REGIONAL PARTY SYSTEMS IN ETHNOFEDERAL STATES

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2012

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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Scholars of federalism and political parties argue that ethnic federalism leads to the creation of regional and ethnoregional parties at the expense of national parties. Critics of ethnofederalism claim that a regional party system dominated by branches of national parties in ethnofederal states is virtually impossible and argue that ethnoregional parties act as centrifugal forces that threaten the territorial integrity of the state. Using the case of Russia this dissertation shows that the rise of regional parties is not a direct result of ethnofederal institutional structures but a product of specific electoral systems. Then, using the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, and Nigeria, I demonstrate the central role of electoral rules and institutions in shaping party systems in ethnofederal states.

Next, I look at the sources of variation in regional party systems in ethnofederal democracies. I demonstrate that the ethno-demographic compositions of the federal units provide the best explanation for this variation. Using the cases of India, Pakistan (1988-1999), Spain, Canada, and Belgium I show that the ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities are more likely to provide electoral support for national parties, regardless of their region of residence. For example, I find that Hindus, despite their linguistic, regional, and tribal heterogeneity, are more likely to support national parties than other ethnic communities in India. Similarly, I find that Anglophones in Canada and Castilian-speakers in Spain provide the most

consistent support for national parties. Belgium and Pakistan, on the other hand, lack an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community; as a result, Belgium has no national parties and Pakistan's national parties in the 1990s were perceived as increasingly ethnoregional, drawing most of their support from Sindh and Punjab regions. My findings, therefore, are twofold: they demonstrate that the formation of regional parties is not solely a product of ethnofederal institutional design and that electoral strength of regional parties is not a common characteristic of all ethnofederal states. Their presence depends on electoral institutions and on the ethno-demographic composition of the federal unit in question.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Introduction

By 2011, at least thirteen states have adopted ethnofederalism or ethnofederal features in an attempt to preserve their territorial integrity and avoid or moderate ethnic conflict. However, studies of federalism demonstrate that ethnofederal institutions often serve to dismember rather than consolidate multinational states. The USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia disintegrated along their federal lines. The Republic of Georgia, which inherited an ethnofederal structure from the Soviet era, has experienced armed and/or political conflict with all three of its autonomous regions[1] while avoiding conflict with minorities that did not possess territorial autonomy. Referenda on the sovereignty of Quebec and political crises in Belgium demonstrate that ethnofederal instability is not specific to one-party states of Eastern Europe. The most common criticism of ethnic federalism is that such a system promotes politics based on ethnic division and ethnoregional cleavages. In democracies this propensity is most commonly expressed through the electoral strength of ethnoregional parties at the expense of national parties; therefore, one of the main debates about ethnofederalism in democratic societies revolves around the question of parties. Indeed, some scholars argue that ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states are inevitable. Why then do ethnoregional parties dominate regional legislatures in some ethnofederal units but are largely absent in others? When do ethnoregional parties form and not? What explains variation in regional party systems in democratic

[1] In this dissertation, I use regions to refer to federal units within an ethnofederal state. I use the terms regions, subnational regions/units/territories, territorial autonomies, and federal units interchangeably.

ethnofederal states?

Scholars of federalism and political parties argue that ethnic federalism leads to the creation of regional and ethnoregional parties at the expense of national parties. Critics of ethnofederalism claim that a regional party system dominated by branches of national parties in ethnofederal states is unlikely and argue that ethnoregional parties act as centrifugal forces that threaten the territorial integrity of the state. Overall, these studies assume that the rise of regional and ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states is unavoidable and that all ethnically based territorial units are expected to have strong regional and ethnoregional parties.

However, the empirical evidence contradicts these assumptions. For example, despite its ethnofederal make-up, Russia failed to develop any significant regional parties in the 1990s, suggesting both that party development is not inevitable and territorial structure cannot explain party formation, development, or underdevelopment. In addition, considerable variation exists in regional party systems in ethnofederal states. For example, in Spain, Andalusia is dominated by national parties, Catalonia is dominated by ethnoregional parties, and in Galicia national parties share electoral popularity and power with regional ones. The same variation extends to other ethnofederal states, such as India. Electoral systems cannot account for this variation because ethnofederal units that are part of the same federal state tend to use similar electoral systems. What then explains the lack of political parties, regional or otherwise, in Russia in the 1990s and what accounts for the variation in regional party systems in democratic[2] ethnofederal states?

First, using the case of Russia, this dissertation will show that the rise of regional parties is not an automatic result of ethnofederal institutional structures but a product of specific electoral systems. Next I will examine the effect of electoral rules and institutions on party

[2] This term "democratic" will be discussed and operationalized later in this chapter.

systems in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia. Then I will explore possible sources of variation in regional party systems. Finally, I will demonstrate that ethno-demographic compositions of the federal units provide the best explanation for this variation.

The main opposition to ethnofederalism stems from the argument that ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states are inevitable and that they lead to instability. However, even a brief survey of regional legislatures in ethnofederal democracies is sufficient to refute the direct correlation between ethnoterritorial design and regional party systems. Therefore, if the second assumption is true, that is, if the electoral dominance of ethnoregional parties is associated with a higher level of political instability, it is important to understand why populations of some ethnofederal units support ethnoregional parties whereas populations of other ethnofederal units support national ones. This dissertation proposes a classification of regional party systems which can then be used to study sources of conflict in ethnofederal democracies and identifies causes of variation in regional party systems. This study is especially timely considering the amount of contemporary interest in federal solutions to ethnoregional conflict, in places ranging from the United Kingdom, Italy, and Ukraine to Iraq and Afghanistan. Ethnofederal territorial designs have most recently been introduced in Ethiopia (1995) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995). Despite this interest, while ethnofederations in the process of transition have attracted a lot of attention from scholars due to their susceptibility to secessionist movements and territorial disintegration along ethnofederal lines, systematic studies of ethnofederal democracies remain scarce. This dissertation aims to address this gap by analyzing regional party systems in all democratic ethnofederal states.

Why Parties?

Political parties are formed and shaped by ambitious office-seeking politicians in order to

make the electoral and legislative processes more efficient (Aldrich 1995). Parties may be defined as political organizations whose main goal is to gain access to political offices through elections (Downs 1957). Therefore, "mobilizing the electorate to capture office is a central task of the political party" (Aldrich 1995: 19).

Political parties are the main instruments of policy making and political mobilization in many states, regardless of political regime type:

> It is not simply that parties are central to elections and to policy making, or that they make and break governments, administer patronage, and make decisions that deeply affect a nation's welfare. Under their aegis, mass publics are mobilized for good and evil, revolutions are fomented, dissidents are arrested, tortured and killed, and ideologies are turned into moral imperatives. Not only democracies, then, but political systems of every conceivable variety seem unable to function without the presence of one or more parties (Anderson and LaPalombara 1992: 393).

Parties are not exclusive to democracies. However, in authoritarian regimes a ruling political party, facing little competition, tends to mobilize the population for the purpose of the central state rather than divergent regional, ethnic or other interests and cleavages. Moreover, oppositional parties' mobilizational power and ability to affect policy outcomes are limited, both by formal rules and informal practices. In authoritarian states, therefore, it is more likely that parties supportive of the government are the only ones with sufficient mobilizational resources to set the government agenda and influence policy. This general observation about political parties in purely authoritarian states does not apply to "competitive authoritarian" (Levitsky and Way 2002) regimes. Competitive authoritarian regimes are often described as partial or "diminished" democracies. These regimes are not fully authoritarian because of their use of formal democratic institutions which include regular elections; they are also not fully democratic, because of the presence of frequent and massive electoral fraud, abuse of state resources by the incumbents,

repression of the political opposition and the media, etc. (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52-53). In competitive authoritarian regimes, most opposition parties remain weaker than their counterparts in democratic states but not to the same extent as in purely authoritarian states, where elections are either banned or not competitive. In competitive authoritarian regimes, elections, despite extensive electoral fraud and harassment of the opposition, are competitive and outcomes are not always certain (Levitsky and Way 2002, 55).

In a democratic state, parties "represent the principal instrument through which segments of the population compete to secure control of elective institutions, and through them to exercise predominant influence over public policies" (Anderson and LaPalombara 1992: 393). Parties both react to and shape public opinion, preferences of the electorate, and political identities (Horowitz 1985, 291). In the electorate, parties provide information shortcuts for voters (simplifying their choices during elections), educate the public about various political issues, construct symbols of political identification, and mobilize potential voters in the democratic process (Dalton and Wattenberg 2000, 6-7) – not for altruistic reasons but to get their candidates elected into office. In government, parties are the main actors in public policy decisions both for ideological reasons and for the purposes of reelection.

The recent literature on federalism and decentralization has focused on the effect of political parties on the presence, nature, and intensity of conflict between ethnically demarcated regions and the center. Scholars argue that decentralization and territorial autonomy based on the ethnic principle leads to the formation of ethnic and regional parties and such parties lead to conflict (Brancati 2006, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). For example, Brancati (2006) argues that decentralized political systems are less likely to experience ethnic conflict and secessionist movements because decentralization creates greater opportunities for political

participation and allows local communities to express their concerns and protect their interests. However, she finds that decentralization promotes the development of regional parties, and regional parties undermine decentralization's stabilizing potential because they reinforce regional and ethnic identities, produce policies that threaten regional minorities, and mobilize communities to participate in ethnic conflict. Chhibber and Kollman (2004) similarly demonstrate a direct relationship between regionalization and formation of regional parties, although they do not discuss stability of federal or territorially decentralized states. Filippov, et al. (2004) argue that ethnofederal states are unstable because they discourage cross-regional integration of political parties. Parties in ethnofederal states are ethnoregional; a regional party system dominated by branches of national parties in ethnofederal states is virtually impossible, because ethnicity becomes "the primary integrative mechanism" (Filippov, et al. 2004, 273). Critics of ethnofederalism argue that in societies where ethnicity is significantly politicized by ethnic entrepreneurs (political parties, politicians, intellectuals, etc.), ethnic identity then continues to link political elites at different levels of government, and, if ethnic groups are not territorially dispersed but are instead concentrated and granted regional autonomy, the likelihood of inter-regional integration of political parties diminishes. Furthermore, ethnoregional parties increase the salience of ethnoregional cleavages, which lowers electoral support for national parties in ethnically based autonomous regions. In general, scholars observe: "in most democracies the dominant form of ethnoregional conflict occurs among political parties" (Newman 1996, 3).

Some scholars maintain that ethnic parties are a product of divided societies and also exacerbate conflict in such societies. Horowitz (1985) argues that ethnic parties make for divisive politics which ultimately threatens the state's stability. Ethnically divided societies have

a propensity to form parties based on ethnic cleavages, especially if ethnic groups are large enough to make for powerful electoral allies (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004). Horowitz (1985) maintains that non-ethnic or interethnic parties in such societies are uncommon, and they are prone to centrifugal forces. Overall, the literature on decentralization, political parties, and ethnically diverse societies assumes that political parties may either contribute to or thwart political and territorial stability. Specifically, ethnic parties in democratic societies are viewed as inimical to stability of the state (Filippov, et al. 2004; Horowitz 2005). The association between ethnic parties and ethnic conflict is so common that some scholars use the presence of ethnic parties as one of the principal measures of ethnic conflict in democratic states (see Vanhanen 1999).

However, not everyone agrees that ethnic parties necessarily promote more conflict in divided societies. Some scholars maintain that political and electoral systems that allow ethnic parties to form and participate in government promote greater cooperation and compromise between ethnic groups. For example, Lijphart (1977) criticizes majoritarian democracy for permanently excluding ethnic minorities from the decision-making process. Instead, he proposes a consociational arrangement – a system of elite cooperation which provides institutional constraints on extremist politics by requiring grand coalitions, proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy. In consociational states, all major ethnic groups are represented in government by ethnic parties. Hechter (2000) and Birnir (2007) similarly argue that by allowing nationalist groups to express their demands through legitimate political channels such as political parties, states are likely to avoid violent conflict. In contrast, if states restrict nationalist groups' political participation through legitimate means, these groups are likely to adopt violent tactics. Moreover, political exclusion leaves no room for compromise and leads to political intransigence

of nationalist groups; political inclusion leads to moderation of nationalist parties' political behavior (Birnir 2007). In sum, the debate about ethnically heterogeneous democracies, including ethnofederal states, revolves around political parties and party systems. However, little research has addressed the subject of parties and party system formation in ethnofederal democracies. What kinds of party systems, especially at the regional level, form in ethnofederal states and under what conditions?

Formation of Regional Party Systems

Scholars have attributed the formation of regional and national parties to the level of decentralization (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Brancati 2006), ethnofederal institutions (Filippov, et al. 2004), and electoral institutions (Reilly 2002; Horowitz 2004).

The recent literature on party system formation in federal states demonstrates that a greater level of centralization leads to party aggregation (Chhibber and Kollman 2004) or linkage (Cox and Knoll 2003). Centralization of authority and resources provides voters with an incentive to attempt to influence policy-making at a higher level of government and party politicians with an incentive to merge with other parties to increase their chances of securing influential national, as opposed to local or regional, offices. A greater degree of decentralization, in contrast, provides less incentive for party aggregation because most of the power and revenues are concentrated at local or regional levels; politicians have less incentive to spend their resources to link across regional lines and attempt to gain power at the center (Cox and Knoll 2003; Chhibber and Kollman 2004). Brancati (2006) finds that decentralization promotes the development of regional parties. Filippov, et al. (2004) argue that ethnofederal institutions result in the formation of ethnoregional parties at the expense of the national parties.

Despite the expectations that ethnofederalism by its very nature contributes to the rise of

ethnoregional parties (Filippov, et al. 2004), regional parties failed to develop in Russia after 1993. Even national political parties that enjoyed some degree of success in the State Duma (McFaul 2001) failed to penetrate the parliaments of Russia's ethnic republics. Very few national parties nominated their candidates in the regional elections; therefore, regional parliaments remained virtually party-less throughout the 1990s. Research shows that single member district electoral systems, adopted by all ethnic republics in the 1990s, had a negative impact on political parties in Russia (see, for example, McFaul 2001). This demonstrates that the rise of regional and ethnoregional parties cannot be taken for granted in all ethnofederal states and shows the importance of electoral systems for party formation regardless of the territorial structure of the state.

Scholars have also found that electoral institutions, most significantly electoral systems but also district magnitude and legal threshold, have an effect on the number of parties and party systems (Sartori 1986; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994; Taagepera 1998; Sisk and Reynolds 1998; Saideman et al 2002; Norris 2004; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005). For instance, scholars find that electoral systems of proportional representation (PR) encourage the inclusion of more parties than single member plurality (SMP) systems because PR lowers the barriers to entry for smaller parties. Similarly, high district magnitude (high number of seats per district) tends to encourage a higher number of parties and vice versa. The literature also shows that the system of proportional representation in heterogeneous societies is more conducive to the creation of ethnic parties than the majoritarian or plurality system because PR facilitates multipartyism while a majoritarian system promotes two-partyism (Duverger 1963; Lijphart 1977; Sartori 1986; Sisk 1996: 59; Hechter 2000: 128; Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994).

However, electoral institutions cannot explain the variation in either national or regional

party systems in ethnofederal democracies. In general, despite the single member district's (SMD) tendency toward two-partyism, in countries where ethnic or other minorities are territorially concentrated in higher-than-plurality proportions, a two-party system is impossible under any electoral system (Rae 1971; Sartori 1986). Territorial concentration facilitates ethnoregional party formation by minimizing the cost of creating new parties and maintaining group solidarity and cohesion (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003). Studies show an interactive effect between ethnoregional concentration and the structure of party systems (Mozaffar, et al. 2003). Different democratic ethnofederations produced different electoral systems. Specifically, India and Canada have adopted an SMD electoral system while Spain and Belgium have chosen a proportional representation (PR) system. These countries' federal units mirror electoral systems adopted by the federal centers. Regardless of this variation in electoral systems, all democratic ethnofederations have eventually developed multi-party systems and strong ethnoregional parties that often dominate at the regional level and succeed in winning election into the federal legislatures.

The rise of strong ethnoregional parties may also be explained by socioeconomic factors. The literature on ethnic conflict shows that economic inequalities, whether real or perceived, are one of the main sources of such conflict (Zariski 1989; Hechter 2000). On the one hand, economically disadvantaged groups may feel that their economic difficulties compared to other groups are due to intentional state policies and both policy-based and informal discrimination against their communities. On the other hand, communities residing in wealthier regions may resent the lack of sufficient fiscal autonomy or the incongruence between their economic resources and political power. In both cases, ethnic and regional parties may rise to reflect and sharpen these concerns and frustrations. Additionally, some early modernization theorists

predicted that wealthier as well as better educated communities were less likely to support parochial or exclusive ethnic and regional parties because favorable economic conditions and education were associated with a more tolerant and politically moderate population (Lipset 1959). Most research still links higher levels of education with greater levels of political tolerance (Golebiowska 1995, 24). Education has been used to create common national identity in France (Weber 1976) and other industrializing states (Gellner 1983).

Finally, the literature on ethnic party formation shows that the size of ethnic groups plays an important part in elites' decision to form ethnic parties and in ethnic parties' electoral success (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004). Ethnic identities are rarely, if ever, singular and unchanging. They are shaped by a multitude of social, economic, and political factors, and political parties' role in shaping both ethnic identities and ethnic divisions cannot be overstated. Parties both politicize and reflect the existing divisions and exacerbate or moderate such divisions (Horowitz 1985: 291). However, ethnic parties are less likely to form in regions where ethnic cleavages are weak or where no ethnic group represents a significant portion of the population (Horowitz 1985; Posner 2004). In ethnically divided societies in which parties are primarily divided along ethnic lines, elections often take the form of a census because each party's success depends on getting all eligible voters from their respective ethnic communities to vote (Horowitz 1985: 326). Such elections are less about issues and more about mobilizing voters based on their ethnic loyalties. Therefore, the literature on ethnic parties suggests that ethno-demographic composition of the region in question may have important consequences for the party system formation in that region.

Explaining Party Formation and Variation in Regional Party Systems: Electoral Systems and the Ethno-Demographic Composition of the Ethnofederal Units

As discussed in the previous section, scholars of decentralization and federalism warn that ethnically based decentralization or autonomy leads to the formation of regional and ethnoregional parties. The assumption behind this argument is that regardless of the electoral institutions in place, ethnofederal institutions encourage the formation of regional and ethnoregional political parties at the expense of national parties (Filippov, et al. 2004). It is ethnofederal design then that is primarily responsible for party formation. Specifically, ethnofederal design institutionalizes differences between the state's citizens, legitimates "ethnic" politics, encourages regional nationalization, and weakens people's national identity (Nordlinger 1972; Bunce 2004; Cornell 2002; Roeder 2005; Korostelina 2008; Hughes 2001). As a result, it lowers the costs of forming regional and ethnoregional parties and makes national parties less competitive. In sum, territorial autonomy institutionalizes ethnoregional identities and legitimates ethnic politics as demonstrated by the proliferation of ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states.

This dissertation challenges this assertion in two different ways. First, I will demonstrate that the formation of regional parties is not a simple function of a state's territorial structure but instead is shaped by electoral institutions. Ethnofederal constitutional design promotes the formation of ethnoregional parties; however, electoral institutions can be used to strengthen, moderate or even reverse this effect. In addition, ethnoterritorial structure alone does not automatically lead to ethnic party formation, although it provides fertile grounds for regional and ethnoregional party development if the electoral system conducive to party formation is in place. Specifically, a pure single-member-district (SMD) system is less advantageous to party formation than a system of proportional representation (PR). At first the reason seems too mundane to merit much discussion: party-list PR systems promote party formation and

development by mechanically limiting access to political competition to political parties alone. Independent candidates are excluded by default. However, as the next chapter will demonstrate, the effect of the PR system on party formation is not that straightforward. Evidence from Russia will show that when the mixed PR/SMD system is introduced to replace a pure SMD system, the PR portion of the system stimulates party participation at the SMD level as well. This cannot be attributed to the mechanical effect of the PR system and instead demonstrates the interactive effect between the two electoral systems. Argument 1: Ethnofederal institutional structures are conducive to the rise of regional parties in ethnofederal states, but electoral institutions serve as the critical intervening variable that may reinforce, moderate or even reverse the effect of ethnofederal constitutional design on party systems.

Secondly, ethnofederal constitutional design alone cannot explain the formation and electoral popularity of regional and ethnoregional parties. If territorial autonomy alone were responsible for the creation and popularity of regional parties, regional legislatures of all federal units would have been dominated by regional parties. However, there is significant variation in the regional party systems in ethnofederal states: some ethnically defined regions are dominated by regional parties and lack strong national party presence, others are dominated by national parties and lack electorally competitive regional parties, yet others are ruled by equally powerful regional and national parties that either share power or compete for regional dominance from one election to the next. Few studies of ethnofederalism have stressed the importance of the ethno-demographic composition of the federal units. Many studies, instead, have assumed that providing regional autonomy for a specific ethnic or linguistic community alone is sufficient to institutionalize its identity, increase its willingness and capacity to act as a cohesive unit, and secure its political dominance in the region (see, for example, Cornell 2002). I will argue,

however, that this assumption may hold only if the community in question is numerically dominant in the corresponding region or if it is provided with additional constitutional rights that assure its political dominance regardless of its size relative to the whole regional population. The latter was the case, for example, in the Soviet republics (Roeder 1991) and autonomous regions in Georgia (Cornell 2002). Argument 2: The variation in regional party system is primarily a result of the ethno-demographic composition of the ethnofederal units.

I will test this second hypothesis by examining the sources of variation in regional party systems in all ethnofederal democracies. I expect to find that the ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities (both terms are defined in the section below entitled Terms and Definitions) – communities that share some common characteristics such as language and/or religion and are commonly identified as dominant ethnocultural and political communities in the state in question – are more likely to provide electoral support for national parties, regardless of their region of residence. For example, I expect that in Canada, Anglophones will be more likely to support national parties than Francophones, and, similarly, Castilian speakers represent the main electoral base of support for national parties in Spain, regardless of their place of residence. I do not suggest that ethnoculturally dominant communities possess a single ethnocultural identity. For example, in India O'Leary (2001) identifies both Hindi speakers and Hindus as members of India's dominant political and ethnocultural community; however, these communities are also internally divided based on a variety of ethnic, tribal, caste, and regional cleavages. My research will show, however, that regardless of their region of residence or, as in the case of India, multiple ethnic, tribal, or caste identities, ethnoculturally dominant communities are more likely to support national and less likely to support regional and ethnoregional parties than other groups. The definition of ethnocultural and political dominance

neither automatically implies nor necessarily results from demographic dominance of any ethnocultural community. Such an assumption could only hold if the state were an ethnoculturally neutral artifact or simply reflected cultural interests of the numerically dominant group. However, as Beissinger (1996) points out: "States need to be understood in part as repositories of cultural interest; while the degree to which cultural interests are embedded in states varies, no state is entirely culturally neutral" (101). Moreover, states are not always "repositories of cultural interests" of numerically dominant ethnocultural groups. There are many examples in history where the state privileged linguistic and ethnic minorities at the expense of majorities. Examples include the privileged position of Francophones in Belgium (in the 1800s), Urdus in Pakistan, and Tutsis in Rwanda (prior to 1961). At a subnational level, Soviet affirmative action policies privileged titular nationalities of the respective union or autonomous republics regardless of their demographic position vis-à-vis other groups residing within the same territory.

The presence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community alone, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of national parties. If an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community is territorially concentrated (regionally based), its support for a political party, no matter how nationally oriented that party appears to be, will effectively transform this party into a regional one, unless other regions choose to support the same party as well. However, other regions will likely support parties representing their own ethnoregional communities instead. In addition, if an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community is evenly distributed throughout all the regions, it cannot account for the variation in regional party systems.

To summarize, I propose that the variation in regional party systems in ethnofederal states

depends on three conditions: (1) the presence or absence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community; (2) territorial dispersal rather than regional concentration of that community; and (3) variation in regional presence of that community. The third condition demands that an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community must not be either a numeric majority or minority within all federal units. Its presence at a regional level must vary in order for regional party systems to vary.

Terms and Definitions

I define ethnofederalism as a system that has two components. A federal system may be defined simply as one in which power is divided between a central government and territorially defined subunits that are guaranteed constitutionally defined autonomy. The "ethno" piece requires at least one federal unit be established to territorially coincide with and represent a territorially concentrated ethnic minority.

Unless specified otherwise, regions in this dissertation are used synonymously with federal or ethnofederal units.

I define ethnocultural communities as communities that share such common characteristics as language, religion, race, history or culture.

I define politically dominant ethnocultural communities as communities that occupy the majority of jobs in the government sector and control the ruling party/parties. In majoritarian democracies, an ethnocultural community's political dominance is usually a result of its demographic strength. Such dominance, however, may also be the result of discriminatory state policies that favor one group at the expense of others.

I define ethnoregional political parties as parties that have branches in one or a few ethnofederal units and identify themselves with those ethnopolitical groups with whom these

regions are associated.

I define national parties as parties that have branches in at least half of the ethnofederal units and, at the level of national elections, do not explicitly identify themselves with any one ethnoregional community.

I define inter-regional parties as parties that are, spatially, in between national and ethnoregional parties. They are not concentrated in one ethnofederal unit, having established branches and receiving electoral support in several ethnofederal units; however, they fall short of having a truly national presence.

Case selection

1: Regime types included in this study: democracy and competitive authoritarianism

In order to choose my case studies, I use Roeder's (2009) list of independent ethnofederal states. It includes a total of eighteen countries: Austria-Hungary (1867-1918), Canada (1867-present), USSR (1922-1991), Yugoslavia (1945-1991), Pakistan (1947-present), Burma/Myanmar (1948-1962), Indonesia (1949-50), Ethiopia (1952-62), India (1953-present), Nigeria (1960-present), Malaysia (1963-1965), Tanzania (1964-present), Czechoslovakia (1962-1992), Spain (1978-present), Belgium (1980-present), Russia (1991-present), Serbia-Montenegro (1992-2006), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-present). To this list I add Ethiopia from 1995-present as its new 1995 constitution once again created an ethnofederal state.

In this dissertation I examine only democratic and competitive authoritarian regimes, because the examination of my hypotheses requires the existence of more than one party and parties' ability to compete during the elections. Clearly, one-party regimes and other non-democratic regimes that do not allow political contestation cannot be used to explain the variation in national and regional party systems. Democracy is a loose concept, and it is

increasingly difficult to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic regimes, which may include authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and hybrid systems (Diamond 2002). The question of regime classification is subject to much debate (Diamond 2002, Collier and Levitsky 1997) and, with the proliferation of democratizing states which vary greatly in their political norms and institutions, much of comparative work on democratic states is susceptible to "conceptual stretching" (Sartori 1970; Collier and Levitsky 1997). The problem is that most regimes do not clearly belong either to the authoritarian or democratic category but tend to be situated somewhere in between. Scholars have distinguished between a number of subtypes of democracy in order to deal with this problem. This has led to the proliferation of what Collier and Levitsky call "democracy with adjectives," which includes such subtypes as "'authoritarian democracy,' 'neopatrimonial democracy,' 'military-dominated democracy,' and protodemocracy'" (1997, 431). The three most commonly used subtypes of democracy are advanced, liberal, and electoral democracies (Schedler 1999, 92-93). However, most regimes do not fall neatly within any of those categories; these ambiguous cases are "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002, 22) that share some characteristics with both authoritarian and democratic systems. Therefore, "analysts…seek concepts that distinguish among different *degrees* of democracy, in addition to distinguishing among different *types* of democracy" (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 435). For example, in order to conceptualize hybrid regimes and "democracy with adjectives," Wigell (2008) creates a two-dimensional model; the two dimensions are: electoralism and constitutionalism.[3] Using this model he distinguishes between four regime types: authoritarian, electoral-autocratic, constitutional-oligarchic, and democratic. He then divides democracy into four subtypes: limited,

[3] By electoralism Wigell means variation in electoral conditions such as free and fair elections; by constitutionalism he means variation in constitutional conditions such as freedom of speech and assembly.

electoral, constitutional, and liberal. Coppedge and Gerring, et al. (2011) propose a new way of measuring democracy that errs on the side of conceptual inclusiveness: their proposed dataset, due to its inclusion of different conceptions and components of democracy, would incorporate a comprehensive list of democratic indicators. These indicators would include measures and principles such as gender equality, party strength, judicial independence, subnational government elections, and ethnic equality.

The process of case selection must take into account the goals of the comparison and then use the best fitting classification that fits those goals. This dissertation seeks to determine the sources of variation in regional party systems. It would be inappropriate to include hybrid regimes that do not hold regular elections and limit party competition. On the other hand, limiting the number of cases by applying a very demanding definition of democracy may exclude some states with competitive party systems and limit this examination only to long-standing Western democracies.

In this dissertation I use the Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (ACLP) (1996) classification of political regimes. First, this approach uses "a nominal classification, rather than a ratio scale" (Alvarez, et al. 1996, 21). Their classification uses a dichotomous approach, which divides countries into democracies and non-democracies. Such a parsimonious approach has important limitations because it does not allow us to understand different qualities of political regimes such as the quality of elections and civil liberties in different countries labeled democratic by this binary approach (Coppedge and Gerring, et al. 2011, 249; Wigell 2008, 232-233). However, the goal of this dissertation is not to compare degrees of democracy but to analyze variation in party systems in ethnofederal states which hold regular, fair, and competitive elections. By fair and competitive elections I mean elections whose results are uncertain and

irreversible (Alvarez, et al 1996, 5) and which are not mired by extensive and systematic election fraud and repression of the opposition parties and candidates. Second, their classification is grounded in Przeworski's definition of democracy as "a system in which parties lose elections" (Alvarez, et al 1996, 5). This dissertation focuses on political parties and electoral results of party competition; therefore, Przeworski's definition is especially well suited for this project. According to the ACLP approach, a regime is classified as a democracy if: (A) the chief executive and legislature are elected, (B) there is more than one party, and (C) the incumbents have lost an election (Alvarez, et al 1996, 14). The last rule (that the incumbents must lose an election in order for a regime to be classified as a democracy) refers to the "Type II Error": Alvarez, et al. classify a regime as a non-democracy if incumbents never lost an election, because it remains unknown whether they will willingly and peacefully cede power to their opponents if they lose an election (10-13). I also make one important modification to the ACLP-based case selection. In addition, to all cases classified as democracies according to the ACLP system of classification, I also include cases of Ethiopia and Nigeria. According to Alvarez, et al., regimes in which the incumbents (in this dissertation this means the incumbent parties) continue to hold office by virtue of elections without losing a single election cannot be considered democratic. Therefore, neither Ethiopia nor Nigeria can currently be considered a democracy because the incumbent parties, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), respectively, which never lost an election to their opponents, dominate both regimes. In Ethiopia, despite the presence of regular legislative elections and a multi-party system, one party, the EPRDF, secured the super majority of seats in all parliamentary elections since the first multi-party parliamentary election held in 1995. In Nigeria, since the first democratic multi-party election held in 1999, the PDP won all

presidential elections and the majority of seats in all parliamentary elections. Despite the presence of regular multi-party elections, there is no evidence to suggest that if either EPRDF or PDP fail to win the majority of seats, they will accept the election results and willingly transfer power to their opponents. However, despite this limitation, both Nigeria and Ethiopia hold regular multi-party elections; therefore, unlike Alvarez, et al., I do not classify these countries as non-democracies. I am also hesitant to refer to these states as transitional regimes. Referring to Nigeria and Ethiopia as transitional states contains an important weakness: it is based on the "transition paradigm" that countries moving away from authoritarianism are necessarily moving towards democracy (Carothers 2002, 6). Welsh (1994), for example, writes: "The interval between an authoritarian political regime and a democratic one is commonly referred to as the transition period" (380). Therefore, if we classify Nigeria and Ethiopia as transitional regimes, we imply that the end result of their transitions is democratic consolidation. As Alvarez, et al. demonstrate in their discussion of the "Type II Error" rule, such an implication is premature. Moreover, such classification also implies that neither Nigeria nor Ethiopia has yet reached their regime equilibrium and are on a path to such equilibrium. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Ethiopia's or Nigeria's current political system is not a final point in their political development. For example, Carothers points out:

> An uneasy, precarious middle ground between full-fledged democracy and outright dictatorship is actually the most common political condition today of countries in the developing world…it is not an exceptional category to be defined only in terms of its not being one thing or the other; it is a state of normality for many societies (18).

