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Power and affiliation within a local trade union: Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers

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City University of New York, 1987

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POWER AND AFFILIATION WITHIN A LOCAL TRADE UNION; LOCAL 3 OF THE INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS

BY

GEORGE SANTIAGO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1987

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

April 30, 1987
date

Chairman of Examining Committee

April 29/87
date

Executive Officer

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Acknowledgements

This study is a synthesis of scholarly research and personal experience. The former has been given credit in footnotes and bibliographical references appended to the text. The latter, however, deserves equal acknowldgement, so at this point, I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to those individuals and organizations who have provided me with the support, insights and encouragement without which this study would not have been possible. In the course of both my career and the preparation of this thesis, I have had the good fortune to meet countless persons who have furnished me with the background for this endeavor. Space does not permit a complete roster of those who have shared with me in this way, but I do want to recognize some of the organizations whose members have given so freely of their time, energy and expertise. They are:

The Santiago Iglesias Educational Society

The Black Labor Movement

The Lewis Howard Lattimer Progressive Association

The Hispanic Labor Committee

The Women's Club of Local 3, I.B.E.W.

The National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights.

Finally, I must mention a somewhat smaller circle of people whose support and encouragement were necessary for this project, namely, the Dissertation Committee, namely, Stanley Aronowitz, Chairman, William Kornblum, Bogdan Danitch; and last but not least, my wonder sons and daughters, and my terrific grandsons.

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INTRODUCTION

This study investigates the internal workings of a local labor union, Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (New York City). It contains both descriptive and analytical elements. The bulk of the thesis is devoted to a comprehensive and detailed account of the basic structures and processes that constitute this construction trade local, including a fairly extensive history of their evolution. The study also adopts a critical perspective toward the topic at hand, with analytical commentary interspersed with descriptive material and presented in summary form in the thesis's concluding chapter.

My particular approach to this undertaking rests upon an artificial, but conceptually useful distinction between the two salient dimensions of Local 3's "interior life". On the one hand, there is what I will be calling the "power dimension" of the organization under scrutiny. This side of Local 3 consists of the formal and informal means through which its leaders govern, and is, therefore roughly equivalent to the political aspect of the union. It encompasses such features as organizational structure, administrative devices, electoral mechanisms, and most pointedly, elite recruitment and tenure. On the other

hand, there is the Local's "affiliational dimension" which is essentially synonymous with the social component of the Local. As I view it, this facet consists of two major subsystems; the Local's program of non-wage fringe benefitsand its network of social clubs.

The object of taking these integral halves of the Local apart and treating them as separate sub-topics is to pinpoint the interrelationships between them. At bottom, my aim is to suggest, albeit tentatively, how the affiliational dimension of Local 3 reinforces the prevailing status quo of its power dimension, specifically the continued control of the Local by a narrow set of leaders. To be sure, the strictly political advantages which incumbent office-holders possess over potential challengers are, in themselves, strong enough to virtually ensure their continuance at the top. Nevertheless, by utilizing the affiliational dimension to underpin their power, this same group not only provides itself with additional insurance against prospective rivals, it also does so in a manner which lends an impression of democratic legitimacy grounded in rank-and-file consent.

Beyond the research "hunch" presented above, this study does <u>not</u> set forth specific hypotheses to be tested in any exacting sense. Indeed, the nature of the topic, the approach selected and the materials available all but preclude this type of stringent method. For example, as

I shall discuss in a subsequent section of this chapter, much of the empirical data incorporated into this thesis has been extracted from in-house publications. Taken in aggregate, they do not provide a systematic body of information on such critical matters as Local 3 election results: in all of the thousands of primary documents which I have examined, I have yet to discover the names of losing or opposition candidates for any office contested within the Local. Absent field research based on the imperfect recollections of the union's members, there is simply no way to fill in these blanks. Consequently, the kind of quantitative base necessary for testing rigorous formal hypotheses is not accessible. However, there is enough "hard" information to accomplish the end of delineating the Local's power and affiliational dimensions and reconstructing the interactions between them.

While occasional mention of matters external to Local 3 will be made in the course of this exposition, the study's scope will be limited to the internal operations of the Local. These references will be confined to describing its environment as it impacts upon what are basically internal affairs. Hence, while some discussion of the Local's parent body, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, is necessary to fully understand the Local's workings; such discussion will be kept to a minimum. A seeming exception to this self-imposed rule

will be made in the case of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry of New York City. Although the Board is not properly a part of Local 3, it is so closely integrated with the union that it must be considered as an inseparable appendage, particularly in the administration of the Local's benefit package. Conequently, no genuine departure from the study's focus will occur in considering it at length.

Apart from a chapter tracing the Local's chronological development, the thesis deals with Local 3 as it exists today. Conveniently, since the 1962 "opening" of its appreciceship program, very little has changed in Local 3 beyond the passing of power from one generation of leaders, e.g., Harry Van Arsdale, Jr. as Business Manager, to their closely related successors, e.g. Thomas Van Arsdale as Business Manager. Consequently, the study draws extensively on works written in the 1950's and 1960's since they remain accurate in the present.

As will become amply evident in the course of the study, Local 3 is unique in certain fundamental ways. To cite but one distinguishing characteristic, its plus-30,000 membership makes it the largest construction trade local in the United States. As a result of this status, the analytical observation made about this organization cannot be readily applied to other local labor unions -- craft, industrial or amalgamated. However, as suggested in the

existing literature, many of the power and affiliational features of the Local are, in fact, common to other local unions and to other types of voluntary organizations as well, so that the value of the study is not limited to its particular topic.

The method which I have used in gathering information for this study has two parts. The first consists of a standard library search of secondary theoretical and empirical sources germane to my task. Far more troublesome was the location of primary source materials in the form of publications issued by the International and Local 3 itself. It was not that such documents did not exist: mountains of newslewtters, pamphlets, brochures, etc. have been printed by Local 3 alone. The problem is that one must painstakingly cull through mounds of irrelevant material to find a single grain of data useful to the study; there being no systematic internal records accessible to me and no central index to these publications. The pay-off, while by no means ideal, was a satisfactory assembly of bits which were then stitched together to form parts of a coherent whole. In terms of documentation, then, many passages lack specific citations to corresponding sources since listing all documents by date and page would have generated thousands of footnotes having little or no value to future research efforts.

The remainder of this study is comprised of five

chapters. Chapter I is a Review of the literature broken down into five parts: an overview of the contours of relevant literature body; a section summarizing the theoretical politions of two major writers, Selig Perlman and Frank Tannenbaum, on the nature of the labor maovement in the United States; a brief passage inditifying works dealing with Local 3 of the I.B.E.W.; and outline of the "power dimension" of internal union workings within the existing literature; and, a counterpart sketch of the "affiliational dimension" of organized labor.

The history of Local 3 is the topic of Chapter II. Its starting point, logically, is the year 1887 when rudiments of Local 3 were established and its terminus is the year 1986. The lion's share of this chapter, however, covers the years 1926 to 1962, for it was in the former that Local 3 began a new era in its evolution and in the latter that the essential features of the Local were completely in place.

The power dimension of Local 3 is described (and analyzed) in Chapter III. It consists of four sections: a brief delineation of the International and its power vis-a-vis Local 3; a taxonomy of Local 3's organizational structure, executive offices and electoral procedures; a third section identifying contemporary leaders with the local and analyzing the process of elite recruitment into the leadership cadre; and, a concluding section covering

the Local's apprenticeship system and the operations of the Joint Industry Board.

The counterpart Chapter IV treats the affiliational dimension of Local 3. It consists of two broad parts: a roster of the benefit program available to Local 3 members prefaced by a general analysis of their meaning within the study's context and a similar listing of the twenty-odd social clubs, especially their origin, functions and outstanding personnel.

The concluding Chapter V is intended as more than a simple recapitulation of the analytical points made during the course of the study. It freely introduces new materials to highlight the interrelationships between the power and affiliational dimensions of Local 3. It is hoped that the information presented in advance of this portion of the thesis will support the broad observations presented in this Chapter, enabling the reader to make his won independent assessment of their validity. Once again I would emphasize that a full demonstration of the points made here cannot be made with anything approaching a formal proof. Nevertheless, the available evidence does support the analysis provided in Chapter V to a degree consitent with the broadly defined objectives of this study.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Overview

In 1977 the distinguished labor scholar George Strauss summarized the existing state of research devoted to American labor unions and their government by stating:

> During the five-year period 1948-1953, unions and union government were the subject of much interdisciplinary attention. There was a second wave of interest around 1960, this time with an emphasis on union government. Since that time scholars have largely ignored the subject.[1]

The same comparative disinterest in organized labor since the 1960's can be seen in the field of economics. As George Johnson observes:

> The study of the behavior and effects of trade unions is not currently one of the major growth industries of the economics profession. For example, the average proportion of all articles in the American Economic Review (AER), Journalof Economics (QJE) dealing with questions concerning unionism... has steadily declined for the past thirty years. In the 1940's, 9.2 percent of the articles in these journals dealt with union topics. This fell to 5.1 percent in the 1950's, further to 2.3 percent in the 1960's, and to just 0.4 percent during the first four years of the 1970's.[2]

[1] George Strauss, "Union Government in the United States:Research Past and Future," Industrial Relations, Vol.xvi, no.2 (May, 1977), p.215.
[2] George E. Johnson, "Economic Analysis of Trade Unionism,"American Economic Review, vol.lxv, no.2 (May, 1975), p.23.

From a center of widespread and passionate scholarly interest two decades ago, labor unions have apparently fallen from academic grace, with political scientists, economists, sociologists and anthropologists currently echewing the topic of unions.

As importantly, those studies of labor unions which have been produced of late tend to be marginal or ancillary to the core nature of these organizations. In the course of my research I have found that works of recent vintage have been overwhelmingly concerned with two secondary facets of their workings. First, since the late-1970's, and especially with the emergence of perennial American trade deficits, unions have been examined in terms of their effect on productivity rates for industry. Here we find two opposing schools engaged in a debate abou the impact of unionism on productivity growth. As R.B. Freeman sets the stage: "Standard economic analysis of the impact of trade unions on the labor market are straightforward: unions are monopolistic organizations that raise wages and create inefficiency in resource allocation."[3] The crux of this argument that organized labor is a drag on productivity gains for American industries resides in the indisputable

[3] R. B. Freeman, "Inidividual Mobility and Union Voice in the Labor Market," American Economic Review, vol.lxvi, no.2 (May, 1976), p.361.

observation that wages for union workers are significantly above those paid to comparable non-union employees,[4] and it has been estimated that, "the average wage effect of American unions (is) between ten and fiftenn percent."[5] Contrary to this deceptively simplistic association of inordinant union wage acting to inhibit productivity growth in the United States, an opposing camp points to a "second face" of unionism, concentrating on the so-called "union voice."[6] Hence, Freeman would counter the conventional wisdom about the impact of unions on industrial productivity by asserting:

> By providing a mode of expressing discontent beyond existing, direct information about worker desires and certain preferred work conditions that cannot be readily offered by non-union establishments, union voice can be expected to reduce quit rates, absenteeism and related exist behavior... The reduction in quits will reduce labor turnover and training costs and increase firm-specific investments in human capital and possibly have efficiency fains.[7]

More recently, Freeman working with James Medoff has bolstered this argument that unions are good for productivity, finding in a cross-industry survey that

[4] Daniel J.B. Mitchell, "Unions and Wages: What We've Learned Since the 1950's," California Management Review, Vol.xxii, no.4 (summer, 1980), p.61.
[5] David Lewin, "The Impact of Unionism on American Business: Evidence for an Assessment," Columbia Journal of World Business Vol.iii, no.11 (November, 1984), pp.59-60.
[6] Paul W. McCracken, "Giving Unions Their Due," Across the Board, Vol.xxi, no.11 (November, 1984), pp.59-60.
[7] Freeman, p.365.

unionized firms displayed productivity rates between 6 percent and 25 percent higher than non-unionized firms.[8]

The second major topic related to unions which has captured scholarly interest in the 1980's is the growing emergence of labor-management cooperation through formal joint industry boards, alternatively termed employers associations. The general thrust of this research is that while such organizations have emerged in more and more industries, most labor officials are unwilling to serve as partners with management (junior partners at that) and find joint boards to be useful in the handling as a relatively narrow set of issue areas which are of secondary importance to both groups, i.e., fringe benefits as opposed to wage bargaining.[9] Thus one student of organized labor cites the comment of AFL-CIO officer Thomas Donahue: "We do not want to blur in any way the distinction between the respective roles of management and labor in the plant."[10] The summary conclusion that can be drawn from these studies that the potential for industrial democracy of the type

[8] Richard Freeman and James Medoff, "Would You Believe Unions Are Good for Productivity?Fortune..1 December 1, 980, p.149.

[9] Milton Derber, "Employers Association in the United S State," Employers Associations and Industrial Relations: A Comparative Study, John P. Windmuller and Alan Gladstone, eds. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), p.93.

plant.'"

[10] Ted Mills, "European Industrial Democracy: An American Response," Harvard Business Review, (November-December, 1978), p.148

common to Western Europe and Japan in the United States is inherently limited by the individualistic nature of American culture and the adversarial bargaining role adopted by the labor movement in the United States.

Although these type of studies clearly have merit, and, in the case of joint board studies, relevance to the topic at hand, the point being made is that recent scholarly treatment of labor unions has been decidedly focused upon matters aside from the core characteristics of these organizations. Such topics as democracy in labor unions and economic/social factors motivating individuals to join and maintain membership in unions have been eclipsed by interest in external sujects.

The most obvious reason for the paucity of works dealing with the primary characteristics of labor unions is the evident decline in their collective power as is reflected in the shrinking portion of the American workforce having union membership.[11] According to one researcher, some 29 percent of the American labor force belonged to unions in 1970; by 1983, this proportion had slipped to 18 percent.[12] Moreover, while the shrinkage of workers belonging to unions over the past two decades can be found throughout the industrial world, "the United

[11] Mitchell, pa.58.
[12] Howard Banks, "An Army Without a Strategy," Forbes, vol.cxxxii, no.10 (October 24, 1983), p.41.

States continues to have one of the lowest overall rates of union membership among developed and some developing countries."[13] The "globalization" of the American economy, with U.S. multinations exporting jobs abroad and foreign direct investment in the United States being concentrated in the comparatively non-unionized South,[14] do not bode well for a resugence of the labor movement in this country. In fact, a host of factors have conspired to reduce the importance of labor in the United States, including a switch from an industrial to a service economy and labor's pronounced inability to strongly affect national politics.[15] Finally, the image of labor officials held by the American public, including union members, has undergone a pronounced deterioration during the past twnety years,[16] with one scholar reporting that in a recent nationwide poll "the image of union leaders rated just above that of used car dealers."[17]

Behind these obvious factors accounting for the decline of scholarly interest in organized labor topics there is, I think, a more basic phenomenon, what may be one

[13] Lewin, p.91.
[14] "Let's Go Where the Unions Aren't," The Economist, vol.cclxiii, no.6979 (June 4, 1977), p.101.
[15] A. Val Bradley, "Management and Labor in the Next Decade," Personnel Journal, vol.lix, no.12 (December, 1980), p.981.
[16] "Still No Confidence in Labor Leaders," Businessweek,, April 16, 1984, p.16.
[17] Bradley, p.981.

termed the "maturing" of the American labor movement. At one point in their history, labor unions appeared to have the potential to serve as a vanguard force in the transformation of American society. As labor's power peaked and began to wane, it became evident that unions in the United States had neither the capacity not the desire to play this role, that they were, in fact, conservative institutions more concerned with their own continued existence than with a large scale recasting of political, economic and social relations in the United States. What unions became, and, more significantly, stayed were transactional or "bargaining" agencies. Thus, even before the erosion of their power in absolute terms, the potential function of American labor unions to accomplish widespread change in the United States had diminished on a permanent basis. This decline in their prospective capacity was not lost on scholars of the U.S. labor movement as they became progressively disinterested and, in some cases, disaffected, in labor unions. Currently, it seems as though the multinational corporation, rather than the labor movement, has a much greater potential to actually transform basic relationships in the United States. This "offhand" observation is meant not only as a further explanation of decreased interest in studying unions, but also as an introduction to the next portion of

this chapter which examines the theories of two labor scholars, Selig Perlman and Frank Tannenbaum, who recognize the essentially conservative caste of the American labor movement at an early date.

Theoretic1 Background

If we were compelled to select two theorists who have shaped our understanding of the nature of the labor movement in the United States to a greater extent than any others, they would be Selig Perlman and Frank Tannenbaum. Perlman's principle works, A History of Trade Unionism in the Unisted States,[18] and A Theory of the Labor Movement[19] were both written during the 1920's, at a time when American unions were still in their adolescent stage. Tannenbaum published a major work at around the same time in his The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences,[20] but it was not until some thirty years later that he produced his principal opus, A Philsophy of Labor.[21] In the main, Perlman's and Tannenbaum's thoughts regarding the American labor movement have much in common: both see organized labor in the

[18] Selig Perlman, AHistory of Trade Unionism in the United States (New York: MacMillan, 1923).
[19] Selig Perlman, A Theory of the Labor Movement (New York: MacMillan, 1928).
[20] Frank Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement: Its Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (New York: Putnam, 1921)

United State as basically conservative in nature, lacking ideological fervor and representing a repudiation of Marxism. For our purposes, however, we have elected to emphasize the differences between the two theorists and to identify Perlman's work with the power dimension of labor unions and Tannenbaum's with the affiliational dimension of the labor movement. Thus, in the course of contrasting the works of these two labor theorists I will present a clearer understanding of my basic distinction between the tandem dimension concept underlying this study and provide a partial theoretical rationale for it.

Perlman elaborates upon this critical concept of scarcity in a central passage of his chief text.

Selig Perlman was a member of the so-called Wisconsin school of the American labor movement and is frequently associated with John Commons of this basis. Rejecting Marxism as the ideological motive behind the formation of labor unions, Perlman pointed to the concept of scarcity as the primary force motivating individuals to organize into unions.[22] Perlman elaborates upon this critical concept of scarcity in a central passage of his chief text.

> It is the author's contention that manual groups, whether peasants in Russia, modern wage earners

[21] Frank Tannenbaum, A Philosophy of Labor, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).
[22] Eugene V. Schneider, Industrial Sociology: The Social Relations of Industry and the Community (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p.378.

> medieval master workmen, have had their economic attitudes basically determined by a consciousness of scarcity of opportunity, which is characteristic of these groups, and stands out in contrast with busines men's "abundance consciousness," or consciousness of unlimited opportunity. Starting with this consciousness of scarcity, the "manualist" groups have been led to practicing solidarity, to an insistence upon an "ownership" by the group as a whole of the totality of economic opportunity extant, to a "rationing" by the group of wuch opportunity among the individuals consituting it, to a control by the group over its members in relation to the conditions upon which they as individuals are permitted to occupy a portion of that opportunity -- in brief, to a "communism of opportunity."[23]

Although this consciousness of scarcity is universal and ever-present within the "Manulist's" psyche, it comes forth into action when external conditions dictate, that is, when opportunities for work are perceived as highly limited by manulists. Thus, according to Perlman, it was the depressed labor conditions of the late-nineteenth century which led to the formation of unions in the United States. "Unionism," he writes, "first became a stabilized movement in America only when the abundance consciousness of the pioneer days had been replaced in the mind of labor by scarcity consciousness -- the consciousness of job scarciy."[24]

From this starting point the funtion of unions for

[23] Perlman (A Theory), p.6.
[24] Ibid., p.8.

those who join them according to Perlman is virtually self-evident, i.e., job control.[25] The purpose of forming and joining unions, then, is not to overthrow the capitalist economic structure, but (a) check competition from other workers willing tc work for low wages and (b) to present a united front in dealing with employers over matters of immediate economic concern, i.e., wage rates.[26] Perlman illustrates this point through the histoical example of a noteworthy union.

> What the true purposes of unionism are (distinguished from mere verbal pronouncements, in which the preambles to the constitutions of some "sociliatic unions abound), and what a union does when it applies a scientific rationalism to its problems, have best been shown by the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America. Although it is the outstanding "socialistic" union in America. it has in practice turned its efforts no to fighting capitalism in its industry, but to securing a thoroughgoing job control.[27]

It is by forming unions, then that individuals can achieve the essential "good" determined by their consciousness of job scarcity, in effect, ownership of the job.

How can Perlman square this universal motive behind unionism with the appearance in Russia of a workers' movement which obviously had greater aims than mere job control? Perlman would explain this phenomena with reference to the three basic forces shaping labor

[25] Everett John Burtt, Labor in the American Economy (New York: St. Martin's, 1974), p.116.
[26] Schneider, p.378.
[27] Perlman (A theory), p.278.

movements in any given national society, the relative power of capitalists, the intelligentsia, and the workers themselves.[28] Thus, Perlman contends that, "There are, by and large, three basic economic philosophies: the manual laborers', the business men's, and the intellectual's."[29] Burtt summarizes Perlman's explanation of the differential outcomes of the labor movement in the United States and Russia.

> The particular combination of these three factors in any country could explain the nature of that country's labor movement. In Russia for example,the Marxist intelligentsia proved to be the dominating factor over a weak capitalist class and a weak trade-union movement. In the United States, on the other hand, the employer class was strong, while the unions were definately on the defensive but strong enough to prevent domination by anticapitalist intellectuals.[30]

Consequently, it was the strength of the Russian intellectuals vis-a-vis both the business and manulist groups which gave that country's labor movement a "radical" character, while it was the comparative power of the American businessman over both labor and intellectuals, as well as a weak labor's power over a weaker intellectual class which dictated the conservative form which unionism had taken in the United States.

The result of all this is that American labor unions are basically bargaining agencies that maintain their

[30] Burtt, pp.115-116.

control over workers due to the superior political/economic power of an organized body compared to disorganized individuals. Perlman makes this point in a passage which reads:

> American wage earners have steadily disappointed several generations of Marxians by their refusal to accept the Marxian theory of social development and the Marxian revolutionary goal. In fact, in their thinkin most American wage earners do not wtart with any general theory of industrial society, but approach the subject of bargainers, desiring to strike the best wage bargain possible.[31]

On this basis, Perlman explicates the triumph of the American Federation of Labor within the national union movement as a victory for the conservation of American values, stating that the AFL "fitted" local conditions "because it recognized the virtually inalterable conservativism of the American community as regards to private property and private initiative in economic life."[32] In fact, since the AFL took control of the labor movement in the 1980's, idealistic unionism, to say nothing of radical unionism, disappeared from the American scene, subsumed by what Perlman terms "opportunistic unionism."[33] In fact, Perlman would correctly predict a phenomenon which I shall speak of at length in regard to Local 3, management-union cooperation.

[31] Perlman (A History), pp.266-267.
[32] Perlman (A Theory), p.201.
[33] Perlman (A History), p.283.

> In truth, such a unionism might easily acquire a lively interest in problems of management without undergoing mutation. It is not at all unnatural that a unionism which is intent upon job opportunities should join with management in a joint campaign to reduce the cost of operation and raise efficiency -- all for the conservation of the current job opportunities.[34]

Given the antagonism between organized labor and business at the time of Perlman's writing, his prediction of such joint action between the two parties was indeed farsighted.

Our interest in outlining Perlman's analysis of the labor movement in the United States lies not in its details, but, instead, in his relative emphasis upon political factors as the motive force in back of the formation of unions. Individuals form and join unions in order to achieve power advantages over non-union workers and, to a lesser extent, employers. The basic character of a labor movement in any given nation is determined by political variables, i.e., the relative power of business, intellectuals and labor. Moreover, power is not used to attain broad ideological goals, its exercise being directed toward the achievement of immediate economic advantages, i.e., wage gains. Hence, in my interpretation, Perlman lays his stress upon the power dimension of unions in explicating their origin and nature.

As I have previously mentioned, the common points

[34] Perlman (), p.283.

between Perlman and Tannenbaum outweighed their differences. Tannenbaum certainly did not dismiss the importance of organized labor power directed roward immediate economic advantage in his analysis of American unionism.[35] Nevertheless and, again, for our purposes, Tannenbaum places much greater importance upon affiliational factors in explaining unionism than Perlman, and, so, I will treat his argument as a contrast to that of Perlman.

As Schneider infroms us, Tannenbaum's starting point is the social situation of the manual worker under the medieval guild system.

> The salient fact about the guild, according to Tannenbaum, was that it included the worker within a tightly knit social group, a group in whcih the worker was assured a secure status, protection against the accidents of life, and a chance of identification with his job and with his fellow workers... As tightly knit social groups the guilds acquired, in their own right, political power and judicial authority with which to discipline and punish their members.[36]

The critical force in this disruption of this social system was a tchnological one, i.e., the coming of the industrial revolution and factory system.[37] Tannenbaum makes this point in a passage from A Philosophy of Labor:

[35] Schneider, p.379.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Burtt, 114.

> The factory system, in its turn, proved to be both an economic and social revolution. It added to the dissolution of the community and attacked the most intimate of human groupings, the family. The towns that grew up around the factories and mines provided little room for the ordinary decencies of life.[38]

For guild workers, the industrial revolution proved a highly destructive force, atomizing existing social relations and severing long-standing social bonds.

It was in reaction to the impact of the factory system that unions were created. In, effect, what the individual worker sought in participating in unions was a return to the community of vlues of which he had been deprived by the industrial revolution. In Tannenbaum's exegesis: "The trade union is both the expression and the extension of the basic sociability vreated by men's psychological needs and by factory conditions... the union does not create worker sociability, it rests upon it."[39] Consequently, Tannenbaum downplays the importance of political and economic ends in the creation and maintenance of unions.

> The developing situation is lost sight of in the persistent argument over wages, as if the union were chiefly occupied with pecuniary income. That is not the case. The overemphasis of economic ends has obscured the real issues. The economic ends are there, but there are also the purposes embraced by membership in a society, and

[38] Tannenbaum (A Philosophy), p.41.
[39] Schneider, p.380.

> these include the broad ethical objective that define the good life.[40]

From the outset, then, we observe that Tannenbaum places remedial emphasis upon social or affiliational factors in sharp relief to Perlman's accent on political variables.

From one standpoint, Tannenbaum ascribed a much greater mission to labor unions than did Perlman. Union, he contends, are a transforming force within society in the sense that their aim is the "re-creation" of "community."

> The unions thus gives the worker something he must have, a place in which he can feel at home; and only by doing this can the union be sure of that loyalty of its members which it must have to survive.[41]

To underscore the "community" function of labor unions, Tannenbaum spoke extensively about the proliferation of welfare benefits, e.g., persion programs.[42] This spread was by no means altruistic in nature: such benefits tended to tie the worker to both his industry and his union through the substitution of a life contract for a temporary contract.[43]

By a decidedly different route, Tannenbaum comes to essentially the same conclusion as Perlman about the social character of American unions. He contends:

> If this analysis has any meaning, the trade-union

[40] Tannenbaum (A Philosophy), pp. 162-163.
[41] Ibid., p. 164.
[42] Ibid., p. 179.
[43] Burtt, p. 115.

> is the conservative force of our time. It is conservative because through bickering over details and by continuous compromise it seeks to preserve the older values by integrating a nonmoral, and therefore essentially corrosive, power (the corporation) in a "society" possessed of an ethical basis for survival.[44]

Indeed, like Perlman, Tannenbaum predicts that unions will become more and more involved in cooperation with management in increasing productivity of industry, that, "they must eventually become concerned with production,"[45] and, in modest relief to Perlman, he sees this as a trend to be encouraged, writing that: "The real danger in this situation lies not in wanting an increasing share of the product, but in refusing to be responsible for producing an increasing share."[46]

What is of paramount importance for the purposes of this study is that Tannenbaum sees the individual worker drawn into the union by the promise of membership in a society,[47] in effect, by an affiliational "pull." By contrast, Perlman views union membership grounded in the "push" of external forces beyond the worker's control, i.e., the political or power variables. Hence, it is my contention that the distinction between the power and affiliational dimensions of unionism has strong theoretical grounds and is mirrored in the differences between these

[44] Tannenbaum, (A Philosophy), p,.169.
[45] Ibid., p.177.
[46] Ibid., p.160.
[47] Ibid., p.169.

two writers who otherwise follow the same line of analysis.

Since the publication of their respective works, both Perlman and Tannenbaum have developed extensive bodies of followers. For instance, both Schneider[48] and Estey[49] clearly follow Perlman's job control argument, while Tyler, for example, aligns himself with Tannenbaum's re-creation of community theme. [50] Moreover, several labor researchers have employed the very distinction which serves as the heart of this study's analysis in fashioning their own study designs and explaining their results. For example, Sayles and Strauss undertook research into rank and file attitudes towards union participation based on the premise that: "A distinction can be made between the acceptance of the union's economic functions and emotional identification with the union as an institution."[51] Sayles and Strauss, moreover, found this distinction of use, their study revealing a "psychic cleavage," with union members accepting their organization's bargaining role, but generally failing to identify with the union as a social institution. On the other hand, while A. Rose[52] and C. Rose[53] both utilized the

[48] Schneider, p.303
[49] Martin Estey, The Unions: Structure, Development and Management (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), p.81.
[50] Gus Tyler, The Political Imperative: The Corporate Character of Unions (New York: MacMillan, 1968), p.186.
[51] Leonard R. Sayles and George Strauss, "What the Worker Rally Thinks of His Union," Harvard Business Review, vol.xxi, no.3 (May-June, 1953), p.94.

political/social distinction employed in my study, its usefulness in these cases was less pronounced, the former finding Local 688 Teamster members endorsing both the bargaining and social roles of their organization, the latter finding an unidentified industrial local's membership dissatisfied with their organization as both a bargaining agency and a social institution.

Local 3, I.B.E.W. in the Literature

Before proceeding to review the existing literature on the power and affiliational dimensions of labor unions I would like to point out that Local 3 of the I.B.E.W. has received considerable coverage by other researchers. Some, notably Harold Seidman, have been highly critical of the Local, with Seidman beginning his indictment of "labor czars" by stating that: "The history of Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in New York City provides a particularly lurid tale of corrupt unionism."[54] Other, Jack Barbash, for example, have been far more evenhanded in their assessment of Local 3, Barbash stating that the Local's reputation as a "free" and

[52] Arnold M. Rose, Union Solidarity: The Internal Cohesion of a Labor Union (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1952), p.182.
[53] Caroline Baer Rose, "Morale in a Trade Union," American Journal of Sociology, vol.lvi, no.2 (September, 1950), p.173.
[54] Harold Seidman, Labor Czars: A History of Labor Racketeering (New York: Liveright, 1938), p.127.

"democratic" union is "partially illusary and partly real."[55] Given the prominance of Local 3, it is not surprising that numerous studies of unionism at both the local and the general levels mention Local 3 as an example of one point or another being made.

There are two works which stand out from the rest as far as their treatment of Local 3 is concerned and which therefore deserve an extended introduction. The first is a book written by Professor Maurice Neufeld of Cornell University in 1951 entitled Day In and Day Out With Local 3, I.B.E.W.[56] Neufeld's text has served Local 3 as a kind of official document, and, in fact, Neufeld, and Cornell University, would establish strong bonds with Local 3 over the years. The reason for this close association is that Neufeld's general attitude about this organization is one of barely restrained adulation. While much of his work is devoted to a morphology of the Local's organizational structure, an equal portion covers the Local's extensive benefit package, and it is apparent that he regarded it as a model for other locals to emulate. Moreover, Neufeld takes Local 3's claims of truly democratic functioning at face value, seeing it as an example of a genuinely open and democratic institution. His account remains valuable (if

[55] Jack Barbash, Labor's Grass Roots: A Study of the Local Union (New York: Harper & Rose, 1956), p.82
[56] Maurice Neufeld, Day In and Day Out With Local 3, I.B.E.W. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1951).

not completely valid) in the present since Local 3 has not changed significantly in its broad form since the early 1950's aside from a few modifications.

A decidedly different impression of the Local's operations can be found in the work of one of Neufeld's Cornell colleagues, Alice Cook. Written a decade after Neufeld's text, Cook's Union Democracy: Practice and Ideal is a comparative study covering four local unions in the New York area, and one cannot but ssume that it was Neufeld who suggested that Cook include Local 3 in her study as a primary example of union democracy in action. Cook does not identify Local 3 as such (she refers to it as Local 300), but in the course of her analysis it is evident that Local 3 is, in fact, the union under scrutiny. In contrast to Neufeld, Cook does not provide a complete inventory of the Local's benefits package, and, again in relief to Neufeld's text, she pays far more attention to the socialization role of the Local's ancillary social clubs. Her principle interest, however, is an evaluation of the Local's surface impression of democracy. In this regard, she finds it far from ideal. Summarizing her study of the Local, Cook writes: "What is apparent from this description of Local 300 is that it has a government only in a very inadequate and undemocratic sense,"[57] going on

[57] Alice H. Cook, Union Democracy: Practice and Ideal (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1963), p.141.

to explain:

> What really holds the organization together is not its governmental structure, for that is balkanized, unrepresentative of the whole, and at no point cohesive, but the highly disciplined and local staff, the system of communications emanating from them, the variety of activities which members are encouraged to engage in, and the far-reaching responsibility given to them in many matters. The programs which they carry on with such devotion become for them the union. At the center somewhere is a power plant over whose turbines and whose productive power they have no control.[58]

The "center" of which Cook speaks is readily identifiable as the office of the Local's Business Manager, occupied at the time of her study by Harry Van Arsdale Jr. and currently by his son, Thomas Van Arsdale. While repeated use of both Neufeld and Cook will be made in the course of this study, as the reader may have already surmized, it is, in fact, Cook's work which rings deepest and true.

The Power Dimension in the Literature

One of the principal topics which has preoccupied students of the power dimension of American unions is the relative strength of local unions vis-a-vis their parent (inter)national unions. "Few aspects of union government," Strauss observes, "received as much attention in the early literature as the relations between local and national unions."[59] In a formal sense, locals are all but

[58] Ibid., p.143.
[59] Strauss, p.235.

absolutely dependent upon nationals for their continued existence. Estey makes this point by stating that: "Local unions are not chartered by the national unions, but may be disbanded, suspended or put under administrative supervision (trusteeship) by the national union."[60] Moreover, in an informal sense, nationals generally possess resources far greater than their constituent locals, national leaders, for example, being far more prominent in nationwide politics.[61] This is particularly true of industrial, as opposed to craft-type, unions. One strong factor contributing to the power of nationals over locals having industrially-based membership is, somewhat ironically, the wishes of management.

> Management in large centralized industries prefers to negotiate with union leaders who represent the entire leadership, rather than with local leaders. This tends to deprive local leaders of much of their power, concentrating power at the national level. Similarly, management in large industries demands that the national union control wildcat strikes to insure continued production, once an agreement has been reached, and national union leaders are urged to punish locals that do not conform to the negotiated contract.[62]

Thus, while the impression may be given that national

[60] Estey, p.41.
[61] Joel Seidman, "Some Requirements of Union Democracy," Labor: Readings on Major Issues, Ricahrd Lester, ed. (New York: Random House, 1969), pp.165-166.
[62] Philip M. Marcus, "Union Conventions and Executive Boards: A Formal Analysis of Organizational Structure," American Sociological Review, vol.xxxi, no.1 (February. 1966) p.62.

unions are at the forefront of union militancy against management, in fact, within the industrial sphere, national labor leaders and business may function as tacit allies in controlling "radical" locals.

