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Toledo, Raymond Juan, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

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THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTED CONTACT, PERCEIVED SIMILARITY, AND MOTIVE TO LIE ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF LYING TO A SPEAKER

by

Raymond J. Toledo

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1990

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE EFFECTS OF EXPECTED CONTACT, PERCEIVED SIMILARITY, AND MOTIVE TO LIE ON THE ATTRIBUTION OF LYING TO A SPEAKER

by

Raymond J. Toledo

Adviser: Professor Irwin Katz

This research sought to better understand the processes whereby an observer attributes the act of lying to a speaker. The perception of lying serves to de-stabilize the interaction process. This research wanted to identify some of the factors which contribute to the perception of deception, independent of the accuracy of the inference.

This study examined the effects of three situational variables-- expectation of future contact with the speaker, perceived speaker-listener similarity, and the speaker's perceived motive to lie-- on the tendency of a listener to infer the presence of lying. Hence, the experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial. A pre-recorded job interview served as the stimulus material. A total of 130 subjects evaluated each of the job-applicant's responses. The main

dependent measure was the degree to which the applicant's responses were perceived as truthful.

The results showed that the expectation of future contact with the speaker or perceived speaker-listener similarity significantly reduced the probability that the speaker would be viewed as lying. The findings also showed that the attribution of lying increased when the speaker was perceived as having a motive to lie.

In addition, subjects were required to indicate the degree to which they liked the speaker and would recommend him for a job. The speaker perceived as lying, was liked less and was less likely to be recommended for a position. Those subjects who indicated that the applicant was not truthful were asked to indicate the degree to which the speaker's inferred use of deception was due to situational factors and/or the speaker's disposition. The subjects who perceived the greatest degree of deception, tended to ascribe less guilt to the speaker for lying and to attribute the use of deception to the speaker's internal disposition. The results were interpreted as suggesting the presence of an estimation-of-lying bias, in which high estimators of lying viewed deception as a more significant threat than low estimators.

Finally, this study also included an interpersonal trust scale. The results demonstrated that the perception of lying and interpersonal trust represent two distinct and independent constructs.

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INTRODUCTION

Problem Statement

The aim of this study was to better understand the processes whereby an observer attributes the act of lying to a speaker. Specifically, the investigation focused on the effects of three variables-- expectation of future contact with the speaker, perceived speaker-listener similarity, and perceived motive to deceive-- on the tendency of a listener to infer the presence of verbal deception. Emphasis on these three situational factors represent a deviation from the traditional approach to the study of lying which has concentrated almost exclusively on nonverbal behavior and paralinguistic cues.

Lying Defined

Lying[1] represents a verbal form of deception in which the speaker makes one or more statements he or she knows to be untrue in an attempt to mislead the listener (Bok, 1978). Since the current study examines lying from the perspective of the listener (i.e., how an individual comes to believe that someone is lying), whether the speaker's statements are true or not is unimportant; the key issue is that the listener comes to view that which is said to him or her as a lie.

The Social Impact of Deception

The psychological effects of verbal deception can be felt in three basic domains. First, the most immediate effect of lying is its implications for the ongoing social encounter. The mere suggestion of lying will serve to undermine the social exchange process and threaten the continuation of the encounter. Second, the continued experience of being lied to can result in making vulnerability seem an endemic feature of the interaction process (Ichheiser, 1970). Perceived vulnerability, in turn, can serve to slowly erode an individual's sense of control and interpersonal trust, concepts which are considered important for mental health and psychological well-being (Erikson, 1963; Lefcourt, 1966; 1976; Seligman, 1975). Finally, the act of lying may pose a threat to the underlying social structure (Bok, 1978; Hochreich & Rotter, 1970; Stacks, 1978; Wrightsman & Baker, 1969; Worchel, 1979). That is, the perception that there is a general failure to adhere to social conventions will serve to promote further and stronger norm violations which may eventually threaten the society as a whole (Curvin & Porter, 1979). Hence, the act of lying can have both immediate and long term effects.

The Lie Detection Literature: A Critique

The social significance of deception has served to generate numerous studies on the detection of lying (see Ekman, 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981, for review). The research suggests that nonverbal and paralinguistic cues serve to alert the listener to the presence of lying. This contention is rooted in two frequently cited sets of findings. First, studies have shown that the act of engaging in deception often has an effect on the speaker, which is manifested nonverbally (e.g., Apple et al., 1979; DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Second, observers have been able to distinguish between deceptive and non-deceptive messages at a better than chance level (Kraut, 1978; Littlepage & Pineault, 1978; Miller & Burgoon, 1981; Zuckerman et al., 1981). While these two findings may be valid, the assumption that the former is responsible for the latter is still open to interpretation. Although subjects have reportedly been able to discriminate between deception and nondeception (see Ekman, 1985; Zuckerman et al., 1981, for review), few subjects have been able to correctly identify the nonverbal cues which systematically varied with either truth telling or lying (e.g., Maier and Janzen, 1967). Such findings tend to weaken the premise that the attribution of lying reflects an actual skill based on the utilization of

nonverbal cues. In addition, there are a number of methodological issues, associated with lie detection research, which hamper our ability to interpret the empirical findings.

Lie Detection Accuracy

Although a number of studies claim to demonstrate that individuals can distinguish between lying and truth telling (e.g., Apple et al., 1979; Baskett & Freedle, 1974; DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979a; 1979b; DePaulo et al., 1978; Ekman, 1986; Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Littlepage & Pineault, 1978; McClintock & Hunt, 1975; Schneider & Kintz, 1977), any conclusions drawn from these results may be misleading if they are based solely on the notion of statistical significance. Zuckerman and associates (1981) reviewed the percentage of accuracy scores reported in detection studies. The results indicated that accuracy ranged from 45 to 65 percent. In most of these studies the subjects had a 50 percent chance of guessing correctly. Given the accuracy range cited above, Zuckerman maintains that most subjects failed to demonstrate any substantial ability to detect deception. In addition, the laboratory paradigm used to exam the detection of lying may not be representative of everyday deception. Hence, the research findings suggesting the existence of a lie detection ability may be invalid.

Ecological Validity and Detection Research

Certain characteristics associated with the lie detection paradigm seem to hamper a speaker's ability to lie effectively and/or provide the listener with an unfair advantage in the detection of lying (see DePaulo, 1980; DePaulo et al., 1980; Knapp & Comadens, 1979; Kraut, 1980; Kraut & Poe, 1980- for a more thorough discussion). For example, in the laboratory the reasons for engaging in lying and the consequences of discovery are poor approximations of that found in real life. The laboratory simply cannot duplicate the motivational aspects which are normally associated with lying. In addition, the experimenter's orchestration of the deception scenario may serve to make the speaker's performance appear somewhat unnatural when compared to the control condition where the speaker is often left to respond as the person would normally. These differences may indicate that the type and form of lying examined in the laboratory is not representative of lying found in normal social situations.

There are several factors related to the listener which also serve to unduly bolster lie detection accuracy in laboratory studies. First, in order to reduce distractions the stimulus message is usually kept simple and brief. Second, to maximize concentration, the listener is not allowed to converse with the

speaker. Third, the actual search for evidence of deception is artificially induced by the experimenter; the subjects are warned beforehand that the speaker may lie. Finally, most detection studies use a single trial design, which in conjunction with the previously cited problems may serve to increase the probability that the listener will correctly guess whether the speaker is telling the truth or lying. These characteristics, which are rarely found in normal conversation, introduce sufficient variations between laboratory and non-laboratory lying that the generalization of research findings to everyday life may be quite limited. The ability to detect deception may be a laboratory restricted phenomenon. Furthermore, despite the advantages posed by the laboratory, accuracy scores in the detection of lying have continued to revolve around the 50 percent random chance level (Zuckerman et al., 1981). It is, therefore, quite possible that under normal circumstances the average person possesses little, if any, ability to detect actual lying. The lack of an ability to detect deception, however, will not make the perception that someone is lying seem any less real nor will it nullify the potential social consequences of such an attribution.

Perceptual Errors and lie Detection

Misperception in the detection of lying occurs because there are no universal indices of deception (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Nonverbal behaviors as cues of deception are essentially .meaningless in and of themselves; it is the listener who provides them with their significance. How nonverbal cues are interpreted will vary depending on a host of factors which may or may not have any direct relationship to the presence of deception. Ekman (1986), a strong proponent of the lie detection position, readily admits that lie detection is not a simple task or one quickly accomplished. "No one can be absolutely certain whether or not a liar will fail or a truthful person will be exonerated. Lie checking provides only an informed guess" (Ekman, 1986, p. 240). Despite the potential for error, the traditional lie detection literature has generally opted to overlook perceptual errors as a relevant area of study.

There are four possible outcomes associated with any lie detection situation (see Figure 1). The detection literature has focused primarily on the investigation of the non-error cells. Since both false-positive and false-negatives responses reduce a subject's accuracy score they have been character-istically lumped together and treated as a single

factor-- error. Zuckerman and associates (1979) have, however, found correlational evidence which suggests that many individuals tended to consistently perceive stimulus messages as either truthful statements (i.e., low estimators of lying) or deceptive statements (i.e., high estimators of lying). Systematic error in the perception of truth-telling or lying may have important implications in our understanding of the lie attribution process.

Figure 1

Speaker-Observer Lie Detection Perspectives

		SPEAKER'S PERSPECTIVE	
		TRUTHFUL	LYING
OBSERVER'S PERSPECTIVE	TRUTHFUL	CORRECT PERCEPTION	ERROR (Low Estimation of Lying)
	LYING	ERROR (High Estimation of Lying)	CORRECT PERCEPTION

High estimators of lying may best be characterized as "lie-sensitive" because they frequently and impulsively appeal to the lie attribution as if deception was a highly pervasive phenomena. Correspondingly, low estimators of deception appear to be "lie--insensitive". These individuals are more prudent about using the lie attribution. They are more likely to give the speaker the benefit of the doubt and as a result may fail to detect actual deception when it does occur.

Bias in estimation of lying may reflect a person's strategy towards interpersonal relations and how an individual comes to terms with the fact that any social situation can involve some form of deception. The estimation bias is assumed to be an attempt by the listener to minimize the probability of making what the person considers to be the worst of two possible mistakes. For example, the low estimation of lying may stem from a basic need on the part of the listener for social acceptance and a desire to ensure social harmony, at any cost. Hence, the low lie estimator would find a distrust error (i.e., the mistaken perception of lying) to be the least favorable alternative. The high lie estimator may be afraid of being manipulated by others and not being in control. As such, the high lie estimator may feel that a trust error (i.e., to mistake a lie for the truth) is the least desirable option.

Regardless of whether my underlying reasoning for the estimation bias is correct or not, there is indirect evidence from the psychophysical literature which serves to suggest that motivations can influence the perception process.

Psychophysical research has established that an observer's motivational state will have an impact on the perception of a signal (Green & Swet, 1966). The effects of motivation have been demonstrated by separately varying the potential consequences, through the use of differential payoff functions, for making false-positive and false-negative errors. The results have shown that the type of error associated with the lowest penalties was the one most favored by subjects. These findings are essentially applicable to the perception of lying.

LIE PERCEPTION MODEL

Given the potential for error in the perception of lying, a model was developed based on signal detection theory (Martin & Rovira, 1968). Ideally the probability of a person reporting the presence of a lie should depend solely on the strength of the signal (i.e., the conspicuousness of the deception attempt). Psychophysical research, however, has demonstrated that observers will on occasion report the presence of a

signal when none has been given, and will occasionally indicate that there was no signal when in fact one had been provided (Green & Swet, 1966). According to signal detection theory the perception of either a psychophysical or social phenomenon is based on the interactive contributions of two factors-- the actual presence or absence of a signal (i.e., the lie) and the conglomeration of all other variables which serve to form the "psychological" backdrop of the detection situation (Martin & Rovira, 1981).

I theorized that the attribution of lying reflects the end product of a social construction process which involves three distinct phases-- an initial trust phase, a transitional phase, and a label acceptance phase (see Figure 2). Each preceding stage in the process must be completed before the observer is able to infer that a person is lying. Although some individuals may exhibit a greater propensity to perceive lying, the actual process by which the attribution is made is assumed to be similar for both the high and low estimator of deception.

Figure 2

The Lie Perception Model



Initial Trust Stage

The model presumes that interactants initially trust each other.[2] The display of mutual trust between interactants tends to occur even in cases involving total strangers. The reader should note that the type of trust that is thought to characterize the initial phase in the lie perception process can and should be distinguished from what might be termed "explicit trust". Explicit trust implies that the listener is cognizant of the fact that s/he trusts the speaker. This form of trust usually involves either special circumstances or a special relationships (e.g., spouse). The trust that is associated with the initial stage of the model can best be described as passive, in which the listener does not actively distrust the other participant and as a result will often accept what s/he is told by the speaker.

