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AN INVESTIGATION OF THE VALUE OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

*City University of New York*

PH.D. 1987

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**AN INVESTIGATION OF THE VALUE  
OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH**

by

**DONALD J. SCHROEDER**

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in  
Criminal Justice in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
The City University of New York.**

**1987**

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Criminal Justice in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many people from my personal, business, and academic life to whom I am indebted concerning the successful completion of this dissertation. However, they are all true friends and I would prefer to keep my recognition of their assistance as a personal matter between them and me.

Therefore, I would, somewhat in line with my personality, like to depart from the usual and make a general acknowledgement of a group of people who never seem to get the amount of recognition they truly deserve. I would like to dedicate the effort I put into this study to the many fine police officers across the country who on a daily basis risk their lives so that the rest of us can enjoy the tremendous advantage of living in the greatest country in the world. It is a shame that too few people realize how much they owe to the police of our nation. In my opinion the individual police officer on patrol has one of the most difficult jobs in our society and I, for one, will never waiver in my support of the splendid job he/she does despite the many obstacles we put in the way.

The researchers of today owe something to the police. A way must be found to produce research that benefits our law enforcement personnel. And, in my opinion, it is up to the research community to take the initiative to make this happen.

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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION

During the last twenty years, researchers studying police organizations and police officers have been awarded far in excess of one billion dollars to conduct their research. The bulk of this funding has been in the form of government grants, with the federal government being the primary sponsor. The major justification for this considerable expenditure of public funds on police related research has been to find ways to improve the delivery of police services to the community. This study was conducted to evaluate the extent to which this significant outlay of public monies did in fact help to improve the delivery of police services. More specifically, this dissertation investigates the dissemination and utilization of law enforcement research among and by operational commanders of large, urban police departments, with major particular emphasis on the New York City Police Department.

The study's purpose is essentially two-fold. First, it seeks to analyze the adequacy of the research dissemination process among potential targets of police related research, to measure the perceived relevance of such research from the perspective of working practitioners, and also to measure the perceived degree of actual research utilization from the standpoint of the same group. Second, the study attempts to identify present remedial deficiencies in the research dissemination/utilization process within large urban police

departments. This will form the basis for recommendations aimed at improving that process.

Ever since Robert Lynd published his classic study, Knowledge for What? (1939), a growing number of scholars have been questioning the value of social science research in its application to practice. It was largely in response to the perceived failure of large-scale, extensively researched federal social programs in the 1960s and early-1970s that the evaluation of research dissemination and utilization of publicly funded studies emerged as a sub-field integral to but distinct from program evaluation. A number of such dissemination/utilization evaluations yielded disheartening results. The National Research Council (1971), for example, assessing the contribution of applied research to Department of Defense policies found that, "researchers are sometimes viewed as being more interested in furthering their academic disciplines than in providing operational help to the Department of Defense" (p.31). Similarly, as chairman of a research evaluation team, former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Elliot Richardson, stated of publicly-funded HEW studies, "Too much of this money has gone into poorly conceived projects, too few of the results have been rigorously assessed, and our means of disseminating the worthwhile results have been too feeble" (United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972, p.11). As a further representative example of the failure of research dissemination/utilization in federal programs, Salasin and

Kivens (1975), inquiring about the extent of utilization of research findings in the Federal Office of Budget and Management were told by the agency's Assistant Director, "It would be difficult in many cases to attribute more than five percent of the ultimate changes that are made to any analytic contribution whatsoever" (p.39). If such research was intended to have instrumental value, as was the on-going assumption, it was clear that much of it was falling far short of its objective

Since the mid-1960s, there has been a virtual explosion in publicly-funded law enforcement research, much of this growing body of literature being focused on police operations. Indeed, so rapid and large has been this expansion that James Q. Wilson (1980) recently observed: "The work of the police may well be, next to the work of politicians, the most thoroughly studied occupation in the United States" (p.146). As in other areas of public policy, however, recent studies indicate that: "Traditional criminal justice utilization have not been particularly relevant to the people who are potential utilizers" (Conner, 1980, p.638). Indeed, criminal justice scholars and police personnel alike have expressed grave concern over public monies expended on public commissions which "have either made no use of social science (the Kerner Commission), made some use but in ways irrelevant to its policy conclusions (the violence commission) or made use of relevant but unconvincing and inadequate research (the obscenity commission)," (Wilson, 1978, p.85.) Concerning

utility, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, a body which would issue a long list of recommendations for change in police operations in 1967, Dickson (1971) would report four years after the publication of the Commission's report that, "of the more than 200 specific recommendations put forth by the Commission, only a handful have been implemented" (p.216). Surveying the field as a whole, Wilson (1983) indicated his acute awareness of the skepticism that exists "toward academic pronouncements on crime and its control" (p.5).

Explanations for the apparent shortcomings of law enforcement research dissemination and utilization have tended to be of two sorts. On the one hand, some researchers (Chester and Flanders, 1967) have concentrated upon deeply-embedded factors at work in the external and internal environments of bureaucratic organizations. The general thrust of such studies is to demonstrate a strong resistance to change of any sort in "closed", hierarchical organizations, as well as, somewhat paradoxically, their vulnerability to external "political" influences. However, in the context of police administration, organizational and individual resistance to change through the implementation of study recommendations is, according to Wilson (1980), far less than this approach suggests, and, in fact, "what is surprising is that police agencies display as much interest in change as they do" (p.130). On the other hand, some scholars (e.g., Goldstein, 1977) have argued that it is the narrow

point-of-view which police operational personnel impose upon criminal justice research, not the lack of value or irrelevance of the research which is the culprit creating the poor assessment which such research has generated. Goldstein's premise is that practitioners characteristically overlook or are unconcerned with the contribution of certain studies to theoretical and conceptual understanding of the topics they address. However, it seems that Conner (1980) makes an important point in stating that while instrumental, problem-solving use is not the sole purpose of research, it is patently evident that, "the primary rationale for applied research is that its products will be useful in guiding future policies and practices" (p. 629).

One reason which has been advanced for the, at best, "mixed" outcomes of law enforcement research dissemination and utilization is that researchers generally have little ongoing contact with operational decision-makers (Sundquist, 1978). Both Lynn (1980) and Rothman (1980) have suggested that research dissemination and utilization can be upgraded through the active participation of potential users in all phases of the research process, including their participation in topic selection, research design, the conducting of surveys and field experiments and the extrapolation of recommendations. Weiss (1978), for one, calls for "continuous contact" between researchers and operational decision-makers as the surest means of enhancing research dissemination/utilization. Such remedial suggestions have received empirical support in at

least two cases involving urban police departments, Kansas City (Wilson, 1978) and Oakland (Toch, Grant and Galvin, 1975). In both instances it was found that successful implementation of pilot study findings was directly related to the active part played by operational personnel in all stages of the research project. Consequently, it appears that there is room for improvement in the process of police-related research dissemination and utilization

#### STUDY HYPOTHESES

The study tests the following set of hypotheses:

- (1) Potential targets of "external" law enforcement research studies have knowledge of these studies and their central findings.
- (2) In the judgement of potential targets, "external" law enforcement research studies of which they do have knowledge are considered to be relevant to working practice.
- (3) In the judgement of potential targets, "external" law enforcement research studies have been used in policy formulation.
- (4) In the judgement of potential targets of "external" law enforcement research studies, their participation in the planning, administration, analysis and presentation of recommendations for these studies is considered to be adequate.

It was our research hunch, based upon preliminary examination

of the available research conducted in this field, that these hypotheses would not be confirmed and would be answered in the negative. Hence, an alternate set of hypotheses was generated by stating each in its negative form, e.g.: "Potential targets of "external" law enforcement research studies have not gained knowledge of these studies and their central findings."

#### OTHER AIMS OF THE STUDY

In addition to testing the above hypotheses and interpreting the results of questionnaire response within a coherent theoretical framework, the study also explores significant aspects of the research dissemination/utilization process through a series of directed, in-depth interviews conducted by the author with study participants. The interviews were based on a set of research questions organized around the general model of research dissemination/utilization developed by Conner (1980), and tapped respondents' knowledge about primary characteristics of the process, e.g.s, the pattern, mode, rationale and timing of utilization. It is believed that our interview results "fleshed out" questionnaire data, thereby permitting the author to probe qualitative facets of the process, including suggestions for its improvement made by potential utilizers.

#### STUDY LIMITATIONS

It is recognized that the study's findings are severely limited. As explained by Conner (1980), because we find

ourselves in the position of a "trapped" research evaluator (confined to post hoc analysis), our results do "not permit definitive conclusions about causes and effects," (pp. 639-640) and can "at best (result) in qualified, tentative assessments" (pp. 647-648). Nevertheless, post hoc analysis through survey of potential research targets has generated meaningful results in other studies, e.g.s, Knorr's study of Austrian government officials (1977) and Berg, et.al (1978) in a study of technology assessment research. Since in essence, both the questionnaire and interview components of the study's primary research only tapped the perceptions and recollections of operational decision-makers, an attempt was not made to measure the actual relevance, use or value of the research studies about which they were asked. Moreover, given the close professional involvement of study respondents with policy formulation and implementation, a strong subjective undercurrent may have colored their perceptions of policy-relevant research, and, hence the data which they provided. One of the central premises governing the design of this study is that while asking working practitioners about the "value" of external research is by no means an ideal way of generating "objective" results, it is undeniably a straightforward and meaningful approach. In our view, even the most elaborate and fully planned methods for assessing research dissemination and utilization contain their own inherent biases and methodological complexity often obscures areas of central interest. Finally, because the study is not

longitudinal and rests primarily upon responses from a homogenous and narrowly-defined study populace, the generalizability of study results will be necessarily limited. Despite these weaknesses, however, there is much that can be learned, and there is a strong possibility that this study has a high degree of instrumental utilization.

#### SOURCES OF INFORMATION

Sources of information used for this dissertation can be placed under two headings. First, theoretical, conceptual and empirical works in the field were examined through a standard library search of materials. Second, primary research was undertaken to test working hypotheses and explore relevant research questions. This primary research effort consisted of two elements: (1) the administration of a survey instrument to the study population (defined below); and (2) a number of directed interviews with a representative cross-section of study participants. The survey instrument or questionnaire was constructed to test the hypotheses stated above in relation to external law enforcement research in general and to four specific examples of external studies in particular. It consisted of forced-response items, with responses arranged in five-point, Likert-type form. Use of this format enabled us to code and analyze study responses through standard statistical means. The selection of the four representative studies mentioned above was accomplished through inquiries to authorities in law enforcement scholarship. These experts

were asked to list four research studies in the area of police operations which they thought to be "most important". Final study selection was based upon a "forced choice" second inquiry of the C.U.N.Y. doctoral faculty in the Criminal Justice Program at John Jay College. Only studies which met the following criteria were eligible for selection:

- (1) Studies chosen had to be funded and prepared outside the formal organizational structure of the New York City Police Department.
- (2) Studies chosen had to have been completed and made known between 1976 and 1982.

The second element of the study's primary research base was garnered through ten directed and formally structured interviews with a cross-section of questionnaire respondents from the New York City Police Department. Interviews were conducted by the author on a face-to-face basis and were initiated after survey instrument data had been collected.

The study population itself consisted of the seventy-four (74) precinct commanders of the New York City Police Department, and one hundred (100) operational commanders from ten of the country's largest police departments. It was assumed that, as operational commanders in a major city police force, these individuals are (1) potential targets of law enforcement research dissemination, and (2) have a continuing part in policy decisions which could be effected by consideration of such research. It was also assumed that this group had an interest in the topic at hand, and that, based on

their extensive experience in police operations, they are sufficiently knowledgeable about police-related research and working practice to provide the data and insights being sought.

The procedures which were followed in the preparation of this study are given below in chronological sequence, and are, of course, discussed in greater detail in a later chapter.

- (A) Full search of the available literature;
- (B) Development of the survey instrument incorporating questions about the four research studies selected as being very important;
- (C) Initial contact with survey participants in the form of a "pre-letter";
- (D) Mailing of questionnaire to participants (with one round of telephone calls to non-respondents);
- (E) Data analysis and use of data generated in refinement of the directed interview schedule;
- (F) Administration of the interview;
- (G) Interpretation of questionnaire and interview data interpreted within theoretical model garnered via examination of pertinent source materials; and,
- (H) Presentation of results in the form of a completed dissertation.

The response rate to the survey instrument was very satisfactory. Sixty-two (62) of the seventy-four (74) New York City Police Department commanders polled responded as did sixty-one (61) of the one hundred (100) "out-of-city" commanders who were polled.

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

The evaluation of research dissemination and utilization is only now beginning to emerge as a separate sub-discipline in its own right. It has its proximate origin in program evaluation which, in its turn, is generally derivative of systems theory. Program evaluation (termed simply "evaluation study" in the early literature) arose as a means of assessing the actual outcomes of applied research, most of which was done in the areas of public administration and public interest.

In a sense, research dissemination/utilization studies came about as a consequence of a widely-noted shortcoming in the assumptions guiding evaluation research. In 1981, Roesch and Corrado asserted that, "evaluation research in criminal justice has reached a stage where there is increasing doubt about which methodologies are appropriate or necessary for assessing policies and programs" (p. 7). Broadly, evaluation research in the field of law enforcement and elsewhere began in the early-1970's to branch out into two distinct types. On the one hand, many researchers continued to focus upon program outcomes and policy analysis, while, on the other, some scholars began to look more closely at process evaluations and implementation analysis (Roesch and Corrado, 1981). It was chiefly from process-focused evaluation studies of the latter type that the assessment of research dissemination/utilization arose as a distinct sub-field.

Why did this parting of the ways occur? The answer lies in a critique of existing assumptions governing evaluation studies in general. According to the "classic" model presented by Havelock (1969) in his presentation of the research process, once research had been completed and channels of circulation identified, it was assumed that utilization and implementation of study findings by actual and potential targets would unfold in a smooth, automatic and linear way. As Blakely and Davidson (1982) observed with regard to criminal justice studies, from the standpoint of those following the "classic" model: "Criminal justice service agencies are viewed as adopters in the RD&D process who value evaluation results and passively receive programmatic innovations" (p. 89). To cite an often-used analogy, the classic research model rested upon a "trickle down" notion of research dissemination and utilization, one which presumed that research studies would "naturally" reach potential targets by general "diffusion" and that their findings would be utilized in policy decision-making with little or no deviation from policy recommendations made in those studies.

Currently, a number of scholars have found that this understanding of the research dissemination/utilization process is woefully simplistic. The process, in fact, "is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon," (Weiss, 1977, p. 11) which "is not a simple, linear, semi-automatic event which follows the publication of a research report," but, rather a

"complex and non-linear" process characterized by gaps, blockages and an array of factors which impinge upon both the circulation and use of research findings. Consequently, several critical works have now been devoted to analysis of the gaps which can arise in the process as a whole (Sunquist, 1978), to understanding deeply-embedded impediments to instrument use (Weiss, 1978) and to variables which influence research dissemination and utilization (Greene, 1982). In brief, it can no longer be simply assumed that publication of research will necessarily lead to its adequate dissemination among potential users, that these potential targets will deem them as being relevant to working practice or that research findings will be taken into consideration in the process of policy-making and implementation.

Fortunately, an alternative model of the research dissemination and utilization process tailored to the field of law enforcement is available to us. As presented by Conner (1980), this model avoids the simplistic assumptions which undermined the "classic" conceptualization of research dissemination/utilization. Conner conceives of research dissemination/utilization as a process in which ultimate decision makers play an extremely active role in determining the policy relevance of research findings and their actual use in decision-making. In short, Conner's model, by focusing on the "bottom" of the process hierarchy and by conceptualizing research as a process, replete with potential problems and obstacles, overcomes the drawbacks of the classic model. It

is, therefore, Conner's model of the research process, his identification of the eight primary characteristics of that process and his guidelines for handling assessment of both planned and unplanned dissemination efforts which we have adopted as the theoretical underpinning of our study.

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

As we have stated, research dissemination/utilization studies are of recent origin, and, while "a small number of government agencies have started to investigate the dissemination and utilization of their research knowledge" (Conner, 1980, pp. 629-630), the field is still in its infancy. A number of reasons have been advanced to explain this prior lack of interest in assessing whether research is adequately circulated and used, not the least of which is the understandable reticence of researchers to question the value of work performed by their colleagues and themselves (Davis and Salasin, 1978).

In the field of criminal justice research, "the literature...on the use of research knowledge is particularly limited" (Conner, 1980), for, as Yin (1976) has pointed out: "until recently, most of the major works in criminal justice have failed to discuss the utilization or implementation process at all" (p. 7). In light of the assumptions controlling the "classic" RD&D model, such lack of interest, while not excusable, is understandable. Organized along formalized and hierarchical lines of authority and

responsibility, police agencies "fit" the "trickle down" conception of research dissemination/utilization, and, hence, they served as prime examples of how research dissemination/utilization "naturally" unfolds as understood by adherents of the classic model.

It is not merely the paucity of studies devoted to this area which makes this study significant, however, but the critical nature of the topic under scrutiny. As will be discussed, the results of this study suggest very strongly that large amounts of time, energy and public monies are expended on the preparation of law enforcement reports and literature which does not reach potential users and/or is not considered to be of value by operational decision-makers. Therefore, we must conclude that something is seriously amiss in the way the process is now working. Since we have found that the dissemination and use of research findings by clear potential targets is inadequate, we believe it is crucial that means be found for improving it, that key problems be identified and ways of overcoming them be designed. One direct way of accomplishing this end is by examining the perceptions and judgements of operational decision makers who have extensive experience in translating policy into practice. This has been done in the pages that follow. Therefore, since this study's findings indicate there is, in fact, a problem or inadequacy in how law enforcement literature is passed down to and used by operational commanders and since the study suggests what can be done about it, it should prove of worth

to law enforcement scholars and practitioners, as well as to those with an interest in the research process itself.

## CHAPTER II

### HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE RESEARCH-POLICY PROBLEM

#### THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL RESEARCH

Sponsorship of scientific research by the United States government dates back to the earliest years of the Republic and President Jefferson's orchestration of the Lewis and Clark Expedition in 1803. Systematic Federal support of social science research, however, has a somewhat shorter history, the earliest example being the creation of the Federal Bureau of Ethnology in 1881 (Lynn, 1978A;P 1). Between the Progressive Era and the advent of the New Deal, public concern for burgeoning social problems periodically spurred the Federal government to finance scientific inquiry into their causes, effects and cures. It was not until the Great Depression that an "enlightened" Roosevelt Administration undertook sustained, large-scale social research and development (R & D) , as the basis for decision-making and the first policy studies saw the light of day (Patton, 1978,P. 14). By 1937, Federal expenditures for social research had climbed to an annual level of \$53 million, jobless academics benefiting from this initial wave of public money channeled into applied social studies.

During World War II and the two decades following it, rapid expansion of the Federal government's social R & D budget came to a halt. The Truman and Eisenhower Administrations shifted the focus of government funding on

research and development from social issues to advancements in military technology, e.g., the hydrogen bomb and atomic-powered submarines. A dramatic reversal of this trend occurred in the mid-1960s, when, as part of his campaign for the presidency in 1964, Lyndon Johnson pledged his commitment to a broad agenda of social reforms and the construction of a "Great Society". Under the guiding assumption that social change could be achieved through programmatic initiatives, the Johnson administration widened the Federal government's role in underwriting evaluations of existing social service programs and designs for their restructuring/extension. Flush with government grants, social theorists and field researchers met the call for rationale delivery of social services by producing a virtual mountain of policy and evaluation reports. From its humble origins in the New Deal and the setbacks of the Cold War, publicly-financed social R & D took on the organizational characteristics of a full-fledged industry. By 1976, the Federal government found itself footing the bill for nearly \$2 billion worth of research, statistics, evaluations, demonstrations and experiments related to the identification and solution of social problems each year (Lynn, 1978, p.1). The lion's share of these funds were devoted to "evaluation research", designed "to plan intervention programs, to monitor the implementation of new programs and the operation of existing ones, and to determine how effectively programs or clinical practices achieve their goals" (Monette, Sullivan and DeJong, 1986, p. 281). As revealed in the 1976 Congressional

Sourcebook on Federal Program Evaluations, between 1973 and 1975 alone, some 1700 program evaluation reports were issued by 18 executive branch agencies and the General Accounting Office (Patton, 1978 ,p.18).

Since the late-1970s, the growth of Federally-sponsored social research has levelled off, annual expenditures remaining fairly constant at around \$3 billion. Part of this deceleration is clearly attributable to the new conservatism which has emerged in the 1980s under the stewardship of President Ronald Reagan. It is apparent that the Reagan Administration does not share the enthusiasm of its immediate predecessors for government leadership in stimulating social change, and, consequently, the former priority accorded to social R & D has dissipated, scientific study of social problems being relegated to secondary status. More important than this ideological/political shift on the value of social research, from the mid-1960s onward a growing legion of public and private analysts has voiced its opinion that such efforts have not yielded their intended results. They contend that social research has not served as a guide for public policymaking and that much of it is flawed, irrelevant and/or impractical. On the other hand, after nearly two decades in which institutions dedicated to social research have become embedded, there are no signs that they will be dismantled in the near future. In a sense, social research has become a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Policy changes are adopted on the basis of social research, these changes then become the

object of study for social program evaluators, and, in turn, the findings of these evaluations stimulate more remedial policy studies as a research cycle proceeds ad infinitum. Thus, while dissatisfaction with the fruits of social R & D is widespread, an end to government-sponsored research on a wide range of social problems does not appear to be in the offing.

#### THE GROWTH OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

It is by no means a coincidence that the evolution of public-funded research in the field of law enforcement, criminal justice and police operations has followed a course parallel to that of social research in general: concerns with crime in the United States and the optimistic assumption that it could be dealt with more effectively through scientifically-based programs and policies were part and parcel of the "Great Society" platform, the "War on Crime" being a prominent salient of the broader "War on Poverty." Prior to the mid-1960s, research on theoretical issues in the field of law enforcement was confined to the work of a handful of scholars, while the empirical study of police operations was exclusively an "in-house" affair, conducted by a few local police departments for their internal use (Larson and Cahn, 1985, p. 10). As Larson and Cahn note, with the exception of a small group of police officials, e.g., August Vollmer and O.W. Wilson, "research of any form was notably absent from most police departments" (p.12), with the vast majority of police operational commanders accepting the traditional

functions and strategies of police work. James Q. Wilson provides us with a sharp contrast between the state of police-related research in the early-1960s, and what it had become by the end of the 1970s:

In 1963, when I published my first essay on the police, I was able to find only one other scholarly study of the sociology of police patrol officers that had been written in the preceding twenty years, and that was an unpublished doctoral dissertation... Today, the work of the police may well be, next to the work of politicians, the most thoroughly studied occupation in the United States. (Wilson, 1980, p.146)

The situation which Wilson describes was indicative of the status of law enforcement studies in general prior to the mid-1960s. On occasion, concern with improving responses to crime through scientific study did surface, as in the case of the United States National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (Wickersham Commission) during the 1930s, while private research foundations, e.g., the Walford E. Meyer Research Institute of Law, the Ford Foundation and the Russell Sage Foundation, published research reports in the field. On the whole, however, "these efforts were sporadic, problem-centered, and guided by the decisions of a relatively small number of researchers interested in crime and criminal justice," so that, "it is only since the 1960s that one can speak of organized research efforts" (Wellford, 1983, p.1375).

Again, the seminal impetus behind the expansion of law

enforcement research was the commitment of Federal resources to this field by President Lyndon Johnson. In 1965, Johnson made good on his campaign promise to expand vastly the government's commitment to eradicating crime through scientifically-grounded policy changes. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice was established, and, in 1967, it issued its first summary report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.

This study found that crime was, in fact, a major problem in American society, that it could be curbed, if not eliminated altogether, by improved practices and that, above all, far more attention (and money) ought to be expended to enhance America's knowledge of crime, criminal justice and law enforcement as the basis for recommendations for prosecuting the "War on Crime". Responding to the Commission's conclusions, Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), (Feeley and Sarat, 1980, pp.3-4). Under the organizational umbrella of the United States Department of Justice, the LEAA became the leading force in the drive to examine crime, law enforcement and police operations in the United States through its own resources and those of state planning agencies. While part of this effort would take the form of "indirect" or "conceptual" inquiry, the bulk would be empirical in nature and conducted under the assumption that the studies would be of instrumental value. Thus, Conner (1980) asserts that: "The Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration...supports studies of police behavior...because they are expected to increase our understanding of current police practices and to result in improved practices in the future" (p. 629).

The establishment of the LEAA in 1968 signaled the coming of a new era in the magnitude and the form of police-related research. Not only would the number of such studies increase exponentially between 1968 and 1979, in contrast to "in house" research endeavors of the past, research would be undertaken primarily by independent consultants and academics operating under grants from the LEAA or related state agencies. (Larson and Cahn, 1985, p.15). By the end of the 1970s, literally thousands of research projects were published each year delving into law enforcement practices, assessing their "efficiency" and putting forth proposals for upgrading them. As with federally-sponsored social R & D as a whole, most of this research has taken the form of program evaluations, wherein shortcomings in current practices are noted, specific proposals for their improvement are tested empirically in an experimental setting and the results of these experiments are then used to fashion policy/program recommendations. According to Larson and Cahn (1985) there is a discernible pattern in the timing of research into any specific police-related issue.

Initially, a few pathbreaking 'seed' studies of the issue will be published. After a short period of time, the interest generated by these studies will lead to a growth of research in the area. Finally,

a small number of definitive studies, building on the results of past research, will effectively answer the original research questions and hence end the debate (p. 16).

Although law enforcement studies sponsored by the Federal government have come under the same pressures as social R & D in general during the 1980s, there is, again, no reason to suspect that the law enforcement research "establishment" will be substantially pared in the near-term.

#### CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED SOCIAL RESEARCH

Even before the research "explosion" of the mid-1960s, the Federal government's part in underwriting social R & D was subjected to critical scrutiny. While basically supportive of the Roosevelt Administration's commitment to social research, the National Resource Committee (itself an outgrowth of progressive New Deal social research), did not refrain from commenting upon its defects in its 1938 report, Research---A National Resource, advancing the tempered conclusion that much publicly-sponsored social R & D being produced at the time was "biased" in favor of the "enlightened" social assumptions of its backers (Lynn, 1978, p.2). Private research "watchdogs" were neither so kind nor so cautious in their evaluations of the government's commitment to solving social problems via scientific study. In 1939, sociologist Robert Lynd got to the heart of the matter in his now-famous treatise, Knowledge for What? (Lynd, 1939). In his text, Lynd would focus upon what

has become a perennial criticism of government-funded social R & D. Lynd argues that social R & D has little, if any, relevance to working practice, principally because policy recommendations stemming from these undertakings neglected to take into adequate account intractable obstacles to policy changes, e.g., resource constraints.

