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APPLYING BAKHTIN IN AN ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY DISCOURSE

by

HARRIET RAFE

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of
New York**

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Abstract

APPLYING BAKHTIN IN AN ANALYSIS OF EVERYDAY DISCOURSE

by

Harriet Rafe

Adviser: Professor Lindsey Churchill

M. M. Bakhtin speaks of two forces which exist side by side in any developed society: The centripetal or centralizing force which strives toward homogeneity and tends to hold society together and the centrifugal force which tends to disrupt the social order, to rend it apart. Contemporary discourse studies have been particularly one-sided in their approach, privileging the orderly, unifying forces in language-use and either ignoring the more disruptive elements or treating them as error, incompetence or deviance. This research project represents an effort to adjust that imbalance, to examine the more disruptive voices.

Spontaneous conversations were collected in a marketplace area in Brooklyn via the conversation analysis technique of audio-taping dialogues in naturally occurring activities. Bakhtin's concepts of speech genres and double voiced discourse were adapted for utilization in the analysis of this collection of dialogues. Through these two concepts both sides of the language-picture were addressed. The analytic part of this dissertation begins by describing the use of

speech genres, which proved to be a cohesive force around which participants organized their activities. Bakhtin's categories of double voiced discourse, which included the hidden polemic, irony, parody, were found to be widely and skillfully used by participants to challenge each other's discourse and at the same time, the established order. Through the juxtaposition and manipulation of genres and the use of extremes of double-voiced discourse participants are able to create new and dynamic forms and to stretch the language boundaries, often to the point of carnivalization. It is a finding of this study that the addition of Bakhtinian concepts to an analysis of discourse in everyday life both broadens the range of analysis by highlighting elements heretofore unexamined and allows us to see both the centripetal forces and the centrifugal forces at work in our society's language. In addition Bakhtin contributes a theory of language which may be utilized to provide a socio-historical and ideological element to a project which has come under criticism for its apolitical and undertheorized view of the everyday world.

FOR CARL

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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation project was undertaken in an attempt to fill a gap left by contemporary studies of everyday conversation and to broaden the range of phenomena that can be discussed in a discourse analysis. Traditional models, such as those based on Austin's speech act theory and the conversation analysis model which derives from Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, have come under criticism because they tend to concentrate on one aspect of discourse and exclude phenomena which fall outside of their particular emphasis. The speech act model stresses rational mental processes as the organizational base in conversation, processes which are often assumed by the analyst. Conversation analysis places its emphasis on structural features such as turn-taking sequences and does not consider individual motivation.

The above approaches differ from traditional linguistic studies in that they both consider the importance of extra-linguistic factors and both have produced studies that have greatly enhanced our knowledge of the role of discourse in face-to-face interaction. Yet each has, in its own way, obscured a great deal of social speech phenomena that occur during interaction. They both tend to privilege the orderly, non-controversial aspects of discourse and assume

consensus as a desired goal. That is, although recently there has been a rash of studies concentrated on phenomena such as conflict talk (Grimshaw 1990), ambiguity in discourse, and other less orderly, even problematic, aspects of talk in interaction (Coupland, Giles, and Wiemann 1991), these phenomena still tend to be treated as problems which must be solved so that we might proceed toward a more competent, less ambiguous communication.

Lacking a theory of language acquisition and development, contemporary studies cannot address the constraints that a language also places upon its users: participants in a dynamic, changing environment who struggle for expression through dominant language forms that must always prove inadequate to that expression. The above-mentioned models cannot address regional and cultural differences in spoken communication except, again, as problems to be solved. They cannot speak of changes in language-use within a given society. They are unable to reach the ideological/historical dimension in a society's use of language.

Many areas have developed within the social sciences which stress a need for alternative ways of looking at society. (These include women's studies, Afro-American studies, and cultural studies.) The input of the minority group or sub-culture has been given new emphasis and questions can be raised as to the possible meaning of the many clashing themes and value systems which co-exist in postmodern societies. These ideas have not for the most part been applied to the analysis of discourse in everyday communication.

This study will adapt the concepts and categories utilized by Soviet theorist and social critic, Mikhail M. Bakhtin, in order to utilize them in an analysis of conversations collected during everyday activities of participants. Specifically, Bakhtin's concept of speech genres and categories of double-voiced discourse will be applied, with an emphasis on the use of irony and other polemical and rhetorical devices. Through the utilization of these two concepts, Bakhtin allows us to examine both sides of the linguistic coin: coherence in everyday discourse is achieved through the individual's knowledge of and ability to utilize speech genres and, conversely, the more disorderly, the evaluative, critical, disruptive forms of dialogic discourse show us the dynamics of a living language.

Bakhtin considers situational context as a vital factor in the understanding of discourse but he adds the socio-historical and ideological environment which surrounds the word to his definition of context. The introduction of ideology and history, as trans-situational factors which constitute the shared understanding that people of a given culture utilize in order to conduct their daily activities in a heteroglossic society, sets Bakhtin's work apart from that of other contemporary language theorists and allows it an added dimension of analysis. Bakhtin can also be credited with introducing the dialogic, a way of thinking about discourse which does not treat the speaker nor the discourse as an object but also avoids the assumption that the analyst can somehow present findings from the viewpoint of the other: the minority group or individual participant. At the same time, his use of categories such as double-voiced speech forms and authoritative vs

internally persuasive discourse allows us a way of talking about talk that does not treat it as an exchange between two unified subjects.

My own research, the analysis of which forms a major part of this dissertation, has been devoted to identifying and describing speech phenomena which include the less orderly, conflict laden and otherwise disruptive, often divisive, features of spontaneous talk in interaction, not as something to be corrected but as a part of everyday discourse in its natural setting. This study will, therefore, begin with an assumption of difference as an integral part of human interaction and will also consider the socially created constraints participants encounter during interaction.

I wish to emphasize that although this study combines many of the traditional techniques of conversation analysis with a more ethnographic, participant observation methodology in the collecting and presenting of the conversations which are then discussed from a Bakhtinian perspective, it should definitely not be seen as an attempt to synthesize these diverse methods. We have, however, tried to show that the theoretical bases behind the research forms, although not always open to synthesis, are at least able to speak with one another in their mutual search for knowledge.

CHAPTER ONE

LITERATURE REVIEW

The decision to investigate a new approach to the study of everyday communication is based on current trends within the discipline of sociology which emphasize the importance of context and factors within the cultural environment to studies of discourse. The decision to adapt the work of Mikhail M. Bakhtin, to utilize the concepts and categories which Bakhtin applied in his literary analyses, in an analysis of everyday discourse was arrived at only after an in-depth examination of the ways in which Bakhtinian theory and concepts can fit into and enhance our knowledge of talk by participants in the everyday world (Rafe 1989).

A Bakhtinian approach to discourse analysis, while fully recognizing the importance of social context to the dynamics of speech in its everyday use as well as the structural aspects of language, also allows us to examine the signifying power of the words themselves, the significance of which has been strangely missing from contemporary analyses of conversation. We can say that Bakhtin has put the word back into discourse. His conceptualization of "the word" as well as other concepts which have come to be recognized as "Bakhtinian," will be explicated in this chapter. Bakhtin also allows us to add an

element of history, a theory of language and ideology, to a project which has been criticized for its ahistoric and apolitical stance, without losing the immediacy of its involvement in ongoing everyday activities.

The following review of contemporary literature can be seen as a response to current controversies that have appeared in the form of debates, or in true Bakhtinian fashion let us call them dialogues, and which by reflecting many concerns and developments in contemporary social theory and research also act to signal the need for a more inclusive approach to the study of discourse. Since it is the contention of this investigator that controversy need not be understood as a negative concept but rather as a form of dialogue which might aid in the pursuit of social knowledge, it is fitting that this literature review evolve around just such dialogues. Our first emphasis will be on those debates and controversies within the areas of discourse analysis and interaction research that focus on issues most relevant to this study.

One such debate is currently taking place among practitioners and advocates of two diverse models utilized in the investigation of talk in interaction: the conversation analysis model and the "rational" model (Atkinson and Heritage 1984; Jacobs and Jackson 1983). The conversation analysis model, originated by the late Harvey Sacks and developed in collaboration with E. A. Schegloff and G. Jefferson, was largely influenced by Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. It utilizes material gathered from naturally occurring conversations and focuses on sequencing structures such as turn-taking and

adjacency pair rules as organizing features of conversation (Goodwin and Heritage 1990). The "rational" model is derived from John Austin's speech act theory, as developed by J. R. Searle and H. P. Grice. Practitioners of this model assume a rationality of mental processes as the organizing principle in discourse and utilize a game playing model for understanding coherence in conversation (Jacobs and Jackson 1983; Maynard and Clayman 1991).

The Sacks model has come under criticism because it does not concern itself with individual motives and conversation is thus reduced to the obeying of sequencing rules and adherence to a structure which is said to be created and recreated by the participants on a one-time basis for each situation but its practitioners are unable to say just how or why. In addition the technique associated with this model, of utilizing taped conversations only, has been criticized due to the limitations this places on the possible sites of study and consequently on the type of conversations studied. The rational model, which concentrates on objectified goals of the speaker, has been criticized because it ignores structural aspects of discourse. It cannot therefore consider phenomena such as preliminaries, utterances structured to elicit a preferred response (Schegloff 1984), and also because the goals and desires of the subject are assumed by the analyst. Since the speaker's ability to communicate those goals and achieve desired results acts as a measure of success or communicative competence, conversation in this model is reduced to strategies and manipulations.

In order to establish the ground for my own project, it is necessary to look more closely at some of the assumptions which lie behind the use of these models. Although they are often lumped together in sociological literature (Heritage 1984; Sharrock 1989), Garfinkel's approach represents a radical departure from the traditional role-playing approaches such as in Goffman's dramaturgical and game models. A basic difference exists in the way in which each school of thought tends to position the actor in relation to the situation. That is, the humanist, or naturalist, school (Goffman, Lofland, Jackson) ground their analysis in game-playing or dramaturgical metaphors which, although they stabilize situations in order that they can be analyzed, at the same time give the individual less flexibility as to behavior within that situation. Goffman, for example, sets a stage to which actors come, each bringing their own interpretive abilities. As a result, interaction becomes a contest of wills and communicative competence. Since the individual must come to such a situation with his or her own background knowledge intact, we get a sense of the actor disrupting the situation, using it, manipulating it strategically for his or her own ends. Conversely, for Garfinkel the situation is not so much already there as created during the course of interaction. We get a sense of people making it up as they go along, acting spontaneously and more out of a social obligation to act than out of any individual strategy they may have learned. Garfinkel's version lends a fluidity to individual action and leaves room for a diversity in situational definition. On the other hand, it becomes more difficult to account for the order which is

found in interaction. Those followers of Garfinkel who have also followed a linguistic turn have vested this order in structural (or formal) aspects of language-use such as sequencing and adjacency pairs (Maynard and Clayman 1991).

In appreciation of the valuable analyses that have come out of both research designs, it is not the intention of this thesis to be overly critical of either of the above approaches, but rather to introduce a different, perhaps more inclusive approach.

From here on, in my overview of contemporary literature, I will focus on the controversy surrounding Garfinkel's work and the nature and origins of the conversation analysis model, choosing it over the "rational" model because of its original emphasis on natural conversation in the everyday life of ordinary people. (Although the speech act, or "rational" model today is often applied to naturally-occurring conversation, Austin's original design, which developed out of linguistics, utilized sentences constructed by the analyst). In addition, conversation analysis, in the tradition of ethnomethodology, attempts to limit its analysis to what is observable within a given situation rather than assume a priori mental processes as explanation of individual motivation.

Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology

It is generally agreed that one of Garfinkel's contributions to sociology as a discipline lies in his focus on the importance of everyday life, as opposed to the traditional concerns with systems and institutions in the study of society (Heritage 1984) and on praxis, or action rather than on cognitive processes (Button and Sharrock 1993). In addition, Garfinkel is, together with Harvey Sacks, said to be responsible for the linguistic turn in sociology and its emphasis on "natural" conversations in everyday life. Since the present study is concerned with those areas of investigation, we will consider their ideas in depth and try to contrast them with those of Mikhail Bakhtin.

Garfinkel developed his approach, which he termed ethnomethodology, as a response to Parsonian systems theory and the general treatment of the subject in sociological studies as one who acts but is entirely unaware of and powerless over the forces, structural or psychological, that determine his or her choices (Heritage 1984). When the only complete volume of Garfinkel's work was published in 1967, it started a number of controversies and many of them continue to this day (Maynard and Clayman 1991). One such controversy involves the degree to which he was successful in his attack on positivism. From a feminist point of view, Garfinkel is said to maintain the nonself-reflective, patriarchic assumptions typical of positivism (Bologh 1992; Rogers 1992). Other controversies involve what Sharrock points to as the basic disagreement among sociologists: the extent to which the individual social actor is free to choose his or

her course of action and how much they are restricted and controlled by factors which are "perhaps beyond their ken" (Sharrock 1989). Still others evolve around various influences on Garfinkel's work such as how much his thinking may have been influenced by Schutz's phenomenology as opposed to Wittgenstein's emphasis on praxis.

For some reason critics tend to believe that ethnomethodologists assume that actors can do anything they want and that there are no constraints on individual actions (Sharrock 1989). It is important to note here that Garfinkel never says that there are no rules; his earliest research projects consist of showing that there are indeed social rules of expectation covering the simplest interaction. These rules are neither written nor generally discussed (they are "seen but unnoticed"); we are, typically, not even aware of them until they are broken, yet participants have come to depend upon them to the extent that, as Garfinkel and his students found during the course of his well-known breaching experiments (Garfinkel 1967), the breaking of them may result not only in personal upset, but in anger, even outrage to the point of a breakdown in social relations. It is as though a moral issue is at stake rather than a procedural norm of which the participant is unaware (Heritage 1984). On the other hand, Garfinkel's rules are neither binding nor stable—they vary from situation to situation. For example, the rules of politeness that we follow with strangers may not obtain and may even be considered "suspicious" if used with members of our own family. Garfinkel also found that every rule has an etc. since no rule can

cover all contingencies (Pollner 1987) and even the strictest rule can be broken as long as that breakage is accountable, recognizable and explainable, by the participants.

In contrast to other methodologies (role modeling, interpretive interaction, etc.) where rules, or norms, are followed due to an internalization process over which the actor has no control, or in response to hidden drives or desires of which the actor is unaware (although somehow the analyst is always aware), Garfinkel's insistence on the conscious choice of the individual who can decide at any time, and often does decide, to not follow a rule, as well as his or her awareness of the possible consequences of not following that rule, represents an important difference. At the same time, Garfinkel retains a strong sense of social restrictions on behavior and the possibility of a struggle on the part of the participant with those forms of social control. If, indeed, social rules are followed more out of a desire to prevent the results of not following them, or even to avoid the necessity of having to account for not following them, a participant's reluctance to break the social bond attests to an unspoken acknowledgement of the importance of that bond (Heritage 1984) and renders the rules even more constricting. The individual is morally bound to behave in ways which maintain his or her relationships and as a consequence, it is implied, the structures which support society. This micro-macro link is implied without the ethnomethodologist having to talk about structure (that is, without imposing it on the situation) which well may represent a "hidden agenda" in ethnomethodological studies.

The Garfinkel Controversies

A particularly enthusiastic, we can even say malicious, debate appears in the fall 1991 issue of *Sociological Theory* in reply to an earlier article by N. Denzin in which he critiques Garfinkel's "Agnes" essay. Published in *Studies in Ethnomethodology* (1967) the "Agnes" study is perhaps the best known, or at least the most widely discussed, of Garfinkel's work. To briefly recall to mind that text, it involves the analysis of an intersexed person who has come to the Medical Center of the University of California at Los Angeles to request an operation. The analysis is based on many hours of interviews which were conducted by Garfinkel and others in order to determine whether or not Agnes will receive the operation she desires to make her anatomically normal. The point of Garfinkel's study was how Agnes, who had been raised as a boy, is able to "pass " as a woman and led him to conclude that gender is a social production (Garfinkel 1967), a radical idea for its time.

In his critique, Denzin has claimed that Garfinkel assumed a representative view of the relationship between reality and text in that Garfinkel "must presume that his commonsense understandings of what Agnes did also constitute her commonsense understandings" and that "the text he writes maps those understandings accurately" (Denzin 1990, 208). He then chides Garfinkel because Agnes, as it turns out, had "duped" him and the other staff members by not telling anyone at that time that she had been taking female hormones for

many years, as reported by Stoller and included in an "Appendix to Chapter Five" (Garfinkel 1967, 285-88).

In a reply to Denzin, R. Hilbert argues that his remarks are based on a complete misunderstanding of ethnomethodology in that Denzin regards Garfinkel as attempting to tell the "true" story about the "real" Agnes but this view is in error because the ethnomethodologist is "expressly indifferent" to the truth or falsity of the subject's statements, being concerned only with the way in which various activities (and impressions) are accomplished. Ethnomethodology is interested in the method, the how of the production of the text not in evaluating its truth or falsity (Hilbert 1991).

This particular exchange seems to have roots in an earlier feud between interactionists, as represented by Denzin, and ethnomethodologists:

In publishing "Harold and Agnes," Norman Denzin (1990) opens up some old war wounds dating to his early attempt to combine ethnomethodology with symbolic interactionism (Denzin 1969, 1970). In that early attempt Denzin made mistakes concerning the very definition of ethnomethodology as well as its topical domain, assumptions, and theoretical orientation. (Hilbert 1991, 264)

Hilbert's reference is to an article written by Denzin (1970) in which he suggested a synthesis of ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism and which was responded to by Zimmerman and Wieder (1970), who point to the impossibility of such a synthesis. Both are contained in J. Douglas's anthology, *Understanding Everyday Life*.

Another important point about which Denzin is accused of misunderstanding ethnomethodology involves Garfinkel's use of the documentary method of interpretation. According to Hilbert, Denzin sees it as referring to "Garfinkel's own recommended method of doing research on Agnes," and then later in the same article claims that Garfinkel is critical of this method and is "trying to free himself of it." Hilbert adds, "Both of these contradictory assertions are in error" (264). Reference to the ethnomethodologist's use of Mannheim's concept of the documentary method here may be confusing. It does, in fact, apply to both the subject and the researcher. That is, no one can escape using it.¹ In this regard, Garfinkel has discussed the sociologist's inability to somehow escape, or rise above, the social environment from within which he or she writes and was greatly criticized for voicing that insight, which was at the time considered radical and anti-sociological. Whether or not Garfinkel is, ironically, making the same assumption in his own analysis is another matter of controversy and will be addressed later in this chapter.

Denzin further contends that, "The sexual Agnes escaped Garfinkel's net; her sexual being and her sexuality remained unaccounted for" (Denzin 1990, 213). He then proceeds to deconstruct the Agnes story and to replace it with his own "Agnes and Harold" text in which he gives his own account of Agnes' sexuality. Although he has never met Agnes and knows of her only through Garfinkel's work, Denzin subjects her to a long-distance, Lacanian psychoanalysis which we are expected to accept as a "truer" reading than

Garfinkel's. It is pointed out (Hilbert 1991) that Denzin likewise fails to show how his text of Agnes' story is also his own creation.

Denzin's main argument with Garfinkel's text seems to be that it is not self-reflective, or honest enough. Denzin argues that, "Sociologists (and other cultural observers) no longer can presume unthinkingly, and in a taken-for-granted manner, to map the world out there. The world out there, *as it is known sociologically*, [italics Denzin's] exists only in our texts" (1990, 200). He then adds, "I want to suggest as well that sociologists no longer should maintain, in good faith or in willful ignorance, a division between fiction and social science data. Fiction does not mean falsehood, or something opposed to truth, and good ethnographies are true fictions (see Clifford 1986, p. 6; Denzin 1989, pp. 23-25)" (200-201).

I tend to agree with Denzin's opinion about the damage done by various presumptions made in sociological texts and also that fiction does not mean falsehood: fictionalized accounts can be utilized, as Bakhtin utilizes them, as sources of social knowledge. I would argue, however, with the idea that we should no longer maintain a division between fiction and social science data. Whereas it is one thing to utilize fictionalized accounts as sources of cultural knowledge and it is important to be constantly aware of a certain lack of correspondence between the ethnographer's account and the reality as experienced by the subject, the difference between the two, although culturally produced, is very real and consequent. Fiction and sociological reports

represent different "ways of talking" about the world, or to use Bakhtin's terminology, they are "orchestrated" differently. To not differentiate would be a disservice to both.

In spite of bringing up "old war wounds," this debate can be said to have had a positive effect, if only in that it has forced a rereading, and rethinking, of Garfinkel's work. For example, Denzin also accused Garfinkel of using a game analogy in his Agnes chapter. A rereading of that chapter makes it quite clear that Garfinkel is using Goffman's metaphor as an argument against Goffman, to show that it does not explain Agnes' methods (Garfinkel 1967). In his response Maynard (1991) uses this reference in Denzin's article to further explicate the difference between Goffman and Garfinkel. Lynch and Bogen, in yet another response, claim that Denzin has failed to recognize the voice of the other, the dialogicality in Garfinkel's original text, which prompts them to do an interesting, if now quite Bakhtinian, rendering of the voices in Agnes (Lynch and Bogen 1991).

In his reply to some of the above criticism Denzin claims that his purpose was to urge ethnomethodologists to take seriously what he calls the "deconstructive turn in current social theory," to embrace a more postmodern endeavor (Denzin 1991). He further claims that he is doing feminist deconstruction. In this regard, I would point out that feminists have indeed criticized Garfinkel, but on their own terms, ascribing possible motivation for both Agnes and Garfinkel to a cultural awareness of their respective positions at that particular time and place rather than on a long-distance psychoanalysis.

Mary Rogers, for one, has critiqued Garfinkel's "Agnes" essay from a feminist viewpoint. She objects to his use of descriptive terms which refract male-centered stances and which stereotype and diminish the female experience. For example, he refers to Agnes as a "single girl" whose "appearance was convincingly female" and to her "appropriately feminine manner" and "attractive shape". "In all these instances, Garfinkel not only invokes commonplace stereotypes but also fails to say by whose standards or by what criteria his perceptions are valid" (Rogers 1992).

At the same time Rogers acknowledges that Garfinkel's study was done and the article written before the feminist research which has since shown the harmful ramifications of the use of such terminology. Her further criticism regards Garfinkel's failure to address possible consequences of Agnes' position and lack of power vis a vis her interviewers—all male and all professionals. He does say she "*had* to engage in the research" (Rogers' emphasis) in order to get the surgery she could not otherwise afford. Rogers also points to Garfinkel's lack of methodological detail in the Agnes study as compared to his other studies where he is specific about procedure for recording data, etc. In general, he shows an insensitivity to his own part in the interview. As Rogers points out, an interview is a dialogue. We might ask: How were Garfinkel's own questions voiced? To what was Agnes responding?

Bologh in her reply to Roger's article, first reminds us that Garfinkel's Agnes study was a "ground breaking work in sociology with respect to the social construction of gender" and points out that his work was followed by other ethnomethodologically influenced feminist work such as Kessler and McKenna's *Gender: An Ethnomethodological Approach* published in 1978 and West and Zimmerman's well-known work on interruptions in conversations (Bologh 1992).

Bologh does believe, however, that Rogers has touched on an important issue--what Bologh refers to as ethnomethodology's "Achilles heal." "Garfinkel's ethnomethodology lacks self-reflection, an unwillingness to apply its methods and strictures to itself. It therefore ends up guilty of the same kind of 'positivist science' that it decries--" She adds that Garfinkel's study fails to recognize its own part in that very social construction of order which it purports to investigate. In this regard Bologh believes that ethnomethodology could benefit from a feminist sense of the political (Bologh 1992).

Even though ethnomethodologists argue that ethnomethodology's apolitical stance or "institutional indifference" is justifiable in that its practitioner's wish to avoid reifying social structures and prefer to bracket aspects of power in order to concentrate their efforts on what they consider the more important topic of investigation, members' methods of dealing with their everyday lives, or ethnomethods, it is difficult to ignore the counter-argument that one cannot be apolitical because in failing to be critical one is really supporting the politics of the status quo.

To paraphrase Bologh, without inquiry into the form of life that grounds the reality that members' practices constitute (which in feminist studies is done as an acknowledged political activity) and without self-reflection—without examining the grounds of its own accomplished reality—ethnomethodology cannot account for the persistence of that reality nor can it account for its own practices.

In an earlier work Rogers (1983) detailed why Garfinkel cannot be considered a phenomenologist, her main argument having to do with just this lack of self-reflection and ignoring of the phenomenological epoche'. According to Maynard and Clayman (1991, 390), "While the phenomenological orientation to contextual embeddedness is important, Garfinkel nevertheless deemphasized Schutzian regard for perceptual knowledge as a mental process or activity. . . ." Garfinkel's movement away from the phenomenological accent on consciousness has been noted by others and some would, in fact, consider Garfinkel's work to be more influenced by Wittgenstein than Schutz.

Another debate involves that very influence. Ethnomethodological emphasis on individual freedom and creativity has led the contemporary school of social constructionists to claim Garfinkel as well as Wittgenstein as a theoretical base for their argument that "reality is constructed and maintained through language in interaction." This claim is forcefully disputed by Button and Sharrock (1993) who point out that Garfinkel's emphasis is on the activity of discourse, on conversational activities during which we display knowledge of

properties of common discourse. Their argument is with what they take to be the overall constructionist viewpoint, that reality is constructed through talk, and in particular with the constructionist claim that Garfinkel and Wittgenstein are source material for this idea. Button and Sharrock argue that a cognitive turn is antithetical to the thinking of Wittgenstein and Garfinkel and that ethnomethodologically-inspired studies would be better grounded in "praxis, description and explication." They make the further point that constructionists see language as a medium of representation (almost as a "picture image") and that the representational model of language misunderstands the relationship between language and social reality as advocated by both Wittgenstein and Garfinkel. As they see it, the social constructionist notion is based on statements made in *Tractatus*, an early work which ideas Wittgenstein later rejected. In his later work, Wittgenstein not only proposed that there is no determinate connection between language and reality but that the very question of a relationship was a meaningless one, which Button and Sharrock take to mean that language does not picture (or represent) reality—it is independent of reality.

In what can be taken as a response to the above criticism, Shotter claims that the constructionist view is not as simple as its opponents seem to think, that they do not claim that 'mere' talk is enough to make things 'real' and he charges that by suggesting that, opponents indicate their own commitment to the view that the only function of language is representation (Shotter 1993)²

In our own reading of Wittgenstein's later work, we understand him to be of the opinion that, although there is no determinate connection between language and reality, how we understand things in the world "the form the world takes" is tied to the explanations we give of them and that form is learned via various "language games." Language is thus not so much a mental process as a social process. We see this as also being the thought of Garfinkel and Sacks.

Wittgenstein also explains that a language game cannot be thought of as providing an unchanging set of rules which represent reality but rather as a form by which we understand reality.

So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?"--It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.--It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.
(Wittgenstein 1953, 241-242)

According to Wittgenstein, the application of concepts depends on a scaffolding of facts, or framework and if there were a disruption of these facts, the point of the concepts would be lost. As I interpret this, in agreement with Sharrock and Button, our concepts must be based upon elements (or facts) within reality as we find it, not vice versa as some would have it, that reality is based upon elements within our concepts. This makes reality a given but not a

closed, or completed system. It is "as we find it." Circumstances of our everyday lives are subject to change, not merely because we think so but because we find them in our activities, in praxis, to have changed.

The finer points of the dialogue between social constructionists and the more "realistic" ethnomethodologists involve the sociology of science and the sociology of knowledge, specifically in this case as applied to studies of scientific work but on a more general level constructionists appear to challenge the notion of social facts, or social structures and norms as objectively there; as having an existence outside of our descriptions of them. Interestingly, Bernard-Donals, in his book on Bakhtin's theory (1994), has addressed a similar problem. He draws on Bhaskar's argument re transitive vs intransitive dimensions of science. Our knowledge of natural or intransitive material is always mediated by transitive, or cognitive forms. According to Bernard-Donals this poses a problem (in the case of Bakhtin) because historical materialism treats history as intransitive; that is, as existing apart from our knowledge of it and apart from the language we use to describe it. Terry Eagleton (1982) has addressed similarities between the thinking of Wittgenstein and the thinking of Bakhtin. Eagleton's essay will be discussed in Chapter Two.

Background expectations, as discussed by Garfinkel (1967) - closely follows Wittgenstein's description of a stable background which surrounds our activities and at the same time is displayed and produced in these activities. The world of "natural facts" against which we act (and our actions reproduce) is a

socially standardized world. Garfinkel adds that while this standardization, or agreement is constantly accountable in our activities, it is not the topic of our activities. This also applies to spoken interaction during which we assume this agreement but do not discuss it.

The anticipation that persons *will* understand, the occasionality of expressions, the specific vagueness of references, the retrospective-prospective sense of a present occurrence, waiting for something later in order to see what was meant before, are sanctioned properties of common discourse. They furnish a background of seen but unnoticed features of common discourse whereby actual utterances are recognized as events of common, reasonable, understandable, plain talk. Persons require these properties of discourse as conditions under which they are themselves entitled and entitle others to claim that they know what they are talking about, and that what they are saying is understandable and ought to be understood. (Garfinkel 1967, 41-42)

We would conclude that Garfinkel remains theoretically tied to a form of realism although not a "naive" or essentialist one. This connection, however, is not always explicit in his work and seems to have virtually disappeared from the work of most of his followers.

Conversation Analysis

As Heritage has pointed out, a particular viewpoint is often judged in retrospect by the work that has come out of it. In addition to explicating the ideas of Harold Garfinkel, his *Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology* (1984) contains an overview of the work which has come out of ethnomethodology. Since in our own work we see Garfinkel's importance not only in his concentration on

everyday life but also on his notion of talk as an ongoing activity, we will limit our discussion to the origins and contemporary controversies which surround conversation analysis.

According to Maynard and Clayman (1991), conversation analysis, originated by Harvey Sacks and developed in collaboration with Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson, has become "the most visible and individual form of ethnomethodological research." They point out that, although it is generally agreed that conversation analysis came out of ethnomethodology, no one has shown just how but that the beginnings of this idea are laid out in the now well-known Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) article "On Formal Structures of Practical Actions."

This article begins by setting ethnomethodology, or the ethnomethodological project, up in opposition to various methodologies popular at the time: "statistical evaluations of frequency," "laboratory arrangements as experimental schemes of inference," and formal theoretical work such as Parsonian systems theory, to name a few. It then emphasizes ethnomethodology's concern with the phenomenon of "natural language." (unmediated language which "members" speak without really thinking about it) and in particular its indexical properties, and poses the question, "What is it about natural language that makes these phenomena observable/reportable; that is, account-able phenomena?"

Garfinkel and Sacks immediately point to a major consideration of the ethnomethodological project which differentiates it from others:

logicians and linguists when encountering these expressions in attempts to recover commonplace talk in its structural particulars consider them obstinate nuisances the ethnomethodologist considers them observable phenomena to be investigated and analyzed. (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970)

According to Maynard and Clayman the problem of the indexicality of expressions in natural language is central to this essay: "All natural language is indexical, which means that the understandability of any utterance, rather than being fixed by some abstract definition, depends upon the circumstances in which it appears (1991, 269-276). Garfinkel and Sacks discuss "formulations," an ethnomethod used by members to deal with indexical expressions:

A member may treat some part of the conversation as an occasion to describe that conversation, to explain it, or characterize it, or explicate, or translate, or summarize, or furnish the gist of it, or take note of its accordance with rules, or remark on its departure from rules. (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970, 350)

Formulating is "saying-in-so-many-words-what-we-are-doing" and is practiced as a remedy for the intrinsic properties of indexical expressions, but it is also realized in this essay that formulations are themselves indexical—products of context. That is, there are many instances where it is not appropriate to use such formulations, where they are considered "boring, incongruous or evidence of incompetence, of devious motivation and so forth." Garfinkel and Sacks conclude that, "Formulations are not the machinery whereby accountably sensible, clear, definite talk is done." (353-354) and must continue their investigation of what kind of "machinery" makes up the practices of doing accountably rational conversation.

