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A

BLACK AND WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD FORCE AND COOPERATION IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1980-1995)

by

KEITH O. LAWRENCE

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. City University of New York

1998

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
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
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

**BLACK AND WHITE ATTITUDES TOWARD FORCE AND COOPERATION IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY (1980-1995)**

by

Keith O. Lawrence

Adviser: Professor Asher Arian

Historically, white and black Americans often have disagreed over U.S. internationalism, yet public opinion research has given scant attention to the impact of race on foreign policy attitudes. Arguing that centuries of denial of civil rights to African Americans prevented racial foreign policy consensus prior to the 1960s, this dissertation examines the proximity of black and white attitudes in the latter post-civil rights years. Using national opinion polls of attitudes related to the use of military force and foreign aid, and toward immigration and the United Nations, this study takes an initial step in exploring the state of black and white foreign consensus in the U.S. in recent decades.

For military force, the overall finding was racial attitudinal congruence within most standard socioeconomic and political categories. However, whites generally seemed more favorable toward force. Race appeared to be less significant in the non-coercive areas. There was a moderate-to-strong consensus of support for the U.N. as an organization, and equal ambivalence over its performance in specific functional areas. Blacks and whites appeared just as likely to be skeptical of the efficacy of foreign aid, and seemed equally apprehensive about the economic ramifications of immigration.

Nevertheless, there were some complexities and paradoxes in the racial responses that prevent acceptance of the consensus hypothesis, and call for further study. For

instance. though African Americans were more critical of actual interventions, they often seemed more accepting of hypothetical force scenarios -- particularly, those involving in the Third World. African Americans also seemed more convinced of the effectiveness and morality of force as a foreign policy tool. On the other hand, blacks were more willing to accept Third World immigrants as future Americans, despite fears about immigration's economic consequences.

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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION

I. Background and Theoretical Perspective

This dissertation is mainly a comparative analysis of black¹ and white Americans' foreign policy attitudes in the late post-civil rights period. Its focus is the extent to which there has been racial consensus behind America's forceful and cooperative international strategies and actions between 1980 and 1995. In other words, have similarly situated African Americans and whites agreed and disagreed to the same degree with foreign policy initiatives in these two broad areas?

This investigation is prompted by (a) the general lack of attention given to race in typical examinations of foreign policy attitudes despite frequent indications that it might be an important factor, and (b) interest in how the changed domestic racial context, due to the civil rights revolution of the late 1960s, might have affected the proximity of racial attitudes.

A. Attention Given to Race-Centered Foreign Policy Opinion Research

Historical accounts and opinion poll data suggest that, prior to the attainment of civil rights, African Americans opposed all of America's defining military interventions more strongly than whites. On occasion, they also appeared more favorable than whites to cooperative foreign policies as well. Yet the existing research does not allow us to speak confidently about racial differences in Americans' international outlook because

¹The terms "black" and "African American" are used interchangeably throughout. Also, all references to "race" pertain here just to these two broad groups.

race has never been considered a legitimate basis for extensive analysis in this domain. Granted, race has been more salient since the late 1960s (specifically, since the Vietnam war). but the attention it has received has been more event-driven than systematic.

The abundance of race-conscious analysis of public attitudes pertaining to the 1991 Persian Gulf war is typical. Much of the focus then was on the extent to which black elites and masses supported that particular intervention, given the disproportionately large African American presence among front-line combat forces. Valuable though these surveys were, they missed yet another opportunity to probe more deeply into black foreign policy cognition. And, few of the ensuing discussions sought to locate black dissent within historically-grounded theories of black foreign policy outlook.

Today, while we have a substantial body of work noting possible racial effects in reactions to foreign policy (e.g., Verba et al., 1967; Mueller, 1973; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Kinder and Sanders, 1996), comparative racial analyses of internal attitudinal distributions (i.e. the effects of income, education, political views, etc.) are almost non-existent. Little is known, also, about how these factors influence the distribution of African American foreign policy attitudes. Regrettably, the major foreign policy opinion surveys (e.g. the quadrennial Chicago Council on Foreign Relations survey) still rarely solicit African American opinion on a scale large enough to permit confident generalizations about the group. And, sufficiently large samples of black domestic political opinion, such as the National Black Election Studies, rarely include a broad range of probing foreign policy items.

Nonetheless, even the sparse existing data could yield useful insights into racial

reactions and preferences relating to U.S. foreign policy since the turn of the century. Explorations of these limited data could be supplemented by historical analysis of African American engagement in, and reactions to, significant international developments. This research effort is a modest first step in that direction.

B. The Changed Racial Context: Civil Rights and African American National Self-Image

"I am not an American. I'm a victim of Americanism."

- Malcolm X (1960)

Historical neglect of African American opinion is one reason for this research; the other is interest in how civil rights might have affected racial foreign policy consensus. From a domestic perspective, the civil rights movement has had the biggest single impact on American society since the Civil War. Yet, although many of its political and social effects have been extensively studied, some of its possible psychological impacts on various groups have not. For instance, its likely impact on African American allegiance to the U.S., and on their conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy, have not been explored.

My basic assertion (supported by evidence presented in Chapter Three) is that historically, civil rights sensibility dominated African American national self-image, and thus, cognition of U.S. internationalism -- military and cooperative. Prior to the civil rights revolution, I would argue that it was highly unlikely that most blacks shared positively-biased -- or patriotic -- perceptions of the United States as an international actor. Logically, the official barriers to full citizenship and opportunity they faced would have made them much more likely to challenge the legitimacy of foreign policy actions,

supposedly predicated upon democratic principles. On the other hand, I contend that whites always had a stronger basis for holding positive, national self-perceptions, particularly as the U.S. grew in international stature and prosperity during the first half of the twentieth century.

These contentions are supported by recent research (Hirshberg, 1993) demonstrating that most Americans “perceive a positive relationship between themselves and their nation, and they think of the United States as good (p. 79).” This “goodness” is most strongly related to the belief that the U.S. possesses “the most clever and moral set of sociopolitical systems” which can be summed up as “democracy” (ibid.). Hirshberg contends that America’s rise to world economic and military dominance by the middle of this century, and the relative prosperity its citizens enjoyed, is attributed by them to its embrace of democratic values, especially “freedom.” Gallup Poll findings of 90 percent or more Americans saying they were “proud to be Americans” (e.g., see *Gallup Poll Monthly*, March 1989) probably reflect the pervasiveness of these positive beliefs.

Hirshberg’s argument is that the patriotic self-image has been a dominant, shared stereotype among Americans.² As such, he sees it as self-confirming and resistant to refutation because it is used to process the very information used to evaluate and validate it (p.77). Furthermore, he explains, the mechanics of information recall make these stereotypes self-reinforcing (p.78). This is reinforced by a large literature on stereotyped

² Hirshberg conducted an experiment in 1986 into how introductory-level political science students at the University of Washington recalled information related to U.S. interventions. He controlled for gender, political viewpoint and party identification, but not race. Findings indicated that the positive stereotype of what America stood for was predominant (p. 85).

knowledge frameworks -- usually termed "schemata" -- which describes and explains the effects of stereotypes on memory (see Larson, 1994). This work is discussed later in more detail.

However, negative national self-images also exist and are equally self-reinforcing. Given the historical realities, these may be more prevalent among African Americans. Malcolm X statement, cited above, clearly is based on a perception of American society as oppressive, undemocratic and malevolent.

Granted, most African Americans' national self-images may not have been so extremely negative. Indeed, a remarkable aspect of the recent poll data has been the finding that African Americans, despite unvarying dissatisfaction with public policy priorities and consistently higher levels of economic pessimism, tend to report just as much pride in their American identity as whites. By every measure of national allegiance or patriotism employed in Gallup polls during the 1980s, black and white loyalties were indistinguishable.³

In fact, a slightly higher percentage of blacks (90 percent) than whites (89 percent) polled by Gallup in June 1986 -- after six years of unfriendly Reagan policies -- reported that they were "very proud" to be Americans. And, 90 percent expressed "... confidence in the future of the U.S.," compared with a slightly higher 95 percent of whites. Yet, the same poll found 49 percent of blacks dissatisfied "... with the way

³ Gallup did note that blacks were far less likely to display the American flag on patriotic holidays, a fact that might have more to do with the lower incidence of black homeownership and suburbanization, than anything else. Furthermore, according to Sullivan et al. (1992), flag-waving might be indicative of just one conceptualization of patriotism -- "symbolic patriotism."

things are going in the U.S. at this time” compared to just 24 percent of whites.⁴

The historical reality seems to be that blacks have always held images of American society that were complex, and that contained paradoxical or conflicting elements. As Don Rojas stated in the *Amsterdam News* on February 9, 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis, “The patriotism of African Americans is a complex mix of pride, resentment and hope . . . ” (p. 1). Tyler, Casper and Fisher (1989) contend that, at any given time, allegiance to government or “diffuse support” is based on two factors: the existence of a reservoir of allegiance developed during the childhood political socialization process, and, the experiences that adults have with government officials (p. 629). Though the model devised by the Tyler team was used to measure the impact of experience with the criminal justice system on defendant attitudes toward government, it might be relevant to the history of African American patriotism as well. The negative political socialization and adult experiences widely shared by blacks prior to civil rights undoubtedly contributed to the existence of the kind of national self-image summed up in Malcolm X’s statement.

Historical accounts show that from the turn of the century to the late 1960s, especially, African American reactions to U.S. intervention were repeatedly articulated in civil rights terms. Blacks perceived a moral and political linkage between U.S. actions overseas and their domestic situation of oppression and second-class citizenship. Their own direct involvement in many of these military interventions, combined with the government’s tendency to justify them as crusades for democracy, easily allowed African

⁴ Gallup Poll, June 1986.

Americans to make a psychological connection between the two political domains that whites may not have shared.

To African Americans, these wars not only diverted attention and resources away from their domestic plight, they also trapped blacks in a moral and political dilemma. As a relatively powerless political community, blacks needed to support popular foreign military operations to bolster domestic claims for full equality. But at the same time, they also needed to draw attention to the moral and political double-standards inherent in these ventures.

One of the best illustrations of the depth of this dilemma came on the eve of U.S. participation in World War I. Respected African American intellectual and civil rights leader W.E.B. DuBois urged the African American community to forget their “special grievances” and “close ranks” with whites in the fight against the Kaiser in 1918. This drew bitter attacks from the black press at the time (see Mullen, 1973:45); many African Americans found it difficult not only to ignore unabated domestic discrimination and escalating anti-black violence, but to serve in the segregated armed forces (into which 370,000 African Americans were drafted during World War I). Nevertheless, DuBois saw an opportunity to use the U.S. military as a vehicle for social and political change. As he put it, “if the black man could fight to defeat the Kaiser . . . he could later present a bill for payment due to a grateful white America (cited in Binkin, Eitelberg, Schexnider and Smith, 1982:17).” Others have suggested that blacks were the only Americans who continually felt compelled to serve in the military to prove their humanity (see Berry and

Blassingame, 1982).⁵

Coercive interventions in the Third World illustrated the difference in racial outlook even more clearly, as black Americans' were often able to identify with such societies on a political (and possibly racial) level. Mullen notes that the jingoistic campaign for war with Spain following the destruction of the USS *Maine* in 1898 struck a very responsive chord among blacks, as it talked about freeing "our little brown brothers" the Filipinos, Cubans and Puerto Ricans from the despotic Spanish (ibid., p. 35).

Six decades later, black leaders like Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, Jr. strongly opposed U.S. interventions in Africa and Vietnam because they identified those struggles as part of a legitimate fight by nations of color for freedom from racist and capitalist domination (see Essien-Udom, 1971).

Following logically from the proposition that (denial of) civil rights formed the main prism through which blacks filtered U.S. internationalism, African American assessments of these policies in the post-civil rights period should reflect the institutionalization of equality that came *Brown v. Board of Education*, the Voting Rights Acts and the various fair employment and housing initiatives of the 1960s and 1970s. The fundamental improvement in African Americans' political and social status attributable to this new regime could reasonably be expected to have altered negative

⁵This probably overstates the case since, throughout U.S. history, almost all "second-class" groups embraced military service as they struggled to gain acceptance as Americans. For instance, the combat performance of Japanese-American "Nisei" units in Italy during World War II is legendary. Nonetheless, no other minority group has so strongly embraced military service for as long as African Americans.

cognitive stereotypes used to decipher foreign policy.⁶ In other words, the foreign policy views of ordinary African Americans (though not necessarily elites) might have become more “mainstream” by 1980.

A few implicit assumptions should be clarified at this point. First of all, there is the assumption that civil rights were not an important determinant of white foreign policy outlooks. Certainly, some whites’ assessments of U.S. behavior may have changed as a result of the movement, but there is no historical evidence that civil rights held extraordinary foreign policy significance for whites in general. On the other hand, because blacks were denied these basic rights for 350 years, I think it reasonable to posit that the new legal and social regime affected their evaluation of policy issues -- domestic and foreign -- to an overwhelming extent.

Another point to be clarified is that the argument is not that foreign policy consensus was likely because civil rights cured the problems of racism in America. Neither does it imply that civil rights have been so effective that racism was rendered imperceptible to black Americans. All that the theoretical framework presumes is that there has been significant progress on race, and that there are palpable, clearly discernible differences between pre- and post-civil rights racial inequality (see Patterson, 1997).

Before civil rights, ordinary African-American did not have to be particularly perceptive to see or experience race prejudice because it was pervasive and socially

⁶It is possible that civil rights changed some whites’ attitudes on race and foreign policy. However, historical accounts indicate that blacks, as a group, perceived a relationship between civil rights and U.S. policy that whites did not. For this reason, this analysis does not hypothesize a corresponding civil rights effect on white attitudes.

acceptable. The connection between racial discrimination and foreign policy was much clearer also. As will be seen later on in the historical review chapter, black troops were segregated in the armed forces and killed in riots when they came home from overseas service; the U.S. did nothing to help black Ethiopia against Italy in the 1930s; Marcus Garvey was exiled at the height of his influence among grass-roots blacks. Prominent African Americans were Red-baited for opposing military involvement in Korea. Many African Americans, then and now, also remain convinced that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. was killed at the behest of the U.S. government as soon as he began to speak out against the Vietnam war.

On the other hand, instances of egregious institutional racism became less and less apparent after the 1960s, even though many vestiges remained. Barriers to African American equality assumed more subtle manifestations that were harder for ordinary people to decipher. Many factors have contributed to this, not least, the influence of the mass media. Of particular significance was the ability of liberal politics to co-opt the civil rights movement, so that fewer and fewer leaders of national stature were motivated to mobilize the African American community around civil rights issues. Indeed, by the 1980s, Jesse Jackson seemed an anachronism and stood pretty much alone in the Democratic party with his civil rights advocacy.

Another significant difference between the pre- and post-civil rights periods was that the former provided much more of a context for African American psychological linkage with Africa and non-white nations. In large part, this arose from the gravity and seeming hopelessness of the domestic situation for blacks until the 1960s. Unabashed

European colonialism and exploitation of the Third World prior to the 1970s, also made for easy black American identification with these nations on a political level.

Thus, while suggesting that blacks and whites immediately began to share a common national self-image after the 1960s, enough change might have occurred to modify black foreign policy outlooks. Indeed, by the 1980s African Americans themselves concurred that racism has been largely eradicated from the primary institution through which they connected with foreign policy historically: the U.S. armed forces (see Binkin et al., 1982). And, if classic civil rights issues (Jim Crow segregation, lynching and anti-black violence, political disfranchisement, etc.) were primary shapers of an African American national self-image, their legal resolution should have made a difference to black cognition of international affairs. Race should have become less endogenous to black foreign policy attitudes, and “universal” socioeconomic and political factors, more determinative. Civil rights should have moved African American postures closer to those of the “mainstream” dimensions described in the foreign policy attitude structure literature (e.g., Holsti and Rosenau, 1986; Oldendick and Bardes, 1978; Rielly, 1975, 1979, 1983, 1987; Wittkopf, 1981, 1986).