In this dissertation I refer to these states as one-party dominant systems.[4] As Bogaards (2004)

[4] These systems have also been identified in the literature as dominant or predominant party systems (see Bogaards 2004).

shows, scholars define dominant parties by using various thresholds of dominance. In order to be consistent with the ACLP classification of democracy and dictatorship, I define one-party dominant systems as systems where one party continues, uninterrupted, to win a majority of seats in the legislature and, in a presidential system of government, controls both the parliament and the presidency.

2: Electoral Institutions and Formation of Political Parties and Party Systems: Russia, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Russia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia all represent competitive authoritarian states: states where "competition is real but unfair" (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). Levitsky and Way (2010) classify both Russia and Nigeria as competitive authoritarian regimes; they exclude Nigeria from their analysis because it made a transition to a competitive authoritarian regime after 1995 (Levitsky and Way 2010, 32). They exclude Ethiopia because they classify it as noncompetitive in the 1990s (Levitsky and Way 2010, 33). However, as I will discuss in Chapter 3, the lack of competitive parties in Ethiopia was in part due to the fragmented nature of Ethiopia's national party system. With the exception of the 2005 election, only one party, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), was able to achieve a truly national presence. Other parties were divided along ethnoregional lines. When two opposition parties with an inter-regional support base, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopia Democratic Forces (UEDF), were formed to contest the 2005 election, they presented the EPRDF with a real electoral challenge. In this dissertation I define Ethiopia as a competitive authoritarian regime until the 2010 election during which, in the aftermath of the 2005 election, the EPRDF repressed all opposition. Moreover, all three states – Russia, Ethiopia, and Nigeria – represent one-party dominant systems, as defined above. As a result, there is little meaningful

variation in their regional party systems. For this reason, these states will not be used to test the second argument of this dissertation about the sources of variation in regional party systems. These cases will be used instead to examine the effect of electoral systems on party development (in the case of Russia) and the effect of electoral rules and institutions on party systems (in the cases of Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Bosnia) because the competitive nature of these regimes does not formally preclude party formation and competition. The case study of Bosnia and Herzegovina will also be included in this section of the dissertation, along with Russia, Nigeria, and Ethiopia because, after the Dayton Accord, it suffered from a democratic deficit and because its electoral rules and institutions, which emphasize ethnic identities and encourages ethnic voting, provide an interesting contrast to those implemented by Nigeria (which makes conscious attempt to prevent ethnic parties and voting) and Ethiopia (whose electoral laws do not mention ethnicity).

The case of Russia is used in this dissertation to examine the sources of party development and underdevelopment in ethnofederal states. I chose a case study of Russia because despite it being the largest and most complex existing ethnofederation its political parties failed to penetrate the regional legislatures in the 1990s. In the second part of this dissertation I examine regional party systems in democratic ethnofederal states in order to explain the sources of variation in regional party systems. Russia is excluded from that portion of the analysis because of its dubious credentials as a democratic regime. In the early 2000s both democracy and federalism in Russia were seriously curtailed as President Vladimir Putin introduced a series of re-centralization reforms aimed both to provide greater political stability and limit political competition. For example, he ended elections of regional governors and republican presidents, replacing them with presidential nominations. Regional assemblies were put in charge of approving presidential nominations. However, the president has the right to

disband the assemblies, which significantly limits their legislative autonomy. A ban on regional parties further curtailed regional autonomy even though no significant regional parties existed at the time when the ban was introduced. The federal parliament, which was dominated by the pro-executive United Russia since 2003, "became an instrument for legislative endorsement of nearly any initiative offered by the president" (Remington 2009, 50). Overall, reforms introduced in the 2000s made the political process in Russia much less competitive and made many critics proclaim the end of Russia's federalism (Konitzer and Wegren 2006, Tanrisever 2009, Ross 2009).

One may argue that it was a dearth of Russia's democracy that accounted for the underdevelopment of its parties. However, in the 1990s electoral rules in Russia were fairly certain, while electoral outcomes were relatively uncertain (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2009: 67). This reflects favorably on Russia's democratization, as certainty of rules and uncertainty of electoral outcomes is a basic requirement for any electoral democracy. Moreover, the parliament in the 1990s represented an arena for confrontation between the president and the legislative opposition (Remington 2009).

There was no shortage of political parties at the federal level, even though most of them were short-lived and lacked a clear party platform. In the federal election of 1995 forty-three political parties registered to compete (Remington 2009). Most of them failed to pass the five percent electoral threshold. However, four parties with quite diverse political ideologies got seats in the State Duma. They were: Gennady Zyuganov's Communists; the Liberal Democratic Party, a nationalist and populist party headed by Vladimir Zhirinovsky; "Our Home is Russia," the pro-Yeltsin "party of power" headed by Prime Minister Chernomyrdin; and Yabloco bloc, a democratic opposition party led by Grigory Yavlinsky (Remington 2009). Despite "Our Home is

Russia" being linked to the Kremlin and oligarchs, it did not fare as well as some may have expected (Remington 2009). The Communist Party, one of the main opposition parties, received one-third of all the seats in parliament (Remington 2009). The 1999 election was similarly competitive. No party won a majority in the Duma. The Communist Party once again won the most party-list votes and seats in the Duma. However, it was closely followed by Unity, the party allied with Putin that merged in 2001 with another party, Fatherland-All Russia, to form United Russia. Other parties that won seats in the Duma were Fatherland-All Russia, Liberal Democratic Party, Union of Rightist Forces, Yabloko, and Motherland. Overall, in the 1990s Russia experienced no shortage of political competition and this competition translated into a truly multi-party parliament which presented a consistent and at times even hostile opposition to the executive. [5]

Therefore, the fact that political parties failed to penetrate Russia's regions and especially ethnic republics was not due to suppression of parties or other democratic shortages associated with weak or underdeveloped parties in authoritarian states. It was also not a result of "a unitary state masquerading as a federation" (Ross 2009, 170). In contrast to the Putin and Medvedev-era state of federalism in Russia, Yeltsin-era federalism was a decentralized and highly asymmetrical system. Many regional constitutions stood in clear violation of the federal one, and relations between the center and regions were often conducted through bilateral treaties. Therefore, neither

[5] There is one important caveat to this assertion. The focus on the legislative-executive relations and political competition at the federal center obscures the fact that many of Russia's federal regions were much less democratic during 1990s. In many regions, such as Tatarstan, the regional executives held more power vis-à-vis the regional legislatures than the president of Russia vis-à-vis the State Duma. The more authoritarian nature of Russian regions, however, did not prevent multiple candidates from vying for power in the regional legislative elections. It remains unclear, however, why they refused to associate their candidacies with political parties, choosing instead to run as independents.

democratic nor federal deficiency can explain the lack of political parties in Russia's federal regions in the 1990s.

The cases of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are used to examine the effect of electoral rules and institutions on party systems in ethnofederal states. All three states suffered from various degrees of ethnic conflict and secessionist pressures. Also, all three countries introduced competitive multi-party elections relatively recently (in the 1990s). Therefore, it is especially suitable to compare these cases for the purpose of tracing how electoral engineering was used to shape their party systems.

3: Variation in regional party systems: India, Pakistan, Spain, Canada, and Belgium

For the reasons specified earlier in this chapter, the second hypothesis will only be tested on democratic ethnofederal states. I exclude the analysis of non-democratic ethnofederal states and include all democratic ethnofederations with at least ten years of continual history of democratic ethnofederalism that fit the Alvarez, et al. classification of democracy. Therefore, my case studies include four relatively long-standing consolidated democracies, Canada, India, Spain, and Belgium, as well as Pakistan (1988-1999). Pakistan has a long history of alternating between authoritarian rule and democracy. This study will include the case study of Pakistan during its longest democratic period, which lasted from 1988 to 1999.

Dissertation Overview

This dissertation will proceed as follows. In chapter two I will examine why political parties failed to penetrate Russia's regions in the 1990s. Using the case of Tatarstan, I will show that the rise of regional parties is not a direct result of ethnofederal institutional structures but a product of specific electoral systems. I will argue that electoral systems are the key to explaining the development and underdevelopment of political parties and party systems because they shape

electoral incentives for parties to run their candidates in elections. In chapter three I will examine the effect of electoral rules and institutions on the regional and national party systems in two one-party dominant systems, Ethiopia and Nigeria, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I will argue that electoral institutions may be used to reverse or strengthen the effect of ethnofederalism on party systems. In chapter four I will examine the sources of variation in regional party systems in India. I will demonstrate that the ethno-demographic composition of the region, specifically the proportion of ethnoculturally and politically dominant community at the regional level, is the most influential factor in explaining levels of support for regional and national parties. In chapter five I will show that Pakistan's lack of territorially dispersed ethnoculturally and politically dominant community resulted in the absence of truly national parties. In chapter six I will test my hypothesis that ethno-demographic compositions of the federal units provide the best explanation for variation in regional party systems using case studies of Spain, Canada, and Belgium. Chapter seven will conclude.

CHAPTER 2

Electoral Systems and Party Development in Russia: the Case of Tatarstan

Introduction

Critics of ethnic federalism argue against the establishment of ethnically based federal units in ethnically heterogeneous states because ethno-territorial autonomy makes regional or ethnoregional parties more likely. In fact, some of these critics claim that a regional party system dominated by branches of national parties in ethnofederal states is virtually impossible and argue that ethnoregional parties act as centrifugal forces that threaten the territorial integrity of the state (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004).

This chapter will examine the development of political parties and their failure to penetrate the legislatures of Russia's republics in the 1990s. In 2001 the new federal law "On Political Parties" effectively banned regional parties as well as parties formed on the basis of ethnicity, race, or religion (Federal Law No.95). However, during the 1990s laws regarding political parties and other political organizations were highly permissive. According to the literature on regional party system formation in ethnofederal and quasi-ethnofederal states, republics of the Russian Federation were expected to develop at least moderately successful ethnoregional political parties that could threaten to tear Russia apart. Indeed, many republics had no shortage of ethnically based parties or civic associations. However, almost none of them nominated their candidates for regional parliamentary elections. Some may propose that ethnicity perhaps was not a major factor for the electorate after all; thus ethnoregional parties could not count on winning seats based on ethnic appeals. However, the electoral data suggest that voters in the republics used ethnicity as one of the major cues in their electoral choices (Kratov 2008:

217; Moser 2001; Moser and Goodnow 2009). Moreover, while national political parties enjoyed some degree of success in the State Duma (McFaul 2005), they failed to penetrate the parliaments of the republics. Similarly very few national parties nominated their candidates in the regional elections; therefore, regional parliaments remained virtually party-less throughout the 1990s.

In this chapter I will argue that political parties and party systems do not automatically arise to reflect the territorial structure of the state and societal cleavages; in the absence of appropriate electoral institutions, political parties may exist only at a highly superficial level or otherwise suffer from underdevelopment. I maintain that electoral systems are the key to explaining the development of political parties and party systems. Specifically, I argue that electoral systems explain the development and underdevelopment of parties by shaping electoral incentives for political parties to run their candidates in elections. This explanation differs from the traditional explanations for party underdevelopment in Russia which focus on superpresidential regional systems or absence of demand for parties by politicians. Using electoral data from the 1999 State Duma elections and the Tatarstan parliamentary elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009, I will analyze the effect of different electoral systems on the development of political parties and demonstrate the effect of electoral reforms on party nominees' participation in regional legislative elections. I chose the case of Tatarstan because in the early 1990s it seemed more likely to secede than other republics (with the exception of Chechnya). Therefore, if critics of ethnofedralism were correct, Tatarstan was expected to be among the first regions of Russia to develop strong ethnoregional parties. Using the case of Tatarstan I will show that the failure of parties to penetrate regional legislatures in the 1990s was due to majority/plurality electoral systems; the introduction of mixed electoral systems mandated by the

federal electoral reform of 2002 resulted in party development due to the interactive effect of party-list proportional representation (PR) and single-member-district (SMD) components. The introduction of a PR component into Tatarstan's electoral system has lowered costs and increased benefits of parties to run their candidates in an SMD portion of the elections.

Causes of Development and Underdevelopment of Political Parties and Party Systems

The literature on political parties has identified several major factors which influence the development of parties and party systems. One strand of the literature stresses the effect of various cleavages on political parties and party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Specifically, it argues that processes of nation-building and industrialization led over time to the creation of linguistic, religious, center-periphery and eventually socio-economic cleavages around which the first mass parties organized. Party systems thus represent formal institutional manifestations of existing societal divisions. Critics are quick to dismiss the applicability of the sociological argument to Russia by pointing out that socioeconomic and political cleavages in Russia are not yet well-defined (Ross 2002: 43). Moreover, Soviet rule has made the definition of parties based on traditional socioeconomic cleavages highly confusing: one official from the Apparatus of the President of the Republic of Tatarstan has noted that during Yeltsin's era the likes of Anatoly Chubais and Yegor Gaidar – Russia's leading economist proponents of neoliberal economic reforms of privatization and shock therapy – represented the progressive Left while the Communists, due to their opposition to economic and social reforms, stood as the conservative Right.[6] However, if Russia has not yet developed stable socioeconomic and political cleavages, the same cannot be said about its ethnic cleavages. The logic of the sociological approach

[6] From an author interview with Roman Belyakov, Board on internal policy questions to the President of the Republic of Tatarstan, Head of Division of interaction with social-political formations. Kazan', Tatarstan. Tape recording, 13 October 2009.

suggests that the republics of Russia should have developed political parties around some of the most defined existing cleavages – ethnoregional ones. Therefore, those who study party formation in Russia must still account for the failure of this approach to predict the pattern of party development in Russia's republics.

Another argument which focuses on the Russian electorate as the reason for party underdevelopment notes that the Soviet legacy placed nascent political parties at a particular disadvantage: Russian citizens and politicians alike are distrustful of parties after experiencing seventy years of Communist Party rule with its authoritarian methods and hierarchical structure (McFaul 2005: 1170; Moser 1999). However, recent studies have found that antiparty sentiment in Russia was not as strong as some may presume. On the contrary, according to one study "most respondents expressed support for the idea that elections fought between competing political parties are essential to democracy" (Pammett and DeBardeleben 2000: 381). Pammett and DeBardeleben conclude that "it is a wonder that there is as much feeling about the necessity and importance of parties as we have found" (382) despite Yeltsin's refusal to associate himself with a political party, limited opportunities for parties to hold government accountable to the electorate, and large-scale corruption that has involved many politicians, including party elites.

A third different literature emphasizes the inverse relationship between executive and party strength (Shugart 1998; Fish 2005; McFaul 2005). Presidential systems in general are less conducive to party proliferation (Stepan and Skach 1993) and institutionalization (Ross 2002: 43, 45) than parliamentary ones. Evidence shows that pure presidential democracies tend to have between two and three "effective"[7] political parties compared to three to four effective parties in

[7] The number of "effective" political parties rather than simply the number of parties in the political system in question takes into consideration each party's relative size in the legislature.

semipresidential systems and between three and seven effective parties in parliamentary systems (Stepan and Skach 1993: 6). The main reason is that a presidential system is characterized by the concentration of power and resources, and elections of an executive with substantial constitutional powers promote the consolidation of smaller parties into larger parties and coalitions (Moser 2001: 98; Chhibber and Kollman 2004). All Russia's republics fall into the presidential system category. In addition to having presidential systems, Russia's republics also have weak legislatures, and weak legislatures do not encourage active party building:

> The weakness of the legislature deadens interest in party building. For the political operative, the attractive positions are in the executive branch, and party work is not a prerequisite for a position there. For the businessperson, targeting the executive-branch official responsible for policy in one's area of concern is more promising than contributing to political parties (Fish 2005: 226).

In addition to discouraging party proliferation, presidential systems also produce weak parties as they limit party discipline and cohesion (Ross 2002: 45). Compared to parliamentary systems, presidentialism produces less disciplined parties in the legislature (Moser 2001: 97-98). In Russia, the importance of political parties was further diminished due to the fact that few executives found it necessary to attach themselves to parties: very few of the republics' executives belonged to a political party at the time of the first electoral cycle. Those executives who were supported by a party during the elections were not party candidates (Golosov 1999: 1335). Instead, republican executives, the great majority of whom were the leaders of their respective republics during the Soviet period, have used their considerable control over the republican media and plentiful financial and organizational state resources to win decisive victories over their opponents. The lack of party affiliation associated with the most powerful political posts further weakens party development in Russia. However, some empirical studies have failed to confirm that presidentialism has such a strong effect on party development

(Ishiyama and Kennedy 2001). In general, the presence of strong executive institutions alone cannot explain parties' inability to penetrate Russia's regions.[8] After all, "many established democracies with strong presidents also have robust party systems" (McFaul 2005: 1174). Moreover, strong federal executives who claim to "stand above party" politics (Ross 2002: 45) have not prevented a substantial presence of political parties in the State Duma.

A fourth explanation focuses on the demand for political parties by politicians and reasons for the absence of such demand in federal regions of Russia in the 1990s. Literature on party underdevelopment that claims that political parties in Russia are in short supply is inaccurate: in the 1990s Russia had numerous political parties. However, those parties lacked party members. Therefore, parties in Russia appeared to be in large supply but not in great demand (Golosov 2004: 101). Hale (2005, 2006), for instance, argues that political parties are suppliers of electoral goods and services. Specifically, political parties supply three main electoral benefits for their candidates: organizational support, reputation, and material resources (Hale 2005). Politicians in this model represent consumers in search of the most competitive provider of these electoral goods and services, in terms of availability, quality, and price. If another political organization is able to provide these resources more effectively, office-seeking politicians will turn to it instead. According to this argument, the absence of developed regional parties in Russia in the 1990s and the failure of national parties to penetrate Russia's regions are in part a result of the existence of organizations capable of replacing parties to help their candidates win elections. As Hale (2005) puts it:

> Party loyalties and organization [in Russia] are in fact emerging, but parties have failed to close out the electoral market and penetrate state organs less because

[8] In Russia, scholars, policymakers, and politicians refer to Russia's federal units as *regiony.* In this chapter, therefore, I refer to Russia's federal units, both republics and *oblasts*, as regions.

> they face the wrong institutional or societal incentives than because they face stiff competition from other forms of political organization (party substitutes) (148).

Therefore, Hale argues, political parties have been outperformed by "party substitutes." Two party substitutes emphasized by Hale are: governors' political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups. Hale concludes that "parties may fail to penetrate a transitional polity not only when they are intrinsically weak, but also when they are strong but happen to face similarly strong competitors (party substitutes) in the market for goods and services that help candidates get elected" (Hale 2005: 162).

Golosov (2004) lists several functions performed by political parties that make them effective electoral tools: they can nominate candidates, help candidates secure registration by collecting a necessary number of signatures, and directly engage in a candidate's electoral campaign through such activities as door-to-door canvassing (113). However, one can secure both nomination and registration without the help of political parties. Most candidates have sufficient resources to pay individuals to collect the required signatures. In addition, many candidates already have sufficiently high level of visibility and extended networks of influential contacts that allow for a relatively effortless process of nomination and registration. Thus parties' participation in the first two activities is not crucial. As for the third function, no party, with the exception of the Communist Party of Russian Federation (KPRF), directly engages with its candidate's campaign. Instead, wealthy candidates hire individuals, such as college students, to do the campaign work for them. In general, political campaign resources that parties in Russia are able to provide to their candidates are far inferior to the resources available to the predominantly wealthy and well-known independent candidates – who, thus, find little reason to associate themselves with political parties.

In addition to the electoral functions performed by political parties, discussed above, one of their main benefits is that they provide their candidates with a recognizable label, which can be used by the electorate as a shortcut to make their electoral choices. Party labels supply citizens with cues. "The complexities of politics and government increase the importance of having relatively simple cues to evaluate what cannot be matters of personal knowledge" (Campbell, Converse, Muller, and Stokes 1980:128). Aldrich (1995) writes: "The empirical dominance of party cues…in the public suggests, of course, that the affiliation of a candidate with a party has proved useful. Thus, the collective action problem for voters of becoming sufficiently informed to make a (possibly preliminary) determination of whom they favor is greatly attenuated…" (49). The parties' role as providers of a "brand name" becomes less valuable if the candidate already possesses greater visibility than existing parties. Party affiliation may prove extremely useful for less known candidates, but the heads of states, especially in the highly centralized republics of Russia, as well as wealthy and well-known businesspersons, are in possession of a brand name of their own. In his examination of elite partisanship in Russia, Moser (1999) comes to a similar conclusion:

> Elite partisanship seems to depend most on whether candidates possess their own independent source of electoral capital: name recognition and organizational and financial support…These resources were most likely to emanate from state power, particularly regional executive branches…Since they already possess the public goods provided by a party, the cost of party affiliation outweighed the benefits, and a large contingent of competitive independent candidates emerged (161).

Overall, the superior organizational, financial, and "brand name" benefits that pro-executive and/or independently wealthy electoral candidates receive only further weaken the development of parties in legislatures as well as in the executive branch.

In sum, the literature that stresses the importance of demand for political parties suggests

that politicians turn to political parties only when it is in their electoral self-interest to do so: "politicians turn to their political party – that is, use its powers, resources, and institutional forms – when they believe doing so increases their prospects for winning desired outcomes, and they turn from it if it does not" (Aldrich 1995: 24).

All the above explanations either ignore the significance of electoral systems to the development of political parties or relegate the role of electoral systems to secondary importance. The arguments that focus on demand for political parties provide perhaps the most refined and convincing explanation for the lack of parties in the regions of Russia. Moreover, scholars promoting this approach do not ignore the importance of electoral institutions. Hale, for example, writes: "It is crucial to note, however, that the availability of party substitutes will also be directly affected by the nature of political, including electoral, institutions. Indeed, proportional representation systems typically rule out independent candidacies, effectively granting parties a monopoly on ballot access, whereas most single member district systems do not" (Hale 2005: 150). However, here Hale refers only to the fact that party-list systems of proportional representation mechanically exclude independent candidates; he does not address the effect of mixed electoral systems on participation of independent and party candidates in the single-member district tier of the system. Most importantly, the main weakness of the literature that explains party underdevelopment by the lack of demand for parties is that it treats parties as passive vessels, waiting to be filled by politicians in order to come to life.

Little attention has been paid to how Russia's electoral systems affected party development or underdevelopment. For the most part, electoral systems have been treated as secondary in importance to other explanations. Scholars have showed that single-member district electoral system had a negative impact on political parties in Russia. Political parties have

performed poorly in the SMD elections – the most widely used electoral system in Russia's regions. Scholars who stress the importance of demand for parties (Hale 2005; Golosov 2004) maintain that the main reason for poor party performance is that the presence of "party substitutes," specifically regional executives, has provided independent candidates, promoted by the executive in place of parties, with a decisive electoral advantage. In majoritarian or plurality elections, the competition usually comes down to a stand-off between the pro-executive independent candidate and his/her opponent, who may or may not be a party nominee. The pro-executive candidates in such an election often earn an "insider status" which provides them with superior financial, organizational, and symbolic resources (Golosov 2003: 439). As a result, the pro-executive candidates tend to have a substantial advantage over their opponents, making party affiliation superfluous. Regional executives may support party nominees. However, they have little incentive to do so. The elected regional executives are interested in augmenting their control over regional legislatures. If parties in legislatures were strong, executives would most likely have to compromise on some substantial policy issues in their bargaining with legislative deputies, because deputies have to support the policy position of their parties. Executives accordingly prefer to bargain with independent deputies rather than with parties represented in the legislature (Golosov 2003: 435). In many instances, the electoral success of independent deputies is greatly contingent upon the executives' support for their candidacies. For these reasons, executives rarely find it in their interest to assist in the development of strong political parties in their regions. Both sets of explanations for party underdevelopment, an explanation that stresses the effect of presidential system and an explanation that emphasizes the importance of demand for parties by politicians, acknowledge that an electoral system of SMD magnifies the underdevelopment of parties in Russia.

However, few scholars have examined the independent effect of electoral systems in Russia on party development and underdevelopment. Specifically, little analysis has been done about the role of mixed electoral systems. Moreover, few scholars (with the notable exception of McFaul 2001) have scrutinized why parties developed relatively successfully in the federal Duma, elected through a mixed electoral system until the 2007 elections, but not in the regional parliaments. By failing to discuss the mixed electoral system, which is currently the most common system in regions of Russia, scholars ignore the possibility of interaction between two portions of the mixed party-list proportional representation/single-member plurality (PR/SMP) electoral system. The potentially complex effect of the mixed electoral system on the participation of independent candidates and political parties in legislative elections will be discussed and empirically tested later in this chapter. For now it is sufficient to point out that electoral institutions, including electoral systems, may have a more intricate effect on party development than has been identified in the literature that focuses on presidentialism and demand for parties.

Similar electoral institutions may have different effects in different states or federal units, depending on the local context. For example, Duverger's law, which predicts that SMD will result in a two-party system, does not work in ethnofederal states where an SMD system may still (and is actually highly likely to) produce a multi-party system due to the creation of regional and ethnoregional parties. Quebec is a good example of this. Like Tatarstan in the 1990s, Quebec also has a unicameral legislature – National Assembly – deputies of which are elected through an SMP electoral system where candidates may be nominated by a political party or run as independents. However, unlike in Tatarstan, Quebec has a vibrant party system, and the parties represented in its regional legislature are ethnoregional. Therefore, a regional SMP system was

not an obstacle to the development of ethnoregional parties in Quebec, even though it prevented party formation in Russia's republics.

Regardless of the variation in outcomes, electoral systems everywhere perform two separate but interrelated functions: they provide incentives or disincentives to form political parties, and they help to structure the party system. They perform these functions by shaping political actors' incentives through changing the rules and determining the costs and benefits of electoral competition for participants. More specifically, I argue that electoral systems shape incentives for political parties to run their candidates in the elections. This argument is different from an argument that focuses on demand for political parties. For example, Golosov (2004) argues that certain electoral systems can encourage party formation and development by reducing the incentive for candidates to run as independents rather than seek a party nomination (261).This approach, however, treats parties as passive organizations whose participation in elections depends primarily on individuals' demand for their services. They simply wait for politicians to find themselves in need of their services. However, parties are organizations with their own preferences and goals; they actively recruit candidates and campaign for votes and, just as individuals, adjust their behavior in accordance with existing incentive structures shaped by electoral systems.

Electoral Systems

The relationship between electoral systems and the development of political parties and party systems has been firmly established in the literature (Duverger 1954; Gallagher and Mitchell 2005; Lijphart 1997; Horowitz 1985, 2004; Farrell 2001; Katz 2007). For example, the system of proportional representation is associated with a higher number of parties than single member district electoral system because it lowers the barriers to entry for smaller parties. Reilly

(2002) proposes that "preferential" electoral systems, the main types being the alternative vote and the single transferable vote, are conducive to the creation of moderate ethnic or non-ethnic parties. These systems minimize the probability of vote-wasting by counting the voters' second or even third choice if their first choice candidate is defeated. As a result, these systems favor parties that either depoliticize or are willing to compromise on ethnic issues because they require elites to campaign for voters' second or even third preference. Since candidates in a such system have an incentive to seek votes from those groups for whom they present second or even third choice, party candidates have to appeal to more than one ethnic group. The classic study by Lipset and Rokkan (1967), despite emphasizing the role of societal cleavages in the shaping of the party systems, also acknowledges that electoral institutions affected party strategies, including political alliances, coalitions, and linkages, by setting barriers to entry for new parties.

The effects of some electoral systems are straightforward. For example, party-list proportional representation excludes independent candidates, thus, quite obviously, encouraging political party formation. The effect of single-member districts, on the other hand, is not as clear. In many democracies SMDs promoted the development of two-party systems. In Russia, however, they suppressed party development. Ishiyama and Kennedy's (2001) comparative study of party development in Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan suggests that such a relationship between SMP electoral systems and party formation is not limited to Russia: "Systems that had employed only single-member district plurality rules in the initial post-Soviet election were more likely to score considerably lower on the three measures of party development (continuity, gravity and penetration) than systems that had employed proportional representation and a mixed electoral system" (1187). The use of mixed electoral systems rather than pure PR or SMD systems complicates matters even further.

Massicotte and Blais (1999) define a mixed electoral system as an electoral system which includes "two *opposed* principles," proportionality and majority rule (345). Mixed electoral systems combine single-member district majority or plurality with proportional representation. Massicotte and Blais identify several types of mixed electoral systems. In Russia, a mixed electoral system, which is also called a system of parallel voting, was used to elect members of the State Duma from 1993 to 2003. It was afterwards replaced with a system of proportional representation. In contrast to the federal elections, most regional elections in the 1990s were conducted using a single-member district system. After a federal electoral reform of 2002, most regions adopted a mixed electoral system that mirrored the federal electoral system of the 1990s. In Russia's mixed electoral systems, both federal and regional, "all electors are subjected to the two formulas [majoritarian and proportional] and independent sets of districts are established for each formula. Under such a system, each elector has two sets of representatives, one elected in a smaller plurality/majority district and one elected in a larger PR one" (349).

Until the 2007 elections, Duma deputies were elected according to a mixed electoral system: half (225) were elected in SMDs, the other half from closed party lists. This choice of an electoral system automatically boosted the electoral importance of political parties at the federal level. As a matter of fact, "the only kind of national elections in Russia meaningfully structured along party lines is the portion of the State Duma elections held by a list proportional system" (Golosov 1999: 1346). McFaul's (2001) work effectively demonstrates that the institutional design of Russia's national and regional electoral systems has been a key factor in the development of political parties and their presence in regional and national legislatures. McFaul argues that what scholars studying political parties in Russia failed to explain is not why parties are weak but rather, despite all odds, why parties emerged in the State Duma. He argues that the

majority of Russia's federal units have adopted single-member district electoral systems, which explains the inability of parties to penetrate Russia's regions (1174). The relatively important role that parties play in the national legislature is due to the party-list proportional representation portion of Russia's federal electoral system. Therefore, McFaul argues that "for party advocates, proportional representation does appear to be their best tool" (1174).

In contrast, single-member plurality electoral systems contributed to party underdevelopment. Aldrich (1995) argues that majority or plurality rules encourage party formation because such systems require electorally successful politicians to win vast and diverse support – an organizationally and financially costly ambition. Something very different happened in Russia, however, where majority and plurality systems actually thwarted political party development. These electoral systems provided institutional space for wealthy and well-known businessmen and regional executives to supplant parties due to their superior financial and administrative resources and name recognition.

Not surprisingly, considering the strength of their executives who are adverse to parties and the weakness of their legislative bodies, most of the republics decided against proportional representation. The republics of Mari El and Tyva experimented with the mixed system during the first electoral cycle. However, in both cases the PR component of the system was very small: Mari El used PR to allocate eight out of thirty and Tyva, five out of thirty-two seats. The majority of republics adopted single-member district systems. A few have adopted a system using both single and double-member districts. Why, then, did Yeltsin introduce a mixed system in which half the seats were allocated based on party-list proportional representation? McFaul (2001) argues that Yeltsin simply miscalculated; he was convinced that his bloc, Russia's Choice, would become the prime beneficiary of such a system. Due to the bloc's limited penetration of

the regions, Yeltsin's administration believed that the Russia's Choice party would be unable to win a sufficient number of single-member seats and that the block's best chance to dominate the State Duma would be the proportional portion of the system (1181). Contrary to Yeltsin's expectations, Russia's Choice won only fifteen percent of the seats on the proportional representation ballot (1181). In general, however, a federal mixed electoral system is an anomaly; very few regions have introduced proportional representation, either in full or in part (Golosov 2003: 438).