Understandably, Lynd's earlier criticisms of social R & D recurred in more widespread and pronounced form during the late-1960s. While the Federal government had been pumping billions of dollars into social programs constructed on the basis of scientific social R & D (to say nothing of funds channeled into these studies) none of the problems addressed ---unemployment, health care, education, housing---showed any signs of abating. As the Great Society's detractors grew in number, faith in government decision-making underpinned by social research began to evaporate (Patton, 1978, p.18). During the late-1960s, national commissions were established to rate the contribution of Federally-sponsored social R & D (United States House of Representatives, Committee of Governmental Operations, 1967; National Academy of Sciences, 1968; Special Commission on the Social Sciences, 1968; Social Research Council, 1969). All of these bodies came to the same central conclusion: that the actual utilization of social research by government agencies was extremely low (Conner, 1980, p. 629). Taken aback by these negative assessments, the response of the Federal government, somewhat ironically, was to increase its involvement in financing social R & D in

applied form, the intention being to discover what plagued the utilization of social research and what could be done to overcome it. Hence, by the early 1970s, the Federal government required that programs in health, education and welfare be monitored through evaluation studies, and, so, the growth of publicly-sponsored social research was given another boost.

Evaluation studies on the use of social R & D during the early-1970s revealed an even bleaker picture of the research-policy problem than the nation commissions of the previous decade. More importantly, much of the negative commentary was directed not at the implementing agencies, but at the research establishment. For example, the National Research Council (1971) studying social R & D sponsored by the Department of Defense observed that, "Research producers are sometimes viewed as being more interested in furthering their academic disciplines than providing operational help to the Department of Defense (p.31). The Department of Defense was not alone in being the object of critical inquiry into the utilization of social research. As part of a study conducted by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, former Secretary of the HEW, Eliot Richardson, commented as follows on the use of social R & D by his Department:

Too much of this money has gone into poorly conceived projects, too few of the results have been vigorously assessed, and our means of disseminating the worthwhile results have been too feeble. This means that we know less than what we should, that we're less sure of what

we know, and that too few people share the knowledge that we do possess. (United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972, p.11)

Even more maddeningly, apprised of the failures of innovative programs based on public-sponsored social research, government policy-makers found that redressing them was no easy matter. As Weiss (1982, p.20) notes, even after "enlightened" social programs, e.g., the Head Start pre-school program, were judged to be ineffective, in many instances they were continued or expanded: in other cases, programs found to be effective, e.g., direct Federal loans to low-income college students, were either decreased or dropped altogether. The non- or under-use of Federally sponsored social research was also accompanied by the non- or under-use of evaluation studies to assess the effectiveness of programs originally designed from social R & D recommendations. Unable to conscience this woeful state of affairs, members of the Congress began to issue diatribes against the pumping of taxpayer monies into irrelevant and misguided social research. During the mid-1970s, the House of Representatives went so far as to pass the Bauman Amendment, "giving Congress a veto over individual research grants made by the National Science Foundation" (Weiss, 1978, p.24), and while this legislation did not receive Senate endorsement, Congressional discontent with Federal involvement in social R & D continues to surface, e.g., Senator William Proxmire's repeated denunciations of specific social science studies receiving Federal grants.

CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

As with social R & D in general, a few scholars did issue criticisms of research in the field of criminology and law enforcement prior to the mid-1960s. British Magistrate Barbara Wooton (1959), for instance, published a blistering critique of existing American and British research in the field of criminology, a study which will be examined further in the next chapter. However, since the scientific study of law enforcement and police-related matters was comparatively modest prior to the mid-1960s, the chief point made in the Final Report of the Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration was addressed to the paucity of empirical studies in the field. In that report, "The Commission found that little research is being conducted into such matters as ... possible methods for improving the effectiveness of various procedures of the police" (President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967, p.x). In the same year as the Commission issued this assessment, the House of Representative's Committee on Governmental Operations (1967) heard testimony from a number of experts in the field. Their specific criticisms of existing law enforcement research under public grants will be reviewed in the next chapter, but at this point we simply note that most of these authorities cited major problems in this area. To take but one comment on this score, James Q. Wilson told the Committee, "our law enforcement agencies and our scholars have tended to talk past one another" (Committee on Governmental Operations, 1967, p. 97).

Under the sponsorship of the LEAA and the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ), a concerted effort was made to fill in the gaps regarding crime, law enforcement and police operations during the later-1960s and throughout the 1970s. Reviewed in greater detail elsewhere in this dissertation, critics from all quarters consistently pointed to the absence of any collective impact from Federally-sponsored law enforcement research. The broad evolution and gist of these complaints has been outlined by Wellford (1983) as follows:

Although millions of dollars were expended by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice for crime and criminal justice research between 1968 and 1977, A National Academy of Sciences (NAS) panel created to assess the efforts of the institute concluded that the institute had not been the catalyst or sponsor of a first rate and significant research program commensurate with either its task or resources. (p.1377)

As will become amply evident in the next chapter, numerous government and private critics echoed the NAS evaluation: millions of dollars had been spent on trying to improve police response to crime with very little substantive effect.

In point of fact, the NILECJ did not need to wait for the NAS's harsh assessment of its research record. In 1973, the NILECJ had set up its own National Evaluation Program (NEP) (Barnes, 1976, pp. 448-449). During the next five years

(Phase I of the Project) a string of studies (Gass and Dawson, 1974; Schell, Overly, Schack and Stabile, 1976; Day and Woodward, 1976; Webb, Sowder, Andrews, Burt and Davis, 1977) would be published under the NEP. The summary findings of these studies were uniformly dismal in tone: Too much money had been spent on deeply-flawed law enforcement research which was basically irrelevant to the needs of operational police personnel. Also, these studies had done little to advance existing knowledge about crime and how to respond to it. In brief, the Post 1965 spurt of government law enforcement research was subject to the same basic criticisms lodged against publicly-funded social R & D. Unrealistically looked upon as a panacea for the problem of crime in the United States, law enforcement research studies underwritten by the Federal government had not even made a significant dent in the crime problem, much less brought about its eradication.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED LAW ENFORCEMENT RESEARCH

Ironically, despite strong criticism, at present, government-sponsored research in the field of law enforcement, criminal justice and police operations remains well funded. While such "extramural" research, (as opposed to local "in house" research), is sometimes sponsored by state planning boards and even local commissions, it is the Federal government which continues to take the lead in this area. Of the myriad Federal agencies extending grant monies to profit

and non-profit research institutes to study such topics, those under the aegis of the Department of Justice are the largest and most prominent, particularly the National Institute of Corrections, the National Institute of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Institute of Justice, the latter having replaced the NILECJ in the early-1980s. These bodies contract most of their research projects out to private institutions and universities. Examples of the former are the Institute for Law and Social Research, the Rand Corporation, the Police Foundation, the Urban Institute and Abt Associates. Examples of the latter are the law schools of Harvard University, the University of Chicago and Georgetown University, the social science departments of the University of Pennsylvania and the University of Southern California, along with independent degree granting programs like those of the University of Maryland and the State University of New York at Albany. The annual budget outlay of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has grown from \$3 million in 1969 to over \$300 million by 1982. (Wellford, 1983, p.1377) Hence, despite a paucity of accomplishment, the law enforcement research "industry" still thrives as the NIJ and other Federal/state bodies routinely authorize hundreds, if not thousands, of separate law enforcement research projects each year. Admittedly, however, nowadays, funding increases merely keep pace with inflation.

To this juncture, a uniformly bleak picture of the state of law enforcement research (and social science research in general) has emerged. All is not well within the research-

policy alliance. Nonetheless, within the field of law enforcement, government-funded research has made at least a marginal contribution. There are, as Wilson asserts, some cases in which analytical research has found direct, instrumental application within law enforcement practice. (Wilson, 1980, p.147) More broadly, law enforcement research as, again, Wilson observes, has, at the very least changed how police administrators "think" about the problems which they confront in working practice. A second positive outcome of the growth of law enforcement research during the past twenty years has been the creation of a larger pool of skilled researchers, both "outside police departments and within them" (Wellford, 1983, p.1377).

One of the more heartening results of the research explosion in law enforcement is evident in the degree of cooperation which has, somewhat surprisingly, emerged between some individuals in the law enforcement community and some researchers. According to Cahn, Caplan and Peters (1979, p. 234). "Despite the inevitable controversy surrounding study findings, occasional contradictory results or technical inaccessibility...there can be little doubt that evaluation and research have found acceptability in and contributed to the police community." Indeed, as Goldstein (1977, p.300) remarks: "Despite their differing outlooks, some police agencies and academically based people (have) collaborate(d) in research projects." And this experience has led the two "sides" of the research-policy axis "to form a new and sounder

understanding of what each can contribute to a common objective." (Wilson, 1983 ,pp. 4-5) Challenging the common stereotype that police departments obdurately resist any type of change, law enforcement researchers have found that, on the contrary: "The police world has, on the whole, shown itself to be more open to research and experimentation that is linked to problem solving than many other parts of the criminal justice system" (Wilson, 1980, p. 150). Not only have some police administrators allowed researchers on-site access to their operations, they have also undertaken some changes based upon the findings/recommendations of extramural research, thereby exposing themselves to criticism from both program evaluators and the public at large. (Wilson, 1980 ,p.131) As this observation suggests, although law enforcement research has not proven to be of the great instrumental value anticipated during the optimistic days of the 1960s, at times, such research has resulted in recommendations plausible enough for some police administrators and operational commanders to "risk" their adoption.

By and large, there still remains a good distance between the orientation of operating police practitioners, on the one hand, and law enforcement researchers, on the other. For every case of cooperation between the two "camps" there are many examples of bitter conflict. Goldstein alludes to some of the interpenetrating differences between the police and those who study them.

Among the factors accounting for this situation is the obvious conflict between the open and flexible character

of universities and the closed and rigid character of police organizations. Questioning in a university setting is routine and encouraged; in a police agency a much higher value is attached to unquestioning obedience. A further complication is the attitude that each group commonly has for the other. (Goldstein, 1977, p.200)

Such hostile attitudes have not escaped the notice of James Q. Wilson, who, confirming Goldstein's point, comments that: "When police officers or prosecutors refer to you as a 'sociologist' they are not so much describing your profession as repudiating your views,...while many scholars have returned the favor by investing the word 'cop' with roughly the same connotation as 'storm trooper'" (Wilson, 1983, p. 4).

Beneath these deeply engrained biases, a major conflict between police practitioners and law enforcement researcher revolves, paradoxically, upon the issue of the non- or under use of police-related research. From their perspective, the police officials look at the products of extramural research, shake their heads and wonder why the researcher expended time and the public's money on topics that have no practical relevance to the task of policing, or issue recommendations which simply cannot be carried out due to resource, political or other kinds of limitations. At bottom, many police administrators, "see academicians as interested merely in new data and findings that will lead to publication and recognition in the academic world" (Goldstein, 1977,p.301),

rather than their ostensible purpose of assisting in the improvement of law enforcement operations. From the standpoint of law enforcement researchers, the blame for non- or under-utilized research findings lies upon the shoulders of those responsible for implementing them.

Researchers frequently lament that their final reports simply sit on bookshelves, having not even been read or at best ignored by policymakers. When policymakers want to ignore or dismiss the results of a study, it is typically quite easy to identify some major flaw. (Roesch and Corrado, 1978, p. 11)

Thus the ball of blame for the non- or under-utilization of law enforcement research goes back and forth, the police practitioner claiming that it is basically a product of the practical irrelevance of the research itself, the researcher responding that it is the outcome of sloth, intransigence or hostility on the part of the potential implementer.

Ancillary dilemmas complicate the matter. Police officials are faced with the ongoing problem of how to deal with crime in their jurisdictions. Thus, what they want, in effect, is "right now" information of immediate practical value. (Lynn, 1978b, p. 18) On the other side of the ledger, researchers are confronted with the need to build data bases and more effective theoretical models with long term benefits. As Lynn observes:

Ironically, the unsatisfactory outcomes of this type of research management often lead to administrative actions

that make matters worse. Attempts are made to tighten individual project management and to apply specific, utilitarian criteria and strict deadlines to each one. Because valuable new knowledge is usually obtained through a cumulative, iterative, time-consuming and often inefficient process of investigation, the results of applying such procurement methods to knowledge production may deepen the disillusionment with social R & D. (Lynn, 1978b, pp. 21-22)

Indeed, when prompted by their sponsors to produce more "relevant" studies, the reaction of researchers has frequently been to simply pepper their reports with "pseudo-relevant" terminology, reinforcing the impression that, at bottom, they have nothing of practical value to offer.

At this point in its evolution, the relationship between researchers charged with making recommendations for implementation by law enforcement agencies and those officials responsible for acting upon them "is an uneasy marriage, with dilemmas for both sides" (Rein and White, 1978. p. 56). Recriminations aside, both researcher and police wonder why the inter-relationship between them has not yielded more valuable results. Hence, the research-policy problem continues to plague the field of law enforcement, and, as such, to serve as an important topic for investigation in its own right. It is with the aim of examining this problem that the present dissertation has been undertaken. The emphasis here is on the perceptions of police practitioners about the

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value and shortcomings of law enforcement research. The ultimate objective is to fully examine their views and thereby contribute to change. The dissertation's goal is to gain a firmer view of the problem as it exists and to recommend, at least tentatively, ways in which each group can move toward a more productive relationship.

CHAPTER IIIREVIEW OF THE LITERATUREOVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL LITERATURE ON RESEARCH  
UTILIZATION/DISSEMINATION

In terms of sheer volume, the body of published literature concerning the utilization and dissemination on research findings is extraordinary. (Bedell, et.al., 1985, pp 109-110) Scanning the bibliographies of the two principal compendia on the topic, i.e., R.G. Havelock's Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge (1969 and 1976) and E.M. Glaser's Putting Knowledge to Use (1976 and 1983), one finds literally hundreds of closely-printed pages enumerating works in the field of knowledge/research application. According to Kirk (1979, p.6), between 1959 and 1979 the number of citations in the knowledge utilization field increased from 400 to an estimated 20,000. Both theoretical and empirical studies abound: some of these works concentrate upon the construction of models of research utilization and dissemination, others upon empirical investigations of research use in specific cases and/or the identification of factors related to the process of research application. Prior to the mid-1960s, most of the studies within this subdiscipline were devoted to either business organizations or agricultural extension programs. (Kirk, 1979, p. 7) Since that time, the vast majority of writings in this area have been dedicated to social policy research,

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especially programs administered by the Federal government (Wholey; Scanlon, Duffy, Fikumoto and Vogt, 1971; Goodwin, 1975; Hargrove, 1975; Deitchman, 1976).

Within the field, a large number of studies have attempted to gauge the degree of research utilization within public sector social programs (Caplan, Morrison, Stambaugh, 1975; K.D. Knorr, 1977; Rich, 1977; Patton, Grime, Guthrie, Freeman, French and Blyth, 1977; Weeks, 1979, Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1977). The chief finding common to all of these works is that government-sponsored research has not achieved its intended impact; non- or under-utilization of research findings/recommendations is the "norm". Still more frustrating, several scholars have discovered a seeming disparity regarding the value which policy-makers attach to social R & D, on the one hand, and their actual use of it, on the other. For example, Weiss (1978b, pp. 74-75) in her survey of 255 Federal health care officials reported overwhelming support for research among her study's respondents, some 85 percent of the survey's study population agreeing with the statement that good, relevant social research ought to be used in policy-making. However, 75 percent of Weiss' respondents agreed with the statement that, "many decision-makers tend to ignore social science information that is not consistent with their own belief" (p.73). In other words, while policy-makers have voiced nominal support for social R & D, they have not, in general, matched this abstract commitment with concrete use. British

economist L.J. Sharpe describes how the broad failure of social research to influence policy implementation is not confined to the United States. Reviewing European literature on the use of scientific social knowledge, Sharpe concluded that: "We are brought face to face with the fact that it has proved very difficult to uncover many instances where social science research has had a clear and direct effect on policy even when it has been specifically commissioned by the government" (Sharpe, 1977, p. 45). In some cases, e.g., broad theoretical works, the inability of analysts to locate the direct application of social research to policy-making is understandable.. However, even in the case of social R & D clearly intended for direct, instrumental implementation, e.g.s, evaluation studies, non- or under-utilization is, again, the "norm". Thus, Patton (1978, p. 19) asserts that while, "Evaluation research is meant for immediate and direct use in improving the quality of social programming...a review of evaluation experience suggests that evaluation results have not exerted significant influence on program decisions."

While a portion of the "blame" for the non-use of social R & D may lie with the implementers, some scholars have noted that the quality of relevance, or rather, lack thereof, of social research is a major casual factor. This point was made in National Research Council studies of the use of manpower research by the Department of Labor (1975) and the social/behavioral research of the National Science Foundation (1976), with the Council asserting of the latter: "the

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quality of the work is highly variable and on average relatively undistinguished, with only a modest potential for useful application" (p.71). The same impression of under-use grounded in the lack of applied value in government-sponsored social research has been discovered by Davis and Salasin (1978) and by Salasin and Kivens (1975). Salasin and Kivens asked the assistant director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) the straightforward question: "What is your impression about the extent to which evaluation findings, the outcome of analytic studies were used in reaching decisions about programs?" The OMB official answered: "It would be difficult in many cases to attribute more than five percent of the ultimate changes that are made to any analytic contribution whatsoever" (p.43). A similarly direct approach to the problem was adopted by Campbell, Daft and Hulin (1982) in their survey of some 250 human resource administrators and managers. Asking about general impressions of works within their respective fields, Campbell, Daft and Hulin report: "The chief complaints were about the lack of 'practicality' in the published literature and its elitist nature (i.e., an overemphasis on theory, complex design and complex analyses)" (p. 71).

What emerges, then, is a consensus and a controversy. Among those who have examined the use of social R & D with the aim of appraising degree of implementation, there is virtual unanimity upon the broad conclusion that social research does not exert the level of instrumental impact that it is

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presumably intended to achieve. However, efforts to explain why non- or under-utilization of social R & D is so widespread are sharply divided. Some studies assert or imply that the failure of social research to influence policy-making is primarily the result of inaction on the part of the intended utilizers: that while social research has the potential to play a stronger role in decision-making, working practitioners have failed to make proper use of this potential. By way of contrast, other scholars point to shortcomings in social R & D as the chief factor accounting for its failure in application: conceptual and methodological flaws in social science research, "irrelevant" topic selection and impractical recommendations contained in these works are the reason behind their failure to impact upon policies and programs to which they are directed. In the next two sections of this chapter, we shall encounter two kinds of responses which have been elicited from the knowledge utilization community with regard to underuse of social research. On the one hand, several scholars have come to the conclusion that while direct, instrumental use of social R & D is, indeed, low, other types of use are more prevalent. The suggestion here is that the degree to which social research is used has been underestimated because an overly-narrow yardstick of use has been applied. The second theme within the literature on this count accepts under-utilization at face value. These studies are basically diagnostic and remedial in nature, trying to identify factors which constrain research use and propose means for overcoming them.

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BROADENED DEFINITIONS OF "USE" AS AN EXPLANATION FOR UNDER-UTILIZATION

As empirical findings about the under-utilization of social research mounted in number, several scholars attempted to explain this "failure" by expanding the criteria of "use" itself. Since it was virtually impossible to argue that social R & D had received extensive instrumental use, these analysts tested the collective hypothesis that decision-makers were using social R & D in other ways. Pelz (1978), for example, has made the distinction between "hard" knowledge intended for direct application and "soft" knowledge which comes into use through circuitous routes. The most common distinction, however, is that between "instrumental" use and "conceptual" use (Caplan, Morrison and Stambaugh, 1975; Knorr, 1977; Rich, 1977). In general, these scholars have attempted to demonstrate that while direct "instrumental" use of social research is rare, "Conceptual" use is far more common. Decision-makers frequently "use" social R & D as means for conceptualizing the problems which they confront, and, quite frequently, such conceptual use is the result of information drawn from multiple sources. Moreover, unlike instrumental application, decision-makers are generally "unaware" of their conceptual use of social R & D. Thus, by expanding the definition of "use" these researchers challenged the verdict that social research was not having an impact upon policy-making. In fact, the instrumental/conceptual dichotomy

does not exhaust the possible "uses" of social research by decision-makers. Knorr (1977) found in her study of government officials in Austria, social science research could also be "used" to justify and legitimize decisions already made or to repudiate and discredit unpopular policies. This type of application is referred to as "symbolic" use.

It was Caplan's 1975 study of decision-makers in the Federal government that served as the opening salvo in this assault upon overly-restrictive definitions of social research usage. Conducted in 1973-1974, Caplan's study was the largest research utilization study attempted to that time, the author interviewing some 204 decision-makers holding important offices in the executive branch of the Federal government (Caplan, 1975, p. 68). Examining a wide spectrum of subtopics, Caplan's study produced important findings on a variety of matters, among them: that respondents gained social research information from a wide variety of sources; that the "information-processing style" of the decision-maker was the strongest factor accounting for degree of usage; that use was primarily for the purpose of improving organizational efficiency, etc. (pp. 68-73). His most important finding, however, was that while instrumental use of social science research was low, "soft", indirect or conceptual use was extensive. In the wake of this finding, a number of researchers began to test the assertion that conceptual and other modes of research utilization had been overlooked by critics of social research.

Before proceeding to other studies in line with Caplan's findings, it is necessary to mention one central problem of the Caplan study which many of his critics have commented upon. As Caplan would freely admit, most instances of both instrumental and conceptual use stemmed from "in-house" studies, conducted, commissioned or funded by the using agencies.

Fifty-one percent of the research in these instances of use was conducted in-house. Another 35 percent was extramural, but funded by the using agency. Eight percent of the instances of use involved research funded by government agencies other than the using agency, and 6 percent involved research information sponsored by non-governmental agencies. Thus 94 percent of all research activities represented in the instances of use was either funded by the government, conducted by the government or both; and 86 percent was funded or conducted by the using agency. (Caplan, 1975, pp. 69-70)

Even more tellingly, Caplan reported, "that about 80 percent of the knowledge used was ordered at the specific request of the policy-maker" (p. 75). Hence, as Davis and Salasin (1968, p. 96) observed, Caplan's results must be qualified because most instances of usage reported by him were not drawn from extramural sources, but from reports issued by the using agency at the behest of the decision-maker involved. Moreover, according to Rein and White (1978, p. 50) some 44 percent of those interviewed by Caplan reported instances in

which they purposely disregarded or rejected relevant social science information in reaching policy decisions.

Despite the limitations of Caplan's findings, many research use analysts refer to his study as a prime example of "overlooked" conceptual use of social R & D. Among the most prominent proponents of this viewpoint, Weiss (1982) has provided a succinct case on behalf of the conceptual use of social science knowledge. It is Weiss' position that research rarely provides answers that users employ to "solve a policy problem. Rather, research provides a background of data, empirical generalizations and ideas that affect the way policy-makers think about problems" (p. 20). To illustrate her point, Weiss cites the example of changing penal philosophy in the State of California. During the early 1970s, numerous research studies came to the conclusion that rehabilitation programs within the California prison system were not effective in reducing rates of recidivism. State officials were slow in taking up the implied call for a change in their approach to the purpose of imprisonment, but, nevertheless, in the mid-1970s various types of rehabilitation programs were cut back and there was a shift from rehabilitation to punishment as the underlying rationale for incarceration (Weiss, 1982, p. 21). Weiss sees this change as the result of the use of convergent research studies on an indirect, conceptual basis. She also cites a range of symbolic uses of research data, e.g., the use of research reports as an emblem of commitment to "rational" policy, and

although she cautions that research may be overlooked by policy-makers even in conceptualizing problems which they face, in general, neglect of conceptual use is responsible for the low degree of research implementation which scholars have found in concentrating exclusively upon instrumental application.

Another scholar who has built upon the Caplan study is R.F. Rich (1977; 1981). In his survey of "national" decision-makers in twenty-six policy areas, Rich came to the conclusion, "that the conceptual use of social science knowledge...should not be viewed as failures to translate research findings into action" (1977, p. 209). Confirming Caplan's results, Rich found that Federal policy-makers valued extramural social science research as aids in problem-solving. Centering on the instrumental/conceptual dichotomy in utilization modes, Rich discovered that research usage occurred in distinct "waves". During the first three months after research was received by a social agency, Rich asserted that "the utilization of information (by this group) is primarily instrumental" (p. 203). During the next three months, however, instrumental use fades but conceptual use becomes more widespread. On this basis, Rich began to speak of a "knowledge cycle" (1981) with discrete stages unfolding from direct to indirect use.

The distinction between different kinds of research use will be employed later in specifying the operational definitions of this study's primary research effort. At this

junction, it is important to note that an influential group of scholars has taken issue with the use of a strict instrumental definition of research use, and, with it, the broad finding that social science information is typically disregarded by policy-makers. It is equally essential to note, however, that other research use analysts, e.g., Davis and Salasin (1978) question this expanded definition of "use", maintaining that the failure to translate research findings into specific program and policy changes is, in fact, just that, i.e., a research-policy failure.

#### EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE RESEARCH UTILIZATION PROCESS

Taking a decidedly different approach to the problem of non-utilization, many research use scholars have tried to locate those factors which either impede or promote the translation of social research into working practice. For instance, Emerick and Peterson studying the research use process among educational decision-makers observed that: "Overall, utilization occurs most effectively when involved staff perceive such utilization to be in their own interests as well as in the interests of relevant leadership and authority figures" (Emerick and Peterson, 1978, p.91). A host of empirical studies have been published in which the authors attempt to define factors or variables within the implementing agency or its operating environment and gauge their influence on the degree to which social research is used by that agency.

Among these researchers, yet another broad division is evident. Some, e.g., Berman in his 1978 study of educational policy, have focused upon so-called "micro" factors, that is, variables within the implementing agency, to account for varying degrees of research usage. Others, e.g., Bardach (1977) pay far more attention to "macro" factors, variables located within the implementing agency's environment, as forces which impinge upon or support research usage.

From these empirical investigations of the influence which different variables exerted upon the degree of research use, a number of "synthetic" studies have been generated. These efforts generally start like that of Patton, et.al. (1977) by culling the existing literature base in order to identify variables which may have an influence upon the extent to which research information is translated into policy. In the Patton, et.al. study, for instance, the researchers extracted eleven such factors from the empirical literature on utilization: "Methodological quality, methodological appropriateness, timeliness, lateness of report, positive-negative findings, surprise of findings, central-peripheral program objectives evaluated, presence-absence of related studies, political factors, government-evaluator interaction and resources available," (1977, p. 149) and then surveyed a decision-making group for their opinions upon which of these variables did influence degree of implementation. However, Patton et.al. found that the single most important variable explaining the impact or

lack of impact of a particular study upon policy was not on their list. The survey respondents overwhelmingly pointed to the "importance of individual people" (p. 155) as the single most important variable. What this study shows, above all, is that no matter how exhaustive a survey of the literature is undertaken and no matter how lengthy the list of variables tested, other, "unexpected" forces are likely to play a strong or even determining role in whether social science R & D is used by an implementing agency.

