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THE REACTION AGAINST POSITIVISM

IN LATIN AMERICA

A Study in the Philosophies of
Carlos Vaz Ferreira and José Ingenieros

by

Oscar Raphael Martí

A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate
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ABSTRACT

THE REACTION AGAINST POSITIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA:

A STUDY IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF CARLOS VAZ FERREIRA AND JOSE INGENIEROS

by

Oscar Raphael Martí

Adviser: Professor Peter J. Caws

The main thesis of this dissertation is that contemporary philosophy in Latin America can be characterized as a reaction against 19th century European positivism. To support this view, we first deal with the European positivists Comte, Mill and Spencer, and examine their aims, methods and arguments. We portray positivism as a theory of knowledge, a theory of development and a theory of ethics having social and political consequences. Though somewhat related, it bears little resemblance to 20th century logical positivism. We then investigate the reasons and causes for the adoption of classical positivism in Latin America, particularly in Argentina and Uruguay, and for its eventual decline. To understand the reaction against this philosophy, we study the works of two philosophers, Carlos Vaz Ferreira and José Ingenieros, and one writer, José Enrique Rodó. Our method is to scrutinize several features of their work: the influence of positivism, (what they react against and try to discard, and what they accept as valid); their philosophic character; their views on the nature of science and on the validity of metaphysics; their views on ethics and so on. They show, in various degrees, the

belief that positivism can be improved, and that the inductivist view of science is inadequate because it neglects the speculative function of scientific work. Hence, they argue for a revindication of metaphysics as handmaiden of science--a metaphysics that will carry out speculation and offer its conclusions to science for empirical tests. On ethical questions they share a similar dislike for traditional ethical systems they perceive as dogmatic and full of errors. Both Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros assume the truth of an ethical idealism, first formulated by Rodó, that gives individual ideals an axiological status and function as ethical standards. Vaz Ferreira presents a non-systematic ethical intuitionism, markedly anti-Spencerian, while Ingenieros justifies his idealism with Spencerian evolutionary arguments. We argue that these thinkers are true philosophers, not just "pensadores," that they deal with more than social or political issues, that they are highly original, and that they do not lag behind European philosophy nor imitate it.

There was an ape in the days that were earlier,
Centuries passed and his hair became curlier,
Centuries more and his thumb gave a twist,
And he was a man and a Positivist.

Nineteenth Century Ditty

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Classical positivism was the dominant philosophy in Latin America from roughly the second half of the 19th to the second decade of the 20th century. Two major currents are evident: social or Comtian, and evolutionary or Spencerian. Forerunners of 20th century logical positivism, these views made their way into Latin America for a variety of reasons. They offered a cogent philosophic alternative to romanticism and traditionalism; they suggested the idea of a secular society in which increased material knowledge brings the benefits of order and progress; they were theories of development offering hope for the future.

Philosophers, intellectuals, scientists, applied positivist methods to social, political and philosophic problems. They believed the social sciences, sociology in particular, were well equipped to deal with these problems. These positivists tried to control the intellectual and political life of Latin America. They advocated educational, social and political reforms. They challenged the Church at the theoretical level for ownership of the Truth and threatened to dispossess it of prestige and social power at the practical. By force of numbers, by political strategy, as much as by philosophical argumentation, positivism became the dominant philosophy.

Once entrenched, positivism became stifling and stultifying, and

a reaction that led to its downfall occurred at the beginning of this century. In the universities positivism lost prestige as a vehicle for philosophic or scientific investigation. As a political doctrine it met with strong and often violent opposition. Several views appeared--vitalism, Marxism, existentialism, Platonism, and a general return to classical philosophy--all seeking to replace or improve positivism; but its influence was pervasive, for elements of the doctrine tended to reappear even among its strongest detractors.

It is our thesis that contemporary philosophy in Latin America can be understood only in terms of this revolt and of the subsequent attempts to formulate alternatives. We will argue that there was an effort to reconstruct philosophy in general and value theory in particular along modified or non-positivist lines. To support this claim we will examine the works of three Latin American thinkers, José Enrique Rodó, Carlos Vaz Ferreira and José Ingenieros. They are excellent examples of the kind of intellectual who grew up under the aegis of positivism and then sought to change it. We will identify the positivist influences and present their reactions in terms of the alternatives they developed. The plan of this study is to examine European positivism and its influence in Uruguay and Argentina, homes of Rodó, Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros, and then discuss critically their philosophies. Because these thinkers are relatively unknown in the English literature--even in Spanish there are few comparative studies--to understand their views a minimum of exposition and historical material are necessary. But first, let us define our terms.

A. What is positivism? Since there are many views called by

that name, a controversy has developed over the meaning and scope of the term. Classical positivism could be identified with the philosophy of Auguste Comte and his followers.¹ The problem is that many people who followed him had no philosophical views and were interested in his religious or political ideas.² And many who had similar philosophic views--as Mill and Spencer did--refused to call themselves followers of Comte. An alternative is to identify positivism with an admiration for the natural sciences and the denial of any metaphysics.³ Again, this is troublesome since some positivists developed an elaborate metaphysics, and even Comte did not totally approve of the way the natural sciences worked. A more profitable course is to select some features essential to positivism that, when added to historical considerations, allow a simpler exposition.⁴ In this study positivism is taken to be an epistemological theory of science and philosophy, a theory of development and a theory of ethics, society and politics.

Positivists are essentially empiricists: Knowledge is based on experience and is generally obtained by induction. We experience phenomena, from which we discover invariable relations we call uniformities of nature or natural laws. All claims to knowledge are, thus, assertions about our own sensations and open to verification. The demand for grounding knowledge on verifiable assertions is supposed to bar First Causes of Being, mystical illumination or transcendental realities--that is, to eliminate metaphysics. And science is conceived, along Baconian lines, as inductive, with physics the model. Though each science has its own methodology, positivists nonetheless assert an unity of science since its results can be used and evaluated by philosophy.

For the positivist, history, man and the intellect progress in a

given direction: from lower to higher, from inferior to superior. This change and its laws can be determined by science. Human progress is, if not inevitable, at least assured by science, and it leads to human perfectibility. There are two conceptions of change: the Comtian law of the three stages and Spencerian evolution.

Positivists deal with ethical problems as if they were questions of fact. This resolves into two claims: that knowledge of the facts will alter our attitudes and beliefs, and that from factual premises normative conclusions can be derived. In either case, ethical questions are treated as susceptible to scientific methods—ethics is a science. And because all knowledge is phenomenal, and because man and his institutions are natural events, these problems can be solved by means of the sciences—the social sciences.

A distinction should be made between classical and logical positivisms, between the views of Comte, Mill or Spencer, and those of Schlick, Carnap or Ayer. Though these two movements bear the same name, their similarities are superficial. Logical positivists are unconcerned with theories of development, of politics or society.⁵ And they espouse emotivism in ethical questions, instead of the naturalism of classical positivists. Their main concerns are the methodological problems of logic and science. It is in their epistemological theories that logical and classical positivists resemble each other. Both argue for an empirical approach to knowledge; both construe the methods of science as the sole access to this knowledge; both offer a verification theory of meaning and both see metaphysics as undesirable—useless for Comte and meaningless for Carnap. But there are differences: Logical positivists place a greater emphasis on the verification criterion, on the logical structure

of science and the removal of linguistic pseudo-problems. Historically, there is only a weak link between the two movements. Comte influenced the Vienna Circle through Mach; Mill and Spencer exerted their influence mainly on British empiricism, not on their European counterparts.

B. With the decline of positivism in Latin America there is a shift in issues of interest to philosophers. These issues are essential to this study. The first one concerns the status of positivism as a philosophy. Positivism was seen as narrow, dogmatic and inconsistent. It needed considerable improvement. But proper reevaluation was complicated by its widespread influence. Rodó, Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros, for instance, were educated in the doctrine and adopted its conceptual framework. Breaking with the past is difficult, and much of positivism remained with them because, in spite of its faults, they were not willing to give up its advantages.

The second issue is the relation between metaphysics and science. Berated by positivists with their insistence on hard facts, metaphysics went underground, so to speak. But without it, argued Ingenieros, science would be unable to carry out its program, and Vaz Ferreira went so far as to claim that science is metaphysical in nature. Both pleaded for a new kind of metaphysics that takes care of positivist criticisms and allows for a form of speculation they feel is essential to the progress of science.

The third issue is the formulation of an ethics that is neither traditional nor positivist. Except for Rodó, there was no vocal criticism of the kind of ethics associated with positivism: evolutionism, and utilitarianism to some extent. The positions adopted--Vaz Ferreira's

skepticism and Ingenieros' idealism--go counter to positivist assumptions. For both, ethics is not a science nor does it deal with ethical facts. For Vaz Ferreira, it involves feelings, weighing pros and cons, keeping an open mind, and no amount of facts can lead to the solution of ethical problems. For Ingenieros, ethics is normative, involving the adoption of axiological ideals.

C. This reaction to positivism is not unique to Latin America. A similar movement developed in the United States, giving rise to pragmatism and absolute idealism. And there is European existentialism. There are, however, some features peculiar to the Latin American reaction. For instance, regardless of nationality, there is a parallel intellectual development that seems to be determined by circumstances. It began when Spain brought scholasticism into the New World in an effort to colonize it. The conquered native cultures offered little resistance, and this insured a homogeneity of thought. This similarity is reinforced by the appearance, at the same time, of other European influences--the Enlightenment, romanticism, eclecticism, positivism and so on.⁶

Another common trait is the belief that philosophy should be subservient to cultural and political goals. This is one of the reasons for the popularity of Comte's works. It finds expression in the injunction that philosophy should contribute to civilization, independence, modernization, self-sufficiency and national assertion. For some, this belief results in the acceptance of whatever philosophy fosters national goals, and degenerates into a lack of critical thinking--in a receptivity that contributes to superficiality and poverty of thought.⁷

Latin American philosophers also have a similar self-image.

The stress is on action. Philosophers want to be men of action as well as men of thought. They see themselves as leaders in the intellectual and political fields. Like the writers and the poets, they feel they are part of their nation's conscience.⁸ Because of this, they are active in social and political affairs, defining and shaping the destinies of their countries.

Some caveats are in order. Latin American philosophy cannot be treated as a monolith. There are similarities, but there are insurmountable differences. Though their intellectual development, goals and self-images are similar, national boundaries isolate Latin American thinkers from each other. As a general rule they look to Europe for intellectual guidance. Though there is a community in the linguistic and historic sense--Brazil the exception--whatever occurs of philosophic importance in any one Latin American nation seldom affects its neighbors. Positivism, for instance, came into many Latin American countries at about the same time. One finds, however, few references in a given country to the works of Latin American positivists in other countries. This is glaring in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, bordering nations that, up to the middle of the 19th century, shared an intellectual community. This also holds for the beginning of this century when, in spite of efforts of distinguished intellectuals like Rodó and Ingenieros, there was no move toward philosophic unity. If their idealism succeeds in literature and politics, it fails at the philosophic level. In short, there is no unity of philosophic thought that can be called Latin American philosophy.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

¹Walter M. Simon, European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 3 and footnote 4, p. 3-4.

²Speech by Fabien Magnin on September 5, 1878, the anniversary of Auguste Comte's death. Reprinted in Auguste Comte, Discours sur l'esprit positif, with an introduction and notes by Paul Arbousse-Bastide, Collection 10/18, (Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions, 1963), p. 293-307.

³Donald G. Charlton, Positivist Thought in France During the Second Empire, 1852-1870, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 5-11.

⁴Leszek Kolakowski, The Alienation of Reason: A History of Positivist Thought, Norbert Guterman, trans., (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1968), p. 3-10.

⁵This in spite of Otto Neurath's efforts to politicize the movement. See Simon, European Positivism, p. 257-63. For a good account of logical positivism, see Richard von Mises, Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding, (New York: Dover Publications, 1951).

⁶Arturo Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo en el Uruguay, Colección Tierra Firme 49, (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1950), p. 13.

⁷Augusto Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe una filosofía de nuestra América? Colección Mínima 22, (México, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1968), p. 27-44.

⁸Leopoldo Zea, Esencia de lo americano, Colección Itinerario Americano, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Pleamar, 1961), p. 175. Vaz Ferreira, for instance, has been criticized for failing to be a leader of Latin American youth—as Ingenieros and Rodó were. Jesualdo Sosa, Vaz Ferreira, pedagogo burgés, (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1963), p. 99.

CHAPTER II

THE EUROPEAN POSITIVISTS

Comte, Mill, Spencer

The present chapter will deal with 19th century positivism in Europe. Readers familiar with this aspect of the movement and interested only in the Latin American reaction can skip to chapter III. We feel that in order to give an adequate account, we must deal with some issues not directly relevant to Latin America, but important to the movement.

The first exposition of positivism was that of Auguste Comte, who offered a controversial reconstruction of science and society that alienated many potential supporters, among them John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer. We will first discuss Comte's views and then, the reactions of Mill and Spencer.

1 Comtian Positivism: There are two major presentations of Comte's views: the Cours de philosophie positive, (1830-42), and the Système de politique positive, (1851-54).¹ In the Cours, Comte argues for a systematization of science and in the Système, he outlines a plan for social and moral reform—a plan that calls for a religion of humanity with a priestly class and a public cult. If the Cours is an attempt to systematize ideas, the Système undertakes to systematize emotions.²

The Système has been severely criticized. Many have argued that it is an about face from the study of the formal content of science to

its moral applications.³ Worse, the critics continue, in it Comte gives up a sound naturalism and sinks into mysticism and madness.⁴ This is an unfair criticism, for even in the Cours, the ultimate aim is social reform. There, positivism is presented as more than a philosophy of science. Positivism, though based on positive science and unifying positive knowledge, still aims at formulating rules for social action by discovering the truth about social phenomena.⁵ This is one of the features that made it attractive to those Latin American philosophers who were concerned with the reorganization of their societies through some rational basis. Critics like Mill felt the Comtian scientific and social views can be treated separately.⁶ We will argue they cannot without crippling the Comtian program--the law of the three stages, the hierarchy of science and even the conception of sociology.

A. Taking an empiricist position, Comte asserts that all our knowledge comes from experience.⁷ To know something means to observe it, to make inferences from these observations and to fit them to the body of science. What is given are the elements of our perception--the phenomenal. In them we discover invariable relations--resemblance and succession--capable of systematization and classification. What lies behind observation, the causes of phenomena, things-in-themselves, the inner essences--these are beyond knowledge. But Comte is not an empiricist in Bacon's or Locke's sense, for observation means more than passive receptivity of the mind in the face of phenomena. We approach the observed with presuppositions--"théorie" in Comte's words.⁸ And this knowledge is historical and relative: it depends on the observer and the medium; on the categories available to an investigator at a

given time and place.⁹ Further, knowledge is asymptotic: it approaches but never attains reality.¹⁰

Comte is reacting to the contemporary solutions to the problems of the sources and validity of knowledge. He departs from Kant's influence, avoiding the noumenal and the synthetic a priori. Instead, he returns to Hume's identification of the object of knowledge with the phenomenal. It is absurd to posit the existence of an external world that is both, the source of knowledge and an unknowable, a thing-in-itself. Condillac's eclectic or Cousin's spiritualist positions are of no help, nor is the view that fancies this external world to be an idea. Comte's solution is to make science the sole source of, and scientific knowledge the only means to, the truth. How does Comte justify this view? If the noumenal is beyond knowledge, one might ask with Kant, how is science possible? Doesn't a rejection of the noumenal lead to idealism? And what kind of science can we have of only phenomena?

These views Comte justifies in terms of the law of the three stages to which the mind is subject: Our knowledge passes through three historical stages, the theological, the metaphysical and the positive.¹¹ This is a law of development, a yardstick with which to measure the progress of a person's education, a discipline or a society.¹² It is, further, both the statement of three philosophic methods and the law of ontogenic development of the mind: Individuals are theologians in childhood, metaphysicians in youth and natural philosophers in manhood.¹³

The sciences also develop along this progression from the theological to the positive. In its early stages explanations of phenomena are given in anthropomorphic terms: There is a belief in divine wills,

in absolute truths, a reliance on limited observations and in the imagination. Inconsistencies at this stage force the mind to advance to a more critical one--the metaphysical--where now explanations are given in terms of unifying principles and First Causes beyond what is experienced. There is, still, a dependence on absolute solutions to problems by means of dialectical methods. It is at the positive stage that argumentation and imagination are subordinated to observation, allowing true positive science to emerge.¹⁴ At this stage the search for causes becomes the search for laws.¹⁵ And--in terms of their universality and of the historical order in which they became positive--the sciences are classified hierarchically, with mathematics at the top and followed by astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and recently, sociology.

Comte uses the words "theological" and "metaphysical" in peculiar ways. "Theological" is opposed to "religious" and he uses it in reference to the doctrinal aspects of a religion, with its invocation of miracles, divine providence and so on.¹⁶ A better word might have been "mythical." His usage puts a strain on the concept and invites confusion. For instance, he refers to what we would consider the metaphysical views of the scholastics as "theological."

Metaphysics is, for Comte, speculation that passes itself off as science.¹⁷ He doesn't conceive metaphysics as theories about reality that limit the scope and character of science. Instead, he perceives it as a philosophic method for discovering truths, on the same level with and going against the grain of positive science. The explanations of metaphysics are given in animistic and absolutist terms. Metaphysical claims are above observation and beyond the limits of our faculties.

They do not explain or clear away anything, nor do they fulfill the aims of science. They only distract the mind with useless argumentation.¹⁸

At the metaphysicae stage, the imagination has epistemological priority over observation.¹⁹ There is a tacit acceptance of an ontology of personified abstractions—a physicalism that is impossible to justify in positive terms. The positive stage, where metaphysics is given up, represents an epistemological triumph of observation over imagination. It also represents a loss of interest in ontological questions and the adoption of phenomenalism: What there is, apart from phenomena, we neither know nor care to know—a very Humean attitude.

Strictly speaking, Comte does not develop arguments against metaphysics. There is no effort to explain it away, nor is a meaning criterion used to rule it out.²⁰ Rather, there is an outright refusal to entertain such questions. Comte tries to show, not so much that metaphysics is false or meaningless—as the logical positivists do—but that it is a remnant of a historic period that has outlived its usefulness. Its truth is relative to a time gone by.²¹ Metaphysics and metaphysical concepts will simply melt away as we grow into positive science. For instance, the noumenal or the synthetic a priori, as remnants of a metaphysical stage and beyond verification, will go away by the same route as Apollo or Minerva did.²²

The rejection of realism and the assertion of phenomenalism are given in epistemological terms: Matter is unknowable; phenomena are the building blocks of our knowledge. Why not, then, deny the existence of the external world and assert that ideas—as we perceive phenomena—are the only things that exist? That is, why not espouse idealism? This

Comte is unwilling to do for a variety of reasons. First, idealism itself is fraught with metaphysical assumptions.²³ For one thing, it implies the existence of ideas, above and beyond what's phenomenally given. And accepting evidence for the existence of ideas commits him to a methodologically dubious introspective psychology.²⁴ Second, idealism not only involves the adoption of a metaphysical ontology, but also gives absolute answers, and this is barred by positive science.²⁵ Third, there is the unstated belief that the solution is not to change from one metaphysics to another, but from metaphysics to science. And science is possible only when the clutter of metaphysical concepts is cleared away.

The only alternative to metaphysics is positive science. By positive science Comte means the study of the laws of phenomena: the invariable relations of homogeneity and succession. Science is different from erudition. It is more than just a collection of facts. It requires fitting facts to a coherent whole by means of explanations--the linking of one fact to another, or to the whole.²⁶ The task of science is to describe how, not to explain why; to reduce differences to the lowest possible number, not to give reasons; to predict phenomena and utilize these predictions. "Science d'où prévoyance; prévoyance d'où action."²⁷ For example, Newton's laws of gravitation subsume an immense number of facts under one principle: the law of inverse squares. But what gravity or weight are in themselves--the metaphysical questions for Comte--these remain outside the domain of positive science.²⁸

We have here a very limited view of science. In an effort to eliminate anything that resembles metaphysical explanation, Comte rejects

any quest for the why of things. We might accept this if by "why" we mean some anthropomorphic, quasi-supernatural or aprioristic reason behind phenomena, incapable of any form of verification. It is too restrictive if one is willing to accept answers circumscribed within a scientific framework. For instance, to the question "Why does a metal expand when heated?" a satisfactory answer can be given in terms of molecules vibrating faster as the kinetic energy is increased.

Part and parcel of scientific work is the search for and construction of concepts that explain why things work the way they do. This is partly the function of theoretical concepts. Yet, Comte neglects this very fruitful aspect of science.²⁹ This neglect is partial since he does advocate the use of hypotheses in science, but with the restriction that they be verified in the future.³⁰ The use of hypotheses "is only substituting an indirect for a direct investigation when the latter is impossible or too difficult...if we try to reach by hypothesis what is inaccessible to observation and reasoning, the fundamental condition is violated, and hypothesis, wandering off the field of science merely leads us astray."³¹ Comte's verification requirement--propositions not strictly reducible to the simplest statements of fact cannot have any meaning--seems to be formulated primarily to excise metaphysical concepts.³² But theoretical concepts--concepts that, though useful in suggesting experiments, are themselves beyond any observational verification--are, as a result, also ruled out.

Comte is inconsistent. At the end of the Cours, he speaks of admitting concepts that fulfill criteria other than that of empirical verification.³³ Simplicity, continuity and generality are presented as

necessary and sufficient conditions for inclusion. Given these non-empirical criteria, theoretical concepts could be accepted.³⁴ But Comte is unwilling or unable to adhere consistently to these criteria. Some theoretical concepts are accepted while others rejected.³⁵ Falsification is stressed as a means of ruling concepts out, but there is no consistent pattern for acceptance: some concepts are accepted upon verification, others on non-empirical criteria. Left over are some concepts that could be but are not accepted in terms of the same non-empirical criteria. Why are some concepts accepted and others not?

B. The second major premise of Comte's positivism is the assertion that man, his values and aspirations can be studied scientifically. The task falls to sociology, the final science to reach the positive stage. Without sociology the goals of positive philosophy could not be attained. Two claims are made: (i) By means of sociology society can be studied and the laws that govern it discovered; (ii) by means of sociology society can be studied and the best value system applicable to it be discovered. The first claim is descriptive and the second, prescriptive. Comte, however, is not clear about the difference between them--between the factual assertions about a society and the values he imposes on it. Sociology emerges from this, not so much as a science--as we conceive science today--but as a political ideology, as a commitment to definite ethical, social and political views.

The Comtian conception of sociology starts, interestingly enough, with the claim that since social phenomena are subject to invariable natural laws, they are capable of being understood by social physics or sociology.³⁶ Sociology is similar to other sciences in aims and

methods, but, being the most complex, it assumes a knowledge of the hierarchically superior sciences.³⁷ Comte makes a distinction, borrowed from physics, between social statics and social dynamics.³⁸ Social statics, corresponding to mechanical statics--the theory of physical systems or forces in equilibrium--is defined as the study of social structures in a state of equilibrium within a society.³⁹ To continue the physical analogy, this equilibrium and its corresponding laws are the laws of order--the permanent harmony among the conditions of social existence.⁴⁰ It studies the constant conditions of social phenomena, that is, the anatomy of societies.⁴¹ Social dynamics is analogous to mechanical dynamics--the theory of motion produced by continuous physical forces--and is defined as the study of the natural advancement of social wholes by the influence of government through the three stages.⁴² These are the laws of progress or development. Traditionally believed to be incompatible, it is up to sociology to show that the conditions of equilibrium and change--order and progress--can be reconciled.⁴³

Cultures progress from monarchies to judicial systems and finally achieve scientific-industrial societyhood, similar to the intellectual transition through the three stages of the intellect.⁴⁴ This conclusion is derived from historical analysis: By studying the development of societies, not only can the laws governing social structures be discovered, but also the tendencies that have become prominent and those that have disappeared.⁴⁵ An investigator can, with the help of history, predict the tendencies that will become predominant and with this knowledge, a more effective use of sociology and politics can be made.

At this point, one would expect a solid analysis of historical

data, of the actual structures of society and of the development of their institutions.⁴⁶ Instead Comte argues that prescriptive principles can be inferred from a study of the historical process. One does not discover, by studying the historical records, the way societies have developed or the institutions they had: One discovers the way they ought to develop or the institutions they ought to have. By this maneuver Comte has moved from claim (i) to claim (ii). How does he justify the jump?

Any justification for the jump calls for an acceptance of the positive stage as superior, a superiority based on historical analysis and the law of the three stages. It is precisely on this valuation that some of Comte's key concepts--such as progress and order--hinge. To claim that progress has occurred, for instance, means that a change has taken place from state X to state Y, and that Y is somehow better. To show that a change has taken place one has to point to the elements that differ between X and Y--that is, what has changed. This is a question of facts. To justify that Y is better, on the other hand, is a question of values.⁴⁷ Comte recognizes that societies change, but insists this change follows a pattern that is embodied in the law of the three stages. Further, he argues that this pattern is a change for the better, because the positive stage is itself superior.⁴⁸ That is, he begs the question.

An uncritical combination of facts and values also vitiates Comte's conception of order and its laws. In the Comtian framework, to claim an existing order means that certain social elements have achieved a state of social equilibrium in which the social forces, mutually interacting, cancel each other out. This is analogous to mechanical statics, where certain elements or forces reach an equilibrium or harmony.⁴⁹ The laws

of order express this social equilibrium, and sociology, by providing a theory of order, becomes an instrument for social reform and a foe to anarchy.⁵⁰ In this argument there is a shift from order as an equilibrium existing in societies, to that of an equilibrium societies should have to achieve certain ends.⁵¹

The jump from the actual order to the order that ought to be is justified by pointing to an intimate relation between theory and practice, science and art.⁵² Science weaves facts and ends with theories; the arts or practice offer prudential imperatives--if one wants certain ends, one should do this or that.⁵³ That a given social order will be established is a prediction based on facts. As a prediction it is part of science, rather than a prescription of what ought to be. Prescribing is the concern of the arts--the practical sciences. Yet, Comte has no qualms about speaking about modifications of social phenomena according to the indications of science.⁵⁴ He seems to hint that sociology in general, and social statics in particular, is a practical science.⁵⁵ Doesn't this go counter to Comte's efforts to make sociology a theoretical science?⁵⁶ Comte wavers between the two alternatives. He is, after all, both a scientist and a reformer, positions he does not regard as inconsistent.

At any rate, Comte's conception of social statics, like his conception of social dynamics, is value-laden. It suffers from a misleading analogy with mechanics. Order, harmony or equilibrium mean very different things in mechanics and in sociology. In physics, equilibrium means the cancelling out of equal forces acting in the same or opposite directions, and force is the physical agent causing changes in direction, momentum,

and so on. In sociology, equilibrium means the coexistence of antagonistic groups of persons, caused by fear, loyalty, violence or its absence, while force is the ability of an individual or a group to impose its will. Though the words might be the same, the meanings are quite different. This can be disastrous when the analogy is taken as a fact.⁵⁷

A similar confusion arises with the concept of law. Scientific laws, for Comte, function as descriptions of actual or possible events. They are phenomenal regularities and there is no question of their obedience. Things happen and we have no choice but to note them down and file them as laws of nature. Legal or moral laws are prescriptions: they state how things should happen. They need to be stated because things can--and often do--happen in ways other than those the laws prescribe. The way people behave is the province of factual laws, and the way they ought to but do not, is the province of legal or moral sanctions.⁵⁸ Moral laws can be disobeyed; it makes no sense to assert--or deny--such a claim for natural laws.⁵⁹

Given this confusion about the nature of laws, scientific, legal or moral, Comte's connection of science with values is easier to see.⁶⁰ Sociology is the scientific way to understand the phenomenon of man in society. As instrument for social reform, it is the culmination of positive science. Knowledge of the laws of social phenomena carries with it the power to change legal or moral laws. For instance, institutions rest on morality, which in turn is based on a given set of beliefs. Alter these beliefs and you change morality, which in turn will bring an alteration of the social framework.⁶¹ Bring men into agreement on first principles and social change will follow.

These arguments do not imply an attempt to derive normative concepts from the facts, only that our beliefs about the world alter our moral commitment--an accurate assessment. Comte is not trying to argue that from factual premises normative conclusions can be derived. Instead, he assumes normative elements in the premises themselves: "Order," "progress," "laws," carry descriptive and evaluative meanings; the scientific state to be developed at the positive stage is good and desirable, and one should work toward its establishment; there is no difference between describing and evaluating.

C. The validity of Comte's conception of science, as well as his grandiose plan for social reform, hinges on the superiority of the positive commonwealth. He justifies this superiority by advancing three kinds of arguments: a historical or developmental, a factual or scientific, and an axiological. According to the historical or developmental arguments, the positive polity is superior because it is the final step in that natural or developmental process described by the law of the three stages.⁶² That is, because it is determined by a highly verified law of development that placed it at the higher end of the scale. Let us ignore the difficulty in assuming that phenomenal laws can determine anything. This law asserts that civilizations do not just change; they develop. They develop because they change from an inferior to a superior stage. But then, the superiority of the last stage is assumed by the law itself and cannot be used to prove such superiority.

If instead of progress Comte would assert change, no objections arise on logical grounds. That civilizations change, that they change in a given direction, and that this direction could be expressed in a

law, is logically sound though factually unlikely. And that civilizations develop also implies criteria not explicitly stated.⁶³ If progress or development means something value neutral, such as an increase in complexity, the value of the positive polity is still unjustified: Why should a more complex social organization be superior? Either progress or development imply values, or they do not. If they do, the justification of the positive polity is circular. If they do not, then there is no justification.

The second kind of argument--the factual or scientific--hinges on the existence of a factual order of things. The implication is that in a positive polity the way things are is the way they ought to be.⁶⁴ The argument rests on the belief that sociocracy is superior because it is an outgrowth of positive science, whose concepts describe the natural order of things--social reorganization being one of them.⁶⁵ The problem with these arguments is that the concepts employed by positive science--order, progress, law and so on--are vitiated with values. That is, they assume the superiority of the sociocratic state and of the positive spirit. It is Comte's value-laden science that stands in need of justification; it cannot be used to justify the values themselves.

Both the developmental and the factual arguments above assume that a certain state of affairs--the positive sociocracy--is good, valuable, desirable and so on. Apart from these circular arguments, Comte argues that the superiority of the positive stage, and its corresponding state, is due to something other than its ability to discover the truth: The positive stage is superior because it allows for a sound morality. In other words, not because of epistemological advantages, but because of

ethical ones.⁶⁶ The political structure is justified in terms of the moral order. For instance, Comte argues that the positive state is superior because it fosters altruism, order, progress and so on.⁶⁷ The question is: what makes altruism, order and progress valuable moral concepts? The answer cannot be that they aid or are necessary for the welfare of the positive state, for the positive state is regarded as superior because it fosters such good qualities. To claim that altruism, order and progress are good because they are necessary to the positive polity is, again, circular.

What is needed and not given is a justification of the moral order that makes the positive polity superior. What Comte gives us, what seems to be in the back of his mind, is a justification in political terms. The reason is that in the Comtian scheme of things morality is subservient to politics. Ethical commitments are justified in terms of political ideologies. In defending this political system, Comte tries to justify it in terms of its inherent superiority. How is this superiority established? Not by any of the above arguments, for they are circular. Nevertheless, Comte regards them as perfectly sound. This is due to his naturalistic conception of morality. Morality consists of customs and mores that lack metaphysical or supernatural support. When Comte speaks of moral systematization, he means an examination of these customs and mores, that, like the facts of science, would be integrated into a positive framework and out of which a true, healthy, morality will emerge.⁶⁸ The right sort of actions will be found on inspection; that is, they are factual and open to verification as natural events in the world. Because there is no difference between evaluation and description;

because facts and values are the same kind of things, there is no need to justify the positive structure, just as there is no need to justify the laws of astronomy.⁶⁹ In this sense Comte is a naturalist, unaware or uninterested in Hume's distinction between "is" and "ought," and to that extent his ethics and his science are identical.

Very little need be said about the details of the positive society. It does not follow from Comte's own historical analysis. Granting the truth of the law of the three stages, one can argue for a cyclical view of history, as Ortega y Gasset does, or argue for a fourth stage, as Lester Ward does.⁷⁰ Assuming that the positive stage might be the culmination of the historical process does not guarantee nor justify its values any more than an individual who prophesies doom as the ultimate end of mankind guarantees or justifies this end's values.

2 Mill and Comtian positivism: An early English sympathizer--and later critic--of positivism, John Stuart Mill, agrees with the Comtian claim that science represents the highest form of knowledge. Mill also sees science as the study of phenomena, of their relations and of the laws that describe them and enable us to make predictions.⁷¹ Faculties, powers, final causes, are beyond the scope of science, and therefore, that of knowledge. Mill is also sympathetic to Comte's historical analysis, his views about the obviousness of progress and his belief that the role of ethics is to increase the welfare of mankind.⁷² They both assert that there are regularities in human behavior that are discoverable by the proper applications of science and that have a bearing on ethics. But in spite of common ground, the differences between Comte and Mill are profound.

A. The function of philosophy is different: For Comte it presents a world conception and a total systematization of knowledge; Mill sees it as providing a scientific knowledge of Man and of his limits as an intellectual, moral and social being.⁷³ Though both formulate a scientific empiricism, the strength of their commitment varies, depending in part, on different conceptions of experience: Comte treats experience as something conditioned by society--a social product that transcends the individual. Mill treats experience as impressions reaching the mind and combining to form ideas.⁷⁴

Comte adopts a moderate empiricism: Pure, isolated observations are idle and uncertain.⁷⁵ This makes absolute empiricism impossible for him. Even science is not a simple hoarding of facts. Facts must be sorted out, combined into laws and admitted to the body of science through hypotheses and theories.⁷⁶ Collecting factual data without a theoretical base belongs, with mysticism, to a state of intellectual anarchy prior to the positive stage.⁷⁷

Mill is a radical empiricist. Knowledge is reducible to individual sensations the mind receives from the external world and associates to form complex ideas. Thus, laws, concepts, scientific constructs, are ultimately empirical--even the laws of logic and mathematics are inferences from matters of fact. In criticizing Comte, Mill states that unverified hypotheses are not acceptable.⁷⁸ And he has strong objections to theoretical hypotheses: They are fictitious entities--to treat them as anything else is to confuse abstractions with realities.⁷⁹ To be valid, theoretical hypotheses cannot denote anything other than phenomenal realities.

Their views of philosophy of science also differ. Mill identifies

philosophy of science with the logic of the sciences, a conception somewhat broader than Comte's own view of positivism.⁸⁰ Mill points out that in developing a method of investigation, Comte neglects a method of proof.⁸¹ Method of investigation here means a conception of how to arrive at given truths, and method of proof is the procedure by means of which these truths are tested according to deductive or inductive canons.⁸² Mill undertakes a correction of this failure in his System of Logic.⁸³ Unfortunately, he has misunderstood the Comtian program. Comte is after systematization, not descriptive accuracy. He is trying to lay down an experimental base of science in preparation for its main task, the formulation of scientific laws. Once these laws are formulated there is no need for revision; once a coherent picture of the world emerges, science is no longer in need of proof or tests.⁸⁴ The possibility of a Cartesian revision of fundamental concepts does not enter into Comte's program. As a result, formal logic is given a minor role as a branch of abstract mathematics. For Comte, formal logic, detached from its subject matter, only leads to useless or puerile rules and vain ontological speculations.⁸⁵ If it is to have any use, philosophy of science--positive philosophy--cannot be equated with the logic of science, concludes Comte.

These different views about philosophy of science are basically different conceptions of--and attitudes toward--logic. Comte sees logic along traditional lines: the syllogism, metaphysical and aprioristic.⁸⁶ One is unfaithful to the facts if one forces them into preconceived rules or categories. To learn how to reason one must look at how, in fact, one reasons. Knowledge of rules of method do not lead to scientific

discoveries.⁸⁷ The outcome is Comte's rejection of the importance of logic for scientific work. Now, Mill is also at odds with traditional logic, but instead of simply rejecting it, he tries to reconstruct a thoroughly empirical logic, free of ontological connotations and consistent with Locke's empiricism.⁸⁸ The fundamental axioms of logic and mathematics are generalizations from experience.⁸⁹ The laws of reasoning are learned by seeing the agent at work.⁹⁰ Deductive logic always presupposes experience.⁹¹ All inferences proceed from particulars to particulars; general propositions are the records of all particular inferences already made. The individual instances that served as antecedents might have been forgotten, but it is from these that we draw the conclusions. Logical rules are a set of precautions to make sure we do so.⁹²

Mill's criticism--that Comte lacks a method of proof--has a point. Such lack tends to dogmatize scientific laws and makes them immune to factual revisions. Otherwise their empirical character would be betrayed, and the result would be something akin to metaphysics. And this is just what happens when logic is pushed into such a minor role. Mill's conception of science is much more adequate than Comte's. It is able to change radically, to permit the introduction of newer concepts, such as evolution.

Yet, Mill's empirical positivism also assumes a narrow view of science.⁹³ Like Comte, he takes inductive sciences--physics, astronomy, chemistry and so on--as models. From matters of fact one can infer generalizations, higher laws and ultimately, principles of science. Both Mill and Comte underrate the hypothetico-theoretical character of science.⁹⁴ And Mill's radical empiricism also fails to take account of

the analytic, a prioristic character of logic and mathematics. However, to criticize Mill for failing to distinguish between the analytic and empirical natures of pure and applied logic or mathematics, is to fail to see that his point is precisely that there is nothing to see--as some modern empiricists have argued, e.g. Quine. It would be better to argue that they are different because of the manner in which they are verified: Empirical statements are shown to be true or false by appeal to the facts, while mathematical or logical statements are shown to be true or false when they are derived in accord with the body of accepted mathematical or logical canons; that is, when they can logically be derived from axioms and theorems of the system.⁹⁵

B. In evaluating the methodological completeness of Comte's positive science, Mill fails to take into account its value-ladenness. There are some criticisms of the particular values adopted by Comte, but not of the confusion of facts and values.⁹⁶ This is surprising since Mill's conception of science manages to be relatively free of this flaw. Science is value-free: Values do not imply scientific concepts, nor are they hidden in the premises.⁹⁷ But then, how can science discover values or clarify problems of values? Mill's solution is classical: Just as scientific or mathematical laws are the result of inferences from matters of fact, so are moral laws. We derive the morals we have from our interaction with other human beings. They are the most advantageous procedural rules we have for adjudicating resources, avoiding conflicts and so on.⁹⁸ Better acquaintance with the facts, increased knowledge about motives or means and ends, are bound to make these procedural rules more effective. This explains the importance Mill places on the

social sciences. Agreement on method can be a bond between people who have different ideas about values.⁹⁹

Mill's utilitarian program received much attention. From what is factual he tries to derive norms: From the fact that pleasure is desired, Mill tries to show that pleasure ought to be desired, by way of the premise that pleasure is desirable--a claim meaning both, that it is and that it ought to be desirable. Whether this was considered by Mill to be a proof in the strict sense, or the only proof, in a wider sense, of which these matters were capable, is not at issue here. The point is that this is consistent with the positivist goal of social reform by altering beliefs with the help of the sciences; that the sciences can show what a social organization should or could be like.¹⁰⁰ That is, the scientist, the expert, the man capable of judging should make the decisions.¹⁰¹

Knowledge of the facts will alter ethical beliefs. But Mill's claim is stronger: from factual premises normative conclusions can be derived. Ethical concepts are reduced to natural qualities. The summum bonum is equated with pleasure, making ethical concepts ultimately factual. This is a naturalistic ethics. And Mill avoids the value-ladenness of Comte's science, not so much by ridding science of values, but by making values dependent on facts. Still, Mill admits a practical difference between facts and values, and keeps the social sciences value free.¹⁰² The goal of politics, to follow Mill's example, is to point to the cause of conditions in European systems and assess how to prevent, accelerate or modify them, leaving the desirability of each course up to a person's ethical considerations.¹⁰³

A troublesome concept, inherited from Comte's value-laden science, is progress. For Mill progress is real and value free. Progress means a change in man and society--a trajectory rather than a cycle.¹⁰⁴ Mill also believes that progress happens to be for the better. And this connection is an accidental one, for there can be progress "which might not in every case, or which might not on the whole, be improvements."¹⁰⁵ This concept is borrowed from mathematics: Progress, like mathematical progressions, follow definite laws or equations. Once these laws are discovered, the future direction can be discerned. The aim of the social sciences is to find out what these laws are.¹⁰⁶ The trouble with this argument is that Mill has taken a metaphor literally. Even putting aside the questionable existence of empirical or natural laws describing it, social and human progress cannot be like mathematical progressions. In mathematical progressions--the ideal case--the value of the function increases in a determinate manner. It is called a progression because there is an increase in numerical value, disregarding the sign, because the resulting number is larger. But in social progress, what gets larger? What increases in number? If Mill claims that progress is the numerical increase of anything--population, income, pleasure or even pain--this would contradict the utilitarian principle. If Mill singles out an increase in some particular feature as progress, questions arise, such as why this particular feature and not another?¹⁰⁷ It is in justifying these features that Mill tends to bring in value considerations: that such and such a thing's increase is better, more desirable and so on.¹⁰⁸

Another agreement between Comte and Mill is the necessity of historical studies for the benefit of the social sciences.¹⁰⁹ However,

Mill is not willing to go along with Comte's historical conclusions about the best social order. For Mill, Comte fails to establish a satisfactory connection between the theoretical explanations of past progress of a society and his proposals for future improvement. Comte's analysis does not bear out either his predictions for the future, nor the proposals for social reform.¹¹⁰ It is important to note that Mill never questions the validity of inferences from descriptive historical analysis to prescriptive measures for the future, from historical facts to social values. After all, according to Mill, all impartial observers would, when presented with given fact, come out with the same value conclusions.¹¹¹

3 Spencerian Positivism: The second major formulation of positivism is of the evolutionary variety as presented by Herbert Spencer. Two points must be made: first that Spencer is a positivist, and second, that he made evolution a central, unifying concept of science and philosophy.¹¹² Despite his own protests Spencer stands within the positivist movement.¹¹³ Like Comte and Mill, he is interested in giving a definite, coherent organization to scientific thought in which phenomena are preeminent, in the unity of science, and at least in principle, in the verifiability of scientific claims. Science, as the knowledge of man, should serve as a rational foundation for a natural ethics. Hence, we also find in Spencer the contradictory demands made by Comte and Mill: that social science be both rigorously scientific and yields ethical principles.¹¹⁴ It is precisely to bridge the gap between facts and values that the concept of evolution is introduced. Spencer is within the general framework of social positivism, offering an epistemological theory of science and

philosophy, a theory of development, and a theory of ethics basing itself on scientific knowledge. Disagreement with social positivists hinges on details about the scope of knowledge, the kind of development or how social reform can be achieved.¹¹⁵ Let us examine his views.

