling that this intensity is something enveloping both parties, something shared.
>
> Sexual invitations [in bath houses] follow an etiquette involving simple and nonabrasive rituals … that are characterized by their gentleness; usually they are not forceful or persistent. Nonacceptance is ordinarily communicated in a way that is nonabrasive and that masks rejection. In the hallways, one declines another's invitation by avoiding eye contact or by smiling but not sustaining eye contact. In private rooms, such simple scripts as 'I'm just resting,' 'Sorry, I've just come,' or 'Not now,' accompanied by a smile, are customary forms of not accepting an invitation. In the orgy room, one gently removes the hands of the solicitor and/or moves on. If group sex is occurring, a participant merely turns his head, shifts his body, or raises his arm to signify that a newcomer is not welcome.
>
> During the sexual activity itself, concerns over sexual performance do not disrupt an atmosphere of congeniality to the degree that they often do in other contexts. For example, since trial-and-error positioning is routinized, it does not communicate

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> rejection or a sense of incompetence … Participants also note that after sexual episodes verbal and nonverbal communications of congeniality are not uncommon (e.g., an embrace or expression of thanks).
>
> Since participants expect the interaction to be restricted to sexual activity, departures after a sexual episode are also simple, routine, and nonabrasive. Participants melt away with little or no ceremony. And since participants expect as much, such departures do not ordinarily engender feelings of disappointment or emptiness.
>
> The being-together, the intensity and the companionship are established, consummated and completed by means of a language, often a 'silent' language, body language; moving hands, lips, and so on become signs, of liking. (p. 114-115)

As the above description of exchanges of sexual contact among anonymous participants in gay bathhouses suggests, an egalitarian atmosphere seems to prevail. Perhaps as the participants are themselves members of a stigmatized minority they show each other a certain modicum of respect in rejecting unwanted advances or approaches. The author of the above passage had intended on communicating recent changes in the gay and lesbian community. Changes that suggest colonization within and among gay and lesbian members have caused an increase in discrimination based on a whole array of traits and characteristics. Anything from genital size, fetishes, racial and ethnic qualities, professional affiliation and educational backgrounds, to age categories can be used to cut off, eliminate, or welcome

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participants in activities from sexual to just plain social gathering.

But as I have tried to argue in the course of this chapter on "Queer Voices and Discursive Formations", I think that the democratic impulse has its roots much deeper in the kind of communal longings that gathering in such places as sex clubs afford those who frequent them. I have also suggested, in the course of my developing the situation of dark body erotics, that all people have at the foundations of their humanity, in the very fibers of the linkages between their embodiment and that of their fellow humans, an urge to unite through touch without regard to these other socially evaluated discriminatory factors. All these other things are learned. This is not to say that they are not incorporated into the body image of the participants, but to raise the more refined questions of how the development of such fetishes occurs. In proposing that our body-schema is not only implicated in the motor/muscular adjustments that go into navigational movement through physical space, I have opened a way for investigating the developmental path that our bodies take in acquiring the "goodness of fit". "Goodness of fit" may become a phrase for capturing what one means when they say that they have a sexual preference or have a tendency toward orienting themselves bodily toward

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bodies with whatever the characteristics and emotional feel that they say are involved in their aesthetic attractions. Just how the body-schema and the body image work in exchange and unison is a question that needs answering. But before we can pose interesting research experiments to investigate the ways these things work in developing our pleasuring activities, we will have to take a detour through some approaches to homoerotic desire and gay liberation that have been proposed by queers in the Italian context. From examining this context, I hope to discover some of those things that have been obstacles to more people recognizing their potential for same-sex relations. Or better still, I would say that we need to uncover the more general way that homoerotic desire is implicated in all longings for community.

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Gay Liberation Italian Style; Reading Freud, Marx & Fanon with Mieli & Pasolini:

The Gay Revolutionary Project, as conceived from an Italian cultural perspective, informed by Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxian criticism of alienation, sets out the following as its project to reform the "domination … by the immanent tendency to socialisation which transforms capitalism into state capitalism." Mieli (1980) quoting from the *Communnist Manifesto* highlights the Marxian critique of the ever engrossing and all consuming nature of capital that Marx and Engels characterize as follows:

> it is no longer just labour, a specific and determinate aspect of human activity, that has to be subjugated and incorporated into capital, but rather the entire human life process. (p. 115)

In introducing the revolutionary gay project, Mieli (1980) states that

> Revolutionary criticism has shown how the ideology based on the capitalist mode of production, on the alienation of labour and the reification of the human subject, involves the absurd absolutising of contingent historical values, the hypostasis of opinions (scientific, ethico-moral, socio-political, psychological) that are in reality relative and transitory. This ideology upholds the 'naturalness' of the present system and mode of production, absolutising it in an ahistorical manner and concealing its underlying transience. What is hypostatised here by ideology as 'normal' and normative is nothing but the temporary appearance of something that is in reality changing, being transformed and developing together with the means and mode of production, with the dynamic of the contradiction between capital and the human species, with the entire movement of society. But if

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> capital has so far withstood the entire revolutionary movement, and managed to repress it, in the same way its ideology has survived the upsurge and widespread progress of the theory of the proletariat, with respect to which it has sought-and often partially managed-a recuperation, without however touching the essence. (p. 114-115)

Mieli (1980) specifically argues that "a direct approach to the homosexual question shows the basic importance of the homoerotic impulse in any human being, and makes a contribution to tracing the issues inherent to its repression and its disguise"(p. 119). He appeals to Norman O. Brown who said "it is in our unconscious repressed desires that we shall find the essence of our being, the clue to our neurosis (as long as reality is repressive), and the clue to what we might become if reality ceased to repress"(p. 119).

Responding to Norman O. Brown and perhaps echoing the general approach of a psychoanalytically informed criticism, Mieli (1980) lays out in the following passage the nature of the goal of the revolutionary gay movement:

> The revolutionary gay movement is struggling to (re)conquer our mysterious underlying being. Revealing the historical-existential secret that has up till now been gleaned and preserved in our marginal position, forced as we have been for millennia and for all the most oppressed years of our individual lives to remain secret, we homosexuals, with our voice and all the expressions of our presence, are beginning to reveal what is one of the world's basic mysteries. Perhaps homosexuality is indeed the key to trans-sexuality; perhaps it does point towards something that the

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> repressive requirements of civilization have been keeping down for thousands of years. (p. 119)

After commenting on how capital in liberalizing the so-called perversions, and among them most important for his analysis is homosexuality, claiming that this liberalizing is not merely an economic fact but a promotion of the submission to capital of the whole of human life, Mieli goes on to say that

> This demonstrates the very complex task of our revolutionary project, to recognize and express a humanity that transcends capital, without offering ourselves up to be devoured by it. In fact, if this should happen, then capital would simply vomit us up again in its own forms, with a view to making use of us to reproduce a new 'humanity', even more programmable, because already programmed in advance. (p. 120)

In a clear statement at the end of his chapter on "Fire and Brimstone, or How Homosexuals Became Gay", Mieli (1980) sums up the objective of the liberation of Eros among gays.

> For us it is no longer a question of an individual project to combat the prevailing morality, but rather a conscious inter-subjective project of our own gay responsibilities and goals, with a view to involving the whole of humanity. We homosexuals must liberate ourselves from the feeling of guilt (and this is one of our immediate goals), so that homoeroticism spreads and 'catches on'. We have to make the water gush from the rock, to induce 'absolute' heterosexuals to grasp their own homosexuality, and to contribute, through the dialectical confrontation and clash between the minority and majority of sexual tendencies, to the attainment of the trans-sexuality which the underlying polysexual 'nature' of desire points towards. If the prevailing form of monosexuality is heterosexuality, then a liberation of homoeroticism, this Cinderella of desire, forms an indispensable staging-post on the road to the liberation of Eros. (p. 120)

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Mieli (1980) then reiterates once again the objective of this program of liberation of Eros in the following:

> The objective, once again, is not to obtain a greater acceptance of homoeroticism by the hetero-capitalist status quo, but rather to transform monosexuality into an Eros that is genuinely polymorphous and multiple; to translate into deeds and into enjoyment that trans-sexual polymorphism which exits in each one of us in a potential but as yet repressed form. (p. 120-121)

In a chapter entitled "Heterosexual Men, or rather Closet Queens"; Mieli (1980) explains the connection between social cohesion and sublimation.

> But the sublimation of homoeroticism is based historically on its suppression. It is the bulwark of social cohesion for a system, which directly or indirectly condemns the overt expression of homosexuality. If homosexuality is liberated, then it ceases to sustain this system, comes into conflict with it and contributes to its collapse. At the same time a liberated homosexuality is an important condition for the creation of communism, i.e., the (re) conquest of human community. And the realization of this true community is inconceivable without the liberation of homoeroticism, which is universal, and which alone can guarantee genuinely totalising relations between persons of the same sex. (p. 135)

Mieli (1980) discloses in a parenthetic remark that "Communism is the rediscovery of bodies and their fundamental communicative function, their polymorphous potential for love"(p. 135).

After a rather interesting analysis of the relations between money and shit, Mieli (1980) concludes "that in the present

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society, the capitalist and bureaucratic functionary has the same anal character as the general equivalent for commodities"(p. 144). But then before concluding his foray into the heterosexual closet queens, he says that

> It is the function of ideology to obscure the genuine 'nature' of capital, to deny the human, bodily foundations that sustain it. The entire system is underpinned by our alienated labour, our repressed libido, our estranged energy. If this is understood, then we arrive at a revolutionary consciousness and a revolutionary libido. As Luciano Parinetto writes: "the proletarian revolution must also pass via the arsehole." The (re) conquest of anality contributes to subverting the system in its foundations. (p. 144)

Mieli (1980) concludes with a comment on the danger homosexuality poses for the capitalist system. He states that

> What in homosexuality particularly horrifies *homo normalis*, the policeman of the hetero-capitalist system, is being fucked in the arse; and this can only mean that one of the most delicious bodily pleasures, anal intercourse, is itself a significant revolutionary force. The thing that we queens are so greatly put down for contains a large part of our subversive gay potential. I keep my treasure in my arse, but then my arse is one to everyone. (p. 145)

But interestingly, Mieli maintains that capitalism is built upon the sublimation of an egoistic and anal-erotic component of our instinctual desires. Using the words of Ferenczi, one of the psychonazis he has severely criticized for deviating from Freuds position of the fundamental bisexuality of all human beings, Mieli (1980) mentions that "The delight in gold and in the possession of money

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represents the symbolic replacement of, and the reaction-formation to, repressed anal eroticism, i.e., that it also satisfies the pleasure principle"(p. 144).

To concretely show how intellectual activity serves the interests of Capital through a kind of sublimation of anal erotic desire, I will turn to my own case of development. My early work in the field of operant conditioning was what I wish to call a form of symbolic and disguised problem solving. One which hid the potential I was forced to sublimate for expansive development of my individuality. The following will be a synoptic presentation of what took years to understand.

After graduating college and avoiding the draft into the U.S. aggression in Vietnam, I enrolled in a master's program at Queens College. There were two doctoral programs also administered in the Queens Psychology Department; I was studying in the master's degree which was a general master's in psychology that prepared students to pursue further study in either of the two doctoral programs: one was in Neuropsychology, and the other in Learning and Conditioning. Before completing the master's I applied to the Conditioning program. I had already studied in the notoriously difficult course taught by the Conditioning Program Head, William N.

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Schoenfeld, and entered with a letter of recommendation from him.

Although I was definitely interested in the psychophysiology of behavior, I chose the Learning and Conditioning program because of its attractiveness to me. I was more prepared to embrace the Conditioning program because it afforded, in its philosophical outlook, a chance to manipulate and control one's own behavior. And as a closeted gay twenty-one year old, who had been raised in a family disposed to preferential valuing of heterosexuality (and its concomitant homophobia), I found that especially hopeful for controlling perhaps curbing my own homosexual desires. The belief that behavior was learned was a principle upon which this philosophy was built.

Skinner had started a revolution with his behavior theory. His method embodied in the "Skinner box" made available a convenient technology for studying control and manipulation of behavior in laboratory animals. The leap from animals to human behavior was made through a combination of argument and demonstration. It was intuitive that rewards and punishments controlled humans. However, cautious opponents of Skinner likened his method to a madness in which we might all be over taken by this impulse to control. Skinner did

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indeed recognize some of the moral aspects to his offer of behavioral control, but argued that the environment or others will control us if we do not ourselves become monitors and designers of our own environments. I was convinced and pursued the doctorate with zealous ambition.

Interestingly, I collaborated with a man whom I became madly in love with. Perhaps I should say that I was obsessed with him sexually. And this was not a one-sided affair. He was extremely seductive though at the time he was in a heterosexual marriage. There is some happiness that was found in this affair; we did eventually, after his separation and divorce, live together and engage in a relationship of shared bodily pleasure. What I mean to call the readers attention to is not the romantic details, though they too were present, but to the symbolic and disguised nature of our intellectual collaboration. I hope to make clear the hidden attempt at expressing my attraction to him well before anything physical was possible.

During those years of working in Professor Nat Schoenfeld's Lab, (which was especially well funded with million dollar contracts from the government agencies), an interesting challenge had been set for behavioral scientists. Dr. Brady at the Bethesda Maryland Navy Research Labs had shown that

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monkeys could be conditioned in such a way that they pressed a lever connected to equipment that delivered electric shock to the monkey's tail. This was painful because under more normal conditioning histories, monkeys, even these monkeys, would have avoided them. But their reinforcement schedule histories were manipulated so that these animals responded to produce rather than avoid the electric shock. My friend and laboratory collaborator got the idea that we could do the same thing with food. We thought that we could establish a conditioned avoidance to food instead of electric shock. That would be, or so we thought, a fine complimentary demonstration to the against-nature demonstration of Brady's in which monkeys no doubt had survived and evolved as more likely to avoid painful and damaging conditions in the wild. I joined him in the pursuit of setting up the appropriate lab and scheduling conditions to show that animals could be taught to avoid food. We did in fact accomplish this to the pleasure but not the surprise of Nat Schoenfeld.

But this was not sufficient to the two young turks that me and my collaborator desired to become. We eventually set out to explore the parameters of the conditioning paradigm altogether. Skinner had been able to show that behavior was controlled in these small environments because of a feat of

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engineering. He not only varied the physical size of the experimental chamber in which the animal would have to learn under different deprivation and reinforcement schedules, but he also understood and discovered just the right response parameters. Among those parameters were the force required to press a lever, the size and composition of the lever that protruded into the experimental chamber, and others. The whole demonstration of control and lawfulness that was the sine qua non of behavior theory was the result of skillful matching of stimulus and response variables in ways that could produce the regularities that became the findings of Skinner's behavioral science. Focusing on the response parameters and the idea that the lawfulness was an artifact of the entire way in which the experimental situation had been devised, we set out to design a new experimental chamber that would expand and contract. This would make a continuum between the Skinner box and the more open field that was the location of more naturalistic observational studies of the ethologists against which the Skinnerian operant conditioners competed for the public's attention and for funding. The case of Skinner is a good example of how psychology developed as a technoscience. There was, yet as I believe could not be, pure science separate and apart from technology. The separation between science and technology

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is a myth that serves to maintain the public's faith in the objectivity of science.

Using my own case as an example I can show the reader how my own personal development as a closeted gay man manifested itself in the exploration of the response parameters alluded to above. The way that my collaborator and I went about investigating the contribution that the experimental parameters (size and other physical constraints) made to the constitution of lawful regularity, was to design an apparatus that would allow us to track the movement of a small organism in the expanding and contracting space of the chamber I referred to above. Say, for instance, that the chamber would be, at its smallest, comparable to the several cubic feet of the Skinner Box. And in its largest, fully expanded size, it would be around 10 feet by 10 feet. The height would not vary much from the height of the typical Skinner box, as we were thinking of measuring the movement or activity of small animals on the ground, not as they might take flight in the air, as would be possible with pigeons that Skinner also studied in addition to laboratory rats. The pigeons had their wings trimmed so they could not fly. Thus height was not a variable to be explored, but roominess was. We know that if the organism could roam too far from the response levers in the experimental chambers

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then the conditioning and control of that behavior most famously studied would not be possible. The distance from the lever would encourage other sorts of behavior, among them sleeping, which would have been problematic. If the animal was not in hearing distance of the click that the food or water dispenser made after pressing the lever, there would be not discriminative stimuli to attract the attention of the animal. Attending to this dimension of the inability of the experimenter to record what the organism was doing except when it made contact with the response mechanisms, allowed us to conceptualize behavior along the broader continuum of movement or activity. We conceived the bar press in rats and monkeys, or key pecking in pigeons, to be constrained movements. More specifically, we had transposed these recognizable movements that performed functionally to produce food or water after meeting the schedule of reinforcement contingencies, (also understood as requirements not its normative meaning of accident), into a two dimensional and a three dimensional space in which the continuous location of the organism could be triangulated by the intersection of photoelectric light beams that formed a matrix of either two dimensional XY coordinates or, in the case of a three dimensional frame of reference, an XYZ set of coordinates.

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What we were in effect doing was operationalizing the entire system of responses. If we could, within our two or three-dimensional frames of reference, describe the speed of movement/activity and the patterns of movement, eventually, with the aid of computer analysis we might describe the homogeneity of movement patterns as well. All was dependent upon, we found out, the speed of the computational capacity of the computer. Translating from real time analog description to digital sampling of the real time continuous movement through space/time was totally up to the developments in computer technology. Actually at the time there was clearly too much data; samplings of the animal's movement, even movements as slow as ten times a second, produces unmanageable amounts of digital recorded information that could not be analyzed by computer. That is to say that computational analysis would take longer than the actual experiment, and that would have been prohibitively expensive. But the ideas were fascinating on their own. Imagine showing that Skinner's regularities were artifacts, it was revolutionary. We were delving into the chemistry of the science of behavior. Little did we know we were among the first social behavioral construction thinkers.

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Let me explain why I think of myself as that. Because my collaborator had rejected my initial approaches to have sex with him, I sought help for my obsession with a behavioral therapist. This therapist tried to apply desensitization techniques that would discourage the homoerotic pursuit of this man and encourage my attraction to women. Thankfully I was out of the age range and period of time when it was fashionable to expose homosexual men to electric shock of their penises when aroused by the presentation of photographs of nude males, but not when nude females were presented. This had been an approach that behavioral therapists employed for a while. In my opinion that treatment was a form of torture and not very enlightened. Needless to say that my attraction to my collaborator continued and more so by the fact that he was somewhat peeved by my showing, at least behaviorally, a lack of interest in him. To me, this continued to be seductive and alluring.

The chair of the Queens College Psychology Department, himself a gay man, decided that he would assign me to teach courses that were more clinically oriented: personality theory, personal adjustment, and abnormal behavior or psychopathology as it is know in medical circles. This challenged me to expand my previously acquired,

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experimentally oriented, graduate education. Though at first I was a loyal behaviorist and taught the abnormal behavior classes according to the best lights of behavioral science, and of operant conditioning in particular, I soon turned to reading more psychoanalytic material. Having taken up with a woman I met through work and teaching I was living with her at the time I decided to enter psychoanalysis. What had happened to me was the result of increasing my knowledge and expanding my own frame of reference for understanding especially my own bodily dispositions to pleasure and erotic encounters and my self more generally.