Thus, in analytical terms, I adopt the perspective that foreign policy attitudes might also occupy a race-based dimension that could be labeled “civil rights internationalism.” African American sensitivity to issues of equality and justice may still make them more likely than whites to cluster on one side of this dimension, but the gap should have narrowed over recent decades.

II. Related Theoretical Perspectives

“Civil rights internationalism” seems related to Howard-Matthews’ (1993) conception of black foreign policy outlook. She perceives a complex, highly self-conscious perspective that remains unaffected by the jingoistic pressures of war, and by the fact that so many African Americans look to the military for secure employment. Rather than simply embracing a self-serving isolationism -- a “rational” posture given the history of government reluctance to make the costly interventions that could alleviate deplorable conditions in the black community -- she sees a tradition of political dissent that challenges “anti-imperialist, military excursions abroad” despite the “prevailing national ideological view (p. 31).”

Seemingly less related to my perspective, though quite interesting, is the suggestion is that African American postures are a manifestation of “diaspora politics (Shain, 1995:70).” “Diasporas” are Americans who have retained cultural, religious, racial, or national affinities with their ancestral lands. From this perspective, traditional political elites dominate U.S. foreign policy, but many groups of ethnic Americans seek to shape policy based on ancestral loyalties. As these groups find political maturity, it transforms them from “outsiders” who have a “Balkanizing” influence on foreign policy, into “insiders” who vigorously promote American ideals and values. Thus while he sees race as an important initial source of African American outlooks, Shain posits a gradual evolution toward a more “American” perspective and it is this latter observation that agrees with my proposition.

Instead of focusing on the history of black foreign policy dissent, Shain would emphasize the past decade during which African Americans “have emerged as one of the strongest voices on U.S. policy toward Africa and the Caribbean, [and] have been converted from outsiders trying to penetrate the system into mainstream foreign policy players (p. 74).” For him, the Haiti invasion and South Africa anti-apartheid campaign symbolize a new black interventionism motivated by an interest in “marketing the American creed abroad (ibid.).” Shain would applaud recent efforts by the TransAfrica lobby encouraging U.S. sanctions against Nigeria’s military regime.

“Civil rights internationalism” incorporates some of the insights of these two authors though it is clear that both can be challenged on several levels. First of all, both views do not address obvious contradictions and anomalies within African-American postures. Shain would be hard-pressed to explain why African American militancy within the U.S. armed forces reached its peak after blacks had attained the long-sought goals of integration and equal opportunity in that institution. Moreover, there is the contradiction of strong black opposition to the Gulf War at a time when blacks had so penetrated the military mainstream that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was an African American.

On the other hand, Howard-Matthews’ viewpoint would not obviously explain vigorous black support for military intervention in Somalia and Haiti, nor findings of stronger black retrospective support for Vietnam (see Chapters 4 & 6).

Also, questions can be raised about Shain’s equation of the African American and ethnic European diasporas, and his racial affinity logic. International linkages for

African Americans have been as much political as they have been cultural. Black diasporas generally lack the direct connection to specific regions or family trees in Africa while such specific linkages are commonplace among ethnic Europeans. The political, social and economic experience of being nonwhite in America probably determines African American international affinities more than feelings of ancestral kinship. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that experience was most painful because African Americans were subjected to waves of repression with each incremental gain in status.

III. Other Framing Contexts

Comparing racial views in the post civil rights years is important, I suggest, because African American perceptions of U.S. involvement in world affairs, its responsibilities as a world leader, threats to U.S. interests and national security, and appropriate levels of expenditure on national security might have changed. A corollary to this proposition is that for white Americans these outlooks have been relatively constant.

Obviously, basic civil rights were not a central domestic concern for most white Americans. After World War II, communist ideology was viewed as the most serious threat to American values. But communism was not fundamentally divisive among whites. Schneider (1992) mentioned that the configuration of majority views has changed little since the seventies. As he put it, despite the end of the Cold War stratifications over “objectives and instrumentalities” of American foreign policy have remained constant because Americans were never really divided over communism (p.68).

However, since civil rights polarized white and black Americans, positive change in the civil rights area makes it more likely that African Americans, rather than whites, would have adjusted their foreign policy outlook in recent years. In other words, context can be “held constant” for whites and the analytical focus can be on African American attitudes in this period.

IV. The Relevance of Studying African American Foreign Policy Attitudes

African American foreign policy opinion is central to this study. But, given the structure of American democracy, why should political scientists care about the opinions of a social group traditionally on the margins of foreign policy?

First of all, students of the American democratic system should be especially concerned about minority group preferences. Secondly, African American foreign policy opinion should be viewed as critical because blacks have always played a significant foreign policy role, notwithstanding their weak domestic political stature.

The prominence of blacks in the combat arms of the modern U.S. military alone, should cause their foreign policy postures to be of great interest to policymakers. At the beginning of the study period (1980), the proportion of black enlisted personnel in virtually all of the army units likely to be involved in hostilities exceeded 25 percent. For instance, As Binkin et al. (1992) explained

should the Army's 2nd Infantry Division become involved in hostilities on the Korean peninsula, black soldiers would be likely to suffer 40 percent of the casualties, based on the racial mix in the division [41.1 percent black]. The proportion could be larger, depending on which units of the 2nd Division were engaged. As of December 1980, for example, the proportion of enlisted blacks in

its five infantry battalions ranged from about 38 to 46 percent; the proportion was 38 percent in both its armored battalions, and from 41 to 51 percent in its four artillery battalions (p. 78).

At the extreme, the 197th Infantry brigade had an enlisted component of over 50 percent black, with an artillery battalion in which the fraction reached 60 percent (p.79).

The Marine Corps was similarly dependent on African Americans. The regular units of the First, Second and Third Marine Divisions were, respectively, 25, 33 and 30 percent black (p. 80).

A. The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

After some debate, there is a growing consensus that public opinion -- majority and minority -- is directly relevant to foreign policy. Until recently, the conventional wisdom held that while broad public opinion might be related to policy, it merely circumscribed the decision context and was not causal. As former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick put it over a decade ago:

Foreign policy is made by presidents, by national security councils, by state departments, and not in any direct or simple sense by public opinion. However, since Congress and presidents are elected, public opinion provides the context for foreign policy. Sometimes that context is much more important than at other moments (especially in presidential election years)[cited in Wittkopf, 1982:270].

On the other hand, political leaders were viewed as molders of opinion to suit their purposes. The public was felt to lack the knowledge and objectivity to make decisions that could bear on the very survival of the state.

However, the recent research suggests that the public might have a bigger impact on policy than previously believed. Jacobs and Shapiro (1994) summarize the vast literature in terms of the various research designs employed. They cite case studies -

many of which were cross-national - that carefully compared opinion poll results with policy decisions (e.g., see Jacobs, 1993). and approaches that rely on quantitative analysis and study of a wide range of policy issues. Basically, these analyses compare constituency “mood” with ideological postures and positions embraced by elected officials (e.g., see Stimson, 1991). Or, they look at the consistency (e.g., Monroe, 1979) or congruence (e.g., Page and Shapiro, 1983) of the relationship between public opinion and the eventual policy outputs of government institutions. A number of time series studies have indicated opinion’s impact on a variety of policy areas. For instance, Jacobs and Shapiro (1983) studied time sequencing to explore causal connections, and concluded that “shifts in policy more frequently followed changes in opinion than vice versa (p.10).”

Of particular significance is the contention that this opinion-policy relationship holds for foreign policy as well. Since 1973, Bernard Cohen’s conclusion that State Department officials had been largely impervious to public opinion had been widely accepted (see Cohen, 1973). Many now assert that foreign and defense policies closely mirror public opinion, which now seems far more stable and reliable itself than was previously thought (Nincic, 1992b; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Wittkopf, 1990).

The establishment of a public opinion-public policy connection is hardly unambiguous; there are at least as many unresolved questions as there are encouraging findings. Page (1994:25-29) presents five categories of “open questions”: (a) those concerned with determining precisely *how much impact* opinion has on policy, (b) those interested in the *circumstances* in which this impact is larger or smaller, (c) those related to the actual *processes* of opinion transmission and policy response, (d) those related to

the *relative potency* of public opinion compared with other sorts of influence, and lastly.

(e) questions about the *sources* of measured public opinion.

Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence makes it safe to say that the interesting question is no longer whether or not the public's opinions shape policy. Rather, these are the key questions: where exactly do they (the public) stand on the issues, and by what mechanism is their influence transmitted?

B. The Significance of Minority Opinion

Not overlooking politically significant minority groups when it comes to foreign affairs is especially important in figuring out public postures. Granted, low levels of African American representation in the foreign policy decision structure suggest insignificance to international affairs. African Americans were always few in the House (1980 - less than 4 percent; 1994 - less than 10 percent) and virtually absent in the Senate (1 percent in 1995). Also, blacks have been grossly underrepresented at policy-making levels within the foreign policy bureaucracy and Foreign Service as well (White, 1981: 47). And, prior to the appointment of Army General Colin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff by President Bush in 1989, no African American had participated at this level of foreign policy decision-making.⁷

Furthermore, the focus of U.S. attention always had been on regions without "natural" ties to the African-American community: the former Soviet Union, Western

⁷ Powell himself had been appointed National Security Adviser by Ronald Reagan. African Americans Ralph Bunche, Andrew Young, and Donald McHenry played prominent roles at the U.N. during previous administrations; however these were not policy making roles. A handful of blacks served in the foreign policy bureaucracy during the 1960s and 1970s, generally in obscure positions (see White, 1981:47 for details.)

Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific rim. American interests in sub-Saharan Africa, such as they were, were defined in terms of the Cold War -- even stances on South African apartheid. Inability to create a political bloc compounded black isolation from this arena. Given that context, American policy in general was more susceptible to domestic influences other than those exerted by African Americans.

Nevertheless, the moral basis of U.S. foreign policy has periodically allowed blacks to play a foreign policy role disproportionate to their political power as a bloc. As will be seen later, America's European policies in 1917-18 and 1940-45 were huge catalysts to African American efforts to equalize the society. Nincic (1992) explains this by arguing that foreign policy often exerts a greater strain on the fabric of pluralistic democracies than generally realized. And, for powerful states like the U.S. the domestic consequences of foreign policy are far more acute

Countries that can mold the course of international events are often led to equate their national interest, and by extension their domestic needs, with an ambitious and understandably self-centered vision of the international order. Because an a priori link is established between external and internal goals, and because such nations are in a position to act on this link, foreign policy reverberates domestically, often touching the foundations upon which the political order is established (Nincic, p. 16).

Foreign policy goals often reflect (or impinge upon) narrow bureaucratic and group interests, and the greater the ability of the state to act internationally, the greater the efforts of these interests to either shape foreign policy, or change the domestic setting in their favor.

Also, the execution of foreign policy requires a marshaling of society's human and material resources. Military policies, in particular, disproportionately affect black

Americans as a community. Today, blacks are over-represented in the U.S. armed forces. In the past they were under-represented but still played a major role at critical junctures in all America's wars. Furthermore, the most distressed communities in the U.S. are largely African American, and massive military budget outlays detract from the social spending that could alleviate many of their problems.

Thus, along with abstract theoretical justifications, African Americans' foreign policy views matter because, as Nincic puts it, "the support of those groups on whose shoulders the burdens of policy rest most heavily must be secured . . . (ibid., p.17)."

V. The Problem

Broadly, the research problem is reconciliation of complicated evidence relating to African American and white foreign policy postures between 1980 and 1995, so that reasonable conclusions about the state of racial consensus in the late post-civil rights period can be drawn. Some opinion studies and polls indicate that blacks were more likely to oppose military intervention than whites; others suggest that blacks were more interventionist. Similarly, there is contrasting evidence about black attitudes toward foreign aid and other forms of cooperation.

A. Black Opposition to Military Force

After reviewing the combined 1972-1988 NORC-GSS surveys, Page and Shapiro (1992:298) observed that blacks "have been less supportive of foreign involvements and military spending." More than two decades ago John E. Mueller, in his comparative studies of national attitudes toward the Vietnam and Korean conflicts, wrote:

Another social variable that relates rather persistently to war policy is race. Relative to whites, blacks react to the wars as doves, both on the “mistake” questions⁸ . . . and on questions about escalation and withdrawal (Mueller, 1973: 147).

And before Mueller. Sidney Verba and six colleagues came to this conclusion in their landmark Vietnam study:

A major finding is that though the preferences of respondents . . . are not related to the broad social groupings around which political and social attitudes cluster . . . two differences among social groups do stand out . . . One is the difference between whites and Negroes with Negroes more in favor of de-escalation. (Verba, Brody, Parker, Nie, Polsby, Ekman & Black, 1967:331).

B. Support for Foreign Aid

Not only did African Americans seem less militant than whites on coercive intervention, blacks also seemed more “liberal” in their foreign policy preferences. Throughout the 1970s and 80s, black leaders pressed Washington to provide more nonmilitary assistance to developing countries - particularly those in Africa.

Consider these items in the “National Black Agenda for the 1980s,” developed in March 1980 at a conference of more than 1,000 black leaders from across the country in Richmond, Virginia:

[The conference calls for] an increased and more equitable program of economic assistance to and trade and private investment relations with Africa and the Caribbean. Specifically . . . the United States should increase its overall level of foreign aid to seven/10ths of one percent of GNP. The African and Caribbean share of this should be increased to \$5 billion. The allocation of aid to these countries should be according to need and not geopolitical considerations . . . [and

⁸ The questions were: “*In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Korea, do you think the United States made a mistake in deciding to defend South Korea, or not?*” “*In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam?*”

regarding refugee assistance and political asylum] the U.S. should mount a major program to address the grave situation of four million African refugees and displaced persons, and modify the eligibility requirements for political asylum so that [they] might be admissible into this country (*Focus*, March 1980: 3A).

Moreover, despite the widespread unpopularity of developmental foreign aid in the U.S. Congress and general public in the 1980s and 1990s, the Congressional Black Caucus and other black leadership organizations still advocated increases in aid levels to the Third World. Ninety-four (94) percent of a black leadership sample surveyed in 1991 thought the U.S. either should reallocate its \$15 billion foreign aid budget more evenly among poor nations, or spend more overall (Dorn and Carrington, 1991:36).

C. Complicating Evidence

However, contradictory evidence in both foreign policy areas is also part of the broad contemporary picture. Recently, African Americans have sometimes seemed more pro-force than whites. In 1993 the Congressional Black Caucus pressured the Clinton Administration to commit large numbers of U.S. troops to support a massive U.N. humanitarian operation and police action in Somalia in 1993. And in September 1994, black leaders again lobbied successfully for armed intervention; this time, with the assistance of the African American international lobby, TransAfrica, they called for an outright U.S. invasion of Haiti to restore exiled Jean-Bertrand Aristide, its first democratically-elected president. As the Clinton Administration wavered and sought various diplomatic solutions, a hunger strike staged by TransAfrica's Executive Director Randall Robinson might have been the factor finally tilting the balance toward invasion.

Thus, black leaders were quite prepared to use force, inflict punishment, and if

necessary, incur U.S. casualties in pursuit of moral and humanitarian goals. Neither state was likely to pose a serious military challenge to the U.S., but significant numbers of U.S. military, and Somali and Haitian civilian, casualties would have been unavoidable if local militias had chosen to resist.