A. Basic to Spencerian positivism is the distinction between two epistemological categories: the knowable and the Unknowable. The former is that which can be experienced, phenomena, the object of science and philosophy. But behind phenomena lies what cannot be conceived or experienced: the Unknowable. This is the limit of our knowledge, the ultimate nature of things, the object of metaphysics and religion. It includes such problems as the origins of the universe, the nature of God, space and time, matter and motion, force, consciousness, etc. Of these ultimates we cannot form any conception. If we do they lead us to inconceivabilities, contradictions or suppositions that can not be represented in thought.¹¹⁶

Comte defines the unknowable as only the limits of our knowledge, and as such, beyond meaningful discourse.¹¹⁷ Spencer's view, then, represents a departure from this position: Because the Unknowable is incomprehensible, we should not just write it off. Of what we know nothing we can state nothing, neither that it exists nor that it doesn't.¹¹⁸ But lack of knowledge does not prevent Spencer from speculating about the nature of the Unknowable or about our conceptions of it. This speculation, however, leads to unverifiable assertions and to the accusation that the Unknowable itself is a metaphysical conception.¹¹⁹

Granted one cannot be both a metaphysician and a positivist, and given that Spencer makes all sorts of suspect assertions about the Unknowable; does this make him a metaphysician? Perhaps, but only

because of his own inconsistencies in dealing with the subject, for he is no friend of the metaphysician. To Spencer, metaphysical claims are futile. The subject matter of classical metaphysics--the reality behind appearances--is, and must be, unknown.¹²⁰ If no knowledge about the ultimate nature of things is possible, and the subject matter of metaphysics consists of these ultimates, then metaphysics is impossible. It isn't that metaphysics is the archaic remnant of some old intellectual viewpoint, as Comte sees it, useful because it contributed to the transition from the theological to the positive stage. It always was, and is, nonsense.¹²¹

And what is the knowable, the object of science and philosophy? Since all we have are phenomena, what is knowable are the relations between these phenomena.¹²² When talking about the knowable, Spencer constantly refers to the data of consciousness, to what is in one's mind when one knows something. He seems to identify the phenomenal with the content of consciousness. This identification seems to lead to idealism. His analysis of knowledge does point in this direction: The act of knowing is the establishment in consciousness of relations in the world. Given x and y as connected properties in some outer object, and a and b as the effects they produce in our consciousness, as long as a and b and the relation between them answer to x and y and their relation, it does not matter whether a and b resemble x and y or not.¹²³ Pushing to its logical conclusion, if it does not matter whether a and b resemble x and y, then it does not matter if x and y exist at all; what we are interested in is in a, b and their relations. How does he escape the conclusion that all we can know are states of consciousness?

Spencer's answer is unsatisfactory: objective reality exists because we have a consciousness of something beyond. This consciousness is impossible to eradicate; this is a feeling that forces us to accept its existence.¹²⁴ Not only does reality have a commonsense base, but we also assume the existence of things, even when we deny their existence.¹²⁵

The constant appeal to the data of consciousness and the search for certainty beyond empirical generalizations indicates the primacy of rational criteria for knowledge--What can or can not be conceived? What are the deeper truths behind the facts revealed by induction?¹²⁶ This raises serious questions about Spencer's commitment to empiricism.¹²⁷ Like Comte, he is not totally committed. This is due in part to his conception of experience. Experience is not the psychological atomism of Mill or the socio-cultural inheritance of Comte; it is racial, consisting of all the accumulated knowledge of the race, and inherited by a person at birth.¹²⁸ Experience, in this wider sense, includes all our faculties--our instincts and all that is for us biological. It includes so much of what we normally try to exclude from experience, in the narrower sense, making us wonder what is not experience for Spencer.

Spencer's view of philosophy is similar to Comte's.¹²⁹ Philosophy is the most general knowledge of reality: "Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge; Science is partially-unified knowledge; Philosophy is completely-unified knowledge."¹³⁰ Its points of departure are the broadest generalizations of the particular sciences. The principles of physics, biology, etc. are systematized and unified to yield more and more general concepts, until completely unified knowledge is achieved. Philosophy emerges as a kind of interdisciplinary scientific knowledge;

ultimate inductive truths from which the axioms of the sciences can be deduced.¹³¹

The kind of philosophy Spencer pursues is, however, naive. It lacks depth or historical perspective, and tends toward vague generalities and a neglect of facts.¹³² Though generalities are common, and facts do not stand in the way of many a good philosophical theory, a more serious flaw is his psychologism: the constant reduction of epistemological, logical, or even factual questions, to psychological ones.¹³³ It might be good to be reminded that these are also psychological questions, or that there is an introspective side to them. It might be worthwhile exploring the kinds of psychological solutions logical, epistemological, or even factual questions are capable of eliciting, but Spencer's treatment results in an almost exclusive preoccupation with the psychological side. It ignores the classical epistemological, logical, or factual questions themselves.

This psychologism contributes to a muddled view of science and method. The view is Comtian: Science is the development of common sense for solving particular problems and is a base for understanding the universe.¹³⁴ The function of science is prevision and, Spencer adds, "all prevision ultimately helps us in greater or less degree to achieve the good and avoid the bad."¹³⁵ Science is pragmatic, utilitarian, ultimately concerned with man. Scientific laws or generalizations are statements of uniformity of relations among phenomena.¹³⁶ These laws arise from common observation, colligating facts and formulating them as generalizations. The generalizations, in turn, form the base for higher generalizations, until ultimate principles are reached. As these laws become more generalized they increase in precision and scope. Yet, there is no qualitative difference between

commonsense and the laws of science, no matter how broad, for the latter are rooted in the former. Given this inductivist view of science, theoretical concepts are characterized as symbolic conceptions or representations. Symbolic conceptions are concrete ideas that are applied to more and more general concepts, losing their concreteness. As they become more abstract they also become more fictitious. In effect, this has eliminated many theoretical concepts from science. Other theoretical concepts, such as matter, force, etc. remain, at the price of being relegated to the realm of the Unknowable. But here, the discussion leads unavoidably to psychological questions—questions of what is experienced, conceived and so on. Scientific laws are, as uniform relations displayed by phenomena, cognitions established by the mind.¹³⁸ Theoretical concepts, be they lower-level symbolic conceptions or unknowables, are corresponding representations or our inability to make such representations. But, this is not a philosophy of science. It is the psychology of scientific thought. In this sense Comte's and Mill's philosophies of science are superior to that of Spencer.¹³⁹

This psychologism also muddles Spencer's view of the scientific method. On the one hand, the proper method of the sciences is conceived as mainly inductive.¹⁴⁰ On the other, there is an agreement that science and philosophy are corrigible by the hypothetico-deductive method.¹⁴¹ There are many difficulties with these two views that are lost when placed in a psychological framework. Questions of agreements between experiences, congruities of beliefs, correspondences of perceptions and reflection, and the consciousness of impressions might be interesting from a psychological point of view. They might even explain how we arrive at certain

forms of mentation. But they are hardly a philosophy of science.¹⁴²

B. Considerable part of the Spencerian program is devoted to the social sciences. In spite of Spencer's claims to independence of thought, there are important similarities with the Comtian program of social reform through scientific knowledge. Man and society, as natural structures, are the proper object of scientific investigation; changes, social or political--even revolutions--are subject to regularities sociology tries to discover and formulate as laws of change or progress.¹⁴³ But what of Spencer's disagreement with Comte about the proper methodology of science? If Comte sees each science as having its own methods, Spencer claims that, though the subject matter is complex, the methods of the social and natural sciences are similar.¹⁴⁴ Actually, their positions are not so far apart since both Spencer and Comte--and to a lesser degree Mill--take physics as a model for the social sciences. This analogy is both helpful and misleading. As has been pointed out, the danger with this kind of argument is that it can lead to anthropomorphism, or to a distortion of the social process.¹⁴⁵ Social statics and dynamics, as conceived by Comte and Spencer, and disregarding the differences, are flawed with a careless handling of analogical reasoning.

Although Comte and Spencer disagree about the function of social science, they reach similar conclusions: For Comte, the aim of sociology is to help in the achievement of social reform and the instauration of a positive society. But since this end is a necessary development of mankind anyway, sociology is really dispensable. For Spencer, the role of sociology is to reconcile man to the march of progress, rather than to accelerate or slow this march.¹⁴⁶ Progress is, for Spencer, inevitable;

thus sociology is unnecessary. But Mill sees social science as the knowledge of man and makes such knowledge an indispensable condition for progress, or even social reform.

The object of the social sciences is, for both Comte and Spencer, to discover the laws to which man and society are subject. But the content of their laws is different: For Comte, they are the laws of the three stages; to Spencer, the laws of evolution. Evolution is gradual, a continuous process from simple to complex—not a discrete advancement through stages, as Comte formulates it.¹⁴⁷ The law of evolution is the highest generalization of the sciences and is discoverable in all animate or inanimate nature.¹⁴⁸ This universal principle of development forms the pattern by means of which man's changes can be understood.

It is clear that Spencer takes the law of evolution as a factual statement, a generalization from the data of science, though demonstrably a necessary consequence of a universal rational principle like the law of gravity.¹⁴⁹ Spencer's task is clear: he must produce both a universal principle from which the law of evolution is deducible, and the evidence supporting evolution. The higher principle is identified with the principle of multiple effects. And to confirm the law, Spencer marshals an enormous amount of facts drawn from different fields, to be subsumed under one of its several formulations. Unfortunately, in all cases the law of evolution turns out to be an analytic dictum instead of a factual assertion, with its different senses working against each other.

The argument for subsuming evolution under a higher principle seems simple and attractive. Universal evolution can be caused by the principle that every active force produces more than one change: From

simple causes multiple effects follow.¹⁵⁰ Every event we call the cause affects, not just the event we call the effect, but many others as well. These other events are also effects of the same cause. For want of a nail, the shoe is lost and so on. Because of the multiplicity of effects from a given cause, we have an increase of complexity in the world; hence evolution. But the same kind of argument can yield monist conclusions: Every effect is the result of multiple causes. To every event we identify as the effect there corresponds, not only an event we usually identify as the cause, but an enormous number of other events, near and remote, that stand in a causal relation to the event in question. Not only the blacksmith's thriftiness, but his background, the hurry of the knight for his mount, the pressures of the forthcoming battle, the price of nails, the economic situation of the kingdom, national interests or the course of civilization, are all causes of the shoddy workmanship. Consequently, the universe is tending toward simplification, for multiple causes conspire to yield an unique effect.

The problem with Spencer's argument is that he has taken an analytical tool--a procedural rule on how to look at the world--as a self-evident axiom from which the facts about the world can be derived. If the law of evolution is construed as a deduction from this principle, it is either a procedural rule for examining facts, or an analytic derivation from a self evident axiom. In either case, factual it is not.

Spencer gives five major versions of the law of evolution: It is a change (i) from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, (ii) from the simple to the complex, (iii) toward integration of matter and dissipation of motion, (iv) from the less to the more adapted, (v) toward progress.

Each of these formulations is a different sense of the same law and describes an ongoing natural process. Let us examine them.

The first formulation states that evolution proceeds from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous.¹⁵¹ But this is only a stipulation of the meaning of "evolution," rather than a factual statement. From Spencer's examples, one gathers that homogeneous means the possession of similar attributes or properties throughout, and heterogeneous that the properties or attributes are not similar throughout: a balance in equilibrium--with equal forces acting on both beams--is said to be homogeneous and a man's limbs, heterogeneous.¹⁵² More exactly, to call something "homogeneous," as a homogeneous population or a homogeneous solution, means that if a sample is taken from any part of a given subject, it will have the same characteristics. "Heterogeneous" means that if a sample is taken from any part of a subject, the characteristics obtained in one sampling might differ in relevant ways from the characteristics of another sampling. A change from homogeneous to heterogeneous means that the result of sampling, at different times, will be different in both cases. The problem is that the formula does not tell us what is evolving--a fact. It tells what to call something if it conforms to our expectations; hence analytic.

Spencer qualifies the above formulation by adding that it proceeds from the simple to the complex, from the indefinite to the definite.¹⁵³ This means that evolution is a change from the simple or indefinite homogeneous whole, to the complex or definite heterogeneous whole.¹⁵⁴ But this clarification does not clarify anything, for concepts such as "simple," "complex," "definite" or "indefinite" are not at all descrip-

tions of anything. To be told that something is simple, for instance, is not the same as being told that it is red, or square. We need not be told in what respect something is simple. These words stand in place of a set of characteristics that provide a meaning background for the concept. For instance, something can be simple in the sense of having few components, or the relation between the components being easily understood, or having a uniform color, or shape, or being easily manufactured, and so on. But it would make no sense to ask which is simpler, fewer components or being easily understood.

Spencer claims that evolution is a change from the simple to the complex, and this is hardly a factual statement. Instead, it is a statement about linguistic usage, and once the context in which things are said to be simple, complex, etc., is understood, the law ceases to hold for all cases. For instance, X changes from simple to complex with respect to A, (say, shape), and Y changes from simple to complex with respect to B, (say, function); what do the changes of X and Y have in common? that they change from simple to complex? but simple and complex meaning what? A? B? or a third alternative C, not specified but somehow including A and B? Spencer might claim that the law states that there is a common meaning to "changes from simple to complex," but the question is: What is this meaning? Making the claim instead of showing this meaning is far from proving the point.¹⁵⁵

Another formulation presents evolution as a change toward more integration of matter and dissipation of motion.¹⁵⁶ This law purports to describe the course of change of matter and motion in the universe; a cosmic pattern.¹⁵⁷ Taken alone, the claim is universal, but taken

with other claims it actually narrows down the scope of the evolutionary law, for all changes from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous and all changes in the direction of integration of matter are not necessarily identical.¹⁵⁸ Formulation (iii) is broader in scope than formulation (i), and the evidence supporting one does not necessarily support the other: Change in the direction of integration of matter--say from vegetable structures to oil--can be considered to be a change in the direction of homogeneity. Logically speaking, (i) is a subset of (iii), the changes described by (i) being a small segment of the changes described by (iii). Acceptance of (iii) as the formulation of evolution brings in the kinds of changes that would undermine or falsify (i). Acceptance of (i) undermines the universality posited in (iii). Spencer is faced with a choice between (i) and (iii), between an analytical statement and a false lawlike statement.

Evolution, so far, has no biological connotations. These are brought in by the claim that evolution is a change from the less to the more adapted. What is heterogeneous and complex, indicating greater integration of matter, is also more adapted. Assuming for the moment no problems with adaptation, there exist an enormous number of counterinstances where the homogeneous or simple organisms or structures are what survived: Protozoa survived while dinosaurs became extinct. Insects, when compared with their ancestors preserved in amber, show no anatomical change: (iv) is factually false.

It is worth mentioning that European positivists are mainly reacting to Lamarck.¹⁵⁹ Comte argues against Lamarck and in favor of fixity of the species.¹⁶⁰ Spencer's biological evolutionism is pro-Lamarckian.¹⁶¹

His working concepts are change and adaptation: As circumstances change, an organism tries to change with them.¹⁶² If successful, this adaptation is passed on to the offspring. Natural selection, or as Spencer calls it, survival of the fittest, implies a change along the line of least resistance.¹⁶³ Human nature changes both physically and mentally, a change of adaptation of constitution to condition—fitness to circumstances.¹⁶⁴ There is also a parallel between the individual and the social organism, for just as acquired characteristics are transmitted to offspring in the species, social experiences are transmitted through learning to succeeding generations.

To account for our present condition Spencer speculates that man once had a moral constitution suited to a primitive state of nature. Population increase and emergence of societies changed his situation. In order to adapt, man has to go toward socialization, the adoption of a constitution that enables him to live in his new environment. This is known as civilization. It constitutes progress, and the belief in the perfectability of man means that he will ultimately succeed in adapting.¹⁶⁵

Values can now be defined: Evil is a lack of adaptation of constitution to condition.¹⁶⁶ Certain actions tax the organism, lead to pain or illness and death: certain events place the individual in conditions beyond his moral capacity. Adaptation would remedy this. Adaptation of constitution to condition would then be good.¹⁶⁷ Here the open ended argument is appropriate: is this adaptation itself good? Any adaptation? One could question the value of adapting in a particular way to some change e.g. adapting to scarcity of resources by, say, developing

strength for pillage and murder, helping an individual to survive and teach the art to his offspring--a case of skillful might making right.¹⁶⁸ This counterexample would be rejected by Spencer on the grounds that the situation tends to cause pain, and pain is an indication of non-adaptation; in other words, it can't be a case of adaptation of constitution to condition.¹⁶⁹ The problem with this defense is that it makes adaptation as useless as the dormative powers of opium. There are evils. Why? Because they are cases of non-adaptation. And how do we infer non-adaptation? Because there are evils.¹⁷⁰

Spencer also defines adaptation in terms other than pain, illness, and so on. Habits, learning, development of body resistance or immunity, increase in power of self-preservation, growth, are all cited as examples of adaptation. In short, anything that is living is adapting.¹⁷¹ And, anything that adapts survives. Adaptation means a change toward an equilibrium of organism and environment--constitution to condition--and a change that enables the organism to survive.¹⁷² But equating these two meanings leads to a paradox: that all living things adapt and yet, many perish, seems to be a contradiction. If to adapt means to reach equilibrium between actions and reactions, constitution and condition, then organisms perish if they fail to reach this equilibrium. Not all organisms adapt ("successfully" is superfluous). What then is the criterion for adaptation? That organisms reach equilibrium? How? By developing habits? resistance? growth? Organisms can develop in any of these ways and their species still perish. To claim that this adaptation must be successful is to beg the question for that is precisely the problem: what is (successful) adaptation?

Actually we are dealing with several concepts that go by the same word, something Spencer fails to see.¹⁷³ There is an immediate distinction between ontogenic adaptation, the changes of constitution to condition in an individual organism, and phylogenetic adaptation, the changes that lead to survival of a species. Their criteria of success are different. We adapt, in the first sense, if our organism is restored to an equilibrium with the environment; we adapt, in the second sense, if the organism reaches the reproductive stage, if the number of members of the species does not decrease significantly from generation to generation. These concepts also refer to different things, the first to individuals and their tribulations, the second to the species as a whole. The first concept can be used comparatively; organisms can be more or less adapted as they are more or less able to restore an equilibrium. It makes no sense to speak of more or less adapted in the phylogenetic sense, for organisms live to reach reproduction or they do not. If death is taken as a disturbance in equilibrium, an organism can fail to adapt in the first sense, and as long as there are offspring, adapt in the second sense.¹⁷⁴

There is another meaning of adaptation Spencer ignores, that of social adaptation to the environment. The mechanism responsible for adaptation to society is the same that accounts for adaptation to the environment. Society is a kind of biological environment and social adaptation is continuous with biological adaptation.¹⁷⁵ However, that an individual adapts to a social situation is more or less voluntary, conscious action. This is a question of choice, decisions, conscious action. This is a question of choice, decisions, even in the face of

external compulsion in the form of social threats instilling fears, etc. That an organism adapts to a biological situation involves little choice of conscious, voluntary actions. This is a biological process to which voluntary actions can more or less contribute, but it is independent of our will, wishes and hopes--psychosomatic illness discounted. Spencer cannot accept this distinction for it undermines, in an important way, his program of deriving ethical conclusions from factual premises. He wants to argue that just as organisms adapt to the environment, people should adapt to the societies they live in--that social adaptability is desirable. If the jump from organic to social adaptation cannot be made, neither can the jump from the desirability of organic adaptation to the desirability of social adaptation. And the derivation of social structures from phylogenetic premises is not possible. The jump from species to individual is faulty; so is the jump from individual to society.

There are three kinds of adaptation, three kinds of changes, three forms of evolution: phylogenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic. They use the same verbal schema--the same words--but they have different meanings. The jump from phylogenetic to individual and social evolution is also assumed in the identification of progress with evolution: Progress and evolution are synonymous.¹⁷⁶ In the positivist tradition, Spencer assumes that progress is real, a natural and necessary occurrence.¹⁷⁷ As such, it is subject to laws and is independent of our interests, i.e., is value-free.¹⁷⁸ To present a value-free definition of progress, Spencer uses the method of generalizations: to seek the common elements of progress in all instances of the case, phylogenetic, organic or social. He concludes that whenever we find progress, the

common element is the growth from homogeneous to heterogeneous, from simple to complex structures, making it part of the evolutionary process. However, something else has been generalized in this inductive definition and that is the value content, since another element common to anything we regard as progress is the belief that the end of the change is always more valuable, an improvement or development.¹⁷⁹

Spencer's method does not rid the concept of its axiological connections; it does not make progress value-free. Heterogeneity is perceived as more valuable, more desirable, the mark of superiority or higher evolution.¹⁸⁰

C. Spencer is interested in deriving values from facts. As argued above, he uses evolution as a conceptual bridge between what is and what might be, between natural and social man, between the individual or species, and society.¹⁸¹ But Spencer also uses evolution as a justification for many ethical claims: (a) that since the laws of evolution are universally true, they also hold for ethical conduct; (b) that certain kinds of conduct are more evolved, higher, better; (c) that certain kinds of satisfactions of desires are permissible forms of conduct, while others retard our progress, and so on. These are very influential claims that, when scrutinized, turn out to be surprisingly weak.

The first claim, that ethical conduct is subject to the laws of evolution, is part of the larger claim that all conduct is subject to evolutionary changes.¹⁸² Conduct is defined as the adjustment of acts to ends, ethical conduct being an adjustment according to some standard.¹⁸³ The difference between conduct and ethical conduct is a matter

of degree, not of kind.¹⁸⁴ That conduct is subject to evolutionary laws means that, for instance, at some time people believed that certain things were good, right, praiseworthy, etc., but that these beliefs changed or evolved. In other words, if certain kinds of adjustments of actions to ends were once common, other kinds of adjustment, more complex and heterogeneous, are now made. If all he is talking about are people's beliefs, his position, though simplistic, is consistent and leads to ethical relativism. Yet, Spencer refers, not to people's beliefs, but to their conduct and claims that ethical conduct is now better than it was before—that the conduct of civilized man is superior. He treats these later assertions as if they were facts of the first kind, as if people's beliefs and people's conduct were the same thing and subject to evolutionary theory.¹⁸⁵ Claim (a) now becomes claim (b).

What is wrong with claim (a)? It assumes conduct to be identical with behavior, or with what people believe: "morality is essentially one with physical truth—is, in fact, a species of transcendental physiology."¹⁸⁶ Spencer, like Comte, confuses normative and descriptive statements. And this confusion is based on a more fundamental one—the failure to distinguish the normative and descriptive meanings of laws. Why the confusion? Perhaps it is because of Spencer's psychological reductionism, his failure to distinguish epistemological or ethical questions from psychological ones. Granted that laws in science are statements of invariable relations among phenomena, so are ethical or judicial laws if all we examine is what is before consciousness. Phenomenally, observations about the behavior of people lead to relations of uniformity and contiguity, whether the behavior is breathing or breeding.

Normativeness is not discovered by observation. An observer who sees traffic flowing one way in one-way streets might argue that it's a law of nature that people travel in the same direction, a sort of herd instinct.

The second claim is a consequence of the first: because we evolve along a given line, we are achieving the best, where "best" means, not just "more evolved" but also "more valuable."¹⁸⁷ Spencer fails to see that being more evolved is something very different from "being the best," "higher" or "better."¹⁸⁸ Being "more evolved" implies factual criteria, while being "higher" or "best" carry standards of value that are not part of evolutionary theory. The inference from "more evolved" to "higher" or "best" can be carried out under the faulty assumption that evolutionary laws are also moral injunctions. Except for this drastic step, all that can be inferred from evolutionary theory is that we change depending on circumstances; that we adapt, and nothing else. That ethics, conduct, social behavior, conform to these patterns means that only behavior changes, depending on circumstantial changes. Whether the end result is better or worse, higher or lower—that is another question.¹⁸⁹

The third claim is a more specific statement of the second: It indicates what particular kinds of conduct are in fact superior. For instance, adaptation to the social state requires that each individual have such desires as may be fully satisfied without preventing others from satisfying their desires.¹⁹⁰ The ultimate man is he whose private requirements coincide with public ones.¹⁹¹ But couldn't we have a society in which satisfaction of desires is more limited for one group

of individuals than for another? or a society in which one group receives full satisfaction while others do not? If everyone adapts to this inegalitarian society, there would be less pain. Gratification could be implemented along the lines of sex, age, ability, not necessarily power or wealth. If everyone adapts to their station in life, there would be as much, or as little, evil here as in the egalitarian society he proposes. It is true that societies evolve, that they are not manufactured, but why one kind of adaptation and not another? If adaptation is the criterion, then any adaptation should do. Yet the reasons Spencer presents imply criteria other than evolutionary ones: Certain social arrangements distribute pleasure, etc., more equitably or efficiently than others, and efficiency, equitability, etc., are not evolutionary criteria.¹⁹² The argument for a particular social arrangement on evolutionary grounds is a non sequitur and stands in need of justification.

The claim for the perfectibility of man is analogous; and so is the claim that studying evolutionary patterns will reveal the direction in which we evolve.¹⁹³ We are perfectible because we evolve; to evolve means to adapt better—to be better, both physically and morally.¹⁹⁴ This kind of argument does not follow either, since to adapt better and to be better are quite different; a case of the is-ought fallacy. The identification of physical with moral evolution is challengeable, for it is conceivable that we might be reaching behavioral perfection, but that ethically our conduct leaves a lot to be desired—Orwell's 1984. As for predicting the direction in which evolution should take us, the way we evolve need not be the way we ought to evolve.

There is in Spencer, no doubt, a hint of ethical relativism.¹⁹⁵ Man adapts to a pre-social state, but as times change so do the demands on his moral constitution. Today man is in need of another kind of constitution to adapt to his present state. Today's evils are the result of retaining yesterday's morality. The implication is that morality is circumstantial. Yet, the spirit of this relativism is shortlived, for Spencer makes the distinction between Absolute and Relative ethics.¹⁹⁶ Like science—which deals with fundamental generalizations and ignores conflicting factors—Absolute Ethics deals with ideal societies, ideal social beings and ideal social codes of conduct and formulates the conduct of completely adapted man in a completely evolved society.¹⁶⁷ Relative ethics is relegated to casuistry, using the generalizations of Absolute Ethics as standards of conduct for solving problems of real conduct. The relativism is one of actions, subject to principles to be discovered or formulated in the future.

Spencer envisions a series of gradations of social evolution, as well as a definite state, with naturally superior values, toward which mankind is developing. As presented in his Absolute Ethics, progress or civilization moves through the military and industrial states and culminates in a future state of total adaptation and moral perfection.¹⁹⁸ This future state bears the same relation to the modern industrial state that the modern industrial state bears to the military state, and, like the positive polity, it is the highest stage attainable by and a standard for mankind.¹⁹⁹ Like Comte, Spencer's justifications for the valuation of the future state are faulty. This state is superior because it is the goal of our evolution, because it is inevitable, and because

it is the state in which we are finally adapted. All these justifications imply that evolution in a given direction, inevitability, adaptability, etc., are superior. Yet, this is not a justification for this future state's value, for what we are asking is precisely what is the value of a state having these characteristics.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

¹Auguste Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, 5th Ed., 6 vols., (Paris: Schleicher Frères, Editeurs, 1907); Système de politique positive, 5th Ed., 4 vols., (Paris: 1851; reprinted by Editions Anthropos, 1969). An excellent introduction to the ideas of the Cours can be found in the Discours sur l'esprit positif. Two new English editions of Comte's work exist: Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings, edited with an introduction by Gertrude Lenzer, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975); The Essential Comte, edited with an introduction by Stanislaw Andreski, Margaret Clarke, trans., (London: Croom Helm, 1974).

²Harald Höffding, A History of Modern Philosophy, B.E. Meyer, trans., 2 vols., (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), 2:328. Höffding's history of philosophy is popular in Latin America.

³For instance Littré, Mill, Spencer; see Simon, European Positivism, p. 20-21. The Système has been regarded as a reversal from the earlier stress on scientific philosophy, a second career as Comte saw it; Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 26.

⁴Höffding, History, 2:355.

⁵Many of the ideas expressed in the Système can be found in earlier works. To answer those critics who accused him of lacking unity of purpose and of abandoning his earlier positivist stand, Comte reprinted the Plan of the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society, of 1822, in vol. 4 of the Système; see Essential Writings, p. 3. Also Lucien Levy-Bruhl, The Philosophy of Auguste Comte, Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein, trans., with an introduction by Frederic Harrison, (London: Swan and Sonnenschein, 1903; reprinted by Augustus Kelly, Publishers, 1973), p. 10. Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 35-36, 42.

⁶John Stuart Mill, Auguste Comte and Positivism, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, 1973), p. 4-6. Also Lenzer, Introduction to Essential Writings, p. xxxi.

⁷Comte, Cours, 1:8; Essential Writings, p. 75.

⁸Comte, Cours, 1:4-5; Essential Writings, p. 73. See also Larry Laudan, "Toward a Reassessment of Comte's 'Méthode Positive,'" Philosophy of Science 38 (March 1971):42-43.

⁹ Paul Arbusse-Bastide, notes to Comte, Discours, number 5, p. 254. Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 41.

¹⁰ Comte, Discours, p. 78-79, 107. Höffding, History, 2:351.

¹¹ For the historical antecedents of the law see George Boas, French Philosophies of the Romantic Period, (New York: Russell and Russell, 1964), p. 264-76.

¹² Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 29, 37; Cours, 1:56; Essential Writings, p. 97. See also Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 36-39.

¹³ Comte, Cours, 1:4, 4:331; Essential Writings, p. 73, 280-81.

¹⁴ Boas, French Philosophers, p. 263. Lenzer, Introduction to Essential Writings, p. liv.

¹⁵ Comte, Discours, p. 75. Though excising final causes from science might have a salutary effect, there have been some objections to the eradication of efficient causes; for instance Mill, Comte, p. 57-58, and Alvin F. Welson, "Lester Ward's Conception of the Nature of Science," Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (October-December 1972):635.

¹⁶ Paul Arbusse-Bastide, notes to Comte, Discours, number 4, p. 254. Mill, Comte, p. 10.

¹⁷ Frederic Harrison, Introduction to Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. x. For the function of metaphysics, see Comte, Cours, 1:7-8; Essential Writings, p. 74-75.

¹⁸ Comte, Cours, 2:227-33; Essential Writings, p. 147-49; Discours, p. 67, footnote.

¹⁹ Comte, Cours, 4:154; Essential Writings, p. 219.

²⁰ Laudan argues that Comte could have argued this way since he had indeed formulated a criterion of meaning; Laudan, "Toward a Reassessment," p. 39.

²¹ Boas, French Philosophers, p. 281.

²² Comte, Discours, p. 170.

²³ Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 70-71.

²⁴Comte, Cours, 4:401-402; Essential Writings, p. 182-83. Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 190-93. For Mill's criticisms of this view see Comte, p. 63-67.

²⁵Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 71-72.

²⁶Comte, Discours, p. 81-82, 89.

²⁷Comte, Cours, 1:35; Essential Writings, p. 88; Discours, p. 82. This remark should not be taken to be the assertion of a syllogism. In the Cours and the Discours, Comte adopts a position that we should study science for its own sake; Cours, 1:36-37; Essential Writings, p. 89-90.

²⁸Comte, Cours, 1:8-9; Essential Writings, p. 75.

²⁹This stand is surprising in the light of Comte's views about observation being in need of theory: "Si, en contemplant les phénomènes, nous ne les rattachions point immédiatement à quelques principes, non seulement il nous serait impossible de combiner ces observations isolées, et, par conséquent, d'en tirer aucun fruit, mais nous serions même entièrement incapable de les retenir; et, le plus souvent, les faits resteraient inaperçus sous nos yeux." Cours, 1:5. If Comte is to be read consistently "principes" above should be understood as "laws of phenomena" and not as "hypotheses." See Clarke's translation in The Essential Comte, p. 22, and Harriet Martineau's translation in Essential Writings, p. 75.

³⁰Comte, Cours, 2:226; Essential Writings, p. 146.

³¹Comte, Cours, in Essential Writings, p. 146-47. Less stringent conditions are outlined in the 40th Lesson: "But it is only the highest order of investigators who can be entrusted with it;" Cours, 3:226; Essential Writings, p. 178.

³²Comte, Discours, p. 74.

³³Comte, Cours, 6:459-60.

³⁴Laudan argues for a liberal interpretation of Comte's verification criterion to allow for hypotheses about non-observable entities on the grounds that these can be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience; "Toward a Reassessment," p. 48-49. He further argues that Comte believes theoretical concepts to be fictions, "but nevertheless scientific." *Ibid.*, p. 52. Laudan opposes Mill, who takes Comte to task for accepting hypotheses which, though not disconfirmed, are still incapable of confirmation. These fictions--hypotheses not corresponding to the realities of outward fact--stand in the way of positive science. Mill, Comte, p.59-62.

³⁵ See, for instance, Comte's treatment of the nature of light in Cours, 2:331-40, or of electricity in Cours, 2:355-56. Mill makes a similar point; Comte, p. 62.

³⁶ Comte, Cours, 1:12-14, 4:167ff.; Essential Writings, p. 76-77, 223ff. Also Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 40.

³⁷ Comte, Cours, 4:265-69, 277-78; Essential Writings, p. 257-59, 260-61.

³⁸ Comte, Discours, p. 154-61. See also Höffding, History, 2:345-51, and Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Social and Political Philosophy of Auguste Comte: Positivist Utopia and the Religion of Humanity," in Harry Elmer Barnes, editor, An Introduction to the History of Sociology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 66.

³⁹ Comte, Cours, 1:323, 4:167-68, 283; Essential Writings, p. 123, 223, 263. In the Système, 2:1-4; Essential Writings, p. 390-92, social statics is defined as the abstract theory of human order.

⁴⁰ Comte, Cours, 4:168; Essential Writings, p. 223.

⁴¹ Comte, Cours, 4:179.

⁴² Comte, Cours, 1:356, 4:328-87; Essential Writings, p. 125, 279-97, and Discours, p. 87-91. See also Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 90-91.

⁴³ Comte, Cours, 4:5-7; Essential Writings, p. 197-98.

⁴⁴ That is, through the theological, metaphysical and positive. These abused concepts are, again, used in a sense different from the traditional or even the sense specified by Comte when referring to scientific-intellectual change. Theological here means that kind of government in which its participants are usually members of a religious sect; metaphysical means that kind of government which bases its validity on metaphysical principles such as the will of the people, democratic rule and so on. By positive Comte means a society governed by scientists, as specified in the Système. See Mill, Comte, p. 67-69, 73.

⁴⁵ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 44-48. Système, 4:556. See also Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 30-31.

⁴⁶ Particularly in Cours, 5:61ff., since this is what Comte promises but only fulfills partially.

⁴⁷ Progress is "une progression continue vers un but déterminé."

Comte, Discours, p. 157. (Note the similarity to motion in mechanics, Comte, Cours, 1:306-07; Essential Writings, p. 122.) Comte proceeds by characterizing this "determined end" as an "amélioration continue de la progression humaine." Discours, p. 160. The same analysis, however, holds for "amélioration" or improvement: To improve is not only to change, but to change for the better. Comte is aware of some difficulties. In an early edition of the Cours he, while discussing civilizations, sees them as pressing toward perfection. In later editions he substitutes "development" for "perfection" to avoid normative connotations. Cours, 4:192. See Höffding, History, 2:325 and note 78, 2:585.

⁴⁸ Comte, Système, 4:157.

⁴⁹ Comte, Cours, 4:168; Essential Writings, p. 224.

⁵⁰ Comte, Cours, 4:2; Essential Writings, p. 195.

⁵¹ Comte, Cours, 4:183; Essential Writings, p. 227. Système, 2:426; Essential Writings, p. 437ff.

⁵² Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 22-23. Also Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 234.

⁵³ Comte, Cours, 4:159, and the important paragraph in 4:168-69; Essential Writings, p. 223-24.

⁵⁴ Comte, Cours, 4:181.

⁵⁵ There are several reasons for treating social statics as a discipline concerned with ends, rather than with descriptions. For instance, there is the problem of improving society, first stated in Plan for Reorganizing Society; Cours 4:169-70; Essential Writings, p. 224. Also Cours, 4:183. Further, there is the concern with the utility of sociology, Cours, 4:171. See also Cours, 4:179, 180.

⁵⁶ Comte claims sociology studies the interaction between elements of society, Cours 4:170; Essential Writings, p. 224, and should not be taken as a justification of the existing order, Cours 4:179-80. See also Comte, Cours, 4:154, 164-65, 167; Essential Writings, p. 219, 223, and Cours 4:179.

⁵⁷ Comte, Système, 2:265-81; Essential Writings, p. 420-28.

⁵⁸ This confusion is at bottom the reason for the tirades on freedom. Comte argues that freedom is the greatest hindrance to the development of civilizations. Höffding, History, 2:325. Freedom is as out of place in a positive society as it is in physics. Comte, Plan for Reorganizing

Society, in Essential Writings, p. 14. Freedom is a remnant from the metaphysical stage. True freedom means a rational submission to scientific laws. Comte, Cours, 4:163.

⁵⁹ Social laws, a result of the natural development of civilizations, are ultimately deterministic natural laws. Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 41. Also Comte, Cours, 4:179-83; Essential Writings, p. 227. Hence, social laws cannot be disobeyed either: People's actions are a result of historical forces; one can accept these forces, but is powerless to oppose them.

⁶⁰ Comte asserts a value freedom principle: Phenomena should be accepted without passion—neither admiring nor reproving them. Lenzer, Introduction to Essential Writings, p. xxxviii. Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 54; see also Discours, p. 162. But we should not read into this principle our present day views about scientific value freedom. It would otherwise be difficult to explain why Comte presents us with such value infested enterprise. Rather, Comte is trying to keep extraneous personal biases out of a science whose main aim is social reform. Once all other personal biases are kept out, the positive spirit will be both, a tool for, and the guarantee of, an intellectual communion ending in political unity. Comte, Discours, p. 100; Arbusse-Bastide, note 19, *Ibid.*, p. 257.

⁶¹ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 45. Comte, Cours, 1:28; Essential Writings, p. 83. Also Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 4, 25-28, and the announcement of the "Association Libre Pour l'Instruction Positive du Peuple dans Tout l'Occident Européen," reprinted in Comte, Discours, p. 267.

⁶² "The fundamental law that governs the natural progress of civilizations rigorously determines the successive states through which the general development of the human race must pass." Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 42; see also p. 48.

⁶³ To claim self-evidence will not do; Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 34. Self-evidence is not an argument but refusing to advance an argument.

⁶⁴ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 47. Comte, Discours, p. 78, 96. Lenzer, Introduction to Essential Writings, p. lvii.

⁶⁵ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 31. A number of variations can be subsumed under this category. For instance, that there is a fundamental correlation between the ascendancy of the positive spirit and industrial life; Comte, Discours, p. 108-11. Or that our evolution is, in fact, aiming at a decisive systematization

that can come only from the positive spirit; *Ibid.*, p. 158-59. Or that the value of positivism is that it aids the development of certain attributes that distinguish men from animals; *Ibid.*, p. 160.

⁶⁶ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 26-27. Comte, Cours, 6:529-34; Essential Writings, p. 301-02. Also Cours, 6:452-57; Discours, p. 178. Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 35-6.

⁶⁷ Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. p. 31. In the same vein Comte argues that it is the only political system that brings men into agreement about beliefs. *Ibid.*, p. 49. Also Comte, Cours, 6:533; Essential Writings, p. 302. In the Discours a number of similar arguments are given: that the positive state is superior because it serves our interests best, p. 102-03; or because a healthy philosophy, positivism, is the best base for a normal industrial order, p. 108; or because the positive state is the only one to assure us of order and progress--necessary elements to the solution of social problems, p. 146-47.

⁶⁸ Comte, Discours, p. 177, 181.

⁶⁹ Comte, Discours, p. 178-80.

⁷⁰ José Ortega y Gasset, "The Sunset of Revolutions," in The Modern Theme, translated by J. Cleugh, with an introduction by José Ferrater Mora, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961), p. 102-03. Nelson, "Lester Ward," p. 636.

⁷¹ Mill, Comte, p. 6-8.

⁷² Mill, Comte, p. 69.

⁷³ Comte, Système, 1:8-9; Essential Writings, p. 320. Mill, Comte, p. 53, 177. Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 55, 61-62.

⁷⁴ Thomas Whittaker, Reason, A Philosophical Essay with Historical Illustrations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), p. 31.