As part of this study's methodology, the model of research dissemination/utilization constructed by Conner (1980) for specific application to law enforcement agencies will be examined in depth. Conner, of course, is not the only scholar to undertake the construction of such a model. Davis (1971), for example, has produced a Decision Determinants Analysis Model, also known as the A-VICTORY model, as an analytical overlay for predicting and describing the likelihood of scientific research leading to programmatic change. According to Glaser (1976) the Davis model incorporates factors common to other paradigms of research utilization, and, hence, is a "fair" candidate as the subject for empirical investigation of its utility.

Bedell, et.al. (1985) tested the validity of the Davis model by examining the influence of its eight implementation factors (ability, values, idea, circumstances, timing, obligation, resistance and yield) in the decision-making of 177 Federal mental health officials. The results of this

effort were mixed, the authors finding that, four of the eight factors (values, idea, obligation and yield) as perceived by these policy-makers were positively correlated with whether research use had actually taken place. However, "the remaining four DDQ factors (ability, circumstances, timing and resistance) did not differentiate between the use and nonuse groups" (p. 117). In addition, Bedell, et.al. found that in many cases, research-based program changes had been adopted but were subsequently discarded after a very short period of usage. An inference to be drawn from this study, however, is that attempting to identify factors influencing the process of research utilization even when they "fit into" a coherent theoretical model is a knotty undertaking; that the process of research use is so complicated that it virtually defies this type of empirical analysis.

#### THE DISSEMINATION STAGE WITHIN RESEARCH UTILIZATION

Far less scholarly attention has been given to the process of research dissemination as distinct from its utilization. As a rule, the problem of how research results come into the hands of prospective policy-makers has either been overlooked or subsumed under the broader heading of utilization. Some authors have studied specific points within the subprocess of dissemination. Sundquist (1978) for instance, has asserted that "research brokerage" comprises a "weak link" in the channeling of social R & D to potential decision-makers (p. 129). Those who have looked closely at

the ways in which social R & D is broadcast to those who might be able to use it generally concur with Weiss (1978) that:

The lack of channels for regularized dissemination of research results is a major cause of their neglect. Often, few of the persons involved in decisions learn of research that could reduce the degree of uncertainty. Even when research is expressly commissioned by government agencies, it sometimes fails to reach the appropriate user. Research done at a farther remove, under a grant or through non-governmental support, has a more circuitous and stony path to the proper audience.

(p. 57)

Part of the paucity of analysis in the field of dissemination is clearly due to the inherent difficulty of determining just "who" should have received a specific research report, a task which is complicated by the fact that this determination must be made on a post hoc basis. At the same time, deeply embedded assumptions work against studying dissemination as a separate stage in the research use process, chief among which is the unwarranted premise that simply because a research report has been published it will "automatically" find its way to relevant decision-makers. Those scholars eschewing this notion of automatic dissemination have reached a common conclusion, however, the general finding being that it is only through continuous contact between researchers and policy-makers that the dissemination of social R & D can be assured (Weiss, 1978a, p.64)

Among those who have treated dissemination of social R & D as a distinct topic worthy of study in its own right, Glaser et.al. (1976, 1983) stand in the forefront. "The availability of knowledge to those who might apply it depends, of course, on the nature, extent and effectiveness of the dissemination of knowledge," (1983, p. 311) and, as these modifiers suggest, adequate dissemination is by no means a foregone conclusion. Indeed, just as factors can impede or promote utilization of social research, similar variables influence whether social R & D is, in fact, communicated to policy-makers. Hence, according to Glaser et.al. (1983, p. 311) the self-interest of individuals and groups controls the process whereby research findings are communicated (or not communicated) to their appropriate targets. This same research team has identified four stages in the dissemination process itself.

The progression of research information dissemination goes from (1) informal talk among colleagues to (2) prepublication dissemination, such as some type of report on the main contents of future journal articles, to (3) scientific meeting presentations, distribution of pre-prints and face-to-face interaction to (4) transfer from the informal to the formal domain---namely, journal publication. (pp. 311-312)

The chief point made by Glaser and his associates is that, "publication of research findings does not necessarily result in widespread absorption of these findings by practitioners" (p. 312). Indeed, just the opposite is likely to occur.

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"Core" scientific journals in which major research findings are published have very narrow audiences, most of which are comprised chiefly of other researchers and not working policy-makers. On the whole, face-to-face interaction between researchers and policy-makers is a far more effective means of disseminating research results than the printed page. Among the factors accounting for the comparatively low value of printed materials as a vehicle for research dissemination, Glaser et.al. cite the following:

(1) the overload created by a superabundance of printed matter, (2) the technical and limited nature of research reports, (3) the limited number of readable reviews, (4) the restricted quantity of abstracts and related services, (5) the increasing problems (especially in cost and delayed timing) of publication and library service, and (6) despite astounding technical advance, the problems of computer storage and retrieval. (1983, p.334)

Like Weiss, Glaser et.al. conclude that continuous contact between researchers and working practitioners is necessary if an adequate bridge is to be maintained between research findings and their scrutiny by decision-makers.

Cherns (1979) has addressed the same problem of ineffective dissemination of social R & D. According to Cherns, research reaches relevant decision-makers through three main conduits, i.e., changes in the climate of opinion, general diffusion and deliberate planned dissemination (p. 113). Unfortunately, Cherns contends, most social R & D is

undertaken without any attention being devoted to precisely how findings will be circulated among appropriate decision-makers (p. 114) Cherns goes farther. Drawing upon his own extensive experience in the field, he relates: "I have not been able to trace in practice one example of a study carried out in a university or research institute or anywhere else which resulted in direct application except where the researcher has become involved in following through his studies into application" (p. 115). Once again, then, we encounter the same point made by Weiss and Glaser, et.al., that it is only through continual contact between those performing research in the social science and those responsible for making social policy that effective dissemination of research results takes place.

Before proceeding to review the literature on research utilization and dissemination in the field of law enforcement, it should be noted that some scholars have strongly criticized the methods employed by their colleagues in trying to gauge degrees of implementation of social research. Rein and White (1978) find that most of these efforts are themselves plagued by conceptual or methodological problems (p.51). Scheirer and Rezmovic (1983) underscore the lack of sound procedure for assessing research utilization processes when they note that, "applied researchers have not developed a standard methodological paradigm for constructing implementation measures. Instead, they have tended to create ad hoc implementation indicators consistent with their institution or their research budgets (p.600).

Based on this review of the literature, the criticism made by Scheirer and Rezmovic seems sound. In the context of instrumental usage, a fairly strong consensus has arisen concerning the extent to which social R & D functions as a guide to actual policy-making, that such research rarely has its intended effect. Whether the fault lies with the implementors or with the researchers, however, is a matter of strident debate. Moreover, by expanding the definition of use to conceptual and symbolic modes, some have argued that research use is stronger than is generally reported, suggesting that the real "fault" resides in how usage has been defined by those appraising its degree of implementation. From a decidedly different perspective, many scholars have tried to identify variables which influence the research process. This has resulted in lists of factors which are assumed to have an impact upon the transformation of research findings into working policy. Again, however, no consensus has emerged as to precisely which factors actually play a substantial part in determining whether social R & D comes into usage. Although a range of utilization models exists, each with its own constituent variables, empirical investigation reveals that while some factors common to these paradigms do exist, others demonstrate little or no influence upon the research-policy process. Finally, dissemination of research results has been treated as a poor step-child within this field. Many efforts to conceptualize the utilization process adopt the assumption that relevant policy-makers

"naturally" become aware of major research findings, while, in fact, there is no study which supports this premise

#### OVERVIEW OF UTILIZATION LITERATURE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT

In direct contrast to the abundance of works which have been devoted to examining research utilization in other fields of social policy, particularly education, health and welfare, as Conner puts it: "The literature in the criminal justice area on the use of research knowledge is particularly limited" (1980, p. 630). Conner is not alone in noting the absence of studies investigating the research utilization process by law enforcement agencies. Yin (1976, p. 7) echoes this assessment in his statement that, "until recently, most of the major works in criminal justice have failed to discuss the utilization or implementation process at all." There are, of course, a number of noteworthy exceptions to this situation, among them Beck's (1978) study of factors affecting the utilization of research sponsored by the NILECJ, and Lewis and Greene's (1978) parallel account of variables influencing the degree to which extramural research findings are incorporated into the practices of local police departments. By and large, however, very little scholarly effort has been expended upon analyzing the process through which law enforcement, criminal justice and police operations research is disseminated to and/or utilized by police decision-makers.

A number of forces may have played part in the relatively scant effort which has been made to study the dissemination

and utilization of police-related research. Police services are organized on a local basis: consequently, in contrast to health, education and welfare, where the role of the Federal government is more pronounced, there has been little institutional impetus for research use studies in this area. Moreover, in spite of evidence to the contrary, many researchers assume that police departments naturally resist change, especially change suggested by social scientists "outside" the police community. Above all, however, as both Yin (1976) and Blakely and Davidson (1982) observe, the rigid, hierarchical nature of police organizations in general has worked against their selection as subjects for research use studies. According to Blakely and Davidson (1982, pp. 89-90) what we will be referring to as the "classic model" of R & D utilization in the delineation of this study's theoretical background, has been the dominant paradigm for conceiving of research use within police departments. The "classic model" tends to assume that in hierarchical organizations such as police departments, once dissemination of research findings has occurred, utilization naturally follows through a kind of "trickle down" pattern.

...Criminal justice service agencies are viewed as adopters in the research, development and dissemination (RD & D) process who value evaluation results and passively receive programmatic innovations. Thus, the classic RD & D model ultimately calls for the dissemination of the innovation and/or information about

the innovation to individuals and organizations that have contact with the social problem. However, there is increased concern about the effectiveness and efficiency of this model. Evidence has accumulated suggesting that adopting organizations are not passive recipients of disseminated programs. Rather, a multitude of factors influence the degree to which adopting organizations incorporate innovations with high fidelity. (pp. 89-90)

In essence, the study of research dissemination/utilization among police decision-makers has suffered from the same "automatic" and "mechanical" defects common to the application of the "classic" model in other areas of social policy. Use of more sophisticated models, e.g., those incorporating intra- and extra-organizational variables to account for differing levels of actual policy implementation, has been comparatively recent in studies of police-related research, largely because police departments appear to neatly "fit" the "classic" RD & D model. Understandably, as the shortcomings of the classic model came to light in other areas, researchers began to question the validity of this model for research use by law enforcement agencies. Nevertheless, the change to more advanced models of research use within the criminal justice system has lagged behind corresponding conceptual shifts in other disciplines, having long been handicapped by adherence to an overly simplistic and mechanical model.

As preceding review of research utilization studies in general showed, most summary judgements regarding degree of

actual usage have been decidedly negative. If anything, the record of research use by police departments as reported by scholars working in this area is even worse. To be sure there are some cases in which innovative programs have been successfully incorporated into law enforcement practice. Most of these, however, like Toch, Grant and Galvin's 1975 study of experimentation within the Oakland Police Department, are evaluations of experiments undertaken "in house" by the departments which eventually adopted them. By way of contrast, when extramural police-related research has been evaluated, as, for instance, in studies of the impact of research that stemmed from President Johnson's national crime commission, a far harsher judgement has been rendered. Noting that the Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice's final report contained over two hundred specific policy recommendations for changes in the practices of local police departments, Dickson (1971, p.216) asserts that three years later, "only a handful had been implemented." Feeley and Sarat (1980) devoted a full-length volume to assessing the degree to which policy proposals generated by the Safe Streets Act of 1968's research efforts were actually adopted. Concentrating upon the establishment of institutional mechanisms through which the Act's recommendations were intended to be achieved, Feeley and Sarat write that, "the Act has not had this effect," and that, "despite good intentions and bold pronouncements, it has not led to the creation of institutions which have developed the authority and expertise

to significantly alter traditional crime fighting strategies" (pp. 5-6). Somewhat fatalistically, Feeley and Sarat conclude that crime is an intractable social problem which is not readily amenable to policy innovations, i.e., that even if the Act's recommendations were carried out, they would not have had their intended role of reducing crime (p. 28). What is of interest here, however, is not whether recommendation based upon government-sponsored research could have achieved their ultimate policy goal, but whether they were adopted by target implementors. The evidence suggests that they were not. The logical question, then, is why police-related research has been under-utilized. From the available literature, two broad types of explanations have been put forth in response to this question. The first type of research on this count points to factors at work within police departments which have constrained the adoption of research-based policy changes. The fault, if it is to be assigned, lies, in effect, with those charged with carrying out research recommendations according to analysts of this ilk. On the other side of the ledger, the bulk of the studies within the area of research use by police practitioners have cited the poor quality and/or irrelevance of the research itself as the chief cause of its failure to be implemented. Consequently, the same division of opinion apparent in the debate over the defects of social R & D as a whole is replicated within the sub-field of law enforcement research use.

#### RESEARCH UNDER-UTILIZATION AS A FUNCTION OF THE IMPLEMENTORS

A relatively small group of researchers has laid the blame for the failure of police-related research findings to be implemented at the feet of the practitioners, e.g., the operational police personnel. In their 1979 survey of over 200 local police departments across the United States, Krantz, et.al. found that police departments rarely make specific changes in line with current research findings simply because they rarely issue written policies at all. To illustrate this point, the authors note that: "despite over ten years of discussion on the advantages of police agencies engaging in policy-making to structure the discretion of their officers, very few police departments report having developed written policies for this purpose" (p. 222). The authors continue on to assert that innovation in police departments is hampered by the absence of incentives for their personnel to keep abreast of written policy changes. Distilling the results of their national survey, Krantz, et.al. observed that, "except for the use of policy material on promotional exams, police departments do not report using any positive incentives to encourage officers to know the written policies, or report much value in such positive incentives" (p. 222). From their vantage point, then, the weakness of the research-policy connection within law enforcement is primarily an outcome of the failure of police departments to follow through with adequate implementation.

Gurney's 1982 account of a pilot project undertaken as a result of LEAA sponsorship also faults the practitioners. As

detailed by Gurney, in 1973 the LEAA established an Economic Crime Project. Based upon LEAA research findings, a number of Economic Crime Units were created within local police departments with the aim of attacking "white-collar" economic crimes. The program, however, did not attain its stated objective. According to Gurney not only did the various Economic Crime Units fail to adhere to the guidelines established by the LEAA, they inappropriately expended their resources "going after small-time welfare cheaters, most of whom were members of disadvantaged groups---the poor, Blacks and women" (p. 43). What transpired, as Gurney sees it, is that the goals of the national program, primarily intensified law enforcement against "white-collar" criminals, were not identical to, or even congruent with, those of the implementing agencies. The later focused upon "small-time" economic criminals because it was generally easier to obtain convictions against them than against the more well-to-do counterparts. On this basis, Gurney makes his central recommendation, that, "designers of national crime-control programs should consider the organizations and operation of local agencies that will implement those programs" (p. 44). What emerges from the Gurney study, however, is that a workable and relevant program innovation was undermined by those charged with carrying it out.

Viteritti's study of the Civilian Complaint Review Board within the New York City Police Department offers another example of policy changes being undercut by operational

personnel, the author stating, "that policy implementation served to undermine the original intention of the decision" to alter the Board (Viteritti, 1973, p. 14). Partially as a result of recommendation made by President Johnson's National Commission on Law Enforcement, under the administrative leadership of Mayor John Lindsay, an alteration in the personnel of New York City's existing civilian complaint review procedure was adopted with the objective of increasing civilian participation on a newly-constituted Board. In the end, however, the civilians who were appointed to the Board were not drawn from the public at large, but were exclusively civilian employees of the New York City Police Department. According to Viteritti, resistance to outside interferences with police department affairs by the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association made it politically impossible for the Board to be altered along the lines proposed by the national commission. Thus, according to Viteritti, the research-policy breakdown was principally a result of blockages adopted by the intended implementors.

Of all the scholars who have studied the use of research by the police, James Q. Wilson is probably the most widely known. On the critical issue of where the fault for the under-utilization of law enforcement research lies, Wilson has pointed to both the implementors and the research which has been produced on their behalf. Wilson generally displays a favorable attitude toward the potential benefits of police-related research. Like Weiss, Wilson notes that while direct,

instrumental application of law enforcement research is a rarity, its conceptual use tends to be overlooked, (1980, p. 146) and that at the very least, the explosion of police-related research which has taken place since the mid-1960s has altered the way in which practitioners "think about" crime.

The list of problems inherent in transforming police research into working practice given by Wilson includes both "research-based" and "implementation-based" difficulties. One of the chief constraints upon the adoption of research recommendations by local police departments is finding the necessary manpower, time and money to make the changes called for by law enforcement scholars (Wilson, 1980, p. 145). This same point has been made by Greenberg in his observation regarding aggressive law enforcement tactics that, "although crime rates have been increasing for the last decade at rates that many consider alarming, the fiscal crisis of the state has imposed sharp limitations on the ability of the state to mobilize the resources needed to deal with the increase" (1977, p. 471). Greenberg, of course, was writing at a time when budget-cutting by city governments was far more prevalent than in the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, the key point which he makes mirrors that brought forth by Wilson. Police-related research recommendations may be relevant and available to the implementing agencies, but that does not mean that local police departments have the wherewithal to follow through on them even when these policies are viewed as relevant.

Another problem endemic to the research-policy nexus

which has been brought up by Wilson is that of research findings which do not lend themselves to clear-cut policy recommendations. Analytical crime studies have yielded some important points, which nonetheless, do not provide the basis for practical policy changes (Wilson, pp. 132-133). Hence, for example, although analytical studies demonstrate that both homicide perpetrators and victims usually have alcohol in their blood at the time a murder is committed: "The police cannot...eliminate alcohol from those public and private places where violence may occur" (p. 133). In like fashion, while bands of unemployed teenagers may be responsible for a large portion of violent street crime, the police cannot simply break up assemblies of youths who appear to fit this mold. Consequently, in addition to the limitation which finite resources impose upon the adoption of law enforcement research recommendations, there are further limitations revolving around actions which are not feasible from a political or civil liberties standpoint.

Wilson (1980) has also commented extensively on the roadblocks which personnel resistance to policy changes create in the efforts of local police departments to alter their practice in line with research recommendations. On this score, Wilson notes that because of the wide discretionary authority possessed by patrol officers, special efforts must be made to obtain their cooperation if experiments are to be successfully conducted. Not only does resistance to change by lower-strata personnel inhibit the implementation of

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particular policy changes, it also serves to inhibit police decision-makers from trying to impose future policy alterations. Cognizant of the difficulties involved in persuading their subordinates to adhere to new policies, law enforcement operational commanders may neglect relevant research findings because they are likely to be undermined by those further down the organizational ladder.

#### THE RELEVANCE AND QUALITY OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Although Wilson appears to lay part of the blame for the under-utilization of law enforcement research at the feet of working practitioners (or, at least, at forces within their operational environment), he has also voiced profound dissatisfaction with the quality and relevance of the research findings/recommendations which have been presented to potential utilizers. In an essay published in 1978 Wilson underscores this point.

The first and most important general observation I derive from these experiences is that only rarely have I witnessed serious governmental attention being given to serious social science research. That, of course, is what anyone would expect who is familiar with the maintenance and enhancement needs of bureaucratic organizations. I will make an even stronger statement: I have only rarely observed serious social science being presented to government agencies. If the latter is true, then the lack of any serious governmental response to

social science is explicable on grounds quite different from organizational imperatives: there is nothing to which a response can or should be made. (1978, pp. 82-83)

To exemplify this point, Wilson goes on to cite three national commissions charged with making recommendations to improve responses by local police departments to three, different law enforcement problems: President Johnson's National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission), the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence and an otherwise unspecified national obscenity commission. As noted in Chapter One, picking apart the reports issued by these three bodies, Wilson complains that, "public commissions, on the record, have either made no use of social science (the Kerner Commission), made some use but in ways irrelevant to its policy conclusions (the violence commission), or made use of relevant but unconvincing and inadequate research (the obscenity commission" (p. 85). As is apparent, national commissions are not the only source of police-related research that have been sharply criticized on the basis of procedural errors, conceptual shortcomings or irrelevant topic selection. Thus, Goldstein reports that: "LEAA and the planning agencies responsible for administering LEAA funds at the state, regional and local levels have funded many projects which...appear to have little to do with serious crime" (1977, p. 322). What comments of this type suggest is that police policy-makers have neglected government-sponsored

research simply because the later is generally invalid or irrelevant.

Probably the first empirically-grounded study of the quality of police-related research is Barbara Wooten's 1959 volume surveying some twenty-five years of British and American research into the traits characterizing the criminal personality. The gist of Wooten's findings is twofold. First, Wooten observed that nearly all of the studies coming under her eye were methodologically flawed, errors ranging from the failure to adequately define subject populations to simple arithmetical mistakes. Hence, the contradictory findings of different studies on the same point are, to Wooten's mind, a necessary outcome of shoddy procedure. Second, and equally important, in spite of decades in which researchers had attempted to correlate character attributes with a propensity toward crime, apart from sex (male) and age (15 to 30 years) "no clear cut picture of a criminal personality can be drawn" (p.234).

Aside from Wooten's pioneering work, the first large-scale effort to assess the quality and relevance of police-related research was undertaken as part of the Committee on Governmental Operation's hearing held in 1967. As a sub-committee within the House of Representatives, this body elicited comments from law enforcement experts on the state of criminal justice research. Among those responding to the Committee at the time, Geoffrey Hazard, Executive Director of the American Bar Foundation said that, "the quality,

quantity, scope and utilization of research is not bad as far as it goes, but it is woefully inadequate" (1967, p. 31).

Compared with the comments prepared by Gerhard O.W. Mueller for the Committee's consideration, Hazard's observations appear sanguine. After decrying the fragmented organizational structure of government-sponsored law enforcement research, Mueller gave the Committee members a blunt assessment of the character of President Johnson's National Crime Commission.

It is my considered opinion as a not uninterested observer...that many of these appropriations were made solely for the purposes of publicly or for other public relations purposes. When the President originally announced the creation and members of the so-called 'National Crime Commission' I was aghast at the patronage which had apparently gone into the selection of the Commission and the lack of a sufficient number of experts necessary for that Commission. (Mueller in Committee on Governmental Operations, 1967, p. 34)

Mueller reserved his frankest criticism for the particular questions posed to him by the Committee. As to the relevance of Federally-sponsored justice research, for instance, Mueller complained that the bulk of it, "is less relevant than it should be for the simple reason that the most basic questions of criminal law have not yet been researched" (p. 34). Concerning dissemination of research findings, Mueller stated that, "the relevant research sponsored by one agency is not

always sufficiently known to other agencies," and in assessing the practical utility of the research itself, he would continue on to testify: "I have no information to indicate that the research data derived from governmental or private research are put to good use by practical law enforcement" (p. 34). To be fair, (1) some authorities provided somewhat more positive depictions of the state of Federally-sponsored law enforcement literature and (2) given in 1967, the criticism was, quite obviously, addressed to the limited research effort achieved to that time. Notwithstanding these qualifications, the view expressed to the 1967 Committee was decidedly negative and, in fact, it would set the tone for a wide range of subsequent criticisms lodged over the next two decades.

As previously mentioned, in 1973, the LEAA initiated a series of research efforts as part of a National Evaluation Program to rate the quality/relevance of police-related research conducted under LEAA auspices. The first of these (Gass and Dawson, 1974) included an entire chapter under the heading, "Improper Study Design and Analytic Methods". In this section, Gass and Dawson apprised NEP supervisors about LEAA-sponsored research: "the main theme appears to be the misuse of statistical procedures...Where the techniques are discernible, what is discerned is often faulty...Inference, which is the step logically following from analysis, is thereby rendered invalid" (p.21). A similar NEP overview was prepared by Gay, Day and Woodward (1977) with specific reference to team policing, but, again, with similar results.

"Most of the reports," examined by Gay, Day and Woodward, "were rated low primarily because of inadequate research designs which made it difficult to determine if the reported effects could be attributed to the team policing program evaluated" (p.4). A third NEP document (Webb, et.al. 1977) concerning specialized police projects reproduced these judgements, citing, "serious flaws in the evaluation designs (which) hindered any definitive conclusions" (p.11). Lastly, Schell, et.al. (1976, p. 5) completed the picture of shoddy LEAA research in the area of traditional preventive patrol, propounding that, "Knowledge about patrol is incomplete in many respects and frequently of dubious quality."

The last-mentioned study by Schell, et.al. raises an extremely important point concerning our knowledge of "what works" in police operations. Since the mid-1960s, literally hundreds of studies have been produced with the object of correlating preventive patrol with the reduction of crime. Despite this enormous effect, as Larson and Cahn inform us: "There are no definitive studies that have been able to clearly depict the presence or absence of a relationship between police patrol and crime deterrence" (1985, P. 119). Thus, as both Greenberg (1977, p. 470) and Frohock (1979, p. 127) complain, while traditional, preventive patrol is the single most expensive field operation conducted by local police departments, and while scores of studies have attempted to assess it in relation to crime reduction, no satisfactory conclusion has been reached in this front. In other words,

after decades of extensive research on what may be the single most important assumption guiding police operations, scholars have not come to a credible judgement concerning its value.

In 1979, the NILECJ sponsored a series of police field services evaluations and published them in a volume entitled How Well Does It Work? The authors responding to the NILECJ's call issued a collective judgement almost identical to those of the NEP studies. Cahn, Kaplan and Peters (1979) took up the matter of evaluation research in the areas of patrol and investigation. After commenting that most patrol studies took the form of experimental designs, while most investigations studies were approached through survey and in situ observation, the authors conclude of police field services research taken collectively:

Two significant issues are evident. First, using the experiment as a research tool has engendered large investments of time and money to examine relatively few hypotheses. Second, reasonably conclusive evidence has been generated for only one or two of these hypotheses. (Cahn, Kaplan and Peters, 1979, P. 231)

In the same volume, Cunningham and Taylor assess the state of evaluation research in the area of police personnel. They summarize their findings with the observation, "Considering a national effort of almost a decade and several billions of taxpayers' dollars expended to improve both the criminal justice system and its impact on criminality, the state of evaluation data on the justice system's largest component---

police personnel---is indeed sad" (Cunningham and Taylor, 1979, p. 287). The authors criticize not only the research projects themselves, but also their LEAA sponsors finding, "No evidence... that program or grant funding consistently and automatically included independent assessment of results" (p.288).

The most recently-published summary evaluation of government-sponsored police research that I know of is that of Larson and Cahn. Sponsored by the National Institute of Justice in 1985, the Larson and Cahn report is a litany of complaints about police-related research in the field of patrol:

From our review of research in the field of police patrol, one fact has become obvious: many studies exhibit low technical quality. Inappropriate methods were used in some cases, while reasonable techniques were poorly applied in other instances. Since conclusions regarding the effectiveness of alternative patrol strategies are reached through such analysis, the credibility of these studies becomes questionable.