Electoral reforms of the early 2000s, which introduced mixed electoral systems to Russia's regions, demonstrate the conviction of Russian politicians and policymakers that appropriate electoral institutions could stimulate party formation "by regulating the demand side of the political marketplace" (Golosov 2004: 262). What drove federal elites' desire to introduce reform that would contribute to party formation in Russia's regions, however, is a different question altogether. It is possible that federal leaders perceived a more developed and stable party system as essential for the stability of the overall state. Golosov (2004), for example, argues that without well-established parties, electoral politics in Russia involved high levels of uncertainty and electoral volatility (257). Another and more likely reason for the reform was to encourage the development of national noncommunist parties that would provide a genuine opposition to regional elites and the KPRF (the KPRF was the only political party in the 1990s with sufficient grass-roots organization and support to consistently and relatively successfully participate in the regional legislative elections under the SMD electoral formula) (Golosov 2004: 263). One thing remains clear: by requiring federal units to have at least half of their legislators elected through the PR method, federal elites aimed to breathe some life into parties in the regions.

Indeed, federal elites were so certain that the introduction of a mixed electoral system would promote party formation and greater party participation in regional elections that they passed a *de facto* ban on regional parties several months prior to amending the law regarding regional electoral systems. After all, the federal government under Putin aimed to limit the power of regional elites, not augment it by potentially providing them with additional organizational support to challenge national parties. The law that effectively banned regional parties required political organizations to have at least forty-five regional branches with no fewer than one hundred members in each branch in order to be recognized as political parties. Since no electorally competitive regional parties formed in the 1990s, this law would have been superfluous (indeed it was seen by many outside observers as such) if it were not for policymakers' expectation that new electoral systems would encourage the proliferation of both national and regional parties. While the proliferation of national parties, especially parties that would challenge the KPRF's regional dominance, was seen as an improvement, the development of strong regional parties could provide regional elites with potential new sources of power. It is this outcome that the law on political parties was designed to prevent.

Mixed Electoral Systems and Party Development

Until the 1990s, mixed electoral systems have been largely ignored by scholars (Massicote and Blais 1999; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schoppa 2002) due in part to their relative infrequency. However, in the late 1980s this gap in the literature began to narrow. Many new democracies adopted mixed electoral systems to take advantage of positive components of both majoritarian and proportional systems: the aim was to combine the benefits of the greater government effectiveness and accountability associated with majoritarianism with the greater social diversity and better representation for minorities associated with proportional

representation (Norris 1997).

Many studies have analyzed the two components of the mixed system independently, as if their co-existence had no effect on one another (Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Cox and Schoppa 2002). However, several studies have questioned this approach by arguing that the "interaction" (Cox and Schoppa 2002) or "contamination" (Herron and Nishikawa 2000) effects of these two systems may produce results that are not typically associated with either pure proportional or majority/plurality systems. As noted above, the PR portion of the mixed electoral system has a straight-forward positive effect on party development and participation in elections. However, the PR portion of the mixed system may also affect political party participation in the SMP portion. Golosov (2004) refers to this possibility as "the contamination effect" (221). The increased presence and improved competitive position of political parties in the electoral arena, encouraged by the PR tier, may be expected to increase the benefits of political candidates running as party nominees rather than as independents (221). This general increase in competitiveness of party nominees, therefore, can also be expected to increase participation of political parties in the SMP portion of elections. If the two portions of the mixed system functioned independently of each other, one would expect small parties to avoid participating in the SMD portion of the race. However, if no such independence exists and there is a level of "contamination," it is reasonable to anticipate that not only the two most popular but also the smallest parties will place their candidates in SMD races, since such a strategy would increase voter awareness and, therefore, help the small parties gain more votes for the PR portion of the election. It can also provide inexperienced politicians with a valuable electoral experience and name recognition (Herron and Nishikawa 2000). Finally, small parties may run inexperienced and hopeless candidates in the SMD tier of the election in order to give their party a human face,

which could potentially enhance their overall tally of votes (Cox and Schoppa 2002: 1031). Thus, in contrast to pure SMD systems which tend to produce a two-party system and discourage small parties from participation in elections, in mixed systems the number of parties in the SMD portion would likely exceed two due to the contamination or interaction effect of this electoral system.

If the logic of the contamination effect is correct, then party development in Russia as a result of the introduction of a mixed electoral system is not as straight-forward and easy to explain as some scholars may suggest; we should expect an interaction between the two portions to promote party participation not only at the PR portion, due to its automatic exclusion of independent candidates, but also at the SMD portion. Also, as a result of such contamination, the SMD portion would be expected to produce a higher ratio of party to independent candidates than in a pure SMD system.

Data

The data analyzed in this chapter are based on the electoral data from the Inter-Regional Electoral Network of Assistance in Russia (IRENA) database.[9] This database, to my knowledge, contains the most complete information on both federal and regional elections in Russia, including information about candidates, such as the mode of candidate nomination.

Analysis of an Effect of a Mixed Electoral System on Party Development

In order to test whether electoral systems are best suited to explain the development of political parties and party systems in Russia, this chapter will provide two sets of comparisons. Both sets will be used to test whether party development is promoted through a combined

[9]The Inter-Regional Electoral Network of Assistance in Russia (IRENA). http://www.irena.org.ru

interactive effect of the PR/SMD mixed system, as proposed above.

The first test will compare the participation of party nominee and independent candidates in the 1999 elections to the Tatarstsan legislature and the SMD-portion of the elections to the State Duma. If the test shows that parties at the SMD-tier of the State Duma elections were more active than in Tatarstan's regional elections, this would suggest that electoral systems are the main determinant of party development or underdevelopment and that mixed electoral systems contribute to party development not only at the PR-tier but, due to the contamination effect, at the SMD-portion as well. The second test will compare party-nominee and independent-candidate participation in Tatarstan's 1999 legislative elections to those of post-electoral-reform 2004 SMD-portion elections to Tatarstan's legislative body. The goal of this comparison is to test whether the introduction of a mixed electoral system in Tatarstan's legislative elections contributed to party development by promoting party nominee participation not simply mechanically in the PR tier of the electoral system, but, more importantly, in the SMD tier, in which both party nominees and independent candidates were allowed to take part. After the effect of a mixed electoral system is tested, a third test will compare the 2004 and 2009 elections to the Tatarstan legislature. The purpose of the third test is to trace a developmental trajectory of a party system two elections after a new electoral system was introduced. Results of these comparisons are summarized in the table below.

Table 1

Elections to the federal Duma and Tatarstan Legislature (1999-2009)

	Total # of Party Nominees	Total # of Self-Nominations	Total # of Candidates*	Total # of Winners: Parties	Total # of Winners: Self-Nominees	Ratio of Parties to Self-Nominations	Average # of Party Nominees/ District	Average # of Self-Nominations/ District	Average # of Candidates/ District
DUMA 1999	332	1111	2078	48	53	0.299	1.48	4.94	9.24
Tatarstan 1999	62	383	482	1	125	0.16	0.48	2.95	3.71
Tatarstan 2004	118	93	211	38	12	1.27	2.36	1.86	4.22
Tatarstan 2009	95	71	166	45	5	1.34	1.9	1.42	3.32

*The total number of candidates includes the total number of party nominees, total number of self-nominees, and total number of candidates nominated by political blocs and movements. The latter category is excluded from this table.
Source: The Inter-Regional Electoral Network of Assistance in Russia (IRENA). http://www.irena.org.ru

As explained earlier in this chapter, from 1993 until 2007 the State Duma elections have been held under the mixed electoral system: 225 deputies were elected using a system of proportional representation, in a single district, and another 225 deputies through a single member district method. In contrast, throughout the 1990s, seats in Tatarstan's unicameral legislature were filled using a majoritarian SMD system. Based on the electoral data, an average number of party, as opposed to independent, candidates per district was much higher in the 1999 SMD-tier elections to the State Duma (1.48) than in the 1999 elections to Tatarstan's legislature (0.48). The fact that so few parties participated in regional elections in Tatarstan confirms the general observation that political parties failed to penetrate Russia's regions. However, if the

mixed electoral system had only a simple mechanical effect on party development due to the necessary participation of the parties in party-list PR elections, the distinction between party presence in the SMD tier of the Duma elections and party presence in the Tatarstan SMD elections would not have been so dramatic. This supports the argument proposed in this chapter that a mixed electoral system has a more complex effect on the development of political parties. Specifically, it promotes party participation not only at the PR tier but also encourages party participation at the SMD tier. Thus, the overall effect of the mixed electoral system is more complex than the simple mechanical effect most scholars suggest.

Of course, the data also show that more independent candidates participated in the Duma than in Tatarstan elections in 1999. Specifically, on average 4.94 candidates per district ran as self-nominees compared to only 2.95 of self-nominees in Tatarstan. This could mean that the higher average of party nominees per district in the Duma elections than in the Tatarstan legislative elections is a result of a higher total number of candidates, both party nominees and independents, rather than of a difference in electoral systems. However, the difference in ratios of total number of party nominees to total number of self-nominees between federal and regional elections – 0.299 in the Duma's SMD tier compared to 0.162 in Tatarstan's legislature – demonstrates that the higher absolute number of candidates in Duma elections does not account for the disparity between the average numbers of party nominees in these two elections.

In 2002, the federal government passed an amendment to the law "On basic guarantees of electoral rights." This amendment introduced the mixed PR/SMD electoral system in the regions. Specifically, it required at least half of the legislative seats to be filled through the proportional representation mode of election (Wilson 2006: 318). As a result, whereas in the 1999 election all 130 deputies in the Tatarstan legislature were elected by SMD electoral system, in the 2004

elections fifty percent of the seats of a now one-hundred-member parliament were filled using a PR system, in a single electoral district for the entire republic.

The data demonstrate that the electoral reforms of 2002 made a difference for party participation in Tatarstan. The average number of party nominees per district in Tatarstan's 2004 SMD-tier elections increased to 2.36 from 0.48 in the 1999 elections – an increase that a simple mechanical effect of a newly introduced PR tier would not account for. At the same time, the average number of self-nominees per district decreased from 2.95 to 1.86. The ratio of party nominees to self-nominees increased from 0.17 to 1.27. This increase suggests that more politicians found it beneficial to run as party nominees rather than independents under the mixed system, even under its SMD portion, that is, the incentive for parties to run their candidates in legislative elections had grown significantly.

It is clear from these data that the average number of party nominees per district increased after the introduction of a mixed electoral system. Moreover, this increase cannot be explained by the rise of United Russia, as some might argue, even though it has nominated its candidates in the majority of districts in Tatarstan in 2004 elections. The 2004 elections data show that United Russia was not alone responsible for the surge in party nominations – the average number of parties per district increased from 0.46 (less than half a party per district) to 2.36 (over two parties per district). Therefore, parties other than United Russia also increased their presence in SMD component of the elections.

To summarize, this analysis leads to two findings: first, political parties were moderately present in the 1999 Duma SMD-tier elections (averaging 1.5 party nominees per district out of an average of 6.4 independent and party nominee candidates per district) while they were largely absent from the 1999 SMD elections to the Tatarstan legislature (with only 0.5 party nominees

per district, on average, out of an average of 3.4 independent and party nominee candidates per district). Second, the introduction of a mixed electoral system in Tatarstan led to a significant increase in the participation of political parties in SMD-tier elections – not a result expected by those who argue that mixed systems promote a demand for political parties solely through a straight-forward exclusion of independent candidates in the PR-tier. These findings point to a conclusion that mixed PR/SMD electoral systems contribute to party development not simply through a straight-forward beneficial effect of the PR system but also due to the contamination effect of an interaction between PR and SMD portions of a mixed system. Specifically, as I discussed earlier in this chapter, the PR portion of the system increases political parties' incentives to run their candidates in the SMD portion of the system because party competition at the SMD level helps to increase voter awareness, provides politicians with electoral experience, and gives political parties a human face. The chances for success of parties would then be improved in the PR portion of the system.

Finally, how do the 2009 elections to the Tatarstan legislature compare to the elections of 2004? In both elections, fifty deputies of a hundred-seat unicameral congress were elected through a PR tier and fifty deputies through an SMD tier. The party threshold during both elections equaled seven percent. In the 2009 elections, self-nominees' participation in the Tatarstan elections declined further. After an initial increase of the average number of party nominees per district in the SMD component of the 2004 Tatarstan elections to 2.36 from 0.48 in 1999 election, the average number of party nominees declined to 1.9 in 2009. The average number of candidates per district decreased as well – going down from 4.22 in 2004 to 3.32 in 2009 suggesting the overall decline in electoral competitiveness in the Tatarstan legislative elections.

This tendency demonstrates that the introduction of a mixed electoral system, due to its interactive effect on party development, has improved the party nominee/self-nominee ratio – from 0.158 in the pre-reform 1999 to 1.27 in 2004 and then to 1.34 in 2009. Despite the decline in average number of party nominees in 2009, that ratio continued to increase. Therefore, candidates at the SMD electoral tier are increasingly more likely to be nominated by political parties rather than choose to run as independents.

It appears that the electoral reform of 2002 initially improved overall competitiveness and participation of party nominees: the average number of candidates per district increased from 3.71 in 1999 to 4.22 in 2004 but the average number of self-nominees per district declined. Thus, in 2004 voters in Tatarstan have encountered more choices – demonstrating an increase in electoral competition. However, after that initial surge, the average number of candidates per district in 2009 dropped below 1999 levels, signaling, most likely, that United Russia has crowded out other parties. Therefore, while the reform has initially provided an institutional incentive for party candidates to compete in regional elections at the SMD tier, its effect on increased electoral competitiveness was negated by the supremacy of United Russia. By 2009, the only party that was clearly benefitting from these reforms was United Russia, the so-called party of power.

An additional piece of evidence that demonstrates that the level of electoral competitiveness in Tatarstan legislative elections in 2009 was lower than that in 1999 was the number of run-off elections that took place in 1999. In 1999 Tatarstan had run-off elections in thirty-two out of 130 electoral districts, demonstrating that political campaigns in at least twenty-five percent of electoral districts were relatively competitive, in the sense of no clear winner in the first round. The 1999 election was also the last year in which the absolute majority rule was

applied. In the 2004 and 2009 elections, at the SMD portion of the electoral competition, a simple plurality rule was used instead. However, the dominance of the United Russia party in the 2009 election would have made the absolute majority rule superfluous – it has managed to beat all its competitors in all fifty SMD districts by a large margin, always safely breaking the fifty plus one percent barrier.

Conclusion

Most successful candidates in the regional elections in Russia were independents. The literature on party underdevelopment in Russia, which focuses on the party demand by politicians, convincingly explains the success of these independents in winning most of regional elections. The winning candidates are backed by wealthy individuals and groups and/or extremely powerful regional executives; therefore, these candidates already possess both name recognition and the necessary resources to run successful electoral campaign without having to turn to parties. However, this does not mean that no political hopeful was willing to affiliate herself with a political party. Moreover, parties are not simply vessels waiting to be filled by politicians. Parties chose not to actively recruit and run candidates in regional elections.

In addition, the demand explanation fails to account for the lack of party nominees in the elections in 1999 and their sudden appearance in the first post-electoral-reform election of 2004. "Party substitutes," such as governors' political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups, remained in place. However, the number of independent candidates declined and the number of party nominees increased. If the increase in the number of party nominees under the SMD portion of the election occurred after several electoral cycles following the introduction of the mixed electoral system, that change could have been explained by the PR-induced improvement in reputation and organizational resources of parties and consequent increase in

demand for parties. However, the increase in party nominee participation and decline in the number of independents under the SMD portion of the election occurred during the first election under the new mixed electoral system. This change, therefore, cannot be explained by the sudden shift in demand for parties.

The argument advanced in this chapter focused on the effect of electoral systems on party formation and party system consolidation (see, for example, Duverger 1963; Sartori 1986). It was the key premise of this chapter that electoral systems play a decisive role in the formation of political parties and development of party systems through shaping incentives for parties to place their candidates in electoral races. In 2002 the Russian federal government introduced electoral reform in its regions in order to promote party development in regional legislative elections, most possibly for the purpose of minimizing uncertainty, limiting the autonomy and power of regional elites, or creating opposition to the KPRF. This chapter demonstrated that the electoral system significantly contributed to party development in the State Duma and party underdevelopment in the regions, as measured by party willingness to nominate and run its candidates in legislative elections. It also showed that after the electoral reforms of 2002 the mixed electoral system introduced in the Tatarstan legislative elections led to an immediate decrease in the number of independents and an increase in the number of party nominees in the SMD portion of the mixed electoral system, contrary to what the literature on SMD would expect.

CHAPTER 3

The Effect of Electoral Rules and Institutions on Party Systems in Ethnofederal States: The Cases of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

Introduction

Scholars of ethnofederalism argue that ethnically based territorial autonomy is linked to the formation and electoral dominance of ethnoregional parties. However, this argument focuses on the territorial structure of the state alone and ignores the role of electoral institutions in shaping the state's party systems. In this chapter I will compare party systems in three ethnofederal states: Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. I will discuss how differences in their electoral institutions contributed to the differences in their party systems. All three countries have suffered from ethnic conflict and secessionist demands, introduced multiparty elections in the mid to late 1990s, and currently suffer from a democratic deficit. Ethiopia and Nigeria are examples of one-party dominant systems. Bosnia and Herzegovina's (BiH) sovereignty was curtailed as a result of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The international civilian agencies, specifically the Office of High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, were appointed rather than elected and had substantial powers. The High Representative, for example, had the authority to discharge publicly elected officials if they violated the peace agreement or obstructed the peace process. This limited sovereignty constrained BiH's democracy. This chapter will show how differences in design of electoral rules and institutions of these three ethnofederal states have resulted in three different party systems: Nigeria is dominated by national parties, Ethiopia is ruled by a national coalition and its ruling party faced a considerable challenge from two inter-regional parties in 2005 but the remaining parties are

fragmented along ethnoregional lines, and BiH, which is dominated by ethnoregional parties, is distinguished by the absence of national parties. I will argue that while ethnofederalism does encourage the proliferation of ethnoregional parties, electoral rules and institutions represent the critical intervening variable that may either moderate and even reverse or reinforce the effect of ethnofederal territorial structures. By electoral rules and institutions I mean not only electoral systems but also rules regarding party registration and candidate nominations (for example, territorial distribution requirements) and elections of public officials (for example, regional or ethnic specifications, power-sharing arrangements).

Ethiopia and Nigeria share some striking similarities. They both have a long history of ethnic conflict and adopted federal structures to help manage their ethnically diverse population and assuage secessionist aspirations of some of their ethnoregional communities. Both countries employ a majoritarian electoral system, and elections in both countries are plagued by extensive fraud and intimidation of the opposition. Both states are examples of one-party dominant systems. In Ethiopia, which is a parliamentary system, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) won the vast majority of seats in the national legislature in all four of its multi-party elections since 1995 (88 percent in 1995 and 2000, 60 percent in 2005, and 91 percent in 2010). In Nigeria, which uses a presidential system, one party, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP), has won all four presidential elections since 1999 and won control of the majority of seats in the national legislature in all four parliamentary elections (60 percent in 1999, 62 percent in 2003, 73 percent in 2007, and 56 percent in 2011). Finally, both Ethiopia and Nigeria lack the kind of regional variation in party systems (variation between regions dominated by national or inter-regional parties and those dominated by regional parties) that is the focus of this dissertation: However, despite these similarities, Ethiopia and Nigeria's regional party

systems are very different from one another. Ethiopia is dominated by ethnoregional parties. Every region is ruled by its own ethnic party. Consistent with the one-party dominant model, however, all ethnic parties that consistently dominate regional councils are either members of or created and controlled by the ruling party, EPRDF. Nevertheless, ethnic parties and ethnic voting are widespread in Ethiopia. In Nigeria, ethnic parties are banned and the constitution creates incentives for parties to pool votes across various regions. As a result, all parties are inter-regional (if not truly national) in character. Also, as I will demonstrate below, Nigeria's regional and national elections are slightly more competitive than Ethiopia's.

The variation in kinds of regional party systems in Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina can teach us valuable lessons about the importance of electoral engineering. Specifically, the comparison of these three cases will show that electoral engineering can be an effective tool to shape party systems in an ethnofederal state. The case of Nigeria will show that electoral institutions in ethnofederal states can be used effectively to prevent the formation of ethnoregional parties by providing incentives for politicians to pool votes across ethnic and regional lines. The case of Ethiopia will show that without electoral institutions serving as the intervening factor, ethnofederal constitutional design may lead to the proliferation of ethnoregional parties. Finally, the example of BiH will show that electoral institutions may strengthen the effect of ethnofederal territorial structures on party systems.

Ethiopia

In 1994 Ethiopia adopted a new constitution which provided a framework for Ethiopia's ethnofederalism. Each region in Ethiopia has a right to establish its own official language (Cohen 1995, 164). Currently, Ethiopia is divided into nine ethnically based states. Because the basis for Ethiopia's federalism is ethnicity rather than economic or administrative efficiency, Ethiopia's

states vary greatly in size and levels of economic development (Cohen 1995, 164).

Ever since the EPRDF came to power in 1991, and despite the introduction of multiparty elections in 1995, its rule has been almost completely unchallenged. The elections of 2005 provided a greater level of electoral competition and first real challengers to the EPRDF's hegemony. Prior to the 2005 national and regional elections, EPRDF faced very limited electoral opposition in part because many opposition parties chose to boycott the elections of 1995 and 2000 (Aalen 2006, 252). The opposition's unwillingness to compete with the EPRDF in the electoral arena was due to a widespread perception of electoral fraud and erosion of boundaries between the ruling party and state bureaucracy, which provided the EPRDF members with an excessive advantage over opposition parties (Aalen 2006, 250-252). In addition, and equally important, the opposition parties were weak and divided, both ideologically and ethnoregionally (Arriola 2008). High incidents of voter fraud, intimidation of the opposition, incumbency advantage, weak regionally and ethnically based opposition parties, and monopoly over state resources resulted in EPRDF's dominance in both national and regional legislatures during the first two elections. Therefore, the elections of 2005 denoted the first time since it came to power in 1991 that EPRDF faced any real competition.

The election of 2005, the most competitive election in Ethiopia's short history of multi-party electoral competition, unveiled one of the most prominent political splits in Ethiopia's national politics: a split between supporters and opponents of ethnic federalism. Two coalitions, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) and United Ethiopia Democratic Forces (UEDF), challenged EPRDF's electoral hegemony. The CUD, the stronger of the two coalitions, campaigned in favor of non-ethnically based federalism (Aalen 2006, 253). The UEDF, though supportive of ethnic federalism, opposed the right to secession included in Ethiopia's constitution

(Aalen 2006, 253).[10] Both coalitions managed to win a significant number of votes both in federal and regional elections. The tables below summarize federal and regional elections results:

Table 2

Ethiopia: Elections to the House of People's Representatives

Party/Coalition	**Number of Seats**	**Percentage of Seats**
1995		
EPRDF	483/548	88%
2000		
EPRDF	481/547	88%
EPRDF-Affiliated Parties	37/547	7%
2005		
EPRDF	327/547	60%
CUD	109/547	20%
UEDF	52/547	10%
2010		
EPRDF	499/547	91%

Source: African Elections Database: Elections in Ethiopia: http://africanelections.tripod.com/et.html

[10] Article 39 of Ethiopia's Constitution states: "Every Nation, Nationality and People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession" and "The right to self-determination, including secession, of every Nation, Nationality and People shall come into effect:
(a) When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned;
(b) When the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place within three years from the time it received the concerned council's decision for secession;
(c) When the demand for secession is supported by majority vote in the referendum;
(d) When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the council of the Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and
(e) When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law."

Table 3

Ethiopia: Elections to Regional State Councils

State	Party/Coalition	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Afar			
2000	Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)	84/87	97%
2005	Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)	84/87	97%
2010	Afar National Democratic Party (ANDP)	93/96	97%
Amhara			
2000	Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM-EPRDF)	286/294	97%
2005	Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM-EPRDF)	188/294	64%
	Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)	106/294	36%
2010	Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM-EPRDF)	294/294	100%
Benishangul-Gumuz			
2000	Benishangul Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Frong (BGPDUF)	71/80	89%
2005	Benishangul-Gumuz People's Democratic Unity Front (BGPDUF)	85/99	86%
	Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)	11/99	11%
2010	The Benishangul Gumuz Peoples' Democratic Party (BGPDP)	98/99	99%
Gambela			
2000	Gambela Peoples' Democratic Front (GPDF)	40/53	75%
	Gambela Peoples' Democratic Congress	13/53	25%
2005	Gambela People's Democratic Movement (GPDM)	81/82	99%
2010	The Gambela Peoples' Unity Democratic Movement (GPUDM)	156/156	100%
Harari*			
2000	N/A		

Ethiopia: Elections to Regional State Councils (Cont.)

2005	Harari National League (HNL)	18/36	50%
	Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)	14/36	39%
2010	The Harari National league (HNL)	18/36	50%
	The Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO-EPRDF)	18/36	50%
Oromia (Oromiya)			
2000	Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)	535/537	100%
2005	Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO)	387/537	72%
	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF):	105/537	20%
	Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)	33/537	6%
2010	The Oromia Peoples Democratic Organization (OPDO-EPRDF)	537/537	100%
State of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples			
2000	Walayta, Gamo, Gofa, Dawro and Konta People’s Democratic Organization (WGGPDO)	85/348	24%
	Sidama People’s Democratic Organization (SPDO)	54/348	16%
	Gurage Nationalities Democratic Movement (GNDM)	50/348	14%
	Kafa Shaka People’s Democratic Organization (KSPDO)	27/348	8%
	Hadiya National Democratic Organization (HNDO)	21/348	6%
	Gedeyo People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (GPRDF)	21/348	6%

Ethiopia: Elections to Regional State Councils (Cont.)

	Kembata, Alabaa and Tembaro People's Democratic Organization (KATPDO)	20/348	6%
2005	Southern Ethiopia People's Democratic movement (SEPDM)	271/348	78%
	Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD)	39/348	11%
	United Ethiopian Democratic Forces (UEDF):	37/348	11%
2010	The Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (SEPDM-EPRDF)	348/348	100%
Somalia			
2000	Somali Peoples' Democratic Party (SPDP)	148/168	88%
2005	Somali Peoples' Democratic Party (SPDP)	161/182	88%
2010	The Somali Peoples' Democratic Party (SPDP)	186/186	100%
Tigray			
2000	The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF-EPRDF)	152/152	100%
2005	The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF-EPRDF)	152/152	100%
2010	The Tigray Peoples' Liberation Front (TPLF-EPRDF)	152/152	100%

*The state of Harari is the only state in Ethiopia besides the state of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples whose state council is not dominated by a single ethnic party. Unlike other states in Ethiopia, which are rural and ethnically based, Harar is an ethnically mixed urban area (Cohen 1995, 164).
Source: African Elections Database: Elections in Ethiopia: http://africanelections.tripod.com/et.html and National Electoral Board of Ethiopia: http://www.electionethiopia.org/en/home.html

The results of federal legislative elections, summarized in Table 1, show a drastic reduction in the number of seats won by the EPRDF as a result of 2005 election. As a result of the federal elections of 1995 and 2000, the EPRDF controlled eighty-eight percent of the seats in the House of People's Representatives, and in 2000 another seven percent of the seats were controlled by ethnoregional parties affiliated with and controlled by the EPRDF. In 2005 EPRDF's share of seats decreased to sixty percent. The EPRDF's main opponents, the CUD and

UEDF, gained twenty percent and ten percent of the seats, respectively. However, both federal and regional results also show that support for both CUD and UEDF was not uniform across the country but highly territorially concentrated. It is, therefore, difficult to think of both coalitions as truly national despite their inter-ethnic and inter-regional party platforms. Therefore, even when the EPRDF was challenged by two multi-regional and multi-ethnic coalitions, the support for both coalitions was largely ethnoregional. In federal elections, the CUD received sixty-seven percent of all its legislative seats from Amhara and Addis Ababa alone; the UEDF received seventy-nine percent of its legislative seats from Oromia (Arriola 2008, 121). With respect to regional elections, the CUD acquired most of its support from the state of Amhara, where it gained thirty-six percent of the state council seats. UEDF's main source of support came from the state of Oromia, where it won twenty percent of the state council seats. The UEDF's leadership was composed primarily of the Oromo and Hadiya ethnic groups (Arriola 2008, 119). Its chairman, Merera Gudina, was the leader of the Oromo People's Congress (OPC) (Arriola 2008, 119).

Of the two opposition coalitions, ideologically, the CUD was the least ethnically based: its political program was nationally oriented and pan-Ethiopian rather than ethnic (Abbink 2006, 182). However, despite its inter-ethnic appeals, the CUD was viewed by many as the party of Amhara people. It was a coalition of four parties; however, the largest party in the coalition was the All Ethiopian Unity Party (AEUP), which was a direct successor of the All Amhara People's Organization (AAPO) (Aalen 2006, 253). Moreover, the composition of the CUD's leadership was largely ethnically Amhara (Abbink 2006, 120). A perception that the CUD was dominated by Amhara interests was further maintained by the EPRDF, which presented the CUD's criticism of ethnic federalism and challenge to EPRDF's rule as the Amhara people's attempt to return to

political dominance they enjoyed during the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes (Aalen 2006, 253; Arriola 2008, 120). Leaders of the CUD were accused of supporting genocide, especially against the people of Tigray (whose party, the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), dominate the EPRDF coalition) (Aalen 2006, 254).

The EPRDF's support was much more uniform throughout Ethiopia. Despite its pan-Ethiopian program and truly national base, it is clear from the regional elections results that the EPRDF's stronghold is in the state of Tigray – the only region in Ethiopia that consistently granted one hundred percent of the state council seats to the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) – the main member party of the EPRDF coalition. This is not surprising. The EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic parties: the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM), the Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Front (SEPDF), and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) (Aalen 2006, 251). However, they are not all equal partners. The EPRDF has been created and controlled by the Tigray People's Liberation front (TPLF) (Aalen 2006, 245). The TPLF created the EPRDF in 1990, provided fifty percent of the EPRDF's fighters and dominated its leadership (Joireman 1997, 393). As a result, scholars and critics of the EPRDF government argue that Ethiopia is controlled by Tigrayans (Joireman 1997, 388; Horowitz 1993, 23). Overall, politics of Ethiopia is largely ethnic based. All major political parties are divided along ethnic lines, and even inter-ethnic coalitions are perceived to represent ethnic rather than pan-Ethiopian interests.

Nigeria

In contrast to Ethiopia, Nigeria is dominated by inter-regional parties. This is what makes the case of Nigeria especially interesting: despite the fact that Nigeria's history is dominated by issues of ethnic and regional conflict, its parties are inter-ethnic and inter-regional (they lack a

truly national presence but receive electoral support from several regions and ethnic groups). Like Russia, Nigeria's example demonstrates that the formation of ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states is not inevitable. It will illustrate the important effect that electoral rules and institutions have on shaping political parties in ethnofederal states. The tables 4, 5, and 6 below show federal and regional elections results for the latest elections in Nigeria:

Table 4

Nigeria: Results of Latest Gubernatorial Elections (2008-2011)*

State	**Party**
Abia	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Adamawa*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Akwa Ibom	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Anambra*	All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)
Bauchi	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Bayelsa*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Benue	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Borno	All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
Cross River*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Delta	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Ebonyi	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Edo*	Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN)
Ekiti*	Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)
Enugu	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Gombe	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Imo*	All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)
Jigawa	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Kaduna	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Kano	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Katsina	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Kebbi	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Kogi*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Kwara	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Lagos	Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN)

Nigeria: Results of Latest Gubernatorial Elections (2008-2011) (Cont.)

Nasarawa	Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)
Niger	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Ogun	Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN)
Ondo*	Labour Party (LP)
Osun*	Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN)
Oyo	Action Congress of Nigeria (CAN)
Plateau	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Rivers	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Sokoto*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Taraba*	Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)
Yobe	All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)
Zamfara*	All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP)

*In 2011, gubernatorial elections were held in twenty-three out of thirty-six states. In the remaining states, marked by an asterisk, governors won the elections prior to 2011 (as early as 2008) and continued to hold office until the end of their four-year tenure.
Source: World Statesmen.org at http://www.worldstatesmen.org/Nigeria_regions.html and Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) http://www.inecnigeria.org/

Table 5

Nigeria: Results of the 2011 State House of Assembly Elections

State	**Party**	**Seats**	**Percentage of Seats**
Abia	PDP	24	100.00%
Adamawa	PDP	20	80.00%
	ACN	4	16.00%
	CPC	1	4.00%
Akwa Ibom	PDP	25	96.15%
	ACN	1	3.85%
Anambra	APGA	17	56.67%
	PDP	7	23.33%
	ACN	3	10.00%
	LP	1	3.33%
	A	1	3.33%
Bauchi	PDP	25	80.65%

Nigeria: Results of the 2011 State House of Assembly Elections (Cont.)