⁷⁵ Comte, Cours, 1:8-9, 4:350; Essential Writings, p. 72-73, 286. Also Comte, Cours, 4:219-20. Laudan, "Towards a Reassessment," p. 42.

⁷⁶ David Lewison, "Mill and Comte on the Methods of the Social Sciences," Journal of the History of Ideas 33 (April-June 1972):321.

⁷⁷ Comte, Discours, p. 80. Comte points out that the positive approach can lead the primitive mind into a vicious circle by demanding

no observation without a theory and no theory without prior observation. Comte, Cours, 1:8-9; Essential Writings, p. 73. Perhaps this is the reason why he feels positivism cannot emerge spontaneously, but only after a period of historical preparation.

⁷⁸ Mill, Comte, p. 60-61.

⁷⁹ Mill, Comte, p. 17-18.

⁸⁰ Particularly Comte's later speculations. Mill, Comte, p. 172-76.

⁸¹ Mill, Comte, p. 54-55.

⁸² The unfortunate consequences of this failure are obvious in the later Comte. Mill, Comte, p. 186.

⁸³ Lewison, "Mill and Comte," p. 315-17. Many of the ideas in the Cours find their parallel in the System of Logic, particularly the sixth book, "The Logic of the Moral Sciences." Mill claims that had the Cours been published before he began work on Systems of Logic, he would have instead translated it into English. Lewison points out, correctly, that in spite of this claim, Mill would have hardly been indifferent to Comte's disregard of methods of proof. Lewison, "Mill and Comte," p. 318. In the first edition of System of Logic, Mill eulogized Comte, but, changing his mind, Mill omitted many references to Comte in subsequent editions. See Henry Magid, ed., Appendix B, The Logic of the Moral Sciences, The Library of Liberal Arts, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril and Company, 1965). Also Simon, European Positivism, p. 275-79, and Mill's own references in John Stuart Mill, Autobiography, Jack Stillinger, ed., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 125-26, 134, 147-48, footnote 9.

⁸⁴ John Herman Randall, The Career of Philosophy, 2 vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 2:473.

⁸⁵ Comte, Cours, 3:223; Essential Writings, p. 177.

⁸⁶ Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 103, 104-05.

⁸⁷ Levy-Bruhl, Comte, p. 104. Also Comte, Cours, 6:708.

⁸⁸ William and Mary Kneale, The Development of Logic, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 372.

⁸⁹ Höffding, History, 2:413. John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive, 8th ed., (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1900), II, vii, 3-4.

⁹⁰Mill, System of Logic, VI, i, 1.

⁹¹Höffding, History, 2:406-07.

⁹²Mill, System of Logic, II, iii, 4. Curiously enough, Littré fails to notice this point when he criticizes Mill for giving logic a false primacy. "Ici, tout à rebours de croire que l'expérience ait besoin de la logique, je crois que c'est la logique qui a besoin de l'expérience." Emile Littré, La philosophie positive; M. Auguste Comte et M. J. Stuart Mill, quoted in Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 61-62.

⁹³In the Autobiography, Mill confesses a lack of knowledge about inductive sciences—a lack he remedies by reading Whewell and Herschel; p. 124-25.

⁹⁴Whittaker, Reason, p. 51.

⁹⁵But see Mill, Comte, p. 72.

⁹⁶Mill, System of Logic, VI, x, 3. also Comte, p. 90, 105, 124. Lewison is mistaken about this point; "Comte and Mill," p. 321, 324.

⁹⁷Mill, System of Logic, VI, xii, 1, 2.

⁹⁸Mill, System of Logic, VI, xii, 3. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, M. Gorovitz, ed., (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril and Company, 1972), p. 29.

⁹⁹Lewison, "Mill and Comte," p. 317.

¹⁰⁰Mill, System of Logic, VI, xii, 5.

¹⁰¹Compare Comte, Plan for Reorganizing Society, in Essential Writings, p. 27, and Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 20. But see System of Logic, VI, xii, 6.

¹⁰²Mill, System of Logic, VI, xii, 1-2.

¹⁰³Mill, System of Logic, VI, vi, 2, and VI, x, 1.

¹⁰⁴Mill, System of Logic, VI, x, 3. Though this attitude is kept throughout VI, x, 3, there is some change of position in VI, xi, 2.

¹⁰⁵Mill, System of Logic, VI, x, 3. In Comte, Mill asserts a similar view: progress is the ascendancy of human qualities over animality, the

standard of morality making a contribution to this ascendancy, (p. 100). Here Mill is echoing Comte; see Comte, Essential Writings, p. 234. Also Mill, Autobiography, p. 97.

¹⁰⁶ Mill, System of Logic, VI, x, 2-3. These laws are, for Mill, ultimately psychological, Ibid., VI, x, 3.

¹⁰⁷ Mill also argues that human progress is the increase of intellectual powers, System of Logic, VI, x, 7. But what is meant by this increase or progression? quality? quantity? of what?

¹⁰⁸ This value-ladenness is best appreciated when Mill examines what he takes to be the elements of social stability; System of Logic, VI, x, 5. From the tenor of the argument it is difficult to tell whether he claims these are the actual elements of social order, or those desirable in a social order.

¹⁰⁹ Mill, Comte, p. 85-87, 106; Autobiography, p. 97-99. System of Logic, VI, x, 4.

¹¹⁰ Mill, Comte, p. 118-19.

¹¹¹ Other elements Mill finds objectionable in the Comtian sociocracy are the status of women, the denial of liberty and of individualism. Mill, Comte, p. 4; Autobiography, p. 127-28. See also Lenzer, Introduction to Essential Writings, p. xxvi-xxvii, xxx-xxxi.

¹¹² T. H. Hill, Introduction to Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 6th ed., Thinkers Library 62, (London: Watts and Co., 1937), p. xi. Also J. D. Y. Peel, Introduction to Herbert Spencer on Social Evolution, The Heritage of Sociology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), p. xxiii.

¹¹³ Herbert Spencer, "Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte," reprinted in Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte and Other Essays, (Berkeley; The Glendessary Press, 1968), p. 6. Also Simon, European Positivism, p. 218-19.

¹¹⁴ Peel, Introduction to Spencer, p. xxiii.

¹¹⁵ Details such as whether our efforts can influence social change? or whether it is best to leave such change to occur without human intervention? or how long does such change take? Spencer does not seem to be aware of this; "Reasons," p. 19-20.

¹¹⁶ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 14, p. 35-37; sec. 21, p. 53-54. See also Höffding, History, 2:459.

- 117 Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 60.
- 118 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 31, p. 89.
- 119 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 34, p. 101-02. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols., vol. 1, 3rd. ed., vols. 2 and 3, 2nd. ed., (New York: D. Appleton, 1899), vol. 3, sec. 660, p. 174-75. Also Charlton, European Positivism, p. 60-61.
- 120 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 22, p. 55.
- 121 There is a sense in which metaphysics is not meaningless; if it is understood as a psychological need. That we have an indefinite consciousness of the absolute and that metaphysical, like theological concepts, are impossible to eradicate from consciousness points to its irrational and persistent psychological origins. Spencer, First Principles, sec. 26, p. 72. Spencer's argument for causality runs along similar lines. Though we might never be able to understand the causes of things, we can never dispense with the psychological need for causality; "Reasons," p. 12 and footnote 2, p. 79.
- 122 Peel, Introduction to Spencer, p. xxvii.
- 123 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 25, p. 70.
- 124 Spencer, First Principles, sec., 26, p. 72, 77.
- 125 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 46, p. 137, 139.
- 126 Spencer, First Principles, secs. 64-65, p. 173-74; sec. 81, p. 218; sec. 89, p. 241.
- 127 Mill, Comte, p. 72.
- 128 Spencer, First Principles, sec. 53, p. 150-52. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., 3rd. ed., (New York: D. Appleton, 1899), vol. 1, sec. 208, p. 468-71; sec. 216, p. 491-94. This view is an attempt to reconcile rationalism and empiricism. There is a priori knowledge, but it was inherited from our racial ancestors who, at some point, incorporated into the racial makeup repeated experiences. Repeated external uniformities became fixed through generalizations from these conjunctions. Spencer, "Reasons," p. 6. Though this might be a very interesting account of how we acquire certain experiences, or a priori forms of knowledge, it leaves open the question of the validity of these forms of knowledge. Höffding, History, 2:455.

- ¹²⁹ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 36, p. 112.
- ¹³⁰ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 37, p. 115; author's punctuation.
- ¹³¹ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 17, p. 115. This, he claims, is a common feature to all philosophic works throughout history. See also Höffding, History, 2:462.
- ¹³² "Huxley's quip, that 'Spencer's idea of a tragedy was a deduction killed by a fact,' does not do justice to his extraordinary resiliency; there were in fact few tragedies in his universe because he rarely admitted the demise of either fact or deduction." Gertrude Himmelfarb, Darwin and the Darwinian Revolution, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1959), p. 183.
- ¹³³ The stress is always on what can or cannot be conceived. Knowing something means, for instance, having certain thing in mind; Spencer, First Principles, sec. 25, p. 66-70. Logical necessity becomes the conscience of logical necessity, absent in a child but present in an adult, a process of growing up to the recognition of necessary truths; *Ibid.*, sec. 53, p. 150. Even the argument for the indestructibility of matter boils down to our inability to conceive matter as changing into nothing, an incomprehensibility Spencer calls a law of thought; *Ibid.*, sec. 53, p. 152.
- ¹³⁴ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 5, p. 14. Also Herbert Spencer, "Laws in General," reprinted in Reasons, p. 32, 36-37.
- ¹³⁵ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 5, p. 14. See also Herbert Spencer, The Study of Sociology, with an Introduction by Talcott Parsons, (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1961), p. 34-35. Compare with Comte, Cours, 1:35, and p. 15 above.
- ¹³⁶ Spencer, "Laws in General," p. 31-45, *passim*.
- ¹³⁷ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 9, p. 19-23.
- ¹³⁸ Spencer, "Laws in General," p. 32.
- ¹³⁹ Stanislaw Andreski, Introduction to Herbert Spencer; Structure, Function and Evolution, edited by Ronald Fletcher, (London: Michael Joseph, 1971), p. 16.
- ¹⁴⁰ Spencer, "Laws in General," p. 43; Principles of Psychology, vol. 2, sec. 300, p. 77-84. For a comparison of this view with that of

Comte or Mill, see Whittaker, Reason, p. 49-50, 51.

¹⁴¹ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 40. p. 119-20, and sec. 41, p. 122. See also Höffding, History, 2:462.

¹⁴² The interesting questions are left unanswered: which is the better method--the inductive or the hypothetico-deductive? how reliable are they? and so on. The psychological approach does not even help us distinguish between the methods. Spencer's claim, that "if in a present experience, the impressions, relations, and conditions, perfectly correspond with those in the past experiences, the cognition has all the validity of which it is capable," holds for claims established by the inductive, deductive or hypothetico-deductive methods. Spencer, First Principles, sec. 40, p. 120. Also Principles of Sociology, Appendix B, vol. 1, p. 830-31.

¹⁴³ Herbert Spencer, Social Statics, (New York: Robert Schalkenbach Foundation, 1954), p. 388.

¹⁴⁴ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 65; "Reasons," p. 20-21.

¹⁴⁵ Above, p. 18, 19-21. Also Spencer, Principles of Sociology, vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 8. Spencer, for instance, speaks of cooperation between physical or social aggregates. Though it makes sense to talk of social aggregates as cooperating, it does not when we refer to physical aggregates. What kind of cooperation can there be between physical bodies, except in a metaphorical way? Another confusion occurs when Spencer speaks of the adaptability of man to conditions, citing examples of change in food, clothing, custom, adding that man "alters in color according to temperature." Social Statics, p. 55. We can understand what is meant by altering color--tanning, blushing or hepatitis--depending on conditions--sunning, embarrassing situations or disease. But when Spencer talks of altering color in a racial sense, to white, black, yellow or whatever, this makes no sense unless "altering" is used in a sense different from the ordinary one. If this is the case, the power of his argument--the adaptation of man to conditions in all situations--is lost. Another example is the dictum that motion follows the line of least resistance, which is equally faulty, particularly when used to explain physical, biological and social phenomena. Spencer, First Principles, sec. 80, p. 214-18.

¹⁴⁶ Like Mill, Spencer believes that the social sciences are not instruments for achieving particular social goals. Unlike Mill, he reasons that this would make progress contingent on fallible human decisions, instead of on an inner necessity. Peel, Introduction to Spencer, p. xxix.

¹⁴⁷ Spencer, "Reasons," p. 9-10.

¹⁴⁸ Herbert Spencer, "Progress: Its Laws and Causes," reprinted in Spencer, p. 45-46. Also Peel, Introduction, Ibid., xxii.

¹⁴⁹ Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 47; First Principles, sec. 189, p. 492-93.

¹⁵⁰ Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 47; Social Statics, p. 31; First Principles, sec. 163, p. 412-14; sec. 189, p. 492-94. The overall principles responsible for evolution are called the persistence of forces, and is open to the objection that force does not mean the same thing in physics, biology or the social sciences.

¹⁵¹ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 145, p. 358; "Progress," in Spencer, p. 39. Höffding, History, 2:467-71.

¹⁵² Spencer, First Principles, sec. 149, p. 368; "Progress," in Spencer, p. 40.

¹⁵³ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 129, p. 328.

¹⁵⁴ This formulation tends to reappear in the literature every so often, with major or minor modifications. See, for instance, Robert L. Carneiro, "The Four Faces of Evolution," in Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology, John J. Honigman, ed., (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1973), 89-90.

¹⁵⁵ A similar criticism can be made of the view that evolution is a change from an incoherent to a coherent state; Spencer, First Principles, sec. 115, p. 291-92; or a change from the diffuse to the more consolidated; Ibid., sec 107, p. 273ff.; or an increase in definiteness; Herbert Spencer, "Cardinal Principles," reprinted in Reasons, p. 28

¹⁵⁶ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 97, p. 253.

¹⁵⁷ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 91-92, p. 243-45. Alone, this statement could amount to a hypothesis about the motion of the cosmos—a prediction. Spencer adds the dictum that the universe also goes in an opposite direction, and in a rhythmic fashion to boot. How can such an assertion be verified? What can prove it false? Ibid., sec. 97, p. 253.

¹⁵⁸ In fact, there seems to be some sort of contradiction, for change to integration could be regarded as change toward the homogeneous and simple. See Spencer, First Principles, secs. 111, 112, p. 281-88.

¹⁵⁹ Lamarck's and Darwin's are two major theories of biological

evolution. These views give different answers to the problems of how an organism acquires new characteristics that enable it to adapt to an environment, and how these characteristics are passed on to their offspring. For Lamarck, the main cause of an organ's development is increase in use. Acquired characteristics are functionally produced modifications that are then passed on to offspring. To Darwin, the process is one of natural selection: a change in the environment favors the characteristics of a particular organism which becomes more adept in the struggle for survival. Chance mutations in the offspring can also produce organisms that survive better. The success of the Darwinian theory can be accounted for in terms of its ability to dispense with teleological assumptions by presenting a purely mechanical explanation of natural selection based solely on chance.

¹⁶⁰ Comte, Cours, 4:197.

¹⁶¹ Though Spencer claims coincidence with Darwin's ideas; First Principles, sec. 159, p. 404.

¹⁶² Spencer, Social Statics, p. 32. Höffding, History, 2:471-73.

¹⁶³ Spencer, First Principles, sec. 73, p. 211. Also A. G. N. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, New Studies in Ethics, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 1.

¹⁶⁴ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 56.

¹⁶⁵ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 54-55, 57-58, 368; Study of Sociology, p. 316-17.

¹⁶⁶ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 54.

¹⁶⁷ Herbert Spencer, Principles of Ethics, 2 vols., (New York: D. Appleton, 1899), vol. 1, sec. 8, p. 21. Here good conduct is defined as the relatively more evolved, while bad conduct is the relatively less evolved. "More evolved" means "more multiplied and varied adjustments of acts to ends, by which the more developed creature from hour to hour fulfils more numerous requirements." Ibid., vol. 1, sec. 4, p. 14-15. By means of this definition Spencer tries to link claims (i)-(iii) to moral conduct. Moral conduct shows settled connections between antecedent and consequent; that is, it is more definite, coherent, heterogeneous, than immoral conduct. The moral man is more exact in a greater number of transactions than the immoral man—the ideal of the perfect Victorian gentleman. Ibid., vol. 1, secs. 25-27, p. 65-71.

¹⁶⁸ Instead of developing intelligence; see Spencer, "Population and Progress," in Spencer, p. 35-36.

¹⁶⁹ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 57. What would Spencer say about the drug subcultures, or about the elimination of pain by opiates, etc.?

¹⁷⁰ Another version of this circular argument appears in Spencer, Social Statics, p. 373-74, when it is argued that the conquest of one people by another is "the conquest of social man over anti-social man; or strictly speaking, the more adapted over the less adapted."

¹⁷¹ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 56-57; Study of Sociology, p. 316.

¹⁷² In Spencer, First Principles, sec. 25, p. 67-68, adaptation is the attempt to maintain organic balance in the face of physical, chemical or biological changes. Changes in the environment lead to changes in the organism, that lead in turn to survival. Herbert Spencer, The Principles of Biology, 2 vols. 2nd ed., (New York: D. Appleton, 1898) sec. 67. This is an attempt to account for evolution in physiological terms and seems to have influenced Darwin. See Peter J. Vorzimmer, Charles Darwin: The Years of Controversy; The Origins of the Species and its Critics, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970), p. 85-86, 120.

¹⁷³ For a similar set of distinctions see A. Alland and B. McCay, "The Concept of Adaptation in Biological and Cultural Evolution," in Handbook, p. 144.

¹⁷⁴ That fewer members of a species are reaching the reproduction stage only means that the species is in danger of becoming extinct, i. e., of not adapting, and vice versa. Though Spencer equated adaptation with survival, he failed to see the implications Darwin saw. Himmelfarb, Evolution, p. 185.

¹⁷⁵ Spencer, Social Statics, p. 371-72.

¹⁷⁶ Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 45-46. Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, p. 20.

¹⁷⁷ Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 52. See also Social Statics, p. 367. The chief proximate cause of progress is the modification of man's social nature due to discipline. Spencer, "Reasons," in Reasons, p. 13; Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 95, p. 250.

¹⁷⁸ Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 39.

¹⁷⁹ Progress is the change toward a "more complete life;" Spencer, "Population," in Spencer, p. 36; a higher state of culture or the improved satisfaction of human wants; *Ibid.*, p. 27; or an increase of knowledge from savages to philosophers; "Progress," in Spencer, p. 38;

or what results in happiness; Social Statics, p. 367.

¹⁸⁰Change alone does not constitute an advance for Spencer. Only when a higher organism emerges can we claim an advance. Spencer, "Progress," in Spencer, p. 48.

¹⁸¹Peel, Introduction, Spencer, p. xxii-xxiii.

¹⁸²Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 2, p. 5-7.

¹⁸³Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 2, p. 5; sec. 8, p. 21-26.

¹⁸⁴Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 3, p. 10.

¹⁸⁵For instance, Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 5, p. 16-17; Principles of Psychology, vol. 1, sec. 253, p. 582-84, and vol. 2, sec. 486, p. 524-25.

¹⁸⁶Spencer, Social Statics, p. 391, 413.

¹⁸⁷Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 7, p. 20; sec. 8, p. 25, where he indicates that "good is the relatively more evolved conduct." In vol. 1, sec. 10, p. 30, Spencer takes a hedonist stand: "the good is universally the pleasurable." G. E. Moore takes him to task for failing to distinguish these propositions in Principia Ethica, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), sec. 32, p. 50; sec. 33, p. 51-54.

¹⁸⁸Moore, Principia Ethica, sec. 31, p. 49.

¹⁸⁹Moore, Principia Ethica, sec. 30, p. 48.

¹⁹⁰Spencer, Social Statics, p. 391, 395-96; Study of Sociology, p. 317; Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 19. Equality of satisfaction for all individuals is the key idea, and selfishness rather than the Comtian altruism the main motive behind actions; Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 68-91, p. 187-241. In First Principles, equilibrium or social stability is the desired goal; sec. 175, p. 457-61.

¹⁹¹With natural man, so to speak. Spencer, Social Statics, p. 397.

¹⁹²Spencer, Social Statics, p. 58-59; Study of Sociology, p. 320-23; Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 19.

¹⁹³Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 4, p. 10-15; sec. 6, p. 18-19. See also John Passmore, The Perfectibility of Man, (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1970), p. 241-42. Compare to Comte, above, p. 18-19.

¹⁹⁴In Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 106, p. 279-80, Spencer argues that organic character is inherent in structure, and that organic morality cannot arise from organic immorality.

¹⁹⁵Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 63, p. 174; sec. 65, p. 178-80.

¹⁹⁶Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 104, p. 268-71; sec. 105, p. 275.

¹⁹⁷This Absolute Ethics--the science of ethics--will help to solve the real problems of real societies. Its counterpart is sociology: social statics and social dynamics. Social statics is the science that deals with the equilibrium in perfect societies and determines the laws for obtaining human happiness. Social dynamics deals with the forces by which societies advance toward perfection, and analyzes the influences that make us competent to obey the laws for obtaining happiness. Spencer, Social Statics, p. 367; Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 105, p. 277. Spencer is at pains to distinguish his conception of statics and dynamics from that of Comte; "Reasons," p. 21-24 and footnote g, p. 80. The main distinction Spencer makes is that his conception is mainly ethical; but as we have argued above, so is Comte's.

¹⁹⁸Höffding, History, 2:480-81. Peel, Introduction, Spencer, p. xx.

¹⁹⁹Spencer, Principles of Ethics, vol. 1, sec. 6, p. 19; sec. 106, p. 279-80.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF POSITIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Reasons and Causes

The influence of positivism in Europe spans half a century, from the 1840's to the 1890's. Though a popular philosophic movement influencing science, literature, history, politics and law, it was also a collection of loosely connected views, with room for disagreement, but antagonizing both traditional philosophers and its own supporters. A result of the rise of a scientific spirit and a reaction against the political climate, its development can be appreciated by observing the interplay with European intellectual life. Why then did positivism make such an impact in Latin America? Why its popularity? What were its causes and reasons?

1 Historical Background: To understand the impact of positivism in Latin America, it is necessary to follow the historical development of philosophy in the New World. First, the historical antecedents will be stated, then, the events leading to its success.

A. In the New World, philosophic activity began in the 16th century when, within a political and ecclesiastical framework, the main currents of Iberian thought were introduced. Latin America was to be conquered, subdued, civilized to better serve the mother country, to increase its power and wealth. A number of universities were chartered

to implement these goals and prepare students for holy orders. The official doctrine was Francisco Suárez's version of scholasticism.¹ Its purpose was to teach the ideas and values sanctioned by the Church and the state. This version of scholasticism was a highly conservative philosophy, anti-empiricist and other-world oriented. It was mainly a Thomistic view, generally accepted in spite of the influence of Duns Scotus on the Franciscans and the friction between Dominicans and Jesuits.² Renaissance humanism was absent from the colonies, though it influenced the works of missionaries like Las Casas or Sahagún and intellectuals like Zumárraga or Cervantes de Salazar.³ And new themes do appear, some dealing with Latin American problems such as the Indian's humanity, the right to make war against the New World denizens, the right to dominion and rule.⁴ These are novel and interesting problems, but formulated within the rigid framework of scholasticism and from a purely Iberian point of view.

Political absolutism and religious intolerance characterize the 17th century. To prevent the infiltration of humanism and other Lutheran heresies--so was philosophy perceived--colonial authorities imposed a rigid censorship. Intellectual and artistic creativity were, as a result, stifled. Still, a few individuals do stand out: Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, in literature, and Carlos Singüeza y Góngora, in philosophy, mathematics and astronomy. There are also critics of scholasticism, such as Andrés de Guevara and Juan Díaz de Gamarra.⁵ In the 18th century, there occurred a change in the political climate, due to Charles III's liberal policies, that allowed some of the banned doctrines to be taught in the universities. Renaissance ideas and the more "modern" Enlight-

enment philosophies made their way into Latin America. Their effects can be seen in the works of reformist writers, such as the Cartesian Benito Feijóo and the Portuguese Luis Antonio Verney.⁶ These ideas also reappear as justifications for the great revolutions, the expulsion of Spanish domination and the formation of the new republics.⁷

During the 19th century, when Spanish domination ended, the intellectual development of Latin America became freer. Censorship, the main stumbling block to freedom of thought, had been removed. But now social and political problems troubled the emerging nations. Asking people who had never voted nor governed themselves to follow Enlightenment political ideals was a problem. It ended in failure: in abuses of power, lack of government representation, curtailment of freedom, more censorship, more dictatorships, oligarchies and chaos. It also undermined the belief in the power of reason to govern. If the period leading to the revolutions was influenced by the Enlightenment, the period immediately following, and until the 1860's, was romantic in character. A number of "isms" appeared: Ideology, Scottish commonsensism, French eclecticism, utilitarianism, spiritualism and Krausism, as well as utopian socialism and anarchism--all answers, all seeking to replace the rule of reason.⁸ And these were influential doctrines, not only in philosophic circles, but in political ones as well.

When emancipation from Spain occurred, it was generally felt that the road toward modern democratic nationhood would be easy, that the promises and aspirations of the wars of liberation could be fulfilled. However, something was wrong, for anarchy, dictatorships, coups, followed one another. What was wrong, it was argued, were not just the colonial

institutions Spain left and that ought to be changed, but the inherent attitudes as well.⁹ Though the forms of government and institutions had changed, the colonial mentality that remained, shaped by scholasticism, was backward. There was a need for mental emancipation from the past, modernization, a need to change the old forms—even Church theology, the bastion of feudalism.¹⁰ The most effective weapon against an ideology is another ideology; hence, positivism.

During the last decades of the 19th century, Latin American intelligentsia turned to positivism, formulating a credo that with varying intensity, dominated the scene for the next five to six decades.¹¹ At first a revolutionary doctrine, positivism slowly changed and became highly conservative.¹² Its first adherents were in the universities, then the middle class, finally the politicians. Being a tendentious doctrine, once it gained prominence, it tried to oust other philosophic outlooks. So aside from this pattern—from liberalism to conservatism and from classrooms to legislatures—there is little that is common to the development of positivism in the various countries in Latin America. This is partly because it was not just adopted but adapted to the immediate needs of those countries in which it made inroads.¹³ As a consequence, its expressions are different depending upon social, political or historical developments.

B. The Universidad de Montevideo opened in 1849. Up to that time, Uruguayan intellectual life had been dominated by Argentinian romantic writings or by scholasticism. A shift now occurred, from traditional Hispanic thought to French philosophy.¹⁴ French eclecticism, particularly the metaphysics of Victor Cousin, became popular.¹⁵ Eclecticism

diverted interests away from the positivism of Comte, and only a series of violent debates with other doctrines weakened the former enough to allow evolutionary positivism to gain in strength.¹⁶ These debates, mainly between eclectics and Catholic spiritualists, occurred in 1872, against a background of political instability. Because of its rationalist approach to religion and its advocacy of secular education, eclecticism was accused of causing a crisis of faith. The results of the debate were inconclusive, though a decline in rationalist thought can be detected.¹⁷

From the 1880's on, and in spite of the political closing of the university, a new polemic raged. This time the main contenders were the advocates of spiritualism, eclecticism, Krausism, who allied themselves with the Catholics, former foes, against the now powerful positivists. Representatives of eclecticism and spiritualism were Carlos María Ramírez, Prudencio Vázquez y Vega and Angel Solla. Advocates of positivism were José Pedro Varela, Julio Jurkowski and José Arechavaleta.¹⁸ The polemic revolved around the ability--particularly in the form of a scientific education--of positivism to uplift the moral level of the nation.¹⁹ At first, they argued in the university classrooms, then the newspapers, and finally the political arena. Positivists emerged as victors in the debate.²⁰ This victory was not, however, the result of a dramatic conversion, but of political intervention. In 1877, the government cancelled the philosophy courses at the university and blocked the promotion of advocates of eclecticism. In 1880, Alfredo Vázquez Acevedo was elected rector of the university.²¹ Vázquez Acevedo, of scientific temper, began to appoint those instructors who favored

a scientific education, i.e., positivists.²² Once appointed, they proceeded to reform the university curriculum along scientific and positivist lines. By 1890, only positivist philosophy was taught in the university. Spiritualists and positivists still continued to debate, causing a polarization in university politics along party lines.²³

The same year a new Uruguayan government was sworn in whose president, Julio Herrera y Obes, was a follower of eclecticism. Herrera y Obes intervened in university politics and reappointed the eclectic faction to university power for a brief period. The positivist faction returned to power and Vázquez Acevedo was reappointed rector until 1899. And it is in this intellectually confining atmosphere that José Enrique Rodó and Carlos Vaz Ferreira attended the university.

C. A number of scholars studying Argentine philosophy argue that many ideas of European positivism can be found in the works of Echevarría, Alberdi and Sarmiento.²⁴ The latter are influenced by the same sources as positivists--traditionalism, eclecticism, Saint Simonian socialism, organized religion and so on--and their solutions are also similar: improving social conditions through education, economic and social engineering, etc. But Echevarría, Alberdi and Sarmiento lack a historical continuity and represent a more or less parallel development. They are transitional figures between romanticism and positivism. Their work will lend prestige to later positivists who will follow in their footsteps as intellectual leaders of the Argentine nation. Their stand, however, is sufficiently outside the mainstream of European positivism to enable us to ignore them.

In Argentina, evolutionary positivism appears before the Comtian

variety.²⁵ When, in the 1870's, Comtian positivism finally appears, its principal advocates are members of the faculty of the Escuela Normal de Profesores de Paraná.²⁶ The first exponent of Comte there, and probably in Argentina, was Pedro Scalabrini.²⁷ The influence of the Paraná school extended to the school of education at the Universidad Nacional de la Plata, where his disciple, J. Alfredo Ferreira taught. Founder and co-editor, with Scalabrini, of the journal La escuela positiva, in 1884, Ferreira tried to reconcile Spencerian elements with Comtian positivism, and at the same time remain a member of the Religion of Humanity.²⁸ An active positivist during his lifetime, Ferreira headed, as late as 1924, the Comité Positivista Argentino, publishers of the journal El positivismo.²⁹

Spencerian positivism gained a foothold at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, mainly among scientists.³⁰ Its most important exponents were José María Ramos Mejía, Carlos Octavio Bunge and Florentino Ameghino.³¹ Unlike the Paraná group, the Buenos Aires group did not create a school nor institutionalize itself. Though participant of university activities, it never formed an integral part of it. Yet, it was the Buenos Aires group that had the greatest influence on Argentinian philosophy, particularly on José Ingenieros.

2 Reasons for Positivism: Many reasons have been given for the rise of positivism. Salazar Bondy believes that positivism was an ideology advocated by the ruling classes in an effort to establish capitalism.³² Davis perceives it as an answer to anarchical popular revolts, such as Hidalgo's, in Mexico: To avoid this catastrophe, intellectuals sought political stability at the expense of change or liberty. Offering order

and progress, positivism was the most attractive doctrine available.³³ Some Latin Americans thought, Villegas argues, that if positivist political and social ideas were carried out, Latin America would become part of the modern world.³⁴ This movement was bound to fail, Villegas adds, because unlike the European positivists who already were a bourgeois class, Latin American positivists aspired to be one. On a more intellectual plane, Lipp claims that the popularity of positivism was due to a number of facts: that it could be understood easily by the layman; that it allied itself with the prestige of the sciences; that the Catholic Church failed to adjust itself to the advances of science.³⁵ But these reasons are academic if we do not take into account how positivism was perceived by its advocates.

In Uruguay, positivism gained popularity after the debates with spiritualists. Two issues were at stake: whether positivism was a cogent philosophical doctrine and whether it could fulfill the task its advocates claimed. Opponents believed positivism was an amoral doctrine that was unable to uplift the nation's morality. Its defenders saw in positivism an ethical viewpoint, an evolutionary theory having beneficial consequences.³⁶

Critics accused positivism of being a mixture of views--utilitarianism, determinism, materialism and so on--confused, and at times contradictory. Can we determine, asked Angel Solla, the nature of positivism?

However strange it may seem at first glance, that determination is impossible to make. In the field of positivism there reigns the most fearful confusion. Every one of its adepts has his own doctrine which differs essentially from that of the others, and all of these opposing and contradictory doctrines endeavor to form a body of uniform and compact doctrine. (37)

This criticism is not too far off the mark. If many positivists adopted

a methodological scientism, others dogmatized the conclusions, particularly evolutionism and materialism.³⁸ Advocates countered with a definition of positivism: It is, according to Haeckel, a theory of evolution, a theory of descent and a theory of natural selection—Monism, Lamarckism and Darwinism.³⁹ Its strength lies in its use of scientific conclusions. If critics of positivism produced no scientific facts in their favor, Arechavaleta argued, then their views were merely metaphysics.

Another source of criticism was the inadequacy of positivism as a moral theory. In 1875, Angel Floro Costa presented his view of positivistic ethics.

The great problems of salaries, population, improvement of the working class, are basically nothing more than problems of physical necessities, problems of empty stomachs. Modern physiology confirms, on the other hand, in the clearest terms, the great truth that politics and history have revealed as major results. It proves that heat, muscular effort, the leverage of modern industry, and even thought itself—mysterious center of human activity—are nothing but the change of food into energy, by means of the admirable combinations of chemistry in the interior of this sublime machine that, with reason, has been called a small universe—microcosm—in opposition to the larger—the macrocosm—in which, as in the former, an infinite wisdom is apparent. (40)

And in 1878, Costa adopted a more moderate position:

The day our political parties are studied in terms of anthropological sciences, the day we realize their internal psychology and the physical and historical forces that shaped their respective character, the day we reverently bow to the incontestable truths of science, all anarchy will end and we will begin to discuss and to reason seriously--and to understand each other. I believe this future is not far; I believe that the politician and the moralist will find, in the sciences of nature, their best guides and the wisest and most nutritive teachings. (41)

The analogies are organic, and the assumptions either that from facts ethical conclusions can be derived or, in the latter passage, that knowledge of the facts can lead to ethical conclusions. In both cases there is the confusion, typical to classical positivists, of facts and

values. Prudencio Vázquez y Vega, arguing for a Kantian metaphysics of morality, asserted that there could be no rigorously scientific morality without some normative metaphysical principle.

These questions include facts beyond sensible perceptions; the exclusive observation of physical phenomena cannot solve them scientifically... The most eminent thinkers of the world have agreed in a profound distinction between phenomena and physical laws, and phenomena and moral laws. Physical laws have matter as their base and are fatally obeyed; moral laws have as their foundation human personality and are freely obeyed. (42)

This is a sharp criticism. Defenders of positivism failed to see the point. Take Julio Jurkowski's answer:

As humanity progresses, it tends not only to material well-being but also to moral perfection, since without the latter the former would be impossible... Misery impedes the intellectual and moral development of a society; industrial progress, by assuring well-being, favors it... The changes that humanity is undergoing are the result of a fundamental law of organic nature, and these things will necessarily lead humanity to perfection. This is our firm belief; that is the basis of the materialistic doctrine. (43)

This answer to Vázquez y Vega fails to address itself to the latter's criticisms. Instead of clarifying the confusion between factual and moral laws, it only restates it.

Uruguayan positivism is first an instrument of social policy and then, a philosophical theory: Philosophical considerations take a secondary role to its ability to perform social or political changes. Whether its followers made a good exposition or critical examination of positivism, or whether they defended adequately against criticisms, it must be admitted that the social policy role they espoused is in line with the claims of Comte and Spencer.⁴⁴

There are some parallels in Argentinian philosophy. As in Uruguay, what is called "positivism" was a mixture of views—materialism, determinism, scientism, evolutionism, even strict or Spencerian positivism,

utilitarianism and other world views--that would better answer to the name "naturalism."⁴⁵ Positivism was also considered to be an ethical doctrine that used the results of science, a perfect weapon against the claims of traditional religion. Its main function was to deny a transcendental or religious base to ethics and to encourage a shift to scientific--preferably biological--considerations. Even evolutionism was, for some, more of an argument against religion than a scientific hypothesis.⁴⁶ Because of the variety of viewpoints, it is better to examine the different individual positions.

Pedro Scalabrini and J. Alfredo Ferreira are the most important interpreters of Comte in Argentina. They believed Comtian positivism finished the philosophic revolution started by Aristotle and Descartes.⁴⁷ Both are in sympathy with Comte's effort to reform society and both accept the truth of the law of the three stages as a pattern of change, a law of material development of human values.⁴⁸ For Scalabrini, the highest value to be attained is the altruistic conception of Humanity.⁴⁹ For Ferreira, by means of scientific methods, man can discover natural, biological or social laws.⁵⁰ Scalabrini's avowed goal is to improve Comtian positivism by reconciling it to the newer discoveries in the sciences--paleontology and evolutionary theory--and by allowing more humanistic doctrines. Surprisingly, for Scalabrini, this means a science closer to Comte's conception in the Systeme.⁵¹ The goal of positivism in theory and in practice is social reform. Ferreira's concern is, however, with ethics. The superiority of positivism in this area lies with its ability to replace traditional dogma with lay ethical ideas.⁵² Assuming the validity of Scalabrini's doctrines, Ferreira also adds a Spencerian element to Comtian positivism: The will, essential to moral life, is a result of

social and biological evolution; hence, morality is ultimately based on natural, positive laws.⁵³

Argentinian evolutionary positivists were less committed to the doctrine. This holds true of Carlos Octavio Bunge, who is, strictly speaking, not a philosopher, but a sociologist.⁵⁴ Though at times critical of positivism, he adopted its main tenets. To Bunge, positivism implied a valid metaphysics based on the unknowable and that reduced knowledge to psychological and biological elements.⁵⁵ Positive metaphysics acts as a pathfinder for human knowledge.⁵⁶ Positivism has the advantage of being able to state a good psychological theory explaining the nature of character, which can, in turn, lead to individual or social improvement. Ethics is custom, relative to time and place, but subservient to human needs and wants.⁵⁷ Hence, the assumption of progress and moral perfectibility. And this psychology also provides a good foundation for a theory of rights: human rights rest on pleasure and pain, on the evolution of character and on instincts.⁵⁸ On this base Bunge constructed a theory amounting to a systematization of force.⁵⁹

Like Bunge, Florentino Ameghino was not a philosopher, but a scientist, in this case a paleontologist given to cosmological speculation. He was more influential than Bunge, at least on Ingenieros.⁶⁰ His ideas stand as a transition from agnostic positivism to a scientific metaphysics similar to Spencer's.⁶¹ They are presented as a system of beliefs in Mi credo, (1860).⁶² The problems dealt with here and elsewhere are typically Spencerian: psychological reductionism; the belief that science can solve all philosophic problems; the denial of transcendental principles; the reification of evolutionary laws and so on.⁶³ His evolution-

ary views are Lamarckian, though he pays lip service to Darwin.⁶⁴ According to these views, man is the culmination of evolution, and this evolutionism extends to natural laws: as human or social laws evolve, so do natural laws.⁶⁵

In conclusion, many Latin American intellectuals regarded positivism as primarily a social and political theory.⁶⁶ This is true in Uruguay where positivism was used to justify educational, economic, social or political changes and where the ethical implications of the doctrine were widely debated. But positivism is also understood as a theory of evolution, be it in the Comtian or the Spencerian sense. This is true in Argentina, where these views of progress--also having ethical implications--caused considerable controversy. What is apparently missing is a view of positivism as theory of science and method. Though there is a thorough rejection of religion and a partial one of metaphysics, the available literature does not afford evidence of a lively debate about purely philosophical issues, such as the nature and logic of science, the reasons for rejecting metaphysics and so on. Many contemporary students of the period, philosophers and historians alike, resent this lack. They accuse positivists and Latin American philosophers in general of failing at being philosophers, of acting more like sociologists, of being just "pensadores." These critics go as far as questioning whether there ever was any philosophy, never mind a typically Latin American one.⁶⁷ This attitude is unfortunate since the works of Ingenieros or Vaz Ferreira do show concern with these "purer" issues. Further, the unavailability of original sources does not allow a critical examination of this accusation and might perpetrate what could otherwise be a myth.⁶⁸

Perhaps a closer look at the works of many positivists might reveal a greater concern about the "purer" aspects of the doctrine.⁶⁹ These interests are overshadowed by the more immediate, livelier and controversial issues--issues that turn out to be what interests the contemporary historian of ideas. Another reason for the relative lack of evidence about the more abstract philosophical issues may well be because many outstanding individuals took exception to the more practical aspects of positivism, carrying out brilliant polemics that obscured the more difficult side of the doctrine. We suspect this is what happens in the case of Rodó.

3 José Enrique Rodó: In Uruguay criticisms of positivism appeared first in literature rather than in philosophy. The essay Ariel, of 1900, was a major attack on the already entrenched doctrine.⁷⁰ Dedicated to Latin American youth, Ariel called for a new understanding of Hispanic heritage, for a reassessment of present conditions--specifically the relations between North and South America--and offered an optimistic view of the future. It had an enormous impact, still felt today, in both literary and philosophic circles.

