

Extremist Networks and Lethality: A mapping of violent white supremacist group networks and an investigation of the relationship between network location and ideologically motivated murder

by

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APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

Extremist Networks and Lethality: A mapping of violent white supremacist group networks and investigation of the relationship between network location and ideologically motivated murder

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Empirical evidence indicates that domestic extremists in the United States pose a greater risk to the American public than international terrorism (Carlson, 1995; Hewitt, 2003; Blewas, Griggs, and Potok, 2005; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006). This dissertation attempts to further our understanding of domestic extremists by employing Social Network Analysis (SNA) methodology to investigate the network of white supremacist groups associated with – via formal members - extreme ideologically motivated violence (homicides). SNA focuses on how actors (i.e. people, organizations) are linked in patterns of interaction and the meaning of those connections. The general hypothesis of SNA is that entities, like people or groups, are interdependent, and therefore more likely to network with those who share common interests, goals, belief systems, etc. Ultimately, choices are influenced by the company one keeps (Wasserman and Faust, 2006).

The data for this study comes from the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), created by Joshua Freilich of John Jay College and Steven Chermak of Michigan State University. The first objective of the study is to analyze and measure overall network structure (e.g. density, cohesion) as well as actor level characteristics (e.g. centrality, constraint) in an effort to ascertain which groups are most popular and/or important to the flow of information within the

network. A second objective of this study is to determine, via regression analysis, whether certain actor level characteristics are significantly related to an increased threat of ideologically motivated homicide. If so, then a white supremacist group's role or location within the network may serve as a predictor of lethality.

While SNA has been used to study international extremist networks (e.g. global jihadists), this research is novel in its approach to the study of domestic extremists and the threat they pose.

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

“In order to preserve our Christian heritage and race, it is our right, our patriotic duty, to overthrow the Anti-Christ government.”

James D. Ellison

Founder of Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord

Terrorism is on our minds. A quick review of recent polls confirms that Americans believe that the threat of international terrorism from extremist groups like al-Qaeda is real. However, Americans, and this includes law enforcement and policymakers, may be overlooking an equally realistic and grave threat - the domestic far-right. There is substantial evidence, both empirical and anecdotal, that domestic extremists pose as much of a terrorist threat as foreign extremists.

Since the attacks on 9/11 academicians have taken a renewed interest in the study of terrorism and have been quite prolific. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons, the vast majority of research in terrorism is not empirically based. Researchers have been attempting to overcome these limitations by developing more comprehensive databases and employing more sophisticated tools of analysis by which to analyze the data. One tool that has only recently been applied in the study of terrorism is social network analysis (SNA).

SNA is used to study networks (personal, organizational, etc.) in order to assess overall structure, as well as the location and role of participants within the network. SNA has been employed in a variety of disciplines for a multitude of purposes (e.g. medicine, business, anthropology, criminal justice, etc.). The results of these studies show that networks do indeed matter. With regard to terrorism, studies of global jihadists found that networks play a role in recruitment, radicalization, resource mobilization, and lethality.

Although domestic extremists are considered a significant threat, and although SNA has provided important insight into global jihadist networks, SNA has never been employed to study domestic extremist networks¹. This dissertation attempts to fill this gap by providing a first look at the networks of white supremacist groups associated with, through actions of their members, ideologically motivated homicides (IMH). Exploratory in nature, this study addresses research questions related to two broad objectives. The first objective involves examining the overall structure of various white supremacist networks, and the roles of groups within those networks. The second objective involves investigating, via regression analysis, whether network characteristics are related to an increased threat of IMH. Such information can prove valuable to both law enforcement and terrorism researchers.

In order to accomplish the above mentioned objectives, this study relies on the Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), a comprehensive database created by Joshua Freilich (John Jay College of Criminal Justice) and Steven Chermak (Michigan State University). Pulled from this database were all ideologically motivated homicides associated with a formal white supremacist group. In addition, an open-source based group database was created to augment information retrieved from the ECDB.

¹ There have been three studies looking at the network of white supremacist groups connected by web links: Burris, V., Smith, E., & Strahm, A. (2000). *White supremacist networks on the internet*. 2) Gustavson, A.T., & Sherkat, D.E. (2004). Elucidating the web of hate: The ideological structuring of network ties among white supremacist groups on the internet. 3) Zhou, Y., Reid, E., Qin, J., Chen, H., & Lai, G. (2005). U.S. domestic extremist groups on the Web: link and content analysis.

A. Threat Posed by the Far Right

Since the attacks of 9/11 the threat of international terrorism has been a primary concern of law enforcement, the general public, and the academic community. A 2004 poll of 3,378 people indicated that 11% of the public believed another major attack was “very” likely to occur within the following twelve months, and 62% of Americans thought another terrorist was either “somewhat” or “very” likely (Harris Interactive, Inc.). Zogby International conducted a more recent poll (September, 2007) concerning the threat of international terrorism and found that 91% of Americans believe that terrorists will again attack the U.S. on American soil. Forty-seven percent believe that the attack will happen within the next five years. Moreover, 20% of Americans anticipate the attack will be against a U.S. food or water source, 17% expect the attack to be by biological (disease or poison), and 16% expected the use of a car bomb in a crowded area or mall (Zogby International, 2007).

It is not clear to what degree the American public fears domestic far-right extremists specifically, but there is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that the threat posed by the far-right is significant. Carlson conducted a survey in 1995 where he surveyed U.S. police chiefs in the largest 140 cities with a population over 100,000. Carlson asked the police chiefs to rank what they believed were the top four groups likely to commit a terrorist act within the next two years. The results of the survey indicated that white-supremacists and anti-abortionists were the two greatest threats - greater than Middle Eastern terrorists (Carlson, 1995). When surveyed about terrorist group presence within their state, 85% of state law enforcement agencies indicated right-wing group presence, and 83% indicated race/ethnicity/hate-related group presence (Riley, Reverton, Wilson, and Davis, 2005). Consistent with these findings, a recent poll of state police agencies throughout the United States, found that among the 37 states that responded to the poll,

92% acknowledged the presence of neo-Nazis, 89% acknowledged the presence of racist skinheads, 72% acknowledged the presence of the Klu Klux Klan, and 70% acknowledged the presence of Christian Identity groups. The study also found that Islamic Jihadists have been identified in 62% of the responding states (Simone, Freilich, Chermak, 2007).

In addition to a significant presence, recent research has indicated that these groups are not idle. Gurr and Cole concluded that attacks by the far right have increased over time (Gurr and Cole, 2002). In 2003, an empirical study found that far-right extremists caused more than 250 lost lives between 1978 and 2000. And that the two biggest terrorist threats came from far-right extremists and Islamic terrorists (Hewitt, 2003). Freilich and Chermak's database of U.S. extremist crime has revealed that between 1990 and 2008 the extremist far-right is responsible for thousands of criminal incidents, including 524 deaths as a result of 273 homicidal incidents and 125 victims from 93 attempted homicidal incidents. Further, over 100 specific extremist groups are connected to these criminal events. Also noteworthy, Freilich and Chermak found that the far-right was responsible for the deaths of at least 49 law enforcement officers (Freilich and Chermak, 2010). Perhaps most interesting with regard to the threat posed by far-right extremists is the finding that within the United States, domestic terrorism attacks outnumber international attacks by a ratio of 7:1 (LaFree, Dugan, Fogg & Scott, 2006).

The threat from far-right extremists has fluctuated over the past few decades but it has not gone away. The Intelligence Project of the SPLC has identified sixty terrorist plots planned or attempted by far right extremists since the Oklahoma bombing (Blejwas, Griggs, & Potok, 2005). According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, in 2004 hate groups rose by 6% to 751 (there were 708 hate organizations the year before) (Southern Poverty Law Center³, 2004). Compounding concerns of an increased threat are reports that extremist groups are encouraging

members/adherents to join the military for the purpose of obtaining training in weapons, combat tactics, and explosives (Southern Poverty Law Center³, 2006).

In sum, far-right extremists in general, and for purposes of this dissertation, white-supremacists in specific, pose a significant terrorist threat to government and private institutions, as well as public officials and ordinary civilians. Moreover, it appears that this threat may be as grave as any threat posed by international terrorist organizations, single issue extremists, or far-left groups.

Adding to the impressive empirical evidence is a substantial body of anecdotal evidence. There is no shortage of examples of far right extremists committing, or attempting to commit, terrorist acts on U.S. soil. Two of the most obvious examples are the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh and Eric Rudolph's bombing during the 1996 Olympics, but there are many other less publicized cases. Since this study is only concerned with white supremacist groups, the following illustrative list only includes terrorist acts, or attempts, committed by those motivated by white supremacist ideology. In 1997 three Klu Klux Klan members were arrested for their involvement in a plot to blow up a natural gas refinery which could have resulted in as many as 30,000 deaths (Blejwas, Griggs, & Potok, 2005). William Krar was a white supremacist from Texas that was stockpiling sodium cyanide, explosives, machine guns, and ammunition (Blejwas, Griggs, & Potok 2005). In 2004 Demetrius "Van" Crocker (an admirer of Hitler and the Nazi party) of McKenzie, Tennessee was arrested by the FBI while attempting to acquire chemical weapons and explosives for the purpose of attacking government buildings (Copeland, 2004).

B. Weaknesses in Terrorism Research

In recognition of the threat posed by both international and domestic extremists, researchers from a variety of disciplines have generated a substantial body of terrorism literature. The vast majority of what has been published, however, is either unempirical or sufficiently compromised so as to call into question the validity and reliability of the results. According to Silke, only 3% of articles in terrorism journals used inferential analysis (Silke, 2001). This is supported by the finding that of the more than 14,000 terrorism articles published between 1971 and 2003 only 3-4% were empirical (Lum, Kennedy & Sherley, 2006). Silke states that the study of terrorism “has existed in a state of perpetual staleness for over 30 years” (Silke, 2001). This ‘staleness’ is a result of limitations with which terrorism researchers must contend. The following outlines two primary limitations that have typically plagued much of what has been published.

Data

One of the most significant limitations terrorism researchers have faced is the serious lack of data (Hamm 2005). Terrorists or members of terrorist organizations are, for obvious reasons, either very difficult to locate, or very reluctant to participate in a study if actually located. Even when it is possible to gain access to a terrorist, what the terrorist is willing to share may not be reliable. Lastly, terrorists are not typically available in large numbers, thus sample size is frequently an issue as well.

Since primary data sources are either difficult, or impossible, to obtain in sufficient quantity, empirically inclined terrorism researchers have turned to secondary and partial sources. Secondary sources, however, also present some limitations (Merari, 1991). Secondary sources

typically include newspapers, court documents, and data collected by governmental and non-governmental agencies. Newspapers may contain inaccurate or unchecked facts. Data collected by governmental and non-governmental agencies also possess reliability concerns. For instance, while the United States has terrorism laws, as do many other nations, the suspected terrorists are frequently charged with domestic crimes (i.e. murder, kidnapping, arson, etc). Consequently, many acts of terrorism may not be recorded as such (LaFree and Dugan, 2004).

The various problems noted above are compounded when considering data collection of domestic terrorism specifically. According to Schulze, the lack of empirical quantitative data on U.S. domestic terrorism is due to problems of defining terrorism, the merging of hate crimes and terrorism statistics under one rubric by watchdog groups, and due to the government choosing not to fully disclose domestic terrorism problems (Schulze, 2004).

Definitions

The ability to collect quantitative terrorism data is also compromised by the simple fact that it is difficult to find one universally acceptable definition of terrorism. As a result terrorism has been defined in numerous ways. Like crime, terrorism is a social construction and therefore must be appropriately defined (LaFree and Dugan, 2004). Unfortunately, less than two percent of articles published about terrorism have addressed the definitional issue (Silke, 2004). The lack of a consistent definition poses inclusion problems because which acts are counted as terrorism is dependent on how terrorism is defined.

C. Improvements and Continued Research Problem

As noted above, terrorism research has been largely unempirical, has struggled with definitional issues, and has tended to focus on the individual (mind, upbringing, societal pressures, etc.). Fortunately, researchers have begun to address these weaknesses and the recent past has presented some important improvements.

The proliferation of computers and the internet has made large amounts of data accessible. Researchers are now able to obtain information from not only media outlets, but also courts, law enforcement agencies, watch-dog groups, forums, blogs, and extremist group websites. Moreover, an increasing number of comprehensive databases are available or in the process of becoming available. For example, the American Terrorism Study database, created by Brent Smith and Kelly Damphousse, includes information on approximately 500 terrorists from about 60 terrorist groups and the crimes for which they were indicted. Freilich and Chermak's ECDB (the database used in this study) includes all crimes (terrorist or otherwise) committed by far-right U.S. extremists between 1990 and the present. The Global Terrorism database, created by Gary LaFree and Laura Dugan includes data on international as well as domestic terrorist incidents and currently includes approximately 80,000 cases that have occurred since 1970. The RAND Terrorism Chronology (1968-1997) and RAND-MIPT Terrorism Incident database (1998-present) together include international and domestic (1998-present only) incidents. The Terrorism Knowledge Portal is a database with over 360,000 terrorism news articles and web pages for open source data collection. Marc Sageman and Scott Atran are assembling a network analysis friendly people-based database (as opposed to an incident, or event, based database). The database will consist of two parts, a detailed categorization of basic biographical and socioeconomic information (i.e. nationality, ethnicity, occupation, and religious upbringing), and

data on connections (i.e. acquaintances, family ties, friendships, and venues for terrorist training). Sageman and Atran believe this database will be helpful since global terrorism appears to be a decentralized evolutionary process (Atran, Axelrod, & Davis, 2007).

In addition to new databases and the opportunity for more empirical research, researchers have also begun to employ new empirically based methodologies, like SNA. SNA has been used to study individual and organizational terrorist networks. Networks matter because a person's ideas, choices, and actions are influenced by those with whom one interacts.

The above mentioned developments have done much to improve the state of terrorism research. Nevertheless, there continues to be a need for more empirical and inferential research. There is also a need for more studies investigating domestic extremists that are considered to pose a significant threat. Further SNA terrorism studies have almost exclusively focused on individual networks, largely ignoring organizational networks. Consequently, there is a need for a study that employs social network analysis methodology to analyze white supremacist organizations and attempts to assess threat levels posed by these dangerous groups.

D. Research Questions

In an attempt to address gaps in the terrorism literature, this study employs SNA to map the networks of violent white supremacist groups associated with one or more IMHs. The study investigates two networks: a network of only those groups associated with IMH, and a network that includes the links of those groups to the broader white supremacist movement.

Since this is the first time actual ties are being used to study links amongst white supremacist groups, the study is largely exploratory and presents a few overarching research

questions. Research Questions one and two are addressed in Chapter Six, and research question three is addressed in Chapter Seven.

Research Question 1:

What does a network consisting of only groups known to be linked to ideologically motivated homicides look like?

- a) Which groups are most important to the network?
- b) Is the network cohesive and/or dense?
- c) Do groups tend to be primarily associated with others of similar ideology?
- d) Which ideologies appear to be most central to the movement?
- e) Do groups that are most important to the network share certain attributes?

Research Question 2:

Does a violent group's importance and role change when considering links to the broader white supremacist movement?

- a) Do the same groups continue to be the most important to the network?
- b) Is the network more or less cohesive? Is it more or less dense?
- c) Do groups continue to associate mostly with other groups of the same ideology?
- d) Which ideologies appear to be most central to the network when considering links to the broader movement?
- e) Do groups that are most important to the network share certain attributes?

Research Question 3:

Do certain network characteristics or group attributes suggest an increased threat in terms of the number of ideologically motivated homicides committed?

E. Data and Methodology

As previously noted, the data for this study comes from the Extremist Crime Database. Included in this database are ideologically motivated homicides committed by formal members of various white supremacist groups between 1990 and 2008. In addition to the data obtained from the ECDB, group relational data (ties between groups) and attribute data (e.g. ideology, size) was collected and coded. The data and coding of data is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4.

In terms of methodology, the research questions are addressed via the application of social network analysis and regression analysis. Social network software is employed to generate maps of two primary networks. The first network involves only those groups associated with an IMH (core groups) during the years of the study. The second network (core groups embedded) includes links from the core groups to the broader white supremacist movement. These maps are analyzed to determine overall network structure as well as specific network characteristics that reveal the importance of the groups within their respective network. Regression Analysis is used to ascertain whether a relationship exists between those various network characteristics and the number of ideologically motivated homicides committed. Since SNA allows for attribute data as well as relational data, regression analysis is also employed to determine whether certain group attributes are related to the number of IMHs committed. As with the data, the methodologies employed in the study are described in more detail in Chapter 4.

F. Contribution of Dissertation

Academic

This study, first and foremost, contributes to the body of empirical terrorism research. Second, it contributes to the general terrorism literature as well as the growing body of terrorism studies employing SNA. Third, it contributes to the literature specifically regarding domestic extremists. Lastly, it is a novel study in that it attempts to map, based on actual ties, the network of violent white supremacist movement, and investigates whether organizational network characteristics are related to an increased threat.

Policy

The recent election of President Barack Obama and the actions of some white supremacists illuminate the fact that this movement and its adherents still present a threat of extreme violence and terrorism. It also reinforces the need for law enforcement and policy makers to be informed about these groups and those (groups and individuals) formally and informally connected to them. This study provides insight into which groups are important to the violent white supremacist movement, which groups (or types of groups) may pose an increased threat, and what network characteristics matter when assessing threat levels. A better understanding of white supremacist networks and groups within those networks can inform strategy and policy. Network structure and group location reveal pathways for communication, influence, and exchange of ideas. An understanding of the network will provide insight on not only how to assess threat levels but also how best to address such threats from a law enforcement perspective.

G. Review of Chapters

Chapter 2 reviews the various approaches to the study of terrorism. It covers terrorism research by criminologists, psychologists, sociologists, social movement theorists, social network theorists, and those that see religion as an important contributing factor.

Having addressed the threat of violent white supremacist groups, the value of social network analysis, and the current lack of such research, Chapter 3 provides a more in depth description of the need for the study and research objectives. Lastly, it presents the numerous hypotheses generated from existing research.

Chapter 4 details the methods by which the data for the study was obtained and coded, and how the core groups of the study were identified. In addition, the chapter explains how relational links and attributes were coded and categorized. Lastly, it addresses the methodological tools used for analysis of the data.

Chapter 5 provides biographies of the thirteen core groups contained in the study. It outlines each group's history and ideological foundation. It also describes the ideologically motivated homicidal incident(s) with which the group is associated. Lastly, to illustrate that these extremist groups pose ideological threats beyond homicides, other incidents of ideologically violence are included.

Chapter 6 provides the findings from the application of social network analysis to the data. It first addresses the Core Groups Network (CGN), a network that includes only the thirteen groups in the study linked to an ideologically motivated homicide. The chapter then addresses the Core Groups Embedded Network (CGEN) which looks at the thirteen core groups and their links to the broader white supremacist movement. This chapter finishes by analyzing a 2-core network generated from the CGEN in order to more carefully observe the roles of non-core groups (groups not linked to IMH) to core groups and to the broader white supremacist movement.

Chapter 7 provides the findings from the linear regression analysis of the various network characteristics generated by social network analysis. It indicates, for both the CGN and the CGEN, whether there is a relationship between certain network measurements (e.g. centrality and constraint) and the number of ideologically motivated homicides.

Similar to Chapter 7, Chapter 8 provides the findings from linear regression analyses. However, this chapter indicates whether there is a relationship between certain group attributes

and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which a group is linked. It also discusses correlations amongst the various network characteristics and attributes that served as independent variables in the regression analyses.

Chapter 9 recaps the need for the study, the objectives, and anticipated contributions. It also synthesizes the key findings from both methodologies. The chapter next discusses the policy implications from the findings and identifies certain weaknesses and limitations of the study.

H. Defining Key Terms

Prior to proceeding with this study, it is first necessary to set forth and operationalize key terms necessary to this study.

Christian Identity:

A racist religion that asserts that non-Jewish white people are God's true "chosen people" and the true descendents of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. There are two strains of this religion (Covenant and Dual Seedline) but both are apocalyptic and believe in a final battle between God and non-Jewish whites against the Satan, Satan's offspring (the Jews), and racial minorities which are viewed as sub-human.

Core Group:

White –supremacist organization associated with an ideologically motivated homicide by virtue of the fact that one or more of its members committed murder in furtherance of the group's ideology during the years of the study (1990-2008).

Creativity:

Creativity is a racial religion where non-Jewish white people are viewed as nature's highest creation and must therefore be preserved. Jews are considered a mortal enemy as they seek to destroy the white race and control the world by promoting race mixing. Thus, anything deemed to be good for the white race is virtuous and that deemed bad for the race is considered sin. Similar to Christian Identity, Creativity adherents believe in a Jewish conspiracy to control the world and believe in an ultimate apocalyptic showdown. One must adhere to the Creativity religion to be a member.

Domestic Far-Right:

The domestic far-right is composed of individuals that are “are fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority, reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for many the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training and survivalism. It is important to note that mainstream conservative movements and the mainstream Christian right are not included (Freilich & Chermak, 2010).

Domestic Terrorism:

There is no universally accepted definition of terrorism. When discussing terrorism, this dissertation relies on 18 U.S.C. §2331, which makes a distinction between international and domestic terrorism. According , 2331(5) the term “domestic terrorism” means activities that—

- (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State;
- (B) appear to be intended—
 - (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
 - (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
 - (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and
- (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

Extremist:

An extremist is one who advocates extreme measures or views: a radical (Extremist, 2009). A radical is a person who advocates fundamental political, economic, and social reforms by direct and often uncompromising methods (dictionary.com). For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition also includes persons who advocate for religious reforms.

Group:

For the purposes of this dissertation, a group is defined as an identifiable organization comprised of two or more individuals where such organization adheres to a white supremacist ideology and had demonstrated a willingness to use violence in furtherance of its ideology.

Ideologically Motivated Homicide:

An unlawful taking of a life motivated by, and consistent with the goals and objectives of, a white supremacist ideology.

Ideologically Motivated Homicidal Incident:

An event (occurrence) where at least one individual is killed, and where the suspect, or at least one of the participating suspects, was motivated by a white supremacist ideology.

Neo-Nazis:

Revere the Third Reich and adhere to a politically based ideology founded on Hitler's beliefs as well as national socialist ideals. These groups use Nazi symbols and frequently dress in Nazi uniforms.

Non-Core Groups:

White-supremacist groups identified as being directly linked to one or more of the core groups at some point during the years of the study (1990-2008).

Racist skinheads:

Combine white supremacist ideology with the skinhead youth subculture. Their ethos is driven by white power music and dress (e.g. shaved head, Doc Martens, etc.) as opposed to a particular ideology.

White Supremacist:

An individual, group, organization, or movement that adheres to an ideology that asserts white people are superior (intellectually and morally) to other races, ethnicities, and non-Christian religions. Such individuals, groups, organizations, or movement are frequently anti-government and justify the use of violence in furtherance of their ideological objectives (separation from, expulsion of, and/or dominance over non-whites and non-Christians).

White Supremacist – General:

Groups that adhere to a white supremacist belief system but do not espouse a particular ideology (religious, political, or sub-cultural). These groups are generally open with regards to membership and don't require members to adopt a particular belief system.

White Supremacist – Prison Gang:

Groups formed in prison and advocating a general white supremacist ideology, as opposed to a specific belief system. Although white supremacist, prison gangs are primarily focused on their criminal enterprises and thus tended to be somewhat independent of the broader white supremacist movement.

It is important to note that the above definitions are included for the purpose of operationalizing key concepts specific to this study. They are not asserted, nor intended, to be viewed as universally accepted definitions.

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A. Criminology and the Study of Terrorism

Members of domestic extremist organizations, such as those of white supremacist groups, engage in a broad range of crimes; from non-biased to hate motivated, from non-violent to the deadly, and from passive forms of resistance to large-scale terrorism. Although domestic extremists pose a variety of serious threats, there is much we still do not know about these organizations and their members.

As indicated above, domestic extremists are responsible for more acts of terrorism than international actors and domestic extremists top the list of those most likely to commit a terrorist attack in the future. Criminologists have tended to focus on the characteristics of extremists and those that pursue terrorism. For instance, Handler investigated the differences between extremists on the far-left and those on the far-right and found that members of the far-left differ demographically (e.g. education, age, geographically) from far-right adherents (Handler, 1990; Smith, 1994; Hewitt, 2003). Hamm revealed that domestic and international terrorists engage in different types of crimes when preparing (obtaining necessary funds and materials) for an act of terrorism (Hamm, 2005; Smith & Morgan, 1994). Smith found that virtually all right-wing terrorists during the 1980s were white, male, poor, with a high school education or less, and resided in a rural setting. Smith also found that these individuals were typically associated with the Christian Identity religion/ideology and tended to target federal law enforcement agencies. (Smith, 1994). Hamm attempted to investigate how one becomes a far-right extremist capable of terrorist acts by studying the social histories of 40 plus neo-Nazi males. More specifically, Hamm sought to provide an analytical framework for understanding the sub-cultural framework

(music, literature, symbolism, etc.) among those who become terrorists; the manner in which individuals are seduced into terrorist subcultures (Hamm, 2004).

While many researchers focus on the features of a terrorist, others have focused on how or why an extremist turns to violence. Hewitt determined that white supremacists resort to violence once they feel ignored by governmental powers. Further, the more hostile the Administration is to white supremacist views (i.e. affirmative action is reverse discrimination), the more likely white supremacists will experience frustration and turn to violence (Hewitt, 2000). Ferber and Kimmel found that white supremacist literature is instrumental in fomenting violence. White supremacist literature involves key themes involving purity of whiteness, cosmic battles of good vs. evil, threats against other races, and the concept that manliness means action over language, and action means violence (Ferber & Kimmel, 2000; Hamm, 2004). A slightly different study, but not inconsistent with Ferber and Kimmel is Dobratz' finding that, among certain white supremacist groups (Christian Identity, World Church of the Creator, and Odinists), religion plays an important role in strengthening one's racial identity (Dobratz, 2001)

Other studies, and perhaps more relevant to this proposed study, have focused on a terrorist organization structures and the meaning of those structures. For instance, Smith found that organizations consist of individuals who perceive themselves as victimized and collectively find a scapegoat for their anger and frustration. Moreover, Smith found that these far-right adherents are linked through an elaborate system of networking via paramilitary training camps (Smith, 1994). In a study of white power movement groups (i.e. Christian Identity, skinheads, etc.) it was found that white power activists nurture their oppositional identities in small networks which reinforce their notions of Aryan dominance thus becoming part of their normal

life. These small networks then connect to other small networks via Aryan music festivals and the internet (Futrell & Simi, 2004).

B. Psychology and the Study of Terrorism

Another approach to understanding terrorism is to study the minds of individuals who engage in such acts. A common assumption is that there must be cognitive or emotional differences with an individual who is capable of killing and maiming innocent people, especially women and children. As Victoroff notes, “terrorism is a problem that – stripped to the basics – is one of atypical human behavior” (Victoroff, 2005). Proponents of psychological investigations believe that if we can better understand the thought process, personality, or perhaps mental defects of those who are willing to engage in terrorism, then we will be in a much better position to develop methods and policies to combat terrorism. More specifically, if we can understand what kind of person is willing to commit violence in furtherance of a radical ideology, or what makes an individual susceptible to recruiting efforts of these extremist organizations, then we can develop specific counterterrorism programs.

Over the years there have been numerous studies that have attempted to answer the questions noted above and attempted to develop profiles of a terrorist. Ferracuti and Bruno found nine typical characteristics of a right-wing terrorist (Ferracuti and Bruno, 1981). Merari found in his 1990 study that terrorists share a psychological condition known as antisocial personality disorder, or psychopathic personality disorder, which allows them to commit extreme violence without feeling any empathy for their victims. Furthermore, Merari found that terrorists engage in very polarized thinking (i.e. good vs. evil) which enables them to kill without feeling remorse (Merari, 1990). Post, Sprinzak and Denny found that peer influence and the desire to

increase one's personal social standing were reasons why an individual would choose to join an extremist organization that engages in terrorism (Post, Sprinzak & Denny, 2003). Contrary to the findings of many of these psychological studies, more recent studies seem to indicate that terrorists do not suffer any psychological disorder. Marc Sageman, a psychiatrist who studied 172 transnational jihadists did not find any evidence of paranoid personality disorder or pathological narcissism (Sageman, 2004).

As indicated above, there have been numerous studies that have yielded inconsistent results. In addition, much of what has been written in the psychology literature, with regard to terrorists, has been speculative as opposed to empirically tested (Victoroff, 2005). Of the studies that did attempt to be empirical and valid, there have been issues regarding the lack of control groups, the lack of validated psychological instruments employed, and the drawing of conclusions based on small samples (Victoroff, 2005). In sum, there are numerous psychological theories that propose to explain terrorist behavior but the vast majority of those studies are flawed in that the theories have not been tested in any valid and reliable way.

In addition to lack of rigor or sufficient means of testing theory, there are also difficulties with the data necessary for such studies. For one to study the mind of a terrorist, a researcher has to find, and have access to, a terrorist. As one would imagine, this is no easy task as terrorists tend to prefer anonymity and would likely be distrustful of the motives of the researcher. Further, locating terrorists or becoming embedded with terrorists is a risky endeavor (Victoroff, 2005). There are also concerns with regard to the reliability of the data one could collect even if they could interview a terrorist. Terrorists may not reveal everything they know or believe, and may be more committed to promoting an image/message than in being truthful.