This paralleled my expansion of the experimental chamber in the collaborative experiments and conceptual revisions that my collaborative partner and I had devised. What I am going to argue based on my own case is that my intellectual activity was a symbolic and disguised medium in which my real life encounters were worked out. This is different from what some has said that life follows art. I do not intend to argue that my life reflected exactly what had been conceptualized in the expanded framework. I think that our intellectual activity is something of a microcosm for the larger workings of our living reality but as a part of the macrocosm we each are interrelated with our work and our life more broadly defined. Intellectual activity takes on

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for me a meaning not unlike what some in psychoanalytic circles, Freud among the first but also Nietzsche before him, have thought was the function of dreaming. In dreams, according to Freud, people express wishes that have been prevented from surfacing during normal waking states. For Freud there is always a wish and a fear tied together. This libidinal ambivalence is the result of the antithetical relation between the bodily id and the internalized superego drawn from civilizing processes implemented by our own parents who had the same things restricted in their upbringings. As fruitful as this style of explanatory system has been for Freudians across many academic disciplines, I find it too restrictive. I think that dreaming, and also intellectual activity, has a more forward-looking meaning. We dream ourselves into existence by anticipating possibilities that the energetic rumblings that are traversing our bodies foretell. That is, our dreams are a form of cognitive and imagistic reflection of energies that have been forming into, as yet unrealized, gestalts. Our waking states of interpretation and further engagement with other people who are perhaps engendering these subliminal states of desire in us help to shape the forms that these potential energy patterns will take.

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To get specific: my interpretation of the meaning of my expansion of the experimental chamber which I described at one point as an undulating process wherein the chamber could be expanded and contracted and its relation to my desires for and the seductions from my collaborative partner was that the chamber represented my asshole. During orgasmic climax and ejaculation in males the anal sphincter expands and contracts. Gay and straight men who have enjoyed the pleasure of anal stimulation are perhaps more aware of this experience. From a psychoanalytic perspective, I was disguising my desire for orgasm with this collaborator/future-sex-partner and expressing it in a symbolic manner as an experiment that had other semiotic connections and meanings than just the more personal ones that I am disclosing to the reader now.

In determining how these semiotic productions that constituted my intellectual activity while in the Learning and Conditioning Program lead back to my bodily desires for pleasure, we might consider the function of higher psychological processes. In Vygotsky's (1978) *Mind in Society*, we find a discussion of the role of play in children's development of higher psychological processes. In this work, Vygotsky shows that, originally, the child's activity is constrained by its embeddedness in the

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situation. That is to say that perception and meaning are determined by situational constraints. If you will recall, this is something like what I have argued for above in considering that our bodily actions are called forth by the affordances that our environmental stimulation makes possible. Things are alive in the sense that there is energy from things that affect our perceptual systems as living organisms that may be perturbed by things around us as well as when they are inside our skins. For me the body has much more potential for action but we are constrained by social traditions and practices to the benefit of our affordances. In my argument about the polymorphous perversity of our bodies, I want to claim that gender practices have the impact of curtailing our affordances for same-gendered pleasuring. Yet these affordances, though higher psychological processes may control them, are nonetheless still operating on us subliminally. Vygotsky did not discuss our bodily desires for pleasure, or what I hope will become an old and obsolete term, our sexuality. He did explain that there was originally, in the young child, just this bodily tendency to react to the affordances that structured our interactive possibilities with those things that we perceived and simultaneously experienced as specifically meaningful. Our bodies could produce biologically based movements that developed into gestures,

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and these in turn signaled to others, (people mostly but also animals as the case may be), the kind of needs we had, or the state of our organism.

For Vygotsky (1978), play in children did not serve the inhibited desires, as in the Freudian interpretation of dreaming, but instead helped them to disengage with the natural tendency of the young to be enmeshed in the network of lived affordances that are present from conception. These affordances must guide our structural development through gestation until birth, and then for sometime after. But I think that Heinz Werner was correct in saying that this bodily level of perceptual understanding was also present in adults, just not usually prominent in conscious awareness except during times of creativity or during times of need, like when we travel to unfamiliar places. (Perhaps this is what people experience during acid trips on LSD or mescaline?) Anyway, Werner corroborates Vygotsky. For both, play in children serves to prepare the child for the transformation or transcendence of what we call culture. Though cultural processes are never separate from the natural or biological processes; they are really interwoven. This is very different from the understanding that contemporary social construction would have us believe.

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To examine what help Vygotsky's explanation of the genesis of play has for my own intellectual activity in the conditioning laboratory, I think we can build on Vygotsky's understanding rather than on Freud's. But on first gloss it is difficult not to fall into the Freudian interpretation of my intellectual activity as something comparable to dreaming in order to find some outlet for the libidinal energy that was building with each encounter with my lab partner/collaborator. However I want to resist the Freudian trap. I will explain why in a moment. But first I want to consider how my own activity could be considered as play in the vein that Vygotsky thought play functioned as a disengagement from the reality of the lived embeddedness or the perceptual/meaning continuum of affordances. Given that it was painful and frustrating at times to want, that is, to desire to be with my collaborator in a bodily pleasuring way, I still wanted to have sex with my collaborator. It was titillating to have the extreme longing for him. We spent a lot of time together, we would lie around on couches in his living room and read the same book (though we each had our own copy). Then we would discuss what we had read; it was intellectually very exciting too. I remember reading Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* and having heated debates about it. This no doubt stimulated us as young "turks" working in a high power laboratory with an

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internationally known behavioral scientist who had made room for us in his laboratory. So how exactly would Vygotsky think of my intellectual activity as a kind of play? He might have considered it an attempt on the model of the child in order to overcome the longing. To overcome the longing meant that I would have to gain some measure of control over the affordances that enlivened my bodily experience of his bodily presence.

That sounds like a possibility, and one better than what Freud would have said. Freud would have said that I was using the defensive maneuver of sublimation to channel my homoerotic libidinal energy into my work. That after all is what Freud thought all good heterosexuals did anyway. I was just not as good at it as my "straight brothers." I do not really know what Freud would have made of my intellectual "pas de deux" with my collaborator. For elegance in reading I shall call him Gregory from now on. I do know that Wayne Koestenbaum (1989) has tried to make sense of man to man collaboration in writing co-authored articles. He has even criticized left intellectuals for avoiding collaboration because to engage in such integrating activity would threaten to raise, in the friction of the exchange, the passion of homoerotic desire. I know that Freud's theory of sexuality is based on the bourgeois family dynamics wherein

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there is a mother and father present during the development through the psychosexual stages. This is problematic. Below I shall explain why I think so. In what follows I shall give my reasons for why I think that Mieli's return to Freudian and Marxian explanations of the sublimation of gay desire is too weak and I will attempt to show how we might strengthen an explanation of gay liberation.

Frantz Fanon (1967) offers a criticism of the Freudian conception of the oedipal complex when applied to the understanding of inferiority feelings in Black men. The Freudian system of explanation of sublimated male aggression is based upon the intact nuclear family in which both a mother and a father are present throughout the psychosexual development of the male child. Because the Black family was decimated, at least with regard to the two-parent aspect, Fanon argues that the Freudian explanation cannot account for inferiority feelings of the Black man. According to Fanon, as a young boy, the Black child never had a father with whom he could act-out or workout his oedipal relations. Since most Black boys grow up without a father present, for Fanon, something else must be responsible for the engendering of inferiority feelings in Black men. As the knowledgeable reader will recall, this is the racism that is fostered in a World in which class is operative but not in a

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powerful enough way to account for the inferiority feelings that are racially engendered. Fanon captures this in his criticism of the blank use of a Marxist class analysis of the exploitation of Blacks. Fanon argues that with the invention of the "Third World" and its encompassing of mostly unemployed, underemployed and/or undervalued people, Marx's notion of the domination of the working class by the ruling class does not pertain to most of the people of color of the world who are living in the conditions that would warrant the application of the category of lumpen-proletariat. Third World women, just like their First and Second World "sisters," whose laboring in the household and reproduction of human beings in child rearing, create value that is not calculated in the economics of the marketplace of capitalism because it is considered to be private and hence outside the scope of production. Fanon calls the exploitation of people of color by White people the more widespread process. But where does this racism find its origination? For Fanon, it is not in biological archetypes that work through a kind of Jungian collective unconscious. Although Fanon finds the Jungian notion of collective unconscious processes potentially useful, he does not think that the way that Jung and most Jungians have conceived of it is productive in explaining the racial tension that leads to Black inferiority feelings (Wyrick, 1998).

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To back up for just a moment, I want to say that Fanon utilizes both Freudian and Jungian explanations in his analysis of racism. But he finds both as lacking in explanatory validity. What he keeps from Freud is the idea that racism must be operative early in a child's life. So Freud was right in so far as he looked to the early years of psychosexual development. But he was wrong in claiming that male aggression has its only roots in the clash between sons and fathers. Jung was right insofar as he caught the pervasive and powerful penetration of racism in the collective unconscious. But Fanon tried to use what was right in both Freud and Jung. And he tried to rehabilitate Marx's category of class to show the overwhelming power of racial prejudice in the operations of international relations.

Jung was right that racism was endemic to the human species, but, Fanon claimed that Jung's reliance upon the Manichean thought pattern of binary opposites, as in White versus Black, did not capture the way that this duality covers up the development and learning of inferiority feelings in Black children. If the collective unconscious contained, so to speak, both the White and Black archetypes, with a White raced person having the corresponding White archetype, and

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the Black raced person having the corresponding Black archetype, how does the racial memory of Black and White people reside in both Black and White people's collective memory? Presumably a White person would only have one pole of the archetypal configuration, and the same goes for the Black person. Along those lines, we are supposed to think of the Black unconscious as having both a White and Black pole, as in Jung's explanation of male and female archetypes, called anima and animus. How, then, did these poles become joined in the species' memory if the two races are separate and not biologically joined as in Jung's notion of androgyny where the personality has both male and female properties? And how would we explain the predominance of one of the two poles in people of mixed racial heritage? In those people, as well as with Fanon whose family had intermarried across racial lines, we might agree that, biologically, both races were configurable in the same person because he or she shared genetic material from both races. But why or how did the inferior racial archetype come to dominate over the suppressed one? This was not explained in the Jungian system of explanation. Surely, Fanon was right in his dismissal of Jungian thought as too Manichean. Instead of throwing away the notion of the collective unconscious, Fanon revised its inception with the

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help of Jacques Lacan's idea and rereading of the Freudian unconscious.

According to Fanon, in his rereading of Freud, Lacan gave weight to the pre-Oedipal relations between mothering parent and child, but more important for explaining the transmission across racial lines-White and Black-is Lacan's reinterpretation of the meaning of the father in the child's development of life in the symbolic order. Lacan believed that pre-Oedipal relations were euphoric, and took place in the realm of bodily imagery. This is the child's world of sensations in which his or her bodily separation from the mother was not yet experienced. The real comprehension of the child's separation from this symbiotic world of mother and child comes with the instruction by the father; symbolically understood as the law of society that the father helps to implement. Lacan in re-reading Freud enhances our understanding of the unconscious as a writing pad which we, if skilled enough, may learn to read.

Fanon likes the Lacanian notion of the unconscious as something upon which inscriptions are made by cultural sources. Among them are messages received via the family, but more importantly for understanding the inferiority feelings that constitute racism are the cultural portrayals

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of Black as evil or scary. The omission of any Black characters in children's fairy tales is a powerful tool of racism. Think of when Black characters do appear in fairy tales. I have only been able to recall one or two and in those Black characters there is little to enhance positive self-esteem in young Black children. Fanon believes that this is made possible because Blacks in colonized places are taught in languages other than the traditional ones that would carry stories of their own racial heritage. For example, in Fanon's island of Martinique learning French was favored at the expense of the native language of Creole. Fanon was himself colonized with the implantation of the belief that Creole and all that went along with it was not as good as the products of the colonizing French culture.

So for Fanon, Lacan's emphasis on the mediation of linguistic favoritism brought about the earliest memories of racial inferiority. I know how this works; in my own case as a young "gay' kid, I never saw men acting affectionately with each other in the media except to make a joke of it. I must have learned quickly to not raise any questions about this disparity. And it was odd because in my family of European heritage, it was accepted custom for fathers and sons, grandfathers and grandsons, uncles and nephews, and boy cousins to kiss each other on the lips/mouth. When you

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are never shown this kind of affection in film, advertisements, and television, you quickly get the message that it is not acceptable. Though I have no recollection of such an incident in my own life, I have read of how a young boy had expressed to his family at dinner his interest in marrying the plumber who had repaired the kitchen sink that day. To me, this would have been a hoot, but as the story was told his family found nothing amusing in the innocent aspiration of their young boy. He was instructed, needless to say, to never say such a thing again, with the added recommendation that boys grow up to marry girls not other boys. Sentiments as these lead me to sympathize with Black children who, even now, have little to admire in the Black characters that are acted out in TV sitcoms. According to my own Black students, who can take any of them seriously?

I think that Fanon has used the theories of Freud, Jung, and Lacan skillfully in analyzing the inferiority feelings of Black men. Black men are also the screens for projecting unwanted or unacceptable erotic feelings. According to Fanon, White men project their own powerful sex drives onto Black men. It is not uncommon to picture all Black men as bearers of huge penises that threaten to rape White women. This is only fantasy; distorted though it is, it winds up motivating or rationalizing the fears that White men experience in relation to their own sexual desires when

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these are repressed in their own unconscious. White men then use the Black man in establishing their own psychic balance. The Black man is first portrayed as inferior by White cultural creations, and then, through the mechanisms of psychological reciprocation, they become these things that they are hounded into becoming through the media and their own repressed anger.

An important understanding that Fanon reaches in his analysis of the functioning of voodoo in modern colonized peoples may be applied to my own case as a gay intellectual. Let me try to lay this out for you: Fanon claims that colonized people seek refuge in the Old World superstitions of voodoo. The need for refuge is the result of debilitating anger and rage that Black people experience at the hands of the colonizing White media and social practices of domination. Fanon sees the appeal in voodoo as healthy. He thinks that it shows an inherent desire to affirm, that that belongs to the Black man's native or indigenous culture. But unfortunately for the Black man his anger is only temporarily dissipated in the frenzy of ritualistic dancing and voodoos sacrifice. Rather than finding constructive ways of confronting and overthrowing the colonizers and their overwhelming cultural conditioning, the Black man defeats his attainment of this larger more

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attractive goal by surrendering to magic and superstition. It is understandable how Black men would shirk from the larger more costly experience of all out revolt. After all hasn't the Church in Christianity sought similar magical solutions to the domination of the ruling classes? At least this was Engel's and Marx's response to the effects of the Church in what they summarized as "religion being the opium of the masses." Who would deny the enormity of what Fanon believed was the necessity of violence in the overthrow of colonization?

I want to use something of the spirit of Fanon in interpreting my own early intellectual activity. As a gay man living in a closeted condition, I experienced most of the silence around gay affection that Blacks experienced around their own cultural worth and self-worthiness. But there is one major exception: Whereas Blacks were born into families that could support and bolster the development of Black children, I, however, was born into a family whose hetero-sexism and homo-phobia meant that I was living in the midst of the enemy camp, and thus had no comparable support as the Black child had from his or her family. This is the tragedy of all children with early leanings towards a gay orientation.

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But as I have come to realize this tragedy is only tragic if the broader culture cannot or continues to refuse to learn from it. We are currently in the condition of the Black native who resorts to voodoo as a means of warding off the anger and rage toward the colonizers. Placing my self in this similar,(though I would argue more tragic), condition, I see my self and other gay men who resort to the kind of sex club activity I have tried to describe above as acting in a ritualistic manner. In these rituals we are trying to cope with the rage that we are saddled with because of the constant lack of affirmation of our desire for man to man affection and body pleasuring.

I, too, have gone to these places for recreation, even resuscitation, in early times before the AIDS crisis. But as a closeted intellectual I tried also to express my longings for community in the imagery of the experimental chamber that was like "an asshole writ large." The expansion and contraction of the experimental chamber, together with the intellectual creation of a continuum of all responses as constrained activity that merges and blends with all other activity, were intended, I would submit, to be indirect communications of my longing to be at home in what had become my own nature as a gay man.

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There is an otherness that is truly different. I want to preserve this otherness. All too often the colonizer has tried to absorb difference into a conceptual realm of possibility. While I am afraid that I will never quite know what a Black child or man or woman experiences in a White dominant culture, nor will they know what it is like to be a White gay man in an academic institution. Materially speaking we are all separate in our bodily constitutions. Experientially we are all alone in the responsibility for our own centers of consciousness and for passing through our own lives and deaths. But in coping with those existentially necessary events and their meanings, we all move together in the sort of group longing for community that I think is captured in Elias Canetti's description of the open crowd discussed earlier.

Fanon believed that there was more to understand of Black oppression than just anger and rage. And that more is the continuation of the growth and development of what had been created and nurtured throughout the evolution of Black cultural development. I believe that the Black man's oppression in circumstances of colonization can tell us much about out lack of humanity toward each other. That story has still not been exhausted of its potential for sensitizing us to what should be our responsibilities to

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children who do not ask to be born into the families that are their places of entry to this worldly life. So, too, I believe the gay experience of oppression has much more to tell us.

I have brought the reader to a place of understanding. This understanding, that I hope has been transmitted, should teach that we are not the same in the markings upon our bodily memories. The categories of women and men, Black and White, gay and straight are not just conceptual polarities lying out there in the void waiting for us to realize. We are not each representations that compliment each other. In our bodily existence we are each separate yet similar. I think we have materially different constitutions, though there are major cultural shared circumstances and even physically shared circumstances, how we merge with, experience, and respond to these circumstances varies always. In my imaginary construction of the experimental chamber, I expressed the longing for a space in which reaching out and pulling back would be possible. This is a space of cultural dancing in which we may learn to understand each other.

To construct a more interesting set of responsibilities for gay people we need to see them, as I have seen myself, as

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struggling to make sense out of our existence. Struggling and hoping to enjoy this time we have alive. There is so much wasted time. And now I am attempting to address the time we waste in our academic pursuits: each of us I believe has a story to tell. That is, we have longings that might teach us something. Serving in the teaching profession it is our duty to provide spaces in which the ritualized voodoo practices of our managerial class can be transcended.

My contribution, if it is one, is to call forth a greater appreciation of our real materially residing differences by exploring the limits of reaching toward a great understanding of these differences. In trying to outline the workings of the common emotional space in which all bodies desire contact and touch I hope to have found a common meeting place. Where we may go from there I do not yet know.

I have some ideas though. As academics we might try to push further with new kinds of writing that do not protest against the confessional style in which we bring to light, as best we can, what our significant longings are. Much protest has been issued with regard to the use of testimonials. For that is what form this kind of confessional writing has taken. The novel is an experiment

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in writing that has permitted greater understanding of the inner life of people since its inception in the Nineteenth Century (Bernstein, 1984). I am looking for a new form that would combine intellectual writing with the kind of symbolic confessional interpretation that I have struggled to make clear in what I have written about above; the meaning of my experimental chamber as a symbolic gesture that pointed toward my longing for bodily merging with my collabortor who I am now calling Gregory.

I suggest we need to look elsewhere, possibly at Pier Paolo Pasolini's (1997) *Petrioli* for an example of an attempt to create something beyond the bourgeoisie notion of the novel. Although for some it might be considered the ultimate in bourgeois decadence. From the jacket cover we get a synopsis:

> A work in progress at the time of Pasolini's murder, *Petrolio* is made up of a series of notes-some extended and polished, others cryptic messages from the author to himself that consist of no more than a few words. At the novel's center is Carlo, an oil executive who undergoes a profound personality split: Carlo 1 is a super-Machiavellian power monger; Carlo 2 lives only to satisfy his perverse and insatiable sexual desires. Carlo also experiences a sexual metamorphosis in which he becomes, at will, female. The story of Carlo is interspersed with re-visions of myth-Oedipus, Medea, the Argonauts-and of Dante's hell.
>
> The teller of this story is also dual in nature. There is the author-the external shaper of the novel-who interrupts the text to comment on its mechanics and its meaning. And there is the narrator, whose cynical and

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> seductive perspective comes from within *Petrolio*'s fictional world.
>
> Fragmentary, deliberately self-referential, meta-literary, schizoid, a devotional exploration of the male libido, an ode to the lust for power and the power of lust and, above all, a wrenching attempt to define the intellectual and his responsibilities, *Petrolio* is a postmodern masterpiece. (p. Jacket cover)

Certainly this form of writing approximates the open-ended style that might provide wide enough and expansive enough for the explorations that I have suggested need to be made into our intellectual activity. What Passolini does in his new but unfinished novel captures the quality of all works as being works-in-progress. This work is also a work-in-progress.

