HOMONOIA IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

By Joshua A. Kinlaw

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Abstract

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This study centers on the role of the idea of *homonoia* in the eastern Roman Empire between 50 and 170 CE. It focuses on six Greek-speaking authors, each of whom form one of the following chapters, which are arranged in rough chronological order. These authors and their emperors view reality through a lens of virtue and vice, and the ideal of "like-mindedness" has a vital, if little-discussed place in such a worldview. The socio-political value of *homonoia* was important enough to be personified and worshipped as deity. Nevertheless, there is no English monograph on the topic. This dissertation highlights the role of *homonoia* in authors traditionally labelled as either "pagan" or "Christian." *Homonoia* was essential in both these environments. It played an important role in the socio-political assemblies, on the one hand, as well as philosophical and religious dialogue, on the other.

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INTRODUCTION

This study centers on the role of the idea of *homonoia* in the eastern Roman Empire between 50 and 170 CE. It focuses on six authors, each of whom form one of the following chapters, which are arranged in rough chronological order. The topic of *homonoia* grew out of conversations with Professors Allen and Yarrow, and was also a relatively organic process stemming from my interest in imperial virtues and the history of ideas. I was inspired by previous study of Seneca's *De Clementia* (an example of both an imperial virtue as well as an important episode in the history of an idea) and Pliny's *Panegyricus*. Both are products of the Roman senatorial elite, and are dedicated to emperors (Nero and Trajan, respectively) but obviously they tell us a lot about contemporary ideals or values. These authors and their emperors view reality through what Noreña calls a "prism of virtue and vice," and the ideal of "like-mindedness" has a vital, if little-discussed place in such a worldview.[1] "Divine qualities" such as the Roman *concordia* and the Greek *homonoia* were important enough to be personified and worshipped as deities.[2] Homonoia's cult probably dates to the mid-fourth century BCE in southern Italy, and there is of course a temple to Concordia in the Roman forum that dates to at least the late third century BCE. Nevertheless, there is no English monograph on either of these as virtues or socio-political values.[3]

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[1] Noreña 2011, 51. Fears 1981 provides a significant summary.
[2] The phrase is Clark's (2007), who has also contributed to my understanding of virtues.

Neither Concordia nor Homonoia are virtues per se; Seneca, for example (De Clem. 1.5) implies that concordia transcends or orders virtues. I do not wish to establish a precise relationship between either of these ideals and common virutes, such as *pax* or *eirene*. Rather I mention the virtues here because good, intriguing work (like that mentioned above) has been done on virtues as key words—powerful ideas—in ancient history, and it is my hope to highlight the role of *homonoia* in that environment, specifically the time between the reigns of Nero and Marcus Aurelius.

I mentioned that the topic of *homonoia* grew out of conversations with advisors; but it was actually a conversation about "conversations," which is to say first- and second-century rhetoric on socio-political ideals such as "like-thinking" or "unanimity of heart or mind." By this I mean *aspects* or *themes* of homonoia: it was a multifaceted ideal with any number of contexts, from the individual soul to the state and even empire. The "conversation" that initially interested me was that between the Emperor and his family, on the one hand, and his subjects and armies on the other. It could be called "imperial homonoia," meaning how the emperor and his closest associates managed his brand, or established consensus. This conversation, over the course of my early research, became subordinate, however, to the dialogues among members of the same community. I focus on the periphery, rather than the center, in other words: and on intellectual texts, rather than institutions.

On a practical level, the dissertation grew out of a draft of a first chapter that encompassed Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Aelius Aristides. I realized in the process of writing the draft that there was more than enough textual evidence to focus solely on *homonoia,* and therefore left *concordia* aside. This is not to say the conversation about social cohesion was only taking place on the local level, nor that it was taking place primarily in Greek, as opposed to Latin. Around the year 110 CE, for example, in the middle of a three-year stint as deputy to the emperor Trajan, the Roman governor of Bithynia (northern Anatolia) had a problem. A small but growing contingent within the province for which he was responsible was misbehaving—holding secret meetings and refusing to make offerings to the emperor's divinity. The governor was unsure how to even categorize the group, let alone discern its motives or aims. Interviews with members and former associates of the minority revealed little: "I discovered nothing but depraved, excessive superstition," the governor reports to Trajan. "I therefore postponed the investigation and hastened to consult you. For the matter seemed to me to warrant consulting you, especially because of the number involved. For many persons of every age, every rank, and also of both sexes are and will be endangered. For the contagion of this superstition has spread not only to the cities but also to the villages and farms."[4]

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[3] Theriault 1996b (in French) is concerned with the capital-H (or Ω) *Homonoia*. While his work is a valuable collection of evidence, Theriault's focus on the cult is only tangential to my study.

The governor is Pliny the Younger, and his report to Trajan is perhaps the most famous of his letters. It is the earliest Roman reference to the growing *superstitio* that would eventually receive Constantine's blessing as Christianity. Pliny's problem—social division and the dangers it implies—was a constant concern not only for Roman administrators, but for those they govern. In other words, this famous piece of ancient Roman evidence is actually part of a much larger contemporary conversation about socio-political organization and unity—a conversation embedded in rhetoric in which *homonoia* was the highest ideal. Ironically, the people who were, in Pliny's view, the very source of discord—*christiani*—ultimately offered some of the strongest statements in support of "like-mindedness," both within their own community and between their community and Roman authorities.

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[4] Pliny *Ep*. 10.96.8-9: *Nihil aliud inveni quam superstitionem pravam et immodicam. [9] Ideo dilata cognitione ad consulendum te decucurri. Visa est enim mihi res digna consultatione, maxime propter periclitantium numerum. Multi enim omnis aetatis, omnis ordinis, utriusque sexus etiam vocantur in periculum et vocabuntur. Neque civitates tantum, sed vicos etiam atque agros superstitionis istius contagio pervagata est.* Sherwin-White dates the letter to ca. 110 (1965, 80). All extrabiblical translations are based upon the Loeb editions, which I have frequently modified. Biblical translations are based upon the *New Revised Standard Version*.

In the course of writing the first chapter I also became interested in early Christian uses of homonoia rhetoric. This is because some of the best descriptions of homonoia rhetoric has been written by New Testament (NT) scholars. It is also a function of my interest in the way the Christian ideas about homonoia in the natural world and in their God himself seems to mirror the way Seneca or Pliny (for example) thought about the ideal role of their emperor (and gods). One of the most important and challenging aspects of my approach is reading together sources that have conventionally been divided between "Christian" and "pagan." This is a distinction I hope to ignore as much as possible, for homonoia is best considered without a religious boundary. It is arguably too early, in a first- or second-century context, to talk about a hard distinction between followers of Jesus (or Paul) and their contemporaries. That the very words we use to construct such a boundary come into being during this time period is sufficient evidence that the relationship was very much in flux.[5] Nomenclature surrounding "Early Christianity," or "proto-Orthodoxy" as well as the nature and existence of multiple Jesus "movements" remain matters of scholarly discussion and personal preference. While aware of the3 semantic difficulties, I will generally forgo quotation marks around these and similar terms that some find problematic.[6]

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[5] The dating is imprecise, but the earliest literary instances of *christiani* and *christianismos* cluster around the end of the first century: Tacitus, Pliny the Younger, Suetonius were contemporaries. The first Greek instances, in the Acts of the Apostles and Ignatius of Antioch, date to the same period. See also Judge 2003.

[6] Nearly every key term of this discussion, including "cult" and "religion," has generated scholarly discussion or controversy. Lieu 2004 and the essays collected in Holmberg 2008, as well as Robinson 2009, are helpful analyses of earliest Christian identity and terminology.

Clement and Ignatius (Chapters 3 and 5) emerged rather quickly as significant milestones in the history of *homonoia*. The pair became a trio when I realized how significant Paul was for both of them. We need only think about their traditional label, "Apostolic Fathers," to understand Clement and Ignatius are explicitly defining themselves in terms of a Pauline precedent (which is the subject of Chapter 1). The apostle is the basis of their authority and much of their rhetoric. While Eshleman has recently highlighted this phenomenon of identity formation for later authors, my study offers another window on that process, in the previous generation.[7]

There are of course geographical and cultural differences among the six authors considered here. Paul died in a Roman prison, an outsider executed for his troublesome devotion to what was then still largely a Jewish sect, or a secret "atheist" club. In contrast, Aristides died on one of his family's estates around 180 after living the culturally and economically charmed life of an eminent insider. Then there is the matter of geography: it is fair to ask how many of Clement's congregants on the Tiber would have been familiar with Ignatius' church on the Orontes, some 2,000 miles to the east.

Yet the authors are only seemingly disparate. All six were quick to point out the fact that their world had shrunk under Roman hegemony. The elites of the eastern half of the Empire during the "long century" from 50 to 170 CE lived in a "small world." [8] There is a remarkable physical proximity about these episodes in the history of homonoia. The Christian epistles are written to the same cities in which Dio Chrysostom and Aristides spoke. A map of these cities reveals a relatively small cluster around the Aegean.[9] Clement is something of a geographical outlier in residing in Rome, but his letter is addressed to the same church to which Paul wrote a generation before. Our latest Christian author, Ignatius, travelled through some of the same cities as the earliest, Paul. In fact all of these authors were likely to have literally walked the same streets. Cultural distance, moreover, is arguably even less significant. All the authors can easily be considered elites, by which I mean well educated, Greek-speaking Roman citizens. Five of the six are natives of eastern cities which had been under Roman hegemony since at least the first century BCE. Clement's biography is the least documented, but what little we have suggests associations, if not intimacy, with elite households in Rome itself. All five of the other authors spent significant time in Rome; three were associated with the emperor himself. Finally, all of the sources were probably read aloud in an assembly, or *ekklesia*. It is well known that the meaning of the word *ekklesia* evolved from an "assembly" of Greek males to a universal "church."[10] I hope to show that homonoia was important in both.

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[7] See Eshleman 2012.

[8] The phrase is Bekker-Nielsen's (2008). To take one example: Plutarch's nephew was tutor of Marcus Aurelius, who knew Aelius Aristides well. (For Plutarch's ancestory, see Barrow 1967, xi.)

DEFINITION

The word *homonoia* clearly refers to "same-mindedness," but there is no perfect English translation. Perhaps this is fitting, for *homonoia* took on multiple shades of meaning in the authors surveyed here, depending on its context. *Homonoia* is usually common rendered "concord." This is etymologically troubling, for *concordia* derives from the Latin "heart," while *homonoia* has its origin in the "mind."[11] Nevertheless the ideas are similar in meaning and use.

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[9] As is clear in the maps included by Theriault 1996b. These indicate cities where there is evidence for Homonoia cult and those that issued homonoia coinage. The same cities are involved in both.

[10] On the difficulty of translating *ekklesia*, with reference to "cult," "religion," and "assembly," see Judge 2003, 501-505.

[11] Surveying Greek literary and archaeological evidence, Smith defines homonoia as "a bond that could bring together otherwise unrelated or unallied groups (2011, 123-124). Tarn notes the difficulty: concord "can be satisfied by the negative meaning 'to live without quarrelling,' a thing that can be done by people of very different mentalities and outlooks. 'Unity' might pass, but is too vague" (1948, 400). From here, I follow Tarn in using an un-italicized homonoia throughout.

Cicero, who thought *concordia* an essential idea for Roman society, describes it in a way that is applicable to homonoia. He said that in order to understand concord, we must study discord.[12] As we will see below, homonoia is defined in terms of its antonyms, the most prevalent of which is "strife," or *stasis*.[13] It is often used as an essentially negative term: less tightly bound to agreement than with an end of quarrels.[14]

Homonoia's contexts ranged from interpersonal relations in the home to international affairs between and among Rome and its eastern provinces. Homonoia was also an important part of Hellenic identity vis-à-vis Roman imperialism; it was part of an ideology that asserted provincial "independence and self-governance, so that order could not be externally imposed but was a 'concord' reached rationally" by independent agents.[15] This sort of observation captures the spirit of our Greek authors' shared honor-based culture.

In emphasizing homonoia, the six authors surveyed here were able to draw on a rich intellectual heritage. By the time Paul of Tarsus takes up homonoia rhetoric in the middle of the first century, the idea has a literary pedigree dating back over four hundred years. Homonoia was "one of the highest aspirations of the Greek world" from end of the fifth century BCE, and a constant preoccupation in Greek history from Solon to Alexander.[16] Its importance is a function of its applicability. It was championed separately by democrats and aristocrats at Athens in the fourth century BCE, and was a panhellenic slogan even earlier.[17] A conjugal, domestic version of the word may have preceded both of these.[18] Another version of homonoia was championed by Alexander the Great, who sought a new worldwide extension of the ideal.[19] Alexander's tutor, Aristotle, discusses homonoia in his ethical works.[20] In doing so, he followed Plato, whose perfect polis is characterized by a homonoia that "brings about the unison (συνᾴδοντας) in the weakest, the strongest, and the intermediate, whether in wisdom or, if you please, in strength, or for that matter in numbers, wealth, or any similar criterion."[21] It is "the harmony (συμφωνία) of the naturally superior and inferior as to which ought to rule both in the state and the individual" (4.432a). Aristotle's comments sound similar: "commoners" (φαῦλοι) are incapable of homonoia; if they are allowed to wield power, their selfishness will displace the common good (*koinon*) and create *stasis*.[22] The maintenance of concord therefore requires rule by the "good." Later, the Stoic conception of cosmic homonoia features prominently in Hellenistic philosophy. Universal homonoia is a foundation for an influential Stoic cosmology which seems to inform all of the authors considered here.[23]

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[12] *De Amic.* 7.23; *quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atque ex discordiis perspici potest*. See also Virgil *Aen.* 6.280, where Discordia is depicted as a woman with hair of bloody serpents. Cicero writes as a moderate Optimate of equestrian origin in favor of conservative, Senatorial dominance. This is the basis of his conception of social harmony. Concord was thus based upon concession of lower orders to their superiors. See *Ad. Att.* 1.14-18.

[13] The very presence of *concordia* is, in Purcell's memorable phrase, "an effective diagnostic of its absence" (*OCD*^{3}, *s.v.* Concordia). Clark illustrates how the establishment of Roman monuments in honor of *concordia* correlates with the threat of *discordia* (2007, 121-128).

[14] This was true of *concordia* as well, but it has a history in the Latin West which I will leave to one side. There is no book devoted to *concordia*, but the numismatic surveys of Amit (1962) and Beranger (1973) are valuable. For *concordia* as an imperial virtue, with background and bibliography, see Fears 1981 and Noreña 2011. Noreña sees *concordia* as a Greek import to southern Italy in the form of a Homonoia cult (46-47), and discusses the varieties of contexts for *concordia* at 132-136. For the potential encouragement of *concordia/*homonoia iconography from Rome, see Theriault 1996b, 148, and Bost-Pouderon 2006, 142.

[15] Brent 2006, 233, surveys a range of meanings and contexts for homonoia, based in part on Aristides 24.9-13. Brent's study is a good example of the sort of work that reads Christian texts in terms of the Second Sophistic. Meeks 2006, Nasrallah 2008, and Eshleman 2012 have also been helpful in this regard.

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[16] Ferguson 1958, 118. Ferguson's survey of the literary evidence posits three phases in this evolution from domestic and personal to the international, political harmony. De Romilly sees 404 BCE as the starting point, after which "tout le monde" was familiar with homonoia (1972, 199-200). She sees a link between the history of vocabulary and politics in homonoia's seemingly sudden rise (201). The earliest occurrence seems to be Thuc. 8.75 (*homonoeō*) and 8.93 (homonoia), both in reference to conflict between democrats and oligarchs in Athens; each is related to the calming of a restless army. A Homonoia cult probably existed in Greece and southern Italy by 350CE; for the evidence, see Theriault 1996a, as well as Curti 2000, 79-81.

[17] The *Homonoia* speech attributed to Antiphon might predate Thucydides, but it is too fragmentary for significant analysis, and in any case seems to support the conclusion that late fifth-century internal political disputes are the earliest attestations of homonoia. There is also a letter within Demosthenes' corpus usually entitled *On Concord*, and Isocrates *Panegyric* is a significant source (see Chapter 6, below). For a summary of the evidence, see Sheppard 1984b.

[18] Swain 1996, 220. Aristides 23.7-8, cites the related Homeric ideal (*Ody*. 6.182) that there is nothing stronger than a husband and wife "thinking alike," ὁμοφρονέοντε. Ferguson 1958, 121, captures at least part of panhellenic homonoia: "a cynic might suppose that the easiest way to obtain peace on earth might be to invent an invasion from Mars." Low 2007, 60-61, comments on homonoia's link with opposition to "the other," and speaks of homonoia "both as a prerequisite for and a consequence of" expeditions against barbarians. As consequence, it will benefit both intra- and intercity relations.

[19] Tarn's is still the fullest account (1948, 399-450). Though it has been critiqued (by Baldry 1965, for example), Tarn's description of what could be called a "post-racial" homonoia advocated by Alexander remains valuable, if unrelated to my focus on the Roman Empire.

[20] Arist. *EE*. 7.1241a makes homonoia inherently political in that it is not as widely applicable as *philia*, the definition of which is Aristotle's theme here. "Homonoia is civic friendship." (καὶ ἔστιν ἡ ὁμόνοια φιλία πολιτική.) This is consonant with the discussion at *NE* 8.1155, where Aristotle defines a ruler's duty: "to promote homonoia, which seems akin to *philia*, is their [νομοθέται] chief aim, while faction (*stasis*), which is enmity (*ekthran*), is what they are most anxious to banish."

[21] *Rep*. 4.432a, παρεχομένη συνᾴδοντας τούς τε ἀσθενεστάτους ταὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἰσχυροτάτους καὶ τοὺς μέσους, εἰ μὲν βούλει, φρονήσει, εἰ δὲ βούλει, ἰσχύι, εἰ δέ, καὶ πλήθει ἢ χρήμασιν ἢ ἄλλῳ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν τοιούτων.

In light of its intellectual pedigree, there is, at first glance, seemingly nothing new about homonoia at the beginning of the Common Era. Furthermore, the redeployment and manipulation of words or ideals to fit one's own interests is timeless. The quotation above on the victimized using the rhetoric of the powerful, for example, is in reference to Polybius, a hostage at Rome over two centuries before our earliest author flourished. Nevertheless in homonoia we are dealing with the *rebirth* of an ancient ideal. Homonoia is in fact an illustration of why the Second Sophistic has also been called "the Greek renaissance." Though this label has largely been abandoned, it contained a kernel of truth as far as a student of the history of homonoia is concerned. While "renaissance" is necessarily backward-looking, it is nonetheless a new form of an ancient concept that we see in the homonoia rhetoric that flourished after the turn of the first century. The Classical (largely Athenian) antecedents of homonoia are products of a fundamentally different time and place in that the geopolitical context has changed utterly: Roman hegemony was an established fact. First- and second-century homonoia has a wider scope than even Isocrates' panhellenism allowed for. The homonoia of Plato and Aristotle, on the other hand, seems ancillary to their concerns regarding politics. It is also more class-based than our authors would permit. The Stoic homonoia, finally, was inherently idealistic and too abstract for most of our authors, all of whom were concerned with practical socio-political success in the here and now. An additional complicating factor in homonoia's "new" history in the Common Era is that one of its earliest proponents of was not a sophist at all, but a Jewish convert-missionary. Paul of Tarsus' letter to the young Christian congregation at Corinth is a significant episode in the story of homonoia. He takes up the language, images, and themes associated with unity—with "same-thinking"—that had long been associated with social and political unrest. But he applies these to a new sort of community. I would like to argue that in doing so, Paul contributes to a proliferation of homonoia rhetoric that lasts well into the second century.

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[22] Arist. *NE* 1167a-b: "Men are not of one mind (ὁμονοεῖν) merely when each thinks the same thing (whatever this may be), but when each thinks the same thing in relation to the same person: for instance, when both the *dēmos* and the upper classes (epieikeis) wish that the best people (*aristoi*) shall rule…Homonoia appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens (πολιτικὴ δὴ φιλία φαίνεται ἡ ὁμόνοια), which indeed is the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life." Only the good (ἐπιεικής) are capable of either homonoia or *philia*.

[23] Direct influence is impossible to prove, yet has seemingly always interested scholars. See Malherbe 2003. Erskine 1990 discusses Hellenistic homonoia in the Stoics Zeno (fl. 275 BCE) and Chrysippus (fl. 200 BCE), in which homonoia could be called a utopian ideal, meaning it is only practicable for philosophic "sages." While a feature of Zeno's ideal society, "it was a relationship between individual wise men which represented a concord and stability that *did not exist* in the present world" (59, emph. mine). This differs from the concept contained in the rhetoric considered here. These authors may have been aware of such a purely idealistic notion of homonoia, but are all united in their interest in practical homonoia, i.e. socio-political unity.

THE ROMAN EAST

Five of the six following authors inhabited eastern cities near the Mediterranean coast which were, by time of Paul's birth, well known to Rome.[24] Greece, Macedonia, Asia Minor, and the Levant had come under Roman control by both conquest and treaty.[25] In turning Greek and eastern lands into provinces, Rome was quick to adapt itself to local conditions and unafraid to exert authority and influence through preexisting political and economic channels. Rome built on the framework of Hellenistic kingdoms, and supervised their relatively peaceful provinces from a distance.[26] These were the foundations for the *pax* which, however peaceful it may have seemed to contemporaries (and moderns), does not seem to have altered a human penchant for conflict. The first Caesar, as well as his rivals and successors, set the stage for an "ideological industry" of homonoia rhetoric that became central to both Christian and pagan communities.[27]

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[24] The nomenclature surrounding provinces can be confusing. I adopt throughout this chapter Fergus Millar's definition of a "zone" of Greek-speaking provinces that includes Achaea, Asia, Pontus and Bithynia, as well as the geographical region of Asia Minor, all of which can fall under "eastern Greek cities." (Millar 1993, 243, 246); Ferrary 2011, 5-7 also deals with terminology.

[25] On Roman patronage in the provinces of Asia and Bythinia during the Republic and early empire, see Eilers 2002.

Dio Chrysostom's native Prusa is a good example of the status of eastern cities under Roman power. The Hellenistic kingdom belonging to the city's namesake, Prusias, was bequeathed to Rome in 74 BCE. After a significant campaign against Mithridates, Pompey settled Bithynia and incorporated the area as a province in 63 BCE.[28] By Dio's time, there was a long-established model of diplomacy between Rome and the East. Augustus had inherited a system of diplomacy based on an exchange: justice and order from Rome in exchange for fiscal and military support from the provinces. The Romans preferred oligarchic government, evident in their imposition of property requirements and life-tenure in indigenous political assemblies. All of our authors were among this upper echelon that the Romans depended upon to avoid democratic flux. Politically and culturally Prusa and many neighboring cities thrived under Roman rule; their prosperity reached an apex at the turn of the first century. This was due in part to the "Philhellenic" tendencies of successive emperors; the number of Greek-speaking citizens in the Roman senate suggests happy relations as well.[29] Ultimately Rome seems to have decided outright oppression was unnecessary or inefficient as long as they had men like Plutarch, Dio, and Aristides. These men made their careers because of, not in spite of, Roman imperialism. While I will make distinctions among these three figures, the chief function of homonoia is the same: to make autonomy coexist with autocracy. They were leading citizens who, in the "small world" of provincial politics, closely guarded any vestige of autonomy. This autonomy rested on homonoia within and between cities. Furthermore, it implied a homonoia between any given polis and Rome itself.

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[26] The Roman approach was more complicated than to displace Hellenism with allegiance to Rome, as Jones 1978 notes (5). From Republican times they used current institutions and bodies after officially taking control of cities, as seen in the careers of both Flaminius (196 BCE), and Pompey (60s BCE).

[27] Swain 1996, 181; on the popularity of homonoia rhetoric, see Jones 1978, 94.

[28] For Roman expansion from Sulla to Pompey, see Kallet-Marx 1995. Together, their successive campaigns (between 90 and 60 BCE) in the East directly affected all the provinces connected to this study.

[29] Salmeri 2000, 67-70.

The very fact that homonoia was a stabilizing tonic for dissent might have produced a chilling effect on political discourse. Sheppard's analysis allows for a certain cynicism regarding local politics as: homonoia had a "deadening effect" on the vitality of assemblies.[30] Aristocratic success was based largely upon Roman rewards, such as a temple (or its supervision) and various titles. This created a touchiness in intercity diplomacy. In fact the Romans seemed to have enhanced competition between cities then, partly due to their predilection to coopt native cultural-political frameworks, and also because their rule precluded the top of the social hierarchy from dreaming very big.[31] Part of the difficulty of understanding the nature of local politics is a matter of evidence. In his anthropological work on the significance of imperial cult in Asia Minor, Price highlights the limits of epigraphic sources. While the sheer number of inscriptions pertaining to Roman titles and honors suggests a certain provincial pride in associating with Rome, literary sources shed light on a behind-the-scenes drama that surrounds seemingly superficial concerns.[32] There were actual power struggles behind ritual ceremony and titulature that, in Price's view, are too often written off as analogous to religious nominalism in the modern West. Salmeri's reading of the epigraphic evidence leads him to a similar conclusion: although the inscriptions suggest provincials were quietly, dutifully buying in to the empire, there was nonetheless a marked contentiousness in their cities.[33] Finally, Zuiderhoek offers an interesting counterargument to theories of "hierarchization" and "oligarchization" inherent in Roman imperialism that would have lowered the stakes in *ekklesiai* and *boulai*. Without denying the reality of Roman dominance—a reality all too apparent in our authors—he warns against "trivializing" the importance of the public assemblies and councils to which Dio devoted so much time: "the imperial Greek cities had oligarchic elites, supported, to some extent, by Rome, yet there was also present within them a strong and continuing tradition of democratic popular politics, exemplified by active and, in many cases, apparently independent assemblies."[34]

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[30] Sheppard 1984b, 246-248, a conclusion based on an apparent lack of "free speech," παρρησία; Plut 815D, likens such direct discourse as a reserve anchor (ἄγκυρα ἱερὰν), to be used only in emergencies.
[31] Levick seems to think of Rome setting a standard for nineteenth-century European nations' "scramble" for Africa, at least in their slight regard for ethno-linguistic boundaries. This of course would have made homonoia something of a pipe dream "even under the Pax Augusta" (1967, 121-122). See also Whitmarsh 2001, 23.
[32] For epigraphic evidence and the difficulty of reading it against textual numismatic evidence, see Robert 1977, Price 1984 and Mitchell 1993, 108-113. Thomas 2007, 217, emphasizes the monumental aspect of city competition in the Greece and summarizes the situation in Asia, where the three leading cities were *neokoroi* by c.65 CE.

Downsized geopolitical aspirations, then, did not mean an end to local conflict.[35] With Rome's supremacy generally unquestioned throughout the region, provincial politicians had fewer ways of obtaining status. Success increasingly depended upon participation in (and manipulation of) Roman *imperium*. There were at least three significant channels for provincial competition for status and prosperity. First, judicial autonomy; the governor's judicial *conventus* was a badge of honor for those who hosted it.[36] A second avenue to success and source of prestige involved the Koinon, or council, whose power increased in the cities of the East as Rome solidified her imperium. These were especially important for their ties to imperial cult, which was arguably the most significant of the three channels of Eastern competitiveness and intercity conflict.[37]

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[33] Salmeri 2000, 73-74.

[34] Zuiderhoek 2008, 433-434.

[35] Macro 1980, 682; Dio 48.13, where a city is like an ornery horse—"when the bit fails to hold them in check, a cur is put upon them from without."

[36] Five of the cities under consideration here were assize districts for the province of Asia, which fueled competition. Millar 1999, 95-97, outlines a spectrum city types in terms of their rights under Rome or lack thereof. Bekker-Nielson 2008, 41, further complicates the matter in reminding us of the problems in pinning down administrative nomenclature in the empire: any given official's job description might vary geographically.

[37] The most blatant example of intercity competition is in Asia, where competition grew fierce enough to warrant intervention from the emperor himself (Antoninus Pius' letter to Ephesus, c. 140 CE = Abbot and Johnson 1926, 422).

When Octavian became Augustus in 27 BCE, he also became *Sebastos*, and Greek cities immediately began to “revere him with temples and sacrifices.”[38] Some two years prior, the *koinon* had been established to oversee a proliferation of duties, rights, and honors, association with the imperial cult. There were temples in Pergamum, Smyrna, and Ephesus by 26 CE, and more were steadily added. Supervision of such a temple became a locus of provincial prestige and source of heated competition. The sacrifice was but one element of a grand scheme of processions and protocols that multiplied rapidly at the end of the first century BCE, including “prayer, sacrifice, solemn ceremony, and religious processions to feasts, games, and festivals.”[39] An individual office, the priesthood, or the corporate “temple warden” (neokorate) status offered their holders a chance to confirm their prestige and extend local political authority through liberality. A priest of Divine Augustus and Roma might contribute pubic banquets, olive oil, gladiatorial games, hunts, races, and athletic competitions. It was understandably a vehicle for competition and constantly carried a potential for conflict. This is the background for Plutarch’s comment that the highest goal of any statesman is to avoid *stasis*.[40] For whatever conflict remains within or between eastern cities, homonoia is the antidote.

The early Christian church was not immune to competition or divisiveness. Surveying the inscriptions of first century Corinthian politics, Welborn asserts "we deceive ourselves if we imagine that the Corinthian Christians were innocent" of the factious squabbling and heated competition described by pagan sources.[41] In fact the Christian *ekklesia* may have been more recognizable to contemporary observers as a (political) “assembly” than as “cult.” “They were far too argumentative, far too socially activist” to be mistaken for a cult.[42]

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[38] *FGRH* 90 F. 124, 1, cited by Mitchell 1993, 100-102. The seemingly smooth transition to adopting Augustus and his heirs as sebastoi, as well as the importance of neokorate status, is summarized by Collas-Heddeland 2002. See also Dignas 2002, 218-220.

[39] Mitchell 1993, 108-113.

[40] *Political Precepts*, *Mor.* 815A (see below, Chapter 2). For the competition surrounding cults between 29 BCE and the third century CE, see Collas-Heddeland 2002 and Dignas 2002.

[41] Welborn 1993, 80.

EASTERN INTELLECTUAL LIFE

Together with Pliny the Younger, these six authors are the basis of much of what we know about eastern provincial life under the empire, and the best evidence for the mechanics of Roman imperialism in the East.[43] They are more important here, however, because of their elucidation of homonoia as a key concept in the relationship between Rome and its provinces, as well as relations within and between political and religious communities. This is a reminder of an intractable question of identity hovering over all discussions of the East during this time period. There is an inherent ambiguity in all of these figures—a product of their success in multiple cultures, Greek, Roman and Jewish. They are uniformly difficult to classify. Are they politicians or philosophers? Rhetors or sophists? Stoics or Cynics? Christians or pagans? Regardless of how we might attempt precise classification, they all put the issue of “Greek identity” in the service of homonoia. “Pure Greeks,” says Aristides, should be the first to compete for who can be first to initiate homonoia both within their polis and between neighbors, both of which imply harmony with the Roman overlords (Chapter 6). An important characteristic of true “Greek” cities, says Dio, is a penchant for homonoia, given all their commonalities (Chapter 4). Similarly, Christian orthodoxy becomes increasingly tied to “like-thinking” about authority and doctrine over the first two centuries of the history of the religion.

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[42] Judge 2003, 514. Judge notes the word *Christianoi* itself is a Greco-Roman hybrid; he makes an interesting further observation that theLatin-based -*ianus* suffix “constitutes a *political* comment” (emph. mine) because it “is never attached to the name of a god” The suffix “classifies people as partisans of a political leader.”

[43] Pliny will not be considered here. Woolf 2006, 93-108, offers an analysis of Book 10 of Pliny’s letters, asserting they have much more in common with his *Panegyricus* than historians would like to admit. It is more rhetorical, that is, than archival. The letters do attest, however, to Bithynian wastefulness and corruption, as well as the division, prosperity, and jealousy outlined below. Pliny mentions Dio by name (*Ep*. 10.81-82 and below, chapter 4). Harris 1964 outlines the chronology of Pliny and Dio in Bithynia.

As far as can be determined, all of the figures here were imbued with a respect for an idealized Hellenic (or Hellenistic) culture even though they accepted Roman political realities and cultural norms. Loyalty to one's city went hand in hand with a broader devotion to Greek culture, and expressions of any variety of patriotism demanded the sort of eloquence on display in the rhetoric discussed below. Ultimately it is best to envision a spectrum of responses to imperialism that includes both skepticism and cooperation—even an "eagerness" to be Roman.[44] All the authors would agree with Plutarch's conviction that a man ought to "avoid the disruption and madness of empty opinion (*kenodoxia*)," for which homonoia was an antidote.[45]

The geopolitical developments that were being solidified in the first century, which I have outlined above, resulted in a flourishing cultural scene in the East, usually called the Second Sophistic. This phenomenon is to some extent an attempt by elite politicians and rhetors to recreate the culture of the classical polis even as they admitted its decline.[46] The label, "sophistic," reveals it as basically a rhetorical phenomenon, but it refers more widely to the culture that informed the sophists of both fourth-century BCE Greece, and more importantly the memory of that ancient environment in the minds of the "second" sophists, as summarized by Philostratus in his *Lives of the Sophists*. One of the more important aspects of their effort to re-create, or re-establish Greek pride was historiographical. There was a classicizing impulse aimed at bolstering and delimiting Greek identity, as well as an effort to co-opt the past, and this will be the more important of these aspects to my study. [47] Rhetors were proprietary about Greek history, and homonoia played a significant role, which I will illustrate below. In these authors, homonoia or lack thereof explains Greek history more clearly than the rise and fall of successive cities or empires. The pagan authors here were all fascinated with Hellenic history, but it is clearly a *version* of the story—a selective re-telling that will become clearer below. Christians, like their pagan contemporaries, "shared memories of the distant past [which] played an important role in shaping present identities" and struggled to establish and preserve their own version of history.[48] They were also actively carving out an identity for themselves based, as Eshleman has recently shown.[49] Though her study is focused on the third century, the processes of defining and securing one's place are already observable in Paul's lifetime; they are applicable whether one was seeking to be considered a genuine Sophist or an authentic follower of Christ.

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[44] Madsen 2009, 103. See also Salmeri 2000, 69-61.

[45] 815B, ἡ μὲν γὰρ προαίρεσις ἔστω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ τῆς ἀσφαλείας ἐχομένη καὶ φεύγουσα τὸ ταρακτικὸν τῆς κενῆς δόξης καὶ μανικόν; Duff 1999, 296, links this to Plutarch's fear of Roman intervention.

[46] "Greek Renaissance" is passé but probably conveys more of the meaning of the meaning to those unfamiliar with the "first" sophistic period. The literature on the phenomenon is voluminous; I have benefited from Bowie 1970; Anderson 1993; Swain 1996; and Whitmarsh 2001.

[47] Swain 1996, 27-33; 87-89.

A central thesis of this study, then, is that homonoia rhetoric was employed not only by elite Greeks in the provinces, but also by early Christian leaders who were, after all, elite Greeks, too. Paul and his successors were not only part of this environment, but in fact played an important part in making homonoia rhetoric a prominent feature of these sophistic trends. It is worth remembering, lest we conclude the apostle has nothing in common with the priest of Delphi (Plutarch), that Paul was from Tarsus—the same polis in which Dio gave multiple speeches about the benefits of homonoia. Christians used the intellectual and rhetorical tools available to them, and homonoia is the tool upon which I would like to focus.

My approach is not purely lexicographic. The structure and vocabulary of the speeches of Plutarch, Dio Chrysostom, and Aelius Aristides are similar enough to that of early Christian letters that it is useful to think of a *peri homonoias* genre in 100 CE. Furthermore, this genre is capacious enough to include pieces of rhetoric that do not actually use the word homonoia. The most important benefit of this broad view of homonoia rhetoric is that it allows for analysis of sources that might not otherwise be read in tandem. It also helps us understand why Paul's first letter to Corinth set such a precedent for his successors. A scholarly consensus has been established around the strong intertextual relationship between epistles of Paul and those of the Apostolic Fathers.[50] The most important aspect of the relationship between Paul, on the one hand, and Clement and Ignatius, on the other, is Paul's decision to use the structure and vocabulary of homonoia rhetoric. His first letter to Corinth represents a type of deliberative discourse usually called *peri homonoias*. Both Clement and Ignatius seem to be familiar with—and influenced by—1 Corinthians, and model their letters according to a Pauline precedent that had already garnered prestige in the decades immediately following Paul's death.

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[48] Goodman 2012, 69.

[49] Eshleman 2012. She emphasizes the roles of "affiliation" and "credentials" in both sophistic and Christian circles. "Christian authors cast themselves as *idiotai* with respect to Greek *paideia* in order to outflank its claims to prestige while simultaneously presenting Chrsitianity as a superiro kind of *paideia*" (260).

A unifying theme of each of the three Christian authors is the close association homonoia shares with heresy, heterodoxy, and hierarchy. I have tried to flesh out the place of each of these terms in homonoia rhetoric, starting with Paul and reaching Ignatius. Homonoia is of course my central focus, but its semantic field is relatively broad; some of the most important associated terms are intellectual—mind and will (*nous*, *gnome*) as well as choice (*hairesis*). Homonoia is obviously in the same category. This "mind-based" vocabulary is present from the beginning (in Paul), but becomes more explicit after the second century. Williams draws our attention to this pattern: "the mind begins as a present theme and gradually grows in importance."[51] Though the importance of homonoia rhetoric is more than simply the occurrence of the word, homonoia seems to bear out this thesis. It receives increased attention beginning in the generation after the apostle's death; by the turn of the fourth century, John Chrysostom has used it some two hundred times.

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[50] The "Apostolic Fathers" are the first generation of Christian leaders after the apostles, with whom they may have had contact. I follow Weinandy's definition of these "Fathers" and their "tradition" (2005, 72 n. 3). The consensus is exemplified by the Mitchell 1991 and Martin 1995.

[51] Williams 2007, 22. De Romilly considers homonoia "more intellectual" than synonyms such as *homophrosunē* or *symphonia*. She distinguishes homonoia from *homognōmōn* in that the latter is shared opinion within a party, rather than "communauté nationale" (1972, 200 n.8).

PLAN OF THE WORK

Looking at the following chapters collectively, there are at least as many versions of homonoia as there are authors. I will not attempt to establish a rigid taxonomy of "homonoias," but will note the breadth of its potential applications throughout the following chapters. At the most basic level, they are each based upon sources that were occasioned by the same problem: social unrest, and more particularly by questions of power and authority. They also share a solution: homonoia. But the arguments and assumptions differ, however slight at times, as to how unity is to be achieved. Over the course of the following chapters, I will flesh out these arguments and assumptions. Whether the division is primarily intellectual, political, or social, and regardless of whether it goes by the name of *stasis*, *eris*, or *schism*, it tends to be described in "medical" language, as a disease. (The modern "like a cancer" is technically anachronistic but figuratively perfect.) So it is perfectly in keeping with this tendency that Pliny describes a nascent Christianity in Latin terms that are strikingly similar to contemporary Greek descriptions of the social division. Pliny must have been aware of some of the Classical homonoia rhetoric, as well as the popularity of the ideal in contemporary rhetoric. What he could not have known was that some of the clearest statements of social cohesion were being composed and preserved by the members of the same *superstitio* he sought to end.

The first chapter will deal with this Christian, or Pauline, precedent for combatting social and intellectual division in a community. The apostle strives for an equality of "mind" (*nous*) among Corinthian Christians that transcends divisions in "flesh," or a variety of statuses. In the following chapter, we will look at the place of homonoia in Plutarch's political thought.

Homonoia is the ultimate goal of a politician in his opinion. It is an eminently pragmatic approach—even “Machiavellian”—yet informed by philosophical assumptions regarding “natural homonoia.” This philosophical theme is more prominent in Chapters 3-6, each of which embraces a view of the cosmos that exemplifies good order and homonoia. Both Clement (Chapter 3) and Dio (4) ground their appeals for homonoia in what could be called “doctrines of creation.” In Clement’s case, this basis serves his larger goal of order within Christian *ekklesiai* that, a generation after Paul’s death, still grapple with internal strife. Meanwhile, in the prominent city-states of Asia Minor, Dio advocates homonoia both within a city’s walls and between cities, both of which assume a “like-mindedness” in relation to Rome. The last two chapters are the latest chronologically, and it is therefore unsurprising that both Ignatius and Aristides expand upon their predecessors in making explicit appeals for homonoia within the growing Church, on the one hand, and a Roman hegemony at its height, on the other. In Ignatius we see strong hints of a connection between homonoia and heresiology which will become increasingly important to Christian efforts to identify themselves. In Aristides, the political and philosophical strands converge in some of the most significant examples of *peri homonoias* speeches. These are strengthened by Aristides' use of what I will call “visual aids;” a temple of Hadrian, for example, is for him a statement of imperial harmony that should be imitated by provincial populations.

1

THE PAULINE PRECEDENT

Around 54 CE, the apostle Paul wrote a letter to the Christians at Corinth. It is one of the earliest extant Christian texts. I would like to consider it here, however, as one of the first major examples of homonoia rhetoric of the Common Era. 1 Corinthians is an important precedent for subsequent generations of Christian leaders: both Clement and Ignatius refer to it explicitly (see Chapters 3 and 5). But it is important to view the letter not only as a Christian precedent, but as antecedent to a *peri homonoias* genre that flourished after the turn of the first century. Paul's language is in many ways ancient, even by first-century standards. Yet his evocation of old images, such as the human body and an emphasis on the "common good," (*koine*), predate Plutarch's use of the same imagery by at least forty years.[1] As such, Paul is an important figure in the "renaissance" of Classical rhetoric that culminates in Philostratus' project. Though the details of the divisiveness Paul combats at Corinth are unknown, it is clear that he found himself (at the most basic level) in a similar situation to Pliny's. In fact the apostle's job is arguably more difficult: the "community organizer" requires reserves of self-reliance and determination that an imperial bureaucrat may not have faced.[2] Homonoia was particularly important to the

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[1] The dating here and elsewhere is imprecise, but 1 Corinthians is usually dated to ca. 55, while Plutarch probably did the majority of his writing during the reign of Trajan, post-96 CE (on which see Chapter 2, below).

[2] The sociological approach to 1 Cor. is inspired by scholars such as Thiessen, whose essays (translated in 1982) argued for the view of Paul as community organizer.

Christians as the best defense against threats to fledgling *ekklesiai*, the only bulwark against internal factions. For the early Christians, however, homonoia is more than an antithesis.[3] While its link to social division and factionalism (as *stasis*, *schisma*, or *eris*) is present here as it is in pagan rhetoric in Asia Minor, homonoia has a social and theological significance in the Jesus movement.

Approaching the Himalayan range of Pauline scholarship is obviously daunting, a prospect made more intimidating by the significance of 1 Corinthians (hereafter 1 Cor.) in particular.[4] Moreover the topic is part of the larger subject of Christian origins, and "no ancient phenomenon has been the subject of such intensive research," as Meeks observes.[5] Focusing on homonoia makes the task more manageable. 1 Cor. is replete with homonoia vocabulary and related themes.[6] Here I will concentrate on unity as the overriding concern of the letter. In doing so I follow the work of New Testament (NT) scholars who classify 1 Cor. as deliberative rhetoric of the *peri homonoias* genre.[7] This categorization is based upon the idea that terms as well as the rhetorical strategy of admonishing behavior that puts the common good before individual autonomy derive from "homonoia speeches."[8] I would like to argue that Paul's epistle to Corinth represents a major chapter in the early history of the idea. Moreover, as both a rhetorical genre and ideological concept, homonoia had an important role in establishing and strengthening the Christian religion. Whether or not it was Paul's intention, his first letter to

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[3] For the *schisma*-related vocabulary in ancient sources, see Welborn 1987.

[4] The question hovering above Pauline studies is the question of the apostle's identity. Both his historical person and self-presentation are still disputed. See Dunn 1999 and Harrill 2012.

[5] Meeks 1983, 1. For a summary of the modern phase of the subject, initiated by German scholars at the end of the nineteenth century, see White 1986 and Meeks 2001. Precise classification of Paul's epistles, as well as the types of rhetoric present in Clement and Ignatius, remains a matter of scholarly debate. The work of Betz has generated much comment in this regard (1994).

[6] Royalty 2013, 68; Meeks 1983, 190, points to a "powerful and constant concern" with unity.

[7] The rhetorical approaches of Mitchell 1991 and Martin 1995 (who follow Betz 1994 [orig. 1975]) are the most influential for this chapter. Horsley's discussion and bibliography is also valuable (2000).

[8] Martin 1995, 39. He follows Mitchell 1991, whose work "has so decisively demonstrated that 1 Cor. fits the ancient rhetorical category of the homonoia speech that I will not belabor the point." See also Maier 2005.

Corinth gave homonoia rhetoric a theological and ethical foundation. His application of an ancient type of rhetoric to a new kind of community, the Christian *ekklesia*, was already a precedent by the turn of the first-century (as seen in Clement, below). Ramelli has observed Paul's tendency to "use a theological point for his ethical argument;" I would add that the same could be said of the other five authors considered here.[9] For Paul, homonoia only results from the *nous Christou* (1 Cor. 2.16). His task is therefore to articulate the characteristics of the "mind" capable of "same thinking."

We noted in the Introduction that homonoia rhetoric does not necessarily feature the word *homonoia*. The rhetorical structure, as well as the content and tone of the letter are so similar to the writings of both Christian and non-Christian authors in the century between 50 and 150 CE that we can speak of a *peri homonoias* genre in the first century.[10] An awareness of the rhetorical nature of 1 Cor. allows us to conceive of Pauline homonoia in spite of a glaringly obvious omission: Paul does not use the word *homonoia*. This fact has allowed for an argument from silence, namely that Paul intentionally avoids the term.[11] Paul may use synonymous phrases, like "in the same mind" (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ) or "in the same opinion" (τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ) *instead* of homonoia, perhaps because of homonoia's association with pagan religious and political rhetoric. When considering these associated terms, it is helpful to consider Fitzgerald's theory of "linkage groups." Such groups "indicate certain terms and ideas that remain associated with one another through a number of generations."[12] Homonoia and *mia gnome* would therefore be a significant "linked" pair. In her important study, Mitchell suggests that Paul uses the synonymous phrase in order to avoid the name of a deity, especially in light of his arguments against idolatry. Thus he “attempts to pick up the clear significance of homonoia as a cultural value,” while avoiding explicit religious or political associations that might be linked to the concept.[13] This is logical and, more importantly, necessary for Mitchell’s technical rhetorical analysis. Nonetheless it need not detain us here: ignorance of Paul’s motives for his word choice does not preclude the study of 1 Cor. as a chapter in the history of homonoia rhetoric.

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[9] Ramelli highlights the parallels between the theological ethics of Paul with those of the Roman Stoic Musonius Rufus (2008, 376-377).

[10] The notion of a "semantic field" is legitimate and useful. I owe the language to Lotz 2007, who concludes, "Paul avoided the terminology of *homonoia* in spite of the fact that he availed himself to a rhetorical genre that would have encouraged him to use it (133)." Maier 2005, 310: "Paul repeatedly invokes terms and commonplaces associated with [*homonoia*]."

[11] See Mitchell 1991 and Lotz 2007 for this argument. On the rhetorical taxonomy, see Bakke 2001.

[12] Fitzgerald borrows the term from the modern study of genetics (2003, 219-220).

Scholars continue to debate the success and institutionalization of early Christianity, which is beyond the scope of this study. There is something of a consensus, however, that the context of the audience is as significant as the ideological content of Paul’s letters.[14] “Equally important” as the “message itself were the social networks into which it was sown and through which it took root and spread.”[15] The *ekklesia* at Corinth was likely “composed of people from different social strata: the wealthy, the poor, and also slaves and former slaves.”[16] My interest is in Paul’s application of ancient homonoia rhetoric to this diverse collection of people.[17] As is the case with the other examples of homonoia in this study, 1 Cor. has a very concrete impetus: social division. Perhaps a more fundamental point is that “Hellenistic concepts about honor and status are not just part of Paul's general 'background'. Rather, he participated in a discussion of their role and influence in community formation and community life."[18]

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[13] Mitchell 1991, 78 n.73.

[14] “It is a power struggle, not a theological controversy, which motivates the writing of 1 Cor. 1-4.” (Welborn 1987, 89). Paul’s rhetorical *solution*, however, is theological in nature, which Welborn himself recognizes in his conclusion: Paul had “higher aims” and was devoted to “the great politics” (111).

[15] White 1986, 122. Social bonding may actually have preceded ideological attachment, he notes (124). See also Sanders: theology “played its role…but it hardly explains the [Christian] triumph. Christian activity and social formation were the primary factors” (2000, 173).

[16] Coutsoumpous 2012, 285. “Nor was it possible to regulate who gathered under the guise of congregation or school” (Eshleman 2012, 259).

[17] “By urging concord upon the Corinthians, Paul adopted an ideology which had long been used to fortify acceptance of a hierarchical system.” Welborn 1993, 207, 209; both Cicero and Polybius are discussed as precedents.

An interest in sociological analysis should not preclude a role for ideas, even if they seemed to play too large of a (triumphalist) role in older scholarship.[19] . Even a cursory survey of the scholarship reveals an important niche for homonoia as a concept and a rhetorical strategy. The oft-cited work of a sociologist on this topic does not refuse a place for ideas in the discussion. Stark's study of early Christianity, which covers a gamut of potential growth factors yet does not emphasize ideas, concludes that doctrine was "the ultimate factor."[20] "Like-mindedness" was essential for the movement to become something more than a tiny cult or a Jewish sect. The Christian emphasis on orthodoxy relative to contemporary religions' interest in orthopraxy is an aspect that scholars have for some time used in an attempt to understand the contours of ancient religion and its relationship to Christianity. The "strategy of privileging belief over practice" meant that writing about dogma was important. [21] Homonoia rhetoric is profoundly important in such an environment. In his recent analysis, Rives links Christian expansion with its ideology. He highlights three interrelated ideas in particular, each of which is radical in its Greco-Roman context: totalization, exclusivity, and homogeneity.[22] That is to say that Paul, in his letters to the Corinthians, articulates a comprehensive new worldview that calls for an allegiance that must have been unprecedented for subjects of the Roman Empire.[23]

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[18] Moxnes 1994, 203. For Paul as a "community organizer" facing status anxieties at Corinth, see the oft-cited work of Theissen 1982. Paul's education is unknown, but Martin thinks it "impossible for an urban person of Paul's day to avoid exposure to a great deal of rhetoric," and probable that he had training (1995, 48-49).

[19] White analyses Harnack's influential school of thought that credited Christianity's "message" with the religion's success.

[20] Stark 1996, 211: "I believe that it was the religion's particular doctrines that permitted Christianity to be among the most sweeping and successful revitalization movements in history." The subject of expansion is vast; White summarizes the twentieth century scholarship (1986). See also Sanders 2000: the "rampant adaptability of the new social organism that we call Christianity may well have been much greater than the adaptability of which Mithraism and Isis religions were capable" (160). For a critique of Stark, see Sanders 2000, 135-159.

[21] Hopkins 1998, 221. Meeks 1983, 166, underscores the link between belief and sociology. He concludes that the unity emphasis is the "social expression of faith in the one God." See also 169, where monotheism "had as its primary implication the consciousness of unity and singularity of the Christian groups themselves."

[22] Rives 2005.

PAUL'S THESIS

Paul's first letter to Corinth clearly exemplifies the three intertwined ideological aspects mentioned above. In other words, the totalizing impulse is part of the emphasis on unity, and both of these are tied to exclusion. The sheer breadth of issues Paul deals with across the body of the letter (some thirty six pericopes) attests to a totalized worldview. Among the topics are incest and prostitution, as well as proper diet and dress within the *ekklesia*. Doctrinally, the letter is most famous for its development of the idea of *agape* love. It also includes the earliest description of the Eucharist, however, as well as discussions of the doctrines of the resurrection of the dead and spiritual gifts. The focus here is less on specific doctrines and more on the emphasis on ecclesiastic order and unity that permeates the letter. Whatever the specific dispute happens to be (and there are many), order and unity are the emphases.[24] Although seemingly disconnected at first, the several issues may be "instances of a single, overarching conflict over status."[25] The specifics are unknown, but this thesis would link Paul's letter to the rhetoric of the following chapters. He was dealing with a "private" version of what is quite "public" in the speeches of Dio and Aristides, for example. While the latter addressed *civic* conflicts both within and between cities, they have much in common with the *ecclesiastic* concerns of Paul. In either of these contexts, order and unity are linked to homonoia, and in 1 Cor. both are linked to Paul's theology. He wants to establish unity based upon a new identity of Christians as members of the same body who submit to one another in love. For Paul the *ekklesia*, as a public "body," is analogous to the physical body in its hierarchy. In both contexts, members—or classes—are "assigned by Nature to positions in the body and to particular roles in the harmonious cooperation of the body's parts."[26] *Agape* can only thrive in those who understand this new identity, knowing they have been "called into partnership" (ἐκλήθησαν εἰς κοινωνίαν) (1.9) which creates an "artificial equality."[27]

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[23] Rives 2005, 24: orthodoxy-versus-heresy not *inherent* in Christianity. It is rather "an ideological construct of those early Christian leaders who put high value on homogeneity of belief and practice. This too contrasts with Greco-Roman tradition, where diversity is the norm." See also Hopkins 1998, 218-219: "Christians invented, or gave unprecedented force to the idea of orthodoxy and heresy … The centrality of correct dogma, as a defining characteristic of Christian praxis, was a religious innovation. It arose, I think, from the circumstances in which Christianity evolved." Like so many other terms in the field (of late), both "orthodoxy" and "heresy" are slippery concepts.

[24] Social divisions based upon wealth may lead to the lack of unity and order (Coutsoumpos 2012, 292).

[25] Harrill 2012, 62, suggests the addresses to the "weak" and "foolish" in the introduction (1.25) mean that a minority of group members were actually strong and "wise" or "powerful," and that socio-economic differences were at the root of the problem.

The occasion for Paul's letter to Corinth is clearly division. "For it has been reported to me," Paul writes in the introduction "that there are quarrels (ἔριδες) among you, my brothers sisters" (1.11). That this report comes to the apostle "from Chloe's people" (ὑπὸ τῶν Χλόης) suggests deep fissures in the community: a faction loyal to Paul must have told him about other groups. Later, Paul repeats the pressing issue: "When you come together as a church (ἐκκλησία), I hear that there are divisions (σχίσματα) among you" (11.18).[28] Beside these explicit references, the issue of factionalism "runs throughout all sixteen chapters of I Corinthians."[29] His goal and overarching theme is ecclesiastic harmony.[30] Personalities, or divisions based upon allegiance to individuals, were at least part of the origin of discord; four are named in early in the letter. Doctrinal differences, on the other hand, are equally obvious, particularly in Paul's discussions of liturgy (11; 14) and eschatology (15). In his review of recent scholarship on the subject, Fitzmyer tentatively posits three or four factions based upon a mixture of personality and doctrine.[31] Whether there were actually three or four groups, however, is less important than the general observation that, whatever the nature and causes of the division, Paul responds "using *topoi*, imagery, and vocabulary" common to homonoia rhetoric.[32] Furthermore, regardless of the *cause* of the divisions (social, economic, or intellectual), the *solution* for Paul is theologically-infused homonoia rhetoric. This positions the apostle at the front of a line of orators who employ that rhetoric through the first two centuries of the Common Era.[33]

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[26] Martin 1995, 39. Harrill observes that body imagery is especially apt for a Corinthian audience because of the temple of Asclepius in their polis (2012, 63).
[27] The description is Sanders'; as a result of this relative equality (or equality of essence, rather than status) he sees the *ekklesia* as home "for those who felt cut off by status inequality" (2000, 162). On this being the thesis of the entire letter, see Coutsoumpos 2012, 275.
[28] On "Chloe's people" being *partisans* of Chloe, rather than her domestic staff, see Fiorenza 394-395.
[29] Mitchell 1991, 182.
[30] Martin 1990, 142.

The thesis of Paul's letter to Corinth sets the tone of the entire epistle at 1.10:

> I appeal to you, brothers, by the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you agree and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be united in the same mind and the same judgment.
>
> Παρακαλῶ δὲ ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἵνα τὸ αὐτὸ λέγητε πάντες, καὶ μὴ ᾖ ἐν ὑμῖν σχίσματα, ἦτε δὲ κατηρτισμένοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ καὶ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ γνώμῃ.

This verse gives an example of Paul's use of the semantic field of homonoia: the distinction between homonoia and "in the same mind" (ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ νοῒ) is a fine one.[34] Being "in the same opinion" is similarly close to a definition of homonoia. What is more, the verb used in Paul's exhortation, καταρτίζω, was also used in medical texts, where it denoted resetting bones or correcting displaced joints.[35] Thus the vocabulary here seems to constitute a linkage group; in the four requirements expressed here, Paul establishes his expectations for “like-mindedness.”[36]

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[31] Fitzmyer 2008, 137; 475. He sees three categories of schism, based upon either "preachers," spiritual gifts, or liturgy; Mitchell 1991, 71, on *schisma*. Theissen's description of a socially-stratified Corinth has been quite influential (1982, 69-70); Meeks 1983, 73, sees a "fair cross section" of Greco-Roman society in the early communities, though perhaps lacking representatives of the highest or lowest social classes. These members might have been divided into groups around "different kinds of authority" (122). Harrill 2012, 62, believes "status" is the origin of all Corinthian conflict.

[32] Maier 2005, 309.

[33] A fact underappreciated, according to Welborn 1987, 89. See also 93-94 on what he sees as the neglect of class conflict in Paul's letters.

[34] Fitzgerald 2003, 331, would put homonoia in a linkage group with *philia*.

[35] Mitchell 1991, 74-75, with ancient sources.

The clarification and three rhetorical questions following Paul’s thesis reveal other fundamental characteristics of Paul’s approach:

> What I mean is that each of you says, ‘I belong to Paul’, or ‘I belong to Apollos’, or ‘I belong to Cephas’, or ‘I belong to Christ.’ Has Christ been divided? Was Paul crucified for you? Or were you baptized in the name of Paul?
>
> λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει, Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, Ἐγὼ δὲ Ἀπολλῶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Κηφᾶ, Ἐγὼ δὲ Χριστοῦ. μεμέρισται ὁ Χριστός; μὴ Παῦλος ἐσταυρώθη ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, ἢ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα Παύλου ἐβαπτίσθητε; (1.12-13)

These questions illustrate the theological nature of Paul’s plea for unity. The first, of whether Christ is “divided,” is profoundly significant in that it is the seed of Christian ecclesiology. It is an early version of the idea that the church is the “body” of Christ, which Paul develops more fully in chapter twelve.[37] The subsequent two questions evoke an even more fundamental idea, that all earthly authority, including that of Paul himself, is subservient to Christ. While we could read 1 Cor. as an apologia for primitive “apostolic authority,” it contains a simpler, more radical idea in the notion that loyalty to Christ is preeminent. These are two examples of Paul’s determination to encourage unity in terms that would gain theological significance in time. Paul came to be interpreted as one who “feels that Christ himself is suffering division: the lack of unity in the community implies a misunderstanding of Christ among them.”[38] Thus Paul links the problem of schism to Christology and soteriology. By doing so he adds profound theological weight to his admonishment of agreement.

HAIRESIS

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[36] The four requirements being (literally) agreement in speech, mind, and will, and that (fourthly) there is no division.

[37] See below. Marshall 2004 notes “body” language in Col. 3 and Eph. 4. He credits Paul with being the first to develop the “headship” of Christ in relation to the church (177).

[38] Fitzmyer 2008, 475.

In the first century, *hairesis* had yet to take on the negative connotation imposed on it by Christianity. It was a relatively neutral term meaning "choice," and could be synonymous with "school of thought." Its neutrality is not without ambiguity, however. "If a *hairesis* was not by definition a bad thing, it is clear nonetheless that Paul viewed the proliferation of *haireseis* within Christianity as a very real danger—a danger as all disagreement might be."[39] Nevertheless there is as much reason to think of *hairesis* here in sociological terms as in intellectual (or theological) ones. Paul's use of "heresy" at 11.19 is particularly interesting: "Indeed, there have to be heresies (αἱρέσεις) among you, for only so will it become clear who among you are trustworthy (δόκιμοι)."[40] This reveals an ambiguity about *hairesis* in Paul's mind. From a historical standpoint, it is one of the more important clauses in the whole of 1 Cor. because it is an early version of Christian orthodoxy as well as the exclusivity this entails. The very notion of a "trustworthy" thing implies the existence of its opposite. Paul urges the Corinthians to separate the two. "Do you not know that a little yeast leavens the whole batch of dough? Clean out the old yeast so that you may be a new batch."[41] He is more direct when he quotes Deuteronomy 17.7: "Drive out the wicked person from among you." (ἐξάρατε τὸν πονηρὸν ἐξ ὑμῶν αὐτῶν) This seems to parallel the rhetoric in the following chapters regarding the exclusion or even banishment of troublemakers. However, in Paul's letter the exclusion is tempered by the corollary idea (in the same verse) that a Christian's judgment of his or her peers is confined to the *ekklesia*. "For what have I to do with judging those outside? Is it not those who are inside that you are to judge? God will judge those outside."[42] Therefore the Pauline ideal of a group of unified individuals committed to "genuine" beliefs and behavior does indeed rest on the orthodox-versus-heresy distinction. It exists in tension, however, with a conviction that once a person commits himself to the faith, he has no business judging those outside the *ekklesia*.

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[39] Boys-Stones 2001, 156, notes Paul's inclusion of *hairesis* in a list of "works of the flesh" in Gal. 5.19-21.

[40] *Dokimoi* could also be rendered "genuine," but, as Fitzgerald notes in his survey of friendship literature, *dokimos* is linked with *pistis* (2003, 331). This would seem to be a solid basis for thinking of Paul's language here sociologically.

[41] 5.6-7, οὐκ οἴδατε ὅτι μικρὰ ζύμη ὅλον τὸ φύραμα ζυμοῖ; ἐκκαθάρατε τὴν παλαιὰν ζύμην, ἵνα ἦτε νέον φύραμα.

[42] 5.12-13, τί γάρ μοι τοὺς ἔξω κρίνειν; οὐχὶ τοὺς ἔσω ὑμεῖς κρίνετε; τοὺς δὲ ἔξω ὁ θεὸς κρινεῖ.

Ultimately *hairesis* is among the most historically significant of several dichotomies Paul draws in 1 Cor. In order to flesh out what "trustworthy" Christians look like, he draws several distinctions and uses multiple metaphors. Wisdom, for example, is contrasted with foolishness; the spirit is placed over and against the flesh; and the mature are compared to the childish. All of these dichotomies are means to an end of church unity, and the drive towards unity calls for a delineation of Christian principles and specific practices. Paul's use of both *schismata* and *hairesis* come in the context of a discussion on communal meals (11). It is the earliest reference to the ritual that will become known as the Eucharist, and an excellent example of the mixture of social and ideological roots of the Corinthian conflict. The problem is that groups are eating separately without any ceremony or reference to Christ. This custom, probably a traditional *eranos* meal, was often the source of *schismata* in communities because "social distinctions were reflected both in the quantity of food consumed and in the kind of food brought and eaten."[43] Both socially and theologically, the Eucharist is tied to unity and uniformity, and Paul gives what was a haphazard (and drunken) meeting in Corinth a serious theological significance. If anyone "eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner," that person "will be answerable for the body and blood of the Lord."[44] The apostle is responding to division which is based upon theological misunderstanding and perhaps straightforward socio-economic divisions.

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[43] Coutsoumpos 2012, 288. For bibliography on the ancient *eranos* meal, see 287 n.6. She also notes socioeconomic categories of food in Pliny the Younger (296, 297 n.9).

[44] 11.27 Ὥστε ὃς ἂν ἐσθίῃ τὸν ἄρτον ἢ πίνῃ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦ κυρίου ἀναξίως, ἔνοχος ἔσται τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ κυρίου.