(p. 105)

Itemizing the most common methodological and conceptual shortcomings found in two decades of police field research, Larson and Cahn assert that, "a decision-maker could be much worse off relying (on such studies) since, poorly designed research can mislead decision-makers, resulting in potentially serious misallocations of scarce resources" (p.106). Along

with procedural and conceptual errors, Larson and Cahn found that the studies they examined relied too heavily on the use of "null hypothesis" approaches, leading them to call for more "action-oriented" study designs, (p.120). Larson and Cahn also comment upon the problem of generalization. Many of the studies that they reviewed were originally conducted in highly "progressive", research-oriented departments headed by innovative chiefs, e.g., Clarence Kelly's Kansas City Police Department. While the selection of these departments often yielded impressive research results, the usefulness of these studies in other police departments, e.g.s, those having greater workloads or strong police unions, must be called into question (p.120). In the next section of this chapter, we shall review literature regarding factors which impede the transformation of research into police policy and program changes. It is evident that Larson and Cahn's argument concerning generalization is well-taken; that in most police departments (and their operating environments) there are strong forces at work which impinge upon the implementation of research-based policy changes.

#### FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESEARCH-BASED POLICY CHANGES

As in the larger body of research use studies, some analysts have tried to identify those variables/forces which influence the extent to which police-related research is actually implemented. Morash (1982, p.10) has summarized the state of such analytical endeavors in his observation that:

"There is very little research in this third stage that identifies the range and incidence of influences on criminal justice policy implementation and relates the identified influences back to general policy implementation models." A similar assessment has been issued by Greene (1982), who concludes that: "Generally, the results of effects-oriented evaluations of police programs and policies have been disappointing, failing to link systematically the inputs of policing (resources, more officers, public support) to police outcomes" (p. 71). Finally, Wycoff (1982) has come to the same judgement in his evaluation of the crime effectiveness of municipal police, complaining that very little effort has been exerted in attempting to locate forces which impede the adoption of innovative policy changes by local law enforcement agencies (pp. 15-16).

Most existing studies of factors influencing the degree to which police-related research is incorporated into actual policy-making have concentrated upon a comparatively small set of variables and/or the implementation process within a single law enforcement agency. Lewis and Greene (1978) produced a short article in which they pointed to organizational factors, principally the clarity of policy change goals and the presence/absence of consensus about those objectives, as variables affecting the implementation of criminal justice innovations. This research was confirmed by Wycoff and Kelling (1978) in their examination of rank-and-file resistance to personnel policy changes within the Dallas

Police Department, and in Guyot's 1979 survey of like resistance to alterations of the rank structure of local police departments. The same findings were cited by Schwartz and Claren (1977) in their evaluation of the Cincinnati Police Department's attempts to adopt team policing, and by Greene (1981) in his examination of "threatening" policy changes and the subversion of this policy by patrol officers. Sandler and Mintz (1974) have identified a range of environmental factor clusters, e.g., the political and socio-economic climate in which police departments operate, as variables influencing the policy implementation process, while Wycoff and Kelling (1978) have also alluded to the pressure which political factors exert upon policy changes within the Dallas Police Department. By and large, these scholars have concentrated heavily upon intra-organizational or "micro" factors which impinge upon the successful implementation of research-based policy changes, chiefly resistance to changes by organizational personnel. While their points may be well-taken, researchers have generally neglected other significant variables, e.g., the quality and relevance of the research itself, the presence or absence of sufficient organizational resources to carry out planned changes.

The sole example of a "synthetic" study in the area of factors influencing research-based policy changes identified other than the Conner model (discussed in the next chapter) is Morash's 1982 study. Trying to identify gaps in the existing literature, Morash used a model of policy implementation

constructed by Van Horn and Van Meter (1977), taking the eight factor clusters undepinning it and then surveying existing research within the law enforcement field. As Morash details:

The first two clusters are (1) policy resources, most obviously money, and (2) standards for policy implementation...Three additional variable clusters are (3) communication of the policy and standards, (4) methods used to enforce the standards, and (5) the disposition of people who work in the implementing agency to support the policy. The sixth variable cluster includes (6) characteristics of the implementing agency, such as staff competence and financial and political support. The seventh variable cluster includes (7) characteristics of the political environment, for example, public and elite opinion. The eighth variable cluster includes (8) economic and social conditions, such as the need for the program and for federal and state assistance. (Morash, 1982, pp. 10-11)

Morash then compares the range of influences considered by scholars as forces influencing policy implementation within police departments with those derived from the Van Meter and Van Horn model. What Morash discovered was that most of the variables identified by Van Meter and Van Horn as important factors influencing the translation of research into policy had not been given their due. Not only were instances of scholars studying "macro" forces, i.e., characteristic (p. 7) and (p. 8), rare, aside from the fifth cluster, i.e., the

disposition of personnel , very little empirical research could be found on the impact of (1) resource constraints, (2) policy standards, (3) communications, (4) incentives/sanctions and (6) agency characteristics. (Morash, 1982, pp. 14-17)

Morash's findings represent a challenge and an opportunity within the context of the present research effort. It is evident that: (1) research is required into a broader range of implementation factors within police departments and that; (2) such research ought to be guided by a coherent and plausible model of the research utilization by operational police agencies. Fortunately, Conner (1980) has provided just such a model, i.e., one designed to direct the study of research use within police departments. As Parks (1979) asserts far too much effort has been expended in simply "rating" the degree to which research-based policies have attained their stated objectives when compared to the study of the process through which law enforcement agencies receive and apply extramural policy/evaluation research (p. 253). Thus, one of the primary objectives of this dissertation will be to study this neglected process in order to fill in the wide gaps which currently hinder our grasp of how extramural research is disseminated to and used by law enforcement policy-makers.

## CHAPTER IV

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

#### MODELS OF THE RESEARCH DISSEMINATION-UTILIZATION PROCESS

During the past twenty years, our theoretical understanding of how social science research is transmitted to and used by operational decision-makers has undergone a radical revision. Prior to the late-1960s, conceptualizations of the research-policy process were governed by a single, "classic" model. The fundamental tenets of this model, in turn, were derived from orthodox theories of public administration and scientific management. The eminent sociologist Max Weber is frequently cited as the chief forebearer of this "school" of public administration. Weber theorized that an "ideal" bureaucracy is "a highly rationalized, legalistic kind of authority and structure controlled at the top by a small group of decision-makers whose policies (are) dutifully implemented by "subordinate administrators" (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980, p. 8). Following in Weber's footsteps, Woodrow Wilson in his highly influential monograph "The Study of Administration" made a sharp distinction between policy-making and administration. In Wilson's view, policy-making was firmly distinguished from administration, the former involving creative discretion, the latter being essential a mechanical function. Frederick W. Taylor's The Principle of Scientific Management supported and strengthened Wilson's distinction. In Taylor's opinion, the job of administrators was to carry out the instructions of

those at the top of the organizational pyramid in the most efficient manner possible. For all of these scholars, the transformation of policy into working practice was a straightforward, linear affair. Their collective notion of how implementation took place virtually excluded the actual implementers from any significant role in the policy process.

It was from this body of public administration theory that the "classic model" of social science research utilization arose. Alternatively termed the Research, Development and Diffusion (RD & D) model, this paradigm rests upon a linear, rational sequence of activities, moving from the generation of research data to policy implementation. From the standpoint of this conception, research consumers, i.e., working practitioners using social science data, "are a clearly defined and somewhat passive audience who will accept an innovation if it is delivered in the right way at the right time" (Kirk, 1979, p. 6). In the main, writings by adherents of this model show little regard for the process of implementation itself and the role of implementers within it. For them, policy implementation is as simple and straightforward. It requires three elements:

1. An agent to carry out the policy is chosen by the policy-maker according to technical criteria.
2. The policy is communicated to the agent as a series of specific instructions.
3. The agent implements (carries out) the specific instructions in the communication from the policy-maker. (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1979, p.9)

Substituting research findings/recommendations for policies, the RD & D model takes implementation to be essentially a foregone conclusion. Research findings/recommendations are generated; they are then communicated to relevant administrators; the administrators unquestioningly implement policy changes based upon them. It was this notion of the policy-research process which underpinned the most widely cited text on research use. Havelock's Planning for Innovation Through Dissemination and Utilization of Knowledge (1969 and 1976), and this conceptualization continues to pervade the field of research use study. Thus, in the context of law enforcement evaluation research, Blakely and Davidson related in 1982, that: "Criminal justice agencies are viewed as adopters in the RD & D process who value evaluation results and passively receive programmatic initiatives" (pp. 90-91).

During the late-1960s, as the findings of evaluation studies assessing the applied value of research-based policies were gathered, it became more and more apparent that the classic model was unable to account for the widespread disparity between what ought to have been implemented and what was, in fact, carried out. The marked "gap" in the research-policy chain stimulated a quite a large number of scholars to advance the opinion that policy implementation is much more complex and far less mechanical than implied by the classic model. Lynn (1978b, p. 17), for instance, wrote that policy-making is not a discrete event which can be

artificially separated from implementation, but, rather, an ongoing process, while Weiss (1977, p. 11) asserted that "research utilization is an extraordinarily complicated phenomenon." Most importantly, close examination of how the research-policy process actually took place revealed that "adopting organizations are not passive recipients of disseminated programs," (Blakely and Davidson, 1982, p. 90), and that a wide array of organizational/environmental factors exert an influence upon the degree to which research-based policy recommendations are implemented (Williams, 1976, p. 268). Conner (1980) furnishes us with a cogent comment on the change which this new brand of research use theory prompted when he stated, "the dissemination/utilization process, then, is complex and non-linear---qualities which present difficult problems in evaluating utilization"(p.638).

Working in the area of law enforcement research use, other scholars (Blakely and Davidson, 1982; Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker, 1978) came to the same basic conclusion: the classic RD & D model, despite its surface relevance to police organizations, is unable to capture the complex interplay of forces influencing the process through which police-related research is translated into working practice.

Cognizant of the inherent defects of the RD &D model, research use analysts began to construct alternative paradigms of the utilization/dissemination process that were "user-oriented". Where the classic model depicted research implementation unfolding in a string of compartmentalized

stages, the new models tended to adopt a circular form featuring overlapping stages and "feedback" from practitioners to researchers. Moreover, these revised conceptions tended to be more amorphous and less rigid as a consequence of the acknowledge complexity of the research-policy process they described.

The chief rival to the classic model which emerged from utilization factor studies has been referred to by Kirk (1979) as the Social Interaction (SI) model. Kirk outlines its central features in contradistinction to the RD & D conception as focusing on the level of operations and the latter phases of the process. He believes the SI model is more responsive to complicated "sets of human relationships which impinge upon the diffusion process" (pp. 6-7). It must, however, be stressed that neither the recognition of the classic model's shortcomings nor the existence of alternative models has "solved" the problems inherent in conceptualizing the research-policy process. What has transpired is that the hold which the RD & D model possessed over our thinking about research utilization has been broken and that necessary remedial emphasises have been embodied in new models. As an outgrowth of these developments, individual researchers have tailored specific research dissemination- utilization models which were designed for application to particularized implementation settings. In the section which follows, we shall examine one such effort, Conner's model of research use by law enforcement agencies.

#### The Conner Model

Scouring the available literature for theoretical materials useful for this study, I was able to locate only one full-developed model of research use designed for specific application to law enforcement agencies. Ross F. Conner's utilization model appeared in the 1980 edition of the Handbook of Criminal Justice Evaluation. In preface to this work, Conner alludes to its basic objectives: to focus on a description and analysis of different aspects of the utilization process and on a discussion of a general model for evaluating the effects of research utilization with particular attention to the criminal justice system" (1980, p. 630). The Conner model consists of two broad dimensions. The first of these being comprised of eight characteristic aspects of the utilization process" as it usually occurs in disseminating and utilizing criminal justice...research, "and the second of four broad areas of inquiry central to the task of studying research utilization by criminal justice agencies. Derived from a thorough review of the literature, Conner's eight characteristics of criminal justice research usage are:

1. The quality of the research results to be used;
2. The importance of the research results to be used;
3. The pattern of the utilization process;
4. The type of utilization taking place;
5. The rationale for research usage;
6. The timing of the utilization process;
7. The organizational level of the utilization target;
8. The state of the utilizers.


A graphic depiction of the Conner model is presented as Figure 1.

The first facet of the utilization process seen by Conner as an important determinant of research use is the quality of the original research pieces themselves. Quality, in turn, is composed of two basic ingredients, i.e., reliability and validity. Reliability can be tested through replication, while validity requires freedom from conceptual and methodological errors. Quite obviously, if potential utilizers perceive research findings and/or research recommendations to be lacking in either reliability and/or validity, they will naturally dismiss them in considering policy changes. In fact, should potential implementers frequently encounter "shoddy" research reports, they may come to discard habitually such information without independent assessment of its quality.

The importance of research findings/recommendations is the second aspect of the utilization process as Conner thinks of it. Importance is comprised of two, broad elements, i.e., social significance and generalizability. Concerning the former, valid and reliable research can be presented to a potential utilizers which nevertheless is not socially significant. For example, a well-designed analytical study can demonstrate that jaywalking is more likely to occur at certain times of the day than at others, but this finding is not socially significant enough to warrant policy changes. In analogous fashion, research may show that women are more

FIGURE 1

CONNER'S CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF AN EVALUATION PROJECT



likely to engage in shoplifting than men, but this too may be deemed to lack, a socially significant policy pay-off by relevant decision-makers. Regarding generalizability, analytical research and experimentation conducted in one locale, New York, for example, may be relevant to the circumstances of another place, Cleveland, for instance, but of no value to decision-makers in Bangor, Maine or Ames, Iowa.

As Conner observes, the pattern of utilization is probably the most complex of the characteristics encompassed in his model. In this regard, Conner states, "This factor relates to the sequencing of activities in the utilization process, from the compilation of research results to the adoption of the results in new policies or practices" (pp.633-634). In a handful of cases, the pattern may be comprised of a few, simple steps, but, far more frequently, "the sequence of events is likely to be quite complex and labyrinthine" (p. 634). At any stage in the process, events are likely to arise which effectively bring the process to a halt.

We have already encountered the fourth aspect of Conner's research-policy model in our review of the literature. The type of utilization which takes place rests upon the distinction between instrumental and conceptual use (as discussed in Chapter Three). Although instrumental use is fair easier to identify than conceptual use, the latter is clearly important as well.

The next aspect of the utilization process identified by Conner is, in fact, an extension of the fourth. Normally research results are promoted because of the presumed part which they may have in (a) solving a specific policy problem and/or (b) increasing the conceptual understanding of a general policy area by relevant decision-makers. However, in addition to this central rationale for research use, there may be another type of motive behind the utilization of a specific research finding/recommendation. Drawing upon the works of Knorr (1977) and Weiss (1978), Conner refers to the symbolic use of research findings which "can substitute for decision-making, legitimate a predetermined decision, discredit an unpopular policy and the like" (p. 635). Although such usage may appear to be tarnished by political motives, it is nonetheless widespread, and, so, instances of research employed by decision-makers for symbolic ends must be recognized and taken into account.

The timing of the utilization process is the sixth aspect of Conner's interpretation. As many social science researchers have complained, normally there is a substantial time lag between the compilation of research results and their consideration in policy-making. Conner (1980) elaborates on this point by pointing out that, "In some cases, utilization requires years or decades, including dormant periods, until either the political climate or the reform trend is such that certain practices can be adopted" (p.639). Even in the case of high-quality, important research, years may elapse before research results come to play a part in actual problem solving

and an additional period of time may transpire before they can be incorporated into actual practice. This, of course, represents a problem for the research use evaluator who must rely upon the retrospective memories of potential and actual policy-makers in order to measure research use timing.

By level of the utilization target, Conner means the formal organization position of the individuals/groups to whom a dissemination-utilization effort is directed. According to him, these may include any or all of the following: "the project level, the program level (i.e., a more general unit), the agency or department level, the legislative level, the executive level or the academic level" (p.637). In most "planned" dissemination-utilization programs, two or more organizational levels are pin-pointed as "targets" for the circulation of research results. As a rule, utilization is enhanced when the targeted levels are those empowered to make policy changes along with those just above them in the organizational pyramid. This point has been made by Emerick and Peterson (1978), with Conner citing their conclusion that: "Overall, utilization occurs most frequently when involved staff perceive such utilization to be in their own interests as well as in the interest of relevant leadership and authority figures" (p. 637).

The final characteristic of the utilization process in the Conner version, i.e., the state of the utilizers has been found to be the most important determinant of research use in a host of factor studies. Conner explains the significance of

this factor by pointing out that those who are responsible for implementing changes can be a positive or negative force depending on their personal views. And, their views are greatly influenced by "their past experience with research and the reward contingencies which control their professional behaviors" (p. 637). This last characteristic, then, is roughly equivalent to the "people" factor which Morash (1982) found to be most strongly correlated with the degree to which research findings are utilized. As numerous studies in the field of law enforcement policy changes have observed, the disposition of subordinates toward policy changes grounded in research findings often disrupts or undermines the efforts of superiors to put these changes into operation. As a direct corollary of the importance of the "people" factor within the utilization process, many scholars have noted that unless incentives and/or sanctions are available to superiors, those directly beneath them may readily undermine implementation of research-based policy changes. On this count, Conner remarks:

Traditional criminal justice utilization strategies have not been particularly relevant to the people who are potential utilizers. Police officers, for example, derive little reward from reading research reports. By contrast, police officers derive great rewards (such as certification and promotions) by learning the methods and techniques taught to them at a training school. (p. 638)

It is not enough, then, for potential utilizers to view a

research-based policy change as a means for increasing the effectiveness with which an agency goal is pursued, e.g., to see it as a way of improving law enforcement in a particular area. They must also view the prospective change as contributing to their own personal goals, e.g., upgradings in their performance reports.

The Conner model has been constructed for two inter-related ends: as a description of how research dissemination-utilization normally occurs within law enforcement agencies and as a guide for those who would attempt to study this process. Reflecting this second aim, Conner divides the systematic evaluation of research use into four components; goals, inputs, processes and outcomes. As we shall soon discover, probing each of these study areas is far easier and more reliable in a planned dissemination-utilization effort than in an unplanned one of the kind which we shall be undertaking. However, despite the greater difficulty, even in an unplanned evaluation study, each of these elements demands attention and, thus, their description is warranted at this juncture.

As illustrated in Figure 1, none of the eight utilization aspects given by Conner relates directly to the goals of an original dissemination-utilization effort. It is crucial to understand here that by "goals" Conner does not mean the policy goals of the research itself, e.g., the reduction of crime rates. Instead, by goals, Conner refers to the degree to which a research finding reaches relevant policy-makers and

is subsequently used by them. Unfortunately, in the majority of cases, such goals are not given adequate attention by researchers and sponsoring bodies, and rarely are they stated with precision and clarity.

Those hoping for research utilization rarely consider such questions as: How will the results be disseminated? How will we know if the dissemination has been successful? What do we want potential utilizers to do with our results? Who will direct the potential utilizers in their efforts? What criteria will be used to assess the degree of utilization? (p. 641)

Consequently, in tracing the utilization process for a specific research report, scholars are frequently hampered by (a) the non-existence of clearly defined dissemination-utilization objectives or (b) the difficulty of locating the express goals of such programs beyond generalized statements such as "intended for use by operational personnel". In such cases, the researcher must proceed through logical inference. For example, we can reasonably assume that the dissemination goal of a utilization effort is to reach a large number of potential utilizers, and we can, again by inference, roughly identify potential targets of such programs. Again, however, it is only infrequently that the original objectives of a research utilization program are known to analysts studying it retrospectively, since, in many cases these aims are not spelled out from the beginning of the dissemination process.

Two aspects of the research utilization process are viewed by Conner as the input component of evaluation study, the quality of the research findings and the importance of those same findings. We can hope that care has been taken by the original researchers and their sponsors in both these areas; that the research findings themselves are of sufficiently high quality and importance to merit their distribution (and use) by decision-makers. As we saw in our review of the literature, however, independent assessments reveal that this is not always the case, that research findings of poor quality and low importance are routinely churned out for subsequent usage. In order to determine on a post hoc basis what the actual quality and importance of research findings are, we are compelled to enlist the help of outside experts who did not participate in the original research project. In addition, by surveying actual and potential targets of such research, we can garner their opinions regarding the inputs into the research use process.

The pattern, rationale and state of the utilizers are all facets of what Conner terms the "processes" element of research use study. These aspects can be studied as they unfold, an evaluation analyst observing the pattern, rationale and state of the utilizers through concurrent, on site examination. Again, however, even in the case of a planned program, the chief channel for gaining information about these aspects is the retrospective accounts of actual or potential utilization targets. Through surveys and interviews with

these individuals, we can get at least some rough idea about what sequence of events occurred in the transformation of research findings into elements of some type or form of policy-making, about the overt and covert justifications underlying research-based policy changes, about the interference of personal factors of participating policy actors in furthering or hampering the research-policy process.

The last area of inquiry for studying research utilization is termed "outcomes" by Conner. It includes the type, level and timing of the utilization process. Determining just how, by whom and when a research finding was used by an implementer is no easy task. Even when we have the benefit of following the process as it evolves, reports from actual/potential research use targets are the chief means available to us for investigating these facets of the utilization process.

#### UNPLANNED UTILIZATION EVALUATION AND THE "TRAPPED" EVALUATOR

The Conner model is designed primarily as a tool for planned utilization evaluation. Planned evaluations are feasible only when a conscious effort is made as part of the original research project to follow the course of subsequent dissemination-utilization. As noted above, quite frequently such conscious effort is lacking as some researchers and sponsoring agencies simply assume that publication of research findings will ensure that they get into the hands of potential utilizers, that the latter will recognize their value and that

no impediments to implementation will delay, inhibit or countermand their application. Although study of so called planned programs may present utilization evaluation scholars with a complex of conceptual and procedural problems, those approaching the study of unplanned efforts will encounter the same difficulties in amplified form and a host of additional problems. Hence, the significance of findings in an un-planned evaluation is necessarily limited and tentative. When a utilization analyst has been involved from the outset in the planned dissemination-utilization of research materials, he or she may have explicit knowledge of precisely who were the targets of the utilization program, e.g., a list of particular candidates or groups of candidates to be apprised of research findings. With this roster in hand, the researcher can simply contact these actual targets to find out whether they were, in fact, reached. Through reports from actual targets, the researcher can judge their perceptions of the quality and importance of the findings disseminated to them. The pattern, rationale and state of the utilizers can be examined by the analyst through on site observation and via surveys/interviews with actual targets. Similarly, the type, level and timing of research use can be pieced together through first-hand observation and the reports of actual targets.

None of these tools are available to those approaching an unplanned utilization effort. One can only guess at what the initial objectives of the dissemination-utilization program

were. Appraisals of the quality and importance of the research findings must be garnered through post hoc assessments by "neutral" experts in the field and/or potential targets. In like manner, the processes through which research usage took place can only be traced through interviews/surveys of potential targets since the actual targets remain unknown. The same holds true for outcomes.

As Conner relates, the task of studying an unplanned dissemination-utilization effort places the researcher in the unenviable position of being a "trapped utilization evaluator." A number of scholars have commented at length on the inherent difficulties which the trapped evaluator faces in proceeding through retrospective inference and speculation (Campell, 1969; Patton, 1978; Cook and Campell, 1979; Scriven, 1974). The general consensus of these scholars is that a trapped utilization evaluator cannot expect to come to the same rigorous and accurate conclusions that an evaluator following the process on a concurrent basis can anticipate. However, by relying upon a priori assumptions and the reports of potential targets, tentative evaluations can be made.

We get a stronger grasp of how a trapped utilizer can approach the task when we consider a distinction which has been employed in the course of the foregoing discussion, i.e., that between actual and potential targets. In some planned utilization programs, evaluators are privy to the actual targets of the original dissemination-utilization effort. In the case of unplanned programs, the only option open to the

retrospective evaluator is to contact what is considered to be reasonable "potential" targets. As Conner tells us:

In this case, the evaluation researcher determines the groups and individuals who are most relevant for the utilization of findings. Then these individuals are contacted to learn whether they received a summary report, for example, or participated in the dissemination workshop, and, if so, what type and degree of utilization occurred. (p. 646)

It is evident that this procedure suffers from (a) the need to retrospectively specify who should have been reached by the original dissemination effort and (b) the strong subjective undercurrent which is likely to color feedback from potential utilizers. This method has been successfully applied by Berg, et.al. (1978) in their study of the use of technology assessment research by public policy-makers. Moreover, when we widen the scope of inquiry to include a number of research reports or a general "type" of research report, e.g., significant studies of police operations, identifying potential targets can become a somewhat surer endeavor. For example, both the Caplan (1975) and the Knorr (1977) studies the evaluators were interested in determining whether potential targets were reached by and used a broadly defined type of research finding. Neither of these evaluation teams were aware of precisely which individuals were the actual targets of specific research utilization efforts. Caplan et.al. and Knorr, then, both started their inquiries by simply

assuming that officials at certain levels and in certain functional areas should have been targets for some research findings from a generalized body of research reports. Despite these impediments, both of these analyses yielded significant conclusions as to how research is used and to what degree dissemination-utilization objectives could be reasonably assumed to have been met.

#### OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS

Before outlining the specific methodology employed in gathering the primary research data of this dissertation, it is necessary to specify operational definitions for certain critical terms, namely research, relevance and use.

For the purposes of this study, research is defined as being analytical research. As Wilson (1980, p. 132) defines it, analytical research differs from "research" in its simplest form, e.g., the presentation of bare statistics without accompanying interpretation, being "an inquiry in which the relationship between one factor (or variable) and another is systematically measured without altering either factor." Although Wilson makes a further distinction between "analytical research" and "experimentation", in the context of this study, experimentation will be treated as a form of analytical research and both will be subsumed under the rubric of research.

In addition, for the purposes of this study, both the individual research works about which we shall inquire and

complementary research in general will be strictly confined to extramural works. In other words, "in-house" studies conducted by implementing agencies will not fall within the parameters of this study. Our interest lies in the use of research sponsored and conducted by "outside" bodies and researchers.

As Lynn (1978a, p. 9) underscores, the problem of specifying what is meant by "relevance" is by no means a cut-and-dried one; research evaluators must be aware that there is no "single yardstick of relevance" shared by all evaluators. Indeed, Lynn illustrates the multiplicity of meanings which can be attached to the term "relevance" by constructing a series of eight different questions which could be asked of operational decision-makers in attempting to garner their opinions of whether a research finding is relevant. Of these, the first four are germane to our operationalization of the term "relevance".

These four very important questions are as follows:

1. Have the findings of this study been incorporated into policy?
2. Have the findings of this study been analyzed and discussed by someone influential in the policy process?
3. Are the findings of this study potentially important to a current policy debate?
4. Are the findings of this study potentially important

to a future policy debate?

For the purposes of this project, the first question would serve as a measure of research application, the second question as a yardstick of research usage, while the third and fourth questions are taken to be measures of research relevance. Hence, "relevance" in this study will denote potential relevance to an ongoing or prospective policy decision as assessed by potential decision-makers.