Neither Freud nor Marx is able to explain well enough the repression of queerness. I have used Fanon as an example of someone who found both Freud & Marx lacking in explanatory power to help understand the predicament of Blacks in Algeria and around the Third World. Fanon also is of help in making headway into understanding the meaning of the oppression of queerness. For apart from the direct onslaught that feminism has made against the oppression of women by patriarchy, queerness has made great inroads in disrupting the colonization/ indoctrination that patriarchy makes through the differentiation of genders and sexes.

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To explain how Freudian Oedipal explanations have been adapted to understanding the life of gay men, I can say that just as Fanon argued that not all Black families have had fathers, so too we can argue that many gay men have not had fathers throughout childhood, or do not recall having had sexual attractions for their fathers. One gay psychologist, Charles Silverstein (1989), has offered an account of gay men's early development around puberty as involving rejection by real or imagined approaches toward their fathers. Though he has some case material in which gay men remembered actually reaching out to touch their father's penis, and subsequently having this as a traumatic scar when they were rebuffed or rejected, there are also cases in which gay men's fathers took them up on the attraction and reciprocated. From what I have read these men do not seem to have a better time of adjusting to a homosexual lifestyle than those gay men who were rejected by their fathers.

To my mind, it is more convincing to accept the Freudian explanation of Oedipal relations as accounting for life in the dysfunctional Victorian family. According to Richard Lichtman's (1982) re-reading of Freud's family drama from the perspective of an enlarged framework structured by Marxist Theory, the Oedipal relations are the result of the father teasing the mother by titillating (and sometimes

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more) their daughter, or of the mother teasing the father by titillating their son. This crossing over between the generations of parent and child is the classical model for sexual abuse. According to Lichtman and others it happens in families wherein sexuality is repressed between the normal parental exchange. Parents in these families use their children to get at each other. Needless to say this has repercussions for all the members of the family but most regrettably for the children who are innocent and incapable of doing anything to prevent the abuse.

But to focus this on gay men and particularly on myself: I can remember having attractions toward my own father who would parade in front of the hall mirror in his boxer shorts, sometimes with no shirt, but often with an athletic style tee-shirt, displaying his flexed muscles for me to appreciate. He was a narcissus but as best I can recall always respected the no touching of genitals appropriate between fathers and their sons. At least this is considered inappropriate in Western European cultures, but there are cultures, e.g., in Papua Highlands of New Guinea, where all boys are removed from their mother's care at age seven, and kept with older boys and fathers and uncles with whom they are inducted into the practices of fellatio (definition of fellatio = oral stimulation of the penis, especially to

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orgasm). This social practice is based on the belief that ingesting the semen of older males facilitates the passing on of strength and masculine essence from man to boy. It is carried on until around twenty-one when men are expected to take a female as their bride in marriage. Although some men never quite break from the practice of fellating other men their own age, tribal norms proscribe this as unacceptable behavior. But then I guess the hardship is not so unbearable as they get a fresh group of youngsters with which to have their way (Herdt, 1994).

According to Gilbert Herdt, professor of Human Development at University of Chicago (an anthropologist who has studied the Papua New Guinea Indians extensively in field research) this normative practice of using the younger boys for the pleasure of the older boys and men has the effect of producing a balance in the gendered life of the whole community. Though Herdt does not present any data that would lead one to believe that this is child abuse being conducted under the guise of ritual, I have read some reports that did not appreciate this as normative in the way that a cultural anthropologist would (Real, 1997). But the trend in scholarship is to demonstrate through study of cultures that have had previously written histories, e.g., Japan (Leupp, 1995), that even among warring nations the

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practice of homosexuality was normative among the military personnel. As with much in the area of gay and lesbian studies there is little known because of the censorship of homosexuality in most written histories. The academy and scholarly publishing have been at fault in excluding the representation of this minority practice. Perhaps the future will allow the recovery of what has been excluded until recently.

I do not wish to engage a debate about man/boy sex. I have raised this issue because I think that it is not acceptable to import wholesale, without a critical edge, the application of Freudian Oedipal Complex to the case of gay men and their fathers. For all those that do remember an attraction toward their fathers there are others who believe that their fathers were absent either physically and/or emotionally. It is my sense that mothers, as well, are not responsible for their sons turning out gay. Mothers are more likely to try to protect their potentially gay sons by being overprotective. That is my understanding of my own mother's closeness. She seems to have tried to make up for the emotional absence of my father, but then I think that both my mother and father instilled in me a vigilance that they conducted first on their own to try to keep my gay sensibility as a young boy a secret from outsiders,

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ultimately this vigilance took root in my own consciousness. Only later in life did I gain enough distance to see this vigilance as living in my constant belief that I would discover something terribly wrong with me with physically or emotionally. I took the opposite defensive tactic to their planted belief that there was something wrong with me and tried all out to compensate for this misdiagnosed "disability."

Instead of pondering which theorist has been most correct, I think that we should take a different tact and look at the responsibility of intellectuals. I have tried to show with my own case that the academy fostered my production of indirect discourse that symbolically and in disguised fashion expressed my erotic desires for "Gregory." In what follows I want to try to establish a new understanding of Gramsci's term "organic intellectual." For therein, I believe, lies salvation for the passion that animates, and yet lurks beneath the surface in all academic discourse.

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Recovering Materially Significant Others:

The difficulty that I have tried to bring to light is that theories of knowledge that reduce all knowing to that which is socially constructed eliminate the foundation, or better, the material out of which such constructions are made. And most importantly, the predomination of literary theorists in the business of understanding the construction of gender and sexuality has meant that the natural semiotic processes have been devalued and eliminated in the attempt to regain the autonomy which has been lost in an increasingly bureaucratized mass society.

In a section called "America As A Bureaucratized Mass Society: The Obsolescence of the Intellectual" sociologist, Lewis A. Coser (1997) summarized this condition in the following:

> Modern industrial societies, and American society in particular, are characterized by a comprehensive bureaucratization of social and cultural life. Not only their technological apparatus but their cultural apparatus as well is highly complex and integrated and confronts the individual as an alien and oppressive power. A corollary of increasing industrialization and rationalization is the fact that the ratio of organized activities to unorganized, spontaneous ones increases and that the individual is deprived of autonomy. (p. 252)

Coser continues to generalize about earlier societies in which cultural activities were relatively uncontrolled and

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things still abounded with individuality such as handicrafts. This he contrasts with later societies in which all things become commodities. By things he includes the production of ideas as well as material things. And in citing Marx, and before him, the German idealists Schiller and Hegel, he underscores the alienated existence of "men of ideas." For the purpose of illustrating the extent to which this understanding of bureaucratization goes back even before Marx, Coser (1997) quotes Schiller who wrote "Eternally bound to a small fragment of the totality man himself develops only a fragmentary existence … and becomes a mere replica of his business or of his science"(p. 252).

In wanting to understand the elimination of the natural processes from the theorization of gender and sexuality I have realized that Schiller's sense of the intellectual's treatment of the totality as necessarily fragmented because of the intellectual's own fragmentary existence is still correct or useful. Literary theorists (e.g., Sedgwick), and I would include philosophers (e.g., Butler) have rushed to serve the causes of women's and gay liberation by rejecting the naturalistic dogmatic ascription of gender and sexuality to fixed physical causes that deterministically generate the social conditions of antagonism between 'men as male' and 'women as female', and between 'men and women as

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heterosexual' and 'men and women as homosexual'. It is right to reject dogmatism whatever its form but I am afraid they have rushed too quickly and discarded the materiality of others. It has been my argument that gay and lesbian sexuality differs from normative heterosexuality, and also that male and female gender, though socially constructed, are also materially embodied and thus are really significantly different both in their respective material consequences and in their semiotic processes. Applying Schiller's understanding of the fragmentary nature of each of us as existentially embodied partialities that contribute to and make up the totality of real and existing things and/or world, we should understand that literary theorists need, that is, require, correction from their natural scientific counterparts.

The lack of cooperation between what we should think of as companion intellectuals-of the sciences and of the humanities-comes partly from the political nature of intellectual production. Or more correctly put, this antagonism is endemic to the semiotic processes inherent in the manufacture of natural and social reality. To dichotomize for a moment: you can, as an intellectual, be on the side of regressive forces that are animated by the tendency to maintain the status quo (not an altogether

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frivolous or useless responsibility, and a preservationist, even a cautionary, role engendered in phylo-genetically evolutionary processes), or you can be on the side of progressive forces that are also part of an evolutionary natural drift that results from the diversification of genetic pairings that enhance the chances of adequate alignment with the shifting properties of our natural environments, thereby making the alignment of the drift in our species' natural lineage fitted to the environmental surrounds so as to make this a truly good- fit worthy of the name "habitat." Rarely have we thought of ourselves as being necessary participants in the production of reality. But I think that we are. And it is shameful to denigrate those, who through chance forces, have wound up on what is conceived of politically as opposing sides, and in moral terms, as on opposite sides of the equation of good and evil.

Coser proceeds in the conclusion of his chapter on the "Intellectual in Contemporary America" (from which I took the quote from a section within it) to assess the predicted deleterious effects of mass culture on the production of ideas. He decides that in the balance ideas have not been adversely affected. He has drawn on the assessment of

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people like Talcott Parsons and Winston White; those who he claims echo Daniel Bell who wrote:

> Most fundamental of the fallacies underlying the biases of the mass culture theorists seems to us to be the assumption that this is an 'atomized' mass society where the relations of one individual to another have become increasingly amorphous. Quite the contrary … American society is one of the preeminent examples of a *pluralist* society in which-through the course of structural differentiation-an increasingly ramified network of crisscrossing solidarities has been developing. (Coser, 1997, p. 259)

I agree that American society has become a pluralistic society but I do not think that intellectuals in all ranks are a part of the communal network. It is possible to have a pluralistic, or better a diversified society, perhaps the best descriptor would be a stratified society, and yet still lack the enjoyment of an existence free of fragmentation and compartmentalization. Coser however does not believe this. Rather, Coser (1997) maintains that:

> Men are no longer enveloped by restricting communal institutions that claim all their loyalties in return for protection and security, but instead a huge number of fragmented and differentiated groupings now allow the individual to pursue his aims, make his choices, and allocate his loyalties and allegiances. There may be strains and conflicts in such pluralistic societies; individual life may be more complicated now than when men pursued their careers within the predictable routines prescribed by uniform communal associations. But the varieties of choices, of pathways, of challenges in associational and pluralistic society allow men to live more variegated and more stimulating lives. (p. 259)

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I cannot help but feel that he is speaking as a relatively privileged intellectual whose location in the academic world was, at the time of writing and publication of his book *Men of Ideas,* Brandeis University. Later he became Distinguished Professor of Sociology at the Stony Brook campus of the State University of New York. In drawing these conclusions Coser was influenced by the work of Edward Shils. He quotes liberally from Shils in hammering out his conclusions about whether mass society has had a deleterious effect on intellectual development. Coser asserts that "it is not true that mass society has dehumanized man and robbed him of autonomy."

In order to bring us closer to understanding the nature of these conclusions and to provide a platform for questioning the classification of embodied voices, the opening topic of my next chapter, I will quote some of what Coser quoted from Shils's writing in what follows.

> [Mass society] has aroused and enhanced individuality. Individuality is characterized by an openness to experience, an efflorescence of sensation and sensibility; a sensitivity to other minds and personalities. It gives rise to, and lives in, personal attachments; it grows from the expansion of the emphatic capacities of the human being. Mass society has liberated the cognitive, appreciative, and moral capacities of individuals.
>
> The decline in generalized roles and the increase of specialized activities associated with differentiation of societal functions do not necessarily destroy opportunities for a creative intelligentsia. Rather,

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> the intelligentsia, which was once a small and fairly homogeneous stratum, is itself differentiated. We now have, according to Edward Shils, a high intelligentsia, a mediocre intelligentsia, and a brutal intelligentsia. (Coser, 1997, p. 260)

According to Coser, the brutal intelligentsia is walled off from superior culture. They are the producers of what is referred to as "brutal culture". That term will be left undefined for now. The mediocre cultural producers are aware of the difference between the quality of their productions and the standards that superior culture embodies. So their conscience is split, being aware of what constitutes superior culture yet somehow incapable of achieving such superiority in their own production. And lastly, the high intelligentsia is far from being atrophied in mass culture. Though it is incapable of encompassing all that previous generations of their superior ranks had known, it is still possible with specialization, to capture the nature of the diversity of intellectual productions in the superior culture it produces. At least this is the gist of what both Coser and Shils hold as their opinions.

What I come away with from reading Coser and Shils is that intellectuals as individuals are not the bearers of detachment and objectivity. Rather these are the values to which intellectual groups must show allegiance within democratic communities. Due to the specialization and

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partiality of our knowledge or understanding of existence we must join forces, including the regressive and progressive ones I mentioned above. This may be done in the context of democratic institutions that are shaped by discussion and open to change and development. I believe that gay and lesbian liberation is, at present, an instrument of great importance in realizing institutions of such quality.

What I have accomplished in this chapter is showing how gay desire calls forth the need for a full semiotic rendering of the human condition. That indeed the part is related to the whole/totality was a fundamental starting point for my investigations. I believe that studying the location in which one finds oneself and disclosing that to others is the beginning of the reflexive moment that our postmodern condition harkens us to embrace. The figure of the closet calls me to discuss the way I think that that figure permits connection with what has excluded us (here I speak as and for/with other gay men). What I have intended on showing is that in order to understand the closeted nature of bodies and voices in psychological inquiry we need to recover a full semiotic method of disclosing the making of significance out of the differences that imbibe in nature. The nature/culture dichotomy that is used to inscribe separate domains for the sciences and humanities is totally

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bogus. Through the faulty rush to eliminate the regressive interpretations and patriarchal valuations that they help to manifest and to propagate, feminist interpretations of gender have elided the opportunity to go farther into the semiotic coding of queer desire. Therein lies the scientific grounding of the political economy of self-esteem. Only a semiotic method of interpretation can capture the materially significant bodily processes that are involved in the production of biochemical molecules of emotions, such as the natural painkillers, or euphoria of endorphins. Of course, language is implicated in the construction of knowledge but it cannot help us to pick out differences in, for purposes of illustration consider, anatomy when those differences are not detectable through the sensory apparatus of our surveillance systems. In other words, reality is not as we choose just as history may vary in its telling there must be something about which the telling claims to portray or depict. If all that existed was language, then everything would be but a dream and that would eliminate the distinction between what is real and what is fantasy. What we are now and what we might hope to become is always connected and interrelated. Desire participates in the manufacturing of our future and it arises from a lack in our past. The future calls me to work on the disclosure of the diversity of desire as well as to

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understand what is this thing called desire. Not to efface the divide between what we are and what we hope to become means that we work to disclose what others have closeted. Nature's way is to call us to attend when we are in pain. This thing called the AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome) crisis has called the gay community, and some of us answer in strange ways. But not to answer would be at our peril. Pain requires our attention, and the attention of others is also called for. For within the community, all are bound up with each other. Though almost all gays and lesbians have been born into normatively heterosexual families, some of us have felt betrayed by them and have sought to find our own families because our families of biological origin have produced, in part, the emotional pain that we so often, all too often I'm afraid, come to understand as lethal, if not respond to with flight. But we have not yet achieved a common understanding that would let each of us see the other in ourselves, not as mere copies or replicas of ourselves but with appreciation of the genuine differences that have become our actuality from the differently valued starting points in our cultural histories.

So far the course taken by intellectuals has been to cover-up nature, perhaps even hide from nature, behind a veil.

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This veil is contributory to the scientization of discourse. It is interesting that Galileo Galilee is marked among the first to go public with his scientific enterprise:

> According to the familiar Galilean dictum, the book of Nature is written in the language of mathematics. On the basis of this conception modern science is committed to reading nature in terms of formal quantitative functions. With the benefit of Husserl's analysis of Galileo's mathematization of nature, it is evident that the language of mathematics pertains to the perceptually experienced world only indirectly, and through the mediation of an ideally constructed conceptual model. In modern natural science, Husserl says, "we measure the life-world … for a well-fitting *garb of ideas* [*Ideenkleid*]. Indeed Galileo himself was aware of the need to abstract from the qualitative richness of the perceived world in order to interpret nature's structures in quantitative terms. Still he and his compatriots in classical science, as Merleau-Ponty has said, "clung to a feeling for the opaqueness of the world, and … expected through [science's] constructions to get back into the world. (Jones, 1989, p. 90-91)

I have quoted this passage for several reasons. First, I wanted to emphasize the similarity between my own interpretative analysis of the production of the experimental chamber described and, as discussed in the previous section, the treatment that Galileo launched in the transformation of nature qualitatively experienced to that which would be mathematized and quantitatively understood. Second, I want to use this connection to generalize my own interpretive analysis of the animation of serious non-gay identified academic discourse to include the kind of scientific work that is exemplified in Galileo's project.

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I need remind the reader of the homosexuality attributed to the great master, Galileo Galilee. I need to say that I believe that Galileo's mathematization can be interpreted as an attempt to disengage from his own homoerotic desires. My argument for the similarity between Galileo's production and my own, in the nature of the expanding and contracting experimental chamber which I have described as "my asshole writ large", is that both of us, though Galileo more than me, lived under the deleterious influences of oppressive institutions, namely the Church and the family. Both are powerful institutions in which the message of homophobia germinates and propagates the distortions that no doubt exist in the object choices that find their attraction in the expression of the homoerotic desires of our polymorphously perverse bodies.

Though I do not wish to be understood to be claiming any essential quality to homoerotic desires, I think it may be safely claimed that Galileo produced his system of mathematizing nature under similar necessities that are produced in homophobic institutions. Research regarding the more personal side to Galileo's life identifies the suppressed love and affectionate attractions he had for his co-workers so that it is perfectly clear to imagine the

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similarity that I am asking the reader to accept between Galileo and myself.

However, what is contained in Galileo's production of the mathematization of nature and not in my own intellectual activity is noteworthy. Before explaining, let me quote again, continuing the quotation offered above.

> From a perspective on this broader context defined by the aims of experimental inquiry, the commitment to the language of mathematics can be seen to have already set the task of returning to the life-world, if science were indeed to be an interpretation of man's own environment. (Jones, 1989, p. 91)

In this passage, the author makes clear what the trajectory is. Experimental inquiry and commitment to mathematics are considered obstacles to be overcome in order to return to the life-world. If I am correct in my judgment of Galileo's and my own intellectual channeling, perhaps even eruption as in my own case, then Galileo set the course for clouding our appreciation of the life-world, and for accepting our naturalness of being creatures among others. It seems to me, that at least since Freud, all civilization has been set against nature. Freud did not forget that civilization was built upon the energetic fountains that spring from our bodily being, others are not so mindful of this inherent connection, better ensconced cradling, with nature. I think that we are coming to appreciate the wisdom of indigenous cultures who have not torn themselves apart from the

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interrelated network between ourselves and nature. We are being made ready for a return to this older form of wisdom that predated the scientific revolution in which Galileo was a principal figure. My supposition would be that Galileo constructed his own indirect communications with the Church in his symbolic and disguised discourse in which mathematics played a principal role. Now I am not rejecting the freedom that we have gained from using the tools of mathematics and science in helping us to disengage from the affordances that are our bodily abode in the natural context. I am merely here claiming that we might need to reconsider the effectiveness of what is gained and what is lost in the one-sided application of these techniques. We need to understand the natural rumblings that are generated within nature by these applications and our disengagement.

