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WITTGENSTEIN AND SCHIZOPHRENIA:
ON THE GRAMMAR OF WILL AND THE LIMITS OF METAPSYCHOLOGY

by
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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

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CHAPTER ONE

1. Mr. D., a man in his mid-twenties, tells of his previous hospitalization in a nearby state psychiatric facility. How for several months he had refused to speak to anyone. His therapist described him as "mute, isolative, seeming internally pre-occupied." The subject of his absorption?

For that time I worked real hard. It was exhausting. I would sit in the corner of the day room. You see I would be busy, working inside my body. I would travel in my body, checking the machinery. You know, the organs, the liver, heart all that....For what reason you ask....To make sure they were all working right. If they weren't I would work on them....And I am now nearly done. They are almost all ready....For what? So I can emerge of course. Emerge as The Master, what I know myself to be. Master, you ask? Yes, master of the universe! Yes, as my breath is the wind, my tears the rain, my semen the snow....

In Wittgenstein's language we might speak of Mr. D. as providing a "signpost" for us, indicating to us a way to proceed. Several aspects of Mr. D.'s experience will be of particular interest to us: The sense of being far from life, apart--this combined with a keen focus on the mechanism of coming into being, on agency; and the sense of a link between emergence into life and self-dissolution.

2. The sense of apartness, of standing outside life, which was suggested above in Mr. D.'s delusional construction, is frequently evident in schizophrenic experience. We are here in the territory of what has been termed "schizophrenic autism."

E. Bleuler speaks of the "pathological predominance of the inner life" in schizophrenic individuals:

The most severe schizophrenics, who have no more contact with the outside world, live in a world of their own. They have encased themselves with their desires and wishes (which they consider fulfilled) or occupy themselves with the trials and tribulations of their persecutory ideas; they have cut themselves off as much as possible from any contact with the external world.

This detachment from reality, together with the relative and absolute predominance of the inner life, we term autism (Bleuler, 1950, p. 63).

E. Minkowski (1970) describes "the loss of vital contact with reality" as characteristic of schizophrenia. As has been pointed out by J. Parnas and P. Bovet, Minkowski's approach extends the sense of schizophrenic autism beyond Bleuler's definition, with its "predominance of a withdrawal element" (Parnas and Bovet, 1991, p. 14). Influenced by the philosopher Henri Bergson, Minkowski sees schizophrenic autism less in terms of introversion and more as a matter of being out of touch with

the depths, with the very essence of our personality, in which it links with the world around us. And this world is not just a collection of external stimuli, of atoms, forces and energy. It is a moving stream which envelops us at all points and constitutes the milieu without which we would not know how to live (Minkowski, 1927, p 191).

Extending Minkowski's conceptualization, Bovet and Parnas seek to link "delusion formation to the autistic predisposition," which they regard as "the elementary phenotypic expression of the vulnerability to schizophrenia." Autism is "viewed as a defective preconceptual (i.e., before language) attunement to the world." (Bovet and Parnas, 1993, p. 579)

3. My central theme in this dissertation: How we may view Wittgenstein as bringing us inside schizophrenic experience. Particularly, how he brings us inside around the issue seen above, the issue of being inside or outside life. In so doing he will help us give this issue a philosophical place and, I hope to show, a clinical home as well.

Consider from Wittgenstein:

"Only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick. Looked at from outside, there it is, lifeless and isolated."--It is as if at first we looked at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped back, and were now outside it; we saw the frame, and the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our intention's pictures, and we are inside them. But when we step outside intention, they are mere patches on a canvas, without life and of no interest to us. When we intend, we exist in the space of intention, among the pictures (shadows) of intention, as well as with real things. Let us imagine we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entering into the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film continues on the screen. But suddenly we are outside it and see it as movements of light and dark patches on a screen. (Wittgenstein, 1967, #233. Hereinafter referred to as Z.)

And now it seems to us as if intending could not be any process at all, of any kind whatsoever.--For what we are dissatisfied with here is the grammar of process, not the specific kind of process.--It could be said: we should call any process "dead" in this sense. (Z, #236)

Notice the kinship here with the evocation of a core schizophrenic experience above. Consider the similar focus on being inside or out, and on the movement between these. Notice too how attention is being given to the agency of such a shift, the vehicle of its coming about--as in Mr.

D.'s concern with the means to his emergence. Wittgenstein's interlocutor invokes the intention, the act of meaning, as the imagined necessary vehicle to traverse the imagined gap between self and world: "only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick." Here the movement "into reality" is crucial. And notice: as with Mr. D. above, we are drawn to the idea of movement via a certain connection, one that has a quality of necessity or ineluctability to it.

Consider also the question whether one's experience, one's world, is alive or dead. Can we sense how this question finds expression in Mr. D.'s self-description, how it may take the form: "Am I alive or dead?" Might we be able to see a kinship between the assumptions made in a schizophrenic attempt to "bring oneself alive" and the philosopher's assumptions regarding the conditions needed for meaningful reference to the world.

I want to say that within schizophrenic experience we can see the in-life manifestation of Wittgenstein's above dilemma, where, as it were, the light has come up, and one feels "far away" from the flow of life. In so being apart, that which one confronts may appear strange or dead, a thing--rather than a live entity, in or through which, we might say, one could be expressed.

In Two Accounts of a Journey Through Madness, Mary Barnes well evokes this experience:

I can remember as a child, and all through my life, having very strange feelings. I would seem to go away, right away from everything and everywhere. I didn't belong anywhere. I would jolt myself back, perhaps by touching something....I was empty and not there, not anywhere. If someone spoke with me, it didn't seem to be me. It was "just a thing"--I had gone. Sometimes it was quite difficult to come back because familiar things didn't seem the same. The air had changed and everything was alien as if I was on the moon and was just something--anything, not a person, me. There was a feeling of deadness, of being in a blind alley. My soul was musty, like a cobweb in the dust (Barnes and Berke, 1991, p. 26).

Can we let ourselves begin, in Wittgenstein's words, "to be struck" by such kinships as we can glimpse here? Indeed, the fact that we are here to be "struck" is, I hope to show, crucially related to the way in which Wittgenstein thought of his philosophy as having a therapeutic intent.

What is your aim in philosophy?--To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (Wittgenstein, 1953, #309. Hereinafter referred to as PI.)

4. Regarding the reference to "grammar" in Wittgenstein's above remark, to our dissatisfaction with the "grammar of process": Consider how our dissatisfaction in the particular circumstances described, our sense of deadness, is being linked by Wittgenstein to a broader discontent with an aspect of the way in which we are seeking to capture experience in language. Here it is our attempting to grasp intention within the language of mental processes that leaves us dissatisfied. What is it about the "grammar of process" that leads to such a result? What bearing would

answering this question have on our understanding of the dynamics of "being outside/being inside" as these are suggested by Mr. D.'s self-description? In this dissertation I will argue for the significance of the fact that certain philosophical dilemmas around agency, will and meaning can, strikingly, be seen to be "instantiated" within schizophrenic experience.

That this understanding may bear clinical fruit is suggested when we consider the passage in the Investigations that immediately precedes Wittgenstein's expression of the liberative, freeing-the-fly, purpose of his philosophy:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise?--The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them--we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)--And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them (PI, #308).

The possibility that the "conjuring trick" here has bearing within schizophrenic experience is made more apparent when we note that the fly to be liberated by Wittgenstein's work is elsewhere linked by him with the solipsist, with the one who

flutters and flutters in the flyglass, strikes

against the walls, flutters further. How can he be brought to rest? (Wittgenstein, 1971, p. 256)

5. My approach will suggest ways in which the conceptual issues which fuel metapsychological investigations into the nature of human agency can themselves be manifested clinically. That is to say, they can, therefore, be seen to not be separable from, prior to, "behind," or "beneath" clinical practice. Rather, I will explore the way in which they can be seen to be "instantiated" within practice.

I will show how Wittgenstein's presentation of an interrelated set of issues around agency, will and meaning can provide us with a framework within which to understand schizophrenic experience; how it might, in fact, be viewed as presenting aspects of schizophrenic experience. From this perspective, Wittgenstein's belief that philosophy is a form of therapy becomes quite tangible. Might his work be usefully regarded as providing clues to the therapeutic meaning of schizophrenic states of being?

I hope to demonstrate how within schizophrenic experience we commonly see an attempt to be, what I will term, "present at creation." This longing can, I will argue, be understood dynamically and can be seen to constitute an "in-life" manifestation, an instantiation, of philosophical issues that Wittgenstein is addressing in his discussion of the "grammar of will," specifically as revealed in his analysis of the context and consequences of our attempt to "experience 'the because.'" That is to say,

our understanding of these "conceptual" dilemmas will provide insight into the "grammar," in Wittgenstein's sense, of schizophrenic experience itself. I will, therefore, be developing a line of thinking which enables us to see how we may see within schizophrenic experience an in-life playing out of a philosophical concern with the nature of meaning, intention, and will. (As opposed, for example, to regarding schizophrenia as a "disease of the will" (as in, e.g., Bleuler, 1950, pp. 70f)).

My understanding of the philosophical significance of schizophrenic experience has been deepened by my reading of the recent work of Louis Sass on schizophrenia and, specifically, on the way in which Wittgenstein's work opens a new vantage point on schizophrenic experience. Though I will take exception to a central tendency of Sass' approach, I am indebted to his work for providing a framework within which we might begin to view schizophrenia differently.

Before presenting my account of the ways in which philosophical issues are instantiated within schizophrenic experience, I begin with a critique of the work of several contemporary psychoanalytic writers who have concerned themselves with the relationship between metapsychological theory and clinical practice. It is here, I hope, that certain key limitations upon metapsychological theorizing will be revealed. I then present an account of Wittgenstein's treatment of the philosophical "problems"

arising in our attempts to understand human agency. In so doing, I will develop the in-life significance of the metapsychological limits revealed in my opening discussion. In the fourth chapter of this dissertation, I take up a discussion of Sass' work as a means to opening my investigation of the clinical significance of the schizophrenic instantiation of philosophical issues concerning agency, will, and meaning.

6. A word on the style of this dissertation.

Wittgenstein states that "A philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'" (PI, #123). He likened his role as philosopher to that of one who guides us toward a hands-on understanding of potentially confusing territory.

In teaching you philosophy I'm like a guide showing you how to find your way around London. I have to take you through the city from north to south, from east to west, from Euston to the embankment and from Piccadilly to the Marble Arch. After I have taken you on many journeys through the city, in all sorts of directions, we shall have passed through any given street a number of times--each time traversing the street as part of a different journey. At the end of this you will know London; you will be able to find your way about like a born Londoner (Gasking and Jackson, 1967, p. 51).

In seeking to apply Wittgenstein's insights to the often labyrinthine worlds that characterize schizophrenic experience, I will sometimes give more detailed attention to a particular philosophical or clinical neighborhood. On other occasions, however, I have found it necessary to more quickly jump from one vantage point to another, one part of

town to another, in an attempt to reveal the connections between seemingly distant points, seemingly disparate experiences. At times, therefore, this dissertation is written in a more discursive style; at other times in a more condensed, even epigrammatic, manner.

I have found the practice of numbering thematically unified sections of text to be helpful in that it has given me the freedom to shift between these stylistic modes and to, on occasion, simply indicate connections that can be so revealed more readily than they can be clearly articulated. The latter approach becomes more pronounced as my argument proceeds. This development is to a large extent dictated by the material itself. In order to show how Wittgenstein brings us "inside" schizophrenic states, I need to evoke aspects of such modes of being. Seeing the therapeutic relevance of Wittgenstein's work also requires more than agreeing with a well-argued conclusion as to its applicability. In addition, we must be "struck" by the way in which it meets schizophrenic experience. It is in the attempt to evoke such states that I at times employ a more disjunctive style in the latter chapters of this dissertation. Becoming "at home in London" will require that we pass through key conceptual/existential moments more than once, coming each time from a slightly different vantage point. I hope the reader will have patience with this practice when its value is not so apparent.

CHAPTER TWO

WITTGENSTEIN AND THE LIMITS OF METAPSYCHOLOGY

1. Introduction:

My argument in this chapter begins with a discussion of several recent attempts within the psychoanalytic literature to create a "purely clinical" metapsychological theory. My interest in these efforts is motivated by a concern which I share with such authors as Merton Gill, George Klein, and Roy Schafer who in their respective ways argue that any psychoanalytic metapsychology which is couched in the language of the natural sciences will inevitably contain a conception of human nature which is at odds with certain essential aspects of the image of man which guide the clinical practitioner. These aspects center around the notoriously difficult to conceptualize human capacities to make experience meaningful and to act with purpose.

Although in sympathy with most of what motivates those who defend the idea of a purely clinical theory, I hope to be able to show that such approaches cannot achieve what they set out to accomplish. I will argue, in essence, that they are looking in the wrong place for the source of the misleading conception of human nature. Rather than being rooted in the metapsychological commitment to explanation in the language of the natural sciences, it actually lies in a particular tendency to over-generalization which characterizes any systematic explanatory perspective.

Although at this point I do not think that I can demonstrate that any systematic clinical theory must have these shortcomings, I hope to at least show that this is a tendency to which the writers that I will be considering in this section are prone.

In developing the critique outlined above I will begin to introduce certain ways of thinking which derive from my reading of the later work of Wittgenstein. In the next chapter of this dissertation I will proceed from a Wittgenstein-inspired critique of the idea of a purely clinical theory to a discussion of Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical issues arising in our attempts to understand human agency. I do not intend to present a new version of clinical theory to replace or modify those of the writers I will consider. My work has the quite different intent of developing the clinical implications of our insight into the limits of clinical theory--specifically as these implications bear on our understanding of human beings as having the capacity to engage in purposeful activity. In this way my work remains thoroughly "critical" in the sense in which Kant and, in his own way, Wittgenstein have understood that approach to doing philosophy. Partly as a result of this orientation my insights will at times be difficult to express straightforwardly--such is the inevitable, if unfortunate, consequence of marking out those areas where a certain sort of thinking cannot go by virtue

of certain features inherent in the activity of such thinking itself.

In beginning to develop the clinical implications of the limits of metapsychology, I will be laying the foundation for the investigation of schizophrenic experience which I will pursue in later chapters. For there we will see how the aspect of human experience which cannot be captured metapsychologically becomes of in-life concern within some schizophrenic states.

2. On the Idea of a Purely Clinical Theory:

I begin with a discussion of certain reasons which several writers have found for challenging traditional conceptions of psychoanalytic metapsychology. I will focus on the work of George Klein and Roy Schafer. Schafer's work is of particular interest in that he explicitly sees himself to be influenced by Wittgenstein. A consideration of the ways in which he is--and is not--true to what I take Wittgenstein to be suggesting will provide a helpful transition to a more direct consideration of the importance of Wittgenstein's work for our understanding of psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Before proceeding to examine Schafer's "new language for psychoanalysis," it will be helpful to consider an argument of George Klein's against the "old" language which sets the stage for Schafer's, in some ways more radical, attempt.

Klein expresses quite succinctly the dilemma facing contemporary metapsychologists:

whether to develop a theory of the mental apparatus through quasi-thermodynamic principles (including contemporary, more plausible physical analogies in this choice) or to confine theoretical effort to the enterprise of deciphering meanings, i.e. to remain on the level on which the discoveries themselves were formulated. (Klein, 1976, p. 60. All references to Klein are to this volume.)

Klein opts strongly for the latter alternative, arguing that no amount of knowledge of the physiological workings of the person will allow us to infer the purpose or meaning of the activity in which the person is engaging. The psychoanalyst "perceives...strategies (functions) of the machine as determined by his own attributions of meaning and intention" (p. 62). Paraphrasing Michael Polanyi, Klein contends that "statements of purpose or meaning and principles of physiological regulation are two mutually exclusive ways of being aware of our bodily activities. The somatic is to the mind as the clue is to the meaning" (p. 62, Klein's emphasis). Klein seeks to develop an overall clinical theory through systematizing the statements of purpose or meaning relied upon by analysts.

While the content of Klein's clinical theory is quite rich and provocative, I do not wish to examine it here. Instead, I want to stay with the "meta" issue, focussing on the sort of theory which Klein takes himself to be proposing. Having made an effort to distinguish

physicalistic explanations--what he calls elsewhere "process explanations"--from "meaning explanations," Klein seems to waver over what his clinical theory is a theory about. On the one hand, as we saw above, he regards "statements of purpose" and "principles of physiological regulation" as being mutually exclusive ways of speaking about "bodily activities." In another passage, while discussing the "meaning" of aggression, Klein remarks that "we may be able to define the physiology of aggressiveness, but the phenomenon of aggression is a meaning that we attribute to the physiological pattern" (p. 63). What I want to highlight here is the manner in which Klein seems, while taking process explanations and meaning explanations to be mutually exclusive, to succumb to the temptation to regard the latter as being about that which is specifiable in the "process" language.

Further evidence that he does so regard the meaning explanations that make up the clinical theory, and some hint as to what goes wrong when they are so regarded, can be seen by considering the quotation from Polanyi with which Klein closes his argument for the difference between mental and physiological explanation: "'A neurophysiologist observing the events that take place in the eyes and brain of a seeing man would invariably fail to see in these natural events what the man sees in them'" (p. 63). It isn't too hard to see that something has gone badly awry here. What, we might

ask, could the man see in his own brain events? He sees whatever he's seeing, a tree perhaps; and, of course, we believe something is going on in his brain without which he would not see what he's seeing. But only under very special circumstances would he see anything in the events inside his head. Similarly, it's true (trivially) that it's to a person with a body that we ascribe aggressiveness. But this is not to say the person who attributes aggressiveness attributes it "to a physiological pattern." (Imagine a situation in which that would be what we'd say! Perhaps in the context of some biofeedback experiment.)

Presumably, we want to say, what is meant here is that the neurophysiologist cannot see in the brain events whatever the person actually sees; or that whoever is seeing someone as aggressive is seeing what we could also--from another point of view--describe as a physiological pattern characterizing aggressiveness. As it stands now, however, these remarks suggest a particular kind of confusion which I hope to show to be characteristic of a certain sort of attempt to accommodate purpose or meaning language within the context of an explanatory theory.

This area is not one in which it is easy to see clearly, but let's begin by noting one feature of the above argument. The significance of this feature should become clearer as we proceed. Notice what might be called a shifting of perspectives which is evident here. We might

characterize this shift in terms of a movement between first and third-person points of view. Here, for instance, the first-person perspective is somehow elided; it drops out in some way, or is assimilated to the third-person perspective (that of the neuroscientist in one of the above examples). We can at this point perhaps begin to imagine how this might be an expression of a tendency toward an over-generalization, an over-extension, of the third-person point of view to the detriment of clearly seeing the character of actual experience.

Much remains murky, however. It should be remembered that we have so far only given a loose sense--really, just a "definition" by example--of what is meant by speaking of first and third-person perspectives. The former is particularly problematic: what do we mean by "a person's actual experience"? Consider, for example, how in the Polanyi remark it seems to be the person's phenomenal world which is elided, whereas in the "aggression ascription" case what drops out is not the person's phenomenal world but, rather, what we might call the first-person context--the way, for example, that the person would describe that to which he has ascribed aggressiveness.

Returning to Klein's argument, we can see how this eliding of the first-person perspective seems to be consequent upon his wish to be able to take a stance outside the clinical theory itself--with its understanding of

persons in terms of their intentions, motives etc.--in order to see a statement in its language as being about the person specified in non-purposeful language. It remains to be seen whether such a tendency is evident even when we remain "within" the clinical theory. That it may be will be suggested in our consideration of Schafer's elaboration of a purely clinical theory.

Schafer's work is of particular interest here in that, unlike Klein, he presents a theory which is not held up against a "process" language account of human doings. It is therefore significant that a similar sort of "dropping out" of the first-person perspective can be seen in it. From this fact we may be able to further characterize those aspects of experience which seem to not be seeable as a consequence of looking at experience from an explanatory perspective--whether that point of view be developed in the "process" language of causes or in the purpose language of reasons and meanings. It will then require a further examination to determine whether that which lies beyond the limits of a clinical theory is in fact that which such theories were intended, in some sense, to protect or reveal. For now, let us turn to a consideration of Schafer's "action language."

3. Action Language:

Speaking generally, Schafer's intent with his "new language for psychoanalysis" is to offer an alternative to

traditional Freudian metapsychological language. The main feature of Freudian metapsychology to which he objects is its "commitment to conceptualize and explain phenomena in the terms of natural science [by] invoking Newtonian forces to explain the workings of the psychic apparatus." (Schafer, 1976, p. 194. All references to Schafer are to this volume.) Such an approach, according to Schafer, must fail to capture the very features of human life which are at the center of the psychoanalyst's attention in his work with patients--namely, meanings, intentions, and choice. That is to say, explanation within the language of Freudian metapsychology cannot account for human agency, for "reasons, meanings, and goal-directedness [are] essential constituents of the idea of action" (p. 194).

Generalizing from his discussion of Heinz Hartmann's work, Schafer argues that any account which attempts to explain purposeful behavior using theoretical constructs acceptable within a natural science framework must be internally inconsistent. For, inevitably, it will slip that which it is attempting to explain into the terms in which the explanation is given. For example, in his theory of higher ego functions, Hartmann portrays these functions as "self-activating" and "self-regulating"; hence they "are implicitly being portrayed as independent, symbol utilizing minds that can make themselves up" (p. 109). Schafer acknowledges his debt here to Gilbert Ryle's argument

against mind-body dualism, against the "ghost in the machine." Although Schafer does no more than cite Ryle's argument, it will be helpful for our purposes to bear Ryle's actual argument in mind.

Ryle is concerned with the relationship between what he calls "knowing how" and "knowing that." He argues against what he calls the "intellectualist legend." This point of view begins from the observation that intelligent performance, behavior with a purpose, requires more than meeting certain standards of performance. For an action to be performed skillfully the person who performs it must in some sense "know what he is doing while he is doing it"; he must, in some sense, "be following rules and applying criteria in the performance of the action." Ryle accepts this formulation, but challenges the "intellectualist" constual of it. From the "intellectualist" perspective, skilled performance requires prior consideration of the appropriate standards of performance and application of these standards in the course of performance. Ryle argues that this account is infinitely regressive.

The consideration of propositions is itself an activity which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretic operation had to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone to ever break into the circle (Ryle, 1949, p. 30).

If a prior intelligent performance cannot be what is required in order that an action be purposeful then,

according to Ryle, the ghost in the machine is exposed. The dualist's habit of thinking in terms of a prior, hidden, mental action as providing the purpose in purposeful action is shown to be logically unsound.

Although Schafer follows Ryle in his exposure of what Schafer calls the "mover of the mental apparatus" (chap. 5), the conclusions which they draw from this argument are somewhat different. The issue for Ryle becomes finding a non-dualistic way of analyzing mental-language terms. Schafer, on the other hand, is concerned to rewrite the foundations of psychoanalytic theory in a way which, in addition to being philosophically acceptable, will also be closer to the "native tongue" of practicing psychoanalysts. Moreover, he does not want his revised psychoanalytic theory to be any the less explanatory than the traditional approaches. As we shall see, some of the problems with Schafer's theory are due to his wanting to wear these several hats at once.

4. The most striking feature of Schafer's proposed revision of psychoanalytic metapsychology is its breadth. Given the impossibility of understanding human agency in natural science language, Schafer proposes an entirely new metapsychological language system. He argues that there is nothing in "the facts" which forces us to use natural science language; the phenomena are not "simply given." Schafer says he is here "following Wittgenstein's conception

of language as a set of rules for saying things of the sort that constitute or communicate a version of reality or the world" (p. 4). In this context, he notes, "constitute" and "communicate" have the same meaning. The version of the world which his language will communicate centers around the idea of action. Freudian talk of forces, impulses, and functions affecting a person is to be translated into language which describes how the person acts. "We shall regard each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity" (p. 9).

The idea of the synonymy of "constitute" and "communicate" which Schafer takes from Wittgenstein is not an easy one to grasp. Perhaps we could see its implication for Schafer this way: action language is itself active. Its value (meaning?) lies in its use within the clinical setting. How is this? Schafer argues that a major purpose of therapy is to enable the patient to take responsibility for his own life. Analysands, says Schafer, often seek to evade taking this responsibility through "disclaiming" their own actions. Schafer points out the irony that traditional metapsychological language, with its picture of the person as influenced by id-forces and ego-functions, actually speaks in a way similar to the disclaiming patient.

5. What, then, does Schafer mean by the term "action"?

By action, I do not mean voluntary physical deeds only. In my sense, action is human behavior that has a point; it is meaningful activity; it is intentional or goal-directed performances by

people; it is doing things for reasons (p. 139).

To say that human behavior has a point is, for Schafer, to say it has meaning: "Aims are meanings" (p. 89). A person need not be conscious of the aim of his behavior in order for it to be an action on Schafer's view. By presenting such a broad conception of human action Schafer intends to restore to psychoanalytic theory the concern with "psychic reality" which is at the heart of psychoanalytic practice.