There have been indications of other “contradictory” black attitudes lately. Retrospective assessments of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war have sometimes found African Americans more “hawkish” than whites. Compared with 23 percent of whites, 37 percent of blacks surveyed in 1991 agreed that American intervention in this conflict was “just,” though they lagged behind whites in a similar assessment of six other major conflicts (*Gallup Poll Monthly*, February 1991, p. 20). Also, African Americans currently seem more willing than whites to use U.S. military force within the context of the United Nations. Seventy-two (72) percent told Gallup in 1990 that it was a “good idea” to strengthen the U.N. emergency force “to a size great enough to deal with “brush fire” or small wars throughout the world.” Just 60 percent of whites agreed (*Gallup Poll Monthly*, October 1990, p.18).

These latter examples suggest that African Americans might be more interested in applying force to Third World problems such as those plaguing Haiti and Somalia -- intractable poverty, military dictatorship, and widespread human misery. Perhaps civil rights values encourage military intervention in such cases.

However, so little is known about African American opinion in this area that the above examples could just as well be the tip of an iceberg of racial divergence, or anomalies in a larger pattern of convergence. Instances where black attitudes seem

counterintuitive strengthen the case for racially-comparative analysis over a range of contemporary issues. We cannot assume that the axioms associated with mass attitudes in this domain necessarily hold for blacks as well.

VI. Analytical Focus, Method and Organization

A. Focus

The analytical focus is a comparison of black and white attitudes toward selected aspects of U.S. foreign policy between 1980 and 1995. Along with race, the comparison takes place on another dimension: it examines two types of foreign policy, the use of military force and cooperative strategies. Attitudes toward military interventions (of various kinds) are analyzed along with those related to foreign aid, immigration, and international organizations (the United Nations).

B. Method

The working hypothesis is that even if racial attitudes continued to diverge in the early civil rights years, black and white opinion toward the use of force and cooperation in U.S. foreign policy should have begun exhibiting similar direction and intensity since 1980. This should be especially apparent in responses to more searching survey questions, if not to the more straightforward ones asked for commercial or journalistic purposes. As stated before, the assumption is that African Americans' stereotypes of the U.S. would have changed in the direction of whites' since civil rights. Progressive political and social gains should have led to a more and more universal distribution of the dominant American patriotic self-image. This should be reflected in similar positions on

foreign policy issues.

To test this hypothesis, I compare black and white responses to selected questions from the *Americans Talk Security* (ATS) series of in-depth foreign policy surveys done in the 1987-88 presidential election season (see Appendix D). The questions relate to four themes covered by those surveys: (a) assessments of retrospective and prospective uses of force, (b) the importance of strategic, cost and moral considerations to support for force, (c) appropriate uses of nuclear weapons, (d) support for the United Nations and foreign aid. Dissimilarities in racial responses for each theme were compared.

In this secondary analysis, attention is given to variables in the ATS dataset that might hold explanations for black-white attitudinal differences -- education, sex, party identification, income, political viewpoint and region. However, the summary measure used throughout focused selectively on education as a potential source of constraint. In the absence of specific scales measuring civil rights awareness and perceptions of the societal progress on civil rights, educational attainment was considered a rough guide to where black patriotic self-image stood in relation to mainstream views. This is not to say that other variables are irrelevant; income, region, age and other variables might have been factored in with education. However, the interest here was more breadth than depth of analysis. The need to describe and compare racial opinion over such a wide range of foreign policy issues was considered more pressing.

Black and white responses were compared at two educational levels: attainment of less than a college education, and college education. The former included those with at least some high-school education, but no college; the latter included those with at least

some college. (Postgraduates were excluded due to small representation in the African American sample).

The null hypothesis is that African Americans and whites continued to differ significantly in direction and intensity of attitudes toward these issue-areas in the 1980-95 period. This is plausible since legal progress on civil rights had not translated into the complete institutionalization of equality, nor eliminated social and cultural barriers traditionally associated with race. African Americans continued to be outsiders in many respects, and hence many may still have shared the kind of negative national self-image that generates non-mainstream foreign policy preferences.

Statistical rigor is not the standard used here for acceptance or rejection of these hypotheses: data limitations are an important constraint (see Appendix I). Along with the inadequacies of secondary data, there is also the problem of baseline data for the pre-civil rights period. Historical accounts of black involvement and organization around salient international issues and events are substituted for empirical data to develop a profile of community preferences and intensities on such issues. Unavoidably, such sources more heavily reflect the voices and postures of opinion leaders than the wider community. Legitimate questions can be raised about the actual depths and intensities of early black opinion on international matters given the elite bias of historical sources.

C. Organization

Chapter Two reviews relevant areas of the public opinion literature. Chapter Three is a review of African Americans' relationship to foreign affairs prior to World War II, and Chapter Four continues the historical review up to the Vietnam war -- the

height of the civil rights period. These chapters provide a basis for understanding post-civil rights attitudes. They explain the nature and intensity of nineteenth and early twentieth century black internationalism, the salience of international affairs and U.S. policy to African American elites and masses, and the linkages and dynamics that existed between this community and Africa and the Third World.

Chapter Five provides empirical context for the main analysis using national survey data to sketch racial reactions and preferences toward U.S. military interventions and cooperative actions in the late post-civil rights period. It summarizes the policy context and draws on national polls to sketch racial reactions to salient force and cooperation issues and events over the study period.

Attention to the important underlying question of African Americans' primary national affinities. Chapter Six presents empirical data on black perceptions of Africa and other societies of color, and on their view of American society. Two data sources are used to gain insight into both black elite and mass attitudes: the National Black Election Study (1984 and 1988), and summary statistics from a 1990 Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies survey of African American leaders.

Chapters Seven through Ten include the main analysis relating to the hypotheses outlined. Instead of journalistic poll data, these chapters utilize the more evaluative data gathered by ATS relating to the American use of military force, U.S. foreign aid, and its relationship with the United Nations. They provide insights into the state of racial consensus on U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter Eight examines retrospective and prospective assessments of the use of

military force. Chapter Nine is entirely devoted to attitudes about nuclear weapons. And, Chapter Ten looks at opinions related to foreign aid and the United Nations.

In the final chapter -- Chapter Eleven -- I conclude by commenting on indications of racial convergence and divergence suggested by the data. Also, I propose future research directions based on the groundwork laid here.

Chapter Two: THE PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH CONTEXT

I. Introduction

Scholarly interest in the American public's foreign policy opinions grew after the Vietnam war, but because the research continues in its old tradition we still know little about the foreign policy views of African Americans. What is known mostly relates to military intervention; African Americans' impressions of economic and trade initiatives, arms control, foreign aid, international organizations and other areas -- remain relatively obscure.

Basically, the research tradition reflects the dominance of post World War II realist perspectives of international relations by concentrating on leadership or "elite" opinion, rather than on the views of social groups less directly associated with the making of foreign policy. From this perspective "mass" attitudes are important as a basis for comparing elite views, but the opinions of sub-groups on the periphery of policy making and execution -- blacks, women, etc. -- are relatively unimportant. Nevertheless, this tradition has produced a large literature from which many valuable insights about the interplay between public opinion and American foreign policy have emerged. We now know a great deal about the possible attitudinal dimensions specific to international affairs, and about broad public "moods" relating to overseas involvement.

Some of the domestic opinion literature also fits into this research context, particularly that addressing the issues of shared identity and political consciousness within racial minority groups.

Briefly, the early research was preoccupied with the question of coherence: did foreign policy opinion have a logical basis in any particular ideology? Or, did it lack “structure” and simply reflect the prevailing political currents? Since Vietnam, much attention has gone to discovery of the dimensions structuring both leadership and mass opinion. And throughout, there has been related theoretical work on the cognition of foreign policy information.

Before exploring these literatures, this chapter briefly discusses the general characteristics of foreign policy opinion, and elaborates on how the dominance of the realist paradigm in American foreign policy perspective has influenced research trends, to the detriment of racial perspectives.

II. Public Knowledge and Awareness of Foreign Affairs

Over the years the public opinion survey industry has shown that, in the United States, there is an enduring tradition of general public apathy and ignorance regarding international affairs. Illustrations are plentiful: in 1984 for instance, a mere 33 percent were aware that the government of the United States supported the “contras” against the Nicaragua government, although, by then, this issue had been debated in the media for years (cited in Hughes, 1991:159). More recently, only 10 percent of those polled correctly identified Canada as America’s largest trading partner (*Gallup Poll Monthly*, March 1991).

Many Americans lack basic historical perspective. Large percentages do not know, for instance, that the U.S. supported South Vietnam against North Vietnam, or

suffered many more casualties in World War II than in the Vietnam war. A *CBS News* Poll taken in January 1994 found that 73 percent of adult respondents either did not know or gave the wrong answer to the question: "As far as you know, what does the term D-Day refer to?" And, over half of the sample was unaware that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. were allies in World War II (cited in the *New York Times*, December 3, 1995, p. 5).

The recent war in Bosnia provided yet another example of persistent mass unawareness. Notwithstanding extensive media coverage of the "ethnic cleansing" and other civilian atrocities related to this conflict, a total of 60 percent of those polled by the *New York Times/CBS News* in July 1995 either did not know, or incorrectly identified ". . . the name of the ethnic group (Serbs) that conquered much of Bosnia and surrounded Sarajevo."

Public discussions about appropriate levels of U.S. commitment to foreign aid are similarly uninformed. Few realize that current U.S. aid expenditures add up to less than 1 percent of the federal budget. Instead, foreign aid levels are usually grossly overestimated by the public. In response to a January 1995 poll conducted by the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland, the median respondent estimated that 15 percent of the budget went to foreign aid (cited in Kull, 1996:109). The same poll found 81 percent assuming that the U.S. gave a higher percentage of its gross national product (GNP) in aid to poor countries than other industrialized nations; in fact, the U.S. ranks last in overseas development assistance among the 25 countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. (Interestingly, the median respondent to the PIPA poll

thought a contribution level of 5 percent of the budget would be “appropriate.” and 3 percent “too little.” when asked to recommend aid levels).

However, this unawareness is not evenly distributed throughout the public. The research suggests that when attentiveness and knowledge measures are applied, several distinct “opinion publics” are identifiable. Roughly 30 percent of the population constitutes a “mass” public with limited knowledge of, or interest in, world affairs. A second segment -- the “attentive” public -- amounting to 45 percent, has some knowledge and interest but little internal consistency and stability in its views. The remaining 25 percent are “opinion leaders” who know a great deal and who attempt to communicate their views and beliefs to others (Hughes, 1991:161). Although this stratification varies somewhat by geographic region, time and issue, it has been found to be remarkably stable and resistant to strategies aimed at improving public awareness and knowledge (Ibid., p.162).

Levels of education and literacy in America rank among the world’s highest, so the most credible general explanation offered for this unawareness is “privatism.” Americans are preoccupied with the private sphere. Family considerations, financial security, good housing and other matters “close to home” mean far more to most people than political events (Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976; Campbell, 1981). For most ordinary people politics and foreign policy are mere sideshows to life’s more immediate concerns. As Converse (1975a: 96) observed, given the seemingly low personal utility of political information “ . . . voters are no fools to remain ignorant.”

A. African Americans

These generalizations hold true for the African American community where levels of unawareness have been lower among elites and higher in the rest of the population. African American leaders -- journalists, business executives, elected officials, educators, academics, political activists, and others -- maintain levels of interest in foreign affairs similar to their white counterparts, particularly in areas of concern to them as black people. In a recent study of African American leaders' interest in U.S. policy toward Africa, Dorn and Carrington (1991) found virtually all expressing "strong interest" in foreign affairs. This study, commissioned by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, found 76 percent of leaders reporting either that they donated money to organizations seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy or tried to help people in other countries (Dorn and Carrington, p.2).

However, the same African American leaders overwhelmingly said that blacks paid little attention to Africa and knew little about the continent. And, there is no doubt that, historically, blacks have been far less attuned to foreign policy than whites in the aggregate (see Hero, 1969: 122).

B. The Significance of Public Foreign Policy Attentiveness

Americans are not preoccupied with routine foreign policy and African Americans lag behind whites in general knowledge and attentiveness in this area. But how significant is this for attitude formation and coherence? First, interest and knowledge vary considerably with events. Furthermore, factual knowledge does not necessarily affect tendencies to hold opinions, though we might question their coherence. As will be

discussed later, it is an open question as to whether possession of detailed information is a prerequisite for deep convictions or prescriptive preferences relating to specific foreign policy issues.

Finally, regardless of the state of public knowledge, its views inevitably provide a context for foreign policy in a democratic system. Ultimately, public opinion legitimizes or changes foreign policy. For this reason, much of the foreign policy opinion research has been preoccupied with questions about the stability, coherence and configuration of public attitudes.

III. Realism and the Marginalization of Race in Foreign Policy Opinion Research

Interest in the popular legitimacy of foreign policy has resulted in a large theoretical literature exploring the attitudinal postures of, and stability and change in, the mass and elite publics. Along with their preferences, the attitudinal congruence between these two groups has also been a central concern (see Kegley and Wittkopf, 1980: 286).

Since Vietnam, elite attitudes in particular have been scrutinized for changes in preferences regarding U.S. intervention. One problem with this focus is that, though valuable, it diverted analytical attention from the foreign policy attitudes of mass and elite sub-groups, such as racial minorities and women.

Perhaps a larger problem is that elite emphasis reinforces the dominance of realist conceptions of international affairs in the American foreign policy culture. This culture de-emphasizes non-elite societal sources of foreign policy, thereby institutionalizing the asymmetrical distribution of domestic political influence.

A. The Influence of Realism on Opinion Research

The full spectrum of realist thinking relating to international affairs ranges from the classic writings of Machiavelli (1952) to the modern expositions of Waltz (1979), Morgenthau (1985), Keohane and Nye (1977) and many others. Though realism includes many subtle variations it is not an oversimplification to assert that, essentially, realists consider public opinion an unsuitable basis for foreign policy decision-making (see Kissinger, 1969; Kirkpatrick, 1980). Realists hold that an anarchic international environment mandates that states practice power politics if they want to survive on their own terms. Thus, moral and ethical principles -- often issues at the core of pluralistic domestic politics -- should not be primary determinants of rational foreign policy. They would argue that the attainment of national objectives often necessitates duplicitous, deceptive, and coercive actions. Furthermore, costly and unpalatable public sacrifices may be required in the short run to achieve larger long-term goals.

Some realists see domestic structure (which might be considered the institutionalization of opinion) as the critical source of instability in international relations (see Kissinger, 1969). This is because different domestic pressures in different societies produce widely incompatible political systems, based on "fundamentally different conceptions of what is just." Thus, it is difficult for statesmen to agree even on what constitutes a problem (Kissinger, p.261).

Given their great interest in achieving or preserving system stability, realists prefer that foreign policy decision-making be as insulated as possible from the pressures of domestic structure. "Serious" foreign policy decisions would be left to foreign policy

professionals and top political leaders. Kissinger attributes the long periods of European peace and stability between the end of the religious wars and the French Revolution, and between the Congress of Vienna and World War I to this “political” (i.e., rational) approach to system management (ibid., pp.274-275).

Until fairly recently (the Vietnam war period), there was tacit executive and legislative consensus in American government that foreign policy should stand above the fray of domestic politics. For much of the Cold War, lawmakers tried to keep their partisan and institutional foreign policy disagreements “inside the Beltway.” As Destler et al. (1984:17) state:

. . . while politics was never in short supply . . . the leadership in the Executive Branch and the Congress each knew where the other stood, and both were ready to make deals that fit both the national interest and party interests. The prevailing anti-Communist ideology, though thoroughly ingrained in what was called a consensus, did not preclude the practical.

Chief Executives, for their part, have long asserted supremacy in foreign policy -- especially regarding the use of military force. Many felt that the legislative and public role in foreign policy should be largely confined to ratification, rather than prescription. Whether or not this stemmed from adherence to a realist world-view, or belief that the presidency was constitutionally mandated to monopolize foreign policy, the effect has been undemocratic.

