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The quest for security in the Caribbean

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City University of New York, 1990

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THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN

by

Ivelaw L. Griffith

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of
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Abstract

THE QUEST FOR SECURITY IN THE CARIBBEAN

by
Ivelaw L. Griffith

Adviser: Professor Donald Zagoria

This dissertation examines security problems in the English Caribbean, assesses the Regional Security System (RSS), and considers measures Caribbean states may take to safeguard their interests. Vulnerability, intervention, militarization, and internal instability are the major small state security problems. Caribbean states have faced all of these, in varying degrees and at different times. Their subordinate status makes them militarily, politically, and economically vulnerable to actions by the U.S., and by middle powers such as Venezuela; military-political threats to internal security are greater than threats from outside the region; capability constraints limit their ability to maintain strong security mechanisms.

Caribbean states can adopt individual and collective measures to bolster internal and external security. While not a credible military mechanism, the RSS could help with drug interdiction and coastal patrol. There are no prospects for greater military security guarantees given the capability limitations of Caribbean states and the unwillingness of powerful states in the area to facilitate this. Caribbean states should, therefore, use several existing arrangements at the sub-regional, regional, and international levels more efficiently.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

List of Tables

List of Figures

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
II.	CARIBBEAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS.....	22
	1. Caribbean Elites	
	11. Security Perceptions	
III.	SECURITY CAPABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN.....	48
	1. Capability in the Caribbean	
	11. Security Measures in the Caribbean	
	111. Security Credibility	
IV.	GEOPOLITICS OF THE CARIBBEAN.....	105
	1. Strategic Interests of the Superpowers	
	11. Regional Middle Powers	
	111. Extra-Regional Powers	
	1V. Proximity and Influence	
V.	IDEOLOGY IN THE CARIBBEAN.....	156
	1. Ideological Doctrines in the Caribbean	
	11. Ideology - Security Nexus	
VI.	SAFE-GUARDING SMALL STATES.....	182
	1. Security Measures in Small States	
	11. Caribbean Security Safeguards	
	111. Other Regional Approaches	
VII.	CONCLUSION.....	223
	APPENDIX: MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RELATING TO SECURITY AND MILITARY COOPERATION...233	
	BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	247

LIST OF TABLES

2.1	- Foreign Policy and Security Policy Elites in the Caribbean.....	27-28
2.2	- Security Perception in the Caribbean.....	37
3.1	- Capability Profile of the Caribbean.....	54
3.2	- Security Establishments in the Caribbean.....	55
3.3	- Major International Networks of Caribbean States.....	66
3.4	- Caribbean Subscription to Multilateral Security Agreements.....	67
3.5	- U.S. Security Assistance to the Caribbean, FY 1989.....	68
3.6	- SDAF Assistance to the Caribbean.....	93
3.7	- US IMET Assistance to the Caribbean.....	94
3.8	- U.S. Military Sales to the Caribbean 1982-1987..	95
4.1	- Principal Straits and Passages in the Caribbean.....	108
4.2	- Minerals in the Caribbean.....	109
4.3	- Oil in the Caribbean.....	110-11
4.4	- Profile of Caribbean Middle Powers.....	124
4.5	- Middle Power Representation in the Caribbean...	131
4.6	- Caribbean-U.S. Proximity.....	144
4.7	- U.S. Military Installations in the Caribbean...	147
5.1	- Ideological Profile of the Caribbean.....	169-70
6.1	- Third World Alliances by Category and Class....	190
6.2	- Regional Security Initiatives Involving Small States.....	194

LIST OF FIGURES

3.1	-	Capability Determinants.....	49
3.2	-	Structure of the Regional Security System.....	91
4.1	-	Oil Fields, Refineries, and SLOCs in the Caribbean.....	112
4.2	-	U.S. Military Networks in the Caribbean.....	148
5.1	-	Ideology in the Caribbean.....	165
5.2	-	Ideological Posture of Caribbean States	171

CHAPTER ONE**INTRODUCTION**

This dissertation examines the security problems of a group of very small states that have either been given little scholarly attention in the past, or have been examined as an adjunct to the concerns the U.S., or of European powers. This chapter outlines the parameters of the study. We begin with a definition of the central issues in Caribbean security. We then explain our conceptual framework and outline the remaining chapters.

1. CENTRAL ISSUES

This study deals with security in the English Caribbean. The states involved are Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. These states constitute a region by virtue of their geographic proximity, social and cultural homogeneity, political interdependence through shared institutional membership, and their economic interdependence (see Banks, 1969:352). They also constitute a Subordinate State System: geographic delimitation; more than three actors; recognition by

others as constituting a distinctive community; identification of themselves as such. Their units of power are relatively inferior to units in the Dominant State System; and changes in the Dominant System have greater effect on them than the reverse (Brecher, 1969:esp 157).

Our inquiry into the security problems in this subordinate state system has three specific objectives.

To:

1. Examine the security concerns of the Caribbean in the context of four critical factors: perception; capability; geography; and ideology;
2. Assess the Regional Security System (RSS) as a credible security mechanism for the region;
3. Consider some measures Caribbean states may take to safeguard their interests.

The concept security is used here to mean protection of a nation-state against threats to its territorial integrity, political-economic independence and institutional stability. It is viewed as multi-dimensional, with military, political, and economic dimensions.¹ Studies by Simmons (1985), Gary Lewis (1986), Young and Phillips (1986), Jackson (1982), Black (1985) and others show that there are differing assessments of the security circumstances of the

1. See Trager and Kronenberg (1973:esp Section 2), Buzan (1983:Ch 8) and Twitchett (1971) for a wide variety of definitions and uses of "security."

region. However, several issues recur in the literature and in comments made by political actors in the region:

1. the military, political and economic vulnerability of Caribbean states to American foreign policy and security actions, and to those of other important hemispheric actors (such as Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela), both individually and as a subordinate state system;
2. the need to guard against the violation of territorial sovereignty, and against militarization;
3. the need to ensure domestic regime stability in the face of coup attempts in Barbados and Dominica, rebellion in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the removal of Gairy Government in Grenada by non-parliamentary means, and a once growing coalition of the "left";
4. the need to attend to the problems of economic insecurity due to economic vulnerability and economic dysfunctions;
5. the need to combat the drug menace that has the potential for moral and political corruption.

Several initiatives have emerged in response to the perceived security problems of the region (RSS, 1986; CARICOM, 1986; CIIPS, 1987). One such initiative has been the formation of the Regional Security System (RSS) in October 1982. This security mechanism was

created through a Memorandum of Understanding to which Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are original signatories. St. Kitts joined in February 1984, and Grenada followed in January 1985.

The Memorandum of Understanding provides for a wide range of activities and for structural and operational aspects of the RSS (see Appendix). The System is based in Barbados and draws upon the military and police establishments of the participating states with technical and financial assistance from the US and the UK. The emphasis in this research will be placed on the RSS's military-political aspects, and for three reasons. One, the military-political dimension has become a critical focus of many participating states. Two, it was this aspect that helped facilitate U.S. intervention in Grenada. And it is the area of major contention. Three, this aspect has the greatest potential for undermining collective pursuits in other areas.

The RSS is currently concentrating on strengthening local forces and on building up the command and control abilities of participating forces. At a wider level there is integrated training, both formally and through joint exercises involving American and local forces. How these pursuits evolve depend on several factors, among them:

- a. the capabilities of the participating states;

- b. the disposition of other actors in the region to the System;
- c. the domestic political situation in the states;
- d. the political environment within the Caribbean basin;
- e. the kind of competing demands in the light of the social and economic problems of the states involved;
- f. the attitudes of leaders who assume office subsequent to the formation of the RSS;

The security problems of Caribbean states seem to fit the larger portrait of small state security dilemmas. The preeminent issue of small state security is vulnerability. Other important concerns are intervention, militarization, and internal instability.

Vulnerability is a circumstance where, because of geographic, political, economic or other factors, a nation may have its security compromised. The vulnerability of small states in military and political terms often dominates the analysis of this dilemma (See Vital, 1967; Handel, 1981; Quester, 1983). But it is increasingly recognized that questions of economic vulnerability are significant in their own right, and they impact on military and political vulnerability (Commonwealth, 1985; Azar and Moon, 1984). The Harden Report points to "half dozen 'factors of Vulnerability'" - great power rivalries; territorial claims; possession of rich resources; provision of

refuge to refugees or freedom fighters; corruption, and suppression of democracy (Harden, 1985:13). Some scholars feel that "a small state is ... inherently vulnerable because it can be seen as a potentially easy victim for external aggression in all its guises" (Commonwealth, 1985:15).

This is only part of the problem. What other states perceive is certainly important. But more importantly, vulnerability has to do with geography, and with social, economic, political, technical and organizational deficiencies such as populations too small to meet security needs, both military and non-military; absence of the economic capacity to acquire defense related materiel; inability to deal with political penetration and destabilization, among other things. It is thus not usually a function of a single factor, but the factors that combine to create it (geography, perception, poor economy, etc..) do so in a way that removes or reduces the influence or power of the state in question, thereby opening it up to internal subversion or external incursion.

Intervention is the intrusion by one state or entities from it into another, often with the use of force. Several factors conduce to this. Societies that are victims of military intervention are generally politically unstable and in dispute about a central political authority. Grenada in 1983, Seychelles in 1981, and Uganda in 1979 are cases in point. States

intervene in the affairs of others for a variety of reasons: ideological commitment; quest for influence; strategic considerations (Macfarlene, 1985; Khalilzad, 1985).

The degree of cohesion in a target society is a factor which any potential intervenor must consider. Interveners could be constrained by adversaries, their own military limitations, economic costs, and the state of international politics at the time. A climate unfavorable to intervention by developed states developed over the years. But intervention by Third World states in the affairs of others is, however, becoming a matter of increasing concern (Maniruzziman, 1982; MacFarlene, 1984; Mehta, 1985). Among some of the more notable cases are Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia; Indonesia in Malaysia, and in West Irian and East Timor; Jamaica, Barbados, Dominica and St. Lucia (alongside the U.S.) in Grenada; Tanzania in Uganda; Libya in Chad.

Militarization involves increasing the allocation of resources to the development, purchase and deployment of military equipment and forces. Sedoc-Dahlberg (1986) identifies several indexes of militarization: percentage of budget allocated for military purposes; total size of armed forces; level, number and kind of political positions held by military officials; the military's status in the decision-making process.

Some writers feel militarization was chosen by some states because of a fear of neocolonialism. Others argue that in some cases it was inevitable since the military was the institution to which ex-colonial powers transferred authority (Al-Mashat, 1985:3). But for Mehta (1985:17):

In most Third World states, however, the quest for arms is often unrelated to security needs; hypothetical external threats and the responsibility to preserve law and order are only convenient arguments for extravagant militarization. The desire for prestige and the determination to stay in power have been, more often than not, the true incentives of many governments to build up armed forces and acquire unnecessary sophisticated and expensive military hardware.

Internal instability, protracted in some places, recurring in others, is for many small states a serious threat to internal security. The instability could be due to political factionalism, economic deprivation, military coups, conflict involving ethnic or racial groups, or civil war. Sri Lanka, Haiti, the Sudan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are but a few examples of states with differing kinds of political instability. Whatever its source or explanation, political instability tends to undermine domestic order

and sometimes external security (see Azar and Moon, 1986; Khalilzad, 1984-85; Maingot, 1986-87)

Political stability requires attention to four matters: 1. political authority; 2. political equality; 3. political participation; and 4. political legitimacy. The first relates to a reciprocal relationship between government and people where the former manage the society and the latter accept and consent to that rule. The second implies the possession of rights by citizens to actively participate in the political process. The third involves the ability of citizens to influence the nature and operation of the political system through institutions such as political parties, unions, free media and impartial judiciaries. Political legitimacy, the fourth, requires that the governing body be appropriate, widely representative and have the capability to govern (See Mars, 1975; Huntington, 1968). It is the absence of all or some of these in small states that creates problems of internal instability.

It is not suggested here that vulnerability, intervention, militarization and internal instability are security problems exclusive to very small states. Some of these are problems for middle powers, big powers, and the superpowers. Vulnerability has been a problem for China, Vietnam, Poland, and others. Intervention has been a concern for India, China, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia and others. Militarization has

been a problem for Vietnam, the U.S.S.R., Indonesia and others. And Poland, Italy, the U.S.S.R., Iran and Argentina are only a few of the states outside the small state context that have been troubled by instability problems recently. But it is the "soft" nature of these small states, the capability limitations from which they suffer, and the extent to which they could be subordinated to others in the international community that make these problems all the more acute for them.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The conventional approaches to security analysis place emphasis on military security and on the power commodities that states can use to secure themselves. This is a diplomatic-strategic conception of security that assumes the existence of external threats that are violent, hostile, and military in form. This approach has been unable to adequately explain Third World small state security problems and offer relevant potential safeguards for these states (see Buzan, 1983; Korany, 1986b; Rothstein, 1986). Over the years scholars have, therefore, sought more relevance and conceptual utility in attempts to study security in small states.

The scholarly discourse on security has thus been modified, in three closely related and significant ways. First, the preoccupation with external security

has given way to recognition that internal security factors are not only important in their own right, but that they complicate, and sometimes aggravate, external problems. Second, the tendency to cast security analysis in military-political terms has been replaced by acceptance that security concerns go beyond these to the economic arena. Some scholars go further. They address ecological and environmental issues which they argue qualify for substantive security treatment because of their impact on the survival of states and peoples (Azar and Moon, 1984; Tuchman-Mathews, 1989).

The third significant way in which the parameters of the analysis have widened is in recognition of and emphasis on the link between security and development (see Commonwealth, 1985; Rothstein, 1986; Clarke and Payne, 1987). One scholar whose work now reflects a departure from the conventional approach to which he once subscribed, described the change this way: "The traditional concern with territorial integrity and political independence has had to be broadened to include a concern with domestic stability - and thus also a concern with prospects for, and means of, domestic development" (Rothstein, 1986:8-9).

There are several recently proposed conceptual approaches to the study of small state security. Azar and Moon (1984:105-107) find four "commonalities" in the conventional literature on security: conception of security as high politics; emphasis on coercive power;

preoccupation with security management techniques; heavy reliance on system determinism featuring the superpowers or middle level powers. They note the influence of these "commonalities" and suggest that they present four limitations in application to the Third World. They suggest a multidimensional approach that accounts for four security dimensions - the military, the political, the ecological, and the ethnic protracted social conflict - and for policy responses relevant to the various dimensions. They examine the security dilemmas of Lebanon and South Korea using this framework to demonstrate its utility (Azar and Moon, 1984:121-29).

Rothstein (1986:1-2) argues for a pretheory based on the conviction that "...grand generalizations miss important differences between apparently similar countries, and case studies or regional analyses provide little general guidance about either policy or theory." For him the problems for most Third World countries do not arise from universal structural constraints, but from limited power capability, domestic disorder, and from threat perception by small ruling elites (Rothstein, 1986:5-9). The security challenges for the small states in the Third World are considered linked with problems of development. The common features of these two relate to threat perception, resource constraints and legitimacy. The concern of the elites is not only with external threats

to national survival, but with internal challenges to their rule. Resource constraints not only narrow the range of elite choices, but incline them to use more coercion and repression. Linked to all this is legitimacy. The degree of legitimacy perceived by the ruling elite is likely to affect the perception of threats and the use of resources to deal with them.

Three interlocking variables are offered: legitimacy, effectiveness, and threat. Rothstein offers a schema to facilitate quantitative measures to permit more objective assessment of the security dilemmas. But while he posits that his schema is capable of offering objectivity through the use of quantitative measures, he does not develop any measures. And he admits (1986:21) that "an element of subjectivity will probably always be present, if only because elite and government statements about security threats are not reliable." Rothstein (1986:29-30) emphasizes the linkages between domestic security, development choices, and the provision of greater international resources. It is improbable that significant external resources will be provided. Anyhow, additional external resources do not guarantee greater spending on development and less on security. Rothstein suggests, though, that the absence of such resources almost

guarantees that security will get priority attention by ruling elites.²

Four Factors Framework

The approach used in this study, called the Four Factors Framework, addresses four interactive factors that are critical to understanding the security circumstances of very small states in the Caribbean and elsewhere: perception, capability; geography; and ideology. Each factor has several elements. Perception, by which we mean the total cognitive view of a nation of itself and of others in the world (Stoessinger, 1986:421), is a function of education, culture, and history, among other things. Capability, taken here to mean the internal and external resources of a state, involves size of territory and population, strength of military, governmental organization, nature of economy, and international support relationships. Geography relates primarily to spatial location, land form, land density and climate. Ideology, used here to mean coherent views on life and political practice that guides political power holders (Herz, 1968:69), is a

² For other recent conceptual approaches see Buzan (1983, 1986) and Al-Mashat (1985:39-106). Buzan's "security complexes" proposition is not designed primarily for small states, but has been applied to them. Al-Mashat's framework involves international cooperation, domestic cohesion, tranquility, and well-being.

function of beliefs, political parties and interest groups, and political activism.³

These factors act in a dynamic, interactive fashion. Security does not hinge on any one factor. The security concerns of a state are largely what the elites define them to be - on their perception. How those elites define their security problems relates to the strength (or weakness) of the state and where the state is located. The kinds of security mechanisms that the state creates would depend on its capabilities, on the leadership's perception of the need for such, and on the location of the state, among other things. And the ideological posture of a state is certainly impacted upon by its elite images, and its capabilities, if not its geography.

The four factors are not presented as the only ones that influence the security of small states. There are certainly others. Azar and Moon (1984), for example, speak of an ecological one. But the nature of these states, the dimensions of their problems, and the

3. One needs to resist the temptation to include in a framework all possible factors and variables, and thereby over-complicate it. Al-Mashat (1985:19) seems unmindful of this and therefore runs this very risk. He argues that:

...essential issues such as the quality of life (both physical and psychological), social equality and justice, total national development, structural interdependence among nations, global concerns with common environmental problems, and international cooperation should be built into the theory of national security.

nature and sources of the range of possible threats seem to make these factors the ones most critical to understanding their problems, and to the protection of their interests than any other possible set. For example, while there are ecological concerns in the Caribbean, they are not of such gravity or significance to warrant inclusion of an ecological factor in the framework.

The importance of the four factors could be seen in specific terms. Perception is crucial to security. One, policy choices are based on the images of policy makers. Two, foreign and security policy-making is usually the preserve of a small elite or a single leader. Three, the narrow/limited institutional basis for decision making in small states magnifies the importance of the images of the elite/the leader. Four, the consequences of misperception may lead to conflict between/among small states (see Boulding, 1969; George, 1979; Jervis, 1976).

Kenneth Waltz (1979:97) has argued that:

The parts of a hierarchic system are related to one another in ways that are determined both by their functional differentiation and by the extent of their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their

greater or lesser capabilities for performing similar tasks.

This study deals with a common dilemma and a common task - security - of a set of functionally undifferentiated small states. And if one accepts Waltz's proposition, as this writer does, it stands to reason that important to this "similar task" being performed by these states is the question of the nature and extent of their capabilities to perform it.

Capability is vital because: One, security depends primarily on national capability; two, external threats become more credible where capability is minimal; three, consciousness of low capability could influence threat perception; four, awareness of capability limitations could trigger pre-emptive measures in situations of tension; five capability helps determine policy choices; six, capability influences perception of elites about the intentions of other elites/states (Handel, 1981; Kolodziej, 1982; Rothstein, 1968).

Geography is important because it could mean vulnerability due to small size, especially of island-states; vulnerability because of large size and low population density; advantages/disadvantages of being contiguous or close to large and powerful states; vulnerability due to large territory with civil war, or other forms of political instability that limit the exercise of full authority. In addition, geography is crucial because it influences foreign and security

policy, and because the security options of small states rarely, if ever, avoid being influenced by proximate big powers (see Cohen, 1973; Lacoste, 1984; Anderson, 1984; Gordon, 1986).

Ideology is a security factor for several reasons. One, it helps shape images held by the elite. Two, ideological differences could be the basis for conflict, both domestically and with other states. Three, ideological consensus could be the basis for security collaboration between/among states. Four, ideology could be the tool for deflecting attention from domestic crisis to external issues/crises thereby precipitating conflict with other states (George, 1987; Dror, 1987; Carlsnaes, 1986).

This framework is useful for three reasons. One, it adopts a differentiated approach to security that permits the identification of varying problem areas. Two, it identifies factors with elements that are critical to the formulation and implementation of security policy. Three, it permits choice from a range of options appropriate to the security area(s) in question (military, political, economic) and to the nature of the threat(s).

Approach

Our data come from interviews with Caribbean decision-makers and with decision-makers from states with interests in the region (see bibliography), and from published and unpublished sources. The interviews

were conducted following elite interviewing guidelines (Dexter, 1970:esp 3-80, 131-62; Johnson and Joslyn, 1986:159-83) with standardized open-ended questions. Our main discussion is built around four propositions, with some working assumptions.

The first proposition is that the differing perceptions of the Caribbean political elites have affected a united approach to security in the region. Our working assumptions are: 1. perception of the "reality" and not the "objective situation" guides policy choices; 2. the international system is not the sole determinant of small state action. We are dealing here with with the relationship between elite images and security. The second proposition is that the capabilities of Caribbean states militate against credible regional security pursuits. Our assumptions are: 1. credible security depends on national capabilities; 2. regional security measures necessitate reliance on the resources of the states involved. Our concern here is with correlations between capability and security.

The third proposition is that the geopolitics of the Caribbean is such that the small states there risk endangering their own security by trying to secure a credible military organization. Our working assumptions are: 1. geography influences foreign and security policy; 2. the security options of small states are influenced by proximate big powers. The central issue

here is the relationship between geopolitics and security. Our fourth proposition is that the absence of ideological differentiation in the Caribbean inclines states there to take the security of the region for granted. The working assumptions are: 1. significant ideological differentiation in a region leads to greater sensitivity about political security; 2. complacency about security by small states in a region is fostered by ideological similarities between them and the dominant state. This proposition addresses the relationship between ideology and security.

The objectives of this study as outlined here are pursued in the remaining chapters.

Chapter Two looks at issues relating to perception. We identify the region's foreign and security policy elites, explain their security perceptions, and assess the implications of these for security in the region. Chapter Three looks at the capability factor. We examine the internal and external capability features of the states in the region, the security measures pursued, and the extent to which some of these could be deemed credible.

Chapter Four examines the geopolitical milieu in which the Caribbean states find themselves. There we come to understand how geography, and military, political and economic concerns shape interests and relations among states in the hemisphere, and may impact on the security of Caribbean states. In looking

at the ideological factor, Chapter Five attends to the final proposition. We identify the doctrines of Caribbean states, and assess their impact on security in the region.

Chapter Six discusses some security measures used by small states and some safeguards that Caribbean states may use to deal with their security challenges. Chapter Seven is the conclusion.

CHAPTER TWO
CARIBBEAN SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

Introduction

Leaders in the Caribbean, like those elsewhere, formulate and execute policy partly in response to their perceptions of the issues and problems before them. As Boulding (1969:423) reminds us:

...we must recognize that the people whose decisions determine the policies and actions of nations do not respond to the "objective" facts of the situation, whatever that may mean, but to their "image" of the situation. It is what we think the world is like, and not what it is really like, that determines our behavior.

Our purpose here is, therefore, to examine what the political elites of the Caribbean consider the nature and dimensions of the security challenges facing their states. We examine the proposition that their differing perceptions have affected a united approach to security in the region. First we identify the relevant elites. We then profile their perceptions of military, political and economic aspects of the region's security. Finally, we consider some implications of these perceptions for security policy and conduct in the region.

We find differences and similarities in the perceptions of Caribbean leaders that derive from their varying beliefs, political styles, socio-economic situations and national interests. But the differences are not significant enough to prevent the development of working consensus in crucial areas at the regional level. We also find that while Caribbean leaders define security broadly and have several concerns, they see their main threats as being in the political and economic areas - political factionalism; drugs; secession; foreign debt. This has several implications for policy, at both state and regional levels.¹

1. CARIBBEAN ELITES

The ultimate decision unit of a state is usually one of the following: 1. Predominant Leader - a single individual with power to make the choice and to stifle opposition; 2. Single Group - a set of interacting individuals all of whom are members of a single body, having the ability to select a course of action and secure compliance; 3. Multiple Autonomous Groups - groups or coalitions of important actors, no one of

1. There is very little in the Caribbean security literature on this. While some writers, such as Danns (1986) and Garcia-Muniz (1988a), offer insights into elite thinking, analysis of elite perceptions is not their main concern. Anthony Maingot is one of few scholars to do a study that makes perception the primary concern. See Maingot (1985).

which by itself, can decide and force compliance on the others; no overarching body in which all the necessary parties are members (Hermann et al, 1987:311-18). The foreign and security policy elites of the Caribbean may be defined broadly as the political office-holders and senior appointed officials involved in the formulation, execution and evaluation of foreign and security policy for their states. This definition suggests that the elites operate in the context of a Single Group decision unit - the Cabinet.²

Braveboy-Wagner (1988:86) argues that "the decision-making process in the Caribbean is still too personalized and politicized because the Westminster system allows a prime minister and his cabinet carte blanche in an environment in which oppositions have traditionally been weak." Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that the Single Group decision structure implied in Table 2.1 and by Braveboy-Wagner (1988) is more form than substance. In reality, Predominant Leaders operate in Single Group frameworks. Several reasons explain this.

First, irrespective of leadership type (charismatic, rational-legal) or foreign policy orientation (active independent, mediator/integrator, opportunist, etc.), the political culture of the Caribbean has accommodated strong, and decisive, though

2. For a discussion of Cabinet decision-making see de Smith (1977:144-75).

not tyrannical, leadership. Many of these leaders - Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago), Norman Manley and Alexander Bustamante (Jamaica), Errol Barrow (Barbados), Forbes Burnham (Guyana), Vere Bird (Antigua) are the most noteworthy - were/are acknowledged political giants in their own societies as well as within the wider region. Their political beliefs, political styles, political experiences, and the histories of their societies all combined to facilitate their exercise of predominance. This pattern persists even though the era of the charismatic leader seems on the way out.

Second, foreign and security policy making is the preserve of the executive branch of government. In most societies with coequal or roughly coequal branches of government, some foreign and security policy role is played by at least two of the branches. For example, while executive dominance in foreign and security policy is established in the U.S., the Congress has well recognized capabilities in these areas which it utilizes and cherishes (see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1988:1-11 and Chs 1,8,12). All Caribbean states have governments with multiple branches: Executive; Legislative; Judicial (though these operate differently than in the U.S.).³ Some Parliaments have committees

3. The form of government in the Caribbean is Parliamentary. While Guyana has an executive presidential arrangement, and Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago have ceremonial presidents, they all have modifications of parliamentary operations. See Alexis (1983:50-159).

with foreign and security policy mandates. They are, however, either emasculated by the Executive or have abdicated such roles, all in the context of political environments where the predominance of the leader of the ruling party and head of the administration is the norm.

Table 2.1

Foreign Policy and Security Policy Elites in the Caribbean

(At December 1989)

COUNTRY	ROLE	NAME	HIGHEST EDUCATION	YEARS OF LEADERSHIP	PREVIOUS PROFESSION/OCCUPATION
Antigua	PM	Vere Bird	High School	8 (29)	Trade Unionist
	FM	Lester	LL.B	13	Lawyer
	MDP	Vere Bird	High school	8	Trade unionist
Bahamas	PM	Lynden Pindling	LL.B	16 (22)	Law, business
	FM	Charles Carter	Post grad dip	11 months	Journalist
	MDP	Paul Adderly	LL.B, M.A.	11 months	Lawyer
Barbados	PM	Lloyd Sandiford	M.A.	2	Educator
	FM	Maurice King	LL.B	9 months	Lawyer
	MDP	Lloyd Sandiford	M.A.	2 months	Educator
Belize	PM	George Price	College	3 months (20)	Trade unionist
	FM	Said Musa	LL.B	3 months	Lawyer
	MDP	George Price	College	3 months	Trade unionist
Dominica	PM	Mary Charles	LL.B	9	Lawyer
	FM	Mary Charles	LL.B	9	Lawyer
	MDP	Mary Charles	LL.B	9	Lawyer
Grenada	P M (AG)	Ben Jones	LL.B	1 month	Lawyer
	FM	Ben Jones	LL.B	5	Lawyer
	MDP	Ben Jones	LL.B	1 month	Lawyer

Table 2.1 (continued)

COUNTRY	ROLE	NAME	HIGHEST EDUCATION	YEARS OF LEADERSHIP	PREVIOUS PROFESSION/OCCUPATION
Guyana	P	Desmond Hoyte	LL.B	4	Lawyer
	FM	Rashleigh Jackson	Post Grad Cert.	11	Diplomat
	MDP	Desmond Hoyte	LL.B	4	Lawyer
Jamaica	PM	Michael Manley	B.Sc.	10 months(8)	Journalist/ trade unionist
	FM	David Cook	B.C.L.	10 months	Lawyer
	MDP	Michael Manley	B.Sc.	10 months	Journalist/unionist
St. Kitts	PM	Kennedy Simmonds	M.B.B.S.	6(9)	Medicine
	FM	Kennedy Simmonds	M.B.B.S.	6(9)	Medicine
	MDP	Kennedy Simmonds	M.B.B.S.	6	Medicine
St. Lucia	PM	John Compton	LL.B	7(22)	Lawyer
	FM	Neville Cenac	Legal studies	2	Civil servant
	MDP	John Compton	LL.B	7	Lawyer
St. Vincent	PM	James Mitchell	Dip Tropical Agri	5(7)	Agronomist
	FM	James Mitchell	Dip Tropical Agri	5(7)	Agronomist
	MDP	James Mitchell	Dip Tropical Agri	5(7)	Agronomist
Trinidad & Tobago	PM	Arthur Robinson	LL.B, M.A.	3	Lawyer
	FM	Sahadeo Basdeo	Ph.D.	1	Educator
	MDP	Selwyn Richardson	LL.B	10 months	Lawyer

28

P - President PM - Prime Minister FM - Foreign Minister MDP - Minister with Defense Portfolio () - includes total years as PM (+Premier) (+Chief Minister)

Note: This table does not show Ministers of Home Affairs or National Security who are different than the ministers with the defense portfolio.

Source: Compiled by author based on interviews and documentary sources.

