INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND SOCIAL MOBILIZATION: THE CASE OF THE INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT IN ECUADOR, 2007-2011

by

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Abstract

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Over the last three decades Indigenous people in Ecuador have faced government policies threatening their internationally recognized Indigenous human rights. Although a national social movement emerged in Ecuador in 1990, the level of mobilization has since varied. This dissertation project proposes to address the question, under what conditions can the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) contribute to successful social mobilization, and when can the use of ICTs hinder mobilization? Through a comparative analysis of 14 indigenous organizations, I find that the extent to which the process of mobilization is successful will vary depending upon three independent variables: first, the level of *strategic appropriation* of ICTs by Indigenous organizational leaders; second, the level of *creative adaptability* of movement leaders in using ICTs, especially with regard to interactions with the government; and third, the level of movement leaders' success in *distinguishing and targeting their audiences.* These three variables are additive, that is, when high levels of all three elements are achieved, mobilization will be most successful and vice versa. However, mobilization will be unsuccessful if organizations fail to creatively adapt to changes in the political arena. This project should contribute to literature in social movements, the

emerging literature on the intersection of ICTs and politics, and comparative politics, and has practical implications for the use of ICTs in the developing world.

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I. *Introduction*

Over the last three decades Indigenous people in Ecuador have faced government policies threatening their internationally recognized Indigenous human rights. Although a national social movement emerged in 1990, the level of mobilization has since varied. Some local Indigenous organizations have maintained high levels of political mobilization within their communities, while other organizations have failed to do so. This dissertation project addresses the question, under what conditions can the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) contribute to successful social mobilization, and when can the use of ICTs hinder mobilization? Social mobilization is defined as the activation of a social network to make disruptive contentious demands on a target.

In focusing on the Indigenous social movement in Ecuador, I hypothesize that the extent to which the process of mobilization is successful will vary depending upon three independent variables: first, the level of *strategic appropriation* of ICTs by Indigenous organizational leaders; second, the level of *creative adaptability* of movement leaders in using ICTs, especially with regard to interactions with the government; and third, the level of movement leaders' success in *distinguishing and targeting their audiences.* These three variables are additive, that is, when high levels of all three are achieved,

mobilization will be most successful and vice versa. However, mobilization will be unsuccessful if organizations fail to creatively adapt to changes in the political arena.

This dissertation project has four important practical and theoretical implications. First, there are practical implications for social movements. The best practices identified regarding ICT use by Indigenous organizations are being shared both within Ecuador and with other marginalized groups in other developing contexts. I am providing a Spanish language summary of my dissertation to the Indigenous organizations whose members participate in my study, the scholars who assist me, and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with which I have contact.

Second, this dissertation contributes to the debate surrounding the political and economic utility of ICTs in developing countries. This debate, in both the policy and the academic arenas, has remained largely at the surface level, with some arguing by anecdote that access to ICTs can strengthen participatory democracy or capitalist economic development and others arguing that ICTs are nothing more than the latest imperialist intrusion into the developing world. However, I move beyond this impasse to determine systematically how ICTs matter with regard to social mobilization. This finding has implications regarding under what circumstances ICTs might contribute to the success of other political processes such as participatory democracy.

Third, this dissertation addresses the gap between the political science and sociology literatures. The former assumes that new ICTs are equal to earlier forms of communication technologies, whereas the latter argues that ICTs and their uses are fundamentally different from older technologies.

Finally, this dissertation contributes to the social movements literature, which has been dominated by macro level political opportunity structures and micro level rational-choice explanations for mobilization. However, this project employs a strategic actor model that includes both macro and microelements in order to achieve a more nuanced understanding of social mobilization.

II. *Relevant Literature*

Social movement scholars, especially those focusing on Northern/Western movements, have largely assumed that new ICTs, such as the Internet, cell phones, and small media productions, serve as a resource for mobilization in that they can diffuse and spread information through social networks, much like older technologies, only more quickly. However, some critical scholars, especially those focusing on Southern movements, have demonized ICTs as the ultimate neo-colonial penetration into societies of the developing world. Hence they have sometimes undermined the legitimacy of movement activists who and organizations that utilize ICTs in the eyes of grassroots members. Recent empirical studies suggest instead that both are possible—in some cases new ICTs create autonomous opportunities for social mobilization, while in other cases they may not.

This dissertation aims to synthesize and contribute to four bodies of literature: first, Indigenous social movement literature; second, social movement literature, especially regarding strategic players; third, literature directly concerned with ICTs, their uses, and their societal effects; and finally, literature that investigates the relationship between the state, ICTs, and society. I use James Jasper's definition of a social

movement as "conscious, concerted, and relatively sustained efforts by organized groups of ordinary people (as opposed to, say, political parties, the military, or industrial trade groups) to change some aspect of their society by using extrainstitutional means" (1997). Social mobilization is defined as the activation of strategic players to disruptively make contentious demands on a target.

a. *Indigenous Social Movement Theory*

The 1990s saw an explosion of scholarship on Indigenous mobilization began in the 1990s, especially in Latin America (Yashar 1999, 2005; Van Cott 2005; Postero 2007). Deborah Yashar (1998, 2005) and Nancy Postero (2007) argue that Indigenous peoples' motive for mobilization in Perú, Ecuador, and Bolivia was the wave of harmful neoliberal reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. Focusing on domestic, horizontal social networks, Yashar argues that pre-existing transcommunity networks have been the key to Indigenous social mobilization in the Andes (Yashar 1999, 2005). Established by the Catholic Church, networks have connected rural communities for decades and have served as a conduit for spreading mobilizational messages across distances, although she does not indicate by what specific modes of communication these networks function. However, motive and capacity alone, for Yashar, a movement do not make; she instead argues that the existence of political opportunity, identified as a ruling government's dedication to liberal ideals such as freedoms of association and expression, served as the key to understanding when Indigenous movements were successful (Bolivia and Ecuador) or unsuccessful (Perú).

Others have begun to consider the ways in which Indigenous communities in Latin America have utilized ICTs for social mobilization (Salazar 2007; Brysk 2000; Castells 2004; Cleaver 1998; Garrido and Halavais 2003). Juan Francisco Salazar (2007, 16), Alison Brysk (2000), and Margaret Keck and Katherine Sikkink (1998) have shown that new ICTs have helped to forge a stronger pan-Indigenous identity and affected cultural survival on two dimensions—horizontally within a state, and vertically through transnational advocacy networks (see also Lieberman 2003, 18; Ginsburg 1997, 122). Within a state, Juan Francisco Salazar (2009) and Gabriella Zamorano (2009) illustrate how Latin American Indigenous movements have successfully utilized new visual media technologies, such as video and DVD, to produce audiovisual projects that capture, preserve, and share cultural—as well as political—practices. Brysk (2000, 69) has argued that new ICTs create possibilities for the spread of information about recently recognized Indigenous human rights (e.g., United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, November 2007), allowing the global Indigenous movement to provide resources to local movements and put normative pressure on the state government, thus increasing local Indigenous movements' relative power.

Other scholars, such as Manuel Castells (2004), note instances in which access to new ICTs has eroded the power structures within communities and effectively undermined any attempts at social mobilization. For example, young members of rural Indigenous communities migrate to urban areas to attend universities often encounter—or cause—problems when they return home educated, westernized, and with the hope of inciting mobilization without respect for, or recognition of the importance of, local culture, traditional constellations of power, and societal decision making processes.

When new ICTs are added to this equation, especially because it tends to be the young and educated who have the know-how to actually use the technologies, generational social divisions can be exacerbated (Castells 2004; Salazar 2007).

b. *Relevant Social Movement Theory*

Structural explanations for mobilization have largely dominated social movement theory. The explanations for Indigenous social movements, as exemplified by Yashar, similarly argue that the political opportunity structure is the single most important factor regarding the success or failure of a movement. Others who have considered social movements from a micro level have, conversely, left aside structure and instead focused on individuals making rational choices. As one scholar states, social movement theorists tend to be either "gamesters or situationalists, *explaining either our choices or why we have none*" (Jasper 2006, 3).

James Jasper suggests instead of conceptualizing activists as rational actors (e.g., Lichbach), or as embedded in a structure that limits or dictates their actions (e.g., Tilly, Tarrow), we think of activists as players in arenas acting strategically. Jasper recognizes that actors are constrained by their cultural contexts and social milieu; however, strategic players with "imagination, creativity, will, and subjectivity" can potentially overcome these constraints (Jasper 2006, 5). Reality becomes a playing field with multiple arenas. Each arena is an "open-ended bundle of rules and resources that allows certain kinds of interactions to proceed, leading to outcomes that may be formal or quite casual" (Jasper 2006, 141). An arena, although similar to a political opportunity structure, is distinct in that actors can alter it. It is more fluid than the traditional and static conception of a

political opportunity structure. An arena is a type of political structure that contains both opportunities and challenges, but actors within any arena have choices about how they will act and what strategies they will employ, which ultimately may change the arena/structure.

Jasper argues that in the process of strategic (inter)action, strategic players, whether individuals or compound players made up of multiple individuals, have many goals. One possible goal is to initiate large-scale social mobilization in order to make contentious demands on another player, such as the state. Thus, while other scholars have argued that social networks render individuals structurally available for mobilization (e.g., Tilly), Jasper argues that we need a language to understand why some social networks can be successfully mobilized and others cannot (Goodwin and Jasper 2003; McAdam 2002). Furthermore, while strategies are necessarily intentional and goal-oriented, they may not be rational in an individual cost-benefit sense. For example, Ecuadorian Indigenous leader and activist Marco Guatemal's 2010 decision to break a law and lead a protest march, which disrupted traffic along the Pan-American Highway ultimately, led to his arrest and incarceration for almost two weeks. This decision was not rational in that he now has a police record, lost two weeks worth of salary, and spent 14 days and nights in deplorable conditions in a jail. However, for Guatemal, his contribution to the marches against the proposed Water Law and the ALBA reunion in Ecuador was much more important than his own comfort or criminal record. In his words, "Who am I? Just one person. Think of how many people were there that day, I a drop in that river, I did what any one would do, what we all did do" (Marco Guatemal, interview with author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, April 21, 2011).

In this framework - or language - for explaining social mobilization, there are four dimensions of protest which, while autonomous, are related and often overlap. Perhaps the most important of the four dimensions is culture, defined as shared understandings (emotional, moral, and cognitive) and their physical embodiments (Jasper 1997). Culture is both implicit and explicit, and can be individual (interior) or collective (public). This duality of culture means that, methodologically, culture can be analyzed through physical documents and images, as well as through interviews with individuals (Jasper 1997).

The second dimension, resources, is defined as physical capacities and technologies, as well as the money that can buy them. The third dimension, strategies, is composed of the goal-oriented and intentional moves that individuals and groups make in interaction with other groups and individuals. The fourth dimension, biography, is the constellation of cultural meanings, personalities, and sense of self, derived from biological experiences, that composes each actor within the arena (Jasper 1997). These four dimensions intersect and influence each other without end; however, Jasper shows that by analytically separating these dimensions we can better understand the answers to questions such as why social movements occur at the moments they do, how they recruit members, and how and why movements are successful, or not.

Each strategic player in an arena is directing his or her actions at multiple audiences and because audiences are composed of players, issues such as attentiveness and interpretation influence how successful a player will be in "getting their way" (Jasper 2006). The fact of multiple audiences poses a number of dilemmas for strategic actors. A major dilemma is what Jasper calls the "*Audience-Segregation Dilemma,"* meaning that "it is extremely useful to get different messages to different audiences, but doing so

brings the risk of appearing duplicitous" (1997; 2006, 132). This dilemma requires actors to "craft different strategies and rhetorics for each important audience, corresponding to the different objectives you have for each," without alienating any target audiences (Jasper 1997; Jasper 2006, 131). Thus, a strategic actor's rhetoric, as well as his or her actions, can and will incorporate culture, language, dialogue, narrative, and identity. Strategy, therefore, is thoroughly cultural; "we filter information through our cognitive biases and emotional states" (Jasper 2006, 138).

For Jasper, ICTs are a type of resource that players may use in their strategic actions. Resources, while necessary for success, are insufficient to guarantee it. Instead, he shows that players must use their resources artfully, meaning they innovate while trying to achieve their goals (Jasper 1997). Furthermore, artfulness in the use of resources must display the cultural know-how of the user in order to resonate with the audience (Jasper 1997, 275). However, Jasper remains focused on examples of American protest and social movements, joining other social movement theorists in not interrogating systematically how (or whether) new ICTs are, in fact, resources that can help movements achieve goals such as recruitment, mobilization, and protest.

c. *Information and Communication Technologies*

John D. H. Downing and Lisa Brooten have noted that social movement scholars, particularly those working within the resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, political process model, and new social movement frameworks have spent little time considering the role of new ICTs in social mobilization, tending to assume ICTs are simply a way to "summon for action" or serve as a "forwarder of information" (2007,

542). However, since 2005 scholars have begun to question critically the role of ICTs in social mobilization.

Technologies are designed with a purpose in mind, and are therefore said to be "governed by the ideology" of their sponsor and/or creator (Larkin 2008, 4). In fact, there are new and creative possibilities outside of the control of the sponsor; thus, once technologies are made available to players other than their sponsors, their meanings and uses are always socially, politically, and economically mediated. New ICTs, such as mobile telephones and the internet, were designed or sponsored by states and their militaries, multinational corporations, and individuals largely in a liberal, capitalist context with specific purposes in mind such as progress, modernization, national security, increased efficiency in governing, rapid communication, increased productivity, commercial profit, natural resource extraction, and the uniform enforcement of state policies. However, the literature regarding ICTs shows these technologies have been appropriated and adapted in various contexts and for purposes unimagined by their creators, particularly for social mobilization.

The case of the Internet is one such example. ARPANET, the forerunner to the internet that we know today, was designed in the 1960s by the United States Department of Defense with three main goals: first, to save money by allowing for computers to be used more widely; second, to allow scientists working in national defense to share information, software, and data more quickly and easily; and thirdly, to allow for more rapid communication within the community of scientists with the goal of innovation and collaboration (Duque, et al 2005, 3). The scientists involved in ARPANET emphasized the importance of free communication and openness, while the military desired more

stringent regulations, and ultimately in 1983 when the military created their own MILNET, Internet governance and management was moved into the realm of the National Science Foundation. Once public-private partnerships expanded the infrastructure of the Internet, individuals, businesses, universities, and others were able to collaboratively and innovatively create programs to be shared. However, the initial reticence of the US government to this open format, as displayed by the military and MILNET, continues, perhaps more strongly today than ever. Thus, ironically, while the US government and private businesses funded the development of the Internet with one specific goal being to improve national security, social movement activists around the world have used it to confront governments both indirectly (e.g., to organize protest activities) and directly (e.g., cyber attacks on government web pages).

While the potentialities of social movements may increase with access to ICT, whether new potentials are reached depends partly upon the conditions under which activists adopt and utilize new technologies (Garrett 2006; Sassen 2007; Graham and Goodrum 2007). Some scholars argue that ICTs have a generally positive effect on prospects for mobilization, while others argue that ICTs often have a negative effect. The literature on ICTs broadly suggests two potential benefits and two potential challenges inherent in using ICTs for mobilization. Specifically, ICTs have been shown to contribute to social mobilization in contexts in which organizations remain autonomous from outsiders, especially funders, while the use of ICTs has negative effects on mobilization when social movement organizations (SMOs) are unable to remain autonomous.

The first potential benefit is that new ICTs allow for rapid communication across vast physical space, an essential element for fundamental organization or call to action purposes, as well as for information sharing. However, this literature remains focused on movements in a Western context. Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow even go so far as to argue that the internet-based call to action has become a modular performance, that is a "generic form that can be adapted to a variety of local and social circumstances" (2007, 3). Other literature focused on southern, or developing world, movements has found that the creative use of ICTs can play a central role in the process of mobilization. For example, Downing and Brooten (2007) have shown that in Latin American movements, while rural ICT infrastructure is often sparse, social movements are finding creative ways to use whatever ICTs are available to enhance pre-existing forms of organizing and communicating. In rural Africa and Latin America, a single Internet entry point or a single cell phone with multiple SIM (subscriber identity module) cards in a community serve both as a means for obtaining information and for long-distance instantaneous and interactive communication. Harry Cleaver (1998), Saidou Dia (2003), Momar-Coumba Diop (2003), John Downing and Lisa Brooten (2007), and Brian Larkin (2008) have all shown how the instantaneous and networked nature of the Internet and cell-phone communication creates new opportunities for mobilization through radio networks. When community radio stations across a country or region are connected through ICTs, coverage is amplified and distant communities have more complete and substantive information and are able to communicate among each other in real time (Cleaver 1998; Dia 2003; Diop 2003; Downing and Brooten 2007; Larkin 2008).

Scholars looking through an international relations lens, such as Saskia Sassen (2007) and Allison Brysk (2000), have shown that ICTs can provide links between the local and the global, creating new potentialities for mobilization (also Keck and Sikkink 1998; Castells 2004; Cleaver 1998). Communication between local and international actors has been seen as most beneficial in that transnational activist networks (TANs) can provide resources—both material and ideational—to local movements.

Castells (2004) and Cleaver (1998) support the TAN scholars' arguments with evidence from the *Zapatistas*, an Indigenous movement in Mexico. The *Zapatistas* used new ICTs to spread their message to the international community in an attempt to bypass and then pressure an unresponsive national government. While the international community responded to the *Zapatista* message with support, the connections between the movement and the international community were not direct; because the *Zapatistas* did not have access to the internet at the local level (deep in the Lacandon jungle), they relied upon local NGOs sympathetic to their cause to send their handwritten messages to the world over the internet. Thus, in the framework of Jasper, the *Zapatistas* effectively utilized new ICTs to segregate their specific audiences, international and local, and diffuse particular messages to each.

The second potential benefit of ICTs for mobilization is their multimodal nature. The multimodality of ICTs means they have the ability to combine words, images, music, and sounds and thus can communicate interactively and immediately (Graham and Goodrum 2007). Unlike print media and other forms of communication that rely upon the written word and static photos and graphics, new ICTs allow interactive communication through local forms of literacies that differ according to culture and

context (Graham and Goodrum 2007, 478). As mobilizing tools, new ICTs can offer more expansive opportunities for individual players to incorporate culture into their strategies more meaningfully. For example, a technology like a radio broadcast can be indigenized using local languages and cultural symbols to induce greater cultural resonance. Furthermore, new ICTs also allow for responses to broadcasts to be immediately sent back to a central distribution point via the internet, creating new interactive possibilities for the older technology of the radio that is embedded—or integrated—in Indigenous communities (Osvaldo, Burch, and Tamayo 2005).

Similarly, Castells (with Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu, and Sey 2007) has demonstrated that while ICTs such as text messaging create new possibilities for coordination, the context in which the message circulates is extremely important. Thus, the credibility of the text-message sender and the messages' resonance with the receiver are "critical ingredients" of the power embedded in new ICTs (Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu, and Sey 2007, 211). This point suggests that the context in which ICTs are utilized cannot be separated in any consideration of how their use may or may not contribute to mobilization.

The two challenges identified with regard to the use of ICTs by SMOs stems from the fact that ICTs require resources, and resources often come from outside sources (e.g. INGOs, other NGOs, or government agencies). The first potential challenge of using ICTs for mobilization is potential loss of autonomy of the individuals or organizations using the ICTs (Bob 2005). Claire Mercer (2004) and Herman Wasserman (2005) have found that NGOs in Tanzania and South Africa using ICTs and acting in the capacity of SMOs are in the precarious position of having to adapt their agendas and forms of

presentation to meet the expectations of prospective donors, while trying simultaneously to distance themselves from these technologies in order to forge and maintain deeper connections with social movement participants. For example, in interviews Ecuadorian grassroots movement members expressed the need to speak face-to-face with SMO leaders in order to participate confidently in mobilizations and stated that contact through cell phones was simply not the same.

This position of SMOs and NGOs set precariously in the middle between local constituencies and international actors is a result of two processes. First, ICT access has reinforced pre-existing international and national non-governmental organization (INGO) and non-governmental (NGO) hierarchies, allowing the INGOs to serve as gatekeepers of information and strengthening the position of the local NGO leaders who have access to new ICTs (Mercer 2004, 54; Bob 2005). Second, ICTs remain closely linked with international (Western) ideals and the wealthier segments of the domestic populations. Local NGOs attempting to mobilize prospective movement members prefer to use traditional methods of communication that allow them to retain their legitimacy in the eyes of the grassroots movement members (Mercer 2004, 59; Wasserman 2005, 188). It is important to note here that activists emphasized that whether the use of ICTs actually resulted in a loss of autonomy of their SMO or NGO with regard to donors was of little consequence; their concern was with the perception of their constituent populations. Thus, while an NGO office could very well use computers, the Internet, telephones, and fax machines, employees opted for more traditional forms of communication in their day-to-day functions outside of the office.

A second and related potential challenge of ICTs for local movements is that the use of ICTs can cause degradation of local social networks and relationships. In a case study of a regional peasant organization in Central America (ASOCODE), Marc Edelman (2005) finds connections with transnational networks to be detrimental to local movements. The NGO-ization of ASOCODE—by which he means the professionalization of staff and the increased importance placed on appealing to outsiders for material resources in order to keep the organization afloat—resulted in a detachment between the organization and the local social movement, and ultimately, the demise of the organization and movement alike. While social movement scholars recognize professionalization as one possible mechanism of demobilization, Edelman suggests that increased interaction with international actors vis-à-vis ICTs can lead to professionalization of the NGO and alienation of its base before a movement actually begins. Thus, professionalization has the same potential negative effect as that of loss of autonomy; constituent populations will perceive the NGO/SMO as being different and as serving the interests of outsiders, and consequently, will cut their connections with the organization.

d. *Types of State Power, ICTs, and Mobilization*

While scholars of Indigenous social movements have tended to define state power in terms of coercive power to repress social movements, other scholars have shown that there are a variety of types of state power that affect prospects for mobilization. These scholars have pointed out that much of the work done regarding the new uses of ICTs in society has neglected to address power, and specifically the ways in which ICTs

contribute to the shifting relative power of the state and social groups (Ho, Bber, and Khondker 2002; Mansell, Avgerou, Quah, and Silverstone 2007; Sassen 2007; Thompson 2004).

Michael Mann's concept of infrastructural power, while developed to help explain state formation, can be used as the core for a model for understanding the organization of power between states and social movements. Mann defines infrastructural power as the "capacity of the state actually to penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm" (Mann 1984, 113). The measures of state infrastructural power are such things as roads, access to ships, telegraphy, and the rapidity of communication of messages and of transport of people and resources (Mann 1984, 117). However, Mann suggests that none of these techniques are specific to the state, but instead they are part of "general social development," and as such, they increase the "capacities for collective social mobilization of resources" (1984, 117). Because these technologies do not belong exclusively to either the state or society, Mann argues that there is a "perpetual dialectic of movement between state and civil society" of influence over the social development process (1984, 119). Given this dialectic, the state does not have sole access to infrastructural power, but instead society can also utilize it. The relationship of power between the state and society is not, however, zero-sum. Mann assumes that society and the state will continuously invent new technologies or innovate on old ones, therefore increasing one's infrastructural power with respect to the other. After a process of diffusion of the new technologies (or of new innovative uses for old technologies), the state and all segments of society will be able to utilize the new

technologies and, therefore, equalize the power differential. Thus, the keys to increased power are innovation and creativity.

Brian Larkin (2008) has more recently defined infrastructural power as the totality of both technical and cultural systems that create institutionalized structures within a state. Thus, technical systems, such as the capability to broadcast radio and television or to produce films, and cultural systems, the messages carried through technical systems, are inseparable and together are the sources of infrastructural power. He argues that while infrastructure—both the technical and cultural systems—is constructed by governing authorities to increase their power, it is often utilized in unexpected and unpredictable ways by society, creating new possibilities for organization, mobilization, and the articulation of demands (2008, 6, see also Ho, Bber, and Khondker 2002). Thus, infrastructure not only consists of roads, broadband lines, and power grids, but also of the cultural messages and systems that are projected by and carried through these technical artifacts. Infrastructural power then is both technical and cultural.

Steven Jones (1995) argues that ICTs may be particularly potent for mobilization prospects in a developing context; while developing states may have the capacity to deploy a coercive apparatus, they tend not to be surveillance states and lack the capacity to police and repress communication, coordination, and the spread of information vis-à-vis new ICTs (Jones 1995). K. C. Ho, Zaheer Bber, and Habibul Khondker (2002) also address the question of power directly to argue that in Singapore the powerful central government's construction of a knowledge-based economy, including both a vast and efficient fiber optic infrastructure and education programs for citizens, had unintended consequences. Once this infrastructure was constructed, it was available to regime

supporters and the political opposition alike; opposition groups use the Internet to stake out spaces of resistance and gain support and strength in relation to the state (Ho, Bber, and Khondker 2002). So, while an improved infrastructure can increase the state's disciplinary power, it also opens new spaces for resistance and means that a renegotiation of power will likely take place; "technologies can either reinforce the status quo or shift the distribution of power" (Ho, Bber, and Khondker 2002, 146; Larkin 2008).

III. *Framework for Analysis*

The 14 Indigenous nationalities and 18 *pueblos* (peoples) in Ecuador have a shared identity that emanates from more than 500 years in a position of subordination to the rest of society and the state. This identity emphasizes linguistic differences, a sacred bond with the *Pachamama* (Mother Nature), including the land, air, animals, and water, and their right to autonomous governance of their traditional territories.[1] Indigenous nationalities and *pueblos* (and the individuals that comprise these communities) have also faced decades of marginalization, hardship, and outright exclusion from the national political arena. Recently, industrialization and development activities such as industrial farming, mining, and oil extraction, as well as the ever-growing reach of the state, have increasingly threatened their territory and autonomy both directly and indirectly.

[1] There are 14 distinct Indigenous nationalities in Ecuador, each with its own language, history, cultural practices, holidays, family and community structures, and regions. Within these nationalities there are various *pueblos*, especially within the larger nationalities such as the Kichwa nation, which includes the majority of the sierra and large swaths of the Amazonian basin. *Pueblos* of the same nationality share language and some basic cultural traits; however, they often have distinct styles of dress, different holidays, and specific cultural practices.

However, sustained, organized, collective action, especially aimed at (perceived) powerful actors – such as the state and multinational corporations (MNCs) – is a risky move, and there is much that could be lost in such an engagement. Sustained mobilization requires activists' time, resources, and, if the state reacts repressively, even their lives. Thus, to mobilize Indigenous individual players living in rural communities to engage with players in the arena of politics (national), or an arena of MNCs, requires a fair amount of persuasion and prior to the 1980s, Indigenous people throughout Latin America had not mobilized as such.

There are two main explanations for why Indigenous people did not mobilize in the earlier half of the twentieth century (or before). First, a simple fact of geography: Indigenous communities of the Ecuadorian Andes, Amazon, and Coast all have valuable natural resources, but are not easily accessible. Hence, interaction between national governments (or MNCs) and Indigenous communities was limited. Moreover, even when there were grievances in Indigenous communities, a lack of communication and travel infrastructure discouraged mobilization across difficult territory (Starn 1999). In Ecuador, oil extraction on a large scale only began in 1972, with the entrance of the US oil company Texaco and the formation of the Ecuadorian State Oil Corporation (CEPE) (Kimerling 1991).

Between 1972 and 1991, oil extraction and the roads necessary for these operations opened an estimated one million hectares of the Amazon that were previously untouched and the Indigenous peoples living there uncontacted, creating inroads for colonists to make land grabs. Furthermore, accidental spills in the same period resulted in more than 400,000 barrels (16.8 million gallons) of oil ruining both land and water

sources (Kimerling 1991). Thus, in the latter part of the 20th century, oil extraction created new grievances for previously autonomous Indigenous peoples in the form of unwanted contact, land seizures, and oil spills. However, it also constructed a new infrastructure with the potential to allow these same Indigenous actors to make demands on the government.

Second, Indigenous communities had a high degree of autonomy prior to the 1980s. Yashar has shown that the governments of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Perú employed a corporatist citizenship regime during the period prior to the late 1980s, under which rural communities were (often unwittingly) granted relatively high levels of autonomy, and so local cultures, that is, the specific language, legal practices, religion, power structures, and so on remained intact. Thus, prior to the 1980s, Indigenous communities had little interaction with the government, and therefore, little reason to mobilize. Instead, mobilization has been explained as a result of the state governments' shift from corporatist citizenship regimes to neoliberal citizenship regimes, which redefined Indigenous communities as individual citizens of their respective states while simultaneously stripping individuals of social and economic rights that were protected under the former regime.

These explanations remain overly structural, emphasizing the importance of the political opportunity structure, as a static variable, without considering the variable strategies that movement leaders employed for mobilization. Furthermore, these explanations fail to address the fact that the shift from corporatist citizenship regimes to a neoliberal citizenship regime would not have been possible prior to the late 1980s/early 1990s. It was only at this point that national governments – as well as MNCs interested

in exploiting natural resources – constructed ICT infrastructure, making new information and communications technologies available, and ultimately, widespread. What these players could not, or must not, have suspected was that this new infrastructure, while perhaps useful for their own purposes of reaching a greater percentage of the population in order to extract resources, govern more efficiently, and enforce state policies more uniformly, could potentially also serve as a tool for their adversaries, such as the Indigenous movement. Neither explanations of geographic isolation nor autonomy from the state take into account improvements in infrastructure, the creative ways for utilizing these new resources, or the subsequent shifts in infrastructural power between the state and society.

How have Indigenous players utilized new ICTs in order to mobilize on a national, regional, and/or local scale? More generally, under what conditions can the use of new ICTs contribute to successful mobilization, and under what conditions can they hinder mobilization?

In focusing on Indigenous social movements in Ecuador, I hypothesize first, that the extent to which the process of mobilization is successful will vary depending upon the level of *strategic appropriation* of ICTs by Indigenous organizational leaders. Appropriation refers to a movement's reinterpretation and innovation of ICTs to reflect the local culture, both symbolically and behaviorally, thus rendering the movement and its messages as credible in the eyes of grassroots movement members (Cleaver 1998; Tarrow 1998; Dia 2003; Diop 2003; Downing and Brooten 2007; Graham and Goodrum 2007; Larkin 2008).

Second, the level of success of mobilization will vary depending upon the *creative adaptability* of movement leaders in using ICTs. Because states (and/or MNCs) have many strategies to thwart attempts by activists to utilize new ICTs for mobilization—broadly categorized as cooperation, cooptation, and coercion—activists who are flexible and creative in responding to changes in the political arena will ultimately be more successful (Jasper 2006; Lu and Weber 2007). Organizations with a group of leaders who have expertise in, and access to, multiple ICTs will have more options for creatively responding to changes in the political arena (Ganz 2009).

Finally, the level of success of mobilization will vary depending upon the level of movement leaders' success in *distinguishing and targeting their audiences.*[2] In distinguishing and targeting their audiences, leaders will use ICTs in a way that resonates with specific audiences (e.g., local Indigenous communities and organizations, national publics, politicians, international activists) by appealing to each audience's cultural norms and mirroring and/or creatively bending social relationships and power constellations within different arenas in order to retain legitimacy while diffusing information and the movement's message (Jasper 2006; Castells, et al. 2007). Targeting of audiences is especially important as ICTs are often utilized to connect with international and national actors for resources, and scholars have shown that this can often undermine social movement leaderships' credibility with local grassroots populations as leaders can be perceived to be using their positions for personal gain,

[2] Identifying and targeting of audiences is the same as Jasper's notion that it is necessary for communicators engaged in persuasion with the goal of mobilizing individuals to segregate audiences order to not appear to be duplicitous (1996, 2006). This dissertation chooses to replace the verb segregate with distinguish and target as the word segregation implies complete separation of audiences, something that is not possible. Furthermore, the word segregate has a long and historically specific connotation that is not relevant to this study.

rather than to strengthen the organization or movement as a whole (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brysk 2000; Castells 2004; Mercer 2004; Bob 2005; Edelman 2005; Wasserman 2005).

These three hypotheses can be additive. That is, organizations that are successful in all three areas – innovation, adaptability, and segregation of audiences – will be most successful in inciting mobilization. It is possible that an organization will still be able to create mobilization, if on a smaller scale, if they are able to achieve two, or even one, of these elements. However, an organization will be unsuccessful in its attempts to mobilize its bases if it cannot successfully adapt to changes in the arena in which it is acting.

The dependent variable—successful social mobilization—is defined as the activation of strategic players to disruptively make contentious demands on a target. Social mobilization can be measured first, as the frequency of protest activities; and second, as levels of participation.

The first independent variable, appropriation of ICTs, is the degree to which culture—the "linguistic practices, institutional rules, and social rituals" (Polletta 1999, 67)—is reflected in the creative reinterpretation and innovation of ICTs and their uses. Appropriation can be measured, first, as the congruence between the actual uses of ICTs and historical uses of other forms of communication; second, as the degree to which ICT use reflects local literacies; and third, as the subjective experience of potential grassroots movement members. The second independent variable, creative adaptation of the use of ICTs, is defined as the capacity of an organization's leaders to respond to changes in the political arena when using ICTs. This can be measured, first, by process tracing specific changes in government policy regarding ICTs and activists' responses to these changes;

and second, determining the degree of expertise of leaders in using various ICTs. The third independent variable, leaders' identifying and targeting audiences, is defined as leaders identifying various audiences and crafting different strategies and rhetoric for each. Distinguishing and targeeting of audiences can be measured first, by asking what audiences the activists would like to reach and for what purposes; second, by determining to what degree materials produced by activists reach their target audiences; and third, the degree to which the materials produced resonate with their target audience(s).

IV. *Case Selection and Methodology*

In order to test my hypotheses, I conducted 17 months of field research throughout Ecuador. I selected Ecuador because, while there was a strong and successful national Indigenous movement during the 1990s that continued through the early 2000s, there has since been variation in the levels of local, regional, and national mobilization, as well as in how Indigenous social movement organizations have utilized new ICTs. I consider 14 Indigenous organizations at the local, provincial, regional, and national level as unique cases of a compound strategic player using ICTs (Jasper 1997, 2006). The period of the study is from January 2007 through December 2011. I selected this time period because Rafael Correa was elected president in 2007, and so the political arena was controlled by the same government during the years under study. I conducted 58 open-ended semi-structured interviews in the organizations and their base communities. I also volunteered with the national Indigenous organization (CONAIE), one regional organization (CONFENIAE), three provincial organizations, and one *segundo grado* (federation of communities) organization, granting me insider-access for participant

observation.[3] I carried out a newspaper archival search and consulted ICT connectivity databases and government records.

V. *Organization of Dissertation*

Chapter two explains the history of the Indigenous movement in Ecuador in order to contextualize mobilization in the years of this investigation (2007-2011). Furthermore, it investigates the level of communications infrastructure in Ecuador, as well as the particular government policies and strategies in the realm of communication in order to illustrate that the ICTs were, and are, in fact available to Indigenous activists and grassroots movement members. Chapter three argues that President Correa's administration has combined strategies of cooperation, cooptation, and coercion with regards to telecommunications in the Indigenous political arena in order to win over Indigenous populations and dictate the "rules of the game" for social movement organizations (SMOs) utilizing new ICTs. Chapter four presents a quantitative analysis of the 14 cases to show that organizations that achieved high levels for the three independent variables also achieved high levels of mobilization. It then presents case studies of the CONAIE and the regional Kichwa Federation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI) in order to more clearly illustrate the causal mechanisms linking variables. Chapter five presents four cases in order to further illustrate organizations' strategies with regard to the uses of ICTs and how their uses affected levels of success of

[3] As a volunteer in Indigenous organizations I worked with communications teams, sharing technical knowledge about website development and managing social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter. I also translated documents (from Spanish to English) and helped with grant writing, especially when required in English.

mobilization. The conclusion summarizes the findings of this dissertation as well as presenting areas for future research.

Chapter 2 – Contextualizing the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement

I. *Introduction*

In order to understand and explain Indigenous mobilization, or lack thereof, in the period from 2007 through 2011, it is first necessary to understand the history of the Indigenous movement in Ecuador. This good advice is, in fact, reflected in the Ecuadorian Indigenous movement protest chant: "*No se construye el presente sin conocer el pasado*," or, "We can't construct the present without knowing the past." Furthermore, before considering how Indigenous social movement organizations have utilized new information and communications technologies, it is necessary to determine what technologies were available, to what extent, and where. This chapter will briefly consider the history of the Indigenous movement in Ecuador. It will then explain the organizational structure of the Indigenous movement and provide a brief overview of the relationship between the Indigenous movement and the Correa administration in the years 2007 through 2011. Finally, this chapter will summarize the trajectory of the telecommunications sector and show the availability of various ICTs in order to illustrate that the Ecuadorian state has been crucial in the expansion of ICT infrastructure in rural areas where Indigenous populations are found. As discussed in chapter one, scholars considering the relationships between power, the state, and civil society with regard to ICTs argue that because infrastructure is very costly it is the state that often leads the way in its expansion; however, the presence of ICT infrastructure is necessary for its subsequent utilization by other social sectors.

II. *History of the Indigenous Movement in Ecuador*

i. *Who are Indigenous Peoples?*

The most commonly accepted criteria to determine whether a group of people is Indigenous, and therefore eligible for certain internationally identified considerations and rights, are cultural distinctiveness, first come, non-dominance, and self-identification (Saugestad 2001, 30). The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) that was passed on September 13, 2007, by the United Nations General Assembly after more than twenty years of work by the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Issues, refers to these four criteria time and again, although it does not list them outright.[4] Cultural distinctiveness is both external and internal, but is typically outwardly displayed in particular forms of dress, languages spoken, dances, music, and livelihood. Internally, cultural distinctiveness includes elements such as spiritual and/or religious beliefs, worldview, and the organization of family relations. First come refers to the fact that Indigenous peoples were present in a particular area prior to colonization. Non-dominance refers to the fact that Indigenous peoples are typically minority populations in countries throughout the world, and as such have suffered discrimination, both informal and institutionalized, often for hundreds of years. In the Latin American context, Indigenous peoples are minority populations with the

[4] According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the working group on Indigenous populations consists of "independent experts and members of the Sub-Commission - one from each of the geopolitical regions of the world. The Working Group is open to all representatives of Indigenous peoples and their communities and organizations. The openness of the Working Groups' sessions, which also includes the participation of representatives of Governments, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, has strengthened its position as a focal point of international action on Indigenous issues" (2012). The yearly working group meeting has representation from Indigenous communities in all regions of the world.

exception of Guatemala and Bolivia. Finally, self-identification refers to the fact that to be Indigenous, one must claim to be so.

Figure 2.1 Administrative Map of Ecuador, Courtesy of University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin

Figure 2.2 Topographical Map of Ecuador, Courtesy of University of Texas Libraries, the University of Texas at Austin

Indigenous peoples live in Ecuador's three regions – the coast, the sierra, and the Amazon. The coast is composed of seven provinces (Esmereldas, Manabí, Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas, Los Ríos, Guayas, Santa Elena, and El Oro), the sierra of 10 provinces (Carchi, Imbabura, Pichincha, Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, Bolívar, Chimborazo, Cañar, Azuay, and Loja), and the Amazon of six provinces (Sucumbíos, Napo, Orellana, Pastaza, Morona Santiago, and Zamora Chinchipe). In all regions Indigenous peoples have distinct cultural practices. One very observable external cultural indicator is the specific form of dress found in each nationality or *pueblo*. Male Tsáchilas of the coast, for example, put a mixture of fire red *achiote*, a substance that comes from the seeds of a shrub, in their hair to slick it forward. In the Andean province of Cotopaxi, both men and women wear *sombreros*, felt hats, with ostrich feathers in the brim, while in Imbabura only men wear *sombreros* while women wear *anacus*, a floor length woolen wrap skirt. Shuar women of the Amazon wear blue dresses that drape over one shoulder, and both men and women wear adornments of black, red, and brown seeds.[5] As part of an oral history project in the province of Imbabura, one woman from the community of Ilumán explained the importance of her hand embroidered blouse and *anacu*:

> The women used to make their own cotton thread to weave the fabric used to make shirts and pants. They also spun yarn from sheep's wool to make their skirts and hats. They embroidered their own blouses. The men dyed the wool and wove. We don't do everything by hand now, but we wear the same clothing to show our respect and keep close to our ancestors. (in Castro 1994, 14)

[5] The Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) emphasizes the importance of preserving the distinct forms of dress among the nationalities and *pueblos* of Ecuador. For example, in all CONAIE events, the organization promotes a *gala* dress code, meaning that participants should come dressed representative of their nationality or *pueblo*.

In fact, Indigenous politician Lourdes Tibán of the Pueblo Panzaleo in the province of Cotopaxi argues that the traditional dress is perhaps the most important cultural display of the *pueblos* and nationalities in Ecuador. She laments the fact that young people are increasingly dressing in Western fashions and suggests that Indigenous organizations and communities should do more to teach the youth about the significance of traditional dress (Tibán 2004).

In other external displays of culture, there are 14 Indigenous languages that are widely spoken throughout the 14 Indigenous nationalities of Ecuador. Indigenous communities celebrate holidays such as Inti Raymi, the Celebration of the Sun, a holiday in the ancient Incan calendar around the time of the Summer solstice to celebrate the bounty of the earth, or the *Pachamama* (Castro 2004). Internally, Indigenous peoples of the Andes base their world-view in the ideology of Andean *cosmovisión*. Thus, while the majority of Indigenous peoples consider themselves to be Catholic (although there is a growing evangelical population), there is also an internalized understanding that the four basic principles of cosmovision (to be honest, truthful, loyal, hard-working) are equally relevant in the functioning of the *Pachamama*. Furthermore, principles of *cosmovisión* such as reciprocity, or in Kichwa, *ranti-ranti*, are shared among Indigenous individuals and dictate interactions in the social and family spheres. *Ranti-ranti* "is a condition that necessarily implies the act of giving in order to receive, which is a principle that characterizes Indigenous time and space, giving them their driving force, and developing in the *runa* an eternal sense of reciprocity" (Castro 2004, 283).

Indigenous peoples of the area that is now Ecuador were there long before colonizers arrived – Incan or European. The territory that today is known as Ecuador was conquered by the Incan empire only a few years before the arrival of the Spanish in the mid 16th century, one of the main reasons that such a diversity of languages and cultures still exist today (Becker 2008, 3). At the time of colonization, while the Indigenous population was far more numerous than that of the Europeans, they remained non-dominant due to their lack of metal weaponry and their susceptibility to European diseases. In Ecuador, the Indigenous population continues to be sizeable, but at between 30 and 40%, it remains a minority (Yashar 2005, 21). Self-identification is a tricky issue in a context where discrimination has been rampant and institutionalized for hundreds of years. However, Indigenous peoples do self-identify as such, an issue that will be further discussed in the following section. Furthermore, while Europeans, their descendents, and Indigenous peoples have inevitably had relationships and consequently children, there are those who continue to self-identify as Indigenous, as well as those who self-identify as *mestizo* (mixed) (Cameron 2001).

ii. *Historical Trajectory of Indigenous Peoples in Ecuador*

Indigenous peoples of Ecuador have had various names assigned to them over the past 500 years. *Indio*, or Indian, has been a common name since the colonial period, for Indigenous peoples from Northern Canada to the Southern *Tierra del Fuego*, given to the original inhabitants of these lands by *conquistadores* looking for the Indian subcontinent. Thus, *indio* was not only simply incorrect, but also used as a derogatory slur, a practice that continues even today. The Spanish colonial administration was characterized by

racism and brutality, allowing the Indigenous peoples to be used as slave labor and requiring that they pay taxes. As explained by Cameron, "the Spanish conquest of the Andean region and wars with the Incan empire devastated the Indigenous populations of the region, began the process of enslavement and enculturation, and set the stage for Spanish domination" (Cameron 2001, 32). The administrative officials, the representatives of the Catholic Church, and *hacendados* (landowners) worked together in a three-part system called *gamonalism* to carry out what Guerrero calls "ethnic administration," in which citizenship and rights were dependent upon one's skin color and ability to speak Spanish (Guerrero 1983; Cameron 2001). The *gamonal* triangle of power was a system "in which the coercive power of the *hacendados* (*hacienda* owners) was reinforced with the ideological support of local Catholic priests and the political authority of municipal officials and local representatives of the central state" (Cameron 2003, 101).