Data obtained from subjects during debriefings in a preliminary questionnaire concerning the perception of lying seemed to suggest that mutual trust is an inherent aspect in most face-to-face situations (Toledo, 1983). Even when an encounter involved strangers, the majority of respondents indicated that they rarely entered into a conversation not trusting the other interactant. In addition, other researchers have found truth detection accuracy to be significantly greater than lie detection

accuracy (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1979). The observed asymmetry may suggest that individuals have a predisposition to initially accept as true whatever the speaker says, even when involved in a study on lie detection (Zuckerman et al., 1981).

Individuals need and seek harmony and predictability in their social relations (Heider, 1958). In reality, however, the interaction process is filled with uncertainty. In an effort to introduce some semblance of stability, each actor often resorts to "typification schemes" (Berger & Luckman, 1966).[3] Typification schemes serve as a type of perceptual shorthand which enables each actor to perceive and respond towards the other interactant in terms of preestablished, relatively well organized behavioral patterns (e.g., scripts). Interaction rituals also serve in this capacity because both interactants recognize and adhere to them (Garfinkel, 1964; Goffman, 1955; 1959).

Goffman (1955, 1959) has discussed a number of these ritualistic mechanisms under the rubric of "rule of the encounter". The notions of the "line" and "face" deserve special mention. The line is the mutually projected definition of the situation (or purpose of the encounter). The face is the respective images each participant exhibits towards the other. In a deception

situation the speaker attempts to mislead the listener by projecting a false face and line while in actuality pursuing an altogether different purpose.

The experience of mutual trust stems largely from the special dynamics that result from and are associated with the face-to-face situation. According to Berger and Luckman (1966), it is within the face-to-face encounter that the other person is perceived as "real" in the fullest sense.

> Indeed, it may be argued that the other person in a face-to-face situation is more real to me than I myself. Of course I 'know myself better' .... But this 'better knowledge' ... requires reflection ... The other ... in the face to face situation ... is ongoingly available. This availability is continuous and pre-reflective (Berger & Luckman, 1966, p. 29).

In a live encounter the image projected by the other interactant is so massive and compelling that it is often accepted by the observer without collaboration (Berger & Luckman, 1966). It is as if when a person assumes a particular line and face, the individual is, in effect, making an implicit but definite promise regarding the person's subsequent conduct during the encounter and projected into the future. I refer to

this aspect of the face-to-face encounter as the promissory quality of the dyad.[4] As a result, the image a speaker presents is seldom, if ever, challenged (Goffman, 1955, 1959). The assumptions inferred from the interactant's behavior (i.e., line & face) will continue to operation until the interactant fails to meet the other person's expectations.

The functional value of assuming a trusting posture in most social situations is that it serves to facilitate the interaction process. Without at least the rudiments of trust, the social exchange process would become extremely problematic (Homans, 1961; Kelley & Thibaut, 1969; Thibaut & Kelley, 1978). In the absence of trust, the participants would have to take extra precautions, demand proofs, and draw-up contracts. There are, however, no effective external means by which to ensure against deception. Instead of relieving social concerns, these externally imposed safeguards serve to magnify them. As a result, even the most superficial encounter would become exceedingly difficult to negotiate (Bok, 1978). Yet, present day "... existence rests on a thousand premises which the single individual cannot trace and verify to their roots at all, but must take on faith" (Simmel, 1950, p. 313). Trust has become an indispensible, routinized (i.e., taken-for-granted) aspect of everyday life (Farrington,

1979). In other words, an individual will tend to trust the other interactant because the person has to, there is no viable alternative; interpersonal relations as a whole could not function without such an assumption.

The impact of the face-to-face situation is so overwhelming that it can temporarily supplant the common belief that people frequently lie. Many individuals believe that lying is an integral part of everyday life (Edgley & Turner, 1975; Henry, 1973, Ichheiser, 1970). A study by Shippee (1977) found that most respondents felt that they were told at least two "serious" lies a day. In a natural observation study of dyadic encounters it was found that most individuals use information management techniques, which included lying, in most of their interactions (Turner et al., 1975). Of 130 encounters observed, representing over 870 verbal statements, only 38.5 percent involved complete and uncensored material. Although lying may be perceived as a highly common social phenomenon, this fact does not seem to dampen the tendency towards mutual trust. It would appear that in order to circumvent threats to our ability to interact with one another, individuals tend to engage in what Milgram (1974) refers to as an agentic shift during a face-to-face encounter. That is, the listener becomes so involved in the conversation that often it is only after the interaction has ceased that

the listener is able to entertain the notion that the speaker may have been lying.

Given the presumption of implicit trust associated with the face-to-face encounter, an interactant should not be looking for or sensitive to so-called "deception cues". Furthermore, the nonverbal cues which have been associated with lying are often very subtle. "It is unlikely that an individual is ... continually monitoring all potential cues. If only because of the information overload this would cause" (Kraut, 1978, p. 385). Hence, the detection of lying seems to require an active and perhaps conscious process which presupposes a shift in the listeners perspective.

Transitional Stage

A sudden shift from unquestioning acceptance to the perception of lying would seem unlikely. Such radical changes in social perceptions do not occur so readily (McGuire, 1969). Hence, it is assumed that an intermediate or transitional stage, serves to separate the two cognitive states of implicit trust and the perception of lying. The transitional stage represents the central core of the model and is based on Schachter and Singer's (1962) two-factor theory of emotions. As a result, the transitional stage can be divided into two interdependent stages.

During the first phase of the transitional stage, the listener becomes aware of a growing sense that something is slightly amiss.[5] As the encounter continues, the listener's sense of uneasiness is expected to rise until the individual can no longer ignore it. The sense of discomfort can emanate from three basic sources-- the speaker, the listener, or the situation. For example, the listener may find a particular mannerism of the speaker somewhat disquieting (e.g., excessive blinking). The listener may eventually misattribute his or her sense of uneasiness to some dispositional trait of the speaker.

As the sense of discomfort becomes more pronounced, there will be a greater need to account for it. The individual will attempt to provide a reasonable explanation for his or her visceral experiences (Schachter & Singer, 1962). This is the primary function of the second half of the transitional phase of the model (see Figure 2, see p. 13). In other words, to be cognizant of a sense of uneasiness when speaking to someone will not necessarily lead to a lie attribution. The heightened state of arousal requires some form of cognitive interplay which will interpret and label the experience and situation as one that involves deception. In this respect, I chose to view the lie attribution as representing a means by which an individual can come to

interpret a particular social experiences. It allows the individual to account for certain observed or imagined inconsistencies that may characterize a given encounter.[6] It must be remembered, however, that the deception inference represents only one possible interpretation; other explanations may serve the same function.

Label Acceptance Stage

The third and final stage of the model involves the observer accepting the lie interpretation. Failure to accept the inference would deny the attribution access to awareness. An individuals response in a social situation is dependent on his/her perceptions. Hence, the ability to perceive lying has adaptive significance. Yet, the individual is expected to resist the lie inference, due to the potentially troublesome and cognitively demanding nature of the lie attribution.

Resisting the Lie Attribution

One reason an individual may reject the lie interpretation is that the terms "liar" and "lying" have such strong negative implications. In most instances deception can only be inferred; an error is always a possibility. An individual may be hesitant to acknowledge even to himself or herself that the speaker is lying. It is more likely, however, that a person

tends to resist the lie inference because the individual is not sure how to respond in such situations.

The appropriate reaction to a deception attempt may seem obvious, but in the context of an ongoing encounter, where one is the target, simple issues can become confused. Social protocol and interaction rituals generally stipulate that the listener should refrain from taking any action which might jeopardize the interaction process (Goffman, 1955, 1959). These norms tend to emphasize non-confrontational, face-saving tactics in which the observer must act as if nothing has happen. The perception of lying, however, is likely to elicit several inconsistent responses from the listener which might threaten the continuation of the encounter. For example, suspected lying may provoke anger in which the listener may want to confront or challenge the speaker (i.e., moving against the speaker). The perception of lying may elicit a heighten degree of caution and worry which might lead the listener to want to withdraw from the encounter (i.e., moving away from the speaker). The fact that the attempted deception was apparently discovered may even lead the listener to want to express sentiments of sympathy or forgiveness (i.e., moving towards the speaker). No single one of these responses would seem to be potentially satisfying, and all pose a threat to the encounter.[7] As a result, the

listener is likely to find the perception of lying a highly frustrating experience.

As aversive as a lie situation may be, avoidance is not always possible. Withdrawal from the encounter which involves deception is also not a viable alternative; bringing an encounter to a premature end would be awkward and would require an explanation. The listener, however, has one option. The individual can attempt to circumvent the potential distress associated with perceived deception by simply rejecting the annoying attribution. This tactic will work best in brief encounters; otherwise, it will only serve to delay the eventual realization that the speaker is lying.[8]

Researchers have not devoted much attention to the immediate impact of perceived deception on interpersonal relations. One exception was a study by Maier and Janzen (1967). The study involved a role-playing format in which a student/subject requested a grade change due to an exam grading error. Subjects functioning as professors were required to distinguish between honest and dishonest claims and to decide whether and by how much a student's grade should be changed. The results showed that "professors" were able to significantly distinguish between honest and dishonest students. Although those who were viewed as lying were given a smaller increase, it was found that all students

received a better grade. The less favorable response to the deceptive students would seem to suggest that the perception of lying had a definite impact on the interaction process, even in a role play situation. The fact that no one was denied a grade change would also suggest that reactions to lying are neither simple nor direct. One can interpret the latter results as indicative of a compromise which enable the "professors" to reward truthful students and avoid having to confront deceptive students. If correct, this study would support the view that most individuals find situations involving deception uncomfortable and will attempt to avoid them through either physical or psychological means.

The Lie Estimation Bias

The high or low lie estimation bias should influence the lie perception process during the transitional stage, when the individual is attempting to account for his/her feelings of uneasiness. Usually there are a number of alternative explanations which could satisfactorily account for the listener's aroused state. Lying represents only one possible interpretation. The reason a high estimator of lying is more likely to make a lie attribution is due to four basic difference between the high and low estimator of lying. First, the high estimator of lying will consider

fewer alternative interpretations before drawing an inference. Second, the lying interpretation is a more salient interpretation, because the high lie estimator is usually worried about being deceived. Third, the high estimator of lying is relatively impulsive resulting in a shorter latency in considering and making an attribution. The fourth major difference between a high and low estimator of lying is that the former exhibits less hesitancy in making a lie attribution due to his/her previous frequent use of the label.

The lie estimation construct was original conceived of as an enduring dispositional trait; however, it can also be viewed as a behavioral tendency elicited by situational factors. For example, an individual may operate like a high lie estimator when functioning as a police officer and act like a low lie estimator in situations involving friends and family. In other words, situational factors which are independent of the actual signal (e.g., lying), can have an profound impact on the perception process (Martin & Rovira, 1981). Some factors will serve to inhibit, other factors will serve to facilitate the inference that the speaker is lying. Regardless of the direction of influence, the net effect is the same-- distortion of perception. Such influences will cause a systematic change in the percentage of false-alarms and correct detections made by the

observer. Some situational variables that may contribute to the distortion of the lie attribution process will be considered in the following section.

Three Situational Factors and the Perception of Lying

The proposed lie perception model maintains that the attribution of lying can only be understood in terms of a three stage process. In the first stage, an interactant tends to display trust towards the other individual. As a result, it is assumed that initial statements by a speaker will generally be perceived as truthful.

The second stage serves in a transitional capacity and consist of two components. In the arousal phase, the listener becomes aware that something is amiss. Any number of factors can be responsible for eliciting the tension necessary to activate the search for an explanation. It is assumed that participation in a study in which subjects repeatedly evaluate the performance of the same target individual will serve to produce the appropriate aroused state. This tension derives from the fact that the observer, functioning as an evaluator can never be certain that his or her impression or assessment of the target person is correct. That is, the role of evaluator is presumed to, in part, interfere with the initial trust stage and be

antagonistic to an individual's ability to extend trust the other interactant. Once the listener is cognizant of this inconsistency, the individual will enter the interpretation generation phase. The speaker in this phase will be monitored more closely, as alternative explanations are considered in an attempt by the observer to account for his or her sense of incongruity and need to label the experience.

The final stage involves the acceptance of the lie inference. It is assumed that most people will attempt to reject the lie attribution. These two last components of the model, the interpretation generalization and label acceptance stages, are most susceptible to transient situational factors.

The attribution of lying is assumed to operate somewhat independently of the actual occurrence of deception. This premise is based on two seemingly inconsistent observations. While the laboratory investigation of lying seems to facilitate lie detection (see p. 5-6), the accuracy level reported in the literature was found to be only slightly above that expected by chance (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Since actual social situations are more complex, it is assumed that lie detection in non-laboratory settings will fail to differ from chance.

Given that overall deception detection accuracy in everyday social situations is expected to be poor, what leads the observer to periodically attribute lying to a speaker must be the results of transient situational factors. Three situational variables will be examined in this research in an attempt to better understand their impact on the lie perception process.