Third, a combination of practical circumstances (small size, dearth of skills, etc.) and political desire create situations of multiple role performance, especially in the Eastern Caribbean. Thus, as Table 2.1 shows, many Prime Ministers are not only Foreign Ministers, but some also hold the defense portfolio. Moreover, all of the Prime Ministers - President in Guyana's case - are leaders of their respective political parties.⁴ This fusion of power enables them to exercise clout even in cases where Single Groups seem firmly operational. As Searwar (1987:4) says, "The ruling group, in the case of the Caribbean, nearly always reflects the perceptions and views of a dominant leader."⁵ Braveboy-Wagner (1988:86) is also correct: "In particular, crisis decisions tend to be personal decisions with little attention paid to opposition

4. One recent exception was in Grenada where Dr. Keith Mitchell, Minister of Public Utilities, replaced Prime Minister Herbert Blaize as leader of the New National Party on January 21, 1989. This led to factional strife, culminating with the dismissal of Mitchell and a supporter, and the resignation of other Ministers in July, 1989.

5. For a useful theoretical analysis of relations between individuals and small group decision-making units see Semmel (1982). The Multiple Autonomous Group type of decision structure was never a feature of (independent) Caribbean decision-making units. The closest thing to this that I know was in Guyana where the ruling People's National Congress maintained a Foreign Affairs Subcommittee of the Central Executive Committee, among entities paralleling the decision structure of the Executive branch. But then Forbes Burnham exercised hegemony over all policy entities in a way that permitted little or no autonomy by them.

sentiment and not enough alternative information and opinion solicited."⁶

"...Leaders' personal characteristics are more likely to have influence on foreign policy decisions if the leaders are predominant in their government" (Hermann and Hermann, 1982:4). This is certainly true of the Caribbean. The study by Ince (1983) of Trinidad and Tobago showed the Prime Minister to be the consummate decision-maker; more deus inter homines than primus inter pares within the Cabinet. Ince was talking about Eric Williams, whose erudition, charisma, intellect, and political style may have made Trinidad and Tobago a special case. But then the Caribbean has had, and still has, other leaders who, though not fully comparable with Williams, have towered over their societies intellectually and or politically. Forbes Burnham (Guyana) and Errol Barrow (Barbados) were among them. And there is Michael Manley (Jamaica), Vere Bird (Antigua), John Compton (St. Lucia), the late Robert Bradshaw (St. Kitts) and Lynden Pindling (The Bahamas).⁷

6. Braveboy-Wagner adds a salutary note in recording her observation of a decrease in personalism and increased bureaucratic and interest group influence.

7. For brief personality profiles of Burnham, Williams, Manley and Barrow, see Jessamy (1986:74-95). Harold Hoyte (1988) deals with the present Barbados Prime Minister, Erskine Sandiford, and Pantin (1988) deals with the present Trinidad leader, A.N.R. Robinson. The Caribbean and West Indies Chronicle (1981) deals with Vere Bird.

The relevant elites are, therefore, the President, Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and Defense Ministers of the various states.⁸ While these leaders operate ostensibly within Cabinet decision structures with supporting bureaucratic mechanisms, the reality is less of Single Group and more of Predominant Leader situations. They demonstrate a variety of political styles, leadership characteristics and foreign policy orientations. And they operate in policy-making frameworks that requires them to consider internal and external referents.

11. SECURITY PERCEPTIONS

While some Caribbean leaders are inclined to view security in traditional military terms, most subscribe to the view that the protection of their nations requires a broad definition of the term to account for the dimensions from which the critical threats emerge - the political and the economic. Thus, in the Caribbean, security has a broad definition encompassing military, political and economic dimensions. As Table 2.2 shows, there is a hierarchy of threat perceptions, with political and economic concerns such as factionalism,

8. A few states have different portfolios and individuals for external security (Defense) and internal security (Home Affairs/National Security). Two such states are Guyana with Home Affairs Minister Stella Odie-Ali, and Jamaica with National Security Minister Keith Knight.

drugs and foreign debt ranking above military concerns such as foreign intervention and mercenary action. Expectedly, for some leaders there is greater emphasis on some dimension(s) than on others. Dominica and Barbados, for example, have both experienced mercenary and coup attempts at undermining their internal stability. The leaders in these countries are, therefore, very sensitive to actual or potential threats coming from those directions.⁹

Military Dimension

Many Caribbean leaders worry about potential military threats. But overt military threats are the least of their concerns. Terrorism, as experienced in Europe, Asia and the Middle East, is not a matter of great import. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are the states with the greatest racial pluralism. Both have seen racial strife. Guyana's in the late 1950s - early 1960s developed to dangerous proportions. But while both societies have come a long way in terms of racial harmony, political polarization and economic disparity related to race do exist (see Edwards-Romain, 1987; Mackoon, 1988a). However, civil war there or elsewhere in the Caribbean is not likely.

9. This profile is based on interviews with people who make, influence and implement decisions (see Bibliography) and on examination of elite speeches and writings: Compton (1987); Tudor (1987); Hoyte (1986, 1987b); Charles (1983, 1988); Brana-Shute (1985); Mitchell (1987); Jackson (1982); CARICOM (1987); Seaga (1988).

There is some concern about U.S. military operations in the hemisphere. There is a record of U.S. intervention in the area - Guatemala in 1954, Dominican Republic in 1965, and in Haiti and Nicaragua earlier on. The 1983 Grenada intervention was the latest in the English Caribbean.¹⁰ Thus, even for those states that supported the U.S. action in Grenada, the prospect of intervention, whether for pure U.S. national interests, or in pursuit of U.S.- Caribbean interests, is a real one. The Grenada action signalled America's low tolerance for radical politics like Bishop's. Bishop himself had been murdered by the time the American troops landed. But it was his politics that had given rise to the factional strife that precipitated the crisis, thereby giving the U.S. the motive and opportunity for action. The intervention in Grenada has contributed to the eclipse of radical politics in the region. There are, therefore, no "Grenadas" in the Caribbean to trigger similar American action (though a "Grenada" is not the only possible basis for intervention); neither are any on the horizon.

Concerns about the U.S. also derive from another factor. The Caribbean Basin has a considerable American military presence (see Barry et al, 1984; Tiryakian, 1984; Rodriguez-Beruff, 1985; Garcia-Muniz, 1986). The

10. The latest American intervention in the area was in December 1989, in Panama. See Gordon, 1989; and Rosenthal, 1989.

military network is designed to secure the region from external and internal threats to American security interests. The concern of Caribbean leaders about the possibility of the region becoming embroiled in East-West conflicts due to the region's linkages to the western defense arrangement is thus not unfounded. As such, a threat to the U.S. may be interpreted, by extension, as a potential threat to the Caribbean.

Cuba has a significant military capability, and has actively pursued relations with Caribbean states. These matters are of interest to all Caribbean leaders. But they have been of comparatively greater concern to Americans. Some Caribbean leaders are known for their strident anti-communism and their distaste for Castro's political overtures. Among them are example Eugenia Charles of Dominica, John Compton of St. Lucia, and Edward Seaga (Jamaica) and Herbert Blaize (Grenada) among recent leaders. But the kinds of concerns voiced in North America about probable military adventures by Cuba in the Caribbean are not paralleled by similar concerns within the Caribbean. For example, much more importance has been attached to the MIGs and the surface-to-air missiles in Cuba and their potential threat to the area by North American statesmen and scholars than by those in the Caribbean.

A realistic concern based on East-West politics exists. Conflict between the two superpowers may draw Cuba into the picture, either initially by the Soviets,

or by American pre-emptive action. Caribbean leaders worry about military spill-overs into their area in such scenarios. Moreover, some feel that since the U.S. perceives Cuba as a threat, Cuba becomes an indirect threat to the Caribbean. The cases of Guyana (under Burnham), Jamaica (under Manley, 1972-1980) and Grenada (under Bishop) show how close contacts with Cuba can result in the kind of economic ostracism, diplomatic hostility, and military intervention from which the entire region suffers.

Venezuela has territorial claims against several Caribbean states - Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominica. That against Guyana is the largest and most significant. Venezuela has used aggression as well as political and economic intimidation in pursuit of the Guyana claim (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guyana, 1981; Griffith, 1981; Braveboy-Wagner, 1984). Fears of intervention up to the early 1980s were justified, and they can never be entirely dismissed. Since 1985 though, relations have been on the upswing (see Hoyte, 1987b). Thus, while military intervention cannot be fully ruled out, it is doubtful that it would be used by Venezuela to settle its claims.

The experiences of some states in the region make them sensitive to military - political threats stemming from mercenary adventures or coup attempts. In 1970 Trinidad and Tobago was the scene of a military uprising. In October 1976, a conspiracy to topple the

Tom Adams government in Barbados was exposed. In March 1979 Eric Gairy was removed from power in Grenada. In April 1981 there was a failed coup attempt against the Eugenia Charles regime in Dominica. It was led by American and Canadian mercenaries in collaboration with ex-Prime Minister Patrick John. In December of the same year, another coup attempt involving former Dominica Defense Force (DDF) members was foiled. This led to the disbanding of the DDF.

Such experiences color the political histories of Caribbean societies and are not easily expunged from the memories of the present elites. There is no evidence that the Caribbean now stands in jeopardy by such threats. But Searwar (1987:12-13) is correct:

The OECS states, as a homogeneous group of small islands, appear, at present to perceive the security problem primarily in terms of warding off of mercenary attack and subversion from within the state or grouping, with U.S. support as an ultimate resource.

Table 2.2
Security Perceptions in the Caribbean

SECURITY DIMENSION	THREAT AREA	THREAT INTENSITY	CONVERGENCE/ DIVERGENCE
Military	Terrorism	Nil	Hi Convergence
	Civil War	Low	Lo divergence
	U.S. intervention	Low	Hi convergence
	Cuban intervention	Low	Hi convergence
	Venezuelan intervention	Low	Lo divergence
	Mercenary action	Low	Hi convergence
Political	Factionalism	High	Low Divergence
	U.S. destabilization	Low	Low convergence
	Venezuelan hegemony	Low	Hi convergence
	Cuban destabilization	Low	Lo divergence
	Drugs	Very high	Very hi convergence
	Secession	high	Hi convergence
Economic	Drugs	Very High	Very Hi Convergence
	Foreign debt	Very high	Hi convergence
	Econ system failure	High	Hi convergence
	Brain drain	Very high	Hi convergence
Hi - high	Lo - Low		

Note: Threat intensity indicators are based on "sense of concern" expressed by interviewees and in official statements. Convergence/divergence indicators reflect proportion of total interviewees and official expressions about the area of threat.

Source: Compiled by author based on interviews and documentary sources.

Political Dimension

Political factionalism has been a feature of the recent political histories of Caribbean states. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Grenada, Antigua, The Bahamas, and St. Kitts have all known the kind of factional politics and elite in-fighting that can rupture the fabric of a society. Factionalism has arisen from conflicts among strong-willed leaders. It has also correlated with race. In Guyana it was a hindrance to unity. And in Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua it cast a cloud on politics that still lingers and could threaten internal stability. It is, therefore, a matter to which leaders are very sensitive.

Destabilization seeks generally to either change the regional balance of power, or the ideological posture of particular states. While there have been destabilization efforts by Caribbean Basin states - Venezuela against Guyana in 1968 and 1980-82 - destabilization attempts have generally been by the U.S. Guyana in the mid 1970s, Jamaica during the first Manley years (1972-1980), and Grenada during Bishop's time are all said to have experienced this. American destabilization usually results from a perception of actual or potential threats to its national interest pursuits in the region (Mars, 1983; Brands, 1987-88; Ronning, 1970).

Mars (1983) found that Caribbean states have responded differently to destabilization. Grenada under Maurice Bishop adopted the Popular Mobilization approach. The Defensive/Reactive Diplomacy approach was used by Guyana under Forbes Burnham and by Jamaica under Michael Manley between 1972 and 1980.¹¹ And Mars (1983:48) came to the conclusion that:

Generally, the response of Caribbean states to the problem of external penetration and destabilization is characterized more by distinct and piecemeal approaches rather than a capability for concerted action. In the areas where consensus is apparent, the response is nevertheless inadequate to meet the severe challenge of the encroachment of the most powerful international actors in the life of Caribbean states. Perhaps the most significant problem undermining effective responses to external destabilization is the tendency toward political disunity or ideological fragmentation of the region.

Some Caribbean leaders harbor muted suspicions about Venezuelan pursuits in the region. It is felt though, that, judging from the nature of Venezuela's present conduct, any ulterior motives by them would be more

11. Using a definition of the Caribbean to include Cuba, Mars (1983) also talks about the Belligerent Opposition approach used by that country.

economic in direction than anything else. Cuba's achievements are popularly admired in parts of the Caribbean. But many leaders, especially in the Eastern Caribbean, are wary of Cuba and the likelihood of their being victims of Cuban destabilization. Former Barbadian diplomat Charles Skeete presents what is perhaps a sentiment of most, if not all, Caribbean leaders: "While we believe that Castroism may be good for Cuba, we have our reservations as to whether Castro is entitled to spread his ideology to our region" (U.S.H.R., 1985b:96).

Drugs present a serious problem to the region. They could be both economically and politically disruptive. Their effects on the values and mores of Caribbean societies also cause concern. There are several aspects of the drug problem: production; trafficking; sale; use; abuse. Marijuana production in Jamaica, for example, is said to be worth US\$82 million to that country's economy. Heavy trafficking and transshipment take place in Jamaica and The Bahamas as well as in Martinique and Turks and Caicos. Serious allegations have been made about the use of drug money to finance political party operations in The Bahamas and in Jamaica (see Ramjeet, 1988).

Several countries have found it necessary to introduce draconian legislation to deal with aspects of the problem. Among these are Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts, Guyana, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent.

The legislation generally imposes stiff fines and long terms of imprisonment on users and traders; provides for the confiscation of property acquired through the drug trade; and creates new or added institutions to deal with users and pushers. The report of an official inquiry into drugs and corruption in Trinidad - the Scott Drug Report - noted the danger of drugs as it undermines internal security and corrudes values in the society.

The observation by Frank Taylor (1987:15) about Trinidad and Tobago undoubtedly has region-wide relevance: "The publication of the Scott Drug Report highlights a problem that threatens to undermine the sovereignty and security of the young nation." He noted that the corruptive power of narcotics has, like a cancer, for some time been growing at the very entrails of the local community, hooking within the vice of drug abuse school children, teachers, and even a couple of cabinet ministers of the previous Trinidad administration.¹²

Economic Dimension

The aspect of the region's security on which there is greatest agreement is the economic. For most

12. It was less than a month after my interview with the Police Commissioner of St. Lucia in August 1988 that he was fired for being implicated in drug related corruption and inefficiency in the St. Lucia Police Department. I remember well how the Commissioner declaimed against the drug barons and those who aid them.

Caribbean leaders, the economic problems gripping their societies present the greatest security threat. The economic security dimension has both manifest and latent elements. Economic problems are seen as likely precipitants of later political and military challenges. Many leaders would endorse the position of the Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, James Mitchell:

Fundamentally, in my view, the sores of poverty in our region cannot be cured by military therapy. I lead a popular government and I need to deliver the goods. Opportunities for subversion will emerge when the people are frustrated again. It is the collapse of social institutions that creates avenues for international intrigues. If the people's expectations are not fulfilled through the channels that people like me create, we will, in due course, be inviting the colonels or the commissars. And the more arms we have available in the country, the greater will be the temptation to solve our problem with a coup (Brana-Shute, 1985:28).

Economic vulnerability is a critical security dilemma for small states (see Commonwealth, 1985:16-35; 54-90; Harden, 1985:7-13; Azar and Moon, 1984). The economic vulnerability of the Caribbean is an increasingly burning issue (see U.S.H.R., 1985b; Demas,

1986; Stone, 1988; Bourne, 1988). It is not merely a functional vulnerability, but a structural one also; one where Caribbean economies suffer from heavy reliance on foreign trade, limited production and export diversification, low savings, heavy reliance on foreign capital, and a dearth of capable economic and commercial management skills, among other things.

One respected Caribbean economist has characterized the region's economies as suffering from dependent underdevelopment (see Demas, 1986:6-19). And CARICOM, on which many hopes lay to mitigate the situation, has not fulfilled expectations. There are several reasons for this. First, the expansion of CARICOM trade has been frustrated by import restrictions, especially by the larger states, a situation occasioned by their adverse balance of payments situations. Second, CARICOM states have failed to agree on industrial allocation policies. Third, there is limited regional labor mobility.¹³ Fourth, regional trade expansion has been unable to generate the foreign exchange required for imports from hard currency areas.¹⁴

A major problem is the high indebtedness of Caribbean countries. For example, Jamaica's stood at

¹³This situation is expected to change for some categories of workers with the implementation of the Grand Anse Declaration, the agreement by Caribbean heads of government at the July 1989 summit in Grenada. ¹⁴For an assessment of the successes and failures of CARICOM see Mirlande Manigat (1988a) and Ten Years of CARICOM (1984).

US\$3,520.3 million in 1986, Trinidad and Tobago's at US\$1,061.7 million, Guyana's at US\$772.3 million. St. Kitts-Nevis had the smallest figure - US\$22.0 million (see CDB, 1988:17). Servicing the debts is a major headache since debt ratios run very high. Jamaica's was 44% in 1986. The debts are not only an economic burden, but in attempting to deal with them some states run the risk of jeopardizing their internal security due to popular, labor, business and other reaction. Both Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago found themselves in this position in 1988-1989 with riots, strikes, demonstrations, and arson and vandalism against public property costing millions of dollars (see Singh, 1989; Mackoon, 1989; Gibson, 1989; Wilkinson, 1989).

Former Jamaica Prime Minister Edward Seaga has argued that the ability of the developing world to meet the necessary welfare considerations, while servicing their external debt, requires real economic growth. He suggested that priority be given to achieving sustainable economic growth in the medium term. However, growth requires adequate external financing (Seaga, 1988:3). One can hardly challenge this proposition. But there seems to be a chicken and egg dilemma: should such countries strive for growth before seeking debt solutions - an aim with several implications - or should efforts be concentrated on debt crisis solutions at the expense of real growth - an aim also with implications for economic and

political stability? Firm decisions on these issues are difficult. Most leaders - especially those of Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago - are working on half measures, or on coping strategies in collaboration with regional and international bodies.

As Table 2.2 shows, there is both image convergence and divergence in this security profile reflecting similarities and disagreements in the views of leaders as to the nature and intensity of threats. The greatest convergence lies in the economic area, and the divergence is great in the military and political areas. Political histories, present political and economic circumstances, and the nature of Caribbean leadership do not permit the definition of a single regional security perception. While Caribbean societies share several common historical, political, economic, and social features, there are still strong definitions of national and subregional interests that often jar against what seem to be manifestly regional ones. Thus, for example, while there is common recognition of military, political and economic vulnerability, there is divergence in perceptions regarding the source and intensity of threats. The OECS states place premium on potential threats from internal subversion, secession and mercenary action. And they seem more willing than the others to invite the U.S. to deal with actual and potential threats to their security. Guyana and Belize,

the mainland states, have cause to worry about potential military and political problems stemming from Venezuelan and Guatemalan claims.

Three related implications flow from the differences described above. First, while the divergences are not critical in all areas, they could mean the use of precious time and already scarce resources in attempting to narrow the range of differences. Second, since unilateralist external security measures by these states hold little prospect for success, collaboration is important. But security collaboration requires consensus, if not unanimity, to be credible and successful. Divergences of the kind described above can present obstacles to this. Third, Caribbean states stand to create greater scope for others such as the U.S., Venezuela and Cuba to determine the nature and direction of events in the region. In such circumstances, they stand to lose the initiative, and act by default, progressively being carried by the turn of events and the interests of other states, rather than by their own volition and in pursuit of their own interests.

The events related to the 1983 Grenada invasion dramatize this last point. The failure of Caribbean leaders to adopt a decisive position at the emergency Summit in Trinidad, coupled with the inclination of some leaders to facilitate extra-regional initiatives, helped accommodate the pursuit of American interests

(see Statement by George Chambers in U.S.H.R., 1983; Shahabuddeen, 1986: Ch 3; Vaughan Lewis, 1987, 17-18). The U.S. may have intervened regardless. But at least Caribbean leaders could have avoided being such facilitators, through acts of commission and commission and loss of initiative. It would appear, though, that the differences are not conflicting enough to prevent the development of working consensus in crucial areas.

Some of the security measures Caribbean leaders have taken recently stem from these perceptions (see Chapter Three). Whether these perceptions and the resulting decisions are realistic, and how they impact on the actual security of the states are, however, other matters. Judgment in these respects requires that we add another factor to the analysis. That factor is capability. It is to that factor that we turn next.

CHAPTER THREE


SECURITY CAPABILITY IN THE CARIBBEANIntroduction

While a few Caribbean states have strategic materials such as bauxite and oil, resources in the Caribbean are generally limited. But it is well established that meaningful national and regional security requires that states in search of security have appropriate security capabilities. This chapter addresses the security - capability nexus in the Caribbean by examining the proposition that the security capabilities of Caribbean states militate against credible regional security pursuits.

We first examine internal and external aspects of the capabilities of Caribbean states. A review of some of the security measures Caribbean states have undertaken follows. We then consider whether some of these measures are credible. Minuscule capabilities do not by themselves militate against regional security measures. However, we find that Caribbean capabilities are insufficient for military security measures that could rely substantively on the nations themselves, given the degree of external dependence. They do not enhance the credibility of current measures to reduce vulnerability, or to deal with several of the other problems perceived as important by the elites.

Figure 3.1

Capability Determinants



1. CAPABILITY IN THE CARIBBEAN

As Figure 3.1 suggests, there are both internal and external dimensions of a state's security capability. The internal elements may be placed under five headings: geographic; human resource; material resource; institutional; military. The external elements include membership in or subscription to regional and international organizations and agreements; formal and informal alliances; bilateral relationships of other kinds. These enable a state to complement its internal elements in meeting the security objectives or strategy designed (Handel, 1981). Table 3.1 indicates some socio-economic aspects of the internal capabilities of Caribbean states.

Internal Elements

Geographic: Except for mainland Guyana and Belize, the Caribbean states are island-states. Some, like Trinidad and Tobago, and Grenada, are plural island-states. The Bahamas is an archipelago of about 700 islands and hundreds of cays and rocks. The states of the Caribbean are all very small. Guyana, with 214,970 square kilometers, is the largest. Population densities vary from a strategically dangerous low of four persons per square kilometer in Guyana, to 588 per square kilometer in Barbados. Except for the northern Bahamas, the area lies within the tropics. The region's climate is an asset to agricultural production, especially of sugar

cane, bananas and ground vegetables, on which much of the region's economy depends. Hurricane, a tropical cyclone, is the most destructive natural hazard. Jamaica was devastated by hurricane Gilbert in September 1988. It left 45 people dead, 300,000 homeless and one billion (Jamaican) dollars worth of damages. In September 1989 hurricane Hugo left a trail of death and destruction in Antigua, Guadeloupe, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, among other places.

Human Resource: The region's total population stands at 5.5 million. Populations vary. Montserrat, with 12,000 people has the smallest, and Jamaica, with 2.3 million, the largest. The rates of population growth are troublingly low. It is highest in St. Lucia and St. Vincent - 2.5%, and lowest in Barbados - 0.9%. Anderson (1987:10) argues that while population growth rates are the result of the combined interaction of fertility, mortality, and migration, fertility and migration are the main determinants in the Caribbean since mortality levels have been substantially controlled.

Declining fertility, increased life-expectancy, and emigration impact on the age structure of the Caribbean population. Anderson (1987) expects the proportion of the working age population (15-64) to increase over the next fifteen years while the under 15 group decreases. And she makes the worrying observation that "the lack of adequate social security provision throughout the

region, combined with the fall in the real value of pensions and savings, and probable decline in family-based support, all point to a future in which aging is tied to poverty" (Anderson, 1987:13).

Education levels are relatively high. Primary education is compulsory in all countries. Secondary education is also mandatory in some places. The universities of the region - the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the University of Guyana (UG) - offer diplomas and degrees in a wide variety of disciplines. The UWI also offers terminal degrees, among them the DM (Doctor of Medicine) and the Ph.D.¹ The Bourne Report, however, notes that the main deficiencies of Caribbean education are at the tertiary level. It notes that:

Although a wide range of programmes and institutions exist in the larger CARICOM countries, facilities are rudimentary elsewhere. Moreover, only a very small proportion of the working age population seems to have benefited from tertiary level education and training. There are also reservations about the quality and subject matter of tertiary level education (Bourne, 1988:20).

 1. There are also American-run universities in Grenada, Antigua and Montserrat that cater to West Indian students. So does the University of the (U.S.) Virgin Islands (UVI).

Thomas Anderson (1984:41) makes an observation about the Caribbean that is relevant to its human resource, material resource, and institutional elements:

Compared with the Third World as a whole, the people are not as poor, ill-fed, unhealthy or uneducated. In general there exists a substantial corps of well-trained civil servants, modern skills, and an awareness of their place in the world. Improvements are indeed needed in all socioeconomic aspects, but ...the Caribbean is not a backward region.

Table 3.1

Capability Profile of the Caribbean

STATE	SIZE (km ²)	POPULATION (Mid 1986)	POPULATION DENSITY (/km ²)	PER CAPITA GDP (1986) US\$m	PUBLIC DEPT (1986) US\$m	NATURAL RESOURCES
Antigua	440	81,000	184	2,935	119.3	None
Bahamas	13,942	234,000	17	9,462	211.2	Oil, aragonite
Barbados	431	253,100	587	5,288	276.8	Oil
Belize	22,960	169,500	7	1,226	103.3	Oil (Unexplored)
Dominica	750	78,100	104	1,423	53.2	None
Grenada	345	102,100	296	1,013	43.2	None
Guyana	214,970	794,000	4	654	772.3	Bauxite; gold; diamonds; manganize; oil (under exploration)
Jamaica	11,424	2,336,200	204	1,042	3,520.3	Bauxite
Montserrat ^a	102	11,900	117	3,555	-----	None
St. Kitts-Nevis	269	45,800	170	1,670	22.0	None
St Lucia	616	139,500	226	1,388	48.2	None
St. Vincent	388	111,000	286	883	38.0	None
Trinidad & Tobago	5,128	1,119,200	234	3,959	1,061.7	Oil

a - British colony

Source: CDB, Annual Report 1987. Bridgetown, 1988.

Table 3.2

Security Establishments in the Caribbean
(As at end of 1987)

STATE	SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT				TOTAL
	ARMY	COAST GUARD/ NAVY	AIR FORCE/ AIR WING	POLICE	
Antigua*	700	NA	-	600	1,300
Bahamas	496	496	40	1,400	2,432
Barbados*	1,800	100	-	1,500	3,400
Belize	600	40	15	600	1,255
Dominca*	40 ¹	NA	-	280	320
Grenada*	80 ²	NA	-	550	630
Guyana	5,000	225	200	4,000	9,425**
Jamaica	2,200	150	170	5,000	7,520
St. Kitts*	80 ²	NA	-	150	230
St. Lucia*	80 ²	NA	-	509	589
St. Vincent*	80 ²	NA	-	490	570
Trinidad & Tobago	1,500	525	50	4,000	6,075
TOTALS	12,656	1,536	475	19,079	33,746

* - RSS member state

** - Guyana has the GNS with 1,500 and the GPM with 2,000

1 - The Dominica Defense Force was disbanded in April, 1981. This figure represents the SSU.

2 - Two SSUs.

Sources: IISS, The Military Balance 1987-88. London, 1987; Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook 1987-88. Wash: The Perth Corp, 1987; International Security Directory. London: R. Hazell and Co., 1987.

Material Resource: There are some strategic resources in the area: oil, gold, diamonds, bauxite, aragomite, and manganese. The problem though, is that very few countries have natural resources. Bauxite is found only in Guyana and Jamaica, and oil in The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados. Active exploration is underway in Guyana. Aragomite is found in the Bahamas. Manganese exists in Guyana, but commercial mining ceased some years ago. Guyana also has gold, diamonds and timber. Export income in the Caribbean comes mainly from oil, bauxite, tourism, agriculture and some light manufactures. Our discussion on perception (Chapter Two) showed that the region is considered to be economically vulnerable partly because of its dependent development.

There is heavy reliance on foreign trade and aid, limited production and export diversification, low savings, and heavy reliance on foreign capital, among other things. The agricultural and public sectors are the major employers. In both sectors productivity is very low, but in the capital intensive mining sector it is high. The state plays major roles in the economies of the region. There is majority state participation in the agricultural and mining industries, sometimes complete ownership and control, as in Guyana. Taxation and public spending as a percentage of GDP are high. And while there has been significant economic growth in many places, the desired industrialization and economic

development are yet to be achieved (see Stone, 1986:chs.. 5,6; Demas, 1986, 1988; Bourne, 1988).

Institutional: The Caribbean is largely stable and democratic. As Anderson (1984:6) declares, "that the Caribbean is the fourth most democratically ruled region in the world - after Anglo-America, Western Europe and the Southwest Pacific - is a political reality."² But as Phillips (1985:10) quite rightly remarks, there has been a tendency in some states towards repressive practices in the name of security, in response to emergent militant opposition. Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Jamaica, and St.. Lucia have at varying times shown evidence of this. Most of the states, while fully independent, maintain ties with the British monarchy. They retain Governors-General - representatives of the British queen, the head of state, with largely ceremonial functions. Three states are republics - Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominica. The first has an "executive" presidency and the others have "constitutional" (ceremonial) ones. Montserrat is still a colony.

The system of government is largely British parliamentary with modifications in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominica which have presidential arrangements. Antigua, Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts, and -----

2. The fact that Anderson defines the Caribbean in Basin terms does not change this reality.

St. Vincent have unicameral legislatures³. The others have bicameral ones. The judiciaries are generally impartial and respected. Guyana has been striving for legal autochtony and has its own terminal appellate court - the Guyana Court of Appeal (see James and Lutchman, 1984: Chs. 1,3). There is a regional appeals court within the Eastern Caribbean - the Eastern Caribbean Court of Appeal. But most states opt for ultimate recourse to the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council as the final judicial arbiter. Moves to institute a Caribbean Court of Appeal, based in Trinidad and Tobago, are afoot (see Singh, 1988).⁴ The Caribbean has known several political styles and ideological postures. Some societies are racially plural and have experienced racially based conflict. Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are the primary cases. Political factionalism and ideological cleavages have also featured in the recently in Jamaica, Antigua, The Bahamas, St. Kitts, Dominica, and Guyana.

Military: As Table 3.2 shows, the security establishments of Caribbean states are all very small. The countries with standing armies are Barbados, Belize, Antigua, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and -----

3. Guyana also has a number of constitutional "houses" - the Supreme Congress of the People, the National Congress of Local Democratic Organs, etc. These are not legislative, but deliberative. See Griffith (1982) and Alexis (1983).

4. See also Hyatali (1988) who lauds the work of the Privy Council but advances eight reasons in stridently arguing for a Caribbean Court of Appeal.