Realists’ distrust of the public derives from a narrow conception of public awareness. According to Nincic (1992:49-56), three kinds of awareness shape foreign policy. A grasp of factual information is indicative of the first. Most of the time references to attentiveness in the opinion literature relate to degree of knowledge of

names, places, dates, etc. -- the type of information known either by those whose professions demand it, or by passionate amateurs.

A second kind of awareness involves normative understanding: a sense of national priorities and of the (often ethical) values that ought to shape those priorities. For example, should the U.S. intervene wherever sovereignty is threatened by an outside aggressor, or only when vital American interests are at stake? Such questions elicit sentiments and aspirations.

Third, awareness relates to an understanding of the context for foreign policy behavior. Context includes generalized assessments of how the international system operates -- e.g., the view that trade, arms control and other agreements are futile because states cannot be trusted -- and thus, a sense of the likely outcome of a given course of action.

Of course, these categories are somewhat artificial as all three types of awareness no doubt interact inseparably. However, the mass public is clearly most deficient in factual information -- to the consternation of realists who overemphasize this attribute in their rationalistic approach. A fact often overlooked is that polls reveal no dearth of sentimental or inferential opinion on foreign policy issues and that there is little to suggest that public and elite inferences and sentiments differ widely. Though realists may disagree, policy makers -- though armed with all the facts -- rarely make better foreign policy choices than the public. In retrospect, the mass public probably had better insight on Vietnam, Nicaraguan contra aid, "Star Wars," and many other dubious ventures over the years.

Nevertheless, realists accept that the public remains an important source of legitimacy for the political order. And, after all, if there is fighting to be done, the mass public is the main source of rank-and-file military personnel. Hence, they see public opinion as a resource to be carefully cultivated and molded to provide a ratifying context for foreign policy. However, this task does not require that much attention be paid to less influential opinion blocs like racial minorities or women. Indeed, the fact that women (who are half of the citizenry) consistently favor non-coercive foreign policies has not been reflected in the long history of violent American international conduct.

IV. The Early Research Tradition

Early foreign policy opinion research has concentrated heavily on discovering the attitude structures, or “belief-systems,” used by the American public to decipher new information. For the most part, this early work confirmed the realist perspective of the public as an inadequate source of foreign policy.

Narrow conceptions of belief structure contributed to such conclusions. A belief system is a set of ideas about a particular issue-area that “go together.” In Converse’s (1964:207) terms, it is “a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence.” Ideas are related in a logical way that amounts to a coherent cognitive system, or decoding mechanism, for interpreting complex new information.

At the time Converse wrote, the dominant conceptualization of belief systems was hierarchical: a central abstract belief stood in the midst of concentric circles of beliefs of

lesser abstraction. A key aspect of this conception of structure is that the central belief set -- the "ideology" -- must be collectively held rather than idiosyncratic. Thus in a given political context, structured thinking could only flow from a belief system rooted in a shared preference for some political order, either existing or proposed, that "... offers at least a sketchy notion of strategy . . . for its maintenance and attainment (George, 1971:1)."

Working from this theoretical perspective Gabriel Almond (1960) made the early argument that foreign policy thinking was non-ideological -- that is, not organized by coherent, overarching political principles or deeply-held beliefs. Almond contended that the reaction of the general population to foreign affairs was shaped by "mood" -- a sort of superficial consensus around the appropriate American role in world affairs -- rather than by deep, organized thinking about specific issues and events. These moods "lacked intellectual structure and factual content" when it came to specific issues, and were merely unstable "superficial psychic states (Almond, 1960:69)" largely unconstrained by deeper and broader perspectives. Almond contended that they were not "anchored in a set of explicit value and means calculations or traditional compulsions," but were mainly influenced by privatism and the absence of an established orthodoxy caused by a high rate of "political mobility" in the United States (p. 69).

Almond found that neither the elite nor mass publics displayed structured thinking; both sets of opinion were unassociated with ideology. But his interest was less in how knowledge was arranged, stored, and retrieved in memory, than it was about belief stability and change. This focus of concern shaped much of the subsequent opinion

research -- some determined to prove Almond wrong, others determined to reinforce his hypothesis.

Philip Converse (1963, 1964, 1975a, 1975b) bolstered Almond's conclusions with his influential analyses of years (1956-60) of national survey data on both domestic and foreign policy views. He agreed that Americans were, for the most part, innocent of ideology and concluded that (a) in the process of attitude formation the general public applies constraints that are less elaborate than those of elites; and (b) elites and masses did not share ideological patterns of belief "any more than [they] share . . . abstract conceptual frames of reference (1964:230)." Converse found little consistency among domestic attitudes, less among foreign policy attitudes and little, if any, between the two domains.

On the domestic side especially, Almond's mood theory was strongly reinforced by a large body of opinion research. Prior to Converse, other writers (e.g., Campbell et al., 1964; McClosky, 1964) had found American attitudes non-ideological: people appeared far more likely to rely on cognitive references "close to home" than upon remote, generic, or abstract objects. They were unfamiliar with standard ideological terms like "conservative" and "liberal," and could not articulate the essential differences between the two main American political parties. Furthermore, people's preferences seemed to fluctuate aimlessly back and forth over time. When the same questions were posed to the same respondents in successive studies, their answers often differed, although in the aggregate, the pattern of opinion on any of the issues was unchanged.

A. Challenges to the Incoherence Thesis

However, the consensus that developed around this “innocence of ideology” thesis gave way to numerous critical reappraisals and much controversy. Some of these critiques were theoretical while others challenged research methodology. For instance, Nie, Verba, and Petrocik (1979:369) argued that the American voter had been greatly politicized by the events of the early 1960s, and so, by 1964, was far more likely to link seemingly disparate policy issues -- domestic and foreign. But Kinder and Sears (1985:666) pointed out that seemingly innocuous changes in the formats of the public policy questions employed in the 1956-1972 national surveys on which Nie et al. relied, led to erroneous conclusions: although American politics might have changed profoundly, the underlying structure of public opinion had not.

Others (e.g., Lipsitz, 1970) suggested that the fluctuation in opinion Converse attributed to public shallowness and reluctance to confess ignorance, really stemmed from unclear or inappropriate questions. Lipsitz (pp.166-169) makes several points about attempts to gauge the ideologies of poorer Americans, in particular. First, questions asked of them generally do not take into account their overriding interest in economic advancement. Survey style questions based on political issues of greater concern to elites are thus more likely to draw non-responses, giving the impression that the poor lack meaningful beliefs about politics. Secondly, many political grievances held by the poor may not have been shaped into issues by elites, and because the poor may lack a conception of how the political system works they may be unable to connect these “latent grievances” with particular institutions or actors (ibid., p.168). Thus, Lipsitz suggests

that

one way to restructure the concept of ideology is to see it as an expression of concern about the distribution of resources -- as the individual sees that distribution. We would expect constraint among those issues an individual perceives as immediately relevant to himself (ibid.).

As Kinder and Sears put it, ordinary Americans may not lack meaningful beliefs about politics and the apparent attitudinal instability Converse and others found "reflects vague questions, not vague citizens (Kinder and Sears, 1985:667)."

Despite these strong rebuttals, it is hard to disregard Converse entirely; indeed the value of his contribution to our understanding of this area cannot be overemphasized. Instability in political opinion is not just a manifestation of measurement problems. Public ignorance about politics, and about the plethora of highly complex U.S. foreign policy issues, is obviously significant. Nevertheless, Converse may have been applying an inappropriate standard by which to measure coherence. Generalized hierarchical belief systems are clearly inadequate for evaluating opinions across policy areas even within the same political domain (see Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987: 1100).

V. More Recent Research Focusing on Foreign Policy Attitudes

Much of the post-Almond and post-Converse research continued to concentrate on the nature, durability and compatibility of elite and mass belief systems. However, the search for coherence was extended to a variety of possible ideological dimensions specific to foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, a major reason was interest in the effects of the divisive Vietnam war.

The Verba team (1967) found opinion relating to the war “relatively orderly” and arranged in “patterns of consistency among the population” (1967:330). Many respondents appeared to derive their views from beliefs typically described as “hawkish” or “dovish.” Later analysts (e.g., Bardes and Oldendick, 1978; Wittkopf, 1981; Oldendick and Bardes, 1982) generally supported the Verba group’s insight that attitudes were more organized and durable than Converse thought.

But others (e.g., Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984) suspected changes in the way people thought about foreign affairs. By the end of the 1980s it had become clear that mass and elite foreign policy beliefs might sometimes be differently structured and multidimensional. According to Chittick (1990), elite belief structure appeared to remain unchanged from 1974 through 1986: mass structure appeared to change in a cyclical four-year pattern and only intermittently to resemble elite structure (pp. 396-397). Yet although these researchers were able to identify structural changes, they collectively could not confirm the hypothesis that Vietnam caused a permanent fracture in foreign policy public consensus.

Nevertheless, important progress was made when the research began to demonstrate that foreign policy thinking might be multi-dimensional and more related to specific foreign policy criteria. Oldendick and Bardes (1982), for instance, posited six factors as structuring public foreign policy beliefs in 1974 and 1978: internationalism-isolationism, militarism, attitudes to military spending, ethnocentrism, detente, and attitudes relating to human rights.

Oddly, they did not explicitly consider race as a possible influence. White racism,

for example, was not considered a potential social source of ethnocentric, militarist, or human rights attitudes though writers such as Hunt (1987) have argued that racism historically undergirded U.S. foreign policy. Nor were civil rights, black nationalism, Pan-Africanism or other race-based perspectives considered, even though these were as much a part of the American political fabric.

A. The Interventionism Dimension

Much of the post-Vietnam research concentrated on the internationalism-isolationism dimension because of the sharper politicization of military intervention following that conflict. Regardless of their own perspectives of the public's role in foreign policy, policy makers were very interested in the public mood toward involvement in the affairs of other countries. Again, much of the research contrasted general public interventionism, with interventionism amongst opinion leaders.

Interventionism: Public and Elite Preferences

It is widely acknowledged that, since 1945, large majorities in the general public consistently expressed preference for active involvement rather than isolation [see Appendix II (a)], though this enthusiasm has waned steadily over the years.

However, American internationalism has become increasingly complicated. Rielly (1987) observes that even as public enthusiasm wanes, Americans have been more interested in news about other countries and news about foreign policy since 1980, while interest in local and national news has remained at old levels. Furthermore, elite and mass publics often held different international priorities.

Both valued U.S. economic self-interest highly, but since the 1970s, the public has

emphasized protectionist and Cold War goals while leaders ranked globalist and altruistic concerns much higher. Selected survey data (1974-1990) gathered by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations illustrates this [Appendix II (b)].

In both groups, perceptions of the Cold War threat began to diminish in the 1980s and were replaced by fears of economic defeat by Japan and Western Europe as the decade wore on. However, foreign policy solutions like protectionism seemed more appealing to the mass public than to leaders after 1970. Though leaders saw Japan as a “critical threat” they rejected protectionism by consistently large margins (ibid., p.60). And while public support for protecting the interests of American business abroad steadily increased since 1974 to a high of 63 percent in 1990, it was a low elite priority, with declining support [see Appendix II (b)]. Over the same period, economic aid to developing countries was less popular than domestic welfare spending (ibid., p.55), particularly among the mass public.

These findings show that one of the biggest paradoxes of contemporary U.S. economic internationalism is that it runs counter to general public preferences.

B. The Use of American Troops

Another seeming paradox in American internationalism relates to the use of troops abroad. Large majorities in the public have always told researchers that only imminent military threats to American soil justified use of the military. For instance, in response to the *CBS News/New York Times* poll question in February 1979: “*Aside from an attack on the United States, is there any other situation when you might approve sending American troops to fight overseas?*” Sixty-nine percent of those expressing an

opinion said they could not think of another situation.

But when asked specific questions about hypothetical military attacks on particular states, public responses have tended to be more varied. Scenarios involving states that were close friends or allies of the U.S. generally always drew interventionist responses. Throughout the Cold War the public generally accepted the proposition that the United States must be prepared to send troops to defend its ideological allies in Western Europe against Soviet invasion (see Benson, 1982: 595; *Americans Talk Security*, 1989: 28). However, some allies appeared to be more favored than others: majorities would not send troops to defend Asian or Third World allies (Ibid.; see also Kelleher, 1994: 27).

C. The Effect of Vietnam on Attitudes Toward Intervention

Schneider explains that since the Vietnam War, the American public has been less supportive of internationalism as policy, than as principle. Failure in Vietnam and diminished confidence in domestic policy making institutions convinced a large segment of the public that military intervention demanded skepticism and scrutiny, rather than the unquestioning support or disinterest of previous decades.

What was the significance of Vietnam? By several accounts, Vietnam was a watershed because it severely eroded the consensus over the use of force within the foreign policy elite (see Holsti and Rosenau, 1984; Rielly, 1987; Yankelovich and Smoke, 1988). Though still largely internationalist, elites appeared to divide over the mode that intervention should take.

In a review of recent studies and through his own analysis of Chicago Council of

Foreign Relations elite and mass surveys, Wittkopf (1994) concluded that since Vietnam, elite opinion located on two internationalism dimensions: militant internationalism (MI) and cooperative internationalism (CI). And within these dimensions people clustered around four belief systems: “*internationalists* (those who support both forms of internationalism), *isolationists* (those who oppose any form of involvement abroad), *accommodationists* (those who support cooperative internationalism but oppose militant internationalism), and *hard-liners* (those who support militant internationalism but oppose cooperative internationalism (Wittkopf, 1994:379).”

Schneider suggests that by the time of the Persian Gulf intervention in 1990-1991 the consensus on force split roughly along political party lines: Democrats had become the “party of peace” and the Republicans the “party of strength (p.36).” Congressional voting patterns on resolutions pertaining to this war seemed to reinforce this interpretation, though pure partisanship probably was a major factor as well. In Wittkopf’s terms, Democrats appeared accommodationist (urging restraint, more diplomacy and economic sanctions) and Republicans more hard-line.

Multilateralism

Despite this heightened skepticism about intervention, there seems to be no public desire for a return to isolationism. In an analysis of a variety of recent poll data, Steven Kull (1995) showed that Americans continued to favor significant levels of involvement and foreign aid once other countries did their fair share. Also, there appeared to be a preference for American involvement in cooperative, multilateral efforts rather than the hegemonic leadership of the Cold War era. As Kull (1995) put it:

Rather than a reversion to the isolationism of the interwar years, a majority of Americans would like to see a revival of the postwar universalist vision that prompted the U.N. Charter, a vision of a cooperative world order that would address problems of security collectively, uphold humanitarian principles, and promote global economic development. They would like to see a more robust United Nations become the primary medium for the use of U.S. military power. Provided others are carrying their fair share, Americans are ready to support active U.S. participation in such a system, including committing significant resources to U.N. peacekeeping and Third World development (p. 103).

However, Jeremy Rosner (1995: 116) argued that foreign policy consensus is largely a political manufacture to serve the narrow interests of those seeking power. Although the “facts on the ground” indicate that the American public continues to be broadly internationalist, isolationist opinion leaders are able to dominate the discourse and define the options.

Elites and Intervention

Needless to say, these indications of decades of popular reluctance to use force have not been matched by a steady decline in the actual number of military interventions since 1945. As Benson noted, anti-interventionist sentiment, although quite pervasive, has not prevented intervention because this posture is not evenly distributed among demographic groups within the public. Rather, “the lower the socioeconomic status of the respondent (best determined by income, education and occupation) the less likely that person is to favor the use of American troops abroad . . . (Benson, p.594).” This lower status majority traditionally has had far less influence over foreign policy than the minority of higher-income, well-educated, white, male professionals who tend to constitute the foreign policy establishment.

Higher status Americans share a more sophisticated view of vital interests and thus are more likely both to favor intervention, and have greater certainty about their preferences. Therefore in any given foreign policy crisis decision-making environment, intervention is always much more likely than broad opinion patterns might suggest. Wittkopf considers the mass public to be fairly evenly distributed among his four dimensions, but believes that elites are disproportionately internationalists or accommodationists, with a smaller proportion of hardliners or isolationists (Wittkopf, 1994:379-381).

