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Rich, Jonathan Edward

**A PSYCHOSOCIAL CONCEPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL: AN
INTEGRATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM
AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL OF THE PERSONALITY**

City University of New York

PH.D. 1982

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**A PSYCHOSOCIAL CONCEPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL;
AN INTEGRATION OF A THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEM
AND THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL OF THE PERSONALITY**

by

JONATHAN E. RICH

**A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City
University of New York.**

1982

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1982

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

7/21/82
date

Laurence J. Gould
Chairman of Examining Committee

July 29 1982
date

Herbert A. Saltzman
Executive Officer

Laurence Gould, Ph.D.

Seymour Slovik, M.S.W.

Harold Wilensky, Ph.D.
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

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INTRODUCTION

With respect to the psychology of the individual, it is very often the case that psychological theory is conceptually anchored far too securely either inside the individual or outside the individual. Whether a theoretical position accents internal biological drives or whether it points to the reinforcing effect of external social norms, what ultimately happens is that despite some token acknowledgement of the importance of the other position, a side is taken on the issue of heredity versus environment, nature versus nurture, or other manifestations of the real issue -- organism versus everything but that organism. It is with respect to this state of affairs that the psychosocial perspective can offer a very attractive conceptual alternative. It focuses more specifically on the "relationship between" rather than on one side or the other.

My interest in the psychosocial perspective grew out of an interest in analytic group therapy. More specifically, it grew out of a wish to understand the nature of the therapeutic process through which the individual group member changes during group treatment. In the course of reflecting on this matter, I was struck by a rather obvious yet critical issue. I realized that an individual in a therapy group is, from the very beginning, embedded in an immediate social setting, and

that since this is so, if I was to ever understand the process through which that individual changes, it would first be necessary to arrive at a conception of the individual which could be linked to social experience. After perusing through some of the relevant literature, I was fortunate enough to come across an article by Nathan Ackerman (1949) which helped to clarify this issue even further. It was Ackerman's statement of the conceptual problem, a problem that is just as significant now as it was in 1949, that guided my thinking into a more formal psychosocial direction. Ackerman proposed that if the nature of group therapy is to be clearly understood, the concept of personality must be expanded to satisfy two necessary conditions:

1. The operations of personality must be conceived in terms of a biosocial unit. The biological and social determinants of behavior cannot be dissociated. Out of the interaction between the organism and environment, a new unit of behavior emerges which is biosocial. The adaptive functions of personality must be so viewed as to take into account the continuous interplay between those processes that reflect the individual's relation to his inner (biological) being and those which reflect his orientation to social participation. It is necessary, furthermore, to find criteria for the dynamic relations between the adaptive expressions of personality in group action and the relatively more fixed internal structure of personality, as conditioned by developmental influences. In other words, man has an identity that is, at once, both individual and social.

2. The functions of personality must be defined within the context of a broader theory of social organization and social relations. The adaptive behavior of the individual must be viewed in relation to the characteristics of the group to which he belongs. Differences between individual and group behavior must be understood. The behavior of a group has certain unique characteristics of its own, and the adaptive processes of personality, both normal and pathological, need to be viewed within this wider frame. (p. 208)

According to Ackerman, it is only through social participation that the individual can respond to his "inner being." However, the nature of this participation is dependent not only upon the individual but also upon the characteristics of the social groups in which he participates. In this light, the individual's personality can be seen as an adaptation to his own needs (i.e., that which is "inside") as well as to the needs of the groups to which he belongs (i.e., that which is "outside"). In this study, I will attempt to develop a conception of the individual that will not only embody the above psychosocial orientation considered necessary for understanding the nature of group therapy, but also stand by itself as a contribution to psychoanalytic thought regarding the individual personality. Although it may seem surprising at first that both claims could be made with respect to one conceptual model, it will nevertheless become clear that whether or not the group therapy context is taken into consideration, no conception of the individual can ever really ignore the influence of social experience.

While the term "psychosocial" is often used to refer to a general type of personality theory, the psychosocial conception of the individual that will be developed here will specifically reflect both a theoretical model of the social system and the personality model of psychoanalysis. These two models will be integrated through an original schema that will evolve in the course of the discussion as I attempt to sub-

stantiate two postulates: (a) the individual lives his life within the context of social systems, or in other words, it is within the context of social systems that the individual "behaves" in order to satisfy his biological and psychological needs, and (b) the personality of the individual is shaped and structured through his involvement in social systems. While these propositions are in some respects the kinds of notions that would be expected to be at the foundation of any psychosocial study, it is the conceptual schema that I will develop and utilize to bring them to light that will make this particular study different from any other. This study will also be characterized by a greater degree of terminological clarity. Terms such as "psychosocial," "social system," "role," "internalization," and "identification" -- terms which are often used glibly or assumed to have "obvious" meanings -- will be carefully and systematically defined. It can therefore be said that the uniqueness of this study will not lie so much in the nature of its basic premises, but rather it will lie more in the particular schema that will be used to expound these premises and, hopefully, in the level of conceptual clarity that will be reached in this regard.

In accordance with the two postulates, my overall procedure will be to (a) describe the social system conceptually and elaborate on the manner by which the individual participates within it, and (b) describe the process by which this participation can become internalized as part of the indi-

vidual's personality structure. I will attempt to accomplish this task over the course of four chapters, each of which will now be outlined in brief.

In the first chapter I will present an introductory conceptual overview of the psychosocial perspective. In this overview, a model of the social system and a framework for understanding the nature of the individual's tie to social systems will be progressively developed. I will elaborate on how the individual satisfies his needs by taking a role within the context of various social systems, and how each role not only responds to his own needs but also to the needs of the other members of the social system. It will become clear that it is the members themselves in each social system that ultimately provide for each other's need satisfaction, and in this manner, maintain the social system as a whole. In this respect, it will be seen that the individual, within the context of his role behavior, engages in what I have termed "give-and-take activity" -- he gives as well as takes need satisfaction. Give-and-take activity will be discussed with regard to interpersonal transactions at the level of both reality and fantasy. It will also be proposed that since the individual's behavior in social systems is comprised of give-and-take relational processes, the individual, at least with respect to his behavior, cannot be conceptually dissociated from the social systems of which he is a member. His behavior, in other words, is dependent on the behavior of

others. Discussion will also center on the structure of the social system, i.e., the interconnection of its roles, and the manner by which this structure fluctuates over the course of time in correspondence with changes in the behavioral characteristics of the members within their respective roles. It is in this chapter that many of the terms that will be used throughout the study will be clarified in detail. Hopefully, as a result of this effort, the psychosocial perspective that will be referred to in the course of the ongoing discussion will begin to take on a more definite conceptual character.

It will also be seen, however, that the psychosocial perspective is ultimately only a view of the individual in the act of "behaving," i.e., behaving in relation to others for the purpose of need satisfaction, and that it does not in itself constitute a model of the personality. It does not explain, for example, why some of the needs of the individual which fuel his present give-and-take activity are based on previous social system experiences, such as experiences within the family social system. In other words, in order to fully explain the behavior of the individual, the psychosocial perspective requires the conceptual support of a personality model which is responsive to both structural and developmental considerations. It is in this respect that the psychoanalytic model of the personality can be called into play. In Chapter II, I will attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of psychoanalytic thought with the psychosocial perspective. More

specifically, I will delineate the psychosocial aspects of the positions taken by such theorists as Freud, Sullivan, Hartmann, and Erikson, among others, and demonstrate the way in which they accommodate the give-and-take schema.

In Chapter III, I will explore some of the major psychoanalytic conceptions of the individual's first experience of relatedness and discuss the way in which this experience is related to the initial structuralization of the personality. My focus, in other words, will be on the link between early psychic development and the infant's experience of object relations. Differentiating between early and later development will prove to be particularly important in that it will ultimately be shown that give-and-take activity can only take place within the context of the latter, i.e., it requires the capacity to realistically distinguish between oneself and others. It will also be shown, however, that an understanding of the psychic developments that correspond to the kind of relational activity in which the infant does engage for the purpose of need satisfaction will serve as a good foundation for understanding the psychic developments that correspond to the give-and-take activity that he will engage in later. I will discuss early development from the perspectives of both ego psychology and the British object relations school. The work of Melanie Klein, Fairbairn, Winnicott, Spitz, Mahler, and Jacobson will be particularly highlighted.

Chapter IV will build on the conceptual framework devel-

oped in the preceding chapter, extending it further to include the relationship between give-and-take activity and the continuing structuralization of the personality. More specifically, I will discuss in this chapter the way in which social system experience is internalized within the personality. The term "personality" in this context will specifically refer to the psychoanalytic tripartite system comprised of the ego, id, and superego. The concept of internalization as well as the related concepts of incorporation, introjection, and identification will be elaborated on. Particular emphasis will be put on the internalization perspective developed by Kernberg in his synthesis of ego psychology and object relations theory.

Kernberg maintained that the personality is structured by object relations that become internalized as self-object-affect "units." These units were said to be based on the individual's experience of his interaction with others and to involve the linking of a self-representation with an object-representation. What will be proposed in this study is that at the developmental level at which identification usually takes place (as characterized by realistic self-other differentiation), the object relations that are experienced and internalized by the individual actually constitute social systems, and that the respective self- and object-representations that are involved in this process correspond to roles. In this light, the concept of identification will be broadened to include larger collectivities of persons instead of just dyads made up of the individual (the

subject) and one other person (the object). I will attempt to show that when a social system experience is internalized, the individual internalizes the entire structure of the social system, i.e., his own role as well as the roles of the other members. This phenomenon is accounted for by the give-and-take schema, which explains how each member's behavior in a social system, i.e., his role, "exists" only in relation to the behavior (or roles) of the other members. While much of this chapter will be based on material developed in the previous chapters, the work of Schafer, Loewald, Meissner, Parsons, and Sandler and Rosenblatt, in addition to that of Kernberg, will also be utilized extensively.

It is by now quite apparent that this study will rely substantially on the work of indeed many distinguished social psychologists and psychoanalytic theorists. In a manner of speaking, it will be their empirical research, clinical observations, and theoretical conclusions that will serve as my own data bank, although, of course, not all of their contributions will go unchallenged. In the end, it is my hope that by providing a conceptual integration of the social system and the personality, this study will stimulate further and more refined thought about the psychology of the individual, especially the link between metapsychology and social processes.

It should also be stressed, however, that what will ultimately be presented here will be at best a very general conception of the individual. It will essentially involve a look at

the individual with respect to his present involvement in social systems and the way in which this involvement is influenced by his previous experiences in social systems. It will offer no epigenetic blueprint to predict the course of ongoing development nor will it focus on specific clinical applications. Yet, despite its limitations, I believe that it will serve as a viable theoretical framework for conceiving of the individual in a truly comprehensive fashion -- one that focuses on the "inside," the "outside," and the ongoing relationship between.

Chapter I

THE SOCIAL SYSTEM AND THE PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

From the time of his conception to the time of his death, the individual lives in relation to others. Indeed, even the event that brings him into existence is relational in nature. It is through his relations with others that the individual survives in the world. In this sense, relatedness is automatic and not an optional condition of life. This entire study will focus on the nature of these relational processes and their relation to the individual personality. Since these processes ultimately involve both the individual and his social environment, they can be considered psychosocial in nature.

The psychosocial perspective is a relational perspective that focuses on relational processes. It is not in itself a model of the individual. As such, it requires a model with which it is compatible and on which it can be grafted. It is with regard to this need that the psychoanalytic model of the personality, with some modification, can be brought into the picture. The psychoanalytic model has the potential to serve as an excellent "host" for the psychosocial perspective. This claim will be more fully elaborated in later chapters. At this point, however, there is a more pressing matter to attend to -- that of explicitly clarifying what the psychosocial perspective, as used here, actually entails.

To begin with, I wish to point out that in using the term "psychosocial," I am not necessarily referring to the specific theory of Erik Erikson (1956), who popularized the term, but rather my usage is directed to an orientation that can be simply characterized as a conceptual approach which relates the individual to his social environment. What is not so simple to characterize, however, are the specific implications of the terms "individual" and "social environment" that are assumed in this context.

The Individual and the Social System: Basic Considerations

The term "social environment" refers to a social system, or as is more likely to be the case, a number of social systems. A social system includes (a) a number of individuals, and (b) a network of interpersonal relationships that is shared by these individuals. Through the relational network, each individual is related in some measure to every other individual in the social system. Some examples of a social system are a family, a school, a circle of friends, a business organization, a therapy group, and a community association. While the term "social system" usually implies a group or a large collectivity, i.e., a relational unit made up of at least three individuals, the smallest conceivable social system, strictly speaking, would be a dyad, even though in this case there is only one relationship, as opposed to a network of relationships, that is shared by the constituent members.

The question naturally arises as to why an individual would participate in social systems in the first place. While the answer to this question seems obvious in some respects, it also has some less obvious and rather far-reaching implications. The individual becomes involved in social systems in order to satisfy his biological and psychological needs. Indeed, with respect to the individual beyond the developmental stage of infancy, participation in various types of social systems is the only means through which he can actively satisfy his needs. (The infant's needs are also satisfied through the facilities of a social system, but not as a result of active participation in it. This matter will be discussed shortly.) Some of the early group therapists were well aware of this aspect of the human condition and used it as theoretical support for the group modality. J. W. Klapman (1946), for example, the author of one of the first textbooks on group therapy, suggested "that the principle of cooperation between individual and individual is a concern of nature and that the idea of a superorganism constituted by society with the individuals forming social atoms has much in its support" (p. 104). According to Klapman, the individual must find expression for all of his personal needs within the framework of this societal "superorganism." From a more modern sociobiological framework, Buirski (1980) has proposed that the social group (which will be considered here as a social system) represents an evolutionary adaptation to the demands of survival and procreation:

The tendency for human beings...to come together in groups is clearly a biological imperative acquired over millions of years of evolutionary development. Grouping represents an achievement of adaptation which ultimately led to man's transcending the limitations of his biology, through the evolution of culture. It was from the group that cultural adaptations sprang and through the group that culture was transmitted. (p. 449)

From this general line of thought, it follows, then, that the question as to why an individual would participate in social systems is not quite viable. The individual really has no choice in the matter. Not only does he begin life and survive as an infant within the context of a social system, but all of his subsequent growth and development becomes predicated upon ongoing active participation in an expanding array of social systems. It would consequently be quite difficult to conceive of an individual independent of a social system. As Bion (1959) pointed out, "no individual, however isolated in time and space, can be regarded as outside a group or lacking in active manifestations of group psychology, although conditions do not exist which would make it possible to demonstrate it" (p. 132). Despite this view and others like it, however, Knobloch and Knobloch (1979) have highlighted the fact that it has generally taken psychologists a long time to realize that "one man is no man". They themselves have maintained that a small social system, i.e., a system of at least two individuals interacting with each other in pursuit of goals, is the minimal context for studying the individual.

The Concept of Give-and-Take Activity

A social system can thus be formally defined as a number of individuals who relate to each other through a network of coordinated interpersonal relationships with the result being that at least some of the needs of each individual are met. However, just as each member takes through the relational network in the process of satisfying some of his own needs, he must simultaneously give through the network in order to satisfy some of the needs of the other members. Knobloch and Knobloch (1979) have referred to this as a "multiple exchange of rewards and costs." What must be kept in mind here is that the pool of resources for need satisfaction in any social system are not derived from any other source than what is provided by every member of that system. Consequently, if an individual is going to get some of his own needs met within the context of a particular social system, he must ultimately respond in some measure to some of the needs of the other members of that social system in order to ensure that the entire social system is maintained as a whole. Talcott Parsons elaborated on this requirement quite eloquently:

All human behavior is embedded in networks of interpersonal interaction at the social level. The patterning of these relationships is not a function only of the "motives" of the individuals who are parties to them, nor even of these motives combined with the cultural "orientations" expressed in them. It is a function also of the exigencies imposed by the coexistence of many such relationships in situations where they are necessarily interdependent, which is to say that they constitute a system. (1961, p. 28)

Every member of a social system must therefore engage in what I will henceforth refer to as "give-and-take activity" in order to satisfy some of his own needs as well as maintain the social system. This giving and taking occurs through the shared relational network. Some of that which is taken through the relational network by each member is usually similar in nature, and the same is usually true for some of that which is given by each member. For example, all of the residents of a town "give" taxes through their relational network at the same time that they "take" the services of a police force, a fire department, a board of education, and a maintenance crew. The members of a friendship group all "give" loyalty through the relational network and "take" a feeling of belonging. In the family social system, each member usually "gives" love as well as "takes" love through the relational network. Finally, in the therapy group it can be said that all the members "give" therapeutic assistance through the relational network at the same time that they "take" therapeutic experience. It may also be the case that the similarity in some of that which is given and taken in a social system only applies to some members as opposed to all of them. For example, it is only the students in a school who "give" authority to the teachers through the relational network while it is only the teachers who "give" formal education to the students. In any event, despite the similarity in some of that which is given and taken in the social system, it should always be kept in mind that at least some of what is given and taken by

each member is quite unique due to the more idiosyncratic needs of each member. Any two students in a class not only "give" different amounts of authority to their teacher, but they also make different kinds of demands on the teacher based on each student's personal needs. For example, one student may need and therefore take more support and approval than the other. These idiosyncratic needs, which are based on the individual's constitutional features and on his previous experience, can vary considerably, and they usually include some needs which might be considered pathological in nature. The members of a social system are usually quite adept at responding to each other's more personal needs. Waelder (1948) shed some light on the manner by which some of these kinds of needs are satisfied:

Man has an almost uncanny ability of getting into contact with those who are the nearest complement of himself. The sadist will sense the masochist at a distance; he who desires being supported will instinctively, as it were, spot those who are desirous to support others; and he who is out to deceive others will be attracted by those who are willing to be deceived. Furthermore, though people do not consciously understand the unconscious tendencies of others, they frequently behave as if they had understood them. (p. 534)

Give-and-take activity is behavioral in nature. More specifically, it is the behavioral mode for the individual who functions beyond the development level of infancy. I am using the term "behavior" here to refer to all of the individual's psychological and motor processes, e.g., thinking and feeling as well as observable psychomotor acts, through which he attempts to satisfy his needs. In this sense, it can be said that behavior assumes personal motivation and is comprised of psycho-

logical and/or motor action. Give-and-take activity is associated with post-infantile behavior because it involves motivation and action directed toward realistically-perceived others. I emphasize the post-infantile framework here because an infant is not yet able to perceive himself or others except in a grossly unrealistic manner. More specifically, he cannot perceive others as separate from himself, as whole persons with characteristics of their own. It is this factor which makes it impossible for the infant to engage in give-and-take activity and to participate as an active member in a social system. This is not to say that his needs are not met through the facilities of a particular social system (such as a hospital or his family), but rather it is just that he cannot experience the same relational network that the formal members of the social system do and is therefore not able to "buy a share" in it through give-and-take activity.

This notion deserves more discussion at this point even though it will be expounded upon in later chapters. What I am basically saying here is that the infant cannot barter need satisfaction with other individuals within the context of reality and thus cannot meet the prerequisite for participation in a social system. He cannot be a formal member of the family social system simply because of his inability to engage in what I have defined as give-and-take activity. A baby in the household may "give" lots of joy to a family and satisfy a host of needs, but this joy and need satisfaction is not

willfully given by the baby through the relational network of the family social system. On the contrary, the baby cannot even distinguish members of the family or their particular needs let alone appreciate an existing relational network. From the standpoint of reality, the baby contributes nothing in any purposeful manner to the actual members of the family social system on which he himself is totally dependent. In this sense, it can be said that the infant does not "earn" the need satisfaction that is readily provided to him. It is only when he gets older and more oriented to reality that he becomes more able and more expected to earn his keep through give-and-take activity. It is then that he finds that some of his needs only become satisfied on a conditional basis, depending on whether or not he uses the toilet, cleans up his room, "gives" a kiss, etc.

A few comments are in order regarding this issue of reality orientation with respect to the ongoing development of the individual. While it can be said that as the infant matures his perception of himself and of the world around him becomes more realistic, it can also be said that not only is full, continuous reality perception never achieved, but there is always a fair amount of flexibility with respect to the level that is attained. More specifically, while the individual functioning beyond the infantile level of development always perceives other individuals as whole persons separate from himself, some of the characteristics of these other individuals are not always realistically perceived. The incidence and degree of

unreality with respect to the way in which others are perceived depends on both the individual's needs and his immediate circumstances. This entire issue is a complex and crucial one, and, again, it is an area that will be addressed at length in later chapters. It is in this area that psychoanalytic research and the psychoanalytic model of the personality has proven to be invaluable.

What I would specifically like to focus on here with regard to this issue is the "realistic" nature of give-and-take activity. I had previously stated that give-and-take activity is a form of behavior (i.e., it assumes motivation and consists of action) that is directed toward realistically-perceived others. However, I have also just pointed out that the perception of reality is usually never total, that there is inevitably some degree of unreality with respect to the way in which others are perceived. It would consequently be more correct to say that give-and-take activity, or for that matter, post-infantile behavior, is "relatively realistic" as opposed to being "realistic" in nature. It should be made clear, however, that the margin of unreality that exists within the context of give-and-take activity is quite small as compared to that which exists within the context of infantile behavior. In other words, the perceptions that characterize give-and-take activity are always much more realistic than those that characterize infantile behavior. Give-and-take activity always assumes the capacity to perceive others as separate, whole individuals with characteristics of their own, even if these

characteristics are not all so realistically perceived.

Adding the word "relatively" to the term "realistic" opens up a lot more room for the satisfaction of a vast assortment of needs within the context of the give-and-take activity of the individual in a social system in that it allows for the use of fantasy. For example, some of what is "given" by an individual through the relational network may not be willfully and actively donated by that individual, but instead is assumed to be given and "taken" by another member through the use of fantasy. A case in point is that of the paranoid member of a therapy group who "takes" imagined malevolent intentions from another group member or, for that matter, from every other member of the group. The giver in this context is not really giving; he only passively serves as a fantasy stimulus for the taker. It can therefore be said that the giver in this context is not "behaving", i.e., he is not motivated and acting in this regard; only the taker is. The reverse can also be true, i.e., some of what is willfully and actively "given" can be assumed to be taken when it is not actually "taken". Furthermore, fantasy can be shared by the members of the social system as well. Bion (1959) elaborated on this phenomenon with respect to his notion of the "basic assumption" culture in the group. Shared fantasy engagement is also implicit in the pathological "matching" that was described earlier by Waelder (1948). I would like to point out, however, that I am not attempting here to equate fantasy with psychopathology per se. Psychopathology involves

the use of fantasy in a fixed, repetitive, and ultimately maladaptive way, but fantasy can also be used in a flexible, temporary, and adaptive manner as well.

It can be stated, then, that the members of the social system relate to each other by way of fantasy as well as by way of reality. This constitutes the "relatively realistic" nature of give-and-take activity. Using again the case of the paranoid member of the therapy group, while he may relate in some measure to the other members of the group through private fantasy (although a paranoid preoccupation can also be shared), he also engages in more realistic transactions with them as well. Just the fact that he maintains membership in the group and shares in its ongoing development as a therapeutic agency implies that he is taking much more than imagined malevolent intentions from the other group members. It is this mix of realistic assessment and fantasy that allows the individual to satisfy his diverse biological and psychological needs within the context of give-and-take activity.

I would now like to draw some attention to these needs and the way in which many of them are responded to simultaneously by the give-and-take activity of the individual in a particular social system. In some respects, the needs of the individual can be characterized not only as representing different degrees of reality orientation, but in a related way, as also representing different developmental stages and different levels of consciousness. It is quite possible that within the context of

one particular social system, the give-and-take activity of the individual might respond both to unconscious, infantile needs that were once experienced as being necessary for basic survival as well as to more mature, more realistic, and more specific conscious concerns having to do with day-to-day living. Participation in a tenants association, for example, might satisfy the wish to bond securely with a maternal entity as well as guarantee that the landlord will provide adequate building services for one's apartment building. The basic condition that must always be met is that at no time can there be a significant breakdown in the relatively realistic perception of others. If this condition is not met, then the behavior cannot be considered give-and-take activity, and if there is no give-and-take activity, then there can be no participation in a social system.

The Perspective of the Individual and the
Perspective of the Social System

The give-and-take activity of the individual in a social system can be seen from the point of view of two different perspectives. These two perspectives are (a) the perspective of the individual and (b) the perspective of the social system. It is important to distinguish very clearly between these two perspectives in order to fully appreciate the psychosocial perspective, for as will ultimately become evident, both are included in the psychosocial perspective. In the perspective

of the individual, the focus is on the individual as he relates to others. More specifically, although there is an assumed social system (at least one) of which the individual is a member, the conceptual focus is anchored only to the behavior of the individual as he relates to the other members of that social system, i.e., that which he gives and takes through the relational network, as opposed to the behavior of all the members of that social system as they relate to each other, i.e., that which they all give and take through the relational network. It is this latter focus which constitutes the perspective of the social system. The social systemic perspective utilizes an aerial view of all the individuals in a social system without specifically focusing on any one of them. All the members are given equal attention because the conceptual focus is anchored to the social system itself, or more specifically, to all the give-and-take activity that is expressed through the relational network.

In utilizing these two perspectives, it becomes easier to appreciate the dual function of the individual in the social system. Not only does he interact with the other members for the purpose of getting some of his own needs met, but since his own need satisfaction requires that he satisfy some of the needs of the other members, he in fact meets some of the needs of the social system per se. In this latter sense, the individual functions as a necessary component of the social system. The perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social

system can therefore be applied toward differentiating between the needs of the individual member and the needs of the social system. Furthermore, through the use of both perspectives, the individual member can be seen as responding to both sets of needs. It might well be pointed out in this regard that these two perspectives correspond to the two conceptual approaches that Ackerman (1949) called for in conceiving of the individual (as described earlier in the Introduction). Ackerman essentially stated that the personality of the individual is expressed through social participation, and that this participation is adaptive in nature with respect to (a) the individual himself and (b) the characteristics of the social groups to which he belongs.

The distinction that I have made between the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system can also be applied to the general area of relational terminology. I am specifically referring here to simple relational terms such as "social," "interpersonal," "relationship," "interaction," and the like. While these terms are usually taken for granted and used quite loosely, they are also frequently accompanied by conceptual confusion. For example, mention is often made of an individual's "interpersonal relations" as well as the "interpersonal relations" in a group. Does the term "interpersonal relations" have the same meaning in both contexts? It clearly does not. In the first context, "interpersonal relations" refers to that which is given and taken by one person with

respect to one, several, or even all of the social systems of which he is a member, while in the second context, the term refers to that which is given and taken by every member of a particular social system.

As demonstrated above, it can generally be said that relational terms are used with reference to either an individual or a social system, and as such, they call for either the perspective of the individual or the perspective of the social system, respectively. The terminological confusion that often ensues results from the fact that each perspective imbues the same term with different conceptual implications. The terms "social," "interpersonal," "relationship," "interaction," and "relations," either used by themselves or in conjunction with each other as in "social relations" or "interpersonal relationship," all imply a social systemic perspective. However, when they are used with modifiers that reflect the individual, such as in the case of "his social relations," "the individual's interaction with," "the student's interpersonal relationships," or even, for that matter, when such modifiers are not clearly stated but are nevertheless implied, as in the phrase "an interpersonal theory of personality," the perspective becomes that of the individual, or more specifically, the individual in the process of relating to others as opposed to several individuals in the process of relating to each other.

The Concept of Role and Role Characterization

I would like to return the discussion back to the concept of the social system itself. A social system can be characterized as being very small or very large, simple or complex, temporary or long-lasting, flexible or institutionalized, voluntary or compulsory, or representative of any point on the continuums established by these polarities. At the bottom line, however, it must involve a coordinated network of interpersonal relationships through which at least some needs of each member are met. It is structured as a system through the relational network, and it is because of this structuralization that the social system can be considered a unified "whole" or even a distinguishable entity. At this point I would like to focus some attention on the structure of the social system and how this structure corresponds to the give-and-take, need-satisfying activity of each individual member. In order to do this, however, it is first necessary to introduce the concept of role.

A role can be defined as the composite of the give-and-take activity of an individual within the context of a particular social system. Inasmuch as I am defining it here through the give-and-take schema, a role can be seen as servicing some of the needs of the individual as well as some of the needs of the rest of the members of the social system. In another important sense, it can also be said that the role services some of the needs of the social system itself, since, as stated before, a

social system as a whole is maintained by each member responding to some of the needs of the other members. In this light, a role can be described as the behavioral composite of an individual member of a social system not only through which some of his own needs are met, but also through which some of the needs of the social system itself are met. It will be useful here to refer back to my discussion on the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system, for both perspectives have bearing on this conception of role. The focus here is on the need-satisfying, give-and-take activity of the individual member as well as on the collective give-and-take activity that constitutes the social system as a whole. A role, in other words, is functional for the individual as well as for the social system, and in this sense, it can be said to represent the dual function of the individual within the social system.

It is largely with respect to the conceptual perspective of the social system alone, however, that social psychologists have usually discussed the concept of role. While they acknowledge the give-and-take nature of the concept, the emphasis is typically on the functional requirements of the social system, not on the specific needs of the individual. This is exemplified in the definition offered by Hare (1976):

The term role refers primarily to a set of expectations which group members share concerning the behavior of a person who occupies a position in a group....The expectations for a role for any content category of behavior may be visualized as falling somewhere in a space defined by two axes. One axis represents the behavior which the individual is expected to direct toward others and the other axis represents the behavior which others are ex-

pected to direct toward him. In both cases this behavior ranges from that which is required to that which is prohibited. (p. 150)

In a similar vein, there has been much written in the group literature about the emergence of specific roles or individual members who serve as particular "role specialists." Hare (1976) listed eight roles that usually develop in small groups: high talker, silent member, supporter, critic, serious worker, joker, conformist, and nonconformist. In studying small task-oriented groups, Bales (1965) found that two kinds of peer leaders tend to emerge -- an "instrumental" (task) leader and an "expressive" (social-emotional) leader. Dunphy (1974) distinguished between "rational" and "nonrational" roles, the latter allegedly representing important aspects of collective unconscious fantasies. Winter (1974) has pointed out that characteristics such as age, race, social class, sex, and physical attractiveness influence the "assignment" of individuals to particular roles.