Guyana. These are all poorly armed. The other states have Special Service Units (SSUs) and police and coast guard operations. The military arsenals of these states comprise mostly British and American light infantry and maritime equipment, some of World War Two vintage. Arms and equipment include automatic rifles, mortars, artillery guns, anti-aircraft guns, observation aircraft, small troop transports, helicopters, and patrol boats. The inventories of some countries have been expanded by the U.S., the U.K. and other countries recently. While some countries, for example Guyana, have long had high military expenditures, there is neither research and development nor indigenous arms manufacture there or elsewhere in the region.

One advocate of military roles in the Caribbean was former and late Prime Minister of Barbados, Tom Adams. He articulated what came to be known as the "Adams Doctrine." It was a political-military proposition relating to the security of the Eastern Caribbean. It saw the subregion's main security threat coming from internal subversion, coups and mercenary action. Adams felt that the security of the entire region was jeopardized with such a situation in any one country. Quick corrective action was needed in such an eventuality. The most expeditious action would require a speedily mobilized and deployed military force. He was thus a prime actor behind the creation of the Regional Security System (RSS), but failed to get

agreement on a standing Caribbean Defense Force (see Norton, 1984; Maingot, 1985).

The events of October 1983 in Grenada have given rise to the development of a defense strategy by some states. It may be called "The Crisis Contingency Strategy." It revolves around the SSUs. These units are the equivalent of the American S.W.A.T. teams. They offer a combination of parka- military and police skills and are designated to deal with crisis situations beyond the capacity of the regular police forces of which they are structurally a part. They are trained and armed by the U.S., but both American and RSS officials indicated to this writer that training is progressively becoming a joint American-Caribbean responsibility.

The idea of a standing army was mooted in 1984, again by the late Prime Minister of Barbados, Tom Adams. He explained: "My feeling is that one regional army rather than a number of national armies will give an additional safeguard, namely protection of small governments against their own armed forces" (Advocate News, 1984:1). Adams contemplated a 1,000 member Regional Defense Force headquartered in Barbados with smaller garrisons of 50 to 90 members on two other islands, preferably Antigua and Grenada. It was expected to cost between US\$60 million and US\$100 million with the support coming from the US and the United Kingdom. Brigadier Rudyard Lewis of the Barbados

Defense Force and the Regional Security System also floated a similar proposition. His was for a five year plan to develop a Caribbean Defense Force of 1,800. Seven hundred were to be combat infantry troops with the remainder in a coast guard and an air wing. He contemplated the Force operating on the basis of "minimum force." Police deployment was to be the first line of operation with, the SSUs and the Defense Force troops being second and third lines of action under a graduated crisis plan (see U.S.H.R., 1984:24-43).

Neither version of the standing army proposition survived. First, the U.S., expected to be the main financial sponsor, was not keen on the idea. Not only were the anticipated costs substantial, but the U.S. prefers to operate bilaterally as much as possible. This permits more influence. Moreover, it is not too keen on creating too great a relative military independence in the Caribbean. The U.S. wants to be the source on which Caribbean states need to rely for military protection. In addition, the idea failed muster with many Caribbean leaders, and for two basic reasons. One, was cost. Assuming equipment was secured free of charge, the annual recurrent cost of Caribbean support of the standing army was estimated at US\$12 million, the equivalent of the annual public sector investment program of some OECs states. St. Vincent's James Mitchell declared "...My government has no intention of releasing one cent for the creation of any

regional army or to waste money on security matters in preference for a basic needs program" (Singh, 1984:1). Secondly, some Caribbean leaders, mindful of the political implications, were not amenable to having Barbados be their de facto security guarantor.

External Elements

The low level of the Caribbean's internal capability resources necessitate reliance, to varying degrees, on the support and assistance of several countries and regional and international organizations. Table 3.3 indicates the major regional and international organizations with which Caribbean states are affiliated: the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), the Commonwealth, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Regional Security System (RSS), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the United Nations (UN), the Latin American Economic System (SELA), and the ACP-EEC group.

The capability support varies with the nature of the organization. It also varies in kind and among states. Some of it is bilateral, some is multilateral. For example, all states benefit from the various functional operations of the Commonwealth, especially the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation and the Commonwealth Caribbean Technical Assistance Program. That support is essentially economic and political.

Most states are able to take maximum advantage of the functional and political linkages of CARICOM and the OECS (for those that are part of it). The capability support there is essentially economic and political.

For the RSS member-states, the assistance is military and political. In the case of the NAM, the support is mainly political. The Movement supported Guyana, Jamaica, and Barbados in 1976 in the face of destabilization efforts against them. It has consistently stood by Guyana in the dispute with Venezuela. Guyana's activism within the Movement enabled it to secure the denial of membership to Venezuela in 1982 at a time of marked tension between the two over the territorial claim by Venezuela (see Jackson, 1982:23-25; Searwar, 1985:7-9).⁵

There is an explicitly military relationship between Belize and Britain whereby the latter has provided a security guarantee against the threat of Guatemalan aggression since the time of Belize's independence in 1981. There are, however, no formal military alliances either within the Caribbean or involving states in the region and elsewhere. But as Table 3.4 shows, Caribbean states are signatories to a number of multilateral security agreements. The Geneva Protocol deals with the prohibition of the use of -----

5. The framework of the NAM also permits some economic and technical benefits through mechanisms such as the Action Programs, the Technical Programs and the News Agency Pool.

poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons in war. The 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty bans atmospheric and under water nuclear testing. The Outer Space Treaty governs the activities of states in space and outer space exploration. The Treaty of Tlatelolco deals with nuclear weapons prohibition in Latin America, and the Non Proliferation Treaty deals with nuclear proliferation globally. The Sea Bed Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons in sea and ocean floors. The Bacteriological Warfare Convention prohibits the development, production and stock-piling of bacteriological and toxic weapons (SIPRI, 1987:457-59).

There is a certain artificiality about the signature of Caribbean states to most of these agreements. They have neither the military or technological capability, nor the disposition to qualify them for substantive contribution to the subjects of those agreements. Neither is there any concern by the international community about any serious consequences of their breach of these agreements. Moreover, financial constraints prevent some states from participating meaningfully in initiatives sponsored under some of them. For example, in 1988 Grenada was trying to withdraw from OPANAL, the Mexico-based secretariat established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco, on grounds of financial incapacity. The signatures of the Caribbean states, however, reflect

their endorsement of certain principles, and indicate to the international community their seriousness about the issues in question. Moreover, such signatures offer them a measure of political respect which they may use to their advantage in pursuing their own limited security interests.

Table 3.3

Major International Networks of Caribbean States

<u>STATE</u>	<u>CARICOM</u>	<u>Rio Pact</u>	<u>OECS</u>	<u>Commonwealth</u>	<u>Interpol</u>	<u>RSS</u>	<u>OAS</u>	<u>NAM</u>	<u>SELA</u>	<u>UN</u>	<u>ACP-EEC</u>
Antigua	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Bahamas	X	X ^c		X	X		X	X		X	X
Barbados	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Belize	X			X			Y	X ^d		X	X
Dominica	X		X	X	X	X	X	X ^d		X	X
Grenada	X		X	X	X	X	X	X ^d	X	X	X
Guyana	X			X	X		Y	X	X	X	X
Jamaica	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Montserrat ^a	X		X	X ^b							
St. Kitts	X		X	X		X	X			X	X
St. Lucia	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X
St. Vincent	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X
Trinidad and Tobago	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X

a - British colony b - Membership as part of U.K. c - signed but never ratified d - inactive membership

X - full member/subscriber Y - observer

Source: Treaties and Alliances of the World Detroit: Gale Research, 1986; International Security Directory London: R. Hazel and Co, 1987.

Table 3.4

Caribbean Subscription to Multilateral Security Agreements

STATE	GENEVA PROTOCOL	PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY	OUTERSPACE TREATY	TREATY OF TLATELOCO	NON- PROLIF TREATY	SEA BED TREATY	BACTERIOLOGICAL CONVENTION
Antigua	-	-	-	1983 ²	1985 ¹	-	-
Bahamas	-	1976 ¹	1976 ¹	1977 ¹	1976 ¹	-	1986
Barbados	1976	-	1968	1969 ²	1980	-	1973
Belize	-	-	-	-	1985 ¹	-	1986
Dominica	-	-	-	-	1984 ¹	-	-
Grenada	-	-	-	1975 ²	1975 ¹	-	1986
Guyana	-	-	S	-	-	-	S
Jamaica	1970 ¹	S	1970	1969 ²	-	1986	1975
St. Kitts	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
St. Lucia	-	-	-	-	1979 ¹	-	-
St. Vincent	-	-	-	-	1984 ¹	-	-
Trinidad & Tobago	1970 ¹	1964	S	1970 ²	1986	-	-

67

S - signature without further action

1 - notification of succession

2 - in force due to declaration which waived the requirements for the entry into force of the Treaty

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1987. New York: Oxford Univ Press, 1987.

Table 3.5U.S. Security Assistance to the Caribbean, FY 1989
(\$US in millions)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>MAP</u>	<u>IMET</u>	<u>ECON SUPPORT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bahamas	0	60	0	60
Belize	500	100	2,000	2,600
Eastern Caribbean	5,000	400	15,000	20,400
- Antigua				
- Barbados				
- Dominica				
- Grenada				
- St. Kitts				
- St. Lucia				
- St. Vincent				
Guyana	0	50	0	50
Jamaica	3,500	300	25,000	28,800
Trinidad & Tobago	0	75	0	75
TOTAL	9,000	985	42,000	51,985

MAP --Military Assistance Program. Used to provide funds to countries allied or friendly to the US to procure defense equipment and services to help strengthen their defense capabilities.

MET --International Military Education and Training. A grant aid program to provide training - 2,000 specialities from basic skills to professional military education - for foreign military personnel. Also allows for future access to the military and civilian leadership of other countries.

ECON SUPPORT

--Funds through the Economic Support Fund to advance US interests by offering economic assistance to allies or countries of strategic importance to the US.

Source: Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1989.

Much of the external capability support comes through bilateral relationships. Most of this aid comes from the U.S., Canada and the U.K. in the form of security assistance, development aid, and technical assistance. Table 3.5 shows that U.S. security assistance comes in different categories. It stands at US\$52 million for fiscal 1989. The British Overseas Development Administration reports that 124.3 million pounds sterling was given to the region between 1982 and 1986. Canadian aid is also significant. Caribbean countries also receive economic and military assistance from the USSR, China, Cuba, East Germany, West Germany, North Korea, South Korea, Israel, Venezuela, and Brazil, among other countries. Multilateral support comes from the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Inter American Development Bank, among other agencies.

Belize-Britain apart, there are no security patron-client relationships. The closest to this recently have been the relations developed between the U.S. and a few Caribbean states. The accession to office of Edward Seaga in Jamaica in 1981 witnessed the blossoming of a relationship between the U.S. and Jamaica between that time and Seaga's departure in February 1989. This was intended firstly to reverse relations developed with Cuba by Michael Manley between 1972 and 1980; secondly, to use Jamaica as a model of conservative politics in the Caribbean; and thirdly, to have Jamaica serve as a

surrogate in the Caribbean. (See section on Jamaica below.) Close relationships also developed with Grenada and Dominica after the 1983 intervention in Grenada. Those relationships have developed surrogate aspects to the point where Eugenia Charles of Dominica felt confident to declare: "We in the Caribbean, who see ourselves as allies of the Americans, wish to maintain that tradition and uphold the Monroe Doctrine, as it has developed through the ages" (Charles, 1988:154).

The above suggests that the combined effects of poor internal capability and the extensiveness of reliance on external sources make for a very tenuous capability situation within the Caribbean. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the capabilities of Caribbean states are not sufficient for any meaningful military security mechanisms by these states. Given this, it is important to see what kinds of security initiatives these states have undertaken over the recent years.

11. SECURITY MEASURES IN THE CARIBBEAN

The manner in which Caribbean states have exercised military and political security options may be viewed along the lines of the Twitchett (1971) approach. There have been unilateralist and collaborative measures.

Unilateralist Measures

Decolonization reached the Caribbean in the 1960s. Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago secured their independence in 1962. Barbados and Guyana got theirs in 1966. The other Caribbean countries secured political freedom as follows: The Bahamas, 1973; Grenada, 1974; Dominica, 1978; St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 1979; Antigua and Barbuda, and Belize, 1981; St. Kitts-Nevis, 1983. Sovereign statehood by these nations meant, among other things, that the responsibility for security passed from Britain to them.⁶ The case of Belize is exceptional because of Guatemalan aggressiveness.

In pursuit of their security responsibilities several states pursued largely unilateralist measures in attempting to develop and maintain some semblance of a security mechanism. These measures, of course, required supplementation from abroad. But in intent and evolution they reflected primarily the perceptions and interests of the ruling elites and the state of relations in the hemisphere and in the world. Not all Caribbean states adopted such measures. Not all of them thought such either politically expedient or -----

6. Eric Williams, former Trinidad scholar and statesman, argued that Britain even made the establishment of a defense force a precondition to granting independence in the case of Jamaica (and presumably in other cases). See Eric Williams, "The Regiment," Journal of the Trinidad and Tobago Regiment Dec. 1964, p 11 cited in Phillips (1988:127-28).

economically feasible. Among those that did were Antigua, The Bahamas, Belize, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. It is, therefore, essential to take a brief look at some of these initiatives.

THE BAHAMAS: The Bahamas secured independence from Britain in 1973. The Royal Bahamas Defense Force (RBDF) was, however, not formed until 1979, two years after the creation of a Ministry of National Security on January 1, 1977. No need for such was felt to exist before. The RBDF was created from the Marine Division of the Royal Bahamas Police Force which then had a complement of sixty eight. The RBDF is predominantly a maritime body with small army and air wings.⁷

The Bahamas Defense Act of 1979, the legal basis for the RBDF, declares the mandate of the Force to be:

- The Defense of the Bahamas
- Prevention of drugs and arms smuggling
- Prevention of illegal immigration
- Protection of fishing rights
- Disaster relief support.

The RBDF is headed by a Commander. The present Commander, Leon Smith, holds the rank of Commodore. Until June 29, 1987 RBDF operations fell under the policy direction of the Ministry of National Security.

7. The Air Wing itself was not started until November 26, 1981.

Since then the Ministry has been abolished and most of the security portfolio assigned to the Attorney General. Structurally there are five major departments, each with sub-departments: 1. Administration; 2. Operations; 3. Supply; 4. Technical; 5. Training. The force has a personnel strength of fifty seven officers and 639 men. While recruitment for the RBDF began in 1976, the entry of women was only allowed in 1985. To execute its mandates, the RBDF has thirteen patrol vessels of varying sizes and differently armed. Equipment comes from Britain and the U.S. and most of the training is provided at British military and naval institutions.

The main preoccupation of the RBDF presently is with its second and fourth mandates - prevention of arms and drugs smuggling, and protection of fishing rights. The nature of Bahamian geography as a bridge between North America and South America facilitates its use for transshipment of both drugs and arms. There are plans to develop and expand the RBDF over the years 1988-1992 to deal with this and other problems. The expansion will involve recruitment of an additional 500 members, and modernization of naval and air facilities including the provision of more powerful naval and air craft for surveillance and interdiction (RBDF, 1987; The Royal Bahamas Defense Force Magazine, 1987).

BARBADOS: Like The Bahamas, Barbados did not create a standing army at the time of independence. It did so thirteen years afterwards. The Barbados Defense Force (BDF) was created on August 9, 1979. While its predecessor was the Barbados Regiment, its history is traceable back to 1902 when the Barbados Volunteer Force was formed (see Brinkley, 1982; Barbados, n.d.). No standing army was felt necessary before 1979. The police force was considered adequate for internal security, then the only security concern. Phillips (1988:128) explains "during the first thirteen years of its [Barbados'] existence, the police force was the factorum and security mainstay of the nation-state."

The BDF is basically a ground force headed by a Chief of Staff, presently Brigadier Rudyard Lewis. The Chief of Staff is appointed by and subject to the direction of the Governor-General, but policy direction is the prerogative of the Prime Minister who has also long held the defense portfolio. He is aided in this by the Barbados Defense Board. The BDF has seven organizational divisions: 1. Infantry Army; 2. the Barbados Regiment; 3. the Pioneer Squadron; 4. the Coast Guard; 5. Administration; 6. Cadet Corps; 7. Women's Army Corps (Phillips, 1988:134-37). The Coast Guard is relatively autonomous, but still an integral part of the BDF, as its naval wing. It has a complement of seven vessels of varying sizes and capabilities. The Coast Guard is primarily responsible for maritime

surveillance, rescue, narcotics control, and disaster preparedness. The BDF also once maintained a small air wing. This was deoperationalized in 1986 with the reentry into power of the late Errol Barrow.

The BDF receives security assistance from the U.S., Britain, and Canada. While all three provide training, both the training and operational structure of the BDF follow British Army lines. The establishment of the Regional Security System (RSS) 1982 (see below) saw the expansion of the role of the BDF. Not only does the BDF Chief of Staff double as RSS Coordinator, but the headquarters and facilities of the BDF constitute the operational nucleus of the RSS. Barbados' military budget increased progressively between 1978 and 1985 (see Phillips, 1988:142). But there is no arms development or manufacture in the island. Neither does the BDF engage in any military research and development.

GUYANA: Guyana, against which territorial claims by Venezuela were being pressed since before independence (1962) found it necessary to establish a standing army at independence (1966). This army, the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) grew out of the Special Service Unit (SSU), a para-military elite group which, prior to independence, was part of the British Guiana Police Force. The GDF grew from an estimated force strength of 750 in 1966 to 5400 in 1987. It is basically a ground

force with air and maritime operations, all of which fall under an integrated command structure headed by a Chief of Staff. The first Chief of Staff, Ronald Pope, held the rank of Colonel. The present one is Norman McLean. He holds the rank of Major General.

Guyana's defense expenditure has risen over the years (see Danns, 1986:115). But while there has been expansion in troop strength and operational structure, the range and sophistication of weapons have not reached levels desired by the military. Military research and development are rudimentary where they exist. There is no indigenous arms manufacture. Weapons come from several sources. Much of it was originally donated by the British and the Americans, but over the years, as Guyana adopted socialist and non-aligned postures, weapons, equipment and training have been secured from North Korea, Cuba, East Germany and from Commonwealth Countries such as India and Nigeria, in addition to Britain. The GDF inventory includes anti-aircraft guns, automatic rifles, machine guns, artillery guns, helicopters, small troop transports, mortar throwers and naval patrol vessels.

There was minimal contact with the American military until 1988. As Table 3.8 shows, there have been no military purchases from the US since 1982. IMET assistance, suspended in 1983, will resume in 1989. Guyana will get four places, the lowest of all Caribbean countries. The death of President Forbes

Burnham in 1985 has resulted not only in changes in the country's leadership, but also in its policy direction. The US is hoping that these changes will facilitate renewed contacts with the GDF as well as pursuit of its own security interests. This is clear from submissions made to Congress in 1988.

The IMET program tentatively proposed for Guyana would improve the professional military skills of the Guyana Defense Force (GDF) and enhance the GDF awareness and observance of human rights. We would like to restart the program at the earliest opportunity. This would give us important access to the GDF and enable us to impart and reinforce shared values such as respect for civilian rule and human rights. It would also discourage the GDF from seeking military assistance and/or training from the Soviet bloc (U.S., 1988:176). (Emphasis added)

The GDF has been at the centerpiece of Guyana's unilateralist strategy. But this strategy has also involved two paramilitary organizations - the Guyana National Service (GNS), and the Guyana People's Militia (GPM). The GNS was formed in 1973 with a security mission having defense and development aspects.⁸ The

8. Guyana is not the first or only case of a developing state explicitly incorporating defense and development elements in its security framework. See Shaw and Inegbedion (1988) for an examination of cases in Africa.

mission was to be accomplished through five corps: the Young Brigade; the National Cadet Corps; the New Opportunity Corps; the Pioneer Corps; and the Special Service Corps. A National Reserve Corps was also contemplated. As the Parliamentary Paper on the subject explained: "This will be the last Corps to come into operation. It is envisaged that all groups of the Pioneer Corps will be given an opportunity to sign up as reservists to be on call for work in any area vital to the stability, security and productivity of the country" (Guyana, 1973:11).

The defense mission of the GNS was, therefore, intended to revolve around the Pioneer Corps and the National Reserve Corp. But expectations were never fulfilled. The National Reserve Corps was never really established. Some writers mistakenly describe the GNS as a military organization (for example Danns, 1986:117-118). While this is not really so, the ruling party has made it (especially the Pioneer Corps and the Young Brigade Corps) highly politicized and often more of an instrument of regime political security than national military-political security. (Of course there are those in the regime who see the two as inseparable.) They employed a strategy of substance and symbolism (parades, high visibility, donning of GNS uniform by top party officials) that resulted in the impression that the GNS is part of a massive military machine.

The GPM was established in 1976 to institute a popular mobilization strategy in the wake of destabilization measures by the US and intimidation from Venezuela. It had the more politically wishful than militarily practical mission of making "every citizen a soldier" through the provision of basic paramilitary skills to wide cross-sections of the nation and use of those trained as a strategic reserve. It was headed by a GDF officer and used GDF training and other facilities. Over the years (especially since 1985) relations with both the US and Venezuela have improved. This along with the financial stringencies faced by the country led to the progressive contraction of the GPM. It was eventually absorbed into the GDF.

JAMAICA: Jamaica's military security mechanism revolves around the Jamaica Defense Force (JDF). It became operational in July 1962 and was constituted from the First and Second Battalions of the Federal West Indian Regiment, previously known as the Jamaica Regiment. It is an establishment with army, maritime and air components with full-time and reserve elements for each. Its security orientation has been mostly towards internal security. As one early observer remarks:

...the role of the army becomes increasingly that of supporting the police force. It took a long time for Jamaican public opinion to

realize that the main role of the Jamaican army was that of and [sic] internal security force, even though its training and operations were clearly geared to giving aid to the civil power, and latterly to a potential counter insurgency role.⁹

Weapons were accordingly secured from the US and the UK with this internal security role in mind.

While there is still an internal security orientation, the JDF's coat-tail operations alongside the RSS in Grenada in 1983 demonstrated its adoption of a new orientation and an additional role between 1980 and early 1989, during the tenure of Edward Seaga as Prime Minister. The new orientation was external and the new role was that of U.S. surrogate in the Caribbean. Tables 3.5 and 3.7 show Jamaica to be a major recipient of American security assistance in the Caribbean, especially since 1983. And the following congressional submissions are quite explicit about U.S. objectives:

Jamaica is important to the U.S. because of its location along vital sea lanes, the ability of its government to influence opinion in the English Caribbean, and its role as a major source of bauxite and

9. Terry Lacey, Violence and Politics in Jamaica 1960-1970 London: Frank Cass, 1970, p 159 cited in Garcia-Muniz (1988a:74).

marijuana. The U.S. has a very close relationship with the present Jamaican government.

Security assistance can contribute towards achieving our objectives of maintaining a stable democratic government friendly to the United States, maintaining close cooperation in preserving regional stability, and furthering cooperation in marijuana eradication and narcotics interdiction.

The Jamaica Defense Force (JDF), with the support of U.S. military assistance, is capable of performing its role in maintaining internal order to protect the democratic process, and participating in narcotics interdiction and eradication efforts. Our military assistance will also foster a continued close relationship between the JDF and the US military, and will promote the JDF's ability and willingness to participate in joint operations with friendly forces to further regional security and support US foreign policy objectives (Emphasis added) (U.S., 1988:200).

There is no military research and development of significance in Jamaica. Neither is there any arms

production there. But Jamaica has one of the largest and best military inventories in the region - armored cars, mortar throwers, attack craft, jeeps mounted with machine guns, troop transports, etc. (see Garcia-Muniz, 1988a:116-117). Drug interdiction and eradication have become major concerns of the JDF. In 1986 the JDF confiscated some 17,000 pounds of marijuana intended for the United States. And the air wing along with private companies collaborate and cooperate with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and other American bodies concerned with the drug trade.

Collaborative Measures

Caribbean leaders have recognized the need to collaborate inspite of the above unilateralist measures. Those areas of collaboration of relevance to us have been the Mutual Assistance Scheme (MAS), the Zone of Peace Treaty proposal, and the Regional Security System (RSS).

MAS AND ZONE OF PEACE TREATY PROPOSAL

The genesis of the MAS dates to April 1973 when Caribbean leaders met in Guyana before the launching of CARICOM. They agreed that the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs (SCMFA), an "institution" of the planned Community, should prepare a scheme capable of protecting the political

independence and territorial integrity of member states. For several reasons (the vicissitudes of the integration movement, the priorities of member-states, the geopolitics of the region, etc.), that mandate was not really acted on until the July 1981 Grenada meeting of the SCMFA. Based on that meeting's instructions, the CARICOM Secretariat prepared a proposal that was examined at the June 1983 meeting of the SCMFA. The Ministers decided to create a Working Group to recommend ways of implementing the Scheme. That Group met in Nassau, the Bahamas in February 1985, but failed to agree on implementation measures. Searwar (1988:78) explained that the difficulties of achieving agreement emerged not only as a consequence of differing perceptions of security needs, but of the logistics which would be involved in a region-wide scheme. He pointed out that although there was no explicit agreement that the matter should be abandoned, this was the unspoken understanding. The proposal is no longer on the foreign ministers' agenda.

The Zone of Peace proposal has its origins in a wider context. In October 1979, at the meeting of its General Assembly in Bolivia, the OAS adopted a resolution calling for the Caribbean region to be declared as Zone of Peace.¹⁰ Through the Grenada sponsored resolution, the OAS General Assembly -----

10. See "The Caribbean as a Zone of Peace," AG/RES.456(IX-0/79).

expressed "deep concern over the heightening of tension in the sub-region resulting from recent increases in military activity in the Caribbean area." It repudiated the concept of the region as a sphere of influence and stressed support for the principles of ideological pluralism and peaceful coexistence. It called upon states to "recognize the region as a Zone of Peace and to devote all their efforts in appropriate regional and international forums to the advancement of this concept."

In the English Caribbean the Zone of Peace proposal was first raised at the 1981 Grenada meeting of the SCMFA where a Working Group was established to examine the resolution in CARICOM context. That group met in Belize in 1982, but met stumbling blocks similar to those faced by the Working Groups then dealing with the Mutual Assistance Scheme. The proposal has thus had a similarly inconclusive fate.

A Zone of Peace Treaty for the Caribbean could only be meaningful if the military powers in the hemisphere consent to respect its terms and requirements. It would require the elimination of foreign military bases, the end of foreign military maneuvers, the adoption of a policy of non-intervention by states, and adherence to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, among other things (CCC, 1982:20; Searwar, 1988). The proposal, therefore, relies, in great measure, on the actions of states outside the Caribbean. The geopolitics of the region

(see Chapter Four) make the prospect of the Caribbean becoming a Zone Of Peace highly unlikely.

REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM

Background

To understand the RSS we need to appreciate its background. There are two important elements in this background: 1. apprehensiveness about security, and 2. the formation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).

In Chapter Two we noted that the security perceptions of Caribbean leaders have been colored partly by the political experiences of their societies, some of which involved serious internal and external threats. The Tom Adams government (Barbados) was the intended victim of a planned mercenary expedition in 1976. There was insurrection in St. Vincent in 1979 which the Barbados Defense Force helped to quell. In March 1979 the Eric Gairy government in Grenada was removed from power. And the government in Dominica was the target of mercenary and coups attempts in 1981. These events and experiences created justifiable apprehensiveness about stability and security by Eastern Caribbean leaders. They were fully aware of their individual limitations, and were amenable to adopting collective schemes to secure themselves. One such scheme, a precursor to the RSS, was the 1979

agreement by Antigua, Barbados, St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Lucia on joint coast guard patrols.¹¹

The OECS was established in June 1981 by treaty, as a successor to the 1966 West Indies Associated States Council of States (WISA).¹² It brought together Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The objectives were several and varied: promotion of regional and international cooperation; promotion of unity and defense of sovereignty; harmonization of foreign policy; joint diplomacy; economic integration. In pursuit of these objectives, five principal "institutions" were created - Authority of Heads of Government; Foreign Affairs Committee; Defense and Security Committee; Economic Affairs Committee; Central Secretariat. The chief executive officer of the organization is the Director General (WISA, 1981). The current Director General is Dr. Vaughan Lewis.¹³

The OECS Treaty outlines defense and security matters under Art. 8. Section 1 deals with the composition of the Defense and Security Committee,

11. In a sense the first regional security initiative in the Caribbean (though not fully indigenous) was the West India Regiment comprising police and para-military units of the members of the then West Indian Federation, in existence from 1958 to 1962. For an historical treatment of the military in the Caribbean see McFarlane (1974).

12. See "Treaty Establishing the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States," 20 International Legal Materials 1166 (September 1981).

13. For useful discussions of the OECS see Gilmore (1985) and Emmanuel (1984, 1988).

comprising "the Ministers responsible for Defence and Security or other Ministers or Plenipotentiaries designated by the Heads of Government of the Member States." Section 2 restricts the deliberations of the Committee to member states "possessing the necessary competence in respect of matters under consideration from time to time." Section 3 establishes the Authority as the body to which the Defense and Security Committee will report. It says of the Committee: "It shall advise the Authority on matters relating to external defence and on arrangements for collective security against external aggression including mercenary aggression, with or without the support of internal or national elements".

Section 4 is worthy of full reproduction:

The Defence and Security Committee shall have responsibility for co-ordinating the efforts of Member States for collective defence and the preservation of peace and security against external aggression and for the development of close ties among Member States of the Organization in matters of external defence and security, including measures to combat the activities of mercenaries operating with or without the support of internal or national elements, in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Sections 3 and 4 are thus the core of the OECS background against which the RSS was created.

Structure and Operations

The RSS was created on October 29, 1982 by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed originally in Roseau, Dominica (see Appendix).¹⁴ It became operational in mid 1983. St. Kitts joined in February 1984. Grenada followed in January 1985. The MOU is a 42 point agreement outlining a broad range of issues relating to the structure and operation of the RSS. Under Art. 2, the RSS is mandated to to prepare contingency plans and assist member states, on request, in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, fishery protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution control, natural and other disasters, and threats to national security.

As shown in Figure 3.2,¹⁵ the structure of the RSS involves a Council of Ministers, comprising the ministers with defense portfolios of participating

14. The Memorandum was signed by St. Lucia later, on November 4, 1982.

15. I am grateful to Cmdr. Peter Tomlin of the RSS for his comments on the first draft of this chart.

states, as the central policy-making body. Operational command falls under a Central Liaison Office (CLO) headed by a Regional Security Coordinator (RSC). He is appointed by the Council of Ministers (Art. 9) and is designated to be "adviser to the Council of Ministers in matters relating to regional security and shall be authorized to negotiate with extra-regional agencies on behalf of the parties hereto" (Art. 11). However, negotiations by the Coordinator do not bind participating states unless they expressly agree to them in writing. Figure 3.2 shows a linkage between the RSC and the US Military Liaison Office in the Eastern Caribbean and the United Kingdom High Commissions in the area since these are the principal foreign agencies through which the RSC negotiates on behalf of the RSS.