A somewhat different situation exists among trade or craft unions. Here we find with Estey that in "many cases the local unions still play the decisive role in collective bargaining, chiefly in the building trades or service trades where product markets are essentially local in character."[63] While the extension of product markets for industrial goods to national scope serves to increase the relative power of the national over the locals in industrial unions, then, in the crafts, locals retain considerable power over their parent bodies. In fact, within the building trades, local leaderships may pay far more attention to the demands of other locals in the area engaged in allied craft work than they do to the demands of their own Internationals.[64]

Along similar lines, a number of writers have commented upon the craft-type unions superiority to industrial-type unions in terms of intra-organizational conflict. "One of the advantages of the craft-union type," Estey observes, "is that, because of the essential similarity of the problems that members face, the

[63] Estey, pp.38 and 62.
[64] Barbash, p.2.

community of interests of their members is relatively great and conflicts of interest relatively small."[65] Indeed, leaders in craft-type unions have used this "commonality" of interest argument to reconcile the lack of factionalism within their organizations with claims of internal democracy.[66] Further support for the idea that craft-type unions are more likely to be democractic than their industrial-type counterparts is provided by Martin.

> Industrial unions, with industrial homogeneity and occupational heterogeneity are less likely to be democratic, for wage rivalry is likely to be intra-union, inhibiting anti-leadership alliances and allowing the executive to play interest groups aginst each other. [67]

Nevertheless, if we define democracy as "responsiveness to the desires of the rank and file," at least one scholar sees the craft-type union as less likely to be democratic than and industrial-format union, Strauss asserts:

> In a typical craft union situation the opportunity for informal upward communication is even less than in industrial unions. Here the workers are typically scattered among a great many employing units, each of very small size, with jobs often of short duration. In a large local a large staff of full-time business agents is needed to police these jobs, and inevitably they are given authority over jobs and over the members. There is no informal shop society of

[65] Estey, p.60.
[66] S.M. Lipset, M.A. Trow and J.S.Coleman, "Democracy and Oligarchy in Trade Union," Trade Unions, W.J. McCarthy, ed. (Middlesex, England: Penquin, 1967), pp.164-165.
[67] Roderick Martin, "Union Democracy: An Explanatory Framework," Trade Unions, W.J. McCarthy, ed. (Middlesex, England: Penquin, 1967), p.195.

> which the business agent is a member and to which he is responsible.[68]

Consequently, scholarly opinion is sharply divided over the issue of whether a craft-type or an industrial-type union is likely to be more democratic.

I have placed this discussion outside of a later examination of internal union democracy in general simply because of the conceptual utility of distinguishing between craft and industrial union forms has eroded greatly over the past three decades. "Undiluted structural types -- in the sense of 'pure' craft or 'pure' industrial union -- are almost non-existent among the international unions,"[69] and the same type of federation or amalgamation exists within large locals. At both the international and local levels, a union will typically contain skilled or "craft" type workers and semi-skilled/unskilled "industrial" type workers, and invariably, the latter dominate the former in directing the union's affairs. As Aronowitz points out: "A major defeat for the industrial union concept was the right won by skilled workers, professional and technical workers, and white-collar workers to hold separate elections under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,"

[68] George Strauss, "Control by the Membership in Building Trades Unions," Labor and Trade Unionism: An Interdisciplinary Reader, Walter Galenson and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960), p.290.

[69] Jack Barbash, The Practice of Unionism (New York: Harper & Row, 1956), p.90

and where skilled workers join with semi-skilled workers as parts of the same union," the technical position of skilled workers within the production process enabled them to enhance their social position and manipulate the union to serve their particular needs."[70] In fact, examples abound of hybrid unions which have a minority of "A" or skilled workers controlling the union over a majority of "B" or unskilled workers as found in Stele's study of the American Flint Glass Workers Union,[71] and Nash's research into Local 1199 of the Drug and Hospitals Union. [72]

This brings us to the central topic of the power dimension of labor unions, that is the existence, or more properly, the lack of democracy within unions in general. As Anderson notes: "Within the field of industrial relations, few topics have received such widespread attention from theorists, researchers, and policy makers as the democratic government of unions."[73] In fact, simply defining the appropriate criteria for evaluating the degree of democracy present within a given union can require

[70] Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises: The Shaping of American Working Class Consciousness (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp.176-177.
[71] H. Ellsworth Steele, "Tenure of Leadership in the American Flint Glass Workers Union," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.lxv, no.1 (February, 1951), pp.130-132.
[72] John C. Anderson, "A Comparative Analysis of Local Union Democracy," Industrial Relations, vol.xvii, no.3 (October, 1978), p.278.
[73] John C. Anderson, "A comparative Analysis of Local Union Democracy," Industrial Relations, vol.xvii, no.3 (October, 1978), p.278.

elaborate exegesis in and of itself.

> A vast number of criteria of local union democracy have been discussed in the literature. Strauss, in summarizing past research, classifies such criteria into three groups: (1) legal, encompassing constitutional provisions, honest elections, regularly called meetings, and freedom for an opposition to develop; (2) behavioral, including institutionalized opposition, close elections, and high participation; and (3) responsiveness and control, comprising the ability of officers to reflect members' interests, to be responsive to members' demands, and to allow a substantial amount of control to reside with the general membership.[74]

In fact, it is quite possible that a union can be highly democratic when judged by one yarstick of democracy, e.g., legal porvisions, while, at the same time, be deemed highly undemocratic when another criteria is applied, e.g., behavioral and responsiveness measures.

As a rule, however, the bulk of the literature suggests that despite a nominal commitment to democratic forms, in practice, unions are oligarchical. The rule is, in fact, Robert Michel's "Iron Law of Oligarchy" formulated in the early twentieth century as the vanguard of "elite theory." "It is by now commplace," Applebaum and Blaine tell us, "to assert that the American trade union movement is a classic example of Michel's 'iron law of oligarchy'." Marcus provides a succinct rendition of Michel's thought on

[74] Ibid., p.279.
[75] Leon Applebaum and Harry R.Blaine, "The 'Iron Law' Revisited: Oligarchy in Trade Union Locals," Labor Law Journal, vol.xxvi, no.9 (September, 1975), p.597.
[76] Marcus, p.61.

this front.

> Even in organizations whose very goal is to attain greater democracy for the membership, said Michel, oligarchical structure develops to prevent the fullest expression of the members' interests and desires. The "Iron Law of Oligarchy" holds because organizations require concerted action which virtually demands the delegation of special tasks to a few leaders. The separation of leadership from the rank and file contributes to member apathy, and this tends to strengthen the leaders powers and permit their self-perpetuation. Frequently the organization's existence becomes an end in itself for the leaders who wish to retain the rewards of their high position. The organization's original goals are often compromised and subverted as a result of these oligarchical tendencies.[76]

Michel was not specifically concerned with labor unions: he intended his Iron Law as a universal rule fitting the behavior of all organized groups, but it is his broad theory which has been called upon most often in explaining the oligarchical tendencies inherent in labor organizations.

The classic work on union oligarchy remains that of Lipset, Trow and Coleman. Their focus begins with a look at all "voluntary organizations" with their comment that, "In few areas of political life is the discrepancy between the formal judicial guarantees of democratic procedures and the actual practice of oligarchic rule so marked as in private or voluntary organizations such as trade unions..."[77] This same observation has been made by

[76] Marcus, p.61.
[77] Lipset, Trow and Coleman, p.155.

Aronowitz in more concise fashion: "Many unions in the United States have retained the forms but not the content of democracy."[78] In fact, when approached objectively, even the forms which unions typically evince in terms of their internal structures are less than what is conventionally thought of as democratic, for, as Estey remarks, "unions typically do not have a two-party political system, with an incumbent party and a recognized and accepted opposition party."[79] In lieu of such a two-party system, unions, with the noteworthy exception of the Typographical Union, display one-party rule; that party being being comprised of the incumbent officers who face a disorganized opposition during periodic elections, one which was no formal status with the organization.

As a result of the oligarchical tendencies of union government, the clearly warranted impression is left that unions are, in fact, non-democratic or undemocratic. "A common stereotype among industrial relations students is that (unions) are undemocratic,"[80] and polls of union rank and file members support this general viewpoint.[81] At bottom, there is an essential paradox involved in the rights of the individual union member, one which has been

[78] Aronowitz, p.219.
[79] Estey, p.50.
[80] Strauss, p.170.
[81] A.H. Raskin, "Big Labor Strives to Break Out of Its Rut," Fortune, (August 27, 1979), p.38.

cogently set forth by Hardman:

> The distinction between the rights of individuals concerning their internal and external interests is thin and often blurred. The two sets of rights differ in that union members have the actual power to assert and defend their rights when immediate material interests are at stake in negotiations with employers. But they do not have quite that power when it comes to defending individual rights within the union.[82]

From the standpoint of many, Hardman's qualified conclusion is an understatement since in actual practice union members are under the virtual control of a leadership which they have little, if any, chance of dislodging from power via electoral means.

There are, of course, some labor theorists and researchers who dispute the general supposition that unions are undemocratic. One school, for example, states that unions must be "nondemocratic" in their internal affairs in order to marshall the type of united front necessary to function effectively in dealings with management.[83] This "societal pluralism" argument, however, is more of an apology for undemocratic internal affairs within unions than anything else. Still others assert that unions must be responsive to their members in the sense of delivering in contract bargaining and enforcement.[84] But this position suffers from the same flaw as the "societal

[82] Hardman, p.56.
[83] Martin, p.189.
[84] Hardman, p.57.

pluralism" position and, moreoever, there is considerable evidence to show that most unions do not "deliver" on either the overt or tacit claims of the rank and file.[86]

Perhaps the most common argument in defense of unions on the issue of internal democracy is that their constitutions, constrained by Federal law, allow for the potential of opposition factions emerging which "limits executive ability to disregard rank and file opinion by providing the potential means for its overthrow (although the potential is rarely realized)."[86] As Marcus counters, "this criterion evades the question of influence channels and allows many more unions to be classified as democratic," than is warranted by the facts.[87] Nonetheless, by employing such weak definitions of what constitutes democracy, Strauss for one, was able to examine the affairs of four local building unions and report that: "All four of these locals were democratic."[88]

Apart from the disparity in the criteria used by different scholars to assess internal democracy in labor unions, perhaps some of these differences can be explained through reference to different characteristics which varying unions possess. This notion has been given support

[86] Michael Poole, Theories of Trade Unionism: A Sociology of Industrial Relations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), p.73.
[86] Martin, p.191.
[87] Marcus, p.62.
[88] Strauss (1960), p.285.

by Marcus in his statement "that although certain conditions do diminish membership control, others actually increase rank and file influence over leaders.[89] One such characteristic which has received considerable attention in the literature is sheer size. Stein sees the size of a union organization directly correlated with its degree of internal democracy.

> The lessening of union democracy is inextricably and inevitably interwoven with the large growth of the individual union... the prospects for th recreation of literal democracy diminish as the size of the union is increased.... [90]

In his analysis, Stein points out that as a union increases in size, and especially when it is large enough to "afford" a full-time, paid staff, a gap develops between the leadership and the bulk of the membership.[91] Marcus' research, focusing upon national convention frequency as a measure of democracy, reinforces Stein's position, as he observes that: "Frequency of conventions is limited by the size and structure of the union," and, "large unions with many locals, and older unions tend to convene less frequently."[92] Marcus' findings were based on the study of national unions in the United States, but doubt is cast

[89] Marcus, p. 70.
[90] Emmanuel Stein, "The Dilemma of Union Democracy," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. cccl, (November, 1963), p. 47
[91] Ibid., p. 51.
[92] Marcus, p. 70.

upon their universal validity by Edelstein and Ruppel in their alternative study of national unions in Great Britain using the same frequency of conventions test as they report:

> A study of 77 British unions did not support the hypothesis, previously supported for American unions, that increasing organizational size, complexity and age lead to a loss of membership control, as shown in the infrequency of national conventions. Greater size and complexity were associated with a greater frequency of conventions, probably in part because of the greater prevalence of district or occupational representation at conventions of the larger unions.[93]

However, the difficulties involved in using a single characteristic as a measure of internal union democracy are apparent when we consider that even if size can be correlated with a greater frequency of national conventions, these conventions may simply be seen as "delegate assemblies" which do not adequately reflect the demands of a genuine rank and file.[94] The bulk of the evidence suggests, in line with Marcus, that greater size does entail a diminution of internal democracy since it leads to a hardening of the bureaucratic structure within the union as these organizations become more complex and control mechanisms become more elaborate.[95]

[93] J. David Edelstein and Howard J. Ruppel, "Convention Frequency and Oligarchic Degeneration in British and American Unions," Administrative Science Quarterly, vol.xv, no.1 (March, 1970), p.47.
[94] Anderson, p.283.
[95] Ibid., p.281

This is not to say that smaller unions are necessarily more democratic than their large counternumbers, or that local unions are necessarily more democratic than national ones. In a local building trades union, for example, a central business agent or business manager may exercise greater power over his membership, despite the fact that he has greater ongoing contact with them than national leaders, i.e., that the communication "gap" between the leader and his followers is comparatively small.[96] Again, there are factors which can curb the business manager's capacity to exercise control in an authoritatian manner,[97] but, these are numerous, varied and ill-defined.

Whatever criteria we use, whatever group of unions is studied and whatever their level, local or national, we are brought back to the salient tenets of Michel's "Iron Law" when we examine actual and potential leadership turnover. "At the head of most private organizations, "with trade unions as a prime example," stands a small group of men most of whom have held high office in the organization's government for a long time and whose tenure and control is rarely threatened by a serious organized internal opposition."[98] Once an individual union leader assumes power, whether through election, appointment or otherwise,

[96] Strauss (1960), p.171.
[97] Strauss (1977), p.232.
[98] Lipset, Trow and Coleman, p.156.

it is "virtually impossible"[99] to dislodge him. The reason for the iron-clad tenure of union leaders in their positions are essntially two-fold: the advanage which incumbency furnishes to them against prospective challengers and the generalized apathy of the rank and file.

As for the first set of factors accounting for the low degree of leadership turnover in unions, Joel Seidman has divided them into three groups: "(1) control over channels of communication, (2) opportunity to build a political machine, and (3) elements of power over the rank and file."[100] In any union, small or large, national or local, the organization is likely to communicate with its membership through in-house publications; newsletters, and the contents of these publications are more than likely to be stringently controlled by the existing leadership. Moreover, since the leadership normally chairs business meetings, it can, through procedural devices, effectively curb the expression of hostile views from the rank and file. As to the second of these advantages of incumbancy Widick has written: "The chief method of fortifying the position of the officialdom is through the administration machine which is basic to the real structure -- not necesarily to the formal constitutional or idea structure

[99] Ibid., p.159.
[100] J. Seidman, p.164.

-- of the internal life of the union."[101] Incumbent executives in unions frequently have a number of positions below them to which they can appoint rank and file individuals. The existence of these "political plums" stimulates members to curry favor from executives by actively supporting their continuance in office.[102] Thirdly, executives in many unions have formal mechanisms through which they can discipline "errant" members. Like the "carrot" of political appointment, the "stick" of discipline can serve as a powerful instrument for keeping members in line, that is, supporting elected officials. Frequently we find that members can be disciplined for vaguely defined offenses, e.g., "slandering" an incumbent union officer, and punishments may range from fines to expulsion from the union. A fourth mechanism by which leaders retain union office which is not given by Weidman consists of the development of a "cult of personality."[103] As a consequence of the past gains which they have won for their members, of the struggles which they have engaged in with management, etc., members may form an idealized image of their leaders, believing that they owe these individuals their loyalty. In fact, this charismatic factor is self-reinforcing in the sense that the leader begins to

[101] Widick, p.79.
[102] J. Seidman, p.165.
[103] Widick, p.80.

perceive himself as special and, therefore, able to bend the rules for the membership's "well being."

> The officer forms a self-image as an important industry and political figure. As a result, he envisions himself as a "papa who knows best" and therefore feels that he has the right and duty to caution, restrain, admonish and even punish the unruly or misguided member.[104]

By way of contrast, the potential challenger to the incumbents offices does not have access to formal channels of communication, has no "political plums" firmly in hand, cannot discipline his followers and has not had the opportunity to evolve an aura of charisma about himself.

The second, and intimately related, set of factors which inhibit turnover in union officers revolves around the "well-known problems of membership apathy."[105] Apart from the rewards and sanctions attached to supporting , or failing to support, office holders, the rank and file may simply be disinterested in the outcome of internal political processes. Thus Sayles and Strauss would underscore membership apathy in explicating the results of their study:

> This apathy toward the union's organizational or "internal" life shows up clearly in participation statistics. Except in matters which concern the union's collective bargaining functions and affect the worker's economic position vis-a-vis the company (rates of pay, promotion, hours of work and so on), participation in internal activities is extremely low. For example.

[104] Tyler, p.285.
[105] Estey, p.49.

> attendance at regular meetings of large industrial unions averages from 2% to 8% of the total membership, whereas at extraordinary events, it averages 40% to 80%.[106]

Although there is some evidence to suggest that regular participation in union affairs is higher in craft type unions than in the industrial type unions studied by Sayles and Strauss,[107] in general, the rank and file membership leaves union leaders with a clear field, so to speak, being fundamentally disinterested in who governs or what their policies are so long as they are not affected in an immediate economic sense.[108]

In light of the advantages which union elected office-holders enjoy over potential challengers, it is not surprising to find that office turnover at both the national and local levels is inordinately low. As Estey observes, formal mechanisms for limiting the number of consecutive terms which an individual can hold are rarely placed in the constitutions of national unions,[109] and while a like study of local by-laws has not been made, one can assume that few, if any, require rotation of personnel. Thus, at the national level, not only do incumbents normally triumph in elections; they frequently run

[106] Sayles and Strauss, p.95.
[107] Albert Rees, The Economics of Trade Unions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), p.173.
[108] Paul E. Sultan, The Disenchanted Unionist (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p.248.
[109] Estey, p.53.

unopposed, with one study of seven national unions over a forty year period finding that of 764 executive positions, "only 130, or 17 percent, were contested."[110] The typical route through which national leaders exit from office is not by defeat at the ballot box, but, rather, through the natural attrition of death and retirement.[111] This situation has not escaped the attention of the Federal Government which through legislative acts has attempted to stimulate more frequent elections, and, by inference, a greater turnover in office. These enactments however, have not had a significant impact upon leadership turnover, as Snowbarger and Pintz inform us: For the four two-year periods prior to Landrum-Griffin (1950-1959), turnover averaged 23.3 percent per period' for the three two-year periods after the passage of the Act (1961-1967), the percentage declined to 19.3."[112]

On the surface, it would appear that executive turnover is greater at the local level than at the national one.[113] In his study of the tenure of business agents in local unions, Strauss points to an "acceptable" level of turnover.

In the most recnt elections seven out of fourteen

[110] Applebaum and Blaine, p.598.
[111] Ibid., p.599.
[112] Marvin Snowbarger and Sam Pintz, "Landrum-Griffin and Union President Turnover," Industrial Relations vol.ix, no.4 (October, 1974), pp.475-476.
[113] Strauss (1977), p.236.

> full-time business agents faced opposition, and one was defeated. Over the last six years, six had been either defeated or forced to retire in face of membership pressure. At the time this study was made, business agents had been in office for an average of 7.5 years -- yet none felt completely secure. Elections were never taken lightly, and for some the prospect of being defeated was a source of constant and often neurotic worry. For executive board positions opposition and turnover was even more common.[114]

Applebaum and Blaine cite a similar study of local union officers in the city of Milwaukee pursued over the years 1960 to 1962 and yielding the conclusion that "over 40 percent of the major officers were replaced."[115] However, the same research team goes on to make a very important point about interpreting such figures in the case of local union leaderships, the fact that leaders may leave one high office in the union only to assume another. In their extensive research into a cross-section of local unions, Applebaum and Blaine used the index of <u>new</u> individuals entering the union hierarchy, and reported that turnover ratios calculated on this basis averaged less than 0.20 percent, that is, less than one new individual entered the hierarchy at each election for every four who retained office, while in 13 percent of the locals surveyed, there were no new entrants into the hierarchy at all.[116] These figures led Applebaum and Blaine to conclude:

[114] Strauss (1977), p.172.
[115] Applebaum and Blaine, p.597.
[116] Ibid., pp.599-600.

> We believe that previous estimates of the frequency of officer turnover at the local level are misdirected. Although turnover in individual officers may be considerable, the rate of change lessens signigicantly when the positions in question are either full time or significant part-time. And if we use a measure of leadership group stability, the evidence is even more dramatic: most turnover is replacement or exchange from within a clearly defined group.[117]

Even in small, local unions, leadership turnover does not begin to approximate what one would normally expect in a nominally "democratic " organization,[118] while in elections for officers in larger locals, turnover may be virtually non-existent.[119]

Given their extended terms in office, at the end of their careers union leaders may confront a leadership gap, with no new generation of sub-leaders adquately trained to assume their positions at the top.[120] But if this generation gap is profound, a far more knotty problem is found in the almost complete absence of minority individuals in high union office. As Lamm summarized what is a self-evident observation: "Being black substantially reduces one's chances for gaining union leadership."[121] The fact that aging white leaders hold on to office for

[117] Ibid., p.600.
[118] William A Faunce, "Size of Locals and Union Democracy," American Journal of Sociology, vol.lxviii, no.3 (November, 1962), p.298.
[119] Nash, p.562.
[120] Raskin, p.40.
[121] Roger Lamm, "Black Union Leaders at the Local Level," Industrial Relations, vol.xiv, no.2 (May, 1975), p.231.

prolonged periods of time virtually assures the exclusion of Blacks, Hispanics and women from key union posts. To be sure, on occasion a minority group member has been able to approach the center of union power, but invariably, such individuals have been "sponsored" by white officials.[122] Hnad-picked for their capacity to accomodate themselves to existing, i.e., white-dominated, union policies, token minority group members find it exremely difficult to affect change without appearing to reverse themselves and become labelled as "radicals or turncoats.[123] This is particularly the case in hybrid unions where an older, male, and white leadership directs the union toward policies which favor skilled "A" workers while allowing only marginal representation from the ranks of minority group semi-skilled "B" workers.[124]

Before ending this review of the literature concerning the power dimension of labor organizations, it is necessary to mention the emergence of a phenomena which has been previously touched upon, the integration of union management through "joint boards." As Aronowitz asserts, "trade unions have become as appendage of corporations,"[125] and this is nowhere more evident than in labor-

[122] Strauss (1977), p.230.
[123] Scott, Greer, Last Man In: Racial Access to Union Power (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1959).
[124] Nash, p.564.
[125] Aronowitz, p.219.

management joint boards. Typically staffed by an equal number of representatives from business and labor, joint boards frequently deal with such matters as fringe benefits and productivity in a "spirit of cooperation."[126] Through the conduit of joint boards, moreover, management develops a routinized and "businesslike" part in the day to day operations of the union as when, for instance, benefit programs are administered through such bodies. Among the functions which such boards typically perform are:

> (1) staffing for members firms through maintenance of employment offices and contacts with union hiring halls, (2) managerial and supervisory training, (3) administration of insurance and other employee benefit plans, (4) wage and salary administration, and (5) research on pay, personnel practices and collective bargaining materials.[127]

A supremely interesting finding brought forth in a study prepared by Dyer, Lipsky and Kochan reveals that: "Respondents in unions with relatively few minority members tended to favor joint programs to a greater extent than those with a relatively high proportion of minority members."[128] One reason for this relationship is that joint boards are most prevalent in the case of skilled, craft-type unions. The "natural domain" of these

[126] Michael H. Schuster, Union-Management Cooperation (Kalamazoo, Michigan: W.E. UpJohn Institute for Employment Research, 1984), p.1.
[127] Derber, p.94.
[128] Lee Dyer, David B. Lipsky and Thomas A. Kochan, "Union Attitudes Toward Management Cooperation," Industrial Relations, vol.xvi, no.2 (May, 1977), p.168.

associations is "a highly competitive industry consisting of numerous small and medium-sized forms and a relatively strong union seeking stability, standarization and convenience in collective bargaining."[129] For these reasons, it is in the construction trades that joint boards have flourished, sectors in which comparatively strong locals comprised of skilled workers or dominated by skilled workers deal with a relatively large number of individual employers.[130]

The Affiliational Dimension in the Literature

As a rule, scholars have paid far less attention to the affiliational dimension of labor unions than they have to the power dimension of organized labor. In large measure, the relative neglect of the "social side" of unions rests upon the acceptance of Perlman's understanding of unionism in contradistinction to Tannenbaum's. "For American labor," Hammer writes, "the decision to join unions has been and still is largely an instrumental one."[131] Nevertheless, a number of scholars have recognized the importance of affiliational ties as underpinnings to union solidarity, and in this regard, A. Rose's comment "Union

[129] Derber, p.109.
[130] Ibid., p.84.
[131] Tove Helland Hammer, "Relationships Between Local Union Characteristics and Worker Behavior and Attitudes," Academy of Management Journal, volv.xxi, no.4 (1978), p.561.

loyalties of the members are attached to the local union, not to the international,"[132] is relevant since much scholarly attention has been focused upon international unions while overlooking the practical workings of local bodies.

Poole is among those authors who extends the greatest weight to the impotance of affiliational bonds for understanding the meaning of unionism. He stresses the importance of this aspect of union affairs in a passage which reads:

> But to focus upon cultural elements and the social action perspective is to add a final crucial dimension, which alongside structural movements, organizational and institutional exegencies and the power of the respective parties to industrial relations, binds together the various segments of modern theorizing about trade unionism. For, after all, an indispensable minimum in any explanatory synthesis is to incorporate the distinctively human capacity of groups of workers to develop certain meaning (whether context-independent or context-specific) about their social experiences since, in action, these produce a rich cultural variety manifest in an array of cognate institutional forms. [133]

While they are clearly in the minority, there are a number of scholars who follow Tannenbaum in adcknowledging the importance of subjectivist influences upon the character of a union as being of equal importance to, for

[132] A. Rose, p.186.
[133] Poole, p.187.
[134] Richard B. Meyers, "Interpersonal Relations in the Building Industry," Applied Anthropology, vol.v, no.2, (spring, 1946), p.1.

instance, structural features, in explicating organizational behavior.

The study of subjective facets of unionism peaked during the late 1940's and early 1950's as sociologists and anthropologists brought their powers to bear upon unions. Meyer's 1946 study of the "attitudes, sentiments and traditions which form the culture of the trades (in building locals),[134] was one of the first in a large volume of efforts produced during the 1950's which were devoted to "member satisfaction with union activities and with loyalty toward the union as a whole."[135] Unfortunately, around the mid-1950's, such scholarly interest began to wane, the last wave of these subjectivist studies being devoted to "dual loyalty research" which "tested the hypothesis that positive attitudes toward the union would lead to negative attitudes toward the employer."[136]

While studies concentrating upon the affiliational dimension of unions have been scarce since the early 1950's, there have been a handful of efforts which have sought to link worker attitudes with the structural characteristics of unions published since that period. For example, Greer's examination of racial relations within

[134] Ricahrd B. Meyers, "Interpersonal Relations in the Building Indsutry," Applied Anthropology, vol.v, no.2 (spring, 1946), p.1.
[135] Strauss (1977), pp.219-220.
[136] Hammer, p.561.
[137] Greer, p.125.

West Coast local unions initiates his analysis by describing the associational base upon which unions are built and relating them to the control structure adopted by each given organization.[137]

In fact, many of the studies conducted on the affiliational dimension of union life appear to have been aimed at indirectly explaining the power dimension problem of inadequate union democracy through examination of membership participation in union affairs. Thus, while Martin's examination of union operations is concerned with union democracy, the bulk of his piece is devoted to describing the characteristics which led to or inhibit membership social participation, including: "the degree of informal association on or off the job; the degree of isolation from non-members; the number of role relationships between members; the degree of identification with occupation and the union; and the number of functions performed by the union."[138] Similarly, A. Rose's research into the workings of a Teamsters local seeks to identify sources of strong loyalty by the members toward the local within the context of member participation, finding that such loyalty can be bolstered by including union members' families in a range of social activities that, "a

[137] Greer, p.125.
[138] Martin, p.198.

frustrated desire to participate is worse for union loyalty than no desire to participate."[139]

I have already mentioned the work of Sayles and Strauss in the context of the power dimension of local unions, but, as suggested above, their study was also concerned with measuring union member identification with their organization as a social institution. They report:

> Whatever their attitude toward the union's economic function, few workers have a feeling of identification with the union. One attitude survey conducted in a large industrial plant revealed only a minority of the workers showed any real emotional involvement. More specifically, although 87% of the workers felt that the union was "accomplishing much or making great efforts," their attitudes toward the union's goals, as they say them, were as follows:
>
> 3% strong acceptance
> 24% moderate acceptance
> 68% neutral or no evidence
> 3% moderate rejection
> 2% strong rejection.[140]

These results must be qualified, however, due to the study population used in the Sayles and Strauss research. A much higher degree of emotional identification, membership participation and acceptance of the union as a social institution has been found among highly-paid, skilled workers of the kind found in building trade craft locals. Strauss summarizes four conditions which tend to further the individual members sense of community within the

[139] A. Rose, pp.183-184.
[140] Sayles and Strauss, p.95.

framework of unionism, all of which are more common to craft-type workers than to their industrial-type counterparts:

> This sense of community may exist if several conditions are met. The first requirement is that the nature of the union members' working and living arrangements permit frequent interaction with other members. High participators tend to work in small plants, on the night shift, or in key communications postions... and to live in isolated communities with chiefly fellow members as neighbors.
>
> Generally, sense of occupational community is enhanced if the members value and identify with their occupations, that is, if they have a stake in their jobs. Thus high union participants tend to be more senior and to hold higher-paid, higher-status jobs than do low participants and also to be more satisfied with their jobs.... Third, workers are more likely to feel part of an occupational community and to participate in a union if they are socially active and their social activity revolves around work. Finally, occupational communities are strengthened if those who belong to them are relatively homogeneous to job as well as ethnic and cultural background.[141]

Form and Danserea have also noted that the affiliational dimension is more important than simple economic interest in explaining individual participation within unions, that, "social activists" were more active than those with economic interest.'"[142] What we can glean from this initial survey is that (1) the affiliational dimension is extremely important in explaining actual individual and

[141] Strauss (1977), p.222.
[142] William H. Form and H. Kirk Danserea, "Union Member Orientation and Patterns of Social Integration," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol.xi, no.10 (October, 1957), p.9.

organizational behavior, (2) that involves in this of union life is highly variable, and (3) that it is linked to the power dimension of union workings.

Turning now to the two salient facets of the affiliational dimension under consideration in this paper, i.e., fringe benefit programs and social clubs, Barbash notes in relation to the former that only "a limited number of locals" carry on such benefit programs as "housing cooperatives, scholarships for members' children, health care clinics, credit union activites,"[143] etc.

Evidence concerning the relative value which members place upon immediate economic rewards, e.g., wage gains, versus indirect rewards, fringe benefits, is mixed.[144] Schneider maintains that fringe benefits are of low priority for most union members when compared to direct economic gains.

> ...Allegiance of rank and file to unions depends on the extent to which unions can achieve economic and others "practical" goals dear to the workingman.... Few workers thought that the union was helping to achieve goals not directly connected with the job, e.g., medical or legal advice...[145]

This impression has been countered by the findings of A. Rose's research into a Teamsters local.

The union members are enthusiastic about the

[144] Strauss (1977), p.220.
[145] Schneider, p.304.

> newer supplementary functions of unions, such as extending security and providing recreational affairs. There is evidence that a majority now consider these functions more important than the traditional ones of getting higher wages and shorter hours.[146]

Hence, whether workers attach greater importance to direct wage benefits than they do to fringe benefits is obviously a matter of what is being used to distinguish between the two, and, more importantly, what study population is being surveyed, e.g., skilled as opposed to unskilled or semi-skilled workers.

In fact in one sense, fringe benefits have become more important over the decades since World War II, particularly during times when general economic conditions constrain the unions' opportunities of pushing for direct wage advances. As Burtt informs us, the cost of providing fringe benefits to union workers is a rough index of their relative importance within collective bargaining negotiations, and, in the course of a single decade, the 1960's supplementary benefits grew from an average of 18 percent of the compensation paid to manufacturing workers to 24 percent of such compensation.[147]

The evolution of fringe benefits and their growing importance as an explanatory variable in union affairs has been traced by a number of scholars, most of whom identify

[146] A. Rose, pp.184-185.
[147] Burtt, p.229.

World War II as the origin of these programs.[148] During the war, the federal government limited direct wage gains, but allowed unions to make advances in fringe areas. As Aronowitz tells us, after the War craft unions took a new track, eschewing their support for New Deal type social legislation in favor of industry wide, or contract-wide benefit programs.

> Their support for significant improvements in social welfare took a back seat to the use of bargaining power to strengthen the existing welfare structure within the industry. Since nearly all union members have occasion to require the services of the health plan, pension benefits, or the increasingly common cut-rate eyeglass, dental, drug and other retail goods sold either by union outlets directly or through special arrangements with retail stores, the function of the union in the lives of its membership extended far beyond the shop floor. Many members who had given up hope that the union would defend them on the job remained loyal to the union leadership because of the growing importance of these ancillary services.[149]

The importance of fringe benefits increased significantly in the late 1940's as the combination of economic recession[150] and judicial rulings[151] contributed to their growth and prominence. The emergence of fringe benefits, as Aronowitz points out, was a highly conservative development in the history of American unionism. This was,

[148] Francis M. Wistert, Fringe Benefits, (New York: Reinhold, 1959), p.2.
[149] Aronowitz, p.363.
[150] Aronowitz, p.361.
[151] Burtt, p.229.

in part, a political strategy in rection to a prevailing national climate of conservatism. "After 1949," Aronowitz writes, "union leaders responded to the conservative mood and the adverse economic conditions of the country by concentrating their political action on softening the blows of anti-union forces in Congress and adopting their collective bargaining strategy to the pursuit of health benefits, pensions and other 'fringes' rather than concentrating on money wage increases."[152] More importantly, from out particular standpoint, union leaders discovered that such fringes could be a conservative force in a sense that they valued most highly, i.e., the conservation of their power within unions.

> The welfare program became an adhesive for members' loyalty to the existing union leadership, which usually cotrolled the vital pension and health policies within the local or district union. MOreover, welfare plans were used by the leadership as a club to curb members' resistance to union poliicies.[153]

The mechanism through which such benefit programs can be employed to keep members in line is not difficult to comprehend. If members wish to benefit from the provisions of these programs at some future time, they must remain overtly loyal to those who administer them, i.e., union leaderships and, often, joint union-management boards.

[153] Ibid., p.363.
[154] Ibid., p.262.

There is one final sense in which the emergence of fringescan be seen as a conservative phenomena within American unionism, one which harkens back to Perlman's "job control" argument. As Aronowitz correctly predicted in the late 1960's, established union leaderships became more and more hostile to "radical" strains within their organization, remaining benefits-oriented, and, "fighting incessantly to improve the economic position of their own membership in relation to other sections of the work force rather than in relation to the employers."[154]

Within unions themselves, it is the sub-group of skilled, high-paid workers having greater intra-organizational power who favor fringe benefits over direct wage gains in contract negotiations. As a management researcher observes, "since the union is more likely to express the desires of the more senior workers, it is not surprising that fringes are stressed in negotiations."[155] While younger members with less of a stake in benefit programs are likely to favor direct wage benefits, older workers, from whose ranks union leaderships are drawn, have a far greater interest in fringe benefits. Indeed, as Wistert relates, the attitudes of rank and file members toward fringes varies greatly, so that, for instance, "older men were found to be far more receptive

[154] Ibid., p.262.
[155] Mitchell, p.61.

to fringe bargaining than younger family men who prefer direct pay increases."[156] In the main, it is precisely that group of workers who possess the greatest proportional degree of leverage within a union's power structure who display the greatest degree of support for fringes.