	CPC	5	16.13%
	ACN	1	3.23%
Bayelsa	PDP	21	87.50%
	KP	1	4.17%
	LP	1	4.17%
	PPA	1	4.17%
Benue	PDP	20	68.97%
	ACN	8	27.59%
Borno	ANPP	19	67.86%
	PDP	7	25.00%
Cross River	PDP	21	84.00%
Delta	PDP	16	55.17%
	DPP	9	31.03%
	ACN	1	3.45%
	UDP	1	3.45%
Ebonyi	PDP	22	91.67%
	ANPP	2	8.33%
Edo	ACN	19	79.17%
	PDP	4	16.67%
Ekiti	ACN	24	92.31%
	PDP	2	7.69%
Enugu	PDP	24	96.00%
Gombe	PDP	20	83.33%
	CPC	4	16.67%
Imo	PDP	14	51.85%
	APGA	5	18.52%
	ACN	1	3.70%
Jigawa	PDP	28	93.33%
	ANPP	1	3.33%
	ACN	1	3.33%
Kaduna	PDP	22	64.71%
	CPC	12	35.29%
Kano	PDP	30	75.00%

Nigeria: Results of the 2011 State House of Assembly Elections (Cont.)

	ANPP	10	25.00%
Katsina	PDP	30	88.24%
	CPC	4	11.76%
Kebbi	PDP	23	95.83%
	CPC	1	4.17%
Kogi	PDP	19	76.00%
	ANPP	3	12.00%
	ACN	1	4.00%
Kwara	PDP	22	88.00%
	ACN	2	8.00%
Lagos	ACN	40	100.00%
Nasarawa	PDP	20	83.33%
	CPC	4	16.67%
Niger	PDP	23	85.19%
	CPC	3	11.11%
Ogun	ACN	17	65.38%
	PDP	6	23.08%
	PPN	3	11.54%
Ondo	LP	23	88.46%
	PDP	1	3.85%
Osun	ACN	26	100.00%
Oyo	PDP	12	37.50%
	ACN	11	34.38%
	A	6	18.75%
Plateau	PDP	19	79.17%
	LP	4	16.67%
	ACN	1	4.17%
Rivers	PDP	32	100.00%
Sokoto	PDP	30	100.00%
Taraba	PDP	20	83.33%
	CPC	2	8.33%
	ACN	1	4.17%
Yobe	ANPP	24	100.00%
Zamfara	ANPP	13	54.17%
	PDP	11	45.83%

Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). http://www.inecnigeria.org/

Table 6

Nigeria: Federal House of Representatives Elections

Party/Coalition	**Number of Seats**	**Percentage of Seats**
1999*		
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	215/360	60%
All People's Party (APP)	70/360	19%
Alliance for Democracy (AD)	66/360	18%
2003**		
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	223/360	62%
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	96/360	27%
Alliance for Democracy (AD)	34/360	9%
United Nigeria People's Party (UNPP)	2/360	1%
All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	2/360	1%
National Democratic Party (NDP)	1/360	0%
Peoples Salvation Party (PSP)	1/360	0%
2007		
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	262/360	73%
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	62/360	17%
Action Congress	32/360	9%
Progressive People's Alliance (PPA)	3/360	1%
Labour Party (LP)	1/360	0%
2011***		
Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP)	202/360	56%
Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)	66/360	18%
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC)	35/360	10%
All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP)	25/360	7%
Labour Party (LP)	8/360	2%
All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA)	6/360	2%
Accord Party	5/360	1%
Democratic People's Party (DPP)	2/360	1%
People's Party of Nigeria (PPN)	2/360	1%
Peoples' Democratic Party (PD)	1/360	0%

* 9 vacant seats
** 1 vacant seat
*** 8 vacant seats
Source: PARLINE database on national parliaments at http://www.ipu.org/parline-

e/parlinesearch.asp

Unfortunately, Nigeria's National Electoral Commission does not make results of all elections readily available. However, the results for both the federal and regional elections that took place in 1999, 2003, and 2007 followed the same pattern as the elections of 2011. Specifically, the Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) won every single presidential election in the Fourth Republic since 1999, the majority of seats in the federal parliament (see TABLE 5), the majority of seats in most state assemblies, and most gubernatorial posts. With respect to the presidency, since the presidential elections of 1999, when Northern elites decided to allow the rotation of the presidency to the South, Nigeria's main political parties adopted an informal arrangement of regional rotation of the presidency every two terms. In 1999 the Nigerian parties nominated candidates from the South for the presidential race; in 2007, the three biggest parties (PDP, ANPP, and AC) nominated their candidates from the North (Orji 2008, 135-136). The latest presidential election of 2011, which followed the death of Umaru Yar'Adua, a Northern Muslim, caused a great deal of controversy because it was won by the PDP candidate, Goodluck Jonathan, who is a Southern Christian. This latest controversy demonstrates that the informal agreement regarding regional (and religious) rotation of the presidency is taken seriously. Its primary goal was to assuage regional tensions between a better-educated Christian South and a more populous Muslim North. Moreover, it provided, largely unintentionally, an additional incentive for political parties to establish an inter-regional and inter-ethnic presence.

The federal and regional election results demonstrate that the PDP continually dominates national and regional politics. However, despite the PDP's dominance, the party system in Nigeria appears to be more competitive than the party system in Ethiopia. Whereas in Ethiopia, between the elections of 1995 and 2011 the EPDRF won eighty-eight, eighty-eight, sixty, and

ninety-one percent of the seats in the federal House of People's Representatives, with its affiliate parties picking up several additional seats, the PDP's share of the seats in the federal House of Representatives peaked at seventy-three percent and in 2011 declined to fifty-six percent. In addition, the data from regional elections of 2011 show that the PDP failed to gain the majority of seats in eleven out of thirty-six states and faced significant competition in several other states, such as Delta, Imo, and Kaduna. What explains the more competitive nature of Nigeria's party system?

One could argue that election fraud and repression of the opposition in Ethiopia is responsible for its less competitive party politics. However, election fraud in Nigeria has been widely documented as well (Rawlence and Albin-Lackey 2007; Suberu 2007). Therefore, it cannot be responsible for this difference in outcome. I contend that the national character of some of Nigeria's political parties allows them to present a greater challenge to the ruling party than the fragmented ethnoregionally based opposition parties of Ethiopia.

The election results show that the party system in Nigeria is national rather than regional or ethnoregional in character. This does not mean that Nigeria's politics lack an ethnic or regional dimension. Nigeria has been plagued by ethnoregional divisions since its independence. No amount of electoral engineering can destroy or even significantly reduce ethnic and regional bases for Nigerians' identities and loyalties. While Nigeria's most competitive political parties, such as the PDP, ANPP, and ACN, enjoy support in a variety of states and among many ethnic groups (both linguistic and religious), they all possess strong regional and ethnic strongholds at the grass-roots level. For example, the ANPP's main support base comes from regions in northern Nigeria, especially from Muslim Hausa voters (Olarinmoye 2008, 68; Kendhammer 2010, 49). This weakens these parties' competitiveness in national elections with respect to the

PDP.

Just like Ethiopia's EPRDF, the PDP owes much of its electoral success to its ability to include leaders from a variety of regional and ethnic communities: "The PDP's ruling coalition crosses ethnic and religious lines to incorporate not only elites from the largest ethnic groups – the Hausa and Fulani (North), the Yoruba (West), and the Igbo (East) – but also those from minority groups who have long looked to the federal centre for autonomy and protection from dominance by their larger neighbours" (Kendhammer 2010, 50). This broad regional and ethnic reach makes the PDP a formidable political force. However, the electoral data show that Nigeria's most successful opposition parties, while not truly national, also cannot be considered ethnoregional because of their inter-regional presence and inter-ethnic electoral support. For example, in 2011 regional elections the ACN won the majority of seats in five states: Edo, Ekiti, Lagos, Ogun, and Osun, and tied with the PDP in one more state, Oyo. In terms of geographical concentration, five of these states are located in the South-Western geopolitical zone and another one – in the South-South zone.[11] The South-Western zone is dominated by the Yoruba and South-South zone – by the Urhobo, Ibibio, Ijaw, Edo, and Itsekiri. In addition, the ACN had won a significant number of seats in Benue, which is located in the North-Central zone and is dominated by the Tiv, Nupe, and Jukun. Therefore, while the ACN's ethnic base is the Yoruba and its territorial base is located in the South-Western zone, it did not preclude it from actively seeking and gaining support from other ethnic and territorial communities.

[11] Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones based on ethnic (mostly linguistic and religious) similarities: North-West, North-East, North-Central, South-West, South-East, and South-South. The North-West is dominated by Hausa and Fulani Muslims, North-East – by Kanuri and Hausa Muslims, North-Central – by Tiv, Nupe, and Jukun, South-West – by Yoruba Muslims and Christians, South-East – by Igbo Christians, and South-South – by Urhobo, Ibibio, Ijaw, Edo, and Itsekiri Christians (Kendhammer 2010, 59).

The high salience of ethnic identity in Nigeria encourages politicians to appeal to voters based on these identities. This is not unique to the opposition parties alone: "PDP candidates frequently run campaigns based on mobilizing ethno-religious identity groups and…their supporters frequently participate in ethno-religious violence" (Kendhammer 2010, 50). The PDP's success is largely contingent upon the opposite strategies employed at the national and local levels of PDP's organization: "As a national organization, the PDP depends upon the continued cooperation of elites who share class and (sometimes) economic interests, but who in turn often rely on ethnic campaigning, mobilization, and rhetoric for their support at home" (Kendhammer 2010, 50). In this respect, the organizations of PDP and other major parties in Nigeria are not dissimilar to those of umbrella parties that exist in other majoritarian systems, including the US. They also appear to share some features of consociational arrangements, such as informal power-sharing among different ethnic groups in the context of ethnoterritorial separation, where "the segmental pillars are separate and possibly antagonistic, while their 'capitals' engage in a consociational honeymoon" (Duchacek 1985, 44). This result may disappoint those who hope that the nationalization of party systems in divided societies will result in the elimination of ethnic conflict. However, even though the nationalization of Nigeria's party system failed to eradicate ethnic conflict, it nevertheless helped localize ethnic tensions and prevented them from escalating to a national level, as happened in Nigeria in the 1960s. The continued importance of ethnic politics is demonstrated by subnational governmental elections during which, as I mentioned above, politicians often make ethnically based and ethnically divisive appeals to win office. However, due to an inter-regional nature of Nigerian political parties, success and survival of these parties depends on elite cooperation at the national level, regardless of national elites' ethnoregional origins.

As I discussed above, even though the PDP is the only party with a truly national scope of support in Nigeria, other major parties do not qualify as ethnoregional parties, as defined in this dissertation. Specifically, ethnoregional political parties have branches in one or a few ethnofederal units and identify themselves with those ethnopolitical groups with whom these regions are associated. Political parties in Nigeria, instead, are inter-regional and inter-ethnic. What explains the absence of ethnoregional parties in Nigeria?

One may argue that the obvious reason why Nigeria's parties are not ethnoregionally based is because Nigeria's constitution explicitly bans ethnic parties and rigorously enforces this ban (Bogaards 2010, 730). Specifically, Nigeria's constitution states that "no association by whatever name called shall function as a party, unless…the membership of the association is open to every citizen of Nigeria irrespective of his place of origin, circumstances of birth, sex, religion or ethnic grouping" and "the name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a part only of the geographical area of Nigeria" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999).[12] However, banning ethnic parties alone is unlikely to solve the problem of ethnically driven politics or even prevent the formation of ethnic parties. First, it is doubtful "that such powerful affiliations can simply be written out of the political process" (Horowitz 1993, 32). Second, such a ban is difficult to enforce, because it is not always possible to determine what constitutes a truly ethnic party. For example, in order to get around the ban, ethnic parties can simply register under non-ethnic labels in order to conceal their ethnic character. Finally, some scholars criticize an outright banning of ethnic and other identity-based

[12] The full text of Nigeria's constitution can be found on the following website: http://www.nigeria-law.org/ConstitutionOfTheFederalRepublicOfNigeria.htm

parties as undemocratic and inimical to democratization (Brancati 2004, 16). Instead, they suggest that the best way to avoid the formation of ethnic parties is to create incentives for politicians to broaden their electoral support base beyond their respective ethnic groups and regions (Brancati 2004; Horowitz 1993; Reilly 2002). Nigeria followed this advice when it introduced additional constitutional measures aimed to prevent the formation of ethnoregional parties. I would argue that it is those procedures, described below, that are primarily responsible for the lack of ethnoregional parties in Nigeria's politics.

First, Nigeria is a presidential system. Moreover, the Nigerian system is highly centralized and the president wields significant powers (Ibrahim 1999, 15). As a result, the presidency is the most coveted office in the country. According to the Nigerian Constitution, a person wishing to run for president, in addition to other qualifications, must be "a member of a political party and is sponsored by that political party" and have "not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in each of at least two-thirds of all the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Such territorial distribution requirement for presidential elections combined with a high power and prestige of the office and candidate's required association with a political party (unlike, for example, in Russia) creates incentives for political parties to expand their territorial presence. No party without a significant inter-regional presence can hope to have its candidate qualify for the presidential race.

The second institutional mechanism introduced by Nigeria to reduce the presence of ethnoregional parties specifies what associations could function as political parties. Similar to the presidential elections, this part of the constitution also introduces territorial distribution requirements: "No association by whatever name called shall function as a party unless…the

name of the association, its symbol or logo does not contain any ethnic or religious connotation or give the appearance that the activities of the association are confined to a party only of the geographical area of Nigeria" and "the election of the officers or members of the executive committee of a political party shall be deemed to be periodical only if it is made at regular intervals not exceeding four years; and the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political character of Nigeria only if the members thereof belong to different states not being less in number than two-thirds of all the states of the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja" (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999). Therefore, no association can function as a political party unless it establishes an inter-regional presence.

Nigeria is not the only ethnofederal state to have introduced territorial distribution requirements to prevent the formation of regional parties. As discussed in the previous chapter, Russia introduced similar restrictions in 2001. Brancati (2004) argues that this is a major strength of ethnofederal states: they allow one to introduce various mechanisms to discourage the formation of regional and ethnic parties. These mechanisms include cross-regional voting laws and other territorial distribution requirements for political parties to compete in national elections (17).

The comparison between Nigeria and Ethiopia leads to two conclusions. First, the difference in party systems in these states helps to explain in part why Ethiopia's dominant party, the EPRDF, faces less significant opposition than its Nigerian counterpart, the PDP. It is unclear whether Ethiopia will make a transition to democracy, remain a dominant-party system or revert to authoritarianism. The EPRDF's unwillingness to share power demonstrated during and after the elections of 2005 has led some critics to proclaim the end of Ethiopia's democratic

experiment (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009). However, at least until 2010, the dominance of the EPRDF was not due solely to its unwillingness to share power with the opposition groups. Rather, it was to a great extent due to the narrow base of the opposition parties. Most opposition parties and political organizations in Ethiopia are ethnoregional in constituency; therefore, the opposition is divided and, with the exception of brief competition from the EUDF and CUD (whose formation and electoral success should have surprised those who argued that Ethiopia's lack of electoral competition prior to the 2010 elections was due primarily to the EPRDF's repression of the opposition), the EPRDF is the only political coalition that can claim to represent all of Ethiopia. The PDP's dominance in Nigeria is also in part due to the fact that its opposition parties lack a truly national presence. However, in contrast to Ethiopia, parties in Nigeria are not ethnoregional; they have a considerable inter-regional presence. Therefore, they are able to challenge the PDP's electoral dominance both at the regional and national levels. Second, Ethiopia's example confirms suspicions shared by critics of ethnofederalism that ethnofederal design encourages the formation of ethnoregional parties. However, Nigeria's example shows that ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states, even in states with a long history of ethnoregional conflict, are not inevitable and are subject to institutional engineering.

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)

Whereas the Nigerian constitution explicitly prohibits ethnic parties and discourages the formation of regional parties, BiH's ethnofederal constitution combined with its electoral rules and institutions promote ethnoregionalization of parties. For example, whereas the Nigerian constitution includes inter-regional requirements for presidential candidates in order to ensure that no candidate appeals exclusively to one ethnoregional community, Article V of the Bosnian constitution states: "The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall consist of three Members:

one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska."[13] This specification creates incentives for political parties that hope to gain control of the shared presidency to appeal to their respective "constituent peoples" (Serbs, Croats, or Bosniacs) and discourages parties from establishing significant presence across ethnoregional lines. However, it must be noted that BiH's federal system is highly decentralized (although the federal center has been significantly strengthened with time (Bieber 2006, 18-21)) and the presidency is collective; therefore, winning the presidency for parties of BiH does not have nearly the same importance as winning the presidency in Nigeria's highly-centralized political system. It is clear, however, that the ethnonational requirements for the presidency must have some restraining effect on the formation of inter-ethnic and inter-regional parties. At the very least, the institution of an ethnically based shared presidency encourages ethnic outbidding between parties representing each of the three Bosnian constituent peoples:

> Mono-ethnic, competitive contexts encourage nationalist rhetoric and ethnic outbidding precisely because there is competition between those who are elected, even if there is no direct electoral competition between them. Electoral campaigns for such positions are more likely to be framed according to which candidate or party can best promote the interests of the constituent ethnicity relative to the other ethnic groups (Hulsey 2010, 1142).

In addition to Article V, Article IV, which addresses the selection of members of the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH, further promotes regionalization of political parties. Specifically, Paragraph 2 states: "The House of Representatives [lower house of the Parliamentary Assembly] shall comprise 42 Members, two-thirds elected from the territory of the Federation, one-third from the territory of the Republika Srpska." Even though this law carries

[13] The full text of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina can be found on the following website: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/bk00000_.html

no ethnic requirement, in BiH's context[14] this mode of electing members of the House of Representatives encourages the development of ethnonational parties and discourages the formation of inter-ethnic and truly country-wide parties. Inter-ethnic parties with significant presence in more than one region in such political systems are highly improbable and party systems at the country-wide level are likely to be dominated by ethnonational parties. The electoral data for all federal-level elections since 1996 confirm this expectation. In the elections to the House of Representatives in 1996 and 1998, ethnonationalist parties won the majority of seats:

[14] After years of war and ethnic cleansing (1992-1995) territories of BiH became highly ethnically homogeneous.

Table 7

1996 and 1998 BiH House of Representatives Elections

Year	District	District Magnitude	Party/Coalition	Seats
1996	Federation of BiH	28	Democratic Action Party (SDA)	16
			Croatian Democratic Party/Union BiH (HDZ)	8
			United List of Bosnia Herzegovina	2
			Party for BiH	2
1996	Republika Srpska	14	Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)	9
			Democratic Action Party (SDA)	3
			People's Union for Peace	2
1998	Federation of BiH	28	Coalition for a United and Democratic BiH (KCD)	14
			Croatian Democratic Party/Union BiH (HDZ)	6
			Social Democratic Party BiH (SDP)	4
			Social Democrats BiH	2
			Democratic People's Community (DNZ)	1
			New Croatian Initiative-Croatian Christian Democratic Union (NHI-HKDU)	1
1998	Republika Srpska	14	Sloga Coalition [SLOGA]	4
			SDS List	4
			Coalition for a United and Democratic BiH (KCD)	3
			Serbian Radical Party of Republic of Serbia (SRS-RS)	2
			Radical Party of the Republic of Serbia	1

Source: Brancati, Dawn. Constituency-Level Elections (CLE) Dataset, 2007 rev. 2011. New York: Constituency-Level Elections Dataset [distributor], Date Accessed 11/18/2011. Website: http://www.cle.wustl.edu

In 1996, parties that won the most seats were three ethnonational parties: Democratic Action Party (SDA), which represents Bosniacs, Croatian Democratic Party/Union BiH (HDZ), which represents Croats, and Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), which represents Serbs. In 1998, Sloga Coalition (supported by the western organizations due to its more moderate position

relative to the SDS) and Serb nationalist SDS List won the majority of seats from Republika Srpska (four seats each). In the Federation, Croat ethnonationalist party, HDZ, once again won the most seats of all the Croat parties. The majority of seats from the Federation district went to the Coalition for a United and Democratic BiH (KCD). The KCD was a coalition of four parties: SDA, SBiH, LS, and GDS. Despite its inter-ethnic non-nationalist appearance, its two dominant coalition members were SDA and SBiH, which are the two most popular Bosniac parties. With Bosniacs being a clear numeric majority within the Federation, it is not surprising that the KCD won the largest number of seats in that region. The data also show that there was very little inter-regional support for any of the parties during the first two elections. One may argue that the virtual absence of inter-regional parties and dominance of ethnoregional parties was hardly surprising this soon after the war. In addition, prior to 2002, the constitutions of Republika Srpska and Federation of BiH privileged their respective dominant communities (Serbs in Republika Srpska and Bosniacs and Croats in the Federation). For example, the constitution of the Federation named only Bosniacs and Croats as "constituent peoples," thus excluding Serbs (ICG Balkans Report No. 128, 3). In addition, the Federation granted Bosniacs and Croats greater representation and veto rights than Serbs and "Others" (Bieber 2006, 22). In 2000, the Constitutional Court of BiH found that such discriminatory provisions of regional constitutions violated the constitution of BiH. Political parties were asked to negotiate constitutional reforms in both entities, and in 2002 the Office of the High Representative imposed required constitutional reforms (Bieber 2006, 21). Both entities revised their constitutions to define Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats as "constituent peoples." Republika Srpska amended its constitution to provide proportional representation to "constituent peoples" and "others" in entity's executive,

legislative, and judicial branches of government.[15] The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina changed the number of seats in the House of Peoples to fifty eight to ensure election of seventeen delegates from among each of the "constituent peoples" and additional seven delegates to represent the "others."[16] However, despite changes in regional constitutions, the data for the last two elections to the House of Representatives show similar patterns of voting for ethnoregional parties as was the case during the first two elections. The data for the election of 2010 show that no party managed to win a significant number of seats in both regions. The party system in BiH remains regionalized. Even non-nationalist parties, such as the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP), are unable to win seats from both regions:

[15] Amendment LXXXV of the Decision of the High Representative No. 150/02[09], Constitution of Republika Srpska, available at: http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1580/file/c8ea79bc0db11c11f49f19525f43.htm/preview

[16] Amendment XXXIII, Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, available at: http://legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/1577/file/cf85ae3b01c1adcd1b6eed4a3b84.htm/preview

Table 8

2006 and 2010 BiH House of Representatives Elections

Year	District	District Magnitude	Party/Coalition	Seats
2006	Federation of BiH	28	Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	8
			Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH)	7
			Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)	5
			Croatian Democratic Union-Croatian National Union (HDZ-HNZ)	3
			Croatians Together (HDZ 1990)	2
			Patriotic Party (BPS Sefer Halilovic)	1
			People's Party Working for Prosperity (NS)	1
			Democratic People's Community	1
2006	Republika Srpska	14	Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	1
			Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH)	1
			Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)	7
			Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	3
			Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)	1
			Democratic People's Alliance (DNS)	1
2010	Federation of BiH	28	Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP)	8
			Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	7
			Union for a Better Future of BiH (SBB BiH)	4
			Croatian Democratic Union-Croatian National Union (HDZ-HNZ)	3
			Croatians Together (HDZ 1990)	2
			Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBiH)	2
			People's Party Work for Betterment (NSRzB)	1
			Democratic People's Community (DNZ)	1
	Republika Srpska	14	Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)	8
			Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	4
			Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)	1
			Democratic People's Alliance (DNS)	1

Source: PARLINE database on national parliaments at http://www.ipu.org/parlinee/reports/2039_arc.htm

The Social Democratic Party (SDP) is the only non-ethnonationalist party that was able to maintain a consistently significant level of popular support. In 2000 it won the highest number of seats in the House of Representatives (nine out of forty-two). Its support declined considerably in 2002 when four ethnonationalist parties, the SDA, SBiH, SDS, and HDZ, became clear winners, gaining ten, six, five, and five seats, respectively. The SDP came in a distant fourth, with only four out of forty-two seats (see PARLINE database on national parliaments at http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2039_arc.htm). In 2006 it gained five seats – all five from the Federation. Finally, in 2010 the SDP gained eight seats, all from the Federation, proving to be the most popular party in that region. The SDP's success demonstrates that parties that do not explicitly intend to represent an ethnic group are not impossible and that the electorate does not necessarily punish non-ethnic (based on their electoral platform) parties at the polls. On the other hand, even though the SDP is a non-ethnic (by design) party, most of its support comes from the Bosniac community. Despite SDP's anti-ethnonationalist agenda, "the SDP's success has been limited to Bosniak voters and particularly Bosniak voters in larger cities…The SDP's ideology is strongly multi-ethnic, but they have made few inroads in Croat or Serb-dominated areas" (Hulsey 2010, 1135). As a result, it failed to gain support outside of the Federation, thus remaining a regional party. The data above show that the SDP failed to win any seats from Republika Srpska in the federal elections of 2006 and 2010. Despite running its candidates in the regional elections in Republika Srpska, it also failed to win more than four percent of the seats:

Table 9

2006 and 2010 National Assembly of the Republika Srpska Elections

Year	DM	Party/Coalition	Seats
2006	83	Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)	41
		Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)	17
		Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)	8
		Democratic Peoples' Alliance (DNS)	4
		Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina	4
		Socialist Party (SP)	3
		Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	3
		Serbian Radical Party of Serbian	2
		Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP)	1
2010	83	Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)	37
		Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)	18
		Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)	7
		Democratic Peoples' Alliance (DNS)	6
		The Socialist Party and the Party of United Pensioners	4
		Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP)	3
		The Democratic Party	2
		Social Democratic Party	2
		Party of Democratic Action	2
		Serbian Radical Party	1

Source: National Assembly of the Republic of Srpska at http://www.narodnaskupstinars.net/ and BiH Central Election Commission at http://www.izbori.ba/default.asp?col=Statistika

The data above show that in the 2006 the SDP won only one seat in the National Assembly of the RS and in 2010 its share of seats went up to three (or 3.6 percent of the total number of seats). The two ethnonationalist parties, SNSD and SDS, were clear winners in the last two elections into the parliament of Republika Srpska. The population of Republika Srpska continues to back ethnonationalist parties, such as the SDS and SNSD, both in national and regional elections.

When the Constitutional Court of BiH criticized the constitutions of Republika Srpska and the Federation for privileging ethnicity and creating "rigid mechanisms of assigning ethnicity to office holders" (Bieber 2006, 22), its reasoning implied a critique of the Constitution

of BiH as well (Bieber 2006, 22). However, any serious reform of the national constitution is unlikely in the near future, because the main political powers in BiH represent three ethnoregional communities, Serbs, Croats, and Bosniacs, and each has a very different vision of the state. Bosnian Serbs, represented predominantly by the SDS and SNSD, would not accept any constitutional reform that would challenge Republika Srpska's sovereignty. Bosnian Croats, represented by the HDZ and HNZ, would like to see a creation of the third entity that would represent a homeland of Bosnian Croats (Hitchner 2006, 129). Neither Serbs nor Croats would accept the removal of consociational arrangements embedded in today's Constitutions of BiH that granted "extraordinary precedence to ethnicity over other forms of political identification and orientation" (Bieber 2006, 26). Any ethnically blind constitution would privilege the plurality, Bosniacs, at the expense of minorities, Serbs and Croats. This is a dilemma that faces all democratic multinational societies:

> To be blunt, democracy as such is a numbers game. Majorities rule. Minorities are potentially threatened. In this sense, democratization in culturally or ethnically plural societies typically faces a "minority problem" that must be dealt with in order to forestall strife or instability. Ethnic minorities are potentially among the biggest losers in any democratization process that empowers ethnic majorities, so the dilemma facing democratization in multicultural society is how to marginalize destabilizing forms of mobilization and to integrate the interests of minorities in a revised system of power whose legitimacy critically depends on majority rule (Beissinger 2008, 91).

It is not surprising, therefore, that the only parties in BiH that endorse the state defined in less ethnic terms (Bieber 2006, 25) are parties that are predominantly supported by Bosniacs, such as the SDA, SBiH, and the SDP (Hitchner 2006, 129). Overall, in contrast to Nigeria's constitution, BiH's constitution today does not include any incentives for political parties to make inter-ethnic and inter-regional appeals; in many cases, as the ones discussed above, it discourages such tactics (Hulsey 2010, 1140).

Electoral institutions adopted by the democratizing ethnofederal states of Ethiopia, Nigeria, and BiH provide an interesting range of institutional tools used by these states to manage their ethnoregional divisions. On the one extreme, Nigeria's constitution bans ethnic parties and creates incentives for political parties to establish an inter-regional presence. On the other extreme, the federal constitution of BiH encourages the formation of ethnoregional parties by privileging ethnicity in some political institutions (presidency) and regional representation in others (House of Representatives). Parties, then, have a better chance of succeeding by narrowing their focus on one relatively ethnically homogeneous region or cantons: either Republica Srpska or ten homogeneous cantons in Federation of BiH. Finally, Ethiopia's electoral institutions can be located in the middle due to their relative neutrality with respect to party system design. By neutrality I do not mean that electoral institutions in Ethiopia have no effect on party formation or party system. No electoral institutions are neutral. As discussed elsewhere in this dissertation, the scholars of electoral and party systems have established, for example, that the PR system is more likely to be linked to the formation of ethnically based parties than the SMD system. However, Ethiopia's constitution expresses no explicit intent to shape the party system: the electoral laws in Ethiopia neither explicitly promote nor ban ethnic or ethnoregional forces from participating in electoral competition. The combination of the majoritarian electoral system and ethnofederal territorial design in Ethiopia has, on the one hand, resulted in the proliferation of ethnoregional parties, and, on the other hand, significantly impaired their competitiveness at the national level.

Table 10

Nigeria, Ethiopia, and BiH: Summary

Country	Electoral System	National or Inter-Regional Parties/Coalitions	Ethnic and Ethnoregional Parties	Level of Centralization	Institutional Incentives for Ethnic and Ethnoregional Party Formation
Nigeria	SMD	Yes (PDP, ACN, ANPP)	No	High	Low: ethnic parties are banned; territorial distribution requirements for presidential candidates and parties competing in federal elections
Ethiopia	SMD	Yes (EPRDF)	Yes (ANDP, ANDM, BGPDP, GPUDM, OPDO, HNL, SEPDM, SPDP, TPLF, etc.)	High	Moderate: no specific requirements either encouraging or discouraging ethnic or regional parties. High level of centralization encourages party aggregation; ethnofederal territorial design encourages formation of ethnoregional parties.
BiH	PR	Yes* (SDA, SDP, SBiH)	Yes (SDA, SBiH, HDZ, SDS, SNSD, etc.)	Low	High: ethnofederal territorial structure, PR electoral system, weak federal center, ethnic specifications for presidency, regionalized selection of members of the House of Representatives.

*However, these parties are all ethnonational. Due to the fact that both federal units of BiH are highly ethnically homogeneous, no party enjoys a high level of country-level support.

The institutional explanation proposed in this chapter, which focuses on how electoral institutions shape incentives and constraints faced by politicians and political parties, helps

explain why some ethnofederal states are dominated by national or inter-regional and inter-ethnic parties while others are dominated by ethnoregional ones. However, this explanation alone is insufficient. Specifically, it is unable to explain why, even though they face the same set of electoral rules and regulations, some ethnoregional groups tend to support national, inter-ethnic, and/or moderate parties while others – ethnoregional and ethnonationalist parties. For example, the institutional explanation cannot explain why during the 2005 elections in Ethiopia, support for the strongest opposition coalition to the EPRDF rule, the CUD, came primarily from the Amhara people. This deficiency will be addressed in the following chapters, which will focus on explaining the variation in support for different types of parties within ethnofederal states.