What characterizes these references to the concept of role is the primary emphasis on the needs of the social system per se. While this emphasis makes sense from the perspective of the social system, it unfortunately also serves to reduce the significance of the needs of the individual himself that are met through his occupation of the role. Indeed, even the term "to occupy a role" connotes a rather dry, passive acceptance of a particular behavioral repertoire that is significant only in that it is needed by the social system in order to

function. In this framework, the concept of role loses its motivational characteristic with respect to the individual himself. It begins to take on the flavor of an imposed duty or an impersonal function one fulfills, all the while retaining a "not-me" quality. Slater (1966) warned against the notion of "the disembodied role, divested of the needs, the motives, the feelings which, however group-specific they may be, nonetheless derive from a breathing organism" (p. 251). In a similar light, Heine (1971) commented on how the concept of the individual has been adversely affected by the elaboration of role theory from what can be considered the perspective of the social system:

While the most durable criticism personality theory has brought to role analysis has been the disappearance of person into role and institutional function, similar alarums have not infrequently been raised by sociologists themselves. It is the dismal and prosaic picture of the overdetermined world of man that has most often been attacked -- a world whose theatricality has been limited to unimaginative stage sets, roles, and interactions of the "same old scenes," thus leaving scant room for personal whim or individual freedom.... Theoretically, roles may be vehicles of realization and fulfillment as well as restriction and restraint; but if so, the latter emphasis has been pushed with such proponent zeal that we can scarcely acknowledge other possibilities. (pp. 143-144)

Through the utilization of the schema of give-and-take activity, the kind of conceptual one-sidedness described by Heine with respect to the concept of role is eliminated. In the give-and-take schema, a role can be clearly perceived as the manifestation of both the individual and the social system, a manifestation which serves to meet some of the needs of both simultaneously. (It is, again, through the satisfaction of

some of the needs of the other members that some of the needs of the social system are met.) In particular, the give-and-take schema gives the concept of role a needed conceptual boost in the area of motivation and action with respect to the individual. As such, it removes the concept from the realm of impersonal, passive acceptance of external regulations. It is in this spirit that I prefer to use the term "to take a role" instead of the term "to occupy a role" since the former term has a stronger behavioral connotation, i.e., it implies personal motivation and action with respect to the individual manifesting a particular role.

The dual function implied in the concept of role clearly necessitates the simultaneous utilization of the perspectives of both the individual and the social system. It is for this reason that the term "role" has been a source of considerable conceptual confusion. With the hope of clarifying matters, Arsenian, Semrad, and Shapiro (1962) introduced the term "billet" to refer to the "recurrent patterned behaviors" in the group setting which allegedly are largely determined by the requirements of the "situation," or more specifically, by the maintenance needs of the group. They spoke of the possible "utility of distinguishing between a role concept compounded of, if not dominated by, personality factors and a billet concept primarily defined by situational features" (p. 422). Utilizing this notion of billet, Bott (1976) took an even more controversial stand by maintaining that group life is in fact

more the product of the interaction of billet functions than the product of the interaction of the individuals who comprise the group. In essence, he claimed that the needs of the social system are more important than the needs of the individual members in that the social system's needs assumedly determine the behavior of each individual. My own view with respect to these positions is that it serves no purpose, except possibly to distort matters, to divide the dual function implied in the concept of role into two separate concepts. Every role is "assigned" on one level and "chosen" on another; what is important to keep in mind is that in order to understand this phenomenon, it is necessary to maintain simultaneous correspondence with both perspectives. One must never lose sight of the fact that the needs of the individual are intimately connected to the needs of the social system.

While the characteristic of dual function does not necessitate the adoption of multiple terms for the concept of role, there is, nevertheless, some value in introducing a new role term in light of the way the term "role" is typically used. More specifically, while it is unfortunate enough that the term "role" is often associated exclusively with the perspective of the social system in the way that it is used to refer to a member's function or "position" in a social system, it becomes even more of a conceptual problem that the position that is referred to is usually one that is marked by a significant degree of generality. I am specifically referring here to

formal roles such as mother, father, student, boss, and employee, as well as to less formal roles with less specific task requirements such as friend or neighbor. There is, for example, a fairly wide range of behavioral styles or "characterizations" available with respect to taking the role of mother. While one mother may be nurturant, another may be depriving, and a third may alternate between these two modes. Even within the specific context of being nurturant or depriving, there may be many behavioral options or "ways" of being so. Furthermore, in less formal roles such as that of friend, there is even greater variability in available behavioral styles. It can therefore be said that the nature of a role can vary from person to person and from time to time. In this regard, the term "role characterization" is being introduced to refer to the specific manner in which a role is taken by a particular individual at a particular point in time. More specifically, a role characterization can be defined as the composite of an individual's give-and-take activity within a particular social system at a particular point in time.

It is the clause "at a particular point in time" that distinguishes this definition of a role characterization from my earlier definition of a role. Both imply a dual function in that both are based on give-and-take activity. What I wish to make clear is that what is conventionally referred to as a "role" in a social system can usually accommodate many different characterizations of itself over time. It can therefore be said

that a member of a social system can change his role characterization many times and still be considered to be continually taking the same role. It should be pointed out, however, that at any particular point in time, the member taking the role is manifesting only one role characterization. A teacher in a classroom, for example, may manifest several different role characterizations throughout the course of a school day. The teacher may start the morning off as a supportive, tolerant teacher, turn into a less supportive, less tolerant teacher by noon, and become an angry and rather strict teacher by the end of the day. The teacher maintains the role of teacher throughout, only the role characterizations change. The change, however, does not have to be progressive in nature. What might also happen by the end of the day is that the teacher may once more become supportive and tolerant.

The Structure of the Social System

On the basis of what has just been described, it now becomes possible to define the overall structure of the social system as the interconnection of its roles. Each member's role is a component of this structure. More specifically, each role is a behavioral component of a structure that is behavioral in nature. It is a component that, again, is not just imposed on the individual, but is also sought by him as a means of ensuring some measure of need satisfaction. As the roles are established, so is the structure of the social system. Each role is inter-

dependent and complementary with every other role in the social system in that each is based on give-and-take activity. What binds the roles together as a structure, then, is the relational network shared by the individual members.

It will soon be seen, however, that the interconnection of roles which gives structure to the social system changes over time as the nature of the roles which comprise it change. I have already pointed out that what is usually termed a "role" can be quite variable over the course of time, or more specifically, that over the course of time many different role characterizations can be manifested by an individual taking one particular role. I have also pointed out that these role characterizations are manifested one at a time, that at any particular point in time an individual taking a role in a social system is manifesting only one role characterization. With respect, then, to the structure of the social system at a particular point in time, it would be somewhat imprecise to refer to it as only an interconnection of roles; it would be more correct to refer to it as an interconnection of role characterizations. In order to avoid terminological confusion, I will henceforth refer to the latter not as an "interconnection" but rather as a "configuration" of role characterizations. In this manner, a configuration of role characterizations can be said to refer to a time-specific interconnection of roles, i.e., the structure of the social system at a particular point in time.

In order to describe the manner in which the structure of

the social system changes over time, it is first necessary to elaborate in more detail on what is implied by a configuration of role characterizations. Just as a role assumes a role characterization at any point in time, an interconnection of roles similarly assumes a configuration of role characterizations at any point in time. In this sense, much of what can be said about role characterizations with respect to a configuration of role characterizations can also be said about roles with respect to an interconnection of roles. Nevertheless, I will specifically focus here on a configuration of role characterizations because in order to describe the structure of the social system in the process of change, it is first necessary to describe that structure at a particular point in time.

Each role characterization in a configuration of role characterizations (like each role in an interconnection of roles) represents in some measure the needs and the corresponding behavior of every member of the social system since each is created by give-and-take activity that is coordinated through the shared relational network. In this sense, at any point in time, each member's need satisfaction is dependent to some degree on every role characterization in the social system. The role characterizations themselves (like the roles with which they are associated) are interdependent and complementary to each other. In some respects they can be said to be defined by each other. Each role characterization assumes the existence of the other role characterizations and the particular

configuration of which they are all a part. Indeed, it can even be said that any role characterization assumes a specific configuration of role characterizations, itself being one of them. A role characterization in this light can be considered to carry the blueprint for an entire configuration of role characterizations, much like a single chromosome carries the genetic blueprint for an entire organism.

It might be useful at this point to take a step back and discuss how a social system becomes structured in the first place. The entire structuralization process originates as a response to the inevitable problems that result when individuals attempt to interact with each other in the pursuit of need satisfaction. Bales (1953) discussed this matter in detail:

The actions of other individuals in the [group] situation are always relevant to the problems of tension reduction of any given individual, since the action of others may aid or interfere or modify his own activity in various ways. It is to the advantage of every individual in a group to stabilize the potential activity of others toward him, favorably if possible, but in any case in such a way that he can predict it. All of the individuals in the group are in the same boat as far as this problem is concerned....A basic assumption here is that what we call the "social structure" of groups can be understood primarily as a system of solutions to the functional problems of interaction. (p. 32)

It can be said that at any particular time, it is the configuration of role characterizations which serves as the "system of solutions" in the social system. Through the configuration, each member can predict the behavior of every other member and thus maximize his need satisfaction.

The social system, however, never stands still. As Bonner (1959) observed with respect to the group, the members are always

in dynamic interaction with each other and are therefore always engaged in a continuous process of adaptation to one another as well as to their mutual concerns. In this sense, the social system can be seen as an ongoing, "living" entity due to the ongoing, "living" processes of its constituent members. The structure of the social system is consequently never completely stagnant. In an interdependent manner, the members change the characterization of their roles over the course of time, resulting in a continuous flow of different configurations of role characterizations. Sometimes a member may change the characterization of his role to the extent that it would be more appropriate to say that he has actually taken a new role. All of these changes depend upon the ongoing needs of both the individual member and the social system (which includes, again, the needs of the other members). The teacher whose role characterization changed during the course of the school day may have started the day in a tolerant mode due to a personal belief in a liberal educational philosophy but then may have felt the need to tighten the reins and become a strict teacher because of the lack of impulse control on the part of the students. While every member has some range of role adaptability, he may or may not get the chance or feel the need to express this range.

This notion deserves more discussion. To begin with, it must be made clear that one social system can have many different configurations of role characterizations. More specifically, while a social system is always structured by one con-

figuration at any one time, it can ultimately manifest many different configurations over a period of time. These configurations can generally be differentiated from each other by differences in the way each member characterizes his usual role. In other words, while each configuration of role characterizations in a particular social system usually involves the same individuals (i.e., all the members of the social system) taking the same respective roles, each configuration is unique with respect to the manner in which each individual characterizes his respective role. Each configuration consequently assumes its own particular role characterizations. Because of the interdependency of role characterizations in a configuration, any change in one role characterization automatically results in some degree of change in all the others; it is through this process that a new structural configuration of role characterizations is manifested.

Perhaps it would be useful to underscore the point that I am specifically referring here to changes in structure, not to changes in membership. I am arbitrarily assuming that the entrance of any new member or the exit of any old one would formally result in a new social system, no matter how similar it might be to its forerunner. In this sense, a social system can be said to be defined by its particular individual members and structured by its consecutive configurations of role characterizations. As I mentioned earlier, a member of a social system may change the characterization of his role to such a degree that it would be more correct to say that he has actually

taken a new role in that social system. A child taking care of an alcoholic parent, for example, virtually forsakes the role of the child for the role of the parent. It is usually the case, however, that new configurations of role characterizations result from less dramatic changes, namely, from changes which do not involve the actual taking of new roles. It is worth pointing out, nevertheless, that very flexible social systems, such as a therapy group or a training group, would not always be expected to follow this pattern too closely. In these kinds of groups, it would not be unusual to find that some of the resulting configurations of role characterizations would stem from what could be considered actual role-switching within the membership.

In recognition of the complex nature of this material, I would like to offer an example that will hopefully help to clarify matters. I will consider a family social system made up of a father, mother, son, and daughter. Each takes a role with respect to the family social system. In accordance with the conceptual framework that I have just presented, it can be said that these four people define this particular social system. If a new child is born, he becomes a member of the family social system only when he is old enough to engage in give-and-take activity. However, when that time comes, the family social system that he becomes a member of is a new social system by virtue of his entering it. It is not just a new configuration of role characterizations; it is formally a whole new family

social system with now five individuals taking five different roles. Getting back to the original four members, however, each member relates to the other members and achieves some measure of need satisfaction through give-and-take activity that is expressed through the relational network. At any particular point in time, each embodies a role characterization which is coordinated with the role characterizations of the three other members of the family social system. In other words, the family social system is structured as a whole by the configuration of role characterizations which the family members embody at that time. What is important to keep in mind here is that the role characterizations change over time. A change in one role characterization will effect some degree of change in the other three, ultimately creating a new structural configuration.

To be more specific, if the father comes home from work on Friday night moody and irritable due to pressures stemming from his job, it will affect the way the other family members relate to him and to each other. In general, they might be especially careful not to act in a way that might disturb him further. His wife may become unusually responsive to him and less responsive to her children. The children may demand less of both parents and be less argumentative with each other. On Saturday morning, however, when the father is more relaxed and feeling friendlier, the rest of the family members would also be expected to behave differently. What can be said here is that the configuration of role characterizations in the

family social system will change as the father changes his role characterization from the "moody" father to the "friendly" father. The father maintains the role of father throughout, only his characterization of the role changes. Furthermore, new configurations will similarly result when other family members are compelled to initiate a change in their respective role characterizations.

In some respects, a social system is continually rearranging itself. I have repeatedly pointed out that one can speak of a "configuration" of role characterizations only within the context of a particular point in time. Assuming that I have made this point clear, I would now like to backtrack on my formal definition of the term "configuration" in order to broaden and extend it so as to make it more operational in nature with respect to this study. I will henceforth use the term "configuration" to refer to a particular patterning of role characterizations that has fairly distinguishable features and that is somewhat enduring over a particular period of time, even though more minute changes will always be assumed to be going on. In this regard, my notion of a role characterization is also being broadened and extended; it will now refer to a more general mode of give-and-take activity in that it also will be associated to a particular period of time. With respect to the example of the family social system presented above, it now becomes possible to speak more loosely of a "moody father" configuration of role characterizations that often becomes manifested on Friday nights and that lasts the entire evening. In

this light, the term "configuration" can be used in a more general way to refer to recurring interpersonal patterns of behavior within a social system as well as to periods of more unique interpersonal exchange. With respect to the family social system, the latter might involve events such as a serious illness in the family, a graduation from school, etc.

I stated previously that the structure of the social system is behavioral in nature. I have described how the give-and-take activity of the individual members is coordinated through the relational network and manifested as an interconnection of roles that provides ongoing structure to the social system. The structure is thus founded on give-and-take activity, i.e., the behavior of each member. With respect to the issue of behavior, there are some interesting implications that stem from looking at the social system through its structural framework. One implication is that there is a direct correlation between the intrapersonal and interpersonal processes that occur within a particular social system on one hand, and the processes of the social system as a whole on the other. In other words, the collective, need-satisfying, give-and-take activity within a social system, activity which is manifested as a structural interconnection of roles, embodies the behavioral processes that occur within as well as between the individual members as they relate to each other within that social system. This supports the position of the "group-centered" school of group therapy which assumes that the behavior of the individual patients in the

group can only be understood within the context of the "group-as-a-whole." Another implication of the structural framework is that the norms of the social system can be considered to be derived from the collective need to steer the behavior of each member in a direction that will comply with the structural requirements of the social system. Norms would then be expected to change as the structure of the social system changes. In this sense, it could be said that norms reinforce the structure of the social system on an ongoing basis by delimiting what can optimally be given and taken by each member through the relational network.

The Concept of the Social Environment

In the beginning of this chapter, I stated that the psychosocial perspective can be characterized as a conceptual approach which relates the individual to his social environment. The term "social environment" can now be defined as the various social systems of which a particular individual is a member. Although the word "environment" implies a relationship to a given individual who serves as a reference point, the term "social environment" as used here utilizes the perspective of the social system rather than the perspective of the individual. While this may seem a bit confusing if not contradictory at first glance, the following explanation will hopefully clarify the matter. The term "social environment" focuses squarely on the social systems of which a particular individual is a mem-

ber, i.e., it focuses on the collective give-and-take activity that is expressed through each relational network, not on the individual or the individual's relationship to others, i.e., that which he gives and takes through each relational network. The individual in this case serves only as a means to identify the particular social systems to which attention is to be directed. His significance in this regard is merely that of a common denominator.

It becomes easier to understand how an individual can simultaneously belong to many social systems when it is first understood that an individual's involvement in any particular social system is usually never one of complete "body and soul," or at least never the latter. When an individual member of a social system relates to the other members of that social system through a role, he relates to them through a specific composite of give-and-take activity in order to satisfy a specific set of his needs. He will undoubtedly behave differently through different roles, i.e., different composites of give-and-take activity, in other social systems in which he seeks satisfaction for other sets of needs. For example, a man may act quite differently with his family, with his teammates in his bowling league, and with his boss at work. Each of these involvements reflect a different social system, a different set of needs seeking satisfaction, and a different role (i.e., different behavior). With respect to the individual's different sets of needs, however, I should point out that certain needs which are particu-

larly important to the individual would tend to be reflected in many of his "sets" and thus in many of the roles that he takes, resulting in some fairly consistent behavior patterns which might be considered "characterological" in nature. In any event, any role can be said to represent only an aspect of the individual who takes it. Furthermore, it can also be said that the members of a social system only relate to aspects of each other since they relate to each other through roles. Slater (1966) discussed this notion quite cogently with respect to the group:

Sociologists have long been aware...that a group is "more" than the sum of its component individuals. It might be more productive to stress the fact that it is also a good deal less. Unless we are to remain utterly fixated on physical bodies, it is apparent that a group is not a collection of individuals at all but only pieces of them. If all of an individual were bound up in a group we could scarcely talk of an individual at all, nor of fears of or wishes for envelopment, since he would in fact be enveloped. (p. 251)

In line with this train of thought, if the assumption is made that the individual is always seeking to maximize his need satisfaction, then the assumption must also be made that he must maintain membership in many social systems. In other words, the different needs of the individual are usually satisfied through different roles within the context of different social systems. Each social system membership represents a different aspect of the individual. It is these social systems which can collectively be considered the individual's social environment. The social environment includes all of the various social systems of which the individual is an active member. The possibility that these

various social systems might be related to each other or overlap within the context of larger supersystems, ultimately leading to what Klapman (1946) called "a superorganism constituted by society," is a matter that will not be specifically addressed here.

The Individual and the Psychological Frame of Reference

I recognize that there is a significant conceptual dilemma with respect to the issue of internality/externality that is imposed on my notion of the social environment due to the use of the word "environment." Environment usually refers to conditions which are completely external to a given individual. Yet I have already described how an individual is an integral part of the social systems that make up his social environment. In this sense, it would appear that the individual is an internal component of his own environment. This seeming contradiction can be appropriately resolved if some distinction is made between the biological frame of reference and the psychological frame of reference. What I am essentially calling for here is an admittedly arbitrary differentiation between the biological organism of the individual and the psyche of the individual. In this light, it becomes possible to consider the notion that it is only through the psyche that the individual can transcend his biological organism and enter into relationships with others for need satisfaction. As Foulkes (1973) suggested, in a manner of speaking, "it is mental processes,

not persons, that interact" (p. 214).

The point that I wish to bring out is that all behavior, including give-and-take activity, can be said to emanate from the psyche, and it is therefore through the work of the psyche that the individual meets the needs of his biological organism as well as those of his psyche. The psyche is the interface between the biological organism and everything else but the organism, between that which is "inside" and that which is "outside." It is for this reason that I prefer to use the term "psychosocial" to refer to this general orientation rather than use the term "biosocial" as Ackerman (1949) did. After all, it is the individual's psyche, not his biological organism, which relates to others in the social arena.

At the risk of going too far afield, I offer here an outline that extends this line of thought even further:



While the psyche enables the individual to get his needs met within the social environment, it is the social environment that enables the individual to get his needs met within the realities of the more infinite natural environment (including the nonhuman environment). In other words, man survives the elements because of his social systems. Furthermore, the direction of influence can go both ways. The natural environment can stimulate changes down the link (such as when a flood

or an earthquake mobilizes individuals to seek or provide relief for basic biological and psychological needs) as well as be stimulated by changes that come up the link (such as when the needs of individuals require that a forest be cleared in order to make way for a housing development). With respect to the primary focus of this chapter, however, most of what has been discussed can be represented in the junction between the psyche and the social environment. This is the region of the psychosocial perspective. It is here where the individual's give-and-take activity is coordinated through various relational networks and manifested as roles within the context of various social systems. More specifically, it is here where the needs of the individual and the needs of the social systems of which he is a member are both represented.

Getting back to the issue of internality/externality with respect to the individual and his social environment, there is certainly no question that an individual member of a social system exists biologically as a distinct organism, a composite of organic tissue that is separate from the other biological organisms that make up the rest of the social system. Although he may be involved in social relations with the other members, these members are in this physical sense external to him and can be considered to constitute an external environment. On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the individual lives psychologically (and ultimately survives biologically) not as a distinct organism but only as part of a social system.

The focus here is on the individual's behavior. The individual is conceived in this context as a conglomerate of roles, i.e., composites of give-and-take activity, which exist only in relation to the roles of other such conglomerates. In this sense, it is impossible to separate the individual from the other members of the social systems of which he is a member.

Thus, while the word "environment" in the term "social environment" serves as a reminder of the organic separateness of the individual from those with whom he relates, the word "social" brings to the term the psychological frame of reference. The social environment can consequently be considered external to the biological individual at the same time that it includes the psychological individual. It is, however, the psychological frame of reference rather than the biological frame of reference that has been, and will continue to be, reflected in this study. As stated before, it is through the psyche that the individual responds to his bodily needs as well as to his psychological needs. The individual, from this point of view, has no "life" (behaviorally speaking) except through his psychological processes, manifested as behavior that is coordinated and interdependent with the behavior of other individuals. As Rice (1969) put it, "'Individual' has...little meaning as a concept except in relationships with others. He uses them and they him, to express views, take action and play roles. The individual is a creature of the group, the group of the individual" (p. 577).

From a similar perspective, Foulkes (1973) maintained that "psychology is...neither 'individual' nor 'group' except by abstraction. We cannot speak about the individual without reference to the group, nor about a human group which does not consist of individuals" (p. 215).

I wish to emphasize here that my notion of the social environment is different from Kurt Lewin's (1951) concept of the "psychological environment," even though Lewin also struggled with the conceptual dilemma of representing both person and environment as part of one whole situation. The difference results from the fact that Lewin maintained that the psychological environment was completely distinct from the person as they both exist and interact within the boundary of the "life space" -- his term for the totality made up of these two factors. This lack of overlap contrasts with my notion of the social environment, which includes the person with respect to his give-and-take activity, i.e., his behavior. Lewin ultimately failed to go beyond the biological frame of reference and thus could not fully appreciate the influence of the relational network, for it is the relational network which conceptually opens the boundary between the person and his environment, at least from a behavioral point of view.

The Psychosocial Perspective

On the basis of all that has been presented in this chapter, it is now possible to arrive at a more specific notion of what is meant by the psychosocial perspective. I originally stated that

the term "psychosocial" refers to a conceptual orientation which relates the individual to his social environment. In this regard, I have tried to clarify what is specifically implied in my use of the terms "individual" and "social environment." Such clarification, however, required the development of a model of the social system and the concept of give-and-take activity. With respect to the complexity of this material, I offer here a summary that will hopefully help to pull together the major ideas that have been presented into a more unified statement.

The individual has been discussed from the point of view of his behavior. Behavior has been defined as psychological and/or motor action that is directed toward need satisfaction. It has been pointed out that it is within the context of the social system that the individual "behaves." More specifically, it is through his active participation in social systems that the individual functioning beyond the developmental level of infancy finds satisfaction for his biological and psychological needs. It has also been pointed out, however, that the maintenance of any social system requires some taxation of all of its members. This means that in order to maintain the social system in which some of his own needs are met, each member must provide satisfaction for some of the needs of the other members. In this sense, each member gives as well as takes some measure of need satisfaction. All the giving and taking is accomplished through a relational network which all the members of the social system share. It is through this relational network that every

member is related in some degree to every other member. In this respect, the relational network can be said to represent the flow of all the give-and-take activity in the social system.

I have stated that give-and-take activity is behavior that is post-infantile in nature. It is post-infantile in that it requires the capacity to realistically perceive others as separate from oneself, as whole persons with characteristics of their own. If the individual does not have this capacity, then he cannot be a formal member of a social system simply because he cannot effectively barter need satisfaction with other individuals on the level of reality. Consequently, the behavior of the infant, or for that matter, of any individual who significantly blurs the distinction between himself and others, such as an acute psychotic, cannot be considered give-and-take activity.

On the other hand, I have also pointed out that the level of reality that serves as the context for give-and-take activity is not always so "level." In other words, the realistic perception of others that characterizes give-and-take activity is actually "relatively realistic" in nature. While basic self-other differentiation is assumed (unlike the infantile mode of behavior), some of the characteristics of others may nevertheless be seen in a distorted fashion. There is consequently always some leeway in give-and-take activity for the use of fantasy toward the pursuit of need satisfaction, in addition to the use of reality-oriented transactions. In this respect, some of what is given and taken through the relational network

is not always actively (i.e., behaviorally) given or taken, but rather is only assumed to be given or taken. Some need satisfaction can thus be elicited in the social system solely through the fantasy of the elicitor. I also mentioned that fantasy can be shared as well. It is because the members of the social system use each other as fantasy stimuli at the same time that they engage in realistic transactions with each other that a great assortment of needs, representing different levels of reality orientation, can be satisfied within the context of one social system.

I have proposed that the give-and-take activity of the individual in a social system can be seen from the point of view of two different perspectives -- that of the individual and that of the social system. The former perspective is concerned with that which the individual member gives and takes through the relational network in order to satisfy some of his needs, while the latter is concerned with that which is given and taken by all the members of the social system in order to maintain the social system. That the individual satisfies some of his needs through his give-and-take activity in a social system is a notion that has already been discussed at length. What must be made clear, however, is that the needs of the individual are not the only needs that are met through his give-and-take activity. More specifically, since his activity also involves the satisfaction of some of the needs of the other members, in another sense it can be said that the individual's give-and-take activity also

satisfies some of the maintenance needs of the social system as a whole. The individual member can therefore be considered to have a dual function in the social system in that his give-and-take activity is functional with respect to the satisfaction of (a) some of his own needs as well as (b) some of the needs of the social system. The perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system both serve to fortify the distinction between these two sets of needs. At the same time, it can also be seen that in the notion of dual function both perspectives are employed simultaneously.

The composite of the individual's give-and-take activity within a particular social system has been formally defined as a role. It is, then, a role that most succinctly represents the dual function of the individual in the social system. In other words, since a role is based on the individual's give-and-take activity in the social system, it can be seen as a manifestation of both the individual and the social system, a manifestation which serves to meet some of the needs of both simultaneously. With respect to this dual function, the concept of role requires the simultaneous utilization of both the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system. It has been demonstrated, however, that in conventional usage, the term "role" is often employed in a way that overlooks the perspective of the individual. This is indeed unfortunate, for from the very start, a role is behavioral in nature with respect to the individual who takes it; it originates in the individual's wish

and endeavor to satisfy some of his own needs. It is only because this need satisfaction is dependent on the give-and-take context of the social system that a role must also respond to some of the needs of the social system (which, again, includes some of the needs of the other members). In the end, it can be said that a role is both "chosen" by the individual who takes it as well as "assigned" to him by the social system.

While the term "role" is often conventionally used to refer to a member's function or "position" in the social system (which, again, serves to accent the social systemic perspective), another conceptual problem arises in that the position that is usually referred to is one that is marked by a significant degree of generality. I have demonstrated how what is commonly referred to as a "role" can vary considerably from person to person and from time to time. In this respect, I have introduced the term "role characterization" to refer to the specific manner in which a role is taken by a particular individual at a particular time. It can consequently be said that a role taken by an individual in a social system can accommodate many different characterizations of itself over the course of time, although only one role characterization can be accommodated at a time. A role characterization can therefore be defined as the composite of the individual's give-and-take activity within a particular social system at a particular time.

The overall structure of the social system has been defined as the interconnection of its roles. I am referring here to a

structure that is, again, behavioral in nature. Each member's role is a component of this structure, and each role is interdependent and complementary with every other role in the social system in that each is based on give-and-take activity. In this sense, it can be said that the roles are bound together as a structure by the relational network which all the members share. I have also pointed out, however, that the structure of the social system changes over time as the members change the characterization of their roles. With this in mind, I have referred to the structure of the social system at a particular time as a "configuration" of role characterizations rather than as just an interconnection of roles. A configuration of role characterizations can therefore be said to refer to a time-specific interconnection of roles. Just as a role assumes a role characterization at any particular time, an interconnection of roles similarly assumes a configuration of role characterizations at any particular time.

Like the roles in an interconnection of roles, the role characterizations in a configuration of role characterizations are interdependent and complementary to each other. Each role characterization assumes the existence (behaviorally speaking) of the other role characterizations in the particular configuration of which they are all a part. It can even be said that any role characterization assumes a specific configuration of role characterizations, itself being one of them. Because of the interdependency of the role characterizations in a particular configuration, any change in one role characterization

will result in some degree of change in all the others; it is in this manner that new configurations of role characterizations become manifested in the social system.