From the mid-1800s until the early 1980s, Indigenous peoples in Ecuador self-identified as *campesinos*, or rural peasant farmers. *Campesinos* most often worked on large *haciendas*, plantation style farms, although some had their own small landholdings. In Ecuador, *haciendas* largely functioned through the *huasipungo* system. In Kichwa, *huasi* means home and *pungo* (also spelled *punku*) means door; thus, *huasipungo* translates roughly to the door of the house, and was so named because the doors of the homes of *huasipungueros* (laborers) opened directly to the *hacienda*. A *huasipunguero* and his extended family worked four to six days a week on the *hacienda*. As explained by Walters, the types of labor varied greatly:

> In addition to agricultural and pastoral tasks, workers provided *huasicamía* (domestic labor in the *hacienda* residence or in the patron's urban home), *chagracama* (guarding the fields), *cracama* (harvesting), *cuentayo* (care of the flocks in the *páramos*, the high Andean meadows), and *faena* (additional tasks performed before the day's regular duties). A variety of other duties, such as road repair and construction, were demanded on an irregular basis. (Walters 2007, 123)

In return for their labor, *huasipungueros* were given access to a parcel of land on which they could build their home and do subsistence farming. Additionally, they had access to the resources of the *hacienda*, such as roads, firewood, water, and pastures (Guerrero 1983; Korovkin 2002; Cameron 2003; Walters 2007). Occasionally they were given a small salary, in most cases pennies a day; however, these salaries normally went toward paying debts owed to priests for performing baptisms, marriages, and last rites. This overcharging by priests for performing basic services within the church is a concrete example of *gamonalism*, in which the priests, *hacendados*, and local authorities worked together to ensure that the *huasipungueros* remained indebted and without economic or political power (Walters 2007). According to the 1954 census, approximately 80% of the highland labor force worked as *huasipungueros* (cited in Korovkin 2000, 7).

Even when *campesinos* had their own land, they often lacked access to necessary resources, such as roadways and water, which were controlled by the *hacendados*. In these cases, *campesinos* and *hacendados* participated in the *yanapo* system. In the *yanapo* system, *campesinos* worked two to three days a week on the *hacienda*. In exchange for their labor, they were given access to *hacienda* resources, and occasionally, a small salary (Cameron 2003; Walters 2007).

While the Indigenous peoples of the sierra and the coast were murdered, enslaved, and repressed, one author notes that they "were not passive observers of their own fate" (Walters 2007, 123). Instead, throughout the 17th century, the laborers engaged in individual acts of resistance, such as "working slowly, breaking tools, or even committing suicide" to rebel against the Spaniards (Becker 2008, 4). These individual acts of rebellion increased in frequency until in the 18th and 19th centuries there were organized revolts throughout the Andes, including in Ecuador (Walters 2007). In the early 20th century, Indigenous peoples – working together with the communist party – began to form rural syndicates to present their demands to the government (Becker 2008).

In 1944, the Ecuadorian communist party created the Ecuadorian Federation of Indians (Federación Ecuatoriana de Indios – FEI). The FEI worked to create *huasipunguero* unions and cooperatives, demanding salaries, vacation time, and general compliance with the labor laws of the day that outlawed excessive violence in punishments for *huasipungueros* (Korovkin 2002, 17). In 1964, the government passed the first Agricultural Reform Law, largely as a result of the political activities of the FEI and *campesino* and *huasipunguero* resistance and initial land seizures. This law abolished the *huasipungo* system and gave *huasipungueros* rights to their "miniscule parcels" of land (Korovkin 2002, 18). However, the actual redistribution of land fell short and many former *huasinpungueros* expressed their desire to return to the old system as they "lost access to pastures and other resources of the *hacienda*," making subsistence farming impossible and forcing great waves of migration toward cities (Korovkin 2002, 18). Thus, according to Korovkin, the agricultural reform was a disaster for *campesinos*

economically. Nonetheless, the reform proved to be a victory politically and organizationally as there was a subsequent rapid growth of communities that were not part of *haciendas* (Korovkin 2002, 19). The FEI continued to organize after the agrarian reform, but with less success, largely due to the fact that the vertical organizational structure of the communist party was incompatible with the communal Indigenous tradition (Korovkin 2002).

In 1973, the Ecuadorian government again tried to implement agrarian reform. In the previous decade, only nine percent of territory held by *hacendados* had been redistributed. Of this territory, only 20.1% was "considered land adequate for agriculture or raising cattle" (2.8% for farming and 17.3% for pasture) (Ecofuturo report 1990, cited in Korovkin 2002). Frustrated with the slow progress in acquiring their own property, *campesinos* increasingly began to take matters into their own hands with widespread "*toma de haciendas*," or taking of *haciendas*. While these unsanctioned land seizures were usually pacific, *hacendados* retaliated brutally, hiring security groups to defend their properties. Korovkin explains, "The security groups burned the houses of the Indigenous *campesinos*, they killed their cattle, and they threatened the *dirigentes* with death, while the police looked the other way, or at times, helped the *hacendados*" (2002, 26). In 1979, the government passed a law specifically outlawing land seizures by *campesinos*, making the crime punishable with time in prison and ensuring that any communities that participated in a *toma de hacienda* would be ineligible to receive territory from the government (Korovkin 2002, 27).

In 1986, *campesinos* – many former *huasipungueros* – came together in an assembly to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). The CONAIE was to be an organization of Indigenous communities that would continue with the *lucha* of the FEI, but with an organizational structure that more closely represented that of Indigenous communities, with decision-making happening from the bottom up. Furthermore, the CONAIE was to be an organization explicitly of *indígenas*, rather than *campesinos*, and so was immediately looking to change more than just the political-economic system in Ecuador, but rather the fundamental notion of the Ecuadorian state and the national identity. Namely, the Indigenous movement wanted the Ecuadorian to state to recognize the diversity of its constituent population, made up of various nationalities, rather than simply one Ecuadorian nationality. Thus, with the formation of the CONAIE in 1986, self-identification began to shift broadly from *campesino* to *indígena* (Indigenous). While the goals of the CONAIE have been, and continue to be, largely political, the organization considers the promotion of culture, history, and self-identification as *indígena* as integral to the success of their political project (Almeida 1993; Lucas 2000).

During the early 1980s through the year 1998 with the writing of a new constitution, Ecuadorian society largely came to recognize the offensive nature of *indio*. While racism is not eradicated overnight, in the 1990s, the politically correct term became *indígena,* or Indigenous person, that was a member of an é*tnia*, or distinct ethnic group. Thus, to be Indigenous became an issue of ethnicity rather than race, as had been implied by the term *indio*. The success of the term *indígena,* both in Ecuador and

internationally, can be directly linked to the slow but steady success of the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Peoples from 1983 through the present day, with the passing of the aforementioned Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 as the pinnacle of their work (Saugestad 2001).

The CONAIE argued that there were 14 distinct Indigenous nationalities in Ecuador, each with their own language, history, cultural practices, holidays, foods, family and community structures, and regions. The nationalities of the coast are the Epera, Chachi, Tsa'chila, and Awá. In the Amazon one encounters the Zapara, Shuar, Cofán, Secoya, Waorani, Achuar, Shiwiar, Siona, and Andoa nationalities. The Andean sierra and the Amazon are home to the Kichwa nationality – by far the largest in Ecuador (CONAIE 2011).

Within these nationalities there are various *pueblos*, especially within the larger nationalities, such as the Kichwa. The Inca conquered the Indigenous peoples living in the Ecuadorian sierra, resulting in the Kichwa nationality; however, because the Inca ruled for a short period of time in Ecuador, many aspects of the pre-existing cultures remained intact, resulting in what today are referred to as distinct *pueblos* (Becker 2008).[6] *Pueblos* of the same nationality share language and some basic cultural traits; however, they often have distinct styles of dress, different holidays, and specific cultural practices. The *pueblos* that compose the Kichwa nationality of the Andean sierra are the Karanki, Natabuela, Otavalo, Kayambi, Kitukara, Panzaleo, Salasaca, Chibuleo, Tomabela, Kisapincha, Puruhua, Waranka, Kañari, Saraguro, Palta, and Pasto. The

[6] The majority of the Kichwa of the Amazon are descendents of those who fled to the Amazon to avoid Spanish conquest in the Andes.

pueblos of the coast are Manta and Wankavilka. Specifically among the Kichwa nationality, the Kichwa language of the sierra is distinct from Kichwa of the Amazon, and while Kichwa speakers of each region can more or less understand each other, the difference in dialects makes communication in this Indigenous language difficult. For example, the phrase thank you in Kichwa of the sierra is *yupaychani*, while in the Amazon it is *pagarachu.*[7]

iii. *Statistics*

The United Nations estimates that the Indigenous population of Ecuador makes up between 30 and 40% of the total population of 14.5 million people (cited in Yashar 2005, 21). According to the 2001 census, over 70% of Ecuador's Indigenous population lived in the Sierra region, about 20% in the Amazon region, and the remaining 10% in the Coast region and Galapagos (CEPAL 2005, 28). The 2010 Ecuadorian national census specifically asked respondents to identify as Mestizo, Afroecuatoriano or Afro-descendent, Indigenous, White, Montubio, or Other. However, the census statistics, especially those regarding the Indigenous population, have been questioned as the data suggest that the Indigenous population is between 6.9 and 7.1% of the national population, a number that is drastically lower than the UN data (INEC 2011) and does not reflect the great diversity one views on a daily basis in Ecuador, even in urban centers.

[7] Kichwa in Ecuador is related, but distinct from, Quechua in Bolivia and Quichua in Perú, as all were derived from the Incan empire's Quichua. In Ecuador, Indigenous scholars, linguists, and organizations have promoted the use of Unified Kichwa, which was created in 1981 and employs the letters "k" and "w", two letters that do not exist in Spanish, to distinguish Kichwa from the language of the colonizers (King 2001; Wroblewski 2012; Gonzalo Díaz, interview with author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, November 5, 2010). As Wroblewski notes, Indigenous organizations and scholars in Ecuador have been successful in standardizing Kichwa into Unified Kichwa through bilingual education curricula and state policy reforms (2012, 65).

Having been in Ecuador on November 28th of 2010 during the census and having participated (obligatorily), I can confirm that the methodology was problematic. The census was carried out by thousands of census takers in an oral, question-and-answer format. While this is potentially important in a country with a reported illiteracy rate of almost 7%, an oral census poses problems in self-identification where there is a strong history – and persistence – of discrimination against Indigenous peoples. Thus, it is likely that Indigenous individuals, while they may identify as such in private, within their community, and as a part of a collective in a national context, still feel *vergüenza*, or shame and embarrassment, in identifying as such to a *mestizo* middle class census taker. Furthermore, there were many reports that census takers did not ask all questions and took the liberty to assess an individual and decide if one was *mestizo,* Indigenous, or otherwise. I personally can attest to the fact that I was not asked to self-identify my race/ethnicity and while I assume the census taker, a friendly twenty-something Quiteña, marked me as *blanco* (white), I cannot be sure.

Regardless of the problematic posed by the 2010 census data, they provide a general idea of the distribution of the Indigenous population in Ecuador. According to the data collected, almost 16% of the Indigenous population lives in the coastal region, 46% in the sierra, and 38% in the Amazon (INEC 2011). These data suggest that there has been a shift in the Indigenous population in Ecuador in the last ten years away from the sierra and towards the coastal and the Amazonian regions. The likely explanation is that Indigenous men from the sierra have been emigrating to the coast and Amazon in search of work. For example, in the area of the Union of *Campesina* Organizations of

Northern Cotopaxi (UNOCANC), more than 90% of men over the age of sixteen have emigrated to urban areas, coastal plantations, or Amazonian oil fields in search of work.

III. *Indigenous Governmental Organizations*

i. *Organizational Structure*

The governmental organizations of the 14 nationalities and 18 *pueblos* of Ecuador function parallel to the state. Indigenous government is organized in a federal manner with governing bodies at the community, local, provincial, regional, and national levels. *Comuneros*, members of communities, participate directly in government at the community level where decisions are made by consensus, rather than one person, one vote.[8] *Comuneros* vote for representatives in organizations of *segundo grado* (second level) organizations. *A segundo grado* organization is an aggregation of community organizations and can be composed of a *pueblo*, confederation of *pueblos*, or a nationality. Official delegates of *segundo grado* organizations elect provincial *dirigentes*, or authorities, during general assemblies. Provincial organizations are an agglomeration of *pueblos* and/or nationalities.

The provincial organizations designate official delegates to participate in the regional assemblies in which they elect *dirigentes* of the regional organizations. There are three regional organizations, the Confederation of Indigenous and Afro Organizations of the Ecuadorian Coast (CONAICE), composed of seven federations, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE), composed of 12

[8] A *comunero/a* refers to a community member and implies that this individual works in agriculture.

federations, and the Kichwa Confederation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI), composed of 13 federations. For elections of the *dirigentes* of the national organization, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities and Pueblos of Ecuador, *dirigentes* of the three regional organizations are automatically official delegates, and organizations of *segundo grado* directly send delegates to participate in the voting. The *dirigentes* of organizations at each level form a governing council that is typically composed of a president, vice-president, and *dirigentes* of commissions such as territory, health, family, women, education, communications, and youth, among others.



Figure 2.3 Organizational Structure of the Indigenous Organization of Ecuador

At all levels above the community level, there is a shared understanding that positions of leadership—especially the president and vice-president—should rotate

among *pueblos* and/or nationalities, depending on the composition of the organization (Tibán 2004). The CONAIE elections of March 2011, during which I worked with the communication team and as a participant observer, serve as an example of this principle. While the sitting president, Marlon Santi of the community Sarayaku of the Kichwa nationality of the Amazon, was eligible for reelection as he was only completing his first term, there was a general call for change in leadership within the CONAIE. In this call for change there was an assumption that the challenger should be from the sierra in order to rotate power to a new region, and the vice-president should be from the Amazon to appease the *pueblos* and nationalities of that region and guarantee their representation. There was great debate and backroom wheeling and dealing to broker agreements between various blocks of delegates from the coast, the sierra, and the Amazon. While I was not privy to these private conversations, *compañeros* (colleagues) working in the CONAIE who also were participating in the congress as delegates from their respective provincial organizations recounted the negotiations to me. Ultimately, Humberto Cholango of the *pueblo* Kayambi of the sierra was elected president, with José (Pepe) Acacho of the Shuar nationality of the Amazon as vice-president. This anecdote is particularly important in illustrating the earlier mentioned principle of reciprocity, one of the eight principles of the Andean cosmovision that is also prominent in Amazonian and coastal Indigenous cultures (Lozano 2004). As explained by Alfredo Lozano, architect and expert on Andean cosmovision, "Every action carried out by the *runa* [person] … fulfills its purpose when it is repaid by an equivalent action, for the *runa*. That is, to receive, you first have to give" (Lozano 2004, 283). Thus, while elections are one person, one vote, there is an underlying shared understanding that positions should be

rotated fairly, or reciprocally, among the various regions and nationalities to guarantee representation for all (Tibán 2004).

ii. *Indigenous Social Movement, 1986-2006*

Indigenous and *campesino* resistance in Ecuador to political and economic elites can be traced back hundreds of years. For example, in the Ecuadorian Amazon many tribes (which now identify as nationalities or *pueblos*) successfully resisted both conquest by colonists and integration into the Ecuadorian state (Shwerin 2005). Even today there are Amazonian *pueblos* that continue to live in voluntary isolation, meaning they do not interact with the outside economy, society, culture, or political system. However, in 1972, the Ecuadorian state created the Ecuadorian State Oil Corporation (CEPE), intensifying oil extraction in the Amazon and subsequently threatening Indigenous peoples' autonomy, territory, and the nature they depend on to survive, a problem that grows every day.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the sierra, *pueblos* and nationalities were dominated through the *hacienda* system, which was the dominant economic system in the Ecuadorian Andes from the northern border with Colombia to the southern border with Peru. In the 1950s and 1960s, there were Indigenous uprisings that overthrew many *haciendas* and were followed by government land reform laws in 1964 and again in 1973. However, individuals identifying as *campesinos* and strictly demanding access to land and water carried out these uprisings. Thus, the mobilizations were framed in terms of

historical and basic rights of *campesinos* to material (albeit natural) goods, rather than the rights of Indigenous people as a special group within the Ecuadorian state.

In November of 1986, Indigenous delegates sent from community organizations throughout the Ecuadorian Amazon, sierra, and coast, held an assembly to form the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). The platform of the CONAIE was initially, and continues to be, political, economic, and cultural (Lucas 2000). The CONAIE has consistently demanded that the Ecuadorian state create spaces for the exercise of Indigenous political, cultural, and economic practices, the subsequent recognition of Indigenous governments, the granting of land titles to Indigenous collectives and individuals, equal access to water, recognition of Indigenous medicinal practices, and the right to bilingual education in Spanish and Indigenous languages (Lucas 2000; CONAIE 2011). Additionally, the CONAIE and the Indigenous movement have opposed the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small percentage of the economic elite, be it landholders or business people. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, this tendency included the CONAIE's opposition to neoliberal economic policies and free trade agreements, both bilateral and regional (Becker 2008).

In June of 1990, the CONAIE called for the first national mobilization, the *Primer Levantamiento* (First Uprising). In assemblies of the *segundo grado* organizations, *campesinos* and Indigenous individuals made the collective decision to mobilize. This decision was then passed to the provincial organizations, which handed the decision up to the regional organizations and to the CONAIE. Thus, the process that resulted in the *primer levantamiento* was thoroughly bottom-up and involved arriving at consensus, an

important principle in Andean cosmovision. The actual communication between the CONAIE and its filial organizations to determine the routes that the protestors would march and the dates happened through CONAIE *dirigentes* that traveled around the country informing the organizations about the logistics of the mobilization. *Dirigentes* also relied on community radio stations to broadcast information about the *levantamiento* so that the "greatest possible quantity of people would participate" (Manuel Castro, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 25, 2011). This process was repeated throughout the 1990s for each mobilization.

During the resultant *levantamiento,* Indigenous protesters occupied roads, invaded *haciendas*, took over public offices, and detained soldiers (Lucas 2000; Selverston-Scher 2001). The blocking of main roadways proved to be particularly effective in paralyzing the country, stopping all economic activity, and subsequently forcing the government to take a seat at the negotiating table. Over time, roadblocks became part of the regular repertoire of the Indigenous movement in mobilizations (Jameson 2011). During the course of the *levantamiento*, the Indigenous leadership developed a relationship with the military that ultimately protected the protesters from violent repercussions (especially by the police, who remained aligned with the government). The government of then president Rodrigo Borja, as well as the general *mestizo* population, was surprised at the size and strength of the uprising and ultimately, called for dialogue (Becker 2008; Lucas 2000; Selverston-Scher 2001). During this *levantamiento*, the use of Kichwa was key to the success of the protesters in occupying the *Plaza Grande*, Quito's main square, and the Santo Domingo Church. Nina Pacari, an Indigenous lawyer, activist, politician, and the

first Indigenous person to be named to the Constitutional Court, recounted her experience in the *levantamiento*:

> In Quito on Sunday, June 3, [1990], at 4:00 pm, the Santo Domingo Church was circled by police who would not let us get close to the doors of the church. They thought there was a lack of communication, that we were not organized. But we could overcome their challenge with our ingenuity. Through singing and shouting in Kichwa, we managed to communicate among ourselves. And so, we exchanged critiques, we shared words of guidance, we recognized the problems, we were in the know. We shared all the information about the progress of our day of *lucha* [fight]. In the middle of all this, there were jokes, stories, speeches, discourses, analysis, and songs. There was no lack of courage, or solidarity, or of chants prepared in *mingas*. It was a collaborative work. (Pacari 1993, 171)

Thus, the use of Kichwa was a strategy that allowed the protestors to communicate amongst themselves without the national police understanding. Furthermore, the singing and joking in Kichwa served as a morale booster to protestors who had marched many kilometers – sometimes hundreds – to reach Quito.

In 1992, the CONAIE organized another *levantamiento* coinciding with the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas. This uprising stopped commerce and government in Quito and again forced government leaders into discussions with Indigenous leaders, ultimately leading to the devolution of more than 16,000 km^2 of land to Indigenous organizations (Becker 2008). This was, and at the close of 2011 continued to be, one of the largest land devolutions to Indigenous peoples in the history of Latin America.[9]

[9] As with earlier land reforms, while the law on paper gave land to *campesinos* and *indígenas*, the government has fallen short in actual land devolutions. At the close of the present study, the Correa administration and the Indigenous movement were still working to write a new *Ley de Tierras* (Law on Land) that would redistribute *hacienda* territory to *campesinos* and *indígenas* (CONAIE 2011).

In 1994, the CONAIE organized another round of massive protests against to the proposed Agrarian Reform Law and the privatization of the oil sector. The Agrarian Reform Law aimed to reduce and consolidate territory with collective titles, or Indigenous territories, and to privatize water.[10] The strength of the national Indigenous mobilization required the government once again to participate in discussions with Indigenous leaders, and ultimately, the government abandoned the controversial Agrarian Reform Law and made concessions with regard to the privatization of the oil sector (Becker 2008). After the victories in 1990 and 1992, the 1994 *levantamiento* was especially important in proving to the Ecuadorian government and population at large that the Indigenous movement was not a one-hit wonder, but instead, a national political player to be reckoned with.

In 1996, the Indigenous movement formed a political party, *Movimiento de Unidad Plurinacional Pachakutik*, or the Movement of Plurinational Unity Pachakutik (MUPP). While Pachakutik was separate and distinct from the CONAIE, the two entities worked together in different political arenas to achieve shared goals – the CONAIE in the social sector and in community governments and Pachakutik directly in the national government (Lucas 2000). Thus, the CONAIE worked to mobilize Indigenous peoples in order to put pressure on the government from without, while Pachakutik worked directly within the national assembly and other elected positions to reform government from within. Pachakutik has had 29 members elected in the national assembly since its

[10] During all previous land reforms, the government had refused to recognize collective land titles and would only provide land titles to individuals. The Indigenous movement, led by the CONAIE, demanded recognition of collective titles in which territory would belong to a community (without naming individuals or families). The 1998 and 2008 constitutions recognized collective rights, including collective land titles (Becker 2008).

creation, as well the appointment of the Constitutional Court Justice Nina Pacari ("La historia de Pachakutik," *El Comercio*, July 15, 2012).

In 1998, the CONAIE led protests demanding constitutional reform. While the CONAIE led these protests, other sectors of the Ecuadorian society also participated. The resulting Constitutional Reform Assembly reformed the constitution, recognizing Ecuador as a multiethnic and multicultural state, and declaring the rights of self-determination of Indigenous peoples and to "maintain, develop, and fortify their spiritual, cultural, linguistic, social, political, and economic identity and traditions" (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 84, 1998). This constitution was a victory for the Indigenous movement, even if it did not recognize the existence of various nationalities within the Ecuadorian state, a fundamental demand of the CONAIE. In the eyes of the law, Indigenous peoples remained Ecuadorian citizens, first and foremost, and were only secondarily members of various ethnic groups (Van Cott 2005).

In 2000, the CONAIE called for Indigenous participation in the protest against then President Jamil Mahuad and the proposed dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy in which Ecuador would cease to have their own currency, the *sucre*, and instead use American dollars exclusively. More than 20,000 Indigenous people participated in these protests alongside students, military, and Quiteños, despite government efforts to shut down public transportation within the country in order to prevent protesters from reaching Quito. While the protests did not manage to prevent dollarization, they did ultimately force President Mahuad to resign (Gerlach 2003). In 2005, the CONAIE again mobilized to oust then President Lucio Gutiérrez, whom the CONAIE had, in fact, helped

to elect, saying he had violated his contract with the Indigenous movement by signing a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lucas 2000).

In addition to these large-scale national mobilizations, the CONAIE frequently partnered with regional and provincial organizations to carry out mobilizations directed at national government programs in specific regions, at regional governments, at multinational corporations (MNCs), or a combination of these actors. For example, mining and oil extraction in the Amazon have been a constant concern of the CONAIE, as well as access to water in the Andes, both of which have resulted in mobilizations.

From 1990 with the first large-scale national Indigenous *levantamiento* through the close of 2011, the Indigenous movement was a strong political force in Ecuador. While politicians could win a presidential election without the outright support of the Indigenous sector, their ability to stay in power depended upon not angering the Indigenous movement (Lucas 2000, 4).

iii. *Government, Social Movement, or Organization?*

Within the Ecuadorian Indigenous population, the terms Indigenous (social) movement, Indigenous organizations, and Indigenous community governments are used interchangeably. Organizations, such as the CONAIE, admittedly act in a variety of arenas, sometimes fulfilling the role of government, at other times appearing more like a non-governmental organization (NGO), and often serving the function of a social movement organization. However, for the purposes of this study it is necessary to analytically separate these different roles.

Indigenous organizations fulfill some governmental roles, especially in the area of local justice and law enforcement, commonly referred to as *justicia indígena* (Indigenous justice). The role organizations play in community justice is especially important for the credibility of the organization in the eyes and everyday lives of their grassroots movement members.[11] Additionally, Indigenous organizations form part of a social movement, defined as "conscious, concerted, and relatively sustained efforts by organized groups of ordinary people (as opposed to, say, political parties, the military, or industrial trade groups) to change some aspect of their society by using extrainstitutional means" (Jasper 1997). In fact, in Ecuador Indigenous grassroots movement members often refer to *el movimiento indígena* (Indigenous movement), or simply *el movimiento* (movement), interchangeably with the CONAIE or other provincial organizations. However, analytically, the Indigenous movement includes far more than solely these organizations.

For the purposes of this study, it is most useful to consider the organizations in question as social movement organizations, defined as a "complex, or formal,

[11] Tibán explains that Indigenous *dirigentes* are elected largely due to being respected members of the communities (2004). Therefore, traditionally when problems arose in communities of the sierra, such as infidelity, family infighting, property disputes, or robbery, community members went to their *dirigentes* for an *arreglo* (arrangement or fix). However, this process was quite informal. In more serious cases, such as murder, community members often went straight to local authorities (Tibán 2004). In the Amazon, where communities are much more isolated and local authorities are often unreachable, *arreglos* by the *dirigentes* has historically been more prevalent. Since the formation of the CONAIE, there has been a new emphasis on the rejuvenation of *justicia indígena*, which culminated with the inclusion of the right to exercise *justicia indígena* in the 2008 constitution (Grijalva 2009). Article 57 of the constitution states that "persons, communities, *pueblos*, and nationalities have the collective right to create, develop, apply, and practice their own customary rights, that can not infringe upon constitutional rights, especially of women, children, and adolescents" (Constitution of Ecuador 2008). The actual exercising of this right is an ongoing process, however, as many communities, *pueblos*, and nationalities do not have a long-rooted history of exercising *justicia indígena*. Furthermore, the right to exercise *justicia indígena* within a *pueblo* or nationality's territory is complicated, especially in the sierra, where Indigenous and *mestizo* communities often overlap, both in cities and in rural areas (Grijalva 2009).

organization, which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (McCarthy and Zald, 1218). Indigenous organizations in Ecuador act as social movement organizations attempting to implement the goals of the Indigenous movement in various arenas with specific strategies, depending upon the conditions at any given time.

IV. *Indigenous Communication*

Some scholars of social movements argue that communication is necessary to persuade (Jasper), while others see communication more simply as a sharing of information (Tilly, Tarrow). However, regardless of the specific function communication plays in mobilization, it is unarguably a necessary element for mobilization success. This dissertation subscribes to the theory that communication is culturally mediated, meaning that leaders who are communicating must consider their specific audiences as well as how their messages and the methods in which they choose to deliver their messages will resonate within the specific arena in which they are acting. As Jasper explains, it is necessary to "know local rules, the hazards to expect, and what resources you can seize, so that you can 'blend in' better" (2006, 29). In order to know local rules, one must be familiar with the local history.

Anthropologists of South American Indigenous cultures have consistently pointed to the importance of oral history and imagery in Indigenous communication. Written history is considered to be that of the other, the colonizer, or the dominator, while orality and imagery is considered to be *propio*, or their own, and legitimate (Rappaport 1994).

Jean Jackson and Kay Warren (2005, 554) similarly argue that oral and visual displays of authenticity, such as speaking in an Indigenous language and dressing in traditional clothing, is intended not only for insiders, but for outsiders – such as the international press and government officials – as well and are necessary to gain legitimacy to speak and be listened to.[12] Thus, Indigenous leaders often choose to speak in an Indigenous language; however, this also has risks. If one speaks solely in an Indigenous language, it is impossible to communicate with a broader audience. To rely on a translator avoids this problem, but creates a new problem in that one's message may be mistranslated or misinterpreted. Therefore, the most effective strategy of an Indigenous leader is to "insert culturally specific content into speeches delivered in the dominant language" (Graham and Goodrum 2007). In Ecuador, for example, Marlon Santi, president of the CONAIE from 2008 through 2011, wore a traditional Kichwa headdress – a blue beaded headband with two arrows pointing toward a yellow sun with the Andean Cross in the center – for all TV interviews and press conferences. While this headband was not part of his everyday attire, on TV and in photographs it identified him as an Amazonian Kichwa, and distinguished him from the *mestizo* interviewers.

In interviews and participant observation in Indigenous communities, especially in the province of Cotopaxi, elderly men and women explained that speaking in Indigenous languages was often a form of protest (Scott 1985; Morales 2011). In the

[12] Individuals participating in interviews for this study regularly asked me if I spoke Kichwa. I would always respond with "*chinallinalla*," meaning, "more or less," and then laughingly say that no, I do not speak Kichwa, but I do know a few words. This interaction inevitably got laughs from the interviewees, who often then offered to help me learn, and they were clearly impressed that I could say even a few phrases. My ability and willingness to speak and learn their language gave me credibility as, if not an insider, at least not an outsider to the movement.

Ecuadorian *haciendas*, workers were prohibited from speaking in Indigenous languages. Punishments for being caught speaking Kichwa included barbarities such as being trampled by a horse, or for lesser offenses, being dragged behind a horse through *paja*, a tall grass that cuts the skin (Morales 2011). Regardless of these threats, *campesinos* continued speaking Kichwa in their homes so that their children would not lose their heritage, as well as to each other when wanting to defy the *hacendados* or *mayordomos* (overseers) (Korovkin 2002).

In Ecuador, Catholic missionaries recognized that their chances for converting the "natives" into Christians would be improved by learning Kichwa. In order to teach the bible, they also translated prayers and songs in Kichwa and developed extensive Kichwa literacy programs throughout the highlands and the Amazon. The result of this project is that in Ecuador, Kichwa replaced many local dialects and is now the most widely spoken Indigenous language. Additionally, in the 20th century many Catholic priests, monks, and nuns inspired by liberation theology became active in the *campesino* uprisings, especially in the sierra. Missionaries had extensive radio projects in order to reach distant populations, especially in the Amazon and the sierra, with the goal to proselytize and educate. The radio programs were transmitted daily and covered such topics as literacy, math, agricultural techniques, and hygiene, as well as broadcasting local news and evangelical messages (Korovkin 2002, 19). As radio is an oral form of communication, and the broadcasts were in Kichwa, the programming resonated with Indigenous populations much more than written educational materials. Subsequently, throughout the 1900s, radio was an important form of communication within Indigenous communities

(Korovkin 2002). For example, as early as the 1960s, the Shuar nationality had their own radio programming which was broadcast through the radio network of the Catholic missionaries working in Ecuador's southern Amazon (Gerlach 2003). Radio broadcasts were especially important in the *levantamientos* of the 1990s, providing access for *dirigentes* to communicate quickly with their bases – always in Indigenous languages – to inform when, where, and why the protest marches would begin (Eduardo Guerrero, interview with author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, June 9, 2011).

Visual forms of communication have also been important in Indigenous communities. In the Amazon, designs on clay bowls tell stories. Dance and traditional music similarly transmit histories and myths of a *pueblo*. Amazonian communities communicated through drumming, a practice that is still audible today – and which I had the opportunity to observe during participant observation – during *fiestas* (festivals) in which *priostes*, roughly translated as the hosts, call to their followers to gather in the mornings through 3:00 am drumming. In the Andes, communities used fire and smoke to communicate from *loma* (mountain ridge) to *loma*; today this tradition can be seen during *fiestas* as the various *priostes* set off fireworks to communicate when they are carrying out various parts of the festivities (Tibán 2004). For example, a *prioste* sets off a firework to signify the commencement of the butchering of a bull and another to communicate that the butchering has been completed.

Within the Indigenous communities of Ecuador, as well as throughout the Andean region, there is a popular memory of the *chaski*, a young person who served as a sort of town crier, traveling from community to community sharing important news. In

interviews, participant observation, and everyday life in Ecuador, Indigenous individuals constantly referred to the *chaski*; the image is clearly revered within the Indigenous movement—the communications department of ECUARUNARI is even named *Ecuachaski*. The shared memory of the *chaski* highlights the importance of face-to-face oral communication in Indigenous communities.

Thus, communication in Indigenous communities has historically been based in oral and visual forms. The value placed on communicating directly, face-to-face, cannot be underestimated. Communication in Indigenous languages was both practical, as illustrated by the Catholic missionaries, as well as a form of rebellion. Communication through dance, pottery, and other forms of visual art has been integral to the life of the community. The use of the radio to coordinate *levantamientos* allowed for massive protests in the 1990s with hundreds of thousands of Indigenous protestors participating in marches and concentrating in the capital, Quito. Furthermore, protesters themselves recounted the importance of Kichwa in their strategies to circumvent the government's police forces (Pacari 1993).

V. *The Ecuadorian State and ICTs*

In order to use new information and communications technologies, it is obvious that there must be a communications infrastructure already in place. This section looks at the telecommunications infrastructure put in place by the Ecuadorian state since 1975 in order to show that there is indeed infrastructure available to the Ecuadorian population, and Indigenous communities in particular.

i. *Telecommunications Legislation*

In Ecuador, the 1992 *Ley Especial de Telecomunicaciones*, the Special Telecommunications Law, regulates all telecommunications (radio, television, fixed telephone lines, and mobile telephone services). Under the umbrella of the Telecommunications Law, there is a Law of Radio Diffusion and Television that was first passed in 1975. These laws were reformed in 1995 and 2002, largely to accommodate advances in television broadcasting, increases in the quantity of frequencies, the introduction of cellular telephony, and to change the organizational structure of the state-run telephone industry (Vélez 2006). There is no law directly governing mobile telephone services, only contracts and agency regulations.

The 1992 version of the Telecommunications Law passed by the Ecuadorian National Assembly created the State Telecommunications Enterprise (EMETEL) and the Superintendent of Telecommunications (SuperTel), state entities that were to provide services and regulate the telecommunications sector. However, EMETEL and SuperTel did not have the administrative capacity to carry out their numerous functions, resulting in high levels of corruption.[13] Thus, in 1995, the assembly reformed the Telecommunications Law to create the National Telecommunications Council (CONATEL), the National Radio and Television Council (CONARTEL), and the National Telecommunications Secretary (SENATEL). This round of reforms also altered the responsibilities and functioning of SuperTel. The goal of these reforms was to distribute responsibilities amongst these various entities. Also, the National Assembly

[13] Vélez (2006) argues that EMETEL and SuperTel did not have sufficient budgets or personnel to deal with the demands for service, resulting in functionaries accepting bribes in exchange for services.

was given the responsibility to designate the Superintendent of Telecommunication, while the President was charged with the responsibility to designate the President of CONATEL and CONARTEL, as well as the Secretary of Telecommunications (Veléz 2006).

In 1996, EMETEL, which was working solely in the area of fixed telephony, was converted from a public enterprise to a private enterprise, EMETEL S.A. with the goal to increase its flow of capital and avoid the process of approval of all projects by the State General Comptroller. Thus, while EMETEL remained an entity of the state, it gained autonomy in management. The following year, EMETEL S.A. was divided into Pacifictel S.A. and Andinatel S.A. In the following years, Andinatel S.A. succeeded in increasing telecommunications coverage and improving their services, while Pacifictel S.A. was destroyed from within by corruption. Nonetheless, these two enterprises succeeded in increasing penetration of fixed telephone lines throughout Ecuador, providing services in rural areas where private companies chose not to expand due to limited profits (Veléz 2006).

While Andinatel reported profits of more than $100 million between 2004 and 2008, Pacifictel had losses of more than $40 million in the same period. In 2008, due to the hugely different levels of success and corruption in the two entities, Pacifictel S.A. and Andinatel S.A. fused to form the National Telecommunications Corporation (CNT) with the goal of creating a business that would be more competitive and profitable in order to improve the quality of services and optimize technological resources. CNT

immediately had a natural monopoly of the market with 90.3% of all telephone lines in Ecuador (Veléz 2006).

In 1993, the Ecuadorian state signed the first mobile telephone contract with Conocel S.A. (Porta, now Claro), a legal entity in Ecuador that is part of the Mexican communication company, América Móvil ("Información General" 2012). Months later, the SuperTel signed a similar contract with Otecel S.A. (Movistar), a legal entity in Ecuador that is part of the multinational company Telefónica Latinoamérica, which is part of the Spanish parent company, Telefónica ("Estructura del Grupo" 2012). The nearly identical contracts outline in the first point of article four that,

> The number of service points (cell phone towers) installed in "n" year may not be less than one half of one percent (.5%) of the total sites active on December 31 of "n-1" year. Seventy percent (70%) of the total number of service points will be in rural populations and suburban zones and thirty percent (30%) in urban sites. (Contrato de Concesión para la Prestación de Servicio Móvil Avanzado, del Servicio Telefónico de Larga Distancia Internacional, Los que Podrán Prestarse a Través de Terminales de Telecomunicaciones de Uso Público y Concesión de las Bandas de Frecuencias Esenciales Celebrado Entre: Secretaría Nacional de Telecomunicaciones y Compañía Consorcio Ecuatoriano de Telecomunicaciones S.A: CONOCEL y OTECEL 1993)

This growth requirement is referred to as the Minimum Expansion Plan. Signed in 2003, the contract between the Ecuadorian state and Mobile Telecommunications of Ecuador (Telesca S.A., known commonly as Alegro), which is a branch of the CNT, similarly required that Telesca S.A. comply with a Minimum Expansion Plan.

In 2002, CONATEL created their Regulations for the Providing of Advanced Mobil Service. Chapter VI, Article 21, states that it is the obligation of all providers of advanced mobile services to "comply with the Minimum Expansion Plan agreed upon" in

the same regulation. Thus, the Minimum Expansion Plan of .5% of the prior year's service towers, 70% in non-urban areas and 30% in urban areas, is not only found in the contracts, but has been codified.

The state telecommunications entities, such as CONATEL, have not been alone in regulating the telecommunications industry. The National Assembly has also intervened directly at times in the regulation of mobile service providers for the benefit of consumers. For example, in Ecuador it is very economical to make a call within one service provider, that is, to call from a Movistar cell phone to another Movistar cell phone, or from Claro to Claro. However, interconnection, that is, to make calls from one provider to another, is much more costly. In the early 2000s, this type of interconnection call could cost up to thirty cents per minute and so, in 2005, the National Assembly intervened to set the limit at $.1131 cents per minute to call from fixed lines to cell phones (Veléz 2006).

The Radio Diffusion and Television Law regulates concessions and renewals of radio and television frequencies, as well as infractions. While the law was passed in 1975, it is still in effect today, although it was reformed in 1995 and 2002. In the 2002 reforms, the assembly created a new form of concession for community radio stations. Community radio stations, as defined in the reformed Law of Radio Diffusion and Television in 2002 in Chapter 1, Article 8:

> Are public service stations destined to serve the community, are non-profit, and that may not have commercial publicity of any kind. Public service stations include private stations that are dedicated to social, educational, cultural, or religious ends, duly authorized by the State.

However, through the end of 2011, there were only two community radio station frequencies that had been granted, and the community radio stations that have existed for more than 50 years chose to retain their status as private stations.[14] This decision was based on the fact that the types of financing allowed for community radio stations remained ambiguous in the law, and the law does not state that community radio stations can broadcast political programming. These decisions will be discussed in further detail in the following chapters.

The regulations associated with the Radio Diffusion and Television Law have changed with different presidential administrations, most recently with that of President Correa. Additionally, in 2009, CONARTEL (now CONATEL) put into effect Resolution 5743, outlining procedural details for concessions of radio and television frequencies. CONARTEL created resolution 5743 in response to the constitution passed in 2008 that identifies in Article 16 the right of persons, individually or collectively, in "the creation of means of social communication, and conditions of equal access to the use of frequencies of the radio electric spectrum for the management of public, private, and communal radio and television stations," and thereby requiring the state to incorporate this newly identified right in its regulations and especially in its concessions process (Constitution of Ecuador 2008). In addition to outlining the procedures for applying for a radio or television frequency, Resolution 5743 also states in Chapter II, Article 5, that the

[14] There were also 13 community radio station frequencies granted through the Secretary of *Pueblos* radio program; however, these stations were not created as a result of actions taken by pre-existing radio stations or of independent applications of communities or organizations. In 2010, the Secretary of *Pueblos* began a radio program to provide capacity building workshops and the equipment necessary to the fourteen nationalities of Ecuador. Thirteen of the 14 nationalities passed CONATEL's revision and the frequencies were given in July 2010. This experience is further discussed in Chapter three.

radio electric spectrum will be split with 30% of frequencies for public and community stations and 70% of frequencies for private stations.

The natural monopoly CNT had over fixed telephony in Ecuador continued at the close of 2011, the privatization of telecommunications in Ecuador having been a slow and limited process. The Ecuadorian state's requiring private operators of mobile telephone services to include investment plans for rural coverage in their offers has meant that increased telecommunications could not be limited to urban centers indefinitely. Thus, while Internet, fixed line, and cell phone connectivity is certainly limited in rural areas, it is better than in some neighboring countries, such as Perú, largely due to government policies designed to guarantee some level of connectivity for all Ecuadorians (Braga, Ziegler, and Liu 1998).[15]

ii. *ICT infrastructure and availability*

There are no statistics regarding the availability of communications technologies in Indigenous communities. However, by consulting the provincial demographics statistics collected by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in tandem with the Superintendent of Telecommunications of Ecuador (SuperTel) and the National Institute of Statistics and Census (INEC) statistics, we can

[15] In Perú, there was a state monopoly on telecommunications until 1994 when the government decided to privatize its telecommunications service providers. The Spanish company Telefónica won the bidding process and the contract dictated that 54% of all telephone lines should be installed in Lima, and 46% in the rest of the country. Additionally, Telefónica had to provide service in every town with a population greater than 500 (Braga, Ziegler, and Liu 1998: 155). Conversely, Ecuador did not privatize their national telecommunications providers.

infer what sorts of technologies were available to Indigenous peoples in rural communities during the period under consideration.

Fixed telephone lines have been around longer than other technological advances and remain important for communication between communities. In 2000, Ecuador had just over 1.4 million fixed principal telephone lines within the National Telecommunications Corporation (CNT) (SuperTel 2000). By 2007, the number of fixed telephone lines had grown to over 1.8 million principal lines (SuperTel 2007). In 2011, there were slightly more than 1.9 million principal lines (SuperTel 2011). In 2011, in the coastal region there were almost 740,000 fixed principal lines; in the sierra, just over one million fixed lines; and in the Amazon, just over 72,000 fixed lines. By 2010, almost 39% of homes (nationally) reported having a fixed telephone line, with 50% of homes in urban areas and 13% in rural areas (INEC 2011).

Fixed lines are important for communications, but for people living in areas without the necessary infrastructure, cellular phones offer new possibilities for connectivity. In 2008, Movistar had almost 80% coverage of surface area in cities, in 2009, 91% coverage, and in 2010, 87% coverage. Meanwhile, Porta/Claro had 88%, 98%, and 89% coverage during the same years. In 2007 and 2008, Alegro had 98% and 99% coverage, respectively (SuperTel 2011).