"Psychic reality" refers to subjective meaning, especially unconscious meaning. Its usefulness resides in reminding us that psychoanalytic explanation depends on our knowing what an event, action, or object means to the subject; it is the specifically psychoanalytic alternative to descriptive classification by a behavioristic observer (p. 89).

Within Schafer's system, explanation in terms of action will not refer to causes. Rather we will explain what a patient does in terms of his reasons for doing it. These reasons serve to redescribe what a person does. Therefore, "there can be no absolute distinction drawn between reasons for an action and the action itself" (p. 231). In so explaining action, we will be able to do justice to the "subjective meaning" which an action has for a person. In fact, given Schafer's interest in seeing the patient not as a victim of his circumstances but as, in effect, creating them through seeing them in a certain way, "there is no way of treating action and situation as distinct or logically independent variables" (p. 337).

6. Granting the clinical value of claiming responsibility

for what one does, and accepting the theoretical value of a language which does not have to sneak in the idea of agency, there remains something peculiar about what Schafer is doing. Speaking loosely, I sometimes, in reading his work, get the sense that he thinks one can cure patients through the change in psychoanalytic language alone. I assume that he does not think any such thing, but the reasons for his leaving me feeling this way may be of interest. Perhaps it's the very success which Schafer has in translating any statement about anything which the patient suffers (short of reflex actions) into action language, into something he does. It seems to raise the question: "What does 'doing' amount to then?" In a view that prides itself on bringing psychoanalytic theory closer to clinical practice, what, for instance, do we make of the discrepancy between the relative ease with which Schafer translates from passive to active language and the struggle which sincerely taking on the active voice can be for the patient?

I can, of course, imagine the immediate objection that since Schafer is obviously not himself engaged in this struggle our misgivings over the ease with which he can translate from passive to active voices should be of no concern to us. But, this really isn't my worry. Rather, what I wonder is whether the process of therapeutic change can be adequately captured within a theoretical perspective in which the movement from victim to agent is a matter of

translation. In order to get a little more concrete with this intuition, and to begin to relate it to the concerns which we had regarding Klein's work, let's consider how we would use Schafer's action language to understand a specific clinical example, one borrowed from David Shapiro.

7. In discussing the obsessive-compulsive style, Shapiro emphasizes the appearance which the "compulsive's activity...has...of being pressed or motivated by something beyond the interest of the acting person" (1965, p. 33). Shapiro mentions one compulsive patient who "always tried hard in his social life to be 'spontaneous.'" From an action language perspective Schafer, like Shapiro, would emphasize what the compulsive was doing in trying so hard to be spontaneous. He would try to help the compulsive see the unconscious meaning of his effort, what he was actually trying to gain through his pained pursuit of spontaneity. The limitations of Schafer's view begin to be apparent, however, in light of Shapiro's further remarks on agency. In Shapiro's words, a person "whose direction of himself is secure can...afford abandonment of direction of himself in various forms and degrees" (p. 36). In our example, the compulsive defeats himself through trying to abandon self-direction. Now, of course, whether he continues trying to act spontaneously or loosens his grip and actually succeeds in going on smoothly, his behavior will be explainable. Either way he goes, from Schafer's perspective he will be

acting--that is, his behavior will be redescribable in terms of its purpose. Within action language, we would just be talking about two different actions, each "co-defined" with the situation in which it occurs. But this is the problem: for we are not just talking about two different actions here. We could talk instead of two qualitatively different kinds of action, and that would be true enough, but we wouldn't thereby be saying what was important about this difference. To begin to understand its significance, note that our obsessive person needs to discover how to go on in a way which, from his perspective, would not be acting at all--for him, we might say, it would be too easy. We could say of him that he is uncomfortable acting without reason. That is, we could say this if we were not bound by the rules of action language within which, by definition, such a formulation makes no sense.

But, why is this a problem? After all, Schafer is interested in explaining what the patient does, not in providing the language within which to describe his "subjective state." Moreover, the fact that Schafer can, at the level of theory, easily translate statements in a passive voice into action language does not imply that he would be unaware of the difficulties facing someone who was actually in the middle of taking on a more active voice. In response, there are a couple of things to be said. First, Schafer stresses that he is interested in bringing

psychoanalytic theory closer to the practicing psychoanalyst's concern with the "psychic reality and subjective meanings" of the patient. Perhaps, given his emphasis on a person's unconscious reasons for behaving, he fails to see what is at least an important feature of human action. Perhaps with his interest in explaining action he loses "doing" itself. This is related to my difficulty seeing the relation between Schafer's action language and the process of therapeutic change. Although our obsessive may come to understand the unconscious motivation of his action, there will, at the least, be a difficulty understanding within action language how he views himself in the course of coming to this more full understanding of himself.

Moreover, we are not just talking about his "subjective state" here, but about the way of acting which he needs to achieve--it is not one countenanced within the grammar of action language. If, to adopt Wittgenstein's metaphor, we regard language as akin to a game with rules, we can say that Schafer's action language does not allow a certain move to be made; it does not allow us to speak of a person's acting without reason. But we need to be able to make this move if we are to describe the situation facing our obsessive person.

What we need is to be able to meaningfully speak of acting without reason even though, from another perspective,

reasons for what our patient does could be found. That is to say, we need to have a language which can describe the person's situation without, as it were, standing outside of his point of view for the purpose of explaining what he does. Such a possibility is blocked if, as seems to be the case with Schafer's action language, this explanatory perspective is written into the grammar of the language itself. As we saw in our consideration of Klein's view, something which we might regard as the agent's perspective-- as opposed to a more third-person way of regarding him-- seems to be difficult to conceptualize within Schafer's theory.

8. One complicating dissimilarity between the Schafer and Klein examples emerges, however, when we consider that in the former situation our patient's first-person perspective has a decidedly third-person flavor: we might say, in fact that he is stuck in taking a third-person perspective on himself, forever evaluating himself and his actions. Here we may be up against the limits of our own nomenclature. What we have said our compulsive needs is, in effect, to cease taking a perspective on himself in a way that continues to call himself and his actions into question. To compare this situation with the Klein examples may be misleading in that in the latter case it made sense to speak of the person's perspective as opposed to one which seems imposed upon his experience.

These cavils notwithstanding--and they are significant ones in that they involve our sense of what a first-person perspective amounts to--the central affinity between the difficulties facing Schafer and Klein can still be seen. In both cases, an adoption of an explanatory perspective seems to color the phenomena which are to be explained in a way which prevents our also seeing them from another vantage point. Although there may be problems speaking of this latter point of view as a first-person perspective, we can say of it that, in Klein's case, it is one which is actually available to the subject of our explanation and, in Schafer's case, it is one which would need to at least be true of, or at least sayable of, our patient in the course of his therapeutic growth.

9. What we need to do now is to explore the broader significance of the capacity, which we have found lacking in Klein and Schafer, to accommodate and keep distinct what we have called the third and first-person points of view. In order to lay the groundwork for doing this let's return to Schafer's argument, attempting to get clearer on what's wrong with his approach through examining his criticisms of Wittgenstein.

Schafer takes Wittgenstein to task for arguing that "a person might act without giving himself reasons." According to Schafer, Wittgenstein, in so arguing, "was using the word 'reasons' in a behavioristic sense, and, psychologically,

this is no sense at all." On the other hand, the "acceptable part of Wittgenstein's meaning [is] that, as a rule, we may say that people just do what they do and that we need not qualify this statement with suggestions of prior reflective activity" (p. 231). Why "behavioristic"? Because for Schafer, with his emphasis on the unconscious reasons for a person's acting, to say that a person acted without reasons just because he didn't give himself reasons would make no sense. Speaking metaphorically, it would be to view the person "from outside," in terms of what he said, in terms of his behavior alone.

But notice the perspective which Schafer adopts in taking this position. It is the vantage point of the psychoanalyst, in his role as the one who is in a position to know, or at least hypothesize, the reasons for a person's behavior. My suspicion is that Schafer wrongly attributes the impersonality of psychoanalytic explanation to its being cast in the language of the natural sciences, and that the problem is not with "reasons vs. causes" per se, but with an inherent tendency toward over-generalization which is characteristic of any explanatory perspective on human action. Establishing this will take some showing. That there is a problem whose source we might ferret out can, however, be seen readily.

10. At one point, Schafer wonders whether by explaining behavior in terms of reasons and not causes we might be

"accepting a principle of chaos in human affairs" (p. 231). But he reassures us that we would not be; this is because of the "fundamental assumption on which we base explanation in terms of reasons," which is that "whenever one sees oneself as being in the same situation, one will react in the same way." This is linked up with that part of Wittgenstein which Schafer accepts: in order to act for a reason no prior reflection is necessary. "Psychic reality" is not in the head, standing in opposition to the situation "outside." As Schafer puts it, "the concept of situation is the same as the concept of psychic reality." But if Schafer proposes that our explanations of action rest on his fundamental assumption, then they rest on thin air. For given the "logical" connection between situation and action, the notion of same situation can be understood only in terms of the action which is performed in it. So, to say that in the same situation one reacts in the same way is to say only: one does what one does. Therefore, if--and it's a big "if"--we think we are in the business of proposing rules for explanation which in some sense must be guaranteed against introducing "chaos into human affairs," then grounding them on an assumption which amounts to saying "one does what one does" sounds like a recipe for anarchy.

What does this difficulty reveal? Recall where we started, with Schafer's claim that, following Wittgenstein, he was presenting rules for a new metapsychological

language. In so doing, he is following Wittgenstein to the extent that Wittgenstein does try to show that the meaningfulness of our language is not due to its describing "the given," the stuff of the world, but to its being used in the countless ways in which we do actually use it. Forces, for instance, are not given; rather, we talk of them when we speak a certain explanatory language. So, Schafer reasons, let our fundamental term be "action"; and then we can translate our old metapsychological language into a new one and have an explanatory theory which is closer to clinical practice.

11. Wittgenstein's views on language are intimately connected with the aspect of his view on action which Schafer approves of--namely, that in order to do what they do people do not need to engage in prior reflective activity. For Wittgenstein, this view on action grows out of his consideration of what it means to follow a rule. In essence, for Wittgenstein, the prior reflective activity which people are thought to engage in is precisely that which is allegedly necessary in order for them to follow a rule properly. In speaking of rule-governed activities Wittgenstein is speaking here of any activity at all which can be understood by another (or, as he argues, by oneself). Consider, for example, our capacity to speak meaningfully, which involves our capacity to understand the meanings of words:

When someone says the word 'cube' to me, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind when I understand it in this way (PI, #139).

We might think that a picture of a cube came before our mind, and that having this picture would enable us to use the word "cube" appropriately. Wittgenstein's point, however, is that whatever picture we might associate with the word "cube," a way could be found to match this picture with any use of the term. Therefore, it cannot be grasping the picture--in a flash, with the mind's eye--which accounts for our using the term properly.

Perhaps you say--"It's quite simple; if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then that use of the word doesn't fit the picture."-- But doesn't it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.

The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible to use it differently (PI, #139).

Wittgenstein's argument here resembles Ryle's argument against the ghost in the machine sketched above, but it is significantly different. Ryle argues that an analysis of purposeful action cannot require a prior act of purpose. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, is contending that the rules for the use of a term are neither inherent in the term nor in any picture which we might associate with the term. Concerned with the presuppositions of the meaningful use of everyday language, Wittgenstein argues that if an individual is to understand the meaning of a word there must be a

public practice of using the word. Wittgenstein extends this line of thinking to the question of what it means to say that a person acts intentionally, to say that he acts for a reason. Considering the everyday situation of intending to speak a particular sentence, he remarks:

But didn't I already intend the whole construction of the sentence (for example) at the beginning? So surely it already existed in my mind before I said it out loud!...But here we are constructing a misleading picture of 'intending,' that is of the use of this word. An intention is embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions (PI, #337).

When Wittgenstein speaks--in the way which Schafer finds objectionable--of a person's acting without a reason, he is speaking from the standpoint of his notion of rule-guided human activities. This is what he has in mind when he talks--in the way which Schafer finds acceptable--of people just doing what they do.

'How am I to obey a rule?'--if this is not a question about causes, then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way that I do.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do' (PI, #217).

What is important, but very difficult, to see here is the way in which this capacity to go on "without a reason" is seen to pervade everyday life. The way in which it is "right before us."

In later chapters we will see that it is just this pervasive "immediacy of going on" that becomes of in-life

concern within schizophrenic experience.

12. What moral should we draw from Schafer's misunderstanding of Wittgenstein? I think it helps us see what is confused about Schafer's view. If, with Wittgenstein, we regard giving reasons for one's actions as itself a practice embedded in our everyday life, then we are in a position to give a sense to the idea of acting without reasons which does not conflict with psychoanalytic practice. We are in a position to see how it makes sense to speak of a person's going on without reasons while at the same time allowing that it is of course true that there may be reasons for what he does of which he is unaware. To deny this possibility, as Schafer does, is to take a view from on high; it is to say "either he has a reason or he doesn't." Rather, we should say that explaining behavior in terms of reasons is a particular practice. Acting without reasons is a pervasive phenomenon and is the bedrock of any particular practice, any "form of life," including the practice of giving reasons.

Schafer tries to bring action back into psychoanalytic theory through providing rules for translating the language of forces into the language of action. In presupposing, however, that our ordinary notion of action (and what other do we have?) includes by definition our having a reason for acting, Schafer leaves no conceptual room for a sense of human action which is at the heart of human life. This

sense of freely going on is part of what we as clinicians hope to instill in our patients. Taking responsibility for one's life involves coming to know why one is doing what one is doing. But there will always be a gap between knowing and doing. Our clinical example illustrates how this gap can be the locus of human anxiety. In Schafer's work we have gained a new language with which to explain behavior, but we have not, thereby, been brought "closer to the psychoanalytic process itself." Just talking about action will not "constitute and communicate" the world of action, no matter how tight we make our rules of action language. The rules of language are seen in the actions of people-- including the activities which we call giving reasons, or explaining actions, or going on "without reasons." We will not come closer to human action through making up new rules for a new language with which to explain what people do.

In the next chapter I present Wittgenstein's discussion of the will, with attention to the way in which issues concerning the limits of a third-person perspective show themselves there. We will begin to see how these issues can take on in-life significance, thereby preparing the ground for the attempt to understand their "instantiation" within schizophrenic states. That is, I hope to lay the foundation for our seeing how philosophical questions regarding the will can, within schizophrenic experience, become urgent. So seeing will require our understanding how the issues we

have revealed regarding the limit of a metapsychological stance can come strikingly to life.

CHAPTER THREE

WITTGENSTEIN ON THE WILL

1. Unlike most philosophers who have concerned themselves with the way in which people engage in voluntary action, Wittgenstein does not present anything resembling a "theory of the will." To the contrary, he seems to suggest that it is precisely the search for such a theoretical account of the workings of the will which can get in the way of a clear understanding of voluntary action. He hints, in fact, that such an approach can lead to our missing something quite striking and powerful. The question of how we are to state or, at least, to present this "something striking" is a quite difficult one. If Wittgenstein has no theory of the will, then, we might ask, with what does he leave us?

2. Wittgenstein takes it as his task as a philosopher to "change our way of looking at things" (PI, #144). This is to be accomplished by freeing us from our "captivity to certain pictures." As he puts it: "One thinks that one is tracing the outline of a thing's nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it" (PI, #144). His work, therefore, might be viewed as a sort of philosophical therapeutic; he, in fact, did so regard it (see, e.g., PI, #133). Attention to how it is that we come to be locked into seeing in terms of certain pictures is a central feature of this therapeutic orientation.

3. I will approach the task of presenting Wittgenstein's view on the nature of the will through discussing a perspective on the will which we are tempted to take, but which, according to Wittgenstein, prevents us from seeing the nature of the will clearly. That is to say, I will be concerned both with presenting Wittgenstein's conception of the "frame round which we trace" in our thinking about the will and with exploring his conception of the reasons for our becoming so captivated. Once we have this vantage point on Wittgenstein's approach, we will be in a position to better understand how our voluntary actions might be differently seen.

It is appropriate, then, to begin our exploration of Wittgenstein's treatment of the will by giving careful attention to a passage from his work in which the will is introduced in the context of a certain dissatisfaction with a particular way of attempting to say something about it.

The discussion which I have in mind focuses on the phenomenon of "being guided" (PI, #172ff). Among the actions which we would be inclined to consider ones where we are being guided we find a variety of everyday voluntary activities such as "walk[ing] along a field track, simply following it" (PI, #172). Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a situation in which we are copying "some arbitrary doodle," allowing ourselves to be guided by it. In what, he asks, does the guidance consist? He notes how easily we are able

to carry out this request, how "while I am being guided everything is quite simple, I notice nothing special." The situation is dramatically different, however, when I attempt to say what it was which characterized my being guided in making the copy:

But afterwards, when I ask myself what it was that happened, it seems to have been something indescribable. Afterwards no description satisfies me. It's as if I couldn't believe that I merely looked, made such and such a face, and drew a line (PI, #175).

Why do such phenomena as looking in a certain way and making a certain face not seem to be enough? What else is there for which we are looking? Wittgenstein's answer comes in the following section:

When I look back on the experience I have the feeling that what is essential about it is an "experience of being influenced," of a connection-
-as opposed to a mere simultaneity of phenomena: but at the same time I should not be willing to call any experienced phenomenon the "experience of being influenced." (This contains the germ of the idea that the will is not a phenomenon.) I should like to say I had experienced the "because", and yet I do not want to call any phenomenon the "experience of the because" (PI, #176).

When I look back on the experience of being guided, I want to say there must be something more going on than that I just made a certain face and drew a line in a certain way. The "something more" which I seek is something which might serve to connect my drawing a line in a certain way with the original line which guided me. It is not, we want to say, as though my drawing the line happened "merely simultaneously" with my being aware of the line to be

copied. It was not as though I, so to speak, just found myself drawing the line as I did; no, rather, I experienced the influence of the original. Under its influence, I drew the line. Here I am active. It did not just happen that I drew the line as I did--no, here I have a reason for so drawing it.

At a related juncture, when considering the phenomenon of reading, Wittgenstein speaks in the following way of what it is that we are attempting to capture when we talk of "influence": "For when I speak of the experiences of being influenced, of causal connection, of being guided, that is really meant to imply that I as it were feel the movement of the lever which connects seeing the letters with speaking" (PI, #170). I cannot find any experience which is the experience of being influenced--but, we want to insist, I certainly was influenced. In a cryptic passage from this section Wittgenstein remarks that, at this point, "you would like to say: "And it just is a particular inner experience. (And that is, of course, to add nothing)." He then proceeds to suggest: "This is connected with the problem of the nature of intention, of willing" (PI, #174). What does he see here? What is this connection?

As is characteristic of Wittgenstein's work, we find several interwoven strands of thought here. And, as is also typical, the phenomenon of the crossing of lines of thought, of ways of seeing, is central to the content of what is

being suggested. In order that we might see how this is so, and the light which this might shed on the nature of the will, I would like to draw attention to the way in which two distinct "vantage points" on experience--as we might loosely term them--manifest themselves in the passages under consideration.

Recall that while copying the line "I notice nothing special"; only afterwards am I unable to be satisfied with any description of what happened. There is a sense, we might say, in which in my subsequent thinking about what happened I stand "outside" that which interests me. Speaking quite intuitively here, there is a sense in which while being guided I am "absorbed" in what I am doing. I am focused on the matter at hand; I am not reflecting on what is taking place in doing whatever it is that I am doing. Notice also that there is a sense in which while being guided I am not concerned with "how things are," am not making any claims about "the way things are." The situation is different when I am looking back on what happened, attempting, as it were, to see the process of being influenced. Here I am reflecting on the way things occurred; here I am looking to be in a position to make some statement about "the way things are."

Finally, notice how the line which I am copying provides a standard or, as Wittgenstein would put it, a rule which guides my activity. As we saw, we want to say that

more is happening here than the "merely simultaneous" occurrence of certain phenomena--of, say, my looking at the standard and drawing its copy. Another way of putting what we are looking for here would be to say that "the movement of the lever" which we are hoping to "feel" is the movement which enacts or applies the rule.

4. In a series of sections from the remarks of Wittgenstein's which are collected in the book Zettel we see a striking development of the lines of thought which we are beginning to map out. Here we can see more clearly both the neighborhood of conceptual issues around the phenomenon of "absorption" in a rule-guided activity as well as some of the conceptual roads which lead off from the vantage point which characterizes the activity of describing "how things are." In Zettel #233, Wittgenstein remarks:

"Only the intended picture reaches up to reality like a yardstick. Looked at from outside, there it is, lifeless and isolated."--It is as if at first we looked at a picture so as to enter into it and the objects in it surrounded us like real ones; and then we stepped back, and were now outside it; we saw the frame, and the picture was a painted surface. In this way, when we intend, we are surrounded by our intention's pictures, and we are inside them. But when we step outside intention, they are mere patches on a canvas, without life and of no interest to us. When we intend, we exist in the space of intention, among the pictures (shadows) of intention, as well as with real things. Let us imagine we are sitting in a darkened cinema and entering into the film. Now the lights are turned on, though the film continues on the screen. But suddenly we are outside it and see it as movements of light and dark patches on a screen.

How might the metaphor of "being inside" which

Wittgenstein presents in this passage help us clarify the situation sketched in the "guidance" example? What is immediately striking here is how Wittgenstein gives poetic expression to a distinction which is akin to that which we saw in the guidance example. He is speaking here of a capacity to stand outside an activity. And, with the metaphor of the "isolated and dead" process, he gives voice to a recognition similar to that which we find in the guidance case--a recognition of the inability of the view "from outside" to, in some way, capture something which appears essential to how things are "from the inside." What can we say, if anything, about this quality which we are looking for but cannot seem to find? What, recalling our earlier example, can we say of the "movement of the lever"?

5. A way into these questions is suggested by a passage from Zettel which follows the one quoted above. Having said (Z, #231) that "by 'intention' I mean what uses a sign in thought," Wittgenstein remarks (Z, #235):

If I see the thought symbol "from outside," I become conscious that it could be interpreted thus or thus; if it is a step in the course of my thoughts, then it is a stopping-place that is natural to me, and its further interpretability does not occupy (or trouble) me. As I have a time-table and use it without being concerned with the fact that a table is susceptible of various interpretations.

Herein, I believe, lies the clue as to why, in the guidance case, "afterwards, no description satisfies me." Afterwards I am looking "from outside." From this vantage point no

mental process could provide me with a way of understanding the sort of certainty of movement which I experience when copying the line. Looked at "from outside" any antecedent or accompanying process could just as well be taken to require a different sort of action from the one which I perform in going on, without difficulty, to copy the standard. No description, Wittgenstein is suggesting, could capture the movement of the lever. For, no matter what description I might propose, I must be standing outside the process which I am attempting to describe. But, from this vantage point I cannot have the sort of certainty which characterizes the everyday activity of going on without difficulty to make a copy.

But wait, it might be said, something doesn't quite hang together here. I can imagine someone saying: "Wittgenstein's argument, as you have sketched it, does not really seem to be aimed at what I thought was supposed to be its target. What I thought Wittgenstein was looking for-- and what seemed somehow related to the idea of the will not being a phenomenon--was some experience which could, as it were, stand between the original line and my activity of copying it. This, after all, was where the idea of a kind of perception of influence had bearing. But, what you are saying now seems significantly different. For now, to follow up on the time-table example, you seem to be suggesting that the possibility of the multiple

interpretability of the time-table is in some way related to my viewing the time-table 'from outside.' However, if we were to apply this example to the guidance case, we do not end up saying anything about the experience of being influenced which was the target of our investigation. Rather, we end up with something like this: viewed from outside the original line was capable of multiple interpretations; that is, I could have taken various different ways of drawing the line to count as copies of it. And this, no doubt, is in accord with a prominent theme in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. (See, e.g., his discussion of the schema for reading a table at PI, #86.) But does this really touch the way in which he is looking for an experience of being influenced? We can allow that, when looking 'from outside,' we become conscious of other possible ways of copying the original. Nonetheless, wouldn't it be the case that the issue of what constituted the feeling of being influenced would still arise? That is to say, how we copied the original seems a separate issue from how we are to understand our sense of being influenced by the original. Hence our recognition of this feature of viewing 'from outside' would not seem to alter the fact that we would still end up engaged in a subsequent disappointing search for something which we might call 'the experience of the because.'"

In response one might say: Alright, I think I see your

point. You are saying, in effect, that the multiple interpretability of the time-table, for example, does not seem to have any bearing on my sense that--no matter how I interpret it--the time-table is influencing me. It still isn't the case, you are suggesting, that there is a "mere simultaneity" between my checking the time-table and my proceeding to the station. I would say two things in response to this. First, the multiple interpretability of the to-be-copied original, when viewed "from outside," can be regarded as providing a clue to Wittgenstein's "diagnosis" of our subsequent dissatisfaction if we attend to the importance that he places on the ease with which we are able to go on to make the copy. The multiple interpretability which characterizes the standard when it is viewed "from outside" does prohibit us from seeing--from this perspective--any feature of the to-be-copied original which would necessitate our proceeding in a certain way. The certainty which we have in going on cannot, therefore, be accounted for by referring to any feature of the standard which we are following. Secondly, to perhaps respond more directly to your concern, any phenomenon which we might propose as a candidate for being the experience of being influenced would itself be susceptible--seen, as it would be, "from outside"--to being variously interpreted. We are looking for an experience of being influenced; that is, we are looking for a process which we might describe as "the

movement of the lever" connecting the standard with the act which is in accord with it. The recognition that no process could do this seems, for Wittgenstein, to essentially involve an awareness of how things must look given the vantage point from which we would actually be experiencing them.