Regardless of whether the issue here is primarily about “profaning a sacred rite” or “division in a sacred community,” Paul’s remedy is not simply appeals for unity, but for theologically sound liturgy that is presented in homonoia rhetoric.[45] A primary part of Paul’s instructions is the command to assemble together, at one time, admonishing them to “wait for one another” (ἐκδέχεσθε) (11.33). Paul’s basic presentation of the theology behind the Christian liturgy, which may have stemmed directly from traditional communal meals and was therefore subject to schisms, can be considered a step towards “orthodoxy.” Some sixty years later, we find the same controversy in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, who takes a similar approach (below, Chapter 5).

ORDER

Another central theme of Paul’s message which is tied to unity is the proper “order” of the community. Near the letter’s conclusion, Paul summarizes by saying “all things should be done decently and in order” (πάντα δὲ εὐσχημόνως καὶ κατὰ τάξιν γινέσθω) (14.40). This principal applies to at least three spheres in the epistle: doctrinal, liturgical, and social. These spheres overlap one another, of course; we have seen that the heretical-orthodox dichotomy which Paul draws involves both liturgy and “genuine” doctrine. Also involved, however, is the larger issue of Christians’ relationship to the nonbelieving world around them. Two specific examples of social issues are lawsuits and dietary restrictions.

As to the first of these, Paul prohibits legal actions brought by one member of the Christian *ekklesia* against another member. This rests on a distinction between *adelphoi* (“brothers”—often rendered in this context as “believers”) from the *apistoi* (“unbelievers”); as well as the *hagion* (“saints”) from the *adikon* (“unrighteous”).

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[45] Coutsoumpos 2012, 293-294.

> When any of you has a grievance against another, do you dare to take it to court before the unrighteous, instead of taking it before the saints? … I say this to your shame. Can it be that there is no one among you wise enough to decide between one brother and another, but a brother goes to court against a brother—and before unbelievers at that? In fact, to have lawsuits at all with one another is already a defeat for you.
>
> Τολμᾷ τις ὑμῶν πρᾶγμα ἔχων πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον κρίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀδίκων καὶ οὐχὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁγίων;… πρὸς ἐντροπὴν ὑμῖν λέγω. οὕτως οὐκ ἔνι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεὶς σοφός, ὃς δυνήσεται διακρῖναι ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ; ἀλλὰ ἀδελφὸς μετὰ ἀδελφοῦ κρίνεται καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ ἀπίστων; ἤδη μὲν [οὖν] ὅλως ἥττημα ὑμῖν ἐστιν ὅτι κρίματα ἔχετε μεθ᾽ ἑαυτῶν. (6.1-7)

These judicial strictures are consistent with the expectation mentioned earlier: Christian matters are to be judged by Christians, while worldly matters should be left to secular authorities. The fact that believers appearing in a secular court is "shameful" suggests Paul cares about how Christians are viewed by their peers. The passage quoted above shows that the apostle seeks to present a picture of unity to unbelieving onlookers.

This effort is even clearer in the issue of dietary restrictions. One of the most well-known passages of 1 Cor. concerns eating food offered to idols. This is another controversy on which Paul asserts his authority in the interest of church unity. Like the issue of lawsuits, it stems from the idea of a Christian's freedom: a convert assumes privileged status. The status involves judicial authority (Paul believes Christians will one day judge the angels [6.3]), as well as freedom from certain religious dietary restrictions. The theological basis is simply monotheism: when the convert recognizes the one true God and properly understands his nature, he gains the freedom to eat food offered to idols. This is because the idols represent nonexistent gods. However, the newfound freedom comes with a profound sense of responsibility towards others, especially newer converts. This reminds us of that whatever theology is at issue, it is embedded in social networks.[46] The food issue reminds us of the fact that the "strong" and

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[46] Sanders describes Paul's give-and-take in this scene in sociological terms. In the "convert adaptation" with idol food we see "one of the best examples of an advocate's attempting to engineer convert adaptation, while himself

"weak" almost certainly have some connection to socio-economic class. The Christian should never exercise his freedom at the expense of others; one's actions should never cause theological confusion in others. If, in and of itself, food is not linked to salvation: it is connected to ethics: "take care that this liberty (ἐξουσία) of yours does not somehow become a stumbling-block to the weak" (8.9). If a person's actions do cause confusion, division, or misbehavior in others, you have not only wronged your "brother," but also sinned against Christ. "Therefore, if food is a cause of their falling, I will never eat meat, so that I may not cause one of them to fall."[47] These are the final words of Paul's section on food. He clearly sublimates his own Christian freedom to a theologically sound ethics, as well as an emphasis on social unity. It is important to note that one of the most important statements on Christians' relationship to their environment is based upon unity.

Much of the spirit of homonoia rhetoric is captured in the slogans contained in 1 Cor. These slogans may represent the factions dividing the *ekklesia*.[48] Regardless of their unknown specific context, however, the slogans encapsulate both Paul's message and that of his opponent. The latter, according to Paul, behave according to their slogan, "All things are lawful" (10.23). The apostle counters this message with his own slogan: "Do not seek your own advantage, but that of others" (μηδεὶς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ζητείτω ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἑτέρου) (10.24). This is an essential message of Paul's letter; it assumes a homonoia ideal since deference demands at least empathy, if not the "same mind." Paul recognizes the kernel of truth regarding Christian freedom contained in the faction he encounters, but adds two important qualifications. First, whatever a

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adapting (2000, 123-124). This is, for Sanders, part of Paul's effort to reach a "broad middle" of Corinthian society that ultimately worked for Christianity.

[47] 8.13. διόπερ εἰ βρῶμα σκανδαλίζει τὸν ἀδελφόν μου, οὐ μὴ φάγω κρέα εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, ἵνα μὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν μου σκανδαλίσω.

[48] For a summary of the debate over the nature of the slogans, which are almost all the evidence that exists for the nature of Corinthian schism, see Welborn 1987, 90-93.

Christian does with her newfound freedom should “be beneficial” (συμφέρει) to the community. *Sympherei* is an important word in 1 Cor; Paul is intent on believers acting in the interest of one another, striving towards a “common good.” Secondly, Paul expects that a Christian’s actions should “build up” or encourage others (οἰκοδομεῖ), and here there is an interesting connection to one of Paul’s metaphors (below) that likens the *ekklesia* to a “building” and “temple” of God. Paul’s language features a *koinos*-based vocabulary in this section of the letter which harkens back to the introduction, where Paul asserts the place of Corinthians within the “fellowship” or “partnership” of Christ (1.9).[49] The ideals of “commonality” and becoming “sharers” (κοινωνοί) are further instances of homonoia associates. Paul is emphasizing here both a “horizontal” commonality (with fellow believers) as well as a “vertical” sharing (with God).[50]

Concluding his answer to the Corinthian slogan, Paul introduces a pair of important ideas. He calls on the Corinthians to “do everything for the glory of God.” He continues: “Give no offence to Jews or to Greeks or to the church of God, just as I try to please everyone in everything I do, not seeking my own advantage, but that of many, so that they may be saved.”[51] First, there is in these commands the concept of *mimēsis*, a call for his audience to imitate his own actions, particularly in laying aside perceived “rights” and acting for the benefit of others.[52] This is characteristic of the homonoia rhetoric in pagan authors after Paul’s death, as we will see. The call to take Paul as a model is explicit at 11.1: “Be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (μιμηταί μου γίνεσθε καθὼς κἀγὼ Χριστοῦ).[53] This is another indication of the impossibility of separating homonoia rhetoric from its social context: Paul is clearly attempting to establish his own authority where it has been questioned, or even denied.

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[49] On *koinōnia*’s association with *philia* and related terms, including homonoia, see Fitzgerald 2003, 325-326. He notes Aristotle’s dictum: “All *philia* consists in *koinōnia*” (*NE* 8.12.1).

[50] 1 Cor. 10.16, 18, and 20; Lee 2006, 128. See also Ramelli 2008 on *koinōnia* in Stoic fragments.

[51] 10.31-33 Εἴτε οὖν ἐσθίετε εἴτε πίνετε εἴτε τι ποιεῖτε, πάντα εἰς δόξαν θεοῦ ποιεῖτε. ἀπρόσκοποι καὶ Ἰουδαίοις γίνεσθε καὶ Ἕλλησιν καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ θεοῦ, καθὼς κἀγὼ πάντα πᾶσιν ἀρέσκω μὴ ζητῶν τὸ ἐμαυτοῦ σύμφορον ἀλλὰ τὸ τῶν πολλῶν, ἵνα σωθῶσιν.

[52] On *mimēsis* in Paul’s letters, see Reis 2005, 288-293.

[53] On the “rights” language in contemporary literature, and the athlete exemplifying self-control see Garrisson 1997, 100-104.

What does it mean to imitate the apostle and his Christ? Paul answers this by way of an *apologia* that defines his own apostolic authority on a foundation of humility and concern for others. Paul is also describing the relationship between Christian freedom and ethics. He establishes his identity as a “free” (ἐλεύθερος) apostle who has “seen” (ἑώρακε) Jesus (9.1), then launches into the *apologia* proper. Within this short section, Paul lists the “rights” (ἐξουσίαι) and “material benefits” (σαρκικοί) to which he is entitled as an apostle. These range from food and drink to marriage. To strengthen his point, Paul offers no less than six examples, or parallel situations that underscore the significance of his abstention from earthly rewards. He likens himself to a farmer who does not partake of his own vineyard, for instance, and a shepherd who forgoes his own goats’ milk (9.6).

> for whoever ploughs should plough in hope and whoever threshes should thresh in hope of a share in the crop. If we have sown spiritual good among you, is it too much if we reap your material benefits?
>
> ὅτι ὀφείλει ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι ὁ ἀροτριῶν ἀροτριᾶν καὶ ὁ ἀλοῶν ἐπ᾽ ἐλπίδι τοῦ μετέχειν. εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῖν τὰ πνευματικὰ ἐσπείραμεν, μέγα εἰ ἡμεῖς ὑμῶν τὰ σαρκικὰ θερίσομεν; (9.10-11)

As one who has been ordered to share the gospel, Paul should “derive his life” out of it (ἐκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ζῆν) (9.14). He is no different in this way than one employed at a temple. His conclusion, however, sets him apart from all the parallels he has listed. “Nevertheless, we have not made use of this right (ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐχρησάμεθα τῇ ἐξουσίᾳ ταῦτῃ) (9.15).

This is connected to a second overarching idea of the letter, that of universalism. In terms of the history of ideas, this is the most revolutionary aspect of 1 Cor.. Universalism is more than Paul’s patent concern for the Christian “witness” to their nonbelieving neighbors. In naming three different populations of Corinth, Paul is making a profound theological statement on the universal application of the gospel. The "Greeks," "Jews" and "the *ekklesia* of God," Paul is dealing with every significant element of Corinthian society, at least in religious terms. Each of these groups represents potential difficulties and factions. Paul's solution to the problem of Christians confronting *mos maiorum* is to "become all things to all people" through *agape* love.[54] His thoughts on this subject encapsulate the spirit of homonoia that will become a precedent for many Christian authors of later generations. As an idea, homonoia infuses some of Paul's most remarkable language:

> For though I am free with respect to all, I have made myself a slave to all, so that I might win more of them. To the Jews I became as a Jew, in order to win Jews...To the weak I became weak, so that I might win the weak. I have become all things to all people.
>
> Ἐλεύθερος γὰρ ὢν ἐκ πάντων πᾶσιν ἐμαυτὸν ἐδούλωσα, ἵνα τοὺς πλείονας κερδήσω· καὶ ἐγενόμην τοῖς Ἰουδαίοις ὡς Ἰουδαῖος, ἵνα Ἰουδαίους κερδήσω…τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν ἀσθενής, ἵνα τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς κερδήσω· τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα (9.19-20, 22)

Without using the term, here Paul presents an outline of homonoia. His vocation of spreading the gospel depends upon the ability to relate to "all." Again, the distinction between "thinking like" someone and identifying oneself with him is quite fine. It is tempting (and facile?) to greet such statements (quoted above) as so much hyperbole. Regardless of what we think of "St. Paul," or of his intentions and motivations, however, it is difficult not to admire his consistency. This passage, for example, ends with Paul's motivation for "becoming all things." He does it for the sake of the gospel, "that by all means [he] might save some" (ἵνα πάντως τινὰς σώσω). This brings us back to the letter's inscription, where the author identifies himself as "Paul, an apostle of Jesus Christ by God's will."[55] Paul's identity as a "sent one" is tied to his mission to spread the message of Jesus, and he is willing to use "any means" to accomplish this. Note the repeated use of *pas*, a linguistic witness to Paul's universal thrust. In fact *pas* is one of the more important words of the entire epistle. It communicates the universality of Paul's faith and also suggests a sense of urgency in his tone.

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[54] Sanders wonders if this sort of universal language is something contemporary cults could not match, an ideal (even if unrealized in the congregations themselves) that was part of the religion's "constant adaptability" (2000, 161-171).

[55] 1.1 Παῦλος κλητὸς ἀπόστολος Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ διὰ θελήματος θεοῦ

MATURITY

Maturity is another fundamental characteristic of Paul's ideal community, a fact he underscores with language about childhood, which he contrasts with manhood. "When I was a child, I spoke like a child, I thought like a child, I reasoned like a child. When I became a man, I gave up childish ways."[56] He is even more explicit at 14.20: "Brothers, do not be children in your thinking. Be infants in evil, but in your thinking be mature."[57] We couldn't ask for a clearer statement of Paul's expectations for the maturity of his ideal Christian community. The child / adult contrast that he draws will appear again in later rhetoric, as we will see below. The same spirit informs Aristides, for example, who paints a picture of Greek *poleis* behaving like children. Their hyper-competitiveness is equated to immature misbehavior. Like wayward youths, the belligerent city-states risk censure from their overseers—the Romans, who take on the appearance of parents. Paul closes his letter to Corinth with this very message, commanding his audience to "act like men," (ἀνδρίζεσθε) (16.13).

Rather than threaten Roman intervention, Paul assures the Corinthians that he plans to return to their city to get to the bottom of their maladies. "What would you prefer?" he asks. "Am I to come to you with a stick, or with love in a spirit of gentleness?"[58] This familial imagery strengthens the argument for unity: as children benefit from the hierarchy of the home, so subjects should obey their imperial masters. This fits well with the idea that homonoia is less concerned with equality than “the preservation of the ‘natural’ relation of strength to weakness.”[59] The imagery also helps to develop Paul’s larger theological distinction between the mind and the flesh. He separates his audience into those who are “of the flesh” rather than “spiritual” using some of the same rhetoric as Second Sophistic figures. “But I, brothers, could not address you as spiritual people, but as people of the flesh, as infants in Christ. I fed you with milk, not solid food, for you were not ready for it. And even now you are not yet ready, for you are still of the flesh.”[60] It is important to note here that the primary characteristic of maturity is, in Paul’s mind, is the ability to coexist peacefully with other believers. Paul equates unity with maturity. He does so by aligning key characteristics with either the flesh (*sarx*) or spirit (*pneuma*). “Jealousy and division” (ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις) are aligned with the former: factions are signs of “human” behavior, as opposed to spiritual maturity (3.3-4).

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[56] 12.11 ὅτε ἤμην νήπιος, ἐλάλουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐφρόνουν ὡς νήπιος, ἐλογιζόμην ὡς νήπιος: ὅτε γέγονα ἀνήρ, κατήργηκα τὰ τοῦ νηπίου.

[57] Ἀδελφοί, μὴ παιδία γίνεσθε ταῖς φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ τῇ κακίᾳ νηπιάζετε.

[58] 4.21 τί θέλετε; ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἔλθω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἢ ἐν ἀγάπῃ πνεύματί τε πραΰτητος;

The maturity theme culminates in a father metaphor that captures Paul’s self-understanding as well as the ideal relationship he has in mind between himself and his audience. Addressing the Corinthians as his “beloved children” (τέκνα μου ἀγαπητὰ), Paul asserts his own fatherly identity: “For though you might have ten thousand guardians in Christ, you do not have many fathers. Indeed, in Christ Jesus I became your father through the gospel.”[61] He adds to the familial imagery by calling on his “children” to imitate him (γίνομαι μιμηταί) in sacrificing everything for the gospel (4.16). The *mimesis* idea and the father imagery are about authority within the community. It is important to understand the competition for Corinthian loyalty and potential challenge to Paul's authority that may be implied in his language here. That Roman fatherhood was relatively "flexible" makes this all the more likely. Paul is of course writing as a Roman citizen; he must have known a first-century father "might face competition for authority over a younger generation from men in other categories of fatherhood," such as a father-in-law or foster-father.[62]

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[59] Martin 1995, 41.

[60] 3.1 Κἀγώ, ἀδελφοί, οὐκ ἠδυνήθην λαλῆσαι ὑμῖν ὡς πνευματικοῖς ἀλλ᾽ ὡς σαρκίνοις, ὡς νηπίοις ἐν Χριστῷ. 2 γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρῶμα· οὔπω γὰρ ἐδύνασθε. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ἔτι νῦν δύνασθε, 3 ἔτι γὰρ σαρκικοί ἐστε. See Aristides 24.7, 24.32; Dio 24.24; 38.15; Clement 21.7. Meeks 1983, 88, emphasizes family vocabulary here as part of a larger effort to establish Christian identity. It is a way of “dramatizing the break with the past and integration into the new community.”

[61] 4.15 ἐὰν γὰρ μυρίους παιδαγωγοὺς ἔχητε ἐν Χριστῷ ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πολλοὺς πατέρας· ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα. Wanamaker’s emphasis on this image, along with that of Paul as “master builder,” is the most helpful part of his analysis (2003, 123 and 132).

As is true in later homonoia rhetoric, the metaphors tend to multiply in 1 Cor.. In fact he uses the same metaphors as later Greek rhetors would employ in Greece and Asia Minor, including the athlete and the body. Perhaps a half century after Paul's death, Dio exhorts the citizens the apostle's native city to "fight fair" and avoid attracting the notice of the referees, Paul calls upon the Corinthians to "run" for the prize.[63]

> Run in such a way that you may win it. Athletes exercise self-control in all things; they do it to receive a perishable garland, but we an imperishable one…I do not run aimlessly; I do not box as one beating the air. But I discipline my body and keep it under control"
>
> οὕτως τρέχετε ἵνα καταλάβητε. πᾶς δὲ ὁ ἀγωνιζόμενος πάντα ἐγκρατεύεται, ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ἵνα φθαρτὸν στέφανον λάβωσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἄφθαρτον. ἐγὼ τοίνυν οὕτως τρέχω ὡς οὐκ ἀδήλως, οὕτως πυκτεύω ὡς οὐκ ἀέρα δέρων· ἀλλὰ ὑπωπιάζω μου τὸ σῶμα καὶ δουλαγωγῶ (9.24-27).

Paul lays other images on fatherhood: he is a gardener who plants or water seeds; an architect who plans a solid foundation. The community of believers is likened in turn to a garden, a building, or a temple.[64] These images that illustrate authority are coupled with statements of subservience, however. The apostle calls himself God's "coworker" (συνεργός), but recognizes his own limitations under the gospel. His role is first and foremost to be a "sent one" for the gospel, and he clearly lays out a simple spiritual hierarchy wherein God is preeminent. The language here (as elsewhere) is connected to the semantic fields of both homonoia and friendship (*philia*). *Philia* was possible between people of different classes or ranks, which makes its associated terms useful for the apostle. "Given the socioeconomic diversity" at Corinth, "it was imperative to stress commonality, and friendship language was useful."[65] This is at once empowering and humbling for both Paul and his fellow believers. They are free to recognize a radical egalitarianism as followers of Christ, yet called to submit themselves to God and to one another.[66] An essential part of the "imitation" towards which he urges his audience is to become servants to all. This by no means ends hierarchy per se; rather it is an emphasis on equality of essence, as opposed to equality of status. Martin builds his theory of "benevolent patriarchy" on such calls for submission as these. Reading these passages politically, he sees Paul's rhetoric as presenting a mean between democracy and tyranny in which the "stronger" (whoever they may be) rules with restraint, and the weaker submits. Ideally, the communities' interests are protected, "and everybody lives happily ever after."[67] The fatherhood image could be more than purely political, however, for the father is key to a person's identity as well. In making himself the Corinthians' "father" then, Paul may be suggesting that identity outside the *ekklesia*, however important it may seem, is irrelevant to their new identity as "members" of the body of Christ. Thus "benevolent patriarchy" could be more revolutionary than it appears.

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[62] Allen 2006, 126-127, summarizes *adoptio* and *adrogatio* traditions which allowed for surrogate fatherhood; although Roman in origin, these must have been quite familiar in first-century Corinth. Fiorenza sees Paul's adoption of father language as part of his attempt to establish himself as "*sole* founder and father" of the *ekklesia*: it is how he imposes hierarchy on the new movement (1987, 397).

[63] *Or.* 34.12-13. On the athletic imagery, see Garrison 1997, 95-96.

[64] The horticultural language is traditionally associated with *philia* language. See Fitzgerald 2003, 332-333.

HIERARCHY

The idea of Paul's spiritual paternity is an important part of the overall tone of the letter because it allows him to deal with status and hierarchy in the community. Scholars have identified a major theme of Paul's letters as the author's efforts to define and defend his own authority in new churches, but have not generally linked this to homonoia rhetoric. There is a complicated dynamic at work between Paul and his audiences. I would note only two aspects of the relationship here. On the one hand, there is an implied hierarchy. On the other hand, 1 Cor. is much more than a power play: Paul's homonoia rhetoric is significant for its own sake.[68] Marchal, for example, focuses on homonoia in the "civic rhetorics" surrounding Paul. The most important aspect of this analysis is his attention to the motives behind homonoia rhetoric. It is worth asking "whose concerns are addressed and which power relations are constructed or reinforced" by referring to homonoia?[69] According to this interpretation, a hermeneutics of suspicion that equates concord with conformity, homonoia is not prescribed for its own sake. There is a link between "unity" and dominance; homonoia is to some extent a denial of difference. The ideal can bolster the status quo; it is a reflection of the priorities of the elite, and is intimately connected to Greek apologia for beneficent monarchy. Greek rhetoricians like Dio and Aristides were useful to Rome because they equated concord with loyalty and submission. In this rhetoric, Rome is the solution to discord: she saves Greece from *stasis*, bringing peace and good order.[70]

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[65] Fitzgerald 2003, 338.
[66] For radical subversion of social norms, see Carter 2009, 106-110.
[67] Martin 1995, 42, draws on Dio *Or.* 40 to reach this conclusion, and notes a parallel in Aristides' household model (41). On Aristides' *Or.* 24, see below (Chapter 6).

Thus the political ramifications of the concord speeches tend to be conservative. The equality described here seems to be within a hierarchy: whether in Corinth or Pergamum (for example), the audiences are urged toward concordant submission. It seems that in all of these authors homonoia or an associated idea, such as unity, is more important than freedom, as if Paul would agree with Plutarch that his audience probably has as much freedom as they need in the status quo (see chapter 2, below). Personal freedoms should be sacrificed for the good of the whole community. "Underlying these unity rhetorics are claims to superiority, empire, and elite status" that are paired with "obedience, conformity, and subjugation."[71]

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[68] For Royalty 2013, 64, the gospel itself is a tool in Paul's "discourse of power." Wanamaker 2003 interprets 1 Cor. as an "ideological move;" see also Harrill 2012, 80-88.

[69] Marchal 2006, 96; Royalty 2013, 73.

[70] See below, especially chapter 6.

The apostle is certainly making an effort to preserve the status quo to a significant extent.

> Let each of you lead the life that the Lord has assigned, to which God called you…Let each of you remain in the condition in which you were called. Were you a slave when called? Do not be concerned about it.
>
> ἑκάστῳ ὡς ἐμέρισεν ὁ κύριος, ἕκαστον ὡς κέκληκεν ὁ θεός, οὕτως περιπατείτω… ἕκαστος ἐν τῇ κλήσει ᾗ ἐκλήθη, ἐν ταύτῃ μενέτω. δοῦλος ἐκλήθης, μή σοι μελέτω· (7.17, 20-21)

Try as they might, it would be difficult for later homonoia advocates—pagan or Christian—to express it more eloquently. Paul seems awfully close to the same understanding of homonoia and hierarchy as Plato, for example, or Dio.[72] "In whatever condition you were called," he continues, "there remain with God."[73] However, Paul is doing more in this letter than demanding subservience. That his letters were used by subsequent generations of Christian thinkers as a basis for Roman Catholic hierarchy and identity should not prevent an appreciation of the letter as a radical theological statement. He does indeed seek to define his authority, but only in the interest of communicating revolutionary theological content. An appreciation of Paul's homonoia rhetoric legitimizes such a reading and complicates efforts to read his letter to Corinth as nothing more than a power play. Pauline authority is actually more nuanced than a purely sociological reading of the letter suggests. The imagery and ideas packed into 1 Cor.

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[71] Marchal 2006, 98.

[72] See below (Chapter 4). On the linguistic similarity (*sophoi*, *dunatoi*, *and eugeneis*, with their antonyms) among these three authors as well as more ancient ones, see Welborn 1987, 96.

[73] 7.24. ἕκαστος ἐν ᾧ ἐκλήθη, ἀδελφοί, ἐν τούτῳ μενέτω παρὰ θεῷ. 1 Cor. plants a seed, in Welborn's analysis, of church authority at large: he links Pauline rhetoric to Constantine's ideology of the Christian state (1993, 232).

should preclude a reductivist reading and reveal a more realistic portrait of the early church and the place of homonoia rhetoric within it.

Thus a nuanced picture of I Cor.'s relationship to hierarchy is possible. Interestingly, though Martin agrees that there is a hierarchy implied in the letter, he reaches a different conclusion with regards to the relationship between Paul and church structure. According to his reading, Paul actually *undermines* hierarchy by rhetorically attacking well-to-do Corinthians and praising the lower elements of their society. First Corinthians is indeed a homonoia letter, but is also a "glaring exception" to the normal emphasis the genre places on hierarchy. "Hierarchy maintenance is the hallmark of ancient homonoia speeches," Martin concludes. "The rich should remain rich without oppressing the poor, and the poor should remain poor without seething with jealousy of the rich." [74] But this must be balanced against Paul's injunction for believers to "not become slaves of human masters" (7.24). Paul actually uses role reversal in his appeal for unity rather than the typical justification of the status quo. He does so by spiritualizing the conversation: in Paul's worldview, the slave (*doulos*) is a freedman (*apeleutheros*), and the freedman a slave in Christ (7.22).[75] The sacrifice of Christ makes earthly status relatively unimportant as a Christian's theological identity trumps any other.

It is helpful here to make a distinction between hierarchy within the church and social status quo. Paul is certainly interested in the former, but actually inverts the latter. In his quest for church unity, he does in fact prescribe obedience to church elders; he also lays out a hierarchy of spiritual gifts. Furthermore, he places himself, as an apostle, at the top of the ecclesiastic "pyramid." On the other hand, Paul sees the church as a place where social distinctions should melt away. "It is, he asserts, specifically the weak, foolish, 'nobodies' who have been chosen by God and to whom God has given the greatest honor in the body."[76] Paul's hierarchy is based upon voluntary submission of his will for the good of the community. He lays out his "credentials" as an apostle only to renounce any rights to which he may be entitled, while emphasizing his commitment to his message of Christ (9.15, 18). "For though I am free (ἐλεύθερος) from all, I have made myself a servant (ἐδούλωσα) to all" (9.19).

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[74] Martin 2012, 227.

[75] On the importance of *douleia* and *eleutheria* to Stoic *homonoia*, see Erskine 1990, 58-63. Paul's use of *doulos* in 1 Cor. (7.21, 22, 23; 12.13) supports his argument for unity regardless of whether we translate it literally (slave or servant) or figuratively (in the Stoic sense of moral slavery and subordination). Chapter 7 has elements of "household codes," or *peri oikonomias* literature, for which see Balch 2003.

There is a sense of Realpolitik about Paul's approach: he knows better than to attempt to abolish all power dynamics. Even as he points out a great leveling effect of the gospel that demands apostles to become servants, he recognizes that hierarchy is to some extent inevitable. It is an inevitability, however, that does not necessarily preclude homonoia or unity. The manner in which Paul deals with spiritual gifts is illustrative. As is true in other cases, his approach to this specific source of contention is based upon a theological doctrine:

> Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are varieties of services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same God who activates all of them in everyone.
>
> Διαιρέσεις δὲ χαρισμάτων εἰσίν, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα· καὶ διαιρέσεις διακονιῶν εἰσιν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς κύριος· καὶ διαιρέσεις ἐνεργημάτων εἰσίν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς θεὸς ὁ ἐνεργῶν τὰ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν. (12.4-6)

Paul's conclusion for this Trinitarian doctrine is profoundly important: each of the different gifts is bestowed by the same Spirit "for the common good" (πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον) (12.7).[77] Thus Paul recognizes the existence of varied degrees of authority, yet subsumes the variety under the ideal of the common good which coincides nicely with the notion of each individual serving another. Also present is the aforementioned concern for non-believers: spiritual gifts should not be used in a manner that would alienate newcomers or strangers. The gifts are “signs” (σημεια), according to Paul. As such, they communicate positive or negative messages to witnesses. More importantly, the gifts, as signs, fit into Paul’s passion for spreading his gospel, for growing the Christian community worldwide. They are part of his emphasis on maintaining a positive witness for the Jesus movement. In fact Paul classifies the spiritual gifts according to whether they are signs for “believers” or “unbelievers” (ἀπίστοις).[78] Prophecy, for example, falls into the former category, while tongues (γλῶσσαι) belongs to the latter. The important point for Paul is they manner in which each is manifest in the *ekklesia*. If a nonbeliever or an “outsider” (ἰδιώτης) were to witness a room full of believers speaking in tongues, for example, they would think the *ekklesia* insane (14.23). The ideal outcome is rather that an unbelieving person would, upon witnessing a gift expresses in a prudent manner, be awestruck. Such a person might “fall to his face and worship God, declaring, ‘God is really among you.’”[79]

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[76] Horrell 1996, 195.

[77] Lee 2006, 117-123, rightly critiques the non-literal translation, but essentially arrives at the same conclusion herself. Paul is reorienting what is "advantageous" for the individual in terms of their new corporate identity.

This is another clear example of Paul’s concern for the Corinthian *ekklesia* to establish and maintain a healthy identity before their God and their neighbors. Ultimately his thoughts on the divisive issue of spiritual gifts are one aspect of the emphasis on good order that is evident elsewhere in the letter. Good order requires unity, and this is the ultimate goal of the apostle’s homonoia rhetoric for Corinth. It is based upon the theological idea that his is a God “not of disorder (ἀκαταστασίας), but of peace (εἰρήνης)” (14.33). As a consequence, the *ekklesia* should be characterized first and foremost by unity. The historical significance of this idea will become clearer when we consider Clement and Ignatius (below). Both “order” and “peace” are fundamental for Clement, for example, who writes his own letter to the same Corinthian congregation some sixty years after Paul.[80] This will occur has the individual seeks to contribute according to his gifts in the interest of his neighbor, whether believing or nonbelieving. "Let all things be done for building up," Paul says (14.26). The ideal is that "all" (πάντες) exercise their gifts "so that *all* may learn and *all* be encouraged."[81]

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[78] Though *pistis* is normally translated as “belief” in the NT, the word has social connotations as well; it might be rendered “untrustworthy” or “uninitiated,” which would strengthen the view of Corinthians division as primarily social, rather than intellectual.

[79] 14.25 πεσὼν ἐπὶ πρόσωπον προσκυνήσει τῷ θεῷ ἀπαγγέλλων ὅτι ὄντως ὁ θεὸς ἐν ὑμῖν ἐστιν.

Few lines capture the universalism that marks 1 Cor. better than this. The ultimate expression of the totalizing impulse in 1 Cor., and of Paul's penchant for *pas*- vocabulary, is the eschatological hope in the penultimate chapter of the letter. "The end" (*telos*) is that moment when everything on earth is "subjected" (ὑποταγῇ) to the messiah, at which point the messiah himself will "subject himself" to God the Father. The result is that God "is all in all" (ᾖ πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν); this is the theological basis of Paul's call for members of the *ekklesia* to submit to one another.[82] The eschatology developed here is gives theological significance to Paul's call for believers to submit to one another. This ideal is clearly synonymous with that of homonoia. Furthermore, the entire line of thought is linked to, or grounded in, Paul's universalism by the repeated use of *pas*. The *pas*-based vocabulary that Paul uses intensifies in the later chapters of the letter. These later chapters also contain two of the letter's most significant passages. Paul develops the homonoia-related ideal of Christian submission with a famous metaphor and an innovative concept, to which we should now turn.

THE BODY AND *AGAPE*

Paul elaborates his thinking with the image of the human body, a well-known metaphor in contemporary sources. Indeed the body analogy is widely used in ancient literature, with the best-known example located in Livy’s speech of Menenius Agrippa.[83] Thus Paul avails himself in his letter to Corinth to a figure that was likely well known to his audience. It is instructive to consider this famous metaphor in the context chapters twelve’s discussion of spiritual gifts, which was a source of conflict within the *ekklesia*. Paul picks takes up this theme again at 14.1, where he spends an entire chapter further developing the theme. At its core, the *charismata* discussion is about how diversity and unity can coexist. The image of the body makes allows this problem to be more easily discussed, for a body’s very existence depends upon diversity. “If all were a single member,” Paul asks, “where would the body be?”[84] Before delving into the metaphor, Paul lays out the theological groundwork. All the gifts, he concludes, are given by “one and the same spirit” (τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πνεῦμα), which allots them as it pleases (12.11). This should be taken in conjunction with the apostle’s remarks on the Eucharist. Earlier in the letter, he asserted that “we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.”[85] This is another example of Paul building his case for homonoia upon theological concepts. Christian unity is based upon a right understanding of theology and its associated rituals, like the Eucharist and baptism (below). Paul encourages Jews and Gentiles to accept one another as fellow communicants on the basis of their new identities and these rituals. This is the basis of a fundamental “team spirit” of 1 Cor. The metaphor is another obvious instance of the universal language of the letter. A believer’s new identity as a follower of Paul’s message—as a Jesus-follower—trumps ethnic and economic classifications. He continues:

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[80] Of course *eirene* had a significant presence in imperial propaganda as well. See chapter 3, below. Clement's use of Paul's authority is a clear example of what, in her study of later Christian heresiologists, Eshleman calls an emphasis on "connections and credentials" (2012, 151).

[81] 14.31 emphasis added. ἵνα πάντες μανθάνωσιν καὶ πάντες παρακαλῶνται. Meeks 1983, 119-123, sees the *charismata* controversy is primarily an issue of authority. This makes Paul's ordering of the gifts at 12.28 significant: tongues come last in this ordering, implying another "status reversal" by the apostle.

[82] 15.28. *hupotasso* occurs nine times between chapters 14 and 16, primarily in reference to *theos*, but also to women submitting to men (14.34), and all people to leaders such as Stephanus (16.16).

> For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit we

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[83] The image occurs in Livy 2.32, where the goal is *concordia*, and Dion. Hal. 6.86; at 6.87, Dionysius uses *symphroneo*, a synonym of *homonoia*, in describing the outcome of the speech. See also Plut. *Cor.* 5.3-7, where the people recognize the importance of the stomach / Senate; and Horrell 1996, 178; Mitchell 1991, 157-165.

[84] 12.19; see also 12.17, 12.20, and 12.14: “Indeed, the body does not consist of one member but of many.”

[85] 10.17, ἓν σῶμα οἱ πολλοί ἐσμεν, οἱ γὰρ πάντες ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἄρτου μετέχομεν.

> were all baptized into one body—Jews or Greeks, slaves or free—and we were all made to drink of one Spirit.
>
> Καθάπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν καὶ μέλη πολλὰ ἔχει, πάντα δὲ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλὰ ὄντα ἓν ἐστιν σῶμα, οὕτως καὶ ὁ Χριστός· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ πνεύματι ἡμεῖς πάντες εἰς ἓν σῶμα ἐβαπτίσθημεν, εἴτε Ἰουδαῖοι εἴτε Ἕλληνες εἴτε δοῦλοι εἴτε ἐλεύθεροι, καὶ πάντες ἓν πνεῦμα ἐποτίσθημεν. (12.12-13)

One of the more innovative elements of Paul’s use of this well-worn image is the remarkable interdependence it calls for. A standard message of the body metaphor is that any individual’s identity is secure no matter what others may think. Paul stays within the norms of the genre in this particular. Note, for example, that a “member’s” identity and function in the body is independent of external perceptions.[86] “The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘I have no need of you.’” Paul actually precedes this predictable element of the fable, however, with the inverse statement that finds no parallel in Livy. “If the foot were to say, ‘Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body’, that would not make it any less a part of the body.” (12.15) This means that a member’s identity is not even a function of its *own* understanding. By making identity independent of both self-perception and the perception of others, Paul gives a security to the parts of the body that is lacking in Livy’s version. In the latter, all the members of the body revolt against the stomach, and the narrator, Menenius Agrippa, points makes a similar conclusion to Paul on the indispensable place of any one member in the whole. The image is told in terms envy and discord. The historical revolt that in which the fable is told, however, is primarily political. It is explicitly based on mutual distrust between plebs and patricians. The army (and “people”) resents the Senate, and the former secedes, causing a panic. This context gives Livy’s use of the image a practical, political tone. In contrast, Paul is making a theological statement about identity and unity within a diverse, universal community. He is also managing the social discord that brought the letter about in the first place. If normally associated with "upper-status" reminders of "natural" hierarchy, the image here is Paul's attempt to reverse the normal interpretation: he wants "to nullify the rhetoric of the Strong in his congregation."[87] Moreover, a member's identity in Livy is purely a matter of its function. Paul, on the other hand, is making an ontological statement: existence of the body depends upon variety.[88] What is more, this variety is led by the Spirit, and divinely ordained (12.8). Just as no individual part of human anatomy is completely self-sufficient, so the "members" of the *ekklesia* coexist in vital symbiosis.

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[86] For the body discussion with a “physiological” frame of reference(rather than social) which incorporates Galen and Hippocrates, see Carter 2009.

The theological impact of this version of the metaphor, as compared to Livy's, is in even higher relief in Paul's conclusion. The apostle acknowledges a hierarchy of members: a gradient of some sort is inevitable in human communities. "God has appointed in the church first apostles (ἀπόστολοι), second prophets (προφῆται), third teachers (διδάσκαλοι), then miracles," then those with any number of specific gifts, such as healing or administration (12.28). In Paul's usage, however, the "body" is the "body of Christ." This allows its members, upon initiation into the body as a believer, to transcend human perceptions. As is usual in 1 Cor., a theological principal is coupled with an ethical precept:

> God has so arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the inferior member, that there may be no dissension within the body, but the members may have the same care for one another. If one member suffers, all suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice together with it.
>
> ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα τῷ ὑστερουμένῳ περισσοτέραν δοὺς τιμήν, ἵνα μὴ ᾖ σχίσμα ἐν τῷ σώματι ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων μεριμνῶσιν τὰ μέλη. καὶ εἴτε πάσχει ἓν μέλος, συμπάσχει πάντα τὰ μέλη· εἴτε δοξάζεται [ἓν] μέλος, συγχαίρει πάντα τὰ μέλη. (12.24-26)

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[87] Harrill 2012, 63. See also Coutsoumpos 2012, 289.

[88] Lee 2006, 142, "[Paul] does not say that the body would die, as in the Agrippa story…but rather that without all of the parts, 'It would simply not exist as a body.'"

This is homonoia illustrated. It is one of the most revolutionary conclusions of 1 Cor. The idea that believers are “the body of Christ and individually members of it” allows for a radical reversal.[89] Paul would have us view his image of the body as revolutionary because although he admits hierarchy is impossible to avoid completely, it is an order held together not by power but by love (ἀγάπη). Paul explains this quality in the famous thirteenth chapter, where he lays out the characteristics of the love that holds the body of Christ together. *Agape* is the antidote to Corinthian ailments.[90] Paul’s definition of *agape* is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it worth noting here that it is in accord with the spirit of homonoia in that it is held up first and foremost as a means to social cohesion and as an indispensable quality for any group. It is the key characteristic of the “mind of Christ” that allows for diversity within the body of believers. Of particular importance is the fact that the list of attributes Paul gives to *agape* has a “one-to-one precise correspondence” with the symptoms of Corinthian conflict mentioned elsewhere in the letter.[91] Considered collectively, the fifteen characteristics Paul packs into two verses (8-9) fit perfectly as qualities of homonoia. To the extent that love “bears all things” and “endures all things”—traits that form the culmination of Paul’s definition of *agape*—love fosters homonoia.

CONCLUSION

In his conclusion, Paul touches on multiple important themes of the letter. He uses *agape* in describing his relationship with the Corinthian *ekklesia*, addressing them directly as “beloved”

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[89] 11.27 ὑμεῖς δέ ἐστε σῶμα Χριστοῦ καὶ μέλη ἐκ μέρους. Compare Cic. *De Off.* 1.35, which is emblematic of a more traditional understanding of “inferior” status tied to function. “Man's modesty has followed this idea of Nature's; all right-minded people keep out of sight what Nature has hidden and take pains to respond to Nature's demands as privately as possible; and in the case of those parts of the body which only serve Nature's needs, neither the parts nor the functions are called by their real names. To perform these functions — if only it be done in private — is nothing immoral; but to speak of them is indecent” (trans. Miller). On “head and body language” in 1 Cor., particularly in reference to the husband and wife, see Marshall 2004. He notes (imprecise) parallels in Aristotle and Plutarch at 172-173.

[90] Mitchell 1991, 165-171.

[91] Mitchell 1991, 170; see also Lee 2006, 181.

(ἀγαπητοί). Additionally, it is yet another instance of Paul's use of "always" (*pantote*) is in keeping with the liberal dispersal of related terms throughout the letter. He proceeds to exhort them to two ideals, both associated with the building imagery used previously in the letter. He calls the *ekklesia* to be "steadfast" and "immovable," and to "always" be doing "the work of the Lord."[92] This is a poignant echo of Paul's earlier use of the building metaphor where he calls believers "God's building" (θεοῦ οἰκοδομή) (3.9). In using "work" (ἔργω), it also evokes the ideal of believers being coworkers (συνεργοὶ) with God, which is how the apostle described himself in the same line. It is worth noting that Paul calls himself a coworker with Apollos, who is apparently the inspiration of one of the Corinthian *schismata*. Paul is therefore doing his best to model the homonoia ideal: he tries to defuse any discord between himself and another leader who must have been nearly as charismatic. What matters, he insists, is that they agree on a common purpose—that they think alike in striving towards an overarching goal. The spirit of homonoia is again unmistakable.

The letter ends with exhortations and greetings that recapitulate Paul's ideals. A few brief lines contain one key term after another. The concepts to which Paul has given theological and ethical grounding in this letter are restated in a final push that is a fundamental expression of homonoia rhetoric. It establishes a precedent for generations of Christian leaders to emulate. The ideals of submission, order, maturity, and of course *agape* are all present. The next two chapters will show how these ideals are appropriated and developed by Clement and Ignatius. The final sections of 1 Cor. give these successors tools with which to further develop and solidify Christianity.

Paul exhorts the *ekklesia* to "keep alert, stand firm in the faith, be courageous, be strong" ([γ]ρηγορεῖτε, στήκετε ἐν τῇ πίστει, ἀνδρίζεσθε, κραταιοῦσθε) (16.13). "Let all that you do be done in love” (πάντα ὑμῶν ἐν ἀγάπῃ γινέσθω) is his conclusion, a final reminder of that *agape* ideal that the thirteenth chapter established (16.14). Two of the four attributes commanded here, “firmness” and “strength” evoke the aforementioned building imagery. The other two traits, literally “manliness” and “vigilance,” remind the audience of the ideal characteristics of Christian maturity that he discussed earlier in the letter. Both of these are staples of homonoia rhetoric that would be employed by later political and religious leaders in the Roman empire.[93] The presence of moral *exempla* is another characteristic feature of the rhetoric, and Paul leaves the Corinthians with one of these.

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[92] ἑδραῖοι γίνεσθε, ἀμετακίνητοι, περισσεύοντες ἐν τῷ ἔργω τοῦ κυρίου πάντοτε

> Get to know the household of Stephanus…who have devoted themselves to the service of the saints; I urge you to put yourselves at the service of such people, and of everyone who works and labors with them.
>
> οἴδατε τὴν οἰκίαν Στεφανᾶ, ὅτι…εἰς διακονίαν τοῖς ἁγίοις ἔταξαν ἑαυτούς· ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς ὑποτάσσησθε τοῖς τοιούτοις καὶ παντὶ τῷ συνεργοῦντι καὶ κοπιῶντι. (16.15-16)

This restates two of Paul’s ideals for the *ekklesia*, and establishes a practical precedent for believers to emulate.[94] It is the final occurrence of “submission” (ὑποτάσσω) that Paul has emphasized through the letter and to which he gives theological significance earlier in the letter, especially in the fifteenth chapter (above). It occurs here in conjunction with another form of τάσσω, which recalls the overarching theme that everything should be done in “good order” within the *ekklesia*, and that submitting to one another is the key to being “of one mind.” The act of devoting oneself to serving other believers, as Stephanus’ household has done, is for Paul a primary characteristic of the mind of Christ. It is also the defining feature of what it means to imitate the apostle.

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[93] Maier 2005, 311.

[94] For the *oikos* language related to Staphanus, see Tucker 2010, 186.

In this ideal of submission, as well as the call to maintain good order, both by way of *agape* love, Paul plants the seeds of Christian theology and ethics. The apostle himself uses this farming metaphor. From a historical perspective, however, the letter does more than illustrate germinating doctrine—it's even more than a "precedent" (as I've called it)—because Paul insists on a universality for which there were are few ancient parallels. Ironically, a chief characteristic of this comprehensive, exclusivist new Christian message, with its emphasis on "right teaching," was universalism. This too is contained in Paul's closing: he calls on the Corinthians to an outward focus that results in them getting to know *all* people who are laboring with him. Taken collectively, the relatively long list of ideals recapitulated here reveal the nature of "the mind of Christ."

Taken as a whole, Paul's letter to Corinth clearly exemplifies the hallmarks of homonoia rhetoric. There has been a significant effort to place 1 Cor. in its "Greco-Roman context." It leads naturally to the view that first-century Christians were not really "Christians" at all, but members of a fringe cult that, in its effort to establish itself, availed themselves to the rhetorical and philosophical tools available to them. They "did not take a stand in sharp opposition to Greco-Roman culture as a whole, but instead drew upon its insights and models in literary, social, and conceptual ways."[95] This reasonable conclusion should not completely overwhelm an appreciation of Christian innovation. Paul's use of the rhetorical commonplaces is part of a larger project to delineate the relationship that converts to a new faith should have with one another, and with the world around them.[96] His primary objective was to articulate the "mind of Christ" so that Christians could display homonoia. Though the problem of social division is timeless, Paul is apparently one of the first to take up tools—however ancient—related to homonoia in order to combat it. While not at all immune to the competitive, divisive, and status-conscious trends of the society around them, they were hearing in Paul's letter theologically based solutions that must have struck converts as new. There is thus truth in the idea that the Corinthian *ekklesia* was one of several new communities that were "constructing a new world."[97] In highlighting homonoia's place in the Paul's rhetoric, this chapter has shown that the concept had an indispensable role that project. Chapters 3 and 5 (below) will make clear how the apostle's letter became a founding document of the Jesus movement—there seems to have been a Pauline precedent already established shortly after Paul's death. The next chapter, however, is a reminder that Paul is initiating a conversation that others are having about "like-mindedness." This becomes clearer by considering Plutarch's *Political Precepts*; a reading of this alongside early Christian homonoia rhetoric makes one wonder whether we miscategorize Paul's letter. Is 1 Cor., like Plutarch's *Precepts*, a political manual? Regardless, the Jewish missionary for Jesus is to some extent speaking the same language as the priest at Delphi.

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[95] Kee 2002, 349. The majority of the scholars cited above would concur.

[96] This process of establishing identity in terms of social and intellectual relations is the basis of Eshleman 2012.

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[97] Meeks 1983, 192. For evidence of Christian competition, see Welborn 1987, 110-111.

2

PLUTARCH'S PRACTICAL POLITICS

Plutarch's biography and oeuvre are, after Paul, the most well-known of the authors considered here. His fame is a function of a relatively long life as well as his high status and connections to both Greek and Roman elites, several of whom were close enough to become friends and dedicatees of his many works.[1] Some of these friends were prominent enough that direct (if unproven) associations with the emperor himself have long been attributed to Plutarch. He was first and foremost an author with a wide ranging career—an *archon* at his native Chaeronea in Boeotia and a priest at Delphi, as well as an ambassador who spent time in Rome and surrounding areas of Italy. An impressive career and social network were supplemented by a prodigious literary output over roughly the first quarter of the first century. The *Lives* alone assure Plutarch's status as one of the most significant sources of the Second Sophistic. Indeed, in terms of historical significance, they more than compensate for the fact that Plutarch's biography shares some of the uncertainties that are inherent in ancient history and common to each of the subjects of this dissertation. The parallel lives should be read alongside their author's somewhat lesser known *Moralia*, however. It is the latter that form the basis of this chapter.

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[1] For a summary of the evidence pertaining to Plutarch's biography, see Jones 1995. It seems likely that Plutarch, like Dio (and Pliny and Tacitus) did most of his writing around the turn of the first century, after the death of Domitian. He may have known the emperor Hadrian personally in his capacity as priest at Delphi. See also Barrow 1967, xii, 193-196. I leave aside the (unanswered) question regarding Plutarch's awareness of Judaism and Christianity. He makes slight mention of the former, and is silent on the latter; for the context see Brenk 2007.

Over his wide ranging corpus, Plutarch uses homonoia more than sixty times. Over a third of these are contained by the *Moralia*. This is remarkable given that homonoia has not been a significant presence in Plutarchan studies.[2] Nonetheless it is clear that homonoia was for Plutarch a key to success at both an individual and corporate level.[3] His use of the ideal across the corpus confirms that homonoia is one of the greatest goods of human life; it is a prerequisite to other goods, such as wealth and power.[4] Surveying a comprehensive list of occurrences of the word, multiple levels of homonoia emerge. From Plutarch's vantage point, the benefits of *homonoia* stretch from the individual bodies of animals and humans, on the local (or even microscopic) levels, all the way to the empire. It affects human relations at every level, from brothers and spouses to geopolitics. Combined with the sheer size of the corpus, this variety makes it difficult to perfectly isolate any one particular definition of homonoia. It is clear nonetheless that the most striking concentration of "homonoia" occurrences is contained in Plutarch's *Political Precepts* (παραγγέλματα πολιτικά).[5]

This work is therefore my focus, and homonoia is among the most important of its precepts. While the actual term "homonoia" appears in *Precepts*, Plutarch (like Paul) does not limit himself to any one word in his advice for Greek politicians. It is important to bear in mind the fact that homonoia rhetoric is a topos that does not necessarily feature repeated use of any single term. In this regard *Precepts* has something in common with 1 Corinthians. Plutarch's definition of homonoia, however, is more explicit and more practical than Paul's.[6] *Precepts* is first and foremost a political manual, rather than a theological essay (or epistle). While Plutarch's environment differs in substantial ways from Paul's, his conviction that tolerant humility is superior to quarrelsome self-righteousness is difficult to distinguish, at times, from early Christian rhetoric. In both contexts the author's motivation is to defuse social, political, or religious tensions with homonoia rhetoric.

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[2] Major recent collections include Nikolaidis 2008 and de Blois 2005 (2 vols.). Verseput 2001 acknowledges the importance of the idea, but focuses on *philia*. Tsouvala's article (2008, below) is also an exception.

[3] Homonoia is"not just a simple ideal, but a vital necessity" to Plutarch's elite class (Carrière 1977, 241).

[4] *De Frat. Amor.* 487F; without homonoia, "there is not any joy or profit either in 'wealth' or 'in that kingly rule which makes men like gods;'" ἧς χωρὶς οὔτε πλούτου φασὶν οὔτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς εἶναί τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν

[5] Hereafter *Precepts*. Homonoia occurs more often in *Precepts* (6 times) than any other of Plutarch's many surviving works. There are 61 instances of the word in total, five of which are verbs. For bibliography on *Precepts*, see Duff 1999, 293 n. 20.

Though *Precepts* is the focus here, my reading of it is informed by the scattered occurrences of "homonoia" in his *Lives* as well as *Moralia*. Yet Plutarch's use of homonoia in these other works supports the idea that for him it is most importantly a political concept. By *political* I refer first and foremost to internal civic actions and processes within the individual *poleis* of Achaea. However there is an undeniable *geo*-political aspect to Plutarch's understanding of provincial politics in general, and of homonoia in particular. By not normally mentioning Rome explicitly or substantively, Plutarch adheres to a general rule that governs all of the rhetoric in this study. The Romans are present, but "they stand threateningly in the shadows, ready to intervene violently" should the need arise."[7] The final word on any of these authors' attitudes towards Rome is beyond my scope, but it is impossible to keep Rome offstage. I will have more to say about this in the conclusion of this chapter and the remainder of the study; suffice it to say the Romans are linked to homonoia in Plutarch's oeuvre. In the *Lives*, for example, homonoia is the most beneficial possible outcome of a Roman presence in Greece.[8]

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[6] Plutarch introduces his precepts by distinguishing himself from "philosophers who urge people to take lessons from them, but give no real instruction or advice; for they are like those who trim the lamps, but fail to pour in oil" (798B); Plutarch's practicality sets him apart from his hero, Plato, who never could have imagined the Achaea of 100 CE (Sirenelli 2000, 395-396).

[7] Duff 1999, 297. On the unspoken reality of geopolitical power as opposed to "apparent power" on a local level, see Carrière 1977.

[8] This is what leads Foxhall to label homonoia a "negative" virtue: "the most important common interest of competing individuals, families and groups within a Greek city was avoiding Roman interference" because if that

And interpersonal homonoia as portrayed elsewhere in the *Moralia* supports and enhances its geopolitical emphasis in *Precepts*.[9] In the *Precepts*, finally, homonoia defines the successful politician.[10] It is a means of making autonomy and autocracy coexist in the Greek East.

Precepts is the most significant of Plutarch's political writings, and perhaps "the most important single expression of Greek elite views of living with Romans."[11] Asked for advice by a young, aspiring politician around the turn of the first century (called Menemachus), Plutarch responded with *Precepts*. It could be thought of as an introductory course in political science that has significant similarities with Paul's letter to Corinth.[12] Homonoia is the central element of Plutarch's "syllabus," for he defines political success as the preservation of homonoia and the prevention of *stasis*. The "best thing," he says, "is to see to it in advance that *stasis* shall never arise."[13] Avoiding or eradicating infighting is "the primary and finest function of politics" (824C). Yet homonoia is not purely negative; it also characterizes his ideal polis. He poses a practical question at the outset: "Nowadays, when the affairs of the cities no longer include leadership in wars, nor the overthrowing of tyrannies, nor acts of alliances, what opening for a conspicuous and brilliant public career could a young man find?"[14] His question implies that the authority of his audience, aspiring politicians, is much further contracted than it would have

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occurred, "everyone lost and no one gained" (2002, 181). Desideri puts it more positively: the problem is to ensure as much vitality as possible for indigenous institutions despite foreign imposition (2011, 85).

[9] Plutarch advocates a conjugal harmony within the oikos, for example, this too is linked to his interest in geopolitical "same-thinking." Tsouvala confirms this in her study of intermarriage; for Plutarch, marriage is "the institution that can create homonoia—and therefore peace—across the Empire" (2008, 713).

[10] Or "statesman," which I will use interchangeably with *politikos*.

[11] Swain 1996, 162; Desideri 2011, 84 calls Precepts "the most important" political work in the corpus.

[12] The academic language is Sirinelli's (2000, 398-399). See also Kokkinia 2006, 183. The precise date is unknown; a reference to the "recent" rule of Domitian (815 D) is the strongest evidence for circa 100. On the imprecise chronology of Plutarch's works, see Jones 1995, who dates Precepts to between 96 and 114.

[13] 824C, κράτιστον δὲ προνοεῖν, ὅπως μηδέποτε στασιάζωσι, καὶ τοῦτο τῆς πολιτικῆς τέχνης μέγιστον ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ κάλλιστον.

[14] 805A, νῦν οὖν ὅτε τὰ πράγματα τῶν πόλεων οὐκ ἔχει πολέμων ἡγεμονίας οὐδὲ τυραννίδων καταλύσεις οὐδὲ συμμαχικὰς πράξεις, τίν᾽ ἄν τις ἀρχὴν ἐπιφανοῦς λάβοι καὶ λαμπρᾶς πολιτείας;. This sort of sentiment is the basis for Dillon's view (1997) that Plutarch believes he lives at "the end of history," in Fukuyama's twentieth –century, Hegelian sense. Dillon does not mention the question quoted here, but highlights parallel ideas in On the Oracles at Delphi (408BC [235]).

been in the Classical era that Plutarch and his peers are so wont to recall. The answer, for Plutarch, is to instill homonoia in his polis. The ideal statesman recognizes the severe limitations that Rome has placed upon him, and will remind his peers of the "weak condition" of Greece. This weakness is the most important aspect of Plutarch's historical context; it determines the tone of his own rhetoric as well as that of Dio and Aristides. The only avenue to success for them is within the context of the "forced blessing" of Roman peace.[15] This context is one "in which it is best for wise men to accept one advantage — a life of stillness and homonoia."[16] To struggle against this is to vainly oppose fortune (*tyche*). In the interest of maintaining the status quo, the *politikos* must teach others to yield in insignificant matters in the interest of maintaining homonoia. He should seize disputes as if they were diseases, and cure them with his treatments (825 D).

Homonoia's positive presence is clearest when, in *Precepts*' conclusion, Plutarch defines four qualities of a successful polis. These are peace, freedom, strength, and homonoia.[17] This is directly related to the limited Greek sovereignty in the Roman Empire. Plutarch advocates what could be called a politics of prudence that saw the road to prosperity as the prevention of Roman meddling. Second-century political success for Plutarch seems to consist of preserving a "smooth surface" for outsiders to see.[18] Of all these "greatest goods" mentioned in the conclusion, for example, the statesman can only concern himself with the last. Plutarch dismantles the first three of qualities as politically irrelevant, which leaves homonoia on a pedestal. As to peace and freedom, the Romans have given both to Plutarch's native land. War has “disappeared,” everywhere, and the Greeks have sufficient freedom (824C). Economic abundance and a fertile population, furthermore, are largely out of any leader’s control. Plutarch views these as benefits given by the gods; all a statesman can do is pray for the continuation of divine favor and prosperity. The fourth quality is therefore the only of Plutarch’s key attributes that matters:

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[15] The phrase is Alcock's (1993, 14). Her conclusion that "[u]nity came only with subservience to an outside power" is also relevant (129).

[16] 824E, ἧς ἓν ἀπολαῦσαι ἄμεινόν ἐστι τοῖς εὖ φρονοῦσι, μεθ᾽ ἡσυχίας καὶ ὁμονοίας καταβιῶναι. It is worth noting Plutarch's realism is substantive enough to allow for disagreement among friends (see below).

[17] 824C, εἰρήνης, ἐλευθερίας, εὐετηρίας, and ὁμονοίας. Plutarch also links εὐανδρίας to εὐετηρίας, but the association seems close enough to consider them as one characteristic.

[18] Foxhall 2002, 181-182.

> There remains, then, for the statesman, of those activities which fall within his province, only this—and it is the equal of any of the other blessings—always to instill homonoia and friendship in those who dwell together with him and to remove strifes, discords, and all enmity.
>
> λείπεται δὴ τῷ πολιτικῷ μόνον ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔργων, ὃ μηδενὸς ἔλαττόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμόνοιαν ἐμποιεῖν καὶ φιλίαν ἀεὶ τοῖς συνοικοῦσιν, ἔριδας δὲ καὶ διχοφροσύνας καὶ δυσμένειαν ἐξαιρεῖν ἅπασαν. 824D

This is among the most explicit instances of an eastern elite’s advocacy of homonoia. In *Precepts*, the rhetoric is based upon a pragmatic understanding of the polis itself, which is clarified here (as in our other authors) with a metaphor.

The Queen Bee

Plutarch uses bee imagery (among countless other metaphors) to envisage his ideal political environment. A bee simile occurs three times in *Precepts*. Each of these develops Plutarch’s geopolitical ideal: to maximize Achaean autonomy and cultural prestige while acknowledging political limitations that were, by his lifetime, quite old. The first instance of the simile is perhaps the most predictable in its support for the status of current leaders of the *polis*: “the statesman (*politikos*) is always by nature ruler (*archon*) of the polis, like the queen bee.”[19] As such, his power is great: “he ought to keep public matters (*demosia*) in his own hands” (813C). This is the strongest statement of Plutarch’s respect for local office-holders. His respect is to a significant extent a product of his respect for the office itself. Every political office is

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[19] Literally “leader among bees,” ἡγεμὼν ἐν μελίτταις (813C), as the gender of the insect was unknown until the early modern period.

"great and sacred," and therefore he admonishes his audience to "pay the highest honor" to its holder.[20] This is related to the high standard to which he holds authorities (confirmed in his conclusion). The *politikos*, for Plutarch, constantly acts in the public interest.[21]

The second instance of the bee simile shows the combination of Plutarch's expectations for both the *politikos* and *politai*. In this case, the bee imagery is embedded in rhetoric aimed at the "hive" of the citizenry at large, yet it has implications for the leader himself. On the one hand, Plutarch expects deference from the *demos*; he believes that "bees would come off better if they would only welcome and placate their keepers and attendant instead of stinging them and making them angry."[22] The context of this line indicates Plutarch is interested first and foremost on conditions within the individual polis; it is homonoia rhetoric in reference to class. It is difficult to identify precisely what segment of the *polis* Plutarch has in mind when referring to the "bees" or "hive." *Precepts* suggests, however, that at least part of the problem is systemic. A democratic polis, according to Plutarch, is inherently troublesome. "There is in every *demos* a spirit of malice and fault-finding."[23] In fact, unanimity makes the *demos* nervous; conspiracy theories, which lead to open opposition, are common (813A). Because Menemachus leads so many taciturn citizens, it is imperative that he "not to let any *stasis* or challenge (*antilogia*)" against him endure (813A). This is only possible through attention to his own *ethos*, as we will see below.

The political leaders are therefore also implicated in the simile. The key to obtaining a state of acquiescence to authority—whether in the apiary or agora—is trust (*pistis*) in the leader himself. Plutarch highlights *pistis* and another quality which help to create an ideal political environment: “nothing makes a man willingly manageable and gentle to another man except trust in his goodwill (*eunoia*) and belief in his nobility and justice.”[24] The link between *eunoia* and homonoia is profound; Plutarch’s descriptions of either term are difficult to separate. For example *eunoia* is a key to political success (821D), and its socio-political consequences are potentially radical. It is “a weapon of defense for the good against the slanderous and wicked,…keeping off envy, and in the matter of power, making the low-born equal to the nobles, the poor to the rich, and the private citizen to the office-holders.”[25] This is another instance of the social leveling implied in homonoia rhetoric that emphasizes equality of status over equality of essence (above, and Chapter 1). The traditional status categories are taken for granted, but they are subordinate to a transcendent emphasis on agreement on more important matters. In Paul’s case, these matters were social and spiritual; in Plutarch’s, they are primarily political. It is worth noting that in Plutarch’s view, the citizens, because they are reasonable creatures, deserve to be convinced by their leaders to be in harmony with one another, rather than forced. Unlike a keeper, he cannot routinely use smoke to force complacency in his beehive (821B). Hence the importance of rhetoric and the ethical emphasis of *Precepts.*

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[20] 816A, ἱερὸν δὲ χρῆμα καὶ μέγα πᾶσαν ἀρχὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἄρχοντα δεῖ μάλιστα τιμᾶν.
[21] 823E, Public business (δημοσιεύω) is the politician's "life and work" (βίος καὶ πρᾶξις), not simply a routine duty (λειτουργία). For Plutarch, politics is "the lifestyle for those of wealth and good birth," notes Foxhall (2002, 174-175).
[22] 821A, οἶμαι δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὰς μελίττας ἀπαλλάττειν βέλτιον, εἰ τοὺς τρέφοντας καὶ θεραπεύοντας ἀσπάζεσθαι καὶ προσίεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κεντεῖν καὶ χαλεπαίνειν ἐβούλοντο.
[23] 813A παντὶ: δήμῳ τὸ κακόηθες καὶ φιλαίτιον ἔνεστι.