D. A More Pragmatic Foreign Policy Public?

In the immediate aftermath of the World War II Americans paid little attention to foreign affairs, yet they wanted their country to be involved globally. Once mobilized by political leaders -- who often framed the issues in moralistic terms -- they were broadly supportive of decisive action to "get the job done," using military force if necessary. As the decades passed and the principal threat to U.S. security receded, fewer and fewer people opted for military internationalism and more for cooperative participation in international regimes of various kinds.

By the decade of the 1990s, Americans had become much more aware of, and engaged in, global issues. They were more pragmatic in foreign policy outlook, and cooperation had become much more of a legitimate guiding principle -- even for military intervention. Catherine Kelleher states that:

Americans are clear . . . about the general strategy they believe the president and the nation should pursue in international military involvement. The use of military force is to be an exception in U.S. foreign policy. The approach is

usually to be multilateral and cooperative, with support and contributions of allies and other countries. The costs and risks involved in any overseas military option should be explained, and there can no longer be blanket approval for military preparation against a range of unlikely threats. Many view the loss of American life, even when counted in the tens and not the hundreds, as intolerable, but most also recognize there are international commitments and national interests beyond simple self-defense for which the risk of war is justifiable (p.29).

These general observations might be plausible, but scrutiny finds wide differences of opinion over “international commitments” and “national interests” within the public. From a group perspective, preferences often appear quite uneven. Higher status Americans often perceive a greater need for U.S. intervention than lower status Americans: women and blacks frequently seem less likely to favor such involvement, especially when it involves using military force.

VI. Relevant Aspects of the Literature on Domestic Political Attitudes

The proposition that African Americans might be less likely to favor military intervention is made more interesting by arguments that racial group identity is a major predictor of political preferences within this group (see Dawson, 1986; Allen et al., 1989; Gurin and Hatchett, 1989; Bobo and Gilliam, 1990). This fits a broader assertion that the sources of political belief might be pluralistic.

Kinder and Sears (1985: 682) suggest that Americans develop allegiances to race, class, party and other social groups, and their “political beliefs are, in the first place, badges of social membership.” Other influences such as self-interest, leadership, values, personality and history, interact with group membership in degrees that vary with issue relevance. In many instances these influences are so strong and meaningful to an

individual that group membership is better described as group identification.

There is a sharp distinction between the two: identification involves much more than membership. As Tajfel (1982:2) states,

in order to achieve the stage of 'identification,' two components are necessary, and [another] one is frequently associated with them. The two necessary components are: a cognitive one, in the sense of awareness of membership, and an evaluative one, in the sense that this awareness is related to some value connotation. The third component consists of an emotional investment in the awareness and evaluations.

In other words the member cares about the condition of the group. The interest is not merely cognitive, but also emotional. Politically, people identify strongly with groups like race and gender because powerful social constructions attached to external physical characteristics and biology, have direct bearing on their life chances.

For blacks, racial identification begins at an early age. It is one of the earliest conceptual systems to develop in an African American child's understanding of society (as any black parent soon discovers). It becomes a basic part of personal identity, and a basic schema through which perceptions of self and others are filtered. In their discussion of the group consciousness and identification literature relating to gender, Sigel and Casey (1991: 3) make this point, and stress that "gender forms part of our personal identity independent of whether or not we also identify with our gender group."

This may hold true for race as well. As with women, black self-concept is reinforced by social stereotypes and impersonal, categorical treatment. Lau (1983: 12) states that "the more strongly other people treat one as part of a group, the more strongly will that group become part of one's social identity." And, the perception of

discrimination or disadvantage -- a particularly persistent feature of African American opinion -- heightens the salience of the group in the minds of its members. Black Americans all know that their racial identity is an important aspect of their lives in America, but their tendency to see themselves as part of a group varies with the degree of focus placed on the group by particular issues and events.

A. African American Political Consciousness

Of course, group identification does not automatically equate to group political consciousness, or shared political outlook. Gurin, Miller, and Gurin (1980:30) offer this distinction: "Identification refers to the awareness of having ideas, feelings, and interests similar to those who share the same stratum characteristics. Consciousness refers to a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of this awareness of similarity." Whether or not American blacks have developed a sense of group consciousness toward foreign policy is, of course, a basic underlying issue here.

Several scholars (e.g., Bracey et. al., 1970; Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson, 1989; Dawson, 1995) have argued that group consciousness among blacks has long been evident in the domestic politics domain. For instance, in contrast to Converse and Almond, Dawson (1995) identifies three major historical tendencies in black political thought: black feminism, black nationalism and black conservatism. These (and other) ideologies "have contested for dominance within the black community throughout black history (p.8-9)." Dawson offers a definition of ideology more suited to the experiential model of public opinion recommended here.

Ideology is . . . a world view readily found in the population, including sets of

ideas and values that cohere, that are used to justify political stances, and that shape and are shaped by society. Further, political ideology helps to define who are one's friends and enemies, with whom one should form political coalitions, and furthermore, contains a causal narrative of society and state (p.4).

Cognitively, ideology serves as filters of what one "sees" and responds to in the social world.

Because blacks share a communal approach to politics, Dawson asserts, these ideologies shape their view of the social world as well as their political behavior (ibid., p.8). It might be noted here that this scholarly consensus on black group consciousness regarding where the group stands in this society, contrasts sharply with the continual debate at the policy making level over the relevance of race to personal achievement and socioeconomic status.¹

Verba and Orren (1985) in their study of the political and economic interpretations of equality in America show that blacks, among other groups, hold distinctive notions and positions on equality. And, another important finding has been that "substantial [racial] differences emerge . . . on questions that, although manifestly unrelated to race, nevertheless evoke the recent political experience of black Americans (Kinder and Sears, 1985: 673)."

The domestic opinion literature suggests that very often, even though the political attitudes of black and white Americans generally follow the same direction, they often

¹ Scholars may agree that on several levels there may be a strong sense of a "shared fate" among blacks. However, they disagree over strategies for group advancement. Essentially the division is among those who see institutionalized and structural barriers as continuing problems and thus call for more comprehensive community-building approaches, those stressing "black nationalist" and "economic self-help" approaches, and others recommending universalistic rather than racially-targeted government interventions. The latter school received a huge boost from William Julius Wilson's influential "declining significance of race," "underclass" and "economic polarization" theses (Wilson, 1978; 1987).

differ noticeably in intensity (Page and Shapiro, 1992; Niemi, Mueller, and Smith, 1989). Thus, the domestic research consistently treats race as an independent variable. Insofar as there is a relationship between domestic and foreign policy, and given the centrality of race to politics in the United States, it appears that we cannot identify foreign policy ideologies by “assuming away” race-driven differences in cognition of both this society and the rest of the world.

B. Social Cognition

This is not to suggest that we may not take the general mechanics of social cognition for granted; there are no indications of significant racial differences in the information processing literature. In a review of this area, Fiske and Taylor (1984) posit that all humans behave like “cognitive misers” when trying to make sense of complex new issues. In other words, they use what they already know as deciphering tools. The difficulty lies in identifying what people know about specific issues, what additional, relevant perceptions they bring to bear as they form opinions, and exactly how they apply these stored beliefs to new data. Thus, accurate description of the cognitive process is a more useful exercise than speculation about inherent racial differences in cognition.

A Schema-Based Approach to Racial Foreign Policy Ideology?

Along with more focus on social groups, opinion analysts may also benefit from giving more attention to the information processing literature, particularly the work on schemata (see review in Hurwitz and Peffley, p. 1100). Larson (1994) suggests approaching the problem of structure at a higher level of analysis: one that incorporates the belief-system model into a superordinate construct of the formulation of people’s

general knowledge of concepts and situations. This conceptualization of attitude formation, termed “schema” by social and cognitive psychologists, offers several advantages for researching a diverse, non-ideological (in the Almond and Converse sense) population.

Larson’s definition of schema is “a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes . . . (Larson, 1994:18).” What this means is that a particular belief system may be one of numerous attributes embedded within a particular schema. Although schema are structured hierarchically -- from the general to the specific -- like belief systems, the elaborateness and complexity of the structure varies with the expertise of the individual. For instance, an opinion of Cuba may derive from schema related to Cuban immigrants that we might happen to know, without necessarily being embedded in beliefs about the relative merits of communism and liberal capitalist democracy. Connection to a central belief is not the measure of coherence. “Just because a person does not organize knowledge along an ideological dimension does not mean that he is unable to grasp political information in any terms other than the most concrete and proximate (ibid., p.20).”

Structural flexibility is one advantage of the schema concept; another is its generality. It recognizes that people frequently analyze new data in terms of examples drawn from their own experience. This seems to apply even to knowledgeable foreign policy experts. Over the past fifty years we have often heard questionable invocations of the “lessons of Munich,” the “domino theory” and the “lessons of Vietnam” from leading

statesmen and historians. But debate over the accuracy of these diagnoses misses the larger point that individuals “include specific instances, exemplars, and analogies as well as the more abstract knowledge found in belief systems (ibid., p.20)” in their cognitive structures.

A third advantage is the recognition that ideological schema may differ in content and organization from person to person according to background, education, and expertise. “Liberal” and “conservative” schema may include more than issue positions, but also personal impressions of how people that embrace these ideologies conduct themselves (see Larson, p.21).

Finally, Larson elaborates on the theory of cognitive efficiency as a natural human tendency in processing new information. This efficiency originates in “inherent human cognitive limitations (ibid., p.22.)” Our capacity for holding information in short-term memory is very limited, compared to long-term memory capacity. This means that we draw heavily on preexisting knowledge and concepts when confronted with complicated new facts. Only the essential elements of past experiences are stored, and such schema are used to “reconstruct” what is currently perceived. Some of these stored schema function as templates; others furnish linkages that allow us to go beyond the information given.

In summary, aside from a few exceptions (e.g., Axelrod, 1973; Jervis, 1976; Hirshberg, 1993; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987) the study of foreign policy attitudes has not been conducted at an appropriate cognitive level of analysis. It has not been rooted in a theory of memory comprehensive enough to recognize conceptual coherence despite

individual differences in comprehension of new information. Since it is part of a general theory of memory, schema theory offers many possible explanations of how groups, such as African Americans, might conceivably register “anomalous” foreign policy opinions in some areas on a regular basis. It offers a theory of how it might be possible to apply structured thinking and yet come to conclusions that many see as unwarranted by the contemporaneous data. Schema theory represents a more inclusive theoretical framework because, unlike the belief-system approach, it recognizes the cognitive significance of specific examples, analogies, and past and present real-life experiences. It is better suited to a society where it is highly likely that various groups have profoundly different backgrounds, and in many respects, profoundly different contemporary social experiences. Recognition that new information is evaluated by schema that include both cognitive templates (belief systems) and linkages (experiences, analogies, memberships, etc.) in a retrieval process that seeks the most economical route, and that allows us to “go beyond the facts,” allows us to develop a structural framework to accommodate African American foreign policy views. As Lipsitz noted, people might not consistently apply sophisticated political concepts to all their evaluative processes -- and in this narrow sense display ideological innocence -- but they seem to apply consistent standards to issues of personal significance and high relevance to their group or immediate community. Clearly then, in the search for coherence, structure must take issue and group salience, and the complexities of people’s lives into account.

African American Schema

In structural terms, an appropriate opinion model might include an African

American racial belief system that resides either as a cognitive template or linkage in the long term memory banks of black Americans. Central to this schema would be conceptions of the deepest and most permanent concerns of African Americans -- most likely equality, overcoming discrimination, and economic opportunity.

Also, the model must include a "what America means to me," or patriotism schema. African Americans attempt to make sense of complicated foreign policy events like all other average Americans: they rely on cognitive simplification strategies that include not just images of other countries, but of their own as well. Both images are likely determined by some assessment of the legitimacy of American society, as well as other factors.

African American cognition in this domain is as "top-down," or "theory-driven," as it is for any other group or individual. Like others, African Americans reevaluate their preconceptions when new information challenges them. Larson cites recent research (op. cit., p.25) indicating that clearly contrary evidence has a stronger impact on judgment than the perceiver's cognitive structures. She writes:

Schema research suggests that people will *not* interpret information so that it supports their schema when the evidence contradicting the schema is unambiguous and obviously relevant (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) . . . The strongest schema cannot stand up to unambiguously incongruent information or a competing schema which fits the data better (Markus & Zajonc, 1985).

However, my view is that when it comes to foreign or domestic political matters with racial significance, it takes a great deal to challenge black beliefs. The well-known persistence of myriad racial "conspiracy theories" among blacks suggests that it is hard

for this group to “see” evidence that irrefutably contradicts their political schema. Just as foreign policy-makers often see what really are genuine cooperative overtures by adversaries as tricks, African Americans remain understandably skeptical as they assess motives behind seemingly benign or “inevitable” U.S. actions, particularly when they involve weaker, nonwhite states.

Thus, any serious effort to understand the African American foreign policy “mentality” must be historically based. African Americans are not like all other Americans: in many important respects they have had a totally different historical relationship, both with this society and the international system. The following chapters attempt to characterize this unique historical experience.

Chapter Three: RELUCTANT INTERNATIONALISM: African Americans and Foreign Affairs from the 1890s to World War II.

I. Introduction

Historically, how interested were African Americans in foreign affairs? How did they respond to the major American military involvements of this century, and to the shift in emphases of U.S. foreign policy from Europe to the Third World in the 1960s? Did identification with black Africa dominate their foreign policy outlook? And, were there noticeable changes in the intensity or direction of black foreign policy involvement or preferences as the civil rights movement peaked in the late 1960s?

Relying primarily on historical sources to respond to these questions, the following two chapters argue that the unique African American experience encouraged a reluctant internationalism, which progressively grew through the century. This posture was especially apparent for military intervention, the stated goals of which (democracy, freedom, justice) always contrasted sharply with their everyday experience as Americans. On the other hand, blacks were less reluctant to intervene cooperatively in Africa and the Third World. My suspicion is that black cooperative impulses were shaped by feelings of political solidarity and empathy with the poor and oppressed in those regions, and not by racial affinity in the simplest sense. However, it may be impossible to disentangle those factors since race has long been intrinsic to the international distribution of wealth and power.

Accounts of two social movements and five international developments that were foci of African American attention in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are reviewed

to outline the main currents in African American foreign policy interest. After briefly addressing the question of African American knowledge of and interest in international affairs, this chapter covers the emigrationist “back-to-Africa” movement, and reactions to the two world wars and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in the interwar period. Chapter Four addresses the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, the anti-apartheid movement, and early black attitudes toward foreign aid, immigration and the United Nations. Before these events are discussed, the foreign policy context in which each was embedded is outlined briefly.

Reliance on historical accounts prevents detailed characterization of the African American community’s attitudes. And, the lack of detailed early survey data makes it impossible to describe with confidence patterns associated with education, socioeconomic status, age, political partisanship, and views on domestic matters. Nevertheless, these chapters contribute to the very sparse literature in this area. They provide both an overview of the pre-Vietnam African American relationship with international affairs and a basis for interpreting the internal distributions of the black community’s foreign policy attitudes in the 1980s and 1990s.

A. Black Foreign Policy Knowledge and Attentiveness before Vietnam

Sparse data from the late nineteenth to early twentieth centuries allows for little more than speculation about relative racial interest in the international issues of that period. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine that the average African American would have possessed the general knowledge of and interest in world affairs of the average white citizen at that time. Simple survival and the effort to secure basic rights and

opportunities must have made interest in world affairs a luxury few blacks could afford. And for most of those interested, centuries of relative educational deprivation would have limited their ability to access and comprehend such information. Also, aware of the possible adverse domestic repercussions of taking controversial foreign policy stances, African Americans themselves probably shied away from expressing opinions on European intrigues to white interviewers prior to the 1960s (see Hero, p.2210).