A. Rodó is a literary figure, acutely aware of the main currents of European thought. He is a stern critic of positivism, and the leader of an idealist reaction to the growing materialism of the time. His works are pregnant with ethical and aesthetic views, but are hardly a philosophical system or a conception of the world.⁷¹ Rodó is a man of ideas, a "pensador," deeply concerned with things human, distrustful of dehumanizing intellects and rebellious of inclusion in any particular

school.⁷² Living thought--thought in ferment--cannot be expressed with the cold logic of any school.⁷³

The kind of philosophy Rodó grew up with was Spencerian positivism, and his view of philosophy is, along the same lines, a synthesis of the most general conclusions of science. He assumes the truth of evolutionism and the scientism it implies.⁷⁴ Yet, it seems he lacks direct acquaintance with the works of many philosophers. He has read Plato and Marcus Aurelius, but not Kant, Hume or Hegel, and of Spencer only the Principles of Sociology and perhaps parts of The First Principles. There is some controversy as to whether and how much Rodó read of Bergson, Nietzsche, Hartmann or Schopenhauer.⁷⁵ As for his knowledge of the newest developments in European letters, this Rodó gained from the later French positivists Guyau, Taine, and Renan. It is reasonable to assume that Renan's Caliban suggested to Rodó the symbolism of Shakespeare's The Tempest. Prospero represents Wisdom and the Intellect, Caliban sensualism and the lower passions, and Ariel--the spirit of light--a desire for higher values.⁷⁶ It might be argued that Rodó tries to solve the conflict posed in Caliban, a conflict between aristocracy and democracy, between the intellectual elites Prospero represents and Caliban's vulgar masses.⁷⁷

Rodó acknowledges the influence of positivism. In 1899 he confessed:

I belong with all my soul to that great reaction giving temper and feelings to the evolution of thought during the last stages of this century; to the reaction that, departing from literary naturalism and philosophic positivism will lead thoughts, without impairing their fertility, to dissolve themselves in the highest conceptions. (78)

This passage reveals a sensitivity to those oncoming changes of which he will be a spokesman. Ten years later, a maturer Rodó still acknowledged

with praise positivist influences:

Positivist initiation left in us, in what is speculative as well as what is practical, and in action, its powerful sense of relativity; the just consideration of earthly realities; the vigilance and insistence of the critical spirit; the lack of trust in absolute assertions; the respect for provisions of time and place; the careful adaptation of means to ends; the acknowledgement of the value of the smallest event and of the slow and patient effort in whatever kind of work; the disdain for illusory intuition, for useless passion, for vain hope. (79)

Elements of this positivism permeate his writings, and he often lapses into its language.⁸⁶ Unlike the members of the oncoming anti-positivist movements who hold science as impoverished or bankrupt, Rodó praises its benefits as one of the supports of our civilization.⁸¹ Of what, then, does his rejection of positivism consist? What, to Rodó, is wrong with positivism?

On the theoretical level Rodó perceives the errors of positivism to be metaphysical skepticism or lack of idealism; on the practical level it is an espousal of utilitarian ethics. These errors must be corrected; positivism must be overcome and surpassed.

Positivism is the cornerstone of our intellectual formation; it is not the capstone that finishes and crowns it; and as in the sphere of speculation, we regain possession of the indomitable permanence, the sublime obstinacy of a yearning that excites the human creature to face what is basic of the mystery that surrounds it from the unscalable walls of positivist investigation. Thus, in the sphere of life and in the discernment of its activities, we tend to restore to ideas, as norms and as objects of human purposes, many of the privileges of their sovereignty that were snatched away by the overflowing tide of utility. (82)

What is lacking in positivism is a sense of ideals "as norms and objects of human purposes." Hence, its reconstruction or improvement can be achieved only through idealism. This idealism is not a metaphysics that makes reality an idea. By ideals Rodó means ultimate goals, principles of actions having value, axiological in nature. The reality of

these ideals is closer to the Platonic reality of forms.⁸³ And there are other Platonic elements in Rodó, such as the traditional scale of values, Beauty, Truth, Goodness. But he is not a Platonist, though he is partly responsible for the youth movement in that direction. These elements are not totally rational as in Plato. They are influenced by the world of experiences, by the world of change.⁸⁴ Instead, we have an evolutionary rationalism based on human experience, whose values evolve from concrete life, aiming at Ariel--not a lost heavenly city, but one to be made.

B. In ethics, aesthetics and in the more speculative forms of philosophy, positivism stresses realism or naturalism.⁸⁵ To Rodó this is superficial for it leads to an acceptance of the phenomenal, disregarding the deeper realities. The problem is how to transcend phenomenalism and establish a link between the real and the ideal. It is a question, not of denying phenomenal reality, but expanding it. And this holds true for science as well as art.

Take art. If aesthetic canons required it to be close to nature, now they demand a search for beauty and illusion. This Rodó sees as an idealist reaction against naturalism and realism.⁸⁶ But reactions can also be steps backwards, and this idealism is similar to the romantic idealism and utopianism of the 1840's. Positivism, however, prevents this return by freeing the imagination from an orgy of ghosts.⁸⁷ Positivists, like Hegel, are right in arguing that art must have human content; but, Rodó insists, there must also be some conception of beauty and illusion.⁸⁸

At the root of art there is a sense of the beautiful, arising from the hopes and vitality of youth. It grows through education and by an exercise of disinterested leisure, emerging fully mature as an appre-

ciation of all that is beautiful. Today, this sense has been thwarted by the immediate demands of life and lost to the many. It has also died in the few cultured individuals who ought to have it.⁸⁹ Yet, this very sense of beauty is what contributes to the formation of a sense of justice and morality:

I believe it indubitable that he who has learned to distinguish the delicate from the vulgar, the ugly from the beautiful, is half way to distinguish the evil from the good...As humanity advances, the moral law will be conceived more clearly as an aesthetics of conduct. One will shun evil and error as one shuns dissonance; the good will be sought as a pleasure of a harmony. When the stoic severity of Kant symbolizing the spirit of his ethics, inspires the austere words: "I slept and dreamt that life was beauty; awoke and discovered it was duty" it ignores the fact that if duty is the supreme reality, in it the object of dreams can become real, since the conscience of the beautiful will give it, with a clear vision of the good, the pleasure of the beautiful. (90)

For Rodó there are two great conceptions of human ideals: the Greek and the Christian. Both are opposed to utility. But the good is identical with the beautiful. Let us return to Athens by integrating Hellenic and Christian values: This is what Ariel represents.⁹¹ Rodó, however, fails to see a clash between the moral and the intellectual superiority, between Bethlehem and Athens.⁹² When faced with the prospects of Nietzsche's superman--with the intellectually superior man who is above morality--Rodó rejects him as a monster, as falsely superior. His answer is a reassertion of the superiority of love and of Christianity.

C. In Argentina and Uruguay English positivism was associated with utilitarianism. Rodó portrays this philosophy as the demand that human activities be oriented toward an immediate finality of interests.⁹³ This he sees as opposed to his conception of values. His utilitarian conception neglects art for its sake and culture for its enjoyment. It fails .

to distinguish the beautiful and the noble from the useful. Wedded to positivism it becomes, for Rodó, a narrow and exclusive ethical criterion. It considers only material interests, lacks ideals, proposes a debased conception of human purposes and destiny, and ignores whatever is not practical or useful.⁹⁴ Positivism is to be improved, but utilitarianism is to be eradicated.

Rodó understands utilitarianism to be a doctrine that identifies the good with the useful. This was the popular interpretation.⁹⁵ Rodó derived it partly from Spencer, partly from the critical writings of Renan and Guyau, or from Latin American Benthamites like Montalvo and Bello. It is a caricature of the views of Bentham and Mill. In all probability Rodó never read them: In the Obras Bentham is mentioned twice and Mill once.⁹⁶

In Ariel the United States represents the incarnation of the utilitarian spirit, of Caliban.⁹⁷ This reflects a growing mistrust in the United States as a world power. The North American nation is admirable, Rodó states. It is highly industrialized, it has institutionalized democracy and preserved individual liberties.⁹⁸ "Though I do not love them, I admire them," he writes to a friend.⁹⁹ But the price paid for these accomplishments is too high: art, literature, refinement in manners, good taste--culture, that is--are lost.¹⁰⁰ Even the love of truth for its own sake has been abandoned, leaving utility as the only motive for scientific investigation.¹⁰¹ The American spirit represents positivism without worthy ideals. Its most profound philosophy is expressed by Franklin or Orson Sweet Madden. Writers like Emerson and Poe are anomalies.¹⁰²

The utilitarian attitude is understandable, Rodó argues, since we cannot deny Caliban. This attitude should not be condemned if it is a means to an end, to higher goals. The problem with utilitarianism, he feels, is that it equates means and ends, that it denies higher needs, values above and beyond utility. This is why the United States cannot be used as a model: it represents an ideology inadequate to Latin American needs.¹⁰³

Rodó is one of the first intellectuals to warn Latin America of the dangers inherent in an unqualified emulation of the more industrialized nations.¹⁰⁴ He criticizes the vulgarization and the materialism of democracy while enjoining us to search for nobler democratic ideals.¹⁰⁵ Democracy well understood, that is.¹⁰⁶ His argument is that democracy tends toward mediocrity and materialism not because it is intrinsically mediocre or materialist, but because such state has been encouraged by an utilitarian education.¹⁰⁷ He sees the need for a spiritual elite that will extricate the nation from the absolutism of numbers--not an omnipotent oligarchy of the wise, as Renan proposes, nor an aristocracy of philosophers, as in the Republic; but an elite at the service of all and working for the ideals of democracy.

D. There is much that can be criticized in Ariel. It is a work of its time. Its view of art is obsolete. Cubism, the theater of the absurd, Dadaism, have demonstrated this. It also helped to create a myth: The United States is pictured as materialistic, lacking in culture and unconcerned with higher values. This view partially portrays an era of robber barons, the Morgans and Carnegies, of trusts and yellow journalism. But as Rodríguez Monegal points, it ignores the cult of excel-

lence of Dean Howell, the works of Walt Whitman, Whistler, Sargent, Henry Adams or William and Henry James.¹⁰⁸ This myth also represents a Latin race—a concession to the Spencerian notion of racial traits inherited by nations—a race whose spiritual qualities permit it to appreciate culture, poetry, music, the higher values.¹⁰⁹ He sees no inconsistency between the belief in the spiritual superiority of all Latins and the elitism the myth preaches. Only the intellectuals, the leaders of the future can heed Ariel's call; only a small portion of this superior race is truly superior; the masses are crass and oriented toward material values. A weakness of this myth is the opposition of Ariel and Caliban, of spiritualism and materialism, idealism and utilitarianism. There are no other alternatives. Even some contemporary critics of Rodó, particularly those who like Jesús Castellanos felt the roles had reversed—that Latin America was dominated by an exclusive utilitarianism—still accepted the opposition.¹¹⁰

A positive contribution of Ariel is the stress on the power of ideals, particularly of the ideal of Latin Americanism—of a common bond between Hispanic nations that would lead to a brighter future.¹¹¹ The inconsistencies of this vision ought not detract from its attractiveness, nor its vagueness from the influence it exerted on subsequent generations. Ariel became the rallying point for a Latin American youth searching for identity and for a reassertion that what they had inherited was good.¹¹² In Argentina, Rodó's works heralded an unmistakable idealism.¹¹³ In Mexico, José Vasconcelos and Pedro Henríquez Ureña answered Rodó's call when, in 1910, they laid the foundation of the Ateneo de la Juventud.¹¹⁴

In criticizing Rodó we must bear in mind he was a thinker and a critic, not a philosopher; the loss is philosophy's. His idealism is a recognition of the power of ideas. This is not a philosophical system; he had no intention of creating one. What he wanted to do is to remind us that we have an inner life, dreams, illusions—a delicate aspect of our spirit that ought to remain intact from the ravages of science. His idealism is not an unique call, but is imperative for those who contemplate taking the road toward technology. The values they stand to lose might be greater than the material wealth they stand to gain.

Rodó cannot be accused of being ethically naive. He simply fails to recognize the possibility of moral conflicts.¹¹⁵ The intellect and the heart, according to Rodó, can never be at war with each other. If they are, this is a sign of a misguided intellect. The heart takes precedence over the intellect which, if properly educated, would come to the same conclusions anyway. The base of Rodó's morality is, then, a sort of sentimentalism. The sentiments are the criteria for goodness or rightness. Here, again, possible conflicts are rejected: there cannot be a conflict among good feelings. If there is, it must be between higher and lower, good and bad sentiments.¹¹⁶ And this can be remedied by education. The problem is that this education of sentiments makes an appeal to an ideal that remains to be justified. To call sentiments, feelings, emotions, good because they conform to an ideal that cultivates these good feelings or emotions is to place the burden of justification on the ideal. To call the ideal good because it fosters these feelings, sentiments and so on, is to beg the question. Rodó's sentimentalism fails precisely because no justification for the ideals chosen

is forthcoming. After all, any sentiment and any ideal could be called good. The critical test comes in their justification.

Rodó's mistakes are partly due to the time and place. One regrets his deemphasizing English and German influences when he tried to return to French intellectual hegemony.¹¹⁷ This, in spite of Clarin's claim that Rodo aimed, in Ariel, to return to the traditional roots of Hispanic literature, broken by revolutions and by the introduction of French influences.¹¹⁸ One also regrets the stress Rodó places on popular writers like Renan and Guyau, to the detriment of the more serious philosophers like Boutroux, Poncairé, Meyerson. And one regrets even more the uncompromising rejection of utilitarianism, particularly when obtained second hand. This is a pity since Mill would also be sympathetic to Rodó's outcry against the lower passions, or overstressing the practical at the expense of the nobler aspects of the soul. This was, after all, the basis for Mill's revolt against Bentham.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

¹ Suárez's influence in the New World is in need of study; see Harold E. Davis, Latin American Thought: A Historical Introduction, (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 31. Also Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 16.

² Patrick Romanell, Making of the Mexican Mind, with a foreword by Edgar S. Brightman, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), p. 32-35.

³ Germán Arciniegas, Latin America: A Cultural History, J. MacLean, trans., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), p. 71-72, 145-51 passim.

⁴ Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 16.

⁵ Octavio Paz, The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico, L. Kemp, trans., (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 103-16. See also Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 26-27; Romanell, Mexican Mind, p. 34.

⁶ The works of Descartes, Leibniz, Locke, Grotius, Galileo and Newton were read and discussed, but since few translations existed, the audience was limited to those who could follow the original. The Enlightenment thinkers, Condillac, Voltaire, Rousseau, Montisquieu, Adam Smith, Filangueri, Beccaria, Franklin, Jefferson and Constant also appeared in the private libraries of prominent figures. Roland D. Hussey, "Traces of French Enlightenment in Colonial Hispanic America," in Arthur P. Whitaker, Latin America and the Enlightenment, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 34-43. Also Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 31-35; Romanell, Mexican Mind, p. 34-39; Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 17; Zea, Esencia, p. 175-76.

⁷ There are some disagreements about the extent and popularity of Enlightenment ideas--or whether it was only a background to the revolutions or a cultural achievement in itself significant. Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 28-29; Romanell, Mexican Mind, p. 35-36.

⁸ Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 64-66; Zea, Esencia, p. 176.

⁹ Abelardo Villegas, Panorama de la filosofía iberoamericana actual,

Biblioteca de América, Libros del Tiempo Nuevo, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 12. Also Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 40-41; W. J. Kilgore, "The Development of Positivism in Latin America," Inter-American Review of Bibliography 19 (1969): 134-35; Paz, Labyrinth of Solitude, p. 128-29.

¹⁰Zea, Esencia, p. 162, 174-75.

¹¹Villegas, Panorama, p. 9. See also Alejandro Korn, "Influencias filosóficas en la evolución nacional," in Obras, 3 vols. (La Plata: Universidad Nacional, 1940), 3:185-257.

¹²Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 99; Romanell, Mexican Mind, p. 42-53.

¹³Arturo Ardao, "Assimilation and transformation of positivism in Latin America," in R. L. Woodward, Positivism in Latin America, (Lexington, Mass.: D. Heath and Co., 1971), p. 11. Luis Ferré, "La filosofía: positivismo/antipositivismo," Revista de la Universidad, Universidad Nacional, La Plata, 20-21 (1966-67):287-89. Kilgore, "Development," p. 134.

¹⁴Arturo Ardao, La filosofía en el Uruguay en el siglo XX, Colección Tierra Firme, Historia de la Filosofía en la América I, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1956), p. 13-18. Also Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 15, 24-27.

¹⁵The introduction of eclecticism in Uruguay can be traced to the adoption, in 1848, of E. Geruzez's Cours de philosophie as official text in the gymnasiums; Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 29.

¹⁶The main sources are the French translations of Spencer's Study of Sociology and First Principles. Mill was also read, but in an abstracted version of System of Logic. The first major exponent of Spencer is José Pedro Varela; Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 83-86.

¹⁷Arturo Ardao, Racionalismo y liberalismo en el Uruguay, Historia y Cultura 1, (Montevideo: Universidad de la República, 1962), p. 193-95; Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 54-61.

¹⁸Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 112.

¹⁹Leopoldo Zea, The Latin American Mind, J. H. Abbot and L. Dunham, trans., (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 31.

²¹Arturo Ardao, "El magisterio de Vaz Ferreira," Inter-American

Review of Bibliography 8 (1958):227-44, in Arturo Ardao, Introducción a Vaz Ferreira, (Montevideo: Barreiro y Ramos, 1961), p. 58. Also Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 241-42.

²¹ Alejandro C. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1948), p. 99-100. Alberto Zum Felde, Proceso intelectual del Uruguay, 3 vols. (Montevideo: Imprenta Nacional Colorada, 1930), 2:20.

²² Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 159-62.

²³ Ibid., p. 178-79.

²⁴ Korn and Romero feel they are autochthonous positivists. Korn, "Filosofía argentina," Obras, 3:261. Francisco Romero, "Tendencias contemporáneas en el pensamiento hispanoamericano," in Leopoldo Zea, ed., Antología de la filosofía americana contemporánea, Pensamiento de América, Segunda Serie 7 (México: B. Costa-Amic, 1968), p. 49. Hubert Spalding, "Argentine Sociology," in Woodward, Positivism in Latin America, p. 52. To Juan Carlos Torchia Estrada, these men are really utilitarians, La filosofía en la Argentina, Pensamiento de América, (Washington, D.C.: Union Panamericana, 1961), p. 171-76. See also Solomon Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969), p. 19-20. Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 68-69.

²⁵ Arturo A. Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini, introductor de la filosofía de Comte en la Argentina," Inter-American Review of Bibliography, 19 (1969):3-4.

²⁶ Hence, the name "normalista." Korn, Obras, 3:229-30. Also Alberto Caturelli, La filosofía en la Argentina actual, II Congreso Nacional de Filosofía, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamérica, 1971), p. 46-47. Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 177-87.

²⁷ Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 3; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 179.

²⁸ Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 11; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 184, footnote 14.

²⁹ Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 182-83.

³⁰ These are the "universitarios." Korn, Obras, 3:229-30. Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 30-31.

³¹ Caturelli, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 46, 49-50, 52-53; Ferré, "Positivismo/antipositivismo," p. 289; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en

la Argentina, p. 188-201.

³²Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 20.

³³Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 88-89.

³⁴Villegas, Panorama, p. 18; Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 29-30.

³⁵Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 15.

³⁶Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 247.

³⁷Angel Solla, "El positivismo y la metafísica," Anales del Ateneo del Uruguay, (Montevideo: Imprenta Ruiz y Becchi, 1881-86), translated in Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 246. Also Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 196-97.

³⁸Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 116-17, 127.

³⁹José Arechavaleta, "La teoría de la evolución es una hipótesis?" Anales, 1881, translated in Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 247. Also in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 119-23.

⁴⁰"La gran cuestión de salarios, de población, de mejoramiento de la clase obrera, no son en el fondo más que cuestiones de necesidades físicas, cuestiones de estómago. La fisiología moderna confirma, por otra parte, de la manera más luminosa esta gran verdad que la política y la historia han formulado como una grandiosa resultante. Ella prueba que el calor, el esfuerzo muscular, palanca de la industria moderna, y el pensamiento mismo, foco misterioso de la actividad humana, no son sino la transformación del alimento en fuerza, al través de las admirables combinaciones de la química en el interior de esta máquina sublime, a que con razón se ha llamado pequeño universo--microcosmos--por oposición al grande--macrocosmos--en que tanto como en aquél resplandece la sabiduría infinita." Angel Floro Costa, "La caída de la Gironda y el triunfo de la Montaña," quoted in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 239-40.

⁴¹"El día en que nuestros partidos se estudien a la luz de la ciencia antropológica, el día que empecemos a darnos cuenta de su psicología interna y de las influencias físicas o históricas que han delineado las modalidades de su respectivo carácter, el día que nos inclinemos reverentes ante las verdades incontestables de la ciencia moderna, toda anarquía tendrá fin y empezaremos a discutir y razonar seriamente y a entendernos. Yo creo que ese advenimiento no está lejano; yo creo que en la ciencia de la naturaleza encontrarán siempre el político y el moralista sus mejores guías y su más sabia y nutritiva enseñanza." Angel Floro Costa; "La

Metafísica y la Ciencia," in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 243; author's italics.

⁴²"Estas cuestiones comprenden datos que están más allá de la percepción sensible; la observación exclusiva de los fenómenos físicos no puede resolverlas científicamente... Los pensadores más eminentes de todas las épocas convienen en hacer distinción profunda entre los fenómenos y las leyes físicas y los fenómenos y las leyes morales. Las leyes físicas tienen por base la materia y se cumplen fatalmente; las leyes morales tienen por fundamento primordial la personalidad humana y se cumplen de una manera libre." Prudencio Vázquez y Vega, "Crítica de la moral evolucionista," Anales, 1881, in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 146.

⁴³Julio Jurkowski, "La metafísica y la ciencia," Anales, 1881; translated in Zea, Latin American Mind, p. 249. Also in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 117-18.

⁴⁴See above, p. 17-19, 44-47. Kilgore, "Positivism in Latin America," p. 138.

⁴⁵Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 174.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 174-75.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 182; Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 6.

⁴⁸Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 183; Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 6-7.

⁴⁹Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 7.

⁵⁰Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 185.

⁵¹Roig, "Scalabrini," p. 6-7.

⁵²Caturelli, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 48; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 183.

⁵³Ricaurte Soler, El positivismo argentino, Biblioteca América Latina, Serie Menor 12 (Buenos Aires: Editorial Paidós, 1967), p. 206-3.

⁵⁴For an unfavorable evaluation of Bunge's works see William Rex Crawford, A Century of Latin-American Thought, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1944), p. 103-6.

⁵⁵Ferré, "Positivismo/antipositivismo," p. 289; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 192.

⁵⁶Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 193.

⁵⁷Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 209.

⁵⁸José Sazbon, "La sociología," Revista de la Universidad, Universidad Nacional, La Plata, 20-21(1966-67):364-65.

⁵⁹Carlos Octavio Bunge, "The Evolution of Rights and Politics," Inter-America, English Edition, 2 (1918):98-115. Also Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 196; Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 211-12.

⁶⁰See José Ingenieros, Las doctrinas de Ameghino, (Buenos Aires: Ramon J. Roggeiro y Cia., 1951).

⁶¹Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 72.

⁶²Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 176.

⁶³Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 72.

⁶⁴Contrary to Roig, "Pedro Scalabrini," p. 3-4.

⁶⁵Ferré, "Positivismo/antipositivismo," p. 289; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 199.

⁶⁶Ardao adds "educational." Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 67.

⁶⁷For instance, Crawford, A Century, p. 4; Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 41, 131-33.

⁶⁸Some of the original sources are difficult to find. This is true of the works of Argentinian positivists; other works, like Jurkowski's or Arechavaleta's, have dissappeared. Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 114, 119.

⁶⁹For instance Prudencio Vázquez y Vega or Julio Herrera y Obes; Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 131-50.

⁷⁰José Enrique Rodó, Obras completas, 2nd ed., edited with an Introduction, Prologue and notes by Emir Rodríguez Monegal, (Madrid:

Aguilar, 1967).

⁷¹Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 25.

⁷²Rodríguez Monegal, Obras, p. 112.

⁷³Rodó, Motivos de Proteo, in Obras, p. 465-66.

⁷⁴Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 111.

⁷⁵Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:48. Also Clemente Pereda, Rodó's Main Sources, (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Imprenta Venezuela, 1948). Though some criticisms of Kant are found in Ariel, they are more or less superficial and give Zum Felde's view some credence. For criticisms of Zum Felde and Pereda, see Rodríguez Monegal, Introducción, Obras, p. 110-11, and also Mario Benedetti, Genio y figura de José Enrique Rodó, Biblioteca de América, Colección Genio y Figura (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1966), p. 122-24.

⁷⁶Leopoldo Alas [Clarín], Prologue to Ariel, by José Enrique Rodó, Colección Austral, (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, 1948), p. 15-16.

⁷⁷Zum Felde, Proceso, 2:76-77.

⁷⁸"...yo pertenezco con toda mi alma a la gran reacción que da carácter y sentido a la evolución del pensamiento en las postrimerías de este siglo; a la reacción que, partiendo del naturalismo literario y del positivismo filosófico, los conduce, sin desvirtuarlos en lo que tienen de fecundos, a disolverse en concepciones más altas." Rodó, "Rubén Darío," Obras, p. 191.

⁷⁹"La iniciación positivista dejó en nosotros, para lo especulativo como para lo de la práctica y la acción, su potente sentido de relatividad; la justa consideración de las realidades terrenas; la vigilancia e insistencia del espíritu crítico; la desconfianza para las afirmaciones absolutas; el respeto de las condiciones de tiempo y lugar; la cuidadosa adaptación de los medios a los fines; el reconocimiento del valor del hecho mínimo y del esfuerzo lento y paciente en cualquier género de obra; el desdén de la intuición ilusa, del arrebató estéril, de la vana anticipación." Rodó, "Rumbos nuevos," El mirador de Prospero, in Obras, p. 521.

⁸⁰Order is one of the qualities of the winged Ariel. Rodó, Ariel, Obras, p. 248. There is an enormous faith in the future, in progress and in intellectual evolution. Ibid., p. 246-47. Even the several attacks on democracy are backed by Comtian and Spencerian considerations. Ibid., p. 225-227, 236.

⁸¹Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 228.

⁸²"El positivismo, que es la piedra angular de nuestra formación intelectual, no es ya la cúpula que la remata y corona; y así como, en la esfera de la especulación, reivindicamos, contra los muros insalvables de la indagación positivista, la permanencia indómita, la sublime terquedad del anhelo que excita a la criatura humana a encararse con lo fundamental del misterio que la envuelve, así, en la esfera de la vida y en el criterio de sus actividades, tendemos a restituir a las ideas, como norma y objeto de los humanos propósitos, muchos de los fueros de la soberanía que les arrebatara el desbordado empuje de la utilidad." Rodó, "Rumbos nuevos," in Obras, p. 521.

⁸³Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 30.

⁸⁴"The empiricist and vitalist base--realist in some ways--of this speculative idealism is patent in the kind of foundation Rodó offers for ideals. Ideals--in his conception of values--have no a priori foundation, neither rational nor theological. They emerge from experience, created by Life in the bosom of Nature and under the sign of Evolution."

"El basamento empiricista y vitalista--realista a su modo--de este idealismo especulativo, se hace patente en el tipo de fundamentación que Rodó ofrece a los ideales. Los ideales--en su concepción, los valores--no tienen un fundamento a priori, ni racional ni teológico. Surgen de la experiencia, creados por la Vida en el seno de la Naturaleza bajo el signo de la Evolución." Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 40.

⁸⁵Rodó, "Rumbos nuevos," in Obras, p. 519; Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 38-39. For an earlier criticism along the same lines, see Juan Carlos Blanco, "La novela experimental," in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 201-23.

⁸⁶Rodó sees this trend in French and Hispanic literature, particularly with the advent of Modernism and in its high priest, Rubén Darío. Rodó, "La nueva novela," in Obras, p. 155-64; "Rubén Darío," Ibid., p. 169-92.

⁸⁷Rodó, "Rumbos nuevos," in Obras, p. 521.

⁸⁸Rodó, "Arte e historia," in Obras, p. 861-67. The same kind of criticism appears in Ariel, Ibid., p. 210, 215-16.

⁸⁹Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 218.

⁹⁰"Yo creo indubitable que el que ha aprendido a distinguir de lo delicado lo vulgar, lo feo de lo hermoso, lleva hecha media jornada pa-

ra distinguir lo malo de lo bueno...A medida que la humanidad avance, se concebirá más claramente la ley moral como una estética de la conducta. Se huirá del mal y del error como de una disonancia; se buscará lo bueno como el placer de una armonía. Cuando la severidad estoica de Kant inspira, simbolizando el espíritu de su ética, las austeras palabras: 'Dormía y soñé que la vida era belleza; desperté y advertí que ella es deber,' desconoce que, si el deber es la realidad suprema, en ella puede hallar realidad el objeto de su sueño, porque la conciencia del deber le dará, con la visión clara de lo bueno, la complacencia de lo hermoso." Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 219.

⁹¹Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 179. Also Jean Franco, The Modern Culture of Latin America, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1970), p. 63.

⁹²Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 218.

⁹³Ibid., p. 222-23.

⁹⁴Rodó, "Rumbos nuevos," in Obras, p. 519.

⁹⁵Arciniegas, Latin America, p. 379-83. But see Vázquez y Vega, "Crítica de la moral evolucionista," Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 144-45.

⁹⁶Rodó, Obras, p. 239, 598, 822.

⁹⁷Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 232.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 232-36.

⁹⁹José Enrique Rodó to Juan Francisco Piquet, fragment, 1909; in Obras, p. 1352; Ariel, Ibid., p. 235.

¹⁰⁰What is missing is leisure, ("ocio"). Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 236.

¹⁰¹Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 238.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 237-39.

¹⁰³Villegas, Panorama, p. 23.

¹⁰⁴James W. Symington, "Echoes of Rodó," Américas, 20 (1968):8-13.

- ¹⁰⁵Rodríguez Monegal, Introduction, Obras, p. 114.
- ¹⁰⁶True democracy will deny unjust inequalities and assert the just ones. Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 224. Here Rodó takes issue with Renan who asserts that egalitarianism and excellence are incompatible and that the enthronement of Caliban is inevitable. Ibid., p. 223, 227-28. Rodó counters that this is a distortion of the facts, for democracy can insure an equality of possibilities. It does not have to force an actual equality of influence or prestige among the members of that society. Ibid., p. 228.
- ¹⁰⁷Symington, "Echoes," p. 10.
- ¹⁰⁸Rodríguez Monegal, Prologue to Ariel, in Obras, p. 202-03.
- ¹⁰⁹Franco, Modern Culture, p. 63.
- ¹¹⁰Cited in Rodríguez Monegal, Prologue to Ariel, in Obras, p. 203.
- ¹¹¹Franco, Modern Culture, p. 64.
- ¹¹²Zum Felde, Proceso, 2:90.
- ¹¹³Hobart A. Spalding Jr., "Sociology in Argentina," in Woodward, Positivism in Latin America, p. 55.
- ¹¹⁴Rodríguez Monegal, Introduction, Obras, p. 109.
- ¹¹⁵José Enrique Rodó, Los motivos de Proteo, in Obras, p. 476-77.
- ¹¹⁶José Enrique Rodó, Proteo, in Obras, p. 915.
- ¹¹⁷Zum Felde, Proceso, p. 2:92-93.
- ¹¹⁸Clarín, Prologue to Ariel, p. 14-15. Nothing seems further from the truth: in Ariel, Rodó's sources are the French writers, Renan, Taine, Fouillée, Guyau, and even Comte. And the style of the essay is "that in-between genre which, with so much success the French cultivate and is almost unknown in Spain." ("...ese género intermedio que con tan buen éxito cultivan los franceses, y que en España es casi desconocido.") Ibid., p. 15. In fact, one can reproach Rodó of ignoring or forgetting "the ancient mother country, the race and the civilization from which America originates and to which he insists in calling Latin." ("...el olvido de la antigua madre patria, de la casta y de la civilización de que procede la América que se empeña en llamar latina." Juan Valera, Cartas americanas, quoted in Obras, p. 1327.

CHAPTER IV

THE REACTION AGAINST POSITIVISM IN URUGUAY

Carlos Vaz Ferreira

One of the fundadores of contemporary philosophy in Latin America, Carlos Vaz Ferreira stands as a pivotal point in the shift from positivism to the more moderate positions that were to represent, from a 1900's perspective, twentieth century philosophy.¹ His philosophic life covering over five decades, is an effort to achieve a "justo medio," a golden mean--a position between Mill and James, somewhat closer to the first.² His accomplishments are consistent with an avowed goal of not creating philosophic systems, and with an attitude of reasonableness, sincerity, fairness and freedom.

1 Positivist Influences: Vaz Ferreira's views on positivism present some problems.³ His intellectual development occurred at a time when the Universidad de Montevideo was run by positivists. Vaz Ferreira adopted their ideas, only to find them untenable and give up all but what he thought were their good qualities.⁴ What does Vaz Ferreira mean by positivism? And what are its good qualities? In an often quoted passage he distinguishes two senses, one good and one bad:

If by "positivism" it is understood to take as certain only those facts that have been verified, if by positivism it would be understood to grade beliefs, having as certain only the certain, as doubtful the doubtful, as probable or possible the probable or possible, if by "positivism" it is understood, once more, knowing

how to distinguish, to discern what we know well from what we do not know well, if positivism means the feeling of admiration and love for pure science without, in its name, making exceptions, then positivism is a good and commendable position. But positivism has also been understood to be the systematic limitation of human knowledge to science alone, a prohibition against leaving its closed confines, forbidding the human spirit to speculate about, meditate on or psychify affectively about those problems alien to what is measurable, to what is accessible to the senses. Then positivism, thus understood, is a doctrine or tendency intrinsically inferior and with malignant consequences. (5)

From this excerpt—which appeared as part of his 1914–15 university lectures and was restated in 1952—one can infer that Vaz Ferreira was reacting to what he believed were dogmatic limitations on free thought.⁶ His remedy is to keep an open and skeptical attitude—a good skepticism he feels will inevitably lead to a good positivism.

Unlike Rodó, who admires Renan, Taine and so on, Vaz Ferreira ignores French positivism altogether. He calls Renan "commonplace."⁷ He has equally unflattering remarks about Taine.⁸ Comte, he considers an authoritarian personality, a creator of closed systems: Though appearances indicate Comte converted from a scientific positivism to a kind of mysticism, for Vaz Ferreira he just changed his mind about the supreme authority of his sociocracy—from the scientist to the priest.⁹ This kind of dogmatism or authoritarianism, Vaz Ferreira reminds us, has deplorable effects on our thinking:

Who is more confined? a humble prisoner in a narrow cell but with a view of the fields, the sea, the sky and the unlimited horizons, or the Pope in a vast palace, opulent but ending in a wall?

At least it is indubitable that this last situation favors the tendency to believe oneself infallible. (10)

It is against Spencerian positivism, however, that Vaz Ferreira directs his strongest attacks.¹¹ Spencer tends to systematize, to present as clear or logical obscure or fallacious explanations. He twists facts to

fit explanations--a kind of intellectual dishonesty.¹² Spencer also rejects metaphysical speculation in the name of science while, at the same time engages in inferior metaphysical eclecticism.¹³ Spencerian positivism purports to portray thinking, whereas what it represents is counterfeit; it tries to develop a scientific ethics that is, in reality, dogmatism and personal biases.

If Spencer is an example of bad positivism, John Stuart Mill typifies the good sense. The latter's influence can be felt in Vaz Ferreira's work. Mill's opposition to rationalist systems, the criticisms of those fallacies therein incurred, his empiricism, are elements admired and adopted by Vaz Ferreira. In criticizing William James' pragmatism, for instance, Vaz Ferreira feels he is also following in Mill's footsteps:

If Stuart Mill had come to know today's pragmatism, if he had criticized it--as he criticized, with intelligence and feeling--he would have undertaken a critique of this doctrine, of which, I am sure, mine gives an idea, as an imperfect though sincere sketch can give of a masterpiece. (14)

And in later works, particularly the *Fermentario*, Mill is still an object of praise.

It has been said that he had the temperament of a follower. This is unjust: The tendency to think in terms of the thoughts of others can be a modality of the spirit, frequent in analytic and critical minds, or the result of noble modesty, or it can be chosen as one of the many ways to present one's thoughts. (15)

Even the goals of Lógica viva are, in a way, an extension of System of Logic.¹⁶

The direction of Vaz Ferreira's thought is now clearer: Positivism is a valuable point of departure, something to be improved, modified, amended. He asks us to give up its systematizations, its dogmas

and to reconstruct a metaphysics or an ethics free from a priorisms, from categorical walls. Given this program, he takes Mill's empirical positivism as an adequate model since its goals are also to amend and improve classical positivism. Like Mill, Vaz Ferreira can be called an emancipated positivist.¹⁷

2 Philosophic Character: For Vaz Ferreira our task as philosophers is to free philosophy from any kind of intellectual authoritarianism.¹⁸

We must reject closed systems of thought where everything is fixed, determined by principles and categories at odds with everyday experience.¹⁹ For instance, we should not divide philosophy, as is sometimes done, into materialism, spiritualism, positivism, etc.--systems that answer all questions in terms of their own tenets.²⁰ This kind of systematization leads to narrow-mindedness and to a break in communication among philosophers.²¹

Vaz Ferreira approaches philosophy with the idea of correcting these faults. He presents his views in fragments, aphorisms, avoiding general theses or systems. Instead of stating a philosophic position, the accent is on form, on philosophical arguments. Vaz Ferreira is problem oriented: he analyzes them, outlines pros and cons, tests the validity of arguments, points out where mistakes have or could occur and suggests where one has or could improve.²² He is always careful not to force beliefs nor advocate persuasive pragmatisms.²³ We cannot do any more "because we do not know anything more; to promise anything else one would have to be a genius or an ignoramus."²⁴

This attitude has been compared to Socrates' treatment of unexamined dogmas.²⁵ For Socrates, philosophy begins by challenging the

sacred cows, by knowing that we do not know anything. Once such recognition develops, a dialectical process begins and a philosophy is built on the ruins of the old. But Vaz Ferreira sees a prior kind of philosophizing as more valuable. What he is interested in are the confusions that arise when important distinctions are ignored--in the reformulation rather than the solution of problems. Philosophic problems must be clarified, their logic shown faulty or confused--shown to be pseudo-problems, that is.²⁶ Only after such necessary clarification can any other forms of philosophizing be tried.

An interesting consequence of this method is Vaz Ferreira's conception of philosophic progress: For any progress to occur in philosophy we must discard the original formulations. When a problem is presented the way it was first stated, it tends to polarize ideas.²⁷ It blinds us and deceives us into thinking that there is no philosophic progress. There is some truth to his argument. To understand the original problem we must know its history. This leads to those previous problems that created the one at hand. We work backwards, and the result is that philosophy can become the history of philosophy. For Vaz Ferreira, the proper procedure is to state a problem, make all the relevant distinctions and clarifications, reformulate it in contemporary terms, make further distinctions and so on. After this, solutions, if any, can be tried. Only then can we break with the original problem; only then can we see the road traveled and assess the progress.

A danger in this style of doing philosophy is that distinctions tend to be piled up; one loses sight of the original point and ends up with casuistry. Granted that many times there is a feeling that philo-

sophy has gotten nowhere, that we are still arguing the same problems Plato dealt with. Granted that when we manage to dispense with the original formula and recast the problem in a more modern fashion we realize how far we have advanced. But some of the problems we are still dealing with in their original formulation are enormous problems and as difficult to solve now as they were in Plato's time. We call then universal or enduring questions, and progress—in Vaz Ferreira's admittedly subjective sense, should be tantamount to appreciating their difficult or insoluble nature.

Vaz Ferreira's philosophic style—style rather than method—is flexible enough, not just for philosophical problems, but for political, legal and social ones as well, where conceptual analysis is imperative.²⁸ It does not, however, degenerate into casuistry because of a commitment to empiricism. For Vaz Ferreira, we must constantly refer back to experience to make sure we do not misinterpret or distort it.²⁹ By experience he means concrete, living and fluid awareness, thinking and sensing, before it is distorted by language. This is a purely psychological concept with epistemological consequences: a denial of abstractionism, of generalizations, theories, idealizations or intellectualisms.³⁰ Yet, Vaz Ferreira's empiricism is also a guarded position since he warns us of the illusions of experience: Though it is claimed experience teaches men, in reality it seldom does.³¹ When it shows something contrary to opinions or beliefs, men refuse to make the connection, or perceive it as unrelated, or confuse its import; and this is never truer than in the social or political arena.³² "By reasoning, humanity learns very little," Vaz Ferreira ironically adds, "but from experience

it learns nothing."³³ Still, empiricism is the most reasonable position; one should just be aware of its inadequacies, of its dangers.

Two criticisms are often made of Vaz Ferreira's style and his guarded attitude. First, that he is an eclectic, that he borrows from whatever sources he finds practical or useful to solve his immediate problems. Historically, this is a step backwards. Second, that the position he really espouses is skepticism. To answer the first criticism, Vaz Ferreira argues that his philosophical view can be confused with eclecticism only in a superficial way. An eclectic philosophy, borrowing concepts from other philosophies, is as absurd and incongruous as a painting made by borrowing different figures--trees, clouds, sky and so on--from other paintings.³⁴ Philosophic reasoning consists of thinking and sensing directly from reality, that is, going back to the source of all experience.³⁵ The eclectic does not think directly, only through other theories, generalizations, positions or systems. This is misleading and prevents original thought.³⁶ And if the systems and theories are borrowed, the danger of error is even greater.