C. Religion and the Study of Terrorism

Another approach to the study of terrorism is to examine religion's role in causing, motivating, and facilitating terroristic activity. There has been a recent rise in the number of religiously motivated terrorist acts, and with the rise of religiously motivated terrorism there has also been a corresponding rise in lethality (Hoffman, 1998). As a result of this phenomenon, researchers have increasingly analyzed terrorism via the lens of religion.

It appears to be generally accepted that religion is not the root cause of most of the conflicts in which terrorist tactics are employed. However, religion is seen by some as a tool that allows terrorists to achieve their political objectives (Sosis and Alcorta, 2007) and to achieve those objectives through more lethal means. According to Pape, suicide terrorism accounts for only 3% of all terrorist activity but is responsible for 48% of the fatalities (Pape 2003). Pape points out, however, that of the various groups responsible for suicide attacks carried out between 1980 and 2003, the group that carried out the most was the non-religious Sri Lankan organization known as the Tamil Tigers (Pape, 2003).

There are four distinct reasons that enable religion to serve as an effective tool for terrorists. First, religion allows the terrorists to frame the conflict. In other words, religious terrorists translate political struggles into cosmic wars (Juergensmeyer, 2003). This perception helps motivate religious terrorists to sacrifice themselves for the cause (Sosis & Alcorta, 2007; Kaplan, 1996). Further, when one perceives they are participating in a divine conflict, the expectation is that this struggle can last well beyond one's lifetime (Juergensmeyer, 2003), so there is no expectation of immediate results.

The second feature of religion that allows it to serve as a tool in terrorism is that it provides moral justification (Juergensmeyer, 2003). Religiously motivated terrorists believe they

are participating in a divinely connected war (Juergensmeyer, 2003). This creates a dichotomous framework where good is fighting evil, or righteous vs. infidel. Consequently, this framework provides the justification for legitimizing one's perspective, and actions, while at the same time demonizing the opposing side (Juergensmeyer, 2003; Dobratz, 2001)

The third significant feature of religion as it relates to terror is the incorporation and use of highly evocative symbols, myths, and rituals. These symbols, myths, and rituals serve to motivate and unify individuals under a common banner (Sosis and Alcorta, 2007). This is significant because it fosters greater commitment to the group or organization. Through initiation rights and rituals an individual can demonstrate their commitment to the group (Atran, 2003). The greater the commitment among members, the greater the in-group cohesion, and with increased cohesion comes the desire to separate from the mainstream. This is one of the suggested reasons for why religious terrorists tend to strongly reject Western multiculturalism (Juergensmeyer, 2002).

The fourth distinct feature of religion is that it provides rewards to adherents that extend beyond certain political objectives. Being a soldier in a holy war of good versus evil allows the individual to participate in something bigger than himself and promises certain divine rewards in the afterlife (i.e. life in heaven) (Sosis and Alcorta, 2007).

While the above four factors provide insight as to how religion facilitates acts of terrorism, there are still many unanswered questions. For instance, why has religious terrorism been on the rise? What types of conflicts are more likely to involve responses from religious based organizations? Why, as it appears, is religious based terrorism more lethal? Why do some religious groups engage in terrorism and others don't? Does religion radicalize the individual or

does the individual become politically radicalized and then use religion to justify acts committed in furtherance of their objectives?

D. Sociology and the Study of Terrorism

A fourth framework by which to study terrorism is to apply sociological principles and theories. Unlike the psychological approach (a micro-level unit of analysis), the sociological approach focuses on societal factors and organizations. Thus, with regards to terrorism, sociology stresses factors such as political conflicts, socioeconomic status, education, deprivation, etc. In other words, terrorists resort to terrorism as a rational response, or perhaps a learned response, to social stressors.

According to sociologists, the world consists of people in conflict and these conflicts typically involve an imbalance of power. Terrorism is a social construction employed by the more powerful against the weak. The more powerful party has the capability of labeling (stigmatizing) the weaker party (Turk, 2004). Typically, the stronger party is a state or country and the weaker party is a collective of individuals who seek to use violence to bring about some form of political change. Thus, terrorism is a self-serving interpretive label of events, and their presumed causes, imposed by the more powerful for the purpose of manipulating perceptions to their benefit (Turk, 2004).

Sociologists not only see terrorism as a social construction, but they also tend to look at those labeled as terrorists as employing a last resort response to oppression and exploitation (Turk, 2004). Some sociologists have concluded that terrorism is linked to deprivation in one or more forms (i.e. poverty, education, political power, etc.) (Turk, 2004). However, more recent theories find that terrorism is associated with relative deprivation and not simply material

deprivation (Turk, 2004). The relative deprivation hypothesis involves a gap between expectations and the ability to satisfy these expectations. With relative deprivation comes frustration, indignity, humiliation, and a sense of powerlessness.

While deprivation theories are popular, a growing body of evidence suggests that such a relationship does not exist. In a study of members of Hezbollah, Krueger and Maleckova (2002) found the inverse relationship where a higher standard of living and higher education were both positively associated with participation in the terrorist organization. Consistent with this finding was Berrebi's study of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Berrebi concluded that if a link between income level, education and participation in terrorist activities exists, "it is either very weak or in the opposite direction of what one intuitively might have expected" (Berrebi, 2007).

Empirical evidence aside, other sociologists find the relative deprivation hypothesis too simplistic as it ignores such phenomena as prejudice, hatred, and fanaticism. According to Paul Wilkinson, "political terrorism cannot be understood outside the context of the development of terroristic, or potentially terroristic, ideologies, beliefs, and lifestyles (Wilkinson, 1974). Still other sociologists argue that the focus should not be on deprivation or ideology but rather on the social geometry (physical distance and social distance) of a conflict. According to Donald Black, each form of violence has its own structure, and "structures kill and maim, not individuals or collectives" (Black, 2004). Further, Black argues that terrorism arises when "a grievance has a social geometry distant enough and a physical geometry close enough for mass violence against civilians" (Black, 2004). Similarly, in study designed to identify structural conditions that provide a context where racist framing resonates with a target white audience, McVeigh and Sikkink found receptiveness to racial framing is influenced by spatial and social distance. To resonate effectively, there must be a certain degree of social distance and spatial proximity

between the target group (whites) and the group being demonized (non-whites) (McVeigh and Sikkink, 2005).

In addition to focusing on certain macro-level factors, sociologists have also studied extremist movements through the application of social movement theory. A social movement, like terrorism, has been defined in many different ways. Mario Diani (1992) compared definitions for 'social movements' provided by scholars from various disciplines. As a result of this comparison, Diani proposed defining a social movement as networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, and/or groups and associations, engaged in a political or cultural conflict, on the bases of a shared collective identity (Diani, 1992). Social Movement Theory (SMT) was developed as a means to explain how and why social movements are created and mobilize. Over the years, a number of social movement theories have emerged, but an in depth discussion of these theories is beyond the scope of this paper. With regard to domestic (far-right) extremists, two main theories have been applied: Resource Mobilization Theory and Political Opportunities Theory. Resource Mobilization suggests that availability to resources (knowledge, skills, money, internal and external support, etc.) is a key factor in the development and success of a movement (Marx and McAdam, 1994). In other words, people with common purposes and solidarity develop into a movement when they are able to mobilize sufficient resources to act. Political Process theory emphasizes the importance of the availability of political opportunities; the political processes that allow for greater "political leverage of previously powerless groups" (Marx and McAdam, 1994)

There is not a lot of research analyzing extreme right-wing movements (Lo, 1982) in general, and the white supremacist movement in particular. Some have argued that white supremacists do not satisfy the definition of a movement because they consist of many groups, are not

sufficiently organized, and don't all subscribe to the same beliefs and strategies (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 1997). Others have asserted that white supremacy is not a movement but rather a reactive response to economic and political threats posed by racial minorities (Boucher, Jenkins, and Van Dyke, 2006). However, Dobratz and Shanks-Meile (1997) propose that white supremacists do constitute a movement because the numerous groups are all especially focused on the issue of race, they all see whites as different than other races, and, for the most part, are in agreement on the goal of separating the races. Moreover, they all agree that white interests, in terms of power, status, and/or culture, are threatened.

One may find it difficult to see how a white person in the United States could perceive themselves as part of a powerless group, but another key aspect of Resource Mobilization and Political Process theory is the concept of framing. Framing is a tool by which one processes and organizes information based on previously held beliefs, perceptions, and or interpretations (Johnston, 1995). Framing, sometimes referred to as "consciousness," has also been described as the interpreting of one's grievances in a manner where "blame or discontent is placed on cultural, structural, or systematic factors rather than on individual deviance or personal failures (Dobratz and Shanks-Meil, 1997). Through framing processes, white supremacists can interpret information and events in a manner such that they see the white race as disadvantaged or discriminated against.

Based on interviews with white supremacists, Dobratz and Shanks-Meil (1997) have determined that while there is support for white supremacists groups and the issues advocated by such groups, it is not clear how broad the support is for the movement. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile posit that an inability to attract financial resources from those not formally a part of the group/movement may explain why the white supremacist movement has not been particularly

influential. Robert Balch used Resource Mobilization theory to analyze the rise and fall of the Aryan Nations, finding that the interplay of internal (e.g. competence of leadership) and external factors (e.g. law enforcement activity) determines the success of a social movement organization (Balch, 2006).

When looking at studies that employed the political process model, one study found that the Klan had strong support in the 1920s but due to a change in political opportunities during the 1960s (i.e. civil rights movement), the white supremacist movement's call for segregation lost momentum (Dobraz and Shanks-Meile, 1997). Although not directly related to the U.S. white supremacists, Koopmans and Olzak (2004) determined that political opportunities contribute to the mobilization of right-wing nationalists in Western Europe. Dobratz and Shanks-Meile found that a Republican president and Republican controlled legislative branches had a negative effect on white supremacy actions, suggesting political allies may mainstream a movement rather than provide opportunities for mobilization. In other words, political allies do not facilitate collective action (Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 1997).

Some sociologists have advocated that social movements must also be studied via social network analysis. Dobratz and Shanks-Meil found that almost ninety percent of the white supremacists they interviewed admitted to having links with other white supremacist groups (Dobratz and Shanks-Meil, 1997). People engage in collective action as a result of shared norms and values. The participation in collective action is an identification process and identities are shaped through social relations (Passy, 2003). Consequently, movements are made up of social networks. These networks may consist of personal networks, subcultural networks, and/or organizational networks – network of Social Movement Organizations (SMO). Networks influence decisions and actions, and play a role in whether, or how, one participates in a

movement . One of the most established findings in social movement research is that “prior social ties operate as a basis for movement recruitment and that established social settings are the locus of movement emergence” (Diani, 2003) According to Mario Diani (2003), “we get closer to a social movement dynamic the more there is a coupling of informal networks, collective identity, and conflict.” In other words, a social movement is more likely to emerge when informal networks share a collective identity, exchange practical and symbolic resources, and collectively engage in social conflict.

Because social networks matter, some researchers have employed social network analysis (SNA) methodology to better understand social movements. Most studies have focused on recruitment processes and participation, but others have looked at inter-organizational dynamics and how structure of a movement shapes collective action (Diani, 2002). SNA allows researchers to investigate network processes within a social movement. In addition to individual links, SNA enables researchers to focus on links between individuals and groups, between groups, or between SMOs, in order to identify conflict/alliances within the movement. It also helps identify issues of centrality (Diani, 2002).

In sum, sociologists would argue that there is no unique terrorist personality, but rather terrorism is a social activity engaged in as a means of bringing about political change. Further, sociologists may argue that environmental factors play an important role in the process of a terrorist’s radicalization, recruitment, and violence justification. Lastly, sociologists have provided the concept of social movements and have attempted to study extremism and extremist groups by applying social movement theory. While white supremacy meets the definition of a movement, only a limited number of studies have analyzed this movement via SMT.

E. Social Network Analysis and the Study of Terrorism

As the study of terrorism started to become more popular, and as it took on a new urgency after 9/11, researchers (as well as intelligence agencies and the media), started to look at the meaning and relevance of terrorist networks. In 2001, shortly before 9/11, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt noted that terrorist networks consist of small, disparate, leaderless groups that lack a formal hierarchical structure. They provided the new term “netwar” to characterize the form of anticipated future conflicts (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001). The attacks of 9/11 by al-Qaeda a few months later reinforced the notion that future conflicts will increasingly involve small networks of individuals hostile to various nation-states. Consequently, SNA began to be employed in an effort to better understand terrorist organizations.

In 2002 the social network journal *Connections* devoted an entire issue to SNA and terrorism. This journal contained an important article by Valdis Krebs. Krebs mapped the al-Qaeda network and found that the 9/11 hijackers network maintained very resilient ties through redundancy of prior contacts that were already firmly in place. These close ties were rarely active and thus virtually invisible for most of the time the terrorists were preparing for the attacks. Moreover, Krebs found that many, if not most, of the ties within the hijacker network centered around those in possession of a valuable skill (e.g. the pilots) (Krebs, 2001). Also, contained in this issue of *Connections* is an article by Rothenberg who found that terrorist networks are not hierarchical in structure but do typically contain a central leadership that plans major moves and provides training, financing and logistical support. However, the central leadership allows local actors much autonomy (Rothenberg, 2001).

Consistent with Rothenberg’s findings are those of Jose A. Rodriguez who mapped the 2004 Madrid bombing terrorists (Rodriguez, 2004). In his study, Rodriguez notes that terrorist

networks thrive on ties “forged among people that trust each other even when they have never interacted before, on the bases of their participation in the same endeavors” (i.e. previous attacks, war in Chechnya, etc.). These ties are referred to as “reliability ties.” Further, Rodriguez finds that the Madrid bombing was committed by a small cluster (attacking cluster) of operatives that consisted primarily of Moroccans, but this cluster was guided by another small cluster of al-Qaeda operatives from other Arab countries. These two clusters existed within a much broader network that doesn’t act but does help to facilitate the attack (Rodriguez, 2004).

Marc Sageman’s study of global jihadist networks, including the al-Qaeda operatives involved in 9/11 revealed that recruitment into Islamic jihadist organizations tends to be “bottom up.” Individuals are introduced to jihadist groups through social bonds (primarily friends) and then became more extreme in their ideology. In other words, the social bonds predate the radicalization. Sageman’s findings thus refute prior theories of causes of terrorism, such as poverty, madness, or prior psychological trauma (Sageman, 2004). Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat, Reminga, and Kamneva in 2003 examined an Al Qaeda network that undertook an embassy bombing in Tunisia, and examined destabilization techniques of this network (Carley, Dombroski, Tsvetovat, Reminga, and Kamneva, 2003). More recently, Koschade employed SNA to study the Jemaah Islamiyah cell that was responsible for the 2002 Bali bombing (Koschade, 2006), and Edwin Bakker built upon Sageman’s research by comparing European jihadist networks to Sageman’s global jihadist networks (Musharbash, 2007).

Social network analysis studies of terrorist networks have almost exclusively focused on personal networks where the unit of analysis is the individual. Further, no studies attempted to use network data for the purpose of assessing or predicting threat levels. A recent study by Asal and Rethemeyer attempted to fill these gaps in the literature by studying an organizational

terrorist network where the unit of analysis was the organization. The purpose of the study was to investigate which factors influence group lethality. The results of the study indicated that an organization's size, ideology and connectedness were important predictors of lethality. Specifically, organizations with a larger membership, a religiously based ideology, and high degree (large number of friendly connections) are significantly associated with a greater number of fatalities. The study also found that an organization's age and host country characteristics were not related to fatalities (Asal and Rethemeyer, n.d).

Social Network Analysis and the Study of Domestic Terrorism

Burris, Smith, and Strahm (2000) applied SNA to examine the inter-organizational structure of the white supremacist movement by treating web links as ties of affinity, communication, or potential coordination. Accordingly, Burris, Smith and Strahm found that white supremacist groups are a decentralized movement with multiple centers of influence, with the strongest links existing between groups with special interests (e.g. Holocaust revision). The researchers also found that Stormfront.org occupied a prominent position within the white supremacist web network. Overall, the white supremacist network is relatively isolated from mainstream conservatives and other extremist groups (Burris, Smith, & Strahm, 2000). In a separate but similar study, Gustavson and Sherkat (2004) attempted to examine "the ideological structuring of internet ties among white supremacist groups", by "focusing on those tied to one of the largest and most active internet sites, the Aryan Nations" (Gustavson & Sherkat, 2004). Gustavson and Sherkat analyzed the size and density of ties to assess how ideological affinities influence the scope and structure of connections (Gustavson & Sherkat, 2004). Lastly, researchers at the University of Arizona Dark Web Terrorism Research Center published a study

that employed SNA for the purposes of analyzing the web forums posted by terrorist organizations. When looking specifically at U.S. domestic extremist web sites, the two most popular websites were Stormfront.org (this is consistent with Burris, Smith & Strahm, 2000) and the National Alliance. This study also found that domestic extremists (with the exception of eco-terrorists) don't attempt to propagandize to outside audiences, but rather target their perceived community. Lastly, this study found that domestic extremist groups do not depend very heavily on virtual communities for funding and support. This is in contrast to international terrorist organizations, which do in fact depend on such virtual communities (Zhou, Reid, Qin, Chen, & Lai, 2005).

Excepting the few web-link studies noted above, SNA has never been employed to look at actual links amongst domestic white supremacist organizations. This will be the first study to do so. This study will also be the first to investigate whether network characteristics of white supremacist organizational networks are related to lethality.

Social Network Analysis and the Study of Criminal Organizations

Domestic extremist organizations are criminal organizations that, similar to non-extremist criminal organizations (i.e. gangs, mafia), often engage in crimes driven by financial gain, as opposed to pure ideology. Criminal enterprises are dynamic social networks of individuals, thus it is important to pay attention to the quantity and quality of connections among people (McGloin, 2005). While it is very likely that there are significant differences in the network structures of extremist organizations and criminal organizations, the possible similarities suggest that network analysis, as it has been applied to criminal networks, should not be dismissed as irrelevant.

SNA of criminal networks have been useful in furthering our understanding of criminal groups, such as gangs, and designing interventions that could help reduce crime. For example, Kennedy, Braga and Piehl (1997) used SNA to determine how gangs in the Boston area were connected and the nature of existing ties between those gangs. This information helped select which gangs would be the best targets for intervention and which gangs would be most useful for diffusion of anti-gun information (Kennedy, Braga, & Piehl, 1997). In 2005, McGloin employed SNA to analyze four Newark, New Jersey street gangs. McGloin found that Newark gangs tend to be loosely organized but contain cohesive subgroups. Further, the gangs also contain cut-points (bridges). Cut-points are those individuals who are in the unique position of being the only connection between two subgroups or between two individuals (McGloin, 2005). The cut-points may be a good target for law enforcement intervention to reduce gang activity.

Gangs are social networks composed of individual members whose choices and actions are, in no small part, determined by the individual's location within the social network (Fleisher, 2001). The same assessment can be made with regard to other criminal organizations. Whether employing a macro-level unit of analysis, as in the Kennedy et al (1997) study, or a micro-level unit of analysis, as in the McGloin (2005) study, network analysis has been employed by criminologists with real practical and policy related implications when used in the context of problem analysis.

CHAPTER 3: SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

A. Brief History of Social Network Analysis

SNA is not a new methodology, but in fact has been around for a number of years. Contemporary SNA begins with Stanley Milgram's 1967 experiment where he attempted to understand how people are connected (Ressler, 2006). The findings of this experiment would later lead to the expression of "six degrees of separation" which posits that each person is connected to every other person via six steps (links between individuals). Mark Granovetter's study of network structures titled "The Strength of Weak Ties" asserts that relationships with acquaintances (weak ties) are more important than relationships with friends and family (strong ties) when trying to find employment (Granovetter, 1973). Subsequent research built on Granovetter's research finding that disperse, open networks have greater access to information and power than smaller, denser, and more interconnected networks. This is because open networks allow for greater diversity of information and knowledge (Ressler, 2006).

D.J. Watts built upon Milgram's "six degrees of separation" and Granovetter's "weak ties" theories with his determination that most social networks are highly clustered but far-reaching (Watts, 1999). In other words, the network has a highly interconnected center (inner core) but each of the nodes in the center has weak ties that can connect it to any other node in the network in a relatively few number of steps/connections (Watts, 1999). Malcolm Gladwell's book "The Tipping Point" introduced SNA to the general public. Gladwell shows how networks explain real-world social epidemics work, such as the popularity of Airwalk shoes (Gladwell, 2000)

Today, social network science and technology is omnipresent with online internet sites like MySpace, Friendster, and Facebook. These websites map out each user's social network thereby allowing users to connect with friends and friends of friends (Ressler, 2006). In addition to these friends based social network websites, other websites (e.g. LinkedIn) offer the opportunity to map a user's professional connections (Ressler, 2006).

In sum, during the last ten years or so, with the benefit of enhanced technology, network theory has become much more powerful and popular and is being used in a multitude of settings. For instance, in addition to online social or professional networking, researchers have used network analysis to study how people interact at cocktail parties, how crickets synchronize their chirps, and ways in which airlines route their flights, to name just a few (Keefe, 2006).

B. What is Social Network Analysis?

SNA is a system by which a researcher can map ties (links) between nodes (individuals, organizations, countries, individuals and organizations etc.). Nodes typically have attributes; for individuals this may include things like age, sex, membership, occupation and for groups this may include size, location, ideology. A tie can represent direction, type, or strength of a relationship or communication. The ties between nodes represent relationships between and amongst individuals or groups, or between groups and individuals. It is these relational ties that make up a network. What constitutes a relationship is varied. For instance, nodes can be linked to each other directly (e.g. communicate with each other), or indirectly (membership in same organization, ideological belief, common neighborhood, etc.)

There are many types of networks: they may be large or small, tight or loose, dense or open, or they may consist of a primary core or a multitude of cliques, or they may contain strong ties, weak ties, or both (Wasserman & Faust, 2006).

Ties and networks matter because we are social beings and these ties represent interpersonal relations. The general hypothesis is that people who are similar (i.e. similar ideologies, similar social characteristics) will interact more often and share information, norms, and attitudes. People who interact regularly will foster a common attitude or identity and tend to act as a group (Wasserman and Faust, 2006; de Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005).

C. Social Network Analysis and Homophily Theory

There are a number of theories that apply to social networks (e.g. theories of self-interest, cognitive theories, etc.). A detailed discussion of applicable theories is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one consistent finding within the literature is that homophily theory characterizes network systems (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). Homophily is the principle that similar individuals are more likely to interact and interact more frequently. Entities (organizations, individuals, businesses, etc.) with common attributes interact and develop common norms. The reverse is also possible. Entities with common norms will bring together those with common attributes (Burt, 1982). The end result is that networks are often homogenous with regard to behavioral, political, and/or intrapersonal characteristics. This homogeneity limits the social world of network members and has significant implications in that it tends to reinforce information, attitudes, experiences, and beliefs (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). In light of the importance of homophily to the operation of networks, this dissertation relies on homophily theory for hypothesis testing and analysis of results.

D. Value of Social Network Analysis in the Study of Terrorism

Theoretical approaches like psychology, sociology, or political science tend to focus on individual characteristics and view individuals as independent entities. SNA, which is also known as network sociology, focuses on how people and groups are linked in patterns of interaction and views individuals as interdependent beings that are influenced by those with whom they are connected. One of the advantages of SNA is that while it focuses on the network, it also allows for the incorporation of individual characteristics. This is significant because while the structure of a network and existing relationship ties are very important, individual factors are also relevant and need to be considered (Ressler, 2006). In other words, while a terrorist organization's structure will influence important factors like the flow of information, recruitment, and knowledge sharing, individual characteristics (i.e. socioeconomic status, criminal history, education, age, mental illness) provide a more detailed understanding of the linked entities and allows for multivariate analysis (Ressler, 2006). Further, SNA can also enhance prediction and the ability to predict behavior thereby serving as an important tool for analysts and law enforcement (Renfro and Deckro, 2001)

E. Policy/Practical Implications of Using Social Network Analysis to Study Terrorism

As previously indicated, extremist organizations typically consist of covert networks. A covert network requires little in order to pose a significant threat, as evidenced by the Madrid bombing which, according to estimates by the Spanish police, involved preparation costs between \$53,200 and \$70,000 (Jordan, Manas, & Horsburgh, 2008). Social Network Analysis can be instrumental in helping law enforcement identify hidden networks of extremists

committed to engaging in violence, and can provide stratagems by which to disrupt these networks before they are able to act.

Identifying Hidden Networks

SNA also assumes that people are interdependent, thus decisions to act are very much influenced by the company one keeps (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). An understanding of SNA methodology allows law enforcement to map a dangerous extremist's personal networks. For example, Canadian intelligence initially observed suspects espousing, on certain websites, anti-Western views and a desire to commit terrorist acts in North America. Canadian intelligence, via normal surveillance methods, monitored these individuals and determined who was within the network. According to Krebs, once mapped, intelligence analysts can observe network activity and look for spikes in activity (i.e. increase in communication frequency, training etc.). Spikes in activity occur when a planned event is approaching thus signifying to law enforcement a need to move from observation to action (Krebs, n.d.).

A mapped network not only reveals who is connected to whom, but also includes information about types of connections and strength of those connections. A detailed map of an extremist network may be useful in identifying how members of the network are indoctrinated and motivated to act. Are they linked to a charismatic leader within the movement? Are they attending religious/ideological gatherings? How often? How strong are these connections? While it has not been found that madrassahs (Islamic religious schools) produce terrorists, there is evidence that radical madrassahs are associated with participation in terrorist acts. (Magouirk, Atran, & Sageman, 2008). Thus, if law enforcement is attempting to ascertain who in an extremist network poses the greatest threat, it may be wise to observe those with the most

frequent or the strongest connections to individuals or institutions (religious or otherwise) that attempt to indoctrinate followers with a radical ideology.

While certain radical institutions or leaders of an extremist organization play an important role in indoctrinating a network, these institutions and leaders can also be a source of frustration. While an espoused ideology may provide a justification for certain beliefs, a lot of rhetoric without action may ultimately lead to the creation of an even more radical sub-group that seeks to take control of the group or to split from the organization. This was the case with the splinter group known as The Order. Robert Matthews created The Order after becoming frustrated by the inactivity of Richard Butler and the Aryan Nations. Thus, while leaders of an extremist organization are important, law enforcement may find it useful to look for certain cliques or sub-groups within the larger network that are focused on acting (as opposed to organizing or educating) when assessing threat potential.

In addition to number and type of connections, a mapped network will also allow an analyst to ascertain an individual's location and role within the network, as well as their level of importance to the network. Unless a terrorist network contains all it requires, the network will have to reach out to others for the purpose of raising money, obtaining important material (explosives), or locating individuals with special skills (i.e. the bomb builder). For example, the Madrid bombers reached out to criminal organizations to assist them in obtaining explosives (Jordan, Manas, & Horsburgh, 2008). Law enforcement's observation of extremists reaching out to those capable of providing necessary tools and resources exposes the covert network (Fernando, Manas, & Horsburgh, 2008) and allows intelligence analysts to identify critical nodes within the network as well as a heightened threat level.

Disrupting Terrorist Networks

A mapped network also reveals a network's structure. The structure of a network discloses characteristics (cohesiveness, centralization, weak links, etc.) that may be used by law enforcement to disrupt a terrorist network. One of the most common forms of disruption mentioned is the removal of an individual or clique that is very central to the network. Those most central are typically those that are connected to many others who are not necessarily connected to each other and these central nodes thus play an important role in the transfer of information. The removal of central members of the Hofstad group inflicted a nearly mortal blow to the terrorist group (Vidino, 2007). Removing central figures can disrupt communication, result in loss of leadership, and create instability. While such an action may not destroy the group, it can significantly reduce or delay the danger.

Perhaps as important as removing central figures to a network is the removal of individuals with high social capital. Typically an individual with high social capital acts as a bridge or weak tie. A bridge connects two or more unconnected sections of the network and thus plays an important role in the network. Law enforcement can break up a network and isolate components of the network by eliminating weak ties. Ressler (2006) found that with the Samdura, who were involved in the attacks in Bali, the terrorist cell had one or two members that controlled communication between sections of the network. The removal of such a weak link could have effectively disrupted the terrorist network thereby reducing the threat presented.

As noted in the section above on identifying terrorist networks, terrorist networks often require one with a special skill (e.g. bomb maker) in order to carry out their terrorist objective. Magouirk, Atran, and Sageman (2008) suggest that law enforcement should be focusing not only on the most connected individual or the spiritual leader, but rather on removing those with

operational control (special skills). According to Peter Klerks (2001), it is wise to target those individuals (nodes) that possess unique skills and connectivity because by removing these individuals intelligence analysts can cause maximum damage to the terrorist organization and their goals. Replacing those with unique skills may be problematic for a terrorist organization. Such practices have already been successfully employed. While observing Islamic extremists, French intelligence determined that those with unique skills and knowledge (i.e. document forgers, explosive technicians, paymasters, etc.) hold key positions within the network. Once identified, French intelligence engaged in “selective detention” in order to disrupt the network. For example, they detained a document forger of a network that resulted in certain documents disappearing from the underground (van Meter, 2001).