As we saw in our review of the literature, what constitutes research "use" is a matter of scholarly debate. According to Weiss (1978a, pp. 27-35) there are no fewer than eight separate meanings which can be ascribed to social science research use. The most commonly intended definition of "use" remains that of direct and instrumental use as a tool for problem-solving. It is this reading of "use" to which our inquiry will be restricted. Thus, following Weiss (1978a p. 35), "If a decision-maker considers the findings of a study or group of studies for near-term resolution of a policy problem, then that research is being used."

Lastly, our definition of "use" must be distinguished from "application." Simply because a decision-maker has considered a certain research finding in making a policy decision, that does not necessarily mean that he or she will apply the research finding. If, however, a decision-maker reports that a specific research finding has been incorporated into working practice, that is, implemented, then we shall assume that application of the finding has taken place.

## CHAPTER V

### METHODOLOGY

#### OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY DESIGN

This project's primary research effort is governed by a study design consisting of two structural elements. The first component is a survey questionnaire or survey instrument comprised of 31 forced-response items. The questionnaire was mailed to a total of 174 potential participants, with 123 respondents completing and returning it for an overall participation rate of 70.7 percent. The second component is a structured interview conducted by the researcher with 10 respondents who had completed the survey instrument and expressed their willingness to be interviewed. This element was comprised of eight, open-ended questions.

The formal objective of the study design was to test the hypotheses given in Chapter I of this thesis. To accomplish this overall objective, seven subordinate objectives were pursued, as follows:

- (1) Measurement of the degree to which police-related research findings were disseminated to potential targets. This objective was pursued through two means. Questionnaire participants were surveyed concerning their knowledge of four (4) specific research works and they were asked to give their opinion as to the adequacy of dissemination efforts for police-related research in general.
- (2) Measurement(s) of the perceived relevance, degree of

use and degree of application of police-related research as expressed in the opinions of potential targets. This aim was also pursued through two channels. Participants were asked to give their opinion as to the relevance, degree of use and degree of application for each of the four survey works, and they were asked to give analogous opinions about police-related research in general.

- (3) Measurement of the expressed degree of satisfaction of potential targets of police-related research regarding their participation in topic selection, study preparation, derivation of recommendations and evaluation of research-based policies/programs.
- (4) Measurement of the survey participants' opinion of the primary reason motivating researchers to conduct police-related studies.

All four of these subordinate objectives were sought through data supplied by respondents to the survey instrument. In addition, three (3) further objectives were pursued.

- (5) A qualitative investigation of four of the eight utilization process characteristics found in the Conner model, i.e., the pattern, timing, rationale of (for) police-related research use and the state of the utilizers. Reasons for the exclusion of the other four aspects found in the Conner model will be discussed in the course of this chapter.
- (6) Qualitative investigation of the opinions of

potential targets of police-related research concerning the chief defects of the research dissemination-utilization process within their field, i.e., law enforcement.

- (7) Qualitative investigation of the opinions of potential targets of police-related research concerning remedial measures to overcome or mitigate the chief defects of the research dissemination-utilization process within their field, i.e., law enforcement.

Information pertaining to this second set of study objectives was collected through the structured interviews administered by the author with ten respondents from the questionnaire survey, as discussed more fully later in this chapter.

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY POPULATION

The study population consisted of two groups (a) the 74 commanding officers of each precinct within the New York City Police Department, and (b) 100 operational commanders from police departments in ten cities across the United States. The latter group was selected from police departments in the following locations: Cleveland, Ohio; Baltimore County, Maryland; Birmingham, Alabama; Miami, Florida; Seattle, Washington; Chicago, Illinois; Los Angeles, California; Minneapolis, Minnesota; St. Louis, Missouri; and San Jose, California. Each of the potential study participants was at roughly the same organizational level so that no attempt was

made to investigate that aspect of the utilization process which Conner refers to as level of the utilizer. Given their common status as operational commanders at the precinct level, it was assumed that these individuals were (and are) potential targets for police-related research dissemination-utilization programs. These individuals may or may not have been the actual targets of research dissemination-utilization efforts for one or more of the specific survey works about which they were asked and/or like programs for other police-related research: I have no means available for confirming or refuting this. It is, then, on the grounds of the plausible a priori assumption that these individuals should have been targets for (a) the specific survey works and/or (b) other or "general" police-related dissemination-utilization efforts that the study population has been selected.

The rationale for using two separate groups is itself two-fold. First and foremost, the use of two groups enables us to expand the universe of potential participants from 74 to 174, thereby enhancing the validity and reliability of this study. Second, it provides a means of checking results from one group, e.g., the New York City study populace, against the other, e.g., those outside of the New York City Police Department. Although our primary interest lies in responses from the New York City group, the study does not take it as the "test" group to be measured against the outside, "control" group. On this count, our aim was simply to gather information from a broader cross-section of potential targets,

thereby enhancing the generalizability of study results, as well as to note potential disparities in the respective data coming from these two groups.

The survey instrument included a section intended to elicit information about four relevant demographic/career characteristics of the study populace: their age, the length of their tenure as police professionals, the length of their tenure as operational commanders, their level of education.

The vast majority of the survey respondents (101 of 123 participants or 82.1 percent) were between the ages of 36 and 55 years old. Of these, 49 (39.8 percent) were between the ages of 36 and 45 years old, 52 (42.3 percent) were between the ages of 45 and 55 years old. Of the remainder, 19 (15.4 percent) were over 55 years old, 3 (2.4 percent) were under 35 years old. Unfortunately, due to an oversight, there is no information available about the gender of the respondents. Given their seniority, however, it can safely be assumed that the great majority of them are males.

The vast majority of the survey respondents (119 of 123 or 96.8 percent) had served as professional police officers for a period of 16 or more years. Of these, 90 (73.2 percent) had served for over 21 years, 47 of them (38.2 percent) serving for more than 25 years. Of the remaining four cases, 3 (2.4 percent) reported professional careers as police officers ranging between 11 and 15 years and only 1 (0.8 percent) had a professional career of less than 10 years.

In terms of their tenure as police operational

commanders, the study populace was evenly divided: 67 (54.5 percent) had served as operational commanders for less than 5 years, 56 (45.5 percent) had served as operational commanders for more than 5 years. Of the latter, 37 (30.1 percent) had held the post of operational commander for between 6 and 10 years, 9 (7.3 percent) for between 11 and 15 years, 7 (5.7 percent) for between 16 and 20 years, and 3 (2.4 percent) had served for more than 20 years.

About two-thirds (83 of 123 or 67.5 percent) reported a level of educational attainment equal to or higher than a bachelor's degree. Of these, 18 (14.6 percent) reported "some" graduate school work, 36 (29.3 percent) reported completion of a master's degree, and 1 (0.8 percent) reported holding a doctor's degree. Of the remaining cases, all had completed high school, 34 (27.6 percent) reported some college work, 15 (12.2 percent) reported holding an associate's degree and 6 (4.9 percent) reported no formal education beyond secondary school.

Comparing the New York City group to the "outside" group, we find that the two are roughly identical in terms of these four demographic/career characteristics. In terms of age, there was slightly greater uniformity within the New York City group, with 85.5 percent being between 36 and 55 years old compared to 77.7 percent for the "outside" group. The New York City contingent was slightly younger than its outside counterpart, but of the 3 study respondents under 35 years old, 2 were from the non-New York City group.

The New York City group displayed slightly longer tenure as police professionals 79 percent reporting overall seniority as 21 years or more compared to 67.2 percent for the "outside" group. As a parenthetical exception, the sole study participant with less than ten years as a police officer was from New York.

The non-New York group displayed significantly greater tenure as police commanders. While 64.5 percent of the New York group had held their command posts for less than 5 years, only 44.3 percent of the "outside" group had held their command posts for less than 5 years. Further down the scale, this disparity widens, so that only 3 (4.8 percent) of the New York City group reported command tenure of more than 11 years, while 16 (26.3 percent) of the non-New York group reported command tenure of 11 years or longer.

On the whole, the New York City group displayed a moderately higher level of educational attainment. Some 72.6 percent of the New York group had attained a bachelor's degree of higher educational level compared to 62.3 percent of the "outside" group. On the other hand, of the 6 respondents reporting no college work at all, 5 were from New York, but the sole holder of a doctoral degree was from the New York City group.

By and large, with the exceptions noted above, the two groups were judged to be highly comparable in terms of the four characteristics surveyed. While we can speculate that the only significant difference between the two groups, i.e.,

tenure as an operational commander, may be due to a higher turn-over rate for individuals at this organizational level within the New York City Police Department compared to turn-over rates elsewhere, we have no valid means of confirming such speculation.

#### DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT

A facsimile of the actual survey instrument mailed to the 174 potential study participants has been appended to this study as Appendix A. The questionnaire consists of two broad parts, the first including Sections A, B, C and D, the second of Section E. Each of the Sections (A through D) comprising the first half of the survey instrument are identical in form. The participants were presented with a brief abstract of a specific police-related research work, these works being selected through procedures outlined later in this chapter. The inclusion of these abstracts was judged to be necessary to "jog the memory" of survey participants about works they may (or may not) have encountered since the time of their respective publications, i.e., between 1976 and 1982. Each respondent was then asked (a) whether he was aware of the existence of this study prior to reading the abstract and (b) whether he had ever read the work in question in complete or abridged form. Those answering "yes" to both of these questions, were then asked to respond to affirmative statements about the relevance of the particular work to the operations of their command, whether that work had been considered (used) in decision-making for their command, and

characteristics, i.e., research quality) which they judged to be important to police work (thereby covering the second of Conner's eight characteristics). This screening panel was staffed by the following individuals: Dr. Gary Marx (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), Prof. Peter Manning (Center for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford University), Dr. Jennifer Hunt (Montclair State College); Dr. Carl Klockars (University of Delaware), Dr. Barbara Raffel Price (John Jay College of Criminal Justice), Dr. Dorothy H. Bracey (John Jay College of Criminal Justice), Prof. Lawrence Sherman (Center for Crime Control, University of Maryland) and Ms. Joan Petersilia (Rand Institute). From the works most frequently identified by this panel, a winnowed list of "candidates" was derived. The final selection of the four study works was made through a forced-response questionnaire administered to the entire doctoral faculty of John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The four "survey works" or "prominent studies" that emerged from this search are:

1. Greenwood, Peter W; Chaiken, Jan M; Petersilia, Joan; and Prosoff, Linda. The Criminal Investigation Process. Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath, 1977.
2. Police Foundation. The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment. Washington: Police Foundation, 1981.
3. National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. Response Time Analysis: A Study Performed in the Kansas City Police Department. Washington: National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1977.

whether that work's findings/recommendations had been incorporated (applied) into working practice within their command. These responses were forced, arranged in five-point Likert-type form as: (1) strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree and strongly disagree. Use of this format allowed respondents to express a wider range of opinions than would be possible with a simple "agree"/ "disagree" format and facilitated quantification of data from this portion of the questionnaire.

What we shall be referring to as the four "prominent studies" were selected through a three-stage process. With the assistance of Dr. Antony E. Simpson, a comprehensive search was made of all works published between the years 1976 and 1982 which met three further criteria:

- (1) Their topics must have been related to police operations or police organization;
- (2) They must have been funded by public or private bodies outside of the police departments from which survey participants were drawn;
- (3) They must have been conducted within police departments other than those from which survey participants were drawn.

From this extensive list, we asked eight (8) acknowledged experts in the field of criminal justice to nominate potential "candidates" for ultimate selection as survey works. These experts were asked to select high quality research works (thereby "covering" the first of Conner's eight specific

4. Milton, Catherine; Halleck, J.W.; Lardner, J.; and Albrecht, G.L. Police Use of Deadly Force. Washington: Police Foundation, 1977.

For the purposes of conciseness and convenience, we shall periodically refer to these works as Study #1 or (Investigation), Study #2 or (Newark), Study #3 or (Kansas City) and Study #4 or (Deadly Force). Additionally, we will refer to them collectively as "prominent studies". Some information about the content of these works is contained in the abstracts attached to this study as Appendix A. In what follows, I shall try to provide further background material which may be relevant in considering the response of participants to them.

Conducted over a two-year period (1973-1975), Greenwood et.al, The Criminal Investigation Process synthesized data from some 153 questionnaires, on site observations and the examination of police department records to discover predominant patterns in the conduct of investigatory work by local law enforcement agencies. Funded by a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, the text first appeared as a summary report in 1975 and was published two years later by D.C. Heath. The work's chief findings were not welcome by law enforcement practitioners. The authors concluded that most crimes are cleared by simple means or not at all, and that much of work performed by police department detectives could have been handled with equal skill by clerical personnel. Announced as the most comprehensive study

of the investigation process to that time, the Greenwood et.al. work came under fairly severe criticism from the police community, many alluding to study design problems entailed in a work of this scale.

The Newark Foot Patrol Experiment was conducted under a grant administered by the National Institute Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice through the Police Foundation. To this day, it remains the fullest examination of foot patrol ever made in the United States. From the standpoint of the police community, this work is far less threatening in its central conclusion than the Greenwood, et.al. piece. The researchers central conclusion was that while foot patrol does not appreciably reduce crime, it does affect the feelings of citizens about their safety and mobility. On this basis, the researchers recommended the increased use of foot patrol by urban police departments and the raising of the status of this function. Critics of this study often allude to the absence of a "control" group against which to measure the effects of the "test" group.

Sponsored and conducted by the NILECJ, Response Time Analysis: A Study Performed in the Kansas City Police Department was conducted in Kansas City in 1973 and published some four years later. Its principal finding was that rapid response did not appreciably increase the probability of arresting criminal suspects, largely because of the time lapse between a crime's commission, its discovery and the citizen's reporting of it to the police. On this basis, the authors

asserted that minimization of response time was not an empirically-justifiable police goal. The study was later replicated in Peoria, Illinois; Jacksonville, Florida; San Diego, California; and Rochester, New York. These replicatory studies confirmed the Kansas City results, thereby challenging the prevailing notion that the probability of arrest is directly correlated with the minimization of police response time.

Sponsored by the Police Foundation under an LEAA grant, Milton's et.al.'s Police Use of Deadly Force is by far the most "threatening" study from the standpoint of law enforcement practitioners. The authors investigated 320 incidents in which citizens were shot by on-duty and off-duty police officers. The survey covered seven cities, including Washington, D.C. and Birmingham, Alabama. The most disturbing conclusion which the researchers reached was that many of these shootings were uncalled for by the circumstances in which they occurred, and that in the case of shootings by off-duty officers (some 17 percent of the total, unless gross negligence was involved, e.g., drunkenness, police administrators were unlikely to impose sanctions. The general impression of police "recklessness" which emerged from this study has not endeared it to the law enforcement community.

What we have then are four divergent studies examining different facets of police operations carrying decidedly varying degrees of "threat" to law enforcement practitioners. Two of the studies, i.e., Investigation and Deadly Force, came

to conclusions which tend to downgrade police work or case it in a negative light. One study is essentially neutral; the Kansas City piece challenges a prevailing assumption of police operations but in a non-threatening manner. The Newark study is generally up-beat, calling for the enhanced status of foot patrolmen. As the reader will no doubt note, in at least two cases, critics have found conceptual or methodological flaws. Nevertheless, because they were deemed valid by our panel of experts, we consider these works to be of fairly high quality and clearly of importance to police operations.

The second part of the survey instrument (Section E) contains 11 forced-response items, arranged, again, in five-point Likert-type scale of strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree and strongly disagree. Since these questions concern police-related research in general, all 123 of the survey respondents were asked to complete it. Three of the eleven statements (items #8 through #10) are basically identical to the questions asked about the relevance, degree of use and degree of application for specific survey works in Section A through D, only here we asked about police-related research in "general". No effort was made to examine the fourth characteristic of Conner's model, i.e., type of utilization. According to the operational definition of "use" adopted in this study, only instrumental use for direct problem-solving is at issue, while conceptual use is virtually discounted. Four items seek to measure the degree of satisfaction which respondents have about their role in topic

selection, preparation, derivation of recommendations for police-related research in general, and about their part in the evaluation of policies/programs based upon research findings. One item (#2) asks whether respondents have been consulted about police-related research on a frequent basis, one (#7) probes satisfaction with the dissemination of police related-research in general. The remaining two items (#1 and #11) inquire as to the perceptions of operational personnel about the motives of research in the field and their summary judgement of the value of police-related research in general.

#### SURVEY INSTRUMENT PROCEDURES

Prospective participants in the survey instrument portion were initially contacted through an introductory during the summer of 1985. A total of 174 questionnaires were mailed in the fall of 1985, and by the spring of the following year, a total of 123 were completed and returned. Of the 74 instruments sent to precinct commanders in the New York City Police Department, 62 were returned for a group participation rate of 84.3 percent. Of the 100 questionnaires sent to operational commanders outside of New York, 61 were completed and returned, for a group participation rate of 61 percent. The overall participation rate, 70.7 percent, was deemed sufficiently high to proceed with data analysis as subsequent follow-up post cards to non-respondents did not substantially increase participation. Each of the questionnaires was accompanied by a cover letter outlining the broad purposes of the project and assuring strict anonymity of respondent data.

The questionnaire ended with a segment which requested voluntary participation in the interview portion of this study.

#### THE STRUCTURED INTERVIEW

In response to the request for survey participants to take part in structured interviews conducted by the researcher, a total of 42 positive and 80 negative answers were received. Of the 42, 18 positive responses were given by subjects from the New York City Police Department, while 24 came from subjects outside of New York. Upon consideration, it was decided that the interviews could best be conducted on a face-to-face basis. This, in turn, prompted us to limit the interview population to members of the New York City group. From the list of 18 potential interview candidates, 10 were selected at random. All 10 were subsequently interviewed by the researcher during sessions which lasted from between 20 to 30 minutes.

The structured interview itself was comprised of 8 questions presented in an open-ended manner. These questions were designed to elicit opinions and gather background information concerning the views of and the experience of the interviewees on/with extramural police-related research. Having the benefit of the survey data, we were able to structure the questions so as to "explain" broad trends evident from the survey information. For example, the first question in the interview was based on the survey finding

that, in general, dissemination of research to potential targets is weak, and, so, the first question posed was: "In your opinion, why is dissemination (of police-related research) so weak?" Since the entire interview schedule is attached to this dissertation as Appendix B, only a few comments are necessary at this point. Question #2 parallels question #1 in the sense that the interview subjects were asked to explain why utilization of research is generally low. Question #3, #4, #5 and #6 pertain respectively to the pattern, rationale, timing and state of the utilizers described by Conner as factors affecting the dissemination-utilization process. Question #7 is meant to confirm the expressed desire of survey participants to play a greater role in topic selection, research preparation, recommendation formulation of research studies and in the evaluation of policies/programs based upon research studies. In question #8, we try to gather the suggestions of the interview subjects as to measures which might be taken to improve the dissemination and utilization of police-related research.

We originally intended to code interview responses for subsequent quantitative analysis. In the case of the first three questions and the first part of question #7, a numerical value based upon frequency of a given type of response was possible. For questions #4, #5, #6, #8 and the second part of question #7, the range of responses given was so diverse that such quantification was not possible. Consequently, while all of the survey data have been subjected to computer-assisted

quantitative analysis, the interview information will be presented without such analysis, although, when relevant, reference will be made to the frequency of a given response to a particular interview question.

CHAPTER VI  
STUDY RESULTS

INTRODUCTION

As previously mentioned, the study design of this research effort consisted of two structural elements. The first was a questionnaire survey comprised of 31 forced-response items. The second component was a structured interview with ten survey respondents. This chapter presents in detail the results of the survey and the interviews.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT: SECTIONS A THROUGH D

Questionnaire items A-1, B-1, C-1 and D-1 were intended to measure the degree to which survey respondents were aware of the existence of Prominent Study #1 (The Criminal Investigation Process), #2 (The Newark Foot Patrol Study), #3 (The Kansas City Response Time Analysis and #4 (Police Use Of Deadly Force). Participants were asked the question(s): Are you aware of the existence of (one of the Prominent Studies)? To this question they had the option of responding "yes", "no" or "unsure". A tabulation of the data derived from these items is shown in Table 1.

The most significant information generated from these items is that the awareness level of survey participants concerning the four "Prominent Studies" as a whole was "moderate": in the roughest terms, the probability that any given respondent was aware of any specific survey work was one in two. Secondly, there was significant variation evident in

**TABLE 1**  
**AWARENESS OF "PROMINENT STUDIES"**

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents Reporting an Awareness of Prominent Studies as Indicated by Questionnaire Items A-1, B-1, C-1, and D-1.

<u>PROMINENT STUDY</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>UNSURE</u>
<u>#1 (Investigation)</u>	Total	41(33.3)	71(57.7)	11(8.9)
	NYC	17(27.4)	40(64.5)	5(8.1)
	Outside	24(39.3)	31(50.8)	6(9.8)
-----				
<u>#2 (Newark)</u>	Total	66(53.7)	51(41.5)	6(4.9)
	NYC	33(53.2)	33(38.7)	5(8.1)
	Outside	33(54.1)	27(44.3)	1(1.6)
-----				
<u>#3 (Kansas City)</u>	Total	79(64.2)	39(31.7)	5(4.1)
	NYC	41(66.1)	20(32.2)	1(1.6)
	Outside	38(62.3)	19(31.3)	4(6.6)
-----				
<u>#4 (Deadly Force)</u>	Total	50(40.7)	63(51.2)	10(8.1)
	NYC	22(35.5)	34(54.8)	6(9.7)
	Outside	28(47.5)	29(47.5)	4(6.6)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of cases  
Numbers within parentheses are percentages within relevant survey group

the awareness of all survey respondents about individual Prominent Studies: nearly two-thirds were aware of the Kansas City study, over one-half were aware of the Newark study, but only 2 in 5 were aware of the Deadly Force study, while awareness of the Investigation study was about one-third of the total survey populace. Comparing the New York and outside groups, there was little disparity in their respective awareness of studies #2 (Newark) and #3 (Kansas City), while the outside group reported slightly greater awareness of studies #1 (Criminal Investigation) and #4 (Deadly Force). On the whole, survey subjects were fairly certain about whether they were aware or were not aware of a specific study: in no case and for no group was the percentage of "unsure" responses greater than 10 percent.

Questionnaire items A-2, B-2, C-2 and D-2 were intended to measure the degree to which survey respondents had actually read Prominent Studies #1 (Criminal Investigation), #2 (Newark), #3 (Kansas City) and #4 (Deadly Force). Participants were asked the question(s): Have you ever actually read (one of the Prominent Studies) in full, abridged or summary form? To this question, they had the option of responding "yes", "no" or "unsure". A tabulation of the data derived from these items is shown in Table 2.

As one might anticipate, the percentage of respondents reporting that they had actually read a given survey work was significantly less than those reporting awareness of the existence of a given survey work. The probability that any

**TABLE 2****READ/NOT READ PROMINENT STUDIES**

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents Reporting Having Read or Not Having Read the Prominent Studies as Indicated by Questionnaire Items A-2, B-2, C-2, and D-2.

<u>PROMINENT STUDY</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>YES</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>UNSURE</u>
#1 (Investigation)	Total	21(17.1)	100(81.3)	2(1.6)
	NYC	7(11.3)	54(87.1)	1(1.6)
	Outside	14(23.0)	46(75.4)	1(1.6)
-----				
#2 (Newark)	Total	39(31.7)	79(64.2)	5(4.1)
	NYC	18(29.0)	42(67.7)	2(3.2)
	Outside	21(34.4)	37(60.7)	3(4.9)
-----				
#3 (Kansas City)	Total	53(43.1)	65(52.8)	5(4.1)
	NYC	22(35.5)	37(59.7)	3(4.8)
	Outside	31(50.8)	28(45.9)	2(3.3)
-----				
#4 (Deadly Force)	Total	20(16.3)	95(77.2)	8(6.5)
	NYC	8(12.9)	50(80.6)	4(6.5)
	Outside	12(19.7)	45(73.8)	4(6.5)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of cases. Numbers within parentheses are percentages within relevant survey groups.

respondent had actually read any Prominent Study was about 1 in 3. Again, there was considerable variation across works. Over two-fifths reported that they had read the Kansas City study, nearly one-third had read the Newark study, but less than one-fifth had read either the Investigation or the Deadly Force studies. Comparing the two groups, those outside the New York City Police Department consistently reported higher percentages of actual reading than their New York counterparts. This variation was smallest in the case of the Newark study, i.e., 34.4 percent compared to 29.0 percent, and greatest in the case of the Investigation study, i.e., 23.0 percent versus 11.3 percent. The percentage of respondents who were "unsure" of whether they had actually read a given Prominent Study was again low, not exceeding 6.5 percent for any survey group.

Questionnaire items A-3, B-3, C-3 and D-3 were intended to measure the degree to which survey respondents viewed the Prominent Studies as being relevant. Only those having responded "yes" to having read a particular work were asked to respond to these items. For the total survey population, the number of valid cases was 21 for study #1 (Criminal Investigation), 39 for study #2 (Newark), 53 for study #3 (Kansas City) and 19 for study #4 (Deadly Force). Valid case respondents were presented with the statement: The findings/recommendations (of a given survey work) are relevant to the operations of my command. To this statement, the valid case respondents for any given survey work were given the option of

responding, "strongly agree", agree, "no opinion", "disagree" or "strongly disagree". A tabulation of responses derived from these items appears in Table 3.

On the whole, the probability that a given respondent who had read a given study would "strongly agree" or "agree" with a statement asserting the relevance of that study to the operations of his command was about 1 in 2. Significant variation is evident across studies: nearly two-thirds of all valid cases strongly agreed or agreed with this statement with regard to the Newark study; nearly one-half gave similar opinions in the case of the Deadly Force study; 45.2 percent concurred in regard to the Kansas City study; only 38.1 percent voiced a positive opinion of the relevance of the Investigation study. Comparing the two groups, the "outside" cases were more likely to strongly agree or agree to statements asserting the relevance of three of the four survey works. This disparity was greatest in the case of survey work #4 (Deadly Force) where only 27.3 percent of the outside group disagreed that it was relevant compared to 62.5 percent of the New York City group. By way of contrast, in the case of study #2 (Newark), 72.2 percent of the New York group strongly agreed or agreed that it was relevant compared to 61.9 percent of the outside group. The percentage of those reporting "no opinion" was low except in the case of study #4 (Police Use of Deadly Force) where 10.5 percent of the total study population and 12.5 percent of the New York group responded "no opinion".

Questionnaire items A-4, B-4, C-4 and D-4 were intended

**TABLE 3 - RELEVANCE OF "PROMINENT STUDIES"**

Numbers/Percentages of Survey Respondents' Opinions of the Relevance of the Prominent Studies as Indicated by Questionnaire Items A-3, B-3, C-3, and D-3.

