

INFORMATION TO USERS

This was produced from a copy of a document sent to us for microfilming. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the material submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or notations which may appear on this reproduction.

1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting through an image and duplicating adjacent pages to assure you of complete continuity.
2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a round black mark it is an indication that the film inspector noticed either blurred copy because of movement during exposure, or duplicate copy. Unless we meant to delete copyrighted materials that should not have been filmed, you will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.
3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., is part of the material being photographed the photographer has followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin filming at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. If necessary, sectioning is continued again—beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.
4. For any illustrations that cannot be reproduced satisfactorily by xerography, photographic prints can be purchased at additional cost and tipped into your xerographic copy. Requests can be made to our Dissertations Customer Services Department.
5. Some pages in any document may have indistinct print. In all cases we have filmed the best available copy.

**University
Microfilms
International**

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106
18 BEDFORD ROW, LONDON WC1R 4EJ, ENGLAND

7913127

GLADUE, E. TED, JR.
CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED
NATIONS: A PERCEPTUAL ANALYTIC APPROACH.

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PH.D., 1979

University
Microfilms
International

300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

© COPYRIGHT BY

E. TED GLADUE, JR.

1978

CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC BEHAVIOR IN
THE UNITED NATIONS:
A PERCEPTUAL ANALYTIC APPROACH

by

E. TED GLADUE, JR.

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.

1978

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

18 December 1978
date

December 18 1978
date

J. S. Staessing
Chairman of Examining Committee

Wm. L. L. L. L.
Executive Officer

Stanley L. L. L.
Wm. L. L. L.
Wm. L. L. L.
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Abstract

CHINA'S DIPLOMATIC BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED NATIONS: A PERCEPTUAL ANALYTIC APPROACH

by

E. Ted. Gladue, Jr.

Advisor: Professor John Stoessinger

This study examines China's diplomatic behavior in the United Nations within the context of four important global issues: Africa and Decolonization; Law of the Sea; Disarmament, Arms Control, and Deterrence; and the New International Economic Order (NIEO).

The thesis of the study is that an analysis of China's diplomatic behavior within the context of the global issues under discussion reveal that:

1. The Sino-Soviet conflict is so pervasive and penetrating that it affects China's perceptions of all the crucial global issues.

2. China perceives the evolving process of a new world economic order, and is active in the making of new procedures, new rules, and new structures of international behavior. From the policy standpoint, China is deeply concerned with her future economic development and future international economic trends.

3. China has never perceived herself in the role of a Superpower as evidenced by her behavior in the Security Council, various UN conferences, and her profile at the UN.

4. While China seeks to project the image of accommodation with most Third World countries, she has refrained from playing a leadership role, and has opted to play a supportive and often passive role as evidenced by her participation in the legislative politics of UN and international conferences.

5. China's image in the world cannot be too closely linked with any one bloc or group of states, whether East-West, or North-South. Policy decisions are often influenced by pragmatic considerations.

6. Peking's UN diplomacy reflects an image of China that seeks accommodation and patience in achieving her desired goals. China, in the 1970's, has learned to accommodate her expectations to reflect compatibility with the external environment, and this will likely carry over into the 1980's.

7. China's private and public image, based on what she says and what she does, reflects a high degree of consistency. This is expected to be further reinforced in the future.

This study covers the period from 1971 - 1976, during which time the author was in residence at the United Nations. The data utilized in the research were based on U.N. documents, speeches, voting records, and most important, hundreds of interviews at the United Nations.

Perceptual and cognitive studies are utilized as the method of analysis in this study.

THIS IS DEDICATED TO
MY SON

MICHAEL PATRICK GLADUE

July 26, 1963 - March 7, 1968

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I first wish to thank the United Nations library staff members who have been helpful, friendly, courteous, and above all--efficient. Allowing me the use of an office for four years enabled me to share in their environment. I shall never forget their hospitality, and they emotionally became my good friends. I shall always be grateful to these fine people. I would like to personally thank Mr. Nicholas Christonikos for his consistent help and professional support over a seven year period at the United Nations.

There are hundreds of delegates, Secretariat staff, and members of the Security Department at the United Nations that, if space allowed, I would wish to mention for their thoughtful considerations.

I wish to thank Dr. Donald Zagoria and Dr. Abe Bargman of CUNY for suggesting very helpful criticism on earlier drafts of this study. Dr. Samuel Kim, of Monmouth College, offered several very helpful suggestions for which I am grateful. I was most fortunate to have a Committee made up of people for whom I had the utmost respect. They are: Dr. John Stoessinger (CUNY), Dr. Arnold Rogow (CUNY), Dr. Stanley Lawson (St. John's University and the UN), Dr. Noel Brown (UN), and Dr. Benjamin Rivilin (CUNY and NYU). I thank you all.

Dr. Arnold Rogow (a practicing psychotherapist as well as a political scientist), who served as my reader, gave me more support than I think he realizes. I had the intellectual treat of Dr. Rogow's year's course in Psychiatry and Politics at Mt. Sinai Medical School. I found him to be a stimulating teacher, with a wide range of knowledge and expertise. But most important, he is a fine gentleman.

I think Dr. Joseph Viteritti, whose close friendship during these long years of graduate school went far beyond discussions of political science. Dr. Viteritti, a Public Policy expert, who himself devoted considerable energy to Chinese studies, unselfishly gave time from his busy schedule to read, discuss, and criticize this manuscript.

When rewriting a 300 page draft of this study, I was reminded that Florida can be a difficult place to work when compared with the stimulation afforded by seven years in New York. I am most grateful to Dr. Richard Hodgetts, Professor of Business Management at Florida International University, whose critical evaluations became so crucial to my discipline. I wish him to know how much I cherish his friendship.

I wish to thank an old friend, Clyde Wooten, Professor of Chinese studies at the University of Miami's International Affairs Center, for reading and criticising several chapters of earlier drafts.

I wish to thank my dear old friend, Dr. Louis Gioia of CUNY for giving me a roof over my head during those last six months in New York. Our friendship has, and will always, be.

I shall never forget Dr. Henry Rofinot of Villanova University, who, several weeks following my graduation from college, offered me my first opportunity to teach at the university level.

Above all, and more than anyone else, I thank Dr. John Stoessinger. He encouraged me to come to New York in 1970 and never lost faith in my abilities and potential. He worked with me through the most difficult period of my personal life, never critical, never questioning unnecessarily, but always "there." Teaching with Dr. Stoessinger at Hunter College for six years was an experience I shall cherish the rest of my life, for I

know I was with the most eloquent teacher anyone might ever encounter. His spirit is inspiring, his intellect is exciting, his presence is hope, his recovery capacity is tough, his humanity is always present. He is a friend.

To my daughters, Beth and Maureen, who through this whole ordeal may have doubted my love--I love you both, and may Daddy's accomplishment in some way give inspiration to your own dreams. And to their mother, may life be kind to a good woman.

To my parents, who never had the opportunity of an education, but whose intelligence I was always cognizant of and proud, may your son's Ph.D give you a little solace to soothe some of the past pains caused by an untamed son.

To Jim Crissy, for his faithful friendship and support, may our friendship continue the rest of our lives. To Miss Marcy Shain, for her patience, care, and consideration in the typing and final preparation of this manuscript.

To my dearest Jennifer, whose support and love enable me to complete this dissertation, our celebration will be a private one.

Table of Contents

	Page
ABSTRACT	iv
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	vii
CHAPTER	
I INTRODUCTION	1
Focus of Study	1
Thesis of Study	2
Method of Analysis	4
Problems of Analysis	6
Development of Theory and Method	11
Application of Theory and Method	15
Data Collection	22
A Framework of Perception	27
II CHINA: DECOLONIZATION, AFRICA, AND THE UN.	31
Introduction to Decolonization: Background	31
Chinese Perceptions of Decolonization	36
Chinese Perceptions of Africa.	40
China in the United Nations	52
Angola: A Case Study in Decolonization	62
Perceptions of Several African States	62
Perceptions of Non-African States	63
Chinese Perceptions of Angola	65
Diplomacy Prior to Security Council Debate.	69
The Security Council and Angola	72
Summary.	85
III CHINA: THE LAW OF THE SEA	93
Introduction	93
Background to the Law of the Sea Issue	93
Problems of Negotiation and the Law of the Sea	101
Chinese Perceptions of the Law of the Sea	106
Chinese Perceptions Prior to Caracas and Geneva: The evolution of Chinese Perceptions	113
The PRC and Caracas, 1974	135
The PRC and Geneva, 1975	156
The PRC, the Spratly Islands, Off-shore Oil	167
Summary	176

CHAPTER

IV	CHINA: DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, AND DETERRENCE	188
	Introduction: Disarmament and Arms Control	188
	Chinese Perceptions on Disarmament and Arms Control	197
	Chinese Perceptions on Deterrence and Nuclear Power	204
	Chinese Perception and Disarmament: The Background	210
	Chinese Perception of General Dis- armament Questions	216
	Chinese Perception of Nuclear-Free Zones	227
	China and The Treaty of Tlatelolco: A Case Study	231
	Chinese Perception of Biological and Chemical Arms Control	238
	PRC and SALT	240
	Summary	251
V	CHINA: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER	262
	Introduction: Perceptions of Development.	263
	NIEO & Interdependency	267
	NIEO & Self-Reliance	275
	Chinese Perceptions of the NIEO	282
	Chinese Perceptions of the NECO Issues	302
	Chinese Perceptions of International Trade and Development.	302
	Chinese Perceptions of International Aid and Assistance	319
	Summary	328
VI	CONCLUSIONS.	334
	APPENDIX A	356
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	358

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Focus of Study

This study is an analysis of Chinese diplomatic behavior in the United Nations within the context of four important global issues:

1. China: Decolonization and Africa
2. China: Disarmament, Arms Control, and Deterrence
3. China: and The International Law of the Sea
4. China: and The New International Economic Order

On October 25, 1971, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was welcomed to its seat at the United Nations. The inevitable question on everyone's mind was how the Chinese would behave within the organization that had rejected the PRC for 22 years.¹ The record since enables us to offer an analysis.²

1. In the spring of 1971, this writer submitted a paper for Professor John Stoessinger's International Organization course at CUNY entitled: "How Will the PRC Behave When They Enter the United Nations?" In my research I conducted interviews at the United Nations and found, even at this early date, that most UN personnel were optimistic about the PRC's future contribution at the UN.

2. See Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: a preliminary analysis," World Politics, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (April, 1974).

Data from the internal environment relating directly to China's involvement with the issues under investigation will be used to supplement information gleaned from United Nations' sources. Resource people at the United Nations, who have had direct experience with Chinese diplomatic behavior in various areas of the global arena, have been quite helpful in respect to this supplemental data. In other words, in order to develop a comprehensive analysis of Chinese perceptions of the important issues under examination, it will be necessary to consult supplemental data pertaining to Chinese foreign policy external to the UN.

This dual approach is necessary, since with some global issues, Chinese diplomatic behavior at the UN may be more "symbolic" than "substantive."³ By studying Chinese behavior external to the United Nations, substantive data on the issues may be acquired that will supplement and clarify China's symbolic diplomatic activity in the United Nations. In the final analysis all data will be measured against whatever insight the United Nations affords in order to clarify any perceptions, images, or misperceptions.

Thesis of Study

The thesis of this study is that an analysis of Chinese diplomatic behavior within the context of the global issues under discussion will reveal that:

-
3. Samuel S. Kim, "Behavioural Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," China Quarterly, No. 72 (December, 1977), p. 741.

1. The Sino-Soviet conflict is so pervasive and penetrating that it affects China's perceptions of all the crucial global issues.

2. China perceives the evolving process of a new world economic order, and is active in the making of new procedures, new rules, and new structures of international behavior. From the policy standpoint, China is deeply concerned with her future economic development and future international economic trends.

3. China has never perceived herself in the role of a Superpower as evidenced by her behavior in the Security Council, various UN conferences, and her profile at the UN.

4. While China seeks to project the image of accommodation with most Third World countries, she has refrained from playing a leadership role, and has opted to play a supportive and often passive role as evidenced by her participation in the legislative politics of UN and international conferences.

5. China's image in the world cannot be too closely linked with any one bloc or group of states, whether East-West, or North-South. Policy decisions are often influenced by pragmatic considerations.

6. Peking's UN diplomacy reflects an image of China that seeks accommodation and patience in achieving her desired goals. China, in the 1970's, has learned to accommodate her expectations to reflect compatibility with the external environment, and this will likely carry over into the 1980's.

7. China's private and public image, based on what she says and what she does, reflects a high degree of consistency. This is expected to be further reinforced in the future.

Method of Analysis

Perceptual and cognitive studies will be utilized as the method of analysis in this study. The importance of perceptual analysis in international relations has been recognized by numerous scholars lately,⁴ but over a decade ago John Stoessinger suggested that:

the gap between perception and reality have exacerbated the fierceness of the international struggle for power and have also done much to slow down the advance toward international order. In view of this fact, it seems of the utmost importance for students of international relations to expose themselves to the work of scholars in the area of human perception--sociologists, social psychologists, and even depth psychologists. This is not to say that the objective realities of world affairs should in any way be neglected. Yet since these are as vast and difficult to contend with as they are, the least we can hope for is that they not be rendered even more complex and inaccessible to reason by our unsubstantiated preconceptions. The perils of our age demand our every effort to see and deal with the world as it really is. Once again man must escape from Plato's cave, in which he perceives only shadows instead of realities. Only when our reason thus acquires passion will we remove the Sword of Damocles which has been suspended for far too long over our tormented world.⁵

Few studies have even attempted to evaluate the impact of environmental factors on the shaping of Chinese foreign policy, and Robert Boardman has argued:

-
4. Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically: 'Cognitive Process' Approaches," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns, The Free Press, Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1976, pp. 120-144.
 5. John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time. Random House, New York, 1965, pp. 402-403.

. . . that much of the existing academic literature on Chinese foreign policy is open to criticism when tested against the prevailing norms of political science. Students of Chinese foreign policy have tended to lack a commitment to theory construction. As a result, the field has remained somewhat apart from the major thrust of theoretical and empirical research into foreign policy structures and processes. One of the victims of this lack of interest on the part of theorists and Sinologists has been the study of perception.⁶

In stressing the importance of perception as a method of investigation, Boardman has maintained that:

The transition in Chinese foreign policy studies to a model of behavior or paradigm more in tune with the concerns of theorists involves more than just the addition of a few extra research questions. The differences are too great and too crucial. Methodologically, recent empirical foreign policy theory calls for comparative research and a goal of theory-building that would require a herculean shift of the Sinologist's traditional orientation towards his subject. Substantively, the models focus on a quite different array of questions. In particular, the continuing endeavours in the foreign policy field as a whole to come to terms with perceptual and cognitive phenomena clash headlong with the Chinese foreign policy scholar's perennial neglect of this central issue. The role in research design which a comprehensive vision of social and political reality can play is an unresolved problem, but one view in the natural and biological science is that "the more the object of research is a complex systematic whole, the less one can dispense with the help of gestalt in perception." The suggestion is that the most useful gestalt in China studies would be one that accorded an important role to perception and cognition, and through these sets of variables to the impact of environmental determinants of Chinese foreign policy.⁷

-
6. Robert Boardman, "Perception theory and the study of Chinese foreign policy," in Roger Dial (ed.), Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy (Halifax, Canada: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1974), 321.
 7. Ibid.

Problems of Analysis

One of the basic problems involved with attempting to study Chinese foreign policy from the perceptual and cognitive perspective is the lack of any substantial perceptual studies in the field of Chinese foreign policy. Specifically, some scholars utilize the term "perception" in their titles, but none of the perceptual tools--attitude change, social psychology, cognitive psychology, or visual perception--are utilized in their analysis.⁸

Second, when many scholars analyze the ways in which China views the world, it is usually subsumed under the general classifications of "ideology," or "national interest." In fact, most studies of Chinese foreign policy have concentrated on either one of these concepts, and it has long been debated whether "national interest" or "ideology" is the most decisive factor in the conduct of China's foreign relations. Several examples may be cited. Hans J. Morgenthau claims that ideology is not important and maintains:

Communism only adds a new dynamic dimension to the means by which those policies are to be achieved. In other words, the fundamental fact in Asia is not that China has a Communist government but that she has resumed her traditional role as the predominant power in Asia.⁹

-
8. See Morton Ginsburg, "On the Chinese Perception of a World Order," in Tsou, China in Crisis, Vol. II, p. 73; G. W. Choudhury, Chinese Perception of the World, University of American Press, 1977; Dennis M. Ray, "Chinese Perceptions of Social Imperialism and Economic Dependency," "The Impact of Soviet Aid," in Bryant G. Garth (ed.), China's Changing Role in World Economy, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975, pp. 36-82.
 9. Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Vietnam Crises & China," Bull. of the Atomic Scientist (June, 1965), p. 27; see also, "The U.S. & China," in Tang, Tsou, China in Crises, Vol. 2, University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 93-105.

Meanwhile, A. Doak Barnett has argued that one must be careful not to ignore ideology:

It is true that the Chinese Communists are pragmatic in interpreting their ideology to take advantage of concrete situations and are flexible in formulating their day-to-day tactics. But to underrate the importance of ideology as a determinant of Peking's long-range policy, or to argue that ideology is nothing more than a cloak for Chinese national interests, would be a very serious mistake. The Chinese Communists are motivated by a genuine revolutionary zeal which is probably stronger than that of the present leaders of the Soviet Union. Ideology greatly influences their conceptions of China's national interests, and the Communists' belief in world revolution definitely impels them to project their influence beyond China's borders.¹⁰

Scholars such as Dwight H. Perkins and Morton Halperin share a corresponding view on ideology, and argue that the Chinese leadership "probably gives a higher priority to ideology than their Soviet counterparts do."¹¹

In direct contrast to the supporters of national interest as the primary motivating theory, other scholars maintain that ideology is the raison d'etre behind Chinese foreign policy.¹² At the same time Abraham M. Halperin significantly points out:

-
10. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), 68.
 11. Morton H. Halperin and Dwight H. Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge, Mass.: Frederick A. Praeger for Harvard University, 1965), p. 1.
 12. Franz Michael & George Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964); H. Arthur Steiner, "The Mainsprings of Chinese Communist Foreign Policy," American Journal of International Law, XLIV, No. 1, January, 1950.

It is sometimes asked whether Chinese policy is based on ideology or on national interest. Neither concept is altogether clear, and the two are not mutually exclusive. Communist ideology is not pure philosophy but also political analysis and strategy. . . while . . . a drive toward great power status has been a constant move of the CPR, it is a motive that has not always pulled in an opposite direction from ideology. . . . In a number of situations the Chinese have had options and . . . their choices have reflected both their great power ambitions and their sense of a world revolutionary mission.¹³

Similarly, A. S. Whiting maintains that both national interests and ideology are important to China, and argues that:

The present rulers of China are Chinese. They have lived there, with few exceptions, during most of their past. The environment within which they operate is essentially the same as that which prevailed in China for the previous century. At the same time, they view that environment through Communist lenses. The elite possess a highly articulated ideology which it consciously proclaims as the basis of behaviour: the Marxist Leninist creed of Communism.¹⁴

Many other scholars, such as A. Doak Barnett, Morton Halperin, Robert A. Scalapino, and Harold C. Hinton share this conclusion.¹⁵

13. Abraham M. Halperin, "China in the Postwar World," China Quarterly, No. 21, January-March, 1965, p. 43.
14. Allen S. Whiting, "Foreign Policy of Communist China," in Roy C. Macridis (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 296.
15. A. Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia; Robert A. Scalapino, "The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China," in Foreign Policies in A World of Change, Joseph Black and Kenneth Thompson (eds.) (New York: Harper & Sons, 1963), pp. 549-590; Morton Halperin, "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy," Current Scene, VI, No. 13 (Aug., 1968), pp. 1-15; Harold C. Hinton, Communist China in World Politics (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966).

This study will be only marginally concerned with the problems implicit with analyzing such dichotomous factors as national interest and ideology as they relate to the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. The main concern of this study deals not with objective factors as national interest and ideology, but with the subjective nature of perception.

For example, it is the belief in this study that knowledge of Chinese interests and ideology will not necessarily tell us how the Chinese perceive their environment, select their options, bargain with actors, and define their goals. Nor does such knowledge tell us much about the perceptions other actors have of Chinese behavior.

Yet, this study does not ignore ideology and interest since they do play a determinant role in the formulation of perceptions.

For example, Willard Mullin's recent definition of ideology would have to be taken into account when analyzing perception development. Mullin states:

I would define ideology as a logically coherent system of symbols which, within a more or less sophisticated conception of history, links the cognitive and evaluative perception of one's social condition--especially its prospects for the future--to a program of collective action for the maintenance, alteration or transformation of a society.¹⁶

Within the context of Chinese foreign policy, this writer would have to agree with Allen Whiting and Robert

16. Willard A. Mullins, "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVI, No. 2, 1972, p. 510.

Dernberger who have pointed out that:

Chinese perceptions and expectations are shaped by an ideological framework that is articulated daily through aural and visual media from the break of sunrise to the hour of retirement at night. This constant flow of indoctrination intermittently contains modifications and new formulations, but the basic ingredients remain the same amalgam of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.¹⁷

And, carried into a broader framework, the same authors argue that:

Whether in China's defiant isolation or in its speeches to world councils and United Nations assemblages on such issues as population, food, and law of the sea, the larger ideological framework has been and still is invoked the pertinence of particular developments for all levels of society.¹⁸

However, the problem under discussion is not "what motivates," "what causes," or "what goals," but how situations are defined and viewed. The central idea is that, "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."¹⁹ It has been argued that "preliminary to any self-determined act of behavior there is always a stage of examination and deliberation which we may call the definition of the situation."²⁰

17. Allen Whiting & Robert Dernberger, China's Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.), p. 37.

18. Ibid., p. 39.

19. W. I. Thomas, The Child in America (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 572.

20. W. I. Thomas, The Unadjusted Girl (Boston: Ginn, 1923), p. 42; see Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (eds.), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962).

Within the broader context of international relations, John Stoessinger has suggested:

that international relations are often what people think they are; or, to put it in other words, that under certain conditions, men respond not to realities but to fictions that they have themselves created. To say that there are no objective problems in Sino-American or Russo-American relations would, of course, be folly. But the state of world politics lends itself all too easily to the development of wide gaps between what reality is and the way it is perceived. Because of this fact, perception probably plays almost as important a role in international relations as does objective reality itself.²¹

In discussing Chinese diplomacy Samuel Kim as stated:

It is not the objective reality--whatever it may mean--but subjective perceptions (images) of other participants that bear practical relation to the conduct of Chinese multilateral diplomacy. For the reactions of other actors in global politics would be based on their images of Chinese behaviour in UN politics. In short, the question as to whether the Chinese succeeded in establishing diplomatic credibility by matching their words with their deeds is a matter of perception on the part of political actors.²²

Development of Theory and Method

A great many scholars have recognized that our behavior is in large part influenced by the manner in which we perceive, diagnose, and evaluate our social and physical environment. Our perceptions, in turn, are filtered through clusters of beliefs about the past, the present, and the

21. John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 4.

22. S. Kim, Behavioural Dimensions, p. 715.

future, and what ought to be. Our experience and beliefs provide us with a more or less coherent code by which we organize and make sense out of what would otherwise be a confusing array of signals picked up from the environment by our senses. Foreign policy decision-makers are not much different in this respect.²³ Yet, scholars are far from agreement about the central relevance or utility of research on perception and cognition in international politics. As an example:

In the long run, if not in the short run as well, the course of international history seems likely to be shaped mainly by the convergence of forces in which the talents, aspirations, and perspectives of particular individuals are of relatively minor importance.²⁴

Beliefs of foreign policy decision-makers are central to the study of decision outputs and probably account for more of the variance than any other single factor.²⁵

In terms of a central paradigm, a perceptual study of foreign policy behavior is a little difficult to characterize. Partly because it is only recently in the history of the discipline that the models of state responses, being employed intuitively by scholars, have been spelled out and consciously examined. Foreign policy and international relations scholars have questioned and differed in their response to arguments

-
- 23. Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers Viewed Psychologically," p. 122.
 - 24. James Rosenau, "Book Review," American Historical Review, Vol. 77, 1972, pp. 1415-1416.
 - 25. Michael Shapiro & Matthew Bonham, "Cognitive Processes and Foreign Policy Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 17, June, 1973, p. 149.

based on psychological data. The earliest development of a theoretical formulation may perhaps be seen as the "power" framework of Morgenthau and Schwarzenber.²⁶ This school developed in the 1940's in an attempt to create a discipline separate from diplomatic history, international law, current affairs, and the utopianism of the previous decades. The "power" model stressed the role of several enduring factors in state behavior: geographic, military capability, economic strength, and others. The role of belief played only a marginal part within this model. But beliefs did play some part in the sense of information about capabilities, distortions, by governments of the nature of international politics, and diplomacy. And finally, in the use of "will" as a psychological determination to use military power, or the ability to persuade other states of this determination, and other states' judgements of this readiness.²⁷

In the 1950's and 1960's Modelski developed one of the earliest models employing an input-output format akin some ways to psychological models, while confining it to the categories utilized in the power politics model.²⁸ In contrast to the study of international systems; more attention was now being paid to foreign policy studies that focused on the

26. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1976); G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of International Society, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens, 1951).

27. Boardman, op. cit., p. 337.

28. George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1962).

state itself as the pivotal actor in international politics. This new emphasis on the state opened up a whole new area of investigation. Richard Snyder and his colleagues maintained that:

We need to carry the actor-situation scheme one step further in an effort to rid ourselves of the troublesome abstraction "state." It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as its official decision-makers--those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers. State X as actor is translated into its decision-makers as actors. It is also one of our basic choices to take as our prime analytical objective the re-creation of the "world" of the decision-makers as they view it. The manner in which they define situations becomes another way of saying how the state oriented to action and why. This is a quite different approach from trying to recreate the situation and interpretation of it objectively, that is, by the observer's judgement rather than that of the actors themselves.²⁹

Another scholar, Karl Deutsch, built on this approach and on models from such diverse fields as cybernetics, engineer-information theory, and communication, while at the same time stressing the decision-making network's selective filtering of information from its environment.³⁰ J. W. Burton's model of state decision-making has made particular use of the categories of perception, and classification or

29. Snyder, Bruck, & Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision Making (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 65.

30. K. W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control (New York: The Free Press, 1963).

or memory at both governmental and community levels of states' responses to change. Another scholar, R. A. Brody, has also studied the relations between cognition and behavior in foreign policy processes by concentrating on the frame of reference of the decision-maker.³¹

In order to simplify a breakdown of the literature dealing with perception and cognition in decision-making, Holsti has devised a chart which can be found in Appendix A. However, the application of these theoretical models of political science to the study of Chinese foreign policy has left much to be desired. For example, Boardman argues that:

Little if any of this theoretical activity has made an impact on the study of Chinese foreign policy. In terms of the models of perception and behaviour mentioned, the field has remained in an arrested state of development at the stage of looking for explanations of behavior inside the organism: at such factors as ideology, revolutionary ambitions of the leadership, military strength, or whatever. . . . little thought has been given, that is, to the impact of environmental factors on the shaping of Chinese foreign policy. Part of the reason for this is the neglect of the intermediary set of perceptual variables.³²

Application Theory and Method

Perceptual theory begins in the world as we know it and attempts to explain how we come to know it. Part of the answer seems to be that we cannot find out about the world if we

31. R. A. Brody, "Cognition and Behavior: A Model of International Relations," in O. J. Harvey (ed.), Experience, Structure Adaptability (New York: Springer, 1966), pp. 321-348.

32. Boardman, p. 338.

know nothing to begin with. Only by preliminary knowledge or assumption can we interpret sensory information to determine what we are confronting. The necessity of knowledge for the obtaining of knowledge. . . .³³

Perception has been studied in depth by not only psychologists but also by philosophers, social anthropologists, sociologists, and other social scientists. But for the purposes of this study the findings of social psychologists are particularly germane, essentially in the area of research that deals with perceptual and behavioral interactions.³⁴ Of primary concern here are the factors involved with the development of individual's perceptions of others.³⁵ For years researchers were mainly concerned with perceptions as they related to physical objects, and avoided perceptual processes in relations to persons.

Perception research can contribute to foreign policy studies in areas dealing with an individual's perception of

-
33. Kent Dallet, "Transactional and Probabilistic Functionalism," in Carterett and Friedman (eds.), Handbook of Perception: Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 387.
 34. Allan C. Filley, Interpersonal Conflict (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman and Co., 1975), pp. 35-47; P. B. Warr & C. Knapper, The Perception of People and Events (New York: Wiley, 1968); Eric Berne, Games People Play; B. Von Haller Gilmer & Edward Deci, Industrial and Organizational Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1977).
 35. Fritz Heider, "Perceiving the Other Person," in Tagiuri & Petrullo, Perception and Interpersonal Behavior (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 23-32; R. Tagiuri, "Person Perception," in Lindzey & Aronson, The Handbook of Social Psychology (Boston: Addison-Wesley Co., 1969), pp. 395-435.

other's perception.³⁶ For example, several decades ago Fritz Heider stated that:

It is noteworthy that the usual treatment of perception in psychology does not include the area of problems in which p's attention and behavior are directed toward o as a perceiver. The following questions are pertinent in this respect: How do we perceive (know) that another person perceives something in the environment? When do we look forward to his perceptions and when are we afraid of them? When do we believe that o wants to see something or that he can or ought to see it? Certainly, the naive psychology of perception is not merely a figment of the imagination. In its way it provides an admirable analysis of perception for practical purposes. In order to reach a better understanding of these processes, it will be helpful to study the ideas one ordinarily has about the conditions and effects of another person's perceptions. These ideas are the basis of our actions and cognitions in regard to the perceptions of other people, though they are seldom made explicit.³⁷

This leads to the tendency to perceive patterns of relations as consistent and the question of whether this perceptual bias is a net asset or a net liability to decision-making. This tendency to perceive patterns of relations as consistent is derived from people's experiences with their environments and that it is, at minimum, rational. Social structures are more likely to be balanced than they would be by chance alone. If person A likes B and B likes C. A will

-
36. Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1958); R. D. Laing & H. Phillipson, & A. R. Lee, Interpersonal Perception (New York: Spinger, 1966); Edward Jones & Richard Nisbett, "The Actor and the Observer: Divergent Perceptions of the Causes of Behavior," in Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner (eds.), Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior (Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971), 79-94.
37. Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, p. 59.

probably like C. And people do tend to like the enemies of their enemies. This tendency is also apparent in international relations. Patterns of alliances and hostility often approximate balance as states that share the same enemies join forces and states that form close bonds with others earn the enmity of their new friends.³⁸

This research in interpersonal perception can be particularly applicable in dealing with face-to-face interactions as part of an everyday activity, such as the United Nations. Most significant for international relations research:

. . . are the various models that have been developed to investigate interactions as such, at whatever level of analysis a particular investigation is pitched. For example, studies at Stanford University on the outbreak of war in 1914, the Cuba missile crisis of 1962, and other situations have employed a mediated model of state interaction which gives a prominent role to the perceptions by decision-makers of the actions of other states in the international system or in regional subsystems. In other studies, especially of Soviet-American relations, researchers have made use of notions such as Merton's use of the term self-fulfilling Prophecy as a means of tackling conflict situations where the actions of one party seem to be such as to justify the image which the other party has of it; or of the idea that the views of each party in such conflicts constitute a mirror-image of those of the other party. Recently, Gamson and Modigliani, in their "Untangling the Cold War," have looked at the cold war "as a special case of dyadic mutually contingent, hostile interaction." One conclusion was that "mutual misunderstanding and misperception were apparently an important part of the dynamics of this hostile interaction."³⁹

38. Nathan Kogan and Renato Tagiuri, "Interpersonal Preference and Cognitive Organization," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 56 (1958), pp. 113-116.

39. Boardman, Perception Theory, p. 342; see Holsti, North, & Brody, "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis,"

In utilizing "perception" we are dealing with three levels of analysis which can create an analytical problem. Robert Gorman has pointed out some of the inherent difficulties:

Must we look into the perception of the decision-maker at the time the decision was being made by centering our political analysis on the decision-maker himself? Or, should we concentrate on the social organization of which the decision-maker is a part and the social environment in which both the organization and the individual function? If we accept the first choice, then social factors assume a secondary, instrumental purpose. If we choose the second framework, the perceptions of the decision-maker would seem to be logically dependent on external rules, and investigation into the nature of individual perception would be absurd. If we combine the two, as the decision-making theorists seem to have done, we are left with a theory in which each premise is negated by the existence of the other, and the general theory itself is left to flounder in a formalistic but meaningless syncretism.⁴⁰

Rather than attempting to explain Chinese diplomatic behavior as the direct consequence of variables at the three levels of analysis previously discussed, we will examine China's perceptions as one of the immediate causes of her behavior. For example, China felt that her security was endangered by the United States during the Korean and Vietnam

in David Singer (ed.), Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 121-158; U. Bronfenbrenner, "The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report," in Journal of Social Issues, Vol. 17 (1961), pp. 45-60.

40. Robert Gorman, "On the Inadequacies of Non-Philosophical Political Science: A Critical Analysis of Decision-Making Theory," International Studies Quarterly, 14 (December 1970), p. 408.

wars. Peking may have been mistaken in the latter case and correct in the first case, but both cases can be grouped together in discussing the immediate causes of their responses.

Our understanding of China's images and beliefs affects the further question that we ask about China's behavior that we may expect to witness throughout this study. In other words, once we understand China's images and beliefs, how can we explain Peking's risk-taking and misperceptions?

Of course, perceptions, and more specifically perceptions of other actors in the international environment,⁴¹ are not the only variables that are important in this study. Peking and other actors may have the same perceptions, but this does not guarantee that they will adopt the same response. Responses may often be the same, but when they are not, it is normally possible to find the causes of the differences. Actors with different images of an adversary may agree on the appropriate response, but this agreement is apt to be short lived. The same is true with actors favoring the same policy for different reasons. Essentially, the roots of many important disputes about policies lie in differing perceptions. And in many cases when the actors do not realize this, they will misunderstand their disagreement

41. In this study we will usually be discussing specific foreign policies rather than finding general patterns of interaction in most cases; therefore, the term "international environment" is used rather than international system.

and engage in a debate that is unenlightening.⁴²

Images are not first causes, and we will attempt to find the causes of both China's misperceptions and of differences in perceptions. "The second step in the model involves relating images held, if not to reality, then at least to the information available to the actor."⁴³ How, for example, does China come to develop perceptions and images of other actors? What evidence do the Chinese pay most attention to? What makes China perceive threat? Under what conditions does China think that other actors, although hostile, have only limited objectives? What differentiates legitimate inducements from bribes? What kinds of behavior are most apt to change an established image?

This is not to claim that we will be able to explain nearly all Chinese diplomatic behavior. Propositions about both the causes and the effects of images can only be probabilistic. There are too many variables at work to claim more. In the issue areas discussed in this study, actors are faced with a large number of competing values, highly complex situations, and oftentimes, very ambiguous information. Thus, the possibilities and reasons for misperceptions and disagreements are legion. In cutting across all the issues under analysis in this study, certain generalizations concerning Chinese diplomatic behavior will be

42. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1977), p. 31.

43. Ibid.

developed, but exceptions will be common, since in many instances outcomes will be influenced by factors that, from the standpoint of most theories, must be considered accidental. Important Chinese perceptual predispositions will be discovered, but often they will not be controlling.

In summary, perceptual and cognitive tools will be utilized in order to ascertain Chinese perceptions of the issues under discussion, their perceptions of other actors and their intentions, and images the Chinese hope to project to other actors in the international arena. When possible, other actors' perceptions of the Chinese will be analyzed.

In concluding this section on application of theory and method, this writer would be remiss by not stating that the writings of Robert Jervis have been heavily relied upon in this study, particularly Jervis's 1977 textbook on perception.⁴⁴

Data Collection

My six years at the United Nations provided me with unique sources of information that are not otherwise available. These six years of personal observation have left me with impressions that go beyond the information level. In essence, the social and political processes of the United

44. See Robert Jervis, "Hypothesis on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, April, 1968, pp. 454-479; The Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970); Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977).

Nations are not fundamentally different from other social and political organizations that I have experienced. They involved processes such as bargaining, communication, decision-making, socialization, and voting that are found in many other local and national institutions. But, the United Nations is a unique institution and I would have to agree with Chadwick Alger when he states that:

Participation in the United Nations as a learning experience. . . . In terms of those who enter its "classrooms" learn about the whole world, I believe the United Nations is the greatest university in the world--whether the participant be diplomat, doctor, lawyer, journalist, or scholar.⁴⁵

Chinese delegates have spoken out on global issues in plenary sessions, committees, and conferences at the United Nations. Altogether, the PRC's statements as recorded in UN documents are a rich source for analyzing how these global issues fit into the hierarchy of values in Chinese perception of the international order. In addition, we presently have a composite voting record on many of these issues which come before the UN bodies.

The United Nations' published documents record only the verbal and voting behavior of the participating member states. One scholar who has assessed the differences in the forum of negotiations, relates:

45. Chadwick F. Alger, "The Researcher in the United Nations: Evolution of a Research Strategy," in Rosenau (ed.), In Search of Global Patterns, p. 71.

The worst features commonly appear in the open meetings, perhaps because they are used for propaganda, because they fear appearing weak before a public audience, or because they have to show Communists that they are sufficiently "tough" with the imperialists. In quiet negotiations, these external pressures are not present, thus allowing Russian diplomats to adopt more moderate styles. These statements would apply to contemporary Chinese negotiations as well.⁴⁶

Interviews proved to be an indispensable source for descriptive analysis of Chinese behind-the-scenes "consultative" behavior. They often resulted in a clearer understanding of how the Chinese perceived themselves, the issues, other actors. They also added to an understanding of the image Peking may have wanted others to receive, and, in addition, those perceptions other actors had of China.⁴⁷

Anyone familiar with the United Nations is aware that an increasingly growing number of UN decisions grow out of the behind-the-scenes consultations among UN delegates whose end-product is oftentimes a result of informal consensus.⁴⁸

46. K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 207.

47. For background see, K. E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956); "National Images and International Systems," in Wolfran E. Hanrieder, Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (New York: David McKay Co., 1971), pp. 90-107.

48. Sidney B. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure & Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964), pp. 70-71.

It is often difficult to derive any behavioral insight into Chinese diplomacy from UN documentary materials alone since they are often not only inadequate but also can be misleading, revealing blase or rhetorical aspects while concealing vital ones.⁴⁹

My interviews at the United Nations included hundreds of formal and informal meetings. Opinions and comments were solicited from delegates of over 80 nations, ranging in rank from First Secretaries to Ambassador; international civil servants, ranging in rank from p-2 to the Secretary General of a Specialized Agency. In addition, many newsmen, visiting specialists, and scholars all proved to be a tremendous source of consultation.

Further benefits were derived from interviewing many United Nations' personnel and members of delegations who had direct or indirect contact with Chinese diplomacy in various parts of the world. Such valuable contacts could not have been made without extensive travel. This was particularly helpful in attempting to analyze the PRC's behavior in relation to certain issues that the Chinese may have only given "symbolic" attention at the United Nations, while the issues themselves may be of "substantive" importance to Peking. For example, while the Chinese have given only "symbolic" attention to the issue of disarmament at the United Nations,

49. Gabriella Rosner Lande, "An Inquiry into the Successes and Failures of UN General Assembly Resolutions," in Leon Gordenker (ed.), The United Nations in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 106-129.

this is such an important international problem that any analysis of China's international behavior would be remiss in ignoring the disarmament problem. My discussions gave me insight into how the Chinese perceived these problems, and the perceptions others had of Chinese behavior in relation to the problems not readily clarified at UN headquarters in New York.

Prior to most of my interviews, it was politely mentioned that I was to maintain "confidentiality" of my source. This request has been respected throughout the writing of this study.

In concluding this section on data collection, I have to recognize a significant truth in Chadwick Alger's statement that:

No single research technique is adequate for handling a significant research question. Each is only able to provide one perspective, one approximation, of what is going on. I sensed this before my work at the United Nations but experiences in this "laboratory" deepened my understanding of the value of multimethod research. Documents, voting records, interviews, informants, observed behavior, all can be seen as pieces of a mosaic. Each piece was placed there for a purpose by the actor and must be understood in terms of its special purpose. Each piece of the mosaic has effects that the actor may not understand and sometimes may not even perceive. But a number of pieces must be viewed in order to comprehend fully the context of a single piece. This simple truth is most obviously, and repetitively, violated by many who do UN voting studies--those who exhibit a naive unconcern with the context of the voting data they manipulate.⁵⁰

50. Chadwick Alger, in Rosenau (ed.), Global Patterns, p. 59.

This study covers the period from the fall of 1971 to the spring of 1976. The analysis ends with the spring of 1976 since my residency at the United Nations ended at that time.

Framework of Perception

Perception like taxes has always been with us; Just as Moliere's "Bourgeois Gentil Homme" discovered in respect to prose, it is something that we have been doing all our lives.⁵¹

Perception, the meaning and understanding of which, like democracy, may appear obvious to many but (like democracy) to understand its essence, demands critical discipline. The purpose of this section is to give the reader some idea of the parameters of perception that are utilized in this study.

The following hypotheses have been taken from Robert Jervis's 1968 article on misperception,⁵² but again, it should be stressed that these hypotheses are only reference points and many other variables come into play during the course of this study.

Hypothesis 1: Decision-makers tend to fit incoming information into their existing theories and images. Indeed, their theories and images play a large part in determining what they notice. In other words, actors tend to perceive what they expect.

51. Lester Mann, "Perception Training: Misdirections and Redirection," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, Vol. 40, No. 1 (January, 1970), p. 30.

52. Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20 (April, 1968), pp. 454-479.

Hypothesis 2: Scholars and decision-makers are apt to err by being too wedded to the established view and too closed to new information, as opposed to being too willing to alter their theories. . . . Actors tend to establish their theories and expectations prematurely.

Hypothesis 3: Actors can more easily assimilate into their established image of another actors information contradicting that image if the information is transmitted and considered bit by bit than if it comes all at once.

Hypothesis 4: Misperception is most difficult to correct in the case of a missing concept and least difficult to correct in the case of a recognized but presumably unfilled concept.

Hypothesis 5: When messages are sent from a different background of concerns and information than is possessed by the receiver, misunderstanding is likely.

Hypothesis 6: When people spend a great deal of time drawing up a plan or making a decision, they tend to think that the message about it they wish to convey will be clear to the receiver.

Hypothesis 7: Actors often do not realize that actions intended to project a given image may not have the desired effect because the actions themselves do not turn out as planned. Thus even without appreciable impact of different cognitive structures and backgrounds, an action may convey an unwanted message.

Hypothesis 8: There is an overall tendency for decision-makers to see other states as more hostile than they are.

Hypothesis 9: Actors tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized, disciplined, and coordinated than it is.

Hypothesis 10: Because a state gets most of its information about the other state's policies from the other's foreign office, it tends to take the foreign office's position for the stand of the other government as a whole.

Hypothesis 11: Actors tend to overestimate the degree to which others are acting in response to what they themselves do when the others behave in accordance with the actor's desires; but when the behavior of the other is undesired, it is usually seen as derived from internal forces.

Secondly, there is a tendency of actors to believe that the hostile behavior of others is to be explained by the other side's motives and not by its reaction to the first side.

Hypothesis 12: When actors have intentions that they do not try to conceal from others, they tend to assume that others accurately perceive those intentions. Only rarely do they believe that others may be reacting to a much less favorable image of themselves than they think they are projecting.

Hypothesis 13: It is hard for an actor to believe that the other can see him as a menace; it is often even harder for him to see that issues important to him are not important to others.

Hypothesis 14: Actors tend to overlook the fact that evidence consistent with their theories may also be consistent with other views.

CHAPTER II

CHINA: DECOLONIZATION, AFRICA, AND THE UNITED NATIONS

Part 1

Decolonization: Background to the Issue

One of the major problems facing the United Nations since its birth has been the process of decolonization.¹ The extent of this process has been enormous, since prior to World War II, one-third of all the world's population and one-third of the land areas of the world were under colonial rule. In 1939 seven countries with a total population of 200,000,000 people controlled almost 700,000,000 people in colonial territories.²

By 1945 27 of the 51 founding members of the United Nations had at one time been subjected to some form of colonial rule. This anti-colonial faction gained political leverage in the form of support received from the Soviet Union, one of the five great powers. The major objective of the anti-colonial faction was to prevent a return to the antebellum status-quo and to further disengage the territories

1. For an examination of the extent of this debate at the San Francisco conference, see, Ruth B. Russel, A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the U.S., 1940-45 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1958), pp. 803-842.
2. Emil J. Sady, The UN and Dependent Peoples (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 3.

from their old colonial masters. The dislocations resulting from World War II had created a new political environment which exhilarated the expectations of thousands of peoples in colonial territories. The battle lines in this new struggle were drawn, and as one scholar viewed the division:

Since the earliest days of the San Francisco Conference, the principal colonial powers have been on the defensive in the organization. Their attitude, in general, was that they had nothing to gain and much to lose from the activities of the United Nations in the field of trusteeship and non-self-governing territories. Their opposition at the San Francisco Conference was formidable and their posture was weak.³

By 1960, due to a changing political atmosphere and the persistent efforts of the anti-colonial faction, a new era emerged in the decolonization process.⁴ The old colonial empires were disintegrating, and 17 colonial territories (16 from Africa) were scheduled to gain their independence in time for admission to the UN during the 15th session of the General Assembly. An organization as politically oriented as the United Nations would never again be the same.

In September, 1960 the Soviets made political capital of the situation by seizing the initiative, and requested an additional item be added to the agenda of the 15th session.⁵

3. Sady, op. cit., p. 824.

4. David Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations' Political Process," International Organization, XXI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 786-811.

5. UN Doc. A/4501, September 23, 1960.

The item was a "Declaration on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples." Then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, in his historic UN speech, demanded the immediate independence of all the colonial dependencies whether they are trust territories, non-self-governing territories, or leasehold territories.⁶

After months of debate and consultative diplomacy, an Afro-Asian draft Resolution was passed with 89 votes in favor with nine abstentions (see Appendix B).⁷ The most important element contributing to the success of the new nations was a universal awareness in the Assembly that the victory of the decolonization movement was inevitable.

In 1961 the new nations, again with Russian support, were able to pass a resolution which established the Special Committee on Colonialism.⁸ The purpose of the Special Committee was to implement the declaration passed the previous year, circumvent the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, which had been organized on the basis of parity of membership between the colonial powers and the noncolonial states. The Special Committee would have an automatic anti-colonial majority.

6. UN Doc. A/4502, September 23, 1960.

7. UN, General Assembly, Official Records (15th Sess.), 947th plenary meeting, December 14, 1960, pp. 1273-1274.

8. UN, General Assembly Resolution, 1654 (XVI), November 27, 1961. The formal title of this body is the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, commonly referred to as the Special Committee of Twenty-Four.

The Special Committee first had to decide exactly what its mandate was in terms of operational procedures. The outcome was a determination to utilize voting procedures "whenever any member felt that procedure was necessary," and furthermore, territories would be considered on a country-by-country agenda with priority given to the African territories.⁹ The Committee's mandate grew rapidly, and by 1963 the Assembly decided to dissolve the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and to transfer its functions to the Special Committee. This final mandate made the Committee the sole organ of the United Nations concerned with the examination of colonial problems, which meant that:

All UN activities concerning Non-Self-Governing territories should now be coordinated and consolidated, with a view to the immediate ending of colonialism, thus also bring the trust territories within the domain of the Special Committee.¹⁰

This study will not attempt to cover all the United Nations' activities with regard to decolonization. The Special Committee alone examined more than 60 territories between its first meeting in February, 1962, and the fall of 1966. But several African territorial problems will be discussed to illustrate the use to which Third World nations have put the Special Committee, General Assembly, or Security Council in their desire to eliminate colonialism. For example, the Special Committee devoted 15 of its first 26

9. UN Doc. A/5238, October 8, 1962, p. 18.

10. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1963, UN, 1965, p. 443.

meetings to Southern Rhodesia; in 1963 put the Rhodesian question before the Security Council--without success;¹¹ and, after having failed to obtain Security Council approval of their demands, brought the problem before the Assembly and quickly obtained adoption.¹² This beginning was followed by months and years of worldwide pressure against Britain and Rhodesia, which too detailed to discuss here, culminated with some success by 1966.

In December, 1966, the Security Council, for the first time in UN history, called for selective mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under Chapter VII of the Charter. In May, 1968, again a first in UN history, the Security Council unanimously imposed comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.

The United Nations has taken up the questions relating to South Africa, which include the much detested Apartheid policies of the South African government, as well as the problems related to the territory of South-West Africa, or Namibia. African perseverance bore some fruit by 1969 with the Security Council calling on South Africa "to immediately withdraw its administration from the territory" and set October 4, 1969, as the deadline for the withdrawal.¹³ The deadline was never met, and the battle still rages.

11. UN Doc. S/5409, August 30, 1963.

12. UN, General Assembly Resolution 1883 (XVIII), October 14, 1963.

13. UN, Security Council Resolutions 264, March 20, 1969, and 269, August 12, 1969.

While United Nations' efforts at decolonization may have been concentrated on South Africa and Southern Rhodesia during the 1960's, the Portuguese territories would take center stage during the 1970's. Of all the European colonial powers, Portugal managed to maintain its grip on its African possessions longer than anyone else. And when this grip was finally broken, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and particularly Angola would erupt into civil war directly involving the major powers of the Security Council. It is this area of the decolonization problem that will be analyzed here because of the critical nature of the problem itself: specifically, Angola, which drew China, the United States, and the Soviet Union into what was considered basically a question of decolonization.

Chinese Perceptions of Decolonization

Most of the United Nations' energy and time related to problems of decolonization have been concentrated on African issues;¹⁴ therefore, this chapter will examine only African problems within the context of the issue of decolonization.

-
14. See, David A. Kay, "The United Nations & Decolonization," in The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 143-167. David A. Kay, "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nations and the United Nations' Political Process," International Organization, XXI, No. 5 (Autumn, 1967), pp. 786-811. David A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations 1960-1967 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970).

China's perceptions of African colonial problems debated in United Nations' forums have been influenced by images held prior to Peking's entry into the United Nations. These images have been formed by several currents.

First, China can identify with colonial peoples because of her shared historical experience of being suppressed by colonial powers,¹⁵ as seen in 1962, when Peking emphasized that China shared "a common historic destiny" with the peoples of the colonial world whose desire to win and preserve independence set them apart from "other peoples."¹⁶ A delegate from Gabon related a conversation he had with a member of the Chinese delegation, who pointed out that the Chinese were in "no way responsible for your [African] plight, and that we [Chinese] too were subject to the imperialism of the developed and excolonial powers." It has been pointed out that previous international events provide a country with a wide range of imaginable situations and allow that country to "detect patterns and causal links that help him understand his world."¹⁷

Second, perceptions of Chinese statesmen with regard to colonial peoples have been influenced by the way the CCP achieved success in its own struggle for power.¹⁸ Several

15. J. D. Simmonds, China's World: The Foreign Policy of a Developing State

16. Peking Review, No. 29, 1962, p. 12.

17. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 217.

18. Ibid., p. 265.

examples can be cited. The strategy of the "united front"--of united with as many people as possible, even if short term, in order to isolate and destroy the enemy--was used by the CCP to great advantage in the course of its own revolutionary civil war. They also have had recourse to use this strategy with some success in their foreign policy. Mao Tse-tung asked in his "Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society": Who are our enemies and who are our friends?¹⁹ To the CCP leadership during the revolution, this question was of primary importance. The method employed in analyzing the contradictions within society and making use of this analysis to select the main targets for attack was one the CCP leadership intended to apply in their foreign policy. The Chinese relate this strategy to the Korean Conflict or down to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 to demonstrate the fact that a colonial people could win a struggle of national liberation. The experiences had a tremendous impact on the Algerian war of independence which erupted in November, 1954.²⁰

Another example is the tactical strategy that Peking prescribed for the violent overthrow of oppressor classes and armed struggle against imperialism and colonialism.²¹ The most comprehensive and specific definition of the Chinese

19. Mao, Tse-tung, Selected Works 1, p. 13.

20. John Dunn, Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 1972), pp. 146-147.

21. Simmonds, China's World, p. 143.

"revolutionary model" appears in Lin Piao's article on "People's War."²² This article, in conjunction with Mao's works, especially Mao's Selected Military Writings:

. . . can provide potential revolutionary leaders with the theoretical tools not only to develop their own commitment to revolution as a means of social change, but also to help enable them to guide popular discontent into revolutionary channels by providing the ideological foundation and organizational principles for the formation of revolutionary movements.²³

Third, China's perceptions of the colonial world have been shaped in part by the Sino/Soviet confrontations. As Jervis has pointed out, "Two people with different beliefs can each see an event as consistent with his views,"²⁴ and to the Chinese, the Soviets have been grouped with the Americans as global capitalists interested in keeping the colonial states poor.²⁵ A delegate from Kenya summed up the African response to the Sino/Soviet conflict in Africa this way: "We Africans learned to play China off against the USSR as we earlier had learned to play the west off against the Communist bloc to our own advantage." Africa has been involved in the Sino/Soviet conflict in three distinct ways. One, the Chinese have challenged the Soviets in both the international Communist Front organizations and in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSC), resulting

22. Peking Review, No. 36 (1965).

23. Peter Van Ness, Revolution & Chinese Foreign Policy (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), 118.

24. Jervis, Perception and Misperception, p. 292.

25. Johan Galtung, "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," The African Review 1, No. 4 (April 1972), pp. 81-117.

in splits in existing organizations and the setting up of new, Chinese-sponsored ones. Two, each Communist power has supported rival national liberation movements from the same territory. Pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet wings have emerged in some revolutionary parties and some liberation movements, among them "the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) and the Parti Africain de l'Indépendance" in Senegal. Third, Africans have been deeply affected by the propaganda war fought between the Russians and Chinese.²⁶

Chinese Perceptions of Africa

Prior to China's debut in the United Nations, she developed perceptions of African problems which will be examined in this section in order to provide some perspective of her evolving attitudes toward African questions. Members of African delegations at the United Nations have also contributed some perceptual analysis of African views on Chinese behavior. These contributions will also be discussed.

Chinese perceptions of sub-Sahara Africa have not always been consistent, nor have they led her to develop policies that have always been linked to a tendency to generalize:

To view the situation in the underdeveloped world, and in Africa in particular, as it were, through the wrong end of a telescope, as all of a piece, led to a further elaboration of the Chinese view of Afro-Asian "solidarity."²⁷

26. G. W. Choudhury, Chinese Perception of the World (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), p. 59.

27. Charles Newhauser, Third World Politics: China and

When the Chinese have, at times, developed misperceptions on Africa, they have tended toward a "kind of tunnel vision"²⁸ that has led to certain policies which in the long run have proven to hinder Chinese influence on that continent. This "tunnel vision" may be harmful in developing correct images in that:

The decision-maker's perceptions are restricted not in the sense that he examines information on a narrow range of subjects, but in the sense that he assumes that others are focused on that which concerns him. So he not only tries to determine the impact of others' behavior on his problem but also believes that producing these consequences was the others' goal.²⁹

This misperception is related to the propensity of actors to seeing themselves as central to others' behavior. An actor's knowledge of "what he wants, what he fears, and what he has done sets the framework for his perceptions."³⁰ As an example, one scholar has pointed out that Chinese agitation in Africa during the 1960's often "harmed" Chinese/African relations.³¹ A delegate from Ghana stressed that the Chinese have had to live down their pre-1965 reputation for supporting revolutionary movements within independent Black African states. The Soviets, he maintained, "were never as reckless as the Chinese in this respect."

the Africo-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-67, East Asian Research Center (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19), p. 22.

28. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 212.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Van Ness, op. cit.

However, this is not to say that Chinese perceptions of Africa led her to follow policies that on balance were failures. In fact, such an evaluation of successes and failures of Chinese foreign policy in Africa is beyond the purview of this study. But Peking has pursued certain objectives in Africa that have continued to influence Chinese perceptions in her dealing with African nations at the United Nations.

The first of these objectives has been twofold: at times Peking has projected the image of China as a credible "revolutionary model" for the emerging African nations³², while attempting also to serve as a "development model." But even here the Chinese often misperceived certain African realities. On the one hand, the Chinese have confused local rebellion with genuine national revolutionary movements. On the other hand, the Chinese have seen analogies of a Marxian class analysis in Africa similar to Chinese experiences, when in fact they did not exist. In projecting this dual image, Peking has provided both ideological and financial support for many African independence groups. Several examples may be cited for analysis.

The first thrust of this projected image in Africa came with China's financial, diplomatic, and material support

32. A. M. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," in The China Quarterly, No. 7, (July-Sept., 1961), pp. 1-16; see also, George T. Yu, "Peking's African Diplomacy," Problems of Communism (March-April, 1972), p. 16; Al Imfeld, China As a Model Model of Development (New York: Oris Books, 1976); Geoffrey Hudson, "The Chinese Model and the Developing

for the Algerian revolution. An Algerian Minister Plenipotentiary at the United Nations pointed out that Peking then believed that the struggle in Algeria was likely to be emulated elsewhere in Africa. In time this "fire of revolutionary war which the Algerians had lit spread in time to other colonial areas of Africa."³³ This would conform with China's advocacy of "armed struggle," but this does not mean that China was responsible for it.³⁴ The Chinese were intrigued with the situation developing south of the Sahara where newly independent states were coming into existence.

Peking's advice to the new African states was to continue the struggle to attain economic independence, for "without which political independence was only a chimera."³⁵ Along with this advice was an element of the conflict between Peking and the West, when China advised all African states to reject Western aid, and later Soviet aid, because of its imperialist strings. However, no African state accepted China's advice to depend solely on their own self-reliance and reject such aid. In fact, as one African delegate pointed out, "many African states viewed this triangular competition as a favorable condition, enabling Africans to secure economic and technical assistance from all sources."

Countries" in Werner Klatt, The Chinese Model (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1965), pp. 205-218.

33. Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa--1958-71 (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 259.
34. See, Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on People's War (Los Angeles: U. of California Press, 1973), pp. 26-45.
35. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 260.

Peking's economic and technical assistance had the greatest impact in such states as Tanzania, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville, and Mali, where the leadership placed more emphasis on self-reliance. One of the most successful cases of aid was rendered to Tanzania, with whom the PRC has had relations since that African nation's independence in 1961.³⁶ The financial assistance to Tanzania was one of China's most generous endeavors³⁷ (which will be discussed in more detail in another chapter). The PRC has provided military and technical assistance to several African nations. As an example of the continuation of this policy, note the hundreds of tons of arms and Chinese instructors supplied to Angola's RNLA by mid-1974.³⁸ The extent of this aid will be discussed later.

A second objective of China in Africa was in developing a reputation among Africans as a supporter of Third World demands, thereby allowing Peking to enhance her international Third World image.³⁹ A random concensus of African delegates

36. Bruce Larkin, China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp. 66-68.

37. Principally a \$67.5 million, interest-free loan to Tanzania for a coal and iron complex, including a 250 KM railway line; \$15 million to Gambia for miscellaneous projects; and \$40 million to Tunisia for a canal between Mejerdah and Cap Bon and 1,000 railway cars to transport phosphates. African Research Bulletin, Economic Series, p. 3270; Daily News Tanzania, Oct. 8, 1974, p. 3441; West Africa, March 10, 1974; L'Action Tunis, April 8, 1975, p. 3474.

38. John A. Marcum, "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs Vol. 54 (April, 1976), p. 413.

39. Yiu, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

in UN corridors concluded with the impression that the main problem the Chinese encountered with Africans is basically one of communication. As one respondent indicated: "We often are unable to clearly understand what message the Chinese are trying to convey." Often, Africans perceive "messages" or the behavior of Chinese statesmen in terms of what Jervis refers to as their own "evoked set" (meaning the way people perceive data is influenced not only by their cognitive structure and theories about others actors, but also by what they are concerned with at the time they receive information).⁴⁰ This problem of communication becomes more complex when reinforced by Chinese beliefs that Africa shared Chinese concerns and information. In other words, what the Chinese believed to be good for the Africans was not always what the Africans considered to be good for themselves, and often the timing was wrong.⁴¹ But this is not to argue that China did not have some success with its Third World image in Africa, and even further success with its international image in other areas of the Third World.⁴²

A third objective of China in Africa has been to improve its image at the expense of the United States and the

40. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, pp. 24-25; and Hypotheses on Misperception, p. 471.

41. Richard Lowenthal, World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 260.

42. Donald S. Zagoria, "Asia," Survey, No. 54 (January, 1965), p. 102.

Soviet Union. This objective has been often wrought with misperceptions leading at times to miscalculated decisions. African statesmen have at certain points become suspicious of Peking's efforts to form a Chinese-led international "united front" directed at both the US "imperialism" and the USSR "revisionism"; when, in fact, the national interests of the African parties dictated nonalignment and the acceptance of economic aid from both the US and the USSR.⁴³

To Africans, the evolution of China's image may have begun with the Bandung Conference in 1955, which was a watershed in Chinese diplomacy.⁴⁴ Contrary to US and Soviet expectations, Chou En-Lai disarmed all hostility, remained aloof from all wrangling, identified China with African problems, and gained enormous prestige for Peking. Furthermore, he was able to decouple China's foreign policy from that of the Soviet Union;⁴⁵ and, in addition, played his "master card" by offering to negotiate with the United States on the Taiwan issue.⁴⁶ One African member of the Secretariat staff who was present at Bandung maintained that this Chinese offer to negotiate with its then arch-enemy had a tremendously positive effect on China's image among Africans at that time.

43. Robert A. Scalapino, "Africa and Peking's United Front," Current Scene, Vol. III, No. 26 (Sept. 1, 1965), pp. 1-10.

44. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 8.

45. W. A. Adic, "China Returns to Africa," Current Scene, (August, 1972), p. 3.

46. Charles Neuhauser, op. cit., p. 6.

By the early 1960's Peking increased its diplomatic channels in Africa, and by 1963 Chou En-Lai visited Africa and announced that "revolutionary prospects are excellent throughout the African continent."⁴⁷ Prior to Chou's African visit, the Chinese had begun to send out what Jervis calls "signals."⁴⁸ For example, Peking suggested that "socialist countries were duty-bound" to serve as "base areas" in support of "armed struggle" in the "extremely favorable revolutionary situation which now exists in Asia, Africa, and Latin America."⁴⁹ The new leaders of Africa perceived Peking's efforts with some suspicion.⁵⁰ Particularly by 1965, when the Chinese pushed for a second Afro-Asian summit--a "second Bandung"--since Peking desired to use the forum to press African countries into an alliance against the world's two Superpowers.⁵¹

47. "Premier Chou En-Lai Speaks at Mogadishu Mass Rally," Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 3156 (Dec. 7, 1964), p. 24.

48. "Signals" are statements or actions, the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit understandings among the actors. Signals are issued mainly to influence the receivers' image of the sender. See Jervis, Logic and Images, p. 18.

49. Peoples' Daily and Red Flag, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," in Peking Review, Vol. VI, No. 43, 1963, p. 10.

50. Scalapino, op. cit.

51. Richard Lowenthal, in Tang Tsou (ed.), China in Crisis, pp. 2-13.

Secretariat staff members from various African countries insisted during interviews that the record of these years be kept in proper perspective when evaluating China's image among Africans. One staff member stated that:

What must be kept in mind is the degree of support and sympathy which many progressive Africans had for China as a result of Peking's attitude with regard to the "struggle" in colonial areas. The quid pro quo for Chinese support in the "struggle" was the damping down of any anti-Chinese feeling aroused by the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962.

Another Secretariat staff member who had direct experience with Chinese diplomacy during these years emphasized that Peking's consistent support for the "struggle" in Africa "forced the Russians off their butts in attempting to change their lackluster image. Now the Russians wanted to show us [Africans] that they [Russians] also supported 'just' wars of national liberation."

Another staff member, who has served in numerous UN posts in Africa, summed up his experiences: "Chinese policy by 1963 was reacting to the challenge of a changing international environment, particularly in relation to the Third World. The partial nuclear test ban treaty, coming on the heels of the Sino-Indian conflict, the Cuban missile crisis, and the intensification of the Sino-Soviet conflict, intensified the tripartite struggle between the US, USSR, and Peking in Africa. As a result, China attempted to strengthen her relations with African states in an attempt to form an international front of the poor people of the world."

With the emergence of the cultural revolution Peking "revolutionized" its policy toward Africa and consequently China's state-to-state relations in Africa became rather "passive." By the end of 1966 nearly all of China's ambassadors were recalled from Africa, and African governments had little patience with Chinese interference with the internal factions of African politics. "At the same time (as pointed out by a former Angolan member of the FNLA), it should be noted that leaders of African national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea did not lead or send any delegations to Peking from September, 1966, to the end of 1968." It should be mentioned that he was not implying that Peking stopped supporting national liberation movements during this period but that, in fact, by the end of 1968, the three liberation movements fighting in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea had made considerable progress in their struggles, and this success is not attributed to any Chinese assistance.⁵²

By 1968 a dramatic shift had taken place in the style of Chinese diplomacy in Africa. Peking was attempting to change its image by improving state-to-state relations with many African countries, and in doing so revealed a new awareness of the nationalist sensibilities of African Communist parties.

52. Ogunsanwo, op. cit., p. 232.

By 1970 Peking's changing perceptions of the international environment brought with them a down-grading of revolutionary promotions abroad, stressing national sovereignty and the advocacy of a "nationalist model."⁵³ In fact, Peking now had a major advantage over the US and the Soviet Union, in that from 1965 to 1970 there was almost no Chinese presence in Africa.

By 1971 The Chinese internal situation was stabilized and a new trend in foreign relations had been established. A growing number of states had recognized China and agreed to establish diplomatic relations. In 1971 alone ten new Third World countries established diplomatic relations with Peking, and 12 more nations agreed to exchange diplomatic missions in 1972. By the end of 1972, for the first time since 1949, a majority of the independent states of the Third World had established formal relations with Peking. China had changed its image, possibly recognizing that "a desired image can often be of greater use than a significant increment of military or economic power."⁵⁴

Since the beginning of 1970, China had been diligently remolding her global image by systematically communicating with all those states which had supported the restoration of the rights of the PRC. This diplomatic effort culminated in

53. Halpern, "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model."

54. Jervis, The Logic of Images in International Relations, p. 6.

October, 1971, in a resounding victory at the United Nations. The PRC's victory marks a major success for Peking's ability to "signal" a new direction in foreign policy, and to have this "signal" received and accepted by numerous other nations. The General Assembly, after 22 years of avoiding political reality, voted to seat the PRC by expelling the ROC from the UN. Chinese delegates now joined their African allies in the United Nations and would strive to end imperialism and colonialism in Africa.

In conclusion, there are several points that can be summarized in relation to China in Africa. First, one cannot single out a specific Chinese image of Africa. Not much different than most major powers, Chinese perceptions have neither been totally consistent nor have they revealed a single objective of Chinese diplomacy in Africa. It should be understood that Chinese perceptions developed over a considerable time period and in response to a variety of stimuli. But, no matter what influenced Chinese perceptions of Africa, Peking has placed Africa in the center of her global image of the world.

Second, there can be little doubt concerning the importance of the Soviet Union and the United States in influencing China's perceptions of Africa. Opposition to imperialism and social-imperialism have been centerfold in China's African policies. In fact, the degree of China's activism in Africa can be directly related to Peking's perceptions of Soviet and American intentions in Africa.

Third, China has been searching for a new international strategy, and, therefore, China's image in Africa has been most important to her.

Fourth, Chinese perceptions of Africa have been determined as much by China as they have been by Africans. In other words, China has subjectively responded to specific needs of Africans, as well as African responses to China's signals.

The PRC in the United Nations

In 1971 there was much speculation concerning the behavior that Chinese delegates would exhibit at the United Nations, but even at this early date many African delegates whom I interviewed predicted that the Chinese behavior would strike a no-nonsense, positive tone.⁵⁵

Most Africans were quite pleased when Peking named Ambassador Huang Hua as the People's Republic of China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Many Africans felt comfortable with Ambassador Huang Hua since they had experience with his diplomatic style. He had been Peking's ambassador to both Ghana and the United Arab Republic, and had handled many sensitive issues while serving in Accra and Cairo.

55. In the spring of 1971 I was writing a graduate research paper attempting to predict the PRC's behavior when she would eventually take her seat in the UN. By the fall of 1971 no one could predict with complete assurance that the PRC would be successful at this time, but after the vote was taken, I continued to interview the people I had met the previous spring.

Almost immediately the Chinese were interested in the Secretariat's administrative responsibilities and opted for the position of Under-Secretary for Decolonization, which would place Peking in the front lines of the UN battle against imperialism in Africa. During her first year in the UN, Peking was developing the image of a persistent supporter of sanctions and enforcement measures under Chapter VII that pertains to colonial and apartheid problems. Tactically, Peking linked the principle of domestic jurisdiction (Article 2, Section 7 of the Charter) with the principle of state sovereignty (Article 2, Section 1 of the Charter) in attacking those UN activities appearing as "interventionist," which Peking argues is beyond the jurisdiction of the United Nations and is thereby "unjust."

I questioned several Chinese personnel concerning this tactic, and they insisted there was consistency in their policy; and they argued that neither absolute sovereignty nor domestic jurisdiction can stand in the way of UN support for "anti-colonial, anti-racial, and anti-imperialist" movements. Huang Hua announced before the UN General Assembly:

We maintain that the UN is duty bound to support the people of various countries in their struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism.⁵⁶

In January, 1972, the Security Council held its first meeting ever in Africa. Huang Hua used this historic event

56. UN, General Assembly official, Twenty-seventh session, plenary meetings.

to forcefully advocate that the Council should "further strengthen and expand the sanctions against Rhodesia, South Africa, and Portuguese colonialists." Huang Hua then took the United Nations to task for failing to meet its obligations under the Charter:

According to the purposes and principles of its charter, the United Nations should support the African people's just cause of opposing imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. However, as a result of obstruction and disruption by imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonialism, the United Nations in the past failed to play the role it should, but instead did things detrimental to the desires and interests of the African people. It was under the flag of the United Nations that imperialist aggressors (ONUN) overthrew the legitimate government of the Congo in the early days of its independence, which was led by its national hero Lumumba. And Lumumba himself was murdered in cold blood. . . . The UN must not be allowed to do anything again to harm the interests of the African people.⁵⁷

One must be careful not to overstate the impact of Chinese participation on UN sanctions measures. It should be remembered that in the 1960's several committees in the General Assembly had already acquired the power to review, investigate, and admonish in this area considered as "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of states in the 1950's. Moreover, the Security Council had already made a formal determination through Resolution 232 on December 16, 1966, that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to international peace and security within the meaning

57. UN Doc., SCCR, 27th Yr., 1630th Mtb., January 31, 1972, p. 10.

of the Charter. At this time the Security Council ordered political and economic sanctions measures, including an embargo on oil and petroleum products under Article 41 before China entered the Security Council.⁵⁸

The Security Council, however, had refused to initiate any military measures against Southern Rhodesia. Consequently, most of the UN debates about enforcement concentrated on the implementation of Resolution 232, particularly with regard to the US Byrd Amendment, which unilaterally lifted the embargo on chrome, ferrochrome, and nickel. Momentum increased until the fall of 1971, allowing China to participate in the debates.

By the fall of 1971 the General Assembly adopted a resolution (2765, XXVI) in effect condemning the US Congress for having sponsored the Bryd Amendment, an act which constituted a "serious violation" of the relevant Security Council resolutions.⁵⁹ In essence, this resolution stood to remind all delegations of their obligations under Article 25 of the Charter to carry out the Council's decisions imposing mandatory sanctions against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia.

58. Myres S. McDougal and Michael Reisman, "Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of International Concern," The American Journal of International Law (January, 1969).

59. The New York Times, April 16, 1976. In September, 1975, the US House of Representatives defeated a motion to repeal the Bryd Amendment.

To Peking, this debate concerning Rhodesia would allow her the first opportunity to exercise the right to vote in the General Assembly. The roll-call vote was 106:2:13 with Peking voting in favor of the resolution. A member of the Chinese delegation informed me that they voted in favor of the resolution simply because it was "in line with the basic stand of the Chinese government." In the Assembly Huang Hua stressed that:

The Chinese delegation's support for the present resolution did not imply that it supported the previous resolutions on the subject adopted before the arrival of the Chinese delegation.⁶⁰

All the Black African delegates on the Decolonization Committee interviewed stated that China, since 1971, has continued to support all UN efforts to apply pressure on Rhodesia.

In May, 1973, the Security Council attempted to extend the sanctions against Rhodesia in areas of trade, transportation, insurance companies, and air flights into and out of Rhodesia. At that time Huang Hua stated in the Council that Rhodesia had imported a Boeing 707 from "so-called" unidentified sources. In addition, Rhodesian foreign trade was 15% higher in 1971 than 1970, amounting to \$749 million. Behind the scenes, the Chinese delegates alluded to the failure of implementing sanctions and suggested stronger measures. After consultations with African delegates, the Chinese delegate in the Council appealed to all parties in extending

60. UN, General Assembly official records, Twenty-sixth session, plenary meetings, 1971.

sanctions to cover South Africa and Portugal, and sternly condemning importers of chrome and nickel, alluding to the United States.⁶¹

On May 22, 1973, after extensive consultations with African delegates, China's delegate, Chuang Yen, alluded to another level of the Rhodesian problem for the first time. He made reference to the suppression of national liberation movements in Zimbabwe (African name for Rhodesia).

In September, 1975, China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chiao Kuan-Hua, addressed the General Assembly further defining Peking's perceptions of the situation on South Africa. He stated that "an excellent situation prevails in Africa."⁶² But he warned that the South African proposed dialogue between the Zimbabwe national liberation organizations and the "minority white regime of Southern Rhodesia" was a "trick to frustrate majority rule and to disarm the freedom-fighters."⁶³

A Chinese delegate interviewed explained that to Peking the fundamental solution to the question of Rhodesia could only be found in the Zimbabwean people relying on their own strength, rejecting Superpower schemes, and at times relying on the support of the people of Africa and the rest of the world.

61. UN Doc., S/PV, 1715, May 18, 1973.

62. UN, General Assembly official record, Thirtieth session, plenary meetings.

63. Ibid.

In the plenary session the Chinese minister endorsed the position taken by the Conference of Heads of State and Government on the Organization of African Unity, which stressed armed struggle, calling on the Zimbabwe people to "immediately intensify" their action. Mr. Chiao stated to the Assembly:

We have always advocated the use of revolutionary dual tactics against the reactionaries' counter-revolutionary dual tactics. Armed struggle is fundamental; the people's armed forces must be strengthened and not weakened, negotiations or no negotiations. Deviations and detours may sometimes occur in the complicated struggle against counter-revolutionary dual tactics. But the people will sum up their experience, overcome difficulties and continue to advance. Through long and tortuous struggles the people of South Africa will eventually win the complete liberation of the African continent.⁶⁴

Following this statement by Mr. Chiao, a military advisor from the Chinese delegation stressed that "no matter how tortuous the road of advance may be for Africans, the raging torrents of the people's struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism can never be checked. Final victory certainly belongs to the people of Zimbabwe, and the rest of Africa."

In April, 1976, the Security Council adopted Resolution 388 which comes under Chapter VII of the Charter to expand mandatory sanctions including insurance, franchises, and trade names. This Resolution was the work of the Security Council's Sanctions Committee, which basically has the same

64. People's Republic of China, press release, September 30, 1975.

membership as the Council. Several members of this committee, when interviewed, expressed the belief that the Resolution was more than satisfactory and could not have been worded any stronger. On first reading, it appeared that the Resolution was consistent with previous Chinese suggestions that mandatory sanctions against Rhodesia should be "further strengthened and expanded."

Huang Hua voted for the Resolution in the Council, but expressed China's reservations that the measures were far from sufficient in dealing with the problem. The United States, he claimed, should "cease immediately its acts of importing chrome, nickel and other materials from Southern Rhodesia in violation of the resolutions on sanctions." In addition, he stressed that the sanctions should be expanded to include South Africa.⁶⁵

A First Secretary in the Chinese delegation explained that Peking's objection was quite simple: "That the sanctions were not strong enough." And he emphatically added, what must be kept in mind is that China has voted in favor of all six resolutions on the Rhodesian question that have been adopted by the Council since Peking has been in the Council.

During this same debate, Huang Hua perhaps expressed what may be considered the core of China's thinking on the questions of colonialism, imperialism, and revolution in Africa. He stated that:

65. UN Monthly Chronicle (May, 1976), p. 15.

The fundamental solution to the question of Rhodesia can be found only in the Zimbabwean people relying on their own strength, persevering in unity and struggle, guarding against the newly designed superpower schemes of division, disintegration, infiltration and control and carrying through to the end of the struggle. . . .⁶⁶

Here is basically the Chinese theory of revolution, the distrust of Superpower hegemony, and the element of Sino/Soviet confrontation. It may also be interpreted as a forecast of Peking's attitude toward the Angolan crisis.

The image of China as Africa's most vehement supporter of anti-colonialism was seriously shaken by the Angolan crisis, and its repercussions in the UN Security Council. The dissonance, resulting from Peking's direct or indirect association with other political actors involved with Angola, appeared to gravely affect China's image as a spokesman for Third World demands.

In January, 1975, Portugal and the Angolan national liberation movements (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA) signed the Alvor Agreement granting the independence of Angola from Portugal. The catch--actual accession to independence--was not scheduled for implementation until November 11, 1975. The result, as expressed by a Secretariat consultant, "was the immediate transformation of the liberation movement into an all-out civil war, in which the competing factions were each attempting to seduce anyone into giving financial and military assistance." Angola temporarily appeared to

66. PR, No. 16 (April 16, 1976), p. 27.

resemble a "Serbia of Africa," with China, France, West Germany, Belgium, Zaire, South Africa, the United States, and the Soviet Union supporting one or the other of the competing national liberation movements.

Angola is presented here as an excellent case study in decolonization. It allows for an analysis of Chinese perceptions concerning decolonization of an emerging nation, and an African nation in revolution. The case study allows for an analysis within the framework of the Sino/Soviet conflict, China's relations with Third World nations, and China's tripartite relations with the Superpowers.

Part II

Angola: A Case Study in Decolonization

The Perceptions of Several African States. President Mobutu of Zaire attempted to present an image that his country was concerned about the fate of the Bakongos, who resided on the Angolan side of the Angola/Zaire boarder. Fundamentally, Mobutu was opposed to the establishment of a hostile Communist regime in Angola, particularly in the northern areas. Economically, Zaire, as well as the People's Republic of the Congo, were very interested in the oil wells of Cabinda, which, in 1975 alone, produced 54.6 million barrels of crude oil. Mobutu correctly perceived that a politically unfriendly Angolan regime could quite easily disrupt Zaire's economy. Zaire also depends on the Benguela-Lobito railway to export copper from her mineral-rich South Shaba district--particularly so, since 1973 when Rhodesia closed the Livingstone-Beira railway to Zaire's trains. The magnitude of such considerations becomes apparent when considering that Zaire depends on copper for over 90% of her foreign exchange earnings.⁶⁷

Other considerations must also be examined in analyzing the Zaire-Angolan connection. The Center for National Security Studies in Washington, D.C., reports that the CIA had been funding the FNLA and Holden Roberto since 1962. Roberto happened to be the brother-in-law of Zaire's

67. Strategic Studies, p. 29.

President Mobutu who himself had been receiving secret CIA funds and other aid since independence in 1960.

In Angola, like Zaire more than a decade ago, the CIA provides large amounts of secret money and arms to its local allies who are fighting against groups backed by the Soviet Union.⁶⁸

South Africa's involvement in Angola took several forms: (1) In taking advantage of the confusion created by the civil war, her forces attacked SWAPO bases in southern Angola; (2) troops were sent to guard the vital installations at Ruacana and Calueque; (3) several thousand conscripts and regular troops were sent to reinforce the FNLA/UNITA alliance with maintenance, logistic, reconnaissance, and limited combat functions; (4) troops were sent to guard and control refugee camps at Chitado, Pereira de Eca, Cuangar, and Cali. (See Figure 1.)

Perceptions of Non-African States. The Soviet Union perceived it to be in her interest to support the MPLA since armed resistance to Portuguese rule began in 1961. By contrast, the United States had generally supported Portugal's anti-insurgency campaigns in the African territories. In "playing all ends against the middle," the CIA had been supplying undercover aid to the FNLA since the early 1960's, and in 1975 the Ford Administration authorized \$300,000 for UNITA. Shortly afterwards the USSR responded by delivering much larger shipments to the MPLA. The American reaction

68. Intelligence Report Center for National Security Studies, "CIA's Secret War in Angola" (Washington, D.C., Vol. 1, No. 1), p. 1.

was swift. The Ford Administration decided in August, 1975, to increase American aid to FNLA and UNITA to the level of \$10 million. In turn, the USSR escalated her support for the MPLA with tanks, armored personnel carriers, heavy artillery, and other equipment. By September of 1975 American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated that:

We are most alarmed at the interference of extracontinental powers who do not wish Africa well and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence.

By November, 1975, 400 Soviet advisers arrived in Luanda to join the 1,400 Cuban forces (which rose to about 2,500 by January, 1976). By this time the Ford Administration was attempting to persuade Congress to increase the level of aid to Zaire to \$60 million that would be passed on to the FNLA/UNITA alliance. The CIA started aerial shipments of at least \$20 million worth of arms.⁶⁹ However, on December 19, 1975, the US Senate voted by 54 to 22 to cut off all American military and financial assistance to the FNLA/UNITA coalition, including CIA assistance. This was followed on January 27 by a 323 to 99 vote in the House of Representatives, reinforcing the Senate's decision.

The Cuban involvement was as much Fidel Castro's policy as it was Moscow's. Castro, who sees Havana as a leader in

69. During the writing of this chapter, I interviewed an American Merchant Marine who sailed from a US east coast port, crossed the Atlantic to Africa, and thereon sailed up the Congo and dropped off arms and supplies in Zaire. He was informed that Chinese troops would pick up the supplies and take them into Angola.

the Third World, was simply continuing to help the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as he had been doing for 15 years, but now with Soviet assistance allowing for a much greater commitment. It is likely that Mr. Castro would have extended support to the Popular Movement whatever decision Moscow may have made.⁷⁰

As Castro has boasted, Cuban revolutionaries assisted the Algerians against France, lately helping the Algerian-backed Polisario guerrillas against the Moroccans in the western Sahara; helped the Frelimo guerrillas in Mozambique, and still others in Guinea-Bissau; and maintaining military missions in a number of African countries today.

Chinese Perceptions of Angola. The Chinese image of Angola evolved in reaction to the international environment as perceived by the Chinese and an attempt to change those aspects of the environment which were inimical to China's interest. Specifically, China's involvement in Angola has been an apparent response to Chinese perceptions of Soviet intentions to influence the revolutionary leadership in Africa.

One highly placed African member of the Secretariat informed me that most Africans viewed the early Chinese practice of supporting spin-off movements in southern Africa as an attempt by Peking to encourage them to side with China.⁷¹

70. Herbert Matthews, "Forward With Fidel," New York Times, March 4, 1976.

71. Several examples may be cited that agree with this, such as China's support for COREMO, ULIPAMO, and

In the 1960's there existed many sources of external support, and therefore there was compelling reason for Angolan revolutionary factions to give up their desire to stay independent from other factions and lead eventually a united liberation movement.⁷²

In the early 1960's the Soviets had considerable influence in Angola, but were not prepared for long and protracted struggles which would only validate Mao's theory of a people's war in Africa. During the UN General Assembly debate in 1960, Khrushchev called for a resolution, demanding the immediate independence of all colonies. One Chinese staff member at the UN, who recalled reading the speech, gave me an interpretation: "We disregarded the propaganda aspect of this call and believed that no nation, nor independence movement, should have been under any illusion about the United Nation's ability to bestow independence on the peoples of Africa." In actuality, Peking's embassy in Guinea was already in contact with Angolans,⁷³ and by 1961 a delegation of Angolan freedom fighters was visiting Peking.

By 1964 UNITA's chief, Jonas Savimbi, met with Mao Tse-tung in Peking.⁷⁴ Following this meeting Savimbi

PAPOMO in Mozambique, and SWAPO and CLSTP in South West Africa; see G. W. Choudhury, Chinese Perception of the World (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977), pp. 62-63.

72. Pieter Lessing, "Moscow Fights Peking in Africa," Sunday Telegraph, March 25, 1962.

73. Ibid.

74. Peking Review, No. 54, 1964.

proposed a self-reliant strategy emulating the Chinese.⁷⁵ The PRC, in turn, assisted the UNITA with some training and financial aid. At the same time the UNITA denounced the MPLA as "modern revisionists" for accepting their arms from the Soviets.

By the mid-1960's Chinese support for the Angolan revolutionary movement cooled due to several developments which directed Chinese attention away from Africa. The Chinese perceived the massive entry of American troops into Vietnam as a threatening situation; and second, the events of the Cultural Revolution also reduced Chinese interest in revolutionary activity in Africa. A former freedom fighter from Mozambique informed me that "neither his fellow liberators, nor Angolan freedom fighters, sent any delegations to China from mid-1966 to the end of 1968 because of China's concentration on her own problems." Furthermore, he stated: "By 1968 considerable progress had been made in Angola, but this success could in no way be attributed to Chinese assistance. Assistance in arms, ammunition and finance came from brothers [African] and Soviet sources."

By 1973 the PRC was supplying the Angolan FNLA with material assistance in addition to sending a 112-man training mission led by a Chinese major-general.⁷⁶ FNLA guerrillas

75. Actually, as early as 1960 China began to emphasize a self-reliance and self-help. People's Daily and Red Flag, editorial, February 4, 1964.

76. In the 1960's the PRC supported insurgent groups in Zaire, but as China's foreign policy shifted its ideological direction to a more pragmatic tone, state-to-

were trained by Chinese instructors at the Kinkuzu military base (reported to me by an Angolan freedom fighter who was part of this training program). By 1974 the Chinese had supplied the FNLA with hundreds of tons of arms as well as trained instructors. By the summer of 1975 there were well over 200 Chinese instructors. Peking's assistance enabled the FNLA to achieve apparent military supremacy, and may have enabled China to outmaneuver Moscow, as well as to gain influence in West Africa, hoping to duplicate their success in East Africa. As one UN consultant now working for a North African mission told me: "As a movement, the FNLA entered the 1975 power struggle for control of independent Angola from a position of military but not political strength." However, the Chinese correctly perceived that continued affiliation with the FNLA would have disastrous effects on the African image of Chinese intentions in southern Africa.

In late 1975 it became public knowledge that there was a growing affiliation developing of the FNLA/UNITA alliance with the United States and South Africa. Peking's "anti-imperialist," "anti-colonialist" image was, as one delegate remarked, "on the coals," and China publically announced the withdrawal of active support for the FNLA/UNITA alliance. By November, 1975, all Chinese personnel had been withdrawn from Zaire. This shift in Chinese policy motivated Zambia's Kenneth Kaunda, one of Africa's most respected

state relations between Zaire and China improved. Following Mobutu's visit to Peking in January, 1973, China began active support for the Zaire-based FNLA.

statesmen, to praise the PRC for her prudent action on the eve of Angola's independence.⁷⁷

The timing of the Chinese withdrawal is rather interesting and appears to have taken into account the current psychology of many Africans. The South African intervention had a rather discomfoting effect on all Africans that resulted in many Africans viewing the Soviet and Cuban intervention from a different perceptual perspective. As one Eastern European delegate related to me, "by the time the Angolan question reached the UN Security Council, China's early withdrawal would allow her a special position."

Diplomacy Prior to Security Council Debate. The complex political differences within the Angolan independence movements became too severe for any attempt at reconciliation by neighboring African statesmen. Africans offered their "good offices," but these efforts met with little or no success.

At President Kenyatta's initiative, the presidents of the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA agreed to present a "common front" in negotiations with Portugal in January, 1975. A summit meeting with Portugal was held near Alvor in the Algarve. An agreement among the nationalist leaders was worked out; this proved to be a temporary arrangement when fighting broke out shortly afterwards.

77. At the same time, several astute African delegates confided to me that many Africans were upset with Kaunda for his negotiations with South Africa on detente.

Again, President Kenyatta initiated a meeting to talk truce at Makuru in Kenya in mid-July, but the truce collapsed within a month. The 12th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity was held in Kampala in July. The OAU got no further than organizing a "Commission of Inquiry," and officially refused to involve itself in an "internal" dispute.

Between October and December the conflict see-sawed back and forth. An early joint FNLA/UNITA/South African offensive was repulsed by the MPLA supported by Cuban troops and increased levels of Soviet military aid. By the end of November, 1975, the MPLA was able to stabilize the northern, eastern, and southern battlefronts, and then to seize the initiative--first again the FNLA in the north, then in the south. The MPLA's most dramatic success occurred in the north. FNLA forces were beaten back, losing its then military headquarters, main port at Ambriz, political headquarters at Carmona, and their most important airbase at Negage.

On the eve of the OAU emergency summit on Angola, held in Addis Ababa in January, the MPLA was in a secure military position. At the summit meeting the MPLA made huge diplomatic gains as a result of South African intervention. This changing diplomatic prestige was evidenced on the eve of the summit meeting when two influential African states, Nigeria and Tanzania, abandoned their previously neutralist stance and recognized the MPLA. The conference, nonetheless,

ended in a deadlock.

Despite unsuccessful diplomatic initiatives by African states, it was quite clear by January, 1976, that the MPLA was becoming firmly implanted in Angolan soil. This reality resulted in the questioning of several previous positions. Zaire would not have to review its long-standing support for the Bakongo-based FNLA, that is, if Zaire wanted to continue utilizing its only two outlets to the sea--the Zaire River and the Benguela railway, both of which were now under MPLA control. In an attempt to please Agostinho Neto, Zaire closed its transit facilities to mercenaries recruited by anti-MPLA groups.

The interests of Zambia were also seriously affected. Unofficially, Zambia had clearly supported UNITA, which, in turn, controlled the territory through which ran the vital Benguela/Lobito railway line, giving Zambia access to the port of Lobito. To make matters more complicated for Zambia, she faced political pressure from both Tanzania and Mozambique, both of whom fully recognized the MPLA. Zambia's outlets to Dar-es-Salaam and Mombasa via the Tanzam railway, and to Nacala via Malawi, were controlled by Tanzania and Mozambique. Zambia's only alternative was through Rhodesia or South Africa, which would have been a politically embarrassing course. Zambia's credibility was already suspect by other Black African leaders for her detente partnership with South Africa in attempting to negotiate settlements over Rhodesia and South West Africa. Zambia was, in addition,

concerned that continued support for UNITA would drive the MPLA towards further dependence on the Soviet Union, which President Kaunda was quite interested in avoiding.

The Security Council and Angola. In response to a complaint by Kenya, the Security Council met seven times between March 26 and 31, 1976, to discuss the Angolan situation. That complaint was contained in a letter of March 10, addressed to the Council President. The Kenyan representative, speaking on behalf of an African group, requested the meeting to consider the act of aggression committed by South Africa against the People's Republic of Angola.

On March 31 the Council condemned South Africa's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola, demanding that South Africa scrupulously respect the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola. The Council further demanded that South Africa desist from utilizing the international territory of Namibia to mount provocative or aggressive acts against Angola or any other neighboring African state.

The Security Council resolution adopted was sponsored by Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Republic, Panama, Romania, and the United Republic of Tanzania. The vote on this resolution was nine in favor to none against, with five abstentions (France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States). China did not participate in the vote. When a Chinese delegate was questioned concerning the reason for non-participation, he replied that, "It was principally

because the resolution remained silent about Soviet and Cuban intervention, and this omission was completely unacceptable to the Chinese people."

Members of delegations which had abstained from the voting were questioned concerning their positions. All implied that the lack of universal support for the resolution was not due to any disagreement over the fact of South Africa's invasion, which was opposed by everyone, but to the questionable and sometimes angry disagreement over the issue of Cuban forces in Angola.

A member of the Swedish delegation commented that the core of the Security Council argument centered on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, and whether their presence triggered the South African intervention, as had been argued by the South African representative. A Nigerian delegate claimed that the South African invasion forced the newly victorious MPLA government of Angola to invite the Soviet-equipped Cuban troops to assist Angola.

Feeling uneasy about the direction of this debate, the chairman of the African group, Kenya's Charles Maina, pleaded with other delegates to avoid raising "questions, which we have reason to believe, judging by the experience of the last few weeks, will have only remote relevance to this debate."⁷⁸ In essence, his appeal was to confine remarks to the South African context of the issue.

78. UN doc., S/PV. 1906, March 31, 1976.

One delegate from the United Kingdom later commented on "the ironicle aspect of this appeal by the African group." Too often in the past, he pointed out, international conferences have been marred by the "intrusion of non-germane, extraneous, political issues introduced by Third World delegates." He claimed he had attended meetings such as the UN Conference on Human Settlements, "Habitat"; a conference in Rome to set up the new International Fund for Agricultural Development; at Geneva, the International Labor Organization's World Employment Conference; and many other meetings of international importance that became side-tracked with extraneous political issues.

Early in the Security Council debates, China's ambassador Huang Hua purported to strengthen Peking's image as a supporter of national liberation movements, while at the same time using the occasion to attack the USSR and its "foreign mercenaries," the Cubans.

Ambassador Huang first directed his attention toward the Angolan people, "who have persevered in protracted and courageous struggles against Portuguese colonialists," and then extended "warm congratulations to the Angolan people and all the Angolan liberation organizations."⁷⁹ I have emphasized the all, since it is consistent with the theme of an interview conducted with a member of the Chinese delegation prior to Ambassador Huang's speech. The interviewee made reference to a General Assembly speech by Lai Ya-Li on

79. UN Doc., S/PV. 1900, March 26, 1976.

November 24, 1975, in which the Chinese position on anti-colonialism in Africa was made quite explicit.⁸⁰

In that particular 1975 speech Lai Ya-Li stated that Peking's attitude toward African peoples struggling against imperialism and colonialism was always one of firm support, and that this would apply to the Angolan people as well.

We have always treated the three Angolan liberation organizations on the same basis and in a friendly way, and we provided them with various kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in their struggle against Portuguese colonialism. In our opinion, the three Angolan liberation organizations are fraternal organizations, who were comrades-in-arms in the days of arduous anti-colonialist armed struggle.⁸¹

The interviewee stressed that because of this general attitude, the Chinese have been attempting to persuade the MPLA, UNITA, and the FNLA to seek common ground while setting aside their differences and to unite against the enemy. "In 1975 representatives from all three organizations visited China, and they were urged to solve their differences through peaceful consultation."⁸² He stressed that China hoped they would consider their national interests, do away with Superpower "meddling and intervention," and support a common effort to build a "truly independent and united Angola of national harmony."

80. UN, General Assembly official records, thirtieth session, plenary meeting 2415.

81. UN, Doc., A/PV. 2415.

82. Holsti, Enemies in Politics, p. 31.

Referring again to the March 26th speech by Ambassador Huang, another element was added to the level of discourse. At this juncture the Chinese delegate injected the Sino/Soviet conflict:

However, when the victory of the national liberation struggle in Angola was won, the Soviet social imperialists crossed the oceans, committed naked armed intervention and plunged the newly independent young State of Angola into painful division and civil war.⁸³

After condemning the USSR, and the South African authorities for their intervention, Huang Hua firmly held that the Soviet military personnel and its "foreign mercenary troops" (Cuban) should immediately and completely withdraw from Angola.

The following day a UN delegate sympathetic to China's perception of the crisis, cited the fact that even though South Africa was forced to declare complete withdrawal on March 27, "some 1,000 Soviet military personnel and over 10,000 Cuban troops supported by the USSR were still in Angola and refused to withdraw."

In the Council Huang Hua had stressed that:

Since Soviet social-imperialism got the upper hand in Angola, it has been hatching new schemes of aggression and expansion. The Security Council cannot evade such a serious state of affairs, still less condone it.⁸⁴

The Chinese emphasized that the Soviet actions in Angola were by no means accidental, but constituted a strategic part

83. UN Doc., S/PV. 1900, March 26, 1976.

84. UN Doc., S/PV. 1900, March 26, 1976.

in the Soviet global policy "world hegemony" by questing for control of the South Atlantic. The Chinese accused the Soviets of "never" giving any "real" support to the Angolan people during their long struggle against Portuguese control until after the collapse of the "old colonial rule" and the attainment of independence by the Angolan people. Then the Soviets became most "generous" and, "As a result, 150,000 Black brothers in Angola were killed with Soviet weapons and many towns were razed to the ground by Soviet bombshells."⁸⁵

During these early stages of this Council debate, Ambassador Huang claimed that the Soviet objective was to "seize" naval and air bases in Angola with a view to dominating the southern Atlantic, to be used as a springboard for expansion to other areas of Africa in order to grab the region's strategic resources.

The Soviet reply defended its involvement in Angola. Several Soviet Secretariat staff members interviewed at this time insisted that Russia's Angolan policy could be reconciled with her overall policy of detente. What must be kept in mind, one Soviet interviewee contended, is that "lessening of international tension doesn't mean freedom of activity for aggressors or neo-colonialists."

Mikhail A. Kharlamov, acting Soviet delegate, told the Council that his government had given "and continues to give moral, political, diplomatic and other types of support" to

85. PR, No. 14, April 2, 1976, p. 14.

Angola. He further denied Chinese allegations of the USSR seeking any material or strategic benefits in the former Portuguese colony, and stressed that Moscow would help all national and social liberation movements. In fact, by May 31, 1976, Angola's Prime Minister, Lopo do Nascimento, was ending a week-long visit to the Soviet Union. It was reported in the New York Times that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Angola with further military aid in the wake of the support it gave to the Luanda authorities during the civil war. Two weeks before this the USSR agreed to help Mozambique "in strengthening its defense potential."⁸⁶

My interviews with Soviets at the UN at this time reflected their outrage with Ambassador Huang's reference to the Cuban forces in Angola as "mercenaries." In the Security Council Mr. Kharlamov suggested that if people aiding a country in its struggle for freedom are called mercenaries, "then we'll call the Chinese, who at one time helped the Koreans, 'mercenaries'--this is nonsense, worse than nonsense." The Soviet delegate did not elaborate, but accused China of having itself "sent armed mercenaries" to Angola. Mr. Kharlamov insisted that the "aid to Angola arose in very complicated conditions," and asserted that the former colony was a target of aggression by South Africa, which wanted to make Angola a basis for attack on other African countries.⁸⁷

86. Christopher Wren, The New York Times, May 31, 1976.

87. UN Doc., S/PV. 1905.

What happened next in the Security Council came as an unexpected surprise to everyone, including those Third World delegates I had been communicating with during breaks and recesses. Ambassador Salim A. Salim of Tanzania asserted what amounted to a "Monroe Doctrine" for Africa during what appeared to be a standard debate between the PRC and the USSR, shocking both the Soviet and Chinese delegates present, and delivering a severe blow to China's African image.

Salim, who has earned a reputation as Black Africa's most articulate, influential, and outspoken voice, took both the Chinese and Soviets to task when he stated:

In the past . . . there have been a good number of exchanges in this organization between the delegation of China and the delegation of the Soviet Union. I have always, advisedly and I think wisely, remained quiet. I intend to do so in the future. For it would be the height of naivete on my part to intervene in such cases: those who indulge in these exchanges have their own reasons for doing so.⁸⁸

The timing of Salim's comments was interesting in itself. The speech was delivered on a Friday evening, which at the UN means that most delegates have already left for their weekend holiday. The few delegates remaining began readjusting their headsets quizzically questioning the tone of Salim's voice. The Chinese and the Russians had just concluded their bombastic exchange of remarks, which may have sparked Salim's reaction. Initially, Salim referred to Council President Thomas S. Boya's appeal that the Council

88. UN Doc., S/PV. 1907, April, 1976.

"confine the scope of its discussion to the agenda item under consideration." Salim then argued that Africans also had the right to insist that their conceptions of problems be taken "seriously" into account when members of the Council address themselves to a problem which has been "brought up by the African states."

I think, it put it mildly, it would be unfortunate and indeed sad for us if, when discussing what Africa considers a very serious problem--the problem of South Africa's aggression against Angola--we were to hijack the debate from the consideration of the real problem and divert it to other problems. . . .⁸⁹

He advised delegations that wanted to discuss extraneous issues "to ask for their specific inscription on the agenda" and not to clutter up the Angola debate. And, in a direct reference to China's Security Council statements, Salim added:

I also for the first time wish to take issue with the statement made by the representative of China, only to say that we do not accept and we shall never accept the thesis that the South African aggression in Angola was caused by Soviet support for the liberation movement in Angola.⁹⁰

A quick poll of African delegates following this meeting reflected a general opinion that this solitary blast by Salim had the most disastrous effect on China's image in Africa to date, particularly in view of the linkage that existed between China and Tanzania.

89. Ibid.

90. Ibid.

Several African delegates interviewed indicated that Salim directed a warning to the United States as well. Salim had emphasized that South African aggression had precipitated Angola's request for support, and this "Salim Doctrine" for Africa was intended to indicate a hands-off warning to the United States. A Tanzanian delegate related in an interview that this was "clearly a response to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's announcement that the United States would not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad."⁹¹ But Salim's remarks were especially significant due to the fact that Tanzania is regarded as a close friend of both the USSR and PRC, and has been Peking's most important link with Africa. This was the first time that any African had so bluntly and publicly criticized the USSR and PRC and instructed them to refrain from political diatribes when it detracted from the thrust of "legitimate agenda items."

Within an hour following this debate, a member of the Nigerian delegation related his perceptions of the episode by placing it within a broader analytic framework:

Times have changed, and all non-African countries including China must realize this fact. The mid-1970's are not the 1960's. American and Soviet statesmen were naive in their dealings with tropical African states, and have thus been led to more cynical policies on their part. The Chinese have been more cautious than both the Americans and Soviets, and may have taken a more pragmatic approach toward African states. But, they too must learn by their own experiences, and the major lesson to be learned by this experience [Angola] is that Africans

91. For a discussion of Kissinger's remarks, see, "Kissinger's Warnings on Africa," The New York Times, March 29, 1976, p. 12.

will play China off against the USSR, or the West, if it is to their own advantage.

On the other hand, in order to mitigate the sting of his rebuke to the Chinese and Soviets, Salim acknowledged that "foremost in giving support to the liberation have been the Socialist countries . . . the Chinese and the Soviets, particularly." At this juncture Salim made an observation concerning the West.

We even had occasion in the past to say that we would welcome it if our American and British colleagues, as well as our other Western European colleagues . . . also provided equipment and material for the liberation struggle.⁹²

Salim then directed his aim at the US/South African connection without mentioning the United States by name. Since the United States first intervened militarily in Angola to support the anti-Marxist factions, most Africans linked Pretoria and Washington together as the enemy of the liberation. Salim argued that because of Washington's "anti-Communist campaign," Kissinger issued his threat against Cuba. Salim concluded by stating that the extracontinental support received by the MPLA in no way justified South African involvement in the Angolan crisis.

There were several developments that appeared to damage China's image during the Angolan crisis. Following the MPLA victory at the tail-end of the civil war, Peking refused to extend diplomatic recognition.

92. UN Doc., S/PV. 1900.

As discussed earlier, the critical test came on March 31, 1976, when the Security Council voted on the draft resolution sponsored by Benin, Guyana, the Libyan Arab Republic, Panama, Romania, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Huang Hua stated, much to the shock and surprise of many Third World delegates, that "we absolutely cannot agree to it."⁹³

Huang Hua stopped short of vetoing the draft resolution by not participating in the vote, while France, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstained. Thus, the draft resolution passed by a vote of 9:0:5 with one non-participation. If we accept five abstentions and China's non-participation as "hidden oppositions," the vote follows the North-South bipolarity in UN politics.

In conducting random interviews following the Angolan Security Council debates, it was found that a cross-section of Third World delegates expressed uncertainty as to Chinese behavior. For example, Security Council Resolution 387 condemns South Africa's aggression against Angola, demands that South Africa desist from utilizing the international territory of Namibia to mount provocative acts against Angola, and economically recognizes Angola's claims against South Africa for just compensation. Or, as one delegate claimed, "It was clearly an anti-South African resolution." A consensus among those interviewed believed that the resolution was consistent with China's "principles" in that the

93. UN Doc., S/PV. 1906, p. 146.

resolution made a distinction between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.

When a counsellor from the Chinese delegation was questioned concerning their perceptions of the resolution, he maintained that China's position was not different from other members of the Council who believed that condemnation should be extended to all foreign military forces in Angola. The other members of the Council he was referring to were the abstaining western powers and Japan, who, in turn, objected to Soviet and Cuban troops in Angola.

When the counsellor from the Chinese delegation was asked to be more specific, he replied:

The Security Council resolution contained two paragraphs within the preamble that were in conflict. If I may read to you from the preamble, it states that "the principle that no state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any state," but it continues to postulate that "also the inherent and lawful right of every state, in the exercise of its sovereignty, to request assistance from any other state or group of states." Now, this second part of the insertion contradicted and canceled the first. We believe that the second part implied that the Angolan "state" had, in the exercise of its sovereignty, asked Cuba to send an expeditionary corps of 13,000 men and had asked Moscow to supply the force with tanks, missiles and other up-to-date weapons. This we found to be completely unacceptable.

Peking continued her opposition by "non-participation" during the June, 1976, voting for Angolan United Nations membership, thereby leaving the United States to cast the only veto to kill Angola's membership request.

Summary

A perceptual analysis of Chinese diplomatic behavior reveals that the Angolan crisis had a tremendous impact on China's image among many Third World countries. Many Third World delegates were interviewed following the Security Council debate, and one interviewee confirmed what most had been saying:

Most of us from Third World countries were quite surprised by the posture taken by China during the Council debates, as well as China's dealing in Africa during the crisis. I do believe that China suffered a stinging setback when she was downright abandoned by many nations in the Third World, especially nations such as Tanzania and Pakistan with which China had been cultivating good relations.

What happened to Chinese perceptions during the crisis? Exactly why did China's image among Third World nations suffer during the crisis? What role did the Sino/Soviet conflict play during the crisis? There are several observations that can be made in response to these questions.

Chinese behavior during the crisis appeared to be determined by the positions of other actors, or what may be referred to as an "actor-oriented" rather than an "issue-oriented" response. Peking's perceptions appeared to be determined more by what the Soviet Union did rather than by the evaluation of objective data. As an example of this type of behavior, the Cuban representative in the Security Council described Chinese behavior as being guided by the Soviets, saying: "We oppose everything the enemy defends and defend everything the enemy opposes."⁹⁴

94. UN Doc., S/PV. 1932, p. 146.

In terms of the processes of perception, Robert Jervis has noted: "When one country thinks that another is the enemy, the perception of hostility is usually more central than other aspects of the image."⁹⁵ This attitude in itself may be considered rational behavior, since, as Jervis explains:

If you think the Russians are aggressive, there is nothing irrational about viewing their suggestions with suspicion--not only will you know of previous attempts at deception, but the belief that the Russians are adversaries implies, by definition, that you should be skeptical of their proposals.⁹⁶

This aspect of the Sino/Soviet conflict carried over to Peking's perception of the MPLA during the Angolan crisis. For example, during the Security Council debate on Angola, Huang Hua made reference to the fact that all three of Angola's national liberation groups had visited China in March and May of 1975 requesting aid.⁹⁷ At that particular time, as reported in the Chinese press, there existed no expressed hostility toward the MPLA.⁹⁸ But later, when the Soviets escalated their support for the MPLA, Chinese perceptions of the MPLA changed.⁹⁹

95. Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 299.

96. Ibid, p. 120.

97. UN Doc., S/PV. 1906, p. 132.

98. PR, No. 50, December 12, 1975, pp. 7-9.

99. There have been very few studies of how policy decisions are changed, but for an exception, see, Paul Diesing and Snyder, Systems, Bargains, Decisions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977), Chapter 4.

What may have transpired here is that the Chinese perceived no inconsistency in their changing attitude toward the MPLA. The Chinese perceptions may not have been apparently logical, but it was linked to Peking's own experiences with the Soviets. One scholar, Charles Osgood, adds some clarify to this perceptual process:

If we like (the president) and he happens to praise some diplomat from Afghanistan, we tend to feel favorably disposed toward this otherwise unknown individual. But let (the Soviet Premier) comment on this same diplomat's sound idea--a kind of association known as the kiss of death--and we suddenly find ourselves distrusting the man.¹⁰⁰

This psychological association results not from an emotional source, as suggested by Osgood, but reflects a "rational consistency," for it is quite rational to believe that many of the people your enemy supports will have interests opposed to yours. In fact, it can be argued that China's actions were rational throughout the entire crisis. This is particularly so if, when using Allen Whiting's definition, that a policy may be considered rational:

as the pursuit of likely attainable goals through available means where perceived costs are outweighed by anticipated gains. In a reactive policy against perceived threat, rationality is the attempt to deter an enemy against perceived threat, rationality is the attempt to deter an enemy with a credible counterthreat of costs which he will find unacceptable if he persists in conflictual behavior.¹⁰¹

100. Charles Osgood, An Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 19), pp. 26-27.

101. Allen S. Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1975), p. 227.

China's perception of the South African invasion during the crisis was distorted, again by Peking's hostility toward the Soviet Union. Peking failed to accurately perceive, as indicated by Salim, the alarm with which many Black Africans viewed this invasion. As a delegate from Pakistan stressed when interviewed about this matter:

During the Angolan crisis, one must not forget, as the Chinese may have, that the general consensus among many UN delegates was that the assistance of the Soviet Union, or any assistance for that matter, was quite welcomed by most Black Africans in repelling the white mercenaries from South Africa.¹⁰²

Many Africans may have had differing perceptions of the developments from the beginning of the Angolan civil war, but these differences in perceptions among Africans decreased as the threat from the Republic of South Africa increased. As one scholar has found, the differences in perception among a group of decision-makers decrease as tension increases.¹⁰³

This is where Peking may have misperceived the African attitude during the Angolan crisis. Jervis may be focusing on Peking's perceptual problem during the Angolan crisis when he states:

102. Angola's decisions were greatly affected by the policies of other states. Rosenau has suggested that the international environment is more important in determining the policy of small states than it is of large ones. See, James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories & Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative & International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1966), pp. 47-48.

103. Ole Holsti, "Individual Differences in Definition of the Situation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, No. 14 (Sept., 1970), pp. 303-310.