Lastly, an understanding of a terrorist network’s structure can be used to help law enforcement decide how or where to infiltrate a terrorist network. Moreover, law enforcement can destabilize a dangerous group by leaking certain types of false information to individuals important to the transfer of information within the network. A rumor that a group has been infiltrated by government agents can destabilize a group by increasing the paranoia of its members. A reluctance to communicate with others for fear of speaking with an undercover agent will negatively impact the network’s efficiency. Over time the constant fear of infiltration can demoralize the terrorist network, as well as sympathizers and those who might have been otherwise motivated to form a new group (Jordan, Manas, and Horsburgh, 2008).

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH APPROACH

A. Purpose/Goal of Study

Although SNA has been employed to study international terrorists, it has not been employed to analyze white supremacists, a community considered to pose a significant threat of extreme violence. In addition to the focus on international terrorists, network analysis studies have also been overwhelmingly focused on individual actors (Pyncheon and Borum, 1999). There are very few network studies where the organization is the unit of analysis (Asal and Rethemeyer, n.d.) and attempts to use SNA to predict lethality are virtually non-existent.

In an effort to better understand the threat posed by domestic extremist organizations and fill existing gaps in the literature, this study was designed to accomplish two primary objectives. The first was to identify and map two networks consisting of violent white supremacist groups for the purpose of observing overall network structure and actor level characteristics. The first network consisted of thirteen formal white supremacist groups associated with ideologically motivated homicidal incidents and the direct ties amongst these groups (Core Groups Network or CGN). The thirteen core groups of the study are: American Front, Aryan Brotherhood, Aryan National Front, Aryan Nations, Confederate Knights of America, Confederate White Vikings, Denver Skins, Hammerskin Nation, Insane Criminal Posse, National Socialist Front, Nazi Low Riders, Volksfront, and World Church of the Creator. The second network consisted of the same thirteen groups but also included their ties to the broader white supremacist movement (Core Groups Embedded Network or CGEN). Once the network was mapped, the goal for this objective was to:

- 1) observe and measure, in both networks, overall network characteristics, such as

- cohesion and centralization, and measure actor level characteristics (i.e. centrality and constraint);
- 2) assess whether certain network characteristics changed when considering the core groups' links to the broader white supremacist movement;
 - 3) identify which core groups are most important to both networks;
 - 4) identify which ideologies were most central to the network; and
 - 5) to identify which white supremacist groups not associated with an ideologically motivated homicide during the years of the study (1990-2008) are playing an important role amongst the violent core groups.

The second objective of this study was to assess, via regression analysis, whether certain network characteristics correlate with a greater threat level (increased number of ideologically motivated homicides). Since the network data includes attribute information on the groups, regression analysis was also employed to investigate whether group attributes correlate with an increased threat level. Lastly, correlations were run to ascertain whether network location and group attributes were significantly correlated

B. Hypotheses

This study differed from network analysis studies on global jihadists, which typically use the individual as the unit of analysis and focus on a network involved in a particular incident (i.e. Valdis Krebs' study of the 9/11 bombers). In this study the unit of analysis is the group and the time period is not restricted to a particular incident but rather involves an eighteen year period².

² Although many network analysis terrorism studies map ties existing over short period (i.e. 2-3 years), a few studies have captured mapped networks that covered longer periods. This study's eighteen year period is longer than average but similar in its objectives. The purpose of the study is not to suggest that these groups posed a significant threat of IMH in the past or that they will in the future. The purpose of the study is to identify factors that made white supremacist organizations lethal during the years of the study.

This provides a broad view of the dynamic and violent white supremacist movement. Since this is essentially the first time that social network analysis is being employed to exclusively study white supremacist groups, the study is primarily exploratory. Nevertheless, based on previous SNA studies and other research on white supremacists, a number of hypotheses may be posited.

Network Analysis Hypotheses

1. The violent white supremacist network is not a cohesive network.
2. The violent white supremacist network is, by and large, decentralized, but will have some semblance of a core.

The above two hypotheses are based on previous research that found that the white supremacist movement is both non-cohesive and decentralized, containing multiple centers of influence that inter-connect based on common ideological and political belief systems (Burris, Smith, and Strahm, 2000; Gustavson and Sherkat, 2004).

3. Within the network, groups will primarily be linked to other groups that adhere to the same ideology.

This hypothesis is based on research findings that white supremacist websites tend to link to other supremacists with whom they share the same ideology (Zhou, Reid, Qin, Chen, & Lai, 2005).

4. The Aryan Brotherhood, although a large and old group, will not be as central to the network as the Aryan Nations because of the Aryan Brotherhood's focus on crime over ideology.

This hypothesis is not based on any specific study but rather the overall composite provided by numerous studies which have demonstrated that the most central groups are those with an ideological and/or political focus (e.g. Aryan Nations, National Alliance).

5. The Aryan Nations will be central to the Core Groups network as well as the Core Groups Embedded network.

Again this hypothesis is not tied to any particular study but rather based on previous research that have identified the Aryan Nations as major player within the movement.

Regression Analysis Hypotheses

6. There will be a positive relationship between centrality of a group, in terms of degree, and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

This hypothesis is based primarily on the Asal and Rethemyer's finding that extremist groups with many connections are more lethal (Asal and Rethemyer, n.d.).

7. There will be a positive relationship between centrality of a group, in terms of closeness, and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.
8. There will be a positive relationship between centrality of a group, in terms of betweenness, and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

Hypotheses 7 and 8 have not previously been tested but it was felt that members of groups that are more central are likely to be more frequently exposed to attitudes, ideas, and calls for action. Repeated exposure to these messages can reinforce permissive attitudes or incite one to act.

9. There will be a negative relationship between structural constraint of a group and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

Similar to hypotheses 7 and 8, there is no research that specifically suggests such a relationship. However, previous research on employment networks found that less constrained individuals experience better compensation and evaluations, and are more likely to generate ideas and express those ideas (Burt, 2004). Thus, it was thought that members of groups with low constraint may feel more likely to generate ideas and more empowered to act on those ideas.

10. There will be a positive relationship between size of group and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

This hypothesis is again based Asal and Rethemyer's study that found a correlation between size of group and the group's lethality (Asal and Rethemyer, n.d.).

11. There will be a positive relationship between age of group and the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

While no previous research has identified such a relationship, it is believed that larger groups tend to also be older, and groups with a longer history are presented with more opportunities to be associated with ideologically motivated homicides.

12. Certain white supremacist ideologies (i.e. Christian Identity) will be significantly related to an increased threat of violence (greater number of ideologically motivated homicides).

Although they only account for a small percent of terrorist attacks, religious terrorists are responsible for a disproportionate number of fatalities (Hoffman, 1995). Juergensmeyer (2003) posits that religion provides tools that make it easier for the individual to commit a terrorist attack. Lastly, Asal and Rethemyer (n.d.) found that religious extremist groups are more lethal than non-religious.

C. Data

As previously noted, the bulk of the data for this study came from the U.S. Extremist Crime database assembled by principal investigators Joshua Freilich and Steven Chermak. The database includes all known crimes committed by the domestic far-right between the years 1990 and 2008. As defined by Freilich and Chermak, the far right consists of domestic groups or individuals that subscribe to aspects of the following:

“are fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in orientation), anti-global, suspicious of centralized federal authority,

reverent of individual liberty (especially their right to own guns, be free of taxes), believe in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty and a belief that one's personal and/or national "way of life" is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent (sometimes such beliefs are amorphous and vague, but for many the threat is from a specific ethnic, racial, or religious group), and a belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating in paramilitary preparations and training and survivalism. It is important to note that mainstream conservative movements and the mainstream Christian right are not included (Freilich & Chermak, 2010).

The data was collected in a three step process: (1) identifying criminal incidents; (2) researching criminal incidents; (3) coding criminal incidents.

Identifying Criminal Incidents

Criminal incidents are identified from a variety of sources, such as: existing databases (e.g. American Terrorism Study); official sources (e.g. government agency reports); scholarly and journalist accounts; and watchdog reports (e.g. Southern Poverty Law Center). Additional crimes committed by far-rightists discovered when researching known incidents are another means by which criminal cases are identified.

Researching Criminal Incidents

Once identified, criminal incidents are provided a case number and assigned to a specific researcher. The researcher thoroughly researches the case to obtain as much information as possible about the incident, the perpetrators, the victims, and the far-right groups associated with the perpetrators. The information on the respective case is culled via a systematic search of all existing terrorism databases, official sources, watch-dog groups, court records, and 26 search engines: (1) Lexis-Nexis; (2) Proquest; (3) Yahoo; (4) Google; (5) Copernic; (6) News Library; (7) Westlaw; (8) Google Scholar; (9) Amazon; (10) Google U.S. Government; (11) Federation of American Scientists; (12) Google video; (13) Center for the Study of Intelligence; (14) Surf Wax; (15) Dogpile; (16) Mamma; (17) Librarians' Internet Index; (18) Scirus; (19) All the Web; (20) Google News; (21) Google Blog; and (22) Homeland Security Digital Library. In addition, coders searched four additional search engines for each suspect to uncover other criminal incidents. These include: (23) Vinelink; (24) The Inmate Locator; (25) Individual State Department of Corrections (DOCs); and (26) Blackbookonline.info.

Coding Criminal Incidents

Once researched, each identified case is assigned to a specific individual coder. The coder reviews the researched information and inserts the relevant information into four code books: incident code book, perpetrator code book, victim code book, and group code book. The incident codebook contains 225 variables, the suspect codebook contains 283, and the group codebook contains 202. The victim codebook is divided into three parts: victim, target and network with 121, 41, and 7 variables respectively. Lastly, there is also an assessment codebook with 25 variables, in which coders are able to provide an assessment of the data and sources.

The codebooks are in computer form and located in Access. Each case in Access indicates not only the case number but also the researcher and coder assigned to the case.

Incident Inclusion Criteria for Study

Although there is no universal definition for terrorism, it generally means an attack on civilian targets with the intention of spreading fear and advancing a political agenda³. Many ideologically motivated acts committed by white supremacists, even though targeting civilians, are categorized as hate crimes and not as acts of terrorism. However, hate crimes, like acts of terrorism, involve attacking civilians with the goal of intimidating a target population. Moreover, hate crimes account for the majority of fatalities caused by domestic extremists⁴. White supremacists typically target ethnic and religious minorities, immigrants, homosexuals, and the homeless. The act is less about the individual victim and more about the message it sends to others who fall within the same ethnic, religious, or lifestyle categorization as the victim – *we don't like you and we don't want you here*. Further, the white supremacist movement advocates the notion of leaderless resistance which calls for individuals to engage in acts of terrorism on their own initiative. These acts, without direct orders from group leaders, typically resemble hate crimes more than obvious acts of terrorism (Michael, 2003). Consequently, the data in this study includes any homicide motivated by the white supremacist ideology, or committed in

³ Although no universally agreed upon definition of terrorism, most require that the act be politically motivated, directed towards civilians, and with the goal of affecting (scaring, intimidating, etc.) the target audience (Martin, 2009). The U.S. Code defines domestic terrorism as “activities that (A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; (B) appear to be intended— (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and (C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (United States Code, Title 18, Part 1, Chapter 113B, § 2331(5)). The F.B.I. uses this definition of domestic terrorism.

⁴ Hewitt’s study of domestic right-wing terrorism found that between 1955 and 1998 64.2% of the total fatalities were hate crimes. This finding does not include the Oklahoma City bombing fatalities (Hewitt², 2000).

furtherance of a white supremacist ideological objective. This includes hate crimes. The benefit of this approach is that it avoids inclusion criteria issues since inclusion is not dependent on law enforcement's determination of whether an incident is an act of terrorism.

Identifying Groups

To identify the groups that would be used for the study, all ideologically motivated homicidal incidents committed by members of formal white supremacist groups between the years of 1990 and 2008 were pulled from the ECDB. An ideologically motivated homicidal incident is defined as an event (occurrence) where at least one individual is murdered and where one or more of the perpetrators was motivated by a white supremacist ideology or belief system. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, there were 273 total homicidal incidents committed by far-right extremists between 1990 and 2008. These 273 incidents account for 524 victims (356 if we subtract the 168 killed by McVeigh). Of these 273 homicidal incidents, 115 (42%) were ideologically motivated. These 115 incidents account for 318 victims (150 if subtract the 168 killed by McVeigh). Of the 115 ideologically motivated incidents, 85 (74%) were committed by an individual identified as a white supremacist. These 85 incidents resulted in 95 victims. Of the 85 ideological incidents committed by white supremacists, 36 incidents (42%) involved members of a formal white supremacist group. These 36 incidents accounted for 44 victims (46% of 95).

Table 4.1

General Overview of Homicide Data from ECDB

	Homicidal Incidents	Number of Actual Victims
Total Committed	273	524 (356 without McVeigh's 168 victims)
Ideologically Motivated	115 (42% of 273)	318 [150 (42%) without McVeigh's 168 victims]
Ideological and Committed by White Supremacists	85 (74% of 115)	95 (63% of 150)
Ideological and Committed by member of formal White Supremacist Group	36 (42% of 85)	44 (46% of 95)

There were 24 formal white supremacist groups associated with the 36 ideologically motivated incidents. For the purposes of this study a white supremacist group is defined as: an identifiable organization comprised of two or more individuals where such organization adheres to a white supremacist ideology and advocates for, or has demonstrated a willingness to use, violence in furtherance of the group's ideology. Of the 24 white supremacist groups, this study selected and researched 13 (54%) of the groups. These 13 groups were linked to 27 (61%) of the 44 ideologically motivated homicides. The 13 groups were selected because it is believed that they constitute a fairly representative sample of the population of white supremacist groups associated with ideologically motivated violence existing in the broader white supremacist movement during the years of the study. The sample of groups are varied with regard to popularity (number of ties), ideology, age, and size (see Tables 4.3, 4.6, and 4.7 below).

Researching Groups

Once identified from the ECDB, each of the thirteen groups was thoroughly researched to obtain information regarding relational data and attributes. Specifically, information was

collected about a group's ties, history, ideology, time in existence, and size of membership when at its height.

The information on each group was culled via a systematic search of all existing terrorism databases, official sources, watch-dog groups, court records, and 26 search engines: (1) Lexis-Nexis; (2) Proquest; (3) Yahoo; (4) Google; (5) Copernic; (6) News Library; (7) Westlaw; (8) Google Scholar; (9) Amazon; (10) Google U.S. Government; (11) Federation of American Scientists; (12) Google video; (13) Center for the Study of Intelligence; (14) Surf Wax; (15) Dogpile; (16) Mamma; (17) Librarians' Internet Index; (18) Scirus; (19) All the Web; (20) Google News; (21) Google Blog; and (22) Homeland Security Digital Library. In addition, coders searched four additional search engines for each suspect to uncover other criminal incidents. These include: (23) Vinelink; (24) The Inmate Locator; (25) Individual State Department of Corrections (DOCs); and (26) Blackbookonline.info.

(see Table 4.2 on next page)

**Table 4.2
Number and Type of Information Sources**

	Watch Group	Book	News Media	Court Document	Government Document	Website or Blog	Group website	Total # of Sources
American Front	5	2	2			1		10
Aryan Brotherhood	4		2	1	2	2		11
Aryan National Front	3		1					4
Aryan Nations	4	4	9			2		19
Confederate Knights of America	2	2	5					9
Confederate White Vikings	2		1	1				4
Denver Skins	2		1			1		4
Hammerskin Nation	7		1				1	9
Insane Criminal Posse	2		2					4
National Socialist Front	2		1			2		5
Nazi Low Riders	3		1		1	2		7
Volksfront	2		1				1	4
World Church of the Creator	5	1	2		1	1	1	11
Total	43 (42.5%)	9 (8.9%)	29 (28.7%)	2 (2.0%)	4 (4.0%)	11 (10.9%)	3 (3.0%)	101 (100%)

The number of sources reflects those selected out of the hundreds reviewed. When researching these groups, many of which have been in existence for years, there is a substantial

amount of material provided by news sources, watch groups, government agencies, and academicians. It took many hours to cull the data from all of the available sources. Of course, many sources were repetitious, thus each one need not be acknowledged for coding purposes. However, Table 4.2 does reflect, as one would imagine, that a greater number of sources are available for larger and older groups.

Coding Attributes

Once researched, each of these attributes was then coded such that information on ideology, size, and age of the group was assigned to a specific category. There were a total of six identifiable ideologies and each was assigned a number. Categorizing groups by ideology is a difficult undertaking because there are a variety of ways to categorize and there is frequent overlap (e.g. some skinheads celebrate Hitler's birthday, some white supremacist prison gang members may believe in Christian Identity). The categorization in this dissertation is based on the categorization system pronounced in an internal document prepared by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis (USDHS, 2009). However, the category of KKK was replaced by the category "White Supremacist – General", because there is, in fact, much variety amongst KKK groups. For example, some are strong adherents to Christian Ideology, others are more traditional, and yet others actively recruit skinheads. Also, the category "Nordic mysticism" used by the Department of Homeland Security was not used in this study. Although groups within the study may have members that subscribe to Nordic mysticism, none of the groups in the study required adherence to, or promoted this specific ideology. The ideology known as "Creativity" was included as an ideological category because it is a religious

based ideology with a distinctive belief system. Table 4.3 illustrates the ideological categorizations, the 13 groups in the study, and the number of groups within each category.

Table 4.3

Ideological Categorizations

Category No.	Category Name	# of Groups in Category (Percent of total)	Groups Within Category
1	Christian Identity	1 (7.7%)	Aryan Nations
2	Racist Skinhead	4 (30.7%)	American Front, Denver Skins, Hammerskin Nation, Confederate White Vikings
3	White Supremacist – Prison Gang	2 (15.4%)	Aryan Brotherhood, Nazi Low Riders
4	Neo-Nazi	3 (23.1%)	Aryan National Front, Volksfront, National Socialist Front
5	Creativity	1 (7.7%)	World Church of the Creator
6	White Supremacist - General	2 (15.4%)	Confederate Knights of America, Insane Criminal Posse
Total		13 (100%)	

**a seventh category (Biker Gang) was included when mapping links to the broader white supremacist movement but none of the core groups fell into this category.*

The strength of a group’s ideological affiliation was determined by how consistently a group was identified as being part of a particular ideological categorization. Table 4.4 demonstrates how strength of affiliation was determined and coded. Table 4.5 indicates each of the thirteen groups, its ideological affiliation, and the strength of that affiliation.

Table 4.4

Means of Determining Strength of Group Ideological Affiliation

Category	Criteria
3 = group solely identified with one specific ideology by all sources	Sources consistently (100%) identified the group as belonging to one ideological categorization.
2 = primarily identified with one specific ideology, but not consistently	Group primarily referred to as belonging to a specific ideological category but one or more sources indicated no ideological categorization or a different ideological categorization.
1 = group never associated with any specific ideology	Group not associated with any particular ideology but referred to as white supremacist.

Table 4.5

Group, Ideology, and Strength of Association

Name of Organization	Ideology	Strength of Association
Aryan Brotherhood	White Supremacist - Prison Gang	3
Aryan Nations	Christian Ideology	2 (some refer to group as neo-Nazi but recognize religious foundation)
American Front	Racist Skinhead	3
World Church of the Creator	Creativity	3
Denver Skins	Racist Skinhead	3
Nazi Low Riders	White Supremacist - Prison Gang	3
Aryan National Front	Neo-Nazi	2 (also referred to as neo-Nazi racist skinhead)
Hammerksin Nation	Racist Skinhead	2 (also referred to as neo-Nazi skinhead)
Confederate Knights of America	White Supremacist - General	2 (one source referred to group as a Klan related prison group)
Volksfront	Neo-Nazi	2 (also referred to as a neo-Nazi skinhead group)
Confederate White Vikings	Racist Skinhead	3
National Socialist Front	Neo-Nazi	2 (one source referred to as neo-Nazi skinhead)
Insane Criminal Posse	White Supremacist - General	1

In terms of the age of the groups, ages varied from one year to over 45 years. Groups were assigned to one of four age categories (Table 4.6).

Table 4.6

Age Categories

Category No.	Category Description	# of Groups Within Category (percent)	Groups Within Category
1	1 to 5 years old	2 (15.4%)	Insane Criminal Posse, Aryan National Front
2	6 to 15 years old	3 (23.1%)	Denver Skins, Volksfront, National Socialist Front
3	16 to 30 years old	4 (30.7%)	American Front, Hammerskin Nation, Confederate Knights of America, Confederate White Vikings
4	31+ years	4 (30.7%)	Aryan Brotherhood, Aryan Nations, World Church of the Creator, Nazi Low Riders
Total		13 (99.9%)	

The sizes of the groups varied as well, with a range from three members to fifteen thousand. Sizes were assigned to one of six categories.

(see Table 4.7 on next page)

Table 4.7

Size Categorizations

Category No.	Category Description	# of Groups Within Category (percent)	Groups Within Category
1	3-10 members	1 (7.7%)	Insane Criminal Posse
2	11-100 members	5 (38.5%)	American Front, Denver Skins, Aryan National Front, Confederate Knights of America, Volksfront
3	101-1,000 members	3 (23.1%)	Aryan Nations, World Church of the Creator, Hammerskin Nation
4	1,001-10,000 members	1 (7.7%)	Nazi Low Riders
5	10,001+ members	1 (7.7%)	Aryan Brotherhood
999	Size unknown	2 (15.3%)	Confederate White Vikings, National Socialist Front
Total		13 (100%)	

Coding Links

Each of the thirteen core groups was also researched to ascertain to which groups they were directly connected within the white supremacist movement. To be considered a direct connection, the tie must involve actual human interaction. In addition to identifying ties, each tie was valued to represent the strength of the connection between the groups. Table 4.8 provides the classification system by which ties were identified and valued. Values of actual links between groups can be observed in the network maps contained in Chapter 6.

Table 4.8

Valuation of Links

Link Value	Link Type
<p>3 = strong positive link</p> <p>relationship involves significant regular interaction/communication between groups and their leaders</p>	<p><i>Positive Links</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ leaders are close friends ◆ groups cooperate in criminal enterprise ◆ one group runs/manages other group
<p>2 = moderate positive link</p> <p>Relationship involves somewhat regular interaction/communication between groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ groups allied or described as having close ties but tie is not defined; ◆ groups co-organize/co-sponsor event ◆ group or leader of group provides occasional financial or other type of support to other group; ◆ group/member of group provides ongoing service to other group (i.e. managing website)
<p>1 = weak positive link</p> <p>relationship involves limited interaction/communication between groups</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ leader of group invited to speak at another group's event ◆ members co-participate in criminal act but not part of ongoing criminal enterprise; ◆ media reports link but does not comment on strength or type of link ◆ leaders engage in one time business dealing ◆ member (low ranking, not leader) is also simultaneously a member of the other group
	<p><i>Negative Links</i></p>
<p>-1 = negative link</p> <p>relationship involves hostile feelings or conflict and thus negative or no interaction</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ personal dislike between leaders ◆ members of group speak negatively about other group ◆ physical confrontation between members of two groups ◆ business deal gone bad ◆ group split from other on non-friendly terms

D. Methodology

This study involved two methodologies. The first employed social network analysis to analyze two networks. This method involved three steps. The first step involved generating case studies, via open sources, for each core group in order to provide a contextual background (see Chapter 5). The second step involved identifying and valuing the connecting ties amongst the

core groups and between core groups and non-core groups. The relational data was inserted into a format that could be uploaded by the network software. The third step was the application of social network analysis to the relational data to investigate two single mode networks: Core Groups Network (CGN) and Core Groups Embedded Network (CGEN). In this study Pajek software (version 1.25) was used to analyze the coded relational data of both networks for the purpose of measuring network level characteristics and node level.

Network Level Measures

Network level measurements provide information about the overall network. The following are the measurements analyzed in this study.

Network Density:

provides an indication of the cohesiveness of the entire network. It assesses how many actual ties exist among all possible ties in the network (percent of all possible ties) (de Nooy, Mrvar, & Batagelj, 2005). If a large proportion of possible ties do in fact exist within the network, then the network is considered dense.

Network Centralization:

a measure of the variableness or heterogeneity of the centralities of the actors within the network (Wasserman and Faust, 2006). It provides an indication whether and to what extent the network has a center (de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005). A very centralized network is dominated by one or a few vertices (www.orgnet.com/sna.html). A network that is dominated by one or a few vertices will have an obvious center and a periphery that depends on the center for access to information (de Nooy, Mrvar, Batagelj, 2005).

Node Level Measures

Degree Centrality:

degree is the number of neighbors (ties to other vertices) a vertex possesses. Those vertices with the greatest number of neighbors are most popular/important/active. They are where the action is within the network and thus occupy a central position. Vertices with low degrees are more peripheral to the network (Wasserman and Faust, 2006).

Closeness Centrality:

closeness is a measure of how accessible a vertex is to other vertices in the network. The higher the closeness centrality score the more accessible the vertex, meaning the more quickly it can interact with all others in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 2006.)

Betweenness Centrality:

betweenness is a measure of how necessary a particular vertex is to the flow of information. The higher the betweenness centrality score the more likely the vertex is to be a link in the communication geodesic (shortest path) between any two other vertices in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 2006).

Constraint:

constraint is a measure of social capital or advantage based on how a vertex is connected to its neighbors. An actor that is connected to other actors not directly connected to each other is provided with an opportunity to mediate/broker between the unconnected actors and potentially exploit his/her position. In social network analysis parlance, the lack of connection between two actors ("B" and "C") that are connected to the same actor ("A") is called a "structural hole." The actor ("A") who is directly connected to the unconnected actors serves as a bridge across the structural hole. The lower the constraint score of a vertex, the more social capital it possesses. Constraint scores range from zero to one (Wasserman and Faust, 2006).

The second methodology employed was regression analysis. The data coded in Microsoft Access and Pajek were exported into SPSS 11.0. The regression analysis methodology consisted of four fundamental steps. The first step was to run descriptive statistics on the network data for qualitative analysis purposes. The second step was to run regression

analyses to ascertain whether nodal network characteristics were significantly related to the number of ideologically motivated homicides committed. If such a relationship exists, then certain network characteristics could serve as predictors. One of the advantages of social network analysis is that in addition to relational data, it allows for nodal attribute data. Thus, the third step was to run descriptive statistics on the attribute data for qualitative purposes. The fourth step involved running regression analyses to determine whether certain group attributes (age, size, ideology) were significantly related with the number of ideologically motivated homicides. Lastly, correlations were run to investigate whether network characteristic predictors were significantly correlated, whether attribute predictors were significantly correlated, and whether network characteristic predictors were significantly correlated with attribute predictors.

Deidentification of Study Subjects

Although this study was only concerned with the network of violent groups, it nevertheless required data collection on the members of those groups who committed murder in furtherance of the group's ideology. The individuals and groups contained in this study were identified through open source searches available to the general public, such as newspapers and websites. Even though obtained through public sources, the study de-identified individuals by assigning each a number. Only the primary researcher has access to the database that links the number with the name of the individual. Ultimately, this study is only concerned with the network of violent groups so information on individuals are not disclosed; not even their assigned number.

Conclusion

In recognition of the threat posed by domestic extremists (organizations and individual members) and the virtual non-existence of social network analysis research concerning home grown radicals, this chapter presented a method by which to help fill the knowledge gap. The following chapters will apply the social network analysis and regression analysis methodologies, and provide the findings.

CHAPTER 5: BIOGRAPHIES OF CORE GROUPS (in alphabetical order)

A. American Front

History

The American Front was initially founded in the early to mid-1980s by Bob Heick (aka Bob Blitz) for the purpose of being a banner organization for all skinheads in the United States (AD¹, n.d.). Heick created the group after visiting London in 1984 and being impressed by the British right-wing group “National Front” which had been attempting to attract skinheads and then indoctrinate them with a racist ideology (Moore, 1993). Heick began publishing leaflets that were primarily nationalist writings but they failed to resonate with the mostly apolitical skinheads. Heick then began to shift from a nationalist orientation towards Nazism. During this progression he formed United White Brethren, a short lived white supremacist group (www.whiteprisongangs.blogspot.com¹, n.d.). In 1987 Heick transformed the American Front into a political organization that adhered to a pro-Nazi and Third Position ideology. Heick was introduced to Third Position by his close friend Tom Metzger, leader of the White Aryan Resistance. Third Position is a nationalist ideology that centers around race (or religion) and opposes both capitalism and communism. It has been described as a neo-fascist ideology (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2000; Anti-Defamation League⁵, n.d.).

The American Front held its first march (White Workers Day march) on May 1st, 1988. Soon thereafter, the organization began publishing its own tabloid titled “Aryan Warrior.” In the early 1990s Heick moved to Portland, Oregon where he continued to direct the organization until 1993 when he stepped down. James Porazzo took leadership of the organization and moved its headquarters to Harrison, Arkansas. Like Heick, Porazzo was anti-capitalist (believed Jews ran capitalist system) and promoted the Third Position philosophy (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.;

Laqueur, 2004). Porazzo, it turns out, was an ineffectual leader. The move to Arkansas was a bad decision since few racist skinheads were there, making it difficult to recruit new members, and Porazzo managed to alienate the existing members. As a result, the American Front effectively became a dead organization (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).