Although the social system is initially structured as an interactional solution that allows each member to predict the behavior of the other members in order to maximize need satisfaction, it remains structured in an ongoing manner by changing configurations of role characterizations. While each configuration usually involves the same individuals (i.e., all the members of the social system) taking the same respective roles, each configuration is unique with respect to the manner in which each individual characterizes his respective role. I have made a distinction between membership and structure by pointing out that the social system is defined by its particular members while it is structured by its consecutive configurations of role characterizations. Regarding these consecutive configurations, I have also mentioned that in some instances a member may change the characterization of his role to the extent that it would be more correct to say that he has actually taken a new role. In any event, while each configuration is ultimately unique, a social system would also tend to manifest some basic, recurring interpersonal patterns of behavior which would be expected to appear over the course of time in configurations of similar form. I have also touched on how the norms of the social system reinforce its changing structure, i.e., the changing configurations of role characterizations, by delimit-

ing on an ongoing basis what each member can optimally give and take through the relational network.

The social environment was described as being comprised of the various social systems of which a particular individual is a member, i.e., the social systems in which he takes a role. Despite the usual implications of the word "environment," i.e., its reliance on an individual as a reference point, I stressed that the term "social environment" assumes only the perspective of the social system; it refers to the collective give-and-take activity (as opposed to just the individual's give-and-take activity) expressed through the relational network of each of the social systems of which the individual is a member. With respect to the individual's multiple social system membership, I described how an individual's participation in any social system, i.e., his role, represents only an aspect of that individual since his role reflects a specific composite of give-and-take activity that is oriented toward satisfying a specific set of his needs. The other roles that he takes in other social systems represent other aspects of the individual, i.e., they reflect other composites of give-and-take activity oriented toward satisfying other sets of needs. It was also suggested that these various sets of needs would nevertheless be expected to overlap somewhat, the overlap manifesting itself in what could be considered the characterological features of the individual's behavior. Since a role represents only an aspect of the individual who takes it, it would also follow that the

members of a social system only relate to aspects of each other since they ultimately relate to each other through roles. The central notion being proposed, however, is that the different needs of any particular individual are usually satisfied through the taking of different roles within the context of different social systems, and that each social system membership, i.e., each taking of a role, represents a different aspect of that individual. It is these social systems which can collectively be considered the individual's social environment.

A conceptual dilemma arises, however, in that the social environment includes the individual himself as part of the social systems of which it is comprised. In order to explain how an individual can be considered an internal component of his own "environment," I have distinguished between the biological and the psychological frame of reference with respect to the individual. In other words, I have made an arbitrary differentiation between the biological organism and the psyche of the individual. I have further stated that all behavior, including give-and-take activity, can be said to emanate from the psyche, that it is through his psyche that the individual can transcend his biological organism, enter into relationships with others, and in this manner, meet the needs of both his biological organism and the psyche itself. I described the psyche as the interface between the biological organism and everything else but the organism, between that which is "inside" and that which is "outside." The term "psychosocial"

reflects this notion; it implies that it is the individual's psyche, not his biological organism, which relates to others in the social arena. In this respect, I have also suggested that while the psyche enables the individual to get his needs met within the social environment, it is the social environment that ultimately enables the individual to get his needs met within the more infinite natural environment, which includes the nonhuman environment. This study, however, is specifically focused on the junction between the psyche and the social environment for this is the conceptual region of the psychosocial perspective. It is here where the individual's give-and-take activity is coordinated through various relational networks and manifested as roles within the context of various social systems.

In using this admittedly arbitrary conceptual differentiation between the biological organism and the psyche, it becomes easier to consider the notion that while the individual exists biologically as a distinct organism separate from the other biological organisms that make up the rest of the social systems of which he is a member, he lives psychologically (and ultimately survives biologically) not as a distinct organism but only as part of these various social systems. The individual is conceived here with respect to his behavior; he is seen as a conglomerate of roles, i.e., of composites of give-and-take activity, which exist only in relation to the roles of other such conglomerates. In this sense, it becomes impossible to separate the individual from the other members of the social

systems of which he is a member. On the basis of this argument, the social environment can therefore be considered external to the biological individual at the same time that it includes the the psychological individual.

The psychosocial perspective has now been described and summarized. While it was simply defined at the beginning of this chapter as an orientation which relates the individual to his social environment, the specific implications of what is meant by the terms "individual" and "social environment" have at this point been elaborated in great detail. The individual has been described in the act of "behaving" -- in particular, behaving in relation to others within the context of give-and-take activity in order to satisfy some of his own needs as well as, ultimately, some of the needs of the others. This behavior can be considered relational in nature; it involves relational give-and-take processes. It assumes the existence of need-satisfying social systems of which the individual is both a contributing member and a recipient. Since both the individual and his social environment are implied in the psychosocial perspective, the psychosocial perspective includes both the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system. It is in this context that the concept of role can be considered the basic psychosocial unit. Through his roles, the individual simultaneously responds to his own needs as well as to the requirements of the social systems that make up his social environment. It is this dual function of the individual that is truly

psychosocial in nature.

While the psychosocial perspective offers a useful framework for understanding the manner in which the individual satisfies his needs within the social arena, it does not, as I stated earlier, constitute a conceptual model of the individual. More specifically, it is not a model of the personality. While the term "personality" can be closely associated with the term "psyche" since it also implies behavior, it is more specific in nature in that it refers to the individual's more enduring give-and-take tendencies, i.e., his characteristic behavior. In the 1980 edition of A Psychiatric Glossary published by the American Psychiatric Association, the term "personality" was defined as "the characteristic way in which a person thinks, feels, and behaves; the ingrained pattern of behavior that each person evolves, both consciously and unconsciously, as the style of life or way of being in adapting to the environment." Hinsie and Campbell (1970) presented a similar definition in the fourth edition of their reference work, Psychiatric Dictionary, adding that "the personality represents a compromise between inner drives and needs, and the controls that limit or regulate their expression. Such controls are both internal (e.g. 'conscience,' 'superego') and external (reality demands). The personality functions to maintain a stable, reciprocal relationship between the person and his environment."

With respect to descriptive phrases such as "in adapting to the environment," "a compromise between inner drives and...

controls," and "reciprocal relationship between the person and his environment," the psychosocial perspective can be seen as a conceptual ingredient in the traditional concept of the personality. It is an ingredient, however, that is usually not elaborated upon. What usually does command much discussion are two other aspects of the personality which are reflected in such notions as an "evolving" pattern of behavior and "internal" controls. More specifically, the personality is said (a) to have structure, and (b) to undergo development.

I stated previously that while some of what is given and taken through the relational network by each member of a social system is usually similar in nature, some of what is given and taken is also quite unique due to the idiosyncratic needs of each member. I pointed out that these idiosyncratic needs are the result of the member's constitutional features and his previous experience. In a different but related context, I also suggested that the needs that the individual meets through his give-and-take activity in a social system generally reflect different levels of reality orientation, which correspond to different stages of development and different levels of consciousness. In other words, the individual who takes a role and participates as a member of a social system brings with him not only needs that are rooted in present reality, but also more unconscious needs that are rooted in his past development. This past development would consequently include, among other things, his previous social system experiences. This means

that some of the needs that motivate an individual to take a particular role in a particular social system stem from his experiences in previous social systems, experiences that have become "internalized" within the structure of his personality and continue to influence his present functioning.

A true psychosocial conception of the individual consequently requires a model of the personality that has the potential to be more fully responsive to the psychosocial perspective in the realm of both structure and development. It is the psychoanalytic model of the personality that most easily lends itself to this kind of approach. Using the psychoanalytic framework, I will discuss in Chapter IV the manner by which the individual's social system experiences can become "internalized" within the structure of his personality. But first, I will review some of the past and present psychoanalytic literature in order to delineate what will prove to be a long-standing kinship between the psychosocial perspective and psychoanalytic thought regarding the individual. This review will not only serve to bolster my claim regarding the psychosocial potential of the psychoanalytic model, but it will also help pave a conceptual path to the material that will be presented later on.

Chapter II

PSYCHOANALYTIC THOUGHT AND THE PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE

In some respects, it can be said that the psychosocial perspective has always been an inherent aspect of psychoanalytic thought regarding the individual personality. In 1921, Freud himself alluded to the psychosocial framework at the beginning of his book, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego:

The contrast between individual psychology and social or group psychology, which at a first glance may seem to be full of significance, loses a great deal of its sharpness when it is examined more closely. It is true that individual psychology is concerned with the individual man and explores the paths by which he seeks to find satisfaction for his instinctual impulses; but only rarely and under certain exceptional conditions is individual psychology in a position to disregard the relations of this individual to others. In the individual's mental life someone else is invariably involved, as a model, as an object, as a helper, as an opponent; and so from the very first individual psychology, in this extended but entirely justifiable sense of the words, is at the same time social psychology as well. (p.1)

In the course of this chapter, the relationship between the psychosocial perspective and psychoanalytic thought will be explored with respect to the development of the latter. What will become increasingly clear is that as psychoanalytic theory has evolved, its capacity for accommodating the psychosocial perspective has increased as well. I will begin the discussion by looking more closely at the original Freudian position and then proceed to examine some of the theoretic-

cal developments that followed.

The Freudian Viewpoint

As implied in the passage above, Freud maintained that the individual ultimately requires "objects," particularly other individuals, in order to satisfy his "instinctual impulses," or biologically-derived needs. While the need for social relations was therefore not disputed, Freud's conceptual emphasis was nevertheless clearly on the individual himself, particularly on his biological nature and his intrapsychic contents, not on the individual's involvement within his social environment. It is this emphasis on the individual alone as the unit of study that has prompted considerable criticism to the Freudian approach. Parsons (1958), for example, pointed out that Freud's theory has often been interpreted in a way which suggests "the relative unimportance of society and culture, except as these constitute agencies of the undesirable frustration of man's instinctual needs" (p. 321). Erikson (1946) apparently had this kind of interpretation in mind when he complained that classical psychoanalysis made only "patronizing tributes to the existence of 'social forces'" (p. 359).

It can be seen, nevertheless, that while Freud did not elaborate a formal psychosocial conception of the individual, it is possible to extrapolate from his work a psychosocial orientation of sorts just the same. Otto Fenichel, a strong

advocate of the orthodox Freudian view, attempted to clarify how Freud's biological orientation did not really limit the influence of social experience, but rather was ultimately dependent on it. In essence, Fenichel laid the foundation for clarifying the relationship between the biological and the psychological frame of reference:

The instinctual needs are the raw material formed by the social influences...Different "biological constitutions" contain manifold possibilities; yet they are not realities but potentialities. It is experience, that is, the cultural conditions, that transforms potentialities into realities, that shapes the real mental structure of man by forcing his instinctual demands into certain directions, by favoring some of them and blocking others, and even by turning parts of them against the rest. (1945, p. 588)

In a review of Erich Fromm's book, Escape from Freedom, Fenichel elaborated further on this matter:

Freud says: Man is an instinctual being, driven by innate forces. Fromm says: Man is first a social being. There is no contradiction between these two statements. A man is a social being because he cannot feel instinctively satisfied without other beings...But what does Fromm state? According to him Freud said that the human individual is, first of all, a secluded entity with certain instinctual demands, and only secondarily he asks for other individuals whom he needs as instruments for his satisfaction. Freud never said that. If we assume that there is something like a "primary narcissism," the embryo or infant in this stage is no human being yet. According to Freud the human being becomes a human being (an "ego") by entering into "interrelations" with other human beings. (1944, p. 139)

The implication here is that the psyche (limited to the ego in this context) evolves in response to the impetus of the individual's biological needs, which can only be satisfied through social means, or more specifically, "interrelations" with other individuals. Fenichel pointed out that the Freudian

view assumes that the ego is in fact established through relationships with others. What is also interesting to note is that a "true" human being is defined here along developmental lines, i.e., as an individual who is mature enough to engage in social relations with other "true" human beings. This notion correlates with my earlier claim that give-and-take activity is post-infantile in nature.

Part of the difficulty in appreciating the psychosocial aspects of Freud's work stems from the rather indirect way in which the give-and-take schema was utilized. The giving and taking of need satisfaction was not discussed so much with respect to the individual's actual social behavior as it was with respect to the individual's intrapsychic activity. For example, in his early topographical model, Freud elaborated on the individual's need to repress some of his wishes into the unconscious. This is an indirect example of giving need satisfaction to others since repression can be seen as a response to the demands of "social reality,"¹ i.e., to the norms of the social systems that make up the individual's social environment. From a similar standpoint, the functional coordination of the id, ego, and superego in Freud's later

¹With reference to the diagram presented in Chapter I, it can be said that the individual's "reality" is constituted by both his social environment and the larger natural environment. Reality, in this light, can therefore be conceptually differentiated into "social reality" and "natural reality," even though the former exists within the context of the latter.

structural model of the personality can also be said to reflect the process by which the individual negotiates need satisfaction with others within his social environment. Freud considered the superego the primary representative of the social context, especially social norms, and once the superego was established, its influence within the tripartite system was considered to be present at all times.

Perhaps Freud's most direct application of the give-and-take schema was in his elaboration of the oedipal situation. Here it can clearly be seen that in the act of renouncing the wish for exclusive possession of his mother, the young boy does not just "give in" to the wishes of his family (and ultimately the larger social order), but he also gains support for, among other things, establishing a viable gender identity. In other words, he gives as well as takes need satisfaction through the relational network of the family social system. Not surprisingly, Freud maintained that it is within the context of the oedipal situation, which corresponds to the developmental period in which the individual first becomes able to use the mode of give-and-take activity, that the superego becomes established.

While it is possible to draw out evidence of psychosocial thinking in much of Freud's work, it would nevertheless be inappropriate to formally consider Freud a psychosocial theorist. There is certainly ample justification to the

criticism that major aspects of his theory, notably the importance he attached to the sexual drive and the related notion of psychosexual development, are too biologically-oriented, and that his concern with intrapsychic formulations, i.e., his intrapersonal focus, overshadowed interpersonal, i.e., social system, considerations. In some respects, it can be said that Freud did not fully appreciate how the intrapersonal and the interpersonal go hand-in-hand, a correspondence which has become increasingly appreciated in psychoanalytic thought, especially in the area of object relations theory. Nevertheless, he did provide a useful model of the personality, a model which not only offered a meaningful structural framework, but one which also possessed great potential for future conceptual development.

Burrow's Phyloanalysis

The early years of the psychoanalytic movement were largely dominated by the Freudian emphasis on the individual as a distinct entity. Little work was done to formulate in a more direct manner a conception of the individual's behavior as a product of his social roles, past and present. Using, again, Ackerman's (1949) notion that the personality is expressed through social participation that is responsive to both the needs of the individual and the needs of the groups to which he belongs, it could be said that early psychoanalytic thought was primarily focused on the former needs and

only slightly attentive (at least in any direct manner) to the latter needs. When social relations were considered, there was usually an emphasis on what the subject required from the object for his own gratification, and considerably less regard for what the object (or the social system as a whole) required from the subject.

Trigant Burrow (1927a, 1927b) was a psychoanalytic theorist whose work represented a dramatic exception to this trend. Although he was one of the founding members of the American Psychoanalytic Association in 1911, having studied with both Freud and Jung, his views concerning the need to treat patients in group settings and to focus on social relations ultimately estranged him from the early orthodox psychoanalytic community. Burrow called his approach "phyloanalysis" and his argument in support of it was as controversial for his time as it was eloquent:

I have come to the position that, with respect to the organism of man, an analysis, which presupposes the isolation and private examination of the individual elements apart from their instinctive racial congeners, leaves out of account the larger societal organism of which the individuals are a part and without which it is not possible for them to survive in their coherent unitary life. Such an isolated process of analysis, when applied to the individual of the species man, destroys the organic integrity of the organism as a group or race as truly as we destroy the integrity of the organism composing the flower when we isolate its petal or leaf in order to examine it apart from its structural continuity with the whole. The organic principle uniting the group or societal aggregate represents functional solidarity; the isolated element represents its disruption. So that the analysis of the individual element is contradictory to the preservation of the whole. In other words, the continuity of the group and the isolation of the individual are processes which are of their nature exclusive of one another. (1927a, p. 270)

While Burrow was rather unique in stressing the importance of what can be considered the individual's ongoing involvement within his social environment and the "functional solidarity" that results from it, his position was nevertheless not without major conceptual limitations. He postulated, for example, the existence of a species-wide instinctual drive -- the "organic principle of consciousness" -- which supposedly acts to influence and bind together all human beings. He also stressed that the contemporary social order operates contrarily to this organic principle, resulting in a society-wide "social neurosis." Individual psychopathology was seen as the individual's maladaptation to this social neurosis, i.e., as an inability to respond to the demands of a sick society. While Freud emphasized the individual at the expense of the social environment, Burrow was guilty of emphasizing the social environment at the expense of the individual. Both utilized a rather excessive biological orientation. It is also apparent that Burrow tended to view social systems, at least in the way that they are typically manifested, in a decidedly negative cast (e.g., as manifesting the "social neurosis") and thus could not fully appreciate the more helpful, supportive aspects of social system involvement.

Sullivan's Interpersonal Theory

While Burrow's emphasis on the social environment was generally disregarded in the early psychoanalytic circles, in the late 1930's what has been called the "culturist" school

began to make its mark on the way in which the individual personality was conceived. This school of thought placed a strong emphasis on the social roots of behavior, and its most influential theorist was Harry Stack Sullivan.

Sullivan (1953a, 1953b, 1964) developed a view of the individual based solely on interpersonal relations. While he specifically defined the personality as "the relatively enduring pattern of recurrent interpersonal situations which characterize a human life" (1953b, pp. 110-111), his general approach has perhaps been best summarized by his students, Thompson and Mullahy (1950): "[Sullivan] holds that, given a biological substrate, the human is the product of the interaction with other human beings, that it is out of the personal and social forces [italics mine] acting upon one from the day of birth that the personality emerges" (p. 211). It could thus be argued that Sullivan had a basic awareness that in order to understand the nature of the personality and its development, importance must be placed on both the needs of the individual and the needs of the social systems in which the individual is ultimately obligated to participate.

Since he considered the individual to be dependent on other individuals for need satisfaction, Sullivan maintained that the individual's behavior is to a large extent directed toward "interpersonal security." He pointed out, however, that the attainment of interpersonal security is often hindered by enduring "parataxic distortions," a concept which goes beyond

the traditional psychoanalytic notion of transference to include the perception of any person, in or out of the psychotherapy setting, that is based on fantasy. The fantasy usually stems from the investment of that person with characteristics that are actually typical of other persons in the individual's past or present life. Sullivan's treatment plan was consequently aimed at correcting these distortions, which would enable the individual to participate more collaboratively and abundantly with others in order to obtain satisfaction within the context of more realistic and more mutually-satisfying relationships.

Sullivan did not construct an intrapsychic model of the personality, but he did introduce the concept of the "self-system," which he described as consisting of all of the interpersonal security "operations" the individual customarily employs in his relationships with others. He also formulated a model of individual development based on the evolution of interpersonal experience. This model utilizes three different experiential "modes" -- the prototaxic, the parataxic, and the syntactic. In the Sullivanian framework, the prototaxic mode refers to the undifferentiated (and thus noninterpersonal) experience of infancy. As the individual matures and begins to distinguish himself from others, he begins to become interpersonally-oriented. His first experience of others, however, is dominated by the parataxic mode, which is characterized by thoughts and perceptions which are primarily idiosyncratic in

nature and not well oriented to logic or to the reality of those around him. Gradually, the individual begins to make use of shared communicative symbols, particularly but not exclusively language, which facilitate the process of "consensual validation." Consensual validation refers to the way in which interpersonal activity becomes experienced and understood from a collective frame of reference. When the individual, in his attempt to achieve interpersonal security, can participate in the process of consensual validation with others within what Sullivan called an "interpersonal field," he is said to be experiencing the syntactic mode.

The concept of consensual validation highlights the notion that much of what is considered "reality"¹ ultimately involves shared, subjective experience. It is interesting to note in this regard that even the term "consciousness" originally stems from the Latin word "consciens," meaning "knowing something with others." The concept of consensual validation also bears some relevance to the way in which the give-and-take activity in a social system is coordinated through the relational network. Sullivan recognized how shared symbols, such as words as well as non-verbal gestures, help in the process of negotiating mutual need satisfaction, and how one's continuing inability to effectively use such tools is indicative of psychopathology. In their work on communication, Ruesch and Bateson

¹It is specifically "social reality" as opposed to "natural reality" that is, again, being referred to here.

(1951) elaborated on this latter notion in great detail:

The schizophrenic patient...tends to be unaware of the fact that human relations are multi-polar phenomena; he assigns himself a role and neglects the fact that roles are determined by a mutual relationship. In the past this phenomenon was called autistic thinking; we prefer to see it as a distortion which makes a schizophrenic unaware of his impact upon others, though he maximizes the coercive aspects of the messages which others may have for him....This distortion of communication prevents the schizophrenic, first, from receiving messages correctly and, second, from correcting information which he already possesses....The psychoneurotic patient, in contrast, ...tends to flood others with messages, in an attempt to coerce them into accepting roles they are not willing to assume....Neurotics, instead of correcting the messages which they transmit unsuccessfully, essentially repeat the same message over and over in the hope that eventually it will be understood. If the term "psychosis" is reserved for people whose communication processes are primarily disrupted in the sphere of perception, the term "neurosis" refers to difficulties in the area of transmission of messages to others. (pp. 88-89)

Within the Sullivanian framework, give-and-take activity, which was previously described as being "relatively realistic" in nature, can be considered to consist of behavior that is simultaneously representative of the parataxic as well as the syntactic mode. As pointed out in the first chapter, the behavior of the individual in a social system is fueled by needs which are shared with other members of the social system as well as by needs which are idiosyncratic in nature. It was also pointed out that some of the idiosyncratic needs of the individual are satisfied through the use of private, unshared fantasy. It is in this sense that give-and-take activity can be associated to both the parataxic and syntactic modes. It must be stressed, however, that give-and-take activity would

always require at least some syntactic capacity from all of the individuals involved simply because a common framework for interpersonal negotiation could not be established within the context of the parataxic mode alone. As brought out above, too much of a reliance on the distortions of the parataxic mode would represent a psychopathological state as defined by the inability to engage in effective social relations.

Sullivan's work clearly called for a more direct application of the psychosocial perspective to personality theory. While acknowledging the "biological substrate" of the personality, Sullivan underlined the notion that the behavior of the individual must ultimately be considered within the context of the behavior of others. It is in this sense that the give-and-take schema is implied in much of his work. Even within the context of the psychotherapeutic setting, he emphasized that the therapist is not a neutral "blank screen," but is rather an observing participant in an interpersonal exchange.

Despite its basic foundation, however, Sullivanian theory does fall short as a psychosocial conception of the individual in several key areas. Although the notion of give-and-take activity seems to be present in much of his thinking, Sullivan constructed his position primarily from the perspective of the individual, i.e., that which the individual gives and takes through the relational network in order to satisfy his own needs, and gave much less attention to the perspective of the social system, i.e., that which all the members give

and take through the relational network in order to maintain the social system. It should be kept in mind here that interpersonal relations, at least as defined by the syntactic mode, would automatically assume the establishment of a social system. Sullivan's lack of equal emphasis on both perspectives resulted in his not being able to fully appreciate the dual function of the individual within the interpersonal setting, as manifested by his role, and the extent to which role behavior constitutes interpersonal events. It is in this respect that his theory does not achieve the level of conceptual depth that it otherwise might have.

It is also unfortunate that Sullivan did not formulate a viable personality model. Although he claimed to be interested only in observable interpersonal events and was critical of the use of inferences anchored to an assumed intrapsychic framework, his view of behavior is nevertheless based significantly on the influence of previous interpersonal (including social system) experiences. His theory can therefore be considered somewhat deficient in that it lacks a conceptual explanation as to how these previous experiences are stored up by the individual and how they come to influence his present behavior. Such an explanation would require a conception of the personality that is responsive to structural considerations, as Freud's intrapsychic model was, at the same time that it takes into account the influence of the individual's evolving interpersonal experience within the context of his

evolving social environment. Perhaps it was with respect to the growing need for just this kind of conception that ego psychology developed as a major direction in psychoanalytic thought.

Hartmann's Ego Psychology

Ego psychology originated as an attempt to extend psychoanalysis to a broader theory of general psychology. Its orientation is based largely on the work of Heinz Hartmann, although there have been many other important contributors who have helped in shaping its theoretical development. In contrast to Freud's earlier emphasis on the importance of the id and its role in generating conflicts, Hartmann (1939, 1964) focused both on the ego as the dominant substructure of the intrapsychic system and on the conflict-free, autonomous potentialities that are available to it. More specifically, he maintained that (a) the ego is not just a by-product of the conflict between the id and reality, as Freud suggested, but rather it evolves with the id from an original undifferentiated matrix, and (b) the ego has available to it a conflict-free sphere of inborn autonomous "apparatuses" which control such important processes as perception, comprehension, imagery, memory, and action. Hartmann also assumed that as the ego becomes differentiated, the energy for its ongoing processes is supplied through the neutralization of both libidinal and aggressive instinctual drives.

Hartmann's emphasis on the ego could in some respects be seen as a reflection of what was then the orthodox psychoanalytic community's growing (and more direct) appreciation of the influence of the social environment. It is, after all, through the facilities of the ego that the individual is said to actively relate to the world around him. A cornerstone of Hartmann's work is, in fact, his concept of "adaptation," a notion based on the "reciprocal relationship between the organism and its environment" (1939, p. 24). Adaptation refers to the way in which the individual "fits" into his environment, a process which assumes both autoplasmic and alloplasmic activity. Autoplasmic activity refers to the efforts of the individual to effect changes within himself while alloplasmic activity refers to the individual's efforts to effect changes within the environment. The process of adaptation, in other words, involves the individual continually responding to the environment as well as making sure that he is continually being responded to by the environment. The give-and-take quality of this notion is evident -- giving need satisfaction to others requires responses from oneself while taking need satisfaction from others requires the elicitation of responses from others. I have shown that within the context of the social system both kinds of responses occur simultaneously, that it is through the act of giving need satisfaction to others that the individual elicits need-satisfying responses from them as well.

Hartmann stressed that the process of adaptation is in-

fluenced not only by the constitution of the individual and the environment, but also by the individual's stage of development. It should be kept in mind here that in his effort to elaborate a general psychology, Hartmann was interested in the process of normal development. He referred to the growth of the individual within the context of the "average expectable environment," and suggested that at any point in time within the life of the individual, there are particular needs on the part of both the individual and the average expectable environment which must be reckoned with within the context of adaptation. These two sets of needs, however, are not so unrelated to each other, for as Hartmann also pointed out:

Man adapts to an environment part of which has not, but part of which has already been molded by his kind and himself. Man not only adapts to the community but also actively participates in creating the conditions to which he must adapt. Man's environment is molded increasingly by man himself. Thus the crucial adaptation man has to make is to the social structure, and his collaboration in building it. (1939, p. 31)

It becomes clear that in Hartmann's use of the term "environment," reference is actually being made to the concept of the social environment that was developed in the first chapter. Hartmann recognized that the individual is a contributing member of his own social context, within which his needs are met. The notion of the individual participating in his changing environment can actually be said to refer to the individual's ongoing role contributions to the social systems that make up his evolving social environment. In any event, it is much to Hartmann's credit that while he elaborated on the

individual's influence on the environment, he elaborated equally on the influence of the environment per se on the individual. He made it quite clear that the environment plays an important part in regulating both the elaboration of the instinctual drives and the development of the ego. He pointed out that "the structure of society decides...which forms of behavior shall have the greatest adaptive chance....We may describe the fact that the social structure determines, at least in part, the adaptive chances of a particular form of behavior, by the term social compliance" (1939, p. 31).

There is, then, considerable evidence to support the thesis that Hartmann called for a conception of the individual that is fully psychosocial in nature, i.e., one which utilizes both the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system. He recognized, in other words, that the individual's behavior is ultimately determined by the needs of the individual himself as well as by the needs of the social systems of which he is a contributing member. Hartmann's theoretical work on the ego reflects this orientation. In general, ego psychology looks at the development of the ego over time within the context of adaptation. More specifically, attention is directed to the ego's adaptive (as well as mal-adaptive) compromises or solutions to the tasks of various developmental stages, with the assumption being that each stage involves both personal and social demands.

Hartmann proposed that it is the ego, fueled by neutralized

instinctual drives, that (a) actively organizes the intrapsychic system on an ongoing basis, and (b) influences and is influenced by the average expectable environment. He thus conceived of the ego as the intermediary between that which is "inside" and that which is "outside" and in this light, as ultimately being a part of both realms simultaneously. It is in this respect that Hartmann's view of ego functioning supports the notion that the individual must be conceived as being part of his own social environment.

In general, Hartmann's work served to move psychoanalytic thought closer to the position that the tripartite "mind," while having a biological representative (i.e., the id), progressively organizes itself around social experience. It is this kind of thinking that prompted Hartmann to state that he was "inclined to formulate conditions of health in terms of the equilibrium that exists between the substructures of personality on the one hand, and between these and the environment on the other hand" (1947, p. 382). Perhaps it was the need for a conceptual bridge that would allow more of the influence of social experience to be brought more directly into the intrapsychic arena that prompted Hartmann to develop the notion of "internalization."

Hartmann borrowed the term "internalization" from biology and first used it to refer to the "evolution" of the individual. According to Hartmann, "evolution leads to an increased independence of the organism from its environment, so that

reactions which originally occurred in relation to the external world are increasingly displaced into the interior of the organism" (1939, p. 40). In a later work, written with Loewenstein, his frequent co-author, Hartmann was more to the point: "We would speak of internalization when regulations that have taken place in interaction with the outside world are replaced by inner regulations" (1962, p. 48).