When evidence gradually accumulates that a view is wrong, those who hold the view often seem willfully stubborn as they refuse to recognize that, while their beliefs may have been tenable in the past, they are now clearly incorrect.¹⁰⁴

What happened to the Chinese in this case occurs time and time again in international politics, that "people do not understand the impact that their beliefs have on their interpretations of new information."¹⁰⁵

Whatever misperceptions the Chinese may have developed was related to their propensity to see themselves as central to the behavior of many Africans, as the Chinese have also done in other areas of the Third World. It was difficult for the Chinese to believe that Africans saw China as being on the "opposing team," and it was even more difficult for China to realize that many Africans were "playing an entirely different game."¹⁰⁶ The Chinese may have allowed their expectations to distort their perceptions during the Angolan crisis. An observation made by one scholar may be relevant in this particular case:

. . . national leaders should guard against the dangers of psycho-logic: the tendency to see what they want to see and to respond to situations, not on the basis of empirical evidence, but on the basis of their subjective wishes. The wish must never be father to policy; only facts can be.¹⁰⁷

The Angolan crisis gave everyone an opportunity to view China's behavior within the Security Council. And Peking's

104. Jervis, Perceptions & Misperceptions, p. 176.

105. Ibid., p. 182.

106. Ibid., p. 212.

107. John G. Stoessinger, Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 195.

image here, as with her anti-colonial image, is closely linked with the Chinese distrust of Superpower hegemony. For example, Ch'iao Kuan-hua has described China's perception of the dynamics of Security Council debate during a 1973 Middle East Council meeting:

The Chinese delegation firmly opposes such a malicious practice of using the United Nations Security Council as a tool to be juggled with by the two Superpowers at will. In our opinion this also shows utter disrespect for the other State members of the Security Council. The Chinese delegation cannot tolerate such a practice. We have something to say. We believe that the other State members of the Security Council also have something to say from the bottom of their hearts.¹⁰⁸

As indicated during the Angolan Council debate, Peking's anti-hegemonial image came under direct attack by "other" members of the Security Council. At the same time it should be remembered that Peking's anti-hegemonial image must be reconciled with her status as a permanent member of the Security Council possessing the veto power.¹⁰⁹ An indiscreet use of this veto power during the Angolan debates could have resulted in irreparable damage to China's anti-hegemonial image among many Black Africans.

In order to maintain this image, and in order not to obstruct the will of the majority of Black Africans, China

108. UN Doc., S/PV. 1748, October 23, 1973, p. 17.

109. China actually cast the least number of vetos among the five permanent members between November, 1971, and December, 1976: United States (17), United Kingdom (9), Soviet Union (5), France (4), China (2).

utilized a device which was rarely employed by the permanent members of the Council--"non-participation."¹¹⁰ One scholar of China's UN politics states that:

Non-participation is thus perceived as maximizing the flexibility of the Chinese position in the Council with little "political responsibility." The Chinese could argue that they opposed all peacekeeping operations consistent with their past "principled stand" by not voting for the authorizing resolutions. Or they could argue that they supported--or not obstructed--peacekeeping operations by not vetoing the authorizing resolutions. For the Soviet Union, however, Chinese non-participation "shows the cowardice and unprincipledness."¹¹¹

The "non-participation" device, utilized by Peking as a major voting procedure, often circumvents the tension that exists between the dichotomous elements of national interest and ideology. Such was the case during the Security Council voting on the Angolan question. Peking acted on what she perceived to be in her best interest, while at the same time minimizing any antagonisms within the Third World bloc.

On the general question of decolonization, Peking left it open-ended. If Article 2(7) of the Charter cannot stand in the way of United Nations' mandatory enforcement measures as applied to decolonization, why did not Peking's motion to have the United Nations apply leverage to force the withdrawal of "imperialist" forces from southern Africa?

110. Between 1971 and 1976 China cast 46 "non-participations" on 158 non-procedural questions disposed of by the Security Council.

111. Samuel Kim, "Behavioural Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," p. 727.

China showed no interest in pursuing this issue in the United Nations. Furthermore, Peking has requested that the "erroneous" categorization of Hong Kong and Macao as "colonial territories" should be immediately removed from the list of "colonial territories" covered by the Declaration on Decolonization."¹¹² A content analysis of the Chinese press uncovers no mention of this forementioned request, which, in essence, could well mean that Peking considers the legacies of western colonialism in China as being beyond the purview of United Nation's affairs. Yet, in what appears to be a major contradiction, the Chinese have put forth the following argument in the Special Committee on Decolonization:

Puerto Rico was in fact a colony of the United States and the Puerto Rican people's struggle for national independence was a just one which the Special Committee should support. The request for the inclusion of Puerto Rico in the list of colonial territories covered by the Declaration on Decolonization was reasonable and his delegation would support it.¹¹³

112. UN Doc., A/AC. 109/396.

113. UN Monthly Chronicle (August-September, 1972), p. 41.

CHAPTER III

CHINA: AND THE LAW OF THE SEA

Definition of Freedom of Seas

That expanse of water which antiquity describes as the immense, the infinite, bounded only by the heavens, parent of all things; the ocean which the ancients believed was perpetually supplied with water not only by fountains, rivers and seas, but by the clouds, and by the very stars of heaven themselves; the ocean which, although surrounding this earth, the home of the human race, with the ebb and flow of its tides, can be neither seized nor enclosed; nay, which rather possesses the earth than is by it possessed.¹

Part 1

Introduction

Due to the kaleidoscopic nature of the law of the sea, any attempt to formulate international agreements only reveals the multitudinous scope of perceptions, misperceptions, and images that must be dealt with. For example, first, most states at the United Nations have a general perception of the principle that the wealth of the seas should be exploited for the "common heritage of all mankind." In reality,

-
1. Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas, translated by Ralph Van Demon Magoffice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1916), p. 37.

we have to recognize that the same states generally feel insecure and perceive one another with a good deal of apprehension and distrust.² This is what accounts for the problem of transposing the principle of "common heritage" into a concretized plan of action, since ultimately all states become concerned with the priority of their own interests.³

A second example deals with the perceptions in a slightly different setting. The first example began with the assumption that most states were "alike" in their general agreement on sharing of the oceans' riches. Now we begin by considering that each nation's internal institutions and development may be somewhat unique or "unlike" other nations, which may affect their commitment or lack of commitment to proposed solutions relating to the debate on the law of the sea.⁴

Third, what must also be considered is the fact that each of the states represented within the United Nations are normally instructed by home governments that make their foreign policy decisions, and these decision-makers each, in turn, have their own perceptions of what should constitute

-
2. David A. Kay, "Intergovernmental Dimensions of International Conferences," in Francis T. Christy (ed.), Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond (New York: Bellinger Press, 1974), p. 202.
 3. Hans Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, 3rd edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), pp. 1-100.
 4. H. Gary Knight, "Special Domestic Interests and United States Oceans Policy," in Robert G. Wirsing (ed.), International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space (University of South Carolina, 1974), pp. 10-43.

the law of the sea.⁵

Fourth, how does one develop accurate perceptions of an issue that is in itself as complex as the law of the seas? The complex and nearly chaotic nature of the issue can best be visualized by trying to think in matrix form. For example, take the developing states' list of subjects as an indicator of the range of perceptions and the resultant complexities involved in finding solutions.⁶ One scholar, Robert Friedheim, maintains that:

It includes 63 separate and distinct categories of major issues which include a large number of contentious sub-issues. Assuming there will be an average of three sub-issues in these 63 categories, the total of voting issues forming one side of the matrix will be 189. On the other side of the matrix are placed the participants, perhaps as many as 142 states (132 UN members plus 10 states that are members of a UN functional agency but not the United Nations itself) who will be entitled to vote. With a 189 times 142 matrix we can see that there will be 26,838 decision cells. Thus, a participating state in planning its strategy for the conference must not only be concerned with what its policy will be on 189 issues, but it must also attempt to understand how its preferences can be blended with the intricate decisional strategies of enough other states to form majorities. It is an awesome task with or without a computer. The problem of complexity alone is a reason to express concern about the possibility of success of a law of the sea conference.⁷

5. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/66, March, 1972.

6. Robert L. Friedheim, "A Law of the Sea Conference--Who Needs It?" in Robert G. Wirsing (ed.), op. cit., p. 62.

7. Robert L. Friedheim, "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study," World Politics, XVIII (October, 1965), pp. 20-41.

This chapter, unlike Chapter Two, deals with an issue that is lacking much precedent, and by comparison is not as politically volatile. Nevertheless, its potential for generating conflict compels an in-depth analysis of all the ramifications involving the law of the sea.

The law of the sea issue reflects China's deep concern with future international resource allocations derived from the wealth of the oceans, sovereignty over coastal waters, fishing rights, and the drafting of new principles of international law of the seas. This chapter will analyze Chinese perceptions of the broad range of issues involving the law of the seas.

Background to the Law of the Sea Issue

The classical law of the sea dates back 200 years to the Dutch jurist, Hugo Grotius, and was based on a pivotal concept freedom of the seas.⁸ Vaguely interpreted, it meant that the high seas were "res communis" (belonging to everyone) and "res Communis" (belonging to no one), and therefore could not in whole or in part be under the sovereignty of any nation.

The law of the sea has developed over the centuries around the notion of freedom of navigation and the aura which attaches to the word has tended to obscure the expansion of maritime empires which it permitted. This freedom-of-the-seas concept favored certain nations' needs during

8. See quotation on p. 93.

the age of mercantilism and later supported colonialist ventures. But free access to all meant that in practice only those few with the technology could enjoy the benefits which enabled them to expand and assert new claims. Rene-Jean Duprey has pointed out that:

The idea of free communications between peoples, rich in images of large ships opening the way to exchange with far-off lands, justifies placing the sea at the disposal of all; however, in historical reality, only the great maritime powers were able to make use of it. Freedom of the seas has been akin to "Freedom of Labours" in the industrial Europe of the 19th century: in effect the right of the great was license, that of the poor was submission.⁹

So, those few dominant maritime powers had a common interest in supporting a concept that essentially meant non-regulation and laissez-faire for colonialist policies. The Third World countries of today, which fell under the domination of the colonialist powers, had no voice in developing any concept dealing with the international law of the sea.¹⁰

For the fourth time in the 20th century (the first three were the League of Nations' Codification Conferences of 1930 and the UN Law of the Sea Conferences of 1958 and 1960), the world's nation-states have brought law of the sea problems to what there is of a centralized world decision apparatus. The United Nations has been summoned for the

9. Rene-Jean Duprey, The Law of the Sea, Current Problems (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceans Publications, Inc., 1974), p. 3.

10. D. W. Bowett, The Law of the Sea (Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1967), pp. 2-3.

third time to consider law of the sea matters. If a UN law of the sea conference is to be successfully concluded, the political nature of the UN system must be understood.

The United Nations may perform important lawmaking functions, but, above all, it is a political institution; and any problems that are handled are handled in a political manner. It must never be forgotten that the UN General Assembly is a political forum in which states and groups of states attempt to foster and protect what they believe to be in their interests. Many members of the UN community may wish to create law at the UN Law of the Sea Conference, but the problems that arise are more a result of clashing national wills on policy than of contrasting legal philosophies.¹¹

What must be understood as essential to the core of the debate on the law of the sea is the question of allocation-- allocation of the world's oceans between contending states that consider notions of "jurisdiction," "control," or "freedom" not as theoretical abstractions but as concepts which enhance their short-run interests or provide them some tactical maneuver room.

Anyone familiar with the atmosphere at the UN understands that most of the delegates from the developing states recognize these political realities, and for them, the UN

11. Lucian W. Pye, "Law as the Source of Both Instability and Rigidity," Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966), pp. 113-125.

is a forum in which they can take action to overcome the disadvantages their nations suffer. Doubtless they find the UN a relatively weak institution, but given their individually insufficient capabilities, it is often the best means available to them in confronting the developed countries.

Too often the developed states have talked as if the schemes they propose concerning the law of the sea were purely altruistic, having nothing to do with their national interests, and put forth entirely to protect the interests of the world community as a whole. Whatever the reason now for projecting a selfless image, it was tried before and it failed. The developed states' legalism and idealism did not impress the Third World of 1958 and 1960,¹² and random interviewing at the UN today reflects that there is no reason to believe it does today.

Previously held attitudes by the developed nations create the wrong psychological climate for realistic bargaining with the developed countries. One of the reasons for this condition is that the developed countries have failed to clearly convey to the Third World that negotiations cannot succeed unless the vital interests of both sides are taken into account. At least, this was the psychological environment on the eve of the Caracas convention.

What must be kept in mind is that the developing states have an entirely different perception of the law of the sea

12. Robert Friedheim, "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study," World Politics, XLIII:1 (October, 1965), pp. 20-41.

than that of the developed states. The developed states continually express the need for known rules of transiting on, over, and under the ocean; they need laws to state with precision what the rules will be governing ocean exploitation (fishing, oil, minerals); they are concerned with ocean science and wish to bring man's degradation of his environment under control.

While some developing states have substantial ocean interests (some African and Middle Eastern states in offshore oil, the West Coast Latin Americans in fishing), most are primarily concerned with the problems arising out of their own underdevelopment. Therefore, there are two foci to the ocean concerns of the developing countries. The first centers on the hope that they might share in the wealth of the oceans to quickly overcome their grave disadvantages. The second is to prevent the advanced industrial nations from using the oceans to widen the gap between developed and developing states as occurred in the 19th century.¹³ Since the developing nations have a political majority in the UN, the temptation has been strong to break the many deadlocked issues in UN negotiations simply by insisting upon its own way. As interviews at the UN have indicated, such was the case at the presentation of the developing states' list of subjects at the end of the March, 1972, meeting of Subcommittee 11. More than one delegate from the developing

13. John J. Logue (ed.), The Fate of the Oceans (Villanova, Pa: Villanova University Press for the World Order Research Institute, 19), pp. xvi-xxiv.

countries expressed their perception that they feared the developing countries were prepared to vote in their list as the agenda, thus precluding discussion of the superpower-backed formula of "free transit" through straits and restricting discussion to "innocent passage."¹⁴ What had to be remembered is that the one state-one vote formula has made the UN General Assembly a tool of the developing countries, and they have no intention of meekly ratifying the legal rules the developed states find valuable.

Problems of Negotiation and the Law of the Sea

Most major law-of-the-sea issues are so contentious that if put to the vote prematurely, that is before at least near consensus is achieved, the conference would fail to achieve any meaningful goals. It is obvious that where consensus is needed, the most intransigent participant is at a negotiating advantage if he holds out for as long as possible. He may not obtain all he wants, but his utility is increased by refusing compromise. Delay alone may allow outside events to make the proceedings moot. Essentially this has been the strategy of many Latin American states in defense of their position on the 200-mile territorial sea, a negotiating tactic that has also been employed by China. The Latin Americans have dominated floor discussion and helped to prolong the debate both substantively and procedurally.¹⁵

14. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/66, March 24, 1972.

15. Lewis M. Alexander (ed.), The Law of the Sea: A New Geneva Conference, p. 195.

At minimum, they have created enough time to erode the 90 vote majority the Soviet Union had claimed for a 12-mile territorial sea proposal.¹⁶

Another characteristic of UN politics relates to the type of issues which, if consensus is not achieved, are likely to be forced to a vote. Many of the most contentious issues which could not be brought to a vote in the law of the sea conference are highly visible issues with a large symbolic content. Especially sensitive are those issues which deal with territoriality-borders, jurisdictional rights, sovereignty. For example, if freedom of ocean science, which in the minds of most developed state delegates has a positive connotation, correlates very highly with control of territory in the minds of representatives of many developing states, such a concept will have a difficult time gaining a requisite majority if brought to a vote.¹⁷

When issues are symbolic, there is a tendency for states to be rigid in their voting. What is normally being debated at Seabed conferences are exactly those symbol-laden concepts by which states define themselves. Despite statements by representatives of the developing countries that western derived international law is unjust, many find some aspects of that law highly relevant to their present and future aspirations. One distinguished member of the Group

16. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC.11/Sr. 14, August 18, 1971, p. 11.

17. Robert L. Friedheim & Joseph B. Kadane, "Ocean Science in the U.N. Political Arena," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 3:3 (April, 1972), pp. 473-502.

of 77 voiced his perceptions within a broader framework:

Many of the developing societies are "new" states in the sense that they are highly concerned with the integrity of their borders and the legitimacy of their governments. Thus they find concepts of sovereignty and territoriality highly salient. Many older developing states, especially Latin American, who feel the disparity between their power and that of the United States remaining constant or even growing, are sometimes even more territorially conscious. Many have even made substantial unilateral claims on ocean areas. Many Third World delegates will privately recognize not only that their claims may present substantial problems to others ocean users but that they will have difficulty in enforcing their claims even if unchallenged by the developed states. Nevertheless, there is virtually no way to induce us to vote for a retrenchment of national claims. We will vote for the symbols which help reinforce our seeming independence. Statements on the part of developed states' representatives that they "do not see much point. . . in accommodation of mere symbolism" are foolish as they are arrogant.

On the other hand, the developing countries are just as prone to perceive proposals of the developed countries as symbolic--as symbols of great power hegemony.¹⁸ Many Third World states are not in a position to resist the developed states in exercising what they consider to be pre-existing rights: many more do not want to create a major incident and do not intend to challenge the great powers. But when an issue is symbolic of national sovereignty or of resistance to developed state domination, many developing countries can be induced to vote for it.

18. Joao Augusto de Araujo Castro, "The United Nations and the Freezing of the International Power Structure," International Organization 26:1 (Winter, 1972), 158-166; "Environment and Development, The Case of the Less Developed Countries," International Organization 26:2 (Spring, 1972), 401-416.

Anyone observing UN politics over a period of time will be aware that not all of the trade-offs and deals are made on the particular items on the agenda. It is not unlikely that African states, for example, will base their votes on a resolution concerning the law of the sea offered by a Western state on how that Western state voted on a resolution to impose sanctions on Rhodesia. Interissue trading is well known, but unfortunately, its value as a bargaining device gets blurred at UN special conferences. At times this prevents understanding and dealing with the real underlying issues.

Too often Western delegations to special UN conferences have prepared for the issues on the agenda of that conference and little else, which means that they are usually authorized to bargain only on the items on the formal agenda. In other words, they are unable to take advantage of the trade-offs which are so important to the developing countries' needs,¹⁹ and do not reflect the necessities of the bargaining environment. The developing states are not primarily interested in developing a set of rules for ocean use per se. What they want is development assistance, more attention to UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid, and Development), or lower developed state tariffs on the products of developing countries. As one African related his perceptions on the eve of the Geneva conference:

19. Claire Sterling, "U.S. Losing Argument With Poor Nations at Stockholm," Washington Post, June 8, 1972, p. A29.

Until the developed states understand that they must make concessions on subjects of interest to the developing states, unrelated or peripherally related, to the law of the sea in return for developing state concessions on the law of the sea, we can expect little progress in the law of the sea or any other negotiations between North and South participants.

The United Nations' political process, blending sovereign equality with sovereignty, has had another deleterious effect on the law of the sea negotiations--it had heightened the inability of the Assembly or Seabed Committee to reduce the issues to manageable proportions. The developing countries have expressed concern over the preference of the developed states for expert preparatory groups, depoliticization of the issues, a set date for the Law of the Sea Conference to begin, etc. The developing states, in addition, attempted to present an agenda favorable to themselves. All of this can make it difficult to create an adequate preparatory structure for the law of the sea negotiations.

On the other hand, all manner of states, developed or developing, who felt excluded by a Seabed Committee of the whole complained of the limited membership of the Seabed Committee.²⁰ All manner of states who felt their interests were involved were unwilling to delegate preparatory work to experts or small working groups, and complained of lack of representation of states or blocs with their particular needs or characteristics. The result is essentially

20. Australia (UN Doc., A/C. 1/PV. 1782, November, 1970; A/AC138/SR42, March, 1971); Greece (UN Doc., A/C 1/PV. 1794, March, 1970).

consideration by the whole United Nations (each Seabed Committee is virtually a committee of the whole), consideration of the issues with no agenda, and consideration of the issues with few specific preparatory materials.

Chinese Perceptions of the Law of the Sea

Chinese perceptions of the law of the sea have been molded and nurtured by several factors, none of which are mutually exclusive in themselves. Peking's behavior within the context of the issues under examination can be perceived as a series of adjustments depending upon the time, place, actor, and nature of the issue itself. In other words, no one perception can explain China's behavior in any one issue under discussion, while at the same time, any one perception may possibly help to explain behavior in all the issues under discussion. China's perceptions of the law of the sea may be examined from the perspective of several factors:

First, Chinese perceptions of the law of the sea are partially formed by Peking's conceptualization of international law. From 1949, when the Communists assumed power, to 1971, when they claimed their seat in the United Nations, the PRC was in virtual isolation from most international forums. In this period Chinese scholars began to examine international law in the context of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Beginning with the assumption that existing international law was designed by Western nations to sanctify their

encroachments upon non-Western people,²¹ Chinese legal scholar Chu Li-ju wrote:

International law is an instrument for settling international problems. If this instrument is useful to our country, to the Socialist cause, or to the cause of peace for the peoples of the world, we will use it. But if it is disadvantageous. . . we will not use it, and we should create a new instrument to replace it.²²

To the Chinese, the old order of the law of the sea reflects the old colonial interests, and:

In fact, the old law of the sea was never universally accepted. It was imposed by a few imperialist maritime powers on the great majority of the countries of the world. C. John Colombos, a British "authority" on the law of the sea, bluntly admitted that in former times the so-called international law of the sea was Anglo-American "law." And yet flaunting the label of "socialism" and calling itself the "natural ally" of the Third World, the Soviet revisionist leading group has totally taken over the old law of the sea of old-line imperialism, guards it with might and main, and opposes the just demand of the other countries of the world, particularly the Third World, to safeguard their national maritime rights and resources. Does this not expose the social-imperialist features of the Soviet revisionists as clearly on the maritime issue as they are unmasked on other issues.²³

As one Chinese staff member of the UN Secretariat pointed out, "What first must be understood by anyone attempting to understand China's approach toward the law of the sea

-
21. Jerome Cohen, "Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law and Our Own," Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l. Law (April 27-29, 1967), p. 116.
 22. James Chief Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations, A Study of Attitudes and Practices (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 16-19.
 23. Peking Review, No. 27, July 5, 1974, p. 12.

is that the Chinese word for international law is cheng-fa, literally translated as "politics-law." The Chinese believe that the new international law of the sea can and ought to be determined by the new international consensus of the global community.

Second, Chinese perceptions on the law of the sea are partially formed by Peking's ideological view of the world. The projection of Peking's image of world order is far removed from the cosmology of the tribute system that some scholars have described, primarily because the history that influenced Mao's thinking was modern history. The Maoist image of world order is fundamentally different from the traditional Chinese image of world order which was a projection of the Confucian moral order. The Maoist image of world order is an outward projection of revolutionary China's self-image. For example:

The Maoist image of world order has substituted a new value of struggle for the traditional value of harmony; a new value of populism for the traditional value of elitism; a new value of equalitarianism for the traditional value of status and hierarchy; and a new value of national sovereignty, independence and equality for the traditional value of tributary relations.²⁴

The most crucial concept, and the one least understood by those attending many conferences in which the Chinese participate, is the fundamental break with the traditional Chinese image of world order by substituting the value of

24. Samuel S. Kim, The Maoist Image of World Order, World Order Studies Program, Occasional Paper No. 5 (Princeton, N.J.: Center for International Studies, Princeton University, 1977), p. 48.

struggle for the Confucian value of harmony. This new image is bound to clash with the objectives of many industrial nations at law of sea conferences whose priorities are directed toward concluding a treaty of harmony with their own interests. The concept of struggle throws a drastically different light on Peking's perception of and behavior within the context of any issue which allows for the reinterpretation of world order. This could be extended to include a crisis situation. For example, in contrast to the common understanding of crisis as a situation that presents a high threat with a short response time and surprise to the decision-makers,²⁵ the Chinese perceive international crises as recurrent and protected phenomena, generated by economic factors and related to the domestic crises of political actors.²⁶ In other words, considering the fact that even military conflict situations in international relations are not generally regarded as crisis in the Chinese view of world order; Chinese delegates attending the law of the sea conferences see no immediacy in resolving crucial issues that would leave Third World nations without control in the struggle for equitable distribution of the oceans' wealth.

What may be perceived to be a crisis in negotiations by Western and industrial country delegates is never

25. Charles F. Hermann, "Threat, Time, and Surprise: A Simulation of International Crisis," in Hermann (ed.), International Crises Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1972), pp. 187-211.

26. John A. Kringen and Steve Chan, "Chinese Crisis Perception and Behavior: A Summary of Findings." Paper delivered at meeting of the Comm. on Contemporary China (Ann Arbor, Mich., Aug., 1976), p. 3.

considered as such by the Chinese, who may not perceive of a resolution to an issue within an emergency framework, which may be a slight exaggeration of the point, but is nevertheless related, in that the Chinese term wei-chi (crisis) does not even appear in Chinese documents relating to such confrontations as American/Chinese conflicts over Quemoy in 1958, the Sino-Indian border conflicts in 1962, or the Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964.²⁷

Another aspect of the ideological influence on Chinese perceptions of the law of the sea is the Chinese value on populism, equalitarianism, and national sovereignty. What must be remembered is that Peking's self-image as the populist champion struggling against the injustices and inequities of a system of world dominance represents more than proselytizing rhetoric. In fact, populism as epitomized in the slogan "serve the people" (wei jen min fu-wu) permeated Mao's private and public thought and behavior to such an extent that it has been considered as the supreme value in his global outlook. In comparison with Lenin, who was distrustful of unguided popular impulses (What Is To Be Done), Mao believed that the masses of the people were the creative force of history. Therefore, they should be constantly urged to shape their own destiny by liberating themselves from the pernicious influence of the "slave mentality." This populism led to a major campaign against the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius, "which propagate despising of labor and the

27. Ibid., p. 28.

laboring people."²⁸ In addition, this stream of populism led Mao to attack Lin Pio's theory of "super-Genius" in history.²⁹

In contrast to the traditional Chinese image of the world, Mao's perception of the world reflected his vigorous and unceasing quest for an equalitarian society. Equalitarianism is not a value in and of itself, Mao admitted in his interview with Andre Malraux in 1965, but "it is important because it is natural to those who have not lost contact with the masses."³⁰ Mao conceptualized equalitarianism as an operational principle of unification between the masses and the elites based on his equalitarian vision:

Humanity left to its own devices does not necessarily re-establish capitalism (which is why you are perhaps right in saying they, the Russians, will not revert to private ownership of the means of production), but it does re-establish inequality. The forces tending toward the creation of new classes are powerful. We have just suppressed military titles and badges of rank: every "cadre" becomes a worker again at least one day a week; whole trainloads of city dwellers go off to work in the peoples' communes. Khrushchev seemed to think that a revolution is done when a Communist party has seized power--as if it were merely a question of national liberation.³¹

The central objective of the struggle for equality was to unify leadership with broad mass participation, thus

28. JMJP, February 7, 1974.

29. Stuart Schram, Chairman Mao Talks to the People (New York: Pantheon Books, 1974), pp. 293-294, 297, 299, 350.

30. Andre Malraux, Anti-Memoirs, trans. by Terence Kilmartin (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968), p. 373.

31. Ibid., p. 373.

fighting-off "the forces tending toward the creation of new classes."

It is through these concepts of popularism and equality that Peking perceives the tactical struggles involved with working out a just solution to the sharing of the ocean resources. Without the "just solution" there will be an undermining of the national sovereignty of many Third World states in the latter part of the 20th century. Economic viability may be a precondition for national sovereignty.

Third, Chinese perceptions on the law of the sea are partially formed by how Peking perceives its strengths and interests vis-a-vis her two major rivals, the Soviet Union and the United States. It can never be forgotten that China's humiliation in the 19th century began with the intrusion of the colonialist powers from the sea, a fact which has printed on the Chinese psychic and is not to be forgotten.

This military variable of Chinese perceptions on the law of the sea is given focus by Chinese attacks on the principle of the freedom of the seas. A member of the Chinese delegation concentrating on this issue summed-up China's attitude:

At the UN General Assembly session and the UN Seabed Committee meeting in 1973, representatives of the Third World countries explicitly pointed out their opposition to the traditional concepts of the freedom of the seas which can no longer continue to be framed by the big powers. A declaration of the 1973 Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries said: "The new rules of the law of the sea must effectively contribute to the elimination of threats to the security of states and ensure respect for their sovereignty

and territorial integrity." The Soviet revisionist may continue to raise various arrogant and arbitrary claims on the issue of freedom of the seas, but no matter how strenuously they and the other superpower may step up their contention on the sea, the day of doom of maritime hegemony is near.

Fourth, Chinese perceptions on the law of the sea are partially formed by practical considerations of the economic potential of ocean resources. To the Chinese, the untapped wealth of the oceans is the "common heritage of mankind" which must be shared as equally as humanly possible, thereby avoiding the type of economic "plundering" that developed in the 19th century.

Chinese Perceptions Prior to Caracas and Geneva

Traditionally, the territorial sea was a zone which provided security for the coastal state. Later a few states used this concept as a method for asserting exclusive jurisdiction over all economic resources adjacent to and within a specified number of miles of their coast.³²

The Chinese perception of territorial seas has consistently led to an essential question as to the extent of the breadth of a state's territorial sea should be decided within reasonable scope, in accordance with the respective needs of those countries.³³ This perceptual bias has been

32. Barry Hart Dubner, The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagoes and Archipelagic States (The Hague: Martinus Mijoff, 1976), pp. 8-9.

33. J. Cohen and H. Chiu, People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 472.

repeatedly articulated by Chinese delegates before the United Nations Seabed Committee, and has been enunciated in Working Paper 1, which provided that:

A coastal state is entitled to reasonably define the breadth and limit of its territorial sea according to its geographical features and its needs of economic development and national security and having due regard to the legitimate interests of its neighboring countries and the convenience of international navigational, navigation, and shall give publicity thereto.³⁴

The Chinese have been quite flexible with regard to accepting each state establishing the boundaries of its own territorial sea. But others have had questions concerning the flexibility as one member from the French delegation maintained on the eve of the 1974 Caracas Convention:

The Chinese must recognize the fact that acceptance of broad coastal state jurisdiction, such as a 200 nautical mile "economic zone," would require some sixty-one coastal states to reach points in international waters by passing through the economic area of one or more neighboring states. In essence, this would "zone-lock" sixty-one coastal states, and thus illustrates what some states consider to be an acute threat to the common interest.

In contrast to China's liberal attitude on this issue, it appeared that the Chinese had accepted certain absolute limits on the breadth of the territorial sea. By implication alone the Chinese have limited the breadth of the territorial sea to 200 nautical miles, since they have stipulated:

34. UN Doc., A/C. 138/SC 11/L.34 (1973); also in Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 1973, Vol. III, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 21 (A/9021) at 71.

"The outer limit of the economic zone may not, in maximum, exceed 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of the territorial sea."³⁵ In essence, the Chinese had proposed that any coastal state's determination to extend its territorial sea could include an exclusive economic zone, not exceeding 200 nautical miles, measuring from the baselines of the territorial sea. Beyond the territorial sea or economic zone, the coastal state should have exclusive jurisdiction over the continental shelf, the limits of which have to be defined "reasonably" according to the geographic conditions of the coastal state. The Chinese have, furthermore, maintained that "the maximum limits of such continental shelf may be determined among states through consultations."

On the other hand, at the heart of China's decision to support extensive territorial sea claims is the fear that the Superpowers will continue to make optimal use of the world's oceans for military navigation and economic exploitation. As a result, the Chinese have consistently backed those states which have attempted to extend their jurisdiction over surrounding waters.

Latin American states such as Peru, Ecuador, and Chile have received China's wholehearted support when attempting to extend what they call their "patrimonial-sea" to 200 miles.³⁶

35. Screenirasa Rao, The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the Contemporary Law of the Sea (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1975), p. 68.

36. Evan Lauard, The Control of the Sea-bed: Who Owns the Resources of the Oceans? (London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1974), pp. 30-31.

Iceland in 1958 and Indonesia in 1957 were accorded similar support.³⁷ China's support for such positions is based on her awareness of the imbalance that exists due to the unequal distribution of fishing technology. Distant water fishing nations such as the USSR, US, and Japan have the technology which allows their fleets a wide coverage of the world oceans in search of concentrations of fish found principally in waters above the world's continental shelves, and thus within the 200-mile limit often proposed by Latin American nations.

Chinese spokesmen had consistently spoken out against any attempt by the Soviet Union or the United States to limit a state from unilaterally extending its territorial sea 200 nautical miles. At the 72nd meeting of the United Nations Seabed Committee, the Chinese delegate insisted that the Latin American countries in question were reacting "to resist robbery and plunder of their fishing resources by the Superpowers."³⁸ The Chinese took the argument one step

37. Cohen & Chiu, People's China and International Law, p. 469.

38. The proceedings of the March, 1972, meeting of the Seabed Committee can be followed in: U.N.G.A., Committee of the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed; Plenary meeting, Provisional Summary Records of the Seventy-First to Seventy-Seventh Meeting (UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SR. 71-76); Sub-Committee I, Provisional Summary Records of the Thirty-Second to Forty-Seventh Meeting (UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC. 1/SR. 32-47); Sub-Committee II, Provisional Summary Records of the Twenty-Fourth to Thirty-Second Meeting (UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC.11/SR. 24-32); Sub-Committee III, Provisional Summary Records of the Fifteenth to Nineteenth Meetings (UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC. 111. SR. 15-19).

further by labeling as an "heroic struggle" any direct action such as arrests and fines that might be imposed by Latin American states in protecting their territorial seas. He alleged that such an "heroic struggle" proved that:

Small and weak countries could triumph if they increased their vigilance, strengthened their unity and supported one another and that the Superpowers, despite their size, were not at all frightening and could be defeated.³⁹

At this same meeting the Chinese attacked the legal arguments of the two Superpowers. Traditionally, both Superpowers accepted the three-mile limit, but "under pressure of circumstances" changed that to 12 nautical miles, and later accused Latin American countries of violations for claiming a 200-mile limit. Mr. An Chih-Yuan of China emphasized that "it is well known" that there never has been a uniform and internationally recognized limit for territorial waters.⁴⁰ He argued that each country has established its own sovereignty and "itself established the extent of its territorial waters," and that there are "currently more than 10 different ways to establish territorial-sea limits," which range from three to 200 miles. Therefore, Mr. An Chih-Yuan concluded the Superpowers were violating the "principles of freedom of international navigation and freedom of fishing," and that in essence the conflict over territorial seas is a struggle between "aggression and resistance; plunder and conservation; foreign hegemony and independence."⁴¹

39. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SR., p. 75.

40. Ibid.

41. S.C.M.P., 72-31: 134, July 21, 1971.

The quintessence of China's early policy in supporting expanding claims to territorial seas can be narrowed to a few specific arguments. First, there are the economic arguments. Statistics show that most fish and other aquatic animals breed and live in the world's 14 fishery zones and three principal fishing grounds where more than 80% of the world's sea catches are obtained.⁴² Due to massive international economic problems, many coastal states are attaching more and more importance to the use of their maritime resources to develop national economies. For example:

Peru's fish haul in 1970 was more than 12.38 million tons, and its fisherman products totalled 2.25 million tons, each heading the list in world output. Peru's fishery products rank second among the country's exports both in total value and in foreign exchange revenue.⁴³

The future of the world's fisheries is inextricably linked with a number of problems that have contributed to the present crisis situation in the world's food supply. Tremendous population growth in developing countries, rising income levels in the developing nations, and perhaps some fundamental changes in the world's weather are all part of the same equation that has resulted in a scramble for property that is changing the fishing industries throughout the globe.⁴⁴

42. August Felano, "Problems Confronting Distant-Water Fisheries in A New Law of the Sea Environment," in Don Walsh, (ed.), The Law of the Sea: Issues in Ocean Management (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 129-142.

43. UN Doc., A/AC Conf. 62 (01) 1 R3, Vol. 1, pp. 79-81.

44. Donald A. Pepper, "The Future of the World's Fisheries," in D. Johnston (ed.), Marine Policy and the Coastal Community (London: Croom Helm, 1976), p. 119.

Not only does this haul constitute a major source of protein for the nation, but it becomes a major source of revenue by which Peru is able to purchase needed imports from abroad. The Chinese have suggested that available data establish that over 86% of the Soviet hauls were in outer seas and distant waters. In 1971 the US, in turn, had tuna catches within the territorial waters of Ecuador to the tune of \$15 million.⁴⁵

In addition, the Chinese have pointed out that the seabeds abound in potential wealth with oil, natural gas, coal, sulphur, tin, gold, diamonds, and other mineral resources. The question the Chinese raise is who is going to exploit these resources? During previous decades the "Superpowers" harmed the economic interests of many coastal states, especially those of Africa, Asia, and Latin America and violated their national sovereignty."

Second, China's image as a supporter of expanding claims to territorial seas may be argued to arise from a deep seated fear of military intervention. The Chinese have learned the lessons of history. The invasions of China's port cities from the sea in the 1840's have left an indelible mark on the Chinese global images. Secretary of State Dulles' pledging of the US Seventh Fleet in 1958 to defend the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu is all too well remembered. In fact, on the same day the US and Taiwan signed their

45. Ibid.

mutual security pact, China announced an expansion of her territorial sea which put Quemoy and Matsu within her internal waters. In the United Nations' Law of the Sea Committee the Chinese delegation leader stated that the seas have always "been an arena of contention and rivalry among colonialist, imperialist, and hegemonic powers." He contended that all colonial rule was enforced precisely by means of gunboat diplomacy:

The once mighty maritime empires were all built on the foundation of imperialist naval forces. Today, in their drive to seize world hegemony and plunder marine resources, the two superpowers have made contention for the seas an important part of their global strategy.⁴⁶

Furthermore, the Chinese delegate accused the Superpowers of using sophisticated electronic vessels in off-shore areas of many countries in order to carry out espionage activities. He specified that:

It reaches out in every direction and worms its way into every crevice, and it is so shameless as to boast about fulfilling the wild tsarist ambition of a century ago to dominate the seas.⁴⁷

Third, China's policy in supporting expanding claims to territorial seas has been based on her perception that she is in tune with world opinion, or what China refers to as the "Formation of an International United Front Against Hegemonism." The Chinese point to the fact that by 1952 Chile, Peru, and Ecuador had proclaimed the Santiago

46. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62 (01) 1R3, Vol. 1, 28th meeting, p. 104.

47. Ibid.

Declaration declaring sovereignty and jurisdiction up to 200 nautical miles from its coast. At the First and Second United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, the Soviet Union and the United States attempted to counter the Santiago Declaration, but to no avail. In 1970 nine Latin American countries, including the signers of the Santiago Declaration, issued the Declaration Principles on the Law of the Sea which defended their rights of territorial breadth to 200 nautical miles.⁴⁸ In 1971 many Caribbean countries signed the Declaration of Santo Domingo, and in November, 1971, 77 developing countries opted to sign the Declaration of Lima "supporting the principled stand of the Latin American countries on coastal states" free disposal of the maritime resources in the spheres under their national jurisdiction.

Inspired by these developments in Latin America, in addition to such African and Asian states such as Guinea, Tanzania, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Pakistan, declaring expansion of their territorial seas from 18 to 200 nautical miles, the Chinese argued that:

Henceforward, the struggle in defense of the 200 mile maritime rights initiated by the Latin American countries has grown into a mammoth movement taking in the whold Third World.⁴⁹

48. John Hargrove, Who Protects the Ocean? (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1975), p. 159.

49. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SR. 72 (1972), p. 44.

Such Chinese perceptions were reinforced by several developments. In 1973 the council of ministers of the O.A.U., the Tenth Assembly of Heads of State and Governments of the O.A.U., and the Fourth Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries all expressed the belief that the establishment of the 200-mile territorial sea was not only crucial in the defense of their natural resources but also is indicative of their common struggle against maritime hegemony. The Chinese press has pointed out that:

Of the more than 110 coastal states in the world about 80 have advocated or formally declared territorial waters, exclusive economic zones, patrimonial seas, fishing zones and other forms of the limit of national jurisdiction extending to the maximum of 200 nautical miles.⁵⁰

The issue of the territorial seas is not isolated to those in the Third World, since by 1973 Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Australia, France, and others had supported, approved, or encouraged the establishment of a policy that would allow an individual nation state to determine its own jurisdiction, not exceeding 200 miles.

How China Perceives Her Own Policy

In September, 1958, the Chinese government announced claim to a territorial sea of 12 nautical miles which established:

The breadth of the territorial sea of the PRC shall be 12 nautical miles. This vision applies to all the territories of the PRC

50. Ibid.

including the Chinese mainland and its coastal islands, as well as Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Penghue Islands, the Tungsha Islands, the Hsisha Islands, the Chungsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its coastal islands by the high seas.⁵¹

The Chinese perceive these claims to be consistent with the principles of international law, and have developed a series of legal arguments to justify such perceptions. First, they stipulate that it is within the scope of a state's sovereignty to establish its own boundaries. Second, they deduce that there is no uniform breadth of territorial sea either in international law or in international practice. Third, they argue that even if the three mile rule was once accepted, it is now obsolete due to new political and technological conditions.⁵² To support their claim that the so-called three mile rule has never been a "legal" principle of international law, the Chinese have referred to such widely acceptable western jurists as the 17th-century Grotius and the 18th-century Bykershoek. One Chinese member of the Secretariat who had been at the UN before 1971 argued that:

To Grotius, control over the sea depended on the extent to which a coastal state could control from its shores. To Bynkershoek, a nation's authority is determined by the range of its batteries, and at that time the range of batteries was approximately three nautical

51. James Chieh Hsiung, Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 103.

52. Cheng Tao, "Communist China and the Law of the Sea," American Journal of International Law, No. 47 (January, 1969), p. 63.

miles. This rule came to be known as the "cannon shot rule," which the Chinese argue has long since been replaced.

In addition, it could be pointed out that one of the world's foremost experts of maritime law stated nearly five decades ago that:

Whatever the present limit of territorial waters may be, it is certainly true that that limit has not existed for so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary; it is of comparatively recent origin.⁵³

A Chinese delegate also referred to data that were collected by the Secretariat of the Conference on the Law of the Sea convoked by the United Nations in 1958. These statistics show that of the 68 states reporting their territorial sea claims, only 21 states had set their limit to three nautical miles. This same delegate also pointed out the fact that the US, who has most consistently (until recently) insisted on the three mile rule, had not always been consistent. For instance, the US Secretary of State Seward proposed in 1864 to Great Britain an examination of the breadth of its territorial waters to five nautical miles, and in 1945 President Truman struck a major blow for change in the law of the sea when he claimed for the United States exclusive rights to the resources of her continental shelf.⁵⁴ Fundamentally, it was long before any law of the sea conference that it was becoming apparent that coastal states

53. S.C.M.P. 73-31: 66, p. 69.

54. Oscar Schachter, Sharing the World's Resources (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 40.

would obtain the right to exercise jurisdiction over the living and non-living resources within the 200-mile zones beyond their shorelines. The 1945 unilateral United States' decision rather quickly became accepted as customary law and was then codified in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf. The post-war development of technology in the extraction of offshore petroleum and natural gas, along with the rising demands for energy, alerted all coastal states to the need of extending this jurisdiction over shelf resources that could be of immense economic value.⁵⁵ While the precise limitations of the zone of exclusive jurisdiction over the marginal seabed were not easily agreed upon, the basic trend was toward extending the shelf to the outer edge of the continental margin, regardless of distance.⁵⁶

In establishing the breadth of its territorial sea, the Chinese decided upon what is known as the straight base-line method of delimiting territorial sea. In international law and practice there are two methods used in measuring the breadth of territorial sea. First, the "normal baseline method," which takes the low-water mark as baseline (that is, the outermost line where the ocean tide retreats from the coast), and then measures a specific area of sea as territorial sea. The other method is called the "straight baseline

55. UN Secretary-General, "Economic Implications of Sea-bed Mineral Development in the International Area." UN Doc. A/Conf. 62/25, May 22, 1974; UN Secretary-General, "Marine Questions-Uses of the Sea," UN Doc. E/5650, April 30, 1975.

56. Louis Henkin, Law of the Sea's Mineral Resources.

method," which initially sets several points on the mainland or coastal islands, then joins all the base points by straight lines, thereby drawing a broken line as the baseline of the territorial sea. It is then that one measures outward to determine the territorial sea.

There are several reasons for China's adopting the straight baseline method in delimiting its territorial sea. First, the Chinese were sufficiently influenced by the Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case. In 1957 Wei Wen-han, a Chinese legal scholar, argued that the numerous coastal indentations in combination with the scattering of islands along the southern section of China's 11,000 kilometer coastline justified application of the straight baseline method which had been applied by Norway and upheld by the International Court of Justice in the fisheries case. The Chinese have also pointed to Article 4 of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, which legalizes use of the straight baseline method where the geography necessitates.⁵⁷

Second, the Chinese adapted the straight baseline method in order to enlarge its jurisdiction over as much territorial waters as possible in 1958 due to serious security reasons. Prior to 1958, relatively little was known about the PRC position on the breadth of the territorial sea, since there were no published documents on the subject.

(New York: Columbia University Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, Monograph No. 1, 1968), 38.

57. Cohen and Chiu, op. cit., p. 468.

But on the very day that the United States Secretary of State Dulles pledged to defend Quemoy and Matsu under the mutual security pact with Taiwan on September 4, 1958 (and the Seventh Fleet initiated convoy escorts), the PRC announced its 12 nautical mile claim. In 1867, during the American Civil War, the US Government responded to a threat by attempting to extend its control to five miles, as did the PRC in 1958.

Under the classification of territorial sea, there are additional areas of contention, such as the question of passage through straits, bays, islands, and the concept of "innocent passage." The most controversial of these issues is that dealing with traditional rules governing passage through straits which are overarched by territorial seas and are often referred to as international straits. The rules have been set forth in Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone and the International Court of Justice decision, and the Corfu Channel case which stipulates that passage through territorial waters must be "innocent," i.e., not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.

What had tended to complicate nearly everyone's perceptions on the issue of the straits and facilitates a problem is the recent trend toward a 12-mile territorial sea. There are a large number of straits that contain corridors of "high seas," by virtue of the extension of the territorial sea from three to 12 miles to 200 miles. These straits now

fall within the classification of territorial seas or exclusive economic zones.

The Chinese perceptions on this question have been quite direct and simple. "If the strait is entirely located within the baseline of the territorial sea of a state, it is an internal sea of that state."⁵⁸ For example, in July, 1972, Shen Wei-liang addressed the United Nations Seabed Committee meeting in Geneva and argued that it is general knowledge that high seas and territorial seas are quite different. He insisted that every state can define the extent of its territorial seas as its own sovereign right, meaning that even if traditionally used straits happen to have been used for international navigation, this history does not affect the new status of that strait within a territorial sea nor can it be utilized as a high sea.

In essence, the Chinese were taking aim at the exercise of indiscriminate use of Superpower naval flexibility. The Chinese view the Superpowers as stubbornly opposing any claim of sovereignty by a coastal state over a strait which they wish to use for their own military purposes. In obvious reference to a proposal put forth before the Seabed Committee by the US in 1971, the Chinese press declared that:

They [Superpowers] clamour for the "free passage or "free flight" of foreign ships and planes, military or otherwise, through or over all straits without any restriction whatsoever.⁵⁹

58. J.M.J.P. (April 12, 1972), p. 6.

59. Peking Review, No. 14 (Nov. 5, 1971), p. 45.

At that time the United States had different perceptions on straits. The US had proposed a system of free transit through international straits which would have changed the existing rules in several ways. First, instead of "innocent passage," which allows a coastal state to apply a subjective test on an ad hoc basis, a change to "free transit" would take this coastal strait right away from the coastal state and thereby erode the terms of their security. Second, the US wanted to include submerged vessels within the right of "free transit." Third, the right of overflight within the concept of "free transit" was to be included, where heretofore there existed no right of overflight.

A Chinese delegate outlined a change that he felt had taken place in United States perceptions; for example, he said:

Prior to World War II, the United States acknowledged that foreign warships had no right of free transit through the territorial seas of coastal states. But in the post-war period the United States had established its control over the world's oceans and by the time of the 1960 Law of the Sea Conference the US position had changed considerably. The US delegate at that conference argued in favour of "innocent passage," of warships through the territorial seas of other countries without the latter's prior consent.

In fact, the Chinese have noted that the president of the delegation to the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference had later testified before the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 20, 1960, and stated that:

Our Navy would like to see as narrow a territorial sea as possible in order to preserve the maximum possibility of deployment, transit, and maneuverability on and over the high seas, free from the jurisdictional control of individual states.⁶⁰

In a February, 1972, foreign policy report the US Government argued that her security and that of her friends depended upon freedom of overflight and free movement through and over international straits.

In short, the Chinese have contended that the US concept of international straits and the demand of the right of free transit flagrantly opposes the rights of a majority of the world's nations, as well as running counter to new standards of international law.

The Chinese have also rebuked the Soviet Union for its changing perceptions of passage through straits within territorial waters. "For a long time in the past the Soviet Union adhered to the principles of innocent passage and prior consent as regards the question of the right of passage."⁶¹ As an example, the Chinese cite the Soviet position on the Corfu Channel case of 1949. The then Soviet jurist Kyrlov explicitly pointed out that foreign warships had no right to passage through territorial seas of other states, and the right to regulate passage with the coastal state.⁶²

Again, using the 1958 Convention on the Law of the Sea as a terminal point of attack, the Chinese have referred to

60. Cohen, Peoples China and International Law, p. 541.

61. Ibid.

62. Ibid.

the Soviet arguments made at the time by the Soviet delegate Nikolaev. First, in exercising its sovereignty, each coastal state has the right to subject the passage of foreign warships in its territorial waters "to an application for prior authorization." Second, with respect to Article 23 of the 1958 Convention on Territorial Seas and Contiguous Zone, the Soviets went one step further by stating that a coastal state had the right to "establish procedures for the authorization of the passage of warships through its territorial waters." The Chinese have argued that "Up to this day that reservation is still printed in a United Nations document of 1972."⁶³

A quick glance at Soviet laws exhibits that in 1960 Soviet regulations allowed for non-military ships to enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters of the USSR, reserving the power of prior consent to ships of war. In 1967 two US Coast Guard ships were refused passage through the Vilkitsky Straits on the basis of these rules.

In 1972 Chinese representative Shen Wei-liang recognized a change in Soviet policy and called attention to the idea that:

In his statement on March 24, 1972, the Soviet delegate made a 180 degree about face from the original position of his government by trumpeting with all his might for freedom of transit through straits.⁶⁴

63. Ibid.

64. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC.1./SR. 32.

The Soviet Union justified its changing policy by anchoring its argument on the idea that freedom of transit through international straits is a generally recognized principle of international law and practice. And without freedom of transit through straits not regulated by international convention, "the realization of freedom of the high seas is practically impossible."⁶⁵

The Chinese, knowing that the Soviet Union does not recognize a right of innocent passage through Soviet territorial waters by warships without prior consent, asked if the Soviet Government was now willing to open its straits within territorial waters to all other countries. The obvious answer is negative, since Soviet straits that fall within her 12-mile limit remain closed. Legally, the Soviet position was expressed by Soviet jurist Koretski, who claimed that a coastal state has the sovereignty to regulate security, sanitary, business, navigation, and resources.⁶⁶ A Chinese delegate referred to this as hypocrisy, since the Soviets refuse to recognize others states' claims over straits that have traditionally been considered international straits. In fact, one Soviet delegate declared that "the extension of territorial waters to 12 nautical miles should not of itself lead to the change of the legal status of a considerable number of international straits." Shen Wei-Liang said metaphorically that:

65. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC.1/SR. 32.

66. Ibid.

This is acting just like the magistrates in an ancient fable, who allow themselves to burn down houses while forbidding the common folk to light lamps.⁶⁷

The Chinese have opposed Superpower attempts which have called for internationalization of certain straits, such as the Strait of Malacca. In 1972 the Chinese attacked both Japan and the USSR for conspiring to encroach upon the sovereignty of Malaysia and Indonesia by calling for the internationalization of the Strait of Malacca. In 1973 the Chinese concretized their image by arguing that a frequency of use is not the criterion by which one determines whether or not a strait lying within a state's territorial sea is an inseparable part of a territorial sea of that coastal state.

In 1974 on the eve of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Chinese suggested that the USSR desired internationalization of the Strait of Malacca in order that Soviet naval vessels and military planes can pass the strait at will.⁶⁸ It must be considered that in 1971 Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia issued a statement declaring tripartite responsibility for the affairs of the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore. To the Chinese the Soviets are now in agreement with the 1971 United States' proposal that demands the freedom of transit of ships and planes, which only displays that the Soviet Union is following the example of the United States in attempting to become another hegemonic sea power.⁶⁹

67. UN Doc., A/AC. 138/SC111/SR. 15-19.

68. Peking Review, No. 29 (July 19, 1974), pp. 16-17.

69. Peking Review, No. 26 (June 28, 1974), p. 15.

In conclusion, the basic Chinese perception is that all straits within territorial waters should be regulated by the coastal states concerned, and this control should not be predicated on the frequency of their use of international navigation.⁷⁰ Concomitant with this right of control is the responsibility to take into account the "convenience of international navigation and some reasonable international standards."

Concerning more specific aspects of rights and responsibilities, the Chinese perceptions have reflected some inconsistency. For example, in a 1972 speech the Chinese held that "prior consent" should be obtained before foreign warships and military aircraft may pass through a state's territorial waters.⁷¹ But in the same speech the Chinese stated that foreign warships must obtain "prior authorization" before passing through territorial seas of coastal states.⁷² In 1974, before the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Chinese representative stated that coastal states can require foreign military vessels to give "prior notification" or obtain their prior authorization for passage. The words "should" and "must" expressed in the 1972 speech display a certain inconsistency in policy. The 1974 speech left room for an option of "giving" notification or "obtaining" authorization.

70. Peking Review, No. 15 (March 17, 1972), p. 15.

71. Cohen, Peoples China and International Law, p. 543.

72. Ibid.

While often adamantly supporting the policies of Third World nations on questions concerning straits, the Chinese representatives have established their willingness to view all positions expressed openly on the Second Subcommittee of the United Nations Seabed Committee. In 1973 the Chinese delegate on that committee, Chuang Yen, in response to a Soviet accusation, stated that he hoped to achieve a "responsible solution of the question of navigation through straits."

Part 2

The PRC and Caracas--1974

The work of the Caracas session can be divided into four phases. The first phase of about one week was taken up with settling the conflict over the Draft Rules of Procedure. The second phase, spanning the next four weeks of a ten-week meeting, was consumed by general debate in both the plenary (two and a half weeks) and the main committees (one and a half weeks). The third phase, lasting about two and a half weeks, was one of almost no movement on the major issues in the committees, giving rise to widespread disillusionment openly expressed in the corridors and committee rooms by delegates from all regional groups. The fourth phase emerged in the last one and a half weeks of the

conference, when a sense of movement developed in the private negotiations concerning the resource aspects of the economic zone and in the informal working group of Committee 11.

The Seabed Committee met in Geneva in the summer of 1973 in preparation for the Caracas meeting, and numerous interviews conducted with participants of the Geneva talks disclosed a significant split in the perceptions of those interviewed as to the actual tasks of the Seabed Committee. Many claimed that for a committee as large as the Seabed Committee to be asked to prepare for a plenipotentiary conference signaled the start of actual negotiations, and that in effect the conference had begun in 1971. On the other hand, many delegates complained in interviews that, for their governments, the task given the Seabed Committee did not signal the start of actual negotiations and, therefore, they had not been given the authority to commit their governments to anything. Consequently, their roles were reduced to an unending reiteration of national positions. This discrepancy combined with the number and complexity of the issues to be dealt with by such a large group of countries seemed to this writer to be the major factors in explaining the incompleteness of the preparatory work done for the conference. Yet, inferentially, it stimulated expectations that significant progress could be made at Caracas, though a treaty certainly would not be completed there in 1974.