<u>"PROMINENT STUDY"</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>VALID CASES</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
#1 (Investigation)	Total	21	1(4.8)	7(33.3)	1(4.8)	11(52.4)	1(4.8)
	NYC	7	-----	2(28.6)	-----	4(57.1)	1(14.3)
	Outside	14	1(7.1)	5(35.7)	1(7.1)	7(50.0)	-----
#2 (Newark)	Total	39	10(25.6)	16(41.0)	2(5.1)	10(25.6)	1(2.6)
	NYC	18	5(27.8)	8(44.4)	1(5.6)	4(22.2)	-----
	Outside	21	5(23.8)	8(38.1)	1(4.8)	6(28.6)	1(4.8)
#3 (Kansas City)	Total	53	5(9.4)	19(35.8)	2(3.8)	26(49.1)	1(1.9)
	NYC	22	2(9.1)	7(31.8)	1(4.5)	11(50.0)	1(4.5)
	Outside	31	3(9.7)	12(38.7)	1(3.2)	15(48.4)	-----
#4 (Deadly Force)	Total	19	3(15.8)	6(31.6)	2(10.5)	8(42.1)	-----
	NYC	8	1(12.5)	1(12.5)	1(12.5)	5(62.5)	-----
	Outside	11	2(18.2)	5(45.5)	1(9.1)	3(27.3)	-----

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of valid cases within each survey group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages of valid cases within each survey group.

to measure the degree to which survey respondents believed that survey works had been considered in decision-making for their operational commands, such consideration being a yardstick of "use" according to the definition of "use" employed in this study. Again, only those having responded "yes" to having read a particular survey work were asked to respond to the relevant item. Thus, the number of valid cases for each study was the same as for items A-3, B-3, C-3 and D-3. Valid cases respondents were presented with the following statement: The findings/recommendations (of a given survey work) have been considered in policy-making for my command. To this statement, the valid case respondents for any given survey work were given to option of responding "strongly agree", "agree", "no opinion", "disagree" or "strongly disagree". A tabulation of the data derived from these items appears in Table 4.

As was expected, the percentage of respondents reporting the "use" of survey works was generally lower than those responding affirmatively to assertion of survey work relevance. There is a very significant disparity in reported percentages of use for studies #1 (Criminal Investigation), #3 (Kansas City) and #4 (Deadly Force), on the one hand, and study #2 (Newark), on the other. Of the total respondents, 36.9 percent strongly agreed or agreed that study #4 (Deadly Force) was "used", the respective percentages for studies #1 (Criminal Investigation) and #3 (Kansas City) being 33.3 percent and 30.2 percent. Conversely, 45.5 percent disagreed

**TABLE 4 - THE USE OF PROMINENT STUDIES**

Numbers/Percentages of Survey Respondents' Opinions about the Use of the Prominent Studies as Indicated by Questionnaire Items A-4, B-4, C-4, and D-4.

<u>"PROMINENT STUDY"</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>VALID CASES</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
#1 (Investigation)	Total	21	-----	7(33.3)	-----	13(61.9)	1(4.8)
	NYC	7	-----	2(28.6)	-----	4(57.1)	1(14.3)
	Outside	14	-----	5(35.7)	-----	9(64.3)	-----
-----							
#2 (Newark)	Total	39	4(10.3)	17(43.6)	4(10.3)	12(30.8)	2(5.1)
	NYC	18	1(5.6)	11(61.6)	1(5.6)	5(27.8)	-----
	Outside	21	3(14.3)	6(28.6)	3(14.3)	7(33.3)	2(9.5)
-----							
#3 (Kansas City)	Total	53	2(3.8)	14(26.4)	6(11.3)	26(49.1)	5(9.4)
	NYC	22	1(4.5)	6(27.3)	2(9.1)	8(36.4)	5(22.7)
	Outside	31	1(3.2)	8(25.8)	4(12.9)	18(58.1)	-----
-----							
#4 (Deadly Force)	Total	19	1(5.3)	6(31.6)	4(21.1)	7(36.8)	1(5.3)
	NYC	8	1(12.5)	2(25.0)	2(25.0)	3(27.5)	-----
	Outside	11	-----	4(36.4)	2(18.2)	4(36.4)	1(9.1)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of valid cases within each survey group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages of valid cases within each survey group.

or strongly disagreed with statements asserting use of study #4 (Deadly Force), the respective percentages for studies #1 (Criminal Investigation) and #3 (Kansas City) being 66.7 percent and 58.5 percent. Directly counter to these patterns, 53.9 percent of all survey respondents "strongly agreed" or "agreed" that study #2 (Newark) had been used in decision-making for their commands, while only 35.9 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed. This deviation was even more pronounced in the case of the New York City group: a full 67.2 percent of this group strongly agreed or agreed that study #2 (Newark) had been used in decision-making for their commands, only 27.8 percent disagreeing or strongly disagreeing. The number of "no opinion" responses to these items was generally greater than in the case of the "relevance" items, with, for instance 21.1 percent of the total populace reporting no opinion about the use of study #4 (Deadly Force).

Questionnaire items A-5, B-5, C-5 and D-5 were intended to measure survey respondents' opinions regarding the incorporation of study findings into policy for their commands, such incorporation being taken as a measure of application or implementation. As with the past two series of items, only respondents answering "yes" to having read a given work were asked to respond as to the degree of application of that work. These valid case respondents were presented with the statement: The findings/recommendations (of a given survey work) have been incorporated into the working policy of

my command. To this statement, valid case respondents were given the option of responding, "strongly agree", "agree", "no opinion", "disagree" or "strongly disagree". A tabulation of the data derived from responses to these items appears in Table 5.

Again, as we anticipated, on the whole, reported instances of application/implementation were fewer in number than reported cases of "use". Strong variation across studies was again in evidence. Of the total survey population, 42.1 percent strongly agreed or agreed that the findings/recommendations of study #4 (Deadly Force) had been implemented, the respective percentage for studies #3 (Kansas City) and #4 (Deadly Force) being 24.6 percent and 19.0 percent. However, more than one-half of all survey respondents strongly agreed or agreed that study #2 (Newark) findings/recommendations had been implemented within their commands. Again, this "positive" appraisal of the Newark study was due to an extremely strong percentage of New York City respondents (61.2 percent) agreeing or strongly agreeing that the Newark study's findings/recommendations had been implemented within their commands. Apart from study #2 (Newark), there was no significant variation in the response patterns of the two study groups. Those giving "no opinion" were relatively fewer in number than for the "use" items, but, in some cases, e.g., studies #3 (Kansas City) and #4 (Deadly Force), "no opinion" responses were greater than 10 percent.

SURVEY INSTRUMENT: SECTION E

**TABLE 5 - THE APPLICATION OF THE PROMINENT STUDIES**

Numbers/Percentages of Survey Respondents' Opinions on the Application of Prominent Studies

<u>"PROMINENT STUDY"</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>VALID CASES</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
#1 (Investigation)	Total	21	-----	4(19.0)	-----	15(71.4)	2(9.5)
	NYC	7	-----	1(14.3)	-----	5(71.4)	1(14.3)
	Outside	14	-----	3(21.4)	-----	10(71.4)	1(7.1)
-----							
#2 (Newark)	Total	39	4(10.3)	16(41.0)	3(7.7)	13(33.3)	3(7.7)
	NYC	18	1(5.6)	10(55.6)	1(5.6)	6(33.3)	-----
	Outside	21	3(14.3)	6(28.6)	2(9.5)	7(33.3)	3(14.3)
-----							
#3 (Kansas City)	Total	53	2(3.8)	11(20.8)	6(11.3)	27(50.9)	7(13.2)
	NYC	22	1(4.5)	6(27.3)	3(13.6)	7(31.8)	5(22.7)
	Outside	31	1(3.2)	5(16.1)	3(9.7)	20(64.5)	2(6.5)
-----							
#4 (Deadly Force)	Total	19	1(5.3)	7(36.8)	2(10.5)	8(42.1)	1(5.3)
	NYC	8	1(12.5)	2(25.0)	1(12.5)	4(50.0)	-----
	Outside	11	-----	5(45.5)	1(9.1)	4(36.4)	1(9.1)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of valid cases within each survey group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages of valid cases within each survey group.

Section E of the questionnaire was devoted to questions concerning the opinion of and experience of the respondents about externally-funded, police-related research in general. All 11 items in this section presented the respondents with an affirmative statement and asked them to select from five mutually-exclusive, forced-responses, i.e., "strongly agree", "agree", "no opinion", "disagree" and "strongly disagree". Since knowledge of specific research studies was not required, all survey respondents were asked to complete this section of the questionnaire. There were 123 valid cases for all 11 items, 62 from the New York City group and 61 from the "outside" group.

Item E-1 asked participants to respond to the statement: In general, the needs of operational police commanders are the primary concern of police-related researchers. The results of this item are presented in tabular form in Table 6.

The central finding which can be derived from the data in Table 6 is that nearly two-thirds of all respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement, while less than one-fourth of the respondents strongly agreed or agreed. Another way of looking at it is that three times as many participants "strongly disagreed" with the statement as "strongly agreed". On the whole, the New York City group was slightly more negative than its outside counterpart, but the response patterns for the two groups are consistent.

Item E-2 presented the participants with the statement: During my tenure as an operational police commander, I have

been consulted many times about police-related research. This item was designed to measure the experience of the survey population in contrast to their opinions. The data generated on this item is presented in Table 7.

The study population's response to this statement was overwhelmingly negative. A full 87.8 percent of the total group either disagreed or strongly disagreed, while less than 10 percent agreed (there were no strongly agree responses). Moreover, over two-fifths of the total stressed their disapproval of this statement by strongly disagreeing. The New York City group was considerably more negative on this count than the outside group: only 2 of the 62 members of the New York group agreed with the statement compared to 10 of the 61 members of the outside group. Again, despite this variation, the general pattern for the two groups is similar.

Items E-3, E-4, E-5 and E-6 may be treated as a distinct subset. In each instance, respondents were asked to express their level of satisfaction with their involvement in some phase of the research process. Thus, in Item E-3, respondents were presented with the statement: "In general, the part played by operational police commanders in the selection of topics for externally-funded, police-related research studies is satisfactory." In lieu of that portion of Item E-3 which reads, "in the selection of topics for", Item E-4 substitutes, "in the preparation of", Item E-5 substitutes, "in the formulation of recommendations contained in" and Item E-6 substitutes, "in evaluating the results of policies based on the findings/recommendations of". Due to the similar nature

**TABLE 6****THE PRIMARY CONCERN OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCHERS**

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About the Primary Concern of Police-Related Researchers as Indicated by Questionnaire Item E-1.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	3(2.4)	27(22.0)	16(13.0)	68(55.3)	9(7.3)
NYC - 62	1(1.6)	13(21.0)	6(9.7)	35(56.5)	7(11.3)
Outside - 61	2(3.3)	14(23.0)	10(16.4)	33(54.1)	2(3.3)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of respondents within each group. Numbers inside of parentheses are percentages within each group.

**TABLE 7****CONSULTATIONS ABOUT POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH**

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Recollections of Their Experience in Being Consulted About Police-Related Research.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	-----	12(9.8)	3(2.4)	56(45.5)	52(42.3)
NYC -62	-----	2(3.2)	3(4.8)	29(46.8)	28(45.2)
Outside - 61	-----	10(16.4)	-----	27(44.3)	24(39.3)

Note: Numbers outside of parentheses are numbers of respondents within each group. Numbers inside of parentheses are percentages within each group.

of these items and the convergent results which they elicited, data from them has been aggregated into Table 8.

What is striking about the data contained in Table 8 is the uniformly negative character of the responses: for all groups on all items, the percentage of those disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with these statement(s) ranged from 80.3 percent to 87.1 percent, while, on the same basis, those strongly agreeing or agreeing with the statement ranged from 1.6 percent to 14.7 percent. With one exception (the "outside" groups response to their role in evaluation), in all cases and for all groups, those strongly disagreeing with the statement outnumbered those strongly agreeing by 12 to 1 or more. When we constructed this set of items, we expected to find some variations in responses across them. Such was not the case. All respondents were about as dissatisfied with the involvement of operational commanders in all four "phases" of the research process expressed in these items. There was, however, some variation in the responses of the two groups. The outside group included a higher number of "positive" responses than the New York group on all items, while the New York group was more likely to strongly disagree than the outside group on every item. Still, given the small number of affirmative responses for both groups, these variations appear small.

Item E-7 presented the respondents with the statement: "In general, I consider the dissemination of externally funded, police-related research studies to me to be satisfactory." Responses to Item E-7 appear as Table 9.

TABLE 8

PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT BY POLICE COMMANDERS IN THE CONDUCTING OF POLICE RESEARCH

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About the Involvement of Operational Police Commanders in the Production of Police-Related Research as Indicated by Items E-3,4,5,6.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
E-3	Total	2(1.6)	8(6.5)	9(7.3)	76(61.8)	28(22.8)
(Topic Selection)	NYC	1(1.6)	1(1.6)	6(9.7)	38(61.3)	16(25.8)
	Outside	1(1.6)	7(11.5)	3(4.9)	38(62.3)	12(19.7)
-----						
E-4	Total	-----	5(4.1)	11(8.9)	78(63.4)	29(23.6)
(Preparation)	NYC	-----	1(1.6)	7(11.3)	38(61.3)	16(25.8)
	Outside	-----	4(6.6)	4(6.6)	40(65.6)	13(21.3)
-----						
E-5	Total	1(0.8)	6(4.9)	15(12.2)	69(56.1)	32(26.0)
(Recommendations)	NYC	1(1.6)	1(1.6)	9(14.5)	34(54.8)	17(27.4)
	Outside	-----	5(8.2)	6(9.8)	35(57.4)	15(24.6)
-----						
E-6	Total	1(0.8)	9(7.3)	10(8.1)	82(66.7)	21(17.1)
(Evaluation)	NYC	-----	1(1.6)	7(11.3)	39(62.9)	15(24.2)
	Outside	1(1.6)	8(13.1)	3(4.9)	43(70.5)	6(9.8)

Note: Numbers outside of the parentheses are the numbers of respondents within each group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages within each group.

The response to this statement was resoundingly negative: a full four-fifths of all respondents gave a "disagree" or "strongly disagree" answer, only 1 in 7 agreed with the statement and there were no "strongly agree" responses. The outside group was decidedly more affirmative on this point than the New York group, giving twice as many "agree" responses as the New York participants, while the latter gave twice as many "strongly disagree" responses as the former. However, given the overwhelming weight of the negative responses, this variation---while statistically significant---does not alter the overall similarity in the two groups' response patterns.

Item E-8 was intended to obtain the participants opinion concerning the "relevance" of extramural, police-related research in general. Thus, the respondents were presented with the statement: "In general, I consider the findings/ recommendations of externally-funded, police-related research studies which I have read to be relevant to the operations of my command." The data elicited by this item is shown in Table 10. For the total study populace, there were exactly twice as many "disagree" or "strongly disagree" responses as "agree" or "strongly agree" responses. Indeed, at the ends of the response spectrum, the disparity is even greater: there were six times as many "strongly disagree" responses as "strongly agree" ones. Discounting the "no opinion" responses, the pattern for the New York and outside groups are nearly identical; in fact, there were slightly more negative

TABLE 9THE DISSEMINATION OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About the Dissemination of Police-Related Research to Them as Indicated by Questionnaire Item E-7.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	-----	19(15.4)	5(4.1)	76(61.8)	23(18.7)
NYC - 62	-----	6(9.7)	3(4.8)	36(58.1)	17(27.4)
Outside - 61	-----	13(21.3)	2(3.3)	40(65.6)	6(9.8)

Note: Numbers outside of the parentheses are numbers of respondents within each group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages of respondents within each group.

TABLE 10THE PERCEIVED RELEVANCE OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About the Relevance of Police-Related Research as Indicated by Questionnaire Item E-8.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total -123	2(1.6)	35(28.5)	12(9.8)	62(50.4)	12(9.8)
NYC - 62	1(1.6)	16(25.8)	9(14.5)	27(43.5)	9(14.5)
Outside - 61	1(1.6)	19(31.1)	3(4.9)	35(57.4)	3(4.9)

Note: Numbers outside of the parentheses are the numbers of respondents within each group. Numbers within parentheses are percentages within each group.

responses to this statement from the outside group than from the New York participants.

The next question, Item E-9, dealt with the survey populace's view of the degree to which they had "used" extramural police-related research in general. The questionnaire subjects were presented with the statement: In general, I have considered the findings/recommendations of externally-funded, police-related research studies in formulating policy for my command." The results generated by this item are given in Table 11.

On the whole, the response pattern to this "general use" statement was what one would expect on the basis of the responses given on the previous, "relevance" item. About two-and-one-half times as many respondents answered "disagree" or "strongly disagree" in relation to affirmative responses. What this suggests is that, in addition to those who "discarded" extramural research findings/recommendations as "irrelevant", a small number (about 5 percent of the study populace), appear to have considered these findings/recommendations relevant but did not use them in making policy for their commands. Placing the "no opinion" responses to the side, the outside group was slightly more negative than the New York City group. In the case of the latter, there were, in fact, a large number of "no opinion" replies, 1 in 6 of this group answering this item with a "no opinion" response.

Item E-10 was designed to measure the degree to which the

survey participants viewed extramural police-related research as actually having been applied to the working policy of their commands. This measure of "implementation" presented the participants with the statement: "In general, the findings/recommendations of externally-funded, police-related research have been incorporated into the working policy for my command." Data gleaned from responses to this item are summarized in Table 12.

The overall response pattern to this item is logically consistent with the response patterns for the "relevance" and "use" items. Those responding "disagree" or "strongly disagree" outnumbered the "agree" or "strongly disagree" respondents by a margin of more than 4 to 1. This indicates that in addition to those who (a) discard extramural research as "irrelevant" and (b) deem such research relevant but do not consider it in policy-making, there appears to be a fairly large group (about 9.0 percent of the total study populace) who consider such research relevant and consider it in policy-making but, for whom, such consideration does not, in general, lead to implementation. Otherwise, the response patterns for the two groups are virtually identical, and, again, the number of "no opinion" responses to this item is fairly large.

Intended as a kind of summary question, Item E-11 inquires about the respondents' opinions regarding the value of extramural, police-related research in general. This item presented the survey subjects with the statement: "In

general, externally-funded, police-related research studies are of great value to me." Responses to this item are presented in Table 13.

For the entire study populace, "disagree" or "strongly disagree" responses outnumber "agree" or "strongly agree" replies by a ratio of 3 to 1. On this item, the New York City group was moderately more negative and moderately less positive than the outside group. Curiously, however, there were more "strongly disagree" responses from the outside group than from the New York City group.

#### STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESULTS

As the second broad component of the primary research design, the researcher conducted a set of 10 structured interviews with respondents chosen at random from among those members of the New York City group who expressed their willingness to participate in this portion of the study. Although an initial attempt was made to code interview responses for quantification purposes, by noting the frequency of a "type" of response, (a) this was not possible in the case of some questions and (b) more basically, the primary objective of the interviews was to "flesh out" the survey instrument data with qualitative information. Thus, for the first three questions and the first part of question #7, the frequency with which a given type of response occurred will be provided, but, for the remaining questions (#4, #5, #6, #8 and the second part of #7) no attempt at coding was judged to be

TABLE 11PERCEIVED USE OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About Their Use of Police-Related Research in General from Item E-9.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	3(2.4)	28(22.8)	13(10.6)	66(53.7)	13(10.6)
NYC - 62	1(1.6)	14(22.6)	10(16.1)	28(45.2)	9(14.5)
Outside - 61	2(3.3)	14(23.0)	3(4.9)	38(62.3)	4(6.6)

TABLE 12PERCEIVED APPLICATION OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Numbers/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions Concerning the Application of Police-Related Research to Working Policy as Indicated by Questionnaire Item E-10.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	1(0.8)	19(15.4)	15(12.2)	77(62.6)	11(8.9)
NYC - 62	-----	10(16.1)	9(14.5)	37(59.7)	6(9.7)
Outside - 61	1(1.6)	9(14.8)	6(9.8)	40(65.6)	5(8.2)

TABLE 13PERCEIVED VALUE OF POLICE-RELATED RESEARCH

Number/Percentages of Respondents' Opinions About the Value of Police-Related Research in General as Indicated by Item E11.

<u>SURVEY GROUP</u>	<u>STRONGLY AGREE</u>	<u>AGREE</u>	<u>NO OPINION</u>	<u>DISAGREE</u>	<u>STRONGLY DISAGREE</u>
Total - 123	2(1.6)	24(19.5)	13(10.6)	65(52.8)	19(15.4)
NYC - 62	1(1.6)	9(14.5)	6(9.7)	37(59.7)	9(14.5)
Outside - 61	1(1.6)	15(24.6)	7(11.5)	28(45.9)	10(16.4)

Note: For all three tables, the numbers outside of the parentheses are numbers of respondents within each group. The numbers within the parentheses are percentages within each group.

feasible. Wherever possible, we have tried to correlate specific answers given to these questions with one or more of the eight research utilization aspects embodied in the Conner model. In attempting to do this, however, an important finding was made. Three utilization factors, which were judged by the respondents to be very important, were not contained in the Conner model. As a result, we believe we have developed a more complete model of research use. These factors are as follows:

1. Resource constraints, i.e., finite limitations on the time, personnel or budgets of operating departments that affect research use/application.
2. Systemic characteristics, i.e., features of the current law enforcement research/dissemination and utilization system which affect research relevance, use and application.
3. Political-environmental variables, i.e., political factors within the external environments within which police departments function.

Where appropriate, these three factors will be cited in relationship to a given type of response. For the sake of clarity, Conner's characteristics will be underlined when they are connected to an interview answer, the three non-Conner factors mentioned above will appear without such italicization.

At the outset, we informed the interviewees that the survey data indicated that dissemination of extramural,

police-related studies was considered to be unsatisfactory by the vast majority of the questionnaire participants. We then asked the interview subjects why they thought dissemination of these materials was so weak.

In reply to this question, 10 different "types" of responses were given, some of the interviewees offering more than one explanation so that a total of 39 separate answers were recorded. In order of descending frequency with which they were mentioned, the five most prevalent responses were:

1. (8 responses) Police commanders are so busy reacting to daily problems that they do not have the time to seek out research that could help them (resource constraints).
2. (7 responses) Police commanders are not convinced of the value of research, so they don't go out of their way to find it (quality and importance of research results, state of the utilizers)
3. (6 responses) Topics researched are of little practical interest to police commanders (importance of research).
4. (6 responses) Researchers don't "do" research for the benefit of practitioners, so they don't care if operating personnel find out about the results of their research (systemic characteristics).
5. (5 responses) Funding agencies don't insist on guarantees of effort to inform police commanders about research studies (systemic characteristics).

Of the remaining five types of responses, two touch upon the points made above. The first, that research studies are "long" on problem identification, but short on solutions is clearly related to Item C above, the second, that approved dissemination plans simply don't include practitioners is directly connected with Item E above. In addition, two further comments are inter-related as facets of what Conner calls the level of the utilization target. They are: (A) that studies are distributed to the department's upper echelon, but are never distributed to operational personnel, and (B) that since research is not seen as important by police chiefs, line commanders also remain disinterested. The last comment remaining, is addressed to a "Political-Environmental Variable" one respondent asserting that, there is no one entity that is concerned enough to take the lead by developing and implementing a rational system to circulate findings to operational personnel.

Question #2 was prefaced with a statement that in the opinion of most survey respondents, the use of extramural police-related researchers by operational personnel is low. The obvious question was then asked: Why are research recommendations not used by police commanders. Two broad types of answers were elicited by this question, the first touching upon the importance of the research, the second upon resource constraints. On the former count, there were 8 responses of the type: Findings, although sometimes interesting, are often of little practical value. In support

of this assertion, one respondent recalled a study in which homicide rates were correlated with phases of the moon. Under this same heading, 7 interviewees responded that findings/recommendations are not useful because the topics researched are not relevant to the needs of operational commanders. This comment encompasses both the importance of the research and as a systemic characteristic. Finally, one respondent pointed to the problem of generalizability of research findings, observing that police services are organized on a local basis, so that what works in one jurisdiction may not necessarily work in another. The second inclusive category of responses to this question revolved around resource constraints. Three types of responses fall under this rubric.

1. (5 responses) Many times, recommendations simply cost too much to implement.
2. (3 responses) Recommendations of research studies are made in a vacuum by non-police personnel who do not understand inherent limitations on police work.
3. (1 response) Often recommendations cannot be implemented because of union contracts and community resistance.

The first sub-set of responses is clearly a "resource constraint" concern, the second includes both "resource constraints" and "systemic characteristics", while the third is a combination of "resource constraints" and "political-environmental variables."

Question #3 tapped the issue of the pattern of research utilization, asking interviewees how they normally came across extramural police-related research. The two most commonly given answers were as part of their college education or some other form of independent study, and through scanning professional journals in the field, with 7 and 6 respondents giving these replies respectively. Four respondents mentioned word-of-mouth" channels, i.e., through colleagues, while two cited familiarity through previous assignments on specialized planning units. What is most interesting, however, is that only two respondents stated that they came across extramural, police-related research studies via formal organizational channels. Apart from one respondent's citation of the New York Times, formal organizational channels were the rarest means through which police-related research reached interview subjects. Most frequently, the interviewees reported learning about extramural research studies as part of a "special" phase of their careers, e.g., while enrolled in educational/training courses or as members of special planning units. In other words, normally the interviewees learned about extramural research studies as a result of their participation in a sphere separate from the routine operational functions of their commands.

Question #4 was designed to probe the rationale behind the use of externally-funded research studies by police agencies. The interview subjects were asked if they could recall any cases in which extramural research was used

"symbolically", that is, to bolster a predetermined policy course or to repudiate an unpopular policy, either in force or under consideration. The response to this question was relatively meager: only four respondents could remember a specific instance of "symbolic" research use. Moreover, only two of these, reproduced verbatim below, were judged to be full-fledged cases of symbolic usage:

1. When the use of female officers on patrol was still a controversial issue, various studies, principally one done in Washington D.C., were used to convince or persuade non-believers/skeptics that females could perform the patrol function as well or better than males.
2. The Kerner Commission study of the Civil Disorders in the late sixties was used as a basis to change the philosophy concerning the policing of such disorders.

The other two responses to this question have less to do with symbolic usage than with the failure of research findings to be implemented. Specifically, respondents mentioned the 1966 Presidential Crime Control Report (The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society) and a study conducted in Kansas City in the early 1970s which questioned the value of preventive patrol (not survey work #3), as instances in which recommendations made were not translated into policy changes at the local level.

Question #5 set forth a hypothetical situation in which

extramural research studies were deemed to be relevant and then asked the interview subjects how likely would it be for the findings of this study to stimulate change within their department's operations. It was expected that this question would tap into the pattern and timing aspects of the Conner model. However, as the responses discussed below suggest, what came across most strongly were the factors which Conner calls level of the utilization target and importance of the research results. A total of five separate "types" of responses were recorded. Of these, the first two revolved around the same observation---albeit from slightly different perspectives---that change would occur only if it were mandated from the upper echelons of the department's organizational hierarchy. One subject commented that if decision-making power rests solely with the operational commander, the chances for change on a timely basis were good, otherwise, change was either unlikely or slow in coming. Another subject tapped into the rationale and state of the utilizers aspects of the Conner model, noting that when change is mandated from above, often it is "only a paper change (for) it is one thing for an administrator to mandate change, and another thing for the change to actually occur." In line with this comment, a third response went to the core of the rationale aspect of research use.