The group continued to be dormant until 2002 when David Lynch took over as leader of the organization. Lynch was a skinhead who became a member of the American Front in the early 1990s. As leader, Lynch dropped the group's advocacy for the Third Position philosophy and rebranded the group to give it broader appeal. An active leader, Lynch was effective at forging connections with other skinhead or skinhead friendly groups, such as Volksfront, Vinlanders Social Club, United Society of Aryan Skinheads, National Vanguard, and the Hammerskins, to name a few (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.). In addition to establishing ties with other white supremacist groups, Lynch had the American Front join the Liaison Committee for Revolutionary Nationalism, a Fascist group formed in the 1950s with the goal of bringing about a pan-European Fascist regime. Lynch also established a United States division of the international skinhead organization Troops of Tomorrow, and launched Prison Skin, a prison outreach campaign to support skinheads in prison (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2007). Recently the group has been active organizing anti-immigrant rallies (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.). Although Lynch has been active and has revived the organization, it is estimated that the group probably never exceeded fifty members (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).

Ideology

Under Heick's leadership, and then Porazzo, the American Front was a skinhead-oriented organization that espoused a pro-Nazi and Third Position philosophy. When Lynch took over the American Front, he dropped the Third Position philosophy. The American Front is primarily

focused on race and does not espouse any one particular ideology. Anyone white person can join, regardless of religion, and American Front will work with any group, regardless of their public image (americanfront.org).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) On September 29, 1992 in Salem, Oregon, two people were killed and three others injured when Molotov cocktails were thrown into their basement apartment after a racially charged confrontation. The decedents were H. C. (29) and B.M. (45). H.C. was a lesbian black woman, and B.M. was a white homosexual man. The perpetrators consisted of four white individuals ranging in age from 20-22 years. Witnesses indicated to law enforcement that H.C., and several black youths staying with her, had been feuding with skinheads for several weeks prior to the incident and were victims of racial and sexual taunts. About an hour before the incident a neighboring tenant and one of the perpetrators were yelling racist comments at H.C.'s nephew (17). This led to a scuffle involving a knife and one of the perpetrators getting punched. Approximately one hour later two Molotov cocktails were thrown into H.C.'s apartment. Two of the four perpetrators were members of the American Front. It was believed that racial and sexual-orientation were motivating factors in the crime and the perpetrators were charged with violations of Oregon's hate crime laws, as well as with murder, arson, and assault (Egan, 1992; Martinis, 1992)

Sample(s) of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes

- 1.) In 1994 an American Front member was sentenced for his participation in attempting to start a race war by bombing a NAACP center in Tacoma, Washington (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).
- 2.) In 1994 a member of the American Front pleaded guilty to charges associated with his involvement in a drive by shooting of a synagogue in Eugene, Oregon (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).
- 3.) In 2001 an American Front member was arrested for making terrorist threats and battery after attacking an African-American man (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).
- 4.) In 2005 another member of the American Front brutally attacked an African-American in Salt Lake City, Utah (Anti-Defamation League⁶, n.d.).

B. Aryan Brotherhood

History

The Aryan Brotherhood (AB) has the longest history of the thirteen core groups in the study. During the 1950s and 1960s a prison gang known as the Blue Bird Gang existed in San Quentin state prison in Northern California. In the late 1960s prisons were desegregated and white inmates began to feel threatened by emerging black and Mexican gangs. In response, the Blue Bird gang changed its name in 1967 to the Aryan Brotherhood (FBI, n.d.). At the time of origin, to be a member one had to be part Irish (FBI, n.d.). This is why one of the symbols of AB membership is a Shamrock tattoo, and why the group is also known as Brand of the Rock (reference to the Shamrock). In addition to the Shamrock, AB members are adorned with various white supremacist tattoos, including Nazi symbols (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005).

In 1973 the AB began to spread into federal prison system and since that time has spread to many other prisons, both state and federal. Over the years the AB evolved from a white supremacist prison gang into a white supremacist criminal enterprise. The AB earns money through involving drug trafficking, drug dealing, extortion, contract killings, and shakedowns (FBI, n.d.). This provides for some interesting bed partners for a white supremacist organization. The AB has routinely ignored strict rules regarding negotiating, or doing business, with black and Hispanic gangs (US DOJ, 2003).

The AB grows and expands through the 1980s and continues to develop its criminal operations. As a result, the AB was involved with an increasing amount of violence and crime, including numerous attacks and murders on inmates and prison guards. This brought the gang to the attention of both state and federal authorities. The California Department of Corrections cracked down on the organization by identifying it as a “prison gang” and isolating it from the

rest of the prison population. This forced the AB to rely on other white supremacist gangs like the Nazi Low Riders to assist it with its criminal enterprise (Anti-Defamation League, 1998). The federal government also got involved when the FBI began investigating the organization. The investigation spanned from 1982 – 1989 but did not result in any prosecution (FBI, n.d). However in 1992 the U.S. Attorney began a new investigation and ten years later most of the suspected leaders of the gang were indicated and charged with various crimes, such as: stabbings, poisonings, extortion, robbery, narcotics trafficking, conspiracy to commit murder, and contract murders. In 2006 eleven more members of the AB were indicted (whiteprisongangs.blogspot.com¹, n.d.). While these legal prosecutions certainly hurt, there is no evidence that it has significantly impacted operations or destabilized the organization. As of 2006 the estimated national membership of the AB was at least 15,000 (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005), and there is no evidence that this has changed in the last couple of years.

Ideology

From the beginning the AB was a white supremacist organization. It required new members to read Mein Kampf and kill another (frequently a black inmate) to “earn their badge” of membership (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005). Although the AB appears to have transformed to an organization that puts profit over ideology, members of AB continue to support the white supremacist ethos. In the beginning the AB seemed to identify with a neo-Nazi philosophy. During the 1970s and 1980s many members responded to the Aryan Nations prison outreach and converted to Christian Identity. Today, members subscribe to a mix of white supremacist ideologies, including Odinism (Norse/Viking theology) (Inside Prison, n.d.). While the AB does not espouse any unified white supremacist ideology, it is linked to many acts of violence consistent with the white supremacist ideology.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. In May of 1999, T.W. (37), a black inmate at a U.S. penitentiary in Marion, Illinois was killed after he had a violent interaction with a white inmate. The murder was ordered by a leader of AB, and three members stabbed T.W. to death (Anti-Defamation League², 2009).
2. On November 17, 1999 in Indiana, two members, ages 18 and 19, shot and killed an African-American teenager, as he was walking home with diapers for his girlfriend's baby. The victim was targeted because of the white supremacist ideology of the Aryan Brotherhood and because one of the perpetrators was hoping to earn the right to get a spider-web tattoo indicating that he killed a person of another race (Thomas, 1999).
3. On May 17, 2001, an Aryan Brotherhood member killed a man and woman who had taken in the perpetrator when he was homeless. The AB members shot both victims in the head. The woman, who was pregnant, was killed because the perpetrator believed she was a "nigger lover" and that the father of the baby was an African-American man. The man was killed because the perpetrator was angry that the victim played a role in helping police find the perpetrator so they could serve him with a traffic ticket (State v. Tracy Allen Hampton).
4. On July 2, 2007 in Lubbock Texas 37 year old Aryan Brotherhood member, accompanied by his friend, returned to a 7-Eleven with a gun after an argument involving racial epithets. Upon return to the store he saw a group of African-American men who he claims created a tense atmosphere, and scared him. The group of African-American men were three brothers. The AB member shot and killed one of the brothers (21 years old) (Anti-Defamation League, 2008²)

Sample(s) of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes Committed

1. In 2000 an AB member who was an explosive expert that turned informant informed federal investigators that he had been approached by leaders of the AB to teach them to make bombs which they intended use on federal buildings and officials (Spcenter, 2005)
2. In 2001, angry about the September 11th attacks, an AB member shot a Bangladeshi gas station attendant because he "looked like an Arab" (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005)

C. Aryan National Front

History

The Aryan National Front is a white supremacist group with a short history. The group was formed in the early 1990s (likely 1990 or 1991) by Bill Riccio, a white supremacist associated with the Ku Klux Klan. Riccio's was an auto-parts salesman, with a criminal history (possession of illegal gun) whose real name was William E. Davidson (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). Riccio owned some property in Alabama which he turned into a compound (called the WAR House) for his newly formed group.

The Aryan National Front, almost exclusively, attracted teenage boys. It appears that the Aryan National Front consisted of Riccio, an adult in his thirties, and numerous disenfranchised white teenagers. One of the factors that may have been drawing these young men to the Aryan National Front was the opportunity to hang out and party on the compound without any real adult supervision. Riccio regularly threw parties and served alcohol (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). Riccio's motivation to recruit teenage boys may not have been accidental or simply a desire to educate the next generation of white supremacists, Although never charged, a number of former members of the Aryan National Front have alleged that Riccio attempted to, or did in fact, sexually molest them while at the compound (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007).

Another possible motivation for recruiting young men is that it served his ego. The Southern Poverty Law Center points out that Riccio did not seem interested in generating revenue for the cause (in fact he used his income to fund the activities at the WAR house), but rather simply enjoy being adored (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, by 1992 Riccio presided over at least 70 skinheads residing in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006).

The Aryan National Front was centered around Riccio and collapsed with his arrest in August 1992. Riccio was again charged with illegal weapons possession and sentenced to fifteen months in federal prison. Upon release from prison he returned to the Ku Klux Klan and ultimately became the national chaplain of the North Georgia White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). The Aryan National Front only existed for approximately two years.

Ideology

Riccio was not an educated leader like William Pierce of the National Alliance or Richard Butler of the Aryan Nations. However, he was a close friend of Roger Handley (former grand dragon of the Invisible Empire Knights of the Ku Klux Klan) (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006) and thus very familiar with white supremacist ideology. He indoctrinated the members with a blend of neo-Confederate ideology and Hitler worship (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2006). He instructed the boys to blame their problems on minorities, Jews, and gays. Further, he informed them that Jews secretly control the U.S. government (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2007). In addition to providing an ideological foundation, Riccio also gave members a plan to achieve their objectives. According to the Southern Poverty Law Center, during the taping of an HBO documentary titled “Skinheads, U.S.A.”, Riccio explained that the ultimate goal of the organization was to reclaim the South for pure Aryans (Southern Poverty Law Center 2006).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. On the evening of April 18, 1992 in Alabama, four individuals went out looking to murder a minority in celebration of Hitler's birthday. Two of the individuals, E.H. (22) and M. D. (22), were members of the Aryan National Front. A third participant, M.L. (18 yr), was a member of Hammerskin Nation, and the fourth participant (18) was an Aryan Nation member. The foursome decided to go "bashing" as a way to celebrate. They were looking for any non-white individual and ultimately found a 35 year old homeless African-American man camping under a viaduct. The victim was beaten and stabbed to death (Nizkor Project¹, n.d.; Visser, 1993).

D. Aryan Nations

History

The Aryan Nations was created in 1973 by Richard Girnt Butler. Butler actually created the Aryan Nations for the purpose of serving as the political arm to his church, the Church of Jesus Christ Christian, where Butler served as Reverend. The history of the Aryan Nations (AN) requires a brief recounting of Butler's personal history.

Richard Girnt Butler was born in 1918 in Colorado and later moved with his family to California where he studied Aeronautical Engineering (Wakin, 2004). He then joined the Army Air Corp and was stationed in India where he worked on planes for the Royal Indian Air Force. It was during this time that Butler claims he began think about white racial superiority. While in India he observed that that caste system was such that the whiter the individual, the higher their societal position (Wakin, 2004).

After the war Butler settled in Montebello, California and worked as an engineer during the 1950s. During this time he also started to believe that Jews were behind Communism's objective of worldwide domination. In the 1960s, Butler left his Presbyterian Church because he felt the church contained too many minorities. A few years later he would leave his position with Lockheed Martin out of disgust with the Federal policy that required Lockheed to hire more minorities in exchange for a federal loan (Wakin, 2004). It was around this time that Butler met (introduced by William Potter Gale) Wesley Smith. Smith was one of the originators of Christian Identity faith and founded his church, Church of Jesus Christ Christian, in Lancaster, California in 1946 (Balch, 2006). Butler, who already maintained a healthy respect for Hitler and National Socialism, and a strong dislike for communism, was tremendously influenced by Swift (commenting at one time that Swift was the "total turning point" in his life (Balch,2006;

Barkun,1997). Butler became a member of Swift's church and a strong adherent to the Identity ideology. Not long thereafter Butler began conducting services at Swift's church (Barkun,1997). Swift died on October 8, 1970 of an alleged heart attack and Butler became the head of the church.

Despite Butler's best efforts the number of congregants of the church began to drop. In 1973 Butler purchased 20 acres in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho, near Hayden Lake, where he established his own Church of Jesus Christ Christian (Barkun, 1997). From 1973 to 1978 the Church of Jesus Christ Christian church compound was comprised primarily of a closely connected group of families. In 1978 Butler created the Aryan Nations, which was to function as the political arm of his Christian Identity church, thus the full name of Butler's organization was Church of Jesus Christ Christian, Aryan Nations (Balch, 2006). The name Jesus Christ Christian reflects the belief that Jesus was not Jewish, and the term Aryan Nations reflects the call to whites from various European nations and North America (Balch, 2006).

From 1978 until 2001 the Aryan Nations' headquarters was located at Butler's compound in Idaho. During the early years the Aryan Nation organization expanded in the form of loosely affiliated chapters located around Idaho and elsewhere in the country. Part of the rise of the Aryan Nations during its early years can be attributed to its call for a white racial homeland in the Pacific Northwest, which struck a chord with those concerned with how best to respond to the rapid growth of multiracialism. The rise of the Aryan Nations is also likely linked to the waning influence of the KKK (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002).

Beginning in July of 1980 Butler organized his first, of many, annual Aryan World Congresses (AWC), which took place each July at the Aryan Nations compound in Idaho (Balch, 2006). The purpose of the conferences was to attract white separatists from various religious and

ideological factions. Within in a couple of years attendance grew significantly with 200 AWC attendees in 1982 and 500 attendees in 1983 (Balch,2006). Attending the 1983 AWC was Robert Mathews. Mathews, dissatisfied with Butler's leadership, formed a criminal/terrorist organization called "The Order," also known as Brüders Schweigen (Silent Brotherhood). The Order was comprised of members from the Aryan Nations, National Alliance, and the Klu Klux Klan, and was created to accomplish two objectives. First, it was to foment a revolution, and second it was to obtain funds for the various racist organizations (Balch, 2006). In furtherance of these objectives, The Order went on a crime spree that involved murder and bank robberies, among other crimes. The Order was successful in stealing millions of dollars but ultimately was a short lived when its members were arrested and Mathews died in a shoot- out with federal authorities.

While the 1980s were relatively good years for the Aryan Nations, the 1990s were less kind. The 1990s saw a decline in AWC attendance, with only 120 attendees in 1992, and as few as 150 in 1995, 70 in 1996, and 85 in 1997 (Balch, 2006). Some of this decline may be linked to fears of law enforcement after the stand-off with Randy Weaver at Ruby Ridge in August of 1992 and the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. In addition to the apparent decline of interest in Aryan Nations and the AWC, Butler's health began to wane. Recognizing his failing health, Butler appointed Carl Franklin (then "Chief of Staff" of the Aryan Nations) as the new leader of the Aryan Nations. However, within two years Franklin left the Aryan Nations to establish his own church in Montana (Barkun, 1997) and Butler resumed the leadership role. During the July 1995 Aryan Nations World Congress, there was an unsuccessful attempt by Aryan Nation members John Burke and Charles Mangles to seize control of the Aryan Nations from Butler.

Things started to look up again in the late 1990s. Butler received a large donation from R. Vincent Bertollini and Carl Story, two men who made a lot of money in Silicon Valley and were very supportive of Butler and the Aryan Nations. Also, Butler organized a march through Coeur d'Alene for the 1998 AWC and 170 people attended the 1998 AWC. This good fortune would be very short lived however because later that year Aryan Nation guards shot at and assaulted Victoria Keenan and her son Jason, who happen to be driving on a road near the Aryan Nation compound. A lawsuit was brought, on behalf of the Keenans, against Richard Butler and the Aryan Nations resulting in a \$6.3 million dollar judgment in 2000 (www.cnn.com). Furthermore, the Keenans were awarded legal title to the name "Aryan Nations" and "Church of Jesus Christ Christian" (CBS News, 2004). The \$6.3 million dollar judgment in 2000 bankrupted Butler and the Aryan Nations and Butler lost the 20 acre compound at Hayden Lake. Bertollini and Story came to Butler's aide again and purchased a new 1,200 square foot tract house in Hayden, Idaho for Butler. Butler renamed his organization the "Aryan National Alliance" and continued to run operations out of his new home with a small group of volunteers (Balch, 2006). The AWC in 2000 was the last congress held on Butler's 20 acre compound and it only attracted 90 attendees. Subsequent congresses (2001 – 2004) were held on campgrounds and had between 40 and 70 attendees.

In August of 2001 Butler appointed Harold Ray Redfeairn as leader of the Aryan Nations. Redfeairn, who was located in Ohio, had been seeking the leadership role for a number of years. Shortly after his appointment, Redfeairn, along with August Kreis III (Propoganda Minister for the Aryan Nations) led their own group away to establish the new official Aryan Nations headquarters in Pennsylvania. In response to this move, Butler declared that the official headquarters remained in Hayden Lake, Idaho and expelled Redfeairn and Kreis

(Southern Poverty Law Center, 2002). Within a few months, Redfeairn accused Kreis of thievery and returned to the Aryan Nations. Kreis then joined Charles John Juba's Aryan Nations in Pennsylvania. Jay Faber and Joshua Caleb Sutter were appointed to the positions of High Counsel of this organization (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2002). Thus, there were now competing Aryan Nations, Butler's in Idaho and Kreis and Juba's in Pennsylvania.

In 2002 the Idaho Aryan Nations headquarters was transferred to a post office box in Lincoln, Alabama. The post office box was in the name of Clark Patterson. Butler continued his activities as leader of the Aryan Nations and held another AWC in 2002 but leadership ultimately passed to Jonathan Williams upon Butler's death in September, 2004 (Anti-Defamation League, 2009).

In 2005 Juba resigned as leader of the Pennsylvania based Aryan Nations and named Kreiss as his successor. Kreis moves the headquarters to Lexington, South Carolina. Around that time Williams moved Butler's Aryan Nation headquarters to Lincoln, Alabama. Williams continued to hold Aryan Nation World Congresses, with the most recent taking place in 2006. It appears that Williams has recently stepped down from his role as leader of the Aryan Nations to start his own church called United Church of YHWH. Although not definitively stated, it appears the new Pastor of the Aryan Nations/Church of Jesus Christ Christian located in Lincoln, Alabama is either a man by the name of Pastor Michael Lombard or Pastor Jerold O'Brien.

Today, there are two competing Aryan Nations, each claiming to be the true and legitimate Aryan Nations. The two organizations differ in their level of religious commitment and in their attitudes towards Arabs. Kreis' Aryan Nations does not appear to be heavily invested in the Christian Identity religion, where as William's/Lombard's Aryan Nations emphasizes it strongly and has dropped the use of Nazi symbols (Arizona Daily Star, 2007).

Also, Kreis has embraced Arabs and Al-Qaeda and maintains links on his website to Islamic websites (The Weekly Standard, 2005). Williams on the other hand, although sympathetic to Arabs vis-à-vis Israel, believes supporting Arabs and Islamic fundamentalists such as al-Qaeda is contrary to the beliefs and ideals of Christian Identity (Snugg, 2006).

Ideology

As noted above, the Aryan Nations subscribe to the religious ideology known as Christian Identity. Christian Identity evolved from a belief system known as British-Israelism. British-Israelism is the notion that the British are the actual descendents of the ten lost tribes from the northern kingdom of Israel, and the two tribes from the southern kingdom of Israel were a people known as Jews. According to the beliefs of British-Israel followers, the Jews played an important role in British-Israel's millennial vision because a prerequisite of the Last Days is a reuniting of all the lost tribes in Israel, thus Anglo-Jewish resettlement of then Palestine was supported by adherents of British-Israelism. (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). British-Israelism was brought to the United States by Lieutenant Charles Totten and the missionary expeditions of Edward Hine between 1884 and 1888. (Goodrick-Clarke, 2002). Soon thereafter a national organization for British-Israel was established under the name "Anglo-Saxon Federation of America" and was led by Howard B. Rand. Rand has the dubious distinction of being the individual who first to introduce anti-Semitic theories to American British-Israel theology. Furthering this anti-Jewish influence was William J. Cameron, a journalist and editor for Henry Ford's weekly, the Dearborn Independent. He later became Ford's Press Agent. Cameron introduced Jewish world order conspiracies to the American chapters of British-Israel. Soon thereafter British-Israelism in California began affiliating with Vancouver chapters of British-Israel which had also adopted anti-Semitic and conspiratorial world views. This association

further drove the American version of British-Israelism to the right. Los Angeles soon became the center of the British-Israel movement as four leaders (Gerald L.K. Smith, Wesley Swift, William Potter Gale, and Bernard Comparet) of the movement converged there. These individuals ultimately come to be the first generation of Christian Identity adherents.

In 1944 two books are published that provided theories that were to become the foundation of Christian Identity. The first book, "When? A Prophetic Novel of the Very Near Future" alleges that Jews are the offspring of Satan, and Cain, being the son of Satan and Eve, founded a secret society to carry out the Devil's work. The other book, "When Gog Attacks", alleges that Cain is the founder of the Synagogue of Satan and asserts the historical truth of "The Protocols of the Elders of Zion." The belief that Jews are the spawn of Satan comes to be known as "seedline" Christian Identity. (Balch, 2006; Barkun, 1997). While British-Israel didn't hold Jews in the highest regard, the Jews were at least salvageable and could ultimately be converted to Christianity either before or during the time of the Second Coming. According to seedline Christian Identity, there is no salvation for Jews (Satan's spawn bent on the annihilation of Aryans) and thus the only option is extermination (Barkun, 1997).

In support of their belief that the Satanic Jews are pursuing an objective of Aryan annihilation, the Aryan Nations adopted a number of conspiracy theories. For instance, members believe that the United States government (commonly referred to as ZOG – Zionist Occupied Government) is secretly run by Jews (Goodrick-Clark, 2002) as are all the governments of the western world (George Michael, 2006). Moreover, it is believed that the U.S. Government is engaged in the destruction of Aryans by allowing minorities to invade their ethnic homeland through immigration (legal and illegal), affirmative action, killing of white babies via abortions, human sacrifices of white children for the purpose of drinking the blood, race mixing, and

encouraging women to seek careers thereby curbing white population growth. (Goodrick-Clark, 2002) All of this is orchestrated by the Jews who control non-whites. Furthermore, it is believed that Jews control the media and financial institutions.

As a consequence of their religious and conspiratorial beliefs, the Aryan Nations is a survivalist organization in that they believe that there will be an ultimate showdown between good (white Christians) and evil (Jews and non-whites). Butler preached about an upcoming apocalyptic race war (Balch, 2006) which would ultimately serve to preserve the white race and culture and result in a National Socialist Aryan state governed by Biblical laws (Balch, 2006) In preparation for the apocalyptic showdown, and recognizing that overthrowing the American government and making the United States a white-only nation was highly unlikely, Butler and the Aryan Nations settled for the more moderate, goal of creating a white only Aryan Nation in the Northwest United States. This was known as the 10% solution because it involved taking over 5 out of 50 states. It was believed that this could be accomplished by first bringing like-minded racist whites to Idaho and over time gaining enough power to take over Idaho. Once Idaho was within their control, the racist would use similar tactics to take over Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Wyoming (Balch, 2006).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. The Aryan Nations is tied to the murder of a 35 year old black homeless man. One of the participants in the murder was Aryan Nation member C.W. (18). On April 18, 1992 C.W. and three friends, two Aryan National Front members and one Hammerskin Nation member went out to celebrate Hitler's birthday. The foursome decided to go out "bashing" (attacking a non-white person) to celebrate. They found a homeless man camping out under a viaduct, and beat and stabbed him to death (Visser, 1993).
2. In Denver Colorado on November 19th, 1997 Aryan Nations member N.T. (21) and his friend J.B. (25) shot and killed a 38 year old immigrant from Senegal because he was

“wearing the enemy’s uniform” – the victim was black. They also shot and paralyzed a white nurse who tried to help the victim from Senegal. N.T. made it very clear in an interview subsequent to the murder that, consistent with his white supremacist ideology, he shot the victim out of love for his white race and a desire to live in a place where there were no black people. N.T. was sentenced to life plus 32 years, and J.B. received 12 years (Brook², 1997; Montana Human Rights Network, 1997).

3. On August 10, 1999 B.F. went on a shooting spree where he shot at a Jewish Community Center day care in Granda Hills outside of Los Angeles, injuring three children and an adult employee, and then shot and killed a United States Postal Worker. The postal worker was Filipino. By his own admission B.F. admitted that he engaged in the attack because of his hatred of Jews and that he would not have killed the postal worker had he been white. Moreover, B.F. said that the fact that the postal worker was a federal employee made him an even more attractive target. B.F. had been a member of the Aryan Nations for approximately five years and had, at times, worked as a security guard at the group’s compound in Idaho. B.F. was charged with, and plead guilty to, a number of crimes, including committing an act of terrorism (CNN, 2001; California Senate Office of Research, 2004).
4. On August 23, 2003 an incarcerated Aryan Nations member (age 37) murdered a 68 year old man who was serving time for acts of pedophilia committed while serving as a priest in the Catholic church. The perpetrator hated Jews, blacks, and homosexuals and was serving a life sentence for murdering a gay bus driver in 1988. While in prison, but prior to murdering the former priest, the perpetrator sent hoax anthrax letters to attorneys that he thought had Jewish sounding names. (Conner, 2003).

Sample(s) of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes Committed

1. In 1983 Aryan Nation members along with members of the National Alliance and the KKK formed “The Order.” The Order engaged in a crime spree that involved robbing armored cars, counterfeiting, and murder. The goal was to provide funds for white supremacist groups and ultimately overthrow the U.S. government (Balch, 2006).
2. In 2009, an Aryan Nation member, along with three others, lured an African-American man into a home where they severely beat him while yelling racial epithets (Southern Poverty Law Center¹, 2009).

E. Confederate Knights of America

History

The Confederate Knights of America was created as a splinter group from Virgin Griffin's Christian Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. Terry Boyce left Griffin's group in 1989 to form the Confederate Knights of America (CKA) after becoming frustrated by the lack of militancy in Griffin's organization (Green, Abelson, & Garnett, 1999). CKA was formed with the help of North Carolina neo-Nazi Harold Covington (Nizkor², n.d.) and established in Huntersville, North Carolina (Anti-Defamation League, 1995). The CKA has established chapters in Virginia, Mississippi, and has members within the Texas prison system (Temple-Raston, 2002).

Unfortunately, there is not much historical information available on this organization. What is known is that CKA focused on recruiting young men and developed ties to skinhead groups such as SS of America which served as security guards for CKA events. CKA also had a close relationship with the National Socialist Front (Anti-Defamation League, 1995). What is also known is that the CKA is associated with the murder of James Byrd Jr., an African-American man who was dragged to his death behind a pick-up truck in Jasper, Texas on June 7, 1998. The murder was committed by Shawn Allen Berry, Lawrence Russell Brewer, and John William King (Stewart, 1999). King and Brewer joined the CKA in the early 1990s during previous stints in a local prison (Cohen, 1999). Upon his release from prison, King wanted to start a Texas chapter of the CKA and the killing of Byrd may have been part of an initiation ritual.

The current status of the CKA is unclear but it is interesting to note that the group is not listed on the Southern Poverty Law Center's hate map as being present in either North Carolina or Texas.

Ideology

There is little information about CKA's ideology. It is frequently referred to as a skinhead group but its original foundation is linked to Christian Identity and Boyce has spoken at Christian Identity events. Consistent with the Christian Identity religion, the CKA apparently believed a race war was imminent (Temple-Raston, 2002). Allegedly, while tying Byrd to the back of the truck, King stated that he was "starting the Turner Diaries early" (Sapsted, 1998).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. On June 7, 1998 L.B. (31) and J. K. (23), both members of the Confederate White Vikings, along with S.B. (23) beat a 49 year old African-American man with a bat and then chained him to the back of their pick-up truck and dragged him to his death. The victim was targeted because of his race. Subsequent to the murder, J.K. wrote, "Regardless of the outcome of this, we have made history. Death before dishonor. Sieg Heil!" Also, an officer testified that witnesses said J.K. referenced The Turner Diaries after beating the victim. In addition to being motivated by hate, there is some suggestion that the murder was committed to help recruit members to a group the three wanted to start called the Texas Rebel Soldier Division of the Confederate Knights of America (Lyman, 1999; Thesmokinggun.com, n.d.).

F. Confederate White Vikings

History

There is virtually no information available on this group. What is known is that the group was created in the Dallas area in 1989. It is not clear how the group came to be created or who were the initial founders, but according to Mark Briskman of the Anti-Defamation League, a portion of the group consists of individuals associated with the Confederate Hammerskins. Mr. Briskman also estimated that in 1990 the Confederate White Vikings (CWV) consisted of approximately twenty-eight members (Nizkor³, n.d.)