As with fringe benefits, the comparative importance of social clubs in determining worker attitudes toward and behavior within unions is a matter of debate. Again, Schneider contends that, "(Not) many workers seem to value their unions highly as social clubs or as recreation centers, although unions may serve such functions for a small minority."[157] Nevertheless, in terms of the creation of solidarity bonds between individual members and the union, social activities, frequently organized around ancillary clubs, perform a vital function for the union leadership.

> From the point of view of the union the motive for sponsoring social events is not merely to satisfy the recreational needs of members and their families at a low cost. If this were all that was involved, management sponsored events... might fully satisfy the need. The union's motive is to build a deeper attachment to the union, to foster a sense of identification with the work group and with the union that will translate itself into solidarity (with the Union).[158]

[156] Wistert, p.5.
[157] Schneider, p.303.
[158] Jeol Seidman, Jack London, Bernard Karsh and Daisy L. Tagliacozzo, The Worker Views His Union (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958), pp.222-223.

Aronowitz places social clubs under the rubric of legitimaized play, commenting, "Many loacl unions function most of the time as barrooms and social clubs; union business is transacted in part, to provide legitimacy for the real activity of the membership -- play." Such social club functions have a pointed purpose for the leadership in retaining their power, the diversion of rank and file members from real decision-making processes. At the same time, social functions tend to cement active members of the ledership group into a tightly-knit cadre,[160] and can serve as a base for elite recruitment as well.

One of the chief functions performed by social clubs and social functions within the union is the process of socializing of indoctrinating individual members with the values of the organization's culture. Perline and Lorenz emphasize this aspect of social activities.

> The extent to newcomer orientation to the group is paramount in maintaining or increasing levels of activity. If a systematic program of membership indoctrination to group purposes and objectives is established, membership turnover is reduced. If members are invited to participate at the start in group activities, they are more likely to adopt the "social" characteristics of

[159] Aronowitz, p.93.
[160] Schneider, p.305.
[161] Martin M. Perline and V.R. Lorenz, "Factors Influencing Member Participation in Trade Union Activities," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol.xxix, no.3 (November, 1962), p.432.

> the group. These social attributes of the group are in some sense hereditary in that the group transmits these qualities to its members.[161]

In terms of the union's interest in the newcomer, social clubs perform two inter-related functions which support the status quo: (1) they allow new members to become active without impinging upon core political processes; and (2) they impart a value system to these individuals which includes such conservative ideals as loyalty to the union and support for the status quo within its leadership.

As to the diversion function of social clubs, Nash in his study of Local 1199 of the Drug and Hospital Union in New York City has insightfully written:

> The union leadership quite clearly desires participation of members. The desire is written into the constitution. There are, however, two levels of participation by members in the union. ONe is the non-decision-making activities of the union in which there is extensive and intensive participation. These activities consist of dances, boar rides, sports, civil rights celebrations, rallies, peace demonstrations, political rallies and the utilization of union services (e.g., health and drug plans and credit union). The other level of participation consists of activities related to decision-making and is much less intensive and extensive....
>
> With respect to the non-decision-making activities, the union has demonstrated considerable imagination, verve and sensitivity. With respect to the activities which involve decision-making, it has not demonstrated a similar sense of imagination, verve and sensitivity; on the contrary, it has somehow, created blocks to participation in decision making by members and delegates. By locking members and delegates into a complex network of bureaucratic rules, the leadership has inadvertently or otherwise reduced genuine decision making and thoughtful involvement by

> members. Meetings are devoted more to socialization by members to leadership norms and to expression by members than to deliberative and legislative procedures.... Thus the exhortation expressed in the constitution to attend meetings becomes ritualistic since it is not accompanied by opportunitites for meaningful participation in the meetings.[162]

Nash's insinuation "inadvertently or otherwise" is clearly to the point. By engaging the rank and file in various types of harmless and politically meaningless activities, the union leadership builds loyalty to the organization and to itself while keeping the rank and file away from the core process of decision-making.

In large local unions directing an array of social activities and social club functions, and especially in those with mixed craft and industrial memberships, a problem emerges in terms of the heterogeneity of the rank and file by race, ethnic background and religious persuasion. Perline and Lorenz have written upon the importance of homogeneity within the socialization process.

> Homogeneity is a major importance in welding the group into active conditioning. While individuals may have the motivation to be active, they need the support of the organization or group with which they identify. The more an individual has in common with his group, the more he can actively participate in group objectives. The typical attributes of a homogeneous group are that members work together; the jobs of members are approximately the same; the pay is equal, and

[162] Nash, p.559.

> they are from the same ethnic group and residential neighborhood....
>
> In addition to the requirements of homogeneity of the work situation, ethnic similarities are important. One inquiry found that ethnic similarities in groups of a mill local union contributed to greater participlation (within the union).... The study concluded therefore, that active groups are more likely to contain workers with common ethnic ties.
>
> In addition to ethnic similarities, residential proximity is a motivating force for group homogeneity. It has been established that the social unity of a group is further increaed by members who happen to live in close proximity to each other.[163]

In parallel fashion, Aronowitz alludes to the importance of ethnic homogeneity as part of the "play role" of local unions.

> Thus, even though the play role of local unions is grounded in the community of interest derived from a single work situation (or labor skill as in the craft unions), its significance resides not in the identification of the members with the union, but with the similarity of their lives. Adults rarely consciously attach significance to pay except as an interlude between the responsibilities of labor and family life. And yet it is in these situations that the person achieves the status equal to other persons in contrast to subordination in the shop and his abstracted domination of the home.[164]

The problem in unions with heterogeneous memberships is that many rank and file members do not think of themselves as equal to those from other racial,ethnic, religious or territorial groups, but, in fact, as superior. Hence, for

[163] Perline and Lorenz, pp.430 and 433.
[164] Aronowitz, pp.94-95.

instance, A. Rose would report that while Teamster local members had great enthusiasm for union-sponsored social activities, "most members favor segregation of Negroes at union social affairs."[165] In identical fashion, Seidman, London, Karsh and Taglizcozzo note that: "many white workers prefer not to bring their families to social events if appreciable numbers of Negro workers are to be present," and, "social events are likely to be best attended where the union membership forms a fairly homogeneous group in terms of skill and pay as well as educational background and race or national origin."[166] Thus the very heterogeneity of a large "mixed" local may erode the value of social activities in carrying out important functions which support the status quo, e.g. increasing membership participation, directing it away from decision-making processes and socializing members to the norms of the incumbent leadership.

How can this problem be overcome? The answer is simple: union leadership can assure social homogeneity in social activites by actively encouraging the formation and maintainance of social clubs for different racial, ethnic, religious, territorial and status quo groups within the union. Will Herberg comments upon this solution in New

[165] A. Rose, p.152.
[166] Seidman, London, Karsh and Tagliacozzo, p.223.

York's needle trades union where the dominant Jewish and Italian membership felt threatened by the inclusion of Negro and Hispanics within their ranks. While rejecting separate "language" locals, the leadership of Local 22, as far back as 1934, turned its attention to organizing the Spanish-speaking and, to a lesser extent, the Negro members, into cohesive and semi-autonomous groups within the local and to providing them with recognized channels through which they could pursue any special interests or concerns of their own. Special Negro and Spanish-speaking organizers were appointed to serve as the link between the union leadership and the ethnic newcomers, and a varied educational, cultural and recreational program was launched.[167]

Under the banner of meeting the special needs of different groups, local unions can maximize the political function of social activities and clubs in support of the leadership status quo by setting up segregated clubs on either a formal or informal basis. The old doctrine of "separate but equal," therefore, can be recast by union leaders through the use of such "special interest" clubs

[167] Will Herberg, "The Old-Timers and the Newcomers: Ethnic Relations in a Needle Trades Union," Journal of Social Issues vol.ix, no.1 (1953), pp.16-17.

which minimize potential conflict and allow for the full exploitation of the union's affiliational dimension in support of the power dimension.

Summary and Conclusion

For the past two decades scholarly interest in labor unions has eroded, reflecting the general decline of unionism in the United States and the failure of organized labor to go beyond a transactional mode. Those recent studies of labor unions which have been published concentrate upon aspects of unions which are marginal to their core characteristics. Thus, although numerous works have dealt specifically with Local 3, the bulk of these were published in the 1950's and 1960's. Moreover, in seeking to establish a theoreticl basis for the topic at hand, I have been forced to return to analyses written in the 1920's (Perlman) and early 1950's (Tannenbaum) to explain my distinction between the power and affiliational dimensions of unions. Studies devoted specifically to the power dimension of unions center around the disparity between union guarantees of formal internal democracy and actual domination by a handful of incumbent leaders having oligarchical characteristics and profound advantages over potential challengers. Those covering the affiliational dimension are fewer in number, but they generally attest to the importance of social bonds built up through devices such as fringe benefits and social clubs, both of which can

be used by union leaderships to cement their hold on internal power. All in all, despite the decreased interest in unions of late, there are ample theoretical and empirical materials to support my undertaking.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF LOCAL 3, I.B.E.W.

1887 to 1919

The parent body of Local 3, the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (I.B.E.W.) was formed in the early 1890's as an outgrowth of the St. Louis World's Fair of 1890. One of the displays featured in that event was an electrical exposition, and work on it brought together electricians from all quarters of the United States. St. Louis would be the sight of the formation of the first local of the I.B.E.W. as the fledgling A.F.L. sent organizer Charles Cassel to a meeting of electrical workers held in that city. This group elected Henry Miller as their first president and received a charter from the A.F.L. as the Electrical Wiremen and Linemen's Union, No.5221.[1] On November, 21, 1891, this group held its first convention, taking the designation of the National Brotherhood of Electrical Workers and confirming Miller as its President. Two weeks later, the A.F.L. granted the N.B.E.W. "sweeping jurisdiction over electrical workers in every branch of the trade and industry."[2] As one of their first actions, the N.B.E.W. convention delegates

[1] International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, History and Structure of the I.B.E.W. (n.p.: I.B.E.W., n.d.), p.1.
[2] Ibid., p.2.

established an apprenticeship system mandating a minimum three-year term for new entrants into the trade before they could qualify for membership as journeymen in the union. At the sixth convention of the N.B.E.W., the inclusion of Local Union 93 based in Ottawa caused the organization to change its name to the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers in 1899.[3]

There are, in fact, two versions of the origin of Local 3, and they differ substantially. According to the "official" rendition, Local 3 was already in existence by the time of the formation of the I.B.E.W. The group consisted of a small number of electrical workers who, in 1887, formed together to establish the Electrical Mechanical Wireman's Union afifliated with the ill-fated Knights of Labor as Local Assembly 5468. According to a second version, Local 3 came into existence in 1891, having no affiliation with the Knights of Labor, and immediately sent delegates to the founding convention of the I.B.E.W. in St. Louis. As Neufeld recounts, in both versions, Local 3 did <u>not</u> join the I.B.E.W. at the time of the latter's first convention, and, in fact, relationships between the New York Local and the I.B.E.W. were highly conflictual:

> Although delegates from this local were present at the founding convention of the I.B.E.W. in

[3] Ibid., p.5.

> 1891, due to a controversy regarding the remission of per capita taxes, the predecessorof Local e refused to become part of the International. The I.B.E.W., in retaliation, established a rival local in the Brooklyn Navy Yard and jurisdictional strife followed. In all, three other locals were fostered by the International in the city during this period.[4]

This first instance of a dispute between New York electricians and the International would not be the last.

At the time of the first I.B.E.W. convention, standard working conditions and wages for electricians in New York City were deplorable. The norm, as established in successive contracts with the City's Building Trades Employers Association was $3.00 a day for a nine hour day over a six day work week. The early efforts of the Local to improve these standards met with hostility from the Employers Association. In an unidentified document published in 1892, the Employers Association presents its position as follows:

> The principal and only point at issue at present is our right to employ whom we choose, and to conduct our business according to our own wishes. We claim that it is not just that any union or body of men chall compel us to employ only union men, and at the same time limit the number of men in the union by closing the books of the same....We object to any arbitration in the matter, for the reason that we have nothing to arbitrate; the question simply being whether we shall manage our own business, or whether it shall be managed for us by a body of men exercising their authority entirely beyond out control.

[4] Neufeld, p.1.

Given the Employers Association's position, it is not surprising that a prolonged lock-out of Local 3 men was put in place in 1892, and given the relative weakness of the union, it is not surprising to find that the one-year contract signed by them with the Association included no wage or hour gains, but merely a promise not to reduce the $3.00 a day rate over the life of the agreement.

Following over a decade in which the new York local waged organizational war against rival unions promoted by the I.B.E.W., it was only in 1901 that the Local affiliated itself with its parent body and received exclusive jurisdiction over electrical construction work in New York City and its surrounding environs. By 1901, the I.B.E.W. took steps to curb the numerous unconstitutional strikes by its constituent locals, and, two years later, the International elected FRank J. McNulty as its first full-time, paid President, allowing him to vigorously enforce the I.B.E.W.'s constitution.[5] The I.B.E.W.'s principal oppostion, however, remained industry employers, who, with the help of state and Federal courts sought and obtained injunctions against all union strike and organizing efforets under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The I.B.E.W. may have gained the upper hand vis-a-vis its locals with McNulty's election, but it was still in a very

[5] I.B.E.W., p.5.

weak position relative to employers.

The use of lockouts to curb union organizing activities was an extremely efficient weapon employed against Local 3 itself during this period. From 1904 through part of 1907, Local 3 members faced a city-wide lockout by electrical employers, an action which received the full blessing of the New York State Supreme Court which issued the opinion: "If the workman may decline to work, the master may decline to employ."[6] Under these circumstances, the Local's ranks declined from 1,800 to a mere 400 members, and when the lock-out issue was finally settled in 1907, the Local was forced to change its designation to Local 534 to placate employers' enmity toward Local 3. Indeed, it was not until 1917 that Local 3 would be recognized as such by the industry's Employers Association and left free to use its original designation. As external conditions for the Local worsened and membership dropped off, it was subject to constant internal friction and misdeeds on the part of its officers. Thus, a 1905 edition of The Electrical Worker reported that a three man committee set up to handle the Local's dwindling coffers refused to return funds entrusted to them and set up their own dual organization, the Electrical Mechanics'

[6] "The Legality of LOckout Sustained," New YOrk Labor Bulletin, December, 1905, pp.439-440.
[7] "Local Union No.3," The Electrical Worker, March, 1905, p.9.

Association.[7]

The same kind of internal conflict would soon plague the I.B.E.W. in the form of the so-called "Reid-Murphy split." During the 1908 national convention, a large portion of the membership seceeded from the I.B.E.W., called their own special convention and elected J.J. Reid and J.W. Murphy as their officers, claiming both the name and the property of the I.B.E.W. While the A.F.L. rejected the Reid-Murphy group from the outset, it was not until a 1912 decision by the United States Supreme Court that the 1908 convention was declared illegal and the purloined funds were returned to the McNulty-headed I.B.E.W.[8] Once this controversy was settled, a modicum of stability entered into the affairs of the International, and, along with the boom in industry activity occasioned by World War I, the I.B.E.W.'s membership grew from 23,500 in 1913 to 148,072 in 1919.[9]

1919 to 1933

Although the War meant a rise in employment opportunities for Local 3 members, the early 1920's signalled a return to the norm of scarce work and low wages. Local 3 business agents engaged in a number of practices which were either corrupt or verged upon corruption. To begin, business agents were elected by the

[8] I.B.E.W., p.6.
[9] Ibid., p.7.

membership, and, as it worked out, separate religious-ethnic groups, organized into clubs, elected their own business agents who, quite naturally, favored their followers in the assignment of such work as was to be had. At the same time, since employers would more readily hire electricians at helper's pay, a number of qualified journeymen accepted positions as helpers, undercutting the Local's journeymen and bringing the term "permanent boys" into the Local's lexicon. Worse, the union issued "privelege cards" for the sun of $2.50 a week which allowed non-union members to work within its jurisdiction without objection. It would later be discovered that some $26,000 in revenues obtained on this basis had not been recorded in the Local's books, i.e., that they had been simply pocketed by Local officials.[10]

In 1921, the New York State Legislature set up an Investigating Committee known as the Lockwood Committee to probe corruption in the building trades in New York City, and one of its first targets was Local 3. The Committee would discover the missing "privelege card" money, and their inquiries led to the Local's Treasurer, William A. Hogan. As a critic of Local 3 tells us:

> William A. Hogan was indicted in March 1922 on a charge of stealing $21,675 from the union between August, 1918 and July, 1921. It was revealed that Hogan had deposited an average of $11,000

[10] H. Seidman, p.128.

> annually in his bank in 1919, 1920 and 1921 and had built a $13,000 home for himself at Mount Vernon. A $19,000 defense fund raised by Local 3 failed to save him. He was convicted and sentenced to from eighteen months to three years in Sing Sing... Shortly after his release from prison, Hogan was made international treasurer (of the I.B.E.W.)[11]

Indeed, following World War I, the fortunes of the International took a turn for the worse as membership dropped from nearly 150,000 in 1919 to less than 60,000 in 1925.[12] The International would respond to this decline with the establishment of an Electrical Workers Benefit Association in 1927 offering the union's first pension plan,[13] but conditions at the national level remained depressed.

In 1926, mindful of continued abuses by Local 3 officials despite the house cleaning activity of the Lockwood Committee, the I.B.E.W. sent an ambitious, energetic and newly-elected Vice President, Howell H. Broach to execute a complete purge of Local 3.[14] Broach had been sent to New York for the nominal purpose of assisting in its membership drive, but, "it soon became apparent that Broach was using his dictatorial powers not to increase the union's membership, but to oust President

[11] Ibid., p.129.
[12] I.B.E.W., p.7.
[13] Electrical Workers Benefit Society, Constitution and By-Laws (Washington: E.W.B.S., 1960), p.35.
[14] John Rogers, "The Electrical Workers Union," Labor Age, March 1932, p.13.

Richard L. O'Hara and other local officers."[15] During the early Broach years, electricians contemplating moving to New York were advised: "The big word to the boys this month is 'Stay away from New York'."[16] Attempting to delve further into the Local's finances, Broach was initially stimied when it was found that union records had "mistakenly" been destroyed by the minor Local official to whom they had been entrusted.[17]

As suggested above, Broach became convinced that nothing short of a wholesale purge and a complete restructuring of Local 3 was in order. From a temporary mission to New York, Broach moved permanently in, and assumed virtually absolute control of the Local's affairs. In one of his earliest moves, Broach declared the religious-ethnic clubs supporting the business agent system illegal to the extent that they interfered in Local business, and, most importantly, he replaced the system of separate business agent elections with one which greatly increased the centralization of power in his hand. Under the new regime, the Local's membership as a whole would elect a Business Manager, who, in turn, would appoint a number of business agents without the further approval of the Local, its Executive Board or any of its officers. As

[15] H. Seidman, p.130.
[16] "L.U. No.3, New York City," The Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, November, 1927, p.584.
[17] H. Seidman, p.311.

Seidman has it:

> Broach became "receiver" for Local 3 and was endowed with absolute power. Business agents ceased to be elected, but could be appointed and summarily discharged by Broach without any appeal to the membership.... Members testified before the Industrial Survey Commission in 1927 that a reign of terror marked by physical assaults, black-listing and arbitrary expulsions had been inaugurated in Local 3.[18]

The Local which Broach came upon in 1926 clearly rewquired reform: the methods which he used to accomplish this aim, however, were nothing short of Draconian, earning him the appellation "little Caesar," A further pall is cast over the Broach reign by the fact that he readily enlisted the assistance of William Hogan in "cleaning out" Local 3.[19]

In 1929, Broach's efforts to recast Local 3 encountered a huge external problem, the coming of the Great Depression. In that year, the I.B.E.W. would hold its last delegate convention for a period of more than a decade as successive conventions were postponed by referendum vote between 1929 and 1941.[20] Although the Depression reduced the I.B.E.W.'s power versus business, Broach himself used the opportunity to reform the International as a whole, including a complete revision of its Constitution, Broach himself having been appointed to the office of International President at the end of 1929

[18] Ibid, pp.134-135.
[19] Rogers, p.13.
[20] I.B.E.W., p.10.

by action of its Executive Council.[21] Needing to firm his position in Washington, Broach left New York in 1932. This move proved to be of no avail as he was forced to resign his post as President of the International.

At the time of Broach's departure, Local 3 was beset by an array of external problems. Chief among these was the depressed work conditions in the industry due to the impact of the Depression. Lacking any "social safety net," Local 3 members were fortunate to secure two days of work a week at a rate below that paid to them in the late 1920's. For men over the age of fifty, work was unavailable altogether. Local 3 attempted to assist its members through parment of $15.00 a week in unemployment benefits, but this depleted the Local's treasury rapidly, and, by 1932, all the Local could offer was a waiver of union dues for those out of work.

While Local 3 may have been purged of its own internal gangsters, racketeers like Louis (Lepke) Buchalter and Jake (Currah Jake) Shapiro continued to muscle their way into its affairs, often with the support of local political officials and law enforcement officers. Their method of operation was to exact tribute from Local 3 members and simply scare off non-union workers from competing with them through beatings and threats of violence. At the same

[21] Ibid.

time, the American Communist Party had set up a number of avowedly communist locals to compete with Local 3 as dual unions. When this tactic failed, Party members infiltrated Local 3; they attempted to disrupt union business meetings and to hold up critical decisions via filibuster. Under these conditions, as Neufeld chronicles: "Due to the anarchy of the industry itself and the anti-union spirit of the times, during this period Local 3 was forced to create for itself a sense of solidarity against the world, the employers, the forces of law and order, the Communists, its own former officers, its own International and other unions."[22]

It is at this juncture that the most important force in the history of Local 3 entered the picture in the form of an extremely youthful Harry Van Arsdale Jr. Since a fuller biography of this individual will be given at the end of this chapter, I need only mention at this point that Harry Van Arsdale was the son of a Local 3 journeyman who joined the Local in 1925 at the age of nineteen and quickly came to the notice of Howell Broach. In 1931, on appointment from Broach, Van Arsdale bacame a Local 3 Business Agent at the salary of $100.00 a week; he was but twenty-six years old at the time.

When Broach left to defend his position in Washington,

[22] Neufeld, pp.1-2.

Van Arsdale and his cohorts formed the legendary Committee of 100, the Local's first Wage and Policy Committee, charied by future Local 3 President Jeremiah P. Sullivan. This group was determined to rid the union of gangster and Leftist influence, to organize the industry and to fight for better wages against a formidable front of employers, politicians, judges and their ilk. In a move of far-reaching significance, Van Arsdale revitalized those religious or "borough" clubs allied with the Committee and set up half a dozen new ones on territorial lines in order to enlist grass roots support for his faction.

Mere organizing of the union on an internal basis, however, was not all that was demanded of Van Arsdale and the Committee. In 1932, for example, a group led by Al Terry challenged the Committee's growing power within the Local, and, in the course of a brawl, one of the Terry men was wounded by a gun shot. It was Van Arsdale who was charged with felonious assult; a charge from which he would later be exculpated.[23] A year later, an opposition leader, William Sorenson, was also shot at a Local 3 meeting, and, again, Van Arsdale was charged with the crime. In fact, in this case, Van Arsdale was convicted and sentenced to serve between six to twelve years in jail, a conviction and

[23] Charles Yale Harrison, "Van Arsdale's Tight Little Island," The Reporter, April 11, 1950, p.11.
[24] Kenneth C. Crowe and T.J. Collins, "Labor Leader Van Arsdale Dies," Newsday, February 17, 1986, p.3.

sentence which would ultimately be reversed upon appeal to a higher court. It was on April 6, 1933 that the Van Arsdale faction took control over Local 3 on a permanent basis. The Committee of 100 forced the Local's President, Frank Wilson to resign, and its executive board placed Bert Kirkman in Wilson's post. Kirkman, in turn, appointed Van Arsdale as the Local's Business Manager until the next Local election scheduled for mid-1934. The Van Arsdale faction assumed control, then, at a time when the Local's 5,000 members were mostly unemployed and the vestiges of past infighting still jung in the air.[24]

1933 to 1940

When Van Arsdale and his colleagues took over and a modicum of internal order had been established, the first item on the agenda was the renegotiation of the Local's 1929 contract with the City's Building Trades Employers' Association. Under the 1929 agreement, workers in all of the building trades were paid at the rate of $1.65 an hour for an eight hour day, but when the Depression hit and this contract expired in 1932, the Association cut the rate to $1.25 an hour. After a prolonged strike by all of New York's trade locals, the Association boosted this to $1.40 a day, but Local 3, while working informally on this basis,

[24] Kenneth C. Crowe and T.J. Collins, "Labor Leader Van Arsdale Dies," Newsday, February 17, 1986, p.3.

refused to accept the new terms. According to one labor scholar:

> ...In spite of unfavorable economic conditions the union made new demands as a condition of the renewal of tis agreement. As was to be expected, this met with great oppostion. The employers resisted not only the new demands but the union itself. In fact, the members of the Electrical Contractors' Association locked out Local 3 members, promoted an "independent" union, hired "detectives," and proclaimed a reduction in wages.... After the controversy had continued for a while. a number of contractors reached individual agreements with the union; then the Brooklyn contractors as a group broke away from the Electrical Contractors' Association and made peace with the union. Finally, in November, 1934, a general settlement was made with the association.[25]

Under the 1934 contract, Van Arsdale's "end run" through Brooklyn resulted in a wage increase to $1.70 an hour, but more significantly, it brought a reduction of "straight time" hours from eight to seven a day, with the eighth hour paid at time-and-a-half. Two years later, the Local negotiated a six-hour straight time day, with double rates for overtime.[26] Eventually, this schedule would be reduced to a five-hour working day in 1962, following a compromise in which Van Arsdale had pushed for a four-hour day. Although the rate of pay remained the same in the 1934 and 1936 contracts, by the latter straight-time was reduced to a thirty-hour week.

[25] Elia Lieberman, Unions Before the War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp.272-273.
[26] Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, June, 1939, p.248.

As these wage gains were achieved, Local 3 changed its form completely by organizing industrial workers and bringing them into a fold formerly consisting of "outside" construction journeymen.[27] In October, 1933 the Local's leadership moved to organize switchboard assembly workers in factories. The remnants of the Local 3 opposition accused Van Arsdale of seeking to pad the union's rolls to strengthen his campaign position for upcoming Business Manager elections, but Van Arsdale vigorously denied this charge. Starting with the 425 workers employed by six major witchboard manufacturers in 1933, Van Arsdale moved to vastly increase the Local's ranks and jurisdiction as the "division concept" was first implemented. In fact, the leadership moved so quickly that it had already brought these men under the Local's protection before the Local could formally amend its by-laws to validate their inclusion, and it was not until two years later that the international workers. The inclusion of the switchboard workers created a distinction within the ranks between "A" construction members and "B" manufacturing members, and, originally, "the members engaged in the manufacture of equipment were treated by the union as a special class; they paid lower dues but had no right to vote, and wre not given any voice in union affairs."[28] In 1935-1936, the

[27] Lieberman, p.273.
[28] Ibid., p.274.

International followed suit, and the "A"/"B" member distinction was spread throughout the I.B.E.W.[29] As time passed, the disparity between the rights and benefits accorded respectively to "A" and "B" members would narrow profressively. In point of fact, the Local's membership had already been increased in 1928 when Broach had brought electricians from Local 261 into a merger with Local 3, i.e., workers incolved in inside fitting and wiring.[30] But these were skilled workers in contrast to the semi-skilled workers organized in the 1930's. In fact, it was not until 1936 that a separate Fixture Division was established within the Local covering the "industrial" faction to Local 261. Like many such divisions, it was only later, in 1941, that the Fixture Division was granted full Local benefits equivalent to those enjoyed by the construction journeymen. As the Local got inside the factories, it used its existing members to help organize workers in other branches so that Switchboard Division members were highly instrumental in organizing a Supply Division group in 1938. Between 1935 and the early 1970's, no fewer than twenty-five separate divisions had been established with the Local, with more coming in the ensuing years. Slowly but surely, Local 3 was becoming a labor leviathan, branching out into every sector directly or indirectly

[29] I.B.E.W., p.10.
[30] Lieberman, p.272.

related to electrical work.

Before leaving the history of divisionalization (its current form will be detailed in Chapter III), two points deserve mention. First, the creation of the divisions clearly aided Van Arsdale's faction in establishing its dominance with the Local. The new workers, even those of "B" status, owed their elevation to Van Arsdale and his "A" construction followers. Moreover, as time elapsed, the latter realized that Local 3 could branch out into the organization of semi-skilled workers without compromising their privileged status within the Local, and the ongoing organizing process, in which they participated, cemented the "A" class members to Van Arsdale's leadership. Second, we recall that between 1929 and 1941 the I.B.E.W. held no conventions due largely to a lack of funds to pay for them. In other words, Van Arsdale took the opportunity to expand Local 3 along "mixed" lines at a time when the International was in no position to object. This, of course, vastly increased Local 3's power within the I.B.E.W. and its ability to act independently of I.B.E.W. policy.

The organization of manufacturing workers and the resultant increase in pay for them when compared with non-unionized workers employed outside the city in the same industry posed a problem for their employers. The rise in labor costs meant an increased final price tag on the goods

they produced, reducing New York manufacturers' competitiveness in what is a nation wide market. Van Arsdale, however, had a solution to this problem: if the manufacturers would allow Local 3 to organize in their plants, then Local 3 construction workers would refuse to install any switchboards not bearing the Local 3 label.

The use of the "secondary boycott" technique devised by Van Arsdale proved highly successful in gaining employer cooperation with Local 3. It also served as the cause of a chain of litigation which would go on for nearly thirteen years and a heated dispute between Local 3 and the International. In 1935, the legal aspect of the boycott case began as suit was filed by the National Electrical Manufacturers Association in federal court. The plaintiffs charged that Local 3 "had built a 'Chinese Wall' around New York; behind it, they said, flourished a monopoly."[31] in violation of the Serman Anti-Trust Act. The director of the Association complained that, "by means of strikes, boycotts, threats, and intimidations, the local union has thrown an economic wall around the 10 million or more people residing in the New York metropolitan district."[32] This particular suit, however, would ultimately be

[31] Lester Velie, "The Union That Gives More to the Bosses," Reader's Digest, January, 1956, p.4.
[32] "Labor Boycott Suit, "Business week, December 14, 1935, p.23.

dropped,[33] but in 1939, the United Electrical, Radio and Machinery Workers Union -- a rival organization chartered by the C.I.O. -- brought its own suit against Local 3 and Van Arsdale was indicted for his role in the purported monopoly. At the time it was reported that Van Arsdale said, "he was not greatly worried about the final outcome because the spitit of unity manifested by our members and their willingness to make sacrifices would overcome any ill effect arising from this suit."[34] In fact, Van Arsdale realized that by the time a final resolution to the case had come about, Local 3 would have already established itself within the manufacturing sphere. The case reached the United States Supreme Court in 1945 under the title of Allen Bradley Company, et al v. Local Union No. 3, et al. The Court's ruling was a mixed bag for the Local. It upheld the Local's right to institute a boycott (and affirmed the legality of the Joint Industry Board of which I shall speak shortly), but it also ruled against the Local in this particular instance, stating, "when unions participated with a combination of non labor groups to control the market of goods and to eliminate competition, the unions no longer enjoyed the immunity extended to them by the exemptions of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia

[33] Joseph Kahn, "Harry Van Arsdale: Labor and Politics," New York Post, August 3, 1965, p.24.
[34] Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, July, 1940, p.37.

Acts." [35] By the time the case was remanded back to the court of original jurisdiction,[36] Congress had passed the Taft-Hartley Act which specifically barred the type of secondary boycott in which Local 3 had engaged. Twelve years had elapsed in the interim, however, and during that time, Local 3 had achieved its end in instituting the boycott, i.e., organization of thousands of manufacturing workers under the Local 3 standard.

During this period of manufactural organization, Van Arsdale was careful not to neglect the direct needs of his "A" construction workers. In 1930, the Electrical Contractors Association of New York had established an extremely modest life insurance, disability and pension plan for Local 3 "A" members.[37] When the Federal Social Security system came into force in January, 1937, Van Arsdale pressed the Employers Association to pay all of the social security contributions to the system, with no corresponding sum from the employees themselves, a provision not done by any other union at the time and one which allowed Local 3 to later boast that its members "were the only workers in the United States who never paid a cent out of their own pockets and were participants in the

[35] Lieberman, p.283.
[36] Neufeld, p.2.
[37] Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, December, 1930, p.564.

Social Security program."[38] In late 1939, Van Arsdale pushed the Employers Association even farther. He asked for, and got, a private pension plan paid for by employers and administered through the Joint Industry Board via a Joint Labor-Management Pension Committee, the first multi-employer pension plan in the building trades ever established in the United States.

I have twice mentioned the Joint Industry Board and it is now time to undertake an elaboration of its origin. It was in 1934 that Van Arsdale reached an agreement with John Flagg, then President of the New York Electrical Contractors Association which represented the first step toward the establishment of the J.I.B. At the time, it was nearly impossible for men over the age of fifty-five to be hired, a situation which both Flaff and Van Arsdale sought to change. Under an agreement with the Employers Association, Local 3 secured a provision which read: "On jobs employing 10 members of the union, a member of the union 55 years of age or older shall be employed, and one such member shall be employed for each additional 10 members employed or a major fraction thereof." What this agreement did, in effect was to placed the meting out of available work opportunities among Local 3 members under the joint control of management and labor.

[38] "Harry Van Arsdale Jr.: 1905-1986," Electrical Union World, vol.xlvii, no.4, March 7, 1986, p.6.

From one perspective, the emergence of a joint employment program was a natural outgrowth of the failure of either side to handle the details of job assignment in a satisfactory manner.

> Throughout its fifty years, the industry had tried various employment schemes which eventually fell apart. The crucial problem with most of the systems was that they often were administered either by labor or by management alone and generally not recognized by the other. Such experiments were attempted during the lockout (1904-07), the Electrical Board of Trade (1923) and consistently with the hiring hall of Local Union No.3.... On the one hand the union had supply and on the other hand management had the demand. What was needed was an intermediary that could successfully combine the supply and demand factors necessary for a smooth flow of manpower where and when it was needed.[39]

At the national level, some progress had been made on this front with the creation of the Council on Industrial Relations for the electrical construction industry in 1919,[40] but this body only issued broad guidelines due, of course, to its nation wide scope, and could not administer the details of hiring practices at the local level. By 1939, the control of hiring remained as it had been from the inception of the industry, i.e., lacking any systematic basis. Sometimes the individual worker obtained his own

[39] Joint Industry Boar, History and Organization of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry (New York: Joint Industry Board, 1983), p.9.
[40] John W. Hooley, "What Cooperation Has Done in the Electrical Industry," The Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, 1930, n.p.

job, sometimes it was obtained for him by Local 3 staff member so that the steadiness of employment varied greatly from worker to worker.