CHAPTER 4

From Rajasthan to Manipur: Explaining Variation in Regional Party Systems in India

Introduction

Research has shown that political decentralization stimulates the development of regional political parties (Brancati 2006, Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). Such parties are even more likely in ethnically based federal units. In addition, certain electoral systems are more conducive to the proliferation of regional parties than others. However, the electoral popularity of regional parties varies even when levels of political decentralization, state structure, and electoral systems are held constant. Not all ethnically based federal regions have electorally significant regional parties even if there are no institutional obstacles to their formation. Electoral strength of regional parties varies not only from one ethnofederal state to the next but also from one ethnofederal unit to the next within the same state. India, currently composed of twenty eight states as well as seven union territories, provides an opportunity to examine why some ethnofederal regions tend to be dominated by national parties while others – by regional ones. This chapter will evaluate the effect of socioeconomic and ethno-cultural variables on the regional variation in party systems. It will show that, contrary to modernization theories, socioeconomic factors play little role in influencing the differences in levels of support for regional and national parties. Instead, the most important determining factor is ethno-demographic composition of the region. More specifically, the regional party system variation in India is best explained by the presence or absence of a Hindu majority/plurality. This conclusion calls into question an often-made assertion that ethnically based territorial autonomy necessarily sharpens and institutionalizes ethno-territorial cleavages.

India: background

India is one of the oldest ethnic federations. It is relatively poor, demonstrating that income or a certain level of economic development is not a necessary condition for a stable democracy (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011: 42). It is also the most populous democracy in the world and its population is extremely geographically, religiously, linguistically, and culturally diverse.

India's federalism is based on ethno-linguistic distinctiveness. The Indian population is divided by a multitude of identity cleavages, which include tribal and caste loyalties; however, the two predominant symbols of identity that shaped most political demands in India's regions are religion and language (Brass 2005: 3). India's federal constitution presupposes a high level of centralization, with regional governors assigned by the president and residual powers remaining with the center.

Despite its single-member-district electoral system, India is a multi-party system. For several decades after its independence, India's central and regional assemblies have been dominated by one party: the Indian National Congress (INC). However, since the late 1970s its popularity has waned, and it has faced increasingly robust political competition, both at the central and regional levels. At the center, the INC's strongest competitor is the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). However, since the 1990s neither party has had much success obtaining the necessary parliamentary majority to form a government without creating coalitions with smaller national or state parties. At the states' level, in addition to the BJP, the INC's dominance has been successfully challenged by a myriad of regional parties.

Case selection:

India uses a first-past-the-post, single-member-district electoral system both at the federal and regional levels. Some states initially used double-member district systems but within one or

two electoral cycles have shifted to the single-member district electoral system. Therefore, there is no regional variation in electoral systems. The one-country study also allows controlling for changes in the federal level of centralization.

India is composed of twenty-eight states which, since 1956, for the most part have been formed based on linguistic identity,[17] as well as seven union territories. Union territories are administered by the president and an administrator, appointed by the president. More importantly, only two of the seven union territories, Delhi and Pondicherry, have legislative assemblies. For this reason, union territories are excluded from this analysis. In addition, the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand, are excluded from this analysis because all three were formed in 2000, limiting the analysis of the party composition in their legislative assemblies to only one or two elections. Finally, Sikkim is excluded from this analysis due to its distinctive mode of incorporation into India, which has shaped its political landscape, including its party system, in important ways. Sikkim joined India in 1975 after the referendum demonstrated that the majority of Sikkim's population was in favor of merging with India. Therefore, the dataset created for this chapter has a total of twenty-four federal units (n=24).

India poses an important challenge to those who claim that federal arrangements lead to the formation of electorally powerful regional parties. The likelihood of such an occurrence may be higher in ethnofederal states; however, based on this logic one would expect all states in India to be dominated by regional parties. An examination of regional legislative elections in the states of India from the 1950s to the early 2000s demonstrates that this is not the case. Party systems, with respect to the balance between regional and national parties, it turns out, vary considerably

[17] Uttarakhand, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh are notable exceptions. See Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011): 47.

from state to state. Rajasthan, for example, has always been dominated by national parties. Between 1957 and 2003, it had eleven state assembly elections. Regional (state) parties participated in only three of these elections: in 1957 a state party gained 17 out of 176 seats, in 1962 – 3 out of 176 seats, and in 1998 – 1 out of 200 seats. In contrast, since its creation in 1956, Tamil Nadu (originally named Madras) has been consistently dominated by regional parties. Finally, Manipur, created in 1972, is an example of a state in which both national and state parties have always had a strong presence. With the type of electoral system and level of centralization held constant, what explains this variation?

Data collection and coding

The analysis presented in this chapter is based on electoral data from the Election Commission of India and India's 2001 Census data. The electoral data makes available statistical reports for all state assembly elections, starting with each state's inception; crucially for this study, the data break down electoral results for assembly seats contested and won by all participating national parties, state parties, and independent candidates. The 2001 Census provides India-wide and regional socioeconomic and cultural data.

Dependent Variable

The goal of this chapter is to evaluate some possible factors that might account for the regional variation in state-level party systems when electoral system and level of centralization are held constant. After collecting data on assembly elections in twenty-four states, I divided them into three categories: National = states consistently dominated by national parties, State = states consistently dominated by state parties, and Mixed = states in which both national and state parties have both historically played a major role, either sharing power in state assemblies or taking turns dominating state assemblies. These three categories of state-level party systems

are coded as follows: 1 = National, 2 = Mixed, 3 = State. The three constructed categories imply a specific ordering based on an assumption that states dominated by national parties are likely to identify more closely with India's central polity than states dominated by state parties; states in which national and state political parties share power in legislative assemblies are assumed to have a higher identification with the federal center than states dominated by state parties but a lower identification than states dominated by national parties. Whether or not this assumption holds will not affect the results of this examination; however, such ordering, with lower digits representing greater levels of association with the overall federal state of India and higher digits representing lower levels of such association, helps maintain consistent coding throughout this analysis.

Table 11

India: Coding of Regional Party Systems

State	# of elections	# of National	# of State	# of Mixed	Code*
Andhra Pradesh	12	8	3	0	1
Arunachal Pradesh	7	6	0	1	1
Assam	12	11	0	1	1
Bihar	13	11	2	0	1
Goa	10	6	3	1	2
Gujarat	11	11	0	0	1
Haryana	10	8	2	0	1
Himachal Pradesh	11	11	0	0	1
Jammu & Kashmir	8	2	5	1	3
Karnataka	11	11	0	0	1
Kerala	12	12	0	0	1
Madhya Pradesh	12	12	0	0	1
Maharashtra	10	9	0	1	1
Manipur	10	5	1	4	2
Meghalaya	8	2	1	5	2
Mizoram	5	2	2	1	2
Nagaland**	10	4	3	3	3
Orissa	13	10	0	3	1
Punjab	13	8	3	2	2
Rajasthan	12	12	0	0	1
Tamil Nadu	10	0	10	0	3
Tripura	8	8	0	0	1
Uttar Pradesh	15	13	0	2	1
West Bengal	14	14	0	0	1

* 1 = national party system, 2 = mixed party system, 3 = state party system. National party system means that a state assembly was consistently dominated by national parties; state party system means that a state assembly was consistently dominated by state parties; mixed party system means that both national and state parties have both historically played a major role in a state assembly either sharing power or taking turns dominating state assemblies.
** I decided to code Nagaland as 3 instead of 2 because State parties in Nagaland were consistently strong and undivided.

In this chapter, the state parties of India are not divided into ethnically based and non-ethnically based categories. The primary reason for this is the lack of readily available data, which would have allowed a more accurate categorization of such kind. Several parties in India had begun as state parties but have expanded into national parties or aim to gain the status of a national party.[18] Those parties are not necessarily ethnically neutral; however, they share little in common, both in terms of their party organization and party platform, with true ethnoregional parties. Therefore, the lack of classification of state parties into ethno-regional and non-ethno-regional categories produces certain empirical and theoretical limitations in this study. However, a great number, if not a majority, of state parties are also ethnic as they explicitly identify with specific religious, linguistic, tribal or caste communities. Indeed, ethnic politics has always been one of the identifying characteristics of India's democracy. Even national parties, such as the Congress party, which dominated India's political landscape until the 1980s, cannot ignore ethnic interests in selection of their candidates and policy-making. Increasingly, however, these national parties have been successfully challenged by regional parties that make ethnic appeals an explicit and often dominant part of their party platform (see, for instance, Chandra 2000). Despite the ethnic character of many Indian parties, no conclusion will be made that would suggest a unique role of ethnoregional parties in party system formation and intra-state variation in party systems. This chapter's goal is more modest: it aims to explain why some states in India vote for regional parties rather than for national ones and vice versa.

Independent Variables

[18] The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) is one such party. Its roots and greatest support come from Uttar Pradesh; however, it is currently classified as a national party, and it aims to further expand its geographical base.

The literature on political parties identifies three factors that are primarily responsible for the presence, absence or relative dominance of regional parties: electoral institutions (Reilly 2002; Horowitz 2004), level of decentralization (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Brancati 2006), and ethnically based federal units (Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova 2004). These explanations, however, are unable to account for variation in regional party systems in ethnofederal India, where all states have adopted similar first-past-the-post SMD electoral systems. Similarly, greater decentralization of the late 1980s had undoubtedly contributed to the proliferation of regional parties (Chhibber and Kollman 2004). However, this general trend also fails to address the issue of inter-state variation in party systems.

This chapter identifies and tests several socioeconomic and cultural variables that may have an effect on inter-state variation in party systems in India. The choice of these variables is heavily influenced by theories on peripheral nationalism, cultural and political exclusiveness, and separatism (for a discussion of these theories see Zariski 1989). The link between ethnic conflict or political instability and ethnic parties has often been made in the literature (see, for example, Horowitz 1985, Brancati 2006). At least one study attempts to quantify the institutional dimension of ethnic conflict by estimating the vote share of ethnic parties and ethnic organizations (see Vanhanen 1999: 60-61). However, others (Lijphart 1977, Chandra 2005) claim that the institutionalization of ethnic parties may promote democratic peace rather than conflict. Therefore, this chapter does not assume a correlation between ethnic conflict, separatist movements, or peripheral nationalism and the existence of regional or ethnoregional parties. It does, however, presuppose that similar forces that may contribute to peripheral nationalism also contribute to the greater prominence of regional political parties. Specifically, it is reasonable to expect that populations of those regions that feel most estranged from the overall state of India

may be less supportive of national political parties and more inclined to cast their votes for regional parties.

Socioeconomic Variables: Education and Urbanization

There are several different theories that stress the economic logic of peripheral nationalism. Many scholars argue that poorer regions are more likely to develop contentious relationships with the center and demand greater autonomy or even secession. Theories of internal colonialism and relative deprivation stress the importance of the real or perceived exploitation or neglect of the periphery by the center (Zariski 1989). In a federal system, absolute economic equality between regions is unfeasible and federal subjects who lag behind others in their economic development and living standards may perceive their relative underdevelopment to be the result of unequal treatment by the federal center. However, critics of these theories maintain that economically "backward" regions are unlikely to pose a serious challenge to the state's territorial integrity because of their lack of resources. Moreover, many poor regions are actually economically dependent on the center and may be the main beneficiaries of federal redistributive policies. Wealthier regions, in contrast, possess necessary resources and incentive to challenge the center either to achieve independent statehood or greater autonomy within the existing state. Some wealthy regions may be critical of the center's redistribution policies which may lead to accusations of economic exploitation and demands for greater autonomy over that region's resources. Case studies provide support for both theories. For example, in the 19th century, peripheral nationalism in Western Europe originated largely from poorer regions, consistent with theories of relative deprivation and internal colonization. However, in the 20th century some of the strongest nationalist movements developed in more economically advanced regions such as the Basque Country and the Flemish region. Likewise, Roeder (1991) observes

that peripheral nationalism in the USSR was least developed in the Central Asian republics, which were among the poorest regions of the country, and most developed in its wealthiest regions such as the Baltic republics and the Caucasus.

The economic logic of peripheral nationalism briefly outlined above suggests a correlation between regional party systems and the relative economic development of that region. According to theories of relative deprivation and internal colonization, poorer regions of India, frustrated with their lower level of income, are less likely to be supportive of national parties. Unless nationalist movements in these regions, driven by a feeling of exploitation, neglect, or discrimination, are limited to a very narrow portion of the population, such movements are expected to be translated into significant wins by regional parties. I could find no readily available data that would enable ready comparisons between economies of India's states. Therefore, I will use the state-level data on education and urbanization as proxies for economic well-being indicators (as well as important indicators of economic development on their own, as I discuss below). States with higher levels of urbanization and literacy should also have better economies.

According to modernization theory, one could expect states with higher levels of education to express a higher tolerance of diversity, have higher identification with the overall state of India, and be more likely to vote for unifying national parties, such as the INC. Stepan, Linz, and Yadav (2011) demonstrate that "nonliterates" display a slightly lower level of national pride (pride in India) than other categories, which include "all of India" and minority groups, such as Muslims, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes. The authors argue that the lower levels of pride found in uneducated respondents are explained "partly because a large proportion of these groups fails to understand the question . . . and partly because they are genuinely less

enthusiastic about Indian nationalism" (59).

On the other hand, higher levels of education may also correlate positively with greater peripheral nationalism. This was the case in the USSR, where republics with higher levels of education exhibited the highest levels of peripheral nationalism (Roeder 1991). However, that was due, in part, to the specific nature of upward mobility that was shaped by the Soviet ethnofederal affirmative action policy, which structurally limited mobility on the basis of titular nationality to the level of the republic. More generally, greater support for regional parties from regions with higher levels of education may be found if education, along with other indicators of economic development, contributes to the strengthening of peripheral nationalism.

As a measure of education, this chapter uses illiteracy rates. The illiteracy rates are computed using the Census 2001 data on state-wise education levels.

The arguments about the effect of economic development on peripheral nationalism, which were discussed above in relation to income and education, also apply to the urbanization variable. In addition, some scholars of nationalism have argued that greater urbanization, by way of greater intra and inter-ethnic communication, may contribute to the creation of ethnic consciousness (Connor 1972).

As a measure of urbanization, this chapter computes regional proportion of urban populations, using the data provided by India's Census 2001. Table 12 includes the summary of all three socioeconomic variables, discussed above:

Table 12

India: Socioeconomic Data

State	Illiteracy	Urbanization
Andhra Pradesh	48%	27%
Arunachal Pradesh	56%	21%
Assam	47%	13%
Bihar	63%	10%
Goa	3%	50%
Gujarat	41%	37%
Haryana	43%	29%
Himachal Pradesh	34%	10%
Jammu & Kashmir	53%	25%
Karnataka	42%	34%
Kerala	20%	26%
Madhya Pradesh	48%	26%
Maharashtra	34%	42%
Manipur	40%	25%
Meghalaya	50%	20%
Mizoram	26%	50%
Nagaland	43%	17%
Orissa	46%	15%
Punjab	39%	34%
Rajasthan	51%	23%
Tamil Nadu	35%	44%
Tripura	37%	17%
Uttar Pradesh	54%	21%
West Bengal	41%	28%

Source: India's 2001 Census available at: http://censusindia.gov.in/

According to the data presented above, Goa and Mizoram have the highest levels of urbanization with fifty percent of their population residing in urban areas. Goa also enjoys the lowest proportion of illiterate residents: only three percent of Goa residents are illiterate. Mizoram has the third lowest illiteracy rates in the country (with twenty-six percent being illiterate). In contrast, in Bihar and Himachal Pradesh only ten percent of the population resides in urban areas. Bihar also has the worst literacy record among all the states listed above: sixty-three

percent of its population is illiterate.

Linguistic and religious diversity

The effect of ethnic heterogeneity on ethnic conflict has been a subject of much debate (Horowitz 1985; Bowen 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Gagnon 2006). An argument that ethnic diversity is responsible for societal tensions and leads to civil wars has gained significant prominence as a result of the Yugoslav wars, which were consistently portrayed as the unfortunate and unavoidable result of democratization, which released popular feelings of ethnic animosity that had been previously suppressed by the authoritarian state (Gagnon 2006). Despite much evidence to the contrary, the argument that ethnically heterogeneous societies are inherently unstable, unfit for democratic governance and doomed to follow Yugoslavia's fate, continues to be invoked by journalists, policy makers and scholars.[19] In contrast to these theories, some studies suggest that high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity are associated with lower levels of conflict (Horowitz 1985; Fearon and Laitin 2003).

In order to measure the regional levels of religious and linguistic diversity, this chapter uses the state-wise language and religion data provided by the Indian Census of 2001. To compute religious and linguistic diversity, this chapter uses the Greenberg Diversity Index formula, originally used to estimate linguistic diversity but later also applied to religion (see, for example, Finke and Stark 1988). The Greenberg Diversity Index (DI) is equal to $1 - \Sigma(P_i)^2$, where P represents proportion of the population belonging to a specific linguistic or religious community and i represents the total number of linguistic or religious communities, including "others." As part of an initial step of calculating the Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI), I use the

[19] See, for example, Friedman, Thomas L. "Pray. Hope. Prepare." *The New York Times*. April 12, 2011.

census data on the distribution of the twenty-two scheduled languages by state. A great majority (over ninety percent) of the population in most states of India belong to a scheduled language group (twenty-two languages listed in and protected by the Indian Constitution). However, there are six notable exceptions: Arunachal Pradesh (only 33.06 percent belong to the scheduled languages group, the rest belonging to "other languages" category), Manipur (63.45 percent belong to the scheduled languages group), Meghalaya (16.57 percent), Mizoram (12.51 percent), Nagaland (only 9.83 percent belong to the scheduled languages group), and Tripura (70.84 percent). Because a large portion of the population in these states speaks the non-scheduled languages, all of which are combined into a single "other languages" category, the LDI for these states is significantly underestimated. In order to correct for this problem, the LDI numbers for the six states in which the proportion of the population belonging to the scheduled language groups is less than ninety percent is calculated using the census data for the unscheduled languages. The data on the unscheduled languages also includes the "other languages" category. However, this category is relatively small. Overall, the inclusion of the unscheduled languages significantly improves the accuracy of the LDI. The unscheduled languages data could also be used to re-calculate the LDIs for the remaining states; however, because in those states over ninety percent of the population belongs to the scheduled language category, this correction would lead only to a minor change in results (no higher than one or two percentage points).

The religious diversity index gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a given state belong to a different religious group. The linguistic diversity index gives the probability that two randomly selected individuals in a given state belong to a different linguistic group.

Proportion of Hindus and Hindi speakers

Finally, we would expect to find that states in which Hindus and/or Hindi speakers are a majority or plurality of the population are more likely to support national political parties. In part, this may be because many, inside and outside India, associate the overall state of India with the Hindu religion and Hindi language. Therefore, it is likely that Hindus and Hindi speakers' identification with the overall state of India is greater than that of other religious and linguistic groups. Moreover, some major national parties, such as the BJP, are associated with Hindu nationalism. On the other hand, Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2011) find that only thirty-eight percent of Hindus in India self-identify as being part of "the majority." Most, instead, identify with smaller communities or castes (Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011: 47). This demonstrates the extent of cross-cutting (religious, linguistic, regional, and caste) cleavages in India.

India's Census 2001 is used to compute the state-wise proportions of Hindus and Hindi speakers. The cultural data, used in this chapter, including the Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI) and the Religious Diversity Index (RDI) data, are summarized in Table 13:

Table 13

India: RDI, LDI, Proportion of Hindus and Proportion of Hindi-Speakers in Each State

State	RDI	LDI	Hindu	Hindi
Andhra Pradesh	20%	29%	89%	3%
Arunachal Pradesh	73%	90%	35%	7%
Assam	48%	67%	65%	6%
Bihar	28%	43%	83%	73%
Goa	49%	61%	66%	6%
Gujarat	20%	28%	89%	5%
Haryana	22%	23%	88%	87%
Himachal Pradesh	9%	20%	95%	89%
Jammu & Kashmir	46%	63%	30%	18%
Karnataka	28%	54%	84%	3%
Kerala	59%	6%	56%	0%
Madhya Pradesh	17%	23%	91%	87%
Maharashtra	34%	51%	80%	11%
Manipur	65%	64%	46%	1%
Meghalaya	47%	67%	13%	2%
Mizoram	24%	45%	4%	1%
Nagaland	18%	93%	8%	3%
Orissa	11%	30%	94%	3%
Punjab	50%	15%	37%	8%
Rajasthan	20%	17%	89%	91%
Tamil Nadu	22%	20%	88%	0%
Tripura	26%	48%	86%	2%
Uttar Pradesh	32%	16%	81%	91%
West Bengal	41%	27%	72%	7%

RDI: Religious Diversity Index; LDI: Linguistic Diversity Index. I computed RDI and LDI using the following formula: $1 - \Sigma(P_i)^2$, where P represents proportion of the population belonging to a specific linguistic (LDI) or religious (RDI) community and i represents the total number of linguistic or religious communities, including "others." In the table above I present these values as percentages: higher percentage means higher level of linguistic or religious diversity within a given state.
Sources: India's Census 2001 available at: http://censusindia.gov.in/

The data above show that two numerically dominant communities in India, Hindus and Hindi speakers, do not make up a majority of the population in all Indian states. Hindus make up

less than fifty percent of the population in seven out of twenty-four states examined in this chapter: Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Manipur, Punjab, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland. Arunachal Pradesh has no religious majority, in Jammu & Kashmir Muslims are a majority, in Manipur Hindus and Christians represent the two largest religious groups but neither represents a majority, in Punjab Sikhs are a majority, and in Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland Christians comprise a majority (the Indian Census 2001). Hindi speakers comprise less than fifty percent of the population in eighteen out of twenty-four states: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Goa, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, and West Bengal.

In terms of religious diversity, Himachal Pradesh is the least diverse of all states examined in this chapter (RDI is nine percent) and Arunachal Pradesh is the most diverse (RDI is seventy-three percent). The state of Kerala has the least linguistically diverse population (LDI is six percent) and Nagaland has the highest level of linguistic diversity (LDI is ninety-three percent).

Findings:

Table 14 provides descriptive statistics of all independent variables.

Table 14

India: Descriptive Statistics

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Illiteracy	24	.030	.630	.41417	.125661
Urban	24	.098	.498	.26858	.114757
RDI	24	.090	.730	.33708	.173943
Hindu	24	.040	.950	.65375	.294010
LDI	24	.060	.930	.41667	.241907
Hindi	24	.000	.910	.25167	.364151

RDI: Religious Diversity Index, LDI: Linguistic Diversity Index

Next, I specified a series of multinomial logit models to help assess the reasons for the variation in national, regional, or mixed party systems across India. This type of model is a generalization of the more basic logit model for dependent variables with just two categories. In it, there is no order for the different alternative outcomes, and so switching the order of any of the party categories would not change the results. With such models, one of the parameter estimates is set to zero to deal with the "indeterminacy" (Greene 2003; 721) that would result when probabilities for an outcome can be produced by more than one set of parameter estimates. Thus, the national party system category is designated as a baseline category in this analysis, but because the outcomes are unordered, any changes in the baseline category would effectively make no difference.

Using Greene's (2003: 720-723) notation, the probability of state *i* "choosing" alternative *j* out of *J* alternatives is:

$$\text{Prob}(Y_i = j \mid \mathbf{x}_i) = \frac{e^{\beta' j \mathbf{x}_i}}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^{j} e^{\beta' k \mathbf{x}_i}} \text{ for } j = 0, 1, \ldots, J. \beta_0 = 0$$

If *J* were equal to 1, this would be the standard binary logit model, but in this case *J* is equal to 2 with 0-2 party system alternatives. Because of the relatively small "n," or sample size, I run a series of these models that test separately the effects of the socioeconomic (models 1-2) and cultural (models 3-6) variables, and simultaneously the effects of the more salient variables (models 7-8) on the probability that states would have either mixed or regional party systems compared to the baseline national party system.

In Tables 15, 16, and 17, I summarize results of the multinomial logistic regressions:

Table 15

Multinomial Logit Results (relative risk ratios and significance levels): Socioeconomic Factors (Education and Urbanization)

	Model 1	Model 2
Mixed Party System		
Illiteracy	0.0003*	
Urbanization		20672.31*
Regional Party System		
Illiteracy	0.663	
Urbanization		96.209
Pseudo R^2	0.0913	0.1058

The comparison group (baseline category) is the outcome "National Party System." I report only relative risk ratios in this table. ** indicates significance at the .05 level and * indicates significance at the .10 level.

Table 16

Multinomial Logit Results (relative risk ratios and significance levels): Cultural Factors (Religious Diversity Index, Linguistic Diversity Index, Proportion of Hindus, and Proportion of Hindi Speakers)

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Mixed Party System				
RDI	306.634*			
LDI		16.462		
Hindu			0.0005**	
Hindi				0.00001
Regional Party System				
RDI	0.432			
LDI		67.264		
Hindu			0.002**	
Hindi				0.025
Pseudo R^2	0.0921	0.0788	0.3283	0.1401

The comparison group (baseline category) is the outcome "National Party System." I report only relative risk ratios in this table. ** indicates significance at the .05 level and * indicates significance at the .10 level. RDI: Religious Diversity Index, LDI: Linguistic Diversity Index

Table 17

Multinomial Logit Results (relative risk ratios and significance levels): Effect of Hindus on Party Systems (controlling for education and urbanization)

	Model 7	**Model 8**
Mixed Party System		
Hindu	0.00005**	7.44e-12*
Illiteracy	0.00001*	
Urbanization		6.70e+25*
Regional Party System		
Hindu	0.001**	5.16e-09
Illiteracy	0.034	
Urbanization		4.72e+18
Pseudo R^2	0.4459	0.6122

The comparison group (baseline category) is the outcome "National Party System." I report only relative risk ratios in this table. ** indicates significance at the .05 level and * indicates significance at the .10 level.

According to Table 15, the relationship between socioeconomic variables and party systems appears to be weak. Therefore, there is little statistical support for theories of relative deprivation and for theories that maintain that regional nationalism is stronger in more economically developed regions. In the first model, relative risk ratios are less than 1, which means that an increase in illiteracy would make the relative risk of having both mixed and regional party systems less likely. Therefore, states with higher literacy rates are more likely to provide support for regional parties and less likely to provide support for national parties. Similarly, the second model demonstrates that a higher level of urbanization is likely to produce greater support for regional parties and lower support for national parties.

However, both results are either not statistically significant (in the case of the regional party system) or significant only at the .10 level (in the case of the mixed party system). Therefore, both relationships provide only slight support for a theory that economic development

leads to greater support for regional political parties. A considerable amount of scholarship draws attention to a link between modernization and civic (Gellner 1983) or ethnic (Connor 1972) nationalism. On the one hand, modernization theory claims that economic development, associated with greater urbanization and a higher level of education and communication, results in the creation of national identities at the expense of more parochial regional or tribal identities. On the other hand, modernization encourages group conflict because industrialization intensifies ethnic competition over scarce resources. In so far as ethnoregional and national identities are reflected in electoral choices between regional and national political parties, it is, therefore, surprising to find no statistically robust relationship between socioeconomic indicators (education and urbanization) and regional level support for regional or national parties.

Next, the relationship between cultural variables and party systems is analyzed. Table 16 provides summaries of multinomial logistic regressions where the party system is a dependent variable and religious diversity index (RDI), linguistic diversity index (LDI), proportion of Hindus, and proportion of Hindi speakers are independent variables. The only statistically significant relationship evident here is between party systems and proportion of Hindus: the relative risk ratios are lower than 1, which means that the higher the percentage of Hindus, the higher the chance of that state being dominated by national parties. Since higher proportion of Hindus is associated with the dominance of national political parties, I conclude that Hindus are more likely to support national rather than regional political parties. In contrast, Hindi speakers do not appear to demonstrate a clear preference for either national or regional parties. The relationships between religious diversity index, linguistic diversity index, and party systems are also not statistically significant. This finding indicates that even if different levels of linguistic and religious diversity resulted in different levels of conflict between linguistic and religious

groups, as some scholars suggest, this was not reflected in significantly greater support for either ethnoregional or national parties. Also, out of all six variables, the Hindu variable possesses the best predictive power: it predicts thirty-three percent of the variability in party systems (the Pseudo R^2 is equal to 0.3283).

Finally, in models 7 and 8 (Table 17), I examine the effect of Hindus on regional party systems while controlling for levels of illiteracy and urbanization. Due to the small sample size, I decided to run models 7 and 8 separately instead of including all three variables in one model. Model 8, in which I control for the level of urbanization, provides the best fit: it predicts sixty-one percent of the variability in party systems (with a Pseudo R^2 equal to 0.6122).

Conclusion

Socioeconomic factors appear not to have a significant effect on the regional variation in party systems in India. Religious and linguistic diversity and the proportion of Hindi speakers also do not have a statistically significant effect on the party system. The analysis shows that it is the proportion of Hindus that best accounts for the party system variation at the regional level. States whose populations are predominantly Hindu are more likely to support national parties. It is peculiar that it is religious (Hindu) rather than linguistic (Hindi-speaking) identity that provides the best explanation for the variation in party systems because India's ethnic federalism has at its inception been shaped by political movements in favor of the formation of linguistic-based states. As a result of political pressures and then the creation of a Telugu-speaking state of Andhra Pradesh in 1953, "the principle of language as the basis for state boundaries was broadly accepted" (Hardgrave 1993: 59). Language is not the only basis for India's federalism; however, it is an important one. For that reason, it is surprising that linguistic cleavages do not play a stronger role in explaining the population's choice of political parties. In addition, despite

numerous (linguistic, tribal, caste, etc.) cross-cutting cleavages that divide many Hindus, the Hindu religious community appears to prefer national to regional political parties. In this way it is possible to think of Hindus as a cohesive majority. This does not mean that cleavages that divide Hindu communities are unimportant. However, this evidence leaves room to question the accuracy of the assertion that due to a multitude of cross-cutting cleavages, the Hindu majority in India is a myth (Hardgrave 1993; Stepan et al. 2011). More importantly, this evidence contradicts an often-made assertion that ethnically based territorial autonomy sharpens and institutionalizes ethnic cleavages. According to this assertion, institutionalization of ethnoregional cleavages, associated with ethno-territorial autonomy, should be expected to lead to greater division among the Hindu population and encourage Hindus to vote for parties that represent their ethnoregional identities. Despite the fact that India's states were created based on ethno-linguistic distinctiveness, in Hindu-dominated states this policy did not translate into shifts in support for parties that reflect institutionalization and amplification of ethno-regional identities.

Overall, it can be concluded based on the analysis presented in this chapter that strong regional political parties in ethnofederal states are not a given. The party system and the popularity of regional parties vary from region to region. This variation is primarily dependent on regional ethno-demographic differences.

CHAPTER 5

In Search of a National Identity: Sources of Support for National and Provincial Parties in Pakistan between 1988 and 1999

Introduction

In Chapter 4 I showed that the proportion of Hindus in a particular state within India provides the best explanation for the regional party system variation. Do the same lessons apply to Pakistan as well? After all, Pakistan and India share many similarities. In addition to their common colonial history, both are multi-religious and multi-linguistic ethnofederal polities, which, after receiving independence from Great Britain in 1947, shared similarly high levels of poverty and inequality (Oldenburg 2010, 1). In this chapter I will examine regional party systems in Pakistan during the democratic rule that lasted from 1988 to 1999 and analyze the effect of socioeconomic and ethnocultural factors on levels of support for national and ethnoregional parties. I will argue that one of the most importance differences between Pakistan and India is that Pakistan lacks a territorially dispersed politically and ethnoculturally dominant community. The absence of such a community helps explain why Pakistan's national parties, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N)), were perceived as largely ethnoregional and lacked sufficient electoral support to form majority provincial governments outside of their strongholds in Sindh and Punjab provinces, respectively.