Expected Contact with the Speaker

According to Heider (1958), people strive for consistency and harmony in their interpersonal relations and between their cognitions and their behavior. It is assumed that any cognition which might serve to create a strain in an inevitable social encounter is likely to be subjected to distortion. In order to circumvent unnecessary interpersonal and psychological complications, most individuals would rather avoid getting involved with a deception situation. When physical circumvention is not possible, the observer may still avoid the aversive consequences associated with the attribution of lying by simply rejecting the troublesome perception. Thus, the expectation of an unavoidable future contact with the speaker should be associated with a lower probability that the observers will attribute lying to the speaker. Correspondingly, no expectation of future contact with the speaker should serve to reduce the inhibition against using the lie

interpretation and would promote the greater probability that the listener will perceive deception.

Perceived Similarity with the Speaker

Uncertainty in interpersonal relations tends to produce a disquieting effect perhaps because it is often associated with personal vulnerability. Both Kanter (1977) and Simmel (1950) maintain that as uncertainty increases the issue of trust becomes more salient. Situations which involve at least a moderate amount of unpredictability (e.g., an encounter between strangers), fail to provide an objective basis for trust. In such situations, an individual will attempt to establish a sense of trust by relying on artificial and often irrelevant criteria. Kanter (1977) maintains that perceived similarity is frequently utilized as evidence of trustworthiness. "The greater the uncertainty, the greater the pressure for those who have to trust each other [i.e., those who are by circumstance, dependent upon each other] to form a homogeneous group" (Kanter, 1977, p. 49). The notion of similarity serves to make a stranger, a hitherto unknown quantity, seem less unpredictable and less threatening, because perceived similarity creates the illusion that the observer knows and understands the new acquaintance. In other words, ambiguity in social situations serves to create a strong impetus towards greater social solidarity based on

similarity in an attempt to introduce at least the rudiments of mutual trust. Thus, we can expect that less lying will be attributed to those individuals who are perceived as similar. Since unfamiliar and dissimilar others tend to raise the level of uncertainty and personal vulnerability in a given situation, a listener is expected to attribute greater lying to a speaker in situations involving an unfamiliar, dissimilar speaker.

Motivation of the Speaker

When a person resorts to deception the underlying assumption is that the speaker had a reason or purpose for lying (Bok, 1978). Deception attempts have a potential to fail, thus lying always entails some risks to the speaker. Hence, the speaker is not likely to engage in lying unless the benefits for doing so outweigh the possible costs (Bok, 1978). In terms of lie perception, an observer may rely on a similar form of reasoning in deciding whether a speaker is being truthful or lying. That is, in the absence of any apparent pressure to present a specific or advantageous impression, the speaker will be perceived as not having any reason or motive to lie. As a result, the inference that the speaker is lying will become less tenable and, therefore, less likely to be selected.

The Social Consequence of Perceived Lying

This research is interested in the potential consequences of deception, once it is perceived. Little or no research has been devoted to understanding how the perception of lying affects the interaction process. One exception was the Maier and Janze role-playing study (1967) which found seemingly inconsistent results. Although some students were perceived as lying, they nevertheless received a reward, a higher grade. My interpretation of this finding was that the perception of lying did have an effect on the observers but that the individuals attempted not to make outward displays in order to avoid making a scene. If this premise is correct then evaluator anonymity and the absence of the face-to-face encounter should foster a stronger and more consistent pattern of disapproval towards those who are perceived as lying. These two features have been incorporated into the design of the proposed study. The aim, however, is not to demonstrate that an artificial situation will elicit reactions from a listener-observer that would not otherwise be expressed. Instead, the assumption is that the perception of lying does have an impact on the interaction process, but one that may not be readily observable. For example, how does one quantify that an encounter ended before it should have or that the two interactants might have become friends

were it not for the fact that one of the interactants was suspected of lying?

Differences Between High and Low Estimators of Lying

The lie perception model maintains that normal social dynamics serve to foster implicit trust and that the attribution of lying is highly disruptive. As a result, most individuals are expected to resist making a lie inference. Hence, it is assumed that those individuals who appear to lack restraint in the attribution of lying are reacting to additional dynamics which serve to negate the hesitancy that seems to be associated with the perception of lying. The high estimator of lying is such a person. It has been suggested that the high estimation of lying stems from an individual's basic fear of being deceived and/or unfairly manipulated (see p. 7). These concerns should lead the listener who is a high lie estimator to emphasize the negative implications of lying and to view the speaker, rather that the situation, as the principal factor responsible for the deceptive act. In essence, we have a "victim blame" phenomenon at work here. The speaker cannot be held culpable or blameworthy, unless the person is seen as responsible. In addition to making an internal disposition, the high estimator of lying will tend to assume that the speaker does not feel guilt or regret for having lied, sentiments which are

much more consistent with an external or situational attribution for lying (e.g., the person is sorry but s/he had no choice).

Interpersonal Trust

The perception of lying and interpersonal trust are not expected to be inversely related. These two factors represent very different constructs. Interpersonal trust reflects an individual's general orientation towards the social world. According to both Wrightsman (1964) and Rotter (1980) interpersonal trust is conceived as a stable characteristic of the individual. The lie perception model maintains that the attribution of lying is primarily the result of situational influence factors. It is, therefore, not expected that the tendency to perceive deception will be strongly related to interpersonal trust.

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1

It is hypothesized that an expectation on the part of the listener of unavoidable future contact with a speaker (i.e., job applicant) will result in significantly fewer lie attributions than will an expectation of no future contact.

Hypothesis 2

It is hypothesized that a perception by the listener of similarity between the self and the speaker (i.e., job applicant) will result in less attributed lying to the applicant than will a perception of dissimilarity.

Hypothesis 3

It is hypothesized that the listener will be less likely to view a speaker (i.e., job applicant) as lying, if the speaker does not appear to have any reason or strong motivation to distort information than if the speaker does appear to have such motivation.

Hypothesis 4

It is hypothesized that the speaker (i.e., job applicant) who is perceived as lying will receive a lower hiring recommendation than a speaker who is not perceived as lying.

Hypothesis 5

It is hypothesized that the speaker (i.e., job applicant) who is perceived as lying will be less liked than a speaker who is not perceived as lying.

Hypothesis 6

It is hypothesized that listeners who exhibit the greatest propensity to perceive lying will tend to attribute the use of deception to the internal disposition of the speaker (i.e., job applicant).

Hypothesis 7

It is hypothesized that there will be no relationship between a listener's tendency to attribute lying to a speaker (i.e., job applicant) and a listener's general disposition towards interpersonal trust.

Interaction Effects

No interaction effects are expected between expected contact, similarity, and motivation on the perception of lying. The impact of the independent variables should be additive, with experimental sessions in which the three manipulations are all geared in the same direction, eliciting the strongest impact. Conditions involving mixed-level manipulations (e.g., contact expected/low similarity) should produce intermediate lie estimation scores.

Interpersonal Attraction

In order to examine how interpersonal attraction is related to the independent variables and the attribution of lying, two measures for liking will be included as dependent variables.

METHODS

Overview

The study was introduced as an investigation on impression formation in a job interview setting. During an initial recruitment session, subjects were given an attitude questionnaire and told that it would be used to determine whether there was a relationship between the attitudes of subjects and their evaluation of a job applicant. Each subject was told when to report to the laboratory for the actual experiment. The study consisted of the manipulation of three perceptual variables: a) whether or not a subsequent interaction with the applicant was expected, b) high vs. low subject-applicant similarity, and c) whether the applicant's desire for the job was high or low. Each subject was exposed to a single combination of the three independent variables. Hence, the experimental design was a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial. Segments from a supposedly pre-recorded job interview served as the stimulus material. Subjects evaluated each of the job-applicant's responses on a series of multi-point scales; the main dependent measure was the degree to which the applicant's responses were perceived as truthful.

Subjects

The study was conducted at Lehman College, City University of New York during the 1987 Fall and 1988 Spring semesters. The first half of the subjects were full-time day students; the second half of the subjects were students enrolled in evening courses. The targeted population was white male and female undergraduate students. However, four Hispanic students were also included in the study due to a failure on the part of the experimenter to correctly surmise ethnic identity. Each subject was run individually and paid six dollars for participation in the full study.

A total of 163 subjects agreed to participate in the study and completed a questionnaire as part of the initial recruitment phase of the experiment. Only 136 subjects reported to the laboratory for the second phase of the study, of these the responses of 130 subjects, 66 females and 64 males, were analyzed. Of the six subjects whose responses were disqualified, two subjects admitted that they knew or had some prior contact with the person playing the role of the job applicant. The responses of the other four subjects were not included in the analysis because they failed to respond to all the questions required in the manner specified.

The average age of the 130 subjects was 21.5 years, with a range of 17 to 33. In terms of religious

affiliation the sample consisted of 62 Catholics (47.7%), 23 Jews (17.7%), 19 Protestants (14.6%), 11 (8.5%) who indicated other religious affiliation, and 15, (11.5%) who indicated no affiliation..

Independent Variables

Manipulation of Expected Contact. The cover story indicated that the purpose of the study was to compare people's impressions of a job applicant based on their observation of a pre-recorded interview with impressions derived from observation of a live interview. In the contact expected condition subjects were specifically told that after they rated the applicant in the videotaped interview they would have the task of interviewing the same applicant in a face-to-face situation. Subjects in the no-contact-expected condition, were also led to believe that they would be interviewing a live applicant face-to-face, but it was made clear that this applicant would not be the same person who would be appearing in the videotape. Each subject was randomly assigned to either a contact-expected condition or a no-contact-expected condition.

Similarity Manipulation. The degree of similarity perceived by subjects between self and the applicant was manipulated by using the "attraction-to-a-stranger" paradigm initially developed by Byrne (1961). Before a subject saw the pre-recorded interview, he or she was

instructed to review an attitudes questionnaire supposedly filled out by the job applicant (see Appendix A, p. 107). The questionnaire was similar to the type given to subjects during the initial recruitment session; it, however, did not include the interpersonal trust items which were imbedded in the version given to subjects (see Appendix B, p. 108-114). The information provided concerning the applicant's attitudes was fabricated by the experimenter based on the responses given by the individual subject on his or her own questionnaire, which had been completed during the initial recruitment session. For a given subject the attitudes attributed to the applicant exhibited either a 90 percent (high similarity) or a 10 percent (low similarity) rate of agreement with the subject's own responses to the same set of questions. In the dissimilar condition mid-point responses by subjects were alternatively assigned to moderate points above or below the scale medium. Each subject was randomly assigned to either a high subject-applicant similarity condition or a low subject-applicant similarity condition.

Motivation Manipulation. The degree to which the applicant appeared to want the position for which he was being interviewed on videotape (i.e. motivational level) was manipulated by showing a subject one of a pair of

alternative statements made by the job applicant supposedly just prior to being interviewed. In the high motivation condition the applicant indicated that he was very interested in the position being offered. In the low manipulation condition, the applicant indicated that he was not interested in the position being offered. Each subject was randomly assigned to either the high or low motivation condition.

Procedure

Initially, subjects were told that the purpose of the study was to assess the accuracy of first impressions in the job interview situation. Those who agreed to participate were given an "Attitudes and Values Questionnaire" which consisted of 30 Likert type items that focuses on commonly held beliefs, attitudes, and values (see Appendix B, p. 108-114). The subjects were told that the purpose of the questionnaire was to determine whether there is a relationship between the attitudes of a subject-evaluator and the assessment process. In actuality, the information obtained from the subject's questionnaire was used to generate the applicant's questionnaire, which provided the false feedback necessary to create the illusion of applicant-subject similarity (or dissimilarity).

The attitude questionnaire subjects completed included nine items from Wrightsman's (1979)

interpersonal trust scale (see Appendix C, p. 115). An interpersonal trust score was derived for each subject from this scale. This score was used to determine if there was a relationship between the perception of the applicant as lying and a person's interpersonal trust score, or general trusting orientation to the social world. After the questionnaire was completed a subject was given an appointment indicating when to report to the laboratory for the "actual" experiment. Subjects were run individually.

In the laboratory, the subject were given a small booklet entitled "Subject Response Booklet" and told that all of his or her responses during the study would be recorded in it. The first page of the booklet elicited basic demographic information (see Appendix D, p. 116). The experimenter than read the following as a cover story:

> This study is trying to improve the job interview process. Research has indicated that having more than one person evaluate a job-applicant results in a better and more fair selection process. The problem is that interviewing a person more than once poses many difficulties for both the company that is hiring and the applicant.

> One proposed solution would be to videotape the job interview, which would enable more individuals to review an applicant's performance without having to repeatedly interview the job applicant.
>
> This study is concerned with whether watching an interview on videotape will produce the same effects as interviewing an applicant face-to-face. In other words, are the impressions and evaluations based on a videotape comparable to those that are derived from a live interview?

The contact manipulation was introduced at this point in the cover story.

The Contact Expected Condition

> This study will consist of two parts. In the first part of the study you will observe a videotape of a job interview in which an applicant by the name of John Garwin will briefly answer seven questions. You will be asked to evaluate the applicant's responses. Immediately afterwards, John Garwin will enter the laboratory. You will then interview him face-to-face and ask him

the same seven questions that he was asked during the videotape interview. You will be given a list of the seven questions at the appropriate time. Mr. Garwin is participating in this research as part of his independent studies project. At the end of the study your evaluation of John Garwin's videotape interview will be compared with your evaluation of John Garwin's live interview to see if there are any significant differences.