These expectations, however, turned out to be ill-founded. Many public and informal meetings of the main

committees of the Caracas session seemed to be merely a continuation of the unproductive side of the Seabed Committee meetings, an almost unending repetition of national positions in many cases identical with statements made during the first preparatory session in 1971. Why was this so? The reasons were many: the conference was possibly too large, where 137 out of 148 invitees participated; too many issues were negotiated, covering about 100 separate items; the issues in themselves were complex; the structure of the group of 77 (actually consisting of 110 potential members of whom 103 participated) and its preferences for negotiating the entire package of issues simultaneously; Sub-committee 11 of the Seabed Committee failed to produce even a few alternative texts on each item within its terms of reference to serve as a basis for negotiations; no deadline was set for decisions, the rules of procedure being based on "consensus," thereby making voting so difficult and potentially time-consuming that even without contention it would have been difficult to complete the agenda in ten weeks; the impact of ideological conflict and system incompatibilities, specifically within Committee 1. But 5,000 delegates came to Caracas, many of whom attended "to lay Grotius to rest without ceremony," as one delegate commented.

There were four main issues under consideration at Caracas. First, how far offshore could each coastal nation extend its absolute sovereignty. Second, how far beyond that sovereign limit could nations have exclusive economic

jurisdiction (i.e., first rights on living and mineral resources). Third, who owns the resources even further out, in the high seas. Fourth, should an international organization be created to settle ocean disputes and parcel out dividends from development of the sea's resources.

The political universe that produced the old law of the sea has changed as evidenced by the political divisions that emerged at the Caracas conference. The conference broke down into two groups. One group consisted of 120 developing countries that included nations as large as China to the tiny South Pacific island of Nauru (population 6,500). Basically, they argued that the old law of the sea gives an unfair advantage to developed nations in a technological era. Lesotho's delegate, Makhohl Lerotholi, protested at Caracas that a continuation of the status quo would mean a "continuation of a colonial mentality of the most cynical nature."⁷³ Many developing states looked upon the oceans' wealth as a unique opportunity to augment their meager national resources with none of the unpleasant connotations of "economic aid."

At the other end of this political spectrum was a collection of 29 modern industrial nations, led (loosely) by the United States and the Soviet Union, and including the European countries plus Canada, Japan, and Australia. The French diplomat, Michel Lennuyeaux-Comnene, brought the underlying political polarization to a head when he flatly stated that his country was "hostile to a vote of the

73. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62 (01) 1 R3, 42nd meeting, July 15, 1974, p. 182.

majority of developing nations dictating maritime law to the minority of countries technologically capable of exploiting the seas."⁷⁴

The political reality is that the large maritime nations, which still rule the seas, hold the veto power on any decisions involving the law of the sea in order to prevent "rampant majoritarianism."⁷⁵ One American delegate summarized the feelings of most maritime powers concerning the political realities that still existed when he stated that a new law of the sea "won't be worth the paper it is written on, unless it has the full agreement of the US, USSR, Britain, and Japan."

In essence, Caracas reflected an international arena split not along the old ideological lines, but among cross-cutting coalitions based on mutuality of interests.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest as major military powers to oppose claims from broad coastal zones made not only by Latin American countries and China, but also Albania, Cuba, Yugoslavia, and other developing countries. Also there are the NATO countries such as Norway, Canada, Iceland, in addition to traditional allies such as Australia and New Zealand.

74. Ibid., 37th meeting, July 11, 1974, p. 153.

75. On majoritarianism or the tyranny of the majority, see Robert Kahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

Second, the US and the USSR along with Japan and other maritime powers consider that freedom of navigation and overflights in and over straits and the economic zones is a non-aligned issue. China and most developing countries consider this a spurious demand.

Third, countries with long-distance fishing interests such as the USSR and Japan oppose claims of those interested in wide territorial zones for coastal fishing.

Fourth, countries with massive continental shelves and continental margins argue for their right of extending sovereignty over the living and non-living resources in their coastal waters to the seaward limit of their continental margins. Many countries with small continental shelves or landlocked or self-locked argue for narrow coastal zones.

Fifth, archipelagic states, such as Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines, claim broad coastal waters on the theory that all waters lying within the outermost islands of such states are archipelagic waters which they could enclose for economic and security reasons. Archipelagic states have proposed to set up corridors by which they would grant innocent passage to foreign shipping. The major maritime powers question the very definition of an archipelago and claim the right to free navigation and overflight in such areas.

Sixth, the industrialized nations prefer that the proposed international resource agency (to be established to regulate and manage the resources of the deep sea) have limited powers of licensing and collecting royalties. Most

developing nations would choose a strong international body having full control over exploitation of the ocean resources in the international zone. Such an agency would use the capital and technological know-how provided by advanced countries and multinational corporations to produce revenue for the benefit of all mankind, but primarily for Third World countries.

Seventh, while many technologically advanced countries invoke freedom of oceanic research as a basic principle under which scientific research could be conducted, unhampered even on continental shelves, a broad coalition of developing countries deeply mistrusts the research designs of the "military-industrial complex," and prefers that final say on the subject be left with each coastal state.

For purposes of analysis the Caracas session will be examined by treating each issue individually, such as territorial sea, straits, the economic zone, fishing, scientific research, and the deep seabed.

Territorial Sea. By 1974 the three-mile territorial sea was no longer a debatable issue, since most of the member states had reached a consensus on including the 12-mile limit in an international convention. A non-governmental observer who attended most of the Committee 11 meetings at Caracas explained his perceptions of this issue:

There was a striking degree of agreement on the subject of the territorial sea. There was virtually unanimous agreement of a 12-mile territorial sea once certain other items relating to

straits used for international navigation, the economic zone, and the delimitation of the continental shelf were satisfactorily resolved. Those opposing this trend were those Latin American countries preferring the establishment of a 200-mile territorial sea: Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and Uruguay. The major obstacle most directly related to the territorial sea is the issue of transit through straits used for vessels through straits which would be affected in the event of agreement on a 12-mile sea.⁷⁶

The Chinese, along with their Albanian allies, disregarded the 12-mile issue and directed their attention on the limits placed on a 200-mile economic zone.⁷⁷ The perceptions of the Chinese delegates were evident by the consistency with which they emphasized that any member nation had the sovereign right to determine the extent of its territorial sea.

Chia Shu-fan, head of the Chinese delegation to Caracas, established Peking's image quite clearly in his opening statement to the conference:

It was the sovereign right of every country to define its territorial sea and the scope of its national jurisdiction. Coastal states were entitled to define . . . their exclusive economic or fishery zones with appropriate limits in the light of their economic development and national security and to define a territorial sea of appropriate breadth.⁷⁸

76. Survey of the Mainland China Press (July 16, 1974), pp. 108-109.

77. Ibid.

78. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, second session, plenary meeting, A/Conf. 62 (01) 1 R3, Vol. 1, July 2, 25th meeting, p. 80.

Straits. The issue of the territorial sea directly affects the issue of straits, since an extension of the territorial sea from three to 12 miles would overlap more than 100 straits which had been considered part of the high seas.⁷⁹

The Chinese had previously defined a strait as an inseparable part of that territorial sea, with the coastal state having full authority to enact laws regulating passage of commercial ships and aircraft through and over these straits. A coastal state would also require prior approval for the passage of military vessels.⁸⁰

Chinese perceptions on the issue of "innocent passage" through straits centered on the developing strength of the Soviet Navy in contest with the United States for what Peking cited as "World Hegemony." What is at work here in Chinese perceptions is not the issue of the moment, but expectations about how the USSR will behave in the future. Peking's perception is based on a belief that China is confronted by an implacably hostile adversary--the Soviet Navy.⁸¹

The Chinese press has attacked the Soviets for using the straits of other countries for its own expansion abroad, and along with the US, threatens peace by using straits for deployment of warships and nuclear submarines. The Soviets,

79. Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Statistical Tables 1974 (London: Lloyd's Register Printing House, 1974), p. 3.

80. Fred Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 105-106.

81. Ibid.

the Chinese delegate charged, displayed nothing but "contempt" for the sovereignty of other nations.

The Chinese have alluded to such examples of "contempt" as the Soviet-Japanese announcement in March, 1972, that the two countries had come to an "official understanding" on making the Straits of Malacca an "international strait" in spite of an agreement among Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in November, 1971. This later agreement suggested the creation of a cooperative organization to safeguard the navigation in the Malacca and Singapore Straits, and stated that any internationalization of the Straits of Malacca was unacceptable.⁸²

Ling Ching, the deputy leader of the Chinese delegation, focused attention on the "smokescreen" effort by the Superpowers to obliterate the distinction between commercial and warships by the application of the phrase "all ships."⁸³ A member of the Chinese delegation, who had been involved with the negotiations at Caracas, summed up the logic of the Chinese perception on straits:

What must be kept in mind is that the Chinese people are completely behind freedom of navigation through straits for the purpose of developing international trade, as are most Third World peoples. But, this condition can hardly be brought about by the free passage through straits of nuclear submarines and warships.

82. SPR P'9, September, 1974, p. 33.

83. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/C.2/Sr.13 (July 26, 1974), p. 12.

The Economic Zone. The core of the economic zone issue centered on the concept of a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile economic zone. At Caracas an American-Russian consortium attempted to resolve the conflicts arising from this issue by offering an "overall treaty package" which would include "provisions for unimpeded transit of international straits, and a balance between coastal state rights and duties within the economic zone."⁸⁴

During debate in the second committee at Caracas, Ling Ching quite succinctly put forth China's perceptual bias by stating that his delegation could not accept:

. . . the suggestion that free passage of warships through straits lying within the limits of the territorial sea must be recognized before the establishment of economic zones could be accepted; that idea was nothing less than blackmail. In short, no attempt to "make a deal" at the expense of the sovereignty of other states could be tolerated.⁸⁵

Fishing. The most critical challenge from the PRC came within the debate concerned with fishing rights in the economic zone. The USSR and the US revealed their perceptions by submitting similar proposals which allowed for the licensing and regulation of foreign fishing fleets by an international authority, that is, where a coastal state was unable to utilize fully its fishery resources in the economic zone.

84. John R. Stevenson, "Address to the Plenary Session of the Law of the Sea Conference," United States Department of State Press Release 301 (July 11, 1974), p. 3.

85. UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Second Committee, UNA/Conf. 62 (01) R3, Vol. 1, p. 187.

The Chinese argued that this was akin to reintroducing the discredited concept of "preferential rights" in the economic zone at the expense of the sovereignty of the smaller coastal states. The PRC accused the Soviets of exhausting the fishery resources of African, Asian, and Latin American countries, and referred to the Soviets as "super-fishing despots."⁸⁶

A member of the Chinese delegation who participated in the Second Committee debates at Caracas explained Chinese perceptions on this issue:

The Chinese people fundamentally oppose the superpowers on this issue of fishing rights, since they pay only lipservice to the concept of an economic zone by denying the coastal states their exclusive rights. We believe that a coastal state may, in accordance with its wish and needs, allow foreign fishermen to fish in the areas under its jurisdiction by bilateral or regional agreements. But, it must never be provided beforehand that the coastal state shall have the obligation to grant foreign states any such rights.

At Caracas, according to US perceptions, a coastal state should be given a 200-mile-wide "economic zone" for exploitation of minerals and fish. In other words, nations bordering on the sea would control fish species classified as coastal (cod, haddock) and anadromous (salmon and other varieties), therefore having rights to harvest these species and being the authority which would license foreigners to take the rest. Management of wide-ranging oceanic species such as tuna, swordfish, and whales would be left to existing international fishing commissions.

86. Peking Review (July 12, 1974), p. 16.

According to Chinese perceptions, the US proposal along with the USSR position was nothing more than an attempt to introduce "preferential rights in a disguised form." The Chinese charged the Superpowers with attempting to maintain the "status quo," since their proposals had long been rejected by the developing nations.

The Chinese attacked Articles 15 and 16 of a Soviet draft which provided that a coastal nation could grant permission for foreign vessels to fish in its economic zone while "giving priority to none other than the so-called states which have borne considerable material and other costs of research, discovery, identification, and exploitation of living resource stocks."

In contrast, the Chinese have worked towards bilateral agreements with Japan and Korea in determining fishing rights within their areas.

The Chinese position on fisheries was articulated in the Second Committee at Caracas during a discussion on exclusive economic zones beyond the territorial sea. To the Chinese, the fisheries question revolved around the issue of whether a coastal state should exercise "full sovereignty" or have "preferential rights" over the renewable resources in its economic zone, but at the same time they attempted to restrict the sovereignty of coastal states over their resources. Here the Chinese referred to the Soviet proposal that allowed foreign fishermen the right to fish within that zone in cases where the state did not harvest 100% of the allowable catch. To the Chinese:

Such logic made no sense; the suggestion in fact harked back to that superpower's well known proposal that coastal states should be allowed only "preferential rights" when fishing their own off-shore areas.⁸⁷

The Chinese suggested that their position in no way implied a sacrifice on the part of the Superpowers, but simply allowed the developing countries to regain their long-lost rights. Under such conditions the coastal states would be able to decide which foreign fishermen were allowed to fish in its jurisdiction by virtue of bilateral or regional agreements. However, the coastal state should not be obliged to grant other states such rights.

The Chinese position on land-locked countries in regard to sharing fishing resources is not clearly defined. The twenty-five land-locked states in the world fall into four categories. The oldest are essentially remnants of Medieval Europe. Second are those which emerged from the collapse of the Spanish-American empire. Next are those which emerged a century later as successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Youngest of all are those former colonies and protectorates of European powers in Africa which have become independent in the mid-20th century. This leaves only those in Asia. Each has a distinctive national history, but each, except for Laos, was able to obtain independence and maintain it because of its location between Russia or China and Britain on the south.⁸⁸

87. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62 (01) 1R3, Vol. 1, 24th meeting (July 2, 1974), p. 82.

88. Martin Ira Glassner, Access to the Sea for Developing

Basically, the Chinese perceive that these countries are to "enjoy reasonable rights to and benefits from the resources in the economic zones of their respective neighboring coastal states." Such rights are to be negotiated between the coastal and land-locked states, which would involve bilateral and regional agreements.

Scientific Research. Again, Chinese perceptions of the problem under discussion clashed with Soviet and American perceptions. The United States argued that not only did many countries lack the resources to conduct research, but also that a "consent regime" supported by the PRC and other Third World countries would increase costs and would undermine the validity of scientific findings. Research teams could be excluded from some of the oceans by the coastal states, and as American Ambassador John Stevenson emphasized, "oceanic processes do not respect man-made jurisdictional boundaries."⁸⁹

The United States presented several proposals that were designed to protect the rights of coastal states, including advance notification of proposed research, the right of a coastal state to participate, the sharing of data and samples with the coastal state, assistance in interpreting

Land-Locked States (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), pp. 9-10.

89. John R. Stevenson, "Address Before Committee Three of the Law of the Sea Conference," Department of State Press Release 317 (Caracas, July 26, 1974), pp. 1-6.

results, publication of significant findings, compliance by researchers with international environmental standards, flag state certification that the research will be purely scientific and conducted by a qualified institution, and respect for the jurisdiction of the coastal state within its economic zone.⁹⁰

The Chinese opposition to this US proposal was quite clear: ". . . in the hands of the superpowers, marine scientific research is a tool of contending for maritime hegemony and pushing policies of aggression and plunder."⁹¹

In order for the PRC to accept the research procedures suggested by the US, four alternative guiding principles were offered. These principles included the prerequisite of prior consent; the right of the coastal state not only to participate in research projects, but the right of prior approval on the publication or transfer of all data and results; regulation of scientific research in the international sea area by an international regime; and assistance by the sophisticated maritime community to developing nations to enhance the latter's capability to conduct research independently.⁹²

The Deep Seabed. This issue was extremely contentious as reflected by the North/South alignment of states over the

90. UN, UNA/Conf., 62 (01) R3, Vol. II, First Committee (July 14, 1974), p. 42.

91. UN, A/Conf. 62/C.1/Sr.8, First Committee Provisional Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting (July 19, 1974), 11.

92. SPRCP (August 1, 1974), p. 195.

future international regime and the machinery that would be established to govern the world's seabeds. China consistently supported Third World demands, questioning who would benefit from the exploitation of the seabeds and what would be the structure, powers, and functions of the international regime.

United States' perceptions were reflected by its position that access to the rich manganese nodules in the deep seabed be guaranteed on a non-discriminatory basis, under reasonable conditions which would provide the security needed to attract the private investments essential for development. A portion of the revenues earned from this exploitation would be used for international community purposes, mainly for developing countries.⁹³

Such US perceptions were shared by Japan and eight western European states. They favored development through a system licensing to private investors having the requisite scientific capability.⁹⁴ Control, rather than regulation, as proposed by the opponents to the US plan, would rest with an international authority with policy guidance coming from a broadly representative assembly. Decision-making authority would lay in the hands of a smaller executive body.⁹⁵

93. Nyhart Antrim, A Cost Model of Deep Ocean Mining and Associated Regulatory Issues, Mass. Inst. of Tech., Report No. 78-4, 1978, pp. 2-3; also see, UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/C. 1/L.6. This was originally presented informally to the working group as conference room paper 6, August 8, 1978.

94. Vinod K. Dar, "US Policies and the Ocean Mining Industry," in Edward Miles & John Gamble (eds.), Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 19), 343-361.

95. UN Doc., Conf. 62 (01), Vol. II, July 17, 1974, p. 43.

The Jamaican delegation offered a proposal in an attempt to reconcile perceptual differences stemming from US concerns for stability in the protection of its interests and the pragmatism and flexibility sought by the group of 77. This may have been an interesting approach, but to resolve a conflict by splitting the difference between the two sides requires both trust and the perception by both parties that lack of agreement would be worse than agreement on available terms. Both conditions were absent at Caracas, and there were cues that the US, the EEC countries, Japan, and the Soviet Union were quite prepared to exploit manganese nodules outside any internationally defined regime.

The effect of this situation appeared to reinforce the perceptions of the group of 77 in standing on principle, and this was clearly witnessed in the Trinidad-Tobago response to the US statement. Since it was suggested by a Chinese delegate that this statement be read, it is worthwhile repeating crucial portions of the Trinidad-Tobago statement:

For the developing countries, the resources of the international sea-bed might provide the last opportunity for collective exploitation; they must not let that opportunity slip. There was only one way to make use of those resources for the benefit of the majority, by managing, developing and supervising all aspects of their exploitation so as to ensure equal benefits for all . . . not only the few.

Peking supported the Group of 77's counter-proposal whereby all rights to the deep seabed would be vested in an international authority "on behalf of mankind as a whole." The international authority would be entitled to exploit the deep seabed resources directly, whether through joint ventures, contracts, other associations, with complete and effective control in the hands of the international authority.⁹⁶

Soviet perceptions of this exchange between developed and developing groups was especially interesting. The Soviets, concerned primarily with protecting the positions of state enterprises and agencies and historically opposed to creating strong international organizations, could not possibly support the Group of 77. The Chinese, however, could, and did, ideologically making the most of the situation by improving her Third World image.

Peking's delegate, Ke Tsai-shue, emphasized that pending the establishment of an international regime and machinery, no state or person should be permitted to exploit the deep seabed, and that all such activities already underway should be stopped.⁹⁷ He went on to state:

We must oppose the superpowers' conducting military operations in the area under whatever cover. The emplacement of nuclear weapons as well as activities of nuclear submarines in the area shall be prohibited. Scientific research and other related activities . . . shall also be subjected to

96. S.P.R.P. (September 6, 1974), p. 177.

97. Peking Review (August 2, 1974), p. 12.

appropriate regulation. We are opposed to military espionage carried out under cover of scientific research.⁹⁸

The Soviets chose not to reply to China's charges and innuendoes, restricting themselves to a careful analysis of their interests in the items under consideration. Consequently, the Soviet representatives argued that they had to know what laws and conditions would govern the participation of state enterprises in the expensive and complex exploitation of the seabed. The Soviet Union, they warned, could not accede to the convention until it was clear that the details had to be worked into the convention and not left to the authority to determine.

One member of the Italian delegation gave his perceptions of Soviet behavior:

In time it became clear that the Soviet position was identical with the EEC position, and they later gave strong support to the EEC paper rather than putting in one of their own. Like us [Italy] the Soviets objected to the contention of the Group of 77 that domestic law not apply to exploitation of the international seabed area. Those questions had to be decided immediately, and from their point of view, the essence of the problem lay in the duties and obligations of the exploiter and of the authority. In particular, those who wished to establish a strong authority needed to spell out clearly what these rights and duties would be.

Another important point in this debate, and one mentioned by a Chinese delegate interviewed for this chapter, was the surprising attack on the US and EEC positions by the Norwegian representative. At the heart of the attack

98. Ibid., pp. 11-12.

lay the Norwegian perception that the US and European drafts had embarked on an impossible attempt to produce detailed regulation of the conditions of exploitation simultaneously with the negotiations of the treaty itself. In addition, both positions reflected concepts of former times, adopting provisions from mining and other contracts utilized in the early decades of the 20th century.

What added to the thrust of this attack was the reputation of the one directing it. Jen Evensen, Norwegian Minister of Commerce and Shipping, is perceived by most delegations in the Law of the Sea Conference to be one of the very influential negotiators in the game, especially in the role of mediator. The EEC group, especially France as the leader, greatly resented the attack. The Soviets, presumably, were unhappy also, given their support to the EEC position. The Group of 77 was particularly pleased, and China was delighted and reiterated warnings that the "common heritage" should not be allowed to fall into the hands of the Superpowers and others with advanced technology.

Responding to the Chinese charge that under the US and European drafts, those with the technology would gain control of the authority, this, maintained a US delegate who had attended Caracas, was a matter of interpretation. The US, he maintained, did not want control; it wanted a system that would allow its participation on a fair and equitable basis.

In the end, most of the delegates interviewed following the Caracas meeting were pessimistic. The style of negotiating exhibited at Caracas was extremely difficult, since no faction appeared to possess the required majorities. Central to the problem is the realization that if a treaty is concluded, including all the preferences of the Group of 77 with Chinese reservations, this is unlikely to provide a viable ocean regime, since the countries with the capabilities are unlikely to sign and ratify.

The PRC and Geneva--1975

On March 18, 1975, the third session of the Law of the Sea Conference opened in Geneva, Switzerland. Unlike Caracas, there were few formal presentations. Geneva was designed as a negotiating session where the general outlines developed at Caracas were to be expanded into a new treaty on the law of the sea. Unfortunately, and not due to any lack of bargaining efforts, the delegates were unable to finalize a treaty acceptable for signature. The only substantive document to emerge from the session was a single text on virtually all LOS topics prepared by the chairman of each of the three committees. This text revealed only the prevailing attitudes on the various issues and was compiled by the chairman of each committee. In other words, this was not a negotiated text.

Although there may have been few substantive changes in the positions taken by the People's Republic of China,

the United States, or the Soviet Union, Geneva did serve to illustrate the consistency of Peking's perceptions of the problems involved with hammering-out the multitudinous issues of the law of the sea. Geneva also illustrated the intensity of the Third World opposition to the Superpower interests, and China's commitment to these Third World ambitions. This is not to argue that the Third World negotiated as a bloc at Geneva, since, in fact, trade-offs, disinterest, and self-interest were as important motivating factors as regional or bloc associations; they maintained their insistence on the sovereign right of nations to set their own territorial sea limits. Since there was so little support at Geneva for the 200-mile claim, it appears that Peking may have slightly changed her policy as a result of her perceptions of the atmosphere at the conference. For example, the Chinese used the word "resolutely" in supporting the struggle of Third World countries to safeguard their national resources, economy, and sovereignty. At another juncture, the Chinese substituted the term "200-mile maritime right" in place of territorial sea, and thereafter described not the territorial sea but the economic zone.⁹⁹

At Geneva there were several provisions in that single text that appeared to run counter to the positions usually taken by the PRC. For example, there were no restrictions against the surface navigation of submarines through territorial waters; no coastal state restrictions on the design,

99. F.B.I.S. (May 6, 1975), pp. A20-21.

construction, manning, or equipment of foreign ships transiting territorial waters; the same right of innocent passage for warships as for commercial vessels; and limitations on the criminal jurisdiction of coastal states to foreign ships passing through territorial waters.¹⁰⁰

Geneva also served as a means by which the PRC could launch a diplomatic barage against the Soviet Union and the United States. The pervasiveness of the Sino/Soviet confrontation was very much in evidence at Geneva as it had been in Caracas.

Again, for purposes of analysis, the Geneva session will be examined by treating each issue individually, as was done with Caracas.

Territorial Sea. At Geneva the second committee produced a single text which reflected a consensus for a 12-mile territorial sea.¹⁰¹ Peking made no public comment on Article 7 of this text, which states:

. . . waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea form part of the internal waters of the State. Where the establishment of a straight baseline in accordance with Article 6 has the effect of enclosing as internal waters areas which previously have been considered as part of the territorial sea, of the exclusive economic zone or of the high seas, a right of innocent passage, as provided in these articles, shall exist in those waters.¹⁰²

100. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Part II (May 7, 1975), pp. 8-13.

101. Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Vol. III, A/Conf. 62/L.8 Rev. 1, annex II, appendix I.

102. United Nations, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Single Negotiating Text, A/Conf. 62/WP.

As previously discussed, Peking's 1958 adoption of the straight baseline method removed the right of innocent passage from the Chiunghow Strait and Pohai Bay, both formerly within China's territorial waters, but now classified internal waters.¹⁰³

At Geneva Peking did support Peru and Ecuador's position that they had the right to extend their territorial waters up to 200 miles.

Straits. At Geneva many maritime powers were hopeful of gaining support of guaranteed transit for all ships and aircraft through straits used for international navigation.¹⁰⁴ China, however, reflecting the perceptions of many Third World countries, held to their previous position that: "A strait within the limits of a territorial sea, no matter whether it is frequently used for international navigation, constitutes an inseparable component part of the territorial sea of a coastal state."¹⁰⁵

Economic Zone. The final draft of the section of the single text dealing with the economic zone appears to reflect Peking's perceptions of the issue rather than those of the Soviet Union or the United States. For example, contrary

8/Part II (Geneva, May 7, 1975), p. 6.

103. Jerome A. Cohen & Hungdah Hiu, People's China and International Law, A Documentary Study (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 467-468.

104. Dept. of State Press Release 248 (May 2, 1975), p. 3.

105. F.B.I.S. (April 1, 1975), p. A16; UN Doc., Conf. 62 (01) R3 V. IV, p. 78.

to the previously held American position, the term "exclusive" is applied to the economic zone in title and throughout the second committee report. Sovereign and jurisdictional rights to exploration and scientific research within the zone are granted to the coastal state, being consistent with Chinese declarations on the subject.

At Geneva China attacked the Soviets for their insistence that the exercise of coastal state rights in the economic zone give due regard to other legitimate uses of the high seas. The Chinese argued that inclusion of high sea rights distorts the status and nature of the economic zone. Peking charged the Russians with wanting to threaten the sovereignty and security of these coastal states.¹⁰⁶ However, the single text provides in Article 47 that high seas rights of navigation and overflight shall apply to the exclusive economic zone as long as the exercise of these rights is not incompatible with the provisions outlined in the section on the economic zone.¹⁰⁷ This article also protects the right of foreign nations to lay cables and submarine pipelines in the 200-mile economic zone of another coastal state. During the last few sessions at Geneva, the Chinese conceded on these points made in Article 47.

106. F.B.I.S. (April 30, 1975), p. A24.

107. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/WP.8/Part II (May 9, 1975), pp. 19-20.

Fishing. On the question of fishing rights in the economic zone, the single text attempts to strike a compromise between the position of complete sovereignty of coastal states over fishing resources, an argument supported by China, and the "preferential rights" proposal of the United States and the Soviet Union. The single text provides for the coastal states, not the international authority, to determine the allowable catch of living resources in the exclusive economic zone. But at the same time, the text provides that, "where the coastal state does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements, give other states access to the surplus of the allowable catch."¹⁰⁸

Landlocked Nations. On this issue the single text article provides for participation of non-coastal states in the exploitation of "living resources" in the economic zone of a neighboring coastal state but leaves the terms and conditions of such participation to subsequent bilateral or regional agreements.¹⁰⁹ The Chinese completely supported this position prior to and throughout the discussions at Caracas as well as Geneva.

The major beneficiaries of a 200-mile exclusive economic zone include several large developed countries, notably

108. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62 WP. 8, Part II (May 9, 1975), p. 21.

109. Ibid., p. 24.

the US, Canada, Australia, and the USSR.¹¹⁰ One delegate from a landlocked state expressed what he maintained were the perceptions of many landlocked state representatives:

It is ironical that only a small number of the developing countries, those with long coastlines and abundant off-coast natural resources, will benefit from the exclusive zones. A large number of the poorer countries will gain very little since many are landlocked or self-locked and others have short coastlines or comparatively few resources off their coast.

To these geographically disadvantaged countries, the large exclusive economic zones represent a betrayal of the idea of res communis and common heritage.¹¹¹

At Geneva the USSR modified its position by proposing that only fundamental scientific research unrelated to exploration and exploitation of resources be exempt from prior notification.¹¹² The Chinese refused to accept this distinction and maintained that any deviation from the principle of prior notification nullified the jurisdiction of the coastal state and gave the Superpowers a "free hand to carry out all furtive activities under the pretext of scientific research." The Chinese delegate, Mr. Lo Yu-ju, argued that:

In order to safeguard their sovereignty and security the coastal state's consent should be required for any marine scientific research carried out in waters over which it had

110. Ann Hollick, "What to Expect from a Sea Treaty," Foreign Affairs, 18 (1975):76, 777; John T. Swing, "Who Will Own the Oceans," Foreign Affairs, 54 (1976):533.

111. Thomas M. Franck, M. El Baradei, and G. Aron, "The New Poor: Landlocked, Shelflocked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States," NYU Law Review 7 (Spring, 1974), pp. 33-47.

112. UN Doc., Conf. 62. 01 R3., Vol. IV, Summary Records of

jurisdiction. It was impossible, in practice, to determine whether or not such research was related to marine resources. The pretext of scientific research was used by super-powers to undermine the security and economic interests of the many developing countries which were coastal states.¹¹³

At Geneva the issue of scientific research was extensively dealt with in the Third committee. A sharp distinction was made between research related to the exploration and exploitation of living and non-living resources, for which prior consent is mandatory, and pure scientific research. For pure scientific research notification is required only in order to give the coastal state an opportunity to participate in the research project. The coastal state cannot prevent pure research unless it determines that the project is not, in its estimation, fundamental in nature. In such instances, the dispute can be submitted to settlement machinery.¹¹⁴

The Deep Seabed. Solutions to the problems related to the deep seabed were as elusive to the delegates at Geneva as they were at Caracas. No compromise could be found for the issue of control over the exploitation of the deep seabed. The single text that was produced by the first committee fairly well encompassed the proposals of the Group of 77.

Meetings, Third Session: Geneva, Official Records, pp. 99-100.

113. Ibid., p. 97.

114. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/WP. S/Part III (May 9, 1975), p. 18.

Basically, the text provided for an international authority to explore and exploit the deep seabed directly and for control over the authority to be, in effect, in the hands of the majority of smaller nations. The technologically advanced nations opposed these proposals,¹¹⁵ but China was particularly interested in seeing that the developing nations control the legislative, executive, and administrative power of the machinery that was to administer the authority to be. Speaking in the First Committee, Mr. Tien Chin first outlined Peking's perceptions of how the structure should be established:

The machinery should have an assembly, a council and an enterprise. The assembly, the supreme organ, should be composed of all states and should formulate policy on all important matters and give instructions to the council and other subsidiary organs. The council, as an executive organ, should be responsible to the assembly and operate according to the guidelines laid down by it. The enterprise would be subordinate to the assembly and council, and would be responsible for all operations related to exploration, exploitation and scientific research.¹¹⁶

During the same presentation, Mr. Tien discussed the control factor that would be crucial to the developing countries.

He stated:

The composition of the assembly and the council should be consistent with the principles of equality among states and of rational geographical representation. Developing countries,

115. Judith Kildow and Vinod Dar, "U.S. Policies and the Ocean Mining Industry," in Miles & Gamble, Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publ. Co., 19), 343-362.

116. UN Doc., A/Conf. 62/WP.S/Part III (May 9, 1975), p. 18.

as the majority, should have greater weight in the council. The council and other subsidiary organs should not be subjected to any form of control or manipulation by the super-powers. In the assembly and the council, procedural matters should be decided by a simple majority and matters of substance by a two-thirds majority. His delegation was opposed, as were many developing countries, to the Super-powers introducing a disguised veto system with the aim of appropriating the international sea-bed.¹¹⁷

This Chinese position ran diametrically opposed to the American argument which was in essence based on the question of incentives for investment. The American Ambassador Stevenson, in a final plea at Geneva, reminded the delegates of recent raw material scarcities, the need of those investing in exploration and exploitation of seabeds to control the decision-making processes, and the necessity of avoiding the reliance on giving exclusive powers to a "single, new international entity."¹¹⁸

Of all the issues involved with the law of the sea, the issue of deep seabed exploitation was the most crucial in the perceptual framework of the Chinese. Chinese perceptions of the entire panorama of seabed issues were crucially linked to this question of control over the future untapped mineral wealth of the seas. Many industrial nations perceived this issue to be the major stumbling block to an overall consensus, but to the Chinese, a new, more equitable

117. Ibid, pp. 68-69.

118. US Department of State Press Release 248 (May 12, 1975), p. 5.

world economic order was only possible if the developing nations controlled the international machinery. Many Third World countries were acutely conscious of controlling the untapped mineral wealth of the seas and had not forgotten the impact of the oil cartel on Western economies and the disastrous side-effects it had on the economies of the developing countries. The international political effects would not be soon forgotten.

The perceptions of the developing countries were based on the belief that if they controlled the international regime, the enterprises operating the exploitation, the transnational companies, and national enterprises with so much power would not be able to effectively escape regulation. The developing countries charged that if they lacked power to control, then the developed countries and transnational companies would tend to fix prices, allocate markets, and engage in oligopolistic restrictive practices. Their objectives would be toward increasing their own profits and power without regard to the needs or entitlements of the developing countries. As one African delegate perceived the controversy:

The dream of the common heritage of mankind will have transformed into a reality of the common heritage of the multinational companies. It is to avoid the particular danger that the developing countries have insisted that the authority to be established should insure direct and effective control of all activities in the area.¹¹⁹

119. Frank Njinga, representative of Kenya, in remarks at Conference of the Law of the Sea, Institute of the University of Rhode Island, Occasional Paper No. 24, (December, 1974), p. 21.

The 140 countries represented at Geneva were unable to mold the 97 different issues into a completed convention treaty acceptable to all parties, and at center stage stood the issue of exploitation of the seabed. The developing countries that make up the Third World knew that, at all immediate costs, they would have to avoid the experiences of the 19th century which allowed the then industrial nations to exploit the have-nots of the world. And, in this endeavor, the most powerful of all developing countries, China, fought with the developing countries for the "common heritage of mankind."

The PRC, The Spratly Islands, and Off-Shore Oil

Aside from the Law of the Sea conferences, but most crucial to China's economic growth in the future, stands the volatile issue of the Spratly Islands of the South China Sea. Extensive sedimentary deposits are known to exist in the South China Sea, and this adds up to one thing--oil. Oil has already been discovered off the Mekong in Vietnam, and on the Reed Bank near the Philippines, in an area jointly claimed by the PRC and the Philippines.¹²⁰

Most of the Spratly Islands, including Spratly Island itself, are occupied by Taiwan. Nanshan, Thitu, and Flat Islands are occupied by the Republic of the Philippines. The crux of the problem is that any one of these nations

120. Lee Conzaga, "A Shot in the Arm for Philippine Oil Research," Far Eastern Economic Review (August 20, 1976).

could legally place some of the sea lanes passing through the South China Sea in their territorial or archipelagic waters. This could be done by simply considering other islands across these sea lanes from the Spratlys and the Spratlys themselves as one large South China Sea archipelago. In the case of the PRC, or Taiwan, for that matter, these islands would be the Paracel Islands, Hainan Island, Tungsha Island, and Taiwan. The Philippines and Vietnam could lay claim to a great many islands in the area, and the justification for their claims could most likely be made on the basis of the concept of archipelagoes now under consideration at the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, or by unilaterally declaring a 200-mile territorial sea, which means that territorial waters would not only include the waters between these islands, but also all waters extending out from these islands, or in a case where another nation's land was less than 400 miles away, halfway to the other nation's territory.¹²¹

The Paracel Islands controlled by the PRC are less than 200 nautical miles from the first of the Spratlys. According to the informal negotiating text of the third session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 125 nautical miles should be the maximum permissible as the encircling baseline of an archipelago.¹²² No matter what

121. Martin H. Katchen, "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea, 'Dangerous Ground' for Asian Peace," Asian Survey, Vol. XVII, No. 12 (December, 1977), p. 1171.

122. Ibid.

criteria are used, the main sea lines through the South China Sea can be included within the territorial or archipelagic waters of either Vietnam or China, "should either nation possess all of the Spratlys and choose to assert itself."¹²³

The PRC's claim to the Spratly Islands is based on the right of prior discovery in 1282, and their administration by successive Chinese dynasties. Chinese claims were never seriously challenged until 1931, when France, who had been occupying Vietnam, based Vietnam's claim to the Spratlys and the Paracels on historical precedent dating back to 1816. However, France has acknowledged that when she occupied the islands in 1933, the indigenous population of the islands was Chinese. Japan also refused to recognize the French occupation of the islands as legal under the auspices of international law.

Japan renounced any of its claims to the Spratly Islands in the Treaty of San Francisco, which was signed after the end of hostilities of World War II. However, as a result of the ambiguities following the signing of the aforementioned treaty, the Philippines laid claim to some of the Spratly Islands, which, in turn, sparked Taiwan reactions, who along with South Vietnam, landed naval units in the islands in 1956.¹²⁴ The Republic of Vietnam (South)

123. Ibid.

124. Hung Dah Chiu and Park Choon Ho, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," Ocean Development and International Law, 3:1, pp. 9-12.

retained units on Spratly Island until they were replaced by Vietnamese Communist troops in May, 1975. In the previous year, January, 1974, after being driven from the Paracels by PRC forces, South Vietnam occupied six of the islands and placed 11 islands under its jurisdiction as part of Phouc Tuy Province.¹²⁵

In summary, the issue of claims is compounded, since:

Both the PRC and Taiwan claim the Spratly Islands on the basis of historical possession by China from the time of the Yuan Dynasty until the present. Vietnam claims the islands on the basis of prior occupation by France, its former colonial master. Whether or not France occupied the Spratly Islands as Terra nullis, or whether or not the Chinese presence on the islands raises doubts about the legality of the French occupation, the fact remains that the French did occupy the Spratlys and conquest is still a valid method of transferring territory under international law. However, the Japanese conquered the Spratlys from France, and then yielded. Therefore, the status of the islands is undetermined. Since the United Nations has not acted on this question, the islands in theory would become terra nullous, subject to occupation by China or any other state. This is the basis of the Philippine claim.¹²⁶

The Spratly archipelago is scattered throughout the South China Sea with over 100 reefs, rocks, and shoals that remain apart from the islands already occupied by states involved within the controversy. The United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences have dealt with archipelago claims of this nature, and they would be considered "land" by whoever

125. Ibid.

126. Ibid.

should erect a light on them.¹²⁷ Any nation that wishes to claim the Spratly Islands area as an archipelago must put a claim to these rocks, reefs, and shoals, which leaves the Spratly Islands very much in the category of a contentious geo-political area in the South China Sea.¹²⁸

The perceptions on the Law of the Sea of both the PRC and the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) further complicate finding a solution to the Spratly Islands. China has supported those states favoring a 200-mile territorial sea, presumably adhering to the median line principle where 200 miles between countries does not exist. China also interprets the concept of the Continental Shelf as an extension of the natural land area of any given state. The question that the PRC has yet to deal with involves the equitable distribution of the area of the Spratly Islands, "some of which extend on to the Sunda Shelf of Malaysia and Indonesia."¹²⁹

Vietnam's perceptions are even less clear, since the DRV has only recently become a member of the United Nations and had been able to participate in the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The central question is dependent on the DRV's concept of archipelagoes and the 200-mile territorial sea.

127. UN, Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records, Vol. IV, Part vii, Art. 118, Sec. 4, p. 169.

128. See, The Offshore Hydrocarbon Potential of East Asia (Bangkok: Cop, 1974), p. 40.

129. M. Katchen, The Spratly Islands, p. 1180.

The Philippines' perceptions will be filtered through the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, since her claim will be based on the conference outcome.

The future of China's image among the Third World countries within the context of the Law of the Seas will be very much dependent on the manner in which the PRC handles the exploitation of resources in South China and East China Seas. If China perceived it to be in her best interests, the vast resources in both seas could be entirely controlled by Peking if the PRC were to succeed in pressing its maximum claims to full acceptance. There appear to be three approaches available to China at this time. They are:

1. China's continental shelf extends to Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. China's claims are not unique, since many states are acting on the assumption that they have sovereignty over their continental shelves as they extend into the sea. The Law of the Sea Conference should eventually define a new international law of the sea.

2. China's second approach is linked with the relatively new growing assertion of the right to a so-called economic zone of 200 miles, whereby the adjacent state may exercise exclusive rights of exploitation and that it may share only by its own discretion. This concept has earlier been applied to Latin American states and enacted into law recently by the United States. China has given its complete backing to Latin American claims but has not formally applied the claim on its own behalf.

3. China must decide how she is going to approach her territorial claims within the context of the 200-mile economic zone principle. Peking's claims involve the Paracel, or Hsishas in the north; the Spratlys, or Nanshal in the south; and the Macclesfield Bank, or Chungshas in the east. All these claims could involve the PRC in disputes with the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia. In addition, both China and Japan have laid claim to the potentially oil-rich Senkakus, or Tiao Yu Tai, which lay approximately 100 miles northeast of Taiwan.¹³⁰

China's image within the East Asian arc, extending from Korea to Vietnam, will depend on the way Peking negotiates her claims with all the states involved. In January, 1974, the PRC reacted militarily in its disagreement with non-Communist Vietnam concerning the Paracels; and for several years thereafter, the Chinese press reflected on the episode in the most "militaristic and chauvenistic" fashion that appeared in the press since the Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969.¹³¹

Conversely, Peking has also displayed a conciliatory attitude in her perceptions of the Philippine offshore oil question. In 1976 the Philippine Government announced that it had contracted with foreign companies to test drill in the

130. Allen S. Whiting & Robert Dernberger, China's Future: Foreign Policy and Economic Development in the Post-Mao Era (New York: McGraw Hill Books, 1977), pp. 63-64.

131. Ibid.

Reed Bank area near the Spratlys, whereupon Peking, Taipei, and Vietnam (by now the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) protested. Manila and Peking maintained a dialogue, and the resulting diplomacy avoided any military confrontation.

Chinese perceptions of her relations with Japan are reflected in the Law of the Sea issues. For example, the possibility of vast oil reserves in the subsoil beneath the East China and the Yellow Seas has brought China and Japan into contention for the rights to the areas under question. The Tiao yu-t'ai Islands, or Senkaku Islands, are, in addition, claimed by both the PRC and the KMT (Nationalist Government of Taiwan), as well as Japan. Both the PRC and the KMT perceive their claims to be based on several factors.

First, they point out that geographically the islands are situated on the continental shelf which is contiguous to the China mainland and Taiwan, whereas the Ryukyus are separated from the Senkakus by the Okinawa trough.

Second, although the islands are uninhabited, they have traditionally been used by Chinese fishermen.

Third, the earliest writings which mention the islands refer to them as part of China rather than the Ryukyus.

Fourth, the Chinese maintain that when Taiwan and the smaller islands associated with it were ceded to Japan as a result of the 1895 treaty ending the Sino-Japanese War, the Tiao-yu-t'ai chain also transferred. Therefore, when Japan surrendered to the allies in 1945 and agreed to the return of all Chinese territories, this included the Tiao-yu-t'ai

or Senakaku Islands.¹³²

The Senkaku issue appeared to strain relations between China and Japan in the early 1970's, but since 1972, both parties have been moving in the direction of reconciliation and normalization of relations. As reflective of this trend, Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing of China indicated in 1974 that the Senkaku controversy has been quieted for tactical reasons. At the same time he added that the Taiwan question complicated the issue and that the issue would return to prominence at some future time. Of crucial importance within this context is the future of Peking's relations with Japan.

The question of oil and the continental shelf exhibits all the variables that could make this complex and explosive issue Peking's dilemma involving its entire Law of the Sea policy. In the early 1970's Peking appeared to favor acceptance of the ideal that undersea access be "apportioned by mutual agreement as done in the North Sea."¹³³ By 1973 Peking was formally protesting the exploration of the East China and Yellow Seas by American companies given approval by South Korea, stating that "areas of jurisdiction for China and her

132. See, Choon Ho Park, "Oil Under Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Seabed Controversy," 14 Harvard International Law Journal (1973), p. 212.

133. Peking Review, No. 23 (December 6, 1970). For a detailed analysis of this North Sea agreement, see, International Court of Justice Pleading, Oral Arguments, Documents, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, Netherlands, Vol. 1, p. 579.

neighbors in the Yellow and East China Sea have yet been delimited."¹³⁴ By 1974 Peking was objecting to an agreement between South Korea and Japan, referring to the agreement as an "infringement of Chinese sovereignty" that China "absolutely cannot accept." Peking then called for consultation with "the other countries concerned."¹³⁵ The "signal" that Peking was sending out was compromise.

The crucial variable in China's perceptions of the Law of the Seas remains the continental shelf and oil, which has extremely sensitive political implications, since the stakes will be high for all the regional states in the area for the next several decades. The energy needs in Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan (and communist Vietnam) will most likely be greater than that of China, due to a lack of underground resources. The reality of this perception will test Chinese decision-makers' abilities to strike the correct political balance among the Asian states involved.

Part 3

Summary

The issue of the Law of the Sea transcends Chinese regional policy, since its resolution is intimately related to global law, international organization, and resource

134. Whiting & Dernberger, op. cit., p. 67.

135. Peking Review, No. 6 (February 8, 1974), p. 3.

management. As a result, analyzing Chinese perceptions by studying her diplomatic behavior at the Law of the Sea conferences reflects an image of accommodation and patience in achieving her desired goals. On the other hand, this image was not consistently received by everyone. For example, interviews with several Western industrial delegations revealed an opinion that the PRC was not interested on way or another in the outcome of the conferences; and furthermore, these same delegates believed that if a law of the sea treaty were to be concluded, the PRC would not even be a party to it. What this misperception of Chinese behavior fails to take into consideration is the symbolic nature of Chinese diplomacy in the law of the sea conferences.

Peking's use of symbolic diplomacy may be a function of China's protracted sense of timing. Many Western observers have misperceived China's attacks during the law of the sea conferences as being part of Peking's immediate strategy on the issues. Immediate solutions, immediate treaties, immediate victories are not the goal of Chinese diplomacy within the context of the law of the sea issues. In essence, the Chinese are not interested in counting the returns of votes on law of the sea resolutions, but they perceive the process in terms of a "trend of history" analysis, whereby the Third World will eventually get its "just" share of ocean resources.

Second, China's diplomatic behavior at the law of the sea conferences reflects China's perception of a new world

order in which will emerge new structures and rules of international behavior benefitting developing as well as developed states. The Chinese recognized that these conferences, as have most international gatherings in recent years, pitted the developing nations against the traditional industrial powers. Exhibiting a distrust of tradition for the rules of the past, suspicious of the leadership positions of the Superpowers, cognizant of their group strength in an international forum, taking at face value the Western-sponsored concept of sovereign equality, and caught up in an irresistible momentum for change, The Third World was determined to rewrite the rules governing the use of the seas.

Third, China's diplomatic behavior at the Law of the Seas conferences reflects an accommodating and supporting image in Peking's dealing with the Third World. While China has strongly supported Third World demands, she has refrained from playing the leadership role that many expected to witness. For example, while China strongly opposed Superpower positions on straits, fisheries, and scientific research, she was accommodating and supportive when members of Third World delegations became involved with the "trade-off" game with the industrial nations.

Fourth, China's diplomatic behavior at the law of the sea conferences reveals that she never perceives herself in the role of a Superpower. Objective conditions may reveal many attributes of Superpower status. For example, by virtue of China's naval strength, her ranking among the leading

fishing nations, her potential as one of the foremost oil producers in the world, her rapid growth as a shipping and trading nation, and her position as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, the PRC should qualify, at least, for potential status as a Superpower, seeking the same prerogatives and advantages as the United States and the Soviet Union. But the subjective perception is different. Instead, the PRC has vehemently declared that "China is one of the countries of the Third World. . . . China will never be a Superpower."¹³⁶ Even the new "Constitution of the People's Republic of China" proclaims, "in international affairs we should uphold proletarian internationalism." China will never be a Superpower.¹³⁷

These protestations against Superpower status may also be explained in the way China perceives its strengths and interests vis-a-vis her two major rivals, the Soviet Union and the United States. The PRC may be a principal naval power in her region of the globe, but she does not perceive herself as a world naval power. Some estimates predict that in about five years the PRC will have saturated the Yellow Sea with a hundred submarines, a thousand coastal defense craft, and a large number of aircraft carriers. The perception here is that the Chinese objective is complete control of the adjacent seas, rather than the embarkation into

136. SPRCP (July 17, 1974), p. 149.

137. SPRCP (February 21, 1975), p. 121.

distant deep-water ventures.¹³⁸

It appears that China does not perceive of herself as a number three in naval power to the United States and Russia, but as a smaller and weaker state. She does perceive of herself as a strait state, with concerns over Soviet and American encroachment in the passages between Hainan Islands and the mainland and through the Formosa Straits and islands.

Although the Chinese are fourth in the world in tons of saltwater fishing catches and are fishing in nine of the world's 19 major fishing zones, the great bulk of their saltwater catch is taken out of the Northwest Pacific zone, off-shore of the Chinese mainland. Even in this region the PRC trails behind Japan, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Korea.¹³⁹ Compared to Japan, the Soviets, and the United States, China is not equipped for large-scale, long-distance fishing expeditions. China lacks technology, exploratory fishing vessels, and the requisite number of factory ships.

China is moving very cautiously with relation to off-shore oil exploitation. Domestically, China still relies heavily on coal and wood for fuel, and it does not appear as though the Chinese are immediately interested in becoming a major oil exporter on the world market, even though China has the potential to be a major oil power, since she

138. John R. Dewenter, "The East China and Yellow Seas," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (May, 1975), p. 208.

139. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Yearbook of Fishery Statistics--Catches and Landings (New York: Unipub, Inc., 1973), p. 96.

probably possesses at least 20 billion tons of crude oil reserves.¹⁴⁰ Some analysts believe that China is "stringently husbanding" its oil reserves in recognition of its potential as a source of foreign exchange to finance imports of necessary items for its industrial infrastructure. Peking is also acutely aware of the political importance of oil in a world of increasing need and decreasing supply.¹⁴¹

While China's merchant marine fleet grows, her port facilities expand, her trade and aid agreements for foreign countries increase, she is, for her size and potential, still a minor commercial nation on the international scene. However, what we must keep in mind is that this image was developed partly by design. An article in Jen-min Jih-pao explains Chinese perceptions governing her foreign trade:

. . . the state must be in control of it and the condition of dependence on or control of it by foreign powers must be thoroughly demolished. While mainly trying to increase her exports, the country may import a certain amount of materials for construction and consumer goods according to the needs and possibilities. In no circumstances should a country rely on imports to meet the needs of national construction and daily necessities. . . . We hold that political independence

140. United Nations Statistics for 1973 places Chinese power reserve at 1,709,000,000 tons, estimated reserves higher. UN Statistical Yearbook of 1973 (New York: UN, 1974), p. 170.

141. On the controversy surrounding Chinese oil production in 1973, see, "Chou En-Lai's Million B/D," The Petroleum Economist, XLI:2 (Feb., 1974), p. 49; on the 1974 controversy, see, Alexander Eckstein, "China's Trade Policy and Sino-American Relations," Foreign Affairs, 54:1 (Oct., 1975), p. 141; Seliy Harrison, "Time Bomb in East Asia," Foreign Policy, No. 20 (Fall, 1975), p. 5; Choon-ho Park and Jerome Alan Cohen, "The Politics of China's Oil Weapon," Foreign Policy, No. 20 (Fall, 1975), p. 32.

cannot be separated from economic independence.¹⁴²

Peking has exported an insignificant proportion of its national product, but even this is primarily for the purpose of procuring foreign currency exchange required to import goods and equipment to supplement the general development strategy of self-reliance.¹⁴³

Therefore, on the evidence, China is not in the image of a Superpower as with the Soviet Union or the United States. But neither is China part of the relatively impotent developing countries in whose interest Chinese delegates purportedly spoke at the law of the sea conferences. In fact, Peking skirted this dichotomy during the Caracas and Geneva negotiations by launching continuous criticism toward the Superpowers to emphasize her support for the Third World. But as one participant of the Caracas and Geneva negotiations pointed out:

If one were to base his perceptions of China solely on those articulated attacks on the Superpowers, he would have received a distorted image of the dynamics that were taking place at the conferences. For the Chinese never allowed themselves to be identified too closely with many Third World demands, which resulted in China maintaining a degree of flexibility which she always appears to desire.

142. SPRCP (November 6, 1974), p. 144.

143. Leo Goodstadt, "Oil Provides China's Solution," Far Eastern Economic Review (December 13, 1974), p. 53; Chang Chung, "Peiping's Petroleum Industry: Growth and Future Development," Issues and Studies, X:8 (May, 1974), p. 53.

In what may be related to the first point developed in this summary, the Chinese perceive flexibility as being a more advantageous approach to a law of the sea regime than the international constraints of a treaty. For example, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, which the Chinese have supported, could serve to exclude the Japanese fishing fleet from most of the Yellow Sea and parts of the East China Sea.¹⁴⁴ At Caracas and Geneva Japan was the most implacable foe of the 200-mile exclusive economic zone, reflecting her global fishing interests. The Chinese never singled out Japan, as they did the Russians, for attack as a selfish exploiter of these resources.

Fifth, China's diplomatic behavior at law of the sea conferences reflects the pervasiveness of the Sino-Soviet conflict. In fact, one of the most contentious Sino-Soviet UN conflicts has involved the law of the sea discussions, where both have had differing perceptions on issues such as territorial water limits, freedom of navigation and overflight, strait transit, fisheries and seabed resources, and peaceful uses and administration of the international seabed. The political, strategic, and economic implications of each of these issues are tremendous, and will have a significant impact upon the future international balance of power.

144. Choon-Ho Park, "The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," The Harvard International Law Journal (Winter, 1975), p. 40.

Particularly troublesome is the issue of territorial water limits. The Soviet Union and over 100 other nations support the traditional 12-mile limit and the increasingly popular 200-mile economic zone. According to Soviet perceptions, the sovereign rights of coastal states should be limited to living and mineral resources rather than to the control of the sea and air beyond the 12-mile limit. According to Chinese perceptions, a state has the right to a 200-mile maritime sea with virtual coastal state sovereignty over the entire zone and national control of straits within territorial waters. The later provisions nationalize some 100 straits and passages, many of them of strategic importance to Soviet naval interests, and would restrict the use of coastal waters for military research, aerial and oceanic reconnaissance and spying, and the placing of scientific instruments for military use.¹⁴⁵ While the Soviets have endorsed freedom of navigation and innocent passage for military and civilian shipping, the Chinese have insisted on unrestricted riparian state control of coastal waters and passages with prior notification and passage authorization for foreign military vessels.

Approximately three-quarters of the world's coastal states presently support the 200-mile economic zone, which, if adopted, would allow both the PRC and the USSR to claim to control the vast wealth of fisheries, petroleum, and

145. John F. Cooper, "Peking on the Law of the Sea Conference," China Report, XI:1 (January-February, 1975), pp. 5-6.

mineral resources in their respective zones. An extended economic zone would benefit the PRC far more than the USSR. For example, China has 6,700 miles of coastline and claims to Taiwan, adjacent islands and contiguous waters in the South China, East China, and Yellow Seas. Though one of the world's leading fishing nations, most of China's fishing, unlike Soviet global operations, is of the coastal variety. Peking has supported exclusive coastal state fisheries control rather than "preferential" fishing rights with a licensing system for ships of other states, as favored by Moscow.