At the beginning of 1939, representatives from Local 3 and the Employers Association conferred on a means for remedying this unsatisfactory situation.[41] As a central clause in the union's 1939 contract with the Association, the negotiators wrote the following amendment into the agreement:

> The purpose of the amendment is to put into effect a plan for equitable distribution of employment in the industry through cooperative action of members of the Association and the Union. Resolved: That the contract now in force between the Association and the Union shall be amended as follows: There shall be a Joint Employment Committee consisting of five (5) members of the Union representing the Union and five (5) members of the Association representing the Association. [42]

The plan, then, would be administered by a Joint Employment Committee through which all hiring in Local 3's jurisdiction would be channeled and the placement of men in jobs would be handled by the Committee's chosen staff. When work was scarce, workers would be rotated in a given job, with individual employment monitored via a card system. No record is available to me of the precise method

[41] Joint Industry Board, The Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry (advertising supplement to The New York Times), 1983, p.5.
[42] Joint INdustry Board History, p.9.

through with the first Joint Employment Committee was "elected," but the roster contained no suprises: on the management side, A. Lincoln Bush, Efrem A. Kahn, Stephen C. Reville, John J. Sullivan and Edward Zwicker were chosen; on the labor side, the representatives were Bert Kirkman, Harry Van Arsdale, Hugh Morgan, Nat Bedsole and Jeremiah J. Sullivan with Dennis J. Crimmins, a Local 3 man seving as Secretary, of the Committee.[43] We shall encounter all of the names of the Local 3 member of the Committee (and their sons) time and time again in Chapter III and IV, as well as those of Bush and Kahn. As would be the custom for the Board's first three decades, a representative of management, Bush was elected as its Chariman. In addition to its immediate function of administering hiring, the Joint Employment Committee also began work on developing an effective apprenticeship program to meet the manpower needs of the industry in New York.

As we can surmise from the very existence of such a body, by the late 1930's, industrial relations between Local 3 and the Employers Associations' members were comparatively harmonious, in sharp relief to the labor strife which characterized the general situation throughout the United States at the time. As Aronowitz comments, "it was not until the 1930's that (employers) were willing to

[43] A. Lincoln Bush, "Helping Solve the Unemployment Problem," Metropolitan News, March 15, 1939, p.3.

listen carefully to those who claimed that unions would be important allies in the quest for labor peace."[44] and the Joint Employment Plan was clearly one of the first such instances of this recognition on the part of management and labor.

This is not to say that conflict was absent from Local 3's relation with industry employers. Not all employers belonged to the Employers Association and, by 1940, several still refused to allow Local 3 to organize their personnel. This was most clearly so in the case of industrial assembly plants not covered by the provisions of the Joint Employment Plan which dealt only with "A" construction men. In the summer of 1940, two bitter strikes erupted. At the Leviton Manufacturing Company, the firm's President bitterly opposed Local 3 organizing drives and its required ten-and-one-half months of picketing before a settlement was reached. Settlement, importantly enough, came about only after Eleanor Roosevelt visited the site in support of Local 3, a measure of the union's growing political pull, and only through the good offices of Mayor Fiorello La Guardia,[45] a reflection of the Local's political strength within New York. A second hard fought dispute came about at the same time in the case of the

[44] Aronowitz, p.232.
[45] "L.U. No. B-3, New York City, N.Y." Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, July, 1941, p.362.

Triangle Conduit and Cable Company. The tactics which Triangle used in attempting to squash the strike made Leviton's efforts appear pale by comparison.

> The Triangle Company, in addition to strikebreakers, armed guards and false propaganda in the newspapers have, with the assistance of the District Attorney of Queen's county, had our business manager, Harry Van Arsdale Jr., Assistant Business Manager Fred Hansen, Business Representative Edward J. McAlinn, and 13 members of the local indicted for conspiracy and inciting to riot under an ancient statute....[46]

Again Van Arsdale was, in fact, convicted of these charges, but, again, that decision was reversed upon appeal. Ultimately the Triangle strike was settled, permitting organization by Local 3 of the company's manufacturing workers. The gains achieved under the first contract, however, were modest. Since Van Arsdale had agreed to allow Mayor LaGuardia to decide on them, he accepted the Mayor's recommendation not desiring to alienate a powerful political ally. Both the Triangle and the Leviton actions are counted as triumphs in Local 3 official annals, but in July, 1941, when Local 3 instituted an 8,000 man general strike against Consolidated Edison of New York, this proved completely unsuccessful and even official historians have been unable to transmute it into a victory.

[46] "L.U. No.B-3, New York City, N.Y.", Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, April, 1941, p.190.

1940 to 1949

When the United States entered World War II, Local 3 agreed to abide by guidelines established by President Roosevelt (himself a Local 3 and I.B.E.W. ally) and all work actions came to an abrupt halt. The Roosevelt labor plan for the duration of the War included three basic points:

> (1) No strikes or lockouts for the duration; (2) peaceful settlement of all industrial disputes; (3) uninterrupted production to be assured by a War Labor Board with power to handle all disputes. This Board is to be appointed by the President.[47]

In the course of hammering out these guidelines, the representatives of labor successfully resisted an attempt by management to ban closed shops for the duration of the War.[48] The coming of the War also curtailed the activities of the I.B.E.W. so that following an International convention in 1941, conventions were again suspended at the national level until 1946.[49]

The gains made in benefit provisions before the War received a boost when contract negotiation of these programs was held to be valid under the National Labor Relations Act. At the same time, Roosevelt's War Labor

[47] Allied Union News, January 9, 1942, p.1.
[48] Ibid.
[49] International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (History), p.11.

Board held that wage increases should be suspended during the War, but, in 1943, it allowed that labor could press for fringe benefit increases. Since I shall be treating Local 3's benefit program in detail in Chapter IV of this paper, what appears below is merely a partial chronological listing of fringe benefits achieved by the union between 1941 and 1971.

1941 Standard Pension

1943 Supplemental Pension

1943 Disability Pension

1944 Hospitalization Benefit -- Members

1945 Hospitalization Benefit -- Wives

1946 Death and Pension Premium Benefit

1948 Hospitalization Benefit -- Children

1949 Surgical Benefit

1949 Scholarship Benefit

1949 Serious Injury Benefit

1950 Loan Fund Benefit

1952 Medical Department Benefit

1952 Rest Home Benefit

1962 Optical Department Benefit

1969 Pension Benefit for Surviving Spouse

1971 Pension Vesting Benefit

1971 Major Medical Plan Benefit [50]

[50] Joint Industry Board (History), p.25.

There are two reaons for including this inventory at this point in my narrative. The first is simply that such benefits started and increased in number during the 1940's. The second, and more significant, is that the list is partial because it represents only those benefits directly controlled by the Joint Industry Board. In 1941, the Joint Employment Committee branched out from merely handling hiring matters to the administration of Local's 3 precedent setting multi-employer pension program. This was followed in 1943 by the replacement of the Joint Employment Committee into a permanent Joint Industry Board, "the first such amalgamation of management and labor in the United States."[61]

In one sense, the formation of the J.I.B. was a logical outgrowth of the Joint Employment Plan. As a J.I.B. publication details:

> By the middle of 1943, it was felt that the idea of a joint labor management structure was here to stay and that every effort should be made to insure the continued success of the J.E.C. It was decided that, since the J.E.C. had done such a fine job of administering the employment plan, it should also take over the administration of the newly formed Pension Fund as well as any other programs described in the contract. Its new function, therefore, would be to carry out all joint functions including the employment plan. This being the case, such a group could not accurately continue under the name of only one of its functions, namely the Joint Employment Committee. On March 30, 1943, the Joint

[61] Joint Industry Board (History), p.25.

> Employment Committee was temporarily set aside as the ruling body and a reorganizational meeting took place. During this meeting, it was officially declared that, as of April 22, 1943, the Joint Employment Committee would become the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry.[52]

Three points require further analysis at this juncture. First, the Joint Employmnet Committee was set up as an amendment to the existing contract between Local 3 and the Employers Association, while the J.I.B. itself was established by the Executive Board of the J.E.C. In other words, at neither point did the rank and file membership of Local 3 play a part in deciding or confirming this wholesale change in the decision-making structure of the union to which they belonged! Second, the Joint Industry Board was initially devoted exclusively to the affairs of the "A" division, and to the present, its focus is on this portion of Local 3. This, in turn, tended to increase the power of the "A" division over their manufacturing "B" division brethren. Finally, the Joint Industry Board was created at a time when the I.B.E.W. itself was in a state of suspension (at least at the convention level) so that the International's Executive Board in Washington as Van Arsdale and company wrought fundamental changes in the New York local.

Under the 1943 transformation, the former J.E.C. was

[52] Joint INdustry Board (New York Times), p.4.

incorporated into the J.I.B.,[53] and so, it was through the J.I.B. that the creation of an apprenticeship program was established under the prior J.E.C. mandate and supervised through a separate Joint Apprenticeship Committee. As to form of the new Board, it replicated that of the J.E.C., with five members from management and five from labor. The only modification was the addition of a public member not associated with either side and appointed by the Senior Judge of the United States District Court for New York. Looking at the actual personnel on the first Board, they included A. Lincoln Bush (again as Chariman) and Efrem A. Kahn on the management side, along with Bert Kirkman, Jeremiah P. Sullivan, William A. Hogan and Harry Van Arsdale Jr. from Local 3.

In the aftermatth of the J.I.B.'s establishment there was considerable question about its legality, much of which centered around the "boycott" case. In its 1945 handling of the Allen Bradley suit, the United States Supreme Court incidentally confirmed the validity of the J.I.B., and in the final 1947 antitrust action under Taft-Hartley, the federal courts again saw the J.I.B. as a "legal" body. [54] It was with the inception of the Board, moreover, that clause began to appear in Local 3 contracts with management linking wage and, more frequently, fringe

[53] Ibid., p.11
[54] Joint Industry Board (The New York Times), p.6.

benefit, advances to productivity improvements via the use of modern, time-saving tools and enhanced work proicesses. The rationale for this was the adoption of successively lower "straight time" days for Local 3, but it was not until the J.I.B. had been created that specific linkages appeared in Local 3 contracts. Thus, of a typical 1960 contract negotiated through the J.I.B.

> What seems to us a most forward-looking work contract has just been drawn up by Local 3... and some 600 firms doing business with this union in the metropolitan area.
>
> These workers, employed in construction jobs, are already highly paid. The new contract calls for stilkl higher pay rates over the next two years. But it also calls for workers to deliver more results for the higher pay, by consenting to increased automation, reduction of such time-wasters as coffee breaks, stepping up of efficiency in use of various tools,and so on.[55]

From a virtual nemesis of the Employers Association in the early 1930's, by the late 1940's Loca 3 had become more than a partner with management, acting as a virtual arm of the corporate structure as far as its "A" division was concerned.

In the late 1940's, Local 3's organizing activity in the manufacturing sphere continued apace as one shop after another voted for Local 3 membership in elections conducted by the National Labor Relations Board. As benefits proliferated and different divisions graduated from "B" to

[55] "Constructive Contract," Daily News, January 13, 1960, p.25.

"A" status, the I.B.E.W. found itself hard pressed to keep up with the rank and file hierarchy being created by Local 3. Hence, as an I.B.E.W. publication recounts:

> Also, our 1946 convention created still another type of membership, the "BA," This gave us three types -- "A," "B," and "BA." The "BA" member was given equal voting rights in every way with the "A," both paying the same per capita and both having equal voting rights, while the "B" member continued to pay 50 cents with limited voting rights. The only difference between the "A" and the "BA" members, then, as now, was that "A" membership carried death and pension benefits for which the "A" member paid an additional sum.[56]

What this indicates, however, is not merely a structural change in the I.B.E.W., as significant as it was, but the fact that policies being set by Local 3 were compelling the I.B.E.W. itself to change its organization. By the end of the 1940's, Local 3 was operating as a truly "autonomous" body within the International.

Local 3's power within the I.B.E.W., however, was not unassailable, and Van Arsdale's "pioneering" was a source of resentment in other quarters of the union. This became evident during the 1946 convention spoken of above. At that time, Local 3 delegates swung their support to Howell H. Broach in the election for the International's President. Broach, however, lost his bid to return for a third time as the I.B.E.W.'s President and the Convention chose Daniel W. Tracy to fill this post. By 1948, it was

[56] International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (History), p.12

evident to Van Arsdale that the International was about to make a move against Local 3. In anticipation of this, Van Arsdale temporarily resigned his post as Business Manager, leaving the office for a period of eighteen months as John J. Kapp filled in on a temporary basis. This dodge proved of little avail; immediately after Van Arsdale's return to his formal postion, Tracy filed charges against him and Local 3 for replacing the I.B.E.W. label on manufactured products with its own Local 3 logo. The boycott issue had been settled in the courts, but it remained as an issue within the I.B.E.W. itself.

It was in November, 1949 that Tracy threatened to eject Van ARsdale from office and place Local 3 under a trusteeship. In reaction, the Local 3 rank and file held a mass meeting at which 2,500 delegates voted "unanimously" for Van Arsdale to defy Tracy's order and sanction the continued use of the Local 3 label. The dispute dragged on, and there was some speculation that a permanent split between the Local and International was in the offing.

> If Van Arsdale is suspended or expelled, and the Brotherhood attempts to take over Local 3, it is certain that the Local's thirty thousand members will leave the Brotherhood and set up an independent organization.[57]

In the end, it was Van Arsdale who relented, promising to end the the substitution of the Local 3 label for that of

[57] Harrison, p.14

the I.B.E.W.[58] Under the specifics of the agreement worked out, Van Arsdale was allowed to retain his post as the Local's Business Manager, but he was placed on three years probation.

1950 to 1962

The 1950's was a decade of watershed importance in the history of racial relations within the United States. Local 3, centered in the heart of New York's "melting Pot," could not help but be affected by the burgeoning Civil Rights Movement. The I.B.E.W. itself was the target of considerable protest action by Civil Rights advocates seeking to open up the construction trades to Blacks, Hispanics and other minority group members. In the early 1950's the International's Cleveland local became the center of one such action described by labor scholar Paul Jacobs.

> Theodore Pinkston of Cleveland is an electrician who learned his trade in the Army. Togehter with a few other Negroes, he applied for membership in Local 38 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. They were all refused. For eight years, the Negroes unsuccessfully attempt to gain dmittance to the local Both the Urban League and the NAACP were involved in the case, with NAACP labor secretary Herbert Hill making trips to Cleveland and attempting to work through the federation's machinery. Nothing availed until the Cleveland Community Relations Board took legal action against the local and forced

[58] "Boycott Off," Businessweek, July 1, 1950, p.38.

> it to admit the Negro electricians. Even then, Pinkston, who started the case, was twice rejected on the grounds that he was not qualified.[59]

In fact, Local 38's stance was not unusual within the white dominated construction trades where non-whites were few and far between, nor was it unusual for an I.B.E.W. local to be the target of legal action on this front. As late as 1968, the I.B.E.W. itself was the object of an equal employment opportunity case brought by the United States Justice Department.

Within Local 3, the Van Arsdale leadership had already had considerable experience in combatting racial and ethnic prejudice. Van ARsdale himself came from a mixed Irish/Dutch family; although we have not made mention of it, when he entered Local 3, its affairs and executive offices were dominated by individuals of Irish descent. Irishmen continued to play the major part in Local 3 politics, but Van Arsdale increasingly enlisted the support of newer immigrants, notably Italians and Jews. In fact, along with Broach, he had helped to break down the older ethnic clubs and replace them with groups siding with his faction. Hence, when the 1950's arrived, Van Arsdale was sensitive to the situation of Blacks and Hispanics within the Local, many of whom worked as "B" status members in the

[59] Paul Jacobs, The State of the Unions (New York: Atheneum, 1963), p.161.

maufacturing division. To begin, in 1957 the informal Labor Advisory Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City was replaced by the AFL-CIO's Committee to End the Exploitation of Puerto Ricans and Other Minority Group Members, the new committee being an official part of the AFL-CIO's structure. This shift was furthered by the actions of Van Arsdale and Local 3. More bluntly, Van Arsdale as newly elected President of New York City's Central Labor Council threatened to "raid all unions deemed guilty of exploitation and (to take) strike action against all employers who continued collusive contracts."[60] A year later, Mayor Wagner established a Committee on Exploitation (of Puerto Ricans) in New York, headed by a member of Local 3, myself, George Santiago. In that same year, Local 3 sponsored a study tour to the island of Puerto Rico, as well as establishing a Puerto Rican ethnic club, the Santiago Iglesias Society, as an ancillary body to Local 3. Its purpose was to further the aims of the Local's Hispanic members. Two years later, in 1960, a similar organization, the Lewis Howard Latimer Progressive Association, was formed for Negro members of the union and was highly instrumental in Civil Rights actions within the city. At the same time, the Local showed its support for the

[60] Lois Gray, The Puerto-Rican Workers in New York (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1963), p.5

Movement nationwide by donating $1,000 to Reverend Martin Luther King after his sentencing to four months imprisonment in Georgia.

While these moves were being made, it remained for Local 3 to clean up its own act, so to speak, by instituting changes in its apprenticeship system for lucrative "A" division journeyman membership. The prevalent system prior to 1962 was dominated within the "A" division by the so-called and unwritten "father-son rule." What this meant, in effect, was that entrants into the construction apprenticeship system were almost invariably the sons of Division "A" members. In 1955, under Joint Industry Board auspices, some cracks were made in this air-tight arrangement and the sons of members other than construction division journeymen were granted a few apprenticeship opportunities, although preference was still given to the sons of the construction division.[61] Although the Local included some 1,500 Negroes and 4,500 Puerto Ricans, virtually all of them worked in the manufacturing divisionand the number of minority group apprentices admitted in a "good" year could be counted on the fingers of a closed fist.

As part of the 1962 contract negotiations, Van

[61] Marshall Briffs, The Negro and Apprenticeship (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1967), p.60.

Arsdale reformed this system. He vastly expanded the number of new entrants allowed into the "A" division by the Examining Board, promising to recruit 1,000 new apprentices and he put an end to the "father-son'rule" at the same time. Moreover, Local 3 actively recruited Black and Hispanic candidates for its 1962 apprenticeship drive.

> The class selected in 1962 totaled 1,020 new first year apprentices (more than the total number in the entire five-year program at that time). Of this number, 240 were Negroes and 60 were Puerto Rican. The 300 minority apprentices were placed in the regular apprenticeship training class which would lead to full journeyman status with Class "A" membership. The significance of this event cannot be stated in strong enough terms; its importance can be gauged by the fact that the U.S. Census of 1960 reported only 79 Negro electrical apprentices in the entire nation.[62]

In 1966, the final formal move toward opening the apprenticeship program for "A" status members was made as the program as a whole was placed under the direction of the Joint Apprenticeship Committee of the Joint Industry Board and testing applicants included representatives from the Howard Lewis Lattimer Progressive Association and the Santiago Iglesias Society. Over the years, the percentage of minority group members in the apprenticeship program has remained at about 15 percent of the total.

While the inclusion of more minority candidates in the appprenticeship program was motivated by broad

[62] Ibid., p.61.

concerns, the increased number of apprentices was the result of 1962 contract negotiations. At that time, the Local 3 leadership stunned the Employers Association and management representation on the Joint Board by demanding a reduction of the six hour "straight time" day to a four hour "straight time" day. As a newspaper report of the time noted, up until December, 1961: "There (had) been no strike of construction electricians in New York for twenty years, and their employer relations (had) been considered a model of the construction trades."[63] This demand came in conjunction with fringe benefit and wage increase demands, and clearly, employers were not about to ink the contract proposed by Local 3. An eight-day general strike ensued. When the conflict was settled, Local 3 received a pay increase, new fringe benefits and a compromise five-hour, twenty-five hour a week, "straight time" day. In return for this concession, the union promised new productivity increases and the enlargement of its apprenticeship program; both of which it made good on.

1968 to the Present

Since 1968, very little of real substance has transpired in Local 3: the opening of the apprenticeship program brought the last major change in the Local to the

[63] Joel Seldin, "Electricians Ask Four-Hour Day and Raise,"New York Herald Tribune, December 10, 1961, p.1.

present day. To be sure, minor adjustments have been made; pay increases won, new benfits added, new issues such as inflation addressed, but on the whole, Local 3 has retained its basic form of harmonious relations with management through the J.I.B. and has slowly mended its fences with the International as well.

In 1968, of course, there was a major change of sorts. Harry Van Arsdale after thrity-five years as the Local's Business Manager stepped down from his post. "Van" or HVA, as he was known to his men, assumed the post of the Local's Financial Secretary and took on the job of Treasurer for the International. From this position, he continued to play a major role in guiding the Local along the lines he had laid down himself over three and a half decades. As to the post of Business Manager within the Local, it was inherited by Harry Van Arsdale's son, Thomas Van Arsdale, who occupies that central office to this day.

The only area in which the Local has become embroiled in strife of late is not vis-a-vis management, but in organizing and jurisdictional disputes with other unions, particularly locals of the Communications Workers of America. The rivalry between the C.W.A. and the I.B.E.W. intensified greatly after the breakup of American Telephone & Telegraph.[84] As a result of deregulation in the

[84] "A Union Fight That May Explode," Businessweek, March 16, 1881, p.102

telephone industry, C.W.A. and I.B.E.W. locals have gone head to head, with Local 3 facing direct opposition from Local 1109 of the rival union.[65] Indeed, the C.W.A. had the temerity to institute its own apprenticeship program, with Local 3 complaining to Federal and State officials on this count. In general, while the C.W.A. offers workers an easier route to apprenticeship and journeyman status (a four-year as opposed to a five-year program), it also extends a wage rate of $3.00 an hour less than the I.B.E.W.'s on average. As for employers within the telephone and communication industry, they clearly welcome lower wage rates but are convinced of the higher levels of skill possessed by I.B.E.W. workers as a consequence of a more stringent training program.

Two incidents which occurred in the spring of 1986 illustrate how far the union has evolved from the labor-management struggles of the 1930's. In May, 1986, Local 3 construction workers became aware of a project in mid-Manhattan employing non-union electricians. Their response was to gather en masse and attack the non-union help, flipping over a van belonging to the unauthorized workers, setting it ablaze and causing a near riot in the process. In June of the same year, AT&T workers belonging to the Communication Workers of America instituted a

[65] Ibid., p.103

nation-wide strike against the conglomerate. In those pockets of the AT&T complex employing I.B.E.W. personnel, however, agreement was quickly reached on a new contract and I.B.E.W. workers, including Local 3 members crossed the picket line of the C.W.A. What these two incidents illustrate is that the I.B.E.W. and Local 3 have remained on peaceful grounds with employers, but they have done everything in their power to stifle competition from non-union workers and members of rival organizations.

A Note on Harry Van Arsdale Jr.

Before leaving the history of Local 3, a further word about its central figure, Harry Van Arsdale Jr. is clearly warranted. Van Arsdale was born in New York City in 1905, the son of a Local 3 construction electrician. He excelled during his two years at an experimental high school, but left before receiving his diploma to follow in his father's footsteps by joining Local 3 in 1926. As for his career as a Local 3 Business Manager, enough information has been presented in this chapter to obviate the need for further elaboration. It should be mentioned, however, that in 1957 Van Arsdale was elected President of the Greater New York Central Trades and Labor Council, and after the merger of the A.F.L. and C.I.O., he became President of the New York City Central Labor Council. In 1965, he was instrumental in organizaing the city's taxi drivers and

became President of Local 3036 of the New York City Drivers Union. Upon his resignation as Local 3's Business Manager, Van Arsdale assumed the post of International Treasurer for the I.B.E.W. He later became a member of the executive board of the National Building and Construction Trades Council.[66] In late 1985, Van Arsdale took a leave of absence from the presidency of the Central Labor Council and his son assumed this postion. The leave was occasioned by a deterioration in Van Arsdale's health; in early February, he died in his apartment in Electchester, the houseing complex his Local had erected for its members.[67]

Trying to classify Van Arsdale is a difficult task. He fought for increased benefits for labor and was branded a socialist.[68] He fought against the communists and was labelled a reactionary. In point of fact, Van Arsdale did not display any particular ideological bent. Placing him within the dual context of the theories of labor advanced respectively by Perlman and Tannenbaum, he showed a mixture of both. On the one hand, job control was given a new definition by Van Arsdale's secondary boycott method of enlisting manufacturing workers into Local 3; clearly he was a skilled practitioner in the use of power. On the

[66] Gary M. Fink, ed., Biographical Dictionary of American Labor Leaders (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974). pp.363-364.
[67] Crowe and Collins, p.3.
[68] Harrison, pp.12-13.

other hand, the camraderie he sought to instill, the benefits which he won for Local 3 members, and his habit of freely mixing with the rank and file displayed a use of the local or affiliational dimension of unionism without match in American labor history.

To this juncture our recapitulation of Harry Van Arsdale's accomplishments has focused almost exclusively on the steps which he took to further the well-being of Local 3 members and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. To be sure, Van Arsdale advanced the welfare of his local and its parent body to a degree unprecedented in the annals of American unionism, and, throughout his career, Van Arsdale's immediate concern remained with the workers of Local 3. This record of achievement, however, should not blind us to equally significant and laudable actions which Van Arsdale initiated on behalf of working men in general and American society at large. In eulogizing Van Arsdale, the AFL-CIO's Executive Council touched upon the breadth of his impact by stating:

> "New York City labor and Harry Van Arsdale Jr. were synonymous. He organized workers who had been left unprotected, life the city's taxi drivers; he reached out to minority workers to bring them under the protection of union contracts, and he worked to elect progressive political leaders at every level of government...."[69]

[69] AFL-CIO News, February 22, 1986, p.e.

If anything, this tribute does not extend far enough. In the words of Lane Kirkland, President of the AFL-CIO, Van Arsdale was "one of the great figures of, not just the New York labor movement, but the whole American labor movement.[70] Consequently, in this section, an effort will be made to recount _some_ of the myriad accomplishments which Van Arsdale attained within their broader context, that is, withing the larger framework of the betterment of the American worker, not simply that of Local 3 or the I.B.E.W. Not only will this digression from the affairs of Local 3 _per se_ help us to grasp a stronger understanding of the full meaning of Harry Van Arsdale's legacy, it will also function to counterbalance the generally critical thrust of this study thus far.

It was in the mid-1950's, with many important and unparalled gains for Local 3 secured, that Van Arsdale began to extend his union activities into new and larger areas, i.e., outside of Local 3 itself. In recognition of his unmatched leadership of Local 3, Harry Van Arsdale was elected to the position of President of the Greater New York Central Trades and Labor Council in 1957. Simultaneously, Van Arsdale assumed the office of President of the New York City AFL-CIO.[71] It was, of course, at

[70] _Electrical Union World_, April 7, 1986, p.7.
[71] _AFL-CIO News_, February 22, 1986, p.2.

this time that a momentous change in the structure of organized labor in the United States was taking place in the form of the merger between the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organization. For two decades these two bodies had been at odds over ideological differences centering on the issue of whether workers should be organized along trade or industry lines. By 1955, it has become apparent that this fragmentation was greatly hindering progress in the cause of organized labor, the two groups underwent a reconciliation and a united AFL-CIO was formed. [72]

Both the extent and the nature of Van Arsdale's achievements within Local 3 and the I.B.E.W. placed him in a unique position to facilitate the AFL-CIO merger. Not only had he successfully won wages, benefits and conditions for his local which were far more advanced than those prevailing anywhere else, the amalgamated or hybrid structure of this local, including both highly-skilled traded electricians and semi-skilled industrical workers, provided him with precisely the sort of background necessary to spearhead and implement the AFL-CIO consolidation in the New York area. In fact, Van Arsdale was a prime mover in the merger at the national level and functioned in guiding it in New York through the formation

[72] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.

of the New York City Central Labor Council.[73] Understandably, Van Arsdale was elected as the Council's first President, an office which he retained until ill health forced his resignation in late 1985.

The late 1950's was a period of profound change not only within the American labor movement, but also within American society as a whole. It was during this era that issues concerning civil rights and equal treatment for minority group members surfaced throughout the United States, as activist leaders such as the Reverend Martin Luther King pressed for fair treatment of blacks, Hispanics and others who had experienced discrimination in a wide range of fields, including employment. Harry Van Arsdale was in the front ranks of labor leaders demanding equal, and under the circumstances of the day, necessarily better, treatment of nonwhites and an end to the discriminatory and exploitive conditions which had been imposed on them by both employers and unscrupulous labor leaders. Within Local 3, as is detailed elsewhere in this study, Van ARsdale took the lead in promoting the interests of blacks and Hispanics. Local 3's study tour of Puerto Rico in 1958 led to the establishment of the Santiago Iglesias Society in that same year, and a short time later, the Lewis Howard Lattimer Association was set up within the

[73] Electrical Union World, November, 1985, p.11.

Local. Perhaps the most significant change undertaken within Local 3 to further the cause of minority group members occurred in 1961 when Local 3 cast aside its father-and-son pattern of elegibility for participation in the "A" apprenticeship program to institute open enrollment; thereby enabling black and Hispanic individuals the opportunity to enter into the ranks of Local 3's construction journeymen. At the same time, Van Arsdale furthered the orgnization of minority group members working in New York's Lamp and Shade Industry by temporarily waiving dues for these low paid workers until they could achieve higher wage rates via Local 3 collective bargaining. This provided many black and Hispanic workers with the chance ofjoining Local 3 and enjoying its benefits while being temporarily relieved of dues payments which would have proved onerous under their initially meager salaries.[74]

Van Arsdale's efforts on behalf of minority group members were not restricted to the ranks of his own local. His post as head of the Central Labor Council enabled him to extend these efforts beyond the confines of Local 3 itself.

> As President of the newly-formed 1,000,000 member Central Labor Council, he began to direct his efforts towards organizing one house of labor in

[74] Electrical Union World. April 7, 1986, p.7.

> New York City. He recognized the problems of minorities and instituted the Hispanic Labor Committee after conducting a study tour of Puerto Rico and Jamaica in order to identify the problems of low paid workers in the American workforce.[75]

In complementary fashion, it was Van Arsdale who first addressed the particular needs of black workers through the Central Labor Council, establishing the Black Trade Union Leadership Committee within the Council.[76]

Van Arsdale's drive to better conditions for Hispanic and black workers within the New York City area was clearly warranted in light of the abuses these groups faced. As Lois Gray would chronicle the situation in the late 1950's as part of a study of Puerto Rican workers in New York for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Hispanics in New York were subjected to inordinately harsh forms of exploitation. Frequently Hispanic workers suffered from the activitiies of so-called "racket" or "paper" unions.[77] These organizations were not, in fact, unions in the conventional sense of the term, but rather, front organizations created by employers to divert genuine organization through legitimate unions andd stifle the rightful demands of Puerto Rican workers for living wages and adequate working conditions. The task of

[75] Electrical Union World, November 15, 1985, p.11.
[76] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.
[77] Lois Gray, The Puerto-Rican Workers in New York (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1963), p.e.

investigating these "racket" union practices and promoting authentic unionism among Hispanic workers in New York initially fell to a city government-created Labor Advisory Committee on Puerto Rican Affairs in New York City, but, in 1957, the Central Labor Council superceded this body with the creation of a Committee to End the Exploitation of Puerto Rican and Other Minority Groups. The establishment of this body was the brainchild of Harry Van Arsdale,consulting closely with AFL-CIO President George Meany. Van Arsdale instituted strong action by the Central Labor Council against renegade "paper" unions, vowing to "raid all unions guilty of exploitation" and to take "strike action against all employers who continued collusive contracts."[78] In addition, in conjunction with the office of Mayor Robert Wagner, Van Arsdale was instrumental in setting up the Mayor's Committee on Exploitation in 1958.[79] As a watchdog over current and potential abuses against Hispanics and other workers in New York, the Committee on Exploitation was staffed by individuals from the City's labor unions, and headed by myself, George Santiago, to ensure rapid response to cases of exploitation.[80]

This, however, does not complete the story of Van

[78] Ibid., p.5.
[79] Ibid., p.6.
[80] Ibid.

Arsdale and Local 3's efforts on behalf of minority group members. During the 1960's, as the Civil Rights Movement continued apace, under Van Arsdale's direction Local 3 assumed an active role in assisting workers outside of its organizational jurisdiction and in promoting the cause of racial justice. Speaking of Van Arsdale's part in the drive for equality, an article in the Electrical Union World relates:

> As president of the Central Labor Council he recognized the plight of black workers in the deep south where segregation has created second class citizens of black workers and he lent both financial and moral support to civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. in his quest for his dream. As an active supporter of the Civil Rights Movement he led New York workers during the 1063 March on Washington.[81]

This heritage of support for the cause of minority group and oppressed workers continues in the Local 3 tradition. For example, in June, 1986, the New York City Central Labor Council in conjunction with the New York Anti-Apartheid forces participated in the largest march and rally against apartheid ever held in the United States. Some 90,000 people gathered at the United Nations to protest racial inequality in South Africa.[82] In the forefront of the parade, Thomas Van Arsdale, having taken over the position of President of the Council re-affirmed Local 3's commitment to fair employment conditions, not only in New

[81] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.
[82] Ibid., p.7.

York, nor even the United States, but around the globe.

In many ways, Van Arsdale's efforts to extend the reach of Local 3 into quarters beyond the ken of normal union activities is reflected in his sponsorship of the Brotherhood Party during the late 1950's and early 1960's. Originally conceived by Van Arsdale in 1956,[83] the Brotherhood Party was an outgrowth of the Central Labor Council. Including many prominent labor leaders in its ranks, the Brotherhood Party did not seek office for its principal representatives; in fact, its founding members had pledged to seek neither elective nor appointive office for themselves.[84] Instead, it threw its considerable electoral support behind individual progressive candidates for municipal and state government. In 1961, for instance, it endorsed the campaigns of Robert F. Wagner for re-election as the City's Mayor, Paul R. Screvane as City Council President and Abraham D. Beame as City Controller.[85] Harry Van Arsdale, Armand D'Angelo and other Local 3 officials supervised voter registration drives and other campaign activities on behalf of these candidates. While the builk of those backed by the Brotherhood Party were Democrats of Liberals, the Party was "non-partisan" and also backed a handful of like-minded

[83] Newsday, February 17, 1986, p.19.
[84] Electrical Union World, October 24, 1961, p.1.
[85] Ibid., p.1.

Republicans.