Garfinkel and Sacks also discuss "glossing practices" in this article.

Glossing here refers to the work of the professional.

In that work we see *members* being careful to build context-free descriptions, relevant instructions, perspicuous anecdotes, cogent proverbs, precise definitions of ordinary activities, and context-free formulations of natural language practices, and using members' competence with natural language practices to assure the doing and recognition of (adequate evidence), (objective description), (definite procedure), (clear, consistent, cogent, relevant instructions), (computable conversations), and the rest." (360)

I would read this article a little differently than Maynard and Clayman do.

In it I see two separate interests. We might attribute one to Sacks: the use of formulations by members, which is discussed as a possible source of order in conversation. A second interest would appear to be the use of gloss by the professional, or "the machinery of professionals' gloss achievements" but as is pointed out, these practices do not tell us exactly what is glossed—We can't see the machinery. And that machinery, I believe represents a major interest for Garfinkel. The appendix on glossing, in fact, needs an analysis of its own, for here we see that Garfinkel and Sacks are quite aware of ethnomethodology's vulnerability to the same criticism that they are leveling at other methods—in fact they admittedly gloss the definition of glossing as an embedded example of "what they are talking about." It is in this same article that Sacks and Garfinkel talk about the pluralistic methodology of the social sciences and therefore as well as a unity of effort, I think a reading of a duality of purpose is not inappropriate.

In retrospect, we know that Garfinkel did not pursue the direction of sociolinguistics but continued his interest in the study of work (see Garfinkel 1981) but that Sacks did pursue his question of order in conversation (see Sacks 1972) and, as has been pointed out, together with Schegloff and Jefferson, he continued his ideas along the structural aspects of conversation such as sequencing and adjacency pairs. Of course we cannot tell because of his untimely death where his own research would have eventually led him. It is also suggested that his interest in stories (Sacks 1986), whereas not pursued by him that we know of, seems to give him a wider interest than that of conversational analysis as it is presently practiced and of which Maynard and Clayman say, "As this volume of work, its cumulative character, and its influence on other areas attest, conversation analysis is an endeavor with a momentum and trajectory separate from ethnomethodology (Schegloff 1989)" (Maynard and Clayman 1991).

It is important to note that as Goodwin and Heritage, who emphasize the cognitive as well as the interactionist influences on conversation analysis, remind us: its originators were also influenced by Goffman who they position as related to a second tradition "more concretely focused on the study of social interaction. Labeled "context analysis" by its followers, this line of inquiry extended from Bateson, Birdwhistle and Scheflen to contemporary scholars, such as Kendon. and "found substantial expression in the work of Erving Goffman" (Goodwin and Heritage 1990). J. Gumperz and D. Hymes are also mentioned as contemporary

followers of this tradition. In spite of any other influences, the Garfinkel influence is still held to be crucial and Sacks' insistence on the use of "natural language" or "real conversations" represented a departure from other discourse studies.

Contemporary practitioners of conversation analysis are in general agreed on its utilization as a product of the continued work of Sacks and Schegloff based on what has been referred to as a definite "methodological perception," in which two tenets are closely observed: 1. Data is drawn from real-life, or naturally occurring interaction. 2. Audio and when possible video recording technologies are utilized to record data. Practitioners also utilize a convention for the presentation of the taped conversations originated by Gail Jefferson. As Psathas and Anderson (1990) explain, there cannot be a "neutral" transcription system: "The Jeffersonian Transcription System was developed for the purposes of conversation analysis, and the structures of this system directly reflect the concerns and analytic stance of this approach." It is implied that this method along with its transcription system reflects a particular stance, is utilized for a particular reason, and if you don't want that reason, there is no purpose in the use of the method. This is not a condemnation but rather an explanation of the construction of this particular model and a sentiment which is echoed by Sharrock (1989), "If you want to do something different you have to go elsewhere." Sharrock, adds that in his own work he will leave the conversation analysis method in order to include aspects of discourse which he considers important and which cannot be included there.

At the same time, others, even from different disciplines, have taken an interest in conversation analysis since they see it as a necessary way of narrowing down a traditional ethnographic approach too wide to focus on important details in interaction. Anthropologist, M. Moerman, whose explicit goal is to synthesize ethnography's "concern with context, meaning, history and intention" with conversation analysis's "exacting techniques for locating culture in situ," writes the following:

By explicating elements of the social organization of speech, conversation analysis provides a component that has been critically missing from the realistic examination of such issues as how language relates to thinking, how "structure" relates to "practice" and institutions to experience, or how actors can be both agents and objects in the social world. But conversation analysis can do this only when it is coupled with ethnography, informed by the context in which speech occurs, and sensitive to the apparent purposes of speakers. (Moerman 1988, x)

In a similar vein, M. Goodwin's study of discourse among black children in Philadelphia combines some of the better aspects of both conversation analysis and ethnography and will be discussed further in Chapter Two (Goodwin 1990).

The paucity of published work by Garfinkel and Sacks has been remarked upon before. In the case of Sacks, this has been only partially mitigated by the recent publication of his lectures, twenty years after the fact. In any event, this paucity has perhaps been made up for by the vast amount of work published by their followers.

We have gone into detail concerning Garfinkel's ethnomethodology, which concentrates on everyday life, and Sacks' development of conversation analysis, as an important backdrop to our utilization of Bakhtin's literary categories in the analysis of everyday conversation, which would act as an alternative to, not a synthesis of, these different approaches. It is important to keep in mind, of course, that there remain deep contrasts between the work of Garfinkel and Bakhtin. In the following overview of the corpus of Bakhtin's work that has been translated into English and a number of available secondary texts, we would like to discuss those contrasts and point out a few similarities. We will then discuss some Bakhtinian concepts emphasizing, as we did with Garfinkel and Sacks, the controversies contained in the literature on Bakhtin.

Bakhtin and the Dialogic

From the time of its first publication in the U. S. in 1968, Bakhtin's work, like that of Garfinkel, has been an object of controversy. As with any translated work it is recognized that there will be problems of interpretation: for example, there are expressions in the Russian language, as in most languages, which cannot be directly translated into English. In addition, Bakhtin has introduced concepts not heretofore expressed in the context of linguistics and literary criticism: polyphony, carnivalization, metalinguistics, and words such as heteroglossia, dialogic, referred to as his "neologisms" (Morson and Emerson

1990, 10), which not only make translation difficult but also render the concepts associated with these expressions all the more open to different interpretations.

Bakhtin's writing presents other difficulties, some of which he has admitted:

"My love for variations and for a diversity of terms for a single phenomenon. The multiplicity of focuses. Bringing distant things closer without indicating the intermediate links" (Bakhtin 1986, 155).

An additional problem, especially for the non-Russian speaking reader, exists in the lack of sequence and rather "piecemeal" manner in which Bakhtin's work was presented in the United States and in other Western countries.

Translations of his work appeared not in the order written but more or less as they became available so that it was difficult to grasp a continuity or totality.

Bakhtin's *Rabelais and his World*, written during the time of Bakhtin's exile in the 1930's was finally published in the Soviet Union in 1965, and Iswolsky's English translation appeared in 1968. In contrast, the first complete translation of his *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, originally published in the Soviet Union in 1929, was not published here until 1984.³ Prior to that publication, Holquist's compilation of four of Bakhtin's essays titled *The Dialogic Imagination* had also appeared (Bakhtin 1981). These were followed by the 1986 edition of *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, which had appeared in the Soviet Union after Bakhtin's "rediscovery." For some time, these four, plus three disputed texts which we will discuss later in this chapter, formed the totality of complete volumes

which we will discuss later in this chapter, formed the totality of complete volumes of Bakhtin's work readily accessible to the English-speaking reader. (A few excerpts had appeared in scholarly publications and journals.) It was not until 1990 that the American reader had access to translations of Bakhtin's earlier work with the publication of *Art and Answerability* (1990), a compilation of essays, and *Toward a Philosophy of the Act* (1993), all written in the five years between 1919 and 1924, just after Bakhtin had finished his studies in classical philology at the University of Petersburg (Holquist 1990).

Due to this non-sequential publishing history, one or two works often became the basis for criticism. The work on Rabelais, according to middle-ages expert, Berrong, is a typical Marxist critique of capitalism and a misreading of Rabelais. "One does not need to be a student of political philosophy to see the Marxist framework that informed Bakhtin's interpretation" (Berrong 1986). In that text, Berrong mentions only two of Bakhtin's works, his books on Rabelais and Dostoevsky. Strangely, the Rabelais book is held by Slavic students to be evidence of Bakhtin's anti-marxist views. In fact, Zima, who is of the belief that Bakhtin was a Young Hegelian, takes him to task for dismissing the destructive effects of exchange value in *Rabelais and his World* (Zima 1989).

Wayne Booth, in his Introduction to *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, points to the problem in judging Bakhtin on the basis of one, even two, texts when he explains that "...his [Bakhtin's] defense of Dostoevsky as the master of such polyphony depends on larger views developed by Bakhtin elsewhere."

Booth sees Bakhtin's Dostoevsky book as more than literary criticism or the study of the novel as form. "It is a philosophical inquiry into our limited ways of mirroring—and improving—our lives" (Booth 1984, xxv).

As has been said when discussing the work of other writers who were adapted by American sociology (e.g., Simmel), the tendency of Americans is to Americanize. We hasten to add that this is not a tendency peculiar to Americans only, we discover there is a French Bakhtin, a feminist Bakhtin, and the Chinese students in America see Bakhtin as uniquely applicable to current problems in their homeland (Diaz-Diocaretz 1989).

M. M. Bakhtin developed his dialogic method of critical analysis and what he terms his metalinguistics as a response to and an alternative for the formal methodologies then popular in the Soviet Union. He specifically argued against the formalist and stylistic methodologies which he saw as representing the prevailing thought of his own time:

Philosophy of language, linguistics and stylistics (i.e., such as they have come down to us) have all postulated a simple and unmediated relation of speaker to his unitary and singular "own" language, and have postulated as well a simple realization of this language in the monologic utterance of the individual. Such disciplines actually know only two poles in the life of language, between which are located all the linguistic and stylistic phenomena they know: on the one hand, the system of a *unitary language*, and on the other the *individual* speaking in this language. (Italics Bakhtin's) (Bakhtin 1981, 269)

The two poles referred to by Bakhtin, the language structure at one end and the individual at the other, sound strangely like those seen by extreme versions of the two models utilized today: conversation analysis, which concentrates on structural rules and sequencing form without regard for social motivation, at the

one end, and the rational model, which concentrates on the various strategies utilized by the individual actor in order to obtain his or her desires or perceived needs, on the other. As Bakhtin says, "they ignore the entire social and socializing world" in between. It is the constitution of that "social and socializing world" in between that Bakhtin's concepts and categories are especially designed to investigate.

Nor can we ignore that outside world when considering the work of Mikhail Bakhtin. In addition to those problems expected when tackling any translated work and those peculiar to and intrinsic in Bakhtin's style, we must consider the social circumstances surrounding their writing and publication which included official suppression and amazing re-discovery in the Soviet Union. These factors have perhaps had a greater impact on rendering Bakhtin's work controversial than anything intrinsic to the work itself. The political conditions under which Bakhtin wrote, we can well imagine without engaging in additional condemnation of the communist state, were at best adverse to an openness of ideas. During most of Bakhtin's productive years, publication of his work in the Soviet Union was impeded and a sharing of that work with the rest of the world was out of the question. In addition we have Bakhtin's particular difficulties with the Stalinist regime, his failing health, exile and poverty. These conditions prevailed until the "thaw" in the 1950's and 60's when his work was discovered by students and he became what has been called "an overnight cult hero" in what was still, let us remember, the Soviet Union, but one which was beginning to allow intellectual converse with the noncommunist world.

The "Disputed Texts"

The first area of contestation that we will address in this overview is referred to as "The Disputed Texts Controversy" and has been called, "clearly the most urgent and polarizing field of contention" (Diaz-Diocaretz, 1989). This dispute involves three texts originally published in the Soviet Union in the 1920's, under the names V. N. Voloshinov and M. Medvedev, two colleagues of Bakhtin and members of what came to be known as the "Bakhtin Circle." Much later, in 1970, after his revival, it was put forth that Bakhtin was the actual author of at least part, if not all of these three texts. The resulting arguments, published opinions and counter-opinions did nothing to clear up the mystery. Bakhtin himself is reported variously to have been ambiguous or evasive in his answers when questioned about his authorship (Clark and Holquist 1984) or, according to another source, the question was never put to him properly (Morson and Emerson 1990).

More is at stake in this controversy than a mere desire to credit proper authorship. It involves issues regarding Bakhtinian thought on topics such as the philosophy of language and formalism in literary criticism as well as on structural and psychoanalytic approaches to the use of language, the extent of Bakhtin's involvement in the political and intellectual debates taking place in Russian at that time, as well as indicating a possibly subversive, or at least novel, attitude toward publication itself on the part of the Bakhtin circle.

One of the disputed texts, published in the U. S. in 1978 as *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics* under the authorial name of Bakhtin/Medvedev is a critique of Russian formalism.

It is generally agreed that whether or not Bakhtin is author or co-author of that work, he was greatly influenced by Russian formalism, although his actual relationship to it is still a matter of debate. Tony Bennett, who admittedly deals with only the early Bakhtin—"the intellectual Bakhtin"—situated him among the formalist thinkers of his time (Bennett 1979) and Emerson, who denies Bakhtin's authorship of the disputed texts, refers to a "hidden polemic" with Russian formalist critic, Viktor Vinogradov. Kristeva (1973) writes of the Bakhtin Circle as playing a part in formalism's downfall.

Translations of two other works, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* and *Freudianism: A Critical Sketch*, published in the U. S. under the name V. N. Voloshinov, in 1986 and 1987 respectively, represent additional critiques of formalism and structuralism, as well as Freudian psychology, and are couched in marxian terminology. That is, the two Voloshinov books and the Medvedev are marxist oriented, whereas the main body of Bakhtin's work that we have available today does not seem to be so. Some are of the opinion, in fact, that Bakhtin was an anti-marxist (Clark & Holquist 1984; Morson 1986; Morson and Emerson 1989, 1990; Shukman 1989). The problem of the disputed texts raises questions as to: How much of Bakhtin's work can we attribute to his thinking as a marxist? as an idealist? or materialist, humanist, or formalist? philosopher or activist?

The first Bakhtin biography to appear in English was that by Slavic specialists, Clark and Holquist (1984) and was soon followed by the English translation of Todorov's *Mikhail Bakhtin: The Dialogic Principle* (1984). Holquist and Clark accept Bakhtin as author of all disputed texts, or at least 95% of them. They cite the political conditions surrounding publication in the Soviet Union as reasons for Bakhtin's failure to use his own name. At the same time, out of their belief that Bakhtin was a "religious man" and strongly anti-marxist, they explain the use of marxist discourse in the disputed texts as "window dressing," engaged in as a necessary concession to the political environment of the time. Todorov is, however, more skeptical. In their more recent works, Morson and Emerson (1989, 1990), while admitting to having initially, "gone along with" the assumption of Bakhtin as author of the disputed texts, claim a change of mind based on a re-reading of the texts and charge that no hard evidence was given for the claim of Bakhtin's authorship but that it was based on rumor and conjecture too readily accepted. Morson and Emerson join those who ask why, if window dressing was used, was there a need to disguise Bakhtin's authorship? Their own interpretation is that Bakhtin was an apolitical philosopher, although one who strongly disliked marxism. That is, if he were political he would be an anti-marxist.

In *Rethinking Bakhtin*, Shukman describes two short works, generally known as Bakhtin's "Tolstoy prefaces," as the most marxist of any writing under his own name, containing even more of a marxist orientation than the Voloshinov and Medvedev/Bakhtin texts and which Todorov agrees are "the most Marxist of all." Shukman is nevertheless able to read a religious, anti-marxist

message into these prefaces. For example, when Bakhtin talks of Tolstoy's non-participation in the crime of the ruling classes and his preoccupation with good and evil, she sees him as expressing his own position re the evils of marxism by nonparticipation in it (Shukman 1989). Strangely, Morson and Emerson, who scoffed at Holquist's use of "window-dressing" to explain the marxist rhetoric in the three disputed texts, now are of the opinion that what appears to be (at least to this reader) the same type of rhetoric in the Tolstoy prefaces is an example of window dressing. Emerson's translation of these prefaces is contained in an appendix to that volume (Bakhtin 1989).

The disputed texts argument also problematizes the extent of Bakhtin's involvement in the debates of his time. Todorov, who stresses Bakhtin's role as a thinker in a totalitarian state, laments his plight as an author of the dialogic who was not able to engage in the dialogues of his time, who did not ever in his lifetime receive a response. Morson and Emerson disagree with that interpretation. They see Bakhtin's relationship with his circle as dialogic, "the young friends engaged in many lively debates" They see a disservice to those works and to their authors in denying their voices as representing ideas, many of which Bakhtin was in agreement with, but others which were different from his own (Morson and Emerson 1990).

This touches on a different but related area of contestation involving the wholeness, or totality of Bakhtin's thought. Holquist and Clark have claimed that every idea of the later Bakhtin is contained in his early work. This point is echoed

by Todorov but contested by Morson and Emerson, who see Bakhtin's thought as developing but as though along an inevitable path:

His works in print can in fact be seen as ripped-out segments of one vast philosophical project, begun in 1920, on the nature of language, literature, and moral responsibility. That huge text was written at various times, and in the various languages of the time; literary, philosophical, Marxist, even, when necessary, in the Stalinist rhetoric of the First Five-Year Plan.⁵ It constituted a basically religious quest into the nature of the Word. (Emerson 1984, xxxi)

She does, however, see a change, almost an epistemological break, between the early and the later Bakhtin explained as "his discovery of linguistics." Shukman also discusses Bakhtin's discovery of modern linguistics as a "watershed" which separates his early pre-1925 years and the Leningrad years which culminated in his book on Dostoevsky.

Diaz-Diocaretz (1989) notes that the disputed texts controversy is, "Closely linked to the political orientations showing the scholars' own interests in changing Bakhtin's initial premises...." She has also suggested, perhaps ironically, that we should leave such considerations to the scholars of Slavic specialization. I suggest that this statement is ironic since the Slavic specialists cannot seem to agree among themselves and also because as a group they have their own axe to grind, preferring perhaps to see Bakhtin as more of a philosopher and apolitical thinker than as a marxist and a materialist.

It is perhaps also ironic that Bakhtin's early biographers seem to present the life and ideas of this champion of the dialogic with texts which tend to monologize his thought. In a more recently published work, Bernard-Donals

(1994) has emphasized the ambivalence and theoretical tension in Bakhtin. It is his contention that because Bakhtin's work rests ambivalently between phenomenology and marxism, it does not fall under any "simple rubric" but rather a theoretical tension is created about which others do not speak. The various attempts to reconcile Bakhtin's work under one umbrella in themselves attest to the fact that no one simple theory is adequate to the complexity of his thought.

Whereas he sees Bakhtin's early work as bearing a close relation to Husserl's phenomenology, Gadamer's hermeneutics, and neo-Kantian aesthetic theory in that, "Bakhtin proposes a human subject that is defined by its *relation* to other subjects, and the ways in which that relation is manifest in the creation of signs," Bernard-Donals is of the opinion that Bakhtin's work went through an important transformation which he sees as beginning with *The Formal Method* in which Bakhtin pays more attention to material conditions of the human subject. "[Bakhtin] pre-empt[s] phenomenological theory of the subject and introduces the broader concept of subject-formation at the level of society." In other words, the change is not merely expressed by an interest in linguistics nor part of a smooth developmental process, but rather signifies a complete shift in emphasis.

He reframes the question of language production as a question of re-production of signs as ideological material which is emphasized in his idea of the inescapability of language and suggestion that aesthetic language be analyzed on the basis of one subject's relationship to another, a relationship which shifts emphasis of analysis away from questions of interpretation and bias toward forms of social intercourse by which meaning is realized. (Bernard-Donals 1994)

This concentration on broader processes of subject formation is seen by Bernard-Donals as bringing Bakhtin closer to a traditional historical materialist analysis of culture and history. He adds that Bakhtin also considered "how a work was material, and how its language—no longer considered strictly aesthetic, but part of the intercourse of culture—could act as an instrument of social change, a question which is relevant today."

Just as early writers on the work of M. Bakhtin tend to discuss it as a single, unified theory, they also tend to explain contradictions in his writing from one period to another as accidents or idiosyncrasies, as error or subterfuge, rather than stress the ambiguity and tension, rather than hear his voice as internally dialogized. Hirschkop (1989), for example, who does speak of the tension in Bakhtin's work, sees it as a flaw, a possible problem to be solved. Hirschkop refers to this tension as created by Bakhtin's use of the dialogic for both the abstract and concrete levels of analysis and sees additional tension between 'performative' and 'constative' linguistic conceptions of discourse. The tensions Hirschkop finds in Bakhtin become problems which must be solved because they hinder analysis, rather than evidence of that glorious unresolvability which Bakhtin himself so admires in the novel and we believe also in the human subject.

Bakhtin's thought has been compared and contrasted with that of other thinkers both materialistic and ideological, such as Buber, Wittgenstein, Simmel, Vygotsky. For example, Shukman sees an affinity between Bakhtin and Buber; Zavala Discusses Bakhtin in relation to Hegel and Heidegger as well as post-

structuralists, Foucault and Derrida; Ivanov compares him to anthropologists, Levi-Strauss and Leach; Yamaguchi says he significantly parallels Victor Turner, Barbara Babcock and Mary Douglas; Stam compares Bakhtin's notion of the carnival to Nietzsche's Dionysian revelling; Stallybrass and White, in an excellent work on the subject, contrast Bakhtin's concept of the carnival with that of Foucault and Kristeva.

It is, strangely, that very versatility and popularity which other critics see as Bakhtin's greatest flaw—a flaw which they believe compromises his best concepts and renders them invalid as political or social critique. "It seems that just about anyone can, and probably will appropriate Bakhtin for just about anything" (Young 1986). It is the use his non-marxist admirers make of Bakhtin, the liberal and Christian appropriations represented by Lodge, Shukman, Patterson that Young finds most objectionable.

In his reply to Young's criticism, Allon White argues that it is neither true nor just. White suggests that it is a virtue of the "internal open-endedness" of Bakhtin's writings that "invites dialogic continuance." He accuses Young of the "crude" binaryism of the conservative project in wishing to discard either Bakhtin's Marxism or his Christianity and points to liberation theology as an example of the possibility that one can be both. (White 1987-88)

Introduced to American readers as a literary critic, it is only recently that Bakhtin's contribution to social semiotics, modern anthropology, and other areas of study has been recognized. For some of us today (Aronowitz 1994), "Bakhtin is above all a *"social critic"* (Aronowitz' emphasis.) In his recent book of essays,

Aronowitz has also addressed another point of controversy: that is, Bakhtin's use of works of fiction such as Rabelais' *Gargantua and Pantegruel* and the novels of Dostoevsky and others as a form of social knowledge. Carlo Ginzburg, described by White as "one of the undisputed major historians of popular culture," while complimentary of Bakhtin's writing and of the Rabelais book in general, sees its "principal failing" in that, "The protagonists of popular culture whom he has tried to describe, the peasants and the artisans, speak to us almost exclusively through the words of Rabelais" (Ginzburg 1989, xvii).

Ginzburg further implies that Bakhtin might have chosen a more direct source of information. As pointed out by Aronowitz, Ginzburg's work is dependent upon official documents (tribunal records kept by the Roman Catholic Church in the sixteenth century), yet he does not see that his own method is "inevitably indirect," since to quote Aronowitz, "Members of lower classes cannot emerge as real subjects from official documents without the historian's narrative construction." Aronowitz also questions the reliability of public records kept by officials who were in the service of the upper classes, nobility and church and who may very well have been tempted to alter certain facts to please their masters, in which case the work of fiction may well be a more reliable source in that the writer of fiction does not have to please authority and is less constrained in his or her subject matter: "Official documents do not discuss the grotesque" (Aronowitz 1994). I would add that works of fiction do not promise an objectivity which they cannot deliver.

This debate is especially relevant when some, particularly in the fields of anthropology and ethnography, are examining their own work for possible fictionalizations (Clifford and Marcus 1986) which brings us almost full circle to our argument with Denzin who, while complaining, and rightly so, about the lack of self-reflection in the work of Garfinkel, proceeds without examining his own assumptions, use of metaphor and psychological categories which he applies in his own version of the Agnes story. Paradoxically, formal categories and abstract concepts are perhaps unavoidable in our work as they were unavoidable in the texts of Bakhtin who retains a touch of the formal in his "love of categories" (Aronowitz 1994). It is, however, important to recognize the gap which exists between reality and our descriptions of reality. A gap which may never be resolved but which will hopefully always be remembered in our dialogues.

It has been said that even if the matter of Bakhtin's authorship or non-authorship of the disputed texts would be solved tomorrow, there would still be much controversy over various interpretations of his thought and the use of his concepts, many of which have in themselves raised controversy over meaning and usage. Because Bakhtin is not well-known to American sociologists, although that is changing, I will here explicate my understanding of some of his concepts, again stressing any controversies that surround their application when that is the case.

The Concept Controversies

The Dialogic

According to Hirschkop, Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic tends to receive the most attention in introductory articles. But he adds, "there is a tendency not to push Bakhtin too hard, and to leave the concept in the same ambiguous state in which we received it." As might be expected various controversies evolve around this concept. An important focus, and one which is particularly significant to this study concerns whether it describes a relationship, as Hirschkop has put it, "between utterances or between social conventions of style or genre." That is, does it refer to the intersubjective or to the intertextual, is it an ongoing everyday occurrence or a "more specifically historical phenomenon" (Hirschkop 1989).

As we have mentioned, Hirschkop believes that Bakhtin's trying to make it work as both has created an "irresolvable" tension in his work (Hirschkop 1986). Various other critics have emphasized one or the other usage. Todorov, as well as Kristeva, emphasizes its "intertextuality." Morson and Emerson argue against that as a reductionist view in that the term "textuality" belongs to the heritage of structuralism where texts are whole entities—not dialogized from the start (Morson and Emerson 1990, 6). For Bialostosky (1989), the dialogic is comparable to hermeneutic understanding. He proposes its institutionalization as a means of inquiry—in line with, but superior to, Rorty's pragmatics and Gadamer's hermeneutics. Others see it as a continuation of Habermas' project.

According to Zavala Bakhtin's dialogic is about understanding and is, "based on a theory of the concrete social event of speech" (Zavala 1989, 61). She sees it as a tripartite model for responsive understanding between social subjects, set up against the "pervasive dualism of Western epistemology" and especially against a "dyadic communicative system." Zavala points out that the dialogic should not be confused with the dialectical model of marxist criticism, where each concept is substituted by another independent concept. In that model the synthesis masters the contradictions and closes the circle, whereas the dialogic indicates simultaneity and conjunction as well as understanding.

Zavala's interpretation of the dialogic is important here because she is using it toward a theory of subjectivity (Diaz-Diocaretz 1989) which rests on her interpretation of its tripartite nature. While it is generally agreed that the dialogic is grounded in a tripartite communication system, the constitution of this system is a matter of debate. Clark & Holquist have determined that Bakhtin's tripartite consists of Speaker, Hearer, Topic (or hero who unfolds the utterance). Zavala claims that Holquist's use of topic is too narrow, and also implies a written or linear discourse. Whether we name the first two as speaker / hearer, or sender / receiver, It is the identity of the third which leads to the most controversy. Jauss (1985) has traced the dialogic form back to antiquity and points out the various interpretations of the third: God, absolute truth, impartial human consciousness, the people, the judgment of history, science, etc.

For Zavala, the third is not the "other" hidden behind the text (the ego, the unconscious) , nor Iser's "implicit reader," nor Martin Buber's "thou." The

third of a verbal exchange is the inner self (the inner man or inner speech) where all discourses meet and are interpreted. This third gives "comprehension" or "sense" to verbal exchanges. The person who understands becomes a participant in the dialogue, although on a special Level. At the same time, the third represents the voice of society, the authoritative voice as it constitutes a part of our consciousness and as such it is also evaluative. The third is therefore an unfinalized, but accessible self (accessible via an active "dialogic approach to one's own self") and also part of the dialogic.

By way of contrast, conversation analysis can be compared to the Platonic model of dialogue that Jauss describes as assuming an unspecified third which implies a social knowledge. If we consider Bakhtin's dialogic consciousness as representing the third, since this consciousness is made up of the words of others, it can also be seen as society and culture produced through interaction. This idea is strangely akin to Garfinkel's use of "background knowledge" which he sought to use as a bridge but neither he nor Sacks was able to explicate how it connects the everyday world to the linguistic and social structure.

A Bakhtinian view, which sees the world as heteroglossic and dialogic, cannot help but extend those concepts to the consciousness of the individual participant. The self, Bakhtin has contended, is made up of the utterances of others, that is we are all social constructs and we can all, to ourselves and to others, be said to stand as representations of reflected images. If we were to take a social constructionist viewpoint, we might posit the question: What are the

building blocks from which the self is constructed? For Bakhtin and his circle the answer is inevitably "the words of the other." As Sharrock has said, the social constructionists do not show us how we receive the words of the other. Bakhtin points to a way of doing so beginning with a reception theory which, according to Jauss, is similar to his own.

I am not uncomfortable, as Hirschkop and others seem to be, with the ambiguity surrounding the dialogic, nor do I see Bakhtin's use of it to describe all levels of investigation including the inner thought of the subject as problematic. On the other hand, I see a danger in trying to institutionalize it. *I would question whether institutionalization would not strip the dialogic of its spontaneous and dynamic nature. To render the dialogic non-ambiguous, to destroy its "dark side" does not seem to have been what Bakhtin had in mind.*

In my own work, I use it more as a tool by which to describe a process which takes place on all levels. Like the documentary method, it has its roots in human processes which cannot be restricted to either the theoretical work of the analyst nor to the thought process of the individual.

Authoritative vs. Internally-Persuasive Discourse

Although it is true that other social psychologists have emphasized the struggle between internal and external forces—the self and society—their concern centers on a monologic, linear developmental process for each individual psyche. In his discussion of the authoritative vs. the internally persuasive voice, Bakhtin

shows how the struggle with the words of the other is a dialogic struggle and is part of a socialization process which continues throughout the life span of the individual as well as a vital element in the continued process of self-creation. These considerations render the process far more complex than has heretofore been shown.

Bakhtin reveals the importance of the words of others in the daily life of the individual but then tells us that the topic of a speaking person takes on quite another significance in the ordinary ideological workings of our consciousness, in the process of assimilating our consciousness to the ideological world. The ideological becoming of a human being, in this view, is the process of selectively assimilating the words of others.

The tendency to assimilate other's' discourse takes on an even deeper and more basic significance in an individual's ideological becoming, in the most fundamental sense. Another's discourse performs here no longer as information, directions, rules, models and so forth—but strives rather to determine the very bases of our ideological interrelations with the world, the very basis of our behavior; it performs here as *authoritative discourse*, and an *internally persuasive discourse*. . . .