6. It may help us understand what Wittgenstein is getting at here to see what he is saying in terms of his notion of "grammar." Broadly construed, Wittgenstein speaks of the "grammar" of a given verbal expression to refer to the logical frameworks within which the expression is used--that is to say, to the ways in which it can and cannot be combined with other expressions and, significantly for our purposes, to the logical features of the everyday contexts in which it is used. Returning to Wittgenstein's contention that no process could provide us with the movement of the lever, we could put his point this way: the grammar of "process" involves a vantage point "from outside" and, hence, involves the possibility of multiply interpreting what we see. The relevance of the grammar of "process" to our considerations is suggested in a remark from Zettel which follows those quoted above:

When one has the picture [of what is intended] in view by itself it is suddenly dead, and it is as if something had been taken away from it, which had given it life before....Whatever accompaniments we imagine for it, articulate or inarticulate processes, or any feeling whatsoever, it remains isolated, it does not point outside itself to a reality beyond....

And now it seems to us as if intending could not be any process at all, of any kind whatsoever.--For what we are dissatisfied with here is the grammar of process, not the specific kind of process.--It could be said: we should call any process "dead" in this sense (Z, #236).

But what is the moral of all this to our earlier questions concerning how it is that Wittgenstein takes the guidance example to contain "the germ of the idea that the will is not a phenomenon"? In order to see this more clearly, let us return to Wittgenstein's remark that in attempting to give expression to our experience of being influenced we are finally tempted to say "And it just is a particular inner experience." Recall that this, he adds, would be to say nothing. We can find no experience which could count as the experience of being influenced, so we are left wanting to say that it is just "the experience of the because," just, as it were, this particular experience. Understanding our temptation here is crucial to understanding what Wittgenstein means by saying that the will is not a phenomenon. This, in turn, requires our seeing the obscure, but critical, relationship between our temptation here and our dissatisfaction with the "grammar of process"--and with the vantage point on experience which is inherent in such a grammar.

A clue to this relationship is provided by a passage which occurs toward the latter part of the Investigations. Here, at the outset of an extended discussion of the will, Wittgenstein alludes again to our temptation to speak of

something "quite particular." He remarks:

We say "The expression in his voice was genuine."
 If it was spurious we think as it were of another
 one behind it.--This is the face he shows the
 world, inwardly he has another one.--But this does
 not mean that when his expression is genuine he
 has two the same.

(("A quite particular expression.")) (PI, #606)

Staying, for the moment, within the metaphor introduced in this passage, it seems that we are being warned here against assuming that the logical framework which characterizes the situation in which we question the genuineness of the other's expression must carry over into the situation where we have no such question. More specifically, we are being warned against over-extending our way of thinking in terms of the "true expression" which lies "behind" the spurious one. We are being advised against assuming that a similar form of description must be possible in the situation in which the expression is genuine. We are being warned against failing to distinguish the different "grammars" of these two situations.

In order to apply this example to our situation regarding being guided we might rephrase it as follows. The appropriateness, in the situation of doubt, of seeing the "face behind" does not imply the presence of the "same face behind" in the situation where we have no reason to doubt the genuineness of the expression. What is particularly relevant here is the suggestion, as we might put it, that finding the "face behind" has its logical place in the

situation of doubt. We could say that it is a feature of the grammar of the "face behind" that we speak of such an inner thing in the context of having certain doubts. To draw the implications of this example for the being guided case we might note that we have there a similar distinction between two sorts of situation: one in which we "go on," copying the line without difficulty, and the other where we are afterwards looking questioningly at what we have done, attempting to find the event which is the experience of being influenced. And the implication of the "face behind" example would be that we are being warned against thinking that the sorts of phenomena which we might see when looking afterwards would be appropriately read back into the situation where we follow the standard without difficulty.

7. But what bearing do these considerations have on my earlier exploration of the way in which we cannot have the kind of certainty looking "from outside" as we do when "inside" our activity? I want to say that the lines of thought around the "two faces" example provide us with a context within which to see the significance of our earlier considerations. The two lines of thinking are quite akin.

At one point, in the section of Zettel from which I quoted above, Wittgenstein remarks:

What happens is not that this symbol cannot be further interpreted, but: I do no interpreting. I do not interpret, because I feel at home in the present picture (Z, #234).

Our attempt to find the antecedent event whose presence would account for my feeling of being influenced requires, in effect, that I not feel at home (that I not feel the facial expression to be genuine). I seek to find some guarantor of the certainty which I have when I feel at home from a perspective which presupposes that I do not. Nothing which I could come up with could possibly work here. Any candidate could be otherwise interpreted. We cannot "get behind" the genuine face!

In particular circumstances, where we are, so to speak, trying to distinguish the spurious expression from the genuine one, it makes sense to speak in terms of the "hidden face." We get in trouble, however, when we attempt to overly generalize this situation. As Wittgenstein puts it early on in the Investigations: "Impressed by the possibility of a comparison, we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality" (PI, #104). We might adapt this to our situation in the following way: Impressed by our tendency to compare the spurious expression with the "inner" genuine one, it is as though we think we have a "space"--that of the inner expression--which needs to be filled in all cases.

It may be helpful to note the way in which Wittgenstein warns us against making a similar sort of assumption in our thinking about situations in which we notice something unfamiliar. He gives several examples where we might, in

such situations, speak of experiencing feelings of strangeness. However, he then goes on,

the existence of this feeling of strangeness does not give us a reason for saying that every object which we know well and which does not seem strange to us gives us a feeling of familiarity.--We think that, as it were, the place once filled by the feeling of strangeness must surely be occupied somehow. The place for this kind of atmosphere is there, and if one of them is not in possession of it, then another is (PI, #596).

8. We are now in a position to clarify Wittgenstein's remarks on the will which follow shortly after the "two faces" section. A central contention here is that my willing to do something excludes my having a wish to do it. He says: "When I raise my arm, I have not wished it might go up. The voluntary action excludes the wish" (PI, #616). Taken in isolation this remark may seem hair-splitting at best, and probably false. Surely, we might say, if I raise my arm voluntarily I have wished it to go up--after all, I certainly did not wish it not to! But here we see a situation akin to the "two faces" and "feeling of strangeness" examples. Although we would not want to say that I did not wish my arm to go up, it may not thereby be true to say that I did wish it to. A passage from Zettel connects this line of thinking with the guidance example:

Writing is certainly a voluntary movement, and yet an automatic one. And of course there is no question of a feeling of each movement in writing. One feels something, but could not possibly analyze the feeling. One's hand writes; it does not write because one wills, but one wills what it writes.

One does not watch it in astonishment or with

interest while writing; does not think "What will it write now?" But not because one had a wish it should write that. For that it writes what I want might very well throw me into astonishment (Z, #586).

Again, what is at issue seems, to speak metaphorically, to be that there is too much "distance" between any possible antecedent event and the willed action--space enough to leave room for my being surprised that my action followed the antecedent event.

Our appreciation of the "distance" which is an inherent feature of the perspective from "outside" also puts us in a position to better understand our temptation to speak of the feeling of influence as "just a particular feeling." We might say it this way: in effect, this remark occupies the border territory between being "inside" and being "outside," in the sense in which these terms were introduced in the Zettel passages above. It attempts to express the certainty which is characteristic of the way in which when acting voluntarily we can go on--immediately--to do whatever we do. Yet, it attempts to give voice to this from "outside" the going on, from a perspective in which such certainty is not to be found. The remark conveys the illusion of such a certainty by not distinguishing this experience from any other. But since it does not so distinguish it, it does not succeed in actually picking out any particular experience. Here, we might say, we have the last hope of being able to regard the will as a phenomenon. Unable to find any process which we might regard as guaranteeing us the sort of

certainty which we experience in our voluntary action, we are left able only to say that our willing is just a particular, not otherwise qualified, experience--that it is just this particular phenomenon. But this, the limiting case of the view "from outside," says nothing. The will, therefore, is not a phenomenon.

"But wait," I can imagine it said, "undercutting our expression of the temptation to say that we are aware of a particular experience of being influenced does not free us from the temptation to say that something more occurs in the guidance case than my simply looking and drawing a line. If this is all that Wittgenstein thinks takes place, then what room is there for the will at all?" In response, I think we must proceed very carefully here. In asking, "But, don't I remember anything else?", Wittgenstein does seem to be suggesting that in fact I do not. So, then, where do we end up? In the absence of being able to speak of an experience of being influenced, are we left with only "the mere simultaneity of phenomena"?

Here, I think, our discussion so far gives us a way of seeing how, for Wittgenstein, the answer to this question is "yes and no." Viewed from the standpoint outside our engagement in willed action we can find no other events which might count as experiences of the movement of will. However, we do have another option, because we are left with an awareness of the capacity to be "inside" our voluntary

action. What we might lose is our tendency to over-extend our perspective "from outside"; what we might gain, on the other hand, is an appreciation for the independence--and the pervasiveness--of this other perspective on ourselves.

9. But what sort of an awareness is this? What sort of an appreciation? What can we say about it, if anything? One response to these questions would be to say, in Wittgenstein's words, that here "the straight road is blocked." To fully answer these questions would require that we go beyond the scope of this chapter, for it would require that we trace the way that such an awareness is woven through Wittgenstein's work. The suggestion of a more direct approach might be seen, however, if we recall the way in which the "movement of the lever" provides me with the reason for my action. What I do doesn't just happen; it isn't just "caused" by the standard. Rather, I am guided by the standard. The original provides the rule for, the reason for, my going on as I do. Now consider the following remark:

On being asked for the grounds of a supposition, one bethinks oneself of them. Does the same thing happen here as when one considers what may have been the causes of an event? (PI, #475)

And now compare:

"You said, 'It'll stop soon'.--Were you thinking of the noise or of your pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning"--is he observing that the connection existed, or is he making it by means of these words?--Can't I say both? If what he said was true, didn't the

connection exist--and is he not for all that making one which did not exist? (PI, #682)

Consider here how bethinking myself of the reason involves the sort of "immediacy" which we have seen to characterize the perspective "from inside." If we take the second of the two above quotations to be suggesting that we can say both, and we notice how the perspective which "discovers the connection" is akin to the view "from outside"--to "seeing through the lens of the 'because'"--then we may be in a position to consider the possibility of our seeing, as it were, through the lens of "bethinking oneself." This perspective could not, of course, be one in which we so view some antecedent event, or some inner "movement of the lever." Nonetheless, when seeing "through" our capacity to bethink ourselves, we do obtain a new perspective on our everyday capacity to "go on." We are perhaps in a position to have a vantage point which brings before us what is normally hidden by virtue of being too pervasive to be seen. What we might then be in a position to see is something quite simple, but something which our captivity to the view from outside prevents us from seeing. Something quite simple, but, in being the foundation of our everyday capacity to freely "go on," something quite profound:

The aspects of things that are the most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something--because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.--And this means: we fail

to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (PI, #129)

10. Something quite simple, and therefore so easily not seen. Yet something, this capacity to "go on," the absence of which is a striking characteristic of some schizophrenic experience. And here, as we shall see, the yearning for/terror of a first-person perspective, of a view "from inside," becomes of in-life concern.

CHAPTER FOUR

WITTGENSTEIN BRINGS US INSIDE SCHIZOPHRENIC EXPERIENCE

1. Sass, Wittgenstein, and the Context of Schizophrenic Hyperreflexivity:

In the recent work of Louis Sass we find an appreciation of Wittgenstein's relevance for the understanding of schizophrenic modes of existence. In The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the Schizophrenic Mind, Sass describes his "main purpose" as

an eminently Wittgensteinian one: to unravel ...the self-deluding involutions of the schizophrenic "form of life"--and thus to dissipate the atmosphere of unutterable mystery and profundity that surrounds such patients, often confusing them as much as those who seek to know them. (Sass, 1994, p. 9. Hereinafter referred to as PD.)

In a manner that provides a helpful context for our efforts, Sass seeks to bring out the existential relevance of Wittgenstein's work for schizophrenic experience. In an approach to which I feel akin he contends that a "comparison of these two intractable domains--the thought of Wittgenstein and the phenomenology of a schizophrenic world--may allow each to illuminate the other" (PD, p. 13).

Schizophrenia, Sass argues, has tended to be misleadingly thought of as the "overcoming of reason" by primordial passions. Rather it might better be regarded as a "self-deceiving condition...generated within rationality itself rather than by the loss of rationality."

Wittgenstein's work is taken to be relevant to the understanding of schizophrenic experience given his concern with the existential contexts of philosophical dilemmas.

The parallels between Wittgenstein and Schreber reveal not a primitive or Dionysian condition but something akin to Wittgenstein's notion of a disease of the intellect, born at the highest pitches of self-consciousness and alienation. Madness, in this view, is the endpoint of the trajectory consciousness follows when it separates from the body and the passions, and from the social and practical world, and turns in upon itself; it is what might be called the mind's perverse self-apotheosis (PD, p. 12).

2. Sass' basic thesis: madness as a heightening rather than dimming of conscious awareness, an alienation not from reason but from the emotions, instincts, and the body.

Philosophical abstractions may, oddly enough, be the most apt way of capturing the actual feel of such a [schizophrenic] world...(PD, 10).

I will want to take this a step further, investigating the extent to which it is not just in their being abstract that philosophical issues evoke schizophrenic worlds, but by virtue of their concern with foundational matters.

3. Consider: Schizophrenic "hyperreflexivity" and the awareness of what is normally implicit.

If Natalija's influencing-machine delusion represents the lived body turned inside out and contemplated at a remove, Lang's "strata" involve an analogous externalization--a projection outward of the usually implicit phenomena of inner speech and dialogue. In the apt vocabulary of the philosopher Samuel Alexander, each tends to "contemplate" experiences or psychological processes that would normally be inhabited (lived through) or "enjoyed." And such tendencies are hardly likely to confirm a sense of self: the formula of exigent introspection is not "I think

therefore I am" but "It thinks and therefore I am not" (Sass, 1992, p. 232).

In marking out these two modes--contemplation and enjoyment--Sass enlists the notions of the third and first-person perspectives in his description of schizophrenic experience. Furthermore, he suggests how a third-person position is related to an attenuation of a sense of self within schizophrenia.

Sass sees this objectification of the normally implicit conditions of experience as a consequence of the "hyperreflexivity" that characterizes schizophrenia.

Wittgenstein, I want to say, places us inside this "investigation," where the third person/first person movements are of in-life concern. How does this put a different spin on schizophrenic reflexivity?

4. We need a way in, a way to see the relationship between Wittgenstein's understanding of "grammar" and the instantiation of philosophical questions in schizophrenic experience. We can start here, with Sass sensing something like the connection we are after:

As is typical of Wittgenstein, he does not concern himself with the truth or falsity of solipsism as a metaphysical doctrine. He wants to wean philosophy from idle speculation about these kinds of unanswerable issues and to move it toward more useful questions that will allow people to dissolve such metaphysical conjectures or worries. One method of doing this is to consider what might be called the experiential counterpart to the metaphysical doctrine--that is the mode of existence that supports the doctrine, whether by motivating it or justifying it. (PD, pp. 34-35)

Sass argues that a certain existential stance motivates a philosophical position. It "arises" (PD, p. 34) out of a certain mode. Wittgenstein, however, looks to the mode as the living philosophical view. Within schizophrenic experience we see a particular instance of this. Where here the mode of living carries, I want to say, this very question, the very question of instantiation. It is in this sense that within schizophrenic experience we can see the philosophical question coming alive, the "in-life" manifestation of the "how to connect with the world" question.

5. Sass links schizophrenic hyperreflexivity to a "phenomenological bracketing" whereby we suspend the "natural standpoint within which we assume the objective existence of the world."

What is right about this has to do with "grammar": that, e.g., a certain vantage point on the will, on intention differs from that in which one is engaged in willing.

Where we go wrong, however, is in the attempt to see reflexivity, or passivity or staring--to see these as "making," bringing about, certain schizophrenic states.

The manifestation of such framework concerns within schizophrenic experience is not the product of, say, the adoption of a passive stance, not the product of the fixed stare. To see these modes of being as giving rise to a

solipsistic stance is misleading. Rather than seeing the lack of movement as giving rise to a solipsistic position, we might say: Movement is the issue here.

6. See Sass on Natalija:

I am suggesting that phenomena like the videocamera or Natalija machine do not even exist in the same subjectivized domain as do other delusional objects. ...[T]hese delusional phenomena function as something like symbols for subjectivity itself, for the self-as-subject, and thus that they are not objects within the world, whether real or delusional, so much as expressions of the felt, ongoing process of knowing or experiencing by which this world is constituted. If this is true such phenomena would be expected to be doubly ephemeral and unreal--difficult to locate not only because they have no existence in the objective world independent of the subject's consciousness but also because, like the eyeball that sees, they are unlikely to appear even as immanent objects within their own (subjectivized) fields of vision...(Sass, 1992, p. 286).

Two aspects here need scrutiny: (a) the context of such hyperreflexivity and, related to this, (b) how we understand the manifestation of framework questions in first-order, clinical contexts.

We might say that such delusions [as Natalija's above] are concerned with ontological questions--with the general metaphysical status of the entire universe or the most fundamental issues involving the relationship of knower and known, rather than with objects or events existing within such a universe. Blindness to this fact--which is enshrined in the widely accepted poor-reality-testing formula--has, in my view, been one of the most important sources of misunderstanding between schizophrenics and those who treat them (Sass, 1992, p. 287).

A powerful guiding statement. As close as Sass comes to what I will seek to articulate regarding what we might term

the "transcendental" aspect of this experience--that is to say, transcendental in a Kantian sense of being part of the framework within which experience occurs.

Hence these experiences are, according to Sass, ephemeral; something I guess like the eye trying to see itself. What I want us to see involves speaking in a similar sense of the transcendental aspect of certain sorts of experience, but there is a significant difference between what I'm doing and Sass' argument. I am contending that what might be, and usually is, taken as a philosophical difference, a subject for philosophical debate--as, for example, whether a person's reasons for acting as he does are causally or in some other way related to his actions--cannot be a matter of debate as here we have no common ground from which such a debate might be decided. To the contrary, this is an ongoing, "in-life" dilemma, and in fact one which shows itself within schizophrenic experience. I want to say, for example, that we see in the content of some schizophrenic delusional concerns a focus on agency, on who's controlling, on the question of whether there can be a place, a center, from which I might emerge.

So it is not so much, as with Sass, that some delusions differ from others in being, as it were, meta-level delusions, and therefore "more ephemeral." Rather, the gap between the metapsychological debate and the existential dilemma collapses. Thus, as we will see, philosophy and

treatment (can) coincide.

What Wittgenstein does: to bring philosophy to life, to bring it (and us) home.

The problem is with how we locate the "agency." His scrutinizing makes... and then the machine story as his explanation, "subjective" explanation....I want to say: rather, the machine shows itself. Within the idea of the machine something is sought. Yearnings, and fears, portrayed. Some with "transcendental" significance. HERE is where they are to be seen.

Compare with the idea of instantiation: Sass speaks of the "mode of existence" as "motivating or justifying" the metaphysical doctrine. The state of hyperreflexivity, e.g., motivates, justifies the solipsistic doctrine. How to say? What Wittgenstein suggests is something much "closer" than this. Closer as in "here we see X." This connected with "movement is the issue." Compare: seeing pain in a person's face--not, as it were, inferring its presence behind the grimace (Z, #225).

7. Wittgenstein's target is not just the logic but the existential sources and conditions of philosophical illusion; indeed, he often seems less interested in refuting explicit philosophical doctrines than in diagnosing the whole attitude that tends to accompany not only these doctrines but the philosophizing stance or attitude in general. This stance, with its fostering of detached contemplation, abstraction, and introspection, is something with which Wittgenstein himself was, no doubt, all too familiar (PD, pp. 13-14).

Yes, here Sass is seeing a broader in-life context that

is of concern for Wittgenstein. Here note that the stance is seen to "accompany" the explicit doctrines. Elsewhere said to motivate them. Just the nature of this relationship that concerns Wittgenstein, and that can be of importance within schizophrenic experience.

8. Sass on Jonathan Lang's projection outward of the usually implicit phenomena of inner speech and dialogue:

The example of schizophrenics like Lang and Natalija demonstrates that such "contemplation" is possible, though it may not be normal. For in their experience, the implicit and transparent phenomena that would normally lie close to the subject-pole of the intentional arc of consciousness have, as it were, migrated out to the endpoint of this arc, there to turn opaque. It is true of course that there must then be another act of consciousness that is more invisible and implicit, an "enjoyed" act that, as it were, "contemplates" the acts that have been rendered explicit....In this sense, Alexander's claim about an act of consciousness necessarily remaining implicit seems to hold true (Sass, 1992, p. 500).

I want to say: This misses the shift in perspective which would be involved in such a "migration." What's wrong here: An attempt is being made to describe my relationship to, as it were, the medium of my being conscious. We think, rather than objectivizing we'll speak in a way that emphasizes doing and puts the object of some intentional state, e.g. "enjoyment," as close as can be to the subject....Our problem here is in holding onto the "intentional arc." Recall Schafer's "eliding the first-person perspective" discussed in chapter two.

In addition, this leaves open the question of context.

How are we to understand this tendency within schizophrenic experience to objectify the conditions of experience. What do we miss when we assume the implicit processes? I want to say: We miss that very thing which creates the flybottle and entraps the solipsistic fly.

9. Attention to the context, to how one is looking. This much Sass emphasizes. But we must be wary lest we fall into forgetting how we have situated hyperreflexivity. This may be what is happening if we are caught in the picture of "that which is normally implicit," whatever this X might be--with the schizophrenic person being hyperaware of this same thing, process etc..... This is just the problem! Just "the crucial mistake" that "seemed so innocent," just what Wittgenstein is intent on alerting us to. Again:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise?--The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them--we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)--And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.

What is your aim in philosophy?--To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle (PI, ##308-309).

This crucial mistake is here being linked to the

solipsist's captivity!

10. Note where Sass distinguishes his approach from Wittgenstein's more logical/linguistic argument re solipsism. Where Sass differentiates between the situation that motivates a solipsistic stance and the transcendental issues.

The argument I have been considering is a phenomenological one: I have traced out, primarily in the perceptual sphere, the contradictory consequences of a certain kind of introspective contemplation--namely, the vanishing of the I-sense into its objects. As is his frequent practice, Wittgenstein also mentions a second line of argument that is more logical and linguistic (an argument that may be of broader relevance, since it would also apply to forms of solipsism that may be more dependent on logical or transcendental forms of argument and less bound up with a particular attitude or lived context). He points out that a statement such as "this experience is my experience" is, from a logical point of view, essentially empty or meaningless (tautologous), since its negation is not false but inconceivable...(PD, p. 70).

But the point, the question: just how are these two related? We might say: it is just this distinction that Wittgenstein is undermining. And this has significant implications for how we view schizophrenic experience.

11. Wittgenstein brings, e.g, the search for the cause, brings what could be an argument about whether actions are caused or not, brings this into the everyday contexts in which such questions might live (their instantiation). And this is more than just giving examples of philosophical problems, or of the relevance of philosophy or some such.... The next "step," the one we need to to pursue, involves

extending this line of thinking in what would appear to be a natural direction, namely toward the development of these in-life contexts, particularly those developments which when encountered are called by us schizophrenic.

12. We can see in Wittgenstein an awareness of that which we are seeking when we are caught in philosophical dilemmas. When we so approach schizophrenic experience we can see other dimensions of, e.g., delusional thinking. As clinicians we have been sensitized to listen for "the truth in the delusion," thought of as a metaphorical way of giving expression to core issues, to one's history of persecution, invasion etc. Can we also think of the transcendental dimension, what is being worked upon in that regard?

13. What, I want to say, if the issues under consideration within schizophrenic experience are framework issues? If they are transcendental in that sense. To whatever extent this is so, we do not have the bearings that are assumed by remarks like the above re "the usually implicit phenomena..."

Re: The "migration" to the object pole: Here we see the "transcendental" dimension of experience--that by which the world is constituted--manifested within schizophrenic "first-order" experience. ("First order", as I will discuss further below, in the sense invoked by Wittgenstein when he speaks of philosophy as not being "second order," but rather "like orthography which deals with the word 'orthography'

among others without then being second-order." See below Chapter 7.)

What do you mean by transcendental work? Here, for example, we see a concern with "going on", there with movement from a stance from without to view "from inside," with movement from a third to a first person perspective.