The program of the Brotherhood Party was not the "socialization" of America as its detractors characterized it, but, instead, a grass roots or populat coalition aimed at increasing the participation of working men in government decision-making. Many of its chief platform planks were addressed to the foremost concerns of labor, full employment, a living wage and assistance to individuals laid idle through automation, but other were directed to broader interest such a housing education, civil rights, health and hospitalization, crime control, transportation and adminstrative reform. In a sense, the objective of the Brotherhood Party was to extend to citizens the same types of benefits which Local 3 had successfully gained for its members through collective bargaining. As labor union analyst Victor Riesel would comment, the emergence of the Brotherhood Party had a powerful impact upon the shape of New York City politics. Speaking of the Van Arsdale led Party, Riesel declared: "They could well rip the Democratic Party from its old moorings and even reshift power balances inside the Republican Party.[88] In fact, the Brotherhood Party was highly instrumental in the re-election of Mayor Wagner to a third term in office, and most of its electoral choices

[88] Victor Riesel cited in Electrical Union World, September 15, 1961, p.30.

succeeded in retaining or obtaining office. During the course of the Brotherhood Party's campaign drive, Harry Van Arsdale resurrected the labor Day Parade in New York City; 1961 being the first year since 1939 that a Labor Day Parade was held in New York.[87] The event functioned as part of the Brotherhood Party's electoral effort, but, at the same time, it symbolized the unity which had come into being within the New York labor movement under the direction of Van Arsdale as Central Labor Council President. Over 200,000 union members and their families participated in the parade.[88]

The campaign of 1961 was, in a sense, a prelude to the strike action taken by Local 3 in January, 1962. The eight day stoppage by the Local's 9,000 journeymen brought numerous construction projects to a halt. Ultimately a compromise was reached with Van Arsdale's negotiators settling for a 25 hour "straight time" work week, in place of the 30 hour week before the strike and somewhat short of the 20 hour week they had originally sought. Since this event has been adquately dealt with elsewhere in this study, three points require emphasis in the broader context of this sections's analysis. First, Local 3 undertook its action in cooperation with other locals within the Central Labor Council. Under Van Arsdale's

87 Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.
88 Electircal Union World, September 15, 1961, p.16.

leadership, the Council adopted a stated policy of granting "unlimited financial, moral and picket-line support to any union that goes on strike for a cut in work hours, and that promises to remain out until it has achieved its objective."[89] Along with Local 3, then, other bodies, notably Local 100 of the Transport Workers Union and Local 1199 of the Drug and Hospital Employees Union walked out on the job in support of reduced work week demands. Secondly, realizing that a complete stoppage would threaten the well being of New York City residents, Van Arsdale made a personal promise to Mayor Wagner that essential public and private electrical service would be maintained, that picket lines would not be used unless scabs were employed and that work on the New York World's Fair construction site would continue unimpeded.[90] Finally, while shorter hours were in the immediate interest of Local 3 members, Van Arsdale made it clear that he was concerned with a larger problem in his understanding. Writing to the editorial department of the New York Times, Van Arsdale placed his demand for a 20 hour work week in line with the findings of a special committee formed within the New York Central Labor Council to study the impact of automation on unemployment. Specifically, he cited the Committee's conclusion, "that the shorter work-week and the shortened work is an answer

[89] New York Times, December 11, 1961.
[90] New York Mirror, January 12, 1962.

to what has become America's endemic unemployment problem,"[91] i.e., a means for spreading available employment among American workers. He chastised the Times for its critical stance on the twenty hour week, telling its editorial staff that they would do better to investigate continued exploitation of minority workers in New York than to oppose the legitimate interest of unions in conserving jobs under the onslaught of automation.

Van Arsdale's activities as President of the Central Labor Council highlight another facet of his career which has been overlooked in this study thus far, his role in organizing workers outside of the electrical industry. Under Van Arsdale's direction, workers in a wide range of industries and service field were brought into the union fold. During the early 1960's, Van Arsdale took on a task that others had tried to accomplish and failed.

> In 1961 he set out as president of the counsel to organize the Taxi Industry in New York City. A feat that had evaded the Transport Workers, Teamsters and United Mine Workers in three prior attempts. By involving every affiliation of the Central Labor Council the organizing drive was successful and the newly formed New York City Taxi Drivers Local 3036 AFL-CIO was born.[92]

Not only would Van Arsdale be the prime mover behind the formation of Local 3036 of the Taxi Drivers, he would later become President of that union, serving for eleven years

[91] Harry Van Arsdale, Memorandum to the Editor of the New York Times, December 18, 1961
[92] Electrical Union World April 7, 1986, p.7.

without pay in the post.[93] In parallel fashion, November, 1960, the American Federation of Teachers under their President, Albert Shanker, went on strike over the issue of teachers to organize and engage in collective bargaining. Shanker contacted George Meany who, in turn, communicates with Mayor Wagner urging the establishment of a Committee to facilitate teacher unionization in a manner which would not harm the school system. Wagner had the benefit of ongoing contact with Harry Van Arsdale and referred the matter to him. The President of the Central Labor Council moved swiftly forming a Committee, and, as a direct result of its efforts, the first collective bargaining rights for teachers were established, not only in New York City, but in the United States as a whole.[94] Finally drawing upon his influence with Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Van Arsdale led the effort to establish collective bargaining rights for members of Local 1199 of the Drug and Hospital Workers union.[95] These are but three instances in which Van Arsdale took the lead in organizing employees in areas which had previously resisted unionization. Throughout his career, Van Arsdale remained actvive in supporting the cause of unions other than Local 3. In fact, during the 1985 New York City hotel strike, Harry Van Arsdale personally picketed for the hotel workers.[96]

As we have seen repeatedly in this section, Harry Van Arsdale and the leaders of Local 3 maintained

close links with a number of powerful political figures at the local, state and national levels. As an AFL-CIO publication puts it, Van Arsdale was "a confident of a string of mayors and governors in New York,"[97] along with a host of important individuals from the private sector, e.g., the master builder Robert Moses.[98] On many occasions, the 1962 strike action, for instance, Van Arsdale tempered the demands of his union to serve the public interest, e.g., his guarantee that the 1962 work stoppage would not threaten essential services or interrupt work on the World's Fair. In effect, the close ties which Local 3 kept with office holders and the political clout which Van Arsdale carried represented a store of political "capital" upon which he could draw at critical junctures. Of all the prominent public leaders associated with Local 3 none was more prominent than long time New York City Mayor Robert Wagner. It was through an appointment by Wagner that Armand D'Angelo was picked to serve as the City's Water, Gas and Electricity Commissioner, and, quite obviously, there was an element of patronage in his selection. As importantly, Van Arsdale used his considerable pull with Wagner to further the cause of workers outside of the electrical industry. For example,

[96] Ibid.,
[97] AFL-CIO New, February 22, 1986, p.3.
[98] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.

in 1954 Mayor Wagner granted City employees the right to lodge work grievances with a public panel; in 1958 when Van Arsdale was head of the Central Labor Council, Mayor Wagner went further by issuing Executive Order No. 49, "permitting employees (of the City) to participate, to the extent allowed by law, through their freely chosen representatives, in the determination of the terms and conditions of their employment."[99] This allowed City employees to engage in collective bargaining.

Indeed, Van Arsdale's role in City policy making extended beyond the sphere of narrolwly construed labor and employment issues. He was one of a small circle of leaders who participated in the creation of the Municipal Assistance Corporation, the so-called "MAC" body designed by Feliz Rohatyn from bankruptcy.[100] MOreover, Van Arsdale would subsequently serve as a member of a commission comprised of business, financial and labor leaders to study the region's economy and make recommendations for its continuing development.[101] Van Arsdale understood that politics was a two-way stree, that if he expected office-holders to supporat the cause of unionism in New York, he would have to respond by

[99] Robert F. Wagner, Mayor's Executive Order No. 49, March 31, 1958 (New York: Office of the Mayor, 1958), n.p
[100] New York Daily New, February 21, 1986, p. 7.
[101] Ibid.

encouraging union members to support crucial efforts by these same office holders. For example, during New York's fiscal crisis, it was Van Arsdale who actively encouraged teachers to invest their pension funds in "MAC" bonds, thereby helping to relieve the City's financial crisis.[102]

One final area in which Van Arsdale and Local 3 extended their reach beyond their own interest was in the field of education. Van Arsadale himself had quit high school at the age of sixteen, despite being earmarked as a gifted student. This personal event may well have influenced him in later years. What is apparent is tha Van Arsdale never wavered in his support for the cause of education, for his local members and for the general public as well.[103] Local 3 initiated a technical training program within its "A" division apprenticeship program, but Van Arsdale was interested in more than purely technical training. Through his efforts courses in advanced topics, e.g.s., human relations, logic, labor history, etc., were made available to union members at such prestigious institutions as New York University, Columbia University and Cornell University.[104] Perhaps the crowning achievement of Van Arsdale's life long commitment to higher education came in 1971 with the establishment of the Labor College of New York, an affiliate of the State

University of New York.[105] As summarized in an issue of the Electrical Union World;

> In 1971, with the support of Governor Nelson Rockefeller and the trade union movement in New York City, the Labor College was established. The college, a branch of the State University of New York, instructs trade union men and women in the science of labor stude. Ipods associate, bachelor and masters degrees upon satisfactory completion of its curriculum.[106]

Initially called the Empire State College, the designation of the Labor College was changed in June, 1986 to the Harry Van Arsdale Jr. School for Labor Studies, reflecting the part which Local 3 Business Manager played in creating and maintaining it.[107] Van Arsdale's dedication to the cause of higher education was not confined to the improvement of his local's membership. To cite but two examples, the Robert Wagner Labor Archives, a repository of documents and studies relevant to the labor movement in New York was established at the urging of Van Arsdale,[108] and, in 1985, the New York Institute of Technology College of Osteopathic Medicine established a chair in Osteopathic Medicine in the name of Harry Van Arsdale as recognition for the Business Manager's fund-raising activities on its behalf.[109] From one perspective, Van Arsdale's activities in the field of education clearly furthered the cause of his local,

[105] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.
[106] Ibid., p.7.
[107] Electrical Union World, July 24, 1986, p.12.
[108] Electrical Union World, April 7, 1986, p.7.

creating an informed membership and a "pool" of individuals who could then be recruited into the Local 3 elite. But, from another vantage point, Van Arsdale's interest was far broader. He supported all types of educational programs and character building institutions for all members of society. It is certainly no coincidence that virtually every club within Local 3's affiliative structure sponsors a Boy Scout troop:[110] Van Arsdale's notion of cradle to grave unionism reached out beyond the organizational confines of the Local and the labor movement.

What emerges from all of this is a picture of a labor leader whose concerns and activities transcended the interests of his Local and, in fact, of unionism in general. Van Arsdale saw the labor movement not as a force in opposition to the established power structure, but rather, as an integral and progressive force having a rightful place within that structure. The ability of labor to make its voice heard was, for Van Arsdale, directly related to its capacity to advance broad social causes, civil rights, political reform, education and the like. Thus, while much of the analysis contained in this study concentrates on Local 3 as a distinct unit, Van Arsdale consistently tried to bring the Local out into the larger

[109] Ibid., p. 7.
[110] Long Island Press, Jamuary 11, 1962

field of civic and public affairs, to extend the gains which he and Local 3 had made in bettering their own lives to the public at large.

Chapter Summary and Conclusion

The early history of Local 3 is freely punctuated by strife against employers and rival unions. By the end of World War I, the Local had developed a deserved reputation as a thoroughly corrupt organization. The reform instituted by Broach in the late 1920's represented more than a purge of personnel, they restructured the entire power dimension of Local 3, placing enormous leverage and responsibility in the office of the Business Manager. Harry Van Arsdale and the Committee of 100 used this power to ward off incursions by racketeers and communists. Benefitting from a suspension in I.B.E.W. conventions during the 1930's, Van Arsdale moved to vastly expand the membership and jurisdiction of Local 3, organizing not only construction but also industrial workers. He established a working relationship with the Employers Association and, successively through J.E.C. and J.I.B. integrated all of the Local's basic functions into a labor-management corporate form. As the 1940's elapsed, Local 3 gained more and more fringe benefits, virtually all of which were administered through the J.I.B. The late 1940's brought a power struggle with the International, and although the

latter won this conflict, Local 3 and Van Arsdale retained most of their autonomy. The 1950's found Local 3 in the midst of the Civil Rights movement, and following some token gestures, the Local made real progress on this front by opening up its apprenticeship system and actively soliciting minority group applicants. The attainment of the five hour day linked to productivity benefits was a crowning achievement for Van Arsdale. After his retirement and replacement by his son, the Local faithfully followed the path that he had laid down.

CHAPTER III

THE POWER DIMENSION OF LOCAL 3

THE I.B.E.W. and LOCAL 3

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers counts over one million members within its ranks. It is comprised of approximately 1,500 separate locals across the United States and Canada, the bulk of which include both construction and manufacturing workers. It is, according to the I.B.E.W., the fifth largest union in the entire world.[1] Perhaps more impressive, as union membership has generally declined in numbers, the I.B.E.W. has held its own on this front. For example, between 1978 and 1980, a time of rapid erosion in union membership for traditional production (as opposed to service) industries, the I.B.E.W.'s membership increased modestly, from 1,012,000 to 1,041,000 million; a gain of 2.9 percent. This compares quite favorably with a 15.2 percent lose for the United Rubber Workers over the term, a 9.5 percent drop for the United Auto Workers, and a 7.2 percent decline for the International Ladies Garment Workers.[2]

As a democratic organization, the supreme power of the

[1] I.B.E.W. (History), pp.15-16.
[2] Del Marth, "The Sorry State of the Unions," Nation's Business, vol.lxx, no.7 (July, 1982), p.52.

I.B.E.W. is vested in the membership, more specifically in Internaional Conventions held every four years in which delegates from locals assemble. "The International Convention elects all International officers and determines the basic policies of the I.B.E.W. by its votes on proposed resolutions and constitutional amendments, "serving as the final authority on all appeals.[3] The representation formula used to determine the voting power of each local is comparatively straightforward given that two classes of members are encompassed within the union, i.e., "A" and "BA" members (the "B" designation having been dropped in the 1970's).

> The International Convention is composed of delegates elected by secret ballot from and by the membership. Delegate representation is based on the number of members per local union, with a maximum of 15 delegates per local union.... Each eligible local union is entitled to one vote for each "A" and "BA" member.... However, local unions representing "BA" members cannot vote on questions relative to Article XII and Article XIII of the Constitution, inasmuch as "BA" members are not covered or governed by said articles.[4]

The two constitutional articles referred to above concern benefit programs administered by the International and funded by contributions "A" class members.

The real power within the I.B.E.W., however, is

[3] Ibid., p.19.
[4] The Interntional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Basic Laws and Policies of the I.B.E.W. (Washington: IBEW, n.d.), p.3.

located in its executive councils and offices. The International Executive Council, which meets four times a year, "carries out policies laid down by vote of the conventions and deals with needs and issues arising between conventions,"[5] so that, for all practical purposes, it is the Executive Council and the International's short list of officers who made the decisions, with conventions simply ratifying them. As to the Council, it consists of nine elected members, a chairman and eight other drawn from each of the International's eight Executive District Councils. Its functions are many and critical to the workings of the I.B.E.W.

> The I.E.C. is the final authority on applications for and the granting of pensions, disability benefits and vested rights of members. It acts on all appeals from the decisions of the International President, and on charges filed against pensioned members; may try any member of a local union charged with violattion of I.B.E.W. Laws or his obligation of membership; names a successor to the office of International President, in case a vacancy occurs; recommmends constitutional amendments for submission by referendum to local unions; and has quarterly and yearly audits prepared.[6]

On a day to day basis, however, working decisions of the I.B.E.W. are made by the International's three elected, full-time and paid officers; the Secretary, Treasurer and, most importantly, the President. Looking at the host of

[5] I.B.E.W. (History), p.19.
[6] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws), p.4.

functions performed by the latter, it is apparent that power within the I.B.E.W. is, in fact, highly centralized. The President's duties include:

> "carrying out the laws of the Brotherhood; deciding all controversies... acting of all appeals from decisions of the International Vice Presidents; deciding I.B.E.W. policy and procedure; approving all agreements and by-laws; chartering, merging or amalgamating local unions, assigning local unions their jurisdictions; and suspending or revoking local charters."[7]

Immediately below the President are twelve International Vice Presidents elected by the local unions from their respective presidential districts, each of which has a staff of International Representatives. Incidentally, Local 3 is part of I.B.E.W.'s 3rd District under the supervision of long-time Vice President John J. Barry. As is the case with Local 3 itself, the International participates in its own joint board, the National Electrical Contractors Association on the Council on Industrial Relations, charged with resolving disputes between local unions and their employers and establishing guidlines for local apprenticeship programs through a National Joint Apprenticeship and Training Committee.[8]

Turnover at the national level had been quite frequent. Scanning the lists of individuals since McNulty's time (including McNulty), between 1903 and the present,

[7] Ibid.
[8] I.B.E.W. (<u>History...</u>), p.19.

eight individuals have held the office of International President. The longest term or any individual President, as discussed in greater detail below, is that of the present incumbent, Charles H. Pillard, who has functioned in that capacity since 1968.[9] The lastest International Convention, held in September, 1982, re-elected all three International officers (Pillard as President, Ralph Leigon as Secretary, and Thomas Van Arsdale as Trasurer), and, within the 3rd District, John Barry was returned to office as Vice President.[10] Since that meeting, Legion has been replaced by Jack F. Moore by Executive Council appointment.

Space does not permit the type of career breakdown which I shall carry out for Local 3 officers for International officers, but since they are few in number and Thomas Van Arsdale's career will be amply detailed below, I will simply concentrate on two representative figures, Charles Pillard and newly elected I.B.E.W. President, John J. Barry. Charles Pillard entered the I.B.E.W. in 1940 as an "A" class construction apprentice, the son of an "A" status member. He rose through the informal ranks of Local 41 (Buffalo, New York) and in 1952 he was elected to the office of Business Manager within Local 41. When an opening arose through the resignation of

[9] Ibid., p.16.
[10] Electrical Union World, September 30, 1982, p.2.

a member of the International Executive Council in 1961, Pillard was appointed to the Council by its members before being unanimously elected to that post by the 1962 and 1966 Conventions. In 1968, the International's President, Gordon M. Freeman resigned, and Pillard was again appointed to the office of President by the Executive Council to fill Freeman's remaining two years in office. According to the I.B.E.W., Pillard has been unanimously elected to the presidency in the Conventions of 1970, 1974, 1978 and 1982. What is interesting, and, more significantly, characteristic of I.B.E.W. political affairs at<u>both</u>the national and local levels is that Pillard was twice appointed to critical post in the course of his movement to the top and only after a two year term in each was that appointment confirmed by a Convention vote.

With the 33rd convention of the I.B.E.W. impending, the union's Executive Council took the opportunity to make its selection for union President in meetings held in August, 1986. At that time, the I.B.E.W.'s President, Charles H. Pillard concluded a long record of faithful service to the union by submitting his resignation and announcing his retirement. In his place, the Executive Council's choice naturally fell upon an individual with an equally laudable record of service within the I.B.E.W., John J. Barry. Barry entered the union more than four decades before his elevation to its highest rank, having

joined Local 43 in 1943 and been elected as its Business Manager in 1962. Between 1968 and 1976, Barry was given the invaluable opportunity to expand his horizon by serving as an International Representative, John Barry became I.B.E.W. Vice President for the union's 3rd District, encompassing New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware. Barry's selection as I.B.E.W. President, however, required the approval of the 3,500 delegates representing the International's 1,000 local bodies at the 33rd Convention held in Ontario, Canada between September 15 and 19, 1986. Barry received this confirmation through his election by acclamation, the Convention also confirming the Executive Council's decision to replace outgoing International Secretary Ralph Legion with long time official Jack Moore and, of course, endorsing the continued tenure of Thomas Van Arsdale as the I.B.E.W.'s International Treasurer. Sensing the outcome of the Convention, Barry tapped Alfred W. Giles to assume his former position as Vice Presdient for the I.B.E.W.'s 3rd District.

As mentioned above, local unions are subordinate to the International. They are chartered by the International Secretary when authorized by the International President and operate within prescribed geographical territories and trade jurisdictions. In formal and actual terms, absent fundamental conflict with the International, specifically

the expulsion powers of its President, locals within the I.B.E.W. are free to run their affairs as they choose.

> A basic philosophical and practical tenet of the I.B.E.W. is that local unions and their memberships understand their problems better than anyone else and are better able to care for their needs.
>
> Practical application of this concept of local autonomy is achieved through chartering of local unions by the International President. The locals then develop bylaws to take care of their business and responsibilities as effectively and efficiently as possible.[11]

There are some strong restrictions on the power of locals to insitute their own by-laws. The International provides newly forming locals with a "model" by-law format and expects fairly close conforming to it. Moreover, under Article XVII, Section 7 of the International Constitution, all by-law changes, amendments, rules or agreements of any kind, adopted by locals, "must first be approved by the International President," and without such approval, "a change is null and void,"[12] from the International's standpoint.

Within the I.B.E.W., Local 3 stands as the single largest local. Although membership has waned somewhat from the early 1970's, its current membership is over 33,0000; making it the largest building trades local union in the United States. The sheer size of Local 3 is evident when

[11] (Basic Laws...), p.6.
[12] Ibid., p.8.

we consider that it is about one hundred times larger than the average local within the International. If all of the locals in the I.B.E.W. were equal in membership to Local 3, the International's ranks would be equivalent to one-fifth of the population of the United States. By virtue of its magnitude, and apart from the principle of "local autonomy", Local 3 possesses enormous sway within the I.B.E.W. It is by no means an anomoly that upon Harry Van Arsdale's departure from the office of International Treasurer the post went to Thomas Van Arsdale: it was a practical recognition of Local 3's power within the I.B.E.W.

Aside from its size, the independence which Local 3 enjoys within the I.B.E.W. is partially a product of its historical development as outlined in the previous chapter. Barbash mentions Local 3 as a classic example of local union power in commenting, "Where the local union had been largely instrumental in building its organization on its own power, local leaderships are likely to build islands of influence and power in relation to the internationl."[13] As we recall, the organizing and membership drives of Local 3 were undertaken during the 1930's and 1940's, at a time when the International did not have the power necessary to intervene in Local 3's affairs as was the Local's

[13] Barbash (1956), p.58.

amalgamation with the Joint Industry Board and the erection of the Local's benefit system. Indeed, during the boycott controversy with the International in the late 1940's, although the International won on the issue at hand, Van Arsdale was allowed to retain his power within the Local. Had he been suspended from the I.B.E.W. or removed from office, there is little question that Local 3 would have broken ranks from theI.B.E.W. This legacy of Local 3 independence within the International carries forward to the present.

Within its own sphere of operations, moreover, Local 3 has become a political force to be reckoned with; one which city or state officials can neglect only to their discomfiture. The Local has supported political candidats at all levels of government, including Franklin Roosevelt, Fiorello La Guardia, Nelson Rockefeller, Jr., Mario Cuomo, and the politician most intimately connected to the Local's affairs, Robert Wagner, Jr. Indeed, Van Arsdale threatened to form an independent political party within New York City, the Brotherhood Party, if the Democratic organization did not nominate Wagner for re-election in 1961. According to Cook, "as a result of close, although not always visible connections with City Hall, the union's leaders are among a small group of intimates of the mayors, no matter what

their party."[14] On occasion, this support has translated into direct political favors for Local 3 and its personnel, as for example, Wagner's appointment of Local 3 officer (and later Joint Industry Board chairman) Armand D'Angelo as New York City's Water Supply, Gas and Electricity Commissioner,[15] a post which D'Angelo held for over a decade. Recently members of the "A" construction division voted to establish a COPE check-off system with contributions to be forwarded to the I.B.E.W.'s Political Education Fund in Washington.[16] Its local, regional and, indeed, national presence clearly add to Local 3's leverage vis-a-vis the International.

Organizational Structure

Local 3 is a prime example of a local union operating according to a flexible jurisdiction, that is, with members from both the craft and trade segments of the industry.[17] Termed a "multi-craft organization"[18] or an "industrial federation",[19] the Local's broadest structure is based upon the divionalization of construction and manufacturing units .By utilizing this format, Local 3 has

[14] Cook, p.121.
[15] Kahn, p..24.
[16] Electrical Union World, January 31, 1982, p.1.
[17] Florence Peterson, American Labor Unions: What They Are and How They Work (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), p.65.
[18] Tom Brooks, "New York's Local 3 Pledges Cost Reductions to Offset Pay Raises," Industrial Relations, vol.xxxiv, no.3 (March, 1960), p.6.
[19] Barbash, (1961), p.22.

been able to greatly expand its membership and resources without generating intra-union frictions which might operate against the status quo in the distribution of internal power.

> Thus, by creating "industry" divisions within their memberships, unions may reconcile their expansion programs, designed to strengthen their political and social positions... with the need for having homogeneous worker groups that will be primarily concerned with the business of negotiating and administering labor contracts.[20]

Consequently, the homogeneity of Local 3's bargaining units,i.e., the divisions ensure greater harmony than would be the case if members with different occupations voted on a single contract. However, the heterogeneity of the Local as a whole reduces the potential for rival factions to emerge against the established leadership.

The International now recognizes only two classes of members, "A" and "BA". Individual locals are free to decide whether to include both or either type of members within their ranks, but also are constrained to separate "outside" (class "A") members from "inside" (Class "BA:) members according to loose formulae developed by the International.[21] Currently, "BA" members have voting rights formally equal to those of "A" workers at both the national and local levels, except in matters concerning

[20] Carpenter, p.178.
[21] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws...), pp.19-20.

and local pension funds; the International justifying this distinction by asserting that otherwise "BA" members might outvote "A" members "establishing pensions for all on a lower per capita tax basis, and this endangering the solvency of the fund,"[22] financing pension disbursements. Given the loose occupational definitions set by the International, it is possible for a "BA" division to evolve into "A" status, as was the case with Local 3's wire and cable workers who upgraded their status to "A" membership in 1940.[23]

What Neufeld terms the "next most inclusive grouping" within Local 3 beyond the "A"/"BA" distinction is that between the construction and marine division, on the one hand, and the maintenance, manufacturing and supply division, on the other.[24] As Cook explains, in the early 1960's, and with little modification since then:

> Administratively, the Local is divided into two major sections: one covering chiefly construction work, the other maintainance, manufacturing and supply. The first, referred to as C&M, is made up of twelve Divisions... nearly all of whom are journeymen. The second, known as MM&S, is made up of fourteen Divisions and subdivisions, whose members are at best only semi-skilled. MM&S covers about two and a half times as many workers as C&M.[25]

Since Cook's writing, there have been some changes in

[22] Neufeld, p.9.
[23] Neufeld, p.372.
[24] Ibid., p.10.
[25] Cook, p.116.

degree, but not in basic form, between the two basic segments of the Local: C&M workers are now "outmanned" by MM&S workers by a ratio of about two to one, new divisions have been ircorporated into each group.

On critical matters of contract negotiation, a further divisional level, that of the twenty-five individual divisions, e.g., construction, fixture, supply, lampshade, A.T.& T. workers, Off-Track Betting workers, etc., becomes the basic unit of operation. Contracts are negotiated by committees drawn from and elected by members of the individual division and "the resulting contract (is ratified) by popular vote of a majority of the group membership only."[26] According to Article XIV of the 1971 version of the Local's By-Laws. Between contract negotiations, each unit has its own set of officers, drawn from and elected by members of the union, including a Chairman, Vice Chairman, Recorder and a Executive Committee consisting of the Chairman and four elected officers.

In practical application, divisional autonomy is highly constrained. Contracts are invariably negotiated under the supervision of a Local 3 Business Representative appointed by the Local's central Business Manager. Their Executive Boards do <u>not</u> have the power to bring their members to disciplinary trial, a function which is retained

[26] Carpenter, pp.177-178.
[27] Cook, p.125.

by the Local's Executive Board, and the Business Manager is free to attend all divisional meetings, including Executive Committee sessions as a non-voting participant. Importantly enough, one part of its structure in which devisions deviate from the Local pattern can be seen in the absence of a corresponding post of Treasurer at the divisional level. Although divisions "are able to and do exercise some autonomy over the amount of their financial contributions," to the Local, "they have no power over expenditure; in each case of special need, the Division must petition the Treasurer and the Executive Board (of the Local) for funds."[27] Moreover, the divisionalized structure severly limits formal contract between branches of the Local, so that, in actuality, "the only liason between the Divisions and the parent Local or among the divisions themselves is established by the business representative,"[28] of the Local's staff, limiting shared governmental action to the election of Local officers once every three years.[29]

There is, however, a marked exception to this, in the form of Division 1 comprised of Class "A" construction journeymen. Historically, "all of the less-skilled crafts and trades within Local 3 owe their organization, economic

[28] Cook, p.120.
[29] Ibid., p.142.

and social welfare, continued existence, and consequently, their administrative life to the power and good will of the electrical construction workers."[30] Although other divisions, and parts of divisions, have "A" class status, the construction division is clearly the elite group within the Local as reflected in their higher wage and benefit rates.[31] The key role of the construction division within the context of Local 3's power dimension is summarized by Cook:

> While it has shared (in varying amounts) some aspects of this function with its fellow-Divisions over the intervening years, Division 1 (construction workers) today remains in fact the lawmaking body of the union.... The fact is... that all matters of major union policy remain today, as they originally did, solely within the power of Division 1.[32]

As Neufeld informs us, the construction members of Local 3 exercise inordinate influence upon Local affairs relative to their numbers, and, in formal terms, the dicision actually differs from all other since it, and it alone, has no divisional officers or committees.

> Class A is the controlling group not only in the Division, but within Local 3 itself. At the time when the business manager (then Harry Van Arsdale) assumed office, the Local consisted almost wholly of Class A construction workers. Although the Local as expanded its jurisdiction and influence widely since then, the officers still identify themselves, at times unconsciously, with the affairs and welfare of

[30] Barbash (1961), p.91.
[31] Carpenter, p.245.
[32] Cook, p.114.

> Class A.... As a a consequence, too, of this close alignment, Class A has no officers of its own; in reality, its officers are those of the Local.[33]

As we shall shortly see, with rare exceptions, all of the executive officers of the Local and the vast majority of its Executive Board members come from the construction division. For their part, recognizing their priveleged status within the Local, the construction journeymen have always thrown their support behind the incumbent leadership headed by Business Managers Harry and Thomas Van Arsdale. Moreover, other divisions are encouraged to model themselves, their policies and their patterns of political support after the construction division.[34] The division's Wage and Policy Committee, an outgrowth of the Committee of 100 formed in the early 1930, and consisting of one hundred and fifty elected rank and file members from the construction division is of critical importance. Each construction Division apprenticeship class elects representatives to the Wage and Policy Committee, with candidates being selected by Local officers. These individuals enjoy lifetime tenure on the Wage and Policy Committee and with the coming of each new round of contract negotiations, ten are selected by lot to serve on a Negotiating Committee. In the June, 1983 contract

[33] Neufeld, p.378.
[34] Cook, p.122.

negotiations for a three-year pact with the Employers Association, as one might anticipate, the Negotiating Committee, under the supervision of Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale, voted unanimously to accept the package of wage and benefit increases offered, a decision reported as "unanimously" approved by the Division 8,000-plus members.[35]

The complement of Local-wide executive officers with Local 3 corresponds to what one would expect of such an organization: the Local's by-laws provide for the election of a Business Manager, President, Vice President, Recording Secretary, Financial Secretary, Treasurer, five Executive Board members and three Examining Board members. The Local's President, however, is not the chief officer of the Local: that distinction belongs firmly to the Business Manager. He is a paid, full-time official, however, and has considerable powers in his own right as well as by virtue of his position on the Local's Executive Board. Indeed, each of the principal officers of the Local has some power, but only the President and the Treasurer are full-time employees of the Local, each receiving a modest salary by the standards of organized labor. The other executive officers are part-time officials who receive only a modest stipend for their work.

[35] "'A' Division Contract Ratified," Electrical Union World, June 30, 1983, p.1.

In collective terms, it is the Executive Board, comprised of the Local's President, Vice President and five members who are, by rule, rank and file, unpaid officers, which is at the center of its decision-making process. As stated in the I.B.E.W.'s version of the powers and functions of local executive boards:

> The executive board considers all matters properly brought before it and has the power to take any action the local union can take and which should be taken prior to the next regular local union meeting. A report of the board's action or recommendations shall be submitted to the regular meeting of the local for approval. The executive board is empowered to act as trial boards to hear all charges and try all members for violation of the Constitution, by-laws, and working rules of the local union. This does not include charges against officers or representatives of the local unions.... Charges against these officers must be filed with the International Vice President in the district where the alleged violation occurred.[36]

Although the Negotiating Committee steered by the Business Manager has the power to negotiate contracts for the construction division to be ratified by the general rank and file of that division, in practice, the prior approval of such agreements by the Executive Board is necessary for such submission. As to the Executive Boards powers to discipline any member of any division for violation of laws, it is virtually absolute. If a member is found guilty by the Executive Board, it has virtually

[36] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws...), pp.11-12.

unrestrained power to mete out punishments, including fines, suspensions of expulsions. We get some sense of the Executive Board's power over the rank and file when we consider that such "wrongs" as the use of profanity on the job, loafing on the job, slandering a union official or failure to report violations by another Local 3 member can serve as grounds for trial.[37] Although Local executive officers, Board members and convention delegates are immune from such trial, the Local has seen fit to include a special provision concerning the relationship between the Executive Board and the Business Manager which reads: "The Executive Board shall not at any time inject itself in, or allow itself to be brought into, the affairs or matters coming under the jurisdiction of the Business Manager...."[38] As for the Examining Board, it, at one time, served as an "admissions" committee passing on the meritis of individual journeymen for Local 3 membership, setting the number of apprentices for inclusion in the Local's "A" division apprenticeship program, and determining the qualifications of individuals ofr apprenticeship.[39] In 1966, however, a goodly portion of the Examining Board's power over the apprenticeship system was transferred to the Joint Industry Board, including the

[37] Local 3, By-Laws (1946), Article XI, Section 1.
[38] Ibid., Article III, Section 10.
[39] Cook, p.118.

screening of potential apprentices. Hence, within the Local, while the Examining Board is not devoid of formal power, its role is comparatively marginal when compared to that of the Executive Board.

We come now to the heart of the matter insofar as the power dimension of Local 3 is concerned, i.e., the office of the Business Manager. It is, "the business manager, and not the president" of Local 3 who, "is the most important official."[40] As Cook alternatively puts it, "The manager is in fact the single powerful figure in the union and the staff owe undivided allegiance to him and are totally dependent on him.[41] This is the general practice within the I.B.E.W. which has set forth the powers and responsibilities of the Local Business Managers in an extended passage of its Basic Laws:

> The business manager is the recognized local union representative in dealing with employers. He shall appoint all stewards where needed and aid them in the discharge of their duties. He has general jurisdiction over stewards and can remove any steward at any time....
>
> The business manager is responsible for representing all members of the local union and all employees within the appropriate bargaining unit. He is charged with enforcement of all terms of the collective bargaining agreement and should make every effort to establish friendly relations with employers. He should investigate and resolve all grievances or disputes promptly or cause the same to be done through the

[40] Neufeld, p.373.
[41] Cook, p.142.

appointment of competent stewards.

> The business manager should be aware of all work in the local union's jurisdiction, and he shall be responsible for organizing all electrical workers within that jurisdiction.
> The business manager, while not a member of the executive board shall attend all of its meetings and shall have a voice but no vote.... he is empowered to call special meetings of the local union and the executive board.[42]

According to the Local's By Ly-Laws, it is the Business Manager who "shalll be held solely responsible for results in the field,"[43] and the Local has endowed his office with powers commensurate with such sweeping responsibility.

Of course, the Business Manager cannot accomplish all of the tasks assigned to him without assistance and he must delegate function authority and responsibility to a hierarchy of subordinates. Immediately below the Business Manager are a number, usually three or four, Assistant Business Managers. Each of the two primary sections of the union must have an Assistant Business Manager attached to it. Below them, but reporting directly to the Business Manager is a staff of between twenty or thirty Business Representatives. Usually a Business Representative is assigned to each of the divisions with a small group serving at-large. Beneath the Business Representatives, but again, directly responsible to the Business Manager is a number (in the hundreds) of job and shop stewards

[42] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws...), pp.10-11.
[43] Local 3, By-Laws, Article III, Section 10.

responsible for ensuring that workers have Local 3 cards, that contract provisions are enforced and that any irregularities are reported to the Business Representative in charge of this particular division. All of these individuals are appointed to their posts by the Business Manager; he can remove any of them at will (without further consultation with any other officers of the union). Clearly, as Neufeld would euphemistically put it, "the reins of the administrative process in Local 3, consonant with the most advanced principles of administration, are tightly held by an elected official in whose person responsbility is centered."[44] Cook's alternative portrayal of the business staff's relation to the Business Manager is more objective: "They are, therefore, completely dependent upon him, not receiving even a perfunctory endorsement from the membership at large or the Divisions to which they are assigned."[45]

Apart from the formal powers which the Business Manager exercises, in practical or informal terms, it is this single individual who is the "source" within Local 3. "Almost without exception," Cook writes, "new plans and innovations in established procedures and politice is -- certainly within the union but frequently in the industry

[44] Neufeld, p.67.
[45] Cook, p.117.

as well -- originate with him."[46] Of course, the Business Manager's power is, in a sense, counterbalanced by the collective power of the Executive Board, but here too, as Cook points out, the counterbalance is more of an additional weight to his office:

> The elected officers and the Executive Board members could possibly be formally viewed as balancing forces to his power and prestige. In reality, they all act as a small, close official family. Indeed, one gains the impression that the prestige of the members of this family is more a product of their close relationship to the manager than of any independent power derived from election.[47]

In addition, as we shall soon see, even those elected officials who do possess some measure of power within the Local have been, in effect, handpicked by the Business Manager in the process of making their way up the ranks.