SuperTel does not have useful cellular telephone usage data before the year 2005. However, by 2005, there were over six million cellular telephone users in Ecuador, and by the end of 2007, the number of users had reached almost ten million (SuperTel 2007). In 2010, more than 80% of homes in Ecuador reported having cell phones, with almost 86% in urban areas and 68% in rural areas. In a country of nearly 14.5 million people,

these data imply that a significant portion, if not the majority, of people have access to cellular telephones (INEC 2011). In fact, in many interviews, such as with Osvaldo Leon, the director of the Latin American Agency of Information, and with Manuel Castro, the *dirigente* of International Relations of the ECUARUNARI, respondents expressed a frustration with the importance poor, rural Indigenous people put on having a cell phone. Leon lamented that young people of the "chip generation" are "growing up too quickly," getting cell phones at age ten rather than age sixteen (Osvaldo Leon, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, September 21, 2010), while Castro expressed concern that people are purchasing *saldo*, or credit to make calls, rather than food or school supplies for their children and families (Manuel Castro, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 25, 2011).

The sierra, Amazon, and coast account for 60%, 23%, and 2% of Ecuador's nearly one million Internet users, respectively (SuperTel 2007). Thus, the Amazon does not have a significant Internet-using population. While these data are seriously limited, they suggest that there is some degree of rural connectivity, particularly in the sierra. According to the INEC census information, in 2010, almost 30% of the population answered that they had accessed the Internet. In urban areas, over 37% said they access the Internet, while in rural areas this number dropped to almost 22%. However, access to Internet often means access to Internet in cyber cafés, the workplace, educational facilities, or community centers. Only 11.8% of homes in Ecuador have access to the Internet, 16.7% of homes in urban areas and a mere 1.3% of homes in rural areas (INEC 2011).

The television has become one of the most common forms of communication in Ecuador, as in the world. In 2008, more than 83% of Ecuadorians reported having a television in their homes, and in 2010, this number rose to more than 85% (INEC 2010). While televisions are relatively expensive, families told me that they were the only way they had to see and hear any national news. Especially in rural areas with high rates of migration, the television is a way to maintain a sense of contact with loved ones working in other cities, regions, or countries who are able to come home only once every month or every other month, if not less frequently. Given the history of Indigenous forms of communication and the importance of oral, face-to-face communication, it is not surprising that the television resonates in rural, Indigenous communities. Furthermore, television provides a form of entertainment, especially where TV frequencies do not reach; families can watch movies, DVDs of national and local musical sensations, and *novelas* (soap operas).

As explained earlier in this chapter, the radio has a long history in Ecuador. Radio continues to be important not only because of its history, but especially because it is relatively inexpensive; a basic AM/FM radio is cheap. Furthermore, a radio can run on batteries or electricity, and thus, is functional where electricity is available as well as where it is not available. Neither the Ecuadorian census nor the SuperTel have statistics about the availability of radios in Ecuadorian households – the assumption is that nearly 100% of households have radios.

VI. *Conclusion*

The Indigenous movement has been an important national political player in Ecuador since the formation of the CONAIE in 1986. Mobilizations have largely demanded the recognition of a broad array of Indigenous rights, defense of the environment and its resources, and the rejection of a neoliberal economic policy. While presidents have come to power without the support of the Indigenous movement, they rarely stay in power if they act in opposition to the Indigenous movement.

After the 1980s, the Ecuadorian state successfully constructed a telecommunications infrastructure that offered accessibility of fixed telephone lines, cellular phones networks, television, and radio. The state combined a strategy of state-controlled telecommunications and the slow, but heavily regulated, privatization of select telecommunications sectors to ensure that accessibility reaches rural populations. This combination of strategies in the construction of the ICT infrastructure has guaranteed access to Ecuadorians not only living in urban centers, but also to those living in peripheral and rural areas.

Indigenous communication traditionally centered on oral and visual forms. The use of Indigenous languages, such as Kichwa, first, was part of everyday resistance against *hacendados*, and later, a strategy for circumventing government interference in mobilization. In the 1990s, Indigenous organizations took advantage of the long history of the radio in Indigenous communities to broadcast their calls for mobilization.

With an understanding of the history of the Indigenous movement in Ecuador, the remainder of this dissertation aims to answer the question, under what conditions can the

use of new information and communications technologies result in successful social mobilization. Traditionally, Indigenous organizations relied heavily on face-to-face communication due to a lack of communication infrastructure. However, by the 2000s, this was changing and rural areas were increasingly connected to urban centers through telephones, cell phones, and the Internet. The following chapter presents the context in Ecuador from 2007 through 2011, during which Rafael Correa served as President. Chapters four and five present data to support the three hypotheses tested in this dissertation, namely that organizations that *strategically adapted* ICTs, *creatively adapted* to changes in the political arena, and that *distinguished and targeted* their specific audiences subsequently had higher levels of successful mobilization. Through research, it became clear that contained within each of these processes organizations that recognized and respected both the historical forms of communication, as well as the potential contained within new ICTs, ultimately succeeded in achieving their mobilizational goals.

Chapter 3 – The Ecuadorian State and ICTs: Cooperation, Cooptation, and Repression, 2007 – 2011

I. *Introduction*

Penetration of information and communication technologies (ICTs) into rural areas that has the goal of empowering locals may, in fact, increase the power of the administrative apparatus of the state (Fortier 2001, 86). Conversely, the creation of ICT infrastructure in rural areas by governments in order to increase the reach of the state may inadvertently empower locals and allow for new forms of making demands of the state (Larkin 2008). Once these infrastructures are in place states have strategic options with regard to their use, especially by the opposition; democratic governments can work together with society cooperatively, they can co-opt unfriendly segments of society, or they can resort to repression.

These three dimensions—cooperation, cooptation, and repression—have been discussed in the context of undemocratic regimes (see for example, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006); however, the implementation of these strategies by democratic regimes has not yet been investigated. While Ecuador has a complicated political history that includes periods of military dictatorship, it is considered a democracy by most analyses. The 2010 Global Democracy Ranking put Ecuador in 49th place (of 110 countries), globally, in quality of democracy, sitting in the middle third of democracies (Campbell, et al 2011). Freedom House, in its yearly Freedom in the World publication, ranked Ecuador as "partly free" both in terms of political freedom and civil rights from 2005 through 2011 (Freedom House 2011). This put Ecuador roughly in the middle of

South American countries in terms of its level of freedom; Ecuador performed better than countries such as Colombia and Venezuela in terms of guaranteeing political rights, and on par with other neighboring countries such as Colombia and Perú in terms of guaranteeing civil rights (Freedom House 2007-2011). The southern cone countries (Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay) and Brazil were ranked as completely free for all years between 2005 and 2011. In the Latinobarometer, for all years 2005 through 2011, a majority of the Ecuadorian population (77.3%) believed democracy to be the best form of government for resolving the problems of the country and that democracy existed in Ecuador.

This chapter will explore the ICT strategies of the administration of Ecuador's President Rafael Correa, first elected in 2007 and still in power in December 2011 at the close of this investigation. It will argue that in the political arena the state has used a mixed strategy, combining cooperation with media outlets, cooptation of media outlets, and repression of media outlets and journalists, especially of community media such as radio stations, in order to reach the players who compose the Indigenous political arena in an attempt to persuade (or coerce) them into supporting the administration, rather than the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE). In addition to these strategies for dealing with the opposition, the Correa administration also created an extensive communications apparatus in order to reach various audiences, including the Indigenous population.

II. *State Strategies*

The Indigenous social movement comprises a specific political arena within the Ecuadorian context, here referred to as the Indigenous political arena. The arena is composed of Indigenous individuals – the bases – who are members of communities that compose Indigenous organizations (see chapter two for further discussion of Indigenous organizational structure).[16] The CONAIE is a compound player contained within the arena, while the state is a compound player that exists outside of the arena, but acts within it. As explained by Jasper, compound players acting within an arena are often hierarchically positioned, meaning that especially in terms of resources, all players are not equal. This is particularly true when considering the state as a compound player; the state not only has more resources in terms of money, but also has control over regulatory structures and laws that dictate the bounds of what is allowed and not allowed within any political arena. Thus, in the case of the Indigenous political arena in Ecuador, the government has the power to set the rules of the game that dictate what is permissible within the arena.

[16] The bases are Indigenous individuals living in communities that make up the *segundo grado* organizations that are filials of the CONAIE. Every individual in these communities is a member of his or her respective *segundo grado* organization, and subsequently of the provincial, regional, and national organizations to which their *segundo grado* organization belongs. These individuals, also referred to as the grassroots of the organizations, are those whom the organizations want to persuade to participate in mobilizations.



Figure 3.1: Indigenous Political Arena

These two compound players have at least one common goal that results in their oppositional positions: to win the support of the bases of the Indigenous movement. In the case of the state, this support is necessary for an administration to be both elected and reelected in the democratic context. Furthermore, as was explained in chapter two, administrations that promoted political agendas contrary to the platform of the Indigenous movement tended to be ousted in the Ecuadorian context. In the case of the CONAIE, movement support is necessary in order to retain the legitimacy of the organization as its very existence is based upon serving as political representation of the Indigenous bases. The government and the CONAIE could hypothetically be allies, rather than foes, and in fact the CONAIE tacitly approved of the *Alianza PAIS* movement that brought Correa to power in 2007. However, since January of 2010 with the rupture

between the CONAIE and the Correa administration, these two players have been at odds.[17]

a. *Cooperation*

i. Community Radio

Community radio stations have a history of more than 60 years in Ecuador, especially in rural areas. While most of these stations initially were part of the Catholic dioceses' efforts to proselytize and educate the *indio*, in the 1960s and 1970s, many missionaries and priests utilized the radios as a tool to join the *campesinos* in their *lucha* (fight) for land rights and agrarian reform, as well as to spread liberation theology, often in Indigenous languages such as Kichwa, creating close ties between Indigenous communities, the church, and the community radio stations (Korovkin 2000). In the 1960s, many community radio stations were transferred directly to *campesino* (peasant) community organizations.[18] Thus, the radio has long been a presence in Indigenous communities, especially in the areas of education, religion, and politics.

In Ecuador, the Special Law on Telecommunications regulates all that is associated with the radio. Additionally, there is a Law on Radio Diffusion and Television. The National Council of Telecommunications (CONATEL), whose director is selected by the president of Ecuador, produces the regulations regarding concessions

[17] President Correa was elected in 2007, and reelected in 2008 after the passing of the new constitution. In early 2008, the Correa administration unveiled and passed a new *Ley Minera* (Mining Law) and proposed a controversial *Ley Organico de Recursos Hidricos* (Water Law). The CONAIE led protests against these laws in 2008 and 2009. In January of 2010, the CONAIE presented the government with a list of ten demands, and when the Correa administration refused to bargain, the CONAIE cut all dialogue with the government.

[18] *Campesino/a* refers to a peasant laborer working in agriculture.

and renewals of radio frequencies, as well as infractions. There are three main steps in the process to acquire a radio frequency, as outlined in the 1975 Law on Radio Diffusion and Television. First, the Superintendent of Telecommunications (SuperTel) announces in at least three national newspapers and one local paper that there are frequencies available and provides a deadline for initial applications. Second, all interested parties submit initial applications. During this phase the SuperTel reviews the applicants, selects those that are feasible, and publishes the information in newspapers (national and local) so that any concerns from third parties can be presented. The applicants that pass through this phase are then given 60 days to have their stations up and running. They must have all recording and broadcasting equipment, trained staff, a locale with a deed or rental agreement, and the ability to demonstrate they have the funds necessary to function. After 60 days, the SuperTel reviews the station and if the applicant is in full compliance they pass to the third step, the signing of a concessions contract (Engineer Edwin Panchi, SuperTel, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, November 14, 2011).

In 2002, the National Assembly revised the Law on Radio Diffusion and Television to create two classes of radio stations, private and public service/communal. The classification of a community radio station found in Chapter 1, Article 8, of the Law of Radio Diffusion and Television, as discussed in the previous chapter, states:

> [Community radio stations] are public service stations destined to serve the community, are non-profit, and that may not have commercial publicity of any kind. Public service stations include private stations that are dedicated to social, educational, cultural, or religious ends, duly authorized by the state. (Law of Radio Diffusion and Television 1975)

However, the following paragraph states that these stations may "self-finance in order to improve, maintain, and operate their installations, equipment, and to pay personnel through donations, paid messages, and publicity of commercial products" (Law of Radio Diffusion and Television 1975).

In interviews with directors of community radio stations, I was told that they have consciously decided not to attempt to change their private radio to public service station with the government. Because Article 8 (above) on the one hand, prohibits commercial publicity for profit, while on the other hand permitting commercial publicity to raise funds for the functioning of the stations, directors expressed a concern that the law allows for significant interpretation on the part of the government. As will be discussed below, since 2008 many of these stations had experienced difficulty with the government with regard to the renewal of frequencies, the fear was that to allow any space for the state to interpret would mean that there would be more opportunity for the state to threaten their autonomous functioning. Furthermore, community radio stations are defined as having social, educational, religious, or cultural ends, meaning that if their content were to be conceived as political, they would be acting outside the bounds of their legally recognized areas of communication.

While, prior to 2002, radio stations could not be recognized as community radio stations by the government (since this category did not exist), radio stations throughout Ecuador self-identified as such. Community radio stations throughout Ecuador joined together in the late 1980s to share experiences and strategies. This group eventually created the Coordinator of Popular and Educational Radio of Ecuador (CORAPE), a

network legalized in January of 1990, with the mission to strengthen education, popular, and community radio stations in Ecuador. CORAPE works in two main areas: first, it works to increase the capacity of communicators and those working in community radio stations in Ecuador through workshops, classes, access to resources, etc.; and second, CORAPE produces informational programming that is spread to community radio stations via telephone and/or satellite, in both Spanish and Kichwa.

The 45 community radio stations that make up the CORAPE network boast coverage in 23 of the 24 provinces of Ecuador. While there are not any actual technical studies of the coverage of the network, CORAPE estimates that the community radios reach approximately 30% of the urban population and 60% of the rural population. Remembering that Internet reaches 1.3% of rural homes, and fixed telephone lines approximately 13%, the rural radio coverage offered by the CORAPE network is impressive. There are seven radio stations that make up the Kichwa radio network, five in the sierra, one in the Amazon, and one national. While the remaining 38 stations do not necessarily have programming in Kichwa, they are associated with Indigenous organizations and often times with churches.

CORAPE is a legal entity, but autonomous from the state. In order to function, CORAPE and the filial stations look for funding from international donors, especially for specific projects. Additionally, like all radio stations, CORAPE affiliates sell airtime to generate revenue. The government supported the community radio stations by purchasing airtime for public service announcements. However, each station was free to choose to whom they wanted to sell airtime, and some chose not to allow government

public service announcements or propaganda. The majority of radio stations, and all of those with which I interacted during field research, refused to sell air time to multi-national corporations such as Coca-Cola, political parties (including Pachakutik), and national businesses they felt threatened the well-being of the communities in which they served. For example, Radio Arutam of the Shuar nation's federation, the Interprovincial Center of Shuar Federations (FICSH), refused to sell airtime to oil and mining companies, national or international.

The Ecuadorian state has historically had a cooperative relationship with community radio stations, permitting their free functioning and supporting them by purchasing airtime. Even though the Correa administration continued, and, in fact greatly increased, the government's investment of funds in community radios through the purchasing of airtime, the relationship between the government and radio stations became progressively less cooperative in the period 2007-2011. This trend will be further discussed below.

ii. TV

The process for obtaining a television frequency is identical to that of radio frequencies and is regulated by the same government body, CONATEL. However, as television is a newer technology than radio, and one that requires much more capacity, equipment, and expertise, it has a shorter history in Ecuador and, prior to 2009, there are no examples of TV stations produced by or for Indigenous communities. Furthermore

the cost of a television set was historically prohibitive in rural areas, limiting the potential audience for TV programming.

TV stations for Indigenous organizations was an idea that first surfaced in the early 2000s, as the level of family income increased slightly and the prices of electronics began to go down, allowing more families access to television, especially in rural areas. In 2001, 28% of rural households and 71% of urban households reported having a TV (INEC 2001). In the 2010 census, more than 65% of rural families and 95% of urban families reported having a television in the home (INEC 2011). There are not data regarding the availability of cable television, but there is little infrastructure in rural areas. Most families in rural areas had antennas with which they could get reception of one to seven stations. A few households had DirecTV satellites; however, the cost of satellite TV in most cases was prohibitive. In the community of Quinte Buena Esperanza in the province of Cotopaxi, I was reminded of my parents' childhood stories in which there was one color television in the neighborhood and all the children would gather on Saturdays to watch movies in color. In Quinte Buena Esperanza, there was one family with DirecTV and community members - both children and adults - gathered there to watch movies on the weekends, as well as certain *novelas* during the week – for a small fee, of course.

The first – and to date, only – television station of an Indigenous organization is that of TV MICC (*Movimiento Indígena y Campesino de Cotopaxi*, Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi),[19] which began broadcasting in February of 2009.

[19] *Campesino/a* refers to a peasant laborer working in agriculture.

While there was an almost eight year struggle to obtain the frequency, in late 2008, the government finally approved the concession and the MICC managed to obtain the necessary equipment, staff, and money to begin broadcasting within the sixty day deadline. Some of the initial money for the TV station actually came from CODENPE, a government ministry. However, this was largely a result of personal politics; Lourdes Tibán, an ex-*dirigente* of the MICC, was serving as Secretary General of CODENPE at the time. For Tibán, the construction of TV MICC was not only a way to give back to the movement that had propelled her political career, but it also created an infrastructure that she was able to employ in future campaigning. In fact, in 2010, Tibán was elected to the national assembly. This experience will be further examined in chapter four.

The Ecuadorian state has a radio and television frequency concessions system that, at least potentially, allowed access for all people in Ecuador to radio and television frequencies, including Indigenous organizations. However, as the first step of the process is review by CONATEL, an agency whose director is appointed by the president, it is inherently political, and therefore not necessarily cooperative. Furthermore, the startup costs of radio and especially television stations are high, and the government has not developed programs to assist communities. The new constitution, passed in 2008, further guarantees the right to communication. However, the lack of actual access has been a grievance of social organizations, particularly within the Indigenous political arena. Indigenous organizations and communities argued that the state must provide capacity building and access to resources (in the form of actual equipment and/or cash infusions).

iii. Telephony

As discussed in chapter two, Ecuadorian governments have historically played an active role in guaranteeing access to fixed lines and cellular infrastructure throughout the country. The Correa administration continued this trend, especially as exemplified by the renewal of the contracts with the cellular providers Conocel S.A. (Porta, now Claro) and Otecel S.A. (Movistar). These contracts were predicted to be renewed at a cost of $70 million per contract for a period of fifteen years; however, the Correa administration renewed the contracts for a total of $220 million each ("15 años de concesión para Movistar," *El Comercio*, November 21, 2008; "Porta firma Nuevo contrato de telefonía con Ecuador hasta 2023," *El Universo*, August 26, 2008). Additionally, these contracts extended the dictated growth plan that guarantees cellular telephone coverage throughout Ecuador, including rural areas; the expansion must be at least ".5% of the total sites active on December 31" of the previous year, with no less than 70% of all service points being in rural areas (Contrato de Concesión para la Prestación de Servicio Móvil Avanzado CONOCEL, S.A. 2008; Contrato de Concesión para la Prestación de Servicio Móvil Avanzado OTECEL, S.A. 2008).

b. *Cooptation*

i. Secretary of *Pueblos* Radio Program

For almost twenty years, Indigenous organizations throughout Ecuador demanded access to radio frequencies, and this right to communication was finally included in the constitution of 2008. The government, however, has often rejected requests for frequencies, before and after 2008, largely on the grounds that certain technical requirements have not been met due to a lack of funds and/or expertise. In fact, in early

2010, directly following the break between the CONAIE and the government, the Correa administration rolled out a new community radio program for the nationalities of Ecuador through the Secretary of *Pueblos*.[20] The mission of the Secretary of *Pueblos* is to:

> Coordinate public policies from the Executive branch that guarantee the right to intercultural citizenship through measures to stimulate and strengthen the *pueblos*, social movements, and citizenship in decisions that are key to the new model of development. (Secretaría de *Pueblos* 2011)

The goal of this program was to provide a community radio frequency to each of the 14 nationalities of Ecuador, as well as the necessary training and equipment, in order to achieve the right to communication guaranteed by the constitution.

While the Secretary of *Pueblos* helped the nationalities to apply for the radio frequencies, each nationality's organization still had to go through the entire process explained earlier in this chapter. The nationalities had to have all legal prerequisites submitted to CONATEL (through the Secretary of *Pueblos*) by September 1, 2010. CONATEL then reviewed the information and allocated frequencies in November of the same year. Of the 14 nationalities, only the Secoya failed to meet all requirements and to be allotted frequencies. The Secretary of *Pueblos* had a number of workshops and capacity building programs within each nationality, especially with youth, and all stations were broadcasting by July of 2011. The stations were reviewed again in July of 2012 to see if they met all broadcasting requirements.

[20] Within the 14 nationalities of Ecuador there are various *pueblos*, especially within the larger nationalities such as the Kichwa nation that includes the majority of the sierra and large swaths of the Amazonian basin. *Pueblos* of the same nationality share language and some basic cultural traits; however, they often have distinct styles of dress, different holidays, and specific cultural practices.

This program should provide many benefits to the communities the radio stations will serve. By providing capacity building workshops and training to young people in Indigenous communities, the program is providing an educational experience that will lead to future opportunities. Also, by providing the equipment, technical assistance, and training necessary to run a radio station, the program is making community radio stations possible in poor communities that would otherwise be unable to meet the financial demands of starting up a radio station. Finally, the radio stations are meant to be intercultural; the contracts state that programming must be at least 30% in Indigenous languages, guaranteeing that the radio stations will help to promote the culture of each nationality. Thus, it might appear that this program is responding directly to the demand of actors in the Indigenous political arena for access to radio frequencies in order to fully practice the right to communication.

However, there are at least three aspects of this program that reveal the intention of the Correa administration to retain control over the radio stations in order to use them as a tool to reach distant communities that have historically been hostile toward the government in an effort to win them over. For the Indigenous movement, this is especially worrisome in the Amazon where the Correa administration opened more areas to petroleum extraction and mining and expressed a desire to further exploit these natural resources. The first fundamental problem with the program is that the stations are established legally as community radio stations, meaning the frequencies have a much shorter range than those of private radio stations, and are legally prohibited from amplifying their frequencies. Furthermore, the radio stations are located in urban centers,

such as the city of Puyo in the province of Pastaza, while the majority of the Amazonian Indigenous population lives in rural areas. Consequently, the programming reaches a limited audience, especially in a context like the Amazon where one nationality, such as Shuar, is composed of communities that span between two and four provinces.

Second, as explained above, the possibilities for funding community radio stations are also ambiguous in the Law on Radio Diffusion and Television, leading directly to the problem of an annual operating budget. An employee of the Secretary of *Pueblos* who worked directly with this program confided to me that while the stations are free to sell airtime to businesses in order to generate revenue, this would likely not work in rural areas and with such a targeted audience. However, this employee assured me that I should not worry about the financial feasibility of the radio stations because the government is ready to purchase all the air time the stations will sell in order to broadcast public service announcements and advertisements, in both Spanish and Indigenous languages (Interview with employee, Secretary of *Pueblos*, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 25, 2011). In fact, during the period of Correa's presidency, the Ecuadorian government has been the number one purchaser of advertisement airtime nationally, occupying 6.4% of the total investment in radio advertising (Ramos 2010; Punín 2011).[21]

Finally, as discussed above, Article 1, Section 8, of the 2002 revised version of the Law of Radio Diffusion and Television states that community radio stations are those

[21] The administration of Correa is not alone in the Latin American region in taking steps to increase control over private media and increase the quantity of state media outlets. In fact, the Venezuelan government under President Hugo Chávez has engaged in an almost 10 year process of constraining private media and augmenting state media. Some scholars and journalists (both international and Ecuadorian) have expressed concern that Correa is on a path similar to that of Venezuela and that the proposed Communication Law would seriously constrain freedom of expression and free access to information (Orlando 2012, 179).

"dedicated to social, educational, cultural, or religious ends" (Law of Radio Diffusion and Television 1975). Similarly, the capacity building workshops put on by the Secretary of *Pueblos* emphasized that these radio stations should be to promote cultural survival, education, and information, and should not be used for political purposes. Thus, the government provided access to communication within the Indigenous political arena, so long as this communication is not political. However, there is no discussion in CONATEL regulations about what constitutes political communication, and therefore, the government is able to interpret this clause as suits it best, thereby retaining significant control over the content broadcast through these stations and likely leading to self-censorship by the stations.

The program to provide radio stations for Ecuador's nationalities is a thinly veiled attempt of the government to gain direct access to the nationalities of Ecuador. This program provides a service, or rather, access to the constitutionally recognized right of communication, while truncating this right to such an extent that the stations must self-censure to avoid disputes with the government. Furthermore, the structure of the program ensures that these radio stations will remain financially dependent upon the state. The combination of ill-defined regulations and financial dependence results in state control over the radio stations, being able to co-opt them for its own ends. This process will be further illustrated in chapter five through the presentation of the case of the Federation of the Indigenous Cofán Nation of Ecuador (FEINCE).

c. *Repression*

i. Attacks on the Media

Since 2007, Rafael Correa has waged a "personal war" against the Ecuadorian media (Ayala 2011), with skyrocketing cases of aggression toward the media, especially since 2009, as seen in table 3.2 below. The Andean Foundation for the Observation and Study of the Media (FUNDAMEDIOS), which tracks freedom of expression in Ecuador, defines aggression as assassinations, kidnappings, physical aggression, intimidation, threats, torture, illegal detention, assassination attempts, deportation, arbitrary judicial decisions, confiscation or destruction of property, the shutting and/or suspension of media outlets, censure, impediment of coverage, the unjustified deprivation of liberty, and other. Particularly worrisome is that through October of 2011, more than 31% of cases of aggression toward the media were arbitrary decisions by the judiciary (Ricuarte 2011). This growing tendency suggests that aggression toward the media is becoming institutionalized in both the judicial and the executive branches.

Year	**Number of Attacks**
2008	22
2009	103
2010	151
2011	156
Total	**432**

Table 3.1 Attacks on Journalists, 2008-2011, Courtesy of FUNDAMEDIOS 2011

Repression of journalists during the Correa administration has included physical aggression or intimidation by the government, legal action including being jailed, and being fired from one's job. In the most extreme cases, journalists have even been murdered, although these deaths have never been linked directly to the Correa

administration or any other government officials (Ricuarte 2011). For example, Jorge Santana, director of the weekly newspaper *Tribunal* and television news reporter for channel *CQ15* in southern Ecuador, was killed on March 22, 2010. Santana was going to work on his motorcycle when he was hit head-on by a car in a hit and run. Before passing away, in the ambulance on the way to the hospital, Santana said, "Save me, they're after me" (Red de monitoreo de amenazas a la libertad de expresion 2010). This case remains unsolved.

On September 30th of 2010, the national police in Quito staged a strike against the government's cuts in wages and bonuses. President Correa immediately named this strike a coup attempt, and he entered the police quarters in northern Quito to speak with the protestors. Still recovering from knee surgery, Correa arrived at the police quarters literally yelling, "If you want to kill me, here I am, kill me!" ("La insubordinación policial subió de tono con el discurso de Correa," *El Comercio,* October 1, 2010). General chaos followed and President Correa was injured in the fray, his recuperating knee unable to withstand the running. He was brought to the police hospital to be treated where he claims that he was held hostage, although some observers note that he was able to make live addresses over the radio and television via his cell phone during the course of the entire day.

FUNDAMEDIOS recorded a total of 32 attacks against journalists on September 30th, including physical and verbal attacks and the destruction of journalistic materials such as cameras, camcorders, and microphones (Ricuarte 2010). Journalists were prohibited by military operatives, under direct orders from the executive, from

videotaping the debacle, including the supposed rescue of the president that included the military opening fire on the police, killing one officer and injuring others. The government ordered that all TV and radio stations stream the same broadcast, "*La Cadena Indefinida e Interrumpida del Gobierno*," or "The Indefinite and Uninterrupted Channel of the Government," meaning that the only information available was directly from the government.

An interesting note here is that while President Correa succeeded in controlling the flow of information through official media outlets throughout the day, the state was unable to control the Internet chatter, especially over Twitter. Both protesters and supporters of Correa used Twitter, and to some extent Facebook, to organize their activities, set meeting places, and provide information about the activities of the Ecuadorian military that the state *cadena* was certainly not broadcasting ("El 30-S se regó por el mundo a través de Twitter," *El Comercio*, April 1, 2011).

Since September 30th, 2010 there have been numerous calls from assemblywomen and men, the public, national and international human rights organizations, and others, for a non-governmental panel to analyze occurrences of that day. However, the administration has rejected these calls, opting instead for an inquiry by a government commission. While the commission published their findings, large parts were redacted, including all reference to the shoot-out between the military and the police, ultimately providing little new information.

Perhaps the most famous – or infamous – case of individual repression was in February of 2011 when Emilio Palacio, the Opinion Editor of the national daily newspaper, *El Universo*, referred to President Correa as "the Dictator," and wrote that he could be tried in a court by a future administration for having ordered that the military open fire against the striking national police on September 30th, 2010. Correa sued Palacio (for the second time), along with the directors of *El Universo*, brothers César, Carlos, and Nicolás Pérez Barriga, for libel. The court found all three guilty and sentenced them with a $40 million fine and three years in prison ("Correa: por unanimidad la corte reconoció que Emilio Palacio injurió," *El Comercio*, September 20, 2011). The original decision was upheld through the appeals process.

Following the sentencing, it was determined that a draft of the sentence had been transferred to the computer of the judge around midnight the night before the sentencing by a user named "Chucky7." The Judge, along with President Correa who was the plaintiff in the case, has assured the public that Chucky7 is not another user, but simply the judge himself. Critics, especially assembleyman César Montúfar, largely rejected this explanation and instead claimed that it was the President's lawyer, Gutemberg Vera, who drafted the sentence and transferred it to the judge ("César Montúfar acepta el reto del Presidente Correa: se despojará de su inmunidad," *El Comercio*, December 25, 2011). Furthermore, the opposition noted that even if the judge and president are telling the truth, Chucky7 is the name given to pirated versions of Windows7 sold in Ecuador, and

so even if it was the justice himself, he is working with a pirated version of Windows7 to do official state business, and this in and of itself is worrisome.[22]

Another important case, directly linked to the Indigenous movement, is that of Monica Chuji, the ex-Secretary of Communication in the Correa administration and Indigenous movement activist. In November of 2011, Vinicio Alvarado, Secretary General of the Administration, charged Monica Chuji with defamation because she had described Alvarado as a "nouveau riche of the government" in an interview in the national daily newspaper, *El Comercio,* in February 2011 (Buitrón 2011). Alvarado's publicity business, Creational D'Arcy, has served as the central command for the Correa administration's communications and publicity campaigns, meaning his "economic interests have been favored" (Punín 2011; Ramos 2010). After an audience with three judges in a national court in which President Correa himself was in attendance, Chuji was found guilty and sentenced to one year in jail and $100,000 in damages to be paid directly to Alvarado. In late November, Alvarado pardoned Chuji ("Alvarado perdona a Chuji, pero dice que no aceptará más injuries," *El Comercio*, November 26, 2012).[23]

ii. Repression within the Indigenous Political Arena

[22]On Thursday, February 23, 2012, the Justice Mónica Encalada fled the country and filed an official complaint with the Inter American Court of Human Rights saying that the justices involved in the case had been pressured by the Correa administration to decide in his favor, and that his lawyers had threatened her personally ("Ex jueza amenazada" 2012). The following Monday, February 27, 2012, President Correa had a press conference in which he pardoned the plaintiffs not only in the *El Universo* case, but also the defendants in the libel case regarding the book, *El Gran Hermano* ("Wilson Merino archivó el caso" 2012). The timing of President Correa's pardons suggests that he would like to get rid of the international audience during any investigation into the accusations of Justice Encalada. Justice Encalada returned to Ecuador in April 2012, with promises from the government that she would not be prosecuted nor persecuted ("Jueza Mónica Encalada se siente perseguida por Gutemberg Vera" 2012).

[23] Ecuadorian law allows for plaintiffs to pardon, or forgive (perdonar), defendants in civil cases, even after the court has made its decision ("Alvarado perdona a Chuji, pero dice que no aceptará más injurias," *El Comercio*, November 26, 2012).

Indigenous journalists, as well as non-Indigenous journalists, interested in reporting on happenings within the Indigenous political arena have reported direct repression by government. These instances created an environment of fear in which journalists, even when not directly under threat, often chose to self-censure in order to avoid problems (Ricuarte 2010, 2011). As reported by a CIESPAL-UNESCO study, "journalists perceive that multiple pressures exist from their directors or bosses of the media outlets, and especially from the government ("Análisis del Desarrollo Mediático en Ecuador – 2011" 2011).

Beginning on September 28 of 2009, the Shuar organization of *segundo grado*, the Interprovincial Center of the Shuar Federation (FICSH), led marches in the southern Amazonian province of Morona Santiago to protest, primarily the Correa administration's proposed water law, and secondly the concessions that the Correa administration was in the process of giving to mining companies. The FICSH utilized their community radio station, *Radio la Voz de Arutam*, or the Voice of the Spirit, to communicate with their bases and provide information about the protest. Radio Arutam, as usual, broadcast in the Shuar language. During the course of the protests there were violent interactions between the national police, who had been sent by President Correa, and the Shuar protesters. One Shuar teacher, Bosco Wisum, was killed by a bullet.[24] The government claimed that the protestors had incited violence by protesting with spears in hand and by

[24] There are many differing accounts of this day. The official government investigation claims that Wisum was killed by a rubber bullet, while the Indigenous movement insists that the police fired with real bullets. Regardless of the type of bullet, Wisum died during the confrontation between protestors and police.

launching rocks at the police.[25] In response to this death, the government named the Shuar leaders terrorists, issued warrants for their arrest, and the SuperTel and CONATEL jointly issued resolution 440-16 on December 17th of 2009, terminating the contract between Radio Arutam and CONATEL, rescinding the right of Arutam to their radio frequency and effectively closing the station (CONATEL 2009; Red de monitoreo de amenazas a la libertad de expresion 2009).[26]

The logic behind this resolution was that Radio Arutam had been clandestinely inciting violence in the Shuar language in order to challenge the rule of law in Morona Santiago (CONATEL 2009). A public battle ensued and, ultimately, the government did not shut down Radio Arutam. Instead, the two sides agreed to a new regulation that would require not only Radio Arutam, but all radio stations broadcasting in languages other than Spanish, to provide translations of all broadcasts to CONATEL.[27]

In interviews with other community radio stations, such as Radio Ilumán of the province of Imbabura that has links with the Indigenous and *Campesina* Federation of Imbabura (FICI) and Radio Latacunga of the province of Latacunga that is associated with the Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC), directors time and

[25] The spear is a sacred Shuar symbol, and Shuar men bring their spears with them to any and all official events. For example, Shuar men attending the CONAIE and CONFENIAE assemblies bring their spears to demonstrate their position of leadership within their communities. The spears of today are largely made for purposes of adornment and are not used for hunting.

[26] The Ecuadorian government has increasingly named Indigenous leaders as terrorists and arrested them under charges of terrorism and sabotage. In August of 2012, there were nearly 200 Indigenous and community leaders in jail ("Indígenas Terroristas?" 2011; "Dirigente indígena Marco Guatemal fue detenido en Ibarra," *El Comercio*, October 25, 2011). The use of anti-terrorism laws to prosecute Indigenous leaders has been a trend in Latin America since September 11, 2001, such as has been discussed by Haughney (2005) in the case of the Chilean government and its actions against the Mapuche.

[27] This agreement completely ignores the fact that the constitution recognizes not only Spanish, but also Kichwa and Shuar, as official languages, thus guaranteeing the right to the production of all materials in these languages. Therefore, it should actually be the responsibility of the state to provide translations of the programming, as well as its own programming, in not only Spanish, but in Kichwa and Shuar as well.

again expressed their fear of participating in any type of political activity – including broadcasting information about protests – given what happened with Radio Arutam. Directors of Radio Ilumán were especially concerned as their frequency was up for renewal in 2010, and CONATEL had told them that the process would be postponed until the new Communications Law was passed. To Radio Ilumán, this reasoning seemed nothing more than a CONATEL pretext, the real reason being to wait for the trials of the FICI *dirigentes* who were under investigation on charges of terrorism as a result of the 2010 mobilization in opposition to the proposed Water Law and Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) meeting, in order to see if Radio Ilumán could be implicated. After more than a year of waiting, CONATEL still had not renewed the frequency at the close of 2011.[28]

Government repression of Indigenous communication does not have to be direct to have a widespread impact. The 2009 case of Radio Arutam served as a warning to other community radio stations within the Indigenous political arena. Self-censorship followed and directors of radio stations hesitate to participate directly in the political arena, which they had been doing since the 1960s. The following chapters will examine more fully the strategies of Indigenous organizations and their media outlets in response to the hostile actions of the Correa administration.

III. *Government Communication Apparatus*

[28] The president of the community of Ilumán on March 2, 2012, told me that the radio continues to wait for CONATEL approval. Furthermore, he said that CONATEL has suggested that the radio will have to close their current frequency and apply for a new community radio station frequency. Thus, it appears that CONATEL continues to wait for the passing of the new Communications Law before taking any concrete steps.

President Correa has repeatedly referred to the media as being corrupt and full of "liars," "smurfs" (*pitufos*), and "savage beasts" (Banderas et. al 2011). Using this as his main argument, he created a public media empire in which the government controlled no fewer than 18 public media outlets worth a total of an estimated $40 billion (Punín 2011). In 2008, President Correa issued an executive order stating that because various bankers were still indebted to the government as a result of Filanbanco's bankruptcy in 1999, the government would be seizing the media outlets to pay back the debt. The bankers had to pay their debts immediately, or forfeit their media outlets. On July 8, 2008, the government seized dozens of TV stations, newspapers, news magazines, and radio stations (Ramos 2010, 252).

The various banks and investors formed three investment groups, the Pichincha Group (composed of Banco del Pichincha, Diners Club, the magazines Gestión and Soho, and the TV station Teleamazonas, and Radio Colón), the Eljuri Group (composed of Banco del Austro and the TV station ETV Telerama), and the Auirola Canessa Group (composed of Banco de Machala and the Caravana fast food chain that has a TV station). More than 50% of the investors for each group were Ecuadorian; for example, the Pichincha and Eljuri groups were sold to affiliated employees (Checa-Godoy 2012). These three groups were supposedly autonomous from their investors, and hence were not taken over by the government. All media outlets who had members indebted to the government were seized: in print news the *El Telégrafo* newspaper and the magazines of the Group *La Otra*, the television stations Gama TV, TC Television, Cable Noticiás, and Cable Deportes, and the radio station Radio Universal (Punín 2011). President Correa, at

the time of the issuing of the decree, assured the public that the media outlets would be taken over, assessed, perhaps reorganized, and then auctioned publicly in order to pay back the debt. However, at the close of 2011 not one of the seized media outlets had been auctioned.[29]

In 2009, Correa signed executive order number 1793, modifying the Law of Public Contracts and making it illegal for the government to sign contracts with businesses outside of Ecuador. This immediately affected the three largest independent print news outlets, *El Comercio*, *El Universo*, and the news magazine *La Vanguardia*, all of which have between 49 and 55% of their investors located outside of Ecuador (Ayala 2011). The order decreased the income of media in Ecuador that have investors outside the country as they could no longer sign contracts with the government to broadcast advertising or public service campaigns. Furthermore, this put pressure on smaller media outlets to relocate completely in Ecuador to ensure continued funding from the government. The rest of the state media outlets were created directly by the Correa administration. Both of these changes in the regulatory structure of the media were results of executive decrees, not of public debate and formulation of laws in the assembly – another facet to the coercive, if legal, strategies of President Correa.

Perhaps the single most telling statistic is state publicity spending. In the years 2004 through 2006, the Ecuadorian state spent less than $7 million in official publicity. The Correa administration spent $17.19 million dollars in 2007, $34.57 million in 2008,

[29] The situation had not changed as of August 2012 and the government remained in control of the seized media outlets.

and $42.70 million in 2009 (Ricuarte 2010). This publicity, or perhaps more adequately called propaganda, is distributed throughout the television, radio, and print media in Ecuador and is summarized in Table 3.3 (Ramos 2010; Villamarín 2012).

Year	$ Spent on Publicity
2004-2006	$7 million
2007	$17.19 million
2008	$34.57 million
2009	$42.70 million

Table 3.2 Increased State Spending on Publicity

a. *Television*

According to Alvarado, the Correa administration invested 71% of its public advertising budget in television (Ramos 2010; Punín 2011). However, as discussed in the previous section, advertising is not the state's only TV presence as it also has its own TV frequencies. In 2007, the state had two TV frequencies and 12 radio frequencies. In 2008, Correa's first full year in office, that number jumped to 79 TV frequencies and 32 radio frequencies. In 2009, once both of the previously discussed executive orders went into effect, the number of TV frequencies ballooned to 275 and radio frequencies to 58. By 2010, there were almost 400 TV and 400 radio frequencies controlled by the state in Ecuador (Ricuarte 2011). This increase in frequencies was a result of both seizures of media outlets, as well as the creation of public media outlets and the amplifying of these frequencies to reach populations in rural areas (Ramos 2010).

Year	Number of Radio Frequencies	Number of TV Frequencies
2007	12	2
2008	79	32
2009	58	275
2010	400<	400<

Table 3.3 State Media Outlets, 2007-2010

b. *Radio*

The Correa administration invests 23% of its public advertising budget in radio advertising (Ramos 2010; Punín 2011). This includes advertisements such as public service announcements, as well as propaganda for the *Revolución Ciudadana* (Citizens' Revolution) of the political movement *Alianza PAIS* that propelled Correa to the presidency. All advertisements, both radio and television, end with the phrase, "*La Revolución Ciudadana Avanza,"* meaning, "the citizens' revolution advances" (Orlando 2012). In a one-week period (in June of 2011) of tracking the number of times this phrase was transmitted during two hours of radio and one hour of television broadcasts per day, I found the average to be 16, or 5.3 times per hour.

In addition to public service announcements and propaganda, President Correa gives a national radio address every Saturday. The *sabatino*, or Saturday address, is also broadcast over YouTube and audio clips are shown on TV networks. The *sabatino* is given in locations throughout the country, always with a large live audience, and is presented by Correa in an informal conversational style. He recounts the work of the government for the preceding week, responds to citizens' concerns, and gives his own personal evaluation of what has been published in the media (Ayala and Cruz 2009, 4).

The *sabatino* inevitably includes an attack on the media and on "the lying journalists," "the savage beasts" (Banderas, et. al 2011). The irony found in these *sabatinos* is that President Correa attacks the media – at least that of the opposition – for their lack of professionalism and for blatantly sharing their opinions rather than remaining neutral, while his style of address is unprofessional, as exemplified by his name-calling and sexist comments (Banderas, et. al 2011).[30] This address lasts a minimum of one hour and does not have an upper limit, although they typically last for about three hours (Orlando 2012, 151).

c. *Print Media*

The Correa administration invests only 4% of its public advertising budget in written media, reflecting the virtual war that has been under way between President Correa and the Ecuadorian daily newspapers essentially since the day he took office in 2007 (Ramos 2010; Punín 2011). In his inaugural address, Correa actually encouraged citizens to sue newspapers for publishing falsehoods, putting the media in his crosshairs since day one (Ayala and Cruz 2009).