* * *

The No Contact Expected Condition

This study will consist of two parts. In the first part of the study you will observe a videotape of a job interview in which an applicant by the name of John Garwin will briefly answer seven questions which you will than be asked to evaluate. Immediately afterwards, a different undergraduate student by the name of Peter Scott will enter the laboratory. You will interview Peter Scott face-to-face and ask him the

same seven questions that were used in the videotape interview. Mr. Peter Scott is participating in this research as part of his independent studies project. You will be given a list of the seven questions at the appropriate time. At the end of the study your evaluations of John Garwin's videotape interview will becompared with your evaluation of Peter Scott's live interview to see if there are any significant differences.

* * *

The videotape segments you are about to watch come from an interview recorded earlier in the year. Company representatives were invited on campus to interview students as part of a program which attempts to locate suitable part-time and summer employment for students in areas related to their major. Some of these interviews were videotaped by the Career Counseling Office which allowed us to use the tape in our research.

The similarity manipulation was introduced at this point.

> Before proceeding with the videotape interview, it might be useful if you knew something about the applicant you are about to observe. In a live interview situation an evaluator would have access to the applicant's resume. For the sake of confidentiality a decision was made not to use resumes. Instead the applicant was asked to complete a standard attitudes questionnaire similar to the one you completed. You have been given a copy of it; turn to it now. We hope it will provide you with some idea about the applicant's personality. Please study the applicant's responses; you will be given a few minutes.

The motivation manipulation was introduced at this point.

> You will not get to see the entire interview. Instead you will see and evaluate the job applicant's responds to seven questions. Because the tape is so brief you will first be shown a short segment which was recorded immediately before the interview. This segment serves as an excellent introduction to the job applicant. Please pay close attention to the monitor, the visual portion of the study is about to begin.

The High Motivation Condition

My name is John Garwin. I am 22 years old and I am currently a junior in college. I am a little nervous. I am waiting to be interviewed. I really want this job. The position is ideal for me for three reasons: First, I will receive very important on-the-job experience and training. Second, it represents an excellent opportunity to use and apply what I have learned in my major. Finally, I will be able to save some

money for school for the upcoming school year. I know that a number of other people want this position. The only thing I can do is go in there and try to convince the interviewer that I am the right person for the position.

* * *

The Low Motivation Condition

My name is John Garwin. I am 22 years old and I am currently a junior in college. Although I am waiting to be interviewed, I might decide to accept

> another job offer. The offer made today as a result of an earlier interview, is directly related to my field of study. The job for which I am now being interviewed, although a good paying job is not related to my field of interest. But, I would still like to see if this company will match what the other company has offered me.

At this point the pre-recorded interview was presented.

Anonymity of Subjects

The following procedures was used to insure the anonymity of subjects. In the initial recruitment session the subjects were specifically instructed not to indicate their names on the attitude questionnaire. Instead of a name, the subjects were directed to use the last four digits of their social security number for the purposes of collating material. After completing the questionnaire, each subject was given a date and time to report to the laboratory.

Prior to reporting to the laboratory the experimenter prepared the bogus applicant questionnaire (i.e. the similarity manipulation). During this process the experimenter was blind as to what questionnaire belonged to which subject. Attached to each bogus

questionnaire was an index card with the identification number of the subject for which it was intended.

Upon arriving at the laboratory, the subject was asked for his or her identification number and given a blank subject response booklet. While the subject completed the demographic items, the experimenter entered an adjacent room to supposedly get a fresh supply of photostatic copies of the applicant's questionnaire. The applicant's questionnaire, which was specially prepared for the particular subject, was placed on top of a bundle of other questionnaires. As the experimenter returned with the bundle of questionnaires, the subject was asked to take one. The experimenter held the bundle in such a fashion that the only convenient choice available to the subject was the top questionnaire.

Stimulus Material

The stimulus material in the study appeared to be segments from a pre-recorded interview. The scene depicted involved a frontal close-up view of the job-applicant, shown from the waist up, responding to questions posed by an off-camera interviewer. The confederate was a white male in his early twenties.

The verbal content of the interview was held constant across conditions (see Appendix E, p. 117-120). The seven responses given by the applicant were tested

in a pilot study of 35 subjects to determine whether the statements would elicit differential responses from subjects. In the pilot study subjects were required to rate each of the applicant's seven responses as presented on videotape using the following eight point scale:

1._____The applicant was completely untruthful.

2._____The applicant was untruthful.

3._____The applicant was moderately untruthful.

4._____The applicant somewhat untruthful.

5._____The applicant somewhat truthful.

6._____The applicant moderately truthful.

7._____The applicant was truthful.

8._____The applicant completely truthful.

The mean truthfulness score for the seven statements was 6.37 with a standard deviation of 2.3. Although subject's ratings were skewed towards truthfulness, there was a seven point score range.

Dependent Measure

The videotape containing the interview paused temporarily after each of the applicant's seven responses in order to give the subjects an opportunity to evaluate each answer as it was made. Each of the confederate's responses was evaluated using the following three basic criteria:

a) How complete was the response?

b) How good was the response?

c) How truthful was the response?

The evaluations were made on three corresponding 22-point scales (see Appendix F, p. 121-127). The third item in the series, the truthfulness scale, constituted the main dependent measure. The scale values for the truthfulness estimation for each response were in the reverse direction. They were summed across the seven responses in order to derive a subject's total lie score which reflected the degree to which a subject perceived the applicant as lying over the course of the entire interview.

The next section in the subject's response booklet consisted of four six-point scales (see Appendix G, p. 128). These questions focused on the applicant rather than his individual responses. The first item asked whether the applicant should be hired or not hired. The subject was presented with six possible choices which

extended from "I strongly believe that the applicant should not be hired" to " I strongly believe that the applicant should be hired". The second question sought a recommendation concerning the applicant's salary. The choice of recommendation ranged from $ 3.60 per hour to $ 10.00 per hour. These two items were combined to form a composite score called the applicant's employability score.

The other two questions on this page focused on social attraction or liking for the job applicant. The subjects were asked to indicate the degree to which they would be willing to work alongside the applicant. The six choices ranged from "I would very much dislike working with this person" to "I would very much enjoy working with this person". The other attraction item required subjects to indicate the degree to which they would eventually grow to like the applicant given time. The six-point scale ranged from "I would probably like this person very much" to "I would probably dislike this person very much". These two items were also combined into a composite score and labelled the applicant's social attraction score. The composite scores derived from the four items in this section of the response booklet should reflect a subject's overall impression of the applicant as a result of the interview as a whole

rather than a response to the applicant's individual answers.

The final attached section in the response booklet consisted of five items. These items were preceded by the following statement:

> Job applicants want to make a good impression in an interview. Sometimes in doing so the applicant may not answer questions truthfully. As a result, one of the duties of an evaluator is to distinguish between a truthful and untruthful response. You have already been asked to evaluate whether the applicant was truthful or untruthful when answering the interviewer's questions. Another important ability of an evaluator is being able to determine <u>why a person might have chosen not to be truthful</u>. We are interested in knowing whether such judgments are possible after watching a videotape of an interview.

The above introduction set the premise for the subsequent items (see Appendix H, p. 130-131). First, the subjects were asked, "Was the applicant completely truthful during the entire interview?". If they indicate yes they were to skip the remaining questions

and wait. If they indicated no, they were to answer the four subsequent questions. The remaining items consisted of 19 point scales. The second question in this series required subjects to indicate the extent to which the applicant's failure to be truthful was due to situational pressures brought about by the interview process. The third question required the subject to indicate to what extent the applicant's failure to be truthful was due to the individual's personality. The fourth question asked the subjects to estimate how truthful or untruthful the applicant was expected to be in a non-interview routine conversations. The last item in this section required subjects to indicate the degree of guilt the job applicant experienced for having failed to respond truthfully during the interview. A composite score, which was labeled the lie accountability score, was developed from the latter four items. An extremely low composite score would suggest that the subject had assumed a non-blaming, situational perspective when considering the possibility that the applicant may have lied during the interview. That is, a subject was viewed as having a non-blaming situational viewpoint if the responses to these items suggested that the individual expected the applicant to be truthful during non-interview conversations, attributed the applicant's lack of truthfulness to situational pressures, avoided

making dispositional inferences, and believed that the applicant had experienced guilt when he failed to tell the truth. An extremely high composite score would suggest the opposite viewpoint on the part of the subject.

While supposedly waiting for the applicant to enter the laboratory to begin the live interview phase of the study the experimenter engaged the subject in conversation in an attempt to determine whether the subject had understood and accepted the contact manipulation. The subject was told that the experimenter was trying to determine if the introduction and instructions given were clear. The subject was then asked a series of questions beginning with the following:

What do you expect to happen now?

Who are we waiting for?

What was the experiment about?

The experimenter rated the subject's responses on the following three point scale:

1- The subject does not expect to meet the applicant appearing in the videotape.

2- The subject response was ambiguous and unclassifiable.

3- The subject expects to meet the applicant appearing in the videotape.

The subject was then given a separate page containing a final set of items consisting of two seven-point scales. These constituted manipulation checks for the similarity and motivation variables (see Appendix I, p. 129). In terms of the similarity manipulation, the subjects were asked to indicate "How similar were the applicant's attitudes to your [subject's] attitudes"? In terms of the motivation manipulation, the subjects were asked to "Indicate how strongly the applicant seemed to want the position for which he was being interview"?

Following the manipulation checks the subject was told that the study was over and was given a complete debriefing in which he or she was informed that the study involved some deception and the reasons for it. The subject was asked not to discuss the study with other students until the end of the semester.

Due to the complexity of the experimental procedures, the reader is provided with the following summary.

SUMMARY OF PROCEDURES

1. Initial Contact

   Subjects completed an attitude questionnaire which also contained the nine interpersonal trust items. Subjects were given an appointment for the laboratory session of the study.

LABORATORY SESSION

2. Cover Story

Subjects were told that study was comparing the impressions of a job applicant obtained from a videotaped interview with those obtained from a live interview. Subjects were let to expect that they would first evaluate the videotaped interview and conduct a live interview.

2. Expected Contact Manipulation

A. In the contact expected condition, subjects were told that the applicant in the videotape would be the same individual evaluated in the live interview.

B. In the no contact expected condition, subjects were specifically told the videotaped interview and the live interview would involve different job applicants.

3. Similarity Manipulation

Subjects were provided with questionnaires supposedly completed by the job applicant. Information from the subjects' own questionnaires were used to develop the false similarity-dissimilarity feedback.

A. In the high similarity condition the applicant's questionnaire exhibited a 90 percent

rate of agreement with the subject's responses on a similar questionnaire.

B. In the low similarity condition the applicant's questionnaire exhibited a 10 percent rate of agreement with the subjects' responses.

4. Motivation Manipulation

Subjects were shown a short videotaped segment in which the applicant either indicated that he very much wanted the position for which he was about to be interviewed or he indicated that he was not interested in the position.

5. Videotaped Interview

After each of the applicant's seven answers to the interviewer's questions, the videotape was stopped to allow subjects to evaluate each response using the three scales. "How truthful was the applicant's response?" served as the primary dependent measure.

6. Post Videotape Interview

Subjects encountered a number of scales at this point.

A. The first pair of items comprised the subject's employability rating of the applicant.

B. The next pair of items represented subject's attraction rating of the applicant.

C. The final items in the subject's response booklet were designed to determine whether subjects' attributed the applicant's untruthfulness to situational or dispositional factors.

7. Manipulation Checks

A. The experimenter engaged the subjects in conversation designed to determine whether they actually expected to take part and meet the job applicant during the live interview session.

B. Afterwards the experimenter handed subjects two scales which served at manipulation checks for the similarity and motivation manipulations.

8. Debriefing of Subjects

The purpose of the study was explained and subjects were asked not to discuss the study with other students.

4. RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

Contact Manipulation. A manipulation check of the three independent variables was conducted based on the responses of the entire sample. The check for the contact with applicant expectation manipulation was based on the experimenter's rating of the subject's responses when probed about understanding the instructions in the study. The subjects' responses were for the most part very clear and easy to classify in terms of the expectation of future contact with the applicant on videotaped. Listed below are some typical examples of the responses made by subjects:

Expected Contact Responses:

1) "It's funny that in the interview he said he's never late, and now we have to wait for him."
2) "That guy John [applicant's name] seems to be a serious person different from most of the students at Lehman ... I am looking forward to meeting him.

3) "Is everything in the live interview going to be the same, will he be wearing a suit like on the videotape ...".
4) "We are waiting for the person appearing in the tape to arrive in order for me interview him".

No Expected Contact Responses:

1) "Now we are waiting for this new guy to show up so that I can interview him".
2) "I am going to be asking this other student the same questions that the person in the film answered".
3) "Why couldn't this second applicant be a woman, why does it have to be another male?"
4) "I don't think its fair to compare these two interview if they're not very similar. How different is the applicant I'm interviewing from the one I just saw".