Furthermore, Europe tended to be the focus of U.S. foreign policy attention until a well into this century, so blacks very likely viewed international politics as “the white man’s business” -- as reminded by Woodrow Wilson during World War I (Mullen, 1973:46). This raises a legitimate contextual question: historically, how attentive and interested have African Americans been to U.S. military interventions and foreign assistance policies of various kinds? Also, how was attentiveness distributed socially within this community?

B. Characteristics of African American Foreign Policy Attentiveness

The evidence suggests that ordinary African Americans were not very knowledgeable or opinionated about foreign affairs prior to the 1960s. In his 1937-1967 opinion data Hero not only found “. . . Negroes . . . considerably less well informed about, less interested in, less apt to ascribe importance to, and less inclined to hold opinions on most international issues than whites (p.222),” they were not even as familiar with black Africa as were whites. “In 1957, for instance, only 1 percent of Negroes, contrasted with 6 percent of whites, could name as many as five countries, colonies, or other territories on the African continent; seventy percent of Negroes, compared with only 55 percent of

whites. could not name any at all (Hero. p. 223).”

Less than a majority of black voters had heard of the proposed Marshall Plan in 1947, and black unawareness of its objectives lagged behind whites’ through the 1950s. Similarly, African Americans knew less about “the U.N. in 1947, the financial difficulties of Britain in 1949 . . . the tensions over Quemoy and Matsu in 1955. the French elections in 1956 . . . and so forth (ibid.).”

Hero attributed much of the disparity to the relatively low average education of blacks and to disproportionate numbers of least-informed Southern blacks, and noted that the racial gap in awareness narrowed as black educational levels gradually approached those of whites. Nevertheless, “. . . Negroes still clearly lagged behind whites by considerable margins in [levels of knowledge and awareness] by the mid-1960s (p.222),” and this held true for all major geographical regions and for most aspects of foreign affairs. Undoubtedly, greater educational opportunity and rural-urban migration since then, reduced racial disparities in unawareness. Nevertheless, proof of its persistence (and relationship to many other socioeconomic variables) is seen in continuing racial disparities in “don’t know” responses to survey questions well into the present.

To cite just one recent example, issues relating to UNESCO were very topical in 1984 but African Americans seemed much less aware of them than whites. In the previous December the U.S. announced its decision to resign from the organization unless it implemented administrative, structural and political reforms. Great Britain also threatened to “review” its own membership if such changes were not made. President Reagan even escalated his customary anti-U.N. rhetoric to threaten eviction of the U.N.’s

headquarters from the United States. Despite all this publicity, 80 percent of blacks told Gallup in an August 1984 poll that they had not even heard about this U.N. agency, compared with 62 percent of whites (*Gallup Poll Monthly*, August 1984).

However, two historical aspects of the black community's foreign policy awareness are critical. Firstly, black opinion leaders in the church, press and other civic organizations were highly attuned to international affairs. Secondly, although generally unconnected, blacks demonstrated intense interest and engagement in international issues and developments that held particular racial appeal.

Issue Attentiveness

South African apartheid, for instance, was one issue that saw a reversal of historical trends in racial awareness: here the awareness gap has generally avored blacks. A Gallup poll on events in South Africa taken in August 1985 found 70 percent of blacks reporting "fairly close" concern, compared to 62 percent of whites (*Gallup Monthly Report*, August 1985).

Accounts of black community reactions to major events involving Africa earlier in the century also suggest more intense black, than white, mass interest (Emerson and Kilson, 1966; Dorn and Carrington, 1991; Harris, 1994). These include events such as Marcus Garvey's "back-to-Africa" organizing after World War I, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and the attainment of independence of several African states after World War II. The two world wars themselves seemed at least equally salient to both racial groups.

One contextual aspect common to these events may be crucial to the general

assessment of black foreign policy attentiveness: they were particularly salient to African Americans because they coincided with periods of heightened domestic black despair. The first two decades of the twentieth century were particularly difficult for black Americans. Organized white violence was at its height and there were anti-black riots in many northern and southern cities. Public and private national institutions did little to prevent waves of lynchings. Returning black servicemen faced great danger in the summer of 1919 as whites sought to dispel any notions of equality they might have acquired serving in Europe. The economic setbacks of the 1930s fell heavily on the black community, and the World War II period saw a repeat of the organized violence against black servicemen, businesses, and churches. In this context of domestic persecution and hopelessness, blacks may have been more willing to pay close attention to international developments that rekindled hopes for the empowerment of the race, or that threatened this prospect.

Racial attentiveness, therefore, is a slippery issue not readily susceptible to measurement. Also, as discussed earlier, the main premise behind its relevance -- that factual knowledge of foreign issues is a prerequisite for "rational" assessment of the national interest -- is open to question. The monopoly on factual information held by decision makers does not necessarily lead to better foreign policy prescriptions than those preferred by the "inattentive" public.

Findings of racial disparities in factual knowledge by public opinion polls, then, must be interpreted with caution on two counts: they may not reflect broader conclusions about an issue area, and they cannot give much insight into context. On the whole, when

the context involves issues of race and racial justice, the poll data suggest high attentiveness across communities. As Kinder and Sanders (1996) note:

...when policies become entangled with race, nonattitudes tend to disappear, replaced by the real thing. Compared with opinion on other matters, opinions on race are more coherent, more tenaciously held, and more difficult to alter (p. 14).

The areas of foreign policy addressed here -- military force, immigration, and foreign aid -- have always held racial connotations in the minds of African Americans. There is little reason to believe that racial disparities in knowledge and attentiveness are sufficiently profound to invalidate attitudinal comparison on such matters. Indeed, the survey data assessed in later chapters generally finds blacks to be no more likely than whites to give "don't know" responses to questions about military force, or foreign aid.

II. The "Back-to-Africa" Movement: Emigrationism in the 19th Century

Given the manifestations of strong "natural" affinity for ancestral homelands among other ethnic and national groups in America, black American identification with Africa (and perhaps the Third World) on some very basic, psychological level would be a reasonable assumption. Some groups (e.g., Jews, Irish) have, for many years, been vigorous and effective advocates (or critics) of particular U.S. policies toward their countries of origin. Referring to ethnic European Americans and Jews more than thirty years ago, Almond (1960:191) observed that the high priority "hyphenated Americans" placed on the national affairs of their own countries ". . . is a constant source of difficulty within the foreign policy consensus."

We know that blacks lacked the political capacity, historically, to have a similar impact. Prior to emancipation, there were only 488,000 free blacks in the United States, with 46 percent living in the North, 44 percent in the South Atlantic states, and the remainder in the South Central states and the West. Free blacks tended to be urban, with the biggest concentrations living in northeastern cities like Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York (Franklin, p.217).

Regardless of where they lived, these “quasi-free Negroes (ibid., p.214)” were generally indistinguishable from slaves insofar as civil rights were concerned. However, free blacks in the North had better opportunities for business, education and professional development -- particularly within the church -- than in the South. For instance, New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and other northeastern states permitted elementary and higher education of free blacks well before emancipation. Thus, despite the persistence of slavery for much of the nineteenth century, a small, educated, black middle-class developed in the North, and was a source of early black political leadership.

Most of these leaders were based in black churches, and a very influential handful vigorously encouraged linkages with Africa toward the end of the nineteenth century. Before exploring these efforts and their motivations, it is important to understand the larger context of U.S. foreign policy during that period.

A. U.S. Foreign Policy Context Before 1917: Isolationism and Selective Imperialism

Ostensibly, Americans had little to do with international affairs during the nineteenth century. There was particular wariness of European “entanglements” since

George Washington's famous cautionary comments on foreign policy in his 1796 Farewell Address. Indeed, except for the brief Spanish-American War -- which did not really involve Europe, but Asia and the Americas -- Washington's admonition seemingly held sway until World War I in 1917 and the structuring of the peace that followed. It is generally held that after the Versailles conference the U.S. essentially reverted to isolationism until the eve of World War II. Proponents of this argument for the nineteenth century point to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823. While warning European powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere, President Monroe reiterated that "our policy in regard to Europe . . . is not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers (Rieselbach, 1966:10)."

The Civil War reinforced this prescription. The Union exerted every effort to deny the Confederacy any alliances or recognition by European powers, often reminding the latter that American abstention from the affairs of the Old World under Monroe Doctrine required that they stay out of the politics of the New. (Rieselbach [p.10] argues that it was the weakness of the southern position, and not acceptance of the northern argument, that really kept Europe away). For whatever reason, the Confederacy never received significant European assistance.

But though isolationist toward the European continent, there is much evidence that the United States was quite internationalist -- even imperialistic -- in the New World in the post-Civil War period. While Europe divided up Africa in the late eighteenth century, the U.S. purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867 and orchestrated the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands in 1898 for their strategic and economic value. In similar

fashion, the American Navy first secured a coaling station at Pago Pago in the Samoan Islands in 1872, then -- to the displeasure of several European powers -- confirmed the arrangement by treaty in 1878. Franklin (1967:415) writes that "after a decade of rivalry. Great Britain, Germany, and the United States agreed to divide the islands, [and] the United States got the favored island of Tutuila . . ." Furthermore, the U.S. acquired jurisdiction over many other small islands in the Pacific: Wake, Midway, Palmyra, and Howland. Franklin asserts that before the end of the century, the United States "was well on her way to the development of an empire of darker peoples -- Polynesian, Japanese, Chinese, and others (p.416)."

The Monroe Doctrine had been particularly effective in the Americas, where the U.S. conducted several imperialistic interventions before the end of the century. Intent on keeping Europe out of the region, America insisted of arbitrating boundary disputes between Argentina and Paraguay in 1876, and British Guiana and Venezuela in 1895. It also organized the first Pan-American Congress in 1889 with the aim of bringing the Americas together under U.S. leadership.

From 1868 onward, the United States permitted "unofficial" expeditions against the Spanish in Cuba in support of local insurgents fighting for independence from Spain. This culminated in the dispatch of the battleship *Maine* to Havana harbor in 1898 where it was blown up, triggering the Spanish-American War. [It should be mentioned that there were black volunteers amongst the U.S. troops in the Spanish-American interventions -- in fact, 22 went down with the *Maine*, four were injured in the blast, and four more escaped unharmed (Franklin, 1967: 418)]. In defeat, Spain relinquished all control over

Cuba, and ceded Puerto Rico and all other Spanish islands to the U.S. as well. The Philippines were also “sold” to the U.S. for \$20 million by Spain, giving the U.S. a prized foothold in Southeast Asia (ibid.).

A “Laissez-Faire” Approach to Africa

Furthermore, this nineteenth century “isolationism” certainly did not apply to economic intercourse. This period saw the peak of European colonial commerce and the U.S. was an active participant in and a beneficiary from these transactions. The U.S. tenaciously pursued a commercial foothold in West Africa from the 1840s, fearing exclusion by British and French traders. Foner (1983:170) notes that from the 1840s on “the American naval squadron in West Africa was instructed to promote American commercial interests.” Indeed, in explaining the reason for stationing the American warships there, Secretary of the Navy A. P. Upshur stated to Congress in 1842 that the curbing of the slave trade was a secondary objective, since “our commerce with that country . . . holds out at this time greater inducements to commercial enterprise than any other part of the world (Foner, p.170).”

From all appearances, Commodore Perry and other American naval commanders did little to arrest the slave trade, as African slavery played a direct and indirect role in U.S. business. Profits from slavery and the slave trade in the American South went directly to commercial ports and industrial areas on the northeastern seaboard - New England and New York. And, although the British slave trade had virtually ended by the early 1800s, and it had been outlawed in U.S. in 1807, W.E.B. Du Bois stated the following in a study of the American slave trade:

The number of persons engaged in the slave trade and the amount of capital embarked in it exceed our powers of calculation. The city of New York has been until of late (1862) the principal port of the world for this infamous commerce: although the cities of Portland and Boston are only second to her in that distribution (cited in Rodney, 1974:87).¹

Viewed from this perspective, though the U.S. scrupulously avoided confrontation with major European colonial powers in the nineteenth century, it was not genuinely isolationist, particularly regarding Africa which served a valuable economic purpose. Cheap labor was the engine of growth for most of this period, and that labor came - directly or indirectly - from Africa.² Insofar as the U.S. had a strategy for procuring that labor, it did have an Africa foreign policy. Furthermore, non-involvement in the “colonial game” was in itself a highly effective strategy for securing America’s overseas economic objectives at the time.

Thus, African American interest in Africa in the nineteenth century existed within a context of significant U.S. engagement with that region. Ordinary white Americans probably had little interest or awareness, but political and business leaders, keenly aware of the adverse strategic and economic implications of genuine isolation, were quite prepared to have the U.S. selectively play the big-power game abroad once domestic westward expansion and the Civil War were over. Contests with Europe over its colonial possessions in Africa and elsewhere were generally avoided, except where easy commercial advantage could be gained. But there was a *laissez-faire* foreign policy

¹ See Franklin (1967:171-184) for an economic analysis of the persistence of the African slave trade well into the 1860s.

² For instance, David Brion Davis (1984:236) notes that “...a significant number of Africans were re-exported from Cuba to the new Republic of Texas” after the proclamation of Texan independence from Mexico in 1836. Franklin (p.183) puts the figure at 15,000 annually.

climate that tolerated private ventures, especially with regard to Africa (as the ongoing “unofficial” slave trade demonstrated).

In this sense, the United States itself displayed an “affinity” for Africa that legitimized significant private organizing and activity, among them a variety of repatriation and emigration schemes, aimed at that continent. Both whites and blacks were involved in the latter.

B. The Emigrationist Effort

Emancipation and full citizenship seemed such remote possibilities to African Americans at the beginning of the nineteenth century that some in the free black community looked toward Africa for solutions. Ideas such as repatriation and black nationalism were promulgated by a handful of dynamic leaders who saw little future for the race in America. These ideas were highly controversial as many African Americans thought the greater duty to be the fight for the freedom right here in America. In sum, though by the end of the nineteenth century only a few blacks had actually resettled in West Africa, the idea of “Africa for the Africans” had become widely circulated among whites and blacks alike.

There are several areas of consensus in the literature on this early repatriation/emigration effort. The first is that it was not a mass movement. A small group of visionary black church leaders largely drove the initiative and never managed to galvanize the black masses in its support. As Phillip V. White (1981:43) states: although “black Americans have had an interest in foreign affairs [related to Africa] of a long duration, . . . it has been unevenly distributed socially and diachronically.”

Another accepted view is that white initiation of this scheme tainted it from the beginning in the eyes of most blacks. The repatriation program was launched by whites of the American Colonization Society (ACS), established around 1817 for the “voluntary” return of blacks to Africa. Inspired by the ferrying to Africa of 38 blacks by Paul Cuffee in 1815 at his own expense, the ACS planned to establish a black colony in Africa with federal and state funding, and to solicit public support for the project. Following the British model of Sierra Leone, they bought land (present-day Liberia) in West Africa and until 1832, enjoyed the support of more than a dozen state legislatures, even some in slave holding states like Maryland, Kentucky, and Virginia.³ Initially, only free blacks were encouraged to travel, but eventually some slave owners permitted manumission expressly for this purpose (Franklin, 1967).

There is general concurrence that Northern blacks (and some whites) perceived mass emigration to be a sinister government policy to eliminate its race problem through exile. Foner (1983:187) writes that “the emigrationist leaders failed to win widespread support because, in the main, black Americans continued to see emigration as a white plot to exile free blacks and further entrench slave power.” Franklin adds that even some white abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison, Arthur Tappan, Gerrit Smith and James G. Birney, “. . . once friends of colonization, turned upon the scheme (Franklin, p.239).”