Something quite important in the difference between on the one hand the life-situation that motivates the philosophical view and, on the other, the in-life instantiation of the view. The latter, for one, is what needs seeing within schizophrenic experience.

14. In his Madness and Modernism, Sass situates the "hyperreflexivity" that characterizes a schizophrenic mode through the lens of modernism.

Sass contrasts the phantasmagoria of the [modernist] imagination with another modernist tendency, the vertiginous mise en abyme of hyperreflexivity.

In such a 'triumph of desiring fantasy' the inner self dissolves outward into the objects of its yearnings. In the latter forms of self-fragmentation, by contrast, there is a turning away from a world of desired objects and toward inner experiences and an increasingly devitalized self; further, it is not desire or emotion that dominates, but the relentless impulse to know. It is not impossible for these two tendencies to be included, perhaps even synthesized, in the same work; but the fact remains that the two trends are, if not exactly incompatible, at least in fundamental tension with each other (Sass, 1992, p. 226).

On an "increasingly devitalized self": What is the

perspective from which we are speaking here?

As though enough of the hyperreflection leads to an attenuating of the old substantival self, whereas what we need is to contextualize our [schizophrenic] sense of, and search for, such a self.

15. Sass: hyperreflexivity and the attenuation of self. The picture of something breaking under scrutiny. And we can imagine situations in which this picture might be applicable.

What can, however, be misleading: for one, the "hyperreflexivity bringing about" picture starts with, as it were, something solid to be broken....But, we might say, we are in the middle of "seeking to break/seeking to mend". Furthermore, this conception of that which is broken may be significantly regarded as itself "delusional"--not "corresponding" to [transcendental] reality--and as itself a significant piece of the schizophrenic world.

Can we sense that there is a context here, one which when examined appears problematic? It is as though we had a substantive self which then, given this process of hyperreflexivity, becomes attenuated. The illusion of efficacious cause here is revealed when we see through this myth. What was it that was there to be dissolved?

Compare here with "we talk of states and processes....This just what commits us to a way of looking at the matter."

See Wittgenstein and what we might term "the delusion of the implicit." It is the overgeneralization of a picture that is the problem. We can imagine, for example, the therapeutic value, at certain points in the process, of thinking in terms of substantial self, of the implicit. This has its grammar, will have its uses, allows certain movements.

16. So what are we to make of the attempt to "dissipate the attitude of mystery and profundity that surrounds schizophrenics"? If for example what we are offering is a demystification which invokes passivity as bringing about a solipsistic stance....If this, then what are we offering? To be more active?

Can we see how it is just this, being more active, being engaged, that is problematic? We can see this once we broaden our sights to include the context for passivity, and to include the way that the mystery arises precisely in the context of active/passive. So we may reduce our confusion about the mystery of schizophrenic experience with this approach....but then how does this relate to where one is within such states, a place we need to be able to understand, to meet.

In speaking of schizophrenic yearning for/fear of movement we open the possibility of a position from inside on, e.g., becoming active, the fear and longing there.

17. Sass and the confusion diagnosed in terms of solipsism.

In a way that must leave the clinical dimension undeveloped, assumed? Starting from disengagement/engagement, seeing as the "counterpart" or motivator of certain characteristic schizophrenic states.

But what if one has not got this place from which to see in terms of engagement or its absence? When being "inside" or "out" is an in-life concern. How could it not be that one's "self-expression," if you will, wouldn't express such a fundamental dilemma as the extent to which one feels apart, as well as where, with its conflicts and ambivalences etc, one yearns to be. Yes, Sass is right regarding the fundamental importance of the inside/outside, active/passive dimensions. But not as motivators. Yes, integrally involved.

The mistake of concluding from Wittgenstein's pointing us toward everyday usage that he is presenting the view: solipsism is "born of" self-consciousness and abstraction (PD, p.9).

Where can we sense in Wittgenstein a way of bringing us more inside a schizophrenic frame? In the very dilemma around inside and outside, for example. How could we pull out any one strand here to serve as explanation of such experiences?

18. For what yearning? How to understand the fragmented, repetitive, constant closing-in-on-itself reasoning? We might say: Think of this as the fly against the glass. So

that to speak only of the debility, the self-dissolving hyperreflexivity would be as incomplete as describing the fly without mentioning the light beyond.

19. Re a view from inside schizophrenic experience and the limitation of a third person perspective.

Consider Wittgenstein:

Writing is certainly a voluntary movement, and yet an automatic one. And of course there is no question of a feeling of each movement in writing. One feels something, but could not possibly analyze the feeling. One's hand writes; it does not write because one wills, but one wills what it writes.

One does not watch it in astonishment or with interest while writing; does not think "What will it write now?" But not because one had a wish it should write that. For that it writes what I want might very well throw me into astonishment (Z, #586).

Just intuitively, notice the psychotic "feel" of, for example, being astonished that my hand does what I want it to do! Something very important here. Think about the uncanny kinship between schizophrenic experience and similar states which Wittgenstein evokes, such as the astonishment at movement of one's hand.

For one thing, we might say: Indeed there is something quite astonishing about my hand doing what I will it to.

What is involved here, when so seeing, may be a certain picture of the act of will and then consequent....Here we are in the territory of, can understand a reason for wanting to say with Wittgenstein: "The will must go right up to the action..." The kinship with schizophrenic experience is

suggestive. What we may have here, in effect, is an example of bringing a "third-person perspective" right into experience. Seeing the distance, but also seeing the truth, the insight here.

One's hand writes; it does not write because one wills, but one wills what it writes.

20. I want to say: we are looking around within the space of such astonishment, seeking to walk within this neighborhood. Here the import of the idea of grammar. That is, rather than just speaking of a consequence of hyperreflexivity, we are looking for its address. And such would, of course, involve knowing what it might bring about.

21. I agree with Sass in his noting a characteristic of delusions that goes against the reality testing view as he construes it, namely:

In reality, however, the delusions and hallucinations recognized as being most characteristic of actual schizophrenics do not simply exaggerate but fundamentally distort, contradict, or call into question the normal human form of life.

The first-rank symptoms include various hallucinations or delusions in which the patients lose a normal sense of owning or controlling their actions, sensations, or thoughts (PD, p. 22).

Jaspers' "metaphysical delusions" that reflect an experience of a shattering of self....Schizophrenics may believe that they have invented everything that they encounter.....Or that what appear to be human beings are really phantoms or automata.

I agree as well with Sass's reservations regarding a particular explanatory approach:

Such delusions are not explicable as wish-fulfillment fantasies--at least not readily so--for even if they do, at some level, involve intense wishes, the wishes themselves seem in need of considerable elucidation before they can be empathically understood or can play an explanatory role (PD, p. 22).

Such themes certainly do, as Sass suggests, point to limitations of the regression hypothesis, limitations of a wish fulfillment fantasy interpretation of such. In addition, they suggest that what is, not surprisingly, often of concern in schizophrenic experience is the very question of foundation, of reality, of how to go on.

22. These concerns bear on the idea of instantiation. I want to say such questions can be seen to be instantiated within schizophrenic experience. Once we see the sense in which these transcendental concerns are under investigation, we will see the limits of Sass' turn toward a different explanation from that which is offered in (a perhaps somewhat straw man) invoked psychoanalytic explanation. More, we might say, of a problem with explanation in this context.

Consider: "transcendental reality testing."

23. Why the instantiation of the philosophical dilemma is important: As Kierkegaard put it, this contradiction "lies upon the race" (Kierkegaard, 1944). Contrast this with Sass' existential context. As a way into instantiation we

can ask: what is the relation between a view from inside schizophrenic experience and the instantiation of a philosophical dilemma?

Something like: Staring, e.g., an element of, has grammatical place in, the expression of a philosophical dilemma....To say this brings about a solipsistic stance, for example, either reduces the latter to just a held-to position or is a matter of one lived aspect, staring, being held apart as accounting for, bringing about other aspects. In the latter case it would then be misleading to speak of it as bringing about a solipsistic stance, since it is an integral part of such.

24. Essence of Wittgenstein's applicability to schizophrenia. The image that comes to mind: Working in "reveal codes" on word processor. What Sass notices regarding the turning of awareness on the conditions of experience. Wittgenstein works this territory and does so with an eye toward liberation.

I want to say that we can see within schizophrenic experience a coming up upon that which we might speak of, with Sass, as implicit. Coming upon.

Image of the awareness that beneath city streets a labyrinth of pipes and wires....As though no longer the dark thickness of asphalt hiding this. Now a shearing brightness, and the underworld revealed.

Recall also images of the undergirding of the

city....Revealing the latticework (key metaphor in the O'Brien's 1958 autobiography Operators and Things), the mechanism behind what appears....That which is underneath the streets on which we walk....

(And note: This has important implications re how psychiatric brain talk might be heard, put to use!)

25. I want to say: the problem with Sass that he is insufficiently "inside".

[T]he person who stares intently at his own stream of experience is unlikely to discover any concrete evidence of his own identity, innerness, or volition. Even his own bodily sensations will seem separate from him, since the very fact of scrutinizing will make them seem out there apart. To experience one's own sensations as having their original locus in another version of one's own body, in an influencing machine not under one's own control, would seem an appropriate way of symbolizing such an experience (and of providing a subjective explanation for it) (Sass, 1992, p. 226).

An appropriate way of symbolizing the experience of staring intently in a way that makes the objects seem apart.

Will seem separate from him due to the act of scrutinizing. What this does not get to, we might say, is the attempted "making of him" that may be seen in this process. And this relates to the instantiation of philosophical ideas. Here we see it. And here a way in for us.

26. It is understandable that we might see a connection between passivity and a solipsistic stance, but the meanings of non-action may have as much to do, e.g., with the

maintaining of agency--with, we could imagine, keeping the pure possibility of movement safe from the contamination of action in the world.

Yet there is something to this connection. It is not, we want to say, just a coincidence that non-action might result in a solipsistic stance. For Wittgenstein their "going together"--compare a Buddhist "dependent arising"--is comparable to the relationship of the fact that fire devours to the appeal that fire has held as purificatory.

That fire was used for purification is clear. But nothing can be more probable than the fact that later on thinking people brought purification ceremonies into connection with the sun, even where the ceremonies had originally been thought of only as purificatory....

That fire destroys things completely, unlike battering, tearing them to pieces, etc., must have attracted the attention of people (Wittgenstein, 1993, p. 153).

It may be one attraction of non-action that it allows such a stance, but it is no explanation of schizophrenic solipsism.

27. Recall:

When I look back on the experience I have the feeling that what is essential about it is an "experience of being influenced," of a connection--as opposed to a mere simultaneity of phenomena: but at the same time I should not be willing to call any experienced phenomenon the "experience of being influenced." (This contains the germ of the idea that the will is not a phenomenon.) I should like to say I had experienced the "because", and yet I do not want to call any phenomenon the "experience of the because" (PI, #176).

Interesting that Wittgenstein would choose these examples. More here than just the non-essentialist point.

That he chooses to make an example of willing, of intention. "(This is connected with the problem of the nature of intention, of willing.)"

Notice the immediacy here, the immediacy of meaning, of going on.

As with the relation of non-action and solipsistic stance, so too here we want to say: more than "mere simultaneity," more than an accident, but less than a "bringing about" by way of some antecedent process.

Seeing through the lens of "the because"; tracing round the frame of "because." Compare PD, p. 4:

Despite the certainty with which they are held, such delusions typically do not lead to action, at least not to the kind of action that would seem reasonable given what the patient seems to be claiming.

Consider around grammar of doing and its having been taken up into the delusional world. As for example one might expect if work is being done within the delusional realm on the transcendental conditions of movement. As it were, one is not oneself moving outside this world, despite appearances to the contrary. An example here of Sass' beginning to step outside the experience despite expression of intention (PD, pg. 6), to seek understanding from within.

Here we can see a crucial "getting inside" schizophrenic experience: how with the search for the because we see the seeking of a foundation in the very interstices of everyday life. Wittgenstein's example of

"being guided" while reading: a most everyday pursuit. This for us provides a way of entry to seeing the transcendental level at which delusional thinking can work.

We might say: as it were, a crack in the very ground on which one wishes to walk.

28. Initial remarks on PI, 615:

"Willing, if it is not to be a sort of wishing, must be the action itself. It cannot be allowed to stop anywhere short of the action." If it is the action, then it is so in the ordinary sense of the word; so it is speaking, writing, walking, lifting a thing, imagining something. But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort,--to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc...

Here we see introduced the "terror of the gap." Might say: it is as though within schizophrenic experience this gap were made "concrete"--as it were, an actual crack in the ground on which I seek to walk.

We can see this expressed, for example, in the schizophrenic "fear of the empty spaces" (horror of the vacuum). See, for instance, the art of A. Wolfli. [And see Treasure Island drawings of Charles Crumb, R. Crumb's brother. The way the "wrinkles" took over everything. From film "Crumb" on R. Crumb (Zwigoff, 1995).]

From Arieti:

A frequent experience is one of anxiety in the face of space and escape into a restricted or very definite space, like the corner of a room. Some patients seem to grasp for what they can touch and see; they cannot stand emptiness, even on a piece of paper. This feeling often obliges them to write on sheets of paper up to the border, without leaving any margin or space unwritten (1974, p.

249).

See:

The sense of a sentence--one would like to say--may, of course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless have a definite sense. An indefinite sense--that would really not be a sense at all--This is like: an indefinite boundary is not really a boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the man up fast in the room--there is only one door left open"-- then I simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all". An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none--But is that true? (PI, #99)

See the "fly bottle": a way out in the turning. The sham lies in thinking that one is locked in. The real delusion.

29. With regard to hyperreflexivity: we want to feel our way inside this experience. Here an avenue. What is it like to so stand apart. The will must go right up, no gap. But then we seem to simply vanish into the action, no place to stand apart.

And what does it show about a schizophrenic state that here would be the experience of the gap, of being "stopped short" of action, of the world. We have the fevered attempt to bridge this gap. And we have a sense of the context of there being such an experience of a gap.

30. The question: How would "then it is action in the ordinary sense" be experienced within schizophrenic context? Here we see the "grammatical" context for a schizophrenic terror. Movement from terror of gap to terror of loss of difference. A central schizophrenic dynamic.

Important as with Mr. R. the destructive relationship, can't live with or without, with family, especially mother. How would such a dynamic aspect figure in your presentation?

One way: if think of mother as carrying experience of the place where one would just walk, as where one just on earth, one's sense of on earth.

Also the issue of control. For Mr. R., when not "with us," to be "lost in the computer," seeking, playing with number link-ups--with "mere simultaneities"--lost with circuits lighting up around him.

31. I can imagine someone saying: "for you there seems to be little awareness of dynamic factors, of e.g. the struggle around separation from mother..." Think though of issues of control, of mine, the place of "mine." The sought creation of mine with the imagined being inside hers as well. It is true that Wittgenstein does not so present the philosophical issues. Look to how the grammar of control, movement and objectification interacts with the central schizophrenic separation dynamics.

Consider regarding the context for hyperreflexivity: how maintaining of objectified I--present at creation--allows maintaining of [her] as controlling bringing into being creator. This is a central dynamic. Where the more abstract objectification/"could not but" can be seen to be a playing out, expression of psychodynamic movement. Can be seen as, of course, occurring in our world--our world of

mothers and children.

Mr. R.: I won't be able to live my life until she dies. See re dissolution fear. Fear the living of your life would kill her [you].

32. Consider: extent to which these grammatical issues regarding will, meaning, language and world, how these provide "logical form, framework" for schizophrenic experience.

Rather than the "interpersonal" issues of being apart, separate//merged, swallowed, rather than these being more explanatorily fundamental, rather than this: how the question of the relationship to the world interwoven with question of can I mean/can I will....

It cannot, we might say, "stop anywhere short"!

33. For one thing we might wonder here about "dynamic" factors, e.g. of penetration from behind. Note how generally in Sass these are given little attention once the regression hypothesis is discarded.

See possibility here of connection with object-relational perspective. Not being able to get behind. How could it not be that the object-relational manifestation of the longing to enter that place where can dissolve, from which one came, that oceanic place, how could it not be that such would pick up a yearning for the womb, for union with mother etc.? How one could see this as foundational another matter. Not being able to get behind: and schizophrenic

forcing the issue. And, likewise, how could this not also find fundamental expression in object-relational inner worlds....And here the famed schizophrenic aggression. Breaking in, breaking back in. Rape and self-devastation. We are not surprised to see a more intense expression of the yearning to return, not surprised to find it in interpersonal, "internal" object relational, and "grammatical" realms. This is a manifestation of philosophy comes to life. And the illumination which guides us.

34. Where the psychodynamic context of schizophrenic experience cannot be overlooked. Why the fevered attempt to make real? There most certainly was not "going on being" in the environment which nurtured schizophrenic attempts at escape, at liberation. What needs remembering: that this "make believe" attempt to will into being was learned somewhere. And the possibility of meeting around this.

35. On the Grammar of Agency and the Context of Schizophrenic Concern:

"Could not but walk..." An example of Wittgenstein's bringing us inside schizophrenic experience.

Sass: A schizophrenic person may lose the sense of initiating his own actions.

We might ask: how would you react? Perhaps, eg, with an absorption in the idea of an apparatus that might lead to action as result.

Might put it this way: consider how in, e.g., the searching for just the right number coincidence, (e.g. Mr. R.) just the right one which would certify a certain state...think of this as looking for a kind of certainty...certainty of movement we might say...and then consider:

We do say: 'Now I can go on, I mean I know the formula", as we say "I can walk, I mean I have time";...that is when we are contrasting this condition for walking with others. But here we must be on our guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case (e.g. for a person's walking) so that, as it were, he could not but walk if they were all fulfilled (PI, #183).

Conditions are ideal but there's no friction...(PI, #107).

What is involved in holding to the slippery ice? Think, for example, of the fervid search for number connections. What seems from outside to be coincidental as pregnant with meaning. That which could give birth to, express, something of highest significance. Clinging to certainty. And the accompanying, ever-growing dread, the sense of emptiness at the center. Attempting to make certain...to make what cannot be so made.

Notice how we see again a shift in perspective here. We have the point of view from inside a situation--going on "in so far as" one factor, among others, is concerned. And we have the tempting elision to the "could not but" standpoint which no longer serves to distinguish anything.

Consider drawing our awareness to this temptation as

akin to a clinical intervention, and, with timing, a wise one at that.

36. The above remarks regarding "could not but" are intended to help us see how aspects of the grammar of agency can become the locus of concern in schizophrenic experience.

Compare: Schizophrenia as "disease of the will."

Would be better to speak of ways in which, as Wittgenstein puts it, "this is connected with the problem of the nature of intention, of willing."

What is connected is that it adds nothing to speak of a particular inner experience here. And we ask: What is expressed in this turn to a particular inner experience? What sought/feared?

Consider Mr. L: "I see what you have to be an unbending will. This is what I want."

37. Think here of Rene from Sechehaye's Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl. Where she speaks of the "smoothness" of the world of unreality.

In these disturbing circumstances I sensed again the atmosphere of unreality. During class, in the quiet of the work period, I heard the street noises--a trolley passing, people talking, a horse neighing, a horn sounding, each detached, immovable, separated from its source, without meaning. Around me, the other children, heads bent over their work, were robots or puppets, moved by an invisible mechanism....And always this ghastly quiet, broken by outside sounds coming from far away, the implacable sun heating the room, the lifeless immobility. An awful terror bound me; I wanted to scream (1951, pp. 29-30).

Themes of "being apart from," together with "being in a

world of detached objects" and "being an object, a thing."

Compare here: "no friction" and "back to the rough ground!"

The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger of becoming empty.--We have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground! (PI, #107)

Recall Schafer's action language where we also see "conditions such that could not but walk..." The elision--with the consequence that the power of the "action intervention" is thereby lost.

38. What I am seeking to see here: the conflict around trying to get to, in Kierkegaard's words, "kokolorum." [Said of the movement within Hegel's dialectic, which forgot only one thing--"the individual": "Ein, zwei, drei...kokolorum." (Kierkegaard, 1941)] An example of the "smoothness" of delusion. "Could not but..." The pain of being on the brink of the turn. What has occurred to bring about this predicament?

39. Compare: "the order begins to stammer."

When we give an order, it can look as if the ultimate thing sought by the order had to remain unexpressed, as there is always a gulf between an order and its execution. Say I want someone to make a particular movement, say to raise his arm. To make it quite clear, I do the movement. This picture seems unambiguous till we ask: how does he

know that he is to make that movement?--How does he know at all what use he is to make of the signs I give him, whatever they are?--Perhaps I shall now try to supplement the order by means of further signs by pointing from myself to him, making encouraging gestures, etc.. Here it looks as if the order were beginning to stammer.

As if the signs were precariously trying to produce understanding in us.--But if we now understand them, by what token do we understand?

The gesture--we should like to say--tries to portray, but cannot do it (PI, pp. 433-434).

I want to say: that the "goes right up," with the link to "transcendental" concerns, offers us something in the territory of "that which brings us inside." In that place we are only gesturing, we can feel that the order begins to stammer. But it is, we want to say, with regard to a "being apart from" here that we can see the possibility of healing, a being apart from regarding, for example, "can I will, can I mean?" What Sass captures with awareness of the importance of hyperreflexivity is one aspect of the concretization of such concerns. The most basic transcendental issues made concrete.

40. Sass: Wittgenstein and two aspects of the experiential stance relating to solipsism: passivity and staring.

Here possibility of link up with "could not but"...With this passivity placed in context...Say in context of a waiting to leap...And the staring connects up with yearning, with longing for immediacy...And with the longed for (apparent) certainty of the meaning connection.

Just how much can we derive, however, from active vs.

passive? "Yet the act of moving a physical object also confirms one's own experience of activity and efficacy, thus precluding a sense of passivization as well as subjectivization."

Well, I want to say, not moving alone. I want to inquire into: "moments" of activity and passivity...In-life...Not just the schizophrenic sitting in corner of the day room....Have known such people at such moments to also be then quite active....We must be careful not to ourselves too quickly "step outside." If the issue is active and passive, how manifested, how understood, what sought in either....If this is so then we must be wary of moving too quickly ourselves to explanatory position. As in "activity precludes....."

What is terrifying about activity? Losing something? What the thought gain of passive posture? Seeing and holding into being: we might say to be "present at creation." Or, say, to be "moved." Or to be in godlike position of identifying with the mover, and magically movement must happen. See here "could not but." See the clinical importance of our knowing our way about active and passive. Not enough to give an explanation in terms of active vs. passive....

This is related to grammar and instantiation: we cannot ground activity/passivity in specific patterns. What is important is the grammar of activity, grammar of will....

Movement is the issue.

41. We have been looking at the relationship between hyperreflexivity and a sense of agency, with a different emphasis than Sass in that it is not as though the hyperreflexivity simply results in vitiating a sense of agency; the extent to which it is also a feature of the search for such.

The search for which is also conflicted. Some conflicts here: The impossibility of "seeing oneself unobserved" requires a sort of "letting go" which might, for example, be given concrete expression via an image of being swallowed, dissolved, expanded beyond bounds.

Here again see the crossing of psychodynamic and grammatical features.

42. Our relationship to agency:

Mr. P: today speaking of the movie "Black Hole." The spaceship, like a living room, people around smoking. How he had only seen twenty minutes of this movie years ago while in the local state hospital, but it has stayed with him...How the crisis came, doesn't remember what but the lights went out and the controls could be seen. Dials all around the walls of the room. Didn't know if they would remember how to work them. Turns out there were dials everywhere, hidden.

Went to wake the captain, who was in suspended animation. Coughed a few times before arousing.

How had been struck by the way in which they were going through space, smoking...."Without purpose, but not without dignity."

43. Compare:

The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine--I might say at first--seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean?--If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement seems already to be completely determined (PI, p. 193).

On the hyperbolic: As a representation of what? Yes controlled, but what else? As an attempted representation of that which cannot be said: An attempt to represent, as it were, the immediacy of going on. An attempt to bring into the light that which once so seen withers. To bring into the light that which, being all around us, is not seen. Yes, as noted by Sass, a hyperawareness. But more going on here than awareness of that which is normally implicit--in the sense of being that, those processes, which are not normally attended to.

44. Re Mr. P.'s spaceship:

When you ask what is the appeal of the machine that symbolizes itself, think of this moment, not knowing if he could enter the machine as agent.

That are carried along, guided by a hidden machine. That the controls emerge in moment of crisis. See Wittgenstein on what not seen for its familiarity.

Consider as also seeking the controlling apparatus--dynamically, e.g., seeking Her--question of entry to it.

45. Regarding each object being "hyperbolically itself." Here we can sense another aspect to the isolation, of self and object: The pregnancy of meaning, holding all within oneself, to somehow grasp this.

Consider this search as a search for the "meaning connection," as a search for the "because."

"It is as if we could grasp the whole use of the word in a flash." Like what e.g.--Can't the use--in a certain sense--be grasped in a flash? And in what sense can it not?--The point is, that it is as if we could 'grasp it in a flash' in yet another and much more direct sense than that.--But have you a model for this? No. It is just that this expression suggests itself to us. As the result of the crossing of different pictures (PI, p. 191).