Based on the experimenter's classification system, the responses of 64 out of 66 subjects (or 97.0%) in the no-contact-expected condition were rated by the experimenter as indicating that the subjects did not expect to meet the applicant during the course of the study. The response of one subject in the no contact

expected condition suggested that they expected to have future contact with the applicant. (e.g. "I know the instructions said it would be a different person, but I bet its the same applicant I just seen.") The response of one subject in the no contact condition was designated ambiguous because it suggested both an expectation and no expectation of future contact. The responses of 62 out of 64 subjects in the contact-expected condition were rated as indicating that they did expect to meet the applicant in the videotape during the second (live interview) phase of the study. Two subjects in the contact expected condition did not expect to meet the applicant. The results indicate that the experimental procedures used to manipulate the expectation of future contact was adequate.

Subject-Applicant Similarity Manipulation. As part of the experimental procedures, subjects were asked to indicate on a 7 point scale how similar or dissimilar the applicant's attitudes were from their own attitudes. A 2 (contact) x 2 (similar) x 2 (motive) ANOVA showed a significant main effect for similarity on ratings of self-other similarity, F (1, 129) = 225.8, $p < .001$. The mean similarity rating (7-point scale) for the non-similar condition (M = 2.48) was significantly lower than the mean for the similar condition (M =5.32). No

other significant main effects or interactions were observed. The results indicate that the similarity manipulation was adequate.

Motivation Manipulation. At the end of the experimental session, subjects were required to rate on a 7-point scale how strongly the applicant appeared to want the position for which he was being interviewed, based on what the applicant had said before the interview. A 2 x 2 x 2 analysis of variance was performed on subjects' ratings of the applicants level of motivation. The results indicate a highly significant main effect for the motive condition, F (1, 129) = 121.8, $p < .001$. The mean motivation rating in the low motive condition (M = 3.62) was significantly lower than the mean rating in the high motive condition (M = 5.77). In addition, a main effect for contact was observed, F (1, 129) = 4.9, $p < .05$. The mean motivation rating for the non-contact condition (M = 4.53) was lower than the mean motivation rating for the contact condition (M = 4.86). No other main effects or interactions were observed. The results of the manipulation check indicate that the motive manipulation was adequate. In addition, the findings show that subjects tended to attribute greater motivation to an applicant when contact was expected. The latter results may be an artifact of subjects' interpreting the

applicant's participation in the study as an indication that he is a highly motivated individual.

Scale Reliability

The internal consistency of the scales was assessed by means of Cronbach's coefficient alpha. The alpha estimate of reliability for the 7-item lie scale was .38. This moderate alpha level was expected since each item was supposed to assess a distinct response by the applicant. The alpha estimate of reliability for the 9-item interpersonal trust scale was .69, a figure which is acceptable given that the scale was a short version of Wrightman's interpersonal trust scale. The 4-item lie accountability scale demonstrated a .65 level of internal consistency. The 2-item social attraction scale had an alpha level of .78. The 2-item employability scale had an alpha level of .47.

TESTS OF HYPOTHESES

Situational Factors and Lie Attribution Scores

Hypothesis 1 stated that expected contact with the applicant would decrease the degree to which lying was attributed to the job applicant. Hypothesis 2 stipulated that subjects' perceived similarity between self and the job applicant would decrease the degree to which lying was attributed to the job applicant. Hypothesis 3 predicted that a lack of perceived motivation on the part of the applicant would result in a decrease in the degree to which lying was attributed to the applicant. Table 1 presents the cell means and standard deviations for the lie attribution scores for the 130 subjects. The pattern of results is consistent with each of the three hypotheses. The overall average lie score was 48.6 in which the sum of the seven scales provide for a possible range from 7 (completely truthful on all responses) to 154 (completely untruthful on all response). The actual range of lie scores was 91 with a minimum score of 7 and a maximum score of 98. The lie scores across the eight experimental conditions showed a .21 degree of skewness and favors the perception of less lying.

Table 1

Means and Standard Deviations of Lie Attribution Scores by Contact, Similarity, and Motivation Conditions

		Low Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	M	54.1	45.4
	SD	16.7	18.1
	N	15	17
Contact Expected	M	44.9	33.3
	SD	16.4	14.4
	N	16	17

		High Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	M	73.8	52.3
	SD	16.8	22.1
	N	18	16
Contact Expected	M	45.8	37.4
	SD	22.2	19.2
	N	15	16

A 2(contact) x 2(similarity) x 2(motivation) analysis of variance was performed on the lie attribution scores. The results are shown in Table 2. The analysis revealed three significant main effects. First, the ANOVA indicated that there was a significant main effect for expected contact, $F(1,129) = 25.3$, $p < .001$. As Hypothesis 1 predicted, the mean lie attribution score for the contact-expected condition ($M = 40.2$) was significantly lower than the mean lie attribution score for the no-contact-expected condition ($M = 56.8$). Second, the analysis showed a main effect for perceived similarity, $F(1,129) = 16.0$, $p < .001$. As Hypothesis 2 predicted, the mean lie attribution score for the high perceived self-other similarity condition ($M = 42.0$) was significantly lower than the mean lie attribution score for the perceived low similarity condition ($M = 55.4$). Third, the analysis found a significant main effect for perceived motivation, $F(1,129) = 6.3$, $p < .01$. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the mean lying score in the low motivation condition ($M = 44.1$) was significantly lower than the mean lying score in the high motivation condition ($M = 53.1$). In addition, the analysis revealed that there were no interaction effects between the contact, similarity, and motivation variables. Thus, ANOVA results support all three hypotheses.

Table 2

Summary of Analysis of Variance of Effects of Contact, Similarity, and Motivation on Perceived Lying.

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Main Effects	16701.8	3	5567.3	16.6**
Contact	8497.9	1	8497.9	25.3**
Similarity	5378.7	1	5378.7	16.0**
Motivation	2123.4	1	2123.4	6.3*
2-Way Interaction	1381.4	3	460.5	1.4
Contact x Similarity	214.0	1	214.0	0.6
Contact x Motivation	914.4	1	914.4	2.7
Motivation x Similarity	199.9	1	199.9	0.6
3-Way Interaction	527.7	1	527.7	1.6
Explained	18611.0	7	2658.7	7.9
Residual	40986.2	122	335.9	
Total	59597.2	129		

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$

In order to determine how the main effect produced by the similarity manipulation was associated with liking a covariate analysis was performed on the lie attribution scores. The subjects' attraction ratings of the applicant served as the covariate. It should be noted that this analysis violates one of the assumptions of ANCOVA. The within-cell means for the covariate (i e. attraction scores) were not equal across conditions $F(3,129) = 6.6$, $p < .001$). This, however, was expected because of the theoretical relationship between the similarity manipulation and attraction.

As Table 3 shows, liking for the applicant as demonstrated by subjects' attraction rating was strongly related to the pattern of lie attribution scores, $F(1,129) = 20.5$, $p < .001$. When the effect of social attraction was statistically controlled through this procedure, the previous significant main effects for the anticipated contact and motive manipulations disappeared. Of the three main effects shown in Table 2, the only significant one to remain was that associated with similarity, $F(1,129) = 4.2$, $p < .05$. The results show that liking for the target person is strongly related to the perception of lying. However, these findings also indicate that subjects' tendency to attribute less lying to a similar perceived other

represents more than the effect of social attraction or liking for the target person.

Table 3

Summary of Covariate Analysis of Variance of Effects of Contact, Similarity, and Motivation on Perceived Lying when Controlling for Social Attraction Ratings.

Source of Variance	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F
Covariate	7286.5	1	7286.5	20.5**
Attraction	7286.5	1	7286.5	20.5**
Main Effects	2222.6	3	740.9	2.1
Contact	726.6	1	726.6	2.0
Similarity	1494.4	1	1494.4	4.2*
Motivation	13.6	1	13.6	0.0
2-Way Interaction	1827.0	3	609.0	1.7
Contact x Similarity	799.9	1	799.9	2.2
Contact x Motivation	12.6	1	12.6	0.0
Motivation x Similarity	1016.7	1	1016.7	2.9
3-Way Interaction	116.8	1	116.8	0.3
Explained	11452.8	8	1431.6	4.0
Residual	43032.6	121	355.6	
Total	54485.4	129	422.4	

* $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$

RELATION BETWEEN LIE ATTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYABILITY SCORES

Hypothesis 4 stated that there is an inverse relation between the perception of the applicant as lying and subjects' willingness to hire the applicant and the salary they would recommend he be offered. The willingness to hire the applicant and the salary recommendation were combined into a composite score labeled the applicant's employability score. A Pearson correlation was computed on the lie attribution and employability scores for the entire sample. As predicted, a significant negative relation between these two variables was observed for the entire sample of 130 subjects ($r = -.48$, $p < .001$). The relationship between lie attribution and employability remained essentially the same when a second Pearson correlation was performed in which within cell variance was pooled ($r = -.44$, $p < .05$).

In order to determine the goodness of fit of a linear model, R squared, sometimes called the coefficient of determination, was computed ($R2 = .24$. Since R square was not zero there is evidence of a linear relationship between lie attribution and employability scores for the observed sample. An ANOVA was performed to test the null hypothesis that the population slope was zero. The results indicate that a

significant linear relationship exist $F(1,128) = 39.2$, $p < .001$.

In order to determine if the overall negative relationship between perceived lying and the applicant's employability scores was consistent across the eight experimental conditions within-group correlations were performed. As shown in Table 4, seven of the eight cells displayed negative relations; however, only five of these cells were significant. Contrary to what was expected, one cell did show a very strong positive relationship between lie scores and employability. In general, the findings indicate that the perception that the applicant was lying had an appreciable negative social consequence for the speaker. The more lying was attributed to the applicant, the less likely was the applicant to be recommended for the position.

Table 4

Correlations Between Lie Attribution and Employability Scores by Contact, Similarity, and Motivation Conditions

		Low Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	-.20	-.50**
	n	15	17
Contact Expected	r	.52	-.68***
	n	16	17

		High Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	-.28	-.75***
	n	18	16
Contact Expected	r	-.60***	-.47**
	n	15	16

Note: All test are one-tailed
* p < .07; ** p < .05; *** P < .01

RELATION BETWEEN LIE ATTRIBUTION AND ATTRACTION SCORES

Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be an inverse relation between subjects' attraction rating of the applicant and lie attribution scores. A Pearson correlation was computed on these scores for the entire sample. As predicted, a significant negative relationship between perceived lying and attraction scores was found based on the entire sample of 130 subjects ($r = -.44$, $p < .001$). A second Pearson correlation was performed in which within cell variance was pooled. The results showed a somewhat weaker relationship between lie attribution and attraction scores ($r = -.34$).

In order to determine the goodness of fit of a linear model, R squared was computed ($r2 = .20$). Since R square was not zero, there is the presence of a linear relationship between lie attribution and attraction scores for the observed sample. An ANOVA was performed to test the null hypothesis that the population slope was zero. The results indicate that a significant linear relationship exist $F(1,128) = 31.3$, $p < .001$.

In order to determine if the overall negative relationship between perceived lying and the applicant's attraction scores was consistent across the eight experimental conditions within-group correlations were performed. As shown in Table 5, this negative pattern

was consistent across the majority of the experimental conditions. Seven of the eight cells demonstrated an inverse relation between perceived lying and the social attraction of the applicant; however, only five of these relationships were significant. The findings indicate that those subjects who attributed the greatest amount of lying liked the applicant least.

Table 5

Correlations Between Lie Attribution and Attraction Scores by Contact, Similarity, and Motivation Conditions

		Low Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	.10	-.40*
	n	15	17
Contact Expected	r	-.12	-.48**
	n	16	17

		High Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	-.45**	-.58***
	n	18	16
Contact Expected	r	-.36	-.39*
	n	15	16

Note: All test are one-tailed.
* p < .07; ** p < .05; *** P < .01;

RELATION BETWEEN LIE ATTRIBUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY SCORES

According to Hypothesis 6, the subjects with high lie attribution scores should have a tendency to view lying as stemming largely from an internal disposition of the speaker. A Pearson correlation between lie attribution scores and lie accountability scores was computed for that segment of the sample which indicated that the applicant had not been completely truthful during the entire interview. A total of 83 subjects fell into this category. The results indicate that there was a significant positive relationship (r = .37, p < .001) between subjects' lie attribution scores and accountability scores. A second correlation was preformed between lie attribution scores and accountability scores in which within cell variance for the eight experimental conditions were pooled (r = .45, p < .05).

In order to determine the goodness of fit of a linear model, R squared was computed ($r2$ = .14). Since R square was not zero, there is evidence of a linear relationship between lie attribution and accountability scores for the observed sample. An ANOVA was performed to test the null hypothesis that the population slope was zero. The results indicate that a significant linear relationship exist $F(1,128)$ = 13.0, p < .001.

In order to determine if the overall negative relationship between perceived lying and the applicant's attraction scores was consistent across the eight experimental conditions within-group correlations were performed. As shown in Table 6, the positive relation between lie attribution scores and lie accountability scores was exhibited consistently across the eight cells. However, only four of these cells exhibited significant correlations. These four cells were the ones which were expected to give arise to the highest lie attribution scores. In addition, these four cells were associated with intent (i.e. the high motivation to lie). The findings suggest that the greater the tendency of subjects to perceive the applicant as lying the more likely that the applicant was blamed and held primarily accountable for lying and viewed as having a general predisposition to engage in deception without feeling guilt or remorse.