. . . The struggle and dialogic interrelationship of these categories of ideological discourse are what usually determine the history of an individual ideological consciousness. (Bakhtin 1981, 342)

Authoritative discourse refers to the word as it comes down to us from figures of authority such as the parent, the church or school, and which we may learn to memorize and recite back but which always remain at a distance from us.

Internally-persuasive discourse, on the other hand, refers to our own words, or rather the words of others (sometimes those very figures of authority)

that we have made our own, that we have come to accept, although rarely in their totality, but more often to which we have added our own accents and modifications.

This is not that different from the internalization process as described by Mead and other sociologists and is very close to that described by Vygotsky as studied today by developmental psychologists. A difference in Bakhtin's conceptualization is that this process is not confined to childhood nor to a particular stage of development. It is a continual, ongoing process. Life and thought can, in fact, be seen as a continuing struggle to maintain one's position between these two types of discourse; life is, therefore, a dialogic experience. Inner speech becomes dialogic since it involves the coming to terms of the individual with the evaluative word of his society as the word moves from the authoritative to the internally persuasive. In that way, we can be said to be the author's of ourselves—although we achieve a kind of individuality, it is not a private or autonomous individualism in the Western sense (Booth 1984).

Bakhtin allows us to look at the self as object, without reification, since it is always in the process of becoming and never completed. We see life as potential. This is perhaps closer to a way of understanding the other from his or her own point of view, the way he or she sees themselves, than any structuralist or systems approach would allow, as well as any understanding reached through varying degrees of empathy or phenomenological epoche'. Potentiality always contains ambiguity—as people see themselves, not as finished products.

Heteroglossia

Like the dialogic, a lot has already been written on Bakhtin's concept of heteroglossia so I will make my comments brief. For Bakhtin, speech in all complex societies takes place against a background of heteroglossia. The term heteroglossia, although not directly translatable into English, nor Russian for that matter since it is one of the neologisms referred to by Emerson, can be defined for our purposes as the "varied and multiply accented voices which a member of a given society encounters everyday." For Mikhail Bakhtin, any national language in contemporary society is internally stratified into:

Social dialects, characteristic group behavior, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashion, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour (each day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphases)— (Bakhtin 1981, 262-3)

The effect of heteroglossia on the spoken and written word in a stratified society is one aspect that is ignored by the methodologies against which Bakhtin argues and, although few would deny the heteroglossic nature of our own society and although Bakhtin's concept is gaining in recognition in some areas of sociological as well as literary studies, specific ways in which the surrounding heteroglossia may influence everyday communication has not been examined. It is also important to this study in that, as we will try to show, its influence cannot be seen from the viewpoint of the currently practiced approaches to the study of discourse.

The Word

Translators and critics familiar with that language agree that the Russian *slovo*, or "word" as utilized by Bakhtin, may be translated as "word" or "discourse," the two being interchangeable.

As with many Bakhtinian concepts, again we see the tendency to emphasize that meaning which falls within one's own specific interest. Kristeva, who as we have noted emphasizes the intertextual nature of the dialogic, first says of Bakhtin's use of "the word" that its description has been regarded as "vague" (we take that to mean Bakhtin's description of it is vague) but nevertheless offers her interpretation: "Bakhtin was to study the 'word', that is, discourse—for it is as much a matter of sentences or phrases as simply of 'words' in the strict sense of the term—as a territory in which instances of discourse confront each other" (Kristeva 1973, 109). Others emphasize the word as verbal exchange. Zavaia, for example, while also recognizing its ambiguity in Bakhtin's work, has placed her emphasis on the intersubjectivity of the word (Zavala 1989).

According to Danow (1984), "To translate Bakhtin's *slovo* simply as either word or discourse without recourse to greater explication, would allow for the inevitable impoverishment of the entire concept." He explains that the two are logically interchangeable in that a single word may in a given situation represent an entire discourse bearing its own ideology, intent, or special meaning. To Bakhtin's use of "*slovo*" as including the concrete utterance, the personal idiom

as well as social discourse, Danow points out McHale's addition of "the metaphysical Logos itself." "All these notions are subsumed under a single multivalent term, *slovo*."

For Bakhtin, the word is an unstable structure. As a sign, It is both arbitrary and conventional. Although, arbitrary in origin, It does not mean only in relationship to other words but rather its meaning is dependent upon the associations and evaluations given it by society as a whole, as well as by the accentuation given it, not only within a concrete situation but as Danow puts it, "by the accentuation afforded it within concrete instances of its previous usage."

Bakhtin is very specific when he says that words are not taken by an individual directly out of the dictionary and applied by him or her to a given situation. On the contrary, words are learned from the mouths of others and have relevance to the specific dialogue out of which they arise: "The word, or utterance, does not approach its object from the sidelines but arises out of dialogue as a continuation or as a response to it." But at the same time, the word "does not forget where it has been," it carries the baggage, so to speak of its past usages.

All words have the "taste" of a profession, a genre, a tendency, a party, a particular work, a particular person, a generation, an age group, the day and hour. Each word tastes of the context and contexts in which it has lived its socially charged life; all words and forms are populated by intentions. Contextual overtones (generic, tendentious, individualistic) are inevitably in the word (Bakhtin 1981, 293)

Bakhtin has further described the "living word" as a ray of light which, on the way to its object, enters a "dialogically agitated and tension-filled environment' of alien words, value judgments and accents. It recoils from some of these and merges with others (1981, 276), which Danow interprets as meaning that the word is engaged in a constant struggle to achieve meaning and influence. It is Bakhtin's idea that whether one speaks of written discourse, a spoken utterance or one single word, in every instance, the word carries the potential for internal dialogization, or what Danow describes as the dialogic nature of the word, "One may distinguish in a word or single utterance two voices, in which instance the word itself embodies a dialogical relationship." (Danow 1984). We will discuss our own interpretation of the dialogical relationship and dialogic or double-voiced discourse as it is utilized in face-to-face interaction in chapters two and four respectively.

Ideology

Like most everything in Bakhtin's world, ideology enjoys a dual position as well as a potential for internal dialogization. It refers, on the one hand, to the generalized belief systems which organize the political, religious, economic, and other institutions extant in any given historical time and place and also to the personal belief system under which the individual conducts his or her everyday life. We should note that, although we have used the phrase "a dual position" to indicate its use on both the level of the individual and on the level of his or her

society. these are not presented by Bakhtin as a dichotomy but rather as a dynamically charged, interactive group of beliefs extant in a given society at a particular time and place and the way these beliefs are demonstrably held and acted upon or opposed by its participants in their everyday activities.

Bernard-Donals sees Bakhtin as uniting the ideological and materialist views--making the case that "ideology is materially constructed and contributes to subject-formation, but one's historical situation also contributes to subject formation. That is, one's ideology and historical situation (or subject position, historically constructed) are so closely tied together that we cannot separate one out and look at it alone.

For the sake of clarity we will first refer to the generalized beliefs of a society. On this level Bakhtin's use of ideology is described as definitely marxist, but not in an Althussarian sense. That is, it is definitely political but "does not necessarily imply class struggle nor reification" (White 1987-88). That description is in contrast to Emerson's apolitical interpretation of Bakhtin's use of ideology as "an idea system, determined socially or something that means."

Gardiner (1992) also sees Bakhtin's ideology as having a marxist orientation but also different from that of Althussar . Bakhtin does not present ideology as a negative or destructive form of knowledge, referring to the notion of ideology as a form of distortion or mystifying illusion. Gardiner, however sees a flaw in Bakhtin's thought in that he makes his appeal to normative precepts that are "ultimately based in his idiosyncratic philosophical anthropology --a utopian conception of the dialogic community." Gardiner does not stress the

tension caused by the continued ambiguity in Bakhtin's own thought. A tension, I believe exactly due to his failure to really accept that utopia. Although he may yearn for it (and don't we all), Bakhtin has always a reservation seen in a seeming ambiguity regarding the ideologies of his own time and space.

We may be confused by Bakhtin's apparent interest in Christianity and the strains of marxism which we do find in his writing, but only if we accept a binary view which assumes one cannot be both. As White (1987-88) and Aronowitz (1994) point out and as liberation theology attests, that is an erroneous assumption.

I will take this opportunity to give a little of my own impression from reading Bakhtin--of the man from reading his texts. Although it is evident that Bakhtin took a deep interest in the ideologies which surrounded him, including the political, the philosophical and the religious/ethical, he gave himself to none completely or radically. Radical belief tends to close the door to further questioning. The image of utopia, either worldly or other-worldly, signifies the end of dialogue. In *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* Bakhtin describes a possible dialogic of agreeing voices, "'Life is good.' 'Life is good'" in which each reenvoicement represents a new voice, a new inflection (1984,183). But his words are not really convincing compared to his passionate description of the conflicting voices of other dialogic instances--the voices that argue: in his "Discourse in the Novel" essay he says "the dialogic voice must always argue" (1981) In this work as well as in his critical work on Dostoevsky and on Rabelais, he clearly privileges the "dark side", the carnivalesque the dialogized

voices that argue. But the dilemma is increased because whereas he could not fully conform to any closed system, neither could Bakhtin silence their authoritative voices. The one thing that he does oppose over and over again is that which tends to silence the voice of the other whether that other is represented by a closed religious system such as that of the medieval church or the ideology behind a political regime such as that of Stalin.

Over the course of Bakhtin's writing, he also developed his other use of ideology. As he moves from the philosophical writing of his early work to the more concrete work on social semiotics to his work on Rabelais and the theory of the novel, he develops his notion (begun, actually, in the Dostoevsky book) of everyman as an ideologue.

For Bakhtin, ideology, like everything else, is a dialogized system. Even the authoritative voice, like the centripetal force, is subject to change over time. The struggle between centripetal and centrifugal forces (discussed in the following chapter) is one which always takes place in the everyday lives of participants as they speak in their own native, living language, and becomes visible at any time its words are spoken. As Aronowitz has so well put it:

For the Bakhtin circle, ideology is not located in consciousness as a subjective reflection on reality. It consists of practices, not disembodied thoughts. Ideology is inscribed in the way we deal with the practical problems of daily life, in the things we buy and eat, the ways we "spend" time, which movies and TV shows we watch, the kinds of friends we choose to keep. (Aronowitz 1994, 164)

When Bakhtin says every man is an ideologue, we understand him to mean everyone has a viewpoint, but he or she is not locked into it. The man or

woman who is an ideologue, is also continually in the process of becoming. He or she does not represent a stable belief system, but rather an individual's beliefs shift, and change over a lifetime, sometimes even from one situation to another. Just as a person's expressed attitude toward sex and the teenager has been seen to change when talking to his or her own daughter. This is, however, not a smooth transition but rather comes about through a struggle with the socially evaluative words of the other which constantly bombard us. At the same time, this struggle cannot be seen as dialectical in nature, some voices are unsynthesizable and some internal ambiguities are irresolvable.

Carnivalization

I will discuss Bakhtin's writing on the carnival and carnivalization at greater length in Chapter 5 where I utilize it as a specific and concrete form of double-voiced discourse. Here I simply wish to point to some of the recent literature which has been inspired by Bakhtin's book on Rabelais and which specifically addresses the inherent nature of the carnivalesque. That is, is carnival a vehicle for the voices of the oppressed—a time and place for folk art and marginal expression to be freely heard—or is it a vehicle of control whereby the powerful and conservative forces allow the people a limited time and space of freedom, because they know that after this safety-valve has expurgated pent-up hostility, they will again assume control. A related question: is carnival only a time of *jouissance* or does it not also include its own abuses and acts of terror?

Stallybrass & White refer to a large and increasing body of writing which sees carnival not simply as a ritual feature of European culture but as a mode of understanding , an analytic category. In their own work, they link carnival, or the "low," to identity—as a form of transgression which they see as acting to aid in the production of identity and status through the repudiation of the "low":

The "top" attempts to reject and eliminate the "bottom" for reasons of prestige and status, only to discover, not only that it is in some way frequently dependent upon that low-Other (in the classic way that Hegel describes in the master-slave section of Phenomenology), but also that the top includes the low symbolically, as a primary eroticized constituent of its own fantasy life. (Stallybrass and White 1986)

From that viewpoint, Stallybrass and White argue with other interpretations, such as that of Foucault who sees transgression as an interrogation of the boundaries and especially with Kristeva who proposes what they call "the extreme position that the infraction of *formal* literary codes of language is identical to challenging official law." Stallybrass & White, via their own historical analysis, conclude that, "The bourgeoisie . . . is perpetually rediscovering the carnivalesque as a radical source of transcendence," and that this rediscovering is in fact a crucial element in the formation of middle class identity. For that reason forms such as carnival are not adequate to effect a revolution or even deep social change. For them, only a challenge to the sites of discourse, which usually comes from groups and classes "situated" by the dominant in low or marginal positions, carries the promise of politically transformative power. In other words, they would concentrate on activity and space over language. "Control of the major sites of discourse is fundamental to political change"(201).

In my own research I will emphasize that it begins with language-use. As Stallybrass and White point out, words-- "poetics and language"--do have a power of revelation, "They reveal the disgust, fear, and desire which inform the dramatic self-representation of that culture through the scene of its low-Other."

As for the Rabelais book itself, it has met with both acclaim and disparagement. Tony Bennett comments that "Bakhtin's study of Rabelais should hold an exemplary place in materialist cultural criticism" (Bennett 1979, 90-92) Eagleton, who considers Bakhtin, "One of the major marxist philosophers and aestheticians of the 20th Century," sees carnival itself as a licensed affair allowed by the top and too obvious to have political impact. He sees Bakhtin's positive embrace of carnival, however, as having its own political implications: "[Bakhtin] is pitting against the official, formalistic and logical authoritarianism whose unspoken name is Stalinism--the explosive politics of the body, the erotic, the licentious and semiotic" (Eagleton 1981, 144).

Others consider the Rabelais book as only a piece of literary criticism. For them it is either a complete misunderstanding of Rabelais and Medieval history, or it is a refreshing new way of viewing these events. In either case they fail to consider it as a contribution to social knowledge.

Bakhtin and Garfinkel

We have in this literature review attempted to include a body of writing most relevant to our own research and analytic plan, and at the same time have attempted to contrast the work of Garfinkel and Sacks with that of Bakhtin. Some may ask how can we even begin to compare a Soviet social theorist and critic with an admittedly ahistorical, apolitical American whose work has been criticized as under-theorized. The answer is we cannot unless we see both consciousnesses as internally dialogized. To do that I have concentrated on the more ambiguous aspects of their thought; an ambiguity best seen in the various interpretations and dialogues which surround them.

One similarity is an interest in the everyday world and the people of that world, Bakhtin's 'folk' or Garfinkel's 'members'. In their writing, both men make a great effort to disencumber their subjects from the traditional, formal stereotypic and restrictive language and categories conventionally utilized by their respective fields of inquiry. This may account, in both cases, for an ambiguity of expression, as well as the use of neologisms (the term ethnomethodology itself and Bakhtin's heteroglossia and dialogic) as well as the use of "catchy" phrases to describe phenomena such as Garfinkel's "accounting practices" and Bakhtin's "loopholing." It has been pointed out (Morson and Emerson, 1989:10) that it is perhaps to his credit that in such a short time Bakhtin's neologisms have become clichés. This is also true of Garfinkel, whose very name got turned into a way of doing research (Garfinkeling). In both cases, there is a danger, therefore, in

using them without a proper analytic grounding, which is one reason for our devoting so much time and space to an explication of Bakhtin's concepts.

Another major similarity, lies in their argument with the traditional, rule-following, methodologies and with the failure of those methodologies to tap the rich diversity of everyday life. It has been said that Garfinkel and other ethnomethodologists have done much to point out the importance of examining and describing *how* everyday social activities get done. It is the opinion of this researcher that a false impression has been given by followers of Garfinkel, especially those who follow the linguistic turn, in that they have over-emphasized the instances of adherence to rules, for example in the use of sequencing and adjacency pairs in studies of conversation, and have not given enough time to the diversity of choice, the changing of the rules from one situation to another, the breaking of the rules, not only in field experiments such as those set up by Garfinkel, but in natural everyday situations. They have also failed to examine the interaction of diverse sets of rules, or codes (an exception being Wieder's too often ignored study of the ways in which one code can be subversively set up as against another and utilized to explain conduct (Wieder 1988)). Bakhtin shows us *how* everyday social rules and norms of language usage also get resisted through the use of parody and irony. He has given us these tools of double-voiced discourse to better see how this resistance take place on the level of the everyday.

A great difference lies in Bakhtin's inclusion of what I have so far referred to as "the dark side" in the everyday experience. Its exclusion may or may not be

an exclusively American tendency but the damage that exclusion does is apparent in what has been called the sociology of error, which Garfinkel tried to avoid by adopting an attitude of indifference (to individual motive) but which Bakhtin, more successfully I believe, handles by positing a "dark side" as part of man's natural mundane existence. We see it in the widespread use of parody and irony and especially in everyday instances of the carnivalesque—as an accepted part of life—often as an other, but never as a deviant other.

Bakhtin's fastidious attention to detail has been remarked (Emerson 1984; Morson & Emerson 1990) as has that of Sacks's and contemporary practitioners of conversation analysis. But even here what we encounter is difference. The detailed reproductions in conversation analysis are done in order to accurately describe what has taken place in a natural conversation. Bakhtin's attention to detail does not serve the purpose of exact accurate, description, which he admits is not possible anyway, but rather it enables him to say *something about* what he has described.

Bakhtin, like Garfinkel and Sacks argues against the linguistic viewpoint which does not include context in its study of discourse. Another great difference, however, lies in what constitutes context. For the ethnomethodologist, it is the immediate situated corpus—What is there and entirely visible to the researcher—In the case of Sacks this includes the structure of the language itself. Bakhtin's concept of context is much broader. According to White: "Bakhtin clearly endorses a key post-structuralist insight by positing context not as some simple,

fixed frame which holds a meaning steady and in place once and for all, but as a system of potentially infinite displacements and substitutions" (1987-88).

Here we have perhaps the greatest difference. For Bakhtin context includes history and ideology (which some would argue are the same thing). Bakhtin is not content with merely describing the activity of discourse in a situated context, for this in reality tells us little more of the cultural processes surrounding those activities than did the made-up sentences of the linguist or the context-free analysis of early speech act theory. To understand what is being communicated, especially in a heteroglossic society, it is necessary to understand the evaluative and "loaded" nature of the word which "does not forget where it has been."

Although Bakhtin's biographers seem to disagree about the extent to which he privileges theory over practice, it would seem that at least in his later writings, he emphasized activity. But the activity is not without its moment of reflection, a reflection which sometimes takes place within the activity. It is not the same as the ethnomethodologist's reflexivity, but rather the reflective nature of a particular utterance can be seen in the structural change of the utterance, as when a participant in a dialogue hesitates or stumbles over a response. In addition, Bakhtin supplies a theory of language development and a socio-historical referent in the generic history of the word, as an analytical base.

As I have suggested, the impact of the words themselves have been eliminated from conversation analysis studies. Conversational coherence has been vested in structure or in rational thought processes. Bakhtin has returned our attention to the weight of the word. Although he might agree that nothing is

realized until the activity, his conceptualization of language development allows us to understand how instances of interaction are carried around in our heads from activity to activity via the word. Because of the "social life of the word, an activity need not begin and end at the time of its production—It is not closed—It becomes part of a history of activities and as such it counts in subsequent activities. In that way the sense of a trans-situational continuity in the history of the word is maintained in a Bakhtinian analysis.

Both Garfinkel's ethnomethodology and Bakhtin's dialogic have given birth to a large and diversified range of studies both theoretical and practical. We have talked about Garfinkel's work in relation to feminist theory and research and would like to mention feminist critiques of Bakhtin without going deeply into those projects. Like Garfinkel, Bakhtin has come under criticism for a lack of gender-sensitivity in his writing: he wrote mainly about male authors and was "conspicuously silent" about feminism and the social effects of gender (Glazener, 1989). At the same time, like those of Garfinkel and Sacks, his concepts have been utilized in feminine research.⁴

Although we must keep those criticisms in mind, we must at the same time remember that even the most profound thinker is still to a greater or lesser degree, a product of his or her own chronotope, to use a Bakhtinian concept—their time/space in history.

CHAPTER TWO

ON THEORY AND METHOD

In the preceding chapter I discussed the various controversies surrounding two distinct types of discourse study: Conversation analysis, which utilizes taped conversations of participants engaged in everyday activities, and a Bakhtinian analysis which focuses on dialogic speech phenomena. In this chapter I will describe how each is utilized in my own research. First I would like to reiterate that I am definitely not suggesting a synthesis of two diverse methodologies. A synthesis implies a dialectical movement in which each side must lose some of its strength, must cease to exist in its original form. Rather, I am attempting to show how Bakhtin's concepts, heretofore applied only to the written text, can also be applied to everyday discourse. For my method of gathering everyday conversations, I have utilized a modified version of the conversation analysis technique.

The site I chose for conversation collecting is a neighborhood shopping area, or marketplace, in the Brighton Beach section of Brooklyn. It encompasses about a seven block stretch (although it is steadily growing) and consists of a group of small businesses such as grocery stores, fruit stores, clothing outlets, Laundromats, newsstands, eating places, bordegos, and boutiques, all of which

engage in the sale of products or services for use in the everyday lives of the participants. Marketing areas of this type are seen throughout the metropolitan area and can be said to have a specific nature or generic makeup: they are situated in a particular space, typically, an urban neighborhood already established in its ethnic identity as well as in its class or socio-economic structure, and at the same time, they are places of trade which attract small-business owners, workers and customers from many other areas.

The particular site I have selected is attached to a neighborhood in the process of a transition which is opening it up to diverse new immigrant groups. At the same time, there remain a number of "traditional" ethnic groups from past migrations. The area was chosen because of the diversity of the participants both in age, gender, and ethnicity as well as the diverse types of interaction one can observe there, from the "fleeting encounter" between customer and salesperson, to those which have developed out of a greater degree of contact (i.e., neighborhood residents who are recognized and recognize each other as "established customers"), to the ongoing relationships among co-workers or between entrepreneurs, managers and employees.

During my initial visits to this and other shopping areas, I had observed that the activity of buying and selling seems to act as a unifying force which organizes the interaction but also places constraints, or limits, on what can be said and done. At the same time, these "limits" are constantly stretched, sometimes broken as the different voices struggle to be heard. The tension of this struggle can be seen in the way that participants' use of the traditional genres

of buying and selling are constantly juxtaposed with other genres (of intimacy, of flirtation, of family).

Due to its diversity, we found this to be an excellent site in which to test the use of Bakhtin's categories and to answer our question as to whether or not the use of Bakhtin's categories, which support a more historical/ideological type of analysis, can enhance the search for knowledge of the everyday. In addition, my investigation will question the nature of that unifying force and the ways in which it stands in opposition to and restricts the more disruptive life forces as they come up against it. As Simmel has said, life must express itself but can only do so through form (Simmel 1968). My overall question at a more micro-level or one that can be applied to the individual instance, can be stated as:

"What is being expressed here?"

In order to collect and organize a body of those instances of conversation, I have combined the conversation analysis technique of taping conversations in situ with a more ethnographic, participant observation, methodology. The taped conversations will be backed up with extensive field notes taken before and after as well as during the time when the tape recorder was on so as to note my observations of the activity surrounding the conversation such as the position of the speakers, their facial expression, the reaction of other observers all of which might effect or explain what is in the conversations themselves. In addition, due to the physical aspects of this site it was often necessary to refer to field notes when taped conversations were drowned out by background noise of traffic and an elevated subway train or a form of Muzak

utilized in some establishments. In other instances it was not feasible to attempt to record at all. The details and value of this method are described in M. Stubbs's *Discourse Analysis* (1983).

I hope to show, as Moerman (1988) has observed, that the rigor and attention to detail associated with the conversation analysis method, need not be lost when applied to a wider area. M. Goodwin's (1990) exemplary study further proves this point and has been influential in my own work although I cannot begin to approach the exhaustive attention to detail and thoroughness of analysis that she has provided.

Although I have, in my research utilized participant observation as well as conversation analysis techniques in the selection of and recording of conversations, for the theoretical and analytical aspects of this dissertation, I have utilized concepts and categories introduced by Bakhtin.

Since, as brought out in Chapter One, Bakhtin's thought is said to follow many paths, I wish to briefly outline the path I have followed in my reading of his work: the one that I believe led him from the world of abstract ideas to a consuming interest in the concrete everyday world around him. Following that, and since I have mentioned Bakhtin's theory of language as supplying a missing ingredient to the analysis of everyday conversation, I will discuss that theory by first pointing to what others have referred to as a commonality of ideas regarding language-use that run through the work of Bakhtin and some of his contemporaries. The remainder of this chapter will then be dedicated to those

specific concepts and categories of double-voiced discourse and speech genre as I will utilize them in my adaptation of Bakhtin's concepts to an analysis of everyday life.

Morson and Emerson (1990) have mentioned Bakhtin's reluctance to talk, even in letters, about his personal life. They see him as above all, a philosopher and emphasize his years before 1929 as "critical" in that he was, as they put it, "seeking—and for a decade not finding—his own critical voice." They see the Dostoevsky book as a watershed for this period. What is interesting, however, is Morson's and Emerson's attitude toward the Rabelais book and its emphasis on the carnivalesque, which they describe as "his weakest formation," an "extravagance" to which Bakhtin "succumbed" and which makes him appear "anarchistic and irresponsible." Holquist and Clark, who do not see Bakhtin's thought as developing, but as a reworking of the same ideas, do try to tie his thinking in with the story of his life. They describe the Rabelais book as "a study of how the social and the literary interact" and attempt to emphasize the carnivalesque areas of Bakhtin's own life—a year spent in the bustling heterogeneous city of Odessa, his love for the "practical joke," for "rogues and eccentrics," the various backgrounds, the socio-economic and religious diversity of his friends and acquaintances. Unfortunately, their biography has been criticized for its speculative nature in that Holquist and Clark do not always produce adequate evidence to back up the claims they make.

A few facts of Bakhtin's life are, of course, documented. Briefly, the highlights follow: Born in 1895 in Orel, a provincial town south of Moscow, to an upper middle class family, Bakhtin was educated in Vilnius and later at the University of Petersburg (later changed to Petrograd). He and his brother, Nikolai, joined the literary circles of the time where neo-Kantian and Young Hegelian thought was prevalent. Other European philosophies, including those of Marx and Engels, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard were also discussed. It is a matter of controversy which influences had the greatest impact on Bakhtin's thinking. It is however known that while teaching in the provinces and later in Leningrad, he formed his own discussion group which became known as the Bakhtin circle. Both Medvedev and Voloshinov were among the members of Bakhtin's circle. They both died in the 1930's. In 1929 a major work, *The Problem of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, appeared under Bakhtin's own name. A few days before its publication Bakhtin was arrested. One of the charges was that of belonging to a religious organization. Literary friends intervened on Bakhtin's behalf and his sentence was reduced to a 6-year exile in the town of Kustanai in Kazakhstan. While in exile he was not allowed to teach the young but supported himself doing accounting and other official work. Also during that time he wrote *Rabelais and his World* as well as his essays on the novel. In the late 1950's, his exile over, reinstated as a teacher but still living in the provinces, Bakhtin's work was rediscovered by a group of his students who influenced him to rework his Dostoevsky book and were instrumental in initiating the publication of some

of his other work. Bakhtin began once again to enjoy the attention of his colleagues and became known outside of the Soviet Union. He died in 1975. (Clark and Holquist 1984; Morson and Emerson 1990)

As we have implied, it is unfortunate that early writings on Bakhtin did not stress the tension in his thought. A reconstruction is doubly difficult if, like Holquist and Clark we try to find all his ideas in his early work or, like Emerson & Morson we see his life as a process of becoming but then choose to slough off as an "unfortunate extravagance" that which we may not like and emphasize only that which fits with a perhaps lofty idea of what Bakhtin should have been. An alternative is to look for contrasts rather than unity in Bakhtin's life and thought--to stress (even celebrate) the tension and ambivalence as the stuff that internal dialogization is made of. We also have a degree of knowledge, gleaned from the writing of other contemporaries, about the position of the intellectual in the socio-historical environment of Bakhtin's own space and time. By putting this together with the official records that do exist, we may begin to see that Bakhtin's thought is also internally dialogized as he moves through a life of contrasts in a heteroglossic world.

We need to remember Bakhtin's situation in the early days of communism, without judging that system based on subsequent developments, but when there was still a freedom of ideas. We can readily imagine Bakhtin as a young idealist in the heady atmosphere of revolution and his life as a student in the companionship of his older brother, free for perhaps the first time from the parental, authoritative voice, thrown into contact with people of all persuasion--

then the free exchange of ideas with the intellectuals in his circle—the apparent shock of the Stalin purges, his own arrest and exile—the disappointment when what he may have thought of as an opportunity for the voices of the people to finally be heard proved to be only one more monologic system. The days of exile, of which we know the least, may well have been the most influential in Bakhtin's turning in his writing from the voices of other intellectuals to the voices of the folk. Exile separated him from the culture, the ideas he grew up with, and placed him in an agricultural environment completely strange to him. It seems there were long periods when Bakhtin was without the intellectual companionship of colleagues. To whom, then, did he speak? Photographs exist showing that he may have sought companionship in the company of his guards, ex-members of the of the red army, and also evidence that he taught economics to the peasants (although not permitted to teach the young, he was drafted to tutor adults due to the great national need) (Clark and Hoiquist 1984). We would suspect that is when he was able to more fully develop an already existing interest in the people as he found them—not as "the masses," not as a social class, but as he found them, engaged in their everyday, mundane activities.

Impressed as we are with his knowledge of the written word, it is possible to ignore Bakhtin's other sources, what he has described as "the life outside the artist's studio," about which, it is true, he may not speak directly but which cannot help but enter his work. Bakhtin's life in the various provinces during the years in exile, and as a teacher after that exile, would have put him in contact with a variety of people other than the intellectuals of his circle—a whole

polyphony of voices he also heard—to bolster the power of the linguistic theory he supported and allow him to say:

And we, when perceiving prose, orient ourselves very subtly among all the types and varieties of discourse analyzed above. Moreover, in real life as well we very keenly and subtly hear all these nuances in the speech of people surrounding us, and we ourselves work very skillfully with all these colors on the verbal palette. We very sensitively catch the smallest shift in intonation, the slightest interruption of voices in anything of importance to us in another person's practical everyday discourse. All those verbal sideward glances, reservations, loopholes, hints, thrusts do not slip past our ear, are not foreign to our own lips. All the more astonishing, then, that up to now all this has found no precise theoretical cognizance, nor the assessment it deserves! (Bakhtin 1984, 201)

The concentration on activity in the work of at least the later Bakhtin, has led some to consider him more of a nominalist than a realist. On the contrary, as White puts it:

In his essay on "Speech Genres" 'Bakhtin' makes it clear that speech is generic and conventional to an astonishing degree and that there is no linguistic space in which the individual makes utterances free from systematic cultural inflection. But, Bakhtin does allow individuals a reflexive and creative relation to speech genres such that, to parody Marx, people make language but only on the basis of what language has made of them. (White 1987-88)

According to Aronowitz, Bakhtin sees language as intimately linked to action. A position that "bears some affinities to pragmatism," which Aronowitz describes as a democratic philosophy in which "a discourse is evaluated not in relation to transcendent 'truth' but in terms of its practical consequences." At the same time, "His work may be interpreted as profoundly ensconced in a subtle but unmistakable realist epistemology which, despite its differences from Lukacian marxist criticism, shares a sociohistorical referent" (Aronowitz 1994).