The final appearance of the bee in *Precepts* occurs in the essay’s conclusion, where Plutarch restates the most significant themes. Here the simile offers a view of the entire apiary through a wider lends. In Plutarch’s view, the rational and political nature of humans sets them apart from other creatures; it is these essential characteristics that make homonoia possible in the human community. In this instance, however, the bee simile breaks down; the ideal situation in a polis is, after all, the opposite of that of a hive.

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[24] ἄνθρωπον δ᾽ ἀνθρώπῳ χειροήθη καὶ πρᾶον ἑκουσίως οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πίστις εὐνοίας καὶ καλοκαγαθίας δόξα καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρίστησιν; see also 821C, where both *pistis* and *eunoia* are repeated as the two most important advantages for a politician.

[25] 821D, ὅτι πρὸς τοὺς βασκάνους καὶ πονηροὺς ὅπλον ἡ παρὰ τῶν πολλῶν εὔνοια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἐστιν…ἀπερύκουσα τὸν φθόνον καὶ πρὸς τὰς δυνάμεις ἐπανισοῦσα τὸν ἀγεννῆ τοῖς εὐπατρίδαις καὶ τὸν πένητα τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην τοῖς ἄρχουσι;.As Carrière notes, eunoia is linked to hierarchy, however. It ”cements” the body politic through a “paternal affection” of the powerful for the “lowly” and the devotion of the lowly to their betters (1977, 241).

> Now those who are skilled in tending and keeping bees think that the hive which hums loudest and is most full of noise is thriving and in good condition; but he to whom God has given the care of the rational and political hive will judge its happiness primarily by the quietness and tranquility of the *demos*.
>
> οἱ μὲν οὖν ἔμπειροι θεραπείας καὶ τροφῆς μελιττῶν τὸν μάλιστα βομβοῦντα τῶν σίμβλων καὶ θορύβου μεστὸν τοῦτον εὐθηνεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν νομίζουσιν ᾧ δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ σμήνους ἐπιμέλειαν ἔχειν ὁ θεὸς ἔδωκεν, ἡσυχίᾳ μάλιστα καὶ πραότητι δήμου τεκμαιρόμενος εὐδαιμονίαν. 823F

Though “homonoia” does not appear here, this is a clear instance of homonoia rhetoric; the idealization of “peace and quiet” and the noticeable absence of “buzzing” are directly related to homonoia in that they characterize an environment in which unanimity is possible. For Plutarch, the cultivation of such an environment is the primary responsibility of the effective politician. One of the greatest obstacles to reaching this objective is the *agonistic* cultural environment.

COMPETITION and HOMONOIA

A fundamental characteristic of Plutarch’s context is competition within and between cities.[26] Plutarch and his peers lived in a time where traditional *agon* had intensified into outright hatred and jealousy that affected many poleis of the eastern provinces. It is easy to sense the *schadenfreude* of Plutarch’s world. Honors were jealously guarded and insults painfully felt; both were carefully catalogued in both official records and social memory.[27] Stadter supposes “many ancient Greeks would have agreed,” with Lombardi’s adage that “winning isn’t everything, it’s the only thing.”[28] As a priest, ambassador, and philosopher, Plutarch may have been relatively detached from the rough and tumble local political scene, at least in comparison with someone like Dio Chrysostom.[29] Yet his Achaea is plagued by the same contentiousness that is rife in Dio’s Asia. Competition was so endemic as to make Plutarch grateful, at least to some extent, for a Roman presence. Regarding “freedom,” (*eleutheria*) he concludes the Greeks “have as great a share as our rulers grant them, and perhaps more would not be better for them.”[30] This is a remarkable example of a Greek giving credence to what must have been, by Plutarch’s time, a stereotype regarding Hellenic contentiousness.[31]

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[26] In the Common Era, violent *stasis* was no longer a problem, “but the contest for honor, glory, and power continued as before.” (Stadter 2011, 254).Competition created demand for homonoia, which was “the only way for the system to survive,” according to Jones (1971, 112). See also M. de la Vega 2002, 96. Zuiderhoek 2009, 66-70, summarizes the gravity of the situation in Asia Minor specifically in regards to social class. He links political dominance and economic accumulation with public munificence; Kokkinia 2006, 184 describes the three main levels of the second-century social pyramid in Achaea.

[27] For *philotimia* and persistent polis-based allegiance in spite of trans-regional provincial administration, see Alcock 1993, 156-157.

But supercharged *agon* was an inherently ambiguous phenomenon, for even if competition bred *stasis*, it was also the very lifeblood of the polis. A city’s wellbeing depended on the public works, magistrates, entertainment, and funding that competition might win. The rewards for becoming preeminent in the eyes of one’s neighbors—and in the eyes of Rome—were of political and economic significance. Plus, a man like Plutarch (or like his protégé) could succeed only by being of “one mind” with those above and below him in the socio-political hierarchy. Therefore decrying *stasis* and promoting homonoia occurred within—not despite—a competitive environment. With this in mind, Plutarch urges politicians to honor friendship over accumulating honors, and makes an important connection between prestige and homonoia: high status should be a function of earnest promotion of homonoia. As Plutarch articulates the ideal, “the honor of an office resides in unity of thinking (ὁμοφροσύνη) and friendship (φιλία) with one's colleagues much more than in crowns and a purple-bordered robe."[32] It was not a matter of revolutionizing an honor-based society, but of prioritizing homonoia above traditional prizes and status.[33]

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[28] Stadter 2011, 237.

[29] Aalders 1982, 6-7, notes an improbability, given the size of Plutarch’s corpus, that he had time for a political career in addition to writing; on the comparison with Chrysostom, see Stadter 2002a, 3.

[30] 824C, ἐλευθερίας δ᾽ ὅσον οἱ κρατοῦντες νέμουσι τοῖς δήμοις μέτεστι καὶ τὸ πλέον ἴσως οὐκ ἄμεινον. See also Flam. 12.3, which is interesting for two reasons. First, the “freedom” announced in 196BCE was, according to Plutarch, of secondary importance to homonoia; the eleutheria seems μικρότατον. Secondly, Flaminius prides himself more for replacing *stasis* with homonoia than for his Macedonian exploits.

[31] Burrell 2004, 355; see also Foxhall 2002, 181.

If Plutarch had to attribute political problems to one thing, he might well choose *philotimia*. "Love of honor" is among the most common obstacles to homonoia. *Philotimia* is especially dangerous because it tends to grow and become uncontrollable in the interaction between powerful men and the *demos* at large. It is "innate," Plutarch says, "in the most vigorous and impetuous, and the surge which comes from the masses, raising it on the crest of the wave and sweeping it along by shouts of praise, often makes it unrestrained and unmanageable."[34] Reading *Precepts* reminds one that "honor" was "not as intangible as ancient authors and modern scholars often portray it."[35] Like the closely associated "love of winning" (*philonikia*), *philotimia* is an inherently ambivalent term.[36] Plutarch uses a certain Theagenes to exemplify the ambivalence. He was an athlete of some renown, but the "honors" were too much for him. While his "*philotimia* and *philonikia*" may have contributed to his significant trophy case, there is no doubt in Plutarch's mind that they drove him to become a pompous celebrity who could not bear others' successes. According to Plutarch, there is no difference between this athlete and certain politicians; they are both over-eager to “strip down” for competition (811D). Love of honor and victory can therefore both inspire healthy competition and even excellence, yet they are also potentially two of the worst vices in political life. Plutarch is keenly aware of the *philotimia* that inevitably caused conflict within the highest reaches of any polis.[37]

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[32] 816A, τιμὴ δ᾽ ἀρχῆς ὁμοφροσύνη καὶ φιλία 'πρὸς συνάρχοντας πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ στέφανοι καὶ χλαμὺς περιπόρφυρος; these are in homonoia's semantic field. On honors, see also 820B-D.

[33] The goal is not to eradicate, but to "soften" *philotimia* by doing everything possible to separate the "honor" from the parasitic "envy" (φθόνος) and "fault-finding" (μῶμος) that so often latch onto it (820A).

[34] 819F, καὶ γὰρ τὸ τολμᾶν αὐτῇ πρόσεστι μᾶλλον ἐμφύεται…ἐρρωμέναις μάλιστα καὶ νεανικαῖς προαιρέσεσι, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν ὄχλων ῥόθιον πολλάκις συνεξαῖρον αὐτὴν καὶ συνεξωθοῦν τοῖς ἐπαίνοις ἀκατάσχετον ποιεῖ καὶ δυσμεταχείριστον.

[35] Burrell 2004, 358.

[36] Frazier 1988, 119; on the ambiguity, see Burrell 2004, 252; Stadter 2011, 244, finds *philonikia* less ambiguous than *philotimia*. It is "almost uniformly negative," especially among friends, relations, and political associates. Stadter also highlights the problematic orthography of *philonikia* / *philoneikia* as potentially a compound of either *nike*, "victory," or *neikos*, "strife" (238-240). He argues for the latter without neglecting the ambiguity; "love of winning" was easily abused in both Roman and Greek societies in the second century. One's motives separated a noble pursuit from the "mere contentiousness" destructive to society that Plutarch decries in Moralia (252). See also Duff 1999, 84, 89; *philonikia* is paired with *pleonexia* (greed) at 815A; see also 819B, C for avoiding *philonikia* through delegating wisely; 809F for avoiding envy through generous compliments for friends.

The primary obstacle to homonoia in Achaea is internal then, rather than external. This is true on at least two levels. First, conflict within the city walls at Sardis is much more likely to give Menemachus headaches than a foreign threat. Plutarch notes two types of *stasis*: that between equals, and that between members of different classes. Both class conflict and infighting within any single class were common problems. On a second level, Plutarch’s philosophical vantage point draws attention to the battle within the politician as an individual human being. The issue is “ethical” in that an individual’s *ethos* is the ultimate origin of either *stasis* or homonoia. It is the behavior of local leaders and their fellow citizens that most commonly prevent like-thinking. A Plutarchan premise is that ignorance (*agnoia*) of the *ethos* of the citizens is dangerous. It is the task of the *politikos*

> to train the *ethos* of the citizens, leading them gently towards that which is better and treating them with mildness; for it is a difficult task to change the multitude. But do you yourself, since you are henceforth to live as on an open stage, educate your character and put it in order; and if it is not easy wholly to banish evil from the soul, at any rate remove and repress those faults which are most flourishing and conspicuous.
>
> τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολιτῶν ἦθος ἰσχύοντα δεῖ καὶ πιστευόμενον ἤδη πειρᾶσθαι ῥυθμίζειν ἀτρέμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ὑπάγοντα καὶ πράως μεταχειριζόμενον: ἐργώδης γὰρ ἡ μετάθεσις τῶν πολλῶν. αὐτὸς δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ τὸ λοιπὸν ἀναπεπταμένῳ βιωσόμενος, ἐξάσκει καὶ κατακόσμει τὸν τρόπον: εἰ δὲ μὴ ῥᾴδιον ἀπαλλάξαι παντάπασι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν κακίαν, ὅσα γοῦν ἐπανθεῖ μάλιστα καὶ προπίπτει τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἀφαιρῶν καὶ κολούων. (800A)

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[37] 819F, ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία…ἔχει κῆρας ἐν πολιτείᾳ; Lafond describes a preponderance of *philotimia* in inscriptions as well (2010, 107).

This is a clear example of Plutarch's expectation that Menemachus will understand the *ethos* of his polis, on the one hand, and cultivate his own character, on the other. Both are required for *homonoia* to flourish. "How one held office," notes Foxhall, "was even more important than which offices one held."[38] The emphasis on personal ethics, or "character" (*ethos*) here is symptomatic of contemporary political thought; absent constitutional strictures, an individual's virtues (and vices) became all the more important.[39] This was true in Rome, for the emperor (which is clear in Seneca, for example, as well as Pliny the Younger); yet "aretology" was in the air. Virtues were important in the political discourse on the local level as well. Plutarch, Dio, and Aristides all attest to this.[40] Furthermore, there is very little separating this virtue-laden rhetoric of pagans from that of their Christian neighbors. Homonoia has an important part in both.

"Like-thinking" is not a virtue per se since it is not something that can be practiced by the individual. Rather homonoia is the result of the proper mixture of virtues, as well as an impetus for virtuous behavior. It is the mark of the environment in which "politics is a part of ethics."[41] The virtues are building blocks of an indispensable "strong, permanent, and permeating mixture of sanity and soundness" that counteracts *stasis*.[42] Homonoia rhetoric is therefore inseparable from the virtues that Plutarch and contemporaries emphasize. Ultimately *Precepts* shows a strong connection between ethics and "like-thinking." This link will reveal itself in each of the following chapters. In *Precepts,* the essence of Plutarch's message does not change: the statesman must lead by personifying virtue (*arête*) so as to stifle vices (809 F). More importantly, his statements regarding the avoidance of *stasis* and enhancement of any given virtue culminate in his description of the politician's primary duty: to foster homonoia (824D).

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[38] "Both etiquette and strategy played important roles;" Foxhall refers to a "complex hierarchical matrix of civic duties and behaviors" that required careful navigation (2002, 175).

[39] The early sections of Precepts, for example, encourage the understanding of citizen's *ethos* and the mastery of one's own (799). The preeminent role of virtues and vices as the basis for behavior comes across quite strongly in Plutarch's description of Cleon, who severed ties with his friends upon entering public life: "But he would have done better if he had cast out from his soul *philoplutia* and *philoneikia* and had cleansed himself of envy (*phthonos*) and malice (*kakoeitheia*); for the polis needs, not men who have no friends or comrades, but good men (*kreistos*) and sane (*sophros*) men (806F). For the idea that "character counts," and that a leader's self-control is an essential aspect of politics circa 100, see Lafond 2010, 114.

[40] Plutarch's Lives are a major example (see Duff 1999); the principle is articulated clearly at *Num*. 20. Latin literature shows a similar attention to the personal character of leaders, particularly a senatorial concern for proper conduct on the part of the emperor. Stadter 2002b reads Plutarch in tandem with Pliny in order to show how both reflect "Trajanic ideology." Sirinelli concurs in thinking *Precepts* "echoes" Trajanic policies (2000, 399).

[41] Aalders 1982, 10.

HOMONOIA'S BREADTH

Plutarch's ethical expectations govern a statesman's behavior in both the *oikos* and the agora. At the end of *Precepts*, it comes across in the assertion that, by his efforts towards homonoia, "the great is made small and the small is reduced to nothing" (καὶ τὸ μέγα γίγνεται μικρὸν καὶ τὸ μικρὸν εἰς τὸ μηδὲν ἄγεται) (825D). The "great" here refers to public matters, while the "small" are private, or domestic. Plutarch is keen to establish the idea that there is very little difference between the two, as far as political success is concerned.

A look at another of Plutarch's essays clarifies what he has in mind. The principle is expressed most clearly in Plutarch's *Marriage Precepts*: "a man ought to have his household well harmonized who is going to harmonize polis, agora, and friends."[43] In *Precepts,* this is directly related to Plutarch's realism about the political beehive: "the people love and admire one man and dislike and despise another quite as much for his private as for his public practices."[44] Like the following authors, then, Plutarch thinks of homonoia as beginning in the home; conversely, just as a small house fire can overtake an entire city, so *stasis* can spread from house to house until the polis is engulfed (824F). He clearly subscribes to the notion of an ethical ripple effect. Thus the ideal *politikos* "is on an equal level with others in his clothing and daily life, in the bringing up of his children and as regards the servants who wait upon his wife, as one who wishes to live like the masses and be friendly with them."[45]

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[42] 824A, τὸ ἀπαθὲς καὶ τὸ ὑγιαῖνον ἐγκεκρᾶσθαι πολὺ καὶ παραμένειν καὶ συνοικεῖν. The context of this passage is a discussion of civic *stasis* which culminates in Plutarch's description of homonoia as the greatest duty of the *politikos* (824D, and above).

[43] 144C, where a critic points out the hypocrisy of an orator speaking *peri homonoias* without being able to reach homonoia with his own wife (and her maid). See also Alex. 9, where the same charged is leveled against Philip II. Ramelli 2008 highlights the parallels between Plutarch and Musonius Rufus, according to whose Stoicism "the most important element in a household is concord" (377). He also points out more general similarities with Stoic thought, particularly the idea of marriage as biou koinōnia (393-394). For the same ideal in the context of household codes of the NT and contemporary literature, see Balch 1988, 40. On marriage and homonoia, see Tsouvala 2008, 704: "For Plutarch, conjugality is the institution that controls uproar in the polis, joins ethne together, and promotes homonoia at all levels of the socially and ethnically diverse world of the Empire."

The idea is also forcefully expressed in Plutarch's work on "brotherly love" (*De Fraterno Amore*), in which homonoia is the natural condition between brothers.[46] Plutarch concludes that "most friendships are in reality shadows and imitations of that first friendship which nature implanted in children toward parents and in brothers toward brothers."[47] The homonoia theorized there is "biologically determined," in a way. As products of the same "seed," nature has engineered brothers for homonoia. The healthy existence of each individual, moreover, is contingent upon homonoia of his or her constituent elements. Plutarch uses the analogy of the body to illustrate: "just as in the same body the combination of moist and dry, cold and hot, sharing one nature and diet, by their homonoia and agreement (*symphonia*) engender bodily *harmonia*," so brothers should be unified (478E). Similarly, if "strife (*pleonexia*) and stasis" are dangerous to both animals and human communities, there is hope that through "like-thinking"

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[44] 801A, οὐχ ἧττον ἀπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἢ τῶν δημοσίων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τὸν μὲν φιλοῦντες καὶ θαυμάζοντες τὸν δὲ δυσχεραίνοντες καὶ καταφρονοῦντες.

[45] 823B, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσος καὶ ὁμαλὸς ἐσθῆτι καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ τροφαῖς παίδων καὶ θεραπείᾳ γυναικός, οἷον ὁμοδημεῖν καὶ συνανθρωπεῖν τοῖς πολλοῖς βουλόμενος

[46] De frat. amor. 478E,F; see also 483D on the threat to homonoia that wills commonly present.

[47] De frat. amor. 479C,D, σκιαὶ γάρ εἰσιν ὄντως αἱ πολλαὶ φιλίαι καὶ μιμήματακαὶ εἴδωλα τῆς πρώτης ἐκείνης, ἣν παισί τε πρὸς γονεῖς ἡ φύσις ἀδελφοῖς τε πρὸς ἀδελφοὺς ἐμπεποίηκε.

(ὁμοφροσύνη) of brothers, both family and household flourish (τέθηλε)." They will be "like a harmonious *choros*, neither do, nor say, nor think, anything discordant."[48]

The body (*soma*) therefore requires *symphonia* and homonoia to survive. This is a microscopic version of what the political homonoia outlined in *Precepts;* it is paralleled in Plutarch's thought by a conception of domestic homonoia that is natural, yet not necessarily lasting, to brothers. On all three levels—individual, domestic, and societal—Plutarch uses the same language to describe the harmonious ideal and its opposite. The threat of greed (*pleonexia*) and stasis, for example, is true on the biological level as it is for the political scene. *Eunoia*, on the other hand, is vital to lasting brotherhood as it is for political success. This is one indication of the inseparability of the microscopic from the macroscopic in Plutarch's conception of homonoia. Another example is his belief that nothing solidifies homonoia between brothers as having the same friends and enemies (490F); the domestic is therefore necessarily societal to some extent.

As to the societal or political level of homonoia, there is something of a leveling effect implied in the rhetoric in the concluding chapters of *Precepts*. Plutarch admonishes Menemachus to "show himself in his private differences mild and conciliatory (*amenitos*)," and to treat "no one with *philonikia*, anger, or any other *pathos*" (825E). Plutarch must have been skeptical that any contemporary Greek polis would be able to follow Plato's advice (quoted in *De Frat. Amor.*) to do away with private property. Nevertheless the local leaders should appreciate the spirit of the Platonic ideal.[49] Here Plutarch's language is again reminiscent of Christian epistles: the leaders should "love equality and cling to it" (τὴν ἴσην ἀγαπᾶν καὶ τῆς ἴσης περιέχεσθαι). In doing so, they lay a strong foundation for "homonoia and *eirene*" (484B).

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[48] ὥσπερ ἐμμελὴς χορὸς οὐθὲν οὔτε πράσσουσιν ἐναντίον οὔτε λέγουσιν οὔτε φρονοῦσιν

[49] The same ideal regarding the absence of private property is cited by Aristides at 23.65.

In this instance the distance is clearly not great between Plutarch’s *philadelphia* and the ideal of the Christian *ekklesia*. The *Precepts* shows the same resemblance. The language is at times positively “Pauline;” it has much in common with the early Christian calls to humility and submission surveyed in other chapters.[50] Like Paul, Clement, and Ignatius, Plutarch’s emphasis on homonoia had social ramifications. The *politikos*’ interest in homonoia will affect his behavior:

> he is affable and generally accessible and approachable for all, keeping his house always unlocked as a harbor of refuge for those in need, and showing his solicitude and friendliness, not only by acts of service, but also by sharing the griefs of those who fail and the joys of those who succeed.
>
> ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν εὐπροσήγορος καὶ κοινὸς ὢν πελάσαι καὶ προσελθεῖν ἅπασιν, οἰκίαν τε παρέχων ἄκλειστον ὡς λιμένα φύξιμον ἀεὶ τοῖς χρῄζουσι, καὶ τὸ κηδεμονικὸν καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐ χρείαις οὐδὲ πράξεσι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ συναλγεῖν πταίουσι καὶ κατορθοῦσι συγχαίρειν. 823A

Not only is this one of the more succinct descriptions of Plutarch’s perfect office-holder, but it is also an assertion of the relative unimportance of hierarchy in the ideal community. Related to this is Plutarch’s assertion that the basis of true power and reputation is virtue (*arête*) and reason (*logos*), rather than birth or money. Together with eloquence they compensate for one’s socio-economic status in political leadership.[51] Here Plutarch is focused on the political context. We will note examples below of how early Christians made very similar statements about their own communities—new versions of *ekklesiai*. In both contexts, a member of the community (whether members or citizens, bishops or archons) only strives for “the common good" (*ta koina*).[52] Any other sort of competition, "glory," or "honor" may result in division. Rather than give a theological basis for such an ideal, however, Plutarch intensifies his warnings against *stasis* by drawing on mythological imagery. He asks us to picture Geryon, the monster with three heads and one body. Geryon was killed by Hercules in part because his extra heads or body parts did not work in concert. Plutarch uses him to illustrate the dangers of discord: if only Geryon's legs, arms, and eyes had been "of one mind," he might have withstood the attack of Hercules.[53] Plutarch's moral here is that statesmen must do exactly that—direct others with "one mind." In fact homonoia is the key to political success. *If* they are "thinking together" (ἂν ὁμονοῶσιν), politicians can succeed where Geryon failed and be "highly esteemed" (εὐδοκιμεῖν) (819D).

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[50] Compare Paul’s commands for the Christians at Rome: πένητα τοῖς πλουσίοις καὶ τὸν ἰδιώτην τοῖς ἄρχουσι (Rom. 12.15).

[51] 823A. Plutarch describes the ideal rhetoric at 802F: “his speech must be full of unaffected character, true high-mindedness, a father's frankness, foresight, and thoughtful concern for others.” (ἀλλ᾽ ἤθους ἀπλάστου καὶ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ παρρησίας πατρικῆς καὶ προνοίας καὶ συνέσεως κηδομένης ὁ λόγος ἔστω μεστός.)

GREEK HISTORY

Since the good statesman is, for Plutarch, first and foremost a peacemaker and mediator, it is logical for him to evoke Solon as model. The sixth-century Athenian did not embroil himself in the conflict between the three ancient segments of his polis. These were each associated with a geographic region (the hill, the plain, or the coast), and were at loggerheads as to the best form of constitution. The most important feature of Plutarch's view of Solon is the centrality of homonoia. Solon "said and did everything in the interest of homonoia" (πάντα λέγων καὶ πράττων πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν) (805E). Solon's role as reconciler and his pursuit of harmony are, in Plutarch's understanding, the basis of his power.

This is one of countless instances of Plutarch's use of the past. At the broadest level, Plutarch's exempla are one of the more obvious manifestations of his assertion of his own

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[52] 817D. Tsouvala notes the geopolitical significance of *koine* and *synkrasis* in Plutarch's Romulus, where the "intermarriage" (*epigamia*) of Romans and Sabines is more or less approved by Plutarch for the sake of homonoia (2008, 709-710). The context of this passage, however, seems to indicate a focus limited to Achaea.

[53] 819D, εἰ πάντα μιᾷ ψυχῇ διῴκει; The same point (in reference to imaginary creatures) is made at De frat. amor. 478E.

Hellenic identity. Plutarch's identity, like that of Dio and Aristides, was organized around "the power of language and the power of the past."[54] An emphasis on familiarity with Hellenic history seems to have been, for Plutarch (as well as Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides, see below) a prerequisite for prestige at Rome, but also for respect at home. The archaizing tendency in Plutarch is one of the more noticeable characteristics that define the Second Sophistic. Absent large scale political power, Greek-speaking elites channeled energies into emphasizing Greek culture and Greek history.[55] Kokkinia offers a helpful contrast: while Baroque painters dressed ancient subjects in modern garb, Plutarch and his peers are doing the opposite. "They apply ancient concepts to describe contemporary realities" and think about the present "in terms of the past."[56]

Plutarch assumes that politicians (including Menemachus) will draw constantly on Greek history just as he does in *Precepts*. His exempla are of course countless; of more importance here is the principle that informs them. The exempla can be thought of as small examples of what Plutarch does on a larger scale in the *Lives*. In either case, it is not anachronistic to think of Plutarch as an advocate for "character development," in his audience rather than any sort of radical change, let alone revolution, in its environments.[57] He urges his readers to use history carefully, making sure to exemplify not rebellion, but cooperation. This is clearest at the conclusion of *Precepts*, when Plutarch employs language about childhood that was quite popular in his society as well as that of the other subjects under study here. "When we see little children trying playfully to bind their fathers' shoes on their feet or wear their crowns, we only laugh."[58] The problem is, for Plutarch, that Greek politicians attempt to play the same sort of game using the past, and this threatens to undo the polis through Roman intervention. In the interest of maximizing prosperity under the "forced blessing" of Roman *pax*, Plutarch is keen to point out the dangers of using Greek history in inappropriate ways.[59]

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[54] Swain 1996, 9; no author "manipulated" the Hellenic heritage as much as Plutarch, concludes Stadter (2002a, 7).

[55] Anderson 1993, 101 comments on the selective nature of Hellenic history as conceived by Second Sophistic authors. Bowie's summary of this issue is still helpful (1970). He has supplemented it with an analysis that takes into account regional variation (or lack thereof) of historic themes (2004). The bibliography is summarized by Asirvatham 2005, 107 n.2.

[56] Kokkinia 2006, 181.

[57] 814B recommends that readers "mold the character" (ἠθοποιεῖν) of leaders through use of historical exempla; Stadter thinks the Lives were intended as "mirrors" reflecting the character of the reader (2002b, 238-239); for the idea of character development, see Jones 1971, 113, 124-125; Aalders 1982, 9; and Bremer 2004, 258.

Like the ambivalent phenomena of *philotimia* or *philonikia*, Hellenic history needs to be handled with care by the contemporary provincial politician. No matter how glorious they may seem to a Greek, the exploits of classical *strategoi* and leaders can just as easily hinder *homonoia* as help obtain it. This is implied in Plutarch's use of Solon, mentioned above. In his conclusion on this matter, he points to the danger of what might be called "patriotism." "The officials in the cities, when they foolishly urge the people to imitate the deeds, ideals, and actions of their ancestors, however unsuitable they may be to the present times and conditions, excite the crowd" (ἐξαίρουσι τὰ πλήθη) (814A). This is connected to another assertion that the stakes in Plutarch's political practices are high: the contempt of his peers is the least of all possible repercussions—more serious punishment is implied. Though evoking military adventures of the fourth century BCE might seem harmless, and deserve scorn, it risks punishment that is "no laughing matter." "Though what they do is laughable, what is done *to* them is no laughing matter, unless they are merely treated with utter contempt."[60] Military conflict in particular should be left aside: "Marathon, the Eurymedon, Plataea, and all the other examples which make the crowds vainly to swell with pride and kick up their heels, should be left to the schools of the sophists."[61] Plutarch intensifies his rhetoric here by naming three Greek poleis in which political disruption and rebellion resulted in destruction at the hands of Rome.[62] Later, he implies that actual conflict may have been a real possibility in Sardis.[63] If, as these latter passages suggest, rebellion was conceivable, this makes sophistic rhetoric on history—which we find in all three of the pagan authors here (see Chapters 4, 6)—much more than an intellectual pursuit. Exempla were potentially explosive, and the overarching theme here is that a life marked by "homonoia and quiet" is best for the polis.[64]

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[58] 814A, τὰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ παιδία τῶν πατέρων ὁρῶντες ἐπιχειροῦντα τὰς κρηπῖδας ὑποδεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς στεφάνους περιτίθεσθαι μετὰ παιδιᾶς γελῶμεν,

[59] To use Alcock's phrase once more (1993, 14). By "inappropriate" I mean anything that would motivate civic unrest; as Plutarch puts it (814C), whatever might "make the common folk vainly to swell with pride and kick up their heels (ὅσα τῶν παραδειγμάτων οἰδεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ φρυάττεσθαι διακενῆς τοὺς πολλούς).

[60] 814A, γέλωτά τε ποιοῦντες οὐκέτι γέλωτος ἄξια πάσχουσιν, ἂν μὴ πάνυ καταφρονηθῶσι. By this point, rallying citizens around military history was officially "demagogic," notes Desideri 2011, 84.

HOMONOIA and ROME

Earlier we looked at the *politikos* as "queen bee" of the polis; this simile elucidates not only domestic politics but the international scene, as Plutarch understands it. He draws from the biography of Pericles, placing him on a pedestal as a ruler who humbly recognized the freedom of his fellow citizens, and using Pericles' situation to summarize that of any politician under the Empire.[65] The example of Pericles is also a point of comparison with second-century politics. In this situation, the reality is that even the Greek rulers are themselves ruled; the highest provincial official is under the supervision of the emperor's deputy. As such, the audience of *Precepts* faces a situation even more delicate than that of his classical predecessors. Unlike Pericles, Menemachus must say to himself, "You who rule are ruled, the polis controlled by proconsuls, Caesar’s administrators.”[66] Thus there is a realist tone to Plutarch’s language here as elsewhere; his Achaea is far from a hotbed of democratic activism. Plutarch effectively places scare quotes around the notion of native political power. “What sort of power (*dynamis*) is it,” he asks, “which a small edict of a proconsul may dissolve?”[67] To the aspiring politician then, Plutarch’s seems to offer brutally honest advice. The Realpolitik tone culminates in one of the more significant descriptions of Roman superiority in Greek literature:

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[61] 814C, τὸν δὲ Μαραθῶνα καὶ τὸν Εὐρυμέδοντα καὶ τὰς Πλαταιάς, καὶ ὅσα τῶν παραδειγμάτων οἰδεῖν ποιεῖ καὶ φρυάττεσθαι διακενῆς τοὺς πολλούς, ἀπολιπόντας ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς τῶν σοφιστῶν.

[62] Thessaly, Pergamum and Rhodes are mentioned, the latter "recently under Domitian" (815D).

[63] 825D: "And indeed you yourself also no doubt have excellent examples at home in the enmity of Pardalas and Tyrrhenus, which came near to destroying Sardis by involving the State in rebellion and war as the result of petty private matters." This is the context for Duff's conclusion: "The maintenance of this harmony is the chief job of the Greek statesman" (1999, 296).

[64] 824E. Elsewhere Plutarch refutes "men who hold that betterment consists in wealth, luxury and hegemony, rather than in safety, gentleness (*praotes*), and that independence which is attended by righteousness" (*Comp. Lyc. Num.* 4.7). Dillon's analysis is helpful in its assertion that for Plutarch, "history" had "ended" in the Roman Empire—it was potentially the best monarchy ever known, and therefore obviated the need for internal conflict (1997).

[65] Pericles' name appears sixteen times here, making him the most prominent of Plutarch's many examples.

> You should not have great pride or confidence in your crown, seeing the boots just above your head. No, you should imitate the actors, who, while putting into the performance their own passion, character, and reputation, listen to the prompter and do not go beyond the degree of liberty in rhythms and meters permitted by those in authority over them.
>
> τῷ στεφάνῳ μὴ πολὺ φρονεῖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν, ὁρῶντα τοὺς καλτίους ἐπάνω τῆς κεφαλῆς· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, πάθος μὲν ἴδιον καὶ ἦθος καὶ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἀγῶνι προστιθέντας, τοῦ δ΄ ὑποβολέως ἀκούοντας καὶ μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων 813 E,F

It is hard to imagine a more realistic definition of second-century Greek “autonomy.” The *politikos* must communicate this reality to the citizenry at large; in order to flourish, they too must appreciate their constricted political purview. The leader will therefore “instruct his people both individually and collectively and will call attention to the weak condition of Greek affairs.”[68] These passages introduce the ambiguous nature of Greek identity under Roman rule in the first and second centuries.[69] This issue continues to inspire scholarly interest as a significant aspect of the Second Sophistic. On a spectrum of attitudes towards empire, Plutarch fits somewhere in the middle. His is not purely a passive protest, but neither is it an active political resistance.[70] The Empire was a well-established fact by the time of Plutarch's birth, and he clearly thrived within it. Ultimately he is willing to work within the status quo. Remembering one's "boundaries" (*horoi*) is, for Plutarch, a vital component of a leader's success and survival.

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[66] 813E, ἀρχόμενος ἄρχεις, ὑποτεταγμένης πόλεως ἀνθυπάτοις, ἐπιτρόποις Καίσαρος; Sirinelli summarizes the modern analyses, according to which Plutarch exhibits either the treachery of a Vichy collaborator, or simply a *duplicité* common to elite Greeks of his time (2000, 398).

[67] 824E, ποία δύναμις, ἣν μικρὸν ἀνθυπάτου διάταγμα κατέλυσεν; Duff sees this as “a statement of acquiescence in, even happiness with, the fact of Roman rule” (1999, 297).

[68] 824E, ἔπειτα καὶ καθ᾽ ἕνα καὶ κοινῇ διδάσκοντα καὶ φράζοντα τὴν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν πραγμάτων ἀσθένειαν

[69] Preston defined identity in Second Sophistic elites as “necessarily complicated and multiple. It is not a single, static, easily defined and apolitical entity” but rather “a complex process of construction, negotiation and contestation” (2001, 88).

Nontheless there is an ambivalence about Plutarch's stance towards the Empire that allows for a political interpretation of his rhetoric which may lie behind his obvious deference to current Roman authority. The very fact that this passage (quoted above) mentions Pericles is a reminder of *cultural* power, even if geo-political power was not in question. Pericles example is therefore double-edged. The warning about Roman power is directly linked to friend of Pericles who allegedly gave a different warning altogether: "Take care, you rule free men" (πρόσεχε, Περίκλεις ἐλευθέρων ἄρχεις). There is something potentially subversive about reminding a Greek politician of a Classical heritage marked by *eleutheria*. Tatum's observation seems right however, that as readers of Plutarch, "we have to do with cultural *resistance*, not cultural (and certainly not political) defiance."[71]

The local or regional politician's duty is to "show himself and his polis blameless" before Rome.[72] A more subtle indication of Plutarch's attitude is contained in his admonishment for clemency (809E). In the interest of the *homonoia* ideal, a *politikos* should not consider any fellow citizen an enemy. The only exception given here is who by consensus is considered an enemy of the state. Plutarch forms a line of perpetrators, each of whom proved enemies to their own polis and to Rome. It is significant, if unsurprising, that Plutarch selects villains, such as Catiline, whose status would obviously be agreed upon in both Rome and in the East as threats to wellbeing.[73] To further strengthen the case, he evokes the popular image of a conductor. When dealing with someone "singing out of tune," the *politikos* should imitate the *harmonikon* and "gently tune" the person "by tightening or relaxing the strings."[74]

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[70] Aalders sees Plutarch oscillating from devotion to the polis to "complete acceptance of and participation in" the empire (1982, 11). Duff 1999, 298, argues for a "dark picture of Rome" as a threat here; Preston sees only complexity in Plutarch's identity (2001, 115); Kokkinia 2006, 182, labels him "more Greek than Roman," rather than one or the other. Allen's description of Polybius as hostage is an apt summary for Plutarch as well: although a "student of Rome, he was not necessarily its disciple" (2006, 218).

[71] Tatum 2010, 16. While his comment is explicitly tied to the *Lives*, it is applicable to *Precepts* and the *Moralia* in general. The larger issue is whether Plutarch—or any of this study's six subjects—should be read primarily as a conciliator, or rather as an objector with regards to Rome. Taking Precepts as a whole it seems less subversive than realistic. I think Plutarch retained deep cultural pride in Achaea (suffused, it seems, with religious devotion—as in Aristides' case), but do not see any outright political resistance. Like Tatum, Anderson is open to the possibility of ambivalence in this passage with regards to Rome; he would balance the "Roman boots" with the mention of Pericles (and cultural supremacy) (1993, 102). See further below, "Conclusion."

[72] 814C, οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ παρέχειν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὴν πατρίδα…ἀναίτιον; compare Num. 20.1, where Plutarch is critical, but not openly hostile, to incessant Roman warfare, particularly before Augustus.

The most interesting aspect of Plutarch's identity, or his view of Rome vis-à-vis his Hellenic heritage, is the connection he makes between Roman imperialism and homonoia. This is clear, for example, where the word appears in his *Lives*, in which there are at least five examples of Roman conquest as a means to homonoia within foreign lands, including Greece. An early example (and close to home for Plutarch) is Flaminius' famous declaration of "freedom" for Greece some three centuries before. In his *Flaminius*, Plutarch links the Roman general's success and popularity among Greeks with his efforts towards homonoia. Flaminius established "good order" (*eunomia*) as well as justice and homonoia (12.3). It is clear from Plutarch's description of Flaminius' victory tour through Greek cities that ending *stasis* was the reason for all the celebration—so much so that the famous *eleutheria* was actually an afterthought.[75] It is worth noting that because there was no “Greece” at this point, but rather a group of autonomous *poleis*, that the homonoia here is intercity, or geopolitical in nature.[76]

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[73] This is also an example of the "duplicity" frequently manifest in Plutarch, and part of the reason Sirinelli sees him and his friends as instruments of empire, communicating Trajanic propaganda under a veneer of Platonism (2000, 404).

[74] 809E, δεῖ γὰρ ἐχθρὸν μηδένα πολίτην νομίζειν, ἂν μή τις, οἷος Ἀριστίων ἢ Νάβις ἢ Κατιλίνας νόσημα καὶ ἀπόστημα πόλεως ἐγγένηται τοὺς δ᾽ ἄλλως ἀπᾴδοντας ὥσπερ ἁρμονικὸν ἐπιτείνοντα καὶ χαλῶντα πράως εἰς τὸ ἐμμελὲς ἄγειν

Another early example of this attitude (also relatively close to Plutarch’s native land) occurs in *Aemilius Paullus*. His early second-century BCE campaign successfully brought “good order” and homonoia to Macedonia. Plutarch describes him in the same way as Flaminius: Having “arranged everything,” Paullus exhorted the Macedonians “to be mindful of the freedom bestowed upon them by the Romans and preserve it by *eunomia* and homonoia.”[77] Finally, Julius Caesar’s biography provides a third example. Whatever his faults, Caesar may have, in Plutarch’s mind, set a precedent for more recent emperors by addressing internal divisions in a place he had just conquered. Plutarch implies two phases of Caesar’s expansion into Spain, for example. Having successfully won the war, he set about solving “problems of peace.”[78] For Plutarch, the solution to the “problem” of postwar dissension is the same in the early second century CE as it was in Caesar’s time—homonoia.[79] Taken together, and in combination with the Realpolitik tone that governs *Precepts*, these examples suggest Plutarch feels a sense of relief for well-established empire in his area of the world.[80]

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[75] Flam. 12.3, καταπαύων μὲν τὰς στάσεις…ὥστε μικρότατον ἤδη τήν ἐλευθερίαν δοκεῖν ὧν εὐεργετοῦντο. That a twenty-one year-old Plutarch witnessed another such declaration in 67 CE under Nero is surely relevant (Stadter 2002a, 7). On Flaminius exhibiting “Greek” *philanthropia* and thereby questioning our understanding of Greek and Roman identity in Plutarch, see Asirvatham 2005, 120-121.

[76] “The triumph of Rome led to the creation of Greece,” notes Alcock (1993, 129), who also notes that this was the first time all of these city-states were forcibly united—and the last until the 1800s (16).

[77] *Aem.* 29.1, διῳκημένων δὲ πάντων αὐτῷ καλῶς ἀσπασάμενος τοὺς Ἕλληνας, καὶ παρακαλέσας τοὺς Μακεδόνας μεμνῆσθαι τῆς δεδομένης ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἐλευθερίας σῴζοντας αὐτὴν δι᾽ εὐνομίας καὶ ὁμονοίας. See also Pelopidas 26.3, in which Pelopidas leaves Thessaly “in homonoia towards one another” (πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοιαν); Cato Minor 36.1, where Cato brings homonoia to Byzantium.

[78] This is Perrin’s intriguing translation for ta *eirenes*—an eloquent summary of Plutarch’s world (Loeb Classical Library, 1914).

[79] Caes. 12.1 θέμενος δὲ τὰ τοῦ πολέμου καλῶς, οὐ χεῖρον ἐβράβευε τὰ Τῆς εἰρήνης, ὁμόνοιάν τε ταῖς πόλεσι καθιστὰς; see also 23.4, where Plutarch implies that the marriage of Pompey and Julia was in the interest of *eirene kai homonoia*, and the only thing preventing civil war. For the significance of this pair, see Conclusion, below.

[80] Bremer 2004 argues that the “gratitude” that Plutarch has for Roman intervention is what allows him to compose lives of men who conquered his own homeland (264).

As the quote above regarding the boots of Roman soldiers makes clear, humility, for Plutarch, goes hand in hand with homonoia. The same link is present in the following chapters. Like Paul, Clement and Ignatius, Plutarch makes a rather harsh distinction between those willing to humble themselves to others, on the one hand, and the "uncultured and vulgar" (ἀπειροκάλος καὶ σολοίκος) member of the community who refuses to heed his call to homonoia. Such opponents fail to realize Plutarch's precept that "it is often more glorious (ἐνδοξότερον). To give honor than to be honored (τιμᾶσθαι). "[81] This precept assumes a definition of "honor" (τιμή) and "glory" (δόξα) that Paul and the Christians would surely have embraced.

Plutarch further develops the humility theme by way of an acting metaphor.[82] The series of images culminates when Plutarch names two third-century Athenian actors who, although famous, played their parts even if they required submitting to inferior actors onstage. Plutarch is struck by the fact that politicians seem incapable, at times, of imitating such deference when working with or for officials from lower status. As we saw in Chapter 1, the idea of sublimating socio-economic status is at the heart of Pauline Christianity. The principle is the same here, even if the apostle places more emphasis on submission's religious aspect than on explicitly political benefit. In neither case is the audience asked to invert or undermine the socio-economic or political status quo. Indeed maintaining that situation is part and parcel of the humility promoted in homonoia rhetoric.

Humility is not the only "precept" established here, however. A provincial politician's humble mien towards Roman superiors is, ideally, counterbalanced by a determination to succeed on a local level. Overall then, Plutarch's rhetoric suggests a balancing act. A statesman must recognize the curtailment of authority that Roman dominance entails without completely ceding political autonomy or cultural prestige. In this political "game," the stakes are high.[83] The actor, whom Plutarch calls on the politician to imitate, may face the scorn of his audience if he fails to perform well. The statesman, on the other hand, could lose his life if he fails to maintain just authority. What is more, Roman military intervention was a real possibility, according to Plutarch. He reminds Menemachus of a rebellion in his native Sardis in which "many" were executed, and also mentions the common occurrence of threat of exile (813F). In fact Plutarch sees Roman intervention as healthy, if avoidable, discipline of recalcitrant provincial city. "*Poleis* which have fallen into complete disorder are utterly ruined unless they meet with some external necessity and punishment, and are thus forcibly compelled by their misfortunes to be reasonable."[84] This is Roman superiority cast as the best medicine for Achaea; there is an undeniable, ominous tone to the rhetoric that suggests Plutarch took obedience seriously.

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[81] 817 B "They did not behave like some uncultured and vulgar persons who, as if swaggering in the excess of their own power, abuse the umpires at the games, revile the *choregi* at the Dionysiac festival, and jeer at generals and gymnasiarchs, not knowing and not understanding that it is often more glorious to pay honor than to receive it."

[82] Other instances of the image, including the political "stage" and political "drama," occur at 799A; 800B; and 805D. See Anderson 1993 for popularity of this image in contemporary literature (80-81).

While actual Roman intervention could be deadly, their interference in Greek affairs was potentially more costly to the political status quo. It is this latter, relatively prosaic, bureaucratic interference that Plutarch seems to fear more than the uncommon military suppression of revolt. If Plutarch does represent a sort of political-ideological resistance against the Roman Empire, it is to the extent that he strives for as much Greek autonomy as possible. His imagery clarifies this point and supports the view of his *Precepts* as a prescription for balance. In regards to Rome's supremacy over the eastern cities, he says "the statesman, while making his native land (*patris*) readily obedient to its sovereigns, must not further humble it; nor, when the leg has been fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke."[85] Thus obeisance brings its own risks, according to Plutarch's calculations. The problem is not so much the Romans, for Plutarch, as overzealous Greek citizens whose constant appeals to the proconsul bring unwanted political or economic interference.

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[83] 813F; Stadter summarizes: "Execution or exile awaited a false step by a senator or general. Fear of conspiracy dictated harsh measures; the possibility of revolt and civil war was always near" (2011, 254). I owe the idea of playing the political "game" to Lafond 2010, 105.

[84] 824A, δὲ δι᾽ ὅλων ἀναταραχθεῖσαι πόλεις κομιδῇ διεφθάρησαν, ἂν μή τινος ἀνάγκης ἔξωθεν τυχοῦσαι καὶ κολάσεως ὑπὸ κακῶν βίᾳ σωφρονήσωσιν.

> For just as those who have become accustomed neither to dine nor to bathe except by the physician's orders do not even enjoy that degree of health which nature grants them, so those who invite the sovereign's decision on every decree, meeting of a council, granting of a privilege, or administrative measure, force their sovereign to be their master more than he desires. And the cause of this is chiefly the greed and contentiousness of the foremost citizens.
>
> ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ χωρὶς ἰατροῦ μήτε δειπνεῖν μήτε λούεσθαι συνεθισθέντες οὐδ᾽ ὅσον ἡ φύσις δίδωσι χρῶνται τῷ ὑγιαίνειν, οὕτως οἱ παντὶ δόγματι καὶ συνεδρίῳ καὶ χάριτι καὶ διοικήσει προσάγοντες ἡγεμονικὴν κρίσιν ἀναγκάζουσιν ἑαυτῶν μᾶλλον ἢ βούλονται δεσπότας εἶναι τοὺς ἡγουμένους. αἰτία δὲ τούτου μάλιστα πλεονεξία καὶ φιλονικία τῶν πρώτων. (814F)

In sending every single issue up the chain of command, these overly ambitious Greeks threatened to undermine what little independence remained for Achaea. The Romans can revoke political privilege and destroy the *boule*, the *ekklesia*, and courts.[86] The Achaean *politeia* therefore is liable to become "dazed, timid, and powerless in everything"—a worst-case scenario that Plutarch considers "slavery" (*douleia*).[87] The Plutarch's political ideal here is the same as Paul's in Corinth: to neutralize internal conflict by promoting equality. The *politikos* "should soothe the ordinary citizens (ἰδιώτας) by granting them equality (ἰσότητι)and the powerful (δυνατοὺς) by concessions (ἀνθυπείξει) in return" (815A). This also involves, in Plutarch's case, an avoidance of Roman interference, and in avoiding that external penalty, the Achaeans are able to maintain whatever autonomy is available. There is therefore a sense here that his ideal is equality of status with Roman administrators, even if geopolitical power is inherently unequal.

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[85] 814E, ποιοῦντα μέντοι καὶ παρέχοντα τοῖς κρατοῦσιν εὐπειθῆ τὴν πατρίδα δεῖ μὴ προσεκταπεινοῦν, μηδὲ τοῦ σκέλους δεδεμένου προσυποβάλλειν καὶ τὸν τράχηλον.
[86] Thus ruining the "fiction" of local autonomy and elite power, according to Carrière (1977, 242).
[87] 814F, καταπλῆγα καὶ περιδεᾶ καὶ πάντων ἄκυρον ποιοῦντες.

These passages reaffirm Plutarch's pragmatism in regards to the Roman Empire. Cooperation was required for socio-economic success in the first and second centuries; imperial favors were a basis of prestige.[88] Furthermore, Plutarch's view of the Romans themselves is rather double-edged. While undeniably hegemonic, their authority can allow their subjects to thrive. The most important characteristic of the Romans, for Plutarch, is that they "are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends."[89] It follows, naturally, that the politician should foster friends in high places. Specifically, he should sow good favor with his superiors, that he may reap the rewards for the sake of his polis. It is "a fine thing," he concludes, to turn the advantage gained from such friendships into the welfare of one's community.[90] Thus *Precepts* shows a view of imperial power as inevitable and also potentially benign. This benignity rests on homonoia within and between *poleis*, however. Hence the prominent place of the ideal in *Precepts*.

The result of Roman meddling in Greek affairs is dire: "*boule*, *demos*, courts, and the entire local government lose their authority" (815A). As Paul and his successors liken early Christian leaders to physicians, so Plutarch pictures his politician diagnosing the evils of *philonikia*, and prescribing a "secret political medicine" whenever necessary.[91] The lengths to which Plutarch is willing to go in the interest of peace and quiet become clear in one of his concluding sentences:

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[88] Madsen 2006, 65.

[89] 814C, τὰς πολιτικὰς σπουδὰς προθυμότατοι τοῖς φίλοις.

[90] 814C, καρπὸν ἐκ φιλίας ἡγεμονικῆς λαμβάνοντας… εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν δημοσίαν [2] ἐξενέγκασθαι καλόν. For the benefits of strong friends, see also 814C.

[91] 815A, ἀπόρρητος ἰατρεία. For "humoral harmony," and biological synkrasis, see Duff 1999, 93.

> but the statesman, if he cannot keep the State entirely free from troubles, will at any rate try to cure and control whatever disturbs it and causes sedition, keeping it meanwhile hidden within the State, so that it may have as little need as possible of physicians and medicine drawn from outside.
>
> ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἂν μὴ δύνηται τὴν πόλιν ἀπράγμονα παντελῶς διαφυλάττειν; ἐν αὐτῇ γε πειράσεται τὸ ταρασσόμενον αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζον ἀποκρύπτων ἰᾶσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ φαρμάκων δέοιτο. (815C,D)

It is difficult not to sense an ominous tone in Plutarch’s warnings about the “medications” from foreign “doctors.” This quotation clarifies the motivation behind Plutarch’s push for homonoia in the polis. It also underscores the geopolitical aspect of homonoia implicit in his rhetoric.

THE *LIVES*

Before leaving Plutarch, I will look briefly at his interpretation of three historical figures, one from *Precepts* along with two of his *Lives*. Together they help to fill out Plutarch’s notion of homonoia. Like the many exempla within *Precepts*, the biographies of Lycurgus and Numa supplement the *Precepts* particularly well, adding substance to the metaphors and anecdotes of the political handbook.[92] Plutarch credits Lycurgus and Numa with actually instilling *homonoia* in practice at Sparta and Rome, respectively. Numa’s biography reads like a panegyric based largely on praise for the peace he instilled. The Roman king is also a case study of sorts for Plutarch’s precept that the virtue of the leader improves the polis at large. In fact Numa’s “mildness” assured peace both domestically and abroad. Numa is one of a select few leaders during whose rule the doors of Janus were closed (20.2). “There is no record either of war, or *stasis*, or political revolution (*neoterismos*) while Numa was king,” Plutarch concludes (20.5). In convincing the his subjects, during his entire forty-year reign, of the supremacy of *eirene*, Numa is credited with making the Romans very un-Roman. They "began to experience a change of temper, and all of them were filled with a longing desire to have good government, to be at peace, to till the earth, to rear their children in quiet, and to worship the gods" (20.3). Numa was, in short, a manifestation of the Platonic philosopher-king. He exemplifies *arête* to the extent that his subjects conform themselves to a life of *philia* and homonoia (20.7,8). In the *Comparison* of Numa and Lycurgus, Numa receives high praise: "Such a life is the noblest end of all government, and he is most a king who can inculcate such a life and such a disposition in his subjects (4.6)." But it could not last; Plutarch returns to reality in an epilogue in which he reports that the homonoia of Numa's reign did not survive him. Shortly after the king's death, the doors of the temple of Janus were reopened, and "Italy was filled with blood."[93]

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[92] The bee imagery, for example, appears also in *Lycurgus*: “he trained his fellow-citizens to have neither the wish nor the ability to live for themselves; but like bees they were to make themselves always integral parts of the whole community, clustering together around their leader, almost beside themselves with enthusiasm and noble ambition, and to belong wholly to their country” (25.3).

Stadter makes the important observation that, despite his apparent pragmatism, Plutarch's prototype of an ideal ruler is a mythical figure, and already "ancient" by Plutarch's time.[94] The same can be said of Lycurgus, the Spartan "parallel" of Numa in Plutarch's series. Lycurgus' Sparta is a second "real world" example of the ideal of philosophically-informed politics—an ideal taken for granted by Dio and Aristides.[95] He credits the Spartan king with two of the same major accomplishments to which he encourages Menemachus to aspire in *Precepts*. Lycurgus obtained the *eunoia* of his people, which led to his success, and also established homonoia in his polis.[96] The most significant aspect of Lycurgus' bios here is that it gives homonoia a philosophical pedigree. We see this in Numa's story as well, where Plutarch applies Plato's philosopher-king ideal to the Roman ruler (20.6). In *Lycurgus*, however, Plutarch pinpoints an intellectual origin of homonoia in the idea that happiness (*eudaimonia*) is contingent upon homonoia. The presence of *arête* and homonoia—whether in an individual or a polis—determines wellbeing.[97] This was the governing principle of Lycurgus' politics. It was adopted, according to Plutarch, by Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno, as well as many other philosophers. Thus Plutarch advocates a *homonoia* which can be traced, he says, to ancient philosophies of Platonism, Cynicism, and Stoicism.[98]

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[93] *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 4.6. For Duff 1999, Numa exemplifies what I have called the "microscopic" (inner) homonoia that parallels the political manifestation (90-91).

[94] Stadter 2011, 254; compare Boulet 2004, 255-256, who argues in favor of a pragmatic interpretation.

[95] Though the issue of the philosopher's relation to kings is perennially debated (in antiquity and modernity), all three of these authors advocate philosophically informed leadership. See Dio's "kingship Orations" (Or.1-4), and below (Chapters 4 and 6).

[96] *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 1.4; *Sol.* 16.2; see also Aalders 1982, 11.

It is worth pointing out, lest these two examples seem utopian, the homonoia of *Precepts* is not perfect. The realism of Plutarch's politics that has been a theme here is it not undermined by his adulation of mythical kings because Plutarch recognizes the inevitability of conflict.[99] The purpose of the politician is to minimize it. His homonoia therefore does not mean absolute unanimity; nor is it code for "micromanaging" one's family, friends, and subordinates. This much is clear in Plutarch's distinction between "small" matters and more substantive ones. [100] The precept is explicit in Plutarch's conclusion: "by yielding in a small thing they win (*nikosin*) in the best and most important matters" (824E). This is the way to properly mold one's *ethos*, and to inspire improvement in that of peers, he says. More realistically, it is the path to a true political victory.

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[97] *Lyc.* 31, It was not, however, the chief design of Lycurgus then to leave his city in command over a great many others, but he thought that the happiness of an entire city, like that of a single individual, depended on the prevalence of virtue and homonoia within its own borders. οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γε τῷ Λυκούργῳ κεφάλαιον ἦν τότε, πλείστων ἡγουμένην ἀπολιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς βίῳ καὶ πόλεως ὅλης νομίζων εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπ᾽: ἀρετῆς ἐγγίνεσθαι καὶ ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς αὑτήν,

[98] *Lyc.* 31.2. Plutarch incorporates Thales into this heritage for homonoia as well. The Cretan philosopher was a forerunner of Lycurgus' ideas in that his works were "exhortations to obedience and homonoia (εὐπείθειαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν)" (Lyc. 4.2). Similarly, Solon received "training" in Crete by learning from Epimenides of Phaestus, who made his city "observant of justice and more easily inclined to homonoia (μᾶλλον εὐπειθῆ πρὸς ὁμόνοιαν κατέστησε)" (Sol. 12.5).

[99] This is implied throughout, but see, for example, the mention of "unavoidable disputes" (ἀναγκαίοις ἀμφισβητήμασι) at 825E.

[100] See 813B, 818A, with Foxhall 2002, 177. The basis is at least partially theological—even the *basileus kosmou* leaves minor matters to *tyche* (811D).

That Plutarch is more interested in efficiency than abstract absolutes comes through strongly in his account of a third historical figure. This person, Theramenes, is mentioned in connection to Solon. This second instance of Solon as exemplum is more intriguing than the first because it is more complicated. Rather than solely being a paragon of political success, Plutarch's Solon provides a negative example as well. Though he encourages Menemachus to "imitate to the best of his ability the other precepts of Solon," he warns the new politician not to err in the same way.[101] In punishing citizens who did *not* choose a side in political *stasis*, Solon—according to Plutarch—compromises himself. In calling taking an ambivalent stance in regards to stasis, Solon violates Plutarch's larger principle that the statesman's highest good is homonoia. Plutarch's complicated reception of Solon is at its strongest in his evocation of Theramenes, whom he sets up as a counterexample. A controversial Athenian leader, Theramenes' intermittently served the interests of both oligarchy and democracy in the last two chaotic decades of the fifth century, choosing the "right" side until he finally alienated his fellow tyrants enough that he was killed. The memory of Theramenes varies according to ancient source, but however convoluted it may be, his biography is for Plutarch a straightforward example of laudable political activism.[102] The lesson, for Plutarch, has less to do with Theramenes' (potentially dubious) motivations and misjudgments than with his efforts to preserve Athenian sovereignty by any means necessary. That Theramenes was involved in the establishment of three different governments in less than ten years is apparently not suspect to Plutarch, or rather less important than the fact that when *stasis* broke out, Theramenes was in the political scrum, and not on the sidelines. Plutarch's exhortation for Menemachus to imitate Theramenes in times of *stasis* is one of the strongest examples of pragmatism in the *Precepts*. It is totally in keeping with his broader purpose of establishing and maintaining homonoia. The goal is to appear to be a "common" (*koinos*) ally by relating to both sides of faction, and to communicate interest in either side without committing to both. There is a striking similarity between Plutarch's rhetoric here in the conclusion and in Paul's language in his letter to Corinth. Both emphasize "commonality," and there is very little separating Plutarch's idealization of sharing trials together (συναλγῶν ὁμοίως) and the Pauline ideal of becoming "all things to all people."[103]

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[101] 823F; for Solon's inferiority to Lycurgus, see Sol. 16.2. Interestingly, Aulus Gellius ponders this same episode in Solon's story. Gellius surmounts the difficulty, however, by offering a different interpretation. Solon's banishment of those who refuse to engage with civil conflict makes sense, he says, if we understand that he sought not to encourage d*iscordia*, but rather to force good men (*boni*) to engage with their quarrelling countrymen. They had the power to bring the factions around to *concordia*, and therefore must take part in the process, even if violent at first (*NA* 2.12).

[102] On Theramenes' complicated career, see Xen. *Hell*. 2.3.31; Thuc. 8.68.4; and *Ath. Pol*. 2.28.

CONCLUSION

Plutarch shares with Dio and Aristides an approach to provincial politics that is based upon realism. All three of these authors call for Greek political leaders to a) acknowledge their constricted purview under Roman authority; and b) successfully channel Hellenic competition into constructive pursuits. All three instances acknowledge the inherent difficulty of political success; they describe a delicate balance of power and respect between the leaders and the led. This is a reflection of Plutarch's respect for (and wariness of) office holders and "the people" (οἱ πολλοὶ).[104] An important precept for Plutarch is the ability of the people to "see through" the character (*ethos*) and actions of their leaders; thus the high ethical standard that runs through the essay is to some extent a product of respect for the citizenry.[105] While the *politikos* is undoubtedly in charge of the state, he must earn deference—and genuine, worthwhile glory—by exhibiting a virtuous character.

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[103] 824B; compare I Cor. 9.22 (τοῖς πᾶσιν γέγονα πάντα). See also 824D: "He will talk, as in the case of quarrels among friends, first with the persons who think they are the more aggrieved, and will appear to share their feeling of wrong and anger, then he will try in this way to mollify them and teach them that those who let wrongs go unheeded are superior to those who are quarrelsome (*erizonton*)." The *eris* here again lacks the theological sense used in 1 Cor.

[104] At times Plutarch's view of "the people" seems quite low. See Carrière 1977, 239-240.

[105] 800F, "The people (*hoi polloi*) see through the ethos, counsels, acts, and lives of politicians." διορῶσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ τὰ πάνυ βαθέως περιαμπέχεσθαι δοκοῦντα τῶν πολιτευομένων ἤθη καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ πράξεις καὶ

The most charitable interpretation of this rhetoric would identify a principle of “those who rule are ruled.”[106] This refers not only to Roman hegemony in Achaea but also to an older Hellenic ideal stemming from the practice of relatively high political participation and rotating political offices. The precept allows for a political environment marked by equality among citizens.[107] This appears more than once in *Precepts*. Plutarch’s idea that “a man ought to conciliate his superior, add prestige to his inferior, honor his equal, and be affable and friendly to all” is one example.[108] It acknowledges differences in status while calling for humility at the same time.

Homonoia is first and foremost a benefit to be had in Greece by Greeks. But this is inseparable from the reality of Roman hegemony. Long before Plutarch’s lifetime, “autonomy” in the eastern provinces had been redefined, and Plutarch knew this well.[109] To achieve homonoia, Plutarch accepts what he sees as the reassuring presence of a foreign occupier insofar as it maintains social order.[110] He even considers Romans “friends” (*philioi*) who have a common interest in peace and prosperity (814C).

Given the difficulty of determining Plutarch’s attitude on Roman power, and the location of homonoia within that his worldview, it is fitting to end on an ambiguous note. For not all of

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βίους See also Duff 1999, 90; Bremer 2004, 267, for Plutarch’s praise for the end of a “subversive” *demos* resulting from Roman intervention.

[106] *Archein kai archesthai* was considered “one of the most important characteristics of Greek democracy,” according to Aalders (1982, 10). It is one of Plutarch’s “precepts” at 816E, where Theopompus praises the “rule-ability” of the Spartans; Θεόπομπος δ᾽ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα σῴζεσθαι τὴν Σπάρτην διὰ τοὺς βασιλεῖς ἀρχικοὺς ὄντας “μᾶλλον” ἔφη διὰ “τοὺς πολλοὺς πειθαρχικοὺς ὄντας.”

[107] See 823B, where the *politikos* is “equal and similar” ἴσος καὶ ὁμαλὸς to “the people” (οἱ πολλοὶ).

[108] 816B, δεῖ δὲ καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸν κρείττονα καὶ κοσμεῖν τὸν ἥττονα καὶ τιμᾶν τὸν ὅμοιον, ἀσπάζεσθαι δὲ καὶ φιλεῖν ἅπαντας,

[109] For the history of this process in Achaea after 27 BCE, see Alcock 1993. Plutarch is an important source for her analysis of indigenous response to Roman imperialism in Achaea (129-157).