Regional Elections in Pakistan

Pakistan has been an ethnofederal state since its inception in 1947. It is currently divided into four linguistically defined provinces: Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province[20]

[20] In 2010 NWFP was renamed into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. I will refer to the province by its

(NWFP), and Balochistan. Prior to 1988 Pakistan experienced two democratic regimes, from 1950 to 1955 and from 1972 to 1976. Both periods are excluded from this analysis because even the longer of the two lasted for only five years. In 1988, with the death of President General Zia and election of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, a democratic regime once again replaced a military one. It ended with a military coup in 1999. Pakistan's more recent transition to democracy began in 2002 when Pervez Musharraf's military regime allowed for national and regional multi-party elections. However, no presidential elections were held until 2007. Until then, Musharraf remained in power as a self-appointed president. Therefore, Pakistan's last democratic period will also be excluded from this study; only the democratic period between 1988 and 1999 will be examined in this chapter. [21]

Between 1988 and 1999, all four provinces held four provincial assembly elections. They took place in 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997. In order to analyze the results of these elections, I compiled an electoral database of all provincial assembly elections held between 1988 and 1999, using district-level electoral data available at the Election Commission of Pakistan's web site. I excluded election results for the seats reserved for minority communities (non-Muslims and women): members to fill reserved seats are chosen by party heads instead of being directly elected. Reserved seats do not have an effect on what parties are elected into provincial assemblies; therefore, they have no effect on the variation in regional party systems.

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previous name because of the time period covered in this chapter.

[21] As I specify in the Introduction, this study includes those democratic ethnic federations whose history of democratic ethnofederalism has lasted for at least ten years, uninterrupted by a regime change.

Table 18

Regional Elections in Pakistan

State	Party/Coalition	Number of Seats	Percentage of Seats
Punjab			
1988	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)**	107/240	45%
	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	90/240	38%
1990	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)	210/240	88%
	Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA)***	10/240	4%
1993	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	105/240	44%
	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	90/240	38%
	Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo) (PML(J))	18/240	8%
1997	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	207/240	86%
	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	3/240	1%
	Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo) (PML(J))	2/240	1%
Balochistan			
1988	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)	12/40	30%
	Assembly of Islamic Clergy (JUI(F))	9/40	23%
	Balochistan National Alliance (BNA)	4/40	10%
	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	3/40	8%
	Pakistan National Party (PNP)	2/40	5%
1990	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)	8/40	20%
	Republican National Party (JWP)	8/40	20%
	Pakistan National Party (PNP)	3/40	8%
	Assembly of Islamic Clergy (JUI(F))	3/40	8%
	PKMAP	3/40	8%
1993	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	8/40	20%
	Balochistan National Movement (Hayee Group) (BNM(H))	4/40	10%
	Pukhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP)	4/40	10%
	Republican National Party (JWP)	3/40	8%
1997	Balochistan National Party (BNP)	8/40	20%
	JUI(FG)	5/40	13%

Regional Elections in Pakistan (Cont.)

	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	4/40	10%
	Republican National Party (JWP)	4/40	10%
	Balochistan National Movement (BNM)	2/40	5%
	Pukhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP)	2/40	5%
NWFP			
1988	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)	24/80	30%
	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	21/80	26%
	Awami National Party (ANP)	13/80	16%
1990	Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI)	31/80	39%
	Awami National Party (ANP)	22/80	28%
1993	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	21/80	26%
	Awami National Party (ANP)	19/80	24%
	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	15/80	19%
1997	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	30/80	38%
	Awami National Party (ANP)	29/80	36%
Sindh			
1988	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	63/100	63%
1990	Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA)	45/100	45%
	Haq Parast Group (HPG)*	28/100	28%
1993	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	56/100	56%
	Haq Parast Group (HPG)	26/100	26%
	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	7/100	7%
1997	Pakistan People's Party (PPP)	35/100	35%
	Haq Parast Group (HPG)	28/100	28%
	Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N))	15/100	15%

Note: These data (seats won and the total number of seats) exclude reserved seats. These data include seats won by parties and coalitions only; independents are excluded. Also, the number of seats, and, consequently, the percentage of seats, for each party listed in the above table may underreport the actual number of seats and the percentage of seats by a few seats due to missing data for several electoral districts.

* HPG is a group backed by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM).

** IJI: An alliance comprised of nine parties formed in 1988 in opposition to the PPP. The PML was the main party in the alliance.

*** PDA: An alliance of several parties formed in 1990 of which the PPP was the main

component.
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan http://www.ecp.gov.pk/

The electoral data show the following variation in Pakistan's regional party systems: provincial assemblies of Punjab and Sindh provinces have been dominated by national parties and provincial assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP provinces have experienced significant presence of both national and regional parties. The population of Punjab tended to vote for the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz group) (PML(N)) and the population of Sindh supported Pakistan People's Party (PPP). Sindh's provincial assembly also had a consistent and significant presence of the HPG – a group of politicians backed by Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), an ethnic political party representing an Urdu-speaking *Muhajir* community. Since its founding in the 1980s, MQM enjoyed high levels of support in Karachi, a city in Sindh which is dominated by Urdu-speakers. In Balochistan, national parties, Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) and then PML(N), shared power with two ethnoregional parties: Balochistan National Party (BNP) and Republican National Party (JWP). In NWFP, national parties, IJI, PPP, and PML(N), shared power with the Awami National Party (ANP), a Pashtun nationalist party. What factors explain this variation? The remainder of this chapter will analyze the effects of socioeconomic and ethnocultural factors on the variation in Pakistan's regional party systems.

Examining the Effect of Socioeconomic, Religious, and Linguistic Factors on the Variation in Pakistan's Provincial Party Systems

In order to analyze the effect of socioeconomic, religious, and linguistic factors on regional party differences in Pakistan, I use the data provided by the Population Census Organization of Pakistan. Information about province-level GDP per capita was obtained from "The State of Pakistan's Competitiveness 2007" published by the Competitiveness Support Fund

(CSF), 2007. The CSF is a joint initiative of Pakistan's Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, and the United States Agency for International Development. Socioeconomic data derived from that database are summarized in Table 19 and linguistic and religious data are summarized in Table 20 below:

Table 19

Pakistan: Socioeconomic Data

Province	Population 1998	Population (%)	Proportion of urban population 1998	Edu: below primary 1998	Edu: primary 1998	Edu: middle 1998	Edu: BA/BS 1998	GDP/capita in USD 2004
Pakistan	132352279	100	28.30%	18.3	30.14	20.9	4.38	600
Punjab	73621290	55.63	27.60%	19.16	31.73	21.81	3.23	580
Balochistan	6565885	4.96	15.62%	19.23	25.91	20.05	4.43	410
NWFP	17743645	13.41	15.06%	19.78	29.64	19.94	3.43	480
Sindh	30439893	23	43.32%	15.56	27.13	19.2	7.43	760

Sources: Population Census Organization of Pakistan available at: http://www.census.gov.pk; "The State of Pakistan's Competitiveness 2007" published by the Competitiveness Support Fund (CSF), 2007.

Table 20

Pakistan: Religious and Linguistic Data

Province	Main Religion 1998	Muslim	RDI* 1998	Main Lang. 1998	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	LDI ** 1998
Pakistan	Muslim	96.28	0.07	Punjabi	7.57	44.15	14.1	15.42	3.57	0.74
Punjab	Muslim	97.21	0.05	Punjabi	4.51	75.23	0.13	1.16	0.66	0.4
Balochistan	Muslim	98.75	0.02	Balochi	0.97	2.52	5.58	29.64	54.76	0.61
NWFP	Muslim	99.44	0.01	Pushto	0.78	0.97	0.04	73.9	0.01	0.41
Sindh	Muslim	91.31	0.16	Sindhi	21.05	6.99	59.73	4.19	2.11	0.59

* RDI: Religious Diversity Index. Calculated using the following formula: $(DI) = 1 - \Sigma(P_i)^2$, where P represents proportion of the population belonging to a specific religious community and

i represents the total number of religious communities, including "others."
** LDI: Linguistic Diversity Index. Calculated using the following formula: $(DI) = 1 - \Sigma(P_i)^2$, where P represents proportion of the population belonging to a specific linguistic community and i represents the total number of linguistic communities, including "others."
Source: Population Census Organization of Pakistan available at: http://www.census.gov.pk

National parties dominated provincial assemblies in the most populous, wealthy, and urban of the four provinces in Pakistan: Punjab and Sindh. These two provinces also have the lowest illiteracy rates, and Sindh has by far the highest proportion of residents with college degrees in Pakistan. These patterns are consistent with the modernization and ethnic conflict theories that predict that levels of socioeconomic development are correlated with the development of civic and ethnoregional nationalisms. Specifically, one could interpret these data to suggest that higher than national levels of economic development and literacy promote a greater degree of tolerance for diversity and satisfaction with the overall performance of the state, thus tempering parochial regional and ethnic identities and loyalties. "In short, development is generally considered a sufficient condition for the elimination of ethnic nationalism…" (Lecours 2000, 154). This is also consistent with theories of relative deprivation and internal colonialism, according to which unequal levels of economic development and distribution of resources among different ethnoregional communities reinforces poorer communities' sense of alienation, dissatisfaction, and exploitation by the state (Zariski 1989). According to these theories, it is not surprising that the two poorest and most rural provinces in Pakistan, Balochistan and NWFP, expressed the highest levels of support for ethnoregional parties. However, the province-level socioeconomic data hide important ethnically reinforced disparities within the provinces. The example of internal ethnically based socioeconomic heterogeneity in Sindh province illustrates that greater degrees of wealth and urbanization do not result in greater support for national parties. On the contrary, in the case of Sindh province, the

reverse is true.

The Sindh province boasts levels of wealth and urbanization far higher than the national average. According to the 1998 census figures, Pakistan remains a predominantly rural country with only 28.3 percent of the population living in urban areas. In comparison, the proportion of the urban population in Sindh province is 43.32 percent. Its GDP per capita is also much higher than the national average. However, Sindhi-speakers live in predominantly poor and rural areas. It is the Mohajirs (mostly Urdu-speakers) who are mainly responsible for the high levels of urban population and wealth of the province (Adeney 2006, 143).

> Because most of the [Muhajirs] have settled in the urban areas of the province, the native Sindhis have become a minority in Sindh's two largest cities. In Karachi, Sindhis constitute only the fifth largest ethnic group in the city, outnumbered by Muhajirs, Punjabis, Pathans, and Baloch. In Hyderabad, Sindhis are the second largest group, outnumbered by Muhajirs. Only in Sukkur, a comparative backwater, are Sindhis a majority of the city's population. By contrast, however, they constitute an overwhelming majority in Sindh's rural areas; 81.5% of the rural inhabitants of the province in 1981 were Sindhis (Kennedy 1991, 939).

According to Pakistan's census figures, despite representing only twenty-one percent of the total population in Sindh province, Urdu-speakers represent 41.5 percent of Sindh's urban population, compared to 25.8 percent of urban Sindhi-speakers.[22] Therefore, even though Sindhi-speakers comprise a linguistic majority in their province (according to the 1998 census data, Sindhi-speakers make up a little fewer than sixty percent of the population in their province), Sindhis represent the most rural and impoverished group in Sindh province especially compared to the urban Muhajirs:

> It is a measure of the political system of Pakistan that Sindh is the most developed province in the country, while its indigenous people are, after the Baloch, the most marginalized. In no other region of Pakistan is the divide between urban

[22] Population Census Organization of the Government of Pakistan, available at http://www.census.gov.pk/.

> prosperity and rural deprivation as wide as it is in Sindh. Due to the concentration of commerce and industry in its capital city, Karachi, Sindh has the highest per capita income in Pakistan, while its rural inhabitants are among the country's poorest (Khan 2002, 213).

Such clear socioeconomic differences between Sindhi and Urdu-speakers in Sindh province have created a lot of hostility between these two groups. Sindhi nationalists claimed that socioeconomic and political dominance of the Muhajirs (whose politically dominant position is rivaled only by the Punjabis) and their overwhelming presence in Sindh cities turned Sindhi-speakers into foreigners in their own land (Kennedy 1991, 941). Muhajirs, in turn, resented the policies championed by the PPP in the 1970s, which aimed to benefit Sindhi speakers (who were among the PPP's most ardent supporters) at the expense of Muhajirs (Khan 2002, 222).

Considering the socioeconomic differences between Sindhi and Urdu-speakers in Sindh province, it is especially revealing that support for the PPP party in Sindh came mostly from the Sindhi-speakers, with the majority of Urdu-speakers voting for the MQM instead (Khan 2002, 226; Kennedy 1991). Therefore, the socioeconomic indicators of the Sindh province, which are much higher than the national average, cannot account for the dominance of the national party (PPP) in that region: the electoral support for the PPP in Sindh province came predominantly from the Sindh-speakers who represent predominantly a rural and impoverished community.

The ethno-demographic composition of Pakistan's provinces summarized in Table 20 shows that socioeconomic differences are not the only source of significant variation among the four provinces. All four provinces have their own dominant language and are ethnically very different from one another. Internally, all four provinces are relatively linguistically and religiously homogeneous.

In chapter 4 I found that variations in religious and linguistic diversity had no statistically

significant effect on regional party systems in India. In this chapter I calculated religious and linguistic diversity indices (RDI and LDI) for Pakistan and its four provinces and examined Pakistan's religious and linguistic composition both at the national and provincial levels (see Table 20) to determine if religious and linguistic diversity in Pakistan demonstrates a more significant impact on Pakistan's regional party systems than it does in India. Not surprisingly, considering the reason for the India-Pakistan partition in 1947, Pakistan is much more religiously homogeneous than India. Both India and Pakistan have a dominant religious majority. In India about eighty percent are Hindu, and in Pakistan about ninety-six percent are Muslim. India's next largest religious group is Muslims, with about thirteen percent of India's population being Muslim. In Pakistan the two most prevalent religions after Islam are Christianity and Hinduism; however, neither religion exceeds 1.6 percent of the population. India includes several states where Hindus comprise less than fifty percent of the population. These are: Arunachal Pradesh, which has no religious majority, Jammu & Kashmir, where Muslims are a majority, Manipur, where Hindus and Christians represent the two largest religious groups but neither represents a majority, Punjab, where Sikhs are a majority, and Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, where Christians comprise a majority (the Indian Census 2001). In contrast, all four of Pakistan's provinces are dominated by Muslims. The most religiously diverse of all four provinces, the province of Sindh, has a Religious Diversity Index (RDI) of only 0.16. Pakistan's Religious Diversity Index (RDI) of 0.07 is much lower than India's RDI of 0.33 (see Chapter 4). Finally, all of Pakistan's provinces, with the exception of Sindh, are even less religiously diverse than all of Pakistan.

Linguistically, Pakistan's level of diversity is more similar to India's. Pakistan's Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI) is 0.74, only a little lower than India's LDI of 0.8. Pakistan's

two most linguistically heterogeneous provinces are Balochistan and Sindh; they have a Linguistic Diversity Index (LDI) of 0.61 and 0.59, respectively. However, in all four provinces the speakers of the dominant languages represent the overwhelming majority. The majority of the population in Balochistan speaks Balochi as its mother tongue, in NWFP the majority's mother tongue is Pushto, and in Sindh it is Sindhi. The most popular language is Punjabi; however, it is a mother tongue of only forty-four percent of the total population in Pakistan. In addition, the Punjabi language is a dominant language in only one of four provinces, Punjab, where it is a mother tongue to seventy-five percent of the population. Overall, Pakistan is characterized by relatively high levels of linguistic diversity combined with high levels of linguistic homogeneity of its provinces. The absence of significant regional variation in religious and linguistic diversity means that religious and linguistic diversity cannot account for the variation in regional party systems in Pakistan.

Whose State? Punjabis, Urdu-Speakers, and Muslims as Ethnoculturally and Politically Dominant Communities

In this dissertation I argue that ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities are more likely to vote for national parties, regardless of their region of residence. The case-study of India confirms this claim by showing that the regional assemblies of those states where Hindus represent a majority tend to be dominated by national rather than regional parties: the state-level numerical dominance of Hindus is the strongest predictor of that state's electoral support for national parties. The data show that Pakistan has two potential ethnocultural and politically dominant communities: Punjabi-speakers and Muslims. Both groups, therefore, may represent national parties' most consistent supporters. Some evidence appears to confirm the assumption that Punjabis may prefer national to regional parties due to their identification with the overall

state: between 1988 and 1999 Punjab was one of two provinces in Pakistan whose assembly was consistently dominated by national parties, and it was the only province that, during that time period, never had any ethnoregional party represented in its provincial assembly. Punjabi officials historically dominated both Pakistan's army and bureaucracy, due primarily to British colonial policies as well as their demographic advantage (Jan 1999, 703). As of 1998, Punjab province, which is dominated by Punjabi-speakers, included more than fifty-five percent of Pakistan's population. Due to its demographic advantage, Punjab appears to represent what Henry Hale (2005) calls a "core ethnic region" (56).

However, additional analysis shows that the Punjabi-speakers are not as likely to represent an ethnoculturally dominant community of Pakistan as it may appear at first. Specifically, Punjabi-speakers represent less than half of Pakistan's population. This would not have prevented Punjabi from eventually becoming the primary means of communication throughout all of Pakistan if Punjabi were the language of power. However, Punjabi is not historically associated with the language of the state elite. Pakistan's two official languages are Urdu and English. Therefore, Punjabi, despite its demographic advantage, does not represent the language of the state. Given that Punjabi was never the language of power, other linguistic groups faced little pressure to switch to Punjabi.[23] Instead, most choose to study Urdu and/or English as their second or third language. Until 1971 the regional elites in Punjab, Balochistan, and NWFP communicated primarily in Urdu (Adeney 2006, 143). Therefore, "Urdu has become an effective link language" (Adeney 2006, 144). This situation is similar to what happened in Belgium in the nineteenth and beginning of twentieth century. Flemish-speakers, despite being a

[23] See Laitin 1998 and Zolberg 1974 for in-depth analyses of costs and benefits of learning the language of the state rather than the language of one's community and/or region.

demographic majority in Belgium, chose to study French because French was the language of the state. French-speakers were a linguistic minority in Belgium; however, French was the language of the center, economic and political elites, urban communities, and upward mobility (Zolberg 1974). Flemish speakers who did not speak French were effectively alienated from the center and faced significant limits to their socioeconomic mobility. The Urdu language in Pakistan enjoyed a similar position as the French language in Belgium, both demographically and politically.

Historically, Wright (1991) points out that Pakistan was founded by Urdu-speaking Muslims, not Punjabis (300). After the Partition of 1947, Urdu-speaking refugees (*Muhajirin)* emigrated from India to Pakistan, specifically to Karachi city, which is located in Sindh province. Despite their demographic weakness (according to the 1998 census figures, Urdu-speakers comprise less than eight percent of Pakistanis and, due to the privileged position of the Urdu language as the language of the state, this low number cannot be attributed to any state-designed assimilation policies), Urdu-speakers "continued to share the rule politically and economically by reason of their high literacy (70 percent), relative modernity, and historic role in the Pakistan movement" (Wright 1991, 300). Therefore, despite their demographic dominance, Punjabi-speakers do not represent a clear ethnoculturally dominant community in Pakistan.

Muslims who comprise over ninety-six percent of Pakistan's population are another potential candidate for an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. However, one of the greatest obstacles to Muslims becoming a dominant political community is the absence of the significant "other" due to Pakistan's religious homogeneity. Unless the minority four percent of Pakistan's population were perceived to be favored by the state, which is not the case, political parties cannot use Muslim identity to differentiate themselves from other major parties in Pakistan. Moreover, religious minorities in Pakistan are territorially dispersed (Adeney 2006,

138), preventing them from organizing in opposition to the Muslim majority.

In addition, a multitude of territorially dispersed sectarian conflicts between Sunni and Shi'a divides the Pakistani religious majority since the early 1980s (Nasr 2000, 2002; Zaman 1998). One scholar observes: "The magnitude of the sectarian problems in Pakistan is clear. In 1997, sectarian violence within Punjab increased dramatically, resulting in hundreds of deaths. This trend has continued since then, notwithstanding efforts by the government to impose law and order" (Jan 1999, 704). The presence of violent sectarian conflict in Pakistan demonstrates that it would be inaccurate to treat all Muslims as a homogeneous community, either culturally or politically.

Finally, as I will show below, neither Sunni nor Shi'a represents an ethnoculturally and politically dominant group in Pakistan. There are no exact figures on the number of Sunnis and Shi'as in Pakistan; however, the clear majority of Muslims in Pakistan are Sunni (Zaman 1998, 689). Despite the Sunni numerical dominance, prior to the 1970s the state's treatment of Sunni and Shi'a communities was impartial, and there was little conflict between the two groups (Zahab 2002, 115). However, General Zia's policy of Islamization, despite its claim to universality, displayed a preference for Sunni identity. General Zia's preferential treatment of Sunnis (he generally supported the Sunni interpretation of Islam to the chagrin of the Shi'a), in turn, helped to further alienate and radicalize Pakistan's Shi'as. It pushed Shi'as to align themselves with the PPP – the secular party that opposed Zia's military regime (Nasr 2002). The electoral politics of the new democratic regime were affected by sectarian differences but did not translate into long-term partisan divisions between the two groups. Despite Shi'as' initial support for the PPP, which lasted until the mid-1990s, Sunnis did not automatically vote for the opposition parties. The majority of Sunnis did not endorse a more militant anti-Shi'a stance

taken by Sunni sectarian factions (Nasr 2002). In addition, not all Shi'as voted for the PPP. Shi'a landed elites, whose economic interests seemed to take priority over sectarian solidarity, chose to back the IJI and later the PML (Nasr 2002). Their support for the PML, in turn, weakened the party's connection to Sunnis:

> By 1997, many important Shia landlords had joined the PML. As they became more powerful within the PML and were able to somewhat limit the party's support for Sunni sectarianism, their positions within their constituencies were strengthened. In this regard, Shia landlords created sectarian bridges, and protected Shia interests in the PML (Nasr 2002, 103-104).

In addition to Shi'a landlords' support for the PML, many Shi'as who were loyal to the PPP since the 1970s switched to the PML in the mid-1990s, as a consequence of Benazir Bhutto's unsuccessful attempt to attract more Sunni votes (Nasr 2002, 106-107). As a result of greater support from both Shi'as and Sunnis, the PML lost an incentive to support sectarian conflict:

> Between 1997 and 1999, the PML enjoyed the support of both Sunni and Shia politicians and constituencies, and, as a result, developed a vested interest in ending sectarian conflict. The party thus moved away from the divisive sectarian policies that it inherited from the Zia regime (Nasr 2002, 108).

In general, close electoral competition between the main parties (PPP and PML(N)) ensured that neither party could afford to alienate either Muslim sect; therefore, both parties tried to cater to both Sunni and Shi'a constituencies (Nasr 2002). Overall, the Sunni-Shi'a sectarian conflict did not translate into clear partisan divisions in the electoral arena.

The conflict between Sunnis and Shi'as was in great part about whose interpretation of Islamic law would be adopted by the state (Zaman 1998, 692). Neither group had managed to capture the state. When General Zia attempted to support Sunni institutions to weaken Shi'a activism, his strategy eventually backfired, and the state lost control of Sunni sectarian factions. One of Zia's main Islamization policies, which aimed at promoting Sunni identity in the public

sphere, involved funding Sunni *madrasas* (educational institutions) (Nasr 2002, 90). This and other pro-Sunni policies, however, helped to strengthen Sunni factions and allowed them greater autonomy from and even opposition to the state:

> The Zia regime's attempt to extend the state's control over madrasahs by making them dependent on the state for both their finances and employment opportunities for their graduates eventually translated into resistance. Most Islamic groups, parties, and ulama who oversaw madrasahs welcomed state patronage but not the control that came with it (Nasr 2000, 153).

The duration and nature of the sectarian conflict demonstrate that neither Sunni nor Shi'a community in Pakistan enjoys an ethnocultural and political dominance. First, the politicization of Sunni and Shi'a sectarian identities and the conflict between the two groups in Pakistan are relatively recent. Second, the sectarian divisions did not translate into partisan divisions. Both Shi'a and Sunni groups were courted by the major political parties and no party could claim to represent a purely Sunni or Shi'a community. Therefore, no major party claimed to speak for any sectarian faction or push any sectarian agenda. Finally, neither group managed to capture the state. On the contrary, in the 1990s both Shi'a and Sunni factions remained in conflict with the state and the state proved incapable of curtailing the sectarian violence, which claimed lives of about two hundred people in 1997 alone (for the list of the worst cases of sectarian violence from 1988 to 1997 see Nasr 2000, 141). General Zia's attempt to strengthen Sunni institutions only provided the Sunni with more resources to resist the state's control and radicalized the Shi'a.

Overall, neither Punjabis nor Muslims and neither Sunnis nor Shi'as in Pakistan represent a clear ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. Punjabis historically dominated military and bureaucratic posts by virtue of British colonial policies and, to a lesser extent, their demographic superiority to other linguistic communities in Pakistan. However, Punjabis lack ethnocultural dominance because Urdu and English, not Punjabi, were adopted as official

languages of the state. As a consequence, Punjabi never became the language of power and upward socioeconomic and political mobility. As for Islamic identity, even though the majority of Pakistanis are Muslims, and support for Islamic parties in Pakistan is significant (exemplified by the inter-regional support for the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IJI) and high levels of support for the Assembly of Islamic Clergy (JUI(F)) in Balochistan (see Table 18)), Pakistani Muslims are divided along sectarian lines. Moreover, political parties cannot use Muslim identity to differentiate themselves from their competitors due to Pakistan's high level of religious homogeneity.

Despite their demographic weakness, Urdu-speakers held a dominant ethnocultural and political position within an early state of Pakistan. However, they lost much of their political advantage by the 1950s, first forced to share political power with Punjabis and then losing even more ground to other linguistic groups:

> Urdu-speaking *Muhajirin* have gradually slipped from dominance (1947-51), to partnership with the Punjabi elite (1951-71), to subordination under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) and General Zia ul Haq (1977-88) without even a province of their own, to tentative attempts to a return to partnership under Benazir Bhutto (1988-90) (Wright 1991, 300).

Prior to the 1970s, Urdu speakers dominated economic and political life in the province of Sindh. In the 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, himself a Sindhi, and his PPP party's policies towards Sindh province aimed to redress both perceived and real political and economic inequalities between Sindhi and Urdu speakers. The PM appointed many Sindhi-speakers to national and provincial offices. Even more importantly, the PPP government of Sindh made Sindhi an official language of the province (Wright 1991, 304; Jaffrelot 2002, 22-23). The new language law led to Urdu riots, which resulted in a series of concessions by the provincial government (Wright 1991, 304). Despite these concessions, however, reforms designed to

appease the Sindhi population alienated many Urdu-speakers. General Zia's military regime (1977-1988), in turn, privileged Punjabis, thus further alienating Urdu-speakers from national politics (Wright 1991, 305). As a result, their political allegiance switched from mainly Islamic national parties to an ethnic party, MQM, which was founded in 1984 to represent interests of *Muhajirs*.

Overall, it appears that in contrast to India, Pakistan lacks a clear ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. Equally important is that all of Pakistan's potential candidates for ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities except for the Muslim community are regionally concentrated. It is not surprising, therefore, that its national parties, the PML(N) and PPP, had strong ethnoregional bases and were perceived as ethnic despite their inter-regional presence and inter-ethnic appeals. Therefore, the case of Pakistan fails to satisfy both conditions that, as I proposed, explain the existence of national parties: it lacks clear-cut ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities, and all its ethnocultural communities, except for Muslims, are regionally concentrated.

PML(N) and PPP as both National and Ethnoregional Parties

The PML(N) has dominated the Punjabi assembly since 1990. Even though it was a national party, which enjoyed significant support in other provinces as well, the PML(N) was "heavily dominated by Punjabi landowners and industrialists, [and] is viewed by many as primarily representing Punjabi interests" (Jan 1999, 703). The PML(N) and its predecessor, the IJI (Islamic Democratic Alliance), dominated all four elections in Punjab province, winning a majority of provincial assembly seats in 1990 and 1997. The Punjab province, however, was the only region where the PML(N) was able to win the majority of seats in the provincial assembly. In Sindh province, the PML(N) was never able to acquire sufficient support to gain a greater

share of seats than either PPP or HPG. It enjoyed considerable levels of support in Balochistan and NWFP, although it never gained a majority in either province and had to share power with ethnoregional parties. The ethnic composition of the PML(N) party elite, its regional stronghold in the Punjab region, and Nawaz Sharif's own connection to Punjab province (Sharif, a Punjabi, was born in Lahore, which is currently the capital of Punjab, and served as Chief Minister of Punjab in the 1980s) had reinforced a perception of the PML(N) being a Punjabi party. Moreover, because Punjab province is the main stronghold of the PML(N), "it has been more responsive to demands from that province" (Adeney 2006, 148).

Similarly, the PPP was perceived by many as representing the interests of Sindhi-speakers. This perception was supported by the fact that after the elections of 1988, the PPP was able to maintain consistent electoral support only in Sindh province. It made a temporary comeback in 1993, when it won the second highest number of seats in the Punjab provincial assembly and managed to gain the largest share of seats (although far fewer than the majority) in NWFP province. However, by 1997 the PPP once again largely disappeared from the provincial assemblies outside of Sindh. Moreover, as discussed above, in Sindh province the PPP's support came from the Sindhi-speakers; the province's second largest linguistic group, Urdu-speakers, supported MQM instead. Only Sindhi-speakers remained loyal to PPP throughout the 1990s. The fact that PPP was led by Sindhis (first Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then his daughter, Benazir Bhutto) prevented the success of any significant Sindhi ethnic parties or separatist movements (Wright 1991, 301), making the PPP the only party that could claim to represent Sindhis. As a result, "the PPP was . . . perceived as a Sindhi party and the fact that a Sindhi once again became Prime Minister played a role in defusing the nationalist feelings in the province" (Jaffrelot 2002, 24).

Therefore, despite their multi-ethnic and multi-regional appeal and character, both PPP

and PML(N) parties failed to gain a truly national (both territorially and ethnically) support base. Both parties managed to maintain a certain level of inter-regional support primarily due to their association with three of Pakistan's prime ministers: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Benazir Bhutto of the PPP and Nawaz Sharif of PML(N). Nevertheless, both parties were perceived as increasingly ethnoregional. This perception was further reinforced by the fact that no linguistic group in Pakistan represents a majority or even a plurality in more than one province. The only identity that unites majorities in all four provinces is religion. However, all major parties of Pakistan, including the PPP, claim to represent Muslim interests and identities. Unlike in India, where the BJP gained support from the Hindu community by appealing to Hindu pride and anti-Muslim sentiments (see Hardgrave 1993), no such opportunity existed for parties in Pakistan due to Pakistan's high level of religious homogeneity. Without a common enemy, it is difficult to mobilize the population solely based on Muslim identity, especially when all the parties make similar appeals.

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter has led to three main findings. First, in contrast to India, Pakistan lacks a politically and ethnoculturally dominant community. It has three potentially dominant communities: Punjabis, Urdu-speakers, and Muslims. However, Punjabis lack ethnocultural dominance because Punjabi has never been the language of the state. Instead, Pakistan's official language is Urdu, despite the fact that native Urdu-speakers comprise less than eight percent of Pakistan's population. Urdu-speakers, however, have gradually lost their privileged position in Pakistan's ethnic hierarchy and by the 1970s began to lose their economic and political dominance even in Singh province. Finally, Muslim identity in Pakistan is too divided (between Shi'a and Sunni), too large (Muslims comprise over ninety-six percent of

Pakistan's population), and lacks variation in regional distribution to represent an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community and to account for the variation in regional party systems. Sectarian conflict has resulted in communal violence which started in the 1980s and escalated in the 1990s. However, even if Pakistani Muslims presented a united front, the question then would become: domestically, united front against whom? In contrast to India, where Hindus make up about eighty-three percent of the population and Muslims another eleven percent (Hardgrave 1993, 54), Pakistan's religious homogeneity precludes it from mobilizing the population against a common domestic enemy.

Second, with an exception of the Muslim community, all ethnocultural groups in Pakistan are regionally concentrated. As a result, both national parties of Pakistan, PML(N) and PPP, were associated with a specific region: PML(N) was associated with Punjab province and PPP was associated with Sindh province. Both parties failed to win the majority of seats in the regional assemblies outside of their home provinces and were perceived to represent the interests of the dominant ethnoregional groups residing in their provincial strongholds. Therefore, the PML(N) was perceived as a party of Punjabis and the PPP as a party of Sindhi-speakers.