Two Important Ideas

In his theory of language, Bakhtin has adapted two strains of thought shared by some of his contemporaries who seem to have, perhaps independently, reached similar conclusions regarding two important ideas about language acquisition and use: The social formation of consciousness through language and the nonrepresentational connection between language and reality.

The Social Development of Consciousness

Similarities between Bakhtin's ideas of the social development of consciousness and the thinking of American pragmatists such as Peirce and Mead have been noted by others (Holquist 1990). These ideas also converge in European schools of linguistics, such as The Prague School and the Vygotsky-Luria School in Moscow which carries on Vygotsky's thoughts on speech, inner speech and writing. According to Wertsch (1985), the latter shows the influence, in part, of Vygotsky's contemporary, Bakhtin. For Vygotsky, speech is a social act, learned through interaction, which precedes both inner speech and writing. Inner speech, in fact, acts as the bridge between speech and writing. Writing, although a translation from inner speech, is itself a distinct system in which the writer re-creates the situation and presents it to the self.

According to linguist and developmental psychologist, John Dore, all meaning in a child's mind can only come about "...Through social collaboration in objective situations." He explicates Vygotsky's idea of how internalization works

through a series of transformations, as follows: "1. An operation that initially represents an external activity is reconstructed and begins to occur internally. 2. An interpersonal process is transformed into an intra-personal one." This transformation is "the result of a long series of developmental events."

Intellectual functions that take place between individuals, when transferred to inner processes, are incorporated into a new system with its own laws. The important idea, as pointed out by Dore, is that the child's development is, "A gradual individualization that emerges on the foundation of the child's internal socialization." It is Dore's contention that this model of development accounts for the emergence of word meaning in the child's mind, based on a process of dialogue with parents (Dore 1989).

Briefly encapsulated, Bakhtin's theory of language development begins with the words of the other which we encounter from infancy. The process of internalization continues throughout the life of the individual via a continuing internal dialogue during which the word of the other is constantly evaluated and reenvoiced. The human mind is, therefore, internally dialogized—internalization is never total but an ongoing unfinalized process. Language can be seen as both the substance of and the key to this process.

The Nonrepresentational View of Language

An emphasis on the nonrepresentational connection between language and reality is seen in virtually all of Bakhtin's work but especially when he speaks about speech genres and double-voiced discourse can his ideas be seen as

close to those of Wittgenstein. This similarity is pointed out in an article by Terry Eagleton, in which he refers to the quote from Wittgenstein which we have already mentioned in our discussion of Garfinkel in chapter one, "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?...that is not agreement in opinions but in form of life" (Wittgenstein 1953), which Eagleton interprets as meaning that what "human agreement" decides is not what is true or false, but the criteria as to what is to count as truth or falsity. He adds that this avoids the fear of some, such as Adorno, that truth might come to be thought of as empirical consensus (Eagleton 1982). We saw a similar fear expressed by Sharrock and Button.

Eagleton points to a flaw in Wittgenstein's theory of language in that he assumes that by referring beliefs and discourses to social activity he has liberated them from the metaphysical but, as Eagleton asks, "Where . . . could metaphysics be more at home than in the everyday?" If we must assume that human agreement or disagreement in opinion is possible only because of criteria established, as though by some "primordial pact," at the base of our form of life and the structure of our language and somehow embedded in our social practices, such usages nonetheless remain prisoners of metaphysical assumptions. Highlighting the use of language in action, as Wittgenstein does, only obscures the fact of those assumptions (Eagleton 1982). The ethnomethodologist may claim indifference, caring only how things are done, how effects are achieved. The problem is that part of the effect that is achieved is a result of what Eagleton refers to as the metaphysical in the language, something

which is beyond the intent of the speaker, a problem we noted especially with speech act theory, but a problem one cannot even talk about within the ethnomethodological nor the conversational analysis project, although it is subsumed there. Bakhtin, on the other hand, although he also insists on the concrete use of language rather than on some metaphysical notion of essences; unlike Wittgenstein, he sees such concrete uses to be inseparable from the realm of ideology (Eagleton 1982).

Such similarities of thought force us to ask the obvious question: did these important thinkers ever meet, or is there evidence at least that they knew of and read each other's work? Or is the similarity a case of ideas being "in the air" or "popular" at a given time? It is quite certain that Wittgenstein and Bakhtin never met but we do know, and this is the basis of Eagleton's article, that Wittgenstein was a close friend of Nikolai Bakhtin, M. M. Bakhtin's brother, who had fled the Soviet Union during the revolution and later took up residence in England, where he taught at Birmingham University with Wittgenstein. As to Bakhtin and Vygotsky, whereas again we do not have established evidence of their ever having met, even though they were co-patriots their relationship to the communist party was entirely different. It is probable that they read, or at least heard of each other's work

We have taken considerable time and space to discuss these similarities of thought because they are important to our own research project because of what Bakhtin has contributed to the dialogues: Internalization as an ongoing, unfinalized process and the ideological link. It is in fact, the ideological

link which Bakhtin adds to the everyday use of language that makes his theory indispensable if we are to understand the basis of human communication.

I have made a point of mentioning that Bakhtin's categories of speech genres and of types of double-voiced discourse are taken from literary terminology. I want to remark here upon what their application to everyday conversation is all about. It is a way of showing that although there is not a representative relationship, between life and art, there is certainly a relationship—let us call it one of recognition. How we know, in the language of the ethnomethodologist, what someone is talking about and how we expect to be understood is not different from the reader's ability to comprehend the text. If we could not recognize and respond to the everyday use of such forms as irony, parody, loopholing and utilize them in our own conversation, we could never comprehend them in a joke, a televised performance or a novel, whether it be written by Dostoevsky, or Dickens, or Clancy, or Spillane.

Furthermore, Bakhtin has incorporated the dialogic into his own methodology. He possessed an astounding ability to perceive difference (heterogeneity) where others heard only sameness (what Holquist calls a third ear). An attention to detail allowed him to present that difference in combination with an often beautiful prose style. But above all, his use of the dialogic forced him to hear all voices and to include all that he heard, dismissing nothing as noise nor because it did not happen to fit into the model of the moment.

Pertinent Bakhtinian Concepts

In the following chapters, I will utilize Bakhtin's concept of the utterance as a unit of analysis and apply his categories of speech genres and types of double-voiced discourse to conversations collected from everyday interaction. My interpretation of these concepts follows. As he conceived them, they have been applied by Bakhtin and others to the written text and in a very few instances, by anthropologists in the study of speech forms utilized in the languages of the people they have analyzed. As far as I know Bakhtin's conceptualizations of these categories have never before been applied to everyday spontaneous conversation in the English language, with the notable exception of J. Dore's study of language acquisition in the child, in which he utilizes Bakhtin's concept of speech genres.

The Utterance

For Bakhtin the utterance is the only unit of communication through which we can really understand speech genres. (Actually he says it is "the only appropriate unit of study for linguistics", and he later extends this to the human sciences.) Bakhtin is not the only analyst to prefer the utterance as their unit of study in a discourse analysis, so to avoid confusion I will provide his definition and explication of five constitutive features which should clarify my own usage.

Defined as: "The concrete expression (oral or written) of participants in various areas of human activity," the following features emphasize elements pertinent to a study of speech genre:

1. It is bounded. It has an absolute beginning and an absolute end. Its boundaries are defined by a change of speaking subjects.
2. It is finalized. It is a total unit which represents all that a speaker wishes to say or is able to say at a given moment. Of course, finalization may be only temporary since a subject may be reopened. One criteria for finalization of the utterance is that it may be responded to.
3. It is engendered. Although it carries the expressive or emotional evaluation of the speaker it is also stable in that it is expressed in a specific generic form.
4. It is connected. The utterance is a link in a chain and connected to both past utterances and future utterances which respond to it.
5. It is always addressed to someone. That is, it is itself always a response. (Bakhtin 1986)

It is Bakhtin's contention that nothing is spoken "into the void" as though there were no words or ideas before it (none but the "mythical Adam" having had that privilege.) All utterances are, therefore, direct or indirect responses to other utterances and as such include every expression which may be taken as a response to the word of another, from a monosyllabic response to a full-length novel, and including silent, responsive understanding as well as acts of obedience to a command. The conversations reported in this study, therefore

will be broken down into utterances according to Bakhtin's description of the features which constitute them.

Speech Genres

Bakhtin has described the speech genre as the relatively stable type of utterances which develop around any particular sphere of activity in which language is used and that:

An individual's repertoire of oral (and written) speech genres is ordinarily rich and multifarious. We use them confidently and skillfully in practice and do not necessarily even suspect that they exist in theory. (Bakhtin 1986, 78)

Speech genres are learned in childhood and develop out of social interaction. They are learned as we learn our language before we learn its grammar. The ability to understand and manage genres is, thus, not a matter of intelligence or language ability but rather stems from a familiarity with various spheres which obtain in one's culture (Bakhtin 1986, 80).

The term genre is taken from the area of literary criticism but the concept has been utilized to describe nonliterary phenomena. For example ethnographer Del Hymes (1974) has described the church service as a complex genre which is, in his analysis, made up of the elementary genres such as sermons, hymns, litanies, psalms, etc. That usage has been compared to Goffman's frames of talk and keys which shift the frame in terms of how talk is done. The concept is also close to "register" as described by Lemke as, "That kind of language specific to a particular situation type" (Lemke 1985, 6).

According to Hodge and Kress, genres represent a mediating category necessary to trace the relationship of micro to macro structures . Although in their *Social Semiotics*, the concentration is on written genres, they are described as being both socially ascribed and constraining. "Genre therefore represents one semiotic category that codes the effects of social change, of social struggle." Although genres usually reflect the ideology of the dominant class, Hodge & Kress explain that they can constrain the behavior and beliefs of the non-dominant only to the extent to which they have been effectively imposed and have not been effectively resisted. It is especially through these forms of resistance that we can see the links of the micro to the macro. These linkages are beginning to be made in the area of social semeiotics through consideration of the social-historical structure of genre and texts and their relations to the macro-level symbol system.

Bakhtin has distinguished between two basic types of speech genres:

Primary (or simple) genres constitute the unmediated speech used in everyday communication. They are concretely and immediately related to our everyday experience. Primary genres in a given society might include greetings and farewells, congratulations, good wishes, informal inquiries about health or business as well as the more personal family and intimate genres. Although primarily spoken, informal personal letters and diaries also fall into this category. They may be highly ritualized, such as greeting exchanges, or particularly creative and expressive but they are unmediated, we really don't have to think

about them they are so much a part of our daily lives.

Secondary (or complex) genres are highly developed and organized, used in formal communication. They are abstract and often highly ideologized. This category includes most written communication from the novel to the business letter but also includes spoken derivatives such as the military command, the language of the professional or of the courtroom, the mediated speech forms of the news broadcast or political speech.

It is important to note that for Bakhtin primary and secondary genres do not represent two mutually exclusive categories. They have a common nature in that the complex genres, during the process of their formation, absorb and digest various primary genres. The novel utilizes everyday speech, for example, in dialogue between characters and business letters include personal greetings, but everyday genres are altered, they take on a special character, when they enter into complex ones. On the other hand, Bakhtin makes it clear that everyday speech, ordinary dialogue, can encompass all of the more complex genres and that it is, therefore, essential to include both types, primary and secondary, in a discourse analysis. "One must analyze both types to understand the nature of the utterance" (Bakhtin 1986, 62).

Concepts such as speech genres are an important addition to sociological studies since they are not individually created but develop out of social interaction. They are both enabling and constraining. We might say that the rules of genre uphold society as much as society upholds the rules of genre. It is also true that these rules are frequently broken. This breakage often

accompanies social conflict and may also acts as a signifier of social change. Genre forms remain stable as long as they adequately refract the underlying social evaluations, the social reality of their surrounding environment. Once a particular genre no longer adequately represents the evaluation of a constantly changing society, it becomes destabilized and either changes to adapt to the new social conditions or else fragments and disappears

This study will utilize a modification of Dore's proposed interpretation of Bakhtin's elements of genre. A description of the genres which I am utilizing and instances of their use in everyday discourse will be elaborated in Chapter Three.

Double-Voiced Discourse

Unlike speech genres Bakhtin's categories of double-voiced discourse do not seem to have any counterpart in sociology nor in sociolinguistics, nor have they been utilized in any contemporary study as far as we know. Mentioned in Bakhtin's later work they are given their most formal treatment in his *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. In that work Bakhtin distinguishes three types of discourse.

1. Direct, unmediated discourse
2. Objectified discourse (discourse of a represented person)
3. Double-Voiced Discourse (with an orientation toward someone else's discourse)

These are often collapsed into two major types: monologic and dialogic discourse. Dialogic, or double-voiced discourse contains: stylization (as of a

written work), skaz (the narrator's narration) , parody and all its nuances, any transmission of someone else's words with a shift in accent, hidden polemic, discourse with a sideward glance at someone else's word, hidden dialogue (Bakhtin 1984). Although monologic discourse, directed exclusively toward its referential object and expressing one semantic purpose, is the one most frequently studied, the use of dialogic discourse in everyday conversation will be analyzed in this present study. Whereas it is true that certain polemical forms such as parody and irony have been studied, their dialogic aspect remains unexamined.

Bakhtin applied his ideas to samples of discourse taken from literary texts in order to acquire new knowledge regarding the construction of those texts, the results achieved by the writer and their impact on the fields of literature and literary theory and, most important to us, their connection to the "real " world, the social environment "outside the artist's studio" in which the artist lived and wrote. Although his work is concentrated on the literary text, Bakhtin explicitly stated that the same phenomena also exist in everyday life. His categories of double-voiced discourse, therefore, should be applicable to concrete examples of discursive interaction as they occur in the daily lives of ordinary participants in any given society. Even a cursory examination of the tapes and notes recorded during my collection of conversations in everyday interaction shows that participants do utilize double-voiced forms such as parody and irony as well as the more complex constructions of double voiced discourse during spontaneous conversation. Their use will be described and analyzed in Chapter four. These

types are differentiated by Bakhtin according to distance (or degree of objectification) and dialogic angle. See chart in Appendix B.

The Dialogic Relationship

When one's internally persuasive word encounters the words of another they enter into a dialogic relationship. It cannot be overemphasized that this is strictly a linguistic relationship and in this sense has nothing to do with social position or interpersonal relationships, but its conceptualization is important as a vehicle through which those relationships may be tapped. Bakhtin's dialogic approach to discourse was formulated out of his own belief that the dialogic relationship could not be seen within the framework of a traditional analysis of discourse. Contemporary conversation analysis and other forms of discourse analysis assume the same linear, unmediated sequencing against which Bakhtin argued: one which follows a straight line from sender to receiver and never acknowledges the disruptive forces, the conflicting values which may be expressed in one single utterance, and which render that utterance and the relationships expressed through it, problematic. In addition, contemporary models talk about conversation as though it is an exchange between two unified subjects. From that stance they cannot address the inner dialog or see the internal dialogic: the two voices that may speak from within a single utterance.

As it is conceptualized by Bakhtin, the dialogic relationship must be understood on several levels. It may take place:

1. Between language styles, social dialects, speech genres.
2. Between individuals as in a conversation in which there are whole utterances, that is between individual utterances.
3. Toward one's own utterance.

In all of the above instances, the dialogic relationship (or argument) may be between whole utterances, toward any signifying part of an utterance, toward an individual word, or inside a single utterance or individual word, if two voices collide within it dialogically (Bakhtin 1984).

In all cases a necessary degree of objectivity is achieved through personification. According to Bakhtin, "...A dialogic reaction personifies every utterance to which it responds." A word in a dialogue, for example must be perceived as a sign of someone else's semantic position, as the representative of another person's utterance. We must hear it as someone else's voice.

Language styles which represent world views, are necessarily personified, perceived as semantic positions, as language world views, social dialects, speech genres. The authoritative voice is always personified. In the case of one's own utterance, we must somehow detach ourselves from it, or from part of it, speak with an inner reservation, maintain a certain distance from it, as if limiting our own authorship or dividing it in two.

Bakhtin is adamant that the dialogic relationship cannot be reduced to logical relationships nor linguistic relationships. Yet, as he has emphasized, one cannot exist without the other. They are, therefore, intricately tied.

Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces

Bakhtin speaks of two forces which exist in all developed societies, and which he refers to as centripetal and centrifugal forces. The centripetal or centralizing force tends towards homogenization or keeping the social order. This force would tend to hold a society together. The ruling classes, the church, the state, would represent the centripetal forces. The centrifugal or decentralizing force on the other hand, would tend to disrupt, or decentralize, a society. This force is represented by the novel, and the new, as well as the deviant, or any faction of the people which would upset the norm. Linguistically these forces can be seen as the grammatically correct, authoritative voice, the "accepted literary" language which writes a societies rules and maintains its myths as opposed to those heteroglossic voices which tend to disrupt, including the parodic or ironic voice which destroys the myth, pokes fun at the more centralizing organizations. The voice of the immigrant, the foreigner, the sub-culture, are part of the centrifugal forces which tend to disunite to break up a society.

As Bakhtin has said of the literary critic, we can also say of the sociologist: that he or she tends to privilege the centripetal forces. Not that the centrifugal voices of the people lack the attention of analysis, but they are typically analyzed out of context and with an eye to discovering how they can be

corrected, become part of the mainstream, be changed into or utilized by the orderly, organizing forces. For Bakhtin both of these forces always exist within a society and are part of its linguistic life. Their constant struggle is a factor in the dynamics of a language.

Alongside the centripetal forces, the centrifugal forces of language carry on their uninterrupted work; alongside verbal-ideological centralization and unification, the uninterrupted processes of decentralization and dis-unification go forward.

The utterance in fact can be seen as the point where these two forces meet:

Every utterance participates in the "unitary language" (in its centripetal forces and tendencies) and at the same time partakes of social and historical heteroglossia (the centrifugal, stratifying forces). (Bakhtin 1981)

For Bakhtin, the more disruptive centrifugal forces, become both important and natural voices in a society. They should not be thought of as "only a static invariant" but rather they are what "insures its dynamics....as long as language is alive and developing."

Limitations of Other Models

In our comparison of Bakhtin and the ethnomethodologists, we spoke about the openness of Bakhtin's writing, as though welcoming the response, whether by a written criticism, reinterpretation or actual use of his dialogic model by others. We have related this to his unwillingness, inability, actually to silence the voice of the other. In contrast we do see such a silencing, or closing of the door, not as an attitude but more as an intricate part of other models. As an

example of what we mean, we refer again to Psathas and Anderson's (1990) description of a "methodological perception" in conversation analysis based on two rules: Data is taken from real-life situations and collected by audio and/or video-tapes. Some have objected that these two rules greatly limit the possible sites and types of interaction which can be included in this type of research project, resulting in a preponderance of studies of students in and around the university. It has also been said that Jefferson's convention makes everyday speech seem unreal, its signs obscure what is actually said and very often diminish the subject. I will utilize a simpler convention for the presentation of taped conversations in the following chapters, as described in Appendix A.

We also mentioned that some sought to avoid these limitations by combining conversation analysis techniques with an ethnographic approach. A particularly noteworthy example of this combination is Goodwin's *He Said, She Said*, a study of language-use by African-American children in a neighborhood in Pennsylvania. Utilizing extensive audio recordings of the children's conversations taped during their everyday activities, Goodwin has managed to retain the attention to detail peculiar to conversation analysis and at the same time provide a richness of analysis. She leaves the immediate framework of the recorded interaction to tie the children's talk to a larger context when that can be done in such a way as to not impose social norms on their interaction but rather only as their interaction itself suggests a norm peculiar to that activity which in turn impacts upon the larger society. For example, what is said by the children during the interaction she has recorded is seen to directly affect the life of one of

the participants and her parents who consider moving to another neighborhood because their daughter is ostracized as a direct result of the he said, she said discourse. This allows us to glimpse the seriousness of the children's activities and to attach them, however briefly, to a reference outside the immediate activity.

The only problem is that although it seems clear that Goodwin's taping procedure does not intrude upon the activity of the children, we might not be able to say the same for adults. It is also interesting that areas of Goodwin's study touch on much of what is expressed by Bakhtin, for example, when the children repeat each other's words but with a difference—which turns them against the speaker and gives them new meaning. Goodwin seems to reach for a way to explain this double-voicedness in other than Bakhtinian terms and paradoxically, is one of the few contemporary ethnographers to mention him as a source.

As I say, I cannot hope to emulate Goodwin, but I have in my research utilized ethnographic, participant observation, and conversation analysis techniques in selection of and recording of conversations. However, for the theoretical and analytical aspects of this dissertation I have utilized concepts and categories introduced by Bakhtin. One of the goals of this research project was to discover the extent of their use in everyday conversation, to describe how they are utilized and determine as far as possible whether or not their use has any observable influence on talk in interaction. Another was to broaden the scope of analysis of talk in interaction and to include elements of that talk that are in general excluded from contemporary discourse studies.

Due to the newness of Bakhtin's ideas to sociology, and to the writer of this thesis, the analysis section of this project in the chapters that follow must necessarily reflect a tentative and investigatory attitude. Sharrock refers to the expression "the cognitive science present tense" used by some to note the way cognitive scientists talk about things they propose to do as if they could really do them. He says there is much of this in sociology because investigators often talk as if their approach could actually do the things that they would like it to do whereas, most studies represent first stabs at objectives they cannot be expected to realize. As Sharrock (1989) puts it "In actuality studies are prolegomena, to initial explorations in the direction of making a study of, etc." It is with that in mind that the analytical part of my study will proceed.

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CHAPTER THREE

SPEECH GENRES

We have mentioned the importance of the word in a Bakhtinian discourse analysis. The word is first of all a sign, what it stands for, its semiotic/ideological nature, but the important difference is that for Bakhtin words also have a history—they carry the baggage of past usage. They do not mean, semiotically, only in relation to other words. For Bakhtin, meaning resides neither in the sign nor in its referent, neither in the word nor in society, but rather in the relationship, the dialogic angle at which these meet. Words, or utterances, are also related to events and personages. They appear, as it were, authored, not by individuals, but through their generic past.

For Bakhtin, the word, or utterance does not enter conversation as though directly from the dictionary but rather it arises out of dialogue as a continuation or as a response to it.

The word in language is half someone else's. It becomes "one's own" only when the speaker populates it with his own intention, his own accent, when he appropriates the word, adapting it to his own semantic and expressive intention. (Bakhtin 1981, 293)

We must point out here that Bakhtin should not be interpreted as meaning that the word when it is used by the individual somehow becomes a pure expression of the intent or the internal state of the speaker or that it

expresses a purely representative view of his or her reality. Bakhtin is adamant in his insistence on the importance of the generic history of the word which continues to color it with overtones from past contexts. The speaker must also consider the response, a consideration which cannot help but influence her choice of words.

Bakhtin's concept of speech genres, the "*relatively stable types*" of utterances (emphasis Bakhtin's) which develop around any particular sphere of activity in which language is used (1986, 60), is closely tied to his concept of the word, or utterance in that they are learned in childhood as we learn our language and develop out of social interaction (78). His insight that speech genres are connected to a particular "sphere of activity" needs some further explication in that the activity associated with speech genres must not be confused with that ordinarily associated with speech acts theory, which implies a conscious intent on the part of the speaker, but are closer to that described by Goodwin in her study of black children's use of language, where activities are socially organized ways of using language such as building arguments, instigating, or promoting confrontations, stories (Goodwin, 1990). Activities are mutually recognized and accepted as such by the participants but not discussed as such. For Bakhtin, although individuals must "choose" to express themselves in a particular speech genre in order to be understood, this is generally not a conscious or strategic choice and is determined more by socio-historical and situational circumstances than by individual considerations (78).

Bakhtin has emphasized that speech genres are socially, not individually, created so that, although the variety of possible speech genres is infinite over time, they are also culture-bound; they are tied to the time and place of their creation. This fact, plus Bakhtin's description of the three constitutive features of genre: content, style and structure, render his concept of speech genres uniquely applicable to everyday conversation and to its analysis since they are observable and recognizable, they can be differentiated one from the other.

As we have noted in the previous chapter, others have used similar conceptualizations. Gumperz and Hymes, for example, have applied genre to the spoken word and assign it the following type of categories: "By genres are meant categories such as poem, myth, tale, proverb, riddle, curse, prayer, oration, lecture, commercial, form letter, editorial, etc" (Gumperz and Hymes 1986, 65). Bakhtin extends the concept to include a wider range of speech phenomena observable in everyday conversation.

Gumperz and Hymes continue, "The notion of genre implies the possibility of identifying formal characteristics traditionally recognized" (1986, 65). To aid in the identification of various speech genres, Bakhtin has broken them down into three features: 1) content, theme or social/historical meaning; 2) style, which includes intonation and other extra-linguistic features; and, 3) structure.

As of this writing, the most significant application to spoken English of the concept as described by Bakhtin is that done by J. Dore. Dore cautions

that genre must be distinguished from social orders of the scene (or situation) and from internal states (of the individual):

An individual may bring any number of conscious intentions and strategies to a scene, and probably brings many unconscious motives and needs as well. . . . These internal phenomena are not the object of study when we analyze the genres of speech." (Dore 1989, 237).

On the other hand, in identifying genre we cannot look for fixed products or exact reproductions since features of genre are more fluid. They can be likened to Wittgenstein's "family resemblances." "One can produce a perfectly grammatical sentence . . . but a perfect genre performance is a misnomer. Rather, speech is performed only as approximations of 'ideal' genre formats" (249).

The ability to understand and manage speech genres is not a matter of intelligence or language ability but rather stems from a familiarity with various spheres of activity which obtain in one's culture and the kinds of talk that are associated with them (Bakhtin 1986, 80). A marketing area was chosen as the site for gathering conversations for this study because, in spite of the anticipated heterogeneous nature of such areas in an urban setting, one would expect that there would be a concentration on the use of one specific genre, that utilized by salespersons and customers to transact their business, or what we will call the service genre.

Using the utterance as a unit of analysis, see pages 82-83, we will begin our application of Bakhtin's concept of the speech genre by breaking the service genre down into the three features described by Bakhtin.

Features of the Speech Genre

Content

The content of genre is carried in the words utilized, the "propositional theme" or what the dialogue is about.

Two major themes are identified which organize the content of utterances in the dialogues I have recorded during service activities: selling, offering or delivering of service

EXAMPLE: May I help you, Mam?

and buying, asking for or accepting service.

EXAMPLE: Do you have this in size 34?

In addition to buying and selling, sub-themes such as "ordering" (of food or merchandise) or "prompting" or "confirming" (the sale) are also prominent in this marketing area.

Style

For Bakhtin, style consists of extra-linguistic factors such as intonation, rhythm, speed of delivery, hesitations, etc. A genre expresses a set of speaker assumptions and expectations, of emotions and attitudes—these are expressed primarily through intonation. Coulthard defines intonation as the systematic patterning of prosodic features such as pitch, pitch movement, loudness, length. Features of voice quality, also mentioned by Coulthard as part of intonation include whisper, breathy, husky, falsetto, giggle.

The style of the service genre can be characterized as polite—a subtle stress is placed on words such as "sir" or "mam," but in general exchanges in the service genre are characterized by an evenness of tone and volume.

Dialogue can be typified by the frequently used utterance, "May I help you?" delivered with a slight questioning intonation and sense of immediacy. "Thank you, have a nice day." and "Thanks, you too." are typical polite ways of ending transactions.

Structure

Bakhtin refers to compositional structure but in an analysis of the spoken word, the term discourse structure is appropriate. There are two major types of discourse structure found in conversation: narrative and exchange (Dore 1989, 243). Elements of sequencing such as Sacks' concept of adjacency pairs are a part of the exchange structure. Examples of adjacency pairs include 'question-answer,' 'greeting-greeting,' 'offer-acceptance/refusal' (Sacks & Schegloff 1973).

The service genre is generally structured in a series of short exchanges, as opposed to a narrative structure. These take the form of adjacency pairs which we recognize as question / answer, command / compliance, as in the following sample exchange between customer (C) and salesperson (SP).

(1) SP: May I help you, Mam?

(2) C: Do you have this in size 34?

(3) SP: Yes, we do.

(4) C: Show me one in that size please.

(5) SP: Just a moment.

Other structural devices such as listing (of merchandise) are also an observable part of the service genre. The following exchange collected in a luncheonette is typical of the service genre:

C= Customer, W=Waiter. (See Appendix A for explanation of other identity codes as well as presentation convention.)

(1) C: Hi, how've you been?

(2) W: Fine, how [are you.

(3) C: [What kind of soup do ya have today?"

(4) W: You want .. chicken rice?"

(5) C: Yes, okay.

(6) W: You want salad?.. lettuce, tomato, onion

(7) C: (nods)

(8) W: French? Russian? Oil & Vinegar?

(9) C: Italian?

(10)W: I got no Italian.

(11)C: Okay, oil and vinegar.

(12)W: Some coffee .. [or

(13)C: [Coffee.

The above is typical in structure, style and content of the service genre and illustrative of several points which we would like to discuss in describing the features of genre as explanation of generic speech differences and the part they play in organizing conversation in everyday life. First, however, it may be helpful to again refer to Bakhtin's differentiation between primary and secondary genres as mentioned in Chapter Two.

Bakhtin has distinguished between two basic types of speech genres: Primary (or simple) genres are concretely and immediately related to our everyday experience and might include greetings and farewells, congratulations, good wishes, informal inquiries about health or business as well as the more personal family and intimate genres. They may be highly ritualized, such as greeting exchanges, or particularly creative and expressive but they are unmediated that is, they are so much a part of our daily lives that their use is spontaneous and not ordinarily noticed. Secondary (or complex) genres in Bakhtin's terminology are abstract and often highly ideologized, used in formal communication. Bakhtin points out that primary and secondary genres do not represent two mutually exclusive categories. They have a common nature in that the complex genres, during the process of their formation, absorb and digest various primary genres even though utterances from primary genres undergo a change when they are coopted into secondary genres. On the other hand, everyday speech, ordinary dialogue, can encompass all of the more complex genres. It is, therefore, essential to include both types, primary and secondary, in a discourse analysis (Bakhtin 1986).

For purposes of this study we will classify the service genre as secondary since we might assume that the utterances which constitute this genre are mediated by a specific intent peculiar to the business enterprise - to make the sale, or on the part of the consumer - to purchase the product under the best possible conditions: that is, quality merchandise or service at a fair price.

In the excerpt on page 101 above, the first two utterances:

(1) C: Hi, how've you been?

(2) W: Fine, how [are you.

are typical examples of the everyday exchange of greetings which has been co-opted into the secondary "service" genre. If we consider Sacks' adjacency pair law of question and answer: "When asked a question answer it", we can say that the second utterance is a response to the first. However, the second utterance also asks a question but in this case it is not answered. Is the customer breaking a rule? If so, we would expect that it might be mentioned in the exchange or that there might be an observable sign in the facial expression of the persons involved but my field notes indicate that there was not. Because we do not notice, nor do the participants seem to notice anything different, we can only assume that a non-reply is customary in this instance. Similar observations have shown that when greetings are part of the "service" genre they do undergo a subtle change. That is, it seems to be taken for granted that the waiter does not really need a reply, as he might in a primary genre. We see that the intonation here, is not that usually identified with a question, that is there was no

rising inflection, but a flatness bordering on monotone which we have identified with the service genre is used. We have further observed, in this marketplace at least, although it may be polite to ask after the health of the customer or the service person, a reply may or may not follow. Often, there is a slight nod of the head which may indicate a recognition and acceptance of the polite gesture but at the same time a desire to get to the business of the activity itself.