[110] Sirinelli 2000, 398.

Plutarch’s exempla are ideologically neutral. Alexander the Great is the first figure to come to mind, and perhaps the most complex. It is notable, however, that one of his most “greatest” acts, according to Plutarch, is his encouragement of “same thinking.” He instituted a rule of law and reason (*logos*) that fostered homonoia and peace (ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην) across the known world.[111]

And what are we to make of Aratus, the great Hellenistic leader who unified Greek *poleis* despite the geopolitical dominance of Alexander’s successors? Homonoia had a hand in raising his polis from a relative backwater to preeminence in the Aegean. His expulsion of tyranny at Sicyon, and subsequent strengthening of the Achaean League, was based on homonoia. Owing to “good counsels and their homonoia (εὐβουλίᾳ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ), and because [his countrymen] were able, in place of envying, to obey and follow the one who was pre-eminent among them for virtue, they not only preserved their own freedom in the midst of so great cities and powers and tyrannies, but also were continually saving and setting free very many of the other Greeks.”[112] Thus Aratus too is a case study for the sort of homonoia ethics advocated in *Precepts*, yet he took geopolitical matters into his own hands.[113] Furthermore, he epitomizes the “Macchiavelian” tendency seen above in Plutarch’s high view of Theramenes. Plutarch uses a striking image of a loom’s flying shuttle to describe Aratus’ ability to move “in either direction according to the exigencies of the state, loving homonoia between nations, community of cities, and unanimity of council and assembly, beyond all other blessings."[114]

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[111] *De Fort. Alex.* 330E: “But Alexander desired to render all upon earth subject to one law of reason and one form of government and to reveal all men as one people,…Therefore, in the first place, the very plan and design of Alexander's expedition commends the man as a philosopher in his purpose not to win for himself luxury and extravagant living, but to win for all men homonoia and peace and community of interests” (οὐχ ἑαυτῷ τρυφὴν καὶ πολυτέλειαν ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμόνοιαν καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παρασκευάσαι διανοηθέντα).

[112] *Arat*. 9.5, εὐβουλίᾳ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ, καὶ ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν ἐδύναντο μὴ φθονεῖν, ἀλλὰ πείθεσθαι καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν, οὐ μόνον αὑτοὺς ἐν μέσῳ πόλεων καὶ δυνάμεων τηλικούτων καὶ τυραννίδων διεφύλαξαν ἐλευθέρους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων ὡς πλείστους ἐλευθεροῦντες καὶ σῴζοντες διετέλουν. Aratus flourished around 250 BCE.

[113] In so doing, he eased class tensions in a way either Paul or Plutarch would have appreciated: effected homonoia of the disputes between rich and poor, and safety and security for the entire people (κατασκευασθεῖσα τοῖς μὲν ἀπόροις πρὸς τοὺς πλουσίους διάλυσις καὶ ὁμόνοια, τῷ δὲ δήμῳ παντὶ σωτηρία καὶ ἀσφάλεια) (*Arat.* 14.1).

Moving much closer to Plutarch's present tense, there is another example of the link between homonoia and Plutarch's attitude towards Roman imperialism. In fact is a childhood memory for Plutarch—the civil war of 68/69 CE. A clearer lesson in the dangers of *stasis* is hard to imagine. If the events surrounding these years are too broad to encompass here, it is nonetheless possible conclude this chapter with a telling instance of homonoia in Plutarch's *Lives*. As noted above, one of Alexander the Great's main contributions to the Mediterranean world, as far as Plutarch is concerned, was "homonoia and peace." This pair, as we will see below, occurs often in second-century imperial propaganda. It is a favorite, for example, of Clement of Rome, the subject of the following chapter. Plutarch ends his biography of Otho by invoking "homonoia and peace" in the form of the emperor's last words.

> both parties are waging war against Romans, and we sin against our country whether we conquer or are conquered. For the victor's gain is our country's loss. Believe me when I insist that I can die more honorably than I can reign. For I do not see how my victory can be of so great advantage to the Romans as my offering up my life to secure peace and homonoia.
>
> ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις πολεμοῦντες ἀμφότεροι τὴν πατρίδα καὶ νικῶντες ἀδικοῦμεν καὶ νικώμενοι. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κρατοῦντος ἐκείνῃ κακόν ἐστι. πιστεύσατε πολλάκις ὅτι δύναμαι κάλλιον ἀποθανεῖν ἢ ἄρχειν. οὐ γὰρ ὁρῶ τί τηλικοῦτον Ῥωμαίοις ὄφελος ἔσομαι κρατήσας, ἡλίκον ἐπιδοὺς ἐμαυτὸν ὑπὲρ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας. (15.5-6)

It is curious that scholars have not noticed the poignancy of Plutarch's description of a Roman emperor killing himself for the sake of homonoia. In light of *Precepts*, it is impossible to miss Plutarch's highlighting of the danger of civil strife here. At the very least, this is a graphic object lesson in the importance of homonoia. A more subversive reading would make for an interesting study of the ramifications of finding “homonoia” on a Roman emperor’s suicide note.

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[114] *Arat.*10.2 ὑπὸ τῆς πολιτείας ἐπ᾽ ἀμφότερα τῷ καιρῷ μεταβαλλόμενος,ὁμονοίας ἐθνῶν καὶ κοινωνίας πόλεων καὶ συνεδρίου καὶ θεάτρου μίαν φωνὴν ἀφιέντος. As a result, Plutarch describes Aratus memorably as "not so much a strict friend, as good enemy!" (οὐχ οὕτως δοκεῖ γεγονέναι φίλος ἀκριβής, ὡς ἐχθρὸς εὐγνώμων καὶ πρᾶος)

3.

CLEMENT'S CREATED ORDER

There are many unknowns surrounding the epistle known as 1 Clement, from its title (probably a misnomer, since there is no genuine "second Clement"), to its author (who is nowhere mentioned in the text). Unlike Paul's letters, the sender in the prescript here is an institution, rather than an individual: "the *ekklesia* at Rome." The intended audience is the *ekklesia* at Corinth. Even the genre of 1 Clement is somewhat unstable: it may occupy some ill-defined space between "epistle" and "homily." It is closer in length to a Gospel than the canonical epistles. Yet another area of disagreement is the date of composition, which ranges over a half century or so between 65 and 115 CE. This is the most serious uncertainty for the present study in that, for my purposes, the significance of 1 Clement stems from its status as the next major installment in the story of the Christian concept of homonoia. Chronological precision is important only insomuch as it establishes 1 Clement as a product of the generation after Paul. This is indeed the consensus (if not universal), and this chapter assumes a date of circa 95.[1]

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[1] For a survey of the debate, see Jeffers 1991, 90-94. Welborn 1992, 1060, is too conservative in giving a range of 80-140 CE. Lindemann 2005, 12, uses traditional date of c. 95, and settles on forty years between Paul and the author of 1 Clement. This dispute hinges on ambiguous references in 1 Clement to earlier generations (which may or may not have included Peter and Paul) and persecution (allegedly Domitianic). I will refer to Clement, rather than "Clement," despite the mystery.

Paul is mentioned in the beginning of Clement’s letter as a “noble example” from recent times. The context in which Paul makes his first appearance tells us much about Clement’s larger purpose in his epistle. The apostle is part of a litany of moral *exempla* of those who bore up under “jealousy and envy” (ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος). These two are the opposites of homonoia and the source of *stasis* against which Clement campaigns in his letter. That the author instructs his audience to “take up the epistle of that blessed apostle Paul,” is a significant piece of chronological evidence. Paul’s second appearance is again in reference to jealousy, strife, and *stasis*.[2] Here, Paul’s literary influence is clear. Clement considers 1 Corinthians to be divinely inspired, which suggests a good deal of Pauline influence. What is more, 1 Clement is replete with Paul’s imagery, as will be illustrated below. Taken as a whole, the parallels have led scholars to conclude that 1 Clement represents the earliest interpretation of Paul, and that, if not a “direct continuation” of Pauline letters, 1 Clement should certainly be read in reference to them.[3] The similarities with 1 Corinthians are not the only reason for considering 1 Clement, however. It is also “one of the best known writings in the early church,” and an authoritative statement of Christian unity; it was venerable enough to be included in some early lists of the canon that would form the New Testament.[4] The late first-century date makes 1 Clement older than portions of the New Testament, and the first non-canonical work in Christianity, as well as the first interpretation of Pauline theology.[5] Most importantly, it is the first Christian text that contains homonoia. Clement urges the Corinthians to “be clothed with homonoia, being humble in mind" (30.3). This single phrase—ἐδυσώμεθα τὴν ὁμόνοιαν ταπεινοφρνοῦντες—contains the kernel of Clement's message to Corinth.

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[2] 47.1,3: Ἀναλάβετε τὴν ἐπιστολὴν τοῦ μακαρίου Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου…ἐπ᾽ ἀληθείας πνευματιῶς ἐπέστειλεν ὑμῖν. See also 5.37, which is an important early instance of a Paul “tradition;” he is an opponent of *zelos* and *eris*.

[3] Thorsteinsson 2010, 134, in reference to Romans and 1 Cor.

[4] Welborn 1993, 232. See also Pervo 2010, Thraede 1994, 244. Bakke 2001, surveys the occurrence and history of homonoia, *eris*, and *eirene* at 72-81.

[5] Pervo 2010, 129. Lindemann 2005, 14-16, notes a pragmatism about Clement’s use of Paul—associating him and his letter with the most demanding matter at hand, *schisma*.

In addition to dating difficulties, there is the intractable matter of verbosity. 1 Clement is a relatively long letter—more than 1.5 times the length of Paul's longest letter, and longer still in comparison to 1 Cor. In fact the letter is so long in comparison to Pauline epistles that it has been the object of criticism. Its structure is difficult to define with certitude, and more than one outline has been proposed.[6] Long portions of the letter are quotations; Clement interweaves Hellenistic, Jewish, and popular philosophical elements with Pauline or Christian ideas into a long appeal that invokes countless examples and many images. It is unknown whether the mix of references is a function of Clement's education, but it is likely that he is dealing with a diverse and divisive community at Corinth. Rarely is one adjective used when a pair, trio, or list of virtues or vices will do, almost all of which are repeated. The difficulty of isolating the themes and structure has been noted by even admiring observers. One sympathizes with the efforts—only partially successful—to impose simplicity.[7]

The matters of the author's identity, let alone his (or their) intentions and relative intellectual firepower, do not preclude an examination of his language, with particular attention to homonoia's central place in the letter. As was true in the case of Paul's letter, an understanding of 1 Clement is enhanced if one appreciates its rhetorical structure. By using homonoia early and often in the letter, Clement raises his letter to Corinth to the level of a "symbouletic discourse." This classification is even more straightforward in the case of Clement since the author calls his content "counsel" (*symboule*) (58). Furthermore, Clement's use of the second person plural instead of the imperative suggests deliberative rhetoric. He aims, like Paul, to convince his Corinthian audience of the necessity of unity and homonoia. The frequent use of the term homonoia is another trait that is typical of the genre, as is the use of a related term such as "peace" (*eirene*), which is used twenty times. Both peace and harmony "were dominant concerns of the Roman Empire, so Clement's use of this language is suggestive of the serious and political nature of the situation that he addresses," namely *stasis* in a Christian community.[8] A final characteristic of the *symbouleutikon* that appears in Clement's letter is the use of *exempla* of homonoia for the practical edification of his audience. These are frequent enough in Clement that they should be viewed as part of the "dominant concern" for homonoia in the letter, rather than as digressions.

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[6] Chadwick 1961, 285, surveys the scholarship and tries to rescue Clement from his critics (largely Protestant). Far from a hodge-podge of "industrious, if stupid" ramblings, 1 Clement is subtle. "Every word is selected with care and with an eye to the maximum effect." Considering more recent scholarship, which is generally receptive to an acute author and nuanced structure in his letter, this effort seems to have had effect. See also Maier 2002, 87, 93; for the mix of influences, Pervo 2010, 128, mentions a "striking dependence" on Diaspora Judaism; this and popular philosophical morality are the "twin pillars" of Clement's program.

[7] Lindemann 2010, 50, divides 1 Clement roughly in half, with 39 as a transition from examination of the theme to implementation of that theme.

Factions are still the problem in 1 Clement, as they were in Paul's letter. More than forty years later, Corinth is still a "body" at war with itself, a community that has forgotten that they are members of one another (46.7). A series of rhetorical questions from Clement could have been taken from 1 Cor: "Why do we mangle and mutilate the members of Christ and create factions (στασιάζομεν) in our own body? Why do we come to such a pitch of madness as to forget that we are members of one another?"[9] The parallels in the two letters to Corinth suggest Clement "borrowed from 1 Cor and adapted the material there to suit his purpose," and that purpose is the establishment of homonoia.[10] Like Paul, Clement is clearly in debt to both "the genre and form of the homonoia-speech."[11]

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[8] Gregory 2006, 226. See also van Unnik 2003, 151-159; Bakke 2001, 32-64.

[9] 46.7, ἱναντί διέλκομεν καὶ διασπῶμεν τὰ μέλη τοῦ χριστοῦ καὶ στασιάζομεν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἴδιον, καὶ εἰς τοσαύτην ἀπόνοιαν ἐρχόμεθα, ὥστε ἐπιλαθέσθαι ἡμᾶς, ὅτι μέλη ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων;

[10] Wong 1977, 85.

[11] Lotz 2007, 134-35. Hall 1968 notes that Clement's "dependence on Pauline thought is evident" (265).

Clement's thesis is essentially the same as Paul's in 1 Cor. In fact Clement believes the problem has worsened since Paul's letter, since he believes 1 Cor. addresses faction based upon allegiance to actual apostles, whereas in Clement's case the sedition originates with a few unnamed members. These unidentified rabble-rousers have ousted elders (presbyters). This conflict appears explicitly in 1 Clement more than once. A "vile and profane *stasis*" is the reason for the letter.[12] The *stasis* is tied to the removal of church elders: "we see that you have deposed some from the ministry," Clement writes, "even though they had been conducting themselves well." He continues:

> It is shameful, loved ones, exceedingly shameful and unworthy of your conduct in Christ, that the most secure and ancient church of the Corinthians is reported to have created a faction against its presbyters, at the instigation of one or two persons.
>
> αἰσψρά, ἀγαπητοί, καὶ λίαν αἰσψρά, καὶ ἀνάξια τῆς ἐν Χριστῷ ἀγωγῆς ἀκούεσθαι, τὴν βεβαιοτάτην καὶ ἀρχαίαν Κορινθίων ἐκκλησίαν δι᾽ ἓν ἢ δύο πρόσωπα στασιάζειν πρὸς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους (47.6).

While aware of (and indebted to) Pauline language and imagery relating to submission and love, Clement's use of homonoia is explicit and consistent. Homonoia is "the cardinal theme" of 1 Clem.[13] In fact Clement is the first Christian to use the term homonoia, which he employs fourteen times in the letter. *Stasis* also appears fifteen times, yet—as was the case in 1 Cor—homonoia is more than a simple antonym. Rather it is a human reflection of divine realities.[14] Relationships in a believer's home and *ekklesia* are to reflect the homonoia that God created in the cosmos. This is a linchpin of Clement's thought. For Clement, there is an inseparable relationship between theology and ethics, belief and behavior. Clement does not deny the natural human drive for power and influence, but he strives to harness them into a spiritual ambition towards high status *in Christ* (ἐν Χριστῷ) (54.3). Similarly, if they "strive" (ζητεῖν), it should be for the "common good" (κοινωφελής) (48.6).

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[12] 1.1 μιαρά καὶ ἀνόσιαι στάσις; Jeffers 1991, 124, sees a principle at work here surrounding pater-like power for presbyters: "For Clement, once a presbyter is appointed, he is untouchable."

[13] Bakke 2001, 288, 321. This is confirmed by Van Unnik, who sees *eirene kai homonoia* as "the goal of the letter" (2003, 129).

[14] Lotz 2007, 161.

For Clement, becoming a member of the Jesus movement is making a transition from *agnōsis* to *gnōsis*. Homonoia is an important aspect of this transition. This could be considered a variation on the Pauline "mind of Christ;" Clement's homonoia is one aspect of a general interest in the transformation of the mind. It is best captured in the letter's "intellectual" vocabulary, by which I mean words associated with thinking and the mind. Repeated use of the word "gaze" (ἀτενίζω) is an important related idea. It occurs twice in the initial section, and becomes, by letter's end, a key idea. It communicates the interrelated nature of a believer's "knowledge" of God and his ethics, as do several other words which will be discussed below.

With regards to further clarifying the nature of the letter, some of the most important passages occur at the letter's closing. Looking back at his lengthy composition, Clement describes it as an "epistle" and a "request" (ἔντευξις) "for peace and homonoia" (περὶ εἰρήνης καὶ ὁμονοίας) (63.2). There are two other important elements in this passage. First, the author claims religious authority: the letter is written "through the Holy Spirit" (διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος). Its repeated exhortations to obedience, humility, and homonoia are based upon this authority. Secondly, this passage includes the author's objective: a comprehensive, practical statement of ethics for the Corinthian community. The letter claims to be about how to live a "virtuous life" (ἐνάρετος βίος):

> We have touched on every aspect of faith, repentance, *agape*, self-restraint, moderation, and endurance, reminding you that you must be pleasing, in a holy way, both to the all-powerful God—by acting in righteousness, truth, and patience, living in homonoia, holding no grudges, living in love and peace with fervent gentleness, just as our ancestors, whom we mentioned before, were pleasing to God by being humble-minded toward the Father, who is both God and Creator—and to all people."

> Περὶ γὰρ πίστεως καὶ μετανοίας καὶ γνησίας ἀγάπης καὶ ἐγκρατείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ὑπομονῆς πάντα τόπον ἐψηλαφήσαμεν, ὑπομιμνήσκοντες δεῖν ὑμᾶς ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ καὶ μακροθυμίᾳ τῷ παντοκράτορι θεῷ ὁσίως εὐαρεστεῖν, ὁμονοοῦντας ἀμνησικάκως ἐν ἀγάπῃ καὶ εἰρήνῃ μετὰ ἐκτενοῦς ἐπιεικείας, καθὼς καὶ οἱ προδεδηλωμένοι πατέρες ἡμῶν εὐηρέστησαν ταπεινοφρονοῦντες τὰ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα καὶ θεὸν καὶ κτίστην καὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους. (62.2)

This sentence is worth quoting in full because it illustrates the comprehensive scope intended by the author. He claims to have presented “every” necessity for a healthy *ekklesia*. The “virtuous life” described here involves both theology and ethics; the readers are admonished to please “all men” as well as their God. Furthermore, this god is *pantokrator*—the god of creation and natural order. The name for the deity emphasizes the divine attribute that is most important to Clement, “order” (*taxis*).[15] The thrust of Clement’s letter is that this order should be duplicated in a believer’s “church” and society at large, as will be shown below. This passage is also noteworthy for its list of prescribed behaviors, or virtues. The prolixity in this part of the letter is typical of the whole. This single sentence includes no less than fifteen virtues. Many of these occur in multiple passages, but three are central to the epistle as a whole: love, humility, and homonoia. These will be discussed below. The virtues are connected to two other elements here that characterize the entire epistle. First, the author gives examples of ancestral heroes who have actually lived the virtues. Second, he gives a theological basis for the virtues in identifying God as omniscient yet compassionate. Both of these attributes are fundamental to Clement’s theology and to the ethical demands he makes.

This passage shows that regardless of the problems it poses for the historian, there is helpful internal evidence that allows for a study of 1 Clement as one of the most significant chapters in the history of homonoia. Like 1 Cor., 1 Clement is motivated by a division that was likely social in nature, and like Paul’s ethics, those of Clement are cloaked in theologically significant language. The *ekklesia* should be characterized by good order and homonoia because their God exhibits those same characteristics. This centrality is based on the fact that Clement's letter is written for the same general reason as had Paul's: division in the *ekklesia*. Like the apostle, Clement envisions a community that places like-mindedness above temporal divisions, whether economic, political, or social.

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[15] Bowe 1988, 107 n.2, lists eighteen forms of *taxis*, most of which occur more than once.

The first few sections of the epistle are a microcosm of Clement's content and method. Having stated the problem of division and its solution of humble submission, Clement summarizes in a theological flourish before moving on to the middle sections of the body of the letter. This transition point has been likened to a doxology; there are a few such points in the long letter which help to flag transitions and to summarize Clement's thought. The first and most important will be discussed below. Here Clement establishes the Christian doctrine of creation as paradigm for good order in the Christian community: an ethical precept based upon a theological principle. This is immediately followed by a call to right behavior. It is no coincidence that this initial clarion call for a correct, theologically informed community ethics—together with the doctrine of creation—contains multiple instances of the word homonoia.[16] For Clement, homonoia in the community of believers is a result of the appreciation of divine order and humility contained by God himself. An overarching theme of the letter is the link between *dianoia* and homonoia; "understanding" is inseparable from "oneness of mind."[17] Furthermore, those outside of the ecclesiastic homonoia must "change their mind," that is repent and undergo *metanoia*.

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[16] Lindemann 2010, 63, sees taxis-homonoia connection as "plainly decisive; here the theological center of the letter links itself to the goal of its composition."

[17] διάνοια: 33.4, 35.2, 35.5, 36.2, 19.3; γνῶσis: 32.1, 36.2, 40.1, 41.4, 44.1-2, 56.13-14, 59.2; μετάνοια : 7.4–6; 8.1–2, 5; 57.1; 62.2; cf. 7.7; 8.3.

The methodology in the early sections of the letter consists of three basic parts. First, there is a simple comparison of the Corinthian *ekklesia* before schism, and after. This contrast is based on a long list of virtues and vices that characterize the community in either of these stages. Clement sees vices such as jealousy and envy as sources of discord; in using them he "reflects commonplaces of his cultural environment."[18] A second stage of Clement's argument is a rather long list of biblical *exempla* of his Christian ethics, both ancient and contemporary. These object lessons are followed by a third section in which Clement transitions to ethical exhortation. In moving from past to present, he also segues from the indicative to the imperative. The exhortations are based upon—and paired with—Clement's theology. He presents his doctrine of God and of creation before making ethical demands. We will consider each of these three stages of Clement's argument in turn.

VICES & VIRTUES

Clement's goal is homonoia; his ideal community is one in which "every *stasis* and *schisma*" are "loathsome" (*bdeluktos*) (2.6). He therefore uses the vocabulary of virtues and vices to obtain this goal. The before-and-after comparison of the Corinthian *ekklesia* (1-3), for example, is a matter of virtues and vices that are ancient, even by the end of the first century. Faith (*pistis*), hospitality (*philoxenia*), and knowledge (*gnōsis*) highlight a long list of qualities that, in Clement's view, should mark the still-young Corinthian community.[19] These are embedded in a string of adjectives that makes for a thick cluster of positive traits from which, through their *stasis*—"stoked by a few reckless and headstrong persons"—they have fallen, their reputation ruined.[20] There are more than a dozen other attributes listed here in quick succession. Indeed the density of the barrage of virtues that the reader encounters is one aspect of the difficulty of the letter. Scholars have attempted to mitigate intimidation by identifying rhetorical elements within the text. The catalogues of positive traits, for example, have been called (rather unimaginatively) "virtue lists." These are often contrasted with corresponding lists of vices; these lists call the Corinthians to a "general examination of their ethics and lifestyle."[21]

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[18] Bakke 2001, 96, notes these terms, along with *stasis* and *eris*, constitute a "semantic field;" *zelos* and *phthonos* (central to Clement's history of Israel, below) do not occur together in the NT (94).

[19] As noted above (Chapter 1), *pistis* could be rendered "trust of the unfamiliar." *Philoxenia*, moreover, could be "love of the foreign;" combined with the emphasis on *gnosis* that seems to make identity primarily a mental disposition, the trio has radical social ramifications. Such a worldview would have been infuriatingly novel or refreshingly liberating, depending on one's context; this would fit with what little is known of Christian expansion as well as the persecution of early adherents.

The most effective approach to these lists is to highlight the most important—those that significantly inform the entire letter. The chief culprits in these vice lists cluster around the idea of social division and therefore highlight the spirit of the letter: it is an example of homonoia rhetoric occasioned by faction. What caused the faction? As in the earlier case of Paul's letter, the precise origins of the division are a mystery.[22] In this introductory passage, Clement alleges complacency: the Corinthians have "grown fat" (ἐπαχύνθη) and rebellious. As a result, the community is characterized by vices familiar to any reader of homonoia rhetoric:

> From this came jealousy and envy, strife and faction, persecution and disorderliness…And so the dishonorable rose up against the honorable, the disreputable against the reputable, the senseless against the sensible, the young against the old.
>
> Ἐκ τούτου ζῆλος καὶ φθόνος, ἔρις καὶ στάσις, διωγμὸς καὶ ἀκαταστασία,…Οὕτως ἐπηγέρθησαν οἱ ἄτιμοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐντίμους, οἱ ἄδοξοι ἐπὶ τοὺς ἐνδόξους, οἱ ἄφρονες ἐπὶ τοὺς φρονίμους, οἱ νέοι ἐπὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους. (3.2-3)

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[20] 1.1, ὀλίγα πρόσωπα προπετῆ καὶ αὐθάδη ὑπάρχοντα

[21] Jefford 2006, 85.

[22] Van Unnik 2003, 164, alludes to the deliberate vagueness of the rhetorical genre; though inconvenient for the historian, the rhetorician would find the missing details perfectly appropriate—they are simply not the point. Lindemann 2010, 60 with n.58 summarizes the origin theories, which could be labeled religious, economic, and sociological (see also 61 n.68); Bakke 2001, 283-289 outlines the history of the research; Maier 2002, 87 surveys "over a century's" worth of scholarship on "the vexed problem of the precise nature" of Corinthian dispute and decides on "a division within one or two of the Corinthian house churches which has resulted in the creation of an alternative meeting place," probably based upon personality "cliques" (93).

This is one of several lists of vices that have their roots in division. Another example occurs later in the letter, where "rebellion" (νεωτερισμός) is listed among seven vices.[23] Shortly thereafter, there is another list of thirteen vices that culminates in "inhospitality," or "dislike of the foreign" (ἀφιλοξενία), a subject on which Clement had firm convictions (35.5). Clement's pairing of *philoxenia* with *pistis*—the latter obviously fundamental to a Christian text—led Chadwick to posit a doctrine of "justification by faith and hospitality."[24] *Philoxenia* is one answer to the problem that is described as both a *schisma* and *stasis*. Its consequences are clear: "Your *schisma* has corrupted many and cast many into despondency, many into doubt, and all of us into grief."[25]

Among the initial list of virtues, on the other hand, two are fundamental to Corinth's reputation, according to Clement: humility and hospitality (ταπεινοφροσύνη and φιλοξενία).[26] These virtues are, along with homonoia, the most important characteristics of Clement's ideal Christian community. Homonoia and "humility" are frequently coupled; it is no coincidence that he places them together here.[27] "Humble-mindedness" (ταπεινόφρων) is "a central theme Clement develops to define the proper community ethos."[28] It is repeated here, for example, in a triad of virtues (opposite three vices) that closes the passage.

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[23] Originally something closer to "change," and which eventually took on a more rigid, Christian connection to "heresy," *neoterismos* is interpreted negatively here in consideration of its placement in a list of vices.

[24] The phrase is Chadwick's (1961, 282-283); *philoxenia* appears in 1 Clem more often than LXX (0) or NT (6) (Jeffers 1991, 129). It is clearest at 1 Clem 10-12. See also Maier 2002, 92-94.

[25] 46.9, τὸ σχίσμα ὑμῶν πολλοὺς διέστρεψεν, πολλούς εἰς ἀθυμίαν ἔβαλεν, πολλοὺς εἰς δισταγμόν, τοὺς πάντας ἡμᾶς εἰς λύπην; *schisma* is apparently a Christian noun. According to Bakke 2001, 143, it has virtually no pre-Christian parallel in this political sense.

[26] *Philoxenia* occurs twelve times in the letter; *aphiloxenia* three times. This must have implications for the larger nature of the problem (social division in house-churches) and solution (welcoming strangers regardless of *ekklesia*'s location).

[27] Obedience, or submission, is a major theme, the overall purpose of which is to bolster homonoia. It refers to submission to political authorities at 1.3 and 61.1; to church leaders at 57.1; to God at 20.1. The same verb occurs at 37.5 and 57.2.

[28] Maier 2002, 90. *ταπεινόφρων* and its cognates (including *ταπεινοῦν*, *ταπεινός*, and *ταπείνωσις*) occur at least twenty-five times in 1 Clem. For discussion and references, see Thorsteinsson 2010, 122.

Another essential virtue is peace (εἰρήνη), which is coupled with homonoia six times in the letter.[29] *Eirēnē* is “the untroubled state in the relationship between different parts of God’s creation…in nature, in the Roman Empire, above all in the Christian community.”[30] This is “typical political terminology” which shows Clement concerned for “the peaceful and secure existence of the Roman Empire” as well as harmony within the church. Wengst’s view of εἰρήνη καὶ ὁμονοία as established political ideology is connected to his helpful observations on the relationship between homonoia and the *Pax Romana*. In this view, the benefits of the Roman peace depend upon homonoia within and between both Rome itself and the provincial cities. “Peace is the framework appointed by the Romans that has to be filled out by mutual concord.”[31] Brent sees behind this increasing tendency to “assimilate” Roman imperial rhetoric of *pax* with the “Asian” emphasis on homonoia. Clement has “bought in” to Roman imperial ideology, according to this view.[32] Of the three Christian authors surveyed here, Clement does make the clearest effort to make homonoia and *eirēnē* equivalent. The pair occurs twice, for example, within one of the most famous passages of the epistle, where Clement presents an image of the concordant universe that is remarkably similar to the cosmic homonoia praised by Dio. In this rhetorical flourish Clement sees homonoia on a cosmic level. A negative implication of this idea is that to deviate from this "natural order" is to disobey God's will.[33] This is a major emphasis in 1 Clement which will be explored below.

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[29] These are “stock terms”(and a *hendiadys*) in 1 Clement that reveal its authors conventionality; a “well-known formula in Hellenistic literature which discusses the issue of unity among people who naturally belong to the same political unit” (Bakke 2001, 82-83). A *hendiadys*; it occurs at 20.10, 20.11, 60.4, 63.2, 65.1. See also 62.2, where *agape* separates homonoia and *eirēnē*. He notes the use of the same pair by Dio (*Or*. 39.2, 40.26, 49.6), where the they refer “to the internal relationship between the inhabitants of a city or between cities that belong to the same area, and is contrasted with *stasis*” (83). Bakke also includes occurences in Plutarch and other ancient authors (83 n. 389).

[30] Van Unnik 2003, 145-151, surveys instances of the word pair and sees a “widespread conception of the health of the state,” where homonoia is an internal condition and eirene refers to geopolitics.

[31] Wengst 1987, 22, 107.

[32] Brent 2006, 246-249. This rests on a distinction between “imperial *pax* and Hellenic concord” which is potentially helpful yet somewhat confusing because it fails to distinguish between *concordia* and *homonoia*; these two have not to my knowledge been treated as facets of independent ideologies.

Some virtues are placed in specific ethical instruction known as "household codes," one of which is couched in the opening sections of 1 Clement (1.3).[34] Another occurs at approximately the one-third mark of the letter (21). These are two of perhaps ten such codes spread over the New Testament and Apostolic Fathers. Clement is the earliest example in the latter category. If virtues and vices comprise the vocabulary of the letter, these codes are "manuals" of Christian ethics. Both are tools for combatting faction in the Christian community. They may be elements of Greco-Roman culture that have been imported into the Christian community. The nature of this relationship between the early Christian groups and the well-established social norms in which they grew is intriguing though mysterious. According to Jefford, these were "the rules of common decency" that, while guiding society in general, became standards for Christian communities as well.[35] In his analysis, Clement's letter is a Roman attempt to impose a "*paterfamilias* model" of authority and ethics onto Corinth.

There are two intriguing ramifications of this approach. First, these codes establish Christian hierarchy before formal institutions solidified. The best evidence for this is that these codes seem to disappear after the first quarter of the second century. The implication is that bishops and great heresiologists emerged as enforcers of "right thinking," making codes less necessary. They were ultimately subsumed into canons of tradition. This places Clement's letter in the history-versus-orthodoxy story that was touched on in Chapter 1. The importation of common cultural norms described by the *paterfamilias* norm was necessarily only in the absence of consensus or authorities. A second interesting offshoot of the idea of household codes—and another aspect of their place in the history of "orthodoxy"—is their absence from literature that was eventually deemed non-canonical. The inherent practicality of an ethical code may have set it apart from the relatively celestial abstractions of "gnostic" literature.[36]

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[33] Wong 1977, 82.

[34] German *haustafeln*, a part of New Testament scholarship since the Reformation. On the codes, see Balch 2003.

[35] Jefford 1997, 121; bibliography in Bowe 1988, 97; the codes can be thought of as statement s of "Christian citizenship" (noting πολιτεύω at 3.4)(98). See also Jeffers 1991, 122: the code is a "symbol of traditionalism, that is, an ideology, under the Empire;" this is the earliest code addressed only to the *pater* (with other parties in third person), 123.

Regardless of their precise origins, household codes are significant here because of their connection to homonoia. As comprehensive ethical statements of social norms within the Christian community, they are clearly summaries of what "like-thinking" looks like in the ideal *oikos* and the godly *ekklesia*.

> For you used to act impartially in all that you did, and you walked according to the ordinances of God, submitting yourselves to your leaders and rendering all due honor to those who were older among you. You instructed your young people to think moderate and respectful thoughts. You directed women to accomplish all things with a blameless, respectful, and pure conscience, dutifully loving their husbands. And you taught them to run their households respectfully, living under the rule of submission, practicing discretion in every way.
>
> γὰρ πάντα ἐποιεῖτε καὶ ἐν τοῖς νομίμοις τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπορεύσθε, ὑποτασσόμενοι τοῖς παρ᾽ ὑμῖν πρεσβυτέροις· νέοις τε μέτρια καὶ σεμνὰ νοεῖν ἐπετρέπετε· γυναιξίν τε ἐν ἀμώμῳ καὶ σεμνῇ καὶ ἁγνῇ συνειδήσει πάντα ἐπιτελεῖν παρηγγέλλετε, στεργούσας καθηκόντως τοὺς ἄνδρας ἑαυτῶν· ἔν τε τῷ κανόνι τῆς ὑποταγῆς τὰ κατὰ τὸν οἶκον σεμνῶς οἰκουργεῖν ἐδιδάσκετε, πάνυ σωφρονούσας. (1.3)

This passage clearly illustrates the sort of conduct Clement has in mind in his appeal to Corinth, and a respectful obedience is central. Both age and gender are accounted for in Clement's prescription here. The final line, regarding the well-run *oikos*, is of particular interest because it contains the idea of a "rule of submission" which is the origin of the notion of a household code.

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[36] Jefford 1997, 126; Maeier 2002, 108, on the influence of *oikos* norms on those of the *ekklesia*; the codes are symptomatic, in his view, of a "settling into existence in the world." They are part of an "interaction" between ideas and social setting (houses and theology) (97-99). See also Jefford 2006, 87-88.

It is significant that the words “honorable” and “submission” are repeated within this single passage as the hallmarks of appropriate behavior and attitudes within the code.[37]

HISTORY and EXEMPLA

Clement shows a profound familiarity with the Old Testament; he quotes extensively from the Septuagint. Together these quotes make up about one quarter of the whole of the epistle.[38] This is directly related to one of the more important elements of Clement’s method: his use of *exempla*. More than once he urges his audience to “cling” to these paragons of godly conduct.[39] In the fourth section of the letter, Clement summarizes the entire Hebrew Bible according to the effects of one vice, jealousy (ζῆλος). As we noticed in Plutarch regarding *philonikia* or *philotimia*, *zēlos* is inherently ambiguous; it could be “eagerness” as easily as “jealousy.”[40] Taken together with the other authors here, it is clear that these are key words of homonoia rhetoric. In using them, Clement “reflects commonplaces of his cultural environment.”[41] In 1 Clem., however, *zēlos* is associated with *stasis*, *eris*, and *phthonos* (envy) traditionally connected to internal strife. Clement reconceives the history of Israel in terms of jealousy in order to show the Corinthians the danger of division. Seven pairs of ancient figures, from Cain and Abel to Saul and David, are catalogued, each of which is accompanied by *zēlos*.[42] The first example is one of the most dramatic: it was jealousy that led Cain to murder his brother, Abel. From this original example, Clement launches into a tour of the Patriarchs that makes Old

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[37] Bakke 2001, 119-122, calls *hupotasso* a topos of homonoia rhetoric; Jeffers 1991, 124-125, comparing Clement’s code to NT instances, sees a shift in emphasis from children’s general obedience to their education in particular; he attributes this to either history (a growing importance in inculcating the faith as time progresses) and/or class (an aristocratic tradition).

[38] Lindemann 2010, 59, lists Clement’s sources in order of frequency: Pentateuch, Psalms, Wisdom, and Isaiah.

[39] 46.1, “And so we too must cling (κολληθῆναι) to these examples (ὑποδείγμασιν), brothers.” *Kollatho* in this sense is repeated at 46.4; Bowe 1988, 135-136, translates “stick, adhere, cleave, attach oneself.”

[40] Note the ambiguity in Paul’s letter, for example, where the noun ζῆλος the problem (3.1), but latter Paul uses the verb form in a positive admonition: “be eager for” (ζηλοῦτε) spiritual gifts (12.31).

[41] The question of whether Paul or (unnamed) pagan sources were the primary influence on Clement cannot be answered conclusively. Bakke discusses the issue (2001 95-96, with n. 469).

[42] From 4.7 to 5.5, *zēlos* occurs ten times in twelve lines. Among these it is coupled twice with *phthonos* and once with *eris*.

Testament history a function of discord. It is very similar to Aristides' potted history of the ancient Greek world in terms of homonoia (Chapter 6, below). The key events from the lives of Jacob, Joseph, Moses, and David are all tied together as examples of moments that turned on the presence or absence of jealousy (4.7-13). Moving to more recent history and his own environment, Clement concludes that all the current persecution of the Christian community is due to this same shortcoming, ζῆλος. This fourth section is linked to 10-12, which is a similar recapitulation of Israelite history in terms of "hospitality" (*philoxenia*), the virtue opposite jealousy. Hospitality is the key ancient piety, just as jealousy was the hallmark of failure. It is illustrated by way of scriptural exemplars, from Abraham to Rahab (10-12), whose "love of strangers" (or "outsiders") assured them a place in Clement's parade of notables. The commonality shared by all of them is that they were actively obedient to God's will. Moreover, they exemplify humility for Clement's audience which has proven to have a penchant for arrogance. The purpose of both units of history—of both virtue and vice—is to inspire "humility" (ταπεινοφροσύνη) (13.1).

It is significant that the first instances of the word homonoia occur within Clement's list of biblical heroes. Also important is the fact that his scriptural exegesis in both instances is unorthodox. Clement uses the Septuagint "to emphasize the importance of homonoia, even when that concern is not present in their text or in earlier extant traditions."[43] In the first example, the animals which were spared the flood in Genesis are of God's mercy. The key characteristic of the animals is that they entered the ark, and were granted their salvation, "in homonoia" (9.4). Secondly, as Clement quickly surveys the Patriarchs for instances of obedient piety, he uses a negative example to highlight the dangers of living without homonoia. Clement makes Lot's wife, of Genesis 19 and the story of Sodom, into a sign "that God does not forsake those who hope in him, but delivers to punishment and torture those who turn aside to others" (11.1). Again, a key characteristic that decided the fate of Lot's wife was homonoia: she died because she was "not in homonoia" (οὐκ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ) with her husband's obedience to God, and therefore missed God's mercy (11.2). She was "delivered to punishment" because of a lack of homonoia.

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[43] Gregory 2006, 228.

Both of these examples show a certain hermeneutical daring on the part of Clement. He is willing to offer interpretations of scripture that are unique in order to clarify the importance of homonoia. There is no known precedent for either of these interpretations of the Genesis passages. Clement is going so far as to present unorthodox interpretations of famous Old Testament figures for the sake of encouraging homonoia on his audience. Furthermore, the daring is not confined to exegesis of canonical scripture. Clement also draws on the history of "other nations" (*ethnē*), using "many kings and leaders" from foreign lands to illustrate his own Christian moral (55.1).[44] The most impressive example of this is his incorporation of the myth of the phoenix. This legendary bird, native to Egypt and Arabia, lives for 500 years before dying and coming back to life. Clement's logic is straightforward: if God resurrects a mere bird, surely we can expect humans to resuscitate in end times (25-26).[45] This exegetical daring suggests urgency in tone for the letter to Corinth that we would be remiss to overlook. By drawing from a truly "multicultural" group of traditions (Jewish, Christian, pagan), Clement exemplifies the sort of Christian community he desires at Corinth—an *ekklesia* where seemingly significant temporal dividers are broken down in the interest of like-mindedness.

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[44] Jeffers 1991, 138, renders *ethne* as "heathen." "Thus, the ancient Greek concord…provides the standard for conduct in the church." In this view, Christianity did not have enough ideological vocabulary to offer the problem of *stasis*; hence homonoia and *eirene* in the letter, drawn from contemporary discourse.

[45] Pervo 2010, 129 sees this as central to Clement's shift from Pauline eschatological emphasis, a shift "quite apparent in Clement's argument for resurrection as a logical, natural phenomenon, rather than an eschatological miracle of new creation."

A third source of authority in 1 Clement is the apostle Paul, whose influence on Clement is undoubtedly profound. "Paul was of great importance for the church of Rome, both as an apostle and as a teacher of the church, even several decades after Paul's death."[46] Clement adds Paul (as well as the apostle Peter) to the list of victims of jealousy. Paul is described in the same athletic terms common to homonoia rhetoric. Paul the "athlete" (ἀθλητής) and the Corinthian faithful are "in the same arena and the same contest (*agōn*)," against jealousy and strife (*eris*), which has the power to defeat even the strongest believers (5.1; 7.1). In fact these two vices, according to Clement, are capable of overturning even "great cities" and nations (6.4).

These positive examples of correct Christian behavior, though repeated throughout the letter and embedded in strings of Old Testament quotations, are more than digressions. Rather they represent a final basic characteristic of 1 Clement that stretches over the entire letter: a call to ethical action. The biblical heroes of his faith are to be eminently practical models of Christian ethics. Their specific purpose is to inspire first repentance, then ethical behavior, which is to say actions characterized by hospitality and humility in a spirit of homonoia. These exemplars draw their authority, however, from a theological basis that Clement is one of the earliest authors to establish: a doctrine of creation that emphasizes "order" in the very character of God. In short, the quarrelsome Corinthian believers are admonished to "think alike" about their deity as one who has established cosmic order. The connection between what became Christian doctrine and unity is nowhere clearer than the summary passage at 46 (below). Clearly the repetition of "one" here is important. In these two rhetorical questions, Clement is affirming a theological foundation for homonoia at Corinth:

> Why are there conflicts, fits of anger, dissensions, factions, and war among you? Do we not have one God, and one Christ, and one gracious Spirit that has been poured out upon us, and one calling in Christ?

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[46] Lindemann 2006, 16. See also Bowe 1988, 89-92; Jeffers 1991, 180; and Horrell 1996, 253.

> ἱναντί ἔρεις καὶ θυμοὶ καὶ διχοσατσίαι καὶ σχίσματα πόλεμός τε ἐν ὑμῖν; ἢ οὐχὶ ἕνα θεὸν ἔχομεν καὶ ἕνα Χριστὸν καὶ ἓν πνεῦμα τῆς χάριτος τὸ ἐχυθὲν ἐφ᾽ ἡμᾶς; καὶ μία κλῆσις ἐν Χριστῷ; (46.5-6)

CREATION and ORDER (*Taxis*)

"Oneness" is a starting point of Clement's theology. The strongest theme of the letter, however, is God as creator of order. As we will see, Clement was not the only intellectual at the turn of the first century who used what we might call "cosmic concord" to strengthen his defense of socio-political (or congregational) order. The homonoia of the elements, implied in Plutarch and developed explicitly in Dio Chrysostom (below, Chapter 4), was a significant topos in homonoia rhetoric. Divinely inspired order is, in turn, connected directly to Clement's (and to Dio's) anthropology; man's special status as a reasonable creature comes with an ethical mandate, or a moral imperative. It means it is the duty of humankind to imitate divine order. At the ecclesiastic level, the main ramification of this theology is Clement's attempt to establish a "rule of ministry"—κανών λειτουργίας. Clement's theology is summarized in one section of the epistle that contains a doctrine of creation which emphasizes divine order. This is one of the most important portion of the entire letter. It is no coincidence that the same portion contains more instances of homonoia than any other. This means that for Clement, homonoia is among the most important aspects of God's orderly nature. It is one of the most important aspects of the created order that is to be imitated within the *ekklesia*. As Lindemann summarizes, Clement's promotion of homonoia "entails above all the recognition of the *taxis* that goes back to God via Christ and the apostles."[47]

Clement's creation account is brief, and its structure relatively simple, but (as was the case with the virtue lists) Clement packs as many adjectives into each line as possible. The doctrine is laid out in the form of a comprehensive “snapshot” of the cosmos—from the highest heavens to the depths of the abysses. At least six levels are discernible within the ten lines of text that describe Clement’s universe, which also feature some ten types of natural phenomena such as seas, seasons, and winds. Though none of these are described in detail, Clement insistently characterizes any given aspect of the cosmos as orderly. “The great creator and master of all appointed all these things to be in peace and homonoia.”[48] At its base, his cosmos is an orderly reflection of its creator, who is himself characterized by orderliness. Good order thus becomes the ideal behind Clement’s prescribed Corinthian ethics. It is also intimately connected to his use of homonoia.

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[47] Lindemann 2010, 61; Pervo 2010, 129: "The emphasis upon the goodness of creation constituted the pillars upon which emergent orthodox Christianity would build its church."

> “The heavens, which move about under his management, are peacefully subject to him…Sun and moon and the choruses of stars roll along the tracks that have been appointed to them, in homonoia…in accordance with the arrangement he has made.
>
> οἱ οὐρανοὶ τῇ διοικήσει αὐτοῦ σαλευόμενοι ἐν εἰρήνῃ ὑποτάσσονται αὐτῷ. …ἥλιός τε καὶ σελήνη, ἀστέρων τε χοροὶ κατὰ τὴν διαταγὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ δίχα πάσης παρεκβάσεως ἐξελίσσουσιν τοὺς ἐπιτεταγμέπνους αὐτοῖς ὁρισμούς. (20.1,3)

These are two of the first three lines of the description of Clement’s cosmos, and they are emblematic of the passage as a whole. The subject (“he”) in the initial line is of course the deity; two divine attributes are clear in Clement’s description. To begin with, omnipotence is obvious. In the first of the six regions of the universe, there are no fewer than four assertions of divine omnipotence. This is a theme throughout the epistle; natural phenomena that seem limitless to humans are “constrained” by God. The sea, for example, “acts just as he ordered” (καθὼς δέταξεν αὐτῇ) (20.6); the apparently “boundless” ocean, and even the “worlds beyond it” are

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[48] 20.11, ταῦτα πάντα ὁ μέγας δημιουργὸς καὶ δεσπότης τῶν ἁπάντων ἐν εἰρήνῃ καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ προσέταξεν εἶναι. Breytenbach 2003, 184-186, summarizes “cosmic concord” in Hellenistic sources; see also Bakke 2001, 160-167, who sees a Greek (rather than Jewish) influence in “peace and concord” coupling (162).

"governed" by their creator.[49] The use of *choros* to describe the stars is noteworthy; it came to be used by later Christian authors (including Ignatius) as a metaphor for homonoia. It clearly evokes cooperation with authority, as well as unity and harmony. Omnipotent order can be detected even on a lexical level in the repetition of *tag*-based words. The root occurs four times in these first three lines.[50]

A second divine attribute, beneficence, is also revealed here. Clement labels God variably as *theos*, *dēmiurgos*, and *despotēs* in this passage and elsewhere. Whatever Clement calls him, it is clear he is a "structuring God."[51] It is worth noting, however, that in this case (above) the antecedent of "he" is "father and creator" (*pater kai ktisten*) (19.2).[52] The idea that the creation is endowed with "gifts of peace" and "benefits" (*euergesiai*) culminates in commands to consider the nature of God: "We should realize how he feels no anger towards his entire creation."[53] Rather he "rejoices in his works" (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ ἀγαλλιᾶται) (33.2). This is repeated at the close of Clement's creation account, where the very act of creation is equated with "giving benefits" (*euergeton*) and the "great demiurge" offers "compassion" (*oiktirmos*) (20.11). He is a "beneficent father, compassionate in every way."[54] Clement illustrates with an image of aquatic springs offering their breasts for life, thus providing nourishment for humans. This striking personification culminates with more language of intimacy and homonoia. Ultimately the terrestrial realm of Clement's cosmos also reflects the order and homonoia of the creator and of the heavens. "Even the smallest (ἐλάχιστα) of creatures associate with one another in homonoia and peace."[55]

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[49] 20.8, ὠκεανὸς ἀπέραντος ἀνθρώποις καὶ οἱ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν κόσμοι ταῖς αὐταῖς ταγαῖς τοῦ δεσπότου διευθύνονται.

[50] Bakke 2001, 120 n. 586 notes a threefold increase in the use of *tag*- based vocabulary from 1 Cor. to 1 Clem.

[51] Maier 2002, 131-133: "It is from the concept of God as *despotes* that Clement's themes of order, harmony, and humble-mindedness follow" (131).

[52] Paul had greeted the Corinthians in the name of "God the father," (θεοῦ πατρὸς) (1.3). He uses the same name at 8.6 and 15.24.

[53] 19.3, νοήσωμεν, πῶς ἀόργητος ὑπάρχει πρὸς πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν αὐτοῦ. However, Clement uses "master" (*despotes*) more than any NT or early Christian author (Jeffers 1991, 102). This is curious given the lack of *doulos* in the letter.

[54] 23.1, Ὁ οἰκτίρμων κατὰ πάντα καὶ εὐεργετικὸς πατὴρ

The creation section (20) is often thought to be influenced by a Stoic theory of cosmic concord. It is important to distinguish between Stoic vocabulary and philosophy, however. It is worth noting, for example, that Clement's picture is of creation is theocentric, as opposed to Stoicism's "anthropocentric" view.[56] The "demiurge" arranging "all things…to be in peace and homonoia" sounds Stoic, but in Clement the universe is not an object of awe simply because of its well-ordered nature, but because it is ordered by God's will. Whereas a Stoic might deduce a creator from natural order, Clement starts with the Creator and looks for his will in his design.[57] "Order" is not a good in itself, but an attribute of God. This passage is likely influenced by Jewish thought as much as Stoic. It is clearly in agreement with the idea of a God-ordained order that determines both morality and cult. A brief recapitulation of the creation account that occurs later in the letter confirms the notion of creation as a reflection of divine order. It contains a string of verbs that indicate the creator's agency: one act of creation after another is performed "by his power" (τῷ κράτει) or "through his understanding" (τῇ συνέσει) (33.3). Another key phrase occurring here as elsewhere is is "by his will" (κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ) (20.4). "Order is the effect," in other words, "of nature's submission to the divine will."[58] This thought applies to both nature and the church. Cosmic homonoia is being used as a template for ecclesiastic unanimity. Division in the cosmos would destroy it; the same could be said of a human community.[59]

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[55] 20.10, τά τε ἐλάχιστα τῶν ζώωντὰς συνελεύσεις αὐτῶν ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ εἰρήνῃ ποιοῦνται; in his Loeb translation, Ehrman hears sexual intonations here.
[56] Van Unnick 1950, 184, concludes this passage is "not purely Stoic."
[57] Wong 1977, 83, sees a "profound difference" between the two, and detects Jewish thought in Stoic dress, as does Breytenbach 2003, 195-196; Jaubert 1964, 84, recognizes the difficulty in teasing out precise currents of influence (Jewish, Stoic, or "popular philosophical") behind Clement's imagery; see 79, "Analogie ne signifie pas dépendance."
[58] Hall 1968, 270; Wong 1977, 83.

It is no coincidence that the letter's most significant theological statement is immediately followed by an explicit call to ethical action. These two impulses—doctrinal and ethical—are constantly in tension with one another in the epistle. The specific instructions regarding authority and subordination that follow the doctrine of creation are an outgrowth of Clement's conviction that knowledge should affect conduct. The omnipotence and beneficence of god, for example, carry ethical duties. Clement prefaces these two sections, the one doctrinal, the other ethical, with an exhortation to obtain a genuine knowledge of God (19). Persons with the awareness of the creator's knowledge should respond in homonoia. Failure to do so risks judgment. God's omnipotence is also directly connected to ethical response and conviction. It means, for instance, that community "disputes" (διαλογισμός) do not escape God's notice (21.3). The implication is that the Corinthians must imitate homonoia they see in nature, which exists "without dissenting" (μὴ διχοστατοῦσα) (20.4). Elsewhere, Clement reaffirms the omnipotence of God and adds the creation of humans as the culmination of his acts. Clement's idea of human supremacy over the other animals has obvious ethical ramifications. Humans are "preeminent" and "superior in intelligence to all" (παμμεγέθης διάνοια). They bear the image (χαρακτήρ) of God (33.4). As such, they are held to a higher standard; this is the basis for Clement's case for unity and homonoia. Clement also uses the ancient idea of the community believers as a "holy" or chosen "portion" (μέρος) as an additional basis for homonoia. Clement's *pater* has made believers "his own chosen portion."[60]

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[59] Breytenbach 2003, 194.

[60] 29.1, ἐπιεικής καὶ εὔσπλαγχνος πατήρ, ὃς ἐκλογῆς μέρος ἡμᾶς ἐποίησεν ἑαυτῷ; Bowe 1988, 76-85 on background of topos.

There is a clear cause-and-effect relationship between the Corinthian's status as "chosen members" in the faith and their duty to be in harmony with one another. A true member of God's "portion" is sure to flee rebellion (νεωτερισμόι), for example, and "cling" to godly examples of piety. "Since then we are a holy portion…we should be clothed with homonoia."[61] The clearest consequence of the "fatherhood" of God (other than compassion) is discipline. This comes across more strongly still when we consider the ringleaders of the schism at Corinth, whom Clement commands to repent and leave the community. "Be subject to the presbyters," (ὑποτάγητε τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις) he urges them, arguing that they should accept correction and discipline (57.1). Discipline also fits into Clement's household code language and *paterfamilias* norms that apply to the *ekklesia*. The parallels between the two spheres makes for an *ekklesia*-as-*oikos* model in Clement.

The theological-ethical principle is summarized nicely later in the letter in the form of a household code. This second code is important because it is more explicit, and also because it contains an instance of homonoia. The foundation of this code contains injunctions. "We should respect our leaders; we should honor our elders; we should discipline our youth…we should set our wives along the straight path that leads to the good."[62] Clement proceeds to outline the ideal characteristics of women and children, and again several virtues are listed in quick succession. Among these are purity, discipline, gentleness, and humility. The most important of the list is *agape*, which Clement uses here for the first time and will develop later in the letter. It is set apart from "favoritism" (πρόσκλισις). Women should strive to be "worthy of *agape*" (ἀξιαγάπηται) and children should recognize its power. *Agape* underscores the constant contrast Clement draws between right conduct and factionalism. Those who conduct themselves

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[61] 30.1-3 b , ἁγίου οὖν μερὶς… ἐδυσώμεθα τὴν ὁμόνοιαν.
[62] 21.6: τους προηγουμενους ημων αιδεσθωμεν, τους πρεσβυτερους ημων τιμησωμεν, τους νεους παιδευσωμεν την παιδειαν … τας γυναικας ημων επι το αγαθον διορθωσωμεθα.

(πολιτευόμενοι) in *agape* are willing to risk their lives for harmony (ὁμοφωνίας) (51.2). Homonoia is an integral part of the argument here, for the entire code represents an attempt to avoid the judgment of God by doing "things that are good and pleasing before him, in homonoia."[63] Homonoia is thus linked to God's judgment and omnipotence. The final line of the passage summarizes this well: "His breath (πνοή) is in us, and when he wishes, he will remove it."[64]

Also important here is what could be called Clement's "intellectual" vocabulary. An example of this is Clement's description of divine omniscience: he is aware of all our "thinking" (ἔννοιαι) and any "disputes" (διαλογισμοί) (21.3). God "is the one who explores our understandings and deliberations."[65] According to Clement, the marks of a believer are both holy conduct and a "right understanding" (καθαρά διάνοια) (21.8).[66] He therefore makes clear that knowledge (*gnōsis*) and the mind are connected to ethical behavior, and thus to homonoia. "You see, brothers, the more knowledge (*gnōsis*) we have received, the more we are subject to danger."[67] The danger here is judgment, and it is connected to the most important word of the principle, *gnōsis*. The knowledge of God that is spoken of by way of introducing the doctrine of creation, for example, has both passive and active components. It contains an element of "reception" (καταδέχομαι) here as elsewhere, but this is combined with the act of mental "gazing" (ἀτενίζω) and psychological "clinging" (κολλάω). The many biblical examplars of faith and homonoia, for example, are practical models to which the Corinthians should "cling" (9.2; 46.1, 4). The "gaze" emerges as an important theme of the entire letter. It captures much of the connection in Clement between theology and ethics. To "stare at" or observe the nature of God and his creation is to appreciate divine order and thus to create homonoia. Vocabulary surrounding "seeing" and "understanding," on the one hand, and "clinging" to ethical precepts on the other, occurs throughout the letter. The passage introducing the doctrine of creation and the subsequent ethical code (19-20) contains a series of verbs associated with vision and understanding. Gazing and clinging to "the father and creator," the audience is admonished also to "observe him with our understanding and look upon his patient will with the eyes of our soul."[68] The entire rapturous passage culminates in in an exhortation to "be mindful" or "think" (νοήσωμεν).

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[63] 21.1 τὰ καλὰ καὶ εὐάρεστα ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν μεθ᾽ ὁμονοίας.
[64] 21.3 οὗ ἡ πνοὴ αὐτοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστίν, καὶ ὅταν θέλῃ, ἀνελεῖ αὐτήν.
[65] 21.9 ἐρευνητὴς γάρ ἐστιν ἐννοιῶν καὶ ἐνθυμήσεων.
[66] See also 35.1,5; ἀνατυλίσσω "think over; unravel in our mind" at 31.1; κατανοέω "contemplate" and ἐπιγιγνώσκω "understand; recognize" at 32.1.
[67] 41.1, ὁρᾶτε, ἀδελφοί· ὅσῳ πλείονος κατηξιώθημεν γνώσεως, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὑποκείμεθα κινδύνῳ.

Additionally, Scripture plays a central role in creating homonoia and is connected to the intellectual theme of 1 Clement. Inspired by the Holy Spirit, the writings inspire an "awe" (*phobos*)—a "realization" (*epistēmē*)—in those who encounter them that leads to an environment of homonoia. Clement repeatedly exhorts his audience to consider the scriptures. In multiple instances he addresses the Corinthian believers as people with a knowledge of their contents. "You know the sacred scriptures, and you know them quite well," Clement writes. "And you have gazed into the sayings of God."[69] Clement uses scripture as a tool for the community to demarcate themselves from their contemporaries. He specifically points to the scriptures as a source of examples of both homonoia and its enemies. These opponents are described not only in moral terms, but in the sort of intellectual ones that were highlighted above. The enemies are not only unjust and unholy, but "foolish," (ἄφρονες) "unintelligent," (ἀνόητοι) and "uneducated" (ἀπαίδευτοι). The mind is everywhere in Clement's criticism; although he uses διάνοια in both cases, it is clear there is a difference here. He contrasts his “unintelligent” (ἀσύνετος) opponent’s perceived “understanding” with his own divinely-inspired enlightenment.[70]

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[68] 19.3, ἴδωμεν αὐτὸν κατὰ διάνοιαν καὶ ἐμβλέψωμεν τοῖς ὄμμασιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μακρόθυμον αὐτοῦ βούλημα.
[69] 53.1, Ἐπίστασθε γάρ καὶ καλῶς ἐπίσταθε τὰς ἱερὰς γραφάς, ἀγαπητοί, καὶ ἐγκεκύφατε εἰς τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ. πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν οὖν ταῦτα γράφομεν, emphasis mine; see also 45.2, 62.3.

The language of mindfulness is a steady theme of the letter. One of the stronger statements of Clement’s ideas of comprehension of theological truths is found in his Christology. A proper Christology will affect a believer’s intellect: he should be able to “speak knowledge” and “be wise in his discernment of words.”[71] Using the same vocabulary of “gazing” and *dianoia*, he clearly describes Christ in terms of enlightenment:

> Through this one [Christ] we gaze into the heights of the heavens; through this one we see the reflection of his perfect and superior countenance; through this one the eyes of our hearts have been opened; through this one our foolish and darkened understanding springs up into the light.
>
> διὰ τούτου ἀτενίζομεν εἰς τὰ ὕψη τῶν οὐρανῶν, διὰ τούτου ἐνοπτριζόμεθα τὴν ἄμωμον καὶ καὶ ὑπερτάτην ὄψιν αὐτοῦ, διὰ τούτου ἠνεῴχθησαν ἡμῶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοὶ τῆς καρδίας, διὰ τούτου ἡ ἀσύνετος καὶ ἐσκοτωμένη διάνοια ἡμῶν ἀναθάλλει εἰς τὸ φῶς (36.2)

For Clement, Jesus is the “path” (*hodos*) to “*gnōsis* of immortality.” Clement makes a significant theological statement by inserting Christ as example (ὑπογραμμὸς) par excellence; he is the ultimate illustration of the virtue of humility.

As is consistently the case in the letter, this divine enlightenment is connected to ethical action. Clement’s ideal environment is one that fosters homonoia, and this can only exist where the “eyes of the soul” of a person have been opened. Christ “did not come with an ostentatious show of arrogance or haughtiness…but with a humble mind.”[72] Clement summarizes in the familiar mimetic: “You see, beloved men, the example that he has given us. For if the Lord was humble-minded in this way, what shall we ourselves do?"[73] Christ's status as example is double-edged; the audience is compelled to base their behavior on Christ, yet Christ sets a very high standard. An urgency is revealed in the threats that Clement embeds within the text: "you should take care that [Christ's] many acts of kindness do not lead to judgment against all of us. For this will happen if we fail to conduct ourselves worthily…before him, in homonoia (μεθ᾽ ὁμονοίας)."[74] Clement here slips into a persuasive tone more intense than the deliberative register of most of the letter.

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[70] 21.5; 39.1; 45.4-7 characterizes the enemies as unjust (ἄνομοι) and unholy (ἀνόσιοι), and attributes their persecution of believers to jealousy (ζῆλος).

[71] 48.5, ητω δυνατος γνωσιν εξειπειν, ητωσοφος εν διακρισει λογων

[72] 19.2, Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, καίπερ δυνάμενος, ἀλλὰ ταπεινοφρονῶν; on the importance of Christ in Clement, see Maier 2002, 127-130

THE TWO ORDERS

As has been shown, there is repeatedly a sense of obligation in Clement's theology—an expectation that *episteme* would lead to a well ordered community. "*Since* these matters have been clarified for us in advance and we have gazed into the depths of divine knowledge, we should do everything…in an orderly way."[75] This is the fundamental theme of Clement's theology; by the letter's end he has connected each member of the Trinity to "order" within the community. God the Father and creator (the *pantokrator*) establishes a cosmos marked by homonoia. Clement's Christology coincides with this doctrine of creation; it is Christ who allows the believer to do everything "without disorder" (ἀταράχως). The Spirit, meanwhile, has inspired all Clement has said about the subject. Clement calls for two kinds of order in Corinth based upon these ideas: first, an internal or institutional order within the community of believers; second, an external temporal order which is to characterize the relationship of believers to their world. Homonoia is the ultimate ideal in both kinds of order.