The first newspaper in Ecuador, *El Telégrafo*, began circulating in 1860, followed by *El Comercio* in 1906 and *El Universo* in 1922 ("Análisis del Desarrollo Mediático en Ecuador – 2011" 2011). By 2011, there were more than 35 daily newspapers in

[30] In January of 2012 a group of women members of the National Assembly from opposition parties charged Correa with disseminating *machista*, or sexist, perspectives during his *sabatinos*. The final straw for these women was an address in which Correa stated that the government should raise the female assembly women's salaries so that they would be able to afford longer skirts as they were all "going around" in mini-skirts ("Asambleísta Romo responde al Presidente Correa," *El Comercio*, January 10, 2012).

circulation in Ecuador at the national, regional, and local levels. *El Comercio* and *El Telegrafo* remained the most read daily newspapers, accounting for more than 65% of the national daily readership ("Análisis del Desarrollo Mediático en Ecuador – 2011" 2011). While the media in Latin America, and newspapers in particular, have often been criticized for being controlled by the elite, in Ecuador they had been considered as respected sources of information prior to the Correa administration (Rincón 2010; "Análisis del Desarrollo Mediático en Ecuador – 2011" 2011; Orlando 2012).

In April of 2008, the Ecuadorian government unveiled *El Ciudadano*, a biweekly newspaper that is distributed free and paid for with government funds. *El Ciudadano* has a monthly circulation of over 120 million and is distributed through the postal service and public entities. *El Ciudadano* states that its mission is to provide information about the development of government projects; however, it has been criticized for being nothing more than government propaganda, especially that which favors President Correa (Ramos 2010; Banderas, et. al 2011). One investigation published by the International Center for Higher Studies in Communication (CIESPAL) argues that *El Ciudadano* can not, in fact, be considered journalism, but instead is, at best, public relations for the Correa administration, and at worst, pure propaganda (Villamarín 2011).

d. *New Legal Framework: Communications Law*

The *Ley de Comunicación*, or Communication Law, was first introduced in the Ecuadorian Assembly in September 2009, where it was hotly debated and ultimately put on the back burner due to the failure of Correa's *Alianza PAIS* and the opposition to reach

an agreement. As proposed by the Correa administration, the Communication Law would concentrate power over media outlets in the hands of the national government, thereby hurting democratic ideals such as freedom of speech and free access to information ("Ley Orgánica de Comunicación" 2009). The opposition expressed three major direct concerns with regard to this law, especially in the areas of freedom of speech and free access to information. First, it would create a *Consejo de Comunicación*, Communication Council, charged with reviewing media productions for their verifiability and truthfulness. Second, it would create a strict regimen of regulations and establish sanctions for those journalists and media outlets the Communication Council finds to be violating them. Finally, the law would require all journalists and media sources to be registered with the government and that journalists have an official card to work as a journalist. Indirectly, these three elements will likely lead to further self-censorship by those who fear being reprimanded by the *Consejo* (Orlando 2012).

While states often have regulatory bodies to govern media outlets, these are normally autonomous from the government. However, with the proposed Communication Council, there are no efforts to create an autonomous entity; the president would appoint the Council's members. Thus, the power to decide what is true, thereby determining what information may be broadcast to the population, would lie in the hand of a government body that would not be autonomous from the administration (Green-Barber 2010; Ricuarte 2010; Orlando 2012).

The Communication Law was to be debated again in 2011. However, the debate was delayed due to the combination of events. First, Human Rights Watch and the Organization of American States sent letters of opposition to the proposed law to the

Assembly President Fernando Cordero, putting pressure on the Assembly to change the law and/or postpone debate (Human Rights Watch 2010). Second, the political atmosphere after the 30-September incident was highly charged. Third, seven Ecuadorian assemblymen and women – or, as Correa called them, the seven "*enanitos*" (little dwarves) – traveled to Washington, D.C. to present their concerns with the proposed law to various international human rights organizations, resulting in even more unwanted and negative international attention ("El presidente de Ecuador minimiza el viaje de asambleístas de la oposición a Washington," *WFDC News*, September 18, 2010). Finally, the president of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, Dinah Shelton, had promised to come to Ecuador in January 2012 to observe the process of debate of the law. At the close of 2011 the commission of the Communications Law was still working to construct a draft to be presented in 2012 to the Assembly.[31]

In an attempt to win public support for the proposed Communication Law, President Correa included a question in the Popular Referendum of May 2011 asking if the respondent would support a *Consejo de Comunicación* charged with the regulation and review of media productions, especially for sexually or verbally explicit or racist materials. This misleading question did not mention that the drafted law also would give the proposed council the power to determine whether media productions are verifiable and truthful. Opposition assemblywomen and men, including Pachakutik representative Lourdes Tibán, had submitted a proposed revision of the law that included a council, but

[31] The Communications Law commission presented a draft to the assembly in February of 2012. This draft changed some key aspects of that which was presented by President Correa; however, it was still opposed by opposition assemblywomen and men, as well as by journalists, both for its content and for the closed-door manner of its construction. While the National Assembly president, Fernando Cordero, called for a vote on the law in June and again in July, as of August 2012 no vote had taken place ("Cordero: 'La próxima vez instalaré la session con el número de asambleístas que manda la Ley,'" *El Comercio*, July 20, 2012).

one that would be comprised strictly of citizens appointed through a process independent of the executive (Ricuarte 2011). However, the referendum effectively ended all debate over the Communication Law, while simultaneously over-simplifying the content of the proposed law to such an extent as to render the results of the referendum as practically meaningless. While the "si" vote in favor of the proposed Communication Council won, it won with only 46% of the vote, with "no" accounting for 42.5%, and blank or invalid ballots accounting for more than 11% of votes ("Consejo Nacional Electoral: Resultados" 2011). Thus, while the administration claimed a victory for its proposed Communication Law, the opposition similarly claimed that a majority of voters did not in fact vote in favor of the law.

IV. *Conclusion*

Democratic regimes, much like undemocratic ones, have an interest in controlling media outlets, if for different reasons. This chapter has argued that the democratically elected government of President Correa has, since 2007, implemented a mixed strategy of cooperation, cooptation, and repression with respect to communication within Ecuador in order to reach and persuade the Ecuadorian population to support the administration, and especially those within the Indigenous political arena. While there are instances of state cooperation in the area of communication, the Correa administration has adeptly co-opted communities, especially through communications projects, in order to reach distant and historically hostile populations with the desired end to create new bases of support. Furthermore, President Correa – with the support of the judiciary – has been aggressive in his attacks on media, creating a threatening environment that has led to self-censorship

by journalists individually, and media outlets collectively. Most important for this dissertation are the effects – both intended and unintended – these strategies have on Indigenous organizations and their ability to communicate with their bases. The following chapters will consider how Indigenous organizations have responded to these government strategies through successful social mobilization.

Chapter 4 – ICTs and Successful Mobilization: CONAIE and ECUARUNARI

I. *Introduction*

This chapter directly addresses the central question of this dissertation: under what conditions can the use of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) contribute to successful social mobilization, and when can the use of ICTs hinder mobilization? This dissertation proposes that the level of success of mobilization depends upon an organization's success in *strategically appropriating* the use of ICTs, *creatively adapting* their uses, and *distinguishing and targeting audiences*. Social mobilization is one form of democratic participation and is defined as the activation of a social network to disruptively make contentious demands on a target. Mobilization is identified as successful it if meets the goals set by the organization, partially successful if there is mobilization, but it does not meet the goals set by the organizations, and unsuccessful if there is absolutely no mobilization of grassroots movement members.[32]

Many academics, government agencies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have emphasized the potential benefits of new ICTs, such as the Internet, for leading to greater inclusion, representation, and the deepening of democracy in the developing world. However, this euphoria has often been spread without investigating how the ways in which ICTs are utilized affects their usefulness. Perhaps unsurprisingly then, projects that have been developed and implemented to connect the rural and urban poor in order to close the digital divide have had lackluster results. NGO and government projects have worked to bring ICTs to rural areas, build capacity in a few

[32] Indigenous organizations often set goals for mobilizations such as a target number of participant or the closing of a main roadway.

community members, implement a project, and then leave, without constructing a plan to sustain the projects. Thus, few people actually gain the technical skills and access to ICTs. Worse, once the funders have left, there is no way to repair the equipment, which inevitably breaks with time. During interviews and participant observation, I heard numerous stories about NGO programs that delivered solar panels and computers to rural communities without electricity, and then left. Subsequently, the solar panels and/or computers inevitably broke – or were stolen. The empty husks of community technology centers with their peeling paint, haphazardly discarded desks, and three legged chairs serve as physical reminders of the difficulties associated with implementing programs regarding new ICTs in rural areas. Efforts to lessen the so-called digital divide have been fraught with problems not only in the developing world, but in developed countries as well.[33]

The national Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and the regional Kichwa Federation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI) are both Ecuadorian organizations composed of many provincial and *segundo grado* organizations and are based in Quito. Since the 1980s, but especially in 1990 and 1992, these organizations relied upon mobilization as a key strategy to make demands upon the government. In the 2000s, the CONAIE led mobilizations that forced two presidents out of office. Communication is necessary to convene a mobilization; the bases must know about the

[33] While I was writing this dissertation, the *New York Times* reported that in the United States, greater access to technologies, such as the Internet, computers, and smart-phones, has not lessened the digital divide. Instead, studies suggest that increased access to ICTs has widened the "time-wasting divide," resulting in low income children wasting time playing games and in social network sites, while children from higher income homes use these technologies more for educational purposes (Richtel 2012).

mobilization in order to participate.[34, 35] The challenges of the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI with regard to communication have historically been similar; both organizations had constant shortages of funding, large base populations living in rural areas and experiencing high levels of poverty, and were consistently in opposition to Ecuador's various governments since they were formed. Similarly, the communication goals of the two organizations converged. First, the organizations expressed a desire to inform their bases about their activities. Second, they wanted to be able to convene their bases rapidly, be it for assemblies, congresses, social mobilization, or other activities. Finally, the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI both wanted to reach out to potential donors in order to access funds. These communication challenges and goals were shared by all Indigenous organizations throughout Ecuador, although provincial and *segundo grado* organizations had even less in terms of resources (monetary, technical, human).

[34] The bases are Indigenous individuals living in communities that make up the *segundo grado* organizations that are filials of the CONAIE. Every individual in these communities is a member of his or her respective *segundo grado* organization, and subsequently of the provincial, regional, and national organizations to which their *segundo grado* organization belongs. These individuals, also referred to as the grassroots of the organizations, are the ones the organizations want to persuade to participate in mobilizations.

[35] In June of 1990, the CONAIE called for the its first national mobilization, a *levantamiento* during which Indigenous protesters occupied roads, invaded *haciendas*, took over public offices, and detained soldiers (Lucas 2000; Selverston-Scher 2001). In 1992, the CONAIE organized an uprising coinciding with the 500th anniversary of Christopher Columbus's arrival in the Americas, stopping commerce and government in Quito and forcing government leaders into discussions with Indigenous leaders, ultimately leading to the devolution of more than 16,000 km^2 of land to Indigenous organizations. In 1994, the CONAIE organized another round of massive protests in opposition to the proposed Agrarian Reform Law and the privatization of the oil sector, ultimately resulting in the government abandoning the controversial law (Becker 2008). In 2000, the CONAIE called for Indigenous participation in the protest against then President Jamil Mahuad and the proposed dollarization of the Ecuadorian economy in which Ecuador would cease to have its own currency, the *sucre*, and instead use American dollars exclusively. While the protests did not manage to prevent dollarization, they did ultimately force President Mahuad to resign (Gerlach 2003). In 2005, the CONAIE again mobilized to oust then President Lucio Gutiérrez, who the CONAIE had, in fact, helped to elect, saying he had violated his contract with the Indigenous movement by signing a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (Lucas 2000).

In the period from 2007 through 2011, even with these similarities, the communication strategies of the CONAIE, the ECUARUNARI, and other organizations at all levels were different, as were their levels of success in initiating social mobilization. The CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI serve as two examples of organizations with different communication strategies and different outcomes. The CONAIE, after reflecting upon a failed radio project directly preceding the time under study, decided to focus its strategy in the ICT *de moda* (in style) – the Internet. Conversely, the ECUARUNARI chose to continue with and expand upon its tried and true strategies of incorporating ancient communication networks (e.g., the *chaski* system) and the radio. While both organizations were successful in their efforts to mobilize their bases, the ECUARUNARI was completely successful in 70% of the mobilizations called for, meaning the mobilizations met the goals set by the organization, while the CONAIE met their mobilizational goals a mere 20% of the time. However, when the gap between partial successes is much more narrow, with the ECUARUNARI being at least partially successful in 94% of their calls to mobilize, and the CONAIE 76% of the time.[36]

The communication strategies of the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI were repeated in provincial and *segundo grado* organizations. However, these organizations also designed a variety of communication strategies making use of new ICTs, such as audiovisual productions (including television), cell phones, and Internet (including web pages, email, and social networks). The findings of 17 months of field research and the subsequent analysis support the three hypotheses put forth in this dissertation: the organizations that were the most successful in calling for mobilization were those that

[36] I identified calls to mobilize through both interviews in which *dirigentes* recounted their attempts to mobilize their bases and in newspaper searches.

strategically appropriated ICTs, *creatively adapted* the use of ICTs with respect to changes in the Indigenous political arena, and *distinguished and targeted their audiences.*[37] These three variables proved to be additive. That is, organizations that were successful in all three areas – innovation, adaptability, and targeting of audiences – were the most successful in inciting mobilization. It was possible for an organization to initiate mobilization, though less successfully, if they achieved two, or even one, of these elements. However, organizations that did not adapt to changes in the Indigenous political arena were completely unsuccessful in their attempts to mobilize their bases.

This chapter first explains the method of data gathering and analysis. Second, it quantitatively analyzes the communication strategies of 14 Indigenous social movement organizations in Ecuador that used new ICTs in order to determine the strength of the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables. Finally, it looks at one national and one regional organization, the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI, in order to illustrate the specific ways in which ICTs matter for successful social mobilization. Chapter five further examines four organizations at the provincial level in order better to understand the causal mechanism and to see a greater variety of strategies.

II. *Fourteen Cases*

[37] An arena is an "open-ended bundle of rules and resources that allows certain kinds of interactions to proceed, leading to outcomes that may be formal or quite casual" (Jasper 2006, 141). The Indigenous social movement comprises a specific political arena within the Ecuadorian context, here referred to as the Indigenous political arena, and is composed of Indigenous individuals – the bases – that are members of communities that compose Indigenous organizations. The CONAIE is a compound contained within the arena, while the state is a compound player that exists outside of the arena, but acts within it. Compound players acting within an arena are often hierarchically positioned, meaning that especially in terms of resources all players are not equal. This is particularly true when considering the state as a compound player; the state not only has more resources in terms of money, but also has control over regulatory structures and laws that dictate the bounds of what is allowed and not allowed within any political arena. Thus, in the case of the Indigenous political arena in Ecuador, the government has the power to set the rules of the game that dictate what is permissible within the arena.

a. *The Cases and the Research Method*

This dissertation employs the comparative method in order to discover empirical relationships between variables and test the three hypotheses put forth by comparing 14 cases within one country, Ecuador (Lijphart 1971). Richard Snyder has argued that this type of subnational comparison has advantages, especially in that it can overcome some of the limitations of small-N research design by increasing the number of observations, thereby "making it easier to construct controlled comparisons that increase the probability of obtaining valid causal inferences" (2001, 94). While this dissertation has a small sample (N), it is a large sample for the case study method. Because all cases are in one relatively small country, it was possible to perform this study in 17 months (August 2010 through December 2011). Furthermore, the organizations share similar historical trajectories, are composed of Indigenous individuals and communities of similar socio-economic backgrounds, and exist within the same national political context, making it easier to perform a controlled comparison and thereby allowing greater confidence in the results of the investigation (Snyder 2001). One important note is that cultural contexts vary greatly throughout Ecuador among the distinct *pueblos* (peoples) and nationalities, and for that reason culture is incorporated into this investigation in the independent variable of creative innovation of ICTs.[38]

[38] There are 14 distinct Indigenous nationalities in Ecuador, each with their own language, history, cultural practices, holidays, family and community structures, and regions. Within these nationalities there are various *pueblos*, especially within the larger nationalities such as the Kichwa nation that includes the majority of the sierra and large swaths of the Amazonian basin. *Pueblos* of the same nationality share language and some basic cultural traits; however, they often have distinct styles of dress, different holidays, and specific cultural practices.

There are 47 Indigenous organizations in Ecuador at the national, regional, and provincial levels, as discussed in chapter two.[39] This dissertation chose a sample of these organizations to consider as cases in order to test the hypotheses presented—that the successful strategic appropriation of ICTs, creative adaptation of ICTs, and targeting of audiences when using ICTs lead to more successful social mobilization. Conversely, unsuccessful strategic appropriation, creative adaptation, and targeting of audiences, should result in less successful, or unsuccessful, mobilization. The national organization under study is the CONAIE, and is recognized as the largest Indigenous organization in Ecuador. The three regional organizations included are the ECUARUNARI of the Andean sierra, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Coast (CONAICE), and the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE). I began with contacts in the CONAIE, and then moved to the regional organizations. Through the contacts I made in these organizations, I invited provincial and *segundo grado* organizations to participate in this investigation based upon location in order to have broad coverage of the country; participant organizations were from the northern to the southern Amazon and the northern to south central sierra. The seven provincial organizations included are the Federation of Indigenous and

[39] The governmental organizations of the 14 nationalities and 18 *pueblos* of Ecuador function parallel to the state. Indigenous government is organized in a federal manner with governing bodies at the community, local, provincial, regional, and national levels. *Comuneros* (community members) participate directly in government in the *comunidad* (community) and decisions are made by consensus, rather than one person, one vote. *Comuneros* vote for representatives in local governments, or organizations of *segundo grado* (second level), which are an aggregation of communities that represent a *pueblo*, confederation of *pueblos*, or a nationality. Official delegates of organizations of *segundo grado* elect provincial *dirigentes*, or authorities, during general assemblies. Provincial organizations are an agglomeration of *pueblos* and/or nationalities. The provincial organizations then designate official delegates to participate in the regional assemblies in which they elect *dirigentes* of the regional organizations. For elections of the *dirigentes* of the national organization, *dirigentes* of the three regional organizations are automatically official delegates, and organizations of *Segundo grado* directly send delegates to participate in the voting.

Campesinas of Imbabura (FICI), the Interprovincial Federation of Shuar Centers (FICSH), the Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC), the Indigenous Movement of Chimborazo (COMICH), the Indigenous Movement of Tungurahua (MIT), the Indigenous Federation of the Cofán Nationality of Ecuador (FEINCE), and the Waorani Nationality of Ecuador (NAWE).[40] The three organizations of *segundo grado* are the *Pueblo* Sarayaku, the Federation of *Pueblos* Kayambe of Pichincha (FPP), and the Union of *Campesina* Organizations of Northern Cotopaxi (UNOCANC).

[40] *Campesino/a* refers to a peasant laborer working in agriculture.



1	FICI	3	MICC	5	COMICH	7	FICSH
2	FEINCE	4	MIT	6	NAWE		

Figure 4.1, Map of the Nationalities and Pueblos of Ecuador, CODENPE

Data were gathered through open-ended interviews with organizational leaders and grass roots movement members. Interview participants were selected by snowball sampling; one point of entry in an organization introduced me to other community members who then had the opportunity to participate. Six cases were studied making use

not only of interviews, but also of participant observation. In addition to asking questions about mobilizations in interviews, I carried out newspaper archival research in order to record instances of mobilization from sources outside of the Indigenous political arena. In this dissertation, I refer to elected leaders and official organizational employees by their names. However, I have not used the names of grassroots movement members but simply refer to them as *comunero* and identify, when necessary, the *pueblo* or nationality of the respondent.[41]

During the period of 2007 through 2011, I determined to what degree each organization had strategically appropriated ICTs, creatively adapted its use of ICTs to changes in the Indigenous political arena, and identified and targeted their audiences. I carried out a total of 58 interviews with Indigenous *dirigentes* (organizational leaders), grassroots movement members, and communication activists and experts. In interviews with *dirigentes*, I asked questions regarding what ICTs they used, for what purposes, and how often, the decision-making process regarding these uses, their interactions with the government and/or multinational businesses, and with what audiences they felt it is important to contact and their strategies for doing so. To gather data regarding the dependent variable of mobilization, I asked how many mobilizations the organization had attempted to convene from 2007 through 2011, as well as the results. In interviews with grassroots movement members, I asked questions about how they receive their information in general, how familiar they are with various ICTs, how accessible these ICTs are on a daily basis, how often they interact with their local/provincial/regional/national organizations, their perceptions of the organizations

[41] A *comunero/a* refers to a community member and implies that this individual works in agriculture.

and their *dirigentes*, and whether they had participated in mobilizations in the period from 2007 through 2011, and why, or why not. Because the interviews were semi-structured and with open-ended questions, respondents had the opportunity to expand upon any one topic and the information gathered was rich with detail.

In addition to interviews, I had the opportunity to be a participant observer in the CONAIE, CONFENIAE, and UNOCANC, and to a lesser degree in the MICC, FICSH, and FICI. This participant observation was invaluable in that I had the opportunity to observe decision-making processes first-hand, as well as the ways in which *dirigentes* daily made use of various ICTs. I sat in on congresses, spent time in their radio stations, and worked as a volunteer in the communication departments. Furthermore, by being associated with the organizations, grassroots members then had greater confidence in me and spoke more openly. In a cultural context that is highly anti-American, or anti-"*Yanqui*" (Yankee), the importance of this increase in credibility cannot be overstated. The fact that I am a relatively young (at the time of data gathering, 26-28 years of age), *gringa*, woman, also meant that many – especially male – *dirigentes* were more open to speaking with me than they may have been given other circumstances.[42] While this also presented some difficulties in guaranteeing that I was taken seriously as a professional investigator, ultimately it gained me access where otherwise it may have been denied.

[42] *Gringo/a* is a Spanish word used to refer to Americans from the United States, or, more broadly, to any foreigner who is speaking English or is obviously foreign (blonde or light hair, light eyes, pale skin, etc.). The actual root of the word is debated, some arguing that *gringo* was the cry of the Mexican patriots during the Mexican American war, actually saying "Green Go!" as the American soldiers wore green uniforms. Others posit that *gringo* comes from ancient Greek. Regardless, it is common in Latin America and is often said with a great deal of animosity, the anti-American sentiment being strong. This has been especially true during the Correa period under study from 2007-2011, as he is vehemently anti-"*yanqui*". However, *gringo/a*, or the diminutive, *gringuita/o*, is often said with a degree of caring, such as one might call a beloved, but wild, child a "little monster."

Apart from the interviews and participant observation, I consulted government statistics to determine the level of access to various technologies, such as fixed and cellular telephones, Internet, and television (see chapter two). Additionally, I conducted key-word searches for each organization in the online databases of two national newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*, and one provincial newspaper in each province to compare the number and success of mobilizations with the self-reported data from each organization.

b. *Fourteen Cases*

For each of the 14 cases, I identified whether the organizations had a radio station and/or radio production, audiovisual productions, written materials, cell phones, a webpage, social network presence, email, and/or other ICTs. I then determined if the organization had strategically appropriated the ICTs, creatively adapted their uses, and identified and targeted their audiences. Appropriation refers to a movement's reinterpretation and innovation of ICTs to reflect the local culture, symbolically and behaviorally, thereby rendering the movement and its messages as credible in the eyes of grassroots movement members (Cleaver 1998; Tarrow 1998; Dia 2003; Diop 2003; Downing and Brooten 2007; Graham and Goodrum 2007; Larkin 2008). Whether or not an organization strategically appropriated an ICT depended upon whether the ICTs used Indigenous languages, traditional forms of communication such as music or imagery, and in parallel with historical forms of communication and/or use of ICTs.

Because states (and/or multinational corporations) have many strategies to thwart attempts by activists to utilize new ICTs for mobilization—cooperation, cooptation, and coercion (as discussed in chapter three)—I expect that activists who are flexible and

creative in responding to changes in the political arena will ultimately be more successful (Jasper 2006; Lu and Weber 2007). Organizations with a group of leaders who have expertise in, and access to, multiple ICTs will have more options for creatively responding to changes in the political arena (Ganz 2009). For example, a communication *dirigente* (director) that has technical know-how with regard to both radio and the Internet will be able to more adeptly include aspects of both in the organization's communication strategy than a *dirigente* that only has experience with radio, or worse, with no ICTs. In the context of this dissertation, whether an organization creatively adapted the uses of ICTs depended upon whether the organization responded to changes in the political arena affected by the government. Chapter three discussed the context of communication and the administration of Ecuador's President Rafael Correa; each case study presents the specific changes to the Indigenous political arena that affected that particular organization.

In distinguishing and targeting their audiences, this dissertation expects that leaders will use ICTs in a way that resonates with specific audiences (e.g., local Indigenous communities and organizations, national publics, politicians, international activists) by appealing to each audience's cultural norms and mirroring and/or creatively bending social relationships and power constellations within different arenas in order to retain legitimacy while diffusing information and the movement's message (Jasper 2006; Castells, et al. 2007). Targeting of audiences is especially important as ICTs are often utilized to connect with international and national actors for resources, and scholars have shown that this can often undermine social movement leaderships' credibility with local grassroots populations as leaders can be perceived to be using their positions for personal

gain, rather than to strengthen the organization or movement as a whole (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Brysk 2000; Castells 2004; Mercer 2004; Bob 2005; Edelman 2005; Wasserman 2005). Whether an organization targeted audiences depended upon first, whether the organization identified its various audiences, and second, the information shared through an ICT reached the respective audiences, and only the intended audiences. It should be noted that in the Ecuadorian context, the selection of specific ICTs, such as the Internet, automatically limited the potential audience as in rural areas the bases often did not have access to these technologies.

The causal mechanism between the three independent variables and mobilization rests heavily on trust. An organization must create and foster trust among its bases for there to be even a chance the bases will respond positively to a call to mobilize. This element is closely linked to persuasion, and the potential success of an organization to persuade its base members to participate in a mobilization (see discussion of Jasper in chapter one). Thus, ICTs are resources that potentially increase the ability of an organization to reach its bases with information and messages in an attempt to persuade members to mobilize; however, without credibility among its bases, an organization's call to action will be ignored (see, for example, Cleaver 1998; Castells, Fernández-Ardèvol, Qiu, and Sey 2007; Mercer 2004; Bob 2005; Wasserman 2005; Edelman 2005). Furthermore, because new ICTs are viewed as being western and modern, they immediately instill a sense of unease and distrust among rural Indigenous individuals, making their use by organizations potentially even more hazardous.

Level of success of mobilization was determined by identifying the goal of the organization calling for mobilization and then seeing if the actual mobilization met this

goal. While the degree to which a mobilization meets movement leaders' identified goals is not the traditional way to measure mobilizational success, I have chosen to define success in this way for three reasons. First, the Indigenous organizations in Ecuador have few to no resources to mobilize their bases for every march or demonstration, and as earlier mentioned, mobilizations are the main form of demand making on the government, meaning they happen often. Thus, it is important that each organization know how many participants it is responsible for sending to participate in the protest activity in order to appropriate resources accordingly.[43] Second, because mobilizations do happen often (at least since 1990), there is a chance of fatigue in the bases. By making clear the number of participants needed from each organization, the organizations can send representatives on a rotational basis in order to avoid this fatigue. Finally, the organizations themselves measure their success based upon whether they meet their defined goals.

c. *Cross-Case Quantitative Analysis*

The introduction to this chapter began to illustrate the causal links between the independent variables – strategic appropriation, creative adaptation, and targeting of audiences – and the dependent variable – success of mobilization. The data gathered during field research are rich and varied and suggest that strategic appropriation and creative adaptation were the most important factors in the level of success of mobilization; however, targeting of audiences had less of a causal relationship and can

[43] The CONAIE, for example, normally does not have funds to allocate for protests. Instead, if the march is in Quito, the organization looks for donations to provide food and the protestors sleep in the COANIE, ECUARUNARI, or Pachakutik offices. Marches that travel through the provinces to Quito, or that happen exclusively in the provinces, depend upon donations from the provincial and/or *segundo grado* organizations for food and shelter. Protestors – whether in the provinces or in Quito – are expected to bring *cucayo*, food to share in a potluck style.

largely be explained by the other two variables. Given the qualitative nature and quantity of information, it is difficult to get a clear view of the cross-case comparison. In order to more clearly compare across the 14 cases, I have coded the qualitative information to perform an exploratory analysis in order to calculate the correlation coefficient, Pearson's R. For the three independent variables, I first investigated if organizations had utilized radio, audiovisual productions, written materials, cell phones, web pages, social networks, email, and/or other technologies for communication. Then, according to the criteria established in the previous section, I assigned each organization a numerical value of -1, 0, .5, or 1, depending on the level of appropriation, adaptation, and targeting of audiences, with -1 being "unsuccessful," 0 being "none," .5 being "some," and 1 being "complete." I summed the three values corresponding to the three independent variables to create an aggregate independent variable. The dependent variable, success of mobilization, is expressed as the ratio of the sum of completely and partially successful mobilizations to the total number of mobilizations called for by the organization. These values are presented in Table 4.1.

Organization	Strategic Appropriation	Creative Adaptation	Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences	Independent Variables Aggregate	Mobilization % Successful
FICI	1	1	1	3	100% (7/7)
FICSH	1	1	1	3	100% (8/8)
Sarayaku	1	1	1	3	100% (4/4)
MICC	1	1	1	3	82% (9/11)
ECUARUNARI	1	0	1	3	94% (16/17)
FPP	1	0	1	2	80% (4/5)
UNOCANC	0	0	0	0	78% (7/9)
CONAIE	.5	.5	-1	0	76% (19/25)
MIT	1	0	1	2	67% (4/6)
COMICH	0	0	0	0	67% (4/6)
CONAICE	0	0	0	0	50% (2/4)
CONFENIAE	0	0	0	0	50% (3/6)
FEINCE	0	-1	0	-1	0% (0/0)
NAWE	0	-1	0	-1	0% (0/0)

Table 4.1 Independent and Dependent Variable Values by Organization: -1 unsuccessful, 0 none, .5 some, 1 complete

In Table 4.1, it becomes clear that those organizations with the highest value of "aggregate independent variable" had the highest levels of success of mobilization. Also, the two organizations that have negative values for "creative adaptation" (FEINCE and NAWE) were the only organizations with a 0% mobilization success rate.

Scatter plots of the independent variables and the success rates of mobilization helps to visualize the relationship between the independent and dependent variables as well. In the first scatter plot in Figure 4.2, there is an evident positive relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, success rate of mobilization. There is also a relationship between the aggregate independent variable and the success rate of mobilization.



Figure 4.2 Scatter Plots of Independent Variables and Dependent Variable

While Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 indicate a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables, they do not help to understand the strength of the relationship. The N of 14 is admittedly small for statistical analysis; however, it is possible to do an exploratory calculation of the correlation coefficient (Pearson's R) for the variables in order to have an idea of the strength of the causal relationship between each independent variable and the dependent variable.[44] Of the three ordinal independent variables, strategic appropriation has the strongest correlation with the scalar dependent variable mobilization (r = .784, n = 14, p = .001), followed by creative adaptation (r =

[44] In order to calculate Pearson's R, I assigned each case an ordinal level of success depending upon their level of success as a percentage. That is, successful, 3 (85-100%), moderately successful 2 (70-84.99%), slightly successful 1 (55-69.99%), not successful 0 (0-54.99%)

.760, n = 14, p = .002), both of which are significant at the .01 level. Distinguishing and targeting of audiences has the least strong correlation with mobilization (r = .543, n = 14, p = .045) and is significant at the .05 level. The aggregate independent variable composed of the three independent variables is also strongly correlated with the dependent variable and is significant at the .01 level (r = .800, n = 14, p = .001).

This statistical analysis suggests that creative adaptation and strategic appropriation are the independent variables that have the strongest causal relationship with the independent variable. While targeting of audiences does show a correlation, it is less strong. The qualitative data collected suggest that this is the case more because, in the Ecuadorian context, audience targeting is actually not an independent variable, but rather it is contained within the other two independent variables. For example, the choice and manner in which an organization uses an ICT, such as the internet or radio, in the Ecuadorian context almost automatically targets the audience due to the reach of the technology and the ability of the organizational bases to access said technology.

Thus, the three hypotheses presented are supported by statistical analysis. Additionally, the two organizations that did not creatively adapt to changes in the political arena (FEINCE and NAWE, both with an assigned valued of -1) had a 0% success rate for mobilization. This implies that a strategy of either complete avoidance of interaction with changes in the Indigenous political arena or of successful creative adaptation is, in fact, necessary – although not sufficient – for mobilizational success. The experience of the FEINCE, in which the organization wanted to call for mobilization but could not due to its utter lack of communicational capacity and credibility, will be further discussed in chapter five.

Thus, the correlations presented in this section help to visualize the strength and direction of relationships between variables; however, the correlations are exploratory and require the accompanying qualitative analysis of data gathered in order to be better understood. The remainder of this chapter explores the cases of the national Indigenous organization, the CONAIE, and the regional organization of the sierra, the ECUARUNARI. It is especially useful to consider these two cases together because the organizations share many similarities, such as being based in Quito, having a large base that extends throughout the country, having longstanding relationships with international NGOs and resultant resources, and a history of strong mobilization to make demands of the Ecuadorian government. However, from 2007 through 2011 the two organizations developed and implemented very different communication strategies, and subsequently achieved differing levels of success in their calls for mobilizations. Chapter five will present four cases of provincial organizations that share many of these similarities, but have fewer resources (monetary, technological, human, etc.).

III. *The CONAIE*

a. *Mobilizations, 2007-2011*

Voices sing chants in a call and answer style, Indigenous individuals of the 14 nationalities and 18 *pueblos* are *zapateando* (foot stomping) to the beat of the Amazonian drumming, others are dancing in a *caracol* (circle of infinity), women with *guaguas* (babies) strapped to their backs pass water and *chicha* (a traditional fermented drink of corn or yucca) and *tostado* (toasted corn kernels). This is not a party – this is a CONAIE mobilization. Since the *primer levantamiento* (first uprising) in 1990, the CONAIE has

led peaceful *levantamientos*. Protestors sing and joke, often in Indigenous languages, *zapateando* and dancing their way to a new Ecuador (Pacari 1993). In the course of the *fiesta*, protestors also block main roadways, such as the Pan-American Highway, disrupting the national economy and forcing the government to respond to their demands. During the long walk to Quito, rural community members come to the main roadways bringing *cucayo* (potluck) to share with the marchers. They invite the protestors to rest in their community centers and in private homes.

In the period from 2007 through 2011, the CONAIE called for no less than 25 mobilizations, 14 of which were partially successful (56%) and five of which were fully successful (20%), for an overall success rate of 76%.[45] As discussed earlier in this chapter, the classification of full or partial success depends upon whether the mobilization achieved the goals set by the organization, in this case the CONAIE. This section will briefly recount the major mobilizations of the CONAIE from 2007 through 2011, and then explore how the organization's communication strategy – which made use of new ICTs – affected the success or failure of mobilizations.

President Rafael Correa was first elected in 2006, and inaugurated in 2007. While the Indigenous movement, including the CONAIE and the political party Pachakutik, did not officially endorse Correa (they were not about to endorse anyone after the debacle with ex-President Gutierrez), there was a general understanding that Correa was the best

[45] Mobilizations called for and the level of success were determined by compiling data provided to me personally by the CONAIE, information distributed through the CONAIE listserv, and as reported in two national daily newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*. The newspaper searches, conducted through their online databases, included the key words CONAIE, *levantamiento indígena, indio, paro, movilización indígena* and were for all dates between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011.

candidate.[46] Correa's anti-neoliberal, anti-Western, and supposed socialist stances meant that at least economically, his positions were the closest to those of the Indigenous movement. Correa was reelected in 2008 after the passing of the new constitution and he remained in power at the close of 2011. The presidents of the CONAIE from 2007 through 2011 are displayed in Table 4.2.

Period	Name	Pueblo	Nationality	Region
2004-2008	Luis Macas	Saraguro	Kichwa	Sierra
2008-2011	Marlon Santi	Sarayaku	Kichwa	Amazon
2011-	Humberto Cholango	Kayambe	Kichwa	Sierra

Table 4.2 Presidents of the CONAIE, 2004-2011

The first national Indigenous mobilization during the period of study was in February of 2007, when the CONAIE spearheaded a national campaign to demand a Constitutional Assembly with the goal to reform the 1998 constitution. The CONAIE had called for a march in Quito, and had indicated it hoped for the participation of at least 1,000 individuals. In the march, more than 1,000 people walked through the streets of Quito, blocking traffic, and ultimately congregated in *Arbolito* park (Little Tree Park), just one block from the National Assembly. *Arbolito* park is where the majority of the marches or protests end due to its proximity to the National Assembly, and for that reason is also known as also known as *Parque de la Resistencia* (Park of the Resistance),

The Indigenous movement had carefully timed this march and their demand for a new constitution, which had been part of the CONAIE's overall political goals, to coincide with the political opening presented by President Correa and his party, Alianza PAIS, who were in favor of drafting a new constitution. This political opportunity was a

[46] In 2005, the CONAIE mobilized to oust then President Lucio Gutiérrez, whom the CONAIE had, in fact, helped to elect, saying he had violated his contract with the Indigenous movement by signing a letter of intent with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

huge factor in the assembly's decision to call for the Constitutional Assembly. Following this and other marches (see table 4.3), the National Assembly called for a Constitutional Assembly to redraft the constitution. The resultant Constitutional Assembly produced a new constitution recognizing Ecuador as a plurinational state, meaning that within Ecuador, there exist multiple Indigenous nationalities and *pueblos.* This had been a fundamental demand of the CONAIE since its formation in 1986. The 2008 constitution was internationally innovative in being the first constitution to recognize the rights of the environment (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 14, 2008). Additionally, the constitution recognized the right of communication (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 16, 2008), setting the groundwork for new regulations ensuring access to radio and television frequencies for all Ecuadorians. The Indigenous movement had been demanding access to radio and television frequencies since the 1990s, recognizing the important role the few community radio stations had played in the national *levantamientos* of the decade.

In 2008, the Correa administration unveiled its proposed *Ley de Minería* (Mining Law) and proposed a *Ley Orgánico de Recursos Hídricos* (Organic Law on Hydro-resources), more commonly referred to as the *Ley de Aguas* (Water Law). While the CONAIE actually wanted a Mining Law and a Water Law to be passed, it argued that these laws should be constructed with the participation of the Indigenous movement, especially through *consulta previa*, or free, prior, and informed consent, as guaranteed in the constitution (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 27, line 7, 2008), as well as in international agreements such as International Labor Organization (ILO) resolution 169 regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples (ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Article 6, 1989) and in the United Nations

Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (Santi 2009). Furthermore, the government's proposed Mining Law would allow the government to sign large-scale mining (*mega minería*) contracts with international companies. Instead, the CONAIE demanded a Mining Law that would protect the environment and the Indigenous communities located near mining sites (Santi 2009).

The government's proposed Water Law would not guarantee water concessions for Indigenous communities, nor would it have broken the monopoly on water that existed in Ecuador with less than one percent of the population having control over more than 65% of fresh water sources (speech by Luis Contento, June 2, 2010). The government's proposed law did not explicitly make illegal the privatization of water sources, a fundamental demand of the Indigenous movement not only in Ecuador, but also throughout Latin America.[47] In the words of the CONAIE's own proposed Water Law, the main objective of the law should be "to guarantee the human right to water" ("Capítulo III, Aticulo 13, Proyecto Ley de Aguas desde la CONAIE para el País" 2008). The Indigenous movement took the stance that the Water Law should "democratize" access to water, guaranteeing access to all Ecuadorians, and especially Indigenous and *campesinos* ("Proyecto Ley de Aguas desde la CONAIE para el País" 2008).

In November 2008, the CONAIE called for a national mobilization in opposition to the government's proposed Mining and Water Laws, consistent with the movement's historic presentation of itself as a defender of the *Pachamama* (Mother Nature). The CONAIE wanted to paralyze the country with roadblocks and also called for the

[47] For example, there were large-scale protests in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000 against the privatization of water sources to international businesses, protests that ultimately contributed to the election of President Evo Morales in December 2005 (Olivera and Lewis 2004).

participation of 20,000 Indigenous protestors to deliver the CONAIE's proposed Water Law to Assemblymen and women from the Alianza PAIS party to then be presented in the National Assembly. Protestors blocked the Pan-American Highway in the southern Andean provinces of Loja, Azuay, and Zamora Chinchipe and more than 5,000 participated in a ceremony in Cajas (north of Quito) to deliver the CONAIE's proposed Water Law ("5000 indígenas llegaron a la presentación del proyecto de Ley de Aguas," *El Comercio*, November 19, 2008). However, the national *levantamiento* the CONAIE had envisioned never materialized. Furthermore, the mobilization was the strongest in the southern provinces that had a strong interest in mobilizing to oppose the proposed mining law, as the majority of the identified mining sites are in these provinces. This suggests that communities that have the greatest interest in the issues at stake in a mobilization are more likely to mobilize than communities that are not directly affected.

On January 20, 2009, in anticipation of the vote on the proposed Mining Law, the CONAIE again called for a mobilization to put pressure on the National Assembly to vote down the bill. While the CONAIE claimed that this mobilization was a success, it lasted less than 24 hours and did not paralyze the country as the organization had indicated was the goal ("La movilización minera, sin fuerza," *El Comercio*, January 21, 2009; "La CONAIE dice que el paro no fue un fracaso," *El Comercio*, January 21, 2009). There were roadblocks in southern provinces and in Cotopaxi, but not throughout the country. Again, the southern provinces were particularly opposed to the Mining Law, and Indigenous communities in Cotopaxi that are located in the Andean *páramos* (high plains) often experience water shortages. Ultimately, the National Assembly passed the Mining Law on January 29, 2009 (Ley de Minería 2009). The CONAIE, however, did

not accept the passing of the Mining Law and, along with the association of Communal Water Systems of the province of Azuay (*Sistemas Comunitarios de Agua*), filed a case with the Constitutional Court. The CONAIE claimed the law to be unconstitutional because it was formulated without free, prior, and informed consent (Melo 2010).[48]

In late September of 2009, the CONAIE again called for its bases to participate in a national mobilization to demand once again the inclusion of their proposal in the Water Law and for the National Assembly to pass the law. Additionally, the mobilization was to "remind the public and the government" that the CONAIE had an ongoing case against the government's Mining Law in the Constitutional Court (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 11, 2011). In its press releases, the CONAIE emphasized the lack of responsiveness in the government to the Indigenous movement's demands. This protest was more successful than that of January 2009 and blocked the Pan-American Highway and other main roads in Azuay, Cañar, Loja, Morona Santiago, and Zamora Chinchipe ("CONAIE asegura que la movilización tuvo acogida," *El Universo*, January 29, 2009). However, this mobilization also resulted in the death of a Shuar protestor in the southern province of Morona Santiago during confrontations between the Indigenous protestors and police.

In January of 2010, a CONAIE assembly formulated a list of 10 demands, including the passing of the Water Law proposed by the CONAIE, the repeal of the Mining Law, the formulation of an Organic Law on Prior Consultation, and a new *Ley de*

[48] On March 19, 2010, the court declared that the Mining Law was, in fact, unconstitutional because there had not been a process of *consulta previa* with the communities affected, a right guaranteed by the constitution. However, the court concluded that because the National Assembly had not yet passed a *Ley Orgánica de Consulta Previa* (Organic Law on Prior Consultation), there was no mechanism to enforce the principle of free, prior, and informed consent, and so, the Mining Law would not be repealed. According to the CONAIE's lawyer, Mario Melo, this decision was, "unintelligible" (Melo 2010).