The second criticism Vaz Ferreira accepts, but again, with caution.³⁷ Skepticism as a philosophic method is a healthy state of mind. It avoids some of the traps and fallacies eclecticism, or other systems are prone to:

...the method I have followed, [is] primarily an expository method, strictly impartial, allowing space to all important theories in spite of the risk of leaving a great many questions unresolved, [and] could be open to an objection: this method, it could be said, must necessarily lead to doubt and to skepticism...That fearful doubt is precisely a boon rather than an evil because it is a more neutral state of mind, more legitimate and also more fruitful, when what one is examining are simply more or less insecure interpretations, and more or less credible theories. (33)

Vaz Ferreira distinguishes skepticism as a philosophic system from skepticism as a mental attitude. The first is to be rejected as a dogmatism of ignorance; the second is really the most frank admission of that ignorance: "Good skepticism does not inhibit action, but softens it."³⁹ Consequently, he advocates a partial skepticism--about this or that element, about this or that concept.⁴⁰

Two questions emerge: Why does Vaz Ferreira make this distinction? and can he keep a skeptical attitude without falling into systematic skepticism? To answer the first question it must be pointed out that philosophy, for Vaz Ferreira, is not so much a search for truth as it is a serious effort to avoid error. His caution, anti-dogmatism and anti-systematism are definite efforts to avoid biases, narrow-mindedness or "isms." He does not want to repeat the mistakes of the past. Overreacting to positivism or spiritualism, for instance, can lead to equally dogmatic views. To avoid this he seeks a golden mean, a questioning attitude that would not force him to the systematic doubt--to philosophical skepticism.

This leads to the second question: whether Vaz Ferreira, or any one else, can keep a questioning attitude and not become a systematic skeptic. That is, how much does attitude influence the philosophical commitments one makes? It is logically possible to question beliefs, yet reject the systematic doubt. In fact, it is feasible as long as the questioning attitude leads to positive gains, to clarification of views, correction of fallacies or avoidance of errors. But when this attitude becomes a stumbling block in our pursuit of knowledge, or prevents us from distinguishing right from wrong, the result is no different from

systematic skepticism. This is what happens with Vaz Ferreira's epistemology and ethics. This is not his aim, but the unforeseen result of conflicting methodological and substantive commitments, avoidable only at the expense of giving up the "justo medio" for a particular system of thought. How Vaz Ferreira falls into this dilemma and the alternatives open to him will be the theme of the last two sections. First we must deal with his attitude toward metaphysics.

3 Science and Metaphysics: One of the things that sets Vaz Ferreira apart from the positivists is his defense of metaphysics. To the classical positivists, metaphysics is a set of beliefs we will outgrow, a meaningless pursuit of the unknowable. Vaz Ferreira agrees that this criticism applies to classical metaphysics. Nevertheless, he will argue for a new kind of metaphysics, without which our quest for knowledge would be severely curtailed. Even science would be impossible, for science--to use Vaz Ferreira's metaphor--is solidified metaphysics.⁴¹

The conception of science Vaz Ferreira entertains is mainly positivist: it is the collection, classification and explanation of facts by means of empirical laws. It aims at prediction, discovery and invention. And when pure science is well directed, even the highest spiritual values are within its grasp.⁴² Vaz Ferreira, however, departs from this position in two important ways. First, he sees scientific concepts, if theoretical, as non-transcendent symbols, that is, they do not represent a hidden reality: They are instrumental.⁴³ For Comte and Spencer, there is never any question about the reality of scientific laws, or what scientific concepts describe, be they theoretical or empirical. The reality behind phenomena might be unknowable, but is

there, nonetheless. Second, there is a rejection of Spencer's scientific reductionism. It might be advantageous, Vaz Ferreira argues, for a superior or more complex science to use the results of a hierarchically lower or less complex science—for biology to use information from mechanics, physics or chemistry, for psychology to use information from physiology or mathematics, or for the social sciences to rely on the biological sciences. It would be disadvantageous if, instead, these sciences were to imitate the hierarchically superior ones.

When a science of more complex facts, or of a more elevated order, (or simply of events of a different kind), is presented as an imitation of a science of the less complex, or pretends to explain everything in terms of the latter, one can assert a priori that it is still not well made, or that is still unfinished; and of an explanation of this type, that it is not true—totally, at least. (44)

Neither Comte's nor Spencer's objections to metaphysics—that it belongs to the past or that it is intrinsically unknowable—are, for Vaz Ferreira, good reasons to exclude it from the body of knowledge. For, as positive science begins to investigate deeper questions about the nature of its subject, it transcends empirical limitations and becomes metaphysics. The difference for Vaz Ferreira between scientific and metaphysical knowledge is only a matter of degree. By degree he does not mean degree of generality—from observations to inductive laws and to broader or more general laws, metaphysical statements being the most general in scope. "It isn't that, as for Comte or Spencer, philosophy continues to be in its intimate nature positive science: it is that positive science is in its intimate nature already philosophy, that is, metaphysics."⁴⁵ Neither does this difference of degree imply a difference of essences, as some anti-positivists have insisted—say from perception to intuition.⁴⁶ It is a difference in degree of clarity,

of consistency and of certainty in the knowledge obtained.

With the help of another analogy, Vaz Ferreira tries to clarify the difference between science and metaphysics: Science is like the surface of the sea—everyday science. As the scientist moves from the clear, sharp problems of measurement, regulation or adjustment, building and harvesting, he plunges into the darker regions of the ocean—into speculation—where there are no clear or exact concepts.⁴⁷ This is the region of metaphysical thought, to which the scientist must descend if he is to inquire about the foundations of his science:

Each time men of learning go deeper and generalize more, their science, when dissolving into metaphysics, goes through a sort of critical point at which knowledge takes on an exceptionally turbid and ambiguous aspect. And in any case, we think that a lot of philosophy is worth more than a little philosophy in order to clarify these generalizations (which are otherwise deserving of the most legitimate admiration), made by modern mathematicians, mechanists, biologists. (48)

The result is sometimes metaphysics, sometimes scientific inspiration. Since no frontiers between science and metaphysics can be drawn, when the scientist speculates about his field, he will fall into metaphysics. Given the nature of knowledge, speculation about the world is unavoidable. And if science is to advance by investigating its fundamental concepts—which are, by the way, instrumental—metaphysics is inevitable. Further, unless the scientist has some knowledge of philosophy, warns Vaz Ferreira, he will be condemned to do bad metaphysics.⁴⁹

A. The analogy of metaphysics to the depths of the sea raises a few questions: What is the nature of this kind of metaphysics? What are metaphysical propositions? How do they differ from vague scientific propositions? What is to prevent the assimilation of one discipline to

the other? What methods does Vaz Ferreira offer for exploring this region?

The source of metaphysics is, for Vaz Ferreira, thought in its pre-verbal plasticity. We think and then, as we formulate our thoughts in language, apply logical or linguistic constraints.⁵⁰ This is the subject matter of metaphysics, a rich ferment whence our ideas come from and which Vaz Ferreira calls "living thought," "ferments," or coins the verb "psiquear" to refer to the activity itself.⁵¹ This is a kind of spontaneous thinking at its most unclear and amorphous, before language has imposed its limitations. It encompasses doubts, hesitations and contradictions—a kind of thinking peculiar to the philosopher or scientist when they give free rein to their imagination and speculate about reality. The task of the philosopher is to capture it fresh, without regard for logical rules or verbal schemata. In this sense Lógica viva and Fermentario are—better still, aim at being—books on metaphysics. The problem is that "psiqueos," when written or formulated verbally have to undergo change.

Thought, when crystallizing, can gain—clarity, exactitude, fulfillment, applications, and so on—and can lose—spontaneity, sincerity, life, interest, fertility and so on—and often it gains and loses at the same time. To conclude that the ferment is always preferable to the finished product is an exaggeration and misrepresentation. Yet, at times it would be preferable if the public could know thought in the two states. (52)

Vaz Ferreira believes that traditional metaphysics have been, by and large, fully developed systems of thought, precise like geometry and claiming clarity and certainty.⁵³ This is true of the metaphysics of Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, even Kant. If traditional metaphysics seeks to discover a transcendental reality, Vaz Ferreira's conception

deals with the sources of this idea in a philosopher's thinking. His metaphysics, instead of being, say a system of propositions about being qua being, consists of "psiqueos," of those thoughts that give rise to traditional metaphysical statements. These "psiqueos" are not propositions since they make no truth claims--not even claims of coherence or consistency. And his metaphysical statements--those sentences that appear in his philosophical works--are not propositions either, for they refer to--rather, express--"psiqueos."

The claims of traditional metaphysics Vaz Ferreira regards as impossible. Reality is what it is: we perceive it as it is perceived.⁵⁴ To an idealist these two are one proposition; to a realist, two. Vaz Ferreira cannot adopt idealism, for he sees them not as one or two propositions but as "psiqueos." And he cannot adopt realism because reality is too complex to systematize or force into verbal schemata.⁵⁵ Categories, abstract concepts, verbal schemata interfere with our perception of reality.⁵⁶ We see opposites where there are neither opposites nor middle terms; we force categories where there are no boundaries.⁵⁷ Language distorts facts, and our task is to state them and be aware of the shortcomings of our formulations.

In a way, this conception reflects Spencer's influence, particularly his claim that transcendental reality is beyond the mind, that is, unknowable. And like Spencer, Vaz Ferreira traces metaphysical statements to their psychological origins. This conception is also compatible with the views of later logical positivists who see metaphysical propositions as meaningless if understood as claims about reality, yet are willing to accept them as having expressive or artistic meaning.⁵⁸

Questions about the difference between metaphysical and vague scientific statements, or about the assimilation of one to the other, are a result of thinking that Vaz Ferreira envisions two kinds of knowledge, a scientific and a metaphysical. Quite the contrary, his conception is that of a field in which thoughts, when they become clear and precise, give rise to positive knowledge. There can be no confusion between metaphysical and scientific propositions because the former are not really propositions. Vague scientific propositions, speculative scientific propositions and pre-scientific propositions are all metaphysical "psiqueos," that is, not propositions at all—not even analytic or synthetic a priori. This is consistent with his instrumentalism: scientific concepts are tools to be measured by their utility, not by their correspondence to reality. Metaphysics cannot be absorbed by positive science because positive science is already metaphysics made precise; and metaphysics is really science imprecise. They are not two blurred areas of knowledge, but a question of degrees of clarity: at one end we have positive knowledge and at the other pure thought. We introduce the blurring by not recognizing the difference between thought and language.⁵⁹

There are some inconsistencies in Vaz Ferreira's position: If metaphysical claims are not propositions, if they are "psiqueos," then there is more than just a difference of degree between what is scientific and what is metaphysical. The difference is logical—a difference in kind, as is the difference between scientific statements and commands. A gap has been created between science and metaphysics, and it cannot be bridged with the assertion that it is a matter of degree of

clarity. Propositions can range from obscure to crystal clear, from doubtful to certain without ceasing to be propositions, i. e., meaningful true or false sentences. "Psiqueos" can also range from murky to crystal clear without ever becoming propositions. There is a logical difference between an obscure proposition and a "psiqueo." Degree of clarity of our conceptions is not sufficient to distinguish science from metaphysics. If anything, this is an argument for two regions of knowledge that invites science to absorb metaphysics.

The idea behind this reconstruction of metaphysics is to allow a legitimate place for speculation. Vaz Ferreira, no doubt, recognizes the inadequacies of the inductivist view of science that gives no room for speculation. He is also painfully aware of the debt science owes metaphysical speculation—even in its traditional form. Historically, at least as the positivists see it, the science of today was the metaphysics of yesterday. Without it, science would be impossible; hence, the urgency of his defense.

Is this really metaphysics? Though there is something attractive in conceiving it as the foundation of scientific inspiration, it still leaves a lot to be desired. Questions about definition aside, what strikes us as inadequate is that Vaz Ferreira's non-cognitive metaphysics is similar to the psychological biography of the individual. This amounts to a study of the development of thought in a person, with all the doubts, lack of clarity, contradictions and painful efforts it implies. How much better it would be to know the path by which Kant or Bergson arrived at their conclusions, and not just the conclusions themselves as stated in their books.⁶⁰ In this sense, metaphysics is a

description of rational and affective states of the philosopher in a stream of consciousness narration. But for one who pursues philosophy for its sake and sees promised fruits in classical metaphysics, this conception is particularly sterile. It might be intellectually rewarding for what it tells us of men doing philosophy, but it is useless for understanding and evaluating the philosophy these men are doing—hardly metaphysics and hardly philosophy.

B. So far, there is no incompatibility between Vaz Ferreira's metaphysics and the traditional one. One might adopt a particular view about the nature and sources of psychic processes, their clarity or validity, without having to rule out some classical conception of Reality. This is true of psychological atomism, materialism or idealism. Yet, Vaz Ferreira regards them as incompatible. For him, the vindication of metaphysics does not mean a return to its classical presentation. As Rodó said, positivist criticisms must be taken into account.

The rejection of classical metaphysics is implicit in the methods Vaz Ferreira offers for exploring metaphysical thought: avoid the fallacies common to the classic works; e.g., false opposition, false precision, false systematization, verbo-ideological fallacies, or illegitimate mathematical transcendentalisms.

False opposition occurs when beliefs, observations, theories, are wrongly taken as mutually exclusive or exhaustive and are set in opposition to each other.⁶¹ Though common, this fallacy is usually overlooked.⁶² Spencer, for instance, is guilty of this paralogism when he asserts that man needs neither art nor language, but science—implying that a man's education is either scientific, artistic or linguistic,

that it cannot be a combination of the three or anything else.⁶³ This paralogism contributes to an oversimplification of Reality, reduces differences to contraries or contradictions, obstructs inquiry and forces reality into imaginary molds.⁶⁴ The result is a metaphysics that categorizes the world in terms of ideal qualities or mathematical relations, like Plato's, and that distorts our experiences.⁶⁵

False precision is just as insidious, for it also hides facts, distorts and obstructs inquiry and inhibits thought.⁶⁶ One is guilty of false precision when one imposes mathematical or geometric methods on a subject that does not lend itself to such treatment. There is no gain; the result is a feeling of clarity where none actually exists.⁶⁷ Astrological quantification--the precise measurement of angular relations among heavenly bodies for the purposes of predicting destiny or character--is an example of false precision. Herbart's or Fechner's psychological methods are also cited as examples.⁶⁸ So are the textbook presentations of scientific or philosophic views, clear and unambiguous, but at odds with the original views--views that are full of ambiguities and confusions.⁶⁹ The kind of metaphysics or philosophy emerging from abuse of this fallacy posits Reality as exact, precise, mathematical or geometrical in nature; Descartes is a good example.⁷⁰

False systematization happens when, regardless of correctness, one applies a set of rules or procedures to every problem and derives similar solutions, giving the illusion of uniformity and falsifying Reality.⁷¹ Facts and observations are forced into a set framework; contrary evidence is either ignored or distorted. This causes dogmatism, exaggerations and irrational behavior.⁷² This criticism, Vaz Ferreira

feels, holds true for positivism and for the naturalistic, biological or materialist views of science—positions that blind the investigator to the subject matter science should study.⁷³ This fallacy leads to inflexible metaphysical systems that try to encompass everything, be it Reality or morality, by the application of Procrustean principles.

False opposition, false precision and false systematization imply true opposition, true precision and true systematization.⁷⁴ There are mutually exclusive or exhaustive concepts; there are proper uses of mathematical or geometric methods; there are legitimate systems—such as mathematics or mechanics. How do we recognize the proper from the improper applications? How do we identify true from false opposition? How can we avoid false precision or false systematization? Vaz Ferreira is not clear about this. For instance, he fails to provide criteria for detection of false opposition. All he tells us is that we must avoid it. What is the good of this admonition if we do not know how to recognize it?⁷⁵

Vaz Ferreira's classification of fallacies and paralogisms does not represent a comprehensive theory. Lógica viva only tries to teach us to avoid errors and to think clearly.⁷⁶ False precision is a kind of false systematization, but since it is an important error, it is spelled out in detail. False precision is due, we gather, to the nature of the subject matter—not to a faulty methodology.⁷⁷ As with false opposition, how can we recognize and avoid it? How do we know when we are being falsely precise? Certainly not when we are using mathematics, for admittedly there is true precision, correct use of mathematics.

A clue to the kind of rules Vaz Ferreira has in mind can be found

in his treatment of false systematization. Instead of systematizing, he advises us to take all ideas into consideration.⁷⁸ Instead of having an idea dominate the whole inquiry to the exclusion of any other idea, we should consider the likelihood of this idea, as well as the likelihood of every other idea. Instead of making a particular principle the dominant factor, to which all other facts and principles must conform, we should take this principle, and any other relevant ones, into consideration. Another clue comes up when he spells out the conditions under which thinking in terms of systems is permissible: (a) complete knowledge of facts and principles, (b) identity or similarity of cases, (c) the possibility of integration into a system.⁷⁹ Conditions (a) and (b) are debatable points. How do we know we have a complete knowledge? What is meant by "identity or similarity of cases"? Condition (c) is puzzling, for taken at face value it states that it is permissible or legitimate to systematize, provided one can systematize, which begs the question.⁸⁰

Two more metaphysical fallacies remain: those dealing with the confusion of thought with language, and those dealing with the confusion of language with reality--verbo-ideological fallacies and illegitimate mathematical transcendentalisms.⁸¹ The verbo-ideological fallacies are those errors about the relations between thought and language.⁸² These fallacies are, sometimes, caused by an overzealous use of the principle of the excluded middle: propositions are true or false. As Mill points out, to assert this principle is to overlook the possibility of a third alternative--the proposition in question might not apply to the subject matter in an intelligible manner.⁸³ Because a sentence is

stated does not mean it must make sense or be true or false.⁸⁴ Vaz Ferreira adds that a sentence does not have to be devoid of sense, as in Mill's example: "Abracadabra is the second intention."⁸⁵ It could be vague. When one ignores this, one tends to accept the problem the way it is stated and proceeds to prove or disprove the given formulation.⁸⁶ The result is a conceptual muddle. Vaz Ferreira also calls this the paralogism of the metaphysicians: Traditional metaphysicians accept a thesis as if it has a sense and consider it proven if its antithesis leads to contradictions or confusions. For them, proving an antithesis absurd is tantamount to proving that the thesis itself is meaningful. Yet, this is non sequitur since the thesis itself could also be absurd.

The verbo-ideological fallacy is then the attribution of meaning to sentences that lack it. By implication, classical metaphysics is meaningless. To that extent, Vaz Ferreira is in agreement with Comte, Mill, Spencer and with logical positivists. Classical metaphysics "has made the mistake of wanting to be precise, of wanting to be geometric by presenting questions and establishing verbal formulae encumbered with false precision and inadequacy, as we find, not only in metaphysical argumentation, but generally in its own problems."⁸⁷ This does not mean he is willing to go so far as to rule out all metaphysics.

Metaphysics is legitimate; more than legitimate: it constitutes and will always constitute the most elevated activity of human thought as long as it does not pretend to possess the geometric aspect and the false precision that some have pretended to give it; metaphysics is simply the typical illustration, on the one hand, of the sophisms of false precision which we have already studied and on the other, these verbo-ideological fallacies. (88)

Confusing language with reality is another fallacy Vaz Ferreira sees as having an effect on the form metaphysics takes. It seems from

the confusion of symbols with the reality they claim to represent. It can be a simple confusion of questions of fact with questions of words, or the assumption that a given word is identical with Reality, i.e., the reification of a formula.⁸⁹ Behind this fallacy lies the belief that language mirrors Reality, that the structure of language and that of Reality are identical. We incur this fallacy when we ignore the instrumental character of concepts; for instance, when we describe something in a contradictory manner. This does not imply a contradiction in what we describe—in Reality itself—but on the way we describe it.⁹⁰ Reality is what it is and we express it in terms of what we have at hand: linguistic schemata. The problem with much of metaphysics is that it reifies linguistic difficulties and creates confusion.

Metaphysical transcendentalisms also occur in mathematics and in the sciences; hence their importance. We transcendentalize, in Vaz Ferreira's words, when we take mathematical concepts, formulae, definitions, as real.⁹¹ This is confusing the ideal with the real: Mathematics is neither a representation nor a description of reality. It is a tool with which we explain and predict.⁹² To transcendentalize is to reify a tool. Science is also prone to this kind of fallacy, when practical difficulties become metaphysical ones and create pseudo-problems that waste valuable time and give metaphysics a bad name.⁹³

4 Logic and Psycho-logic: Good metaphysics involves, for Vaz Ferreira, avoiding the fallacies of the metaphysician. Metaphysics is possible only if the logician can clear up the fallacies that plague it; that is, if our logic allows it.⁹⁴ The task of the logician is to make us aware of these fallacies so we can avoid them.

The logic developed to fulfill this desideratum Vaz Ferreira calls "a living logic."⁹⁵ This is not the traditional logic of the schools, though he acknowledges being in its debt.⁹⁶ This is, instead, an attempt to carry out Mill's program of radical empiricism to its logical conclusion. Mill's influence is evident, particularly in the similarities: For Mill, logic is ultimately empirical.⁹⁷ That is, the validity of its rules or laws is established by appeal to our own experiences, and this can be done only by means of the laws of association of ideas.⁹⁸ Hence, Mill's logic is, in the final analysis, psychological in nature.⁹⁹ Vaz Ferreira is similarly committed to an empirical logic: All our knowledge is based on facts and observations; this includes logic.¹⁰⁰ And because logic begins with ordinary thinking, he also concludes it is psychological.¹⁰¹

The treatment of fallacies in System of Logic and Lógica viva are also similar. Mill holds that the causes of fallacies should be pursued to the psychological realm, for they are usually the involuntary workings of associations of ideas.¹⁰² Vaz Ferreira also believes that these errors are caused by the environment, the passions, the "will to believe" and so on, and that they should be pursued into the psychological realm.¹⁰³

If Mill and Vaz Ferreira are committed to the view that logic reflects the true nature of thought, they disagree as to what the nature of thinking is. Mill identifies thinking with the syllogism.¹⁰⁴ Logic represents the canons of rationality and its laws are the laws of thought.¹⁰⁵ This empirical logic rests on a commitment to psychological atomism and mechanism. But Vaz Ferreira sees thinking as fluid and

vital, constantly changing.¹⁰⁶ If logic is to be empirical, it should reflect the true dynamics of living processes. Thinking itself is hardly rigorous.¹⁰⁷ It encompasses doubts, changes of mind, fluctuations or errors.¹⁰⁸

Traditional logic, as Vaz Ferreira perceives it, belies the character of mentation when it imposes its patterns on living thought. Propositions and syllogisms are parodies of thought; they are the result of confusing words with ideas, verbal schemata with the psychic processes they represent. Thought and language are different—we are reminded—not just in form but in content.¹⁰⁹ Our mental states, as psychological realities, are different from the linguistic schematisms in which they are presented. And what we express is a small part of what we think, which is, in turn, a miniscule part of what we "psiqueamos."¹¹⁰

The function of living logic is to analyze the most common errors and confusions incurred in everyday thinking.¹¹¹ These are errors of thinking, not of reasoning, as Mill's fallacies are. Because they are more subtle and pervasive than the ones found in Book V of System of Logic, they are more dangerous.

...the real confusion, the psychological confusion is not the same we obtain by a thoughtful analysis of the meaning of sentences. The psychological confusion is not superimposed on the logical confusion; the actual confusion is not, generally, the confusion one would incur if, excuse the paradox, we would be confused the way one is supposed to be. (112)

Living logic is an art designed for practical use.¹¹³ If successful, it heralds a new way of thinking, more ample and sincere than the conventional forms of philosophic reasoning.

This logic is, in Vaz Ferreira's terminology, a psycho-logic—

a logic of psychic processes.¹¹⁴ It uncovers the structure of living thought, buried below the verbal schemata.¹¹⁵ This is a reduction of logic to psychological phenomena, a reassertion of Spencer's psychologism. But as Mill was painfully aware, logic is not concerned so much with what we recognize as valid, but with what we ought to recognize as such.¹¹⁶ This element of normativeness is hardly admitted by either Spencer or Vaz Ferreira.¹¹⁷ Missing from Vaz Ferreira's logic are the rules that state how one ought to think. He tells us that we should avoid fallacies if we want to be free from the burden of faulty thinking, but neglects to tell us how. Since it is impossible to express the richness of thought in verbal schemata, to give rules would be contrary to his view of logic. That way experience is not falsified, categorized or systematized. But this is paradoxical: If the purpose of logic is to point to where fallacies occur or can occur, to clarify issues and avoid unsound reasoning, it must give us rules and tell us how to think. Otherwise it becomes a mere cataloguing of past mistakes, hardly deserving the name of logic and without theoretical or practical value—it neither makes metaphysics possible, nor helps us think straight.

Another problem with Vaz Ferreira's logic has to do with the certainty achieved by its application. Again, if there is a failure to distinguish the way we think from the way we ought to think, how can we see the difference between valid and invalid inferences. Many times we reason and draw inferences we assume correct, but which prove to be invalid because of some fallacy. How can we distinguish these cases from the ones in which our thinking is correct? This task would, then, be reserved for classical logic: to guarantee that our inferences are

not faulty precisely because our thoughts are contradictory, unsure, erroneous. Logic ought to correct, not just reveal these faults in our thinking. Missing from Lógica viva is a theory of inferences that would guarantee the certainty of conclusions derived from true premises. Here the charge of skepticism reemerges, for, if Vaz Ferreira cannot guarantee certainty by his logical methods, how can metaphysics, or philosophy, or ordinary thinking achieve certainty? This criticism misses the point, though, for Vaz Ferreira has made no claims to certainty. To that extent, he is a skeptic. But his skepticism is an attitude that only points to the limitations of our knowledge. His claim is not that we should know with certainty or know nothing, as is apparent in systematic skepticism, but that we do know something and can get to know it better.¹¹⁸

To ward off the charge of skepticism, Vaz Ferreira conceives a methodology of degrees of belief, already implicit in his metaphysics. This ranking of beliefs he thinks is also an answer to the errors of James' pragmatism.¹¹⁹ It requires that we learn to grade our beliefs, to distinguish what is known from what is believed and from what is unknown. We must learn to appreciate the different degrees of knowledge: certainty, probability and possibility.¹²⁰ Knowledge is human, hence finite--though cultural, biological and psychological factors contribute to its acquisition. Reasoning can provide some solutions, more or less.¹²¹ The problem is, how are we going to grade beliefs? By means of what criterion are we going to grade them correctly? How can we judge what is certain, what is probable and what is only possible? What is needed is a criterion of correctness, but Vaz Ferreira seems to stand

firm against it. For him, no formulas or rules are needed in order to grade beliefs, only experience and good sense. This good sense should not be confused with common sense. The latter is the cause of much damage to intellectual progress. In Moral para intelectuales, Vaz Ferreira distinguishes several meanings of "good sense" other than common sense. There is

...a kind of good sense that is above reasoning; no doubt there is a good sense that is anti-logical, but there is also one that we should call hyper-logical. After the mind learns how to reason and see from every point of view, still there is a sense, a kind of logical instinct, that guides, moderates reasoning, that defends against it, if that is the case and that is indispensable because in almost all practical problems, in almost all real questions, there are problems of degree; there are formulas that, true to a given degree, pass on afterwards into falsehoods, the difficulty being that it is not known when and at what instant... (122)

This hyper-logical instinct, or good sense, is not to be taken as a substitute for reasoning, but an addition to it.¹²³ Nor does it replace experience, but aids it. In Lógica viva he adds:

When we have seen and weighted by ratiocination the reasons for and the reasons against that are found in almost all cases, when we have used all the logic (sound logic) possible, when the question becomes one of degrees, a moment comes in which a kind of instinct, what I call the good hyper-logical sense, is the one that solves for us all the questions in the concrete cases. And it would be good that logic does not deprive men of this form of good sense. (124)

The function of this instinct is to help logic rather than to replace it. It works to maintain an equilibrium among opposing ideas, to prevent fallacies and so on. This empirical instinct improves when reason provides it with questions for examination; "the process of reasoning is completed by the good hyper-logical sense, controller of reasoning."¹²⁵

It seems that Vaz Ferreira is arguing for the classical concept

of intuition: a knowledge obtained without recourse to inferences or to reasoning, innate or instinctive and usually contrasted with empirical knowledge.¹²⁶ His resistance to calling it intuition could be due to Mill's influence.¹²⁷ Mill's criticisms of intuition must have seemed quite convincing, given Vaz Ferreira's uneasiness with such concepts as "hyper-logical," "empirical instinct" and so on. It also seems clear that whether or not Vaz Ferreira used the term "intuition," he had in fact opened himself to the same kind of criticism that can be made against intuitionism: How can one recognize good from bad arguments, certain from probable or possible beliefs, by means of this hyper-logical sense? Not by means of reason, for the hyper-logical sense is supposed to aid it. The alternative seems to be a sort of perceptual act--a seeing-the-point sort of experience. One simply sees the good argument. But this creates more difficulties than it solves, for then the elements of error and illusion are introduced: How can we be sure we are not being deceived into thinking that this is a good argument? To avoid this there must exist a different way of judging these arguments or evaluating these beliefs--a criterion of correctness. Otherwise we would never be sure that, for instance, an argument or a belief is truly probable or possible when we perceive it as such and not a mistake on our part. Public agreement is of no help in this case, for the public might be deceived or confused by the beliefs or arguments, as will happen with fallacies. When we are told that an argument is fallacious, we are being warned that we might be misled by it. The argument is fallacious, not because we see it as such--otherwise we might never be misled--but because of some standard of good argumentation. And

when we judge a belief to be certain or probable or possible, we judge it, not because of some psychological feeling of certainty or probability or possibility, but because we can apply some standard of certainty, or some laws of probability, or find no contradictions with physical laws, or whatever. There has to be some way of recognizing the difference between fact and illusion--otherwise knowledge is impossible. To claim the existence of a hyper-logical instinct or intuition does not clear up the difficulty. Though Vaz Ferreira characterizes it as derived from experience, or a part of good thinking, or just a feeling of correctness or the perception thereof, it still remains inextricable, mysterious--a deus ex machina invoked to avoid the admission of an impasse.

The reason why Vaz Ferreira is pushed to epistemological intuitionism--to depart from Mill and lean toward Bergson and James--might be that he wants to avoid falling into a total, systematic skepticism, something contrary to his philosophical golden mean. But why? Intuitionism is not the only alternative to skepticism. Another alternative is the formulation of a criterion of correctness in terms of a theory of inferences. Vaz Ferreira does not take this alternative because he believes the formulation of such a criterion might involve him in fallacious metaphysical claims. "In heaven and earth there might be many things that are not in Horatio's philosophy, but in many philosophies there are plenty of things that are neither in heaven nor earth."¹²⁸ Living logic tries to capture living thought. Logical rules and artificial formal systems falsify living thought. The only alternative for him is intuitionism.

Vaz Ferreira tries to avoid closed systems; this bars both systematic skepticism as well as the formulation and application of criteria

of certainty. Further and more important from our vantage point, to formulate such a criterion might mean a return to the systematism he has abandoned, to a re-establishment of positivist commitments, of positivism in the bad sense. If he is to maintain the desirable skeptical attitude without falling into an unwanted systematic skepticism, he must adopt the most plausible position from his point of view—intuitionism. But intuitionism blocks the development of criteria of truth or knowledge. It tells us that something is going on about which we know nothing but label "intuition." So, paradoxically, the skeptical attitude finally produces what Vaz Ferreira considers the nefarious effects of systematic skepticism: inhibiting knowledge and action.

5 Living Morality: Paralleling the arguments for a living logic, Vaz Ferreira adds a counterpart in the realm of values, a living morality.¹²⁹ For the same reasons living thought cannot be captured by artificial rules and systems, living morality cannot be expressed by injunctions or moral systems—another aspect of the belief that the fluidity of life cannot be systematized.¹³⁰ In ethics, the task of the philosopher is to distinguish true from false morality—living morality from those moral systems that try to encapsulate the vitality of life by forcing it into sterile categories and schematisms. One must moralize with feelings, not with words.

A. There are four major features of Vaz Ferreira's ethics: First, moral judgements deal with practical rather than theoretical problems; second, these judgements are non-systematic; third, they are ultimately intuitive judgements, requiring a moral sense; fourth, there has

been a definite moral progress. Let us deal with each in turn.

For Vaz Ferreira the aim of morality has always been practical: the examination of moral problems. The philosopher's task is not to create moral theories, but to help the reader understand his morality better.¹³¹ He aims at a methodology of morals: a clarification of what the problems and dangers are so they can be avoided.¹³² Typically, Vaz Ferreira develops his views by pointing to a number of moral problems or, as in his metaphysics, to those fallacies that prevent clear understanding of these problems. Moral para intelectuales is a guide for professionals, such as lawyers, doctors, teachers, who, though trained in a given field, seldom examine the moral problems these fields entail. For instance, there is a kind of double standard, the payment of lip service to a theoretical morality having very little to do with conduct, with what is or what should be done.¹³³ The remedy is sincerity and an open mind.¹³⁴ There are also fallacies that obscure the moral problem.¹³⁵ For instance, one anticipates the problem when only one side of the question is seen—its faults or advantages—and a decision is taken, based on this partial view. This attitude leads to biases. Moral decisions should be made after looking at as many sides of the question as possible; only then can one reach a fair decision.¹³⁶

The second feature of Vaz Ferreira's ethical stand is his attitude toward systems:

In general, the tendency to too much systematization in morality falsifies or restricts: all systems have led, and tend to lead, to exclusivist points of view...Now, these are systematizations that crystallize our spirit; the ones that deprive us from mobility, the plasticity characteristic of life, of intellectual and moral advancement. (137)

Take ethical reductionism--the simplification of moral problems in terms of some determined value or system we feel comfortable with--it is due to an inclination toward the advantages systematization offers.¹³⁸

When, in Lógica viva, Vaz Ferreira examines the fallacies of false systematization, he points to their nefarious effect in ethics:

Morality has been created until now by closed systems, each one condemned to take account of only one of the possible factors of conduct. A theory has decreed: "The only factor to take into account is empathy." Another, "No, the only factor to be taken into account is personal pleasure." Another still: "The only factor to take into account is collective utility." And Spencer has told us: "The factor to take into account is progress." And Guyau: "The factor to be taken into account is the expansion of life." In the meantime, all these factors and many others possess value; if we think, not by means of systems, but by ideas that should be taken into account--see how the subject has expanded!--we will understand that man on earth must take into account progress, expansion of life, personal pleasure, collective utility, etc., and still all the hypotheses, possibilities or hopes that relate to the unknown. Now, how can this be combined into a living morality? No one can present it formulated in numbers or letters; but whoever knows how to think that way, without formulas, is the one most likely to feel morality deepest in his soul. (139)

In Lógica viva Vaz Ferreira tells us we should think with thought rather than with words. In the few published fragments of Moral viva, he adds that we should feel with our instincts, with our intuitions of the good and the true, rather than with injunctions or moral systems.¹⁴⁰

This brings us to the third characteristic of Vaz Ferreira's ethics: his intuitionism. Taking a broad view of the moral phenomenon, Vaz Ferreira notes a multiplicity of definitions of right or good, of ethical conditions or systems.¹⁴¹ This reminds him to maintain a guarded and skeptical attitude toward moral problems. But here, in order to avoid systematic moral skepticism, or even ethical relativism, Vaz Ferreira adopts an intuitionist position by positing a moral sense.¹⁴² We know what is right or wrong, good or bad, by following our moral

intuition.

One must be aware that the ideal of man should be to feel, not only with reason, but by means of something more delicate still, by a kind of instinct, that which is good and true; we should, say make our souls be like a sensitive instrument that feels and reveals the good and the true, like a delicate receiver. (143)

The need for positing this moral sense lies in the character of moral judgements: they cannot be stated without exceptions because they are normative rather than factual.¹⁴⁴ Solutions to normative problems are of a different kind than solutions to factual ones. If factual problems admit of definite solutions, normative problems are questions of pros and cons, advantages and disadvantages, weighing and deciding, admitting possible outcomes, all related, all depending on what the agent perceives, feels, senses.¹⁴⁵ They might not be ideally perfect solutions.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, they are solutions that involve feelings, experience, intuition, the moral sense and an element of rationality.¹⁴⁷ That is, morality is reduced to psychology--another agreement with Spencer.¹⁴⁸ Otherwise, the alternative is skepticism.

Since there are several possible approaches to ethical problems, Vaz Ferreira posits a plurality of moral foundations, all legitimate and all equally suited to human affairs.¹⁴⁹ In the realm of facts we search for non-contradiction. In the realm of values, ideals clash. And there is no guarantee that the ideals we choose will never contradict those already adopted.¹⁵⁰ This is a conflictual morality, one of incompatible ideals and opposing principles. It is here that moral progress lies: adding more and different kinds of ideals to what we already have, increasing in kind and in number, broadening our choices and sharpening our moral sensitivity.¹⁵¹

B. In the light of the above discussion, let us examine Vaz Ferreira's criticisms against particular moral systems, against the religious, the metaphysical and the positive.¹⁵² In varying degrees and for a variety of reasons, he feels these systems are incapable of expressing a living morality.¹⁵³ Criticizing the morality encouraged by organized religion, he points to the contradictions and immoralities of the doctrines and their deplorable effects on the moral sentiment. In the simpler minds the effect of this kind of morality is, at best, innocuous. To the more complex minds, to the intellectuals, religion tends to confuse rather than to clarify morality, and there is the danger that morality be altogether stifled.¹⁵⁴

Metaphysical systems of morals are those that base themselves on abstract concepts, devoid of experience and discoverable only by the mind. They are constructed as seemingly solid edifices, with magnificent but illusory foundations.¹⁵⁵ Their columns, to use Vaz Ferreira's metaphor, are held by the structures they purport to hold.¹⁵⁶ There is an apparent clarity, a deception, due to the paralogism of false precision. Morals having a metaphysical foundation, like Kant's, are too rigorous, too demanding, too harsh.¹⁵⁷ The solutions to the problems of conduct these systems offer seem clear and brilliant, but this is because the problems are unreal. They have been cut off from life—they are pseudo-problems.¹⁵⁸ Take duty as a sign of morality: though it is not devoid of experience it is as dangerous to morality as a satisfied conscience. In fact, a quiet conscience should be a sign of moral inferiority, for nothing is more dangerous than a man who has tamed his conscience. There is no worse judge than a bought one.¹⁵⁹ So is the sign of satisfaction

derived from the fulfillment of duty. The good man, the moral man, feels, suffers, worries about the harm, the evil he might have committed in spite of having done his duty.¹⁶⁰ This is based on an error common to most ethical systems: the belief that moral choices are to be made between good and bad alternatives. The truth is that when facing moral choice, the alternatives can all be equally good or equally bad. Moreover, good actions can result in bad consequences, or harm instead of good.¹⁶¹ This is closer to real life; hence, the suffering and remorse of the good man.¹⁶²

Ethical systems based on metaphysics misunderstand, not only the general character of moral choice, but moral life as well. Vaz Ferreira does not intend to deny the rational character of moral issues.¹⁶³ His stress lies in the feeling aspect, the moral sense to which we must ultimately appeal. Metaphysics, in Vaz Ferreira's sense, has an important role to play in morality. It is to offer suggestions, to enlarge the moral landscape with a vision of possibilities, not to clutter it with theories and definitions.¹⁶⁴

Vaz Ferreira is more sympathetic toward positive systems: systems whose base is primarily naturalistic, such as Spencer's, Guyau's and, of course, Mill's. Of these systems, Vaz Ferreira claims, much will be left: the role of pleasure, the expansion of life and so on. But they must be broadened, allow for more ideals, rather than be narrowed down in number.¹⁶⁵ The error of positivist ethics, he argues, is not being more positive: Positivists have taken what is positive, what is known, and closed the system, eliminating the possibility of adding elements other than those already at hand. Consequently, the solution to these problems

becomes narrow and false.¹⁶⁶ What should be done is to leave the problem open, to give approximations only, not final answers.

The diverse moral systems have fallen into an error similar to the one people would fall into when they propose to construct a perfect building, incorruptible and eternal. Departing from that conception, any real building would be, afterwards, incomplete and faulty; it would not be "the edifice." Very well, all systems have done something similar when they pretend to lay the foundation of morality: Morality, capitalized; that is, a morality that would be perfect, that would have no room for conflict, for any doubt, for any objection or any difficulty; it would never be either doubtful or uncertain, or incomplete: And then our architects would say "There is a way our structure has this perfect character and incorruptibility: by hanging it from the heavens." That is true; but very important; if anyone believed to have seen it, it was a mirage (167)

Utilitarianism, for Vaz Ferreira, is one of the better kinds of positivism—a view opposite to Rodo's.¹⁶⁸ There is reliance on experiential principles, on formulations that, as in Mill's logic, concentrate prevision and aid us in situations where the consequences cannot be determined or that are practically unforeseeable. Principles are—in another Vaz Ferreirian imagery—thoughts on credit, actions that will create a favorable balance in the future. Morality, as a normative discipline, is a collection of principles; good morality is a collection of good principles. Nevertheless, there are principles that have false or bad or undeterminable consequences. So, ultimately, even this utilitarian morality must rely on the individual's moral perfection, moral sensibility or moral sense. The appreciation of acts or principles

...should not be made with the narrow criterion of empiricism, but with a complete criterion: not only being based in the directly previsible consequences of the case, but encompassing all the unforeseeable consequences in a concrete manner, but unforeseeable in value and direction (moral sign), for which intuition of experience and sentiment are needed. And then, what happens is that ethics in that improved state cannot be formulated ad docendum, nor be transmitted with pragmatic efficacy. But when principles dissolve in that way for a spirit, theoretically the spirit has overcome the principles, and practically because the spirit does not need them

now. (169)

C. There are difficulties with Vaz Ferreira's views. One is that he does little to clarify practical problems.¹⁷⁰ Take a man who feels a moral conflict: He might be torn between competing alternatives and uncertain about the course of action to follow. To be told that he subscribes to a conflicting morality is of no help; he knows that. His perception of competing choices tells him that the moral principles he subscribes to are in conflict. To be told that there is a plurality of moral foundations, all legitimate, is of limited help if what he wants to know is which alternative is best, or which morality he should commit himself to. Moral decisions mean examining pros and cons, weighing the alternatives, assessing. All this is done with some standards in mind, and with a commitment to some view of what is good or bad, right or wrong. Being able to commit oneself to a view or a standard is a necessary condition for being able to solve the problem. A moral conflict is solved by reaching a decision that sometimes implies reassessment and reevaluation of these standards. Clashes of ideals, plurality of moral foundations and the impossibility of giving ideally perfect solutions to moral problems are difficulties we all have to face. They are also difficulties we all have to overcome. If not, clarification is tantamount to knowing that moral problems are insoluble in practice.