I am less nostalgic than the author I have used in these quotes appears to be. For example, Jones concludes that the veil set out by mathematics and experimental inquiry must be supplanted with the creative art of painting. His objection is contained in the following:

> But when the principal language in which its interpretation is expressed inherently hides nature behind a veil of ideal constructions, the imposed task of subsequently unveiling what has thus become hidden requires an entirely different mode of expression-one that would permit a reading in the same terms as those in which nature is originally experienced. On the conception of the art of painting that emerges from the

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> achievements of Paul Cezanne, as both artist and theorist of art, creative acts of painting supply us with examples of this sought-after mode of expression. (Jones, 1989, p. 91)

Judging from this passage, the author tends to accept painting as a literal interpretation of the constructed continuum from concrete material substance through increasingly more abstract immaterial ideas. But I think that we must accept that, developmentally speaking, there can be no return to this state of innocence; there is no re-entry to the garden of Eden where once we were naked, in the sense that we did not create veils such as the language of mathematics separating us in our embodiment from nature in its sensuous network of affordances.

Whether or not any other kind of recovery is possible is an empirical question that I raise here but shall not be able to answer definitely. The work on higher psychological processes of both Vygotsky and Heinz Werner suggest that developmental movement proceeds dialectically. From Vygotsky and Luria's work on the use of speech, writing and numbering as psychological tools, we can understand that intellectual activity is structured so as to perform a disengagement from the bodily placement in its network of affordances that comprise our natural environs and provide the foundations for our "social habitat." Using their term,

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speech helps the child, (and I would argue the adult also), to engage in self-regulation. Self-regulation is the name of the processes that we might interpret as socialization into cultural and social practices of our group/family. I hope I have demonstrated this through my own case, and, if not demonstrated at least made the suggestion plausible in my introduction of Galileo's construction of experimental inquiry along the dimensions which juxtaposes visible and invisible phenomena.

Galileo and others of the Scientific Revolution contributed an abstraction that permits an idealization of nature. Through a complex process that we do not yet understand, there must be an intermingling of our moral/ethical, and aesthetic values. I have argued in the section "Semiotic Coding of Queer Bodies" that this process is what Semiotics attempts to capture. But Charles Sanders Peirce has also argued for such an all-encompassing intellectual discipline. All such abstract entities are intangible yet most would agree that values, be they political, ethical/moral, and aesthetic, make life worth living. My contribution if it is accepted as one, is to have declared that through this space of idealization more is happening than just the application of numbering. In this space of intellectual abstraction we are forced by our nature to dream as well. Why wouldn't the

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increasing degrees of freedom achieved in the mathematical treatment of physical reality be accepted as providing us with numerous benefits? Among them of course are the ways that we can plan and create environments to our own liking. But also I think that another benefit is that we can discover something of unconscious communication, (I have called it indirect communication), that is usually banned from disclosure in the professions because of the bureaucratic forces that are institutionalized in the academy.

I do not want to rehearse here the multitudinous ways that corporate interests are mingled with what were supposed to be more separate scholarly issues as academic freedom. It should be a commonplace appreciation that the university is not an ivory tower, but an enterprise connected to, supported by, and contributory to the larger social network to which it belongs as an institution that prepares people for work and for life in their communities. One of the obstacles to change has been progressive intellectuals' belief that first you have to change society then you might have a chance to change the university. I do not accept this. Instead I have tried to show how it is possible to disrupt the educational institution through making prominent the divisions that, as I have claimed, mark the development

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of the closet. The figure of the closet marks out the territorial separation between visible and invisible or public and private. Homosexuals, gays, lesbians and/or queers, whichever nom de plume you are most comfortable with, have been at the forefront of criticizing and contesting this artificially imposed division. Foucault knew this but I think he got stuck in carrying forth a program that would have disrupted the business as usual attitude of the French and American academic institutions. Intellectuals maneuver to incorporate and defuse the potential disruption that identity groups might launch in the academy. The disruptions are depicted as idealist social construction analyses that either claim that identity and difference are mutually constructive and constitutive categories, or, as has come later, the revolt against identity politics as being too narrowly focused and enacting a divide and conquer strategy. A strategy that does not serve the needs of identity groups but rather of the conservative majority that means to maintain the status quo by any and all means, including this new form of colonization. Fanon understood and depicted well that manner in which the colonizing forces can manipulate native intellectuals so that they carry the values of the dominant classes inside the communities of the colonized and oppress

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them further through self-inflicted means. Homophobia is one such self-inflicting mean that I know too well.

I think that what I am proposing is a new strategy that means we might risk our privileged positions in the somewhat protected academy. My understanding that has been derived from thinking about non-gay identified academic discourse is that homo-eroticism is a natural force connecting all people in a primal condition of cooperation. My construction and use of the situation of dark body erotics was offered to persuade the reader of this underlying urge for acceptance and belonging at the bodily level. This force, I would argue, is what makes life possible in every sense of that phrase: the raising of children, love among adults, friendship, and cooperation among nations or cultures, to name a few.

The question that looms large for me was set out for the reader in the section above when I discussed the problem embraced by the term "publish and perish." My worry which I would call an ordinary worry in these extraordinary times was that if we continue to write as we do in academic circles we will indeed perish. Others have expressed concerns that arose from the way in which the atomic bomb has made it necessary to rethink the power of technology for

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the destruction of the human species (LeShan, 1996). Among them a postmodern writer, Raphael Sassower (1997) has taken the holocaust of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as landmarks for reconsidering the scope of responsibility of scientists and technicians for their work, but especially for the appropriation of their discoveries for mass destruction. Sassower makes clear that the scope of responsibility must be limited, and the need for an educated public must be respected for an overcoming of the technoscientific angst he thinks has arisen from the atomic bomb's potential for annihilation of the human species. For support of his position he borrows from Bauman. For an elaboration of their (both Sassower's and Bauman's) view of the role of intellectuals, I quote their words in the following:

> Intellectuals have shifted their roles from legislators to interpreters and as such stand in a different relation to political leaders and the public. As [Bauman] explains, the legislative role of intellectuals under the modern model consisted of "making authoritative statements which arbitrate in controversies of opinions and which select those opinions which, having been selected, become correct and binding. The authority to arbitrate is in this case legitimized by superior (objective) knowledge to which intellectuals have a better access than the non-intellectual part of society (Bauman, 1987, 4)."
>
> By contrast, intellectuals' postmodern strategy is interpretive: "It consists of translating statements, made within one communally based tradition, so that they can be understood within the system of knowledge based on another tradition. Instead of being oriented towards selecting the best social order, this strategy is aimed at facilitating communication between autonomous (sovereign) participants. It is concerned with preventing the distortion of meaning in the

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> process of communication (Bauman, 1987, 5)." (Sassower, 1997, p. 17)

Furthermore, Bauman explains that "between communities (traditions, forms of life) intellectuals are called upon to perform the function of interpreters; inside their own community, they are still to play the role of legislators of sorts"(Sassower, 1997, p. 17). According to Sassower (1997), adopting Bauman's qualified classification means that "outright indictment of technoscientists by intellectuals and critics is misguided"(p. 17). Rather Sassower (1997) recommends:

> Appreciating public needs and cultural pressure for answers about one's survival as interpreters would enhance a principle of conceptual charity toward those whose practices are indeed interpretive as well. We may place a different set of expectations on members of the technoscientific community than on other academics, intellectuals, and cultural critics; but we should not confuse our different expectations with the interpretive roles all members of all communities are bound to be performing at the end of the twentieth century. (p. 17)

Sassower (1997) goes on to describe the ways in which, during the modern period Enlightenment, ideals guided our development

> Enlightenment, was … an exercise in two distinct, though intimately related parts. First, in extending the powers and ambitions of the state, in transferring to the state the pastoral function exercised previously (in a way incipient and modest by comparison) by the Church, in reorganizing the state around the function of planning, designing and managing the reproduction of social order. Secondly, in the creation of an entirely new, and consciously designed, social mechanism of

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> disciplining action, aimed at regulating and regularizing the socially relevant life of the subjects of the teaching and managing state. (p. 22)

Sassower (1997) declares Technoscience as an Invitation by saying

> As we move into the twenty-first century, we cover old ground, searching for past insights, so as to guide our future. Our journey reflects an acceptance of the human condition in terms of the quest for some level of control, that is, in terms of an ongoing negotiation with one's personal frailty, the demands of others, and the circumstances of the environment. Instruments of control extend from the operation of the mind to the sets of tools we have invented and perfected over time. (p. 28-29)

Sassower mentions Francis Bacon not just to underscore our interest in controlling nature but to remind us that Bacon realized "Man, [is] the servant and interpreter of Nature"(p. 29). But Sassower asks, "What does obedience mean in this context"(p. 29)? I, too, am troubled with answering this question. I shall go on below to sketch out a way to proceed in searching for an answer.

My answer will be to argue that we need to reinvent the term organic intellectual that I will borrow from Gramsci. But in setting up my argument first I want to say that we need to look again at our past, in particular, the past of indigenous cultures for guidance. No one has made a better case for comparing our own path of development in industrialized society with that of indigenous cultures than

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Jerry Mander (1992) who details the progression of corporate mentality or technological colonization of our species being and the effects that technologies have had on the survival of Indian nations. I will not do that here, except to argue that the sounding I have heard coming from the gay and lesbian community reminds me that we, queers, are representatives of a sort of an indigenous life that our bodies had before the colonization and control of our polymorphous perverse desires led to their deadened condition in our sexist society.

Drawing upon the Italian perspective again we might use the notion of "organic intellectuals" that Antonio Gramsci (1971) gave us. I want to give this notion a new connection with the concept of bioregionalism. My analysis of dark body erotics can permit us-gay, lesbian, and straight-to become organic intellectuals. But first let me clarify what Gramsci intended by the term organic intellectuals. He did not think that intellectuals who were originally from the peasant class (of agricultural workers in feudal society for example) and became priests or lawyers remained organically connected with the peasant class from which they emerged. This is because as priests or lawyers they no longer represented the interests of the peasant class but instead

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became functionaries of the dominant class to which they now belong as priests and/or lawyers (Gramsci, 1971, p. 6).

To clarify what Gramsci thought of the differentiation between intellectuals, I offer the following passage from the *Prison Notebooks*:

> The relationship between intellectuals and the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying degrees, "mediated" by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the "functionaries." It should be possible both to measure the "organic quality" [*organicitia*] of the various intellectual strata and their degree of connection with a fundamental social group, and to establish a gradation of their functions and of the super-structures from the bottom to the top (from the structural base upwards). What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two major superstructural "levels": the one that can be called "civil society," that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called "private," and that of "political society" or "the State." These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of "hegemony" which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of "direct domination" or command exercised through the State and "juridical" government. The functions in question are precisely organizational and connective. The intellectuals are the dominant group's "deputies" exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government. (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12)

I have deliberately introduced the distinction between civil society and the State by use of Gramsci's material. It will be useful for fleshing out the distinction between private and public that I have claimed informs the development of gays and lesbians in their sexual development. It will be a

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distinction that will help us determine how the indirect communication that I have outlined above with regard to my own discourse about the experimental chamber and perhaps on a wider scale as I have tried to suggest by the inclusion of the material example using Galileo Galilee and scientific writing more generally. Remember I have said that we could characterize my homoerotic desires for "Gregory" as: 1) according to a Freudian model, repressed and sublimated, finding their way to a new energetic function, animating the manifest content of my intellectual activity in psychology, or 2) according to a Foucauldian model of control, my homoeroticism was excluded from expression in the public arena of scientific and professional psychological discourse. The latter model is one of govern-mentality that Foucault claimed was the intellectual function of juridical-discursive formations. The latter are sets of rules that implicitly inform and limit the kinds of statements that can be made and the truth relationships that inhere between statements and evidential conditions that make them true or false. I have arrived at the position that neither of these two models quite captures the significance of my indirect communication as I have disclosed it in the above symbolic analysis of my manifest psychological inquiry into the movement of a (small) organism through differently detailed frameworks (in two-dimensions or a three dimensional space)

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for detecting and measuring the activity of this organism. The purported reason or rationale for undertaking this experimental investigation was to show how the Skinnerian paradigm was a constructed one based on the constraints imposed by the situation. But my more symbolic and disguised meaning was an attempt to express my homoerotic desires for "Gregory" that I was fully aware of, and, perhaps able in private to fantasize and orchestrate my masturbation activities. But the longing for unity in a real bodily way found its way into my publicly regulated discourse as a disruption or the control that was supposed to be fostered by the juridical-discursive formations. This cross-over and disruption of the formal rules governing professional discourse is a possible model for how all intellectuals may find it possible to return to the bodily existence that sponsors all of us in a shared phenomenological space of humanity. This is how I propose we may become organic intellectuals in the modified sense that I intend to draw from Gramsci's meaning.

In order to carry out this projected trajectory I will need to call forth a more profound understanding of Gramsci's notion of "structures of feeling." Renate Holub (1992) has, in the following passage, crystallized the relevance of

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Gramsci for the work of organic intellectuals, and elucidates the meaning of the term "structures of feeling."

> It should be pointed out that it is precisely because Gramsci's endeavour to see phenomena in relation to one another … that the various notions of "intellectuals" he presents in his texts do not cancel each other out. In this sense, in the evolutionary trajectory of this Gramscian concept, one notion does not replace, substitute, supplement, or marginalize another. Rather, in Gramsci's critical theory, a plurality of equitable notions squarely exist next to each other, possibly because, as Anne Showstack Sassoon suggests, these various concepts attempt to grasp the many diverse levels and functions of what I would like to call here 'intellectual realities'. Various intellectual functions and relations as Gramsci makes them out in his reality intersect in the Gramscian text. On the one hand, Italian society produces the traditional intellectual, the rhetorician, who creates and disseminates 'high' culture. Croce stands as an example of that. In that this intellectual, whether consciously or unconsciously, either legitimates or challenges the values of the predominant culture, he/she is also a propagator of ideology. Gramsci's approach to this type of intellectual function is thus to begin with a traditional Marxist one, but also one that has in the Italian tradition affinities with the cultural agendas of eminent idealist cultural critics, such as the Spaventa brothers and de Sanctis. As part of the superstructure, that intellectual function supports or resists progressive historical and cultural forces and it is on the basis of his/her partiality for the democratic cause that he/she will be judged. However, when Gramsci engages in a deliberate dialogue with Piero Gobetti, and when he encourages dialogic interaction of left intellectuals with the liberal anti-fascist intelligentsia in general, then he begins to transcend this traditional Marxist model. For what he is evoking in the context of his politics of alliance with the liberal intelligentsia is a nascent and powerful understanding of what we might call, in the conceptual traces of Kuhn, an 'intellectual or cultural or critical community' working not for the status quo but for significant democratic change. So what Gramsci seems to begin to graph is not only a master narrative of the ideological function of the intellectual as part of the superstructure, understood in Marxist terms, but also a micro-history of the

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category of intellectuals that points to a system of intellectual communities. This graph includes interestingly and significantly an attempt to design a psycho-gram of these various communities. An understanding of the collective psychological traits of a specific group or community, of its 'structure of feeling' in its various manifestations and complexities, coupled with familiarization with its members' unacknowledged assumptions, their imagery, their experiences, their practices and, above all, the cultural mission they ascribe to themselves, will enhance the study of the role the intellectuals fulfill in Italian society. When Gramsci chooses the formulation 'esprit de corps' in that context in order to circumscribe the notion of 'intellectual community', then he does not refer simply to the class character of the bourgeoisie and its intellectuals. It is precisely the point of his discussion of the 'esprit de corps' to describe relations that seem to go beyond class. By choosing a formulation such as 'esprit de corps', he points, whether inadvertently or not, to the conditions of possibility of intellectual production, conditions which do not preclude the existence of a body but to the contrary insist on the placement of the body in a specific environment. As such, and more specifically in terms of the production of an intellectuality, of a set of ideas, and of the choices one makes in producing a specific set of ideas and the values attached to them, the activity is not only or primarily contingent on class, or on the will to produce ideas that might transcend the interests of an economic and social class. Rather, and equally often, if not more often, the production of intellectuality is contingent on a very basic reality, namely the body. That body lives within the 'structure of feeling' of a specific community, the socio-psychic language of which informs a person's imagistic and symbolic referentiality. What differentiates one 'intellectual community' from another are the respective languages that are spoken in each, their forms of communication, which contain the emotional, psychological and evaluative registers of their specific 'structure of feeling' or community. The 'structure of feeling' of one community, and the experiences, assumptions and exclusions underlying it, are not identical with but different from the 'structures of feeling' of other communities. (Holub, 1992, p. 160-162)

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This disclosure by Renate Holub of Gramsci's notion of the body as located within the 'esprit de corps' of a community of intellectuals is an important one for my project of recovering materially significant others. There is a danger in my appeal to the lived body as a trajectory for unifying intellectuals who would otherwise be from different cultural semiotic spaces or, in Gramsci's term, different "dialects." I want to conclude with an appreciation for how we have become differently inflected with semiotic productions that represent our different cultural locations/situations. I want to show how this affords an understanding of how of differently embodied selves have developed, and offer the possibility of establishing a common heritage that would be the result of engaged struggle to understand our differences and appreciate their contributions to approximating a more complete understanding of our human condition.

To elaborate on the Gramsci use of dialect I offer the following passage from Holub (1992).

> From Gramsci's discussion of Gobetti it is apparent though that one is not necessarily caught in the emotional and evaluative net of one specific 'structure of feelings'. Indeed, one can take part in more than one 'intellectual community' and consequently speak perhaps not the language but a 'dialect' that approximates a specific 'structure of feeling'. Some dialogue, in the sense of the Habermassian communicative action, can occur in spite of the difference in the background 'structure of feeling'. So what enables the cultural dialogue between Gramsci and Gobetti is not primarily their political stance,

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> which is in any event far from identical. Gobetti is a liberal and Gramsci is a Marxist. Nor is it civilized desire to get along harmoniously with each other. Surely, both Gramsci and Gobetti are marked by an extraordinary open-mindedness coupled with intellectual integrity. What enables the communicative process between these two theorists is a warrant or a dialect they share, the 'dialect' of the enlightenment principles from which to reason and from which to pursue an agenda of freedom for all. The ability to share that dialect is something like a condition for productive consensual discourse, for communicative action. Two differing heirs of the enlightenment, originating in two differing 'structures of feeling', can meet on the fragile ground of a gradually evolving new 'structure of feeling', a new intellectual community, a new moral and social paradigm. (p. 162)

This quote offers us at least the hope of establishing the parameters of a new moral community, and a basis for appreciating the mission that various marginalized intellectual groups have to plat in the argument for embracing this new vision. All of the material that I have supplied the reader so far concerning the situation of dark body erotics, gay sex clubs, and the projected path of an embodied and culturally sensitive semiotics are in support of how a third model for interpreting gay intellectual development. Through my example of my own self-regulation I have made possible the beginning of a method for uncovering the levels-sensory-motor affective (bodily), perceptual, and conceptual-that are operative in the activity of self-regulation and auto-poiesis.

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I should like to discuss that not all marginalized groups are identical solely as the effect of their being oppressed. And, as I will argue, academic institutions are homophobic in their constraints upon the creative endeavors of gay and lesbian scholars. I hope to show, in particular, how psychological inquiry, which either elides inclusion of our bodily existence through social construction or through the more traditional empirical frameworks as the use of statistically analysis, prevents examination of the full semiotic construction of lived experience of real materially significant others. By normativizing all subjects around statistical indices such as group averages and standard deviations, we are presented with a profile that may be representative of no one. When quantitative research is conducted, it must be supplemented with qualitative/ narrative descriptions of the meaning that subjects have experienced while being tested. In the very last chapter I will present a proposal for how we could combine these two approaches to give voice to the lives of gays and lesbians, and compare their voice with that of members from other marginalized groups.