Tierras (Land Law) that would provide Indigenous people and communities with title to land that was then presented to the government. When the Correa administration refused to bargain, the CONAIE cut all dialogue with the government ("La movilización de la CONAIE pierde impulso," *El Comercio,* January 26, 2010). In February 2010, as a result of this rupture, the CONAIE called for a progressive national mobilization rejecting the government's proposed Water Law and opposing the rising cost of living and the Law on Mining ("La Lucha Continua" 2010). In addition to the rupture with the Correa administration, the Constitutional Court had made its "unintelligible" and controversial decision discussed above, further outraging the CONAIE and its bases. The march took place in May 2010. Then-president of the CONAIE, Marlon Santi, explained in a speech during the march, "the government can not keep passing laws without consulting with us, without including us" ("La Lucha Continua" 2010). This time, the mobilization truly was national in scope, with protestors blocking the Pan-American Highway from the northern to the southern provinces ("Los indígenas evalúan la protesta," *El Comercio*, May 17, 2010).

In 2011, the CONAIE called for national mobilizations on two occasions, both in defense of organizational leaders who had been arrested for their participation in marches in 2009 and 2010. In February 2011, the government arrested Shuar leader José (Pepe) Acacho and two others for their involvement in the September 2009 protests in which Shuar teacher Bosco Wisuma died in confrontations with police in the city of Macas in the southern Amazonian province of Morona Santiago. When the government transported the three men to Quito by helicopter due to the heavy protests in Macas led by the FICSH, the CONAIE took action ("La CONAIE anuncia protestas y demandas

internacionales," *El Comercio*, February 4, 2011). The CONAIE rapidly mobilized hundreds in Quito to protest the arrests, marching through the streets of the capital and blocking the road in front of the court. After two days of constant protest, the charges were dismissed due to violations of habeas corpus ("Respaldo indígena a favor de Pepe Acacho," *El Comercio*, February 8, 2011).

In November of 2011, the government arrested Marco Guatemal, president of the Indigenous and *Campesina* Federation of Imbabura (FICI), for his participation in the May 2010 marches that had blocked main roadways in opposition to the proposed Water Law. In early December, the CONAIE mobilized and marched from Otavalo to Ibarra (24 kilometers), demanding the liberation of Guatemal. Guatemal was found innocent of the charges based on the fact that there was no material evidence (Armas 2011).

From January 2010 through the close of 2011, the CONAIE maintained its opposition position with regard to the government. In the nearly two years without dialogue, the Correa administration worked diligently to win the support of Indigenous communities by going straight to the bases with projects and bypassing the Indigenous governmental structure. Basically, the CONAIE and the government were engaged in a battle for the loyalty of the Indigenous population within the Indigenous political arena, and much of this struggle of persuasion has played out in the realm of communication. While the government was able to use its resources to bring physical projects to Indigenous communities, the CONAIE, having extremely limited resources, had to rely upon persuasion to maintain the loyalty of its bases.

For example, in 2009, the government proposed a draft *Ley de Comunicación* (Communication Law) that was to guarantee that 34% of the frequencies allotted in

Ecuador would go to community radio stations. However, as previously discussed, these stations were to be apolitical, thus ruling out radio stations for Indigenous organizations that are filials of the CONAIE. Furthermore, this law would require all journalists to have professional degrees, a threat to many Indigenous journalists who do not have university titles (see chapter three for further discussion). Also, in 2010, the government's *Secretaría de Pueblos* (Secretary of *Pueblos*) unveiled a radio program to provide frequencies and training to the 14 Indigenous nationalities (Secretaría de Pueblos 2011). This program thus guaranteed that the government reached the Indigenous bases directly and provided access to community radio stations that the CONAIE had been demanding for two decades, but had been unable to attain. Finally, Correa utilized the extensive government media apparatus constructed during his time in office to attack the Indigenous movement, and especially the CONAIE. Correa's *sabatinos* (Saturday radio addresses) constantly referred to Indigenous leaders as "*con plumas*" (with feathers), referring to the Amazonian Indigenous traditional dress with feather detailing, and as "*ponchos dorados*" (golden ponchos), suggesting that they were corrupt (Tibán 2009; "Frases críticas de Rafael se contraponen a Ley de Medios," *El Universo*, March 20, 2012). These snippets were then repeated over the television networks – especially those owned by the government, as well as in print media, multiplying their reach. While data are not available regarding the *sabatinos* and public opinion, the constant repeating of these phrases and the insinuation – and outright accusations – of corruption in the Indigenous movement almost certainly affected the movement's credibility with its bases.

The remainder of this section will consider how the CONAIE's communication plan and its use of ICTs affected the levels of success of the organization's mobilization,

especially given the Correa administration's efforts to undermine the CONAIE. While in the pre-2007 period the CONAIE was able to call for national mobilizations that paralyzed the country (see discussion in chapter two), in the period from 2007 through 2011 the organization was less successful in its calls for national level mobilization.

Table 4.3 Mobilizations Called for by the CONAIE, 2007-2011

Mobilizations of the CONAIE				
Date	**Reason**	**Goal**	**Outcome**	**Level of Success**
June 26, 2007	Against firing of director of intercultural health in Guayas	Protest of 200-300 in Quito	Protest of 200-300 in Quito	Partially Successful
February 12, 2007	Pressure National Assembly to call for a Constitutional Assembly	March of 1000 in Quito	March of more than 1000 in Quito	Successful
July 2007	Demand the inclusion of the CONAIE proposal in the Constitutional Assembly	March of 1000 in Quito	No march	Unsuccessful
October 23, 2007	Pressure National Assembly to call for a Constitutional Assembly	March of 1000 in Quito	March of more than 1000 in Quito	Successful
November 1, 2007	Protest government concession of Block 31 (in Waorani territory) to Petrobras	March of 500 in Quito	More than 100 in Quito	Partially Successful
January 2008	Against exploitation of natural resources	March in Quito to paralyze the city	No march	Unsuccessful
February 9, 2008	Demand the inclusion of the CONAIE proposal in the Constitutional Assembly	National mobilization to march to Montecristi for the Constitutional Assembly	March of around 500 in Northwest Quito	Partially Successful
March 10-11, 2008	Opposing a government military action against the FARC and demanding the inclusion of the CONAIE proposal in the Constitutional Assembly	March of 5000 in Quito	March of more than 10000 in Quito	Successful
May 2008	Against exploitation of natural resources	March of 1000 in Quito	No march	Unsuccessful
November 16-17, 2008	Against proposed *Ley Minera* (Mining Law)	National *levantamiento* blocking roads; 20000 protestors to deliver the CONAIE's proposed Water Law	Road blocks in southern provinces; more than 5000 protestors to deliver the CONAIE's proposed Water Law	Partially Successful
January 20, 2009	Against proposed Mining Law	National *levantamiento* to block roads	Roads blocked in southern provinces only	Partially Successful
April 2009	Against government contracts with MNCs to exploit natural resources	March of 1000 in Quito	No march	Unsuccessful

September 10, 2009	Against proposed *Ley de Agua* (Water Law)	National *levantamiento* blocking roads	More than 3000 marched in the southern provinces of Azuay, Cañar, Loja, Morona Santiago, and Zamora Chinchipe	Partially Successful
September 27, 2009	Against proposed Water Law	National *levantamiento* to block roads	Pan-American Highway closed by protestors between Loja and Cuenca	Partially Successful
October 6, 2009	Support for the CONAIE leaders in their dialogue with the government regarding the Water Law and the death of Wisuma	March of 500 in Quito	March of more than 200 in Quito	Partially Successful
January 2010	Against proposed Mining Law and Water Law	National *levantamiento*	No mobilization	Unsuccessful
March 4, 2010	Against proposed Water Law	Blocking of the Pan-American in the southern provinces	More than 300 blocked the roads from Cuenca	Partially Successful
April 9, 2010	Against proposed Water Law	March of 500 in Quito	March of more than 200 in Quito	Partially Successful
May 8-17, 2010	Against proposed Mining Law and Water Law	National *levantamiento* blocking roads	Road blocks of the Pan-American Highway from the southern to the northern provinces	Successful
June 14, 2010	Against proposed Mining Law and Water Law	March of 1000 from the Amazon to Quito	March of more than 300 from the Amazon to Quito	Partially Successful
February 8, 2011	In defense of arrested FICSH president, Luis Acacho	March of 100 in Quito	March of more than 500 in Quito	Successful
April 14, 2011	Promoting a "no" vote in the *Consulta Popular* (Referendum)	Caravan of 300 from Zamora Chinchipe to Quito	Caravan of 50 from Zamora Chinchipe to Quito	Partially Successful
July 2011	In defense of *trabajadores* (workers)	March of 500 in Quito	March of more than 200 in Quito	Partially Successful
September 2011	Against exploitation of natural resources	March of 1000	No march	Unsuccessful
October 29 – November 1, 2011	In defense of arrested FICI president, Marco Guatemal	March of 300 from Otavalo to Ibarra	March of over 400 from Otavalo to Ibarra	Successful

b. *Communication Pre-2007*

Written in 1986, the original statutes of the CONAIE created the position of *Dirigente* of Media and Propaganda. This position stopped being filled in the early 1990s, although it was only officially removed from the CONAIE's statutes in 2004. During the 1990s, there was a director of communication, but this was a technical

position and had no political power within the organization. The general assembly of 1998 in Santo Domingo created the position of *dirigente* of communication; however, at that time the statutes were not officially changed and no *dirigente* was elected ("Estatutos de la CONAIE" 1999). Thus, the responsibilities of communication remained largely in the hands of administrative assistants, or of each *dirigente* to manage on their own. In interviews, respondents working in the CONAIE during the late 1990s said that the *dirigente* of culture took on many of the responsibilities with regard to communication. In the early 2000s, the organization recognized that the administrative assistants were unable to meet the demands of communication within the CONAIE, nor the increased demand for communication with the exterior.

During the period of the CONAIE's President Leonidas Iza, which began in 2001, the organization undertook a large project to reform its statutes. Under President Iza, the CONAIE created a Communication Department that was under the control of all members of the governing council (*dirigentes*), except the president. This department began functioning in 2002, and was formally included in Chapter IV, Article 36, of the reformed statutes that were approved in the general assembly of 2003. After three years of the functioning of the Communication Department, the governing council recommended that the 2004 general assembly (once again) create the position of *dirigente de comunicación* (director of communication), with the mandate to create and implement a communication plan for the organization.

It should be noted that at the close of 2011, the reformed statutes and the positions they created still had not been approved by the Council on Development of the Nationalities and Pueblos of Ecuador (CODENPE), the state entity with which the

CONAIE is registered as a legally recognized organization. However, since 2004, the *dirigente* of communication has been included in the *nombramiento*, or official register of *dirigentes*. Manuel Morocho, an employee in the legal department of the CONAIE for almost 20 years, informed me that this seeming incongruity was possible because the *nombramiento* was approved by the CODENPE, and "because CODENPE is of our own people, there is no problem" (Manuel Morocho, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, January 4, 2011). Morocho, as well as former *dirigentes* of communication, further assured me that the fact that the position does not legally exist has not affected the ability of the *dirigente* of communication to apply for funds or create programs.

Also during the period of President Iza, the CONAIE began a radio project. With funds acquired from the Center of Studies and International Cooperation (CECI), a Canadian non-governmental organization (NGO), the CONAIE constructed a recording studio in its offices. Communication expert and former technical assistant of the CONAIE, José Luis Bedón, asserted in an interview that a young French-Canadian man was a key actor in this process, bringing the expertise necessary to install the recording booth and acquire the necessary equipment, as well as the connections with those funding the project (José Luis Bedón, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 28, 2011).

The first official *dirigente* of communication, Manuel Castro of the Andean *pueblo* Kañar of the Kichwa nationality, was elected in 2004. Castro designed a communication plan that emphasized the importance of radio production for communication between the CONAIE and its bases. Castro, who served as *dirigente* of the CONAIE in a number of positions since 1988, as well as in the regional organization

of the sierra, ECUARUNARI, argued that community radio stations largely orchestrated the mobilizations in the 1990s. Consequently, his goal was for the CONAIE to produce radio programming to communicate directly with communities, rather than having to rely on local radio stations to act as intermediaries (Manuel Castro, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 25, 2011). The importance of radio programming in *levantamientos* (mobilization or uprising) in the 1990s was expressed time and again by *dirigentes* in organizations of all levels, staff of community radio stations, and grass roots community members alike.[49] A key element of Castro's original communication plan was to produce as much programming as possible in Indigenous languages, especially in Kichwa.

The CONAIE's success in obtaining the equipment and expertise necessary to produce radio programming during the period immediately before Castro arrived should have ensured the success of his communication plan. However, from 2005 through 2006, there were internal problems in the communication department that ultimately resulted in the failure of this program. The CONAIE found itself without funds to pay employees who had been working in communication. As a result, some of the recording equipment was stolen from the offices of the CONAIE, presumably to compensate for backed wages that were left unpaid (José Luis Bedón, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 28, 2011). Additionally, there was not, quite obviously, sufficient money in the budget to continually support the staff necessary to produce radio programming. In

[49] *Levantamiento* translates to uprising. In the Ecuadorian context, the Indigenous movement refers to *levantamientos* to mean disruptive – and pacific – action. Whether referring to *levantamientos* in the mid 19th century against *hacendados* in which Indigenous *huasipungueros* (see chapter two) rose up to seize land or the "*Primer Levantamiento*" of 1990, the word is always spoken with pride and always refers to uprisings without the use of arms.

almost every interview with organizations at all levels, I was told that there just was not enough money to support communication projects, especially those that require equipment, such as radio, TV, and/or film production. While this is surely true, it also implies that the priority of the organizations was not communication, as there are funds for other projects.

Although from 2001 through 2006, there were high hopes in the area of communication in the CONAIE, the radio project ultimately failed due to a lack of funds and infighting. While Castro was reluctant to discuss the reasons for the project's failure, Bedón said that Castro was "racist" against *mestizos* and unwilling to work cooperatively to produce programming (José Luis Bedón, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 28, 2011). Ultimately, in 2006, Castro left his post as *dirigente* of communication. While this period is not part of the current investigation, the context of the failure of the radio program is important in that it left an impression on the communication department, quite literally. The abandoned recording booth, stripped of microphones, mixing boards, and computers, served as a physical reminder in the CONAIE offices of the failed program and the risks entailed in pursuing a similar program in the future.

Thus, prior to 2007, communication between the CONAIE and its bases was largely through intermediary organizations – regional, provincial, and *segundo grado*. *Dirigentes* participated in assemblies throughout the country in order to hear the concerns of the bases. For mobilizations, the CONAIE relied upon its filial organizations to communicate with the bases, especially through community radio stations; mobilizational success was thus dependent upon the organizational structure of the CONAIE. However,

the CONAIE was working to create a more political communication plan to communicate directly with its bases in order to strengthen and consolidate its presence in the communities.

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

The year 2007 was carried out largely without activity in the area of communication, a result of Castro's vacating of the position of *dirigente* of communication. In the CONAIE's general assembly of January 2008, Janeth Cuji, a Kichwa communication professional from the northern Amazonian province of Sucumbíos, was elected as *dirigente* of communication to serve from 2008 through 2011.[50] Cuji, along with the President of the CONAIE for the same period, Marlon Santi, a Kichwa from the Amazonian community Sarayaku in the province of Pastaza, elaborated upon the previous communication plan to involve the use of new ICTs. Santi and Cuji especially wanted to develop a CONAIE webpage and get the presence of the CONAIE on the internet, but directly through the CONAIE and not through a third party non-governmental organization. As explained to me by Cuji in an interview, the CONAIE had a presence internationally due to its leadership role in fighting for Indigenous rights; however, it was very difficult for people to get more information about the CONAIE, both outside and within Ecuador (Janeth Cuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011). Thus, in the year 2008, there was a perceptible shift in the CONAIE from a focus on radio production to creating an Internet presence,

[50] Cuji obtained a degree in communication, meaning she studied to be a professional communicator –oral, written, visual, and/or digital.

and from wanting to strengthen the presence of the CONAIE in its bases to wanting to increase its presence in the international sphere.

In explaining why the new administration chose to shift focus, *dirigenta* of communication Cuji referred to the earlier experience of the CONAIE with its attempted radio project as a deterrent to working in the area of radio. She also mentioned that while the CONAIE would, of course, have been ecstatic to have a radio station, it was very expensive to obtain a radio frequency, making that dream appear to be practically impossible. Additionally, the failed attempt at producing radio programming dissuaded them from going back to this original plan, instead encouraging the CONAIE to look for new modes of communication, and especially those requiring less equipment (Janeth Cuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011).

The 2008 CONAIE general assembly was notable for its attention to communication in its creation of the Corporation of Audiovisual Producers of the Nationalities and *Pueblos* (CORPANP). CORPANP was to be an entity separate from the CONAIE, but that would work together with the *dirigente* of communication to promote communication within the nationalities and *pueblos* of Ecuador. The mission of CORPANP was to more broadly "promote the investigation, documentation, and audiovisual production and diffusion of the economic, social, educational, organizational, and cultural situation of the nationalities and *pueblos* of Ecuador" (CORPANP 2011). The CONAIE also envisioned that the CORPANP would serve as a capacity building organization in order to create a body of young Indigenous professionals trained in audiovisual production. Thus, there was recognition that capacity building would be an important aspect of a successful communication plan; however, the responsibility for this

was shifted to an entity outside of the CONAIE. The need to create capacity within Indigenous organizations in order to have communicators *propios* (their own) was recognized in all organizations that participated in this study. However, unlike the CONAIE (and we will later see in the ECUARUNARI), provincial and *segundo grado* organizations lacked the resources and institutional relationships with NGOs that the CONAIE (and ECUARUNARI) had in order to obtain funding for capacity building projects.

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

From 2007 through 2011, the CONAIE strategically appropriated ICTs, although there were some problems with their strategies. While the organization chose to use ICTs such as the Internet and audiovisual productions, they were not always appropriated in such a way that they appealed to, or increased the credibility of the CONAIE, with its bases. Furthermore, the heavy reliance on the Internet to diffuse all media productions meant that even those productions that would potentially resonate with their bases were not accessible.

i. Internet

In 2008, the CONAIE's newly elected *dirigenta* of communication, Janeth Cuji, and President, Marlon Santi, decided that having an up-to-date web page would create opportunities for the CONAIE. With a web page, the CONAIE would be able to produce its own news and information to distribute without having to rely upon the media or other NGOs to act as intermediaries and provide airtime and attention. Also, interested individuals, organizations, and perhaps most importantly, prospective donors, would be

able to make contact directly with the CONAIE in order to obtain information. Finally, in the 21st century, a web page serves as a mark of legitimacy, something that is especially important for prospective donors (Bob 2005; Mercer 2004; Wasserman 2005).

Given this goal but having no expertise in web page construction or maintenance, nor having staff with this expertise, Cuji looked outside of the CONAIE for assistance. In 2008, the CONAIE entered into a partnership with Entrepueblos, an NGO based in Spain that works with Indigenous populations throughout Latin America in order to create networks, especially in the areas of Indigenous human rights. The Entrepueblos-CONAIE project was designed to increase awareness in Indigenous communities about the new constitution (passed in 2008), and especially to help communities understand what is a *plurinacional* (plurinational) and *intercultural* (intercultural) state, and what the inclusion of these concepts in the constitution meant for the Indigenous movement. Through this project, Cuji worked with the Entrepueblos representatives to obtain funding to design and build a webpage, www.conaie.org. Thus, the webpage of the CONAIE was not an independent project, as the leadership had originally hoped, but rather began as part of the Entrepueblos project (Manuel Morocho, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, January 4, 2011; Janeth Cuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011). The webpage included information about the various nationalities and *pueblos* in Ecuador, updates about the CONAIE's activities, and contact information.

However, just because a technology is appropriated does not necessarily mean it is done strategically. In order to be appropriated strategically, the technologies and their uses must be reinterpreted and innovated upon in order to reflect the local culture,

symbolically and behaviorally, thereby rendering the movement and its messages as credible in the eyes of grassroots movement members. One criterion used to determine whether a technology was strategically appropriated is language. The webpage of the CONAIE contains almost no Kichwa or Shuar – the two most widely spoken Indigenous languages – and absolutely no other Indigenous languages. This was the result of two aspects of the website design process. First, the website was constructed by *mestizo* Ecuadorians who did not speak an Indigenous language. Second, the communication team decided that to translate the website into Indigenous languages would be a waste of time as they predicted that the majority of readers would be Ecuadorian *mestizos* or foreigners looking for information about the CONAIE. In fact, in interviews and during my time in the CONAIE, there was an emphasis put on translating information on the webpage into English.

Thus, it is evident that even during the webpage design process, the main audience the *dirigentes* were targeting was foreign. While Santi recognized this fact, he argued that the webpage offered up-to-date information, making it a potential tool for rapid communication with communities; his hope was that as there is more connectivity in communities, they will increasingly have continual access to the webpage. However, he conceded, "the investment costs to create informational centers with the latest technologies [e.g., computers, Internet] proved to be a limiting factor in the webpage's effectiveness [within the bases]" (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 12, 2011). The lack of funds to fully take advantage of ICTs was a challenge for all organizations, consistently limiting the effectiveness of technologies. For example, many organizations had computers that had been purchased with funds

from NGOs for a great variety of projects; however, once the projects ended, the organizations no longer had funds to buy Internet access or to repair the machines when they broke.

Prior to 2007, the CONAIE had created email accounts, but they were largely unused and defunct. Cuji and Santi made new email accounts for the CONAIE's communication department, as well as the various other departments. While many of the departmental email addresses were never used, the communication and information email accounts have been utilized heavily.[51] These addresses were made public through the webpage, and visitors to the site could also sign up to be on the CONAIE listserv. In the period 2007 through 2011, the communication team regularly used the listserv to share information about press conferences, activities, marches, and political stances taken by the CONAIE. However, communication through the listserv was at times sporadic, as there were periods in which there was a shortage of personnel and/or personnel with the technical know-how to manage the listserv. The listserv communications were in Spanish, at times with English translations, but never in Indigenous languages. It is important to note that anyone – or any entity – could sign up to be on the CONAIE listserv, ally or foe of the organization. Consequently, emails regarding mobilizations were sent to individuals and groups sympathetic to the Indigenous movement, as well as to those who were opposed to the movement, such as government agencies. Thus, the CONAIE's strategy of using email to call for participation also alerted its foes to its

[51] Prior to 2007, *dirigentes* may have utilized their own personal email accounts through Hotmail, Yahoo, Google, or another web based server. However, the institutional email addresses that were available on the internet – for example, published on nativeweb.org – were not being checked or maintained, and thus, it was difficult for outsiders to make contact with the CONAIE via email.

activities, thereby eliminating the element of surprise and giving the government the opportunity to deploy police and undercover agents at the marches.

In January of 2010, Lauren Johnson, an American volunteer with a degree in journalism, arrived in Ecuador. Patricia Gualinga, Johnson's ex-coworker from a Washington D.C. based NGO, Amazon Alliance, was from the Amazonian community of Sarayaku, and therefore *compañeros* with the CONAIE's President Santi.[52] Gualinga recommended Johnson to President Santi, and within a few weeks Lauren was set up working in the communication department of the CONAIE under Cuji. In addition to her degree in journalism, Johnson had experience in web page maintenance, and so, was charged with all web site maintenance for the CONAIE. Furthermore, Johnson was responsible for managing the CONAIE's institutional email account, sending all bulletins and other communication, taking photos and videos of all CONAIE events, and helping to organize the 10th International Film and Video Festival of Indigenous Peoples (Lauren Johnson, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, August 23, 2011). Because there were no funds for the communication department and Lauren was working as a volunteer without pay, the majority of the responsibilities fell upon her. This fact highlights the focus of the CONAIE on getting a webpage, without working towards building capacity within the organization, an important factor that will be discussed in the case of the ECUARUNARI later in this chapter.

ii. Audiovisual Productions

[52] *Compañero* translates to companion or friend. However, in Ecuador it is stronger than the word friend and implies that one is working to reach a shared goal and means something closer to partner, as in "partner in crime" or "life partner". One often hears the phrase *compañero/a en la lucha*, meaning partner in the struggle.

Johnson also introduced the CONAIE to YouTube. Given that Indigenous communication has historically been based in audio and visual forms of communication (see chapter two), it is not surprising that the governing council of the CONAIE responded wildly—and positively—to YouTube and immediately wanted to include it in the CONAIE's communication strategy. Cuji and Santi both recognized the possibilities for communication through this new and inexpensive medium (a YouTube account was free). Johnson subsequently became responsible for filming CONAIE events and press conferences, with her own Canon camera, to distribute through the CONAIE's listserv and the web page. The use of YouTube reflects an attempt to strategically appropriate a technology available through the Internet. The small productions done by Johnson included *música folclórica* (Indigenous folkloric music), images of Indigenous people from nationalities and *pueblos* throughout Ecuador, and powerful bits of speeches by the CONAIE's leadership, especially from its charismatic President Santi. Many of these videos contained individuals speaking in Indigenous languages.

President Santi emphasized that another benefit of YouTube productions was that they had the potential to fill the "vacuum" often left by the national media outlets with respect to Indigenous news (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 12, 2011). Santi, along with the majority of other Indigenous leaders with whom I spoke, complained that the national news coverage gave 30 seconds to one minute to Indigenous issues, when it covered these issues at all. YouTube was a way that the CONAIE could produce its own news reports—a minimum of 10 minutes each—that would be accessible not only in Ecuador, but throughout the world (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichinhca, Ecuador, April 11, 2011). Unfortunately,

because the availability of the YouTube productions depended upon access to the Internet, the videos did not reach their intended Indigenous audience.

While, from 2010 through 2011, the CONAIE focused heavily on strengthening its web presence, including the added element of audiovisual production, from 2008 through 2011 the newly created CORPANP worked exclusively in the production of audiovisual programming. CORPANP developed Runa TV, an online "TV station" with programming available for streaming through YouTube. Runa TV had three different series, all in Kichwa: first, *Kikinyari* (Identity) was a series of 24 documentaries about the various nationalities and *pueblos* of Ecuador; second, *Kaypimi Kanchik* (Here We Are) was a series of 14 documentaries sharing Indigenous knowledge and thought; and finally, *La Voz del Pueblo* (Voice of the People) was a collection of seven documentaries regarding the Indigenous struggle both within and outside of Ecuador (CORPANP 2011). While these productions strengthen Indigenous knowledge bases, use Indigenous languages, and reflect the reality of the Indigenous *pueblos* and nationalities of Ecuador, the productions remained available mostly through the Internet, seriously limiting the reach of these productions outside of urban centers such as Quito. Other organizations, such as the ECUARUNARI, also produced audiovisual productions and were more successful in ensuring their productions reached their bases by distributing the videos on DVDs in its base communities.

CORPANP served as a space in which the more than 20 youth who had worked in the organization gained experience and expertise. Furthermore, more than 100 youths have participated in capacity building workshops organized by the organization. However, this knowledge and capacity has not been shared adequately with the CONAIE.

Since the creation of CORPANP in 2008, the CORPANP and the CONAIE, while certainly working on the same side of the Indigenous struggle in Ecuador and in opposition to the Correa administration, were not working together. The productions of the CORPANP were largely cultural, working to rescue and share Indigenous identity, cultural practices, and knowledge, while the CONAIE worked more in the political arena. While these two complementary agendas could have greatly benefited from a two-part communication strategy with the bases, there was almost no communication or coordination between CORPANP and the CONAIE's *dirigente* of communication, Janeth Cuji.

Furthermore, the youth participants of the capacity building workshops continued their studies in universities, started projects with their provincial or *segundo grado* organizations, or continued to work with the CORPANP. However, as of May of 2011 when Humberto Cholango replaced President Santi as President of the CONAIE, not one of these skilled youths had integrated into the communication team of the CONAIE.[53] Between June and December of 2011, the leaders of the CORPANP did form a youth council together with the CONAIE's *dirigente* of youth; however, this group remained largely separate from the communication department of the CONAIE, instead pursuing its own agenda.[54] Consequently, the CONAIE had not benefited from the increased expertise in the Indigenous youth with regards to audiovisual production.

[53] In conversations with employees of the CONAIE, I was told that the youths working in the CORPANP were not interested in working together with the CONAIE. In conversations with employees of the CORPANP, I was told that the CONAIE was not interested in working with them. After time spent with both organizations, I gathered that the former president of the CONAIE, Marlon Santi, did not personally get along well with the former president of the CORPANP, Eliana Champutiz, and so, the two entities chose to remain separate.

[54] Part of the separation between the youth council and the communication department of the CONAIE in the year 2011 can be explained by the fact that the *dirigente* of communication elected in the 2011 congress

e. *Creative Adaptation*

The CONAIE creatively adapted its use of new ICTs with changes in the Indigenous political arena made by the government; however, its adaptation was limited. First, the Correa administration's confrontational stance with respect to the national media outlets (discussed in chapter three) meant that this industry – historically of the elites – found itself on the defensive (Orlando 2012). Furthermore, the government was using its own (new) national media outlets to attack the Indigenous movement and its leaders. Thus, the CONAIE effectively took advantage of the resultant chasm between the government and national media outlets to increase its national presence; however, this presence existed largely outside of the Indigenous political arena, meaning that these broadcasts did not reach the bases living in rural areas.

The Correa administration's proposed Communication Law would have far reaching effects, including in the Indigenous political arena, limiting the funding possibilities and content possible for community radio stations (discussed in chapter three) and requiring that journalists have professional degrees. While the CONAIE recognized this threat and participated in the drafting of an alternative Communication Law, its participation was minimal. Instead, the CONAIE depended upon Pachakutik to participate in the debate surrounding the Communication Law.

Finally, the Correa administration signed new contracts with the mobile telephone service providers Otecel, S.A., and Conocel, S.A., guaranteeing a minimum expansion plan in rural areas. The CONAIE took advantage of the cell phone infrastructure

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of the CONAIE was extremely ill from May 2011 through the close of this study in December 2011. However, it is perhaps demonstrative of the little importance given to communication that an interim *dirigente* was not put in place during this time.

throughout the country—infrastructure that was a direct result of legislation and contracts of the government ensuring coverage in rural areas—to foster communication between the organization's leaders and its filial organizations, especially during mobilizations.

i. National Media

Chapter three discussed the aggressive moves of President Rafael Correa's administration to seize private media enterprises in 2008 and 2009, moves that initiated a fight between the independent press and the government.[55] The CONAIE and other Indigenous organizations had long complained that the national media outlets had ignored or belittled the Indigenous movement, often offering biased and racist coverage of mobilizations. However, beginning in 2008, the CONAIE took advantage of the chasm between the media and the government to create an opportunity to get more coverage by holding more press conferences and sending President Santi to do interviews whenever possible. Santi explained that the communication team created a network based on personal relationships with reporters from the various news networks. In Santi's opinion, he was a favorite interview guest because of his oppositional position with respect to President Correa and his "confrontational, explosive, and entertaining" rhetoric (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 11, 2011). The combination of regularly held press conferences, announced both via email and by phone calls to key reporters from the national networks, and the personal rapport built between President Santi and morning news anchors, resulted in a greater presence of

[55] In 2008, President Correa issued an executive order stating that banks could have direct control over media outlets, resulting in the seizure of no less than seven media outlets. In 2009, Correa signed executive order number 1793, modifying the Law on Public Contracts and making it illegal for the government to sign contracts with businesses outside of Ecuador.

the CONAIE on the national TV networks that reach beyond the capital city into rural homes.[56]

However, this presence had unintended consequences, especially with regard to mobilizations. Santi's presence on the national networks meant that the information about mobilizations was broadcast for all the country to see and hear, including logistics such as the date and the route of the marches. Thus, the government had time to deploy national police to block roads and prevent protestors from reaching Quito. Also, the political party of Correa, Alianza PAIS, frequently organized countermarches in coordination with the CONAIE's mobilizations to demonstrate the lasting popularity of Correa.

ii. Communication Law

From 2009 through the end of 2011, the CONAIE participated in the debate surrounding the *Ley de Comunicación* (Communication Law). While the CONAIE did not draft a law, it did work together with Assemblywoman Lourdes Tibán, of the Pachakutik political party, in order to fight against President Correa's initially proposed draft of the law. Furthermore, the CONAIE – through Assemblywoman Tibán – demanded that the law include at least 34% of all radio frequencies for community radio stations, including Indigenous organizational stations, although they curiously did not demand that the law specify that these stations could have political content. However, Cuji and Santi ultimately left Tibán and the other assemblywomen and men from Pachakutik, such as Geronimo Yantalema and Diana Atamaint, to fight against the

[56] In 2008, more than 83% of Ecuadorians reported having a television in their homes, and this number rose to more than 85% in 2010 (INEC 2011).

proposed law. Thus, the CONAIE was concerned with the proposed law, while it simultaneously recognized its possibilities to benefit the Indigenous movement; however, the Communication Law was not a high priority on the agenda of the CONAIE, and it therefore left Pachakutik to fight alone.

iii. Cell Phones

To use cell phones was not initially a strategic decision of the CONAIE's leadership, but rather a reality of everyday life that was integrated into the functioning of the organization. During the period from 2007 through 2011, every *dirigente* of the CONAIE had a cell phone, and while there was a landline in the CONAIE office, when *dirigentes* traveled to Indigenous communities outside of the capital they rarely encountered fixed lines available for use. The availability of cellular telephones, as a result of rural coverage by cell phone providers, was a direct result of government legislation and contracts. These contracts (discussed in chapter three) demanded that the three mobile service providers in Ecuador, Otecel, S.A., Conocel, S.A., and Alegro, complied with a minimum expansion plan in rural areas.

The Indigenous movement took advantage of the resultant cellular coverage in rural areas to create a new, if loose, communication network based on cellular phones. *Dirigentes* of the CONAIE relied heavily upon their phones to communicate amongst themselves when traveling outside of Quito, as well as to connect with their home communities when working in the capital city. Former CONAIE President Santi reported that his cell phone was "the most valuable tool" he had during his presidency because it had all of his contacts and their phone numbers so that he could get in touch with anyone,

anytime (Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 11, 2011).

As mentioned, the government often attempted to stop buses and block roadways leading to Quito in order to prevent protestors from reaching the capital. However, *dirigentes* of the CONAIE and its filial organizations used their cell phones in order to coordinate and avoid the police roadblocks. According to Cuji, "when the government blocked the Pan-American Highway leading to Quito, people on the buses would call one of us *dirigentes* in Quito to let us know where they were stopped, then we would call the other *dirigentes* we knew were on their way to tell them to take a different route" (Janeth Cuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011). In this way, the *dirigentes* of the CONAIE creatively adapted the use of their cellular phones in order to circumvent government impediments to mobilizations. At the close of 2011, there had not been attempts made by the government to block cell phone reception during mobilizations, as has occurred in other countries, such as Iran ("Iran blocks TV, radio and phone – web proves more difficult," *The Guardian UK,* June 15, 2009).

However, the CONAIE's network was not systematically defined, but instead an ad hoc calling of *dirigentes* as needed, meaning that there was a risk that information would not reach some organizations. In fact, in April 2011, the CONAIE's congress to elect new *dirigentes* was extended to a second weekend. The CONAIE attempted to contact all organizations with information about the second weekend; however, the emails and phone calls never reached at least one organization, the Confederation of Indigenous Organizations of Chimborazo (COMICH). Manuel Morocho, President of the COMICH in 2011, expressed anger at not having been contacted about the congress, and

said, “I don’t know what they are doing in Quito. They think we all have Internet and email, well, I can barely even read. They should have called or come to visit” (Manuel Morocho, interview with author, Riobamba, Chimborazo, Ecuador, May 26, 2011).

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

The CONAIE did not successfully target their audiences, but instead catered to one (external) audience at the expense of the other (internal). The CONAIE’s communication strategy depended largely upon the Internet, which subsequently meant that its strategy resulted nearly exclusively in external communication. Or, in other words, the communication strategy of the CONAIE was focused on communicating with actors outside of the Ecuadorian Indigenous political arena, rather than with actors within the arena. Furthermore, the technologies the CONAIE chose to use inherently excluded a major audience - its Indigenous base.

g. *Mobilizations and ICTs: The Causal Relationship*

The question to be addressed here is not if, but why the mobilizations discussed in this section were successful or unsuccessful. In interviews with grassroots movement members throughout Ecuador, I was told consistently that individuals did not feel connected to the CONAIE, that they did not have a way to share their concerns with the organization, that they felt the organization was not representing them, and that they did not know what, if anything at all, the organization was doing. In 2010, the largest daily newspaper, *El Comercio*, even ran a series of articles interviewing Indigenous *comuneros* who said they were unaware of a recent mobilization called for by the CONAIE.

In interviews and informal discussions with *comuneros*, not one had visited the CONAIE webpage, and most said they did not have regular access to the Internet or the know-how necessary to navigate the web. Thus, among grassroots movement members, the use of the Internet practically had no effect; the webpage and email of the CONAIE did not help to foster a sense of credibility, nor did it erode trust of *comuneros* in the CONAIE. Simply, it did not exist in the world of the bases.

Younger activists (age 15-30) reported more access to and comfort using the Internet; however, they said they mostly used the internet to talk with friends, enter in their Facebook pages, and do homework. Thus, the Internet, even when available, was less of a political tool and more of a social one. However, this could change, and in fact, in late 2011, the CONAIE had rehabilitated their Facebook page and was updating it more regularly, a sign that the organization recognized the potential for using this medium to reach young activists.

While more Indigenous individuals living in rural areas had access to TV than to the Internet, national news broadcasts still did not reach many homes. Thus, while some *comuneros* reported having seen President Santi on TV, the majority of individuals with whom I spoke had not learned of marches of activities of the CONAIE by seeing Santi on news programs. Furthermore, the use of the national media outlets meant that not only the Indigenous audience within the Indigenous political arena had access to information about marches, but also instead, the details were broadcast to the general public, including the Ecuadorian state. Subsequently, the government was able to deploy military and police to block highways leading to Quito in order to keep protestors from reaching the city.

Part of the disconnect between the CONAIE and its bases can be traced to the traditional form of organization and communication within the CONAIE and its filial organizations, and the way the reliance on new ICTs ruptured these practices. Historically, the decision to mobilize was an organic decision made from the bottom up. The *segundo grado* organizations would issue a mandate to their representative provincial organizations saying they wanted to mobilize. The provincial organization would then announce their support for a mobilization to their respective regional organization, the ECUARUNARI, CONFENIAE, or CONAICE. The three regional organizations would then together with the CONAIE decide if a national *levantamiento* was necessary and had the support of the majority of the bases. Hypothetically this process is still in place; however, one can imagine that this method of consultation can take time – sometimes months. The decision should ideally come from the bases, but by the time the actual call for mobilization takes place, time has passed, the message often does not arrive in communities, and if it does, it is often not communicated clearly enough that the bases realize their own demands are those being articulated. The decision-making and communication processes are illustrated in Figure 4.3.



Figure 4.3 Decision Making and Communication Process to Call for a Mobilization

Following this historical logic, the CONAIE continued to send representatives to assemblies of the provincial and *segundo grado* organizations to call for participation in mobilizations (Janeth Chuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011; Marlon Santi, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, April 11, 2011). These organizations then were responsible for communicating with their constituent communities. However, as explained by Cuji, since 2007, the CONAIE sent delegates less and less often and its main strategy became to "call the leaders to Quito, make a decision, call for a press conference," send President Santi to do interviews, and make information available through the webpage and the listserv (Janeth Chuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011). Santi argued that the interviews were important for reaching the bases because the national networks were available throughout the country. In interviews with *comuneros*, while some said they had seen President Santi on the television once in awhile, they said this did not impact their decision to participate or not participate in a mobilization. Rather, seeing Santi on TV brought a sense of excitement in seeing a member of one's community on national

television. Furthermore, Cuji said of their strategy, "[it] hasn't been a very good strategy. Before, everyone would come and everyone would be here [in Quito] and it would be a surprise for the government" (Janeth Chuji, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, March 20, 2011). However, the spreading of information through national media outlets meant that mobilizations were no longer a surprise and the government had the opportunity to shut roads and prevent buses loaded with protestors from reaching Quito.

The use of cell phones increased opportunities for communication between leaders in order to share information about mobilizations. However, the ad hoc nature in which the *dirigentes* used phones limited their usefulness. The CONAIE did not have a system in place for calling leaders of filial organizations, meaning that organizations were, at times, forgotten. The important role of cell phones is more obvious once a mobilization was already under way. For example, leaders used cell phones to communicate with Indigenous protestors who were attempting to reach Quito and encountered roads blocked by the government. These protestors would then share this information with the CONAIE's leadership, who would then call other protestors headed for Quito to tell them to take a different route. Moreover, the reliance on cell phones (and email) for communicating with its constituent organizations without a defined system meant that the CONAIE failed to contact some organizations, resulting in a feeling of alienation from the CONAIE within its filial organizations, as in the example discussed above of the COMICH.

From 2007 through 2011, the communication strategy of the CONAIE did appropriate ICTs and adapted to a changing political arena. However, it did not

appropriate ICTs strategically in order to reach its bases. Furthermore, an increased media presence resulted in the image of the CONAIE reaching its bases, or at least those with TV. However, without a successful strategy to reach the bases directly through face-to-face contact, as it had historically done, or through ICTs that are felt to be more personal by *comuneros*, such as the radio, the relationship between the CONAIE and its grassroots member only grew more distanced and strained. The move away from bottom up decision-making only further exacerbated the situation. The resources and effort the CONAIE could have put into connecting with its bases were instead used in a communication strategy that reached outside of the Indigenous political arena, rather than inside. Instead, grassroots movement members largely reported that they heard about CONAIE mobilizations from their own local *dirigentes* and participated because their local organizations encouraged (or required) it. This highlights the continued importance of the organizational structure of the CONAIE to mobilize its bases. However, as shown in this section, the increasing dependence on new ICTs has resulted in a lack of communication and confidence between the CONAIE and its filial organizations, slowly eroding this organizational structure. Thus, the CONAIE's dependence on new ICTs ruptured their traditional forms of communication and organization.

IV. *Regional – The ECUARUNARI*

a. *Mobilizations, 2007-2011*

Flames jump from tires to piles of eucalyptus branches, filling the air with a heavy kind of acrid sweetness. Men, women, and children *zapatear* in a circle around men playing *música folclórica* on the *quena* (panflute), panpipes, and guitar. National

police in their camouflage uniforms look on as the *paro* (roadblock) continues. When they attempt to break up the burning material, the protestors come rushing to defend their roadblock, making a human shield through which the police cannot pass. The ECUARUNARI is composed of communities throughout the Ecuadorian sierra, communities which surround the Pan-American Highway, making roadblocks the strategy of choice for putting pressure on the national, provincial, and local governments.

During the period from 2007 through 2011, the Kichwa Confederation of the Sierra (ECUAURNARI) called for at least 17 mobilizations, 12 of which were complete successes and four of which were partially successful.[57] Many of the mobilizations of the ECUARUNARI coincided with those of the CONAIE, discussed earlier in this chapter. However, the ECUARUNARI also mobilized – especially in the southern sierra – against the government's proposed Mining and Water Laws.

For example, the ECUARUNARI called for mobilizations in the city of Cuenca, capital of the Azuay province, in September 2009, in the province of Zamora Chinchipe in October 2009, and again in Cuenca in March and April of 2010. In these mobilizations, protestors blocked the Pan-American Highway and routes leading from Cuenca to the coast, causing significant economic disruption within Ecuador ("Unas 3000 personas protestaron hoy por la Ley de Aguas en Cuenca," *El Comercio*, November 9, 2009; "En Zamora, la protesta indígena empieza hoy," *El Comercio*, October 2, 2009; "Masiva convocatoria en protesta en Cuenca," *El Comercio*, March 3, 2010;

[57] Mobilizations called for and the level of success were determined by compiling data provided to me personally by the ECUARUNARI, information distributed through the ECUARUNARI listserv, and as reported in two national daily newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*. The newspaper searches, conducted through their online databases, included the key words ECUARUNARI, *levantamiento indígena sierra, indio sierra, paro sierra, movilización indígena sierra* and were for all dates between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011.