The problem with Vaz Ferreira's attitude toward morality is that it tends to lay the groundwork for moral skepticism: Can we be assured of making a morally correct choice? No--our actions can be immoral given different points of view or different ethical commitments. Can we at least be assured that our actions will not cause any harm? Again, the

answer is no—evil can result from the best of actions. Can we ever know, with any degree of certainty, that something is moral? The answer, for a third time, is no. The possibility that our actions might not be moral always looms in the background. The more we examine a situation, the greater the number of alternatives and the less certain we are of our righteousness. This is a guarded skepticism with respect to morality. Vaz Ferreira feels this kind of skepticism is beneficial since it will never lead us to rash or dogmatic actions; it will tend to soften actions.¹⁷¹ After all, morality is not a set of rules, but a state of mind.¹⁷² Yet, this skepticism has a serious setback: It does not help reach decisions on the practical level--the realm of life Moral viva would have aimed at--leaving the individual who seeks advice, directionless.¹⁷³ And, it makes clarification of moral problems worthless because of the impossibility of moral solutions.

The question remains, how can we distinguish the good from the bad? If Vaz Ferreira were to remain a skeptic, the answer would be that we cannot, but he does not want to be so radical. Skepticism denies the facts: not only can we distinguish good from bad, right from wrong, but we can even trace a moral progress in history. Hence, his intuitionism: If we can distinguish what we cannot reason out, we must have a faculty or sense that enables us to do so. This moral sense would, as in his logic, provide a mechanism that helps us do the distinguishing. This sense is a fact that needs no explanation, a psychological given. Yet, this moral intuitionism is, like his logical sense, a refusal to give moral justification, and in this case, the exclusion of any form of moral reasoning; it makes morality inexplicable.¹⁷⁴

There is something wrong here. The moral sense, if developed, would tell us what to do; but we must also think, deliberate, wrestle with moral problems and worry about our choices. Now, if we exercise our moral intuition correctly, why the self-flagellation? If all this questioning is part of morality--if all this doubting is necessary--how accurate can our moral sense be? There is no way of telling unless we can come up with some way of judging the accuracy of this sense. And here Vaz Ferreira is in difficult straits, for the alternative open in epistemology--a criterion for correctness--is missing from ethics. Why? Because by his own admission, morality is conflictual and its problems questions of judging, weighing pros and cons, etc.; they do not admit of hard and fast rules, and there is always the possibility of error. Asserting a moral sense or intuition means taking back a great deal of what he has so carefully outlined, and this is a heavy price.

Another reason why Vaz Ferreira is committed to intuitionism is because of his attitude against systems. Here Spencer's influence is obvious. Spencer classifies ethics in two categories: Absolute and Relative.¹⁷⁵ The first deals with the general principles that make it a system; the second applies these principles to particular problems. In rejecting systems, Vaz Ferreira rejects Spencer's absolute ethics. Yet, he accepts the second--an ethics that though fragmentary, is empirical, a relative ethics without the advantages or burdens of an absolute one. The result is casuistry.¹⁷⁶ It constantly fails to draw conclusions, advocates anguish, impartiality, seeing all sides of the issue, and so on. Nothing of systems or overarching principles that falsify the nature of morality. Meaning? That morality is not a question of rules, but of

feelings, of a moral sense: a psychological question.¹⁷⁷ To create a morality means to strengthen the moral feelings.¹⁷⁸ The task of the moral philosopher is not to formulate coherent systems or clear away inconsistencies in the rules, but to help strengthen the moral sense.¹⁷⁹ His attitude against moral systems is, in short, that they are by-products rather than the source of morality. For this source we must turn to the psychological. Seen from this perspective, moral judgements are, for Vaz Ferreira as for Spencer, ultimately psychological in nature.

This means that Vaz Ferreira is caught between a Spencerian psychological reductionism and his own insights into the nature of morality; insights that are powerful reasons against Spencer's view. Moral judgements are either psychological facts, or they are assessments, decisions, normative problems and so on: questions of fact or questions of value. They cannot be both. If they are questions of fact, it doesn't make sense to constantly question their morality or worry about the fairness of decisions, etc. If they are questions of values, the moral sense is totally out of place. The rejection of an Absolute Ethics must be followed by a rejection of psychological reductionism. Otherwise, Vaz Ferreira is inconsistent in holding on to a view of morality as intuitional, but conflictual and subject to critical examination.

There is an alternative open to Vaz Ferreira that avoids both this inconsistency and his intuitionism: If, instead of arguing for a moral sense, he argues for moral sensibility. Whereas a moral sense, intuition or faculty is a psychological mechanism by means of which we "see" what is right and what is wrong, a moral sensibility is a disposition to react in any of a number of ways to problems of a moral nature. If the

first is an attempt to reduce morality to psychology, a left-over from Spencer, the second leaves morality in the realm of actions, decisions and arguments. Moral sensibility means a tendency to think carefully about what is right and wrong, have concern about the outcome of one's actions, weight the opinion of others, not to act rashly, or soften action. It is a result of experience and is not necessarily part of any particular form of morality. These are characteristics that distinguish Vaz Ferreira from intuitionists like Moore, Pritchard or Ross, in whom these kinds of moral self-examination would be out of place.¹⁸⁰ What is the price? It makes Vaz Ferreira's effort only an inquiry into some of the conditions of morality rather than an ethics, or it makes him an ethical relativist, or at worst, an ethical skeptic--positions to which he might not be averse.

This interpretation is consistent with Vaz Ferreira's actions. Take the case of a man who feels a moral conflict. Assuming Vaz Ferreira to be an intuitionist, we might expect the following argument: Examine your feelings, your moral sense or your intuition, and then you will know how to solve the conflict. But Vaz Ferreira does much more than that: He studies the issues; outlines the alternatives; investigates the outcomes; and so on. He also reminds us that there will be both good and bad consequences and that sometimes we must choose the lesser of two evils. The conflicts chosen usually exhibit inconsistencies between a general morality and its particular applications; for instance between the demand for honesty and a lawyer's professional "ethics" that demands twisting the truth, defending an individual who has confessed to a crime, plea bargaining, and other kinds of behavior

that under normal circumstances would be deemed immoral.¹⁸¹ Given these conflicts, Vaz Ferreira advises, directs, persuades, moralizes, advocates a particular point of view and so on.¹⁸² This is hardly intuitionism—or ethical relativism—but it does not seem to be morality either, because missing are some general rules of action, general principles defining the conceptions of the right and the good.

Actually, Vaz Ferreira is caught between conflicting claims. He argues for a practical ethics, but believes in a plurality of moral foundations, a relativism that prevents the solution of several conflicts. He wants to clarify moral problems, yet the constant possibility of error forces him to an ethical skepticism. He wants a non-systematic ethics that allows for weighing, deciding, suffering, but posits an intuitionism that makes all these activities unnecessary.

Vaz Ferreira is inconsistent. He wavers between relativism and intuitionism, and ends in skepticism. He has to choose between these two alternatives, or reformulate the problem and start all over again.¹⁸³ Otherwise, he has no ethics. His skepticism becomes too much doubting, too much questioning, and inhibits action. The result is that few of the goals of the "moral viva" are achieved.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

¹Francisco Romero, "Tendencias contemporaneas en el pensamiento hispanoamericano," in Zea, Antología, p. 50.

²Cornelius Krusé, "Personalism in Latin America," Philosophical Forum 20 (1962-63):65. Zum Felde sees Vaz Ferreira's position as half-way between positivist intellectualism and Bergsonian intuitionism, somewhat closer to the first; Proceso, 3:52. To Aníbal del Campo, Vaz Ferreira is an empiricist, or positivist intellectualist; El problema de la creencia y el intelectualismo de Vaz Ferreira, (Montevideo: Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, Universidad de la República, 1959), p. 8, 11, 18, 20, 37, 39-40. I. L. Horowitz considers Vaz Ferreira a mind that never "escaped the hold of nineteenth century modes of European thought. In his book On the Ownership of Land, this traditionalist mold is most pronounced;" "Carlos Vaz Ferreira: A Review of his Collected Works," Hispanic American Historical Review 40 (1960):63-64. This is an unfair criticism particularly when Sobre la propiedad de la tierra was first published in 1918. See also Crawford, A Century, p. 90-94, and Ivo Höllhuber, Geschichte der Philosophie im Spanischen Kulturbereich, (Munich: Ernst Reinhardt, 1967), p. 282-84.

³In the Diccionario de la filosofía, Vaz Ferreira is classified as a neo-positivist, while Arias argues he is not; Vaz Ferreira, p. 52-3.

⁴Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 51; Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 99; Jesualdo, Vaz Ferreira, p. 15, 33.

⁵"Si por 'positivismo' se entiende no tomar por ciertos sino los hechos comprobados como tales; si por positivismo se entendiera graduar la creencia, tener por cierto solamente lo cierto, por dudoso lo dudoso, por probable o por posible, lo probable o posible; si por 'positivismo' se entiende, todavía, saber distinguir, discernir lo que conocemos bien de lo que no conocemos bien; si positivismo quiere decir sentir admiración y amor por la ciencia pura, sin hacer, en su nombre, exclusiones, entonces el positivismo es posición buena y recomendable. Pero por positivismo se ha entendido también la limitación sistemática del conocimiento humano a la sola ciencia: prohibición de salir de sus límites cerrados; prohibir al espíritu humano la especulación, la meditación y el psiqueo afectivo, a propósito de problemas ajenos a lo mensurable, a lo accesible a los sentidos. Entonces el positivismo, así entendido, es doctrina o tendencia en sí misma inferior, y funesta en sus efectos." Carlos Vaz Ferreira, "Sobre la enseñanza de la filosofía," (1952), in

Obras, Homenaje de la Cámara de Representantes de la República Oriental del Uruguay, 25 vols., (Montevideo: Cámara de Representantes, 1957-63), 22:164-65. For the neologism "psiqueo," see below p. 115.

⁶But see Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, Biblioteca Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1962), p. 39-40.

⁷Carlos Vaz Ferreira, "Reacciones," Fermentario, Biblioteca Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1962), P. 109.

⁸Ibid., p. 109

⁹Vaz Ferreira, "Oposiciones extrínsecas e intrínsecas," Fermentario, p. 50-52; translated in Aníbal Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary Latin-American Philosophy, W. R. Trask, trans., (Albuquerque, New Mexico: University of New Mexico Press, 1954), p. 128.

¹⁰"... Quién está más encerrado: un humilde preso en una celda estrecha pero con vista al campo, al mar, al cielo, a los horizontes ilimitados, o el Papa en su palacio vasto, rico, pero que acaba en un muro?

Por lo menos es indudable que esta última situación favorece la tendencia a creerse infalible." Vaz Ferreira, "Reacciones," Fermentario, p. 108.

¹¹"When I was a student, for instance, our aim, when presenting other theories, or in discussing whatever questions, was simply to present Spencer's doctrines...And one could not conceive, not just another way of thinking, but not even another way of presenting the problem."

"Cuando yo era estudiante, por ejemplo, nuestro designio al exponer otras teorías, al discutir cualquier cuestión, era simplemente preparar la exposición de las doctrinas de Spencer...Y no se concebía, no ya otra manera de pensar, sino ni siquiera otra manera de exponer una cuestión." Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Lecciones sobre pedagogía y cuestiones de enseñanza, (1918), Obras, 14:138-39.

¹²Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Curso expositivo de psicología experimental, (1897), Obras, 25:199-201.

¹³Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 49. Compare with the criticisms against Vazquez y Vega in Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 147.

¹⁴"Si Stuart Mill hubiera llegado a conocer el pragmatismo actual, si lo hubiera criticado--como él criticaba, con su inteligencia y con su sentimiento--hubiera hecho de esta doctrina una crítica de la cual, estoy seguro, dará una idea esta mía, como puede darla de una obra maes-

tra un imperfecto aunque sincero esbozo." Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Conocimiento y acción, (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1920), p. 172. Compare to William James dedication of Pragmatism, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1916), p. v.

¹⁵"Se ha dicho de él que tenía 'temperamento de discípulo.' Es injusto: La tendencia a pensar a propósito del pensamiento de otro, puede ser una modalidad del espíritu, frecuente en las inteligencias analíticas o críticas, y hasta resultar de cierta noble modestia; o puede elegirse esa manera como una de tantas para exponer el propio pensamiento." Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 114.

¹⁶Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:57-58.

¹⁷Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 54; "Magisterio," p. 70

¹⁸Arturo Ardao, "Homenaje a Vaz Ferreira," speech given in honor of Vaz Ferreira at the Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, Universidad de Montevideo, 1952; in Ardao, Introducción a Vaz Ferreira, p. 13. Also Carlos Sabat Ercasty, "Retratos del fuego: Carlos Vaz Ferreira;" speech dedicating Vaz Ferreira's bust at the Ateneo de Montevideo, August 1958, (Montevideo: Imprenta Norte, 1958).

¹⁹Solomon Lipp, "Vaz Ferreira: In Memoriam," Philosophical Forum 16 (1958-59):21.

²⁰Carlos Vaz Ferreira, La enseñanza de la filosofía, (1897), Obras, 25:75-94.

²¹Ardao, "Magisterio," p. 58-60. For a similar attitude in Rodó, see "La despedida de Gorgias," Movivos de Proteo, in Obras, p. 463.

²²Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 68.

²³Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:58.

²⁴Vaz Ferreira, Curso expositivo, Obras, 25:200.

²⁵Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 60. Horowitz, "Vaz Ferreira," p. 64.

²⁶Compare with Francisco Antonio Berra, "El programa de filosofía," in Ardao, Espiritualismo y positivismo, p. 174-5.

²⁷Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 70.

²⁸For instance, Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Sobre Feminismo, Biblioteca

Filosófica, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1945). Jesualdo and Pedro Ceruti Crosa feel Vaz Ferreira's methods are not sufficiently sincere to solve social problems. See Pedro Ceruti Crosa, Crítica de Vaz Ferreira, (Montevideo: Ediciones Pueblos Unidos, 1946).

²⁹Ardao, "Homenaje," p. 11. Jesualdo, Vaz Ferreira, p. 94.

³⁰In this sense Vaz Ferreira is not an "intellectualist" as Aníbal del Campo makes him out; El problema de la creencia y el intelectualismo de Vaz Ferreira, (Montevideo: Instituto de Filosofía, Universidad de la Republica, Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias, 1959).

³¹Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, Biblioteca Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1962), p. 182-86.

³²Vaz Ferreira, "Razón y experiencia," Fermentario, p. 48-50; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 125-26.

³³"La humanidad, por el razonamiento aprende poco. Pero, por la experiencia, no aprende nada." Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 123.

³⁴Vaz Ferreira, "Sobre 'eclecticismo,'" Lógica viva, p. 267-68; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 130-31.

³⁵Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo de actualidad," Lógica viva, p. 274-76. See also Leon April, "La 'lógica viva' de Vaz Ferreira," Revista Hispánica Moderna 11 (1945):235-36.

³⁶Vaz Ferreira, "Para buscar la verdad," and "Sobre sistemas," Lógica viva, p. 268-70.

³⁷Vaz Ferreira, "Enseñar a vacilar," Fermentario, p. 81.

³⁸"...el método que he seguido, método principalmente expositivo, estrictamente imparcial, que concede un lugar a todas las teorías importantes, aún a riesgo de dejar gran número de cuestiones sin solución definitiva, podría prestarse a una objeción: ese método, se dirá quizá, debe conducir forzosamente a la duda y al escepticismo...esa duda que se teme es precisamente un bien, y no un mal, porque es el estado de espíritu más legítimo, y también más fecundo, cuando lo que se examina son, simplemente interpretaciones más o menos inseguras y teorías más o menos verosímiles." Vaz Ferreira, Curso expositivo, Obras, 25:199.

³⁹"El buen escepticismo no inhibe la acción: la suaviza," Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo de actualidad," Lógica viva, p. 290; author's italics. See also Conocimiento y acción, p. 7. Del Campo ignores this distinction and makes Vaz Ferreira a skeptic, Vaz Ferreira, p. 26-31.

⁴⁰Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 282. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 60, 101.

⁴¹Vaz Ferreira, "Ciencia y metafísica," Fermentario, p. 81.

⁴²Vaz Ferreira, "El mundo del arte y el mundo de la ciencia," Ibid., p. 67-68. This statement echoes the positivist confusion between facts and values.

⁴³Vaz Ferreira, "Ciencia y metafísica," Ibid., p. 82; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 136.

⁴⁴"Cuando una ciencia de hechos más complejos, o de un orden más elevado (o simplemente de hechos de otra calidad), se presenta imitando a otra ciencia de lo menos complejo, o pretendiendo explicar todo por ella, se puede afirmar a priori que aún no esta bien hecha, o que aún no esta hecha; y, de una explicación de ese carácter, que no es verdadera, (totalmente al menos)." Vaz Ferreira, "Relación (en cuanto al método) de ciencias de lo más complejo con ciencias de lo más simple," Fermentario, p. 72. This criticism is aimed as much to Spencer's reductionism as it is to Comte's hierarchy of the sciences.

⁴⁵"No es que, como para Comte o para Spenser, la filosofía siga siendo en su naturaleza íntima ciencia positiva; es que la ciencia positiva en su naturaleza íntima es ya filosofía, o sea metafísica." Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 53.

⁴⁶For instance, Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics, T. E. Hulme, trans., (New York: G. Putnam and Sons, 1912), p. 7.

⁴⁷Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 125.

⁴⁸"Cada vez los sabios profundizan y generalizan más, y su ciencia, al disolverse en metafísica, pasa por una especie de punto crítico, en que el conocimiento toma un aspecto excepcionalmente turbio y ambiguo; y pensamos que mucha filosofía vale, en todo caso, más que la poca filosofía, para clarificar esas vastas generalizaciones (a veces, por lo demás, dignas de la más legítima admiración), de los modernos matemáticos, de los mecánicos, de los biólogos." Vaz Ferreira, "Ciencia y metafísica," Fermentario, p. 83.

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 82; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 137. See also Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Transcendentalizaciones matemáticas ilegítimas, (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Filosofía de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 1940), reprinted in Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Estudios Filosóficos, (Antología), Colección Ensayistas Hispánicos, (Buenos Aires: Aguilar, 1961), p. 245. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 199-200.

⁵⁰But see Max Black, The Labyrinth of Language, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1972), p. 10-11.

⁵¹Vaz Ferreira, "Un libro futuro," Fermentario, p. 85-87; reprinted with additional comments in Lógica viva, p. 140-45.

⁵²"El pensamiento, al cristalizar, puede ganar (claridad, justeza, cumplimiento, aplicación...) y puede perder (espontaneidad, sinceridad, vida e interés, fecundidad...); y muchas veces, al mismo tiempo gana y pierde. Concluir que sería siempre preferible el fermento al producto elaborado, fuera exagerar y falsear. Pero en verdad lo preferible sería que el público conociera a veces el pensamiento en los dos estados..." Vaz Ferreira, Preface, Fermentario, p. 17.

⁵³Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 201; Lógica viva, p. 140. Also D. F. Pears, ed., The Nature of Metaphysics, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 23-38.

⁵⁴Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo," Lógica viva, p. 274.

⁵⁵Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 103.

⁵⁶Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 267-68; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 131-32.

⁵⁷Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 109-110.

⁵⁸Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), p. 44-45.

⁵⁹Any similarity with Spencer's symbolic conception is superficial: As we generalize our concepts increase in vagueness. For Spencer, the eventual result are unknowables. For Vaz Ferreira, "pisqueos," pure thoughts, more knowable and direct than anything else we can experience.

⁶⁰Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 122-24.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 21.

⁶²These fallacies are absent from Book V of Mill's System of Logic, an error Vaz Ferreira tries to correct in Lógica viva.

⁶³Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 38-40.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 50. See also Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 109-10.

⁶⁵ Vaz Ferreira, Logica viva, p. 55. "The sciences can only win by adopting ample, complete points of view, and by eliminating false opposition and any other paralogisms. Philosophy also wins, when the expansion of the spirit and the lack of narrow-mindedness inhibits certain systems, that would be bad..."

"Las ciencias sólo tienen que ganar con los puntos de vista amplios y completos y con la eliminación de la falsa oposición, como de todos los paralogismos. La filosofía también, aun cuando la ampliación del espíritu y la falta de estrechez mental pudieran inhibir algunos sistemas, que serían sistemas malos..." Ibid., p. 56.

⁶⁶ Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 101-02; Transcendentalizaciones, p. 259. Also Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 117.

⁶⁷ Vaz Ferreira notes the parallel to Bacon's Idols of the Tribe, to the tendency to find too much symmetry in human knowledge; Lógica viva, p. 105.

⁶⁸ Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 101. So is Berra's Spencerian pedagogy; Ibid., p. 103.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 111.

⁷⁰ Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 117.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 120. Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 129.

⁷² Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 132, 134, 136.

⁷³ Ibid., p. 133-34.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 101, 151.

⁷⁵ Vaz Ferreira assumes we can recognize false opposition, that it is somehow obvious. But if it is obvious, why then is it such a common and dangerous fallacy?

⁷⁶ Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 15.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 198-200.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 144. April, "'Lógica viva,'" p. 235.

⁷⁹ Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 151-53. Vaz Ferreira is ambiguous

here. On p. 152, he cites (a) and (c); on p. 153, (b) is introduced without explanation.

⁸⁰Conditions (a) and (b) seem to be necessary but not sufficient: "...though having all the facts and principles, still we might be incapable of integrating them, be it because of the very nature of the facts and principles, or of one or the other, or because of the inability of human reason in general, or because of our own inability."

"...en posesión de todos los datos y principios, podríamos ser incapaces de integrarlos, sea por la naturaleza misma de los hechos y principios, o de unos o de otros, o por la impotencia de la razón humana general, o por la impotencia especial de la nuestra." Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 152.

⁸¹Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo de actualidad," Lógica viva, p. 274.

⁸²Ibid., p. 116.

⁸³Ibid., p. 117. Mill, System of Logic, II, vii, 5.

⁸⁴Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 118-19.

⁸⁵Mill, System of Logic, II, vii, 5; Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, 117.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 121.

⁸⁷"La metafísica ha cometido el error de querer ser precisa, de querer ser geométrica planteando cuestiones y estableciendo fórmulas verbales afectadas casi universalmente de falsa precisión y de inadecuación, como lo están no sólo las demostraciones metafísicas, sino generalmente sus mismos problemas." Ibid., p. 125.

⁸⁸"La metafísica es legítima; más que legítima: constituye y constituirá siempre la más elevada forma de la actividad del pensamiento humano, mientras no pretenda tener el aspecto geométrico y falsamente preciso que ha pretendido dársele, la metafísica es simplemente la ilustración típica, por una parte, del sofisma de falsa precisión que ya hemos estudiado, y por otra, de estas falacias verbo-ideológicas." Ibid, p. 125.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 64, 274; Transcendentalizaciones, p. 265; Conocimiento y acción, p. 132-35.

⁹⁰Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 277.

⁹¹ Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 202.

⁹² Vaz Ferreira, Transcendentalizaciones, p. 248.

⁹³ For instance, relativity theory, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and non-Aristotelean logic. Ibid., p. 246. These are probably transitory technical difficulties or incongruencies that become metaphysical difficulties or incongruencies. See also C. Villalobos Dominiguez, "Los pareceres de Vaz Ferreira sobre el Georgismo," Nosotros [Buenos Aires] 4 (1939):95.

⁹⁴ Vaz Ferreira, Logica viva, p. 125.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 15. Lógica viva is a compilation of university lecture notes from a course taught in 1909. The Lógica elemental or Enseñanza de la filosofía, of 1897, have very little to do with this approach. Vaz Ferreira's first thoughts along this line appeared in Los problemas de la libertad, (Montevideo: El Siglo Ilustrado, 1907), p. 67-70, and in Conocimiento y acción, passim; that is, from the years 1906 to 1909. See Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 57.

⁹⁶ Vaz Ferreira acknowledges the influence of the Spanish scholastic philosopher Jaime Balmes, particularly his El criterio, Biblioteca Mundial Sopena, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sopena, 1961). As for Mill, he probably read the French translation or synthesis of the System of Logic. See Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 135-39.

⁹⁷ John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 2nd ed., (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1865), p. 387-91.

⁹⁸ Mill, System of Logic, V, i, 1. Also above, p. 27-28.

⁹⁹ Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s. v., "Laws of Thought," by S. Korner. Also Hoffding, History, 2:414. Hoffding's History is an appropriate source since Vaz Ferreira himself recommends it; Moral para intelectuales, p. 30; Conocimiento y acción, p. 68.

¹⁰⁰ Lipp, "Vaz Ferreira," p. 22-23. Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:57.

¹⁰¹ Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 101-02.

¹⁰² Mill, System of Logic, V, i, 1. Hoffding, History, 2:407. Arias feels Mill's work is primarily geared toward the classification of fallacies; Vaz Ferreira, p. 105. See also Santiago José Fontana, Algunas Falacias, (Montevideo: Editorial Renacimiento de L. y M. Pérez, 1923).

¹⁰³Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 144, 155. Also Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 105, and Francisco Romero, "Carlos Vaz Ferreira en su 'Fermentario,'" Hombre y cultura, Colección Austral, (Buenos Aires: Espasa-Calpe, 1950), p. 83.

¹⁰⁴Mill, System of Logic, II, ii, 1. Also Kneale and Kneale, Development of Logic, p. 375.

¹⁰⁵Mill, System of Logic, V, i, 1-3.

¹⁰⁶Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo de actualidad," Lógica viva, p. 275-76.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁰⁸Vaz Ferreira, "Un libro futuro," Fermentario, p. 86-87.

¹⁰⁹Vaz Ferreira, "Falacias verbo-ideológicas," Lógica viva, p. 116-17.

¹¹⁰Vaz Ferreira, "Un libro futuro," Fermentario, p. 87.

¹¹¹Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 15. The Losada edition has a number of appendices with examples of common error for use in the classroom.

¹¹²"...la confusión real, la confusión psicológica, no es igual que la que obtenemos nosotros por el análisis reflexivo del significado de las frases; la confusión psicológica no se superpone a la confusión lógica; la confusión de hecho no es generalmente la confusión en que se incurriría si, perdonese me la paradoja, confundiéramos, como sería razonable hacerlo." Vaz Ferreira, Los problemas de la libertad, p. 69-70.

¹¹³Edmont Goblot, "Carlos Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva," Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, [Paris] 96 (1923):455

¹¹⁴The term "psycho-logic" is synonymous with "living logic." Vaz Ferreira, "La lógica y la psicológica en las discusiones, etc.," Lógica viva, p. 155-68.

¹¹⁵Ardao, "Magisterio," p. 68

¹¹⁶Mill, System of Logic, III, xxi, 1.

117 Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 76-82, 196-200. For criticisms of Spencer, see above, p. 36-37.

118 Vaz Ferreira, "Un paralogismo de actualidad," Lógica viva, p. 282, and "Enseñar a vacilar," Fermentario, p. 81. Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:59.

119 Vaz Ferreira, Conocimiento y acción, p. 12-13.

120 Ibid., p. 12. Also Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 65, and Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 152.

121 Influenced by James and Bergson, by the vitalists and the intuitionists, Vaz Ferreira could have turned to irrationalism. Like Bergson, he asserted that reality cannot be known by means of concepts, and that language distorts our thinking. Like James, he asserted that one can acquire knowledge by means of the will or the emotions, in addition to reason. However, Vaz Ferreira maintained a rationalist position, a reasonable rationalism—one positing a reason with a conscience of its own limitations and difficulties. Predictably enough, he does not overrate reason, as classical rationalists did, nor under-rate it, as the pragmatists seem to have done. Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 64-65.

122 "...otra clase de buen sentido que está por arriba del raciocinio; sin duda, hay un buen sentido que es antilógico; pero hay también uno que podríamos llamar hiperlógico. Después que el espíritu sabe razonar y ver desde todos los puntos de vista, todavía hay un sentido, como una especie de instinto lógico, que guía, modera el raciocinio, que defiende contra él, si es el caso, y que es indispensable, porque en casi todos los problemas prácticos, en casi todas las cuestiones reales, hay problemas de grados; hay fórmulas que, verdaderas en cierto grado, van pasando después a ser falsas, siendo lo grave que no se sabe cuándo y en qué momento..." Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 157, author's italics.

123 Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 204-05.

124 "Cuando hemos visto y pesado por el raciocinio las razones en pro y las razones en contra que hay en casi todos los casos; cuando hemos hecho toda la lógica (la buena lógica) posible, cuando las cuestiones se vuelven de grado, llega un momento en que una especie de instinto—lo que llamo el buen instinto hiperlógico—es el que nos resuelve las cuestiones en los casos concretos. Y sería bueno que la lógica no privara a los hombres de esta forma de buen sentido." Ibid., p. 148.

125 "...el razonamiento es completado por el buen sentido hiper-

logico, controlador del raciocinio." Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 205, italics mine. In a footnote to the above sentence Vaz Ferreira expresses a dissatisfaction with the term "hyper-logical." He wants to find a term that can express the meaning of a "good sense, as far as it is not contrary to reasoning nor to good logic." ("...el buen sentido en cuanto no es contrario al raciocinio o a la buena lógica." Author's italics.) Not only is he dissatisfied with such neologisms as "hyper-logical," but also with "logical instinct," ("instinto lógico," Lógica viva, p. 203), or with "empirical instinct," ("instinto empírico," Ibid., p. 205) or even "good sense," with all its ambiguities, ("buen sentido," Moral para intelectuales, p. 157.)

¹²⁶See for instance, Bergson, Introduction, p. 7. This point can be supported by examining the characteristics Vaz Ferreira attributes to his "hyper-logical" instinct. It makes its "intervention after reasoning, or simultaneous with it," ("...venía a intervenir despues del raciocinio, simultaneamente con él..." Lógica viva, p. 203.) It also "comes out of generar experience, that is, like a summary and concentration of experience and points to us, more or less, and makes us feel, approximately what should be the most correct degree" of belief; ("...sale de la experiencia general, que es como un resumen y concentracion de la experiencia, y que nos indica mas o menos, que nos hace sentir aproximadamente cual debe ser aquel grado mas justo." Lógica viva, p. 204-05.) It is also compared with speculative or theoretical knowledge, "this good hyper-logical sense that is missing in the theoreticians of the species I am referring to;" ("...este buen sentido hiperlógico, que falta en los teóricos de la especie que me refiero," Moral para intelectuales, p. 157.)

¹²⁷Mill, System of Logic, Introduction, 4.

¹²⁸"En el cielo y en la tierra habrá muchas cosas que no estén en la filosofía de Horacio. Pero en bastantes filosofías hay bastantes cosas que no están ni en el cielo ni en la tierra." Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 102.

¹²⁹Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 190-204; also Fermentario, p. 33, 34, 35, 42, 44.

¹³⁰Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 153.

¹³¹Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 17, 62, 187. Also Jean Pérès, "Moral para intelectuales, par Carlos Vaz Ferreira," Revue de l'Amérique Latine [Paris] 1 (1922):366-67.

¹³²Ibid., p. 63.

¹³³Ibid., p. 56-60.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 204. Also Ardao, "Magisterio," p. 68.

¹³⁵ Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 270-71; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 132-33. Also in Lógica viva, p. 76-100.

¹³⁶ Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 192; Lógica viva, p. 273; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 135; Fermentario, p. 53.

¹³⁷ "En general, la tendencia a sistematizar demasiado en moral, falsea o estrecha; todos los sistemas han conducido y tienden a conducir a puntos de vista exclusivos... Ahora bien: son estas sistematizaciones las que nos cristalizan el espíritu; las que nos quitan la movilidad, la plasticidad que caracteriza la vida y la progresividad intelectual y moral." Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 190-91.

¹³⁸ Villegas, Panorama, p. 50; Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 123.

¹³⁹ "La Moral ha sido hecha hasta ahora por sistemas cerrados, cada uno de los cuales se ha condenado a no tener en cuenta más que uno solo de los factores posibles de la conducta. Una teoría ha decretado: "El único factor que hay que tener en cuenta, es la simpatía." Otra, "No, el único factor que hay que tener en cuenta, es el placer personal." Otra, todavía: "El único factor que hay que tener en cuenta, es la utilidad colectiva." Y nos ha dicho Spencer: "El factor que hay que tener en cuenta, es el progreso." Y Guyau: "El factor que hay que tener en cuenta, es la expansión de la vida." Entretanto, todos esos factores, y otros muchos más, tienen valor; y si pensamos, no por sistemas, sino por ideas a tener en cuenta—¡vean ahora cómo se nos agrandó nuestro asunto!—entenderemos que el hombre sobre la tierra tiene que tener en cuenta el progreso, la expansión de la vida, el placer personal, la utilidad colectiva, etc., y todavía todas las hipótesis, posibilidades o esperanzas que se relacionen con lo desconocido. Ahora, ¿cómo se combina esto en la moral viva? Nadie es capaz de presentárnoslo formulado con números o letras; pero quien sepa pensar así, aunque sin fórmulas, será quien tenga más probabilidad de que la moral le ahonde el alma." Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 148-49.

¹⁴⁰ Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 200; Fermentario, p. 33-46, sections footnoted "Para 'Moral viva.'"

¹⁴¹ Vaz Ferreira, ¿Cuál es el signo moral de la inquietud humana? Fermentario, p. 131; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 139.

¹⁴² Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 18, 181-82, 190, 200; Lógica viva, p. 148; Fermentario, p. 31, 42. According to Zum Felde, the intuitionism of Bergson overcame the voluntarism of James and the naturalism of Mill; Proceso, 3:62-63.

143. "Tengan presente que el ideal del hombre debe ser sentir, no ya sólo por el razonamiento, sino por algo más delicado aún, por una especie de instinto, lo bueno y lo verdadero; hacer, diremos, que nuestra alma sea como un aparato sensible, que sienta y revele lo bueno y lo verdadero como un delicado receptor." Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 200.

144. Ardao, Filosofía en el Uruguay, p. 74.

145. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 115.

146. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 191-92; Lógica viva, p. 79; "¿Cuál es el signo moral de la inquietud humana?" Fermentario p. 131-32; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 139-40. Compare with Spencer, Principles of Ethics, sec. 103, p. 265-68.

147. Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 33.

148. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 60.

149. Ibid., p. 203; Lógica viva, p. 148-49, above p. 134.

150. Vaz Ferreira, "Cuál es el signo moral de la inquietud humana?" Fermentario, p. 133; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 141. Also Ardao, "Magisterio," p. 70.

151. Vaz Ferreira, "Cuál es el signo moral de la inquietud humana?" Fermentario, p. 131; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 139. Horowitz, "Vaz Ferreira," p. 68.

152. Compare to Comte's three stages. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 194.

153. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 174.

154. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 195-200; Conocimiento y acción, p. 60-68.

155. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 200-201.

156. Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 10.

157. Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 181. The same criticism can be made of Rodó. Though he substituted an ethical aes-

thetics for Kant's deontological ethics, this, to Vaz Ferreira, also amounts to forcing living morality into a systematic framework.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 183.

¹⁵⁹ Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 38.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 38-42.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 42-44.

¹⁶² Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁶³ Ibid., p. 32-33.

¹⁶⁴ Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 201. Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 174.

¹⁶⁵ Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 201.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 202.

¹⁶⁷ "...los diversos sistemas de moral han caído en un error parecido al que podrían cometer hombres que se propusieran construir un edificio absolutamente perfecto, incorruptible y eterno. Partiendo de ese concepto, todo edificio real sería después incompleto y malo; no sería "el edificio." Pues bien: justamente todos los sistemas han hecho algo semejante, al pretender fundar la moral: la Moral, con mayúscula; esto es, una moral que sería perfecta, que no daría cabida a ningún conflicto ni a ninguna duda, a ninguna objeción ni a ninguna dificultad; que no sería nunca ni dudosa, ni incierta ni incompleta: "Y entonces, se dirían nuestros arquitectos; hay un modo de que el edificio tenga ese carácter perfecto e incorruptible; sería suspenderlo del cielo."--Efectivamente; pero es importante: si alguno creyó verlo, fue espejismo." Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 202; author's italics.

¹⁶⁸ Some of the difficulties of rule utilitarianism make Vaz Ferreira opt for act utilitarianism. The main difficulty resides in the concept "act." How broad should it be? If too broad, it has too many exceptions; if too narrow, casuistry is the result. Once a desired degree of generality is accepted, there remains the problem of determining its consequences. The value of the utilitarian approach is, as far as Vaz Ferreira is concerned, pedagogic. If one desires to go to the foundation of morality, one has to invoke a moral sense that will make the classification of acts, etc., unnecessary. Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 29-31.

169"..."esa aparición de cada acto no se hace con el criterio estrecho de los empíricos, sino con el criterio completo: no solamente a base de las consecuencias previsibles directamente en ese caso, sino comprendiendo todas las consecuencias imprevisibles en especie concreta, pero previsibles en valor y en dirección (signo moral), para lo cual se necesitan intuición de experiencia y sentimiento. Y entonces lo que ocurre es que la moral en ese estado superiorizado no puede ya formularse ad docendum, ni transmitirse con eficacia pragmática; pero cuando en un espíritu se disuelven de esa manera los principios, es, teóricamente, porque los sobrepasó, y, prácticamente, porque ya no les necesita." Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 31.

170 Jesualdo, Vaz Ferreira, p. 61-63, 87-93.

171 Vaz Ferreira, Lógica viva, p. 290

172 Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 190.

173 Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:64.

174 G. J. Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, New Studies in Ethics, (London: Macmillan, 1967), p. 14.

175 Above, p. 52.

176 Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 56, footnote 1.

177 Ibid., p. 60.

178 Ibid., p. 62

179 Ibid., p. 18.

180 Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, p. 7-8.

181 Vaz Ferreira, Moral para intelectuales, p. 51-52.

182 Warnock, Contemporary Moral Philosophy, p. 39-42.

183 Arias, Vaz Ferreira, p. 178-79.

CHAPTER V

THE REACTION AGAINST POSITIVISM IN ARGENTINA

José Ingenieros

Whereas Vaz Ferreira is a philosopher interested in science, José Ingenieros is a scientist influenced by philosophy. Like Vaz Ferreira, he reacts against positivism by adopting a strong anti-dogmatic stand and by seeking to reestablish the position and value of metaphysics. And perhaps a more thorough positivist in ethics than Vaz Ferreira, Ingenieros, who begins by assuming the possibility of reducing ethics to biology, eventually modifies this position with an idealism similar to that of Rodó.

1 Positivist influences: The extent of positivist commitments in Ingenieros is a complex problem. He is usually classified as a positivist.¹ His teachers are themselves exponents of Comte and Spencer, and to a large extent, his work falls within this category.² However, Ingenieros' commitments are surprisingly diverse. They range from a strict scientism to a demand that metaphysics be reinstated in the corpus of science, from an ethical naturalism and evolutionism to the adoption of an idealism combined with Marxism—views that are incompatible. The problem is that though Ingenieros starts as a positivist, he shifts positions, advocates a revision and finally abandons many of its tenets.³

Ingenieros is influenced by different kinds of positivism. He is

familiar, though dissatisfied with, the classical versions of Comte and Spencer.⁴ However, the bulk of his positivist ideas come from reading European contemporaries. Ingenieros is personally acquainted with such scientists as Thiobald Ribot and Felix Le Dantec.⁵ He is also an exponent of Wilhelm Ostwald's energetist doctrine, and the latter contributed a rather lengthy introduction to the German translation of the Principios.⁶ Like Ingenieros, Ribot, Le Dantec, Ostwald, even Ardigo, are scientists who became interested in psychological problems that involved them in examining critically the solutions offered by classical positivists--associationism, psychological atomism, even Wundt's psychophysical parallelism.⁷ The status of these scientists as full fledged positivists is, consequently, questionable.

The kind of positivism attributable to Ingenieros is essentially Spencerian. This commitment is revealed in a passage of the Principios de psicología of 1911:

One can point to many failures in the "first principles:" we can find quite a few contradictions in this [Spencer's] introduction--quite metaphysical--to "the Unknowable. The fundamental notions of the system stand, however, unchallenged: empirical experience determines knowledge, sensations are relative and constitute the basis for thought, reality is unique, every phenomenon depends on a rigorous determinism, the whole of reality evolves eternally. These concepts can be translated by stating that the unity of the real (monism) is continually transforming (evolutionism) due to natural causes (determinism). It seems that formulated this way, these will persist in every future philosophy that aspires not to be in contradiction with the results of experience. (8)

Other Spencerian influences are evident in his views on the primacy of scientific knowledge, the naturalistic base of ethics, and the non-transcendence of reality. Originally presented in the Principios, they remain unchanged in the Proposiciones.⁹ This should not be taken to be an unquestioned adherence; rather, it is a reaction to the attacks

against Spencerian positivism by reasserting its most probable scientific and philosophical conclusions.¹⁰ Ingenieros admits there are some difficulties; for instance, there are scholastic and theological residues in Spencer's system, as well as in the systems of Wundt, Ostwald and Fouillée, but eventually they will be cleared up as science progresses and our knowledge increases.¹¹

In spite of his optimistic assessment, it would be inaccurate to simply classify Ingenieros as a follower of Spencer. For one thing, his self-image is not that of a totally committed disciple. "The generation prior to mine has seen two fashions: the positivist and the mystical. My generation has experienced more particularly the second one. I didn't get to adopt the first, nor have I succumbed to the second."¹² And there are important doctrinal differences regarding, for instance, the nature of philosophy or the exclusion of metaphysics. For Comte or Spencer, philosophy begins with the most general scientific conclusions and seeks unified knowledge. Ribot adds that philosophy can never become a science, the former being "une tentative éternelle sur l'inconnu."¹³ Ingenieros not only posits the possibility, but asserts the actuality, of a scientific philosophy which is essentially metaphysical.¹⁴

A classical positivist tenet is that metaphysics must be eliminated. For Ingenieros this is not necessary, nor legitimate, since it is "convenient in every system to distinguish that which is observed from that which is imagined, the certain from the probable, the probable from the credible, experience from hypothesis—in a word, what is already science from what is still metaphysics."¹⁵ This paragraph, written in 1910, resembles Vaz Ferreira's stronger claim in Conocimiento

y acción, written in 1908:

Knowing what it is we should know, and with what degree of abstraction; believing when one should believe, and to the degree one should believe; to doubt when one should doubt, and to rank our agreements with that accuracy within our reach...knowledge of metaphysics is essential in order to be a true positivist in science... Science is solidified metaphysics. (16)

Like Vaz Ferreira, Ingenieros sees the exclusion of metaphysics from philosophy as one of the shortcomings of positivism.¹⁷ Like Rodó, Ingenieros sees positivism as a point of departure rather than an end, a cornerstone rather than a capstone, to be modified, improved, amended.