Thus, China could exclude other nations from its exclusive economic zone and attack the USSR as a rich exploiting maritime Superpower; since China's coastal seas also contain large deposits of easily accessible oil and other resources, considerable foreign exchange might be earned to finance extensive Western technology.

According to Chinese perceptions, seabed resources under the high seas are the "common property" of the people of the whole world, to be shared equally and not plundered by the technologically advanced Superpowers. Exploitation should be conducted by an international seabed agency with majority LDC (less developed countries) voting control.

According to Soviet perceptions, the "common heritage" concept is one to which they can agree, but they want the matter defined by treaty and favor state exploitation if the international agency cannot do the work. Special account would be taken of the LDC interests, particularly the 49

landlocked states. Finally, the Soviets have insisted upon a "package deal" involving both passage through international straits and economic zone fishing rights.¹⁴⁶

As a result of these conflicting views on the law of the sea, there have been repeated Sino-Soviet clashes in numerous conference meetings. At Caracas the Chinese had condemned Superpower "maritime hegemonism" and accused the USSR of boasting about fulfilling the wild Tsarist ambition of a century ago to dominate the sea.¹⁴⁷ The Soviet delegate, I. K. Kolosovsky, countered the Chinese by denouncing them for seizing vast expanses of the open seas and for delivering slanderous accusations against the Soviet Union. Similar confrontations continued at Geneva and came to a head at the April, 1976, New York Law of the Sea meetings, when the Chinese charged the Soviets with "frenzied expansion of naval forces," and sending fishing fleets to "plunder other countries' fishing resources and conduct espionage activities," remarks which prompted a walkout by the Soviet delegation.

Within the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict, selected interviews with participants of the Caracas, Geneva, and New York meetings allow certain conclusions to be taken.

146. See, V. Yaroslavl'tsev, "The Law of the World Ocean," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1 (January, 1976), pp. 66-74; and V. Yaroslavl'tsev, "The World Ocean and International Law," International Affairs (Moscow), No. 2 (February, 1975), pp. 61-71.

147. Peking Review, 28 (July 12, 1974), p. 12.

China's support of Third World claims was quite obvious at the conference meetings. But what was not so obvious is the fact that while the Chinese were advancing their own political and economic interests, they were at the same time maneuvering to address the essential problem of how the new wealth of the oceans would be utilized to redress the balance between the less developed and the wealthier nations of the global community. Throughout these numerous conferences, the wealthier Soviets, with their worldwide naval and fishing interests, had not been able to shed the "maritime hegemonism" image placed on them by the Chinese. On balance, this issue has been more beneficial to Peking than Moscow.

CHAPTER IV

CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF DISARMAMENT, ARMS CONTROL, AND DETERRENCE

Part 1

I want peace (in the sense that I do not wish to become embroiled in a nuclear war with you). I have the same kind of selfish rationality which you have, and I know that you are just as interested in surviving as I am. Therefore we are both driven by a fundamental law of nature to seek at least this kind of peace, even if not other kinds. We seek peace, not because we trust each other, or share each other's values, but rather because we fear each other.

We both know that the outcome of a nuclear exchange is incalculable in advance, because if such an exchange occurs, we shall probably prove incapable of limiting the damage, whether we consider ourselves under those circumstances to be rational or irrational. For on one side or the other or both there will be "rationalists" who will say that to stop now is to accept defeat. They will be joined by irrationalists who are primarily driven by the desire for excitement, revenge or suicide, or something else. Thus we both face the danger of escalation to mutual extinction, simply because we shall exercise all the advantages of war once we are in it.¹

Introduction to Disarmament and Arms Control: Deterrence and the Psychological Dimension

It is the peculiar characteristic of the . . .
Hobbesian fear . . . that you yourself may
vividly feel the terrible feat that you have

-
1. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971), p. 265.

of the other party, but you cannot enter into the other man's counter-fear, or even understand why he should be particularly nervous. For you know that you yourself mean him no harm, and that you want nothing from him save guarantees for your own safety; and it is never possible for you to realize or remember properly that since he cannot see the inside of your mind, he can never have the same assurance of your intentions that you have. As this operated on both sides, the Chinese puzzle is complete in all its interlockings and neither party can see the nature of the predicament he is in, for each only imagines that the other party is being hostile and unreasonable.²

The maintenance of international peace and security, which is the primary objective of the United Nations, depends to a large extent on major progress in the field of disarmament, and the General Assembly of the United Nations has become a focal point for international disarmament efforts. On October 24, 1970, occasioning the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, the General Assembly addressed itself to the question of arms limitations and disarmament with these words:

On the threshold of the Disarmament Decade, we welcome the important international agreements which have already been achieved in the limitation of armaments, especially nuclear arms. Conscious of the long and difficult search for ways to halt and reverse the arms race and of the grave threat to international peace posed by the continuing development of sophisticated weapons, we look forward to the early conclusion of further agreements of this kind and to moving forward from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and to disarmament everywhere, particularly in the nuclear field, with the participation of all nuclear powers. We call upon the Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms

2. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), pp. 19-20.

race and the achievement of the final goal-- general and complete disarmament under effective international control.³

However, the proper shape and direction of disarmament and arms control policies for a nuclear-armed world are not at all apparent. In fact, many of the more popular arms control ideas that are discussed in the hypothetical context of a nuclear-armed world would do not fare well under close critical examination.⁴ Therefore, the problem under examination shifts ever so pessimistically from a discussion of disarmament to one of nuclear proliferation, reflecting a world quite different from that which existed only a few years hence. While the supreme responsibility for international security from nuclear war remains with the United Nations, a special responsibility has fallen upon the United States and the Soviet Union in this age of nuclear proliferation. This responsibility is not so much a compliment as a "critical reflection of the fact that they are and will continue to be in the dual position of arsonists and fighters."⁵ What this means is that:

As an international peace and security mechanism, the UN no longer has the field to itself; bilateral relationships, regional organizations,

-
3. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1970-1975, Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs (New York: United Nations), p. 1.
 4. Colin Gray, "Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World?" in Nuclear Proliferation: Prospects, Problems, and Proposals (Philadelphia: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March, 1977).
 5. Abraham Bargman, "The United Nations, The Superpowers, and Proliferation," The Annals (March, 1977), p. 123.

and permanent conferences of ideologically kindred states now also represent the interests of its members. It has become fashionable in some quarters to become disenchanted with, if not hostile to, the United Nations. Nevertheless, all problems still seem to end up at the East River, especially when they directly affect the superpowers, who alone have the resources and potential influence to make the maintenance of nuclear peace and security a reality.⁶

Since the United States, USSR, and the PRC will most likely remain in tension-ridden, unpredictable competition, discussion of these psychological dimensions of arms control, while remaining anchored within what is referred to as the "security dilemma," shifts to another level of analysis--differing perceptions of the intentions of others.⁷ These differing perceptions of the other state's intentions often underlie policy debates throughout the global community, and questions then revolve around the problem of how to deter the potential adversary? Now the problem takes on new complexities that involve theories of "deterrence."

There are fundamentally critical perceptions surrounding the basic idea of national security and deterrence of any potential adversary, but as one author has maintained:

It is generally agreed that one of the most important dimensions pertaining to deterrence is the psychological dimension. . . . More specifically and precisely, when discussing the "psychological aspect" of deterrence, we

6. Ibid.

7. For an excellent discussion stressing the importance of differing perceptions of the adversary, see, Paul Diesing and Glen Snyder, Systems, Bargains, Decisions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 19), Chapter 4.

are involved essentially in the elaboration of two factors: (1) behavior (including a model of "rationality" conceived as the recognition of self-interests), and (2) perceptions.⁸

Any theory of deterrence rests fundamentally on the assumption that it would not be "rational" to act against one's major self-interests by inviting one's own destruction. This is the first behavioral input. The second is based on what Thomas Schelling has referred to as the "compellent threat," meaning that in the first instance, to make an opponent "to go on not doing something" and in the second instance, to change an opponent's behavior. "Compellent action," of course, may have to follow the "compellent threat."⁹

What must be kept in mind within this psychological context is the difference between Chinese perceptions of nuclear war and those of many other states in the international environment. In the first place, nuclear war has never been regarded as unthinkable by the Chinese leadership; and second, different perceptions of the nature and role of conflict govern Chinese perceptions of deterrence and its role (which will be discussed at a later point).

The perennial problems of finding answers to the dilemmas of arms control revolves around the drive for security.

8. John Erickson, "The Chimera of Mutual Deterrence," Strategic Review (Spring, 1978), p. 12.

9. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influences (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 77. Also see, Glen Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 14-16.

Even in limited situations, arms procured to defend can usually be used to attack. Economic and political preparedness designed to maintain what one has is apt to create the potential for taking territory from others. As Robert Jervis has pointed out, "What one state regards as insurance, the adversary will see as encirclement."¹⁰ Furthermore, in this drive for security, psychological research indicates that under conditions of high ambiguity, actors will tend to turn inward, relying less on the other's behavior and more on their preconceived image of the other.¹¹

These unintended and undesired consequences of actions meant to be defensive constitute the "security dilemmas" that Herbert Butterfield sees as that "absolute predicament" that "lies in the very geometry of human conflict, whatever other patterns may be superimposed upon it later."¹² From this perspective, the guiding principle of international politics is not evil but tragedy. Actors may share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation. This particular view contrasts with the school of realism represented by Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, which postulates that the drive for power is a product of man's

-
10. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 64.
 11. Floyd Allport, Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure (New York: Wiley, 1955), p. 382.
 12. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations, pp. 19-20.

instinctive will to dominate others.¹³ As John Hertz explains it:

It is a mistake to draw from the universal phenomenon of competition for power the conclusion that there is actually such a thing as an innate "power-instinct." Basically it is the mere instinct of self-preservation which, in the vicious circle (of the security dilemma), leads to competition for even more power.¹⁴

Arms races are only the most obvious manifestation of this spiral. The security dilemma had fueled the competition for colonies at the end of the 19th century, and plays a significant role with regard to many of the issues involved with this study. For example, even if nations preferred the status quo to a share of influence in Africa, the wealth of the oceans, and developing new structures of international economics, each nation would prefer expansion and influence to running the risk of being excluded. The desire for security may also lead states to weaken potential rivals, a move that can create the menace it was designed to ward off. This is why contemporary spiral theorists argue that psychological pressures explain why arms and tension cycles proceed as if people were not thinking. Once a person develops an image of the other--especially a hostile image of the other¹⁵--ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated

13. Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 84.

14. John Hertz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 4.

15. Kenneth Terhune and Joseph Firestone, "Global War, Limited War, and Peace: Hypotheses from Three Experimental Worlds," International Studies Quarterly, 4 (June, 1970), p. 218.

to that image. All this suggests that the "aspiral model" stresses the prevalence of self-fulfilling prophecies, defined by one scholar as a "false definition of the situation which makes the original false conception come true."¹⁶

On the other hand, when we compare deterrence and spiral theories, the most striking feature is that they give opposite answers to the central question of the effect of a false definition of the situation. For example, Robert Jervis points out that:

Deterrence theory, while elaborating a sophisticated logic of bargaining that often runs counter to common sense, generally enforces the conventional view that power must be met by power. The only way to contain aggression and cope with hostility is to build up and intelligently manipulate sanctions, threats, and force. The greater the aggressor's relative strength, the more valuable the concessions that will have to be made to him.¹⁷

And the same author has suggested that:

The spiral model, in contrast to deterrence, argues that it is often not to the state's advantage to seek a wide margin of superiority over its adversary. In situations that resemble the Prisoner's Dilemma rather than Chicken, coercion is not likely to produce the desired results. There are two general reasons for this. First, an increase in the adversary's military strength may lead, not to greater assertiveness, but to a more conciliatory stance. The explanation for this is the other side of the dynamics that drive the security dilemma. If the adversary is mainly seeking security, increased arms may give it the confidence to be

16. Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, rev. ed. (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957), p. 423.

17. Robert Jervis, Perceptions and Misperceptions, p. 78.

reasonable. The second branch of this position is the argument that threats and negative sanctions, far from leading to the beneficial results predicted by deterrence theory, are often self-defeating as a costly and unstable cycle is set in motion. Short run victories are possible, but will prove Pyrrhic if they convince the other that the victorious state is a threat that must be met by force.¹⁸

So we could conclude that, if the spiral theory is correct, it may be partially due to the fact that states in the global community do not understand it or follow its prescriptions. By behavior simulating a crude version of deterrence theory, states bring about results predicted and explained by the spiral theory. Deterrence theory then provides an understanding of the world as seen by decision-makers and thus an explanation for their specific actions, but spiral theory provides an explanation for the dynamics of their interaction. Acting on the premises of deterrence theory creates a self-denying prophecy, and if statesmen understood the validity of the spiral theory, they could behave in ways that would similarly undermine its validity.¹⁹

Many UN delegates firmly believe that states must learn to approach issues from a problem-solving perspective rather than from a competitive one. Instead of seeking to gain an advantage over each other, both sides should work together to further develop their common interests.²⁰ Such a

18. Ibid., p. 80.

19. Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," World Politics 21 (January, 1969), pp. 205-207.

20. Dean Puritt and Steven Lewis, "Development of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31 (1975), pp. 621-633.

new and better relationship can be created, Boulding argues, because perceptions of friendships can be made into self-fulfilling prophecies.²¹ Implicit in this belief is that once each side loses its unwarranted fear of the other, some level of arms can be maintained that provides both sides with a reasonable measure of security. Here the spiral theorists stress an understanding the position of the other side makes them more optimistic than the earlier proponents of the security dilemma.

However, when we come to the actual management of nuclear problems in their entirety, the role of the United Nations or of regional organizations is conditioned by whether the Superpowers are directly or indirectly engaged and whether it "is an issue which has previously been resolved collectively through the United Nations."²²

Chinese Perceptions on Disarmament and Arms Control

What has been the basic Chinese perception of disarmament and arms control? This question was answered on January 21, 1960, by the Standing Committee of the People's National Congress, which declared the line that no disarmament agreement can bind China without her full participation. This perception was expressed for the first time with the following statement:

21. Boulding, op. cit., p. 127.

22. Bargman, op. cit., p. 127.

China has always favored universal disarmament and will unhesitatingly commit herself to international obligations to which she agrees. However, it must be pointed out that any international agreement concerning disarmament, without the formal participation of and the signature of her delegate, cannot, of course, have any binding force on China.²³

Basically, this was a changed perception from that which existed prior to 1960. This change can be traced to 1958, following the Soviet's endorsement of the concept of an "atom free zone" for Asia, and the Soviet announcement of a unilateral suspension of nuclear testing. Both Soviet initiatives presented possible adverse implications for Chinese security, and Chinese perceptions became essentially simple and consistent: the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, with nothing said about conventional weapons.²⁴

An acceptance of complete nuclear disarmament would relieve China of the greatest danger to its security and would undoubtedly give China some kind of military parity with the Superpowers and enhance her role in world affairs.²⁵ Soviet interest in Chinese security was deemed of little utilization by Peking, particularly after the failure of the USSR to come

-
23. H. C. Hinton, Communist China's External Policy and Behavior As A Nuclear Power (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, Research Paper P-75, 1963), p. 57.
 24. Peking Review, Vol. 3, No. 4 (January 26, 1960), p. 14.
 25. Shao-Chuan Leng, "Arms Control," in Shao-Chuan Leng & Hungdah Chiu (eds.), Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1972), p. 249.

China's side during the 1958 Taiwan crisis. Later Soviet attempts to guarantee China a nuclear umbrella were not taken seriously. For example, on January 14, 1960, Khrushchev stated for the first time that the USSR had the ability, although not necessarily the intention, of protecting "other Socialist countries" with its strategic power.²⁶

Khrushchev's speech left the Chinese with the perception that the Russians might attempt to bind the PRC to an unacceptable arms control agreement, particularly since the ten-nation Disarmament Committee was about to meet in Geneva. It was at this time that Peking's Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, proposed a resolution to the National People's Congress that was adopted and maintained that the PRC would not abide by any disarmament agreement in negotiations it had not taken part in and which it had not signed.²⁷ This was to be China's basic perception on disarmament.

In 1962 Foreign Minister Chen stated, in a less authoritative context, that the PRC would not take part in negotiations on a test ban or disarmament until it had replaced the Republic of China in the United Nations.²⁸

Chinese perceptions of disarmament have been expressed during many United Nations debates since Peking has been involved in the organization. These perceptions have

26. A. L. Hsieh, The Significance of Chinese Communist Treatment of Khrushchev's January 14 Speech on Strategy, RM 2534 (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, February 19, 1960), p. 38.

27. Hinton, op. cit., p. 60.

28. Tokyo Yomiuri and Tokyo Kyodo, Sept. 20, 1962.

remained unchanged since the 1960's,²⁹ and as China's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chiao Kuan-hua, pointed out in 1975:

Disarmament is an old question. . . . China's views on disarmament are known to all. We are for disarmament. But it must be genuine and not phoney disarmament. We are against phoney disarmament, and still more against the Soviet attempt to use a disarmament conference as a veil to cover up the truth of its arms expansion and war preparations. The two superpowers are quickening their pace towards a new world war.... As regards a world disarmament conference, China keeps to her position set forth long ago, namely, it must have a clear aim and the necessary pre-conditions. The clear aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and absolutely not the so-called limitation of strategic arms. The necessary pre-conditions are: all nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances, and in particular will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and nuclear free zones, and that they must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear missile forces, and dismantle all their military bases, on the territories of other countries. But now the superpowers even refuse to undertake the minimum obligation of not using nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear countries. How can it be said that conditions are ripe for holding a world disarmament conference.³⁰

Many UN delegates interviewed expressed the opinion that many of Peking's articulated perceptions on disarmament were unreasonable, and at times bordering on the irrational.

29. In July, 1963, China made its first complete nuclear disarmament proposal; see, Peking Review, No. 31 (August 2, 1963), p. 8.

30. Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/10028).

But what this writer considers prior to any such evaluation is an assumption of:

rational decision-making in Peking. This posits decisions resulting from a logical assessment of desired goals and available means and as being implemented in a manner calculated to make the gains outweigh the costs.³¹

This assumption is what Graham Allison considers to be central to what he refers to as the classical model. This model "provides a path through which would otherwise seem an incomprehensible swamp."³² Another scholar, Morton Halperin, in analyzing Chinese policy on arms controls, argues that what underlies the attempt to explain Chinese decisions and acts in terms of such abstract goals is a basic assumption of the model. "The Chinese Communist leadership pursues its objectives in a systematic and logical way, given its perception of the world."³³

Others have previously suggested that Chinese negotiating behavior is often unaccommodative, and with many western UN delegates, would agree with what Kenneth Young argues that Chinese negotiating behavior stems from "incessant indoctrination" and does not allow for adjustive bargaining.³⁴

31. Allen Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu (New York: 1960), p. 159.

32. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

33. Morton Halperin and Dwight Perkins, Communist China and Arms Control (New York: 1965), pp. 1-2.

34. Kenneth T. Young, Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-1967 (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 375.

But what must be considered within this context is that the Chinese willingness to prolong disarmament negotiations becomes more understandable since conference sessions provide them with a means of repetitively presenting unwavering positions which they are convinced are ideologically sound, fully logical, and thoroughly correct.

However one accounts for Chinese insistence on preconditions for disarmament negotiations, it is apparent when discussing this issue with Western delegates at the United Nations that they place themselves at a serious psychological disadvantage with their general eagerness to see China change her perceptions on the disarmament and arms control issues. Several Western diplomats interviewed agreed that they shared the attitude formerly articulated by American Ambassador Alexis Johnson when he observed:

During the almost four years that I was negotiating with the Chinese Communists at Geneva, between 1954 and 1958, what I found most annoying and frustrating was their supreme self-confidence that they need make no concessions of any kind and that if they just waited long enough, we would be forced to make all the concessions to them.³⁵

What Chinese diplomatic behavior suggests to many who are uncomfortable with Chinese perceptions on disarmament is that the Chinese believe perseverance will ultimately pay off and that a "continuous, infinitesimal approach to any objective is ultimately equivalent to its attainment."³⁶ As an

35. U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Dept. of State Bulletin (1963), 277.

36. H. L. Boorman & S. S. Boorman, "Strategy and National Psychology in China," Annals 370, p. 151.

example, one study of the Chinese "national character" concluded that the Chinese seem to believe that, "given even a feeble but sustained effort over a long enough period of time, success in realizing any goal, no matter how remote, is certain."³⁷ Thus, Western writing dealing with the problems of negotiating with the Chinese almost invariably calls for patience, strength of conviction, and a commitment to fundamental objectives which should never be sacrificed."³⁸

However, as UN diplomats have attempted to feel out particular substantive conditions relating to China's perceptions on disarmament, they have been forced to explore opposing points of view and even experiment with alternative approaches to settlement. In answer to the question as to when the Chinese would be ready to negotiate some of her demands on disarmament, one Swedish diplomat maintained that:

As a result of dealing with China's views on disarmament, an elaborate process has emerged which will make it possible for all parties to avail themselves of the good offices of the United Nations in order to negotiate disarmament issues.

Important perceptual and cognitive features characterize this process, for negotiations must concern themselves with a broad range of subjective perceptions and behavior interactions. Thomas Schelling argues that the "essence of bargaining" rests in such interactions, including the "communication of intent, the perception of intent, the manipulation

37. Ibid.

38. See, G. L. Steibel, How Can We Negotiate with the Communists? (New York: National Strategy Info. Center, 1972), p. 40; F. C. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate, pp. 253-255; Young, op. cit., pp. 388-390.

of expectations about what one will accept or refuse, the issuance of threats, offers, and assurances, the display of resolve and evidence of capabilities."³⁹ Shelling emphasizes such techniques as "the creation of hostility, friendliness, mutual respect, or rules of etiquette"; and he concludes that the "deeds and displays" which are the principal characteristics of diplomatic behavior have a major effect on negotiating outcomes.⁴⁰

Chinese perceptions on disarmament and arms control must be dealt with as though they are real, and the subjective nature of these perceptions is what must be understood if the bargaining process is to unfold.

Chinese Perceptions of Deterrence and Nuclear Power

Some understanding may be acquired into Chinese perceptions of nuclear weapons and their utility through analysis of the American strategic concept of "deterrence." But, as Allen Whiting has pointed out:

In 1975 an informed Chinese official agreed with this author that the Chinese term used for "deterrence" which literally translated means "to terrify, to scare" did not connote the original meaning of threatening unacceptable damage if an attack occurs. However, the official added, "Since your term originated with nuclear weapons whose main purpose is to intimidate, perhaps the Chinese translation is correct after all." The subtlety of this interpretation was consistent with Mao's strategic view.⁴¹

39. T. C. Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 136.

40. Ibid.

41. Allen S. Whiting, China's Future, p. 54.

According to Chinese images of the world, the way to break the monopoly of nuclear weapons and the co-domination of the world by Superpowers is to have as many nuclear countries in the world as possible. In this way nuclear deterrence maintained by the Superpowers in the world could be discredited. This position made China one of the very few countries in the world which openly advocated nuclear proliferation.⁴² However, Chinese UN diplomats will privately maintain that China is opposed to nuclear proliferation in principle and will not facilitate it in practice.

China's first atomic test was in 1964, and the first hydrogen bomb was exploded in 1967. By the end of 1975 China had detonated 17 test explosions, ranging from ten kilotons to three megatons.⁴³ After its first nuclear test, Peking stopped actively advocating nuclear proliferation for a time but claimed that the possession of nuclear weapons by socialist countries like China was desirable:

The nuclear weapons in the hands of China and those in the hands of United States imperialism are, of course, fundamentally different in nature. China is a socialist country. . . . Having possessed nuclear weapons, we shall continue to pursue, as we did in the past, the foreign policy of peace.⁴⁴

42. Leo Yueh-Yun Liu, China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1972), p. 30.

43. Harvey W. Nelsen, The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 71.

44. Quoted in Leo Yueh, China As a Nuclear Power, p. 31.

This does not mean that Peking considers its nuclear potential in offensive terms; in fact, the PRC has pledged a no first-use, and has guaranteed to undertake the employment of nuclear weapons only in retaliation for attacks against China. As an example, the official Chinese statement reads as follows:

China develops nuclear weapons for defense and for breaking the nuclear monopoly. The Chinese Government has declared solemnly on many occasions that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. It is both ridiculous and absurd to villify China as intending to launch a nuclear war. But at the same time China will never be intimidated by war threats, including nuclear war threats.⁴⁵

What lies behind Chinese perceptions of deterrence and her nuclear power is Peking's strategic concepts of China's role in the international system. To understand this peculiar phenomenon, it is first necessary to appreciate the difference between "strategy" and "tactics" within Chinese terminology. According to Peking, strategy refers to a war situation as a whole, while tactics refers to specific instances in a war situation.⁴⁶ Although strategically one has to "despise" the enemy, tactically one has to "respect" him:

In fighting imperialism, we are of the opinion that, strategically and with regard to the whole, one must despise the enemy, dare to struggle

45. Document of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Oct. 8, 1969, in Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1969), pp. 3-4.

46. See, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War,"

against him and dare to seize victory; at the same time, tactically and with regard to each specific struggle, one must take the enemy seriously and be prudent. If one does not take full account of the enemy tactically and is heedless and reckless, while strategically one dares not despise the enemy, it is inevitable that one will commit the error of adventurism in tactics and that of capitulationism in strategy.⁴⁷

Mao had worked out a theory which utilized fighting tactical offensives within what he referred to as a strategic defensive. In other words, to fight campaigns of quick decisions within a strategically protracted war and to "fight campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines."⁴⁸

Within the context of "deterrence theory," the meaning of what Mao had referred to as "strategic defensive" must not be misunderstood. A "strategic defensive" is by no means passive or conservative in nature. Instead, its approach is still "offensive" because "passive defensive" is absolutely unacceptable. Mao has specifically stated:

As far as I know, there is no military manual of value nor any sensible military expert, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign, that does not oppose passive defense, whether in strategy or tactics. Only a complete fool or a madman would cherish passive defense as a

Selected Works, I (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 180.

47. People of the World, Unite, for the Complete, Thorough, Total and Resolute Prohibition and Destruction of Nuclear Weapons (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), p. 60.
48. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerrilla War Against Japan," Selected Military Writings (May, 1938), p. 155.

talisman. However, there are people in this world who do such things. That is an error in war, a manifestation of conservatism in military matters, which we must resolutely oppose.⁴⁹

In essence, the principal trends evident in Chinese strategic deployment and policy declarations appear overwhelmingly to be oriented toward a belief articulated by the Chinese in 1961:

Though the power of atomic weapons is great, they can only attack the other party's centers in strategic air raids and destroy its economic potentialities. Afterwards, they can only be used primarily, according to their power, as firing Vanguard before an attack. To resolve the battle, to cut down the enemy's living strength, to capture positions, and to achieve victory, it will still rely upon the ground force, the army, and conventional weapons.⁵⁰

Chinese perceptions appear to have resulted in the development of highly defensive systems, which include deployment of delivery systems, aircraft, and general preparations against war. Symbolic of this posture is Chou En-Lai's directive of 1971 which explains Peking's development of underground tunnels which began in 1969.⁵¹ The tunnels, therefore, are symbolic of the image that China's population should not fear war in whatever form.⁵²

49. Mao Tes-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War," Selected Works, I (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965), p. 207.

50. As translated in, J. Chester Cheng (ed.), The Politics of the Chinese Red Army (Stanford: The Hoover Institute, 1966), p. 253.

51. William Hinton, "Chou En-Lai," New China I, No. 4 (January, 1976), p. 41.

52. Chou to James Reston, New York Times Report from Red China, p. 71.

There still remains some perceptual clarification concerning the precise relationship of China's nuclear delivery systems to her defense efforts. In the absence of highly specific information on deployment patterns and weapons system characteristics, inferences concerning calculations and expectations of Peking's military planners must be somewhat generalized.⁵³ Nevertheless, obtainable data do allow for certain judgments and conclusions. For example, Allen Whiting has pointed out:

Chinese attitudes toward nuclear weapons are difficult to determine. No annual strategic force posture statements emanate from Peking as they do from Washington. No debate over weapons and strategy appears overly or even obliquely in journals. However, a partial view of PRC policy with respect to the utility of nuclear arms can be obtained by piecing together unpublished statements by Mao and official conversations with visitors to Peking.⁵⁴

However, someone who does have access to privileged information, the chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, General George Brown, succinctly voiced a military perception of the accomplishment, directions, and pace of the Chinese program as of early 1976:

PRC strategic forces are a result of a small, but carefully conceived, strategic program. A modest but credible nuclear retaliatory capability against the USSR has been achieved, and this undoubtedly has influenced the decision to move ahead slowly, but deliberately, with the task of increasing the effectiveness of PRC nuclear forces. Emphasis is clearly on programs which would provide a more immediate

-
53. Jonathan D. Pollack, "China as a Nuclear Power," in William H. Overholt (ed.), Asia's Nuclear Future (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 52.
54. Allen Whiting, China's Future, p. 53.

strategic posture and perception of growing strength apparently has been resisted.⁵⁵

Chinese Perceptions and Disarmament:
The Background

The question of arms control has continually posed a serious dilemma for China since her foreign policy goals and her perception of the world around her have not disposed her toward arms control arrangements.

Beginning with the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Peking has had changing perceptions toward disarmament at various times, depending on Chinese perceptions of foreign policy goals.⁵⁶ In the 1950's China supported the Soviet Union when the Russian policy aimed to ban testing and use of nuclear weapons.⁵⁷ During the United Nations 14th General Assembly debates in 1959, the Soviet Union introduced several proposals as a "further important and substantial contribution by the Soviet Government to the relaxation of international tension, the avoidance of the calamity of war and the defense of peace throughout the world."⁵⁸

-
- 55. The Military Balance: 1976-1977 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies); p. 46.
 - 56. Chun-tu Hsueh, Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations (New York: Praeger Publishing, 1977), pp. 1-10.
 - 57. Alan Lawrence, China's Foreign Relations Since 1949 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), pp. 22-30.
 - 58. Janmin Jihpao, October 15, 1959.

Beginning in the 1960's, and continuing to the present, the Chinese have displayed changing perceptions and disappointment concerning the struggle for disarmament. The Chinese press and China's representatives in various international organizations endeavoured to project the image that imperialism existed, disarmament was unrealistic, and that slogans calling for general and complete disarmament were sowing "harmful illusions" and undermining the national liberation movement.

By the 1960's the Peking leadership had grown much too skeptical of disarmament as a key method of ensuring peace and averting the threat of total nuclear war. Chinese perceptions were expressed quite succinctly in Jenmin Jihpao: "It is absurd to imagine world peace can be upheld by means of disarmament."⁵⁹ It was within this context that Mao expressed the theme that nuclear war was not to be feared.

It was in the 1960's that Peking began to change its image by opposing the non-proliferation treaty and attacking the Moscow Treaty that banned nuclear tests in the three environments. Chinese perceptions were spelled out in governmental statements in 1963 and 1964, which became the two key Chinese documents on the disarmament question. The central theme in the 1964 document stated that:

Convene a world summit conference to discuss the total banning and destruction of nuclear weapons. As a first step in this direction, the summit conference should reach agreement

59. Ibid.

on a commitment to be undertaken by the nuclear powers and countries which may soon acquire nuclear weapons to refrain from using these weapons against nuclear free zones and also against each other.⁶⁰

This shift in the Chinese perceptions was most likely associated with the realization that the Russians were not going to fulfill their promise to help China develop her potential. Mao realized that China would have to develop her own nuclear force, and in 1964 China did detonate her first nuclear bomb.⁶¹ Mao suggested in 1963 that the nuclear powers were not to be feared, and the Chinese disseminated the image that war, including a nuclear war, was not to be feared because it would lead to the destruction of capitalism and the "triumph of the revolutionary cause."⁶²

This was apparently a tough image, and as one respected scholar has pointed out:

The Chinese have come to believe through their experiences in the past century that in international relations respect is only gained by inspiring fear. A dangerous doctrine, but one which the West was at great pains to teach to China throughout the past 150 years.⁶³

But the Chinese leadership continued to emphasize that they were opposed to a world war. The way to preserve peace, however, did not appear to be through disarmament, but through a concerted effort attacking imperialism, which was spelled

60. Jenmin Jinpao, October 17, 1964.

61. S. K. Ghosh and Sreedhar, China's Nuclear and Political Strategy (New Delhi: Young Asia Pub., 1975), p. 17.

62. Hung Chi, No. 8, 1960, Jenmin Jihao, November 19, 1963.

63. Ibid.

out in an article entitled, "Two Lines in the Question of War and Peace." The thesis here was that imperialism could be defeated in local military conflicts and wars, that "peace can be effectively upheld only by relying on the masses and operating on the principle of spear against spear in the struggle against the imperialist policy of aggression and war."⁶⁴

In further attempting to define Chinese perceptions, Peking had maintained the image, defended consistently, that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was useful on the grounds that it would help "to break the nuclear monopoly" of the USSR and the USA.⁶⁵ If more countries possessed atomic bombs, the possibility of starting a war would be reduced. The non-proliferation treaty, wrote *Jenmin Jihpao*, deprives countries subjected to aggression and threats by US imperialism and its mymidons of the right to develop nuclear weapons for purposes of self-defense.⁶⁶

The Chinese have been highly critical of the Soviet and American treaties prohibiting the usage of outer space, seabeds, and polar environments for nuclear purposes. They perceive of these treaties as a camouflage under which the USSR and the USA continue the arms race, with the least

64. C. P. Fitzgerald, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 74.

65. Paul F. Langer, "Moscow, Peking and Tokyo: Views and Approaches," in Kurt London (ed.), Unity and Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 207-232.

66. Jenmin Jihpao, January 24, 1968.

amount of public criticism.⁶⁷ The Chinese dismiss the practical significance of the treaties and have stated that:

An imperialist peace is only a means of covering aggression and war preparations. US imperialism uses things like treaties and agreements when it needs them and scraps them when it needs no further use for them.⁶⁸

Peking perceives the Environment Treaties as only temporary compromises that will "not bring the peoples peace and security. On the contrary it only harbours the threat of another war." Any acceptance of a radical disarmament agreement would have frozen China's nuclear inferiority vis-a-vis the USSR and the US. China's disarmament image during the 1960's must be perceived with both eyes open: One eye on Peking's experience with Vietnam, and the other on the Sino-Soviet border, where 40-odd Soviet divisions, supported by nuclear weaponry, have posed a constant threat to China.⁶⁹

While confronted with images of political realities, some elements of change in the Chinese perceptions towards disarmament began to appear in the early 1970's. China was now emerging from the cocoon of the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's, and the international scene that Peking viewed was immensely hostile. Peking viewed a hostile USSR to her north and a hostile American presence in Southeast

67. Ibid., July 27, 1970.

68. Ibid., September 13, 1970.

69. See, Joseph de Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), Chapter 5.

Asia, to the south a hostile India who had not erased from her memory the Sino-Indian border clashes, and to the north-east an American-supported Japan with potential nuclear development. As Thomas Robinson surmised China's posture at this time:

the situation that China faces in Asia is unique; never before has a strong China faced a strong Russia, a strong America, and now an increasingly strong Japan.⁷⁰

The question the Chinese had to ask themselves at this time dealt with the usefulness of the old tactics. Would the revolutionary doctrine developed by Mao decades earlier and spelled out by Lin Piao in 1965 be sufficient in dealing with the realities of the 70's? Was Mao suggesting no change in tactics in 1970 when he stated that, "the threat of another world war still exists. However, in the world today the main trend is towards revolution"?⁷¹ Or would the Chinese leadership recognize the geo-political changes that have taken place since the mid-60's that could affect Peking's national security?

The Chinese leadership was also aware of the changing political atmosphere at the United Nations. By 1970, for the first time in UN history, a majority of nations had supported resolutions that may have given Peking her seat at the United Nations.

70. Thomas W. Robinson, "The View from Peking: China's Policies Towards the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan," Pacific Affairs (January, 1969), p. 333.

71. Jenmin Jihpao, May 21, 1970.

It appeared as though some change was taking place, and elements of change could be detected by the manner with which the Chinese press began to handle the disarmament problem early in 1970.

Chinese Perception of General Disarmament Questions

China's perceptions of the disarmament question was revealed following Peking's admission to the United Nations in the fall of 1971. Shortly after taking her seat in 1971, Peking participated in the First Committee's disarmament debate during the 16th General Assembly. At this time draft resolutions aimed at prohibiting all nuclear testing were being discussed.⁷² Nearing the cessation of debate, Ambassador Chen Chu explicated China's perceptions of continued nuclear testing:

China's necessary and limited nuclear tests are conducted entirely for the purpose of self-defense, for breaking the nuclear monopoly of the super-powers and, finally, eliminating nuclear weapons. . . . The prohibition of nuclear tests will be of no positive significance if not linked with the prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons.⁷³

Thus, China established her image and went on to oppose the draft resolutions by voting against all three resolutions presented.⁷⁴

72. Official Records of the General Assembly, twenty-sixth session, Annexes, agenda item 97, document A/8491.

73. UN Doc., A/PV, 1893, November 15, 1971.

74. UN Doc., A/PV, 2051, November 20, 1971.

Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua addressed himself to a number of disarmament items during the general debate of the 27th General Assembly. On the issue of the cessation of nuclear tests, he emphasized that the USSR had conducted numerous types of nuclear tests when the Soviets were developing their nuclear arsenal. But, now that the Soviet Union no longer finds it imperative to continue conducting certain types of tests, the Soviets speak of regulations that would prohibit others from conducting similar tests. The Chinese delegate argued that this was another "trap blatantly designed to maintain its Soviet Union nuclear monopoly." Mr. Chiao then used a Chinese aphorism to metaphorically describe the Soviet position: "The magistrates are allowed to burn down houses, while the common people are forbidden even to light lamps."⁷⁵

Mr. Chiao went on to stress that "at no time and in no circumstances will China recognize such a right for the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power."⁷⁶

The perception underlying the Chinese image was that the cessation of nuclear testing at that time, without complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear arsenals would only hinder the non-nuclear countries in their search for security.⁷⁷ Such a moratorium on testing

75. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV 1847.

76. Ibid.

77. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth session, 1942 plenary meeting. For the Chinese position, see, the letter dated November 24, 1971, from the

would not in the least affect the nuclear hegemony of the Superpowers.

Mr. Chiao then expressed concern over the unnecessary economic aspects of the nuclear arms race. He explained that China was a developing country not interested in spending one penny more than necessary on nuclear development and that China's nuclear program was being expanded under compulsion.⁷⁸ China's tests are conducted in the interior of China, and the number of such tests is rather limited. Therefore, China would be ready at any time "to stop all her nuclear tests." But again, the precondition for China's cessation of tests remained constant--that the nuclear weapons of all nuclear powers be completely prohibited and thoroughly destroyed, and not before. Mr. Chiao stated that "nuclear weapons are something which people can neither eat nor wear."⁷⁹

The First Committee dealt with three draft resolutions on disarmament during the 1972 27th General Assembly.⁸⁰

representative of China to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General (Document S/10397), also circulated as General Assembly document A/8536.

- 78. See, Sydney J. James, "The Chinese Defense Burden," China, A Reassessment of the Economy (Washington, D.C.: US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, July, 1975).
- 79. UN Doc., A/PV 2020, December 15, 1971.
- 80. The vote on A/Res/2936 (XXVII), November 29, 1972, was 73 in favor, 4 opposed (Albania, PRC, Portugal, South Africa), 46 abstaining, and 7 absent--UN Doc., A/C.1, 1847.

Following debate and prior to voting, Ambassador Chen Chu explained the perceptions behind China's vote, and it was here that he attempted to gain Third World support for the Chinese position. He recognized that there were some peace-loving countries whose demand for suspension of nuclear testing stemmed from sincere motives. But, "things will turn contrary to one's desire if the question of the suspension of nuclear tests is not settled along with the fundamental question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." He further argued that the "two aspects of this issue are not linked together." Suspension of nuclear testings without a collateral disarmament program will only "bind hand and foot those countries and peoples which are strengthening their self-defense capabilities in order to consolidate their national independence and safeguard their state sovereignty." Separating the two issues of suspension of testing and disarmament would "separate the US and USSR, enabling the Superpowers to use nuclear 'blackmail' and ultimately aggravating the danger of the imperialists unleashing wars of aggression."⁸¹

In conclusion, Chen stressed that China was compelled to test; the purpose of developing nuclear weapons was solely for defensive purposes; to break the nuclear monopoly of the Superpowers (and for ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons; that she would at any time be willing to stop all

81. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV 1895; Chiao Kuan-hua's statement, Peking Review (November 17, 1972), pp. 5-6; and Chen Chu's statement, Peking Review (November 3, 1972), 22-24.

nuclear tests if forementioned conditions were met.⁸² In the final analysis the Chinese position was "based on this principled position of the Chinese government, the Chinese delegation will vote against the three draft resolutions before us." China voted against all three resolutions.⁸³

The record shows that China voted against all eight resolutions opposing nuclear testing that were considered by the United Nations in 1971, 1972, and 1973.⁸⁴ This is an understandable position for a China still so far inferior to the United States and the USSR in nuclear weapons.

China's future position on a comprehensive test ban may prove to be especially important to its success or failure. If China does not participate in the development of a test ban treaty, it is unlikely that the US or the USSR would fully accept its conditions. Furthermore, non-nuclear nations interested in placing further constraints on the nuclear powers will tend to react negatively to a test ban treaty if Peking adopts a hostile attitude toward it. In actuality, the nuclear arms control agreement may be the most important during the next decade, and is one of those measures least likely to be supported by China at the United Nations. In fact, in 1974 China voted against a resolution advocating a comprehensive test ban.

82. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV 1895.

83. UN Doc., A/8807.

84. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), Annex II, document CCD/431; Document A/9698, Annexes I and II.

In 1974 the 29th General Assembly's Disarmament debates resembled those that preceded it; the states that could make the difference by seriously considering new approaches and alternatives were unwilling to consider substantive change.⁸⁵

However, by the 29th Assembly significant changes were taking place outside the confines of the United Nations that added to the belief of many delegates that time was no longer on their side. India had conducted a nuclear explosion, Israel had formally announced that it had the capability of producing a nuclear bomb, and the SALT talks between the US and USSR had failed to establish any meaningful ceilings on nuclear buildup or nuclear tests, let alone more decisive steps.⁸⁶ All these developments cast a pessimistic shadow on the disarmament deliberations.

The Assembly sharply criticized the US and USSR for the nonprogressive state of the SALT talks. The major concern of most UN delegates this author interviewed focused on the concern for the two Superpowers to reach an agreement on not only quantitative, but qualitative, limitations, not merely higher ceilings in their offensive missile systems. Both Superpowers have declined to do so in the past, but the delegates urged them to "keep the General Assembly informed," on all negotiations. China absented itself from the voting,

85. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/9627), para. 7; see also, Supplement No. 28 (9628).

86. Lewis A. Dunn, "India, Pakistan, Iran. . .: A Nuclear Proliferation Chain?" in W. Overhold (ed.), Asia's Nuclear Future, pp. 197-212.

while the USSR and US abstained.

The 29th Assembly voted on only one resolution dealing with nuclear tests. In past years France and China had been criticized for testing in the atmosphere, but both had now agreed to test underground. States were urged to conclude a comprehensive test-ban agreement and to refrain from tests pending its completion. China, as well as France and Albania, voted against the resolution. The US, USSR, and UK abstained.⁸⁷ China stated they had voted against the Resolution on the grounds that a ban on nuclear weapons testing would not be a genuine disarmament measure, unless linked to a total ban on nuclear weapons.⁸⁸

During the First Committee debates at the thirtieth session of the Assembly in 1975, the Chinese gave a further insight into their opposition of a test-ban agreement. Mr. Chuang of the Chinese delegation expressed an important variable of Peking's perception of the issue:

. . . the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests can in no way prevent the super-powers from continuing the development, manufacture, deployment, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. It can neither eliminate the nuclear monopoly and nuclear threat by the super-powers nor prevent a nuclear war.⁸⁹

During the 31st Session in 1976, direct and indirect pressure was building up among many Third World delegations

87. The United Nations and Disarmament, 1970-1975 (United Nations: Ref.: Sales No. E. 76.IX.1, Feb., 1978), pp. 71-72.

88. Ibid.

89. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV 2095, November 21, 1975.

for cessation of nuclear testing.⁹⁰ But Peking repeated her positions of the following year, and went on to state that she would be willing to cease all nuclear-weapons testing if the Superpowers completely destroyed all their nuclear weapons.⁹¹

At the end of 1976, despite some progress on the questions of testing and verification, these questions, as well as the question whether participation of all nuclear-weapon states was essential, remained largely unsolved by the UN.

There may be benefits that China can derive from a test ban treaty, but these are not likely to be sufficient to convince Peking it should give up underground testing so long as it feels a need to improve the size, yield, and reliability of its nuclear weapons through some form of testing. At the same time Peking could decide that it is not in its interest to actively oppose the test ban, since the success of this agreement would help to preserve Peking's position as one of only five nuclear powers (six, if India is included). It would also help to erect an additional barrier to the possibility of a nuclear Japan. Lastly, taking a strongly negative position could involve significant political costs if Peking were to be accused of being irresponsible and blocking progress in the arms control field.

90. Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first Session, Special Political Committee (A/SPC/31/SR.3 and 4).

91. The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 1 (1976), p. 93.

In sum, the likelihood of China's signing or supporting either the limited test ban or the comprehensive test ban in the next few years is small. Probably the best that can be hoped for is that active Chinese opposition to test bans will diminish as the Chinese gain greater confidence in the deterrent capability of their growing nuclear force,⁹² become more aware of the advantages to China of halting nuclear proliferation, particularly in respect to the continued integration of China into the flow of international cooperation present at the UN.

The attempt to organize a World Disarmament Conference had been delayed, since neither the US nor China has showed much interest. Nonetheless, a committee was formed to collect views on what such a conference ought to be like and to "maintain close contact" with China and the US.

At the 30th session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1975, the chairman of China's delegation, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, suggested that the historical experience with disarmament conferences must be given more attention. For example, he stated that:

The more the imperialists diffuse a smokescreen of disarmament, the bigger the danger of war. Before World War II a large-scale international disarmament conference lasting nearly three years was held under the sponsorship of the League of Nations after nearly seven years of preparation, and hundreds of proposals and

92. Thomas W. Robinson, "Political and Strategic Aspects of Chinese Foreign Policy," in Donald Hellman (ed.), China & Japan: Balance of Power (Toronto: Lexington Co., 1976), p. 243.

suggestions were discussed. But the results? Arms expansion instead of disarmament, and war instead of peace. The only effect of that conference was to put many countries off guard and as a result, they were caught unprepared by the outbreak of World War II and suffered a great deal. . . . We hold that the United Nations should not repeat the mistake of the League of Nations.⁹³

In regard to China's position on a world disarmament conference, Mr. Chiao stated that China would maintain her position set forth long ago, namely, "It must have a clear aim and the necessary pre-conditions." These preconditions include a pledge by the Superpowers of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, inclusion of the concept of complete prohibition and destruction of all nuclear weapons, and an end to all foreign Superpower nuclear bases and forces.

India's nuclear explosion in 1974 preempted the Assembly to introduce a new item in the 29th Assembly concerning "peaceful nuclear explosions"--a phrase no one I interviewed took seriously, since it is recognized that India has a most sophisticated nuclear program and is harboring no illusions about the usefulness of peaceful explosions. This development led the Assembly to openly admit its fears of possible access of unauthorized persons and groups to nuclear materials sufficient for "home bomb" construction.⁹⁴

93. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV. 2095, November 21, 1975, p. 42.

94. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 1A (A/9601/Add.1), Section X; see, Resolutions 3261 D (XXIX) and 3261G (XXXIX).

The USSR/US inspired Non-Proliferation Treaty came under attack at the 29th General Assembly.⁹⁵ Five years prior the nuclear and non-nuclear states made an agreement: the Superpowers agreed to proceed towards total nuclear disarmament and to share with the non-nuclears the technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In the quid pro quo, the non-nuclears agreed to go along with the status quo (at that time there were only five nuclear powers: the US, USSR, UK, France, and China) and to accept international safeguards on the transfer of nuclear technology to assure this would not be diverted for military purposes. These were the principal terms of the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970, which until the 29th session had been ratified by 85 nations.

China's most complete statement on non-proliferation was expressed during the First Committee Assembly debate in 1975:

We have always held that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is something concocted by the super-powers in order to consolidate their nuclear monopoly. This is an extremely unequal and unjust Treaty. . . designed only to disarm the non-nuclear countries while maintaining the arms of the fully equipped nuclear countries. This Treaty has conferred on the super-powers the privilege of developing, manufacturing, stockpiling and using nuclear weapons, but has deprived the numerous non-nuclear countries of their right to oppose nuclear threat, prevent a nuclear war and strengthen their armed forces for self-defense. It even attempts to force other countries to come under the super-power nuclear umbrella.⁹⁶

95. See, UN Doc., NPT/CONF/8 and Add.1; NPT/CONF/5; NPT/CONF 10 and Add. 1; Resolutions 2655 (XXV), 2763 (XXVI), and 2907 (XXVII), 3056 (XXVIII), and 3213 (XXIX).

96. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV. 2095, November 21, 1975, p. 38.

The next section deals with an area of arms control which deeply involved China's interest and participation.

Nuclear-Free Zones

The concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones (referred to here as NFZ's) emerged in international relations as a means of ensuring the complete absence of nuclear weapons from various areas of the world, as well as preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Several factors played an important role in the implementation of the concept, such as the perception of their security by individual states, conditions in a given region, concern about the threat of nuclear attack, and the threat of nuclear war.

In contrast to the NPT, which was principally orchestrated by the nuclear powers of the day, the implementation of NFZ's provides an alternative choice for non-nuclear powers; that is, to take initiative themselves to improve their mutual security.⁹⁷

The concept of NFZ was developed in 1957 by Poland's foreign minister. The original "Rapacki Plan" called for the denuclearization of Central Europe.⁹⁸ In the last decade and a half numerous proposals have been suggested for the

97. William Epstein, "Nuclear Proliferation in the Third World," Journal of International Affairs (London), Vol. 29, No. 2 (1975), p. 185.

98. The Polish proposal was considered at the 12th Session of the General Assembly in 1957 and a revised text was submitted to the 18-nation Committee on Disarmament (INDC) in 1962; see, UN Doc., ENDC/C.1/1.

denuclearization of other geographical regions such as the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Nordic countries, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. All the fore-mentioned proposals with the exception of Africa and Latin America failed to develop due to the complex political and strategic problems involved. NFZ's have been created in areas not involving serious political or strategic situations. For example, NFZ's have been established for Antarctica (1959), outer space (1967), and the seabed (1971), but what must be remembered is that these international treaties were in essence environmental agreements even though they fall under the classification of arms limitation.⁹⁹

Between 1970 and 1975, there was growing interest in creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world comparable to that established for Latin America under the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco, and by 1974 specific new developments had been taken in that direction. In addition, certain action was taken with respect to the implementation of the Latin American Treaty. As previously considered, all such measures were perceived as effective contributions to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons and promoting progress towards nuclear disarmament.¹⁰⁰

99. Epstein, op. cit., p. 195; United Nations, Treaty Series, Vol. 402, No. 5778, p. 72; General Assembly Resolution 2222 (XXI), annex; General Assembly Resolution 2660 (XXV) annex.

100. UN Doc., The United Nations and Disarmament: 1970-1975 Dept. of Political and Security Council Affairs (New York: United Nations, 1976), p. 93.

The concept of NFZ's has always been part of Peking's nuclear disarmament proposals. In the 1960's Chinese officials suggested establishing NFZ's for all regions of the world as one of the steps toward complete nuclear disarmament.¹⁰¹ One Chinese proposal called for an NFZ in Asia and the Pacific region that would apply to the United States and the USSR as well as to China and would be tied to a mutual non-aggression pact. Similarly, in 1964 Chinese leaders expressed willingness to endorse a proposal for an African NFZ.¹⁰²

After China's first nuclear detonation, Peking maintained that no-first-use pledges must precede, or at least parallel, any steps to establish NFZ's. This position, first articulated in late 1964, was repeated in Chinese disarmament statements by Chiao Kuan-hua at the UN General Assembly in 1971.¹⁰³ This policy is based on the perception that even the removal of weapons and the dismantling of bases in a region would not preclude the use of nuclear weapons against it from external launching points or through rapid redeployment of weapons. Thus, the nuclear powers must guarantee that they not use nuclear weapons in particular nuclear-free zones in order to make NFZ agreements meaningful. In 1974

101. Peking Review, VI, No. 31 (August 2, 1963), p. 3; William E. Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964), Document 5, p. 330.

102. Ralph N. Clough (ed.), The United States, China and Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 64.

103. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-sixth Session, Annexes, agenda item 93, Doc. A/7993/Add. 2.

in voting for UN General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of NFZ's in South Asia and the Middle East, the Chinese spokesman declared that China was ready to undertake obligations not to use nuclear weapons against NFZ's in these regions and called on other nuclear powers to do the same.¹⁰⁴

Since China has continued to call for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and means of delivery and the dismantling of overseas nuclear bases, it might be willing to give serious consideration to NFZ's in Asian areas around its own borders. An NFZ accord relating to Northeast Asia--which might, for example, cover Korea and possibly later Japan--could help to reduce Peking's fears of a US nuclear attack by removing the US nuclear weapons that are now stationed close to China. But it appears that at this time China would have to be prepared to forego its insistence on prior no-first-use pledges in order to obtain such benefits. As Allen Whiting has pointed out:

The threat that South Korea will acquire nuclear weapons is sufficiently strong to warrant raising the question of China's attitude toward agreements that would preclude that possibility. One such move would be to make the peninsula a nuclear-free zone. At various times in the past, the PRC has supported a nuclear-free zone for Asia and the Pacific Ocean, but never in a plausible context. It has, however, endorsed similar proposals for Latin America and the Indian Ocean. The threat of proliferation in Northeast Asia would evoke serious concern in Peking. While the prospect of Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons remains

104. Reported in FBIS, Daily Report: People's Republic of China (November 25, 1974), pp. A2-A3.

remote, it, too, could change. An agreement regarding Korea might lead to the complete exclusion of nuclear weapons from the region, including relevant portions of China and the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁵

However, such developments cannot come about while Sino-Soviet hostility continues at present levels with either side unwilling to agree even to withdraw forces from contested border areas. There may be hope if it appears in a situation that both Chinese and Soviet military goals on their mutual border are primarily defensive.¹⁰⁶

China and the Treaty of Tlateloco:
A Case Study

The only successfully planned NFZ thus far is that which attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in Latin America, the noted Treaty of Tlateloco. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, several Latin American statesmen decided to take steps to prevent any further missile crises, or at worse, to repeat Japan's horrible experience during World War II. Encouraged by the United Nations General Assembly, directed by Mexico's leadership, the Treaty was signed in the borough of Tlateloco in Mexico in February, 1967. It was the first multilateral agreement that had as one of its specific aims--stated in the preamble--to prevent nuclear proliferation.

105. Allen Whiting, China's Future, p. 51.

106. Thomas W. Robinson, The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: Military, Diplomatic and Political Maneuvering (Hudson Inst., Nov., 1975), HI-2364-RR.