"Manifestación de ayer fue solo un "abreboca": ECUARUNARI," *El Comercio*, April 9, 2010). Another large-scale mobilization called for by the ECUARUNARI was in March of 2010, when more than 3,000 Indigenous protestors blocked roads in the southern Andean province of Azuay in opposition to the Law on Mining and to put pressure on the government to pass the Water Law. Thus, the largest and most successful mobilizations of the ECUARUNARI were those in defense of the *Pachamama*, and especially in opposition to the Correa administration's Mining Law, which would directly affect ECUARUNARI communities in the southern Sierra by allowing large-scale mining.

The remainder of this section will consider the communication strategies of the ECUARUNARI before 2007, as well as from 2007 through 2011. It will show how the strategies of the ECUARUNARI with regard to the use of new ICTs helped the organizations to achieve high levels of success in its mobilizations.

Table 4.4 Mobilizations Called for by the ECUARUNARI, 2007-2011

Mobilizations of the ECUARUNARI				
Date	**Reason**	**Goal**	**Outcome**	**Level of Success**
January 30, 2007	Pressure National Assembly to call for a Constitutional Assembly	March of 300 in El Arbolito Park, Quito	March of more than 700 in Quito	Successful
February 13, 2007	Pressure National Assembly to call for a Constitutional Assembly	March of 500 in Quito	March of more than 200 in Quito	Partially Successful
October 22, 2007	Deliver ECUARUNARI's proposal for the Constitutional Assembly to the National Assembly	Protest of 500 until the assemblymen and women accepted the proposal	More than 200 participated	Partially Successful
August 20, 2008	Announcing the ECUARUNARI supports a "yes" vote on the proposed constitution	Concentration of more than 1000	Concentration of more than 5000	Successful
November 19, 2008	Against the proposed *Ley de Agua* (Water Law) and the presentation of the ECUARUNARI's own Water Law	March of 3000 in Cajas	March of more than 5000 in Cajas	Successful
January 20, 2009	Against proposed *Ley Minera* (Mining Law) and Water Law	*Levantamiento* blocking the Pan-American Highway	*Levantamiento* blocked the Pan-American Highway throughout the sierra	Successful

March 2009	Against Mining Law and Water Law	*Levantamiento* blocking the Pan-American Highway	No mobilization	Unsuccessful
September 11, 2009	Against proposed Mining Law and Water Law	March of 1000 in Cuenca	March of more than 3000 in Cuenca	Successful
October 2, 2009	Against proposed Mining Law and Water Law and demanding dialogue with the President	March of 300 in Zamora Chinchipe	March of more than 500 in Zamora Chinchipe	Successful
March 3, 2010	Against Mining Law and proposed Water Law	March of 1000 in Cuenca	March of more than 3000 in Cuenca	Successful
April 8, 2010	Against Mining Law and proposed Water Law	March of 500 in Cuenca	March of more than 200 in Cuenca	Partially Successful
May 5, 2010	Against Mining Law and proposed Water Law	March of 1000 in Quito	March of more than 400 in Quito	Partially Successful
June 15, 2010	Against Water Law and celebrating 20th anniversary of the 1990 *levantamiento*	Participation of 100 in march from Puyo to Quito	Participation of more than 100 in march from Puyo to Quito	Successful
September 2010	Demanding government of Loja finish public works projects	Protest of 300 in Loja	Protest of more than 300 and taking of government offices in Loja	Successful
February 2011	In defense of arrested FICSH president, Luis Acacho	March of 200 in Quito	March of more than 300 in Quito	Successful
October 2011	Against government Transportation Law	March of 500 in Latacunga	March of more than 3000 in Latacunga	Successful
October 29 – November 1, 2011	In defense of arrested FICI president, Marco Guatemal	Vigil in Ibarra outside of courthouse with participation of 100	Vigil with participation of more than 300	Successful

b. *Communication, Pre-2007*

The ECUARUNARI was formed in 1972 as a confederation of the Kichwa *pueblos* of the Ecuadorian sierra. Communication in the ECUARUNARI has a long history, claiming its roots in the Incan system of *chaskis*. *Chaskis* were messengers who served as links between communities. When there was news to share, a *chaski* would run to a neighboring community and tell that community's *chaski* the news, and that second *chaski* would then tell the next, and so on. At the point of the ECUARUNARI's inception, it constructed a *chaski* system in its constituent communities throughout the Ecuadorian sierra. Each community had one identified *chaski* who served as the link between the community and other communities, as well as between the community and

the ECUARUNARI. In fact, the communication department of the ECUARUNARI is named Ecuachaski and includes not only the ECUARUNARI's immediate communication team, but also the entire network of *chaskis*. The ECUARUNARI also took advantage of the community radio stations throughout the Ecuadorian sierra. While the ECUARUNARI never had their own radio frequency, they consistently passed messages through the community radios.

Thus, in calls for mobilizations prior to 2007, the ECUARUNARI depended upon face-to-face communication between *dirigentes* and the *dirigentes* and members of *segundo grado* organizations and face-to-face communication between *chaskis*. The organization also took advantage of the community radio stations throughout the sierra to further reach their bases.

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

From 2007 through 2009, the President of the ECUARUNARI was Humberto Cholango from the *pueblo* Kayambe of the province of Pichincha, and the *dirigente* of communication was Joaquín Toroshina of the *pueblo* Quisaphincha of the province of Tungurahua. From 2009 through 2011, Delfín Tenesaca, from the *pueblo* Puruwa of the province of Chimborazo, was President, and Patricio Shingri, of the *pueblo* Kañar of the province of Azuay, was the *dirigente* of communication. The *dirigentes* arrived in office with an established communication department, Ecuachaski, already in place. The communication plan of the ECUARUNARI during the period under study was two fold: first, the organization worked to build capacity in its bases and in the organization in order to have more social communicators; and second, the organization produced communicational materials. The communication plan emphasized the production of

radio programming, audiovisual productions, and written materials. Additionally, the ECUARUNARI created not one, but two, websites. For more than 20 years, the ECUARUNARI had published a monthly magazine, *Rikcharishun*, which the organization continued from 2007 thorough 2011. However, this section will focus on the communication materials and strategies that emphasized the use of new ICTs.

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

i. Cell Phones

Like in the CONAIE, *dirigentes* of the ECUARUNARI arrived in Quito with cell phones in hand, and so, the use of cell phones was not necessarily a strategic decision at the beginning. However, the Ecuachaski team realized the potential for strengthening its Ecuachaski *chaski* network, discussed above, by integrating cell phones into the functioning of the network. The ECUARUNARI compiled a database of contact numbers and information of the *chaskis* in each organization and community and developed a call tree to be employed when there was information to be shared quickly throughout the sierra. Thus, the use of a new technology, the cell phone, strengthened a traditional form of communication, the *chaski* network. When the ECUARUNARI wanted to call for a mobilization, it then had only to activate the *chaski* call-tree and the information could be rapidly communicated through trusted individuals.

ii. Internet

Since the early 2000s, the ECUARUNARI had a webpage, www.ecuarunari.org. According to one technical assistant of the ECUARUNARI, the webpage served as a "window to the world outside," through which anyone could learn this history of the

ECUARUNARI, the names and communities of the *dirigentes*, information about the *pueblos*, and see various news articles about the activities of the ECUARUNARI (Technical assistant of the ECUARUNARI, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 24, 2011). Technical assistants within the ECUARUNARI, all of whom were Indigenous, managed this webpage. The webpage was published exclusively in Spanish, and the goal was to share information with individuals and organizations outside of the Indigenous political arena in Ecuador.

In late 2009, the communication team of ECUARUNARI decided there should be another webpage written more directly for individuals and organizations within the Indigenous political arena in Ecuador. This new site, www.ecuachaski.blogspot.com, was regularly updated with news from ECUARUNARI, its filial organizations, and its umbrella organization, the CONAIE. While the site was written in Spanish, the subject matter—current Indigenous events—was more relevant to the ECUARUNARI's bases than a website with general organizational information. Furthermore, because it was a blogspot website, it required minimal technical expertise and, thus, was a space that allowed for greater participation by the entire communication team, rather than depending on one technical assistant with the technical know-how to update the site, as with the ecuarunari.org site.

The fact that the ECUARUNARI worked to build capacity in its constituent communities meant there were a greater number of people with the technical skills to access the Internet. The ECUARUNARI, in line with its communication plan goal to build capacity in the field of communication in its bases, and especially amongst the youth, carried out many capacity building workshops in communities throughout the

Andean sierra between 2007 and 2011. Each workshop included 15 youths from each federation within the ECUAURUNARI and taught skills like how to write news articles, how to carry out an interview, and how to produce a radio program. The youths then had the opportunity to submit their written news articles to the ECUARUNARI to be published on the ecuachaski.blogspot.com site.

The idea of the blogspot page was based on the principle of the *minga.* A *minga* is a pre-Incan form of community work that is still employed throughout Latin America (Tibán 2004). When the community, or a community member, needs to construct a building, host a *fiesta* (party), or other such large undertaking, the entire community is convened to participate in the construction or activity. For example, during the fieldwork for this dissertation, there was a project to create an irrigation system in five communities in the province of Cotopaxi. The communities together announced when there was to be a *minga*, and each household was then required to send at least one member to participate in the work. Thus, by teaching individuals in communities how to write effective news articles, and then encouraging them to share these articles—framing it as their responsibility to contribute to the webpage as part of a greater *minga*—the ECUARUNARI effectively turned a 21st century practice (blogging) into something that resonated within the cultural context of rural community members.

The ECUARUNARI had an institutional email, as well as an Ecuachaski listserv. Through the listserv, the organization sent information about its own activities as well as those of its filial organizations, assemblies, press releases, and information about the CONAIE. Anyone could sign up to be on the listserv through the ECUARUNARI's organizational webpage. The emails were always in Spanish. Unlike the CONAIE, the

ECUARUNARI did not email information about their marches ahead of time, only reports about the marches during the course of mobilizations.

iii. Audiovisual Productions

In the period under study, the ECUARUNARI regularly produced audiovisual productions. Ecuachaski made numerous videos, both non-fiction and fiction. For example, there was an Indigenous justice series in which they made videos of four different Indigenous judicial proceedings in four different communities of the sierra region. These videos were in both Kichwa and Spanish. For the ECUARUNARI, these videos were an important tool for educating their bases about the collective right to carry out *justicia indígena* that is guaranteed in the constitution, but that does not have a long history of being institutionalized or regularly practiced in the Ecuadorian Andes (Tibán 2004). Another example was a series of videos based on Andean legends. These productions were sometimes distributed through YouTube and the Internet, but more often they were burned onto CDs and distributed through the Ecuachaski network, guaranteeing that they arrived in each community and were then made available to community members. This strategy stands in stark contrast to that of the CONAIE, which relied upon the Internet to share audiovisual productions.

iv. Radio

The ECUARUNARI had, since its inception, produced informational materials to be distributed through the community radio stations of its filial organizations and communities, a practice that continued from 2007 through 2011. In its headquarters in Quito, the organization had the basic equipment necessary for recording—a computer,

microphones, and mixing board. In 2006, the equipment was upgraded, paid for by the general budget of the ECUARUNARI. *Dirigentes* recorded messages when there was something important, such as an impending mobilization, and the information was spread through the network of community radio stations. These messages were recorded in Kichwa, as well as in Spanish. In this way, the ECUARUNARI was able to maintain a constant and direct link with its bases. Thus, while the ECUARUNARI radio project was less glamorous than that attempted by the CONAIE in 2004 through 2006, it was simple and effective. The simplicity of the ECUARUNARI project—there was no recording booth or studio and only very basic recording equipment—ensured its continuation, and the directness of its messages from the *dirigentes* in Kichwa, distributed through community radio stations, guaranteed the messages would reach the bases.

e. *Creative Adaptation*

The strategy of the ECUARUNARI with regard to the government in the Indigenous political arena was largely one of avoidance; the organization avoided any and all confrontation with the government in the area of communication. The government made it difficult for Indigenous and community radio stations to renew and/or amplify their frequencies (as discussed in chapter three). However, because the ECUARUNARI distributed its radio productions through other organizations' stations it did not have to deal directly with frequency renewals or applications, and it chose not to get involved in these struggles.

While the CONAIE took advantage of the rift between the administration and the national media outlets (discussed earlier in this chapter), the ECUARUNARI, under both Presidents Cholango and Tenesaca, preferred not to increase public appearances in the

national media, but rather to limit these interviews to key moments when they wanted to win over the Ecuadorian public. Also, it left the battle about the Communication Law to the CONAIE and assemblymen and women from Pachakutik. While one could argue that avoidance is, in fact, a strategy, for the purposes of this dissertation the fact that the strategy did not change in the period of 2007 through 2011, combined with the attacks of the administration on community radio stations of the filial organizations of the ECUARUNARI, means that the organization did not creatively adapt to changes in the Indigenous political arena, but simply continued with previous practices.

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

Distinguishing and targeting of audiences appeared to have the least strong relationship with the dependent variable, mobilization, and seemed to actually be contained within the other two variables. However, in the case of the ECUARUNARI, the organization successfully distinguished and targeted their audiences, even through new ICTs such as the Internet that tend to automatically target specific audiences. After years of having only the organizational webpage, the ECUARUNARI realized the fact that this page was reaching only an external audience. The organization then effectively identified its distinct audiences – its bases within the Indigenous political arena and its external audience – and produced a second web page with a different strategy in order to reach its internal audience. One page, www.ecuarunari.org, was left as it was to be directed toward an external audience, while the other, www.ecuachaski.blogspot.com, was strategically appropriated in order to function in a way that was distinct from typical webpages in order to appeal to ECUARUNARI's bases. The blogspot webpage contained detailed information about mobilizations, including why the mobilization was

necessary, where and when it would be taking place, and how many participants the ECUARNARI hoped for. However, this information was never presented on the institutional webpage. One young woman who was part of the Ecuachaski team informed me that they did not put information about protests on the www.ecuarunari.org website because, "we don't want potential donors to see that we are calling for a protest and think that means that the situation is not stable. NGOs like stability" (Employee of ECUARUNARI, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, May 24, 2011).

Radio production, by the simple fact that it is distributed through community radio stations with links to the ECUARUNARI, reached only the bases and not the broader public. That these productions were mostly in Kichwa further limited the audience able to understand the messages. In fact, one communication technician with whom I spoke referred to the fact that they purposely do not make this audio material available on the www.ecuarunari.org webpage because it was produced for their bases, not the broader public. Finally, because their audiovisual productions were largely distributed through CDs, the ECUARUNARI had more control over who had access to the productions.

g. *Mobilizations and ICT: The Causal Mechanism*

The ECUARUNARI was completely successful in 70% of the mobilizations it called for, while the CONAIE was completely successful only 20% of the time. Furthermore, the ECUARUNARI had an overall mobilization success rate of 94%, 18% higher than that of the CONAIE. The greatest difference in strategy can be seen in the strategic appropriation of the use of ICTs. The ECUARUNARI successfully incorporated the use of new ICTs, such as cell phones and the Internet, into traditional

forms of communication, like the Ecuachaski network, while the CONAIE did not. Thus, the use of ICTs by the ECUARUNARI made sense to its bases given their understanding of the world and their every day experiences in communication, and so, the use of ICTs did not rupture the trust *comuneros* had in the organization, but instead strengthened the link between the ECUARUNARI and its bases.

In interviews, the Indigenous youths who participated in the capacity building workshops referred to the ecuachaski.bologspot.com webpage as a *minga*, illustrating the success of the Ecuachaski team in constructing and promoting the blogspot page with a cultural reference point. The youths with whom I spoke, who were grassroots members of the ECUARUNARI and its filial organizations, said they use the Internet for social purposes and homework. However, they also said that they use the Internet, and especially Facebook, to stay connected with each other, with the national *dirigentes*, and with the Ecuachaski team. Consequently, the ECUARUNARI had a youth base that was active in the organization, including during marches, and was creatively using the Internet and social networks to stay connected with the organization and with each other.

Nevertheless, limited access to the Internet meant that even if the appropriation of this technology was strategic, its reach was limited. The majority of grassroots movement members instead reported receiving information from the ECUARUNARI through the radio. *Comuneros* reported having high levels of trust in their community radio stations, many of which people said they had listened to their entire lives. Furthermore, they expressed contempt and mistrust of the national news networks, which they said were corrupt and responded only to business interests and the *ricos* (rich), or to President Correa. *Comuneros* said that they received most of their information about the

ECUARUNARI through radio broadcasts in which the president of the ECUARUNARI informed them about what the organization was doing, what the main issues of the day were, and about activities in which the organization was participating. Furthermore, they reported feeling "confident" that when the ECUARUNARI called for their participation in a mobilization, it was likely for a good reason and they had a sense of "responsibility" to participate.

In addition to the radio broadcasts, *comuneros* said they learned about the activities of the ECUARUNARI, such as mobilizations, in assemblies in which *dirigentes* of the ECUARUNARI were present. When a *dirigente* was not present, *comuneros* reported that a representative of the community would inform them about the ECUARUNARI's activities. These individuals were likely the *chaskis* who formed the Ecuachaski network. As was explained, *chaskis,* during the time period under study, continued an ancient form of communication; however, the Ecuachaski network had the benefit of cell phones, making the spread of information, including calls for mobilization, much more rapid than in the past.

Grassroots movement members expressed a greater sense of connection and trust in the ECUARUNARI than in the CONAIE. In interviews, *comuneros* made reference to the work the ECUARUNARI does on behalf of the rights of their communities. One *comunero* in the province of Cotopaxi told me, "When we need it, the ECUARUNARI is here, it has always been here. When there was the problem in La Cocha, the ECUARUNARI led the fight" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, June 15, 2011). The problem referred to in La Cocha was a fight between the national government and the Indigenous community of La Cocha with regard to

Indigenous justice. A man was convicted of murder in La Cocha and the community demanded its right to carry out Indigenous justice, while the national government said that in the case of murder, justice must be carried out by the national judicial system. Ultimately, the Indigenous community – with the help of the ECUARUNARI – won the case and carried out Indigenous justice. As punishment, the convicted man, Orlando Quishpe, was fined $1,750.00 to be paid to the mother of the victim, expelled from the community of Zumbahua for five years, and given a public "bathing" in which he had to appear nude in front of over 4,000 *comuneros* from the area, walk around a large ring four times, lie on stones in the center of the ring, be doused with freezing water, and beat with *ortiga* (stinging nettle) (Olmos 2010). This experience, as well as other similar cases, was filmed and turned into videos that the ECUARUNARI distributed both to promote their successes and to educate communities about their rights. This work, and the effective strategy for making it known in communities, has resulted in community members having a strong sense of confidence in the organization.

The ECUARUNARI effectively appropriated new ICTs in such a way that their use strengthened traditional forms of communication and organization. The organization's strategy to avoid the government meant that while it did not necessarily take advantage of changes in the Indigenous political arena, it was not put at a disadvantage by such changes. The effective targeting of audiences further solidified the legitimacy of the ECUARUNARI in the eyes of its bases, while still assuring access to information for external audiences. The ECUARUNARI's strategies resulted in a strengthened sense of confidence and trust of the ECUARUNARI within its bases. This trust, combined with a communication strategy that was capable of spreading information

quickly and efficiently, meant that the ECUARUNARI's calls for mobilizations were received directly by *comuneros* who then responded to the calls for mobilization.

V. *Conclusion*

In both the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI there were generally higher levels of success in mobilizations to make specific demands on the government, such as the demand for a Constitutional Assembly, and especially in defense of the *Pachamama*, like in the call for a repeal of the Mining Law and the inclusion of the CONAIE's demands in a Water Law. Mobilizations that were not making specific demands, such as marches to commemorate anniversaries, were generally less successful. Furthermore, communities that were directly affected by the issues being protested participated in mobilizations more than communities that were not directly affected. For example, mobilizations against the Mining Law were strongest in the southern Andean provinces where the communities would be most directly affected by the introduction of *mega minería* permitted by the law. While this similarity helps us to understand variation in levels of success of mobilizations within one organization, it does not help us to explain the different levels of success between the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI. Instead, this chapter has attempted to show that differences in communication strategies, especially with regard to the use of new ICTs, helps explain why the ECUARUNARI was more successful in its calls for mobilizations than the CONAIE from 2007 through 2011.

The data presented in this chapter show that strategic appropriation and creative adaptation of ICTs have the strongest causal influence with respect to the success of mobilization. The results of the quantitative analysis are illustrated by the experiences of the two organizations presented, the national CONAIE and the regional ECUARUNARI.

Both organizations chose to use the Internet to share information and create a greater public presence; however, the CONAIE focused solely on an external audience and did not have an accompanying strategy to build capacity with regard to the Internet in its bases. The ECUARUNARI had a two-pronged strategy that included both outreach to external audiences and a webpage designed for their bases. Most importantly, the ECUARUNARI included a strategy of capacity building in order to increase the ability of *comuneros* to have access to and participation on the site.

The ECUARUNARI utilized traditional forms of communication and organization, namely *chaskis* and *mingas*, resulting in a strengthened sense of trust among its bases. The appropriation of new ICTs and their integration in traditional systems resulted in the multiplication of the strength of these networks. Conversely, the CONAIE appropriated new ICTs but left traditional forms of communication to the side.

The CONAIE adapted creatively, at least somewhat, to changes made by the Correa administration in the Indigenous political arena. However, while the CONAIE was active in its confrontations and maneuvering with the government, it fell short on many important issues, such as the Communication Law. Furthermore, their creative adaptation to the changing relationship between the Correa administration and national media outlets in some ways backfired as the constant flow of information was received not only by the CONAIE's bases, but by the actual government, giving the administration the time and information it needed to attempt to thwart mobilizations. The CONAIE was able to combat this fact by using cellular phones, an ICT the government did not co-opt or control, for coordination purposes. The ECUARUNARI largely avoided all interaction with the government in the area of communication, and while this strategy

was effective, it was not so much a creative adaptation, as a continuation of prior practices. Furthermore, there was a need for the ECUARUNARI to come to the aid of community radio stations that were facing an uncooperative government.

Finally, targeting of audiences proved to be the independent variable with the weakest causal influence on mobilization. The two cases presented here illustrate that this is not because targeting of audiences does not matter, but instead because targeting is largely contained within the other two independent variables, strategic appropriation and creative adaptation. In many cases, the choice of which technology to use resulted in a subsequent targeting of audiences, whether this was the intention of the organization or not. The key difference between the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI in terms of audience targeting appears to be the capacity building initiatives of the ECUARUNARI. The skills facilitated by the ECUARUNARI in communities, especially in terms of the Internet, meant they could effectively use the same technology to reach two distinct audiences. Chapter five further explores case studies in order to expose the variety of strategies employed by organizations with regard to new ICTs, as well as to better understand the causal mechanism among the variables.

Chapter 5 – Four Cases from the Provinces

I. *Introduction*

In the 1960s, in the Andean province of Cotopaxi, Ecuador, thousands of Indigenous workers rebelled against the *hacendados* (plantation owners) and took back some of their ancestral lands. In the 1970s, these same individuals then grouped together to form provincial and *segundo grado* organizations (federations of community organizations). Throughout the 1980s, these organizations led *levantamientos* (mobilization or uprising) demanding agricultural reform.[58] In the 1970s in the Amazonian province of Morona Santiago, oil companies entered the jungle to begin extracting the so-called "black gold." The Shuar Indigenous communities banded together in opposition to the government's signing of contracts with the oil companies. Their organizations led roadblocks to stop the entrance of the companies and pressure the government. Thus, for the past 40 to 50 years, Indigenous organizations throughout Ecuador have relied upon social mobilization as their main tool for making demands of the government.

From 2007 through 2011, Indigenous organizations from the Amazon to the sierra to the coast continued to call for mobilizations. These organizations had many of the same communication difficulties that were identified in chapter four with regard to the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) and the Kichwa Federation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI), such as impoverished base populations living

[58] *Levantamiento* translates to uprising. In the Ecuadorian context, the Indigenous movement refers to *levantamientos* to mean disruptive – and pacific – action. Whether referring to *levantamientos* in the mid 19th century against *hacendados* in which Indigenous *huasipungueros* (see chapter two) rose up to seize land or the "*Primer Levantamiento*" of 1990, the word is always spoken with pride and always refers to uprisings without the use of arms.

in rural areas and consistently being in positions of opposition to Ecuador's government. However, provincial organizations had even fewer resources, in terms of money, technology, and human resources. Nonetheless, the communication goals were consistent among all provincial and *segundo grado* organizations – to effectively reach their bases and gain their confidence and allegiance.

Chapter four, through two case studies and a quantitative analysis, presented support for the hypotheses that strategic adaptation of information and communications technologies (ICTs) and creative adaptation of the use of ICTs had a strong causal relationship with the level of success of mobilization. Distinguishing and targeting of audiences also was influential, but to a lesser degree. This chapter considers four additional provincial Indigenous organizations in order to comprehend the variety of communication strategies and further understand the relationships between variables. The organizations to be explored are the Indigenous and *Campesina* Federation of Imbabura (FICI), the Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC), the Interprovincial Federation of Shuar Centers (FICSH), and the Indigenous Federation of the Cofán Nation of Ecuador (FEINCE), as illustrated in Figure 5.1.



Figure 5.1, Map of the Nationalities and *Pueblos* of Ecuador, Courtesy of CODENPE, 2011

This chapter considers the three independent variables, strategic appropriation of information and communications technologies (ICTs), creative adaptation of ICTs, and

targeting of audiences, with regard to radio, telephones, audiovisual productions, and Internet. The dependent variable, mobilization, is measured by level of success. Success is defined in terms of the goal set by the organization. As discussed in chapter four, I have chosen to define success in this way for three reasons. First, the Indigenous organizations in Ecuador have few to no resources to mobilize their bases for every march or demonstration, and as earlier mentioned, mobilizations are the main form of demand making on the government, meaning they happen often. Thus, it is important that each organization know how many participants it is responsible for sending in order to appropriate resources accordingly.[59] Second, because mobilizations do happen often (and have been ongoing since 1990), there is a chance of fatigue in the bases. By making clear the number of participants needed from each organization, the organizations can send representatives on a rotational basis in order to avoid this fatigue. Finally, the organizations themselves measure their success based upon whether they meet their defined goals. For example, in the case of the FICI, the organization regularly identified the goal of a mobilization to be the shutting of the Pan-American Highway. Other organizations indicated a desired number of people to participate in a march. For each organization, the instances of mobilizations called for, and actual mobilizations, in addition to the level of success, were determined by key word searches in two national and one provincial newspaper, as well as by self-reporting from the organizations.

II. *FICI*

[59] The provincial organizations, for example, normally do not have funds to allocate for protests. Instead, the organizations rely upon their *segundo grado* organizations to provide food and, when needed, shelter. Protestors are expected to bring *cucayo*, food to share in a potluck style.

The Indigenous and *Campesina* Federation of Imbabura (FICI) is the provincial organization of Imbabura and a filial of the CONAIE. The FICI was founded in May of 1974, and is composed of more than 200 communities of the Kichwa *pueblos* Otavalo, Karanki, Kayambe, and Natabuela. The province of Imbabura is located in the Andean sierra to the north of Pichincha, the province that is home to Ecuador's capital city, Quito. Nearly 100% of the Indigenous people in the communities of the FICI speak Kichwa, and many elders speak no Spanish.

a. *Mobilizations, 2007-2011*

The communities of the FICI are scattered throughout Imbabura on both sides of the Pan-American Highway. Like its parent organization, the ECUARUNARI, the FICI's main mobilization strategy is the *paro* (roadblock) of the Pan-American Highway. Similarly, mobilizations are filled with music, dancing, and *cucayo* (potluck) snacks. As the vast majority of grassroots movement members in Imbabura speak Kichwa, the FICI's protests are filled with Kichwa conversation and singing.

From 2007 through 2011, the FICI had a 100% success rate for the mobilizations it called for, five of which were completely successful, and two of which were partially successful. The mobilizations were identified in two national newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*, and in the provincial newspaper of Imbabura, *El Norte*, as well as were reported by *dirigentes* of the FICI.[60]

In November 2008, the FICI called for a major mobilization against the government's proposed *Ley de Aguas* (Water Law), its goal being to block the Pan-

[60] The newspaper searches, conducted through online databases, included the key words FICI, *indígena Imbabura, indio Imbabura, paro Imbabura, movilización indígena Imbabura* and were for all dates between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011.

American Highway with at least 3,000 protesters.[61] More than 5,000 Indigenous protestors gathered in El Cajas, the border town between the provinces of Pichincha and Imbabura, in order to deliver an alternative Water Law. In January and February 2009, the FICI called for roadblocks in Imbabura to demand that the government consider its proposed Water Law. In all three cases, the turnout of protestors was equal or greater than had been predicted by the FICI and the protesters effectively blocked the Pan-American Highway.

In April 2010, the FICI called for roadblocks demanding the National Assembly consider its proposed Water Law and in opposition to the controversial *Ley Minera* (Mining Law) the assembly had recently passed.[62] While the turnout in April was lower than hoped for, the FICI once again convened a march for May 2010, regarding the two laws. The CONAIE was also protesting the Bolivarian Alliance of America (ALBA) summit, arguing that the summit – and especially the Ecuadorian government – excluded the *pueblos* and Nationalities of the Americas and that the ALBA was in favor of exploiting natural resources ("ALBA sin pueblos no es alianza" 2010). This march was

[61] While the Indigenous movement actually wanted a Mining Law and a Water Law to be passed, it argued that these laws should be constructed with the participation of the Indigenous movement, especially through *consulta previa*, or free, prior, and informed consent, as guaranteed in the constitution (Constitution of Ecuador, Article 27, line 7, 2008), as well as in international agreements such as International Labor Organization (ILO) resolution 169 regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples (ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Article 6, 1989) and in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples of 2007 (Santi 2009). Furthermore, the government's proposed Water Law would not guarantee water concessions for Indigenous communities, nor would it have broken the monopoly on water that existed in Ecuador with less than one percent of the population having control over more than 65% of fresh water sources (speech by Luis Contento, June 2, 2010). The government's proposed law did not explicitly make illegal the privatization of water sources.

[62] The Indigenous movement was against the government's proposed Mining Law because it was written and passed without free, prior, and informed consent and because it would allow the government to sign large-scale mining (*mega minería*) contracts with international companies. Instead, the CONAIE demanded a Mining Law that would protect the environment and the Indigenous communities located near mining sites (Santi 2009).

hugely successful, blocking the Pan-American Highway north of Quito and creating massive upheaval in the country.

In June 2010, the FICI called for a peaceful march to Quito in celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the 1990 *levantamiento* (uprising). There was considerable participation; however, the *dirigentes* had hoped for at least 3,000 marchers, and the crowd did not reach this goal. Finally, in November and December of 2011, the FICI called for a mobilization in opposition to the arrest of then-President Marco Guatemal. The government had charged Guatemal with terrorism and the blocking of roads for his leadership position in the May 2010 protests. The FICI led a march from Otavalo to Ibarra, where there was a two-day vigil of thousands in the central park in front of the courthouse. Guatemal was found innocent of the charges based on the fact that there was no material evidence (Armas 2011). Thus, the most successful mobilizations were those that were directly defending the communities of the FICI, be it their declared human right to water or of their beloved president. This section will consider how the communication plan of the FICI contributed to their high levels of success in mobilizations.

Mobilizations of the FICI				
Date	**Reason**	**Goal**	**Outcome**	**Level of Success**
November 19, 2008	To present the proposed *Ley de Aguas* (Water Law) of the CONAIE	Participation of 500 members of the FICI	Participation of more than 3000 members of the FICI	Successful
January 1, 2009	Against government's proposed Water Law	Block the Pan-American Highway	Members of the FICI blocked the Pan-American Highway	Successful
February 2, 2009	Against government's proposed Water Law	Block the Pan-American Highway	More of the FICI blocked the Pan-American Highway	Successful
April 2010	Against the proposed Water Law and Mining Law	Candlelight vigil in Otavalo with participation of 300	Candlelight vigil in Otavalo with participation of more than 100	Partially Successful
May 11-14, 2010	Against proposed Water Law and ALBA	Block the Pan-American Highway	More than 500 members of the FICI blocked the Pan-American Highway for 4 days	Successful
June 20, 2010	20 year anniversary of the CONAIE	March of 500 from Otavalo to Quito	March of more than 200 from Otavalo to Quito	Partially Successful
November 1-10, 2011	In support of arrested President Marco Guatemal	March of 300 from Otavalo to Ibarra and vigil in front of the courthouse until Guatemal was freed	March of more than 300 fro Otavalo to Ibarra and vigil in front of the courthouse until Guatemal was freed	Successful

Table 5.1 Mobilizations Called for by the FICI, 2007-2011

b. *Communication, Pre-2007*

Prior to 2007, the FICI had a communications system that was based primarily on face-to-face communication in the assemblies of the *segundo grado* organizations throughout the province of Imbabura. The FICI sent a *dirigente* to all assemblies in order

to inform its filial communities about the activities the FICI was carrying out, as well as to hear the opinions, concerns, and complaints of its bases.

In addition to attending assemblies, the FICI produced written materials to distribute among its base communities. The FICI created informational pamphlets about Indigenous and collective rights, laws being debated in Ecuador's national assembly, and other political issues. They also printed booklets about various Indigenous holidays and traditions. All materials were in Kichwa and Spanish. One *dirigente* explained to me that these booklets were then kept in special places in the homes of the FICI's bases and were treasured as books. These displays served as a sign that one could not only read, but could appreciate the importance of "literature," thereby becoming a status symbol within families and communities. Additionally, the FICI printed yearly Kichwa-Spanish dictionaries and Kichwa baby name books. One elderly *comunera* (community member) in a Kayambe community, when asked if she remembered having seen a baby name book, responded, "What do you think? Why do you think we have such interesting names here [in the FICI]? We don't have those boring Spanish names they have in the rest of the country" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, December 1, 2011).

In the year 2000, the FICI, along with the Association of Indigenous Youths of Imbabura (AJKI), created a radio station, Radio Ilumán. Legally, the radio station was created as a filial of the FICI; however, it functioned autonomously and was largely controlled by the AJKI. From 2000 through 2006, the communication strategy of the FICI included spreading news about the organization's activities and political stances through Radio Ilumán. From its inception in 2000 through 2011, the director of Radio

Ilumán was Dr. Gonzalo Díaz, an expert in bilingual education. Subsequently, one of the central goals of the radio was to improve Kichwa in the communities of the FICI. As mentioned above, nearly all grassroots members of the FICI spoke Kichwa; however, they often spoke in an informal and/or grammatically incorrect manner, with Spanish words scattered throughout.

For mobilizations, the FICI relied predominantly on face-to-face communication. *Dirigentes* traveled between communities to inform the bases about the reasons for a march or protest, as well as the logistics. With the creation of the radio in 2000, Díaz assured me that communication became quicker and "cheaper," meaning that *dirigentes* could reach more individuals with one stop at the radio station, rather than having to visit disparate communities (Gonzalo Díaz, interview with author, Ilumán, Ibarra, Ecuador, November 5, 2010).

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

Presidents José Manuel de la Torre and Marco Guatemal led the FICI from 2006 through 2009, and 2009 through 2011, respectively. Along with the *dirigente* of communication Alberto Segovia, they developed a communication plan that continued with prior practices. However, they also looked to create a closer relationship between Radio Ilumán and the FICI, in order "to better take advantage of the communications possibilities inherent in Radio Ilumán" (Marco Guatemal, interview by author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, April 21, 2011). Furthermore, the FICI wanted to create audiovisual productions for their communities.

Thus, the FICI continued to send at least one *dirigente* to every assembly of its *segundo grado* organizations. According to Segovia, the single most important form of

communication between the bases and the level of the organization were the *dirigentes* and technical assistants of the FICI that lived in, worked in, and regularly visited communities. This constant presence in the communities meant that "we [the FICI] always know what is happening in the communities, and they [the communities] always know what is happening in the FICI" (Marco Guatemal, interview by author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, April 21, 2011). All other forms of communication were supplemental to the continuation of the traditional face-to-face presence of the FICI in its communities.

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

i. Radio

Since its creation in 2000, Radio Ilumán has been a pillar of communication in the communities of the FICI. According to *dirigentes* of the FICI and the directors of Radio Ilumán, the radio was the most effective way for communication among the rural communities. The goals and mission of the radio were to strengthen the Kichwa culture and language within the communities. Historically, when the FICI or one of its communities needed something, it would tell the radio, and Radio Ilumán would call for a *minga.*[63] The programming of Radio Ilumán, according to its statutes, was to be at least 60% in Kichwa, although the reporters with whom I spoke said that the broadcasts were often 100% in Kichwa, and that it was only the music that was in Spanish (Technician of Radio Ilumán, interview by author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 15, 2010).

[63] A *minga* is a pre-Incan form of community work that is still employed throughout Latin America. When the community, or a community member, needs to construct a building, host a *fiesta* (party), or other such large undertaking, the entire community is convened to participate in the construction or activity (Tibán 2004).

Radio Ilumán has been self-financed since its inception. Initially, it was founded with money from the FICI and the AJKI. As the station grew, it began hosting large community parties in which there was a cover charge that went to support the radio. Ultimately, Radio Ilumán sold airtime for commercials; however, it refused to sell to political parties (including Pachakutik) and to companies that are antithetical to the values of the FICI, such as Coca-Cola.

In the period under study, the *dirigente* of communication, Alberto Segovia, decided that the FICI should have a permanent presence on Radio Ilumán, rather than the ad hoc manner in which prior administrations had visited and utilized the radio. Segovia, who has a university degree in communication, worked with Radio Ilumán to develop a weekly radio program to communicate the FICI's news and activities, as well as to communicate any other pressing issues with the base communities of the FICI. Moreover, beginning in 2009, President Guatemal created his own weekly program in order to connect with his bases regularly. As Guatemal said in reference to President Rafael Correa's weekly *sabatino* (Saturday) radio address, "If President Correa can do it, why can't I?" (Marco Guatemal, interview by author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, April 21, 2011).

Radio Ilumán regularly had capacity building workshops for its employees (23 employees at the time of investigation) and in the communities to teach *comuneros* to be *reporteros comunitarios* (community reporters). Thus, the station worked to incorporate *comuneros* in its functioning and gave people a way to get involved. Radio Ilumán's director during the period of study, Gonzalo Díaz, said he was working to create a Center of Cultural Investigation that would be associated with Radio Ilumán and would serve as

a permanent educational facility in order to increase Kichwa literacy and have a formal journalism program. However, in 2011, this project was still in its infant stages, and the FICI and Radio Ilumán were working to find funding for the initiative.

ii. Audiovisual Productions

Segovia said that, prior to 2006, the FICI had not worked in audiovisual productions. However, after seeing some productions of the FICI's umbrella organization, the ECUARUNARI, Segovia dreamed of creating documentaries in the FICI. With the help of some youth who had participated in the ECUARUNARI's capacity building workshops, Segovia led an initiative to produce four videos between 2008 and 2011. The goal of the videos was to create something informative and entertaining that would help the youth to understand their "roots" and the traditions of the *pueblos* of the FICI (Alberto Segovia, interview with author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, November 5, 2010). The videos explain (in Kichwa) the traditions of *Sawari* (marriage and the wedding), *Mushuk Wasi* (a new house), *Wawa Wachari* (pregnancy and childbirth), and *Inti Raymi* (the celebration of the sun). Segovia said they would have liked to produce more videos; however, there was a lack of resources, as well as a lack of capacity. The videos were distributed on DVDs throughout the communities of the FICI, and many organizations had movie nights in which the videos were screened in the community centers so that everyone would have the opportunity to see the productions.

iii. Internet

At the close of 2011, the FICI did not have a web page. In fact, not one *segundo grado* or provincial organization that participated in this study had its own website.

While *dirigentes* expressed interest in creating a web page, and all mentioned this would be good for connecting with prospective international donors, they recognized that it would be useless with regard to communicating with their bases. Thus, a webpage was not a priority for the FICI or for the other organizations. The *dirigentes* of the FICI did use email regularly to keep in touch with the *dirigentes* of the ECUARUNARI and the CONAIE, as well as with the NGOs with which the FICI was working. President Guatemal noted that email communication with the national *dirigentes* was much more economical and efficient than continuously traveling to Quito, as had been the practice prior to 2008. Many provincial organizations reported using email to communicate among themselves, with other organizations and NGOs, and with the CONAIE. However, *segundo grado* organizations rarely had the resources necessary to pay for computers and Internet connectivity, and therefore any use of the internet and email was by individual *dirigentes* in *cibers* (internet cafés) with their own resources.

iv. Cell Phones

In addition to email, the *dirigentes* of the FICI relied heavily upon cellular phones to communicate amongst themselves, and with local and national *dirigentes.* Nonetheless, according to one *dirigente*, cell phones are a "necessary evil" (FICI *dirigente*, interview with author, Otavalo, Ibarra, Ecuador, October 14, 2010). The FICI recognized that people with very few resources available to them were using their money to buy cell phones and credit, rather than using these resources to buy school supplies for their children, for example. Also, Segovia said that to rely too heavily on cell phones at the cost of face-to-face communication would have been a mistake, as confidence between two people can only be created "when you are looking in each others' eyes"

(Alberto Segovia, interview with author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, November 5, 2010). Thus, cell phones were appropriated by the FICI; however, their use was limited to necessary communication between *dirigentes* and was not integrated into a fundamental strategy of their communication plan.

This level of awareness about the possible negative effects of cell phones was not repeated by other organizations. In fact, the majority of other organizations referred to the usefulness of cell phones and the ways in which they wanted to integrate their use in the communication plan of the organizations, without expressing any concerns about their use. The FICI was critical of cell phones, recognizing both the possibilities and challenges presented by this ICT, and developed a strategy to take advantage of them without creating problems for their bases.

e. *Creative Adaptation*

i. Radio

Director of Radio Ilumán, Gonzalo Díaz, said that the FICI and the board of directors of the radio were always concerned about the national government (interview with author, Ilumán, Ibarra, Ecuador, November 5, 2010). For example, Radio Ilumán was formed in 2000 as a private radio station; however, the National Telecommunications Council of Ecuador (CONATEL) granted the station a frequency with a range equal to that of a community radio station, approximately 10 kilometers. In 2006, Radio Ilumán began petitioning CONATEL to increase the range of its frequency in order to reach more communities of the FICI. CONATEL rejected their petitions. Furthermore, in 2010, Radio Ilumán had to apply to renew their frequency. CONATEL

refused to renew the frequency, stating that they would wait for the Ecuadorian National Assembly to pass the controversial new *Ley de Comunicación* (Communication Law) that was first introduced in 2009, but still had not been passed at the close of 2011.[64] According to Segovia, this delay was simply a maneuver by CONATEL to gain more time so that they will be able to require Radio Ilumán to register its frequency as a community radio station, rather than a private station (Alberto Segovia, interview by author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, November 5, 1020). This fear of having to register as a community radio station was shared by radio stations servicing Indigenous communities throughout Ecuador, as community radio stations were limited in the range of their frequency and in their options for funding (for further discussion, see chapter three). Furthermore, community radio stations are to be for cultural, religious, and educational purposes, and are not permitted to broadcast political material.

[64] The *Ley de Comunicación*, or Communication Law, was first introduced in the Ecuadorian Assembly in September of 2009, where it was hotly debated and ultimately put on the back burner due to the failure of Correa's *Alianza PAIS* and the opposition to reach an agreement. As proposed by the Correa administration, the Communication Law would concentrate power over media outlets in the hands of the national government, thereby hurting democratic ideals such as freedom of speech and free access to information (Orlando 2012). The Communication Law was to be debated again in the fall of 2011. However, the debate was delayed due to the combination of events. First, Human Rights Watch and the Organization of American States sent letters of opposition to the proposed law sent to the Assembly President Fernando Cordero Cueva, putting pressure on the Assembly to change the law and/or postpone debate (Human Rights Watch 2010). Second, the political atmosphere after the 30-September incident was highly charged. Third, , and a trip by seven Ecuadorian assemblymen and women – or, as Correa called them, the seven "*enanitos*" (little dwarves) – traveled to Washington, D.C. to present their concerns with the proposed law to various international human rights organizations, resulting in even more unwanted and negative international attention ("El presidente de Ecuador minimiza el viaje de asambleístas de la oposición a Washington," *WFDC News*, September 18, 2010) debate was delayed indefinitely. Finally, the president of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, Dinah Shelton, had promised to come to Ecuador in January 2012 to observe the process of debate of the law. At the close of 2011 the commission of the Communications Law was still working to construct a draft to be presented in 2012 to the Assembly. The Communications Law commission presented a draft to the assembly in February of 2012. This draft changed some key aspects of that which was presented by President Correa; however, it was still opposed by opposition assemblywomen and men, as well as by journalists, both for its content and for the closed-door manner of its construction. While the National Assembly president, Fernando Cordero, called for a vote on the law in June and again in July, as of August 2012 no vote had taken place ("Cordero: 'La próxima vez instalaré la session con el número de asambleístas que manda la Ley'" 2012).