While the concept of internalization will be discussed at length in Chapter IV, I would like to comment at this point on Hartmann's statement regarding the increased independence of the individual from his environment. It would seem to me that Hartmann did not intend to imply here that the individual somehow reaches a point in his development where he becomes independent from his environment, but rather he was referring to the individual's increased degree of autonomous functioning within the context of his environment. As was previously pointed out, Hartmann maintained that "man's environment is molded increasingly by man himself" (1939, p. 31), i.e., the individual becomes increasingly more able to determine the kind of environment to which he must adapt. In this sense, the individual's increased independence can be said to refer to his growing ability to actively negotiate for himself more kinds and a greater degree of need satisfaction within a wider social context. As the individual progressively internalizes the "regulations" of the social system of which he becomes or is already a part, more social

skills become available to him. This, in turn, results in an increase in his capacity to engage in more flexible roles within a broader range of social systems.

Although I am building here a psychosocially-oriented view of internalization, Hartmann himself seemed to be pointing in that direction as well. In his later reference to the concept, for example, Hartmann suggested that that which is internalized is based on regulations that have taken place "in interaction with the outside world." The term "interaction" as used here has an unmistakable give-and-take ring to it, especially in light of Hartmann's concept of the environment, which, as has already been established, is social in nature. Furthermore, even the term "regulations" can easily be considered to refer to the coordination of give-and-take activity in a social system, or more specifically, to the way in which this coordinated activity is manifested as a "regulated" structure made up of an interconnection of roles, one taken by the individual himself.

Yet Hartmann made other contributions which support the development of a psychosocially-oriented conception of internalization, even though he himself did not elaborate on them as much as those who followed him. In one important study (1950), for example, he differentiated the concept of the self from that of the ego, maintaining that while the ego is a substructure of the personality, i.e., the organized system at the core of the larger tripartite system, the self refers

to "one's own person" in contradistinction to the object. In the same paper, Hartmann also suggested that the self is represented intersystemically throughout the tripartite framework since each of the three systems of the personality include within it self-cathexis in "opposition to (and reciprocity with)" object-cathexis. It is with respect to these reciprocal cathexes that Hartmann also found it necessary to differentiate the intrapsychic manifestation of self-representations from that of object-representations.

What this line of thinking ultimately does is raise the possibility that reciprocal self- and object-representations play a part in the structuring of each of the three systems of the personality. The nature of these representations of self and objects (i.e., others), and their relationship to the structure of the personality are issues that will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. At this point, I would only like to bring out the notion that in hypothesizing about reciprocal intrapsychic (and intersystemic) images of oneself and others with whom one relates, Hartmann provided a strong conceptual base for building a psychosocial view of internalization.

Hartmann's work thus stands out as a psychoanalytic elaboration of the personality that not only plants the personality more firmly within the social arena, but also reformulates its conceptual substance in order to accommodate its relocation. In Hartmann's view, the substructures of the

personality, i.e., the ego, id, and superego, lose their Freudian concreteness and become true systems or "units of function" that work together as a larger tripartite system, a system which, through the facilities of the ego, influences and is influenced by a social milieu. This larger system, namely the personality, is also said to contain experientially-derived, reciprocal images of oneself and others. What Hartmann thus made clearer than those who came before him was the notion that if one is to understand the structural development of the personality of an individual, then attention must be focused on the development of that individual within the context of his evolving social environment. It is in this particular area that Erik Erikson made many important contributions, some of which will now be discussed.

Erikson's Psychosocial Theory

The work of Erik Erikson (1959, 1963, 1968) represents an approach founded on ego psychology which attempts to highlight the specific nature of the ongoing reciprocity between the personality of the individual and the social context in which he lives. Erikson claimed that this reciprocity is ultimately based on two major premises:

The underlying assumptions...are (1) that the human personality in principle develops according to steps predetermined in the growing person's readiness to be driven toward, to be aware of, and to interact with, a widening social radius; and (2) that society, in principle, tends to be so constituted as to meet and invite this succession of potentialities for interaction and attempts to safe-

guard and to encourage the proper rate and the proper sequence of their enfolding. This is the "maintenance of the human world." (1963, p. 270)

Erikson's psychosocial theory takes Hartmann's concept of adaptation and gives it more content, i.e., instead of just elaborating on the process by which the individual adapts to the average expectable environment, Erikson, through his epigenetic conception of the "eight ages of man" (1963), defined the typical issues with which the individual is faced throughout the course of this ongoing adaptation. In his reference to the growing social "readiness" of the individual and the "encouragement" of society, what can be seen, again, is the assumption that the individual's ongoing behavior is a reflection of both his own needs and the needs of his social environment. Consequently, while Erikson's schema of psychosocial development charts the expected crises which must be progressively resolved by the individual during his lifetime, each crisis is necessarily considered with respect to both personal and social factors.

Erikson was particularly instrumental in altering the traditional psychoanalytic position regarding the influence of social organization. From the initial Freudian perspective, the social order was seen in a rather pessimistic light as being inhibiting and restrictive in nature. However, largely as a result of Erikson's work, it became more optimistically perceived as being necessary and facilitating toward growth. He stated, for example, that "instead of emphasizing what the

pressures of social organization are apt to deny the child, we wish to clarify what the social order may first grant to the infant as it keeps him alive and as, in administering to his needs in specific ways, it introduces him to a particular cultural style" (1968, p. 47). Erikson thus pointed to the supportive aspects of the social order, those which promote the individual's adaptation. This position can also be seen to stand in sharp contrast to the position taken by Burrow (1927b), who focused on the negative effects of the alleged "social neurosis" of society.

While Erikson's work illuminates the benefits of social living, it has also been criticized as being too socially-oriented. Such criticism results from a misunderstanding of what the psychosocial framework entails. The psychosocial framework is not just "social" in nature. It assumes that the individual's behavior is the result of personal as well as social forces to which he is simultaneously responsive. Erikson made it clear that the individual is active within the context of an ongoing negotiation with the social order of which he is a part; he is not just passively molded by an external social order that freely imposes its will on him. In his introduction to Erikson's Identity and the Life Cycle (1959), Rapaport helped to clarify this distinction further:

The crucial characteristic of [Erikson's] psychosocial theory of ego development, and of Hartmann's adaptation theory (in contrast to the "culturist" theories) is that they offer a conceptual explanation of the individual's social development by tracing the unfolding of the genetically

social character of the human individual in the course of his encounters with the social environment at each phase of his epigenesis. Thus it is not assumed that societal norms are grafted upon the genetically asocial individual by "disciplines" and "socialization," but that the society into which the individual is born makes him its member by influencing the manner in which he solves the tasks posed by each phase of his epigenetic development. (p. 15)

It was brought out in the last section that much of Hartmann's work reflects the notion that through the operations of the ego, the personality becomes progressively organized around social experience. Erikson added considerable weight to this position by arguing that even that which is usually considered instinctive in nature is to a large extent socially determined. He specifically maintained that "the drives man is born with are not instincts; nor are his mother's complementary drives entirely instinctive in nature....Man's 'inborn instincts' are drive fragments to be assembled, given meaning, and organized during a prolonged childhood by methods of child training and schooling which vary from culture to culture and are determined by tradition" (1963, p. 95). Erikson thus raised the question as to whether or not aspects of the id, i.e., the representative of the drives, can also be considered to be shaped by social experience.

Much of Erikson's work revolves around his interrelated concepts of ego identity and group identity. He maintained that satisfactory ego growth is dependent on the condition that the individual's ongoing manner of organizing and mastering experience, i.e., the style of his ego synthesis, is a successful variant of his group's basic way of organizing and

mastering experience. It is through his ego identity that the individual maintains this inner solidarity with his group's identity and ideals. More specifically, ego identity, at least in its subjective aspect, refers to "the awareness of the fact that there is a selfsameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods, the style of one's individuality, and that this style coincides with the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for significant others in the immediate community" (1968, p. 50).

One is immediately reminded here of Sullivan's notion of the syntactic mode of consensually validated experience. The ego identity is, in Erikson's (1968) words, "a group-psychological phenomenon." It has meaning and functional importance for both the individual and the group in which he participates. Erikson suggested that the ego identity emerges within the course of development as "the ego is learning effective steps toward a tangible collective future,... [as] it is developing into a defined ego within a social reality" (1946, p. 363). Erikson thus agreed with the notion that the individual and the group are conceptually interrelated. Yet he also went a step further by elaborating upon the mutual benefits that are derived from this relationship. He pointed out that "the mutual complementation of group identity and ego identity, of ethos and ego, puts a greater energy potential at the disposal of both ego synthesis and social organization" (1968, p. 50). He further maintained that the "cultivation" of this

mutual complementation "on ever higher levels is the aim of all therapeutic endeavor, social and individual" (1968, p. 53).

Erikson's psychosocial framework corresponds quite well with the psychosocial perspective presented in Chapter I. His notion of the social organization of the group is very similar to what I have already described as the structure of the social system, i.e., the interconnection of roles based on coordinated give-and-take activity. The give-and-take schema is particularly evident in his description of the group as being "a psychosocial 'territory' of trusted mutualities and defined reciprocal negations" (1968, p. 220). In this light, the group identity can be seen as a collective identity based on give-and-take processes, or more specifically, as the result of implicit and explicit agreement between the members of the group as to how "reality" is to be experienced and responded to with respect to the needs of each member. It is for this reason that Erikson often utilized the term "social reality." A group identity can therefore be said to assume a number of individuals organized within the context of a social system, while the social system can likewise be seen as the behavioral manifestation of the group identity, i.e., as the behavioral structure through which the group identity is expressed.

Just as the social system can be regarded as the behavioral manifestation of the group identity, a role can similarly be regarded as the behavioral manifestation of the ego identity. A role is, after all, a variant within a specific intercon-

nection of roles that structures the social system. A conceptual dilemma arises here, however, in that Erikson often used the term "group identity" with reference not only to a particular group or social system but also to the individual's entire social environment. With respect to this latter context, he made the further assumption that the social systems which comprise the individual's social environment are themselves systematically interrelated within the larger "social order." The individual is seen, in this light, as a member of a large, complex social supersystem, the supersystem that is constituted by society itself, and it is with respect to this more encompassing context that Erikson described the ego identity as including within it an integrated "ensemble of roles which also secure social recognition" (1968, p. 211). Within this framework, Erikson also made mention of the maladaptive consequences of "role fixations" as opposed to the benefits derived from the ongoing "free experimentation" with roles.

With respect to either context, it can nevertheless be argued that by integrating the concept of the ego identity with that of the group identity, Erikson supported the notion that the individual is part of his own social environment. He also proposed that the individual subjectively experiences this relationship through what he referred to as the "self-identity." According to Erikson, the self-identity is made up of an ongoing synthesis of "role images" of oneself. Hartmann's (1950) notion of reciprocal self- and object-representations imme-

diately comes to mind here since a role assumes a give-and-take relationship with others. It was in light of his concept of the self-identity that Erikson, like Hartmann, also attempted to separate the concept of the self from that of the ego. He specifically made reference to the "identity" of the individual as that which is made up of both the ego identity and the self-identity. The concept of identity thus evolved as a more general term to refer simultaneously to the synthesizing work of the ego with respect to its "central psychosocial function" as well as to the subjective awareness of this activity as manifested by one's role images.

Erikson made it clear that the individual experiences himself as a unique "self" only within the larger context of collective, cultural patterning, i.e., through social system involvement. The self-identity was described, after all, as being made up of role images. With respect to this notion, George Klein (1976) pointed out that "identity must always be defined as having aspects of both separateness and membership in a more encompassing entity, and as developing functions that reflect one's role in and relationship to that larger entity" (p. 179). He proposed that the self has two essential aspects: (a) the self that is experienced as an autonomous unit, distinct from others as a locus of action and decision, and (b) the self that is seen as a necessary part of a unit transcending one's autonomous actions. It can be seen that these two aspects of the self coincide

respectively with the perspective of the individual and the perspective of the social system. Klein further proposed that because of the latter aspect of the self, "we" identities, in addition to "I" identities, are also part of the self, and he suggested that psychoanalytic theory might be in need of a "we-go" concept to complement that of the ego.

With regard to such notions as "role images" and "we identities," what Erikson and Klein both seem to be referring to is internalized social system experiences. The two aspects of the self described by Klein can be said to correspond to the ego identity and the group identity, respectively. Jointly, they reflect social system experience. In Chapter IV, I will present a psychoanalytic conception of the personality that is responsive to both of these aspects of the self at the same time that it maintains a foundation in the original structural model. In other words, without resorting to such notions as a "we-go," I will show how these two aspects of the self can both be represented within the context of the tripartite system.

It is unfortunate that Erikson himself did not establish a firmer structural foundation for his psychosocial orientation. He did, however, offer a psychosocial schedule of ego development that has proven to be quite helpful in clarifying the progressive nature of the internalization process. Erikson (1956) proposed that the ego grows as the individual engages in increasingly more mature interplay with others, and

that this growth occurs in three basic stages, each stage depending on the preceding one. The first stage was said to involve the processes of introjection and projection, although Erikson (1968) later emphasized only the introjective process. During this stage, which roughly corresponds to infancy, a "mutuality" gradually evolves in the infant-mother dyad, providing "a safe pole of self-feeling from which the child can reach out for the other pole: his first love 'objects'" (1956, p. 68). The establishment of this mutuality signals the start of the second stage, that which is characterized by the process of identification. Identification in this context assumes a capacity for role interaction, and it is through the selective integration of multiple identifications that the third stage, that of identity formation, is considered to be reached. While these processes will be discussed later in greater detail, it is worth noting at this point that each respectively represents a more sophisticated mode of adaptational response on the part of the individual to what can be considered, or, in the case of the first stage, what will be, his social environment. Furthermore, in that each stage is built on the preceding one, a progressive internalization sequence is suggested.

One of the controversial issues in Erikson's theory centers around the degree to which the identity of the individual is considered a product of his adolescent crisis. The issue stems from Erikson's frequent terminological ambiguity, a characteristic which was demonstrated earlier with respect

to his inconsistent use of the terms "ego identity" and "group identity." While Erikson claimed that multiple identifications consolidate as an identity during the period of adolescence, he also maintained that identity formation is a process that occurs throughout one's lifetime. Perhaps the issue can be resolved if it is assumed that the initial formation of identity constitutes the psychological task of adolescence, but that identity can never be considered completely fixed or static in that it is continually being challenged and redefined at each critical stage of life. As Hartmann (1939) suggested, the individual is constantly modifying and being modified by his social environment. It would naturally follow, then, that his identity, i.e., the nature of his ego involvement in social systems and the subjective experience of himself within the context of this involvement, would reflect, at least to some degree, this ongoing reciprocity. In this sense, it can be said that Erikson's concept of identity serves to reinforce the notion that personality development must ultimately be considered to extend beyond the traditional confines of the preoedipal and oedipal time frames as well as beyond the spatial borders of the family social system.

In some respects, it can be argued that Erikson's position represents the most complete psychosocial conception of the individual within psychoanalytic thought. It can also be argued, however, that while it may be the most complete, it is still far from being complete. While he presented a useful

framework for conceptualizing the psychosocial perspective through the interrelated concepts of the ego identity and the group identity, and went on to extend this framework throughout the life span of the individual, Erikson still did not offer a clear solution to the continuing question as to how the individual's social system experiences become progressively internalized within the personality structure and continue to influence ongoing psychosocial functioning. In other words, he did not clarify the way in which the evolving ego identity and group identity are represented structurally within the tripartite system.

In a related matter, it can also be said that while Erikson elaborated on the psychosocial aspects of the often neglected areas of adolescent and adult development, he was not attentive enough to the psychosocial considerations inherent in early development. In using the term "early development," I am referring to the events which precede the establishment of the "mutuality" that allows for role interaction. It is this capacity for mutuality with others which marks the start of give-and-take activity and, therefore, social system experience. Correspondingly, it is also this capacity for mutuality which can be said to mark the earliest manifestation of the ego identity (as well as, from the experiential point of view, the self-identity) in association with the group identity.

It is unfortunate that Erikson did not put more of an emphasis on early development for it would stand to reason

that a focus on that which occurs during this particular period of development would be helpful in establishing a stronger conceptual base from which to understand that which occurs after it. In other words, and with respect to the more specific goals of this study, it can be argued that in order to understand the way in which social system experience is internalized within the structure of the personality, it would be helpful to examine both the nature of the individual's first experience of "relatedness" as well as the link between this experience and the structuralization of the personality. It is for this reason that the area of early development will now be explored in greater detail.

Chapter III

EARLY DEVELOPMENT AND THE EXPERIENCE OF OBJECT RELATIONS

In the last chapter, I attempted to substantiate the claim that the psychosocial perspective has been increasingly represented in psychoanalytic thought as the latter has evolved over time. In some respects, this chapter will serve as continuing proof of that claim. In the process of examining some of the major psychoanalytic models of early psychic development, I will also be demonstrating the way in which these models support the kind of psychosocial framework that I developed in the first chapter. I should also point out, however, that this support will be rather indirect in nature, for while much of the discussion in the last chapter assumed an individual with the capacity for give-and-take activity, i.e., psychosocial functioning, the focus of this present chapter will be on the pre-psychosocial functioning of the infant. In other words, I will be looking at what was earlier described by Fenichel (1944) as the developmental period in which the individual "is no human being yet" as defined by the inability to "interrelate" with others.

The major goal of this chapter, however, is not to draw out more of the correspondence between psychoanalytic thought and the psychosocial perspective, even though this will be an inevitable by-product, but rather it is to arrive at an under-

standing of the specific events, particularly the psychic events, that lead to the establishment of the capacity for psychosocial functioning. It is assumed here that while the infant cannot engage in give-and-take activity per se, arriving at an understanding of the psychic events that correspond to the kind of activity in which he does engage for the purpose of need satisfaction will put the discussion on the right track for understanding the psychic events that correspond to the give-and-take activity that he will engage in later. I will be specifically using psychoanalytic theory in this context because, once again, it will prove to be a very complementary conceptual framework from which to arrive at this understanding.

Psychoanalytic theory has always had a lot to say about early development. While much of the discussion on psychoanalytic theory so far has been geared to the ego psychological framework, there is another broad orientation within psychoanalytic thought that is also deserving of examination, especially with respect to the area of early development. This orientation is represented by the work of Melanie Klein, W. Ronald D. Fairbairn, D. W. Winnicott, and other British psychoanalytic theorists, all of whom are usually referred to as comprising the British school of object relations theory. The British school focuses extensively on the matter of early development, particularly on the role, nature, and intrapsychic manifestation of infantile relational experience. It is this

emphasis on early relational experience and its internalization within the psyche that makes this orientation especially relevant to the goal of understanding more about later social system experience and its internalization. I would now like to shift attention away from ego psychology, at least temporarily, in order to explore the British school of thought in more detail.

Melanie Klein's Object Relations Theory

In contrast with one of the fundamental assumptions of ego psychology, namely, that the ego and the id gradually evolve together from an undifferentiated matrix, Melanie Klein (1946, 1952, 1975) proposed that the ego begins at birth with immediate adaptive, albeit very primitive, capabilities. Furthermore, while she subscribed to and emphasized the Freudian dual instinct theory, i.e., the assumption that there are inborn life and death instincts (as manifested by libido and aggression, respectively) which are immediately operative at the time of birth, she also maintained that these instincts only find mental expression in highly emotional fantasies anchored to the experience of object relations. In contrast, then, with Freud's (1914) concept of a developmental progression comprised of an initial autoerotic phase, followed by a narcissistic phase, and finally, by a phase of object investment, Klein believed that the infant experiences object relations from the very beginning. What characterizes these early object relations, however, is that they are rather one-sided from an objective

point of view, i.e., they are based solely on the needs of the infant and it is only he who experiences them.

The term "object," at least as used within the Kleinian conceptual framework, needs to be looked at more closely. Klein maintained that the infant invests the first objects with which he comes into contact with either pure libido or pure aggression through the mechanism of projection. In this manner, these objects become experienced as being either all "good" or all "bad." Klein also pointed out that one individual can represent many objects to the infant. More specifically, some of the objects that the infant experiences can represent different physical features of the same individual. Some can also reflect different relational experiences with the same individual due to the compartmentalized experience of all goodness and all badness. Depending on the situational context, for example, the infant may experience a relationship with a good breast "object" (when the breast is desired and available) as well as with a bad breast "object" (when the breast is desired and unavailable). It is in this sense that Klein utilized the term "part-object." The term "part-object" can thus be said to refer not only to a partial aspect of a whole person, e.g., a breast, that is perceived by the infant as if it was a "whole person" object with whom he is relating, but also to a part of or even a total person perceived in a one-dimensional and thus partial manner, i.e., as being either all good or all bad due to the projection of pure libido or pure aggression.

It is important to distinguish here between the determinants of primitive object relations, i.e., part-object relations, and the determinants of object relations based on give-and-take activity. Regardless of the infant's sense of being in a relationship with volitional, whole person objects, from an objective point of view primitive object relations are ultimately defined solely by the needs of the infant as he attempts to deal with his life and death instincts. The breast, for example, is not really a whole person object per se, i.e., a human being, that purposefully acts in a good or bad manner within the context of a relationship with the infant, but rather it is only experienced as such because of the infant's need to do so. The determinants of object relations based on give-and-take activity, by contrast, are truly psychosocial in nature. They are responsive to the needs of the individual as well as to the needs of the social system of which he is a part (which, necessarily, includes the needs of the other members). While Klein proposed that the infant, from the very start, distinguishes himself from external objects due to already existing ego functions, it should always be kept in mind that the objects from which the infant distinguishes himself do not correspond to whole persons with needs and characteristics of their own, a factor which would preclude any true give-and-take activity, and consequently, any social system participation.

Klein maintained that psychic development is initially based on part-object relations, and that these type of relations

involve both projective and introjective identificatory processes. As was brought out in the last chapter, Erikson (1956) also stressed the initial importance of introjection and projection, although it was ultimately a matter that he did not pursue very extensively. In the Kleinian framework, good part-objects, i.e., those that are made good by the projection of pure libido, are introjected into the ego of the infant and become good "internal objects." These good internal objects then serve as the basis for more "good" projection-reintrojection activity with respect to new objects that emerge within the infant's perceptual field. Klein maintained that it is the progressive building up of good internal objects that ultimately promotes ego synthesis and growth. In the case of bad part-objects, events follow a somewhat different pattern. Klein proposed that the infant initially tries to keep all of his anxiety-provoking, inborn aggression outside of his experience of himself, which at this point is characterized by all goodness. He strives, therefore, to maintain the part-objects that are invested with his badness within an external experiential framework. Gradually, however, they too become introjected as the ego becomes more able to tolerate what then become bad internal objects. Klein further proposed that some of these bad internal objects constitute the earliest manifestation of the superego.

In Kleinian theory, early development specifically takes place within the context of two stages or "positions" -- the

paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive position. The paranoid-schizoid position is characterized by part-object relations and the kind of projective and introjective processes that have just been described. As the infant's rudimentary ego projects aggression outward, the infant experiences paranoid anxiety with respect to what is perceived as a persecutory environment made up of bad objects. It should be made clear here that Klein often used the terms "ego" and "self" interchangeably. She stated that the early ego utilizes the defense mechanism of splitting, that it splits off and projects the experience of its own aggression or badness onto external objects with the result being that it experiences itself, i.e., the infant experiences himself, as all good.

Eventually, however, the bad objects also become subject to introjection, and the ego is then confronted with both good and bad internal objects. This state of affairs heralds the depressive position. The previously split-up ego (or self) begins to integrate itself as the processes of splitting and projection wane and as good and bad objects of both internal and external origin coalesce into "whole" objects. As the infant begins to realize that both his frustration and gratification stem from the same person, e.g., his mother, he begins to feel both love and hate, i.e., ambivalence, toward that person. The paranoid anxiety that was characteristic of the paranoid-schizoid position is now replaced by depressive anxiety. This depressive anxiety stems from the infant's fear that he himself,

with respect to his hatred of his bad objects, has harmed his good objects. He experiences guilt and despair, which he gradually overcomes through the process of reparation.

Reparation, the ego's attempt to reduce the guilt over having attacked the good objects, involves activity directed toward repairing the assumed damage. It basically consists of a new surge of love that is expressed to what are now integrated whole objects that are seen as being both good and bad. This surge of love counters and ultimately masters the coexisting hate. It is in this manner that the ego comes to tolerate its ambivalence about its now "more-good-than-bad" whole objects, objects which now also correspond to whole persons.

With regard to the psychosocial perspective, the depressive position thus represents the developmental passage through which the infant becomes more able to accurately perceive himself and those around him. In this respect, it prepares the way for give-and-take activity. Hanna Segal (1973), a prominent Kleinian, elaborated extensively on this notion:

The depressive position marks a crucial step in the infant's development, and its working through is accompanied by a radical alteration in his view of reality. When the ego becomes more integrated, when the processes of projection lessen and when the infant begins to perceive his dependence on an external object and the ambivalence of his own instincts and aims, he discovers his own psychic reality. The infant becomes aware of himself and of his objects as separate from himself. He becomes aware of his own impulses and phantasies, and begins to distinguish between phantasy and external reality. The development of his sense of psychic reality is inseparably bound up with his growing sense of external reality, and he begins to differentiate between the two. (p. 73)

It can thus be said that within the Kleinian developmental

framework, the individual can only begin to engage in give-and-take activity after the completion of the depressive position for it is only then that he can realistically perceive his separateness from and dependency on whole persons. Yet Klein also made it clear that even the paranoid-schizoid position is never fully given up, that it is usually represented to some degree in the individual's behavior. In other words, it is to be expected that some of the good and bad internal objects will continue to resist integration. Some Kleinians have even speculated that the projective-introjective pattern remains to some extent the prototype for all further interactions between oneself and others. Heimann (1952), for example, aligned herself with this point of view:

Such taking in and expelling consists of an active interplay between the organism and the outer world; on this primordial pattern rests all intercourse between subject and object, no matter how complex and sophisticated such intercourse appears. (I believe that in the last analysis we may find it at the bottom of all our complicated dealings with one another.) The patterns Nature uses seem to be few, but she is inexhaustible in their variation. (p. 129)

Other Kleinians (Bion, 1959; Jacques, 1955) have stressed that the processes of projective and introjective identification play an important part in the establishment of the role structure of the group or social system. In this sense, these processes would appear to influence the way in which give-and-take activity is coordinated through the relational network. Sutherland (1963) specifically brought out the notion that "the social relations created by the individual would reflect situations comparable to those between the ego and his inner

objects" (p. 121). Grinberg (1973), in this light, has coined the term "projective counter-identification" to refer to the response of an individual in a group to the projections with which he is invested by the other members. According to Grinberg, roles, at least to some extent, stem from unconscious fantasies that are projected by each participant in a group onto every other participant. Some of the fantasies are accepted and elaborated upon by each recipient depending on "the personal traits predisposing a participant to a given role" (p. 149), while others are not. In this conceptual framework, then, an individual's particular role in a social system can again be considered to reflect his own needs as well as the needs of the other members of the social system, at least within the specific context of his response to their projected fantasy needs, i.e., his projective counter-identification.

What is actually being described here is the fantasy component of give-and-take activity, the component which makes give-and-take activity "relatively realistic" as opposed to "realistic" in nature. As was described in the first chapter, give-and-take activity involves the perception of others as whole persons, separate from oneself, but with characteristics based on both reality and fantasy. What the Kleinians have suggested is that projective and introjective processes play an important part in the perception of characteristics based on fantasy. It was also brought out in the first chapter that fantasy can be both shared and unshared. In the Kleinian frame-

work, this means that even projections which are unaccepted by the recipient can still be operative and serve as a means for the projector to satisfy some of his needs. It can thus be said that the Kleinians, through their study of projective and introjective processes, have provided a useful conceptual framework for understanding the way in which fantasy is manifested and utilized in social systems.

It should be kept in mind, however, that the projective and introjective processes originally described by Melanie Klein refer to a developmental period in which the ego's boundaries are very crude, its capacities are very limited (in fact limited to projective and introjective identification), and its experience of others is partial and inordinately defined by subjective determinants. On the other hand, the projective and introjective processes referred to by Heiman and discussed with respect to the coordination of give-and-take activity within the social system can be seen as only part of a broad range of processes available to a more mature and more bounded ego, an ego of an individual who experiences others more realistically as whole, separate persons. The relational experience of the infant as described by Klein does not actually constitute social relations, at least as defined here, simply because it precludes the possibility of give-and-take activity. Even though the infant's projective-introjective activity has a give-and-take quality to it, it does not take place within the context of a negotiation process that is responsive to the needs of whole, differentiated persons, and

thus it cannot be formally classified as give-and-take activity per se.

Although it is difficult to conceive of social relating as a phenomenon involving the concurrent utilization of behavioral processes derived from different stages of development, several theorists, with the help of the Kleinian framework, have attempted to do just that. Bion (1959) postulated that the group can always be seen from two perspectives -- that of the "work group" and that of the "basic assumption group." While the former involves reality-oriented activity geared to a task, the latter involves fantasy-oriented processes which reflect a shared projective network. Bion maintained that the work group always coexists with the basic assumption group.

Foulkes (1957) presented an even more detailed view when he elaborated on the "multiple dimensions" of group life. He claimed that the group has four levels of activity operating at the same time, which, beginning with the most overt, include: (a) the current level, representing the most realistic experience of the group, i.e., its immediate tasks and circumstances within the context of the larger community, (b) the transference level, corresponding to whole person object relations and the frequent association of the members of the group to the members of one's family, (c) the projective level, involving part-object relations and thus perceptions of oneself and others (as well as perceptions of the group per se) that are based on the early developmental processes of splitting and projective

identification, and (d) the primordial level, which Foulkes, with reference to the Jungian notion of a collective unconscious, described as the experience of "collective images" in the group.

The Kleinian model of the personality assumes that the ego is to some degree always responsive to its internal objects (including its unintegrated good and bad objects) as it responds to the external world. It is in this way that these internal objects come to influence the individual's ongoing behavior in his external social settings. What is important to keep in mind is that these internal objects are the result of the experience of relational activity. The word "experience" is crucial here for what Melanie Klein essentially elaborated upon was the internalization of what is experienced as interpersonal relationships. In this respect, I have tried to make it clear that what the infant experiences as an interpersonal relationship is, from an objective view, quite unilateral in nature. In other words, it does not actually involve real interpersonal mutuality, i.e., give-and-take activity. Indeed, it does not even involve real "persons" as such, only a part-object and a split-off or partial self.