How could it not be the case that schizophrenic experience would provide an expression of the extent of the schizophrenic meaning crisis! Can I mean? [Recall Mr. Z. "Can anyone see me?"]

A crisis of "no place for me." And we are asking: what to having a place. Wittgenstein and being "at home." Examples of the awareness of apart from, then a coming into, coming home. And crucially something that there happens to our being able to "say" where we are. Something the not seeing of which prevents our being home.

46. Consider Harold Searles, for example, on the way in which the ideational content of psychosis may be seen as an effort to fill the void left by the loss of reality--including the loss of the familiar nonhuman environment (Searles, 1960).

And so the question of the relationship of this world to "our world" is inevitable. It remains. How does it manifest itself within the world apart?

How it seems only partly adequate to speak as above of ideational content as attempt to fill a void left by the loss of reality. Not that this cannot be said, but that to say such is to not see what else is being done, sought: for example, that within the content one may see the attempted working one's way back--not just the replacement in fantasy. And the fear of such. This is to say, we see a greater "awareness of," greater expression of one's total situation. To speak of replacement in fantasy inclines us more toward one's having lost touch with "reality," rather than one's reality being the apartness and the fear/longing stance toward what one imagines one has lost, or imagines one might obtain. Movement is the issue.

47. Now consider Sass' account of "schizophrenic subjectivization."

Schreber does not generally experience his delusions as being literally true but, rather, as having a certain "subjectivized" quality--that is as being in some sense the product of his own consciousness rather than as enjoying an independent or objective existence (as the poor reality-testing formula implies) (PD, p. 8).

What would it be for him to experience his delusions as not enjoying an independent existence....It requires more than some of the "double bookkeeping" examples where a person acts in accord with consensual reality despite expression of

delusional beliefs at odds with such. Would require his so standing, his standing in a position to be so aware. This is a significant accomplishment.

Regarding Sass' "as if": implications other than just that there is better reality testing than we might think. Ask, e.g., what the centrality of the "as if" says about the sense of being at home in the world of meaning, of intention, of expression. I want to say: here we can see a negotiating of "the gap" without having to cross it.

48. Think of the deadness of delusion, though often great color in the narrative, often a lively tale. Or the deadness of the delusional person. Where the affect bound up in delusional world. Often yes a lingering awareness of "reality," but dessicated, emaciated. (Hence it can be so dramatic when the glance enters the shared world. Brings color, life with it.)

In line with my attempt to see the place of the meta-level concerns, I want to have a better sense of what it would mean here to "not experience his delusions as literally true, but as having a subjectivized quality."

I am trying to see the way in which what Sass is responding to, what he is calling the "not taking as literally true," when we see situations that might be so described--and certainly often that could not so say--how the "as if" quality sometimes has to do with the way in which the whole frame of communicating such delusional

material, the whole frame of communicating itself, of going on together, is in question. So of course sometimes a tongue in cheek manner to the telling.

As with "the exaggerated gesture." Thinking of Mr. L. with his exaggerated grimaces. How he ends conversation with them. How their mocking quality allows comedic joining of (and distancing from) others. Think here, as well, it is as if the question were being asked: is this it? This gesture. Is this what expresses, what brings about? How can it be? How bizarre it seems.

49. Sass PD, p. 10: The traditional assumption, however, is that schizophrenic patients project subjective meanings onto the objective world, not that they have at least an implicit awareness of these meanings as subjective.

Link with "delusion of the implicit." Here where we must be careful. The ways in which schizophrenic experience can be transcendently prior to such distinctions.

When we regard the awareness of meanings as subjective as itself "at least implicit" we fail to appreciate the process around arrival at such an awareness.

Around being struck by such.

50. Key: We have the "brings about," explanatory understanding of kinship with solipsism...and we have a similar move vis-a-vis Sass in transcendental reality testing vs subjectivization. These offer us a way of showing a more "from the inside"--thereby opening to

clinical understanding--perspective on schizophrenic experience.

51. How often, for one, it is an achievement this subjectivization. Where in Sass is there room for the achievement of being able to regard as a form of "seeing as...."

Consider Ms. M.: that she is Mother Mary and Maryann. We see here as well the potentially misleading remnant of an impulse/rationality picture. As though only way to not have subjectivized quality would be to accept the picture of the overpowering impulse.

52. Regarding "as an achievement, a place in a process": a connection from here to the notion of grammar. Rather than seeking another version of "getting behind" we see where this phenomenon belongs. Rather than attempting to adjudicate the nature of schizophrenic delusional thinking--that there is not a loss of reality testing as often an awareness that "subjective"--we see the places of such an awareness--its address. Moreover, this allows us to see limit of--and uses of--the frame "reality/fantasy." And to the extent that schizophrenic experience involves bumping up against these limits, to this extent we are limited in our use of these categories to explain such experience.

53. Recall Wittgenstein's "we must do away with all explanation and description takes its place" and "descriptions as instruments for many uses" (PI, #109).

What are we doing in opposing the "as if" picture to e.g. view of Searles (quoted in PD, p. 19) on the way in which a "deeply schizophrenic person has, subjectively, no imagination." Don't we see circumstances in which we would say the one, yet in many others the other? Rather than adjudicating this matter--which is the better fit, etc.--might we not ask: how does this frame (itself) play into schizophrenic experience. How immediacy vs apartness "at issue."

Again: How could we pull out any one strand to serve as explanation?

CHAPTER FIVE
ON INSTANTIATED SOLIPSISM

1. How a solipsistic position relates to an attempt to bring about movement, certainty of movement, in a context of sought "coming into being." Our way to this recognition goes through Wittgenstein on "the particular." The clinical significance of coming up against the limits of a third person perspective.

Rather than seeing solipsism as a mistake see it--as instantiated--as growing out of particular positions in the overall grammar of instantiation. As, e.g., a position which can be seen in the context of a coming up against the sheer immediacy one confronts when facing into the coming into being of things.

2. As an introductory example of what is being sought and of the limits of a third-person framing see Winnicott's "subjective object":

Here is an extract from my report of the interview:

X. then went on to talk about the glorious irresponsibility of childhood. She said: "You see a cat and you are with it; it's a subject, not an object."

I said: "It's as if you were living in a world of subjective objects."

And she said: "That's a good way of putting it. That's why I write poetry. That's the sort of thing that's the foundation of poetry" (Winnicott, 1963, p. 186).

A good way perhaps. Not just "my" objects but the experience of looking from, through my eyes. But there is a limit on how far such could be captured through a

description in terms of any object, however qualified. The paradoxical quality of such descriptions is not surprising. (It might be understood in terms of Winnicott's wanting to guard his "incommunicado" place.)

3. See Sass on "the Stimmung," the "mood or state of mind that accompanies the truth-taking stare."

The Stimmung is difficult to characterize in our standard vocabulary of volition and determinism...It seems to occupy a kind of anxious twilight zone somewhere between act and affliction (1992, p. 73).

Here consider what we are up to and what we might be missing. Placing the Stimmung somewhere. What, however, of the extent to which it can be regarded as itself concerned with this difference, as a moment in the engagement with this question. Let's see if we can look from the inside!

So the issue of adjudication of a phenomenon is not what's central; or it can be, but in a sense quite different from categorization. (It may, e.g., determine if God or the devil rules the universe...)

4. Consider:

"But this is how it is-----" I say to myself over and over again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter (PI, #113).

See this as an example of Wittgenstein placing us inside a schizophrenic state. How familiar this feels. "THIS!" as said with an emphatic piercing manner.

Regarding the Stimmung: Not the reduction to the stare

nor to the vehement "THIS," but seeing where it belongs. To just speak of the staring would not involve the understanding shown here of how we got to this point. Nor would it involve treatment.

5. From Sass: The schizophrenic apophany. The word from Greek meaning "to make manifest."

So freighted with the presence of meaning, yet simultaneously so devoid of any particular, specifiable meaning, the symbols experienced during the Apophany might be called "symbol symbols," for the sole referent of these ubiquitous semiotic pointers seems to be the sheer presence of meaningfulness itself (1992, p. 52).

Jaspers:

"I noticed particularly" is the constant remark these patients make, though they cannot say why they take such particular note of things nor what it is they suspect. First they want to get it clear to themselves (Quoted in Sass, 1992, p. 53).

Something very important here. Notice how Sass keeps us--even as we come up against the unsayable--in the mode of language as being about something, as pointing, here to meaningfulness itself. Sass carries the mode of "referring to" into moments where, from Wittgenstein's perspective, if that's what one was doing then one could not be where one is. It's as though if we remove all that might specifically be meant then we are left with meaningfulness itself. But something else can be seen here, something quite striking. We might ask: Are coming up against the limits of the describable and pointing to sheer meaningfulness the same thing?

6. I want to say:

No, not just meaningfulness itself, but, if you will, the meaningfulness of THIS!

7. Recall:

"But being guided is surely a particular experience!"--The answer to this is: you are now thinking of a particular experience of being guided....

What is the experience of deliberation? Here a particular look, a gesture, at once occur to you--and then you would like to say: "And it just is a particular inner experience". (And that is, of course, to add nothing).

(This is connected with the problem of the nature of intention, of willing.) (PI, ##173-74)

And here we see the exposure of the illusion of the "god's perspective," those "vestments we cannot wear." And how this is related to the illusion of the meta-place. The god's place: to be, I will say, "present at creation."

Limit of "just a particular X": THIS

As close as third and first person perspectives can come. The limit case. So, how can we understand such a limiting case within experience?

Ask: why does nothing satisfy? Why would nothing to which we could point satisfy us?

Nothing satisfies. Coming up against that which we cannot so do. For Wittgenstein "a quite particular expression" comes up in the context of the limit on our attempt to capture the because.

We see those moments where in schizophrenic experience there is a similar context for "just a particular..."

I want to say: when we are seeking to be present at creation.

Where we see in Wittgenstein's "just a particular..." and in schizophrenic particularity, a coming up to the limit of what can be said, a coming upon that needs to be met differently, so that there can be a turn.

With his example of the "visual room" Wittgenstein opens a path for us.

8. The Solipsist's "Visual Room":

A particularly striking delusion: that of the "visual room."

"But when I imagine something, or even actually see objects, I have got something which my neighbor has not."--I understand you. You want to look about you and say: "At any rate only I have got THIS."--What are these words for? They serve no purpose.--Can one not add: "There is here no question of a 'seeing'--and therefore none of a 'having'--nor of a subject, nor therefore of 'I' either"? Might I not ask: In what sense have you got what you are talking about and saying that only you have got it? Do you possess it? You do not even see it. Must you really say that no one has got it? And this too is clear: if as a matter of logic you exclude other people's having something, it loses its sense to say that you have it.

But what is the thing you are speaking of? It is true I said that I knew within myself what you meant. But that meant that I knew how one thinks to conceive this object, to see it, to make one's looking and pointing mean it. I know how one stares ahead and looks about in this case--and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of the 'visual room.' The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it. Inasmuch as it cannot be any one else's it is not mine either. In other words, it does not belong to me because I want to use the same form of

expression about it as about the material room in which I sit. The description of the latter need not mention an owner, in fact it need not have any owner. But then the visual room cannot have any owner. "For"--one might say--"it has no master, outside or in."

Think of a picture of a landscape, an imaginary landscape with a house in it.--Someone asks "Whose house is that?"--The answer, by the way, might be "It belongs to the farmer who is sitting on the bench in front of it". But then he cannot for example enter his house (PI, #398).

Re delusional worlds. Akin to the farmer in the imaginary landscape. I think of Ms. C. and being married to the Kennedys. Or Ms. L. and being from another planet. We tend to think: They cannot enter "our" world, as they are lost in theirs. But here a sense of the way in which they cannot enter theirs either. This opens the possibility of meeting "from the inside" around this "meta-level" dilemma. I want to say: we can see "if only yours, then not yours" as opening a liberative (therapeutic) road here. To enter theirs would have to enter ours. How to make this awareness come to life?

They can't enter theirs. We could ask: what does this reveal re "where" they are? Connect with seeing the psychodynamic place of this limbo land, this unstable position: e.g., entering/fleeing Her.

9. One might also say: Surely the owner of the visual room would have to be the same kind of thing as it is; but he is not to be found in it, and there is no outside.

Where we have spoken of a slipperiness above re "back

to the rough ground," might here express something similar with the image of suffocation. Trapped. The fly in the fly bottle. No outside.

Note: Important that what it is said we cannot do is to enter the visual room. This just the dilemma.

Cannot enter the visual room. We could say: cannot be "present at creation."

Attempting to own the visual room as an exaggerated search for the agent's perspective.

10. "I know how one stares ahead and looks about in this case--and the rest. I think we can say: you are talking (if, for example, you are sitting in a room) of the 'visual room'." Here it appears clear that it is not as though the staring "brings about." How could this one strand be pulled out...?

11. There is a sense of being apart from, as though I have to get myself all the way into this other thing in order to have a voice, but then I will be swallowed, I will melt. One problem here is in imagining that I have to fit into a thing, to be contained in a thing. Often the delusional system itself serves this function. To be taken up into a thing from which I will emerge, but then I will be gone....So can you understand my wish to be present at creation?

12. Think of Ms. C. and Jesus. What it does for her when he tells her that she has a terminal illness. Gives a

location that involves a vanishing....A being taken into him, his love. This indeed the significance she then gave to such revelations: how much he cared etc.

How am I to get myself into that, as seen, package. How to make that the vehicle of my will. Here we are close to the leap, to magic objects, to "THIS."

See the "visual room" as a meta-level delusion presenting this situation.

13. The visual room as a "meta-level" delusion! About the movement into delusional world. In this sense, transcendental. And, as such, how characteristic of a schizophrenic process. And pointing the way to the collapse of this "meta-level."

Notice that the visual room example, in considering "a new way of looking at things," mentions the "discovery" of sense data. Initially, this seems far from the schizophrenic attempt to be "present at creation." Think, however, of the kinship: for example, the way in which in both are seeking a foundation of the world as perceived, one which seems to fit in the context of an explanatory telling of how, in a very global manner, we come to see as we do.

And one way of looking at what Wittgenstein does is to see him asking: "Where are we standing in saying such a thing, presenting such an account?"

Compare Henry Finch's explication of Wittgenstein's response to the solipsist:

In looking at the color red we are tempted to say: "At least I have something when I look at red which no one else has" (i.e. the experience of red, the feeling of red). This makes it seem that, being in the presence of red, I am in possession of its qualitative reality--just what I am experiencing.

To this Wittgenstein's reply is: "Why do you say you have it? You do not even see it" (i.e. you see the red; you do not see what is supposed to be yours alone, your seeing of the red). The seeing cannot be seen, for there is no outside to the seeing (Finch, 1977 p. 122).

Wittgenstein as opening the possibility of a from-the-inside vantage point on the concern with coming from the inside, with the first-person perspective. As such, he allows the meeting of the schizophrenic attempt to will the latter, to "experience the because."

14. I want to say: it is not about taking the delusions away, coming to see their falseness; nor is it about entering all the way in.

Rather, the person must be met--in action, in play--around the place from which (the production of) the visual room emerges.

15. What I am saying: that in Wittgenstein's meeting "captured by the particular" --"I know how you stare..."--he is showing us a meeting of a schizophrenic state. How is this?

The first step is the one that we think most innocent, the one that escapes notice.

How the assumption of states and processes, as we have seen in schizophrenic experience--toward the end of

establishing the transcendental--leads inexorably to being stuck on THIS.

This context provides the framework for our meeting.

How striking it is that within schizophrenic experience we should also see a grasping at "the particular"!

What is it like to attempt to capture the because? "I know how you point." Here Wittgenstein brings us inside.

16. Self-machination, Seeking to be Present at Creation, and the Paranoid Context:

Consider your recent meeting with Mr. C.: He opens a folder to a picture of Schwarzenegger as "Terminator," a postcard size photo of half-man/half-machine. Asks if I know what a cyborg is, what "cyborg" means.

He writes: cyborgs "impregnable to conventional weapons."

He asks: what do "manual" and "automatic" mean?

Our speaking about control. His asking: "is a cyborg independent? A cyborg is programmed and a man is not." The idea of "control from the inside." Issue of whether control is good or bad. Or both.

How the question of "reality" manifests. The awareness of the question of what is real: "But that was a movie; wouldn't it be cool if we could really make cyborgs". (One aspect: if I weren't the only one...)

His ending our session with an uncanny imitation of a cyborg, raising arm, turning hand toward face, staring at

hand, lowering arm. Done with sound of machine movement, with frozen stare.

17. Let yourself be struck: the issue of person vs forces, human vs. machine, reasons vs. causes, is itself under "in-life" investigation within schizophrenic experience!

18. Mr. R.: Are we androids? Is it the case that we are "being made." That we are being put together. See re coming into being. See re "present at creation."

What is interesting here: the way in which the moment of immanence, of to-be-coming-into-being is presented in machine language, but here with an external force as maker.

19. Recall:

The machine as symbolizing its action: the action of a machine--I might say at first--seems to be there in it from the start. What does that mean?--If we know the machine, everything else, that is its movement seems already to be completely determined (PI, #196).

The way that this connects with "could not but walk." To machine as symbol of itself which we might say incorporates, takes advantage of, grammatical situation that we see with "could not but." Key link: to solipsism as there we see what results from (involved in), we might say, self-machination.

"Could not but walk" and "looking for the 'because'" as expressions of the objectification of self.

With our understanding of the idea of instantiation we can see how Wittgenstein's attempt to liberate us from our captivity to the idea of a machine capable of "symbolizing

its own action" might be applicable to a schizophrenic instantiation of such captivity, schizophrenic delusions of influence.

How often it appears that holding the delusional construction is part of a process which "seeks" the sense of self that Sass assumes to be present more generally, with, e.g., his "as if" reading. Working at the transcendental level, seeking to be "present at creation."

20. I want to link this sought self-substantialization with Wittgenstein's understanding and critique of the "will as phenomenon." Objectification of self in a paranoid context is another example of such substantialization.

You say: but what we see there is rather fragmentation. Yes we can. Sass' hyperreflexivity for example.

But what I want to say: Such can exist only in a grammatical space of that which comes into being as object, as objectified.

Notice the way in which the outsider's looking on, with the possibility of humiliation before the outsider, is implicit within this sort of fragmentation.

Re self-consciousness, the watcher etc.: We tend to picture the on-going presence of the watching one. We forget how often what happens is that the one to be watched proceeds in a manner which, in effect, creates the space within which the watcher can reside. And, similarly, inducing such in others around etc.

21. What I am suggesting here: the way that rather than a "loss of self" of ego, there is we might say an overwhelming concern with it. Or in addition to a "loss." (That is to say, we see what is meant by this, how one could so see psychotic phenomena.) A concern which substantializes. And seeks such?

This is significant as, for one, it shows the value of seeing the grammatical environment. Here rather than our description of this phenomenon--which may also have its value--in terms of the loss of ego, self..., rather we see the concern, "from inside," with such. This opens a possibility of seeing how rather than too little self, ego, we might say there is too much. And how it is this moment that is met by Wittgenstein's "You don't have it..." The way in which liberation lies in less, and how the seeds of this way are also to be found (and of course feared) within psychotic states, e.g. immediacy, the apophantic THIS.

22. Think of the "making of self" within paranoid posture. Think of Ms. C. From "my two friends not calling"--from my being forgotten--to my parents and the mob have forewarned people of me, that is: I am the focus, far from being forgotten. And, notice the meta-level here: the authorities, those higher, have attended and then brought attention to me. Something important here. We might say: that which defines attention has brought attention to me. CIA, FBI etc: as it were, pure attention. Those who by

profession attend, watch.

Here relate to the context for hyperreflexivity. Yes, we understand the dissolving under the harsh light; however, can also say that in the gaze self is born. And within schizophrenic experience often a feverishly-held-to gaze of another. Yes, a place of dissolution, but also where the strongest sense of "mine" is experienced. Think of Mr. M.'s delusion of a to-be-made journey to China to fight secret agents. The heroic dimension to paranoid frame as involving the "making of self."

23. How what we see, the fragmented, repetitive, constant closing in on itself reasoning, how we might regard this as the fly against the glass.

The flyglass also gives the fly a world, gives walls, boundaries. How apt this feels for a schizophrenic world. Where pointing to the world outside can seem so puzzling, absurd. E.g. recently Mr. K: "You keep talking about a program that I could go to, keep talking about a thousand and one things, but I've got these snakes in my house that I am worried about."

Here we get deeper into the question of what is involved in "going on." Here we sense, for example, the fear of dissolving that is combatted with the holding onto paranoid battle. The hardness here.

And yes, it does have the feeling of Wittgenstein's "hardness" of logic, of the "logical must."

Like the solipsist in attempting to say what cannot be said. In attempting to move from can go on in so far as...to an independent can go on, attempting to establish what cannot be said, "what can only be shown."

24. Recall: For the fact that I do what I wish, or will what I wish might throw me into a state of astonishment. Consider re Ms. B, how she reports often hearing a voice, usually a woman's, telling her what she is now doing: "now she is getting up, now she is walking, now she...." As she describes it, the voice's tone is slightly mocking.

And consider here the manner in which she so keeps herself, keeps as a someone/something...and in this sense a bulwark against the loss of self.

25. Wittgenstein's therapeutic intervention: "a nothing would be as good as a something about which nothing can be said." We need to step out, to be led out, of the grammatical space of self as object--solid, fragmented or otherwise. How are we to be so led?

26. Key Metaphor: The Kaleidoscope:

From J.W. Perry, The Far Side of Madness:

The analogy that always comes to my mind is that of taking an intact myth and ritual form as one might see it depicted in a Gothic stained-glass window and, by removing the lead and dismantling it into its fragments, watching them revolve into patterns in a kaleidoscope. Schizophrenic contents similarly hover and play around the theme of a center to which they have reference (1974, p. 9).

Re Perry remark: what missing here is the "first-person

perspective," specifically an awareness of the movement needed toward having a sense of a center by that person whose experience we see as kaleidoscopic.

Meeting in, and from, the kaleidoscope's center.

Here the treatment turn. The kinship with Wittgenstein's "turn around the axis of our real need."

27. Evocation of the first person and the kaleidoscope.

Might say: That from which a sense of aliveness, a center, emerges. As it were that which whirls around must be expressible from, through the center.

28. Re the "meaningfulness of THIS", we want to say: treatment would need to allow this turn to be seen, experienced, would need to involve this turn.

As though giving a place to stand so as to not fall into THIS. Into the kaleidoscope's center.

Toward the turn: That can move from THIS.

THIS: as the turning point to which reference is made.

Link with Perry's "kaleidoscope": See as hovering around "self," around a nothing just as good as a something about which nothing could be said.

Around the "extensionless point":

Doing itself seems not to have any volume of experience. It seems like an extensionless point, the point of a needle. This point seems to be the real agent. And the phenomenal happenings only to be consequences of this acting. "I do..." seems to have a definite sense, separate from all experience (PI, #620).

Re: instantiation in clinical contexts. Extensionless

point and looking in one realm, from one perspective, for what cannot be found there. (Germ of the idea that will not phenomenon.) Here an evocation of what it is like to attempt to be present at creation.

29. See re the turn, the kaleidoscope:

Mr. K.: I am on a beach. One that surrounds a pool of oil, doing backstroke in pool, keep bumping up against the walls of pool. Keep bumping head.

How a sense with him of the circling around, how in the loosening of association a sense of circling round. And here an image of containment within that around which the circling.

How you mentioned idea of kaleidoscope to give a sense to the around and around. This as clinically useful metaphor here.

30. I want to say: it is this center that one must meet. And it is to such a center that "your so taking" points. See what to be evoked in "evocation of first person."

Think: why that which so yearned for so feared? An immediacy here into which, as it were, one might fall.

Without seeing the immediacy of self-expression we fail to see that which allows the terror.

Recall above comparison with Wittgenstein's "a nothing as good as a something about which nothing could be said."

Self as this nothing around which the kaleidoscope turns.

31. Re the kaleidoscope: A metaphor that offers a way of seeing kinship between paranoid and more disorganized schizophrenic manifestations. Image of a kaleidoscope offers a way of seeing where there may be common ground with respect to "will--the extensionless point" around which the kaleidoscope turns. A point which we sense as well in less chaotic presentations, the point of the turn. For example, a less disorganized approach to, in Kierkegaard's sense, the "moment" of emergence seen in Mr. D.'s roaming his body.

32. In spatial terms: we have Perry's kaleidoscope. When we read this we tend to picture the view from above, like an aerial perspective on a hurricane's circular whirl. (And note that here too the greatest energy is along the inner walls of the circle, with a calmness inside, an extraordinary peace. [See "emptiness"; in its negative and in its buddhist senses (Epstein, 1989).]

But the vantage needed for getting a sense of the turn could not be this one. Must, we want to say, cross these raging walls, must meet in the center, see from the center. Must become the center.