This brings up the difference between topic and theme. Although they have been used interchangeably (Coulthard 1985), as they apply in an analysis of genre, I would differentiate as follows: Topic refers to what is being talked about in a particular utterance, whereas theme is a feature of genre. We have identified ordering as a sub-theme of the "service" genre. It may also be the topic, as in the utterance. "I'd like to order," or various other topics may be discussed, i.e., soup, salad, even health, but they are not themes in this case. As we see in the above example the health of the participants may be the topic of the first two utterances but it is not the theme of the "service" genre, which in this instance is "offering of service." The remainder of the utterances in this exchange carry through the "offering" theme. There is also evidence here of the listing structure in utterances (6) and (8), although the basic structure of short exchanges is dominant.

Speech Genres as Activities

Examples and Differences

Although, as we had anticipated, our taped conversations and notes taken during our fieldwork in this area include innumerable instances of the use of the service genre, they also include an unexpected number of primary genres. Primary genres, like secondary genres are activity-specific. Flirting, for example, is a popular activity in this marketing area. It is a genred activity. That is, it is recognizable because of the specific combination of content, style, and structure which accompany the activity. These features in the flirtation genre characteristically appear as follows:

Content: There are many themes connected with the flirtation genre but the two which prevail in this particular marketplace area are:

Complimenting and Commanding.

EXAMPLES: Heey, beautiful.

You're lookin good today.

Come here, you

Give me a kiss

Style: Flirting in this neighborhood marketplace is recognized by its teasing, jocular style. This style is characterized by an increase in voice volume and a simultaneous lowering of pitch, a "heightened" but more direct delivery. Other characteristics include an emphasis on the personal pronoun, "Come here,

you," an elongation of some vowels, "you're looking goood." Non-verbal gestures often accompany this genre, a smile or a wink, and act to reinforce its identification.

(1) W: Heey, you're looking goood today. (approaching table)

(2) C: Only todaay?

(Laughter)

(3) W: Oh, sure every day. I'm telling you

Although its content is often of a personal and serious nature, one we might identify with the genre of intimacy described by Bakhtin, its style belies its seriousness. Perhaps because it takes place in the public rather than the private sphere, its content is delivered in a teasing style.. These features should become more obvious when we describe actual situations in which flirting occurs.

Structure: Typically, it is the opening, or first utterance, in a dialogue which marks it as flirtation. No matter what the content, this utterance is structured in anticipation of a response. It may be uttered as a direct question or in the form of a command "Give me a kiss," but with a rising inflection at the end which we recognize as questioning. "Give me a kiss " In addition there is a definite pause at the end of the utterance as it is waiting for the response. It does not try to extend its turn nor attempt to "talk-over" the turn of the other.

In "Discourse in the Novel" Bakhtin describes the internal stratification of a national language in modern societies into various language systems or speech types (Bakhtin 1981). Such speech types, or genres, may be based on age, class, profession, or exist within a circle of friends or a single family. To further illustrate our use of Bakhtin's concept, we will concentrate for now on tapes and field notes collected in a luncheonette where we were able to observe many of the same people over a period of time. Since many customers who frequent this particular establishment are senior citizens, there is a lot of talk about age and about health. As thematic content, these must be differentiated from the polite inquiries such as "How are you today?" which have been absorbed by and become part of the secondary, service genre. Exchanges which we define as constituting separate and distinct genres are accompanied by a change in style and structure as well as content. For example in this area talk about age is typically done in a bantering style, with a concentration of content on words that emphasize good health and "young" feelings. For that reason we can call it the "you're as young as you feel" genre. The following is an example of that genre.

(1) C1: And I walk home every day. So, I'm not doin bad [for ma

(2) C2: [For what? seventy?
seventy-one?

(3) C1: Try seventy-five.

(4) C2: Go ooon, you don't look a day over eighty.

((laughter))

(5) C1: But I got my health to prove it.

We see in the above example the use of positive themes such as "I'm not doin bad," "I got my health." The bantering, often teasing style seen in the elongation of vowel sounds, utterance (4) "go ooon," is differentiated from that of the flirtation genre by its lack of emphasis on the personal pronoun, such as "you don't look a day over eighty." The "you" is not stressed here, as it would be in the flirtation genre. The joking mention of an even older age "eighty" followed by shared laughter carries through the element of banter.

The following is a slightly different example of the same genre.

- (1) C1: She aged
- (2) C2: Some age more ((with a shrug))
- (3) C1: I don't look a lot better
- (4) C2: So? Who gets younger?
((laughter))
- (5) C1: Yeeah, so who cares?.

This exchange starts on a more negative plane "She aged" on the part of customer number 1. In the reply of customer number 2 and especially the accompanying shrug we begin to see some restrictions placed by the use of this genre as customer number 2 attempts to make light of the aging referred to by her partner in dialogue. Here we also see the use of self-directed irony, a form of double-voiced discourse, which will be discussed in Chapter 4, in the words "I don't look a lot better." The bantering style is not evidenced until the forth utterance, "So? Who get's younger?" and its accompanying shared laughter. And again on the elongation of the eee sound in "Yeeah, so who cares."

We see from repeated exchanges such as the above that age is not to be a matter of serious discussion by this group of peers, as long as you have your health. By contrast we find that sickness is typically treated more soberly as in the following example of what I will call the "serious illness" genre.

- (1) C1: Where's ah .. Ruth?
- (2) C2: Well .. um ..
- (3) C1: Don't tell me .. she doesn't feel well (slight inflection at end, a question but not really, speaker knows the answer, or guesses the answer)
- (4) C2: My sister has such pain .. since they took her gall bladder out of her .. and she never neglected it. From the time they discovered a problem. So .. and she still has pain ... So, ah .. from the medication she feels so weak.

We see that there are basic differences in style and structure as well as content, between the "young as you feel" genre and the "serious illness" genre. The bantering style of the former is dropped and speech is lower in volume and also slower, characterized by more hesitations, and "fill-ins" such as "ah," "so". There is also a change in structure. The utterances follow one another more slowly in the dialogue and there is more of a tendency to narration. Yet they are both primary genres according to the distinction made in this study.

An important difference between primary and secondary genres is that the rules of secondary genres are more or less recognized by the majority of participants within a given culture (such as the language of the political platform, the schoolroom, etc.) By contrast, the rules of primary genres tend to follow

along narrower lines of friendship groups or family relationships, but may also be racial/ethnically or regionally determined. For example, some groups may not talk about aging as lightly as do the participants in this area, in which case we could not say they utilize the "you're as young as you feel" genre. However, we would claim that as a genre, "you're as young as you feel" exists and is recognizable as such in some areas of our culture.

The above examples were given in order to display the various generic speech possibilities and to begin to explain how one might distinguish them one from the other. The remainder of this chapter will concentrate on how they are used and the observable consequences of their use. Genre is observed to be a factor in participant's activities of defining the situation, continuing socialization, and exerting social control.

Definition of the situation

One obvious use of speech genres by participants in everyday discourse can be seen in what interactionists have called. "the definition of the situation". In defining a specific situation, each individual participant answers his or her own question of "what's going on here?" by drawing on their knowledge of their own culture to identify the situation in which they find themselves at any given moment during interaction. A knowledge of the speech genres extant in any given society becomes a vital aid in the construction of that definition.

(1) C: Hey, you .. Are yoou passing me by again? ((said to waiter who is walking by with an armful of dishes.))

(2) W: Nooo, you know I wouldn't do that. Aaah, don't feel neglected.

(3) C: We^ll, I do, but I won't if I can see yoou later "

(4) W: Oh, you can see me anytime.

laughter

(5) Can I bring you a menu? "

(6) C: Yes, please.

The first utterance in this dialogue, if we heard only the content, might place it in the genre of service; the customer is annoyed because she is not being served. That annoyance might account for a deviation from the expected politeness of the shopping genre seen in the opening "hey you," If that were the case, the other features of that genre would be maintained. But we also hear the style, the intonation, which is not that of a complaint. The emphasis and elongation of the vowel sound on the second "you" help us to begin to recognize it as belonging to the genre of flirtation. The waiter's response also shows that he recognizes it as other than an ordinary complaint about the service. His response takes on the elongated vowels of the flirtation genre, which both parties keep up for a short time until the waiter returns to the "service" genre, utterance (5), "Can I bring you a menu." Utterance number (5) is recognizable as belonging to the service genre because of its lack of intonation, its neutrality, devoid of emphatic stress. We see from this example that when the customer flirts with the waiter, the hearer (as participant or as observer) can identify the

situation. (We in fact observe such shifts every day without noticing them.) As a change occurs in style and intonation as well as theme, the customer/waiter positions of buyer and seller necessary to the shopping genre have been reorganized into a situation which now involves flirtation. We also observe that either party has the right, (perhaps even the obligation, which we will discuss later under genre as social control) to change the situation back as it was. In this case, there is a shift from the flirtation talk, indicated by the elongated vowel sounds in the first three utterances. In what we might call the intermediary sentence, "Oh, you can see me anytime", the me is still stressed but the teasing tone of elongated letters is missing. In contrast, the you in "Can I bring you a menu" is free of all stress, it could be anyone, as the waiter calls the situation back to the "service" status. In addition, from the first part of the dialogue we can assume that the customer is "a regular" in which case we have observed that a menu is not always brought unless requested or the waiter might ask, "Do you need a menu? The use of the more formal "Can I bring you a menu" in this case would appear to indicate something else is being signaled. Although it may or may not be a conscious reversal on his part, to change the activity from flirtation to service, the waiter must also change the genre.

We have also observed that these choices whether conscious or unconsciously made on the part of the participants, do develop out of the situation. As we see in the following contrasting example.

- (1) CM: I try to make you laugh. Yooou're cute when you laugh. ((said to woman standing next to the booth where CM is seated.))
- (2) CF: Oh' yeaah. ((giggle))
- (3) CM: Yeaah, go ahead, be cute.
- (4) CF: If you think so
- (5) CM: Heey, com'oon. Sit down. ((Slides over in booth leaving a space beside him))
- (6) CF: Just for awhile. ((sits down))

Of course we don't know in this type of study whether or not these two people were previously acquainted or whether or not they lived happily ever after, but what this example does serve to show is that a participant's knowledge of genre, even though they are unaware of it, enables them to signal a desired, or potential outcome which the other can accept or refuse without "losing face." And that this potential for change, although embedded in the situation, is actualized through the use of language. A discourse study grounded in socially developed speech genre rather than in structure or individual mental processes allows us to see the effect of these changes very clearly.

Continuing Socialization

The notion that everyday verbal interaction is a crucial element in the socialization process and the construction of self is by no means a new one. Developmental analysts have for a number of years observed how the process works in studies of child-caretaker interaction. As others have implied (including Talcott Parsons), this process is not confined to childhood experience. It must continue through family and peer expectations to shape our personal identity, we suspect, throughout the life span of every participant in a society.

In this particular marketplace, various types of socialization go on. Children are taught the society's rules of conduct "you can't have that." "Don't touch it" "That's not yours," "Come on, move. Pick up your feet." "Look where you're going, please." We are, however, most interested in the socialization attempts after childhood. Since we are of the belief that social development is an ongoing, never-ending process, we could say that all experiences of interaction are part of the socialization process, but there are recognizable and deliberate activities, which I will call continuing socialization, an activity done by adults wherein one adult attempts to socialize another adult. These are sometimes done in order to teach a new rule or behavior in an unfamiliar surrounding but more often they are in the way of reminders of rules we assume, from the response, may have been learned in childhood. Continuing socialization can be differentiated from merely bossing others around and from more formal activities of teaching and learning: it is inevitably accompanied by a shift in genre.

In the area I have researched, continuing socialization seems to take place on three discernible levels or sub-genres:

- 1) Socialization into general pre-prescribed patterns of socially accepted behavior
- 2) Socialization into specific activity-linked behavior.
- 3) Socialization into more general behavior, attitudes and group belief systems.

The first level would include the following examples where one adult reprimands another adult for not taking care of his or her belongings in which case it is felt to be a continuation of the socialization we have all been subjected to as children.

- (1) SP: No Ma^m. Wait MA^M
- (2) C: What .. oh, my change?
- (3) SP: You gave me too mu~~ch. ((holding up a dollar bill))
- (4) C: Oh, I gave you an extra .. [I gave you .. three dollars.
- (5) SP: [You gave me too much money. You gave me three dollars instead of two dollars. (shaking her head)
How could you do that?
- (6) C: They must've been .. have been .. stuck. [Two bills were stuck together."
- (7) SP: [Be more careful with your money. And watch your bag. Look. Hold it like this.

At utterance (7) the salesperson demonstrates by tucking an imaginary bag under her arm and hugging it close to her body. The customer looks down at her own bag which she is holding by its strap, smiles sheepishly and nods while she changes the position of her handbag, to hold it more carefully under her arm.

We see that in utterance (3) on the part of the salesperson (SP), "You gave me too mu~~ch" the polite shopping style has giving way to a sort of sing-song, delivery. That, in itself, does not represent a full generic change, but as the dialogue continues we see almost a reversal of positions as the salesgirl's utterances both in the words she uses ("How could you do that?") and the stress on words such as do and look (with a corresponding lowering of pitch), give them a scolding quality, as a parent might use with a child. There is also an observable structural change: The salesperson's utterance (5) is longer and she does not obey conventional sequencing rules but prefers to "talk-over" the customer's explanation. Conversely the customer's speech becomes hesitant, with pauses in between words and a lowering of volume, as we see in utterance number 6. There is, in addition, by the time we get to utterance (7), a noticeably "clipped" or slightly staccato style, the words following one another in rapid succession, as an authority on the subject might speak.

The above type of exchange takes place frequently in this area and according to my field notes occurs most often between women whom I judge to be of similar age. An important aspect of these genre shifts is that we cannot always charge one participant with "starting" them. As we see above, the customer's words begin to lower in volume at the same as, rather than as a direct

response to, the salesperson's shift to a scolding voice. We can only say that this type of continuing socialization appears to be a mutually accepted activity, as we see in another example:

The first speaker is sitting at a booth and addressing another woman who has just gotten up from a nearby table and is walking toward front of luncheonette.

(1) C1: Mi^ss. Mi^ss. You left something there. (pointing to floor under table which C2 has just vacated)

(2) C2: My bag.! Oh! hh .. [It was under the chair"

(3) C1: [(Look at that) You don't even watch.

(4) C2: Thank you .. I'm sorry. ((as she retrieves her pocketbook from under the chair.))

(5) I don't .. [usually .. I don't put it there

(6) C1: [You should be more careful.

In this example it is made even clearer for the observer that there is a reminder of lessons once learned going on here. We can tell from utterance (2), "you don't even watch" which is said with the same scolding quality as the salesgirls "how could you do that." and again the response is "talked-over." We see reaffirmation of as well as acceptance of the scolding voice in the response of C2 in that she actually apologizes for her carelessness, nor does she protest when her possible attempt at explanation is not even listened to but is again "talked over." The uncomplaining acceptance on the part of C2 to what in other

circumstances might be considered rudeness, would seem to indicate that both speakers regard this type of interaction as "the norm", that is acceptable in our society.

The frequency of such instances as well as the reaction to them of acceptance rather than demonstrable anger, forces us to look at them not as isolated incidents, but rather as phenomena which must be explained. A tangible explanation would appear to be that they are part of a continuing socialization process. This explanation would tie in with the idea of a continued and accepted socialization, or reaffirmation of a socialization from childhood. (take care of your belongings and, above all, don't lose them in the confusion of the marketplace.) Who does not remember as a child raised in an urban environment being sent to the store with instructions to be careful, don't lose the money and be sure you get the right change." The speech sub-genre of this level can be called the "socialization reminders" genre - it is characterized by extremes of style = sing-song to staccato and structurally by a walking-over of the excuses offered by the other. Also by a scolding voice quality, seen in a stress on the personal pronoun but here without the teasing elongation of vowels we found in the flirtation genre.

The second level, or second type of continuing socialization of adults would include socialization of the "uninformed" or the "unruly" into behavior expectations specifically prevalent in these particular surroundings, this type of neighborhood marketplace. We can call this level the adult socialization genre. It differs from above in that the content or theme is more obviously instructive,

that is specific ways of doing an activity are mentioned. Structurally there is a give and take of short utterances. In the way of orders and responses. Rather than talking over the other's excuses or explanations as in the socialization reminder, the response is listened to and carefully considered. A staccato delivery is also utilized in the style of this genre as well as a persistent and steady intonation. Rather than a scolding voice, as a reminder of a childhood learning, the adult partner in dialogue is subjected to an insistent, teachy, delivery.

For example, it is customary in the groceries as well as in the fruit and vegetable stores in this area, that the customer is free to walk around, inspect and select merchandise. He or she must then take the merchandise to the cashier in order to pay. There is typically a line of people waiting to pay and one is expected to queue up behind the last person in the line and wait one's turn. As behavior, this phenomenon has been the object of other studies, but here we are interested in the socialization aspects of the behavior as they may appear in everyday conversation. How one learns and is reminded to do it.

A = adult (female)

CH = child (female, approximately seven, in judgment of researcher)

(1) CH: Aah, I wanna go.

(2) A: No, we have to wait our turn.

(3) CH: Please, Mo^my

(4) A: Come on. Stand straight. Stay right there. You've been here before.

In utterance number 4 we notice the same clipped, staccato delivery as in the previous example, as of authority, in this case the adult telling the child how to behave. But compare this with the following exchange between two adults.

(CM) Customer, male

(CF) Customer, female

(1) CM: What's this? A line? ((said to female customer standing on line))

(2) CF: Yes.

(3) CM: (Oh gee) .. umm

(4) CF: Here, stand here (pulls him by the arm to stand in front of her)

(5) Let him be in front of me.

(6) Stand there, don't move. Stand right there.

In the above example, of course we don't know whether the man is really unaware of the line procedure or if he may be "pretending" naivety, nor do we really know the woman's motive nor to whom her utterance number five is addressed, but at our present stage of analysis these are not relevant factors. Although we cannot claim an ethnomethodological indifference to them, we will hold them in abeyance. For now, because no one on line visibly objects we can count it as a socialization procedure and use it to compare with the previous example, comparing in particular the words and again the staccato style of delivery used in utterance number 6 with that used by the adult in the previous example.

Of course, not all attempts at socialization, or reminders of appropriate behavior are so easily accepted

- (1) C1: You have to wait on line like everybody else.
- (2) C2: I just want to go get another one. ((pointing to melon in basket))
- (3) Gee, just over there.
- (4) C3: Go, go, I'll hold your spot, go, go, go, go ((gently pushes customer number 3 in the direction of the melons))
- (5) C1: You're not supposed to do that. I'm waiting here. How would you like it.
((said to customer number three - C3))
- (6) C3: Ahhhh.
- (7) C1: Doesn't she know better. She's not supposed to do that. ((said to Cashier, who is busy adding up merchandise.))
- (8) Cashier: ((remains silent and does not look up from his task.))
- (9) C1: He's not interested.
- (10) What does he care

We see from the above example, that in contrast to the acceptance of the participants in the first two examples, what we are calling continuing socialization or attempts to reproduce situations of "observably appropriate behavior" or "waiting like everyone else" do not always succeed. Sometimes they are openly resisted. Others (customer number 3) even encourage the "breaking" of the rule. Generally, we have observed that the salesperson, or cashier, prefers not to get involved.

It should be noted that in order to sustain a speech genre both partners in a dialogue must cooperate. In the case of the adult socialization genre, it is as though the role of one party, the aggressor, or teacher, offsets the role of the partner, the learner, or passive partner.

In the following long example we can observe various shifts and generic changes. The speakers include 4 adults, three of whom are American and one is self-identified as Russian, and one teenager. The three American women are sitting in a booth conversing in English. The Russian woman and a teenage girl are seated in a booth directly in front of the booth of women. When the group of women who have been speaking English begin to use a few Yiddish words, the Russian woman looks over and begins speaking to them in Yiddish. At the point we pick up the recorded dialogue, the women have begun to take an interest in the teenager.

At the beginning of this exchange it does not appear thematically to belong to any genre. But the questions directed at the teenager are delivered in the rapid, staccato style of the adult socialization genre - especially in the repeated question - Utterances 1 and 2.

C1= customer at table of three.

C2 = customer at table of three.

C3 = customer at table of three.

TA = teenager

(1) C1: Where do you live? ((to teenager))

(2) Where do you live? ((more loudly))

(3) TA: Trump Village. ((in a low voice))

(4) C1: What?

(5) TA: I live in Trump Village ((louder))

(6) C1: Why are you talking Russian to her?

(7) TA: (shrugs)

(8) C1: How long are you in this country?

(9) TA: I was born here

(10)C1: Oh, ah ... born here.

(11)C2: Oh ... but you talk Russian good

(12)C3: Hey ... I think I know you. You're ... mmm the daughter of....

(13)TA: ((Silence - does not reply but looks at her companion, the Russian woman, who takes some photographs out of her bag, gets up and shows them to women in the next booth.

(14)C3: She looks just like my girlfriend, Rosie. ((pointing to a photograph))

(15)C2: You're mother's very pretty. (to teenager)

There is additional general conversation - a lot of nodding and smiling - before the Russian woman returns to her booth. She and teenager get up to leave.

(16)C1: You're a very pretty girl, you know that. Don't take that brace off your teeth until you're ready. My nephew took it off. He got so mad after awhile."

After they have left.

(17)C1: No matter where I go I always talk to people. I find that people like that are very interesting. They don't know what this country is like because we had it pretty bad here too."

(18)C2: Everybody

(19)C3: Yeah.

As we have said, the use of genre is dependent upon the cooperation of the partner in dialogue and to that extent, at least, arises out of the situation. Although put as questions to which a response is expected, the structure and delivery style of these first utterances, allows us to suspect an attempt at a socialization genre on the third level, as a group of adult women attempt to socialize a teenager into the value and process of negotiating a shared background knowledge.. It is especially the persistence of theme and quick intrusive voice quality more than content which we note makes this a socialization attempt at this point. This explanation is even more convincing due to the sudden shift with utterance no. 10 "oh, ah..born here," as in response to that piece of information we see a decided change to what we have come to see as the hesitant, trying it out quality of the word with a sideward glance, or loophole, characteristic of the negotiation genre (discussed in chapter 4) Other aspects of the above, also begin to anticipate what we will discuss in the next chapter.

As well as socializing with apparent strangers the women in the booth of three are attempting a form of socialization of the teenager: a socialization into the in the process of negotiating a shared background knowledge, and with

which the Russian woman joins in. (They are also constructing or negotiating a shared background knowledge of their own). The teenager appears to resist their attempts to draw her into their conversation, even though she is, we find, from our own culture or perhaps because of that fact. She may simply resent their questioning which after awhile she does not even answer. The older woman, although we find she is Russian and from a different culture, appears more at home with the situation. She will cooperate even to the extent of showing personal family pictures. Here the stratification may be more into age groups than national background. This example also serves to show that genres are not merely linguistic forms, that is they do not only exist in the structure of a particular language. Most significantly, we are able to observe, in the above example, one of the more subtle forms of resistance. The others words are simply ignored. We will show in Chapters 4 and 5 that there are many other forms of resistance.

What we can, however, see from this part of our study is that socialization does continue into adult life and furthermore that it is also selectively received on the part of the hearer who rather than a helpless victim of socializing forces is able to a greater or lesser degree selectively accept or reject the attempt at socialization.

Social control

We have already begun to see that there is an element of social control in the way various genres are woven together. That is, in addition to the constraints imposed by the genre itself. This is most clear in the following example from my taped conversations.

(1) W: Heey, you're looking goood today. (approaching table)

(2) C: Only today?

(Laughter)

(3) W: Oh, sure every day. I'm telling you ((begins to clear the table)).

(4) C: Yeah, clear away these dishes, they're messy

In the above exchange we immediately recognize the style and delivery associated with the flirting genre. "Hey, you're looking goood today." In utterance No. 4 the customer seems to have interjected into what we have come to identify as the genre of flirtation, the utterance: "Yeah, clear away these dishes. They're messy." If we were to try to analyze this from a structural viewpoint we do not know what adjacency pair that is a part of, or as Jacobs and Jackson might say, it is an anomaly which cannot be explained from that view. From a rational or speech act viewpoint, however, it could be explained as serving the desire to, or part of the strategy of, getting the table cleared away but we have observed that was being done anyway, (The waiter was beginning the process of clearing away the dirty dishes just at the point when the utterance was uttered. In fact, the clearing away of the dishes may have been the first signal of a possible generic shift. Yet the fourth utterance was definitely uttered

and it is not viewed as strange that it was uttered. Nor does it seem necessary as a "reward" because the waiter is doing his job. A far more cogent explanation is possible from a generic basis of analysis: a generic change in the situation has occurred from flirtation to the secondary genre of "service" and this change is reflected in the utterance, or to be more exact, the utterance was uttered almost immediately after the waiter had begun to clear away the dishes and if we see this utterance as a response to that action, we can see it as a mutually negotiated change.

On other occasions, situations are controlled by a strict adherence to the secondary genre, as in the following example:

- (1) SP: Excuse me, you have to check your bag upstairs before going downstairs.
- (2) C: I just bought this here, can't I just go down.
- (3) SP: Before you go downstairs you have to check your bag please. Thank you.
- (4) C: Oh, all right

In this establishment, as a safeguard against theft, it is the policy that customers are not allowed to carry packages with them while they shop. A salesperson is generally assigned to stand near the entrance to insure that this rule is observed, to check the packages of entering customers and to monitor the space where the packages are kept until the customer retrieves them as he or she leaves the premises. We have observed that, as is the case with the rule for waiting on line, attempts are continually made, on the part of the customers, to break them. In

the first utterance of the above example the salesperson requests that the customer abide by the "check you packages" rule. In utterance number 2 we hear the customer's request that an exception be made on the grounds that the package she is carrying was purchased at this establishment. Now she would like to continue shopping in the downstairs area. In Utterance number 3 we again hear the service genre but in an exaggerated, almost parodic, reenvoicement. The salesperson, by exaggerating the politeness aspect with an emphasis on the words "please" and the "thank you" following immediately in the same utterance, succeeds in impressing the customer that he "means business", "will accept no compromises." "the rules of the establishment will prevail." In this case it is successful as we see in the customer's response: "Oh, all right." We observe that, although reluctantly, she does check her package.

Conclusion

In this neighborhood marketplace, we have observed that there is a continual use of the service genre as we had expected to find in this area. What was not as expected, is the extent to which other genre are closely interwoven with the service genre. Besides the more or less expected polite and ritualized greeting and leave-taking, there is much joking, flirting, arguing and also serious personal communication. Through our analysis of the ways in which speech genres are utilized we have identified three types of sociologically interesting phenomena: the use of genre to define and participate "correctly" in

various speech activities: a continuation of the socialization process; the use of genre as a form of social control and maintenance of a status quo.

Lyn Lofland and others have spoken about the fleeting relationships so common to city dwellers as opposed to the more lasting relationships of small rural areas. Jane Jacobs has suggested that city dwellers may prefer cities expressly because they prefer this type of relationship in some cases, to a more lasting and weighty intimacy. My research would show this to be the case and, in fact, people can be seen to utilize speech genres in order to maintain just the amount of distance they require.

A brief word about the constraining rules of Genres. They are why we don't laugh at funerals or during a high mass, nor when someone is telling us about a "serious illness" although its okay to laugh at a healthy senior citizen's complaint of getting older. These rules, however, are also culturally created and culturally maintained and therefore specific to the society we live in; that is, in some groups it is not okay to ridicule a complaint that one is getting older, or there may be societies where it is acceptable to laugh at serious illness, or at funerals, although we are very shocked when it happens in our society (there is an "our society" by the way, even for the ethnographer)

The rules of genre, are definitely learned. They cannot be thought of as in any way inherent or predetermined on an individual level. Their use would appear to have no physical or organic rationale or necessity. In comparison to sequencing rules--because physically we cannot hear what the other is saying if we ourselves are talking, or rational models--our brains may be so structured

that it is necessary to impose a linear or associative order on what we can comprehend, the rules of genre would seem to have a social significance only. Yet they are so pervasive and so tacit, that we do not even think about obeying them. On the other hand, they are also vague, nebulous. (This phenomena has been discussed - it was Wieder who said the less specific the rule the harder it is to break it.) Rules of genre are, in some ways close to Garfinkel's rules. One does not know they exist until they are broken. It is the contribution of Bakhtin, however, that he has given us a tool through which to see just how this is done. (Paradoxically, it is also true that in many cases one cannot break a rule of genre without creating a new genre.)

In his last writing on the subject, Bakhtin lamented the fact that no topology of speech genres exists. Nor do we have, from Bakhtin, more than a broad idea of the difference between primary and secondary genres although a continuum rather than a dichotomy is definitely called for. Although the primary genres appear to be too numerous and specific to situations, areas and socially stratified groups, for any other than a tentative classification, the more formal secondary genre may be adaptable to classification. It seems important, however difficult, to make further attempts of this kind. Some differences in genre involve so subtle a change in one or more features that it is difficult to explain, yet we do know, if only tacitly, that a change has occurred. Again quoting Dore, "This subtlety of genre formation is quite challenging, not only to the child learning language, but to the analyst trying to describe it" (1989, 239)

An additional reason why genres are so important to society and to social research is that, if we believe inner speech or thought is a product of basic dialogic interaction, it becomes evident that if we cannot talk about that which is important to us in certain ways, we cannot think about it in those ways either. That, of course reflects the thinking of Whorf-Sapir and is not a new idea. What Bakhtin with his concept of speech genres adds is a way to see the continuation of that process throughout one's life as well as during a child's various developmental stages. We perceive that as people develop into adults they are able to talk and think in more and more complex ways so that one's center of generic restriction is constantly shifting. Also, as we can readily observe, the "proper" way to speak, for example, about death, sex, or taxes, is also subject to change with time and place. If we are convinced, as some of us are, that these differences are generic - we see that the study of the speech genre is as important to the study of spoken conversation as the study of the literary genre is to the study of the written word.

So far we have dealt with more or less "straight" genre shifts and interweavings and we see the versatility of their use. As we will see in chapter five, when genre juxtaposition is combined with other speech phenomena even more varied and interesting results are achieved.

CHAPTER FOUR

DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE

When sociologists ask how people use discourse to do ordinary social things we intuit that they use prescribed linguistic devices but the categories used in sociolinguistics and other types of discourse analysis fail to include a wide variety of observable speech phenomena which Bakhtin has called double-voiced discourse. In chapter three we discussed the Bakhtinian notion of speech genres and gave examples of the ways in which the internalized knowledge of speech genres becomes a part of interaction in everyday conversation. Socially created speech genres represent only one way in which other people's words enter into our discourse.

During our field investigation for this project, we have observed that, as Bakhtin has implied, the words of others also enter into everyday conversation via: 1) The direct quote; 2) The indirect quote or paraphrase 3) Quasi-direct or Double-Voiced Discourse (Bakhtin 1981). We will illustrate these with examples taken from our taped conversations and field notes.

The direct quote was used, although infrequently, in the conversations collected for this project. We can only recognize the direct quote in spoken

conversation, of course, when the other's words are announced as such as in the following examples.

- (1) SP1: I only asked for one hour and he said 'NO you can't go. I need you here.'
- (2) SP2: That's pretty mean.
- (3) SP1: Yeah, and it's not even true.
- (4) SP2: Yeah, we're not busy.
- (5) SP1: So, he said 'NO.' Wait till he wants a favor from me. He should have been nicer.