In any event, since it is the experience of object relations that is internalized, it would be assumed that the entire relationship, however realistic or unrealistic it is, would be accounted for within the context of the internalization process. Conceptually, this means that the individual's internal

objects (which can be likened to object-representations) would not just float freely within the psyche, but rather they would be directly linked to aspects (or representations) of the self, embodied, in this framework, by the ego. It is in areas such as this that Melanie Klein was quite lax with respect to structural considerations. It can be more clearly stated that the self or ego relates with its internal objects, that they are linked within the personality structure. This is a conceptual point that Fairbairn made very explicit in his work.

Fairbairn's Object Relations Model of the Personality

W. Ronald D. Fairbairn (1952, 1963), another member of the British school, disagreed with some of Klein's central points even though he also stressed the importance of object relations experience in psychic development. Not only did he reject the notion of a death instinct or inborn aggression, but he also maintained that what can be called libido is, by its very nature, object-seeking. Fairbairn thus deemphasized the role of assumed inborn instincts and proposed that the infant's behavioral processes are simply motivated by the wish for object relations. The concept of aggression was not discarded, but rather it was seen as a reaction to frustration or deprivation with respect to the pursuit of object ties.

While Klein did not develop a firm structural framework for her theory, Fairbairn was quite meticulous in this regard with his. In some respects, he even broke considerably with the psychoanalytic model. While he subscribed, as Klein did,

to the view that the ego is present at birth, he broke from all other theorists by claiming that libido is a function of the ego. In this manner, he not only rejected the concept of an id, but he also made the ego itself "fundamentally object-seeking" in nature. Following up on this basic premise, he further maintained that the earliest form of anxiety is separation anxiety, and that it is through the internalization of object relations that the ego defends itself from this anxiety.

According to Fairbairn, the internalization process occurs within what becomes three separate parts of the ego. Aspects of an object that are experienced as being exciting (libidinal) as well as those that are experienced as being frustrating or rejecting (antilibidinal) are internalized and repressed within the context of two respective, split-off sections of the ego, while the "main core" of the object is internalized within the "central ego" in an unrepressed state. Thus both the ego and the object are divided into three parts. What consequently evolves is a personality structure comprised of three egos: (a) a conscious, central ego "attached to" unrepressed aspects of the object, (b) a repressed libidinal ego "attached to" the libidinal object, and (c) a repressed antilibidinal ego "attached to" the antilibidinal object. It can be seen here that the notion of libidinal and antilibidinal objects bears a significant conceptual resemblance to what was earlier described as good and bad part-objects.

Through the use of the phrase "attached to," Fairbairn

clarified what Melanie Klein did not -- that internal objects are not random in their intrapsychic arrangement, but rather are linked with aspects of the self as manifested, again, by the ego. This linking, however, is considered to be determined not by life and death instincts, but rather by affective experience within the context of object-seeking activity. What is also proposed in this model is that representations of the self, i.e., the ego, as well as what could be considered object-representations are jointly present in each substructure of the personality. This notion corresponds with Hartmann's (1950) suggestion that reciprocal self- and object-cathexes play a part in each system of the larger tripartite personality system.

Furthermore, since the central, libidinal, and anti-libidinal egos bear such a strong resemblance to the more traditional ego, id, and superego, respectively (as Fairbairn himself admitted), what is ultimately suggested by this "object relations model" of the personality is that the more traditional psychoanalytic model of the personality might be reconsidered and reformulated to include three substructures, each of which (a) has a definite structure (as opposed to the id being seen as an unorganized reservoir of instinctual energy), (b) has its own libido and thus its own energy (as opposed to the ego and superego being considered dependent on energy from the id), and (c) is shaped by the experience of object relations (which corresponds somewhat with Erikson's (1963)

previously mentioned suggestion that even aspects of the id might be considered to be shaped by social experience).

While Fairbairn offered a comprehensive structural model of the personality based on the experience of object relations, he also presented a three-stage model of development conceived in terms of the changing form in which object relations become manifested. Fairbairn stated that development is "essentially a process whereby infantile dependence upon the object gradually gives place to mature dependence upon the object" (1952, p. 34). This process was further described as being "characterized (a) by the gradual abandonment of an original object-relationship based upon primary identification, and (b) by the gradual adoption of an object-relationship based upon differentiation of the object" (1952, p. 34).

The first stage, that of infantile dependence, is the stage most associated with "primary identification," a term which Fairbairn used to refer to the highly charged experience and internalization of part-object relations. It is consequently a stage which does not assume true self-other differentiation. The final stage, that of mature dependence, involves whole person object relations and thus assumes self-other differentiation. Fairbairn maintained that this differentiation becomes possible as the central ego evolves in scope and function and develops the capacity to tolerate and organize the conflicting relational experiences of the libidinal and antilibidinal egos. Finally, the middle period of development, the transitional stage, can be said to consist of the individ-

ual's attempt to deal with the conflicts inherent in moving from the first to the third stage.

It is the stage of mature dependence that has the most bearing upon the psychosocial perspective. Fairbairn stated that he specifically chose the term "mature dependence" over the term "independence" for this last stage of development because he recognized that "a capacity for relationships necessarily implies dependence of some sort" (1952, p. 145). Mature dependence was seen as an advance from the "one-sided" nature of immature dependence. It was described as a stage characterized by cooperative relationships "involving evenly matched giving and taking [*italics mine*] between two differentiated individuals who are mutually dependent, and between whom there is no disparity of dependence" (1952, p. 145). The notion of mature dependence has been further elaborated upon by Guntrip (1961), a major proponent of Fairbairn's work:

Maturity is not equated with independence though it includes a certain capacity for independence. The nature of this is best appreciated by reference to emotional identification which so involves the infantilely dependent person with other people's fates that he rises and falls with his love-object; and cannot disentangle himself from his infatuation so as to remain stable by his own inner strength, which has not developed. But the independence of the mature person is simply that he does not collapse when he has to stand alone. It is not an independence of needs for other persons with whom to have relationship; that would not be desired by the mature. (p. 293)

It is quite apparent that Fairbairn's notion of mature dependence implies the concept of give-and-take activity, and as such, it can be considered to assume social system participation. It can also be seen that Guntrip's description of the

type of independence that exists within the context of mature dependence is supportive of my earlier interpretation of what Hartmann (1939) was referring to when he spoke of the "increased independence" of the individual that results from progressive internalization. The individual is always dependent on others for need satisfaction, but in the course of his development, he finds that he has more available options through which to seek satisfaction. It is in this sense that the individual becomes more independent. These options become available as the individual progressively internalizes his experiences within a broadening range of social systems.

Just as I have described give-and-take activity as being only relatively realistic in nature, however, so Fairbairn maintained that "the relationship involved in mature dependence is, of course, only theoretically possible" (1952, p. 42). He claimed that a relationship can only approach, as opposed to achieve, the level of mature dependence because there is always some degree of primary identification present within the context of any relationship. What is being referred to here, again, is the fantasy component of give-and-take activity. The other person is always perceived at least partially in a distorted fashion due to the influence of internalized, unconscious, primitive object relations. These primitive relational experiences derive from the developmental level of infantile dependence in which aspects of the ego are linked with images of unintegrated part-objects, i.e., libidinal and antilibidi-

nal objects. Fairbairn made it clear that not only do some of these early relational experiences remain unintegrated, but that also their continuing influence on the individual's perception of the external world can be quite strong. It is in this respect that he described psychopathology as that which results when there is "a great tendency for the outer world to derive its meaning too exclusively from the inner world" (1952, p. 18).

It is just this task of sorting out external reality from one's internal reality, or in Fairbairn's terms, the "outer world" from the "inner world," that constitutes the transitional stage of development. In Fairbairn's framework, the inner world is comprised of unconscious, archaic, dissociated object relational experiences that involve strong emotional investment. The central ego strives to perceive individuals in the outer world as they really are at the same time that it is forced to contend with the influence of internalized primitive, i.e., part-object, relational experiences in the inner world. Guntrip (1969) has described the dynamics of this inner world of the individual quite vividly:

It is a purely psychic world that the individual lives in, largely if not wholly unconsciously, where his lack of internal unity as a self is manifested in dreams, fantasies, and symptoms, as experiences of highly emotionally charged relationships of parts or aspects of himself with internalized good and bad objects. In this "inner world," which is both withdrawn and repressed though it breaks into consciousness as pathological disturbance, a needy deprived infantile ego clamours for good objects, and an angry sadistic infantile ego hates its bad objects, and the whole is shot through with the fears of internal bad objects destroying internal good objects in fantasy, leading to depression and despair. (p. 405)

In order to get a better conceptual picture of the way in which the inner world and the outer world converge within the individual's realm of experience, it would be useful to examine some of the work in this area done by Winnicott.

Winnicott's Concept of Transitional Object Relations

D. W. Winnicott (1953, 1971), another member of the British school, proposed that there is an "intermediate area" of experience, important but not unique to child development, which involves the utilization of illusion and which makes the task of responding to both the inner and the outer worlds somewhat easier. This illusionary activity serves as the foundation for what Winnicott called "transitional phenomena." The term "transitional phenomena" refers to the kind of events that would be expected to occur in the transitional stage of development. In other words, it refers to the processes employed by the infant to make the transition from "primary creativity" (the initial, subjectively-defined experience of reality based on primitive object relations) to "objective perception based on reality testing," which assumes the capacity for differentiation between oneself and others as whole persons.

In agreement, however, with the positions taken by both Melanie Klein and Fairbairn, Winnicott pointed out that "the task of reality-acceptance is never completed, that no human being is free from the strain of relating inner and outer reality" (1953, p. 97), and that relief is only provided by

ongoing transitional processes that are never fully given up. It is these transitional processes that are reflected in the intermediate area of experience, an area of experience "to which inner reality and external life both contribute" (1953, p. 89). In this light, Winnicott referred to the intermediate area as "a resting-place for the individual engaged in the perpetual human task of keeping inner and outer reality separate yet inter-related" (1953, p. 89).

Transitional phenomena require the use of a transitional object. From the point of view of development, the transitional object was described by Winnicott as the infant's first "not-me" possession. In its most primitive manifestation, it can be likened in many respects to what Melanie Klein referred to as a part-object. As Modell (1968), a theorist who elaborated upon transitional phenomena, explained:

[It] is an object that stands midway between what is created by the inner world and that which exists in the environment...it is not a hallucination, it is an object "in" the environment. It is something other than the self, but the separateness from the self is only partially acknowledged, since the object is given life by the subject. It is a created environment in the sense that the properties attributed to the object reflect the inner life of the subject. (p. 35)

Modell stated that the transitional object, which can be inanimate or living, is ultimately "created" by the subject through a rather fluid "oscillation of introjection and projection." In this respect, he claimed that the object can actually be said to be "given form and structure...by the needs of the self" (p. 40). Again, this description corresponds to

the Kleinian notion of how the infant perceives the breast as an "object," an object which, because of the infant's own needs, is seen as a whole, volitional, living entity that purposely acts in an entirely good or bad manner within the context of an assumed relationship with him.

The original manifestation of transitional object relations in the course of development, like the original manifestation of part-object relations within the Kleinian framework, does not imply give-and-take activity per se, even though aspects of this mode of "relating" can be found within the context of the fantasy component of give-and-take activity. With respect to the initial appearance of transitional phenomena, Modell explained that since the assumed qualities of the transitional object are arrived at in a rather "magical" fashion, there is only an illusion of connectedness between the self and the object, and that because of this factor, no real mutuality can be said to exist:

The relation of the subject to the object is primarily exploitive, the subject feels no concern for the needs of the object and cannot acknowledge that the object possesses his own separateness and individuality....That is to say, a transitional object relationship may be established regardless of the attitude of the object. He only needs to be there. (pp. 40-41)

Modell's description of the initial transitional mode of relating corresponds to the manifestation of unshared fantasy within the context of give-and-take activity. His description refers to what could only be a dyadic situation with only one active (projecting and introjecting) participant. Winnicott,

however, brought out the notion that later on in the developmental track, transitional objects can also serve as the basis for shared fantasy experience as well:

We can share a respect for illusory experience, and if we wish we may collect together and form a group on the basis of the similarity of our illusory experiences. This is a natural root of grouping among human beings. (1953, p. 89)

Winnicott (1971) went on to claim that there is a direct development from transitional phenomena to playing, from playing to shared playing, and from shared playing to cultural experiences. He maintained that it is the ongoing intermediate area of experience that accounts for the intense, unchallenged, shared experience usually associated with religion and the arts.

Transitional object relations, like the Kleinian concept of projective-introjective activity upon which it is built, can therefore be applied to the notion of both shared and unshared fantasy within the context of give-and-take activity, and can thus be considered to influence the more realistic perception of others. As Modell pointed out, while the transitional mode of relating persists to some extent in all people, it "exists side by side with a more mature mode of object relationships where the object is clearly delimited from the subject" (p. 109). It is in this sense that I have described give-and-take activity as behavior that involves the perception of others as whole, separate persons with characteristics based on both reality and fantasy. It can be said that in give-and-take activity, a more realistic mode of perceiving others (the kind

implied in Fairbairn's stage of mature dependence) predominates even though the "inner world" continues to make its presence felt in a more limited way through the manifestation of transitional processes.

While mature dependence is never fully achieved, it is achieved enough to warrant the ascendancy of secondary process thinking. As Modell explained:

Secondary process thinking is directed toward action upon the environment. It acknowledges "things as they are" and hence accepts the need for delay. Secondary process thinking is object-directed -- it is social. Primary process thinking is personal -- it is dominated by the omnipotent wish....Secondary process thinking entails the adaptation of culturally conventionalized modes as opposed to the private creativity of primary process thinking. (p. 160)

Secondary process thinking thus assumes true self-other differentiation and, consequently, the capacity to engage in give-and-take activity. It is in this respect that it is social in nature. Primary process thinking, on the other hand, is idiosyncratic in nature, and since it involves a completely subjective coloring of the world, it precludes the possibility of differentiating between self and others, and, consequently, of establishing a mutuality with others within the context of a social system. However, just as there is a fantasy component in give-and-take activity, or transitional processes (reflecting some degree of infantile dependence) within the context of mature dependence, there is also some primary process thinking within the context of secondary process thinking. It would appear that this was something Hartmann (1939) was also aware of in light of

his claim that rational action always includes "irrational elements in its plan" (p. 92).

Hartmann's Ego Psychological View of Early Development

As I previously stated, ego psychology is founded on Hartmann's (1939) claim that both the ego and the id gradually evolve from an undifferentiated matrix that includes within it autonomous apparatuses. These inborn apparatuses ultimately come to comprise the conflict-free sphere of the ego. This line of thought is different from that of the British school, or more specifically, the Kleinian orientation, which maintains not only that the ego exists at birth, but also that no ego functions are free from instinctual coloration since they are all initially manifested within the context of primitive, highly charged object relational experiences. It can be seen that the assumption that object relations begin at birth corresponds to the assumption of a primitive ego.

If it is assumed, then, that the ego does not exist at birth but rather gradually differentiates from an undifferentiated matrix, then it would similarly be expected that object relations also evolve in a gradual fashion. This in fact was Hartmann's position. Hartmann was well aware of the importance of object relations, as evident in his claim that "the task of man to adapt to man is present from the very beginning of life" (1939, p. 31). He also recognized the interdependency between object relations and ego development: "While the development

of object relations is codetermined by ego development, object relations are also one of the main factors that determine the development of the ego" (1964, p. 105). However, in accordance with his view that there is no ego at birth, he also maintained that the infant is initially "objectless," and that it is only after this initial stage of development (primary narcissism) that the experience of object relations can even begin to come into play.

According to Hartmann, the object is first experienced as existing only to fulfill the needs of the infant. Anna Freud (1965) used the term "anaclitic" to refer to this mode of object relating, a mode that from an objective point of view is only one-sided in nature since it is "based on the urgency of the child's body needs and drive derivatives" (p. 65), as opposed to the needs of both the infant and the object. In time, however, the mode of object relating is assumed to proceed to the level of "object constancy." Object constancy is said to occur when the infant is able to maintain a constant psychic representation of the object regardless of his state of need. It presupposes, according to Hartmann (1952), "a certain degree of neutralization of aggressive as well as libidinal energy" (p. 16). Since anaclitic object relations are conceptually similar to what was previously described as part-object relations and since object constancy is assumed to involve drive neutralization, it can be argued that there would be a significant degree of conceptual correlation between the coming together of good

and bad part-objects into a more neutral, whole person object, and the establishment of object constancy.

As would be expected, Hartmann's notion of object relations development also reflects the infant's movement toward self-other differentiation. While the initial stage of primary narcissism assumes no such differentiation, the anaclitic stage is characterized by the perception of the mother as separate from the self only in times of need. In order for differentiation to occur on an ongoing basis, the stage of object constancy must be reached. It is this latter stage of object relations development, then, that marks the completion of the individual's transition from being an infant to being a social individual capable of engaging in give-and-take activity.

It is also at this stage that the ego is considered to become firmly established. In this light, it can be seen that ego development, the major focus of ego psychology, is only one of many possible perspectives from which to study early psychic development. It is a perspective that is ultimately inseparable from both the perspective of object relations and the perspective of self-other differentiation. While Hartmann typically emphasized the development of the ego in his work (in contrast with his British colleagues who emphasized the experience of object relations), he was nevertheless well aware of the many conceptual areas that overlap within this circumscribed focus of study:

Earliest stages of ego development can be described from several angles: as a process of differentiation that leads

to a more complete demarcation of ego and id and of self and outer reality; as a process that leads from the pleasure to the reality ego; as the development of the reality principle; as the way leading from primary narcissism to object relationships; from the point of view of the sequence of danger situations; as the development of the secondary process, etc. (1952, p. 18)

With respect to what has been presented throughout this chapter, it can be said that early ego development also reflects the road that leads from purely self-oriented behavior to social behavior.

Spitz's Study of the Infant-Mother Dyad

There have been several theorists from the school of ego psychology who have made substantial attempts to describe the process of early psychic development, or more specifically, early ego development in greater detail. René A. Spitz (1965) was one such theorist. Although his point of view was clearly anchored to ego psychology, Spitz was in many ways an "object relations" thinker. His work can be described as an attempt to clarify the way in which early object relations promote ego development. He developed his ideas by looking closely at the infant-mother dyad.

According to Spitz, the infant begins life in the state of "nondifferentiation." This concept not only assumes Hartmann's notion of an undifferentiated mass from which the ego and the id evolve, but it also assumes a lack of distinction between psyche and soma, inside and outside, "I" and "Non-I," and different regions of the body. It reflects an objectless stage, similar to that of primary narcissism. Spitz specifi-

cally referred to it as being "preobjectal" in nature. He further maintained that development will only proceed onward as long as the infant has a "human partner," i.e., a mothering figure, with whom to experience "reciprocal" interaction. It is through this dyadic "relationship" that the infant's ego becomes organized.

I emphasize the words "reciprocal" and "relationship" here because it is important to keep in mind that while the infant and mother share an important dyadic, interactive situation, it cannot, again, be formally considered a give-and-take, mutually-experienced relationship simply because the infant cannot perceive the mother as a whole, separate person with needs of her own. This is an issue that is frequently overlooked in the literature and one which often results in conceptual confusion. Menaker (1973), for example, made reference to the "primary social matrix," which she defined as the "reciprocal" interactional situation between the infant and his mother that comprises the infant's "first social environment." My contention here is that there is nothing social or even truly reciprocal about the interaction within the infant-mother dyad, and to claim so ultimately goes against all established notions of early object relational experience as conceived by both the British school and the ego psychological orientation.

Spitz maintained that the mother initially serves as an "external auxiliary ego" for the infant and continues to do so in a decreasing manner until the infant's ego is more adequately

established. In this capacity, she selects the kinds of signs and signals that reach the infant from the external world, providing a protective screen that complements the infant's innate stimulus barrier. Spitz also proposed that within the context of the dyad, the infant gradually shifts from passivity to directed activity. It is interesting to note that while Spitz labeled the infant as initially being "passive," Kleinian theorists would maintain that the infant is quite actively projecting and introjecting within the context of early object relations, even if this activity takes place totally within the realm of fantasy.

Spitz acknowledged three stages in the development of what he called "true object relations." These stages directly correspond to the gradual organization of the ego. Following the initial preobjective stage is a stage based on relations with the "precursor of the object." In this stage, a rudimentary ego is organized as object relations become manifested in association with either libidinal or aggressive drives. This eventually leads to a third stage based on relations with the "libidinal object proper." The libidinal object proper is established by the merging of good and bad object "precursors," the good predominating. This last stage marks the emergence of an organized ego, object constancy, and "object relations on the human pattern." The terms "true object" and "object proper" can thus be said to refer to a whole, separate person with whom one actually relates in a give-and-take manner, not to just any object one experiences

a mutual relationship with.

Although his work centered on early development, Spitz clearly demonstrated an appreciation for the psychosocial perspective. He described how early object relations are directly related to one's potential for give-and-take activity, and thus to the continuing maintenance of social systems upon which all human survival is based:

From the societal aspect, disturbed object relations in the first year of life, be they deviant, improper, or insufficient, have consequences which imperil the very foundation of society. Without a template, the victims of disturbed object relations subsequently will themselves lack the capacity to relate. They are not equipped for the more advanced, more complex forms of personal and social interchange without which we as a species would be unable to survive. They cannot adapt to society....The only path which remains open to them is the destruction of a social order of which they are the victims. (p. 300)

Mahler's Separation-Individuation Theory

The work of Margaret Mahler and her associates (Mahler, 1968, 1979; Mahler, Pine, & Bergman, 1975) represents another major ego psychological investigation of early development. Drawing on her own observational studies as well as those of others, including Spitz, Mahler offered a comprehensive description of the "psychological birth" of the individual. In harmony with the conceptual framework and the terminology of the psychosocial perspective, Mahler conceived of the psychological birth of the individual as a slowly unfolding intrapsychic process that is completed some time after the biological birth of the infant. Psychological birth was described as that which is

marked by the attainment of self-other differentiation and object constancy. In line with the ego psychological viewpoint, this achievement would also assume the establishment of a functional, structural ego.

What makes Mahler's work especially important, however, is the detailed way in which she has characterized the stages, or more specifically, the "phases," that are involved in the psychological birth process. According to Mahler, the infant begins life in the phase of "normal autism," characterized by very primitive hallucinatory disorientation. Normal autism is an objectless phase in which the infant omnipotently experiences all need satisfaction to emanate from himself, or more specifically, from his own "autistic orbit." In this sense, he experiences no differentiation from and between everything and everyone else in the world.

As the infant begins to differentiate between pleasurable and painful experience (which occurs in association with the differentiation of his drives), he becomes dimly (but only dimly) aware of a need-satisfying object, i.e., his mother. It is at this point that he enters the phase of "normal symbiosis." This phase is characterized by the delusional experience of a somatopsychic fusion with his mother, i.e., he experiences himself in a "dual unity" with her within the context of one common boundary. While the symbiotic phase is an advance from the autistic phase, both are still considered to correspond conceptually to the stage of primary narcissism, with the mother still

functioning in the capacity of what Spitz termed an "external auxiliary ego."

The next phase that the infant passes through is the "separation-individuation" phase. This phase is comprised of four successive subphases: (a) differentiation, (b) practicing, (c) rapprochement, and (d) consolidation of individuality and the beginnings of object constancy. According to Mahler, separation and individuation are two complementary developments, the former consisting of the child's emergence from the symbiotic fusion with the mother, and the latter referring to the achievements marking the child's assumption of his own individual characteristics. These events are considered to be the major indicators of psychological birth.

It is within this third phase that the infant, in conjunction with his own maturational processes, gradually and intermittently ventures out, both physically and psychologically, from the symbiotic bond in order to explore increasingly wider segments of reality as a more autonomous unit. Object relations with the mother (which initially includes the splitting and later the integration of good and bad experiences with her) and a functional ego begin to develop concomitantly. Indeed, identification with the mother, a process which already assumes some degree of differentiation from her, is considered a major activity of the rapprochement subphase and one that is essential for ego development. Ultimately, the individual is said to be fully "hatched" from the symbiotic unit when there is a clear

differentiation between he and his mother and when object constancy is achieved. At this point, not only is the mother perceived as a separate person in the outside world, but she also becomes permanently represented intrapsychically as well.

Jacobson's Model of Object Relations Development

Any discussion of Mahler's work should also include a discussion of the work in the area of early development done by Edith Jacobson (1964). Jacobson provided a strong conceptual foundation for the kinds of events that Mahler observed. She was particularly attentive to structural considerations. It was Jacobson, for example, who first proposed that the undifferentiated matrix also includes within it undifferentiated instinctual energy which only gradually differentiates into libidinal and aggressive drives under the influence of external stimulation. This notion helps to explain the infant's gradually emerging sense of pleasure and unpleasure which instigates his move from an original autistic stage to a symbiotic fusion with his mother.

According to Jacobson, intrapsychic life starts out within the context of a "primal psychophysiological self," a notion which can be readily associated to Spitz's concept of nondifferentiation and to Mahler's description of the normal autistic phase. Jacobson suggested that not only is the infant objectless at this point, but he can also be considered to lack intrapsychic structure. The first structure that begins to develop

is a fused self-object representation, which evolves in response to the infant's growing sense of his need for his mother. This event corresponds to the symbiotic phase. It reflects, again, the emerging differentiation of drives in association with the growing experience of pleasure vs. unpleasure.

As development proceeds, the fused self-object representation ultimately differentiates and evolves into distinct self-representations and object-representations that remain inter-related with each other within the context of either pure libidinal or pure aggressive drives. In other words, as a result of the infant's now fully differentiated drives and, correspondingly, his now ongoing "good" as well as "bad" experiences with his mother, many differentiated self- and object-representations evolve. Depending on the relational experience, some of the self- and object-representations are considered to be good while the others are considered to be bad. What comes to mind in this context is Fairbairn's (1952) notion of libidinal and antilibidinal part-object relations in which good and bad aspects of the object become linked with corresponding good and bad aspects of the self. In any event, in Jacobson's framework, the psyche at this point in time can be said to consist of good and bad self-representations as well as good and bad object-representations. It is also at this point in time that the infant can be considered to be solidly engaged in the separation-individuation phase.

It should be made clear here that even though self-repre-

sentations have now been differentiated from object-representations, this state of affairs is not yet indicative of true self-other differentiation. This is because the good and bad representations of the self as well as those of the object have not yet been integrated. When there is a more realistic integration between the good and bad self-representations as well as between the good and bad object-representations, then individuation and object constancy can be said to be achieved. It is at this point that a "true self" can be considered to be differentiated from a "true object." In other words, the individual is now able to perceive himself and others as whole, separate persons and to engage with others within the context of mutually-experienced relationships.

I would like to underscore several aspects of Jacobson's developmental model which I believe are quite noteworthy, especially with respect to some of the other models that I have already discussed. To begin with, Jacobson's model inherently challenges the validity of the concept of primary narcissism in light of its claim that the first intrapsychic structure is a fused self-object representation that gradually differentiates into separate self- and object-representations. In this conceptual framework, the infant's experience of and investment in his "self" can be considered to develop at the same time as his experience of and investment in his "object." In other words, narcissism and object investment would evolve simultaneously. A further question arises, however, as to whether or not the

primal psychophysiological self can be considered "narcissistic" in nature, at least from an experiential perspective if not from a structural one. If it can be, then the concept of primary narcissism might still be retained.

My own position here is that the use of the term "self" in this particular context, i.e., the earliest experience of life, is somewhat misleading. The term "self" already assumes the experience of some degree of distinction from that which is other-than-self. However, what Jacobson's notion of the primal self, Mahler's description of the autistic phase, and Spitz's concept of nondifferentiation all refer to is a boundaryless experiential state. Perhaps Abraham (1973) was more on the mark when she referred to the primal self as both an "experiencing we-self" and an "all-identity." In any event, in light of this argument, it would appear that the notion of primary narcissism can conceptually be laid to rest.

Another important aspect of Jacobson's developmental model is that it brings ego psychology and the British school ideologically closer together. It not only suggests that the personality is actually structured by the experience of object relations, but it also provides a meticulous blueprint for following this event. According to Jacobson, "the establishment of the system ego sets in with the discovery of the object world and the growing distinction between it and one's physical and mental self" (p. 19). Like the members of the British school, Jacobson also stressed the importance of early projective-

introjective activity and the way in which some of the reintroduced bad self- and object-representations contribute to what will ultimately become the superego. She further proposed, however, that idealized representations, i.e., those which stem from the lingering wish for "all good" object relations in light of the growing and disillusioning experience of reality, also contribute to superego formation as well.

Jacobson attempted to sort out some of the conceptual confusion that often accompanies the terms "internal object" and "object." It has already been brought out that the experience of an external object will change over time with respect to the individual's emerging developmental needs and capacities, and that the external object can be quite different from its internal counterpart (such as when the latter is partial or temporary in nature). Spitz dealt with this problem by referring to a "true object" or an "object proper" only when object constancy is assumed; all prior experience of that object implied the perception of a "precursor of the object." Jacobson's contribution to this area was in her detailed use of the term "representation," through which she provided a very comprehensive and comprehensible framework from which to consider object relations and object relations development.

Jacobson used the term "representation" to distinguish the self and object as experienced from the self and object in reality. She was then able to clearly discuss, for example, not only the qualitative differences between preoedipal and

oedipal representations, but also the differences between a representation and its counterpart in external reality. Jacobson suggested that representations get built up over time as corresponding earlier representations and ongoing relational experience coalesce and modify each other in the direction of a closer approximation to reality.

I would like to reemphasize, however, that the experience of reality will always be an approximation. While this theme was discussed at length within the context of examining the orientation of the British school, Mahler and her associates (1975) also maintained not only that "vestiges of [the symbiotic] phase remain with us throughout the entire life cycle" (p. 48), but also that the establishment of both individuality (which, in light of Jacobson's work, can be described as self constancy) and object constancy "are part of an ongoing developmental process" (p. 40). It is this state of affairs that, again, reflects the manifestation of fantasy within the context of give-and-take activity.