Finally, the socioeconomic differences do not appear to explain the variation in regional levels of support for national and regional parties. At first glance, there appears to be a positive correlation between the level of wealth and urbanization and support for national parties at the provincial level. However, the province-level data conceal important socioeconomic differences within the provinces. Sindh is the most prominent example of a province whose overall socioeconomic statistics disguise very prominent intra-regional differences. Specifically, the overall income and urbanization of Sindh province, which is much higher than the national average, conceal internal ethnically based disparities. The actual support for the PPP in Sindh

province comes from the more rural and less prosperous community: Sindhi-speakers. Urdu-speakers, who are responsible for higher than average levels of wealth and education in Sindh province, on the other hand, tend to vote for the MQM.

Overall, similar to the case of India, socioeconomic factors in Pakistan appear not to play a major role in the structure of its regional party systems. However, unlike in India, where Hindus represent a territorially unequally dispersed ethnoculturally and politically dominant community, Pakistan lacks such a community. All its major ethno-linguistic groups are territorially concentrated and lack either ethnocultural or political dominance. As a result, the support for its national parties in the 1990s was largely ethnoregional, and the inter-regional presence of Pakistan's two national parties, PPP and PML(N), was limited.

CHAPTER 6

Regional Party Systems in Spain, Canada, and Belgium

Introduction

In chapter 4 I have shown that, contrary to expectations associated with modernization theory, socioeconomic factors such as levels of education and urbanization have no significant impact on the differences in levels of support for regional and national parties in regional elections. In addition, levels of linguistic and religious diversity also cannot explain the variation in regional party systems. The case of India demonstrates that the ethnoculturally and politically dominant community is more likely to support national rather than ethnoregional parties. In India, political party systems in regions where Hindus are a majority are more likely to be dominated by national parties; in contrast, party systems in regions where Hindus are a minority are more likely to be dominated by regional and ethnoregional parties. Hindus are members of India's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community; their identification with the state and nation of India trumps any ethnoregional, tribal, and caste identities that individual members of the Hindu community may have, as expressed through their party preference. In India, therefore, demographic dominance of Hindus at the regional level provides the best explanation for the variation in regional party systems.

In this chapter I will test the applicability of the findings in chapter 4 to other ethnofederal democracies. Specifically, I will examine which factors are mainly responsible for the variation in regional party systems in Spain. In addition, I will examine the applicability of an argument developed in this dissertation about the relationship between the variation in regional party systems and presence or absence of ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities

to Canada and Belgium, even though the lack of sufficient number of ethnofederal units and ethnoregional variation in these two cases does not allow for the more rigorous analysis used to examine variation in regional party systems in India and Spain. This chapter will demonstrate that regional variation in the party systems of Spain, Canada, and Belgium is best explained by the presence or absence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community at the regional and national levels. In Spain, such a community is represented by Castilian speakers, who do not identify with any of the three main regional languages in Spain: Catalan, Basque, and Galician. As a result, national parties are strongest in those regions where this community represents a majority; in contrast, regional and ethnoregional parties are strongest in constitutionally bilingual regions. One of the most important findings of this chapter with respect to Spain is that the presence of co-official language/s in some regions and their absence in others is the only variable able to accurately and consistently predict the lack of electorally viable regional parties in some of Spain's autonomous communities and their strength in others. The Canadian ethnoculturally and politically dominant community is represented by Anglophones, who dominate all of Canada's provinces except for Quebec. Therefore, it is not surprising that Quebec is the only province with electorally strong ethnoregional parties. Finally, despite the demographic dominance of Flemings, Belgium lacks an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community; as a result, it has no national parties. Overall, this chapter's findings will confirm the argument advanced in this dissertation that the demographic position of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant national community at the regional level is the key factor responsible for the variation in the regional party systems in ethnofederal states.

This chapter proceeds with a brief introduction of Spain's "state of autonomies." I then introduce variables used in the first section of the chapter and examine the effect of these

variables on the variation in Spain's regional party systems. The section on Spain is followed by discussion of regional party systems in Canada and Belgium.

Spain

Though not formally federal, Spain is commonly referred to as a state of autonomies because it is composed of seventeen autonomous communities. After a long history of a highly centralized state, the latest Spanish constitution, ratified in 1978, which included provisions for the formation of autonomous communities, allowed for relatively swift and significant decentralization. Regional parties in three of Spain's historical communities, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia, developed a strong electoral base after the first regional elections, which took place in 1980 in the Basque Country and Catalonia and 1981 in Galicia. Observers expected regional parties to be limited to these communities; however, regional parties soon developed in other autonomous communities as well (Pallares 2006, 100). Spain provides an especially suitable case study because, due to the variation in the levels of autonomy in different autonomous communities, it allows us to examine whether the variation in the level of decentralization influences variation in the party system and whether this variation is more important than the effect of the demographic factor. I expect that because Castilian speakers represent Spain's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community, they tend to support national rather than regional parties in regional elections.

Data collection

The data used for the analysis in this section of the chapter are derived from the following sources: Spain's National Statistics Institute and on-line database about parliamentary elections

in Europe by Wolfram Nordsieck, entitled "Parties and Elections in Europe."[24]

Dependent Variable: Regional Party System

An analysis of the electoral results for all regional legislatures between 1980 and 2007 shows that eight out of seventeen autonomous communities tend to be dominated by national political parties. These regions are: Andalusia, Asturias, Castille-La Mancha, Castile and Leon, Extermadura, La Rioja, Madrid, and Murcia. Six autonomous communities have mixed party systems having strong national and regional parties. They are Aragon, Balearic Islands, Canary Islands, Cantabria, Galicia, and Valencia. Finally, three autonomous communities are consistently dominated by regional parties. They are the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarra. The dominance of regional and specifically ethnoregional parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia is not surprising: these are two communities with the historically strongest nationalist movements. The case of Navarra is different. The dominance of its regional party system is due to Navarra's largest regional party, the Navarrese People's Union (UPN), and its pact with the national right-wing political party, Partido Popular (PP). The UPN, despite being a regional party, functioned more as a regional branch of the PP after their merger agreement in 1990 and until their "divorce" in 2008. During that time period, the PP did not participate in regional elections in Navarra. It is, therefore, not surprising that the conservative UPN has taken a lead in one of the most historically conservative regions in Spain, having allied itself with its most significant rival.

[24] This database can be accessed here: http://www.parties-and-elections.de/.

Table 21

Spain: Regional Party Systems

Autonomous Community	**Party System**
Andalusia	National
Aragon	Mixed
Asturias	National
Balearic Islands	Mixed
Basque Country	Regional
Canary Islands	Mixed
Cantabria	Mixed
Castile-La Mancha	National
Castile and Leon	National
Catalonia	Regional
Extremadura	National
Galicia	Mixed
La Rioja	National
Madrid	National
Murcia	National
Navarra	Regional
Valencia	Mixed

National party system means that a regional legislature was consistently dominated by national parties; state party system means that a regional legislature was consistently dominated by state parties; mixed party system means that both national and state parties have both historically played a major role in a regional legislature either sharing power or taking turns dominating regional legislatures.
The data used to assess individual autonomous communities' party systems is available at http://www.parties-and-elections.de/.

Independent Variables

Two socioeconomic variables that are most commonly identified with greater regional nationalism, relative income of the region, measured in GDP per capita, and education levels, will be included in this analysis. Modernization theory debates, associated with these factors and their potential effect on nationalism, have been discussed in the chapter 4. The education factor analyzed in this chapter is broken down into two separate variables: illiteracy rates and higher

education rates. All socioeconomic variables and the population size are obtained from Spain's National Statistics Institute. The data are summarized in Table 22:

Table 22

Spain: Socioeconomic Data by Autonomous Community

Autonomous Community	GDP per Capita, 2001	Illiteracy Rate, 2001	Higher Education Rate, 2001
Andalusia	12363	23.3	15.1
Aragon	17468	9.6	19.8
Asturias	14087	12.9	16.4
Balearic Islands	20301	15	13.6
Basque Country	20493	6.8	26.9
Canary Islands	15764	21.8	15.8
Cantabria	15896	6.6	18.7
Castile-La Mancha	13138	25	12.8
Castile and Leon	15141	7.6	17.9
Catalonia	20388	12.6	19.2
Extremadura	10670	24.6	12.7
Galicia	12972	19	15.7
La Rioja	18712	3.2	19
Madrid	22573	9.5	26.7
Murcia	14013	21.1	17.5
Navarra	14299	6.8	26.4
Valencia	16155	16.1	16.4

Source: Spain's National Statistics Institute available at: http://www.ine.es/

In addition, this chapter will include two factors not included in the analysis of India. They are: level of autonomy and existence of the co-official language. These three variables are discussed below.

Variable 1: Level of Autonomy

Differences in cultural, historical, and economic conditions resulted in variation in the

level of autonomy accorded to autonomous communities. Throughout the 1980s and early to mid-1990s, Spanish federalism was characterized by high levels of asymmetry as autonomous communities greatly varied in their levels of autonomy. It achieved greater symmetry in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the center surrendered much of its authority over taxation to governments of autonomous communities (Garcia-Mila 2007, 216). The scholarship on political parties and decentralization has established that a higher degree of decentralization minimizes an incentive for party aggregation (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Cox 2003) and encourages regional party formation (Brancati 2008). I would expect, therefore, that Spanish regions with a higher degree of autonomy should have stronger regional parties.

Due to the multifaceted nature of Spanish asymmetric federal arrangements, which include various degrees of linguistic autonomy and fiscal decentralization, any attempt to rank Spanish regions solely by their level of autonomy is difficult. However, on the most general level, it is possible to divide Spanish autonomous communities into two categories, based on the level of fiscal responsibility. In the matter of taxation authority, Spain's autonomous communities are divided into two regimes: the Basque Country and Navarra belong to the foral regime (*régimen foral*) while the remaining fifteen regions belong to the common regime. The foral regime grants the Basque Country and Navarra the authority to levy taxes locally; the remaining fifteen regions' taxing authority, governed by the common regime, is limited (Garcia-Mila 2007, 216). In addition to this distinction, the autonomous communities that belong to the common regime are further divided into regions with high and low spending responsibility. Five regions with high spending responsibility, Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia, are given autonomy over health and education spending decisions in addition to all other expenditure responsibilities devolved to all fifteen regions within the common regime. The

spending responsibilities over education have been devolved to the remaining ten autonomous communities with a low level of spending responsibility, Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-Leon, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, and Rioja, by the late 1990s (Cattoir 2002). The responsibility over health had been transferred from the federal center to these ten regions by 2002 (Puig-Junoy and Rovira 2004). Therefore, throughout the 1980s and until the end of the 1990s, Spain's seventeen autonomous communities could be broadly divided into two categories: regions with high levels of fiscal autonomy and regions with low levels of fiscal autonomy. The first category—regions with high fiscal autonomy—includes the Basque Country, Navarra, Andalusia, Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, and Valencia. The second category—regions of low fiscal autonomy—includes Aragon, Asturias, Balearic Islands, Cantabria, Castilla-La Mancha, Castilla-Leon, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, and Rioja.

Alternatively, a distinction could be made between the fast versus slow-track communities. The four fast-track communities, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Andalusia, have adopted, in accordance with Article 151 of the Constitution, an accelerated process of building regional autonomy. The remaining regions, governed by Article 143, were subject to a more gradual process of autonomy building (Montero 2001, 154). Navarra belongs to the foral regime. As a member of such a regime, it has the authority to raise taxes locally – an authority which, until recently, was not extended to any other autonomous community besides the Basque Country (which also belongs to the foral regime). In summary, Andalusia, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia, and Navarra are all fast track and/or foral communities; the remaining regions are all members of slow track communities.

It is difficult to deduce which kind of decentralization is of greater importance to the regions. This chapter, therefore, will include and individually test the effect of two variables

representing variation in the level of decentralization: the variable based on the level of fiscal responsibility and the variable based on the distinction between fast-track and foral regime regions and slow-track regions.

Variable 2: Co-Official Language

Spain's regional asymmetry does not solely apply to various degrees of fiscal responsibility granted to different autonomous communities. It also includes important cultural asymmetries. One of the most important cultural asymmetries in Spain has to do with language rights. Currently, six autonomous communities have granted the language/s historically associated with much of their community and territory a co-official status with Castilian. Basque language, for instance, has been granted co-official status in the territories of the Basque Country and Navarra; Catalan has been granted co-official status in Catalonia and Balearic Islands; and Galician and Valencian languages have been given co-official status in Galicia and Valencia, respectively (Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007, 13). Catalonia also recently adopted Aranese as its co-official language, along with Catalan. However, until 2006 Aranese did not appear as a co-official language in Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy (Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007, 14).

In contrast to other autonomous communities with co-official languages, the co-official status of the Basque language in Navarra is geographically limited to the northern part of that territory. The southern part of Navarra is defined as a non-Basque-speaking community; therefore, the Basque language does not hold a co-official language status in the south (Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007, 14). The language arrangement in Navarra illustrates the political tensions

between Basque and non-Basque speakers and, more broadly, Basque and non-Basque identities, in Navarra. This tension is also expressed in Navarra's party system, with its regional parties divided between pro-Basque nationalist (the Basque Nationalist Party (EA), We, the Basque Citizens (EH), and Basque National Party (EAJ-PNV)) and anti-Basque nationalist (UPN) parties. There are also other important inter-regional differences associated with the language policy and usage. For example, in most autonomous communities that adopted a co-official language as part of their Statute of Autonomy, large proportions of the population are able to speak, write, and read in the co-official language. However, the actual numbers vary widely from region to region. According to the European Council's report on Regional and Minority Languages, twenty-two percent of the residents of Valencia can understand, speak, read, and write well in Valencian; only thirteen percent have no understanding of Valencian. In Galicia less than one percent is reported not to understand Galician and over fifty-six percent understand the co-official language and can speak, read, and write in it. In Catalonia less than six percent cannot understand Catalan, in Balearic Islands – less than twelve percent. In Navarra the percentage of people that do not understand the co-official language is, not surprisingly, much higher, at almost forty percent.[25] In the Basque Country the population is divided relatively equally between those who do not understand the Basque language (about forty-seven percent) and those who are able to understand the language as well as speak, read, and write in it (about forty-four percent) (Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007, 15).

These differences undoubtedly have important implications for regional language and

[25] However, in Navarra the question about residents' knowledge of the co-official language was not posed in all municipalities (see p. 16 of the Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007).

cultural policies as well as for nationalist sentiments. However, they will not be reflected in the way the data on the co-official languages are coded in this chapter. One of the hypotheses tested in this chapter is that language represents the key component of Spanish citizen identity. I expect that regions whose populations identify primarily with the Castilian language are more likely to vote for national rather than regional parties.

Spain's federal statistical database does not include regional demographic data such as information on the knowledge of official and un-official languages. Therefore, the co-official language variable is used as a proxy for ethnoregional identity. The theoretical justification behind such a proxy is that it reflects the existence of a linguistically based nationalist movement that was strong enough to adopt the co-official status for the language historically associated with its population and territory. The goal of this variable is to test the relationship between the strength of regional parties and non-Castilian-dominated regions. The assumption behind this variable is that the existence of a co-official language both reflects and shapes regional identities that are different from state-wide identities associated with the Castilian language. This assumption, therefore, implies a binary distinction between territories with and territories without a co-official language. Such an assumption is designed to identify general patterns that define the relationship (or lack of such) between language laws and party systems in Spain. The data on levels of autonomy and co-official language are summarized below:

Table 23

Spain: Autonomous Communities by Level of Autonomy and Co-Official Language

Autonomous Community	**Slow vs. Fast/Foral Track***	**Level of Fiscal Autonomy***	**Co-official Language****
Andalusia	Fast	High	No
Aragon	Slow	Low	No
Asturias	Slow	Low	No
Balearic Islands	Slow	Low	Yes
Basque Country	Fast	High	Yes
Canary Islands	Slow	High	No
Cantabria	Slow	Low	No
Castile-La Mancha	Slow	Low	No
Castile and Leon	Slow	Low	No
Catalonia	Fast	High	Yes
Extremadura	Slow	Low	No
Galicia	Fast	High	Yes
La Rioja	Slow	Low	No
Madrid	Slow	Low	No
Murcia	Slow	Low	No
Navarra	Fast	High	Yes
Valencia	Slow	High	Yes

Sources: * My own classifications based on different levels of fiscal and other responsibilities granted to autonomous communities by the Spanish Constitution. **Second Periodical Report on the Application in Spain of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages 2007; Garcia-Mila 2007, 216

Findings

Due to the small sample size (N=17), I will refrain from using statistical analysis in this chapter. Based on the data presented above, it is clear that only two variables, special status of autonomy and co-official language, have an effect on regional party systems. First, there is no strong relationship between the regional party system and GDP per capita: some of the wealthiest (Madrid and La Rioja) and poorest (Extremadura and Andalusia) autonomous communities are dominated by national political parties. Similarly, while two of the three autonomous

communities that are dominated by ethnoregional parties, the Basque Country and Catalonia, are among the wealthiest regions in Spain, the third autonomous community, Navarra, is the seventh poorest region in the country.

Second, there is no strong relationship between levels of illiteracy and regional party systems. For example, regions dominated by national parties have both the lowest levels of illiteracy (La Rioja) and highest levels of illiteracy (Andalusia, Extremadura, and Castile-La Mancha). Also, whereas the Basque Country and Navarra enjoy third and fourth lowest levels of illiteracy, Catalonia is only eighth. The relationship between regional party systems and levels of higher education are somewhat stronger. For example, all three regions dominated by ethnoregional and regional parties, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Navarra, enjoy some of the highest proportions of residents with higher education: the higher education rates are the greatest in the Basque Country, third highest in Navarra, and sixth highest in Catalonia. However, both Madrid and La Rioja, both regions dominated by national parties, also have among the highest proportions of residents with higher education. In general, the levels of higher education in autonomous communities dominated by national parties greatly vary.

As I mentioned earlier, only the special status of autonomy and co-official language demonstrate a strong effect on regional party systems. Table 24 displays these relationships by ordering autonomous communities by their party systems:

Table 24

Spain: Autonomous Communities by Regional Party Systems, Level of Autonomy, and Co-Official Language

Autonomous Community	**Party Systems**	**Slow vs. Fast Track**	**Level of Fiscal Autonomy**	**Co-official Language (Y/N)**
Andalusia	National	Fast	High	No
Asturias	National	Slow	Low	No
Castile-La Mancha	National	Slow	Low	No
Castile and Leon	National	Slow	Low	No
Extremadura	National	Slow	Low	No
La Rioja	National	Slow	Low	No
Madrid	National	Slow	Low	No
Murcia	National	Slow	Low	No
Aragon	Mixed	Slow	Low	No
Balearic Islands	Mixed	Slow	Low	Yes
Canary Islands	Mixed	Slow	High	No
Cantabria	Mixed	Slow	Low	No
Galicia	Mixed	Fast	High	Yes
Valencia	Mixed	Slow	High	Yes
Basque Country	Regional	Fast	High	Yes
Catalonia	Regional	Fast	High	Yes
Navarra	Regional	Fast	High	Yes

First of all, the existence of a co-official language demonstrates the strongest relationship with the party system. Both variables representing levels of autonomy also have a strong effect on the party system. The latter finding is not surprising: it is consistent with the literature on decentralization and political parties. It is, however, interesting that the existence of a co-official language is even better at explaining variation in regional party systems.

With respect to the fiscal autonomy variable, there are four autonomous communities whose level of fiscal autonomy fails to explain their party system: Andalusia (higher level of autonomy but dominated by national parties) and Aragon, Balearic Islands, and Cantabria (lower

level of autonomy but have a mixed party system). In addition to these four cases, the slow vs. fast track variable fails to explain two more: Canary Islands and Valencia (slow track autonomous communities that have a mixed party system). The co-official language variable, on the other hand, fails to explain the party system in Aragon, Canary Islands, and Cantabria: all three have a significant regional party presence despite not having a co-official language. As can be concluded from these exceptions, the level of autonomy and co-official language variables are highly, but not perfectly, correlated. The presence of regional parties in Spanish regions with lower levels of autonomy and without a co-official language is not surprising; after all, these regions are still significantly decentralized and decentralization encourages regional party formation, even though it does not require it. It is also important to mention that many regions with mixed party systems only developed strong regional parties in the mid-1990s. According to the literature on decentralization and political parties, greater decentralization leads to the proliferation of regional parties (Chhibber and Kollman 2004; Brancati 2008). What the co-official language variable explains well, with no exceptions, is the absence of regional parties. No autonomous community with a co-official language has strong national parties; party systems dominated by national parties are present only in the regions without a co-official language. This is consistent with the theory, promoted in this dissertation, that a demographic dominance of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community on the regional level helps predict the lack of support for regional parties. Spain's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community is represented by Castilian speakers without command of a second language traditionally associated with the region in which they live.

Overall, this analysis shows that two factors: level of autonomy and presence of co-official language help predict the regional party system. However, only the co-official language

is able to account for all the cases of the absence of strong regional parties in Spain's autonomous communities.

One may question whether the relationship proposed in this section runs in the opposite direction: the strong regional parties pushing for the co-official language statutes instead of co-official language serving as a proxy for demographic characteristics responsible for the rise of regional parties. This causal relationship could just as successfully explain why there is no co-official language in regions with national party systems: national parties do not support the introduction of the co-official language in the statute of the autonomous communities. However, all six autonomous communities adopted their co-official languages, examined in this chapter, in the early 1980s, in some cases even before the first regional elections took place. Therefore, regional party competition is a poor explanation for the inclusion of regional languages in the autonomous community statutes as co-official with the Castilian. Moreover, the existence of a co-official language is not solely a matter of policy. It reflects objective linguistic reality. All regions that adopted a co-official language have a large number of speakers of that co-official language. No other autonomous community can claim a similar ethno-linguistic circumstance. Of all six autonomous communities that adopted a co-official language, only in Navarra is the co-official language, Basque, associated with a demographically and geographically limited portion of the population. As a result, Basque's status of a co-official language in Navarra is limited to the Basque-speaking areas. The regional parties in Navarra reflect this legal and demographic context: the most powerful regional party in Navarra, the Navarrese People's Union (UPN), promotes pro-Castilian and anti-Basque national identity. Its existence is a reaction to the promotion of Basque linguistic identity rather than a reflection of that or any other specific ethno-regional or linguistic identity. The regional party system in Navarra, therefore,

demonstrates a split between the Basque-speakers – and those who identify themselves with the Basque language and/or people – and members of Spain's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community – Castilian speakers, who do not identify with any other regional language.

Overall, the analysis above suggests that linguistic identity in Spain is one of the primary determinants of political party preferences. Autonomous communities which included co-official languages in their statutes of autonomy in order to more accurately represent linguistic diversity of their population are never dominated by national political parties. Three out of six regions with co-official languages – the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Navarra – are dominated by regional parties; the remaining three regions – Canary Islands, Galicia, and Valencia – all have strong ethnoregional parties.

Canada

Canada has two potential sources of cultural division: language and religion. Lijphart (1979) found that in Canada, as well as in Switzerland and Belgium, religion was the most important determinant of party choice. Linguistic cleavage was also important; however, church affiliation and/or church attendance explained the highest degree of variance in party choice. Class voting turned out to be least important (Lijphart 1979). The majority of Canadians (over seventy-one percent) identify with Christianity; adherents to the Christian faith are divided into Catholics and Protestants. These divisions are not geographically concentrated. Only in two provinces does one or the other denomination of Christianity comprise more than fifty percent of the population. According to the 2001 Census, Quebec, not surprisingly, has the largest percentage of Catholics (about eighty-two percent) and the smallest percentage of Protestants (under five percent). The highest proportion of Protestants (a little under sixty percent) resides in Newfoundland and Labrador. In other provinces, both Catholics and Protestants are more or less

evenly distributed. Geographical dispersion of the religious communities is not a recent phenomenon either. In his 1979 article, Lijphart notes that the regional dispersion of the religious communities and regional concentration of linguistic ones in Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland may be one of the key explanations for the different impacts on voting of linguistic and religious cleavages (Lijphart 1979, 455). Due to a relatively even geographical dispersion of the religious communities, religious affiliation cannot account for regional variation in party systems.

Moreover, the religious cleavage and convictions have been unlikely to drive Canadian party politics for the past thirty years. The Quiet Revolution of the 1960s contributed to a significant secularization of Canadian society. Overall religiosity of Canadian society has greatly diminished. According to the 2001 Census, over sixteen percent of Canadians have no religious affiliation. However, even those who do view religion as a private matter, outside the realm of politics. According to Reimber (2008):

> Because most Canadians aren't very religious, they don't care enough about religion to fight over it. Second, religion is generally viewed as a private matter, a personal preference. In a marketplace of ideas, religion is seen as a choice, like the choice of brands in a supermarket or entrees at a buffet. . . As such, things religious are kept out of public life and political debate (105).

As a result, religious affiliation in Canada today cannot be considered a substantial part of the national identity – identity which is, by definition, political and public. Moreover, it is language not religion that is a constant source of tension in Canadian politics.

Canadians whose mother tongue is English represent a clear majority, making up almost fifty-eight percent of the population (Canadian 2001 Census). This number would be much higher if Quebec were excluded from the calculation:

Table 25

English as a Mother Tongue by Province in Canada, Excluding Quebec

Province	Newfoundland and Labrador	Prince Edward Island	Nova Scotia	New Brunswick	Ontario	Manitoba	Saskatchewan	Alberta	British Columbia
Mother tongue: English (%)	97.43	92.49	91.7	63.77	69.81	73.59	83.56	79.99	72.31

Source: Canadian 2001 Census available at http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/home/index.cfm

In Quebec, in contrast, the proportion of residents whose mother tongue is English, according to the 2001 census, is less than eight percent; instead, most of Quebec's residents' mother tongue is French (at about eighty percent). Overall, Anglophones represent a clear numerical majority in Canada and, unlike religion, language in Canada represents one of the most salient and divisive political issues. Despite strong regional identities that exist in most Canadian provinces and some secessionist movements in provinces such as Newfoundland and British Columbia, only Quebec's demands for either secession or confederal relations with the center is grounded in the linguistic distinctiveness of Quebec from the rest of Canada. It is important, therefore, to emphasize that only Quebec developed strong ethnoregional parties, both that compete on the regional level, such as Parti Quebecois, and on the federal level, specifically the Bloc Quebecois. No other province in Canada has electorally viable ethnoregional parties. Regional branches of Canadian parties are often only loosely associated with their national counterparts; in many cases, in order to mirror the federal structure, parties organized in such a way as to be either split or truncated. "Where split, party structures are formally separated; where truncated the party

makes an explicit decision not to organize both federally and provincially, but rather to confine its activities to either federal or provincial politics" (Hough and Jeffery 2006, 61). However, even in the context of such regionalized party systems, Quebec still stands out as the only province that is dominated by ethnically based political parties, whose goals are often at odds with the goals of the Canadian state.

Since Parti Quebecois' (PQ) creation in 1968, it quickly became one of the two dominant political parties in Quebec. It mounted a powerful challenge to the electoral dominance of the Liberal Party (LP) and replaced another Quebec autonomist party, Union Nationale (UN). Even though it has managed to win the majority of seats in the regional legislature only four times since the 1970 regional elections, it has never held less than eighteen percent of the seats in the regional parliament since its electoral victory in 1976:

Table 26

Elections to National Assembly of Quebec (1970-2008)

Year	LP seats	% of seats	PQ seats	% of seats	Total Number of Seats
1970	72	67%	7	6%	108
1973	102	93%	6	5%	110
1976	26	24%	71	65%	110
1981	42	34%	80	66%	122
1985	99	81%	23	19%	122
1989	92	74%	29	23%	125
1994	47	38%	77	62%	125
1998	48	38%	76	61%	125
2003	76	61%	45	36%	125
2007	48	38%	36	29%	125
2008	66	53%	51	41%	125

Source: Election Almanac available at:
http://www.electionalmanac.com/canada/quebec/results.php

The power of Quebec nationalism can be further witnessed by observing federal elections since the 1990s. The Bloc Quebecois, a political party that represents Quebec in the federal elections, has consistently won enough votes from Quebec's electorate, beginning with the 1993 elections, to form the official opposition (see Table 27). The Bloc Quebecois' creation and electoral success was a result of the failure to ratify the Meech Lake Accord and, consequently, Quebec's failure to achieve constitutional recognition as a "distinct society" (Belanger 2004, 586).

Table 27

Canada: Federal Election Results (1993-2008)

Year	BQ	% of seats	CA*	% of seats	CON	% of seats	LP	% of seats	NDP	% of seats	Seats
1993	54	18%	52	18%	2	1%	177	60%	9	3%	295
1997	44	15%	60	20%	20	7%	155	51%	21	7%	301
2000	38	13%	66	22%	12	4%	172	57%	13	4%	301
2004	54	18%	-	-	99	32%	135	44%	19	6%	308
2006	51	17%	-	-	124	40%	103	33%	29	9%	308
2008	49	16%	-	-	143	46%	77	25%	37	12%	308

BQ: Bloc Quebecois; *CA: Canadian Alliance (includes the Reform Party); CON: Conservative Party; LP: Liberal Party; NDP: New Democratic Party
Source: Election Almanac available at: http://www.electionalmanac.com/ea/canada-election-results/

The Reform Party was another political party with regionally based electoral support that succeeded in winning a sufficient number of seats to form an official opposition in the federal government in 1993. Its votes came from the Western provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia (Belanger 2004). However, unlike the Bloc Quebecois, the Reform Party's support was not limited to one province. Moreover, the Reform Party was created, in part, in opposition to Quebec's claim to be recognized as a distinct society and to what was perceived as a privileged position given to francophone Quebec by the federal government. Therefore, the Reform Party stood for greater symmetry between Canadian provinces, a policy consistent with an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community's defense of national unity and territorial integrity. In summary, aside from Quebec, Canadian provinces lack political parties that promote narrow provincial interests at the expense of national unity and territorial integrity. While some Canadian parties may be considered regional

(in this dissertation I define them as inter-regional, because their support is rarely limited to one province) based on a geographic source of their electoral support, their political agendas do not stand in sharp contrast to the interests of the federal center. Those regional parties that lack organizational links with their federal counterparts may promote, first and foremost, region-specific (but rarely province-specific) interests of their direct constituents.

Belgium

The analysis of regional party systems in Spain and Canada presented in this chapter has shown that national parties enjoy the greatest popularity in those regions which are dominated by an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. In contrast to Spain and Canada, Belgium today has no regional variation in party systems as such variation is defined in this dissertation: all three of its regions - Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels - are dominated by regional parties (party system in the Brussels region consists of Flemish and Walloon regional parties). In fact, Belgium is characterized by its lack of any national parties. I argue that the absence of ethnoculturally and politically dominant community in Belgium is responsible for the regionalization of Belgium's party systems.

According to the Eurobarometer survey conducted in Belgium in 2005, Dutch is the mother-tongue of about fifty-six percent of the population and French – of about thirty-eight percent (Eurobarometer 2006). However, despite their numerical dominance, the Flemish do not represent Belgium's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community: "while the Flemish have always been a demographic majority, their status was more akin to that of minorities" (Cartrite 2002, 46). Despite their demographic weakness, in the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century Francophones/Walloons were better candidates for a title of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community as they represented the political elite of

Belgian society. In addition, the French language was the language of Belgian elites and upward mobility; it was successfully promoted as the language of the Belgian state (Zolberg 1974). The Walloon language was seen as a dialect of French and with time Walloon and French linguistic categories merged, with Walloons becoming French-speakers (Zolberg 1974). By the end of the nineteenth century, the new middle class jobs were not available to the Flemish because they required command of the French language. By the beginning of the twentieth century, as a result of growing socio-economic pressures, many Flemish speakers chose to learn French and educate their children in francophone institutions. The number of Flemish speakers began to decline; increase in multilingualism was also especially noticeable among the Flemish (Zolberg 1974). This assimilation of Flemish speakers into the language of upward mobility may very well have led to the eventual numerical dominance of French-speakers in Belgium. However, this trend was reversed by the Flemish regional elites and intellectuals who successfully challenged the assimilation of the Flemish into French-speakers by linking language, ethnicity, and territory and promoting the idea of Flemings as a people rather than simply as a linguistic group – a category too vulnerable to change due one's ability and incentive to choose to learn the language of socioeconomic mobility (Zolberg 1974). The Flemish nationalist movement, in turn, encouraged the development of Walloon nationalism, creating further ethnoregional division between the two dominant Belgian communities and further weakening identification with the Belgian state and nation. Even today, however, despite their demographic weakness, Walloons still represent a better potential candidate for Belgium's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community than the Flemish. For example, despite regional and linguistic polarization, Wallonia's political arena is still dominated by the traditional left-right dimension which demonstrates that the Walloons' ethnonationalism is weaker (or, at least, no stronger) than the traditional socioeconomic

cleavages. In Flanders, in contrast, "ethnocentrism and political alienation have become the main factors, with Flemish autonomy being the most prominent of the traditional Belgian cleavages at work" (De Winter et al. 2006, 953).