But first let me say why I think that gay and lesbian development is somewhat different from the development of other marginalized groups. I have above argued that neither

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the Freudian nor the Jungian explanations are appropriate for understanding gay and lesbian sexual development. Recall that the common interpretation of the Freudian psychodynamic explanation for same-sex attraction in males is, simply put, due to inadequate gender identity. In the absence of a strong father model, and in the presence of a strong mother figure, the gay child supposedly grows up lacking feeling like a man on the inside, thus he will seek to have sex with a man in order to compensate for this. The acquisition of a man in sexual relations is the substitute for not being a man internally. But if that were the dynamic forces responsible for determining sexual orientation in boys/men then we might expect a much higher incidence of homosexuality among Black males; since the two parent Black family is disrupted by social conditions stemming way back to slavery. Black sons are more often raised by their mothers who are strong heads of households. We might expect more Black children to turn out gay because they were deprived of adequate male role models and according to the psycho-dynamic logic would crave a man, strengthening their internal feelings of male identity through external sexual contact with men. But of course this is not what is found, and so it strongly discredits the whole application of such simplistic explanations of the development of sexual orientation.

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I have argued that neither the repression model of explanation nor the control model is adequate for capturing and explaining my experience as a gay man. I would suggest that the private/public distinction is more appropriate for understanding what transpires within and around my intellectual activity and how it establishes a balance in my auto-poietic needs for health and self-esteem. We may turn to Schehr (1995) for some material to help us in understanding the generality of this spatial figure-the closet-and how it divides both homosexuality and heterosexuality.

> Thus, there is always a homosexual component to heterosexual discourses about sex. Already at the beginning of these discourses, at the beginning of philosophy's tales of love, Plato reminds us that the structure of the discourses of sexuality will be among men (or among women), as the deipnosophists extend their banquet into a symposium on love. The story of Salome shows us that the discourses between the sexes are reduced to closets within closets, tales of lust never spoken. Again we wonder if the figure of the closet, the metaphor of gay liberation of the last twenty years, should not itself be turned on its head: Is it not heterosexuality that is really locked in a closet of its own devising and that forces a similar closet on homosexuality out of spite? (p. 9)

Schehr (1995) argues, interestingly, that both heterosexuality and homosexuality are figured within the construction of the closet. Though his previous examples taken from the literature of Plato and Salome suggest that homosexuality is a expression of liberty, he is quick to say

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that he knows that often the expression of homosexual love has not been inflected with this freedom. He proceeds to explain his position regarding a third model for understanding homosexuality, namely the one of private/public divisions.

> I am not denying the existence in modern times of the acts of repression and the secret of the night with which homosexuality has become associated. Yet to jump from there to an image of opposition and closure is to do a disservice to the acts and discourses of homosexual sex. I am not denying that the figure of the closet has operated as a powerful tool on homosexual individuals and on homosexuals as an amorphous group, as Eve Sedgwick has admirably shown. I am saying that the closet itself is a heterosexual construct foisted on homosexuality. This is readily apparent in the concepts of social construction that gender studies have offered: If sexual and gender identity are only products of the criss-crossings of instruments, structures, and discourses of power, how could sexuality not be in a "closet"? Then again, how could any sexuality not be in a closet? Even as White male heterosexuality thinks it is free because each individual instance identifies with the doxological discourses of social construction, is it not at that moment that sexuality is in its deepest, most tightly locked closet? (p. 9)

Schehr (1995) asks that his reader indulge him still further. He proposes that Alcibiades be taken as the first gay liberation figure that history records: not because Greek homosexuality is the same as modern homosexuality, and not at all as the figure of freedom. But because he is the first to literally join "the inner discussion of homosexuality or the Greek equivalent of ephebophilia to the

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outside praxis and exemplification of that behavior"(p. 10). For Schehr (1995),

> Alcibiades is not opening a closet door; he is joining public and private spaces, he is joining theory and praxis. At the edge between the outside and inside, Alcibiades shows that praxis and theory can be interwoven: having been in the outside world, he will talk at this revived symposium. And he will undoubtedly go out into the world again to revel anew. (p. 10)

Schehr (1995) continues to point out how we have tended to interpret the literary work as closed rather than open. This tendency to internalize the model of closure in the practice of literary interpretation facilitates drawing "safe conclusions about the figure of homosexuality within a cultural space"(p. 10). He emphatically explains that

> Our conclusions depend on our understanding of the dominance of male heterosexuality, whose forms and structures have organized representation in the Western world. Moreover, male heterosexuality has lent its power to the dominant discursive structures and to the praxes that are accepted and acceptable. Male heterosexuality provides the adequation between the truth and the discourses promulgated in the name of truth. Faced with the omnipotence of that discursive and juridico-political machine, voices of women, voices of people of color, voices of the impoverished and the disenfranchised, and voices of nonofficialdom in general have repeatedly and continuously been repressed. (p. 10-11)

Schehr proceeds to briefly set out how through the course of history different genres have arisen in which the expression of some of these minority voices found the possibility of expression. Concerning the voices of women, Schehr links their success to the invention of the novel. We might say

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that despite the non-serious attitude with which the novel was first embraced, it was responsible for the later success of the women's movement. For Schehr (1995),

> The developing genre of the novel was often considered to be non-serious amusement; thus it was not problematic for women to write such stuff. Retrospectively, of course, we have accorded the novel a far more central and serious role, as that genre has proven to be the defining genre of its age, the perfect vehicle, as Ian Watts shows, to embody the ideology of the rising middle-class society and bourgeois exchange system. In the novel, the free-floating signifiers of exchange made women's participation more viable than it had been. … It is only with the development of the bourgeois novel that women's voices move a bit closer to center stage. (p. 11)

Foucault had shown that "the notion that sexuality continued to be repressed in the nineteenth century is a specious hypothesis when there is a mountain of evidence to suggest that it was anything but repressed"(p. 11). Schehr concludes that "Freud could talk about sex not because he was unleashing the dogs of reason against a forceful, silencing repression, but because sex was already visibly and invisibly present in word, deed, and symptom"(p. 11).

Schehr expresses the same trouble that I have had in accepting either of the two models for explaining homoerotic desire: neither the repression nor the control model seems adequate. Even though he admits that these two models have existed side by side in their institutional forms, they

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represent two modes of approaching gay liberation. Schehr (1995) declares

> What some will find striking and others heretical is that I cannot fully accept the implications of either of those models. Without becoming an essentialist, I would like to suggest that the public-private division is perhaps more useful in elucidating the status of homosexual aesthetic expression than either the repressive model or the model of control. To put it roughly, I would say that homosexual discourse is always there and, more often than not, at center stage. Sometimes we choose to read the homosexual aspect publicly, sometimes privately. And when it is read privately by some, others do not read it at all.
>
> Homosexuality has its own path, distinct from the more clearly repressed voices of minorities and women, and even distinct from the general discourse of sexuality. Why is this important or even significant? Over the past two decades, it has been convenient to associate the various voices seeking liberation; that association, the solidarity it produces, and the empowerment it seeks are all laudable on the scale of action, event, and deed. Yet when political activity is institutionalized as discipline, there may be inappropriate inherent assumptions. By no means am I rehearsing the arguments about tenured radicals here, nor am I extending such arguments in a liberal fashion in order to maintain some gay ghetto within the institution. On the contrary, I am underlining the fact that the specific phenomena and history of homosexuality, the specific manifestations of homosexuality in the arts, combine to make us necessarily reevaluate our institutionalization of the act of liberation. Moreover, these specific manifestations demand that we reconsider an approach to a study of the subject that may be different from other voices of liberation, such as feminism, African-American studies, and third world literature, that have found some ground in the academy. (p. 13)

Schehr thinks that there are three components that compel us to approach homosexuality that suits its history and characteristics.

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These are:

1. The general continuity of homosexual poiesis,
2. The presence of homosexuality at the heart and beginning of literary and philosophical endeavor,
3. And finally a particular semiotics of invisibility.

Although Schehr acknowledges that repression and control have been attempted throughout the history of homosexual poiesis, he offers us examples of how these attempts have more often backfired, e.g., censorship by the National Endowment of the Arts of Mapplethorpe.

To conclude the difference between using either of the explanatory models of repression or control, and using this third model that stems from spatially dividing the developmental relationship between private and public activities, is of no small consequence. Unlike Foucault, who generalized the model of Jeremy Bentham's prison as panopticon in elucidating a surveillance technique that he has found pervasive among the social scientific disciplines, (not the least among them is psychology), I have tried to move in the reverse direction. Perhaps I have merely filled out the notion that Foucault offered as one of resistance to the surveillance technique of govern-mentality. For Foucault, govern-mentality is the effect of the penetration of the public sphere-the State-into our private lives. This

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division that has been in effect for longer than we care to measure, (at least since the Enlightenment), and has been the dominant force with which people have had to contend. The utilization of the technologies of the social sciences for the rehabilitation of the human mind has been widespread. Educational practices are just one area where they have achieved popularity. But to shift the direction of influence and to outline, as I have tried to do in this manuscript, the possibility of freedom that uses creative intellectual forms is no small accomplishment. From this vantage-point, we may be able to carry further the more progressive programs that intellectuals have tried before in an effort to traverse the divide between theory and praxis. I would argue that I have at least shown how it is possible to do this through the development of my own intellectual activity. And in so doing I believe that I have shown something of the value of homoerotic desire in the existence of our life force.

My interest in using Schehr has been to provide the reader with a corroboration of the approach that I have offered to better understand homoerotic desire. It is here to stay; it will not go away is perhaps the lesson one comes away with after a study of the presence of homosexuality throughout the history of civilization. From my own example of how my

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homoerotic desire found expression, in albeit a disguised or symbolically coded fashion, in my intellectual activity, it should be clear that the scientific work is also not to be construed as a closed work. There are always avenues for new interpretations. This is possible, even the necessary result, because of the nature of the semiotic process.

Social construction has done us a service in attempting to turn our attention to the social influences that operate in the development of gender and sex differences. Something more than a literary interpretation of these differentiated modes of being is needed. I am afraid that unless we can bring to the fore the study of the effects of discrimination on people from such marginal categories as have been mentioned above, we will have failed to pay the body its due. The battle for liberation must not be allowed to be institutionalized within the constraints of the academy. For in the turf battles that are the currency of most academic disputes, the marginal are bound to lose. The struggle for liberation and the manifestation of the diversity possible in people is an aesthetic worth saving. One way to further the liberation of marginal people regardless of where they fall along the lines of the visible and invisible, public and private divisions would be to demonstrate that people are harmed by practices of

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repression, oppression, and discrimination. My offering a third model of understanding is animated by my desire to show the positive contribution the love for other persons that manifests as homoerotic desire, even homosexuality, has made and will continue to make to our history of humanity. We need to invest in the recovery of difference while at the same time fight the tendency to hierarchically evaluate those differences. My situation of dark body erotics is a thought experiment that hopes to make the realization of some common ground possible while yielding to the opportunity of people to continue to invest in the continuation of their differences. In the following section I will offer some thoughts about doing away with the idea that sex is the basis for gender differentiation.

I want to discuss something of my ordinary worries in extraordinary times. At the time of this writing, President Bill Clinton has been charged with four counts that could lead to the U.S. Senate voting to remove him from office. However, I have an alternative direction for President Clinton who originally declared in a public speech that "I did not have sex with that woman." The woman in question was a White House Intern named Monica Lewinsky. I would argue that his defense should be conducted by following the

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lines of his denial that he had sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky.

I think that the President and his defense attorneys are missing an opportunity to bring to the forefront for public discussion an important debate. Sex should be conceived of as all other biological processes are understood-as activities that transpire among assemblies (organism/environment niches). Sex should be defined as the activity of reproduction. (The moral right should embrace that one). Just as there is no distinction of any importance to breathing in and breathing out, (there is just breathing), so there should not be any emphasis on the male and female sex. Anthropologists have in this century realized that there is no physical (genetic) basis for claiming that there is more than the human race. We are all members of the same race; skin color should be irrelevant in social transactions. Biologists would help us come a long way if they would return to this century's old understanding that sex is an activity in which a species reproduces itself. We should understand that there is no male or female sex to be considered an attribute of a person solely because of the shape of their genitals. Hence, we might eliminate the basis for distinguishing between genders as well.

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To reiterate slightly: There is no male or female sex; there is only the reproductive process that is required for continuation of the species. This activity is a species action, not an attribute or property of an individual. For whatever reason, our species has evolved so as to propagate itself through reproductive processes that encourage the mixture or variation of genetic material from autonomous parents of offspring that draw from each parent a complement of genes and chromosomes. This way of mixing seems to have been preserved, however, as it had originally come about. We can surmise that this mixing and matching in mitosis contributes to variation that brings with it hardiness of the species in weathering the natural drift, as our species adapts to its constantly changing environment (Maturana & Varela, 1998).

Once we have discarded this silly way of defining sex according to the shape of the genitals, and we have recognized that both genitalia form the mechanism for propagation we may realize other things. Namely that pleasure is more important than just serving the function of our species' memory. Certainly we are intelligent enough to be able to figure out why the coupling of the genitals are needed to support reproduction. Perhaps at one time our

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distant ancestors needed pleasure to help them stumble on the connection and make reproduction likely, but we are too knowledgeable to need such assistance now. Pleasure is important in itself: it serves to regulate the production of endorphins, and other immunological molecules. Emotions are the bearers of the body's language of molecular economies that enhance or destroy human life. I prefer to call these molecular activities that occur on our bodies' surfaces and inside, the euphorics that animate our bodily existence.

I have tried to make the link between this form of physiological activity and the expressive function of speaking and writing in an earlier passage where I discussed some quoted material from *Reading the Book of Nature*. There I had explained how science places a veil over our sensuous contact with nature. Science does this by mathematizing and constructing ideal models that become scientific interfaces will the immediacy that constitutes the lived connection between our bodies and voices. This deviation has taken place through the cultural development of technology but especially because corporate bodies have caused things to go awry. Corporate bodies have no real moral obligations except perhaps to those who are its stockholders-to make a profit for them. Intellectual labor has fallen out of touch with its biological roots. We need to help intellectuals to

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become truly organic intellectuals. I have tried to show above how this is a new interpretation or expansion of Gramsci's notion of the concepts of 'structure of feeling' and 'esprit de corps'. Finally, I have tried to demonstrate, through my own confessional analysis, how the play across public and private lines never really extinguishes, or represses, or controls homoerotic desire, but that the activity of intellectual construction, in the language-game of science, is subjected to the same openness of interpretation that all literary works are. In carrying further my development so that I may continue with my transgressions between what Schehr called the mediated space between theory and practice, I will suggest some possible future research practices and institutional arrangements that might better respect our life force. From here is it possible to talk about rehabilitating institutions such as the university that is also functioning as a corporate body (Lynton & Elman, 1987).

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Chapter 6

6. TOWARD A POSTDICIPLINARY PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY

Creating an Interdisciplinary Science Shop Center:

Having argued and hopefully established grounds for a post-disciplinary psychological inquiry in what has come before, I turn in this chapter to consider how we might begin to create a post-disciplinary psychology. In the course of doing this I will propose and consider several studies, the first of which is an institutional-university based research center. However, it is not meant to replicate the traditional "ivory tower" research center, organized as a tribute to the work of a distinguished professor, and run by that person or a faithful disciple. How else would this enterprise be an improvement of the ineffective program of university research that has been criticized under the term "publish and perish?" The format of this center is to follow that of the science shops (Sclove, 1995). Science shops were established in the Netherlands, England, and France, and have been in operation for over twenty years. They open the resources of the university, through its faculty and students, to community-based organizations. The service offered is problem-focused research that will not be used for commercial purposes and could not be conducted without the help of the university-community cooperative

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arrangement. Though the results or products of the proposed operation would not necessarily be off limits for industrial or commercial use or benefit. Presumably, our institutional structures could be so arranged as to benefit all of the members of society instead of being biased in its emphasis or promotion of the interests of the members of an elite socio-economic class. This Center, for which I anticipate seeking funding from the National Science Foundation for, is to be named "The Center for the Study of Communication and Development in Technoscience and the Professions." In the simplest terms, its purpose or mission is to study change, with a focus on how change is possible through the forms of communication used by Technoscience and the Professions, and in the development of Technoscience and the Professions. Significant participation by psychologists would be required since to date only one of the twenty four previously funded NSF Science and Technology Centers have had the involvement of psychologists. That one was the University of Pennsylvania Center named the Institute for the Study of Cognitive Science (IRCS). The focus of the research program of this new Center that I am proposing would be to answer the following question: What are the conditions that make effective problem-solving possible?

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"Technoscience" is a hybrid, formed from science and technology. As an expression/appellation, it signals, and is more than a conflation of, its root terms: science and technology. It suggests that there are benefits from a synergistic collapsing of the distinction between science and technology, and from an intermingling of theory and practice. Whereas science as distinct from technology derives truth from the generation, testing and confirming of hypotheses and technology is the embodiment of knowledge discovered by scientists, the constructive and dialectical activity of technoscience recognizes, organizes and is organized by the interactive, interdependent and reciprocal relations among social, political, economic, psychological, moral and material forces. Technoscience or "science in action" (to borrow Bruno Latour's book title) in contrast to science as distinct from technology raises the stakes for problem solving.

The research program of this science-shop derivative has three major aspects to its agenda. These are summarized below.

1. The contemporary and future effects of technoscience on individual development are not understood or, as the case may be, have not been studied. It has been forecasted or

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predicted that individuals will work in several different careers in a lifetime. We know little of the developmental processes that may facilitate change. Also, how families and social networks contribute to this phenomenon and are affected by it could be better understood.

2. In addition to the contemporary and future effects of technoscience on the development of individuals, their families and their social networks, there are interesting historical cases in which individuals changed from one field of technoscience to another. For example, the atomic bomb led physicists to become molecular biologists. What can we learn about the influence of morality in shaping the choices of these scientists to change fields? In what ways have social, political, economic, psychological, moral and material forces, but especially moral factors, influenced large scale changes to meet what might be perceived as situations of crisis level magnitude? Several other events, in addition to the dropping of the atomic bomb, have triggered people's conscience because of the pending genocide or the perceived possibility of genocide. To name but two of them: the AIDS Epidemic and the exclusion of women worldwide from full participation in science and high

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technology. An interesting comparative case study lies ready at hand in the stark contrast in levels of research funding allocated for the investigation of cystic fibrosis and sickle cell anemia. The former being a disease of Caucasians (Whites) and the latter of People of Color (Blacks). An intervention, perhaps in the form of an AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP) demonstration, would be interesting if simulated in the community affected by sickle-cell anemia. This would be a good test case for replicating the effects of community and affected population involvement and participation in the formulating, articulating and solving of the problem of insufficient research and pending genocide in the affected communities.

3. So much writing and discourse aim at effecting solutions to problems that cause human suffering yet so little change or effective action is achieved. How might our present forms of interventions be improved if we had a better understanding of how communication can be a medium of and vehicle for change or stasis? Are the discursive formations of experts biased in the sense of over representing their own entrepreneurial interests? And how might the inclusion of the people most affected by the problems studied in the process of problem

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definition, solution and articulation better effect change in levels of human suffering? How would our communicative strategies have to be changed to facilitate this kind of collaborative or "joint action?" Ineffectiveness is even prevalent in the interventions and communication of progressive thinkers who at least profess to want to help the populations they mean to serve. These are weighty concerns in our society where so much hope and material resources are invested in the production of knowledge and its consumption.

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Establishing Sites for Regional Problem-Solving:

There are good reasons for extending the placement of Interdisciplinary Science Shop Research Centers to sites that are not considered elite in the Carnegie Scale or Ordering of Higher Education Institutions. I will argue that in the interests of Excellence and Equity, Community Colleges should be included in the practice of Science Shop research. In this section, I present an essay that argues for the interrelationship between psychology as a technoscience and justice, and thus conclude that psychology is necessary in achieving an integrated center for mobilizing university and community resources. The latter is a generic name I have coined for the form which science shops should take at the Community College where significant interface, and commerce, with corporate/business, education sites, and communities and neighborhoods can be effected.