Ideology

There is no specific information about the group's ideology nor does it appear that the group ever published any material that would provide insight into the groups ideological underpinnings or objectives. The CWV's are, however, referred to as a skinhead group. In support of this conclusion is the assertion that the group consisted of individuals that were former members of the Confederate Hammerskins.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) On June 7, 1991, in Texas, two members of the Confederate White went out with a member of the Hammerskins with the intent to kill an African-American in a drive by shooting. The three men shot and killed a 37 year old African-American man (Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Tolley, 1993).

G. Denver Skins

History

The Denver Skins are a skinhead group created sometime during the middle to late 1980s (Bnet, 1998). It appears that a number of individuals left another skinhead group to form the Denver Skins. It is not clear who founded the group but Shawn Slater was an early leader of the group. Slater is a well known white supremacist who ultimately left the Denver Skins to join the Knights of the KKK . (Nizkor¹, n.d.).

There is very little information about the Denver Skins and it is not known whether the group still exists. It appears that at its height the group contained at least thirty members (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005).

Ideology

It is unknown whether the Denver Skins were motivated by a specific ideology. However, in light of the chosen name for the group and the fact that they are consistently identified as a skinhead organization in the media, it is probably safe to conclude that they are (were) similar, ideologically speaking, to other racist skinhead organizations.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) In 1997 a 25 year old man covered in white supremacist tattoos (swastika, lightning bolts, and the Nazi slogan, Blood and Honor”) had a history of run-ins with the police. Over time his anger become focused on “the sytem,” especially at the police. On November 12, 1997 the police responding to a call involving a burglary attempted to pull over this 25 year old man while he was driving with a friend. A chase ensued that ended in a shooting where this man shot and killed a veteran officer (46 yr). The perpetrator continued to shoot at police officers until he ran out of bullets. He then used the deat officer’s gun to kill himself (Brook¹, 1997; Southern Poverty Law Center, 2005).

H. Hammerskin Nation

History

Hammerskin Nation is the umbrella organization that unites various regional divisions of this enduring skinhead organization. The regional divisions are comprised of local groups. The first Hammerskin group was formed in Dallas Texas in 1987. The initial founders were John Johnson, Jennifer Johnson, and Paul Langly (Hammerskin.net). After Dallas, Hammerskin groups were formed in Georgia, Tennessee, and Florida. These ultimately made up the regional division known as Confederate Hammerskins. Other local groups around the country soon followed and ultimately led to other regional divisions, such as Eastern Hammerskins, Northern Hammerskins, and Westerns Hammerskins (Anti-Defamation League, 2009; Southern Poverty Law Center, 1999). The umbrella organization known as Hammerskin Nation was not created until 1994 and it was created to eliminate the regional titles and become a more unified organization (Hammerskin.net).

From the beginning the Hammerskins experienced quick growth. Much of this growth was due to their friendship with Tom Metzger of White Aryan Resistance. Metzger promoted the Hammerskins in the WAR newspaper and Aryan Fest videos. The Hammerskins was also touted in various on-line magazines like Pure Impact, Final War, and Blood and Honor (Hammerskin.net). Hammerskin chapters began popping up all over the country and soon thereafter international chapters emerged in Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, Great Britain, Poland, Netherlands, Serbia, Slovenia, and Russia (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1999).

During the 1990s the Hammerskin Nation remained a fairly stable organization and maintained its prominence among skinheads as well as within the broader white supremacist movement. It grew to a formidable organization with approximately 600 United States members

(Southern Poverty Law Center², 2006). However, Hammerskin Nation's good fortune begins to change after an event in 1999 known as "the pool cue and blowtorch incident." This incident involved a directive from the leaders of Hammerskin Nation to an Indiana chapter to evict a member who had repeatedly propositioned another member's wife. The instructions were to inform the individual that his membership was being revoked and to remove any patches, pins, etc. that indicated an affiliation with the Hammerskin Nation. As instructed, the Indiana leaders located the individual and informed him that his membership had been revoked. However, they also roughed him up, burned off his tattoos with a blowtorch, and shoved a pool cue up his rectum. The leaders who ordered the directive were outraged by this excessive conduct and consequently banished the five Indiana based Hammerskins who committed the violent acts. In response to the expulsion, eight other members of the Indiana chapter left the organization, and joined the five expelled members to form the Outlaw Hammerskins. The Outlaw Hammerskins would ultimately be a thorn in the side of Hammerskin Nation (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2006).

The Outlaw Hammerskins represented a new breed of violent skinhead in that they were white supremacist but listened to rap music, wore gold chains, and quick to violence if they felt disrespected. Some referred to them as "Whiggers" (white "niggers") (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2006). This new breed seems to have found an appealing mixture as membership grew quickly. The Outlaw Hammerskins were antagonistic towards Hammerskin Nation and overtly disrespected them, resulting in Hammerskin Nation losing face. Within a very short time, however, the Outlaw Hammerskins had internal difficulties, as well as troubles with the law, ultimately culminating in the organization's downfall. However, from the Outlaw Hammerskins came new skinhead groups (e.g. Vinlanders Social Club), which continued to challenge the

dominance of Hammerskin Nation and painted the organization as elitist. Over time Hammerskin Nation's dominance and influence waned. In 2002 there were eighteen active skinhead groups, most of which were under the control of Hammerskin Nation. By 2007 there were fifty-nine active skinhead groups, of which only six belonged to Hammerskin Nation (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2006).

Although smaller and less influential than they were ten years ago, Hammerskin Nation is still in existence and still organizing annual events and concerts. They continue to be close allies of Volksfront, and in 2007 they entered into a truce with the Vinlanders Social Club, their number one rival (Southern Poverty Law Center³, 2007).

Ideology

The ideology of Hammerskin Nation is similar to that of most racist skinhead groups. They see themselves as in not only in a race struggle but a class struggle as well. Their ideological focus is race and economics (Southern Poverty Law Center, 1999).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. On June 7, 1991, in Texas, a Hammerskin member (17), along with two members of the Confederate White Vikings who were of the same approximate age went out into the evening with the intent to kill an African-American in a drive by shooting. While driving, the three observed a 37 year old African-American man who they shot and killed. (Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Tolley, 1993).
2. On December 24, 1991 in Alabama, two 20 year old members went out "bashing." Bashing is attacking non-white people, homosexuals or others viewed unfavorably by skinheads. On the evening of December 24th, the two perpetrators found a 50 year old African-American homeless man whom they beat to death with a baseball bat (Anti-Defamation League, 2005; Visser², 1993; Visser, 1994) .
3. On the evening of April 18, 1992 in Alabama, four individuals went out looking to murder a minority in celebration of Hitler's birthday. The four individuals consisted of one member of the Hammerskin Nation, two members of the Aryan National Front, and one member of the Aryan Nations. These found individuals, ranging in

age from 18- 22, found a homeless African-American man lying under a viaduct. The man was targeted and murdered because of the desire to attack those considered inferior in honor of Hitler's birthday (Visser¹, 1993).

Sample(s) of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes Committed

1. In 1988, members of Confederate Hammerskin Nation chased and beat African-Americans and Hispanics who attempted to enter a public park Dallas with the objective of keeping minorities out of the park (Anti-Defamation League, 2005).
2. Also in 1988 members vandalized a synagogue and Jewish community center by shooting out the windows, smashing doors, and spray painting swastikas (Anti-Defamation League, 2005).
3. In 1989 members firebombed a minority-owned nightclub and assaulted its non-white patrons (Anti-Defamation League, 2005).
4. In 1999, members of the Western Hammerskins, without provocation, attacked a 23 year old African-American man because, as they stated, "We don't like niggers here." They also shouted, "Kill that nigger" during the attack (Anti-Defamation League, 2005).

I. Insane Criminal Posse

History

The Insane Criminal Posse (ICP) was a very small group that existed for a short time. The Insane Criminal Posse was created in 1995 and consisted of three people – Gunner Jay Lindberg, Domenic Michael Christopher, and Domenic’s cousin Walter Dulaney (Hernandez, 1997). The leader of this group was Lindberg. Lindberg has a long and violent criminal history as well as a history as a white supremacist (Anti-Defamation League, 2008). Lindberg’s father was a marine who abandoned the family in 1977 when Lindbergh’s younger brother Jerry Gunner was born. Lindbergh was two years old. Lindbergh’s mother then moved the family to various locations as she developed relationships with a series of men. Lindbergh’s mother married another marine in 1988 and they moved to a military base in Okinawa, Japan. This is where Lindbergh first started acting out. Lindbergh returned to the U.S. to live with his grandmother but continued his downward slide into a life of deviance and crime. He began using drugs and alcohol and was cited for assault (Moxley, 2008). From this point on Lindbergh’s life is a string of criminal acts (i.e. serious assault of Hispanic day laborer, armed robbery of elderly lady, possession of methamphetamine, assault of a young boy, etc.) (*OC Weekly*, 2008). Ultimately Lindbergh ended up in a juvenile facility and then state prison. It was during this time that Lindbergh’s racist views began to cement, as evidenced by his attempts to create a white supremacist gang during this time (tolerance.org). According to Lindbergh he ran a White Aryan Resistance group while in prison and wrote to well known white supremacist Gordon Jack Mohr (Anti-Defamation League, 2008). Lindbergh was ultimately paroled but violated his parole and fled to Tustin, California in 1995. Lindbergh found a job at Kmart using

his dead brother's name. His younger brother committed suicide two years earlier (OC Weekly, 2008).

It is not clear exactly when Lindbergh formed Insane Criminal Posse but it is suspected that it was after he moved to California. Within a year of moving to California, Lindbergh and Christopher viciously attacked and mutilated Thien Minh Ly, a 24 year old Vietnamese immigrant. Lindbergh and Christopher were arrested, and after less than a year of existence, the Insane Criminal Posse was finished.

Ideology

The Insane Criminal Posse did not exist long enough to publicize its ideology underpinnings in any form. However, an inspection of Lindbergh's room after his arrest provides some insight. In addition to previous correspondence with Jack Mohr, Lindbergh had also corresponded with the Aryan Nations, KKK groups, White Aryan Resistance, and the New Order (successor to the American Nazi Party) and the National Association for the Advancement of White People (OC Weekly, 2008). In addition Lindbergh had some Nazi paraphernalia. In sum, Lindbergh, Christopher and Dulaney were racists who formed a white supremacist group for the purpose of engaging in acts in conformity therewith. It is not clear whether the organization adhered to any specific ideology or was influenced by any specific group.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) At 8pm on January 28, 1996 in Ocean County, California, two members of the Insane Criminal Posse, ages 21 and 17, approached a 24 year old Vietnamese immigrant while he was practicing his rollerblading at a local high school's tennis courts. The two perpetrators found the 5' 6" victim alone and approached him calling him a "Jap." The two men beat the victim and stabbed him 25 or more times. The older perpetrator, who had a history of violence against minorities also attacked two Vietnamese men while in prison awaiting his trial (OC Weekly, 2008).

J. National Socialist Front

History

Unfortunately, there is very little available information about the National Socialist Front (NSF). What is known is that the NSF was headquartered in Fayetteville, North Carolina and was active during the early 1990s. NSF had very close ties with the Confederate Knight of America (CKA) (Shinbaum, 1995). In fact, some media sources referred to them as the same group (Confederate Knights of America, National Socialist Front) (The Troublemaker, 2006). Although not certain, it is likely that the NSF was actually a militant arm of the CKA (AllExperts.com, n.d.).

Similar to the CKA, the NSF is not included in the Southern Poverty Law Center's Hate map. Thus, it is likely that this group is no longer in existence.

Ideology

The NSF is referred to in the media as a neo-Nazi organization or a neo-Nazi skinhead group. The ideological foundations upon which the NSF is founded are unknown but, based on the organization's name, it can be assumed that it is a neo-Nazi group that likely has strong connections to the skinhead movement.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) The leader of the Winston-Salem, North Carolina chapter of the NSF murdered a white youth and shot one of the youth's two African-American friends. The perpetrator saw the three men walking together and after an exchange of words, during which the perpetrator yelled "Die, nigger-lover," the perpetrator shot the white youth with a high powered rifle (Anti-Defamation League, 1995; Anti-Defamation League, 1996)

K. Nazi Low Riders

History

It is not clear exactly how the Nazi Low Riders (NLR) first came to be, but it is believed that they first came into existence during the early to mid-1970s. The group was created by inmates (juvenile and young adults) housed within the California Youth Authority (Anti-Defamation League², 2005). During the early 1980s the California Department of Corrections began to focus on the Aryan Brotherhood and disrupt its criminal activities by isolating members in the Security Housing Unit. The Aryan Brotherhood turned to the NLR to assist the AB with their criminal enterprises by acting as middlemen and muscle. Because the NLR were fairly unknown they were able to fly under the radar and take on activities previously performed by AB members (California Department of Justice, 2004). This business alliance transformed the NLR from a relatively unknown white supremacist prison gang into a major player among California prison gangs in general, and white supremacist gangs in specific (Anti-Defamation League², 2005). The NLR were less paramilitary than the AB but more violent (Insideprison.com², n.d.). The two prison gangs became so close that at some point during the 1980s, an AB member by the name of John “Youngster” Stinson took charge of the NLR and reorganized the gang (Policemag.com, 2009).

From the 1990s onward, the NLR experienced substantial growth as it spread throughout the California prison system. By the year 2000 the F.B.I. estimated that there were 1500 members within the California prison system. In addition to its growth within the prison system, the NLR evolved into a significant street gang as well with paroled members starting units not only in California, but in Nevada, New Mexico and Colorado as well. Recently, the NLR has been identified in Indiana, Illinois, and Florida (Anti-Defamation League², 2005).

In 1999 the NLR, like the AB, was classified by the California Department of Corrections as a Prison Gang and members were isolated in the Security Housing Unit. Similar to the AB after isolation, the NLR had to seek assistance from other white supremacist prison gangs. The NLR turned to Public Enemy Number 1 (PENI). Consequently, PENI's status within the prison system rose as did its membership (California Department of Justice, 2004). However, unlike the AB, it appears that the Prison Gang classification and subsequent isolation caused the NLR to suffer losses. Members either dropped out or graduated to membership within the AB (Policemag.com, 2009). This may be due to the fact that once isolated, and out of the general prison population, NLR were no longer useful to the AB (Policemag.com, 2009).

Since 1999 the NLR have continued to function both within prison and as a street gang outside of prison. Within prison, the NLR has come into conflict with the AB. The NLR apparently accept members with mixed ancestry, such as white/Hispanic or white/Native American, but not white/black (Insideprison.com², n.d.). Unhappy with this policy, the AB called upon NLR to halt this practice. The NLR has rejected this order and it has been rumored that the AB has provided PENI members permission to kill any NLR member that does not comply with AB's orders (Knowgangs.com, n.d.). In response, some NLR members have encouraged a breaking of the alliance with the AB. Others, however, agree with the AB and have called for a cleansing of "race traitors" from the organization (Southern Poverty Law Center, 2004).

Although perhaps losing prominence within the prison system, the NLR continues to as a formidable white supremacist street gang. They engage in a variety of crimes, primarily for profit but also for ideological purposes. Some street factions of the NLR have grown so big and powerful that they refer to themselves as FTB (F-K the Brand) and openly challenge the AB

(Policemag.com, 2009). The California Department of Justice estimated that there were approximately 1,500 NLR members in California and 2,500 nationwide (Policemag.com, 2009).

Ideology

The NLR, although a white supremacist organization, is also a criminal organization largely focused on profiting from various illicit enterprises (narcotics trafficking, extortion, robbery, etc.). However, unlike the AB, NLR appear to be more invested in white supremacist ideology. The NLR oath states:

“I, as a Nazi Low Rider, hereby swear an unrelenting oath upon the green graves of our sires, upon the children in the wombs of our wives, upon the throne of god almighty, sacred to his name, to join together in the holy union with the brothers in this circle and to declare forthright that from this day moment on that I have no fear of death, no fear of foe, that **I have a sacred duty to do whatever is necessary to deliver our people from the Jew** and bring total victory to the Nazi Low Riders.”

The oath later continues with the following:

“We hereby invoke the blood covenant and declare that we are in a full state of war and will not lay down our weapons until we have driven the enemy into the sea and reclaimed that which is rightfully ours. Through our blood and gods will, the land will be that of our children” (whiteprisongangs.blogspot.com², n.d.).

While the NLR do have some members with mixed blood, and swear to “deliver our people from the Jew,” most of their ideologically motivated acts have been directed at African-Americans (Anti-Defamation League², 2005). Although called the Nazi Low Riders, they are not a neo-Nazi organization and it is not clear if they adhere to any specific white supremacist ideology or require members to become familiar with any white supremacist religion or belief system.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. On November 25, 1995 R.R. (20 yr), R.B. (16 yr) and J.C. Colwell (16 yr), all members of the NLR, beat to death a 43 year old African-American man. According to the offenders, the victim kicked a white woman. In retribution, the perpetrators used a board and a metal pipe to bludgeon the victim to death. However, authorities also suggest that the act is consistent with the known NLR objective of running minorities out of an area known as Antelope Valley. In support of this argument are numerous violent acts. In 1995 J.C. was among a number of NLR that threatened to blow up a coffee shop that served African-Americans and took part in an attack on two African-American males and their white female companion. Also in 1995, R.B. beat and stabbed an African-American male at Antelope Valley High School and R.R. beat a Latino man (Maeshiro, 1998).

Sample(s) of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes

1. In 1996, NLR members attacked a black teenager in Lancaster, California with a baseball bat. According to the Los Angeles Times, the NLR members indicated that they were on a mission to “rid the streets of Lancaster of African Americans.” Later, the same two NLR members attacked two African-American men, stabbing one of them several times (Anti-Defamation League², 2005).

L. Volksfront

History

Volksfront was created in 1994 by four inmates of an Oregon prison for the purpose of reviving the “dying pro-White movement” (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.). Randal Lee Krager, who was serving time for attacking and permanently disabling an African-American man, was the leader of this newly founded group and the one who was responsible for bringing the group out of the prison system. Once released from prison, Krager established Volkfront’s headquarters in Portland, Oregon, a city with a fairly active skinhead scene (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).

Soon after its establishment Volksfront began to distribute hate literature and to cultivate relationships with white supremacist musical groups. Soon thereafter Volksfront began to see experience growth and is estimated to have had approximately 50 members and 7 locations by 1998 (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.). However, between 1998 and 2001 the group went underground in response to “illegal police and governmental pressure” and for “internal reasons” (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.). The group reemerged in 2001 and once again began to experience growth establishing units across the country and doubling in size to approximately one hundred members (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2004). Moreover, the organization went international with chapters in Spain, Portugal, Germany, Canada, and Australia (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).

In 2004 Krager resigned as leader of Volksfront and appointed Richard Arden (bass player in white supremacist band “Jew Slaughter”) to head the organization. Krager, however, remains active and influential within the organization (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).

Volksfront has continued to evolve and grow. Some of its growth is as a result of absorbing

other racist skinhead groups (e.g. Northern California Aryan Volk, Retaliator Skinhead Nation) (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.). Volksfront may have also benefited from the recent downfall of once prominent groups like the National Alliance and Aryan Nations (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d) as well as the World Church of the Creator (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2004).

Ideology

Volksfront's symbol is the neo-pagan Life Rune (algiz) which reflects its Odinist roots (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.). Although Odinist in orientation, Volksfront is ideologically flexible and allows members to believe what they want so long as they are committed to white supremacy and a "folkish" lifestyle. This is likely the reason Volksfront has benefited from the downfall of the Aryan Nations (Christian Identity), World Church of the Creator (Creativity), and the National Alliance (neo-Nazi/Cosmotheism). Nevertheless, most members are Odinist (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).

Odinism provides a racial belief system and helps frame the objectives of the organization. One primary goal of Volksfront is to establish a white only homeland in the Pacific northwest (Volksfrontinternational.com). Consistent with this goal is the broader objective of ending non-white immigration to North America, Europe, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, protecting workers from communist and capitalist manipulation (Volksfrontinternational.com). Similar to their close ally Hammerskin Nation, Volksfront is also concerned with economics and class. Their website states that the group's objectives include protecting all workers from communist and capital manipulation as well as lobbying for the interests of the white working class. This is similar to the Third Position philosophy followed by Tom Metzger of the White Aryan Resistance and by the American Front during its early years (Southern Poverty Law Center², 2004).

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

1. In March of 2003 K.M. a 20 year old member of Volksfront, along with three friends, set out to draw the blood of someone considered inferior so K.M. could earn his red laces and thus advance his position within Volksfront. The intent was to find a black drug dealer but ultimately they found a 42 year old white homeless man, who they killed by beating him with a baseball bat, kicking his head with steel toed boots, and smashing a 40lbs rock on his face. K.M. was convicted of first degree aggravated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment (Barker, 2004; Southern Poverty Law Center², 2004).

Sample of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes

1. In 1994 a Volksfront member shot at a synagogue with an assault rifle (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).
2. In 1994 a Volkfront member plead guilty to three counts of first-degree intimidation for phoning Jewish people and threatening to slit their throats and burn their homes (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).
3. In 2002 a member threw rocks engraved with swastikas at synagogue while services were in session (Anti-Defamation League⁴, n.d.).

M. World Church of the Creator

History

The World Church of the Creator (WCOTC) is a white supremacist group that was formed in 1973 by an individual named Ben Klassen after becoming frustrated with the far right organizations he had encountered. The WCOTC was founded on a belief system, also created by Klassen, known as Creativity. After a slow start, the WCOTC thrived and became a significant organization within the white supremacist movement. However, over the past eight or nine years, the group has experienced significant instability decline. The organization still exists in a couple of competing forms, but is ultimately a shell of its former self.

The WCOTC's history begins with its founder Ben Klassen. Klassen was born on February 20, 1918 in Taurida, Ukraine to a Mennonite family (Anti-Defamation League). When Klassen was approximately five years old his family moved to a Mennonite community in Mexico. After one year in Mexico they moved to Herschel, Saskatchewan in Canada where Klassen attended a German English Academy (Klassen, n.d.).

Klassen began his professional life working as an elementary school teacher but then returned to the University of Saskatchewan to study electrical engineering (Zeskind, 2009). He then moved to California where he worked as an electrical engineer and part time inventor. In fact, he is the patent holder for an electric can opener (Nizkor⁴, n.d.; freepatentsonlin.com). In 1958 he moved to Florida where he became a successful real estate agent (Nizkor⁴, n.d.).

It is in Florida where Klassen first becomes active in politics. During the 1960s he became a member of the John Birch Society and even opened a Birch-affiliated Opinion Bookstore. In 1965 Klassen ran for, and was elected to, the Florida State Legislature. He ran as a Republican who was against busing (Nizkor⁴, n.d.). In 1967 Klassen ran for State Senator but

lost. He then served as the Florida chairman for George Wallace's presidential campaign. George Wallace was an Alabama governor who ran on a segregationist platform. However, Klassen became disenfranchised with Wallace when he felt Wallace was courting African American voters. Sometime between 1968 and 1973, Klassen disassociated himself with the John Birch Society. He felt the organization was a "smokescreen for the Jews" (Nizkor⁴, n.d).

The WCOTC came into existence in 1973 with the publication of "Nature's Eternal Religion," a 511 page book that outlined Creativity, Klassen's newly created religion. Creativity connected race with religion and consequently rejected more traditional belief systems such as Christianity (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). From 1973 to about 1983 the WCOTC did not attract much interest or many members. However, in 1983 Klassen began publishing a monthly tabloid entitled "Racial Loyalty" (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Also around that time Klassen purchased land in North Carolina to serve as a group compound and headquarters (creativityalliance.com) Klassen published a number of books, including his best known book "Rahowa! This Planet is All Ours." (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Over time, Klassen's writings and calls for holy war attracted members and the group grew in terms membership and number of chapters: both national and international (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).

The WCOTC ultimately grew into a formidable organization within the white supremacist movement. However, its fortune began to change as a result of an incident in 1991. During that year, a Creativity minister shot and killed an African American war veteran, ultimately resulting in a civil lawsuit against the organization (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Anticipating the law suit, Klassen began to divest himself of assets. He sold the compound in North Carolina to William Pierce, the leader of the white supremacist group National Alliance,

for \$100,000. The Southern Poverty Law Center brought the suit on behalf of the victim's family and ultimately won a verdict for one million dollars (Smothers, 1996).

Between 1991 and 1993 Klassen began to look for someone to succeed him as leader. After some indecision, Klassen appointed Richard McCarty, a telemarketer. Shortly thereafter, on August 6, 1993, seventy-five year old Klassen committed suicide by overdosing on sleeping pills (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).

Richard McCarty moved the organization's headquarters from North Carolina to Niceville, Florida (Burghart, 1999). McCarty was not a strong or charismatic leader and had inherited an organization with serious legal problems. During this time the WCOTC was fairly dormant. The organization is infused with new life with the arrival of Matthew Hale, a law student. On July 27, 1996, a group of church elders anointed Hale as Pontifex Maximus (highest priest). Although only twenty-five years old at the time, Hale had been an active racist for some time. As a teenager Hale became fascinated with Hitler after reading "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich" and "Mein Kampf" (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). He then began joining and forming (i.e. National Socialist White Alliance) white supremacist organizations. Hale ultimately joined the WCOTC as a member in the early 1990s while a student at Bradley University in Illinois (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).

Once Hale took over he moved the organization's headquarters to East Peoria, Illinois, where Hale lived with his father. Hale was a more natural leader, and a more active leader, than McCarty. Hale began to aggressively disseminate the group's message through pamphleteering, the internet, newsletters, and a public access television show called "White Revolution" (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Under Hale's leadership the WCOTC grew from fourteen chapters in 1996 to eighty-eight chapters in 2002 (Southern Poverty Law Center³, 2004). Unfortunately

for Hale, the seeds of future troubles were planted in 1999 when Benjamin August Smith went on a shooting spree that targeted Jews, African-Americans, and Asians (Burghart, 1999). As a result of this shooting spree, the FBI took an interest in Hale and ultimately recruited, Anthony Evola (WCOTC's Chief of Security) as an informant. Evola secretly recorded his conversations with Hale for four years (Southern Poverty Law Center⁴, 2004). In 2000 a law suit was initiated against the WCOTC. This suit was filed by the Te-Ta-Ma Foundation alleging name infringement. The Te-Ta-Ma foundation had previously registered the name Church of the Creator. The Te-Ta-Ma foundation won their suit and were awarded a \$450,000 (plus interest) judgment against the WCOTC (Chicago Sun-times, 2005). Angry at the verdict, Hale attempted to get Anthony Evola to murder the judge who handed down the verdict. This conversation was recorded by Evola for the FBI and Hale was arrested and convicted in April, 2004 for solicitation of murder. Hale was sentenced to forty years in a federal prison.

Hale's conviction was the primary factor in the decline of the WCOTC, but even before his conviction the organization was experiencing instability. A few members, dissatisfied with Hale's leadership, left to start their own organization. As of 2005 the WCOTC is in disarray with certain members splitting to form their own group and with various chapters operating independently (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). The WCOTC appears to continue to exist, albeit significantly less popular, as the Creativity Movement.

Ideology

Creativity is a belief system that focuses on race and is thus referred to as a racial religion. Followers of this religion see the white races as nature's highest creation. They believe that white people have created all that is good in this world (i.e. culture, civilization, etc.) (Anti-

Defamation League³, 2005). Since adherents consider the white race to be the pinnacle, they believe that the white race must be preserved. Consequently, anything that is good for the white race is virtuous and anything that is bad is an ultimate sin (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).

Creativity considers Jews to be a mortal enemy because, according to the principles of this religion, Jews are a sub-human entity that is striving to take over the world. The Jews are purposely destroying the white race through persistent promotion of race mixing with non-whites, who are also considered sub-human (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Consequently, what is good for the white race (virtuous) is to preserve the white race by destroying the enemy. This is the reason for Creativity's motto "RaHoWa" which stands for Racial Holy War (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005). Consistent with this motto, Klassen openly advocated the use of violence to achieve ideological goals. Hale claimed that the WCOTC would obtain its goals through non-violent means but did state that the organization had the right to use violence to protect themselves when the "Zionist Occupied Government" took their rights away. Hale also referred to those who did commit ideologically motivated violence as martyrs (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).

Creativity is actually very critical of traditional belief systems like Christianity. They see it as a Jewish created religion used to promote race mixing. However, because they see themselves fighting a holy war, they don't stress this fact because they must court white Christians in order to grow and spread their message.

Ideologically Motivated Homicides to Which the Group is Linked

- 1.) In May of 1991 a Reverend in the WCOTC, escalated a minor traffic incident in a parking lot by verbally assaulting a 22 year old African-American Gulf War veteran (petty officer 3rd class in the Navy), with racial epithets. The incident is believed to be ideological because in the months leading up to the incident the Reverend had engaged in

a number of incidents that involved harassing or fighting African-Americans and threatening to shoot at least one African-American woman (Associated Press, 1991). The Reverend was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment (Anti-Defamation League, 1999).