The evolution of the party system in Belgium suggests that the lack of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community, combined with a state structure which encourages the creation of regional parties (i.e., ethnofederalism), results in regionalization of the party system(s) and the disappearance of national parties. The emphasis on the relationship between party regionalization and federalization in Belgium is well established in the literature. The creation of two (or three: both the Flemish and Walloon parties compete in Brussels region; therefore, the party system in Brussels is bi-ethnonational) independent regional party systems and the disappearance of national parties coincided with federal reforms:

> With successive reforms – turning Belgium into a federal state – the party system broke up into two linguistic segments between which there is no electoral competition, in spite of increasing ideological polarization between them. Since this break-up, no national parties have existed (De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont 2006, 134).

This quote suggests that the regionalization of Belgium's party system and disappearance of national parties are a direct and inevitable result of decentralization and linguistically defined territorial autonomy. However, the examples of India and Spain demonstrate that the creation of an ethnofederal structure is not a sufficient condition for the creation of regional parties that dominate regional politics. Moreover, regionalization of political parties in Belgium began long before Belgium adopted a federal constitution: it started in the 1960s with the rise of ethnoregional parties, proceeded as a result of growing saliency of the regional and linguistic cleavages fueled by ethnoregional parties, and concluded with the split of the last traditional party, Socialists, in 1978 (De Winter, Swyngedouw, and Dumont 2006, 934-938). While an

ethnofederal structure provides favorable conditions for the creation of regional and ethnoregional parties and gives some national parties organizational and electoral incentives to separate into independent regional parties, the lack of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community appears to be a necessary condition for the absence of any national parties. However, just like in Bosnia and Herzegovina (discussed in Chapter 3) the regionalization of Belgium's party system was affected by its electoral institutions. For example, since the 1970s the Belgian government established the separation between the Dutch and French language groups. All members of the federal House of Representatives must be a part of either Dutch or French units. "Since 1970 therefore not one single politician formally represents voters outside of his or her language group. Politicians might claim to do so, but their position in the institutions gives them a clear and unambiguous label" (Deschouwer and Van Parijs 2009, 11). Members of the House of Representatives are elected in districts whose borders coincide with provincial boundaries. Therefore, all electoral districts except Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) are unilingual, encouraging both territorial and linguistic nature of the Belgian parties. In order to promote the formation of national parties, scholars and politicians have recently proposed a state-wide electoral district for federal elections (Deschouwer and Van Parijs 2009). Overall, the effect of electoral institutions on the Belgian party systems cannot be overstated and is widely recognized as one of the main sources of the regional and linguistic nature of Belgian parties. However, the regionalization of the Belgian party system began in the 1960s, even before the first of many electoral and territorial reforms that further contributed to this process were implemented. In addition, electoral reforms and institutions must be considered both as exogenous and endogenous variables: electoral institutions have an important effect on party systems, which, as I argued in Chapter 3, may exaggerate, moderate, or reverse the effect of ethnofederal territorial

structures. However, electoral reforms themselves are a product of party competition and the particular balance of power between different political actors at the time decisions were made. The fact that there was a vast support for reforms such as the separation between the language groups in the federal parliament suggests the absence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community willing and able to oppose such reforms.

Some authors (see, for example, Cartrite (2002)) argue that the lack of Belgian citizens' association with the overall Belgian state and nation is exaggerated. The majority, or at least plurality, of Belgians prefers Belgian identity to regional Francophone or Flemish identities and to regionalist policies advocated by political parties. Parties' emphasis on greater decentralization and prioritization of ethnoregional identities is a result of the radicalization of a political elite whose attitudes about these issues do not accurately reflect popular preferences and identities (Cartrite 2002). However, I would argue that the ability of these elites to capture political debate is a result of the general public's passive and non-politicized attitudes regarding national identity. Ethnoregional parties, despite the (passive) preferences of the electorate, are able to achieve greater devolution and pursue anti-Belgian identity politics and even separatist agendas due to the greater salience of the ethnonational issues among the political elites. The majority, even if opposed to this agenda and tactics, is silent (Cartrite 2002, 47). The lack of interest expressed by this silent majority for greater Belgian national and state unity reflects the weakness of Belgium's potential ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. Tacit support for Belgian national identity and an inability to express this identity through electoral dominance cannot be equated with identification with the Belgian state. In general, both the Flemish and Walloon identities are contrasted with a Belgian national identity by the ethnoregional elites (Cartrite 2002, 46). This poses a significant challenge to the potential construction of Belgium's

ethnoculturally and politically dominant community and to Belgium's territorial integrity.

Conclusion

The analysis presented in this chapter supports the argument made in this dissertation that the dominant demographic position of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community at the regional level in ethnofederal states helps promote the dominance of national parties, and the demographic weakness or complete absence of such a community in the region explains the dominance of regional and ethnoregional parties in that region. In the case of Spain, both the level of decentralization and regional presence or absence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community help account for the variation in regional party systems. However, linguistic identity is the only variable that was able to predict, with one hundred percent accuracy, the lack of national party dominance in some autonomous communities and their dominance in others. This chapter attributes Belgium's lack of any national political parties to its lack of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. Despite the Flemish demographic dominance in Belgium, their ethnocentric and often separatist political agenda suggests that the Flemings do not actively associate with the overall Belgian state and nation and instead act as a minority. Finally, the Canadian example demonstrates that the only lasting regional (rather than inter-regional) parties whose political agenda challenges national and territorial integrity of the Canadian state formed in Quebec, the only province dominated by the Francophones. The remaining provinces in Canada are dominated by the Anglophones, who represent Canada's ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. All these provinces support either national parties or inter-regional parties which, despite being organizationally separate from the national parties, share with them both a party label and an ideology. Overall, this chapter has shown that electoral strength of ethnoregional and regional parties are not a common characteristic of all

ethnofederal states. Their presence depends on the ethno-demographic composition of the federal unit in question.

CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Introduction

The literature on ethnofederalism is dominated by the issue of stability (Cornell 2002; Bunce 2004; Bunce and Watts 2005; Bermeo 2004; Hale 2004, 2005; Filippov, et al. 2004; Nordlinger 1972; Watts 1999; Hughes 2001). These arguments about stability can be divided into two broad camps: one which argues that ethnofederalism enhances the state's stability by reducing separatist demands of territorially concentrated ethnic minorities and another which argues that ethnofederalism leads to state dissolution. The critics of ethnofederalism maintain that ethnofederal structures are inherently unstable (Nordlinger 1972; Bunce 2004; Cornell 2002; Roeder 2005; Korostelina 2008; Hughes 2001). However, these critics often fail to explain the link between territorial autonomy and instability. They argue that ethnofederal structures encourage "ethnic" politics and weaken citizens' national identity. These developments in turn threaten the territorial integrity of the ethnofederal state (Nordlinger 1972; Cornell 2002; Roeder 2009). The actors and mechanisms behind these developments are rarely specified.

Recent scholarship links the instability of ethnofederal states with the formation of regional and ethnoregional parties and the weakness of national parties (Brancati 2006, Filippov, et al. 2004). If the proliferation of ethnoregional parties in ethnofederal states is inevitable, then ethnofederalism as a solution to ethnic tensions in ethnically heterogeneous states must be avoided. Overall, current debates about ethnofederal democratic states tend to emphasize the effect of political parties, especially parties at the regional level, on stability of the state. However, little research has focused on party formation in ethnofederal democracies. It is this

question, specifically what kinds of party systems are most likely to form in ethnofederal democracies and why, that was the subject of this dissertation.

I have demonstrated that the formation of regional parties in all ethnofederal states and all federal units of ethnofederal states is not inevitable. Therefore, I asked why strong regional parties developed in some ethnofederal regions and not others. What is a cause of the variation in national and regional party systems?

This dissertation proposed two objectives. The first objective was to analyze the effect of electoral institutions on the development of political parties and formation of party systems in ethnofederal states. The second objective was to provide an explanation for what causes some sub-national units in ethnofederal states to support national parties and other sub-national units to support regional and ethnoregional parties. I have proposed two arguments to address these subjects. First, I argued that regional political parties do not develop in all ethnofederal states; instead, electoral systems are ultimately responsible for the development or underdevelopment of political parties. Moreover, even though ethnofederal territorial structure is conducive to the formation of regional parties, electoral rules and institutions represent a critical intervening factor that may either encourage or discourage regional party formation in an ethnofederal context. Therefore, we should not expect to witness the development of strong regional parties in all ethnofederal states: party systems in ethnofederal states are subject to electoral design instead of being solely predetermined by ethnofederal institutional arrangements. I addressed this argument in chapters 2 and 3.

Second, I argued that the regional variation in party systems within ethnofederal states was a result of the regional variation in ethnoculturally and politically dominant communities. I was able to exclude a numerical dominance requirement from my argument because even though

numerically dominant groups in democratic societies are likely to enjoy political and ethnocultural dominance at the center, this is not always the case. For example, the Flemish community in Belgium never enjoyed ethnocultural or political dominance despite their numerical dominance. In contrast, the Francophones in Belgium, despite their demographic weakness, enjoyed an ethnocultural and political dominance during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Similarly, despite Punjabis being the largest linguistic group in Pakistan, it is Urdu and not Punjabi that enjoys the status of the official state language. Numerical dominance (majority or plurality), therefore, is not a prerequisite for either ethnocultural or political dominance.

I have been able to demonstrate, instead, that the political dominance that may be exemplified by the prevalence of a particular ethnocultural community within the state bureaucracy or ruling political party must be accompanied by this group's ethnocultural dominance. By the latter I mean such indicators as the state laws that establish an official language or religion, noticeable socioeconomic benefits that encourage one's assimilation into the dominant culture, or cultures that are commonly identified with the state in question such as Castilian speakers in Spain, Anglophones in Canada, and Hindus and Hindi speakers in India. However, the official state laws may not always accurately reflect the ethnocultural reality of the state. For example, the French language dominance in Belgium remained unchanged even after the French language ceased to be the sole official language of the Belgian state (Zolberg 1974). In Canada, even though the French language shares a co-official status with English, outside of Quebec province one's socioeconomic success is tied to one's command of the English rather than French language. Therefore, a group may hold a privileged ethnocultural position either as a result of official state laws or due to other factors such as its demographic strength or history of

cultural dominance.

In addition, even though the political and ethnocultural dominance of a group are interrelated, they do not always coincide. An ethnocultural community may enjoy political dominance at the national level due to its demographic strength or an affirmative action policy that favors that group without simultaneously enjoying ethnocultural dominance. If this is the case, as, for example, is the case with Punjabis in Pakistan and, to some extent, Tigray people in Ethiopia, this may limit that community's loyalty to the state. At the very least, such incongruence between ethnocultural and political dominance would force the politically but not ethnoculturally dominant community to incur extra costs associated with learning the language of political and socioeconomic mobility. These extra costs may result in claims of discrimination by the state against a given community. Such a community, therefore, may support both national and ethnoregional parties, especially if ethnoregional parties employ the language of discrimination and ethnic pride and campaign on the basis of minimizing the costs associated with socioeconomic and political mobility. Similarly, a community may enjoy ethnocultural dominance at the national level without also enjoying political dominance, as is presently the case with the Urdu-speakers in Pakistan and Amharic-speakers in Ethiopia. In this situation, such a community is not forced to endure extra costs associated with learning the language of power; however, its loyalty to the overall state may be weakened as a result of its real or perceived inferior political position at the federal center. It is, then, likely to challenge rather than support the central government in an effort to improve its political representation and influence. In both situations, then, support for national parties from an ethnocultural community in question is less likely. Political dominance is more likely to result in a community's support for the state than ethnocultural dominance; however, the lack of congruence between the two is nevertheless likely

to result in tensions between the said community and the state.

Finally, the ethnoculturally and politically dominant community must be territorially dispersed; at the same time, its regional distribution must vary in order to account for the variation in regional party systems. If it is concentrated in one region, its allegiance to the federal center may be rivaled by its allegiance to the region of its residence. More importantly, a territorially concentrated ethnoculturally and politically dominant community's support for a national party may effectively transform that national party into an ethnoregional one or, at the very least, weaken that party's inter-regional presence. I addressed the second argument in chapters 3, 4, and 5. Table 28 below summarizes all the scenarios discussed above:

Table 28

Summary of the Argument

No	Scenario	Examples	Association with/Loyalty to the State	Community's Support for Political Parties (National, Regional/Ethnoregional)
1	Political dominance without ethnocultural dominance	Punjabis in Pakistan; Tigray people in Ethiopia	Moderate or High Association/Loyalty	National and Ethnic Parties
2	Ethnocultural dominance without political dominance	Urdu speakers in Pakistan; Amharic-speakers in Ethiopia	Moderate or Low Association/Loyalty	Ethnic, regional, and ethnoregional parties
3	Political dominance with or without ethnocultural dominance of a territorially concentrated community	Punjabis in Pakistan	High Association/Loyalty	Ethnoregional
4	Political and ethnocultural dominance of a territorially dispersed community	Russians in Russia; Hindus in India; Anglophones in Canada; Castilians in Spain	High Association/Loyalty	National
5	No politically and ethnoculturally dominant community	Belgium; Pakistan; Bosnia and Herzegovina	Moderate or Low Association/Loyalty	Regional and Ethnoregional

This concluding chapter will proceed as follows: first, I will summarize the main findings and conclusions of this dissertation. Next, I will discuss how this dissertation contributes to general knowledge in the field of comparative politics. Finally, I will discuss questions that this dissertation left unanswered and make recommendations for future research.

Findings and Conclusions

In Chapter 2 of this dissertation I presented a case-study of Russia. In this chapter I showed that electoral systems are the key to explaining the development and underdevelopment of political parties and party systems because they shape electoral incentives for parties to run their candidates in elections. I used district-level electoral data from the 1999 State Duma elections and the Tatarstan parliamentary elections of 1999, 2004, and 2009 to demonstrate that the underdevelopment of parties in Tatarstan in the 1990s was due to a majority electoral system. In 2002, the Russian federal government mandated the introduction of either mixed party-list proportional representation (PR)/single-member-district (SMD) or pure PR electoral systems in the regions. My analysis demonstrated that the introduction of a mixed electoral system in the Tatarstan legislative elections led to an immediate decrease in the number of independents and an increase in the number of party nominees in the SMD portion of the system. I argued that this sudden change was due to the interactive effect of PR and SMD components that lowered the costs and increased benefits of parties to run their candidates in the elections.

In contrast to the explanations that emphasize the lack of demand for political parties as the primary reason for party underdevelopment (Golosov 2004; Hale 2005), in Chapter 2 I focused on the institutional incentive structure that shapes parties' willingness to run their candidates in various elections. I argued that political parties are not passive organizations lying in wait until the moment politicians find themselves in need of their services. If this were the case, the change in electoral system in Tatarstan would not have had such an immediate and significant effect on the number of independent and party candidates in regional elections because reform in the electoral system does not have a direct effect on the availability of party substitutes, such as governors' political machines and politicized financial-industrial groups. This

chapter not only contributes to the debate about the sources of party underdevelopment in Russia but also to a discussion about the effect of mixed electoral systems on party formation and development – a subject which, until recently, has been largely ignored by scholars of electoral systems.

Chapter 3 included three case studies: Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In this chapter I examined the role of electoral engineering, specifically the role of electoral rules and institutions, in shaping party systems in ethnofederal states. This comparative study demonstrated that despite similar ethnofederal territorial structures, the party systems at both regional and federal levels vary greatly from one ethnofederal state to another: Nigeria is dominated by inter-regional parties and ruled by a national party, Ethiopia is dominated by ethnoregional parties and ruled by a national party, and BiH's party system is characterized by the absence of inter-ethnic parties. Because all three states are ethnofederal, the differences in their party systems demonstrate that territorial structure alone is insufficient to account for the nature of political parties and party systems in ethnofederal states. In Chapter 3 I argued that Nigeria's lack of ethnoregional parties can be partially explained by the constitutional ban on ethnic parties. However, the ban on ethnic parties alone may not have been sufficient to prevent ethnic party formation. After all, bans on ethnic parties are often poorly enforced. The difficulty of enforcing the ban on ethnic parties has been illustrated by the Bulgarian Court in 1992 when it ruled that there was no evidence that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which is an ethnic Turkish party, deliberately excluded non-Turks; its membership was not contingent on one's religious or ethnic affiliation (Ganev 2004, 84). As a result, despite Bulgaria's constitutional ban on ethnic, racial, and religious parties, the MRF was deemed constitutional. Therefore, on the one hand, the MRF's aim seemed to represent Bulgaria's Turks: the MRF's

chairman, Ahmed Dogan, is a Bulgarian Turk. In addition:

> Most all other leading functionaries on the central and local level had a similar background: its political activities were confined almost exclusively to regions with a large Muslim population; Turkish was routinely used during its electoral campaigns; all of its parliamentary mandates were won in ethnically mixed areas. Certainly, then, the MRF was "formed on an ethnic basis" – it drew its strength from the support of a specifiable ethnic minority (Ganev 2004, 66).

On the other hand, the Court argued that the MRF cannot be considered an ethnic party because its membership was open to members of all religions and ethnicities. This argument demonstrates one of the main weaknesses of relying on a ban on ethnic parties to prevent ethnic party formation: it is difficult to determine what constitutes an ethnic party. Unless a political party explicitly states its goals to represent a specific ethnic community and officially limits its membership to members of that community, it is difficult to establish objective criteria used to define an ethnic party for the purpose of its exclusion. Any such attempt may be viewed as politically biased and undemocratic.

In addition to the ban on ethnic parties, Nigeria's constitution also includes a set of spatial requirements (electoral rules that require that electoral support and/or political activities of candidates and/or parties are not confined to one or a few federal regions) both for presidential candidates and political parties competing in federal elections. Due to the high centralization of Nigeria's federal system, political parties have a strong incentive to abide by these requirements. The territorial structure of federal states makes territorial distribution requirements easy to define and enforce. Moreover, they are less likely to be perceived as politically biased as the explicit bans on specific types of parties.

In contrast to Nigeria, Ethiopia's constitution makes no territorial or other specifications for political parties to participate in federal elections. In that sense, Ethiopia's constitution

exhibits relative neutrality regarding the ideological and geographical nature of its party system. In the absence of explicit electoral rules that either promote or discourage the formation of specific political parties and party systems, the combination of its majoritarian electoral system and ethnofederal territorial structure resulted in the rise of a multitude of ethnoregional parties in Ethiopia. Therefore, I argued that the difference in the Nigerian and Ethiopian party systems was derived from the differences in their electoral rules and institutions with respect to party competition.

I also argued that the differences in Nigeria and Ethiopia's party systems resulted in more competitive elections in Nigeria and less competitive elections in Ethiopia. The proliferation of ethnoregional parties in Ethiopia leaves Ethiopia's ruling party, the EPRDF, without any competitors in the national elections. The EPRDF is the only party that has a national level of support. In comparison, Nigeria's ruling party, the PDP, faces significant opposition from several inter-regional parties. This opposition resulted in the PDP barely maintaining its majority in the federal House of Representatives after the elections of 2011. This difference shows that by shaping party systems, electoral engineering can potentially have an important impact on the level of contestation (as measured, for example, in terms of proportion of the seats held by the largest party).

Finally, I showed that in contrast to Nigeria's electoral institutions which encouraged inter-regional party development and Ethiopia's institutional neutrality regarding party system formation which resulted in the proliferation of small ethnoregional parties, BiH's lack of parties that enjoy country-wide support is due to its electoral institutions that favor ethnically based parties. Some may argue that the main reason for the lack of inter-ethnic parties in BiH is its history of ethnic conflict. However, both Ethiopia and Nigeria have a longer history of ethnic

violence, civil wars, and secessionist movements. In addition, if ethnic hatred were the main reason for the lack of inter-ethnic parties, we would not have seen the rise and electoral success of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP's popularity among the Bosniacs demonstrates that voter behavior is not necessarily driven by ethnic hatred and voters in post-conflict states do not punish non-nationalist parties at the polls. I, therefore, maintain that the primary cause for the dominance of ethnonational parties in BiH, with the partial exception of SDP, is the presence of institutional incentives for such party formations.

Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrated the effect of electoral institutions on party development and formation of different party systems. However, the focus on electoral institutions cannot explain the regional variation in party systems within an ethnofederal state. Federal units within ethnofederal states tend to adopt the same electoral systems as the federal center. However, despite sharing the same electoral systems and uniform federally mandated rules regarding party registration and federal elections, many ethnofederal regions have very different party systems. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I examined the variation in regional party systems in India, Pakistan, Spain, Canada, and Belgium. In these chapters I tested the second argument of this dissertation that the presence of a territorially dispersed ethnoculturally and politically dominant community helps explain why populations of some ethnofederal units tend to support national or inter-regional parties while other ethnofederal units prefer regional and ethnoregional parties or split their votes between regional and national parties.

In Chapter 4 I presented a case-study of India. The primary purpose of this chapter was to examine the sources of variation in regional party systems in India. The case of India confirmed my hypothesis that ethno-demographic composition of the region is the most important determining factor in explaining levels of support for regional and national parties. I found that

Hindus, who compose about eighty-three percent of India's population, tend to support national parties, regardless of their region of residence. Therefore, states in which Hindus are a majority tend to be dominated by national rather than regional parties. In contrast, states where Hindus are a minority tend to be dominated by regional parties. In general, I found that the likelihood of the population of the state supporting national parties rises as the proportion of Hindus relative to other religious groups increases.

Hindus in India represent a clear ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. Another such community is the Hindi speakers. My analysis showed, however, that a proportion of Hindi speakers does not have a statistically significant effect on variation in regional party systems. Clearly Hindu identity is more politicized than Hindi-speaking identity. This observation is confirmed by the fact that since the 1980s the divide between Hindus and Muslims has been skillfully intensified and exploited by political parties such as the BJP.

The findings in this chapter go beyond explaining the sources of variation in regional party systems. As I mention above, my analysis shows that it is the proportion of Hindus that best accounts for the regional party system variation. States whose populations are predominantly Hindu are more likely to support national parties. Thus, despite the largely linguistic basis of India's ethnofederalism, it is religious (Hindu) rather than linguistic (Hindi-speaking) identity that provides the best explanation for the variation in party systems. In addition, based on Hindus' preference for national parties, my findings show that it is possible to think of them as a cohesive majority. This evidence challenges the assertion that the Hindu majority in India is a myth due to the existence of numerous cross-cutting cleavages. More importantly, this evidence contradicts an argument made by critics of ethnofederalism that ethnically based territorial autonomy necessarily sharpens and institutionalizes ethnic cleavages.

In Chapter 5 I examined the variation in provincial party systems in Pakistan from 1988 to 1999. I found that the differences in provincial party systems in Pakistan were not influenced by socioeconomic factors. Moreover, despite the fact that Pakistan had two national parties, PPP and PML(N), neither party possessed sufficient inter-regional presence to win majorities in provincial governments beyond their provincial strongholds, Sindh and Punjab, respectively. Therefore, even Pakistan's national parties were largely regional and were perceived to represent interests of their respective ethnoregional constituents, Sindhi and Punjabi speakers. I argued that this outcome was a result of the absence of a clear and territorially dispersed ethnoculturally and politically dominant community, which is the main condition for the presence of strong national or interregional parties.

Finally, in chapter 6 I examined case-studies of Spain, Canada, and Belgium. I showed that in Spain and Canada regional parties dominate in regions where ethnocultural and politically dominant communities constitute a minority. In Spain regional parties enjoy a lot of electoral support in autonomous communities with co-official languages. In contrast, autonomous communities without co-official languages tend to support national parties. The latter regions are dominated by Castilian speakers and lack other linguistic groups large and politically mobilized enough to have their languages elevated to the official status in regional constitutions. In Canada, French-speaking Quebec is the only province not dominated by Anglophones. It is also the only province that consistently supports ethnoregional parties whose political agenda poses a challenge to the territorial integrity of Canada. Other Canadian provinces also support regional (but rarely narrowly provincial) parties; however, despite separate organizations, those parties share both a party label and an ideology with the national parties. Finally, I argued that the absence of any national parties in Belgium was due to its lack of an ethnoculturally and

politically dominant community. In this, Belgium's example is similar to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both countries are characterized by the absence of truly national parties. In Belgium, parties are regional; in BiH, parties are ethnonational. In BiH, Bosniacs, which are the largest of three main ethnic groups in Bosnia, represent the one community that supports a more ethnically blind and centralized federal constitution. This is not surprising: due to Bosniacs' demographic strength a stronger central government combined with de-ethnicization of the state could strengthen their political position vis-à-vis other ethnic groups. In ethnically blind but divided democracies, ethnic majorities and pluralities are certain to rule (Horowitz 1993). In Belgium, the Walloons that tend to support more moderate and pro-federal parties. Walloons' support for more centrist and pro-federal parties is likely a result of Francophones' historical dominance at the center which, in turn, alienated and radicalized the Flemish. Therefore, despite the Flemish numerical dominance, they tend to support more ethnonationalist regional parties.

Contribution to knowledge

The scholarship on ethnofederalism and ethnically based territorial autonomy is abundant. However, scholars have paid little attention to political parties and party systems in ethnofederal states. Even less attention has been paid to political parties and party systems at the sub-national level: "Theoretically informed, comparative analysis of sub-state elections and party competition has been conspicuous by its absence" (Hugh and Jeffery 2006, 4). Works by Dawn Brancati (2006), Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova (2004), Dan Hough and Charlie Jeffery, ed. (2006), and DeWinter, ed. (1998) are among few notable exceptions. Even more generally, scholarship that examines the relationship between ethnicity, political parties, and party systems is relatively scarce: "while cleavage has received considerable attention in the ethnic conflict literature, the role of ethnicity is largely absent from studies of parties, voting behavior, and

legislative behavior. We know very little about how members of ethnic groups vote and why and how their votes shape democratic party systems" (Birnir 2007, 6). This is surprising because federalism is often introduced to provide for better local representation, especially for ethnically diverse and territorially concentrated communities. The aim of ethnic federalism is both to deepen democracy and to ameliorate conflict through improved representation at the sub-national level. In democratic societies, such representation is provided by political parties which articulate the interests of their constituents both at the regional and national levels. Therefore, the degree to which federalism is successful in performing its primary functions, by providing better representation for the sub-national communities, depends on the kind of parties that form and compete in federal units. In addition, regional parties may exacerbate rather than ameliorate conflict between the sub-national communities they represent and other groups, and, if regional parties dominate at the federal center, this can increase the level of conflict and deadlock in national parliaments. If this happens, the tenuous balance between unity and diversity may be disrupted. Overall, political parties play an important role in the successes and failures of federal states.

When political parties are mentioned in the discussion of ethnic federalism, scholars frequently assume that ethnofederalism would lead to the proliferation of ethnoregional parties. I am not familiar with any systematic attempts either to examine the sources of ethnoregional party formation or to explain why some regional governments in ethnofederal states are dominated by regional while others by national parties.

In this dissertation I showed that electoral rules and institutions play a key role in shaping party systems in ethnofederal states. The literature on ethnic federalism and ethnically based territorial autonomy tends to emphasize the importance of territorial structures of the state,

especially if federal units are designed to create linguistically or religiously homogeneous units rather than cut across ethnic lines (Nordlinger 1972; Cornell 2002). Not enough attention is paid to the effect of electoral institutions on the formation of parties and the structure of party systems. For example, the case of Nigeria, discussed in Chapter 3, shows that electoral institutions can help avoid the formation of ethnic and ethnoregional parties more efficiently in ethnofederal rather than in ethnically diverse but unitary or non-ethnically based federal states by introducing territorial distribution requirements. In general, in this dissertation I showed that electoral rules and institutions help explain party development or underdevelopment and are a critical intervening variable that can help either reverse or exacerbate ethnofederal territorial structures' effect on party systems both at the regional and national levels.

Second, I argued that an institutional explanation alone is insufficient to explain the variation in regional party systems. When examining regional support for political parties, one must also pay attention to the ethno-demographic composition of the region in question. I have shown that in those ethnofederal states where electoral rules and institutions allow for the formation of both national and regional parties, the variation in regional party systems depends on the presence of an ethnoculturally and politically dominant community. However, not all states necessarily possess such a community. According to my findings, the lack of a territorially dispersed ethnoculturally and politically dominant community results in two mutually inclusive outcomes: the absence of significant variation in regional party systems and predominance of ethnoregional parties.

In the table below I provide a summary of the main electoral institutions and ethno-demographics in all ethnofederal states discussed in this dissertation:

Table 29

Summary of the Case Studies

State	Number of Federal Units	Ethnically Based Units	Years	Electoral System	Dominant Community ominant Community	Territorially and Unevenly Dispersed (Y/N)	Regional Party System
Russia	83 federal subjects	21 republics	1999-2009	SMD; Mixed	Russians (ethnoculturally, politically, demographically)	Y	Nat'l
Nigeria	36 states	36 states	1999-2011	SMD	Housa, Yoruba, Igbo (politically)	N	Inter-Reg'l
Ethiopia	9 states/ counties	9 states/ counties	1995-2010	SMD	Tigray (politically)	N	Mixed
BiH	2 entities	2 entities; 10 cantons of the Fed'n of BiH	1996-2010	PR	Bosniacs (demographically)	N	Mixed, Ethnonational
India	28 states	28 states	1951-2008	SMD	Hindu (ethnoculturally, politically, demographically); Hindi (ethnoculturally, politically, demographically)	Y	Mixed
Pakistan	4 provinces	4 provinces	1988-1999	SMD	Punjabi (demographically)	N	Mixed/ Reg'l
Spain	17 autonom. regions	6 autonomous regions	1980-2011	PR	Castilians (ethnoculturally, politically, demographically)	Y	Mixed
Canada	10 provinces	1 province	1970-2008	SMD	Anglophones (ethnoculturally, politically, demographically)	Y	Mixed
Belgium	3 regions	2 regions	1993-2011	PR	Flemish (demographically)	N	Reg'l

Suggestions for Future Research

The literature on federalism that addresses the role of political parties in ethnofederal and/or ethnically heterogeneous states has largely focused on the effect of political parties on political instability. Some scholars argue that decentralization and territorial autonomy based on the ethnic principle lead to the formation of ethnic and regional parties and that such parties promote conflict (Brancati 2006, Filippov, et al 2004). Regional parties reinforce ethnoregional identities, produce policies that threaten regional minorities, and mobilize communities to participate in ethnic conflict. In contrast, other scholars maintain that the political and electoral systems that allow ethnic parties to form and participate in government promote greater cooperation and compromise between ethnic groups (Lijphart 1977; Birnir 2007). By allowing nationalist groups to express their demands through legitimate political channels such as political parties, states are likely to avoid violent conflict. If states restrict nationalist groups' political participation through legitimate means, these groups are likely to adopt violent tactics because political exclusion leaves no room for compromise. Future research needs to address this debate in the literature by comparing conflicts in ethnofederal units whose party systems are dominated by ethnoregional parties with those whose party systems are dominated by national parties and those whose party systems include both strong ethnoregional and national parties. A broader question that this research would help address is: what conditions explain the stability and instability of ethnofederal states? By examining the sources of tension between the center and regions that characterize all federal systems and mechanisms for managing these tensions, such a study would make an important contribution to the debate on the constitutional design of ethnic federations and on the effect of institutions, structures, and processes on the stability of ethnofederal states and enhancement of their reconciliatory potential.

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