In orienting the reader to the nature of this proposed intervention, I should discuss something of what is meant by the privatization of the university, the vocationalizing of the curriculum, and what I understand to be the proper connection between excellence and equity.

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Though criticisms concerning the success of Borough of Manhattan Community College (BMCC), and other City University of New York (CUNY) community colleges, have been prominent and all too prevalent in the media, we should respect that we already operate under well defined notions of excellence as determined by the State Department of Education and other regulatory boards which set standards for degree and professional programs. It is not our standards but how we attempt to operationalize or achieve excellence that is the problem. It might be that how success is typically measured, (quantitatively by graduation rates), is also a problem which clouds the issue of enacting qualitative standards of excellence.

The argument of this paper will show that by thinking holistically and in systems' theoretical terms, we will have a better chance of appraisal and appreciation of the value of our educational activity at the community college and our endeavor to achieve excellence. A systems theory view concerns itself with feedback and interdependence of parts that comprise an ecosystem. Ecosystems fall within the domain of biological science. They are living, dynamically unfolding systems in which organisms develop in interaction with their environments. A holistic conception of the organism-environment dyad is best formulated as an

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integrated and interdependent collaboration of processes that link organism and environment inextricably. This is to say in the old language of cause-effect linear thinking that organism and environment are determinate of each other. But in ecosystems thinking, the organism and its environment are the unit of analysis and are inseparable: change in an aspect of one and the other changes with it.

Instrumental throughout this essay will be a concept borrowed from an approach invented by cultural psychologists in the course of studying human development from what might be called ethnic standpoints. A gloss on the nature of development shows it to be a transformation of "natural powers" into "personal powers." According to John Shotter (1974), under this interpretation of development, the possession of natural powers is in the "nature" of the child, and what requires explaining is how children are helped by those around them, to "appropriate" their own natural powers and to bring them under their own control as "personal" powers. It is a modernist conception in that it assumes natural powers as the source of an individual's talent. From a postmodern or social constructionist perspective the possibility of "joint action", which is modeled after genuine dialogue, makes this original understanding of development as transforming natural powers

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into personal powers problematic. For in conversation that is unrehearsed, what you say is influenced by what I have said and so forth and so on as meaning is constructed and negotiated among participants present and past present in shaping a future which is nascent in our bodily interrelations and not yet conceived in thought. This is hardly typical of academic discourse that is controlled, and controlling, in its attempt to harness and direct untamed, (unwanted), energies of people who do not share the culture of academic insularity. Explanations of meaning and discourse are telling about the problem of academic discussions: meanings are accorded explanations around the concept of rule-following. But people do not just follow rules they also create them. So, as with the distinction between "knowing how and knowing that", dare we push the integration of different social classes further by understanding development as self-regulation emergent in joint action? Together we follow rules, break and create them, in practices not just in thought, as Wittgenstein reminds us, and this is learned within the context of community for the benefit of one and all.

In discussions of excellence, the Subcommittee of the BMCC Faculty Council Strategic Planning Committee, charged with organizing a Faculty Forum on Excellence on November 10,

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1997, has considered numerous perspectives or approaches to its topic. Each field has its own definition of excellence but in starting with local or field specific definitions we risk the all too frequently broached problem of choosing which is more important. Caution is advised because all too quickly we will be pressured to toss aside the task of qualitatively defining what is meant by excellence for a quantitative approach as was tried in what has come to be called the "Goldstein Report of 1993." In the interest of fending off, if not preventing, premature influences of budgetary considerations that had, under the Goldstein procedure, recommended eliminating good quality but small programs, (as judged by the number of students registered), throughout CUNY, I wish to specify a broad and integrated view of our curriculum and programs at BMCC. One which avoids what is referred to in systems theory terms as a win-lose game or strategy of competition. Though win-lose strategies may be valid in relation to competitors, it is not a strategy of choice in an organization such as the community college or CUNY where a win-win strategy is preferable especially under times when financial exigency has not been invoked. To be more specific, the constant playing of career programs against liberal arts transfer programs should be avoided. These are viable options for students attending community college and unless we are

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prepared to face the charge that there really is a conspiracy of vocationalizing the community college curriculum, all programs should be respected as non-competitive.

In deferring to the local or field specific definitions of excellence, I mean to provide us with a framework in which constructing definitions and methods of operationalizing, measuring and achieving field specific definitions will be enhanced. I hasten to add that these field specific definitions will be set forth by experts in those fields rather than by a generalist such as myself. Toward that end it might be worth looking out for the competitive game of divide and conquer. We can do this is by recognizing that systemically in the interest of quality, we do not want to conceive of our game of strategic planning as a series of bouts in which liberal arts and career programs are pitted against each other. For that matter, at the outset, we should not prejudice our deliberations on excellence in favor of any one program over any other. So rather than reacting to political attacks by giving extended platforms for external criticism, we decided, as a subcommittee, to invite prominent people from within and outside of the University to address their conceptions of excellence. We asked them to address how BMCC might go about fulfilling

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some of its curricular functions as a community college: these are 1) liberal arts transfer, 2) science, engineering and mathematics transfer, 3) corporate and telecommunications careers, and 4) health related careers.

In carrying out my program of showing the value of holistic thinking, I thought it might amuse the muse to ask what a few noteworthy thinkers would say about excellence at this community college. First I imagined what Plato would have said if called upon to entertain our question of excellence at the community college. I suggest that he would judge us according to his tripartite theory of the soul and his use of the soul as metaphor for the State. As I have asked my students so, too, I ask the reader: please set-aside, for the moment, the justified criticisms of Plato as abiding by the sexist and racist prejudices of his day. At least he may have gotten it partly right, and we in our enlightenment should extend what he got right to all citizens of this country. For Plato, the human soul, (or psyche as it was called in ancient Greece), consisted of three elements: 1) the desires or the appetitive element, 2) the passions and emotions or spirited element, and 3) the intellect or the intuitive element. His use of the soul as metaphor for the State extended his theory of the psyche to explain the organization of three classes of citizens that comprised the

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Greek City/State of Athens. The class with the appetitive element dominant was made up of craftsman or artisans-the merchants and property owners. The middle class consisted of the military that had the spirited element dominant. And the highest class was the one of philosopher-rulers whose souls were not just dominated by the intellect or intuitive element but had achieved harmony among the three elements. Insofar as an alliance was formed between intellect and spirit thereby permitting organization and mediation of desires, a person would be counted as wise. It was a mark of Plato's wisdom and foresight that he disallowed ownership of property by the middle and ruling classes. This precluded mercenary armies from being formed out of the Athenian army and prevented any corruption through bribery of the ruling class in favor of the property owning class.

But the respect of our founding fathers for the intelligence and power of the ruling classes in America has lead to a differently formed society than that envisioned by Plato. The interests of the ruling elite in America thus inflect the history of the development of colleges and universities in the U.S. In America a college education was at first modeled after the curriculum of the homeland of her European settlers. And so, the early college student learned Latin and Greek and studied the classics. Through this curriculum

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of moral philosophy and theology the education of clerics and teachers was accomplished. Only later was this predominant course of study changed, even transplanted, by engineering based curriculum in state and land grant colleges. This was effected by replacing the majority of Ministers and Clerics who served as Directors on the Governing Boards of the Universities and Colleges with corporate managers of some of the banking industries that were controlled by the five wealthiest families in America (Carnegie, Morgan, Rockefeller, etc.)

Nonetheless, we should apply the thought of Plato, and imagine how his thinking might lead us to an improved understanding of the organization of the curriculum and programs at the community college. If we conceive the entire range of our curriculum as schemes for developing different potentials in human beings, as though each program reflects one or more of the elements in Plato's theory of the soul, then it is easy to envision the curriculum of each field as constitutive in its dominance of certain aspects, or potentials, of our students. Plato would have us understand our various programs as collectible within an organizational framework which develops persons and communities and not as antagonisms as is the case when viewed under the win-lose approach I am trying to oppose.

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Now which programs fall under or pertain to which class or element? The career focused programs fall within the realm of the class of merchants or artisans in their reflecting predominantly our desire for production and commerce and for property and wealth. These fields have a distinct set of practices or services that are provided by their practitioners. Associate degree graduates in nursing, paramedical, computer programming and data analysis, and business management and accounting would be among them. Liberal arts transfer programs have less immediate practical benefit or practice based knowledge. They would perhaps, in the best of the liberal arts tradition, offer the student an education that is well rounded in the sense of focusing on the development of an integrated and yet critical person, wise in the ways of society and of its history. Our hope is that these graduates would approach the class of philosopher-rulers (though many more years of study would be needed for attainment of sage status). Since the science, engineering and mathematics curriculum are in varying degrees practice based and/or applied forms of knowledge, we should place them between the liberal arts transfer and the career options programs. Health and physical education as well as dance and music and art should also be caught up in this category or class of programs.

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What has been gained from looking at our curriculum from the perspective of Plato's theory of the soul and its use as metaphor for the State? At the very least we should have gained harmony among the different programs and options offered at the community college. Most of all we should have realized that a focus on the education of individuals, in interdependent relationships, affords us a chance to understand that in a pluralistic society, in order to achieve openness to a multitude of ends or goals, it is necessary to embrace human freedom as a universal value that is instrumental to achieve any goal whatsoever.

It should be clear that since our commitment is to the population of students that find their way into community college because their performance levels did not warrant inclusion in four year colleges and university, we should not foreclose any options which might help our students in their development now or later. For those more practical minded and eager because of economic pressure to earn a living, independently of their parents or family of origin (though the latter probably applies to all our students), there are the career option programs. And for others there are the liberal arts transfer option and the science, engineering and mathematics programs. New variations on the

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liberal arts option are being developed even as I write this, and these should be welcomed since the guidance afforded in a locally constructed program or curriculum that is supervised by a specific department is especially desirable as an asset to our students who can use exposure and mentoring from people in those fields to which they aspire to gain entrance.

Of course talk of souls and of social classes is not often marginalized. Some think that if we could act as a class blind society, we would be rid of social class distinctions and the discrimination and disadvantaging of the members of the lower or working class, (as with prescriptions for color blindness as a way to solve racism). This sort of idealism is wishful thinking that does not stand a chance against the powerful and deeply engrained bodily dispositions of performance which are acquired, as are other biases such as gender, race and ethnicity, part consciously and imitatively but continue to function unconsciously and automatically. But nonetheless through Plato's vision, we are able to appreciate that the work we do in the community college is vital to the improvement of our society. It is Plato's holistic thinking that has brought us to the realization that individuals are developing according to their

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potentials and that harmony within the individual is consonant with harmony within the State.

Gilbert Ryle, (lesser known than Plato but a philosopher in his own right in the Anglo-American tradition), might help us simplify our Platonic view of society, perhaps even eliminate the hierarchy among the three classes with his distinction between "knowing how" and "knowing that" or the difference between practical knowledge and propositional knowledge. I am not satisfied, however, with the normal distinction between theory and practice or pure and applied knowledge. If applied in the right way, the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge will help us avoid succumbing to the evaluative understanding of typical working class occupations as less worthy because they are coined as less intellectual. Ryle's distinction actually enhances our appreciation and understanding of the part played by knowledge in our everyday practices of living, and thereby integrates what were thought of originally as disparate functions or mentalities.

If we consider the work of Lev Vygotsky and some of his followers in the tradition of cultural psychology, we will see that Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that is applicable to all fields of our curriculum and of

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knowledge in general. Vygotsky, in exploring how children learn to speak, created a paradigm for learning in which adults, or more experienced children, provide a scaffolding for younger apprentice learners to acquire knowledge of how to do things as well as how to internalize, as inner speech, what is originally social talk or dialogue. From Vygotsky we learn that inner speech provides clues to the progressive steps in the sequencing of simple and complex skills or tasks. In attempting to assess a child's capacities more elaborately than merely as what a child can do on his or her own, Vygotsky created a concept of the Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) which calls for measuring both what a child does on its own and what she or he can do in concert with an adult. The ZPD better reflects a child's capacity for and condition of learning and development. It is but a small leap in thought to understand that our standardized methods of testing only reflect what a student has mastered and can perform alone; there is more available to the student under cooperative and collaborative conditions of learning, which may also reflect more accurately what is expected in real life work settings.

Some of Vygotsky's followers, Sylvia Scribner (1997) for one, have shown that skilled workers in mechanical performance situations also utilize complex forms of

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thinking of the kind that Ryle called propositional knowledge. All human activity is a combination of bodily performance and cognitive understanding or guidance. Theoretical activity is just delayed action or planning for action to be executed at a later time. Research findings in contemporary psychology should do much to temper the old prejudices that have been responsible for setting in place much of the hierarchical evaluative relationships among the disciplines in the academy. Understanding this literature can enhance our functioning as a community of teachers and learners. The ZPD enables us to see our relationship as teacher and mentors to our student apprentices.

In attempts to understanding a framework for learning in the community college it is important to comprehend the ambiance of learning. Here I should like to place the emphasis on community. Learned scholars, such as Seymour Sarason, have argued for cognizance of the importance of a sense of place in the development of personal identity and of the value, if not necessity, of addressing the human need for both transcendence and a psychological sense of community. Unfortunately we have done neither at the community college. That is, we have neither understood nor addressed our students' sense of place in the development of their personal identities. The maintenance of an identity is

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bound up with the need for transcendence, and the need for a psychological sense of community. Once understood these will become paramount in developing conditions for excellence because they are formative, if not generative, of excellence regardless of the field or program.

For some preliminary definitions: a sense of place in the construction of personal identity means that the locations or varying contexts of a person's history are inextricably sewn into the fabric of personal identity. Location or in its psychological sense of place is bound up with all aspects of our ecology, including physical, social, cultural, familial, etc. Our attitudes are dispositions of a general kind that require performance to fill in the details. Memory processes, which are so essential to the construction and performance of identity, are the enactment of these attitudinal dispositions. The organism and its ecological environment are not merely a dyad but an open system of interdependent relationships. Understanding of transcendence and community arises with our facing the terror or regret or pain that the knowledge of our mortality engenders. When faced with the inevitable fact of our separation from the human community, we experience strong emotions and the consequent need for reattachment to our communal roots.

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Transcendence, which has historically been the province of religion, still exists as a need in secular societies such as our own. To ignore this need imperils the health and well being of individuals. Transcendence means our activity is understood as having continuity in the work and existence of a larger historical community. Some satisfy this need through the procreation of children while others do this through contributing to the knowledge that evolves in their professions and many others find places in between these. This means that we must comprehend how this need might manifest and be satisfied in our community college. We should examine the ties we have with our students and their communities of love and support. It may be a tired expression but many of our students are, for their families, first-timers in attending college. Do we keep this historical accomplishment alive and constructively a part of our pedagogy other than at commencement or graduation? Do we let our students share in the development of ourselves as faculty and as an educational institution? Aren't students more than mere statistics in graduation rates or class size? In their progression through our classes and curriculum do we entertain their need for contributing towards something larger than themselves? If we adhere to the old model of education as teachers supplying students with knowledge then

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they are consumers only. Part of transcendence comes from understanding oneself as a producer as well. Even minimally, as they re-enact the discoveries of some of our great explorers in the knowledge fields, do we focus on their development as treading on grounds once virginal in their own minds and bodies?

The third component of Sarason's argument about the development of our sense of place concerns our need for a psychological sense of community. Can students experience this in large lecture halls? Hardly, and what of distance learning? What could be more alienating? Perhaps Mario Cuomo had the right intention in calling the citizens of the State of New York members of one big family. But metaphors alone will not work the wonders of eliminating alienation. Faculty must look at themselves and ask whether they accept their membership in the institution of the community college, and I mean really accept membership in which they feel committed and belong in familiar arrangements not merely in bureaucratized relationships which are not really relationships at all. When parents have a child and the family is healthy, the attitude of the family is one of welcoming the newcomer as worthy of taking a place at the table with all the individuality that a new life promises to unfold. Parents who expect their newborn to conform to a

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preconceived idea or pattern are looking for trouble. Norms for age appropriate behaving may provide guidance but should never be imposed as absolute standards. Acceptance means interacting with the child's potential in as free and nonjudgmental a fashion as is humanly possible. This, I would argue, should apply to our acceptance of our students as well. For if we expect them to learn through being in relationship with us then we must learn to nurture them and their potentials, as they may have never been nurtured before.

I have observed in my years of graduate education at CUNY, faculty who did not want to be at CUNY. You could tell they always looked elsewhere for standards of what was good. This was usually at their Ivy League alma maters. I have always argued that CUNY should not look to Columbia, or wherever, but should develop the potential of those entrusted to its care. Of course it is all right to be ambitious but in an ambitious person shouldn't we find an already developed the capacity for commitment? For in selecting someone for appointment in the Ivy League shouldn't the candidate have demonstrated themselves capable of functioning as an integral member of their community of origin? Should we ask less of those at community colleges? I am saddened by how few there are among us with this

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quality. And if we do not possess it how capable are we of inviting our students to learn and develop in the family of faculty, administration, staff, and students? Sure we may look elsewhere for ideas but when it comes down to it we must embrace what and whom we have to work with in order to go anywhere with their potential.

I would also argue that a faculty at the community college, which asks conformity of its own, has not accepted its place in the community college but has merely found a form of resistance in its bureaucratic relationships against commitment and against acceptance. This is not the best that we have to offer. If excellence involves embracing and working with the potential of our students, then so does it entail embracing and working with the potential of our colleagues even more so. But what prevents this from happening? What form does resistance to change and developmental emergence take that prevents our community colleges from realizing a more integrated relationship worthy of being called a community? Again we should draw upon holistic and systems thinking for a clue: the short term reactive strategy of pitting the faculty against the administration, a tired and worn out approach, is the culprit. Short term alliances are created among the bureaucratized faculty when administration who carry the

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responsibility for relations with outside, (external to the college or university), agents criticize the faculty for insularity and unresponsiveness to the needs of the economy. The "Us versus Them" mentality fails us in the long run. We become entrenched and embattled, whereas, we should, as faculty, take into our selves the concern for interrelations with outside agents. This should not be the province of administrators alone.

For this to come about we need to establish the university as a site for the operation of science shops. Traditional academic relationships are structured by the same ideology that structures and informs the so-called free market. Professors are entrepreneurs competing against each other in the market place of ideas, and are plagued by similar counterproductive forces, (some claim that academic politics are more vicious than business ones), which waste energies that could be focused on solving practical social and economic problems affecting the regional area that their institutions serve. Since traditional academic arrangements are unsatisfactory for developing more participatory democratic practices of republicanism, devoted as they are to maintaining the status quo of procedural democracy which is uncommitted to any particular ends or values such as communities and caring, we should leave the traditional

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research and analysis aside, and look to the universities in the Netherlands, England and France where science shops have been in operation for over twenty years. A science shop is a cooperative arrangement in which university faculty and students offer their resources to neighborhood groups and community organizations for collaborative problem solving. The philosophy of American pragmatism, especially that of John Dewey, informs this practice of creating colleges and universities as innovative models of real community colleges whose mission includes creating itself as a modern think-tank with a focus on collaborative problem solving and strengthening participatory democracy. There is no reason why business and corporate organizations cannot play a role in this collaborative enterprise as well. What may be required as a catalyst for changes in higher education are centers for mobilizing university and community resources. These centers would facilitate the learning and forming of a culture of cooperative and collaborative problem solving addressing such things as poverty, illiteracy, homelessness, cancer and AIDS, to name a few in urgent need of attention. This is the spirit, if not the letter, of the republicanism that Dewey advocated so well. This would provide us with the needed reorientation so that integration with our larger communities could be formed on an ongoing dynamically emergent basis.