Originally, all of the executive officers, Executive Board and Examining Board members were elected by the rank and file for terms of two years, while the Business Manager enjoyed a term of four years.[48] Currently, however, all of these officers are elected to three year terms since (a) that is the maximum allowable under the Federal Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act and (b) amendments to the I.B.E.W. Constitution preclude separate elections for local union officers.[49] Up until 1947, the

[46] Ibid., p.119.
[47] Ibid., p.119.
[48] Local 3, By Laws, Article IV, Sections 1 & 2.
[49] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws...), p.27.

administration of elections was handled exclusively by members of the construction division, although the Australian ballot was employed and members of all divisions had equal voting rights. Currently the overall administration of the elections is supervised by an Election Board consisting of fifteen members elected by the rank and file, but the actual voting is administered by a neutral observer. The individual selected to handle this task was Father William J. Kelley, then Chairman of the New York State Labor Relations Board.

On the surface, all of the Local's elections have been open and clean. Nomination for a position in the Local does not require a second, and the names of all nominated candidates are automatically placed upon the ballot. Moreover, Local 3 members are consistently exhorted to exercise their democratic rights by participating in elections. Hence, from the inception of the Van Arsdale dynasty, the proportion of members voting in elections has always been well above 50 percent and it is rare that a candidate for local office has not faced an opposition candidate, frequently two or more rivals.

The provisions of the I.B.E.W. Constitution require that all candidates be allowed to distribute campaign

[60] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws), p.28

literature. Such literature must, however, be paid for by the candidate himself and no union funds are available to underwrite individual campaigns for office.[60] It is, in practice, difficult to see how an opposition candidate can overcome the massive communication machinery which incumbents have at their disposal as a co-sequence of their offices given the lack of "special" campaign financing mechanism. The Local publishes a bi-monthly and rather large newsletter, Electrical Union World, which constantly extolls the merits of incumbent officers and reminds members of the benefits which have been passed to them as a result of their unflagging efforts. The chief editor of Electrical Union World is the Local's President, George Schuck Jr. The publication itself started as the personal newsletter of Harry Van Arsdale.

The inordinately high level of participation in elections of Local-wide offices is, in part, a reflection of the Local's participatory "culture", but, at the same time, it is also the calculated outcome of a tightly organized and controlled procedure having a single purpose, the re-election of incumbents and election of handpicked candidates for open offices. I cannot improve on Cook's description of the process as a whole.

[60] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws), p.28.

> This high degree of membership participation is the result of careful planning and systematic organization. The staff's main task for the four to six weeks preceeding an election is to carry through the necessary propaganda and organizational efforts for a high participation rate. In each Division, special Advisory Board and shop steward meetings are called. Business representatives themselves visit and organize participation in the larger shops. Within the last ten days before each election, stewards hold special shop meetings and then report in a special stewards' meeting on specific plans for bringing their members to the polling place....
>
> In all the preelection meetings which were observed, stress was put on the obligation to vote as an expression of appreciation for the good work of all the present administration. It should not be surprising that the staff, all of whom are appointees of the incumbent administration, threw their prestige, influence, and persuasive powers behind making the election a vote of confidence. In no meeting was mention made of other candidates, the possibility of self-nomination, or the existence of any opposition. The spirit of the propaganda distinctly favored using the election as a vote of confidence in the present administration.[51]

In light of all this, it is not surprising that the Local's leadership permits electoral procedures which are "open" since the elections themselves cannot but have a single result: the landslide endorsement of the incumbent slate.

Looking at those Local 3 election results which are available to us, we get some measure of the effectiveness of the electoral machinery within the Local. In June, 1940, for example, we find that Harry Van Arsdale (the incumbent) attracted 9,169 votes in his bid for a third

[51] Cook, p.138.

term as Business Manager, the other four candidates combining for a a total of less than one thousand votes.[52] In 1950, at the height of the controversy with the International, Harry Van Arsdale's popularity slipped as he garnered 8,128 votes against 2,699 votes for his three opponents.[53] Not to worry, Van rebounded in the 1954 election for Business Manager, registering 13,729 ballots to a total of 1,383 for his three rivals.[54] The passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act meant an election for Business Manager in 1960, but HVA prevailed, garnering 19,147 votes to 891 for the aggregated opposition. In 1968, when Harry Van Arsdale stepped down from his position as Business Manager, his son Thomas carried on the traditional pattern, receiving 13,244 votes in contrast to the 318 protest votes for the other (unnamed) Business Manager candidate. As for Harry himself, he was elected to the position of Financial Secretary for Local 3 without opposition in the same election. The last Local 3 election was held in May 1984. The headline in the Electrical Union World election edition exuberantly proclaimed "Van Arsdale, Schuck and Incumbent Officers Re-elected by 10 to 1 Majority Vote."[55] The sweep was complete: all executive officers, all

[52] Journal of Electrical Workers and Operators, August, 1940, p.424.
[53] Neufeld, p.3.
[54] Ibid., p.3.
[55] Electrical Union World, May 15, 1984, pp.1-2.

members of the Executive Board and all members of the Examining Board were returned to their posts. As revealingly, the Electrical Union World did not provide a breakdown of the voting by individual office and did not even give the names of opposition candidates. From the perspective of the newsletter, it was enough to inform members that they had done their job in showing appreciaition for the incumbents and, with this formality out of the way, it was business as usual for Local 3.

Elite Personnel and Elite Recruitment

At present, Local 3 has five executive officers, the position of Financial Secretary formerly held by Harry Van Arsdale Jr. remaining unfilled since his death in February, 1986. They are: Thomas Van Arsdale, Business Manager; George Schuck Jr., President; William Fiedler Jr., Vice President; Lafayette Jackson, Treasurer; and, William Blain, Recording Secretary. The Executive Board is comprised of Schuck, Fiedler and five rank and file members: Salvatore Bruzzese, Robert Dobbins, Joseph McByrne, Christopher Plunkett and David Rollins. The Examining Baord includes Recording Secretary Blain along with John Shea and Frank Torres.[56] Although the roster includes all executive officers of the Local, this list

[56] Electrical Union World, March 7, 1986, p.2.

does not complete that group of individuals who must be considered part of the Local 3 elite. In addition to those already mentioned, the two primary Assistant Business Managers, James L. O'Hara attached to the C&M branch and Lou Stein assigned to the MM&S portion of the Local clearly exercise great power within the Local, while some Business Representatives (individuals who we shall encounter in the next chapter), also possess considerable sway. Further out in the concentric circles of power and constituting a sub-elite are members of the Wage and Policy Committee and the Election Board along with certain staff officers, e.g., Vincent McElroen as Associate Editor of Electrical Union World and a few individuals serving on various committees of the Joint Industry Board who, contrary to the general pattern, do not hold other offices as well.

Complete listings of indivduals who have held high office within the Local are difficult to come by. Whether intentionally or through oversight, the Local has not prepared such listings (perhaps, I might speculate, because the absence of turnover in these offices might generate a taint of oligarchical rule). As to the office of Business Manager, it is the easiest to trace: apart from John Kapp's eighteen month stint as acting Business Manager, since 1933 Local 3 has had but two individuals occupy this seat, Harry Van Arsdale Jr. (1933-1968) and Thomas Van

Arsdale (1968-1986). Over the same fifty-plus year span, the Local has had five different Presidents. They are: Bert Kirkman (1933-1943), Jeremiah P. Sullivan (1943-1964), Edward Cleary Jr. (1964-1974), George Schuck Jr. (1974-1986), and last but not least, Dennis McSpedon (1986-currently). Jeremiah Sullivan's tenure of twenty-one years as President was the longest, and he left in characteristic Local 3 fashion, that is, by resignation to the Executive Board which then appointed Cleary to fill his position, with Sullivan continuing on as Treasurer of the International (until Harry Van Arsdale took that spot) and as a member of various Local 3 committees. George Schuck Jr. was a "natural" to fill the President's office, his father, George Schuck Sr. having held the post of Local 3 Vice President from 1953 through 1961. As to the current Executive Board, the degree of turnover can be broadly gauged by the fact that fifteen
years ago, in 1971, the five rank and file members of the Board included Robert Dobbins, Christopher Plunkett and George Schuck Jr., while William Fiedler and John E.Shea were two of the three members of the Examining Board.

We can get a better idea of how things really work in terms of elected office by looking briefly at some of the biographical resumes of its current officers. The most obvious candidate for such analysis is Thomas Van Arsdale. It may seem, at first, self-evident that the younger Van

Arsdale had been slated to replace his father as Business Manager almost upon his entrance into the Local. However, Thomas Van Arsdale, like anyone else, made his way up the ranks according to the rules of advancement in the Local. His case is instructive in this regard. Following his graduation with an Electrical Engineering degree from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute and a stint in the United States Navy during World War II, Thomas Van Arsdale (TVA) became a construction division apprentice in 1946, seving as that class's apprentice committee secretary. In 1958, he was appointed by his father to the position of Business Representative, having been elected to the Executive Board in 1953, a post he held until his election as Business Manager in 1968. In 1965, the younger Van Arsdale became Assistant Business Manager of the manufacturing and supply divisions, again, via appointment from his father. Prior to this, however, in 1958, he was elected to the position of Director of the Electrical Workers Benefit Society and enlarged his presence by assuming a number of committee posts wtin the Joint Industry Board. In 1986, Thomas assumed the post of Treasurer for the International, the I.B.E.W.'s Executive Council appointing him to fill the unexpired term of his ailing father. In March, 1986, Thomas Van Arsdale was elected to the post of President of the 1-million-member New York City Central Labor Council, replacing his father, by defeating rival candidate Victor

Gotbaum, President of District 37 of the State, County and Municipal Employees Union by a vote of 335,434 to 273,284. True to the Local's tradition, Thomas Van Arsdale now serves on numerous bodies outside the Local and outside of labor itself, including the Board of Trustees of the State University of New York, that of the Catholic Interracial Council and that of the New York College of Osteopathic Medicine.

One of the most interesting figures among the Local 3 elite is Lafayette Jackson, the source of the interest being that Jackson is Black. Nevertheless, Jackson wended his way up the Local 3 laddar in much the same fashion as Thomas Van Arsdale. After a stint in the armed forces, Jackson entered the Local in 1957 as a construction apprentice. Unlike Van Arsdale, Jackson skipped the office of Business Representative, working instead in the Local's apprenticeship system and on racial relations agencies of the Federal government. In 1968, Jackson became the first non-white officer of the Local, appointed to the position of Treasurer, a post he currently holds, by the Executive Board. One year later, Jackson's appointment was confirmed by the general membership in the Local 3 elections. Jackson assumed the additional post of Apprentice Training Director in February, 1986. His predecessor in this spot was David E. Smith who, perhaps coincidentally, is also Black.

In January, 1986, the position of Local Vice President was filled by William Fiedler following the retirement of Robert Reade and his route to this echelon was through Executive Board appointment. Fiedler, an "A" class construction apprentice in the late 1950's had been appointed to various Local 3 offices since 1971. They include posts on the Examining Board, Executive Board, and the post of Recording Secretary which was subsequently approved in general elections. His replacement as Recording Secretary was William Blain. Blain began his Local 3 career as a construction apprentice in 1956, serving as chairman of the Apprentice Committee for four years of his apprenticeship. In 1974, Blain was appointed to the Examining Board by the Executive Board, and in 1982, he was appointed to the post of Business Representative by Thomas Van Arsdale, an office which he continues to hold. Blain was unanimously elected as Recording Secretary by the seven man Executive Board in November, 1985.

What happens to Local 3 officers when they retire before their terms expire to make way for new appointees by the Executive Board? They become leaders in more broadly based, if less powerful, labor organizations. Edward J. Cleary, President of Local 3 from 1964 to 1974 illustrates this pattern. As to his early career, it also displays the typical Local 3 pattern. He entered the Local as a construction apprentice in 1949, the son of a

construction journeyman who served as Elections Committee Chairman in the 1960 election. He served as Apprentice Committee Chairman for three years during his apprenticeship. In 1957, when a member of the Examining Board was elevated to Treasurer by the Executive Board, Cleary assumed this post through appointment. He was elected to the Examining Board in 1958, re-elected in 1960, but was again appointed a member of the Executive Board two months after the ballots had been counted. One month after this, upon the retirement of George Schuck Sr., Cleary was appointed Vice President by the Executive Board and simultaneously to the position of Assistant Business Manager by Harry Van Arsdale. In 1964, upon the retirement of Jeremiah P. Sullivan, Cleary was appointed to the post of Local 3 President by the Executive Board. Leaving office in 1973 to make way for George Schuck Jr., Cleary became Secretary of the New York City Building Trades Council. Currently he is the President of the New York AFL-CIO, remains active on the margins of Local 3, serving as Secretary of the Joint Industry Board's Educational and Cultural Trust Fund.

Representative of the Executive Board, Christopher Plunkett entered the Local as a construction apprentice in 1935. He was appointed to the post of Business Representative in 1945, and, fifteen years later, he served a two year term as Assistant Business Manager. Plunkett

relinquished his post as Assistant Business Manager in 1962 to become a member of the rank and file portion of the Executive Board. James L. O'Hara, entering the Local as an "A" class construction apprentice became a member of the Executive Board in 1947, but he relinquished this role in 1949 for an appointment as a Business Representative by the Business Manager. This route led him to the Assistant Business Manager appointment in 1964; a post he holds to this day. O'Hara's father, David G. O'Hara served briefly as Financial Secretary of the Local in the early 1930's. His colleague, Louis Stein, was appointed as Business Representative and Vice Chairman for the Fixture Division in 1956. He was subsequently appointed to his current post as Assistant Business Manager for the Manufacturing and Supply Division by Harry Van Arsdale in 1967. Like O'Hara, Stein also functions as a member of various Joint Industry Board Committees. Finally, looking at the Election Board Committee for 1984, we encounter a number of familiar names, including Thomas Cleary, Gus Smith, Joseph McSpedon (the son of prominent Business Representative George McSpedon), and, of course the lastest addition to the dynasty -- Lance Van Arsdale.

The biographical data presented above is not comprehensive; it has been "stitched" together from Local 3

[57] Cook, p.139

published sources. Moreover, while a general pattern of advancement can be discerned, there are variations on it. Cook comments on this matter:

> While there is no well-marked upward road from volunteer activity to elected officialdom and professional employment, so much emphasis is put on the value of experience in union leadership and so many opportunities are available for its exercise that a kind of well-trodden path has been worn.[67]

The characteristics of this path are basically three: grooming for a top post starts early; it includes numerous lateral positions; and, most importantly, at the critical junctures, the move upward is via appointment by either the Business Manager or the Executive Council.

As to the first of thee features of Local 3 elite recruitment, advancement begins with acceptance into the Local's construction division apprenticeship program; very few elite members are drawn from outside the construction division. Although the father-son rule no longer governs eligibility for the apprenticeship program, having a father who is active in the Local helps to distinguish which apprentices will be chosen for membership on the Apprentice's Advisory Committee, and the Wage and Policy Committee, the latter being a step toward the "A" division Wage and Policy Committee. The Apprenticeship Advisory

[67] Cook, p.139.

Committee consists of Local 3 sub-elite members, for example, Vincent McElroen, Business Representative and associate editor of Electrical Union World was recently appointed as a member of the Committee by the current Business Manager. The apprenticeship class is informally screened for potential elite recruits; Local officers "guiding" their selection to apprenticeship class-elected bodies. It is indicative, although not essential, for the prospective recruit to receive "honors"along the way within his apprenticeship class. Hence, in 1951, the winner of the first prize for the A.Lincoln Bush Award was Thomas Van Arsdale. The same award had gone to Harry Van Arsdale III in 1954.[58]

As the prospective candidate graduates from his apprenticeship class, presumably as a lifetime member of the construction division's Wage and Policy Committee, he is expected to engage in a range of volunteer work centered around the Local's social clubs. At the same time, the candidate may serve on various boards and committees within the structure of the Joint Industry Board. The route to advancement normally involves an appointment to the office of Business Representative by the Business Manager, However, the next natural step from Business Representative

[58] Joint Industry Board, Apprenticeship on the Move: A System in Review (New York: Joint Industry Board, 1974), p.89.

is to the post of Assistant Business Manager. At this point, unless one's name is Van Arsdale, advancement to the Business Manager's post is all but precluded. As frequently, with or without appointment as a Business Representative, the new elite member will be appointed by the Executive Board, in consultation with the Business Manager, to a position on the Examining Board, Executive Board or Local-wide offices. As a rule, an individual moves through two or more of these posts.

The single most important characteristic of the recruitment path,however, is the process of appointment, and this holds for both elective and non-elective offices. Cook's descrtipion in 1964 of this process reamins completely accurate to the present.

> Although under the nomination and election procedures (of the Local) these positions (in the elite) are open to the membership at large, a painstaking scrutiny of Local 300's public documents indicates that the one successful approach to these elected offices is through previous appointment....
>
> Since vacancies in the membership of both Boards (Examining and Executive) are filled between election by appointment of the Executive Board on recommendation of the business manager, these vacancies were traced as they occurred over the past twenty years. Actually during that time there has been considerable change in the personnel on thes Boards. Death has taken some of the members. But more significant has been repeated appointment of Executive Board members to the full-time staff.
>
> The rule that members of the Executive Board must be men working at the trade requires in such cases that a replacement be found at once from among the rank and file. Thus the exercise of the appointive power of the manager to a staff

> position immediately creates an opening on the Board (Executive Board). The timing of these appointments, interestingly enough, has almost invariably been a few months after an election. Then with the better part of two years (or three) to go, the appointed Board member is comfortably ensconced in his position when the next election rolls around. For this reason alone, it is neither surprising nor unusual that elections in Local 300 tend to confirm the incumbents....
>
> The fact that acess to the successive stages of elective leadership (from Examining Board on) is through appointment by the Executive Board recommendation of the business Manager is the paradox in Local 300's emphasis on, and pride in, the election process.[59]

Apprenticeship and the J.I.B.

Under the I.B.E.W.'s Constitution, local unions are left essentially free "to adopt, or subscribe to, an apprenticeship system, training program, or helpers rules, as the conditions may require,"[60] Therefore, the principle of local autonomy prevails in determining the specific program for reaching "A" class construction journeyman status. In Local 3, the apprenticeship training program consists of a four year curriculum during which the would-be journeyman works under supervision of Local 3 journeymen during the day and attends technical classes run by the Local at night. After four years, the candidate receives a card identifying him as an "M" journeyman; He becomes a full-fledged "A" journeyman at the end of one additional year. Successful completion of this four-year

[60] I.B.E.W. (Basic Laws...), p.16.

program enables Local 3 journeyman candidates to earn a two-year Associate of Science Degree at Empire State College's Center for Labor Studies, making it "the only apprenticeship training program which also offers the opportunity of earning a college degree,"[61] in the building trades of the United States.

Apart from the expansion of the apprenticeship program in 1961-1962, normally the number of positions open in any given year ranges between 200 and 300, the actual figure being controlled by the Examining Board. As one would anticipate given the high wages and extensive benefits enjoyed by construction division members, competition for the available apprenticeships is intense. For example, some 5,000 applicants were drawn to the 500 openings available in the apprenticeship program in 1972. The potential candidate must meet certain fixed qualifications to be eligible for consideration: he must possess a high school diploma; he must pass an aptitude test administered by the New York State Division of Employment; he must pass a physical exam; and, he must have been a resident of the Greater New York area for at least two years prior to his application. Prior to 1966, the applicant was also required to undergo an interview by the Examining Board. Since that time this function has been transferred to a

[64] Joint Industry Board (Apprenticeship...), p.23.

Joint Apprenticeship Committee comprised of nine employerand six employee members appointed by the Chairman of the J.I.B. In recent years, the interview committee has normally included one member of the Lewis Howard Lattimer Progressive Association (Black), and one member of the Santiago Iglesias Society (Puerto Rican) to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of minority group member applicants. The interview itself is intensive and freqiently lasts four or more hours. It includes an investigation of the applicant's educational background with an emphasis on math and science, an assessment of his aptitude for the journeyman's job, a fuller covering of his physical health and questions probing his interest, attitudes and personal traits.[63]

Upon entering the apprenticeship program, the new class is immediately introduced to the power dimension of Local 3. They elect an apprentices' negotiation and policy committee from among their own ranks charged with contract negotiations with employers. In the past, selection of the ten member apprentice committee was by nomination through the Business Manager with subsequent confirmation by the apprenticeship class.[64] Since the J.I.B. took over the program, nominations are made by the class upon

[63] Ibid., p.25.
[64] Neufeld, p.374.

recommendation of the Chariman of the Apprenticeship Advisory Committee, who is currently Local 3 Treasurer Lafayette Jackson. From the ranks of these individuals each class is allowed to elect a small (two to five) number of members for lifetime positions on the construction division's Wage and Policy Committee from which, in turn, members of the division's Negotiating Committee are drawn by lot. In March, 1986, for instance, thirteen new members were added to the Wage and Policy Committee of the construction division from the apprentice classes of 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984. One of the 1984 class designees was Lance Van Arasdale III.[65]

If one were to attempt to outline the organizational structure of Local 3 as a whole, a hierarchical pattern would not be the most accurate in practical terms. Instead, a series of concentric circles with the office of the Business Manager as its nave would more accurately display the Local's organization. However, out picture of the Local would still not be complete, for, in fact, the Local is but one wheel of two which work in tandem. The other wheel whose gears mesh with Local 3 is the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry. The close "fit" between the J.I.B. and the Local, especially the

[65] Electrical Union World, March 20, 1986, p.1.
[66] Neufeld, p.377.

division of the Local, is described by Neufeld:

> The administration of the Construction Division is wired so intricately to the structure and activities of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry in New York City, that it is difficult at times to discern when the functions of Local 3 leave off and when those of the J.I.B. are brought into play.[66]

This observation was paraphrased by Armand D'Angelo in 1967 when he was serving as Chairman of the J.I.B.:

> The electrical industry in the New York City area is widely considered the most completely integrated industry in America in the sense that its management and labor are not only committed to identical goals but are organized to work toward the achievement of those goals on a day to day, year-round basis.[67]

It is with the construction division of Local 3 that the J.I.B. is concerned, and while other divisions within the Local have theor own joint industry board, e.g.s. the fixture division's Joint Industry Board of the Illuminating Products Industry and the lampshade division's Joint Board of the Lampshade Sector. This all pale in comparison with the central J.I.B.

From its original composition of five management and five labor representatives, the J.I.B. is now governed by a central policy-making Board consisting of fifteen labor representatives and fifteen management delegates along with one Public Member "to insure objectivity and act as an

[66] Neufeld, p.377.
[67] Ibid., p.377.

advocate in the public interest."[68] The Board itself contains a Chairman, a Vice Chairman and an Executive Secretary Treasurer elected annually by the Board as a whole.[69]

Under its original articles of incorporation, the Joint Board is called upon to fulfill a number of critical functions:

> (C) The Joint Industry Board shall have power to formulate and when necessary to modify or amend rules and regulations which will promote harmony between the Employers and the Employees in the Industry, and will study and institute a program which will make it possible for the industry to be of greater assistance to those purchasing our services, the potential purchaser and the general public....
>
> (D) The Joint Industry Board shall administer the Pension, Hospitalization and Benefit Plan of the Electrical Industry... and hereby incorporate said plan as part of this Agreement.
>
> (E) The Joint Board shall administer the Emplyment Plan of the Electrical Industry and hereby incorporates said said plan, as part of this Agreement.[70]

The principle functions of the J.I.B. at present are (1) the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements between Employers and the construction division of Local 3, (2) the administration of conflicts under existing contracts, (3) the administration of most of the benefits enjoyed by both construction division members of Local 3 and other members of the Local, (4) the administration of the apprenticeship

[68] J.I.B. (New York Times), p.1.
[69] Neufeld, p.31.
[70] Joint Industry Board, The Team: Joint Board of the Electrical Industry (New York: J.I.B., n.d.), p.2.

training program. According to President Schuck and Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale:

The primary function of the Joint Industry Board is the administration of the collective bargaining agreement and working rules. It mediates all controversies, problems or disputes arising under the agreement... Labor disputes that are settled in such an atmosphere are rarely brought to the public's attention even though the by-product is a saving of construction time and money.[71]

However, the importance of the J.I.B. in other areas of the Local's affairs cannot be underestimated, particularly since it administers all Plans and Benefits agreed to in collective bargaining arrangements between the Local and the Employers Association, as well as the apprenticeship program. A recent J.I.B. publication provides an organization chart of the J.I.B. with various committees devoted to each of the Benefit Plans included, but the chart is so extensive and so elaborate that it defies reproduction.

Apart from the top Joint Board spoken of above, the Adjustment Committee exercised the greatest power within the Board until a decade ago. This Committee, comprised of members appointed by the Joint Board's Chairman, was charged with reviewing "all controversies, problems and

[71] J.I.B. (New York Times), p.3.

disputes" arising under contracts between the Local's members and their employers.[72] "In later years," as the J.I.B. informs us, "although it is still a standing committee, the Adjustment Committee is only called into session when the Chairman of the Board deems it necessary."[73] In July, 1971, the J.I.B. established a replacement body, the Review Board, to take over the principal functions of the Adjustment Committee.

> The Review Board consists of four employer representatives and four employee representatives and their meetings are presided over by the Chairman of the Joint Industry Board. They have met regularly since the initial meeting at the call of the Chairman. Since its inception, the Review Board has discussed and held hearings on many items to fulfill the purpose for which it was established, such as man power shortages, productivity, pilferage and tool and equipment loss....[74]

The change from the Adjustment Committee to the Review Board is broadly indicative of two ongoing developments: (a) the lack of a need for complaint resolution via a separate committee and (b) the further centralization of power under the J.I.B.'s Chairman.

Cooperative effort is the name of the game at the J.I.B. Since 1945, one of the most prominent bodies within the Joint Board has been the Coordinating Committee of the

[72] Joint Industry Board, History and Organization of the Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry (New York: J.I.B., 1983), p.13.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid., p.95.

Joint Industry Board for Improved Installation Practices for the Electrical Contracting Industry, or, simply the Coordinating Committee. The central purpose of this body is to find ways to improve productivity and cut costs for employers using Local 3 manpower. In 1973, then Board Chairman Armand D'Angelo issued a pamphlet entitled Our Key to Survival: Increased Productivity. In it, D'Angelo reported the central conclusions of the Coordinating Committee to members of the construction division; the first three are replicated below:

> (1) There should be closer supervision of coffee breaks, including the time of starting and quitting.
> (2) Lunch periods for some jobs should be changed to eliminate lost time on elevator service.
> (3) An intensive effort should be made to keep up with the newest time-saving tools and equipment, and a follow-up system established to see that these tools are on the jobs wheerever needed. Every precaution must be taken to limit the unexplained depletion of equipment from the job site.[75]

It is not, of course, the specific content of these proposals which is of interest: rather, it is the fact that the J.I.B. is functioning, in effect, as a control arm of management and that these directives sound like the type of orders handed down by corporate superiors to underlings. Indeed, so close is the cooperation between employers and the union through the J.I.B. that in 1969 a permanent

[75] Armand D"Angelo, Our Key to Survival: Increased Productivity (New York: Joint Industry Board, 1973), p.9.

committee on New and Expanding Markets was established within the J.I.B. to identify porential customers for business. It is apparant, then that in the form of the J.I.B., Local 3 not only cooperates with management, it assumes many of the functions conventionally handled by management, e.g.s., employee control and marketing.

As Cook notes, in terms of ambitious Local 3 members for whom a slot in the Local's hierarchy cannot be readily found, the existence of the Joint Industry Board provides a "safety valve" role. Identifying the J.I.B. as the L-MIB, Cook writes:

> A further element in the mobility pattern is provided by a scrutiny of the makeup of the officials of the L-MIB. Without reporting in detail... one may nevertheless note that most of the Board's staff have come from the union. It is just possible that the transfer of union officers to staff positions in the L-MIB, and on at least one occasion into the industry itself, may have been a planned, and not an accidental way of changing union personnel who could not otherwise be conveniently shifted.[76]

Cook made this observation without the benefit of knowing about a change which occurred in 1966. Prior to that time, there had been three Chairmen of the Joint Industry Board, A. Lincoln Bush, Efrem A. Kahn and Harold Webster, all of them management representatives. In February, 1966 the position fell for the first time to a labor representative, Armand D'Angelo who served in that capacity until 1982.

[76] Cook, p.141.

Prior to his entering the Joint Board, D'Angelo had served for two decades as Assistant Business Manager for Local 3. What seems to have occurred is that D'Angelo represented a potential rival to the prospective taking over of the Business Manger's office by Thomas Van Arsdale. Thuthe easiest solution was to make Armand D'Angelo the head of a parallel and nearly equivalent organization to Local 3 as Chairman of the J.I.B. Upon entering the J.I.B., moreover, Armand D'Angelo did not come alone: he was accompanied by his son, Joseph D'Angelo, and, true to the Local 3 pattern, when the elder D'Angelo retired from the Chairmanship, his son, Joseph D'Angelo was unanimously elected as Chairman of the Joint Board. In June, 1986, the youngest D'Angelo resigned from his post as J.I.B. Chairman to assume office as Executive Secretary of the New York Electrical Contractors Association.

In terms of Local 3 personnel, the degree of overlap between its officers and the key positions within the Joint Board is staggering. The Treasurer of the U.I.B. is George Schuck Jr., and among the employee representatives on the Board we find Dennis McSpedon, James L. O'Hara, Christopher Plunkett, George Schuck Jr. and Thomas Van Arsdale. The J.I.B.'s Coordinator of Industry AFfairs is Armand D'Angelo, its current and long-time Public Member is Robert Wagner Jr. Looking at some of the individual committees within the J.I.B., we find that the Educational and

Cultural Trust Fund is chaired by Armand D'Angelo, its Vice Chairman is Thomas Van Arsdale and its Secretary is Edward J. Cleary. The three listed representatives of the Review Committee for 1984 were James O'Hara, George Schuck Jr. and Thomas Van Arsdale. On the Pension Committee, we find Thomas Van Arsdale listed as Secretary, George Schuck as Trustee, with employee representatives including Christopher Plunkett, Thomas Van Arsdale and, before his death, Harry Van Arsdale. As for the Vacation and Holiday Committee, Thomas Van Arsdale was its Treasurer, George Schuck its Secretary, these two joining Christopher Plunkett and Harry Van Arsdale as employee representatives in 1984. One could, of course, mention even more instances of Local 3 elite members holding key posts in the J.I.B. The point is not simply that they do so, that is to be expected; the point is that no one but elite and sub-elite members of the Local holds any post of significance with the J.I.B. from the labor side. A series of importnat personnel changes were made in the top ranks of Local 3 during an Executive Board meeting held on July 28, 1986, which further illustrate the pattern of career advancement that has developed. At that meeting, George Schuck Jr. resigned as the Local's President to become the Chairman of the Joint Industry Board. The Board unanimously approved the nomination of Dennis McSpedon as Local President at the recommendation of Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale.

No other candidates had been under consideration. McSpedon was a logical choice in the sense that his background conformed to the typical Local 3 leader. The son of former Local 3 Business Representative Howard McSpedon, the newly-elected President entered the Local in 1960 and graduated from the "A" division apprenticeship program in 1966. Among his accomplishments within Local 3, Dennis NcSpedon has been a member of the Wage and Policy Committee since 1968; an inspector on the Election Committees of 1969, 1972, 1975 and 1978; a Director of the Electrical Workers Benefit Society and is currently a trustee of the Joint Industry Board and delegate to the 1986 convention of the I.B.E.W. Between 1980 and 1985, Dennis McSpedon served the Local through his appoinetment by Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale as a Business Representantive of the Loccal's Supply, Expediter and ADM divisions. In 1985, McSpedon took another step up the Local 3 ladder by being transferred to the downtown construction division as its Business Representative. True to form, Dennis McSpedon has been active within the Local's network of social clubs, having previouly served as President of the Westchester Mechanic's Association, and is currently an active member of both this group and the Bronx Acorn Electrical Club. In short, McSpedon's rise to the the Presidency of Local 3 has been "by the book." He was handpicked for recruitment into the Local's power elite by

the Business Manager/Executive Board and he fulfilled all of the requisite roles necessary for elevation to the local's highest echelon, e.g.s., "A" division apprenticeship, Wage and Policy Committee membership, appointment as Business Representative, active officer in the Local's social clubs, etc.

Simultaneously, William Blain resigned as the Local's Recording Secretary, and as an Examining Board member, to assume the post of Financial Secretary left vacant by the death of Harry Van Arsdale. Concurrently, John Shea, a long-time member of the Local's Examining Board, withdrew from from the office. This left two important Examining Board slots open; the Executive Board quickly filed them with, again, "logical" candidates. The names of Edward F. Novey and Patrick Walsh were submitted to the Executive Board by Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale, and the Board endorsed these selections without debate. Both Novey and Walsh are graduates of the "A" division apprenticeship program. Novey served prominently as a member of the New York City Central Labor Council's Labor Day Parade Committee and as a member of the editorial staff of the Electrical Union World. Walsh's credentials are equally impressive, including posts on the Local's Election Committee, Foreman's Committee and Wage and Policy Committee. Since 1984, Walsh has also had the distinction of being President of the Central Colony Club, and, in

addition, he is a noteworthy member of the Keystone Club, the Catholic Council of Electrical Workers,and the Allied Union Social Club. Thus, like McSpedon, both Novel and Walsh have faithfully followed the step-by-step route to high office demanded of all prospective members of the Local 3 elite.[78]

In November, 1986, Local 3 Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale experienced a strong challenge to his continued tenure as President of New York City's 1.2 million member Central Labor Council. In March of the same year, Thomas Van Arsdale had beaten his opponent, Victor Gotbaum, the Executive Director of District Council 37 of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. Subsequently, Thomas Van Arsdale assumed the Central Labor Council's Presidency left vacant by the death of his father, Harry Van Arsdale. The March election resulted in a 60,000 vote margin of victory for Van Arsdale, however, the result in the November contest was far closer, with 402,749 votes cast for Van Arsdale as the incumbent and 396,178 for Gotbaum. Indeed, Gotbaum would have defeated the current Local 3 Business Manger had not some 19,976 votes been excluded from the final tally on the grounds that the voters belonged to locals which had not made timely dues payments to the Council. Local 3's settlement

[78] New York Daily News, November 21, 1986, p.19.

with American Telephone and Telegraph and Van Arsdale's decision to cancel both the Labor Council meetings and the Annual Labor Day Parade in the summer of 1986 cost him support at the polls. Gotbaum, however, hurt his own chances to defeat Van Arsdale by a remark suggesting that special initiatives for or Blacks and Hispanics by the Council should be shifted to other organizations. In the end, despite a protest and an appeal, Van Arsdale triumphed, and continued to hold the position occupied by his father from 1959 through 1986.