Bakhtin has said that in a direct quote, the words of the other are highly objectified. They become things, objects of discussion. As we see in the above example, the words of another are not only reported, but they are discussed and evaluated. In this case they are "not even true."

- (1) C1: 'You are a fool.' Those were her exact words. Believe me, you should have heard .. The way she came out with it.
- (2) C2: It's just the way she expressed herself. Don't take it to heart.
- (3) C1: No, she meant it to hurt me.

In the above another persons "exact" words are quoted precisely in order that they can be evaluated. For Bakhtin, the original meaning of the words of another is not of primary importance but rather the way they are received, responded to and utilized by the hearer, what he or she makes of them is fundamental to his type of analysis.

The paraphrase is used far more frequently than the direct quote in everyday conversation and, according to my collected conversations, it occurs most frequently in two separate but related situations.

1. The words of an authority figure are paraphrased

(1) CM: Everybody should do what they want. Whatever they want they should do.

(2) CF: But .. my sister's not well

(3) CM: She knows how she feels

(4) CF: The doctor told her .. well.. to take it easy .. that the blood pressure .. the blood pressure goes up. He said to take it easy, not to go anywhere. Otherwise I wouldn't say anything ... except I hear everything .. that .. she's going to do everything. ... I get scared.

Here the Doctor's words are reported as explanation, what ethnomethodologists might call "accounting" In this case they are used to explain the concern of the woman about her sister's activity, as an answer to the claim of her partner in dialog that "everybody should do what they want."

In the paraphrase the words of the other are far less objectified than in the direct quote. They are nevertheless evaluated, though often indirectly.

2. The anonymous "They" is called upon - "They" say. " They" said

(1) C1: [They] said that they were traitors. They were guilty.

(2) C2: Maybe they were. I know they had a trial.

(3) C1: I know that they were tried. But now [they] say they were innocent.

(4) C3: Well, now it's too late.

The above example is excerpted from a conversation among three participants who are talking about the Rosenberg trial (a notorious trial that took place in the 1950's in the United States: the Rosenbergs, a man and wife, were tried for treason, found guilty and put to death in the gas chamber). It is an interesting exchange in several ways. It demonstrates the use of the "anonymous they" [in brackets] which is utilized to refer to the voice of society or of an unknown social authority. What is interesting is that the use of the "anonymous they" is recognized by all the participants in the discussion and by the observer. Given the preponderance of "theys" in this conversation it would at first appear strange that the "anonymous they" is so obvious. On the other hand, it is not at all difficult when we examine the utterances from our position as participant in the same society. In the first instance, calling on our social memory, we know that the Rosenbergs did not say that they were guilty and traitors. The anonymous they in this case refers to the authorities at that time, the accusers, the judge, the voice of society, etc. The Rosenbergs did say they were innocent at one time, but "now" of course they cannot say it. So we recognize the second "they" in the third utterance as anonymous, as referring to the same type of authority, or social expert who, it is implied, have changed their minds or may have been mistaken. We also see in utterance number four, an indirect negative evaluation of that voice. "Well now its too late." As well as an example of paraphrasing this excerpt contains instances of other phenomena and will be further analyzed later in this chapter.

Categories of Double-Voiced Discourse

Double Voiced Discourse was found in the area of study to be used most frequently to transmit the words of others. To more fully explicate the various forms of double-voiced discourse, it is important to point out that Bakhtinian analysis is based on the distinction between two basic types of discourse:

1. **Monologic Discourse**: Directed exclusively toward its referential object and expressing one semantic purpose.
2. **Dialogic Discourse**: Directed toward its referential object and at the same time oriented toward the discourse of another. Double-directed and double-voiced, it expresses two semantic purposes (Bakhtin 1981, 324)

Double-voiced discourse, according to Bakhtin (1984, 185), "Inevitably arises out of dialogic interaction," but at the time he wrote it was not recognized as an object of study by linguistics. Since that time, although the importance of social and situational influences on language use has been acknowledged, even emphasized, by many conversation analysts and social semioticians, double-voiced discourse remains largely an unexamined area. The remainder of this chapter will concern itself with double-voiced discourse.

The best definition of this speech phenomena is, needless to say,

Bakhtin's :

In such discourse there are two voices, two meanings and two expressions. And all the while these two voices are dialogically interrelated, they— as it were—know about each other (just as two exchanges in a dialogue know of each other and are structured in this mutual knowledge of each other); it is as if they actually hold a conversation with each other. Double-voiced discourse is always internally dialogized...a potential dialogue is embedded in them, one as yet unfolded, a concentrated dialogue of two voices, two world views, two languages. (Bakhtin 1981, 324)

By internally dialogized, Bakhtin means that the dialogue takes place within one single utterance. It is important to remember when analyzing and presenting conversations of participants in face-to-face interaction, that the double-voicedness, the two voices we refer to in our analysis, do not represent two visible speakers. Although they may argue, fight one another, the conflict is contained within one single utterance, it should not be understood as an argument between two observable speakers.

According to Bakhtin's typology, which he lays out in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, dialogic discourse includes speech varieties such as stylization, stylized skaz, the hidden (internal) polemic, and polemical forms such as parody and irony, discourse with a sideward glance, hidden dialogue (or dialogicality) among others. Although some of these forms, such as parody, have been treated by others, and on occasion referred to by Bakhtin, as simply a different form of genre, that is too general a description to adequately explain the proliferation of their use in everyday conversation as found in this study.

(stylization and skaz generally apply to narrative forms rather than dialogue and will not be considered as separate categories in this study). Simple reenvoicement, however, is close to stylization of the written text in that it differs from mere imitation as Bakhtin has explained in intentionality (Bakhtin 1986).

Simple Reenvoicement

In many instances in my notes and as evidenced on tape, the words of a partner in a dialogue are repeated but with a difference. This is one form of what Bakhtin calls "reenvoicement." Such utterances which occur in face-to-face conversations can be considered double-voiced because one hears in a single utterance the first voice, the voice of the person who made the original statement and at the same time the second, (or reenvoicing) voice, which restates that word but always with a difference, as in the following exchange between Waiter (W) and Customer (C):

(1) W: Something to drink?

(2) C: Ummm, Yes, Tea.

(3) W: Tea?

In a traditional conversation analysis, the second "Tea" in the above example, utterance (3) by the waiter, would have little importance, except perhaps because of its position as a response to the first "tea", uttered by the customer. It is true that, as an observer, or listener, we could not, in fact, understand or see any reason for the second "Tea" had we not heard the first.

However, it is more than a simple response and would in fact, as such, hardly seem necessary. Bakhtin has shown that repeating someone else's words as a question inevitably changes them in meaning, as well as in structure and intonation. We know the second "Tea" (utterance (3) above) is a question because of the rising inflection of the voice at the end of the word. But it is not a question in the general sense. That is, at the same time that it repeats the customer's words it also asks for reaffirmation of them. We might substitute our own "real" question, such as: "I did hear you say "tea" didn't I?" or to take it to an extreme. "Now when I bring you the tea you won't be able to say I made a mistake, will you?." The waiter has, in fact, "locked" the customer into the tea.

Of course, we will not claim, because we do not know, if that was the intention of the speaker, the reason for the reenvoicement. We do know from experience that there is really nothing "strange" about this repetition of the customer's order. It is simply "done" in our society. We, in fact, can recognize that particular repetition of the customer's order as another aspect of the selling genre from chapter three. When looked at dialogically, however, utterances of this type always hold out the potential of a hidden polemic. On the one level they are oriented toward the object under discussion (the tea in this case) and on another level they are oriented toward the words of another speaker, which they potentially question or ask to be affirmed. The important point is that reenvoicement is not mere repetition just as stylization is not mere imitation. On the other hand, it cannot be considered the same as the hidden polemic because the other's words are passive. They influence the speaker's words from within;

they are present and acknowledged within his or her utterance. They are also uni-directional; they carry the other's words along in the same direction rather than forcing them to serve a different semantic purpose. It also follows that out of this common knowledge of how such a question sounds and is accepted in our society, we also know when it does not sound right. When it becomes sarcasm, parody, etc.

Our next task will be to explicate Bakhtin's typology with an eye toward modifying it in order to better apply it to the spoken word on the level of face-to-face interaction. As he has said about his categories: they are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive but rather they represent a continuum of speech acts of a certain type. As explained by Bakhtin types of double-voicedness can be differentiated one from the other by varying degrees of objectivity, distance (from the speaker) and direction, or dialogic angle (Bakhtin 1984). The Chart in Appendix B gives my understanding of above parameters as they apply to the various types of dialogic discourse contained in these chapters. For the purpose of better describing these phenomena, they can be said to fall into two basic categories: Polemical Discourse which argues with the words of the other, as a response to those words, and the hidden dialogues which express argument or ambiguity regarding one's own words.

Polemical Discourses

The Hidden Polemic

In an overt or open polemic, discourse is directed toward the words of another which it refutes; that is, the other's words are the obvious object of reference as in the direct or indirect quote. Such discourse is typically monologic. In the hidden polemic, the words of another are similarly refuted but reference to them is not acknowledged. The hidden polemic is an element of dialogic speech, openly directed at an ordinary referential object, it is at the same time oriented toward the discourse of another. It has a second, unacknowledged purpose, that of refuting or "striking a blow at" the other's discourse about the same object or on the same theme. It is as though the two voices clash within the object itself. In this form, the other's words actively determine the speaker's discourse, according to Bakhtin, "No less than the very topic being discussed." (1984, 195) Because of the additional orientation and purpose, structural changes and changes in intonation occur in the speaker's utterance which can be used as markers to identify this category, as in the following example:

- (1) C: Where's my change? I gave you three dollars.
 - (2) SP: You give me two dollars and change.
 - (3) C: No, No.
 - (4) SP: You give me two dollars and nine cents.
 - (5) C: I gave you three dollars. YOU CROOK. You know what that means.
- ((pause))

(6) Sure, you cheat me because I look like an old man. But I'm not stupid.

(7) SP: Then where is the other dollar? ((slowly and deliberately))

(8) C: You put it in your pocket."

Utterance (5) in this exchange contains a hidden polemic. It is double directed. "I gave you three dollars," oriented toward the object, the three dollars, the emphasis on "gave" marks it as also oriented toward the words of the sales person, subtly (or not so subtly) alluding to her use of give instead of gave. By emphasizing the "gave" he is calling attention to her misuse of "give"—to the foreignness of the other. This allusion is carried further in the phrase You know what that means,. which is delivered with a falling inflection, that is, it is not a question. The falling tone would indicate that the utterance is oriented toward the words of the other, as well as toward their object. And that in fact, the primary orientation is toward the words of the other, as if to say, your English may not be good but I'm sure you know the meaning of crook. The pause after this utterance allows for a response, but none is forthcoming on the part of the salesperson. Further evidence of a hidden polemic can be seen in the rather awkward structure of utterance number 6, which begins with "sure," a word which has no place in that utterance. We can read it as a continuation of the polemic in utterance (5). That is, sure, you know what crook means, and continues you cheat me because I look like an old man. Further confirmation lies in the sales person's response. Her words in utterance (7) are delivered in an uncharacteristic (that is, compared to her other utterances in this exchange)

clearness and deliberateness, as though to show that she can indeed speak clear and precise English. Whereas it too is oriented toward its object (the disputed amount of money) it is also double-directed, it simultaneously argues with the implication that she cannot speak proper English.

The hidden polemic is analyzed by Bakhtin as a literary device but he tells us the polemical devices of parody and irony are most commonly used in everyday conversation.

Parody

In Bakhtin's usage, parodic discourse refers to the transmission of someone else's words with a marked change in accent. In spoken conversation, as I am applying the concept, parody occurs when the speaker consciously and intentionally repeats the words of his or her partner in face-to-face interaction but with a different intonation and intent. We recognize parody in everyday conversation by this marked shift in accent and intonation as well as a difference in intent as a mocking or ridiculing accent is added and the words of another are openly argued with, made the object of ridicule or sarcasm. In contrast to simple revoicing, in parody the speaker's voice clashes with the voice of the other, forcing it to serve an opposing purpose. The parodic utterance is double-voiced since in it we hear the original utterance with its own semantic purpose and at the same time we hear the voice which reaccentuates that utterance and moves it in another direction. Vari-directionality is peculiar to parody and distinguishes it from other categories. In addition, the other's words are highly objectified

As we saw above, in the exchange between waiter and customer regarding the order of tea, the transmission of someone else's statement in the form of a question already leads to a clash of two intentions within a single utterance, for in so doing we not only ask a question but render someone else's statement problematic. In parody, the problematic aspect is exaggerated and used against our partner in dialogue.

(1) W: I wasn't here yesterday. I'm off on Sunday.

(2) C: Sunday. You're off on Sunday. Yesterday was Monday.

(laughter)

(3) W: Oh, no .. not .. I meant the day before.

In this example, the waiter has made a mistake and mixed up the days. The customer repeats the waiter's words but with a difference, emphasizing the incorrect words. This does not seem to be an invitation to self-correct, as conversational analysts would claim is the tendency, but is more of a jibe at the waiter's expense. His words are evaluated, or we might say devaluated, reaccentuated and thrown back at him. In fact, my observations, tapes and field notes all seem to indicate that self-correction is very often pointedly disallowed—as people correct each other and in many cases, although it is usually done jokingly and good-naturedly, they make the other person's words into an object of ridicule through the use of parody.

SP = salesperson, YW= young woman

- (1) SP: Hey, Rosie, come here. Rosie, hurry up"
- (2) YW: What?
- (3) SP: Come here, Baby, I got somethin to tell ya ((takes YW's arm, tries to pull her closer to him, but she resists, pulls away))
- (4) Hey .. why
- (5) YW: I'm late. I gotta go to work.
- (6) SP: Aaah...I gotta go to woork." ((Again he tries to take her arm but she resists))
- (7) YW: No, I don't have time.
- (8) SP: I got a phone call .. Robin called me.
- (9) YW: Robin called? She called yoou. You probably called her."
- (10)SP: Wha....we have a date
- (11)YW: A date? You called her

The first use of parody in this exchange, utterance (6), occurs in the repetition by the salesperson of the young woman's words "I gotta go to work," but rather than a simple revoicement, the word "work" is given parodic emphasis. The distortion is first signaled by the elongated aa sound in aah, a sound we associate with pity, such as in "aah, that's a shame," but in this case the distortion mocks that sentiment. The elongated vowel sound and parodic emphasis on the word "work" carries the young woman's words in another direction. Instead of the serious direction she had intended, her words now

sound petty, like an excuse. They have been forced to act against themselves. Similarly the salesperson's words, utterance (8) are repeated by the young woman, utterances (9) and (11), "Robin called" "A date?" but they are also given parodic emphasis. Rather than the positive implication originally carried (perhaps to show himself as important--a girl has called him) the man's words are reaccentuated and turned against themselves. They now appear pretentious, bragging, their truthfulness is put in doubt.

This is an example of what we can assume involves an interpersonal relationship between two young people. We do not wish to guess at other elements involved in this relationship nor to meanings specific to these two individuals but analyze their exchange in terms of what we observe only and through the use of Bakhtinian categories. It is an important instance because it shows the use of parody as a way of evaluating the others words and again reaccentuating them and using them against the other speaker. That is, we see that the use of parody is not confined to the literary work or to the political speech or to any other rhetorical form. But its effect is much the same; that is, no matter what the intent of the speaker, to the observer it has much the same effect: that of destroying the credibility of the other.

Irony

Bakhtin tells us that the ironic form of utterance, which he maintains is analogous with parody, is extremely widespread in the ordinary speech of everyday life. In his work the two terms (parody and irony) are sometimes used to describe the same phenomenon but in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, where these categories are the most delineated, irony is a separate form of parody.

As I am applying the concept, irony may be differentiated from parody in that, although it is also ridiculing and vari-directional, the words are less distanced from the speaker and less objectified. We do not hear the words of a partner in dialogue repeated but nevertheless we are aware of the conflicting voices in the utterance itself.

- (1) C1: Give me the generic label first. I'm waiting a long time. (turns to customer standing behind her in the line) The service here is terrific.
- (2) C2: They never have the things that you want.

Here the irony is directed toward an abstract element "the service." The double-voicedness occurs in the third sentence of utterance (1). The emphasis on the word "terrific" and the slight elongation of the "r" sound gives it an ironic intonation. In this utterance, we hear the voice stating that the service is terrific and we also hear the voice which contradicts its own proposition in the distorted r sound and emphatic stress. As observers/listeners, we can also judge, from the surrounding conversation, that the service is not good.

Customer No. 2 also understands that "the service is terrific" is meant ironically because she does not contradict it but instead she adds her own reason why the service is not terrific. "They never have the things that you want."

Much irony used by the people in the area I have investigated is self-directed.

(1) C1 Pneumonia comes from phlegm, phlegm comes .. from germs?.

((with a shrug))

(2) C2 Too much smoking. Phlegm comes from smoking. ((slight emphasis and falling pitch on last word))

(3) C1 Okaaay, Mo^ther. She thinks I'm a child. Some child. ((ha, ha))

((General Laughter))

Here the irony in utterance (3) responds to the words of C2 which are said in an almost even tone but with only a slight emphasis and change in pitch on the word "smoking." The irony is signaled first by the elongated vowel sound of the first word in Utterance 3 "okaay" and the emphatic stress on "mother," as well as the distortion of the word itself seen in the rising, falling pitch, then the emphasis on the word child and the self-deprecating laughter, which I have indicated as ((ha ha)) followed by the general laughter of the other participants. We know from past conversations that C1 is a smoker and C2 has complained about it before. Since both women are senior citizens of about the same age, the irony shown in the emphasis on some child, appears to be self-directed .

There are, however, other interesting elements contained in the above exchange—it contains another form of socialization through the juxtaposition of

genres. We should explain here that according to Bakhtin, all utterances are genred and the influence of genre is always a factor, but in itself genre is not always sufficient to explain the enormous variety of utterances we hear. In this chapter we have concentrated on double-voiced discourse and will ignore the effects of genre in our analysis. In chapter five we will show how these work together.

So far we have looked at dialogic forms in which the words of another are used by a speaker, forced to serve a new purpose or given a new often opposing meaning through the use of parody or irony. According to Bakhtin, however, double-voiced discourse also occurs when the speaker anticipates another's words, anticipates the response of the other and structures his or her utterance with that anticipated response in mind.

Word with a Sideward Glance

Whereas the parodic word evaluates the words of the other, in the word with a sideward glance the speaker is anticipating the other's evaluation of his or her own words. The word with a sideward glance is internally polemic, as opposed to the hidden polemic; that is, the argument is an inner one but directly informed by the speakers expectation or awareness of the evaluating word of the other. This awareness results in self-denigrating speech which repudiates itself in advance, apologetic, hesitating speech, what Bakhtin calls "speech with a thousand reservations, concessions, loopholes and the like," with words that

doubt themselves, or by overblown repetitious and self-contradicting speech.

This category includes words that "make digs at others" and all "barbed" words, speech which offends before it has to defend. In this type of dialogic discourse, the words of the other are neither heard nor acknowledged by the speaker, but they are present in that they can be seen to influence the speaker's discourse, changing its tone and meaning (structurally, syntactically and semantically), according to Bakhtin.

In analyzing the work of Dostoevsky, Bakhtin utilizes "*Notes from Underground*" to show what is probably the epitome of the word with a sideward glance. We have observed that it also occurs in everyday conversation. "I know you won't believe me....," which might be said before relating an unusual occurrence, even though no one has verbalized disbelief, is an example of the word with a sideward glance. Another's disbelieving response is anticipated by the speaker and that anticipation dictates the way in which the speaker begins his utterance; it dictates its structure as well as its content. During face-to-face interaction, the word with a sideward glance is often accompanied by a temporary switch to a narrative structure.

- (1) C1: You'll never see or hear from Idee again. In a hundred years, you'll never see Idee again .. Your own sister .. Your sister Idee
- (2) C2: I can call her.
- (3) C1: Don't do it. She'll hang up on you. Oh, maybe she'll answer the phone, but she won't listen to you.

(4) C2: I want to know what I did, that 's all.

(5) C1: You didn't do anything. But they don't want to know that. You'll disagree with me. I know .. You're only her sister, Ha! only her sister .. (that's) nothing to them

In Utterance (1) we see an example of the overblown, exaggerated word typical of discourse with a sideward glance: the stress on "a hundred years," the repetition of "sister" Your own sister, your sister Idee. As Bakhtin has said, the word with a sideward glance insists before it can be challenged, offends before it can be offended. In this case, the partner in dialogue does challenge utterance (1) by offering a simple solution: "I'll call her." The first speaker, however, negates this solution. "Don't do it. She'll hang up on you" In utterance (5) the speaker by his own words shows us that he anticipates disagreement. "You won't agree with me." The emphasis on the word "sister" and its repetition, "only her sister" again in the same utterance make it seem to us as though he must stress the importance of that relationship, a relationship which for whatever reason he has made us believe is very important to him but is "nothing" to them. In the word with a sideward glance, the distortion which signals the double-voicedness is carried to a great extent by the words themselves, there is much repetition of the same word and also exaggeration. The structure of the, utterance, however, must change to accommodate this, often resulting in longer sentences, and pauses within sentences.

(1) W: Do you want to sit next to me?

(2) M: I'd rather look at you. (sits opposite her)

(3) W: What did she say?

(4) M: Jennifer read my crystal balls .. Oh .. ((laughing)) .. what made me say that?.. I wonder why I said that.

The sideward glance in the above example occurs in utterance number (4). This phenomena, as Bakhtin has said, always involves an anticipation of a response, of the evaluative word of the other. In this case, the speaker has said "balls" instead of ball, perhaps by a simple slip of the tongue, but apparently he believes this slang reference to male genitalia might be offensive. We don't know the intent of the speaker, of course, and may not have even noticed except that he himself has drawn our attention to it which is in itself significant. Curiously, he does not directly repudiate his words, which he could easily do with a simple apology or by claiming that they were said in error. Instead he suggests that something "made him say it." Typical of the sideward glance, his words appear to "doubt themselves." In this example of double-voiced discourse we hear in a single utterance, the voice which makes the "questionable" statement and also the voice that repudiates its own statement. Yet we see that the repudiation is not a definite one; that is the repudiation itself is tentative, "I wonder why I said that." As in the previous example, we note an overblown, repetition, in the utterance, "what made me say that?" "I wonder why I said that," and again the structure of the sentence is changed. In this case it is broken in the middle with hesitation and laughter on the part of the speaker (not general laughter since his partner in dialogue does not join in).

The word with a sideward glance always contains a loophole, what Bakhtin refers to as "the retention for oneself of the possibility of altering the final meaning of one's words." It leaves "a way out" for the speaker, who may deny the meaning or place blame elsewhere for it, and often appears during activities such as flirting and negotiating. It is as though the word is put out tentatively ready to be withdrawn, taken back, repudiated. A certain amount of ambiguity is typical of the word with a sideward glance. The ambiguity, however, does not reflect an inner state but in this case seems to be a part of the testing out, the anticipatory quality of the word.

The Hidden Dialogues

The following categories would allow us to take into account those voices of authority whose words all speakers, beginning in infancy, internalize and which enable them to actively participate in their society. As was indicated in Chapter 1, for Bakhtin the processes of socialization and internalization continue throughout the life of the individual rather than either ending in childhood or becoming so diminished that their role in the life of the adult can be ignored. It is also important that in Bakhtin's conceptualization some words are never fully internalized although they may be part of an individual's everyday vocabulary.

These voices influence participants in everyday conversation and determine their behavior in much the same way that the author's overall plan uses the voices and fictionalized social positions of the characters in a novel. In what Bakhtin calls the polyphonic novel, the character's voices often appear as opposed to, or locked in a struggle with this authorial plan. A similar struggle is described in *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Voloshinov) as the individual struggles with the authoritative voice he or she attempts to internalize and again in Bakhtin's *Dialogic Imagination* essay, "Discourse in the Novel." The following phenomena can help us to understand how this struggle is manifest in the everyday lives of ordinary people.

Hidden Dialogization

The speech type which we will call hidden dialogization is described by Bakhtin as being like a dialogue between two persons in which "the statements of the second speaker are omitted but in such a way that the general sense is not at all violated." In this phenomenon, one person may be speaking but it is as if we hear a dialogue, we sense that there is a conversation with an unseen person. Although neither that person nor their words are present "....deep traces are left by them" and these have a "determining influence on all the present and visible words of the speaker or speakers." In a study of face-to-face interaction, this category can explain those instances when while observing a dialogue between two people, we sense that at least one of them is influenced by a third voice to

the extent that their utterance becomes double-voiced and double-directed--"each uttered word responds and reacts to the invisible speaker--points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another" (Bakhtin, 1984).

We see examples of this phenomenon all around us in all those answers to unasked questions. We might wonder, who is this invisible questioner? He or she is perhaps an authority figure who resides only in the conscience of the speaker.

(1):C1 So I need to borrow a blue bag.

(2) C2 I got one up in the closet.

(3) I'm cleaning out my closet for when they come on Friday.

((pause))

(4) I'M CLEANING IT OUT

In this instance the last three utterances are by the same speaker. Utterance number two, we can only assume is in response to speaker number one's need to borrow a blue bag. Utterance number three does not immediately seem to be a part of an adjacency pair, but it might be a response to an earlier remark made by speaker number one that she is going away on Saturday. Utterance number four, on the other hand cannot be so easily explained. The increase in voice volume plus the emphasis on the word cleaning, renders it significant, but we don't know from our observation to whom it is really addressed. There are other people present, but they have not challenged the speaker's first utterance. They have not said, "We don't believe you will clean it out." But if we, like Bakhtin, argue

that every utterance is a response to someone else's utterance then we must assume "I'm cleaning it out" is also a response. A reasonable explanation would be that the response is to an inner voice and that the utterance is therefore double-voiced. From that premise we can easily posit an authoritative voice saying, "You had better clean out that closet.." These two voices, that of an unnamed authority and of our speaker are contained in the response, "I'M CLEANING IT OUT" and have altered the style of the utterance, delivered with a marked change in volume and emphasis, it leaps out at us, as though signaling its difference. This is an example of what Bakhtin would refer to as a hidden dialogue.

- (1) C1: I told you less beans. You put more in.
- (2) W: I didn't put them in, he did. ((indicating counterwoman with a nod of her head))
- (3) C1: I told you less beans.
- (4) W: Removes bowl and takes it to counter
- (5) C1: I told her not too many beans in the bean soup. She didn't tell him.
((smiling and directing her statement to woman in the booth next to hers))
- (6) C2: Nods, shrugs.
((pause))
- (7) C1: I like beans, but not that many. ((in a soft voice))

The hidden dialogization which we would like to analyze takes place in the last utterance (7) which seems to be an explanation of why the speaker has ordered bean soup if she doesn't want beans. "I like beans, but not that many." In context we know that no visible person has challenged her regarding that inconsistency yet for some reason she must explain it....account for it. This customer's first "accounting" in utterance number 5 is directed to another customer and is rather straight-forward, explaining that she did tell the waitress less beans, even though she has not been asked for this explanation. Utterance (7), however, is a different matter. We note, first of all, the structure of the sentence itself. She does not say, "I don't like that many beans," but first must explain that she does like beans, therefore she has not done something foolish by ordering bean soup. In the secondary clause "but not that many" she excuses her complaint to the waitress. Secondly, there is no one there to whom the words could be reasonably directed. The other customer has turned back to her own food and the waitress has not yet returned. Furthermore, the speaker's glance is downward, not looking in the direction of any other person and her voice is soft not projected outward as though to another. To see this utterance as an example of a hidden dialogization would seem to be an appropriate explanation of this behavior. This allows the observer to posit another challenging voice. We can imagine this as the voice of a criticizing authority figure which says, "If you don't like beans, why did you order bean soup?"

Inner Dialogue

In the previous category, hidden dialogization, the response is to the word of an authority figure which has remained over and above the speaker, a voice which he or she has never fully internalized. By contrast, the inner dialogue can be seen to occur when another's words are in the process of becoming internalized but are not fully accepted, not yet internally persuasive. What the observer hears in this phenomenon is the struggle between internally persuasive discourse and authoritative discourse. This struggle is going on in people's heads, or as Bakhtin would put it, "the consciousness of the individual" but it is often reflected in their verbal behavior. In this category, which I will refer to as Inner Dialogue, what we hear is not a reproduction of that struggle, but rather a manifestation of it. This discourse is also marked by an observable "testing out" quality, a hesitancy, but the words are not "put out" in anticipation of the response of another, as in the word with a sideward glance. Rather it is as though the speaker is testing them out for his or her own evaluation, is aware, but only tacitly, of the internally persuasive and authoritative voices with which he or she struggles.

Ordinarily the hearer recognizes this hesitancy, this "thinking out loud" quality, perhaps as a lack of certainty or confidence on the part of the speaker. In this speech type, there is a marked decrease in objectification which makes it very different from the word with a sideward glance or even hidden dialogization. The speaker is not as distanced from his or her own words. They do not leap out. Whereas there is a struggle here, agitation seen in the uncertainty—the

halting speech pattern accompanying this phenomena, it is neither aggressive nor overblown. The conflict remains primarily an inner one. We observe only its effect on the speaker's speech..

SP=Salesperson, B = Boss

- (1) SP: He's a very sweet guy.
- (2) B: You have our appro^val. (with a glance he includes another man, also a salesperson)
- (3) SP: No .. I mean, he made that extra trip just to bring me a soda
((pause))
- (4) I mean .. he's well .. so nice .. real sweet."
- (5) B: Well, he brought you a rose for Valentine's Day.
- (6) ((silence))
- (7) As I said, you have our approval

This is an example of an inner dialogue making itself visible to the observer through the speech patten of the speaker. The young lady's first utterance is said in a straightforward, unhesitating manner. The boss's reply "You have our approval." is "banter" on his part, it is said in a lighthearted manner, evident by the raised, lowered pitch on the word approval, and of course since their relationship as far as we know is that of boss and worker, she does not need his approval. But it is banter which is at the same time social evaluation. It is given a social tenor when he says "our" rather than my approval. He is telling her that society approves of this nice young man. By including the other salesman, closer in age to the boss than to the young woman, the sense of

an authoritative social voice is enhanced. The second utterance by the young lady is hesitant, uncertain as though she is deliberating society's approval; fitting it in with what she already knows. The hesitancy and breaks between phrases gives utterance number three a "thinking out loud" quality which we would argue is reflective of the inner struggle between the authoritative and the inwardly persuasive discourse. (see Chapter One for a description of those voices) The boss' response, utterance (5), is no longer "bantering" but has taken on a more serious tone. (The rise/fall pitch is dropped.) It is met with silence. In his last utterance (7), the boss responds to that silence with a revoicement of society's (again the use of "our") approval.

These last two categories do not appear in Bakhtin's typology, as delineated as I am using them, since for him internal dialogization is inherent in every example of vari-directionality. Rather than a hierarchy, Bakhtin presents these types as a continuum—from unvoicedness to extremes of double-voicedness, such as carnivalization, each category differing in degree of objectivity (or closeness to the speaker) and dialogic angle.

We might add before we continue that the use the utterance, as Bakhtin has described it (see Chapter Two), as a unit of analysis, is helpful in showing double-voiced discourse. His criteria for the end of one utterance, "when it can be responded to," allows us to break a line of dialogue up into utterances and show them as separate entities, with a definable rather than an arbitrary beginning and end, as we have done, for example, with the above dialogue. The first two utterances, that of the young woman and of the boss are typical or

self-explanatory, in a dialogue. Utterance(3) we see as separated from utterance (4) by a pause, which in actual length of time is longer than the hesitation between words in utterance (3). This allows us to separate them and in doing so determine that utterance number three contains a complete proposition followed by a pause which would allow it to be responded to. In this instance it is not observably responded to but might well be part of an internal dialogue carried on in the consciousness of the speaker, which allows us in our reconstruction of this instance, to consider utterance (4) as also part of that dialogue. Contrast this with the utterances (5) and (7) on the part of the boss. Their straightforward delivery, with no internal hesitations signal that they are not part of an internal dialogue but the pause is an invitation to an external response, which is given in the form of silence on the part of the young woman which may well signal more uncertainty on her part. To this the boss responds by reinforcing the fact of society's approval.