Table 6

Correlations Between Lie Attribution and Lie Accountability Scores by Contact, Similarity, and Motivation Conditions

		Low Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	.15	.42
	n	10	9
Contact Expected	r	.10	.08
	n	13	7
		High Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	.38*	.71**
	n	16	11
Contact Expected	r	.83**	.60*
	n	10	7

Note: All test are one-tailed
* $p < .07$; ** $p < .05$

RELATION BETWEEN LIE ATTRIBUTION AND INTERPERSONAL TRUST SCORES

Hypothesis 7 stated that no relation between the attribution of lying and interpersonal trust would be evident. A Pearson correlations was computed for these scores for the entire sample. The analysis showed a low but significant negative correlation between lie attribution and interpersonal trust scores (r = -.18, p < .05). This finding was contrary to what had been predicted in Hypothesis 7. A second Pearson correlation was preformed in which within cell variance for the eight experimental conditions were pooled. The results were as predicted; no significant relationship between lie perception scores and interpersonal trust was observed (r = -.06). These results suggest that the negative correlation originally found may have been a statistical artifact. The coefficient of determination was near zero ($r2$ = .03) indicating little evidence of linearity.

In order to determine if the lack of a relationship between perceived lying and interpersonal trust scores was consistent across the eight experimental conditions within-group correlations were performed. Table 7 shows that no significant relationship was found between lie attribution scores and interpersonal trust within any of the eight conditions.

Table 7

Correlations Between Lie Attribution and Interpersonal Trust Scores by Contact, Similarity, and Motivation Conditions

		Low Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	-.42	-.20
	n	15	17
Contact Expected	r	-.34	-.20
	n	16	17

		High Motivation	
		Low Similarity	High Similarity
No Contact Expected	r	.03	-.24
	n	18	16
Contact Expected	r	-.39	.13
	n	15	16

Note: All test are two-tailed.

5. DISCUSSION

The results obtained in the present study suggest that situational factors have a significant impact on the perception of deception in social situations. Specifically, the findings are consistent with the three main hypotheses, which maintain that expected contact, perceived similarity, and the perceived lack of a motive to lie serve to decrease the probability that a listener will attribute lying to a speaker in a prerecorded video-taped interview.

The perception of lying is antithetical to a smooth interaction process and the development and maintenance of stable social encounters. The present research sought to understand some of the factors which contribute to the perception of deception in social situations independent of actual lying. The research had a number of basic objectives. The principal aim of the study was to demonstrate how the three specific situational factors just mentioned impact on the perception of lying. A second aim was to demonstrate that the perception of deception has negative consequences for the speaker who is perceived as lying. A third aim was to show that subjects who tend to perceive lying, tend also to attribute the use of deception to the internal disposition of the speaker.

The fourth aim of the study was to demonstrate that no relationship between the perception of lying and interpersonal trust would be observed in the data. The final aim in the study was to highlight the fact that there was a difference between lie detection and lie perception.

SITUATIONAL FACTORS AND THE PERCEPTION OF LYING

Contact Expectation

As Hypothesis 1 predicts, the degree of lying attributed to the job applicant when future contact with the speaker was expected was significantly lower than that attributed to the same target person when contact was not expected. This hypothesis was predicated from the notion that the concepts of "lying" and "liar" are perceived by most individuals as unpleasant and the underlying assumption that most people strive for consistency and harmony in their interpersonal relations (Heider, 1958). According to this reasoning, most individuals would prefer to avoid situations involving deception and people who resort to lying.

When an encounter is viewed as inevitable, the perception that the applicant lied during the videotaped interview meant that the subject knew that he or she would soon be involved in an encounter with someone known to lie. This would have led the observer to anticipate a relatively less pleasant and comfortable

interaction than that which would have been expected had the speaker not been perceived as lying. The results show that the expectation of contact serves to significantly inhibit the perception of lying. It appears that in order to circumvent unnecessary interpersonal and psychological complications and stresses associated with an unavoidable encounter, the observer chose to simply overlook the possible occurrence of lying and its potentially troublesome implications.

Assuming that the underlying interpretation for the observed effect between expected contact and the attribution of lying is correct, it is possible that the expected duration of an interaction will have a similar impact on the perception of deception. That is, if the observer's failure to perceive lying is due to an effort on his or her part to minimize the amount of stress associated with the anticipated encounter, then the tendency not to attribute lying to a speaker should be especially strong if the observer expects to have prolonged contact with the individual. People do seem to be more suspicious of strangers than of long-time acquaintances. This may be, in part, the result of the fact that the majority of the encounters with strangers tend to be brief and there is usually no expectation of future contact. In such situations, there is little at

risk in perceiving the possible use of deception. Given the potential negative consequences of being successfully deceived, there is a strong incentive to be suspicious. In encounters which are expected to last a relatively long time or in enduring relationships the benefits of being ever alert to the possibility of deception by the speaker does not compensate for the stress and discomfort such vigilance would cause. In such situations, the observer is much more prone to under-perceive lying.

Perceived Speaker-Observer Similarity

As Hypothesis 2 predicts, when observers perceived the speaker as similar to themselves, the amount of lying attributed to him was significantly lower than that attributed to the same target person when he was perceived as less similar to the self. The pattern of results suggests that perceived subject-applicant similarity served to significantly inhibit the perception of lying. Subjects in the similarity condition were exposed to exactly the same stimulus interview as subjects in the none-similarity condition and were therefore, the subject's were exposed to the same potential set of "deception cues". Yet significantly less lying was perceived by subjects in the similarity condition. It appears that subjects in the similarity condition found it much more difficult to

view the applicant as capable of engaging in deception than did subjects in the low similarity condition. Subjects in the similarity condition chose to overlook the possible presence of lying. Conversely, when the speaker was viewed as a dissimilar other, the subjects appeared to be less inclined to disregard or excuse potential indicators of lying.

The relationship between perceived similarity and the attribution of lying stems from balance theory and the apparent need for people to experience consistency and harmony in their interpersonal relations (Heider, 1958). Two basic premises of the lie perception model will be reiterated for clarification. First, it is assumed that some level of implicit trust is an initial component of most, if not all, social encounters. Second, the attribution that the speaker is lying is only one of several potential interpretations entertained by the observer. Once the encounter has commenced and the observer has some investment in it, it may seem inconsistent and cognitively dissonant for the observer to introduce a new, highly negative social label or concept such as lying into situation.

Motive to Lie

As Hypothesis 2 predicted, the degree of lying attributed to the job applicant in the low motive-to-lie condition was significantly less than that attributed to

the same target person in the high motive-to-lie condition. Most individuals tend to view the act of lying as stemming from a speaker's practical concerns. The job applicant in the low motive condition indicated that he neither wanted nor needed the job for which he was being interviewed. The applicant, therefore, was perceived as being under little pressure to make a favorable impression. Hence the subjects attributed less lying to the applicant than did subjects in the high motive condition, where he was apparently more concerned with making a good impression. The results suggest that the presumed purpose or reason for engaging in deception is an important consideration when observers contemplate attributing lying to a speaker.

These findings indicate that there is a motivational bias when making attributions concerning another person's possible use of deception. It should be noted that the motive manipulation did not specifically vary the speaker's motive or need to lie. Rather, subjects made this inference based on how apparently important it was for the speaker to make a good impression. These results suggest that when it is evident that an individual is concerned with how his or her responses are received, the listener will have a tendency to perceive the speaker as lying. In addition, it is expected that if the majority of a person's

responses are primarily favorable and lack negative information there will be a greater tendency to attribute lying to the individual. In other words, a job applicant who answers all the questions put to him or her in an apparently self-serving or socially desirable manner is more likely to be perceived as lying as compared to someone who consistently lies during the interview but appears to reveal some negative information about himself or herself. It appears that unless a speaker is perceived as a disinterested party or unless what the individual says appears to be contrary to his or her own best interests, the individual is likely to be perceived as engaging in some degree of deception, if not actual lying.

SOCIAL ATTRACTION AS A MEDIATOR IN THE PERCEPTION OF LYING

Tentative results seemed to suggest that liking was a mediating factor between the perception of lying and perceived motive to lie. The results showed that the motive to lie manipulation which was significant in a regular analysis of variance was not significant when subjects' social attraction rating of the applicant was used as a covariate. The association between perceived motive to lie and the attribution of lying seems direct and obvious. There does not to be any rational reason to expect that social attraction mediates the

relationship between these two variables. One should note that liking for the applicant was conceived as a dependent measure in this study and was not independently manipulated. In addition, subjects' social attraction rating of the applicant followed their evaluation of the applicant's responses for truthfulness. In terms of cause and effect, it is more likely that whether the applicant was viewed as truthful or untruthful served to determine the degree to which the applicant was liked and that this relationship, in turn, is responsible for the non-significant results associated with the motive to lie manipulation found in the covariate analysis.

The intuitive relationship between lying and motive (i.e., purpose served), makes it difficult to entertain any alternative interpretation of the findings. However, the same cannot be said about the expected contact and perceived similarity. The findings associated with both of these variables can seemingly be explained by appealing to a single factor, interpersonal attraction. Research has demonstrated that the expectation of future contact with a given individual often leads to greater liking for the person (e.g., Darley & Bercheid, 1967; Mirel & Mills, 1964). Intuitively, liking for a person should inhibit the tendency to attribute lying to the individual. Thus, it

can be argued that it is the difficulty and apparent inconsistency of attributing lying to an individual an observer likes that is responsible for the relatively lower lying scores associated with the speaker in the contact expected condition. This alternative interpretation would seem to be supported by the fact that when subjects' liking ratings for the applicant were used as a covariate, the relationship between expected contact and perceived lying was no longer significant.

Liking as an alternative interpretation for the association between expected contact and perceived lying is appealing because of its apparent simplicity. However, when one attempts to account for the underlying reason why expected contact should lead to greater liking, there seems to be no value in using liking as an alternative interpretation. The association between expected contact and liking is difficult to explain. The most reasonable interpretation is that liking when it stems from the expectation of future contact is the result of an attempt by the perceiver to convince himself or herself that the forthcoming encounter will be pleasant or, at least, not unpleasant. This is basically the same rationale used to account for the relationship between expected contact and perceived lying (see p. 29). The perception that the speaker is

capable of lying would lead the observer to anticipate a possibly unpleasant encounter. The observer, therefore, tends to refrains from making such an attribution. The use of liking for the speaker as an intervening variable which functions to inhibit the attribution of lying becomes superfluous. Anticipated liking for a person one expects to eventually meet and the failure to perceive lying during the encounter when it occurs seems to stem from the same underlying process. That is, given the expectation of future contact, the individual will tend to minimize dissonant expectations and foster consonant expectations. As a result, an individual will, for example, be less likely to assume that the person he or she is about to interact with is unpleasant and will be more likely to view the individual as intelligent (Schneider, 1973).

Interpersonal attraction as an alternative interpretation of the apparent negative relationship between perceived similarity and the perception of lying seems more palatable. It would seem natural that anything which results in increased liking for a person should also serve to inhibit the perception of deception. The fact that individuals are attracted to those who are perceived as similar others has been a highly consistent finding in the psychological literature (see Byrne, 1969 and 1971, for reviews).

Also, the attraction-inducing power of similarity has been demonstrated across a number of dimensions (e.g., Byrne et al, 1966; Byrne, 1971; Senn, 1971).[9]

Liking may seem at first glance to be a reasonable explanation of the association between similarity and perceived lying. It is not clear, however, that liking as an interpretation is able to account for the full range of the observed relationship. Awareness of self-speaker dissimilarity does not automatically engenders feelings of dislike or animosity which would be consistent with the perception that the speaker is also lying. Although the negative relationship between similarity and lying scores does not necessitate that more lying should be perceived in the dissimilar condition, initial pilot data suggests otherwise. Data from a pilot test of the stimulus script showed that when similarity between observer and speaker was not made an issue, most respondents perceived the job applicant as being truthful or moderately truthful. In other words, lie scores were relatively high despite the fact that no appeal to similarity was made. This would suggest that the observed relationship between the similarity-dissimilarity manipulation and the attribution of lying is primarily a function of the disinhibiting effect which perceived dissimilarity produces. Results from the present study provide

further support for this contention. Most subjects, regardless of condition, had lie scores which were skewed in the direction of truthfulness.

The covariate analysis provides further support for the contention that liking is probably not the primary determinant of the hypothesized relationship between similarity and the attribution of lying. A significant negative relationship between perceived similarity and the perception of lying was observed even after the effect of subjects' attraction ratings of the applicant were statistically controlled. Nevertheless, the dynamics which are responsible for the association between similarity and liking may help us account for the observed relationship between similarity and the attribution of lying. There are several theoretical explanations for the similarity-liking effect (see Byrne, 1971; Walster & Walster, 1963; Festinger, 1954). However, Heider's balance theory seems to provide the must useful model.