33. Think: broken glass. Images of that which separates, but as transparent allows painful--or compensatorily glorious--sense of apartness. If only I could just walk through. But the breaking, cutting, the tearing shards (See Laing, 1959).

Yes kaleidoscopic, shards, and the center to which reference is made can seem a falling into hell. Often we sense the whirling as a fevered effort to keep from falling into the center. So just as you can become the center, you can be as well the deadly attractor.

Why the metaphor of the turn is valuable. A way of turning around, so won't need to go through the cutting glass.

I already see you. No barrier. Welcome to the human race. "All have Buddha nature."

Mr O.: "My tears like stars across the sky..." The feel of the Leibnizian intuition: Shards, yet each "of self."

34. See how the turn that we are seeking to describe--where the "straight road" is blocked: the straight road of attempting to grasp "the mine," of attempting to grasp the transcendental, to say what can only be shown--how this predicament is given expression in the image of the kaleidoscope....making reference to a center...and then this image as offering traction for our expression of a clinical meeting... In and through the center....

Recall from above: That which can only be known within space of intention, willing. We ask: How to understand that this is particularly difficult to live for one prone to schizophrenic modes of experience. It is just what destabilizes, what is sought, what is fought off within

schizophrenic experience.

35. Projection of agency as an aspect of what is held in the kaleidoscope.

Is it like this: Agency spreads over things? Can we speak of the "projection" of agency? What is right before us but we do not see it. The center around which the kaleidoscope turns? See as the will, the vanishing point. The "180 turn" as that which evokes the first person perspective, that which allows the "taking back in" of projected agency. The way in which Wittgenstein does something like this in his "invoking the first person" in the course of undermining attempts to "get behind" doing.

We seek to protect it. Place it outside. Might say: as we try to bring it in, in grasping at it it is objectified and seems dead. How could there not be an interaction between such a dynamic and, e.g., the "sense of deadness inside" as it would be understood more psychodynamically.

Think of the ways that agency can be maintained, held, explored, while one remains passive, receiving, a victim.

Recall Ms J. A good deal of agency, but not engaged.... All day long calling information, directory assistance.

36. Beware a glibness to "yearning to come into being." There is terror as well. A primary sense of terror to be seen in the objectification. But also how it holds the

immediacy of going on--objectifies it yes and preserves it.

And it is here that one can be met. The whole situation. Think of Perry and the affect ensconced in the kaleidoscopically presented myth. What needs to not be ignored if the person is to come back.

37. Consider as application of visual room/solipsism, kaleidoscope/vanishing point metaphor world. In a context where seen as typical empty schizophrenic remark.... From Sass, 1992, p. 180: An example of the "vagueness or emptiness of schizophrenic language."

Chirps in a box. If you abstract yourself far enough from a given context you seem somehow to create a new kind of concretion. It isn't something you have or see somehow. It's being fascinated by the generative process of the mind. The thing is to be caught in it, yet abstract from it. Both be in it and out of it--revolving everything around me. You explode like when stars explode. In the sky a plate which burned bright. Symbol of all light and energy with me contracted into this plate.

(From M. Lorenz, "Problems posed by schizophrenic language," Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 1961, 604.)

Though this example seems to speak from the heart of the schizophrenic dilemma!Inside and out. Meta-level fascination. Everything revolving around me....Then to "you explode." Present at creation...at the beginning.

And re chirps in a box: Image of caged (and with nobody) birds evocative of visual room--"no outside."

CHAPTER SIX

FROM PRIVATE LANGUAGE TO THE "TRUTH OF SOLIPSISM"--THE
TREATMENT TURN TO WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHY AS TREATMENT.

1. Private Language and the Transcendental Ground:

The 180 degree turn here to proceeding from the thought that we see "the person." The key here is to grasp that our so seeing is an essential "part" of the transcendental ground. This related to the way in which schizophrenic person, to the extent that he experiences himself as severed from this, can experience himself as inhuman. (Though, and this important, saying it like this is backward. Could say, of a person who so feels severed we say schizophrenic, i.e., criterial...)

That our so seeing is an essential part of the transcendental ground: Consider private language argument and Winnicottian spontaneous gesture. The need to be seen, to be able to rest into something larger, what we may see sought in schizophrenia--e.g., God.

Winnicott speaks of the need for the space to allow chaos. Link this with the theme of the schizophrenic attempt at self-creation. Why being responded to matters: as there we can have the spontaneous gesture. The kinship with Wittgenstein's impossibility of a private language in the idea of the impossibility of meaning in the absence of the possibility of communication with another.

Schizophrenia and private language: private language/private religion...The tremendous appeal of this...And with it the yearning to be received as a God--so, on the other hand, not private at all.

To rest in God; to be received as God. Here we see the dilemma. To be received as that which would be "big" enough to contain oneself. (See re spirituality group below.)

2. Might say there's a connection between its not mine and I cannot establish the authority, the rule by myself...Here to schizophrenic attempt at private language...What we are in a position to do is to see how this relates to "going on"...In that what is being attempted is the going on without the need for the recognition of the spontaneous gesture, and of course also the lingering yearning for such.

3. Recall re the "visual room":

Attempting to own the visual room as an exaggerated search for the agent's perspective. "In other words, it does not belong to me because I want to use the same form of expression about it as about the material room in which I sit."

Schizophrenic modes of being as having already broken the hold of the "inner room." Or as having been truly forced to seek it: as it were, this is what it would really be like if we were to be left seeking it...Our myth, if it were to be brought into being, would look like this, would manifest as schizophrenic experience. We miss this because

we miss all that we presuppose. Wittgenstein reminds us of this repeatedly, doing so in the context of untangling our longing for this inner room. Hence it is not surprising that he offers a "treatment," a healing response to schizophrenic modes of being...For these are as close as we can get to attempting to live the myth, to live "private language."

Wittgenstein reminds us repeatedly: both of what we miss for its familiarity and of this very fact.

For all that the fly flits repeatedly against the bottle which contains him, for all that--and thereby--this bottle is of his making. And it is in seeing this that he may be freed.

4. A different valence on, e.g., schizophrenic "identity diffusion." Think of the ways in which schizophrenic experience seeks to invoke our myth of self. See it as attempting to establish this "inner room"; and of course this cannot work. Using the at-odds-with-all that madness allows in seeking to establish this boundary. To establish a realm within which one could bring into being the myth of no gap/no leap between knowing and doing.

Here we are close to what is critical: that the elision of this gap, this leap, essentially involves a dropping away of dependency on "others," on the world of meaning which is larger than this realm. What, then, would it be like to discover one did not need to so seek such a hermetic realm?

5. Think, e.g., of a recent meeting with Mr. R. and his mother, common phenomenon seen here of her finishing all of his sentences, her "big boy." Yes, we can understand how his thinking might run toward sense of exposure, of need to be hidden, and then the seeing of one's insides in an invasive dissecting light, but what is being systematically thwarted is his own voice, not his own insides. What is problematic is that one can have a (usually quite tenuous) sense of the inner realm, safe place, safe from her control, her encompassing etc., but what cannot have without another is expression....

So you want to say with Wittgenstein that cannot have an "inner" language in such circumstances....See re the "visual room": Cannot enter one's own house!

6. As long as one is trying via meaning connection to establish the rails by which one can emerge, move from knowing to doing, cannot acquire what one seeks; the secret however is that though one cannot "have" this, one doesn't not have it either. The transcendental. Cannot acquire what one seeks: Want to say that psychosis can be seen as forcing this. And the cost? Pulling up the ladder. Pulling being up into a private realm of meaning. Nowhere, in Wittgenstein's words, for the spade to turn.

Psychotic manifestations as attempting to go public with "private" language,...where one does not know how to go on, has no sense of "at homeness" within language rules.

Signposts pointing in all directions. But then what of the sense it can make? It is the sense of this situation expressed, shown. This is very important. See "reality" testing.

7. What we so keenly sense in being with schizophrenic individuals: how the negotiation of being apart from/together with and the negotiation of making sense/willing or not, how these are interrelated.

Re the hiding place: We think, why would one want such? And tempted to think in terms of safety, thinking clinically, in terms of a safe place. But we are also familiar with situations in which not a safe place among others so much as having any place at all.

8. What I want us to see: That in the stuckness around apophantic moment we see the attempt to have both the certainty of immediate going on--that "just like that" I can--with the disengagement of looking from outside. This is the combination that we see for example in Wittgenstein's "looking for the because." We want to see the engagement of the lever.

9. Evocation of the First Person Perspective: Meeting and the Turn.

Wittgenstein: "I" is not the name of a person. If we see schizophrenic person as caught here, one thing we could say is that the failure to find, as it were, "I" name of a person speaks to an awareness of a profound truth, not an

error. The error--and the terror--comes in trying to, we might say, establish "I" name of a person, of me. To bring this about.

Or ask: what are circumstances in which we might seek to establish "I" as name of a person, of me. It would be natural to seek this in a context where sense of I, of agency, of the immediacy of expression, is not found, not "known" by me. As seen in schizophrenic experience.

How can we help him emerge?

Our mistake, and schizophrenic's mistake, the way in which we seek a place for "me" to stand.

What we fail to see in schizophrenic states: that there is nothing inherent in that which is meaningful which dictates our response. The power of Wittgenstein's "Your so taking."

It is the road to achieving this that can appear blocked. Evocation of the first person. The way in which the efficacy of "your so taking" requires that "we make a radical break with the idea that language always functions in one way, always serves the same purpose: to convey thoughts."

For example, in addition to the everyday purpose of ordering, questioning etc. we might look at its uses to evoke...where it is not a matter of, as it were, encompassing the experience. And it is to its use to evoke the first person perspective that we will turn. That is to

say, in the characteristically self-applicable mode which these reflections tend to have, we will turn to the implications of this evocative use itself.

10. Re clinical applications: we will listen for those moments of "from outside," of a barrier, and occasions of, in Ms. J.'s words, "the glory"--places to hide and a place of seeking. And we may hide and seek around these places. The attitude we sense toward them must be matched in our meeting, mirroring, or standing aside. It is in this sense that we can seek to approach even the most "disorganized" experience.

11. [Well if such deep seers then] Why so confused...? Still wanting a place in a land of lies, this where what love there was has been. How to go out into something which can only seem a falling apart of all the world one has had...This is why our meeting such "spontaneous gestures," and our meeting also the loss accompanying their now being met, the loss of the myth that they have been met heretofore, why this is our place, our place to say: "Yes, I see you, see you as you peek out from the rubble of so many houses built on ever-shifting, never-holding, ground, so many desert houses. Yes, I see you there. And, if you wish: "Come in." That is: here is to possibility of a new "inside". Your hiding place. Yes we might say to you in there: Come out. But the possibility it will as well be a coming into meeting space. See: "public solipsism."

12. Recall how Mr. P. did appear to more readily hear the "defense against feeling" interpretation when presented with example of Star Trek android character "Data"--how he had his arm removed with surprise but without pain. (In context of episode in which a trial being held to determine extent to which he had rights of self-determination comparable to those of a human being!)

See in terms of a defense against "being swallowed," against "falling into" feeling.

How to meet around the edges of that to which kaleidoscopic bits make reference.

13. Think of the way Mr. K. has lately been more present in his engagement with the voices. How this not really greater awareness of himself. No, rather, more the quality of his having a voice, of his expression, of a coming from. When we speak of attention to "the glance," to the peeking from around the wall, we are speaking of meeting, nurturing the seeds of this coming to one's voice. Evocation of the first person.

And notice that with Mr. K. a growing lack of certainty re what the voices are saying, what they want. To be able to reflect this back... As appropriate, a "good" thing here, part of a process.

14. As Sass notes: The extent to which madness involves the feigning of madness. This opposed to the view that then could not be truly mad as would be too volitional for such. Certainly, there are crucial considerations here vis a vis

sense of being subject to the other, the hiding and teasing emergence, peek-a-boo games... Play.

The assumption seems to be that, if there is real method in speech or action, then it is not truly madness; thus to play at madness, or within one's madness, is not to be truly mad--only in such literary artists as Diderot and Pirandello do we have the suggestion (never taken seriously by the mental health establishment) that an authentic madness might, in some essential way, involve just such a playing (Sass, 1992, p. 114).

See Wittgenstein: "I'll teach you differences."

Meeting around awareness of this situation. See schizophrenic playfulness.

Thinking of Ms. S.'s today seeking to sell me a boat, a houseboat, rather than as before a spaceship. When I remarked on the change, her response that "Well, needed to come down to reality... Wouldn't want doctors to think I'm crazy." With a laugh, with a joining. "Reality testing."

15. Main thing to say re Sass: that the shift advocated-- here, seeing playing at madness as an aspect of madness, in general the presence of the intentional, is correct, in so far as it goes. But its true implications take us beyond a position of staking out such a stance and place us within the process itself. In a place where these alternatives have life. Achieving this position is the liberative process, in both clinical and theoretical realms.

16. Might think in terms of "avenues of return", return to the human. Recall meeting with Mr. D., his dreams, of shooting someone who was after him, shooting him in the

face....But he won't die....Asking what happens, of whether he gets you....No the dream stops....So then you stop the dream.

Link up with Schafer's pan-actionism, but not as a metapsychological assumption so much as achieved stance... A "larger" sense of self. The uses of the language of self.

Consider Ms. T.: "Mother of creation." The value of the "self idea": that you can be Mother Mary and Maryann, that Maryann includes this, the sense of self as container, of mine....See "your so taking," your dream.

17. Again, seeing the way free of the controlling other, to be met around the evocation of the first person, which involves an awareness of "Its mine and I do not have it in the way presumed it was had or controlled by others." This is hard to articulate. So you wonder how it could possibly be communicated in a therapeutic context. Well, think of the ways in which it is. The empowering stance, for example, along with the shared seeing of what emerges, where here we see an in-practice experience of "mine, yes, in sense of expression, while also not mine in sense of control or ownership." You might say: "I am bigger than the controller."

18. Re grammar: how one is in Wittgenstein evoked into a grammatical space. Where in evocation of the first person one is brought "inside" a grammatical space, where there can be a place to stand "from which...", a place where "a good

ground is one that looks like this."

19. Important: evocation of the first person gives one a space within which to walk. This is why, for example, meeting Ms. J. around "sister kaka hill" gives a place, gives voice, meaning. Each day a walk on the hospital grounds, always past a muddy hillside, "sister kaka hill." A place to meet around forbidden rage. A way of locating.

Think of Ms. J. and creation of the kaka mudslide as example of meeting in play, yes, and of grammar. This goes there. We create familiarity with a world, to which one can return and, significantly, from which one can leave. This begins to give a place, a world within which to walk. A language has come into being. "Transitional" language. Not however incomplete. The sense in which not at all lacking. A "language game."

Your so taking. Your world. A place within which to be, within which the possibility of walking together, the possibility of expression, of coming into being.

With the example of kaka mudslide we see meeting around the apophantic thing. A space opened within which we have room to move toward facilitating awareness of "your so taking."

20. Fundamental shift: from explanation in terms of features of some antecedent something to emphasis on "how taken." The way in which this shift has "clinical relevance": "your so taking," always this move possible--

and we want to say "always" there truth to this....You might look at it this way: Wittgenstein's "bringing in the agent" which we have noticed elsewhere--the way, e.g., that "might take otherwise" forms center of objection to views in terms of "inherent features of antecedent state" position--the shift to doing, and along with it the dissolving of the picture of the "objectified subject"....THIS IS THE 'THERAPEUTIC' SHIFT.

21. The aspect of this situation which Wittgenstein emphasizes, the "how taken": that we must beware because there is something about this situation of being so struck, some fundamental immediacy, "nothing behind," which is essential to it and which we are at risk of losing if we see through the lens of being guided, of that which guides us, which appears to us so, as though it had within it the something which elicits this response....

We might say: if the schizophrenic person fails to see anything it is that, namely that not something inherent in that which is meaningful which dictates our response. The power of "your so taking."

It is the road to achieving this that can appear blocked. Evocation of the first person.

With "your so taking," with "nothing satisfies," Wittgenstein meets the schizophrenic attempt to stand outside and also be "brought about". The "could not but."

With "your so taking" we can meet the wish/fear of

hiding in "mere simultaneities."

22. On not seeing the delusional worlds as manifestations of the breakdown of machinery. Here is what is so important: We cannot, as it were, build up to agency--this what the "could not but" attempts to do. That there is doing, that there is an aspect seeing, that there is a "so taking"; this what cannot be gotten behind. And to see that this is so can be "curative," liberating.

Again, what do we hold as we move to that center round which the kaleidoscope turns? What do we carry? We hold the actuality of will, the possibility of freedom.

23. On "Atmosphere" and the "Truth of Solipsism":

Recall from Sass:

Main purpose...a Wittgensteinian one...to unravel ...the self-deluding involutions of the schizophrenic "form of life"--and thus to dissipate the atmosphere of unutterable mystery and profundity that surrounds such patients, often confusing them as much as those who seek to know them.

Such an atmosphere found in Wittgenstein as well; what is its place? Both found in Wittgenstein and investigated there. Not the case, in either situation, that it is just a matter of lifting the fog.

Consider:

Describe the aroma of coffee.--Why can't it be done? Do we lack the words? And for what are words lacking?--But how do we get the idea that such a description must after all be possible? Have you ever felt the lack of such a description? Have you tried to describe the aroma and not succeeded?

(I should like to say: "These notes say

something glorious, but I do not know what."
 These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot
 put anything side by side with it that will serve
 as an adequate explanation. A grave nod. James:
 "Our vocabulary is inadequate." Then why don't we
 introduce a new one? What would have to be the
 case for us to be able to?) (PI, #610)

Keep in mind how important to Wittgenstein is the way
 in which our language, our pictures of the working of
 language, hides from us what is all around...."Let yourself
 be struck." An evocation of such states. See: "what the
 solipsist means is correct, only it cannot be said."

24. Crucial turn for us here around the "truth of
 solipsism," only it "can't be said." This is what roots us
 in the question of the place of the meta-level and then
 links us with treatment and "philosophy first order." This
 also then connects back to the "truth" of schizophrenic
 experience: rather than as false reality testing, the true
 expression of a situation...and as far, we might say, as
 "transcendental reality testing" goes, on target.

But you say there is a problem... Schizophrenia, a
 terrible suffering. Yes, can be. We will move to "can't we
 say both" re being able to be in "our world" as well.

On the one hand, the dissipation of an atmosphere. See
 also e.g. just a particular something--this to add nothing.
 On the other hand, e.g., see below, the 2-->1 (collapse of
 twoness), "public solipsism", places where that which was
 felt vis a vis the particular, the atmosphere, places where
 this not dissipated. Where we are "struck." What is shown

and not said. What isn't said, isn't captured is the coming into being, the movement of the lever, willing. This we could say is a given. Wittgenstein: "your so taking." (That which we cannot get behind.)

25. In working with those experiencing schizophrenic states, we notice a strikingly similar situation, movement. Often indeed we see situations where we might speak of being caught up in a particular, rarified atmosphere. And a sense of not allowing any contact with it. For fear, it seems, that it might dissipate. And then situations where that which was caught up in the particular atmosphere can then find its place in an awareness of what is given.

Sass' account is a significant first step to seeing the place of instantiation. Sass' analysis of the circumstances surrounding a solipsistic stance in schizophrenia is quite helpful. From a more clinical standpoint, however, we need to have an awareness of the "truth" of solipsism, of what we see being sought there. It is indicative of the therapeutic aspect of Wittgenstein's philosophy that we see the facilitation of such an awareness.

We might say: the problem is not in being (PD, p. 38) "the conscious center before whom and for whom events appear," but in our making something special of this.

26. Re: And a sense of not allowing any contact with it. For fear, it seems, that it might dissipate. Here we see how an awareness of the clinical situation affects our

conceptualization. I want to say: that which Sass seeks is just what schizophrenic individual fears he might be after! (Fears that is what Sass might be after, though can imagine a place for other possible reading as well: fears what he himself might be after. Conflict around maintaining the particular atmosphere.) See above on the fear that might be "mere simultaneities." The playing with the possibility that only have here "mere simultaneities." Here another aspect of "I know how you mean, how you stare." The appreciation that are up to something, a purpose here. I.e. not "mere simultaneities."

How are we to apply our awareness of the instantiation of solipsistic issues? To dissipate the atmosphere? Certainly do see within Wittgenstein where this appears to be what happening. E.g. in the "guidance" quote above. But we might, following Perry, ask: what is being held in this grasping after the particular atmosphere. That which disappears once we look into it. (Can't catch oneself meaning either. "For one is oneself moving." Indeed not.)

27. Could say of treatment: if it is to be effective with schizophrenia then we must in effect come to see that what the solipsist means is correct, though it cannot be said.

28. Consider, for example, the manifestation of schizophrenic "concreteness" in the worlds of language and meaning. One aspect of this related to schizophrenic "yearning," is the pointing to THIS. May open way of seeing

the "yearning" aspect re schizophrenic experience--as opposed to the diminishment (and can here link with Sass)--if examine the position of "THIS" in Wittgenstein.

Again: why does nothing satisfy? Why would nothing to which we could point satisfy us?

On one hand, you want to say "only I have it." But what the solipsist means is correct--only it cannot be said. And what we might ask would be the value of being a therapist who had an ear for importance of THIS, and for the ways of possible entrapment here--as well as for (and here territory Wittgenstein did not explore) the psychodynamic link-ups, the "object-relational" contexts, how, for example, the "stuckness" might be confluent with a particular psychodynamically determined stuckness--to, say, the enveloping/destroying mother object.

Or, for example, where seeing one's holiness, union with the exalted, where trying to hold this...Trying to hold, capture what then seems dead...."In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?"

Relate to THIS: the pain-filled movement of attempting to grasp what dies in one's hand. One can understand being left with a passionate pointing....

Wittgenstein: Yes I am aware here of the way you stare and say, but he cannot have THIS!

To capture and hold. This "method" applied in the yearning for liberation yields, e.g.: patient Mr. S. found

running naked down Grand Concourse, end of the world, longing for the "capture in the rapture." To be "taken up."

Recall Mr. S.: when he extended his crossed hands to allow the handcuffs to be placed upon his wrists and they weren't: this as sign that he was Jesus....As critical. The "meaning connection." Here too in the neighborhood of the transcendental aspect....What could be more certain than that....How much would be called in to question if this weren't such a sign.

29. Consider situations in which one is "struck", a striking way of seeing: "It's like this!!" The dawning of an aspect.

"Just a particular quality to his voice which said to me..." Are we somehow pointing to "sheer meaningfulness" in those situations where a person--e.g. schizophrenic--feels cannot go on to say how it was, what it was that struck him.

No, not just meaningfulness itself, but the meaningfulness of THIS!

30. Also of course it could be said that our "standing outside"-- as we would if we were to be so reductive as to take away the particular significance of whatever is striking in this manner--is part of the situation in which there is a "not going on together." Consider, for example Ms. J. who would become quite animated, pointing intently whenever the sun reached a particular point on the horizon.

She isn't just pointing to meaningfulness itself, but, e.g., to the sun...And bit by bit we come to understand its place in her world, her place in its world.

And if we are to do so we must hold on to the particularity, must point together.

To speak of the "meaningfulness of THIS" is to open the possibility of entry into her world.

Her being "mute" in the language of our world, her apparent muteness, may also be regarded as a sign that are before what "cannot be said" in Wittgenstein's sense.

But can be shown, and can be met. Remember Wittgenstein's "something glorious": An analogous moment here. Ms J. on "the glory", when sun's rays would noticeably link sky and earth.

What, we want to ask, does e.g. Ms J.'s dance to the sun tell us?

It cannot be that here we are before something, whether "referred" to or not, something that we might describe as "sheer meaningfulness." Even--especially!--sheer meaningfulness has, as we might put it, a use. It will tend to be, like Ms. J's sun, at the center. "Gloria"!

31. Two Faces:

We say "The expression is his voice was genuine." If it was spurious we think as it were of another one behind it.--This is the face he shows the world, inwardly he has another one.--But this does not mean that when his expression is genuine he has two the same.

(("A quite particular expression.")) (PI, #606)

We are not just talking here of a kind of relativistic thinking. What is very important here is the connection to a shift in perspective, a shift in kind, so that its not a matter of one point of view as it were on the same scale as another. Here consider, for example, the "two faces" and "looking for the 'because'".

Think of the application of "two faces": The importance of seeing the place for doubt revealed here. And the danger of an overextension. Think of "in-life" manifestations of seeking the true face behind. See this as an example of seeking to will a certain movement.

What we see suggested here is a way in which Wittgenstein's marking of a grammatical place has a clinical bearing.