Opposition was sometimes fierce in the North. While free blacks in the South

³ It is not clear whether or not the ACS and repatriation received direct federal funding and amounted to an explicit foreign policy. However it definitely had the sponsorship of national government figures such as John Marshall, James Madison, and Henry Clay, and commanded wide support in the North and South (see Alkenes, 1969:178).

tended to acquiesce to the idea of emigration, their northern counterparts vehemently rejected it. Three thousand Philadelphia blacks met in 1817 to oppose the scheme, branding it "an outrage, having no other object in view than the benefit of the slave holding interests of the country (Franklin, p.240)." And fistfights broke out at a 1860 meeting of 1,200 pro- and anti-colonization blacks in New York. Emigration advocate Henry Highland Garnet had called the meeting to promote his idea of establishing free-labor cotton plantations in West Africa, aimed at the British market, as a means of undermining Southern slave agriculture. Besides skepticism about the viability of this strategy, participants were angry that Garnet was receiving financial backing from whites associated with the discredited American Colonization Society (Foner, 1983).

There is disagreement, however, on the meaning of Africa to black Americans of that time. W.E.B. Du Bois suggested that there were strong feelings of kinship, as evidenced by the frequent explicit identification with Africa by black organizations since the late eighteenth century. For instance, Du Bois (1965:7) mentioned that the breakaway black congregation of the Methodist Church in 1793 reestablished itself as the "African" Methodist Episcopal (AME). He also noted that there were several "African" societies across the United States. On the other hand, C. Eric Lincoln writes that

the vast majority of Negroes, slave or free, did not wish to leave America. When emigration was made a condition of manumission, the typical slave accepted emigration against his preferences. By far, the prevailing sentiment was to remain in the country with which their lives and labor were inextricably identified, and to be *there* accepted as men.⁴

⁴ Lincoln, C. Eric (1965:9) "Color and Group Identity in the United States" (Paper presented at the Conference on Race and Color, Copenhagen, September), as cited in Essien-Udom, E.U. (1971).

In any event, repatriation and the ACS reached their zenith in the early 1830s, and altogether, about 12,000 free blacks migrated to West Africa. By the late 1800s, the Civil War, emancipation, and passage of the Fourteenth Amendment completely dampened interest in mass repatriation. America seemed prepared to grant full citizenship to former slaves eventually, so instead of mass relocation several black church leaders attempted to advance a missionary agenda in Africa.

Bishop Henry McNeal Turner of the AME Church instructed his congregations that slavery in America was part of a “providential design” to enable blacks to bring “the principles of civilization” back to Africa (Duignan and Gann, 1987:256). Due to exhortations like these, black missionaries from AME, Baptist, and other congregations eventually came to exert great influence in southern Africa. Not surprisingly, their activities were often viewed as politically subversive “because their presence provided examples of what black men were capable of achieving (Dorn and Carrington, 1991:9).”

Unlike most of their white counterparts, the black missionaries resisted the expanding European colonial presence and the increasing white domination of African societies. The AMEs were blamed for the 1906 revolt in Durban, South Africa, during which Africans shouted the slogan that Bishop McNeal Henry had made his anthem when in South Africa: “Africa for the Africans.” In 1915, black missionaries were accused by the British Colonial Office of being involved in the armed revolt of John Chilembe and his followers in Nyasaland (ibid.).

More significantly, these churches facilitated the training of thousands of black Africans at black colleges in the United States. Many future leaders of independent African states were trained at these institutions. For example, Kwame Nkrumah attended Lincoln University in Pennsylvania. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Nigeria’s first president also

attended. Hastings Banda went to medical school at Meharry, and later took Nyasaland to independence as Malawi (*ibid.*).

Some black leadership in the late nineteenth century was ambivalent about where efforts to improve their communities' fortunes should be concentrated. Some, like Martin R. Delany and Henry Highland Garnet, were fervent advocates of emigration as a useful political tactic in the face of unabated oppression throughout the century. Misguided or not, these emigrationists presented a coherent Africa foreign policy for black America, commonly referred to as the "three C's": commerce, Christianity and civilization (Foner, 1983:171). Briefly, these were, first, a conviction that cotton production in West Africa by transplanted free black labor could be marketed to Britain, undermining slave-labor cotton -- and the entire economic basis of slavery -- in the American South. Secondly, emigrationists considered the spread of "the Gospel and Christian civilization to the Fatherland . . . and the consequent overthrow of idolatry and superstition," as Garnet put it, a duty and a privilege (Foner, p.171). They thought themselves uniquely qualified by virtue of race to do this necessary work, which one black scholar described as "Manifest Destiny with a conscience (*ibid.*, p.172)."

Emigrationists argued that the establishment of successful black communities in Africa (or Haiti) would strengthen the struggle for full freedom and equality by blacks in the United States. On the other hand they never seriously planned for a mass departure due to reservations about leaving behind those trapped in slavery, primarily in the South. Furthermore, they felt that mass emigration would place an intolerable strain on the new colony.

There were other prescriptions for black advancement. Some leaders felt that the American West offered more realistic “emigration” possibilities. Booker T. Washington, the influential president of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama, emphasized acquisition of the vocational skills freed slaves needed to compete effectively with whites. He also favored quiet tolerance of the indignities and atrocities of Reconstruction, rather than resettlement in Africa (Bennett, 1966). Ironically, this approach -- criticized as accommodation (and worse) by many -- appealed strongly to African educators, many of whom sought Washington’s counsel.

Paradoxically, Washington himself became heavily involved in Africa in the 1890s. Congress sent a leading black historian (and first black member of the Ohio legislature), George Washington Williams, to the Congo in 1890 to investigate charges of Belgian brutality. His shocking findings motivated Booker T. Washington to become involved in a movement to stir up American public opinion against Belgian repression, and he eventually became vice president of the Congo Reform Association (Dorn and Carrington, p.10).

In sum, nineteenth century proponents of black repatriation or emigration to Africa always faced an uphill struggle. Aside from the cost and staggering logistics of such projects in the nineteenth century, the motives of the “emigrationists” were always deeply suspect to a majority of blacks. The Africa emigration movement could never rid itself of the stigma of white initiation and funding, causing prominent black leaders to oppose vociferously what seemed to be a master plan to rid America of its “black problem,” instead of elevating blacks to the status of whites. Undoubtedly, black

emigrationists like Martin R. Delany, Henry Highland Garnet, and Alexander Crummell considered emigration a “foreign policy” solution that would benefit both African Americans and West Africans. They offered several economic, moral and religious justifications, but their numerous critics in the black intellectual community rejected them all.

Ordinary blacks rejected them too. No doubt they felt a kinship with Africa, but the United States was the only home most had known. Emancipation and equality in the United States were their highest priorities, and they refused to dilute them with other dubious goals. Also, it is very likely that nineteenth century African Americans had themselves internalized white characterizations of Africa as primitive, uncivilized, and backward (Emerson and Kilson, 1966: 632) to a degree that made the prospect of return less attractive.

Nevertheless, early emigrationism suggests that many African Americans were interested in issues other than their immediate domestic problems. True, many of these early nationalist stirrings were motivated by deep desire to escape domestic burdens, but the missionary and educational initiatives later in the century were not narrowly self-interested. Also, we see indications here that afrocentrism was strongly associated with status in the black community. Educated leadership figures, mainly in the black church, dominated and drove these early repatriation and linkage efforts despite overwhelming odds.

III. African American Foreign Policy Preferences Early in the 20th Century

A. The Foreign Policy Context

With the exception of its direct participation in World War I, the United States essentially maintained its nineteenth century foreign policy posture toward Europe during the first four decades of the twentieth century. Its refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles reflected the attitude of the foreign policy establishment in this regard. But again, it would be erroneous to describe the U.S. as isolationist solely because it contrived to stay out of European affairs. Indeed, as one historian puts it, the United States expanded its “Negro Empire” from the turn of the century virtually until the eve of World War II through a series of aggressive economic and military interventions (Franklin, 1967).

Franklin asserts that at the Treaty of Paris concluding the Spanish-American War, the U.S. assumed control of Cuba and Puerto Rico, whose populations included almost one million people of African descent. Acquisition of the Panama Canal Zone in 1903 also added to this number, as did the purchase of the Danish West Indies in 1917 for \$25 million. A military government was established in the Virgin Islands until 1931 when President Hoover created a civilian government there (Franklin, p.428). Santo Domingo and Haiti were occupied by U.S. troops from 1916 and 1917, respectively, basically to bring them securely into the U.S. sphere of influence. Occupation troops remained in Santo Domingo until 1924, and in Haiti until 1934.

As in the previous century, America was quite internationally active in the economic sphere. For instance, the U.S. had a robust trading relationship with colonial Africa in this period. Walter Rodney (1974) notes that as the years passed, the U.S. “got

an ever bigger slice of the unequal trade between the metropolises and colonial Africa.” Its share in Africa’s trade -- much of it involving South African minerals and precious stones

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...rose from just over 28 million dollars in 1913 to 150 million dollars in 1932 and to 1,200 million dollars in 1948, at which figure it represented nearly 15 percent of Africa’s foreign trade. The share of the U.S.A. in West Africa’s trade rose from 38 million dollars in 1938 to 163 million dollars in 1946 and to 517 million dollars by 1954 (Rodney, p.192).

During the colonial era, Rodney adds, the U.S. was practically the colonial ruler of “independent” Liberia, established by freed slaves in 1822. The Firestone Rubber Company was able, in 1926, “to acquire one million acres of forest land in Liberia at a cost of six cents per acre and 1 percent of the value of the exported rubber” generating profits that made it the twenty-fifth largest company in the U.S. (ibid., p.154).

However these economic transactions were overshadowed by such signs of U.S. political disengagement as Congress’ refusal to enter the League of Nations in 1920 and the Neutrality Laws, passed between 1935 and 1937. Despite its increasing international stature, the U.S. preferred to define itself as a nation that kept away from “foreign entanglements.”

Isolationism Among African Americans

Hero suggests that African Americans were, on the whole, as skeptical of international involvements as the rest of the general public. Drawing on a variety of early public opinion surveys,⁵ he noted that Southern blacks were less supportive of U.S.

⁵ Mainly American Institute of Public Opinion (AIPO), Elmo Roper and Associates, National Opinion Research Center (NORC) and Survey Research Center (SRC) polls dating from 1937.

participation in the League of Nations, and less favorable toward relaxing the Neutrality Acts, than Southern whites (Hero, p.223). Even given the usual association of isolationist attitudes with lower educational attainment and economic underprivilege, he surmised that “. . . Negroes, especially some years ago, were a good deal more addicted to such frames of mind than were whites (ibid.).” However, he added some important qualifications.

First, (Southern) regional effects were probably much more determinative of overall early black isolationism due to the under representation of other regions in early black survey samples. Second, discerning racial differences from these national samples was difficult because of the small numbers of blacks interviewed by (white) national pollsters. Along with the large probability of sample error, there was reality of disproportionate black reluctance to actually give opinions. Third, racial differences were generally small, particularly in the North, and those differences were much smaller than expected given the social, educational and economic gulf between the races. Fourth, blacks seemed slightly less isolationist than whites on issues involving nonwhite versus white states. For instance, they seemed to prefer a (nonwhite) Japanese victory over the (Caucasian) Russia, and were less favorable than whites toward embargoing arms to Japan. On the other hand, when race was not ostensibly a factor, blacks seemed more isolationist. There was less black than white interest in assisting Finland in the face of Soviet aggression, and later, Britain in the face of Nazi aggression, to cite two examples. Also, blacks were less prepared to risk war than whites to prevent Japan from controlling China [see Appendix III(a)].

However, whether or not the African American masses were truly more isolationist than similar whites in this period, the historical record dating back to the turn of the century shows that several black leaders and intellectuals sought greater involvement in the international arena.

B. Pan-Africanism

The generalized despair of the Reconstruction period revitalized waning black elite interest in Africa. By the turn of the century, significant tangible and psychological linkages with Africa had been formed by the black intellectual and religious communities and the first signs of a black foreign policy “ideology” began to emerge. Black intellectuals and leading figures, like W.E.B Du Bois, Booker T. Washington, and, later, Paul Robeson, began to articulate preferences for specific American actions in the interest of blacks here and abroad.

Beginning in 1900, black intellectuals in America and the Caribbean began to view international issues through a new ideological prism: racial internationalism, or “pan-Africanism.” As Bracey (1971:262) explains this paradigm,

it asserts that people of African descent throughout the world share certain cultural characteristics and social conditions as a result of their African origins: their political oppression and economic exploitation by Europeans and Americans, and their stigmatization by the racial attitudes, theories, and behavior of Western civilization.

And in the words of its best-known proponent, pan-Africanism was “the idea of one Africa [uniting] the thoughts and ideals of all native peoples of the dark continent (Du Bois, 1965:7).” Its central prescription was “self-determination” for Africans and

indigenous control of Africa's relationships with European states.

The U.S. assumed its first prominent global role with entry into World War I in 1917. Aside from the many domestic racial ramifications of this intervention, two international situations concerned African Americans in the early decades of the new century. The first was U.S. relations with Europe's colonial possessions in Africa and elsewhere. Second, Ethiopia was brutally invaded by Italy and left to fend for itself by the League of Nations. As a symbol of black aspirations and a source of pride, Ethiopia's resistance became a matter of great concern, not just to leaders, but to ordinary African Americans.

C. World War I

The pan-African agenda was temporarily overshadowed and undermined by the onset of World War I, which presented a grave dilemma for African Americans. Strictly speaking, American involvement in this conflict marked the first clear instance of divergence between the black masses and the U.S. government over foreign intervention in pursuit of a defined national interest. While military interventions in the previous century (the Spanish-American and Philippine campaigns) and earlier in this one (Haiti) did not have total black support, they were not as heavily challenged by black leaders as was the sending of troops to France in 1917.

Billed by the President Woodrow Wilson as the war that would "make the world safe for democracy," World War I exposed the basic American social contradiction of official racial segregation. Nevertheless, because the war's aims coincided with fundamental black interests, it demanded their support. As noted earlier, Du Bois sought

to reassure African Americans that their willing participation would be rewarded after the war. This was wishful thinking on his part since America in the 1900s saw some of the worst racist violence and miscarriages of justice against blacks since Reconstruction.

Blacks participated in the war for two reasons: they were affected by the “moral crusade” rhetoric of the allies, and they felt that “the race was on trial” in a patriotic sense. Mullen (1973) notes that black leaders encouraged their communities to support the war effort after the U.S. became involved. “. . . despite insults and discrimination they suffer even while doing their patriotic duty (p.45).” Even Du Bois, bitter critic of European racism and imperialism in Africa, counseled that blacks should not “bargain with their loyalty and profiteer in the blood of their country” while their white brothers bore the whole burden of the war (ibid.).

Implicit in Du Bois’ statements was the notion that despite their long record of sacrifice African Americans still owed a portion of the price of citizenship. Some writers explain this in terms of a “price in blood” ethnic minorities feel obligated to pay in wars fought by their adopted nation (see Novak, 1972; Janowitz, 1976; Binkin et al., 1982). Of course, most African Americans at that time did not in any sense “adopt” the United States.

Du Bois made his pro-war comments in an editorial of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People’s magazine *Crisis*, and was criticized by factions within the same organization, and in the black community, as a “sellout.” Rather than stifling their consciences like Du Bois, said the critics, blacks should acknowledge that President Wilson would not promote and protect democracy in the world when he would

not even do so in America. They correctly pointed out that Wilson had transformed Washington, D.C. into the most segregated city outside the deep South. He had resegregated government facilities, such as restrooms (see Wolgemuth, 1959:369-382). Also, between 1917 and 1918, 96 blacks were lynched (a national rate equaling about two a month). Furthermore, Wilson himself had repeatedly dubbed the war “a white man’s war (Mullen, p.46).”