According to Heider's (1958) balance paradigm individuals have a predilection towards maintaining mental homeostasis. As a result, most people actively strive towards consistency and harmony in their interpersonal relationships. This is the underlying premise for the similarity-liking effect; the individual tends to gravitate toward less cognitively demanding

relationships. The same reasoning may be used to account for the negative relationship obtained in the present study between similarity and the attribution of lying. By viewing a person as similar to oneself, it may become cognitively disconcerting to introduce a highly disparaging label such as lying, once the encounter has commenced. Assuming that a person views himself or herself as basically honest and truthful, then the individual should also tend to see those who are considered similar as also possessing such qualities. Alternatively, if another person is perceived as dissimilar, it would not be inconsistent, according to Heider's model, to embrace negative perceptions concerning the other person's character. This effect occurs not because the dissimilar individual is less liked, but because there is less inhibition against making negative attributions.

THE IMPACT OF PERCEIVED LYING ON THE SPEAKER

As Hypothesis 4 predicted, subjects were less willing to hire the speaker who was perceived as lying. As Hypothesis 5 predicted, subjects liked the applicant less when he was perceived as lying than when he was perceived as being truthful. The results suggest that a person who is perceived as engaging in deception will incur a definite social penalty of devaluation and mistrust. Also, the person's chances to achieve the

goal apparently sought through deception will be reduced.

I believe that the positive relationship between lie perception and employability scores observed in the contact expected-low similarity-low motivate condition constitutes a spurious relationship which is mediated by the subjects' expectation of future contact with the applicant. That is, due to the low similarity manipulation associated with this condition, the subjects may have found it relatively easy to attribute some degree of lying to the speaker; however, the expectation of future contact with the applicant may have made it difficult for subjects not to recommend the speaker for a position.

My concern with the potential social consequences associated with the attribution of lying stems from a role-playing study by Maier and Janzen (1967) involving an interaction between an "instructor" and a "student" (see p. 24-25). Even though subjects were able to distinguish truthful from deceptive speakers, both sets of speakers apparently received what can only be described as positive reinforcement, an increased exam grade. It appears that in this study perceived lying had little or no negative consequence for the speaker. I offered a different interpretation of the findings. I believe that perceived lying does, in fact, have an

appreciable negative impact. However, an observer who perceives the speaker as lying is also subject to a certain degree of pressure to maintain the smooth flow of the interaction process. As a result, the observer will tend to refrain from exhibiting any outward signs which might otherwise jeopardize the interaction process. That is why observers in the Maier and Janzen study did not openly challenge the speaker perceived as lying.

It was my expectation that having the listener rate the speaker anonymously rather than having to behaviorially respond while simultaneously involved in an ongoing encounter would produce evidence that perceived lying exacts a cost. The results obtained in the present study were consistent with the two hypotheses concerning the social consequence of perceived deception. The speaker viewed as lying was liked less and received a lower employability score.

It is recognized that the present study which involves the assessment of a speaker who appears on videotape is rather an artificial situation when compared to a live dyadic encounter. It must be noted that there is a paucity of research on the effect on a speaker of perceived deception and that this stems, in part, from the inherent bias of lie detection research, which tends to focus on the identification and

recognition of social deception to the exclusion of other concerns. The present study should be regarded as an initial inquiry into this area. Further research as to how the belief that one is being lied to serves to affect the listener's behavior towards the speaker requires further study.

THE ATTRIBUTION OF LYING TO INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL CAUSES

As Hypothesis 6 predicts, the observers who tended to ascribe lying to the internal disposition of the speaker also perceived the greatest amount of lying. These findings are consistent with the assumption that high estimators of lying are more worried about being manipulated and are more likely to view deception as stemming from the malicious intent of the speaker as compared to the low estimators of lying. In other words, the fear of being lied to tends to lead high lie estimators to make more false-positive errors in the perception of lying in an effort to avoid being unwittingly deceived. Alternatively, it is not unreasonable to expect that observers will tend to ascribe the exhibition of a socially condemned behavior, such as lying, to a dispositional trait of the individual.

Since the obtained relationship between lie perception and lie accountability was merely

correlational, there is no way to determine the direction of causality or differentiate between these two competing interpretations. One procedure which would have helped tease these two interpretation apart would have been the inclusion of a questionnaire designed to assess fear of being deceived. Presumably, the consistently high estimator of lying operates from the perspective that a trust error (i.e., mistaking a lie for the truth) presents the highest risk of negative consequences, and is therefore the least desirable option. Such a person would be expected to score high on a fear of being lied to scale.

Another helpful procedure would have been to present the observer with multiple speakers to evaluate. The lie estimation bias, I believe, represents an active, although not necessarily conscious, attempt to minimize the probability of making what the observer believes is the worse of two possible mistakes (i.e., to mistake a lie for the truth rather than to fail to recognize a lie). Therefore, the tendency to be either a high or low lie estimator is expected to be consistent across speakers because estimation construct should represent a type of cognitive style that reflects an individual's strategy in interpersonal relations.

INTERPERSONAL TRUST AND THE PERCEPTION OF LYING

A basic premise of this study was that these interpersonal trust and the perception of lying constitute two independent concepts. It was imperative to demonstrate that the perception of lying did not simply reflect the conceptual opposite of interpersonal trust. Intuitively no relationship was expected, because interpersonal trust is viewed as a relatively stable disposition trait and the perception of lying is seen as a variable which is largely determined by fluctuating situational factors. The results support Hypothesis 7. No significant relationship between interpersonal trust and lie attribution scores were found which suggests that these two variables are, in fact, independent concepts.

LIE DETECTION VERSES LIE PERCEPTION

The term lie detection is associated with the underlying concept of accuracy and the notion that people can distinguish truthful statements from deceptive ones. Although much research has been devoted to demonstrating the existence of such a human ability, its reliability within the confines of an ongoing social encounter is highly suspect.

Yet despite the lack of an actual ability to detect lying, people are concerned with protecting themselves

from deception. Unfortunately, the attribution that someone is lying need not be accurate to have a potential impact on the situation.

A major aim of this paper has been to demonstrate that the perception of lying should be considered without reference to the issue of accuracy. Two aspects of the study reinforce this contention. First, subjects accepted the majority of the applicant's statements as truthful. However, the video-taped interview that subjects assessed was based upon a written script. That is, none of the statements made by the "job applicant" were actually true. Second, even when a statement was suspected of being false it was generally not rated very harshly. The results show that subjects' evaluations of the seven responses tended to be skewed in the direction of truthfulness. The failure to generally perceive lying and the tendency to minimize its presence when deception is suspected is consistent with two aspects of the lie perception model. First, it seems to support the notion that initial implicit trust is a common aspect of most social situations, and second it suggests that people have a tendency to resist making lie inferences.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

There are several methodological factors which serve to limit the generalizability of the results. The study did not involve an actual live encounter. Subjects exposure to the stimulus speaker was accomplished through the use of a video-taped interview. Although this procedure served to insure stimulus consistency, it was a highly artificial situation and the results obtained may differ to some degree from that which would be found in a live interaction.

Given the number of situational factors examined, the present study had a minimum number of subjects, an average of 16 per cell. Although the study included approximately equal numbers of males and females, gender differences could not be adequately tested. The inclusion of gender as an additional variable would have meant comparisons of samples of approximately eight subjects per cell.

The study was limited to white subjects and stimulus person. The question of whether there are racial differences in the tendency to attribute lying to a speaker or whether the race of the speaker will have an impact on the amount of lying perceived are issues that deserve further investigation.

Only one stimulus person was used and the order of the applicant's statements, although initially randomly

determined, was fixed throughout the study. It is, therefore, possible, that the obtained results were due to subjects' reaction to that particular stimulus person or the order of stimulus presentation.

In terms of lie accountability, the present research combined two separate issues--internal/external versus blaming/non-blaming. Although the precepts of actor or observer differences would suggest that when another person is perceived as engaging in a socially objectionable behavior, such as lying, there is a tendency to view the behavior as stemming from an internal disposition and to blame the individual for exhibiting it, these two factors can operate independently. Further, research should seek to determine under what conditions lying will be perceived as stemming from situational factors and what conditions increase or decrease the probability that the speaker will be held accountable for lying.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present study tends to support the lie perception model which suggests that the attribution of lying to a speaker stems from a host of factors many of which are independent of the actual presence of lying. The study shows that non-relevant situational factors such as the expectation of future contact with a speaker, perceived similarity between the self and

speaker, and a lack of a inferred motive to lie can produce a substantial degree of perceptual distortion in any attempt to recognize lying in an ongoing encounter.

The findings also suggest that the perception that a speaker is lying will have an impact on the quality of the interaction process. The study showed that when lying was attributed to an individual, it had a negative effect on how the speaker was generally viewed. The lower endorsement for employment given to the job applicant when perceived as lying also indicates that the inferred presence of lying has a potential impact on the listener's overt behavior to the detriment of the speaker. This study, however, did not provide any new insight on what factors determine whether and when a listener will make an issue of the speaker's veracity and openly challenge him or her during the encounter.

The study also demonstrated that there was a linear relationship between the perception of lying and the tendency to attribute lying to the internal disposition of the speaker. The results seem to suggest that individuals can be described using a lie estimation dimension of high to low estimators of deception. Further research is necessary to determine whether these two categories represent a consistent strategy in interpersonal relations.

In addition, the overall distribution of lie scores showed that the applicant was generally perceived as being truthful. This was interpreted as further support for the lie perception model which maintains that during the initial phase of an encounter there is a tendency towards implicit trust. It is possible that this initial form of trust which interactants tend to attribute to each other makes the subsequent attributions of lying to a speaker more dissonance provoking.

The use of interpersonal attraction as a covariate in an analysis of the lie scores showed that liking did not mediate the negative relationship between perceived similarity and the attribution of lying. The covariate analysis also showed that the expected-contact and motive manipulations were not significant. Since the applicant's attraction rating was conceived as a dependent rather than independent variable, these results were not interpreted as indicating that interpersonal attraction served as a mediating factor between perceived lying and the contact and motive variable. Instead it was assumed that the perception of the applicant as being truthful or lying served to determine whether the speaker was liked or not liked.

Finally, the study showed that the perception of lying was only weakly related to interpersonal trust. The findings indicate that these two factors represent independent construct.

** * **

FOOTNOTES

1. Within the context of this paper the terms lying and deception will be used interchangeably to refer to verbal deception.

2. Not all interactions involve an implicit presumption of trust; however, the focus of this paper is on the factors which contribute to the perception of lying which suggests that a change in perception must have occurred.

3. Typification schemes are highly integrated sequences of behavior which are ritualized in that these behavioral patterns are characteristically used or associated with specific roles or situations. These schemes allow an individual to apprehend the person s/he is interacting with in a quick and efficient manner to promote a smooth encounter, even when the interaction is between two strangers.

4. The "promissory" quality of a face-to-face encounter refers to expectations that are never explicitly discussed but nonetheless come to be relied upon by the interactant.

5. The realization that something in the encounter is wrong tends to operate as an impetus, motivating the listener to consider various potential explanations in an attempt to interpret and label the experience.

6. The awareness that something is wrong stems from the listener becoming conscious of some inconsistency. Perhaps the speaker's behaviors are inconsistent with the way the listener expects the person to be acting. Perhaps the listener does not feel the way s/he originally anticipated s/he would feel like. Or perhaps the encounter is not going in the direction originally expected. The level of inconsistency encountered will probably have an effect on whether a lying inference is made. That is, if the inconsistencies are mild enough, they may go unnoticed or ignored. Too extreme, and the listener may not wait to interpret the situation; the listener may simply exit the situation, bringing the encounter to an abrupt end.

7. The response options available to the listener are mutually inconsistent; the selection of any one should lead to a heightened sense of dissonance rather than satisfaction.

8. The listener will continue to search for an explanation for the apparent sense of discomfort. If no viable alternative explanation can be found, the listener may reconsider the lie interpretation.

9. Perhaps this will be considered a matter of semantics rather than of substance but it appears to me that similarity does not induce liking, per se. Rather, similarity produces the expectation of possible liking (e.g. Given what I know about him, I will probably like him). The effect is based on the minimizing of potential conflicts (e.g. we agree on most things) and on the validation of ones own view's through social comparison (e.g. I'm not the only one who still likes Nixon). The expectations associated with similarity can lead to self-fulfilling prophecy situation.

APPENDIX A

(INTRODUCTION TO APPLICANT'S QUESTIONNAIRE)

INTRODUCTION

Instead of a resume you have been given a copy of a questionnaire which the applicant John Garwin completed. It is hoped that knowing something about the applicant's attitudes and opinions will prove helpful in evaluating the applicant.

Read each item very carefully and consider how the applicant responded to each statement. You will be given a few minutes to consider his responses.

If there are no questions please

TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE AND BEGIN.

APPENDIX B

(COVER SHEET FOR SUBJECT'S QUESTIONNAIRE)

DO NOT WRITE YOU NAME

If you would like to participate
in the study please fill-in the

LAST FOUR DIGITS OF YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER.