The work of Edith Jacobson thus provides an impressive structural framework for conceiving of the way in which object relations are progressively internalized within the psyche. While making a clear distinction between the ego as a substructure of the psyche and the self as the totality of the biological and psychological person, Jacobson proposed that it is the ongoing experience of the self in relation to others, as manifested in self- and object-representations, that ultimately

structures both the ego and the superego.

Early Psychic Development and the Psychosocial Perspective

It is by now very apparent that despite some particular variations in conceptual emphasis and terminology, there are some significant areas of correspondence between the major psychoanalytic positions regarding early psychic development. I would now like to draw out some of these areas of correspondence and integrate them within the context of the psychosocial perspective.

To begin with, what can be called the psyche can be seen to develop gradually as a result of relational experience. Whether this relational experience begins at birth or whether it becomes initially manifested shortly afterward is, in my estimation, an unimportant and highly speculative issue. What is important is that the psyche becomes established as the infant, or more specifically, his biological organism, attempts to "understand," control and thus secure ongoing biological need satisfaction. In other words, the psyche evolves as the infant begins to realize that his need satisfaction is dependent on "others," however these others may be experienced. It should also be made clear that as it evolves, the psyche itself begins to demand satisfaction for its own emerging needs. It is in this manner that the infant's behavior comes to be oriented toward biological and psychological need satisfaction.

As the infant's relational experience continues, the psyche, in response to this continuing experience, begins to develop an

internal structure, namely, a functional personality. Within the psychoanalytic framework, the personality is defined by the tripartite system consisting of the ego, id, and superego. Whether or not one adheres to the notion of a "primitive ego" that assumedly exists at birth, all of the developmental theorists would agree that a fully functional and bounded ego or ego system cannot conceptually be considered to be manifested until relational experience is characterized by true self-other differentiation, a phenomenon that occurs sometime after biological birth, i.e., at the onset of what is usually called the oedipal stage. It is at this point that the ego is mature enough (and wise enough) to organize the individual's behavior along the lines of give-and-take activity in order to secure ongoing need satisfaction more effectively.

In contrast to the give-and-take relational experience of the individual, the relational experience of the infant can be said to be marked by extreme cognitive distortion and intense emotional polarity with respect to both the infant himself and the "other." The ego psychologists have suggested that the infant's first experience of the other, i.e., his mother, occurs within the context of an idealistic fusion with her, while the British school maintains that highly emotional relational experiences of both positive and negative charge occur from the very beginning but only within the context of very diffuse boundaries between the two parties.

With respect to both orientations, however, it can generally

be said that different relational experiences with the same external source of need satisfaction, i.e., the mother, eventually become represented intrapsychically as different selves in relation to different others. It is only when these different representations become integrated that a more realistic picture not only of each party but also of the multifaceted nature of their relationship results. As this integration occurs, there is a significant decrease in cognitive distortion, while the two opposite emotional extremes cancel each other out and are replaced by more neutral affect. Some theorists, such as Hartmann, were more inclined to interpret the latter event along instinctual lines, i.e., to view it as the result of the neutralization of libidinal and aggressive drives rather than view it primarily from the corresponding perspective of affective experience.

What has also been pointed out, however, is that some of the representations based on "partial" relational experience resist integration or at least can later be easily reactivated to influence social behavior with respect to the manifestation of fantasy. These representations are largely unconscious. Fairbairn suggested they might be considered a structuring influence within the context of the id and the superego, while both Melanie Klein and Jacobson maintained that they most certainly play a part in the initial structuring of the superego. This brings to mind Hartmann's notion that reciprocal self- and object-cathexes are found within each substructure of the personality. In any event, I would like to make it clear that the more substan-

tial superego formation would be expected to occur after the ego has been established since the superego is, after all, the substructure specifically oriented to social norms and conduct.

In using the term "relational experience," I am, of course, referring to the experience of object relations. According to Lichtenberg (1979):

It can be argued...that all psychoanalytic theories are object relations theories. The observation that pointed to a specifically psychoanalytic theory of object relations was Freud's recognition of the existence of transference -- the hitherto undiscovered fact that a human being under certain structured circumstances "transfers" to a person in his current life whole attitudes derived from significant past experiences, whole relationships preserved outside conscious awareness in a more or less unaltered state. (p. 375)

While object relations theory may ultimately constitute a fundamental aspect of any psychoanalytic orientation, it has also been shown that there are conceptual problems inherent in its usage since the term "object relations" is often used within the context of references to both pre-psychosocial as well as psychosocial functioning. As Hartmann put it, "we should not assume from the fact that the child and the environment interact from the onset, that the child is from the beginning psychologically directed toward the object as an object" (1939, p. 52). Whether one refers to part-objects, libidinal and antilibidinal objects, transitional objects, anaclitic objects, or precursors of the object, none of these imply an object as defined by a whole, separate person with needs and characteristics of his own. From the other side of the coin, none imply a definition of the self as a whole, separate person, either.

It is important, then, to conceptually distinguish between pre-psychosocial object relational experience and psychosocial object relational experience. It is also important to keep in mind that object relations development does not just involve movement toward more realistic representations of oneself and of others, but it also involves movement toward the more realistic experience of interaction. While all object relations reflect interactions with others, early object relations, due to their partial nature, do not reflect realistic relationships as defined by mutual experience. Such relationships can only be said to occur when true self-other differentiation is achieved.

It is to this latter area that I will now turn my attention. Having discussed the way in which early relational experience is internalized within the structure of the emerging personality, I will now discuss the way in which more advanced relational experience, i.e., social system experience, is internalized within the structure of the continually evolving personality. With respect to this goal, I will rely considerably on and yet further extend the conceptual framework that has been developed in this chapter.

Chapter IV

INTERNALIZATION, THE PERSONALITY, AND THE SOCIAL SYSTEM

It was brought out in Chapter I that some of the needs that the individual seeks to satisfy within the context of his current membership in social systems stem from earlier relational experiences, including earlier experiences as a member of other social systems. Indeed, the notion that an individual's experience in social systems can influence his ongoing behavior in more or less permanent ways is a notion that is usually taken for granted. What cannot be taken for granted, however, is the process by which this experience becomes influential in the first place. In other words, it remains to be explained how social system experience becomes manifested within the personality and, in this manner, within the individual's ongoing behavioral repertoire.

In using the term "social system experience," I wish to point out that I am specifically referring to the experience of the individual as a member of a social system. This definition assumes, of course, give-and-take activity as manifested in the taking of a role. With regard to this definition, it should be kept in mind that from an objective point of view all relational experience, including that of the infant, ultimately takes place within the context of social systems. While the infant cannot engage in give-and-take

activity as a member of the family social system, the type of relational activity in which he does engage (i.e., that which is based on part-object relations) is still anchored to his experience of interaction with members (or more specifically, parts of members) of his family, especially his mother, no matter how distorted or subjectively-defined his perceptions might be. When he does develop the capacity to realistically distinguish himself from others as whole persons and to appreciate and act on his interdependency with them, he can then be considered a true member of the family social system. It is at this point that he begins to accumulate social system experience as I have defined it here.

In the last chapter, it was suggested that it is through the manifestation of reciprocal self- and object-representations that early relational experience becomes "internalized" within the psyche. It was also suggested that these representations might be considered to play an important part in the structuralization of the personality as well. In this chapter, I will elaborate on this particular line of thought and extend it further to include the internalization of social system experience. Not only will I demonstrate how the internalization of social system experience (i.e., that which assumes psychosocial functioning and oedipal¹ development)

¹The term "oedipal" is being used here to refer not only to the formal oedipal stage but also to ongoing or post-oedipal development.

evolves from the internalization of early relational experience (i.e., that which assumes pre-psychosocial functioning and the preoedipal level of development), but I will also elaborate on how the former is qualitatively different from the latter, especially with respect to structural considerations. I would like to begin the overall discussion, however, by first revisiting the concept of internalization in order to examine its more important implications in greater detail.

The Concept of Internalization

While the concept of internalization is usually recognized as one of Hartmann's (1939) contributions to psychoanalytic thought, Freud, in his last work, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, published posthumously in 1940, touched on the essential premise of internalization in the course of describing the way in which the superego is structured:

A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead, by identification, been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. This new psychical agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people [the abandoned objects] in the external world. (p.62)

It is interesting to note that in this same work Freud also added support to the argument that the personality, at least with respect to these "abandoned objects," undergoes continuous development beyond the mere establishment of the tripartite system. More specifically, he stated that "the super-ego, in the course of an individual's development, re-

ceives contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers and models in public life of admired social ideals" (p. 3). He also stressed that the parental influence that is embodied within these abandoned objects "includes in its operation not only the personalities of the actual parents but also the family, racial and national traditions handed on through them, as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu which they represent" (p. 3). In other words, it was assumed that the abandoned parental objects reflect both the personal and social needs of the parental figures. Finally, it is in this same work that Freud also acknowledged, although rather briefly, that the id, like the rest of the personality, is also subject to parental and later cultural influence: "Some portion of the cultural acquisitions have undoubtedly left a precipitate behind them in the id" (p. 63). In light of these kinds of claims, it might be said that as the end of his life drew near, Freud was in the process of moving his theory into a more distinguishable psychosocial direction.

While Freud touched on the basic premise of internalization, it was Hartmann's (1939) work, however, as discussed in Chapter II, that more fully established it as a formal concept. Instead of just focusing on the object, Hartmann recognized the importance of the interaction between the subject and the object. He appreciated the fact that it is the interactive element that makes the object significant in the

first place. As Parsons (1952) explained:

When I say a person is my mother, or my friend, or my student, I am characterizing that person as a participant in a system of social interaction in which I also am involved....There is, within surprisingly broad limits, no intrinsic significance of persons to each other independent of their actual interaction. (p. 18)

It can thus be said that it is the interaction between the subject and the object (as manifested within the context of what Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) called "regulations"), and not just the object itself, that constitutes the content of the internalization process. Obviously, the notion of reciprocal self- and object-representations proves to be quite useful in this respect. As was brought out in the last chapter, however, relational experience, i.e., the experience of reciprocal interaction, can be rooted in fantasy as well as in reality. A more comprehensive conception of internalization would thus include this experiential factor. Such a conception has in fact been presented by Roy Schafer (1968):

Internalization refers to all those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment, into inner regulations and characteristics. (p. 9)

Not only did Schafer highlight the possibility that both the nature and the parties of the interaction may be imagined by the subject, but he also emphasized that internalization is an active process on the part of the subject, that "it is the subject who does the work of transformation or replacement, though his doing so may be in response to

considerable environmental pressure" (p. 9). In this light, internalization can be considered to be in the same league as any other behavioral activity in that it is ultimately manifested for the purpose of securing need satisfaction.

Schafer also supported the notion that through the ongoing process of internalization, structure-building self- and object-representations become manifested within each substructure of the personality. While this notion, which was alluded to by Hartmann (1950) and indirectly suggested in Fairbairn's (1952) object relations personality model, seems acceptable enough with respect to the way in which the ego and superego are usually conceptualized, it becomes somewhat harder to accept with respect to the way in which the id is usually conceptualized. Fortunately, Schafer (1967) offered some clarification on this matter as well:

The concept id refers not simply to an aggregate of ideationally unelaborated instinctual tensions; it also refers to a great variety of more or less infantile wishes and their close derivatives that have been rejected by ego and superego tendencies because it would be too dangerous to the person to acknowledge and act on them. The aims we refer to the id are the full satisfactions of sexual and aggressive wishes. (pp. 139-140)

Schafer (1967) went on to explain that "even if we adopted the commonly held position within psychoanalysis that all the id can do is wish, mental content would not be excluded from the id [since] the very concept wish implies a representation of an object, an action, and a consummation" (pp. 146-147). The id in Schafer's view, then, includes

"perceptions, images, concepts, and memories pertaining to the self and objects" (p. 147). Perhaps it can be said that these are the id's cultural "precipitates" of which Freud (1940) made mention.

From a similar perspective, Loewald (1971, 1978) maintained that even the term "instinct" should be used with reference to an essentially psychological (as opposed to biological) force that originates in the interaction between the infant and his mother. More specifically, he explained that while instincts may evolve in response to biological stimuli, they actually represent psychological motivation that is "shaped" within the context of early relational experience. Instincts, in this sense, can be closely associated with reciprocal self- and object-representations. Conceptually, they can be considered to evolve together. As Sandler and Sandler (1978) pointed out:

The idea of an aim which seeks gratification has to be supplemented by the idea of a wished-for interaction, with the wished-for or imagined response of the object being as much a part of the wishful fantasy as the activity of the subject in that wish or fantasy. (p. 288)

Loewald also maintained, however, that not all psychological motivation should be considered "instinctual" in nature. He stated that while "lower-order," instinctual motivation continues to exist, some of it also becomes transformed into more organized, more stable, and more personalized "higher-order" conformations of motivational energy as a result of increasingly more complex, internalized inter-

actions with the human environment. Loewald suggested further that these motivational conformations correspond conceptually to the substructures of the personality. He proposed, in other words, that the ego, id, and superego might be seen as different motivational systems shaped within the context of progressive relational experience.

Not only does Loewald's conception reinforce the notion that the tripartite personality system stems from the experience of interaction with others and is thus structured by reciprocal self- and object-representations, but it also complements the description of behavior that I presented earlier in Chapter I. I stated then that behavior assumes personal motivation and consists of psychological and/or motor action. I also stated that all behavior emanates from the psyche. In other words, it is the psyche, organized as the personality, that shapes the motivational impetus which results in behavior. Conceiving of the substructures of the personality as different motivational systems is certainly supportive of this view.

With respect to this view, it can also be said that even though the ego may be seen as the substructure of the personality that both directly influences and is directly influenced by the social environment, the motivational tendencies of the id and the superego would ultimately also be reflected in the "influencing" endeavor, i.e., in the manifestation of behavior. This notion is in keeping with Waelder's

(1936) "principle of multiple function," which states that any psychic event involves the simultaneous expression of ego, id, and superego tendencies and of the relations of these substructures to each other. This helps to explain why there can be many different kinds of needs represented simultaneously within the context of one particular behavior.¹

What is particularly significant about Loewald's conception, however, is the implication that even that which can be called "endogenous" personal motivation is not just a product of the individual alone, but rather must be seen as being progressively shaped by internalized relational experiences. It might even be said that as a result of these internalized relational experiences, the personal motivation of the individual includes within its realm needs that were originally experienced to be those of interacting objects. As mentioned earlier, Freud (1940) himself assumed that the "abandoned objects" which make up the individual's superego contain the motivational tendencies of the original objects. Perhaps Schafer (1968) was more to the point, however, when he proposed that "in internalization it is commonly the object's motives that are reproduced by the subject himself and brought into a new relation with motives he already regards as his own" (p. 11). In this view, personal motivation can be said to assume both self and object motivational components that

¹The way in which a behavior can be seen as a composite of different motivations was discussed more fully in Chapter I.

have been linked together within the context of internalized relational experiences.

Schafer's description of the motivational nature of internalization applies as much to the internalization of pre-oedipal object relational experience (which assumes pre-psycho-social functioning and thus the perception of part-objects) as it does to the internalization of oedipal object relational experience (which assumes psychosocial functioning and the more realistic perception of whole person objects). It is only with respect to the latter context, however, that this description can be said to suggest that the resulting motivation of the individual would include some of the needs of other persons with whom he has interacted. Nevertheless, whether reference is being made to the pre-psycho-social level or to the psychosocial level of functioning, personal motivation can still be described as being continuously shaped by the experience of interpersonal interaction, even if the "persons" are unreal (as in part-object relations). In this respect, Harry Stack Sullivan's clever maxim, "the personal is always interpersonal," can be seen to have considerable conceptual merit.

While it has been repeatedly stated that that which is internalized within the personality is relational experience as manifested by reciprocal self- and object-representations, it should also be pointed out that not all relational experience is necessarily internalized. This can be explained by

calling upon the concept of the "representational world" developed by Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962). These authors suggested that self- and object-representations first become part of what can be considered a cognitive map of the subjectively-experienced external world, and that it is only after this event that some of these reciprocal representations become truly internalized within the basic fabric of the personality structure. Rapaport (1967) painted a similar conceptual picture by differentiating between the "inner world" and the "internal world." He defined the former as the individual's intrapsychic map of the external world and the latter as the organization of substructures that comprise the personality. With respect, however, to either the concept of the representational world or to Rapaport's specific notion of the inner world¹, it is the ego that is assumed to be most directly involved:

It is a function of the ego to construct a representational world from the original undifferentiated sensorium of the infant. This goes hand in hand with ego development, for the building up of representations is a sine qua non for ego development, and is itself a prerequisite for progressive adaptation. In this the ego is and remains the active agency. The representational world is never an active agent -- it is rather a set of indications which guides the ego to appropriate adaptive or defensive activity....The representational world provides the material for the ego's perceptual structuring of sensory impulses, for imagination and fantasy, for

¹Rapaport used the term "inner world" somewhat differently than did the members of the British school. Because they did not clearly differentiate between self and ego, their conception of the inner world includes aspects of the personality structure, i.e., what Rapaport referred to as the "internal world."

direct and modified action, for language, symbols, and for trial action in thought. (Sandler & Rosenblatt, 1962, p. 136)

It can thus be said that the representational world serves as the medium through which the ego regulates interactions with the external environment. These interactions correspondingly result in new reciprocal self- and object-representations. What should be pointed out, however, is that these representations are never direct copies of reality. They are based on the individual's subjective experience of interaction, which assumes both conscious and unconscious perceptual processes, some of which are strongly influenced by earlier, highly emotional and unrealistic relational experiences that have already been internalized. As Meissner (1973) put it, the representational world is "built up on the basis of experiences derived from both external and internal sources" (p. 807). Consequently, the representational world never quite reproduces the actual world of real people with whom the individual has interacted in the past and in the present. It is for this reason that the perception of reality is, as I brought out earlier, at best an approximation that is only "relatively realistic" in nature.

Meissner (1973) also pointed out that while the representational or inner world is built up and structured over time by self- and object-representations "which form relatively enduring organizations and representational schemata based on the integration of multiple impressions" (p. 807), this struc-

turalization should not be confused with the structuralization of self- and object-representations that takes place within the context of the internal world made of the tripartite personality system:

Our position is that changes in the internal world are true internalizations, while changes in the inner world are internalizations only in an analogous sense. The formation of mental representations must be distinguished from true internalization. Mental representations -- whether of objects or of the self -- remain a part of the inner world and become part of the internal world only through internalization. (p. 807)

In light of the way that Loewald (1971) conceived of matters, it might be said that while the representational or inner world is basically cognitive in nature, the internal world, made up of the ego, id, and superego, is, by contrast, motivational in nature. In other words, internalization can be said to occur when the self- and object-representations manifested within the context of relational experience gain the power to motivate the individual's behavior in an ongoing manner. It is only at this point that these representations can be said to be internalized within the personality structure (i.e., the internal world).

In sum, it is by way of the representational world that certain relational experiences as manifested by self- and object-representations become internalized within the evolving personality. It has been suggested here that these representations are internalized as motivational components, and in the process of being internalized, they serve to structure

the personality further. It is specifically this ongoing structuralization of the internal world that will be looked at more closely in the next section as I now turn to the work of Otto Kernberg.

Kernberg's Theoretical Synthesis: An Overview

In the act of integrating some of the major developmental notions of Erikson, Jacobson, Mahler, Melanie Klein, and Fairbairn into one fairly consistent model, Otto Kernberg (1976, 1980) has provided an impressive theoretical synthesis which, among other things, helps to clarify more explicitly the way in which the personality is progressively structured by internalized object relational experiences. Just the fact that such a synthesis was even possible to arrive at serves to validate his claim that object relations theory "transcends any particular psychoanalytic school or group and represents a general psychoanalytic development to which authors of very different orientations have contributed significantly" (1976, p. 58). More importantly, however, at least with respect to the primary goal of this present study, Kernberg's basic orientation reflects a keen awareness of the potential in object relations theory for integrating the concept of social system life with the psychoanalytic model of the personality:

The term "object" in object-relations theory should more properly be "human object," since it reflects the traditional use of this term in psychoanalytic metapsychology for relations with others....Psychoanalytic object-relations theory...represents, in my opinion, a major in-

egrative framework which can link the psychosocial approach to and the subjective, experiential nature of human life, on the one hand, with the intrapsychic structures comprehended in general metapsychology, on the other....Internalized object relations may be considered a crossroad where instinct and the social system meet and contribute crucially to the development of the personality of the individual. (1976, pp. 58-59)

I will now proceed to discuss Kernberg's basic model in detail. As I do so, however, I will also highlight the need for certain changes in its conception as well as present what I consider to be the appropriate modifications. I will also elaborate more extensively on certain conceptual areas that appear to be in need of further clarification. In general, Kernberg's central notion is consonant with the viewpoint that I have gradually been developing in this and in the last two chapters -- namely, that the personality is structured by relational experiences in the form of internalized object relations. More specifically, Kernberg maintained (a) that the experience of an interpersonal interaction is manifested as a "unit" comprised of a self-representation, an object-representation, and an affect disposition linking the two representations together, and (b) that these self-object-affect units, in their earliest form, serve as "the basic building blocks on which further developments of internalized object- and self-representations, and later on, the overall tripartite structure (ego, superego, and id) rest" (1980, p. 17).

I would like to point out here that in Kernberg's view, like in the views of both Jacobson (1964) and Mahler (1968),

it is the gradually differentiating affective experience of pleasure vs. unpleasure (i.e., of "good" vs. "bad") within the context of evolving object relational activity that serves to organize the biologically-derived (but psychologically-manifested) libidinal and aggressive drives, respectively. This conception is in keeping with the more general notion that endogenous personal motivation is shaped, along with the psyche itself, by relational experience as manifested by internalized self- and object-representations.

Kernberg stated that object relations or, as I would more specifically put it, object relational experiences, are internalized within the psyche through three different, hierarchical identification systems. These three systems or levels of internalization include the processes and the resulting structures related to introjection, identification, and ego identity -- a sequence that, as was shown in Chapter II, was first suggested by Erikson (1956). What is important to consider here is that the term that is being used to refer to a particular internalization process is the same term that is being used to refer to the structural product of that process. Introjections as intrapsychic structures, for example, are assumed to result from the process of introjection. This follows the thinking of Hartmann and Loewenstein (1962) who also used the term "identification" with reference to both a process and a product.

With respect to another important matter, I would also like to point out that while Kernberg used the term "identification systems" to refer to all three levels of internalization at the same time that he used the term "identification" in a more specific way to refer to the second level per se, my use of the term "identification" in all subsequent discussions will specifically assume only the latter context. Furthermore, for the purpose of greater consistency, I will refrain from using the term "identification system" and use in its place the term "internalization system." This latter term would seem to be more appropriate in light of the actual concept to which reference is being made.

Kernberg essentially proposed that introjection, identification, and ego identity assume different levels of object relational experience as well as different levels of intrapsychic structural formation. All three, however, involve processes and structures based on self-object-affect units, even though the component self-representation, object-representation, and linking affect disposition of each unit tend to reflect a more realistic orientation as internalization proceeds from the level of introjection to that of ego identity. This conception will become clearer as I examine each of these internalization systems in greater detail within the context of the development of the personality.

Incorporation and Introjection

In Kernberg's view, introjection is "the earliest, most primitive, and basic level in the organization of internalization processes" (1976, p. 29). Introjections can thus be considered the first structures of the psyche. Kernberg made a distinction, however, between the earliest introjections and those which become manifested somewhat later. He described the former as being comprised of self- and object-representations which are not yet differentiated from each other. The earliest introjections, then, can be appropriately referred to as "self-object representations," and this is in fact the alternate term that Kernberg used to describe them. With respect to this notion of self-object representations, the conceptual framework of Jacobson's (1964) structurally-oriented object relations model of development can already be recognized as an important influence in Kernberg's thinking.

Since the psyche is initially structured by self-object representations, the beginning stage of development, at least from an experiential perspective, is one which can ultimately be characterized as being "objectless" in nature. It is objectless in the sense that the infant does not experience himself as being separate from his objects. This conception of early development thus assumes an ego psychological orientation, and in this light, it can be seen to coincide substantially with what was described earlier as the stage of primary

narcissism (Hartmann, 1964), the stage of nondifferentiation (Spitz, 1965), and the phase of normal autism (Mahler, 1968).

Self-object representations become manifested as a result of the infant's first interactions with his mother, even though he does not experience these interactions as interactions per se due to his objectless experiential state. (This issue will be taken up shortly.) Since some of these interactions are pleasurable while others are unpleasurable, the corresponding self-object representations can similarly be characterized as being either "good" or "bad," respectively. Ultimately, the self-object representations tend to group together on the basis of their particular affective coloring. Two constellations of self-object representations will thus begin to emerge -- a libidinally-invested good one and an aggressively-invested bad one.

The good constellation consolidates as the core of what will eventually become the early ego. Within the framework of subjective experience, this consolidation can also be said to contribute to the infant's first sense of self -- in this case, an all good self fused with an all good mother. The bad constellation, on the other hand, also undergoes some consolidation, but with respect to subjective experience, it is ejected from the experience of "me" and relegated to the realm of "not-me." These events can thus be seen to parallel Mahler's (1968) description of the symbiotic phase of development in which the infant experiences himself only within

the context of an ideal oneness with his mother.

It can be said that self-object representations become introjections on a more formal basis when they evolve into self-object-affect units with differentiated self- and object-representations. What should be kept in mind here is that the separation of self- and object-representations at the level of introjection does not imply the separation of self and object in reality, i.e., true self-other differentiation. The representations at the level of introjection do not constitute "whole person" representations. They are partial in nature and can be likened to the Kleinian notion of part-objects. However, since the notion of part-selves (in interaction with part-objects) is also implied here, Fairbairn's (1952) object relations model of personality development can also be considered represented within this particular conceptual framework as well.

I would like to focus a bit at this point on the differences between the earliest introjections, manifested as self-object representations, and later introjections, manifested as self-object-affect units with differentiated self- and object-representational components. To begin with, it would seem to me that a terminological distinction between these two types of introjections would be quite useful. Such a distinction would provide more consistency and thus more clarity to the overall conceptual framework. With this in

mind, I propose here that the Freudian term "incorporation" be reactivated to refer to what Kernberg considered the earliest introjections, i.e., the self-object representations. In this light, incorporation can henceforth be considered the initial internalization system, to be followed by introjection, identification, and ego identity, respectively.

In utilizing the term "incorporation" in this context, no other connotations based on former usages of the term are implied. I am using it here simply to refer to the processes and structures that are characteristic of the first system of internalization. What must be kept in mind, however, is that an incorporation as an object relational unit is very different from the units which are characteristic of the three other systems of internalization. It is different in the sense that its self- and object-representations are fused together into one component.

It can consequently be said that incorporations do not promote the experience of self or of not-self (that is, at least until the libidinally-invested and the aggressively-invested constellations have evolved significantly). This explains why the infant does not initially experience his interactions as interactions per se. In a formal sense, then, incorporations cannot even be considered to stem from the infant's experience of object relations since at this early developmental level relational experience is beyond the infant's experiential capacities. However, while he may not be able to

experience interactions, what he does experience and internalize as incorporations is nevertheless based on interactions. In other words, even though his initial experience of life is quite boundaryless, he is continuously being attended to by and internalizing interactions with an external object.

Using this new terminology, it can now be said that through experiences dominated by pleasurable or unpleasurable affect, incorporations become manifested within the emerging psyche and gradually consolidate as good and bad constellations of incorporations. As this happens, the two constellations become experienced as "me" and "not-me," respectively. Ultimately, the internalization system of incorporation begins to give way to the internalization system of introjection when, as a result of ongoing experience and maturation, the self- and object-representations that were previously fused as incorporations begin to differentiate into separate (but linked) representations. According to Kernberg, this differentiation occurs first within the context of the good constellation:

Experiences which activate the gratifying self-object representation also activate attention and motivate learning; both gratification and limited frustration (which also activates attention and learning) contribute to gradual differentiation of the self components from the object components in the infant's perception of interaction with its mother. This gradual differentiation is powerfully supported by the maturation of primary autonomous ego functions such as perception and memory and by cognitive developments occurring in the context of the infant-mother relation. In contrast, excessive activation of the "bad" self-object representation under the influence of frustration or deprivation brings on generalized anxiety, whose disorganizing effect inter-

feres with the early differentiation of self and object components. (1976, p. 63)

Kernberg stressed that the earliest affect states are usually quite extreme. In general, they are manifested as either pure, ideal gratification or as total rage, frustration, and fear. These affect states are, of course, associated to fantastic notions of self and others. Occasionally, as a result of new, particularly terrifying experiences, good introjections will defensively refuse into good incorporations on a temporary basis as the infant tries to protect himself from anxiety by recreating the experience of an ideal union with his "good mother."

Nevertheless, as more experiences are internalized, promoting the development of greater perceptual and cognitive capacities, introjection gradually becomes the dominant system of internalization. Introjections represent the infant's first experience of interaction with his mother as manifested by differentiated self- and object-representations. However, as was previously brought out, the interaction is experienced at the level of part-object relations. In other words, the component representations are quite unrealistic. They can at best be likened to one-dimensional "snapshots" taken within the context of interactions dominated by intensely pleasurable or unpleasurable affect. Different snapshots or representations of the same person, or for that matter, of different physical parts of the same person, are experienced by the infant as por-

traying different "persons," i.e., whole entities which are assumed to be acting intentionally in a good or bad manner.