- 2.) In July of 1999, B.S., over the course of three days, engaged in a shooting spree in Indiana where he shot at Asians, African-Americans, and Jews from his car. In total he killed two and injured nine. The two murder victims were a 43 year old African-American man that was the former basketball coach of Northwestern University, and a 26 year old doctoral student from Korea. Ultimately B.S. took his own life as well (Dedman, 1999; Eyeonhate.com, n.d.).

Illustrative List of Other Ideologically Motivated Crimes

- 1.) A WCOTC member was arrested in 1992 and convicted of reckless endangerment after placing a bomb on the porch of a police officer's home (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).
- 2.) In 1993 members of the WCOTC, along with individuals with ties to the groups White Aryan Resistance and Fourth Reich Skins were arrested and charged for plotting to instigate a race war by bombing the largest church in Los Angeles and assassinating Rodney King (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).
- 3.) In 1993 police in Salinas, CA arrested the Washington State Director of the WCOTC and another member after finding a cache of weapons, ammunition, three pipe bombs, and telephone book listings of Jewish agencies and synagogues. When questioned by the police the State Director for the WCOTC confessed to participating in firebombing an N.A.A.C.P. office in Tacoma Washington (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).
- 4.) In 1998 three members were indicted on hate-crime conspiracy charges connected to a robbery of an adult video store in Florida and an assault of the store's owner. According to the participants, they attacked the store because they believed that media outlets were controlled by Jews and thus it was permissible to steal from them. They also stated that they planned to send the stolen money to the WCOTC's headquarters (Anti-Defamation League³, 2005).
- 5.) In 2002, two members in Boston were found guilty of plotting to blow up Jewish and black landmarks for the purpose of sparking a racial holy war.

CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS – SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

A. Network Level Measurements

As previously noted, SNA allows researchers to investigate and measure overall network structures. In this study network density and centralization were calculated.

Table 6.1

Overall Network Structure

	Network size	Density	Degree Centralization	Closeness Centralization	Betweenness Centralization
Core Groups Network (CGN)	13	19.23%	.2652	N/A*	.4552
Core Groups Embedded Network (CGEN)	64	4.37%	.2826	.3689	.4668

**Closeness centralization cannot be calculated when a network is not weakly connected. Because the Insane Criminal Posse is not connected to any of the core groups the network is not weakly connected.*

The CGN is not considered dense with only 19.23% of all possible links actually present in the network. This would indicate that the network of violent groups is not a cohesive network. By comparison, the network that involves the CGEN involves sixty-four groups. The density, however, is significantly less at 4.37%. This is due, in part, to the fact that density is inversely related to size. As the number of vertices in a network increases, the density decreases. This is why it is impractical to compare densities of differently sized networks (de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelj, 2005). However, the low density is also likely due to the fact that this study only attempted to capture links between the core groups and the broader white supremacist community. It did not code the links of the non-core groups to each other or the broader

movement. It is believed that network density would have been greater had such links been included. Density is most helpful when comparing networks of comparable size.

When looking at the degree centralization scores for both networks, it is evident that both networks are similar in that there is no clear center and periphery. They are fairly decentralized. Decentralized networks, as compared to centralized networks, tend to lack efficiency (takes longer to transfer information, ideas, goods, etc.), but are more covert and less susceptible to destabilization. A Closeness Centralization score could not be calculated for the CGN because one group, Insane Criminal Posse, is not connected to any other group in the network. Closeness Centralization is not measurable unless all vertices in the network are connected. The Betweenness Centralization scores are the highest among the centralization measurements and are fairly similar between the two networks. These scores suggest a moderately centralized network. This finding becomes more interesting when looking at the relationship of betweenness centrality to homicides in Chapter 8.

B. Actor (Node) Level Measurements

In addition to overall network measurements, SNA also measures characteristics of nodes (actors) within the network, such as which nodes are most central. Actors that are central generally have better access to information and greater opportunity to spread information (de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelji, 2005), ideas, or attitudes (Borgatti, 2005). There are three primary centrality measures: degree centrality, closeness centrality, and betweenness centrality (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

This study also measured constraint of the nodes in the two networks. When evaluating constraint scores, we are not interested in the number of ties, but rather the type of tie

(Papchristos, 1992). Constraint allows the researcher to identify those vertices that are acting as a bridge between two unconnected vertices (“structural holes”) (de Nooy, Mrvar & Batagelji, 2005).

B.1. Core Groups Network (CGN)

Table 6.2

Ranked Measures of Core Groups Network

	Degree Centrality (rank)	Closeness Centrality (rank)	Betweenness Centrality (rank)	Constraint (rank)	Deaths Linked to (percent)
Aryan Nations	5 (1)	.5344 (1)	.5379 (1)	.4367 (2)	4 (14.8%)
American Front	2(5)	.3173 (9)	.0000 (9)	.9077 (10)	2 (7.4%)
Hammerskin Nation	5 (1)	.4415 (3)	.2273 (3)	.3871 (1) (least constrained)	3 (11.1%)
Volksfront	3 (3)	.4062 (4)	.0530 (7)	.6527 (7)	1 (3.7%)
Aryan Brotherhood	3 (3)	.4835 (2)	.4394 (2)	.4400 (3)	7 (25.9%)
Aryan National Front	1 (11)	.3077 (10)	.0000 (9)	1.000 (11)	1 (3.7%)
World Church of Creator	2 (5)	.2901 (11)	.0152 (6)	.5000 (4)	3 (11.1%)
Nazi Low Riders	2 (5)	.3626 (6)	.1212 (4)	.6250 (8)	1 (3.7%)
Confederate Knights of America	2 (5)	.3626 (6)	.1212 (4)	.5000 (4)	1 (3.7%)
National Socialist Front	2 (5)	.2901 (11)	.0152 (8)	.5000 (4)	1 (3.7%)
Confederate White Vikings	2 (5)	.3905 (5)	.0000 (9)	.7296 (9)	1 (3.7%)
Denver Skins	1 (11)	.3501 (8)	.0000 (9)	1.000 (11)	1 (3.7%)
Insane Criminal Posse	0 (13)	.0000 (13)	.0000 (9)	1.000 (11)	1 (3.7%)
	Mean=2.31	Mean=.3490	Mean=.1177	Mean=.6676	Mean=2.08
					27 (100%)

Table 6.3

Frequencies – Core Groups Network

Degree		Closeness		Betweenness		Constraint		Deaths	
0	1 (7.7%)	.00	1 (7.7%)	.00	5 (38.5%)	.00-.39	1 (7.7%)	1	8 (61.5%)
1	2 (15.4%)	.00-.18	0 (0.0%)	.00-.18	5 (38.5%)	.39-.59	5 (38.5%)	2	1 (7.7%)
2	6 (46.2%)	.18-.36	5 (38.5%)	.18-.36	1 (7.7%)	.59-.80	3 (23.1%)	3	2 (15.4%)
3	2 (15.4%)	.36-.53	7 (53.9%)	.36-.54	2 (15.4%)	.80-1.0	4 (30.8%)	4	1 (7.7%)
5	2 (15.4%)							7	1 (7.7%)

All Centrality Measurements Considered Together

In Table 6.2, the centrality measurements and constraint measurements are ranked for each group. The table also includes the number of ideological homicides to which each group is linked. A review of the table reveals that, when considering centrality measurements cumulatively, three groups are consistently ranked at the top. These groups are the Aryan Nations, Aryan Brotherhood, and Hammerskin Nation. The Aryan Nations is ranked first in all centrality measures. It had the most connections, was most accessible, and had greatest control over the flow of information. The Aryan Brotherhood, while not possessing as many ties as Hammerskin Nation possessed higher closeness and betweenness scores. These three groups together are linked to 52% of all ideologically committed homicides associated with the thirteen core groups. This would seem to suggest that there is a relationship between positions of centrality and the number of homicides with which these white supremacist groups are associated.

The Aryan Brotherhood alone is linked to 26% of the deaths. If the Aryan Brotherhood is ignored on the theory that there may be something unique about this white supremacist group (e.g. prison gang) that accounts for their significantly greater number of homicides, then there are a total of 20 (as opposed to 27) ideologically motivated homicides to which these groups are linked. Nevertheless, the next three most central groups (Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation, Volksfront) are linked to 8 of the 20 homicides, or 40%. Thus, the apparent relationship between centrality measures and number of homicides holds.


Degree Centrality

The Aryan Nations and Hammerskin Nation are the two groups with the highest degree (Degree = 5). The next most popular are Volksfront and Aryan Brotherhood. When looking at the degree centrality map of the CGN (Map 6.1), it is clear that the network is divided into two segments connected only by the tie between the Aryan Nations and the Aryan Brotherhood. Segment 1 includes seven groups: Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation, Volksfront, American Front, Aryan National Front, Confederate White Vikings, and the Denver Skins. Segment 2 includes five groups: Aryan Brotherhood, World Church of the Creator, Nazi Low Riders, Confederate Knights of America, and National Socialist Front. The Insane Criminal Posse has no direct links to any other group among the thirteen core groups. It is interesting to note that in addition to being comparable in size, the two segments of the network are each linked to about 50% of the total number of homicides. In other words, they appear to pose the same level of threat. Also noteworthy is the fact that three of the four most central groups, in terms of degree, are in segment 1. Hammerskin Nation appears to be most central to segment 1 while the Aryan Nations is important not only to segment 1 but also the entire network.

The Aryan Nations and the Aryan Brotherhood play important roles within this small network. Each of these groups acts as the gatekeeper to their respective segments, as is reflected by their closeness and betweenness scores. The link between Aryan Nations and Aryan Brotherhood serves as a bridge between two separate aspects of the network.

Similar to all centrality measurements taken together, the top three groups in terms of degree centrality are the Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation, and the Aryan Brotherhood. These three groups are linked to 14 of 27 homicides, or 52%. Again, if we remove the Aryan Brotherhood, the top three groups still account for 8 of 20 homicides, or 40%. In contrast, the three least central groups are linked to 3 of 27 homicides (11%) or 3 of 20 homicides (15%). Thus, it appears that degree centrality is positively associated with the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which a group is linked.


Map 6.1 – Degree Centrality



*Numbers in parentheses next to a vertex represents degree of that vertex

When looking at the degree centrality map with the attribute of ideology (Map 6.2), we see that segment 1 consists of skinhead and neo-Nazi groups only. The Aryan Nations is categorized as a Christian Identity group because that was the foundation upon which the organization was built and members of the Aryan Nations were expected to practice the religion. However, the Aryan Nations was also strongly identified with Hitler and National Socialism (Gumbel, 2000; Martin, 2006) and openly courted skinheads. Because the relationships between groups are valued, we can see that the ties between groups in segment 1 are stronger (represented by thicker and shorter ties) than those in segment 2. Segment 2, which includes the Aryan Brotherhood, involves a variety of ideologies and weaker ties. In sum, segment 1 appears to be more cohesive than segment 2 and this may be attributed to the homogeneity of the segment in terms of ideology.

Map 6.2 – Degree Centrality with Ideology Attribute




* Yellow(1)=Christian Identity; Green(2)=Racist Skinhead; Red(3)=White Supremacist-Prison Gang; Blue=Neo-Nazi(4); Pink(5)=World Church of the Creator; White=White Supremacist-General(6)

** Line thickness represents strength of tie. The thicker the line, the stronger the tie.

Closeness Centrality

Degree centrality considers direct contacts only. When evaluating closeness centrality, we are assessing not only the direct ties, but indirect ties as well. An actor may not be the most connected (popular) in the network but be highly accessible to others in the network. A look at the network map and the ranked measures of centrality reveal that the Aryan Nations (.5344) and the Aryan Brotherhood (.4835) are the most accessible groups within the network.

Map 6.3 – Closeness Centrality



Map 6.3 illustrates why the Aryan Brotherhood and Aryan Nations are the most accessible to the entire network. They are within 3 steps or less of any other group in the network. Hammerskin Nation (.4415) is ranked third. The top three most central groups accounted for 14 of 26 homicides (54%). Again, if we remove the Aryan Brotherhood the three top most groups are linked to 42% of the homicides. By comparison, the three groups with the lowest closeness

centrality scores (National Socialist Front, World Church of the Creator, and Aryan National Front) accounted for 5 of 26 (19%) of all of the homicides (26% if remove the Aryan Brotherhood). Similar to degree centrality, closeness centrality and number of ideologically motivated homicides appear to be positively associated.

Betweenness Centrality

Betweenness centrality assesses the frequency with which a node is a link in a chain of communication between any two vertices in a network. If we consider the shortest paths (geodesics) to be the most likely channels for passing on information, then a node that is located on the geodesics between many pairs of nodes will be important to the flow of information, ideas, and attitudes. These nodes will possess high betweenness centrality scores (de Nooy, Mrvar & Batageli, 2005).

The Aryan Nations (.5379) and the Aryan Brotherhood (.4394) have the highest betweenness centrality scores, which is not surprising when observing their location within the network represented in Map 6.4. The size of the vertices reflects their betweenness score. It is clear that in order for information to move from one segment of the network to the other it must move through both the Aryan Nations and the Aryan Brotherhood. Hammerskin Nation has the third highest centrality measure because it lies on the geodesic of many pathways within segment 1 of the network. Again the three most central groups account for 52% of the homicides, or 35% if we remove the Aryan Brotherhood. The three least central groups, each with a centrality score of .0000 account for 11% of homicides, or 15% if we ignore the Aryan Brotherhood. Once more, there appears to be a positive relationship with number of ideologically motivated homicides.

Map 6.4 – Betweenness Centrality



**Size of node indicates betweenness score. The larger the node, the higher the score.*

Constraint (Structural Holes)

As noted above, an actor that is connected to other actors not directly connected to each other is provided with the opportunity to mediate/broker between the unconnected actors and thus potentially exploit this structural hole within the network. Actors with low constraint scores have greater social capital, than those with high constraint scores. A score of 1 indicates maximal constraint.

When looking at the constraint scores there also appears to be a relationship with ideologically motivated homicides, but it is a negative relationship. The three least constrained

groups are Hammerskin Nation (.3871), Aryan Nations (.4367), and Aryan Brotherhood (.4400). Again, these three groups accounted for 52% of the homicides. In contrast, the three most constrained groups (Insane Criminal Posse, Denver Skins, and Aryan National Front) all had a constraint score of 1.000 and collectively accounted for 11% of the homicides.

Summary of Core Groups Network (CGN)

This study hypothesized that the violent white supremacist network will be a non-cohesive, dispersed network. Density and centralization measurements support this hypothesis. By and large the CGN, although small, lacked cohesion and any clear core. The study also hypothesized that the Aryan Nations will be very central to the network. Consistent with this hypothesis, the Aryan Nations ranked first in all of the centrality measurements. Inconsistent with one of the hypotheses, however, was the fact that the Aryan Brotherhood was also very central to the network. It was believed that since the Aryan Brotherhood put criminal operations over ideology it would more likely be located on the fringe of the network. In fact, in a network of groups associated with ideologically motivated murder, the Aryan Brotherhood plays a central role. The last SNA hypothesis suggested that groups would be primarily linked to groups of a similar ideology; in other words, birds of a feather will flock together. The CGN provides a mixed result with regard to this hypothesis. Segment 1 consisted almost exclusively of neo-Nazi and racist skinhead organizations. Segment 2, however, was diverse in ideology. There also didn't appear to be any ideology that was most central to the network. The most central groups represented different ideologies. Lastly, although not a formal SNA hypothesis, there appears to be a positive relationship between centrality and number of homicides.

B.2. Core Groups Embedded Network (CGEN)

Similar to CGN, when looking at the CGEN, it appears that the more central a group is to the network, the greater the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which the group will be linked. There also appears to be a negative relationship between constraint and number of homicides. The next question in the study was to ascertain whether, and how, the core groups' network positions change in relation to each other when we expand the network and include links to the broader white supremacist movement.

(see next page for Table 6.4)

Table 6.4**Ranked Measures of Core Groups Embedded Network**

	Degree	Closeness (rank)	Betweenness (rank)	Constraint (rank)	Deaths (percent)
Aryan Nations	20	.5164 (1)	0.4925 (1)	.1245 (1) (least constrained)	4 (14.8%)
American Front	16	.4565 (4)	0.2854 (3)	.1603 (2)	2 (7.4%)
Hammerskin Nation	12	.4737 (2)	0.3492 (2)	.2644 (7)	3 (11.1%)
Volksfront	12	.4737 (2)	0.1760 (5)	.2460 (6)	1 (3.7%)
Aryan Brotherhood	10	.4228 (5)	0.2263 (4)	.1600 (3)	7 (25.9%)
Aryan National Front	7	.3443 (9)	0.1556 (6)	.2422 (5)	1 (3.7%)
World Church of the Creator	6	.3424 (10)	0.0676 (8)	.2116 (4)	3 (11.1%)
Nazi Low Riders	6	.3520 (7)	0.0312(9)	.3973 (10)	1 (3.7%)
Confederate Knights of America	5	.3369 (11)	0.0731 (7)	.3438 (9)	1 (3.7%)
National Socialist Front	4	.3298 (12)	0.0121 (10)	.2900 (8)	1 (3.7%)
Confederate White Vikings	2	.3888 (6)	.0000 (11)	.6917 (12)	1 (3.7%)
Denver Skins	2	.3462 (8)	.0000 (11)	.6259 (11)	1 (3.7%)
Insane Criminal Posse	1	.3014 (13)	.0000 (11)	1.000 (13) (most constrained)	1 (3.7%)
	Mean=7.92	Mean=.3912	Mean=.1438	Mean=.3659	Mean = 2.08

Table 6.5

Frequencies – Core Groups Embedded Network

Degree		Closeness		Betweenness		Constraint		Deaths	
<i>#</i>	<i># of Groups in Category</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i>#</i>	<i># of Groups in Category</i>
1	1 (7.7%)	.00 - .25	0 (0.0%)	.00	3 (23.1%)	.00-.25	6 (46.2%)	1	8 (61.5%)
2	2 (15.4%)	.25-.34	3 (23.1%)	.00-.16	5 (38.5%)	.25-.50	4 (30.8%)	2	1 (7.7%)
5	3 (23.1%)	.34-.43	6 (46.2%)	.16-.32	3 (23.1%)	.50-.75	2 (15.4%)	3	2 (15.4%)
6	2 (15.4%)	.43-.52	4 (30.8%)	.32-.50	2 (15.4%)	.75-1.0	1 (7.7%)	4	1 (7.7%)
7	1 (7.7%)							7	1 (7.7%)
10	1 (7.7%)								
12	2 (15.4%)								
16	1 (7.7%)								
20	1 (7.7%)								
	13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13(100%)

All Centrality Measurements Considered Together

Similar to the CGN, when looking at all of the centrality measurements collectively, certain groups are consistently the most central. However, once links to the broader white supremacist movement were included, the Aryan Brotherhood became less important as it fell from second ranked to fifth. Conversely, the American Front rose from a middle rank to about third. Thus, the top four groups, when considering centrality measurements collectively are the Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation, American Front and Volksfront.


If we look at only the top three ranked groups (Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation, and American Front) we find they are linked to 9 out of 27 (33%) of all ideologically committed homicides. This is less than with the CGN (52%) because the Aryan Brotherhood is no longer in the top three. The bottom three groups continue to account for 11% of the homicides. The apparent relationship between network centrality and number of ideologically motivated homicide, although weaker, continues.

Degree Centrality

The Aryan Nations (20 links) continues to be the most connected among the thirteen core groups. The American Front (16 links) is ranked second, a significant change from its ranking in the CGN. Hammerskin Nation (12), and Volksfront (12) round out the top four. Map 6.5 indicates that the Aryan Nations is clearly situated very centrally, as are Hammerskin Nation, Volksfront and American Front. The Aryan Brotherhood, while popular, is mostly connected with other prison gangs, or biker gangs, and appears to have moved towards the fringe with only a few links to the broader movement. It is no longer playing as significant a role in the communication channels. Non-core groups like White Aryan Resistance (WAR), National Alliance, and the KKK provide alternative pathways to the broader movement, and thus groups like the Confederate Knights of America or the World Church of the Creator are not in fact dependent on the Aryan Brotherhood as suggested by the CGN map. Of course this is true for the Aryan Nations as well. Groups like Hammerskin Nation, Volksfront, and Aryan National Front are no longer dependent on the Aryan Nations. However, the Aryan Nations, because of the number of links, and to whom it is linked, continues to be central to the movement. The top

three groups in terms of degree centrality are linked to 33% of the homicides, while the bottom three groups are linked to 11% of the homicides.

Map 6.5 – Degree Centrality



* number next to a vertex represent its degree (number of neighbors)
 ** line thickness represents strength of tie. Thicker lines indicate a stronger tie.

When looking at the degree centrality map with the attribute of ideology (Map 6.6), the adage of “birds of a feather, flock together” holds true. For the most part, groups of a particular ideology tend to be linked to groups that possess the same ideology. The majority of the Aryan Nations’ links are with other Christian Ideology groups. It also has, however, a significant

number of links to neo-Nazi organizations. Again, not surprising considering the Aryan Nations' affinity for Hitler and Nazism. As previously noted, the Aryan Brotherhood is primarily linked to organizations that have a criminal focus, such as white supremacist prison gangs and biker gangs⁵. It is only linked to the broader movement through links to the KKK, Confederate Knights of America,⁶ and the Aryan Nations, which attempted to recruit Aryan Brotherhood members through the Church of Jesus Christ Christian/Aryan Brotherhood prison ministry (Anti-Defamation League, 2005).


By and large, skinhead groups like Hammerskin Nation and American Front were most likely to be linked to other skinhead organizations. However, there are numerous links between skinhead groups and neo-Nazi organizations, which could be due to demographic similarities between members. This is something worthy of further research. Neo-Nazi groups appear to be the least cohesive ideology and most interconnected, thus playing an important role in the transfer of information between various ideologies.

(see next page for Map 6.6)

⁵ Consistent with its criminal focus, the Aryan Brotherhood also has alliances with the Mexican Mafia and works with African-American associates to help sell and distribute drugs (Florida Department of Corrections, n.d.)

⁶ Racist forms of Odinism and Asatru may have recently replaced Christian Identity as the theology of choice for the Aryan Brotherhood as well as other racist prison gangs (SPLC, 2009)

Map 6.6 – Degree Centrality with Ideology Attribute



*Yellow (1)=Christian Identity; Green (2)=Racist Skinhead; Red(3)=White Supremacist Prison Gang; Blue(4)=Neo-Nazi; Pink(5)=Creativity; White(6)=White Supremacist-Genera; Orange=Biker Gang


Closeness Centrality

As noted above, when evaluating closeness centrality, we are assessing not only the direct ties, but indirect ties as well. Again, the groups that tend to have the highest degree are also the most accessible to the broader network. The three highest ranked groups in terms of closeness centrality are the Aryan Nations (.5118), Volksfront (.4737) and Hammerskin Nation (.4737). The American Front (.4565), which was ranked third when taking all centrality measurements together was ranked fourth in closeness. This is likely due to the fact that

Volkfront is directly connected to the Aryan Nations and American Front is not. The top three groups are linked to 30% of the homicides and the bottom three ranked groups are linked to 11%. Again, although not as strong as when looking at the CGN, the association between closeness centrality and number of homicides endures.

Table 6.4 and Map 6.7 indicate that, similar to degree centrality, the Aryan Brotherhood's role becomes less important/influential when considering links to broader movement. We also see that certain groups, which are ranked at the bottom in terms of popularity, are nevertheless fairly accessible. For instance, the Confederate White Vikings, ranked among the bottom three in degree centrality (low in popularity), is ranked 6th when looking at closeness centrality, and thus fairly accessible to information and attitudes. Its closeness centrality score is likely a result of the fact that its only two links are to very popular groups (Aryan Nations and Hammerskin Nation). Conversely, some fairly popular groups, such as the Aryan National Front and World Church of the Creator, have lower closeness centrality scores than less popular groups (i.e. Nazi Low Riders and Denver Skins). It is also interesting to note that certain non-core groups have a fairly significant closeness centrality score due to having multiple links amongst the core groups. For instance, National Alliance (.42) and the White Aryan Resistance (.43) possess closeness centrality scores equal to or higher than the Aryan Brotherhood, which is ranked fifth in terms of closeness centrality. This suggests that the National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance are playing an important role within the network. It is suspected that if links of non-core groups were included, the National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance closeness centrality scores would be even higher.

Map 6.7 – Closeness Centrality




**number next to vertex represents Closeness Centrality Score. The higher the score the more accessible the group is to other groups within the movement.*

Betweenness Centrality

As was the case with degree centrality, the three most popular groups are also the most central in terms of betweenness. The Aryan Nations (.4925) has the greatest betweenness score, with Hammerskin Nation (.3492) second, and American Front (.2854) third. Volkfront (.2263) was the fourth highest ranked. It is not surprising that these four groups scored high in

betweenness centrality since they are popular and connected to one another. Again, it is worth noting that the National Alliance (.05) and White Aryan Resistance (.10) also have significant betweenness centrality scores. This reinforces the observation that these groups are important actors in the transfer of information among the core groups. Moreover, the National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance are both neo-Nazi organizations and are connected to groups of three different ideologies. This reinforces the belief that they are serving as an important communication link among the core groups as well as to the broader movement.

Map 6.8 – Betweenness Centrality



** size of node indicates betweenness score. The larger the node the more frequently it sits on a path between any two other nodes in the network*

Constraint (Structural Holes)

As was observed with the core groups network, constraint rankings did not follow centrality rankings. Of the core groups that consistently ranked in the top five for the centrality measurements, only three were in the top five for least constrained. Aryan Nations (.1245), American Front (.1603) and the Aryan Brotherhood (.1600) were the least constrained. Volksfront and Hammerskin Nation were no longer in the top five but were replaced by World Church of the Creator (.2116) and Aryan National Front (.2422). In general constraint scores appeared to be less correlated with degree than closeness or betweenness scores.

Certain groups, although not very popular are nevertheless in positions of power and control. For instance, if only considering core group connections, the Aryan Brotherhood is a bridge between the Nazi Low Riders and Confederate Knights of America (Map 6.9). If not for the Aryan Brotherhood, information would have to flow through at least two other intermediaries (World Church of the Creator and National Socialist Front). On the other hand, Hammerskin Nation, although connected to more groups overall, is constrained by its connections to a number of groups that are connected to each other, such as: Confederate White Vikings and Aryan Nations, Volksfront and American Front.

(see next page for Map 6.9)

in the CGN but this is due to the fact that links between non-core groups are not included and because density decreases as more nodes are added to the network. Again, as hypothesized, the Aryan Nations continues to be the most important group to the network, as represented by its ranking in all of the network measurements. Interestingly, the Aryan Brotherhood, which was very central to the CGN becomes less important once links to the broader white supremacist movement are included. This finding supports the hypothesis that the Aryan Brotherhood, which focuses more on its criminal enterprise than on ideology, will be less central than the Aryan Nations. It is believed that if links between non-core groups were included the Aryan Brotherhood would continue to become more peripheral to the white supremacist network.

Although not so obvious with the CGN, the CGEN strongly supports the hypothesis that groups will be primarily tied to groups of like ideology. A review of the network by ideology shows that, by and large, the majority of a group's links are to other groups of the same ideology. It was anticipated that there would be significant interconnections between groups of different ideologies because, although ideologies may differ, there are many foundational principles upon which these groups agree (i.e. Jewish conspiracy theories; admiration for Hitler). The acceptance of all things Nazi may be one reason why neo-Nazi groups seem to be functioning as significant intermediaries between the various white supremacist ideologies. This may also explain why non-core neo-Nazi groups National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance possess high betweenness scores. Nevertheless, the CGEN supports the hypothesis regarding ideological network organization.

In the CGN there appeared to be an association between network centrality and number of homicides committed. This association was also observed with the CGEN. However, the association did not appear as strong as with the CGN.

C. 2-Core Network of Core Groups Embedded Network

The CGEN involved links between the thirteen core groups and formal white supremacist groups not linked to ideologically motivated homicides during the years of the study (non-core groups). In total, this network consisted of sixty-four groups. While the CGEN did not include links between non-core groups, a couple of non-core groups appeared to be playing a central role with respect to both the core groups and the broader movement. To obtain a clearer picture, a 2-core network map was generated (Map 6.10) from the CGEN. In a 2-core network all the groups in the network are tied to a minimum of at least two other groups. This reduced the number of groups from sixty-four to twenty-five. Of the twenty-five groups in the 2-core network, twelve are core groups and thirteen are non-core groups. The Insane Criminal Posse, although a core group, is not included in the 2-core network as it had only one tie. Tables 6.6 – 6.8 provide descriptives of the 2-core network.