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Universities, especially those that serve the city's poor and working class, are ready-made conduits for connecting academic personnel with their students' families in poor and working class neighborhoods and communities. We must remodel higher education for the innovations required for today's workforce: collaborative adaptive workers and management teams that share responsibility of execution. This requires that we realize that the university has been producing citizens for a representative democracy rather than a strong participatory democracy. As Dewey would have said there is a lot of intelligence that lies dormant in our educational institutions, it is incumbent upon us to apply it, or better, to use it constructively. In this direction lies the making of excellence-communities, in which the focus of energies is on developing persons not commodities which are self programmed to become obsolete and disposable; as is the case with short term strategies of excellence that categorize people according to the short changed histories of their disadvantaged courses of development. Wouldn't it be grand if we took excellence to mean a focus on development and the correction of, heretofore unattended, needs and distorted relations among people struggling to achieve real community? This would give a new meaning and understanding to remediation which has been seen up until

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now as the burden of community colleges. With this new meaning and connection, excellence would be understood as a privilege not as a burden. Or as a source of pride and not of shame as it has come to be.

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Chapter 7

7. DEVELOPING POSTDISCIPLINARY INTERVENTIONS

In this chapter I describe two interventions that I believe are necessary in order to move forward with establishing a postdisciplinary psychological inquiry. The general program was outlined in the previous chapter. But there are obstacles that must be removed in order to clear a path for taking psychological inquiry in the direction of promoting academic innovation. It has struck me as puzzling as to why tenure, or its equivalent: real job security, not merely psychological security, makes innovation possible in the work and/or production of employees in business/corporate contexts, but does not in academic/university contexts. In trying to find a solution to this puzzle, I have been drawn to ask what might have happened in the history of the development of the university to produce resistance to innovation. In remarking about how "[the] technological revolution [in which] desktop computers and satellite transmission [being imported] directly into the classroom is engulfing our schools"(p. 194), Peter F. Drucker (1993) claims that the academy has not undergone any major changes in its functioning since incorporating the printed book into its instructional methods several hundred years ago. He anticipates that

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> It will transform the way we learn and the way we teach within a few decades. It will change the economics of education. From being almost labor-intensive, schools will become highly capital-intensive. (p. 194)

Although it could be argued that many factors might be contributing to the resistance to innovation in academic/university contexts-among them resistance to transforming a labor-intensive school into a capital-intensive one may loom large, I think that earlier events in the history of the academy might be salient factors in informing the posture of resistance in academia. Perhaps such penetrating changes are frightening. But we must explain why innovation is possible in the business/corporate contexts and not in the academic/university contexts. In the project developed below, under the heading "Engineering Human Learning: Science & Technology Studies in imaginative works, government censorship, and knowledge-transfer", I propose a way to go about inquiring into the history of the development of the university through the prism of the work of B. F. Skinner.

Interestingly, Skinner's (1976) publication of his utopian novel, *Walden Two,* serves as a case study for uncovering what might be understood in the terminology of Learning Theory as avoidance conditioning. This is how I propose to conceptualize the effects of government censorship in

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shaping the activities in the classroom. Generally, the work that academics do may be understood as knowledge-transfer: taking knowledge that has been produced in specialized research contexts and making it available to students typically through lecture or other methods of classroom instruction that typically involves the exchange of information about the knowledge that others have produced and our students are expected to learn. I develop this project in the following.

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I. Engineering Human Learning:

Science & Technology Studies in Imaginative works, Government Censorship, and Knowledge-Transfer.

Before improvement of knowledge-transfer in classrooms is possible by using an engineering model of education, i.e., science shops (Sclove, 1995), we must understand how the reticence of academic institutions to change its knowledge-producing activities from abstract inquiry that is objectivist and theoretical to community oriented problem-solving that is interventionist and practical, is rooted in episodes that provided painful punishments of those so inclined.

Statement of objectives:

- To study the public's understanding of the constructive use of science and technology by examining the reception of two imaginative works, B. F. Skinner's (1976) utopian *Walden Two* and William Gibson's (1984) dystopian *Neuromancer*.

- To determine in what way the slow reception of Skinner's novel by the public might be related to the connection of

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Skinner's approach to human engineering and the work of Soviet Scientists.

- To uncover the impact of government censorship on personnel at the City University of New York effected by the New York State Rupp-Coudert Committee and McCarthy investigations into un-American activities.

- To explore the reception of William Gibson's (1984) *Neuromancer* and its impact on a significant cult following through generation of a new literary genre known as cyber-punk.

- To appreciate the public's reception and imagination as psychological resistance to incorporating the agencies of science and technology for constructive purposes.

- To make site visits and ethnographic studies of two locations where "science shop" approaches to community service and university education have been successful.

- To train one graduate student and six undergraduates in the social scientific study of science and technology.

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Methods to be employed:

Archival exploration, textual and discourse analysis, interviewing, participant observation, and ethnography.

Significance for advancement of knowledge and education:

In addition to advancing our knowledge of the public's relationship to science and technology, the effects of government censorship on academic innovation, and the benefits of "science shops" in university settings, it will challenge the limits of knowledge-transfer by expanding the context of traditional learning and extending the problem-solving activity of the university to the social, political and economic aspects of the region and communities it serves.

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I. Proposed Project Rationale and Description:

Democracy along with capitalism defines the United States of America, with capitalism governing the market and democracy governing the people and civil society. Some such way of dividing the nation into economic and social spheres is plausible in theory, but less simple in reality. Though the operation of the market rests on the right to make a profit and the operation of civil society requires other rights of equality of opportunity, liberty and justice for all the people, people from the working class know that some minimal economic success is necessary for those rights to have any value at all. People less well off know that more than representative government is needed. For economic democracy, we need empowerment in order to make self-regulation spiral to levels at which we can confidently say that the participation of the people is given freely and not coerced by either their own or others economic means.

For those interested in preserving democracy where it exists and to engender it in those places where it has potential for growth, understanding the role of public and private institutions, such as universities which are vital to the cultivation of a democratic citizenry and necessary to the functioning of openly democratic societies, should be of

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paramount importance (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). Some assumptions that I have made in my work in the BMCC Project in Science, Technology and Society are that ideologies and technologies interact and mutually inform each other. That pedagogical styles influence what is learned and received by students (Glasser, 1986). And that democracy is a complex and subtle blend of technologies, which structure our development and shape our personal identities (Sclove, 1995, p. 35).

Building upon our experience of implementing and teaching four courses in Science, Technology & Society (STS) at a community college, I propose to further our investigations of the conditions best suited for learning in students of today's urban multicultural two year community colleges and four year colleges. This might seem a formidable task to those who rely on the traditional methods of instruction, and lecture classes. Yet, I encourage skepticism toward our ambitions. For we are ourselves skeptical about the capacity of the university, let alone senior and community colleges, to achieve its professed aims of knowledge production and knowledge transfer. In its defense we might say that surely the university has performed well in its mission of research and knowledge production; after all, hasn't the history of science and its application in

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technology been successful? Judged against the agendas of government and military sponsorship that is probably correct, but from the perspective of the classroom and today's student consumers, it is not (Bronfenbrenner, et. al., 1996).

And so I shall argue that once we bring knowledge into the classroom where teachers must engage students in the process of the transfer of knowledge, knowledge loses something of its value qua knowledge and becomes merely information. This distinction between knowledge and information is fundamental to my argument. Information is what lies ready to hand in a situation demanding resolution of a problem or difficulty, or in other words, that affords the opportunity of altering or changing conditions so as to bring about a desired event or outcome. If we were to take the position of Shannon and Weaver in their theory of signal detection (McNicol, 1972), we should refine our understanding of information to mean that which as a signal is not redundant and is detectable against irrelevant background fluctuations or noise. From this perspective what was other people's knowledge, i.e., of scientists and the inventors of technology, has become merely information unless it makes a difference, one detectable against a noisy background. Anyone who has listened to the music of the next generation might be at a

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loss to understand how repetitive signals can be experienced as meaningful. Isn't repetition to be counted as background noise because of its redundancy? And how is attention sustained by such redundancy? Therein lie the puzzles of communication and the limits of signal detection theory in accounting for meaning. Understanding how meaning is derived from information is precisely what is important.

Those of us in college classrooms may have despaired at the differences between students of today in comparison with the caliber of students of immigrant families of the thirties and forties. Thoughtful people have wondered what has changed in the children of new immigrants to make them resistant to learning. Perhaps they are not resistant to learning but need different conditions in which to learn. Children of past immigrants were not biologically superior to today's immigrant children; they were motivated by conditions long faded away. To summarize with cognizance of the risks of over simplifying: Yesterday's college students were on average a lot younger, living at home with their parents and motivated to please their parents with their good grades. Education was valued for its providing a way up the economic ladder, often into a respected profession. To make the comparison fair, we should continue to think of the changed populations at places like the City University

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of New York. Today's college students are older and often parents themselves, no longer with the same motives or mechanisms of appreciation that functioned as incentive for good grades as was the case for immigrant families of past migrations.

And if that were not sufficient reason to register and acknowledge the differences in today's college students, we can add another, namely, the effects of television formats on the alteration of attention in children suckled on multimedia entertainment wedged in between the ninety second commercials that have toyed with and reprogrammed their attention spans to mirror them in their shortness. The abrupt and asyncopated rhythms have no doubt affected the abilities of college students (Garbarino, 1996, p. 92).

These are two salient factors that make the lecture method ineffective as a tool for knowledge transfer. Unless of course you can exhibit showmanship of a world class caliber you may be incapable of competing for and holding their attention. But to return to the conceptual argument I have been attempting to construct, what would I have you make of the distinction between knowledge and information? I should insist that you recognize that in order for college students to make use of other people's knowledge-which is after all

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for them merely information and probably not the kind that Shannon and Weaver had intended-it must be assimilated into a conceptual scheme. Or if not assimilable, then the schema must be altered so as to facilitate the accommodation of the new information. This you may recognize as an application of the terms of understanding of the cognitive developmental theory of Jean Piaget. According to Piaget (1976), the child or adolescent learns to do this through a mental struggle to get hold of the logical structure of reality, first in concrete operations and then formal operations, eventually bringing about, through altered schemes, what Piaget called equilibrium.

Criticisms could be made of Piaget for his believing that such models of scientific thinking were more innate than cultural or if cultural then they are as thought symbolic forms that transcend idiosyncrasies of particular cultures and arise abstractly from our bodily experience (Donaldson, 1978). I would argue that it is precisely the shared nature of our physical experience as embodied and embedded sensuous thinkers which causes the physical sciences to be held in such high esteem and valued as the sine qua non for truth. A theory sensitive historically, socially, and culturally has been developed for understanding the development of all of Piaget's stages of thought (sensory motor perceptual, pre-

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operational, concrete and formal operational, and even the post-formal thought of followers of Piaget) by Soviet psychologists Lev Vygotsky (1978) and Alexander Luria (1976) and cultural psychologists (Cole, 1996; Valsiner, 1997) after them.

The developmental theory of Vygotsky permits us to see that what is personal and idiosyncratic or, better, individual, had its origins in the social. Vygotsky gave us a concept with which to understand this transfer of socially derived practices. These practices must be socially produced for them to have any meaning at all. We know from the analysis of the later Wittgenstein (1953) that thought and concepts must be governed by publicly testable criteria. Individual thought can be said to have its own nuances or interpretive meaning but unless we can find ways to operationalize these according to repeatable functions governed by criteria that others may follow, the rule of law will not hold and communication is impossible. For Vygotsky, the relationship through which practices are taught according to public criteria is an apprenticeship. And it was usually a parent but often an older sibling or other child that created the scaffolding between themselves and the novice child. Language is itself the most prominent part of the scaffolding and medium for the induction or apprenticeship

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in skills, habits and practices. And as such it is the location of knowledge transfer.

In fairness to Piagetians who cast the vote for a post-formal operational thought after studying adults outside of the traditional Western school environment, we should give credit for their beginning to discuss the needs of older learners. According to this literature, older adults develop not more formal operations but, what post-formal theorists call, practical-oriented or problem-focused learning (Denney, et. al., 1991, 1981). Adjustments to the contexts of learning are in operation in some public schools but resistance to academic innovation arises in college classrooms where increasingly we find more experienced older students who are not learning under the old methods.

To take our communities and ourselves to the further reaches of development, making the until-now-only-dreamt-of reality, we must ask: why has knowledge transfer become such a problem? And how can we surmount the obstacles that impede our moving in these hitherto aspired directions? It is not sufficient to bemoan our plight as teachers; we cannot and, morally speaking must not discard our students as incapable of learning. Rather we must revise our teaching. And the

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path lies ready at hand for doing this (Sinnott & Johnson, 1996).

Using the concept of post-formal thinking and the notion of apprenticeship, we may look at how to make the classroom a laboratory of life in the sense that John Dewey meant it. Instead of thinking of the classroom as a space in which rehearsal, to use the dramatic model, for life or getting ready or prepared for life transpires, we should understand that the classroom is a place of embodiment and embededness in which growth and development on the part of students as well as teachers occurs. A way to do this is to use the inherent curiosity of our students; we should let them help us as teachers to see where they may grow and develop. In the student populations of today's urban multicultural four year and community colleges there is much experience to draw upon, regardless of the discipline that is taught.

I would argue that it is not the students who are at fault or defective in their capacities for learning. Clearly the responsibility lies with teachers who must learn to reform their practices in order to meet the needs of students. We can do this if we rely upon an idealization of the community college as a model for all colleges; they are strategically positioned between us and the communities they serve. And

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the "science shop" model of universities in Netherlands can be modified to become teams of students in learning companies in which experts, teachers, students and community groups interact to solve problems. This is an ideal context for learning.

Valuable reforms of liberal education have been proposed. According to Martha Nussbaum (1997), still of value in a liberal education is the Socratic method so as to teach critical thinking. Also, necessary is instruction in and exercise of narrative imagination. And needed for functioning as world citizens is appreciation and understanding of the experience of women and minorities from different class, race and ethnic locations found in the multicultural additions to the curriculum. Following Nussbaum we should add to her three emphases of a reformed liberal education the practical and problem focused approach to classroom learning that has been a quality of the experience of engineering and science students at some universities that I am calling science shops or learning companies.

In order to understand the reluctance of faculty to move toward an engineering model of undergraduate education we should explore experiments that were tried but subverted, as

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well as study where they are successfully operating. For the latter there are two sites: Worcester Polytechnic Institute in Worcester, Massachusetts and in several universities in the Netherlands where science shops have been operating for over twenty years. And for the former I propose a diagnostic and historic exploration of two strategic moments in modern times when opportunities existed but weren't developed. These are demarcated by two imaginative works of literature explained below.

I propose a research project that will explore the role of the university in America in fostering and mediating, if not sustaining, a shift in the public's expectations of the use and impact of existent and future technologies from that of promise and utopia to hesitation and dystopia. Curtailment of the promising role of the university in problem-solving in social, economic and political areas of community life may be measured by the audience reception of two novels, one utopian and the other dystopian. The first is *Walden Two* (1948) by B. F. Skinner and the second is *Neuromancer* (1984) by William Gibson. I develop this project in the following. Explorations of technology have represented it as both dream and symptom of the social body. Another way these aspects may be understood is to think of dream as use and symptom as impact. With this mapping we connect with a wide literature

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which explores on the one hand the constructive purposes for which technologies are used in bringing about utopian worlds of all sorts, and on the other hand the mostly deleterious and undesired consequences of modern technologies as these have impacted on the social body. Depending on perspective and evaluative criteria, dream and symptom are marks, either utopian or dystopian, found on the social body. Though both dimensions of technology have always persisted, history shows a shift in the prominence of one or the other in the attitudes of the public. Perhaps the point at which to mark the utopian promise would be after World War II when the public was infused with the more hopeful expectation that technology would serve to carry us into a dreamy future of convenience, comfort and security. And the moment marking the onslaught of the less hopeful period in which we rest, in any manner but easily, now is the end of the Cold War. This much is clear and well represented in the fields of research and literature. But little is understood of how these changes are mitigated and sustained.

The idea that guides this project is that the reticence of academic institutions to cross the boundary between abstract inquiry that is objectivist and theoretical to community oriented problem-solving that is interventionist and practical has its roots in episodes that provided painful

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punishments of those who considered crossing. As landmarks in this study of utopian and dystopian emergence in American culture, Skinner's *Walden Two* and Gibson's *Neuromancer* play key roles in demarcating the transformation from a hopeful enthusiasm for creative application of powerful principles discovered by behavioral science promising revolutionary living to a bleak outlook represented in the technological nightmare of Gibson's Cage as fallen dark character living in the "future as present" metaphorical corruption of human life form who's downtrodden and mechanically altered in an emblazoned cybernetic system of decadence, deformity and decay. What has transpired between these two literary episodes to change our outlook from one of cautious optimism to reckless abandonment?

To answer the question of what has transpired between these two literary episodes to change our outlook, I propose to look at the reception of Skinner's *Walden* in journals, magazines, newspapers and books of the day. In particular the connection between the slow (judged by book sales) and poor reception of Skinner's *Walden* and the Red scare focused in America by the hearings of Senator Joseph McCarthy in 1952 will be examined. But even earlier in the Municipal College System that became The City University of New York there were witch-hunts launched by the investigations of the

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Rupp-Coudert Committee of the New York State Legislature. The work of this committee was conducted throughout the 1940s and ended with the termination of some forty subversives who worked at CUNY.

My suspicion is that there is a relationship between the witch-hunts of academic subversives by the Rupp-Coudert Committee and the terror of McCarthyism on the optimism and interventionist strategies of what would become a rather timid and well-behaved CUNY faculty. Though the behaviorism of Skinner took off wildly in the educational technology of the fifties as a broader technoscience for constructing social organizations and community life, it was by its connections through Skinner and the intellectual life of Pavlov, and others in the Soviet sponsored and communist imploded research laboratories much too threatening to what were then regarded as American interests.

Skinner himself explains the slow take off of the popularity of his *Walden* some seven or more years after its initial release in 1948 as due to the fact that the American public was unfamiliar with the concept and approach of human engineering. This was plausible at the time of Skinner's conjecture, but how are we now to explain the popularity and cult-like following of the cyberpunk generation that has

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rallied round Gibson's dystopian novel, *Neuromancer*? Why this turn from light-hearted optimism to darkness and gloom, perhaps even downright gleeful wallowing and resurgence in cynicism? Perhaps it should be understood more as a turn to spiteful pessimism. How could this eruption of cynicism have happened unless a smoldering radicalism lies beneath the turmoil of this present and future technological dystopia? And this radicalism, if nurtured and directed, might bring forth a fuller democratic society in which the university would become a site for a contemporary think-tank that would serve as liaison for organizing problem-solving in the affected communities it serves. Instead of preparing for life, the classroom would be transformed into what Dewey thought it was all along, a laboratory of life. This project hopes to make inroads toward this goal of a reinvented university.

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II. Developing Standpoint-Based Action Research:

As an example of the kind of action research from standpoint perspectives including gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality, I propose to define an experimental situation in which bodies are given voice both traditionally in terms of speaking and in the more technological sense of bodies interfacing with machinery to give voice or expression of its energetic meanings that would otherwise remain mute. This study also operates in the area of psychoneuroimmunological research (Ader, 1981), an activity that integrates the relations between bodies, voices and psychological inquiry.

Rationale and Theoretical Context

One of the obstacles to the kind of action-oriented and community-based research that I wish to undertake is the attitude, often expressed by progressives, that in order to change the technoscientific institutions of science, technology, and engineering, you must first change the structures of the larger society in which they function. In what immediately follows I shall discuss this kind of thinking, and develop a proposal for studying the effects of discrimination mentioned before on the bodies and voices of

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minority groups. Hidden in the attitude of professionalism that I find objectionable is a passive/ reactionary assumption that change in more circumscribed sectors of society must follow authorization from the larger society. This in-itself is a form of learned helplessness that I introduce latter. In its most general form learned helplessness means that our imagination has become limited by exposure to past punishments for taking initiative. It is better known in industrial-organizational parlance as co-optation by the powers that be.