The Latin American Treaty may in some ways be called an extension of the nonproliferation concept, but in several areas it goes further than the NPT. It not only negates the acquisition and exchange of nuclear weapons, but it also prohibits testing, receipt of, or stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone. Any military use of any nuclear material is prohibited, and the treaty stipulates that all nuclear materials are to be used "exclusively" for peaceful purposes.¹⁰⁷ Protocol II of the Treaty contains a restriction not covered by the NPT, specifically the prohibition of the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons against nations within the territorial zone. In addition, a permanent system of supervision was established, and a provision was set aside allowing any member state to question a suspected violator. Twenty-two states of the region are bound by the Treaty; Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba are not. Of the four outside powers with territories in the zone, two have ratified-- Britain and the Netherlands. The US and France have not. But Protocol II has been signed and ratified by France, the United Kingdom, China, and the US.¹⁰⁸

The Soviet Union has ignored repeated pleas by the General Assembly to ratify Protocol II. The Soviet perception was based on the idea that the Treaty permits peaceful

107. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fifth Session, Annex, agenda item 93, Doc. A/7993/2.

108. Epstein, "Nuclear Proliferation," p. 197.

nuclear explosions, does not apply to the Panama Canal Zone, or prohibits the transit of nuclear weapons. On the other hand, the Soviets have stated they would respect the nuclear-free status of each state in the region that is without nuclear weapons.

The Chinese have signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlateloco (the original draft signed only by Latin American nations), which is an undertaking by nuclear powers that they will respect the treaty and not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any of the contracting parties. (The treaty itself is for signature by Latin American states only.) This is the first post-1945 arms control convention that the PRC has signed, and thus constitutes an important step toward their cooperation with other nations in establishing significant, even though partial, control on nuclear weapons.

The manner in which the Chinese were drawn, step by step, into agreeing to sign this protocol demonstrates how, as China becomes more active in international politics, it is likely to feel increasing pressure to accede to some arms control agreements or to join in negotiating future agreements.

In December, 1971, new to the United Nations and still feeling their way, the Chinese, while supporting in principle the concept of nuclear-free zones, declined to participate in the voting on a draft resolution urging nuclear powers

to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II.¹⁰⁹ The General Assembly had adopted a draft resolution sponsored by 18 Latin American states, in which it noted with satisfaction that the United States had ratified Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. But at the same time, many Third World delegates deplored the lack of response on the part of the remaining three nuclear-weapon states to sign.

During the debate, Mexico argued that China, whose rights in the United Nations had been restored on October 25, 1971, could, as a consequence, become party to Additional Protocol II, since its previous opposition had been on the grounds that China had been denied its legal rights in the United Nations.

In reply, China held that its solemn statement, made before the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been signed, that at no time and in no circumstances would China be first to use nuclear weapons, constituted the best support for the legitimate ambition of many countries to establish nuclear-peace-free zones and peace zones. China called on the other nuclear-weapon powers to take the same pledge and to dismantle all their bases on the territories of other countries.

Less than a year later, In November, 1972, the Chinese foreign minister, in a note to the Mexican ambassador in Peking, gave a series of specific assurances about how China would respect the nuclear-free character of the zone.¹¹⁰

109. Reported in FBIS, Daily Report: Peoples Republic of China (December 3, 1971), p. A4.

110. FBIS, Daily Report, PRC (November 15, 1972), pp. A17-A19.

China solemnly declared that it would never use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear Latin American countries or the Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone; nor would China test, manufacture, produce, stockpile, install, or deploy nuclear weapons in those countries or in that zone, or transport or deliver nuclear weapons through the territory, territorial sea, or territorial air space of Latin American countries.¹¹¹

In addition, the note pointed out that the text of the Treaty of Tlatelolco referred to two treaties which China had always opposed (the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater). Accordingly, China did not perceive it to be in her interest to sign Additional Protocol II.

During the First Committee debate, Mexico welcomed the Chinese declaration as a first step but stressed that its value was less than that of a legal instrument. Therefore, the Latin American states sponsoring the draft resolution considered it appropriate to continue to invite the Government of China to try to find procedures that would enable it to accede formally to Protocol II as soon as possible.

Soviet perceptions were such that they could not accept Protocol II because Article 18 of the Treaty permitted underground nuclear explosions, did not prohibit transportation

111. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh session, Annexes, agenda item 33, Doc. A/C.1/1028.

of nuclear weapons in the area, definition of the zone not in keeping with international law, the treaty had not been sent to all states concerned for prior consideration.

A draft resolution sponsored by 16 countries was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 2935 (XXVII), by 101 votes to none, with 17 abstentions (including France and the USSR). China did not participate in the vote.

Finally, in April, 1973, during a visit of the Mexican president to Peking, the Chinese announced that they intended to sign the protocol.¹¹² On July 18 and August 21, 1973, respectively, France and China signed Additional Protocol II.

On signing the Protocol, Chinese perceptions were made known. They declared that they would never transport or deliver nuclear weapons through the territory, territorial sea, or air space of the Latin American countries. In addition, China stressed that the signing of the Protocol did not imply any change in China's stand on disarmament, in particular on the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Underwater.

At the 28th session of the General Assembly, a draft resolution was submitted by 19 Latin American countries, which took note of the signing of the Protocol by France and China, and invited both to ratify as soon as possible.¹¹³

112. FBIS, Daily Report: PRC, April 24, 1973.

113. Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-eighth session, Annexes, agenda item 37, Doc. A/C.1/L.654.

During the debate, the Chinese delegate announced that Peking had already decided to take the necessary measures to ratify this Protocol. On June 12, 1974, the PRC deposited their instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol II.

Several factors appear to have been at work in forming China's perceptions (that will be discussed later); primarily, Peking may have seen an opportunity to embarrass the Soviet Union, since she had not signed the Protocol; and second, Peking hoped to improve her image among the developing countries.

In 1975 the Assembly was quite concerned with nuclear and other weapon-free zones, even though effective resolutions could not be passed due to the partisan nature inherent in the discussions. Iran suggested a nuclear-free zone for the Middle East. When this was supported by Egypt, Israel immediately took objection. Pakistan wanted an NFZ for South Asia, and India immediately objected. Africans found it difficult to work realistically toward an NFZ for Africa with South Africa and Egypt each having their personal reservations.

In 1975 Mr. Chuang, in addressing the First Committee, reasserted China's obligations under the Latin American Treaty, but toward the end of his speech outlined China's perceptions of the NFZ issue:

In our view, under the present circumstances of the world, there exists neither equality nor mutuality in the relationship between the nuclear super-powers and the non-nuclear countries; what exists is the aggression and threat imposed by

one side on the other. Therefore, in order to make the nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones true to their name and to free them really from the super-powers' aggression and threat, it is necessary first of all to urge all the nuclear countries, the super-powers in particular, to undertake the minimum obligations not to use nuclear weapons against the above zones, to withdraw all foreign military bases, including nuclear bases therein, and to prohibit the passage of any means of transportation and delivery carrying nuclear weapons through the territory, territorial sea or airspace of the countries in these regions. Otherwise, the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and peace zones will be utterly impossible, while the super-power nuclear war threat still exists.¹¹⁴

At the 31st session of the General Assembly in 1976, the debate over NFZ's was short and restrained,¹¹⁵ but China did support a Pakistani proposal for a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. A draft resolution was submitted by Pakistan and was adopted by the General Assembly as resolution 31/73, by 91 votes to 2 (Bhutan and India), with 43 abstentions (including France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States). China voted in favor.

Chinese Perceptions of Biological and Chemical Arms Control

The UN community has increasingly developed awareness of the threat posed by chemical and biological weapons. Over the decades, as the toxicity of these weapons and the potential for widespread use have increased, efforts have been

114. UN Doc., A/C.1 PV. 2095, p. 39.

115. See, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first session, First Committee (A/C. 131 PV.20-52).

to ban them through international agreements. The idea is to supplement and strengthen the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, adopted and signed in Geneva in 1925.

In 1972 a treaty banning biological warfare, destruction of stocks of biological arms, prohibition of laboratory experimentation with and development of such arms was signed.¹¹⁶ China has criticized this agreement on the grounds that it was a "sham disarmament" measured "cooked up" by the two Superpowers, and since it did not also ban chemical weapons, constituted a step backward from the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹¹⁷ There is no evidence that indicates that China has developed such weapons, and it should be emphasized that China has ratified the Geneva Protocol.

The main thrust of China's perceptions has been articulated by Chinese delegate Mr. Chuang before the First Committee in 1975. In his speech he emphasized that the civilian and military uses of chemical toxin and bacteriological (biological) agents are not distinguishable. Of primary importance, the Superpowers "have mastered the methods and formulas for producing 'such weapons,'" which means that such weapons can be "reproduced when necessary."

116. Official Records of the Disarmament Commission, Supplement for 1972, Doc. CCD/361.

117. FBIS (November 24, 1972), p. A6; the Chinese ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 1952.

Therefore, "We hold that the key to the prohibition and thorough destruction of the weapons still lies in the prohibition of their use."¹¹⁸

A convention banning chemical warfare might well be concluded in the future. It is conceivable that Peking might be motivated to support a ban on chemical weapons by its relative disadvantage in producing such weapons. China's participation in negotiating even a single multilateral arms agreement of this type could begin to change its attitudes toward, and approach to, the entire field of international arms control.

The PRC and SALT

The United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) since late 1969. The first phase of the negotiations (SALT I) was completed in May, 1972. Both parties signed two agreements, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the latter with a Protocol attached to it. The second phase of the negotiations (SALT II), which formally began in November, 1972, is still underway. The goal of the two sides is to replace the Interim Agreement with a more permanent one and to pave the way for negotiations on reductions of their strategic forces. In the meantime, three new agreements

118. UN Doc., A/C.1/PV. 2095 (November 23, 1975), p. 41.

have been concluded, one amending the anti-ballistic missile treaty and two laying down some principles for further negotiations. However, the negotiations of the last two years have not led to a further agreement, largely because of the differing perceptions of the two parties with regard to some of the specific weapon systems under consideration.¹¹⁹

Since the opening of negotiations, both the General Assembly and the CCD have closely followed the efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States. A number of resolutions have been adopted by the General Assembly expressing its support of the negotiations and its concern over the lack of more rapid and substantial progress.

When attempting to analyze Chinese perceptions of the SALT talks, it must be considered that her position is unique in at least four respects. China is the only lesser nuclear power to have a long land frontier in common with one of the Superpowers. She has by far the most serious problem of a lesser nuclear power in terms of her size, topography, and internal communications. She is the least developed and least industrialized nuclear power, and the one with the most dispersed population, making her least vulnerable to attack. And China is the only nuclear power

119. See, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and History of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1975); John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, The Story of Salt (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973); Mason Willrich & John Rhineland, Salt, The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: Macmillan, 1974).

for the time being which has a serious long-term possibility of standing in conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union or both.¹²⁰

Due to the present status of China's limited nuclear capabilities, there does not appear to be any need for the USSR or the US to bring the Chinese into the SALT negotiations at this time. But as John Newhouse has pointed out, embedded as it is in triangular politics, SALT cannot be divorced from Moscow and Washington's concern with China.¹²¹ On the other hand, it is unlikely that the Chinese would be interested in participating in the SALT negotiations. The lack of a Chinese presence at SALT throughout this decade does not appear to cause any serious problem for the US or USSR, since China does not now have the capacity to pose a substantial threat.¹²²

However, what must be considered within this context is the future development of China's strategic forces and the political implications associated with these developments:

The growth and development of China's strategic and nuclear forces will create a variety of new or changed political pressures. As a minimum relationship of stable deterrence with China's competitors is achieved, so its difficulties and the costs of maintaining it can be expected to seem more onerous. While growth will lead

120. Harry Gelber, Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Papers, No. 99, 1973), p. 17.

121. John Newhouse, op. cit., p. 271.

122. Ralph Clough, op. cit., p. 51.

to some refinement of strategic doctrine, therefore, it will also increase the attractions of Chinese participation in arms control efforts, and as costs rise, these may seem desirable as a way of heading off or limiting proposed force increases or improvements. Discussions on arms control could be used to exchange information with other countries, to convey reassurance and diminish threat perceptions in ways which further Chinese external as well as internal objectives. . . .¹²³

At this stage a Chinese presence at SALT would most likely further complicate what are already exceedingly complex negotiations. China has denounced the SALT agreements as collusion between the Superpowers, referred to them as sham agreements that simply codify the nuclear arms race, accused the United States and the Soviet Union of building up their armaments while insisting that other nations forego nuclear weapons, and reiterated their call for a world disarmament conference, for no-first-use pledges, and other steps toward total disarmament. The reality of SALT for the Chinese is perceived as a process that works against their interests, a reality that was explained by Mr. Huang Hua (the successor to Mao) before the 30th session of the First Committee in 1975:

In making a judgment one always has to base himself not on the words of some people but on their actual deeds, from which one derives an assessment in keeping with the objective reality and formulates the correct policies. The stark reality is: Those who shout themselves hoarse about "detente" and "disarmament" are precisely the superpowers which are stepping up the arms race. For instance, in 1962 the intercontinental

123. Harry Gelber, op. cit., p. 28.

ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by the United States were approximately four times those of the Soviet Union. Yet since the successive conclusion between the Soviet Union and the United States of the partial test ban treaty in 1963, the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Arms in 1972 and the Agreement of Vladivostok in 1974, the Soviet Union has kept on accelerating its nuclear arms expansion, and the ICBMs possessed by the Soviet Union have now reached a level at least more than a dozen times that of 1962, which has already exceeded the present level of the United States. The agreement . . . is in effect an agreement on expanding and improving strategic arms.¹²⁴

The Chinese consider their perceptions of SALT to be quite valid. The major argument is that SALT does not reduce the threat to China's security, but in essence actually increases both Superpowers' capabilities. Chou En-Lai summed the matter up in the following manner:

The ink on the agreements was hardly dry before one announced an increase of billions of dollars for military expenditure and the other hastened to test new-type weapons. . . . The agreements marked the beginning of a new stage in the arms race rather than an effort to curb it.¹²⁵

Similarly, Chou En-Lai is reported to have said that the Nixon-Brezhnev agreement of 1973 on preventing nuclear war was untrustworthy and dangerous and merely disguised the Soviet-American struggles for hegemony.¹²⁶

124. United Nations, General Assembly Records, A/C.1/PV. 2084, November 11, 1975, pp. 20-21.

125. Washington Post, July 18, 1972. See also, the joint editorial in People's Daily, Red Flag, and Liberation Army Daily (October 1, 1972).

126. Chou's remarks to the chairman of the Japan-Chinese Association were reported by Kyodo News Agency, July 8, 1973.

This Chinese perception of SALT is not implausible, since the negotiations have actually created several fait accomplis which place China in a rather untenable position. The SALT agreements and the associated documents contain a number of provisions which directly or indirectly affect China, some of which appear on the surface to benefit Peking. For example, the Nixon-Brezhnev Joint Communique of May, 1972, along with the Statement of Basic Principles, contains references to the development of normal relations between states of different ideological and social systems which are, among other things, reminiscent of the tone of some Chinese declarations vis-a-vis the Russians during the 1969-1971 period. The third and sixth points contain reference to the special responsibilities of permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the need for multilateral arms limitation efforts. Contained in the communique were a number of broad hints about not prejudicing the interests of third parties and the desirability of a world disarmament conference.¹²⁷ But, from the strategic standpoint, SALT did little to allay China's suspicions. As a result of new Soviet-American agreements, would the USSR now feel more confident that the US would not interfere in the event of any Soviet use of nuclear weapons against China? As one

127. For the texts of these agreements, see, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements 1959-1972 (Washington, D.C.: US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, June 1, 1972), pp. 108-118; and insert on Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements. See also, Survival (July/August, 1972), pp. 192-199.

scholar has written: "Insiders remember SALT I for many reasons, among them some palpable signs of Moscow's Sino-phobia." At SALT I the USSR talked about "provocative attacks" by third nuclear powers, meaning, of course, China. The US desired this question postponed until another round of discussions. The Soviets finally agreed to this point, but revived the concept of "provocative attacks" at SALT II.¹²⁸

Chinese diplomats have argued that SALT has done nothing to limit the shorter range Soviet systems which are the most urgent threat to them. SALT May have limited the number of launchers to be used for offensive weapons, but there is no corresponding limit on warheads. As a result, while both sides were limiting the number of aiming points for their strategic forces, they were in essence leaving more rather than fewer warheads that could be used against China. But this is of no concession to China, which complicates an already delicate problem which was pointed out in the Chinese press in 1976:

According to the U.S. Defense Department, up to mid-1975, the number of Soviet ICBM-launching pads had reached 1,600. In addition, the Soviet Union has step by step deployed for operation, the four new kinds of ICBMs developed in 1974. But the total number of US ICBM-launching pads (1,154) has remained unchanged in the past few years, thus giving the Soviets a 1.5:1 quantitative superiority over the United States in this field. Moreover, the total Soviet submarine-launching pads for ballistic missiles¹²⁹ have out-numbered those of the United States.

128. John Newhouse, op. cit., p. 176.

129. Peking Review, No. 12 (March 19, 1976), p. 12.

The Chinese may have mixed perceptions of the ABM Treaty because of its particular relevance to Peking's security. At this time China has the capability of striking Soviet far eastern cities with short-range missiles, a creditable deterrent against Soviet aggression. The Soviet ABM program is not capable of defending against short-range missiles that could be fired at Vladivostok or Khabarovsk.¹³⁰

On the other hand, the Chinese are realistic enough to understand that the ability to hit targets such as Kiev, Leningrad, or Moscow would serve as a more secure deterrence than threats to Soviet far eastern cities. To date, Peking has only a few missiles which could reach Moscow, but the ABM Treaty permits the USSR at least three actual or potential lines of defense. The first is the existing Moscow ABM system which can cover an area of several hundred miles against an unsophisticated attack.¹³¹ The second is the proposed ICBM defense complex which will most likely be developed in Kazakhstan. This will allow the Russians 100 interceptors and 100 launchers. The third line of defense could be the Soviet ABM test site at Sary Shagan, which happens to be on the direct line of flight from Sikiang to Moscow. Under the ABM Treaty the USSR is permitted to have

130. Charles H. Murphy, "Mainland China's Evolving Nuclear Deterrent," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist (January, 1972), pp. 28-33; International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 (London: 1973), pp. 46-51.

131. James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), pp. 42-48.

15 launchers at test sites, but test fields (unlike operational ABM complexes) are subject to no limitations on the numbers of interceptors which may be stored at launch sites.¹³²

Therefore, it appears now that China may never have the penetration capabilities against Moscow even if the ABM Treaty remains effective. In addition, it is questionable whether the Chinese missile system has reached a level of effectiveness that would allow for preparatory launching procedures that would not be detected in time for a Soviet pre-emptive strike.¹³³

But so long as SALT II agreement does not seem imminent, China may not be in a hurry for several reasons. The first has to do with the general perception Peking has of such talks, as described by the Chinese before the First Committee:

Immediately upon the signing of this agreement (meaning SALT I), the two sides started a new round in their nuclear arms race. The more SALT, the more new-type weapons, such as MIRV's, cruise missiles and Backfire bombers, and not the fewer.¹³⁴

The second reason why Peking is in no hurry to see a SALT II agreement has to do with her own weapons development.

132. Alice L. Hsieh, "China's Nuclear Missile Programme: Regional or Intercontinental?" China Quarterly 45 (January-March, 1971).

133. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, World Armaments and Disarmaments (Stockholm: 1973), pp. 340-348.

134. UN General Assembly Records, A/C.1/PV.2084, p. 21.

As of present, the smallness and vulnerability of the Chinese strategic force would place her at a maximum disadvantage in any negotiation concerning arms limitations. In other words, time avoids having to negotiate from weakness. In the interim, Peking's no-first-use declaration helps to reassure neighbors and Third World countries that she is not acting out of aggressive impulses. By concentrating on the impractical declaratory aim of eliminating all nuclear weapons, it effectively gains time for quantitative and qualitative Chinese force improvements which will strengthen both China's security and her negotiating position.

However, in the longer term these perceptions could lead to unstable and unsatisfactory situation, in the end having negative effects on Chinese security as well as a drain on her economic resources.

Insofar as the expansion of China's strategic force creates new tripartite relations in global nuclear strategy, this will necessarily change the essentially bilateral methods by which the US and the USSR have managed these matters. This suggests that one of the most important roles of arms and arms control, instead of being a relatively esoteric technical matter somewhat apart from the normal exchanges of international diplomacy, may become a slightly specialized and technical dimension of the diplomatic process itself. This process would most definitely involve the United Nations, whose attention to the SALT talks has been consistent since 1970.

In fact, the international community has shown considerable interest in the SALT negotiations. It is widely felt that their success would be of vital importance in curbing the arms race and averting the danger of a nuclear war. In view of this many states have expressed their regret at the slow pace of the negotiations. The importance of SALT transcends the interests of the US and USSR, and several resolutions of the General Assembly have reflected various points of view.¹³⁵ The main thrust of the United Nations has been threefold: the pace of negotiations should be accelerated, the scope of negotiations should be broadened to provide for substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations, and the international community should be kept constantly informed on their progress.

When the issues of SALT become the issues of the United Nations, it will mean involving China, who will participate by presenting proposals, by being involved with the working groups and making its view known, presenting amendments, and making statements either in Ad Hoc committees or plenary sessions. At this time it will be difficult to reconcile with China's insistence--sincere as it is--that she is not a Superpower. A question of many at the United Nations deals with this image that China is insistent on

135. See, Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), paras. 26-31; Plenary meetings and First Committee (A/C.1/31/PV.10-52); A/C.1/31/PV.7; A/C.1/31/PV.34.

presenting. Can a China possessed of a substantial nuclear force and, in time, of a modernized economy, avoid the image of a Superpower? It may be perceived by others that the concept of a Superpower, in the perjorative sense used by some Chinese officials, relates not just to capabilities but to practical international behavior. Yet it is difficult to see how China's increasingly important role in great power politics and the need to take positions at the United Nations can be reconciled with China's past condemnation of the politics of spheres of influence or her role as ally of and spokesman for the Third World.

Part 3

Summary

A perceptual analysis of Chinese diplomatic behavior within the context of the issue of disarmament reveals one dominant variable that affects every aspect of the issue--the pervasive and penetrating nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The major reason for the dominance of this variable within the issue of disarmament is due to the fact that, of paramount concern to both parties is the problem of national security. For example, Russian perceptions of security are influenced by the fact that the Soviet Union is particularly vulnerable with the world's longest and most exposed frontier, bordering on 12 states, nearly half of which maintain

active or latent territorial claims against it.¹³⁶ Chinese perceptions of security are influenced by the fact that, since 1949, the PRC has also been encircled by actual or potential adversaries opposed to its dedication to world Communist leadership, the spread of its revolutionary doctrine, and selective frontier readjustments.¹³⁷ Compounding these concerns of both powers is the preponderance of nuclear power.

What is important in the cases of both of these Communist powers is to recognize that their attitudinal orientation reflects the general historical experiences and belief systems characteristic of their particular social and political cultures. In both the Soviet and Chinese cases this involves a long history of perceived, if not always real, aggrandizement and hostility, coupled with the commitment to a complex, secular ideology. There is literature that discusses the suspicion, distrust, and xenophobic aspects of Soviet and Chinese perceptions,¹³⁸ but for

136. Vernon Aspaturian, "The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," in James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd (eds.), World Politics: An Introduction (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 57.

137. See, Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina: China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1968); Donald Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New York: Atheneum, 1964); John R. Thomas, "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," Orbis, VI, I (Spring, 1962), pp. 38-64.

138. B. M. Frolic, "Wide-eyed in Peking, a Diplomat's Diary," New York Times Magazine (January 11, 1976), p. 76; S. D. Kertesz, "American and Soviet Negotiating Behavior,"

whatever reasons, both the PRC and the USSR have experienced long periods in which their governments were isolated from normal diplomatic intercourse with the West. These historical factors, when joined with the general philosophical framework of the respective Marxist-Leninist orientations, are seen by many analysts to provide the principal determinants of their negotiating behavior.

The disarmament issue has generated tremendous Sino-Soviet tensions at the United Nations, and has often placed China in a dilemmic situation with many Third World nations. The PRC and the USSR have disagreed on such questions as the non-use of force in international relations (NUF), a world disarmament conference (WDC), the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), certain nuclear-free zones (NFZ's), nuclear testing, and cut military budgets. During the 1971 General Assembly sessions, the Soviets proposed the convening of a world conference on disarmament. The PRC's Foreign Minister, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, in response, maintained that any Superpower's nuclear disarmament proposals were aimed at "monopolizing nuclear weapons in order to carry out nuclear threats and blackmail."¹³⁹ An Eastern European diplomat at the UN voiced an opinion that: "In this particular case, Chinese perceptions are most likely heavily influenced by those forty plus armed Soviet divisions on the frontier,

in S. D. Kertesz and M. A. Fitzsimons (eds.), Diplomacy in a Changing World (South Bend: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1959), p. 139.

139. UN Doc., A/PV 1983, November 15, 1971, p. 98.

and the fact that any agreements would naturally freeze an unfavorable status quo." In other words, Chinese delegates, like other decision-makers, tend to develop specific attitudes or perceptual images of their adversaries based on prior experiences, ascribed reputations, and anticipated behaviors.¹⁴⁰

Chinese delegates attempted to enlist Third World support by suggesting that the Superpowers' nuclear monopoly and blackmail potential were directed against medium and small countries. Peking's participation in a WDC was made contingent upon three unacceptable preconditions: (1) an agenda limited to the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, (2) a no-first-use pledge by the Superpowers, and (3) an end to all foreign Superpower nuclear bases and forces.

During the 27th Assembly session in 1972, the PRC, conscious of provoking Third World displeasure, agreed to "maintain contact" with a special committee to examine the WDC question. This change took place in the words of an African delegate, "after much quiet diplomacy." That committee became moribund when, under heavy Soviet pressure, the Polish Assembly President named the USSR to a seat and reserved places for the other nuclear powers. This move

140. J. Sawyer and H. Guetzkow, Bargaining and Negotiations in International Behavior and Social-Psychological Analysis (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), p. 503.

violated the tacit understanding that no nuclear powers would participate unless all did. A new Fourth Member Ad-Hoc Committee was established, but neither China nor the US participated.

During the 1976 Assembly session, the US agreed to support a proposal calling for a Special General Assembly Session on Disarmament to be held in May-June, 1978. The desire of many delegates interviewed was to see a change in Chinese attitudes towards a WDC. Obviously, attitudes and images are subject to change through the negotiating process, which can be said to be a principal objective of negotiations--to alter images and change initial biases in an attempt to attain compatability between the values of each side and effect a convergence in views leading to a mutually satisfying agreement.¹⁴¹ In lieu of Chinese participation, the Soviets have the opportunity of seeking maximum advantage against the PRC.

One effective disarmament issue for Moscow has been its resolution on the non-use of force in international relations (NUF), introduced on short notice in the 1972 Assembly session. More recently in the 31st session of the General Assembly in 1976, the USSR proposed the conclusion of a world treaty on the NUF. The first resolution sought to undercut Peking's no-first-use of nuclear weapons precondition for the WDC; the second, by insisting on an NUF

141. K. W. Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 134.

formula that reserved the right to use nuclear weapons in self-defense, preserved the Soviet nuclear option in case of a conventional Chinese attack.¹⁴²

In reply, Chiao Kuan-hua described the Soviet position as "sheer sophistry" and a "downright fraud" and declared that: "The stark facts have shown that the Soviet leaders have neither laid down their butcher's knives nor will they become Buddhas."¹⁴³

In 1976 the Chinese described the draft NUF treaty as "another sheer fraud and shopworn trash designed to dupe the people of the world" in order to evade the real issue of Superpower nuclear blackmail.¹⁴⁴ Peking's opposition to these proposals, which were adopted by comfortable margins, was a clearcut gain for the Soviets.¹⁴⁵

The Soviets have used the nuclear testing issue with even greater success. Since 1971 the Chinese have voted against all 13 General Assembly resolutions urging an end to

142. Daniel C. Kurtzer, The UN and Disarmament: The World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force (St. Louis: International Studies Association, 1977), pp. 5, 12.

143. UN Doc., A/PV. 2083, November 13, 1972, pp. 11-12.

144. UN Doc., A/C.1/31/PV. 16, October 29, 1976.

145. The vote on A/Res/2936 (XXVII), November 29, 1972, was 73 in favor, 4 opposed (Albania, PRC, Portugal, South Africa), 46 sustaining, and 7 abstentions. The vote on A/Res/31/9 (XXXI), November 8, 1976, was 88, 2 (Albania, PRC), 31, and 24, respectively. The lower number of abstentions in 1976 was due largely to Soviet clarifications excluding from NUF coverage "colonial" peoples struggling for freedom and victims of aggression.

nuclear testing. The Soviets have attacked the Chinese for sabotaging world peace, polluting the atmosphere with poisonous radioactive fallout, and insensitivity to the legitimate disarmament concerns of the Third World. By 1975 the Soviets increased the pressure by offering a resolution urging all nuclear powers to begin negotiations with 25 non-nuclear states by March 31, 1976, for a comprehensive test ban treaty. Though the deadline passed and a similar Soviet proposal was adopted in 1976, China has remained adamantly opposed.¹⁴⁶

Within the structure of the nuclear testing issue, the Chinese perception of the Soviets is to expect the worst, particularly since the Chinese are "pre-conditioned" to perceive Soviet actions within the framework of what O. R. Holsti refers to as "inherent bad faith."¹⁴⁷ The Chinese appear to believe that only they have an accurate perception of the objective reality of the issue, thereby depreciating other parties' abilities and the likelihood of reaching a mutually acceptable understanding.¹⁴⁸

UN consideration of the SALT negotiations has had more favorable results for China. General Assembly resolutions

146. The vote on A/Res/3478 (XXX), December 11, 1975, was 93 (USSR), 2 (Albania, PRC), 35, 13. The vote on A/Res/31/89 (XXXI), December 14, 1976, was 95 (USSR), 2 (Albania, PRC), 36, 13.

147. O. R. Holsti, "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1962 6:244-252.

148. E. H. Fedder, "Communication and American-Soviet Negotiating Behavior," Background, 1964 8:105-120.

in 1973 and 1974 were overwhelmingly adopted, encouraging the USSR and the US to reach a strategic arms limitation agreement.¹⁴⁹ Albania cast the only dissenting vote as a symbol of China's opposition, and Peking expressed its contempt for SALT "collusion" between the nuclear Superpowers by boycotting the voting.¹⁵⁰ The 1974 Soviet-American Vladivostok Agreement increasing nuclear arms ceilings generated considerable Third World displeasure and led to more strongly worded UN resolutions in 1975 and 1976, regretting the lack of progress and urging the Superpowers to broaden and accelerate their negotiations. Much to China's satisfaction, both the USSR and the US voted against the resolutions, which were adopted overwhelmingly with strong Third World backing.

China and the Soviet Union have also disagreed on certain nuclear-free zone (NFZ) proposals. Since 1968, Mexico has sponsored a resolution urging the nuclear powers to accede to Protocol II of the 1967 Tlatelalco Treaty guaranteeing NFZ status to Latin America. In 1973 the PRC signed the protocol and ratified it the following year, marking the first arms control agreement to which Peking has adhered. By 1976 all five members of the Security Council except the Soviets have subscribed to the agreement.

149. The vote on A/Res/3184A (XXVIII), December 18, 1973, was 96, 1 (Albania), 19 (USSR, US), 19 (PRC); on A/Res/3261C (XXIX), December 6, 1974, it was 105, 1 (Albania), 23 (USSR, US), 9 (PRC).

150. The vote on A/Res/3184C (XXX), December 12, 1975, was 102, 10 (USSR, US), 12, 19 (PRC); on A/Res/31/189A (XXXI), December 21, 1976, it was 107, 10 (USSR, US), 11, 19 (PRC).

The 29th General Assembly of 1974 met within the shadow of India's 1974 nuclear explosion. The assembly was confronted with a number of NFZ proposals for such diverse regions as the Middle East, the South Pacific, South Asia, and Africa. Chinese and Soviet perceptions within the context of these resolutions were determined by political and strategic considerations. If both powers have supported the African and Middle East resolutions, the Chinese have favored NFZ status for the South Pacific and South Asia and successive Assembly endorsements of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, while the Soviets have abstained.¹⁵¹ Chinese endorsement of these proposals would deter the USSR and the US from stationing nuclear weapons on China's eastern and southern borders and would reduce some of the onus of Peking's unpopular positions on other disarmament questions. Except for Latin America, Soviet and US voting behavior has coincided, thereby emphasizing the importance of NFZ's in preserving nuclear confrontation and limiting the overseas deployment of nuclear arms.

During the 1972 General Assembly session, the PRC and the Soviet Union clashed when the USSR introduced the call for a 10% cut in Big Five military budgets with the savings distributed as development aid to developing countries. The

151. The most recent votes were: A/Res/3477 (XXX), December 11, 1975, (South Pacific) 110 (PRC), 0, 20 (USSR, US), 13; A/Res/31/73 (XXXI), December 10, 1976 (South Asia) 91 (PRC), 2 (India, Bhutan), 43 (USSR, US), 10; and A/Res/31/88 (XXXI), December 14, 1976 (Indian Ocean) 106 (PRC), 0, 27 (USSR, US), 13.

Chinese labelled the proposal "a cheap fraud" and "trash picked up from its own garbage heap of disarmament" to be used as a "smokescreen for covering up its militaristic features of social-imperialism" to win Third World credit for "non-existent" money.¹⁵² China's Third World image was not damaged by her opposition. As one LDC spokesman explained:

Many Third World delegates were aware that the proposal was an obvious Soviet attempt to play politics, and even the Soviets abstained for fear that any definition of military budgets would publicize Moscow's practice of budgetary concealment of military expenditures.¹⁵³

Perceptions play a large role in determining the outcome of Sino-Soviet diplomatic confrontations within the issue of disarmament, arms control, and deterrence. In terms of surface evidence it would appear as though the Soviets hold an edge over the Chinese with regard to the Third World, since the USSR has supported or proposed disarmament resolutions at the UN generally favored by the Third World. On the other hand, Peking has largely countered by taking advantage of residual Third World perceptions of resentment against Superpowers' nuclear predominance. That China had been the Third World's representative in the nuclear club (prior to India's entry) and the developing countries penchant for improving their own military establishments have

152. UN Doc., A/PV. 2175, November 21, 1972, pp. 26-30.

153. The vote on A/Res/3187 (XXXI), December 14, 1976, was 95 (USSR), 2 (Albania, PRC), 36 (US), 13.

also weighed in China's favor. After numerous interviews from delegates representing various Third World groupings, it is the belief here that on disarmament issues Soviet attempts to undermine Peking's image with the Third World has not been overly successful.

CHAPTER V
CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER

Part 1

The general perception used to be that development proceeded through a number of stages, along a linear path. Aid contributed missing components and thereby speeded up economic growth. A more recent perception is that the developed rich "underdevelop" the poor, and that the international system is biased against their development efforts. The poor should, according to this perception, insulate themselves from that system.

What Marxist philosophy regards as the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thereby become capable of explaining it, but in actively changing the world by applying the knowledge of its objective laws. . . . When man in society devotes himself to the practice of changing a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development (whether changing a natural or a social process), he can by the reflection of the objective process in his thought and by the functioning of his own subjective activity, advance his knowledge from the perceptual to the rational and bring forth ideas, theories, plans, or programs which on the whole correspond to the laws of that objective process; he then puts these ideas, theories, plans, or programs into practice in the same objective process; and the process of knowledge as regards this concrete process can be considered as completed if, through the practice in that objective process, he can realize his preconceived ideas, theories, plans, or programs into facts.

Mao Tsetung, "On Practice," 1937

Introduction: Perceptions of Development--
Interdependence and Self-reliance

Background. We have recently witnessed a change in the perception of the development process, although some aspects of this change are not at all new. In fact, few aspects of the "old" perception were generally accepted by the Third World at any stage, and objections and alternative perceptions were articulated almost at the same time the "orthodox" perception had been formulated.

The changing perception of development until about 1970 and since then is not just a contrast in time. The two approaches can also be traced to differences of perception between the First World and the Third World.

Economic theory of the 1950's and 1960's was heavily influenced by Walt Whitman Rostow's doctrine of the stages of growth.¹ In fact, the Report of the Pearson Commission on International Development, which was submitted to the World Bank in 1969, was dominated by Rostow's doctrine.² Central to this doctrine is the perception that development is a linear path along which all countries proceed. The developed countries had, at various times, passed the stage of "take-off" and the developing countries are now following them. Development was perceived by Rostow primarily as a matter of economic growth, and secondarily as a problem of

-
1. W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960).
 2. Richard W. Sterling, Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974), pp. 408-413.

securing social changes necessarily associated with economic growth. It was taken for granted that organizing the march along the development path was the prime concern of governments.

This linear perception raised questions concerning the nature, causes, and objectives of development. It tended to focus on constraints or obstacles (particularly lack of capital), the removal of which would set free the "natural" forces making for the steady move toward ever higher incomes. Within the context of international relations, this perception called on the rich countries to supply the "missing components" to the developing countries, thereby allowing them to remove obstacles to growth. These missing components may be capital, foreign exchange, skills, or management. The doctrine provided a rationale for international capital aid, trade, technical assistance, and private foreign investment. By removing obstacles for growth, developed countries could contribute to development efforts a multiple of what it costs them and thus speed up the development process in less developed countries. The two-gap models were a rationalization of foreign assistance. The ultimate aim of aid was to end aid.³

There is a second perception which has gained adherents with the spreading disenchantment about development and about the international contribution to it.⁴ According to

3. See, Collin Leys (ed.), Politics & Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory & Practice of Development (England: Cambridge University Press, 1969), Chaps. 2 & 3.

4. Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backgrounds and Economic

this perception, the international system of rich-poor relationships produces and maintains the underdevelopment of the poor countries. According to one scholar, Andre Gunder Frank, the rich countries "underdevelop" the poor.⁵ The result is that the developing societies are unable to choose their style of development. In addition, the elite groups in the developing countries enjoying high incomes, wealth, and status become subservient to the international system of inequality, conformity, and underdevelopment, and thereby perpetuate it. Not only Marxists but also a growing number of non-Marxists have come to attribute a large part of underdevelopment to the perceptions and policies of the industrial countries of the West, including Japan and the Soviet Union.⁶

According to one aspect of this second perception, aid is not considered a transitional phenomenon to be ended after "take-off," but a permanent feature due, as a matter of right, like an international income tax. In other words, aid in itself becomes part of the international system of exploitation essential to maintain reactionary regimes, and self-reliant, independent development has to rid itself of it.

Growth: Studies in the Theory of Economic Development
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963).

5. Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967).
6. See, Joan Robinson, Freedom & Necessity: An Introduction to the Study of Society (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970). During an interview with a PRC delegate in 1975, which was the first draft of this chapter, I was informed that only two Western economists had been translated into Chinese--Joan Robinson and Thorstein Vebleu.

Many who shared this second perception advocated that the developing countries should erect barriers between themselves and the destructive intrusions of trade, technology, transnational corporations, and educational and ideological influences. The aid would be in the nature of "delinking" or "decoupling," thereby pulling down a poverty curtain, insulating and isolating themselves from the international system. It is paradoxical that the socialist or radical advocates of "delinking" propose something that was triggered off by capitalist hostility to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Cuba.

As we approached the 1970's, the process of change in international relations may have profound implications for the emergence of new power constellations. This has been characterized by the relative declining power of leading capitalist countries, by the increasing significance of socialist countries, and by the growing efforts in the direction of cooperation between Third World countries. But, for all the change, the overall international structure of economic relations (in terms of the orientation of trade and investment flows and the distribution of economic potential) has remained, by and large, intact, with the economic hegemony of the United States still indisputable. Nevertheless, the perceptual change has posed a choice between two strategies of economic development, viz. interdependence and self-reliance, the one basically aimed at maintaining the structure of dominance-dependency relationship and the

at breaking out of it. In essence, the NIEO discussions at the UN focus on these two strategies which often reflect the perceptions of First or Third World countries. In fact, these strategies play a very important part in the perceptual outlook of any actor attempting to formulate policy alternatives with regard to all the issues involved with the NIEO.

The NIEO and Interdependency. Interdependence is such a vague term that many scholars have attempted to define its content, only to find that the concept itself is ambiguous, since it has been used to describe both certain properties of the international system (such as an objective state of affairs), and in a different context (foreign-policy goals).⁷

With the functional use of the concept of interdependency, many scholars often assume relations between actors to be somewhat equal and harmonious. Mutual dependency may exist, however, but it may be within the context of a highly unequal relationship. For example, a dominant actor may be dependent on the raw materials and labor force of the weaker party, while the dependency of the weaker party is manifested in technological, financial, and industrial subordination. This relationship cannot be illustrated solely by a dichotomy between symmetric and asymmetric

7. See, Richard Rosencrance & Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 1 (1973), pp. 1-5; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Independence and Interdependence," Foreign Policy 22 (1976), pp. 131-134; Gerhard Mally, Interdependence: The European American in the Global Context (Lexington, Mass: 1976), pp. 5-14; Richard Rosencrance et al., "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization 3 (1977), pp. 427-429.

relations. Therefore, the essence of interdependence and self-reliance as international economic strategies cannot be understood without due consideration of the interest perspective.

In other words, a central question is whether interdependence is a zero-sum game or a positive-sum game, which then leads us to the problem of whether interdependence can be divided into positive and negative components.⁸ Thus, all states in the world, both industrial and developing, are dependent on each other in the framework of the international economic system. Therefore, unilateral measures, as well as changes in the international position of a country, result necessarily in positive or negative changes in the positions of other countries.⁹ Negative interdependence means simply that improvement in the position of a state or a coalition of states leads to a corresponding weakening of the other. Positive interdependence indicates that both parties can simultaneously improve their positions as a consequence of economic and other exchange values.¹⁰

8. Raimo Vayryen, "European Community and the Nordic Countries: An Analysis of Main Trends," Instant Research on Peace and Violence 2 (1974), pp. 79-101.

9. A. Sergiyev, "Bourgeois Theories of 'Interdependence' Serve Neo-colonialism," International Affairs 11 (1976), p. 105.

10. See, Richard Rosencrance et al, "Whither Interdependence?", op. cit., pp. 426-427; has adopted the positive interpretation by arguing that "by interdependence we mean the direct and positive linkage of the interests of states such that when the position of one state changes, the position of others is affected, and in the same direction."

Interdependence between national economies is clearly divided into subjective and objective components. For example, on the objective level capitalist countries have historically benefited from the international dependence at the expense of developing countries and, in particular, of their citizens. The more powerful the capitalist country, the more it has, as a rule, benefited. Although the question is probably not purely a zero-sum game, one can at any rate speak of strong negative dependence between the economic development of these groups of countries. This situation continues to prevail.

On the other hand, one important change has taken place. Within the Third World, the existence of relations of exploitation and subordination has been conscientized and politicized. This has led to the adoption of new strategies on the subjective political level to counteract undesirable aspects of the historic situation. With strong psychological impetus, this subjective process may lead to efforts to transform the objective reality in the Third World and its relations with the major capitalist powers.

With changing perceptions of Third World countries, resistance to the prevailing negative interdependence has been unfolding, which in turn threatens the interests of major capitalist countries. In particular, domestic power groups within capitalist countries who profit from these historic economic relationships continue to map out strategies preserving their advantages. Thus, with changing perceptions

within industrial societies, there emerges a new image of interdependence. The concept is now perceived not from the objective but also from the subjective level, where it is projected as a warning to the developing countries not to tamper with the historic economic system.¹¹

By the early 1970's a partial change had taken place in the international structure. The international system had changed in political and economic terms from one characterized by strict bipolarity to multipolar directions in which the role of shifting coalitions was more important. In other words, the international system had become more complex. At the same time the significance of military power, as a determinant of the international processes, had decreased. In the case of the United States, the net result was the decrease in the potential to control international politics, including its economic aspects. Although this decrease was by no means drastic, means were needed to prevent this tendency from continuing.¹²

The perceptions of Henry Kissinger, US Secretary of State, reflected a strong reaction to this situation. He perceived that international economic relations were facing an unprecedented attack, and a situation similar to the one

11. See, Fred G. Bergsten, "The Threat from the Third World," Foreign Policy, No. 11 (1973); "Interdependence: Now a Cold Reality," in Toward a New International Economic Order, Selected Papers of G. Fred Bergsten, 1972-1974 (Lexington, Mass.), pp. 19-23.

12. Joseph Nye, "Independence and Interdependence," pp. 142-145; Marina Whitman, "Leadership Without Hegemony: Our

that had led in the 1930's to the destruction of the then prevailing system.¹³ Kissinger argued that developing countries were demanding an entirely different economic order based on ideology and "national selfishness." By these demands, developing countries were striving to create a situation in which the availability of vital natural resources was dependent on political decisions; however, these demands were untenable because the present economic order in general served the world well.¹⁴ From his perception the demands were unfounded for the reason that in the conditions of interdependence, interests and aims of various states were common. He maintained that the recognition of the common destiny commits nations to joint action, which leads both developed and developing countries to promote global interests.¹⁵

This perception of common interests between developed and developing countries was further articulated in the ministerial meeting of the OECD Council in June, 1976. The communique of this meeting stated that increasing interdependence means that nations become more vulnerable to the

Role in the World Economy," Foreign Policy, No. 20 (1975), pp. 138-160.

13. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Twenty-ninth Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 2238, Sept. 23, 1974. (I interviewed after this speech at the UN, and the reaction of most delegates can be summarized in one word--hostility.)
14. Kissinger's speech in Kansas City on May 13, 1975, "Strengthening the World Economic Structure," in Dept. of State Bulletin (June 2, 1975), pp. 714-715.
15. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 2214, April 15, 1974.

economic activities of other countries. The intensification of economic exchange promotes, however, economic prosperity and development of all countries, including developing ones. According to the communique, this means that emerging economic recovery discernible in many industrialized countries would improve the balance of payments of developing countries and their economic situation in general.¹⁶ In other words, when the economies of major capitalist countries are expanding, developing countries will also benefit from it.

From the perception of the US, national solutions are not sufficient in the effort to repel the worldwide crisis, but the resort to them is in fact its major cause. According to Kissinger's perceptions, inflation, famine, and increase in the energy prices pose so severe a challenge that it can be met only by equally strong cooperative solutions. In other words, a new system of interdependence is needed:

a world whose security, well-being, and moral fulfillment demand interdependence; a world whose people are interlinked by technology and global communications, by the danger of nuclear war, and by the worldwide thrusts of human needs; a world in which traditional structures and tenets of diplomacy are being overwhelmed.¹⁷

The policy of interdependence is an influential theme in American political thought, but is also tied into the political thought of the Federal Republic of Germany. For

16. See, OECD Observer, No. 82, 1976, pp. 17-18; report of the Trilateral Commission; North-South Economic Relations: A Tripartite Report by Thirteen Experts from the European Community, Japan & North America (Wash., D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), pp. 29-30.

17. Kissinger's speech in New York on October 16, 1974, in Dept. of State Bulletin (November 11, 1974), p. 644.

example, at the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September, 1975, Foreign Minister Genscher articulated Germany's perception:

In an interdependent world the inevitable outcome of confrontation and selfish unilateral action is that in the end all will be the losers. Interdependence therefore compels us to cooperate and to accept our common responsibility.¹⁸

There appeared to be two different perceptions of the interdependence policy. According to Kissinger, no major concessions should be made to the developing countries, as was reflected in his various initiatives in 1974 and 1976. These initiatives have either contained proposals for only marginal changes or have outright favored more the US economy than those of the developing countries. For example, at the fourth session of UNCTAD in May, 1976, Kissinger proposed the establishment of an international bank for natural resources along with the creation of an international buffer stock for grain; but the objective of his policy was simply to integrate developing countries into the international capitalist division of labor without giving any real concessions to them.

The other perception reflects a policy of accommodation, which implies somewhat greater willingness to take into account demands of the Third World and accelerating negotiations concerning the reorganization of the

18. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Ad Hoc Committee of the Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meetings, A/PV. 2328, September 2, 1975.

international economy. These perceptions are well reflected in the publications by George Ball and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski emphasizes how the US should cooperatively engage in shaping new global relations to provide a positive model for the world and stabilize in this way her position in the international system.¹⁹

Ultimately, interdependence thinking functions in the context of the free play of market forces. It is characterized by the perception that artificial barriers to the flows of technology, capital, and manufactured goods must be removed so that the production of commodities could be globally distributed in the most rational way. Therefore, the main function of the policy of interdependence is to mitigate the problems caused by the activities based on these principles. This presupposes the reform of some existing international institutions and the creation of new ones when needed.²⁰ Some scholars have recently noticed that this type of interdependence policy has its limits, which may have been reached already. According to these views, we have come to an era of mercantilism, which is characterized by the strong impact

-
19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," Foreign Policy, No. 23 (1976), pp. 65-96; see, George W. Ball, Diplomacy for a Crowded World (London: 1976), pp. 278-298. The differences in these perceptions can be conceptualized by the four models of foreign-policy thinking formulated by Richard Falk (isolationists, imperialists, managers, and transformers) in "Beyond Internationalism," Foreign Policy, No. 24, pp. 84-86.
 20. Fred G. Bergsten, "Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions," International Organization, No. 2 (1976), pp. 361-372.

of national political decisions on the international economic and other relations. International economy and politics are now more dominated by governments. This has resulted in a decrease in the relative strength of market forces.²¹

The NIEO and Self-Reliance. The term "self-reliance" normally refers to strategies of economic and social development which are based on the mobilization and utilization of a community's own resources, both material and human, in place of reliance on the resources and ideas imported from without. Self-reliance can be implemented at many different levels: local, national, regional, and inter-regional. At the national level China, Cuba, North Korea, Tanzania, and Sri Lanka have employed the goal of self-reliant development. However, in the broader context there is the strategy of collective self-reliance which calls for cooperation among developing countries to the extent that the division of labor within the Third World is organized on a new basis.

This strategy of collective self-reliance demands the implementation of certain targets, such as the severance of existing links of dependency operated through the international system by the dominant countries, a full mobilization of domestic capabilities and resources, the strengthening of collaboration with other developing countries, and the reorientation of development efforts in order to meet the

21. Gregory Smith, "Interdependence Has Its Limits," Foreign Policy, No. 21 (1975); and Foreign Policy, No. 22 (1976), pp. 220-223.

basic social needs of the peoples involved.²²

The strategy of self-reliance is basically an outcome of a psychological process which leads to a reaction against the dependency patterns and vertical structures prevailing in the international system. In one scholar's terms the policy of self-reliance tends to resist the "center-periphery formation bases on penetration, fragmentation, and marginalization."²³ In resisting penetration the self-reliance strategy aims at two goals: the control of various types of resources, and, of primary importance--psychosocial self-confidence. The question, in other words, deals with local and national dimensions of the policy of self-reliance. The opposition to fragmentation means the build-up of institutions and exchange relations between developing countries' collective self-reliance. But, most important, self-reliance should lead to the satisfaction of basic human needs, to mass-scale political participation, to decrease of alienation, and to increase in creativity, and a more secure military attitude of the leadership.

The idea of self-reliance has been strongly represented in statements by Third World countries. For example, the economic declaration of the Colombo meeting of non-aligned countries in August, 1976:

-
22. Enrique Oteiza and Franco Sergovich, "Collective Self-Reliance: Selected Issues," International Social Science Journal 4 (1976), pp. 664-671; see also, Lurenda Patel, "Collective Self-Reliance of Developing Countries," Journal of Modern African Studies 4 (1975), pp. 569-583.
 23. Johan Galtung, "Self-Reliance: Concept Practice and Rationale, The Politics of Self-Reliance," Chair in

The achievement of the full economic potential rests on the developing countries and entails the following factors: (a) individual self-reliance in order that developing countries may utilize their economic potential to co-operate among themselves to set up the New International Economic Order; (b) intensification of economic co-operation between developing countries; (c) strengthening of their solidarity and the coordination of the activities of the developing countries in a common front against all attempts of imperialists to sow division and to apply pressure.²⁴

In the same declaration the heads of state or government of the non-aligned countries expressed their:

firm belief that only a confident spirit of collective self-reliance on the part of the developing countries can guarantee the emergence of the New International Economic Order. Self-reliance implies a firm determination on the part of developing nations to secure their legitimate economic rights in international dealings through the use of their collective bargaining strength.²⁵

At the Lima conference in 1975 a strategy to intensify cooperation between developing countries was outlined, and it was further developed in the program of action approved at the Colombo meeting. This program pays attention to the following sectors in which cooperation between non-aligned countries already exists or in which efforts can be made to develop it: raw materials, trade, transportation and industry, financial cooperation, scientific and technical development, technical cooperation and engineering, food, and agriculture.

Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo, Papers No. 35 & 44; "Implementing Self-Reliance," Transnational Perspectives, 3-4 (1976), p. 18-24.

Advances in the implementation of the strategy of self-reliance can be evaluated from many different perspectives. First, cooperation within both the Group of 77 and the movement of non-aligned countries has become without any doubt more intense during the last few years, and they have been surprisingly capable of formulating joint positions on a large number of political and economic questions. At the level of the whole Third World, cooperation and agreement have significantly increased, though a certain rivalry between the Group of 77 and the movement of non-aligned countries has tended to weaken the bargaining power of the Third World. Furthermore, there are disagreements between certain developing countries themselves on various political and military questions.

At the functional level the strategy of self-reliance clearly provides a programmatic cornerstone to cooperation between developing countries. At that level the principle of self-reliance is closely connected with the implementation of the NIEO and, therefore, with radical changes in the international economic relations. This is a consequence of the fact that developing countries have correctly perceived their common interests and common problems (indebtedness, the structure of exports, and the development of market prices of export and import commodities, and transfer of technology).

It has been argued that the action programs designed for the implementation of the NIEO would not essentially

alter the present structure of North-South relations. For this reason it is strongly trade-oriented, which tends to preserve the main inequalities and asymmetries of the present system.²⁶ Partly for this reason Samir Amin has pointed out that the "slogan of collective self-reliance" may become a reality, but particularly in relation to the unequal division of international labor and cooperation between countries of the Third World in the struggle to increase the price of their primary exports.²⁷

It appears that self-reliance is only possible in countries which have liberated themselves from the imperialist world system. Amin argues that more collective action should be formulated by increasing mutual economic and financial assistance between countries, as well as by jointly aiming at "modifying the international division of labor between developed countries and Third World countries in the direction of a reduction of inequality, and no longer that of a 'renovation' with no reduction of inequality."²⁸

Amin's argument is probably correct to the extent that for many developing countries the policy of self-reliance is only a slogan which does not result in any

26. Johan Galtung, op. cit., Paper No. 55.

27. Samir Amin, "Self-reliance and the New International Economic Order," Monthly Review, No. 3 (1977), pp. 1-21.

28. Ibid., pp. 18-21.

concrete changes in their development, but actually covers new forms of dependency under the aegis of transnational corporations between them and the leading capitalist countries. The present pattern of industrialization in some developing countries, which tends to emphasize economic growth based on the export of textiles, footwear, home entertainment equipment, office machines, automobile parts, is a good example. These products are mostly produced by transnational corporations which have shifted their plants from developed countries in search of cheap labor and raw material. Such a pattern of industrialization weakens the prospect of a self-reliant policy of development in poor countries.²⁹ It is hardly conceivable that self-reliance, national or collective, is possible in these conditions. In fact, those developing countries which have specialized in low-income industries have governments that favor continued and even deepening integration in the prevailing international division of labor (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, etc.).