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[73] 16.17, ὁρᾶτε, ἄνδρες ἀγαπητοί, τίς ὁ ὑπογραμμὸς ὁ δεδομένος ἡμῖν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ κύριος οὕτως ἐταπεινοφρόνησεν.

[74] 21.1 1. Ὁρᾶτε, ἀγαπητοί, μὴ αἱ εὐεργεσίαι αὐτοῦ αἱ πολλαὶ γένωνται εἰς κρίμα ἡμῖν, ἐὰν μὴ ἀξίως αὐτοῦ πολιτευόμενοι τὰ καλὰ καὶ εὐάρεστα ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ποιῶμεν μεθ᾽ ὁμονοίας.

[75] 40.1, Προδήλων οὖν ἡμῖν ὄντων τούτων, καὶ ἐγκεκυφότες εἰς τὰ βάθη τῆς θείας γνώσεως, πάντα τάξει ποιεῖν ὀφείλομεν; emphasis mine.

In discussing intramural order, Clement repeats his thesis: "We do not think it right to remove from the ministry those who were appointed."[76] This thesis is based on a premise of apostolic authority. Christ was sent by God, who appointed apostles with the gospel who, in turn, appointed their own successors. All this occurred "in an orderly way according to the will of God" (εὐτάκως ἐκ θελήματος θεοῦ) that established a precedent (40.2). It is a divine plan that is executed by apostles who knew there would be "strife" (*eris*) surrounding leadership, especially the bishop (44.1). Clement tries to bolster his case with a Mosaic precedent for the orderly delegation of authority; he would have us view it as an ancient practice that "jealousy and strife" threaten.[77] Clement wants his audience to defer to this standard of authority, recognizing that proper order is essential for the community. Clement's instructions on this point are clear:

> [God] commanded that the sacrificial offerings and liturgical rites be performed not in a random or haphazard way, but according to set times and hours. In his superior plan he set forth both where and through whom he wished them to be performed.
>
> τάς τε προσφορὰς καὶ λειτουργίας ἐπιτελεῖσθαι, καὶ οὐκ εἰκῇ ἢ ἀτάκτως ἐκέλευσεν γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὡρισμένοις καιροῖς καὶ ὥραις· ποῦ τε καὶ διὰ τίνων ἐπιτελεῖσθαι θέλει, αὐτὸς ὥρισεν τῇ ὑπερτάτῳ αὐτοῦ βουλήσει, ἵν᾽ ὁσίως πάντα γινόμενα ἐν εὐδοκήσει εὐπρόσδεκτα εἴη τῷ θελήματι αὐτοῦ. (40.2-3)

This is one of the more important elements of the epistle because it evinces an evolving institutionalization about the Christian movement. In fact this passage is one of the principal reasons for the letter's near-canonical status; it is one of the earliest statements of the institutions that would become so well-established. The gist of the problem is that Clement uses words—bishop, presbyter, deacon, apostle—that have since accrued all manner of historical baggage.

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[76] 44.3 οὐ δικαίως νομίζομεν ἀποβάλλεσθαι τῆς λειτουργίας.

[77] 42.5, 43.

His use of these terms, however, is ambiguous in terms of subsequently established “offices.”[78] The precise nature of Clement’s intentions here are controversial and mysterious. The fact that Clement’s ecclesiology is, in a strict sense, unknowable has not prevented over a century’s worth of scholarly debate. Igantius, rather than Clement, tends to be credited with the innovation of church offices (see below) because his use of these terms is clearer. It is worth noting, however, that Clement may be the first to distinguish between “leaders” (*hēgemones*) of the religious community and “laity” (λαϊκὸς).[79] The institutions per se, however, are not my interest. As far as this chapter is concerned, the “rule” that Clement establishes is important as an expression of theological order; the long history of its reception is beyond my scope. These ideas are also interesting, however, because they affect the interpretation of homonoia in the letter. A survey of Clement’s metaphors will make this clearer.[80]

Clement elaborates on the theme of proper order within the community with a mixture of new and old metaphors. One example is Clement’s unique angelic analogy. “We should consider (κατανοήσωμεν) the angels,” he urges. Like them, believers “should gather together in homonoia, conscientiously.”[81] Clement imagines the group singing together “with one voice”

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[78] πρεσβυτεροι occurs at 1.3, 3.3, 21.6, 44.5, 47.6, 54.2, 55.4. See also υποταγητε τοις πρεσβυτεροις at 57.1. All of these are ambiguous, however. For example at 55.4 *presbytos* is used in OT context, and in the context of the household code at 1.3 it can be rendered “elder men” and “old [men]” at 3.3 and 21.6 because it is in opposition to νεους in both of these cases. “επισκοπους και διακονους” at 42.4,5. This suggests there is not an established office here, but rather an older meaning of “elder.”

[79] λαικοις occurs at 40.5. For this and the three offices, see Kittell 1977, *s.v.*

[80] 1 Clement’s fame is based in no small part on the passages in 40-44 containing the germ of the doctrine of apostolic succession; this is the basis of Roman (Catholic) supremacy, and therefore hugely influential. Moriarty 2012, 116-117, summarizes five interpretations of Clement’s most important—and ambiguous—ecclesiastical passages (44) and opts for an “apostolic delegate view” of the succession of church authorities, but ends on an uncertain note of “diversity of practice” in the first century; Jeffers 1991, 158 uses Weberian language to describe a “charismatic authority” that had “routinized into a traditional authority;” Thraede 1994, 249, reads homonoia as a relatively strict “structural” or “regulatory” concept with heavy political undertones, which seems to be determined by a relatively literal interpretation of 44; Lindemann 2010, 61-62 sees no special authority for Rome: “There is no indication of [Roman primacy] in 1Clem or in any of the texts that date from around 100 CE .” Maier 2002, 103, contrasts a Pauline “fluidity” of language regarding offices versus Clement’s increased “standardization and precision” in the area; see also Bowe 1988, 152-153, who considers homonoia more important than specific offices.

[81] 34.5,7: καὶ ἡμεῖς, οὖν ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ συναχθέντες τῇ συνειδήσει

(ἐξ ἑνὸς στόματος), in language that harkens back to the “chorus” of stars and which will be developed by Ignatius. The issue also elicits some of Clement’s most explicitly Pauline language. Like the apostle, he evokes the body metaphor that must have been familiar to his audience. “Take our own body (σῶμα). The head is nothing without the feet, just as the feet are nothing without the head” (37.5). The “insignificant” (ἐλάχιστος) parts of the body are in reality inseparable and essential, and all parts work, or literally breathe, together (πάντα συνπνεῖ). Jaeger clarifies the medical origins of this idea and sees it as one of two concepts (the other is *krasis*, below) at the base of Clement’s organic *ordo Christianus* that takes the form of a body.[82] *Pneuma* was already an important concept in the *ekklesia*, as Paul’s letters attest. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that Clement is adapting the idea of a permeating “spirit.” The goal is a kind of health:

> Let our whole body be healthy in Christ Jesus, and let each person be subject to his neighbor…Let the one who is strong take care of the weak; and let the weak show due respect to the strong. Let the wealthy provide what is needed to the poor, and let the poor offer thanks to God, since he has given him someone to supply his need.
>
> χωζέσθω οὖν ἡμῶν ὅλον τὸ σῶμα ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰηςοῦ, καὶ ὑποτασσέσθω ἕκαστος τῷ πλησίον αὐτοῦ. Ὁ ἰσχυρὸς τημελείτω τὸν ἀσθενῆ,ὁ δὲ ἀσθενὴς ἐντρεπέσθω τὸν ἰσχυρόν· ὁ πλούσιος ἐπιχορηγείτω τῷ πτωχῷ, ὁ δὲ πτωχὸς εὐχαριστείτω τῷ θεῷ, ὅτι ἔδωκεν αὐτῷ δι᾽ οὗ ἀναπληρωθῇ αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑστέρημα· (38.1,2)

This sort of language echoes Paul’s language, and brings up the difficult question of hierarchy. Like Paul’s letter, Clement’s has the effect of underscoring the importance of hierarchy within the Christian community. While it seems there is a suggestion of reciprocity and mutual cooperation here, Clement’s prescriptions are not precise. The quotation above, for example, requires little comment. It is difficult not to read it as an endorsement for a status quo in contemporary Roman society. Note, for example, that the word here for the “reverence” by weak is the same used for reverence for God elsewhere in the letter.[83] This passage must be balanced, however, with another statement, where the identification of specific disadvantaged groups suggests hopefulness for something other than the norm. Clement includes these groups in his prayer near the letter's end:

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[82] Jaeger 1961, 22-23; Wong 1977, 84-85; Bakke 2001, 176, emphasizes the “interdependency and mutuality” here.

> Save those of us who are in affliction, show mercy to those who are humble, raise those who have fallen, show yourself to those who are in need, heal those who are sick…feed the hungry, ransom our prisoners, raise up the weak, encourage the despondent."
>
> τοὺς ἐν θλίψει ἡμῶν σῶσον, τοὺς ταπεινοὺς ἐλέησον, τοὺς πεπτωκότας ἔγειρον, τοῖς δεομένοις ἐπιφάνηθι, τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἴασαι, …χόρτασον τοὺς πεινῶντας, λύτρωσαι τοὺς δεσμίους ἡμῶν, ἐξανάστησον τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας, παρακάλεσον τοὺς ὀλιγοψυχοῦντας (59.4).

This petition does not mention any sort of ethical responsibility on the part of believers, and therefore does not solve the problem of ambiguity in Clement's social attitude.[84] It does act as something of a counterweight, however, to the previous household codes and instructions for order. The most useful conclusion to draw from these statements is that homonoia is the ultimate goal of Clement's hierarchy.[85] The historian can only guess what Clement's specific motives are, but his hierarchy is an aspect of order—a preventative measure against discord. Bowe's analysis is helpful.[86] She advocates a "dialectical" ecclesiology in Clement consisting of a "vertical" conception that emphasizes "order, structure, [church] offices," i.e. *hupotassō*. There is also a “horizontal” aspect that accentuates “corporateness and fraternal” dimensions, and submission for the common good (*tapeinophroneō*).

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[83] Jeffers 1991, 132-133, sees a patron-client relationship here; Bowe 1988, 100-102 sees cooperation, not simply conservatism; see also Thorsteinsson 2010, 128; Bakke 2001, 178, notes the charisma that precedes this passage (38.1) is no likely no longer spiritual, as in 1 Cor, but material. This is part of the sociological analysis that sees the ekklesia as "settling in" to the here and now (after focusing on the eschaton in Paul's generation); see also Pervo 2010, 129: "The clearest shift [from Paul to Clement] is from focus upon redemption to the centrality of creation;" Jefford 2006 104-106, 206, sees an unprecedented openness in Clement's ethics to pervading (pagan) norms. Maier 2002, 109, cautions against a "too-crude" two-stage theory, however.

[84] Thorsteinsson 2010, 130: : "These are not just abstract members of the communal 'body' or ill-defined masses of the poor, but real groups of people who are carefully identified."

[85] Bakke 2001, 120, admits a "conservative" tone in the exhortation to submit, but emphasizes this and hierarchy in general as a means to a (concordant) end.

[86] 1988, 104-105; Bowe thinks of humility as the "cardinal virtue" of 1 Clement (120).

In the same passage, Clement uses another novel image: the Roman army. This metaphor is significant because it serves as a bridge between the two types of order and homonoia mentioned above. It clarifies both internal and external, or temporal order. The army, according to Clement, is a paragon of unity to be admired by Christians. Clement is impressed with the order and efficiency of the legion, and uses it as a model of humility. “Not everyone can be an officer,” is his message. Rather, each soldier “in his own rank (τάγμα)” follows the orders of his superiors.[87] He praises the submissive manner about the men as they fulfill their tasks (πῶς ὑποτεταγμένως) (37.2); The virtues here are order (εὐταξία), habit, and submission. There is a useful interdependency among the various ranks, a “commixture” (σύγκρασίς) (37.4) in which the great recognize the value of the lowly, and vice versa. *Krasis* can be traced to medical vocabulary for a combination of elements. It implies “interpenetration” and an indissoluble bond that, when applied to a human community, is associated with “a healthy blend of different social elements.”[88]

Clement’s call for the Corinthians to sign up for war (στρατεύω) leads, in his letter, directly to submission to both ecclesiastic and secular authorities. There is very little to distinguish his description of military discipline with that of the *ekklesia*. In the text itself, the military imagery leads directly to an ecclesiastical conclusion: “Brothers, let each of us be pleasing to God by keeping to our special assignments, not violating the established rule of his ministry, acting in reverence."[89] The ambiguity of Clement's attitude toward the status quo is obviously thick. However, the image is also important because it reveals his attitude towards the political authority of Rome. Every soldier recognizes the authority of their officers. At the top of the chain of command are representatives of the Roman state whose authority Clement recognizes over himself. He calls them "our leaders" (ἡγεμόνες ἡμεῖς) (37.2). This is an important point considering it occurs in the context of a practical example without hyperbole.

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[87] 37.2, Οὐ πάντες εἰσὶν ἔπαρχοι … ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶν ἡγουμένων ἐπιτελεῖ. Jaubert 1964, 76, 80-81, notes parallels and defines the military terms in reference to Jewish sources. She concludes Clement’s description does in fact refer to Rome, although in Jewish rhetoric (83); *tagma* could be rendered “unit,” Jeffers 1991, 140-141.

[88] Ramelli 2008 notes the Stoic ideal of “complete fusion (*krasis*) of the spouses” (374). Wong 1977, 84, contrasts it with *mixis* that may be less thorough of a combination; Jaeger 1961, 22-23; Jeffers 1991, 131, see another example of Clement’s adoption of “Roman ideology:” he accepts a natural, Christian hierarchy.

The ambiguity may have a linguistic aspect. Clement uses the verb πολιτεύομαι seven times in his letter. It is usually translated at it broadest level, a rendering which results in a generic emphasis on "conduct." The root of the word is obviously political however, and Clement seems to consider the term "a fitting expression of conduct" within the Christian community, just as it was in the secular state.[90] The term is also connected to the most important of Clement's virtues for the *ekklesia*, love (*agape*). Those who conduct themselves (πολιτευόμενοι) in *agape* are willing to risk their lives for harmony (*homophōnia*) (51.2). For Clement, proper "conduct" and good order should mark life within and without the *ekklesia*. It is clear that homonoia is linked to both of these sorts of order.

How is this possible? Clement's approach is in part the same as Paul's: the answer is *agape*. As was the case in 1 Cor., *agape* is a key component of Clement's ethical system in which "subordination is a necessity and mutual help a duty."[91] *Agape* appears nearly twenty times in two sections of text that have rightly been called a panegyric.[92] The hymn to *agape* is perhaps the most important piece of evidence for the verdict that he knew Paul's letter by heart: "Love binds us to God; love hides a multitude of sins; love bears all things and endures all things." Yet the *agape* has as much or more significance here as in 1 Corinthians. Clement says love "binds us to God," and apart from it "nothing is pleasing to God."[93] Ultimately *agape* is the motivation behind the incarnation; it is the only way a human can approach God for forgiveness. This panegyric is also one of the clearest examples of Clement's theologically-informed ethics. He who "experiences *agape* in Christ" should follow Christ's commands (49.1). *Agape* is the glue that holds Clement's ethical system together. Defined as "a disposition of mind" that is "a prerequisite for proper conduct," it also underscores the general intellectual aspect of the epistle.[94] It is the key to both internal and external order.

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[89] 41.1, Ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, ἀδελφοί ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι εὐαριστείτω ευχαριστειτω τῷ θεῷ ἐν ἀγαθῇ συνειδήσει ὑπάρχων, μὴ παρεκβαίνων τὸν ὡρισμένον τῆς λειτουργίας αὐτοῦ κανόνα, ἐν σεμνότητι.

[90] Jeffers 1991, 135, makes much of despotes here, in which he detects an Emperor-subject relationship, if not master-slave; Maier 2002, 133.1 Clem 2.8, 3.4, 21.1, 44.6, 51.2, 54.4.

[91] Welborn 1993, 228-229, where Clement "appropriates" contemporary ideology; see also Lotz 2007, 144, where 1 Clem "reflects" Flavian propaganda and "borrows language of imperial peace;" for Jeffers 1991, 137, *agape* is "the Christian equivalent of Roman consensus."

More importantly, it is explicitly linked to homonoia. Clement's paraphrase of Paul's language is couched in the language of homonoia rhetoric: "*Agape* has no *schisma*, *agape* creates no *stasis*." But Clement moves beyond the apostle in making an explicit connection between agape and homonoia: "love does all things in harmony" (ἀγάπη πάντα ποιεῖ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ) (49.5). Clement links homonoia to happiness in his conclusion that believers are "blessed" (μακάριοι) when they live "in the homonoia of love," (ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ ἀγάπης) striving to maintain unity (50.5). Because this is almost certainly a paraphrase of Paul, it is all the more significant that homonoia appears. Twice Clement links the transcendent virtue of Paul's letter with homonoia. This makes this passage one of the strongest reasons to think of homonoia as an imported concept. The passage allows for thinking of homonoia as a "reconceptualization" of "an imperial idea" that makes Clement one of the first Christians to "reappropriate" pagan concepts for the Christian *ekklesia*.[95]

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[92] Thorsteinsson 2010, 123; Bakke 2001, 195-196 sees in *agape* a masterful blend of pagan and Pauline elements; this rests, however, on "love" as a term typically found in homonoia rhetoric, which is not true for *agape*, but for *philia* and *eros*.

[93] 49.5, ἀγάπη κολλᾷ ἡμᾶς τῷ θεῷ…δίχα ἀγάπης οὐδὲν εὐάρεστόν ἐστιν τῷ θεῷ.

[94] Thorsteinsson 2010, 125.

Clement reserves some of his strongest appeals to homonoia for the very sections in which he asks a blessing and wisdom on earthly authorities for their continued wise rule. This is especially clear in the final portions of the letter, where Clement's use of homonoia is particularly frequent. Clement closes his letter with a prayer that is the single strongest statement of his attitude towards earthly authorities. Here, Clement asserts that earthly rulers are within God's created order and thus derive their authority from him. Christians are therefore expected to submit not only to individual presbyters within the *ekklesia*, but to the highest authorities in the land. It is unnecessary for Clement to identify these rulers by name; we know they were Roman imperial rulers. The same "harmony and peace" that are mentioned earlier in the letter are now sought on behalf of imperial powers. Clement twice prays that homonoia in particular be given to earthly authorities. This would obviously complicate the picture drawn by Pliny and later Roman authors of early Christians. If Clement is unwilling to actually make offering to the emperor's image, he nonetheless advocates a significant allegiance to temporal authorities that pagan contemporaries might have admired.

The "homonoia and peace" requested here are significant in that they are universal. It involves "all those who inhabit the earth" (60.4). It is linked to Clement's aim that "all nations" (ἅπαντα ἔθνη) come to know his God (59.4). This universal homonoia is clearly linked to obedience (ὑπακοή) in the prayer. This fits the overarching emphasis the letter puts on order. It is notable here, however, because it is not only an obedience towards God, but also towards temporal powers. The ideal is for believers "to do what is good and pleasing to [God] *and* to those who rule us."[96] In idealizing obedience to "all those who rule and lead us here on earth," Clement legitimizes the geo-political status quo. His prayer concerns not only piety, but political allegiance.

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[95] Lotz 2007, 144; on Clement's social class determining his "affinity for Roman ideology," see Jeffers 1991.

> You have given them, O Master, the authority to rule through your magnificent and indescribable power, that we may both recognize the glory and honor you have given them and subject ourselves to them, resisting nothing that conforms to your will. Give them, O Lord, health, peace, homonoia, and stability, so that without faltering they may administer the rule that you have given to them.
>
> Σύ, δεσποτα, ἔδωκας τὴν ἐξουσίαν τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῖς διὰ του μεγαλοπρεποῦς καὶ ἀνεκδιηγήτου κράτους σου, εἰς τὸ γινώσκοντας ἡμᾶς τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ αὐτοῖς δεδομένην δόξαν καὶ τιμὴν ὑποτάσσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, μηδὲν ἐναντιουμένους τῷ θελήματί σου· οἷς δός, κύριε, ὑγίειαν, εἰρήνην, ὁμόνοιαν, εὐστάθειαν, εἰς τὸ διέπειν αὐτοὺς τὴν ὑπὸ σοῦ δεδομένην αὐτοῖς ἡγεμονίαν ἀπροσκόπως. (61.1)

Such statements allow for the conclusion that 1 Clement is an example of imperial ideology and practice being co-opted by a minority community. Clement is striving to define Christian community in terms of Greco-Roman political ideas and ideology, and homonoia was a key rhetorical element surrounding these ideas.[97] It is therefore understandable that the Christian community reflects this discourse. Homonoia was a requirement for the validity of both a polis and the early church. While we are certain of neither the identity nor the ecclesiastic office of "Clement," we can be sure he writes as a representative of the church at Rome. Though his aim is to persuade, rather than command, we can also detect at least some semblance of authority on the part of the sender over his audience. This authority depends on interpreting the letter as a reflection of imperial administration: Clement sends "witnesses" (μαρτυρες) to assure concord within the Corinthian church as Aristides declares himself a "witness" to harmony within Rhodes, for example.[98] Thus the letter has precedent not only in Christian writings such as Paul's epistles, but also—and perhaps more importantly—"in the ideology of the Empire." It utilizes a counsel of homonoia that was "popular" in the late first and early second centuries.[99] He adopts the strategy of government intervention, modeled on the interactions between senate and emperor, on one hand, and fractious provinces on the other. This view is strengthened by the fact that the letter is uniformly positive towards the Roman state.

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[96] 60.2, ποιεῖν τὰ καλὰ καὶ εὐάρεστα ἐνώπιόν σου καὶ ἐνώπιον τῶν ἀρχόντων ἡμῶν; emphasis mine.
[97] Brent 2009, 180, 183.
[98] 1 Clem. 63.3 and 65:1; Aristides 24.833.

Clement's positive stance towards Roman imperial power is based upon his belief, like Paul's, that earthly authorities are divinely ordained. It is part of "a striking line of continuity" between the apostle and Clement.[100] 1 Clement takes this belief to its logical conclusion, to the point where the homonoia ideals of *ekklesia* and *polis* do not differ from one another. Clement's picture of the well-ordered church mirrors the ideal Roman state with individuals "united in a common subjection" to emperor and/or bishop. In terms of a civic ideal, "no Roman could have said it better."[101] Far from questioning Rome's Empire, Clement "gives theological legitimation to this rule."[102] This characterization of 1 Clement as legitimization of existing political power can be taken too far, however, for there is a contingency about Clement's prayer for the worldy authorities. The ideal is that believers resist nothing that conforms to God's will (61.1, above). This leaves substantial room for resisting that which does not so conform. Ultimately the Roman authorities too are encompassed by Clement's theology. This is even explicit in the text: the requests for God's blessings over them begins and ends with acknowledgments of Clement's aforementioned doctrine of creation. The authorities, that is, are among the "works" of the creator through which he "makes plain the eternal structure of the cosmos" (60.1). As such, they reflect God's "understanding" (συνετός) in his created order. Thus the letter is ending where it began, with an affirmation of the divine order. This final recapitulation also recalls Clement’s anthropology, which means the temporal authorities, as men, have been granted “glory, honor, and authority (ἐξουσία). The authority comes with an obligation, however, to establish an environment that fosters homonoia. “Make their plan conform with what is good,” Clement prays, “That when they administer with piety and authority you have given them…they may attain your mercy” (61.2).

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[99] Welborn 1992, 1059; Jaeger 1961, 13; Jeffers 1991, 136-139.

[100] Thorsteinsson 2010, 134.

[101] Rankin 2006, 32-33; Jeffers 1991, 184-186, describes this as a loss of "protest orientation" that marks a transition from "sect" status; Pervo 2010, 129: the "vigorous assertion of [homonoia] does not refer to consensus reached through discussion but of obedience to properly authorized leaders. The essence of harmony is subordination to hierarchy. Greek and Roman authorities would have applauded."

[102] Wengst 1987, 107.

CONCLUSION

Despite the verbosity of the letter, it is clear Clement aims for the practical effects of an end to schism at Corinth. He closes with an appeal that news might be returned to him quickly; he eagerly awaits word of “peace and homonoia” in the community (64). He also concludes with one of his strongest exhortations to obedience. The proper response to the litany of examples Clement names is humility: “it is right for us to bow our necks in submission and assume a position of obedience” (63.1). Nonetheless there is a separate-but-friendly quality about Clement’s homonoia, especially in the context of relationship outside the *ekklesia*. Like his contemporary Plutarch, he seeks a balance between humiliation and hubris on both an international and interpersonal level by way of homonoia. Scholars have noted the similarities between Plutarch and Christian ethics: “in language and intention,” for example, “Clement reveals a deep familiarity with Plutarch’s *Precepts*.”[103] But Clement is also ahead of his time: his hymn to homonoia in the cosmos would have resonated, some seventy-five years later, in the circle of the emperor himself. Both Marcus Aurelius, for example, and his associate Oppian

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[103] Garrison 1997, 61. His conclusion is based upon the parallel themes concerning *ethos*, *philoxenia*, *authadeias* (“self-will”), and *metanoia* (62-3, with references).

(from Cilicia) would have recognized the illustration of homonoia in the natural world that Clement was so keen to communicate.[104]

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[104] Oppian of Cilicia’s *Halieutica* (“On Fishing”) I.412-430, contains similar language, on which see Allen 2006, 78-80. See also *Meditations* 5.30: “The mind of the universe is social. So it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior, and it has fitted the superior to one another. You see how it has subordinated, co-ordinated, and assigned to everything its proper portion, and has brought together into concord with one another the things which are the best.” Ὁ τοῦ ὅλου νοῦς κοινωνικός. πεποίηκε γοῦν τὰ χείρω τῶν κρειττόνων ἕνεκεν καὶ τὰ κρείττω ἀλλήλοις συνήρμοσεν. ὁρᾷς πῶς ὑπέταξε, συνέταξε, καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ἀπένειμεν ἑκάστοις καὶ τὰ κρατιστεύοντα εἰς ὁμόνοιαν ἀλλήλων συνήγαγεν.

4.

DIO, POLITICAL HOMONOIA and the COSMOS

Dio Cocceianus, or Dio Chrysostom (hereafter Dio), exemplifies the ups and downs of a Greek politician-cum-philosopher under the Roman Empire. Born around 50 CE in Prusa, by approximately 82 Dio had been exiled by Domitian. Thus, like Pliny and Tacitus in the West, Dio "could praise the *felicitas temporum* of the new regime" and its benefits in his eastern homeland at the turn of the first century.[1] Restored to the emperor's good favor with Nerva's accession, Dio devoted much of his time to embellishing his own polis and ensuring economic prosperity and political vitality in Asia and Bithynia. On the basis of the addresses he delivered in these regions, he can easily be considered an "ambassador" for homonoia. Like Plutarch, Dio uses homonoia often. His description of the ideal is in keeping with the other authors under consideration here: "there is nothing finer or more godlike, whether between men or between cities."[2] Furthermore, homonoia is tied to Dio's self-perception. To his fellow Prusans, for example, he describes his own duty to be "constantly engaged in discussions conducive to homonoia and friendship, so far as I am able, and trying in every way to eradicate unreasonable and foolish enmity (*ekthra*) and strife (*eris*) and contention (*philoneikia*)."[3] Such a job description would have resonated with both Plutarch and Paul.

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[1] Russell 1992, 4; according to this view, 96 was a watershed year for multiple senators and philosophers, Greek and Roman alike, who welcomed Nerva's accession after the alleged tyranny of Domitian. The reasons for Dio's exile are not completely understood, but commonly attributed to his association with Flavius Sabinus. Dio died around 112 CE. For his biography, Berry's introduction is helpful (1983). For a chronology, see Moles 1978, and Sheppard 1984a.

[2] 41.13, φιλίας δὲ καὶ ὁμονοίας οὐδὲν κάλλιον οὐδὲ θειότερον καὶ ἀνδρὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα καὶ πόλει πρὸς πόλιν.

The resonance is in part a result of the "small world" mentioned in the Introduction. Dio was a member of a tiny coterie of provincial elites with links the imperial family itself;[4] it should therefore be unsurprising that he shares intellectual assumptions with those authors. An example of the smallness of their network can be seen in Dio's education. It seems certain that he studied under the Stoic Musonius Rufus. The evidence may be sketchy for Musonius, but the fact that he is present in Plutarch and Aristides as well makes him worth mentioning here, especially in regards to homonoia. Musonius lived from around 30 to 100 CE, and what is known of his biography is an impressive example of changing fortunes that characterizes the lives of Dio as well as Paul and Ignatius.[5] Exiled in ca. 65 by Nero, he was later restored by Galba, only to be banished again by Vespasian, and then forgiven once more by Titus. His relative obscurity is a bit surprising considering the status of his peers, such as the younger Seneca; his students, including Epictetus and Dio; and other members of a Stoic philosophical fraternity that ultimately included the emperor himself. Dio's contemporary, M. Cornelius Fronto, has high praise for both Musonius and Dio in a letter to Marcus Aurelius. They appear in the context of Fronto's "hall of fame" of poets and orators: Musonius and his students are among those "gifted with a supreme command of words (*summa facundia praediti*)" as renowned for *sapientia* as for *eloquentia* (II.52-53). The philosopher was known to Plutarch and Aristides, and early

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[3] 48.6, λόγων ἀεὶ συναγωγῶν ὁμονοίας καὶ φιλίας συναράμενοι, καθ᾽ ὅσον οἷοί τέ ἐσμεν, ἔχθραν δὲ καὶ ἔριν καὶ φιλονεικίαν ἄλογον καὶ ἀνόητον ἐξαιροῦντες πάντα τρόπον

[4] Dio claims "intimacy" (*synetheia*) and *philia* with the *autokrator* before the Prusan *ekklēsia*, as well as good relations with other powerful Romans (47.22). For a skeptical revisionist account, see Sidebottom 1996; See also Kokkinia 2004 for evidence of associations with Nerva and Trajan (497).

[5] The fragments and biographical evidence are collected in Lotz 1947, and now King 2011. Musonius is mentioned by Tacitus (eg. *Ann* 15.71) and Pliny, as well as Plutarch and Aristides (Lutz 1947, numbers 36, 37, and 53). Dio was long seen as a philosophical "convert," but Moles attempted to demolish this as a late-antique tradition without evidence, a product of Dio's own self-presentation. Moles would allow, however, for a change in "emphasis," ie more philosophical content, in his later life (1978, 96).

Christians were quick to embrace him (however warily) as an exemplary pagan thinker (see below).

Musonius was Stoicism's most eloquent proponent some 200 years after the school's presence was first known at Rome.[6] Dio is by no means purely Stoic—in fact he once presented himself as a Cynic philosopher at Tarsus.[7] His is something of a philosophic grab bag of popular schools of his era. The most important characteristic of Stoicism for my purpose here is its emphasis on a practical ethics that was based upon humans living in harmony with their inherent talent for reason. This was the characteristic that separated man from animals, and it is a dichotomy that Plutarch and others harp upon in their speeches. The Stoic ideal, a "sage," had been released from unruly emotions, and was thus able to live a peaceful life released from either pain or pleasure. Both of these ideas are associated with concord. In avoidance of messy emotion, Stoicism provided a philosophical basis for hortatory addresses on homonoia: psychological peace reflected a divine harmony that embraced Zeus himself. It was only fitting, therefore, that homonoia be extended to political life.

A cursory reading of the fragments of Musonius' thought in other authors (including Plutarch and Aristides) makes it easy to understand why early Christians seemed to have admired him.[8] Ramelli has called his theologically-grounded ethics "radical" compared to some of his Stoic predecessors, and highlighted the parallels between his sexual and gender ethics and those of Paul. For example, Musonius "sees *koinōnia* and homonoia as the principal element in a marriage," rather than only procreation (since any animal can procreate).[9] This is emblematic of

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[6] King 2011, 9.
[7] *Or.* 34.2, which could date to the 70s. Regarding the nature of Dio's philosophic allegiances, the primary characteristic for Bost-Poudern is "eclectic" (2006, 298). See also Moles 1978, 94-66, who observes that Dio's exile experience fits well with the ideal Cynic sage, as does his dress and appearance.
[8] Origen admires Musonius in *Contra Celsum* (c.250 CE).
[9] Ramelli 2008, 377-378. The fragment (Stob. *Flor.* 70.14) is included with translation by Lutz 1947 (90-91).

Musonius' Stoic emphasis on practical ethics and political practice as opposed to pure abstraction. The consequence was an emphasis on persuasive rhetoric, which Dio's speeches exemplify. Some eighty works survive—"some of the most insightful documents on post-classical Greek civic politics preserved from antiquity."[10] Homonoia is at the center of several of them, as we will see below.

To return to the biography of Dio, almost everything we know comes from Dio himself, which has always posed difficulties for students of his work. His first biographer, Philostratus, attests to this when he quits his efforts to precisely label his subject. "I do not know what one ought to call him," Philostratus concludes, and scholars continue to remark "how thin and permeable the divide between sophists and philosophers was" in the second century.[11] "Golden-mouthed" is the only label that has stuck, but it is of course unofficial and posthumous. Thus Dio's worldview remains hard to pin down. "Whatever one chooses to call Dio," Kokkinia concludes, "he was a politician as much as anything else, or at least he became one the moment he entered the walls of his native city."[12] And Dio does generally "keep his feet on the ground," emphasizing the practical benefits of homonoia whenever possible.[13] Whereas Plutarch became increasingly devoted to religion, Dio spent more energy on building programs than on mysticism.[14] Yet he casts himself at times as a philosopher, and there is certainly an ethical and philosophic dimension inherent in his understanding of homonoia. The ambiguity is probably inevitable for a travelling speaker with a sizeable oeuvre, but it has contributed to the view of Dio as a "philosophic and political turncoat."[15] This is due to confusion about whether he is best described as "sophist" or "philosopher;" Dio's slippery stance vis-à-vis Rome is also a contributing factor. This too is a matter of debate, and so the best approach is to remember Plutarch's Theramenes (Chapter 2, above). They are both comfortable with the political ambivalence epitomized by their fifth-century BCE predecessor. The content of Dio's moralizing and the tone of his rhetoric seem to be tailored to his audience, or contingent upon circumstance. If not a chameleon, Dio certainly seems to have adapted well.

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[10] Zuiderhoek 2008, 420; Bekker-Nielson puts Dio and Pliny on a par with Oxyrhunchus and Pompeii for knowledge of internal politics (2008. 17).

[11] Phil. *VS* 487.7. Van Nuffelen 2011, 85. On the difficulty of classifying sophists and philosophers, see Eshleman 2012, 1-3. For a comparison to Plutarch, see Stadter 2002a, 3.

[12] Kokkinia 2006, 185. On the difficulty of classifying Dio, see Bost-Poudern 2006, 303-306.

[13] The phrase is Garcia's (1973, 86).

[14] The details of the building program are unclear, but Dio was busy enough in on such projects to be sued and face criticism at home. Pliny the Younger summarizes a case against Dio to Trajan regarding an *opus civitati* that included a library featuring a statue of the emperor (*Ep.* 10.81; Dio 40.8-10). Dio defends himself in an address to the Prusan *ekklēsia* that mentions several "public improvements," including colonnades and fortifications, and offers no apology for planning new harbors and shipyards (45.12). Kokkinia 2004, 499 thinks a gymnasium was involved in the legal case against Dio.

However, the slipperiness of Dio's identity (and that of any of our authors) is less important than the content of his work. Ultimately his orations are best read as products of a well-educated Eastern elite; like Plutarch, he was unconcerned with the modern separation of the political from the philosophical.[16] His apparent ability to adapt to changing circumstances should not prevent an analysis of homonoia through the orations. It is possible to acknowledge the gaps in Dio's résumé, as well as the intellectual and cultural ambiguities of his identity that characterize his writings, and still isolate themes in Dio's conception of homonoia. In fact what I have called ambiguity adds a welcome variety; in adapting his speeches to the audience, Dio offers a fuller picture of homonoia.

DIO'S DEFINITIONS

The scope of Dio's understanding of homonoia is broad. Homonoia itself appears more than fifty times over the span of Dio's corpus; it is often couched in rhetoric proposing unity that bears a close resemblance to both pagan and Christian contemporaries. Dio explicitly harkens to Stoic tenets at times, some of which would have resonated in the Christian *ekklesiai* as well as the Eastern political *ekklesiai* and agoras. This is particularly clear in Dio's "top-down approach" to unity, which is founded on the Stoic conception of a "one-storey" cosmos in which humans are united with all other matter, governed by an immanent supreme deity.[17] This Stoic cosmology makes Dio's view of homonoia all-encompassing: from the microscopic to the celestial, homonoia is part of the very fabric of the universe. Dio's understanding for homonoia is therefore expansive.

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[15] Moles 2005, 112; he summarizes the long debate surrounding Dio's identity at 134.

[16] Kokkinia 2004, 497 defines elite status as "wealth, noble birth, education, and good relations with the Roman state." On the lack of a philosophy-politics distinction, see Moles 1978.

Though founded on this cosmological base, Dio's homonoia has a major ethical aspect. This emphasis on the application of homonoia to the world around him gives him something in common with Paul, Plutarch, and Clement. The ethical offshoot of his cosmological ideas is seen, for example, in the *oikos*. Dio takes for granted the importance of homonoia between husband and wife, or between a man and his family. Like Musonius, Dio defines a good marriage as "homonoia between man and wife;" the "bad marriage" is characterized by *dichonoia* (38.15). "Many homes," he says, have been destroyed by *stasis* within a marriage or conflict between parent and child.[18] Within the home, safety depends upon two things: "unity of mind" (*homophrosune*) between the husband and wife, and "obedience" (*peitharchia*) among the household servants.

Thus Dio's conception of homonoia has an important role in the domestic sphere, yet it is far more expansive than its conjugal aspect. Homonoia is essential, for example, to all sorts of human relations.[19] It as "a fine (*kalos*) word and a fine thing" that is applicable to the clan (*syngeneia*) as well as to cities and nations (*ethnea*).[20] It is the defining characteristic of both fraternity and friendship.[21] The terms—*adelphotēs* and *philia*—are two examples of a pattern in Dio's orations. He redefines several words in terms of homonoia. As will be discussed below, a "polis," for Dio, consists not so much of public buildings as a cluster of virtues that describe homonoia: "self-control, friendship, and mutual trust."[22] Similarly, Dio's version of "brotherhood" is marked by sharing all (in this case, patrimony) equally. Like Plutarch, Dio uses brotherhood as an illustration of, or template for, homonoia. The most interesting aspect of this is that Dio applies the fraternal ideal to inter-city relations, which is one of his main interests. Sharing—acting in the common interest (*koine*) means everyone will admire them "as good and just and really brothers" (38.45). Dio admonishes entire cities to imitate such behavior: "Since this is true, if this spirit of brotherhood is achieved in your cities, will it not be an even greater blessing, more beautiful and richer?"[23] Thus there is much familiar vocabulary in Dio's speeches, but they are used in a wide variety of homonoia-related contexts.

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[17] Trapp distinguishes this from a Platonic "two-storey" cosmos with a *transcendent* deity, though allows for significant Platonic content in Dio (2007, 191 n. 32).

[18] 38.15. Dio shares Plutarch's conviction that *stasis* can often start in the *oikos*, for which see 38.50. For the pedigree of stasis, see Bekker-Nielsen 2008, 14.

[19] Swain 1996, 220; See also Ferguson 1958, 118.

[20] 38.5-6. Ramelli notes the Stoic *kalon* is "a term that is close to *agathon* insofar as it means 'fine in the ethical sense'" (2008, 374).

DIO'S IDENTITY

Dio's homonoia is tied to the complicated matter of "identity" of Greek-speaking elites of the eastern provinces in the Second Sophistic. Russell simplifies, however, by noting three distinct yet overlapping allegiances for Dio: to Prusa; to his province and Hellenic culture; and finally to Rome.[24] Of course many found themselves with these allegiances, and drawing multiple identities together (whether philosophical, cultural, or "ethnic") seems to have been a common goal. Dio offered advice on how to best negotiate all three of these allegiances, and homonoia was his central theme. At least once in his speeches, Dio explicitly ties homonoia to Hellenic identity. Speaking before the Prusan assembly, the linkage is clear: "And it becomes you since you excel in *paideia* and in natural gifts and are in fact pure Hellenes, to display your nobility in [homonoia]."[25] This fits well with Richter's conclusion regarding Dio's allegiances: he "seems to have advocated a model of Hellas that is linked to but ultimately distinct from the Roman west. What ought to bind this Hellas together is not the external power of Rome but the internal cohesiveness of what Herodotus had called *to Hellênikon*, the Greek thing."[26] I would add that homonoia is inextricably bound to "Greekness."

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[21] 38.15, And what is fraternity save homonoia of brothers? And was is friendship except homonoia among friends? ἡ δὲ ἀδελφότης τί ἄλλο ἐστὶν ἢ ἀδελφῶν ὁμόνοια; ἡ δὲ φιλία τί ἄλλο ἢ φίλων ὁμόνοια; Konstan observes that *philia* tended to be defined by ancient authors in Homeric terms. He notes Dio's remarks in *Or.* 74.28, where three friendships are paragons: Orestes and Pylades, Theseus and Peirithous, Achilles and Patroclus (1997, 24). He also considers *Or.* 3, where *philia* is prerequisite for the good king (107-108). For the inequality linked to these friendships, see Fitzgerald 2003, 329-330.

[22] 48.9, σωφροσύνη, φιλία, τὸ πιστεύειν ἀλλήλοις. See alo Bost-Pouderon 2006, 116.

[23] 38.45-46, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πόλεσι γενομένη αὕτη ἡ ἀδελφότης οὐχὶ καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται καὶ κάλλιον καὶ πλουσιώτερον; Compare Plut. *De Amore Frat.* 483D, which sees the moment of inheritance as the beginning of either homonoia or *stasis* within many families.

[24] Russell 1991, 1; see also Bost-Pouderon 2006, 115 for the congruency of Dio's "Hellenism" with Roman interests. Bekker-Nielson considers the importance of money, municipal office, Rome, and rumors in his brief summary of contemporary politics (2006).

Dio's description of Rome itself confirms a "slipperiness" to his identity.[27] City pedigrees were important marks of Hellenic prestige under the empire. Dio describes the origins of Apamea, a polis neighboring Prusa, in glowing terms. Their heritage is, in part, what makes their "character" (*ethne*) "not rough or stupid." Significantly, Dio attributes Apamea's current status to its affiliation with Rome:

> That city, while so superior to the rest of mankind in good fortune and power, has proved to be even more superior in fairness and benevolence, freely giving both citizenship and legal rights and offices, believing no man of worth to be an alien, and at the same time safeguarding justice for all alike.
>
> ἣ τοσοῦτον εὐτυχίᾳ διαφέρουσα τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνάμει πλέον διενήνοχεν ἐπιεικείᾳ καὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ, τοῦτο μὲν ἀφθόνως μεταδιδοῦσα καὶ πολιτείας καὶ νόμων καὶ ἄρχων, οὐδέν᾿ ἀλλότριον ἡγουμένη τῶν ἀξίων, τοῦτο δὲ ὁμοίως ἅπασι φυλάττουσα τὸ δίκαιον. 41.9

It is clear that Dio has no problem praising Rome and Hellenic heritage in the same breath. The ethical upshot of this passage, moreover, is that the Apameans should "imitate" the "gentleness and generosity" of Rome (41.10). This makes it very difficult to determine Dio's attitude towards the Roman Empire. Regardless of where his allegiances ultimately lay, the point here is that homonoia rhetoric was applicable in his discussion of both cultures. On the one hand, Rome could offer a model of virtuous behavior (above). On the other, homonoia and its semantic field are at times considered "classically" Hellenic—a vital part of Greek heritage that Easterners above all should exemplify. Added to this latter aspect is what little we know of Dio's differences (or conflicts) with the Empire. He was of course exiled, but there were also occasional problems with Roman overseers. If normally well governed, there is record of seven corruption trials involving Roman governors, two under Trajan.[28] They delegated related tasks to *correctores* and *curatores*, whose presence is manifest in Dio's works. "Nothing which takes place in the cities escapes the attention of the proconsuls — I mean the more important ones in these parts; on the contrary, just as relatives denounce to the teachers the children who are too disorderly at home, so also the misdeeds of the communities are reported to the proconsuls."[29]

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[25] 48.8, πρέπει δὲ ὑμῖν παιδείᾳ διαφέροντας καὶ φύσει καὶ τῷ ὄντι καθαρῶς ὄντας Ἕλληνας ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὴν γενναιότητα ἐπιδεικνύναι. The context of the passage means "this very thing" does in fact refer to homonoia.

[26] Richter 2011, 119.

[27] For a recent discussion, see Eshleman 2012, 1-3.

GEOPOLITICAL HOMONOIA

What we can tell about Dio's stance is that he, like Plutarch and early Christians, seems to have resigned himself to geopolitical realities. This is not to say there is a total absence of resistance to or criticism of the Roman "peace." But if Dio were to write a manual of political success for a protégé, it would probably have much in common with Plutarch's *Precepts*. Harris describes Dio's limited aim: he is not after absolute autonomy (which had not existed for centuries), but rather privileges through "orderly execution of the administrative tasks delegated" to Prusa.[30] Execution of these tasks, as well as regional prosperity under Roman imperialism required homonoia. Dio's multiple allegiances are also evident, and more subtle, when he gathers friends for a philosophical dialogue (in the Platonic tradition) and notes with pleasure the "ancient," (i.e. Homeric) appearance of the discussants with their long hair and beards.[31] "Only one among them was shaven," he adds, "and he was subjected to the ridicule and resentment of them all" because he wanted to flatter and befriend the Romans. "Real men" wear beards, is the conclusion.[32] Russell hears an "apparent anti-Roman tone" here, but finds Dio's attitude generally favorable towards the Empire.[33] This conclusion is probably inevitable for someone who, according to the orations, was at home in both cultures. Dio combines an appreciation for the "collectivity of Hellas as a limited and self-sufficient community," with a respect for the peace that Rome provided. [34] Dio, like Plutarch, never knew anything different than the significantly circumscribed version of Hellenic autonomy. He did, however, want his own polis as well as his neighbors to thrive both economically and politically. In fact he wanted to strive for as much "equality" as possible *within* the status quo. Homonoia was a tool to that end, and this is the defining characteristic of the geopolitical aspect of Dio's conception of it. Among other things, homonoia leads to respect; like the other authors considered in this study, Dio sees homonoia and hierarchy as coexistent. Yet he seems to also want at least something of a leveling effect from homonoia. This is evident in one of his definitions of a prosperous polis:

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[28] Harris 1980, 877.

[29] 46.14, οὐ γὰρ λανθάνει τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν οὐδὲν τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ˙λέγω δὲ τοὺς μείζους ἡγεμόνας τῶν ἐνθάδὲ ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τῶν παιδίων τῶν ἀτακτοτέρων οἴκοι πρὸς τοὺς διδασκάλους κατηγοροῦσιν οἱ προσήκοντες, οὑτωσὶ καὶ τὰ τῶν δήμων ἁμαρτήματα πρὸς ἐκείνους ἀπαγγέλλεται. "These parts" refers to Prusa.

[30] Harris 1980, 893.

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[31] Kim notes a "continuous, even oppressive presence" of Homer in contemporary literature (2011, 5). His analysis focuses on Dio's *Or.* 11, which argues that Troy actually won the Trojan War, yet Kim sees this as a caricature of contemporary uses of Homer as historian, rather than of the bard himself, whom he generally reveres (85-138). At least five additional speeches are traditionally entitled *On Homer* or relate to a Homeric subject (53, 55, 56, 57, 58), but there are many quotations outside of these. See also Anderson 1993, 73 and 124-125. Moles 1978, 97 gathers evidence for Dio's self-presentation as Odysseus.

[32] 36.17-18, "And so one could have seen illustrated in his case how disgraceful the practice is and how unseemly for real men." (ὥστε εἶδεν ἄν τις ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνου τὸ αἰσχρὸν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ οὐδαμῆ πρέπον ἀνδράσιν.) For Dio's own long hair and beard, see 47.25. That this is more complicated than a simple Hellene/barbarian dichotomy is suggested by the remark at 36.25 regarding "nominal Greeks" who are "more barbarous than [barbarians]." See also Van Nuffelen 2011, 89 for Dio's "remarkable" openness to ancient barbarian "wisdom" in Or. 36. See also Schmidt 2011, who also sees Dio as more nuanced than Plutarch or Aristides regarding barbarians.

[33] Russell 1991, 220 notes *inter alia* Dio's Roman citizenship (41.6) and joy and pride in returning to Prusa (41.1); at 44.6, Dio mentions an invitation from the emperor (Nerva?) himself and multiple offers of citizenship through his travels and exile, yet nevertheless prefers his native polis.

[34] Richter 2011, 116. An interesting case is Dio's advice for Rome as recounted in Athens (13. 30-32); he prescribes a stronger *paideia*, asserting the basis of happiness has more to do with education than land acquisition (31). See also Desideri's comments on the address to Rhodes (31), where Dio implies the Greeks are largely responsible for their own servility (2011, 91).

> What city is dearer to its people, more honored by the stranger, more useful to its friends, more formidable to its foes?…Who are more nearly equal in honor to their rulers, and whom do the rulers more respect? Whom do good rulers so admire, and bad rulers less despise? Why, is it not clear that not merely the rulers, but even the gods, pay heed to men who live in homonoia?
>
> ποία μὲν τοῖς πολίταις προσφιλεστέρα πόλις; ποία δὲ τιμιωτέρα τοῖς ξένοις; ποία δὲ χρησιμωτέρα τοῖς φίλοις; τίς δὲ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς φοβερωτέρα;…τίνες μὲν ἰσοτιμότεροι τοῖς κρατοῦσιν; τίνας δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ κρατοῦντες αἰδοῦνται; τίνας μὲν οὕτως ἀγαπῶσιν οἱ χρηστοὶ ἄρχοντες; τίνων δὲ ἧττον καταφρονοῦσιν οἱ πονηροί; οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὁμονοοῦσιν οὐ μόνον οἱ κρατοῦντες, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ θεοὶ προσέχουσιν. 39.4

INTERCITY HOMONOIA

A second political type of homonoia in Dio is that which should exist between cities. One of the clearest examples is his address at Nicomedia, which had long been half of the most intense rivalry of the region, its rival being Nicaea. Dio begins the address at Nicomedia by noting homonoia's breadth; it is applicable to any situation, from the home to geopolitics. It is related to his Stoic understanding of human nature. Though they share the faculty of reason with the deities, their proclivity for *stasis* undercuts humanity's efforts towards the divine. The discordant tendency works in cities and nations, Dio concludes, like a disease. "The only respect in which we fall short of the blessedness of the gods and of their indestructible permanence is this — that we are not all sensitive to homonoia."[35] His goal here, however, is to channel this broad concept into a specifically inter-city context. "For when homonoia has been proved to be beneficial to all humankind," he says, "the proof will naturally follow that this particular homonoia between these particular cities is both indispensable for [Nicomedia] and most profitable (*lusitelestaten*) as well.”[36]

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[35] 38.11, ᾧ δὲ μόνῳ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπολειπόμεθα τῆς θείας καὶ τῆς ἀφθάρτου διαμονῆς ἐκείνων, τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὅτι μὴ πάντες ὁμονοίας αἰσθανόμεθα.

“Profitable” captures yet another important part of Dio’s push for homonoia. As a moralist, Dio does indeed seem to attempt to convince his audience to exchange material interests for more moral, philosophical concerns. The rhetorical question posed to the Nicaeans (in reference to the city’s common self-promoting campaigns), captures much of this. “What sort of buildings, what size of territory, what magnitude of population make a community stronger than its internal homonoia?”[37] But Dio’s attempt to reprioritize a polis’ values does not prevent him from making simpler, more explicit appeals to a polis’ self-interest that are based on these same material goods. Dio the elite politician is too practical to neglect the profit motive, in other words. The list of benefits Dio promises the Nicomedians is long: manpower, crops, money, and troops are all doubled, in effect. Individual and civic honors, meanwhile, as well as eloquence, wealth, and justice, will be similarly enhanced.[38] Sharing “goods in common, unity of heart and mind, enjoying the same things” (κοινωνίαν ἀγαθῶν, ὁμοφροσύνην, ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέρων χαράν) —all this increases pleasure (*hedona*) and minimizes pain in the formerly quarrelsome cities.[39] Dio makes the same promises to the Nicaeans in a speech that is essentially an advertisement for homonoia. Though much shorter than the Nicomedian address, it contains no less than eighteen consecutive rhetorical questions, each of which highlights a reward for homonoia. Rather than list these, I simply note here that Dio’s catalogue of benefits for those “thinking alike” (*homonoousi*) culminates in an ideal situation in which the entire city seems to share a single *psyche*.[40] This is one of many indications that Dio's homonoia is more than simply political, as will be discussed below.

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[36] 38.8, ῾ἔσται γάρ ἀκόλουθον τὸ τῆς ὁμονοίας ἀποδειχθείσης ὠφελίμου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπασιν̓ ἀποδεῖξαι ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν τῶν πόλεων τούτων καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτην οὖσαν ὑμῖν καὶ λυσιτελεστάτην.

[37] 39.5, ποῖα δὲ οἰκοδομήματα, πόση δὲ χώρα, πόσον δὲ πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἰσχυρότερον δῆμον ἀποφαίνει τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν ὁμονοίας;

[38] 38.41-42; their opposites (stasis, envy, and strife)are listed in 38.43

[39] The resultant atmosphere will be like a public festival (38.43). Dio makes the same promises (riches, fertility, honors, fame and power) to the Nicaeans (39.7).

INTRAMURAL HOMONOIA

The quote above (from oration 39) is excerpted from one of Dio's more important addresses, one of the few traditionally entitled *peri homonoias*. Addressed the other half of Bithynia's most well-known rivalry—Nicaea—it is significant because it deals with a third type of homonoia: strife within the city. It could be called a statement of intramural homonoia since it celebrates actual homonoia that has been achieved between factions within the city. The nature of these disputes is not usually clear in Dio's addresses, yet internal conflict is nevertheless impossible to miss.[41] Another example of the intramural type of homonoia is in a speech in Prusa where Dio asks the assembly what good Athens' monuments did in assuring its longevity. His answer: not very much. They only served to make echoes of discord louder (48.12). This is one of countless exempla drawn from Greek history; like Plutarch, Dio shows a thorough grounding in the subject.[42]

Success, for Dio, depended upon a beneficent neglect of the Roman governor. The last thing a provincial aristocrat wanted was interference from the governor, or criticism from the emperor. Intramural homonoia is therefore an example of Dio's self-interest in being a champion of homonoia. The assembly had become a political privilege under the Romans, which could be revoked if the emperor saw fit. This is explicit in the 48th oration, which Dio made to Prusa's *ekklesia* in preparation for the appearance of the proconsul in his city. The circumstances are unknown, but it is clear the *ekklesia* had been dissolved by a Roman proconsul

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[40] 39.5 envisions a god fashioning "one soul" for the polis; for benefits, see 39.3-5, 39.7.

[41] *Boule*-versus-*ekklēsia* was probably part of this, as Zuiderhoek notes: "Civic discord during the period are on record for cities all across Asia Minor" (2008, 442). See also Bost-Pouderon 2006, 127.

[42] See Schmidt 2011 for Dio's use of the Persian War topos, in which Schmidt sees a marked openness to draw from both Greek and barbarian "material" (114).

(48.1). A new proconsul, Varenus Rufus, meant the assembly was reinstituted, but this was a privilege that could only be maintained by displaying homonoia. Given the proconsul's presence in the assembly, the "intramural" homonoia of this address is inherently ambivalent. It is essentially like-thinking "within the city walls," but it is in reference to—and inseparable from a wider homonoia vis-à-vis Rome in the person of the overseer.

Dio is quick to deliver his expectations; they imply that the assembly could be a rather riotous place: "On the present occasion it is your duty…to show yourselves temperate (*sōphronoi*) and well-behaved in assembly and first and foremost, to adorn yourselves with mutual friendship and homonoia."[43] Dio continues with specific instructions that develop a picture of what he has in mind. They should show gratitude to the Roman visitor, applaud him, "and welcome him with auspicious words and honor, so that he may visit you, not as a physician visits the sick, with apprehension and worry over their treatment, but rather as one visits the well, with joy and eagerness. [44] The worst-case-scenario is the same here as it was in Achaea (or Sardis) in Plutarch's *Precepts*: Roman interference. Dio contends that a city with a reputation for civil strife should expect a visit from foreign "physicians." Quickly switching metaphors, he uses the same imagery as Plutarch in describing the situation: "Then comes what happens with difficult horses—when the bit fails to hold them in check, a curb is put upon them from outside."[45] Homonoia and related ideals are the most effective preventative measures; a city should be "of one mind (*homognomona*), in friendship within itself and one in feeling (*sympheron*)" (48.6).

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[43] 48.2, νῦν οὖν ὑμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶ…ἐπιδεῖξαι σωφρόνως καὶ καλῶς αὐτοὺς ἐκκλησιάζοντας, καὶ πρῶτον, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, καλλωπίσασθαι τῇ φιλίᾳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ ὁμονοίᾳ. On proconsular mischief, see also Bost-Pouderon 2006, 124. This address as a whole is, for Zuiderhoek, a testament to the vitality of contemporary *ekklēsiai*: "The power of the people was real here, because they could, and sometimes did, refuse to play along" (2008, 425 n.46).

[44] 48.2-3, τὸ δὲ νῦν εὐχαριστήσατε καὶ δεξιώσασθε καὶ μετ᾽ εὐφημίας καὶ τιμῆς ὑποδέξασθε, ἵνα μὴ ὥσπερ ατρὸς πρὸς νοσοῦντας ὑπόπτως καὶ ἀηδῶς θεραπείας ἕνεκεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς πρὸς ὑγιαίνοντας ἡδέως καὶ προθύμως παρῇ.

[45] 48.13, ὅταν ὁ χαλινὸς μὴ κατισχύῃ, ψάλιον αὐτοῖς ἔξωθεν ἐμβάλλεται; compare Plut. 801D and 821A,B.

Dio certainly had a philosophical interest in such rhetoric, but here he probably has a practical purpose. Homonoia was an important tool in dealing with the Roman authorities. It could be considered "the ultimate exercise of the sovereignty of the city."[46] If and when the Roman governor was corrupt, only a unified provincial council would be able call for his prosecution.[47] This occurred more than once, to which Dio's addresses attest. He is convinced the governors are more than capable of playing the Greek-speaking cities against one another. This is another reason for the dangers of stasis—it gives the Romans a means to manipulate and weaken provincial cities. In reference to Prusan infighting, Dio asks if his audience is aware "of the tyrannical power your own *stasis* offers those who govern you?" (38.36) The proconsuls consider quarrelsome provincials to be "fools" (*anoia*); as such, they treat them "like children," pacifying them with useless titles (38.37). "Your governors hand you titles, and call you "first" either by word of mouth or in writing; that done, they may thenceforth with impunity treat you as being the very last!"[48] The lesson here is that homonoia ensures beneficent attention. "For no one readily hears the words either when choruses do not keep together or when cities are at variance."[49] This is one of the most realistic consequences of a lack of homonoia. While indispensable for minimizing Roman interference, homonoia also assured cities of a safeguard of Roman legal proceedings should they be needed.[50]

A CASE STUDY

All three of these types of political homonoia are brought together in a speech to the apostle Paul's hometown. Perhaps forty years after Paul's death, Dio spoke to Tarsus, in Cilicia, on homonoia.[51] Even though the 34th discourse has not been entitled or categorized as "on homonoia," it is nevertheless a clear summary of this aspect of Dio's lifework. In the second of his two addresses to the people there he presents a relatively full picture of the nature of homonoia and its rewards. The Tarsian address is a good example of the mix of the philosophical and pragmatic that marks Dio's rhetoric. As Trapp notes, he is able to approach homonoia from an "abstract generalizing principle" such as the Stoic cosmos, but Dio can also discuss homonoia in concrete terms. When he does so, "it is not upwards to the state of the cosmos that he tends to relate it, but inwards to states of the human soul."[52]

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[46] Bost-Pouderon 2006, 125, who notes the lack of harmony is the best ally of the Roman hegemony (125).

[47] Desideri 2011, 92 comments on "unscrupulous" governors and mismanagement of provinces. See also Bost-Pouderon 2006, 124.

[48] 38.38-39, προτείνουσιν ὀνόματα καὶ ἢ εἶπον ὑμᾶς πρώτους ἢ ἔγραψαν: εἶτά εἰσιν ἀκίνδυνοι τὸλοιπὸν ὑμῖν ὡς ἐσχάτοις χρώμενοι.

[49] 39.4, οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἀσυμφώνων χορῶν οὐδεῖς ἀκούει ῥᾳδίως ὅ τι λέγουσιν οὔτε τῶν διαφερομένων πόλεων.

[50] Swain 1996, 220; Sheppard 1984b, 241.

As he does in other cities, Dio begins with a summary of Tarsus' history. When Cilicia was organized as a province over 150 years prior, Tarsus had favored status for Rome. The city had retained its political and economic dominance, it seems, but had long since squandered Roman favor and was hanging on to prominence by brute strength rather than prestige. Her neighbors recognized Tarsus' diminished status and were keen to capitalize on her weakness. She faced increased hostility from neighbors who resented her power. Like neighboring poleis, Tarsus owes its current success to Rome, as far as Dio is concerned. Whatever prestige they have as metropolis they owe to Augustus, who delivered "land, laws, honor, control of the river and of the sea in [their] quarter of the world."[53] Dio presents himself to the people of Tarsus as a prophet. He implies that the Tarsian assembly looked askance at his philosopher garb, and understands if they think of him (as modern scholars might) as a Cynic. Dio expects the assembly to see him as an inspired madman at worst, a divinely ordained herald at best. In either case, he expects their attention. Unlike those who read the flight of birds, Dio guarantees clear, practical guidance for his audience (34.4). His self-presentation is not confined to the prophet.

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[51] For the date of this speech, see Harris 1966, 172-173.
[52] Trapp 2007, 193.
[53] 34.7-8. See also 34.25: "Your favor [to Augustus] increased the prestige of Tarsus."

He strengthens his demand for attention by likening himself to a physician intent on making the right diagnoses and prescriptions. The doctor simile is one of the most common images in Dio's works, and at Tarsus it is especially strong. There, Dio says he is prepared to examine every part of his "patient" in minute detail in order to decide upon the best treatment (26). Since Dio was apparently invited by Tarsus to advise the assembly, he feels compelled to give clear, practical guidance, much of which is couched in medical language.

Reading the Tarsian address, we could not ask for a clearer presentation of contemporary intercity conflict in Asia Minor than Dio's description at Tarsus. Speaking broadly, Dio accuses Cilician cities of being their own worst enemies (34.28): their lack of homonoia and success springs not from external threat (which is not allowed under Roman imperialism), nor from accidental misfortune (such as the earthquakes often mentioned in these discourses), but from poor governance and vices within. This address therefore clearly parallels Plutarch's *Political Precepts*: Dio's oration suggests there was a real need for practical political guidance. The similarities of outlook between Dio and Plutarch here are remarkable. The problem stems largely from fierce competition for prestige based upon titles (*onomata*) many of which are associated with imperial cult. Men enter public life in both Chaeronea and Prusa, it seems, by virtue of their family name and fortune, for the sake of the "purple robe" and vanity. This results in a leadership vacuum, and a generation or two of selfish career politicians results in the precarious status of a polis that both these orators describe. Their recommendation that men enter politics to serve fellow citizens may be idealistic; what is important here is the link that both Dio and Plutarch insist upon between virtue and homonoia. Virtuous motives and behavior are the only paths to homonoia (29-31).[54] It also exemplifies Dio's penchant for asserting his own definitions for key words based upon their connection to homonoia. Here “victory” (*nikē*) is an example. Dio’s conclusion is that “to take the initiative in *philia* and homonoia, and in these respects to surpass and prevail over all others, is the noblest of all victories and the safest too.”[55]

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[54] 34.29-31; for the philosophical background of "natural rulers" and the attendant emphasis of individual character, see Van Nuffelen 2011, 112-113.