Freud comes most readily to mind when thinking about the influence of fantasy on our perceptions of reality; he assumed that civilization was the collective outcome of the efforts of human beings to control their own nature. And he analyzed the defensive maneuvers that humans engaged in to ward off the helpless feelings of not really being in control of our own destinies. In a work about "Technoscientific Angst," Raphael Sassower (1997) tries to carve out the sphere of responsibility for technoscientific inventions; he apportions much responsibility to the public, and limits the extent to which technoscientists may be held responsible by claiming that the myths of capitalism and of technoscience are the same insofar as they both assume that individuals are free and equal. This is inaccurate according

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to Sassower, though it is an inaccuracy that the public wants to live with. As with most apologists for the hegemonic institutions, he asserts that first you must change the larger society before you can change the workings of the technoscientific community which he says is not exactly a microcosm but, nonetheless, it lives by the same myths that structure our bureaucratic lives in the rest of society. Sassower explores the dimension of control as an antecedent to deciding about apportioning responsibility, beginning with Freud but moving quickly to Ernest Gellner.

According to Gellner, there are three formulations that may be taken as the basis for the epistemological predicament in societies. The first is the mechanistic world-view in which it is assumed that explanations of nature may be reduced to just one on the material or mechanical plane. The second is the view that chaos is the basis of reality. But Gellner believes that no society has ever accepted this since all societies assume that some conceptual ordering of the universe is always possible. So, he rejects it, though Sassower shows that Michel Serres claims that it is up to philosophy to make useable the scientific concept of chaos in the wider human circle of society. The third alternative is the magical one in which fantastical concepts are permitted in order to explain reality. Under this third

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option Gellner claims mythical explanation supplements material conceptions of reality. Sassower appeals to the Stoic, Epictetus, for a non-reductive approach; the Stoic's ledger is defined as a list that divides those things under our control from those that are not. The secret of human happiness lies in knowing the difference.

But according to Sassower's reading of both Freud and Gellner, the blurring of what goes on which side of the Stoic's ledger is a constant mistake that human beings make because they don't embrace reality head on but rather through their interpretive concepts. Sassower claims that the strong thesis of the Edinburgh School-which claims that all we ever have are the conceptions that have been socially constructed by members of the technoscientific community-is not a reasonable one because the public will not accept it. Sassower believes that the weaker version of social construction is acceptable to the public because common sense has it that there is something out there that we are trying to explain and <u>that</u> something has an independence of our interpretations.

I have argued that the strong social construction thesis as it has been applied to explaining homo-eroticism is also not a reasonable alternative. It explains nothing except how

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experts have evaluated and judged the activity of individuals who engage in expressions of same-sex love. I have arrived at the proposal that we would all be better off without the attribution of sexual difference to males and to females. Of course, this is comparable to the sentiment of those who desire a color blind, or non-racist society. It is a great wish, but as it stands now, there is much to be done to convince people of the harm done by bifurcating women and men according to sex characteristics that have no doubt arisen and been acquired under historically definite conditions. The problem of how to enlighten society returns. Thinkers such as Sassower inherit part of the difficulty with Enlightenment thought which tried to separate reason from emotion. Though he certainly wants to overcome the heritage of dividing ourselves in two-with one part that thinks and another part that feels. This is the sine-qua-non of objectivity that Robert Merton claims as one of the norms that guide the technoscientific community. Precisely, the norm of "universalism" guides our production of knowledge so that knowledge is objective and in so being it applies to everyone and benefits all equally. I still find that attractive but in thinking that the way to achieve that is through separating our feelings from our thoughts as if to say that thought could be unfettered by emotion is a mistake.

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To find a correction for that we need to consult the Santiago theory of cognition (Capra, 1996): the founders of which are Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela (1998). They have set forth a non-representational theory of mind. These thinkers showed that cognition is part of the activity of every living cell. A cell as the smallest unity that is self-producing (auto-poietic) knows and judges what to take in through its membrane and what to expel. This is to say that judgment is a function of processes that are determined by the structure of the cell. And these judgments do seem to me to qualify as cognitive in a meaningful sense. Understanding cognition at this basic level will permit Maturana and Varela to remain consistent in their explanation of auto-poiesis in all forms of life, including the complex form that is ours as human beings. Quite elegantly, they show how multi-cellular unities developed with specialized cell structures. The three main types are: sensory, motor, and nerve cells. With the creation of nerves communication between distant parts of the multi-cellular organism is possible. But this is all preparatory for the really significant construction of the Santiago theory of cognition.

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Other primates as well as we are capable of behaving in ways that are meaningful. That is, we perform expressive behaviors that are linguistic. This is not for Maturana and Varela what differentiates us from our non-languaging primate ancestors. Though primates are capable of engaging in communicative activities wherein they signal meaningfully to each other in order to organize and coordinate their activities, and as such live in linguistic domains, they do not as we do engage in "making distinctions about our linguistic distinctions"(Maturana & Varela, 1998, p. 210). The latter is their definition or criteria for languaging. Language then becomes something of a theory of logical types, or ways of categorizing happenings as we have experienced their meaning through our own activity of self-production.

But how can this help us to engage in community-linked action research as I have proposed in the description of science shops above? The Santiago theory of cognition unfolds to say that there are really two brains in our bodies: one is the nervous system, and the other is the immune system. And there is a chemical network that communicates between the two brains, namely the neurotransmitters many, which have been made known through the pioneering work of Candace Pert. According to Pert

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(1997) and her associates, every transaction that is occurring in our bodies and in the processing known collectively as mind is coded for its special emotional quality; neurotransmitters are the bearers of these emotional accents. Approximately eighty-eight different neuro-peptides have been discovered. The first and most celebrated discovery made by Candace Pert was the location of the opiate pain-receptors in our brains. But Pert has gone on to elaborate a whole network of neurotransmitters that interconnect between the brain and immune system. As she says when you feel things at a gut level that is the experience of neurotransmitters affecting our digestive organs.

From this new empirical research, what should we conclude? I would answer: There is no way to separate reason from emotion; emotion is the vehicle for transporting signals within the auto-poietic structures of our bodies. Our bodies are structurally self-maintaining unities that may be affected by their environments-natural and social. When we are perturbed, that is the term that Maturana and Varela use to describe action from outside our bodies, we respond so as to continue the structural coupling that has come about through both our species/phylogenetic and individual/ontogenetic histories of adaptation and

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development with the naturally drifting (changing) universe/world. The phenomena of structural coupling is both magnificent and terrifying at the same time. It is ever so subtle in its relation to change and potential disaster. The latter is perturbations from which we won't recover. And the magnificence stems from the elegance through which our bodies are self-regulating, and self maintaining in their auto-poietic adjustments.

In a chapter called "The Constancy Sea Within Maintains the Constancy Within," Sherwin B. Nuland (1997) provides a meditation on the aesthetic wonders of life and cell organization as follows:

> The result of primitive life's eons-long developmental process has been the begetting of organisms for which the elements of survival and reproduction were only the starting point toward generating hosts of specialized capacities, including at last the capacity to feel and savor conscious pleasure.
>
> Not pleasure alone but also the ability to anticipate it and reflect on it are distinctive qualities of our species. So far have we gone beyond our basic self-protective and propagating drives that we have in the process become endowed with such wonders and marvels as abstract reasoning: the personal and communal wherewithal to build and preserve highly organized civilizations; a level of altruism so far removed from simple instinctual self-preservation that it sometimes runs counter to it, and by doing so becomes an exemplary societal ideal-to sacrifice for others; and perhaps above all, a sense of beauty and even spirituality. Without question, these are all qualities magnificently transcendent to the simple requirements of DNA transmission. So transcendent are they, in fact, that they seem a reward for having persevered-an extra

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> we have granted ourselves, or been granted, as a gift for making proper use of the extraordinary brain with which nature has favored us.
>
> But perhaps even our search for beauty, it might be argued, can in a sense be traced back to the primitive drive to preserve DNA. Pleasure is the eventual trophy for obeying our instincts of survival; pleasure makes life valuable and worth sustaining. The varied forms in which it has been discovered and created by humanity cannot be fully considered except in the context of biologic adaptability and an understanding of the fabric of the human body. And yet, in the full range and power of esthetic thought, there is a quality unexplainable on the mere basis of sustaining life.
>
> I choose to say *fabric* advisedly here. When the greatest of all anatomists, … Vesalius, … in 1543 he used the word in the kinetic sense in which it is understood during the Renaissance, to mean not only the edifice but also the workings that take place within it. The human spirit, I believe, is something we have created from the fabric of our human body. (p. 29-30)

It is a long way to travel up the spiral of adaptation and development to come to terms with what is going on when human beings categorize themselves according to gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality. But this is where I am proposing we should go with the Santiago theory of cognition.

In Maturana and Varela's view, languaging makes awareness of the linguistic domains possible. It makes the awareness of a self possible; it is the vehicle of self-consciousness. We are not merely reactive or expressive in attempting to coordinate our auto-poietic activities but we are aware of

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our differences, even better to say that we are making those distinctions prominent in our mutual recognition.

Two kinds of questions may arise at this juncture: one is the why of it all and the other is the how of it. I think that the why is the easier of the two to answer: We have constructed hierarchies of differences according to the moral and aesthetic values that have animated our form of life. Basically we are a warring civilization. I do not accept that this is inevitable or that it is in our nature, as Freud thought, to be aggressive. Otherwise, if we did not find targets for our aggressive drives, we would turn those forces against ourselves in self-destruction. The real threat of self-destruction lies in how we differentially value our differences. As with human ecology, I accept that diversity is a good thing, and that it is natural for variation to occur as new unities are produced that offer new forms of structural coupling among members of our species and the whole ecological domain. But to rise to comprehend things according to an ecological perspective is made possible from appreciating something of what Sherwin Nuland captured in the quotation I inserted above concerning the wonder of life.

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It is time to reconsider our way of life: in being a warring civilization it has been the accepted way of dividing labor so as to differentiate the males from the females. Probably this was so because the females bore the new offspring and men did not. This meant that men were relatively expendable in terms of survival of the species/group but women were not. So, as the reproductive specialization delineated males from females we found a basis for distinguishing between genders, thereby creating gender roles for men that indeed separated reason from emotion: how else could we train young men to fight and kill other men? If boys were raised the same as girls, we would not have the advantage of good killing machines. But now I think that technoscientific developments have created a choice both deadly but also beneficial for gender differentiation. With the high-tech instrumentation, it is not necessary that we train our boys to become men capable of brutal hand to hand or face to face combat. We could have our attacks launched and guided by computer technology. No need to maim our boys and no longer necessary to distinguish between men and women in this regard: both are equally capable of pushing buttons or operating programs that lead to destruction of the enemy.

The question of who gets constituted as the enemy is a whole other question. And it must be asked along with the question

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of whose interests are served by having an economy based to such a large extent on war anyway. But I want to back down from pursuing that larger question and instead look at how we might study the ways that distinctions according to gender, race/ethnicity, and sexuality operate in our social structural couplings. For this I think Valerie Walkerdine has raised an interesting proposal. She has suggested that we need explore the how of making distinctions about distinctions affects the ongoing structure of our identities.

According to Walkerdine (1997),

> Any subject is produced in practices regulated through the twin poles of fantasy and reality (science, truth). But those stories, truthful or fictional narratives do not have the whole measure of the subject. As I have argued elsewhere, both the fictional and factual discourses have their gaps and absences, things that they simple do not speak about. Subjects then, struggle to find their own stories through which they might articulate other kinds of stories to understand their own formation and transformation. (p. 176)

Specifically, in the construction of a field of critical psychology, Walkerdine proposes to ask how the media works to engage us in our identity formation, in the production of our subjectivity. I too am interested in this question: it has often seemed that the media could put me into a fantastical space that was more exciting than my own life. Though this might work to my good, it has seemed in the

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balance to be negative. I have been unhappy at the comparison. The media can present me with a kaleidoscope of emotional ups and down within a two hour period that makes my own life pale in comparison. In particular I have felt impatient for change and though it occurs at lightning speed in films and television, it crawls at a snails pace in the array of events that constitute my own life. But, what's a person to do? When looking for entertainment as a pause or break from the drill of work, how does one find recreational entertainment that is not exploitative or destructive in being colonizing? Fron the perspective of Maturana and Varela, we are each affected in our self-production and self-regulation by events that disturb us favorably or adversely. And, the media is a most powerful form of disturbance in our social technoscientific society.

Walkerdine (1997) "believes that the work of understanding the production of subjectivity in the present conjuncture is a politically important one"(p. 176). And so do I. For her,

> the failure of grand narratives in the so-called 'developed world' has left a profound pessimism, which is to be countered not by a nostalgia or a denial but by the work of building afresh some new stories. … [T]he political moment of simply deconstructing the modern has passed. To be politically effective, this must be joined together with the work of building new narrative frameworks, which do not have as their basis the grand meta-narratives that have been and still are so central to our regulation. Understanding and taking these apart is clearly a central part of the project that I am outlining, but I am stressing that this is

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> not enough to understand how subjectivity is lived today and how it might be lived tomorrow. (p. 176)

I would add an emphasis concerning the grand meta-narratives that have been and still are so central to our regulation: I would say central to our regulation by others, and against our own best interests. As auto-poietic unities, we live in an interdependent world in which we each are capable of perturbing, or changing the lives of others. The question that I wish to raise is how we can best resist the negative, destructive impacts of other perturbations that are enacted through the means of social structures and institutions that we have not agreed to, or by which we no longer wish to be ruled or governed.

But it seems to me that we do not have to look far or elsewhere for our enemies; for that, we need only look around in our differentiated communities. We have, in ways not desirable, accepted hierarchies that target certain groups for attack, among them blacks, women, and queers. Racism, sexism, and homophobia are forms of aggression that are wasteful and counterproductive in today's world. They rob us of our dignity, our humanity, and our potential for growth and development. How can we investigate the ways that these form of subjectivity structure our communication and darken our lives in terms of health both bodily and

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emotionally? That is the important question and that is the one I will propose a method of answering.

The Experimental Design

In order to examine the effects of discrimination on minority groups, I propose to study the effects of witnessing racist, sexist, and homophobic acts on members of identity groups as blacks, women, and gays. Originally I was interested in seeing in what ways living in a prejudiced society might effect the immune systems of gay youths who were, at the time, especially high risk for contracting HIV infection through unprotected/unsafe sex practices. It might be expected that gay youths would engage in high risk activities because 1) of their low self-esteem which might lead them to engage in self-destructive actions such as unsafe sexual encounters with partners whose HIV status was unknown, and 2) for medical reason of their immune system being compromised (lower immunity in general) due to depression that arises from feeling badly about one's self as reflected in the low self-regard gays have in our societies of discrimination. The inclusion of other forms of discrimination in the study was to get an idea of the impact of those forms of discrimination in creating stress and consequently on suppression of testable immune indicators,

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e.g., suppression of 'immuno-globulin A' molecules that are present in the saliva of humans. In experiments on medical students it has been established that during periods of stress, e.g., during final examinations, the levels of 'immuno-globulin A' are lower than in non-stressful times. Stress might be evaluated by subjective verbal reports but also by measuring the electrical conductance of the skin surface on the palms known as the Palmer or galvanic skin response. This measure would represent the fearfulness of the subjects as they witnessed video presentations of episodes, some real and some dramatic enactments, in which persons with black, female, and gay identities would be attacked, beaten, and berated with hate speech by assailants.

It was anticipated that self-concept and self-identity would interact with the experience of the witnessed events of hateful attack. For example, in a black person who was not at risk for HIV (because s/he did not engage in unsafe sex practices, and was not gay identified) when witnessing a gay bashing s/he would not express fearfulness because their own identification was not with the victims but with members of their own identity group. But when a black person witnessed acts of racist assault, it would be expected that fear and

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immune suppression would result as a consequence of the close identification of the victim.

More subtlety was desired in determining the relationship between emotional reactions of fear (and stress levels) and the witnessing subject's identity. To engage with this I thought that Martin Seligman's phenomenon of learned helplessness would be of use: Seligman (1992) has shown that this condition may be represented in an animal model in which dogs acquired the condition of learned helplessness when they were repeatedly punished for any response that they tried to perform in escaping from a staged situation. This has also been modeled in laboratory rats. The conclusions drawn from the animal experiments is that 'helplessness saps the motivation to initiate responses.' The applicability of this to the effects of racism, sexism, and homophobia should be obvious: when victims of discrimination are faced with new challenges they will not be motivated to try when they have been punished for such initiatives in their past. Discrimination, since it is arbitrary applied, is punitive just for the fact of the persons being black or female or gay. Or any combination of those categories. Though persons do accomplish things despite living under prejudicial conditions. And what I wanted to know was something about why and how those who

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accomplish things despite discrimination, and why and how come those who were more adversely effected by discrimination could not accomplish things or overcome the effects of past punishments.

Seligman's research with humans has shown that persons who have bad things happen to them acquire learned helplessness when they expect that the future will be a repeat of the past. There are several lines along which Seligman (1992) has traced this condition.

> Laboratory experiments on helplessness produce three deficits: they undermine the motivation to learn, they retard the ability to learn that responding works, and they result in emotional disturbance, primarily anxiety and depression. (p. 6)

States of anxiety and depression, Seligman has found, are related to uncontrollability and unpredictability. Subjects who have acquired a condition of learned helplessness are characterized as those who when a negative event occurs (such as a loss of some kind, e.g., employment) they tend to generalized this event as going to happen to more individuals with similar characteristics to the person first affected by the event, and they also think that this event will happen again in the future. This Seligman calls making the tragedy pervasive.

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In applying the findings of Seligman and others to the subjects in my proposed experimental situation, I would suggest that the health of our minority group subjects is affected by the witnessing of events that show aggressive attacks of a discriminatory nature against members of their own group. One would hope that all sensitive people would be outraged at injustice, but I would hasten to say that injustice and rage is not the same complex emotion that one experiences in the condition of learned helplessness, especially when that subject generalizes according to identity group membership and makes the expectation of future negative occurrences pervasive in their imagination. In the extreme, Seligman (1992) has found that death may be brought about by over stimulation of the sympathetic nervous system. This might happen to subjects who are so overwhelmed by fear that their limbic systems, e.g., amygdala, become hyper-responsive to situations that have associations to feared or dangerous stimulation. Recently, humans have been tested in situations where MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) readings of the amygdala are made showing that even when the danger is merely expected, subjects have excitation in the central nuclei of the amygdala region. This indicates that the fear response is conditioned and generalizes to uncontrollable and unpredictable events whether real or imagined (Hall, 1999).

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The technology is ready to hand for testing some of the hypothesized effects of discrimination: I think that it is time we made evident the ways that living in a society that arbitrarily discriminates (in violent and pervasive ways) against minority groups. This would be powerful to show that not just one's psychological health is impaired but also your bodily well-being. Thus, living in a society in which you are conditioned to fear socially adverse stigma as minority group stereotyping tends to produce in its victims, we might have proof that the hurt or harm is in our bodies and not just our minds. And we could extend the practice of mindfulness (Langer, 1989), that is the inheritance of Zen Buddhism and other traditions (Varela, et. al., 1991), to help us recover our experience of our lived bodies, and of the materially significant otherness that is the property of other bodies that have been forged in onto-genetic histories of oppression and colonization. It would also call us to form interdisciplinary communities within technoscience in order to implement the kinds of action-oriented and community-based research that would serve the interests of all of humanity. The excitement of new fields such as cognitive immunology beckons us to move on to the promising next era of technoscience (Toffler, 1994).

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