Introjections, like incorporations, maintain an ongoing movement toward consolidation on the basis of their particular affective bearing. Ongoing relational experiences, which at this point are generally shaped by these introjections, are in turn internalized as introjections within either the good or the bad introjection sphere. What must be kept in mind here, however, is that the good introjections, as mentioned above, become established much sooner than do the bad introjections. As these good introjections evolve and consolidate, more and more of them will begin to fuse together as well. Through this ongoing fusion, they strengthen the boundaries of the emerging ego (which they themselves structurally constitute at this point) as they simultaneously help the infant further differentiate his sense of self from his sense of the object. As Kernberg explained:

In the process of the fusion of introjections of the same valence, homologous components of introjection tend to fuse, self-image with other self-images and object-image with other object-images. Since by this fusion more elaborate self-images and object-images are being "mapped out," this process contributes to the differentiation of self and object and to the delimitation of ego boundaries. This, in turn, further organizes and integrates the apparatuses of perception and memory. (1976, p. 30)

In Kernberg's view, the splitting of pleasurable experiences from the frightening and disorganizing effects of unpleasurable experiences is the major defense mechanism of the early, fragile ego. The early ego can be said to emerge in association with the infant's growing capacity to internalize

what is now experienced as relational activity within the the context, at least initially, of good introjections. This assumes, of course, at least some capacity to differentiate between self and object. A splitting mechanism of sorts, however, was also seen to be prominent at the earlier level of development characterized by incorporation, where good incorporations and the corresponding experience of "me" were seen to consolidate separately from bad incorporations and the corresponding experience of "not-me." While this issue is not one on which Kernberg focused much attention, I will nevertheless attempt to explain how splitting at the level of introjection is a different process than the splitting-type process that occurs at the level of incorporation, and how this difference stems from the experience of interaction that is only possible within the context of the more advanced internalization system.

As the ego evolves, so does a rudimentary appreciation of oneself and external reality. By this I mean that as good self-object representations differentiate to form good introjections and, in this manner, to set the precedent for the further internalization of good experiences at the level of introjection, the infant begins to experience himself not only as being separate from external objects (which at this point actually reflect good part-objects, not whole person objects), but also, and perhaps more importantly, as being necessarily interactive with them. In other words, instead

of experiencing life as being comprised of the vague realms of "me" and "not-me," between which there is no interaction, the infant begins to perceive, however crudely, a world of external objects with which he as a separate entity must interact if his needs are going to be met.

It should be remembered here that what is being referred to as the earliest "me," i.e., that which is embodied by the constellation of good incorporations, is ultimately self-contained from the point of view of need satisfaction. No interaction with something other-than-self is deemed necessary since this "me" is based on the infant's experience of a totally gratifying fusion with his mother. The early ego that evolves in association with good as well as (eventually) bad introjections, however, is forced to consider the fact that gratification stems only from relational activity with external objects, objects which the infant can now perceive in some primitive fashion. At this higher developmental level, then, splitting must now be conceived as the early ego's attempt to separate the frightening and disorganizing effects of bad relational experiences from the ego-strengthening effects of good relational experiences. Splitting at the level of incorporation, by contrast, assumes no experience of relational activity at all (even though, in reality, interactions are continually occurring).

I would now like to describe in more detail the nature of splitting at the developmental level characterized by the in-

ternalization system of introjection. As the process of introjection first becomes established, the structure of the psyche can be said to consist of a fairly sophisticated organization of good introjections and a separate, more primitive constellation of bad incorporations. It is within the context of the good introjections that an early functional ego begins to emerge in association with the infant's growing sense of self in interaction with external objects. This initial sense of self is experienced as being all good since it is based solely on good introjections, or more specifically, good self-representations. Aggression or badness, on the other hand, is seen to emanate only from vague external sources, although good external objects are perceived as well.

In time, however, in association with ongoing experience and the development of greater perceptual and cognitive capacities (which reflect, correspondingly, a now stronger and more flexible ego), the constellation of bad incorporations evolves, like its good counterpart has already done, into an organization of introjections. These bad introjections become manifested as the infant begins to experience his own aggression, i.e., a bad self, in response to, or more specifically, in retaliation against what are now perceived as bad external objects (the persecutory environment, as the Kleinians would say). While these bad introjections also contribute to both the infant's sense of self in interaction with external objects as well as to the structural constitution of the ego,

they are maintained separately from the body of good introjections.

It can thus be said that at this point in the course of development, the early ego, i.e., the emerging structure based on the experience of interaction with objects, is split. It is constituted by an organization of good introjections and a separate organization of bad introjections. What this translates into is an intrapsychic arrangement of good self-representations differentiated from but linked with good object-representations and a separate intrapsychic arrangement of bad self-representations differentiated from but linked with bad object-representations.

Since it is assumed that the characteristics of the psyche dictate the nature of subjective experience, new relational experiences would correspondingly also be characterized as being either all good or all bad, and they would then themselves become subject to internalization as introjections within the appropriate (good or bad) structural area. Again, it cannot be emphasized enough that what is experienced and structurally represented as good or bad objects and selves may actually stem from the infant's different experiences with one person, i.e., his mother, or for that matter, with different physical parts of her, under the assumption that these different experiences reflect different "persons" intentionally interacting with him within a good or bad (gratifying or frustrating) context.

The period of development characterized by the internalization system of introjection can be seen to correspond considerably with Klein's (1946) description of the paranoid-schizoid position, which assumes a predominance of splitting, as well as with Fairbairn's (1952) conception of the stage of infantile dependence, which includes the notion of libidinal and antilibidinal objects being attached respectively to libidinal and antilibidinal "egos" or selves. From the perspective of ego psychology, it can also be seen that the object relations that have been described within this context are similar to the kind that Spitz (1965) conceived of when he referred to the infant's relations with the "precursors of the object." Finally, the establishment of a psychic structure constituted by good and bad introjections, a structure which assumes the ongoing internalization of relational experience as manifested by differentiated self- and object-representations (even if they are highly unrealistic in nature), can certainly be seen to correspond significantly with the beginning of the separation-individuation phase of development as described by Mahler (1968).

Identification

Having discussed the internalization systems of incorporation and introjection, I will now proceed along the developmental course and discuss the internalization system of identification. Kernberg maintained that identification

becomes possible as the now expanded early ego (expanded in the sense that it includes both good and bad introjections) undergoes consolidation. This consolidation consists of an integration of the good and bad self-representations as well as an integration of the good and bad object-representations. What results is more realistic and more enduring "whole person" representations of oneself and one's interacting objects (which includes only the mother at first, but eventually the father, siblings, and more extended others as well). The early ego at this point in time has thus carried out what can now be described as its two essential tasks: (a) the further differentiation of self-representations from object-representations (at least with respect to the incorporations, i.e., the self-object representations, that were still prominent when the ego first emerged), and (b) the integration of the libidinally- and aggressively-determined representations of the self as well as those of the object.

Identification becomes the dominant system of internalization as these integrations approach completion. A rough but valid comparison can be made here with Klein's (1952) notion of the depressive position as well as with Fairbairn's (1952) conception of the stage of mature dependence since, in their view, good and bad objects as well as parts of the ego (or self) are also assumed to achieve some level of integration at this point in development, creating the capacity for whole person object relations. The onset of identification

can similarly be said to signal not only the onset of relations with the "object proper" (Spitz, 1965), but also the basic achievement of object constancy (Hartmann, 1952) and separation-individuation (Mahler, 1968). More to the point, identification assumes true self-other differentiation, i.e., the differentiation of a fairly realistic and integrated sense of oneself from a fairly realistic sense of whole person objects with whom one interacts.

Identification thus signals the capacity for psychosocial functioning and the emergence of the socially-oriented individual from the infant. While the infant attempts to secure need satisfaction through behavior oriented to somewhat self-manufactured or idiosyncratically-conceived "objects" such as good and bad breasts, or even completely fragmented, idealized or terrifying whole physical mother images with which he experiences "interpersonal" relationships of sort, the individual, by contrast, attempts to secure need satisfaction through give-and-take activity oriented to real persons within the context of mutually-experienced and thus truly "interpersonal" relationships. What this latter description implies, of course, is active participation in social systems.

What is also implied here is that through the intrapsychic establishment of whole person representations, the ego has developed the wherewithal to perceive even new persons in the individual's expanding social environment -- persons with whom he has had no prior interactive contact -- as "whole persons"

and, correspondingly, to portray them intrapsychically within the context of whole person representations (in interaction with the individual himself) as well. This is the basic way in which identifications influence ongoing relational experience and help to generate the internalization of new identifications.

In support of the view that identification processes assume relational experiences based on social system membership, Kernberg himself stated that identification "can only take place when the perceptive and cognitive abilities of the child have increased to the point that it can recognize the role aspects [italics mine] of interpersonal interaction" (1976, p.30). Compared to the self-object-affect unit which characterizes relational experience and its internalization at the level of introjection, the self-object-affect unit which characterizes relational experience and its internalization at the level of identification is comprised of (a) a more delimited and more clearly differentiated image of the object that is now seen as taking a role in an interaction with the self, (b) a more delimited and more clearly differentiated image of the self that is now seen as taking a complementary role to that of the object, and (c) an affective coloring of the interaction that is significantly less intense, less diffuse, and more specifically-oriented than the affective coloring found in introjections.

Yet Kernberg highlighted another important difference between identifications and introjections:

Since identifications imply the internalization of roles..., behavioral manifestations of the individual, which express one or both of the reciprocal roles of the respective interaction, become a predominant result of identification; the behavioral manifestations of introjections are less apparent in interpersonal interactions. (1976, p. 31)

What is being referred to here is the assumption that identifications involve overt, focused behavior characterized by obvious motor responses specifically directed to other people, while much of the behavior associated to introjections is manifested primarily through the medium of highly unrealistic, intrapsychic fantasy, making it difficult for others to observe. Furthermore, even when the latter does take the form of more overt motor responses, it is still so grounded in fantasy that it remains difficult to interpret, at least within the context of what Sullivan (1953b) would call consensual validation.

Of particular interest is Kernberg's claim that the behavior associated to identifications involves the expression of "one or both of the reciprocal roles of the respective interaction." In other words, it is assumed that the behavior and thus the corresponding motivation associated to both roles inherent in the internalized self-object-affect unit can become influential in determining the individual's ongoing behavior. This matter, as well as others related to it, will be taken up more extensively in the next section.

Returning now to the structural development of the personality, it can be said that it is during this period that the ego, id, and superego become established as bounded and

fully functional substructures of the personality. In order to understand this, it must be kept in mind that while identification can be considered the dominant process at this point in time, some introjections continue to exist in a "nonmetabolized" form. In other words, not all of the good and bad self-representations and, correspondingly, the good and bad object-representations which they are respectively linked with, become integrated within the context of the more comprehensive and realistic self- and object-representations. These unintegrated introjections play an important part in the establishment of both the id and the superego.

According to Kernberg, as the mature ego evolves in association with the integration of those good and bad introjections which are amenable to the integrative process, it gains the resources of what Hartmann (1950) referred to as neutralized energy. Perhaps this neutralized energy can be thought of as motivation based on a more correct assessment of (as well as, correspondingly, ongoing confirmation from) external reality. In any event, it provides the ego with the capacity to defend itself from disturbing and disorganizing influences through the mechanism of repression. It can generally be said that at the developmental level characterized by the internalization system of identification, repression occupies the position that splitting formerly held as the predominant defensive operation of the ego.

In a manner of speaking, repression consolidates both the ego and the id since it ultimately serves to differentiate the id as a substructure of the personality. More specifically, the id becomes established as a result of the repression of unacceptable internalized object relational experiences. It can essentially be seen as the substructure that serves to contain and organize these internalized experiences. What makes these internalized experiences unacceptable is that they stimulate intolerable amounts of anxiety or guilt (the latter, of course, involving the influence of the simultaneously emerging super-ego), and they are manifested not only by previously internalized introjections that have remained unintegrated in the face of ego consolidation and have been subsequently repressed, but also, in time, by new internalized introjections that reflect the influence of the former on ongoing relational experience (which now assumes active social system involvement).

Kernberg touched on the influence of the id's original introjections within the context of describing their unchanging quality:

Primitive, unrealistic self- and object-representations remain relatively unchanged in the id, and so do their correspondingly primitive, overwhelming affect dispositions. In the id, therefore, primitive cognitive constellations of self- and object-representations and their associated primitive affect dispositions persist. This accounts for many of the characteristics of the id, such as displacement and condensation (of primitive self- and object-representations), and the primitive nature of the aggressive and libidinal drive derivatives involved.
(1976, p. 70)

It can be said that the id persists in coloring ongoing relational experience from a part-object relations perspective even though the ego and, as it shall soon be seen, the super-ego usually maintain a whole person object relations perspective. It is this part-object relations perspective that accounts for the projective-introjective processes that were seen by some of the Kleinian theorists in the last chapter to play an important part in the manifestation of roles in social systems. In other words, it is the id that accounts for much of the fantasy component of give-and-take activity. On a more general level, it can also be said that it is largely due to the id's part-object relations perspective that the individual's perception of reality is only "relatively realistic" in nature.

While the id is structured by both old and new introjections, these introjections can be considered to be maintained in separate camps depending on whether they are libidinally- or aggressively-determined. At no point is there an integration of self-representations or of object-representations that would result in whole person object relations. It can thus be said that the motivation stemming from the id is the most directly instinctual motivation of the entire personality. It is based on either libidinal or aggressive drives in their purest (unneutralized) form in association with rather primitive, one-dimensional perceptions of self and others.

It can also be said that as a result of repression leading to the establishment of the id, primary process thinking, which Kernberg defined as "primitive cognitive processes intimately linked with primitive affect states" (1976, p. 69), no longer has direct access to consciousness. In other words, it can no longer be expressed without regard to reality. Instead, it becomes localized within the context of the id where its influence is tempered by ego and superego factors.

Turning now to the establishment of the superego, Kernberg's view of this event is based largely on Jacobson's (1964) conception. The superego is seen to develop over the course of three different stages, with structural maturity being reached at the developmental level characterized by identification. The first superego structure emerges sometime after the emergence of the first ego structure, i.e., the ego comprised of only good introjections. This superego structure is made up of some of the infant's bad incorporations which have gradually come to be experienced within the context of "me" instead of "not-me."¹ According to Kernberg, these bad incorporations serve as "sadistic superego forerunners" and they reflect the "primitive efforts of the infant to protect the good relationship with the idealized mother by turning the aggressively

¹This could only occur around the time when the infant's bad incorporations are beginning to evolve into bad introjections with differentiated self- and object-representations. It is only at this point that the ego will allow some badness to be associated with the self.

invested images of her (fused with the respective self-images) against himself" (1976, p. 71).

The next stage of superego structuralization takes place at the time when the ego begins to consolidate, i.e., as the good and bad self-representations as well as the good and bad object-representations begin to undergo integration. While it has already been pointed out that these two integrations result in new, realistic self- and object-representations, Kernberg maintained that there are other important consequences which should also be considered:

The fusion of positive and negative introjections implies a fusion and concomitant modification of their affect components. The irradiating effect of purely positive and purely negative affective states diminishes, and the mutual compenetration of libidinal and aggressive drive derivatives fosters a broader spectrum of affect dispositions of the ego. This development, essential for normal psychic growth, also triggers off an additional development of the intrapsychic life: the image of an ideal self representing the striving for reparation of guilt and for the reestablishment of an ideal, positive relationship between self and object. The image of an ideal object which represents the unharmed, all-loving, all-forgiving object completes the picture. (1976, p. 40)

Thus, the consolidation of the ego results not only in a more realistic self- and a more realistic object-representation, but also in an ideal self- and an ideal object-representation reflecting in fantasy the now lost ideal state of the all good self- and object-representations. Together these two idealized representations comprise the early ego ideal formation, and it is the integration of this ego ideal formation with the sadistic superego forerunners (which up to now have remained unintegrated

despite the pull of ego consolidation) that constitutes the second stage of superego development.

While Kernberg did not describe it as such, I would propose that this integration actually involves an integration of good and bad introjections. I propose this because (a) the ego ideal can be considered to be comprised of all good self- and object-representations, and (b) the superego forerunners, which were originally conceived of as bad incorporations, can now be assumed to have evolved into bad introjections. In contrast to this view, Kernberg, following Jacobson's (1964) lead, suggested that both of these components are manifested in the form of self-object representations at the time of their integration. While not denying the individual's continuing potential to blur boundaries and "lose" himself through the manifestation of self-object representations (a potential that at times might be vigorously utilized), it would seem to be quite inconsistent with the overall conceptual framework to assume that at the time when the mature ego has already begun to surface that a significant part of the personality is still exclusively comprised of primitive incorporations.

Interestingly enough, Kernberg's description of the integrative process at this level of superego development can be applicable to either position:

The superego has to repeat the process that has already been started in the ego, namely, the integration of internalized object relations of libidinal and aggressive characteristics. When this step in superego integration is

achieved, a "toning down" of the absolute, fantastic nature of primitive idealization (the early ego ideal) and of the sadistic forerunners within the superego occurs, along with a decrease in the processes of projection of such sadistic and idealized superego nuclei....[This] leads to still another level of superego structures, namely, internalizations of the more realistic demands and prohibitions of the parental figures during the oedipal period of development. (1976, p. 71)

Thus, as a result of the integration of the ego ideal and the sadistic forerunners, a new, more comprehensive superego emerges. It is at this level of superego development that the demands and prohibitions stemming from relational experiences with (at least relatively) realistically-perceived others become significant. Since these relational experiences assume the context of give-and-take activity, i.e., the taking of roles in social systems, it can be said that it is at this point in time that social system experiences begin to become represented within the superego.

What I am suggesting here is that the mature superego is built up in an ongoing manner by realistic self- and object-representations that are internalized within the context of identifications. I emphasize both self and object in contrast to just "parental figures"¹ because an object, as it has been pointed out earlier, is only significant within the context of an interaction with the subject. I would also argue here that

¹This emphasis on the object alone can be traced back to Freud's (1940) notion that the superego is comprised of "abandoned objects."

the demands and prohibitions of a parental figure that are adopted by a child do not reflect a set of absolute standards that are "handed down," but rather they result from the motives of and the actions taken by the parental figure (the object) in association with the motives of and the actions taken by the child (the subject). Thus, the particular demands and prohibitions of the parental figure that are "internalized" within the child's superego are to a large extent specific to and shaped by their evolving relationship. This notion is borne out by the frequent observation in family studies that different children with the same parents will adopt somewhat different constellations of parental demands and prohibitions.

The self- and object-representations that are internalized within the superego have a very specific nature. While they are based on whole person object relational experiences, they ultimately represent only a particular (but important) aspect of those experiences. This aspect can best be understood by keeping in mind, again, that the individual's relational experience at this level of development assumes the act of engaging in give-and-take activity as a member of social systems. What must also be considered here is the description of the structure of the social system that I presented earlier in Chapter I. I stated then that the give-and-take activity of the members of a social system is coordinated through the relational network and manifested as an interconnection of roles that provides ongoing structure to the social system. I also stated that what can be

called the norms of the social system are derived from the collective need to steer the behavior of each member in a direction that will comply with the structural requirements of the social system. Norms, in other words, were said to reinforce the structure of the social system by delimiting what can optimally be given and taken by each member through the relational network.

It can now be stated that the self- and object-representations that become internalized within the mature superego reflect the norms of various social systems within which the individual has had significant relational experiences. What I am assuming here is that since norms are interactionally-determined, they would be manifested intrapsychically as linked self- and object-representations and would thus become subject to internalization as such within the context of identifications. Ultimately, as a result of the continuing internalization and consolidation of norms based on ongoing social system experience, the superego would come to function as a specific motivational constellation that would dictate to the individual how he is generally expected to or "should" behave. Taking this line of thinking one step further, Jacobson (1964) suggested that the representations of the superego become abstracted and "depersonalized" as they consolidate. Perhaps it is through such a depersonification process that values, ideals, and aspirations, i.e., the more abstract motivational elements that are usually considered to be localized within the superego, take form.

I would now like to turn the discussion back to the ego. It can generally be said that as the mature ego emerges in association with the integrations that result in realistic self- and object-representations, so does one of its most important components -- the representational world. It is the representational world that helps the ego coordinate the demands of the overall personality (the motivational aspects of the id, superego, and the ego itself) with those of reality, or more specifically, social reality. In departing somewhat from Kernberg's model, I would like to offer a conceptual framework here that might help to make this notion clearer.

In general, it can be said that the ego is geared toward "knowing" and controlling social reality (as it is manifested in the individual's expanding social environment) for the purpose of securing ongoing biological and psychological need satisfaction. However, some of the needs that demand satisfaction from the ego's work are those which stem from the id and the superego. What must be kept in mind here is that despite the ego's very realistic view of self and others, both the id and the superego, because of the nature of their component representations, have their own particular views which concurrently demand expression. It is with respect to the task of integrating these different orientations that the ego relies significantly on its representational world.

In order to explain this matter more fully, some conceptual groundwork must first be established. To begin with,

it can now be said that while the ego and the superego are structured by identifications,¹ the id remains structured by introjections. In a corresponding way, it can also be stated that while the ego and the superego encourage the individual to internalize his ongoing interactions as identifications, the id continues to encourage the individual to internalize these ongoing interactions as introjections. Thus, when it is pointed out that at this level of development relational activity is characteristically experienced as whole person object relations and internalized within the personality in the form of identifications, reference is actually being made to the context of the ego and the superego only. The id continues to represent a part-object relations orientation.

It is through the ego's representational world that the tendencies of all three substructures of the personality converge. In other words, the self- and object-representations that make up the representational world are shaped simultaneously by the orientations (and thus the internalized representations) of the ego, id, and superego. These multifaceted representations of the representational world dictate the way in which the individual (as a psychological whole) perceives

¹It has been shown that the identifications which make up the superego are of a very specific nature. As such, they must be conceived of as being qualitatively different from the ego's identifications, which tend to be much fuller and, in this sense, more realistic in scope.

himself and others at this level of development. This would explain, again, why the perception of others (as well as oneself) is at best relatively realistic in nature. In a similar light, this would also account for the multiple levels of interactional experience that are simultaneously manifested in social systems. This phenomenon was described earlier with respect to Bion's (1959) notion of the "work group" coexisting with the "basic assumption group" as well as with respect to Foulkes's (1957) conception of the "multiple dimensions" of group life. It has more recently been discussed in even greater detail by Moore and Calder (1979).

While it can be said that relational experience at the developmental level characterized by the internalization system of identification is manifested by linked self- and object-representations which are shaped within the context of the representational world by all three substructures of the personality, it must also be kept in mind that this relational experience takes on a different form when (and if) it becomes formally internalized within the personality proper. A relational experience that is manifested in the representational world by linked self- and object-representations can only be considered "ready" for internalization after it has been "broken down" into at least three self-object-affect units, each reflecting the influence of one of the three "shapers" of that experience, i.e., the influence of the ego, id, or superego. Formal internalization would then take place as these self-object-affect units are integrated

into the substructures which they respectively reflect. In this manner, the realistic and the idealistic aspects of relational experience are internalized as identifications within the ego and the superego, respectively, while the highly fantastic, highly instinctual, and usually unconscious aspects are internalized as introjections within the id.

It has already been pointed out that at this level of development the individual's relational experience assumes the backdrop of psychosocial functioning. In other words, the infant has now fully evolved into an individual who now attempts to satisfy his needs through active social system involvement. This involves the capacity for whole person object relations. What has been brought out above, however, is that despite the powerful predominance of the individual's whole person object relations perspective, the individual's experience of himself and others within the context of his give-and-take activity in social systems is shaped, nevertheless, by both identifications and introjections. Furthermore, this experience -- what I have specifically termed "social system experience" -- can now also be seen as being subject to internalization as identifications and introjections as well.

The conceptual scheme that has been presented here is complementary to an important notion that was brought out earlier in the first chapter -- namely, the notion that the behavior of the individual in a social system is fueled by a variety of needs. Many of these needs were said to be based

on a realistic assessment of both self and others. It can now be assumed that these particular needs would be anchored to identifications, i.e., the internalized experience of whole person object relations. On the other hand, it was also said that some of the needs which the individual seeks to satisfy are based on a distorted assessment and, consequently, involve the use of fantasy. These are the kinds of needs that would be anchored to introjections. It is these more primitive forms of internalized relational experience that would stimulate the individual to perceive particular members of his social system in a highly distorted, one-dimensional manner -- or even perceive the group-as-a-whole as an enveloping maternal entity -- at the same time that he engages in more realistic transactions.

In sum, it has now been shown how the substructures of the personality are established and built up by ongoing relational experience as manifested by internalized (and affectively-linked) self- and object-representations, as well as how these substructures, in turn, influence the way in which the individual perceives himself and others in the present. It is important to emphasize, however, that after the achievement of true self-other differentiation, the individual's perceptions are based primarily on the identifications in the ego. In other words, the individual's perceptions and the give-and-take activity that results from these perceptions are relatively realistic in

nature, not relatively unrealistic. The ego is not only the dominant shaper of the individual's experience, but it also determines how much of the id and superego will be represented in that experience as well. It can consequently be said that with respect to psychological functioning, the mature ego and the process of identification through which it is built up in an ongoing manner take center stage from the oedipal period onward.

Kernberg's view of introjection and identification as generally representing successive modes of internalization has had considerable support in the psychoanalytic literature. Brody and Mahoney (1964), for example, in discussing the progressive "assimilative process" by which the self relates to external objects, maintained that this process first begins as introjection and only later evolves into true identification. More specifically, they claimed, as Kernberg did, that the process of introjection corresponds to an early developmental level characterized by a weak and unformed ego, minimal self-object differentiation, and primary process thinking, while identification, by contrast, corresponds to a higher developmental level characterized by ego maturity, firmly established self-object differentiation, and secondary process thinking.

Meissner (1981), on the other hand, has reinforced my suggestion that incorporation be considered the initial system of internalization, but he also maintained that introjection and identification are, respectively, the next two internal-

ization systems of major influence. Identification was described by Meissner (1979) as the internalization process that stems from relational activity characterized by true mutuality and reciprocity between the interacting parties. This activity was said to assume only a minimum of projection, with projection being seen as a manifestation of internalized introjections. Identification was also considered to be important in the ongoing structuralization of the mature superego. More specifically, it was claimed that the "value components of group structures and group cultures" become internalized as part of the "identificatory matrix" (1972).

The concept of identification that I have been developing here has been primarily oriented to two perspectives. It has been described as both a process of internalization and as an element of psychic structure. The term "identification," however, is frequently used in many other contexts. As Meissner (1972) pointed out:

The first thing to be clear about is what identification is not. The term is often applied to related but quite dissimilar processes. We speak of empathy, or vicarious experiences, or imitative behaviors as identifications. We "identify" with someone else's suffering, we "identify" with a character in a book or play, we "identify" with others in patterns of dress or action. But...identification is not a category of behavior. It is a mechanism of personality formation that produces perduring modifications in the subject. Moreover, identification is essentially an unconscious process, while imitation tends to be conscious and deliberate. We can speak of superficial and transient identifications in such experiences, but it should be clear that they are not identifications in any real sense. (p. 225)

While I would argue here that a psychological "mechanism" or "process" can most certainly be considered a form of behavior (i.e., it represents, ultimately, an attempt by the organism to secure need satisfaction), this statement does raise some very pertinent issues having to do with the relationship between imitation and identification. This issue is an important one in the sense that the term "identification" is very often used to refer to the modeling of an aspect of oneself after an aspect of another person. As Schafer (1968) put it, it is through identification that the subject "represents as his own one or more regulatory influences or characteristics of the object that have become important to him" (p. 140). This kind of modeling often seems quite "imitative" in nature. However, as Schafer further specified, it also assumes an enduring modification in the individual's motivational repertoire as well. Thus, the requirements of true internalization are also met. In other words, this modeling is assumed to involve the context of identification in the structural sense as well.

Schafer maintained that the subject "identifies with" or models himself after a particular aspect or "version" of the object. What I would like to demonstrate here is how the concept of give-and-take activity can be utilized to clarify this particular conception of identification more fully. To begin with, back in Chapter I it was brought out that the individual attempts to satisfy his needs through various social system involvements. It was assumed, more specifically, that the individual's

different needs can only become satisfied within the context of his taking a role in different social systems. Each role that he takes would reflect a different set of needs.¹ In this respect, a role can be said to represent only an aspect of the individual who takes it. What is further implied here is that the members of a social system only relate to aspects of each other since they relate to each other through roles.²

In the social system created by a boy and his father, for example, only certain behavioral (and, consequently, motivational) aspects of each come into play. Both the boy and his father would be expected to behave differently with other persons (such as peers) in other social systems. It can consequently be said that each perceives only one of many possible "versions" of the other within the context of the social system that they constitute. It can be further stated that the particular version that each perceives of the other corresponds to the particular role that each takes in that social system.

As I have previously emphasized, a role is based on five-

¹It was also brought out that these different sets of needs overlap somewhat, with the area of overlap delimiting a pervasive need constellation that is reflected in the individual's more typical, "characterological" behavior.

²The term "aspect" that is being used in this context bears no connection to "part-object" relations. While the individual in a social system only relates to aspects of the other members, he nevertheless perceives these members primarily within the framework of whole person object relations.

and-take activity. It responds simultaneously to some of the needs of the individual who takes it as well as to some of the needs of the other members of the social system (which insures that the social system is maintained). Thus, the role that the boy takes within the context of the dyadic social system that he forms with his father is responsive to some of his own needs as well as to some of his father's needs. In other words, the version of himself that he displays in this context is interactionally-determined (as is the version displayed by the father).

I would now like to consider the process by which the boy "identifies with" his father, i.e., the process by which he adopts for himself some of the behavioral (and, ultimately, motivational) aspects of his father. I propose that this process starts as the boy begins to establish a role for himself in relation to his father. On some level of psychological experience, the boy comes to realize that if he wants his father to satisfy some of his own needs, he will have to satisfy some of the needs of his father. This will usually involve a degree of imitative behavior on the part of the boy. More specifically, the boy will find that in order to maintain his father's love and support, he must comply with some of his father's wishes, one of which will usually be the wish to have him act like a "chip off the old block." Thus, in acting like his father, or at least this particular version of his father, the boy makes certain that he also achieves some need satisfaction of his own.