There are no less than four levels of *stasis* at issue in Tarsus, which makes this an example of *both* intramural and intercity homonoia rhetoric. Relations between and within both Tarsus and its neighbors are the issue. Dio mentions at least four cities that were quarreling with Tarsus—neighbors with whom they do not “think alike” (*homonoein*). He also comments on strained relations with a *“strategos”* whose identity is unknown, but may have been a Roman governor. Thirdly, Tarsus was struggling internally to maintain homonoia in her own assembly and council (34.20). Finally, an unhappy faction of “linen-workers” was the latest threat to stable government.

> “If one were to run through the entire list of citizens, I believe he would not discover even two men in Tarsus who think alike (*phronountas*), but on the contrary, just as with certain incurable and distressing diseases which are accustomed to pervade the whole body, exempting no member of it from their inroads, so this state of stasis, this almost complete estrangement of one from another, has invaded your entire polis.”
>
> εἰ γοῦν τις ἐπεξίοι πάντας, δοκεῖ μοι μηδ᾽ ἂν δύο ἄνδρας εὑρεῖν ἐν τῇ πόλει τὸ αὐτὸ φρονοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἔνια τῶν ἀνιάτων καὶ χαλεπῶν νοσημάτων, ἃ δι᾽ ὅλων εἴωθεν ἔρχεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι μέρος εἰς ὃ μὴ κάτεισιν, οὕτως ἡ τραχύτης αὕτη καὶ τὸ μικροῦ δεῖν ἅπαντας ἀλλήλων ἀπεστράφθαι διαπεφοίτηκε τῆς πόλεως (34.20).

All of this makes Dio liken Tarsus as an oversized, lumbering athlete who, even if truly stronger than his opponent, attracts more criticism from spectators and judges alike because of his sheer, clumsy size (34.12-13). Thus Tarsus was verging on *stasis* both within and outside of its walls. This entire scene could symbolize Dio’s geopolitical reality. That is to say it is of a piece with his admonition (to Nicomedia) to strive to impress the proconsul (38.33). In competing poorly in a “contest” with neighbors—in failing to lead gently and generously—the Tarsians are threatening to disrupt the status quo. In so doing, they may jeopardize the harmony between Dio’s multiple allegiances and bring unwanted imperial oversight to a region in which he is making a major effort to preserve some sort of independence.

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[55] 34.45, τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἁμιλλᾶσθαι πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθρώπους ὑπὲρ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ τὸ φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας ἄρχειν καὶ τούτοις περιεῖναι τῶν ἄλλων καὶ κρατεῖν ἡ καλλίστη πασῶν νίκη καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη. Bost-Pouderon 2006, 78 sees homonoia as advertised in Tarsus as a “panacea.”

What is the solution to this dangerous situation? Dio’s prescription for discord is twofold: he offers remedies for both the external and internal problems. Externally, Dio hits on the major theme running through the work and lives of Aristides and Plutarch as well, namely how an eastern polis succeeds under Roman imperialism. The question is vast, and the answer defies simplistic approaches, but the ideal is a sort of benign neglect. More specifically, Dio reminds Tarsus that she owes her strength—undeniable, yet fading as of late—to Rome. If it continues to act like a bully or even be perceived to be so, the polis will quickly slide further into discord. Dio explicitly charges Tarsus with staying out of Rome’s way. This polis’ task is to give Rome no reason to interfere (34.25), to make others love rather than fear it, thereby assuring homonoia with its neighbors and Rome alike. Avoiding interference does not mean impotence, however. Part of earning the respect of others, and of fostering homonoia, is not to behave like slaves or to be subservient. Like Plutarch, Dio has more self-respect than to ask his peers for servitude. “Let no one suppose that in saying this I am advising you to put up with absolutely anybody and to endure any and every thing.”[56] Moreover, Tarsus must avoid making a nuisance of herself, in the eyes of Rome and Cilicia in general, by constantly complaining about others and about supposed infractions (38-39). Returning to the metaphor of the athlete, Tarsus should act like a true champion, pushing towards the finish even when a referee seems biased against him or when his opponent is more agile.

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[56] 34.26, καὶ μηδείς με νομίσῃ ταῦτα λέγειν ἁπλῶς ἁπάντων ἀνέχεσθαι παραινοῦντα ὑμῖν καὶ πάντα πάσχειν.

As to the internal solution, Dio's diagnosis is clear: a disease of internal divisiveness pervades Tarsus' "body" (*soma*), sparing no one. The causes of the illness are vices that would be familiar to Paul or Clement: envy, greed, contentiousness, and selfishness.[57] All of these vices must be cut out of Tarsus: only then will its people "breathe the breath of harmony in full strength and vigor" (19). Dio says internal discord will require time to be eradicated; it is as if Tarsus is recovering from a wound or amputation. It is unclear what he means by this other than its internal nature: the *boule* and the *demos* are the scenes of discord. His comments must have been related to the fact that Tarsus was embroiled in multiple strife of discord. Only time would tell if the polis would finally emerge in homonoia. Though the nature of the dispute is internal, the intramural homonoia Dio advocates here is impossible to separate from the wider geopolitical scene. The goal is harmony with Rome: whatever privileges Tarsus gained from Augusts, it should maintain by way of "loyalty and friendship" (*eunoia kai philia*). In fact the mark of Dio's ideal version of Tarsus is remarkably similar to Clement's ideal Corinth. In both cases, the community is characterized by *eutaxia*.[58]

"NATURAL" HOMONOIA

Like a good rhetor, and like the other authors surveyed here, Dio offers as many exempla as possible in building his case for homonoia. All of Dio's discourses on homonoia are peppered with figures he hopes will make the hortatory nature of his address more compelling. In the relatively brief 39th discourse, for example, the metaphors proliferate rapidly. The city is like a ship that depends upon harmony between captain and crew for safe passage. Likewise, harmony must exist between a driver and his team if a chariot is to win the race, or survive a battle.[59] The metaphors are so rampant as to risk confusion: in the space of a few lines, the city marked by homonoia is a healthy body contrasted with diseased person stricken with stasis, but also as a body with as many organs as inhabitants, all occupying one great soul.[60]

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[57] Indeed, Dio recommends prayer. 34.19, φθόνου, πλεονεξίας, φιλονικίας, τοῦ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον αὔξειν ἑαυτὸν.
[58] 34.25, ταῦτα ὀφείλετε φυλάττειν τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον δι᾽ εὐταξίαν.

Further images are used in subsequent addresses. Parallels drawn with the animal kingdom, for example, are ancient and traditional, but arguably clearer and more memorable. In fact he may offer a wider variety of what he sees as models for homonoia than any of the other figures considered here. Just as bees played a significant role in Plutarch’s *Precepts*, so at least two of Dio’s speeches look to the apiary for wisdom on “like thinking.” In the climax of a speech before fellow Prusans, he asks rhetorically why the assembly cannot more closely resemble the apiary. “Is it not disgraceful,” he asks, “that bees think alike (*homonousi*) and no one has ever seen a swarm that is factious (*stasiazonta*) and fights against itself, but, on the contrary, they both work and live together, providing food for one another?”[61] Even should a troublesome “drone” arrive, Dio insists it is better to tolerate the annoyance rather than trouble the entire hive (48.16). Addressing the same audience on a different occasion, Dio again admires what he sees in the bees. He praises their cooperation in particular: although crowded in small spaces, bees, like other representatives of the animal kingdom Dio admires, coexist peacefully: “nor do several swarms of bees, though they range over the same meadow, neglect their work and quarrel over the nectar.”

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[59] 39.6. Note the military imagery that parallels that of Clement (above) and Aristides (below, Chapter 6). The ship metaphor also appears at 38.14. It is succeeded there by chariot imagery that emphasizes harmony between a team of horses; at 41.7, the *naos* metaphor joined to the *choros* image.

[60] 39.5. For a division (*eris*) as a disease, see 41.9.

[61] 48.15, οὐκ αἰσχρόν ἐστιν, εἰ μέλιτται μὲν ὁμονοοῦσι, καὶ οὐδεὶς οὐδέποτε ἑώρακεν ἑσμὸν στασιάζοντα καὶ μαχόμενον αὑτῷ: συνεργάζονται δὲ καὶ ζῶσιν ἅμα, καὶ παρέχουσαι τὴν τροφὴν αὑταῖς. Dio allows for the existence of “drones” (*kephenes*) that may not carry their weight, but observes that the beekeeper tolerates them rather than risk disturbing the hive.

Dio casts his net as widely as possible for exempla of cooperation that his audience might imitate. Birds, cows, horses, sheep and goats, and horses are all cited as incarnations of homonoia. The vocabulary here emphasizes cooperation and mutual submission in contrast to quarrelsomeness and division.[62] Apart from the bee exempla, Dio's use of ants is the most interesting of a parade of animals that makes its way through a few of his orations. The ant observations are particularly intriguing because it is with them that the distance between human and animal is at its least. Dio explicitly connects the ant behavior to human ethics, or lack thereof. More than once he contrasts the cooperation of ants with the dysfunction of humans.[63] The contrast is strongest in a speech before the Prusan *ekklesia*:

> It is a great delight to observe the ants, how they live contentedly with one another and go out, how they aid one another with their loads, and how they yield the trails to one another. Is it not disgraceful, then, as I was saying, that human beings should be more unintelligent than wild creatures which are so tiny and unintelligent?
>
> καὶ μύρμηκας πανὺ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν ἔστιν, ὅπως μὲν οἰκοῦσι μετ᾽ ἀλλήλων εὐκόλως, ὅπως δὲ ἐξίασιν, ὅπως δὲ τὰ βάρη μεταλαμβάνουσιν, ὅπως δὲ παραχωροῦσιν ἀλλήλοις τῶν ὁδῶν. οὔκουν αἰσχρὸν ἀνθρώπους ὄντας ἀφρονεστέρους εἶναι θηρίων οὕτω σμικρῶν καὶ ἀφρόνων; 48.16

Thus Dio introduces a basic form of his anthropology, a view of human nature that would not have been foreign in Christian *ekklesia*. Humans are, in short, most like the gods by virtue of their intelligence (or *logos*, as Dio says), and patently poor at using that intelligence to good ends. Their *logos* is double-edged for Dio: they are the wisest of creatures, but also the most obstreperous. In spite of their elevated nature, "human beings are worse than cattle and creatures of the wild," Dio concludes. They are particularly inept in the areas of "friendship and partnership (*koinonein*).”[64] These are both symptomatic of homonoia, and Dio obviously commiserates with Plutarch regarding the difficulty of instilling it in a political context. The leader’s position is a delicate one, as Dio explains to the Prusan *boule*: “of all these creatures man is the most clever (*deinotaton*) and has the most intelligence (*synesin*); accordingly man is most hostile of all toward a bad ruler, though most kindly of all toward one who is good” (49.2). Clearly Dio subscribes to the same belief in the importance of ethical character as Plutarch. The ethics are based upon two further aspects of homonoia: that which exists between the gods and within the cosmos at large.

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[62] *The parade of animals at 40.40 includes the verbs for "making way," "mingling," and "cooperating" (παραχωρέω, ἀναμίσγω, and συνεργάζομαι, respecitively); these contrast with "quarrelling" and "plotting" (διαφέρω, ἐπιβουλεύω). A similar herd refuses to submit (ὑπομένω) to bad farmers / keepers at 49.2.*

[63] At 40.32, for example, Dio contrasts the common, unwarranted violence to which humans are prone with the ants, who do not fight, "but meet and pass and help one another quite gently" (ἀλλὰ πάνυ πρᾴως ἐντυχάνουσι καὶ παρίασι καὶ βοηθοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις).

HEAVENLY HOMONOIA

It is also important to note the theological basis of homonoia that is a fundamental component of Dio’s approach. *Or*. 39, for example, begins and ends with appeals to the gods. Delivered at Nicaea, it is one of the speeches in which homonoia occurs with the highest frequency. Dio refers to a myth according to which the polis was founded by Herakles, which he connects to homonoia: “it is fitting (*prepei*) that those whose city was founded by gods should maintain peace and homonoia and friendship toward one another.”[65] The speech ends with a prayer that summarizes the purpose of Dio’s speeches to at least four cities. Dio prays in the names of seven gods, including Homonoia, that they might grant “love, one *gnome*, a unity of wish and thought; and, on the other hand, that they may cast out *stasis* and contentiousness (*eris*) and *philonikia*.[66]

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[64] 40.41. On the idea of humans behaving more like beasts (*theria*) than *anthropoi*, see also 38.17. See also 38.46, where the Nicomedians fight the Nicaeans as if they were barbarians, or even wild animals.

[65] 39.2. This could be a significant statement given Herakles’ dual status as both mortal and immortal. Thus he straddles two realms like the *homeroi* discussed by Allen (2006). Richter discusses a more cynical approach in the in Dio’s first address to Tarsus (Or. 33), whose origins seem to be a matter of dispute (2011, 116-117).

[66] 39.8 ἐμβαλεῖν…καὶ μίαν γνώμην καὶ ταὐτὰ βούλεσθαι καὶ φρονεῖν, στάσιν δὲ καὶ ἔριδα καὶ φιλονικίαν ἐκβαλεῖν, Dio names Zeus, Athena, Aphrodite, Nemesis, Dionysus, and Herakles as well. This seems to be the only mention of Homonoia as a deity in the orations.

As a whole, the speech is an effort to change the calculus by which cities reckon prestige. Here, as elsewhere, Dio seeks to alter the basis of prestige in western Asia Minor. His effort is centers on vocabulary, to a large extent, and he speaks the same virtue-laden "language" as his contemporaries, both Christian and pagan. Dio operates on the same assumptions as Plutarch did in his *Precepts*. The determinants of municipal success, in Asia and Bythinia, were similar or identical to those of Achaea. Dio would substitute virtues, however, for physical or economic fortune. Rather than abundance or a growing population, the gods would prefer "self-control (*sophrosune*), *arete*, orderly government (*politeia*), honor for the good citizens (*agathōn*) and dishonor for the bad (*kakōn*)."[67] These latter qualities should be seen as the basis of prestige and success, for they are what the gods most value. It is clear, asserts Dio, that both earthly and divine authorities listen to those "thinking alike" (*homonoousi*) rather than those in conflict with one another (*stasiazontes*) (39.4). At home, in the Prusan *ekklesia*, Dio takes a slightly different, pragmatic approach to make the same point. He again uses the same vocabulary and operates under the same assumptions regarding the nature of a healthy city (buildings, territory, or wealth). This time, however, he openly acknowledges the importance of reputation to the city, yet is adamant that reputation should be based upon virtues. This is, again, a pattern in Dio's work; he tries to combine a pragmatic acceptance of the status quo (ie. provincial competitiveness) with his goal of achieving as much autonomy and prosperity as possible under Roman rule. This leads him to subvert dominant mores (like competition over civic titles). The "greatest honor" (*kosmos megistos*) that a city can receive is "praise of its citizens" (*epainos politon*). The thinking is straightforward: homonoia brings honor, dissension and *stasis* bring shame.[68] Despite his warnings about strife and petty squabbling elsewhere in this address, Dio concludes optimistically because “the gods will make it their prime concern that homonoia will endure.”[69]

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[67] 39.2; compare 48.4, where Dio again lists a variation of the four key components of a good city; he adds to these four the importance of having citizens "capable of word and action," and men who have love (*agape*) for their polis. For the emphasis on virtues, see Garcia 1973, 87 and Lau 2010, 202.

A further example of the effort to subvert hyper competition between cities is in the address to Nicomedia. At issue is the title of “first polis,” a title Dio views as a major impediment to homonoia on a regional or provincial basis. The empire offered opportunities for limited socio-political prestige in titulature, which (as we see in the other Greek authors) bred competition and conflict. The most intense rivalry was between Nicomedia and Nicaea, the sites of Dio’s *Orr*. 38 and 39, respectively. These two speeches have the highest concentration of the word “homonoia.” They are the best illustrations of the fragility of relations between Nicomedia and its archrival Nicaea. The “touchiness” that marked their attitudes toward one another is a function of imperial political realities. Imperial cult offered elites from Greece and Asia Minor an avenue to socio-economic prestige, and it was likely the largest cult in Asia by Dio’s time. But the cult and its ceremony could create divisions just as easily as unity. In the case of Nicaea and Nicomedia, the rivalry is based upon a fight over one word—“first” (*prote*) polis of the province. Robert summarizes well: “Nicomedia is ‘the first’ in the province. But so is Nicaea.”[70] Dio’s orations on homonoia are part of a larger story. The battle of propaganda that he attempts to quell was but one episode in a war that can be traced from 29 BCE, when cults of Roma and Julius Caesar were established, to disputes between the cities’ bishops in the fourth century CE. This battle for titles, including “first” but also “temple warden” (*neokoros*), as well as the privilege of hosting games, was more intense than a modern student can probably imagine, but scholars have argued these were important channels of Eastern competition.[71] Dio himself makes a related observation: “Where the greatest crowd is assembled, there also the most money will flow together.”[72]

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[68] 48.5, ἐάν ποτε γένηται διαφορά, κἀκεῖνοι προφέρωσιν ὑμῖν τὸ πονηροὺς ἔχειν πολίτας τὸ στασιάζειν, οὐκ αἰσχύνεσθε;

[69] 38.51, καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς δὲ εἰκός ἐστιν μᾶλλον πάντων ἐπιμελήσεσθαι τοῦ συμμεῖναι τὴν ὁμόνοιαν.

[70] Robert 1977, 4. The rivalry was considered to be intractable by Dio’s audience at Nicomedia (38.6).

For Dio, squabbling over titles was a waste of time. He considers it to be a significant waste of resources for cities that would be better served by focusing on commonalities and shared economic and cultural resources.[73] This conviction motivates his attempt to redefine “first-ness.” Again, Dio operates under the assumption that competition is normal, but he urges new motives, seeking to substitute “solicitude” for greed. The Nicomedian address is therefore a clear example of Dio redefining an important yet divisive term in order to instill homonoia. Two stages are apparent in his effort. First, Dio highlights the futility of titles. This is inseparable from Dio’s pragmatism regarding contemporary geopolitics. Dio offers evidence of the limited power of provincial power found in Plutarch. As we saw in the *Precepts*, however, this does not mean partisan spirit is dampened; assemblies and city elders still competed with one another, and factionalism among provincials is more of a pressing issue than conflict between them and Rome. Intense competition within a city helped assure its vitality in that it produced building projects and ultimately increased a polis’ status, both in the eyes of its neighbors and in Roman estimations. Both were important for the economic and cultural wellbeing of a polis. However, a city could just as easily attract negative attention through fighting, a likelihood that Dio was determined to avoid. This makes an emphasis on homonoia all the more important.

This is the reason Dio emphasizes the constriction of provincial power to the extent that he does in the address to Nicomedia. Compared to poleis of the past, they and their neighbors are not fighting for anything terribly significant; neither hegemony or liberty, nor territory or wealth is at issue (38.16). As Plutarch noted for Menemachus, all such concerns have been addressed by Rome. Or as Dio puts it, "these matters have been clearly delimited—and so indeed is all else besides."[74] He sharpens the contrast of past and present by referencing the Peloponnesian War. Unlike the Bythinian rivalry, that contest had high stakes. Athens and Sparta were fighting for "real power" (*arche alethes*), not simply the right to lead a procession.[75] Such provincial preening only brings laughter in Rome, where the quarrels across the Aegean are referred to as "Greek failings."[76] The "prize" (*athlon*) for which Nicaea and Nicomedia contend is so petty that only fools (*anoetoi*) would pride themselves on it. In doing so, they exhibit nothing but "empty pride" (*kenodoxia*) (38.38). To those people, Dio responds with rhetorical questioning that mirrors Plutarch's in the conclusion to *Precepts*: "What kind of primacy, men of Nicomedia? I am going to ask you a second time, and even a third time. A primacy whose utility is what? Whose function is what?"[77]

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[71] Price 1984, 122-130. See also Burrell 2004.
[72] 35.16. For the numismatic “face” of this competition, see Klose 2005.
[73] The list of commonalities includes intermarriages, kinship (συγγένειαι); “*proxenies* and ties of friendship between individuals (φιλίας ἰδιωτικάς),” as well as shared festivals and religious customs. Richter uses these to describe Dio’s view of “Greekness”—*to Hellênikon*, which he sees as Herodotean (2011, 117, 118).

The second part of Dio's effort to end discord is to present positive ethical norms. At the broadest level, a city is *genuinely* "first," only if they prove themselves to the Roman governor by demonstrating good governance and concern for the entire region. This leads to genuine primacy—τὸ πρωτεῖον ἀληθινόν. As to the intercity rivalry, Dio encourages competition of a different kind:

> Try, therefore, to hold first place among cities primarily by your solicitude for them…and also by showing yourselves fair and moderate toward all, by not being greedy in any matter or using force.

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[74] 38.22, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ τυγχάνει διωρισμένα, καὶ μήν γε καὶ τἄλλα πάντα; in reference to land, seapower, and revenue. The "hegemon" hardly needs mentioning, Dio says (38.36).

[75] 38.38. The idea is appeared earlier as well at 38.24-25. Dio uses similar contrasts in Tarsus (34.49-50) and Prusa (48.12-13).

[76] Ἑλληνικὰ ἁμαρτήματα (38.38).

[77] 38.29, ποῖον, ἄνδρες Νικομηδεῖς, πρωτεῖον; καὶ γὰρ δεύτερον ὑμᾶς ἐρήσομαι καὶ τρίτον· οὗ τί τὸ ὄφελός ἐστιν; οὗ τί τὸ ἔργον; The same question is asked at 38.24. The principle that titles are worthless is spelled out at 38.30, and again at 38.39-40: "For titles(*onomata*) are not guarantees of facts (*pragmaton*), but facts of titles."

> πειρᾶσθε τοίνυν πρωτεύειν τῶν πόλεων τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς ἐπιμελείας τῆς περὶ αὐτάς:…εἶτα τῷ παρέχειν αὑτοὺς δικαίους ἅπασι καὶ μετρίους καὶ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐν μηδενὶ μηδὲ βιάζεσθαι. 38.31

Though their audiences are different, Dio's admonitions here resemble those of Paul in his letter to Corinth. Paul's message for individuals within a relatively small Christian *ekklesia* some fifty years prior is here applied to a polis, in reference to an entire geographical region. Personal ethics thus become urban ethics, and in either case the speaker admonishes the stronger party to show their strength in virtue. As in the Christian *ekklesia*, Dio's rhetoric acknowledges and accepts the hierarchy of the status quo. His advice here is based upon his desire for Nicomedia to be an ideal leader—for the "strong" to care for the "weak," as the Christian would say. Dio bases the appeal above, for example, on Nicomedia's status of "metropolitan;" the city is meant to be a regional leader.[78] Elsewhere he urges his own city to their chief rival in language similar to the rhetoric of the early Christians. "Yielding," "conceding," and "giving" to are prescribed in quick succession in the case of an arch rivalry.[79] The common moral lesson regarding the responsibility inherent in power is applicable to both audiences, pagan or Christian. The same could be said about Dio's idea that "one man is no man" (48.10). While Dio does not use the popular metaphor of the body, this apothegm is clearly in the same spirit as the apostle's corporal language, as is Dio's charge for his audience to "bear one another's burdens."[80]

Philosophical and theological content is especially clear in Dio's 36th and 40th orations. Both of these were delivered in Prusa. The former is a field report of sorts—Dio's recollection of a conversation that took place across the Black Sea in Borysthenes. The 40th was delivered in

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[78] 38.31, "according to your metropolitan status, it's your duty [to be solicitous];" καθὸ μητρόπολίς ἐστε, ἐξαίρετόν ἐστιν ἔργον ὑμέτερον. The admonitions of gentleness are repeated at 38.35-36.

[79] This vocabulary (εἴκειν, παραχωρεῖν, παριέναι) appears in an address at Prusa in reference to Apemea. Unwillingness to yield occasionally "is not manly conduct, as some imagine, but senseless and stupid;" οὐκ ἀνδρεῖόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ οἴονταί τινες, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνόητον καὶ ἀμαθές (40.34).

[80] Dio does use "soma-" related language at, eg. 34.17, 22; 38.11, 13; 39.5; and 41.9. For making "troubles" (τὰ λυπηρὰ) lighter by carrying them "in common" (κοινῇ), like a burden βάρος, see 39.3; 48.10 for "εἷς ἀνὴρ οὐδεὶς ἀνήρ."

Prusa in reference to their neighbor and rival, Apamea.[81] Together, these orations reveal a philosophical aspect for homonoia that is absent in Plutarch's political handbook. Harris, whose study reads Dio alongside Clement, has labeled Dio's approach a "metaphysic of Homonoia;" it connects earthly homonoia with a celestial version that is at once its inspiration and goal.[82] Language concerning the harmony of the cosmos seems to have been "in the air" at the end of the first century, as we have seen in both Dio and Clement. The same can be said of the end of the second century. This cosmic aspect is embedded in some of the same orations that rely most heavily upon homonoia as a political goal for the city. It is therefore an indication of the difficulty (or futility) of attempting precisely classify Dio.

The 36th, or "Borysthenic" oration, for instance, is a significant example of the mixing of theological, philosophical and political elements. Though presented as Dio's recollection of a conversation on Stoic themes he had in Pontus, it could be considered substantively Platonic in its structure and definition of key terms.[83] The discourse illustrates Dio's devotion to "the Stoic idea of the absolute unity of all mankind and saw in the empire that the Romans created the earthly manifestation of the Stoic ideal."[84] He begins by defining *anthropos* as the only animal endowed with reason (*logikos*) (36.19). For Dio and the Stoics, humans shared this trait with the gods. If men would but put this divine gift into use, their city would achieve a profitable peace. Where *anthropoi* gather together, there is a *polis*, which is defined as a "human organization" (*systema anthropon*) (36.29). But this second definition is complicated by the fact that Dio wants "polis" to signify both the "gathering of *anthropoi*" and an ideal celestial phenomenon—a city both mortal and immortal, in other words. There is an analogous relationship, according to Dio's Stoicism, between the ideal structure of a polis and the structure of the cosmos. Dio emphasizes that the analogy is imperfect: as a human institution, no polis will ever perfectly imitate the divine. There is still an ethical demand inherent in the Stoic doctrine, however, in that the human community ought to reflect the unity of the cosmos as much as possible. While it is unrealistic to hope for perfection in Bythinia, citizens should look to the heavens for a model. Such is the "doctrine" (*logos*) of the cosmic Stoic polis. The most important characteristic about this city is its perfect homonoia. No matter the form of government the human polis is liable to experience *stasis*. This is a fundamental contrast with the cosmic city, which is marked by "complete friendship (*pas philia*) and homonoia" (36.31). This, Dio concludes, is what Zeus has established; he offers this as a "paradigm" for all cities (36.32).

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[81] On the 36th, see Schofield 1991, 57-64.
[82] Harris 1966, 174-175.
[83] Anderson describes the oration as "an excellent pot pourri of sophistic preoccupations" (117) and notes a "convergence here between the Platonic notion of a heavenly city-pattern and the Stoic image of the world-state" (1993, 218). See also Schofield 1991, 59-60.
[84] Richter 2011, 117; his discussion on the speech centers on Dio's definition of "Hellenic" (119-124).

The idea that both the gods and the cosmos are characterized by unity is repeated in the Borysthenic dialogue. At root here is a Stoic cosmogony in which everything in existence shares a common origin. What Clement calls "creation" is for Dio a process of "division;" a unifying whole has divided itself into a multitude of beings and phenomena. A common origin extends from the four elements (air, earth, water, and fire) to plants and animals. The variety of natural phenomena, whether on an individual level or on a larger scale, is counterbalanced, in this view, by the fact that all things are governed by a single *psyche* and force (*dynamis*) (36.30).

The vocabulary of this dialogue is notably similar to that of Paul and his successors in the Christian movement. "Division" (*eris*) is noticeably absent from divine conduct. Dio pictures the gods unceasingly doing their own work without interruption for "the common good" (*meta koines*) (36.22). They are "each pursuing their own course — not wandering aimlessly and senselessly, but rather dancing a dance of happiness with supreme intelligence (*nous*) and purpose (*phronesis*).”[85] Finally, the entire celestial realm has “one *gnome*” (36.22), a concept we saw in Paul’s letter to Corinth. Another familiar concept is good “order,” or *taxis*. Along with *diakosmesis*, which in this Stoic context can be rendered “orderly arrangement of the cosmos,” it defines both the universe at large and the polis in particular.[86]

The human, political manifestation of homonoia, then, is a reflection of the harmony that characterizes the “orderly constitution of the universe,” which he describes to his fellow Prusans in the 40th oration. The immediate concern of the entire speech is homonoia with a neighboring polis, Apameia. The political, or inter-city homonoia advocated here, however, is based upon the Stoic precepts that are so clear in the 36th oration. In Prusa, Dio develops the theme of divine homonoia as a paradigm. Here it is tied to homonoia on an “elemental” level as well:

> Do you not see in the whole heaven and the divine and happy beings in it a lasting *taxis* and homonoia and self-control, than which it is impossible to imagine anything either more beautiful or more impressive? Don’t you see also the stable, righteous, everlasting homonoia of the elements, as they are called — air and earth and water and fire — with what reasonableness and moderation it is their nature to continue, not only to be preserved themselves, but also to preserve the entire cosmos?
>
> οὐχ ὁρᾶτε τοῦ ξύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θείων καὶ μακαρίων αἰώνιον τάξιν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, ἧς οὔτε κάλλιον οὔτε σεμνότερον οὐδὲν οἷόν τ᾽ ἐπινοῆσαι; πρὸς δὲ αὖ τῶν λεγομένων στοιχείων, ἀέρος καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ πυρός, τὴν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ δικαίαν δὶ αἰῶνος ἁρμονίαν, μεθ᾽ ὅσης εὐγνωμοσύνης καὶ μετριότητος διαμένειν πέφυκεν αὐτά τε σῳζόμενα καὶ σῴζοντα τὸν ἅπαντα κόσμον; (40.35)

This passage continues with a substantial description of cosmic homonoia. It is homonoia that “preserves” (*sozei*) the *philia* of the gods themselves (40.36). The dependence of the cosmos on homonoia for its preservation is strongest in another speech (also in Prusa), where Dio refers to the “risk” of destruction that follows a loss of cosmic homonoia. Referring to the

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[85] 36.22, τῶν μὲν φανερωτάτων πορευομένων ἑκάστου καθ᾽ ἑαυτόν, οὐ πλανωμένων ἄλλως ἀνόητον πλάνην, ἀλλὰ χορείαν εὐδαίμονα χορευόντων μετά τε νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως τῆς ἄκρας. See also “the ceaseless circling dance of the planets, which never get in each other's way,” at 40.39.

[86] *Taxis* and *diakosmesis* (and *eukosmia*) both occur in the address quoted here (36.30, 31).

"heavens" (*ouranioi*), he concludes that "these divine and grand creations require homonoia and friendship; otherwise there is risk (*kindunos*) of ruin and destruction for this beautiful work of the creator, the cosmos."[87] The same contingency is implicit in the 40th speech where Dio highlights the homonoia of the *ether* of the cosmos; it too is marked by an essential homonoia (40.37). In fact Dio uses the same wording here as in his description of the gods in the 36th oration. In both instances, gods and cosmos are in "complete *philia* and homonoia."[88] There is a clear, if rarely remarked upon, resemblance between Dio's language here and that of the creation account of 1 Clement. Both authors conceive of a kind of cosmic homonoia that is divinely mandated and part of the very structure of the universe. The resemblance is clearest in Dio's elaboration on heavenly homonoia. The sun "gives way" (*methistesei*) to the night, "permitting the more obscure planets to rise and shine" (40.38). The stars, in their turn, "make way" (*hupochorousi*) for the sun without fear; the sun may be eclipsed by the moon, or covered by clouds. Each layer and element of the cosmos occupies its rightful place, from the earth to the ether. The most important aspect of the several examples he gives of homonoia in nature is the ethical ramification. The language of interplanetary concession is used for the purpose of encouraging inter-city homonoia. Given the Christian insistence on submission within and between *ekklesiai*, Dio's language would have resonated in Clement's Roman context as well. Dio highlights the importance of the paradigmatic nature of cosmic homonoia; it must be reflected in one's life, both on a domestic and political level. The link between the divine and earthly is the basis for Dio's insistence upon homonoia. Like Clement's description of the creation, Dio's account builds towards a hortatory climax:

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[87] 48.14, ὅτι τὰ θεῖα ταῦτα καὶ μεγάλα ὁμονοίας τυγχάνει δεόμενα καὶ φιλίας: εἰ δὲ μή, κίνδυνος ἀπολέσθαι καὶ φθαρῆναι τῷ καλῷ τούτῳ δημιουργήματι τῷ κόσμῳ. This contingency is also present at 38.11 (below).

[88] The phrasing of 36.31 is identical to that of 40.37: μετὰ πάσης φιλίας καὶ ὁμονοίας.

> Now if these beings, so strong and great, submit to their partnership with one another and continue free from hostility, cannot such puny, petty towns of ordinary mortals, such weak tribes dwelling in a fraction of the earth, stay at peace and be neighbors to one another without uproar?
>
> καὶ ταῦτα μέν, οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ καὶ μεγάλα, τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίαν ἀνέχεται καὶ διατελεῖ χωρὶς ἔχθρας: μικρὰ δὲ οὕτω πολίχνια τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἔθνη ἀσθενῆ κατοικοῦντα ἐν μέρει τῆς γῆς οὐ δύναται τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐδὲ ἀθορύβως ἀλλήλοις γειτνιᾶν; (40.39-40)

As in the case of Christian *ekklesia*, the Prusan assembly's task, according to Dio, is to reflect cosmic homonoia in their political life. The city should strive to represent, on a smaller scale, the homonoia that is written in to the fabric of the cosmos. Homonoia has both human (*anthropinoi*) and celestial (*ouranios*) manifestations; it is essential to both of these areas (48.14).

5.

IGNATIUS’ HOMONOIA and EXCLUSIVITY

With Ignatius, the historian is on ground firmer than that below Clement, but still somewhat shakier than Dio. The bishop of Antioch is the first “real individual” to emerge after Paul; his letters shed light on the early second century, an era of church history otherwise poorly documented.[1] Ignatius was arrested on unknown charges in Antioch and brought under guard to Rome where, according to tradition, he was martyred. On his way to execution, Ignatius interacted with some of the same city-states as Dio Chrysostom and Aelius Aristides. Like their native cities, Ignatius’ home of Antioch had been settled by Pompey and allowed to thrive under the Roman empire. As the capital of the Roman province of Syria, it was a cosmopolitan *civitas libera* of great esteem for nearly two centuries, and a buffer between the Romans and Parthians. It was made a *colonia* under Antonius Pius, but we know relatively little about this “third city of the Empire.”[2] An “intellectual crucible,” Antioch was home to a substantial Jewish population, as well as Christians of various stripes.[3]

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[1] “From a historical perspective [the epistles] are a lightning bolt momentarily silhouetting some surprising features of church history” (Pervo 2010, 134).

[2] Barnard 1963, 195-196; Robinson 2009, 1 n.2 holds that the *ekklēsia* at Antioch was some 75 years-old by the time of Ignatius, but then concedes “we know almost nothing of Antioch in this period, let alone Ignatius and the Christian assembly with it,” notwithstanding Josephus’ description (6). Ignatius mentions his Roman escort, “a company of soldiers” that he likens to “ten leopards” (Rom. 5.1).

[3] Jefford 2006, 221; Zetterholm 2003, 41-42; he characterizes Jewish-Christian relations at Antioch as “fierce” and “intense” (207-208); Robinson offers an apt description of the city as “a Macedonian/Greek city in origin,

It would be difficult to exaggerate the historical interest of the letters. Not only are they the last will and testament of an early Christian authority, widely respected as an Apostolic Father, but they also have a long, eventful historical reception marked, for example, by heated debate in Britain beginning in the seventeenth century. This is a welcome change from the uncertainties surrounding the anonymous authorship and mysterious circumstances of 1 Clement. The genre of Ignatius' work is also secure; these are seven epistles in the mode of Paul's. Rhetorically, they share relatively straightforward structure and length.[4] Finally, and most importantly, the content is patently familiar: Ignatius writes in order to instill homonoia and to counteract theological and social division in Asian churches.

The good news for historians ends there, however. In fact most of the certainties of the Ignatian tradition are illusory. Thus this chapter is built on a source that has proven to be perhaps less shadowy, but just as enigmatic as "Clement." Ignatian scholarship—at times motivated by religious beliefs—has, over the centuries, raised doubts about the authenticity of the corpus. It does not help that the earliest external evidence comes from Eusebius, who tells us almost everything we know: during the reign of Trajan, Ignatius, third bishop of Antioch, "was sent from Syria to Rome, and became food for wild beasts on account of his testimony to Christ."[5] Separating the historical record from hagiography surrounding an early Christian martyr is likely impossible, and the dating of these letters is decidedly fraught. Unending debates surrounding chronology, however, are a result of theological disputes. I will summarize

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established in the midst of a Syrian countryside, under Roman rule, and with various immigrant populations" (2009, 17).

[4] Sumney 1993 identifies the "epistolary periods" of the letters: polemical, apologetic, didactic, and conventional (347); I will use the following abbreviations for the letters: Ephesians (Eph); Magnesians (Magn); Trallians (Trall); Rome (Rom); Philadelphia (Phil); Smyrnea (Smyr); and Polycarp (Pol).

[5] *EH* 3.36; there are also third-century references from Origen and Irenaeus (Brent 2006, 18-19); Foster 2007 tends towards Hadrian's reign in his survey of scholarship (84-89); Schmithals seems to be open to a conspiracy based on a "Psuedo-Ignatius" seeking to export Roman hierarchy to Asian churches (2009, 202).

the “Ignatian question” below. While it poses difficulties in determining the context of Ignatius’ letters, it does not prevent an analysis of their content with special attention to homonoia.

Ignatius clearly draws from the same rhetorical resources as his predecessors (in previous chapters), and his message is remarkably similar to theirs. Faith, love, and concord are “ever-present” themes.[6] As Ignatius puts it to the Ephesians, “This is the beginning and end of life: faith (*pistis*) is the beginning, *agape* is the end. And the two together in unity (*henotēs*) are God” (14.1). We could not ask for a more succinct reformulation of Paul’s message to Corinth. “I decided to encourage you,” he writes, “that you may run together (συντρέχητε) in the mind of God.”[7] Like the previous epistles surveyed here, Ignatius’ letters can be read as a strategy for hierarchy and “a vision of ecclesiastic ‘sameness.’”[8]

Yet a closer reading reveals differences in Ignatius’ use of homonoia and its rhetorical commonplaces, as compared to Paul’s or Clement’s. Ignatius’ letters blend Pauline precedents with new ideas regarding obedience to church officials. The principal difference in Ignatius’ letters and those of Paul is the explicit use of homonoia. Like Clement, Ignatius uses not only the rhetorical tropes of homonoia rhetoric, but the word itself, which occurs in four of his letters. Beyond this, Ignatius’ interest in homonoia motivates his most famous contribution to early church history, the establishment of church offices. To summarize a thorny issue, Ignatius is credited with establishing episcopal supremacy.[9] He does his best to establish homonoia as “a quality of a community with a structure that is stamped with the threefold order.”[10]

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[6] Carruth 1996, 301.

[7] Eph. 3.2, διὰ τοῦτο προέλαβον παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς, ὅπως συντρέχητε τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ θεοῦ; Trebilco believes the insistence on unity reveals a lack thereof among certain of his addressees (2004, 678-681). In making this perfectly reasonable (and arguable) conclusion, he follows Bauer, who saw in Ignatius’ “frantic” insistence on monepiscopy the *absence* of consensus in contemporary *ekklēsiai* (1971, 61).

[8] Reis 2005, 300; his analysis focuses on a “hierarchy of power,” rather than “sameness” of thought; Trebilco 2004, 639.

[9] The nature of the supremacy is not completely clear. There was a spectrum of authority from the “overseer” of a housechurch, to what would become the Roman Catholic “bishop.” Whether Ignatius is the source of a

If Clement broke new ground in articulating an idea of apostolic authority and a role (though unspecific) for bishop and elders, Ignatius established the threefold ministry that would come to characterize Roman Catholicism. "The one who honors the bishop is honored by God; the one who does anything behind the bishop's back serves the devil."[11] This simple equation is the nutshell of Ignatius' argument. He uses homonoia to bolster an explicit ecclesiastic order. In so doing, he gives homonoia "a concrete, institutional context" that neither Paul nor Clement would have completely recognized.[12] The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate Ignatius' use of homonoia in his effort to establish a uniform church order for the early Christian *ekklesia*. I will begin by looking at the reception of the Ignatian corpus because it helps clarify the place of homonoia in modern scholarship. Then I will highlight some of the commonalities that connect Ignatius to previous authors. In the third part, I will discuss Ignatius' opponents in (or around) the churches of Roman Asia. The chapter will conclude with a broader look at how Ignatius demonstrates the close connection between homonoia and heresy.

RECEPTION

Ignatius is the most-studied member of the Apostolic Fathers. Two reasons for this interest are easily identifiable. First, there is the "inherent intrigue" of a martyr's final journey; the letters are the last words of a "dead man walking."[13] Ignatius' final journey took him over some of the same territory in Asia Minor that was traveled by the apostle Paul. In fact the two authors both wrote to Rome and Ephesus, and it is likely Paul knew the other three cities addressed by Ignatius. After being arrested in his home city, Ignatius was escorted overland to

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"monepiscopacy" or "monarchical espiscopate" is an open question. For the distinction and definitions of these historically fraught labels and a discussion of episcopal power, see Trebilco 2004, 642-645.

[10] Brent 2007, 227.

[11] Smyr. 9.1, ὁ τιμῶν ἐπίσκοπον ὑπὸ θεοῦ τετίμηται· ὁ λάθρα ἐπισκόποου τι πράσσων τῷ διαβόλῳ λατρεύει. (Smyr. 9.1); see also Magn. 3.2, where deceiving the bishop is equated with attempting to deal falsely with God himself.

[12] Welborn 1993, 232. For a purely political reading, see Reis 2005: "By placing himself at the top of the spiritual hierarchy," Ignatius is empowered to admonish (297).

[13] Thus Ehrman in the introduction to his Loeb translation (2003, 203).

Smyrna, where he probably received representatives from other *ekklesiai*. He sent letters with them to Christians at Ephesus, Magnesia, and Tralles, as well as his final destination of Rome. Moving to Troas before sailing westward, he composed a letter to Philadelphia and also two to Smyrna: one for the *ekklesia*, and another for its bishop, Polycarp. They may have been composed (or dictated) within one week after a journey of nearly a month.[14] The itinerant context gives the epistles an urgent tone; it also prevents Ignatius from quoting scripture. Compared to Clement, for example, Ignatius' is eminently succinct. A piece of advice for Polycarp is fairly typical in its concision: "Consider unity (ἕνωσις), for nothing is better" (1.2). Overall, this letter in particular reads like "emergency procedures." The precision marks the other letters as well, and makes the presence of homonoia even more significant.

Secondly, there is the theological content of the letters. This is the more significant of the two, and the reason why the letters have been subject to "some of the most brilliant and painstaking research on any ancient text."[15] While this research contributed to the development of the modern discipline of Patristics, it is a mixed blessing for the historian approaching Ignatius today. Scholarly disputes have raised questions of the authenticity of the letters and cast doubt on their authorship. For my purposes, the issue can be boiled down to Ignatius' lexicon. His letters provide some of the earliest occurrences of fundamental elements of Christian vocabulary. In fact Ignatius is the first to use the very word itself—"Christian"—in the history of its literature.[16] He is also among the first to use the following words in their modern senses:

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[14] Rankin 2006, 83; Ehrman 2003, 208-209; Robinson 2009, 1-4 with note 13; 6 n. 22; see also Ign. Rom. 10.1; Phil. 11.2; for the "deep impression" on Ignatius that the similarities with Paul's life had on his own, see Reis 2005, 294-296.

[15] Schoedel 1985, xi.

[16] According to Acts 11.26, the term originated in Antioch. Judge 2003 discusses this "bafflingly peculiar" term, noting its hybrid nature. He sees it as a neologism from administrators in the service of Rome at Antoich, who "coined it as part of their Latin vocabulary (not for use when speaking Greek, which would have called for *Christitai* or some other *christo-* compound)" (515). See also Löhr 2010, 111.

"deacon," "elder," "bishop," "Catholic," and "heresy."[17] Hence the trouble some 1500 years after his death. Ignatius' use of "Christian(s)," moreover, is in contradistinction with "Jews" or "Judaizers." The historical ramifications of this Ignatian dichotomy probably do not require comment. What may seem odd to the twenty-first century student, however, is that this distinction is not the source of controversy. Rather it is Ignatius' dealings with church offices that are the cause of all the fuss.

"*Episcopos*," "*presbytus*," and "*diaconos*" were relatively inchoate, lateral roles even in the clearest passages of Paul or 1 Clement. In Ignatius, however, they are embedded in a comparatively strict, vertical hierarchy.[18] This got Ignatius into trouble, both in his own lifetime and long after. We may never know whether this threefold order should be interpreted as more descriptive or prescriptive. Regardless, the theme is obvious in Ignatius' repeated exhortations to obedience under the bishops, who are aided by subordinate presbyters and deacons. Given the long history of controversy over church government, it is difficult to separate the historiography from the drama of religious dispute within Christianity. This controversy, "the Ignatian problem," started in the seventeenth century. The accepted "rescension" of Ignatian corpus has subsequently ranged from zero to fifteen letters. The scholarly excitement began as a Puritan movement when the ecclesiastic structure that Ignatius describes seemed too good to be true for a group of dogged (and erudite) religious reformers. They were determined to "purify" the relatively young Anglican church of "monarchical episcopy." Ignatius—by then a saint and martyr of some renown—is one of the earliest, and most important, witnesses to that very institution in the Catholic tradition. He therefore became a target of Puritan scholars determined to reveal him (and his ecclesiology) as a forgery. The ensuing centuries of debate make Ignatius a fascinating case study for reception studies. More importantly, Ignatius' ecclesiology—as well as the minefield that is his vocabulary—has affected the treatment of homonoia in the letters.

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[17] On the offices, see articles in Kittel 1977. Simon reviews the evidence for *hairesis* and sees Ignatius as a turning point (1979, 101-110); Royalty goes further, saying Ignatius' *hairesis* is already negative (as opposed to Paul's more neutral use in 1 Cor—see Chp 4, above) and "the ideology of heresy is fully developed in his letters" (2013, 137). On "Christianity," see Robinson 2009, 203 n.1 and 215 n.44. The terminology here compels Schmithals to date the letters after 150 CE (2009, 185).

[18] The articles for each term in Kittel clarify this process. See also Reis 2005.

"God's homonoia" (ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ) is a central idea in Ignatius' letters, but it is a theme that has not been given substantial scholarly treatment. One of the most important studies of 1 Clement, by Van Unnik, concludes that homonoia is a neglected theme of that letter. This is strange given that it "turns up in all kinds of places…as a motif that is always audible."[19] The same could be said of Ignatius' letters, and scholars continue to voice this same concern. The idea of reading Ignatius against his context, marked as it was by homonoia rhetoric, is not necessarily standard procedure. Although the idea of comparing his letters to contemporary rhetoric seems commonsensical, the approach has recently been called "ground-breaking."[20] As a rule New Testament scholars have not studied Ignatius through a rhetorical and ideological lens as much as Paul or Clement; to the classicist, on the other hand, "St. Ignatius" is largely unknown. Ironically, where homonoia is concerned, the most attention has been given to Paul despite the absence of the term in his letters. One may consult the standard commentary for an example of this phenomenon. Schoedel lists thirteen themes which span the seven letters.[21] Homonoia is not among them. He does recognize "unity" as a "central concern" of the letters. A theological focus oriented around alleged gnostic elements in the letters, however, prevents Schoedel from dealing directly with homonoia, which is confined to a footnote.[22]

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[19] Van Unikk 2003, 133.
[20] Maier 2005, 307.
[21] Schoedel 1985, 17-31.
[22] Schoedel 1985, 20-21.

Teasing out gnostic elements in Ignatius is part of a larger controversy surrounding the identity of his opponents in Antioch and/or *poleis* to which he writes.[23] Ignatius' opponents present one of two issues that overshadow homonoia in Ignatian scholarship. The other is the nature of Ignatius' ecclesiology (above). Fortunately, something of truce has been called. In 1664, an Anglican archbishop established the modern consensus as a way out of fights between Puritans (who deemed the lot a forgery) and Roman Catholics (who included as many as fifteen medieval manuscripts).[24] A consensus (though, as in the case of 1 Clement, not a universal one) has emerged around the so-called "middle" rescension. This consists of the seven letters considered here. They were (as scholars hypothesize) interpolated with spurious letters during the medieval period, which were discarded by scholars during the Reformation. The date of Ignatius' journey, during which he composed the letters, ranges over the first seventy-five years of the second century.[25] Here I accept the traditional date of circa 115 CE. This is the best approximation of what the historian Eusebius meant by "in the reign of Trajan." It continues to appeal to a majority of scholars, despite the fact that it is based upon arguments that are something less than airtight. As has been the case with all the individuals in this study, chronological precision is of secondary importance. Even the latest proposed date for Ignatius (under Marcus Aurelius), for example, is acceptable for my purposes. Ignatius was at least a generation after Paul, and may have been contemporary with Aelius Aristides.[26]

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[23] Summarized, with bibliography, by Sumney 1993, 245-246; Weinandy 2005, sees three: docetists, Gnostics, and Judaizers (76-78).

[24] A "short" recension was put forward around 1850 based on Syriac mss. (Foster 2007, 81-84); for a summary of the alternatives, see Trebilco 2004, 632-633.

[25] Trebilco summarizes the scholarship (2004, 629-631); Lindemann 2005, 17; Mitchell 2006 suggests the lack of explicit scriptural quotations is an obstacle to later dates (when canonization was more advanced) (44-45). This must be balanced against the traditional context of Ignatius' compositions—it is doubtful he would have had access to written materials in captivity. Nonetheless, Mitchell's argument seems strong. See also Schmithals 2009, 183-184.

[26] According to Eusebius, he was the second bishop of Antioch (*EH* 3.2) during the reign of Trajan (3.32).

Therefore the fact that the “Ignatian Question” remains unanswered need not deter us. As Foster concludes, regardless of whether we view him as “suppressor of diversity or the upholder of Christian truth, the instigator of a rigid hierarchy or an advocate of ordered communities, a self-interested power-hungry individual or a self-sacrificing humble servant,” Ignatius is “the most significant figure in the Christ movement from the first half of the second century.”[27] His significance here stems from the fact that his letters offer another window into the concept of homonoia. In using homonoia Ignatius is, like all the other authors here, “clearly applying the rules of political eloquence” to a topic perennially popular among sophists and statesmen.[28] Together his epistles are marked by three primary concerns: to promote harmony; to root out heresy; and to encourage episcopal supremacy. It is my contention that these concerns are listed in order of importance. Homonoia among Christians is, for Ignatius, a hallmark of their “Christianity”—a term which Ignatius himself helps to define. Both his efforts against heresy and his promotion of the episcopate are a means to its preservation. In order to appreciate the novelty of Ignatius’ use of homonoia, let us first consider a few basic commonalities he shares with founding members of the Jesus movement who preceded him.

PRECEDENTS

Several elements of Ignatius’ language are similar to what we have seen in the authors in previous chapters. There is a general emphasis on oneness: “for the common purpose, let there be one prayer, one petition, one mind, one hope” (Magn. 7.1).[29] Ignatius also praises the virtue of peace (*eirene*), just as Clement does. "Nothing is better than peace, by which every battle is abolished" (13.1), he writes to Ephesus. Brent sees homonoia and *eirene* as symbols of opposing cultural agendas. These had been united by Clement; his relative frequent use of "peace and homonoia" suggests that the agendas have been reconciled. It also means that the "autonomous quality" of his homonoia is qualified by Roman ideology surrounding *pax*/*eirene*.[30] This is, according to Brent, why Clement's model for homonoia is not a free *polis* but an obedient soldier. But Ignatius uses the same metaphor in his letter to Polycarp. Thus the precise relationship between the concepts is difficult to nail down in Brent's analysis, but it is worth noting that the "peace and homonoia" coupling does not occur in Ignatius as it had in Clement. Whether this means Ignatius embraces a more "Hellenic" and autonomous ideology for homonoia in Asia Minor than Clement had in Rome is uncertain. *Eirene* is, in any case, less important to Ignatius than "unity" (*henotes*), which is on a pedestal in every letter. Maier sees the centrality of *henosis/henotes* as one of the most obvious cases of Ignatius using traditional rhetorical vocabulary in the service of the *ekklesia*. It is "his own theological development of the pagan political ideal" that represents a combination of "the civic and the theological in a uniquely Christian appropriation of political themes."[31]

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[27] Foster 2007, 107; Royalty notes that Ignatius “exhibits a sharp sense of policing the internal boundaries of the *ekklēsia*,” and his “heresiology is more pronounced than any other early Christian writer before Justin” (2013, 135).

[28] Rankin 2006, 82; Harland 2003, 497, notes that Ignatius also draws language from “local cultural life and world of associations” and processions (see below).

[29] Magn. 7.1, αλλ επι το αυτο μια προσευχη, μια δεησις, εις νους, μια ελπις, εν αγαπη; see also Phil. 4: “For there is one flesh of our Lord Jesus Christ and one cup that brings the unity of his blood, and one altar, as there is one bishop.” Σπουδάσατε οὖν μιᾷ εὐχαριστίᾳ χρῆσθαι· μία γὰρ σὰρξ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰηςοῦ Χριστοῦ καὶ ἓν ποτήριον εἰς ἕωσιν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ, ἓν θυσιαστήριον, ὥς εἶς ἐπίσκοπος; Magn. 7.2 uses ἕνα four times in a similar passage; see also Trebilco 2004, 648-651, for the social aspect of separate meetings.

Like Clement, Ignatius is also fully aware of a Pauline precedent. He uses Paul's ideas and imagery to bolster his arguments. His letters show that Paul's theological ideas were still relevant and needed in the cities of Asia Minor, as they were in Corinth and Rome itself. The influence of Paul is significant, though it is first and foremost the structure of Ignatius' argument, rather than the content, that is oriented around the apostle. "Simply stated, Ignatius borrows constantly from Pauline literary style."[32] Ignatius imitates Paul not only in his martyrdom, but also "as a skilled rhetorician."[33] Examples of this are too numerous to list here, but Ignatius' letter to Polycarp is a clear example. It relies heavily on athletic imagery that was widely used in contemporary rhetoric, as we have seen. Ignatius encourages Polycarp (a fellow *episkopos*) to be a "perfect athlete" (τέλειος ἀθλητής) (1.3) and an "athlete of God" (2.3). "It is the mark of a great athlete," he writes, "to bear up under blows and still claim the victory."[34] Ignatius also describes himself and fellow church officials (bishops, presbyters, and deacons) in Pauline terms, as "slaves" (*douloi*).[35] Another *trope* of contemporary homonoia rhetoric is building (or construction) imagery, and this too colors Ignatius' appeal for unity. His construction metaphor is memorable for capturing believers' relationship with the Trinity, each member of which Ignatius manages to squeeze into a complicated image. Christians are likened to stones of God's temple, "being carried up to the heights by the crane of Jesus Christ, which is the cross, using as a cable the Holy Spirit; and your faith is your hoist" (Eph. 9.1).[36]

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[30] Brent 2006, 252-253. If not entirely convincing, the analysis is valuable for taking geopolitics into account; like the rhetorical context mentioned above, this is not referenced in the scholarship as much as one might expect.

[31] Maier 2005, 319; "The desired goal of unity, springing forth as the fruit of religious devotion, reads like a page from one of Dio Chrysostom's speeches on Concord" (318); Löhr 2010, 104; Brent 2007, 216-217; Williams sees mystical motives rather than a purely political power-play. "The unity Ignatius frequently extols is very much an intellectual unity, not simply in the sense of the assent of each individual to the truth received and proclaimed by the church, but the union of those individuals with one another." That unity "brings about participation in God" raises the stakes: it's not so much "a wooden conception of ecclesiastical authority," as it is a mystical theology (2007, 25).

The issue of Ignatius' awareness of the writings that would come to comprise the New Testament remains controversial. A recent summary of the relevant scholarship, however, concludes that Ignatius knew I Corinthians “almost by heart.”[37] The number of Pauline letters Ignatius might have accessed (if any) is less important than his use of Paul’s name to bolster his case for apostolic authority. Both of the explicit references to Paul support this interpretation. Together with the rest of the letters’ contents, they have led some scholars to think Ignatius thought of Paul as a hero.[38] His letter to Rome is reminiscent of Clement’s in pairing Peter with Paul. Ignatius contrasts their authority with his own status: “they were *apostoloi*, I am condemned; they were free, until now I have been a slave” (4.3). In the second occurrence of Paul’s name, the Ephesians are called “fellow initiates with Paul, the holy one.”[39] Ignatius also links himself to the apostle: “may I be found in his footsteps,” he writes, clearly connecting himself with a man who had already achieved great status among Christians.[40] These quotations are two examples of Ignatius’ efforts to solidify an “apostolic tradition,” and to place himself within it. It is this tradition that is the most important aspect of Ignatius’ relationship to Paul.

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[32] Jefford 2006, 138-139; the debt is especially clear in Romans and Ephesians; Royalty sees a conscious appropriation of Paul in Ignatius' appeals to the apostle's authority (2013, 135-136); Reis argues that Ignatius' mimesis of Paul goes beyond direct quotation (287-288), and that all of Paul's rhetorical strategies have parallels in Ignatius' letters (305).

[33] Lindemann 2005, 20-22. See also Maier 2005, 324.

[34] Pol. 3.1, μεγάλου ἐστιν ἀθλητοῦ τὸ δέρεσθαι καὶ νικᾶν. The "endurance" here may reflect and experience with Roman persecution that is lacking in Clement's letter.

[35] Or "fellow slaves" (*syndoloi*) at Phil.4; Magn. 2.

[36] For Harland 2003, 487 (and *passim*), this passage "clearly evokes images from the world of processions" in Asia Minor. It continues with "And so you are all traveling companions bearing God, bearing the temple, bearing Christ, and bearing the holy things, adorned in every way" (9.2). This is the basis of the work of Harland 2003 and Brent 2006 and 2007; they highlight the resonance of contemporary pagan religious language in σύνοδοι, θεοφόροι, ναοφόροι, ἁγιοφόροι, and κεκοσμημένοι. Ignatius' innovation, in other words, is to add χριστοφόροι.

Alongside all this there is also an emphasis on submission that is reminiscent of the rhetoric already examined (above).[41] Ignatius recommends “obedience” or “submission” (*hupotassein*) several times.[42] He goes further than his predecessors, however, in tying that submission to three particular authorities within the *ekklesia*. The bond between congregants and their leaders should be indissoluble, just as the one shared by the Trinity.

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[37] Foster 2007, 105; Mitchell 2006, 30-34, summarizes the scholarship; Jefford concludes that Ignatius borrows very little directly from OT (two quotes from Prov., one Isa.); other than 4 Maccabees, Ignatius counters what some see as a trend in Antioch to borrow from Judaism (225); he also sees “seemingly endless” potential parallels with the gospel of Matthew (141);see also Weinandy 2005, 71-72: “One clearly perceives echoes of (or similarities with) Matthew, Luke, John, and 1 John, as well as phrases and ideas that bear the voice of Paul” (79).

[38] Jefford 2006, 138; Pervo 2010, 119.

[39] For the significance of “initiates” (*synmystai*), and inscriptions for initiates of Demeter and Dionysius at Ephesus, see Harland 2003, 483, 486.

[40] Eph. 12.2, ἐστε…Παύλου συμμύσται τοῦ ἡγιασμένου, …οὗ γένοιτό μοι ὑπὸ τὰ ἴχνη εὑρεθῆναι; Barnard cites five “certain” quotations of I Corinthians (1963, 203); see also Foster 2007, 105; Mitchell comments on Ignatius’ mix of humility and commands that resembles Paul’s tone (2006, 34-36, 43-44); Royalty notes, regarding apostolic tradition, that the “valorization of received tradition is central to the ideology of heresy” (2013, 141).

[41] Magn. 2; Trall. 2.1, 2.2.

[42] For example, he praises the Ephesians for being joined “in one obedience (ἐν μιᾷ ὑποταγῇ) and subject (ὑποτασσόμενοι) to the bishop and presbyters” (2.2). See also 5.3 (to *theos*); Magn. 2 (ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ); Trall. 2.1 (τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ ὑποτάσσησθε ὡς Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ), 2.2, and 13.2; Pol. 6.1.

> Be submissive to the bishop and to one another—as Jesus Christ was to the Father, according to the flesh, and as the apostles were to Christ and to the Father and to the Spirit—so that there may be unity in both flesh and spirit.
>
> ὑποτάγητε τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ καὶ ἀλλήλοις, ὡς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῷ πατρὶ καὶ οἱ ἀπόστολοι τῷ Χριστῷ καὶ τῷ πατρὶ ἵνα ἕνωσις ᾖ σαρκική τε καὶ πνευματική. (Magn. 13.2)

The goal is the same here as it was in the Corinthian letters. "Unity" (*henosis*) is a term closely associated with homonoia, and it plays a central role in Ignatius' homonoia rhetoric. The manifestation of Ignatius' ideal unity here, however, is more structured. The theological reasoning behind episcopal supremacy goes beyond Ignatius' predecessors. The bishop is God's representative on earth, and Christians are to follow him as sheep follow a shepherd.[43] The precise nature of that supremacy (in terms of institutional hierarchy) is notoriously difficult to draw conclusions about, but that fact does not prevent us from appreciating the prominent place homonoia takes in Ignatius' scheme.

EPHESIANS

I would like to focus on homonoia's role in Ignatius' drive for ecclesiastic uniformity by looking first at an early section of the letter to Ephesus. In this brief opening, Ignatius makes three fundamentally important statements that characterize his entire corpus. First, in the inscription he greets them in the name of both "the Father" and of "Jesus Christ." It is emblematic of the corpus in its entirety that Ignatius immediately identifies Jesus as "the Christ" and as "our God" (θεός ἡμεῖς).[44] This is notable because, as even a brief reading of the letters betrays, one of Ignatius' priorities is to establish a strong Christology. For Ignatius there is comparatively little ambiguity about Jesus' place in the Trinity, on the one hand, or in history, on the other.[45] This is remarkable given that the issue would not be settled until the fourth century. A second essential characteristic here is that Ignatius identifies himself and his audience as "fellow students" (συνδιδασκαλίταις). This evokes the "intellectual" vocabulary highlighted in previous chapters. The Ignatian ideal is for believers to live according to what they have "learned" in Christ (χριστομαθίαν); his emphasis on the mind makes obedience not only a function of ecclesiastic hierarchy, but of "conformity to divine intellect."[46] More of this will be examined below. Thirdly, Ignatius claims to be motivated by *agape*. Thus two of the more important aspects of the previous texts are clearly present in Ignatius as well. It is significant, however, that the conclusion immediately succeeding this concerns episcopal authority. The bishops throughout the world, Ignatius asserts, "share the mind" of Christ and therefore deserve reverence.

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[43] Phil. 2.1. See Malina 1978, 76.

[44] See also Rom. Inscr.