(see next page for Table 6.6)

Table 6.6

Name of Organization	Ideology
Aryan Brotherhood	White Supremacist - Prison Gang
Aryan Nations	Christian Identity
American Front	Racist Skinhead
World Church of the Creator	Creativity
Denver Skins	Racist Skinhead
Nazi Low Riders	White Supremacist - Prison Gang
Aryan National Front	Neo-Nazi
Hammerksin Nation	Racist Skinhead
Confederate Knights of America	White Supremacist – General
Volksfront	Neo-Nazi
Confederate White Vikings	Racist Skinhead
National Socialist Front	Neo-Nazi
White Aryan Resistance	Neo-Nazi
White Revolution	Neo-Nazi
Blood & Honour	Racist Skinhead
Troops of Tomorrow	Racist Skinhead
National Alliance	Neo-Nazi
Vinlanders	Racist Skinhead
United Society of Aryan S	White Supremacist - Prison Gang
Golden State Skinheads	Racist Skinhead
KKK	White Supremacist – General
National Socialist Movement	Neo-Nazi
PEN1	White Supremacist - Prison Gang
C18	Neo-Nazi
The Christian Guard	Christian Identity

Table 6.7

Ideologies Represented in 2-Core Network

Ideology Type	Number (Percent)
Christian Identity	2 (8.0%)
Racist Skinhead	8 (32.0%)
White Supremacist – Prison Gang	4 (16.0%)
Neo-Nazi	8 (32.0%)
Creationist	1 (4.0%)
White Supremacist - General	2 (8.0%)
	25 (100%)

Table 6.6 (previous page) lists all of the groups within the 2-core network and their classification by ideology. Table 6.7 provides an indication of the number and proportion of ideologies represented amongst the 25 groups within the 2-core network. The majority of the groups within this network are racist skinhead and neo-Nazi organizations, which collectively represent 64% of the groups (32% Racist Skinhead and 32% Neo-Nazi). The two are followed by white supremacist – prison gang groups (16%), Christian Identity groups (8%), White Supremacist –General groups (8%) and Creativity (4%).

(see Table 6.8 on next page)

Table 6.8
2-Core Network Rankings

	Degree (Rank)	Closeness (Rank)	Betweenness (Rank)	Constraint (Rank)	# of deaths linked to
Aryan Brotherhood	5 (6)	.4898 (7)	.1044 (5)	.4973 (12)	7.00
Aryan Nations	10 (1)	.6154 (1)	.3334 (1)	.2394 (1)	4.00
American Front	10 (1)	.5714 (3)	.2361 (2)	.2865 (2)	2.00
World Church of the Creator	4 (7)	.4286 (12)	.0217(13)	.3387 (7)	3.00
Denver Skins	2 (14)	.4000 (22)	.0000 (18)	.6332 (17)	1.00
Nazi Low Riders	6 (4)	.4444 (9)	.0650 (7)	.4440 (10)	1.00
Aryan National Front	2 (15)	.3529 (24)	.0030 (17)	.6250 (16)	1.00
Hammerksin Nation	6 (4)	.5106 (5)	.1093 (4)	.3274 (4)	3.00
Confederate Knights of America	3 (10)	.4000 (20)	.0259 (11)	.3333 (6)	1.00
Volksfront	10 (1)	.5854 (2)	.2307 (3)	.3426 (8)	1.00
Confederate White Vikings	2 (14)	.4211 (14)	.0000 (18)	.7308 (22)	1.00
National Socialist Front	4 (7)	.4000 (20)	.0237 (12)	.2954 (3)	1.00
White Aryan Resistance	5 (6)	.5333 (4)	.0790(6)	.3329 (5)	.00
White Revolution	2 (14)	.4444 (9)	.0000 (18)	.6895 (19)	.00
Blood & Honour	2 (14)	.4138 (16)	.0000(17)	.7191 (21)	.00
Troops of Tomorrow	2 (14)	.4138 (16)	.0000 (18)	.6944 (20)	.00
National Alliance	4 (7)	.5106 (5)	.0585 (8)	.3731 (9)	.00
Vinlanders	3 (10)	.4364 (11)	.0000 (18)	2.8057 (24)	.00
United Society of Aryan Skinheads	3 (10)	.4615 (8)	.02827 (9)	5.3861 (25)	.00
Golden State Skinheads	2 (14)	.4138 (16)	.0000 (18)	.6806 (18)	.00
KKK	3 (10)	.4286 (12)	.0138 (14)	.4949 (11)	.00
National Socialist Movement	2 (14)	.4211 (14)	.0127 (15)	.5000 (13)	.00

PEN1	2 (14)	.3529 (24)	.0000 (18)	1.0965 (23)	.00
C18	2 (14)	.4068 (19)	.0263 (10)	.5000 (13)	.00
The Christian Guard	2 (14)	.3871 (23)	.0087 (16)	.5000 (13)	.00

**Groups in bold font are core groups and those not in bold are non-core groups.*

Table 6.9

Frequencies – 2 Core Network


Degree		Closeness		Betweenness		Constraint		Deaths	
#	# of Groups in Category	Range	# of Groups in Range	Range	# of Groups in Range	Range	# of Groups in Range	#	# of Groups in Category
2	11 (44%)	.00-.35	0 (0.0%)	.00	8 (32%)	.00-.24	0 (0%)	0	13 (52%)
3	4 (16%)	.35-.44	15 (60%)	.00-.11	14 (56%)	.24-1.96	23 (92%)	1	7 (28%)
4	3 (12%)	.44-.53	6 (24%)	.11-.22	0 (0%)	1.96-3.67	1 (4%)	2	1 (4%)
5	2 (8%)	.53-.62	4 (16%)	.22-.33	3 (12%)	3.67-5.39	1 (4%)	3	2 (8%)
6	2 (8%)							4	1 (4%)
10	3 (12%)							7	1 (4%)
	25 (100%)		25 (100%)		25 (100%)		25 (100%)		25(100%)

As anticipated, core groups like the Aryan Nations, Volksfront, and American Front are still very central, but also playing central roles are non-core groups National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance. In fact, when looking at their network centrality scores (Table 6.8), White Aryan Resistance and National Alliance are similarly ranked. White Aryan Resistance is ranked 6th in terms of degree, 4th in terms of closeness, and 6th in terms of betweenness. The National Alliance is ranked 7th in degree, 5th in closeness, and 8th in betweenness. Thus, even though the

study did not attempt to research and code their links to the broader movement, they are still revealing themselves as significant players.

Map 6.10 provides a visualization of the 2-core network in which the centrality of the National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance may be observed.

Map 6.10
2-Core Network with Ideology Attribute



**Yellow (1)=Christian Identity; Green (2)=Racist Skinhead; Red(3)=White Supremacist Prison Gang; Blue(4)=Neo-Nazi; Pink(5)=Creativity; White(6)=White Supremacist-Genera; Orange=Biker Gang*

The 2-core map and network variable measurements also reflect that neo-Nazi groups in general may be serving as a connection between ideologies thereby making these groups fairly central to the movement. Three of the seven most central groups in the 2-core network are neo-Nazi groups, and it is believed that the results would be more dramatic if the study included links from National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance to other non-core groups.

Summary

Although not related to any specific hypothesis and conducted primarily for exploratory reasons, a 2-core network was generated to provide a more discernable picture of the white supremacist movement and the roles of groups within the movement. Admittedly, this analysis is limited by the fact that it only includes links emanating from core groups. It is anticipated that a network map that includes links between non-core groups would be substantially more informative and something worthy of further research. Nevertheless, the 2-core network does provide a sense of which non-core groups are important players to core groups as well as the broader white supremacist community.

The 2-core network consisted of 25 groups representing all of the ideological categories. The two most represented ideologies were neo-Nazi and racist skinhead, accounting for 64% of the total (32% each). While both are integrated into the broader movement, neo-Nazi groups seem to be playing a big role as links between the various ideologies. The two most significant neo-Nazi groups are National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance. Even though they are non-core groups, they were consistently ranked in the top third in terms of degree, closeness, and betweenness.

CHAPTER 7: FINDINGS - REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS

A social network analysis of both the Core Groups Network and the Core Groups Embedded Network suggested that groups central to the network are linked to more homicides. The results of SNA indicated a similar relationship for constraint. Linear regression analyses were run to determine whether the network characteristics of centrality (degree, closeness, and betweenness) and constraint were in fact significantly related to the number of ideological homicides to which a group is linked.

A. Descriptives: Core Group Network and Core Group Embedded Network

Core Group Network (CGN) Variables

Table 7.1

Frequencies – Core Group Network

Degree		Closeness		Betweenness		Constraint		Deaths	
0	1 (7.7%)	.00	1 (7.7%)	.00	5 (38.5%)	.00-.39	1 (7.7%)	1	8 (61.5%)
1	2 (15.4%)	.00-.18	0 (0.0%)	.00-.18	5 (38.5%)	.39-.59	5 (38.5%)	2	1 (7.7%)
2	6 (46.2%)	.18-.36	5 (38.5%)	.18-.36	1 (7.7%)	.59-.80	3 (23.1%)	3	2 (15.4%)
3	2 (15.4%)	.36-.53	7 (53.9%)	.36-.54	2 (15.4%)	.80-1.0	4 (30.8%)	4	1 (7.7%)
5	2 (15.4%)							7	1 (7.7%)
	13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)

Table 7.2**Diagnostics – Core Group Network**

	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Constraint
Mean	2.31	.348978	.117716	.667593
Median	2.00	.362637	.015152	.625000
Standard Deviation	1.473	.1283992	.1794782	.2350621
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality	Normal Distribution (p=.066)	Abnormal distribution (p=.040)	Abnormal distribution (p=.001)	Abnormal distribution (p=.035)
Skewness	Positively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)	Positively skewed and significant (abnormal distribution)	Positively skewed and significant (abnormal distribution)	Positively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)
Kurtosis	Leptokurtic but not significant	Leptokurtic and significant	Leptokurtic and significant	Platykurtic but not significant
Outliers?	Yes. The Aryan Nations, Hammerskin Nation and Insance Criminal Posse	Yes. Insane Criminal Posse	Yes. Aryan Nations and Aryan Brotherhood	None

The descriptive for the CGN reveals that all of the centrality variables were positively skewed and contained outliers. Only degree data met the assumption of normality. It should be noted however that the only data actually collected and coded was degree data. The scores for closeness, betweenness, and constraint are generated, via SNA, from the normally distributed degree data. Constraint was also positively skewed and in violation of the assumption of normality, but without outliers.

A violation of the assumption of normality weakens the value of any regression analysis findings. However, the CGN is an intimate network that only consisted of links amongst thirteen groups. Skewness and kurtosis are dependent on sample size. Smaller samples are susceptible to outliers and more likely to provide misleading results (McNeese, 2008). The normality of

distribution will improve considerably as the number of links and groups are increased and the chance of outliers is decreased.

Other regression assumptions were also tested. While not perfect, the data for each of the network characteristics met the assumption of linearity and homoscedasticity. See Appendix A for assumption testing diagnostics.

Core Groups Embedded Network (CGEN) Variables

Table 7.3

Frequencies – Core Groups Embedded Network

Degree		Closeness		Betweenness		Constraint		Deaths	
<i># of Links</i>	<i># of Groups in Category</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i>Range</i>	<i># of Groups in Range</i>	<i># of deaths</i>	<i># of Groups in Category</i>
1	1 (7.7%)	.00 - .25	0 (0.0%)	.00	3 (23.1%)	.00-.25	6 (46.2%)	1	8 (61.5%)
2	2 (15.4%)	.25-.34	3 (23.1%)	.00-.16	5 (38.5%)	.25-.50	4 (30.8%)	2	1 (7.7%)
5	3 (23.1%)	.34-.43	6 (46.2%)	.16-.32	3 (23.1%)	.50-.75	2 (15.4%)	3	2 (15.4%)
6	2 (15.4%)	.43-.52	4 (30.8%)	.32-.50	2 (15.4%)	.75-1.0	1 (7.7%)	4	1 (7.7%)
7	1 (7.7%)							7	1 (7.7%)
10	1 (7.7%)								
12	2 (15.4%)								
16	1 (7.7%)								
20	1 (7.7%)								
	13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13 (100%)		13(100%)

Table 7.4

Diagnostics – Core Groups Embedded Network

	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness	Constraint
Mean	7.92	.391149	.143764	.365925
Median	6.00	.351955	.073127	.264355
Standard Deviation	5.766	.0692089	.1567027	.2565661
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality	Normal Distribution (p=.300)	Normal Distribution (p=.104)	Normal Distribution (p=.051)	Abnormal distribution (p=.011)
Skewness	Positively skewed by not significant (normal distribution)	Positively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)	Positively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)	Positively skewed and significant (abnormal distribution)
Kurtosis	Platykurtic but not significant	Leptokurtic but not significant	Leptokurtic but not significant	Leptokurtic but not significant
Outliers?	None	None	None	Yes. National Socialist front and Insane Criminal Posse

The descriptives for the CGEN reveal that degree, closeness, and betweenness scores all meet the assumption of normality. They are also all positively skewed but without outliers and none violate the assumption of normality. Although the study sample still only involves thirteen groups, the increase in the number of links improved the distribution of data. Constraint was the only network characteristic which violated the assumption and possessed outliers.

As with the CGN, regression assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were also tested. Again, while not perfect, the assumption of homoscedasticity was not violated.

Similarly, the data for the centrality data was not perfect but does not violate the assumption of linearity. However, the constraint data was either curvilinear or non-linear. See appendix B for assumption testing diagnostics.

B. Results: Core Group Network and Core Group Embedded Network

Degree Centrality

The first correlation hypothesis stated that degree centrality will be positively correlated with the number of ideologically motivated homicides.

Table 7.5

Core Groups Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Degree Centrality	4.471	.058	.538	.289	.538

Core Groups Embedded Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Degree Centrality	3.478	.089	.490	.240	.490

Degree centrality was not a significant predictor of ideologically motivated homicides in either the CGN ($p=.058$) or CGEN ($p=.089$). The null hypothesis may not be rejected. While not an appropriate predictor, it is interesting to note that degree centrality is positively correlated with homicides.

Closeness Centrality

The second hypothesis stated that closeness centrality will be positively correlated with the number of ideologically motivated homicides.

Table 7.6

Core Group Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Closeness Centrality	3.749	.079	.504	.254	.504

Core Group Embedded Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Closeness Centrality	3.070	.108	.467	.218	.467

Closeness centrality is not a significant predictor of ideologically motivated homicides in either the CGN ($p=.079$) or CGEN ($p=.108$). The null hypothesis may not be rejected. Again, although not an appropriate predictor, it is interesting to note that the direction of the correlation is positive which is consistent with the hypothesis.

Betweenness Centrality

The third correlation hypothesis stated that Betweenness centrality will be positively correlated with the number of ideologically motivated homicides committed.

Table 7.7

Core Groups Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Betweenness Centrality	18.998	.001	.796	.633	.796

Core Groups Embedded Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Betweenness Centrality	5.384	.041	.573	.329	.573

In the CGN betweenness centrality is a significant ($p=.001$) predictor of ideologically motivated homicides, thus the null hypothesis is rejected. The correlation is strong ($R=.796$) and betweenness centrality accounts for 63% of the variance ($R^2 = .633$) in the number of ideologically motivated homicides. Consistent with the hypothesis, betweenness centrality is positively correlated with homicides, thus the higher a group's betweenness score, the greater the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is likely to be linked. Betweenness centrality is an appropriate predictor.

In the CGEN betweenness centrality continues to be a significant predictor ($p=.041$) of ideologically motivated homicides, thus the null hypothesis is rejected. However, the inclusion of ties to the broader white supremacist movement resulted in a drop in terms of correlation ($R_{\text{core groups}} = .796$, $R_{\text{core groups embedded}} = .573$), and in terms of the analysis of variance ($R^2_{\text{core groups}} = .633$, $R^2_{\text{core groups embedded}} = .329$). Thus, as a core group was situated within the broader movement, betweenness centrality was having a smaller impact on the dependent variable and accounted for a smaller percent of the variance.

Constraint (Structural Holes)

The fourth hypothesis stated that constraint will be negatively correlated with ideologically motivated homicides.

Table 7.8

Core Groups Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Constraint	4.395	.060	.534	.285	-.534

Core Groups Embedded Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Constraint	3.345	.095	.483	.233	-.483

In both networks, constraint is not a significant predictor ($p=.060$, $p=.095$), thus the null hypothesis may not be rejected. However, consistent with the research hypothesis, there is a negative correlation with ideologically motivated homicides.

Predictive Model

It was also hypothesized that a model consisting of more than one predictor would have a stronger relationship with the number of ideologically motivated homicides than any one predictor alone. In both networks various models were run via a backward progression regression to see if any combination of network characteristics improved prediction capabilities.

Table 7.9

Predictive Models for Core Groups Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Mean Square
Model 1. <i>Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, Constraint</i>	3.787	.052	.809	.654	6.368
Model 2. <i>Degree, Betweenness, Constraint</i>	5.662	.019	.808	.654	8.481
Model 3. <i>Degree, Betweenness</i>	8.929	.006	.801	.641	12.476
Model 4. <i>Betweenness</i>	18.998	.001	.796	.633	24.650

In the Core Groups Network, there were three significant models. The most significant model ($p=.001$) was Model #4 (betweenness centrality as the only predictor) which accounted for 63% ($R^2=.633$) of the variance. It is believed that betweenness centrality is the primary predictor and the other models were likely significant due to multicollinearity with betweenness centrality, and each other. A correlations analysis (see Table 7.6) between the independent variables show that all of the variables are indeed significantly correlated.

Table 7.10

Correlations Between Independent Variables in Core Groups Network

	Degree Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Constraint
Betweenness Centrality	r = .749 p = .003	r = .667 p = .013	r = -.631 p = .021
Degree Centrality		r = .797 p = .001	r = -.767 p = .002
Closeness Centrality			r = -.601 p = .030

Intercorrelations among predictors may be problematic in terms of practical prediction and theoretical interpretations. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to determine the importance of a predictor since the effects are cofounded (predictors are redundant). However, this level of multicollinearity is not surprising. Network data, by its nature is autocorrelated and likely to be in violation of the assumption of independence (analytictech.com). In other words, groups with a high degree will likely have high closeness and betweenness scores. However, multicollinearity tests indicated that the levels of multicollinearity are not problematic and thus the assumption is not violated (see Appendix A). It is also interesting to note that in spite of the strong correlation between predictors, betweenness centrality was the only significant predictor in the CGN.

As with the CGN, CGEN models were tested, via backward progression regression, to determine whether multiple predictors would improve predictive capabilities.

Table 7.11

Predictive Models for Core Groups Embedded Network

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square
Model 1. Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, Constraint	1.516	.285	.657	.431
Model 2. Degree, Betweenness, Constraint	2.228	.154	.653	.426
Model 3. Degree, Betweenness	2.761	.111	.596	.356
Model 4. Betweenness	5.384	.041	.573	.329

Once again, model 4 (betweenness centrality as the only predictor) was the best model .

However, now model 4 is the only significant model (p=.041, R=.573, R²=32.9%).

Even though the backward progression regression only revealed one significant model, it was decided to run correlations (Table 7.8) in light of the correlation findings with the CGN.

Table 7.12

Correlations Between Independent Variables in Core Groups Embedded Network

	Degree Centrality	Closeness Centrality	Constraint
Betweenness Centrality	r = .947 p = .000	r = .878 p = .000	r = -.647 p = .017
Degree Centrality		r = .896 p = .000	r = -.735 p = .004
Closeness Centrality			r = -.562 p = .045

Again, there is strong correlation between the predictors. As previously, noted this is not surprising with network data, which by its nature is autocorrelated. What is surprising however is that in spite of the strong correlations between predictors, the model that contains betweenness centrality as the sole predictor was the only significant model. As with the CGN, multicollinearity tests confirmed that the correlations are not problematic and therefore the assumption is not violated (see Appendix B).

Summary

Regression analysis was employed to determine whether certain network characteristics are significantly related to the number of ideological homicides with which a group is associated. If so, then such characteristics could serve as predictors of an increased threat of lethality. The results of the regression analyses revealed that betweenness centrality was the only significant predictor in both networks. This was true even though all of the independent variables were significantly correlated. Thus, among groups with members that have committed ideologically motivated murder, those groups with high betweenness centrality scores are significantly more likely to be linked to a greater number of deaths. One possible explanation for this finding is that groups with high betweenness scores are more frequently exposed to network communications. Perhaps greater exposure to certain thoughts, ideas, or calls for action may translate into a greater likelihood to act.

Although betweenness centrality was the only significant predictor in both networks, its impact was smaller in the CGEN and it explained less of the variance on the dependent variable. This suggests that there may be other variables having an impact on the dependent variable.

CHAPTER 8: FINDINGS – REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF GROUP ATTRIBUTES

It was hypothesized that certain group attributes are also significant predictors of ideologically motivated homicides. The specific attributes investigated were: group ideology, group age, and group size (Table 8.1). It was suspected that older and larger groups would be associated with a greater number of homicides, as would certain ideologies.

Regression analysis was conducted to ascertain whether any of the attributes, individually or collectively, are significantly related to the number of homicides committed in furtherance of the white supremacist ideology.

A. Descriptives

Table 8.1
Core Groups and Attributes

Name of Group	Age <i>(years in existence)</i>	Size <i>(# of members)</i>	Ideology	# of Deaths Associated with group (percent)
Aryan Brotherhood	31+ yrs	10,000+	White Supremacist – Prison Gang	7 (25.9%)
Aryan Nations	31+ yrs	101-1,000	Christian Identity	4 (14.8%)
American Front	16-30 yrs	11-100	Racist Skinhead	2 (7.4%)
World Church of the Creator	31+ yrs	101-1,000	Creativity	3 (11.1%)
Insane Criminal Posse	1-5 yrs	3-10	White Supremacist - General	1 (3.7%)
Denver Skins	6-15 yrs	11-100	Racist Skinhead	1 (3.7%)
Nazi Low Riders	31+ yrs	1,001–10,000	White Supremacist – Prison Gang	1 (3.7%)
Aryan National Front	1-5 yrs	11-100	Neo-Nazi	1 (3.7%)
Hammerskin Nation	16-30 yrs	101-1,000	Racist Skinhead	3 (11.1%)
Confederate Knights of America	16-30 yrs	11-100	White Supremacist - General	1 (3.7%)
Volksfront	6-15 yrs	11-100	Neo-nazi	1 (3.7%)
Confederate White Vikings	16-30 yrs	999	Racist Skinhead	1 (3.7%)
National Socialist Front	6-15 yrs	999	Neo-Nazi	1 (3.7%)
Total				27 (100%)

Table 8.2**Age Categories, Frequency, and Percent of Total**

Age	Category #	Frequency (percent)	# of Deaths (percent)
1-5 years	1	2 (15%)	2 (7%)
6-15 years	2	3 (23%)	3 (11%)
16-30 years	3	4 (31%)	7 (26%)
31+ years	4	4 (31%)	15 (56%)
Total		13 (100%)	27 (100%)

The descriptives for the age attribute (Table 8.2) reveal that 62% of the groups in the sample were in existence for a minimum of 16 years. Those groups in existence for over 31 or more years accounted for 56% of the homicides. This is twice the number of homicides associated with groups that have been in existence from 16-30 years, and five times the number associated with groups in existence for 6-15 years. This seems to support the notion that more established groups are linked to more ideologically motivated homicides.

Table 8.3
Size Categories, Frequency, and Percent of Total

Size	Category #	Frequency	Percent (excludes missing values)* (includes missing values)**	# of Deaths Associated with Group (percent)
3-10	1	1	9.1%* (7.7%**)	1 (4%)
11-100	2	5	45.5%* (38.5%**)	6 (24%)
101-1,000	3	3	27.3%* (23.1%**)	10 (40%)
1,001-10,000	4	1	9.1%* (7.7%**)	1 (4%)
10,000+	5	1	9.1%* (7.7%**)	7 (28%)
Total		11	100%	
Unknown (missing)	999	2	(15.4%**)	not included in calculation
Total		13	100%	25 (100%)

With regard to group size (Table 8.3), groups with 101-1,000 members were associated with the largest portion of homicides (40%). Ignoring the two groups for which size is not known, eight out of eleven groups (73%) have a membership between 11-1,000 members. These

eight groups account for 64% of the total homicides. However, at maximum, the cumulative membership of these eight groups account for less than half the total membership of the Aryan Brotherhood alone which was linked to 28% of the homicides. When viewing group age and size together, it appears that moderately sized groups (101 to 1,000 members) that are established (16 years or older) may in fact be posing the greatest threat.

Table 8.4

Group Ideologies, Number, and as Percent of Total

Ideology	Number (percent)	# of Deaths Associated with Group (percent)
Christian Identity	1 (8%)	4 (15%)
Racist Skinhead	4 (31%)	7 (26%)
White Supremacist – Prison Gang	2 (15%)	8 (30%)
Neo-Nazi	3 (23%)	3 (11%)
Creationism	1 (8%)	3(11%)
White Supremacist - General	2 (15%)	2 (7%)
	13 (100%)	27 (100%)

In terms of ideology (Table 8.4), racist skinheads and prison gangs accounted for 56% of the homicides, but no specific ideology overwhelmingly dominated.

Table 8.5

Mean, Median, and Skewness

	Group Age	Group Size
Mean	2.77	2.64
Median	3.00	2.00
Standard Deviation	1.092	1.120
Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality	Normal Distribution (p=.062)	Normal Distribution (p=.141)
Skewness	negatively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)	positively skewed but not significant (normal distribution)
Kurtosis	platykurtic but not significant	leptokurtic but not significant
Outliers?	None	Yes. Aryan Brotherhood

The descriptives for group attributes (Table 8.5) reveal that age and size data are normally distributed. Group age is negatively skewed towards older groups. Group size is positively skewed with one outlier, but not so significant as to violate the assumption of normality. As with the network data, the attribute data is less than perfect but is linear and homoscedatic (see Appendix C).

B. Results

Size

The first hypothesis regarding the predictive value of the attribute of size stated that there would be a significant positive correlation between the size of a white supremacist group and the number of ideologically motivated homicides.

Table 8.6

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Size Category	11.950	.007	.755	.570	.755

Consistent with the hypothesis, there was a positive and significant ($p=.007$) correlation between group size and the number of homicides to which a group is likely to be linked. The correlation is very strong ($R=.755$) and size accounts for 57% ($R^2 = .570$) of the variance. Thus, the larger the group in terms of membership, the greater the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which that group is likely to be linked.

Age

The second hypothesis stated that there would be a positive and significant correlation between age of white supremacist group and number of ideologically motivated homicides to which it is linked.

Table 8.7

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Age Category	6.286	.029	.603	.364	.603

Consistent with the hypothesis, there is a positive correlation between group age and the number of homicides to which it is likely to be linked. The correlation is significant ($p=.029$) and moderate in size ($R=.603$). Age accounts for 36.4% of the variance ($R^2 = .364$). The older the group, the greater the number of ideologically motivated homicides to which that group is likely to be linked.

Ideology

The third hypothesis regarding group attributes stated that certain white supremacist ideologies (i.e. Christian Identity) will be significantly associated with an increased threat of violence (greater number of ideologically motivated homicides).

Table 8.8

	F-Ratio	p	R	R Square	Standardized Beta
Ideology	1.077	.322	.299	.089	-.299

Inconsistent with the hypothesis, no specific ideology was significantly correlated ($p=.322$) with the number of ideologically motivated homicides. A group's ideology is not an appropriate predictor of an increased threat of violence in terms of number of ideologically motivated homicides.

A logical conclusion is that older groups also tend to be larger, therefore these two independent variables are likely to be significantly correlated. Issues of multicollinearity were investigated by running correlations between the various attribute variables (Table 8.8).

Table 8.9

Correlations Between Attributes

	Age	Ideology
Size	$r = .785$ $p = .004$	$r = -.378$ $p = .251$
Age		$r = -.372$ $p = .211$

Age of group and size of group were significantly correlated ($r=.785$, $p=.004$). There is no universally accepted rule but researchers usually agree that a correlation greater than .80 ($r>.80$) is problematic. Although close, the correlation for age and size as less than .80. Nevertheless, multicollinearity tests were run to ascertain whether the attributes of age and size were overly correlated (see Appendix C). The results indicate that, while strongly correlated, it is not problematic. Ideology was not significantly correlated with either size or age of group.

Since group age and size were significant predictors of ideologically motivated homicides, and significantly correlated to each other, it was considered that older and larger groups may tend to be more central. Consequently, correlations were also run to see if betweenness centrality, the only significant predictor amongst the network characteristic variables, was significantly correlated with group age and group size. Although betweenness centrality was the network characteristic of primary interest, correlations were run with all of the network characteristics.

Table 8.10

Correlations Between Network Variables and Attributes

	Age	Size
Degree Centrality	$r = .580$ $p = .038$	$r = .482$ $p = .133$
Closeness Centrality	$r = .628$ $p = .022$	$r = .636$ $p = .036$
Betweenness Centrality	$r = .595$ $p = .032$	$r = .650$ $p = .030$
Constraint	$r = -.697$ $p = .008$	$r = -.657$ $p = .028$

*The attribute of group size is only based on -size only involved 11 out of 13 groups because of unknown values for 2 groups

Table 8.9 reveals that betweenness centrality is significantly correlated with group age ($p=.032$, $r=.595$) and group size ($p=.030$, $r=.650$). The attributes of group age and size are also strongly correlated with the other network characteristics but this is not surprising considering how strongly correlated the network characteristics are with each other.

Summary

These regression findings suggest one of two possibilities. The first is that in a network consisting of white supremacist groups associated with ideologically motivated homicides, large established groups that possess high betweenness centrality scores pose the greatest threat. However, the descriptives seemed to indicate that moderately sized established groups were posing a more significant threat. The second possible finding is simply that older groups tend to be larger and therefore have more links. The greater the number of links, the more likely the group will have a high betweenness score. The questions raised by these possible explanations will be addressed in future studies.