2 Philosophic Character: Ingenieros' philosophy has been portrayed as an evolutionary monism or naturalism.¹⁸ Ingenieros conceives the world as a unit, the result of reducing its features to physical and biological elements. This reality and its changes, he believes, can be explained adequately in terms of evolutionary laws.¹⁹ For Ingenieros, evolution is Spencerian in character and predicates change from the simple to the complex. This change occurs at the levels of function and structure of the ultimate reality, and in such manner that each stage can be explained in terms of the preceding one.²⁰ Consequently, Ingenieros postulates a structural and functional continuity from inanimate matter to life, to psyche and to consciousness.²¹

Given the above position, as well as Ingenieros' commitment to the validity of the scientific method, one can infer that he is an empiricist. This is confirmed in the opening paragraph of the Principios.

Knowledge of Reality, always relative and necessarily limited, is a natural result of Experience. It is relative to the imperfect structure of our instruments of experience (natural or artificial: the senses or the various technologies); it is limited to that part of Reality that can modify the equilibrium of those instruments. (22)

He also claims that "all the data of experience are empirical," that they are "called phenomena, [and] are coordinated in diverse groups corresponding to the aspects man distinguishes in reality."²³ He seems to be in agreement with the general epistemological framework of positivism: Our knowledge of Reality is phenomenal, any a priori claims being absurd.

The situation becomes confused when, because of his reductionism, behavioral criteria of mental functions are presented: Experience is the natural result of whatever transaction an organism carries out with the environment.²⁴ To claim that knowledge comes from experience means, in this case, that living beings interact with the environment—a process of excitation and reactions—producing certain modifications within the organism that seeks to adapt to its milieu. "The natural formation of experience, implied in the adaptive process of all living things to their environment, conditions the function of knowing, whose outcome is called Knowledge."²⁵

The problem is that Ingenieros confuses two different conceptions of experience, the psychological and the epistemological, a mistake that will emerge in his ethics, particularly with the conception of "ideals."²⁶ In the psychological interpretation, "experience," "knowledge," "thinking," and so on, are concepts either inferred from or equated with purely biological adaptative behavior. They represent functions that result from the evolution of living things. Even logic is a natural result of the conditions of adaptation of human species. Epistemologically, knowledge acquires validity by verification from an experience that is phenomenal. But even in their epistemological inter-

pretation, these concepts do not imply a thorough empiricism: Whereas some empiricists and all positivists are content with reducing reality to phenomenal elements, Ingenieros takes it one further step by reducing the phenomenal or psychic to physical and biological—to interactions between the organism and the environment. In this sense Ingenieros goes against the grain of the empiricist-positivist views of Mill and Spencer by substituting the former's psychological atomism or the latter's psychologism with a belief in experience as a function of organic environmental relations.²⁷

This reveals a severe shortcoming with Ingenieros as a philosopher. Though a careful and painstaking scientist, he seems to lack philosophical sophistication. In philosophy his style is to present broad, and at times brilliant, conceptions; in ethical and political writings he is acid and tendentious. His prose is straightforward and simple. Yet, he does not pay sufficient attention to the meanings of concepts; he neglects a careful analysis and ends up with inconsistencies and contradictions, such as the above. Zum Felde has accurately described him as a scientist doing philosophy.²⁸ In spite of this, there are redeeming features, such as unusual philosophic argumentation or refreshing new insights.

In presenting a problem Ingenieros often uses the genetic method: If we understand the development of a concept, a position, a school—if we know its genealogy—we can then discern its most important features and foresee future outcomes.²⁹ Consequently, he takes great pains to trace the historical development of whatever view he is interested in. Philosophical doctrines cannot be understood apart from

their historical, political, social or religious contexts. "There is nothing more fallacious than to judge the meaning of a philosophical doctrine or the work of a thinker while ignoring the intellectual medium in which he appears, the militant ends which he pursues, or the political interests which he serves."³⁰

The assumptions underlying the genetic method are, in fact, closer to Comte's views than to Spencer's. For Comte, knowing the past developments or tendencies helps predict the future outcomes.³¹ That is, knowledge has an historical base. Spencer denies the validity of historical inquiry. History, as antecedents to the event in question, provides incomplete evidence and presents nothing more than spatial or temporal contiguities; it is just unorganized facts.³² Only in the case of natural history can complete explanations be given, because this is history in cosmic proportions. As Mill appreciated, the genetic method is more than an inductive procedure, for it involves historical considerations.³³ And this method is not immune to fallaciously arriving at prescriptive principles from given historical data, as in the case of progress. Again, the similarity to Comte's view is important, particularly since a great deal of Ingenieros' non-scientific output is historical. Curiously enough, Vaz Ferreira, who is supposed to be an emancipated positivist, does not place equal weight on historical inquiry. Vaz Ferreira's criticism of history bears a close resemblance to Spencer's: Historical explanations are incomplete; history is falsely deterministic and the "great man" view erroneous.³⁴

Examining the history of philosophy, Ingenieros concludes "that the cause of today's sterility, backwardness and dogmatism lies in

an intentional vagueness and hypocrisy, or the adoption of a philosophical jargon that prevents communication. Ingenieros blames this obscurantism on the politically conservative philosophers who used and abused philosophy to justify rather than to change the prevailing ideas of their time.³⁵ These philosophers assented to a double truth: they spoke of universal truths, eternal and immutable, and then proceeded to make them subservient to theological "truths," to political dogmas or popular beliefs.

If the works of Kant would converge in Solutions to the General Questions of the Prolegomena, Critical Philosophy would be a model of logic and clarity. Unfortunately, Kant was as insistent in disguising the ideas convergent in the Solutions as in affirming afterwards the ideas most incompatible with them. His transcendental logicism could have been an error; his rehabilitation of metaphysics was a hypocrisy. (36)

Philosophers are blind to the socio-ethical consequences of their theories--Ingenieros raises an accusing finger--particularly when these consequences challenge social dogma. Their very attitude prevents the liberation of philosophy from dogmatism.³⁷ This is true of the classical philosophers like Galileo, Bacon, Hume, Descartes, Kant, Hegel and so on, "without excluding the most characteristic positivists, such as Comte and Spencer, certain scientific philosophers like Haeckel and Wundt, pragmatists like James, pseudo-idealists like Fouillée, etc."³⁸

This is a strong and rather unfair analysis of the history of philosophy. The immediate reaction is to reject it as polemical.³⁹ Perhaps his socialist militancy obscures the historical analysis.⁴⁰ More likely it is an unconscious emulation of Nietzsche.⁴¹ It embodies a half-truth about human nature--Kepler's or Descartes' cautiousness, Galileo's eventual submission to Church authorities, or even Hegel's

or Boutroux's roles as official philosophers--and a profound historical error.⁴² Ingenieros is judging these philosophers from a privileged position and with a hindsight they did not have. Just because they adopted convictions different from ours and defended themselves with philosophic arguments with which we do not agree, we cannot call their views illegitimate.⁴³ Moreover, Ingenieros is inconsistent with his own statement of the genetic method, for he has chosen to ignore "the intellectual medium" and substitute his own vantage point.⁴⁴

The second reason for backwardness, according to Ingenieros, is the use and abuse of philosophical jargon. Philosophical language is unnecessarily complicated by vague, ambiguous concepts, having multiple meanings.⁴⁵ Philosophers not only coin their own concepts, but also reinterpret the meanings of those previously formulated. As a consequence, communication is impossible. What is needed is a clear and precise language, like the language of science.⁴⁶ Without this philosophical Esperanto, problems could never be formulated sufficiently clearly to be solved. And this is precisely what conservative philosophers wanted to prevent all along.⁴⁷

Again, Ingenieros is being polemical: the implication is that classical philosophers are accomplices in a plot by making communication impossible and deceiving those who want change. But one can argue for the opposite. The quest has been to create more convenient forms of communication, not only in Leibniz's universal language, or Descartes' reconstruction of philosophy by appeal to clear and distinct concepts, but as early as Plato, who puts a demand for the clarification of concepts in Socrates' mouth.

There are merits to this demand for clarification. Ingenieros and Vaz Ferreira both seek the reformulation of philosophic problems. Vaz Ferreira sees this as an integral aspect of the philosophic endeavor, a dialectic which ends only when one ceases to philosophize.⁴⁸ Ingenieros seeks reformulations so the problem can be solved. Anticipating logical positivism, he believes the distinction between genuine and pseudo-problems lies precisely in that the former are formulable and the latter are not.⁴⁹ Yet, unlike the positivists, logical or classical, Ingenieros is willing to admit the legitimacy of some metaphysical propositions.

3 Science and Metaphysics: The most salient feature distinguishing Ingenieros from classical positivists is his stand on metaphysics. If positivists ask for its eradication from science and philosophy, Ingenieros tries to justify the need for metaphysics. To do this, he must make a distinction between a priori and a posteriori metaphysics. According to Ingenieros, a priori or classical metaphysics deals with transcendental or supernatural realities.⁵⁰ Since it entertains a reality that is neither generated nor verified by experience, a priori metaphysics is useless for dealing with any kind of factual problem. Since it is subordinated to conventional ethics and theology, and since truth is sacrificed to dogma, it is hypocritical.⁵¹ This kind of metaphysics, Ingenieros feels, is the justified butt of positivist attacks.

The second kind, a metaphysics of experience, develops when one tries to discover what is beyond the present reach of science. Here science represents the extent of human knowledge, of our experiences.⁵² Taking the most fundamental laws of science as points of departure, we make conjectures about what remains to be known and test them

experientially—that is, by observations.⁵³ These conjectures are legitimate metaphysical hypotheses about what is unknown, and we investigate them by means of scientific techniques.⁵⁴ This kind of metaphysics is, like Vaz Ferreira's conception, the main source of scientific inspiration. Its purpose is to extend the scope of human knowledge from the verifiable to the legitimate.⁵⁵ This scope is related to the amount of scientific knowledge we possess. Yet, there is no danger science might replace it, for, regardless of scientific advances, there will always be a segment of reality outside experience. There will always be scientific unknowns; hence, there will always be a metaphysics.⁵⁶

The object of metaphysics is to explain the "inexperiential."⁵⁷ The inexperiential or unknowable should not be interpreted as something intrinsically unobservable, unintelligible or supernatural, transcendental or absolute. These are attributes of things-in-themselves, implying a noumenal reality, outside the possibility of any experience. Nor should it be confused with Spencer's Unknowable. For Spencer, the Unknowable means what we can have no experience of whatsoever, whereas for Ingenieros or for Comte, the inexperiential means that of which we have had no experiences yet, what we have not observed and remains to be discovered.⁵⁸ Ingenieros, like Vaz Ferreira, claims that by means of these metaphysical statements we can extend our knowledge beyond its present limits, always subject to empirical control.

The known was, always, the base for explaining the unknown; wherever actual experiences are not sufficient to formulate a law, the imagination can anticipate it by formulating a hypothesis that fills the gaps, referring to "possible experiences." (59)

This does not amount, he reminds us, to enunciating dogmas or eternal truths, but to searching for the plausible or likely, grounded in

experience.

The metaphysics of experience is a system of hypotheses about the unknown, but subject to empirical control. Metaphysical hypotheses are similar to probability statements. "It is evident to me," Ingenieros writes, "that the degree of legitimacy of an inexperiential hypothesis would be determined in accord with the probability calculus," and adds that "it does not seem impossible that some norms similar to the ones successfully applied to the probability calculus could be introduced in the logic of the inexperiential."⁶⁰ These hypotheses refer to what is provisionally beyond experience and cannot be true or false, only probable.⁶¹ It is when these hypotheses become scientific that truth can be predicted. And since truth or certainty are outside their scope, inexperiential hypotheses qualify only as legitimate or valid.⁶²

When a hypothesis is experiential, its legitimacy depends on verification; when it is metaphysical, legitimacy depends on logical methods.⁶³ These logical methods act as a logical criterion for ruling out a priori hypotheses--those hypotheses not inferred directly from an experiential base. This criterion must be weaker than, for instance, the logical positivist verification criterion, since it aims at eliminating only a priori metaphysics. Take two competing hypotheses about the origin of the species, the creationist and the evolutionist: Ingenieros feels only the second is compatible with the facts. That is, only the second hypothesis is legitimate.⁶⁴

Metaphysical legitimacy implies logical rules. Contradiction is one: Hypotheses about the inexperiential that are in contradiction with experience are to be ruled out as illegitimate.⁶⁵ Thus, Ingenieros rules out

Kant's metaphysical hypothesis that the phenomenal is mere appearance.⁶⁶ There are other requirements for indirect empirical control of metaphysical hypotheses in the logic of the inexperiential. The legitimacy of any metaphysical hypothesis also depends on the following conditions: (i) on the amount of analytic knowledge on which it is based; (ii) on the agreement with the results accepted as least uncertain in the corresponding field of inquiry; (iii) on the extent to which its experiential base can change—for metaphysical hypotheses are always provisional; (iv) on its coherence with metaphysical hypotheses in other fields of inquiry.⁶⁷ These conditions are enough to rule out, for instance, animistic, or vitalistic hypotheses about the origin of life in favor of psycho-chemical hypotheses, given that only the latter is in agreement with methodological conditions, laws of evolution, etc.⁶⁸

The reasons for these conditions seems obvious enough. They act as constraints to prevent the metaphysician from running amok, from returning to an a priori metaphysics. We examine our experiences and make hypotheses about the unknown, always willing to take them back when they do not agree with observations, when the implications contradict any observations or when future observations falsify the hypothesis or their implications. As such, there is a constant interplay between metaphysics and science, the latter correcting and reshaping the former which, in turn offers science possible avenues of research or sources of inspiration.

This conception of metaphysics reveals a vision of science as the formulator of laws and scientific hypotheses, rooted in actual experiences and used to codify them.⁶⁹ For Ingenieros, as for Comte, exact but

isolated observations do not constitute scientific knowledge: science begins only when these observations are systematized into natural relations, their natural consequences being determined by general laws.⁷⁰

Scientific hypotheses are the results of the imagination of the scientist and not the results of the fantasies of the ignorant, even though both are called intuition. They are provisional instruments science uses to interpret the results of experience or generalize beyond the known, and their value is measured by two circumstances: the amount of phenomena they explain and their conformity to other data or the scientific hypotheses they relate. (71)

Concurring with the classical positivist view, Ingenieros sees science as an inductive procedure, of practical value, aiming at internal coherence and consistency with experience, and solving those problems it sets itself.⁷²

The function of metaphysics is to be the handmaiden of science, helping to extend knowledge to those areas where scientific hypotheses cannot be legitimately formulated. "Where physics does not reach, metaphysics begins."⁷³ We have the rise of a scientific philosophy, not a science of science nor a philosophy of science, but a true metaphysics of experience and in continuous development, "a system of legitimate hypotheses, concurrent with the general results of experience, that sets itself the task of explaining those problems that remain outside experience."⁷⁴ And those hypotheses that converge into harmonious and coherent explanations of the inexperiential constitute a full fledged metaphysical system.⁷⁵

A. There are some serious shortcomings in Ingenieros' reconstruction of metaphysics. He has, for instance, neglected to note the ambiguity of such concepts as "hypothesis," "legitimacy," "experience," etc. "Hypothesis" can mean a generalization from experience, covering observed

as well as unobserved cases. This is the meaning of the concept in the claim that hypotheses are used to make permissible inferences, that their reliability depends on the strength of the evidence and so on. This is what Ingenieros means by calling metaphysical hypotheses probability judgements. But hypotheses can also be conjectures about the facts, regardless of any evidence whatsoever. This is the meaning of the term in the claim that hypotheses are sources of testable consequences that confirm or disconfirm it.⁷⁶ And this is what Ingenieros implicitly means by testing hypotheses experientially. The distinction between hypotheses as generalizations and hypotheses as conjectures underlies the argument between the inductivist and the hypothetico-deductivist. Ingenieros' failure to perceive this distinction, a failure common to positivists, undermines his conception of science and metaphysics.⁷⁷

The confusion in the meaning of "hypothesis" also extends to the requirement of empirical control. Hypotheses should be in agreement with experience.⁷⁸ What does Ingenieros mean by "agreement"? That they be inductively based in observations? That the consequences of hypotheses do not disconfirm them? His answer is that metaphysical hypotheses should agree with observation when they are legitimate; hence, the logical criterion. But rather than clarifying the issue, this legitimacy criterion brings us back full circle. If agreement with experience rests on legitimacy, the legitimacy criterion itself rests on an assumed agreement with the facts: Condition (ii) posits an agreement of metaphysical hypotheses with facts, while condition (iii) posits an agreement with changing facts. And what does this new agreement consist of?

Furthermore, some arguments against induction lurk in the back-

ground. What guarantee do we have that what we have observed can validate hypotheses about what we have not? Like Comte and Spencer, Ingenieros seems indifferent to the difficulties with induction, missing a very important philosophical problem. But even in Ingenieros' conception of metaphysics, no principle asserting the regularity of nature can be ad-duced. To do so is to invoke an a priori principle—as Hume points out—outside the control of experience and outside the legitimate metaphysics Ingenieros proposes.

Another shortcoming lies in Ingenieros' reductionism. Legitimacy, like validity, truth, knowledge and so on, are epistemological concepts that, to an empiricist, are linked to experience. Ingenieros' psycho-logical reductionism, like Spencer's, makes experience a psychological phenomenon. However, unlike Spencer's psychologism, experience is here reduced to psycho-biological terms; and so are those epistemological concepts linked to it. But if epistemological concepts are thus reduced, what is the meaning of "legitimacy"? And can the legitimacy criterion fulfill its function? Any thought process contributing to restore the equilibrium between an organism and the environment would be empiri-cally legitimate. And what of logical legitimacy? "The superior forms of our real logic are the natural results of conditions of adaptation of the human species; they are complex manifestations of the biological function of thought."⁷⁹ There is, then, no difference between empirical and logi-cal legitimacy, for any hypothesis that emerges from the interaction of an organism and the environment would be experiential, hence legitimate. Since the imagination is a result of experience, then any hypothesis based on the imagination would also be legitimate.⁸⁰ And these are pre-

cisely the hypotheses that were epistemologically a priori and to be ruled out by the legitimacy criterion. By reducing logic to physico-biological concepts, Ingenieros has lost distinctions fundamental to his metaphysics: logical and empirical legitimacy, and a priori or a posteriori hypotheses. After all, what would the distinction between a priori and a posteriori hypotheses amount to biologically?⁸¹

The legitimacy of metaphysical hypotheses depends on their not contradicting experience. If contradictions arise, metaphysical hypotheses are ruled out as illegitimate. But even many perfectly good scientific hypotheses would be eliminated this way. Quantum jumps, or relativistic physics would have to be ruled out as illegitimate to a 19th century physics. In fact, such restrictions could undermine the progress of a science, particularly when such progress depends on what Kuhn calls "a revolution." Scientific hypotheses are not rejected just because they contradict observation. If they are useful in any way, they are held in abeyance for future use, or as heuristic devices, or, as in the case of corpuscular and wave hypotheses about the nature of light, because though each conflicts with some set of observations, they are still in agreement with other observations, both covering the whole field, and so on. Such requirements should not, then, be demanded of metaphysical hypotheses. After all, experience itself could be contradictory.⁸²

Scientific procedures are--Ingenieros argues--inductive, and scientific hypotheses are generalizations from experience.⁸³ Yet, in the case of scientific hypotheses, Ingenieros points out three possibilities, each backed with historical examples: (a) that hypotheses become laws if experience confirms them completely; (b) that hypotheses evolve if ex-

perience rectifies them; (c) that hypotheses are rejected if contradicted by experiences.⁸⁴ This indicated that Ingenieros recognizes that scientific hypotheses have a function other than generalization beyond the known: a function of speculating and making conjectures that are brought to test by experience. Examples of hypotheses, as both generalizations and conjectures, are drawn from evidence about what scientists do. Still, Ingenieros fails to see their difference and treats scientific hypotheses as generalizations.

In outlining what the problems of the metaphysics of the future will be, Ingenieros points out that they will be similar though not identical to some of the problems metaphysics faced in the past, such as the constitution of matter and life, time and space, infinity, etc. If these are the problems metaphysics has to deal with, the kind of hypotheses needed cannot be generalizations based on past experience, since some legitimate metaphysical hypotheses might be in contradiction with no experiences at all. That is, if these hypotheses are novel. The metaphysician must be doing conjectures about reality, etc.; otherwise metaphysics would be powerless to explore the realms of the truly unknown. If metaphysical hypotheses are conjectural in nature, the problem is to distinguish them from the conjectural scientific hypotheses.

B. In evaluating Ingenieros' metaphysics the questions that come to mind are: Is this kind of metaphysics necessary? Can't science do the job equally well? His view can be interpreted this way: Science collects, classifies and makes generalizations from facts. This is the inductivist view, with all its advantages and shortcomings. Yet, there is an awareness of our penchant for making conjectures about what we do not know.

Part of this tendency belongs in science, but part—the most important part it seems—is reserved for metaphysicians. Metaphysics is the source of future science. Science is the testing ground for metaphysical hypotheses. The problem lies in distinguishing metaphysical from scientific conjectures.

First of all, the distinction between science and philosophy is not quite clear. In the Principios, the difference is essentially Spencerian. Philosophy is a method of criticisms, a generalization of generalizations, a hypothesis of hypotheses.⁸⁵ There are no intrinsic antagonisms. From Plato to Bacon, science and philosophy were one and the same. The aim of these disciplines—to generalize and explore, to explain and reflect—are also the same.⁸⁶ Their difference is a matter of orientation. The task of the first is the solution of particular problems; that of the second, to interpret in a general way universal phenomena. The first analyzes; the second synthesizes. Science is partially unified knowledge; philosophy is completely unified knowledge.⁸⁷ In joining philosophy and science what is desired is a synthesis of their results through a unification and generalization of methods. The metaphysical character of scientific philosophy will depend on the extent to which generalizations fill in the gaps or anticipate experience by means of legitimate metaphysical hypotheses.⁸⁸

In the Proposiciones, however, Ingenieros becomes aware of shortcomings of his former position. The metaphysics of the future cannot be a pure synthesis of science in the Spencerian sense. This view is based on the positivist error of ignoring metaphysical hypotheses, or confusing them with scientific ones.⁸⁹ As it was originally conceived, metaphysics

is something apart from science.

Where the experiential hypotheses of science do not reach, begin the hypotheses metaphysics extends to the inexperiential. Scientific hypotheses subordinate their legitimacy to possible experiential demonstrations; metaphysical hypotheses aspire to a logical legitimacy and are assumed to be indemonstrable by experience. (90)

Metaphysics has to remain outside science, for its subject matter, the inexperiential, is itself outside the scope of science.⁹¹

Second, Ingenieros is also confused about the logics of science and metaphysics.

The difference between the logics of science and metaphysics does not consist in their methods, but in their aims; the first aims at being the art of proving, a goal barred to the second, which in turn limits itself to the art of legitimizing. The scientific is a logic of the experientially demonstrable; the metaphysical is a logic of the experientially indemonstrable. (92)

On the one hand he sees no difference in methods--only in the subject to which it refers. The first refers to what is experientially demonstrable while the second to what is not--to metaphysical hypotheses. This means that science deals with factual problems and metaphysics with what is plausible. On the other hand, he argues that the former is the art of proving and the latter the art of legitimizing. This means that the procedures of proving and legitimizing are different.⁹³ The conditions of legitimacy he proposes provisionally are totally inadequate if applied to scientific proofs.⁹⁴ Scientific hypotheses explain experiential problems while metaphysical hyperhypotheses explain inexperiential problems. The former is a logical relation, the latter, metalogical.⁹⁵ Under these conditions the logics of science and metaphysics cannot be the same.

If the difference between scientific and metaphysical hypotheses lies in their subject matter, then metaphysics is doomed to an ultimate absorption by science, notwithstanding Ingenieros' arguments. Understood

as conjectures, what is the difference between scientific and metaphysical hypotheses? Both are hypotheses about what is presently beyond our experience; both are restricted by the experiential; both are sources of tests that can confirm or disconfirm them, and so on. Why posit then a metaphysics when science can do the job equally well? The only difference worth noting is that whereas we know how to test scientific hypotheses, we do not know how to test metaphysical ones. But is this limitation in knowledge sufficient to make a distinction between science and metaphysics? If, alternatively, metaphysical and scientific conjectures are logically and methodologically different, not just in subject matter as Ingenieros also seems to recognize, the bridge built to span metaphysics and science collapses. How can a continuity be posited between two different kinds of conjectures? Since scientific hypotheses are not in question, the burden of proof lies with Ingenieros. If no difference can be shown between scientific and metaphysical hypotheses, Ingenieros' conception is otiose; if there are differences, his science and metaphysics are unrelated, and a posteriori metaphysics becomes superfluous for the scientist no matter how necessary for the philosopher.

4 Ethics and Metaethics: Ingenieros' commitment to a scientific philosophy and to evolutionary theories lead him to assert the reducibility of ethics to psychology and to natural sciences. Ethics is, in turn, the assertion of an idealism that, though related, is not identical with Rodó's. This is also an ethics that takes an anti-dogmatic stand reminiscent of Vaz Ferreira. Historically Ingenieros' ethics is within a Saint Simonian socialist tradition popular in Latin America, whose roots--at least in Argentina--can be traced to Estevan Echevarría's

Dogma socialista. This idealism reflects a Weltanschauung to which most Latin American liberals subscribed from the turn of the century on. It is at the metaethical level that Ingenieros differs from his contemporaries when he maintains the posture of a Spencerian evolutionist, and tries to reconcile the classical Comtian dichotomy of order and progress, now between adaptation and change.

A. Ingenieros tries to formulate an ethics consistent with his psychological and evolutionary views. Experience determines the way we think and act; this includes our norms. A result of social experience, ethics or morality is a system of reciprocal relations agreed to by members of a group so as to insure the best survival changes.⁹⁶ Morality, customs, even religion, are processes reducible to biological and evolutionary laws. Their function is to protect and insure a balance between individual rights and social obligations.⁹⁷ Good and evil have their biological sources in pleasure and pain. Socially, they represent what is sanctioned or condemned, not the dictates of a supernatural agency. Morality is taught by example and learned by imitation.⁹⁸

In the past, morality has been afflicted with dogmas. These dogmas were used to hide the truth, to prevent progress and to maintain vested interests in power.⁹⁹ To Ingenieros, religion is a glaring example, in which the conservative ruling classes created a myth to keep the lower classes contented. Dogma has also been an obstacle to scientific progress and to the development of a scientific metaphysics. Ingenieros proposes to free morality from dogmas.¹⁰⁰ Just as the removal of dogmatic influences from science fostered scientific progress, the removal of dogmatism from morality will accelerate the progress of mankind.¹⁰¹

The concept of ideals is central to Ingenieros' ethical theory. Ideals are said to be hypotheses of conduct, complex sets of beliefs about the future. They are based in and modified by experience and govern our present behavior.¹⁰² Functioning like predictions, ideals are true or false, correct or incorrect, depending on future states of affairs.¹⁰³ They are variously called archetype hypotheses of perfection, or perfectible hypotheses.¹⁰⁴ Ideals are also identified with metaphysical hypotheses in the psychological sciences, no different from the metaphysical hypotheses of any other science.¹⁰⁵ This identification again emphasizes the factual nature of ideals.

It is important to note that Ingenieros denies ideals any mysterious or aprioristic character; their source is neither divine revelation nor mystical intuition.¹⁰⁶ Instead, they are a result of the imagination.¹⁰⁷ These beliefs are natural to man; they are generalizations from the data of experience and used as hypotheses, their function being to anticipate nature so as to better adapt.¹⁰⁸ They are the product of men who can foresee.¹⁰⁹ The source of ideals is a purely biological one; consequently their conception is strictly determined by the natural laws that govern evolutionary and psychological processes.¹¹⁰

B. Let us examine these claims in some detail: First, there are some problems in considering ideals as both factual in nature and sanctions of society. To call morality the sanctions of a society might imply a form of metaethical relativism. This is a consistent position, one Ingenieros has been accused of espousing.¹¹¹ However, to assert the factual nature of ideals is to claim that ethical statements or hypotheses are true or false, correct or incorrect, and that the future will

tell.¹¹² This is hardly metaethical relativism, for it insists on a core of factual material in ethics.¹¹³ Ethical relativism implies that there is no correct moral evaluation above and beyond convention. What Ingenieros asserts is that the correct moral evaluation—the right ideal—is identical with judging what the facts are, and this is a kind of ethical naturalism.¹¹⁴

A closely related claim is that ideals are instruments for anticipating the future. The argument in support is, briefly, that nature is changeable, that it evolves, and man, in order to survive, must conform to it. So as to better adapt, man has to anticipate nature. He is forced to know the reality around him and to foresee its significance, its direction, to guess what the future will bring.¹¹⁵ To do this, man needs a mind. Foresight is, then, an evolutionary trait. Psychologically, this means that the imagination anticipates experience and directs life according to the resulting beliefs. Ingenieros insists that "a man, a group or a race is idealistic because propitious circumstances determine his imagination to conceive possible perfections."¹¹⁶ When circumstances determine a man to do or imagine something, there is no freedom involved; the man is impelled, compelled, determined. This means that he has no choice in the matter: "...the formation of ideals is subject to a determinism that, though complex, is no less absolute."¹¹⁷ Given this formulation, one might argue that man is not really anticipating nature, but simply reacting to it here and now—reacting mechanically to environmental changes—adapting to present conditions rather than to something in the future. That is, ideals cannot be instruments of foresight because of their deterministic conception.

Nevertheless, Ingenieros' position is quite tenable. He is presenting both a psychological and an epistemological picture of ideals, views that in Ingenieros are hard to disentangle.¹¹⁸ Psychologically, given a series of experiences, we arrive at certain states of mind inducing us to act in particular ways which later on might be helpful. Epistemologically, from a body of evidence we make judgements about the future, called predictions. These are beliefs one adopts about the future, hypotheses having certain effects on our actions. The above objection confuses the psychological and the epistemological pictures. To say we anticipate nature means that, given a body of evidence, certain beliefs about the future have been formulated and might prove correct or incorrect—regardless of the psychological processes leading to their adoption. In other words, given that psychologically we are reacting to experiences here and now, some of these reactions, though they might be determined, will have an influence on our future behavior. Ideals could be reduced to these reactions. But to claim that because we are determined we cannot anticipate the future, is tantamount to confusing the genetic explanation in Ingenieros' psychology with his epistemological account of the process.

Though it is Ingenieros' adherence to determinism that has brought the greatest opposition, it is understandable why he opts for it: He is interested in reducing morality to a science he takes to be strictly mechanistic and functional. He conceives of a science in which, at every stage, things can be explained in terms of the previous stage and the applicable laws. Even the multiplicity of the living world is accounted for in scientific terms, evolutionary theory in particular. Methodologically, Ingenieros accepts only genetic explanations, rejecting introspec-

tive or intuitive ones. explanations with dualistic or religious implications are ruled out as illegitimate. So are questions of freedom of the will.¹¹⁹ Man knows history, but he does not make it; and though he might be aware of the future, he cannot avoid it. The only choice left is adaptation. As with Spencer, this is the key to Ingenieros' conception of evolution: Adaptation is the criterion for survival of the fittest. Man tries to envision a future, not to change it, to "foresee the significance of his own adaptation, the roads to his perfection."¹²⁰

Some writers, like Torchia Estrada, have pointed out what they feel is an inconsistency between Ingenieros the determinist, the scientist, admirer of La Dantec, and Ingenieros the idealist and inspirer of Latin American youth: "How is one to explain a drive toward moral perfection, if man is ruled by a rigorous determinism and lacks the freedom to choose the road toward perfecting himself."¹²¹ Actually, there is no real conflict between Ingenieros' determinism and idealism, for he is specifying what ethics is, or ought to be, how morality arises and so on. Morality consists of ideals; the strict deterministic nature of their conception is one thing, their ethical justification another. In one sense, the drive toward moral perfection means a drive toward adaptation. Man's lack of freedom to choose is not incompatible with this drive; quite the contrary, there is a pressing need to adapt, to perfect one's self, for otherwise man perishes.

There is a sense in which Torchia Estrada's criticism touches on a problem: If we take it to question the possibility of moral perfection, (read "adaptation"), given a determinism that prevents man

from perfecting himself, (read "bettering"). The problem hinges on the ambiguous use of concepts, reflecting Ingenieros' carelessness. "Perfection" is a case in point. Ingenieros probably derived the concept from Spencer, though it has been around the literature for some time.¹²² It might mean either "whatever we choose that enables us to survive"-- "adaptation," that is--or, in a normative sense, "a desirable state."¹²³ To assert one is not the same as to assert the other. Together with "legitimacy," these concepts are used in a careless and ambiguous manner--wolves in sheep's clothing. Overtly, they purport to be descriptive while covertly they connote a valuation that remains to be justified. Ideals of perfection, perfectible or legitimate hypotheses, imply a valuation that is not part of evolutionary theory as a scientific instrument--a valuation that is smuggled through the back door while posting objective, value free claims at the front. In fact, Ingenieros is guilty of the same kind of hypocrisy he accuses the schools of--obscurantism and unclear language.¹²⁴

Behind Torchia Estrada's criticism one can find a more profound one: if natural selection is purely deterministic, can we as individuals strive for that ideal which will bring us to perfection, (read "survival")? We cannot: In a sufficiently large group some of its members will adopt beliefs that later on might turn out to help them survive.¹²⁵ In that case, some of the members of the group will survive. Because circumstances favored them, they are the lucky ones. But I as an individual have no guarantee that my beliefs about the future will enable me to survive. I might be one of the lucky ones, or I might not; only time will tell. Like entry to a Calvinist heaven, few are chosen; who they are only

God knows.

It might be argued that ideals lose force under different circumstances, and therefore cannot act as rules of conduct. Take, for instance, the ideal that we should strive toward originality.¹²⁶ It seems to work in our society. Yet, it loses its validity when survival depends on conformity to rules and regulations of a group, as it occurs in very inhospitable areas of the world. This criticism does not carry weight since Ingenieros can reply that he has never claimed a dogmatic character for ideals. Quite the contrary, he has stressed that ideals are of a provisional nature and relative to time and place.¹²⁷ Is this a concession to ethical relativism? Not really, for what Ingenieros asserts is that when the mission of ideals is accomplished, they can be discarded for others better suited to the new situation.¹²⁸ Circumstances change, and so do our assessments of the changing times. But this does not mean that any assessment of the situation will do, that any ideal is equally good. Only those ideals that come closest to the truth will do. The normativeness of ideals is proportional to its predictive and adaptive function.

And what accounts for the normativeness of ideals? Ingenieros does not seem to be aware of the difference in logical character between ethical and factual statements. To him ideals are prudential hypotheses of the form "Do X if you want to survive," or "Do Y because it will help you adapt better," and so on. Their normative force lies in the biological drive toward survival.

Ideals can be untrue; they are beliefs. Their strength lies in their effective elements: they influence our conduct according to how much we believe it. Because of this the abstract representations of future variations acquire a moral value: The more advantageous to a species

are conceived as perfections. The future is identified with the perfect. And ideals, because they are anticipated visions of the future, influence conduct with the natural instrument of all human progress. (129)

This, again, characterizes his ethics as naturalistic: ethical statements are predictions about future states of affairs, with the added proviso that we want to survive. They present us with alternative ways of acting given possible future outcomes.

The question of the normative character of ideals remains. In giving an answer we find Ingenieros trying to derive normative conclusions from factual premises. When talking about abstract representations of future variations above, Ingenieros states: "The more advantageous to a species are conceived as perfections." And here "the more advantageous" is taken to mean "what contributes more effectively to the survival of the species." Yet, "perfection" can be read two ways: factually, as "whatever one chooses that enables one to survive;" ethically, as "betterment." Given the first interpretation of "perfection," Ingenieros statement can be paraphrased as "whatever contributes more effectively to the survival of the species is conceived as whatever the species chooses that enables it to survive." What contributes to survival most effectively is conceived as what is chosen, and contributing to survival. And when what is contributing to survival turns out to be a conception--an abstract representation of future variations--called "an ideal" and involving choice, the statement becomes redundant and tautologous.

The second interpretation of "perfection" results in the statement "what contributes more effectively to the survival of the species is conceived as betterment." This claim remains to be justified. Though it is an assertion about what human beings believe, and not an attempt to derive

the normative from the factual, it is ambiguous enough to create confusion. Ingenieros himself is confused by it, continuing as if he has in fact derived normative conclusions from factual premises:

The concept of the best is a natural result of evolution itself. Life naturally tends toward perfecting itself. Aristotle taught that activity is a movement of being toward "entelechy:" its state of perfection." (130)

From an ambiguous statement about what people believe, Ingenieros is deceived into thinking he has derived normative statements.¹³¹

C. If Ingenieros were to maintain the metaethical attitude first outlined in the Principios and re-stated in the Proposiciones, his view would be quite consistent. Morality is an outcome of evolution, contributing to the struggle for survival by preserving a social structure whose function is to protect from common dangers. Ideals, as components of this morality, provide an advantage in the struggle for survival by being instruments of foresight. In developing his Idealism, Ingenieros abandons this deterministic position, at the expense of introducing inconsistencies. These inconsistencies are due to the often contradictory roles his ideals play. Ingenieros asks us to be idealists, to follow any ideal, and criticizes the mediocre man for lacking ideals. This position is ethically disastrous, for there is no provision for adopting ideals--any ideals will do--nor for deciding between conflicting ideals, or ruling out those ideals that might, for instance, go contrary to "perfection" in Ingenieros' sense.¹³² What he has so carefully taken out with his metaethics is brought back with the give and take of ordinary morality.

The fundamental call of Ingenieros' morality is to strive toward

individual and social perfection, and to reject mediocrity and the mediocre man, ancestor of Ortega y Gasset's mass man. By espousing an idealist morality we envision a more perfect state, whatever that is, toward which we must strive. The mediocre man is imitative, adapting to circumstances and preserving stability. He is naturally a creature of habit, conservative, maintainer of custom and the greatest single obstacle to creativity and change.¹³³ Perfection rests with the superior man, with him who can foresee the future.¹³⁴ Virtue is equated with going against the herd, with creating values and taking the lead.¹³⁵

Ingenieros justifies this assessment in evolutionary terms: Nature loves change and variation. Since the process of natural selection hinges on variation, the species that stagnates perishes. Thus, equality is disastrous for any species: Such species would lack the necessary variations for survival and would perish. Future morality demands of an individual that he strive toward that which the average man cannot attain. If a species like mankind would be forced into equality, no evolution would occur and humanity would soon become extinct. Hence, the future rests with the superior man, with the original man.

This view is, given Ingenieros' ethical and evolutionary views, paradoxical: In order to survive, man must adapt. This is one sense of "perfection." Since the mediocre man is best at adapting, it would make sense to argue that it is with him that the future rests. True the mediocre man might refuse to change; but if truly mediocre, truly a follower, he would put no obstacles in his way and do what he was told. On the other hand, the outstanding man is always trying to innovate and change; consequently he is the one who would have difficulties adapt-

ing.¹³⁶ If this is the case, then it is the superior man who is doomed to perish because he cannot adapt to new situations. There is no outright contradiction but it is hard to imagine how the superior man can in fact adapt.¹³⁷ It is difficult, though not impossible, to envision a society of rebels, of superior men, something so heterogeneous as to bar some mediocre men, a tribe of chiefs and no warriors.¹³⁸ Social cohesion would be, at best, weak, a definite hindrance in the struggle for survival. The ideal social order, Ingenieros should argue, must be a small elite of superior men and a large following of mediocre ones. This arrangement would probably achieve Ingenieros' ethical goals--adaptation and survival--more efficiently. His individualistic society tends, on the contrary, to hinder the achievement of these goals.