> Therefore it is fitting for you to run together in harmony with the mind of the bishop, which is exactly what you are doing. For your presbytery, which is both worthy of the name and worthy of God, is attuned to the bishop as strings to the lyre. Therefore Jesus Christ is sung in your homonoia and symphonic love. And each of you should join the chorus, that by being symphonic in your homonoia, taking up God's pitch in unison, you may sing in one voice.
>
> Ὅθεν πρέπει ὑμῖν συντρέχειν τῇ τοῦ ἐπι-σκόπου γνώμῃ ὅπερ καὶ ποιεῖτε. τὸ γὰρ ἀξιονόμαστον ὑμῶν πρεσβυτέριον, τοῦ θεοῦ ἄξιον, οὕτως συνήρμοσται τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ, ὡς χορδαὶ κιθάρᾳ. διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ ὑμῶν καὶ συμφώνῳ ἀγάπῃ Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ᾄδεται. καὶ οἱ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα δὲ χορὸς γίνεθε, ἵνα σύμωνοι ὄντες ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ, χρῶμα θεοῦ λαβόντες ἐν ἑνότητι, ᾄδητε ἐν φωνῇ μιᾷ. (Eph. 4.1)

It would be difficult to find a passage more emblematic of Ignatius' project.[47] The language and imagery are of a piece with the wider rhetorical context, as we have seen in previous chapters.[48] Like those other figures, Ignatius is quick to employ metaphor to elucidate his ideas. Ignatius is “breathing the air of the Second Sophistic” in his seeming inability to use just one metaphor when several are available.[49] Here homonoia occurs twice in a familiar *choros* image, and the audience is likened to athletes in Ignatius’ admonishment to “run together.” The “therefore,” at its start indicates a premise prior to the call to homonoia. The premise is the same theological foundation stretching across Ignatius’ seven letters: the authority of the bishop is based upon Christ himself. Christians are meant to mirror a spiritual homonoia in their communities. Each of the three authority figures in Ignatius’ ideal *ekklesia* has a counterpart in the developing Apostolic tradition that is the basis for its authority. The bishop, for example, is the “image of the Father” (τύπος πατρός), while the deacons are “like” (ὡς) Christ.[50] The third figure, the presbyters or “elders” are likened to a “band of apostles” (σύνδεσμος ἀποστόλων). Thus Ignatius’ version of homonoia is the earthly parallel of a heavenly phenomenon. The authorities of the church are instruments for achieving this. “Apart from these,” Ignatius concludes, “a gathering cannot be called an *ekklesia* (Trall. 3.1).

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[45] Weinandy 2005, 76 and 78 n.13, emphasizes Ignatius' use of Jesus *and* Christ (together), and would credit Ignatius with pushing Christian doctrine towards the great councils at Chalcedon and Nicaea; Löhr 2010, 110: there are as many as eighteen different titles for Christ in the letters.

[46] Williams 2007, 22; Phil. 8.2 urges believers to act "in accordance with what [they] have learned in Christ (κατὰ χριστομαθίαν).

[47] The "negative" version is at 8.1: if there is no strife (*eris*), "then you are living as God wants (*kata theon zeite*)."

The entire passage quoted above (Eph. 4) is based upon some of the same “intellectual” ideals highlighted in 1 Clem. It is their “undistracted intelligence” (ἀπερίσπαστα διάνοια) that make bishop and presbyters worth obeying (Eph. 20.2). The connection between the Trinity and the church leadership which it legitimates is symbolized by the repeated use of *gnome*. Christ is the *gnome* of Father, and the bishops are appointed according to Christ’s *gnome* (4.3). Like

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[48] See Plut. *Comp. Lyc. Num.* 1.3, where the same metaphor is used politically: “just as musicians tune their lyres, so Lycurgus tightened the strings at Sparta, which he found relaxed with luxury, and Numa loosened the strings at Rome, where the tones were sharp and high.” (ἐπεὶ καθάπερ ἁρμονικοὶ λύρας, ὁ μὲν ἐκλελυμένην καὶ τρυφῶσαν ἐπέτεινε τὴν Σπάρτην, ὁ δὲ τῆς Ῥώμης τὸ σφοδρὸν ἀνῆκε καὶ σύντονον.)

[49] Brent 2006, 236; Maier 2005, 316; the strongest example of this must be in the letter to Polycarp, where Ignatius successively likens his audience to God’s slaves, attendants, servants, soldiers, and employees within two lines (6.1-2); the lyre image (Eph. 4) also appears at Phil. 1.2, and the *choros* at Rom. 2.2.

[50] For the contemporary significance of *tupos* in religious processions, see Brent 2007, 221.

Paul's emphasis on the *nous* of Christ and Clement's frequent use of *dianoia*, Ignatius' attention to the "mind" of his audience is part of a theme. They are indicators of a "centrality of the mind" in early Christian texts.[51] One of the most important and widely-remarked upon ideas in Ignatius is harmony with the *gnome* of the bishop, in particular. He praises Polycarp, for example, for his "godly way of thinking" (τὴν ἐν θεῷ γνώμην)(1.1) The ideal is that a bishop "has the mind of God"(θεοῦ γνώμην κεκτημένος) (Pol. 8.1). This is a consistent theme of the letters. It is closely related to the purity of the bishop's mind. As a person whose *gnome* is fixed on God, the bishop acts as a "filter" (ἀποδιυλισμόν) that protects the *ekklesia* from heresy.[52] As a result, his wisdom is then shared by the community in general.[53] For Ignatius, the bishop's presence determines the authenticity of a Christian *ekklesia*. "Let the congregation be wherever the bishop is," he writes to Smyrna (8.2). No one is to do anything without the bishop's presence, particularly the Eucharist. All of this is in accord with Ignatius' call for "one *nous*."[54]

Another familiar theme appears as a bookend at the conclusion of the call to homonoia. The Ephesians' unity is, in Ignatius' understanding, based upon their status as "members" (μέλη) of Christ. Ignatius connects the well-known body metaphor to his ideal of unity, which is based upon his belief that *henosis* is a divine attribute.[55] Ignatian "membership" is also tied directly to intellectual ideas. The divine mind is connected to mortal unity. God "perceives" (ἐπιγινώσκει) a person's status as a member of his son only insofar as their unity is evident to him (4.2). There is a contingency here surrounding the relationship of bishop and people, on the one hand,

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[51] Williams 2007, 21; Malina 1978, 75-76; see also Phil. Inscr. for a parallel passage regarding the appointment of leaders according to the *gnome* of Christ. See also the distinction between "vanity" (*kenodoxia*) and *agape* as bases of episcopal authority (1.1). Compare Dio Chrys. 38.29, where to fight over city titles is *kenodoxeiv*.

[52] Phil.1.1, 3.1. See also the letter to Rome, which is inscribed "to those filtered from every taint" (ἀποδιϋλισμένοις ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀλλοτρίου χρώματος).

[53] God has made the Smyrneans wise (sophisanta) (1.1); the bishop is "wise in God" φρόνιμος ἐν θεῷ (Magn. 3.1).

[54] Magn. 7.1; Ignatius claims that his own *gnome* is directed towards God (7.1), and that the letter is written according to the *gnome* of God (8.3).

[55] "The head cannot be born without the *melois*, because God promises *henosis*, which he is" (Trall 11.2); see also "one *soma*" of God's *ekklēsia* at Smry. 1.2, with Jefford 2006, 139.

and the people and God, on the other. God acknowledges (προσέχει) the *ekklesia* to the extent that they obey the bishop. Ignatius' language is reminiscent of both Paul and Clement in calling attention to a spiritual "mixture" of believers with God. He speaks of a spiritual "intimacy" (συνήθεια) between himself and a fellow bishop that extends to those under his supervision that is grounded in the divine. "How much do I consider you fortunate, you who are mingled together with him as the *ekklesia* is with Jesus, and as Jesus is with the Father!"[56] The result is a "symphonic unity" (ἑνότης συμφωνία) that evokes the musical imagery preceding it. It is also clearly related to Ignatian homonoia.

Ignatius' description of the spiritual intimacy between God, bishops, and the members of the *ekklesia* contains one of many instances of a *syn*- prefix used to bolster his theme of homonoia and unity. "Running" or living together (*syntreke*) occurs in three letters, for example. This sort of language culminates in Ignatius' instructions for Polycarp, the bishop of Smyrna: "Labor with one another, compete together, run together, suffer together, lie down together, and be raised together."[57] Among the barrage of metaphors that follow these exhortations is a military image with precedents in both Paul and Clement. Ignatius' unanimity is a vital aspect of being a good "soldier" in God's army.

> Be pleasing to the one in whose army you serve,…Let none of you be found a deserter. Let your baptism remain as your weaponry, your faith as a helmet, your love as a spear, your endurance as a full set of armor.
>
> ἀρέσκετε ᾧ στρατεύεσθε,…μὴ τις ὑμῶν δεσέρτωρ εὑρεθῇ. τὸ βάπτισμα ὑμῶν μενέτω ὡς ὅπλα, ἡ πίστις ὡς περικεφαλαία, ἡ ἀγάπη ὡς δόρυ, ἡ ὑπομονὴ ὡς πανοπλία. (6.2)

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[56] Eph. 5.1, πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὑμᾶς μακαρίζω τοὺς ἐγκεκραμένους οὕτως, ὡς ἡ ἐκκλησία Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, καὶ ὡς Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς τῷ πατρί, ἵνα πάντα ἐν ἑνότητι σύμφωνα ᾖ;

[57] Pol. 6.1, Συγκοπιᾶτε ἀλλήλοις, συναθλεῖτε, συντρέχετε, συμπάσχετε, συγκοιμᾶσθε, συνεγείρεσθε ὡς θεοῦ οἰκονόμοι καὶ πάρεδροι καὶ ὑπηρέται. Brent 2007 summarizes a primary concern for Ignatius: "How can the Christian name become common or shared" in many autonomous *poleis*? He notes four instances of *koine* (discussed in Chp 4, above) paired with "hope" (215).

JUDAIZERS

One of the reasons for Ignatius' renown is because of his identity as a defender of the faith against heresy. Ignatius as "culture warrior" was a well-established tradition by the third century. Eusebius says Ignatius warned his addressees "above all to be especially on their guard against the heresies that were then beginning to prevail, and exhorted them to hold fast to the tradition of the apostles."[58] This is of course a third-century perspective in which a relatively concrete dichotomy exists between "heresy" and "orthodoxy." The nature of an "apostolic tradition" (παράδοσις ἀποστόλων) was more precisely defined. Although we know little of Ignatius' context, we safely assume his world was less defined than Eusebius' in regards to Christian doctrine. It was arguably more defined, however, than that of the apostle Paul (see Chapter 1, above). Regardless of which of the proposed dates one settles on for the author, the ecclesiology of Ignatius' letters fits somewhere between the protean environment of "charismatic" apostle-leaders and the "bishops" of Eusebius' day. There are many ways to demonstrate the shift from "Jesus movement" to "Church" in Ignatius. Taking a familiar concept such as "order" (*taxis*), it is clear something is different if we compare the use of the term in Clement with that of Igantius. The prescribed "order" in his letters rests not so much on a doctrine of creation as upon avoidance of heresy. The first time the word *hairesis* occurs in his letters, it is in the context of a good report from the Ephesian bishop, Onesimus. Ignatius praises the *ekklesia* "for being so well ordered (*eutaxis*) in God, because all of you live according to the truth and no heresy resides among you…you no longer listen to anyone, except one who speaks truthfully about Jesus Christ."[59] Thus good order is directly tied to doctrinal uniformity.

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[58] Eus. *EH* 3.36.4, …πρώτοις μάλιστα προφυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἱρέσεις ἄρτι τότε πρῶτον ἐπιπολαζούσας παρῄνει προύτρεπέν τε ἀπρὶξ ἔχεσθαι τῆς τῶν ἀποστόλων παραδόσεως.

[59] Eph. 6.2, Ὀνήσιμος ὑπερεπαινεῖ ὑμῶν τὴν ἐν θεῷ εὐταξίαν, ὅτι πάντες κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ζῆτε καὶ ὅτι ἐν ὑμῖν οὐδεμία αἵρεσις κατοικεῖ· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἀκούετέ τινος πλέον ἢ περὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ λαλοῦντος ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.

As mentioned above, much scholarship has been devoted to the question of Ignatius' opponents. Traditionally, they've been labeled as "Judaizers" and "docetists." Their precise nature remains a matter of dispute for Patristic scholars; for the purposes of this chapter, the traditional labels will suffice. They are important here only as threats to homonoia and therefore targets of Ignatius' anti-heretical efforts. Ignatius seems to be struggling "to impose a standardization of structure" upon Christian groups. To put it in sociological language, the "routinization of the charismatic," must have been uncomfortable.[60] He therefore represents an important chapter in the history of "heresy" and "heterodoxy" against "apostolic" and "orthodoxy." Furthermore, it is impossible to appreciate Ignatius' conception of homonoia without understanding the way it contrasts with heresy and heterodoxy. Therefore I will now turn to the issue of Ignatius' opponents.

"Mirror exegesis" is not without limits, but it certainly clarifies why Judaizers and docetists became the favored hypotheses.[61] The first of these is straightforward for my purposes. There must have been, at the turn of the first century, a continuation of the same multifaceted struggle in *ekklesiai* hinted at in the Pauline epistles. Ignatius clearly reveals a cultural-religious context in which there was an understandable tension both internal and external to the churches. There was tension, on the one hand, between members of the (relatively new) Christian churches and traditions or associations from which they converted, including the synagogue. In the case of Jewish converts, it was inevitable that there would also be friction at times between the members themselves regarding observation of cultural norms. Indeed the tension was strong enough for Ignatius to divide "Christians" from "Jews" in his letters, which is one of the first instances of this distinction (by a Christian). By drawing this contrast, Ignatius positions himself as an important early entrant into a much larger, complex discussion about the separation of the two religions that is not fully understood.[62] It seems clear, however, that at least in Ignatius' rhetoric the "parting of the ways" is decisive and final, for Ignatius. It is helpful to compare Ignatius' approach to that of Paul. The "circumcision party" in Paul's letters are "Judaizers" in Ignatius.[63] This is another example of Ignatius building upon a Pauline precedent, as well as making a novel linguistic choice. Here I will consider two of Ignatius' letters in order to better understand the tensions that motivated his calls for homonoia.

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[60] Foster 2007, 95-97.

[61] The term is Sumney's; he detects docetists in Smyrna and "those who see different ties between Judaism and Christianity" in Philadelphia (1993, 364-365); see also Trebilco 2004, 632-634.

Ignatius' strongest statements on the relationship between Judaism and Christianity come in his letters to Magnesia and Philadelphia, which suggest that both *ekklesiai* were expressing more diversity of belief than Ignatius could tolerate. He is concerned enough with differing opinions that he associates Judaism with heterodoxy: "Do not be deceived by *heterodoxia* or old stories (*mutheumata*) that are of no use. For if we have lived according to Judaism until now, we admit that we have not received grace (*charis*)" (Magn. 8.1). We can only hypothesize about the specific point of contention, but an allusion to the Sabbath may be significant. Ignatius separates "observing Sabbath" (σαββατίζοντες) from "living according to the Lord" (κατὰ κυριακὴν ζῶντες) (9.1). He contrasts “old ways” (παλαιός πράγματα) with the “mystery” (μυστήριον) of Christ. Finally, Ignatius makes multiple appeals to the authority of the prophets; they are, like his fellow believers, “disciples” (*mathetai*) of Christ. This has been called a “radical Christianization” of the prophets that is one aspect of Ignatius’ presentation of Judaism as “profoundly different” from his own faith.[64] Ignatius bundles these ideas into his conclusion, which he casts as a logical extension of the contrasts he has drawn. “Since we are his disciples, let us learn to live according to Christianity. Whoever is called by a name other than this does not belong to God.”[65] Ignatius makes a conscious effort, then, to separate his own faith and practice from others, with specific reference to those who would hold on to too many of Judaism’s “old ways.” Ultimately this leads him to one of the earliest and clearest mutual exclusions. “It is outlandish to proclaim Jesus Christ and practice Judaism. For Christianity did not believe in Judaism, but Judaism in Christianity—in which every tongue that believes in God has been gathered together.”[66] The teleological triumphalism here is striking. Ignatius voices the same universalist ideal as Paul.[67] He embeds it, however, in such a way that this passage is an explicit example of the exclusivist drive for homogeneity mentioned above—a drive from which homonoia is inseparable.

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[62] The "parting of the ways" thesis has generated decades of controversy and revision; wide ranging dates have been proposed, from the first to the seventh centuries. For a summary of the debate, see Runesson 2008, 62-74, and Robinson 2009, 207-27. The latter discusses six approaches to the relationship between early Christianity and Judaism; he also outlines the "moral burden of history" that has, in his view, complicated scholarship since the Holocaust.

[63] Jefford concludes that Ignatius' "values and understanding of the faith are inherently non-Jewish." He is "clearly not dependent upon any Jewish background…there appears to be no place within the church for anything that had its essential roots in Judaism" (2006, 167). There is an important caveat here, however. Ignatius does not seem to attack Judaism per se, but rather as a source of discord, ie a threat to homonoia (168). For Royalty, Judaism is a test of the unity theme; there is a "careful balancing act" between Judaic origins, on the one hand, and Christian succession of Judaism, on the other. "The universal Christ proclaimed by Ignatius must contain the right amount of Judaism…no more and no less" (2013, 140). See also Robinson 2009, 88: "For Ignatius, the Christian movement stands separate from Judaism and at parity with it as a distinct religion." Compare Zetterholm 2003, who sees a starker contrast: "While Paul addressed the question of how Gentile adherents to the Jesus movement should relate to Judaism from a position within Judaism, Ignatius argues from a position outside Judaism in order to nullify the whole Jewish religious system" (2). Boys-Stones 2001, 168, in reference to Magn. 10: "Judaism, for Ignatius, had come to a decisive full stop with the coming of Christ. Ancient scriptures spoke expectantly *of* Christ, but were devoid of his teaching; Christ is [a Christian's] *only* teacher, he argued."

Ignatius’ solution for Magnesia is the same as it is for every other addressee: believers should strive for homonoia by recognizing and submitting to their divinely-ordained authorities. The bishop, presbyters, and deacons are the key to homonoia. Scholars debate whether Ignatius’ statements about the threefold ministry are more descriptive or prescriptive.[68] While not essential to this chapter, it is an important historical problem. Bauer used Ignatius to strengthen his famous thesis that diversity of belief was the norm in early Christianity. For him, Ignatius' threefold ministry is wishful thinking, a scheme not yet realized.[69] That Ignatius complains that certain Magnesians "call a person the bishop but do everything without him" suggests at least a nominal authority for the *episkopos*—respect for the title, if not the "office." What is significant here is that Ignatius ties the recognition of this authority to Christian identity itself. "It is fitting not only to be called Christians, but also to be Christians," he says; genuine Christians hold "valid" meetings under episcopal authority (Magn. 4). Whatever the case may be, Ignatius' focus on episcopal authority here makes Paul's Corinthian prescriptions—based upon an ordering of *charismata*—look comparatively egalitarian. Furthermore, the threefold ministry is directly connected to homonoia. "I urge you to hasten to do all things in the homonoia of God," Ignatius writes to Magnesia. What does this homonoia look like? It is conducting oneself "with the bishop presiding in the place of God and the presbyters in the place of the council of the apostles, and the deacons…entrusted with the ministry of Jesus Christ."[70]

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[64] Zetterholm 2003, 220, 224. Ignatius’ reasoning may be (according to Zetterholm) that because the Jews could not correctly interpret their own scripture, they therefore lost rights to them; see also Magn. 8.2, 9.2; and Phil. 5, where prophets are saved by believing in Christ: “they stood in the unity of Jesus Christ.”

[65] Magn. 10.1, διὰ τοῦτο, μαθηταὶ αὐτοῦ γενόμενοι, μάθωμεν κατὰ Χριστιανισμὸν ζῆν. ὃς γὰρ ἄλλῳ ὀνόματι καλεῖται πλέον τούτου, οὐκ ἔστιν τοῦ θεοῦ.

[66] ἄτοπόν ἐστιν, Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν λαλεῖν καὶ ἰουδαΐζειν. ὁ γὰρ χριστιανισμὸς οὐκ εἰς Χριστιανισμόν, ᾧ πᾶσα γλῶσσα πιστεύσασα εἰς θεὸν συνήχθη. For the “transnational” character of this language, see Sanders 2000, 166.

[67] “He is not fishing with a hook for only a certain species” (Robinson 2009, 104).

The letter to Philadelphia contains several similar statements about the difference between Igantius' faith and that of his Jewish neighbors. More importantly, Ignatius opens and closes this epistle with homonoia. Before addressing the Judaizing problem, he praises the

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[68] Weinandy 2005, 78; Royalty sees a rhetorical construct rather than ecclesiastic reality (2013, 140-141).

[69] Bauer 1971, 61-62. Bauer's view gathered steam when a second edition of the 1934 original was translated into English. In it, Ignatius is part of a precarious minority: he therefore desires a "dictatorship" that would establish his party's supremacy. Council (presbyterian) government is a relatively diverse government; *one* bishop, on the other hand, assures orthodoxy, even if it is a minority opinion. The bishop, for Bauer, is leader of group "in a life and death struggle against an almost overwhelming adversary" (64) and Ignatius' episcopate is a "seed sown in hope" (67)! For a summary of scholarship, see Holmberg 2008. Robinson 2009, 99-101 offers a recent counterargument: Ignatius did not "invent" the episcopate; in fact it was a reality in Asia. On resistance to episcopal supremacy, see Trebilco 2004, 640, 660-661, the "struggle for monepiscopy" during a "transitional" period in several *poleis*.

[70] Magn. 6.1, παραινῶ, ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ σπουδάζετε πάντα πράσσειν, προκαθημένου τοῦ ἐπισκόπου εἰς τόπον θεοῦ καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων εἰς τόπον συνεδρίου τῶν ἀποστόλων, καὶ τῶν διακόνων…πεπιστευμένων διακονίαν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ

ekklesia in the inscription for having been "founded in God's homonoia (ἡδρασμένῃ ἐν ὁμονοίᾳ θεοῦ).[71] The objective here is clear, as elsewhere: "All of you should stand in agreement with an undivided heart."[72] This is perfectly in keeping with homonoia rhetoric. The problem, as ever, is division; in Philadelphia, it seems to be connected again to Judaism, which he again mentions by name. There are "wolves" about, within or around the *ekklesia*, who must be avoided despite their apparent tameness.[73] More specifically, the scriptures seem to be the source of division. Ignatius comes to his point at 8.2: "I heard some saying: 'If I do not find it in the ancient records, I do not believe in the gospel.' And when I said to them, 'It is written,' they replied to me, 'That is just the question.'" Again, scholars can only conjecture as to the specifics here, but it is reasonable to conclude the argument centers on the interpretation of the Hebrew scriptures within the *ekklesia*. [74] It would not be surprising if certain members of the community, seeing no obvious sign of the *evangelion* in his scriptures, harbored doubts.[75] Ignatius' response is simple: "For me, the ancient records *are* Jesus Christ."

Surely this failed to convince his detractors. The line of thinking is nonetheless indicative of the lengths to which Ignatius goes to promote homonoia. He returns to this theme in the letter's closing, where he summarizes the ideal community with a flourish. Christ will honor them because the believers hope in him: "in flesh, soul, spirit, faith, love, and homonoia."[76] This is a concise restatement of Ignatius' message. There is an implied contingency about "hoping in Christ" and being "honored" by him; recognition of Ignatius' Christology comes with a reward. Furthermore, this closing sentence encapsulates some of the most important vocabulary of both his own letters and those of his predecessors. Flesh (*sarx*) is placed alongside *psyche* and "spirit" (*pneuma*). Each of these terms already carried significant ideological baggage in contemporary thought. Paul added theological significance in his letters by making *sarx* and *pneuma* opposites. Their relationship differs in Ignatius, however, as we will see below. "Faith" and *agape* are of course central to all the letters considered here. The most notable aspect of their appearance here is their position in relation to homonoia. As the final term of the list, homonoia is the culminating and therefore superior characteristic of Ignatius' ideal community.

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[71] The "spiritual" establishment, or foundation myth of a city is a standard element of encomia for cities as described by Menander Rhetor (Carruth 1996, 305); Schoedel sees Ignatius following "pagan epistolary models" as much as Judaic or Christian reworkings (1985, 35).

[72] Phil. 6.3, πάντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθε ἐν ἀμερίστῳ καρδίᾳ; see also 8.2, "I urge you to do nothing in a contentious way (ἐριθεία)."

[73] πολλοὶ λύκοι ἀξιόπιστοι at Phil. 2.2; "If anyone should interpret Judaism to you, do not hear him; Ἐὰν δέ τις ἰουδαϊσμὸν ἑρμηνεύῃ ὑμῖν, μὴ ἀκούετε αὐτοῦ (6.1).

[74] Phil. 8.2, ἐπεὶ ἤκουσά τινων λεγόντων, ὅτι ἐὰν μὴ ἐν τοῖς ἀρχείοις εὕρω ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ οὐ πιστεύω· καὶ λέγοντός μου αὐτοῖς ὅτι γέγραπται, ἀπεκρίθησάν μοι ὅτι πρόκειται; *ta archeia* can be rendered "archives" or "charters" as well. See Mitchell 2006, 38-39 for summary of debate; he suggests Ignatius is "subordinating" scripture to the gospel (rather than denigrating it altogether); he interprets *evangelion* as "'the Christian message' writ large" (which was not necessarily written) (40); Zetterholm thinks the Septuagint was at issue. The Jews were refuting the Gospel message that Gentile status is acceptable for believers; they wanted to maintain a "hoop" of Jewish conversion before inclusion into Jesus Movement (2003, 209).

[75] Robinson 2009, 88, sees inevitable conflict as a product of Ignatius' conviction that Judaism was neither sect or offspring of Judaism; see also Sumney 1993 for the debate surrounding Scripture (354-358). According to Zetterholm, this fierce social conflict--made fiercer by fact that it's a close-knit group--morphed afterwards into anti-semitism. But it began as an internal debate (2003, 209).

DOCETISTS

There was an additional strained relationship between some philosophically-minded converts and their pagan peers. This group wanted their new faith to accommodate popular philosophy, and therefore could not tolerate the idea of a god-man. The view that Christ only "seemed" to be a god-man was the result, which was eventually called docetism and declared heretical. Ignatius himself describes the group as "unbelievers" (*apistois*) who say that Christ "suffered only in appearance" (δοκεῖν πεπονθέναι) (Smyr. 2.1). For Ignatius they represented obstacles to homonoia and episcopal supremacy. He therefore emphasizes to the Trallians, for example, how Christ, "truly born" to Mary in the line of David, was fully human—he "both ate and drank."[77] He intensifies the message with personal identification and repetition of "truly" (ἀληθῶς). If the "atheist" skeptics are correct that Christ did not truly suffer and die, Ignatius' own impending martyrdom is for naught (10). There is a causal connection between the authenticity of incarnation and salvation; to propose a "counterfeit" Christology invalidates Ignatius' determination and hope regarding his martyrdom. "I am giving my life," he writes to Polycarp, "to those who are subject to the bishop, the presbyters, and the deacons."[78] As for his opponents, "*they* are the ones who are only an appearance…*they* are without bodies, like the daimons."[79]

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[76] Phil. 11.2, τιμήσει αὐτοὺς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, εἰς ὃν ἐλπίζουσιν σαρκί, ψυχῇ, πνεύματι, πίστει, ἀγάπῃ, ὁμονοίᾳ.

As is the case with the "Judaizing" issue, docetism is taken up more clearly in some letters than others. The letter to Smyrna is Ignatius' strongest statement against this threat to homonoia. At first the letter looks very similar to Paul's letter to Corinth. The problem is the same—division within the *ekklesia*.[80] So is the solution of unity. In both cases, the common meal and the Eucharist seem to be a matter of contention. Regarding both the problem (*merismos*) and the solution (homonoia), it is impossible to completely separate the social from the ideological. At the most basic level, small groups of believers were gathering independently of other believers. The social context likely lent itself to such independent meetings. The "churches" at this time almost certainly met in private homes.[81] Informal gatherings may have therefore been more common than in a more institutionalized context, such as an official *collegium* or synagogue. Logistics, in other words, may have frustrated unity and created more demand for homonoia.

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[77] Trall. 9.1, ὃς ἀληθῶς ἐγεννήθη, ἔφαγέν τε καὶ ἔπιεν; the adverb ἀληθῶς is repeated with each of three assertions.

[78] Pol. 6.1; Ignatius' enthusiastic attitude towards martyrdom is clearest in the letter to Rome(e.g. 4.1-2); Weinandy 2005, 74, 80.

[79] Smyr. 2.1, emphasis mine.

[80] Ignatius uses *merismos*, however, rather than *stasis* (7.2). Thraede interprets the lack of *stasis* as a draining of the political "coloring" of homonoia, as compared to Clement (1994, 247).

[81] Robinson 2009 sees the house-churches as too numerous and too "translocal" to be a direct parallel to *collegia* (85-87); for the eucharist as a means to cultural identity, see Brent 2007, 222.

The precise nature and origin of the division at either Corinth or Smyrna is unknown. The recommendations of Paul and Ignatius both focus on the Eucharist, however, which suggests confusion regarding traditional common meals and what would become a central rite of Christianity.[82] In the letter to Smyrna, Ignatius tells us as much: those that disagree with his Christology are “abstaining from the eucharist and prayer” (7.1). Regardless of whether the division was first and foremost a matter of personality or ideology, both Paul and Ignatius respond with theology. That is to say both letters seek unity through repentance (*metanoia*). The call to repentance is in turn based upon a definition of the eucharist. Ignatius must have been aware of the Pauline ideal, which is a central theme of his letter to Corinth. “Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1 Cor 10.17). Ignatius builds upon this idea. He admonishes the Ephesians, for example, to “break one bread, which is a medicine that brings immortality, an antidote that allows us not to die” (Eph. 20). Elsewhere he expresses desire (*thelo*) for “the bread of God, which is the *sarx* of Christ,” and “his blood, which is imperishable *agape*” (Rom. 7.3).

To return to the letter to Smyrna, Ignatius begins and ends the letter with Pauline language. It starts with an assertion of the apostle’s essentials: “Faith and *agape* are everything.” It ends with a final exhortation to “think perfect things” (τέλεια φρονεῖτε) (11.3). Both of these ideas are clearly consonant with Paul’s notion of believers behaving according to the “mind of Christ.” But in between the opening and closing Pauline ideals, Ignatius proceeds to undo one of Paul’s most famous distinctions. As we saw in 1 Corinthians, Paul’s homonoia rhetoric features an important contrast between “flesh” (*sarx*) and “spirit” (*pneuma*). Ignatius, however, moves in the opposite direction. In the letter to Smyrna he goes to great lengths to emphasize an ideal *mixture* of flesh and spirit. *Sarx* occurs some twelve times in this single epistle; in half of those cases it is paired with *pneuma* in a “both-and” construction.[83] This is the strongest evidence that Ignatius was indeed dealing with a group that could not accept such a combination of the matter and spirit. Moreover, the allegation that these individuals could “appear trustworthy” (ἀξιόπιστοι) to Ignatius’ audience suggests they were familiar to the *ekklesia*, if not members of it.[84] According to Ignatius, refusing to acknowledge that Christ was a “flesh-bearer” (*sarkophoros*) is a “blasphemy.” To deny Christ’s material reality is to deny him completely (5.6). Ignatius’ goal is that all the Smyrnean believers genuinely believe in *both* the material and spiritual nature of the incarnation.

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[82] Trebilco 2004, 652-653.

Regardless of the precise nature of the opposition he addresses in the letter, we can see the main elements of Ignatius’ strategy against it. The first component is a strong statement of correct doctrine.

> You are fully convinced about our Lord, that he was truly from the family of David by the flesh, son of God by the will and power of God, truly born from a virgin, and baptized by John…In the time of Pontius Pilate and the tetrarch Herod, he was truly nailed for us in the flesh”
>
> πεπληροφορημένους εἰς τὸν κύριον ἡμῶν, ἀληθῶς ὄντα ἐκ γένους Δαυεὶδ κατὰ σάρκα, υἱὸν θεοῦ κατὰ θέλημα καὶ δύναμιν θεοῦ, γεγεννημένον ἀληθῶς ἐκ παρθένου, βεβαπτισμένον ὑπὸ Ἰωάννου,… ἀληθῶς ἐπὶ Ποντίου Πιλάτου καὶ Ἡρώδου τετράρχου καθηλωμένον ὑπέρ ἡμῶν ἐν σαρκί, (1.1,2)

This is one of the “outlines of early orthodox dogma” that occur periodically in Ignatius’ letters.[85] The converse of such a positive doctrinal conclusion is to emphasize the danger of deviating from it, as we will see below. Here he clearly seeks to establish the historicity of Jesus as well as his dual nature. Ignatius’ conclusion of this “proto-creed” is fully consonant with 1 Corinthians. Christ’s death and resurrection were on the behalf of both Jew and Gentile

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[83] Σάρξ τε καὶ πνεῦμα (12.2); see also 1.1, 3.2, 3.3, and 13.2; note, however, the prohibition of treating others “according to the flesh” (*kata sarca*) at Magn. 6.2. See also Malina 1978, 82, 84.

[84] Pol. 3.1; see also Weinandy 2005 on the “almost repetitious monotony” regarding Jesus’ humanity (76).

[85] Royalty 2013, 138; see below.

(*Ioudaiois* and *ethnesin*), "in the one body (*soma*) of his *ekklesia*" (1.2). But this universalism is placed alongside an emphasis on *sarx* that is absent from Paul's letter.

The second component of Ignatius' strategy against division is more practical. He exhorts the believers to rally around the bishop, envisioning a "centripetal" focus that will allow homonoia to surface.[86] First, Ignatius lays a Trinitarian foundation upon which to build a strong hierarchy of church leadership. "All of you should follow the bishop as Jesus Christ follows the Father; and follow the presbytery as you would the apostles." This is a clear example of the institutionalizing thrust of Ignatius' message. The *diakonoi*, for example are no longer servants but representatives of "God's commands" (ἐντολαὶ θεοῦ) (8.1). In other words, what were "waiters" in the ancient world have moved a considerable distance towards modern "deacons." Ignatius says as much in another letter. As those involved in the "mysteries" (μυστήρια) of Christ, deacons must maintain a high standard of conduct.[87] "For they are not *diakonoi* dealing with food and drink; they are servants (ὑπηρέται) of the *ekklesia* of God" (Trall. 2.3). His strategy against Smyrnean opposition is to make true "membership" contingent upon a person's recognition of and submission to the threefold ministry. "Let no one do anything involving the church without the bishop."

By using such language, Ignatius ties the validity of three central rites to episcopal presence. Neither the eucharist, nor a baptism, nor a "love feast" (*agape*) is valid (βεβαία) unless the bishop (or his delegate) is present. Elsewhere, Ignatius adds the marriage rite to episcopal responsibility. Marriages should be conducted "with the consent" (*meta gnomes*) of the bishop.[88] This is an important reminder that the bishop's authority is not purely theological (or theoretical); control over marriages necessarily involves a socio-political role. Ignatius' final thought for the Smyrneans notably includes "catholic," an adjective with a problematic history of its own. Here the term is probably a distraction from the more basic point. Ignatius clearly has in mind a faith that transcends political boundaries. Perhaps envisioning a "global" religion was made easier for Ignatius by his circumstances.[89] He was travelling under Roman guard, on Roman roads, over roughly half an empire (and the known world) to a capital he had never seen yet clearly respected (as his letter to the Romans makes plain). Perhaps he admired the political cohesion he saw on his way through foreign territory. Whatever the case may be, the ideal he expresses in ending his letter to Smyrna would ultimately win the day: "Let the gathering be wherever the bishop is," he concludes, "just as wherever Jesus Christ is, there also is the *catholica ekklesia*" (8.2).

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[86] Malina 1978, 88.

[87] "Mysteries" in Asia Minor "were among the most respected ways of honoring the gods in the Roman era" (Harland 2003, 484).

[88] Pol. 5.2. The ideal is for union to be motivated "by the Lord" rather than lust (ἐπιθυμία).

HOMONOIA and HERESY

It should now be clear that the letters evince a basic belief that "wrong ideas harm and right thinking brings one closer to God." This is significant because Ignatius is not technically an "apologist," like many of his successors.[90] Defending doctrine is not formally his responsibility, as it would be for later bishops. Nevertheless the homonoia emphasized in his letters is at least partially a matter of doctrine. While he may not have recognized Eusebius' easy distinction between heresies and the "tradition of the apostles," he nonetheless moves the Jesus movement closer to that point. Eusebius tells us as much: "Moreover, he thought it necessary to attest that tradition in writing, and to give it a fixed form for the sake of greater security." On this point, Eusebius' bias is irrelevant; he is referring to sections of the Ignatian letters themselves. Four of the letters contain creed-like statements that summarize beliefs that would become dogma. They could be compared to the household codes of 1 Clement, but are rather more like proto-creeds.[91] They are all Christological statements; taken together, two primary themes emerge. First, the dual nature of Christ; he is both flesh and spirit, born of Mary and of God. Secondly, Ignatius emphasizes the historicity of Christ's birth, death, and resurrection. We have already seen an example from the letter to Smyrna. To the Ephesians also, Ignatius describes the dual nature of Christ; the language obviously parallels that of the Smyrnean creed:

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[89] Löhr 2010, 105, sees a "more-than-regional concept of the one church," while Brent 2007, 231 likens Ignatius' "catholic" church to the *koinon* of Asia; Maier 2004, 517-518, views this as an appropriation of political "propaganda" regarding a *pax deorum* that mirrors the *Pax Romana*.

[90] Williams 2007, 23.

> There is one Physician who is possessed both of flesh and spirit; both made and not made; God existing in flesh; true life in death; both of Mary and of God; first possible and then impossible, even Jesus Christ our Lord.
>
> εἷς ἰατρός ἐστιν, σαρκικός τε καὶ πνευματικός, γεννητὸς καὶ ἀγέννητος, ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ θεός, ἐν θανάτῳ ζωὴ ἀληθινή, καὶ ἐκ Μαριας καὶ ἐκ θεοῦ, πρῶτον παθητὸς καὶ τότε ἀπαθής, Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν. (Eph. 7.2)

The Christological themes are impossible to separate from Ignatius' efforts against his opponents—members of the community who offer variants on his message that are unacceptable to him. He refers colorfully to these opponents as "beasts in human form" (θηρία ἀνθρωπομόρφα) who are to be avoided (Smyr. 4.1). In so doing, Ignatius exemplifies the fundamental tendencies in the early Christian movement towards homogeneity. This necessarily involves antagonism towards differing beliefs. "The two indeed go hand in hand," as Reeves puts it, "since no one emphasizes unity who is not worried by diversity, and no one attacks diversity who is not committed to homogeneity."[92] More specifically, homonoia is inseparable from *hairesis*. We spoke in previous chapters about how *hairesis* is a difficult concept to pin down. *Hairesis* was neutral in Greek and Hellenistic Jewish thought well into the second century

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[91] Royalty 2013, 138; Jefford 2006, 221.

[92] Rives 2005, 28; see also Chapter 4 (above).

CE.[93] When it does begin to take on the pejorative sense that would come to dominate, it seems to have evolved from a more general "division" to our "deviance" or "sect." It could be a moral and social problem instead of (or as well as) a strictly doctrinal one. There are New Testament instances of the earlier senses; Ignatius is certainly a turning point for the more recent, negative sense.[94]

The creedal statement quoted above shows the connection of doctrine and deviance. The "physician" is specifically a curer of "dog bites" of false ideas about Ignatius' faith. The "dogs" are hypocrites in the community who bear the name "Christian," but do not act accordingly. His characterization of these persons could hardly be harsher: "You must shun them as wild animals. For they are raving dogs who bite when no one is looking. You must guard against them, for they are hard to tame."[95] Thus it is *because* Ignatius wants to protect his audience "from being snagged by the fish hooks of worthless ideas (*kenodoxia*)" that he mentions Pontius Pilate by name and affirms the genealogy of Jesus, for example (Magn 11.1). He praises his audience at one point for "plugging their ears" against "evil teachings."[96] The most a believer can do, according to the bishop, is pray for the opponent's repentance. As is often the case in both Clement and Ignatius, *metanoia* precedes homonoia.[97] This is inseparable from the social context. The *kenodoxia* for example, could refer to social (interpersonal) strain as much as purely intellectual opposition. That is certainly what Plutarch implies when he uses the same image in *Brotherly Love*. "Dog-like (*kynikoi*) and slanderous (*diaboloi*) men" may ruin the homonoia between brothers (homonoia *adelphōn*).[98]

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[93] Simon 1979, 104.

[94] There are six occurences of the word in Acts, but these can all be translated "sect;" e.g. Acts 5 and 17 refer to a *hairesis* of Pharisees and Sadducees, respectively. Of the three occurrences in the NT epistles, 1 Cor. 11.19 (above, Chapter 1) is the most ambiguous, the mention of "destructive *haireseis*" (αἱρέσεις ἀπωλείας) at 2 Pet. 2.1 is probably the clearest. The only other reference, in Paul's letter to Galatia, seems to fit somewhere between these two; it is in a list of familiar vices. Simon 1979, 109-110; Ignatius' definition is "an unnatural amalgamation of certain elements of the true gospel and of false teachings" (114).

[95] Eph. 7.1, οὓς δεῖ ὑμᾶς ὡς θηρία ἐκκλίνειν· εἰσὶν γὰρ κύνες λυσσῶντες, λαθροδῆκται· οὓς δεῖ ὑμᾶς φθλάσσεσθαι ὄντας δυσθεραπεύτος. See also Rom 3.2, where Ignatius expresses a desire "that [he] not only be called a *Christianos* but also found one."

[96] Eph. 9, βύσαντες τὰ ὦτα (to κακὴν διδαχήν). Trebilco 2004, 655, highlights the vulnerability of those who resist episcopal authority to dangerous ideas. Ie, even if they agree with Ignatius on essentials at the time of writing the bishop can prevent doctrinal disagreement in the future.

[97] See Phil. 8.1, where Ignatius defines *metanoia* as a return to "the unity of God and council of bishop;" see also Smyr 4.1 and 5.3.

The most important aspect of the heresy in these letters is its connection to homonoia. Heresy within the community is, for Ignatius, a more serious threat than any sort of external paganism. Heresies threatened schism and the destruction of divine unity that characterized Ignatius' understanding of orthodoxy. In other letters, Ignatius likens *hairesis* to a "strange plant" prohibited in a "Christian" diet.[99] They should not associate with those who would offer a "deadly drug mixed with honeyed wine" (θανάσιμος φάρμακον μετὰ οἰνομέλιτος) by combining their own ideas about Christ with Ignatius' teaching. He connects this, in his letter to Philadelphia, with horticultural language similar to that of Paul's letter to Corinth. Ignatius' warnings against the "seeds" (σπεῖραι) of evil teachings, however, have a more negative tone than Paul's image of gardening together. "Abstain from evil plants which Jesus Christ does not cultivate, since they are not a planting of the Father."[100] This metaphor is a favorite of Ignatius'; elsewhere he warns the Ephesians to be united "so that no weed planted by the Devil (διαβόλου βοτάνη) may be found in you."[101]

More important than Ignatius' choice of metaphor in describing heresy is his use of another term that would become historically significant, *heterodoxia*. In the early second century, *heterodoxia* was taking on negative connotations in a similar manner to *hairesis*.[102] A survey of Ignatius' use of *heterodoxia* reveals a formulaic approach to individuals whose Christological "opinions" differ from his own. A faithful member of the *ekklesia* should simply not listen: "Be deaf (kωφώθητε) when someone speaks to you apart from Jesus Christ," he instructs the Trallians. Those in authority, on the other hand, should "stand firm" against the *heterodoxia*. The most a believer can do, according to the bishop, is pray for the opponent's repentance.[103] As is often the case in both Clement and Ignatius, *metanoia* precedes homonoia. Like much else in the letters, this matter is couched in the intellectual language discussed above. Those teaching alternative ideas (ἑτεροδοξοῦντας) about the faith are to be avoided as "opposed to the mind of God" (ἐναντίοι τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ θεοῦ). The ideal is that individual Christians are "thinking alike" so much that in seeing one, you see the whole community. This implies that "a few foolish persons" (ἄφρονες) can contaminate the entire congregation (πλῆθος) (Trall. 8.2). In his efforts against heresy, Ignatius offers an additional characteristic of homonoia, for in his efforts to fight heterodoxy, homonoia is not only glorifying to God, but also a defense against heretics and thereby safety from judgment. It is also a potential weapon against evil:

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[98] Plut. *De. frat. amor.* 490D,E: And yet there is a saying that brothers walking together should not let a stone come between them, and some people are troubled if a dog runs between brothers, and are afraid of many such signs, not one of which ever ruptured the homonoia of brothers; yet they do not perceive what they are doing when they allow snarling and slanderous men to come between them and cause them to stumble.

[99] Tra. 6.1, μόνῃ τῇ χριστιανῇ τροφῇ χρῆσθε, ἀλλοτρίας δὲ βοτάνης ἀπέχεσθε, ἥτις ἐστὶν αἵρεσις·

[100] Phil. 3.1, Ἀπέχεσθε τῶν κακῶν βοτανῶν, ἅτινας οὐ γεωργεῖ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτοὺς φυτείαν πατρός; see also Trall 11. "Flee the evil offshoots that produce deadly fruit; anyone who tastes it dies at once. For these are not the Father's planting;" with "seeds" at Eph. 9.1.

[101] 10.3, literally "slanderer," *diabolos* becomes the Slanderer, i.e. the Devil, in early Christian texts.

> For when you frequently gather as a congregation, the powers of Satan are destroyed, and his destructive force is vanquished by the homonoia of your faith.
>
> Ὅταν γὰρ πυκνῶς ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ γίνεσθε, καθαιροῦνται αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ σατανᾶ, καὶ λύεται ὁ ὄλεθρος αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως. (Eph 13.1)

It is worth noting, finally, that Ignatius' push for homonoia and effort against heresy are not purely intellectual or doctrinal. "Dogmatic difference" is connected here in Ignatius, as it was in his predecessors, with social ethics.[104] The doctrinal statements that "at least in embryonic form," resonate with central tenets of later Christian creeds, are meant to affect believers' behavior.[105] Moreover, the heterodox are moral failures as well as intellectual threats. "They have no interest in *agape*, in the widow, the orphan, the oppressed, the one who is in chains or the one set free, the one who is hungry or the one who thirsts" (Smyr. 6.2). Believers should counter these moral failures with ethical action, or virtues. The list of virtues is familiar to readers of Paul or Clement, but Ignatius adds an interesting contrast of a Christian's "civility" or "tameness" (ἥμεροι) with an unbeliever's "savageness" (ἄγρια) (Eph. 10).

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[102] Simon 1979, 112.

[103] Trall. 9.1-2; Magn 8.1; Pol. 3.1, "Stand firm as an anvil that is struck;" στῆθι ἑδραῖος ὡς ἄκμων τυπτόμενος; Eph. 10.1 urges constant prayer for *metanoia*.

[104] Royalty 2013, 138, notes a "demonization of difference" common to early Christian discourse, as does Reis (2005, 304).

Fortunately Ignatius wrote a letter to a fellow bishop, Polycarp, which gives a clearer picture of an ethics that is Pauline and comprehensive. The bishop must be cognizant of (and humble towards) widows as well as male and female slaves (*doulai*) in particular. The bishop should instruct women to "be satisfied with their husbands in flesh and spirit," while men are to love their wives "as the Lord loves the *ekklesia*."[106] Thus the social hierarchy in Ignatius' ideal *ekklesia* is essentially the same as that of 1 Corinthians.[107] Like Paul, Ignatius does not seek revolution on a structural level, but an attitude of humility and submission on every member's part. The letter to Magnesia offers an ethical summary: "You should assume the character of God and all respect one another. No one should consider his neighbor in a fleshly way, but you should love one another in Jesus Christ at all times" (6). This shows Ignatius comfortable with Pauline language, but we know his relationship is more complicated than pure *mimesis*. This is apparent in "fleshly" (*kata sarka*) here. But it is clearest in the conclusion that consists of a similarly familiar appeal to unity joined to the single most important element of Ignatius' contribution to homonoia rhetoric, episcopal supremacy. "Be unified (*enothete*) with the bishop," he concludes. For all the similarities between Paul's hierarchy, Ignatius makes every effort to establish a new presence at the top of the Christian social pyramid.

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[105] Foster 2007, 100.
[106] Pol. 5.1; see also Robinson 2009, 104-108.
[107] The strongest parallel is perhaps Ignatius' words for slaves who, while tended to by the bishop, should be checked for "haughtiness" (φυσίωσις): "rather, let them serve even more as slaves for the glory of God, that they may receive a greater freedom from God" (4.3).

CONCLUSION

The reason for Ignatius' arrest in Antioch is unknown, but it is reasonable to suppose other "Christians" were complicit in his downfall.[108] Thus Ignatius may have been victim of the lack of homonoia in Antiochene *ekklesiai*. Even if this cannot be verified, the letters attest to the fact that Christians were not immune from the same discord that orators had long been castigating in Roman Asia. They show that, perhaps fifty years after Paul's missionary journeys and not long after Clement's letter to Corinth, the *ekklesia* tended towards quarrels as fierce as those in civic spaces throughout the Roman world. The first series of Christian letters after Paul are aimed against such divisiveness, and therefore represent an important chapter in the history of homonoia.[109]

Even a cursory reading of Ignatius reveals an author who is "clearly a devoted disciple of Pauline thought and imagery."[110] We have seen that this Pauline tradition made use of homonoia rhetoric, and Ignatius' letters are no exception to this. Like Paul and Clement, Ignatius appropriates contemporary rhetoric as a means to religious ends.[111] Ignatius is "at home" in rhetorical commonplaces, ready to refashion civic ideals for the purpose of unity and concord in the *ekklesia*.[112] This holds true for his use of homonoia in particular; it was a well-known term with associated language to which Ignatius, like his Christian predecessors, availed himself. Homonoia is in Ignatius' letters, as in 1 Clement, a cardinal term; taken together with its associated terms homonoia is at the center of Ignatius' message. These closely related terms include "good order" (εὐταξία) and "unity" (ἑνότης), both of which are spread through the letters. Like Clement, Ignatius is aware of the work of Paul before him and, like both these authors, strives to end schism in early Christian communities by emphasizing peace, unity, and homonoia.

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[108] Robinson refers to a "near-consensus opinion" that the Romans were "bit players" in what was fundamentally an internal (Christian) matter (2009, 5-6; 216); Brent 2007, 215; Trebilco 2004, 653, posits the existence of docetic housechurches with elders as participants. While his hypothesis is connected to churches in Asia Minor, it seems reasonable to suppose a similar milieu (and competition) was possible in Antioch.

[109] Lindemann 2005, 23.

[110] Jefford 2006, 166, 196; Lindemann summarizes the relationship with bibliography (2005, 16-24); Mitchell states 1 Cor was "well on its way to widespread use and recognition with Ignatius' audience," not so much as "scripture" per se, but as a stylistic guide and theological model (2006, 41).

[111] Maier 2004, 515-516; Schoedel 1985, 22 n.106, 129; Lotz 2007, 195; Brent 2007, 231: "His theology is a radical re-adaptation of the pagan language of polytheism with its plastic images and processions."

Ignatius is the first to ascribe specific authorities to the bishop, elder, and deacon. In doing so, he furthered the work that Paul and Clement began of strengthening a hierarchy within the church. The reception of the Ignatian letters has therefore focused on ecclesiology, but Ignatius' interest in homonoia is prior to the ramifications of the nature of the episcopate. The bishop's importance stems from his ability to maintain unity, or homonoia. Similarly, Ignatius' use of terms that would become bywords of dogmatism, heresy and heterodoxy, are inseparable from his campaign for homonoia. Ultimately it is clear that even by Ignatius' time, in the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian, homonoia remained a "criterion for validity" of not only the *polis*, but of the Christian *ekklesia*.[113] Ignatius' letters are best read as attempts to briefly describe the nature of that validity, and to inspire "same thinking" in people over whom he clearly had authority.

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[112] Maier 2005, 320. See also Carruth 1996, 305.

[113] Brent 2006, 296; Ibid. 2007, 228 "a quality characterizing a good social order, and a mark of a valid foundation" and unity.

7.

AELIUS ARISTIDES and ANTONINE MODELS of HOMONIOA

Like most of the authors above, Aelius Aristides thrived under Rome. He "seems to have imagined a Hellas that was more integrated into the Roman *oikoumenê*," however, and he would use this conviction to strengthen his appeal for homonoia.[1] His speeches make clear that, a generation or more after Dio and Ignatius, conditions in the cities of the East remained contentious as ever, and that homonoia was still the chief antidote. Aristides (117—c. 182) was born into a family that was granted citizenship in Smyrna by Hadrian in 123 CE.[2] Some fifty years later, he made what may have been his last public appearance, again in Smyrna, where he addressed Marcus Aurelius. The emperor and the rhetor had both been tutored by the finest sophists of the era; Aristides heard Antonius Polemo speak, and attended lectures of Claudius Herodes in Athens. By around 150 he had an entourage of aspiring orators of his own.[3] The rhetorical skill that made him a hero of the Second Sophistic was put to use in defense of homonoia.

Aristides draws on themes in both Plutarch and Dio in order to highlight the importance of homonoia and to illustrate the dangers to cities in which it is absent. Like these predecessors, he is clearly aware of the diminished liberty of Greece and Asia: only a remnant of classical Hellenic glory remains. He does not begrudge the Romans for the reality he inhabits, however. What vestige remains of eastern autonomy is preserved by the Romans. "Scarcely has a small remnant of Greece come down to you, restored by the *arete* of our present rulers."[4] Aristides also laments the infighting that marks contemporary political life. The people of the eastern cities do not understand or value the link between homonoia and success, nor do they appreciate the magnitude of the threat from discord. For Aristides, on the other hand, the danger of faction is "a self-evident truth" whether in the polis, the *oikos*, or the individual.[5]

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[1] Richter 2011, 124; "The central metaphor of the *Roman Oration* is the idea that the *oikoumenê*, under Rome, has become like a single *polis* as the *polis* has become like an *oikos*." While homonoia does not appear in this oration (26), this idea informs Aristides' "peri homonoias" speeches (23, 24).

[2] For date and place of birth, see Behr 1993, 1141-1155; see also Johnson 2009, 53.

[3] Behr 1981, 1-2.

Aristides' use of the term *homonoia* is somewhat narrow in comparison to Plutarch and Dio. But what Aristides' corpus lacks in quantity it compensates for in quality: his *peri homonoias* speeches are two of the finest examples of the genre. Nearly three-quarters of the occurrences of the word are contained by the two speeches traditionally labeled *peri homonoias*: at Rhodes (*Or*. 24) and at Pergamum (*Or*. 23).[6] The former addresses intramural homonoia. The latter focuses on the intercity aspect of homonoia; it is addressed to the three most significant rivals in Asia Minor: Pergamum, Ephesus, and Smyrna. About twenty years separate Aristides' first homonoia address from his second, which is the longer of the two. Shortly before delivering the latter, Aristides spoke in Cyzicus (*Or*. 27) at a temple-dedication where he presents a vision of universal *harmonia* that parallels the ideas he articulates some months later in Pergamum. I will consider these three speeches (*Orations* 24, 27, and 23) in chronological order. All are connected to Aristides' purpose to make homonoia the primary goal of each eastern polis.[7] Taken together, they represent an important final episode in this history of the ideal of homonoia.

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[4] 23.51. This is one of several passages that reveal a rather broad understanding of "Hellas" (and "Hellenes" and "Hellenic") that would base membership upon culture, rather than pure geography. For a recent discussion of Aristides' ambivalence on the issue of identity, see Richter 2011. He sees a "two-tiered" model of Greekness "that accommodated both the ethnic Greeks of the mainland and Ionia and the 'culture-Greeks' throughout the empire" (131). On Aristides' "Greekness," see also Whitmarsh 2010, 1-5; Pernot 2008, 199; and Madsen 2006, 72-74.

[5] Franco 2008, 239.

[6] 34 out of a total 47 occurrences.

RHODES

The address to Rhodes has been called the "best surviving example of a speech advocating communal 'like-mindedness.'"[8] Aristides probably composed it as a letter in Smyrna in c.149, appealing for an end to internal dissension and renewal of homonoia within the polis. There is much that is familiar here, and its message is seemingly straightforward: Rhodes is in danger of losing "precarious privileges" through their internal divisiveness, and homonoia is the path to prosperity.[9] Given the universal consensus that "homonoia is the greatest good for cities," it seems "strange" to Aristides that the Rhodians should engage in unproductive "divisiveness" (*eris*), rather than embrace homonoia—"a fine thing and a means of safety."[10] The details of the source of division are unclear, but it is clear that Aristides is addressing a case of intramural stasis. No chorus out of tune, he says, "is so unpleasant a spectacle as the people of Rhodes in disagreement."[11]

Aristides uses multiple terms in homonoia's semantic field. A "single *gnome*" helps to preserve a proud Rhodian heritage (37), while *stasis* puts the polis in jeopardy. Two of the mythological images which Aristides recalls also support the intramural nature of the dispute. Both illustrations contain the same language we have seen elsewhere. Internecine conflict is a product of flawed thinking; the *nous* in both these cases is afflicted, which has terrible results to the *soma*. First, Aristides says that, in their internal dissension, the Rhodians "await the victory of Cleomenes the Laconian, who chopped up his body, beginning with his feet" (24.38). This

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[7] For the idea that all else is secondary to homonoia, see 23.8.
[8] Swain 1999, 88.
[9] The phrase is Franco's (2008, 244), who summarizes the background and scholarship concerning *Or.* 24.
[10] 24.4, ὡς καλὸν ἡ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριον.
[11] Or "not speaking together" (μὴ ταυτὸν φθεγγόμενος) (24.52).

"victory" (*nike*) actually refers to the insane Spartan king's gruesome suicide.[12] This a gruesome (even ridiculous) end of the body language we saw in Paul and others. Equally dramatic is Aristides' evocation (in the same line) of another ancient king, Pentheus of Thebes, whose body was torn to pieces by frenzied devotees of Dionysus, as depicted in Euripides' *Bacchae*. Significantly, Pentheus' own mother as well as her sisters are among his assailants. This is therefore an extreme version of internal conflict. The family is described by Euripides (as Cleomenes is by Herodotus) as insane.[13] Aristides applies the family tragedy to the polis at Rhodes: "you yourselves have torn apart with your own hands the body (*koinon soma*) of the polis which you all share" (24.39).

On a slightly less dramatic, yet equally serious note, Aristides intersperses reminders of the geopolitical reality throughout the address. Given the international system imposed on the East, Aristides believes homonoia should be easier to achieve as regional ambitions and tensions are subsumed by imperial interests (24.31). Rome was successful in wresting autonomy from formerly proud poleis not simply through brute strength, but because the cities had already weakened themselves by infighting (24.29). This is of course quite familiar to readers of Plutarch or Dio, but Aristides offers more explicit praise of Rome than either of these predecessors. The address at Rhodes (as well as subsequent orations, below) makes monarchy seem sublime.[14] Rome alone makes monarchy good: the Antonines have made a potentially dangerous form of government a blessing to all (24.30, 32). Nevertheless, Aristides operates under the same assumption regarding the link between homonoia and *autonomia*. The imperial reality is still double-edged no matter how fulsome his panegyric for Antonine emperors. The benefits of peace and security had to be balanced by acceptance of and respect for Roman supremacy. The balance was achieved through homonoia; Aristides' rhetoric should be seen as an effort to make submission palatable to the Greeks by means of homonoia. Rhodes seems to have struggled with this balance quite often. The Romans had revoked the "freedom" of the Rhodians at least twice. "Incapable of stability," Franco concludes, "the Rhodians alternated between good faith (and flattery) towards Rome and unrest and internal sedition."[15] Behr defines their *eleutheria* as "freedom from direct imperial supervision," and recounts the dissolution of the assembly under Claudius, then Vespasian. Aristides himself describes it as an "apparent freedom" (*dokouseis eleutherias*) that the Rhodians "risk" losing (*kinduneuesete*). The oration makes clear that homonoia is key to political autonomy in Rhodes, however circumscribed it may be. This is why homonoia is indisputably the "greatest good" for cities and, conversely, why faction a patent threat to safety (24.4, 7). This makes Aristides take on an ominous urgency towards the Rhodians, combined with an ironic tone: "if you do not voluntarily heed this advice, another will come who will *forcibly save* you" (24.22, emph. mine). He connects the warning to an appeal to advantage characteristic of homonoia rhetoric: "if for no other reason, then for the sake of being free and doing what you wish, abandon this present conduct."[16]

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[12] Cleomenes was insane according to Herodotus (his "mind in the grip of *mania*"), "and on his return from exile a mad sickness fell upon him: any Spartan that he happened to meet he would hit in the face with his staff." (*Hist.* 6.75). Franco notes that this episode of Dorian history might have resonated with Rhodians in particular, given their claimed Dorian heritage (2008, 242).

[13] Eur. *Bac.* 1085-1144. "One of them bore his arm, another a foot, boot and all. His ribs were stripped bare from their tearings. The whole band, hands bloodied, were playing a game of catch with Pentheus' flesh" (1135, trans. Buckley).

[14] The fullest statement of pro-Roman views is *To Rome* (*Or*. 26). See Van Nuffelin, who sees in *To Rome* a depiction of the empire that "creates unity out of division, order out of disorder, concord out of strife through the rule of law." Aristides does praise "Law (*Themis*) the eldest of the gods" in the Pergamum address (below) for his influence in the *ekklēsiai* and *boulai* (23.42).

These are some of Aristides' strongest statements concerning his audience's present context, but taken as a whole the address is a blend of past and present in which Hellenic history plays a significant role, as it had in Plutarch and Dio.[17] Aristides shares with many other rhetors an appreciation of “Greek” heritage, with which he bolsters his argument for homonoia. Perhaps all of the previous authors we have considered would agree with Aristides’ principle that “there is benefit to be gained from the past, the application of well-known examples to the present.”[18] Furthermore, Aristides seems—like Dio and Plutarch—to have a “selective and somewhat random” memory when it comes to the story of eastern Mediterranean.[19] As Dio used the mythical divine origins of certain eastern cities, so Aristides recites Helios’ creation of the island of Rhodes. A prime characteristic of Archaic Rhodes, according to Aristides, is its homonoia (24.51). Connected to Aristides’ argument from Rhodian self-interest is their alleged identity as “pure Greeks” (*katharos Hellenes*). The result of this common interest in Hellenic heritage is Aristides’ frequent citation of ancient Greek authorities. His use of Homer, for example, is varied, frequent, and fairly typical of both previous and current orators.[20] The subject is beyond my scope, but it is worth pointing out that Aristides uses Homer as a sort of expert witness in his defense of homonoia (or prosecution of stasis).[21] At Rhodes, for example, Aristides credits homonoia as the reason for Odysseus’ success: as long as he and companions were “concordant” (*homonouon*), they were safe. “But when they fell into dissension (*diesteisan*), they perished.”[22] Later, at Pergamum, he describes the *Iliad* as a testament to the danger of divisiveness. Homer “composed the whole *Iliad* on this point” and “the entire poem is an accusation (*kategoria*) against *stasis*" (23.58). But Homer is not alone: Hesiod is also called as a witness. His Archaic classification of two kinds of "strife" (*eris*) is a significant basis for Aristides' rather lengthy descriptions of homonoia's opposite that serve to put the ideal in higher relief.[23] Moving from Archaic poetry to history, Aristides (like Plutarch) holds up the example of Solon, who "not only exhorts us to homonoia," but also demonstrates how it is obtained (24.14). His description of Solon's method sounds quite familiar: by "mixing" (*katamixai*) the common people with the wealthier (the *dēmos* with the *dunatoi*), Solon assured that Athenians would "live in one *gnome* in their city."[24] Finally, Aristides critiques Plato's conclusion "that 'internecine (*emphulios*) *stasis* is worse than war by as much as war is worse than peace.'"[25] This critique is based upon his premise that while war can be preferable to peace, *stasis* can never be better than homonoia (24.19). There are conceivably benefits to war, moreover, such as material reward and fame (*doxa*). By this logic, even tyranny is better than stasis, for it too can increase a city's size and stature.[26]

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[15] Franco 2008, 245, with evidence for revocation of freedom under both Claudius and Vespasian.

[16] 24.22, κἂν μὴ ἑκόντες ἐπιστρέψητε, ἄλλος ἀφίξεται ὅστις ὑμᾶς σώσει πρὸς βίαν…ὥστε εἰ μηδενὸς ἄλλου χάριν, τοῦ γ᾽ ὄντες ἐλεύθεροι ποιεῖν ὅ τι βούλεσθε.