The CLO, the System's headquarters, is located in Barbados which also provides the present Coordinator, Brigadier Rudyard Lewis, head of the Barbados Defense Force. The CLO plans and coordinates in collaboration with a Joint Coordinating Committee comprising Force Commanders.¹⁶ Financing is prescribed under Art. 12 of the MOU on the basis of 49% contribution by Barbados and 51% contribution by the other states. That formula is, however, subject to a provision: "but if circumstances change the percentage contributed by -----"


16. Under Art. 1 "Force Commanders" are described as the commanders of the defense forces (of Antigua and Barbados) and the Commissioners of Police (of all participating states).

Barbados and the other participating countries shall be subject to renegotiation." Circumstances have indeed changed. Financing is now on the basis of 40% by Barbados and 10% each by the other six states. The budget is fairly stable, at about US\$200,000 per annum. RSS funds may not be used for routine operations within member states, but supplies may be loaned to them.

Financial contributions go to a Central Fund. Several states have been delinquent in contributing to the Fund. Antigua has the worst contribution record and St. Vincent the best. Cmdr. Dean Schopp, head of the US Military Liaison Office in the Eastern Caribbean explained to this writer that while the U.S. is legally prohibited from financing the System, it provides training and equipment "of considerable value" to RSS member states. The United Kingdom and Canada also contribute to the System through bilateral support to member states.

Figure 3.2

STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM



Technically, the overall force level of the RSS is the sum of the security establishments of all participating states. But most states do not want their full force strengths identified for RSS purposes, and therefore designate a complement of their forces for potential RSS activity. The security establishments involved are:

- the Antigua and Barbuda Defense Force
- the Antigua and Barbuda Police Force
- the Barbados Defense Force
- the Royal Barbados Police Force
- the Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force
- the Royal Grenada Police Force
- the St. Kitts-Nevis Police Force
- the Royal St. Lucia Police Force
- the Royal St. Vincent Police Force

Coast Guards are under Police Commissioners, except in Barbados where they are under the army. A key component of the police forces is the Special Service Unit (SSU). As noted above, SSUs are elite police with para-military training and light weapons, mostly M-16s, machine guns and mortar throwers. The plan is for each state with SSUs to maintain at least two units of platoon strength - 40 each. Grenada has about 100 SSU members, the largest number. SSUs are to deal with crises beyond the capacity of the regular police, or with military contingencies. They are rotated biennially. Antigua and Barbados, the states with

standing armies, do not have SSUs. Their equivalents are the Task Force (Barbados) and the Special Patrol Group (Antigua).

Table 3.6

SDAF Assistance to the Caribbean
(Completed/In-progress 1988)

<u>STATE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>
Antigua	Radios
Bahamas	-
Barbados	Machine guns, ammunition
Belize	Radios, ammunition
Dominica	Jeeps
Grenada	Jeeps, radios, ammunition
Guyana	-
Jamaica	Jeeps, trucks
St. Kitts	Radios
St. Lucia	Jeeps
St. Vincent	Jeeps
Trinidad and Tobago	-
Peace Keeping Operations	Jeeps, Radios

The SDAF - Special Defense Acquisition Fund - is a revolving fund established in 1982 to finance the acquisition of defense items and services in anticipation of authorized foreign military sales. It is intended to enhance American ability to meet foreign needs while minimizing adverse impacts on the readiness of U.S. forces.

Source: U.S., Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1989, p 39.

Table 3.7

U.S. IMET Assistance to the Caribbean
(Number of students)

STATE	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988^e	1989^p	TOTAL
Antigua ^a	-	9	9	11	10	7	9	9	64
Bahamas	-	-	-	24	26	17	15	17	99
Barbados ^a	10	22	22	18	14	14	13	13	126
Belize	16	19	23	79	23	21	14	22	217
Dominica ^a	-	6	16	8	10	11	11	11	73
Grenada ^a	-	-	-	18	18	18	18	18	90
Guyana	22	10	-	-	-	-	-	4	36
Jamaica	20	73	60	72	57	63	56	56	457
St. Kitts ^a	-	-	10	7	8	11	9	9	54
St. Lucia ^a	3	6	15	12	13	8	10	10	77
St. Vincent ^a	-	8	12	13	13	10	10	10	76
Trinidad & Tobago	-	-	-	11	10	16	10	10	57
TOTAL	71	153	167	273	202	196	175	189	1426

94

a - RSS member state
e - estimated
p - proposed

Source : Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1987; Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance Programs FY 1989

Table 3.8
U.S. Military Sales to the Caribbean 1982-1987

STATE	(US\$ In Thousands)							
	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1982-1987	
Antigua*	A	-	1,033	353	1,550	627	1,070	4,633
	D	-	-	897	52	263	507	1,719
Bahamas	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados*	A	-	3	-	132	360	602	1,097
	D	13	**	3	-	41	242	299
Belize	A	-	-	158	807	527	311	1,803
	D	-	-	43	100	460	690	1,297
Dominica*	A	-	1,033	377	1,359	458	368	3,595
	D	-	-	897	26	269	368	1,560
Grenada*	A	-	-	2,690	4,611	593	375	8,269
	D	-	-	148	3,316	778	769	5,021
Guyana	A	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	D	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	A	-	3,319	2,803	5,693	9,096	1,880	22,791
	D	9	286	286	5,341	1,997	4,950	12,869
St. Kitts*	A	-	-	-	3,912	419	363	4,694
	D	-	-	-	1,725	176	319	2,220
St. Lucia*	A	-	1,033	377	1,359	385	338	3,492
	D	-	-	897	67	86	175	1,225
St. Vincent*	A	-	-	-	40	4,635	288	4,963
	D	-	-	-	-	1,117	160	1,277
Trinidad & Tobago	A	-	5	-	-	-	8	13
	D	-	-	-	-	-	8	8

95

* - RSS member state

** - less than \$500

A - Agreement

D - Delivery

Source : Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1987

The weapons and equipment at the disposal of the RSS are essentially light Armour (mortar throwers; automatic rifles, especially M-16s; machine guns; hand grenades), basic communications equipment and patrol vessels. Much of the arms is old, some of World War Two vintage. But since 1984 the US and the UK have been providing more recent equipment. None of it is very sophisticated though. There is great reliance on American and British assistance for training and supplies. Most of the security assistance comes from the US under the IMET and MAP programs. Table 3.7 shows the relative preference which RSS states among all Caribbean states have received under IMET, especially between 1984 and 1987. Table 3.8 shows the military sales by the U.S., much of it financed through the various military support programs.

American military officials explain that the U.S. recognizes a duty to assist the RSS in the interest of the Caribbean and in its own interest. Defense needs are assessed by a five member Military Advisory and Training Team drawn from American, British (police) and RSS forces. In October 1984 Baroness Young, British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, pledged that Britain "would do everything to assist regional security operations and in particular the establishment of the RSS" (Simmons, 1985:368). They are, however, reluctant to provide anything beyond police training and equipment, and the construction of

coast guard facilities. They have built port facilities in St. Kitts and Dominica, and are working on similar facilities in St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Canada strongly resists involvement in overt military assistance. Its aid comes in the form of development assistance.

A proposal was made in 1986 to have the MOU upgraded to a full treaty. A draft treaty was circulated to heads of RSS member governments and received the endorsement of most of them. It was seen as part of the evolution of the RSS and was intended to give international legality to the System and at the same time create the basis for direct international security cooperation between the RSS and the U.S. and other states. For example, RSS operations now make it difficult to secure direct security assistance from the U.S. because American legislation prohibits assistance to bodies such as the RSS. The U.S. thus operates largely on a bilateral basis with RSS member states.¹⁷

The treaty proposal encountered strong resistance from the late Errol Barrow, then Prime Minister of Barbados, and from James Mitchell, current Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines. In a

17. There are different stories of the origin of the treaty proposal. One points to Washington. American officials in the Caribbean deny this. Others point to Grenada and Barbados. Cmdr. Tomlin of the RSS, however, contends that it was an RSS initiative that received American support then.

September 2, 1986 letter to members of the Council of Ministers, Barrow made it clear that:

The main preoccupation of this government is in the area of drug abuse control, prevention of smuggling, fishery protection and maritime training.

This government therefore has strong reservations over the use of our resources for militaristic purposes or for the unjustifiable usurpation of the sovereignty of our country by alien influences. Consequently, the Government of Barbados is not prepared to elevate or upgrade the Memorandum to the status of a treaty and does not support the proposal that this should be done (Barbados Advocate, 1986:1).

Barbados, the main Caribbean pillar of the RSS, still holds that position. So does St. Vincent.¹⁸ The Barbadians began to de-emphasize their own military, and hope thereby to do the same to the military security aspect of the RSS. They did this by only slightly increasing or freezing expenditure to the BDF.

18. See Mitchell (1987). He stresses political unity and eschews military security saying, at page 2, "I get a little tired of the patronising sermons on the 'Role of Security in Small States,' and the like. We have to behave like Grenada or Fiji to get attention, and when we stop misbehaving we are left to languish in blissful 'obsecurity.' (That word 'obsecurity' I got from a constituent of mine.)"

The strong reservations by Barbados and St. Vincent along with the reluctance of others have thus displaced the treaty upgrade proposal from the agenda of RSS states, at least for the foreseeable future.¹⁹

111. SECURITY CREDIBILITY

Credible security means the establishment and maintenance by Caribbean states of defense mechanisms able to respond adequately to threats to their societies. The kind of security measures a state adopts depends not only on the material capability of the state, but on the perceptions of the decision-makers, and on their political will - their desire and courage to act decisively and prudently in so far as the endangerment or potential endangerment of their security is concerned. Consensus and political will are necessary for any credible regional security effort. Consensus is closely related to common security perceptions. Political will is needed to utilize the capability elements, and to cut through differences and arrive at a common basis for practical measures.

Our examination of perceptions in Chapter Two revealed the greatest divergence in the military and

19. For some useful discussions on the RSS see Simmons (1985), Gary Lewis (1986) and RSS (1986). The principal author of RSS (1986) is Mark Atkin, ex British army officer now Staff Officer (Plans) of the BDF and the RSS, described as one of the "ideas men" of the RSS.

the political areas. The Mutual Assistance Scheme (MAS), the Zone of Peace Treaty proposal, and the RSS are in these areas. The first two initiatives stand little chance of being credible security pursuits until the differences that prevent agreement on a common basis for practical implementation is narrowed, and until sufficient political will is demonstrated to do this. The great reliance on non-Caribbean actors that the Zone of Peace Treaty would require, as noted above, also detracts from its credibility. Assuming that the need for these initiatives still exists, the search for consensus in these areas should not be abandoned. Keeping them on relevant agendas would ensure that the salience of the issues is not lost. It would also signal the desire to persist in reaching common ground.

An MAS and a Zone of Peace Treaty would only be partial measures. The MAS may be able to meet some internal needs, but will be unable to deal with external aggression from say Cuba, Venezuela or any non-English Caribbean state. And it can do nothing regarding the region's vulnerability. A Zone of Peace Treaty - highly improbable as we noted above - would provide a good measure of moral deterrence, but would lack military deterrent features that could aid the region's military security. Moreover, even in its political aspect, much of its potential usefulness depends on states outside the Commonwealth Caribbean.

The credibility of these initiatives is, therefore, both partial and questionable.

As regards the RSS, several matters are to be noted. First, the RSS operates with some dangerous ambiguities. Terms such as "national emergencies," "search and rescue," and "threats to national security" used in Art. 2 of the MOU to describe RSS competence and responsibility are not defined. Such a situation has the potential for both political and operational complications. A security system should not operate on general notions about such crucial aspects of its mission. There is therefore need for at least a Protocol to the Memorandum or a similar instrument that deals with these ambiguities.

Second, the MOU holds, under Art. 3, that "...the interests of one participating state are the interests of the others; and accordingly the participating countries shall have the right of 'hot pursuit' within each other's territorial waters." This article seems to be stating the principle of collective defense (see Wolfer, 1962:Ch. 12). Under this principle, recognized by the United Nations Charter (Art. 51), states agree to pool defense capabilities to deal with threats common to the security of a group of them. It is done on the conviction that creation of a military mechanism sufficient to deal with specific threats lies beyond the ability of any one state.

Wolfers (1962:183) explains that collective defense arrangements are directed against an opponent known to the parties of the pacts, although the opponent may not be named in the pact for diplomatic reasons. He posits that allies can define geographically the danger they seek to thwart. As such, they are able to make their military preparations and work out their strategy in advance of any conflagration. Obviously, collective defense arrangements against specific opponents, when entered into by countries without offensive objectives are intended primarily for deterrence.

Close scrutiny of the RSS reveals several things in this regard. One, while collective defense contemplates measures against threats external to the subject states, the MOU and the RSS states clearly mean to address both internal and external threats (see MOU, Art.2; OECS Treaty, Art. 8 [3], [4]). Two, by defining the RSS security posture in collective defense terms, the MOU skirts the discrepancy between the exigencies of internal security in which members are interested, and the focus on the external inherent in the collective defense approach. Three, a collective defense focus on threats external to the region is unrealistic since the capabilities of member states do not permit them to provide credible military security against such, even if those external threats were defined.

Ispahani (1984:175) offers this observation on the collaborative security mechanisms of small states:

Their strength lies in their ability to diffuse local conflagrations and thus avoid superpower interference, in their ability to project a strong, collective voice, and in their talent for gaining support of major powers with compatible interests in the region. But the major threats to their areas - local powers or outside will probably best such arrangements [sic]. They have not been able and will not be able to cope alone. In the near term, they will remain half-way houses on the road to security cooperation, dependent on the interest and support of outside powers, and absorbed, first and foremost, by their own political and economic instabilities.

There is little doubt that the RSS fits much of this characterization. But the events of October 1983 in Grenada and the geopolitical realities of the area cast doubt on its ability to diffuse military tensions without the involvement of the proximate superpower. Moreover, I am not sure that it is a "strong collective voice" and "talent for gaining the support of major powers with compatible interests" of RSS states that would attract the US or other military powers to help with conflict resolution in the region.

States such as the U.S., Britain or Venezuela will act because of their geopolitical interests and because they can subordinate the Caribbean to those interests (see Chapter Four). There is no doubt, though, that that the RSS is a security half-way house, dependent on the interests and support of outside powers, and preoccupied with the political and other challenges facing its member states.

CHAPTER FOUR
GEOPOLITICS OF THE CARIBBEAN

Introduction

The geopolitical significance of the Caribbean lies in its possession of strategic materials such as oil and bauxite, in the location of strategic sea lanes of communication there, and in the defense mechanisms which the U.S. and other states have there. The purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to see how these geopolitical realities affect the security of the small English-speaking states.

We do this by discussing the proposition that the geopolitics of the Caribbean is such that the small states risk endangering their own security by trying to secure a credible military organization. We assess the strategic interests of a range of states with interests there, and then consider how, given those interests and the subordinate status of the Caribbean, states may well jeopardize their security with an independent military organization. We question whether the RSS fits into American strategic designs, perhaps thereby making the U.S. favor a strong military organization by Caribbean states. We focus on the RSS because it is currently the only security initiative providing a kind of military-political insurance.

We conclude that the political, military and other pursuits of a variety of states with geopolitical interests in the region significantly affect the security interests and pursuits of the Caribbean states. The RSS does not fit into the American defense posture in the region. There is a considerable American presence in the area. The U.S. therefore has no special reason to want a strong regional military organization of Caribbean states. Such a pursuit risks altering the regional status quo, leading to suspicions by the dominant state and some middle powers about Caribbean security interests, and precipitating reactions by them that may threaten the security of the Caribbean states themselves.

1. STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF THE SUPERPOWERS

The strategic significance of the Caribbean for the superpowers and the other states discussed below varies depending upon the military, economic and political interests and stakes involved. The significance is both global and regional. Within the Caribbean region lie two of the world's major "choke points" - the Panama Canal, and the Caribbean Sea.¹ The importance of the

1. Some other major "choke points" are: the South China Sea; the North Sea; the Mediterranean Sea; the Suez Canal; the Straits of Malacca; the Horn of Africa; the Straits of Gibraltar; the Sri Lanka Straits; and the Cape of Good Hope. See Child (1985:24-25).

first is well established (see La Feber, 1978:esp 3-28; Hayes, 1984:219-32).² And maritime geopolitical discussions often pay closer attention to these than to the Caribbean Sea. But as Table 4.1 shows, within the Caribbean Sea there are several passages. These are crucial to the commercial and military interests of several states in the hemisphere.

States in the region possess and produce some resources that are important for both military and civilian needs. As Tables 4.2 and 4.3, and Figure 4.1 show, there are oil, bauxite, gold, nickel, cobalt, copper, and other strategic resources. There are three aspects of the oil industry in the Caribbean: production, refining, and transshipment. The Caribbean has the world's largest refining operations in St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands. The region is one of the world's major refining centers because of its oil production and the crude oil shipped there from around the world for refining. But perhaps more importantly, "the Caribbean has been highly regarded as a refining center because of its political stability, its deep harbors, its lack of environmental regulations and its proximity to major shipping lanes, and the Panama Canal" (Barry et al, 1984:89).³

2. While the strategic importance of the Panama Canal is well recognised, Hayes (1984:223) quite rightly points out that its significance to world trade has diminished. But it continues to be critical to American commercial and military interests.

3. Abuse of the region's laxity of environmental regulations has been belatedly recognised. See Best et al (1988).

Table 4.1

Principal Straits and Passages in the Caribbean

<u>PASSAGE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SOVEREIGNTY ON EACH SIDE</u>
Aruba-Paraguana Passage	Between Aruba and Venezuela	The Netherlands/Venezuela
Dominica Channel	Between Guadeloupe and Dominica	France/Dominica
Dragon's Mouth	Between Trinidad and Venezuela	Trinidad/Venezuela
Florida Straits	Between Key West and Cuba	U.S./Cuba
Guadeloupe Passage	Between Guadeloupe and Montserrat	France/U.K.
Martinique Passage	Between Dominica and Martinique	France/Dominica
Mona Passage	Between Dominican Republic and Mona Island (Puerto Rico)	U.S./Dominican Republic
Serpent's Mouth	Between Trinidad and Venezuela	Trinidad/Venezuela
St. Lucia Channel	Between Martinique and St. Lucia	France/St. Lucia
St. Vincent Passage	Between St. Lucia and St. Vincent	St. Lucia/St. Vincent
Virgin Passage	Between Culebra (Puerto Rico) and Virgin Islands	United States
Winward Passage	Between Cuba and Haiti	Cuba/Haiti
Yucatan Channel	Between Cuba and Mexican Yucatan	Cuba/Mexico

Source: Jorge Heine and Leslie Manigat, eds., The Caribbean and World Politics
New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988, p 31.

Table 4.2

Minerals In the Caribbean

LOCATION	OWNERSHIP	OPERATIONS
Bahamas	Marcona Industries	aragonite mining
Cuba	Cuban government	nickel mining, nickel refining
Dominican Republic	Alcoa	bauxite mining
	Falconbridge, Dominican government, others	nickel mining, nickel refining
	Dominican government	gold and silver mining
Guyana	Guyana government	bauxite mining, alumina refining
Haiti	Reynolds Metals	copper, gold and silver mining
Jamaica	Jamaican government, Anaconda	bauxite holdings
	Alcan, Jamaican government	bauxite mining, alumina refining
	Reynolds Metals, Kaiser, Jamaican government	bauxite mining, alumina refining
Puerto Rico	Puerto Rican government, Kennecott	copper exploration, planned copper production and smelting
Suriname	Royal Dutch Shell	bauxite mining, alumina refining
	Alcoa	bauxite mining
	Alcoa, Billiton	bauxite mining, alumina smelting
Trinidad & Tobago	Alcan	alumina trans-shipment
U.S. Virgin Islands	Martin Marietta	bauxite mining, alumina refining

Source: Tom Barry et al, The Other Side of Paradise. N.Y.: Grove Press, 1984, pp 110-112.

Table 4.3

Oil In The Caribbean

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>COMPANY</u>	<u>OWNERSHIP</u>	<u>OPERATIONS</u>
Antigua	West Indies Co	National Petroleum, Antiguan government	refinery
Bahamas	Bahamas Oil Refining Co (BORCO)	Charter Oil, Chevron	refinery, crude oil production desulfurizer, distribution
	Burmah Oil	Apex Oil, Bahamas	trans-shipment
Barbados	Mobil Oil Barbados	Mobil Oil	refinery
	Barbados National Oil	Barbados government	production
Cuba	Instituto Cubano del Petroleo	Cuban government	refinery
Dominican Republic	Falconbridge Dominicana	Falconbridge	refinery
	Refineria Dominicana del Petroleo	Royal Dutch Shell, Dominican government	refinery
Jamaica	Petroleum Corporation of Jamaica	Jamaican government	refinery
Martinique	Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des Antilles	Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon, Texaco, CFP, Erap	refinery
Netherland Antilles			
Aruba	Lago Oil and Transport	Exxon	refinery, trans-shipment
Bonaire	Bonaire Petroleum	Northville, Paktank	trans-shipment
Curacao	Curacao Oil Terminal	Northville, Paktank	trans-shipment
	Shell Curacao	Shell	refinery

Table 4.3 (continued)


LOCATION	COMPANY	OWNERSHIP	OPERATIONS
Puerto Rico	Caribbean Gulf Refining Corporation	Gulf Oil, others	refinery
	Petrolane of Puerto Rico	Gulf Oil, others	gas production
	Yubacoa Sun Oil	Sun Oil	refinery
	Clark Oil	Apex Oil	refinery
	Peerless Petro-chemicals	Apex Oil	refinery
St. Kitts	-----	planned by Canadian investors	refinery
St. Lucia	Hess Oil	Amerada Hess	trans-shipment
Trinidad & Tobago	Texaco Trinidad	Texaco, others	refinery
	Amoco Trinidad	Standard Oil of Indiana (AMOCO)	oil and gas
	Trinidad-Tesoro Petroleum	Trinidad and Tobago government, Tesoro	oil and gas production
	Trinidad and Tobago Oil (TRINTOC)	Trinidad and Tobago government	refinery
	Trinmar	AMOCO, Trinidad-Tesoro, TRINTOC	oil and gas production
	Occidental of Trinidad	Occidental Petroleum	production
U.S. Virgin Islands	Hess Oil-Virgin Islands	Amerada Hess	refinery ^a

a - largest in the world, over 700,000 barrels per day

Source: Tom Barry et al, The Other Side of Paradise. New York: Grove Press, 1984, pp 96-99.

Figure 4.j

Oil Fields, Refineries and SLOCs in the Caribbean



Source: Joseph Stodder and Kevin McCarthy, Profile of the Caribbean Basin in 1960/80: Changing Geopolitical and Geostrategic Considerations, Rand Corp N-2058-AF, December 1983, p 4.

The United States

America's strategic interest in the Caribbean relates essentially to preventing extra-hemispheric powers from threatening the mainland U.S., and to enhancing American global capabilities. Pursuit of these has involved the application of four basic principles: one, secure the Caribbean for American presence, power and passage; two, prevent potentially hostile foreign states from acquiring military bases and facilities in the area; three, exclude foreign balance of power struggles from the region; four, dedicate few military resources to protecting interests and assets there (Ronfeldt, 1983:7; 1985:687).

These interests and principles occasion American geopolitical emphasis on Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs), strategic resources, and potential threats by the Soviet Union and Cuba. In this regard Sim and Anderson (1980:1) offer a definitive characterization of the strategic significance of the Caribbean for the U.S.:

For the U.S. there are four distinct strategic perspectives on the Caribbean: militarily, in time of war, it could become a source of danger to Atlantic routes and indeed to the mainland itself ...; commercially, it is a key transit zone for strategic and other raw materials; territorially, it is the location of the U.S. possessions and the Panama Canal,

a major strategic artery; and politically, it serves as a base for subversive operations against U.S. interests in Central and South America.

The Caribbean thus represents "the southern flank" of the U.S. - "its strategic rear." And traditionally it has been defined as the area of highest security concern in the hemisphere, in spite of the political neglect which it has had (Hayes, 1984:219-20). The U.S. therefore maintains significant force concentrations there, particularly in Panama, Puerto Rico and Cuba.⁴ One gets a clear sense of the SLOC significance of the Caribbean to the U.S. when it is recognized that some 45% of the crude oil shipments coming into the U.S. passes through the Panama Canal and especially the eastern Caribbean to destinations along the East Coasts. In time of war, half of the supplies required by NATO forces, along with a large share of U.S. troop reinforcements to Europe would pass through the Florida straits from ports along the Gulf coast (Gonzalez, 1988:283).

The resource and commercial value of the Caribbean to the US cannot be overlooked. Recent analysis on the subject (Moorer and Fauriol, 1984:3-8; Gonzalez, 1988:281-82; Sim and Anderson, 1980:2-3; Hayes,

4. See Section 1V below for a discussion of U.S. security mechanisms in the region.

1984:221-25; Strodder and McCarthy, 1983:2-5) suggests the enormity of this connection:

- The Caribbean has critical resources in demand by the U.S. - oil, iron ore, zinc, silver, selenium, barium, lead, bauxite, gypsum, manganese, nickel (See Tables 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4).
- In 1983 40% of America's crude oil came from Caribbean Basin countries - Mexico, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago.
- 56% of the refined petroleum imported comes from Caribbean refineries.
- One Caribbean Basin country (Mexico) is among the top oil reserves states, with a reserve capacity of 45 billion barrels.
- Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Guyana and Suriname provided the U.S. with 85% of its imported bauxite and 40% of its alumina in 1983.
- 32% of American investments in developing countries is in the Caribbean.
- The U.S. captures 41 % of the Caribbean import market.
- The U.S. provides a market for 60% of the Caribbean's exports.

The Soviet-Cuban factor is an important geopolitical reality when considering American strategic interests in the area. This factor is, however, perhaps best appreciated in the context of

Soviet geopolitical interests in the region. It will, therefore, be looked at in the next section.

The U.S.S.R.

A recurring theme in the western literature on Soviet strategic interests in the Caribbean presents the Caribbean as part of a global design for power projection by the U.S.S.R. (Sumner, 1985; von zur Gathen, 1985; Ashby, 1987). One analyst argues that Soviet geopolitical thinking equates strategic effort with geographic area. In this respect any chosen area may be designated a theater of war. These are not necessarily areas of actual conflict, but may represent regions decisive in political, economic or military terms to competitive states. They are said to be chosen based on strategic sea lanes, sources of strategic materials, and geographic vulnerability. Latin America and the Caribbean is said to be one of those theaters.⁵

Soviet strategic interests in the Caribbean thus relate directly to the proximity of the region to the U.S., and its geopolitical significance to the U.S. Wiarda et al (1987:16) contend that their optimal strategy is the creation, through naval and air presence complemented by the Cubans, of "an offensive interdiction capability effective enough to block the region's sea lanes," thereby upsetting the NATO "swing

5. The others are: the European subcontinent; the U.S.A.; the Middle East and the Horn of Africa; the South Atlantic; and South Asia. See Valencia-Tovar (1985:11).

strategy" designed as a contingency for war in Europe. This strategy posits the movement of American reinforcements from Hawaii, Washington and California through the Panama Canal.

Gonzalez (1988:288) considers the Soviets to have three aims in the Caribbean. One, creation of greater dissension between the U.S. and the hemisphere, and Western allies over the region. Two, promotion of conflict situations that may entrap or tie down U.S. forces were they to intervene in Central America. Three, fostering of political-military changes in the region that would eventually facilitate Soviet-Cuban expansion in the region. Ashby (1987:155) identifies five objectives: 1. erosion of American historical dominance in the region; 2. expansion of influence and power; 3. establishment and maintenance of proxies; 4. proliferation of military and C³ facilities; and 5. creation of vulnerability in Europe and Asia by forcing greater attention to threats to the southern flank.

However, analysts concede that overall the Soviets do not now have sufficient strength in the region to be able to disrupt sea lanes important to the U.S. as feared by some analysts. Carl Jacobsen testified to Congress that while Moscow's presence is pervasive, her ability to control events may be less than some fear. "Moscow's authority among revolutionary groups and individuals is similarly less than it is sometimes made

out to be, and less that she would wish it" (U.S. H.R., 1985a:43).

The centerpiece of Soviet strategic interests in the Caribbean lies in the Soviet-Cuban nexus. The strategic location of Cuba (see Figure 4.1) is undeniable. Gonzalez (1982:3) quite rightly observes that Cuba "sits astride the Caribbean Sea" where it commands the entrance to the Gulf of Mexico, the Florida Straits, the Eastern Approaches to Central America, the Northern region of South America, and the Eastern Caribbean. It is, therefore, of significant tactical value to the Soviet Union.

The only significant Soviet military presence in the Caribbean is in Cuba. It includes modern docks and repair facilities, airport facilities for reconnaissance aircraft, and satellite and other intelligence facilities for monitoring American satellite and micro-wave conversations, sea and air movement, and advanced NATO weapons testing in the Atlantic.⁶ While there are no defense agreements between the U.S.S.R. and Cuba, the economic and political relations between them are extensive (Hayes, 1984:103-120; Duncan, 1985; Gonzalez, 1982, 1985). This not to suggest, though, that there are no differences among them. They are known to have had policy disputes

6. The Lourdes intelligence facility there is said to be the largest such operation the Soviets maintain outside the U.S.S.R. See USDOSDOD (1985:3-4).

on issues relating to the defense of Cuba, American intervention in the region, economic and military assistance to militant groups, and Cuban-American relations (see Duncan, 1985:169-77).

11. REGIONAL MIDDLE POWERS

Wright (1978:65) suggests that:

...a middle power is a power with such military strength, resources and strategic position that in peacetime the great powers bid for its support, and in wartime, while it has no hope of winning a war against a great power, it can hope to inflict cost on a great power out of proportion to what the great power can hope to gain by attacking it.

It must however be added that regional powers do not only derive their influence and power from relationships with and potential value to great powers. To small states, various kinds of relationships are expedient for individual security, or vital to a regional balance of power (see Vital, 1967, 1971; Handel, 1981).

Like all other categories of states, middle powers strive for security, independence, and degrees of military and economic self-sufficiency (see Katz, 1986, esp. articles on India, Egypt and Brazil). One study (Jones and Hildreth, 1986:404-409) found that they

strive to exercise influence over both big and small nations. Several methods are used in this regard: display or use of force; play-off of other forces; ideological coalition building; promotion of regional economic; political or military initiatives. It is for these reasons that in any regional geopolitical analysis, attention must be paid to the dispositions of the middle powers of consequence in the area.