In 2007, recognizing that the CONATEL was not likely going to budge to increase the reach of the frequency of Radio Ilumán, the station's directors and the *dirigentes* of the FICI got together to brainstorm a new plan. The FICI and Radio Ilumán had a shared goal of reaching more communities; however, it was not going to be possible to do so through the radio, or at least not in the immediate future. The FICI and Radio Ilumán decided to create a monthly newspaper, the *Wiñay Kawsay/Cultura Milenaria* (Ancient Culture). The newspaper printed the stories broadcast over Radio Ilumán and was published in both Kichwa and Spanish. It was distributed in all communities of the FICI and sold for $0.50 in order to be self-sustaining. In addition to the news stories, the paper dedicated one full page to the FICI, another to traditional games, and a section to Kichwa, including crossword puzzles, dictionary excerpts, and, to everyone's delight, baby-names. In this way, the *Wiñay Kawsay* served to spread the same information found on Radio Ilumán without requiring the approval or cooperation of the government agency, CONATEL.

ii. Internet

In January 2011, the youth working in Radio Ilumán embarked upon a new project to create a webpage for the station in order to have their programming stream live over the internet. This idea was in direct response to the CONATEL's refusal to increase the reach of Radio Ilumán's frequency, as well as the youths' growing interest and familiarity with the Internet and social network sites like Facebook. One young reporter said, "It will be so cool to have a website. Then people can listen in the *cibers* (internet cafes) here and everywhere. Even in Spain" (Technician of Radio Ilumán, interview by author, Ilumán, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 15, 2010). Director Díaz also saw the

potential of a website, especially to connect with the FICI's large migrant population in the United States and Spain. The FICI financed two grants for two young reporters to take classes in order to create the webpage. At the close of 2011, the website (radioiluman.ec) was up and running, but not without its problems. First, the Internet was very expensive and very slow. The connection was dial-up, making live streaming difficult, and at times, impossible. Second, while there were two young men able to manage the website, they were not experts and found there were often technical difficulties they could not resolve.

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

i. Radio

As discussed in chapter four, of the three independent variables, distinguishing and targeting of audiences showed the weakest causal relationship with mobilization, likely because audience targeting is largely contained within the other two variables – strategic adoption and creative adaptation of ICTs. In the case of the FICI, the organization did identify its main audiences – its bases and international donors. President Guatemal said that the FICI did not worry about communicating much with the Ecuadorian public, because that was the job of the CONAIE. Instead, the FICI focused on communicating with their international contacts through email or phone calls made and received in the FICI's office in the city of Otavalo. To communicate with the FICI's bases, the *dirigentes* visited the communities. The use of the radio was a strategic decision to reach the bases of the FICI, as were the videos and the *Wiñay Kawsay* newspaper. The productions were in Kichwa, but even more than that, the distribution of

the materials guaranteed they would reach an almost exclusively Indigenous population. The short range of Radio Ilumán's frequency resulted in it only reaching Indigenous communities, and the DVDs and newspapers were distributed only in Indigenous communities.

g. *Causal Relationship*

In interviews with *comuneros*, their esteem for the FICI as a defender of the Indigenous *pueblos* of Imbabura and as a "*luchadora*" (fighter) against the government was unmistakable. All *comuneros* with whom I spoke in communities such as Cotocachi, Antonio Ante, and San Juan de Agua Longo, knew President Marco Guatemal by name. When asked what they knew of him, one older man in Antonio Ante replied, "He is young and his voice vibrates. He knows what we need and he isn't afraid to fight" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Antonio Ante, Imbabura, Ecuador, October 15, 2010). He said he knew this from listening to Guatemal on Radio Ilumán, and from later seeing him in his community's assembly. Another woman from San Juan de Agua Longo told me, "I didn't realize he was so small until I saw him at the march against the ALBA. His voice sounded so much bigger!" (*Comunera*, interview with author, San Juan de Agua Longo, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 16, 2010). Thus, it was clear that *comuneros* felt they "knew" Guatemal from listening to him on the radio.

However, without a sense of trust in the radio itself, it might not have mattered that Guatemal was a continuous presence. One youth from Antonio Ante told me that the people "trust the radio because it *is* the people. It was formed by us, and we run it, we are the reporters. So our parents, our grandparents, they trust us" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Antonio Ante, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 17, 2010). Thus, when Radio

Ilumán broadcast information about marches and *levantamientos*, community members trusted it. The "flash informatives" of the radio were played every hour throughout the day when there was important news, guaranteeing that the greatest possible number of listeners would hear the message.

In addition to these personal connections with leaders, *comuneros* referred to the work the FICI does to promote the *pueblos'* cultures. One older woman who had seen the video on marriage produced by Segovia and his young helpers in her community center suggested that "this type of thing will help the young people to see what is important in life – not money and all that, but family and traditions" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 16, 2010). These productions then solidify the vision of the FICI as being part of the communities and having the same ideals and values found in the bases.

The communication plan of the FICI guaranteed rapid and efficient communication among the *dirigentes* and donors through cell phones and the Internet, but appreciated the importance of traditional forms of communication to reach its bases. It worked to increase its presence on the radio to create a greater sense of confidence and a personal relationship between the *dirigentes* and the bases. The other communication materials it produced further solidified the sense of connectivity between the FICI and its bases. As one middle-aged woman said, "the FICI is family, and when they call on me to help, there is no choice, only a responsibility" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 16, 2010).

The communication infrastructure constructed over time by the FICI, a combination of face-to-face communication, the radio, newspapers, cell phones, and the

beginning stages of the internet, guaranteed that the call to mobilize would reach the grassroots bases. However, the initiatives to mobilize were successful not only because they reached the bases, but because the bases trusted the FICI and its leaders and felt a sense of solidarity and responsibility with regard to the organization. When asked why she decided to participate in the FICI's marches, an Otavaleño woman said, "the FICI is always working for what we need. The marches are to fight for our communities. It is my responsibility to help" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Otavalo, Imbabura, Ecuador, September 16, 2010). The word "responsibility" was repeated in every interview with grassroots members of the FICI. The reference to the FICI as a trusted *luchadora*, as mentioned above, was also consistent in interviews. Thus, the bases of the FICI trusted the organization to work for the needs of its members, and, based in the Indigenous principle of reciprocity, felt the responsibility to reciprocate the FICI's efforts by participating in marches, *levantamientos*, and roadblocks.

III. *MICC*

The Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC) was formed in 1978, and is comprised of 22 *segundo grado* organizations (Tibán 2004). The Indigenous population of Cotopaxi is identified by the CONAIE as the *pueblo* Panzaleo of the nationality Kichwa of the sierra; however, within the province there is great diversity in dress, traditions, and language in different communities. While many Indigenous people in Cotopaxi speak Kichwa, there are entire communities where the language was almost completely eradicated between the 1950s and 1970s, during a period of brutal *hacienda* (plantation) bosses (see chapter two).

a. Mobilizations, 2007-2011

The communities of the MICC, like those of the FICI, are spread out surrounding the Pan-American Highway, and so, the MICC also uses *paros* of this main roadway as its main protest strategy. The MICC had an overall success rate of 82% (9/11) in the mobilizations it called for between 2007 and 2011. Of the nine successful mobilizations, seven were fully successful, and two were partially successful. The mobilizations called for and the rate of success were determined through key word searches in the archives of two national news papers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*, and the provincial newspaper of Cotopaxi, *La Gaceta*, as well self-reporting by the organization.[65]

In May 2007, then-President of the MICC, Abraham Salazar, threatened a mobilization in protest against mining contracts the government was in the process of signing with the company Termopichincha in the town of Salcedo, in the south of Cotopaxi province. Ultimately, there was no mobilization, but rather the *dirigentes* of the MICC participated in discussions directly with the government. At the close of 2011, the project remained under review with no contracts having been signed.

In February 2008, the MICC called for a march of at least 500 *comuneros* to Quito to demand the government hold a referendum regarding whether or not to have a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. The march was successful, with more than 1,000 members of the MICC participating in the protest in Quito.

In November 2008, the MICC called for the first of six mobilizations against the government's proposed Water Law. This first mobilization was partially successful; there was a mobilization, but they did not manage to block the Pan-American Highway as

[65] The newspaper searches, conducted through the their online databases, included the key words MICC, *indígena Cotopaxi, indio Cotopaxi, paro Cotopaxi, movilización indígena Cotopaxi* and were for all dates between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011.

the MICC had stated was the goal. In January 2009, September 2009, and January 2010, the MICC called for various mobilizations demanding a debate in the National Assembly regarding the Water Law and in support of the draft version presented by the FICI. These mobilizations were successful in achieving the MICC's goal to block the Pan-American Highway. The progressively successful nature of the mobilizations suggests that as more *comuneros* became aware of the proposed Water Law, the more they were outraged by the lack of guarantee for water to Indigenous communities, and the more they participated in protest activity. However, by February 2010 when the MICC again called for a mobilization, the *paro* was unsuccessful in that the few protestors who participated did not manage to block the Pan-American Highway, the goal put forth by the MICC, likely due to a sense of fatigue in the communities due to the numerous mobilizations of 2009. In May 2010, the MICC was more successful in mobilizing the bases and a massive mobilization of more than 3,000 *comuneros* blocked the Pan-American Highway.

In June 2010, the MICC called for a *levantamiento* in Latacunga in support of the President of the Court of Cotopaxi who had made a decision – unpopular with the Correa administration – that the right to Indigenous justice should be respected in the case of La Cocha.[66] This strong mobilization of almost 1,000 protesters in the center of Latacunga was also to serve as a warning to the national government of what would happen if the

[66] The case of La Cocha was a fight between the national government and the Indigenous community of La Cocha with regard to Indigenous justice. A man was convicted of murder in La Cocha and the community demanded its right to carry out Indigenous justice, while the national government said that in the case of murder, justice must be carried out by the national judicial system. Ultimately, the Indigenous community – with the help of the ECUARUNARI – won the case and carried out Indigenous justice. As punishment, the convicted man, Orlando Quishpe, was fined $1,750.00 to be paid to the mother of the victim, expelled from the community of Zumbahua for five years, and given a public "bathing" in which he had to appear nude in front of over 4,000 *comuneros* from the area, walk around a large ring four times, lie on stones in the center of the ring, be doused with freezing water, and beat with *ortiga* (stinging nettle) (Olmos 2010).

National Court of Justice were to reverse the decision of the provincial court ("Indígenas analizarán paralización" *El Universo*. June 13, 2010; "Sector indígena no descarta una movilización: Respaldo al Presidente de la Corte de Justicia de Cotopaxi sancionado," *La Gaceta*, June 13, 2010). When the National Court of Justice reviewed the case in October 2010, the MICC called for another protest, this time in Quito, to put pressure on the government. The national court upheld the decision of the provincial court, recognizing the right to Indigenous justice.

Finally, in October 2011, the MICC led a protest in Latacunga in opposition to the *Ley Orgánica de Transporte Terrestre* (Transportation Law), passed in April 2011, arguing that it unfairly and negatively affects community transportation companies. More than 1,000 protestors filled the streets of Latacunga, and they threatened to do the same in Quito if the National Assembly did not reconsider the law and make revisions. The law was not changed and went into effect on August 1, 2012.

The strongest mobilizations of the MICC were those that were in defense of the *Pachamama* (Mother Nature) and especially those that were defending the communities of the MICC directly. The huge turnouts in Latacunga for the mobilizations in support of the provincial court's decision to uphold the right to *justicia indígena* and in opposition to the government's Transportation Law further suggest that turnout is highest for mobilizations that have a direct – or potential direct – affect on the participants. Furthermore, mobilizations that were closer to home (in Latacunga, as opposed to Quito), logically had high levels of participation because they required fewer resources for protestors to travel ($.50 - $1.00, while to travel to Quito costs $3.00 - $5.00).

Table 5.2 Mobilizations Called for by the MICC, 2007-2011

Mobilizations of the MICC				
Date	**Reason**	**Goal**	**Outcome**	**Level of Success**
May 2007	Against government contract with Termopichincha	March of 200 members of the MICC in Latacunga	No mobilization	Unsuccessful
February10, 2008	Pressure National Assembly to call for a Constitutional Assembly	Participation of 500 members of the MICC in march in Quito	Participation of more than 200 members of the MICC in Quito	Partially Successful
November 2008	Against the government's proposed *Ley de Aguas* (Water Law) and the delivery of the ECUARUNARI's proposed Water Law	Participation of 200 members of the MICC	Participation of more than 100 members of the MICC	Partially Successful
January 20, 2009	Against the proposed Water Law	Block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Hundreds of members of the MICC blocked the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Successful
September 29, 2009	Against the proposed Water Law	Block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Hundreds of members of the MICC blocked the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Successful
January 7, 2010	Against the proposed Water Law and *Ley Minera* (Mining Law)	Block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Members of the MICC blocked the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Successful
February 2010	Against the proposed Water Law and Mining Law	Block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Not sufficient protestors to block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Unsuccessful
May 11-12, 2010	Against the proposed Water Law, Mining Law, and ALBA	Block the Pan-American Highway in Cotopaxi	Members of the MICC blocked the Pan-American Highway and the Panzaleo Bridge in Cotopaxi	Successful
June 11, 2010	Defense of right to practice Indigenous Justice (La Cocha case)	March of more than 1000 in Latacunga	March of more than 3000 in Latacunga	Successful
October 13, 2010	Defense of right to practice Indigenous Justice (Indigenous youths held in government jail)	March of 200 in Quito	March of more than 300 in Quito	Successful
October 14,	In opposition to the *Ley*	March of 1000 in	March of thousands	Successful

2011	*de Transporte Terrestre* (Land Transportation Law)	Latacunga	in Latacunga	

b. *Communication, Pre-2007*

Prior to 2007, the MICC's main strategy for communicating with its bases was to send *dirigentes* to the assemblies of its *segundo grado* organizations. In these assemblies, the *dirigentes* of the MICC would inform about its political stances and activities, as well as hear the opinions, complaints, and concerns of the base communities to bring back to the organization. Since its formation, the MICC also worked closely with Radio Latacunga, a radio station formed in the 1970s by Catholic missionaries. While the station was created with the goal to be an educational entity, the Liberation Theology of the missionaries resulted in the radio being an ally of the *campesinos'* protest and rebellion against the brutal *hacendados* (plantation owners). This relationship continued through the 1990s, and employees of the radio, *dirigentes*, and *comuneros* alike, insisted that Radio Latacunga had played a key role in the 1990 and 1992 *levantamientos* in Cotopaxi.

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

The MICC's President, Abraham Salazar (2006-2009), who also served as *dirigente* of communication from 2009-2012, developed a communication plan that continued to value face-to-face communication in assemblies and a continued presence on Radio Latacunga. However, after more than eight years of battle, the MICC also acquired a television frequency, and this channel, TV MICC, became the center of the MICC's communication strategy. This innovative use of the television is the most

creative and successful example of Indigenous communication in the period included in this investigation.

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

i. Audiovisual Productions

The idea to create a TV station connected with the MICC was born in 2000, from an elite group of *dirigentes*, all of who had received a political and communication education in Radio Latacunga. The MICC, under the leadership of individuals such as Ángel Tibán, Abraham Salazar, and Jorgé Guaman, applied for a TV frequency from CONATEL. The MICC and this group of communications experts decided to try for a TV frequency, rather than radio, for two main reasons. First, the MICC already had a good working relationship with Radio Latacunga and was guaranteed airtime. Second, the MICC recognized that television provided a unique opportunity to combine words and language with images, as both words and images, or storytelling and visual representations, are key elements of Indigenous culture and forms of understanding the world. As Tibán, the director of TV MICC from 2008 through 2011, said, "words are power, images are power. If you don't have words, if you don't have images, you don't have anything. This is why the Indigenous movement in Cotopaxi has been successful" (Ángel Tibán, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011).

After being granted its frequency in 2008, TV MICC began broadcasting in January 2009. The directors of the station estimate that the station reaches approximately 900,000 people, and that 50,000 people - or 10,000 families - watch TV MICC daily. It does not hide its Indigenous heritage or organizational affiliation. Its name is TV MICC,

and its logo is the *caracol*, a circle of infinity, located inside a red poncho, the Indigenous dress of the men of Cotopaxi. The station was to be the "son of the MICC," meaning its goal was to communicate the political stances and projects of the MICC, as well as the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI. For example, in May 2011, President Correa held a referendum with ten questions. The Indigenous movement, including the CONAIE, the ECUARUNARI, and the MICC, campaigned for a "No" vote to all ten questions, while President Correa and his party, Alianza PAIS, were calling for a "Yes" vote. TV MICC, acting as the mouthpiece of the MICC, openly campaigned for "No". However, Tibán argued that the station did so in a "very strategic manner," bringing in oppositional voices to generate debate and ensure that all perspectives were given space (Ángel Tibán, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011).

TV MICC is not only different from other news stations in its openly political status, but also in its unique style. According to anchorman Jorgé Guaman, "the style of TV MICC is not occidental. Women never appear nude or semi-nude, the reporters are men and women, but not the unbelievably perfect women of the national news channels" (Jorgé Guaman, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011). Furthermore, there are no commercials for international companies, like Coca Cola, or other products in opposition to the ideals of the movement, such as alcohol, cigarettes, agro-chemicals, or the violent American movie "Rambo." Tibán assured that the channel was in dire need of more funds, but "not at the cost of their values" (Ángel Tibán, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011).

The statutes of TV MICC state that programming should be at least 50% in Kichwa, and so there is a one-hour news program in Kichwa in the morning and in the

evening, as well as a second hour of news in Spanish. Each of these news programs has their own anchor desk; the set of the Kichwa hour has a woven table covering in the bright colors of the Andes and Indigenous art hanging behind the desk, while the set of the Spanish hour appears more similar to a typical news set with no adornments other than the TV MICC logo. However, at times TV MICC was unable to fill the full news hour in Kichwa, as not all interviewees spoke Kichwa and there was resistance to the Kichwa programming from the public – including some Indigenous sectors – as not all Indigenous people spoke Kichwa. For example, I passed many evenings in TV MICC watching how they do their news programming and learning the process of the station. After interviewing TV MICC's founder and Kichwa news anchorman Guaman, I was asked to participate in an interview during his Kichwa news hour as a form of *ranti-ranti,* the principle of reciprocity in Andean cosmovision, a type of I scratch your back, you scratch mine. And so, I participated in an interview in which I explained why I was in Ecuador and a bit about my research. However, because I do not speak Kichwa, the interview was in Spanish, although it was during the Kichwa news hour.

During its news programs, TV MICC covered Indigenous news stories that did not make it into the national, or even provincial, media outlets. For example, in April 2011, Humberto Cholango was elected as the new president of the CONAIE and the election was nothing more than a blip of a headline on some national news shows. However, TV MICC attended the CONAIE's congress, interviewed participants, and filmed Cholango's entire acceptance speech. During TV MICC's evening news, there was a ten-minute news segment about the elections and the history of the CONAIE. After the news, they aired Cholango's speech in its entirety.

Because TV MICC is actually a part of the MICC, it guarantees the MICC and its filial organizations airtime whenever it needs it. A *dirigente* of the MICC, or of any other *segundo grado* or community organization, could simply show up at the TV MICC office in Latacunga (the capital of the province of Cotopaxi) around 6:00 pm and let the anchorman, Guaman, or director, Tibán, know what their news was. Guaman would then include the news in the broadcast, interviewing the *dirigente* live. At least once a week a MICC *dirigente* visited TV MICC to give an update about the organization. Any time there was a protest called for, the MICC's *dirigentes* visited the station and gave interviews to explain why the mobilization was necessary and all of the information about dates and locations. TV MICC then repeated this information morning and night until the protest took place. Furthermore, the TV MICC reporters traveled to communities throughout Cotopaxi to report on what was happening throughout the bases of the MICC. In this way, *comuneros* had the chance to see themselves, their communities, their families, and their friends on television, a very exciting prospect that kept people tuned in. TV MICC gave voice to *comuneros* who had never had a voice in mainstream media, while also giving them a direct link with the MICC. In the words of Guaman, "Everyone has the right to participate. TV is power" (Jorgé Guaman, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011).

In addition to daily news broadcasts (including international news), TV MICC broadcast music and documentaries. The music was a mixture of Indigenous music (mostly from the province of Imbabura) and *música chicha,* Ecuadorian national music. Tibán believed that the music and documentaries kept people watching, although the station has not been able to do a formal study due to its lack of resources. TV MICC and

the MICC would have liked to produce more educational programs, such as a Kichwa language classes, but there were simply no funds.

ii. Internet

The MICC did not have a web page, nor was it a goal of the organization. President of the MICC from 2009 through the close of this study, Diocelinda Iza, responded to the topic of a web page by saying, "what would be the point?" (Diocelinda Iza, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011). In 2010, TV MICC created a webpage to have a space in which they could put their documentaries and news reports. However, they quickly realized that there was no demand for this webpage within Cotopaxi and that the only audience accessing the webpage was international. In the words of a technician of the station, "the thing is that very few people access the web page . . . and a really good web page that would attract people would require too many resources" (Technician of TV MICC, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011). Or, as Guaman eloquently stated, "the people in Zumbahua don't have the internet" (Jorgé Guaman, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, May 16, 2011). Ultimately, TV MICC decided that it was not worth it to invest in the web page, as it would not reach the station's most important audience.

iii. Radio

In 1979, Catholic missionaries created Radio Latacunga to serve as an *escuela radiofónica*, or a radio school. In Cotopaxi, the roots of Radio Latacunga were in Zumbahua, where there was a strong tendency of liberation theology, emphasizing both evangelism and humanism, and epitomized in the motto of the station, "Radio Latacunga,

the voice of a *pueblo* on march." In Zumbahua, there was a *Parlante de Zumbahua* (Speaker of Zumbahua) who served as a town crier spreading news, information, invitations for meetings, *mingas*, and *fiestas* throughout not only Zumbahua, but also in neighboring communities. Radio Latacunga installed a very basic recording booth in Zumbahua, and the *Parlante* began to record the week's news and then deliver it to the radio station to be broadcast to all the communities of Cotopaxi. The station then worked to create recording booths and *parlantes* in Chugchilan, Pujilí, and other communities. In this way, Radio Latacunga has been a participatory radio station since its inception.

Radio Latacunga had early morning and late evening programming in Kichwa so that *comuneros* could tune in before leaving for work and at night once they returned home; the rest of its programming was in Spanish. Community reporters did investigations and stories on the communities, and the station had a goal of involving itself in the communities. There was also a policy at Radio Latacunga that the station was to serve as an open house to community members, and anyone who wanted to participate was welcome. This meant that if a *dirigente* or *comunero* of any organization had something they wanted to share over the radio, they needed only to show up at the station's office in Latacunga and they were guaranteed airtime, free of charge. This is a practice that continues even today.

In the 1980s and 1990s, Radio Latacunga was an ally of the *huasipunguero* and *campesino* movements and revolts against the *hacienda* system, demanding rights to water, land, and their own culture, including the Kichwa language. Also, all *dirigentes* and *comuneros* referred to the important role the radio played during the 1990 and 1992 *levantamientos*. However, director of the station, Eduardo Guerrero, said that in 1996,

when the Indigenous movement became explicitly political with the formation of Pachakutik, "Radio Latacunga had to rethink its position a bit not to be a pawn of a political party" (Eduardo Guerrero, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, June 9, 2011).

Radio Latacunga, as mentioned above, served as a school of training for political leaders, *dirigentes*, and politicians in Cotopaxi. Guerrero asserted that, "the radio is a manner in which one can gain credibility and familiarity with the public. Because the people trust the station, they trust those who work there" (Eduardo Guerrero, interview by author, Latacunga, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, June 9, 2011). Guerrero estimates that no less than 90% of all Indigenous leaders in Cotopaxi have come out of Radio Latacunga.

In 2006, then-President of the MICC, Salazar, included strengthening the organization's ties with Radio Latacunga as a fundamental element of the MICC's communications plan. Salazar said that the MICC made it their goal to have at least one *dirigente* do an interview on the radio each week. However, once TV MICC went on the air in 2009, the emphasis on the radio lessened, as the MICC had its own media outlet that was entirely under its control. Thus, while the organization continued to visit Radio Latacunga when there was a pressing matter, its day-to-day communication focus switched to TV MICC.

e. *Creative Adaptation*

i. Audiovisual Productions

The MICC struggled with the government agency CONATEL for more than eight years to obtain the frequency for TV MICC. When they finally obtained the frequency in

late 2008, the government gave them six months to start broadcasting, or else the CONATEL would rescind the frequency. The MICC obtained money for equipment from the Development Council of the Nationalities and Pueblos of Ecuador (CODENPE), largely due to the fact that the Executive Secretary of CODENPE at the time was Lourdes Tibán, political heavyweight within Cotopaxi's Indigenous movement and sister of TV MICC's director, Ángel Tibán. Money also came from the Italian government and some international NGOs that were already working with the MICC. It is worth noting that Lourdes Tibán later was elected as assemblywoman of Cotopaxi for the Pachakutik political party, and her campaign designed a strategy based on a strong presence on TV MICC.

TV MICC's first programs were made with Ángel Tibán's personal hand-held camcorder. Continued funding for the station came from the MICC and the NGOs that financed the MICC. TV MICC's personnel worked practically voluntarily; the station earned approximately $300-$400 USD monthly in advertisements, and this income was split among the six to seven employees of the station. Documentaries brought in a bit more revenue for those working on them, as they had usually had independent funding from NGOs. The frequency was approved for 10 years, but the staff of TV MICC was warned by CONATEL that they would have to do a new inscription of the frequency whenever the new Communications Law was passed.

In order to broadcast, TV MICC beamed a signal from the station in Latacunga to a receptor on a nearby hilltop. This receptor passed the signal to a small satellite, which transmitted the broadcasts to three provinces - Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, and Chimborazo. However, TV MICC wanted more coverage and in late 2009, as soon as it began to

function well, the station applied for an extension of its frequency in order to reach farther. CONATEL rejected their application without an explanation. While the directors of TV MICC assured me that they would continue to petition the agency to expand the coverage of their frequency, they were not hopeful for a different response and claimed that the rejection could only be based on political factors. This hunch was proven to be fact when, in June 2012, Assemblywoman Lourdes Tibán obtained a document of the Correa administration that ranked all radio and television stations in Cotopaxi as good, bad, or *calavera*, or the skull, implying that the station must cease to exist. TV MICC and Radio Latacunga were given the mark of *calavera*, implying that the directors of TV MICC were correct in their assumption that Correa views the channel as an enemy of the government and his administration would do everything in its power to limit the reach of the station (Umajinga 2012).

As a result of the uncooperative relationship between the government and TV MICC, TV MICC went looking for other strategies to reach a greater number of people. In 2010, TV MICC made a strategic alliance with Ecuavisa, a national news station that has been under attack from President Correa since 2008. Ecuavisa agreed to provide TV MICC with access to its satellite so that TV MICC could beam live broadcasts. TV MICC, at the close of 2011, was working with Ecuavisa to strengthen this alliance in order to have a TV MICC broadcast on Ecuavisa's national channel once a week. Thus, TV MICC worked effectively to circumvent an uncooperative government agency that was limiting the reach of the station within the Indigenous political arena by making alliances with a similarly aggrieved party.

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

Viewers in the provinces of Cotopaxi, Tungurahua, and Chimborazo were able to watch TV MICC with an antenna. Thus, it would have been impossible to limit its audience to only grassroots members of the Indigenous movement. However, by having news broadcasts in both Spanish and in Kichwa, the directors of TV MICC were able to direct some important messages at only Indigenous audiences, using Kichwa as a kind of secret code. For example, Guaman informed me that information about marches and *levantamientos* were broadcast during both the Kichwa and the Spanish news hours; however, the message was repeated every few hours throughout the day, but only in Kichwa. Similarly, *dirigentes* visiting Radio Latacunga reported having spoken in Kichwa, although they often translated their messages into Spanish as well. As a result, non-Kichwa speakers did not have the same level of access to information about mobilizations, while Kichwa speakers not only had the information, but the opportunity to feel special for being a targeted audience.

g. *Mobilization and ICTs: The Causal Relationship*

The MICC has been a force in Ecuador since its formation and was one of the strongholds of the Indigenous movement during the *levantamientos* of the 1990s. In that light, the MICC already enjoyed a position of high regard among its bases in Cotopaxi. However, from 2007 through 2011, the organization's forms of communication solidified and increased the legitimacy of the organization in the eyes of its bases. Perhaps even more importantly, in interviews, the level of enthusiasm and pride of the grassroots movement members was notable and unlike that for any other organization in this investigation, a fact that can be attributed to TV MICC.

In interviews and participant observation in communities throughout Cotopaxi, *comuneros* continuously referred to Radio Latacunga. Especially in rural areas where television signals and national radio stations do not reach, Radio Latacunga was the only daily connection with the rest of the province and the country. Multiple *comuneros* referred to Radio Latacunga as a *"luchadora,"* or a fighter, marching alongside the Indigenous movement. One middle-aged woman in Zumbahua said, "My grandfather listened to Radio Latacunga and so did my mother and father. So of course I listen" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Zumbahua, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, June 10, 2011). This quotation illustrates the sentiment that exists in communities throughout Cotopaxi that Radio Latacunga simply is a part of the family and a part of the community. Thus, the individuals who speak over the radio are automatically understood to be trustworthy. One young woman in the community of Wintza said of marches, "I know about them from listening to Radio Latacunga. Sometimes I hear about them if I go to an assembly too, but always on the radio" (*Comunera*, interview with author, Wintza, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, August 10, 2011).

While the continued use of Radio Latacunga as a *parlante* of the MICC certainly helped to maintain the organization's credibility with its bases, the creation of TV MICC greatly increased the MICC's presence in its bases' every day lives, and consequently increased the level of respect *comuneros* had for the organization. Because TV MICC could be viewed with nothing more than a television and an antenna, many *comuneros* with whom I spoke had access to the channel. One man in the town of Toacaso even confided, "I actually bought a television so that I could see TV MICC's news. My brother-in-law kept telling me how he saw our friends and family on TV, and I just had to

see that, too!" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Toacaso, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, August 10, 2011). Thus, the excitement of TV MICC's being integrated into the communities helped create an incentive for *comuneros* to tune in. One Indigenous professional who was living in Quito, but was originally from the community of Planchaloma, explained, "Seeing yourself, or people you know, on the TV helps to build self-esteem. We can see that we matter, that our news is real news, and that we can be as powerful as any other group in this country" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Quito, Pichincha, Ecuador, December 12, 2011).

TV MICC helped to bring the MICC closer to its bases and create a sense that a *comunero* had a personal relationship with the organization; the TV literally brought the whole person of the *dirigentes* into the homes of their bases. Because TV MICC was forthright in its political position and its relation as the "son of the MICC," there was little confusion among respondents about the goals of the station. One respondent stated, "[TV MICC] is in line with the principles of the communities and with our fights and activities . . . it helps us to be informed about what is going on in the country, the world, and in all the communities of Cotopaxi. On other channels, there is no chance of our *dirigentes* going there and speaking, but TV MICC is a space for us, from our own organization" (*Comunero*, interview with author, Toacaso, Cotopaxi, Ecuador, August 10, 2011). TV MICC not only increased the presence and credibility of the MICC, but also increased the pride *comuneros* felt to be a part of the MICC. This helps explain the fact that from 2009 through 2011, all but one of the mobilizations called for by the MICC were complete successes.

When asked about participation in marches, *comuneros* of the MICC responded that they knew about the marches from their communities' assemblies, or from watching TV MICC. However, the explanation for why they participated in marches inevitably included a reference to the fact that the MICC and Cotopaxi have historically been a stronghold of Indigenous and *campesino* resistance in Ecuador. Furthermore, *comuneros* argued that TV MICC is the latest form of resistance and a way to guarantee the Indigenous movement's presence in the public sphere. In this way, the sentiment of grassroots movement members of the MICC mirrored those of *comuneros* in the FICI; *comuneros* felt a sense of pride and trust in their organization, and therefore they had a responsibility to respond to the MICC's calls for mobilization. But even more than that, after the creation of TV MICC, *comuneros* were excited about their organizations and enthusiastic about being a part of the MICC and participating in its events.

IV. *FICSH*

The Interprovincial Federation of Shuar Centers (FICSH) was formed January 12, 1964, in the city of Sucúa in the southern Amazonian province of Morona Santiago, and is a filial of both the CONAIE and the regional organization of the Amazon, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE). The FICSH is composed of more than 100 centers (communities) throughout the province of Morona Santiago. Nearly all members of the Shuar nation speak Shuar, and many who live in the centers deep in the Amazon speak no Spanish. Shuar was recognized in the 2008 Ecuadorian constitution as an official language. The Shuar nation extends to the north of Morona Santiago through the provinces of Pastaza, Orellana, and Sucumbíos; however, each province has its own organization.

a. *Mobilizations, 2007-2011*

Men and women with long, black hair shuffle in place to the beat of drums. Young men with feathered headdresses and leopard skin wraps dance in a line, keeping time with a "huh, huh, huh" chant and thrusting their long spears in the air with every exhale. Women pass *chicha,* a traditional drink made of masticated, fermented yucca. The protestors have blocked the bridges entering Macas, the capital city of Morona Santiago. Unlike the festive mobilizations in the sierra, this *paro* has a more serious tone.

From 2007 through 2011, the FICSH had a 100% (8/8) success rate for mobilizations, six of which were completely successful, two partially successful. The mobilizations and their rates of success were determined by key word searches in the archives of two national newspapers, *El Comercio* and *El Universo*, and the provincial newspaper of Morona Santiago, *Diario Centinela*.[67] *Dirigentes* and grassroots movement members also recounted their memories of mobilizations during the time period under study. The FICSH, as with the FICI and the MICC, rely heavily upon *paros* to force the government to respond to their demands.

In October 2008, the FICSH initiated a successful mobilization against the passing of the new constitution with the participation of more than 500 Shuar in the protest in Quito. The FICSH claimed that by giving the government the right to subterranean natural resources, the constitution undermined the sovereignty of the Shuar Nation over its land and would result in the government giving concessions to natural

[67] The newspaper searches, conducted through online databases, included the key words FICSH, *Shuar*, *indígena Morona Santiago, indio Morona Santiago, paro Morona Santiago, movilización indígena Morona Santiago* and were for all dates between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2011.

resources to multinational corporations (MNCs) without the free, prior, informed consent of the FICSH.

In September/October 2009, the FICSH initiated another successful mobilization against the government's proposed Mining and Water Laws with the participation of thousands of Shuar who successfully blocked the main roadways to the Amazonian city of Puyo and the coast. During the protests, the governor of Morona Santiago sent the police to break up the roadblock, resulting in the death of one Shuar, Bosco Wisuma ("Correa Lamentó la muerte de un indígena shuar en las protestas en Macas," *El Comercio,* September 30, 2009). On December 17th, 2009, the government agency CONATEL, together with the Superintendent of Telecommunications (SuperTel), issued resolution 440-16, rescinding Radio Arutam's frequency. The FICSH called for yet another mobilization, also successful, rejecting this resolution. In January 2009, when the FICSH's appeal of the CONATEL resolution reached the national court, the FICSH called another march, this time in Quito. The appeal was granted and the FICSH mobilized over this case once more, in February 2010, demanding an investigation by a neutral panel into Bosco Wisuma's death, as well as demanding a *Ley de Territorios* (Land Law) that would guarantee collective land title to the Shuar centers ("Indígenas amazónicos anuncian levantamiento," *El Comercio*, February 20, 2010).

In March 2010, and again in May 2010, the FICSH called for mobilizations demanding the passing of a Water Law and in opposition to the passing of the Mining Law. While these mobilizations were partially successful, there were not the thousands who had mobilized consistently throughout 2009 and into 2010, and the protesters were unable to block main roadways between Macas and Puyo, always a central goal of

FICSH protests ("Los amazónicos irán a una marcha hacia Quito," *El Comercio,* May 18, 2010). As noted in the case of the MICC, it is possible that, after the near constant mobilization from October 2009 through February 2010, the grassroots movement members of the FICSH were simply fatigued.

Finally, in February 2011, the government arrested Shuar President Luis (Pepe) Acacho and two other *dirigentes*, charging them with terrorism and as the responsible parties in the death of Wisuma. The logic of the Administration was that Acacho and the others had led the marches, and therefore, were responsible for the violence. The FICSH called for a mobilization in Macas outside of the jail where the three leaders were being held. Thousands of protestors blocked the roads from Macas leading to Puyo and to the coast, and in response, the government transferred the three charged men to Quito ("Los indígenas anuncian lucha a favor de Acacho," *El Comercio*, February 3, 2011). The FICSH called for the mobilization to relocate to Quito, and nearly 1,000 Shuars marched through the streets of the capital, concentrating in front of the court for two days during the hearings. Ultimately, the three leaders were released on grounds of habeas corpus.

The most successful mobilizations of the FICSH were those that were directly in defense of the *Pachamama* and the interests of the organization's constituent communities. Furthermore, the mobilizations in defense of the organization's radio station, Radio Arutam, were long, hard, and the protestors were prepared to forcefully defend the station. This level of commitment can be attributed to the outrage felt by grassroots movement members at the death of a fellow Shuar, Bosco Wisuma. The remainder of this section will further illustrate how the FICSH's communication plan,

and especially its reaction to the government's attempts at coercion to shut down Radio Arutam, contributed to its high levels of success in its mobilizations.

Mobilizations of the FICSH				
Date	**Reason**	**Goal**	**Outcome**	**Level of Success**
September 27-30, 2009	Against proposed *Ley Minera* (Mining Law) and *Ley de Aguas* (Water Law)	March of 500 and blocking of roadways in Macas	March of more than 500 in Macas and blocked roads leaving the city	Successful
October 1-6, 2009	Against government for the death of Shuar protestor, Bosco Wisuma	March of 500 and blocking of roadways in Macas	March of more than 500 in Macas and blocked roads leaving the city	Successful
December 28, 2009	Against CONATEL Resolution to close Radio Arutam	Blocking of roadways in Macas	March of more than 500 in Macas and blocked roads leaving the city	Successful
January 8, 2010	Against CONATEL Resolution to Close Radio Arutam	March of 200 in Macas	March of more than 500 in Macas	Successful
February 20, 2010	Against the proposed *Ley de Territorio* (Land Law) and demanding an investigation of death of Bosco Wisuma	March of 200 in Macas	March of more than 500 in Macas	Successful

March 2, 2010	Against proposed Water Law and Mining Law	Participation of 200 members of FICSH in march in Cuenca	Participation of more than 100 members of FICSH in march in Cuenca	Partially Successful
May 18, 2010	Against proposed Water Law and Mining Law	March of 200 in Quito	March of less than 100 in Quito	Partially Successful
February 2-8, 2011	Support for arrested Shuar leader, Luis (Pepe) Acacho	Permanent *levantamiento* of 100 in Macas and in Quito until Acacho freed	Permanent *levantamiento* of 100 in Macas and in Quito until Acacho was freed	Successful

Table 5.3 Mobilizations Called for by the FICSH, 2007-2011

b. *Communication, Pre-2007*

Prior to 2007, the FICSH relied heavily upon face-to-face communication in assemblies. However, because the centers were spread throughout the Amazon, travel required much time and resources, making the presence of a FICSH *dirigente* in every center's assembly difficult. Thus, the FICSH, as with all other Amazonian provincial organizations that participated in this study, depended upon organization's congresses in Sucúa, where representatives from every center would arrive to participate. These congresses happened every three months, or as needed.

In addition to face-to-face communication, many Shuar centers had high frequency (HF) radios to communicate with other centers.[68] These were utilized mostly for emergency purposes. For example, if there were a health emergency, the leader of a center would communicate with the neighboring center, which would communicate with the neighboring center, and so on until the message reached the FICSH office in Sucúa. In the 1970s, Catholic missionaries founded a radio station in Sucúa so that their *escuelas radiofónicas* could reach Shuar centers. In 1977, 3,109 of the 4,500 Shuar children were enrolled in the educational program, illustrating the vast reach of the station ("Solución

[68] High frequency radios transmit distances from 10 to 100 miles, slightly more than short wave radios.

Original a un Problema Actual" 1977). The educational programming was in Shuar, although one of the courses was in the Spanish language. The FICSH used the station for one half hour each day in order to communicate with its centers, mostly to pass along messages about important activities. In the late 1990s, the station shifted hands from the Catholic Church to the FICSH, and was baptized with a new name, Radio *La Voz de Arutam* (Radio The Voice of the Spirit). The *escuela radiofónica* fizzled out around the same time the FICSH took control and programming shifted to news and music.

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

Luis (Pepe) Acacho was president of the FICSH from 2008 through 2011. The FICSH developed a communication plan based on the radio, but also introduced audiovisual productions. Furthermore, the *dirigentes* of the FICSH had a dream of creating a new type of education program, based on the idea and experience of the *escuelas radiofónicas*, but utilizing solar panels and the Internet rather than the radio. However, at the close of 2011, this project remained in the planning phase with the FICSH in discussions with various NGOs in order to obtain the resources necessary to implement the program.

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

i. Radio

Since the creation of Radio Arutam, the FICSH utilized the station in order to reach its base communities. However, in 2008, the organization decided to increase the number of hours of Shuar programming from four to nine hours daily. Beginning in January of 2008, from 4:00 am to 8:00 am, and from 4:00 pm to 9:00 pm, all

programming was in Shuar. During these time slots, there was a half hour to hour news program that reported national news, as well as news reports written by members of the communities. Also, during the afternoon time slot from 4:00 pm to 6:00 pm, the station had open hours in which anyone could drop-in to share information, make an announcement, or do an interview. Because the station is part of the FICSH and is located on the top floor of the FICSH's offices, *dirigentes* regularly frequented the drop-in time to share news about their activities.

ii. Audiovisual Productions

In 2008, the FICSH decided to produce videos regarding cultural practices to be distributed in its constituent communities and to youths living in urban areas. Lacking the resources and technical expertise necessary, the FICSH partnered up with a young Swiss anthropologist who had come to Ecuador to study Shamanic (traditional healing) practices in the Amazon. As was explained to me by the *dirigente* of education, Claudio Marian, this partnership was beneficial to both parties as the Swiss had access to Shamanic rituals he otherwise would not have had the opportunity to see, and the FICSH had a talented videographer with his own equipment willing to help make the videos. The anthropologist, with a young Shuar as his assistant, made two videos that were distributed on DVD. One video was a series of interviews with an elderly Shuar couple, both Shamans, and the second was a recounting of the process of a boy becoming a man, according to Shuar tradition. These videos were completely in Shuar, with Spanish subtitles. The FICSH distributed the video on DVD in some communities, but mostly distributed it through their office in Sucúa, during FISCH congresses, and in congresses

of the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of the Ecuadorian Amazon (CONFENIAE).

e. *Creative Adaptation*

i. Radio

In November 2009, the FICSH called for a mobilization in Morona Santiago against the entrance of oil and mining companies in the Amazon, as well as in opposition to the government's proposed Mining Law. The FICSH, as usual, communicated the information regarding the march over Radio Arutam in the Shuar language. During the protest, there was a confrontation between the protestors and the police, and Bosco Wisuma, a Shuar teacher, was killed by a police officer's bullet.[69] The government immediately depicted the protesters as violent, saying that they had incited violence through their radio broadcasts by telling their bases to come to Macas to protest and to bring their spears. The national news outlets – many of which were under the management of the government – showed images of men with spears and blamed the Shuar *dirigentes* of the FICSH for Wisuma's death.[70] In response to this death, the government accused the Shuar leaders of being terrorists, issued warrants for their arrest, and the SuperTel and CONATEL jointly issued resolution 440-16 on December 17th of 2009, terminating the contract between Radio Arutam and CONATEL, thereby

[69] There are many differing accounts of this day. The official government investigation claims that Wisum was killed by a rubber bullet, while the Indigenous movement insists that the police fired with real bullets. Regardless of the type of bullet, Wisum died during the confrontation between protestors and police.