Summary and Conclusion

Local 3 is an extremely large and powerful unit within the I.B.E.W., and, apart from the International's express commitment to local autonomy, the New York local derives its independence from its size, resources, historical legacy and extensive political connections. Encompassing both craft and industrial workers, the Local displays a complex organizational structure with numerous divisions within its fold. These units have structures which, on the surface, mirror that of the Local, but their power to operate independently of the Local is severely circumscribed. The sole exception to this rule is the construction division. Although the construction division's formal advantages over its counterparts have diminished through the years, it is clearly the core force among the rank and file. The Local's complement of

executive officers and boards is comparatively small given the size of the Local; in fact, it is even smaller since real power is firmly lodged in the Executive Board, and particularly in the office of the Business Manager. The latter enjoys sweeping powers to match its responsibilities, including the unrestricted power of appointment over Business Representatives and shop stewards. Local 3 appears to be a highly democratic organization, featuring open elections and a high level of participation by the rank and file in these elections. However, the administrative machinery controlled by Local 3 incumbents transforms these elections into demonstrations of approval and appreciation as reflected in the low turnover rate among the handful at the top of the Local's political hierarchy. The careers of Local 3 officials follow an informally prescribed pattern. The recruitment of elite into the inner circle begins with apprenticeship, involves numerous lateral positions and, most importantly, is furthered at critical points through appointment by either the Executive Board or, more frequently, the Business Manager. Given the high wages and benefits which construction division journeymen receive, competition for entrance into the Local's apprenticeship program is understandably intense. While changes made in the 1960's have opened the apprenticeship program up, devices within it further the process of handpicking future Local 3

Union Power and prescribed pattern. The recruitment of elite into the inner circle begins with apprenticeship, involves numerous lateral positions and, most importantly, is furthered at critical points through appointment by either the Executive Board or, more frequently, the Business Manager. Given the high wages and benefits which construction division journeymen receive, competition for leaders. The Local's formal organizational structure does not reflect its complete integration with the Joint Industry Board. The Board performs a wide variety of functions for the Local and, in fact,, for employers as well. It is staffed almost exclusively, from the labor side, by members of the Local 3 elite and sub-elite, and turnover in key positions parallels officer turnover within the Local. Incumbents consistently enjoy long terms and their replacements are no surprises. The general picture which emerges in the context of the Local's power dimension is that of a tightly-geared and well-oiled political machine which all but insures the continuance of an incumbent oligarchy.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFFILIATIONAL DIMENSION OF LOCAL 3

The Benefits Program

Local 3, since the early 1940's, has developed one of the most extensive benefit programs in the building trades, or, for that matter, in any quarter of American organized labor. Students of the Local are invariably impressed by the benefit coverage which Local 3 members enjoy. Sometimes, as in the case of Professor Neufeld, they are virtually swept up by it. As Jack Barbash would put it, "Van Arsdale has created a 'welfare union' which is breathtaking even in a simple listing."[1] Over the decades, Local 3 has extended its benevolent reach into virtually every aspect of its members' lives so that the so-called "Golden Book" of benefits to which the rank and file are entitled has grown into a fat volume indeed.[2]

The Local's extension of benefits to its members seems progressive, if not radical, on the surface. Such an impression is clearly furthered by the use of phrases such as "cradle-to-grave" unionism by Local 3 officials.[3]

[1] Barbash (1961), p.82.
[2] Neufels, p.383.
[3] Brooks, p.93.

Outside observers have scanned the benefit system of the Local and characterized the organization as a "welfare state", with one reporter commenting in 1950 that, "today Local 3 is an island of socialism in a sea of capitalistic electrical enterprise."[4]

The impression that Local 3 is somehow revolutionary in insisting that employers fund this benefit edifice, however, is clearly mistaken. The existence of the benefit program increases the Local leadership's power and resources vis-a-vis external bodies, e.g., the International.[5] More importantly, it enhances the leadership's power over the rank and file in at least two ways. First, fearing a loss of benefits, rank and file members are obviously reluctant to challenge the political status quo within the Local lest their actions be interpreted as a violation of the loosely structured disciplinary rules which govern both the Local and the benefit program. Second, with Local 3 seeing to all of the basic life needs of its followers, individual members come to identify the values associated with a secure retirement, home ownership, educational advancement, etc., with the Local and the leadership from which they stem. This socialization process into the norms of the Local 3 elite is furthered by the second facet of its affiliational

[4] Harrison, p.11.
[5] Barbash (1961), p.7.

dimension, i.e., the social clubs. In addition, the prospects for any form of rank and file militancy are greatly diluted by the fact that it is not Local 3 per se which administers the benefit package, it is the combined, labor-management Joint Board which carries out this role.

It was following the institution of the United States Social Security system that Van Arsdale began to press employers for management funded fringe benefits. His initial foray came in the 1937 contract with the Employers Association stipulating that all Social Security contributions be borne by the employers. This, however, was merely the tip of the iceberg. In 1941, Local 3 negotiated a contract with the Employers Association which included the establishment of a Pension Plan, later termed the Basic Pension Plan and, still later, subsumed into the Benefit Plan of 1982. The original purpose of the Pension Plan was: "To provide for the general welfare and... relieving the needs of the members of the Union between the ages of 60 years and 65 years,"[6] i.e., before they became eligible for Social Security payments. Gradually the Plan was extended beyond the 65 year limit originally spoken of, but, in and of itself, the Plan was a pioneering advance being the first pension plan in the construction industry.[7]

[6] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.21.
[7] Electrical union World March 7, 1986, p.5.

Significantly, the creation of the Pension Plan demanded the establishment of a Pension Committee manned by an equal number of union and employer representatives. This, in turn, was later merged with the Joint Employment Plan to become the basis of the Joint Industry Board. Currently the Plan covers the retirement and disability needs of both the Local member and his or her family.[8]

In 1950, following the passage of a disability benefit plan by the New York State Legislature, Van Arsdale negotiated the institution of a Disability Benefit Plan (later merged with the Pension Plan). At the same time, a Death Benefits Plan was initiated with the Local funding the insurance costs, but with employers then rebating these payments to the Local. This program has, in fact, been supplemental since 1940 when the Local undertook its own life insurance program providing a small lump sum payment, originally $2,000, to the widow of a deceased Local 3 member. This secondary program is still in existence in the form of the Electrical Workers Benefit Society as one of the few benefit provisions outside the administration of the Joint Industry Board.[9] Various offshoots of the disability and life insurance programs came about in the 1940's and 1950's, including, for example, a separate

[8] Joint Industry Board (History), p.24.
[9] Electrical Union World, March 20, 1986, p.8.

Electrical Industry Group Life Fund providing low-cost life insurance on a selective basis for all executives and managers of the New York electrical industry.

In 1954, the strands of past benefit programs were further woven together in the form of an Annuity Fund, administered, of course, by the Joint Board. The origin and purpose of the Annuity Plan is stated in the Local 3 publication:

> During the negotiation for the 1954 Collective Bargaining Agreement the Union Negotiating Committee stated that members of Local Union No.3 were insured for $3,000 since May 1927, (the time of the I.B.E.W.'s own insurance program). They contended that the $3,000 a widow and dependents would receive in 1954 would have very little purchasing power as compared to $3,000 during the period 1927 to 1934. There had been considerable demand by the membership for the establishment of substantial additional death benefit protection for their dependents. Further, the membership was concerned about the forecasts of recession in 1954 and 1955 and the Committee was prepared to propose a reduction of $5.00 per week in their weekly income. Its purpose was to obtain a plan that would provide monies for increased death benefits and supplimental payments during periods when the member would be without any weekly income or at such times when income would be radically curtailed becuase of unemployment, sickness or injury.

This ultimately led to the establishment of the Local's Annuity Plan, with the employers remitting $4.00 a day per worker to a fund operated by a committee of the Joint Board for all "A" class members.[10] The money paid out to Local 3

[10] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.54.

workers supplemented their existing pension benefits from the Local and the International. It was designed to provide monthly payments to beneficiaries rather than a lump sum, leaving the Annuity Committee with control over the bulk of the funds in an individual's annuity account. The plan was upgraded to provide even more benefits in 1969 with the establishment of an Additional Security Benefits Plan financed by an additional $2.00 a day per worker from employers.

Prior to the creation of the Annuity Fund, Local 3 had begun a Loan Fund granting no-interest loans to covered ("A" class) members and employing the individual's death benefit as collateral for such credits. Originally loans were limited to $500.00, but as time went on, this ceiling was raised and larger sums became available for individuals seeking to finance or refinance private mortgages or some similarly worthwhile endeavor. The expansion of the Loan Fund through the inclusion of Annuity Plan monies, however, led to conflict with the Internal Revenue Service. "In 1957, the Internal Revenue Service, after an audit, notified the Trustees (of the Annuity Plan), that the funds being loaned on the individual accounts of the members were not permitted under the Internal Revenue Code,"[11] and the original plan was discontinued only to be recast in

[11] Ibid., p.50.

new contract negotiated between the Employers Association and Local 3 a new plan saw the light of day. Apart from the ad hoc character of its development, proceeeding along this course performed two tacit ancillary functions for the Local's leadership. First, since each plan was new thereby lending the impression of "radical" gains for the rank and file. Second, each plan brought the establishment of a separate committee within the J.I.B., increasing its bureaucratic complexity and providing additional opportunity another form.

In 1967, another component of this portion of the Local 3 benefit system was added in the form of an Electrical Employers Self-Insurance Safety Plan. It required some twelve years of intensive lobbying effort by the Van Arsdale leadership to gain passage of New York State legislation allowing "employers in an industry to pool their resources to meet the self-insurance requirements and to pass any resultant savings to workmen's compensation beneficiaries and their families."[12]

If there appears to be considerable over-lap, not to mention confusion, in the evolution of this pension, death benefit, disability package, this is, in part, a reflection of the incremental manner in which it evolved. With each

[12] "Nelson Rockefeller Signs Self-insured Workmen's Compensation Bill," Electrical Union World, September 1, 1967, p.1.

slots for up and coming Local 3 leaders.

Concerning the hospitalization of Local 3 workers, the Local had created an employer-paid Fund allowing payment of $15 per week for 10 weeks hospitalization for covered members by 1944. This Fund was expanded in 1946 to include their wives and in 1948 to include their children. By 1971, despite the existence of like provisions, such as the disability plan, Local 3 members came under the coverage of a Major Medical Plan vastly expanding compensation for hospitalization costs. In the interim, however, Local 3 went beyond simply providing funds to meet its members' needs; it began to meet these needs directly. In 1949, the Local opened its own Medical and Dental Service Department, while an Optical Department was added in 1962. Located in mid-Manhattan, the departments provide medical, dental and optical services at a nominal cost to Local 3 "A" class members, the workers being, in effect, employees of Local 3 itself.[13]

As a final example of the type of benefit I have been discussing (and space precludes full coverage of all the benefit plans administered by the Joint Board), there is the Vacation Reserve Fund. In 1946, Local 3 set a precedent within the building trades unions by obrtaining six paid holidays from management. Three years later,

[13] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.24.

six paid holidays from management. Three years later, vacations of between one to four weeks were added to the paid holidays. Simultaneously, employers agreed to withhold $5.00 per week from the pay of class "A" employers and remit it to the Local's (read J.I.B.'s) Vacation Reserve Fund. "While actually representing no monetary gain for Local Union No.3,"[14] the Vacation Reserve Fund, automatically deducted from weekly pay stubs, provided even more money which could be co-mingled with pension and annuity receipts. At the same time, it lent the Local's leadership a further means of binding the rank and file to the Local and, by inference, to themselves.

To this point, while the fringe benefits enjoyed by Local 3 members are extraordinary in their number, coverage and complexity, they are not radical departures from the type of benefit now included in standard union benefit packages. The same, however, cannot be said of the two projects , Bayberryland and, most especially Electchester, discussed below. in both cases, Local 3 began to recreate that "community of values" spoken of by Tannenbaum in the most concrete way possible. The idea for the establishment of Bayberryland had its origin in talks between Harry Van Arsdale and Efrem Kahn in 1948. The original conception was the erection of a convalescent home for aged or ailing

[14] Ibid., p.16.

Local 3 members.[16] One year later, Joint Industry Board funds were used to purchase a 314 acre estate in Peconic Bay, Long Island, including a 32 room house for the modest price of $140,000. However, the convalescent home purpose of Bayberryland was altered as it was discovered that not enough members used the facility. Instead, as will be detailed further below, Bayberryland became a training ground for select Local 3 members being groomed for advancement through courses in labor-management relations and "critical thinking." Indeed, it was not until 1967 that five residential buildings and a central administration facility were constructed through Pension Committee funds to meet Bayberrland's original purpose. A short time later, "Camp Integrity," a sumer recreation facility for Local 3 members' children was established,[18] the idea of a camp devoted to teaching "virtues" to Local 3 children coming, of ourse, from Harry Van Arsdale.[17]

Bayberryland, while impressive, does not begin to rival what Haryy Van Arsdale in an unidentified personal letter would term, "the most colossal enterprise that any local union has ever undertaken in the entire history of organized labor,"[18] Electchester. It was in 1949 that the

[16] Joint Industry Board (New York Times) p. 10.
[17] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.80.
[18] Harry Van Arsdale, unidentified personal letter, Januaryl, 1955.

conditions which spawned Electchester came into being. The economy, national and local, was undergoing a recession, with electrical construction work sharply reduced. At the same time, due to the "baby boom" of the late 1940's, there was an acute shortage of housing in the New York area. Van Arsdale's response to these dual problems was the erection of a housing complex to provide both work and shelter for Local 3 construction electricians. Proceeding in the usual Local 3 manner (closed consultation between Van Arsdale and the Local 3 Employers Association elite followed by the formation of a committee comprised of the same), the union raised the $1,239,000 necessary to purchase a 109 estate at the Pomonok Country Club in Flushing. The downpayment was raised by drawing $250,000 from the Pension Fund, $200,000 from direct employer contributions and $550,000 in notes sold to Local 3 members. The Committee then began to plan the 2,100 apartment unit complex which is Electchester today. The Local's connections to City Hall resulted in a twenty year tax exemption for the project, and the purchase of individual units by Local 3 members was facilitated by the use of interest free loans from the Local's Loan Fund.

The Electchester offering was clearly an attractive bargain for Local members. Indeed, with downpayments averaging just $250.00 per room and low maintenance costs, the Co-op apartments were sold at prices about 40 percent lower than those prevailing in the area during the 1950's.

Even though construction had not yet begun, one year after its announcement the Joint Board had received over 1,000 applications from union members.[19] This initial wave of interest, however, soon diminished, and non-union members were eventually allowed to purchase shares and units.[20]

As time went on, a total of five housing companies were established to handle the administration of Electchester. Electchester had its own shopping center by 1957, owned by the Pension Committee of the J.I.B. It included a post office, bank, supermarket, jewelry store, as well as its own auxiliary police force and athletic association. In 1967, the Joint Industry Board constructed an Electrical Industry Center bearing a price tag of $6,000,000, and financed, in by part by bonds sold to Local 3 members through a payroll deduction plan.

Electchester has served as a powerful vehicle for the socialization of construction division members and their families from the start. As Cook observed:

> Although the last unit of the project was erected in 1956 and the whirl of plan and early administrative activity has now been absorbed to routine, a majority of the tenants in the project are union members whose experience in living comfortably and interestingly among their fellows no doubt adds to the close fraternal feeling characterisic of the activities in the union.[21]

[19] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.38.
[20] Ibid., p.38.
[21] Cook, p.129.

Apart from Harry Van Arsdle himself, Electchester was home to a number of important political figures in New York. For example, District 27 Assemblywoman Nettie Meyerson would write glowingly to Local 3 in 1986 of her childhood experiences in growing up among "children whose parents had the same goals and aspirations that we had." Electchester was also home to former Borough President Donald Manes, who, despite his fall from grace, was an extremely useful ally to the Local during his tenure in office.

Local 3 did not end its reach into real estate financing for its members when Electchester was completed. The Electrical Industry Real Estate Fund, Inc. was chartered by the Joint Board in 1977. As the J.I.B. states: "The prime purpose of the Fund... is to invest in first mortgages on residential property which will typically be limited to from one to four family residences owned in fee or in condominium by one or more union members residing at the property."[22] Through the first five years of existence, the Real Estate Fund had invested approximately $10,000,000 in mortgages on homes owned by Local 3 members. Hence, whether they live in Electchester or in their own private dwellings, many members of the Local, particularly the construction division, literally owe the roofs over their heads to the union.

[22] Joint Industry Board (History...). p.88.

If there is one area in which Local 3 has been more active than any other in terms of fringe benefits, it is in education, precisely that field which is most useful for socialization purposes. As part of a collective bargaining agreement reached through the Joint Board in 1949, Local 3 received the benefit of scholarships for children of its members financed by employer contributions. This was "the first instance in this country of joint management labor sponsorship of higher education for the sons of workers.[23] The 1951 contract required employers performing a volume of business in excess of $1,000,000 a year to finance college scholarships for Local 3 members' children. Initially, participation was limited to class "A" members who had been employed by contributing employers, or who had been available for such employment, for a period of ten years. This seniority requirement was relaxed over time and the number of schoarlships awarded annually grew exponentially so that some one thousand such awards had been made by 1985. However, as the New York Times reported in 1961, scholarships for the sons and daughters of Local 3 members was "only one phase of an ambitous program to expand the cultural and civic horozons of Local 3.[25]

A second phase was initiated in 1964 with the founding

[23] New York Times, June 25, 1949.
[24] I.B.E.W. Journal, April, 1986.
[25] " Zestful Union Leadership," New York Times, May 6, 1961.

the Educational and Cultural Trust Fund. Its purpose, as outlined in the Fund's Preamble is:

> ...to provide and grant scholarships to eligible sons and daughters of members represented by Local Union No. 3... to promote the continual formal education of electricians who are represented by Local No.3 as well as that of their spouses; make grants for educational and cultural purposes; promote community activities for pre-teen and teen-agers, as well as adults and senior citizens; in order to improve our society and to make grants for the purpose of improving the welfare of our citizenry.[28]

The Educational and Cultural Trust Fund was tied to the 1962 contract agreement with its five-hour day provision, allowing union members and their spouses to defer the costs of higher eduction for themselves. By 1983, 2,000 individuals had used its resources.

The Educational and Cultural Trust Fund, it goes without saying, is administered by a committee within the Joint Board comprised of twenty-three prominent citizens from within and outside the electrical industry. Its current Chairman is long-time Joint Board Chairman Armand D'Angelo who retained this post after stepping down from the top seat on the Joint Board. Eligibility is limited to Class "A" members having been employed through the J.I.B. for a period of at least three years. A Fund grant is a privilege, not an entitlement, since the Fund's Board of

[28] Joint Industry Board (HIstory...), p.61.

Trustees retain sole right to determine which applicants shall recieve the awards. The Fund pays for the entire tuition cost of the college course plus $200.00 per anum to cover school related expenses. The awards granted in the first few years were limited to top Local 3 officials, for as Armand D'Angelo explained: "using the officers as a small, controlled group, the union would be able to learn which educational courses would be of the greatest benefit to the members," and "therefore, in its first few years, union-sponsored education was directed to the officers and other active members with Local Union No.3."

Actually, the practice of Local 3 officers and "active members" enjoying educational benefits first was initiated in 1957. It was at that time that another Harry Van Arsdale brainchild came into being in the form of a course in "Critical Thinking in Human Relations" held for one week at Bayberryland. Although some 22,000 Local members have attended the one-week course with full pay, the program was originally limited to Local 3 officers and "activists", especially those in their thirties and forties. It is evident that it was intended as a training session for future Local 3 elite. As a Joint Industry Board pamphlet informs us, the "Critical Thinking" course and, indeed, all of the Bayberryland curriculum was grounded in a theory of human motivation, the central tenet of which is that, "the main needs of working people are not for the satisfaction

of hunger and thirst... the most pressing need seems to be recognition and esteem."[27] Beyond the "Critical Thinking" course, Bayberryland offers instruction in such areas as urban economics, the history of the labor movement, geopolitics, the United State Constitution, etc.

As a news journal item would state of Bayberryland: "Such programs are not unusual for large corporations, who often run seminars... as a change of pace for harried executives."[28] In fact, the general thrust of the Bayberryland curriculum is fully compatible with management theory. The chief instructor of the "Critical Thinking" course in its first years was Donn T. Coffee who was, prior to his stint with Local 3, a management science teacher. From the Bayberryland nucleus, Local 3 has branched out to providing extension courses at more than a score of educational institutions such as Columbia University in the New York region. These extension courses are also intended to fill the sub-elite stratum of the Local.

> Lately, too, the business manager has selected about fifteen members of Division 1 each year to attend a thirty-week college level program in labor proglems, offered through a university extension program. These men have been told that good performance in the course will make them eligible to fill vacancies in the Division's Wage and Policy Committee, one of the well-traveled

[27] Joint Idustry Board, Bayberryland: Critical Thinking in Human Relations (New York: Joint Board , n.d.), p.2.
[28] Keith Engh, "Electrical Worker's Think Factory," Newsday, March 7, 1966, p.1-c.

> avenues to higher union leadership and even to full-time employment on the union's staff.[29]

Hence, while this type of direct educational benefit is intended to enlighten the rank and file, it also performs the purpose of training and testing future Local 3 leaders.

One final aspect of Local 3's educational benefit program which merits attention is linked to yet another benefit derived from the 1960 collective bargaining agreement. As part of that accord, management agreed to pay a stated sum, which was originally $15,00 a day and has grown to a curent $75.00 a day, to compensate Local 3 members for time served on jury duty. "In order to qualify for this benefit," however, "each member must have taken a course in municipal affairs, attending a two-hour class a week for a total of five weeks and pass a qualifying examination."[30] It was with the establishment of this benefit that Van Arsdale took yet another step in identifying potential Local 3 elite members. According to Cook, the Business Manager culled through the personnel files of the construction division, locating the cards of members with some college education. These indiduals were then asked to attend an extensive course in civics and together formed the Local's Futurian Society.[31] Following

[29] Cook, p.131.
[30] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.66.
[31] Cook, p.132.

the completion of the civics course, members of the Futurian Society took over the task of instructing Local 3 members in the requisite course for eligibility for th jury duty benefit.[32] Between 1961 and 1982, the Futurians instructed nearly 4,000 Local 3 members in civic education.[33] Thus, as an off-shoot of a specific benefit in the 1960 contract, Local 3 enjoyed the dual advantages of indoctrinating rank and file members with its particular brand of civic education and of earmarking likely individuals for future leadership through their membership in the Futurian Society.

Social Clubs

The second major part of Local 3's affiliational dimension can be found in the network of social clubs attached to it. Within Local 3, "Fraternal feeling and a spirit of lodgism are strong,"[34] and while Local 3 is not unique in this regard, it claims to be unique "because of the club structure which exists in Local 3,"[35] the clubs serving as nerve centers of the union's affiliational network. As Cook points out:

> Although attendance at union meetings is high, they are not the only place where rank and file participation is expected. Local 300 is bound

[32] "Electricians Get Civic Schooling," New York Times, May 12, 1961.
[33] Joint Industry Board (History...), p.67.
[34] Harrison, p.11.
[35] Electrical Union World, June 30, 1985, p.17.

> together by a network of social institutions which tend to fill the leisure time and satisfy the social needs of many of its members, but particularly those of its pacesetting Division 1.[36]

As detailed in this section, a variety of about twenty-five social clubs can be found on the periphery of Local 3, each of which is compartmentalized in the sense that they are designed to serve the social needs of particular memberships, divisions coming on the basis of religion, ethnic background, geographical residence, status within the union, etc.

What do these organizations do? Cook adequately describes their principal function through an organizational analogy: "The clubs serve much the same purpose of the precinct clubs in political organizations -- they are centers where members meet socially, run their "affirs," and carry on in the hours after work the shop talk, camaraderie, and friendships established on the job.[37] In a concrete sense, these clubs engage in much the same activities as an organization such as the Elks; running dinners, picnics, athletic contests and the like.[38] Many are active in philanthropic work like raising funds for charity and sponsoring outside bodies such as Boy Scout

[36] Cook, p.126.
[37] Ibid., p.127.
[38] Neufeld, pp.383-384.
[39] Ibid., p.384.

troops.[39] Considerable effort is expended in providing a mix of "male only" activities with functions for members and their families.[40] Beyond the obvious socialization purpose of the clubs, there are at least two ways in which they tend to support the status quo within the Local's political dimension. First, as with the educational programs, they serve as training grounds from which Local 3 sub-elite and elite members can be identified and drawn. As we shall see below, Local 3 officers who do not have an attahcment to a specific club and who have not served in an official capacity within one of these organizations are rare. Second, the clubs provide an outlet for union activism which is safely apart from the core decision-making process. In effect, they divert the energies of active members from such issues as union policy and incumbent tenure to "harmless" social activities.

Before I turn to look at each of the Local's clubs in some detail, a general history of these organizations is in order. As previously mentioned, during the 1920's, religious-ethnic clubs played a powerful and integral role within Local 3, organized around foremen who, in turn, meted out available jobs to Local 3 members. Cook chronicles this phase of the clubs:

[39] Ibid., p.384.
[40] Cook, p.128.

> In the 1920's and earlier, when the Local was limited to craftsmen, a number of informal social clubs grew up in the various sections of the city. The clubs came to control hiring. When the present group of officers took over in the 1930's, they used draconian methods to dissolve the clubs and transfer the power over hiring to the joint administration of the contractors and the union under the aegis of the Labor-Management Industry Board.[41]

On this score, Cook, in fact, is only partially right. First, the hiring function was transferred to the Joint Industry Board only in the late 1930's; there was a period of more than a decade during which the hiring function was controlled exclusively by Business Managers Broach and Harry Van Arsdale along with their respective staffs. Second, while Cook's account implies that <u>all</u> of the clubs were dissolved, in at least two cases, that of the Masonic Electrical Square Club and that of the Jewish Welfare Club, the Broach-Van Arsdale faction allowed clubs to continue on.

When the Van Aradle leadership took over in 1933, the By-Laws of the Local contained the following provision under the rubric of "Influencing Affairs of Local."

> Attending or participating in any club, social, fraternal or religious organization, or at any meeting held immediately after the meeting of such club, social, religious or fraternal organization, or any other group meeting held outside of this Local Union are discussed, and at which decisions are arrived at regariding the business or affairs of this Local Union, or at

[41] Ibid., p.126.

> which the affairs of this Local Union are discussed, and at which decisions are arrived at regarding the business or affairs of this Local Union, or at which agreements are reached for the selection of candidates for office or delegates to conventions, shall be deemed an offense against this Local Union, and the I.B.E.W., and any member found guilty of violating this law, shall be assessed or suspended, or both, as the Executive Board decides.[42]

In the 1939 By-Laws, however, this passage is ommitted in its entirety. What apparently occurred is that the Van Arsdale faction had found the clubs highly useful in mobilizing grass roots support for their cause, and, in fact, loyal clubs were formed by the Local into a Central Council of Associated Clubs.

Although no formal record of the factional conflicts which erupted within the Local during the earliest years of the Van Arsdale regime exists, I can, through inference and speculation, recreate the actual battle among the clubs. The nexus of the conflict, as it turns out, was religious-ethnic. Prior to the Broach takeover in 1926, the affairs of Local 3 had been dominated by Irish Catholics, associated with the Catholic Anchor Club. This organization continued to back their leaders after the Broach take-over and continued as a thorn in the side of the fledgling Van Arsdale group. The latter, however, drew support from two other religious-ethnic factions, i.e.

[42] Local 3, By-Laws (1934), Article IX, Section 6.

the Masons whole rules virtually bar Catholics and Jews from membership. This is not to say that Van Arsdale did not gather the support of a number of Catholics and Irishmen within the Local, including Jeremiah P. Sullivan. Nevertheless, the fact that the Catholic Anchor Club did not survive the Broach/Van Arsdale purge while the Masons and Jews did, indicates that much of the factional war of the early 1930's was centered not around left-right political struggle, but around old-fashioned ethnic-religious divisions.

There is yet another point upon which Cook is mistaken in regard to the clubs. She writes that, "For all their professed unofficial character, the clubs each have a business representative as chairman."[43] This is simply not the case. In fact, the presidents of the clubs are usually not full-time staff members at the time of their office within the clubs. More frequently, an individual serves within the clubs before being appointed to the staff as a Business Representative and then remains closely associated with the club. There are numerous instances in which club officers have held positions within the clubs without such appointment. In the main, however, Cook is correct in underscoring the importance of these bodies as a

[43] Cook, p. 142.

socialization vehicle.

> Palpably, the manning and administration of all these activities creates an atmosphere in which union allegiance and support are encouraged and in many intangible but important ways rewarded. Members who are thus active gain a strong sense of identification with the organization and its leaders.[44]

The point here is that it is only after an extensive period of activity within a social club that a member will be elevated into the Local's sub-elite. It is only after socialization into the values of the club, especially the non-competitive nature of club activity, that a potential Local 3 leader is tapped by the Business Manager/Executive Board for advancement through the ranks.

Turning now to each of the individual clubs, I began with the religious organizations since the first two clubs examined are, in fact, the oldest continuous clubs within the Local. The Electrical Square Club was organized in 1922 and is limited to Local 3 members who are also Free and Accepted Masons. Its guiding tenets are mystical, but essentially secular humanism, like those of the the Masons. One of its past presidents is James Chiarkas, the Local's at-large Assistant Business Manager.

The second oldest of the clubs is the Electrical Welfare Club consisting of Jewish Local 3 members and founded in 1923. As an otherwise unidentified club

[44] Ibid., p.142.

publication informs us:

> "It was in the early thirties... when Harry Van Arsdale became Business Manager of Local Union No.3 with the support of the Electrical Welfare Club. It was probably the wisest move we ever made."

This statement is clearly accurate, for had the club opposed Van Arsdale at this time it is extremely unlikely that it would remain in existence today. The ostensible puroses of the Electrical Welfare Club are several: to promote friendship and fraternalism amongst the members of our craft; to practice charity and benevolence; to promote the philosophy and the principles of unionism; to support the ideals of democracy; to eradicate all forms of bigotry, hatred and intolerance; to uphold the doctrine of Judaism and the Brotherhood of man. As its designation suggests, this club is extremely active in philanthropic works. For example, it conducts numerous fund raising drives for charities and funds a local Boy Scout troop. True to Local 3 patterns, the club's president was at one time Paul Cohen and when he resigned from the post it was filled by his son, Howard Cohen. He was subsequently appointed as a Business Representative by Thomas Van Arsdale in 1986. Former officers of the club are Bernard Rosenberg, a Local 3 Business Representative, and Joe Jacobson, President of Local 3's Retiree Association.

Since the Catholic Anchor Club no longer exists, the

function of providing for the social needs of the Local's numerous Catholic members now falls to the Catholic Council of Electrical Workers. This group is extremely active in philanthropic work as well. Over the years, it has established direct and strong connections to the New York Diocese. Its current president is Mike Gardenfield who has held this post through five succesive blub elections, but has never reached the elite of the Local's power structure. Nevertheless, former Catholic Council President George Y. McSpedon was also a Local 3 Business Representative, while former Robert A. Reddy, now deceased, was a Council president and was also appointed as a Business Representative. The current treasurer of the Catholic Council is Robert Reddy Jr.

It was not until 1960 that Protestants other than Masons within the Local formed their own club, Chapter No.80 of the St. George Association. Its goal was "to glorify God by a daily life pattenred after the example of our Lord Jesus Christ." Along the way, its members have had time to fill important positions in the Local 3 political hierarchy. Bill Blain is a past president of the Association and Robert Reade, a former Local 3 Vice President, was a founding member and a president of the group.

The latest addition to the ranks of the religious clubs is the Greek Orthodox Council, created for Local 3

members of Greek descent. The club was organized sometime in the late 1970's and is comparatively small in size. For both of these reason, I know of no officer of the Council who has held a significant appointive or elective position within the Local.

While the religious clubs possess power on the basis of seniority, the strongest of the clubs as a group are those organized around residential territoriessuch as in the boroughs of New York, along with Westchester and Suffolk. Of these, the Kingsboro Social and Athletic Club, founded in 1932, is a clear favorite of the Local 3 hierarchy. Its first president was the legendary Sam Dobbins, father of Executive Board member Robert Dobbins. Its first Financial Secretary was Nat Bedsole, a close intimate of Harry Van Arsdale, and, alternatively, the club itself is called the Bedsole-KIngsboro Club. Bedsole himself served as Local 3's Vice President in the 1930's. Its current members include Christopher Plunkett and Sal Bruzzesse, prominent Local 3 officials, and a number of Electrical Welfare Club members, notably Bernard Rosenberg and Paul Cohen who also belong to the Brooklyn-based organization. As we recall, it was in Brooklyn that Van Arsdale made his "end-run" around the Employers Association This Brooklyn group has always been closely identified with the Business Manager(s) of Local 3.

Rivalling the Kingsboro club in terms of its pull

with Local 3 officials, the Bronx Acorn Club, formerly the Bronx Acorn Democratic Club. The "Democratic" label was dropped during Local 3's support of Republican Nelson Rockefeller. The first President of this groups was none other than Jeremiah P. Sullivan, long-time Local 3 President.

The Allied Club of Queens apparently came into existence after the founding of the Brooklyn and Bronx bodies. Given the establishment of Electchester in Flushing, it is not surpirising that it is one of the largest of Local 3's clubs. Like the Catholic Council, recent officer turnover in the Allied Club has been minimal For instance, Thomas Gallery is serving his fifth successive term as the Club's President. The club is currently closely connected with Queens Business Representative Joseph McByrne, with Assistant Business Manager James O'Hara and Business Representative William Gillin. As the surnames of these individuals suggest, the Queens organization has a strong Irish representation in its membership roles, its annual Saint Patrick's Day Dance is a major highlight of the club's social calendar. Nevertheless, the Allied Club aslo has a large contigent of Italian members such as Charles Salerno, a lifetime member of the Wage and Policy Committee and former chairman of the Election Board.

The Central Colony Club is located in Manhattan, and

since its inception in 1939, it too contributed its share of elite personnel to Local 3's hierarchy. Its first President was Edward Cleary Sr., its "Honorary President" William Hogan and its first Assistant Treasurer, the ubiquitous Michael Gardenfield, the current President of the Catholic Council. Its most prominent current members are Business Representative Walter Ineson and Business Representative James Papandrea. Over the years, however, it appears that the Manhattan group has lost a considerable amount of prestige vis-a-vis the Brooklyn, Bronx and Queens organizations.

Finally, among the territorial clubs we find the Westchester Mechanics and the Staten Island Club, neither of which holds much sway among the affiliated clubs. The current President of the Westchester group is Joe McSpedon and its closest power dimension representative is Business Representative Dennis McSpedon. Due to its outlying lacation, however, the Westchester Club is probably more closely associated with Local 448 of the I.B.E.W. (Bridgeport, Connecticut) than with the central power axis of Local 3; It is something of an anamoly among the among the clubs. The Staten Island Club is even more of a fringe group, for while its affairs are often attended to by BusinessRepresentative Walter Ineson, I know of no present elite member of Local 3 who is also a member of the group.