Regional middle power analysis relating to the Caribbean often focuses on the "ABC" countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile) and, or the "BVM" countries (Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico) (Child, 1985; Moorer and Fauriol, 1984; Herrera and Gomez, 1984). Attention will, however, be paid here to Brazil, Columbia, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela. (See Table 4.4) Several reasons explain this choice. First, these are the regional middle states with the greatest geographic significance for the English Caribbean. Second, of all the states in the Caribbean Basin, their potential (and in some cases actual) impact on the economic capability and ideological posture of English Caribbean states is greatest. Third, within this group are states with the capacity to directly affect the security of English Caribbean states, either negatively or positively. And they can play the regional balance of power in ways from which these states can benefit or suffer. What then are some of the geopolitical and foreign policy

considerations that inform their interests and endeavors in the English Caribbean?

Brazil: Brazil has the most sophisticated approach to geopolitical analysis in the region. The geopolitical thinking there is dominated by notions of inevitable greatness - grandeza - which posits Brazil's eventual emergence as the first superpower in the southern hemisphere (Child, 1985:34). Its political economy rests on an alliance of international capital, local capital and local political power brokers, both military and civilian. Perry and Weiss (1986:104) indicate that a symbiosis between economic development and national security underlies their national development policy. This symbiosis emerges from the national security doctrine formulated by their national war college, *Escolata Superior de Guerra*, during the 1950s and 1960s. Its basic thrust is that a certain level of guaranteed security must precede development.

The Lilliputian nations of the English Caribbean seem to harbor no fear of that regional Leviathan. This is partly the result of Brazil's reluctance to capitalize on its size, capability and proximity to Caribbean states, and exercise concerted influence over the region. Mirlande Manigat (1988b:262) is therefore correct in saying "Brazil is..enjoying an odd but rewarding situation: it is sufficiently close to the region to play a role that can be justified by

geographical proximity, but sufficiently remote for its intervention not to frighten."

Historically, Brazil has been a low profile operator in the region, except in relation to neighboring Guyana. Her leaders take pains to correct any notions of ulterior motives in the area. They are also sensitive to claims of subordination to American interests.⁷ The relative passivity with regards to the English Caribbean does not connote total lack of interest in the region though. As Table 4.5 shows, there is a resident diplomatic presence in several Caribbean states. This suggests a certain degree of interest. Technical and financial assistance has been given to Guyana, Jamaica, Barbados and other Caribbean countries; state visits have been made by leaders from both sides; some trade goes on between Brazil and Caribbean nations, and there has been military cooperation with at least one country, Guyana.

Beyond this a major Brazilian concern has been with the actual and potential role of Cuba in the area, especially in continental South America. In 1983 this

7. In an interview in Barbados, July 29, 1987 with this writer, Brazil's Ambassador in the Eastern Caribbean, Amaury Bier, gave repeated assurances that Brazil has no hegemonic disposition toward the Caribbean. He also belabored the point that, contrary to what many people think, Brazil is not an American surrogate. American diplomatic officials in the Caribbean also sought to dispel the notion of Brazil's subservience to American interests in the Caribbean. However, Child (1985:35) indicates that such notions are historically not unfounded.

concern about the Cuban role in Suriname led to their announcing the preparation of a 20,000 member task force to deal with any contingency on the border with Guyana and Suriname. Brazil also dispatched a high-level mission to Suriname, led by General Danilo Venturini, head of the National Security Council. He is reported to have offered the then Surinamese leadership military credit; military supplies of boots, planes, and Cascavel armored cars; training; guaranteed rice imports; a ban on Surinamese exile activity in Brazil; among other things. All this as part of a deal to reduce and eventually remove the Cuban presence (Leslie Manigat, 1988:67-68; Mirlande Manigat, 1988b:269).⁸

8. Most of the Cubans - the Ambassador and 100 technicians - were later removed. This was, however, as a result of the American invasion of Grenada.

Table 4.4

Profile of Caribbean Middle Powers

COUNTRY	AREA (sq. mi.)	POPULATION^a (thousands)	GNP^a (\$bn)	SIZE OF ARMED FORCES (1987)		SIGNIFICANT STRATEGIC MATERIALS
Brazil	3,286,488	142,830	241.69	A	295,700	bauxite, iron, gold, petroleum, dolomite
				R	1,983,000	
Columbia	439,737	29,654	31.05	A	66,200	iron, steel, gold, petroleum
				R	116,900	
Cuba	42,803	10,262	18.09 ^b	A	175,000	nickel, cobalt, chromium
				R	130,000	
Mexico	756,066	83,300	134.13	A	134,500	petroleum, iron, sulphur, copper, barite, manganese
				R	300,000	
Venezuela	352,144	19,100	52.74	A	69,000	petroleum, iron, diamond, gold

a - 1986 estimate

b - Net Material Product (NMP) figure

A - active forces

R - reserve forces

Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1987-88 London, 1987; Europa Yearbook 1987 London, 1987.

The Brazilians have also been concerned about Cuban- Guyanese contacts. The concern became acute as a result of tensions between Guyana and Venezuela in 1981-1982 over Venezuela's non-renewal of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain which had frozen the territorial claim against Guyana that Venezuela had resurrected in 1962.⁹ Venezuela's intimidation led to not unfounded claims of Guyana's preparedness to seek Cuban military assistance in the event of Venezuelan aggression. The Brazilians were disturbed about this likelihood. As a result, while striving to appear non-partisan in the Guyana-Venezuela dispute, they took diplomatic and military measures (limited arms sales; military maneuvers) to help prevent any aggressive measures by Venezuela.

Colombia: Of the five middle powers dealt with in this section, Colombia stands out as having the least contact with the Caribbean. The absence of historical contacts between the two may explain this. But this circumstance seems to lie partly in a larger context of the nature and development of Colombian foreign policy. The Colombians have developed a foreign policy underlain by bipartisanship and devoid of ideological overtones. Their politics is one of pragmatism and they eschew risk-taking. They have had a fragmented approach to foreign relations and place considerable premium on

9. This writer was in Venezuela in April, 1981 at the beginning of the period of tension. See Griffith (1981).

the juridical, rather than the political. They have long developed a strong anti-communist posture and have courted and aligned with the United States (Cepeda, 1988:248-51).

While Colombia has had diplomatic relations with Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Jamaica and the Bahamas since the mid 1960s, 1981 marked the adoption of the first conscious policy towards the English Caribbean. Leslie Manigat (1988:65) attributes this to several factors: competition with Venezuela; the search for support in its dispute with Nicaragua; pursuit of "democratic alternatives of government." However, Cepeda (1988:251-52) feels that other factors are accountable for this: maritime boundary interests with Costa Rica, Haiti, Panama and other states; validation of the territorial claims once made by the US and Nicaragua; growing Mexican and Venezuelan influence in the region.

Like Venezuela and Mexico, Colombia contributes to the Caribbean Development Bank. And apart from interest in stemming the tide of "communist model-building" in the region, their interest seems to lie in exploring economic opportunities. The US\$25 billion annual purchasing power of the Caribbean and the meager US\$80 million of it which Colombia captures seems to have made the pursuit of relations with the Caribbean economically desirable. It remains to be seen how sustained this economic interest will be, and whether

it will translate into more extensive and diversified bilateral and multilateral contacts.

Cuba: Reference was made above to Cuba's strategic location. In addition to this geography factor, the weight of Cuba in the Caribbean is explained by its inordinate military strength for its size and resources, its activist foreign policy, and the model which it once offered.

Cuba foreign policy pursuits have been well articulated, bold, and often pragmatic (see Dominguez, 1984; Duncan, 1985:119-90). Maira (1983:196-97) explains some of the features of the sophisticated overtures in the Caribbean: flexibility; programs of technical assistance; collaboration on health and education; political consultation; and functional cooperation. To this may be added cultural exchanges and party-to-party contacts over and above governmental relations. Cuba's foreign and security policy pursuits trouble the U.S. and some states in the Caribbean. But Leslie Manigat (1988:42), no lover of Castro or admirer of communism, remarks that "To speak of 'exporting' Cuban revolution as if it were a product imposed from abroad is misleading." He argues that what took place was a much more complex process involving a sympathetic response to what happened in Cuba.

The popularity of the Cuban revolution, the existence of a radical network in the Caribbean,¹⁰ the record of American intervention, an active diplomatic and intelligence network,¹¹ and aggressive image marketing are among the factors which facilitate Cuban pursuits in the area. But to suggest that Cuban machinations lie behind every act or policy antithetical to western interests in the Caribbean would be incorrect. For one thing, the Caribbean has had its own radical and marxist bodies, and its own attempts to implement non-western precepts of socio-political organization. Some of these even predate the Cuban revolution.¹² Moreover, as Duncan (1985:177-78) shows, Cuba's inability to extend the kind and level of economic assistance needed by Caribbean Countries, and the political tradition of organized party competition

10. Included in this network would be the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC) of Trinidad and Tobago, the Working People's Alliance (WPA) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guyana, the Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), the Workers Party of Barbados (WPB), the Antigua Caribbean Liberation Movement (ACLM), the St. Lucia Labor Party (SLP), the Vanguard Party of the Bahamas, and the United People's Movement of St. Vincent.

11. Maingot (1983b:20) claims that Cuba has sent DGI officers and agents on senior diplomatic postings to Guyana and Jamaica.

12. For example, Cheddie Jagan of Guyana, "the father of communism in the Caribbean," began his work in the late 1940s. His efforts at Marxist applications in the 1950s were frustrated by the British. There have also been radical applications and attempts by Forbes Burnham of Guyana, Michael Manley of Jamaica, Maurice Bishop of Grenada and George Odlum of St. Lucia. See Mars (1985) and Benn (1987) for a discussion of radical politics in the contemporary Caribbean.

are among the constraints to successful Cuban endeavors in the area.

The Cubans do not pass over opportunities to extend influence, directly or indirectly. One Caribbean Foreign Minister told this writer that Cuba once engaged in the practice of hand-picking citizens from his country for scholarships. This offered them a measure of control over both "the who" and "the what" of higher education in that small state where who gets what higher education could have considerable long-term political and managerial consequences.¹³ And as Maingot (1983b:21-22) argues:

...the Cubans astutely, albeit sincerely understanding the crucial importance of race on the [English] Caribbean, took full advantage of the points built up by their popular and commendable anti-South African policies and actions. Less sincere yet still effective was the quite explicit use of black Cubans as diplomats in the Caribbean. An island where fewer than 25 percent of the people are black and where few of these have achieved important positions in the Revolutionary Government, Cuba managed to be represented nearly exclusively by blacks in the

13. The Director General of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) has reported a similar approach to scholarships by the Cubans in relation to members of the OECS. See U.S.H.R., 1985b:96-97.

Caribbean. It was not surprising to note, therefore, the number of West Indians who believed Cuba to be a black Caribbean state.Such a strategy allows a fundamentally pragmatic approach to the area's complex politics in which issues of race and class interact in a bewildering fashion.

Table 4.5

MIDDLE POWER REPRESENTATION IN THE CARIBBEAN

(As of December 1988)

MIDDLE STATES \ CARIBBEAN	ANTIGUA	BAHAMAS	BARBADOS	BELIZE	DOMINICA	GRENADA	GUYANA	JAMAICA	ST. KITTS	ST. LUCIA	ST. VINCENT	TRINIDAD & TOBAGO
BRAZIL	NRDR	NRDR	RDM	NDR	NRDR	NRDR	RDM	RDM	NRDR	NRDR	NRDR	RDM
COLOMBIA	NRDR	NRDR	RDM	NRDR	NRDR	NDR	NDR	RDM	NDR	NDR	NDR	RDM
CUBA	NDR	NRDR	NRDR	NDR	NDR	NDR	RDM	NDR	NDR	NRDR	NDR	NRDR
MEXICO	NDR	NRDR	NRDR	RDM	NRDR	NRDR	NRDR	RDM	NRDR	NRDR	NRDR	NRDR
VENEZUELA	RDM	NRDR	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM	RDM

NDR - No Diplomatic Relations
 RDM - Resident Diplomatic Mission
 NRDR- Non Resident Diplomatic Representation

Source: Compiled by author with assistance of Carlos Palma, Mission of Honduras to U.N. and Frank Campbell, CARICOM Secretariat.

Mexico: Mexico's approach to the region has been marked by passivity and relative indifference. This is attributable to several features of the country's foreign policy: a relatively isolationist policy; a preoccupation with self-determination and non-intervention in the affairs of others; magnetism to the U.S.; an aloofness to the to the military dominance in much of Latin America (Herrera and Gomez, 1984:29-30).

This indifference is curious since Mexico has a definite Caribbean geographic feature, and a concern with and interest in the English Caribbean would serve economic as well as geopolitical interests. This is not to suggest that there are no contacts whatsoever. Maira (1983:191-95) points to the spurt of intense personal diplomacy involving then president Luis Echeverria in the mid 1970s - visits to Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago; development of the now abandoned bauxite smelter project involving Jamaica, and to plans for functional contacts with Caribbean countries. Grayson (1983) highlights the Mexico-Jamaica oil-bauxite agreement, and the San Jose Agreement under which Mexico and Venezuela pledged to provide oil to the Caribbean on concessionary terms. But overall, Mexico displays a non-interventionist attitude that borders on isolationism. One could therefore well appreciate the harsh comment by Leslie Manigat (1988:65): "Of all the regional powers with a[n active] role in the Caribbean, Mexico would seem to be the one most likely to

acquiesce to the 'Finlandization' of some countries of the area, in the name of ideological pluralism and international neutralism."

Venezuela: With a coast of 1,100 miles and territory 72 miles into the Caribbean Sea, Venezuela considers herself Caribbean, and therefore asserts herself in the area. Of all the regional middle powers examined here, Venezuela enables us to easily delineate interests in the Caribbean that are political, economic, military and territorial (Maingot, 1983a:318-32; Leslie Manigat, 1988:60-64; Myers, 1985). Politically, Venezuela is interested in assisting ideologically compatible elites in the region to strengthen their domestic political positions. Assistance to Eugenia Charles of Dominica, and to Edward Seaga of Jamaica forms part of a policy that Mendez (1984:154) calls a "diplomacy of projection in the Caribbean in general." The most recent evidence of this is their critical role in securing the highly questionable victory by Leslie Manigat in Haiti's search for democracy in 1987-1988 (see Chamberlain, 1988). Manigat was later removed from power by the military on June 20, 1988.

Venezuela also has a concern about the influence of others in the area. There is some evidence to suggest that the cooling of relations between Caracas and Managua was occasioned by the Nicaraguan decision to develop an offensive military capability based on Cuban

training and the acquisition of weapons from Eastern Europe (see Myers, 1985). The closeness of Bishop in Grenada to Cuba and the U.S.S.R. caused similar concern. The Venezuelans also worry that East-West rivalry will intrude into the domestic and international politics of the area. They therefore seek to sponsor or participate in regional initiatives to deal with political and economic problems. Their involvement in the Contadora Group and in the Latin American Economic System (SELA) in the Caribbean Basin, and in the Caribbean Development Bank and the Mexico-Venezuela Oil Facility in the English Caribbean speaks to this.

This diplomacy of projection is interpreted by some as indication of sub-imperialist intentions, something the Venezuelans expectedly deny.¹⁴ The late Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister, Eric Williams was a strident critic of Venezuelan pursuits in the area. In 1975, after an unsuccessful attempt at convincing Caribbean leaders of Venezuelan neo-colonialist intentions, he convened a special conference of his then ruling People's National Movement to highlight the territorial, political and economic jeopardy which the English Caribbean faced from Venezuela (see Williams, 1975).

14. Several Caribbean decision-makers are worry that Venezuela may have hegemonic designs for the area (see Chapter Two). The Venezuelan Ambassador to Barbados, Orieste de Giacomo, took pains to dispel such fears in an interview on August 13, 1987.

Leslie Manigat (1988:61) indicates the extent of their economic involvement in the area when he explains that "for the fiscal year 1982-83 Canadian aid to Caribbean Basin countries amounted to US\$ 44 million, whereas US aid (before the CBI) totalled US\$ 321 million versus a Mexican total of \$400 million and a Venezuelan total of \$588 million, the highest of all." Singh (1987) claims that the aid figure now stands at US\$850 million. The economic interest seems to lie in the desire to expand the export of petroleum and manufactured goods. They are seeking to increase the oil sales which stand at 7% of their exports. And the Venezuelan Institute for Trade and the Association of Venezuelan Exporters have emphasized market expansion in the Caribbean. In this respect they are actively pursuing trade and commercial agreements as well as shipping and air deals to facilitate the expanding commercial contacts in the region (Myers, 1985; Leslie Manigat, 1988).

Venezuela's military interests are closely linked to its territorial interests. Myers (1985:13) suggests that throughout the 1980s, Venezuela will be a party to disputes having military implications on each of its borders. The tensions on Venezuela's eastern and western boundaries are primarily territorial. But each dispute also has a military dimension. Consequently, even though there is low probability that Venezuela will use military force, its Ministry of Defense

retains a keen interest in upgrading the armed forces close to the disputed territories. Venezuela claims territory belonging to several Caribbean states. Reference was made above to the claim against Guyana. It is for the Essequibo territory, five eighths of Guyana, and its richest area.¹⁵ There is a claim to Bird Island, a small uninhabited island over which Dominica has jurisdiction. Venezuela seems to want this territory to enable extension of its economic zone in the eastern Caribbean.¹⁶ There is also a dispute with Trinidad and Tobago over the Gulf of Paria and islands in it (Williams, 1975). (Venezuela is also involved in a dispute with Colombia over the Gulf of Venezuela.)

Venezuelan approaches to the countries with which it has disputes have varied among the countries, as well as over time. For example, in relation to Guyana, the active pursuit of the claim grew to intimidation and aggression during the presidency of Raul Leoni (1964-1969).¹⁷ Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) adopted a more conciliatory approach. This was the period of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain (1970) which froze the dispute for twelve years. Relations were stable during the tenure of Carlos Andres Perez (1974-1979), and

15. For a presentation of the Venezuela claim see Ministry of Foreign Relations, Venezuela (1981). The Guyana response is outlined in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guyana (1981).

16. Williams (1975:2-4) deals with this claim.

17. In 1966 troops occupied the island of Ankoko in north-west Guyana. The Venezuelans are still there.

there was tension during the latter part of the Herrera Campins administration (1979-1983). Relations between the two countries were placed on a more healthy footing under the leadership of Jaime Lusinchi (1983-1988). This was evident from the presidential visits and the number of technical and commercial agreements signed. The current president, Carlos Andres Perez, is expected to maintain that course.

111. EXTRA REGIONAL POWERS

There are several countries outside the Caribbean which have interests in the region. This interest derives from the strategic significance of the area in hemispheric or global terms, or from other factors. Among these states are Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. They all have some stake in the area. Most have clearly defined Caribbean policies. Their posture and actions could therefore affect the nature of the region's military and non-military security profile, as well as the security pursuits of individual states there.

Canada: Anderson (1984:142) makes an important point: "in terms of strategic location or military capability, Canada is not an important geopolitical factor in the Caribbean." And judging from Canada's latest defense policy statement (Ministry of National Defense, 1987) which makes no reference to the Caribbean, neither is the Caribbean geopolitically important to Canada. Yet, as Canada's perhaps best known Caribbean scholar, Kari Levitt, declares:

For Canada, the Commonwealth Caribbean constitutes perhaps the only place in the world where Canada enjoys a 'presence,' in the international relations sense of the

term. The priority accorded to the Commonwealth Caribbean, 'in the overall external policy of Canada'...bear[s] testimony to the fact that Canada places an importance on its relations with the countries of the English-speaking Caribbean that is altogether disproportionate to their small size, and their rapidly diminishing importance in terms of trade and investment (Levitt, 1988:229).

This paradox is easily explained. It has to do with a history of close trading relations, close contacts between Caribbean and Canadian leaders,¹⁸ and a wealth of trust and confidence in the wisdom of Canadian policy and action over the years. Canada enjoys a favorable image. It has no territorial designs, and its non partisan dealings with Cuba and with Grenada under Maurice Bishop have enhanced its image. Aid is not given with political conditions. Canada - Caribbean trade has diminished over the last decade. But since commerce is not their dominant motive, the range of

18. One example of this is the story behind the financing of the Grantley Adams International Airport in Barbados, told to this writer by a Canadian diplomat. The Then Prime Ministers of Barbados and Canada, Errol Barrow and Pierre Trudeau, had built up a close friendship from working in Commonwealth circles. They happen to have met accidentally at a stop light in Toronto in the early 1970s, and during a brief conversation, Barrow indicated that airport financing was on his agenda. Canada's commitment to assist was made there and then.

contacts are generally still extensive in the areas of immigration, tourism, and development assistance.

Within Canada there are three schools of foreign and security policy thinking about the Caribbean: the defense and security school; the peace and development school; and the national interest school. The first emphasizes the linkages between Western strategic interests and the Caribbean. The second holds military security assistance suspect and regards economic cooperation as the best security guarantee. The third argues that Canada make a contribution to Caribbean military security, but that such be done to fit Canada's own interests of emphasis on economic and diplomatic cooperation and non-entanglement in disputes which could damage the country's high reputation and positive image (Baranyi and Dosman, 1987).

Canada's political-security assessments and posture seem to follow the enunciations of one time Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau:

In our view, states have the right to follow whatever ideological path their people decide. When a country chooses a socialist, or even a Marxist path it does not necessarily buy a "package" which automatically injects it into the Soviet orbit....the internal systems adopted by countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, whatever their systems, do not in themselves

pose a security threat to this hemisphere. It is only when countries adopt systems which deliberately inject East-West rivalry or seek to destabilize neighbors that a threat is posed. Canada has adopted a flexible approach in this regard (Levitt, 1988:244).

For all practical purposes the policy pursued seems to be that of the national interest advocates. Canada is involved in forms of security assistance, though in the context of development assistance. They provide police and coast guard training, pilot training, and training in infantry and combat driving to Caribbean countries. There is also intelligence sharing through the International Criminal Police Organization, and port visits by the Canadian navy in the context of U.S.-Canada, and Canada's NATO commitments.

Since 1982 the emphasis has been on coast guard training through the Caribbean Maritime Training Assistance Program (CMTAP). The Program first provided assistance to Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Antigua, Montserrat, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica. It has since been expanded to cater for Anguilla, Belize, the British Virgin Islands, the Caymans, and Turks and Caicos. The Canadians also consider their bilateral and multilateral development assistance programs to be a form of security assistance; economic security assistance. Bilateral assistance to the Caribbean of C\$50 million in 1980-

1981 rose to nearly \$103 million in 1986-1987. Assistance is provided in the areas of communications, health and hospitals, airport security and maintenance, education, fire fighting and disaster preparedness.

France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands: The historical, political and economic connections of the French, the British and the Dutch to the Caribbean are too well known to require comment here (see Mitchell, 1973; Clarke, 1987). And though the passage of time has witnessed a contraction of their power and influence, they still have contacts and interests there. Politically, they all have Caribbean colonies (though the French call theirs 'departments'). Guadeloupe and Martinique are still French possessions. Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda, Montserrat, Turks and Caicos, and the Cayman Islands are all British colonial appendages. The Dutch have Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, Saba, St. Eustatius and St. Maarten.

At the military level, both the French and the Dutch maintain naval basing operations in the area, the French in Guadeloupe and the Dutch in Curacao. The ship tours are rotated, but they all have air reconnaissance capability and small marine detachments. Since 1981 Britain has maintained troops, Harrier aircraft and some light armour in Belize, with which there is a defense treaty, to deter Guatemalan aggression. And especially since the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war, they

have maintained a naval presence that sweeps through the Eastern Caribbean, shows the flag off Belize, and transits through Bermuda in the Mid-Atlantic. In 1982 the Netherlands reactivated the 336th Royal Netherlands Air Force Squadron and deployed it at Curacao. They also participate in joint military exercises with the U.S. and other states. In the case of the U.K. and the Netherlands, their NATO membership also devolves some responsibility on them. (Moorer and Fauriol, 1984:21-22; Seidenman and Spanovich, 1985:85).

1V. PROXIMITY AND INFLUENCE

Rizvi (1986b:136) makes the following conclusion in a study on West Asian geopolitics: "The size and geographical proximity of India has left an important imprint on Sri Lanka's outlook and her strategy for survival as an independent state...geographic compulsions and historical legacies explain the island's precarious quest for security."

Table 4.6 shows the close proximity between the U.S. and the Caribbean. But it is not merely the geographic proximity of the large or dominant states that influences the security perceptions and pursuits of small ones. As our discussion above suggests, historical contacts, trade patterns, transportation and communications linkages, the strategic interests of the larger state, ideology, and culture are all

considerations that affect the nature and extent of the geography - security nexus, and the policy options which small states adopt. This is also true of geopolitical relationships among big powers.

Table 4.6

Caribbean - U.S. Proximity

<u>CARIBBEAN NATION</u>	<u>DISTANCE FROM U.S. (Miles)</u>
Antigua and Barbuda	2,803
Bahamas	1,532
Barbados	3,334
Belize	2,660
Dominica	3,189
Grenada	3,336
Guyana	4,027
Jamaica	2,315
St. Kitts-Nevis	2,767
St. Lucia	3,175
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	3,249
Trinidad and Tobago	3,487

MEAN DISTANCE FROM CARIBBEAN 2,989.5

NB: Distances from the U.S. are calculated on the basis of air distances between Washington and each Caribbean capital.

Source: Gary Fitzpatrick and Marilyn Modelin, Direct Line Distances. Meluchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1986.

Small states cherish their sovereignty. Their leaders sometimes attempt to assert it in ways antithetical to the interests of proximate big powers or of the dominant state in the area. Ideological, strategic or other factors may cause a dominant state to thwart or destabilize those sovereign pursuits that actually or potentially threaten its interests. Grenada under Maurice Bishop is an example. Thus, whether and how a small state militarizes, how it deploys its forces, the kind of military relations it maintains, and how much and what arms it buys or produces would be of direct interest to the dominant state and to proximate big powers. Small states must be mindful of the concerns of those powers, and of their security posture. We explained the geopolitical interests of the the U.S. above. It is now appropriate to note the posture of the dominant state in the area.

U.S. Posture in the Caribbean

We observed above that the Caribbean represents the southern flank of the U.S. - its strategic rear. Because of this the U.S maintains forces there to secure the area from external and internal threats. The principal force concentrations are in Puerto Rico, at the Atlantic threshold of the Caribbean; in Panama, at the southern rim of the Caribbean Basin; and in Cuba - at Guantanamo - on the northern perimeter.

These three force concentrations represent the northern, southern and eastern points of a strategic triangle that stretches across the entire Caribbean basin. There are also installations, facilities and forces in Antigua, The Bahamas, Bermuda, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, plus military advisory groups and attaches throughout the region (See Table 4.7 and Figure 4.4). Operationally, these forces are part of the U.S. Forces Caribbean Command, which also includes the Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force, set up in 1979, at Key West, Florida. This Command cooperates closely with the Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). SOUTHCOM has responsibility for Central and South America; LANTCOM for the Atlantic Ocean, excluding European Coastal Waters, the Caribbean Sea, and the Pacific Ocean in the South American West Coast. The LANTCOM Commander-in-Chief is also responsible for the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and for a NATO command as Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) (Strodder and McCarthy, 1983:62-70; Garcia-Muniz, 1986:3-4).¹⁹

19. This mechanism has linkages to the NATO posture. This is because part the significance of the region to the US and to the West extends to America's leading NATO role. The U.S.-Caribbean-NATO connection is addressed by Moorer and Fauriol (1984:16-23), Sim and Anderson (1980:1-3) and Moodie and Cottrell (1981:47-58).

Table 4.7

U.S. Military Installations in the Caribbean

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>FUNCTION</u>
Antigua	Naval Facility	Ocean research, tracking
	Air Force operations	Tracking
Bahamas	Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Center	Naval testing
	Eastern Test Range	Air Force missile tracking
Bermuda	Tudor Hill Laboratory	Naval Testing
	Naval Air Station	Air patrol
	Naval facility	Ocean research
Cuba	Guantanamo Naval Station	Operating Base
Puerto Rico	Camp Santiago	Army and National Guard training
	Fort Buchanan	Army Reserve training
	Roosevelt Roads	Naval Base
	Sabana Seca	Naval Communications
	Vieques	Naval fleet training

Source: Tom Barry et al, The Other Side of Paradise. New York: Grove Press, 1984, p 199.

The Caribbean is defined by the U.S. military in Basin Caribbean terms. It is therefore difficult to isolate the English Caribbean in examining its posture. One can, however, identify the vertex of the security triangle described above that has most bearing on the English Caribbean. That vertex is Puerto Rico. Rodriguez-Beruff (1985:74) explains that "the geographical mindset that became dominant with the Reagan administration served to emphasize the strategic military importance assigned to Puerto Rico as an Eastern Caribbean enclave."

In this respect there have been increased military operations there. Puerto Rico is used as a training ground for military and police forces from the English Caribbean. It plays crucial roles in single and joint military exercises in the region. Plans to deactivate Fort Buchanan, the army's chief installation in San Juan, were abandoned. The Roosevelt Roads Naval Base received a \$13.7 million expansion. The Ramsey Air Force Base, part of the Strategic Air Command, that was deactivated in 1973, is gradually being reactivated.

In outlining its military posture for 1982, the U.S. Defense Department advocated a "comprehensive strategic vision that integrates regional issues," a de facto division of labor for the defense of the West. One may ask whether the RSS fits into this vision in so far as the Caribbean is concerned. The Caribbean leaders most vocal about the RSS mission and most

partisan to U.S. interests - especially Eugenia Charles of Dominica and until February, 1989 Edward Seaga of Jamaica - sometimes act and speak in ways suggestive of subservience to U.S. interests (see Charles, 1988).²⁰ But there is no evidence to suggest the RSS fits into the "division of labor". First, as we saw in Chapter Three the RSS lacks the capacity to play any effective military defense role in the region. Second, as Figure 4.4 suggests, the U.S. has an extensive network in the area considered adequate to the security function which the RSS, had it the capacity and mission, might possibly have played.

Third, while the Americans lauded the idea of the RSS serving as a "signal of security intent" in the region, there seems to be no devolution of security responsibility by the U.S. In this regard American officials have claimed that although the U.S. favored the upgrading of the System's Memorandum of Understanding to a defense treaty, contrary to a belief in the region, the U.S. (a) did not instigate the movement to upgrade; and (b) was not unhappy with the failure of the attempt since it would have involved new forms and levels of defense assistance and cooperation, and new political issues that the U.S. was glad to avoid. Thus the RSS does not fit into American

20. Up to the time of his death in December 1989, Prime Minister Herbert Blaize of Grenada was part of this group.

strategic designs for the security of the area. Such was not part of the original intent. Neither has this developed over the years.