In this study we are utilizing Bakhtin's categories in order to explain what we have observed and what our taped conversations indicate. Our analysis of the instances are, as I have said, speculative. As we have said of speech genres, it is important to remember that double-voicedness does not describe a situation nor does it refer to an inner state, although as in the last two categories an inner state may be seen as refracted through the double-voiced word. In our analysis we might speculate that the behavior we observe is due to or a reflection of an inner state--an inner state which we can say has "spilled over" into and has affected everyday speech patterns. We arrive at this explanation, no other

adequate explanation having been offered for this type of speech phenomena.

The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the more overt types of double-voicedness, seen in the hidden polemic.

At the beginning of this study we had asked the question: is double-voiced discourse, like speech genres, activity-specific. During the course of our collecting and organizing conversations, in our daily reconstructions of conversations from field notes: collected tapes and written observations, it was decided to group these according to activity type, or what the analyst perceived to be "going on there", and then look within those groupings for use of double-voiced discourse, rather than begin with discourse categories and impose them on the activity. Our groups of conversation types were organized around the following activities: shopping (giving and requesting service) evaluating (the words of others), negotiating (a shared background knowledge, as opposed to marketplace type of negotiation), joking (teasing, flirting), socializing (socialization), accounting (internal and external), resisting (arguing, disagreeing, insulting, name-calling)

It was our finding that the categories of double-voiced discourse proved to be far from activity-specific; that is, although some did appear more in the context of a disagreement or controversy, i.e. parody and irony are often used to evaluate the words of the other or a social system in general. It became increasingly difficult to think in terms of situation or activity due to their connotation of permanence. Juxtaposition of genre for example was often so rapid, and the use of double-voicedness so spontaneous that they tend rather to

constitute "instances" within some larger context. An instance of parodic evaluation, for example, might occur during an attempt at negotiating a shared background knowledge. In general, however, the use of double-voiced discourse did prove to have an observable effect on the speaker, or the partner in dialogue, or to redirect, or change in some way the direction of the activity or conversation, as we will try to show.

Since this is not a study of the marketplace per se, but rather of the social aspects of a marketplace area, we have concentrated on those instances which occur in the context of discourse involved in activities over and above the more obvious shopping genre. Those extracurricular activities, interesting already because of their unexpected abundance, seem to be of two distinct types. (That statement should not be taken as implying a dualism of any kind since there is much overlapping and ambiguity.) There are on the one hand, what appear to be attempts to build toward an order, or consensus, such as negotiating, flirting, accounting, etc. and on the other hand, what appear to be attempts to negate or aggressively disrupt that order. These instances can be seen as reflecting the two forces (described in Chapter Two) which Bakhtin has said are constantly at work in all advanced societies: The centripetal force which tends to hold society together and the centrifugal force which tends to rend it apart.

More Examples in Everyday Discourse

We will begin this part of our analysis with examples of the more constructive voices, those which build towards consensus. The following example was used in Chapter three but different features were emphasized.

The tableau involved a booth of three women conversing in English who enter a dialogue with a Russian woman and a teenager who are seated in the booth in front of them.

C1 = Customer 1, at table of three.

C2 = Customer 2, at table of three.

C3 = Customer 3, at table of three.

TA = Teenager.

- (1) C1: Where do you live? ((to teenager))
- (2) Where do you live? ((more loudly))
- (3) TA: Trump Village. (in a low voice)
- (4) C1: What?
- (5) TA: I live in Trump Village ((louder))
- (6) C1: Why are you talking Russian to her?
- (7) TA: ((shrugs))
- (8) C1: How long are you in this country?
- (9) TA: I was born here
- (10) C1: Oh, ah .. born here.
- (11) C2: Oh .. but you talk Russian good

(12)C3: Hey .. I think I know you. You're .. mmm the daughter of....

(13)TA: ((Silence - does not reply but looks at her companion, the Russian woman, who takes some photographs out of her bag, gets up and shows them to the women in the next booth.))

(14)C3: She looks just like my girlfriend, Rosie. ((pointing to a photograph))

(15)C2: You're mother's very pretty. ((to teenager))

There is additional general conversation—a lot of nodding and smiling—then the Russian woman returns to her booth. She and teenager get up to leave.

(16)C1: You're a very pretty girl, you know that. Don't take that brace off your teeth until you're ready. My nephew took it off. He got so mad after awhile.

After they have left.

(17)C1: No matter where I go I always talk to people. I find that people like hat are very interesting. They don't know what this country is like because we had it pretty bad here too.

(18)C2: Everybody

(19)C3: Yeah.

If we looked at this example of older women questioning a teenager from a functional viewpoint we might merely conclude that they were being nosy. They are using various strategies to pump her for information about herself and her family. But that type of analysis would, I am afraid, leave too many unanswered questions. It would not account for much which has gone on, for much more is going on here when looked at dialogically. Whereas the opening utterance by

speaker No. 1 seems quite direct and monologic, perhaps an attempt to include the teenager, or as we determined in chapter three, as an act of socialization, in the negotiation of a shared background initiated by the Russian's woman's joining in the Yiddish part of their conversation, which apparently she understands. I have not observed her speaking English so assume she could not join in until they spoke Yiddish. (although the observer understands what was said in Yiddish, she does not understand Russian but is able to recognize that language and will confine the rest of this analysis to the interaction which is recorded on our tape and which took place in English.) We see that the teenager seems to be resisting this attempt at inclusion. First she does not answer, then she answers in a very low voice. The next question she shrugs off but finally answers that she was born in this country which seems to surprise the first speaker. The speech of Speakers no. 2 and 3 can be seen as internally dialogized, that is they serve two semantic purposes. They take on a tentative hesitating quality associated with the word with a sideward glance which anticipates a response. " Oh .. but you talk Russian good, the upward inflection on the word good, makes it more of a question as though the speaker is really asking, "How come you speak Russian so good if you were born here?" The speech of speaker number three, utterance (10), contains an even more obvious loophole. According to Bakhtin, "A loophole is the retention for oneself of the possibility for altering the ultimate, final meaning of one's own words. If a word contains such a loophole it will inevitably be reflected in its structure. This potential other meaning , that is, the loophole left open, accompanies the word like a shadow. Judged by its meaning alone,

the word with a loophole should be an ultimate word, and does present itself as such but in fact it is only the penultimate word and places after itself only a conditional, not a final, period. Whereas this utterance might end with a period after "Hey, I think I know you." it does not. It remains open in anticipation of a response which might be, "no you don't know me," in which case the speaker can say, well I thought you were so and so's daughter. The last part of this utterance can be seen again as an open invitation for the teenager to join in and admit she is a part of this community, someone's daughter. Since she does not the speaker's loophole option is still available to her. ("I was mistaken) Of course the women are "fishing" for information but from the remainder of the conversation we gather they are not simply nosy. We can, in fact, compare this instance to a scene in Steel Magnolias - where the women pump the newcomer, almost cruelly, about her background. But we then begin to see that their motives are far more complex than mere nosiness or a thoughtless attack on a newcomer by a powerful in-group. Their concern is with community and when they know about the newcomer, find she is very like them, they are better able to deal with her, to fit her in so to speak, find her a place in their particular group. The comment by Speaker no 1 regarding the braces worn by the teenager can be looked at as a form of acceptance. She is being compared with a family member, a nephew. The remark is said more in a tone of kindness than of approbation or authority.

We now come to the wrapping up, or explanatory utterance: number 17.

Even though, from what we have taped of the prior conversation, what the speaker says is not all that she has done (it refers to only a small part of the

conversation which was in Yiddish). However, what is conveyed in the utterance is a sense of satisfaction, almost smugness, in that the prior conversation has "gone well" and this tone of "going well" seems to be agreed with by the other two women. This feeling of its having gone well is in spite of the resistance on the part of the teenager, which if the observer noticed we can be sure the other women did also. This adds to our belief that they were not merely being nosy but were acting out of a need to fit the two into their ideologized ideas of "how it should be." They have been assured that the teenager and the Russian woman share a similar sense of community, have a similar world view. (Of course the teenager showed some rebellion against their questioning, is that not also how it should be?)

In the area I have studied, the more disruptive voices range from resistance to socialization and negotiation attempts, as we have seen on the part of the teenager and the people standing in line at the check-out counter, to more flagrant interruptions and devaluations, arguing, insulting and name-calling.

The following excerpt, utilized at the beginning of this chapter as an illustration of the use of the anonymous they, is also of particular interest in this part of our study because of the way that the three speakers utilize the words of their partners in conversation to make their own point, often as in parody, turning them against themselves.

- 1) C1: [They] said that they were traitors. They were guilty.
- (2) C2: Maybe they were. I know they had a trial."
- (3) C1: I know that they were tried. But now [they] say they were innocent."

- (4) C3: Well, now it's too late.
- (5) C2: So what are we talkin about.?
- (6) C1: Because today they would be freed.

The words "I know" in utterance number 2 are repeated by a different speaker in utterance number 3 but given a parodic emphasis so that they work against the second speaker and serve to devalue the fact of the trial.

Similarly, the word "now" in utterance Number 3 is repeated in utterance number 4 and again given a parodic intonation which devaluates the comment of the third speaker. It can also be seen as an evaluation of the conviction (if it is a conviction) of the "anonymous they" who now say the Rosenbergs are not guilty. It can further be seen as an evaluation of the society which cannot make up its mind. The evaluative argument against this inconsistency on the part of the anonymous "they" is continued in the remainder of the conversation which deals with the way in which today "violent criminals get off on a technicality."

This piece of dialogue also shows the complex nature of face-to-face discourse in everyday communication. The immediate situated present, the remembered past and the current social situation appear and all are dealt with in this short exchange. The actual words of a partner in dialogue are lifted from the utterance in a discussion about events remembered—removed by time and space—and these events are in turn utilized to comment on a current social problem. This stands as further evidence that everyday conversations are considerably more complex than researchers have been able to describe by utilizing traditional categories and concepts, whether based on structure or logic,

in that participants reach out far beyond the immediate observable situation to utilize a much broader socio-cultural knowledge-base than has heretofore been shown. One that includes a vast and complex variety of symbolic or semiotic systems. Although admittedly, the analysis becomes more abstract in this type of study, can the researcher in good faith fail to even consider these systems in his or her analysis?

Although it is also true in the area I have studied, that some conflict occurs due to lack of understanding, that is not what is of primary interest to us here nor does it even seem to be the primary cause of conflict. Most overt arguing involves waiting on line or queuing up to pay for merchandise at the cashier as so many people try to break into the line to get ahead of someone else, or to "trick" the cashier into taking their money first, or to get someone to "hold their place" while they proceed to do some more shopping. As we see in the following exchange, this is negatively evaluated.

(1) C1: Please hold my place, I only want one more thing.

(About five minutes later, customer returns with three more items to reclaim her place on line.)

(2) C1: Okay, thank you.

(3) C2: Oh, you only want one more thing ((falsetto)) did you .. Wisenheimer

We see the use of parody here in that the "only wanted one more thing" is a repetition of the words of customer 1. They are repeated by customer 2 in a high-pitched falsetto voice which we recognize as an imitation of the woman's speech. In this exchange, not only her words but her speech itself is parodied.

We will see in Chapter Five how entire genres are subject to parodization.

As we saw in our example of the hidden polemic, Page 141, there is also much conflict over prices. The majority of these conflicts start between customer and salesperson and overwhelmingly take place at the cashier's counter. Strangely, they seem to erupt very quickly into name-calling and just as quickly and abruptly end.

The following is another instance of the hidden polemic where the insult is really directed toward the ethnicity of the other.

- (1) C: Why is it so much?
- (2) SP: ((Shakes head, shrugs.))
- (3) C: What, YOU CAN'T UNDERSTAND WHEN YOU OVERCHARGE.
- (4) SP: ((looks down at the cash register--says something in another language--
in a low voice))
- (5) C: Speak English. You're in America
- (6) SP: ((does not look up - repeats the same words - a little louder.))
- (7) C: Oh, go back where you came from ((walks away))

Utterance number three contains another example of the hidden polemic. It is also double-directed (containing two voices), it is oriented toward the high cost of the vegetables the woman has purchased, but we suspect, again due to the awkward structure of this utterance plus the sudden increased volume with which it is delivered, that it also contains a hidden polemic—that it has a second orientation and a second semantic purpose—to cast a slur at the fact that not only is the cashier overcharging but she is not even American and furthermore is in

this country but refuses to speak English. Although we have, in the past heard this cashier speak English, we might wonder why she does not do so now. Her words in another language, are also a response—perhaps a refusal to submit to the customer's demand (to speak English), refracting the image of a voice insisting on its right to exist in its otherness.

Instances of accusation, insults, even ethnic slurs, occur with unexpected suddenness and more frequently than we had expected in this marketplace. They often, due to their qualities of spontaneity and exaggeration, and what Bakhtin refers to as use of the "popular idiom," often border on the carnivalesque (a phenomena which is discussed in the next chapter). In addition, they do not seem to be intended solely for the benefit of the cashier or the sales person, but the loudness of their delivery, often accompanied by a look around to see if others might be called upon to join in, gives them an inclusive quality that we identify with the carnivalesque. On the other hand, they lack the humor and joyful laughter of that phenomena and are often, in fact, quite mean spirited. We might say that they represent the "dark side" of the carnivalesque. They are also strangely lacking in results. There is no attempt at repair but neither do there appear to be any lasting consequences. It is as though this public and informal type of catharsis is quite permissible. The same customer will probably return. We do observe that the salesperson goes on operating the cash register as though nothing has happened and the store has remained in business. The customer in the prior instance, if indeed he was cheated, did not get his money back, nor did he ask for the manager or call the police. Ruptures which don't

destroy and therefore allow for a possibility of rebirth are also typical in carnivalization.

Instances which turn into physical violence are extremely rare in this particular marketing area and, although the public nature of the incidents tend to involve all of those present at least as observers and others are sometimes seen to comment or take sides, organized protests such as occurred in the Bedford Stuyvesant area are rarer still, given the unexpected frequency and speed with which these outbursts seem to happen.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have tried to describe and analyze phenomena which have been largely omitted from other studies by applying the various categories of double-voiced discourse to conversations we have observed and taped. These include various ways of resisting socialization attempts and also negotiation attempts which would build toward a common background: by ignoring the attempt or answering in monosyllables, as the teenager in the luncheonette, or the use of irony, as the woman who is reminded that she shouldn't smoke, or the resistance to flirtation attempts as the young woman in the fruit store.

Whereas the role of language and communication in the more constructive activities have been recognized by other researchers, an emphasis on double voiced-discourse points to additional elements in conversation which further our knowledge of how these things get done and give us an opportunity

for a richer analysis. In the case of the more disruptive activities, however, these have been sadly neglected by most discourse studies. The use of double-voiced discourse so plainly highlights the disruptions, however, that it is no longer possible to continue to ignore them nor to consider them as either infrequent or of secondary importance to the dynamics of a society.

Given that both socialization and the creation of a shared background knowledge, are a matter of a reflective process of selection as well as a shared interactive process of negotiation we must consider that, as Bakhtin has pointed out, a considerable amount of that selection, gets done in the internal processes of mind. Bakhtin has pointed to a way of catching "glimpses" of that process due to what can only be called a sort of spillage or spilling over of internal mental processes into observable speech forms. This spillage also accounts for much hesitating and ambiguous speech. I find, in my own tapes as well as in constructed evidence of tapes utilized by conversational analysts and other models, the hesitating quality as well as the overblown speech which Bakhtin has described as accompanying the word with a sideward glance; the word that is conscious of the word of the other and which anticipates the response. In other studies, these instances go unexplained and the possibility of accompanying mental processes is not referred to. Of course, we cannot hear nor see these processes but through their outward manifestations we can posit their existence as explanation. In other words, as Goodenough has said, people carry their culture around in their heads and language is the best way to get at what is inside people's heads. By pointing to the dialogic nature of mind, the

inner struggle as participants selectively attempt to assimilate the various socially created and ideologized voices around them, Bakhtin has shown us a way of utilizing language to begin to observe these processes.

In this chapter I have shown how double-voiced discourse is utilized in everyday activities and have attempted to analyze the various results which are achieved through that usage. Chapter five will continue in that vein as we attempt to show how genre juxtaposition and forms of doublevoicedness combine to create new and different speech types.

CHAPTER FIVE
EXTREMES OF GENRE JUXTAPOSITION
AND DOUBLE-VOICED DISCOURSE

When we first approach Bakhtin's theory of language we may recognize an affinity of thought with the early American pragmatists, with Mead's theory of the social development of mind, and with various Wittgensteinian ideas regarding language such as its non-representational relation to life, its embeddedness in the situation, its dynamic existence in speech. But that is only where Bakhtin begins. We may also be fooled into thinking of some of his concepts, such as reenvoicement, as merely another way of showing, as in some versions of ethnomethodology, the social world as created and recreated through language by individual members. Or, we may be tempted to see the dialogic as merely a tool to understanding which leads to a consensus and establishes meaning. But there we are quickly brought up by what Bakhtin has added, that which he has intruded, as it were into our comfortableness: a socio-historical and political dimension grounded in ideology. I would maintain that Bakhtin's dialogic goes far beyond understanding in that it contains an unmistakable critique aimed at all centripetal forces and that critique, which speaks from the voice of the other, becomes for Bakhtin a primary concern in his development of the dialogic.

In order to further demonstrate the value of a Bakhtinian approach to the analysis of everyday conversation, chapter five will attempt to show how additional forms of resistance are refracted through various combinations of genre juxtaposition and double-voiced discourse

As we have mentioned, the term genre originated as a literary term and Bakhtin (1981, 1984) had investigated how heteroglossia enters the novel. One of the ways being through the insertion of other genres, such as the personal letter, the newspaper article, into the novel form. These are juxtaposed or manipulated by the author to "orchestrate" the various voices. In artistic and other secondary genres, juxtaposition is done with calculation, to achieve a given effect. (We see this in rhetorical forms such as the political speech.) Often the simple incongruity of a word is recognized by an audience or reader, as in the following utterance from a motion picture:

"I command you not to love me."

When a word from military language (command) is juxtaposed with a word from a more intimate genre (love), its incongruity is easily recognized. Much humor, from the bawdy joke to the more subtle innuendo, utilizes this juxtaposition or manipulation of genres.

Specifically, genre juxtaposition is defined by Bakhtin as, "a particular variety of speech phenomena in which a language type that has become conventionally associated with one sphere or genre is transferred to another, quite different sphere (1986).

Genre juxtaposition goes beyond the interspersing of primary and secondary genres as described in chapter three, and more often than not it also involves the use of double-voiced discourse as two voices are heard in one single utterance.

In everyday speech, genre juxtaposition is more spontaneous and usually less calculated than in the artistic work, but it too is often done with a desired effect in mind. In either case it is marked by expressive intonation. The following is an example of the way in which genre juxtaposition can be seen to work in interpersonal exchanges in contemporary interaction

(1) C1: I think you're a real louse.

(2) C2: Oh, yeah, well I love you, too.

In the above exchange, the words "I love you, " utterance (2) are taken from the language of intimacy, but spoken with a sarcastic overtone (the word love is given what we have come to recognize as a parodic intonation) after one has been insulted or otherwise denigrated. The word "love," has, in Bakhtin's terminology, been accented (or re-accentuated) to indicate sarcasm. In this case the re-accentuation is a parodic one. The word "love" belongs to another time and place. It is lifted from that time and place just as we have seen in chapter four, a word may be lifted from the speech of one's partner in dialogue. It is given a new accent. The listener hears this change in style together with the incongruity of content and so is able to recognize the sarcasm, the double-voicedness, in the utterance.

People engage in genre juxtaposition, or manipulation, every day. The participant, speaker or hearer, will not be aware of this as genre manipulation: that is, he or she does not say "aha, that's from the language of intimacy, " but he or she is aware that it is "other" than usual and that it is being used for a different semantic purpose. The degree of this awareness, of course, differs with the individual and with the situation (some juxtapositions are more obvious than others) but we can assume that typically it is a tacit rather than a discursive awareness. As to the purpose, on the part of the speaker, we might assume it is to either poke fun at an institution or to continue an argument, but as we have tried to emphasize, in a study of this type specific motivation is of less interest to the analysis than how an effect is achieved and responded to.

The appearance of various combinations of genre juxtaposition and other forms of double-voicedness during face-to-face interaction is important to this study as evidence of the way in which these devices, once associated only with the artistic world, with the poetics of a literary work, also enter our most mundane conversations and become a recognizable part of everyday life. It may be possible to utilize this knowledge to discover how different worlds are connected in the consciousness of participants, how it is that we recognize the incongruity of a military command from a secondary genre in an otherwise primary utterance, even though we may not in our own lives have direct experience with the military. It is this knowledge which points to an awareness and a utilization over and above the situation and which, in fact, may be utilized to connect situations and levels of interaction.

Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Everyday Conversation

As discussed in Chapter Two, Bakhtin speaks of two forces which exist in all developed societies and which he refers to as centripetal and centrifugal forces. The centripetal or centralizing force tends towards homogenization or keeping the social order. The centrifugal or decentralizing force, on the other hand, tends to disrupt, or decentralize, a society. As Bakhtin has said says of the literary critic we can also say of the sociologist: that he or she tends to privilege the centripetal forces. That is, although the centrifugal voices of the people have been analyzed, they are typically analyzed out of context and with an eye to discovering how they can be corrected, become part of the mainstream, be changed into or utilized by the orderly, organizing forces.

Although these two forces exist side by side, the centripetal forces tend to dominate except in specific chronotopes. He has shown how during the late middle ages when the authorities of nobility and church began to fail it became popular for the people to use the more familiar, often outrageously intimate, terms when talking about "their betters." This was at first done subversively in secret texts and other forms of carnivalization and only later more openly as a foreshadowing of social change which would topple such hierarchies and begin the slow process toward a democratization of relationships. (Bakhtin 1968, 1981)

More recently, we see that the language of scientific (technological and psychoanalytic) genres have come to challenge both those of religion and nature in descriptions of human motivation and social activity. We would maintain that in both cases these changes do not occur on one level alone, change is not

achieved by one class or one group only, nor do they occur hierarchically, one level systematically following the lead of the other, but rather they occur erratically over time though a process of disarticulation which is far from simple but more often than not includes a struggle against old forms.

I have already discussed the failure to include the interpersonal level as well as the everyday from the process of change in a society. Bakhtin has shown the importance of the participation of "the people," the ordinary people who in their mundane everyday lives, speak and act in ways that tend to cast an evaluative glance at the status quo and to take an active, although perhaps an unconscious, part in a continuous struggle with the centripetal forces that would presume to order their lives. He has, in fact, implied that social change can come about only through a process which includes "the folk."

Of course, Bakhtin does not speak in terms of cause and effect, but rather reveals the potential which always exists in the dialogic relationship. In the following examples, analyzed, from a Bakhtinian perspective we can observe the influence of these two forces at work in the everyday activities of participants.

Negotiating a Shared Background Knowledge

Some form of shared knowledge is said by both phenomenologists (Schutz) and actionists (Wittgenstein and Garfinkel) to be an essential ingredient for understandable communication. For phenomenologists the possession of this knowledge is assumed, but in general they do not tell us exactly how it is acquired. Actionists are inclined to assume it is negotiated, rather than already

there but the actual process or machinery of negotiation is too often obscured in their studies.

The researcher is approaching a counter near the entrance of this clothing store. A salesperson (black, male, young adult—with a slight accent – in a later conversation, it is established that he was born in Jamaica) is engaged in a conversation with a customer (Jewish, male, senior citizen). Their interaction involves an item of clothing which is presently out of stock in the size the customer requires. The salesperson has promised to call the customer when the item is available in the required size and is writing down the information. The researcher can hear this as she approaches and can observe the paper on which the salesperson writes.

- (1) SP: The white jacket .. (while writing)
- (2) C: You want to take somethin for it?
- (3) SP: What? oh, Naaa.
- (4) C: You want to take this Paris Original coat as a down payment?" (makes as though to remove his topcoat.)
- (5) SP: .. Sure .. Ahh, forget about it.
- (6) C: You can see. its goods ..
- (7) SP: Yeah, I know.
- (8) C: Paris, nothin, I got this down in Florida.
- (9) You don't believe me? Here, look. (exposes the label on the inside of the coat)
- (10)SP: Sure, I'll take it. (laughing)

- (11) Okay, My friend.
- (12)C: Okay, What's your name?
- (13)SP: My name is Mohammed, Remember Mohammed Ali, the boxer.
- (14)C: I'll remember .. I don't have to remember .. I'll remember you
- (15) Mohammed Ali I remember too
- (16)SP: I will call you .. You have an answering machine? .. or your going to pick up the phone .. whatever .. okay, I'll tell you that we got it.
- (17)C: Okay, (going towards exit door, but looking back at salesperson ."I'll take a walk now.
- (18)SP: Sure. Walking is pretty good for you.
- (19)C: I'm older than I look. Seventy-two. I don't tell everybody that
- (20)SP: Depends on how you feel.
- (21)C: But don't let anyone tangle with me
- (22)SP: OH .. no
- (23)C: I had a Russian father.
- (24)SP: Oh, yeah?
- (25)C: But he was big. (said as he is opening door to leave the store)
- (26)SP: Take care now
- (27)C: Aha, Take care.

The search for a common background between strangers is as we have implied, always tenuous and therefore often ambiguous. We see in this exchange a variety of double-voiced phenomena: the word with a sideward glance is seen in the early utterances of the salesperson. He seems unsure at first how to take the

joking offer of the topcoat as a down payment. We can see the first part of the conversation, about leaving something as a deposit is partially by way of establishing a shared knowledge—we know that it is sometimes done) but the salesperson, probably having to do with the requirements of this particular establishment, does not want to take a deposit. The joking offer to leave the coat and the self-directed irony in "Paris original" can be seen as a further attempt at establishing, by way of a joke.. something to share, a common background, but it seems at first to confuse the salesperson, as he does not immediately respond. When the customer continues with his denial of the Paris original statement, the salesperson catches the drift as his laughter tells us. There is still, however, a loophole in his utterance (16) "I will call you. (which ends in only a "conditional period" as we see by the upward inflection and the tentative "You have an answering machine? or you'll answer the phone, whatever." We see in this utterance what Bakhtin referred to as the shadow of the loophole, a potential such as "Maybe you don't want me to call and bother you.." The customer's request for the salesperson's name is an added reassurance that he does.

If we were to analyze this episode from a "rational" or "speech act" perspective, we could say it was necessary to establish a trust because the customer wants the item in his correct size and the salesperson wants to make the sale. It would follow in such an analysis that all the tentativeness and politeness which we have observed, including the mention of Mohammed Ali as a common symbol whose first name happens to be the same as that of the salesperson so that the customer will remember it, is strategy toward that end of

conducting the business at hand. But such an analysis would fail to explain various phenomena that we also observe. It would not, for example, explain why the conversation does not end right there. From that viewpoint, there was nothing in the situation to prevent the customer from opening the door and leaving immediately after the salesperson tells him his name. Simple politeness may have required a "goodby" or "take care" but no more. Yet the customer decides to describe his next intended activity (to take a walk), to reveal his age and then to add a reference to his father. There is no observable behavior on the part of the salesperson nor in the structure of the conversation that can be said to elicit those responses. Yet they are responses. They do not initiate a new topic nor do they appear to be attempts to do so. (If they were they would be picked up by the salesperson and responded to as such or there would be some indication on the part of the customer that his attempts were being ignored.) On the contrary, both are smiling and at the same time separating, the customer continues walking towards the door and the salesperson while still attending to this customer's word, is slightly turning towards the next customer. Linguistically, these utterances are not part of any adjacency pairs. One explanation would be that once having established a shared background and interest, both are reluctant to discontinue it. Or can it be that the mention of Mohammed Ali has served as more than a mere mnemonic device for the customer. We might ask why they are having so much trouble establishing a shared background knowledge and why they do so tentatively. Other studies have seemed to refer to it as a rather routine process. We must first of all

remember where our research is being done. An urban neighborhood marketplace in transition. It is also true that these attempts may be grossly different in another area.

The salesperson's solution of a common symbol in Mohammed Ali, is of course, inspired, since it can also be seen as a particularly "male bonding" kind of symbol which we would postulate is also a determining factor behind the customer's subsequent utterances. Rational models and structural models do not allow us to examine these symbolic influences on communication and what is being communicated beyond the rational strategy and the structure.

The point is that these utterances are responses but not directly to anything in the situation, nor to an internal state but rather to a social symbol which we can postulate may join with an internal state. The prize fighter Mohammed Ali may represent manliness, the notion of being able to take care of oneself. Or a sports figure might represent brotherhood, or a fatherly image, etc. All those images are being communicated (although unbeknownst to him) by the customer's last utterances. The responses of the salesperson, "Oh no, "oh yeah" would seem to indicate a lessening of involvement or a desire to attend to his next customer rather than encouragement to keep talking. We would suggest that these last utterances on the part of the customer are double-voiced, while seemingly directed at the salesperson they are not oriented toward any object visible in the present situation, but rather that they are part of a hidden dialogue, the hidden dialogicality whereby the response is to an unseen author, an unheard voice. The most important observation at this point is that we begin

to see the way in which the centripetal, unifying forces are at work in this exchange. The symbolic is called upon and utilized to unify, to bind together.

Ironizing the Symbol

To define the use of the word "symbol" in this chapter, we will utilize the distinction made by C. W. Peirce (in his classification of signs: the symbol is a sign which is related to its object (referent) by convention—as opposed to the icon in which we perceive the object in its physical likeness to the sign or the indexical sign which relationship to its object is based on logical connections. Symbols are, therefore, considered to be the most arbitrary, the most volatile and least persuasive but, at the same time, the use of symbols is considered by Peirce to be the highest mode of thought in an evolutionary schema.

One form of double-voicedness occurs when the symbol is given an ironic accent or, according to Bakhtin's description, one's own voice is introduced into it, one's own fresh intention is refracted within it. He uses the following excerpt from *Anna Karenina* to make his point:

"'Well, yes, as you see, your devoted husband, as devoted as in the first year of marriage, is burning with impatience to see you,' he said in his slow high-pitched voice and in the tone in which he almost always addressed her, a tone of derision for anyone who could really talk like that" (*Anna Karenina*. New York: Signet, 1961) Part 1, Ch. 30; translation by David Magarshack)." (Bakhtin 1981, 328)

In the above utterance, the poetic symbols of love are taken from the discourse of intimacy and uttered in a tone of derision, "In the space between the word and its object another's accent intrudes, a mantle of materiality is cast over the symbol"

In the following example, which we utilized in Chapter Four,

(2) C2 Too much smoking. Phlegm comes from smoking. ((slight emphasis and falling pitch on last word))

(3) C1 Okaaay, Mo^ther. She thinks I'm a child. Some child. ((ha, ha))
((General Laughter))

the symbols of motherhood, mother and child, are displaced—treated in a manner which intrudes upon our personal ideologized image of them. Mother is seen as the authority figure, telling us what to do, and at the same time, fun is poked at this authority. The "child" referred to in this instance is a senior citizen so we get a distorted image, plus a sense of self-derision that a person her age should be treated like a child.