Probably the most interesting of the Local 3 clubs in social terms are those devoted to minority groups, the Puerto Rican, Black, Asian and women members of Local 3. The first of these to appear on the scene was the Santiago Iglesias Educational Society. The idea of forming a club from among Local 3's Spanish speaking members grew out of a tour taken by Harry Van Arsdale and other Local 3 officials to the island of Puerto Rico in 1957. It is no surprise that the idea itself came from Harry Van Arsdale Jr. and the Society was formed in 1958. Among its Presidents have been Jose Lopez, Felix Crespo, and Sal Maldonado. Unlike the dominance of construction journeymen in other Local 3 clubs, the Puerto Rican group drew most of its officers, including myself, a founder and Charter Member, from the MM&S segment of the Local. Moreover, among all of the clubs, the Puerto Rican and Black groups have the strongest political connections outside of Local 3; much of their activity is directed toward community affairs, notably educational and employment programs for their respective groups. Jose Lopez and Felix Crespo are exemplary of the type of community leaders who have come from the ranks of the Santiago Igelsias Society. Subsequently, Alex Hirsch, Frank Torres, Thomas Arroyo and Ramon Soriano, all of whom were actively involved in community affairs as elite representatives of Local 3, were elected to the Society's Presidency. The current President, Edwin Lopez, carries on

this tradition of service. He was set on this path by his father, Jose Lopez, a former President of the Society, now deceased.

Like its Hispanic counterpart, the Lewis Howard Lattimer Progressive Association, which was founded in 1960, is actively involved in a number of community service projects focused on the special needs of Blacks, such as educational programs, voter registration, fund-raising for Sickle Cell Anemia research. Its members are drawn from both the craft and industrial branches of the Local, but, as with the Puerto Rican groups, manufacturing members pedominate. As of mid-1986, its most prominent members, with one notable exception, were Austin Ottley, the Club's first President, and Gus Smith, a long-term member of the Club's Executive Board. Both of them are from the MM&S branch and have sub-elite postions within the union. Following Ottley's death in July, 1386, Doug Griffith assumed the Association's top post. The Association's most prominent member is, of course, Lafayette Jackson, the Local 3 Treasurer, but, curiously, Jackson has <u>not</u> played a leading role in the club's affairs. Perhaps he has not wished to pigeon-hole himself as a representative of Blacks instead of to Local 3 members in general.

It was not until 1980 with the inception of the Women's Active Organizational Club that Local 3 got around to forming a social club for women members. Most of the

club's membership is drawn from the manufacturing division, and its ledership, at least in the initial stages has been largely Black and Puerto Rican. Since there are no women members of the Local 3 elite or sub-elite, at least no Business Representatives, the Women's Active Organizational Club is most closely allied with Business Representative Rudy Bogue, a Black man attached to the Lamp and Shade Division of the Local. Edna Harris is now serving as the Club's President. The Chinese-American Culture Society, organized in 1984 for Chinese and other Asian members of the Local is the newest addition to this aspect of the union's affiliational dimension. It is understandable that none of the members of the Chinese Club are prominent in Local 3 political affairs since the group has been in existence for only two years. Nevertheless, under the current President Lenny Moy, it can be expected that members of the club will rise to Local 3's top echelons in the near future.

A fourth group of clubs attached to Local 3 consists of clubs attached to Local 3 consists of organizations with memberships based on "status" within the Local. The most outstanding of these is clearly the Futurian Society, thehand-picked, college-educated group chosen by Van Arsdale in 1960 to operate the Local's jury duty benefit training program. The Futurians, apart from this role, exist as a social club in their own right, holding regular

meetings, sponsoring social activities, etc. As one might expect, numerous members of the Futurian Society hold sub-elite positions within the Local. Two notable examples are Business Representative Bernard Rosenberg and current President Matthew Falcone.

At least two divisions within Local 3 have formed their own separate social clubs: they are the Spartan Social Club, drawn from the Fixture Division, and the Electrical Sign Club, drawn naturally from the Electrical Sign Division. The Spartan Social Club, or 419-Spartan Club, came on the scene in 1933, quite early, and was a vehicle for including newly-organized Fixture Division members within the Local's social network. One of its most prominent members until his death in July, 1986 was Austin Ottley, who divided his social time between the Spartans and Lattimer organizations. The Electrical Sign Club was founded somewhat later, but again as a vehicle for socializing newly-organized Local 3 members. It is most closelyu associated with Business Representative John Crowley. Neither of these groups, however, enjoys much power within the Local due to the fact that their memberships, by definition, excluded construction journeymen. Finally, the Keystone Club is the group comprised of supervisory personnel within the electrical industry; it illustrates the "democratic" spirit of Local 3. The Keystone Club has never contributed any members to

the Local 3 elite or sub-elite since its membership is drawn from management, but prominent Club activists can be found in the ranks of the J.I.B.'s myriad benefit committees.

The last group of clubs within the Local 3 affiliational network consists of individuals who are not actually members of the union. First, Local 3 has an Alumni Association comprised of individuals who have received college scholarships from the Educational and Cultural Trust Fund. Far more extensive is the set of clubs devoted to retired Local 3 members. The current president of the Local 3 Retirees Association and former Business Representative for the Union is Joe Jacobson. He presided over an organization with more than a dozen chapter located in the five boroughs of New York, Nassau, Westchester and Suffolk Counties, regions of New Jersey and, befitting the organization's make-up, separate units in various parts of Florida. Although they do not, of course,contribute members of the Local's power structure, their activities mirror those of the concentional clubs, e.g., social affairs, philanthropic work, informal political organizing. Moreover, the same distinction Moreover, the same distinction between construction and manufacturing members of the Local which characterizes virtually all of its activities is carried over into retirement so that the Manufacturing and Supply Divisions

operate their own body of retiree associations. Finally, the Santiago Inglesias Association because of the attachment of many Hispanic members of the Local to Puerto Rico has established its own retirees association on the island, the Jose Lopez-Mendoza Retirees Association, This Association offers members modest supplementary retirement benefits in addition to all its normal social functions.

Summary and Conclusion

The affiliational dimension of Local 3 consists of two sub-systems, both of which bond the membership to the union and its leadership. The first is comprised of an elaborate web of fringe benefit programs, the bulk of which are administered through the Joint Industry Board. When we look, for example, at the evolution and form of the Local's pension, death, disability and annuity provisions, we are struck by the complexity of its coverage and its adminstrative apparatus. With advances coming in piecemeal fashion through successive collective bargaining agreements, these characteristics can be explained by (a) the desired impression that totally "new" benefits have been won for the members and (b) the leadership's interest in creating separate administrative committees which can function as training grounds for potential elite recruits and as outlets for potential rivals to the Local's

incumbent officers. We find that in the case of the medical plan, the Local not only administers funds for these services, but offers them directly to the membership by running its own facilities. This direct benefit is most evident in the erection of Bayberryland and Electchester. The latter, in particular, is a clear-cut example of the recreation of community concept spoken of by Tannenbaum in his theoretical works. Like other parts of the Local 3 benefit package, Electchester has given rise to a large pool of financial resources, increasing the Local's power and enhancing the leverage of the leadership within the union and outside of it. The single greatest emphasis in the benefit package is placed on education, for, as is apparent, education provides the Local with its most powerful tool for socializing the members and their families into the values of the controlling leadership.

The Local's network of social clubs existed before the Van Arsdale take-over in the early 1930's. However, its present form arose during that period through the process of the winners rewarding groups supporting them and replacing others in opposition to them. The clubs are of several types: religious organizations serving all of the major faiths; territorial groups centered in various areas of the Local's jurisdiction; minority group organizations founded specifically at the leadership's prompting and having strong political connections outside the Local;

groups such as the Futurians, based upon special status within the union; and, finally, organizations consisting of individuals who are not presently members, particularly retirees. The clubs, of course, provide another avenue for socializing members, and perhaps more importantly, they function as training grounds from which the Local can draw sub-elite candidates who have proved their worth in the non-competitive sphere of "social activity." Hence, while both facets of the Local's affiliational appear political neutral, if not completely set apart from the power dimension, both, as we shall now elaborate, strongly support the political status quo within the Local.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND INTERCONNECTIONS

Introduction

We have already observed a number of interconnections between the power dimension and the affiliational dimension of the union in the course of our description of Local 3. In this chapter, I shall summarize and elaborate upon these points of interaction with an aim toward detailing how the fringe benefit/club system serves to support the political status quo within Local 3. In several instances, the argument here falls short of a "proof" in the conventional sense of the term. Nevertheless, when taken in aggregate, it is apparent that the leadership of the Local clearly benefits from the general and particular form which the affiliational dimension displays.

Fringe Benefits

Within the scholarly literature I delineated an on-going debate between those stressing the exclusive role of economic gain as the motive behind rank and file adhesion to unions, and those who placed equal emphasis upon the function of subjective or affiliational factors. Both camps, however, recognize that in order for a union's leadership to retain power over time, it must project the

impression, if not the substance, of delivering economic advantages to its membership. In this context, the manner in which the Local 3 benefit apparatus has evolved is highly instructive. From 1940 to the present, each separate contract between the Local and the Employers Association has brought with it a new set of fringe benefits to be administered by the Joint Industry Board. This ad hoc, piecemeal evolution naturally projects the impression of incessant gains on the part of the Local to its rank and file. In mnay instances, moreover, an especially in agreements reached during the past two decades, these benefits have been granted in the absence of significant wage/hour advances, or in other words, in lieu of direct gains which can be readily calculated by the individual worker. What we find, in fact, is that the Local's membership is implicitly asked to accept the substitution of fringe benefits for increases in pay and reductions "straight time" hours.

In point of fact, it is extremely difficult to quantify exactly how much the individual member stands to gain from a particular benefit program. Here I concur with Aronowitz when he observes that, "On the whole, fringe benefits have never cost the employer as much as union bargainers have represented to the membership."[1] Indeed,

[1] Aronowitz, p.203.

calculating the precise degree of gain is complicated by the fact that many workers may never receive any gains froma particular fringe benefit progam. In other cases, the Vacation Reserve Fund, for example, what appears to be a benefit is none at all. On closer inspection, it becomes clear that contributions to this program are drawn directly from the paychecks of those enjoying them. In other, such as the health care provisions, the actual cost of the programs to the employers is far less than the leadership has projected to Local 3 members. In a study of the "union effect" on management health care costs, Rossiter and Taylor give us a general rule-of-thumb notion of the real cost of health insureance on employer outlays:

> The regression results suggest that unionism raised employer costs by $182 per eligible employee over the costs ($377) of similarly situated nonunion employees....
> Thus, 18 per cent of employer health insurance costs for all employers can be traced to the effects of unions. While these amounts are not small by themsleves, they are also not a substantial portion of total employer health insurance costs.[2]

While it would be impossible to compute precisely what the Local has gained in fringe for its membership in direct "dollar and cents" terms, it is highly probable that the actual amount is far less than the Local's leadership has

[2] Louis F. Rossiter and Amy K. Taylor, "Union Effect on the Provison of Health Insurance," Industrial Relations, vol. xxi, no. 2 (spring, 1982), p. 176.

stated, at least inferentially, to its members. Hence, the impression given is that large gains are being acquired by a "tough" bargaining union elite, when in fact, these advances are modest.

In many cases, fringe benefits are awaded to Local 3 members only after a specified period of service in the New York City electrical industry. Not only does this further reduce the aggregate cost of these programs to employers, it tends to bind the worker to employers. Realizing that withdrawal from the industry will mean a loss of such benefits as have been accrued or the cutting off of the worker from any benefits whatsoever, individual workers will be reluctant to (a) exit from the job, and (b) engage in any form of militancy against employers which might compromise these benefits. This is the essential point made by Tannenbaum in a passage which reads:

> The worker, once organized and integrated into the industrial structure, tends to surrender his freedom to separate himself from the industry. The union increasingly ties the worker to the industry and tends to convert a contract terminable at will into one terminable only at death. His union gives him his freedoms within the industry, but it hedges his "freedom" to abandon the industry within which he makes his living.[3]

We observe that many of the specific benefits extended to Local 3 members come at what may be termed particular "life

[3] Tannenbaum, p. 162.

stages" in a worker's life, e.g.s., when he is ready to purchase a home, when he has children of college age, when he reaches retirement. Since apprentices normally enter the construction journeyman program immediately after high school, the phrase "cradle to grave" unionism takes on a particular meaning. That meaning is that the worker, if he is to take full advantage of the benefit program, must, in effect, surrender his option to leave the industry during his entire lifetime.

This "carrot" of fringe benefits deferred to some future (and often remote) point in the future, is accompanied by a "stick" in which the central relationship is not between the worker and his employer, but between the union member and the Local's political leadership. On this score, the union's power to punish those who oppose the policies of the Local's elite is mindboggling. Again, Tannenbaum alludes to the raft of "offences" which may be deemed serious enough to being sanctions against the errant member.

> The rights of the worker within his own union are fluid and ill-defined. The consitution of the union may have no definition of forbidden acts, or the local may have a list of its own in addition to those contained in the constitution itself. Where the constitution does enumerate a list of acts that may be punished by the union, they are so vaguely worded as to make it possible for the officers of the union to abuse their powers if they are so minded. Unions can punish their members for such general offecnses as disobeying or slandering union offercers,

> circulating written material without the permission of the officers, creating dissension, undermining the union, participating in an outside meeting for a discussion of union business, performing dishonorable acts injurious to the labor movement, strikebreaking, joining another union, working with non-union men, breaking the union's wage policy.[4]

If an individual worker within Local 3 is accused of such an offense, usually by a shop steward appointed by the Business Manager, he comes under an Executive Board trial. The Executive Board, made up of individuals of the Local's political elite, has virtually complete say in determining whether the charges brought are true and in deciding the punishment which they warrant. Moreover, the Executive Board serves as a disciplinary body not only for the "A" construction division, from which its membership is drawn, but for all divisions within the Local; there being no corresponding boards at the unit level. If he is found guilty of an offense against the Local, the individual member may be expelled from the union. In this case, he will be denied virtually all of the accrued benefits which he has built up , along with such benefits that he would have reached during additional year of service.

Looking at the specific causes which can result in the expulsion or suspension of a Local 3 member, Tannenbaum's observations ring forcefully true. Local 3 members may be

[4] Ibid., pp.170-171

fined, suspended and/or expelled for such acts as slandering a union officer, loafing on the job or even failure to report offenses which other members have engaged in. Moreover, expulsion can carry a partial or full loss of benefits. As a specific example of the vagueries which envelop the disciplinary process, consider Article XI, paragraph c of the Electrical Workers Benefit Society by-laws which permits expulsion from the Society "for conduct unbecoming a member of the Society." Who judges what constitutes "unbecoming" conduct? The officers of the Soceity who, of course, are comprised of the Local 3's incumbent elite. In fact, even those who have reached retirement from the industry, having formally accrued Local 3 benefits, may be subjecr to the disciplinary mechanism. A provision exists which disqualifies such individuals from benefits on the basis of employment or self-employment in the electrical industry in the tri-state area after "formal" retirement. Given the perceived importance of Local benefits, their administration through the Joint Industry Board and the fact that they can be withdrawn by the Local 3's executive officers for the most ambiguous of offenses (and overturned only through the most laborious of means, i.e., appeal to the national convention). The capacity of fringe benefits to "keep members in line" is more than apparent. Facting the prospect of an Executive Board trial and the removal from the Local's benefit

program, a disgruntled rank and file member is far more likely to simply repress his dissatisfaction with the Local's leadership than vent it in opposing the powers that be. Of course, it may be countered that the worker can express his displeasure through the electoral process since Local elections are held on the basis of a secret ballot. However, for an opposition candidate to be successful, it would require candid organizing activities in which opposition members are open to identification. Rather than risk this type of activity and the consequences it may bring in terms of loss of benefits, rank and file members will simply return incumbents to office year after year.

To this point, I have been speaking of benefits as rights which carry corresponding duties; implicitly one of the duties is to support incumbent officers. There are, however, a number of benefit programs within the Local which are priveleges in the sense that they can be granted or withheld on the basis of rulings made by joint labor-management boards under the umbrella of the J.I.E. Three examples should suffice in this regard. First, scholarships granted to Local 3 members, their spouses and children are not automatic entitlements. Officers of the Educational and Cultural Trust Fund possess sole decision-making power in selecting precisely who is eligible for such grants. Second, credit from the Local's

Loan Fund is, again, a matter for ruling by Joint Industry Board officers and it may be denied to the applicant without further recourse. Third application for housing at Electchester is also under a combined union-management review committee. In all of these cases, not only is a "good" record a strong plus for the applicant; good meaning no overt opposition activities. Those activists who have displayed the most vigor in supporting the Local's incumbents are likely to receive the most favorable treatment before bodies comprised of these same officers and their appointees. Hence, the existence of fringe benefit programs which are under the discretionary control of boards dominated by the Local's political elite provide "plums" which can be meted out or withheld depending on the applicant's qualification. Active support of the status quo is a strong credential in this context.

Rounding out this portion of my anlysis, I find that the "carrot and stick" leverage which fringe benefits afford to the Local's leadership operates not only on an <u>individual</u> level, but also on a <u>group</u> or <u>divisional</u> level. As the reader may recall, wether a member possesses "A" or "BA" status within the Local depends upon which division he is in. In time, however, divisions and even portions of divisions can graduate from "BA" to "A" classification. This decision, left to the local autonomy

of Local 3 by the International represents another compelling means by which intra-union opposition can be curbed. Seeking to achieve "A" status, divisions within the Local are hardly likely to oppose the union's power elite. In fact, should opposition sentiment arise within an individual division, it is likely to be "savings" with the Local's fathers steering members along the right path. Indeed, both the responsibility for and decision-making over virtually every important life decision made by a Local 3 member are reduced or curtailed by fringe benefit provisions giving control to Loca 3/J.I.B. officers.

Finally, as greatly reinforced through the club structure, participation in the benefits program brings with it a raft of cultural values which Local 3 members are expected to adopt. One becomes eligible for all of the goods of a full life by keeping one's nose to the grindstone, e.g., maximizing productivity on the job. What are these goods? Basically, they are the values of middle-class America; home ownership, a college education, etc. These "goods" and their attendant values flow from the Local, specifically from the Local working in conjunction with management via the Joint Industry Board. Hence, the benefits program has a socialization function through which Local members come to identify the Local's leaders and select representatives of management with "appropriate" goals for which they strive. The Local's

leadership, then, comes to be associated in the mind of the individual member with all of the subjectively-laden life goals which he seeks. How can one oppose a leadership which, in effect, stands for precisely those values which the member is taught to cherish? The answer is, he cannot. Opposing the Local's leadership is not merely foolhardy or ungrateful, it is, given all this, deviant.

The Social Clubs

Several of the power dimension support functions found within the benefit program are reinforced by the network of social clubs ancillary to Local 3. This is evident, for example, in the case of leadership recruitment and training. Each of the clubs has its own staff of officers and, in contrast to the power dimension, with a few exceptions, turnover in these positions is far greater than circulation in the political hierarchy. As detailed in Chapter III, it is rare to find a member of the Local's politcal elite/sub-elite who has not served as an officer of one of these groups and such tenure is an important, if secondary, qualification for appointment to the Local's staff. The club officer learns the skills necessary to serve as an effective Local 3 leader at first hand by organizing social events, charity drives, political campaigns, etc. His performance in these activities can be evaluated by the union's elite with no risk to themselves.

One highly important aspect of using the social clubs as training grounds for future Local officers resides in the nature of these organizations, that is, their social or "play" character.

> Social clubs cannot engender fierce competition for leadership lest the prerequisite for the existence of the organization itself, group solidarity, be rent by electoral contests. Since the stakes of these organizations are not intimately linked with political power -- that is, the alienated forms of social life encapsulated within critical institutions of schools, religious organizations, unions and the state -- their members are interested neither in profits nor in the allocation of resources that constitutes the real business of large-scale public insitutions. Instead, differences among members that might be interpreted as "political," that is, differences surrounding those issues that are understood as of a pulbic character, are either consciously suppressed by the group or repressed by each individual.[6]

In other words, the training ground of the clubs for potential Local leadership recruits provides precisely that type of non-competitive and "cooperative" culture which the union's officers desire. Active members with an eye on movement up the union ladder to actual power are taught to wait their turn and stifle any conflicts with club members. Of course, the fact that the clubs are comprised of relatively homogeneous social groups also contributes to the non-conflictual workings of the clubs, again providing a favorable means of producing the kind of "cooperative"

[6] Aronowitz, p.94.

cutlure which the union's officers desire. Active members with an eye on movement up the union ladder to actual power are taught to wait their turn and stifle any conflicts with club members. Of course, the fact that the clubs are comprised of realtively homogeneous social groups also contributes to the non-conflictual workings of the clubs, again providing a favorable means of producing the kind of "cooperative" sub-elite member who can be safely brought into the Local's concentric rings of power.

Participation in the social clubs also extends a means for socializing Local 3 rank and file who did not have ambitions for political power with the union. As with the broad socialization function of the benefits program, the clubs engender certain social values among their members, e.g., cooperation for the common good. Moreover, since the clubs are organized along ethnic, religious, territorial lines, the sense of identification with the Local is co-mingled with the sense of identification with these particular social groups. A member of the Electrical Square Club, for example, will tend to bind the principles of Free Masonry with the values of unionism interpreted by the Local's leadership. While not as powerful a socialization vehicle as the union's educational program, the social clubs clearly inculcate their members with a high regard for the Local's leadership.

If there is one particular type of activity which

predominates within the clubs, it is the award dinner. Virtually every club holds one or more of these affairs yearly and the recipient of the award is invariably an officer of the union. Not only are members taught to acknowledge the merits of incumbents in this fashion, they are able to freely mix with these same individuals on a social basis; providing leaders with an opportunity to personally "touch" their rank and file supporters. Although such contacts take place in an egalitarian atmosphere or what could be called "equal" ground, the power and prestige of the officers serves to bind members to them even in these informal quarters.

Although Local 3 workers from all divisions participate in club activities, and, in fact, at least two clubs have been set up for union members other than construction journeymen, the latter predominate. Not only are clubs featuring a majority membership from the construction division the "rule"; within each individual club, with the notable exceptions of those covering minority group members, officers are drawn from the ranks of the construction division.[6] As I have repeatedly mentioned, these squelched by those seeking to improve the division's chances for graduation.

A second set of political functions which the fringe

[6] Cook, p.132.

benefit system in Local 3 performs revolves around leadership recruitment, advancement, and exit from office. We begin by noting the strong emphasis which the Van Arsdale(s) regime has placed upon the education of potential candidates for Local officership. The most apparent of these is the "Critical Thinking" course offered to selected Local 3 members -- overwhelmingly to construction journeymen. However, education of future leaders exists in alternative forms such as extended courses for Futurians and the "civic education" provision tied to the Local's jury duty benefit. Here once again, Aronowitz makes a significant point in speaking of the general tenure of union-administered educational programs.

> Recently "labor education" has been trivialized to the limited function of supporting and enlarging the influence of trade union bureaucracies. Shop stewards and local union officers attend classes at universities that are most of technical interest. They are "trained" in the Administration of the union contract, and are indoctrinated in the political and economic policies of the union. Those who participate in union-sponsored education programs are frequently potential full-time officials or candidates for local union office.[7]

Indeed, this is precisely the type of curriculum offered at Bayberryland and in other Local 3 programs. It is exactly the kind of elite recruitment functions which these programs perform within the Local. Successful completion

[7] Aronowitz, p.436.

of these courses, in effect, "getting the answers right" means that participants adopt the particular ideology and policy tenets of the Local's political leadership. In this form, not only do the programs permit the inculcation of "compatible" thinking on the part of prospective leadership recruits; they also afford the leadership a means of monitoring and evaluating individual progress in this regard.

Next, the administration of the benefit program is handled by the myriad committees of the Joint Industry Board. The existence of this parallel organization performs a number of functions for the Local's political elite. First, it provides opportunity slots through which elite recruits can be tested for their adherence to the Local's labor philosophy under the direct guidance of both Local elite members and representatives from management. As a pre-requisite to advancement in the Local, the benefit committees furnish another means of indoctrinating prospective union officers and assessing their attitudes prior to appointment to a position of real power. Second, in the case of the upper echelons of Local 3 power, the number of positions available is highly limited, with no more than a score of individuals exercising governance over union affairs. What happens when a loyal Local 3 officer advances as far as he can go without challenging incumbents for the Local's highest positions? One alternative, as

appears to be the case with Armand D'Angelo, is to transfer him from the Local per se to the Joint Industry Board. Similarly, when the leadership cadre is intent on promoting a sub-elite member to a position held by an aging elite officer, the latter can be spurred to relinquish his post through the promise of continued office in the Joint Industry Board's committee system.

I have previously mentioned the complexisty of the Joint Industry Board as an outgrowth of its ad hoc evolution. But, as we are told, the complexity of intra-Board arrangement also furthers the centralization of power within the Local and the hold of the leadership over the rank and file.

> The needs of the membership only partially justify the specialization of functions within the trade unions. Insurance and pension plans do require a certain expertise, but the overall guidance of the direction of worker-employer relationships has been centralized as means of preventing the direct intervention of the rank and file.[a]

We recall that the Joint Industry Board at one time had an Adjustment Committee to handle worker grievances against employers Local 3 and the J.I.B., but this function is now performed by a centralized Review Committee, staffed, of course, by Local 3 officers on the sunion side. The very complexity of the Board deters members from approaching its

[a] Ibid., pp.220-221.

automatic workings. In addition, the composition of the Review Committee casts serious doubts about whether such protests will be seriously considered. In fact, financing of Local 3 benefit programs takes place either through automatic deductions written into collective bargaining agreements or through automatic check-off provisions. This rather antiseptic procedure curtails the members opportunities to directly confront union officials on controversies concerning benefits. What the individual member is confronted with is a large, well-oiled and complex administrative machinery which is extremely difficult to approach. This is a bureaucrtic apparatus which inhibits all forms of protest.

What is fostered by all this is an acquiesence on the part of the Local's rank and file; a tacit acceptance of paternalism as the appropriate relationship between the Local's leadership and its members. Here Wistert's commentary is apt:

> Pressure for fringe benefits is not from the workers, who initially do not particularly want them, but from the international union officers who parternatlistically believe that they know what is best for the worker in socio-economic matters. To protect the workers from their own judgements, these officers guard against giving the rank and file a choice between a direct pay increase and its equivalent in a fringe package.[9]

Take, for instance, the Local's Death Benefit provision.

[9] Wistert, p.6.

Here we find that Van Arsdale rejected the notion of paying a lump sum to a deceased member's spouse, opting, instead, to provide a series of monthly payments. Behind this arrangement is the implicit notion that the Local's leadership knows better than its benefit program recipients how to manage their lives. A similar point can be made in the case of the Vacation Reserve Fund. Individual workers, so the implicit logic goes, lack the foresight to put aside adequate savings from paychecks to finance the added costs of going on vaction. Fortunately, the Local's leaders have such foresight and the result is a program of "forced" savings."

Construction workers constitute the hard core of the Local leadership's support base. Hence, the existence of an infra-structure of social clubs dominated by a group which invariably supports the leadership's policies and candidacies obviously gives it an advantage against other Local 3 groups, particularly those in the manufacturing division, in terms of organizing political activity on behalf of incumbents. Lacking such organizations themselves, "BA" members remain comparatively disorganized <u>within</u> the union. This arrangement reinforces the lack of coordinating mechanisms within the Local's divisions. Reading of the worthwhile activites which clubs under "A" group dominance engage in through the reports of <u>The</u>

Electrical Union World, "BA" members can only seek to emulate the example of their more privileged brothers, Naturally, the surest means of doing so is through unswerving loyalty to the Local's officers.

A final and highly important function of the social clubs is the provision of activities for those who wish to participate in Local affairs which are, nevertheless, outside the exercise of real power within the union. Cook makes this point in her study of Local 3:

> An important aspect of democracy is unquestionably participation based on genuine responsibility, participation by many people who have opportunities to learn and to use important political skills. What is clear, however, is that all this activity, all these skills, all this learning and and this carrying of responsibility are not directed to the central affairs or the leadership of the union. Indeed these vital matters are separated off in a relatively small area of the unions' government where initiation of programs is largely in the hands of the professionals.[10]

We recall the observation of A. Rose that a frustrated desire to participate by rank and file union members is worse than no desire to participate. Club activities, quite obviously, perform the function of providing an outlet for Local 3 members to become involved in union affairs, thereby maximizing a strong source of individual loyalty to the union and its leaders. At the same time,

[10] Cook, p.143.

since these activities are innocuous in the sense that they do not touch upon the critical decisions of the union, such participation does not challenge the Local's policies or the incumbency of its political elite.

Taken together, what the fringe benefit programs and the clubs provide to Local 3's existing leadership is a powerful means of binding individuals to the union and heightening their support for those in control. Both aspects of the Local's affiliational dimension are graduated: "A" division construction journeymen receive the most benefits and serve on benefit committees to a greater extent than members of other divisions. This same group dominates club activities. This, in turn, provides a means of increasing their presence within the union, and, given their unflagging support for its leadership, of mobilizing them around its leaders in electoral contests. Indeed, other divisions within the union are envious of the higher status which the construction journeymen clearly enjoy. They, in turn, are predisposed to adopt their "successful" path by becoming more active in support of the candidacies of incumbents.

The most pervasive effect which the use of the affiliational dimension brings to Local 3 is the perpetuation of an impression or illusion of true democracy within the union. Thirty-five years ago Neufeld wrote:

> Concentric to the hard core adminstration in Local 3 itself are a series of committee arrangements, membership meetings, and activities which answer, in part, the democratic needs of the members. Decisions taken by the leaders are ratified in meetings conducted regularly at all craft and industry levels. Attendance is usually excellent.... Elections of local-wide officials are conducted in the public eye, and opposition candidates, while never a formidable threat, are nevertheless present on the ballots.[11]

While the distinction may seem a blurred one, it is not so much that activities within Local 3 reflect an actual ongoing democracy within it; rather, the way in which the activities are structured and the functions which they perform enable the leadership to project an impression of democracy to its members and the public. Basically, the affairs of the Local are tightly controlled by a comparatively narrow leadership group with very little personnel circulation. This perennnial arrangement is given an aura of legitimacy through the bonds formed within the Local's affiliational dimension. Hence, in the last analysis, the leadership's capacity to govern in what <u>appears</u> to be a genuinely democratic and participatory fashion is strongly dependent upon the affiliational base which its elite has so carefully erected.

[11] Neufeld, p.68.

APPENDIX

Joseph R. Bechtold, a member of the Queens Allied Social Club, was elected recording secretary of Local 3, upon the recommendation of Business Manager Thomas Van Arsdale, unanimously by the Executive Board to fill the position that was vacated when former recording secretary, William Blain, Sr., resigned to assume the duties of Financial Secretary.

Bechtold, 32 years old, was initiated into the "A" Apprenticeship program November 1, 1977. As an "A" Apprentice he was a member of the Apprentice Advisory Committee and he served on the 1980 Apprentice Contract Negotiations Committee.

On February 22, 1987, Christopher Plunkett, an Executive Board Member and Business Representative, died at the age of 82. Plunkett, an associate of Harry Van Arsdale, Jr., was initiated into Local 3 on July 10, 1925 and served the union as Business Representative, Assistant Business Manager of Construction and Executive Assistant to the President of the New York City Central Labor Council since 1962 until his death.

During an Executive Board Meeting on March 23, 1987 at the recommendation of Business Manager, Thomas Van Arsdale, the nomination of Joseph Marsden to fill the position on the Executive Board left vacant by the death of

Christopher Plunkett, was unanimously approved.

Brian McLoughlin, pension director of Local 3, was appointed Assistant to the President of the New York City Central Labor Council by Business Manager of Local 3 and President of the Council, Thomas Van Arsdale, to fill the position left vacant by the death of Christopher Plunkett.

Local 3 general election of officers is scheduled for May 16, 1987 at Madison Square Garden, Felt Forum. The present officers are candidates for the next three years. These are Business Manager, Thomas Van Arsdale, President Dennis McSpedon, Vice President William Fiedler, Jr., Treasurer, Lafayette Jackson, Financial Secretary William H. Blain, Sr., Recording Secretary Joseph H. Bechtold. Five Executive Board Members: Salvatore Bruzzese, Robert Dobbins, Joseph McByrne, David Rollins, and three Examining Board Members, Edward F. Novey, Jr., Patrick J. Walsh, and Frank Torres.

And after they are elected the work of the union will continue....

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

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.....

I was born in 1929, one of twelve children. My family lived on a large farm in San Sebastian, Puerto Rico. During World War II, my father had to sell that farm; he could no longer afford to keep it going.

We moved to San Juan, Puerto Rico where I went to high school for three years and studied typing, shorthand, and bookkeeping. I decided to try to find a good job in the United States. I came to New York in 1946. I found a job in a lamp and fixture shop as an assembler and wirer of lamps. As soon as I started to work I became a member of Local 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, but didn't realize that my union membership card held the key to my future and the future of countless others. I received an honorable discharge from the Army and a medal of Occupation of Germany.

After my discharge, I returned to the lamp and fixture shop. I took every opportunity to learn as much as I could about the shop steward position and about labor administration. I enrolled at Kings Community College in 1955, and for four years, I took courses in electronics.

At the same time I studied city government at Cooper Union.

I accepted a job with a private firm as a city traffic light and partking meter inspector. I enrolled at Cornell University; took courses in labor management which were sponsored by the union.

In 1963, I was the Chairman of the Puerto Rican Parade Banquet. The Puerto Ricans hold an annual parade on Fifth Avenue in New York City every year. This parade has linked the Puerto Rican with the most active organization of Puerto Ricans in the United States.

I also took courses in labor legislation at Fordham University Law School. In 1961, Mayor Robert F. Wagner selected me to work with sixteen other persons on the Mayor's Committee on the Exploitation of the Worker.

In 1965 and 1967, I was elected as a member of the Board of Directors of the Brooklyn Tuberculosis and Health Association, Inc. I also became a member of the Police Atheletic League (P.A.L.) in 1965. The City of New York awarded me a citation for my efforts in helping the boys and girls of the city.

In 1964, a group of citizens representing the major sectors of the Puerto Rican Community in New York City organized themelves as the Board of Directors of the Puerto Rican Community Development Project, a project to develop a plan to combat poverty in the New York City Community. I

a member of the Board of Directors which was composed of 26 members citywide.

In 1966, I was appointed an International Representative of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO.

I am still employed by the International Brotherhood and during these twenty years I have travelled to Mexico, Puerto Rico, France, Italy, St. Thomas, St. Croix, Virgin Island, Surinam and all over the United States discussing contract negotiations, coordinated bargaining, grievances, organizing, job advancement, training programs, and many other responsibilities in the areas of labor.

I became a Charter Member of the National Association for Puerto Rican Civil Rights. I also served as a member of the Advisory Board Committee for the Eleanor Roosevelt JOIN Center (Job Orientation In Neighborhoods). JOIN, in recognition for my services as a member of the Advisory Board, gave me a certificate of appreciation.

In the City of New York, minorities were discriminated against, especially in political circles. To help this matter, ex-Borough President Abe Stark appointed me as a member of the Community District Planning Boards of Brooklyn in September, 1963.

At the invitation of former United States Secretary of Labor, Peter J. Brennan, I served as a representative of labor on the North Atlantic Regional Manpower Advisory

Committee during President Nixon's administration.

William P. Rogers, U.S. Secretary of State in 1970, invited me to serve on a Special Advisory Committee on Public Opinion. Michael Collins, the astronaut, and Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs were named Chairmen of the committee.

Today, I spend many working hours helping the workingperson. Employees, and sometimes even employers, come to me for help and advise.

Remembering my birthplace, I was proud to act as President of the Sons of San Sebastian for years, and proud to be a member of the organization.

This is not exactly what I had in mind those long years ago. I dreamed of building -- of being an architect. But there are many things to build and many ways to build them. Today, I am building a better life for many, many people; for the workers in the union shop and for the stranger in the Spanish-speaking community.