The existence of these relationships is closely connected with another problem in the policy of self-reliance. The question as to who will benefit from the implementation of the NIEO and from the strategy of self-reliance. In theory, the answer is fairly simple: the extra resources which developing countries have been able to extract through

29. Folker Frobel, Jurgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye, "Die neue internationale Arbeitsteilung," Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1977.

better terms of trade, more advantageous conditions of the transfer of technology, must be allocated to improve the position of poverty groups in the society and to meet their basic human needs. In practice, the situation is not that simple. There are good reasons to assume that the alleged benefits of the NIEO will be distributed in a manner that strengthens the position of the elites (as in most societies, I must add) than that of poverty groups. The increase in oil prices provides an illustration of this, inasmuch as its benefits went in practically all members of OPEC to their powerholders. Industrialization and other development programs were started, but they have most often favored capital-intensive industries which obtain their inputs from abroad. They hardly improved the position of the masses. This kind of development is also possible on a wider scale; collective action based on Third World solidarity results in a transfer of financial resources from developed to developing countries, where it goes, however, into the hands of local elites, thus reinforcing their dominant position. The oil crisis has been predominantly a means of accumulating more capital to the elites of the OPEC.

Part 2

Chinese Perceptions of the New International Economic Order (NIEO)

Chinese perceptions of an NIEO have evolved as a result of China's own very personal experiences in dealing with economic problems and development, and several variables have to be taken into consideration in order to understand these perceptions.

First, China's perceptions of an NIEO have evolved as a result of her own history in dealing with two dominant historical intrusions, foreign imperialism and economic dependence. Imperialism, which normally precedes the latter, came to the shores of China earlier than that of her neighbor, Japan; and by comparison, China's humiliation and defeat in the Opium War of 1840 was a much more forceful opening of a more devastating nature than the entry of Admiral Perry's fleet into Yokohama Harbor in 1858.³⁰ The Chinese, through their experiences with imperialism, have recently begun to compare their international status to that of the various client states of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. During the plenary meeting of the Third UNCTAD Conference in 1972, Chinese delegate Chou Hau-min gave an authoritative review of contemporary Chinese perceptions:

In the past the Chinese people suffered long from imperialist oppression. For over a century, the imperialist powers repeatedly launched

30. John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). This is an excellent reference of this early period.

wars of aggression against China. They divided China into spheres of influence, interfered with China's internal affairs, backed the reactionary authorities, subjected the Chinese people's revolutionary struggle to bloody suppression, engineered civil wars among warlords, controlled China's customs, shipping and insurance, manipulated China's financial and monetary affairs and extorted privileges of running mines and factories, building railways, inland navigation. . . .31

Through these perceptions the Chinese readily identify with other developing countries in their struggle against imperialism and economic dependence. At the 30th session of the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) in 1974, Peking's representative, Huang Ming-ta, established a very significant linkage with Third World experiences:

Through their own experience, the people of the developing countries in Asia and the Far East have come to see more and more clearly where the root cause of their poverty lies. Meanwhile, through their common struggle against foreign plunder and exploitation, they have become more keenly aware that the correct way to overcome their difficulties is to unite and take concerted action. Many of the raw materials needed by imperialism are produced in the developing countries. Imperialism cannot survive without plundering the raw materials of the developing countries. Why can't we developing countries get organized, strengthen our unity and use every possible means to hit back at imperialism. . . .32

By 1949 China had herself experienced decades of imperialism and war, which wrecked havoc on China's economy and aggravated the sectoral imbalances of over a century of

-
31. Proceedings of the United Nations Council on Trade and Development, Third Session, Mantiago, 1972, Vol. IV (TD 181).
 32. UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), E/CN.11/SR. 1249.

foreign influence and oppression.³³ The war against Japan, along with the civil war, destroyed China's transport system. Businessmen could not invest or plan due to the uncertainty of supplies, deliveries, and markets. Inflation was astronomical, and real estate speculation, foreign banks, luxury spending on imports, and hoarding were the main outlets for the capital possessed by the few wealthy Chinese. Those with wealth began to flee the country as the Communist armies marched on the cities. Shanghai, the largest city, the most important industrial center, and the main connection with the outside world, was beset by poverty, crime, prostitution, starvation, drugs, unemployment, and disease.³⁴ This was the climax of China's legacy with foreign imperialism.

This aspect of China's perceptions of an NIEO has a history that does not conclude with the year 1949, since there existed an on-going period of Chinese "economic dependence" within the Soviet relationship. The violence of past decades associated with foreign oppression may have ended, but a new form of humiliation, "dependency," appears on the horizon.

The concept of dependency used here is not associated with military aspects such as the gunboat diplomacy reflective

33. Stephen Andors, China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Management, 1949 to the Present (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), p. 42.

34. Jack Belden, China Shakes the World (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 478-479; Barry Richman, Industrial Society in Communist China (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 525.

of the history of US foreign policy in Latin America. Rather, dependence refers to procedural, peaceful, economic relations between dominant and subordinate states. Dependence is a situation in which the economy of one country is conditioned by the needs and interests of another country. Economic development in the dependency is a reflection of the growth and expansion of the hegemonic power.³⁵ Our Latin American delegate expressed his perception based on dealing with the Chinese that discussions with Chinese delegates "reflect China's deep-seated sense of former dependence on the Soviet Union." He went on to say that the Chinese continue to "express an essential oneness with the exploited countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America due to this experience with 'dependence.'"

An example of this attitude was expressed by China's representative to the United Nations, Chang Hsien-wu, when he addressed the General Assembly:

We developing countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have more or less the same experience and are in similar positions. We are bound closely together by our common struggle against imperialism and colonialism and by our common desire to build our respective countries.³⁶

So, within this concept of dependency, there results an international stratification among dominant and subordinate states in which decisions made in the dominant state

35. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review, No. 60 (May, 1970), p. 231.

36. "Statements by PRC Delegations and Representatives to the United Nations," Current Background, No. 986 (April 4, 1973), p. 33.

determine the pace, direction, and content of economic growth and development in the subordinate state. The development alternatives open to the subordinate state are defined and limited by its integration into and functions within the world market.³⁷

As the Chinese experienced to some degree with regard to their relationship with the Russians, the transfer of technology from one country to another can easily become addictive for the recipient country. Factories constructed with a particular type of technology are not readily adaptable to plants and machinery constructed on a different technology. Industries can be crippled if for some reason a foreign supplier decides to withhold parts. Foreign ownership may be quickly terminated by expropriation, but technological dependence cannot be so easily concluded. For example:

Technology is so strong a factor that if its stream runs in only one direction it can determine not only the quantity and quality of production, but the lines and methods of production as well. Patents are only frontier markers of the effective borderlines against intruders. Whoever controls technology can determine the market within which products developed on the basis of that technology can be sold and used. Therefore, the stream of technology is equivalent to the stream of control.³⁸

-
- 37. Robert Bodenheimer, "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," Politics and Society, No. 1 (May, 1971), p. 332.
 - 38. Allen Kronstein, "The Nationality of International Enterprises," Columbia Law Review, No. 52 (1952), p. 994.

Technological dependence may be a global phenomenon, but it has its greatest impact on the countries of the Third World. This is due to the fact that their technical incapacity to produce capital goods requires them to import modern technology, as was the case with developing China.³⁹ Underdevelopment is characterized by a structural incapacity to produce the capital goods required for economic growth. The conventional answer to this problem in recent decades has been to adopt foreign techniques. While the short-term gains appear to be very great, the underdeveloped country virtually surrenders to the dominant country (or its leading corporations) the direction and pace of development.⁴⁰ Third World and Chinese delegates interviewed argued that technological dependence breeds international and local inequality, unemployment, regional and social polarization, social marginality, decapitalization, foreign indebtedness, and restricted growth.

Since Chinese perceptions of an NIEO are so dominated by the concept of dependency (as well as the concept of self-reliance), it is important to understand the degree of past Chinese dependency on the Soviet Union.

39. What should be noted is that China's dependence on the Soviet Union should not be perceived in an historical vacuum. To a great extent, China was forced to "lean to one side" because of the historical circumstances created by China's century-long confrontation with the West, the second Sino-Japanese War, and the effects and consequences of Civil War.

40. Richard Girling (ed.), "Dependency, Technology and Development," Structures of Dependency (New York: Praeger, 1973), pp. 47, 55.

China's first experience on Soviet economic dependence came in the form of military aid in 1950, included in an economic development loan of \$300 million. The protocols for military assistance were not published, but a military mission was established in Peking followed by 3,000 Soviet military advisors.⁴¹ Chinese military expenditures during the Korean War grew to 48% of her budget,⁴² and Peking had no choice but to accept Soviet terms, since assistance would have been impossible to obtain elsewhere.⁴³

Chinese perceptions at this time reflected a resentment of China having to mortgage her future to the Soviet Union. For example, General Lung Yun publicly declared that it was "totally unfair for the People's Republic of China to bear all the expenses of the Korean War."⁴⁴ These debts were not only a burden on the economy, but repayment obligations, particularly important at a time when China needed trade for accumulation of foreign currency.⁴⁵ The end result was a serious balance of payments deficit with the Soviet Union.

41. R. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations, 1945-66," Sino-Soviet Military Relations (1966), pp. 85-86.

42. D. Rigg, "Red Army in Retreat," Current History (January, 1957), p. 3.

43. Allen Whiting, "'Contradictions' in the Moscow-Peking Axis," Journal of Politics, No. 20 (February, 1968), pp. 127-161.

44. NCNA, June 18, 1957, cited in MacGregor, "Peiping General Criticizes Soviets on Seized Plants," New York Times, June 24, 1957, at 1, col. 8.

45. O. Hoeffding, Sino-Soviet Economic Relations in Recent Years (Rand memorandum P-2087, August, 1960, revised, December, 1960), p. 15.

At the core of Chinese dependency was the technological factor. China received Soviet blueprints, plans, technical support, spare parts, and the Russian claim that:

There is not a single branch of industry in the Chinese People's Republic that does not produce goods from blueprints, technical specifications, technological documentation devised in the USSR and transmitted to China.⁴⁶

The Chinese dependency relationship with Russia involved Soviet loans, technology, scientists and technicians in China, and Chinese scientists, technicians, and students in the Soviet Union. The way the Chinese perceived this dependency was later described in these terms:

When Socialist construction began, the shortage or inadequate supply of some resources was felt. It was not that these resources were unavailable in China, but rather that, limited by our scientific and technical knowledge and other conditions, we did not have a clear idea about our natural resources and some resources had not yet been discovered. Limited by our scientific, technical and other conditions, although some resources had been discovered, we had not the means to produce them on a large scale to meet the needs of construction.⁴⁷

By 1958 Chinese perceptions began to change in an effort to maintain the revolutionary values that had been developed independently of Soviet influence.⁴⁸ By 1958 the simultaneous

46. A. Vladimirow, "The Question of Soviet-Chinese Economic Relations in 1952-1966," in Chinese Economic Studies (Problems of History: No. 6, Fall, 1969), pp. 8-9.

47. Chiang Chen-yun, "On Self-Reliance--Notes on the Study of Chairman Mao's Works," Economic Research, No. 1 (January 20, 1965), 460 SCMM at 5.

48. Dennis M. Ray, "Chinese Perceptions of Social Imperialism and Economic Dependency: The Impact of Soviet Aid," in Bryant Garth (ed.), China's Changing Role in the World Economy (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 73-74.

pursuit "of self-reliance and increased trade with the Soviet Union strongly suggests both the pragmatism and opportunism of the Chinese elite. Chinese policy in this period suggests not so much dependency as it reflects the assertion of national self-interest."⁴⁹ This Chinese assertion of self-interest suggests an emphasis on autonomy and self-reliance, which, in turn, may be a prerequisite to genuine equality in international economic relationships.

Chinese assertions resulted in a cut-off of Soviet assistance, and for the next decade China was forced to develop new trade patterns, dramatically shifting away from the Communist bloc. It could be considered that the uncommonly economic relationship between the Soviets and Chinese in the 1950's had prepared the Chinese for the tough cash and carry posture assumed in the 1960's.⁵⁰ During the 1960's the Chinese isolated herself from most of the outside world. The period of dependency with the Soviet Union had never reached the point where China was objectively dependent on Russia, but by 1958 China was approaching that objective state. The Great Leap Forward reversed this dependency relationship, and the Cultural Revolution reflected the new revolutionary spirit that is best personified in the nature of self-reliance.

49. Ibid.

50. Ibid., p. 75.

Self-reliance enabled China to reverse the tides of history. She could not selectively adopt foreign technology from abroad and integrate that technology into a dynamic and developing Chinese economy. The revolutionary transformation of Mao's strategy of national self-reliance has finally resolved for China many of the dilemmas raised by Western power, technology, and imperialism, and becomes a blueprint for China's perception of economic development.

Second, China's perceptions of an NIEO have evolved as a result of her very personal experience in formulating and molding theoretical and pragmatic aspects of the concept of "self-reliance." In the Chinese conceptualization of self-reliance, this is the most direct path that developing countries can take to liberate their economic thinking from the entanglements of foreign dependency. Self-reliance can enable them to obstruct the deprecating process of exchanges of unequal values and end the seemingly self-perpetuating structure of the economic dominance of dependence relationships.

The Chinese term for self-reliance (tzu-li Keng-sheng) literally means "regeneration through one's own efforts," which, in practice, is the employment of a process and not an end in itself. In other words, it is not a renunciation of all bilateral and multilateral aid, but that each country should primarily rely on its own efforts and resources. To the Chinese, foreign aid must be based on equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with a developing countries actual needs as a "supplementary means" (fu-chu shou-tuan)

for developing their national economies.⁵¹

One of Peking's more precise definitions of self-reliance was articulated by China's representative to the UN Seventh Special Session, Mr. Li, who maintained that by self-reliance:

We mean that a country should mainly rely on the strength and wisdom of its own people, control of its own economic life-lines, make full use of its own resources, work hard, increase production, practice economy and develop its national economy step by step and in a planned way. Each country should make a distinction between different circumstances and determine its own way of practising self-reliance in the light of its specific conditions. Many developing countries have followed the road of self-reliance in conformity with their own characteristics and conditions and, after making sustained efforts and overcoming all sorts of difficulties, they have achieved gratifying successes. . . . Facts show that it is entirely feasible for the developing countries to develop their national economy independently and self-reliantly.⁵²

The concept of self-reliance appears to fulfill several functions for the Chinese. First, it symbolizes China's ability and desire to stand on its own feet. Second, diplomatically, it is utilized as a means with which to transform the old exploitative type of aid into one designed to allow the receiving country the latitude of independent judgment. Third, it may serve China's strategy of making a virtue of necessity. Fourth, the concept may serve the purpose of alerting the developing countries not to expect

51. JMJP, editorial, April 9, 1974, p. 1.

52. UN Doc., A/PV. 2329, September 1, 1975 (Seventh Special Session of the General Assembly), p. 28.

too much assistance from China, as well as of "rationalizing or justifying its modest role as a donor of foreign aid."⁵³

Self-reliance was a central principle of industrial policy in the 1950's; however, it was at that time a policy defining the long-run direction of industrial development. It was felt that in order to make China independent in the future substantial capital goods and military imports were required, which had to be subsidized by increasing exports. As a result, foreign trade rose quickly and expanded faster than GNP (gross national product).⁵⁴

In contrast, self-reliance in the 1960's assumed much greater operational significance and immediate application. It meant a reduction in China's general dependence on foreign trade, and as discussed earlier, reduced dependency on the Soviet Union. But in the 1960's, unlike the 1950's, foreign trade grew less rapidly than GNP, which meant that the Chinese economy was becoming more self-sufficient.

The political conflict between Peking and Moscow had a very significant effect on China's pattern of trade. For example, during 1955-1960, the volume of China's trade with the Communist countries was twice as large as the volume of trade with the non-Communist countries. By the early 1970's, the corresponding ratio was about five to one in

53. Samuel S. Kim, "China and World Order," Alternatives, Vol. III, No. 4 (May, 1978), pp. 564-565.

54. Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 125-126.

favor of the non-Communist countries, and by 1972 Peking had no problem in balancing her trade account.⁵⁵

New industrial expansion programs in the 1970's involved a liberalization of the self-reliance concept to allow for a more open foreign trade orientation than prevailed in the 1960's. This increased foreign trade will most likely be supported by China's oil surplus, which may reach 50 million tons by 1980, yielding foreign exchange earnings in excess of \$4 billion.⁵⁶

By 1974, what had begun as a modest trickle of Chinese orders for machinery and equipment, "had turned into something of a torrent."⁵⁷ Contracts for complete production facilities and large plant complexes, some valued as high as a quarter billion dollars, were being negotiated and signed at an unprecedented rate. Peking's goal was to raise output and productivity in a half-dozen basic Chinese industries: petrochemical, power, steel, fertilizer, petroleum, and mining. This important change in Chinese perceptions reflects a somewhat more flexible attitude on the principle of self-reliance. For example:

-
- 55. Edward Neilan and Charles R. Smith, The Future of the China Market: Prospects for Sino-American Trade (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1974), Appendix A.
 - 56. B. A. Williams, "The Chinese Petroleum Industry: Growth and Prospects," U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, China: A Reassessment of the Economy, 1975, pp. 247-250; Chu-yuan Cheng, China's Petroleum Industry: Output, Growth and Export Potential (New York: Praeger, 1976), Ch, 8 & 9.
 - 57. Hans Heymann, Jr. "'Self-Reliance' Revisited: China's Technology Dilemma," in Garth, China's Changing Role in the World Economy, p. 15.

China's longstanding insistence on balancing trade bilaterally and on paying for its current imports with current exports had fallen by the wayside and "deferred payment purchases"--a euphemism for buying on credit--had become the rule rather than the exception. Most significantly, for the first time in more than a dozen years, the PRC was permitting small numbers of foreign technicians to accompany the new plants and remain on site long enough to monitor proper installation and start-up.⁵⁸

These technicians are very selectively classified as "assistants" rather than "advisers," but their admittance reflects a substantial readjustment of the self-reliance image. It may be true, as one scholar maintains, that:

There is little prospect that foreign trade will ever be allowed to play as substantial a role in the Chinese economy as it plays in the West or in the Soviet system. The reason for this is not that China under Socialism wants to be self-sufficient. The trade she is already doing belies that. It is simply that the philosophy of self-reliance, which grew up with the Chinese revolution through several decades before and after the seizure of power, rules out allowing control of any factor vital to the people's livelihood to pass into outside hands.⁵⁹

On the other hand, it is difficult to deny that the intrusion of foreign influences looms once again as a threat. The trend has been a steady and highly visible drift away from past "self-reliance" strictures and dependency-avoidance policies toward a more open, flexible relationship with the outside world. China's behavior at the NIEO conferences at the UN reflect the nature of this dilemma.

58. Ibid.

59. Percy Timberlake, "China as a Trading Nation," World Development, Vol. 3, Nos. 7 & 8 (July-August, 1975), p. 575.

Third, China's perceptions of an NIEO have evolved as a result of her grappling with the imperatives of development and modernization. Chinese perceptions of modernization are, in some ways, not at all new, since by its very definition, modernization means industrialization and economic growth. It means building factories, roads, rail systems, and mines. It means the exploitation of natural resources, energy, technology, and machinery in order to mechanize the work process, automate it if possible, and to increase agricultural yields. It means the search for better health and more education to meet the needs of an increasingly complex and sophisticated economy and technology. As it did in the West, Japan, and the USSR, modernization in China promises to profoundly transform the lives of a largely rural, agricultural population living in a still poor, technologically backward, society.⁶⁰ As one scholar wrote:

Work in China's industry is not all that different than elsewhere. Work in a big steel mill is always hot and sometimes dangerous; work in an auto assembly plant is terribly noisy; work in a mine is dirty and hazardous; and serious health risks can exist in plants making asbestos fibers or producing polyvinyl chloride for plastics. Industry in China, as elsewhere, has a tendency to pollute the air and water. These realities are a part of China's modernization and working-class life, as they were and are for others.⁶¹

60. See, Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post Industrial Society (New York: Basic Books, 1973), pp. 86-99; Jeremy Azrael, Managerial Power and Soviet Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 1-11; John W. Dower (ed.), Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman (New York: Pantheon, 1975), introduction.

61. Stephen Andors, op. cit., p. 241.

From another perspective, China is not the same as other societies. The concept of modernization, the relationship between agriculture and industry, is different from other modern societies. Industrial location, land utilization, and development are all different. Food-growing and distribution are geographically linked with industrial centers. The production of goods and services has become the focus of community life, recreation, education, and residence.⁶²

In China the dissemination of learning and division of labor is perhaps as advanced as anywhere in the West. The Chinese by no means completely reject material incentives in the form of inequality which reflects notions of distributive justice, but emphasize instead the importance of small-group autonomy and the effectiveness of participation and cooperation as substitutes for money. These ideas are very close to the human-relations management theorist in the United States. They have paralleled the most progressive and democratic experiments taking place in various corporations of western Europe.⁶³

The Chinese leadership has emphasized the importance of values, institutions, and distribution of wealth outside

62. See, Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); Carl Riskin, "Surplus and Stagnation in Modern China," in Dwight Perkins (ed.), China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspectives (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 49-64.

63. Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California, 1966), Chap. IV; Dwight H. Perkins, Market Control and Planning in

the factory to support and enlarge the scope of worker participation within it. In the general political ethos and in mass political study campaigns, the thrust of ideas is to transcend personal acquisitiveness and to give meaning to the responsibility of participation. The Chinese have accepted that technical innovation is itself a major goal for workers, and they have provided a way for workers to participate in this vital management problem. What in the West are still essentially short-lived and usually isolated experiments in response to growing and dangerous worker apathy or boredom are, in China, the hopeful condition of everyday life. And though the degree and intensity of these new forms of organization vary widely from place to place and time to time, there can be no doubt that this modernization model is one which the world will have to consistently evaluate.

The Chinese have dealt with such management fundamentals as the nature of planning and economic coordination and the relationship between coordination and factory management that is unprecedented in any modern economy either of the market or the planned type.⁶⁴ By emphasizing the direct influence that methods of planning have on class structure, and in trying to limit the impact and need for bureaucratic administrators divorced from productive labor

Communist China (Cambridge, Mass.: 1966); Joan Robinson, Economic Management, China 1972 (London, 1972).

64. See, National Academy of Sciences, Plant Studies in the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: A Trip Report of the American Plant Studies Delegation, 1975); Dwight Perkins, Market Control and Planning in Communist China (Cambridge, Mass.: 1966), pp. 32-38.

and from the local communities over which they exercise power, the Chinese have made a distinct contribution to what people can perceive as possible in a modern, highly complex and interdependent society. In moving toward production-centered communities where the relationships between industry and agriculture, work and administration, work and residence, and urban and rural, are increasingly close, the Chinese process of modernization and development appears in many ways the reverse of how the concentration of population and the division of social labor proceeded thus far in other modern societies.⁶⁵

In January, 1975, Premier Chou En-Lai's statement to the National People's Congress emphasized that China wants to build a powerful modern Socialist country by the end of this century. This probably encapsulates Chinese objectives in their clearest and most succinct form. The pursuit of this goal requires rapid growth of the economy as a whole; more specifically, it requires rapid industrialization, with particular emphasis not only on military goods but also on those branches of industry that serve as inputs for defense production such as steel, machinery, and energy.

On the other hand, the implementation of these goals to the process of production raises a number of dilemmas

65. Robert Walker (ed.), Modern Technology and Civilization (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), Chapters 1 and 2; see, Elton Mayo, The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization (New York: Macmillan Co., 1933); Bertell Ollman, Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1971).

that have plagued Chinese policy-makers throughout the history of the People's Republic. They also plagued Chinese statesmen and modernizers in the 19th century.⁶⁶ In the contemporary Chinese context the commitment to modern technology has to be reconciled with simultaneous commitments to "walking on two legs" and to the relative importance of being "red" versus "expert."

For China's early modernizers a key conceptual slogan was: "Chinese learning for its fundamental principles and Western learning for its practical use." Within a basic framework one could similarly attribute Mao's value orientation as a counterpart of this slogan. "One could perhaps paraphrase it as 'Marxist-Leninist-Maoist learning (or ideology) for its fundamental principles and modern technology for its practical application.'"⁶⁷ But the dilemmas are there and are reflected in the interpretations and principles associated with the Chinese word yang, which can be translated as "modern, developed, and strong." These are highly desirous goals. "Foreign, alien, and Westernized" are also suggested by yang and may be perceived by the Chinese to mean the restoration of capitalism, revisionism, and a felling of inferiority as compared to technologically more developed economies and societies.⁶⁸

66. Albert Feuerwerker, "The Chinese Economy, 1870-1911," Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies (Ann Arbor, 1969); and "The Chinese Economy, 1912-1949," Michigan Papers No. 1 (Ann Arbor, 1968).

67. Alexander Eckstein, China's Economic Revolution, p. 279.

68. Ibid.

In contrast, t'u may be translated as "native, indigenous" and may be identified with the laborers of China, with the masses, and can be perceived as a positive value. Conversely, t'u may also be perceived as "backward, primitive" and, therefore, a phenomenon to be overcome, to be conquered.

Perceived from this vantage point "experts" are to be prized; but this is coupled with a lingering suspicion that they are expert in "modern" and therefore "foreign" technology. They are divorced from the masses and tend to look down upon the cruder, more backward, and primitive methods used by them. Therefore, in Chinese Communist perceptions there may be some association between "red" and "native" on the one hand and "expert" and "foreign" on the other.⁶⁹

However, the pursuits of power and modernity are not unique to China alone but are shared by many developing countries inculcated with a strong sense of nationalism. On the other hand, the combinations of "power and modernity with a strong commitment to socialist values and to the spirit of self-reliance lends China its peculiar distinctiveness as a development model."⁷⁰

69. Lyman P. Van Slyke, "Culture and Technology," prepared for a conference on Sino-American Relations in Historical and Global Perspectives, Wisconsin, March, 1976.

70. Eckstein, op. cit., p. 280.

Part 3

Chinese Perceptions of NIEO Issues

Chinese Perceptions of International Trade and Development. The member states of the United Nations originally conceived the need for an NIEO as a recognition of the imbalances in terms of trade. A basic requirement for many developing countries is to earn the foreign exchange necessary to pay for imports and service foreign loans. A nation's capacity to earn foreign exchange is highly dependent on its ability to gain access to world markets. On the strength of this reason, the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (May, 1974) stated that all efforts should be made to assume:

improved access to markets in developed countries through the progressive removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers and of restrictive business practices.

The Programme of Action also urged:

implementation, improvement, and enlargement of the generalized system of preferences for exports of agriculture primary commodities, manufactures and semi-manufactures from developing to developed countries and consideration of its extension to commodities, including those which are processed or semi-processed; developing countries which are or will be sharing their existing tariff advantages in some developed countries as the result of the introduction and eventual enlargement of the generalized system of preferences should, as a matter of urgency, be granted new openings in the markets of other developed countries which should offer them export opportunities that at least compensate for the sharing of those advantages.⁷¹

71. On May 1, 1974, the General Assembly adopted a Declaration and a Programme of Action on the Establishment of

At the Sixth Special Assembly Session in 1974, China's Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing explained the basic Chinese perception on international trade:

We hold that international trade should be based on the principles of equality, mutual benefit and the exchange of needed goods. We support the urgent demand of the developing countries to improve trading terms for their raw materials, primary products and semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, to expand their markets and to fix equitable and favourable prices. We support the developing countries in establishing various organizations of raw material exporting countries for a united struggle against colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism.⁷²

In another area of the same speech Mr. Teng argued that even though many Asian, African, and Latin American countries have won political independence, their "economic lifelines" are still controlled by imperialism and colonialism in varying degrees. Meaning, that the "old" economic structure has fundamentally not changed that much. From a Chinese perception, neo-colonialist methods continue to exploit the developing countries. Export capital is brought to developing countries, and then there is constructed a "State within a State," by means of transnational corporations which carry out economic monopoly and political interference. From this monopoly position in international markets, they reap fabulous profits "by raising the export prices of their own products and forcing down those of raw materials from the

a New International Economic Order (Doc. A/9556), as Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI), respectively.

72. UN General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special Session, plenary meeting 2209, April 10, 1974.

developing countries.⁷³

China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, Chou Hua-min, in addressing the Fourth Session of UNCTAD in May, 1976, stated what he considered to be the root of economic relations:

Viewed from international economic relations, the essence of the question of trade and development is a question for the Third World countries to safeguard their sovereignty. . . .⁷⁴

At the earlier Sixth Special Session in 1974, the Chinese were quite aware of the huge trade deficits and balance of payments problems in most industrial capitalist countries, and following this meeting they released the following statistics:

The US foreign trade deficit in the first eight months exceeded 2,100 million dollars and its balance of payments deficit in the first half of the year totaled 7,200 million dollars, almost equaling the total 1973 balance of payments deficit of 7,700 million dollars. . . . Japan had its first mammoth foreign trade deficit of 5,240 million dollars last year. . . . The trade situation in Britain and Italy is even worse; France's 1974 trade balance has stayed in the red month after month. . . .⁷⁵

Since most of the major capitalist countries are affected by economic difficulties at the same time, there is not much room for them to shift the burdens of crisis onto each other, so they look toward the developing countries to

73. Ibid.

74. Proceedings of the United Nations Council on Trade and Development, Fourth Session, Nairobi, 5-31/5/1976, Vol. II (TD 218).

75. Peking Review, No. 44, November 1, 1974.

help alleviate their problems in the form of exploitation. And as the Chinese continue to repeat, the sovereignty of many developing countries is being undermined in spite of UN efforts.

According to the Chinese, this undermining of sovereignty was quite evident at the Sixth Special Session. The Chinese point to the efforts used to negate the series of basic principles regarding "nationalization" on the one hand and the "other Superpowers'" deceptive talk about using the resources released from the progress of disarmament for development. These "multifarious tricks," the Chinese maintain, have gone bankrupt one after another.

"Indeed, they are in a deplorable plight: 'Flowers fall off' do what one may."⁷⁶

At the conclusion of the Sixth Special Session, China supported the two documents, the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the Programme of Action, mainly since they appear to basically reflect the sincere demands and propositions of the Third World. Two members of the Chinese delegation explained China's support for the two documents in relation to its emphasis on international trade issues:

The Declaration sets forth a series of correct principles guiding the new order, such as affirmation of the permanent sovereignty of

76. UN General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special Session, plenary meeting 2229, May 1, 1974.

every State over its natural resources and all its economic activities. This includes control over transnational corporations, up to and including nationalization, and changing the existing irrational relationship between export commodities of the developing and developed countries.

A primary method for developing countries to secure the needed foreign exchange is to obtain reimbursement from the monies derived by developed countries from customs duties and taxes applied to their exports. The Programme of Action on the Establishment of NIEO maintained that:

When the importing developed countries derive receipts from customs duties, taxes and other protective measures applied to imports of these products, consideration should be given to the claim of the developing countries that these receipts should be reimbursed in full to the exporting developing countries or devoted to providing additional resources to meet their development needs.⁷⁷

By September, 1975, the Seventh Special Session on Development and International Economic Cooperation adopted a resolution that stipulated:

Developed countries should take effective steps within the framework of multilateral trade negotiations for the reduction or removal, where feasible and appropriate, of non-tariff barriers affecting the products of export interest to developing countries on a differential and more favourable basis for developing countries.⁷⁸

Within this context, the Chinese agreed that international trade should be based on mutually beneficial exchanges of needed goods. But since these conditions do not

77. UN Doc. A/9556.

78. UN Doc. A/Res/3361, 3362 (S-VII), collected in document A/10311 (GAOR, 7th Spec. Sess., Suppl. No. 1).

exist, the Chinese supported the developing countries in establishing various associations of raw material-exporting countries for a "United Struggle" against any type of monopoly. And in particular, China agreed with the means to implement changes in the form of the integrated program for commodities.⁷⁹

At the Seventh Special Session in 1975, Mr. Li of the Chinese delegation supported one of the most controversial means by which the developing countries could readdress the inequities of the terms of trade. In general, he gave China's support of a demand for fair and equitable links between the prices of export commodities and those of commodities imported from the developed countries, and more specifically, for the "indexation" of prices.⁸⁰

From the Chinese perception, this support is in line with reasonable demands to:

improve trade terms for their developing countries raw materials, primary products, semi-manufactured and manufactured goods, expand their markets, fix equitable and favourable prices and increase their export earnings.⁸¹

Within the context of the historical instability of commodity prices and its effect on developing countries, the original objective of the NIEO at the UN was an integrated

79. See, Trade and Development Board Official Records, Fourteenth Session, First Part, Annexes, agenda item 4(b), Doc. TD/B, 498.

80. UN General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Special Session, plenary meeting 2329, September 2, 1975.

81. Ibid.

approach to commodities. The Programme of Action on the NIEO called for the "preparation of an overall integrated program, setting out guidelines and taking into account the current work in this field, for a comprehensive range of commodities of export interest to developing countries."⁸²

Developing countries' key demands in the area of commodities, therefore, as (1) the creation of an overall program (arrangements, guidelines on commodities) which will improve market structures and lead, ideally, to (2) stable, remunerative, and equitable prices. The creation of buffer stock through producers' associations is concerned with the first of these demands, and the idea of indexing Third World export prices to tie them to the prices of the manufactured and capital exports of the developed countries is addressed to the second.

The Chinese argue that the facts speak for themselves, and have shown that these programs are necessary due to huge investments of US interests in developing countries resulting in fabulous profits, and the USSR's plundering of Third World strategic raw materials and farm products.

Statistics show that from 1951 to 1972, such exchange of unequal values caused the Third World countries a loss of 122,269 million dollars, or 51,469 million dollars more than the total value of the exports of Asian, African and Latin American countries. . . . In the 16 years ending in 1973, the US registered a surplus of 28,100 million dollars in trading with

82. UN General Assembly, Resolutions adopted by the GA, Sixth Special Session, Resolution 3202 (S-VI), Order A/9556.

developing countries; the favourable balance of trade with the Soviet Union also steadily increased.⁸³

The Programme of Action on the NIEO (May, 1974) had called for three methods to redress imbalances in trade; number one, it called for the setting up of buffer stocks:

Within the framework of commodity arrangements and their financing by international financial institutions, wherever necessary, by the developed countries and, when they are able to do so, by the developing countries, with the aim of favouring the producer developing and consumer developing countries and of contributing to the expansion of world trade as a whole.⁸⁴

In other words, the Programme of Action requested that buffer stocks be financed by, in order of priority, (1) international financial institutions, (2) developed countries, and (3) developing countries. By the Seventh Special Session in 1975 only the first of these sources was mentioned.

The Programme of Action on the NIEO (May, 1974) had called for, number two, producers' associations, which would be an organization of primary producers emphasizing the need:

To facilitate the functioning and to further the aims of producers' associations, including their joint marketing arrangements, orderly commodity trading, improvement in the export income of producing developing countries and in their terms of trade, and sustained growth of the world economy for the benefit of all.⁸⁵

83. Peking Review, No. 38, September 19, 1975, p. 19.

84. UN Doc., A/9566.

85. Ibid.

This right of primary producers to form a united front for conducting negotiations vis-a-vis the developed countries received further recognition in the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation (March, 1976). In this connection the Lima Declaration affirmed that:

the developing countries must consider all possible means strengthening the action of producers' associations already established, encourage the creation of other associations for the principal commodities exported by them, and establish a mechanism for consultation and cooperation among the various producers' associations . . . as a precaution against any economic or other form of aggression.⁸⁶

The Lima Declaration further emphasized that the creation of such primary producers' associations serves to contribute to a steady growth of the world economy and the acceleration of the development of Third World countries. The establishment of producers' associations is intended to "put an end to speculative practices and erratic movements in prices harmful to the harmonious development of world trade and the growth of the developing countries."

The Programme of Action on the NIEO (May, 1974) had called for number three, indexation. This is another aspect of the integrated approach to commodities which assures an equitable relationship between the prices of the exports and of the imports of developing countries. The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order maintained that a new economic order should be founded on

86. UN Doc., A/31/197, September 8, 1976, A/S.F/E.

full respect for the principle of:

Just and equitable relationships between the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactured capital goods and equipment imported by them with the aid of bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfactory terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy.⁸⁷

The idea of "indexation" is, in effect, a proposal that ways and means be found of preventing or compensating for declines in the real prices of the commodity exports of developing countries from agreed base levels of these prices. Prevention of a decline in the real price of the commodity in money terms would have to rise from its base level at a rate not less than the rate of increase in an index of the prices of goods imported by the countries exporting the commodity, or in some other index of world inflation. Such an approach is what the Secretariat has called in its earlier studies on the subject, "direct indexation."⁸⁸

On December 31, 1974, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD issued another report on indexation with the main theme dealing with a general policy of indexation which would be coordinated with other international approaches to the problems of commodity trade, and in particular with the proposed integrated program for commodities. The report asserted that:

87. UN Doc. A/9556.

88. Report of the Secretary-General, UNCTAD, July 7, 1975 (TD/B/563).

unless producers alone can adopt coordinated policies for market management . . . the administration of an indexation scheme could be carried out only under some form of internationally concerted arrangements, such as those proposed as the principal approaches in the context of an integrated programme-stocking policies, multilateral commitments in commodity trade and compensatory financing.⁸⁹

The report noted that compensatory financing was referred to as indirect indexation in the Secretariat's earlier study on indexation. Payments under an international scheme of this kind (financial transfers related to shortfalls in the market prices of individual commodities from indexed reference levels) are analogous to the type of income support system for farmers employed in some developed countries. These payments are made in only one direction, from governments to farmers, there normally being no restitution in the reverse direction. This contrasts with an international system of indirect indexation, where there might need to be provision for full or partial restitution by commodity exporting countries of a "deficiency" payments already received. This would be applied only if the market price of the commodity concerned exceeded its reference level. Under such a system, if the market price of a commodity showed the same trend as the reference price, payments and restitutions would tend to cancel out over the years. If the market price deteriorated in real terms, there would be a net flow of compensatory payments to exporting countries.

89. UN Doc., TD/B/C.1/168.

In October, 1975, the Secretary-General of UNCTAD set out four proposals for the establishment of an integrated program:

The establishment of a common fund for the financing of international stocks;

The setting up of a common fund for the financing of commodity stocks;

The negotiation of other measures necessary for the attainment of the objectives of the programme within the framework of international commodity agreements;

Improved compensatory financing for the maintenance of stability in export earnings.⁹⁰

Of these four proposals, the core of the program was the common fund and the international stocking policies. In May, 1976, UNCTAD Resolution 93, "Integrated Programme for Commodities" also emphasized the common fund and international stocking policies. The basic objective of the 1976 resolution was the achievement of stabilization of commodity prices at levels which would be remunerative and just to producers and equitable to consumers. It was hoped that such prices would promote equilibrium between supply and demand within an expanding commodity trade.

At the Seventh Special Session in 1975, Mr. Huang Hua stated that China supported the resolution adopted by the session and perceived the document basically to reflect some of the "just propositions and reasonable demands of the developing countries in the fields of international

90. UN Doc., TD/B/C.1/193.

economics and trade."⁹¹ He stated that:

The document has correctly pointed out that the Declaration and the Programme of Action adopted by the Sixth Special Session . . . and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States lay down the foundations for the new international economic order. . . . To implement the basic principles of the resolutions of the Sixth Special Session, the document has formulated certain guidelines for action and concrete measures in the fields of international trade, the transfer of real resources, the reform of the international monetary system, science and technology, industrialization, food and agriculture, etc.⁹²

And most important, Mr. Huang went on to stress that the document has confirmed:

the principle of formulating an integrated programme for commodities and the indexation of prices, which are aimed at improving the terms of trade of the developing countries and stabilizing and increasing their export earnings. It requests the adoption of measures required to implement the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action adopted at the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO).⁹³

To the Chinese these measures are essentially needed because of price differentials between raw materials and manufactured goods. This occurs when industrial countries exploit the Third World countries by exchange of unequal values through buying cheap and selling dear.⁹⁴ The Chinese point

91. UN General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Special Session, plenary meeting 2349, September 16, 1975.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. UN Doc., Economic and Social Council Official Records, Fifty-Seventh Session, 1907th meeting, July 9, 1974.

to statistics of UNCTAD, showing that prices of primary products exported by developing countries (not including fuel) went down 56% in April, 1975, as compared with the same period of the prior year.

Copper prices on the London international market dropped from 1,268 pounds to 561 pounds per metric ton. The price of Philippine copper was down to 287 U.S. dollars per metric ton from 700 dollars. West Africa's palm oil fell from 1,455 U.S. dollars to 444 dollars per metric ton. Prices of other major commodities, such as palm core, natural rubber, cotton, wool, cocoa, coffee, sugar and coconut oil, all dropped drastically.⁹⁵

On the other side of the development coin, prices of manufactured goods continue in an upward inflationary direction. The Chinese have referred to the UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics that shows that the price index (taking 1950 as 100) of industrial goods exported by developed countries to developing countries climbed to 193 in 1973 and to 230 in 1974. The Chinese note that prices of goods, large quantities of which are needed by developing countries, went up even more sharply. Based on reports from Southeast Asia, prices of chemical fertilizers rose over 100% in June, 1974, against the same period of the previous year; steel, 65%; metal ware, 51%; and machinery, 33%. In reference to the International Financial Statistics of the International Monetary Fund, the Chinese point out that in 1974 the developing countries paid 23,000 million US dollars more for

95. Peking Review, No. 39, September 26, 1975, p. 22.

imports from developed countries as a result of price hikes.

In summation, the Chinese perceive trading relationships between the Superpowers and developing countries to be one based on the exchange of unequal values that can only be redressed by implementation of the Programme of Action.

The Chinese have accused the Superpowers of exploiting the developing countries by dumping commodities. This is accomplished by boosting exports and restricting imports, and according to the International Monetary Fund, the US exports to developing countries came to 31,700 million dollars in 1974, or 57% more than in 1973. The Chinese refer to statistics of the US Department of Commerce which show that the favorable balance of trade with developing countries in Latin America and Asia reached 3,200 million US dollars in the first half of 1975. This would be five times the 600 million dollars in the same period of 1974.⁹⁶

The Chinese have accused the Soviet Union of continual dumping of manufactured goods on developing country markets. And, in reference to the "Soviet Economic Gazette," Soviet exports to Third World countries in 1974 were valued at 4,620 million US dollars, approximately 630 million more than in 1973. As a result, the Chinese claims that the USSR had a 1974 favorable balance of 1,360 million dollars.⁹⁷

96. IMF, International Financial Statistics, Vol. 5, No. I 61.

97. Peking Review, No. 39, p. 22.

The perceptions from developing countries take on a different picture. In reference to "International Financial Statistics," the Chinese point out that Third World countries' exports for 1974 did not conform to the 1950 level, even including the increased exports of the OPEC members included. Excluding the petroleum exporting countries, developing countries' exports would account for a mere 12.4% of the world's total. And to account for the disastrous balance of payment problems, these developing countries' imports in 1974 increased by 79% over 1973.⁹⁸

After nearly a dozen interviews with representatives from the Group of 77, the perceptions of the Group with reference to the NIEO can be summarized as follows:

One of our most important concerns is the rise of protectionism. In the past protectionist policies were designed to provide protection for one developed country against another developed state. It now appears to be directed against us developing countries. Quantitative restrictions applied by most developed countries to imports of manufacturers from the developing countries are three times heavier than those applied to the imports from other developed countries.

The magnitude of the situation is reflected in the 1976/77 GAT report, which maintains that some of the export industries in developing countries are critically affected by protectionist policies since protectionism directly affects their ability to repay foreign debts.

The cyclical fluctuating nature of commodity prices does not allow for stabilization of the economy of any developing country. To make matters unbearable, even when commodity prices decline, prices of consumer goods continue to increase. A very serious problem with negative future implication is the discouragement by developed

98. Ibid.

countries, through the use of tariff and non-tariff barriers, of the processing of primary products in producing developing countries.

In May of 1976, 153 UNCTAD Member states met in Nairobi, Kenya, to discuss the implementation of the Declaration on the Establishment of an NIEO and the Programme of Action adopted at the Sixth Special Session. At this meeting the head of the Chinese delegation, Chou Hua-min, articulated China's most concise perceptions on international trade issues:

We hold that international trade should be based on equality and mutual benefit and exchange of needed goods to make up each other's wants. We support the righteous action of the developing countries in setting up and expanding raw material producing organizations and waging united struggle in order to safeguard state sovereignty and economic rights and interests; we support their reasonable proposition on an integrated programme for commodities and price indexations; and will hope that the current decision of the conference will reach position decision on the integrated programme for commodities. We are opposed to attempts to replace the commodity agreements or medium- and long-term contracts. We support the just demand of the Manila Programme of Action that an agreement should be reached at the Fourth Session of UNCTAD on a comprehensive strategy for manufacturers and semi-manufacturers to expand and diversify the export trade and non-tariff barriers and restrictive business practices, enable the developing countries to expand markets and secure remunerative prices, stabilize and increase export earnings. We firmly oppose imperialism, particularly the Superpowers, in using international trade as a means of control and plunder.⁹⁹

99. Proceedings of the United Nations Council on Trade and Development, Fourth Session, Nairobi, 5-31/5/1976, Vol. II (TD 218).

Perceptions of International Aid and Assistance

The member states of the United Nations originally formulated the UN NIEO development assistance targets in October, 1970. At that time the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade (2626-XXV) set a development assistance target of 0.7% of the gross national product of developed countries:

Each economically advanced country will progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7 percent of its gross national product at market prices by the middle of the Decade.¹⁰⁰

Speaking before ECOSOC in 1975, Chinese representative, Mr. Chang Hsien-wu, made it clear that the International Development Strategy for Second United Nations Development Decade had been "worked out five years earlier when China could not participate in the discussions." He went on to say that "it was quite clear now that the strategy failed to give full expression to the requirements of the international situation and the desires of the Third World countries." But he claimed that the PRC has supported the proposal of the Group of 77 for the revision of the strategy in conformity with the "Declaration and Programme of Action (E/5693), Annex IX" and endorsed the correct principles and reasonable proposals put forward by the Group of 77 for the mid-term review and appraisal.¹⁰¹

100. UN Doc., A/2626, Vol. XXV, October 24, 1970.

101. UN Doc., Economic and Social Council Official Records, Fifty-ninth Session, 1957th meeting, July 4, 1975.

The thrust of this second International Development Strategy was toward financial assistance programs that in principle would allow for no-strings-attached aid for recipients on a long-term and continuing basis. The Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order urged the implementation of financial resources transfers to developing countries. It also urged an increase in the official component of the net amount of financial resource transfers to developing countries so as to meet and even exceed the target of the strategy.¹⁰²

The first speaker on the agenda at the Sixth Special Session in 1974 was President of the Council of Ministers of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Houari Boumediene, whose statements on aid and assistance set the tone for aid strategy:

All the initiatives taken with a view to providing a solution to the problem of development have met with universally recognized failure, since, at best, they are palliatives rather than concrete solutions.

Development aid, such as it has been conceived, doled out and applied over the decades of development--aid that has been derisory and, what is more, never completely materialized--is in marked contrast to another form of aid, the Marshall Plan.¹⁰³

Mr. Boumediene used the Marshall Plan as a prototype, which he perceived to have been conceived within the

102. United Nations General Assembly, Resolutions adopted by the GA, Sixth Special Session, Resolutions 3202 (S-VI), Order A/9556.

103. United Nations General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special Session, Plenary Meeting 2208, April 10, 1974.

framework of a "politico-military alliance" in the context of the cold war. Aid, which was granted by one developed country for the benefit of other developed countries, and "ninetenths of which consisted of grants, amounted to 3% of the gross national product of the United States of America." That aid, he maintained, was quickly put in effect, which "shows that in the developed countries financial means can be readily mobilized when there exists the political will to do so." But, what normally occurs, development occurs at the slowest rate in "those countries that stand in the greatest need of it."¹⁰⁴

In another part of his speech he reflected the perceptions of most UN member delegates:

. . . the aid of the international community, based fundamentally on the financial, technological and commercial contributions of the rich and developed countries to those whose development is to be promoted, must be mobilized in a massive expression of solidarity among peoples.¹⁰⁵

Chinese representative Chang Ping-tsien addressed the UN Policy and Programme Coordination Committee meeting in Geneva in 1975 and pointed out that many of the UN multilateral assistance policies and regulations had been formulated years earlier; and due to the reality of changing times, UNDP and other organizations "should make fundamental changes in their aid policies" in accordance with the basic principles laid down by the UN in 1974.¹⁰⁶ New activities

104. Ibid.

105. Ibid.

106. UN Doc. Economic and Social Council, Fifty-ninth Session, E/AC. 24/SR. 564.

would enable the developing countries to evolve "independent national economies and make a due contribution to the establishment of an NIEO."¹⁰⁷

Mr. Chang suggested that useful proposals for reforming the work of the UN assistance system have been put forward, but largely ignored. In addition, UNDP and other organizations should respect the sovereignty and independence of recipient countries, refrain from interfering in their internal affairs, and allow the recipients a choice in the selection of experts, equipment, and recruitment of personnel. He argued, that from the organizational standpoint: "The unfair allocation of memberships in the Governing Council of UNDP and the irrational regulations in existing aid policies and procedures should be changed as soon as possible. . . ."

Furthermore, the Chinese supported the justifiable desire of many developing countries to develop their natural resources:

With help from the UN Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, while relying mainly on their own efforts. The Fund must provide practical aid to the developing countries. . . .

The operational procedures and administrative arrangements approved by the Governing Council at its twentieth session did not conform to that principle. . . .

For instance, having granted the Fund the right to prospect for minerals, the recipient country was required to repay the Fund 2 per cent of the gross sales value of the minerals for a period of 15 years, or a total amounting to approximately 15 times the Fund's original investment.¹⁰⁸

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

In 1976 the Trade and Development Board of UNCTAD reaffirmed the need for developed countries to meet the 0.7 per cent target for official development assistance (ODA). The resolution urged all developed countries to prevent the volume of their ODA from being affected by budgetary difficulties or balance of payments problems. It suggested that ODA financial resources might be raised by the use of the profits from sales of monetary gold held by the International Monetary Fund.

The resolution made, inter alia, the following recommendations:

Developed countries should jointly study the various proposals made for altering the definition of ODA, including the proposals that development loans with a concessional element of less than 50 percent should be excluded from the definition of such assistance;

Each developed country should use its best endeavors to improve the financial terms of its ODA so as to achieve an overall grant element of at least 90 percent;

An official development assistance loan should, as a general rule, be untied and to that end multilateral arrangements for the reciprocal untying of ODA flows should be worked out as early as possible;

Official development assistance should be provided to recipient countries in the forms most appropriate to their needs;

The 0.7 percent target for official development assistance should be treated as the actual financial flow target and the one percent target for net financial resource transfer should be considered a broad indicator of financial cooperation;

All developed countries should distribute their official development assistance rationally and equitably among developing countries, without prejudice to existing bilateral and multilateral

agreements between developing and developed countries.¹⁰⁹

When interviewed concerning this UNCTAD resolution, a member of the Chinese delegation maintained that China agreed that all developed countries should increase their ODA so as to achieve the target of 0.7 percent of GNP for such assistance as soon as possible, and in any case no later than 1980. But to insure that these ODA flows are predictable:

A development tax should be introduced in the developed countries as a means of raising the required revenues. But, this probability may offer a false hope to the peoples of the Third World, who should never lose sight of the guiding principle of development--self-reliance.

This theme (self-reliance) emerges within almost any discussion, speech, or debate involving the Chinese and the issue of aid and assistance. In fact, the Chinese have maintained a strict policy of self-reliance and are a rare example of a developing country, either historically or in the contemporary world, that is a creditor nation with an excellent credit rating.

At the Seventh Special Session in 1975, "self-reliance" was the major principle stressed by the Chinese during the debates. The Chinese perception of self-reliance was made quite clear when Mr. Li stated:

By self-reliance, we mean that a country should mainly rely on the strength and wisdom of its own people, control its own economic life-lines, make full use of its own resources, work hard,

109. UN Doc., Resolution 150 (XVI), October, 1976.

increase production, practice economy and develop its national economy step by step and in planned way.¹¹⁰

Most importantly, Mr. Li maintained that China was not attempting to impose its own perceptions of how self-reliance should be implemented, but emphasized that each country must rely on its own perceptions:

Each country should make a distinction between different circumstances and determine its own way of practicing self-reliance in the light of its specific conditions. Many developing countries have followed the road of self-reliance in conformity with their own characteristics and conditions and, after making sustained efforts and overcoming all sorts of difficulties, they have achieved gratifying success in developing their national industry and agriculture. . . .¹¹¹

Within the context of the UN aid and assistance program, Mr. Li continued:

Self-reliance in a way implies "self-seclusion" or the rejection of external assistance; it means relying mainly on one's own efforts while taking external assistance as something auxiliary.

Experience has shown that in the development of the national economy it is both beneficial and necessary for countries to carry on economic and technical exchanges on the principles of mutual respect for State sovereignty, equality, and mutual benefit and the exchange of needed goods, thus making up for each other's deficiencies and learning from each other.¹¹²

To the Chinese this principle applies to needed economic cooperation and mutual assistance among developing

110. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meeting 2329, September 2, 1975.

111. Ibid.

112. Ibid.

countries. That is, in this respect, developing countries have "responsibilities they should discharge" to each other, in order to destroy the "old international order and establish a new one."¹¹³

Chou Hua-min, Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade, headed the Chinese delegation to the Fourth Session of the United National Conference on Trade and Development meeting in Kenya in May, 1976. Chinese perceptions on a broad range of aid issues were put forth:

We maintain that, when giving economic aid to the developing countries, the aid-giving countries should strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient countries, attach no conditions, political or military, and ask for no privileges. Any aid rendered should be of genuine help to the recipient countries in their efforts to develop their national economies on the basis of independence and self-reliance. The loans provided to the developing countries should be of low interest or interest-free, and in order to alleviate the debt servicing burden, repayment of loans and servicing of interests should be made deferrable when necessary. We support the just demand of the developing countries for convening a conference or major developed creditor and interested debtor countries to work out measures to solve the debt problems.¹¹⁴

In concluding this section on aid and assistance programs, I was referred by a member of the Chinese delegation to "The Eight Principles of Chinese Aid" that had been articulated by the late Chou En-Lai in January of 1964.

113. Ibid.

114. Proceeding of the United Nations Council of Trade and Development, Fourth Session, Nairobi, 5-31/5/1976, Vol. II (TD 218). See also, UN, Economic and Social Council Official Records, Sixty-first Session, Geneva, meeting 2009, July 1, 1976.

Today they remain the basic Chinese image on the issue of aid and assistance.

In providing economic and technical aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly observes the following eight principles:

First, the Chinese government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries. It never regards such aid as a kind of unilateral alms but as something mutual. Through such aid the friendly new emerging countries gradually develop their own national economy, free themselves from colonial control and strengthen the anti-imperialist forces in the world. This is in itself a tremendous support to China.

Second, in providing aid to other countries, the Chinese government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never asks for any privileges or attaches any conditions.

Third, the Chinese government provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for the repayment so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.

Fourth, in providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China but to help them embark on the road of self-reliance step by step.

Fifth, the Chinese government tries its best to help the recipient countries build projects which require less investment while yielding quicker results, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.

Sixth, the Chinese government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices. If the equipment and material provided by the Chinese government are not up to the agreed specifications and quality, the Chinese government undertakes to replace them.

Seventh, in giving any particular technical assistance, the Chinese government will see to it that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.