The following examples were collected in another establishment, where as we have already described, it is customary for customers to be asked to check their packages upon entering. The salesperson, a young male is again positioned near the entrance, this time seated on a ladder which slightly elevates him, we guess so as to better oversee the floor. A second salesperson is standing nearby.

- (1) SP1: Please check your bag, Maam....No, not you, Honey, I was talking to her (indicates another shopper who is about to walk past without stopping) Maam, please check your shopping bag.

A few minutes later,

- (2) Hey, Darlin', where are you goin'? (to young female customer who is leaving the store) Hey, don't leave me .. Aah Darlin'. (as she continues walking out the door without acknowledging his remark.)
- (3) SP2: Hey, he's a married woman, I mean....Ha, Ha
(laughter)
- (4) SP1: How do you know I'm ? How do you know she's....she's a married woman?.
- (5) SP2: Hey, He....he's (laughter) He's a married woman (the last part of this utterance is said slowly, every word enunciated clearly and with a rising inflection on each syllable, so that it ends with the highest and loudest accent on the last syllable of the last word "woman."
- (6) SP1 Hey, what's .. what's with you? I'm trying to make out .. and you.. you .. (pretending indignation) How could you?

As demonstrated by utterance (1), salespersons often refer to customers as "Honey," in this particular marketing area (this address is used for both male and female customers by female salespersons and for female customers regardless of age by male salespersons) and it is not taken as an insult or undue familiarity.

(That is, I have not yet observed a customer being upset by its use.) It seems, in fact, to be used for "preferred" customers, those the salesperson feels most comfortable with as opposed to those instances when the more formal, "Ma'am," or "Sir", is used. This particular use of "Honey" can be seen as a case where a word from a primary genre, of family or even intimacy, is incorporated into a secondary genre (of shopping). Its use is so frequent and so accepted that it cannot be considered a switching of genre nor a juxtaposition of genre. It makes no attempt to alter the expected positions of salesperson and customer nor to disrupt the status quo, although again I must stress this may not be true of its usage in any other time or place.

The use of "Darlin" in utterance (2) however, cannot claim the same convention. In addition, the accent on the pronoun, you and slightly elongated oo sound allow us to place this utterance in the genre of flirting (discussed in Chapter Three). That this analysis is appropriate in this case, we see from the surrounding activity and voices of other observers.

The two salespersons involved in the continuing exchange seem to hold the same positions. They are seen to interchangeably "man" the door, check for packages, and wait on customers. They are of about the same age, one is African\American, the other white, although that seems not to matter—that is in this establishment the stratification seems to be more along lines of class or position, rather than stratification into race/ethnic, or even age groups. Speaker number 1 (who wears a wedding band and we can assume is married) is called down by speaker 2 for flirting. But a mistake is made by speaker number 2 who

says "he's a married woman" instead of a married man, at which speaker number 1, whether jokingly or not, reflects his confusion. "How do you know I'm, she's.... she's a married woman? Speaker number 2 tries to recover by emphasizing a married woman at which they both break up in laughter. A parodic instance takes place in utterance (7) "How could you" which does seem to poke fun at anyone who would talk like that.

We see that in everyday conversation as well as in art an entire genre can be parodied such as the genre of love which we can see more clearly in another utterance by the same young man, this time addressed to a female employee in the same establishment

(1) SP: Do you still love me, Darling? I love you. Ah...say you love me."

I'll just die if you don't love me.

The parodic emphasis (seen in the overblown phrase "I'll just die) is not one of bitterness as in Bakhtin's example from Tolstoy. What this seems to do is not so much to make fun of love but rather to place a somewhat ambiguous message on the floor, so to speak, the young woman can take it as seriously as she would like to. The real intention behind the utterance, we of course do not know. As an observer, I have never seen one of this young man's flirtation attempts succeed. In fact, I've always seen him get rejected. So that we must wonder why he does it—there seems to be no "pay-off" except perhaps to make a rather mundane job a little more palatable. In which case it would seem that the reward is in the act itself.

Carnivalization

Of all Bakhtin's conceptualizations, carnivalization is the most mysterious and obscure and at the same time the most mundane. It conjures up all the mystery of ancient custom and ritual but it is at the same time deeply rooted in the everyday lives of "the folk"—the ordinary people of any time and the popular sources of a culture.

The origin of carnival is basically unknown, but Bakhtin traces it, through their similarities, to the Roman Saturnalia and believes it may date even further back in pre-history. During the Middle Ages the carnival represented a reversal of the everyday commitments and considerations imposed on the people by the feudal state and its supporting religious structure. The time of carnival allowed the poor people, for a prescribed period of time, the freedom to mock their "betters" and to laugh at themselves. Their mockery and laughter were reflected in rituals such as the crowning of the King of Fools. Carnival was also a time of feasting and overindulgence, a time of excess.

In addition to being a celebration of and by the people, the medieval carnival was a showplace for folk culture. For Bakhtin carnival is not a world gone mad but rather it is a world reversed: where the poor are for a short while kings; where the ridiculous becomes the sublime and the sublime is the object of ridicule. Nor is carnival a time of chaos for in this reversal there is also order.

Two important aspects of the carnival are its laughter and its use of the grotesque image. In his major work on the subject, *Rabelais and his World*,

Bakhtin describes these features. Carnival laughter is distinguished by three basic characteristics:

- 1) It is Festive - A communal laughter of all the people as opposed to an individual reaction to some isolated comic event. An entire occasion of laughter.
- 2) It is Universal - Directed at everything and everyone, including the participants. The entire world is seen in its droll aspect, in its "gay relativity."
- 3) It is Ambivalent - At the same time "gay and triumphant" and "mocking and derisive." It asserts as it denies, it devastates as it revives, it is about death and rebirth.

"Low" art forms, Bakhtin tells us, have always been rich in the type of ambivalence identified with the carnival, combining, for example, praise and abuse, death and rebirth. In parodic writing, often carnivalizations of the "higher" art form, another's words, often the words of authority, are used as though to honor them, but in such a manner or context as to give them an entirely different meaning. Billingsgate (the exaggerated insult) is also a form which is associated, by Bakhtin, with the carnivalesque. Billingsgate is characterized by certain curses and oaths, language which has an abusive as well as a humorous aspect in that it is exaggerated and isolated from any specific context. It uplifts as well as it puts down. It is often used lovingly (ethnopaualisms, for example, may fit into this category) Rapping is perhaps the most modern form of

billingsgate. It is abusive but it also enhances one's sense of belonging-to, of being included in a particular community.

We see that carnivalization is more than a way of making fun of, more than a destructive force; It must contain elements of rebirth and inclusion. The audience is always part of the act. Bakhtin describes how in the folk theater of the Medieval carnival there is no stage, and certainly no footlights, separating players from audience.

The function of the carnival can be seen as a liberating one—a freedom from the restricting and authoritative point of view, from the cliché' and trite expression as well as from conventions and established "truths," a chance to replace these with the new, the as yet unexpressed, perhaps the as yet inexpressible. There is also a negative aspect to the function of carnival as has been pointed out by Bakhtin's critics who remind us that it is short-lived, a restricted period which functions as a tool for the elite to give the poor a proscribed period of "acting-out", a cathartic release so that they will be better, more obedient and faithful, servants the remainder of the year. Or, as the pre-Lenten carnival prepares the people for the rigors of Lent with its confining self-denial as well as the poverty of their actual state. One may also look at it in that way. The two views are not mutually exclusive but in fact point to the ambiguity, the tension, within the act of carnivalization as the concept has been used today. Bakhtin also implies that the carnival spirit exceeds its bounds. it is carried over into the routine life of the people, in the puns and obscene jokes of every age.

(As discussed in Chapter One, the extent to which the authoritative system is affected by carnivalization is a matter of current postmodern debate.)

Bakhtin has lamented, in discussing effects of modernization and rationalization as well as an increasingly restrictive Protestant ethic and work code based on a division of labor, there has been a drastic and negative change in the spirit of carnival, the element of joyous laughter was reduced to cold humor, irony and sarcasm. Its positive regenerating power was reduced to a minimum. But Bakhtin also explicitly states, "the popular-festive carnival principle is indestructible. Though narrowed and weakened, it still continues to fertilize various areas of life and culture" (Bakhtin 1968)" Thus, carnival and carnivalization become less tied to a specific time and place, such as the Medieval or pre-Lentil New Orleans or Rio and can be taken to represent a spirit, an attitude which is still connected to "the folk" and the popular idiom and also, as will be shown here, to the marketplace.

Here I would like to refer again to what I have come to refer to as the Mohammed Ali episode. This excerpt was used earlier in this chapter to show how the personal and the business at hand are mixed in the same interaction as two people originally from two different cultures: by nation of birth and ethnic groups, and also in time due to the difference in their ages, attempt to negotiate the business at hand (the purchase of a coat which is expected) They also manage to create a shared background knowledge (as Schutz would say, for all extents and purposes and of course temporarily) We see that this is in part done through the mention of a national symbol "Mohammed Ali", known in American

society, across stratifications such as ethnicity and age.

The aftermath of the dialogue between the customer and sales person, is of particular interest and would not have been part of this study if we had followed a strict conversation analysis technique. Because of the addition of a participant observation stance, we were not limited to the conversation on tape but were able to remain after one of the speakers had left the vicinity and utilize field notes to record our observations in support of the audiotaped record and were able to observe that the exchange between the two individuals had an impact on other listeners.

There were three clerks, (two men and one woman, all black, all who speak in accented voices similar to the SP, who in another conversation had identified himself as being from Jamaica, much closer in age to the salesperson than to the customer, were unpacking merchandise from boxes and placing it on shelves within hearing range of the interaction which the researcher observed and recorded. Almost immediately after the customer has left the store, we hear:

"Mohammed Ali?"

((laughter))

"Mohaaaammed Aliiii" - said in a singsong.

"Oh, Mohaaaammed" (calling)

"You're no Mohammed Ali" (with ironic accent)

"I want that stuff put on the shelf now. Go, go, go, go, Now.

First one of the other workers begins to tease the salesperson by reenvoicing his words "Mohammed Ali?" adding a parodic accentuation and questioning inflection, which mocks the identification with Mohammed Ali. His mocking voice and laughter seem to erupt and spill over to include the other sales personnel and customers in that area. We can identify this part of the episode as an instance of carnivalization utilizing the characteristics of that form as described above. Parody is taken to an extreme. The other clerks repeat the words, "Mohammed Ali, Mohammed Ali" in a sing-song, catcalling which carries the words of the salesperson in another direction, forcing them to work against him. The words are accompanied by a typification of the festive laughter of carnival. It is not quiet and secretive not kept as a private joke within this group but is presented loudly and clearly for all to hear. The researcher definitely felt included. It is also ambivalent: When we try to determine just who was being laughed at the answer is illusive. The salesperson, yes, but he has also joined in the laughter. The customer, perhaps but he is no longer there. Mohammed Ali, the symbol. We would guess all of the above and more. It is the ambiguous laughter of carnival. What does it tell us? For one thing, that as two people might establish a shared background between them, there are also forces ready (even eager) to negate that background. As if to remind the salesperson that he is one of them, not of the same ideological background as the Jewish customer, nor is he Mohammed Ali, the heroic symbol. We see here a good example of how the interpersonal may become political.

Also it may be true that contrary to what some theories would have us believe, the pressure to conform does not always come from above. The minority group, the subculture also have their homogeneous forces demanding loyalty and obedience. I think Bakhtin would agree in that he has tried in his own analysis to reveal the power that also exerts pressure from below. In addition, we see in this example how the voices of the counter-group are in turn interrupted by the manager, the boss, a figure of authority representing the centripetal forces, who comes over to send everyone back to work.

The following episode, some of which was also utilized in Chapter Four also contains elements of the carnivalesque. The two salespersons in this dialogue are situated near the cash register. The observer is "examining" merchandise on a nearby rack but is able to hear the conversation clearly. We also know from an earlier part of this conversation that SP2 has requested that he be allowed to go home early but that request was denied by "the boss." The first utterance below refers to that denial.

- (1) SP1: So, he said NO....Wait till he wants a favor from me. He should have been nicer. Let him say something...If he wants to say something again, he'd better first take a deep breath and hold in all that shit.
- (2) SP2: Hey man, there he goes. The Biiig Man. (pointing to the boss, who is walking toward a stairway some distance from where we are standing)
- (3) SP1: Ha, ha, yeah. Look at him go. Get a load of that jacket.

(4) SP2: I understand he uses Michael Jaackson's designer.

(Laughter)

(5): SP1: Did you see the way the bell-bottoms are going?

(holds up his two hands with forefingers pointing in opposite directions)

Elements of carnivalization are contained in this instance. The boss, the subject of these utterances is "brought down" made into a joke, lowered.

According to Bakhtin, the grotesque image, contained in utterance (1), of shit in the mouth is typical of carnivalesque reversal in which the lower regions are uplifted. The words "biiig man" in utterance (2) are used ironically, which we can tell by the shift in intonation: the elongated vowel sound and emphasis on the first two letters: Biiig man. This utterance is doubly ironic since the man referred to is quite short. The boss and manager of this store, also stands out because of his dress. He is extremely sloppy—his shirt is half in and half out of his pants top and he wears a jacket which is too short to cover this fact. He also has scraggly hair and beard which have been an object of humor on the part of both customers and salespersons in this establishment. The two clerks in this example, are, by contrast, neatly but casually dressed (jeans and long-sleeved white shirts)

In utterance (2), we can also read an invitation to the first speaker to release some of his anger by having a little fun at the boss' expense. This invitation is "taken up" by the first speaker, as we see in utterance (3). Utterance (4) contains the parodic use of another genre. The talk about the wearing

apparel of "the boss" continues but the style of utterance (4) is changed along with the content. The first emphasis on understand distorts the word as though to signal a difference, the word designer although not accentuated, is alien to this type of establishment. The reference to Michael Jackson, a popular entertainer who is considered a "trend setter" his acts and dress being uniquely stylized and whom we can be sure does employ the services of at least one designer, and invokes for us the image of that world of hype and high fashion. This effect is heightened by the style of the utterance. The word understand is emphasized and exaggerated and serves to mark the entire utterance as strange, as belonging to a different genre, one not usually spoken in this time and place. The genre is at the same time parodied. That is, it is not spoken seriously but in fun. There is, again, a lot of ambiguity here. Just who is being made fun of. Michael Jackson, the boss, or the people from that other world who would talk that way. We suspect all of the above and the two speakers as well. As Bakhtin has said of carnival laughter. It is all-inclusive and ambiguous. Another important point about this exchange. The laughter it invokes from both participants (and from the observer, I might add) is evidence of a shared apperceptive background.

In the following example of an ongoing carnivalization, a new participant is added. CW or the crazy woman. This does not represent an evaluation on the part of the researcher but this woman has been so evaluated by other customers and store personnel alike. As she enters the store she is sort of smiling to herself, somehow we can all tell almost immediately that something is "not right"

about her) The salesperson, the same male clerk who's "flirting" activity was discussed earlier in this chapter, asks her to please check her shopping bag.

The "crazy woman" ignores him and continues walking down the isle.

(1) SP1: (following her) Please check your bag, lady.

(2) CW: I need to buy some shoes.

(3): SP1: This nice lady will help you. (indicating salesperson No. 2)

(4) SP2: Hey, don't put her on me. I can't deal with this.

(5) SP1: But, that's your job.

(6) CW: She doesn't want to help me out."

(7) SP1: Come on, help her out. She needs to look nice. She's going to an important affair. A Ball.

(8) CW: That's right. You've got it.... You do a good job. I hear you're going to work for Donald Trump.

(9) SP1: Where'd you hear that? Who told you that?

(10)CW: Oh, I hear things .. in Atlantic City. (This last is said in a sing-song to the tune of "The Boardwalk in Atlantic City)

(11) SP1: That's amazing. Do you know Donald?

Customers have been gathering around, trying to listen but pretending not to-- trying not to show amusement. A young girl, sitting on the floor trying on boots, looks at researcher, smiles and shakes her head knowingly.

(12) Manager: (speaking into a walkie-talkie which comes over a loudspeaker):

Security on floor. Security on floor. All sections upstairs and downstairs. Sales personnel be aware'

(13) SP2 (has retreated to the other side of the store, leaving SP1 to "deal with it.") "I've never seen anything like that. I've seen crazy customers in here but she's the worst I've ever seen."

(SP1 is still carrying on a dialog with the "crazy woman." "humoring" her, but keeping his eyes on her. The manager is also observing)

(14)CW You remind me of Martin Luther King.

(15)SP1: But he's dead

(16)CW Then you're dead.

(17)SP1 Okay, I'm dead.

(18)CW - We have to support our boys ((looking at yellow ribbon which is tied around a post.)) I think general Eisenhower is doing a good job ((indicating the store manager, with an inclination of her head in his direction))

(19)SP1 He's also dead. ((raises eyes, toward the ceiling)).

(20)CW . Is he general Eisenhower ((Indicating the manager again))

(21)SP1: I don't know ask him

(22)CW: You ask him (laughing)

(23)SP1: How can I if I'm, dead.

He and manager both break up in laughter in which the "crazy woman" joins them, as do a number of customers standing around. The above exchange would seem to make no sense at all unless we consider it for its carnivalesque aspects which allow it a form of order. In the talk of death and who is dead, positions get reversed and we lose track of who is humoring whom, who is in

charge here? Both the normal and the abnormal, or so considered, engage in the juxtaposition of genres. Such acts of carnivalization can be seen, as Bakhtin has in fact seen them, as reversals of an imposed reality (imposed that is by the dominant forces): moments during which positions are reversed— that which was high is lowered and all are included in the universal, ambiguous laughter. It also demonstrates a tenet of social semiotics: "Meaning resides in the version of the world presented."

The above episode is also interesting as an example of how order is kept in this establishment, (through the use of a walkie-talkie) and how the sales personnel is mobilized to watch out for danger. (except here again we see the element of resistance in the young lady who "can't deal with it" although it seems to be her job also.) After the above exchange there is no more conversation but a great deal happens, the "crazy woman" continues to wander about the store, begins picking up items from counters and looking at them, and putting them down very carefully. She is aware that she is being watched. The way she picks up each item, looks around to see who is observing and then carefully returns each item to its place attests to her awareness. We can also read her behavior as a challenge to the powers of authority. It is as if she is testing them, waiting for them to accuse her. Perhaps having decided that she is harmless, the sales personnel withdraw and begin waiting on other customers. The manager remains nearby. The "crazy woman" walks toward the exit door, but turns around before leaving and goes over to a garbage bin near the cash register and takes out an old cardboard (the kind used around women's stocking) She takes this to

girl at cash register and showing it to her, says something (which researcher standing near the exit door cannot hear.) The cashier shrugs and nods. The crazy woman leaves the store, holding the cardboard out in front of her as though it is a prize she has won. Outside she hurries to board a bus.. As the bus pulls away she is looking back at store, still holding up the empty stocking wrapper, as though mockingly.

The concept of carnivalization is used today by postmodernists to describe the way in which the underclass, or members of a minority group, might borrow a work of art or an art form from the higher culture and use it for their own purposes, often as a way of poking fun at or in defiance of that larger culture. Graffiti, has also been described as a form of carnivalization. There is something individualistic but also communal about the act, a way of fighting back, of preserving one's own identity and in that way, as it destroys it also regenerates.

I would maintain that there is still a hint of the carnival in the laughter of the people as opposed to irony which is a different, perhaps more isolated, phenomena. As in the above examples, the sense of fun would appear to be universal, crossing all lines of class, race, age and gender, yet it is an element which is missing from sociological studies. The degradation ceremonies of the ethnomethodologist for example, can be looked at in another way by the use of this concept. To degrade, for Bakhtin, as also to bring down to earth, i.e. the pompous, the social climber, also get degraded. To expose one's roots, one's communal ties, one's human condition, as also a type of inclusion. This sense of fun and inclusion as also missing from the encounters described by Goffman and

that may be why his people appear conniving and manipulative.

Bakhtin further claims that without an understanding of the concept of carnivalization, it is impossible to understand the people and their relationship to those who would rule them. His book on Rabelais closes with a quote from Boris Godunov which describes a nightmare of Dmitry, a false pretender to the throne.

The people swarmed on the public square
And pointed laughingly at me,
And I was filled with shame and fear.
(As quoted in Bakhtin 1968, 474)

Conclusion & Summary of Findings

Because a viable public sphere (Habermas notwithstanding) is not a part of most contemporary Western cultures, not even in the form of a traditional period of carnival, the researcher must look at what have come to be called interpersonal relationships for evidence of overt social evaluation, for disarticulation and for less orderly attempts at disruption and then try to find how these are connected to a less private sphere. The marketplace with its peculiar combination of primary and secondary relationships and its variety of generic speech forms has shown itself to be an ideal spot to begin. Paradoxically, we are able to see those connections most clearly due to incongruity, ambiguity and overt forms of resistance and conflict. These instances of disarticulation render the utterance problematic, force us to look at it. Even though, as both Mead and Bakhtin believe, "It is not about the individual," "two people do not resolve anything, they do not live in a vacuum knowing only each other." As in a good

novel, their individual wills and minds are submerged in social heteroglossia—their voices are refracted through it. It is only in this heteroglossia, that the marginal voices of society may also be heard. By examining this type of problematic interaction on the level of the interpersonal, we begin to see that its use extends beyond the individual to situations on levels other than the interpersonal and forms a connection between these levels.

This study has differed from other sociolinguistic studies in several ways. For one, the researcher has used field notes in close conjunction with taped conversations, a technique developed due to the difficulty of using a tape recorder in some locations due to background noise and also because of its possible intrusion into the spontaneity of discourse. The researcher was able to take short-hand notes on what was happening visually in conjunction with what was being said. The tapes were then utilized both to refresh her memory of the event and to aid in the reconstruction of what was said. The ethnographic approach utilized in this study also allowed the researcher to observe and analyze additional aspects of a situation after one or more speakers had left the scene. This has proven to be a valuable technique.

Research Findings

1. Participants can be observed to organize their conversations around speech genres and to utilize Bakhtinian categories of double-voiced discourse during everyday interaction. Speech phenomena categorized

by Bakhtin as types of double-voiced discourse are used by participants to challenge each and often at the same time to challenge the rules of the established order.

2. Participants follow rules of speech genre but they also utilize these linguistic vehicles in combination with double-voiced discourse to create a variety of hybrid forms which allow them to bend all rules, often to the point of carnivalization.
3. My findings support the necessity of analyzing discourse in context but also indicate that a great deal of interpretation (by both participants and observers) is achieved through cultural rather than contextual understanding.
4. The addition of Bakhtinian concepts to a study of discourse in everyday life both broadens the range of analysis by highlighting elements of spontaneous conversation heretofore unexamined and contributes a theory of language which may be utilized to provides a cultural/historical and ideological element to future discourse studies.

I believe I have been successful in demonstrating, in the preceding chapters, how Bakhtinian categories of double-voiced discourse and speech genre, phenomena heretofore ignored by sociolinguistic research, are used abundantly and skillfully by participants in everyday conversation and have shown how their use enables us to see the complexity of various social processes; a complexity obscured by an emphasis on the orderly, consensual, rational,

aspects of interaction. In addition, this study, through its recognition of the crucial role played by culturally symbolic structures and representations (and socially derived evaluations) in even the most mundane of everyday activities, indicates a way of opening up micro-level studies of interaction to a broader theoretical analysis.

I have said, in my proposal and introduction that I wanted to show the constraining, even confining aspects of socially created forms which serve to dictate how things can be discussed and what action can be taken, thereby constricting human behavior and even thought. I find that in order to honestly analyze the verbal interaction that I have observed and taped, I have had to place more emphasis on the ways that people can be seen to attempt to bypass these constraints, to successfully resist them, and to create new forms to surpass the old. These processes, however do not come about without considerable effort and struggle. An effort which in itself attests to the fact of the constraints but also points to a greater imagination and diversity of action on the part of participants than they have so far been credited with.

We have recorded repeated attempts to override the socially constructed rules—for example in "on-line" etiquette, an important element in the orderly functioning of the market-place. People the same people—are guilty of repeatedly attempting to break into the line—to push in front of others—to "hold a place for others" on line—to "trick" the clerk into processing their order before that of another who was there first—even though these attempts almost always result in argument, at worst, or at best only further socialization attempts by others on the

line, or by the cashier, or by a clerk or salesperson. Nor is this tendency to disrupt the social order restricted to on-line etiquette, it is also observed in continual attempts to "peek into the kitchen" in the luncheonette or to "sneak more clothes into the dressing room than allowed in the clothing store. It also manifests itself in the spilling over onto the sidewalk of the produce stores and the bakeshops. These disruption become even more interesting when they contain elements of carnivalization which touch on larger social units. (sometimes involving groups and group ideology as well as national symbols) but we see them reflected in face-to-face interaction.

Bakhtin has pointed to a way of linking the various levels of social interaction but did not himself make those linkages. They are beginning to be made through semiotic concepts of text, genre and ideology by looking at the "situated text." Studies have been done which show how relationships to beliefs can change but to my knowledge these are not being done on the level of the interpersonal. There is evidence that the people I have included in this study do, although not discursively, seem to be aware that they are connected to a larger system. These ties appear to be created and recreated as does Sack's sequencing structure on a onetime basis--Yet they must be created out of something just as a shared background knowledge is created out of something which each participant brings to the situation. One task of the analyst at this level, is to attempt to define that something. I cannot overemphasize the importance of that task even though it would appear to involve the addition of a socio-historical connection such as that supplied by Bakhtin. At the same time it

would be an error to ignore the interpersonal relationship. Even though, as Bakhtin has said, it is not about individuals: two people do not resolve anything. Nevertheless, it is by examining how individuals go about the business of conducting their daily lives that we get a clue as to how they are related to a larger system.

A problem inherent in the type of study I have undertaken is the inability to generalize findings. That is, findings concerning the frequency of speech types and genres utilized in this particular marketing area and the responses they produce cannot be assumed to pertain in any other marketing area or situation. However, the categories themselves and the method of observation can be utilized in other areas and the results compared. It is the opinion of this researcher that such continuing studies would prove valuable.

In further considering future study possibilities, this present study has also pointed to the importance of spatiality and it is suggested that in future studies, more attention should be given to the physical constraints of the area of study. In this marketplace we have observed that position lines are often structurally reinforced: briefly, this entails counters behind which sales-persons stand setting them apart. Tables and chairs in luncheonettes are often strategically placed by the management. Cashiers always have a specific spot set apart as well as a special position in a hierarchy which differentiates them from other sales personnel. This is largely a symbolic difference because often a salesperson fills in as cashier, but to do so he or she must make a spatial change—go to the cash register area. Often these changes are accompanied by

verbal accountings such as "She'll take the money, today" (implying that is not her "real" job) or "I'm filling in here now" (stacking shelves but usually is cashier). But we also have observed that very often linguistic categories tend to surmount these boundaries—insults are flung over counters and all positions are leveled during the all-inclusive laughter of carnivalization. Like all other boundaries, spacial boundaries tend to also get challenged.

This has been an exploratory study. If I have perhaps assumed too much in my analyses it is because Bakhtin's categories and concepts open the door to such a variety of potential possibilities. I have carried some to what I hope is a logical conclusion but one for which I may not have not given adequate substantiation as the "true" conclusion. An additional advantage of a Bakhtinian emphasis on the dialogic is that it refuses to attempt a total, finalized viewpoint which would close down further discussion. Rather it must see itself as only one voice in any dialogue and allow others to also speak. On the other hand, I feel I have only scratched the surface. The area I have studied and others like it host a diversity of ethnic/racial groups and age groups. It also reflects a diversity of life-styles. These people have a lot to tell us. They will not tell us these things in a questionnaire or an interview, nor do they organize and form committees, yet their voices are important—they represent a large segment of the working, or active retired, voting public and they are all members of one minority group or another, by dint of race, age, sex, ethnicity, including some newly-arrived immigrant groups. They are all in their own right social critics. As Bakhtin would say, they are all ideologues.

APPENDIX A

PROSODIC NOTATION

So as not to encumber the example texts with extralinguistic markings, prosodic notation will be kept to a minimum. The following notations will be used only when necessary for clarity. For the most part, the prosody is explained in the analytic discussion.

<u>underlined</u>	emphatic stress
ALL CAPS	said very loudly
?	rising inclination, even if not a question.
^	rising, falling inclination
~	sing-song
smoooth	length repetititon of letter
..	speech pause
...	long speech pause
[[	conversation overlap
()	unclear utterance
(())	Stage directions in double parentheses will be utilized to indicate voice quality, such as softly, falsetto, etc. and also to record simultantous movements such as, nodding of head, shrugging, etc.

APPENDIX B

CHART OF DIALOGIC RELATIONSHIPS

INNER
DIALOGUESIMPLE
REINVOICEMENT
(STYLIZATION)

PARODY / IRONY

PASSIVE - The other's words influence speaker's words from within - are present in speaker's utterance and acknowledged.)

Only slightly objectified* When objectification is reduced, tendency is toward a fusion of voices, toward monologic discourse.

High degree of objectification. Most obviously used. If objectification is increased, tendency is to disintegrate into two voices

Uni-DirectionalVari-DirectionalMARKERS

Hesitant, testing, thinknking-out-loud quality.

Repetition of words of partner in dialogue but with a difference

Shift in accent and and intonation
In irony, one's own words often become objectified

DIALOGIC
RELATIONSHIP

Go in same direction but recognize each other.

Pull in different semantic directions

**HIDDEN
POLEMIC****WORD WITH A
SIDEWARD GLANCE****HIDDEN
DIALOGIZATION**

ACTIVE: The other's words exert influence from outside - They are not present in speaker's utterance. Influence is from their own position as other.

Slightly Objectified

Highly Objectified. More like a conversation with an invisible other

Vari-Directional**MARKERS**

Structural and intonational changes

Hesitating, apologetic, or overly aggressive overblown, speech Repetition of certain key phrases.

More like an actual conversation with an invisible other. Activation of inner dialogue - not hesitant nor halting.

**DIALOGIC
RELATIONSHIP**

Clash as though head-on in object

The other's words penetrate the speaker's discourse

One's own words reply to unheard words of other at varying dialogic angles

*Objectification refers to degree of use by speaker. Degree to which another's words or his or her own words are made an object for speaker's use.

NOTES

1. See Mannheim's original writing on the subject (Mannheim 1952).
2. In the same article, Shotter distinguishes between academic discourse which is monologic and representational, and conversational reality, a la Garfinkel, which is dialogic and responsive-rhetorical. He sees Bakhtin's dialogic as taking place among participants in everyday conversation, but not among texts. He acknowledges that disciplinary discourses (monologic) come out of conversational realities (dialogic). "This is where we must begin our investigations." He does not seem to think academic discourse argues—but rather seems to be placing it on a higher plane. Although he says it is merely different, he nevertheless refers to it as a "Godseye" view, a surveyable order. In another article, in which he compares Bakhtin with Billig, Shotter sees the dialogic as important to the future of social constructionist research as a way of understanding. But, he adds, the urge of certainty cannot be satisfied in dialogue. "Instead of certainty—as accuracy of representation—however, we might concern ourselves with adequacy with doing justice to the being of what we are studying" (Shotter 1992).
3. Emerson, in her Acknowledgments (viii) to this volume, refers to an earlier edition which appeared in 1973 but which was "seriously flawed" and soon taken out of print.
4. See C. Thompson (1989) for an overview and discussion. Also Bauer and McKinstry (1991).

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