What can be further assumed is that if this kind of relational experience is deemed important enough by the boy (as it most certainly will be considering the importance of his father at this point in his life), it will also become internalized in the form of affectively-linked self- and object-representations within the personality proper. When this occurs, the boy will become motivated to act like his father in other social contexts as well. This results because the boy's overall sense of self is now influenced by component self-representations that are based on the original role that he took in relation to his father -- that which involved behaving like his father. It is at this point that the boy can be said to have "identified with" his father, or rather, this particular version of his father. He will undoubtedly relate to and "identify with" other versions of his father later on.

It should be pointed out that I am not suggesting here that every role that an individual takes involves the behavioral imitation of others. What I am suggesting is that when such imitation does occur, it is very often prompted by interactional cues and manifested within the context of give-and-take activity. In the very least, it would be based on the subject's assumption that acting like the object would encourage the object to act favorably toward the subject within the context of their relationship. Perhaps it is within this framework that Anna Freud's (1966) notion of "identification with the aggressor" might be considered, although it would seem that such a notion could

also be extended to include "identification with the provider" as well.

What is essentially being proposed here is that the particular characteristics of a parent that a child adopts through his "identification with" that parent are selected by the child partially in response to the urgencies of that parent and partially in response to the child's own wish to secure ongoing need satisfaction from that parent. The context of give-and-take activity can therefore be seen to play an important part even in this "modeling" view of identification. Through his description of the framework within which the child "identifies with" the defensive strategies of his parents, Schafer (1968) seemed to have presented a similar argument:

The parents communicate the nature and the importance of these strategies in countless unconscious, preconscious, and conscious ways, especially through their loving and hateful responses to the child's expressiveness. For the child to identify with his parents' defenses becomes a way to be loved and safe from attack; it is not just a step toward renunciation. (p. 159)

Thus, in order for a subject to "identify with" or to adopt in an ongoing way some of the characteristics of an object, certain conditions must be met: (a) there must first be a social system of which both subject and object are members, (b) the subject must have the perception that some degree of behavioral and/or motivational imitation of the object is necessary if his particular needs are going to be met in that social system,¹

¹In a social system with more than two members, the other members may also support this imitation. In the oedipal triangle, for example, the child finds that in "identifying with" his father, his needs are more satisfactorily met by both mother and father.

and (c) the subject must behave in a way which reflects this imitation (to the degree that is deemed necessary) within the context of his give-and-take activity in that social system.

As with any other post-infantile relational experience, the subject's experience of this interaction with the object would be portrayed in the subject's representational world by linked self- and object-representations. However, if the object is truly going to be "identified with," i.e., if there is going to be an ongoing motivational impetus for the subject to behave like the object, this relational experience would have to undergo internalization within the three substructures of the personality as well. In other words, the experience would have to become internalized in the form of a structural identification with respect to both the ego and the superego, and, with respect to the id, in the form of (at least one) structural introjection.

It is by now apparent that I am making a differentiation here between the notion of identification conceived of as both the process and the structural result of a particular mode of internalization and the notion of identification conceived of as the process by which "the subject modifies his motives and behavior patterns, and the self representations corresponding to them, in such a way as to experience being like, the same as, and merged with one or more representations of the object" (Schafer, 1968, p. 140). It is the former conception that has been and will continue to be adhered to in this study.

In both contexts, it is assumed that there is ultimately a

modification in the individual's overall sense of self and in his ongoing behavior as a result of his involvement with the object, but the nature of this modification is considered from a much narrower perspective in the latter context. My contention is that this modification is not necessarily based on the modeling of the self after the object, but rather it is based more specifically on the roles of both the subject and the object which have become internalized as linked self- and object-representations, respectively. Since role behavior, i.e., give-and-take activity, is not necessarily imitative in nature, it cannot be said that a self-representation will always assume the likeness of its corresponding object-representation and, as a result, modify the subject's overall sense of self and ongoing behavior accordingly.

Perhaps Kernberg presented the most neutral position with regard to this matter when he discussed the notion of "normal identification:"

Normal identification implies (1) a partial modification of the total self-concept under the influence of a new self-representation, (2) some degree of integration of both self- and object-representations into autonomous ego functioning in the form of neutralized character traits, and (3) some degree of reorganization of the individual's behavior patterns under the influence of the newly introduced identificatory structure. (1976, p. 78)

This description can ultimately be applied to either conception of identification. It is interesting to note, however, that emphasis is put on the influence of the "identificatory structure," not just the influence of what is usually referred to as the "object of identification." This serves to accent, again,

the notion that it is the interaction between the subject and the object which ultimately determines the nature of the modifications that take place within the subject. It can also be seen that no reference is made in this description to any modeling phenomena per se. However, with respect to this issue, Kernberg did state further that "'behaving' like one's identificatory model depends on complex factors, perhaps the most crucial of which is the degree of integration of the self-concept prior to the particular identification involved" (1976, pp. 78-79). In his view, then, the identification processes that would specifically result in the adoption of the object's behavior would be expected to become less prominent as the subject develops over time and establishes a firmer identity.

It is with respect to this notion of identity that attention must now be focused more exclusively on the ego and its development. As I stated before, the ego and the identifications which structure it play the most important part in the psychological life of the individual from the oedipal period onward. In the next section, I will elaborate more on both as I discuss the relationship between ego identity and the expanding social environment.

Ego Identity and the Social Environment

The concept of ego identity that was introduced by Erikson (1956) was discussed at length earlier in Chapter II. In that context, ego identity was described as being the structural

manifestation of identity (as opposed to the experiential manifestation -- self-identity). As the structural form of identity, it was also seen as being the product of an on-going consolidation of identifications. While Kernberg also considered ego identity to result from a consolidation of identifications, his general conception of the notion is, nevertheless, quite different than Erikson's. This difference will be discussed later on. First, however, in order to even approach the general topic of ego identity, especially as it relates to the consolidation of identifications, it will be necessary to examine more closely the identification process as it pertains to the ego and the way in which these identifications integrate and influence each other, structuring the ego further in the process. This is a necessary step because, as both theorists maintained, it is specifically the ego to which ego identity is rooted.

As has been frequently brought out, an identification is based on a whole person object relational experience, and as such, it originally assumes the context of active social system involvement. It was similarly brought out that the linked self- and object-representations which specifically constitute an ego identification reflect the major characteristics of the respective roles taken in the social system. As Kernberg explained:

The child learns his own...roles as part of his self-image component of the identification. He also learns mother's roles (as part of mother's object-image) and may at some time re-enact those roles. Long-term storage and organization are typical of role actualization in ego identity. (1976, p. 31)

This short passage brings to light several important issues in need of further clarification. To begin with, mention is made here of the child's "roles" in relation to the mother as well as the mother's "roles" in relation to the child. In order to better understand this assumed multitude of roles within the context of a simple, dyadic social system, it will be necessary to call upon the concept of role characterization that was developed in Chapter I. I stated then that while a social system over the course of time can generally be described as being structured by an interconnection of roles, with one role being taken by each member, a social system at any particular period of time can more appropriately be described as being structured by a configuration of role characterizations. The assumption here, again, is that each new configuration corresponds to a change in the characterization of each role. Another way of looking at this is that since each role is immediately interdependent with every other role in the social system, any change in the way one member characterizes his role will result in corresponding changes in the role characterizations of all the other members. It is in this way that different configurations become manifested over time (although, as it was also brought out, a particular configuration can reappear at different intervals as well).

Thus, while Kernberg referred to the child's "roles" in relation to the mother's "roles," what he was actually referring to was what I would call their role characterizations. In fact,

it would be more appropriate to conceive of the identification process itself at this level of development not just in terms of "the internalization of roles" but more specifically in terms of the internalization of a configuration of role characterizations, with one role characterization being that of the child himself. In this light, the self- and object-representations of the identification would, correspondingly, also be considered to specifically reflect role characterizations rather than just roles per se.

Utilizing the concept of role characterization allows for a clearer understanding of how representations of both subject and object get built up within the context of the ego. It can be seen that it is from the integration of internalized representations based on a particular individual's role characterizations that a representation based on that individual's role evolves, and it is this latter representation which provides the ego with its most comprehensive view of that individual.

What would be expected to occur, for example, is that the child's old and new ego identifications based on various interactions with his mother (each interaction corresponding to a particular configuration of role characterizations) would tend to fuse together, resulting in more comprehensive and thus more accurate representations of both his mother and himself in relation to each other. This pattern would also be expected to occur in the realm of the child's old and new ego identifications based on interactions with his father, siblings, and,

ultimately, other individuals who become part of his widening social environment.

While it has been pointed out that a role generally represents only an aspect of an individual since he satisfies other needs through other roles in other social systems, it can similarly be said that a role characterization represents only an aspect of an individual within the context of a particular social system. Within the framework of a particular social system (e.g., the dyadic social system comprised of a child and his mother), each member will display different such aspects at different periods of time, each period of time corresponding to a different "relational experience" (as well as to a different configuration of role characterizations). It is these different aspects which are reflected in the self- and object-representations that are internalized within the context of ego identifications, and it is these identifications which clarify and refine each other to create a fuller sense of both subject and object. It might even be said that in order to speak of an "internalized role," it must be assumed that enough representations based on different characterizations of the role have been internalized and fused together to warrant the more general term "role."

Taking this line of thought one step further, I would further propose that as a result of the child's growing involvement in his expanding social environment, a more sweeping sense of self, one that is based on the multitude of roles

that the child now finds himself taking in relation to others, becomes manifested. This more sweeping sense of self can be considered to stem from a consolidation of the ego's more elaborate self-representations, i.e., those self-representations in the ego which can be said to reflect internalized roles per se. In this respect, it is quite similar to what Erikson (1968) referred to as the self-identity, which was said to be made up of "role images."

Since self-representations assume a reciprocal relationship with object-representations, it would be expected that along with the development of an overall sense of self based on the integration of self-representations in the ego, an overall sense of the object world based on clusters of integrated object-representations in the ego would also develop. These two realms of experience will both be seen to play an important part in Kernberg's conception of ego identity.

Going back now, however, to the passage presented on page 203, I would like to direct some attention to Kernberg's claim that in addition to his own roles, the child "also learns mother's roles (as part of mother's object-image) and may at some time re-enact those roles" (1976, p. 31). Kernberg went on to suggest that both the role of the child and the role of the mother are "stored" within the context of the child's ego identity. In line with the view that I have been developing here, it can be seen that this would mean that both roles are stored within the child's ongoing integration of ego identifi-

cations, i.e., they are stored in the form of highly elaborate, reciprocal self- and object-representations, the kind which, as they are integrated with other self- and object-representations, help to create an overall sense of self and an overall sense of the object world, respectively. What is also being proposed here, however, is that depending on the situational requirements, either role may significantly influence the subject's overt behavior in other social settings as well.

Parsons (1958) was very supportive of this position. He, like Kernberg, considered identification to involve the internalization of a "reciprocal role-interaction pattern," and similarly maintained that "by internalizing the reciprocal role-interaction pattern, [the subject] lays the foundation of capacity to assume alter's role as well as his own" (p. 329). He also presented a classic example of this phenomenon:

Adults tend to take, precisely in their unconscious motivations, the reciprocal roles to those they occupied vis-a-vis their parents when they were children. In their roles as parents, then, they tend to "act out" the motivational systems which they internalized, but not by being "childlike" but by being particular kinds of parents. (1961, p. 38)

Conceiving of identification as the internalization of "reciprocal role-interaction patterns" in the form of linked self- and object-representations automatically assumes (a) that the subject has already taken a role in a social system, and (b) that what is ultimately internalized in the form of linked representations is the entire social system structure, i.e., the complete interconnection of roles (if not one or

more configurations of role characterizations). What is important to keep in mind, however, is that not all social systems are dyads involving just two people. More specifically, while he will always maintain some important dyadic relationships, the child, as he develops into an adult, will increasingly take roles in larger social systems, namely groups, which are characterized by a number of people who take roles in relation to each other.

It can consequently be said that since an identification reflects the entire structure of a social system, it can be constituted by more than one object-representation. I am proposing, in other words, that an identification should not be seen only in terms of a self-object-affect unit for it may also be constituted as a self-object-object-affect unit (reflecting, for example, the roles taken in the social system defined by the child [the subject] and both of his parents) or even as a self-object-object-object-affect unit (reflecting, for example, the roles taken in the family social system defined by the child, his parents, and a sibling). I would further state that the internalization of relational experiences that the child has as a member of larger social systems would accordingly result in identifications with even more object-representational components.

It has already been shown that as dyad-based ego identifications stemming from the subject's interactions with a particular object consolidate over time, what emerges is more

elaborate and more accurate representations of both the subject and that object in relation to each other. However, in the case of the consolidation of group-based ego identifications stemming from the subject's interactions with a number of objects within the context of a particular social system, the object-representations that would result would reflect not only a more elaborate portrayal of those objects as they relate to the subject, but also a more elaborate portrayal of those objects as they relate to each other. Thus, through the ongoing consolidation of related group-based ego identifications, an even more comprehensive sense of the motivational and behavioral aspects of the objects in the object world is generated.

In proposing that the process of identification can involve a group context, I am breaking somewhat from Kernberg's general view. While I would agree with him that all of "the earliest internalization processes have dyadic features, that is, a self-object polarity, even when self- and object-representations are not yet differentiated," I disagree with his assumption that "by the same token, all future developmental steps also imply dyadic internalizations" (1980, p. 17). My contention, again, is that since (as Kernberg claimed) the self- and object-representational components of an identification reflect interrelated roles within the context of (at least a two-person) social system, it would logically follow

that the subject's experiences in groups (social systems with many persons and, consequently, many interrelated roles) would also be subject to internalization as identifications, even though such identifications would be constituted by more than one object-representation.

The notion that one's experience in a group can be internalized as a group-based identification is similar in some respects and yet very dissimilar in others to a notion developed by Parsons (1958). He claimed that after the child has achieved a "plurality of dyadic relations" at the beginning of the oedipal period, he comes to "identify with" what was referred to as "social object-systems," and that as a result of this process, he becomes a member of these social systems. He stated, for example, that "the family is an object with which the child identifies, and through this identification he becomes a full-fledged member of that family" (p. 331).

As I brought out earlier, I have not been using the perspective of identification which assumes an "object of identification" that the subject "identifies with." In my view, identification is essentially a mode by which relational experience is internalized. It assumes the experience of an interaction between the subject and at least one object which becomes internalized as linked self- and object-representations, and which, in this form, influences the subject's sense of self and others, and, consequently, his ongoing behavior. In

the perspective that I have been using, the child could not "identify with" his family unless he already is a "full-fledged member" of the family, i.e., unless he already is taking a role in the family social system. If he indeed "identifies with" anything at all, it would be with a family social system interaction in which he has played a part, not just a social system per se, especially one that he is not (yet) a member of.

I would further argue here, as I did in Chapter I, that the family social system that exists before the child can take an active role in it is a different social system than that which exists when he does take such a role. During the time when the child is an infant and unable to actively engage in give-and-take activity with relatively realistically-perceived others, he cannot be considered a formal member of the family social system since he cannot take part in its shared relational network. As an infant, he does not experience what the rest of his family experiences -- an interpersonal world primarily based on whole person object relations. It is only when he achieves true self-other differentiation that he can formally take a role in the family social system, expanding it into a larger social system in the process. Thus, with respect to Parsons' claim that the child "identifies with" his family social system, through which he then becomes a member, what is actually being referred to is two different social systems -- one which he allegedly "identifies with" and is not a member of, and one of which he is actually a member.

I would now like to describe in more detail the way in which a group-based identification can become manifested by a child as a result of his involvement in the social system constituted by his family. (The child is being considered here as a role-taking member of the family social system.) In general, the child will find that he must conform, at least in some measure, to a set of behavioral expectations presented to him by each member of his family if he wants them in turn to respond, at least in some measure, to his own expectations of them. It is through his role, again, that the child both gives and takes, i.e., responds to some of his own needs as well as to some of those of the other members (and thus to the maintenance of the family social system as a whole).

The child's role, for example, may take the form of an "obedient child," a "rebellious child," a "dependent child," or an "independent child," among other variations, and each of these role characterizations would be expected to reflect (often covertly) the needs of both the child and the family social system. The "rebellious child" role characterization, for instance, might stem from the child's need for autonomy as well as his ongoing wish for family approval and attention in association with his family's need for a "little daredevil" who can act out their own rebellious wishes and through whom they can achieve vicarious satisfaction. What I am describing here is a situation in which the child may be overtly admonished but covertly rewarded for his behavior. In the case of

the "independent child," what might be at play is the subliminal recognition by the child that the members of his family have difficulty in accepting his dependency needs.

In any event, what is internalized as an identification is the entire family constellation, with each member other than the child being represented by an object-representation. The child represents himself, of course, by a self-representation. As was brought out in Chapter I, any role (or role characterization), by its very nature, automatically assumes an interconnection of roles (or a configuration of role characterizations). It can even be said that the former exists only within the context of the latter. It is for this reason that an identification would have to include not just a portrayal of the subject's role, but also a portrayal of the roles of all the members involved in the interaction.

It now becomes possible to look more closely at the concept of ego identity, and in particular, to focus on the differences between the views of Erikson and Kernberg with respect to this concept. Ego identity has been generally described by both as that which results from the ongoing consolidation of identifications within the context of the ego. What creates the conceptual differences is the way in which the term "identification" is used.

In Erikson's framework, ego identity can be seen as the structural manifestation of identity, and in this respect, it

complements the self-identity, i.e., the experiential manifestation of identity.¹ As Erikson himself put it, "identity formation...can be said to have a self-aspect and an ego aspect" (1968, p. 211). He also maintained that ego identity is manifested in correspondence with the group identity, and that, accordingly, it assumes an integrated "ensemble of roles which also secure social recognition" (1968, p. 211).

What is important to point out here is that in Erikson's conception of ego identity, the focus is only on the subject himself (his own roles) and not at all on the object world (the roles of others with whom he interacts). Since ego identity has been defined as a consolidation of identifications, it can consequently be said that Erikson's conception of identification does not adhere to the principle that one role (in this case, that of the subject) automatically assumes an interconnection of roles. More specifically, the intrapsychic manifestation of identifications in Erikson's framework seems to be anchored only to self-representations, not to linked self-and object-representations (which would be more reflective of interactional experience in its entirety).

Thus, while Erikson did a noteworthy job in elaborating

¹It has been shown that the self actually involves all three substructures of the personality since each contains self-representations. Nevertheless, it is the self-representational components of the identifications in the ego that are the most influential in shaping self-experience.

on the psychosocial aspects of the individual's present relationship with external objects within the context of an external group identity, he did not adequately account for, at least in the structural sense, the continuing internal representation and influence of the individual's past relationships. This is unfortunate because these past relationships can be considered to play an important part in the individual's present psychosocial functioning. As it has already been brought out, it is these past relationships which are maintained in their entirety within the context of internalized object relations as manifested by both self- and object-representations.

While Erikson's conception of ego identity centers on the subject's experience of himself with respect to his own roles, Kernberg, in contrast, maintained that ego identity assumes (a) the experience of a consistent, overall sense of self based on a consolidation of self-representations, (b) a consistent, overall conception of the "world of objects" based on a consolidation of object-representations, and (c) the recognition of consistency in one's ongoing interactions with others and the sense that this consistency is recognized by others as well. Since Kernberg considered identifications to be comprised of linked self- and object-representations, and in this respect, to portray interactional experience, his conception of ego identity involves not just a consolidation of one's own experience of oneself in relation to others, but also a consolidation of one's experience of others in relation

to oneself. What I would add further here is that due to, again, the manifestation of group-based identifications, the latter consolidation would also include the experience of others in relation to each other as well.

In Chapter II, I discussed George Klein's (1976) proposal that the self should always be seen as having two aspects -- the self that is experienced as an autonomous, distinct unit, and the self that is experienced as a necessary part of a unit transcending one's autonomy. It was with respect to this proposal that Klein further suggested the need for a "we-go" concept to complement that of the ego. What I would like to point out here is that Kernberg's notion of ego identity accounts for both aspects of the self without resorting to any new concepts. Within Kernberg's conceptual framework, it can be seen that while the individual experiences a distinct and unique sense of self, he simultaneously experiences this self in interdependent relationships with other individuals within the context of past and present social systems. Thus, the "I" and the "we" aspects of self are both experienced. It can be further stated that they are both structurally represented by the ego's linked self- and object-representations.

In a related way, it can be said that Kernberg's notion of ego identity encompasses, at least in some respects, the concepts of both ego identity and group identity as they were originally conceived by Erikson. This can be seen to be

the case especially if group identity is considered as a collective "we" identity, one which assumes a number of individuals organized within the context of a social system. As I suggested in Chapter II, a social system could ultimately be described as the behavioral structure through which a group identity is expressed. In any event, since Kernberg's conception of ego identity is based on a consolidation of inter-related self- and object-representations which result in both "I" and "we" experiences, Erikson's notions of ego identity and group identity can both be considered represented within it.

According to Kernberg, ego identity "represents the highest level in the organization of internalization processes" (1976, p. 31). Unlike the notions of introjection and identification, Kernberg characterized ego identity more as an ongoing structural result of sophisticated internalization processes, i.e., those generated by the integration of ego identifications, rather than as a process of internalization per se. Nevertheless, ego identity can ultimately be described as both a product and a determinant of ongoing social system experience. It not only serves as a record of one's past relations with others, but it also accounts for most of one's perception of oneself and others within the context of current psychosocial functioning.

Concluding Remarks

In the course of this study, I have elaborated extensively on the close relationship between the personality and the social system. I have tried to demonstrate how they can be conceptually integrated within the context of a psychosocial conception of the individual. I have also attempted to demonstrate how the psychoanalytic model of the personality can be effectively utilized in this context. What has essentially been proposed is that the overall personality (which is seen here as being comprised of the ego, id, and superego) emerges from and is continuously structured by internalized relational experience. While this relational experience does not initially assume formal membership in social systems, it nevertheless involves the experience of interaction with at least "partial" or fantasized others. As it has been repeatedly brought out, relational experience based on true psychosocial functioning can only become manifested beyond the developmental level of infancy, when the individual can fairly realistically distinguish between himself and others. It is only then that he can begin to take roles in a variety of social systems.

The give-and-take schema has served as the basic framework from which this psychosocial view of the individual has been built. This schema has been shown to be relevant to both realms of the psychosocial orientation -- the realm of the psyche or personality as well as the realm of the social system.

Not only does give-and-take activity bind the social system together as a system, but it also accounts for the linked self- and object-representations that are internalized within the personality as identifications.

From another viewpoint, give-and-take activity also binds the individual to the larger social order. It is only through the taking of roles (which are based on give-and-take activity) in a variety of social systems that the individual can satisfy his biological and psychological needs. Some of these needs, again, stem from earlier relational experiences that have become internalized within his personality. It can further be stated that over the course of time, due to an integration of his experiences in an expanding array of social systems, the individual develops certain characteristic role tendencies which help to make him, behaviorally speaking, the unique person that he is. As Cartwright and Lippitt (1957) pointed out, "from their experiences of multiple memberships and their personal synthesis of these experiences, individuals...have opportunities to achieve significant bases of individuality" (p. 101).

The give-and-take schema helps guard against the tendency to view human life in an oversocialized fashion. In criticizing the work of Parsons and other theorists who have attempted to integrate psychoanalysis with sociology, Endleman (1981) pointed out that such theories, "in emphasizing harmony between personality and society, err in neglecting,

omitting, or denying precisely what is central in Freudian thought, namely the conflict between instinct and culture. This conflict can be formulated as the opposition between instinctual drives and social conformity pressures" (p. 45). The concept of give-and-take activity that I have developed here makes no assumption that there is a smooth interdependence between the individual and the social system. On the contrary, it assumes an often frustrating negotiation process that involves some giving as well as some taking. Give-and-take activity is essentially based on the principle that one does not get "something for nothing." It represents a response to an inherent conflict, a compromise between the biological and psychological needs of the individual on the one hand, and the needs of the social system (which include, again, the needs of the other members) on the other. In this respect, give-and-take activity can also be said to reflect the relationship between the "inside" and the "outside" of the individual, a focus of study that was originally described in the Introduction as being intrinsic to the psychosocial perspective.

It has been shown that the "units" of relational experience that are internalized as identifications reflect social system structures in their entirety. In a similar light, the self- and object-representations that constitute these units have been said to correspond to one's own and others' roles, respectively. (That a role "exists" only within the context of an interconnection of roles has been duly accounted for by

the give-and-take schema.) The concept of identification has therefore been broadened to include the context of groups in addition to the usual context of dyads involving the individual (the subject) and just one other person (the object). Again, in the conceptual framework that I have presented, the subject does not "identify with" an object. If the subject does adopt some of the motivational/behavioral characteristics of an object, he does so as part of his give-and-take activity in his interaction with that object, and it is the entire interaction that is internalized as an identification.

Identifications can thus be said to reflect episodes of psychosocial functioning. It has been shown that such functioning begins at the oedipal stage of development. It is at this point that the substructures of the personality mature, and that, as Meissner (1972) put it, "internalization becomes less introjective and more identificative" (p. 250). The oedipal period can be said to signal the point in time when the individual becomes socially responsible. He not only begins to perceive others as whole, separate persons with characteristics and needs of their own, but he also finds that he must respond to some of their needs if some of his own are going to be met. He begins to realize, in other words, that he must take an active part in what can now be considered his social environment. Parsons (1961) presented a eloquent description of this developmental transition that highlights many of the points made in this study regarding this particular milestone:

The oedipal transition is the primary genetic reference in defining the boundary between the ego and the id.... From the sociological point of view, the preoedipal period is the child's preparation for participation in his society and the period immediately following the oedipal phase is his introduction into the society. The personality structures built up during the earlier period are not directly utilized in performance of social function, but constitute a continuing motivational foundation of role-participations. The oedipal repression line is thus a genuine boundary, and the early superego is, one may say, the border guard. (p. 35)

In my opinion, Parsons was also quite accurate when he argued that "there has been a psychoanalytic prejudice to the effect that everything important about a personality has been determined in the very early years, leading sometimes to an almost ostentatious lack of interest in later phases" (1961, p. 36). In this respect, I would agree with Weinstein and Platt (1973), who maintained that "identity is not a fixed, static quality, but is continually being challenged and requires definition and perhaps redefinition at each stage in life" (p. 69).

I have already described internalization as an ongoing process in the life of the individual. It can consequently be seen that new identifications that stem from the individual's involvement in new social systems, or for that matter, new identifications that stem from dramatic changes in the norms of the individual's current social systems, could potentially challenge his old identifications or even his overall sense of self. Such challenges would ultimately be resolved through a modification or a redefinition of his identity. These kinds of changes would actually be expected as the individual enters into sig-

nificant stages in life, i.e., as he takes on such roles as student, worker, husband, father, etc.

I stated in the Introduction that the impetus for this study originally stemmed from a desire to understand the therapeutic process in analytic group therapy. While I have not really addressed the issue of psychopathology and its treatment in this present work, I would nevertheless now like to make a few comments about the link between analytic group therapy and the psychosocial framework. I will begin, however, by presenting a statement made by Bonner (1959) which serves to summarize the basic argument for conceiving of group therapy along psychosocial lines:

It is not unreasonable to suppose that since nonorganic psychological disturbances are largely group induced they should be amenable to group treatment. Since frustrations, inhibitions, suppressions, repressions, and the like arise in response to group expectations and demands, the tensions and conflicts to which they often lead should be resolvable through constructive interaction with other people in a therapeutic situation. In a world where the individual is irrevocably joined with other individuals, where he begins human life in intimate association with other human beings, where he actualizes himself or becomes a person through participation, restoration of psychological health when it has been dissipated can be effectively achieved in therapeutic groups. (p. 444)

The analytic therapy group is in itself a flexible social system in which each individual member has opportunities to demonstrate, clarify, and alter his maladaptive patterns of interpersonal functioning. These maladaptive patterns are manifested within the context of pathological "role fixations" (Erikson, 1968). Role fixations can be said to involve particular percep-

tions (and expectations) of oneself and others which stem from earlier relational experiences and which are unyielding in their behavioral influence, even in the face of more recent or even current relational experiences. Kernberg's (1976) description of the internalized object relations that remain "nonmetabolized" within the personality has relevance here. In any event, these role fixations become quickly revealed due to the multitude of transference possibilities in the group, and as they are revealed, they become accessible for therapeutic intervention. Ultimately, the members of the group encourage each other to take "healthier" (i.e., more adaptive) roles in their dealings with one another. This, in turn, strengthens the therapeutic potency of the group as a whole.

In some respects, the group setting might be considered to be the most "natural" place to engage in therapeutic work. Foulkes (1965), for example, in presenting a position not unlike the one developed in this study, maintained that "all psychodynamics are originally multipersonal, at the very least two-personal, refer ultimately to the group (tribe, family, community, species) and are thus primarily group phenomena" (p. 17). Some clinicians have also rallied around Trigant Burrow's (1927a) original complaint that a therapeutic focus on the individual alone results in a narrow and shortsighted view. As Rosenbaum and Berger (1975) put it, "it is conceivable that in the emphasis on the individual, the therapist may deny the growth of the person -- of the 'mensch.' The potential to become a real per-

son is only fulfilled in relationships with other persons" (p. 249).

In the course of this study, I have attempted to show that "personhood" always involves assuming some responsibility for others. Accepting this responsibility is not just a "good thing to do" -- it is also the means by which one's own survival and need satisfaction is insured. More specifically, I have attempted to show that the individual achieves need satisfaction only within the context of an ongoing compromise with the other members of the social systems that make up the world in which he lives. It has also been shown that his psychic apparatus has developed and will continue to develop in a way which prepares him for and helps him carry out this ongoing negotiation. This is the essence of psychosocial functioning, and it is through this functioning that the individual joins in and progressively contributes to the "maintenance of the human world" (Erikson, 1963), a world that is his as well as everyone else's.

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