[70] The spear is a sacred Shuar symbol, and Shuar men bring their spears with them to any and all official events. For example, Shuar men attending the CONAIE and CONFENIAE assemblies bring their spears to demonstrate their position of leadership within their communities. The spears of today are largely made for purposes of adornment and are not used for hunting.

rescinding the right of Arutam to their radio frequency and effectively closing the station (CONATEL 2009).

The logic behind this resolution was that Radio Arutam had been clandestinely inciting violence in the Shuar language in order to challenge the rule of law in Morona Santiago (CONATEL 2009). However, according to Shuar CONFENIAE *dirigente* Orlando Juepa, the government's translator, Lucía Mujuen, did not speak perfect Shuar and there were, subsequently, problems with her translation (Orlando Juepa, interview with author, Puyo, Pastaza, Ecuador, October 21, 2010). A public battle ensued and, ultimately, the government did not shut down Radio Arutam. Instead, the two sides agreed to a new regulation that would require not only Radio Arutam, but all radio stations broadcasting in languages other than Spanish, to provide translations of all broadcasts to CONATEL.[71] Thus, Radio Arutam and the FICSH did not bend to the government agency CONATEL's initial strong-arming, but instead used the court system to appeal the agency's resolution. While this was a gamble – since 2007, the courts have often sided with the Correa administration – the maneuver ultimately paid off. The fact that the entire Shuar nation, as well as other Indigenous organizations throughout the country, remained mobilized throughout the appeals process put pressure on the court system to respond positively, as well as on President Correa to back down or face a national *levantamiento*.

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

[71] This agreement completely ignores the fact that the constitution recognizes not only Spanish, but also Kichwa and Shuar, as official languages, thus guaranteeing the right to the production of all materials in these languages. Therefore, it should actually be the responsibility of the state to provide translations of the programming, as well as its own programming, in not only Spanish, but in Kichwa and Shuar as well.

i. Radio

Radio Arutam reached almost the entire province of Morona Santiago, and so was a presence not only in Indigenous communities, but also in cities such as Macas that were largely *mestizo*. FICSH *dirigente* Claudio Marian emphasized the importance of Shuar language broadcasts, especially when Radio Arutam broadcast information and the political stances of the FICSH with regard to controversial legislation, so that the "*mestizos* won't understand what it is that we're saying, so that they can't plan their defense" (Claudio Marian, interview with author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). It is important to know that in Morona Santiago, the divide has been wide and deep between Indigenous organizations (anti-exploitation of natural resources) and the *mestizo* population (pro-exploitation of natural resources). Thus, by using the Shuar language, the broadcasts not only were more credible among the FICSH's bases, but also excluded the hostile portions of the *mestizo* population.

g. *Mobilization and ICTs: The Causal Relationship*

The FICSH recognized the reality of its communities, namely that there were many with no electricity and no cell phone coverage, and so, they decided that ICTs such as the Internet would be a waste of resources. Instead, the FICSH focused on strengthening its presence on the radio, an ICT that had a history in Shuar communities and was already trusted as a source of reliable information. Furthermore, the strong position the FICSH took to defend Radio Arutam strengthened the base members' identification with the radio, as well as with the FICSH.

In interviews, grassroots members of the FICSH emphasized time and again the importance of Radio Arutam as the only way to stay up to date. Indigenous individuals throughout the Amazon repeated the claim that the radio was the only way to receive information. One older woman who lived in a Shuar center a six hour canoe ride and half day walk from Sucúa explained, "There are no cell phones in the *selva* (rainforest), there is no electricity, we don't have computers. We only have the radio. I know that my son's wife had a baby recently because he told us over the radio [Arutam]. All that we know from outside of the community comes from [Radio] Arutam" (*Comunera*, Sucúa, interview by author, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). A young woman whose husband worked in Macas said that, "I listen to Radio Arutam so that I will know when Jhon is coming home and I can get the house and special foods ready for him" (*Comunera*, interview by author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). The husband sent messages during the Shuar time slots to the woman letting her know when he was to arrive in the community, a two-day trip from Sucúa. These few examples illustrate the integral role Radio Arutam plays in Shuars' everyday lives.

Because everyone was tuned in to Radio Arutam in order to get news, gossip, and hear from their loved ones, they inevitably heard the FICSH *dirigentes* when they made their regular radio visits. Grassroots movement members referred to the FICSH as a *luchadora*, especially against oil and mining companies. A young Shuar man explained that the FICSH closely followed what the national and provincial governments were doing, and then it shared this information over Radio Arutam so that "we all know what is happening and the government can't come and lie to us. The government thinks we are stupid and uneducated, but we know what is happening in the country" (*Comunero*,

interview by author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). Pepe Acacho, former President of the FICSH, said that because the FICSH is always sharing news with its bases and explaining "the reality of the situation," when the FICSH calls for its bases to come to Sucúa, Macas, Puyo, or Quito for a protest, "the people come, and they don't ask why, they already know why" (José (Pepe) Acacho, interview by author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 23, 2010).

Even more than the extended hours of Shuar programming, the FICSH's strategy of confrontation with the government when the CONATEL attempted to rescind Arutam's frequency won the FICSH greater legitimacy in the eyes of its bases, and frankly, outraged the grassroots movement members. The Shuar nation's history – at least since the 1980s – is one of defending their territory from invaders – the government, oil and mining companies, and settlers. Thus, there is a strong sense of unity and a quick reaction to defend what is theirs from a government that is assumed to be hostile. Former *dirigente* Marian asserted that the FICSH's refusal to accept the CONATEL resolution assured its bases that the FICSH would not bend to the government's will, "but would defend its sovereignty and the sovereignty of the Shuar centers at all costs" (Claudio Marian, interview by author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). A young Shuar woman agreed that the confrontation between the FICSH and the government "reassured us that the FICSH was fighting for us, and so we had to fight with them" (*Comunera*, interview by author, Sucúa, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, November 22, 2010). The fact that Radio Arutam never closed further guaranteed that news of the firm stance the FICSH took in opposition to the government reached all the Shuar centers. Again, the acceptance of the organization as a stalwart defender of the Shuar nation and

its interests resulted in its grassroots members feeling a sense of responsibility to participate in protests and marches when called for.

V. *FEINCE*

The Indigenous Federation of the Cofán Nationality of Ecuador (FEINCE), founded in the 1980s, represents more than 5,000 Cofánes living in 1,200 Cofán centers throughout Ecuador's northern Amazonian province of Sucumbíos. Cofánes also live in the Ecuadorian province of Orellana and in Colombia. The majority of Cofán community members speak the Cofán language, A'ingae, and many Cofánes speak no Spanish at all.

a. *Mobilizations, 2007-2011*

In the period 2007 through 2011, the FEINCE did not call for a single mobilization. While President Yumbo said that some Cofán individuals or communities might have chosen to participate in CONAIE *levantamientos*, the FEINCE preferred to "stay out of the mess," and keep good relations with the government (Robinson Yumbo, Lago Agrio, Sucumbíos, Ecuador, November 25, 2010). Additionally, in 2008, the FEINCE signed an agreement with the government to enter into the program SocioBosque, a conservation program in which the government pays communities to leave large swaths of land untouched. However, this program was controversial, and the FEINCE, while a participant in the program, failed to reach a consensus within its communities. According to Yumbo, the largest challenge to reaching a consensus was an inability to communicate effectively among the Cofán centers. Thus, even though there were instances in which the FEINCE would have liked to mobilize, for example in 2011 before the government entered into discussions with oil companies about opening new

blocks of the Amazon for oil extraction, Yumbo "knew that the communities would not respond, even if he could manage to reach them" (Robinson Yumbo, Lago Agrio, Sucumbíos, Ecuador, November 25, 2010).

b. *Communication, Pre—2007*

As with the other organizations discussed in this chapter, prior to 2007, the FEINCE's main strategy for communication was face-to-face communication in assemblies. As with the Shuar nationality, Cofánes lived in far-flung centers throughout the Amazon, the majority of which had no electricity or cell phone reception. Because the distances to travel in order to reach the Cofán centers were great, *dirigentes* were unable to attend all assemblies, and instead, the FEINCE depended upon the attendance of community members in the organization's assemblies at its headquarters in the outskirts of Sucumbíos's capital city, Lago Agrio.[72] HF radios served as a way to connect communities in order to communicate an upcoming assembly, as well as in case of an emergency.

c. *Communication Plan, 2007-2011*

Robinson Yumbo was president of the FEINCE from 2006 through the close of 2011, and while he said there had been a *dirigente* of communication elected in an assembly, the person had vacated his post, and consequently, there was no functioning communications *dirigente* during the period under study. Yumbo said that the communications plan of the FEINCE throughout his period as president was based on face-to-face communication in assemblies and visits to communities. While the FEINCE

[72] Lago Agrio was named alter Sour Lake, Texas, home to the Texaco/Chevron oil company, in 1979 when this American company entered to begin oil extraction. The name of the city was officially changed to Nueva Loja in 1990; however, the city is almost always still referred to as Lago Agrio.

continued to utilize HF radios, he said that this form of communication was not dependable as there were issues with maintenance of the radios and especially a lack of batteries. The FEINCE also entered a program with the government agency, the *Secretaria de Pueblos* (Secretary of *Pueblos*), to construct a Cofán radio station (program discussed in chapter three).

d. *Appropriation of ICTs*

i. Cell Phones

The FEINCE continued to use HF radios for communication; however, as mentioned above, HF radios were an unreliable method for the FEINCE to reach its bases. President Robinson Yumbo then decided to encourage *segundo grado* and community organizations to obtain cell phones. While cell phone coverage had slowly begun to reach some Cofán centers – largely thanks to the CONATEL contracts and regulations discussed in chapter three – at the close of 2011, there was coverage in only three of the 14 Cofán centers. Furthermore, in communities where the main economic activities were hunting, fishing, small-scale farming, and the sale of handicrafts, community leaders and grassroots members lacked the resources to purchase a cell phone or buy pre-paid credit in order to be able to make calls. In Sinangüe, the Cofán center closest to Lago Agrio (two hours in car and 20 minutes in canoe), there was cell phone reception. However, President of the community, Fabiola Umenda, said that she did not have a phone, nor did the majority of those living in Sinangüe, due to the prohibitive cost. Furthermore, she asked me, laughing, "What would I do with a cell phone? There is no electricity here. How would I charge a phone?" (Fabiola Umenda, interview by author,

Sinangüe, Sucumbíos, Ecuador, November 25, 2010). Thus, while the use of cell phones could have hypothetically mirrored the earlier use of HF radios, the lack of coverage and electricity, combined with the prohibitively high cost, proved to be detrimental to the use of cell phones taking hold in the FEINCE's bases.

e. *Creative Adaptation*

i. Radio

In 2010, the Secretary of *Pueblos* initiated a program to grant the 14 Indigenous nationalities of Ecuador access to radio frequencies. In July 2010, the FEINCE's plan for its station was approved by CONATEL, and they began the process of acquiring the equipment necessary to broadcast the programming and construct the radio's recording booth. According to one *mestizo* technician working with the FEINCE in a USAID economic development program, the government was providing capacity building programs and money for some of the equipment, such as the satellite dish. While this technician was enthusiastic about the prospects of the program, President Yumbo was more reserved. While Yumbo admitted that the potential of the radio station was great, he claimed that the government had a history of offering projects and changing course at the last moment, and so, he would wait to be excited until the station actually began broadcasting.

The station, Radio Cofán, began broadcasting in Lago Agrio in July 2011. The station's mission "is to deliver to the listener, in all programming, content about the reality of the lives of Indigenous *pueblos*, with an emphasis on the Cofán Nationality of Ecuador, to empower the members of the Cofán nationality so that there is a greater

valuing of traditional customs" ("Propuesta Conceptual Cofán Radio FM" 2011). As required by the Secretary of *Pueblos*, the programming was to be at least 30% Cofán. However, the young Cofán man who participated in the Secretary of *Pueblos* workshops emphasized that they had been instructed to focus on cultural programming, such as stories about *fiestas* and traditional practices. He reported that in one workshop, a facilitator had actually said that the stations should not participate in politics and that they should keep in mind what happened with Radio Arutam of the FICSH.

The Cofán station, as all stations part of this program, was founded as a community radio station, meaning the reach of the frequency was limited to a radius of 10 kilometers. As noted above, the closest Cofán community to the FEINCE's office and the radio station was more than two hours by car, much more than 10 kilometers. Thus, the radio station reached not a single Cofán community.

Finally, the financing provided by the Secretary of *Pueblos* for the stations ended in July 2011, when the station began broadcasting. This could have potentially been an opportunity, serving as the end of government involvement and the possibility for the station to become autonomous in its functioning. However, this was not to be so. President Yumbo and the youths charged with the functioning of the station said they did not have the financing for the station, and that they would not be trying to sell airtime to local businesses. According to Yumbo, this was because it was "unnecessary," as the government was willing to purchase all the airtime they would sell. This was confirmed by an employee of the Secretary of *Pueblos* in Quito who stated that the government was ready to purchase all the airtime the stations would sell in order to broadcast public

service announcements and advertisements, both in Spanish and in Cofán (Robinson Yumbo, interview by author, Lago Agrio, Sucumbíos, Ecuador, November 25, 2010).

Thus, the radio station had the potential to serve as a first step in an effective communications strategy. Instead, it had resulted (at the close of 2011) as an effective government strategy to co-opt the FEINCE and guarantee a government presence on the organization's station, rather than guarantee an organizational presence in its constituent communities.

f. *Distinguishing and Targeting Audiences*

The FEINCE did not have an effective strategy for reaching its bases, using new ICTs or otherwise. While the radio station was broadcasting in A'ingae, the frequency did not reach the Cofán communities, essentially meaning the station was useless for contacting the FEINCE's bases, except for individuals visiting or working in Lago Agrio.

g. *Mobilizations and ICTs: The Missing Links*

In interviews with community members, they echoed Yumbo's sentiment. In a discussion with a group of women in the community of Sinangüe, they explained to me that the FEINCE was not present in their community. They said that the *dirigentes* of the FEINCE visited only once in a while to talk solely about economic projects, and always with "that guy" (the *mestizo* technician) who did not speak any A'ingae. When asked what they would do in the case of a problem in the community, the women replied, "we take care of it" (group interview by author, Sinangüe, Sucumbíos, Ecuador, November 25, 2010).

Ultimately, in the eyes of the Cofán grassroots, the FEINCE was not viewed as a trustworthy source of information or as an organization that represented its bases. The participation of the FEINCE in government projects, such as Sociobosque, divided the communities due to a lack of consensus building and communication between the leadership and the bases. The radio program further undermined the FEINCE's legitimacy among its grassroots movement members as the organization was viewed as simply taking resources from the government and using them for the benefit of the *dirigentes*, rather than for the entire nationality. Its lack of ability and initiative to communicate effectively with its constituent communities resulted in a continually worsening situation. At the close of 2011, the communities of the FEINCE were divided to the point where the organization's president admitted that he had "almost no power" to convene the 14 centers or to make decisions for the Cofán Nationality, never mind to ask the grassroots members to participate in risky protest activity.

VI. *Conclusion*

As in the cases of the ECUARUNARI and the CONAIE, provincial organizations had the most success in mobilizations that were directly relevant to their base communities and that were in line with historic themes of *lucha* like the defense of the *Pachamama*, such as anti-mining mobilizations in the southern sierra and mobilizations demanding access to water. Furthermore, mobilizations to defend their organizations and *dirigentes* from attacks by the government were especially successful. However, even with the similarity in grievances, there still remained variation in levels of success among organizations.

The four cases considered in this chapter illustrate different communications strategies utilizing new ICTs and help us to understand the differences in levels of success of mobilizations. The level of strategic appropriation, creative adaptation, and distinguishing and targeting of audiences differed in each case. The MICC had success in their appropriation of audiovisual productions with the creation of TV MICC. This new communications strategy was effective for reaching the MICC's bases because the combination of audio and visual presentations broadcast through the television appealed to the grassroots movement members' cultural and economic reality, proving to be an ICT that was both relatable and affordable. The success of TV MICC is a phenomenon that has been noted throughout Ecuador. In almost every organization I visited, *dirigentes* and grassroots members alike spoke of TV MICC with a mixture of pride and envy; while all were proud to say that TV MICC was a part of the Indigenous movement, they wished their own organizations had the same initiative.

The FICSH creatively adapted to a hostile government agency with a strategy of confrontation, a move that increased its credibility with the bases and ultimately helped the organization greatly in getting grassroots members to show up for protests. The FICI and its Radio Ilumán were also challenged by the government agency, CONATEL; however, they creatively adapted to the challenges put in their path and created written versions of their radio broadcasts in order to continue reaching their bases. Furthermore, they experimented with the internet as a strategy to reach the FICI's migrant population and as a potential future communications strategy within their communities. The case of the FEINCE was the only that was completely unsuccessful in its creative adaptation, and was instead co-opted by the government. While the FEINCE did not actually call for

mobilization, this was a conscious choice on the part of the *dirigentes* because they recognized their lack of legitimacy with their bases and the fact that they lacked the legitimacy and power to mobilize its bases.

Thus, the creation of a TV station to be directly linked with an organization was the most successful and innovative strategy for increasing communication between an organization and its base communities. TV MICC increased the organization's presence in its grassroots movement members' everyday lives, resulting not only in higher levels of confidence in the organization, but also greater enthusiasm and sense of pride amongst the bases. While the seed of desire to have a TV station is now planted in organizations throughout Ecuador, the resources necessary to fund such an undertaking have been prohibitive. However, organizations that successfully utilized the radio were able to take advantage of its familiar presence in the homes of grassroots movement members, as well as its inexpensive nature, to increase their presence within their filial communities. Cell phones, while useful during mobilizations for logistical reasons, did not prove to be integral to communication between organizations and their bases, but rather among *dirigentes*.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion: Summary of Findings and Future Research

Since the 1980s, democratically elected Ecuadorian governments have implemented policies threatening internationally recognized Indigenous human rights. In response, in 1990 a powerful national Indigenous social movement emerged in Ecuador, but the level of mobilization has since varied. From 2007 through 2011, some local Indigenous organizations were successful in maintaining high levels of political mobilization within their communities, while other organizations failed to do so. Unique to this time period was the introduction of new information and communications technologies (ICTs) in the communication strategies of Indigenous organizations throughout Ecuador. This dissertation asked, under what conditions can the use of new information and communications technologies contribute to successful social mobilization, and when can the use of ICTs hinder mobilization? Social mobilization is defined as the activation of a social network to make disruptive contentious demands on a target, and successful mobilization is that which meets the goals set by the organization calling for mobilization.

This dissertation tested three hypotheses: first, successful *strategic appropriation* of ICTs results in more successful mobilization; second, successful *creative adaptability* of movement leaders in using ICTs, especially with regard to interactions with the government, results in more successful mobilization; and third, success in *identifying and targeting their audiences* leads to more successful mobilization. These three independent variables proved to be additive, that is, when high levels of all three elements were achieved, mobilization was most successful, and vice versa. However, mobilization was

unsuccessful in organizations that failed to creatively adapt to changes in the Indigenous political arena.[73] This concluding chapter will first, summarize the main findings of the dissertation, and second, indicate areas of possible future investigation.

I. *Summary of Findings*

This investigation challenges the commonly shared opinion of academics, politicians, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that more access to ICTs is inherently better – for poverty reduction, for democracy, and for a healthy civil society. Instead, it finds that the use of ICTs can actually undermine the legitimacy of social movement organizations (SMOs) and their leaders, resulting in lower levels of success in mobilization. This has important implications for academic investigations regarding ICTs and political and economic processes, as well as for government and NGO projects regarding ICTs. With regard to academic investigations, these findings suggest that there is an entire line of inquiry regarding the role of ICTs in political and economic processes that has largely not been examined. With regard to NGO and government projects, these findings suggest that projects to connect rural communities with computers and internet are not necessarily the most effective ways to invest resources if the goal is greater democratic participation. Moreover, the introduction and expansion of ICTs in developing contexts could be having unintended and even damaging consequences.

Chapter two presented the history and organizational structure of the Indigenous movement in Ecuador. It explained the existence of 14 distinct Indigenous nationalities

[73] An arena is an "open-ended bundle of rules and resources that allows certain kinds of interactions to proceed, leading to outcomes that may be formal or quite casual" (Jasper 2006, 141). The Indigenous social movement comprises a specific political arena within the Ecuadorian context, here referred to as the Indigenous political arena, and is comprised of the state and the CONAIE, as well as individuals.

and 18 *pueblos*, or peoples.[74] It considered traditional forms of Indigenous communication based on visual and auditory communication, emphasizing the importance of face-to-face communication in Indigenous cultures. These traditional forms of communication were sufficient in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, so that the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE) was able to call for numerous massive national mobilizations demanding Indigenous rights, constitutional revisions, and at times, unseating presidents. Thus, the importance of the Indigenous movement in Ecuadorian politics grew to such an extent that while presidents could be elected without the official support of the movement, not one administration from 1990 through 2007 was able to remain in power after initiating policies that went against the interests of the Indigenous movement.

The time period of this investigation begins in 2007 with the election of President Rafael Correa and continues through the end of 2011 (with Correa still in power). President Correa obviously had learned from history that the dynamic between governments and the Indigenous movement tended to leave presidents in a precarious position and at risk for being removed from power through mass protests. Chapter three argued that the Correa administration implemented a combination of three strategies – cooperation, cooptation, and repression – with regard to communication in Ecuador in order to reach and win over the Indigenous population. While scholars have analyzed how authoritarian regimes have used these strategies to retain their power, democratic regimes have largely been left out of these studies (for example, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). As a compound player in the Indigenous political arena, the government had the

[74] *Pueblos* of the same nationality share language and some basic cultural traits; however, they often have distinct styles of dress, different holidays, and specific cultural practices.

power to change the rules of the game in order to make communication within and amongst Indigenous organizations more difficult.[75] Government agencies, such as the Telecommunication Council (CONATEL) and the Superintendent of Telecommunications (SuperTel), often cooperated with community radio and television stations; however, they also had the power to approve or deny radio and television frequency applications and requests for renewals, a power they wielded strategically to create an environment in which radio stations feared being too political, lest their frequencies be revoked. Furthermore, the government's program to provide radio frequencies, equipment, and training to the Indigenous nationalities of Ecuador proved to be an effective strategy to co-opt Indigenous organizations. Finally, the Correa administration's attacks on journalists and its use of the judicial system to persecute its opposition created an environment in which reporters self-censored in order to avoid run-ins with the administration. Ecuador's history and the strategies of the Correa administration with regard to communication in the Indigenous political arena set the context in which Indigenous organizations were attempting to mobilize their bases from 2007 through 2011.[76]

Chapter four presented data gathered through open-ended interviews in 14 Indigenous organizations at the national, regional, provincial, and *segundo grado* (local federations) levels during 17 months of field research (August 2010 through December

[75] The Indigenous political arena is composed of Indigenous individuals and at least two compound players, the Ecuadorian State and the CONAIE.

[76] The bases are Indigenous individuals living in communities that make up the *segundo grado* organizations that are filials of the CONAIE. Every individual in these communities is a member of his or her respective *segundo grado* organization, and subsequently of the provincial, regional, and national organizations to which their *segundo grado* organization belongs. These individuals, also referred to as the grassroots of the organizations, are the ones the organizations want to persuade to participate in mobilizations.

2011). Quantitative analysis revealed strong correlations (statistically significant at the 95% level) between the independent variables *strategic appropriation* of ICTs and *creative adaptation* of their uses with respect to opportunities and/or challenges created by the government in the Indigenous political arena and successful social mobilization.[77] There was also a positive correlation between success in the *distinguishing and targeting of audiences* when using ICTs and successful mobilization; however, this relationship was less strong and not statistically significant at the 95% level.

The causal mechanism between the independent and dependent variables is based on credibility of the organizations in the eyes of their grassroots movement members and the resultant levels of trust between individuals and the organizations. SMOs that effectively strategically appropriated ICTs did so in a way that reinforced or increased the credibility of the organization with its bases. For example, the Kichwa Federation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI) appropriated cell phones, but they integrated this ICT into the already existing *chaski* network, thereby amplifying the reach and effectiveness of the traditional communication process. In this way, the organization's bases had more information available to them and more rapidly, but still within a familiar context, and so they continued to respond to the calls to mobilize. Similarly, organizations that

[77] An arena is an "open-ended bundle of rules and resources that allows certain kinds of interactions to proceed, leading to outcomes that may be formal or quite casual" (Jasper 2006, 141). The Indigenous social movement comprises a specific political arena within the Ecuadorian context, here referred to as the Indigenous political arena, and is composed of Indigenous individuals – the bases – that are members of communities that compose Indigenous organizations. The CONAIE is a compound contained within the arena, while the state is a compound player that exists outside of the arena, but acts within it. Compound players acting within an arena are often hierarchically positioned, meaning that especially in terms of resources all players are not equal. This is particularly true when considering the state as a compound player; the state not only has more resources in terms of money, but also has control over regulatory structures and laws that dictate the bounds of what is allowed and not allowed within any political arena. Thus, in the case of the Indigenous political arena in Ecuador, the government has the power to set the rules of the game that dictate what is permissible within the arena.

creatively adapted to changes in the Indigenous political arena were more successful in their calls to mobilize. The Indigenous and *Campesino* Federation of Imbabura (FICI), for example, frustrated by the CONATEL's refusal to increase its Radio Ilumán's frequency, created a monthly newspaper to share the same information, as well as a website to broadcast radio productions to the FICI's migrant grassroots movement members living in Ecuador's cities, as well as outside of the country. Subsequently, the FICI was able to circumvent the uncooperative government agency and successfully reach more of its base communities with the same political and cultural information that was broadcast over Radio Ilumán. Finally, organizations that identified their specific audiences and then targeted them effectively had higher levels of successful mobilization, although in the developing context the ability – or necessity – to target audiences proved to be complex and, at times, impossible. The ECUARUNARI was able to use the internet to effectively target an international or cosmopolitan non-Indigenous audience through their organizational webpage. The organization then created a second blogspot webpage that targeted their domestic Indigenous bases. The content and strategies for producing and distributing the two webpages varied greatly and successfully targeted separate audiences. However, for the majority of organizations, the Internet was simply too expensive to be a realistic communication strategy. For other organizations, such as the CONAIE, the Internet was a strategy, but one that could simply not reach their bases due to the lack of connectivity and/or prohibitive cost in rural communities. Thus, often the ICT in question automatically reached only one audience, regardless of the intention or desire of the organization.

a. *Cases*

In order to more fully understand the relationships between variables, chapters four and five considered six cases of Indigenous organizations: the national CONAIE, the regional Kichwa Federation of the Sierra (ECUARUNARI), and the provincial Indigenous and *Campesino* Federation of Imbabura (FICI), the Indigenous and *Campesino* Movement of Cotopaxi (MICC), the Interprovincial Federation of Shuar Centers (FICSH), and the Federation of Centers of the Indigenous Cofán Nation (FEINCE). Examination of these cases confirmed the relationships suggested by the quantitative analysis: primarily, that *strategic appropriation* and *creative adaptation* displayed the strongest causal relationship with successful social mobilization. As mentioned, the causal relationship was based on the level of credibility of the organization with their grassroots movement members and the resultant levels of trust these individuals had in the organization. Or, in other words, organizations that used ICTs in a way that fostered their own credibility and trustworthiness amongst their bases had the highest levels of success in mobilizations.

The ECUARUNARI developed a communication plan that utilized the Internet; however, as previously mentioned, the ECUACHASKI communication team created two different webpages, a traditional style organizational website that shared general information, and a blogspot site based on the Indigenous principle of the *minga*.[78, 79] The blogspot, rather than having general organizational information, served as a space in

[78] A blogspot webpage, unlike a traditional webpage constructed in html – is easy to construct, requiring little to no expertise in website construction. By choosing to construct a blogspot site, the Ecuachaski communication team ensured that all individuals working within their network – assuming a basic level of proficiency with computers and the internet – would be able to actively work in the construction of the site, uploading articles and photos from anywhere with an internet connection.

[79] A *minga* is a pre-Incan form of community work that is still employed throughout Latin America. When the community, or a community member, needs to construct a building, host a *fiesta* (party), or other such large undertaking, the entire community is convened to participate in the construction or activity (Tibán 2004).

which Indigenous members of the ECUARUNARI – especially youths – could publish articles written about what was happening in their communities and/or provinces. Additionally, the Ecuachaski communicators published information about what the ECUARUNARI was doing in their work on behalf of the Kichwa nation of the sierra. The combination of the blogspot webpage, plus the integration of the use of cell phones in the traditional *chaski* communication system and the continued production of recorded materials to be distributed through community radio stations, resulted in the ECUARUNARI successfully reaching its bases.[80] The organization effectively strategically appropriated the use of new ICTs, such as the Internet, in a way that resonated with the bases, rather than alienating them. The ECUARUNARI largely avoided interaction with the government, and because it distributed its radio productions through other organizations' radio stations, they did not have to deal with the CONATEL directly. Furthermore, the organization participated very little directly in the debate surrounding Correa's proposed *Ley de Comunicación* (Communication Law), instead relying on assemblymen and women from the political party Pachakutik to represent the Indigenous movement.[81] Thus, the organization did not effectively creatively adapt to changes in the Indigenous political arena, but rather avoided all interaction with the government. As a result of the ECUARUNARI's communication strategies, in interviews *comuneros* (Indigenous community members) expressed feeling connected with the organization and of having a sense of responsibility to respond to its calls for

[80] *Chaskis* were messengers who served as links between communities. When there was news to share, a *chaski* would run to a neighboring community and tell that community's *chaski* the news, and that second *chaski* would then tell the next, and so on.

[81] Pachakutik is a political party that was formed in 1996. While it is separate from the CONAIE, it represents the political wing of the Indigenous movement.

protest marches. Thus, the ECUARUNARI had high levels of success in their calls for mobilization and the majority of the time met the goals set for the marches.

The CONAIE was successful in many of the mobilizations it called for, although often it did not achieve completely its stated goals. For example, in many cases the CONAIE called for national protests to shut down transit and commerce throughout the entire country; however, these protests often managed to shut down main highways in only a handful of provinces. Its communication strategy focused on using the Internet (web page and email) and national media outlets, without constructing a dependable communication strategy to reach its bases, such as that of the ECUARUNARI. Thus, the CONAIE only partially strategically appropriated ICTs for their communication. The CONAIE did use cell phones for communication, but without creating a formal system in which the organization could guarantee that it had communicated with all filial organizations, instead opting to use the devices in an ad hoc manner. The use of cell phones was, however, useful when the government attempted to block roadways to prevent protestors from reaching Quito in that *dirigentes* could communicate rapidly amongst themselves in order to reroute buses and effectively avoid the roadblocks. Thus, the CONAIE at least partly creatively adapted the use of technologies. Ultimately, the heavy reliance on the Internet and national media outlets meant the CONAIE largely did not even seem to reach its bases with its messages or its calls for mobilization.[82] Consequently, the individuals who make up the Indigenous political arena did not feel a

[82] The bases are Indigenous individuals living in communities that make up the *segundo grado* organizations that are filial of the CONAIE. Every individual in these communities is a member of his or her respective *segundo grado* organization, and subsequently of the provincial, regional, and national organizations to which their *segundo grado* organization belongs. These individuals, also referred to as the grassroots of the organizations, are who the organizations want to persuade to participate in mobilizations.

connection with the organization, and therefore, did not feel a responsibility to participate in its mobilizations.

The provincial organizations reported having access to even fewer resources than the national CONAIE and the regional ECUARUNARI, making the use of ICTs such as the Internet close to impossible. Instead, organizations such as the FICI focused on the use of the radio, an ICT that had a strong presence in Indigenous communities since the 1960s and often already had the trust and admiration of *comuneros* for the role the stations played in mobilizations throughout the 1970s, 1980s, and especially the 1990s. The FICI expanded the organization's presence on Radio Ilumán, an affiliated radio station based in the Indigenous community of Ilumán. Furthermore, when the government agency CONATEL refused to increase the range of the station's frequency, the FICI and Radio Ilumán creatively adapted to this challenge by creating the monthly newspaper *Wiñay Kawsay / Cultura Milenaria* (Ancient Culture) in which they published the same information that was broadcast on Radio Ilumán. Thus, the FICI both strategically appropriated and creatively adapted the use of new ICTs in the organization's communication strategies. The organization's regular presence on Radio Ilumán and its increased presence through the *Wiñay Kawsay* paper resulted in an increased sense of trust in the organization among its bases, and ultimately, in a 100% success rate in the mobilizations it called for.

Similarly, the MICC continued to communicate with its bases over Radio Latacunga, a station that had been a consistent presence in the Indigenous communities of the province of Cotopaxi since the 1960s. The MICC had a cadre of leaders trained in communication through their work in Radio Latacunga with a dream to communicate not

only through the radio, but also to create an Indigenous TV station. After an almost decade-long battle with government agencies, the MICC's TV channel, TV MICC, began broadcasting in early 2009. The strategic appropriation of a new ICT in the form of the incorporation of the TV in the MICC's communication strategy – which combines auditory and visual communication – was in line with traditional forms of communication, thereby resonating within the MICC's base communities. The feeling that the *dirigentes* (leaders) were familiar and right there in the homes of the bases resulted in grassroots movement members reporting high levels of trust in both the *dirigentes* and the organization. Furthermore, the MICC and TV MICC creatively adapted to the challenges posed by the Correa administration with regard to TV MICC. For example, every year since 2010 TV MICC petitioned to increase the range of the station's frequency, and every year this petition was denied by the CONATEL.[83] Thus, in 2011, TV MICC made an agreement with a private station that has nationwide coverage to share technology and, perhaps, airtime. As a result of these strategies, the MICC's grassroots movement members responded positively to the MICC's calls to mobilize, and the organization had a 100% success record for mobilizations during the period under study.

The FICSH also continued to rely heavily upon its radio station, *La Voz de Arutam* (The Voice of the Spirit), which had been in existence since the 1970s. The organization increased its presence on Radio Arutam in order to have more regular

[83] In June 2012, Assemblywoman Lourdes Tibán obtained a document of the Correa administration that ranked all radio and television stations in Cotopaxi as good, bad, or *calavera*, or the skull, implying that the station must cease to exist. TV MICC and Radio Latacunga were given the mark of *calavera*, implying that the directors of TV MICC were correct in their assumption that the administration views the channel as an enemy of the government and that administration would do everything in its power to limit the reach of the station (Umajinga 2012).

contact with its bases. When the government agency CONATEL attempted to shut down the station, charging it with inciting violence in protests in 2009, the FICSH and its bases banded together to protest the order, and ultimately, Radio Arutam remained on the air. The strategic appropriation of the radio to make the FICSH's *dirigentes* a consistent presence in the homes of its bases throughout the Amazonian province of Morona Santiago through the radio meant that its grassroots movement members were informed about the goings-on of the organization and felt they had a stake in its survival. Furthermore, the fact that the FICSH creatively adapted to the government's attempt to shut down Radio Arutam by boldly opposing these actions resulted in a bandwagoning of the organization's grassroots members to mobilize in defense of the FICSH and the radio station. Thus, the use of a familiar ICT and the strong stance the FICSH took with regard to the government resulted in an increase in the organization's credibility among its bases and a 100% success rate in mobilizations.

The FEINCE did not have a radio station prior to 2007, nor had it initiated the process to apply for a frequency. However, when the opportunity presented itself to acquire a radio frequency through the government's Secretary of *Pueblos* program, the FEINCE took advantage. Unfortunately, the range of the radio station was limited, reaching not even the closest Cofán community, and the regulations regarding community radio stations prohibited that the station broadcast political material. Furthermore, the organization did not create a comprehensive communication plan apart from the government radio program. The *dirigentes* tried to use cell phones in place of high-frequency (HF) radios, but they ignored the reality of the situation in the FEINCE's constituent communities in which there was often no cellular signal, and even if there

was coverage, there was no electricity. In cases where there was both cell phone coverage and electricity, most individuals still lacked the resources necessary to purchase a cell phone. The lack of ability to communicate with its constituent communities, when combined with the FEINCE's participation in some controversial government programs, meant that its grassroots movement members felt alienated from the organization and had little trust in its motives and actions. Consequently, the FEINCE did not convoke mobilizations during the time period under study for two main reasons. First, the organization preferred not to anger the government in order not to jeopardize its funding from its participation in government programs. Second, and most important, the FEINCE president admitted that the organization had lost its credibility, and subsequently, its power to convene its bases, because it had no way to communicate with them.

Distinguishing and targeting of audiences when using ICTs proved to be the variable with the weakest causal influence on the level of success of mobilization. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, in the case of the ECUARUNARI, the organization successfully utilized one ICT (the internet) to reach two audiences by creating two different webpages with distinct content and forms of construction. However, in the case of other organizations – especially provincial and *segundo grado* – the ICTs used inherently reached only one audience, and so, it was not actually an organizational decision to target audiences. Instead the nature of ICTs used resulted in a *de facto* separation of audiences. For example, in the case of the CONAIE, the emphasis on sharing information through the web page and email meant that the information did not reach the organization's bases that largely lived in communities without much internet connectivity and who often lacked the technical know-how to use a computer or access

the internet. In the case of audiovisual productions distributed on DVDs, the DVDs were given directly to community organizations and so did not reach the broader public. Furthermore, government interference sometimes limited the reach of an ICT, effectively targeting a station's audience. For example, in the case of the FICI, Radio Ilumán reached only Indigenous communities, not because the organization chose to have a frequency with a short range, but because the government would not authorize the amplification of the frequency. Thus, while the intentional and successful distinguishing and targeting of audiences did show a correlation with more successful mobilization, the majority of experiences were with ICTs that inherently separated audiences, like the internet, by the mere fact that they were not accessible in rural areas.

These patterns were repeated in the other eight organizations that participated in this investigation. Except for the CONAIE and the ECUARUNARI, the Internet was too expensive and required too much technical know-how to be useful to organizations. However, the radio proved to be a relatively inexpensive and trusted way for organizations to communicate with the bases. While TV MICC was the only TV station, other organizations produced audiovisual productions that were distributed on DVDs throughout base communities. In addition to the communication strategies that included the use of new ICTs, organizations continued to rely heavily upon traditional forms of face-to-face communication in organizations' assemblies, as well as visits by *dirigentes* to communities. The organizations that utilized ICTs that resonated with their bases, like the radio and audiovisual productions, while also adapting creatively to changes in the Indigenous political arena affected by the Ecuadorian government – and especially by

government agencies like the CONATEL – were most successful in their calls for mobilization.

II. *Future Investigation*

While the three main hypotheses presented in this dissertation are generalizeable in the Ecuadorian context, they should be tested in similar contexts such as in Colombia, Perú, and Bolivia, where they will likely be upheld. Additionally, it is likely that these hypotheses would prove to be supported in other developing contexts. However, in developed contexts where there is greater infrastructure and availability of ICTs, it can be expected that *identifying and targeting of audiences* will be more important than it proved to be in this investigation; where the internet is more readily available, organizations will likely have to be more conscious in directing their webpages, radio broadcasts, and audiovisual productions – all of which can be made readily available through the internet, thereby reaching all potential audiences. Thus, a logical next step would be to test these hypotheses in a variety of contexts in order to confirm their generalizability.

These same independent variables also may help explain other phenomena, such as citizen participation in political processes, organizational membership, and support for political parties. For example, organizations that can strategically appropriate ICTs, creatively adapt their uses, and target their audiences will be able to increase their membership. Similarly, political parties that can successfully achieve these variables will likely be more successful in recruiting voters and in strengthening party identification of current voters.

There is substantial room for further study on the subject of strategies of democratic regimes with regard to communication. This dissertation has suggested that the administration of Ecuador's President Rafael Correa implemented a mixed strategy, combining cooperation, cooptation, and repression in order to reach the individuals who composed the Indigenous political arena, as well as to limit the reach of Indigenous communication. While these strategies have been investigated in authoritarian contexts, further study is merited about the ways in which democratic regimes employ these strategies.

Specifically, this dissertation has treated cooperation, cooptation, and repression as discrete; however, it is likely that they interact in complex ways. For example, a government might simultaneously attempt to co-opt and repress an organization, such as a community radio station, providing space for the organization to maneuver and make decisions regarding its own future and the relationship it will have with the government.[84] This blurring of strategies can be seen in the example of the Radio Arutam of the FICSH in which the government reacted to the use of the radio by the organization to convene a mobilization by repressing the radio station. However, the FICSH refused to back down, and ultimately, through the court system it managed to remain on the air, if with a diminished level of autonomy and freedom. Thus, there are at least three important questions on government strategy that remain. First, what is the relationship between the strategies used and the duration of a democratic government? Second, how do these three strategies interact and what is their internal relationship? Finally, is the use of these

[84] Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) argue that in undemocratic regimes, dictators may choose to use cooperation (policy concessions) and cooptation (rent sharing) to avoid rebellion. Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) build upon this work to show that cooperation, cooptation are more successful strategies for maintaining civil peace, while repression is more likely to lead to civil conflict, regardless of regime type.

three strategies comparable across all regime types? Or, do democratic regimes employ these strategies differently than authoritarian regimes?

Future studies should continue to interrogate the ways in which ICTs function, rather than assuming that access to new technologies is inherently good for democracy, economic growth, political participation, or other such political and/or economic processes. While access to computers and the Internet, as well as the training necessary to be able to take advantage of these ICTs, can benefit rural communities in developing contexts, we must continue to strive to understand under what circumstances the introduction and expansion of such ICTs will have the desired outcomes. As an employee of the ECUARUNARI explained, "The internet can be a tool for us to use, but only if we can find a way for it to strengthen our culture and our politics. If it breaks our culture, then what good is it? It would only damage our [Indigenous movement's] unity and we would be weaker, worse-off than before" (Employee of the ECUARUNARI, interview by author, May 24, 2011).

Appendix A: Illiteracy Rates in Ecuador

Illiteracy Rates in Ecuador by Social Group

Social Group	Percentage
By area	
Urban	5.1%
Rural	17.7%
By ethnicity	
Indigenous	28.2
Mestizo	7.5%
Blanco	6.7%
Afroecuatoriano	12.6%
Income level	
20% most poor	20.7%
2nd quintile	12.8%
3rd quintile	8.9%
4th quintile	5.8%
20% richest	1.5%
Region	
Coast	8.7%
Sierra	9.5%
Amazon	9.8%
Sex	
Men	7.4%
Women	10.7%
Total	**9.1%**

INEC, 2006

Illiteracy Rates by Province 2009

Province	Illiteracy Rate
Azuay	1.8%
Bolívar	2.3%
Cañar	0%
Carchi	1.5%
Chimborazo	.6%
Cotopaxi	.9%
El Oro	1.5%
Esmereldas	2.9%
Galápagos	1.2%
Guayas	5.4%
Imbabura	2.2%
Loja	1.6%
Los Ríos	3.4%
Manabí	3.4%
Morona Santiago	6.6%
Napo	.1%
Orellana	4.2%
Pastaza	0%
Pichincha	.1%
Santa Elena	4.2%
Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas	3.3%
Sucumbíos	3.7%
Tungurahua	.7%
Zamora Chinchipe	2.5%
Other areas	13.1%

INEC, 2009

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