When a particular study supports a position an administrator already favors, that study will be used as justification for a change that was going to be made even in the absence of the study. If the study

is contrary to a predetermined course of action, then the study will be criticized or ignored. Research, then, is often used by those in authority to implement changes they already wanted to make.

The last two comments both touched upon the importance of research findings as a determinative factor in use, one participant asserting that more change would occur if research study topics were more relevant to the needs of operational commanders, while another provided the rough rule-of-thumb: "The likelihood of change is directly proportional to the practicality of the recommended change." This second comment, of course, also relates to resource constraints, but what is as interesting, although the question asked the respondents to assume that the research in question was "relevant", they still appeared to question the "real" relevance of the "typical" research study.

Question #6 represents an effort to identify factors which affect the utilization process. The interview subjects were asked: "what are the most important problems which you face in transforming recommendations from these studies into actual policy for your command and what forces delay policy changes from occurring?" Nine different types of answers were given to this inquiry. Two of these centered around what has been found to be the single most important factor affecting research application, i.e., the "people" factor spoken of by Conner as the state of the utilizers. One comment pointed to the natural tendency of subordinates to resist policy changes,

the other provided a summary of the rewards and sanctions discussion given by Conner under the heading of state of the utilizers.

Motivation for change is lacking. In the medical profession, for example, research findings spread quickly and are adopted quite rapidly because doctors are anxious to keep up with the state of the art. One of the reasons (that) this happens is because they want to continue to attract patients. Operational police commanders are not similarly motivated. In fact, maintaining the status quo is often the goal of police commanders.

Four of the respondents cited factors which we view as examples of resource constraints upon research use and implementation. Three of these mentioned the most common kinds of resource constraints in this field, i.e., time, personnel and money. Two others cited what we are calling "political-environmental variables", i.e., the limitations placed upon change by union contracts and the existence of political lobbies mobilized to defeat policy changes. In like manner, one interview subject alluded to the inherently "political" nature of law enforcement policy, contending that:

The conflicting goals of police work often prevent change from occurring. What is good for fighting crime, for example, is not always good for developing good community relations. Or, what is good for preventing corruption (the rotation of officers from one command to another) is not always good for community relations

or crime prevention.

Lastly, the matter of the importance of research findings was again broached, with one subject stating that: "The impracticality of research-generated recommendations prevent them from being implemented."

Question #7 centered on a theme which recurs throughout the literature on both research use in general and research use by law enforcement agencies in particular. The interviewees were asked: "Should operational commanders participate to a greater extent in preparing research studies?" Four positive and one negative response were evoked by this question. One was deemed by the respondent to be of central importance, the respondent somewhat vehemently asserting:

Yes, especially with respect to topic selection. There should be a regional clearinghouse for research topics. Police commanders could submit research questions and researchers should pursue from among the submitted topics those which interest them. This would also serve to ensure the cooperation of the police agency with the researcher.

The remaining "yes" answers were all followed by reasons why greater involvement of operational personnel in the research process would be beneficial. The fact that the respondents elected to argue for change by supplying these prospective benefits indicates (a) their current dissatisfaction with

their involvement in that process and (b) their enthusiasm for a larger role in that process. A fifth subject deviated from the prevailing pattern by answering "no" to this question and explaining his response: "Such a system would create a 'vested' interest in the research and lead to self-fulfilling prophecies." We judge this comment to have a salutary effect, in the sense that it indicates that greater involvement of operational personnel in the research process is not a problemless panacea, but a response which must be undertaken with due regard for latent pitfalls.

The eighth and final question asked the interview subjects to offer recommendations for improving the research dissemination utilization process other than through greater involvement in the research process by operational personnel. From the seven responses given, two theses emerged, one focusing upon the state of the utilizers, the other upon what we have termed "systemic characteristics." All seven comments are reproduced below:

1. Insistence by the funding agency on dissemination plans which mandate greater outreach to operational police commanders (systemic characteristics).
2. Follow up by the funding agency to determine if the dissemination plans have been implemented as designed (systemic characteristics).
3. A realization on the part of academic institutions serving the criminal justice community that they have an obligation to keep the police informed of research

findings (systemic characteristic and state of the utilizers).

4. An effort to convince police researchers that they have an obligation to disseminate their findings to operational police commanders (systemic characteristic and state of the utilizers).
5. An attempt to develop an increased awareness on the part of police commanders that research findings can assist them in their job (state of the utilizers and systemic characteristic).
6. Better selection of research topics. Answer the questions that the police commanders want to have answered (importance of research and systemic characteristic).
7. The development of motivational factors which would encourage police commanders to discover and apply research findings. For example, include this dimension in a commander's evaluation (state of the utilizers).

Thus, strong emphasis is evident upon making basic changes in the system of research dissemination-utilization as it now stands and equally strong stress is apparent in altering the state of the utilizers, their attitudes and the forces which motivate them.

## CHAPTER VII

### DISCUSSION OF STUDY RESULTS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

#### STUDY HYPOTHESES

At the outset of this study, four formal hypotheses were formulated for testing. In this section, we shall use the data/information gathered from the survey instrument and the interviews to assess the validity of each of the original hypotheses.

The first hypothesis set forth in Chapter I concerned the adequacy of the process through which extramural, police-related research is disseminated to potential utilization targets, i.e., operational police commanders. In its affirmative form, this hypothesis read: "Potential targets of 'external' law enforcement research studies have gained knowledge of these studies and their central findings." On the basis of the available literature about research dissemination in general and the circulation of extramural police-related research in particular, e.g., Yin (1976) and Conner (1980), we expected that this hypothesis would not be confirmed. In point of fact, the questionnaire and interview responses generally indicate that our expectations were accurate in that potential targets of extramural research have not gained knowledge of these works. Despite some variation across survey works, on the whole, the chances that a survey participant had read a survey work in complete, abridged or summary form were 1 in 3. This was so despite the fact that the research works selected for the survey were deemed by

experts to be the most important of their time. Additionally, in the opinion of the survey population, more than 80 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with a statement asserting the adequacy of the dissemination process in general, while only 1 in 7 agreed. In the course of our interviews, we found that extramural, police-related research rarely reached potential utilization targets through formal, organizational channels. Indeed, the interview responses indicated that a multiplicity of factors impeded the dissemination of externally-funded research studies to operational personnel. The latter were (a) frequently doubtful about the practical relevance of research findings/recommendations (and consequently did not seek them out) and/or (b) doubtful about the feasibility of policy changes based upon such research in light of resource constraints, political factors, etc. The interview responses also suggested that while research is routinely transmitted to upper echelon police department officials, it does not continue down the organizational hierarchy to them, and that when superiors demonstrated disinterest in such research, it was unlikely that subordinates would seek out such research. In addition, interview participants pointed to problems in the system through which extramural research is disseminated to them, specifically alluding to (a) funders' failures to impose "guarantees" of dissemination to operational personnel from researchers and (b) the absence of a unified organizational body overseeing the workings of the dissemination process. Thus, from the data collected and the evidence established in

this study, hypothesis #1 stated in its negative form is confirmed. A multiplicity of casual factors have been identified as a set of reasons behind the weakness of the dissemination process in the field of law enforcement. These reasons help to explain why the study's targets have not learned of important law enforcement research findings.

Hypothesis #2 presented in Chapter I concerns the relevance of extramural, police-related research to operational police commanders. Specifically, stated in its affirmative form, it reads that "in the judgement of potential targets, 'external' law enforcement research studies of which they do have knowledge are considered to be relevant to working practice." The results of this study tend to disprove this assumption. Since the four "prominent studies" which were used in the questionnaire survey were selected by experts as being the most important police related research works conducted over a four year period, they are considered to be more than "fair" examples of relevant extramural research studies. Yet, according to survey results, the odds that a survey participant would consider any one of these "prominent studies" to be relevant were only about 50-50. And, the high positive response accorded to the Newark study skews these odds. For the other three "prominent studies", Criminal Investigation, Kansas City and Deadly Force, only a minority of 41 out of 88 respondents believed them to be relevant. More significantly, when asked about police-related research studies in general, the number of questionnaire respondents

who "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with the assertion that such studies are relevant was twice as large as those "agreeing" or "strongly agreeing" with that assertion. And the interview results revealed that the primary reasons for this collective judgement of irrelevance of general police-related research were that researchers do not conduct their studies with an eye towards practical application and that research recommendations fail to consider the resources needed to implement them. In sum, the data and evidence collected imply that hypothesis #2, stated in its negative form, is confirmed. The conclusion that, in the view of potential utilization targets, is that law enforcement research is generally not relevant to the operations of their commands.

A similar conclusion must be made in the case of the third hypothesis given in Chapter I. The statement that: In the judgement of potential targets, 'external' law enforcement research studies have been used in policy formulation," was not confirmed. True, in the case of the Newark study, more than two-fifths of the total valid responses and over two-thirds of the New York group responses reported that Newark's research/findings/recommendations had been considered in the formulation of policies for their commands. This, however, was an exception to the general pattern. For the other three survey works, only one-fourth to one-third of the total questionnaire participants reported usage. Indeed, concerning the use of extramural, police-related research in

general, two-and-one-half times as many respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with an assertion of use as did those who agreed or strongly agreed. There was some evidence that a small number of questionnaire participants considered research in general to be relevant, but did not see it as receiving usage. On the whole, as supported by the interview results, the principal reason behind the under-utilization of such research lies in its real and/or perceived lack of relevance when put into practice in an internal environment featuring resource constraints and/or an external environment displaying intervention by political forces.

Although the question of "application" as distinct from "usage" was not embodied in the original hypotheses, the data gleaned from the questionnaires and interviews is clearly in line with this study's findings of under-utilization. Apart from the Newark study, the vast majority of the survey participants did not report actual implementation of the survey works' findings/recommendations in the working policy of their commands. As revealingly, the number of survey subjects disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with a statement asserting application of findings/recommendations of extramural research in general was four times as great as that of participants agreeing or strongly agreeing. Again, there was some evidence of "slippage" in the sense that fewer respondents reported actual implementation than those reporting research use. On the whole, however, both survey instrument and interview data suggest that the main reason why

extramural research does not enjoy widespread implementation is the real/perceived lack of practical relevance of these studies' findings/proposals. In conjunction with "usage" data, our findings regarding research "application" support a negative restatement of hypothesis #3: all told, extramural, police-related research is not considered in police decision-making and, obviously, does not enjoy widespread implementation.

The final hypothesis stated in Chapter I centered upon the perceived adequacy of the subjects' role in extramural, police-related research topic selection, study preparation, recommendation formulation and program evaluation as seen by potential utilization targets. This hypothesis was also disproven by study results. On an "objective" or "experiential" basis, nearly 90 percent of all survey respondents indicated that they had not been consulted frequently about extramural research. In like manner, the personal satisfaction of survey respondents with the current role(s) in topic selection, study preparation, recommendation formulation and research-based program evaluation was uniformly low. For no group and in no "stage" of the research process was there more than one-seventh of the respondents reporting satisfaction with their present degree of involvement in that process. Furthermore, the general enthusiasm displayed by interview participants with regard to greater involvement by operational personnel in the research process strongly confirms this general level of

dissatisfaction with that process as it now stands. Hence, as with the previous hypotheses, hypothesis #4 must be restated in the negative in order to receive support from this study's results.

Finally, as part of the "general" (Section E) portion of the survey instrument, all respondents were presented with a statement contending that extramural, police-related research is of great value. The number of negative replies to this question was three times larger than the number of positive replies. Clearly, this summary judgement question supports the negative conclusion reached in the cases of hypotheses #1, #2 and #3 and lends some explanatory support to the negation of hypothesis #3 as well. In sum, data synthesized from the questionnaire and the interviews suggests that extramural police-related research is not relevant to potential utilizers, is not considered in policy formulation for their units and has not received widespread implementation within their units. Part of the reason for this sorry state of affairs may lie in the actual and perceived lack of involvement by operational commanders in choosing topics for, conducting studies of, making recommendations from and evaluating the program effects of extramural, police-related research studies.

#### THE CONNER MODEL

A second approach to the interpretation of study results is placing them in the broad framework of the model of

research utilization constructed by Conner. Hence, in what follows, we shall try to relate the study results to each of the eight aspects of the research utilization process embodied in the Conner model.

In the case of the survey works, an effort was made to ensure the quality of these studies by screening them through a three-fold selection process centered around a panel of recognized experts in the law enforcement field. However, none of the survey or interview items specifically alluded to the quality of any particular research study or the quality of extramural research on the whole. In light of this, it is not surprising to find that research quality did not surface as a distinct factor affecting the dissemination-utilization process as it was approached in this project.

On the other hand, from the information contained in Chapters II, III and IV of this study, it does appear that the quality of extramural law enforcement research in general is highly questionable. Studies commissioned by the NILECJ in the 1970s, e.g., the set of evaluations conducted as part of the National Evaluation Program (NEP), repeatedly refer to the conceptual and methodological defects of such research. Indeed, the most recent study of this type, Larson and Cahn (1985), includes the observation that, given their common shortcomings, operational police commanders might be worse off "using" findings/recommendations from NIJ studies than they would be by simply disregarding them. Thus, while no direct light is shed upon the quality of such research from our

primary results, assessments gathered from secondary sources consistently indicate that it is low.

In the case of the importance of study findings, we have considerable evidence to suggest that survey participants (a) do not consider extramural, police-research to be important, (b) that the real or perceived lack of importance is a strong factor working against its dissemination to operational personnel and (c) that this lack of importance is an equally strong cause of non- and under-utilization of these studies. Indeed, the impracticality and, secondarily, lack of generalizability, typical of extramural research in the view of potential utilizers runs as a strong theme throughout the interview results of this study. Consequently, we have strong direct evidence that the "real" or "imagined" lack of research study importance is a powerful force working against use and implementation of extramural, police-related research study findings/recommendations.

As noted in Chapter I, in conducting this study, we are caught in the position of the "trapped evaluator" confronting what is, in effect, an unplanned dissemination-utilization effort. Neither the survey nor the interview data supplied much in the way of information about the pattern of utilization. We did learn that most interview subjects did not come across extramural, police-related research through formal organizational channels and that the likelihood of relevant research being put into practice was heavily conditioned by pre-determined policy courses adopted by

departmental superiors. Thus, with regard to the pattern of utilization, it does, indeed, appear to heavily affect degrees of use and application. Nonetheless, the intractable obstacles to studying this utilization subtopic via post hoc analysis argue strongly for planned dissemination-utilization programs monitored on a concurrent basis.

Adopting a strictly instrumental definition of "use", this study did not probe the possible "conceptual" use of extramural research by police practitioners. Given the nebulous character of "conceptual" use, it was not practically feasible to try to elicit opinions or recollections of survey or interview subjects about it. Interestingly, none of the interview subjects spontaneously referred to conceptual use: like us, the subjects were strongly focused upon instrumental, problem-solving use. Thus, this aspect of the Conner model never emerged as an important variable owing to the operational definition of "use" adhered to in this project.

Some response relevant to rationale for use was evoked by interview Question #4. Although only two "genuine" cases of symbolic use were provided by our interview subjects, in response to the ensuring Question #5, i.e., the likelihood that relevant research would be put into practice, one respondent gave us a virtual definition of symbolic use. The respondent noted that application of relevant findings was contingent upon their compatibility with pre-ordained courses of action in the minds of organizational superiors. This marginal evidence, then, suggests that the rationale for

research use has some part in determining the degree of use and application.

For much the same reasons as were stated with regard to the pattern of research utilization, the means available to us as a "trapped evaluator" were not sufficient to allow for indepth probing of the timing of research use. We did receive some indication that research application would be delayed indefinitely absent (a) important findings, (b) a symbolic-type rationale, and (c) the presence of adequate resources for implementation, but little direct evidence was available about the timing of utilization. On this count, we cannot come to any conclusive judgement about the relevance of the timing factor to the degree of research usage or application since the failure of this factor to surface during the interviews may be a product of the interview schedule itself, rather than the timing factor.

The seventh aspect of the Conner model, i.e., level of the utilization target did arise as an important variable influencing research dissemination and utilization. In the context of the former, we were told by interview subjects that dissemination of extramural research to unit commanders was heavily influenced by their organizational status. On the one hand, one respondent stated that dissemination often extends to their superiors, but no farther down the organizational ladder. On the other hand, a second interviewee commented that, in some cases, potential dissemination targets at his level within law enforcement agencies, i.e., line commanders,

did not seek out extramural research because their immediate superiors, e.g., police department chiefs, showed little interest in such research. The level of the utilization target was also mentioned as a factor influencing whether a relevant research finding would be implemented. On this point, one interview subject confided that research findings/recommendations were unlikely to be applied to working practice unless they were endorsed by organizational superiors.

Along with importance of research findings, the state of the utilizers emerged as the most powerful and pervasive factor influencing both dissemination and utilization of extramural research. This finding is in line with research by other scholars, (Patton, et.al., 1977; Emerick and Peterson, 1978; Bedell, et.al., 1985) working in other areas of research use. The "people" factor has been cited as the most important determinant of research use and implementation, and, within the law enforcement field, a host of analysts has reached the same conclusion. Indeed, according to Morash (1982), what may be taken as the "people" factor or state of the utilizers is clearly the most commonly studied aspect of research use by law enforcement agencies. The responses to one of the "general" (Section E) items in the questionnaire suggests the presence of widespread distrust by operational police commanders toward the underlying motives of police-related research scholars: A full two-thirds of the survey population disagreed or strongly disagreed with a statement asserting

that the needs of operational commanders were the foremost concern of researchers, while only one in four agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. Perhaps more significantly, "people" factors emerged as the most frequently mentioned forces inhibiting use and implementation of extramural research. On this matter, interview subjects maintained that (a) policy changes were inhibited by the actions of subordinates, (b) that the experience of operational commanders with externally-funded research tainted their present use of research findings/recommendations and that (c) incentives for adopting research-based changes were generally lacking within operational units. Lastly, a goodly number of the recommendations made by interview participants focused upon changing the attitudes of operational personnel, of researchers and of sponsoring agencies and upon erecting reward/sanction mechanisms promoting greater dissemination and use of research-based materials, e.g., including a research "use" dimension in the evaluation reports of operational command personnel.

#### EXPANSION OF THE CONNER MODEL

The analysis presented above does not permit use to come to a summary judgement regarding the validity of the Conner model as a description of the research dissemination-utilization process within local law enforcement agencies. While some of the eight utilization aspects contained in the Conner model emerged strongly, e.g., importance of research

findings and state of the utilizers, others, e.g., timing of utilization, did not. However, the failure of these forces to emerge from this study's results does not necessarily mean that they have had no impact upon research dissemination to and utilization by (a) law enforcement practitioners in general and/or (b) the study populace in particular. Alternatively, this failure may be the product of the necessarily "blunt" instruments available to use for studying the process grounded in the inherent constraints of post hoc, "trapped" evaluation. Nevertheless, as Conner freely admits, his model is a provisional one, i.e., subject to modification on this basis of empirical testing (1980, p.650) .

There are some indications that the Conner model ought to be expanded to include one or more of three factors which did emerge strongly from this study's results: resource constraints, political-environmental factors and systemic characteristics. In this section, then, we shall cite instances in which ease of these "non-model" factors arose within this study's results, arguing, in effect, that each ought to be considered as separate utilization aspects for inclusion within an expanded version of the Conner model.

What we have referred to as "resource constraints" (defined in Chapter VI) may be implicitly included in Conner's understanding of the importance of research findings. In the researcher's opinion, this factor warrants separate and express treatment as a utilization aspect. Some scholars, e.g., Wilson (1980) and Greenberg (1977) have pointed to

finite limitations of time, manpower and budgets as powerful forces influencing degrees of research use and implementation. In fact, Morash (1982) says that resource constraints of this type have been largely neglected in empirical studies of research utilization by police decision-makers. Resource constraints emerged from our interview results as (1) the most frequently mentioned cause of weak dissemination and (2) after importance of research findings, as the strongest factor affecting research usage itself. Consequently, we would suggest that resource constraints be accorded distinct and equal status as a utilization aspect in any revised utilization model applied to police operations.

In like manner, although Conner appears to touch upon what we have termed "political-environmental variables" as part of the rationale for research use, in light of this study's results, this factor should also be upgraded as a force influencing research utilization by police practitioners. Concentrating upon "micro" factors, most research use evaluators have paid scant attention to "macro" or environmental factors. There are some exception to this pattern, e.g., Sandler and Mintz (1974) and Wycoff and Kelling (1978), but, on the whole, as Morash (1982) also found, environmental factors have been neglected by those studying use of police-related research. Morash is not the only scholar arguing for increased attention to political-environmental factors. Greene (1982, pp. 85-86) concludes on the basis of his study of law enforcement research use:

"Cumulatively, these findings suggest the importance of environmental variables as they affect the implementation process directly---and, of course, as they potentially affect the ultimate outcomes of police policy interventions." In like fashion, Weiss (1978) has stated of research application in general: "In sum, problems in the application of research results derive in large part from characteristics of the political sphere in which they move" (p. 62). Our interview participants were eminently aware of the role played by political-environmental variables within the research use/implementation process. Not only did they allude to police unions, political lobbies and the like as direct forces impinging upon the application of research-based policy changes, they also commented upon the conflicting political objectives of police work in general. Thus, one respondent told us that changes which might be adopted to achieve one end, e.g., rotation of police officers among precincts, might come into conflict with other goals, e.g., improved police-community relations. From this, we would suggest that a revised model of research utilization include such variables as a separate aspect of the utilization process to be called "political environmental variables".

The last "non-model" facet of the research utilization process has not received any specific mention in the current body of literature devoted to research use by police practitioners. This is due to the fact that "systemic characteristics", in essence, the present structure of the

research dissemination-utilization system are normally taken as a "given" or "constant" element of the research-policy process. Unfortunately, this assumption serves to obscure the need for and form of salutary changes which might be undertaken to improve the system itself. We can illustrate this point through reference to our interview results. In response to the question of why police-related research dissemination is so "weak", several interview participants alluded to characteristics of the current system as it now works. For example, they complained that (a) funding agencies do not insist on guarantees by researchers to try to inform operational commanders of research findings, and (b) that there is no single organizational entity which has taken on the task of ensuring adequate circulation of such findings to police operational commanders. Indeed, among the recommendations for change suggested by interview subjects, alterations in the dissemination-utilization system itself were the most common. They included:

- (1) Greater insistence by sponsoring agencies on dissemination plans containing outreach efforts to operational personnel.
- (2) More diligent follow-up by sponsoring agencies to determine if dissemination plans have been implemented as designed; and,
- (3) The institution of system-wide programs to inform researchers, sponsoring agencies and operational personnel of their respective obligations within a research-policy alliance.

In other words, getting down to the central questions of what is wrong with extramural research dissemination-utilization by police practitioners and what can be done to "fix" it, features of the present system figure prominently. In contrast to resource constraints and political environmental factors, we would not suggest that this aspect can or should be included as a distinct facet of research utilization by police agencies. Nevertheless, we cannot remain blind to deeply-rooted defects within the present dissemination-utilization system as causes for non- and under-utilization of extramural research and of the opportunity to enhance all aspects of the research-policy process through changes in that system. Thus, in the recommendations contained in the next section of this chapter, heavy emphasis will be placed upon altering the overall system as means for improving the overall research-policy process.

#### POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon the general and particular findings of this study, a number of policy recommendations can be made. None of the proposals appearing in this section is completely original; all have been advanced by other scholars studying the research-policy process either within the field of law enforcement or in some other sphere of endeavor. Consequently, from the start, we must note that although worthwhile recommendations have been made in the past, on the basis of this study's results, none have been given the attention which they clearly deserve.

Our first proposal is a broad, umbrella-type observation which branches out into a series of correlative recommendations: Increase the involvement of operational personnel in all aspects of the process through which research moves, i.e., from topic selection to evaluation of research-based policies/programs. This study has revealed that the current level of involvement by operational commanders in the research process is low, that these potential utilization targets are dissatisfied with that low level of involvement and that they are enthusiastic about greater involvement. At present, the rigid division of the research and policy implementation functions clearly works against the efficient operation of the research-policy process. As Cherns (1979, p. 114) puts it: "The relationship between researchers and administrators ensures neither a comprehension by the researcher of the real choices that face administrators nor a comprehension by the administrator of the real potentialities of the research." Along these same lines, Lynn (1978b) has commented: "There is abundant evidence that the research community cannot remain aloof or isolated from policy-makers and continue to receive federal financial support" (p. 16). Finally, Weiss (1982, p. 22) provides yet another reason for greater involvement by practitioners in the research process, asserting that: "The extent to which they (practitioners) accept a research idea, or give it at least provisional hearing, depends on the degree to which it resonates with their prior knowledge." Greater involvement by operational

personnel in all phases of the research process would increase mutual understanding, enhance the status of researchers in the eyes of current and prospective sponsors, and improve the capacity of policy-makers to assess the merits of individual pieces of research based upon their prior involvement in the preparation of similar studies.

Throughout the course of collecting the interview data, participants reported that extramural research was under-utilized because the subjects researched are, in general, not relevant to their needs. Indeed, when asked whether operational personnel should have a greater role in the production of research, one respondent pinpointed topic selection for research projects as especially critical. Thus, our second recommendation is: Increase the part played by operating personnel in the selection of extramural research topics. Three inter-related means are available for the achievement of this end, two of which shall be discussed here, the third will be examined as part of a recommendation for institutional change. On the one hand, as Leslie T. Wilkins, a member of the staff of the School of Criminology at the University of California Berkeley told the United States House of Representatives in 1966, the field of law enforcement research demonstrated a need for USER REQUIREMENT STUDIES (Wilkins in Committee on Governmental Operations, 1967, p. 41, his italics). Weiss (1978a) has made a similar suggestion in her observation that research "planners should purposefully canvas many groups for their perceptions of the policy issues

and the questions in need of answers" (p. 76). Thus, a portion of the funds currently devoted to police-related research could well be devoted to increasing our knowledge about what operational personnel want to have researched in the first place. As Rothman (1980, pp. 69-70) underscores in large type, UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH IS FACILITATED WHEN RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN DEFINING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM." Hence, in addition to user requirement studies, individual researchers ought to consult operating personnel about potential research topics on a routine, ongoing basis. Weiss (1978a, p. 64) stresses: "Probably only continuous contact with decision-makers and involvement in policy questions will help planners choose appropriate areas for research emphasis." Whether through user requirement studies, informal contacts or, as will later be suggested, through the creation of a research clearinghouse, input from working practitioners before research topics are approved and funded is essential if the research-policy process is to be upgraded.