The feeling of 'familiarity' and of 'naturalness.' It is easier to get at a feeling of unfamiliarity and of unnaturalness. Or, at feelings. For not everything which is unfamiliar to us makes an impression of unfamiliarity upon us. Here one has to consider what we call "unfamiliar." If a boulder lies on the road, we know it for a boulder, but perhaps not for the one which has always lain there. We recognize a man, say, as a man, but not as an acquaintance. There are feelings of old acquaintance: they are sometimes expressed by a particular way of looking or by the words: "The same old room!" (which I occupied many years before and now returning find unchanged). Equally there are feelings of strangeness. I stop short, look at the object or man questioningly or mistrustfully, say "I find it all strange."--But the existence of this feeling of strangeness does not give us a reason for saying that every object which we know well and which does not seem strange to us gives us a feeling of familiarity.--We think that, as it were, the place once filled by the feeling of strangeness must surely be occupied somehow. The

place for this kind of atmosphere is there, and if one of them is not in possession of it, then another is. (PI, #596)

Within Wittgenstein we see a call to be struck by the familiar, by the fact that we do not see it for its familiarity. That we look for foundations, for something behind, underneath when need rather to turn around....

Do we see a similar "being struck by" within schizophrenic Stimmung? What are the possible uses of such?

33. See here re immediacy. Fear of falling into.... How we are surrounded by the familiar....The way we can sense a feared vanishing into the familiar.

At times, we are seeing from the vantage point of one of the fragments speeding away from the center, we are looking back. We can experience the longing to be home as a longing for death, for darkness, that is for the implosion.

34. Think here re D. Loy: dissatisfaction with life arising from a repression even more immediate than death-terror: the suspicion that "I" am not real (Loy, 1992). "True" self in this context..."False" self as attempting to "be" someone. And I want to say here: we think of, generalize from situation of "false" self to something which is not, as it were, for others but for me. Two faces. Here the conjuring trick again. Crucial.

The link from "you don't have it, don't see it" to the terror of going into the void. Note Loy's paper: Re Becker and denial of death--"behind" this a fear of the void, of

the "emptiness" of self. In this sense the fear is of living. Now note: the "emptiness" of immediacy. And what cannot be said, only shown.

35. Re Wittgenstein on the familiar. Compare evocation of the first person. Very important here as we can now see more clearly a link between "the turning" and the "first person perspective." What is Wittgenstein seeking to interrupt? The smooth movement to an assumed antecedent, to an assumed transcendental condition. Here the movement travels the rails of generalization from situation of unfamiliarity to one well "known."

36. Re schizophrenic sensitivity: Consider re sensitivity to the falseness. Not accepting the offered "surface"/conventional presentation. And what does such a capacity presuppose? Well, for one, an attunement to "twoness." (Not to speak of more than a "bad brain.") Curious how in people who have difficulty with "reality testing" there should be such an attunement to what is the case. Of course, conventional "reality" etc. And from here easy to romanticize, forgetting that the concomitant disorganization/terror bespeak an over-valuation of the conventional, fearing its retaliation, as it were...Here where links up with merger/separation dynamics: it is as though the sensed twoness will break me, as though I will be this brokenness. But the "self" not in fact "breakable."

Relate to where can be met. In being outside, in this

sensitivity.

To do so will need to see (also) the place, as well as danger, of the "special atmosphere," the "truth of solipsism."

37. Note: We have spoken of schizophrenic sensitivity to the false--so much of what Sass at one point speaks of in terms of how we readily understand each other, understand in a way which we don't understand the schizophrenic, how much of this territory can be seen as also that in which can see legitimate, understandable, schizophrenic seeing into, the absurdity, e.g., of the hand shake. Not to speak of the warmed over, glossed over deadness which characterizes much social interaction. The awful distances, the not saying, not touching. And what of those who are torn by such things, and who implicitly know there's more here, and what more there is is the direct presentation of all that lies so unskillfully hidden. It is this which we must know if we are to meet such people, we must provide the meeting place--and thereby the affirmation--around the recognition of this. That is to say: we must provide the meeting place around the recognition of the foundations of our activities. That which once seen is most striking and most powerful. And thereby empower: e.g., your so taking, your so seeing. To meet here.

38. Consider PI, #300:

The image of pain is not a picture and this image is not replaceable in the language-game by

anything that we should call a picture.--The image of pain certainly enters into the language game in a sense; only not as a picture.

See as expressive of a dilemma revealed within schizophrenic experience. The attempt to capture in language. The answer is not that is "beyond language"; though we could adopt that posture.

What you are missing is right before you, all around you: THIS.

And I think something quite profound may happen when we are sensitive to this, when we can be so struck. Think here of the "empathy" possible... Meeting. On "twoness," its place and its collapse.

39. Re treatment:

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body. (Which would also be possible.)

Pain-behavior can point to the painful place--but the subject of pain is the person who gives it expression. (PI, #302)

The subject of pain is the person who gives it expression. As it were, wanting to leap to "the subject" from a place of picturing. To draw the "image of pain" into a world known through a perspective which is that within which are seeing through pictures. A key connection is being made here: link between "the image" and "the subject." See immediacy. And

that which is "presupposed."

See: the kaleidoscope and the center to which reference is made.

40. Wittgenstein: what's remarkable is that there is "something rather than nothing!" Relates to: what is remarkable is that we can "just like that" imagine the red object....Right before our eyes. Consider "being struck" by this and all it requires re being a member of the human community, what this might facilitate in a context where feel so apart. (As it were, from "apart" to "a part," merely matter of a gap, of a gap seen, seen through.)

41. What needs to be appreciated: The "transcendental" dimension of the situation when not a twoness. This the hardest thing to grasp. The "hint of a center" manifests as it does because of its transcendental nature.

42. Public Solipsism:

With what H. Finch terms "public solipsism" we see a sense of the "truth of solipsism" and a way of understanding an aspect of the schizophrenic terror in coming up against immediacy.

Immediacy without attempting to hold as mine.

Inside the hiding place, outside life. With the notion of public solipsism, we see a "from the inside" without the objectification of over-against (special) self of the hiding place.

From Finch, 1977, pp. 106-107:

What is correct in solipsism, [Wittgenstein] saw, is not the Cartesian self and the Cartesian privacy, with which it is usually associated, but an incommunicability which is, we might say, wholly public. The solipsist is right in recognizing the absolute uniqueness of the experience of the I, but he is wrong in supposing that there is anything "private" about this. The world as it confronts the I is indeed incommunicable in just the way in which it is experienced by the I, but this is not because the I is private, or this first person experience is private. It is because of the nature of language, which is a "measure" of the world, and not the "experience" of the world.

The traditional solipsist, the fly in the fly-bottle, sees himself as a locked-away private self with a private experience of the world, accessible only to himself. He is in the grip of that picture, which is, as it were, implicit in the Cartesian point of view. He has not discovered that the "first person world" and the "first person experience" (wrongly identified by these terms since there is no "person" involved in this) do not belong to anybody, but are, rather, overwhelmingly public. What it is that "I alone" claim to see or experience I cannot say, not because it is mine alone, but because it is nobody's and everybody's, literally incomparable and unsayable. For the fly to escape from the fly-bottle is to be propelled into an openness where the immediacy which seemed to be the private possession of the fly is, if anything, intensified in its immediacy by being dissociated from its supposed privacy. What it is that put the fly into the bottle was not the main point at all.

See re link with the transcendental. Within schizophrenic experience seeing attempt to make a world in language. See "present at creation." To have as mine. The purpose served: to make mine as opposed to others, to have a "mine."

Notice link with the turn. And not trying to capture. Connection with grammar: Situations in which we might speak

of "trying." See: on "trying at all costs to get there..."-
-not applicable when not a matter of effort.

And one might say: "I can always will only
inasmuch as I can never try to will."

Let us not forget this: when 'I raise my
arm', my arm goes up. And the problem arises:
what is left over if I subtract the fact that my
arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?
((Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?))

When I raise my arm I do not usually try to
raise it. (PI, ##620-22)

Link back to "goes right up" with:

But it is also trying, attempting, making an
effort,--to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to
imagine something etc..

43. Re grammar: the problem is with over-generalization.
Eg with Mr. D., whose emergence will be marked by oneness
with all. The experience of union with all does have truth.
Since we cannot capture the relationship to the world, we
may be tempted to see it in such a total way as does Mr. D.

44. Re Finch's "public solipsism": See as a step on the
road back to "the human race." As a step in the territory
of not just mine, so not just mine alone--an experience of
the feared merger without the loss of "what's mine"...The
treatment process as a place where it is shown that what the
solipsist means is correct....

Might also say the capacity for community with the
empowered other, with e.g. for Ms. J, the sun, that here
also the seeds of recognition of ways in which it is not "I"
that does the taking in the "how taken."

And the terror of this. Of dissolving into that which is larger, encompassing.

45. Relating to discussion of solipsism: might say, an objectified subjectivity is just that which we imagine might be capable of such certain movement as we fantasize in machine delusions.

46. "Can't We Say Both:

PI, #682:

"You said, 'It'll stop soon'".--Were you thinking of the noise or of your pain?" If he answers "I was thinking of the piano-tuning"--is he observing that the connection existed, or is he making it up by means of these words?--Can't I say both?

If what he said was true, didn't the connection exist--and is he not for all that making one which did not exist?

We might ask: what is left when we subtract the foundational longing, foundational use, from delusional material? That is, what is the result if we have the expression of delusional material in a context where "can't we say both" is seen? Recall above on Wittgenstein and the delusion of the implicit. It is this that is met directly with "can't we say both." Thinking here of the dilemma faced everyday re meeting the "delusional." Is there a way to give the needed room, and then to provide the fulcrum for the turn to "and also thus and so," where the latter allows the introduction of a more in-common mode of expression?

47. How to express the intuition that guides us. The sense of the person. That sense of the presence, emergence of a

person. What is involved here.

How, for one, what is involved is the capacity to be at a place where "can't we say both" an instantiated, lived position.

This as a way of meeting the hyperreflexivity in that what is being sought through this hyper-awareness is a putting oneself in a place of inevitable movement.

48. With "can't we say both" we are fostering an awareness of instantiation itself. And in so doing we are developing a standpoint which allows a sort of freedom, a capacity, for example, to not be so easily caught, in pictures, in flybottles.

How some schizophrenic manifestations involve grammatical confusion. See "could not but." Or, if not under my control then must be under another's. Or, if not feeling of unfamiliar then of familiar. Liberation here involves a capacity to see the limited whole. This sense of myself has to do with this view. Others otherwise.

Wittgensteinian liberation involves a particular response to, e.g., the remark concerning place occupied by feelings of strangeness; or in context of schizophrenia to the error of positing (absolute) control, if not by me--that place which occupied, we imagine by me--then by another. I want to say: here is where we see the "misleading extension of twoness" and "you don't have it" crossing. In the sense that what is sought is modelled on what can be seen from

certain (third person) vantage point.

And here the heart of Wittgensteinian treatment of schizophrenic states.

49. The place of "both." Relates to what easily missed: Why we say "both": its not about rival views...The sense in which not commensurable. The point of view of "expression" involves a turning. The very question of "coming into" being, the grammar of coming into being is open before us here.

50. The sense in which can't be anyplace, any one place, in awareness. See what Wittgenstein seeks to evoke in "can't we say both." How what is needed is more awareness of, sense of at homeness with, "the gaps."

From Eigen, 1996:

Of Winnicott's patient:

She could taste the freedom that recognition of lack provides. She began to treasure the space made possible by real absence, a gap not stuffed by falseness. She could do this because of the real support the analyst gave her to experiencing what was not there. At last the missing real, the no-thing or thing that was not there, became part of real existence. In what was missing, she found room to link up with herself, stretch and begin to grow (p. 75).

The felt need to fill the gap.

Compare here with the way grammar allows the seeing of logical space around a particular language game. This here. Ask: what allows the capacity to acknowledge the gap. One answer: that what one fears has already happened.....Re schizophrenic experience: one is already human.

51. How to express the intuition that guides us. The sense of the person. That sense of the presence, emergence of a person. What involved here.

How for one what involved is the capacity to be at place where "can't we say both" is an instantiated, lived position.

52. I want to say: what of the truth here, i.e. what of the truth that the arising of thought, feeling intention is also not under my control. We could say that in schizophrenia we see the mistake of moving from this to "therefore in the control of another." Wittgenstein: not a something, but not a nothing either.

See: controlled by others in context of yearned for place of "controlled by me". "Owned by others" and "owned by me". These two co-arising; in Buddhist language, dependent arising here. Not controlled by others, but not controlled by you either.

Compare PI, #304 on sensation as inner, private object:

It is not a something, but not a nothing either!
The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

Note: we have spoken of Wittgenstein's allowing us inside schizophrenic experience. Here we sense a similar being "inside" the therapeutic response, the space of therapeutic possibility.

53. How an awareness of shifting aspects, how "can't we say

both," involves being within something larger. This is akin to what we are seeking when we speak of "public solipsism" in that this standing place is not "underneath" either of these options.

Nothing underneath. And no intermediary.

We might say: Liberation must involve emptiness as wherever we are can be seen as a limited whole. So we are able to sense...that in which we rest...the capacity to rest.

Interesting that with the current psychiatric conception of delusion we in effect discourage this capacity, in our efforts to bring the deluded person to see our reality. And we might ask: does this encourage just the sort of foundationalism which captures. See re "spirituality group" and attitude there toward the legitimacy of the question.

54. From the perspective of power from the other what's missing is the "how taken." From the perspective of the how (individually) taken what's missing is the framework which is larger than the I.

55. On Being at Home:

On how one is and isn't "already home": Think of where we have spoken of the way in which agency is maintained within delusional space. While we also sense that somehow the movement to bringing into the world, "instantiation," is elided.

Important here to see that the issue of instantiation is very much about "coming into," coming home. In its most fundamental sense. This is why issues of instantiation are so central within schizophrenic worlds.

56. We cannot find our way home down the roads we think will lead us there. We want to say: The will must go right up to our action. There can be no gap. Wittgenstein: the straight road is blocked. Though we see it before us.

What we can do is foster an awareness of extent to which we are already home. But, this awareness can occur now, can occur in the context of being now so seen. This is very important. We are not bringing to an awareness of that which is separate from this moment; the realization requires a seeing such as that in which we are now participating.

[One wonders how much of the appeal of mental illness as brain disease lies in its allowing a "coming home" to the human. How, for example, that view is used to this end within the "consumers' movement."

Don't say: brain disease, that's "just how it is"! Wittgenstein: to say such would but amount to further "tracing round the frame."]

57. On the one hand: the astonishment in which one is so far outside, looking down from orbit at the turning earth, desperate to grab THIS. On the other: Awakened to the fact that one is quite well held, quite well turning, and marvelling at THIS.

58. Central applicability of Wittgenstein to thinking about schizophrenia: Consider the question (see it e.g. in Perry) of the return to earth.

Recall Mr. O.'s spaceship dream: spaceship accelerating toward earth, seen in its glory, colors against the blackness of space. The thought: how will I land this thing, how to reach that place without crashing. Might see this as a vivid, "concrete," manifestation of what have spoken of re the feared annihilation in finding one's place...The possibility of dissolving, crashing etc. with this contact.

One way of understanding what's happening within the Investigations would be to see it in terms of this very return to Earth, to human going on, human "forms of life," with significantly the "mystical"--the immediate--woven through.

59. Spirituality Group as Clinical Example:

The following notes draw from my experiences in a weekly inpatient "spirituality group" which I have led for the past several years.

Recall: No, not just meaningfulness itself, but, if you will, the meaningfulness of THIS!

Compare: "I never believed in God before"--that I understand. But not: "I never really believed in Him before." (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 53)

Spirituality group as a place that is conducive to

facilitating a movement from the special private atmosphere to some awareness of "if mine alone then not mine at all." To the space within the circle.

This relates to the core sensibility needed in meeting schizophrenic states. An assumption of--thereby opening potential for acknowledgement of--scales in common. With Wittgenstein, common "logical space."

What is it like to share a world where "belief in Him"--as contrasted with "belief in God"--makes sense?

Why we need a sense of the "sacramental": Just a return to "the everyday" will leave an emptiness, lifelessness. We do see the highway. Why we need "to be struck." For here the sacred seen in everyday "this." "What, once seen, is most striking..."

But note: we do see the highway before us! Compare: I know how you point... See here another dimension to our engagement: the awareness of terrific loss...Why important to not, on top of this, illegitimate the vision. We do see the highway before us, just that it is not a way we can straightaway walk.

60. Re spirituality group: On the grammar of heaven on earth.

Might see what we are doing in spirituality group as a weaving between heaven and earth. Or seeing "earth," everyday common life, through the lens of heaven, and vice versa. Exploring where this duality dissolves.

And a second trend: as it were from earth to heaven. Group dynamics interpreted through a "spiritual" lens. As elsewhere with the use of the language of agency, so here with use of the language of spirituality. Grammar.

The way in which the process within the group itself is often an expression of what "spirituality" means, how it matters. Those moments, which happen in most groups, where one can sense a shift, often appearing be quite suddenly, in the energy or feel in the room. Like the bottom drops out. Think of the group when this first became apparent. The night when patients were telling "vision" stories. And of Ms. E. telling of her grandmother coming to her. How this was soothing for many in the group. My comment regarding its sounding like people were talking about looking for a place where they could feel at home, could feel safe. And for the first time in the group that night a silence, could sense the shift... To the center of the circle, the kaleidoscope's center.

61. The empowerment around "how taken." The empowerment around just asking such questions as "how to tell if this a hallucination or the voice of God?" That these experiences can be discussed, your visions, your answers. That the question of their meaning can be considered. And the question of illness, of the pain, of the value (also) of medication.

Starting with the very recognition of the validity,

value of such questions, of our so questioning. How none are separated from the divine, whatever name we put to that....How in a world where people are approached as fallen, we speak of our inherent divinity and, hence, power to awaken....The travesty of the psychiatrist-God. The God's eye perspective of the knowing doctor. We need to be present, a potential source of strength yes, but not by playing such a knowing posture, one which of all people schizophrenics are the most adept at seeing through--and, sometimes, all too eager to confirm for us via superficial compliance. A mockery.

62. Consider Ram Dass and the possibility of the "Jesus turn": "The difference between mystic and madman, both believe are Jesus but the latter that only he is so" (Ram Dass, 1992). Re discussion of a clinical 180 degree turn. Validation, meeting and a certain sort of turn. Think e.g. of the turn involved in the "two faces" remark: a collapsing of an about to be, liable to be, overextended twoness, seeing of a gap..."duality." NOT by means of arguing against it, but by virtue of stepping outside it...What involved for example in the Jesus move? Validation etc., also as H. Sullivan well describes a no-big-deal quality to the response. Crucial component: the return to the human race. Acknowledging the validity of that which has been used to differentiate and then "de-differentiating". Perhaps see as so doing by means of

pointing out that what one took as a way of discovering something in opposition to human life has been a discovery of a feature of that very thing. One has already allowed the "enemy" in (and survived)....

The way in which the "Jesus turn," as example of 180 degree turn, is an instance, an expression, of Wittgenstein's "back to the rough ground"--in that it pulls the apophantic back into everyday going on, where it can find some traction....

The 180 degree turn around the--transcendental--axis of our real need.

CHAPTER SEVEN

WITTGENSTEIN ON PHILOSOPHY AS A FORM OF THERAPY: THE CHARACTER OF OUR ENGAGEMENT.

1. Exposure of "the Conjuring Trick":

Again:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise?--The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we shall know more about them--we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)--And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them.

What is your aim in philosophy?--To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. (308-309)

Our way in here: to see Wittgenstein's philosophical treatment as itself a therapeutic meeting of the delusional, meeting that which leads to the solipsist's entrapment.

As a therapeutic meeting of delusion. We want to say: not just any delusion, but ones with "transcendental" import. Captured by "the picture of picturing itself."

Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the picture of the pot (PI, #297).

"Something boiling in the picture of the pot": see re delusion, specifically the connection between delusional

modes and rigidity of perspective. Here we see the eliding movement blocked. Nothing behind: no water in the pictured pot.

We notice the attempt to step outside and see simultaneously from another perspective. Re grammar: "this here."

2. What is accomplished in Wittgenstein's treatment of the delusion of the implicit. See how Schafer, for example, offers an attempt to ground our language in a way which cannot but mislead, a way which is akin to what we see in schizophrenic experience in its focus on the means of meaning--on, e.g., the machine. Or the voice speaking to me, through me.

3. That which is explicit in delusions of influence reveals something which gives us a broader insight into delusional construction. Delusions of influence provide a "concrete" representation of the grammar of entering into delusional states.

4. Philosophy is "First Order":

One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word "philosophy" there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word "orthography" among others without then being second-order (PI, #121).

Important for us to ask: how does Wittgenstein understand philosophical temptation. What insight does this give us to the schizophrenic predicament. Here we agree with Sass and see limits of Sass' view. Agree in the

applicability of philosophical thinking, relevance for schizophrenic experience. But not just in being "abstract" and as abstraction resulting in attenuation of self... Here is where we need to understand reaching for transcendental grounds.

5. An example of first order philosophy:

But being guided is surely a particular experience!" --The answer to this is: you are now thinking of a particular experience of being guided (PI, #173).

Here we can see the return to the rough ground. Looking right at what is taking place as means of facilitating a 180 degree turn. And now the question of what's going on around this particular experience. We will ask such questions rather than those that would seek conditions such that "could not but walk."

"You are now thinking." Here we see an example of a therapeutic intervention.

6. The preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by our turning our whole examination round. (One might say: the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.) The philosophy of logic speaks of sentences and words in exactly the sense in which we speak of them in ordinary life when we say e.g. "Here is a Chinese ornament", or "No, that only looks like writing; it is actually just an ornament" and so on.

We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm. [Note in margin: only it is possible to be interested in a phenomenon in a variety of ways] (PI, #108).

Here we see the exposure of the illusion of the god's

perspective, those vestments we cannot wear. And how this is related to the illusion of the meta-place. The god's place: compare "present at creation."

It is possible to be interested in a variety of ways: here the turn. Not looking for what behind. The therapeutic turn.

7. Now consider:

Do I observe myself, then, and perceive that I am seeing or conscious? And why talk about observation at all? Why not simply say "I perceive I am conscious"?--But what are the words "I perceive" for here?--why not say "I am conscious"?--But don't the words "I perceive" here show that I am attending to my consciousness?--which is ordinarily not the case.--If so, then the sentence "I perceive I am conscious" does not say that I am conscious, but that my attention is disposed in such-and-such a way.

But isn't it a particular experience that occasions my saying "I am conscious again"?--What experience? In what situations do we say it? (PI, #417).

It is very important that the "this and that," the "here not there" that needs to be possible on the way home is just what characterizes grammatical awareness. Recall: the initial problem with Schafer is one of elision involving an absolute stance--that is, a vestment we cannot wear. Attention to grammar counters just such as this.

Note the particular experience of being guided (PI, #173) and of connection here to the "experience of the because" as also looking for the "particular experience." Link up with "could not but walk": the answer is that you are now thinking of a particular experience of being guided.

Something very important here.

It will connect with Wittgenstein's treatment turn in that: the way in which the attempted move to "just a particular something" is undercut carries with it the undermining of the schizophrenic attempt at self-creation. And carries the seeds of seeing the way in which one is "already home." Here, in these very "coming into being" concerns. See: "But it is also trying, attempting, making an effort,--to speak, to write, to lift a thing, to imagine something etc..." The sense in which nothing has changed and yet everything has.

Link back with "your so taking." Your so taking as a key step in "first order" philosophy. As a way of bringing us into a process, a way to get traction, to disenthroned.

8. From Eigen, 1986, p. 116, remarking on Bion:

That is, his patient is convinced that somehow his sounds are connected to or even create the objects he sees ("in the beginning there was sound"). As Bion puts it, this person utters actual objects, not simply phrases.

The objects he observes represent unseeable objects and so function as signs. An unseeable object may be the absent mother, but may also be something unnameable. For the psychotic person (or the psychotic aspect of self), visible objects are part and signals of an ongoing catastrophe. The catastrophe itself is invisible and ineffable. Tangible objects are its more or less momentary compressions. As noted above, the unnameable catastrophe may be conceived of in several ways, but it remains nameless. It may be dread of somethingness-nothingness, creation-destruction, oblivion-aliveness, or the cipher beyond.

The sense in which we see "framework" issues here.

Compare: things as "signposts." Consider how within

schizophrenic states awareness involved with the tension of "things/the implications, meaning rules of things."

Think as well of the kaleidoscope, with the center as a source of terror.

Recall Wittgenstein's "flash of understanding/use extended in time":

But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time! (PI, #138)

To be caught up in this. The in-life awareness of this gap as a schizophrenic state. Where philosophy being first order meets schizophrenic experience.

"Hyperbolically itself" as seeking to bridge this gap. With the signpost we see "the turn" as it meets the yearning here.

9. Think here of Wittgenstein on the "signpost": That it is "not a super-likeness." That it is on the same level as other objects. Somehow the other side, liberation side, involves THIS as signpost rather than as a thing which I have. Possibility of movement from THIS.

Note how the turn re THIS can be seen here! The movement from the seeing into, the piercing gaze, from such to something different, something which involves an awareness of "what is right before us." To a "perspicuous representation."

We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our investigation is directed not towards

phenomena, but, as one might say, towards the 'possibilities' of phenomena....

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by clearing misunderstandings away (PI, #90).