Relevance of the RSS

Few writers dispute the proposition by Rothstein (1968:169): "an alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility. It can neither handle nor is it designed to handle major military threats." Such coalitions are also very limited when it comes to increasing military strength. But as Rothstein (1968), Ispahani (1984) and others acknowledge, regional security organizations involving small states may be useful in collaborating with other regional or international organizations, in dealing with intra-regional political instability, and in serving as moral deterrents to potential external aggressors.

The relevance of the RSS would therefore depend on the definition of the security problems by the elites of the region, the capability of the states concerned, the policy direction that the elites give to the RSS based on their perceptions and capabilities, and the milieu scope and limitations stemming from the geopolitical interests of neighboring states, and particularly of the dominant state. We saw in Chapter Two that Caribbean leaders do not define security in purely military terms because they consider the range of security problems going beyond the military sphere, to the economic and the political. While there is military vulnerability, there is no imminent threat of attack from any quarter. There is concern about political instability and secession, and about economic

system failure and foreign debt, among other things. And we saw in Chapter Three that Caribbean states lack the capability, even if there was the inclination, to establish and maintain credible mechanisms for external military security. The RSS could thus be of relevance if in its policy direction emphasis is placed on matters considered crucial to the security of its member states and within their actual or potential capability. Among such pursuits would be intelligence sharing, drug interdiction, disaster preparedness, and coast guard operations. Any attempt to focus on military security against extra-regional threats would create a mission beyond its capacity.

However, the relevance of any security mechanism for a group of subordinate states is never determined solely by them. This Chapter suggests the extent of the geopolitical influence on the states in the Caribbean. Influence comes from middle powers like Venezuela and Cuba which have been active politically and economically, if not militarily, in the Caribbean. The proximity, power and interests of Brazil, Columbia and Mexico are variables that Caribbean small states take into consideration in their international relations. It is also suggested that the nature and scope of the actions of Caribbean states would be influenced by the interests and pursuits of states that are geographically distant, such as the U.S.S.R., France, Britain and the Netherlands. But the greatest impact on

the security and other pursuits of Caribbean states comes from the dominant state in the area, the U.S.

We saw in Chapters Two and Three that Caribbean states felt it necessary to pursue military security options both individually and collectively. The RSS exists as the only regional military initiative. It stands to reason that if Caribbean states deem it necessary to pursue a credible regional military mechanism they would use the RSS as a model. A strengthened RSS or a new and credible military organization would upset the military and political status quo in the region. This would be against the interest of the U.S. and other states and could well see the kind of reaction that threatens the security of the Caribbean states involved.

As we said in the last chapter, credible security involves the establishment and maintenance of defense mechanisms able to respond to the endangerment of Caribbean nations through the use of force or other means, particularly to cater to vulnerability and deter external and internal threats. Any credible military organization would require the financial and organizational sponsorship of the U.S. We saw in the previous chapter that the U.S. was not keen on sponsoring the versions of the Caribbean Defense Force proposed by the late Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams, or Brigadier Rudyard Lewis. The U.S. is thus unlikely

to be interested in footing the bill for a credible RSS or a new organization.

We saw above that the U.S. already has a military presence in the Caribbean considered adequate to serving its security interests. The RSS is neither part of their defense posture, nor is it likely to become. The U.S. therefore has no special reason to desire a strengthened RSS. In security cost-benefit terms, a credible military organization in the Caribbean is neither necessary nor feasible. The U.S. would have other reasons to be wary of such. Such an organization may give to the Caribbean a certain (limited) measure of relative security independence. This is contrary to the American interest in dominance in the area, and in being the important source of security assistance for Caribbean states. Any attempt to develop such a mechanism independent of the U.S., say with Venezuela or Brazil, would be viewed suspiciously. Caribbean states may well face the kind of diplomatic hostility, economic ostracism or military intervention experienced by Guyana under Forbes Burnham, Grenada under Maurice Bishop, and Jamaica under Michael Manley during 1972-1980, thereby endangering their security.

A strong military organization in the Caribbean is also likely to be viewed with suspicion in Venezuela and Cuba, if not in Brazil. Venezuela is likely to interpret such an attempt to use indirect pressure to force a settlement of its claims against Guyana,

Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago. The same may be said of Guatemala which has a claim for most of Belize. Cuba may see such as either political hostility by Caribbean states, or as indirect U.S. intimidation on the assumption that the Caribbean states are acting as American surrogates. Such perceptions on the part of these states may lead them to react politically and economically if not militarily (on the part of Venezuela and Belize) and subvert the security and stability of states in the region. One can make similar arguments about the likely reactions by geographically distant states with geopolitical stakes in the region, such as Britain, Canada and France.

Our discussion suggests that the nature and direction of the pursuits of Caribbean states cannot avoid being affected by their geopolitical milieu. The states in the English-speaking Caribbean are part of the subordinate state system in the hemisphere. They should, therefore, be discreet in their security initiatives less they attempt measures that become the basis for further threats to their security. Neither the U.S. nor any of the middle powers would benefit from the creation of a strong regional military organization in the English Caribbean. The resource limitations of these states and their geopolitical milieu thus rule this out as a realistic option.

CHAPTER FIVE
IDEOLOGY IN THE CARIBBEAN

Introduction

Most of the internal security problems experienced by Caribbean states, especially Guyana, Grenada, Jamaica, and Dominica, have been related to ideological disputes. Ideological differentiation within the region has also affected the harmony among states in the late 1970s-early 1980s. Understanding the linkage between security and ideology in the region is thus not merely useful, but necessary. We pursue this linkage by examining the proposition that the absence of ideological differentiation in the Caribbean inclines states there to take the security of the region for granted.

We first examine the ideological profile of the Caribbean. We then consider how these may affect security in the region. We conclude that the ideological dominance of the "right" and the "center" inclines some states to take their internal security for granted since much of the internal security challenges seemed to come from "leftist" movements. At the regional level there is a sense of security based on two things. One is the existence of an ideological coalition, the Caribbean Democratic Union (CDU). The

second is the ideological similarity between the U.S. and most Caribbean states.

1. IDEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Caribbean leaders are generally reluctant to address the interests and pursuits of their states in ideological terms. One exception has been the Guyana Foreign Minister, Rashleigh Jackson. He noted the mutual dependence of domestic and foreign policy and argued that states must take account of their "class ideological as well as strategic-national interests." He stated the ideological factor of Guyana's foreign policy in unambiguous terms:

One role of the foreign arm of national policy must thus be to promote the creation of conditions externally which will facilitate the achievement of the political, social and economic goals and programmes of action determined by the [P.N.C.] party. More generally, the principal goal of national policy pursued on the basis of our Party's philosophy must be the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of independence and national liberation, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and their derivatives like racism, socialist internationalism, international solidarity, democratization of

international relations and a peaceful and equitable global order...

...Thus, there is a link between our ideology, our national interests, and our national policy of which foreign policy is an important dimension (Jackson, 1981:5-6). (Emphasis added)¹

Before examining the contemporary ideological profile of the Caribbean, we will refer to some historical antecedents. In this regard Benn (1987) places the development of ideological doctrines in two "traditions" - "the old tradition" and "the newer tradition."

The first tradition developed in the context of the Old Representative System,² the form of colonial government which predominated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This tradition was confined to the white planter class and sought to elaborate a philosophy in defense of the economic and political privileges of that class following efforts by the imperial government to tighten control over the

1. In the context of Guyana's changing political circumstances since the death of Forbes Burnham in 1985, one doubts that Jackson would now articulate the ideology-policy linkage with similar rhetorical stridency.

2. See Benn (1987:7-11) for a brief discussion of this system.

colonies for economic and political reasons. Benn (1987) treats Edward Long (1734-1813) and Bryan Edwards (1743-1800) as representative of the core ideological beliefs articulated then: "Both Long and Edwards attempted to systematize the world view of the planter class of the period, with whom they were closely identified and, as such, may be seen as ideologists of that class" (Benn, 1987:7).

The second tradition developed in the context of the Crown Colony system of colonial government.³ Marcus Garvey (1887 - 1940) of Jamaica and C.L.R. James (1901 - 1989) and Eric Williams (1911 - 1981) of Trinidad and Tobago are the three major intellectual influences on this tradition: Garvey for race consciousness; James for Marxist interpretations of reality; and Williams for epitomizing "the nationalist intellectual ethos which sees the local community as an indivisible entity and as the ultimate basis of political allegiance..." (Benn, 1987:163). Benn explains the development of social and political doctrines, showing how colonial history gave rise to a series of intellectual and political ferments out of which various doctrinal propositions grew.

There have been several assessments of ideological doctrines in the Caribbean, among them those by Mars (1985), Stone (1986) and Searwar (1987). Mars (1985)

3. See Benn (1987:31-56) on this system.

examines "the left spectrum" and offers a Reformist-Radical-Revolutionary typology. The reformists espouse piecemeal evolutionary change, while the latter two articulate fundamental structural transformation in the political, economic and social arenas. The difference between them lies in the "different degrees of commitment to class struggle," with the revolutionary advocates offering more specificity and consistency about class struggle.

Stone's characterization of the ideological profile of the Caribbean is done in a 1982 time-frame. He (Stone, 1986:64-74) finds four ideological trends: 1. Conservative (example Haiti); 2. Reformist (example Barbados); 3. Socialist (example Guyana); and 4. Marxist (example Cuba).⁴ The first focuses on economic growth and spurns strategies to alter the society or its institutions fundamentally, or to redistribute income or wealth in ways significant enough to alter the balance of class forces. The second operates on the assumptions and postulates of the first, but agitates for social change to give relief to the poor without seeking to change income and power distributions. The third advocates the redistribution of wealth and power in favor of the poor through cooperatives, land reform, worker ownership, nationalization and social welfare programs. The fourth

4. Stone uses "Caribbean" in "Caribbean Basin" terms.

goes beyond the third and seeks to establish a planned economy.

Searwar (1987:5-6) suggests that there are two ideological "stances," one radical, and the other conservative. The first is "characterized by objectives which require levels of change with a focus on state action for development, usually projected in terms of 'socialist' ideology." The second is typified by acceptance of existing systems and pursuit of open market economies as the prime development instrument. Guyana demonstrates the first and Jamaica (under Edward Seaga) the second.

Searwar (1987) examines these stances in relation to two issue-areas - development and security - and five areas of operation - the CARICOM region; the Caribbean Basin; the EEC and Canada; the US; and the international system. He finds a surprisingly large number of "swings" or polarizations among states on the range of issues. These are attributed to three things. One, absence of internal consensus on objectives and strategy. Two, response to external demands and pressures and attempts to accommodate them with internal imperatives. Three, perceptual distortion occasioned by ideology and impacted upon by geographic and institutional factors.

Each of the above typologies is useful, but none fully explains the region's present ideological profile. By focusing only on the "left" Mars excludes a


sizable segment of the Caribbean. Stone is well-reasoned, but apart from the typology being designed for the Caribbean Basin, "reformist" and "conservative" are not so much ideological doctrines as variations of political practice; "ideology in politics" in the sense used by Sartori (1987:498-503). Searwar's "stances" are not really ideological doctrines, but tactical positions in pursuit of doctrines. This writer therefore suggests an alternative schema, shown in Figure 5.1.

All Caribbean states have a variety of political parties and interest groups. While most of them have little direct impact on foreign and security policy, some articulate ideological concerns and conduct their political activities in ways that the ruling parties cannot ignore. We define the ideological doctrine of the ruling party as the ideological posture of the state. This definition reflects the reality of leader-party dominance and accounts for the input of party dictates in state operations. As was explained in Chapter Two, decision-making in the Caribbean revolves primarily around the perceptions and desires of predominant leaders. By extension, in an institutional context, the decision-making and choices of the state are a function of the interests and desires of the ruling party which is headed by the same predominant leader.

The contemporary Caribbean has two basic ideological doctrines: 1. capitalism; 2. socialism. The first espouses social democratic principles and places premium on civil and political rights such as free speech, freedom of the press and movement, and free and fair elections. It speaks to a political economy based on free enterprise and a climate conducive to foreign investment. It admires individualism and spurns massive social welfare practices. The socialist doctrine has as its cardinal feature transformation of the economic and political substructure and superstructure of the society. It considers state involvement in the economy to be critical to this aim, and takes the position that the changes should be spear-headed by a political party that is competent and legitimately entitled to do so, based on class interests. It stresses collective, as opposed to individual interests, and tends to subordinate political and civil rights to economic rights.

Figure 5.1

IDEOLOGY IN THE CARIBBEAN
(AT DECEMBER 1989)



These ideological doctrines have been advanced in many variations, with varying strategies. Capitalism has been in vogue in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia and elsewhere in multiple forms - "The Puerto Rican Model," "Industrialization by invitation," etc. (See CARICOM, 1981:27-43; Stone, 1986:115-34; Thomas, 1988:75-102, 267-300). Some of the strategies have been conservative, especially in the economic area. Others have witnessed more "liberalism" or "reformism." And socialism has been offered in many variations - "Democratic Socialism" in Jamaica (under Michael Manley), "Cooperative Socialism" in Guyana, and "Revolutionary Socialism" in Grenada (under Maurice Bishop) (See Benn, 1987:135-97; Thomas, 1988:209-266).

Ideological postures operate in the context of certain domestic and external variables. Domestically beliefs are affected by the political and social histories of states, political parties, education, and the degree of activism or apathy in the polity. Geopolitical and external capability factors such as proximity to the US and aid relationships are among the milieu factors that influence the dynamics of Caribbean ideological pursuits.

The mid to late 1970s saw the visibility of leftist ideological postures and the empowerment of parties advocating or attempting the implementation of various forms of socialist economic organization. The left dominated in Guyana, St. Lucia, Jamaica, Dominica, and

Grenada. There were also militant groups elsewhere, which, while not in control of state power, were eloquent spokesmen for the left. Among these were the National Joint Action Committee (NJAC) in Trinidad and Tobago, the Antigua Caribbean Labor Movement (ACLM) in Antigua, and the United People's Movement (UPM) in St. Vincent. Edward Seaga's victory in Jamaica in 1980, however, marked the beginning of the ascendancy of centrist and rightist parties espousing capitalism.⁵ The parties subscribing to variations of this doctrine have sought to consolidate their position through a coalition called the Caribbean Democratic Union (CDU).⁶

The CDU was formed in January 1986 in Jamaica by eight political parties as a regional branch of the International Democratic Union, the confederation of conservative parties from North America and Western Europe. Edward Seaga of Jamaica was elected Chairman with Kennedy Simmons of St. Kitts, Herbert Blaize of Grenada, and Manuel Esquivel of Belize as Vice-Chairmen. Eugenia Charles of Dominica was elected Treasurer. The second major CDU conference was held in

5. See Hintzen (1987:48-58) and Black (1985:20-26) for some explanations of the decline of the "left" and the rise of the "right."

6. For a discussion of the international politics of alignments involving the CDU see Caribbean Insight (1986:5) and Leslie Manigat (1988:68-70). For a discussion of links between changes in the international political climate and that in the Caribbean see Bryan (1989).

July 1988 in Antigua.⁷ All the officers were reelected and two new parties were accorded membership. The CDU now comprises:

- Anguilla National Alliance - Anguilla (1988)
- United Democratic Party - Belize
- Dominica Freedom Party - Dominica
- New National Party - Grenada
- Jamaica Labor Party - Jamaica
- People's Action Movement - Montserrat
- Nevis Reform Party - St. Kitts-Nevis (1988)
- People's Action Movement - St. Kitts-Nevis
- United Workers Party - St. Lucia
- New Democratic Party - St. Vincent

(Caribbean Insight, 1986:5; Daily Nation, 1988:10).

As Table 5.1 and Figure 5.2 indicate, the Caribbean therefore has an ideological profile in which there are two basic doctrinal beliefs - capitalism and socialism. Those beliefs are reflected, in political terms, in reform, radical, and conservative variations. The balance is in favor of the conservatives, with little ideological differentiation in the region as a whole.

7. The conference was held during the period of the Ninth CARICOM Summit (July 4-8), also in Antigua. This promoted charges that Seaga and others were attempting to subordinate the interests of CARICOM to those of the CDU by taking time and attention away from CARICOM matters.

Table 5.1
Ideological Profile of the Caribbean
 (At December 1989)

COUNTRY	POLITICAL PARTIES	POSTURE
Antigua	Antigua Labor Party* Progressive Labor Movement Antigua-Caribbean Labor Movement	Capitalist-conservative Socialist-reformist Socialist-radical
Bahamas	Progressive Liberal Party* Free National Movement Vanguard Socialist Party	Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-conservative Socialist-reformist
Barbados	Democratic Labor Party* New Democratic Party Barbados Labor Party	Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-conservative
Belize	People's United Party* United Democratic Party Christian Democratic Party	Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-conservative Capitalist-reformist
Dominica	Dominica Freedom Party* Labor Party of Dominica Dominica Progressive Force	Capitalist-conservative Capitalist-reformist Socialist-radical
Grenada	The National Party* New National Party Grenada United Labor Party	Capitalist-conservative Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-conservative

Table 5.1 (continued)

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>POLITICAL PARTIES</u>	<u>POSTURE</u>
Guyana	People's National Congress* People's Progressive Party Working People's Alliance	Socialist-reformist Socialist-radical Socialist-radical
Jamaica	People's National Party* Jamaica Labor Party Workers party of Jamaica	Socialist-reformist Capitalist-conservative Socialist-radical
St. Kitts	People's Action Movement* St. Kitts-Nevis Labor Party Nevis Reformist Party	Capitalist-reformist Socialist-reformist Capitalist-reformist
St. Lucia	United Workers Party* St. Lucia Labor Party Progressive Labor Party	Capitalist-reformist Socialist-reformist Socialist-reformist
St. Vincent	New Democratic Party* United People's Movement St. Vincent Labor Party	Capitalist-reformist Socialist-radical Capitalist-conservative
Trinidad & Tobago	National Alliance for Reconstruction* People's National Movement United National Congress	Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-reformist Capitalist-reformist


* - ruling party

Note: This is not a list of all political parties, but of the three most influential in each country.

Source: Compiled by author based on party manifestos and interviews.

Figure 5.2

**IDEOLOGICAL POSTURE OF CARIBBEAN STATES
(AT DECEMBER 1989)**



11. IDEOLOGY - SECURITY NEXUS

George (1987:18) explains the connection between ideology and security:

Philosophical and instrumental beliefs serve as a cognitive and affective prism that influences an actor's perceptions and diagnoses of the flow of political events, his estimate of threat and opportunity, his definitions of situations. These beliefs also provide general norms, standards and guidelines that influence the actor's judgments of preferred strategies and tactics. Such beliefs influence policy preferences, but do not by themselves determine decision.

He seems to be making three related propositions. One, that there is a linkage between beliefs and policy choice. Two, that the linkage is more than inconsequential. Three, one should guard against overstating causal relationships between doctrine and strategy. He seems to be addressing ideology on an individual basis. But, as we saw in Chapter Two, the political systems of the Caribbean (and of other small states) have predominant leaders. This enables the ideology of the predominant individual to easily become associated with or endorsed by the ruling party and the

state even if there is little genuine original support for it.

Ideology can aggravate a country's security in several ways. First, it can be the basis for additional suspicion and distrust, thereby "introducing a psychological overlay that exacerbates and rigidifies the real conflict of interest..." Second, it can cause a reluctance to secure agreements by magnifying and telescoping the perceived threat by the other side. Third, the dilemma may manifest itself in diplomatic crises. Such crises can lead to measures aimed at reducing vulnerability that are misinterpreted, resulting in an escalation that leads to war (George, 1987:4-6). George (1985:5), however, notes that "the security dilemma can have [these] malignant consequences even in the absence of ideological influences... Ideology, however, can severely exacerbate them insofar as it converts adversaries into enemies (emphasis added). Finally, ideology could be the basis for internal disputes that jeopardize the stability of the state.

The ideology - security nexus in the Caribbean has possible ramifications for both internal and external security. Caribbean regimes may, by virtue of the internal threats they perceive, adopt measures to meet potential threats where such are non-existent, with both economic and political consequences. For example, the increases in Guyana's military expenditure over the

years was intended to partly create a security establishment capable of dealing with threats, some actual, others potential. While part of the threat was certainly external, coming from Venezuela, much of it was perceived to be emanating from within the society; threats to the political survival of the regime. Consequently, the People's National Congress (P.N.C.) government increasingly curtailed political and civil rights - to speech, movement, assembly and the free exercise of the franchise (see James and Lutchman, 1984; Interim Report, 1985).

In doing so, the P.N.C. regime progressively created the basis for a groundswell of opposition and hence real threats to its political survival. This led to a kind of circular situation where threat definition affected by doctrine led to an enlarged security establishment which facilitated the infringement of political rights. This resulted in greater opposition to the regime, and threats to the nation's internal stability. Similarly, ideologically colored definitions of external threats to the state help determine the kinds of defense mechanisms used. The Caribbean states that were the targets of destabilization in the 1970s-1980s - Jamaica, Guyana, Grenada - defined their situations largely in ideological terms (see Mars, 1985). And it was around such definitions that Popular Mobilization and Defensive/Reactive Diplomacy were designed as security strategies.

We saw in Chapter Three that the Mutual Assistance Scheme (MAS) and the Zone of Peace proposal are practically dead as regional security initiatives. This situation was due to the inability of states to agree on a common basis for operation, a circumstance caused by perceptual differences and national interest dictates, among other things. But the ideological factor was clearly also there. It was particularly there in influencing the definition of the situation and in the assessment of security measures. Several states were uncomfortable with Grenada (under Bishop) as prime sponsor and activist of the Zone of Peace resolution. Others, while paying lip service to the spirit of the resolution, were suspicious that Grenada might have been serving the interests of states outside the region with which it shared ideological affinity. They were thus reluctant to commit their full support to both initiatives.

U.S. intervention in Grenada in 1983, and more so the coat-tail involvement of the RSS states and Jamaica, caused a polarization within the Caribbean Community (see U.S.H.R., 1983:218-230; Shahabuddeen, 1986: Ch 3). That polarization saw Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas, and Belize taking an opposing stand. The other states either publicly supported the intervention or tacitly acquiesced in it. One cannot directly attribute the polarization to ideological disputes since opposing states did not, and still do

not, share a common doctrine. (Guyana stood, and still stands, to the left of Trinidad and Tobago, Belize, and The Bahamas.) But the ideological factor should not be discounted.

Guyana, the most strident critic among the four, had then been known for its anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. These certainly entered into the calculus of the Guyana decision. In an address to the nation on October 25, 1983, then President of Guyana Forbes Burnham said:

...however unfortunate may be the events over the past twelve days in Grenada...they cannot justify military intervention and aggression. The Government of Guyana condemns the invasion and seeks to have an immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Today Grenada, tomorrow Guyana and the day after tomorrow someone else.

...we in the Caribbean are witnessing such outside interference instigated and/ or supported by a group of Caribbean countries, a group that has not thought its position through, has not recognized that there we have a case of the reintroduction of colonialism and imperialism by invitation here today in the Caribbean...(cited in Shahabuddeen, 1986:194-95).

Ideological differentiation can lead to disputes in some areas that frustrate cooperation in others. Moreover, ideological dispute can facilitate fragmentation and create the basis for extra-Caribbean states such as Cuba, Venezuela and the US to act in ways injurious to the interests of particular states and of the region as a whole. This is partly the situation stemming from Maurice Bishop's pursuits in Grenada. The ideological posture of the New Jewel Movement was somewhat extreme in the degree of closeness and dependence on Cuba; and in the extent of the hostility to the US. Some states therefore distanced themselves from Grenada thereby weakening the collaborative and supportive network, allowing both Cuba and the USA to exploit the situation in different ways. The net result was a spoke in the wheel of region-wide collaboration in some areas between 1979-1982, and military intervention in a Caribbean state.

We saw in Chapter Two that for many states, the main security problems have been internal - threats to political stability, mercenary action, secession efforts. In many states - St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana - there has been an ideological dimension to the threats or perceived threats. The absence of significant ideological differentiation in the region now has led to a certain sense of (false) security. There is the feeling in some places, among them Dominica, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, St.

Kitts, that the ideological dominance of the "right" and the "center" displaces any significant threats to their internal political security. The danger of this is that the regimes in these states may become both over-confident and complacent, and run the risk of taking their internal political security for granted.

This sense of security is bolstered by the coalition called the Caribbean Democratic Union (CDU). The CDU gives member-parties a sense of solidarity and security. It does more than this though. It facilitates financial and organizational support to them, particularly to ensure their victory at election time, and their organizational sustenance between elections. Aid to the CDU member parties has come both from within the Caribbean, notably from the Jamaica Labor Party, and from the U.S. and Venezuela.

Caribbean states are also likely to take the security of the region for granted because of the ideological affinity of most states with the U.S., the dominant state in the area, and with that of one important middle power, Venezuela. Some Caribbean leaders view the ideological similarity with the U.S. and the geopolitics of the region as sufficient for American protection from possible external threats, possibly from Cuba, or even from Venezuela (see Charles, 1988). It is dangerous for Caribbean states to hold this position. While there is ideological affinity between the majority of Caribbean states and the U.S.,

the history of state practice in international politics suggests that states act according to national interests, and not necessarily according to ideological precepts when it comes to security matters. As Ducachek (1974:223) asserts "national interest, not ideology becomes the last word... when the leader concludes that it would be suicidal to sacrifice the national interest on the altar of ideological purity." American security actions in the area are therefore likely to be driven more by American interests, which may be different than those of Caribbean states, and less by ideology.

Ideological Pluralism in the Caribbean was once recognized as much more than the mere existence of several doctrines at any one time. For many it was an article of faith. It dates to the 1979 OAS Zone of Peace resolution that was introduced by Grenada (see Chapter Three). Among other things, the resolution "stressed its support for the principles of ideological pluralism and peaceful coexistence, which are essential to the peace, stability and development of the region." In 1980, CARICOM Foreign Ministers meeting in St. Lucia called it an "irreversible fact of international relations" and tried to make its consolidation a goal of CARICOM member states.

Guyana is among the states that staunchly and consistently supported the principle. Guyana's Foreign Minister declared "the foreign policy of Guyana has, as principal elements, peaceful coexistence and

ideological pluralism. We shall continue to struggle for their universal acceptance" (Jackson, 1985:54). The ascendancy of the "right" in the region, however, seems to have jeopardized the prospects for this ideological coexistence. One Caribbean scholar and diplomat is of the view that previous tolerance for Ideological Pluralism has been lowered. He feels it may have been "a thin veil which when buffeted by the winds of change quickly fell away." And he argues "what this new scenario has exposed is an inherent unwillingness to tolerate different political persuasions in the hemisphere" (Grant, 1984:6-7). In this respect Commonwealth Secretary-General, Shridath Ramphal, offers this analysis:

In a curious way, that early manifestation of regional unity in areas where it mattered most was achieved in an environment within the region that was tolerant of pluralism; tolerant of shades of difference - ideological and otherwise - among countries of the region. Ironically, that unity fell away when the environment of the region became unpropitious to pluralism. It might be seen as paradoxical but it is really intelligible, that when a group becomes intolerant of the differences within itself, it moves not to homogeneity, but fragmentation - the very environment of

intolerance encouraging fissiparous trends. The differences tolerated before, and here and there overcome in the interest of joint positions, become now ever deeper divisions. And that in large measure has been the fate of the Caribbean over something like the last decade.⁸

The historical and other circumstances of the region discussed in this and previous chapters suggest that hopes for a single ideological view in the region are unrealistic. Some variation in ideological postures is not only a practical circumstance with which Caribbean leaders must live, but they should find ways to bridge ideological differences. Ideological Pluralism should, therefore, be a condition of meaningful bilateral and regional contacts.

8.S.S. Ramphal, Options for the Caribbean: The Lure of Realpolitik (1985) cited in Shahabuddeen (1986:160).

CHAPTER SIX

SAFE-GUARDING SMALL STATESIntroduction

In this chapter we discuss Caribbean safeguards against the backdrop of security measures in small states generally. First we look at some unilateralist and collaborative measures used by small states. We then turn to the Caribbean and see what measures may be employed there. We stress a multi-dimensional approach; adoption of complementary strategies in four overlapping arenas - the sub-regional, the regional, the hemispheric, and the international. The fact that many of the security challenges of the Caribbean are faced by other small states prompt a brief comparison with initiatives used by small states elsewhere. But we find that while there are lessons to be learned from other regions, the circumstances of the Caribbean do not readily facilitate transplantation of experiences from the Gulf, Southeast Asia, or the South Pacific to the Caribbean.

1. SECURITY MEASURES IN SMALL STATES

The approach by Twitchett (1971) permits us to identify two broad strategies: 1. Unilateralist; 2. Collaborative. For each of these, states may exercise a

variety of options. Through unilateralist options states attempt to deal with the challenges and dilemmas themselves. While the value of unilateralist measures is not confined to the internal domain, such measures may have their greatest impact there. But though they revolve around the policies and actions of individual states, their successful implementation would require varying forms of cooperation with and assistance from other states. "Unilateralist" is, therefore, a relative term. Collaborative initiatives involve several states with common or parallel interests.¹

Unilateralist Measures

Isolation as an option implies neither reliance on commitments by others in safeguarding security nor willingness to give such commitment to others (Twitchett, 1971:18). Geographical barriers such as barren terrain, high surrounding mountains or wide seas are seen as necessary for successful pursuit of such policies. But this is not a practical option, partly because revolutions in communications and technology have reduced the feasibility of isolationist efforts. The prospects for neutralism are no better.

Mehta (1985), Al-Mashat (1985) and others have shown that for some states militarization is a solution

1. See Vital (1967), Maniruzzaman (1982) and Al-Mashat (1985) for discussions of other strategies used by small states.

which becomes part of the security problem. Mehta (1985) is convinced of the utility of a two-tracked policy to deal with this problem-solution. On the one hand, pressure must be maintained for big-power disarmament and the restructuring of international economic relations. On the other hand, he says, immediate and simultaneous diplomatic efforts should be initiated by the Third World nations to reverse their own militarization, through graduated arms control agreements (Mehta, 1985:15).

The track of direct relevance here is the second. And Mehta (1985:19-20) offers some specific prescriptions. One, official recognition of the opportunity costs of excessive defensive spending, and public debate on this. Two, segregation of Third World conflicts into pairs or groups to permit clear identification of the local and regional factors that precipitate militarization. Three, decoupling of regions from global great power strategies. Fourth, pursuit of regional diplomacy through confidence building measures.