[_____]

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

This is part of a study on impression formation. First impressions are very important, they influence how we react to other people and how other people react to us. The accuracy of first impressions is especially important in the job-interview situation, where the participants are essentially strangers.

In this study we want to compare a videotape interview with a live face-to-face interview. Previous research has shown that having more than one interviewer evaluating the same individual results in a better and more fair applicant selection process; however, interviewing a person more than once poses many problems for both the company that is hiring and the applicant. The use of videotapes would enable more people the opportunity to review an applicant's performance without having to interview the person more than once.

The study will take an hour and consist of two parts. In the first phase of the study you will evaluate a videotape interview consisting of seven brief questions. In the second part of the study a live job-applicant will respond to the same set of seven questions. At the end of the study the evaluations of the videotape interview and the live interview will be compared.

*****

As part of the study we are interested in determining whether there is a relationship between people's attitudes and their evaluations. We would like you to complete the questionnaire that follows: Remember these are attitudes and opinions; there are no right or wrong answers.

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

Note: Items marked by "*" appeared in applicant's questionnaire but did not appear in applicant's (similarity feedback) questionnaire.

*1. Most people will speak out for what they believe in.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

2. A person needs a college education to be successful.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

3. Smoking should be prohibited in public areas.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

4. In general, people watch too much television.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*5. In an emergency, the average person will try to help others.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

6. Most crime victims only have themselves to blame.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

7. School prayers should be encouraged in the public schools.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*8. Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

9. It is better to get an abortion than be an unwed mother.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*10. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they're just afraid of getting caught.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

11. There is never a good enough reason to get a divorce.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

12. It is wrong for unmarried couples to live together.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

13. Birth control should be made available to adolescents.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

14. Physical exercise should be an important part of one's life.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

15. Children need strict discipline.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

16. Most college professors are concerned about student needs.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

17. Generally, who you know is more important than what you know.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

*18. The average person will attempt to return a lost wallet to its rightful owner.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

19. Money is one of the most important goals in life.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

20. Married women should not pursue a careers of their own.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*21. Most people usually take advantage of an unselfish person.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

22. The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*23. People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people stick to them when the chips are down.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

24. Marijuana should be legalized.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

25. One's career is more important than one's family.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

26. People who work hard and keep trying will eventually succeed.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*27. Most people will not keep a friend's secret confidential.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

Remember to place an "X" over the number that is closest to the way you feel.

28. People should ignore group opinion if they disagree with it.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

29. War is sometimes necessary to solve world problems.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

*30. The average person can be trusted.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
STRONGLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY DISAGREE		SLIGHTLY AGREE		STRONGLY AGREE

* * *

APPENDIX C

INTERPERSONAL TRUST ITEMS

1. Most people will speak out for what they believe in.

2. In an emergency, the average person will try to help others.

3. Most people would cheat on their income tax if they had a chance.

4. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason;
they're just afraid of getting caught.

5. The average person will attempt to return a lost wallet to
its rightful owner.

6. Most people usually take advantage of an unselfish person.

7. People claim that they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people stick to them when the chips are down.

8. Most people will not keep a friend's secret confidential.

9. The average person can be trusted.

APPENDIX D

(COVER SHEET)

SUBJECT RESPONSE BOOKLET

You are about to take part in a study on impression formation. You are part of the group which will be watching a videotape of a job interview involving John Garwin that was recorded earlier in the year by the Office of Career Services.

This is an ANONYMOUS QUESTIONNAIRE--

DO NOT write your name:

DIRECTIONS: Please answer the following questions by placing an "X" in the appropriate space.

1. AGE:_____years.

2. SEX: [ ] FEMALE [ ] MALE

3. ETHNIC BACKGROUND:
   ____ASIAN
   ____BLACK
   ____HISPANIC
   ____WHITE
   ____OTHER:_____

4. RELIGION:
   ____NONE
   ____CATHOLIC
   ____JEWISH
   ____PROTESTANT
   ____OTHER:_____

5. YEAR IN COLLEGE: _____

PLEASE WAIT FOR INSTRUCTIONS-- DO NOT TURN PAGE

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEWER-APPLICANT VIDEOTAPE SCRIPT

INTERVIEWER: As you know before we could participate in this program we had to agree not to ask students for school transcripts. Career Services Office felt that it would be a violation of a student's right to privacy. Therefore, what I learn about you during this interview will greatly influence whether I can recommend you for a position with our firm. Don't be nervous, but please answer the questions as best you can.

QUESTION 1.

Interviewer: To begin with we are looking for a responsible employee. Do you consider yourself a responsible person, and if so, why do you think so?

Applicant: I think I am a responsible person. I have had an after school job since I was 14 years old. I have not taken a day off in the last two years and I am almost never late. I am putting myself through school, my family could not afford the added expense. I have my own car. It was wasn't a new car when I got it, but I did buy it with my own money and without anyone's help. And although I still live at home, I contribute my fair share to the household budget for food and rent. I think these things demonstrate that I am a responsible person.

QUESTION 2.

Interviewer: I understand that you are not presently employed. Why did you leave your last place of employment?

Applicant: I used to work at Westside Audio, an entertainment and appliances store, located in upper Manhattan. I worked there for about two years. I left the store at the beginning of this semester when a conflict arose between my working hours and class schedule. I needed certain courses; I really didn't have much of a choice; so I left the store. I decided that if I could not find another job this semester, I would concentrate more attention on my schoolwork.

QUESTION 3.

Interviewer: We want someone who has had experience in retail sales, and is comfortable interacting with people face-to-face. Do you have any sales experience?

Applicant: I have had some experience selling stereos, televisions and other major appliances. Originally, I was a stockman at Westside Audio; usually I helped with deliveries. But, in the last six months that I worked at the store I was mostly involved in sales. I convinced the manager to let me substitute for a salesman when he was shorthanded. Eventually, I was left in sales permanently. I remained in the sales department until I left the store. I enjoyed working with customers and did quite nicely.

QUESTION 4.

Interviewer: Since we cannot ask you for a school transcript, how would you rate yourself academically?

I am paying for my education so I take it seriously. I study, I enjoy learning; I am very seldom late or absent. I try to participate in class discussions. I think I can say that I am an above average student. I made the Dean's list last semester. I have a 3.28 grade index, which means that I have a better than a B average. In my major I have a 3.41 grade point average. I usually get B's or better in my classes. I have never failed a course. However, I once received a D in chemistry, because I under estimated how difficult the course was. I should never have taken it that particular semester. I was working too many hours after school and could not devote the necessary study time to the course. I took biology the next semester and received an -A. So in general, I do think that I am a good student and that I have done well in college.

QUESTION 5.

Interviewer: The position we are seeking to fill will involve some basic but necessary office duties. Do you have any relevant office skills. For example, can you type or use a word processor?

Applicant: I have never worked with a word processor. I can type. I made it a point to learn how after my first semester. I bought a book on typing, practiced and eventually learned. I can type approximately 65 words per minute and I am very accurate. I am taking a computer course this semester and we are learning to use word processing programs. I don't know what my final grade will be but I did really well on the first major class assignment, so I expect to do well in the course.

QUESTION 6.

Interviewer: Letters of recommendation are extremely important in our hiring decision. We would like three letters of recommendation. One of these letters must be from your former employer. Can you comply with this request?

Applicant: I can get three letters of recommendation from people who know me. What I would like to know is whether a letter from my former employer is really necessary? You see, the store manager wanted me to work more hours this semester than my school schedule would allow. I needed certain courses which I could not postpone, so I had to quit. I think the manager took it personally and felt I led him down. I didn't want to leave the store; I needed the money. I offered to continue to work on a part-time basis, but he wanted more hours than I could give him. Now I am afraid that he might refuse to write me a letter of recommendation or worse. So I rather have someone else write the third letter of recommendation, if I can.

QUESTION 7.

Interviewer: Our company has foreign clients. Often our employees comes in contact with foreign visitors, and recent immigrants. That is why we will be favoring an applicant who knows at least one foreign language. Can you read or speak another language?

Applicant: Yes, I can speak and write in French. I have had two and a half years of French in college. This included one year of French literature. I have an overall B+ average in French. I found that my knowledge of French was very useful when I worked at Westside Audio. The store was located in a neighborhood that had many recent immigrants from Haiti who did not know English very well.

APPENDIX F

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 1

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



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TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 2

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



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TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 3

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



***

TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 4

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



***

TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 5

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



***

TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 6

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



EXTREMELY INCOMPLETE (did not answer question) | SOMEWHAT INCOMPLETE | SOMEWHAT COMPLETE | EXTREMELY COMPLETE (answered the question)

2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



EXTREMELY POOR (unsatis-factory) | SOMEWHAT POOR | SOMEWHAT GOOD | EXTREMELY GOOD (excellent)

3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



EXTREMELY UNTRUTH-FULLY | SOMEWHAT UNTRUTHFULLY | SOMEWHAT TRUTHFULLY | EXTREMELY TRUTHFULLY

***

TURN TO THE NEXT PAGE and wait for the applicant's next response.

INTERVIEW QUESTION NO. 7

Using the following three items--Evaluate the Applicant's response that you have just observed by circling the dot that is closest to the way you feel.

1. To what degree did the applicant answer the interviewer's question? (Circle One):



2. How would you rate the quality of the applicant's answer to the question? (Circle One):



3. How truthfully do you think the applicant answered the question? (Circle One):



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PLEASE CONTINUE ON TO NEXT PAGE

APPENDIX G

OVERALL IMPRESSION

Now that you have seen how the applicant answered all the questions in the interview please complete the following four items.

1. HIRING DECISION: (Check One)

____ I strongly believe that the applicant should not be hired.

____ I believe that the applicant should not be hired.

____ I somewhat believe that the applicant should not be hired.

____ I somewhat believe that the applicant should be hired.

____ I believe that the applicant should be hired.

____ I strongly believe that the applicant should be hired.

2. SALARY RECOMMENDATION: NOTE: Even if you disagree, the applicant may still be hired because the decision is made by a group of evaluators.

What salary would you recommend for this applicant? (Check One):

____ $ 3.60 per hour (or $144/week)

____ $ 4.00 per hour (or $160/week)

____ $ 5.00 per hour (or $200/week)

____ $ 6.00 per hour (or $220/week)

____ $ 7.00 per hour (or $280/week)

____ $ 8.00 per hour (or $320/week)

____ $ 9.00 per hour (or $360/week)

____ $10.00 per hour (or $400/week)

OVERALL IMPRESSION
(continued)

3. WORKING SIDE BY SIDE: (Check One)

____ I would very much dislike working with this person.

____ I would dislike working with this person.

____ I would dislike working with this person to a slight degree.

____ I would enjoy working with this person to a slight degree.

____ I would enjoy working with this person.

____ I would very much enjoy working with this person.

4. GIVEN TIME: (Check One)

____ I would probably like this person very much.

____ I would probably like this person.

____ I would probably like this person to a slight degree.

____ I would probably dislike this person to a slight degree.

____ I would probably dislike this person.

____ I would probably dislike this person very much.

APPENDIX H

OVERALL IMPRESSION

Job applicants want to make a good impression during an interview. Sometimes in doing so the applicant may not answer the questions truthfully. As a result, one of the responsibilities of an evaluator is to distinguish between a truthful and an untruthful response. You have already been asked to evaluate whether the applicant was truthful or untruthful when answering the interviewer's questions.

* Another important ability of an evaluator is being able to determine why a person might have chosen not to be truthful.

We are interested in knowing whether such judgments are possible using only a videotape of an interview.

1. Was the applicant completely truthful during the entire interview?

(Check One):

NO:-[ ]	[ ]-:YES
If you answered no please answer questions 2 thur 5.	If yes, skip questions 2 thur 5.

2. If you believe the job applicant was not completely truthful when answering the interviewer's questions

Please indicate the extent to which you feel that the reason he was untruthful was due to the special pressures that can result from being involved in an interview situation.

THE JOB APPLICANT'S UNTRUTHFULNESS WAS:
(CIRCLE ONE)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

NOT DUE TO SITUATIONAL PRESSURES	MODERATELY DUE TO SITUATIONAL PRESSURES	DUE SOLELY TO SITUATIONAL PRESSURES

GO TO NEXT PAGE

3. Please indicate the extent to which you feel that the reason the applicant was untruthful was due to his personality or character (that is, he frequently does not tell the truth).

THE JOB APPLICANTS UNTRUTHFULNESS WAS:
(Circle One)



4. Please indicate how truthful you expect the job applicant would be in routine everyday conversational situations (i.e. in non-interview settings).

(Circle One)



5. Assuming that the applicant had not been completely truthful during the interview, how do you think the applicant felt while being untruthful?

(Circle One)

THE APPLICANT FELT:



APPENDIX I

(Manipulation Checks for Perceived Similarity and Motive)

QUESTIONS ON THE EXPERIMENT

We are interested in your reactions to certain parts of the experiment.

1. Based ONLY on the applicant's questionnaire: How similar were the applicant's attitudes to your attitudes?

(Circle One):



2. Based ONLY on what the job-applicant said before the interview during the introductory statement, indicate how strongly the applicant seemed to want the position for which he was being interviewed.

(Circle One):



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