CHAPTER 9: DISCUSSION

Terrorism is considered a significant threat by the general public and by law enforcement. Since the attacks of September 11th, the focus has been on international terrorists but empirical evidence suggests that domestic extremists pose an equally serious threat. This observation is supported by the ECDB, which demonstrated that the domestic far right was responsible for a significant number of ideologically motivated acts of extreme violence between 1990 and 2008. Moreover, this database revealed that white supremacists accounted for 74% of ideologically motivated homicides. In spite of these findings, there is much that we still do not know about domestic extremists in general, and about white supremacists in specific.

Numerous disciplines have attempted to investigate the terrorist actor, as well as the causes of terrorism. Criminologists have studied characteristics and attributes of the terrorist, while psychologists have investigated personality traits. Sociologists, on the other hand, have focused on societal factors and their impact on the individual or on a collective (movement). Others have attempted to explain terrorism as a function of religious ideology. Recently, researchers have begun using social network analysis to further our understanding of terrorism and those who perpetrate acts of terrorism.

Social Network Analysis is not new but has become more popular as computer technology improved. SNA is based on the theory that individuals and groups are interdependent actors, thus thoughts, ideas, attitudes, and actions are influenced by those with whom we interact. Moreover, it is not just to whom one is connected that matters but also one's location or role within a network. Central actors and/or actors with high social capital may be

more important, or have greater influence. SNA also allows for the inclusion of attribute data thereby providing the opportunity to analyze nodal characteristics in addition to relational data.

Regarding the study of terrorism, SNA studies have almost exclusively focused on personal networks of international terrorists. Organizational networks (i.e. groups) and domestic networks have been largely ignored. Further, there have been virtually no attempts to investigate whether extremist network characteristics are related to an increased threat level in terms of lethality. This study was designed to help fill these knowledge gaps by analyzing the networks of white supremacist organizations associated with ideologically motivated homicides and determining whether certain network characteristics relate to an increased number of homicides.

A. Results

Chapter 6 mapped three group networks - the CGN, CGEN, and 2-core network. Consistent with the hypotheses, as well as with previous studies, are the findings that the three white supremacist networks were non-cohesive and dispersed. Dispersed networks tend to be less efficient but more difficult to disrupt. The removal of one or more central groups would not likely destabilize the network.

The CGN was an intimate network consisting of ties among only thirteen groups. The three most popular groups were also the most central in terms of betweenness and closeness scores; an indication of their importance to the network. Similarly, when links to the broader network were considered (CGEN), the most popular groups were again most central as indicated by their high betweenness and closeness scores. In both networks, as hypothesized, and also consistent with previous research, the Aryan Nations was the most central group (ranked first in each of the networks), reflecting its role within the broader movement. In contrast, the Aryan

Brotherhood, which is similar in age but significantly larger than the Aryan Nations, is considerably less central to the network when links to the broader white supremacist movement are included. This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis. The result is likely due to the fact that Butler was an active leader who provided a belief system, a clear message, goals, and a plan to obtain those goals. Butler produced and disseminated literature, organized rallies, and reached out to the broader white supremacist community through annual congresses held on the Aryan Nations compound. Similarly, we see the American Front rise in importance when links to the broader movement are included because leader David Lynch was ideologically focused, active, and also made efforts to reach out to white supremacist organizations of various ideological foundations. In contrast, the Aryan Brotherhood, and other white supremacist prison gangs (i.e. Nazi Low Riders, PENI), focus more on criminal profits than ideology. Although supportive of white supremacist ideals and admiring of white supremacist activists like David Lane of The Order, the Aryan Brotherhood is not ideologically or politically active. As a result, the Aryan Brotherhood is peripheral to the broader white supremacist movement.

Although not very important to the broader movement, the Aryan Brotherhood may be playing a significant role in terms of the recruitment and radicalization of white supremacists. As previously indicated, the Aryan Brotherhood is estimated to have over 15,000 members. According to the Anti-Defamation League (2001), 10% of the prison population are involved in white supremacist prison gangs. According to Randy Blazak, this means approximately 220,000 white supremacist prison gang members are released into the general population each year. Upon release, these indoctrinated individuals may find a welcoming home within the broader white supremacist movement.

Another interesting finding is that although white supremacist groups tend to be linked primarily to other groups of the same ideological orientation, the movement as a whole is very integrated. There are a significant number of links between groups of differing ideologies. This suggests that although there are fundamental differences between ideologies, there is much common ground. Neo-Nazi groups, more so than other ideologies, seemed to be serving as a link between the various ideologies. This is likely due to the fact that common to all of the ideologies is an admiration for Hitler and a love for all things associated with the Nazi movement. To better investigate this observation, a 2-core network was generated. The 2-core network revealed that not only were neo-Nazi groups more interconnected than other ideologies, it revealed that two neo-Nazi groups in particular - National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance - were very central to the white supremacist community. Both of these groups have been led by active leaders and it is believed that their role is even greater than indicated by the 2-core network. Although neither the National Alliance nor White Aryan Resistance was linked to an ideologically motivated homicide during the years of the study, members of these organizations have engaged in other forms of ideologically motivated violence. Future studies that include those other forms of violence will likely confirm the importance of National Alliance and White Aryan Resistance to the broader movement during the 1990s and the early years of this century.

In addition to addressing hypotheses regarding network cohesion, group centralization, and ideological interconnections, Chapter 6 also provided support for the hypothesis that certain network characteristics are likely to be associated with a larger number of homicides. In Chapter 7 this hypothesis was tested. Regression analyses of both the CGN and the CGEN revealed that of the measured network characteristics, only betweenness centrality was a

significant predictor. Groups that have high betweenness centrality scores pose a greater threat in that they are significantly more likely to be associated with a larger number of ideological homicides. Betweenness centrality was the only significant predictor even though it was highly correlated with degree centrality and closeness centrality. One possible explanation for this finding is that members of groups that have high betweenness scores are more frequently exposed to attitudes, ideas, and calls for action, and this repeated exposure induces one to act. Although highly correlated, diagnostics indicated that these correlations were not problematic.

Betweenness centrality, however, only explains some of the variance on the number of homicides to which a white supremacist group is linked. Since SNA allows for the inclusion of attribute data, it was considered that certain group characteristics may possibly be contributing predictors. Chapter 8 revealed that both group size and group age are significantly and positively related to the number of ideologically motivated homicides. This would suggest that bigger and older groups pose a greater threat than smaller and younger groups. This is partially consistent with a recent study that found group size is a predictor (larger groups are more lethal), but group age is not (Asal and Rethemeyer, n.d.). When considering betweenness centrality, the results indicate that law enforcement should be watchful of large established groups that are central in terms of betweenness. However, before drawing such final conclusions, it should be noted that group age, group size, and betweenness centrality were all strongly correlated. Older groups may simply be larger and larger groups have more connections and groups with many connections tend to be more central. Multicollinearity tests indicate that the strong correlations are not problematic, but this issue should be addressed in future studies involving larger samples and more sophisticated statistical techniques.

In sum, this study provides insight into groups possessing members that have demonstrated a willingness to commit extreme violence in furtherance of a radical white supremacist ideology. The study shows how groups are interconnected and which violent groups are important to each other as well as to the broader white supremacist movement. This study supports previous findings and provides new insights. Lastly, this study provides a novel approach to studying groups demonstrated to pose a significant threat. As such, it is largely exploratory and provides a foundation upon which future studies can build.

B. Implications – Methodological, Academic, and Policy

Methodological

This study was novel in that it employed unique and cutting edge methodology to explore dangerous domestic extremist organizations. As previously noted, social network analysis has only recently been employed to the study of terrorism and has yielded interesting findings. The mapping and measuring of networks provides insight into how networks organize, communicate, and operate. It also enables researchers to build upon existing knowledge, and to address new and important questions, such as: Is the extremist network cohesive or dispersed? What are the shortest pathways of communication in the network? Which members of the network, if any, are vital to the functioning and stability of the network? Where are the weak points in the network that would facilitate destabilization? Does link type combined with location suggest an increased danger of terroristic activity?

Specific to the discussion of white supremacist organizations, SNA could be an important tool in addressing issues raised by existing research not involving SNA, such as: What is the role of white supremacist prison gangs in the recruitment and radicalization of white inmates? Upon

release from prison, who do these individuals become linked to, and what are the nature of those links? SNA methodology can also be instrumental in the investigation of “lone wolves” (i.e. Timothy McVeigh) by helping to ascertain how these individuals are connected to the broader movement.

Because SNA generates empirical data and allows for the inclusion of attribute data, it may also be used effectively with other types of methodologies. A decision to engage in an act of terrorism is likely due to a confluence of factors: religious, sociological, psychological. These factors are impacted by one’s social network and the nature of those connections. This study combined SNA with regression analyses to investigate whether a *group’s* location within the network, combined with certain attributes, is indicative of an increased threat. This same methodological approach could be employed with *personal* networks to help assess what types of factors (network and attribute) influence individuals (formal group member or lone wolf) to act.

Academic (Future Research)

Another benefit of this study is that it is empirical. As previously noted, there is a lack of empirical research in the field of terrorism and this study helps to fill this gap. Further, this study contributes not only to the general terrorism literature, but also to that which involves domestic extremists. Perhaps more importantly, this paper contributes to the growing body of terrorism research employing SNA methodology, and is essentially the first to apply it to the study of domestic white supremacists. Lastly, this dissertation uses the group as the unit of analysis, where as previous SNA terrorism research focused on personal networks.

In the near future, this study will be expanded substantially. The first step will be to include all ideologically motivated violent crimes or attempted violent crimes. This will considerably expand the number of groups within the database and allow for more robust findings. It will also provide an opportunity to determine if network structure and network location are related to the level of ideological violence (property crime versus violent crime). Lastly, this study will be coded so that the networks can be observed in six year increments. The white supremacist movement is dynamic in that it is constantly undergoing changes as groups merge, split, create alliances, change names, or cease to exist. This dissertation provided an eighteen-year snapshot of a movement with a long history. Such a snapshot provides valuable insight into the players and organizational structure of the white supremacist movement for a period of nearly two decades. However, this eighteen year period can be broken down into three six year periods thereby providing an even more detailed picture of how the network evolved during this time span. For example, such an analysis can demonstrate how the network shifted as old mainstays like the Aryan Nations went into decline and new groups filled the void. It will also provide insight into whether, or how, these new groups differ from those groups that dominated during the 1980s and 1990s.

This dissertation will also serve as a foundation for new research. A recent FBI memo identified lone-wolf extremists as a real concern. The memo also mentioned the fact that there is “scant academic study to date of violent individual extremists” (Fields and Perez, 2009). Data from the ECDB has revealed that of all the ideologically motivated homicidal incidents committed by white supremacists, more than half of the incidents involved individuals with no formal group membership (lone wolves). In light of these facts, it would be worthwhile to employ SNA to identify and study lone wolf individual networks as well as their links to formal

white supremacist organizations. Such a study would provide insight into what types of links or network structures suggest an increased likelihood of violence and could assist in efforts to identify dangerous extremists before they have a chance to act.

In addition to lone wolves, there is concern about the recruitment and radicalization of white supremacists in prison. Again, this study may serve as a foundation for studies that look at how white supremacist-prison gangs are connected to the broader white supremacist movement and how white supremacist individuals, upon release from prison, link to the broader movement.

Policy

As previously noted, the white supremacist movement is a non-cohesive and dispersed network. The removal of any specific group is unlikely to disrupt the network. This is especially true in light of the fact that there are many opportunities (e.g. annual conventions, concerts, internet, etc.) for these groups to interconnect. However, if disrupting the organizational network is the goal, it may make sense to target centrally located neo-Nazi groups as they seem to play a significant role in connecting groups of differing ideologies.

Although difficult to disrupt the movement network, this study suggests that, with the assistance of SNA, investigators have a means by which to assess specific groups that posed a heightened level of threat. It may be advisable for law enforcement to watch members of organizations that possess high betweenness scores and are of a certain size and age. Members of these groups may be more frequently exposed to certain messages and ideas, and thus more incentivized to act. Since the decision to commit ideologically motivated violence is multi-factorial, law enforcement should work with academicians (i.e. criminologists, psychologists) and network analysis experts to create a comprehensive picture of which groups, which links,

and which personality traits, when taken together, pose the greatest threat. In addition to targeting members of groups that already possess certain attributes and high betweenness scores, law enforcement may also wish to focus on “rising stars.” Rising stars are groups that are growing in membership and reputation and becoming increasingly more central to the movement, thus increasingly likely to be associated with extreme violence. Preventing a group from achieving a sufficient growth and centrality within the network could help to reduce threat levels.

Whether looking at established centrally located groups or rising stars, there are a number of methods law enforcement could employ to reduce the threat level posed by these dangerous groups. One method is to destabilize the organization. A lack of internal cohesion can stop growth and lead to a group’s demise (Freilich, Chermak, & Caspi, 2009). Lack of cohesion limits the group’s ability to be effective and active. This leads to loss of membership as members become frustrated and leave (Sageman, 2008; Ross and Gurr, 1989). Destabilization can be accomplished by removing the leader, or key members of the group. The deaths of Richard Butler and William Pierce resulted in destabilization, which led to infighting, loss of members, loss of revenue, and finally, loss of status. Similarly, the arrest of Matt Hale destabilized the World Church of the Creator and initiated its decline. However, law enforcement has to be careful in how they remove a leader or key members of a group. An overly aggressive approach could have a backlash effect thereby raising the prominence of the target group or further radicalizing others and motivating them to join a group and/or commit violence (Freilich, Chermak, & Caspi, 2009; Dobratz and Shanks-Meile, 1997).

In addition to forceful removal, law enforcement can use knowledge of network communication pathways to neutralize or destabilize a group. By knowing who is connected to

whom, law enforcement can ensure that certain messages (e.g. group is being closely monitored and violence will not be tolerated) reach the target group in an effort to neutralize any feared escalation. Law enforcement can also use knowledge of communication links to disseminate rumors (e.g. group has been infiltrated) for the purpose of destabilizing by creating fear and distrust among members.

Other policy implications of this study involve the need for law enforcement to employ network methodology to monitor lone wolves and white supremacist prison gang members released back into the general population. Also, as argued here and elsewhere, hate crimes (personal or property) are a form of terrorism in that the objective is to achieve a political goal by sending a message to the target community. Thus, legislatures may wish to revisit hate crime statutes and link them to terrorism statutes, and/or enhance punishment. The increased cost of engaging in such activity could then be communicated to white supremacists via specific known network pathways. Considering that terrorists are typically considered to be rational actors, some may decide the costs outweigh the benefits. Lastly, law enforcement could make efforts to reach out to the leaders of those groups most influential to a network. If a relationship of trust can be fostered between the police and certain groups, then the two may be able to negotiate terms that are mutually beneficial. A group member's participation in a violent ideological act will often bring unwanted attention, from law enforcement, to the leaders of the group. Heightened police scrutiny may actually create instability within an organization. Moreover, acts by members could result in civil lawsuits that are likely to bankrupt the organization. Like police scrutiny, bankruptcy can lead to group instability and personal loss for the leaders. Consequently, leaders of these groups may be willing to work with police in an effort to avoid such circumstances.

C. Research Limitations

Data Collection and Coding Limitations

The data for this study was obtained via open sources, such as: newspapers, court documents, watchdog reports, internet searches, etc. Databases that rely on open source searches present a number of potential biases. Due to media and newsworthiness biases, not all criminal incidents committed by white supremacists are reported, or reported to the same degree. Further, not all white supremacist groups, or the ties between those groups, are reported by the media to the same degree. While it is almost certain that there is missing data, it is believed that, as a result of the newsworthiness of homicidal events and groups tied to those homicides, the data is representative of the reality.

In addition to media biases, another possible limitation is the likelihood of inaccuracies in media reports or missing data. An information source, such as a newspaper, may report an inaccurate fact which is picked up and repeated in other newspapers thereby repeating the false information. For instance, it is possible that the media will report an individual as being a formal member of a white supremacist organization when in fact he/she was never more than friends with formal members. Compounding the limitation of inaccuracies is the fact that some events were simply never reported or solved. An ideologically motivated homicide may have been committed but never solved, thus not captured in the data.

In addition to collection, the coding of data also presents a couple of limitations. The study focused on ideologically motivated homicides, but it is possible that coders did not apply the definition of “ideological” similarly. This could result in the inclusion of homicides which do not belong in the data, or the exclusion of homicides which do belong in the data. While this risk

certainly exists, numerous incidents were coded by multiple researchers to insure inter-coder reliability.

Other limitations related to the data include the fact that the study focused on only those ideological homicide incidents involving formal members of white supremacist groups. These only accounted for approximately 42% of those incidents committed by white supremacists. A study that considers homicides committed by individuals with no formal links to a white supremacist group could result in different network structure, measurements, and conclusions. Compounding this limitation is the fact that the study focused only on ideologically motivated homicides. The inclusion of other ideologically motivated crimes, such as attempted homicides, assaults, arsons, bombings harassment, etc., might also result in different findings.

The study focused specifically on the links of the thirteen core groups to each other and to the broader white supremacist movement (non-core groups). Thus, links of non-core groups to each other were not included. This was intentional as the goal was to study the core groups in relation to each other. However, the exclusion of such links may have resulted in certain core groups appearing more central than is true in reality and this could impact SNA and regression analysis findings. Lastly, the study focused on only those core groups linked to ideologically motivated homicides between the years of 1990 and 2008. The selection of this time span was somewhat arbitrary and a similar study of years prior to 1990, or the inclusion into the study of years prior to 1990, could lead to different results.

Social Network Analysis (SNA) Limitations

Most SNA limitations are related to data gathering and coding issues. As noted in the section above, missing data is problematic. Missing data results in incomplete networks.

Incompleteness is presumed with data obtained via open sources. While searches of open sources often result in rich and detailed data, it will not necessarily capture all relevant data (e.g. size of membership, links with other groups, etc.). This limitation is exacerbated when the subjects of the study typically seek to maintain a low profile or even anonymity. Incomplete networks could lead to misleading presumptions (Ressler, 2006), such as the size, cohesiveness, or density of a network, or the non-existence of certain relationships.

Another limitation involves the notion of fuzzy boundaries. At times it may be difficult to ascertain who should be included in the network and who should not (Sparrow, 1991). For example, an individual might falsely claim membership in formal white supremacist group, or conversely, a formal member may deny membership. Complicating matters is the fact that the white supremacist movement advocates leaderless resistance. This means individuals may be acting on behalf of an organization, even if not technically a card carrying formal member of the organization. This could present challenges in ascertaining which groups should be included.

Researchers have to be wary about presuming that covert networks behave like normal social networks (Baker and Faulkner, 1993). For instance, in a normal social network, strong ties reveal a significant cluster within the network (easy to see who is in and who is not). However, in a covert network, members desire to remain hidden thus their contacts are much less frequent, or even dormant for long periods. As a result, what are in fact strong ties may appear as weak ties (Krebs, 2001).

Regression Analysis Limitations

In terms of network characteristics, among the models tested, the model that appeared to be a consistent significant predictor of the number of ideologically motivated homicides was a

model containing only one predictor - betweenness centrality. The other predictor variables failed to provide a significant effect. It is generally considered that the more predictors the better the prediction. Having only one statistically significant contributor, however, raises questions about the accuracy of prediction. Another weakness is the fact that as the size of the network increased, the size of the effect decreased. Similarly, there was a decrease in the amount of variance accounted for as well. Typically, prediction capabilities improve as strength of relationship increases.

The inability to determine the underlying causal mechanism of an apparent relationship, as well as sample size issues, are two more possible limitations. Although both networks demonstrated that betweenness centrality is positively and significantly related to the number of ideologically motivated homicides, the exact reason for this apparent relationship is not known. Further, the sample used in the study only included 13 groups. Smaller samples are more likely to provide misleading results (McNeesse, 2008). Future research will expand the number of groups and relational ties thereby reducing this concern.

Potential limitations are also presented by the possibility of violating certain assumptions that accompany regression analysis. The first regression assumption is that the data was normally distributed. This assumption could be in error if there is an issue with outliers. If unchecked, any utility of the predictor models may be lost. The CGN did seem to have some distribution issues. However, once the number of links and groups in the network was increased (CGEN), the data met the assumption of normality and reinforced the findings from the CGN. Reliability in results improves as the distribution of data becomes more normal. Another regression assumption is the absence of multicollinearity among the independent variables. Correlations were run and indicated that the network characteristics, as well as group attributes,

were, in fact, significantly correlated. Multicollinearity makes it difficult to determine the importance of a predictor since the effects are confounded (predictors are redundant). However, as previously noted, multicollinearity is not unusual with network data since network data lends itself to autocorrelation. Nevertheless, multicollinearity tests indicated that, although the network predictors were correlated, the levels were not so high as to be problematic (see Appendices A-C). Moreover, backward progression analysis indicated that betweenness centrality was the only significant predictor and any other significant models were likely as a result of correlation with betweenness centrality. Lastly, regression analysis assumes that there is a linear relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. A non-linear relationship could under-estimate the true relationship increasing the chance for a type II error. Linearity was tested (see Appendices A-C), and although not perfect, the relationships between independent and dependent variables did not appear to violate the assumption. The one exception was constraint which appears to have a curvilinear relationship with the number of deaths.

Appendix A.

Regression Analysis Assumptions: Core Groups Network

Multicollinearity Test for All Core Network Variables


	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness
Closeness	VIF=2.738 (Tolerance=.365)		
Betweenness	VIF=2.276 (Tolerance=.439)	VIF=1.801 (Tolerance=.555)	
Constraint	VIF=2.424 (Tolerance=.412)	VIF=1.566 (Tolerance=.639)	VIF= 1.660 (Tolerance=.602)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values were computed for all independent variables. These values provide an indication of linear associations among predictors which might lead to multicollinearity problems. It is generally considered to be problematic if any VIF value exceeds 10 (or Tolerance is less than .1). The VIF values ranged from 1.566 to 2.738 which do not suggest a problem with multicollinearity.

Degree Centrality Variable


Assumption of Normality

Mean	2.31
Median	2.00
Standard Deviation	1.473
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution normal: test not significant (p=.066)
Skewness	.756
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	.597
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic but not significant




Although not perfect, the distribution of data is normal. The assumption has been met.

Test for Outliers




The box plot indicates the presence of outliers. Numbers 2 and 9 represent the Aryan Nations and Hammerskin Nation, each with 5 links. Number 5 is Insane Criminal Posse which had no links.

Assumption of Linearity



The relationship between degree and number of deaths is not a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as degree increases, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity




The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

Closeness Centrality

Mean	.348978
Median	.362637
Standard Deviation	.1283992
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution abnormal: test significant (p= .040)
Skewness	-.1542
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution abnormal: positively skewed and significant
Kurtosis	4.421
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution abnormal: leptokurtic and significant




Test of normality of distribution indicate the assumption is violated.

Test for Outliers




The above box plot demonstrates the skewness of the data and the presence of an outlier (Insane Criminal Posse).

Assumption of Linearity




The relationship between closeness and number of deaths is not a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as closeness scores increase, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity




The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that virtually all of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.


Betweenness Centrality

Mean	.117716
Median	.015152
Standard Deviation	.1794782
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution abnormal: test significant (p=.001)
Skewness	1.673
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution abnormal: positively skewed and significant
Kurtosis	1.815
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic and significant




Tests for normality of distribution of data indicate that the data is significantly skewed and not normally distributed. The assumption is violated.

Test for Outliers




The box plot demonstrates the skewness of the data and reveals that there are two outliers (Aryan Nations and Aryan Brotherhood)

Assumption of Linearity




The scatterplot reveals that the relationship between betweenness scores and deaths is far from perfect but does demonstrate some linearity in that as betweenness scores increase, so do the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity




The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.


Constraint

Mean	.667593
Median	.625000
Standard Deviation	.2350621
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution abnormal: test significant (p=.035)
Skewness	.484
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	-1.486
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: platykurtic but not significant




Tests of assumption of normality of data distribution show the assumption is violated..

Test for Outliers




There were no outliers present.

Assumption of Linearity




The scatterplot reveals a curvilinear relationship between constraint and death. This could indicate that there is no relationship between the two variables.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity



The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

Appendix B.

Regression Analysis Assumptions: Core Groups Embedded Network


Multicollinearity Test for All Core Groups Embedded Network Variables

	Degree	Closeness	Betweenness
Degree			
Closeness	VIF=5.084 (Tolerance=1.97)		
Betweenness	VIF=9.718 (Tolerance=.103)	VIF=4.381 (Tolerance=.228)	
Constraint	VIF=2.176 (Tolerance=.459)	VIF=1.462 (Tolerance=.684)	VIF= 1.719 (Tolerance=.582)

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values were computed for all independent variables. These values provide an indication of linear associations among predictors which might lead to multicollinearity problems. It is generally considered to be problematic if any VIF value exceeds 10 (or Tolerance is less than .1). The VIF values ranged from 1.462 to 9.718 which do not suggest a problem with multicollinearity.


Degree

Mean	7.92
Median	6.00
Standard Deviation	5.766
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution normal: test not significant (p=.300)
Skewness	.814
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	-.035
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: platykurtic but not significant




Although not perfect, the distribution of data is normal. The assumption has been met.

Test for Outliers




No outliers are present.

Assumption of Linearity




The relationship between degree and number of deaths is far from a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as degree increases, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity




The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

Closeness

Mean	.391149
Median	.351955
Standard Deviation	.0692089
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution normal: test not significant (p=.104)
Skewness	.570
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	-1.147
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic but not significant




Data is normally distributed. Assumption met.

Test for Outliers




No outliers present.

Assumption of Linearity




The relationship between closeness and number of deaths is not a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as degree increases, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity




The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.


Betweenness

Mean	.143764
Median	.073127
Standard Deviation	.1567027
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution normal: test not significant (p=.051)
Skewness	1.052
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	.376
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic but not significant




Distribution of data normal. Assumption is met.

Test for Outliers




Data is positively skewed but there are no outliers.

Assumption of Linearity



The relationship between betweenness and number of deaths is not a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as degree increases, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity



The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.




The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

Constraint

Mean	.365925
Median	.264355
Standard Deviation	.2565661
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution abnormal: test significant (p=.011)
Skewness	1.556
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution abnormal: positively skewed and significant
Kurtosis	1.979
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic but not significant


Data significantly skewed. Data not normal thus assumption violated.

Test for Outliers




Test for outliers reveals outliers that are significantly skewing the data. The outliers are number 5 (Insane Criminal Posse) and number 12 (National Socialist Front).

Assumption of Linearity



There appears to be a curvilinear relationship between constraint and deaths. This suggests that there is no relationship between the two variables. The assumption of linearity is violated.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity



The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

Appendix C.

Normality of Data Distribution: Group Attributes


Multicollinearity Test for Group Attributes of Age and Size

	Age	Size	
Age			
Size	VIF=2.610 (Tolerance=.383)		
Ideology	VIF= 1.161 (Tolerance=.862)	VIF=1.167 (Tolerance=.857)	

Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values were computed for all independent variables. These values provide an indication of linear associations among predictors which might lead to multicollinearity problems. It is generally considered to be problematic if any VIF value exceeds 10 (or Tolerance is less than .1). The VIF values ranged from 1.161 to 2.610 which do not suggest a problem with multicollinearity.


Group Age

Mean	2.77
Median	3.00
Standard Deviation	1.092
Tests of Normality: Shapiro-Wilk	distribution normal: test significant (p=.062)
Skewness	-.373
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: negatively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	-1.034
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.191
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	2.382
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: platykurtic but not significant




Normality tests indicate that data is negatively skewed to a significant degree. Assumption of normality of data is violated.

Test for Outliers




Data negatively skewed but no outliers present.

Assumption of Linearity



The relationship between group age and deaths is far from perfect but by and large as age increases so do the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity






Tests of homoscedasticity indicate that the data is homoscedastic. The assumption is not violated.


Group Size Attribute

Mean	2.64
Median	2.00
Standard Deviation	1.120
	distribution normal: test not significant (p=.141)
Skewness	.888
Standard Error of Skewness	.616
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Skewness	-1.232 to +1.232
Level of skewness significant?	distribution normal: positively skewed but not significant
Kurtosis	.809
Standard Error of Kurtosis	1.279
Range of 2x the Standard Error of Kurtosis	-2.558 to +2.558
Level of kurtosis significant?	distribution normal: leptokurtic but not significant




Tests of assumption of normality of distribution of data reveal that data is positively skewed but normally distributed.

Test for Outliers




Box plot shows that the data is positively skewed and had one outlier. Number 1 represents the Aryan Brotherhood.

Assumption of Linearity




The relationship between group size and number of deaths is not a perfect linear relationship but the scatterplot demonstrates that, by and large, as group size increases, so does the number of deaths.

Test of Assumption of Homoscedasticity



The P-P Plot tests whether the residual error is normally distributed. Under perfect normality, the plot will be a 45 degree line. Again, while not perfect, it is not problematic.



The scatterplot of expected residuals vs. expected residuals show that 95% of the residuals fall between -2 and +2. The assumption of homoscedasticity is not violated.

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