Edward Kolodziej suggests two principles to deal with the phenomenon: 1. insulation of the Third World from the superpower conflict as much as possible; and 2. demilitarization of the modernization process (Mehta, 1985:56). For this he thinks it useful to do four things. First, revitalize the Non-Aligned Movement and have it play active military monitoring roles.

Second, have diversification of arms purchases and progressive indigenous production. Third, foster regional security organizations. And finally, expand the permanent membership of the United Nation Security Council to include such regional powers as India, Brazil and Nigeria.

Kolodziej seems to be making two assumptions, neither of which is necessarily correct. Regarding the first initiative he seems to be assuming that the Non-Aligned Movement offers or could play a credible military role. I think differently. Secondly, there is the underlying assumption in the first and the fourth that common security measures may suffice for those states.² Contemporary international politics suggests that while small states may endorse common security measures in international forums, they really desire security mechanisms over which they have greater measures of influence and control - individual or regional security initiatives. Moreover, while the first seems possible but not probable, the prospects for the fourth seem neither possible nor probable.

Ethnic-religious conflict and ideological-political disputes are not only conducive to intervention by external forces, but they partly explain the militarization of some states, and form the basis for internal instability in others. Some writers (for

2. With regard to common security see Palme Commission (1982: esp Chs 1,6) and UN (1986:13-14).

example Azar and Moon, 1986) see them as reflecting the existence of protracted social conflict to which the application of traditional coercive diplomacy is unsuitable. They argue that conflict management approaches with legal-formalist and bureaucratic-managerial orientations are inappropriate to such circumstances. They therefore advance a conflict resolution approach hinged on (a) Facilitation, and (b) Development Diplomacy (Azar and Moon, 1986:399-401).

Facilitation involves the "identification and tracking of conflicts and the organization of workshops to help representatives of parties in a conflict codiscover breakthroughs and potential exits from war to peace" (Azar and Moon, 1986:401-402). It makes the assumption that only parties to a conflict can determine the substantive issues required to manage and resolve the conflict. And it offers representatives of parties a chance to interact along with academic experts in exploring the dimensions of the problem.³ The tracking aspect of this mechanism is designed to provide information about the nature and extent of the conflict, and about the concerns and interests of the

3. Azar and Moon (1986:402) require these academic facilitators to have several qualities and abilities - knowledge about the specific conflict situation; capacity to work with people from different cultures; multidisciplinary skills; trustworthiness; and empathy, among other things. Scholars who demonstrate "concern for stable and rewarding social relations" are said to be likely successes. Those who are arrogant, compulsive and crave publicity are considered unlikely to be successful.

parties involved. The workshops allow parties to air concerns and hear those of others in non-bargaining settings.⁴

Development Diplomacy is offered as a "pattern of assistance designed to reduce the structural victimization prevalent in developing countries and thereby yield long-term benefits to all parties" (Azar and Moon, 1986:403). Its major focus is firstly to reduce the impact of "domestic structural deformities" and secondly, to build responsive domestic institutions. Development diplomacy advocates urge that external military-economic assistance be reduced and that emphasis be placed on "authentic self-sustaining economic development."

Collaborative Measures

While membership in the Non-Aligned Movement is not sought primarily for national security, the relative success of the Movement in some areas has led some scholars to speculate about its security value. But the Movement's record of conflict resolution holds

4. Azar and Moon (1986) claim to have conducted successful workshops involving the Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Falklands/Malvinas conflicts in 1983 at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland.

dim prospects for its role of security guarantor.⁵ The heterogeneity of the membership - the variety of states, interests, ideologies and perceptions - has made it difficult to agree on security problems and courses of action. This is complicated by the fact that the greatest number of threats and violations of small states presently come from other small states within the Movement.

Maniruzzaman (1982:34) holds that "...there is no evidence whatsoever that it is the 'moral pressure' of the Non-Aligned Movement that has prevented the superpowers ...from engaging in a holocaust...." While this is so, and while the Movement has not been able - and perhaps never will be able - to underwrite the security of individual states, credit must be given to it for seeking relaxation of East-West tensions, encouraging disarmament, seeking the transformation of the global economy, and pursuing an end to colonialism and racism, all of which contribute to the security of small states.

Alliances are institutional links between the politics of balance of power and the politics of

5. Between 1978 and 1983 twenty six Movement members were involved in conflicts with either fellow Movement members, with great powers, or with some aligned state - Afghanistan, Angola, Argentina, Botswana, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kampuchea, Libya, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, North Yemen, Somalia, South Yemen, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia and Zaire (Cheema, 1983:367).

dominance, and are sought by small states essentially because of this. They are secured through agreements of mutual assistance or guarantees to safeguard states against superior adversaries. Liska (1968:24-26) considers them to have three major functions. First, they add interchangeable, cumulative military power. Second, they provide interallied control by safeguarding the parties against betrayal and counter alliance. Third, they serve to promote international order. They may be formal or informal. Formal alliances may be of three types: 1. Unequal Bilateral, involving small states and great powers; 2. Equal Bilateral, involving states of almost equal strength; and 3. Mixed Multilateral, such as the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, where there are states at a variety of levels of a power hierarchy (Handel, 1981:120).

Table 6.1Third World Alliances by Category and Class 1945 - 1980

CATEGORY	CLASS			TOTAL
	1	2	3	
Small states with other small states	8	1	2	11
Small states with Third World powers	4	4	0	8
Third World powers - Third World powers	0	0	0	0
Small states with the U.S.	11	0	6	17
Small states with the U.S.S.R.	14	0	0	14
Small states with France and U.K.	12	0	1	13
Third world powers with the U.S.	0	0	1	1
Third World powers with the U.S.S.R.	1	0	0	1
TOTALS	50	5	10	65

Class 1 - includes defense agreements under which the signatories are obligated to intervene militarily on behalf of each other in the event of an attack.

Class 2 - includes neutrality and non-aggression agreements where the parties are to remain neutral in cases of aggression against one of them.

Class 3 - are agreements which obligate signatories to mutual consultation and cooperation or to provide military supplies in cases of military contingencies.

Source: Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Security of Small States in the Third World. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No. 25, 1982, p 47.

There are two basic alliance strategies which small states may adopt. One, Ally to Balance - unite in opposition to the principal source of danger. Two, Ally to Bandwagon - unite with the state that poses the major threat (Walt, 1985:4). The motives for the first strategy may vary. First, "join with those who cannot readily dominate their allies, in order to avoid being dominated by those who can" (Walt, 1985:5). Second, association with the more vulnerable side enhances the influence of the new member state. Bandwagoning is alleged to be a form of appeasement. "By aligning with the threatening state or coalition, the bandwagoner may hope to avoid an attack on himself by diverting it elsewhere" (Walt, 1985:5-6). But Walt also acknowledges that by such a strategy a state may also hope to share in the spoils of war.

As Table 6.1 shows, several small states have exercised this option at one time or another, in alliances both with other small states and with great powers. And while Finland's political history lends some validity to Walt's proposition that "small states bordering a great power may be so vulnerable that they choose to bandwagon rather than balance" (Walt, 1985:11), the principal alliance strategy of small states now seems to be one of allying to balance. Balancing is however fraught with difficulty and

uncertainty. One such difficulty for small states relates to alliances entered with major powers.

A combination of small weak states does not necessarily make a big strong group. An alliance of small states, whether formal or informal will have limited military impact. Rothstein (1968:169) says: "an alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility. It can neither, nor is it designed to handle major military threats." He also contends that such alliances are poor instruments if their immediate goals are to increase military strength. They may, however, be useful if intended to maintain the status quo and control or remove local grievances without the involvement of great powers.

Table 6.2 does not show all small state regional security endeavors. But it shows that such initiatives differ in their nature and scope. Some deal with a variety of related pursuits while others focus on one or two concerns. The membership in some cases is small, in others it is large. Studies of regionalism (Boyd, 1984; Nye, 1971; Ispahani, 1984) indicate a mixed record of performance over the years. For example, Gavin Boyd, in looking at Pacific community building, makes the observation that the expansion of economic links among market economy states there has resulted in growing interdependence along with increasing vulnerability. He finds "the basic logic of cooperation for the management of the area's interdependencies has

thus been strengthened, but the political feasibility of such collaboration has remained doubtful" (Boyd, 1984:89). On the other hand, in looking specifically at ASEAN, Buszynski (1987:764) concludes that "few observers would doubt that the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been a success as a Third World regional organization" having "provided the states of non-communist Southeast Asia with a basis for regional stability...."

Miller (1969:574) contends that "the real dynamic in effective regional security activity is provided by the coexistence within each grouping of the opposing tendencies of 'good neighborliness' on the one hand, and the hegemonic dominance of the region by a powerful member, on the other." The danger of this though, as the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance in the Americas shows, is that the powerful member may turn out to be the de facto sole guarantor of the region's security. This would enable it to act in its own national interest in adopting measures which not only differ from regional sentiments, but also violate the sovereignty of members of the group. Such a state may also act in ways that suggest that its national interests are the measure of what is correct or necessary for the region, and thus induce or force others to act in tandem with it.

Table 6.2

REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES INVOLVING SMALL STATES

REGION	ORGANIZATION	FORMATION	MEMBER-SHIP	MAJOR CONCERNS
Africa	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)	1976	16	ES, PS
	Organization of African Unity (OAU)	1963	50	PS, ES
	Organization of Front Line States (OFLS)	1976	6	PS
	Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)	1979	9	ES, PS
Asia	League of Arab Nations (Arab League)	1945	22	PS, MS, ES
	Gulf Cooperation Council	1981	6	MS, PS
	Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)	1967	6	ES, PS
	South Pacific Forum (SPF)	1971	10	ES
Latin America/ Caribbean	Organization of American States (OAS)	1948	31	PS, MS, ES
	Latin American Economic System (SELA)	1975	27	ES
	Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM)	1973	13	ES, PS
	Regional Security System (RSS)	1982	7	MS, PS

MS - Military Security PS - Political Security ES - Economic Security

Sources: Gavin Boyd, ed, Regionalism and Global Security. Lexington, 1984; Henry Dagenhardt, compiler, Treaties and Alliances of the World. Detroit, 1986.

The formation of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) in 1981 and the Regional Security System (RSS) in 1982 in the Eastern Caribbean (see Chapter Three), and of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 1981 in the Middle East (see below) lends credence to Boyd's assertion: "tacit and explicit [military] security considerations are becoming increasingly relevant for Third World leaders contemplating regional economic cooperation" (Boyd, 1984:177). The RSS is the only security mechanism composed solely of micro-states. All the GCC states except Saudi Arabia are micro-states. And bearing in mind the observation by Rothstein (1968) mentioned above - an alliance of small powers is an instrument of limited utility - there is justifiable skepticism about the military value or capacity of such mechanisms.

Such mechanisms are not without value though. As Rothstein (1968:169-75), the Commonwealth experts (Commonwealth, 1985:46-47) and Ispahani (1984:174-75) point out, they could be useful in facilitating collaborative contacts with other regional or international organizations, in serving as moral deterrents to potential extra-regional aggressors, and in dealing with intra-regional political instability. Ispahani (1984:175) said of the GCC and the Organization of Front Line States (OFLS)⁶ what is also

6. The OFLS is composed of Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

true of other small state regional security mechanisms: "...they will remain half-way houses on the road to security cooperation, dependent on the interest and support of outside powers, and absorbed, first and foremost, by their own political and economic instabilities."

11. CARIBBEAN SECURITY SAFEGUARDS

The discussion in previous chapters suggests that the Caribbean situation fits the general small state security picture outlined in Chapter One. Vulnerability exists in the military, political and economic areas. There is the militarization phenomenon. Intervention is a concern in some states, and problems of internal stability present the greatest challenge to many states, among them Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, Guyana, and the Bahamas. Our discussion showed that:

1. military-political threats to internal security are greater problems than are threats from outside the region. But outside threats still exist.
2. there is generally an attenuation of military and political threats and an accentuation of political and economic ones.
3. the capability limitations of Caribbean states place severe limitations on their ability to maintain credible regional security mechanisms that are

substantially reliant on their own financial, organizational and other resources.

4. the geopolitics of the area makes Caribbean states, as subordinate states, vulnerable to the actions of the U.S. as the dominant state and to those of regional middle powers, among other states.

Security measures by Caribbean states should therefore be addressed in the context of these circumstances.

Unilateralist Measures

Something common to all Caribbean societies is the friendly, trusting and open nature of their peoples and institutions. This is a cultural characteristic which, when transmitted to the security arena, may make these societies more politically and militarily vulnerable, and susceptible to both internal and external threats. Trust and openness are partly functions of the relative stability of the Caribbean, the absence of militarized politics (except once in Guyana and Grenada), and the predominant practice of social democracy where premium is placed on civil and political rights, except again at times in Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada.

It is, therefore, relatively easy in some places, particularly in the very small islands, to secure access to security installations, security sensitive facilities such as power stations, water supply systems and communications networks, and to leaders, both individually and collectively. One intelligence

official in the region was able to enter - uninvited and unchallenged - meetings of Caribbean leaders in CARICOM and OECS forums and take pictures of them and the proceedings at very close range. He recalled seeing Nicaraguan "officials" lobbying heads and other leaders at the May 1988 OECS Council of Ministers meeting in St. Vincent, having gained the kind of easy access that could be dangerous to the safety of leaders and the confidentiality of some discussions.

Greater security consciousness could be exercised to mitigate circumstances where Caribbean leaders and sensitive installations could become unnecessarily vulnerable. The fostering of this consciousness should be aided by the broad definition of security that exists in the region (see Chapter Two) which allows leaders to be sensitive to potential threats in the military, the political, as well as in the economic area.

Accompanying this consciousness should be appropriate emphasis on training. It is recognized both within and outside the Caribbean that training is one of the major deficiencies of the region's security services.⁷ But more important than just any training,

7. For example when asked to name the main shortcoming of Caribbean security forces in general and of the RSS in the 1983 Grenada operations in particular, Cmdr. Tomlin of the RSS, (former) Commissioner Cuthbert Phillips of the Royal St. Lucia Police Force, Deputy Director-General of the OECS Augustus Compton, and Cmdr. Dean Schopp of the US Military Liaison Office in the Eastern Caribbean all put training at the top of the list.

training appropriate to the Caribbean. Training could be conducted in a range of general and specialized areas - and this is done in some places - including drug interdiction, crowd control, basic intelligence operations, light and heavy weapons use and repair, jungle warfare (for Belize and Guyana), communications, coastal patrol, and security administration. Resource limitations necessitate that much of this training be secured from agencies and states outside the region. While training may be undertaken physically outside the Caribbean, it should not be outside the scope and frame of reference of the region. In this respect training in Commonwealth contexts (India, Australia, Nigeria) may help secure the desired results. Caribbean states should not, however, rely solely on training outside the region. As we saw in Chapter Three, there are Caribbean states with fairly well established military forces - Guyana and Jamaica, for example. They conduct training programs at various levels for differing entry and promotional purposes. Their training programs could be made available to other security establishments.⁸

However, it makes little sense having training without the institutional networks and appropriate technology and facilities to use it. Two points should be made here. One, the technology and equipment should be appropriate to the practices and circumstances of

8. Some of this already exists but on an ad hoc basis. It should be regularized and structured.

the region. This writer learned that much of the transport equipment given to Eastern Caribbean states after the 1983 Grenada intervention was written off due to accidents because (a) they were left hand drive while Caribbean security forces use right hand drive; and (b) they were too large for the narrow roads of Eastern Caribbean states. Two, Caribbean leaders should be sensitized to the need for functional security technology and equipment. In this respect this writer was told that while a security communications mechanism was installed freely in RSS member states by INTERPOL to network heads of government and security chiefs, it is (a) not functional; and (b) apparently getting very low priority. The resource constraints of these states make choices about such technology and facilities both tough and sensitive. Such choices are, however, becoming necessary. Moreover, appropriate use could be made of external support that involves little or no cost to secure and maintain such technology and facilities.

The contemporary histories of Guyana, Grenada and Jamaica, and, to a lesser extent, of St. Lucia and Dominica, show that it is not beyond Caribbean politicians to subordinate the security interests of the society to the political survival of their parties and power bases. Grenada, Guyana and Jamaica have shown the deleterious effects which party sponsored violence, political thuggery, and militarization could have on

the polity. There is, therefore, a supreme challenge to Caribbean leaders: to reduce the vulnerability and penetrability of Caribbean societies without detracting from the trust and friendliness of their peoples, and without encroaching on political freedoms and civil rights.

The Commonwealth experts were correct in asserting "...economic progress could help substantially in reducing economic weakness and insecurity, especially to the extent that it produces economic resilience" (Commonwealth, 1985:55). We saw in Chapter Two that the economic dimensions of the Caribbean's insecurity relate to low resilience, economic vulnerability, and operational deficiencies. While considerable disagreement exists among scholars and statesmen about measures best able to deal with these (see Demas, 1986, 1988; Thomas, 1988; CARICOM, 1981), there is general agreement that some set of alternative economic strategies is necessary. Strategies adopted should bear in mind the geopolitical realities of the region, the region's actual and potential resources, and deficiencies, and the current economic community mechanisms available. They should also coopt and utilize state, private sector, labor and community based resources in the development process, and avoid sacrificing economic growth and resilience on the altar of "ideological sincerity" as Guyana seems to have been doing under Forbes Burnham.

Guyana is one nation that has recognized the need for an alternative economic (and political) strategy. From 1970 to 1985 Guyana pursued a strategy of nationalization, expansion of state control over the "commanding heights of the economy," state supported cooperatives, and modified central planning. For several domestic and international economic and political reasons, that experiment with "Cooperative Socialism" has failed. The successors to Forbes Burnham under whose rule the strategy was pursued, are conscious of the need for alternatives to arrest the economic decline proceeding from the failure of that strategy, and to restore economic resilience to Guyana. The new strategy involves an aggressive outreach for foreign investment, multilateral financing to deal with the US\$772.3 million (at 1986) outstanding public debt, cooptation and inclusion of the private sector in production and investment drives,⁹ removal of financial underwriting of inefficient state agencies, divestment of public sector operations, diminution of the role of the ruling party in the affairs of the state,¹⁰ and

9. According to a Caribbean News Agency report of July 19, 1988, Guyana has invited British officials to work out details for the establishment of stock market operations there. Guyana will have the region's fourth such establishment, following Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago.

10. One of the first measures in this respect in 1986 was the drastic reduction in the size and scope of the Ministry of National Development, the political ministry that executes mandates of the ruling People's National Congress (P.N.C.). The Ministry was finally scrapped in 1989.

rapprochement with the U.S. (see Hoyte, 1986, 1987a, 1987c, 1988a, 1988b).

As we saw in Chapter Two, the experiences of Guyana, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica, and to a lesser extent those of Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent, are such that much of the internal security concerns relate to questions of internal instability. Instability has been caused by racial disharmony, personality conflicts, attempts to gain or retain political power, and external system penetration. Caribbean societies cannot, therefore, ignore the imperatives of political stability. As we suggested in Chapter One, political stability itself is based on four closely related factors: 1. political authority, 2. political equality, 3. political participation, and 4. legitimacy.

The first relates to a reciprocal relationship between government and the governed where the former manage the body politic and the latter accept and consent to that rule. The second implies the possession of rights and freedom by citizens to participate in the political process. The third involves the ability of citizens to influence the nature and operation of the political system through institutions such as political parties, labor unions, impartial judiciaries and a free press. But it is the fourth factor - legitimacy - that is crucial to societies such as Guyana and Jamaica. Political legitimacy relates to a people's confidence

in a government regarded as acceptable and desirable. It implies that the regime is recognized as the most appropriate to further common interests; that the government is representative of the widest cross-section of the society (see Mars, 1975; Huntington, 1968).

Ever since 1973, the legitimacy of the P.N.C government in Guyana has been questioned due to the fraudulent elections on which power was retained and the often blatant demonstration of political partisanship (see Interim Report, 1985; James and Lutchman, 1984). In Jamaica, Edward Seaga returned to power in December 1983 in circumstances where the main opposition, the P.N.P., boycotted the elections because the electoral machinery had created an unfair advantage for the ruling JLP. Thousands were disenfranchised (see Keesings, 1984). This certainly detracted from the legitimacy of the regime, and was the basis for many of the challenges to the political authority of the Seaga government before it lost the election to Michael Manley in February 1989. Legitimacy questions have also been raised elsewhere. In 1987 John Compton of St. Lucia returned to power after two successive ballots, on April 6 and April 30. His resumption of office was on a slim margin of one vote in Parliament. The parliamentary majority was later increased following a ministerial appointment and a defection from the

opposition St. Lucia Labor Party¹¹ (see Keesings, 1987).

Internal stability requires increased confidence in the institutions of political rule. We referred in Chapter Two to the emasculation of Parliament by some leaders, and the abdication of oversight and investigatory roles by some Parliamentarians, especially in foreign and security affairs. This situation ought to change. And the tendency of some to "play politics" with matters of state security should be abandoned. "Multipartisanship" should be brought to bear on critical foreign and security policy matters.

Collaborative Measures

The necessity for collaboration in the Caribbean derives from common regional problems, capability limitations by all states, the "community" orientation of Caribbean leaders, and recognition that collaboration offers the best hope of dealing with the problems of any one nation.

The "community approach" that characterizes many collaborative measures in the Caribbean makes it appropriate to offer a preliminary comment on regionalism and security. Lynn Miller (1969:557) has raised the important question whether the regional

11. The appointment was that of Desmond Fostin as Minister of Communications and Works. The defector, Neville Cenac, was made Minister of Foreign Affairs.

approach to security is "compatible with the goals of universal order." The pursuit of regional options clearly suggests that statesmen harbor few doubts about this compatibility. Table 6.2 offers a partial listing, but shows that there are at least a dozen regional security initiatives, more than half of which were formed during the last two decades.

Vayrynen (1984:339) accepts the expanded role of regional entities: "It is my contention that international relations have experienced from the 1950s onward a gradual rise of regionalism." He infers that while regionalism per se is not incompatible with universal order, the "regional conflict formations" that have developed in the context of the new dynamics of global power realignments, undermine that order. He contends:

The rise of regionalism means the institutionalization of violent regional conflicts. These conflicts are, on one hand, results of intra-regional heterogeneity, and the products of dominance relations between the core and the periphery on the other. Regional conflict formations are a complex mixture of intra-national, intra-regional and extra-regional conflicts of violent character. A novel feature of those conflicts is that they have become more complex and more entangled in the sense that they cannot

be easily decomposed into individual conflicts (Vayrynen, 1984:334).

Our analysis of the Caribbean suggests two things. One, no single collaborative measure will suffice. Two, Caribbean nations need an assertive approach to collaboration. They should take initiatives and not be being pulled along with the tide of events. We referred previously to this in relation to the events in Grenada during October 1983. But the failure of CARICOM heads to take decisive initiatives on the questionable accession to power of Leslie Manigat in Haiti on February 7, 1988, and his displacement on June 20, 1988 by General Henri Namphy also testifies to this. In order to maximize the benefits of collaboration, Caribbean leaders should adopt an affirmative approach, making full use of various opportunities in the several arenas that exist - the sub-regional; the regional; the hemispheric; and the international.

The OECS and the RSS are the two institutions at the sub-regional levels that can provide scope for security cooperation and conflict management. As noted in Chapter Three, the OECS was formed in June 1981 with a view to maximizing the use of the limited resources of member states. The Treaty under which it was established provides for collaboration and harmonization in economic and trade matters, defense and security, and foreign policy and diplomacy.

Nineteen hundred and eighty six saw the renewal of a campaign within the OECS and the wider region to transform the OECS from a pluralistic community into an amalgamated one. But, up to the end of 1989 the absence of political will to do this had frustrated much of the enthusiasm, and slowed the momentum of translating ideals into reality. The plan for integration of all OECS states had, among other things, been scaled down to become one of limited integration - of four of the seven countries - Dominica, St. Vincent, Grenada, and St. Lucia (see Carib News, 1988). While there are security advantages of political integration, two observations are in order.

One, an amalgamated security community in the Eastern Caribbean will not alter the geopolitical and other vulnerability of the sub-region, or of the region, though it may create better scope for dealing with some of the economic problems. Two, it would not automatically remove the basis for internal security concerns, but may well exacerbate polarizations and strain the stability of the amalgamated state. Sub-regional leaders should, therefore, increase the operational efficiency of the present institutions to cater to their security needs. As regards the RSS, while there are serious limitations and shortcomings, as noted previously, it should not be dispensed with. Emphasis on militarism is neither necessary nor desirable, but the RSS can be a useful half-way house

with an ability to aid with intelligence, drug interdiction, disaster relief, and coastal patrol.

There are no region-wide military security mechanisms within the Caribbean. We saw in Chapter Three that proposals for a Caribbean Defense Force, though advanced in a sub-regional context, foundered because of political disfavor and cost considerations. This writer does not support a region-wide standing army. Such is not necessary. There are, however, region-wide institutions and mechanisms that could be used appropriately towards military-political-economic security advantages.

CARICOM is a multi-dimensional institution that could be used for greater political and economic security. For this there needs to be fewer differences in some areas, such as foreign policy harmonization. The Caribbean Development Bank's contribution to the economic resilience of the region is crucial. The higher education institutions - the University of the West Indies (UWI) and the University of Guyana (UG) - could provide invaluable training and policy-relevant research in areas directly related to military and political security. The Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) of UWI and the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) of UG do considerable work in the economic area. These, along with the Institute for International Relations (IIR) of UWI can use the military-political areas. In this respect, ISER and IIR

have been involved recently in a series of conferences and studies on peace and security that could be useful to academic and policy-oriented discourse.¹² And the Association of Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP) that brings together the region's top law enforcement officials could extend the benefits of collaboration in the areas of training, police management, and intelligence, making adequate use of the Barbados-based Regional Police Training Center, among other institutions.

Table 3.3 shows Caribbean involvement in several hemispheric organizations and agreements. Among these are the OAS and SELA. While Caribbean states attest to the importance of these in the political and economic areas, the OAS is not in the mainstream of conflict management and security. This is not likely to change in the near future, even with the admission to membership of Guyana and Belize in 1990 following rectification of the Article 8 anomaly.¹³ Moreover, the

12. The first conference dealt with "Peace, Development and Security in the Caribbean Basin: Perspectives to the Year 2000." It was held in Jamaica, March 22-25, 1987 and was co-sponsored by ISER and the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The second dealt with "Peace and Development in the Caribbean" and was held in Jamaica, May 16-18, 1988. It was co-sponsored by ISER, the International Peace Research Association, and the Jamaica Peace Committee.

13. Article 8 of the OAS Charter stipulates that the pertinent organs of the organization not act on membership applications by those states whose territories, either wholly or partially, became subject, before December 1964, to litigation between an extra-continental state and any OAS member until the dispute is peacefully settled. It thereby precludes admission of Belize and Guyana. However, in December 1985, the Protocol of Cartagena set the stage for the

OAS has a mixed dispute resolution record that reinforces the low confidence in it that exists in parts of the region (see Clarke, 1986; Francis, 1986).

Chapter Four noted that several middle powers have strategic interests in the Caribbean and can act in ways beneficial or detrimental to the security interests of the region. These are Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, and Venezuela. There is much value in Handel's admonition: "weak states must learn to 'draw' or 'borrow' the strength of other states...try to manipulate and commit...the strength of other states...in order to secure their own interests" (Handel, 1981:120). However, alliances between states in the Caribbean and the above middle powers seems infeasible. While there are advantages of such alliance relationships, practical barriers exist.

First, there is the suspicion, though muted, of the motives behind the pursuits of middle powers such as Venezuela and Cuba. Second, there are the territorial claims by Venezuela against Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, and Dominica. And another CARICOM state, Belize, also has the cloud of a territorial dispute hanging over its head. Third, there tends to be some amount of bitterness in some Latin-Caribbean relations that may affect alliance relations. This distaste

modification of this provision, and hence the admission of these states. See McComie (n.d:18-21).

recently manifested itself in the contest for the 1988 U. N. General Assembly Presidency where Barbados and Argentina were the leading contenders (see Best, 1988). Caribbean states should, however, utilize the bilateral and multilateral contacts with these states to their maximum advantage. One Caribbean foreign policy observer even recommends that the Caribbean make the development of relations with Latin America a cornerstone of its pursuits (see Braveboy-Wagner, 1988:88). In a wider hemispheric context there is every reason to use the special bonds developed with Canada for security purposes. We noted previously that while Canada refrains from giving direct military security assistance, some of the considerable development assistance is used for security purposes.

A military or political alliance of the subordinate Caribbean with the dominant U.S. would be precarious for the Caribbean. Stanley Hoffmann makes a pertinent observation:

The great power does not really have to ask whether it ought to mortgage its independence; the alliance it negotiates may well restrict its freedom of action, but does not force it into dependence. A small power, when it establishes a hierarchy of the risks it must minimize, must choose between security and independence whenever it cannot

simultaneously curtail the rights that threaten both.¹⁴

Much as some Caribbean (and other) statesmen and scholars may desire, the geopolitical reality of American military-political-economic dominance cannot be wished away and is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. It is a circumstance with which the Caribbean has to live. Caribbean decision-makers should therefore fashion practical security relationships that could: (a) benefit from America's military strength against extra-regional incursions; (b) minimize reliance on it and thus reduce the vulnerability that derives from heavy reliance; (c) provide for credible intra-regional security thus reducing the militarization of the region by the U.S. ostensibly to help the Caribbean.

This writer supports the proposition that "membership in the United Nations itself...provides some element of deterrence against the possibility of total obliteration by a predatory neighbour" (Commonwealth, 1985:70). But even in the face of the Guatemalan and Venezuelan claims, no Caribbean state faces total obliteration. The aim should, therefore, not be so much to utilize the U.N. to prevent total obliteration, but to use it practically to maintain security in the course of sovereign pursuits.

14. Stanley Hoffmann, The State of War (N.Y.: Praeger, 1968), p 138 cited in Handel (1981:120).

Guyana's diplomacy, and to a lesser extent that by Belize, over the hostile territorial pursuits against them, testifies to the beneficial use to which the U.N. can be put. It could be used to sensitize the international community to vulnerability and threats, gain international sympathy, and play upon international public opinion. The U.N. also has mechanisms to prevent or minimize the violation of sovereignty, and to aid in conflict resolution. Article 33 of the Charter outlines such mechanisms - negotiation, inquiry, conciliation, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and regional initiatives. Caribbean states can use these appropriately as the necessity arises.¹⁵ Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter provide additional scope for resort to regional arrangements. Article 99 empowers the Secretary General to exercise initiative regarding threats to international peace and security. For all this though, it must be remembered that in the absence of collective security action, the United Nations is a mechanism with severe limitations when it comes to security against direct military aggression.