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[17] Bowe’s is a useful summary (1970).

[18] 24.22, ἔστι δὴ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος χρόνου τοῦτ᾽ ἀπολαύειν, παραδείγμασι τοῖς γνωριμωτάτοις χρωμένους εἰς τὰ παρόντα. This same line includes the reference to Rhodians as “καθαρῶς ὄντας Ἕλληνας.”

[19] Franco 2008, 243.

[20] Homer appears more than fifty times in the corpus. For a sketch of contemporary interest in Homer, see Kim 2011 and Anderson 1993, 74.

[21] Homer’s presence in Aristides rhetoric here could have an additional valence in that the poet’s name (*Homēros*) is etymylogically related to *homo-* / *homonoia*. For a discussion of a similar overlap between the poet and the Greek word for “hostage,” (*homēros*), see Allen’s discussion of Lucian, who puns on the words in his *True Histories* (2006, 151-152).

[22] 24.52, in reference to *Odys.* 12.260; Aristides also includes the importance of heeding the “best *gnome*” here.

This line of thinking leads Aristides to a short sketch of the past which makes all of Greek history a function of *stasis* and homonoia. Here Aristides' thesis regarding intramural homonoia overlaps with a secondary theme of intercity agreement that is implicit, if undeveloped. As to the inner homonoia, the Athenians, for example, "liberated not only their city, but also Greece in times of the greatest crisis" because they were united during the Persian Wars.[27] Similarly, Aristides explains the frequent changes of Athenian governments that marked the late fifth century as byproduct of the presence or absence of homonoia. If unity of purpose (or "having one *gnome*") and homonoia led to victory, internal dissension brought defeat (24.25). The highlight of Athenian history, for Aristides, is when "they preferred concord, and rated the common safety of the city before their private complaints."[28] Thus intramural homonoia is Aristides' primary focus. But of course the victories against Persia relied not only on homonoia within, but also *between* (or among) cities. While he mentions "the Greeks and all the Greek cities," Aristides concentrates (unsurprisingly) on Athens and Sparta, both of whose fortunes are (in his thinking) the result of their cooperation, or lack thereof. The reason for Greek decline since their fifth-century victories against Persia is not enemy armies, but "internal *stasis* and distrust" and "a state of general disharmony."[29] This is the sad corruption of the characteristics of previous generations, who showed homonoia towards one another (*homonoeisan pros alleilous*).

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[23] At 24.13 Aristides cites *WD* 11, where Hesiod contrasts a "good" Eris rouses men to a kind of healthy competition with peers (ἔργον ἔγειρεν) and an "evil" Eris who causes warfare and fighting (πόλεμόν τε κακὸν καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλει).

[24] 24.14, ὅπως ἂν μιᾷ γνώμῃ τὴν πόλιν οἰκῶσι.

[25] 24.19, in reference to Plato *Laws* 710 D-E.

[26] 24.20-21. This line of thought is developed later at Pergamum, where the logic can be summarized in the following: *stasis* damages reputation, diminishes courage, and destroys peace; war potentially enhances both courage and reputation, and ends discord; therefore even war is superior to *stasis* (23.55-57).

[27] 24.25, οὐ μόνον τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἠλευθέρωσαν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις καιροῖς.

Having made homonoia the linchpin of his potted history of the Greek world, Aristides abruptly changes course to consider the present which, like the past, he reads in terms of homonoia. The starting point is an acceptance of Roman authority; like Plutarch and Dio, Aristides attempts to use geopolitical realities to strengthen his argument for homonoia. In the middle of the second century, there is no need for faction, he says. "Is not all the earth united, is there not one basileus and common laws (*nomoi koinoi*) for all, and is there not as much freedom as one wishes, to engage in politics and to keep silent, and to travel and to remain at home?"[30] This acknowledgement of the Roman peace is directly connected to the recommendations that follow. Aristides twice casts himself as a physician.[31] While he does not offer a specific diagnosis (ie the exact nature or origin of the stasis), Aristides' prescriptions offer a bit more specificity. First, he recommends the expulsion of three vices that must have been, given their history which we have seen in previous chapters, somewhat predictable to his audience: anger (*orgē*), envy (*phthonos*), and greed (*philonexia*)."[32] These vices are all connected to a socio-economic class struggle in this instance: "I speak of the envy felt by the poor for the rich, and of the greed of the rich against the poor" (24.32). Aristides is plainly engaged in social hierarchy-maintenance here. His prescription is based upon the idea of a "natural law" that "the inferior obeys the superior."[33] To ignore this law in the name of "freedom" is delusional, Aristides concludes (24.35). In divorcing eleutheria from what he sees as subversion of divinely inspired hierarchy, Aristides makes it seem as if there was a political aspect to the *stasis* as well, about which we can only conjecture. Whatever the details of wrongdoing may be, Aristides calls on the perpetrators to "initiate homonoia" (*uparxai tas homonoias*) (24.40). He elaborates with an application of the same sort of oikos-based ethics that appear in Christian letters.

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[28] 24.26, ὁμονοεῖν εἵλετο, τὴν κοινὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν προτέραν τῶν ἰδίων ἐγκλημάτων ποιησάμενος.
[29] 24.29, ἡ κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων στάσις καὶ ἀπιστία καὶ τὸ μήτε κοινῇ ταυτὸν φρονεῖν. Lycurgus' importance here is another similarity between Aristides and Plutarch. The key to Spartan history is Lycurgus' "arguments and laws" (*logoi kai nomoi*) (24.24). On the "overuse" of Athens and Sparta in contemporary rhetoric, see Franco 2008, 241.
[30] 24.31, οὐ κοινὴ μὲν ἅπασα γῆ, βασιλεὺς δὲ εἷς, νόμοι δὲ κοινοὶ πᾶσι, πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ καὶ σιωπᾶν καὶ ἀπαίρειν καὶ μένειν ἄδεια ὁπόσην τις βούλεται;

> In sum, imitate the form and fashion of a household. What is this? There are rulers in a household, the fathers of the sons and the masters of the servants. How do these administer their household well? Whenever the rulers do not think that they can do anything, but voluntarily give up some of their authority, and the others accept as authoritative whatever their superiors decide. But without this considerateness on each side it is not easy to discover a household which will be preserved. It seems best to me now that you apply this conduct to the public affairs of your city."

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[31] Aristides presents himself as a physician charged with curing the "disease" of faction (24.16). He acknowledges his predecessors on the topic of homonoia and stasis, but reminds the audience that a doctor is respected not for the novelty of his prescription, but its effectiveness (24.5).

[32] 24.32. See also cf. 37 where *thumos* (anger; passion) is contrasted with *logos* –when it comes, "you should take as your ally its old opponent reason"(τὸν ἀρχαῖον ἀντίπαλον παραλαμβάνοντας αὐτοῦ δεῖ τὸν λογισμὸν).

[33] 24.35, νόμος γάρ ἐστιν οὗτος φύσει κείμενος ἀληθῶς ὑπὸ τῶν κρειττόνων καταδειχθεὶς, ἀκούειν τὸν ἥττω τοῦ κρείττονος.

> συνελόντι δ᾽ εἰπεῖν οἰκίας σχῆμα καὶ τύπον μιμήσασθαι. τί δὴ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστίν;εἰσὶν ἄρχοντες ἐν οἰκίᾳ, πατέρες παίδων καὶ δούλων δεσπόται. πῶς οὖν οὗτοι καλῶς οἰκοῦσιν; ὅταν οἱ μὲν ἄρχοντες μὴ πάντ᾽ ἐξεῖναι νομίζωσιν ἑαυτοῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἑκόντες ὑφαιρῶσι τῆς ἐξουσίας, οἱ δ᾽ ὅ τι ἂν δοκῇ τοῖς κρείττοσιν ὡς ἐξὸν δέχωνται. ἄνευ δὲ ταύτης τῆς ἑκατέρωθεν εὐγνωμοσύνης οὐ ῥᾴδιον εὑρεῖν οἰκίαν ἥτις σωθήσεται. τοῦτο τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως πράγματα ἀγαγεῖν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν. (24.33-34)

This passage bears resemblance to the household codes in early Christian texts.[34] It is interesting that there are obligations on both of the simplest levels of the hierarchy (fathers and sons, masters and servants). The concession could be interpreted as being mutual. Rulers cede absolute authority while the ruled acknowledge the superiority of those in power. Aristides' ideal here is the same as what we have seen in previous authors; he would have those without power accept their powerlessness in light of their essential (if not political) equality. Such reciprocity is key to every hierarchical statement we have considered, from Paul forward. To further clarify the link between homonoia on a domestic scale with that of the polis at large, Aristides cites a Homeric ideal which uses a homonoia synonym: "there is nothing greater and better than this, than when husband and wife maintain their house with concordant thoughts (*homophroneonte noēmasin*)" (24.7). Aristides applies Homer's conjugal harmony to the polis, where affairs should be conducted "*peri* homonoias" (24.8). Finally, the application becomes explicit:

> Let us make a threefold distinction, and having first examined a city and then a single house, let us next proceed in our argument to a single man and let us consider what is the sort of man whom one would not be ashamed to be like. Even here we would especially see the natural good of homonoia.
>
> τριχῆ γὰρ δὴ διαστησώμεθα, καὶ θεωρήσαντες μίαν οἰκίαν ἐκ πόλεως πρῶτον, εἶτα εἰς ἄνδρα ἕνα ἀναβῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ σκεψώμεθα ποῖός τις ᾧ τις οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύναιτο ὁμοιούμενος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἂν κατίδοιμεν τὸ διαπεφευγὸς τῆς ὁμονοίας ἀγαθόν. (24.9)

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[34] In his consideration of NT household codes, Balch discusses the commonalities in the *peri oikonomias* genre (2003).

Having considered similar passages in the authors in previous chapters, this quotation looks quite familiar. It looks quite similar, in other words, to Plutarch’s link between the individual household and the polis at large; surely it would have resonated also with Paul’s whose metaphor of the body also captures this connection between corporate and corporal homonoia. The sectrum of homonoia’s meaning, from the microscopic agreement of elements to geopolitical realities, is (as we have seen) a hallmark of homonoia rhetoric.

Another hallmark of homonoia rhetoric is the appeal to advantage, or a list of benefits. This was especially clear in Dio, but Aristides goes further in cataloguing the many rewards. In doing so he approaches the upper reaches of Dio’s cosmic homonoia. Only homonoia, he says “preserves the order of the seasons which are given by Zeus, [and] alone confirms all things,” yielding rewards in both city and countryside alike.[35] Aristides’ main interest, however, is how homonoia is important and beneficial to every segment of human society. The purpose for the individual *anthropos* is to be “as concordant (*homonoōn*) with himself as possible,” which will render the person suitable for personal and professional relationships (24.10). For who would want to engage in either marriage or a partnership with one at conflict within himself? From the individual, Aristides moves to the heart of his theme on benefits, encompassing the urban social environment at large.

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[35] 24.42, μόνη μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἐκ Διὸς ὥρας βεβαιοῖ, μόνη δὲ ἅπαντα ἐπισφραγίζεται. See also Aristides’ *Athena* discourse (*Or*. 27) , where the goddess is characterized by seven virtues in opposition to seven vices, most of which we have seen in Christian rhetoric: “folly, licentiousness, cowardice, *ataxia*, *stasis*, *hubris*, scorn of the gods,” versus “intelligence, moderation, manliness, homonoia, *eutaxia*, success, and honor of the gods and from the gods.” ἀφροσύνη, ἀσέλγεια, δειλία, ἀταξία, στάσις, ὕβρις καὶ ὑπερηφανία θεῶν; φρόνησις, σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, ὁμόνοια καὶ εὐταξία καὶ εὐπραγία καὶ τιμὴ θεῶν τε καὶ ἐκ θεῶν (37.27).

> Through it [homonoia] there are seasonable offers of marriage to be given and received, to whom and from whom one wishes, and the raising of child, and education according to ancestral custom, and for women there is security, and there is faith in keeping contracts, and the reception of guests, and the worship of the gods, and processions, and choruses, and pleasures… and means of life for the poor, and the enjoyment of their possessions for the rich, and maintenance for the old and an orderly life for the young.
>
> δι᾽ ἣν γάμοι τε ὡραῖοι καὶ ἐκδιδόναι καὶ λαμβάνειν εἰς οὓς τις βούλεται καὶ ὅθεν βούλεται, καὶ παίδων τροφαὶ καὶ παιδεία κατὰ τοὺς πατρίους νόμους, καὶ ὑπὲρ γυναικῶν ἄδεια καὶ πίστεις συμβολαίων, καὶ ξένων ὑποδοχαὶ καὶ θεῶν θεραπεῖαι καὶ πρόσοδοι καὶ χοροὶ καὶ θυμηδίαι…καὶ πένησιν ἀφορμαὶ βίου καὶ πλουσίοις ἀπόλαυσις τῶν ὄντων, καὶ πρεσβύταις γηροκομηθῆναι καὶ νέοις ἐν κόσμῳ ζῆν. (24.42)

The ideal is that "all things are held in common" (panta koina); the benefits of homonoia should be as communal as sunlight (hosper to heliou phos) (24.42). In this passage it is clear that homonoia's benefits are cast as all-encompassing; economic, social and political spheres are all preserved.

CYZICUS

About fifteen years after the Rhodian oration, Aristides traveled to Cyzicus in 166 CE for festivities surrounding a rededication of a temple of Hadrian a few years after it was damaged in an earthquake.[36] It was no less than Asclepius, Aristides says, who brought him to Cyzicus on this occasion.[37] The temple was meant to be the center of imperial cult for the province of Asia, which makes it ground-zero for intercity *stasis* since, as we have seen, imperial cult was one of the most significant channels for Eastern competition under Roman hegemony.[38] Aristides mentions various outlets for this same competition as an aside in the description of Cyzicus at the beginning of the address. "There are sacrifices, parades, processions, and divine services under established codes" set down by the gods.[39] All of these phenomena are of course related to the temple itself. Although initiated under the supervision of its honoree, the temple of Hadrian was likely finished under Antoninus Pius, and repaired during the co-reign of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. These latter two emperors are therefore the primary recipients of praise in Aristides' address. He uses the temple as a prop for a panegyric to the current administration. More specifically, Aristides draws attention to the harmony within the imperial palace itself; he believes this *harmonia* is "universal for the human race," (κοινοτέρα τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων). It should therefore be mirrored in the Asian *poleis*.

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[36] For the occasion (the Cyzicene Olympiad) and date, see Behr 1981, 379 n1. The immediate circumstances were apparently rather common; Franco makes intriguing mention of a *genos seismikon* (2008, 233).

[37] 27.2, "Aslepius orders me to speak." ὁ γὰρ Ἀσκληπιὸς κελεύει λέγειν. The god's role in Aristides' life has generated more scholarship than the subject of homonoia. This is understandable considering the prevalence of illness, pilgrimage, and "wonders" in the orations. Homonoia does not have a significant presence in his Sacred Tales, nor is it anywhere directly connected to Asclepius. Aristides' medical language regarding doctors and disease could represent some connection, however.

[38] For the *koinon* as "the main sphere for rivalry," see Dignas 2002, 218-220, and Burrell 2004, 351.

The Antonine emperors are a convenient object of praise for an orator urging homonoia, for they famously share power. Marcus Aurelius is the first, Aristides says, to voluntarily take a partner with whom to rule (27.25). The unprecedented success of the Antonine experiment in power-sharing allows Aristides to dilate on the benefits of Roman rule. The co-rulers' submission to one another is the primary cause of their success. They live in harmony (*harmonia*), playing their parts together as "instruments" in a larger work. Apollo and the Muses must be pleased by the "music" of their harmony. The gods sing in *harmonia* for all humanity, themselves following the model of Zeus. The emperors' *harmonia* "has a model from above…it is friendship and sharing which holds together the gods themselves and the whole Universe and heaven."[40]

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[39] 27.14, θυσίαι δὲ καὶ πομπαὶ καὶ πρόσοδοι καὶ θεραπεῖαι θεῶν μετὰ τῶν καθεστηκότων θεσμῶν

[40] 27.35. There is also a strong statement of what could be called cosmic *harmonia* at 23.76-77.

The key term of the Cyzicus address is *harmonia* rather than homonoia, but it is nevertheless an excellent example of homonoia rhetoric.[41] Aristides' ode to *harmonia* is an important antecedent of his more famous *peri* homonoia*s* address months later, in Pergamum. It belongs to the genre of homonoia rhetoric by virtue of its insistence on cooperation among and within cities, as well as the admonishment to political conformity.[42] All the ingredients of admonishment for intercity political and cultural unity are present; ultimately his praise of the *naos* is less important to Aristides than his homonoia rhetoric.[43] In fact he uses the temple to strengthen his argument that his audience should internalize the *harmonia* they see in the repaired temple as well as in their emperors' behavior. He admonishes them to imitate in their "psyches" the proper order that they see in the temple's architectural plan (27.40). "For just as we praise the harmony in the latter [*oikodomeima*] and the fact that each element preserves its proper relationship, so it is also fitting to think that a well lived life takes place whenever *harmonia* and *taxis* prevail throughout." Harmony and "order" are thus "adornments" (*kosmoi*) of both the polis and its inhabitants: they preserve "both individual man and city."[44]

It is interesting to read the panegyric as a culmination of the themes we have seen thus far. Aristides uses familiar topoi, such as brotherhood and friendship, for example, to illustrate the political harmony he idealizes for an audience that comes from many cities of the region. It is worth noting, however, that—unlike Plutarch or Dio—Aristides sees the archetype of both brotherhood and friendship existing in the relationship between the emperors. Aristides' apparent warm feelings for the imperial palace could easily have been strengthened by the fact that he shared a tutor with the emperors; they are praised for their education in particular.[45] The emperors are likened to men who "share the whole earth in common," (κοινὴν τὴν γῆν καταστήσαντες) (27.24). Aristides congratulates his audience on their good fortune: they have been born in an unprecedented era. "Now for the first time an emperor has voluntarily taken another emperor as his partner in the whole empire." [46] This decision makes the co-emperors Aristides' prototype of brotherhood. "Admirable is he who does not desire to be emperor, unless his brother should approve! Admirable is he who does not agree to being emperor (*basileus*), except with his brother (*syn to adelpho*)!"[47] Thus Aristides follows Plutarch in using the *adelphos* language, but focuses it on the emperors in a novel way. He is also quick to point out the benefits of such cooperation (and equality) in the manner of Dio. If Dio's ideal involved neighboring cities who doubled their resources by being in homonoia with one another, Aristides' expression of the same sort of reward is applied to the emperors themselves. By choosing *harmonia* and equality with one another, they double their ability to govern. "Both became the ears and eyes of another, and they doubled a natural function" (27.30).[48] This is characteristic of the "marvelous monarchy" (*monarchia thaumaste*) which Aristides' presents as a model for intercity provincial harmony. It is homonoia rhetoric of the highest order; his language here surely would have resonated with both pagan and Christian authors who preceded him. What makes Antonine rule particularly "marvelous," for example, is that "a single *gnome* is established in two bodies and two souls” (27.30). He likens this to the *harmonia* of strings played in unison. The emperors “have shared their music and sing in harmony on behalf of all the cities and of all mankind.”[49] Furthermore, Aristides summarizes the Stoic conception of cosmic harmony that appears at length in Dio’s orations.

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[41] Swain notes a "restrained approach" to city rivalries in this speech that implies an intentional decision *not* to use the word most closely-associated with the negative consequences of competition, ie homonoia (1996, 287).

[42] For the Cyzicus address as an important example of homonoia rhetoric, see Shepphard 1984b, 243.

[43] The structure of the speech supports this idea. Following Behr's numbering, for example, the temple itself is the focus of just five sections (17-21) out of forty-six; sections 21-46 focus on the benefits of the Empire and intercity harmony.

[44] 27.41, καὶ ἄνδρα ἰδίᾳ καὶ πόλιν σώζει. The thought is subsequently developed at Pergamum, where just as a house is judged by the unanimity (*mia gnome*) of its inhabitants rather than the beauty of its stones, "so also it is fitting to believe that those cities are best inhabited which know how to think harmoniously (οὕτω καὶ πόλεις ἄριστα νομίζειν οἰκεῖν αἵτινες ἂν ταυτὸν φρονεῖν ἐπίστωνται) (23.31).

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[45] Alexander of Cotiaeum, was *grammaticus* to both Aristides and M. Aurelius, after Antoninus Pius promoted him. Aristides wrote a tribute (*Or.* 32) after Alexander's death around 150 CE (32.12-14). Aristides highlights the education of the emperors at 27.23. Behr summarizes the evidence (1981, 394 n1).

[46] 27.25, βασιλεὺς δὲ ἑκὼν βασιλέα νῦν δὴ πρῶτον προείλετο κοινωνὸν ἑαυτῷ τῶν ὅλων καὶ μόνος τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς αἰῶνος οὐκ ἀρχὴν προσλαβεῖν μᾶλλον ἐζήτησεν ἢ βασιλέα προσλαβεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἴσοις. The nearest to a precedent is Alexander the Great, but he is dispensed with in the following two sections (26-27).

[47] 27.28, ὢ θαυμαστοῦ μὲν τοῦ μηδὲν δεομένου βασιλεύειν, εἰ μὴ δοκοίη τῷ ἀδελφῷ, θαυμαστοῦ δὲ τοῦ μὴ δεχομένου βασιλεύειν, εἰ μὴ σὺν τῷ ἀδελφῷ.

[48] ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις ὦτα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὶ κατέστησαν, καὶ τὴν παρὰ τῆς φύσεως χρείαν ἐδιπλασίασαν

> “It is friendship and sharing which holds together the gods themselves and the whole universe and heaven, and because of these everything moves securely in its course for eternity, while in the houses and the ways of the gods there neither is nor arises envy and hostility.”
>
> ἐπεὶ καὶ θεοὺς αὐτοὺς καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα δὴ κόσμον τε καὶ οὐρανὸν φιλίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν φασὶν εἶναι τὴν συνέχουσαν, καὶ διὰ τούτων τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον ἀσφαλῶς ἅπαντα πορεύεσθαι, φθόνον δὲ καὶ δυσμένειαν ἐν θεῶν οἴκοις οὐδ᾽ ἐν ἤθεσιν οὔτε εἶναί ποτε οὔτε γίγνεσθαι. (27.35)

The emperors are able to look to the gods for a model, and the gods bless the Antonine government. Clearly Aristides has accepted the adoptive emperors as paragons of *harmonia*. It is also evident that he subscribes to a belief in the importance of virtuous ethics that is common to all the authors considered here. “*Arete*, justice, and friendship” protect a polis more than palisades (27.36); no matter how famous or impressive a city’s monuments, only such virtues will prevent stasis. All that is needed, in Aristides’ view, is that the individual “persuade himself to choose the better course.”[50]

Aristides closes his speech to Cyzicus by describing this “better course” in a section of explicit “advice” (*paraenesis*). It can be summarized in three ideals: “respect for your rulers, honor for the laws, and thinking similar things.”[51] The prescription culminates in language appropriate to homonoia rhetoric. Aristides adds urgency by repeating the word “now,” and recalls Ignatius and Plutarch, among others, in describing *stasis* and other antonyms of homonoia as “beastly.” What is more, he combines the animal image with an allusion to disease that was also common in first-century rhetoric.

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[49] 27.31, οἱ δὲ ὑπὲρ πασῶν τῶν πόλεων καὶ πάντων ἀνθρώπων κοινωσάμενοι τὴν μουσικὴν ταυτὸν ᾄδουσι. Antoninus Pius also appears here; he is credited with instilling harmony in his adopted sons. See also 27.30 for “string” imagery.

[50] 27.41, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτόν τινα ἕκαστον ἑαυτὸν δεῖ πεῖσαι προελέσθαι τὰ βελτίω.

[51] 27.43, ἀρχόντων αἰδὼς, νόμων τιμὴ, ταὐτὰ φρονεῖν.

> “Now you must regard all cities as sisters to one another, now you must entirely do away with *stasis*, disturbance, *philoneikia*, and pettiness over vanities, in the belief that these are the diseases of wild beasts and should be alert to them, but that true peace, guileless friendship, justice and sharing in every way, if it is possible, should be regarded as the greatest gain.
>
> νῦν χρὴ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ἀδελφὰς ἀλλήλαις ὑπολαμβάνειν, νῦν στάσεις μὲν καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ φιλονεικίας καὶ τὸ μικρολογεῖσθαι περὶ τῶν ματαίων ἐκποδὼν ἀνελεῖν, νομίσαντας θηρίων εἶναι νοσήματα ταῦτα κἀκείνοις αὐτὰ παρεῖναι δεῖν, εἰρήνην δὲ ἀληθινὴν καὶ φιλίαν ἄδολον καὶ δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὴν διὰ πάντων εἰ οἷόν τε κοινωνίαν μέγιστον κερδῶν ὑπολαβεῖν (27.44).

It is worth noting that, for Aristides—as with the figures of previous chapters—countering vices with virtues is a good thing in itself. It is also eminently practical in that there are benefits not only for the emperors themselves, but for the all their subjects as well. Aristides’ rhetoric at Cyzicus implies that harmony among provincial cities yields harmony between the cities and Rome. Speaking of the emperor (*basileus*), his calculus is simple: virtuous behavior reaps rewards. “For in no way would you more gratify them than by such conduct nor would you more attain your desires from them than if you would show yourselves such as they would most wish.”[52] This is a substaintial definition of the Realpolitik alluded to in Plutarch and Dio. This link between harmony in the province and unspecified rewards from Rome—between peace and prosperity—is congruent with Aristides’ view of Roman rule. Whether in Europe or in Asia, he concludes, “all *anthropoi* and all *genei* are connected with the city [*sc.* Rome].” This is more than a simple description of Rome’s power typical of panegyric. Rather it is a reminder of the provincial interest in maintaining a harmonious peace.

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[52] 27.45, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως ἂν μᾶλλον αὐτοῖς χαρίζοισθε ἢ οὕτως δρῶντες, ἢ ὅπως ἂν μᾶλλον παρ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑμῖν ἃ βούλεσθε γίγνοιτο ἢ εἰ παρέχοιτε ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ὁποίους ἂν ἐκεῖνοι μάλιστα βούλοιντο. Cf. 24.48, “Since faction is both foreign to you and hateful to the gods, and concord appears to be the only means of safety, it is surely proper to accept the result as you would the calculation of a sum.” οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δι᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ μὲν στάσις ὑμῶν ἀλλότριον καὶ θεοῖς ἐχθρὸν, ἡ δὲ ὁμόνοια μόνον σωτήριον φαίνεται, προσήκει δήπουθεν ὡς ἐν χρημάτων λογισμῷ τὸ συμβαῖνον δέχεσθαι.

Another historical "first," Aristides asserts, is Rome's habit of delegating authority. While previous empires, both Greek and barbarian, excluded subjects from power, the Romans alone "have set out their advantages to be shared (*koine*) like prizes (*athla*) by the best people (*beltistois*) (27.32). The practical implication of Roman dominance, therefore, is provincial participation in *arche*. "Power" is shared (*koine*) between the emperors, but shared also with their subjects: "all have the right to exercise due authority."[53] Aristides does not explain the nature of the shared *arche*, but it is sufficient here to serve as a clear example of the vested interest which provincial elites had in Roman authority. His rhetoric is a stronger, later version of the same idea implied by Plutarch and Dio. The important observation to note here is that while ostensibly admonishing intercity Asian *harmonia*, Aristides simultaneously urges harmony with Rome as well.

Aristides is fortunate, in Cyzicus, to have in the temple a sort of visual aide at hand to better illustrate the homonoia he has in mind. It is fitting to include this structure here, for there is certainly a physical, monumental aspect to provincial competition and identity under the Empire. The tension between a consolidated imperial identity and civic pride meets in Hadrian's temple. There, the local aristocrats had little choice but to play the game, that is to thrive as best they could under the framework of empire. The interpretations of such a structure are many and seemingly contradictory: is the temple the ultimate symbol of imperial beneficence and locus of provincial competition at once? Or is it a tangible example of the downsized version of eastern autonomy expressed clearly in each of our three authors? Is it, in short, truly an honor, or an insult? We are left with the ambiguous nature of Greek identity that we saw in Plutarch.

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[53] 27.32, καὶ πᾶσιν ἔξεστιν ἄρχειν τὰ γιγνόμενα. Shortly thereafter, in the same section, the Antonines (ie "ancestors" of Aurelius and Verus) "shared their empire over everything;" (κοινὴν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν ὅλων ἐποιήσαντο). In his study of *Or.* 26 (*To Rome*), Van Nuffelen notes the absence of a slave-master image in Rome because Aristides' thinks that in Rome's "all men are equal" by virtue of their membership in the Empire (2011, 145). We are left to wonder whether Aristides is being descriptive or prescriptive here. Compare Pernot 2008, who reads "between the lines" of *Or.* 26 to find "a deeply realistic and embittered message" (190). See also Swain 1996, 254-297.

A second structure serves as an excellent transition to the final oration to be considered. Herodes Atticus was perhaps the greatest contributor to the architectural aspect of Greek identity under the Empire.[54] An edifice had for him "a rhetorical function" that included homonoia.[55] When his wife, Annia Regilla died, Herodes built an archway between her villa and his own. On the keystone of the arch Herodes placed an epigraph to homonoia *athanatos* in which the major themes of this chapter converge.[56] The most obvious interpretation for this is the homonoia between husband and wife. Yet this can be extended as a reflection of the homonoia advertised from Rome between Marcus Aurelius and Faustina. Considering his rhetoric regarding the *harmonia* of the co-emperors and the homonoia they encourage, it is likely that Aristides would have argued for this sort of interpretation. We noted above the mystery as to whether we should interpret Aristides' characterisations of the Empire and its rulers descriptively or prescriptively. This is impossible to completely clarify, but it is worth noting that more may lay behind both Aristides' praise for imperial *harmonia* and Herodes' praise for homonoia. For the arch bearing the *homonoia athanatos* inscription commemorates a marriage that ended in death: Regilla died in 160 under mysterious circumstances.[57] Philostratus recounts rumors that Herodes kicked Regilla to death when she was eight-months pregnant.[58] It is unknown how much truth there is to these rumors, but in any case the ruins of "Gate of Eternal Harmony" at Herodes' Marathon estate may be “a poignant testimony to a marriage destroyed by disharmony.”[59] The fact that Herodes was a sophistic superstar with autochthonous Greek ancestory, while his was wife a cousin to the imperial family and the granddaughter of consuls, only makes this plot even thicker.[60] Regardless of how Regilla actually dies, the context of the *homonoia athanatos* inscription is a reminder of the geopolitical shadow behind so much of the homonoia rhetoric we have seen. That kicking-to-death is a trope associated with tyranny does not so much disprove the rumors repeated by Philostratus as imply a complicated power dynamic between an important native of the East and his wife, who represented the political power of the West.

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[54] For Herodes' architectural legacy in Greece, see Tobin 1997.
[55] Thomas 2007, 83, 127, 140; see also Mitchell 1993, 189.
[56] Tobin describes the Marathon estate, which the arch apparently separated into "his" and "hers" sections (1997, 242-29). It may have imitated Hadrian's arch at Athens (Gleason 2010, 136).
[57] Pomeroy 2007 is probably the fullest account possible, given the limited evidence.
[58] Or he ordered her to be kicked by the servant who was eventually convicted for the crime by Marcus Aurelius. See Phil. *VS* 555-556. The murder is a trope associated with "tyrants" such as Nero.

PERGAMUM

Several months after the dedication ceremonies at Cyzicus, Aristides traveled to Pergamum to deliver his second *peri homonoias* address before the Asian *koinon*.[61] Pergamum was engaged in a protracted battle for prestige with Aristides’ own city, Smyrna, as well as with Ephesus.[62] Their competition derived from their respective relations with Rome. These relations were tied up with politics surrounding the cities’ roles in the imperial cult and the titulature. The three-way rivalry is perhaps the most famous episode in a long history of competition that was already percolating in Plutarch’s generation. Kampmann has helpfully synthesized the research in her study of Pergamon’s coinage that sheds light on the numismatic aspect of the rivarly. She tries to contextualize a seemingly trivial metropolis title, “first of Asia,” by giving it an expansive definition. It meant “most important in regard to tradition, age, beauty, origin, culture, and cults."[63] It was completely subjective, but did determine rank in the processions that had become important bases of prestige in a culture that prioritized protocols surrounding cult. As cities competed for curtailed political power, provincial assemblies became a "showcase for the power configurations" of Asia Minor, and thereby allowed for "self-expression and differentiation."[64] The coins suggest homonoia had a place in frequent renogotiation of city status in relation to its neighbors.[65]

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[59] Pomeroy 2007, 79. Tobin includes plates of the inscription and a reconstruction (1997, Fig. 77-79).

[60] For a recent summary of the biographies, as well as an analysis of Herodes’ monuments, see Gleason 2010.

[61] I follow Behr’s chronology (1981, 365).

[62] The dispute was “proverbial” by Aristides’ time (Kampmann 1998, 375). Dio referred to it long before Aristides at Tarsus, where he called likened the fighting between Ephesus and Smryna (among others) to a quarrel over an ass’ shadow (34.48). Some of the best evidence for the festering ill will, apart from Aristides’ orations, is numismatic. A relatively long series of “homonoia coins” was issued by several cities of Asia Minor. For summary and bilbliography, see Kampmann 1998. Lotz also reviews the German scholarship, noting multiple explanations offered for the homonoia coinage: *isopoliteia* treaties; agonistic competition; and processional protocols, none of which he endorses without reservation (2007, 46-52).

There is considerable overlap between this oration and the one delivered at Rhodes some fifteen years prior. The central theme on the evils of *stasis* and the glories of homonoia is the same. It is couched in similar language and imagery, both historical and mythological. The most important difference between the 23rd and 24th orations is the context. Although Aristides draws from the same rhetorical lexicon in both, he has a broader view at Pergamum than he had at Rhodes. At Rhodes, Aristides is concerned first and foremost with intramural homonoia within the island polis. In Pergamum, on the other hand, Aristides is speaking to several cities, including the three most prominent rivals of the province; the 23rd oration therefore urges intercity homonoia. Aristides says that "friendship and homonoia with one another (*pros allelous*) is naturally the cause of great good for the *ethne*, the leading cities, and each individual city in common" (23.53). Nevertheless intercity *stasis* seems endemic. The chief culprits in this case are Smyrna and Ephesus, along with Pergamum itself. While Aristides praises each polis individually in the early part of the speech, the bulk of it is comprised of Aristides' blaming cities for the "strife" (*eris*) that their competition for titles has produced (23.12). As the traditional antithesis of homonoia, *stasis* is equally prominent in Aristides' thinking. It is the source of all manner of vices: envy (*phthonos*), fear (*phobos*), *hubris*, folly (*anoia*), and every evil (*apas kakia*) (23.40).

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[63] Kampmann 1998, 376. This definition suits her belief that the competition was more important than the orators suggest, that is to say "first" was worth having. This interpretation is shared by Price 1984, and Burrell 2004.

[64] Lotz, 2007, 50.

[65] A Laeodicean coin (*RPC* 2928) bears an reverse legend of *OMEROS* alongside the name of Anto Zenon, son of Zenon. The meaning of the term here is unclear, but *homeros* could refer to Zenon's role as intermediary--he may have acted as an agent, in other words, of homonoia. That this is the same word for "hostage" in Greek could lead to new insights on contemporary understandings of hostages as agents of cultural and international exchange, for which see Allen 2006.

Aristides makes an auspicious beginning in referencing one of the founding documents of homonoia rhetoric, Isocrates' Panegyric, which begins and ends with homonoia as a Hellenic ideal.[66] He refers to Isocrates as "a certain distinguished and ancient sophist" who set two themes for himself in addressing the Greek poleis: war against the barbarians and homonoia between the Greeks themselves.[67] According to Isocrates both peace (*eirene)* and homonoia among the Greeks depends upon identifying a common enemy; his homonoia is therefore not simply intercity, but pan-hellenic. Of course Aristides does not have this type of homonoia in his rhetorical arsenal, given contemporary (imperial) limitations. Only the second of Isocrates' theses is relevant in the late second century CE, Aristides observes, "the whole world (*oikoumeneis*) being firmly held" by "gods and emperors."[68] Isocrates' function here is probably (like the presence of Homer and Hesiod) to enhance Aristides' own status as an orator. He is at least partly motivated by fame. This much is certain from his aspiration to be remembered for all time. He asks that his audience "not only honor [his] speech with immediate praise, but also by being mindful of it for all time and by applying it to the circumstances themselves" (23.27).

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[66] Homonoia occurs at *Pan*. 78, 85, 104, 138, 173-174. In this context, the strongest statements are for intercity, Panhellenic homonoia, though he also praises intramural homonoia at least once. See also Whitmarsh 2010. For Isocrates' possible influence on Aristides' conception of Hellenic identity, see Richter 2011, 125-126.

[67] 23.2. See Isoc. *Pan*. 3, περί τε τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους καὶ τῆς ὁμονοίας τῆς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. See also 173-174 for the connection between homonoia and war against barbarians. For Aristides' use of *sophist* as opposed to *rhetor*, see Behr 1993, 1171-1177.

[68] 23.3. Compare, however, the remark at 23.74 that an earthquake might result in something similar to the unifying effect of a common foreign enemy. "But whenever we are on our own and do what we wish, we become our own earthquakes and we can neither remain quiet nor plan anything for the common good."

Aristides includes a section of praise for each of the three main rivals. The host city, Pergamum, for example, is singled out for living in good order (*taxis*). Politically, they conduct themselves (*politeuetai*) well and their government is the "best under the sun," taking a moderate stance between the extremes of either arrogance (*authadeia*) or servility (*douleia*).[69] While such rhetoric is conventional, the praise for each of the cities is in this case clearly subsumed into a larger argument against *stasis* and for homonoia. It is because these cities have so many geographical and economic advantages, along with prestigious histories, that vices such as eris and philoneikia are unsuitable for them (23.28). In a way, Aristides seems to intentionally undermine his own praise for the three cities by adding the same caveat included in orations by Plutarch or Dio: none of the traditionally praiseworthy characteristics of cities can save it from stasis. Good harbors, plentiful resources—these are the stuff of *tyche*.[70] Homonoia, on the other hand, is a "choice" (*proairesis*) (23.30). In fact this entire section of praise for the cities (13-25) is, for Aristides, an exercise—and enactment—of homonoia. For in homonoia "lies the praising of others and hearing one's own virtues being praised."[71] This is precisely what is happening at Pergamum during Aristides' speech. Did his listeners accept his contention that praising and being praised are both contained in homonoia? We can only wonder whether the audience was aware they were participants in a sort of practice homonoia at that moment.

As was the case in the previous homonoia address (at Rhodes), Aristides presents a potted history of Greece that centers on Athens and Sparta (23.42-51). His conclusion is straightforward: by harnessing a panhellenic homonoia, the rivals defeated the Persian empire.

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[69] 23.9. There are similar statements for Pergamum (13-18), Smyrna (19-22), and Ephesus (23-25). Referring to Aristides' mention of "bad speakers" who praise a city in their assembly only to slander it before their neighbors, Burrell wonders if "cities heard as many speeches exacerbating their rivalry as smoothing it over" (2004, 354).

[70] See also 23.68-70 on the relative unimportance of city buildings.

[71] 23.29, ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ ὁμονοίᾳ καὶ ἑτέρους ἔστιν ἐπαινέσαι καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀκούειν ἐπαινούμενα.

Ultimately Greek victories "certainly were the result of their homonoia."[72] Since that time, it is the lack of homonoia that has caused every conflict in the region. It is important to notice that this history further elucidates the centrality of voluntary acts of submission to Aristides' conception of homonoia. He also emphasizes complementarity. The classical version of panhellenic homonoia as a function of military campaign is no longer a viable option, but Aristides is able to use ancient history to illustrate his own proposal regardless. Victory against the Persians, for example, is not simply due to an abstract spirit of unity between potential hegemons, but to the actual submission of Athens to Sparta and vice versa. The chief rivals for supremacy in the Aegean recognized one another's strengths and weaknesses. This is why Athens conceded leadership of ground forces to Sparta, for example. It was in the same spirit that Sparta ceded naval leadership to Athens, and assured victory over Persia (23.46-47). They cooperated "in the belief that if they should not first display homonoia towards one another, not even twice the number of ships would have helped" (23.45). This sort of concession is characteristic of Aristides' definition of homonoia, and is reminiscent of the concessionary spirit of Plutarch.[73] It is perhaps easier to appreciate if we translate homonoia as "consent."[74] This is a development of Aristides' view of homonoia as an act of the will—it is a "choice" (*proairesis*, above).

The homonoia that propelled the Greeks to victory over Persia did not last, of course, and its absence led to the Peloponnesian War. Aristides breezes through 150 years of Hellenic history as quickly as possible, slowing only to briefly indicate the lack of a common *gnome* after the early fifth century. His historical summary of events after circa 430 BCE states that Greece reached its present downsized state due to dissension, not invasion (23.49-52). The complementarity of the early fifth century was displaced, he says, by the pursuit of individual supremacy. The Peloponnesian War is therefore dismissed as a period when willfulness (*authadeia*) was called *arête* (23.49). Susequently neither the Thebans nor the Macedonians could "live in homonoia" (23.50). Constant discord was the result. In the second century CE, Aristides sees no room for such struggle. It is worth noting here that his realism is bound to the case he builds for homonoia. There is simply no excuse for faction now, since the Romans have established worldwide peace.

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[72] 23.48, ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τὰ τῆς ὁμονοίας αὐτῶν. See also 23.42. Dio Chryostom gives virtually the same version to the Tarsians at 34.49-50.

[73] 816B; 818A.

[74] Swain 1999, 85-96, at 87.

It is difficult to look beyond the selective nature of Aristides' version of Greece's past. His manipulation of the historical record to suit his rhetorical purposes, including highlighting a heritage of homonoia, is obvious. It would be a mistake to write Aristides' view off completely as simple nostalgia, however. In the best tradition of panegyric, his words have a potentially subversive edge, however slight. That is to say Aristides may have a prescription in mind for the Greek cities--that they imitate the good order of an army in the interest of enhancing and maintaining Eastern autonomy, however limited. If outright hostility to Rome is not an option for Aristides, cultural prestige and economic prosperity are in his interests despite geopolitical limitations. The neatly packaged history that he presents in the middle of his address must be balanced, for example, with Aristides' earlier use of an army metaphor. Smyrna, Ephesus, and Pergamum are likened to generals (*strategoi*) whose cooperation is essential to the success of their "soldiers," (ie the poleis). "It is not the case that good order (*eutaxia*) and discipline are fitting for soldiers, yet dishonorable for generals; but if the masses are going to maintain order, their leaders must first take the lead in this, since it is important for the army to be of one *gnome*."[75] Near the conclusion of his address, Aristides adds to this an analogy to siege warfare. Just as it is not profitable for garrisons to be spread too thinly, "do not think that in government and in our associations with one another many factions are profitable." In both contexts—the siege and in the Greek-speaking communities—"*harmonia* is best."[76] The language here is reminiscent of Clement's admonition for military-like discipline among Christians some two generations prior to Aristides.[77] It is also intriguing to read this passage in light of Dio's aspirations towards *synoecism* at Prusa, which could potentially give Aristides' words here more weight.[78] If military power was unrealistic, political and economic independence do not seem completely removed from Aristides' worldview.

As was the case with Plutarch and Dio, the description of the past is inseparable from Aristides' understanding of the present situation in the East. He is fully aware and seemingly comfortable with the contrast between classical times and his own. "Who is such a child or who so senile that he does not know that a single city, which is first (*prote*) and greatest, holds all the earth beneath her sway, and one house leads everything, and according to law governors come to us annually, and they have been entrusted with the task of carrying out everything, both great and small, however they think best?"[79] We could hardly ask for a stronger definition of imperial rule. The core of the problem, according to Aristides, is that eastern cities mire themselves in unnecessary intercity conflict. The Romans provide peace, yet in their current stasis, they "choose an evil which is much greater than war" (23.54). Furthermore, Aristides implies that the Romans have actively encouraged homonoia in the region. He says an (unnamed) emperor has told the cities that he would judge that polis "best and finest" (*beltistos kai aristos*) that "willingly initiated homonoia" between them (homonoia*s archosin ekontes*).[80] Thus the geopolitical reality is the same in Pergamum as it was in Sardis two generations before, when Plutarch wrote his *Precepts*. Aristides highlights the same futility of internal conflict around the Aegean that Dio had some fifty years before when he likened such fights to quarrelling between "fellow slaves" (*homodouloi*).[81] To struggle against one's neighbors now in the search for glory (*doxa*) or *proteon* is to fight "over a shadow."[82] The irony here, Aristides concludes, is the fact that those things that are deemed "common" (*koine*), such as temples and athletic contests, have become sources of quarrels within the Asian *koinon*. "It is fitting," rather, "that all things be held in common by those who will have as good a life as possible."[83]

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[75] 23.34, ὥσπερ τοίνυν εὐταξία καὶ κόσμος οὐ τοῖς μὲν στρατιώταις ἐπιτήδειον, στρατηγοῖς δὲ ἄτιμον οὐδὲ ἄχρηστον ὑπάρχει, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ οἱ πολλοὶ παρέξουσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἐν τῷ τεταγμένῳ, δεῖ τοὺς ἡγουμένους αὐτοῦ τούτου πρῶτον αὐτὸ ἡγεῖσθαι, ὡς ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμήχανον,…μιᾶς γνώμης γενέσθαι.
[76] 23.75, μὴ γὰρ οἴεσθε ἐν μὲν ταῖς πολιορκίαις τὸ διεσπάσθαι ταῖς φυλακαῖς ἁπάντων ἀλυσιτελέστατον εἶναι, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πολιτείαις καὶ ταῖς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλίαις τὰ πολλὰ μέρη λυσιτελεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἴπερ που κἀνταῦθα κρατεῖν.
[77] 1 Clem. 37.
[78] "I mean my desire to make our city the head of a federation of cities (συνοικίζειν) and to bring together in it as great a multitude of inhabitants as I can, and not merely dwellers in this distinct either, but even, if possible, compelling other cities too to join together with us" (Dio *Or*. 45.13). On Aristides' ambivalence vis-à-vis Rome, see Pernot 2008: "Aristides outwardly resembled an applied panegyrist, the good student in the class. Yet even good students can have misgivings" (177).
[79] 23.62, τίς οὕτω παῖς ἐστιν ἢ πρεσβύτης ἔξω τοῦ φρονεῖν, ὅστις οὐκ οἶδεν ὡς μία μὲν πόλις ἡ πρώτη καὶ μεγίστη πᾶσαν ὑφ᾽ αὑτῇ τὴν γῆν ἔχει, εἷς δ᾽ οἶκος ἅπαντα ἐξηγεῖται, ἡγεμόνες δ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐκ νόμου φοιτῶσι καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔτος, τούτοις δ᾽ ἅπαντα ἐπιτέτραπται καὶ μείζω καὶ ἐλάττω πράττειν, ὅπη ποτ᾽ ἂν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ βέλτιστον εἶναι;

Arisitides' conclusion at Pergamum is that homonoia is central to this "good life." He did not have recourse to a visual aide as he did in Cyzicus, but ultimately he does not require one. All that is required is for his audience to consider the best example of homonoia, personified by the emperors. "You have the greatest human example before your eyes, our emperors who are best in every way and whose fairest possession…seems to be the homonoia and zeal which they display toward one another."[84] In so doing the emperors offer both the polis and its inhabitants a model. The key to Hellenic prosperity in Aristides' world is to imitate the *harmonia* and homonoia on display. Their only competition (*philoneikia*) should be for a homonoia (23.79).

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[80] 23.73; compare Phil. *VS* 531, where after fostering homonoia and curbing *stasis* in Smyrna, Polemo convinces Hadrian to finance multiple improvements there through a gift of one million drachmae.

[81] Dio makes the same contrast with classical poleis: The *pleonexia* of "those states of old possessed real power and great utility…whereas anyone seeing the disputes and occasions for hostility of the present time would blush for shame, for they make one think of fellow-slaves (*homodouloi*) quarrelling with one another over glory and pre-eminence (*Or*. 34.51).

[82] 23.53, περὶ τῆς σκιᾶς μαχόμεθα. For the contrast with worthwhile classical conflicts, see 23.59-61, 69.

[83] 23.65, ὡς ἄρα χρὴ κοινὰ πάντ᾽ εἶναι τοῖς μέλλουσιν ὡς κάλλιστα πράξειν.

Homonoia was therefore a key term of Aristides' time just as it had been for the previous authors. We have travelled, in these speeches, a long way from Isocrates' panhellenic appeals to homonoia based on a Greek-barbarian dichotomy. Rome now embraces all cultures, and for Aristides homonoia is a basis for a justification of Roman power in the East.[85] This reality came to be through the general disharmony of Greek-speaking cities, according to Aristides. He does not imagine a return to glory for these cities: over and again he suggests a more modest goal of adapting to Roman power and doing one's best to thrive within the imperial reality. Eastern cities are fighting over mere shadows of power. Their task should be to enjoy the peace given them, not to bother its creators (23.65). "Indeed," he concludes, "it is worth everything for all mankind to work earnestly for (*spoudazein huper*) homonoia (23.45). It seems, as Burrell suggests, that Aristides has in mind a "rivalry over lack of rivalry."[86] The individual and the polis, as well as the entire region, must imitate the harmonious *oikos*, putting anger behind and joining together in mutual concession to political realities on both a personal and polis-wide level. At the political level, to which Aristides is of course devoted, homonoia as "consent" was the basis of the status quo: elites were elite in part due to concession of those beneath them on the social scale; they were also at the mercy of the emperor's consent.

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[84] 23.78, ὑπάρχει δ᾽ ὑμῖν καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων παράδειγμα ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς τὸ μέγιστον, οἱ πάντα ἄριστοι βασιλεῖς, οἷς πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὑπαρχόντων κάλλιστον εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοια καὶ σπουδή.

[85] Sheppard 1984b, 240.

[86] Burrell 2004, 354. Bowe outlines Aristides' position in reference to his economic and political status (1970, 37-39).

CONCLUSION

Homonoia remained a constant ideal of Greek political thought—“the good” *par excellence*—and the goal of every *ekklesia*, whether political assembly or Christian congretation.[1] Lysias had told the Athenians as much by 400 BCE: “Homonoia is the greatest good (*agathon*) for a polis, while *stasis* is the cause of all evils (*pantōn kakōn*).”[2] Such advice was already ancient when Paul wrote in the middle of the first century. In Paul’s use, and later authors’ development of homonoia rhetoric, we are seeing a rebirth of an old way of talking about human relations. Lysias’ conclusion contains a kernel of the grand rhetorical statements that flourished in the Greek East some five centuries later. Lysias’ testimony is therefore a reminder of homonoia rhetoric’s Classical pedigree, and that it is an important connection between the “first” sophistic and the second.

One of the ramifications of this study is that it clarifies (or complicates) the cultural interplay that is at the heart of Second Sophistic scholarship. In fact this dissertation contributes to the issue of how we think about that period in the first place. The label “Second Sophistic” itself is flawed since it is more literary and stylistic than strictly historical, which makes it a difficult concept through which to view contemporary rhetoric and its context. In abandoning the idea of a “Greek renaissance,” we have inadvertently made it more difficult to appreciate a renewal of homonoia in both sorts of *ekklesiai*—the scattered "congregations" of early Christians, and the political assemblies of Eastern cities. In other words, we see in Paul some elements of one of his late medieval admirers, Petrarch, among the first European "humanists" (d. 1374). In his effort to organize a relatively inchoate, distant, and clearly contentious Christian community—both socially and theologically—Paul used the rhetorical tools available to him. I see all six of the authors above as using—even grasping for—whatever concepts were available in their efforts to establish social, economic, and political "like-mindedness."

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[1] Jal 1961, 223-224.

[2] Lysias 18.17, ὁμόνοιαν μὲν μέγιστον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πόλει, στάσιν δὲ πάντῶν κακῶν αἰτίαν, διαφέρεσθαι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων μάλιστ᾽, ἐὰν οἱ μὲν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἐπιθυμῶσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ὄντων ἐκπίπτωσι.

Homonoia was "in the air," and by the turn of the first century this summary given by Dio must have seemed like common sense:

> Well then, homonoia has been lauded by all men always in both speech and writing. Not only are the works of poets and philosophers alike full of its praises, but also all who have published their histories to provide a pattern for practical application (παραδείγματι) have shown homonoia to be the greatest of human goods (μέγιστον οὖσαν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀγαθῶν), and, furthermore, although many of the sophists have in the past ventured to make paradoxical statements, this is the only one it has not occurred to them to publish — that homonoia is not a fine and salutary thing (ὡς οὐ καλὸν ἡ ὁμόνοια καὶ σωτήριόν ἐστιν). 38.10

Thus it was a truth universally acknowledged that the only way to thrive socially, politically, and culturally was by way of homonoia. Dio could not have known (or admitted?) that the essence of his definition of homonoia and the concession to political and social realities it demands, as well as the associated images and philosophical connotations, were manifest more than fifty years prior to his address—in the letter of a Jewish convert to an obscure subculture. Dio's quotation is also, like that of Lysias, a reminder of the long history of homonoia. Nevertheless this dissertation has tended toward the synchronic, however interesting and little-studied the diachronic picture may be. I have been more interested in the *use* of the past than in describing homonoia's heritage. In other words, homonoia is a key attribute in the idealization and redefinition of history in the attempt to describe a better, more unified present and future.

As the non-Christian authors were describing all of Greco-Roman history in terms of homonoia, so Christians were reinterpreting all of biblical (or rather Hebrew) history in terms of the same ideal. One of the best examples is Clement's account of Noah's ark. One could hardly ask for a more freaught, potentially chaotic environment than a boat full of wild beasts. The key to their survival was the homonoia that existed between the pairs and among the species. Humans, Clement seems to say, should take note! Aristides could hardly have said it better.

In conclusion, I'd like to return to homonoia's multifaceted character: to the idea of several simultaneous "conversations" in which homonoia plays an important role. There is a spectrum of meanings and contexts for homonoia. These can be divided into at least two poles, if not four stations. On the one hand, there is the socio-political. Socially, there is a wide spectrum for homonoia: it should characterize all relations from the individual home (*oikos*) to the empire at large (or, *oikoumene*). Homonoia has its roots in human relationships. According to any one of our six authors, homonoia should be evident in any human relationship. On the individual level, this extends from husband-and-wife or master-and-slave, to emperor-and-subject. Homonoia is most commonly corporate, however, and thus it should play an important role in all human communities as well, including the relationships within, between, and among both *ekklesiai* and *poleis*. It is inseparable from the idea of "order" (*taxis*) that characterizes both the earliest Christian community to Aristides' entire cosmos.

Politically, there are at least two major strands. One is within any given polis or community, where homonoia is a "slogan of middle class stability."[3] It is impossible to overlook this facet of the ideal; stability is certainly in the interests of all six authors of. But it is more than social equity. At a fundamental political level, homonoia is the solution to Polybius' anacyclosis: it is an exit ramp off constitutional flux. Another is the geopolitcal strand, which is expressed in the following quote: “The surest indication that a brand of rhetoric was effective and widespread is for those who are targeted, or victimized, by it to redeploy it against the powerful.”[4] This too expresses much of the spirit of the rhetoric of the preceding chapters. Our authors are generally too proud to cast themselves as “victims,” but they are clearly redeploying an ancient ideal, homonoia, along with allied terms, in order to survive and thrive within cultural and political environments in which their interests are threatened by discord. When the authors do claim powerlessness, it is in the interest of “like-thinking” that they do so. In terms of relatively recent scholarship, homonoia offers a way around “Romanization” and also clarifies (or complicates) the cultural interplay that is at the heart of Second Sophistic scholarship (Greek “identity” vis-à-vis Rome). This property of homonoia—of qualifying the Roman *pax* and thriving despite its inherent cultural and religious limitations—has been an overarching theme.

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[3] As expressed by Walbank, who is quoted by Welborn 1993.

On a geopolitical scale, homonoia bolsters a cultural autonomy and economic prosperity in the East as provincial populations strove to thrive within a well-established Roman hegemony. The difficulty of an eastern elite’s situation is partly captured by a recent quotation: “Whenever one hears declarations of unity, one knows that the situation must be dire indeed, rather as whenever one hears appeals for harmony one knows that someone's interests are under threat.”[5] As with Lysias’ words above, all six of the authors in this study would have agreed. They might concur, but they could not openly confess with such reality. In other words, this is a very modern quote, out of keeping with the Second Sophistic. If such conclusions are not completely absent from the first two centuries of our Era, they are certainly less common. They were prevented by both rhetorical conventions (which allowed for intentional vagueness as part of decorum) and political constraints (both local and "international").[6] The image of a one-way mirror is both striking and helpful here. On the mirror side, towards Romans, ruffians, and "slanderers, elites such as our orators project a united front for betters and for subordinates. All the while, however, competition and inequality thrive on the other side.[7] If our Christian authors would have denied such duplicity, it is clear that they nonetheless spread a "thick layer" of homonoia over the tensions, competitions, and general contentiousness that marked their environments.[8]

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[4] Allen 2006, 223.

[5] Eagleton 2013, 177.

Thus even if they left such observations as these unspoken, our authors must have recognized the truth in such a statement. The ideological purpose of the rhetoric here is to end *stasis* and instill like-thinking. The authors of the letters surveyed here "do not as much *describe* a situation as they attempt to *construct* a certain view."[9] This is at the core of ancient rhetoric. A purpose of this study is to evaluate the extent to which Christian authors participated in this tradition. In some cases their rhetoric reaffirms or solidifies existing hierarchies, which was a major conclusion. In following Paul's focus on *mutual* submission, however, Christian authors challenge and even seek to subvert the status quo. Plutarch, Dio, and Aristides, on the other hand, idealize the status quo in socio-economic terms, with geopolitical realities always present, if often unspoken. Their manipulation of homonoia rhetoric for political unity on both a small and large scale is a key to safeguarding whatever autonomy the eastern provinces maintained after over a century of Roman rule. It may have been a means of "social control;" yet was more than “a veneer of political claptrap or a rhetorical ideal” of the elites.[10] Whether in Christian *ekklesia* or a Bithynian *boule*, any definition of first- or second-century homonoia should also account for the act of concession at its heart whether private or public, because that is what the contemporary socio-political environment demanded.

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[6] Martin, for example, notes a distillation of details into a trope of elite-against-the-rest in "all sorts" of conflict rhetoric (1995, 40).

[7] Foxhall 2002, 180, 182. Desideri 2011, 96-98 labels *Precepts* Machiavellian in its advocacy of deception and of a "pretend democracy."

[8] Zuiderhoek, 109.

[9] Marchal 2006, 98.Commenting on the household codes of the NT, Lieu concludes "many of these texts are both idealistic and prescriptive…The virtues that are celebrated need reiterating precisely when they may be lacking" (2004, 168).

Therefore homonoia is a means to reconciliation with the Roman Empire. Plutarch’s Machiavellian tone is an excellent example of this, and I have shown that his political precepts can be read rewardingly alongside Christian authors who liken Jesus-followers to obedient Roman soldiers, and who pray for homonoia both within the imperial court and through the empire. Moreover, homonoia was a tonic for hyper-competitiveness that was a hallmark of contemporary local politics. What I have called intramural homonoia was indispensable to—and inseparable from—intercity homonoia, both of which imply wider geopolitical, or international homonoia. The inter- and intra- distinction holds true for Christian congregations as well, and, similarly, Paul’s rhetoric (and that of his successors) implies reconciliation with political realities. This is admittedly clearer in Clement and Ignatius than in the apostle himself, who is famously “charismatic” than his “routinized” successors, which brings us to the second basic pole of homonoia’s contexts: the philosophical-religious.

In fact we can conceive of a range of meanings and contexts stretching from the “microscopic” homonoia between the elements, all the way to a macroscopic cosmic “concord” that characterizes the planets, stars, and even the gods themselves. By “gods” I mean both pagan and Christian. My focus on homonoia in second-century Greek rhetoric necessarily referenced early Christianity. Patristic sources dovetailed snuggly with the major milestones of contemporary pagan homonoia rhetoric. It is futile to try and separate Christian and pagan completely, and I minimize the distinction (which tends to be anachronistic) as much as possible.

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[10] Foxhall 2002, 180.

Homonoia was a hallmark of the successful community, or *ekklesia*, regardless of whether Clement or Dio is defining that term (*ekklesia*). One of the most intriguing aspects of Paul's homonoia rhetoric is its connection to the survival, solidification, and expansion of the early Jesus movement into the Church.[11] Clement and Ignatius show that homonoia had a key role in this process.

Homonoia furthered two impulses in the Christian community that helped transform it from cult to institution. On the one hand, it is impossible to separate it from Christian universalism that is so clear in Paul's "being all things to all people." It is part of the religion's "rampant adaptability" that reached an increasingly "broad middle" of contemporary societies.[12] On the other, homonoia is part of Christian exclusivity and uniformity. Ignatius' letters, for example, highlight a conviction that "like-thinking" means "straight-teaching." This parallels the definition of Hellenic identitiy that was underway in sophistic circles in the most important eastern cities. Sociologically, homonoia had a similarly vital, if multivalent role. Paul explicitly urges the Corinthians to respect the traditional hierarchy, modeled on a well-run *oikos* that Plutarch would have recognized. What seems conservative is actually relatively new, however, in that Paul's hierarchy demands mutual submission. By emphasizing an equality of essence yet allowing for differences of status, the Christians are able to encourage a homonoia that is radical in its call for masters and slaves to be "of one mind," yet traditional in maintaining those very positions.

Over time it seems to have taken on theological or even "scientific" aspects. These three terms are difficult or impossible to isolate from one another in an ancient context, but we have seen that homonoia governs the ideal state of Stoicism, for example, as well as the idea that homonoia is inscribed into the cosmos—that it governs the elements, and keeps an individual body in balance. In "thinking-alike" with another person or polis, the individual and community are reflecting this cosmic homonoia. It also characterizes the gods themselves, whether Zeus or Jesus. Associated with this is the prevalence of *nous*- based words such as *anoia*, *dichonia*, and *metanoia*, in addition to an emphasis on the mental (*pneuma* or *psyche*) basis of status. All of the authors seek to transcend reality in some way without giving in to what we would call utopianism. Whether it is the reality of political impotence or the existence of major socio-economic gaps in close ("ecclesial") quarters spread over two continents, *thinking* correctly could ultimately produce better *actions* and a more prosperous, cohesive life.

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[11] For the difficulties inherent in the process of coming to terms with a new identity within the Christian community at Corinth, see Fiorenza 1987.

[12] Kee 2002, 337-60. See also Sanders 2000, 125, 160.

From the well-run *oikos*, to the empire as a whole, homonoia was an essential characteristic. Regardless of the breadth of contexts, the language is remarkably similar across these realms. Paul's metaphor of the body, which he borrowed from a tradition "ancient" even to him, was recast multiple times as one of several metaphors to communicate homonoia's importance. Athletic and medical language was also a key tool for our authors, as was family-related vocabulary. Another important element universally employed here was the past: historical exempla had a key rhetorical function in the process of defining one's place in the cosmos, the empire, and the community. For the elite Greeks, it tended to have implications against Rome: history was a way of shoring up Hellenic heritage and subsequent cultural prestige. The latter were especially important in an era in which political aspirations were necessarily downsized. In Christian *ekklesia* homonoia and history played a parallel role—it helped to establish authority by way of affiliation with key figures of the past, from Abraham to Christ.

Being like-minded with one's neighbors—whether cultural, philosophical, or ethnic—was perhaps as important in the period between 50 and 170 CE as it has ever been. A vast territory composed of various cultures, languages, and religions was forced into a single "*oikos*" for the first time in history, at least at such a scale. Our authors were all painfully aware that degrees of status, measuremens of difference and rank, did not disappear after the Romans came to town. The key to maintaining one's place, and to establishing harmony in the new community, was homonoia.

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