It must be mentioned that, in spite of claims to the contrary, Ingenieros advocates a particular kind of idealism.¹³⁹ To the criticism that his claims are so general as to make everyone an idealist--superior and mediocre men included--Ingenieros retorts that idealists are those who are willing to let experience determine the truth of their ideals.¹⁴⁰ Yet, the question is not whether everyone has the correct ideals, but whether any one can fail to have ideals at all. If taken at face value, everyone is an idealist, since everyone has hopes and aspirations. Why then bother to argue for this position? Only if it is perceived as something not everyone aims for; that is, if idealism means a set of particular values rather than having values in general. This reading is consistent with Ingenieros' efforts on behalf of certain specific kinds of morality.¹⁴¹

Why does Ingenieros abandon a perfectly defensible position and

argue for a morality that undermines his own metaethical position? The answer lies partly with the ideological currents popular with the youth of Ingenieros' day. Sensitive to political and intellectual changes, Ingenieros is a socialist, a political activist, an idealist who wants to keep in touch with the radical elements of the left, not only in Argentina, but in the rest of the world.¹⁴² The shift away from biological determinism to moralistic idealism began in the 1910's, when the deterministic base was formulated and continued up until the 1920's, when Ingenieros became a spokesman for the Argentine youth.¹⁴³ The Great War, the Russian and Mexican Revolutions, and the political developments in Argentina and elsewhere contributed to this change. The popularity of Rodó's arielismo should not be discounted.

A parallel can be drawn between Rodó's and Ingenieros' idealisms.¹⁴⁴ Both Rodó and Ingenieros are critics of the establishment. Both see values, ideals, as created by an intellectual elite; an aristocracy of outstanding men. Both stress the value of diversity and individualism, keys to the future and mosaic of social order. Further, culture and ideals oppose the political establishment of the day in order to realize the social order they aspire to—a framework which, for Rodó, is based on beauty, and for Ingenieros, on justice and perfectibility.¹⁴⁵ Their attacks on contemporary values are rooted in conceptions different from the popular ones. While wealth and position—a social and material criterion—were popularly held to be political qualifications, Rodó and Ingenieros seek to replace them with moral and intellectual ones, with culture and talent.¹⁴⁶

There are important differences in the idealist conceptions of Rodó

and Ingenieros. Granted that ideals are what people struggle for, what moves men, and granted that "reality can never equal the dream in a perpetual pursuit of the illusion"; Rodó stresses the normative and axiological nature of ideals while Ingenieros points to their functional and hypothetical character, tracing them to biological and evolutionary roots.¹⁴⁷ Rodó freely acknowledges the evolutionary foundations of ideals, but desires to resist the encroachment of science on "the ultima Thule of the mind."¹⁴⁸

Ingenieros' idealism tries to incorporate both the advantages of a heterogeneous society and the minimum order any society must have to function. It is also consistent with Comte's recognition of the importance of order and progress as social elements.¹⁴⁹ For Comte, order in a heterogeneous society is difficult to maintain, particularly because of the diversity of beliefs.¹⁵⁰ Ingenieros, however, recognizes this diversity as a definite advantage. Since individuals, groups, classes, nations or races undergo different experiences, their beliefs and ideals differ.¹⁵¹ But ideals, as anticipations of things to come, are also subject to the natural order of things. So ideals are instruments of order, for men who strive to adapt--to prepare themselves for what they foresee--must do so on conditions imposed upon them by the natural order of things. Only those ideals that are legitimate--in accord with experience--survive, just as those that are illegitimate perish.¹⁵² Hence, we have the desired social order, reflecting the external order of things to which we must adapt. In spite of our diversity, nature makes relatively similar demands on us all, insuring conformity by adaptation. Furthermore, although no universality of ideals or ethical beliefs

exists, a trend is developing in that direction, because as contact among people increases, so does the uniformity of human experience.¹⁵³ We have now an element of progress: the growth of ideals in scope to encompass larger segments of humanity.¹⁵⁴ Progress then, according to Ingenieros, can be derived from an heterogeneous society by means of ideals.

Order and progress are not incompatible with heterogeneity. The way to progress--perfectibility, in Ingenieros' framework--is through ideals; order is insured by the very nature of the adaptation process, the very reason for ideals. In fact, this represents an attempt to wed the divergent views of socialism and positivism, something that has been tried before.¹⁵⁵

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

¹For instance, Caturelli, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 56-59; Crawford, A Century, p. 116-17; Höllhuber, Philosophie im Spanischen Kulturbereich, p. 250; Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 150; G. J. Seidel, "The Theme of Man in Argentina," International Philosophic Quarterly 7 (1967):118-28; Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 94; Juan Adolfo Vázquez, ed., Antología filosófica argentina del siglo XX, Colección Ensayos, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1965), p. 22; Villegas, Panorama, p. 16-17.

²Spalding, "Argentine Sociology," p. 57; Sergio Bagú, Vida de José Ingenieros, Biblioteca de América, Libros del Tiempo Nuevo, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 46, 52, 54-56.

³Ferré, "Positivismo/antipositivismo," p. 288. Also Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 27-28.

⁴For an assessment of Comte, see José Ingenieros, [Julio Barrera Lynch], "Las doctrinas morales de Augusto Bunge," Revista de filosofía [Buenos Aires] 1 (1915):23-32.

⁵Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 41, 54-55. Also José Ingenieros, "Le Dantec, biólogo y filósofo," Revista de filosofía [Buenos Aires] 3 (1917):96. For a French review of Ingenieros' psychological works, see Thiobald Ribot, "Ingenieros: Principes de Psychologie Biologique," Revue Philosophique de la France et l'Etranger [Paris] 73 (1914):80-84.

⁶Wilhem Ostwald, "Zur Einführung," to José Ingenieros, Prinzipien der Biologischen Psychologie, Julius Reinkin, trans., (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1922).

⁷Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 97-110.

⁸"Muchas fallas han podido señalarse en los 'primeros principios;' no pocas contradicciones hallamos en su introducción, propiamente metafísica, sobre 'lo incognoscible.' Quedan en pie, sin embargo, las nociones fundamentales del sistema: la experiencia empírica determina el conocimiento, las sensaciones son relativas y constituyen la base del pensamiento, la realidad es única, todo fenómeno responde a un determinismo riguroso, toda realidad evoluciona perennemente. Nociones que podemos

traducir diciendo: la unidad de lo real (monismo) se transforma incesantemente (evolucionismo) por causas naturales (determinismo). Así formuladas, nos parece que ellas persistirán en toda la filosofía del porvenir que aspire a no estar en contradicción con los resultados de la experiencia." José Ingenieros, Principios de psicología, 6th edition, (Buenos Aires: L. J. Rosso: 1919), reprinted in Vázquez, Antología, p. 104; author's italics.

⁹ José Ingenieros, Proposiciones relativas al porvenir de la filosofía, 3rd edition, Biblioteca Clásica y Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1960), p. 36-37.

¹⁰ Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 109-110.

¹¹ Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 105; Proposiciones, p. 56.

¹² "La generación anterior a la mía ha pasado por las dos modas: la positivista y la mística. Mi generación ha sentido más especialmente la segunda. Yo no alcancé la primera ni me he entregado a la actual." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 26, footnote 1. See also Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 47.

¹³ Charlton, Positivist Thought, p. 84-85.

¹⁴ Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 110-11.

¹⁵ "Algunos pensadores eminentes, desde Ardigó hasta Le Dantec, querían proscribir la palabra 'metafísica' del lenguaje filosófico moderno, como si ella implicara forzosamente un dualismo fundamental, o una concepción racionalista o intuicionista. No es necesario ni sería legítimo. En todo sistema conviene distinguir lo observado de lo imaginado, lo seguro de lo probable, lo demostrado de lo verosímil, la experiencia de la hipótesis, en una palabra, lo que ya es ciencia de lo que aún es metafísica." Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 107.

¹⁶ "Saber que es lo que sabemos, y en que plano de abstracción; creer cuando se debe creer, y en que grado se debe creer; dudar cuando se debe dudar, y graduar nuestro asentimiento con la justeza que este a nuestro alcance...el conocimiento de la Metafísica es indispensable para ser un verdadero positivista en la ciencia...La ciencia es Metafísica solidificada." Vaz Ferreira, Conocimiento y acción, (1908 edition), reprinted in Conocimiento y acción, (1920), p. 12, and Fermentario, p. 81, 85; author's italics.

¹⁷ Other than common acquaintances, there is very little evidence to connect Ingenieros and Vaz Ferreira. They might have met during Inge-

nieros' visit to Montevideo in 1901. Both men were aware of the same philosophic and scientific material, and both men were acquainted with, or had met, the Spanish philosopher, Miguel de Unamuno. See, for instance, Miguel de Unamuno, "Recuerdos de su última estada en Paris," Nosotros [Buenos Aires] 19 (1925):429-31.

¹⁸Caturelli, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 57; Soler, Positivismo, argentino, p. 109; Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 208.

¹⁹Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 104.

²⁰Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 210.

²¹Ingenieros considers evolution a matter of facts and not of speculation; Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 103, footnote 6.

²²"El conocimiento de la Realidad, siempre relativo y necesariamente limitado, es un resultado natural de la Experiencia. Es relativo a la estructura imperfecta de nuestros instrumentos de experiencia (naturales y artificiales; los sentidos y las diversas técnicas); está limitado a la parte de la Realidad que puede modificar el equilibrio de esos instrumentos." *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²³"Todos los datos de la experiencia son empíricos...Los datos de la experiencia, que se llaman fenómenos, se coordinan en grupos diversos, correspondientes a los aspectos que los hombres van distinguiendo en la Realidad." *Ibid.*, p. 96-97.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 97.

²⁵"La formación natural de la experiencia, implicada en el proceso de adaptación de todo ser vivo a su medio, condiciona la función de conocer, cuyo resultado se llama Conocimiento." *Ibid.*, p. 95; author's italics.

²⁶Below, p. 187

²⁷Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 104; Ribot, "Ingenieros," p. 84.

²⁸Zum Felde, Proceso, 3:47-48. Ingenieros lacks formal training in philosophy. Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 52.

²⁹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 32, 63.

³⁰José Ingenieros, "La cultura filosófica en la España Medieval,"

Revista de filosofía Buenos Aires 2 (1916), translated in Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 52. Also Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 17.

³¹Above, p. 18-19.

³²Spencer, Spencer, p. 83, 87. See also Harry Elmer Barnes, A History of Historical Writing, 2nd revised edition, (New York: Dover, 1962), p. 202.

³³Mill, System of Logic, VI, x, 4-5. It is unlikely that Ingenieros is familiar with Mill. Chances are, however, that he is acquainted with this particular view in Comte

³⁴Vaz Ferreira, Fermentario, p. 44-48; Spencer, The Study of Sociology, p. 26-33. But see Jesualdo, Vaz Ferreira, p. 56-61.

³⁵Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 16, 113. See also Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 224. For Vaz Ferreira's anti-traditionalism see April, "La 'Lógica viva,'" p. 234.

³⁶"Si las obras de Kant convergieran a su Solución de la pregunta general de los Prolegómenos, la Filosofía Crítica sería un modelo de lógica y de claridad. Desgraciadamente Kant puso tanto empeño en disimular antes las ideas convergentes a esa Solución como en afirmar después las más incompatibles con ellas. Su logicismo transcendental pudo ser un error; su rehabilitación de los mitos metafísicos fué una hipocresía." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 20, footnote 1.

³⁷Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 123.

³⁸"...sin excluir los más característicos positivistas, como Comte y Spencer, ciertos filósofos científicos como Haeckel y Wundt, pragmatistas como James, pseudo-idealistas como Fuouillé, etc." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 45.

³⁹Or accept it as polemical; J. Pérès, "José Ingenieros--Proposiciones relativas al porvenir de la filosofía," Revue Philosophique de la France et l'Etranger [Paris] 87 (1919):333. Armando Domoso feels Ingenieros is asserting his independence from traditionalism, "The Renewal of Metaphysics According to José Ingenieros," Inter-America, [English] 2 (1919):353.

⁴⁰Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 73-84.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 19; Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 35; Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 124.

⁴²Höfding, History, 1:169, 1:175-76, 1:215-216, 2:173-79. Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 52-56. See also Edmond Goblot, "José Ingenieros: Emilio Boutroux y la filosofía universitaria en Francia," Revue Philosophique de la France et l'Etranger [Paris] 96 (1923):458-59.

⁴³Alejandro Korn, "El porvenir de la filosofía," Obras, 3:334.

⁴⁴Above, p. 168-69.

⁴⁵Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 85-86; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 161.

⁴⁶Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 88-89; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 163.

⁴⁷Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 87; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 162.

⁴⁸Above, p. 109-10.

⁴⁹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 87 and footnote 1; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 162-63.

⁵⁰Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 61-62.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 23. Also José Ingenieros, Hacia una moral sin dogma, 5th ed., Biblioteca Clásica y Contemporanea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1972), p. 16-17.

⁵²Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 98.

⁵³Ingenieros does not distinguish between "experience" and "observation." Whenever he speaks of testing hypotheses experientially, for instance, what he means is testing them observationally. Again, the careless use of words and the failure to distinguish important concept involves him in a cumbersome language.

⁵⁴Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 115-16.

⁵⁵Donoso, "The Renewal of Metaphysics," p. 358.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 354-55. Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 35-40.

⁵⁷In the Principios, Ingenieros uses "lo desconocido," (the unknow-

able) while in the Proposiciones, "lo inexperiencial," (the inexperienced). Korn considers "lo inexperiencial" an unfortunate neologism and suggests in its place "lo supra-empírico," (the supra-empirical); Obras, 3:326-27.

⁵⁸Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 116.

⁵⁹"Lo conocido fué en todo tiempo la base para explicar lo desconocido; donde la experiencia efectiva no basta para formular una ley, la imaginación puede anticiparse enunciando una hipótesis que llene sus lagunas, refiriéndose a la 'experiencia posible.'" Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 98; Pérès, "Ingenieros--Proposiciones," p. 332.

⁶⁰"...me parece evidente que el grado de legitimidad de una hipótesis inexperiencial podría determinarse conforme al cálculo de las probabilidades...no me parece imposible que se llegue a introducir en la lógica de lo inexperiencial algunas normas similares a las que se aplican con éxito en el cálculo de las probabilidades." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 77-78.

⁶¹Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 97.

⁶²Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 52.

⁶³Ibid., p. 72.

⁶⁴Ingenieros, Ameghino, p. 24-31.

⁶⁵Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 55.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 56-57.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 74-76; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 158. Since these are regarded as temporary postulates for a metaphysics of the future, Ingenieros does not develop nor try to justify them. He planned for a treatise on metaphysics developing these points, but death prevented him from carrying out the project. Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 106. Also Donoso, "The Renewal of Metaphysics," p. 355-56.

⁶⁸Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 98.

⁶⁹Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 98.

⁷⁰Ibid., p. 108.

⁷¹"Las hipótesis científicas son obra de la imaginación del sabio y no de la fantasía del ignorante, aunque a las dos cosas suele llamarse intuición. Son instrumentos provisorios que las ciencias utilizan para interpretar los resultados de la experiencia o generalizar mas allá de lo conocido, y su valor se mide por dos circunstancias: la cantidad de fenómenos que ellos permiten explicar y su concordancia con los demás datos o hipótesis científicas que con ellas se relacionan." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 71, footnote 1.

⁷²Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 109.

⁷³"Donde la física no alcanza comienza la metafísica, dando a esos términos su clásico sentido inicial." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 10-11.

⁷⁴"...un sistema de hipótesis legítimas, concordantes con los resultados generales de la experiencia, que se propone explicar los problemas que permanecen fuera de la experiencia." Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 99; author's italics.

⁷⁵Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 79-80; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 159.

⁷⁶Peter Caws, The Philosophy of Science, (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1965), p. 80-81; Carl G. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural Science, Foundations of Philosophy Series, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 17-18; Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 2 vols., (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 58; Stephen Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 82.

⁷⁷Ingenieros, Ameghino, p. 124-26.

⁷⁸Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 93; Proposiciones, p. 115.

⁷⁹"Las formas superiores de nuestra lógica real son resultados naturales de las condiciones de adaptación de la especie humana; son manifestaciones complejas de la función biológica de pensar," Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 96.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 96. Also Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 217.

⁸¹The same kind of criticism holds for Ingenieros' realism. According to Soler, Positivismo argentino, p. 106, Ingenieros must be an

epistemological realist. Epistemological realism assumes a distinction between thought or mind and an external world the mind discovers. Ingenieros' psychological reductionism obliterates the distinction between mind and the world by making thought a by-product of reactions between organisms and the environment. It also obliterates any claims to truth by making truth whatever reaction is more or less accurate. Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 98-99.

⁸²Caws, Philosophy of Science, p. 319.

⁸³Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 108.

⁸⁴Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 71-72, footnote 1.

⁸⁵Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 107.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 100.

⁸⁷Ibid., p. 101, and above, p. 35.

⁸⁸Note the contrast between scientific generalizations and metaphysical hypotheses. Ingenieros, Principios, in Vázquez, Antología, p. 106.

⁸⁹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 26.

⁹⁰"Donde no lleguen las hipótesis experienciales de las ciencias, empezaran las hipótesis que la metafísica prolonga en lo inexperiencial. Las hipótesis científicas subordinan su legitimidad a la posible demostración por la experiencia; las hipótesis metafísicas aspiran a una legitimidad lógica y se presumen indemonstrables por la experiencia." Ibid., p. 115.

⁹¹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 79; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 159.

⁹²"La diferencia entre la lógica científica y la lógica metafísica no consiste en sus métodos sino en su finalidad; la primera se propone ser un arte de probar, objeto que la segunda no puede proponerse, limitándose a ser un arte de legitimar. La científica es una lógica de lo experiencialmente demostrable; la metafísica es una lógica de lo experiencialmente indemostrable." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 73; also translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 157, author's italics.

⁹³Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 72-73; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 157-58.

⁹⁴Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 75-76; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 158-59.

⁹⁵Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 73-74; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 158.

⁹⁶José Ingenieros, Hacia una moral sin dogmas, 5th ed., Biblioteca Clásica y Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1972), p. 21; Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 49.

⁹⁷José Ingenieros, Sociología argentina, Biblioteca Científico-Filosófica, (Madrid: Daniel Jorro, 1913), p. 20. Also Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 226; Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 57.

⁹⁸Ingenieros, Moral sin dogma, p. 22-23.

⁹⁹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 23.

¹⁰⁰Ingenieros, Moral sin dogma, p. 12-13; Proposiciones, p. 27-28.

¹⁰¹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 41-43.

¹⁰²José Ingenieros, El hombre mediocre, 7th ed., Biblioteca Clásica y Contemporánea, (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1973), p. 11; Proposiciones, p. 117.

¹⁰³Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 102-103; Hombre mediocre, p. 12.

¹⁰⁴Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 102. Also Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 152.

¹⁰⁵"I do not conceive two kinds of methods for investigating the truths accessible to our experience; if the moral sciences are to be sciences at all, they differ only in object from the physical, biological, social sciences, etc; if they differ in essences, they would not be sciences: Neither moral nor immoral ones."

"No concibo dos clases de ciencia y dos clases de método para investigar las verdades accesibles a nuestra experiencia; si las ciencias morales son ciencias, sólo difieren por su objeto de las ciencias físicas, biológicas, sociales, etc.; si difieren de ellas por su esencia, no serían ciencias. Ni morales ni inmorales." Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 95. Also Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 226.

¹⁰⁶Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 152.

¹⁰⁷Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 13.

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁰⁹Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 227.

¹¹⁰Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 97-98; Hombre mediocre, p. 12, 13.

¹¹¹Particularly when Ingenieros asserts that "the relativity of ideals is a fundamental postulate," ("la relatividad de los ideales es un postulado fundamental"), Hombre mediocre, p. 17. Or that value judgments are not absolute, that they change: Today's good men were yesterday's bad ones, and vice versa, Ibid., p. 103; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 154. See also, Proposiciones, p. 101-02.

¹¹²Or what is believed to be the facts; Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 14.

¹¹³To Ingenieros "relative" seems to mean "what is constantly changing or evolving," Hombre mediocre, p. 17-18.

¹¹⁴The authority of ethics has been changed from theology and dogma to experience. Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 96, footnote 1: "Ideals being inexperiential hypotheses about possible perfectionments, the conditions of legitimacy of ideals are the same as those of the remaining metaphysical hypotheses," ("Siendo los ideales hipótesis inexperienciales acerca de una perfección posible, las condiciones de legitimidad de los ideales son las mismas que las de todas las restantes hipótesis metafísicas...") Ibid., p. 104.

¹¹⁵Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 151.

¹¹⁶"...circunstancias propicias determinan su imaginación a concebir perfeccionamientos posibles." Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 151; italics mine. Sánchez Reulet's translation of "determinan" is "impel," with the consequence that some of the statement's deterministic sense is lost.

¹¹⁷"...la formación de los ideales está sometida a un determinismo que, por ser complejo, no es menos absoluto." Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 12.

¹¹⁸As it was pointed above, p. 165-66, this confusion can be disastrous to his metaphysics.

¹¹⁹Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 13.

¹²⁰Ibid., p. 10; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 151.

¹²¹Torchia Estrada, Filosofía en la Argentina, p. 229; also quoted in Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 46.

¹²²Above, p. 49; Passmore, Perfectibility of Man, p. 9. Darwin seems to have argued along the same lines; Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, p. 17-19.

¹²³For the first usage see Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 152. For the second usage see Hombre mediocre, p. 13; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 154. "Perfectible" also suffers from the same ambiguity: It might mean "corregible by experience," Proposiciones, p. 81; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 160, or simply "improbable," Hombre mediocre, p. 10; translated in Sanchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 151.

¹²⁴Above, p. 168-72.

¹²⁵In Ingenieros' words, nature might be propitious to them in determining their choice.

¹²⁶Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 39-40; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 152-53.

¹²⁷Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 102, 105-06.

¹²⁸Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 11; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 151.

¹²⁹"Los ideales pueden no ser verdades; son creencias. Su fuerza estriba en sus elementos efectivos; influyen sobre nuestra conducta en la medida en que lo creemos. Por eso la representación abstracta de las variaciones futuras adquiere un valor moral: las más provechosas a la especie son concebidas como perfeccionamientos. Lo futuro se identifica con lo perfecto. Y los ideales, por no ser visiones anticipadas de lo venidero, influyen sobre la conducta y con el instrumento natural de todo progreso humano." Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 12; italics mine.

¹³⁰"El concepto de lo mejor es un resultado natural de la evolución misma. La vida tiende naturalmente a perfeccionarse. Aristótle enseñaba que la actividad es un movimiento del ser hacia la propia "entelequia": su estado de perfeccion." Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 12.

¹³¹He also dodges the question; originally we wanted to find out

about the normativeness of ethical statements. According to Ingenieros, people take ideals to be normative. Why? Whatever the answer, to point to their evolutionary nature is to return to the original question: Why are evolutionary concepts normative? though cast differently.

¹³²Ingenieros' view is quite naive since he also denies that ideals can be in conflict, as Vaz Ferreira does. Truth is never ugly, nor Beauty absurd, nor Goodness have its roots in disharmony or error. The road to perfection is convergent. Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 16-17. Compare to Vaz Ferreira, "¿Cuál es el signo moral de la inquietud humana?" Fermentario, p. 131; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 139.

¹³³Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 39-40, 43-46. Also Jean Pérès, "José Ingenieros: El hombre mediocre," Revue Philosophique de la France et l'Etranger [Paris] 83 (1917):481.

¹³⁴"the future always belongs to the visionaries," ("el porvenir es siempre de los visionarios"). Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 33.

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 22-23; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 154.

¹³⁶His lack of adaptation is a desideratum. Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 49.

¹³⁷It might be objected that the superior man refuses to adapt to institutionalized custom, and that the mediocre man refuses to adapt to custom other than institutionalized. But the bulk of conservatism, and the main obstacles to progress, does not come from institutions alone. In fact, the most regressive element of society does not belong to any institution: farmers, grassroot voters, middle America, or, in Argentina, the gaucho. See Ingenieros' discussion of the gaucho, quoted in Aníbal Ponce, "Para una historia de Ingenieros," Revista de filosofía [Buenos Aires] 12 (1927):1-82.

¹³⁸A similar point is made in Enrique Mouchet and Alberto Palcos, "Ingenieros Psychologist," Inter-America, [English] 9 (1925-26):385.

¹³⁹Julio R. Barcos, "Our Professors of Idealism in America," Inter-America [English] 3 (1919-20):84-102.

¹⁴⁰Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 14-16.

¹⁴¹For instance, stoicism or Emerson's, Sarmiento's and Ameghino's idealism. Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 27-33, 203-220; Hacia una moral sin dogma, p. 46-58. Barcos criticizes Ingenieros' idealism as a romanticized justification of Argentinian nationalism, instead of being

the scientific view it claims to be, "Professors of Idealism," p. 92.

¹⁴²Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 73-78, 85-88, 94-97; Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 26-28. Also Delia Kamia, Prologue to José Ingenieros, Antología, Panoramas, (Buenos Aires; Editorial Losada, 1961), p. 25-27.

¹⁴³Ingenieros' first idealist arguments appeared in 1910, in the Principios, and in lectures on the psychology of character, latter to form part of Hombre mediocre, (p. 7). See Spalding, "Argentine Sociology," p. 57.

¹⁴⁴Luis Reissig compares Rodó's Ariel and Ingenieros' Hombre mediocre in "Ingenieros y Rodó," Nosotros [Buenos Aires] 51 (1925):677-78. Also Mouchet and Palcos, "Ingenieros Psychologist," p. 383.

¹⁴⁵Spalding, "Argentine Sociology," p. 57.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., p. 55-56. This seems to be a threat to the egalitarian ideal of a democratic society. Pérès, "Ingenieros—Hombre mediocre," p. 481-82.

¹⁴⁷"La realidad nunca puede igualar al ensueño en esa perpetua persecución de la quimera." Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 17.

¹⁴⁸Rodó, Ariel, in Obras, p. 56.

¹⁴⁹It has been argued that Ingenieros derives his non-transcendental ethics from Comte's Catechisme positive. See Alberto Lamar Schweyer, "José Ingenieros: His contribution to American Thought," Inter-America [English] 9 (1925-26):294-96.

¹⁵⁰Comte, Systeme, 2:429-30; Essential Writings, p. 439.

¹⁵¹Ingenieros, Proposiciones, p. 96-97.

¹⁵²Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 16; Lipp, Three Argentine Thinkers, p. 45.

¹⁵³Ingenieros, Hombre mediocre, p. 14, 18-19.

¹⁵⁴Ibid., p. 104; translated in Sánchez Reulet, Contemporary, p. 155.

¹⁵⁵Flew, Evolutionary Ethics, p. 5-6.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The main thesis of this dissertation is that in order to understand philosophy in Latin America, positivist influences must be taken into account. To support this claim the philosophies of Rodó, Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros were examined in some detail. The arguments tried to show that unless one can trace the development from a positivist framework to either the idealism of Rodó and Ingenieros, or to Vaz Ferreira's skepticism and anti-dogmatism, the goals, tasks, perspectives, even the language of their philosophies cannot be fully understood. Let us now summarize our findings and draw some further conclusions.

A. In their epistemological theories positivists aimed at a reduction of all knowledge to the kind achievable only by means of scientific methods. Hence, the claim that metaphysics is useless to science. According to this program, science is mainly inductive: it gathers evidence and generalizes from it. Anything else is speculation, myth, metaphysics. But this view cannot be sustained when one examines some of the tasks science is called upon to perform—tasks such as hypothesis making. Vaz Ferreira finds in science much that is not allowed by the positivist inductivist conception. For him, the main error of positivism is that it tries to rule out all metaphysics. His argument is that if positivism is to be successful in reducing scientific knowledge to the empirical, it must permit those scientific practices that call for speculation and

theorizing. Science can function properly only when this kind of conjectural activity is allowed. This is an activity that actually belongs to metaphysics. Even an investigation of the foundations of science reveals concepts that are, ultimately, instrumental thought-constructs and beyond the empirical; that is, science is metaphysical in nature.

Ingenieros, a careful scientist, also sees flaws in the conception of science positivists advocate. Science is inductive. Still, the scientist must investigate those areas he has no experiences of whatsoever—the source of future knowledge. Scientists do so by means of conjectures. Ingenieros is aware of this aspect of science; yet, he is committed to inductivism. His solution is to separate both aspects by formulating a metaphysics of science whose logical rules would permit a controlled form of speculation. Thus, the inductive aspect is left to science proper and the speculative to metaphysics. By means of this distinction Ingenieros hopes to clarify the nature of science, its relation to what is unknown and to permit meaningful assertions about what is beyond empirical control. And this is a departure from the positivist fold.

Both Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros are taking a stand against the positivist demand that metaphysics be excluded from the body of knowledge. For them metaphysics performs a valuable function by supporting the scientific endeavor. They agree, however, with the positivists that classical metaphysics is useless. For Vaz Ferreira, classical metaphysics is fallacious, a stumbling block in the path of positive knowledge. Avoidance of the fallacies of the metaphysician and proper use of logic—a logic strongly influenced by Mill—will contribute to the recognition of its true nature and value. Ingenieros offers a similar argument: Classical metaphysics is, by definition, a priori, and useless for dealing

with empirical problems. It is full of jargon and its logic flawed. Yet, it indicates the need to study what is beyond experience. As a consequence, they offer a redefinition of metaphysics: For Vaz Ferreira, it is the study of "psiqueos," thought-constructs underlying all speculation, scientific or philosophical. For Ingenieros, metaphysics is the source of conjectures about what is beyond experience, following its own kind of logic and to be tested by science.

Rather than a finished product, what Ingenieros and Vaz Ferreira accomplished is to outline a program for reconstructing a segment of metaphysics. In the process, they also divorced themselves from whatever is valuable in traditional metaphysics, hoping that their conception will remedy the ills the former failed to do. If this program is simplistic, it might be due to Spencer's influence. It is unfortunate that it is not Comte, but Spencer, the model for philosophizing, since the former is so superior to the later in questions of the philosophy of science. And perhaps it is Mill's influence which makes Vaz Ferreira a better philosopher.

Another topic investigated here is the reaction of these Latin American philosophers to the positivist stand on ethics. For these positivists, ethics is a province of the factual: facts and values are similar in important ways. By studying the human condition scientifically, ethical conclusions can be obtained. In Comte's case, the kind of ethics developed is intimately connected with a political system, the positive polity; in Spencer's case, an evolutionary ethics. Rodó identifies these ethical positions with utilitarianism and argues vehemently against them on the grounds that they damage ethical and aesthetic feelings. In fact, his argument against the positivist conception of science is that it leaves out, or reduces to questions of fact, these feelings. Art and not

science is the base of life. Any philosophy that relegates art to a secondary role is doomed to failure.

Vaz Ferreira claims that the function of ethics is not to build systems of thought from some feature about the world--altruism, evolutionary laws, progress, pleasure and so on--but to understand one's own morality and to solve particular moral problems--a sort of situation ethics. This is supposed to be an empirical ethics that captures the essence of living morality and avoids the absolutism and systematization of its positivist counterpart. Yet this ethics is, like Spencer's, relative and reducible, in the final analysis, to psychology. Ingenieros, more clearly than Vaz Ferreira, starts with a metaethics consistent with Spencerian evolutionism, and argues that any system of morality that survives must be good. But, like Spencer's, Ingenieros' biological relativism is shortlived. He adopts an idealist stand that marks a definite departure from positivism. If his idealism is defended with evolutionary arguments, it is a specific kind of idealism--an elitism--he would defend even if it were shown to be incompatible with evolutionism.

Evolutionary ethics is an influential mode of thought in Rodó, Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros; but, for them, it is only a starting point. Its inadequacies lead them to opt for better ethical models. They all start by accepting some of its premises--what they consider adequate--and as with epistemology, proceed to improve the rest. The common theme to ethical views is the movement away from Spencer, the reaction to his work. But, because the directions in which they move are so different, no common theme or unity can be seen on the surface and one could assume a random motion unless one understands this movement.

It is clear that the philosophers studied here did not carry out a full revolt against positivism as did Caso, Vasconcelos, Korn and many other Latin American philosophers.¹ Being the first to protest against what was conceived to be the paradigm of philosophizing, Ingenieros, Vaz Ferreira and even Rodó, tried to modify and improve positivism piecemeal. Granted that the arguments they employed betray positivist influences, it should be noted that they probably had a greater awareness of this influence than the other Latin American philosophers mentioned, who tried to adapt to totally new models.

B. A number of unforeseen conclusions also emerge from this study and challenge some of the traditional views: that Latin American philosophy is just a social philosophy; that there are no philosophers in Latin America, only "pensadores;" that Latin American philosophy is at least fifty years behind European philosophy and that there is a lack of original ideas. These views turn out to be only half-truths whose unqualified acceptance can lead the researcher astray. They should be corrected here.

Overall studies in the philosophy or intellectual history of Latin America usually deal with social or political aspects.² To justify this interest many have argued that young emerging nations are concerned with these problems to the exclusion of others.³ It is true that there are many works on social or political problems, but there are also works on ethics, science and metaphysics. This belief tends to distort the evidence. If one assumes its truth one would seldom look below the surface. Rodó, Ingenieros and Vaz Ferreira are interested in social or political issues, but much of their output is also devoted to metaphysical, ethical and even

aesthetic problems.⁴ Unfortunately, because of the more difficult nature of these issues, works dealing with ethics or metaphysics are less accessible and less popular than those concerned with social and political issues. Ingenieros' Hombre mediocre is more popular than the Proposiciones relativas al porvenir de la filosofía; Rodó's attacks on the United States are more popular than his attacks on positivism.

Equally deceiving is the claim that there are no Latin American philosophers, only "pensadores". Being a "pensador" implies a lack of concern with the deeper philosophical questions and amounts to no more than dilettantism or superficiality of thought.⁵ There are many "pensadores" in Latin America. The adjective might even fit Rodó who is a literary critic first and for whom philosophy is a side issue. But it can not be applied to everyone. Vaz Ferreira's and Ingenieros' works reveal a concern with the so called deeper philosophic questions and falsify this claim. If Vaz Ferreira assumes the mantle of "pensador" in sections of Fermentario, for instance, this is only a public image he quickly drops in his university lectures. The same is true of Ingenieros who, though a scientist by profession, still was seriously concerned with the solution of traditional philosophic problems.

The third general belief challenged here deals with the time span between the rise of a philosophy in Europe and its acceptance in Latin America. The claim is that Latin America lags at least fifty years behind European philosophy. This does not square with the facts, particularly in the case of Rodó, Vaz Ferreira or Ingenieros, since these writers seem to have kept abreast of European currents.⁶ When discussing positivism, for instance, they often refer to Comte or Spencer, but they also deal with

the more recent expressions of this philosophy. Rodó's concern with Renan, Taine, Guyau, points to a familiarity with modern positivists. Vaz Ferreira cites, explains and criticizes contemporary sources and is up on the latest developments of French and even American philosophy.⁷ And his works are cited and reviewed in European journals.⁸ Ingenieros is the most involved of the three in European currents. His scientific and philosophic works are reviewed in the journals, and his books translated into French, German and Italian.⁹ He was invited to attend international conferences and to contribute to European journals. And he made the acquaintance of Unamuno and of the contemporary representatives of European positivism, Le Dantec and Ribot.

There is a time lag, but it can be explained by pointing to the time it takes for philosophic material to be translated and to reach the New World. As the time is shortened, so is the lag. Interest in European ideas was always present in Latin America—only the road these ideas had to travel was arduous. The major philosophic language is French, but the lay public was interested in Spanish translations. These translations were made only when the books were assured a wide readership; hence the wait until a book became popular. Ingenieros' efforts toward the publication of materials regardless of cost or popularity deserves mention.¹⁰

And the distances between European and Latin America are enormous. With the time it took to translate, print, distribute, ship, unload and redistribute in the 18th century, for instance, it is a small wonder the Enlightenment did not touch Latin America for at least twenty five years after its impact in Europe. If positivism began to gain popularity in Argentina or Uruguay during the 1830's, when its popularity in Europe

began to wane, by the 1900's it was already feeling strong opposition, not only from the newer European "imports," but from native ideas.

The last view challenged here is that there is no originality in Latin American thought, that Latin American philosophy is an unqualified emulation of European philosophy, that the ideas of the Enlightenment, eclecticism or positivism were imitated, misused or misunderstood.¹¹ The roots of this half-truth are deep, even for some very good scholars who have studied the subject carefully.¹² Granted that European philosophy played an important part in the development of Latin American thought, the debates for and against positivism in Uruguay, for instance, indicate not imitation, misuse or misunderstanding, but an awareness of the shortcomings of what was considered by some to be a viable philosophy. Rodo's, Vaz Ferreira's or Ingenieros' alleged improvements of positivism are evidence, not of unqualified emulation, but of careful assessment. If anything, this "improvement" should point to a greater originality in their works.

The problem is that lack of originality is a given, something of a dogma. If, on the one hand, there are changes in a doctrine or philosophy, the charge of bad copy emerges. If, on the other, a doctrine is correctly understood and argued for in terms close to what the author had in mind, the charge of copy reemerges--albeit a good copy. It seems that in these circumstances nothing can be given as evidence against the accusation of unoriginality. But what kind of originality can be expected, particularly in philosophy? It certainly can not be, as some have argued, an independence from European models, that is, to an ahistoric philosophy.¹³ Santayana has warned us against that. Nor can it be the kind of

originality exhibited by European models since they make constant references to past philosophies--footnotes to Plato, so to speak. If this curious demand for originality is applied to European philosophies, then either they are ahistoric or copies, good and bad. The search for originality in philosophy is, so construed, a search for the impossible and a demand that Latin American thinkers do what no one else can.

Conversely, there has been a search for a typically Latin American philosophy, whose function has been variously perceived as the expression of the spirit or culture of its people, a different kind of philosophy, on par with British empiricism or French rationalism, or a philosophy of liberation, that aims to free Latin America from the colonial and industrialized nations.¹⁴ The idea behind this philosophy and its variants is to establish a philosophical independence from the European models; hence, the search for originality. The problem with these conceptions is that this idea of total or partial independence would also contribute to an ahistoric philosophy. More important, what is being rejected--the so called European models--are not expressions of values, though God knows this abounds in philosophical formulations, but standard methods, problems, forms of argumentation, traditional to philosophy and transcending accidents of time and place. In a sense, the efforts of these Latin American philosophers--to rid philosophy of "European" biases--is commendable. It would be a shame if, instead, they would impose "Latin American" values and biases, for few of their own stated goals would be achieved. And it would be a disaster if, with these "European" biases, they would rid philosophy of its traditional and universal conceptions.

There are some unresolved questions in this study, for instance, the problem of lack of primary sources: Though all of Rodó's work and most of Vaz Ferreira's or Ingenieros' are available, there is next to nothing from the Uruguayan or Argentinian philosophers who argued for and against positivism.¹⁵ We suspect that if these works are available in anything other than secondary sources, a closer study of the more serious philosophical works will reveal some surprises.

Another unanswered question concerns the mutual influences of Ingenieros, Vaz Ferreira and Rodó. How well did they know each other? There are hints, common acquaintances, similarities in phraseology, but very little else. It is unlikely that Ingenieros and Rodó knew each other personally. It is certain that Ingenieros was acquainted with Ariel, in view of the stand he takes in El hombre mediocre. What about Vaz Ferreira and Rodó? There is some likelihood of personal acquaintance since Vaz Ferreira's sister, a poetess of merit, knew Rodó.¹⁶ And there is no evidence that Vaz Ferreira and Ingenieros crossed paths. These are interesting questions from the historian's point of view and tend to support, to some degree, the idea advanced earlier that Latin American intellectuals worked in relative isolation from each other.

Answers to these and other questions must await the day Latin American philosophy becomes a more popular topic of research. number of scholars interested in the field, even in Latin America, is small, and the subject matter is vast. And further questions will certainly crop up as the horizon expands to encompass a larger number of Latin American philosophers.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

¹Villegas, Panorama, p. 11.

²Crawford, A Century, p. 4; Davis, Latin American Thought, p. 3; Zea, Esencia, p. 173, 176.

³Crawford, A Century, p. 4-5, 7.

⁴For Ingenieros' view on art see José Ingenieros, "Psychopathology in Art," Inter-America [English] 3 (1919-20):377-86.

⁵Crawford, A Century, p. 10-11; Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 39-42. See also Samuel Ramos, Profile of Man and Culture in Mexico, Pan American Paperbacks 4, The Texas Pan American Series, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1975), p. 19.

⁶To explain this time discrepancy some writers assume Latin American philosophy to be asynchronous: either ahead or behind the times. José Perdomo García, "La filosofía hispanoamericana y su ritmo asincrónico," Estudios hispanoamericanos [Madrid] 43-45 (1953):344.

⁷Vaz Ferreira's criticism of William James Pragmatism, in Conocimiento y acción, or the appendix on the fallacies found in Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger, 1909-10, in Logica viva, p. 254-65.

⁸For instance, Goblot, "Lógica viva," p. 455, and Jean Pérès, "Carlos Vaz Ferreira: un philosophe sud-américain," Bulletin de l'Amérique latine [Paris] 9 (1920):107-116.

⁹For instance, Ingenieros, Prinzipien der Biologischen Psychologie, and Principes de psychologie biologique, R. Delpuech, trans., (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1914). Also Paul Holbo, "José Ingenieros, Argentine Intellectual Historian: La evolución de las ideas argentinas," The Americas 21 (1964):21.

¹⁰Bagú, Ingenieros, p. 68.

¹¹Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 39-41.

¹²Ardao, "Assimilation," p. 11. Leopoldo Zea, "En torno a una filosofía americana," Jornadas 52, Centro de Estudios Sociales, (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1945), p. 66.

¹³Salazar Bondy, ¿Existe? p. 125-33.

¹⁴Horacio V. Cerruti Guldberg, "Posibilidades y límites de una filosofía latinoamericana despues de una filosofía de la liberación;" Teodoro Lascaris-Comneno, "Identidad e inautenticidad del pensamiento latinoamericano;" Francisco Larroyo, "Posibilidades y límites de una filosofía latinoamericana;" papers read at the IX Congreso Interamericano de Filosofía, Caracas, Venezuela, 20th to the 24th of June, 1977.

¹⁵With the exception of Bunge's "Evolution of Rights," there are almost no primary sources available to the researcher in the United States.

¹⁶In this context, see Rodó, Obras, p. 1016, 1069, 1419-21.

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