Our reference to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) above suggests that it holds dim prospects for serving

15. The 1970 Protocol of Port-of-Spain signed by Venezuela and Guyana (and Britain) about the settlement of the dispute arising from the Venezuela claim contemplates the use of Article 33 options. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Guyana (1981) and Braveboy-Wagner (1984).

as a military security guarantor. But as was noted in Chapter Three, Guyana has used the Movement to considerable advantage in the controversy with Venezuela. Grenada, Barbados and Jamaica along with Guyana have also used it during the course of destabilization campaigns against them. The limitations placed on the Movement by its nature and operation must be recognized by Caribbean states, but they should not lose sight of scope for beneficial action.

Chapter Four showed France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands to be among extra-regional powers with strategic stakes in the region. Of the three, Britain makes the greatest direct security investment in the region. Caribbean states should continue to utilize these linkages bilaterally and multilaterally to their advantage. Maximum use should also continue to be made of Commonwealth support, training, special security arrangements, the consultative networks, and the office of the Secretary General (See Commonwealth, 1985:90-96).

Two concluding observations regarding the above arenas are in order. First, the multilateral framework in which these arenas operate does not preclude use of bilateral relations. National interest and other factors will create the desire and basis for such relations. It is therefore realistic to cater for them. Caribbean leaders should, however, guard against having positions and policies in the bilateral context that

contradict the regional or other collaborative ones in the multilateral context.

Second, whether for bilateral or multilateral operations, the critical role of skilled and appropriate diplomacy must be recognized.¹⁶ Caribbean states should ensure that: 1. the caliber of diplomats is of the highest order; and 2. the foreign policy machinery is not merely functional, but also efficient and effective. Maniruzziman (1982:16) reminds us that "A small state's goal is not the pursuit of power, but the preservation of the little power it possesses. The problems of small states have been first, how to avoid, mitigate or postpone conflicts, and second how to resist superior force once a conflict has developed. The two problems relate respectively to the spheres of diplomacy and military strategy - the two main instruments of foreign policy."

111. OTHER REGIONAL APPROACHES

We suggested in Chapter One that the security problems and circumstances of the Caribbean are similar to those of other small states. It stands to reason, therefore, that there may be benefit in looking at some collaborative practices of other regional groupings involving small states.

16. Braveboy-Wagner (1988:88) also stresses this point.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC and the RSS share the dubious distinction of being the world's only regional security arrangements composed of micro-states. All the RSS members are micro-states. In the case of the GCC, all except Saudi Arabia are micro-states. It was formed by Charter in May 1981 and comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. Its formation was precipitated by the Iran-Iraq conflict and the military, political and economic problems stemming from it. A main effort has been to secure regional stability through dispute mediation.¹⁷

The GCC has positive and negative features which, when balanced, discount its use as a model for the Caribbean. Similarities in regimes and state structures have facilitated successful internal security coordination. All GCC states have feudal aristocracies ruled by single families, and small, homogeneous populations. They share a single state religion, Sunni Islam, and depend on a single resource, oil. They have similar fears: of radical Palestinians, fundamentalist Shi'ite Iranians, and migrant worker communities often larger than their own.

Another feature of GCC states, and a difference with the Caribbean, is possession of the kind of

17. This assessment is based on Ispahani (1984) and Brown (1986).

financial resources that (a) permit military resource acquisition fairly independent of any extra-regional financial sponsor; (b) have been used to create a fairly credible military security mechanism. GCC states can therefore afford to plan harmonization in weapons procurement, air defense, transport, and a local rapid deployment force. However, they are still buying military systems from a variety of suppliers, and proposals for common military education syllabuses and common structures have already begun to experience intertribal and interstate difficulties.

The nature and intensity of perceived threats - of the "clear and present danger" - have been different for Gulf States than for Caribbean states. There are problems of perceptual divergence as in the Caribbean, but these derive from different bases than those in the Caribbean. The circumstances of the RSS and the GCC and of the Caribbean and the Gulf thus differ in ways that do not make Gulf initiatives entirely appropriate to the Caribbean. What is clear though is that while neither the GCC states nor the RSS states are entirely satisfied with their security initiatives, they consider them valuable half-way houses in pursuit of some kind of workable regional security.

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Another regional security initiative featuring small states is ASEAN. It was formed in August 1967 by

Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Brunei joined in 1984. It was conceived as a means of promoting intra-regional conciliation.¹⁸ As with the RSS and the GCC states, within ASEAN there is a divergence of views on the nature and extent of the security problem. This has to do primarily with the Vietnam and Kampuchea situations. This divergence has given rise to obstacles to cooperation, and is an impediment to alliance formation. Part of the impediment lies in difficulties of coordinating joint deployment of forces from the six states, and moreover, in the political hazards to stationing mixed contingents in any one member state to deal with internal insurgency, a primary security concern of most member states.

ASEAN has the kind of economic and military capabilities that the Caribbean lacks. Given the nature of the security problems initially, their military establishments were built around counter-insurgency warfare. But post 1978 militarization programs have focused on developing conventional warfare capabilities, especially in naval and air forces. Two members, Thailand and the Philippines, maintain alliances with the US, and they all benefit from American bilateral security assistance, training, and weapons sales.

18. This analysis is based on Leifer (1978), Weatherbee (1986), and Buszynski (1987).

The obstacles to close multilateral military cooperation within ASEAN have occasioned the development of "structured ad hoc mechanisms" for intelligence exchanges, occasional joint military exercises involving two or more states, and common-border cooperation. States in ASEAN subscribe to the originally Indonesian concept of "national resilience." This concept advocates the total mobilization and utilization of all of a nation's tangible and intangible resources in defense of its interests. "National resilience" is complemented by the notion of "regional resilience" which posits that as each member increases its capabilities to defend itself, the region as a whole becomes more capable of withstanding external aggression.

ASEAN has been described as a security organization without the structure of an alliance. The Thais have characterized it as a mechanism for "collective political defense" to indicate their reluctance to having a military security community. It places considerable premium on economic security. There is a focus on maximizing benefits from relations with the industrialized world. There is also emphasis on intra-regional economic integration. There are, therefore, size, capability, geopolitical and other factors that differentiate the Southeast Asian and the Caribbean security dilemmas and pursuits. The Caribbean can,

however, profit from adoption of the twin concepts of national and regional resilience.

The South Pacific Forum (SPF)

Axline (1987) feels that the Caribbean can benefit from the experiences and pursuits of some Pacific island states. He cites the South Pacific Forum, formed in 1971, in which micro-states predominate. SPF comprises Western Samoa, Nauru, Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Australia and New Zealand. It pursues economic cooperation through functional networks.

Three points may be made by way of brief comparison of South Pacific with Caribbean pursuits. First, the Caribbean is relatively more advanced in its economic collaboration, having put in place an economic community mechanism (CARICOM), and having developed an orientation towards economic integration. Second, the SPF is underwritten by middle powers (Australia and New Zealand) in a way neither possible nor desirable in the Caribbean. While, as we saw in Chapter Four, there are middle powers with military, political and economic interests in the Caribbean, neither Caribbean states nor any of them (Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico, Venezuela) would be disposed to roles similar to those of Australia and New Zealand.

Third, the Pacific small states seem to have invested the kind of confidence in security guarantees

of Australia and New Zealand that some Caribbean states would be reluctant to do with Caribbean middle powers, or with the US. Thus while there are size and resource parallels between states in the two regions, attempts to transplant the mechanism of the Pacific to the Caribbean would be worthless.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This dissertation is an inquiry into the security problems facing small states in the Caribbean. We used a conceptual framework with four factors crucial to understanding the security problems of such states, and to identifying protective measures. The four factors are perception, capability, geography, and ideology. We noted that there are four principal dilemmas encountered by small, weak states: vulnerability, intervention, militarization, and internal instability.

Our analysis revealed that Caribbean states have been confronted with all of these problems, in varying degrees and at different times. We found that: their subordinate status makes them militarily, politically and economically vulnerable to actions by the U.S. as the dominant state, and by middle powers such as Venezuela; military-political threats to internal security are greater than threats from outside the region; threats in political and economic areas are greater than military threats; capability constraints limit their ability to maintain strong, credible security mechanisms; the Regional Security System (RSS) is not a credible military mechanism, but it could help with drug interdiction, coastal patrol and disaster preparedness.

These overall conclusions flowed from specific ones based on examination of some propositions developed in the context of the Four Factors Framework. This framework suggests that the security of Caribbean states is a function of the dynamic interaction of the four factors noted above (see Chapter One). Our analysis suggested several things.

One, the perception profile of Caribbean political elites reflects both agreements and disagreements in the definition of the region's security. These perceptions are based on beliefs, political styles, the political histories of states, their socio-economic situations, and the foreign policy orientation of the elites. While the divergence has implications at the state and regional levels, and may frustrate common action in some areas, it is not significant enough to prevent the development of consensus in crucial areas.

Two, there is low internal capability and heavy reliance on external capability support for various military-political and social-economic pursuits. While this does not prevent efforts at regional security, it prevents Caribbean states from having security mechanisms reliant primarily on national-regional resources, and therefore not as subject to that many external dictates. This capability limitation makes the RSS unable to serve as a strong military mechanism. But this does not mean that the RSS is of no value. It can

aid in areas such as drug interdiction and coastal protection.

Three, the Caribbean is geopolitically significant because of the strategic resources there and its value in defense terms. The geopolitics of the region is complicated by the variety of states in the area, the range of their power, and the diversity of the interests they pursue. The political, military and other pursuits of these states have an impact on the security circumstances of Caribbean states. The greatest impact comes from the dominant state in the area, the U.S. This dominant-subordinate relationship that springs essentially from geography and capability factors obliges Caribbean states to be circumspect in their security pursuits lest they act in ways that become injurious to their own security.

Four, the ideological profile of the region is essentially capitalist with a predominance of centrist and rightist regimes. This makes for very little ideological differentiation in the region. This inclines some states to be complacent about their internal security, especially where problems of internal security were once related to ideological-political disputes. There also tends to be a complacency about regional security because of the coalition of the centrist and rightist parties called the Caribbean Democratic Union (CDU), and because of the similarity between the ideology of the U.S. and

that of most states in the region. This dominance and similarity incline Caribbean nations to take the security of their nations for granted.

Our discussion showed that security concerns are not only in the external domain; they are both internal and external. And security questions are not important only in the military area, but also in the political and economic areas. We tried to show that while security circumstances may be rooted in "objective" factors such as proximity to the U.S. and capability limitations, the security problems of the region are largely what the elites define them to be. This definition is itself a function of internal factors and milieu factors. Perceptions inform policy choices and the use of capabilities. Consideration of capabilities goes into the determination of policy and influences the perceptions of the elites about the intentions of other states.

The geography of the region makes states there vulnerable to threats and potential threats from proximate states with greater capabilities. The course of action these states take will be influenced by their ideological posture and by the ideology the dominant state and other significant actors in the region, such as Venezuela. What Caribbean states do or can do, is therefore, a function of its elites' perceptions, their capabilities, geopolitics, and their ideological posture.

Our discussion of what Caribbean states can do to safeguard their security, given their perceptual, capability, geopolitical and ideological circumstances, suggested two things. One, they can adopt individual and collective measures to bolster internal and external security. Two, there are few, if any, prospects for innovations to guarantee military security because of capability limitations and the unwillingness of the dominant state and other important actors to facilitate this. Caribbean states are therefore obliged to use a variety of existing mechanisms at the sub-regional, regional, hemispheric and international levels more efficiently.

This dissertation fits into two lines of inquiry in international politics, both of which are of realist theoretical persuasion: that concerned with the security of small states and how small state security dilemmas can affect regional and global security; and that which ponders the interdependence of states in circumstances of dominant-subordinate relationships.

An important question in relation to the security of small states continues to be that raised by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, in The Myth of Independence:

The question before small nations today is how they should conduct their affairs in such a manner as to safeguard their basic interest; to retain their territorial

integrity and to continue to exercise independence in their relationships with the global powers as well as with smaller nations.

This question is not new (see Blair, 1967; Vital, 1971; Fox, 1969). But answers to it assumed a new urgency as small states proliferated and added new dynamics to the anarchic international system. Small states can have both actual and potential impact on regional and global security. Kolodziej and Harkavy (1982:354-65), for example, show how some of these states can block air and sea transport facilities, furnish arms directly to other states, intervene with their own troops, lend them to allies, or make them available for surrogate use. Other studies (Commonwealth, 1985; Harden, 1985) show the precarious position of small states and the actual and potential endangerment of their security and survival.

The scholarly discourse on small state security has been expanded over the years. The literature once focused on external security dilemmas, particularly on vulnerability, intervention and war (see Vital, 1967:87-114; Blair, 1967; Handel, 1981:217-56). But as Rothstein (1986:8-9) rightly observes, "The traditional concern with territorial integrity and political independence has had to be broadened to include a concern with domestic stability - and thus also a

concern with prospects for, and the means of, domestic development."

The weakness of small states which makes them vulnerable to military, political and economic threats has caused scholars and statesmen increasingly to explore forms of collective action - alliances, regional organizations, integration - that can cater more adequately to security needs than can individual state activities (see Ispahani, 1984; Boyd, 1984; Simon, 1982; Maniruzzaman, 1982). But a group of small, weak states does not necessarily make a strong, large, regional actor.

Ispahani's examination of regional security initiatives in the Persian Gulf and in Southern Africa shows that structural, resource and functional limitations by states within regional security organizations may make them just as endangered collectively. She notes that the internal and external economic dependence of the GCC and the OFLS is a severe constraint on their ability to chart an independent course for themselves. She finds that economic dependence creates political and military insecurity. In Southern Africa, for example, vulnerability to South Africa's military might is supplemented by the economic dependence of OFLS states on South Africa (Ispahani, 1984:164).

This dissertation deals with the small states in the Caribbean where a decisive aspect of their independent relations with the hemisphere and the international community is determined by their subordinate status. As was pointed out in Chapter One, these states are subordinate primarily because their capabilities are relatively inferior to those of the dominant state, and because changes in the dominant state have greater effect on them than the reverse (see Brecher, 1969; Cantori and Spiegel, 1970: 1-21; Triska, 1986). Our discussion on capabilities (Chapter Three) and on geopolitics (Chapter Four) showed the degree of dependence and influence, both by American design and Caribbean default, involved in the subordinate relationship with the U.S.

Dominant-subordinate relations are a function of the disproportion in the economic and military capabilities of the states involved, with the balance tipped in favor of the dominant state. But Johnson (1986) argues that the relationship is founded on much more. Dominant states not only have greater military-coercive capabilities, political intervention capabilities, and mechanisms for economic control, but also "ideological, cultural and other normative mechanisms of manipulation." He explains:

Essentially I am referring to those recurrent social processes whereby decision-making elites in subordinate states come to share

the values , beliefs, and attitudes of the elites in the hegemonic power and hence are spontaneously predisposed to identify their own and their country's interests with those of the hegemon and to devise their own policies accordingly. These elites of subordinate states may be educated abroad, rely on foreign technical experts, read mass media dominated by imported wire service reports, attend movies imported from the hegemonic country, travel extensively there, associate with the foreign diplomatic community, adopt a foreign life-style, and so on (Johnson, 1986:297).

This is undoubtedly true of the dominant-subordinate relationship involving the U.S. and the Caribbean.

The circumstances of the Caribbean lend credence to the proposition that opportunities by small states for asserting independence from the dictation of a regional hegemon are very substantially shaped by the character and intensity of the most important demands made by the hegemon upon them Johnson (1986:288). Our discussion of foreign policy and security interests and of the political experiences of Caribbean states (especially Guyana, Jamaica and Grenada) showed that the U.S. has exercised a range of punitive measures - economic ostracism, diplomatic hostility, intervention - when subordinate states in the Caribbean sought to exercise

their sovereign independence in ways that challenged American hegemony or were antithetical to its interests.¹ Small state initiatives in other areas are viewed either with indulgence or unconcern, and are allowed to proceed unhindered. This is how the RSS is viewed.

This dissertation could be valuable in two respects. First, as an assessment of the security challenges of small states in their own right and not as a tangent to big power concerns, it can add to the literature on the international politics of small states. Second, it can be a useful addition to the literature on English Caribbean security. While there are several articles dealing with different issues (Garcia-Muniz, 1986; 1988a; Phillips, 1988; Black, 1985; Norton, 1984; Gary Lewis, 1985; Simmons, 1985), there are few region-wide studies.²

1. This is also true in relation to other states in the wider Caribbean such as Cuba, Nicaragua, Guatemala and Panama.

2. The only single-authored studies on English Caribbean security known to this writer are McFarlane (1974) and Garcia-Muniz (1988b). Among the more important edited works are Young and Phillips (1986), and CIIPS (1987).

APPENDIX

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

BETWEEN

THE GOVERNMENT OF ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

THE GOVERNMENT OF BARBADOS

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF DOMINICA

[THE GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA]

[THE GOVERNMENT OF ST. KITTS-NEVIS]

THE GOVERNMENT OF ST. LUCIA

AND

THE GOVERNMENT OF ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

RELATING TO SECURITY AND MILITARY COOPERATION

This is the original (1982) version of the Memorandum done for and agreed to by the governments of Antigua, Barbados, Dominica, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. The text therefore does not refer to the governments of Grenada and St. Kitts-Nevis which became parties to the Memorandum after 1982.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING**Between:**

The Government of Antigua and Barbuda, hereinafter referred to as the "Antigua Government,"

The Government of Barbados, hereinafter referred to as the "Barbados Government,"

The Government of the Commonwealth of Dominica, herein-after referred to as the "Dominica Government,"

The Government of St. Lucia, hereinafter referred to as the "St. Lucia Government,"

And

The Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, herein-after referred to as the "St. Vincent Government;"

collectively referred to in this Memorandum as the "parties hereto."

The Antigua Government, the Barbados Government, the Dominica Government, the St. Lucia Government and the St. Vincent Government being parties hereto have reached an understanding relating to Security and Military Cooperation as follows:

DEFINITIONS

1. For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding

"Force Commanders" mean the Commander, Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police,

Antigua and Barbuda Police Force, the Chief-of-Staff, Barbados Defence Force, the Commissioner of Police, Royal Barbados Police Force, the Commissioner of Police, Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force, the Commissioner of Police, St. Lucia Police Force, and the Commissioner of Police, Royal St. Vincent Police Force;

"Participating country" means Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Commonwealth of Dominica, St. Lucia, or St. Vincent and the Grenadines;

"Service personnel" means personnel belonging to or connected with

- (a) the Antigua and Barbuda Defence Force and the Antigua and Barbuda Police Force,
- (b) the Barbados Defence Force and the Royal Barbados Police Force,
- (c) the Commonwealth of Dominica Police Force,
- (d) the St. Lucia Police Force, or
- (e) the Royal St. Vincent Police Force.

AREAS OF COOPERATION

2. The parties hereto agree to prepare contingency plans and assist one another on request in national emergencies, prevention of smuggling, search and rescue, immigration control, fishery protection, customs and excise control, maritime policing duties, protection of off-shore installations, pollution

control, natural and other disasters and threats to national security.

3. With regard to paragraph 2, the interests of one participating country are the interests of the others; and accordingly the participating countries shall have the right of "hot-pursuit" within each other's territorial waters.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

4. The Ministers responsible for Defence in the participating countries shall be the Council of Ministers, which shall be the central policy making body.

5. The Council of Ministers may appoint advisory Committees comprising such persons from the participating countries as might be necessary.

6. The Council of Ministers shall meet at least one a year.

CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICE

7. There shall be a Central Liaison Office, which shall be responsible to the Council of Ministers for co-ordinating the objectives of the Memorandum of Understanding.

8. There shall be a Regional Security Co-ordinator, who shall be the chief officer of the Central Liaison Office; and there shall be such other staff as the Council of Ministers shall determine.

9. The Regional Security Co-ordinator shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers.

10. Staff, other than the Regional Security Co-ordinator, shall be appointed by the Council of Ministers on the recommendation of the Regional Security Co-ordinator after consultation with the Force Commanders.

11. The Regional Security Co-ordinator shall also be adviser to the Council of Ministers in matters relating to regional security and shall be authorized to negotiate with extra-regional agencies on behalf of the parties hereto; but any negotiation conducted by the Regional Security Co-ordinator does not bind the Government of any participating country unless ratified in writing by the Government of that participating country.

12. The salaries of the staff of the Central Liaison Office shall be fixed from time to time by the Council of Ministers.

CENTRAL FUND

13. There shall be a Central Fund, forty-nine percent of which shall be contributed by the Barbados Government and the remaining fifty-one percent shall be contributed in equal amounts by the governments of other participating countries; but if circumstances change the percentage contributed by Barbados and the other participating countries shall be subject to re-negotiation.

14. The Central Fund shall be administered by the Central Liaison Office and shall be used for

- (a) paying the salaries of the staff and any other expenses of the Central Liaison Office,
- (b) co-ordinating the objectives of this Memorandum of Understanding, and
- (c) paying to the Barbados Government the cost of insuring the spares and documentation mentioned in paragraph 35.

15. The Central Fund shall not be used for operational purposes in a participating country; but where one participating country requests assistance from one or more of the other participating countries, in this Memorandum of Understanding referred to as the "requesting country" and the "sending country" respectively, supplies held by the Central Liaison Office may be used for the purposes of the operation and any supplies so used shall be replaced by the requesting country.

16 (1) The Regional Security Co-ordinator shall prepare and submit, for the approval of the Council of Ministers, estimates on a triennial basis, but where circumstances change during any triennium for which estimates were submitted the Regional Security Co-ordinator shall prepare and submit supplementary estimates.

(2) The Regional Security Co-ordinator shall, every three months, submit accounts to the Ministers of Defense of the participating countries showing, inter alia, the amount due by each participating country to

the Central Fund, and any such amount shall be paid within thirty days after the receipt of the accounts by the Ministers.

(3) The Regional Security Co-ordinator shall submit any information or prepare any document requested by the Council of Ministers, and any other information relating to the functions of the Central Liaison Office that the Regional Security Co-ordinator considers the Council of Ministers ought to be informed about.

PLANNING AND OPERATIONS

17. There shall be a joint co-ordinating and planning Committee comprising Force Commanders.

18. Combined operations shall be co-ordinated through the operations room at the Barbados Defence Force Headquarters, St. Ann's Fort, Barbados or such suitable place as may be agreed between Force Commanders.

19. The manning of the operations room shall be agreed between the Force Commanders.

COMMAND AND DISCIPLINE

20. For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding,

- (a) the requesting country shall retain operational control over all troops participating in operations in that country;
- (b) the senior officer of the sending country shall exercise tactical command over his troops;

- (c) commanding officers shall be responsible for the conduct and discipline of their subordinate service personnel.

JURISDICTION

21. When service personnel of one participating country are within the jurisdiction of another participating country, they shall respect the laws, customs and traditions of that other participating country.

22. (1) The Service Authorities of one participating country shall have, within another participating country or on board any vessel or aircraft of that other country, the right to exercise all such criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over its service personnel, as are conferred on the Service Authorities by the laws of their own country, including the right to repatriate personnel to their own country for trial and sentencing.

(2) The Courts of one participating country shall have jurisdiction over service personnel of another participating country with respect to offenses that are committed by service personnel of that other participating country within the first-mentioned participating country and punishable by the law of the first-mentioned participating country.

(3) Where the Courts of one participating country and the Service Authorities of another participating country have the right to exercise jurisdiction in

respect of an offense, the Service Authorities of that other participating country shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction if

(i) the offense is committed by a member of the service personnel of that other participating country against the property or security of that other participating country, or against the property or person of another member of the service personnel, or

(ii) the offense arises out of an act or omission arising in the course of official duty by a member of the service personnel of that other participating country.

(4) In any case other than those mentioned in subparagraphs (1), (2) and (3) the participating country within which the offense is committed shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction; but where the country with the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the appropriate authorities of the other country as soon as practicable.

CLAIMS

23. The government of each of the participating countries shall insure its service personnel against any claims for damage or injury, including injury resulting in death, caused by acts or omissions of its service personnel in the course of their duties.

24. In the case of an omission by a participating country to insure its service personnel, or where for any other reason service personnel of a participating country are not covered by insurance, that participating country shall deal with and settle at its own cost any claim brought by any person in respect of damage or injury arising out of the course of official duty.

25. If the law of one participating country does not preserve, save and keep free a member of the service personnel of another participating country against damages for a claim to which paragraph 23 or 24 relates, the first-mentioned participating country undertakes to preserve, save and keep him free from any such damage.

26. The participating country within whose jurisdiction any damage or injury occurs shall settle any claim brought in respect thereof, and where the damage was done or the injury caused by the personnel of any other participating country, that other country shall re-imburse the first mentioned country.

TRAINING

27. Service personnel of the participating countries shall undergo training in any of the participating countries on agreement between the Force Commanders of the participating countries involved in the training exercise.

28. In training operations the Coast Guard units shall be permitted to enter each other's territorial waters on agreement between the Force Commanders of the countries participating in the training operations.

29. Where necessary, exchange billets shall be by mutual agreement between the Force Commanders of the units participating in the exchange.

MAINTENANCE

30. Coast Guard vessels shall, when necessary, undergo maintenance work at HMBS Willoughby Fort in accordance with builders specifications and recommendations.

31. Emergency repair facilities for Coast Guard vessels shall also be provided at HMBS Willoughby Fort.

32. For the purposes of paragraphs 30 and 31, the Commander of the Coast Guard of a participating country is authorized to liaise with the Base Engineer HMBS Willoughby Fort.

33. The Base Engineer HMBS Willoughby Fort shall, before commencing any maintenance or emergency repair pursuant to paragraphs 30 and 31, as the case may be, submit an estimate of costs to the Chief of Staff,

Barbados Defence Force, who shall transmit the estimate to the Force Commander of the country whose vessel it is and await the Commander's decision.

34. By agreement between the Force Commanders, spares and documentation shall be kept at HMBS Willoughby Fort.

35. The Barbados Government shall insure the spares and documentation mentioned in paragraph 34 against loss or damage and recover the cost of insurance from the Central Fund.

PROCUREMENT

36. By agreement between the Force Commanders, arms, ammunition, uniforms, equipment and stores may be procured under a joint procurement programme.

37. Arms, ammunition, uniforms, equipment and stores procured under the joint procurement programme mentioned in paragraph 36 shall be transferred among the participating countries by agreement between the Force Commanders.

OPERATIONAL EXPENSES

38. For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding

- (a) the requesting country shall pay
 - (i) the expenses incurred in accommodating and victualling the troops of the sending country, and
 - (ii) the medical expenses of any troops of the sending country who need medical

- attention in the requesting country;
- (b) each participating country shall meet its own fuel costs;
 - (c) each participating country shall meet the costs of materials used in training its service personnel; and
 - (d) each participating country shall meet the costs of materials and labour used in maintaining its vessels.

LIMITED ASSISTANCE

39. A participating country may request assistance from one or more of the other participating countries and where such a request is made

- (a) the Ministers responsible for Defence in those participating countries, and
- (b) the Force Commanders of those participating countries,

constitute, respectively, the Council of Ministers and the Force Commanders for that limited purpose only; and this Memorandum of Understanding shall be read and construed accordingly.

TERRITORIAL WATERS, EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE AND VISITING FORCES

40. The Governments of the participating countries shall review and update their laws

- (a) relating to their territorial waters and their exclusive economic zones, and

(b) relating to armed forces visiting the participating countries.

COMMENCEMENT AND TERMINATION

41. This Memorandum shall come into force, in respect of a participating country, on the day it becomes a signatory to this Memorandum; and the Memorandum shall remain in force in respect of that participating country until terminated in respect of that country on a day specified by notice in writing to each of the other participating countries given to them at least three months before the day specified in the notice.

42. In the event of the termination of this Memorandum of Understanding, either in relation to all of the participating countries or in relation to any participating country, any provision relating to any matter of the criminal jurisdiction of any country, the treatment of claims by any country and the financial obligations of any country shall remain in force until the matter is finally disposed of.

Done originally at Roseau, Dominica, October 29, 1982.

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B. INTERVIEWS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>DATE</u>
Dr. Norman Antoika	Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Barbados	Barbados	Aug 12, 1987
Robert Beckman	Counselor, U.S. Embassy, Barbados	Barbados	Aug 12, 1987
Amaury Bier	Ambassador of Brazil to Barbados	Barbados	Jly 29, 1987
S. Bob Burnett	Commander, U.S. Forces Caribbean	Key West, FL*	May 19, 1988
Augustus Compton	Deputy Director General, OECS	St. Lucia	Aug 23, 1988
Oreste di Giacomo	Ambassador of Venezuela to Barbados	Barbados	Aug 13, 1987
Thelma Ferguson	Deputy Permanent Secretary, Office of the Attorney General, Bahamas	Bahamas*	Nov 11, 1988
Dr. Albert Gorvine	International Consultant	Barbados	Nov 14, 1988
Dr. Colin Hope	Editor, <u>Caribbean Contact</u>	Barbados	Aug 14, 1987
Earl Huntley	Permanent Secretary, Min of For Affairs, St. Lucia	St. Lucia	Aug 4, 1987
Rev. Allan Kirton	Secretary General, Caribbean Conference of Churches	Barbados	Aug 26, 1988
Dr. Peter Laurie	Permanent Secretary (AG), Min of For Aff., Barbados	Barbados	Jly 27, 1987
Sen. Harcourt Lewis	Minister for the Public Service	Barbados	Jly 30, 1987
Theresa Marshall	Head, Planning & Research, Min of For Aff. Barbados	Barbados	Jly 11, 1988
William Ormsbee	U.S. Southern Command Headquarters	Barbados	Aug 5, 1987
Outhbert Phillips	Commissioner of Police, St. Lucia	Panama*	Aug 8, 1987
James Puddington	Counselor, Canadian High Commission to Barbados	St. Lucia	Jly 11, 1988
Lt. Omdr. Godfrey Rolle	Royal Bahamas Defense Force	Barbados	Apr 29, 1988
Omdr. Dean Schopp	Chief, U.S. Military Liaison, Eastern Caribbean	Barbados	Aug 16, 1988
Omdr. Peter Tomlin	Staff Officer(Intelligence), Regional Security Syst'	Bahamas*	Aug 4, 1987
Sir Cameron James Tudor	Minister of Foreign Affairs, Barbados	Barbados	Nov 2, 1988
		Barbados	Aug 12, 1987
		Barbados	Jly 21, 1988
		Barbados	Aug 18, 1987

Yvette Goddard	Foreign Affairs Officer (CARICOM), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Barbados	Barbados	Aug 6, 1987
Rev. Andrew Hatch	Columnist and former Member of Parliament	Barbados	Jly 29, 1987
Leroy McLean	Assistant to the Prime Minister of Barbados	Barbados	Aug 5, 1987

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