Despite the crucial significance of topic selection, the expanded involvement of operational personnel in the research process cannot be allowed to terminate at that stage. Again, Rothman has presented our third recommendation in bold type-face: UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH IS FACILITATED WHEN RELEVANT OPERATIONAL PEOPLE PARTICIPATE IN CARRYING OUR THE RESEARCH" (1980, p.72). Restated as a formal recommendation, we would call for increased involvement by operational personnel in preparing/conducting extramural research studies.

Weiss (1978a, p. 69) is among those who have noted that, "involving potential users in the conduct of the study, for example, has mutual benefits: it makes the study more relevant to their views and establishes their interest in and commitment to its use." James Q. Wilson underscores this point for law enforcement research. He notes that the Kansas City Patrol Experiment of the mid-1970s was successful largely because task forces were established, "containing officers of all ranks (to) work on designing and running experiments" (1978, p. 89). The Kansas City experience led Wilson to contend that: "The operating personnel of the organization must participate in some important degree in designing and carrying out the project" (1978, p. 91). As an ancillary benefit, use of operational personnel in designing and conducting police-related research studies would stimulate them to further their formal training in how research should be conducted, thereby expanding and enhancing the pool of knowledgeable researchers working in this field.

Our fourth recommendation follows logically from the previously stated proposals: Increase the involvement of operational personnel in the formulation of recommendations based on extramural research studies. Our interview results suggest that under-utilization of research recommendations stems largely from their impracticality and that greater use/implementation would occur if research recommendations took into account various kinds of constraints which operational personnel confront in trying to make policy changes.

"UTILIZATION OF RESEARCH IS FACILITATED WHEN RELEVANT OPERATIONAL STAFF PARTICIPATE IN THE FORMULATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS," (Rothman, 1980, p. 74) The presence of working hands on research staffs making policy recommendations would serve as a needed "brake" upon impractical or unwarranted policy proposals. Weiss (1982) complains that: "Researchers who have done a painfully careful evaluation study have been known to throw caution to the winds when they come to drawing implications for action and leap to unanalyzed, untested and perhaps unworkable recommendations" (p. 23). Increasing the part played by operational personnel in deriving policy recommendations would help to limit such unwarranted "leaps" from study results to study recommendations.

While we have virtually no reservations about the need for greater practitioner involvement in topic selection, study preparation and the formulation of recommendations, our fifth recommendation, i.e., increase the involvement of operating personnel in evaluating the results of research-based policies/programs, carries with it a strong caveat. As Toch, Grant and Galvin (1975) discovered in their study of experimentation within the Oakland Police Department, "men without formal training have not only designed ingenious interventions, but also devised creative approaches to the evaluation of impact" (p. 330). Our qualms on this matter don't revolve around the ability of operational personnel to make a valuation contribution to program evaluations, but

rather the possibility that "bias" (real or perceived) might arise when operational personnel are given the responsibility of assessing programs/policies instituted by their departments. If, as we would argue, operating personnel are included in making evaluations of research-based programs, their input must be a "minority" voice, i.e., as a supplement to evaluation by completely disinterested parties (Cunningham and Taylor, 1979, p. 288). Much more importantly, including operational personnel in the evaluation stage of the research process would be facilitated by a broader change. Much of the hostility demonstrated by police practitioners toward evaluation studies is grounded in their use as a type of "rating" mechanism: police officers resent outsiders "marking" their performance. Indeed, we would concur with Parks (1979, p. 252) that a basic shift is necessary in the objectives of evaluation studies, away from rating impact to understanding how research-based programs are translated into working action. If such a change in the broad aims of evaluation studies is undertaken, then operational personnel could make a valuable contribution to such evaluations without charges of "bias" on their part.

Greater involvement of operating personnel in the research process would not only facilitate research use but would also play a remedial role in the dissemination of police-related research to potential utilization targets. Noting that practitioners tend to be "doers" rather than "readers", Glaser, et.al. (1983) underscore the importance of face-to-face communications between researchers and policy-

makers as the chief vehicle for disseminating research findings/recommendations. Weiss (1982) and Cherns (1979) have also called for continuous contact between the research community and working practitioners as the best way of upgrading dissemination.

Aside from encouraging more interaction between researchers and operational personnel, the dissemination of extramural research can be improved through the creation of channels for the routine distribution of research materials. "The lack of channels for regularized dissemination of research results," Weiss (1978a, p. 57) writes, "is a major cause of their neglect," a point which came across very strongly in this study's interview data. To overcome this defect, Weiss (1978a, p. 73) has made three proposals:

- (1) Development of organizational channels for linking research to decision processes, especially through offices of planning and analysis;
- (2) disseminating integrated 'state of knowledge' reviews of research results rather than the results of one study at a time; and,
- (3) using the mass media more effectively to report policy-relevant research.

Of these, the first two proposals are judged by us to be worthy of inclusion as formal recommendations. Thus, we would recommend that regular channels be established within operating police departments to disseminate extramural research to line personnel. Along with Weiss, Cunningham and

Taylor (1979, p. 288) have suggested that a "bottom line" digest or newsletter be published by an umbrella agency as "a document which highlights the information most valuable to the police administrator or planner." Thus, as a related recommendation, we would propose the establishment of a body(ies) to publish a newsletter summarizing the findings/recommendations of extramural research for circulation to operational police commanders.

This last recommendation leads us to our next proposal. Although some efforts have been made to consolidate the number of agencies with the federal government sponsoring/conducting law enforcement research, the comment of Gerhard O. Mueller to the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives (1967, p. 34) still holds true: there is an "incredibly disjointed structure (or lack thereof) for sponsoring and conducting research on crime and law enforcement." Our interview results reflect this state of affairs today. According to one interview participant the cause of "weak" dissemination of police-related research lies in the absence of a single organizational body to oversee dissemination of these materials to potential utilizers. Cunningham and Taylor (1979, p. 288) have made this very point in stating: This condition indicates a clear need for an effective clearinghouse which is able to collect, classify and disseminate evaluation materials at all levels of criminal justice." This same concern has been voiced by one of our interview subjects with specific reference to topic selection

for police-related research. As presented in Chapter VI, this interviewee told us that there ought to be a "regional clearinghouse" through which police commanders could submit topics for research studies and researchers could subsequently choose from among these topics as objects of analytical pursuit. Hence, along with this respondent, we would strongly recommend: the creation of a clearinghouse system to authorize research projects, garner possible research topics from working practitioners, publish research results in digest form and monitor the dissemination of digest material to operational personnel.

Our last set of recommendations revolves around the absence of incentives encouraging police commanders to seek out, consider and apply research findings/recommendations. As Wilson (1980) has noted, police personnel derive few rewards from reading and using extramural research, and this clearly inhibits them from doing so. Indeed, Cherns (1979, p. 114) has commented that one reason for the gulf which separates researchers from practitioners resides in the "different reward structures of the academic and the administrator." Our interview participants expressed awareness of this problem, pointing to a lack of motivation for change in explaining obstacles to the application of research-based policies. Another called for "The development of motivational factors which would encourage police commanders to discover and apply research findings." With reference to the latter comment, the subject recommended that a police commander's performance

evaluation include the dimension of extramural research use. We would support this proposal and phrase it as a formal recommendation: include the efforts of police commanders to find, use and apply valid and relevant extramural research to their commands in their personal performance evaluations. This recommendation is likely to generate controversy, particularly given the low value which many police commanders attach to extramural research. Thus, in our view, this recommendation should only be taken in conjunction with a second proposal, i.e., establish programs to apprise operational personnel and police-related researchers of the mutual benefits to be had from more active participation in the research-policy process and of their respective obligations within that process. From our viewpoint, it will require a strong educational effort on both sides of the research-policy "fence" for researchers and police commanders to become aware of the limitations and the opportunities which the use of extramural research brings with it. In effect, it is our position that the strongest personal incentive for both researchers and operational personnel is the perception of increased personal efficiency in performing their respective tasks. Consequently, a formal programmatic effort should be undertaken (possibly under the auspices of the proposed research clearinghouse or the Police Command College which is the subject of a following recommendation) to inform researchers of the inherent problems involved in using and implementing research findings. This effort should also include informing operational personnel of the performance

benefits to be gained through judicious use of extramural research.

#### A POLICE COMMAND COLLEGE

As previously noted, over the last twenty years, tens of millions of dollars have been spent on police-related research. And, as indicated in Chapter II, there is no reason to expect that the flow of money into police-related research will be interrupted in the near future. Yet, this study firmly establishes that despite considerable expenditure of monies on research, operational police commanders are not using the product. To remedy this situation, a number of recommendations have been made. Concomitant with the making of these recommendations, it should be noted that there is a single vehicle which could efficiently implement most of the proposed remedies. The vehicle is a Police Command College. Such an institution, in addition to meeting any other important needs of the police, could easily perform the following functions, all of which would contribute to getting a better return from police-related research:

- a. Increase the part played by operating personnel in the selection of research topics;
- b. Increase the involvement of operating personnel in preparing/conducting research studies;
- c. Increase the involvement of operational personnel in the formulation of recommendations based on research studies;
- d. Increase the involvement of operating personnel in evaluating the results of research-based policies and

programs.

- e. Assist in establishing regular channels to disseminate research findings to line personnel;
- f. Publish a "newsletter" summarizing the findings and recommendations of pertinent research for circulation to operational police commanders;
- g. Serve as a "clearinghouse" to authorize research projects garner possible research topics from working practitioners, publish research results in digest form and monitor the dissemination of this digest to operational personnel;
- h. Communicate to operational personnel and those who perform police-related research the mutual benefits to be derived from more active participation in the research/policy process and their respective obligations within that process.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The formal objective of this study has been to test a set of hypotheses concerning the dissemination of extramural, police-related research to operational police commanders and the utilization of these materials by these commanders. Beyond this goal, the study was directed toward increasing our understanding of the research-policy process within the field of law enforcement, particularly the identification of problems which impede this process as it now works and means for mitigating or overcoming these difficulties.

Extramural police-related research has followed the same path as government-sponsored social research in general: the accelerated growth of each can be traced back to the mid-1960s and the sanguine assumptions of the Johnson Administration concerning the ability of social research to help solve a broad range of national problems. With the establishment of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) and the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, scientific study of law enforcement policies mushroomed, but, as with Federally-sponsored social research in general, this wave of police-related research was subjected to unrelenting criticism. Beginning with hearings held by the Committee on Governmental Operations in 1967, through the NILECJ's National Evaluation Project in the 1970s and to the present day, assessments of the actual value of extramural, law enforcement research have been decidedly negative.

Numerous critics, within and outside of government, have expressed the opinion that much of this research is irrelevant, conceptually flawed and/or plagued by methodological defects. The current status of police-related research reflects this collective opinion. Although some benefits have been reaped from the use of extramural research by police practitioners, on the whole, controversy and conflict dominate this research-policy alliance. The research community complains that operational personnel disregard the findings/recommendations of their studies; the law enforcement community responds that such disregard is warranted by the inherent lack of practical value common to these studies.

This broad schism is clearly evident in the existing body of literature concerning the dissemination and use of social research. In response to the undeniable fact that social science research suffers from non- or under-utilization, scholars have adopted two broad stances. Some, following Caplan, et.al., have argued that while direct, instrumental use of research is a rare phenomenon, other kinds of usage, e.g., conceptual use, are widespread. Unfortunately, these same analysts state that these non-instrumental modes of use are difficult to trace; frequently practitioners are "unaware" that they are, in fact, using research findings as means for conceptualizing the problems they face. The second response to non- or under-utilization of social science research has been an admission that a problem exists and a corresponding effort to identify the obstacles which contribute to that

problem. Hence, many research use analysts have tried to locate factors within operational agencies and their environments which tend to inhibit the application of extramural research. It is apparent that one such "factor" is the scant effort devoted to the dissemination of extramural research to potential utilizers, the dissemination process being largely "overlooked" by researchers and sponsors assuming "automatic" circulation of research findings.

Compared to the areas of health, education and welfare, analysis of research dissemination-utilization by law enforcement agencies has not received adequate scholarly attention. The hierarchical organizational structure of police departments has furthered the retention of the assumption that application of research findings proceeds "naturally" in the wake of their publication. In fact, non- or under-utilization of police related research is the norm. While some scholars see the problem as being rooted in the implementing agencies, a far larger group finds that it is grounded in the research itself, its lack of practical relevance and its flawed character. Some efforts have been made to identify variables within implementing agencies which may account for part of the problem of under-utilization. However, when compared to other functional areas, e.g., education, such analyses are few and far between.

For both social research in general and law enforcement research in particular, the mechanical assumptions underlying the dominant paradigm of research dissemination and use, i.e.,

the classic Research, Development and Dissemination (RD & D) model, have hindered a fuller understanding of precisely how the research-policy process works. Alternative models of this process have been constructed, e.g., the SI model, but it has become more and more evident that such models must be tailored to the particular characteristics of the implementing agencies and the environment in which it functions. Fortunately, Ross Conner has constructed a model of research use by law enforcement organizations, and we have employed his model as the over-arching framework for this study. Unfortunately, as Conner relates, we find ourselves in the position of a "trapped evaluator", in effect, trying to analyze unplanned dissemination-utilization efforts on a post hoc basis.

The inherent constraints of "trapped" evaluation have dictated the methods available to us for studying the research-policy process in the area of police operations. Our study population is comprised of "potential", rather than "actual", research utilization targets selected on the grounds that they should have received important police-related research studies. Moreover, since we could not follow the research-policy process on a concurrent basis, we have been compelled to rely upon the opinions and recollections of potential utilization targets to probe this process. Through a questionnaire and a series of structured interviews, we have attempted to investigate "objective" and "subjective" facets of extramural research dissemination and use by our study population.

The results generated by the questionnaire portion of our primary research effort are disturbing and bleak. In terms of both specific survey works and extramural research in general, a relatively low degree of dissemination to potential targets emerges from these results. On the same basis, the majority of survey instrument respondents consider research which they have read to be less than relevant to the operation of their commands and report correspondingly low levels of research use and implementation. The survey populace reports that they have not been consulted by police-related researchers and that they are dissatisfied with their current role in the selection of topics for such research, the preparation of research studies, the formulation of study recommendations and the evaluation of research-based policies/programs. They do not believe that their needs are the primary concern of law enforcement researchers and they do not feel that extramural, police-related research is of great value.

The comparatively negative picture is confirmed by the results of the interview portion of the study design. While participants expressed a range of views on why extramural research dissemination is weak and why this research is under-utilized, the dominant strain running throughout these responses is that research is irrelevant in practical terms, that is, when various types of policy constraints are taken into account. Most interviewees do not report receiving extramural research through formal organizational channels, and even in a hypothetical case in which research is relevant

to operations, its eventual application is contingent upon its compatibility with the pre-determined positions held by organizational superiors. The enthusiastic response of the interview subjects to the prospect of greater involvement in all phases of the research process indicates their strong perception of a need for change. Most of the recommendations which they put forth as ways of improving the research-policy process revolve around altering attitudes and incentives, on the one hand, and restructuring the system through which extramural research is presently disseminated-utilized.

From these findings, it is apparent that all four hypotheses for this study have been disproven, and, with that in mind, it is apparent that something is seriously amiss in the current manner in which the law enforcement research-policy process works. Several aspects of the utilization process drawn from the Conner model, e.g., the importance of the research and the state of the utilizers, appeared as important determinants of dissemination, use and application. Others e.g., timing, did not surface as clearly. Although we have no way of determining whether these factors were not related to the utilization process studies or whether the study methods available to use as "trapped evaluators" were too crude to capture them, it does appear that the Conner model should be altered. We have therefore suggested that a model for analyzing research use by law enforcement personnel include "resource constraints", "systemic characteristics" and "political-environmental variables" as important aspects

of the utilization process. From the available literature, the study findings and the proposals presented by interview subjects, a number of recommendations have been made. These recommendations are of basically two types: those centering upon increased involvement by operational personnel in all phases of the research process; those calling for the establishment of institutional mechanisms, e.g., a police command college. These proposals are not original with us; all have been made before; none have been matched with concrete action. However, since the same problems continue to plague the research-policy alliance within the field of law enforcement, the same remedies with some new refinements are required to address them.

APPENDIX "A"JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE  
DOCTORAL PROGRAM SURVEY INSTRUMENTGENERAL INFORMATION FOR THE RESPONDENT

1. This study is being conducted to investigate the value of police related research to operational police commanders. It also seeks to determine information about the process by which police related research is conceived, accomplished and disseminated.
2. Participants in this study are guaranteed anonymity.
3. Kindly respond to the following items in accordance with the accompanying instructions. Thank you.

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SECTION "A" - BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. Age: Under 35 \_\_\_\_ 36-45 \_\_\_\_ 46-55 \_\_\_\_ Over 55 \_\_\_\_
2. Overall Seniority: Under 10 years \_\_\_\_ 11-15 years \_\_\_\_  
16-20 years \_\_\_\_ 21-25 years \_\_\_\_ Over 25 years \_\_\_\_
3. Years as a Police Commander: Under 5 years \_\_\_\_  
6-10 years \_\_\_\_ 11-15 years \_\_\_\_ 16-20 years \_\_\_\_  
Over 20 years \_\_\_\_
4. Educational Level: H.S. Diploma \_\_\_\_ Some College \_\_\_\_  
Associate Degree \_\_\_\_ Baccalaureate Degree \_\_\_\_  
Some Graduate School \_\_\_\_ Masters Degree \_\_\_\_ Ph D \_\_\_\_

SECTION "B" - SPECIFIC INQUIRIES

The items in this section concern a study conducted by Peter Greenwood, Jan M. Chaiken and J. Petersilia entitled, THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS (published in 1977). A central finding of this study is that the criminal investigation process as it is currently carried out does not significantly contribute to the solution of crimes. On this basis, the authors state that most of crime solving functions performed by detectives in municipal police departments could be adequately performed by clerical personnel.

Item #1: Are you aware of the existence of this study?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

Item #2: Have you ever actually read this study in full, abridged or summary form?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

If you have answered "Yes" to Item #2, please respond to the following three items in this section, (Items 3, 4 and 5). If you have answered "No" or "Unsure" to Item #2, please skip to Section C.

Item #3: Please respond to the following statement: "The findings and/or recommendations of the CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS are relevant to the operation of my command".

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_

(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #4: Please respond to the following statement: "The findings and/or recommendations of the CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS have been considered in policy making for my command".

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_

(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #5: Please respond to the following statement: "The findings and/or recommendations of the CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS have been incorporated into the working policy of my command".

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_

(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION C

The items in this section concern a study conducted by the Police Foundation entitled, THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT (published in 1981). A central finding of this study is that while increasing or adding foot patrols to municipal police operations does not reduce or prevent crime, it does positively affect citizens' feelings of safety and mobility in their neighborhoods. On this basis, the authors recommend that foot patrols be increased or added on to municipal police operations as "an important ingredient in any mix of police strategies that attempts to deal with current problems in congested areas of larger cities."

Item #1: Are you aware of the existence of this study?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

Item #2: Have you ever actually read this study in full, abridged or summary form?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

If you have answered "Yes" to Item #2, please respond to the following three items in this section (Items 3, 4 and 5). If you have answered "No" or "Unsure" to Item #2, please skip to Section D.

Item #3: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT are relevant to the operations of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #4: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT have been considered in policy making for my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #5: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of THE NEWARK FOOT PATROL EXPERIMENT have been incorporated into the working policy of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION D

The items in this section concern a study conducted by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice entitled, RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS: A STUDY PERFORMED IN THE KANSAS CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT (published in 1977). A central finding of this study is that, "rapid police response may be unnecessary for three out of every four serious crimes reported to the police," due to (a) crime elapsed between the commission of a crime and discovery of that crime by the citizen reporting it, and/or (b) citizen delay in reporting a known crime to the police. On this basis, the authors challenge the effectiveness of "rapid response" by the police to crimes reported to them.

Item #1: Are you aware of the existence of this study?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

Item #2: Have you ever actually read this study in full, abridged or summary form?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

If you have answered "Yes" to Item #2, please respond to the following three items in this section (Items 3, 4 and 5). If you have answered "No" or "Unsure" to Item #2, please skip to Section E.

Item #3: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS are relevant to the operations of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #4: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS have been considered in policy making for my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #5: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of RESPONSE TIME ANALYSIS have been incorporated into the working policy of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION E

The items in this section concern a study conducted by Catherine Milton, et.al. for the Police Foundation entitled, POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE (published in 1977). A central finding of this study is that approximately one-third of all shooting deaths by municipal police occur in response to domestic disturbance incidents.

Item #1: Are you aware of the existence of this study?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

Item #2: Have you ever actually read this study in full, abridged or summary form?

(1) Yes \_\_\_\_ (2) No \_\_\_\_ (3) Unsure \_\_\_\_

If you have answered "Yes" to Item #2, please respond to the following three items in this section (Items 3, 4 and 5). If you have answered "No" or "Unsure" to Item #2, please skip to Section F.

Item #3: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE are relevant to the operations of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #4: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE have been considered in policy making for my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #5: Please respond to the following statement: The findings/recommendations of POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE have been incorporated into the working policy of my command.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION F (CONTINUED)

Item #6: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the part played by operational police commanders in evaluating the results of policies based on the findings/recommendations of externally funded, police related research is satisfactory.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #7: Please respond to the following statement: In general, I consider the dissemination of externally funded, police related research studies to me to be satisfactory.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #8: Please respond to the following statement: In general, I consider the findings/recommendations of externally funded, police related research studies which I have read to be relevant to the operations of my command.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #9: Please respond to the following statement: In general, I have considered the findings/recommendations of externally funded, police related research studies in formulating policy for my command.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #10: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the findings/recommendations of externally funded, police related research studies have been incorporated into working policy for my command.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #11: Please respond to the following statement: In general, I have found police related research to be of great value to me in my capacity as a police operational commander.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION F

The items in this section concern externally funded, police related research studies in general, in essence, studies financed by bodies other than your department and conducted outside of your department.

Item #1: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the research needs of operational police commanders are of primary concern to those who conduct police related research studies.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #2: Please respond to the following statement: During my tenure as an operational police commander, I have been consulted many times concerning the suitability of a topic for police related research.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #3: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the part played by operational police commanders in the selection of the subject matter of externally funded, police related research studies is satisfactory.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #4: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the part played by operational police commanders in the preparation of externally funded, police related research studies is satisfactory.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

Item #5: Please respond to the following statement: In general, the part played by operational police commanders in the formulation of recommendations contained in externally funded, police related research studies is satisfactory.

(1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
 (4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION F (CONTINUED)

Item #12: Please respond to the following statement: If asked, I would be eager to suggest a number of research questions which, if answered would be of considerable assistance to me in my role as an operational police commander.

- (1) Strongly Agree \_\_\_\_ (2) Agree \_\_\_\_ (3) No Opinion \_\_\_\_  
(4) Disagree \_\_\_\_ (5) Strongly Disagree \_\_\_\_

SECTION G

I would be willing to be interviewed concerning my responses to this survey instrument, with the understanding that my identity will not be revealed to anyone other than the researcher.

YES \_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_

If YES, please supply the following information.

NAME \_\_\_\_\_

TELEPHONE NUMBER (\_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_  
AREA  
CODE

APPENDIX "B"Interview Schedule

NOTE: Prior to any questioning, each respondent was given the following explanation of the purpose of the interview.

EXPLANATION OF INTERVIEW PURPOSE

I've been working on a project concerning police-related research studies that are sponsored by organizations other than local police departments---the Federal Government---for example. My purpose is to explore the experience of operational police commanders with the dissemination and use of such studies. I've already received responses from police commanders in New York City and elsewhere to a standardized questionnaire that I sent out earlier this year, and, at this time, I would like to thank you again for your participation in that phase of my project. On the whole, the results of the questionnaire survey indicated that there are a number of serious problems in the circulation of externally sponsored research studies among potential users and in carrying out the recommendations that they contain. The most straightforward way for me to get a stronger understanding of just what these problems are and how they might be corrected, is by asking a cross-section of the respondents about them, and, so, I would sincerely appreciate your help to this end.

I will be asking you a series of questions: the entire interview should require no more than twenty minutes of your time.

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Should you have any doubts about the meaning of any of these questions, just say so and I will try to clarify them for you. If you do not want to respond to any particular item, tell me and we'll skip to the next question. Your answers to all questions will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. Other than myself, no one will be able to identify you as the source of any comment.

#### QUESTIONS

Question #1: A majority of the questionnaire respondents reported that they were not aware of the existence of one or more of the specific studies that I asked about, and an even larger number reported that they had not read one or more of these studies. What, if anything, is wrong with the process by which these studies are disseminated?

(If the interviewee was reluctant to answer, he was prompted with Questions 1a and 1b)

1a: Is it possible that those issuing the studies failed to identify potential users or simply did not follow through in reaching them?

1b: Is it possible that potential users dismiss these studies off-hand as having no practical value based upon their past experience with similar studies?

1c: Some other reason?

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Question #2: A majority of the questionnaire respondents did not believe that externally sponsored research studies generally contained information or recommendations useful to them in making policy for their commands. In your opinion, what, if anything, is wrong with these studies on this count?

(Prompt with Questions 2a, 2b, and/or 2c)

2a: Is it possible that the topics of these studies are not relevant or that their results/recommendations cannot be applied in widely differing circumstances?

2b: Do you think that some of these studies are biased toward a particular viewpoint, and, if so, can you identify that viewpoint?

2c: Is it that the data that these studies contain are somehow suspect or that the recommendations that they put forth are unclear, illogical or impractical?

Question #3: In your own experience, how did you come across those externally sponsored research studies with which you are familiar?

(Prompt with Questions 3a, 3b, and/or 3c)

3a: Did you receive them through formal organizational channels?

3b: Were they recommended to you by a colleague on an informal basis?

3c: Did you discover them as part of your own effort to keep

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abreast of developments in the law enforcement field?

Question #4: Are you aware of any instances in which studies of this kind seem to have been used to support or discredit a decision or policy already made or in force? If so, could you describe that situation without specific reference to other persons?

NOTE: No prompting was done for this question.

Question #5: When you do come across a research finding in a study of this sort which you judge to be relevant and you consider it in making policy for your unit, how likely is it that real change will be made in working practice, and how long a time will it take before these changes are made?

(If respondent indicates that answer to Question 5 is somehow problematical or that extensive delay is involved, then Question 6 was asked. If not, I went to Question 7)

Question #6: What are the most serious problems which you face in transforming recommendations from these studies into actual policy for your command and what forces delay policy changes from occurring?

Question #7: In your opinion, should operational personnel have a greater role in conducting research studies sponsored by external organizations?

(7a, 7b, 7c and/or 7d were used if prompting was necessary)

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- 7a: Should they be consulted more frequently about topic selection?
- 7b: Should they play a more active part in conducting these studies?
- 7c: Should they play a greater role in the formulation of recommendations from the results of these studies?
- 7d: Should they be actively involved in evaluating the results of changes stemming from the adoption of study recommendations?

Question #8: Other than greater involvement by operational personnel, what, if anything, can be done to improve the process of disseminating and using externally sponsored studies?

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