10. The possibilities held within the grammar. What we need to see: how the idea of grammar opens to territory of "nothing behind." How with the idea of grammar we are in the territory of the therapeutic turn: for here the tormented search for that which undergirds, that which "brings into being," this search is brought to rest.

That from which we cannot remove ourselves. The very illusion whose limits are lived within schizophrenic experience: the sought for god perspective.

11. On Metapsychology and first order treatment:

Inside/outside and the theory/practice "gap": The way a 180 degree shift in perspective is involved in seeing the "instantiation" of philosophical issues around agency. The way in which Wittgenstein seeks to bring one "inside."

What I am suggesting might be put this way: We get inside a "conceptual" dilemma just as we do the world of a patient. In this sense Wittgenstein's method, imagining this way and that, is an example of therapeutic empathy. Paradigmatically such in fact.

How is this related to the theme of "the transcendental"? Like this: We are in a position to see "can't we say both" when we are no longer trying to be "present at creation."

12. Compare the way in which concern with the will, with purpose, appears in the Investigations. For one we see a movement from a schizophrenic-like concern with the will as a thing to an opening, an inviting, of a different perception, one that is not directly presentable. The "straight road is blocked."

13. What is crucial in the movement toward the "return to the human race": that the signpost just an object among others. But not a private object. As cannot be held, captured, in the way such would need to be.

So a way of being with the signpost that gives it such a place, a way of "going by."

The "answer" to the problem posed by schizophrenic states is an answer which brings the meta-level to everyday ground, would have to be such.

14. Philosophy Akin to Therapy:

From the Investigations:

It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words in unheard-of ways.

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.--The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question.--Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. --Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.

There is not a philosophical method though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (PI, #133)

What is at the center for us is the exploration of the "in-life" manifestations of the...shifting perspectives. Can look at other examples of an awareness of the split. Laing and the scientist vs existential/phenomenological form of this division (Laing, 1959). Donna Williams as presenting examples of the in-life "battle": the world vs. my world (Williams, 1992). Age old distinctions, many changes on these themes....

Why does Wittgenstein not try to "solve" this?

15. Re "I know what you mean." Recall in seeking "experience of the because": We "can't believe mere simultaneity." But then no phenomenon works. In the form of argument here we can see the structure of our movement. In that, significantly, Wittgenstein does not proceed to: "and mere simultaneity, that's all there is." Though not thereby a matter of there being "something else" that we have missed. (To say such would be to insist on the water in the pictured pot. A something that cannot be said, good as a nothing...)

16. Again: the key in the idea that the will is not a phenomenon. Our centering point is here.

We will meet the experience which is a coming up against this limit. In-life.

We will need to see the texture of this moment. How, for example, "THIS" is its expression.

The turn: That, rather, can move from THIS.

Here a glimpse of relationship between Wittgenstein's central insight and the use, purposes of schizophrenic processes...(Where they are alive.) Relates to what we sensed re action language. The elision occurs right at the point of coming into being, right where the drama centered. The conjuring trick right at the place of the turn.

17. We are saying that in Wittgenstein's work (itself) we encounter, can experience, the kaleidoscopic disorientation, and then a being brought in, to where can sense a center around a reference to "a turn."

18. Wittgenstein describes his philosophical work as an attempt to reach that "real discovery,...the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to.--The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions that bring itself into question."

Philosophy, we might say, is at peace with the realization of being first-order, that which we fail to see for its familiarity. Wittgenstein's work as eliciting such a realization.

19. Perspicuous Representation and the Therapeutic Turn:

On perspicuous presentation: consider Wittgenstein on Frazer: it would have been better to present these rituals without any theoretical gloss in a way which would allow their relationships to be shown.

Seeing implications for treatment of "allowing their relationships to be shown."

What valuable here the way it points to the idea of

involvement within, the "from the inside."

To listen clinically for the areas of "owned doing" as a place where enter into a certain grammatical territory, providing an in-life foothold, providing an example, a story, an incident, a "signpost," where that way of seeing can be invoked, and where it can be used as a rule for seeing others, where the activity disowned. As with remark re Frazer: let these speak for themselves. Your doing here. Look at that! Where the perspicuous presentation is a signpost of one's own efficacy, of one's own knowing how to go on.

20. Immediately following description of philosophy as "first order":

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words.--Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions.' Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give [our form of representation], the way we look at things. (Is this a 'Weltanschauung'?)

A philosophical problem has the form: "I don't know my way about." (PI, ##122-23)

How it is that we must be led in to see via participating in a process. The idea of "perspicuous representation." How philosophy being first order looks.

21. Recall Wittgenstein's remark re astonishment at the movement of my own hand. And notice the move that he makes

here, a characteristic turn: "Not because you wish it, for if you were so standing, if in situation so imagined, can see that might actually be astonished." Your attempt to bring something about cannot work as you suppose. And, our seeing this is made possible by the very bringing to mind, evoking the in-life situation.

Note re treatment: in so meeting, Wittgenstein does not just hear the meaning of the delusional--the "truth in the delusion"--but also brings attention to its absurdity. And the possibility of a meeting here. Re Mr. D., for example: Would "the Master" need to work this hard to emerge?

22. And how are we to be led in? Consider how Wittgenstein directs our attention: "inside" in moves to block "inner process" meaning, will, movement analyses. "Outside" to grammar, expression... And then to the awareness of movement beyond inside/outside: in e.g. "two faces" remark. That is, then to an awareness of "that very thing" which we can see before us in his method.

23. We have seen the usefulness and temptation of the picture of the wish behind. That which might "bring me about." Consider the following remark as a clinical intervention:

Saying "I should like an apple" does not mean: I believe an apple will quell my feeling of nonsatisfaction. This proposition is not an expression of a wish but of nonsatisfaction (PI, #440).

Here see the way in which "looking to the mechanism" is

being addressed.

24. Re the turn: Where we see the center point of kinship between therapeutic meeting of schizophrenia and Wittgenstein's treatment of philosophical illness.

See Wittgenstein's "turn" as a clinical turn. See the therapeutic meeting of schizophrenic states (or, those having to do with...instantiation, agency, making of self etc...) through the lens of this turn.

25. Re present at creation: think of, as it were, getting inside oneself. How are we to describe the shift, that shift which we liken to Wittgenstein's 180 degree turn "around the axis of our real need." "Inside oneself." Think of a shift in the direction in which one is looking. Interesting that it really does seem like a 180 degree turn. From in on oneself to outward ongoing--where the self no longer needing the scrutiny; which of course not to say that one is never self-aware or introspective etc.

Compare what Wittgenstein does with mental states: "which is not to say one does not have pain"...See "what greater difference could there be." The answer here has to do with not placing the raw experience as foundation. Within schizophrenic states: not seeking to bring self into being.

The sensation "is not a something, but not a nothing either!"

26. As an example of Wittgenstein's "turn":

A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push it. (Wittgenstein, 1980, p. 42)

27. Why perspicuous representation? With such we meet schizophrenic "THIS" in its home world. To say "sheer meaningfulness," for example, is to remain in ours.

28. When, regarding above description of longing for "frictionless" movement, when here we are met with the imperative: "back to the rough ground!" Here we see an example of being pulled, led inside. Let yourself be struck.

And we see what we are after in that very way of being met, we see the rough ground right here!

See PI, #106:

Here it is difficult as it were to keep our heads up,--to see that we must stick to the subjects of our every-day thinking, and not go astray and imagine that we have to describe extreme subtleties which in turn we are after all quite unable to describe with the means at our disposal. We feel as if we had to repair a torn spider's web with our fingers.

29. Tricky thing about agency that when we place it outside we can "see" it in a way that of own cannot "see," cannot "have" it. "Will not phenomenon."

With searching for "the because" we see a context for schizophrenic hyperreflexivity. Note also we see how schizophrenic experience may be regarded as both more abstract and quite concrete. See what results in THIS.

Link with above: "You do not have it. You do not even

see it." How close this is to "Germ of the idea that the will is not a phenomenon."

Ask: ways in which within schizophrenic states a playing with "mere simultaneities." Very important: a way of capturing the play and despairing of meaning, of meaning connection. E.g., the frequently seen number link ups. To what extent can we see this "play" as (also) a reaction to not finding the phenomenon of the because that could carry one, could be the vehicle. (See Mr.L.'s "grimaces" above.)

39. This links to: "I know what you mean" but can't go that way. The straight road is blocked. We see Wittgenstein's opening--the turn around the axis of our real need--as the opening between, the third way between, mere simultaneity and the experience of the because.

When I look back on the experience I have the feeling that what is essential about it is an "experience of being influenced," of a connection--as opposed to a mere simultaneity of phenomena (PI, #176).

31. We ask of schizophrenic experience when we confront it: what does it mean? We, when so looking "from outside," might speak of an apparatus gone awry. So, meaningless.

Perry's image of the kaleidoscope. Our feeling of finding that place from which there is a sense of the circle's center.

And the suggestion here that we will sense the center when we stand within it.

The place from which there can be emergence.

Compare from Benedetti, 1987, p. 57:

There is, in the schizophrenic personality, a great loss of narcissism, which can also be considered independently of the infantile vicissitudes of the patient, because it is simply the immediate consequence of ego splitting....

A main function of the therapist is, then, to restore this narcissistic gap. This, however, can never happen within the framework of a psychotherapeutic technique alone. Technique presupposes an operational model according to which the patient becomes the object of an organized, skillful, therapeutic procedure. However, the narcissistic gap cannot only be shown to the patient: it must also be filled, and this may happen only if the patient ceases to be purely an object to the therapist and becomes, by way of identification, part of his subjectivity.

Many therapists have tried to describe this: from Rosen to Sechehaye from Searles to Neumann, from Sullivan to Siirala, from Fromm-Reichmann to Arieti. We have often used different words: "relatedness," "participation," "therapeutic symbiosis," "symbolic realization," and so on, but in spite of these different names, a similar thing is meant.

Consider how the therapist can come so close that her being the perspective from which the seeing of experience can occur can also come so close to the expression, as it were right up to it. A "from the outside" which is let in.

32. See:

A picture is conjured up which seems to fix the sense unambiguously. The actual use, compared with that suggested by the picture, seems like something muddled. Here again we get the same thing as in set theory: the form of expression seems to have been designed for a god, who knows what we cannot know; he sees the whole of each of those infinite series and he sees into human consciousness. For us, of course, these forms of expression are like pontificals which we may put on, but cannot do much with, since we lack the effective power that would give these vestments meaning and purpose.

In the actual use of expressions we make

detours, we go by sideroads. We see the straight highway before us, but of course we cannot use it, because it is permanently closed (PI, #426).

In use it is alive. How akin to a schizophrenic moment, not being able to use the vestments, the clothes of the gods....

But we do see the highway before us! See meeting around the glory. See "THIS."

33. What it is like, in Wittgenstein's sense, to be "inside" the space of intention: how this is not about being inside or outside me, not about being inside or outside my head...How frequently this awareness is evoked by Wittgenstein, for whom there are many roads to and from this neighborhood.

How the induction of awareness regarding being inside, the sense of "being inside," how this opens an important clinical awareness. Opens a sensitivity to, a "feeling for," being inside, being out. This issue as seen in the patient, as seen in our interaction, and as seen in the relationship between these two.

We speak of a "feeling for" this dimension, its ramifications. This is apt as we are speaking of an attunement, a sensitivity, to a "framework" dimension. We are here in the territory of the "application," the "use" of our clinical categories.

34. From Winnicott, 1971:

The person might say: "I see what you mean; I am myself when I feel creative and when I make a creative gesture, and now the search is ended."
In practice this does not seem to be a description

of what happens. In this kind of work we know that even the right explanation is ineffectual. The person we are trying to help needs a new experience in a specialized setting. The experience is one of a non-purposive state, as one might say a sort of ticking over of the unintegrated personality. I referred to this as formlessness in the case of description (p. 55).

Winnicott talks of potential space, of that between internal psychic life and external reality. Might say: our question concerns the nature, creation, of potential space when "from inside/from outside" are themselves in the kaleidoscope's whirl, themselves "under investigation."

35. We are held in something larger:

Related to Wittgenstein's overall philosophical project in that, again: The (transcendental) fact that the language of agency is not grounded in, not about, any mental process frees up such language. Frees it to be put to use. Where it can be alive.

How Wittgenstein repeatedly stressed the point: Our mistake in thinking language functions in one way; to be about our minds, mental processes, as about a house, about material objects.

Fly freed once we see through the "conjuring trick."

36. Consider this as a therapeutic stance:

"But I don't mean that what I do now (in grasping a sense) determines the future use causally and as a matter of experience, but that in a queer way, the use itself is some sense present."--But of course it is, 'in some sense'! Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression "in a queer way". The rest is all right; and the sentence only seems queer when one imagines a different language-game for it from the one in

which we actually use it. (Someone once told me that as a child he had been surprised that a tailor could 'sew a dress'--he thought this meant that a dress was produced by sewing alone, by sewing one thread on to another.) (PI, #195)

Crucial for us: How to not be so surprised here, yet to allow ourselves to be struck, e.g. by the fact that "just like that" we can come up with the red image.

Compare "sewing a dress" to delusion with transcendental import, eg "machine as symbol of itself" and seeking to be "present at creation."

37. Wittgenstein's refrain: "what is the use, the application," is a vehicle intended to counter our being caught in the mistaken picture of language as being "about." How frequently Wittgenstein asks "what's the application?" Compare "your so taking." Suggestively similar refrain.

The way in which a turn to the question of application invokes a "container" in a clinical sense. The way that invoking the use turns our gaze to that within which we are. See the move from solipsism to "public solipsism."

38. Re, from Finch: "for these inner states are, after all, ourselves, and do not merely 'belong to us.'" How are we to come to see this? And what sort of a seeing would that be? We notice how often within schizophrenic experience there is a groping toward, and terror of, such a seeing. Here the juncture where we can most clearly see how a clinical awareness meets Wittgenstein's world.

From Finch:

The "escape of the fly"

meant showing my world as the locus of the I and thus also showing that my world is the world (the difference between them being entirely unsayable and certainly not sayable in terms of "privacy"). In this way the Cartesian self is "externalized" and released from its prison. The change in perspective which Wittgenstein's philosophy represents brings about such a freeing as soon as it is understood (1977, p. 245).

"Are after all ourselves." How to make sense of this in schizophrenic context? Certainly the statement alone won't get you all the way. It may however be one tool, at the right moment. The question could be put: what the language game within which the seeing this might occur.

39. What we see in Wittgenstein is a bringing us inside the apartness from on-going life, an appreciation of what leads us to such a position, and a bringing us inside the liberation from such a stance.

40. The Character of Our Engagement. "Let Yourself Be Struck."

Recall where it is we've most keenly felt the treatment link: Around the "turning" imagery. Particularly re the 180 degree turn around the axis of our real need etc. This is not a turn which would result in any particular perception.

What sensing now and trying to find way to articulate is how what we are "left" with...a terrain where can see the looking for what's behind and can see separate from this the immediacy....How the latter is "seen" through being evoked.

Just as we do so with patients. The evocation of the first person.

What we have here is a way into the "meaning connection" territory. We might say: the seamlessness of meaning is not the movement of an ideal machine, but the immediacy of expression. Such seamlessness is transcendental. That we can "just like that..."

See:

"But why have you so little confidence in yourself? Ordinarily you always know well enough what it is to 'calculate.' So if you say you have calculated in imagination, then you will have done so. If you had not calculated, you would not have said you had. Equally, if you say that you see something red in imagination, then it will be red. You know what 'red' is elsewhere.--And further: you do not always rely on the agreement of other people; for you often report that you have seen something no one else has."--But I do have confidence in myself--I say without hesitation that I have done this sum in my head, have imagined this color. The difficulty is not that I doubt whether I really imagined anything red. But it is this: that we should be able, just like that, to point out or describe the color we have imagined, that the projection of the the image into reality presents no difficulty at all. Are they then so alike that one might mix them up?--But I can also recognize a man from a drawing straight off.--Well, but can I ask: "What does a correct image of this color look like?" or "What sort of thing is it?"; can I learn this?

(I cannot accept his testimony because it is not testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say.) (PI, #386)

"But it is this: that we should be able, just like that..." Think of this world, world in which the meta-level manifests, and is seen, in such a striking manner. One aspect here: think how enveloping this might feel. See how within schizophrenic states we are struck by such an

immediacy.

We can get a feeling of vertigo here. As if anything goes. Where can we look for "that which brings peace"?

It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shows is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases (PI, #201).

Think of these moments: the state in which one gives one interpretation, then another, contented for but a moment.... Or the state in which one is struck by the fact that we can just like that project red into reality.

"The deep aspect of this matter readily eludes us."

(PI, 387)

See Finch, 1977, p. 124 on PI, #386, "just like that":

When we look at the red color, we may, finally, be tempted to say: "This is the same color as I imagined when you asked me to imagine a certain shade of red. So there must be something in common between what I imagine and this color. They must be related in some way."

To this Wittgenstein, in effect, replies: "You are talking as though you stood outside of both of them and could compare them and see how they are related. But that isn't what happens when you recognize the red you see as being the same as your image. There is no in-between, no intermediary, no way to do this....The difficulty is that the color and the image are too close and there is no room for any connection between them. And this is what makes us uneasy.

41. Think of "Let yourself be struck." What is Wittgenstein doing here? Our being brought "inside." See

perspicuous representation. The "entering in" invited here is akin to the entering in that is healing of a schizophrenic stance. Don't you see?--we are being treated, are in treatment here!

Have enquired before: what is the stance from which we can see that we can say "both." Without reducing one--expression, say--to the other--explanation.

Might consider what you are doing here as: We are not seeking to capture what cannot be so caught. In being led to see limits to what can be "captured" we are being brought to awareness of the "view from inside," of the agent's perspective. Brought to an awareness of that which not seen for its familiarity. Might say of Wittgenstein: we are being brought within the point of view of the "eye that sees." Hence the inkling of "nothing behind."

Here we can see the sense in which we are "in treatment": we are to see things differently. We are at the point of the 180 degree turn!

Here we are speaking of the striking kinship in our therapeutic approach, mode of being, in treatment of schizophrenic states and in meeting certain states of philosophical (metapsychological) confusion.

42. "Let yourself be struck": Something which can be so seen. What sort of thing? That which is so familiar as to escape notice. The foundations of our action. What is striking is that you can "just like that" imagine the red

object.

What would it be like to have enough doubt to enable one to see, to appreciate such. Think: how could we present, express such a doubt, in life. Look at schizophrenic experience.

What we are missing is what we can in fact see in schizophrenic experience. So it is not surprising that we have not been rightly struck by schizophrenic experience.

Part of an empathic response to schizophrenic experience: appreciating the "being struck" quality of their "particularity." See "THIS."

And the pain--the fly's buzzing against the flyglass--of seeking to capture, seeking to say what cannot be said.

43. The terror of agency, intention. Notice how often Wittgenstein says something akin to: the problem is in seeing it as strange, remarkable. (E.g., the flash of understanding and the use in time.) Here a hint as to the tone of a clinical response.

Our question: what can we say of the position within which it does seem so. What can we say, and what the shift involved in movement to mode in which is not so surprising.

The interesting juxtaposition in Wittgenstein of seeking to have us be both more surprised and less. More, e.g., in that we can "just like that" imagine the red object. Let yourself be struck by this. Less, e.g., with

regard to the perplexity that lends itself to being falsely resolved via mental mechanisms. As in the perplexity of "the flash of understanding matching the use in time."

44. Regarding the difference our awareness makes clinically. What we might say is this: here we see the sensibility that goes with, expresses itself in a particular kind of presence. Hard to articulate. I am thinking for example of the ability to not present with too hard an identity, too role attached, a problem that we often see in the contemporary psychiatric world. A problem which is connected with discomfort in the presence of madness. Think what a difference it might make to have an attitude that sees inherent meaningfulness, even if e.g. it should lie in the self-undermining search for capacity to mean.

45. What Wittgenstein is doing in the Investigations is akin to what is needed in meeting schizophrenic experience. Bringing to the door. (And bringing to the do-er; bringing the do-er to the door.) Bringing to the moment within which the framework stands out, a hint of its boundedness and thereby of choice. This is why where we've been going re the "grammar" of "because" is so important.

46. An Unnecessary Doubling:

What does it do for someone to know the rooting of the otherworldly longings within everyday life. Do you want a hint? Then look here to the 2-->1 collapse evoked by Wittgenstein....

When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' going through my mind in addition to the verbal expressions: the language is itself the vehicle of thought (PI, #329).

See Finch, 1995: "This is what Wittgenstein was showing all along: that metaphysics is an unnecessary doubling." (p. 131)

Finch speaks of the "false transcendence" of metalanguage. A picture of a picture is still just a picture.

47. Recall from above: one road into solipsistic experience, serving as vehicle of separateness. See the doubling here.

"There is the experience and the description of the experience.--So it cannot be a matter of indifference whether the other has the same experience as I or not; and therefore what matters when I talk to myself must be my experience. It must be a decisive factor that I know this experience (whereas I am not directly acquainted with the other's experience)." (in Philosophical Occasions, p. 209)

Wittgenstein and metaphysics an unnecessary doubling. See this as "that very fact" the noticing of which is most striking and most powerful. That philosophy is "first order."

"Depth is hidden, on the surface." (Lao Tzu)

Wittgenstein's concern with exposing, putting in its place, the idea of the hidden. This connects with the exposure of the generalizing tendency which lies in "seeing behind." And to the way this involves maintaining an

observing perspective, and hence the grammar of such, featuring the illusion of "certain" movements, e.g. from the hidden to its expression. The "paranoid" sensitivity to the hidden meaning. What is revealed in the grammar of "the hidden"?

48. See PI, pg. 216:

The secondary sense is not a 'metaphorical' sense. If I say "For me the vowel e is yellow" I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical sense,-- for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the idea 'yellow.'

And from Wittgenstein, 1980:

There is a lot to be learned from Tolstoy's bad theorizing about how a work of art conveys a 'feeling'.--You really could call it, not exactly the expression of a feeling, but at least an expression of feeling, or a felt expression. And you could say too that in so far as people understand it, they 'resonate' in harmony with it, respond to it. You might say: the work of art does not aim to convey something else, just itself. Just as, when I pay someone a visit, I don't just want to make him have feelings of such and such a sort; what I mainly want is to visit him, though of course I would like to be well received too (p. 58).

"Is life breathed into it there?" For one not at home the "visual room" as the sort of home one would imagine. Seeing the familiar on the model of the unfamiliar.

49. Regarding schizophrenia as the "illness" for which philosophy as first order the "cure."

We might ask: what is the "existential" position in the context of which philosophy as first order is liberating. For one it would need to be one in which the sense of

philosophy as "second order" posed a problem, brought with it suffering.

It is from here that we will be in a position to see: the liberation around seeing "both" at level of "how do we go on?".

50. We might say schizophrenia is the instantiated position for which philosophy as first order can be liberating.

A coming into presence with metapsychological, transcendental import (one that, as it were, brings with it transcendental import) is what takes place in a healing presence with schizophrenic person; and this what Wittgenstein is presenting.

51. We might ask it this way: for Wittgenstein, where is the philosophical "sentiment du reel," the "vital contact with reality"? It is, we might say, in our realization of philosophy being first order. Treating our schizophrenic condition.

53. The matter of instantiation enters in the way that the philosophical question of will involves, inherently, a question of vantage point. So rather, we might say, than speaking of need to see instantiation of philosophical questions, can see how with Wittgenstein these must be instantiated. Here the lesson of seeing their grammatical contexts. Here the lesson and this the lesson which schizophrenia needs.

53. And as we get farther out on a limb, farther toward

thinking that we have no ground to stand on: then the "Jesus move." Then philosophy as "first order" can "heal." For this move is just to say: well look at what you have been doing, have already been doing.

And significant that this needs to be said in a no-big-deal manner. For this to do its work it needs to be said in a way so that the "package" does not belie the message. Here you, here we are.

54. Think of: "a good ground looks like this." Where are we then standing. I want to say: this is the everyday standing place that we take for granted, but wouldn't if we had our eyes open. In this respect schizophrenic experience is eye opening. Be struck by it.

55. "'I do' seems to have a definite sense, separate from all experience." Here we may see how philosophy being first order meets schizophrenic experience. Where we think we have found a meta-level place to stand.

However: our signposts are everyday objects, seen "particularly." Here we see where philosophy coming to earth coincides with the healing turn that meets schizophrenic experience.

So what is it that we need to understand clinically. That we are already home? Yes and no.

We must experience, and in some sense become aware of, a situation in which the transcendental grounds can go without saying. Where, as Wittgenstein puts it, philosophy

ceases to call itself into question. It is along these lines that we understand the significance of our meeting.

The aspects of things that are the most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something--because it is always before one's eyes.) The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.--And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. (PI, #129)

Unless that fact: Yes, being home, but coming from an outside place such that one can be met--can find a home--in "being struck by that very fact." Philosophy being "first order" meeting schizophrenic apartness.

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





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IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (QA-3)



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