Eighth, the experts dispatched by the Chinese government to help in construction in the recipient countries will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country. The Chinese experts are not allowed to make any special demands or enjoy any special amenities.¹¹⁵

Part 4

Summary

A perceptual analysis of Chinese diplomatic behavior within the context of the issue of the New International Economic Order reveals that:

One, China perceives the evolving process of a new world order, and is active in the making of new procedures, new rules, and new structures of international behavior. The Chinese fully supported the Declaration and the Programme of Action adopted by the Sixth Special Session, and stressed that the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties should be utilized as the foundation for the NIEO. To the Chinese, the implementation of the basic principles of the resolutions of the Sixth Special Session would set guidelines for concrete action in such important areas as international trade, the transfer of real resources, the reform of the international monetary system, sharing of science and technology, industrialization, food and agriculture, and so forth. The Chinese have argued that these measures are essentially

115. Peking Review, No. 43, October 25, 1974, p. 17.

needed because of the price differentials between raw materials and manufactured goods, which stems from industrial countries exploiting the Third World by the exchange of unequal values through "buying cheap and selling dear."¹¹⁶

Two, China never perceives herself in the role of a Superpower, and Peking's multilateral diplomacy reflects an image of China that seeks accommodation and patience in achieving her desired goals. Basic to this is China's insistence that all parties (the Superpowers and the UN included) should respect the sovereignty and independence of countries receiving aid in any form, with due respect to internal affairs. The recipient country should be able to exercise a choice in the selection of experts and equipment and recruitment of personnel. According to the Chinese, aid should be interest free whenever possible, and given without any political obligations attached. The Chinese principle of "self-reliance" is quite compatible with Third World perceptions of aid in any form, since basically the aim of any developing country is to control its own destiny. This is a fact of international politics which is often overlooked or not considered in the policy formulations of many industrial countries. Aid programs are conceived and implemented in ways to control, change, or manipulate others, and it is often perceived that the recipient of aid shares similar objective goals. One scholar has argued that:

116. UN, Economic and Social Council Official Records, Fifty-seventh Session, 1907th meeting, July 9, 1974.

Addicted to a naive stimulus-response philosophy, we tend to take it for granted that people's actions depend on nothing but the momentary stimuli they receive, stimuli that we, the manipulators, can control at will. Where this philosophy holds sway, the possibility that conduct might also have other sources is not even taken into consideration. . . .¹¹⁷

Considering that concepts of self-reliance are central to the perceptions of developing countries, the Chinese are even so careful not to impose their own self-reliance theories and practices on developing nations, but expect each country to find its own solution.

Three, the Sino-Soviet conflict is so pervasive and penetrating that it affects China's perceptions of nearly all the crucial issues involving the NIEO. In particular, intense Sino-Soviet disputes have emerged over the general issue of economic development. The USSR, acting in the capacity of a modern industrial state, has actively aided Third World development through large-scale credits, trade, and economic, scientific, and technical assistance. The basic Russian objectives are to formulate support of its foreign policy and to promote a model of Soviet-style socialist development process.¹¹⁸ Even moderate success appears to undermine the Chinese image of what Peking perceives to be a better "development model" for the Third World.

117. Richard Ullman, "Britain and the Russian Civil War," Vol. 1: Intervention and the War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 128.

118. See, Marshall I. Goldman (ed.), "The Soviet Model," Sec. IV, Comparative Economic Systems (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 335-446; Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China (excellent for Soviet model).

The process of economic development has always held special importance for China. Since the early 1950's Chinese economic development has attracted considerable Third World attention and respect. Peking, by stressing that record and the principle of national self-reliance has appealed to the Third World goal of controlling its economic and political destiny. The projection of this image has permitted China to justify its limited foreign aid effort compared to the much larger Soviet Program.¹¹⁹ Peking has attempted to rationalize and legitimize its Third World kinship by articulating such alleged grievances as Superpower exertion, the plundering and exploitation of resources, inequitable terms of trade, foreign control of monetary systems, and other economic weapons that subvert and manipulate recipient states.

While both the PRC and the USSR have supported Third World aims against the developed capitalist states in the UN, there remain deep-seated differences of approach. While the Russians blame Third World backwardness exclusively on Western monopoly capital, the Chinese have condemned all wealthy states and especially the Superpowers without making ideological distinctions. At UN conferences both the PRC and the USSR support Third World sovereignty over resources and the right to control or nationalize foreign properties. But a clear distinction must be made, since Peking is a far

119. Samuel Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the UN," pp. 318-319.

more avid advocate of commodity cartels, reserves, and indexing. It appears that the Russians are more cautious and maintain a different perception of the international economic order. The Russians may perceive the relationship between detente and their own increased dependence upon expanded Western credits and trade, as possibly being jeopardized by recessions or depressions triggered by irresponsible cartels.

An example of Peking's dual criticisms of developed states and the Soviet Union can be gleamed from a speech before the Economic and Social Council. In 1974, following the Sixth Special Session, Chinese delegate Pu Ming took both the United States and Soviet Union to task:

Through monopolistic organizations such as transnational corporations and joint enterprises, the super-powers were plundering the resources and controlling the economic life-lines of other countries, interfering in their affairs, and organizing subversion in them. They applied unfair rates of exchange and charged exorbitant interest. Taking advantage of its special position on international finance, one of the super-powers was transferring its economic and monetary crises to other countries.

The other super-power, which claimed to be a socialist country, plundered and exploited others even more viciously. It acted as the overlord in its so-called "international division of labor" and "integration" on other countries, turning them into its processing plants, sources of raw materials and suppliers of commodities. It used its so-called "aid" to extort privileges and to subject other countries to its control. Using coercion, it sold obsolete and low-quality equipment to "recipient countries" at high prices and made them supply large quantities of raw materials and finished products at low prices in repayment of debts. It made large profits by obtaining raw materials and

manufactured from developing countries cheaply and selling them at high prices on the international market. It was socialist in word and imperialist in deed.¹²⁰

The Soviets often retaliate as they did during the Sixth Special Session responding by accusing "isolated voices" of "shameless demagoguery" and "slandorous fabrications" of the USSR and its policy of peace.¹²¹ In 1975, during the Seventh Special Assembly Session, Moscow was attacked even more strongly for "its social-imperialistic system of exploitation," its neo-colonialism in the Third World, and its opportunistic use of aid to secure privileges and strategic bases.¹²² The Soviets retorted that Peking calls itself a developing country to "lull the vigilance of the developing countries, to enter their ranks, and to use them as a means of achieving hegemony," and warned, "Beware the Greeks, even when they bear gifts."¹²³

While the Third World has welcomed support from both the PRC and USSR, the USSR is often perceived as an affluent white power with worldwide ambitions to promote and interests to protect. If China has occasionally deviated from Third World orthodoxy on national security grounds, there is no evidence that its UN image or Third World relationship has been injured.

120. UN, Official Records, Economic and Social Council, Fifty-seventh session, summary records of plenary meetings, E/SR. 1907, July 9, 1974.

121. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Sixth Special Session, Plenary meeting 2210, April 11, 1974.

122. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Seventh Special Session, Plenary Meeting 2329, September 1, 1975.

123. Ibid, A/PV. 2330, September 3, 1975.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Ideological attitudes, domestic determinants, political culture, economic imperatives, interests, and power are all variables that, in different degrees, influence the formulation of Chinese perceptions of the world around them.¹

However, international issues cannot be meaningfully understood by limiting the analysis to objective factors such as geography, the character of a state's resources, size of population, or even to the nature of the political system. State action does not result from these objective and impersonal entities, but from the ways in which these

-
1. I feel that this conclusion was begun in 1967, since it was then that I first became interested in Chinese perceptions of the world. In attempting to teach my first course on China, I introduced myself and my students to C. P. Fitzgerald's monograph, The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. His purpose was to explain why and how the Chinese felt about themselves and the world around them. But his postscript left the reader with a very tantalizing statement which I have never been able to forget and will be considered in this conclusion: "The Chinese have come to believe through their experiences in the past century that international relations respect is only gained by inspiring fear. A dangerous doctrine, but one which the West was at great pains to teach to China throughout the past 150 years." Another book that ignited my early interest in perceptions was Arnold Toynbee's, The World and the West, printed in 1953.

things are perceived by the decision-makers. The abstract entity we call a state does not act as such. Individuals take action and make decisions in the name of the state. It is how human beings view the situation that determines the outcome of policy decisions. In other words, such variables as natural resources, ideological attitudes, economic imperatives, and political culture are important only inasmuch as how they are mediated by the decision-maker's perceptions of them.

Chinese positions on international politics have placed tremendous stress on two values--"sovereignty and self-reliance." The values of "sovereignty and self-reliance" have reflected China's acute memories of past grievances, as well as China's moral and political commitment to assist in building a conceptual environment conducive to a new egalitarian international system.

In fact, the past impinges very heavily on the Chinese perceptions of the world around them. But not as some scholars have claimed, by the past imperatives of the "Middle Kingdom," the "Tribute System," or the "Confucian hierarchical order"; but as a result of Western, Japanese, and Soviet imperialism. Chinese perceptions are very much influenced by the intrusion of Western imperialism that came from the sea in the 1840's, the Japanese invasion of the 1930's,

-
2. Harold Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity, in A Study of Power (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., 1950), p. 3.

centuries of Russian border acquisitions (China's claim adds up to approximately 900,000 square miles), and last, but not least, the unhappy experiences with the Russians between the 1930's and the 1960's.

These past experiences add up to one important input into the formulation of Chinese perceptions--humiliation, which on the output side of Chinese perceptions can be termed hostility. In fact, it can be argued that Chinese perceptions of the world are still afflicted with the siege mentality of an underdog struggling to survive in a hostile environment. Therefore, in spite of China's ideological and moral commitments to a new world order which is often articulated at the United Nations, Peking still lacks any coherent and systematic strategies of transition. To a large degree this is due to the preoccupation with hostility resulting from recent Chinese experiences, since Western and Japanese imperialism appear to be drafted by the impact of Russian experiences on Chinese perceptions.

Chinese positions on the global issues examined in this study are disproportionately influenced by Peking's hostility toward Moscow. This hostility is the result of differences dealing with contentious geo-political problems, ideology, economic exploitation, cultural disparities, and other numerous conflicts. But from this "perception of hostility" emanates many negative variables that serve as inputs with regard to perceptual formulations and carryovers involving the issues analyzed in this study.

In this study it is argued that the principal world strategy employed currently by Peking involves a "zero-sum game" with the Soviet Union. In terms of political theory, the Soviet Union has become the principal contradiction in Chinese global strategy. When projected throughout the United Nations system, the Sino-Soviet conflict is so pervasive and penetrating that it crucially affects China's perceptions of decolonization, LOS, ACD, and the NIEO.

However, this Sino-Soviet conflictual relationship does not demean China's image among most Third World nations as some scholars have maintained. This is due to the identification of most Third World delegates with the input side of China's attitude--humiliation. This identification with China's psychological weight of the past was expressed consistently during interviews in the corridors of the UN. We may analyze this with reference to the issues.

Analyzing the disarmament (ACD) issue first, we discover a tremendous psychological identification with China, and many Third World nations that is not visible on the surface. Many have written that China's Third World image has been damaged due to her continued nuclear testing and her avoidance of signing the three main instruments of arms control--the Outer Space Treaty, the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and the Seabed Treaty. But, in the hallways of the UN is expressed another perception. It is one that emerges from the same painful experience of the past, a perception that is fed by the humiliation of oppression that has been

so thoroughly expressed by Frantz Fanon. Translated into Third World solidarity with China, a nuclear capacity becomes linked with the Third World's quest for "dignity" and "power."

China's military significance for Third World aspirations extends beyond the influence of Mao's guerrilla war concepts which have influenced Vietnamese, Cubans, and other Third World radical fighters. China's entry into the nuclear club in 1964 created almost as much excitement in Africa and the rest of Asia as did Japan's victory over Russia in 1905. Exactly 40 years after the ecstasy of Japan's victory over Russia, which was perceived by many Afro-Asian nationalists as the most significant victory by a non-white country against a European state in modern history, came the agony of Hiroshima. And almost exactly 20 years after Hiroshima, China exploded its first nuclear bomb. All these events were pregnant with symbolic meaning for Asians and Africans everywhere. In the delegates' lounge at the UN I once heard the joke, "Why is the Third World called the 'Third World'? Because it exploded its nuclear device third."

It has been written that China's continued atmospheric testing results in criticism and outright hostility from environmentally conscious Third World nations. But in fact, Chinese nuclear atmospheric testing has elicited very little Third World criticism. Why is this so?

China's psychological identification with many Third World nations blends quite well with Peking's emphasis on the values of sovereignty and self-reliance. In spite of the

public images projecting opposition to the arms race so often expressed at the UN, an increasing number of countries nourish the ambition of becoming members of the nuclear club. Membership in the nuclear club not only enhances sovereignty and independence, but also allows one to participate in the science of the age. For example, the late President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, in speaking at the foundation-laying ceremony of Ghana's atomic reactor center at Kwambenya, Nkrumah stated:

We must ourselves take part in the pursuit of scientific and technological research as a means of providing the basis for our socialist society. Socialism without science is void.... We have therefore been compelled to enter the field of atomic energy because this already promises to yield the greatest economic source of power since the beginning of man.³

An African delegate, when interviewed on the issue of nuclear proliferation, reminded me that "the five-member elite council of the Security Council was not chosen from among the most peace-loving countries in the world; but on the contrary, they were chosen on the basis of their military strength, representing a "military aristocracy." He stressed that the ultimate symbol of military capability came to be the testing and possessing of nuclear weapons. This is a predicament the Chinese are quite aware of, and speaking before the Assembly, Chinese representative Lai Ya-Li pointed out:

3. See, Ghana Today, Vol. 8, No. 21 (December 16, 1964).

What calls for attention is that for some time the Soviet representative has been nastily propagating the idea that China wants to provoke a world war and that China wishes to see a direct confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and so on and so forth. As is known to all, China is a developing country. Like other Third World countries, we need a favorable international environment in which to build our country. But as the Chinese saying goes, "the trees may prefer calm but the wind will not subside."⁴

The Chinese at the UN continue to express their opposition to the widening gap between the rhetoric of peace and the escalation of the arms race between the Superpowers. Peking has stressed the need to examine the fundamentals of disarmament rather than the technicalities of arms control or deterrence. They have argued that arms control agreements, particularly the 1963 partial test ban treaty, have evolved into a new and more complex round of arms escalation by redefining the rules of the game. The arms race moves from a quantitative to a qualitative dimension. This produces the fear of the inevitability of a nuclear war which then involves all nations.

Within this context of the gravity of the arms build-up dilemma, it should be pointed out that Peking is not opposed to every disarmament issue as a matter of dogma. Chinese positions on this crucial question reflect what must be considered her national security interests. This is evidenced by Peking's support of such measures as the establishment

4. UN, General Assembly Official Records, Plenary Meeting 2394, November 5, 1973. (I placed the underlining for emphasis.)

of nuclear-free-zones around the world, the complete and thorough destruction of chemical and biological weapons, and the banning of any military use of the international sea bed. Peking's repeated pledge to the no-first-use principle may be considered as only symbolic by many. But China stands in striking contrast with the refusal of the nuclear Superpowers at the 1975 NPT review conference to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers, despite the Third World's efforts to secure such a pledge.

Interviews with American and Soviet representatives at the UN reflect displeasure at Peking's refusal to participate in what they perceive to be meaningful alternatives to the present disarmament dilemma. But random sample interviews at the UN reveal a general perception that the Chinese pose no problem nor threat to international peace and security.

Considering the issues of NIEO and LOS, we find a tremendous affinity with Third World aspirations which seek implementing the values of sovereignty and self-reliance stressed by the Chinese. But what must be stressed concerns the linkage between the ACD issue and NIEO and LOS. The perception of hostility projected by Peking toward Moscow, with its underlying ramifications of humiliation, pride, dignity, and a sense of power, is readily understood by most Third World countries. But of crucial importance, pride, power, and dignity expressed through the "barrel of a gun" is only the first step. If sovereignty and self-

reliance are to be realized, the pursuit of disarmament, or even arms control, cannot be separated from the struggle for economic equity in world politics. Power becomes one precondition for an NIEO and an equitable settlement of LOS issues. Power may take the form of a barrel of oil or the barrel of a gun. For example, China may have provided a new aspiration to excel in both productive power and nuclear capacity, but the Arabs have retained the symbolic leadership in the struggle for an NIEO.

Marxist scholars may argue that ideologically Peking's interpretation of power should have relied more on economics than on militarism. The economic determinist assumptions of Marxism are not easily compatible with the Maoist doctrine that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," that is, in its classical Marxist formulations. Perceived in this way, it would be closer to Marxian theory to argue that power resides in the barrel of oil rather than in the barrel of a gun, due to the critical importance of technology and petroleum for modern industry. Putting aside the theoretical inconsistencies between Maoism and classical Marxism, Third World countries perceive power in both military and economic terms, both being needed for leverage and influence.

Aware of this thrust, the Chinese have integrated the principles of the NIEO and the LOS with their own positions on development, and have given their full support to the NIEO and most LOS issues.

On LOS issues the Chinese are rarely interested in

immediate solutions and therefore largely ignore the counting of votes. They perceive the process in terms of a "trend of history" analysis, whereby the Third World will eventually get their "just" share of ocean resources. At LOS conferences the PRC may have strongly opposed Superpower positions on straits, fisheries, and scientific research; but, she was accommodating and supportive when members of Third World delegations became involved with the trade-off game with the industrial nations. China's frequent reference to the sea as the "common heritage of all mankind" was particularly appealing to small and land-locked countries. The Chinese were quite aware that these countries had different perceptions of an LOS. Naval power, scientific research, and straits were of little concern to them. Therefore, the Chinese at times worked closely with these small states whose primary interest was economic rather than military or strategic.

Chinese positions in the various organs, agencies, and committees of the UN system have generally supported most NIEO and LOS conceptual programs. In fact, the issues involving the NIEO and the LOS have emerged as legitimate instruments with which China participates in making new procedures, new rules, and new structures of international behavior.

The major contribution of China's image in relation to NIEO and LOS issues has been the concept of independent and self-reliant development of a country's economy. China's policy

of self-reliance was born in the Red Areas of Kiangsi in the early 1930's as a result of Chiang Kai-shek's economic blockade. By 1945 Mao used the phrase tse li gen sen--literally, "regeneration through our own efforts," to express a policy based on confidence that the masses have boundless creative power. As a policy it depends on the initiative of the people and the sense of responsibility of the grass roots economic units without undue dependence on the State and the central administration.

From China's perception of the world, self-reliance has been presented as a hope for developing countries to liberate their economic philosophies from the exploitive center-generated concept of "interdependence." Through self-reliance developing countries can destroy the self-perpetuating structure of center-periphery and dominance-dependence relations, thereby halting the humiliating process of exchanges of unequal values.

What must be understood is that the Chinese self-reliance concept has not advocated autarchy. It does give developing and less developed (LOC's) countries a strategy with which to rid themselves of center-periphery and dominance-dependence relations. At the same time the concept is flexible enough to allow for cooperation among these very nations, and does not regard all aid in negative terms. Central to the issue is the dominance-dependence aspects of any aid program.

Secondarily, the self-reliance concept is flexible and

productive in recognizing the need for cooperation, cartels, and expanding economic relationships within the Third World. It may also be expanded beyond this Third World periphery, but with the utmost caution. Caution must be exercised, since new patterns of dominance-dependency are always lurking in the shadows.

What is important here is that the self-reliance concept does not exclude a nation from "modernizing." It primarily allows a nation the opportunity to evaluate its economic future in subject terms--will this benefit us? In other words, the potential of economic power must go hand in hand with the potential of dignity. The terms of trade and aid programs must be negotiated within this framework. In the future, what is retained of the self-reliance concept may be primarily psychology--giving one a standard by which to evaluate, particularly since economic self-sufficiency may be an impossible dream found only in the history of past civilizations. If you want to modernize, you must cooperate. But this does not mean that you have to sell your sovereignty and independence.

The foregoing analysis does not infer that everything is compatible between China and her Third World friends. On the contrary, there has been some ambiguities between them in perceptions. For example, appearance may reveal that the Chinese have been advocating nuclear proliferation as a means of matching Superpower hegemony, but in reality, it is the finding here that what the Chinese desire is Third

World acceptance of China's nuclear power in "symbolic" terms only, thereby displacing Third World nuclear ambitions. Non-proliferation for the nuclear have-nots will have no momentum until it is matched by progressive military de-nuclearization among the possessors of nuclear power.

On the NIEO and LOS issues, the Chinese model of self-reliance has at times been somewhat incompatible with Third World ambitions because of its stress on value-oriented, qualitative processes concerned primarily with distributive justice. Some delegates in interviews maintained that the developing countries were more interested in quantitative growth and economic statistics than human welfare. But the linkage between the issues is that progress toward reducing the potential of violence in general, and arms control specifically, cannot be made until it is recognized that they are inseparable from progress towards reducing poverty, dependency, and inequality. Progress on implementation of LOS, NIEO, decolonization, and ACD issues at the UN depend largely on Third World perceptions of the linkages involved among the issues.

There is no denying that development must be perceived within the framework of the existing structural international economic system with all its inequities. But at the same time, development must serve to liberate developing countries from a system which allows exploiters to penetrate deeply into their peripheries, leaving them as a pawn in the global economic system.

Above all, the four issues analyzed in this study may be perceived in psychological dimensions, with the developing countries striving for dignity and power. And within this context, the Chinese model of development--with its emphasis on sovereignty and self-reliance--had become deeply interwoven within the policy goals of many Third World countries attempting to settle problems dealing with the NIEO, LOS, and decolonization issues. Implicit within the concept of sovereignty and self-reliance are values of egalitarianism, anti-hegemonism, populism, anti-racism, and nationalism, which have been so explicitly detailed by Chinese representatives at the UN.

This study has found that China has no desire or ambitions to assume a leadership role with regard to important global issues. As early as 1971, Peking rejected an invitation to join the Group of 77, and suggested that she could be more effective by working outside the Third World group. China has been invited to join the coalition of coastal states in the Third United Nations Conference on the LOS in order to have the sponsorship of a major power. To date, the Chinese have not accepted. On the other hand, the Group of 77 has had a substantial influence on Chinese behavior in the UN. On the ACD issue, the Chinese were persuaded to vote for the establishment of a Special Committee on the World Disarmament Conference at the 27th General Assembly session. In addition, the Chinese ratified the Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and

negotiations with Third World delegates resulted in the Chinese supporting the establishment of NFZ's in the Middle East, Latin America, the Indian Ocean, Africa, and South Asia.

China has declined to play a leadership role within the confines of bloc politics. At the UN there are five unofficial caucusing groups which meet quite frequently to discuss Assembly strategy and problems (Asian; African; Latin American; East European, including USSR; Western European, including US). China may have declined to join the Group of 77 but she has become a member of the Asian group which consists of approximately 36 states. China is the only state represented in the Security Council, but on the basis of years of observation and interviews, she plays a very modest role within the group, "being discreet but helpful, passive but well-prepared, friendly and supportive."

Again, while outside the Group of 77, the PRC nevertheless participates in UNCTAD's negotiation process involving the discussions between the developed and developing countries. Peking merely occupied the vacated ROC seat in UNCTAD in 1972, and since has supported most of the goals of the Third World blocs within UNCTAD, remaining free of many factional and geographical disagreements which arise out of differing perceptions within the Third World.

It appears that China has avoided occupying any leadership role as a matter of policy. No Chinese delegate has ever served as chairman of any committee or subsidiary body throughout the entire UN system. The PRC's public record

at the UN has often been criticized for its preoccupation with the Soviet Union, thereby neglecting to fully address substantive problems needing attention, a primary example being the attack on China during the Angolan debate in the Security Council. But, interviews reveal a behind-the-scene Chinese delegation that is extremely sensitive to Third World positions and opinions. Chinese delegates attempt to work with draft resolutions sponsored by Third World countries, rather than initiating her own, which is rare indeed. With regard to legislative politics, Chinese delegates are not intent on seeing their ideas expressed in the final drafts of documents and resolutions.

China may not play an active leadership role in group politics or any UN committee, but she does actively consult with other delegations on a bilateral basis every year during the Assembly's session. At the same time, it should be pointed out that the majority of these contacts are of a social nature. The Chinese always tend to be polite and informal, and their diplomatic behavior in the halls of the UN has been unique. For example, rarely have representatives of the major powers at the UN been seen socializing in the delegates' lounge, but the Chinese have made it part of their pattern to mingle with other delegates on this informal basis.

Playing down a leadership role is not to argue that the PRC fails to pursue her own interests in the UN system. She is quite vociferous when it appears that her security

is threatened. For example, the Chinese were quite active involving the question of Vietnam and Bangladesh membership, the Korean issue, Cambodia's representation, and the Indo-Pakistan conflict. As reflected in this study, the Chinese have safeguarded their interests on specific ACD issues, the continental shelf dispute involving China's coast, and in the decolonization issue regarding South Africa. In fact, we could conclude on the basis of this study that when Peking perceives its security interest threatened in any manner, China can no longer be linked with any one bloc or group, whether East-West or North-South.

In the Security Council the Chinese are obliged to assume a leadership role since the presidency rotates on a monthly basis, based on Rule 18 of the Provisional Rules of the Security Council. Between 1971 and 1976 the Chinese Ambassador, Huang Hua, served as president four times. Most important, China has maintained that she is not, and will never be, a Superpower. Peking defines a Superpower in behavioral terms. For example, one of the first documents China presented to the UN in 1971 detailed an argument that China was not yet a nuclear power and that its development of nuclear power was solely for defensive purposes--unlike the Superpowers. She has pledged never to be a Superpower, but it must be remembered that the PRC enjoys the privilege of the veto power.

The potential use of the veto power does create some ambiguities for the PRC, even though she has used great

caution in implementing this power. The record indicates that between November, 1971, and December, 1976, China cast only two vetoes. This can be compared with the United States (17), United Kingdom (9), Soviet Union (5), and France (4).⁵ This record of constraint causes me to reflect on some of the apprehensions that were expressed when I conducted random interviews at the UN prior to the PRC's admission in 1971. Many feared the PRC's veto power would be used to disrupt the work of the Council. Between November, 1971, and December, 1976, the Security Council disposed of 158 non-procedural questions, and China cast 46 "non-participations," a practice that the PRC also utilizes in the Assembly. Many delegates interviewed stated that this practice was a major Chinese contribution to the voting procedures of the UN. This practice does allow the PRC a great deal of flexibility, while minimizing her political responsibility.

Basically, the Chinese oppose the use of the Council as a tool to be abused by the Superpowers, since it shows "utter disrespect" for the other State members of the Council.

-
5. The PRC cast her first veto on the Bangladesh membership question on August 25, 1972. When the question arose again in June, 1974, Peking supported it without any reservations. Her second veto was cast on an amendment of a three-power draft resolution on the Middle East question on September 10, 1972. The impact of this second veto was mitigated since others vetoed the same issue; it was on an amendment and not a draft resolution, and the original draft resolution itself was vetoed by the US.

For this reason the PRC opposes consensual decision-making which includes only the US and USSR, excluding the other members of the Council. In other words, the Chinese oppose "secret diplomacy" as part of its principled behavior in the Security Council. However, at the same time the PRC has been criticized for using the Council as a public forum for leveling diatribes against the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, the four issue areas analyzed in this study have tremendous bearing on Chinese self-interest and long-term goals. Overall, the Chinese image among many Third World peoples will depend very much on how Peking handles its diplomacy in southern Africa. This will depend on delicate political relations, trade and aid policies, and power constellations yet to be formed. China's policies in Africa after the decolonization process become a matter of history and will depend to a large extent on how the leadership perceives China's priorities at that time.

China's future international behavior will depend upon how the issues of disarmament, rights to offshore oil, and international trade and finance are resolved. In the long run, a proper or equitable resolution of these issues compatible with the way the Chinese perceive them may be at least as important as what develops concerning Taiwan, Korea, Southeast Asia, and India-Pakistan.

On the other hand, global international stability and an equitable resolution of the issues may well depend on how Sino-Soviet hostilities are resolved. Whatever

institutional framework and procedural means of problem-solving the United Nations formulates to deal with the issues of decolonization (and post-decolonization), LOS, ACD, and NIEO will not facilitate the development of a peaceful planet, unless the Chinese and Russians learn to reduce their hostility and work within the new framework.

At times Chinese perceptions of the Soviet Union are based more on unitary than conjunctive explanations. This is not offered as a value judgment. Even individuals searching for an account of their own behavior prefer unitary explanations to conjunctive explanations. It is mentally much simpler to suppose that as many events as possible are linked to a minimum number of causes. As a result, people (or nations) are slow to perceive accidents, unintended consequences, coincidences, and small causes leading to large effects. To understand this may enable individuals, or nations, to resolve problems before they are transformed into irreparable hostile consequences. Instead, plans, coordinated actions, and conspiracies are perceived. As Robert Jervis has maintained, this is a product not only of a psychological need but also of the "Law of Occam's Razor"--the preference for the parsimonious explanation of the data at hand. This does not ascertain that it is naive or unreasonable to attempt to encompass most of another's behavior under a very few explanations. It merely suggests that often the behavior of others is discovered in hindsight to be the product of more numerous and complex forces than contemporary

observers believed. And most important for this short analysis, the predictions that the highly oversimplified model yields are often misleading.

The important point is that from perceptions--whether accurate or not--flows a great many policy decisions. For example, the US had certain perceptions of China's behavior in 1950. What flowed from these perceptions were variables that influenced decisions the US leadership made concerning Korea and Southeast Asia. From perceptions the Chinese have of the Soviet Union flow many of the decisions affecting the issues analyzed in this study.

It is true that the context of international politics often shapes the content of what may be termed "perceptions of centralization" (meaning that everything appears to be simple, unified, and planned). For example, history shows that an awareness of the implications of anarchy often lead decision-makers to be alert for dangerous plots. Consequently, if another's behavior appears innocuous, decision-makers may perceive a hidden and menacing significance attached to that behavior. In other words, they may not only see plans, but sinister ones. Within society this attitude may be characterized as paranoid. But in the international political arena threats and plots are common occurrences; therefore, the perception that others are "Machiavellian" cannot be easily labeled pathological. Metternich's attitude may be considered pathological by some, as when he heard that the Russian ambassador had died, he inquired, "I wonder why

he did that?" But within the context of international political behavior, the search for a devious motive believed to lurk behind the most seemingly spontaneous behavior is neither rare nor totally unjust.

Contemporary Chinese perceptions of Soviet behavior and intentions may be quite accurate, but this is not the point of the argument. The point is, that if global peace may depend so much on the avoidance of continued Sino-Soviet conflict, then it is important that the "Law of Occam's Razor" not dominate Chinese perceptions. If the precarious nature of global peace and cooperation may depend on the reduction of Sino-Soviet hostility, it may be time for both powers to examine the complex and sometimes confusing nuances of the other's behavior for possibilities of agreement. Some agreement may be found on the peripheral fringes of each other's behavior, with the concomitant hope of a functionalist spillover into the center of each other's perceptions. From the standpoint of international peace, it may be time for Sino-Soviet ping-pong diplomacy. The alternative appears to be increased hostility between these two great peoples, possibly ignited by the implementation of the US "China Card."

APPENDIX A

Table 1. Some "Cognitive Process" Approaches to Decision Making

Decision Maker as ^a	Stage of Decision Making ^b	Theoretical Literature ^a	Illustrative Constructs and Concepts	Illustrative Studies of Political Leaders
Believer	Sources of belief system	Political socialization Personality & politics	First independent political success	Barber (1972) Glad (1966) George and George (1956)
	Content of belief system	Political philosophy Ideology	Mind Set Image Operational code World view Decisional premises	Operational code studies Brecher (1968) Cummins (1973) Stupak (1971) Axelrod (1972b)
	Structure of belief system	Cognitive psychology	Cognitive balance/congruity Cognitive complexity Cognitive rigidity/dogmatism Cognitive "maps"/style	M. Hermann (1972a) Osgood (1959b) Shneidman (1961, 1963, 1969)
Perceiver	Identification of a problem	Psychology of perception	Definition of situation Perception/misperception	Jervis (1968) Jervis (forthcoming, chaps. 5, 11, and 13)
		Cognitive psychology	Cognitive "set" Selective perception Focus on attention Stereotyping	Zinnes (1966) Zinnes et al. (1972)
Information Processor	Obtain information	Cognitive consistency theories	Search capacity Selective exposure	Abelson (1971) Holsti (1967, 1972)
	Production of solutions	Theories of attitude change	Psycho-logic Tolerance of ambiguity	Jervis (forthcoming, chaps. 4 and 6)
	Evaluation of solutions	Information theory Communication theory	Strategies for coping with discrepant information (various) Information overload Information processing capacity Satisficing/maximizing Tolerance of inconsistency	
Decision Maker/Strategist	Selection of a strategy	Game theory	Utility Risk taking	Jervis (1970) Jervis (forthcoming, chap. 3)
		Decision theory Deterrence theory	Decision rules Manipulation of images Ends-means links Bounded rationality	Stassen (1972) Burgess (1967)
Learner	Subsequent learning and revisions (post-decision)	Learning theory	Feedback	Jervis (forthcoming, chap. 14 and unnumbered chap. on "learning from history")
		Cognitive dissonance theory	"Lessons of history"	Lampton (1973) May (1973)

^aColumns one and three were suggested by, but differ somewhat from, the framework provided by Axelrod (1972a).

^bColumn two was drawn from Brim et al. (1962, p. 1).

Axelrod (1972a, 1972b); Bonham and Shapiro (forthcoming a, forthcoming b); Shapiro and Bonham (1973); Steinbruner (1968, 1974)

From Ole R. Holsti, "Foreign Policy Decision Makers," in Rosenau (ed.), Search for Global Patterns, p. 131.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

- Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971.
- Augusto, Joao & Castro, Uraigo. "The U.N. and the Freezing of the International Power Structure," International Organization 26:1 (Winter 1971).
- Bailey, Sidney B. The General Assembly of the United Nations: A Study of Procedure and Practice. New York: Praeger, 1964.
- Ball, George W. Diplomacy for a Crowded World. London: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Black, J. & Thompson, K (eds.). Foreign Policies in a World of Change. New York: Harper & Sons, 1963.
- Briton, J. W. Systems, States, Diplomacy, and Rules. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- Deutsch, K. W. The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control. New York: Free Press, 1963.
- Dahl, Robert. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956.
- Deutsch, K. W. The Analysis of Interactional Relations. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968.
- Diesing, Paul & Synder, Richard. Systems, Bargains, Decisions. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Dougherty, James E. & Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. Contending Theories of International Relations. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971.
- Farrell, Barry R. (ed.). Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966.
- Gordenker, Leon (ed.). The United Nations in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Hanrieder, Wolfran E. Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays. New York: David McKay & Co., 1971.

- Hertz, John. Political Realism and Political Idealism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959.
- Holsti, O. J. International Politics: A Framework for Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975.
- Kay, David A. The United Nations: Past, Present, and Future. New York: The Free Press, 1972.
- Kertesz, S. D. & Fitzsimmons, M. A. (eds.). Diplomacy in a Changing World. South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1959.
- Lan Slyke, Lyman P. "Culture and Technology." Prepared for a Conference on Sino-American Relations in Historical and Global Perspectives. Wisconsin: March, 1976.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." World Politics 21 (January 1969).
- Lowenthal, Richard. World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965.
- Macridis, Roy C. (ed.). Foreign Policy in World Politics. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1976.
- Malraux, Andre. Anti-Memoirs. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1968.
- Modelske, George. A Theory of Foreign Policy. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1961.
- Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1976.
- Osgood, Charles. An Alternative to War or Surrender. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971.
- Pye, Lucias W. Aspects of Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1966.
- Rosenau, James N. (ed.). In Search of Global Patterns. New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1976.
- Rosenau, James, Thompson, Kenneth, & Boyd, Gavin (eds.). World Politics: An Introduction. New York: Free Press, 1976.
- Russel, Ruth B. A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the U.S. 1940-45. Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution, 1958.

- Schwarzenberger, G. Power Politics: A Study of International Society. London: Stevens, 1951.
- Shelling, T. C. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
- Stoessinger, John G. Nations in Darkness: China, Russia, and America. New York: Random House, 1971.
- Stoessinger, John G. The Might of Nations: World Politics in Our Time. New York: Random House, 1965.
- Snyder, Bruck & Sopin, M. (eds.). Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. New York: Free Press, 1962.
- Ullman, Richard. Intervention and the War. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

II. PSYCHOLOGY AND POLITICS

- Allport, Floyd. Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1955.
- Boulding, K. E. The Image. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956.
- Butterfield, Herbert. History and Human Relations. London: Collins Press, 1951.
- Carterett, M. & Friedman, M. (eds.). Handbook of Perception: Historical and Philosophical Roots of Perception. New York: Academic Press, 1974.
- de Rivera, Joseph. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968.
- Fedder, E. H. "Communication and American-Soviet Negotiating Behavior," Background 8 (1964).
- Filloy, Allan C. Interpersonal Conflict. Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foreman & Co., 1975.
- Gorman, Robert. "On the Inadequacies of Non-Philosophical Science: A Critical Analysis of Decision-Making Theory," International Studies Quarterly 14 (Dec. 1970).
- Harvey, O. J. (ed.). Experience, Structure, and Adaptability. New York: Springer, 1966.

- Heider, Fritz. The Psychology of International Relations. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958.
- Herman, Charles F. International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research. New York: Free Press, 1972.
- Holsti, Ole. "Individual Difference in Definition of the Situation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 14 (September 1970).
- Holsti, O. R. "The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study," Journal of Conflict Resolution 6 (1962).
- Ikle, Fred. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper & Row, 1964.
- Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Jervis, Robert. The Logic of Images in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Jervis, Robert. "Hypothesis on Misperception." World Politics 20 (April 1968).
- Jones, Kanovse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, M., & Weiner, M. Attribution: Perceiving the Causes of Behavior. Morristown, N.J.: General Learning Press, 1971.
- Kelman, Herbert C. (ed.). International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.
- Kringer, John & Chan, Steve. "Chinese Crisis Perception and Behavior: A Summary of Findings." Ann Arbor, Michigan. Paper delivered at meeting of the Commentary on Contemporary China, 1976.
- Laing, R. D. & Phillipson, H. Interpersonal Perception. New York: Springer, 1966.
- Lasswell, Harold. A Study of Power. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1950.
- Lindzey, M. & Aronson, T. The Handbook of Social Psychology. Addison-Wesley Co., 1969.
- Mann, Lester. "Perceptual Training: Misdirections and Redirection," American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 40(1) (January 1970).

- Merton, Robert. Social Theory and Social Structures. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957.
- Mullins, Willard A. "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science," American Political Science Review 66(2) (1972).
- Pruitt, Dean & Lewis, Steven. "Development of Integrative Solutions in Bilateral Negotiations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 31 (1975).
- Sawyer, J. & Guetzkaw, M. Bargaining and Negotiations in International Behavior and Social-Psychological Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965.
- Shapiro, M. & Bonham, M. "Cognitive Processes and Foreign Decision Making," International Studies Quarterly 17 (June 1973).
- Tagiuri, M. & Petrullo, T. Perception and Interpersonal Behavior. Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958.
- Thomas, W. I. The Child in America. New York: Alfred Knopf, 1928.
- Thomas, W. I. The Unadjusted Girl. Boston: Ginn, 1923.
- Thomas, John R. "Soviet Behavior in the Quemoy Crisis of 1958," Orbis 6(1) (Spring 1962).
- Von Haller, Gilmer, B. & Deci, Edward. Industrial and Organizational Psychology. New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1977.
- Warr, P. B. & Knapper, C. The Perception of People and Events. New York: Wiley & Sons, 1968.

III. CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY

- Barnett, A. Doak. Communist China and Asia: A Challenge to American Policy. New York: Random House, 1960.
- Belden, Jack. China Shakes the World. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972.
- Choudhury, G. W. Chinese Perceptions of the World. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1977.
- Chun-tu, Hsueh. Dimensions of China's Foreign Relations. New York: Praeger, 1977.

- Cohen, Jerome. "Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law and Our Own," Proc. American Soc. Int'l. Law (April 1967).
- Cohen, J. & Chiu, H. People's China and International Law: A Documentary Study. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Dial, Roger (ed.). Advancing and Contending Approaches to the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy. Halifax, Canada: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University, 1974.
- Elvin, Mark. The Pattern of the Chinese Past. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Fairbank, John King. Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968.
- Hinton, Harold C. Communist China in World Politics. New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966.
- Hinton, William. "Chou En-Lai," New China 1(4) (January 1976).
- Hsieh, A. L. The Significance of Chinese Communist Treatment of Khrushchev's January 14 Speech on Strategy. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1960.
- Hsiung, James Chieh. Law and Policy in China's Foreign Relations: A Study of Attitudes and Practices. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.
- Fitzgerald, C. P. The Chinese View of Their Place in the World. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
- Griffith, E. The Sino-Soviet Rift. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
- Halpern, A. M. "The Foreign Policy Uses of the Chinese Revolutionary Model," China Quarterly 7 (July-September 1961), 1-16.
- Halprin, Morton. "The Cultural Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policies," Current Scene 6(13) (August 1968), 1-15.
- Halperin, Abraham. "China in the Postwar World," China Quarterly 21 (January-March, 1965).
- Hellman, Donald. China and Japan: Balance of Power. Toronto: Lexington Co., 1976.

- Kim, Samuel S. "Behavioral Dimensions of Chinese Multilateral Diplomacy," China Quarterly 72 (December, 1977).
- Kim, Samuel S. "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis," World Politics 6(3) (April, 1974).
- Kim, Samuel S. The Maoist Image of World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Center for International Studies (Occasional Paper No. 5), 1977.
- Lawrence, Alan. China's Foreign Relations Since 1949. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975.
- London, Kurt (ed.). Unity and Contradition: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations. New York: Praeger, 1962.
- Michael, Franz & Taylor, George. The Far East in the Modern World. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. "The Vietnam Crisis and China," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1965).
- Robinson, Thomas W. The Sino-Soviet Border Situation, 1969-1975: Military, Diplomatic and Political Maneuvering. Hudson Institute: HI-2364, RR, 1975.
- Robinson, Thomas W. "The View from Peking: China's Policies Towards the United State, the Soviet Union and Japan," Pacific Affairs (January 1969).
- Schram, Stuart. Chairman Mao Talks to the People. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
- Shao-Chuan Leng & Hung Dah Chiu (eds.). Law in Chinese Foreign Policy: Communist China and Selected Problems of International Law. New York: Oceana Publications, 1972.
- Steiner, H. Arthur. "The Mainsprings of Chinese Foreign Policy," American Journal of International Law 54(1) (January 1950).
- Tang, Tsou. China in Crisis, Vol. 2. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- Van Ness, Peter. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy. Calif.: University of California Press, 1971.
- Weng, Bryon S. J. Peking's UN Policy: Continuity and Change. New York: Praeger, 1972.
- Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1975.

Whiting, Allen. "'Contradictions' in the Moscow-Peking Axis," Journal of Politics 20 (February 1968).

Whiting, Allen. China Crosses the Yalu. New York: Praeger, 1960.

Young, Kenneth T. Negotiating with the Chinese Communists: The United States Experience, 1953-67. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968.

Zagoria, Donald. The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961. New York: Antheneum, 1964.

Zagoria, Donald S. "Asia," Survey 54 (January, 1965).

IV. AFRICA AND DECOLONIZATION

Adic, W. A. "China Returns to Africa," Current Scene (August 1972).

Dunn, John. Modern Revolution: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon. London: Cambridge University Press, 1972.

Galtung, Johar. "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," The African Review 1(4) (April 1972).

Imfeld, Al. China as a Model of Development. New York: Oris Books, 1976.

Kay, David. "The Politics of Decolonization: The New Nation and the United Nations Political Processes," International Organization 21(4) (Autumn 1967)

Klatt, Werner. The Chinese Model. Hong Kong: University Press, 1965.

Larkin, Bruce. China and Africa, 1949-1970: The Foreign Policy of China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Lessing, Peter. "Moscow Fights Peking in Africa," Sunday Telegraph, March 25, 1962.

Marcum, John A. "Lessons of Angola," Foreign Affairs 54 (April 1976).

McDougal, Myres S. and Reibman, Michael. "Rhodesia and the UN: The Lawfulness of International Concern," The American Journal of International Law (January 1969).

- Newhauser, Charles. Third World Politics: China and the African-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, 1957-67. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969.
- Ogansanwo, Alaba. China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71. London: Cambridge University Press, 1974.
- Sady, Emil J. The UN and Dependent Peoples. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1956.
- Scalapino, Robert A. "Africa and Peking's United Front," Current Scene 3(26) (September 1965).
- Simmonds, J. D. China's World: The Foreign Policy of a Developing State. New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1970.
- Yu, George T. "Peking's African Diplomacy," Problems of Communism (March-April 1972).

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

- Antrim, Nyhort. A Cost Model of Deep Mining and Associated Regulatory Issues. Boston: M.I.T. Press, 1978.
- Bowett, D. W. The Law of the Sea. England: Manchester University Press, 1967.
- Chang Chung. "Peiping Petroleum Industry: Growth and Future Development," Issues and Studies 10(8) (May 1974).
- Cheng Tao. "Communist China and the Law of the Sea," American Journal of International Law 47 (January 1969).
- Christy, Francis T. (ed.). Law of the Sea: Caracas and Beyond. New York: Bellinger Press, 1974.
- Choon-Ho Park. "The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of a 200-Mile Economic Zone," The Harvard International Law Journal (Winter 1975).
- Choon-Ho Park, & Cohen, Jerome. "The Politics of Chinese Oil Weapon," Foreign Policy 20 (Fall 1975).
- Choon-Ho Park. "Oil Under Troubled Waters: the Northeast Asia Seabed Controversy," Harvard International Law Journal 212 (1973).
- Cooper, John F. "Peking on the Law of the Sea Conference," China Report 11(1) (January-February 1975).

- Conzaga, Lee. "A Shot in the Arm for Philippine Oil Research," Far Eastern Economic Reviews (August 1976).
- Dewenter, John R. "The East China and Yellow Seas," United States Naval Institute Proceedings (May 1975).
- Dubner, Barry Hart. The Law of Territorial Waters of Mid-Ocean Archipelagoes and Archipelagic States. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.
- Duprey, Rene-Jean. The Law of the Sea, Current Problems. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceanic Pub. Inc., 1974.
- Franck, Thomas & Aron, G. "The New Poor: Landlocked, Shelflocked and Other Geographically Disadvantaged States," NYU Law Review 7 (Spring 1974).
- Friedheim, Robert L. "The 'Satisfied' and 'Dissatisfied' States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study," World Politics 18(1) (October 1965).
- Friedheim, Robert & Kadane, Joseph. "Ocean Science in the U.N. Political Arena," Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 3(3) (April 1972).
- Glassner, Martin I. Access to the Sea for Developing Landlocked States. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- Goodstadt, Leo. "Oil Provides China's Solution," Far Eastern Economic Review 13 (December 1974).
- Grotius, Hugo. The Freedom of the Seas. London: Oxford University Press, 1916.
- Hargrove, John. Who Protects the Ocean? St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1976.
- Harrison, Selig. "Time Bomb in East Asia," Foreign Policy 20 (Fall 1975).
- Henkin, Louis. Law of the Sea's Mineral Resources. New York: Columbia University Institute for the Study of Science in Human Affairs, 1968.
- Hollich, Ann. "What to Expect from a Sea Treaty," Foreign Affairs 18 (1975).
- Hung Dah Chiu & Park Choon-Ho. "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratley Islands," Ocean Development and International Law 3(1) (August, 1975).
- Johnston, D. (ed.). Marine Policy and the Coastal Community. London: Croon Helm, 1976.

- Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea, 'Dangerous Ground' for Asian Peace," Asian Survey 27(12) (December 1977).
- Lauard, Even. The Control of the Sea-bed: Who Owns the Resources of the Ocean? London: William Heineman, Ltd., 1974.
- Logue, John J. (ed.), The Fate of the Oceans. Philadelphia: Villanova University Press, 1971.
- Miles, Edward & Gamble, John. Law of the Sea: Conference Outcomes and Problems of Implementation. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Pub. Co., 1975.
- Rao, Screenirasa. The Public Order of Ocean Resources: A Critique of the Contemporary Law of the Sea. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1975.
- Schacter, Oscar. Sharing the World's Resources. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977.
- Swing, John. "Who Will Own the Oceans," Foreign Affairs 54 (1976).
- Walsh, Don. The Law of the Sea: Issues in Ocean Management. New York: Praeger, 1977.
- Wiosing, Robert G. (ed.). International Relations and the Future of Ocean Space. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1974.
- Yaroslavtsev, V. "The Law of the World Ocean," International Affairs (Moscow) 1 (January 1976).
- Yaroslavtsev, V. "The World Ocean and International Law," International Affairs (Moscow) 2 (February 1975).

VI. ARMS CONTROL AND DETERRENCE

- Bergman, Abraham. "The United Nations, The Superpowers, and Proliferation," The Annals (March 1977).
- Cheng, Chester (ed.). The Politics of the Chinese Red Army. Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1966.
- Clough, Ralph N. (ed.). The United States, China and Arms Control. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975.

- Epstein, William. "Nuclear-Free Zones," Scientific American 233(5) (November 1975).
- Epstein, William. "Nuclear Proliferation in the Third World," Journal of International Affairs 29(2) (1975).
- Erickson, John. "The Chimera of Mutual Deterrence," Strategic Review (Spring 1978).
- Garthoff, Richard. Sino-Soviet Military Relations. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Gelber, Harry. Nuclear Weapons and Chinese Policy. London: The Institute for Strategic Studies (Adelphi Papers, No. 99), 1973.
- Ghash, S. K. China's Nuclear and Political Strategy. New Delhi: Young Asia Publishing Co., 1975.
- Gray, Colin. "Arms Control in a Nuclear Armed World," The Annals (March 1977).
- Halperin, Morton & Perkins, Dwight. Communist China and Arms Control. New York: Praeger, 1965.
- Hinton, H. C. Communist China's External Policy and Behavior as a Nuclear Power. Washington, D.C.: Institute for Defense Analysis, 1963.
- Hsieh, Alice L. "China's Nuclear Missile Programme: Regional of Intercontinental?" China Quarterly 45 (January-March 1971).
- Johnson, Chalmers. Autopsy on People's War. California: University of California Press, 1973.
- Kurtzer, Daniel C. The UN and Disarmament: The World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force. St. Louis: International Studies Association, 1977.
- Nelson, Harvey W. The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese Liberation Army. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1971.
- Newhouse, John. Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973.
- Overholt, William H. Asia's Nuclear Future. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977.
- Rigg, D. "Red Army in Retreat," Current History (January 1957).

- Schlesinger, James R. Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1975. Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 1974.
- Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven. Yale University Press, 1966.
- Snyder, Glen. Deterrence and Defense. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Terhune, Kenneth and Firestone, Joseph. "Global War, Limited War, and Peace: Hypotheses from Three Experimental Worlds," International Studies Quarterly 4 (June 1976).
- Willrich, Mason & Rhineland, John. SALT, The Moscow Agreements and Beyond. New York: Macmillan, Free Press, 1974.
- Yueh-Yun Liu, Leo. China as a Nuclear Power in World Politics. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1972.

VII. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS.

- Amin, Samir. "Self-reliance and the new international economic order," Monthly Review 3 (1977).
- Andors, Stephen. China's Industrial Revolution: Politics, Planning, and Management. New York: Pantheon Books, 1977.
- Augusto, Joao & Castro, Oraiho. "Environment and Development, the Case of the Less Developed Countries," International Organ 26(2) (Spring 1972).
- Azrail, Jeremy. Managerial Power and Soviet Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Bell, Daniel, The Coming of Post Industrial Society. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- Bergsten, Fred G. "Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions," International Organization 24 (1976).
- Bergsten, Fred G. "The Threat from the Third World," Foreign Policy 2 (1973).
- Bodenheimer, Robert. "Dependency and Imperialism: The Roots of Latin American Underdevelopment," Politics and Society 1 (May 1971).

- Brzezinski, Zbigniew. "America in a Hostile World," Foreign Policy 23 (1976).
- Chiang Chen-yun. "On Self-Reliance--Notes on the Study of Chairman Mao's Works," Economic Research 1 (January 1965), 460 SCMM.
- Chu-yuan Cheng. China's Petroleum Industry: Output, Growth, and Export Potential. New York: Praeger, 1976.
- Dower, John W. Origins of the Modern Japanese State: Selected Writings of E. H. Norman. New York: Pantheon, 1975.
- Eckstein, Alexander. "China's Trade Policy and Sino-American Relations," Foreign Affairs 54(1) (October 1975).
- Eckstein, Alexander. China's Economic Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- Falk, Richard. "Beyond Internationalism," Foreign Policy 24 (1974).
- Feuerwerker, Albert. "The Chinese Economy, 1870-1911," Michigan Papers in Chinese Studies 1 (1969).
- Frank, Andre Gunder. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.
- Galtung, Johan. "Self-reliance and Global Interdependence: Some Reflections on the 'New International Economic Order,'" University of Oslo Paper: 55.
- Galtung, Johan. "Self-Reliance: Concept Practice and Rationale: The Politics of Self-Reliance," University of Oslo, Papers 35 and 44.
- Galtung, Johan. "Implementing Self-Reliance," Transnational Perspectives 4 (1976).
- Garth, Bogart (ed.). China's Changing Role in World Economy. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
- Girling, Richard. Structures of Dependency. New York: Praeger, 1973.
- Goldman, Marshall I. Comparative Economic Systems: A Reader. New York: Random House, 1964.
- Hoeffding, O. Sino-Soviet Economic Relations in Recent Years. California: Rand Memorandum, P-2087, August, 1960.
- Kronstein, Allen. "The Nationality of International Enterprises," Columbia Law Review 52 (1952).

- Leys, Collin (ed.). Politics and Change in Developing Countries: Studies in the Theory and Practice of Development. England: Cambridge University Press, 1969.
- Leibenstein, Harvey. Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth: Studies in the Theory of Economic Development. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1963.
- Mally, Gerhard. Interdependence: The European America in the Global Context. Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976.
- Mayo, Elton. The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization. New York: Macmillan Co., 1933.
- Neilan, Edward & Smith, Charles R. The Future of the China Market: Prospects for Sino-American Trade. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974.
- Nye, Joseph S. "Independence and Interdependence," Foreign Policy 22 (1976).
- Ollman, Bartell. Alienation: Marx's Concept of Man in Capitalist Society. England: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
- Oteiza, Enrique & Srzovich, Franco. "Collective Self-Reliance: Selected Issues," International Social Science Journal 4 (1976).
- Patel, Lurenda. "Collective Self-Reliance of Developing Countries," Journal of Modern African Studies 4 (1975).
- "Plant Studies in the People's Republic of China," A trip report in, National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1975.
- Perkins, Dwight. China's Modern Economy in Historical Perspectives. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Perkins, Dwight H. Market Control and Planning in Communist China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966.
- Robinson, Joann. Freedom and Necessity: An Introduction to the Study of Society. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970.
- Robinson, Joan. Economic Management, China 1972. London: 1972.
- Rosecrance, Richard. "Whither Interdependence?" International Organization 3 (1977).

- Rosecrance, Richard & Stein, Arthur. "Interdependence: Myth or Reality?" World Politics 1 (1973).
- Santos, Dos. "The Structure of Dependence," American Economic Review 60 (May 1970).
- Sergiyev, A. "Bourgeois Theories of 'Interdependence' Serve Neo-colonialism," International Affairs 11 (Moscow, 1976).
- Shurmann, Franz. Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- Smith, Gregory. "Interdependence Has Its Limits," Foreign Policy 22 (1976).
- Sterling, Richard W. Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
- Timberlake, Percy. "China As A Trading Nation," World Development 3 (July-August 1975).
- Varyryen, Ramo. "European Community and the Nordic Countries: An Analysis of Main Trends," Instant Research on Peace and Violence 2 (1974)
- Vladimilow, A. "The Question of Soviet, Chinese Economic Relations in 1952-1966," Chinese Economic Studies 6 (Fall 1966).
- Walker, Robert (ed.). Modern Technology and Civilization. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
- Whitman, Marina. "Leadership Without Hegemony: Our Role in the World Economy," Foreign Policy 20 (1975).