Conditions black servicemen faced overseas and at home also made Du Bois’ posture unpalatable. Despite honorable black participation in the Spanish-American War (1898-1902) the U.S. Army not only maintained strict racial segregation and subordination, but went to great lengths in World War I to humiliate and degrade black troops in order to placate whites (see McGuire, 1983; Flynn, 1984). For example, concerned that its French ally might be too egalitarian in treatment of black “doughboys.” U.S. General Pershing issued a secret memorandum to the French Military Mission in August 1918 that included these instructions:

- 1) We must prevent the rise of any pronounced degree of intimacy between French officers and Black officers. We may be courteous and amiable to the last, but we cannot deal with them on the same plane as with the white American officer without deeply wounding the latter. We must not eat with them, must not shake hands, or seek to talk or meet with them outside of the requirements of military service.
- 2) We must not commend too highly the [black] American troops, particularly in the presence of [white] Americans . . .
- 3) make the point of keeping the native cantonment population from spoiling the Negroes. [White] Americans become greatly incensed at any public expression of intimacy between white women and black men. (Bennett, 1966: 292).

Moreover, there were notorious incidents of injustice to black soldiers at home

before and during the war. One occurred in Brownsville, Texas in 1906, in which local townspeople attacked sleeping troopers of the all-black Twenty-Fifth Infantry, stationed nearby. When the shooting ended, one white man had been killed and one wounded. Subsequently, 167 black soldiers were charged with murder. Ultimately, President Theodore Roosevelt dishonorably discharged all 167, “. . . some with career-level service (up to twenty-seven years) and citations for bravery, and six with the Medal of Honor even though many had fought with him in Cuba (Binkin et al., 1982:16).”

Later, in 1917, an all-white military tribunal sentenced 19 black soldiers to death, 63 to life imprisonment, and 36 to dishonorable discharges for killing several whites in a period of street violence in Houston, Texas.⁶ In a climate of deep resentment by the white community, these troops mutinied against their white officers over an alleged abuse of a black woman by white policemen, seized weapons and marched upon downtown Houston (ibid.).

These incidents of collective punishment were outright violations of the “due process” protections of the Constitution and, combined with other harsh realities of black life at the time, made it hard for African Americans to “close ranks” with whites during the war. About 200,000 black soldiers served in France and about 10,000 enlisted in the Navy. Yet, the end of the war brought blacks little of the reward Du Bois hoped would come from their contributions.

In fact, attitudes toward integrating the service branches had hardened by the

⁶ The numbers of troops involved and sentenced, and casualties suffered on both sides, varies slightly with various accounts of this incident (see Mullen, 1973; Foner, 1974).

signing of the Armistice. The Navy, which had allowed blacks to enlist as messmen, stewards, and in various laborer positions below decks, virtually stopped enlisting blacks after the war. Instead, large numbers of Philippine nationals were recruited for those positions. After 1932, a few blacks were brought in, but only to serve as messmen. The Army remained committed to a white officer corps, and though it adopted a policy of racial representation proportionate to the national population, never came close to that quota for the next two decades (Dalfiume, 1969:23). The Marine Corps and Air Corps did not even accept blacks until World War II.

D. The Pan-African Revival: Garveyism

Before American troops were actually dispatched to France, Pan-Africanism had begun to experience a revival due mainly to the arrival in the United States of Jamaican-born Marcus Garvey in 1915. Interestingly, Garvey came to meet with Booker T. Washington for advice in establishing a Tuskegee-like school in his homeland, but Washington died before they could meet. He arrived, however, at the height of one of the more desperate periods in black life in America and immediately connected with ordinary blacks with his advocacy of the Pan-African cause. As Dorn and Carrington (1991:11-12) state:

Garvey went to Harlem in 1916 to talk about his recently established Universal Negro Improvement Association (U.N.I.A.). His doctrine of "Africa for the Africans at home and abroad," which he preached with charismatic appeal, caught on quickly. He instilled in the dispirited black masses a pride of self and heritage, and called for a return to Africa - of which he named himself provisional president. At the height of his influence in the early 1920s, Garvey had a following of more than a million people. Garvey . . . had great influence . . . on ordinary black Americans' attitudes toward Africa.

Garvey's internationalist vision and domestic agenda were complex and there is no consensus on his contribution.⁷ Vincent (1971:17) contends that Garveyism was the first black American movement "based on allegiance to a power beyond the borders of the United States." and that his slogan "Africa for the Africans" was far less a call for repatriation than a call to work for African independence. Once Africa had been freed from colonial rule, "blacks in the United States could be given aid in their fight for equal rights, much as the Zionists in Garvey's time sought to make in Palestine a bulwark for international Jewry (p.16)." The UNIA's international mission was to build an alliance of all black nationalist and black power groups that had emerged after World War I, i.e., a worldwide movement. Simultaneously, he sought cultural separatism and economic self-sufficiency for the black community.

Others, according to Stein, dismiss Garveyism as "Negro Zionism": a back-to-Africa movement "that became, in practice a utopian retreat to a psychological Africa" and a phenomenon "that had little or nothing to do with their immediate lives, with their own time and place (Stein, 1986:2)."

Regrettably, little closure can be brought to this debate as the bulk of the UNIA's documents and Garvey's personal papers have been destroyed by the United States Justice Department and during London blitz of 1941 and 1942. However, Garvey's world-view seemed to derive from pessimism in the promise of Wilsonian democracy and rejection of the middle-class integrationist mentality of the other prominent black leaders. He espoused a racial chauvinism that placed him outside the mainstream of the black civil

⁷ See Stein (1986) for a critical review of this literature.

rights establishment and often at odds with the Pan-Africanists, intellectuals (Du Bois) and trade unionists (Randolph) who focused on wresting concessions from the system, rather than separating and growing independent of it (see Vincent, 1971). Also, Garvey rejected socialist class analysis of the black plight and saw little value in alliances and coalitions across racial lines. One of his strongest tenets was absolute dissociation from “whiteness” and celebration of black identity.

Undoubtedly, these attributes endeared him to the black masses even as they worked toward his demise. Garvey was eventually deported in 1927 after indictment on controversial mail fraud charges, and Pan-Africanism lost some of its momentum as a mass movement. But his influence endured among nationalists in the U.S., the Caribbean, and Africa in the sense that they “incorporated working-class modes of politics: the boycotts, sit-in, strike, and demonstration . . . [rather than] petition, lawsuit, parade, and business (Stein, p.6).”

However, the less-radical Pan-African effort did have some impact on international relations. Notably, its proponents were able to influence in the creation of the “mandate” system for African colonies after World War I (Du Bois, 1965). The Pan-Africanists submitted 11 resolutions to the postwar Versailles Peace Conference. As a result, German colonies in Africa were not reallocated to the victors but were placed under international control until their inhabitants could assume sovereignty.

The reactions of the U.S. State Department in this instance typified its posture toward such African American interventions. The government was not friendly to this initiative or to the movement that produced it; indeed, the U.S. attempted to frustrate the

efforts of Du Bois and others to convene the Paris Pan-African Congress of February 1919 that actually generated the “mandate” resolutions. Du Bois cites a 1919 newspaper report that illustrates the U.S. attitude:

Officials here [in Paris] are puzzled by the news . . . that plans are going forward there for a Pan-African conference. Acting Secretary Polk said today the State Department had been officially advised that no such conference would be held. It was announced recently that no passports would be issued for American delegates desiring to attend the meeting (Du Bois, 1965:10).

In sharp contrast to the European powers, the United States had few direct interests in Africa at the time, and placed concern about postwar relations with Europe ahead of African self-determination. Nevertheless, the Wilson administration was sufficiently opposed to European colonialism to tolerate the Pan-African initiative.

IV. The Inter-war Period (1919-1940)

Pan-Africanism lost momentum after Garvey ignominiously left the United States, but black mass interest in Africa in the period between the World Wars was rekindled by the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. Mullen (1973:51) suggests that Ethiopia caused “even the most provincial blacks [to become] concerned with international politics.”

What special appeal did Ethiopia possess?

A. Ethiopianism

Enslaved and disfranchised African Americans did not clamor for equality with whites solely out of adherence to the egalitarian principles of the Declaration of Independence. They also did so because they believed they were “civilized,” or had demonstrated the capacity to join civilized society, since they possessed certain essential

attributes. Belief in Christianity was the main one. As Christians, blacks felt they had internalized the essential moral prerequisites for civilization: Protestant religious enlightenment and responsibility.

Furthermore, they felt that the common religion they shared with their oppressors offered explicit proof of their humanity and equality, as well as of their spiritual exceptionalism. The latter attribute derived from their racial connection to biblical Ethiopia which, in the language of antiquity, was a synonym for Africa as a whole. Psalms 68:31 established the connection with the prophesy that "Princes shall come out of Egypt: Ethiopia shall soon stretch forth her hands unto God."

George Fredrickson (1995) explains how this biblical reference convinced many European Christians, since the Middle Ages, that Africans were a kind of "chosen people" with a special destiny (a providential role somewhat similar to that of Jews of the Old Testament). Some nineteenth century white abolitionists were impelled by this belief. By the 1840s, abolitionist blacks also began spreading this interpretation despite its disparaging premise that blacks were so selected by God because of their innate altruism, credulousness, and passivity (Fredrickson, p.62). Black Christians in the latter 1800s soon came to understand the Ethiopian prophesy to mean two things: black people throughout the world would inevitably be converted to Christianity, and that God would free blacks in bondage throughout the New World (p.63).

Ethiopianism inspired the black protest literature of this period and lay at the root of the internationalist vision that drove the black colonization and missionary efforts of the nineteenth century. By the latter part of the century both "scriptural" and "nationalist"

views of Ethiopianism held sway in the black community. The highly influential AME Church epitomized this dual interpretation. Between 1870 and the early 1900s, it “became a conspicuous battleground . . . between an interpretation of Ethiopianism that would strictly limit its nationalism to the religious sphere and a militant variety that sought to give practical political meaning to the ideal of black independence and self government (Fredrickson, p.76).”

Reflecting its northern middle-class values and preoccupation with “respectability,” the AME establishment faction emphasized the moral and spiritual rehabilitation of its congregations in America and southern Africa. Missionary work was aimed mainly at character building and the inculcation of self-help principles in a people retarded by historical accident. “It was nationalistic only in its insistence that blacks uplift other blacks rather than rely on white Christians to do it for them (ibid., p.76).”

In contrast, the radical faction of the AMEs, notably Bishop Henry M. Turner, called for emigration of African Americans to Africa to help build a powerful nation. Turner accepted the basic Ethiopianist belief that slavery was part of God’s plan for the redemption of Africa, because it exposed blacks to civilization and converted them from heathen practices. Consequently, they were equipped to be the vanguard in the advance of the race in America and Africa. The latter would benefit from a cadre of talented African American emigrants.

Turner was immensely popular in Reconstruction-era Georgia, winning large numbers of blacks away from their old white-controlled churches to the all-black AME Church, and gaining election to Georgia’s Reconstruction legislature in 1868. It turned

out soon afterward, as whites reasserted their dominance, that Turner was deeply embittered by the “betrayal” of the newly-freed slaves by the political parties. His advocacy of emigration to Africa arose, in part, from this disillusionment.

Turner’s message was largely ineffective before the increase in political oppression and lynchings of blacks in 1890-91. In 1892, following his optimistic report on the prospects for blacks’ resettling in Liberia, thousands of Southern blacks sought passage but Turner was unable to secure transportation for the large majority. Inability to raise sufficient funds to cover shipping costs plagued Turner’s efforts until he died in 1915. From a numerical standpoint, Turner’s emigration scheme did not bear much fruit.

There is some ambiguity as to the scope of Turner’s vision. Fredrickson (1995) suggests that Turner did not contemplate a mass return for practical reasons: he doubted that Liberia could readily absorb large numbers of unskilled returnees. However, Redkey (1971:111-115) implies that Turner did not discourage the black masses, but rather sought to convince the skilled, educated, and relatively affluent middle-class that they had no future in the United States. Perhaps motivated by his failure to get middle-class support, he became highly critical of the majority of African Americans whom he held to be morally and culturally inferior to Africans. Among his milder comments was the statement that African Americans were “lacking in common sense and too fond of worshipping white Gods (Fredrickson, p.84).”

Turner’s influence played a part in the Ethiopianist religious nationalism that emerged to become a significant threat to white dominance in South Africa in the late 1800s. Black South Africans seceded from white missionary denominations in large

numbers in the 1880s, culminating in the founding of the independent Ethiopian Church in 1893. There is no evidence that African American influences played a role in this development, but through a series of fortuitous events, Turner cemented a relationship between the Ethiopian and AME Churches in 1898 with an historic visit to South Africa. While there he apparently connected religious independence - the root cause of black secession from the white congregations - with the end of white rule. Fredrickson cites the following Turner comment:

The white man does not appreciate our values, because he believes himself by divine right to be the dominant race . . . The black is the race of the future, and one day the black man will wake up and shake off the white man's yoke. He is already rubbing his eyes and feeling his muscles. The time has come to replace them with their superannuated principles. Our new doctrine is more suited to the African awakening, and only the sons of New Africa may be trusted to propagate it, not any aliens (p.84).

These kinds of comments, and agitation of a similar nature by a radical white English missionary named Joseph Booth in Natal around the same time, alarmed colonial authorities. Booth inspired the creation of the "African Christian Union" in Natal in 1896. Its aims were to establish "Africa for The African" and an "African Christian Nation" with the help of African American immigrants (Fredrickson, p.84). Booth's plan never took off for a variety of reasons, but his thinking illustrates Ethiopianism's role in the pan-African political agenda that developed shortly thereafter.

The ideas of cultural revitalization and race consciousness stimulated by the Ethiopianist tradition undoubtedly formed the intellectual basis of the pan-African movement in the following century. Such ideas clearly inspired the next generation of

black internationalist leaders, notably Du Bois and Garvey.

Du Bois essentially reinterpreted Ethiopianism in a manner that stripped it of its Christian and biblical underpinnings. Blacks, in his view, had a key role to play in the improvement of the world, and this was realization of their "genius" as a race. In order to produce a better world, it was necessary to counterbalance the progress achieved through "Teutonic strength and ruthlessness" with similar achievement by the more "submissive" black race. The synthesis of this struggle between the Strong Man and the Submissive Man was a better world for all. Race was an inescapable reality, Du Bois concluded, and all nations were capable of attaining the highest levels of development once they harnessed their "race consciousness and sense of their unique gifts and potentialities (Fredrickson, p.73)."

African Americans had a pivotal practical role in this process, in Du Bois' mind. They needed to understand that they were the "advance guard of the Negro people - the eight million people of Negro blood in the United States of America. [And they] must come to realize that if they are to take their just place in the vanguard of Pan-Negroism, then their destiny is not absorption by white Americans (ibid., p.73)."

A critical question here is, to what extent were a cross-section of African Americans aware of Ethiopianist thought? Black intellectuals and thinkers of the nineteenth century and later were obviously quite taken with it, as Du Bois' comments illustrate. There can be little doubt that a less intellectualized understanding of Ethiopianism filtered down through the black community to some extent. The AME Church was especially appealing to blacks after the Civil War, and this denomination was

in the forefront of Africa initiatives clearly inspired by the Ethiopian prophesy. Few African Americans actually relocated, but Psalms 68:31 was “without doubt the most quoted verse in black religious history (Fredrickson, p.75).” However, even if Ethiopianism was understood predominantly by the black literate class in the late 1800s, its secularization, and the rise of black mass politics in the following century gave it greater currency.

B. Reactions to the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia in 1935

It is within this ideological context that African Americans perceived the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935. The historical details are well-known. In a last stab at colonial empire-building, and ignoring the new “collective security” regime created by the League of Nations, Italy invaded the kingdom of Ethiopia in 1935 with modern mechanized divisions and bomber squadrons. (A weaker effort at conquest had been defeated by the Ethiopians in 1896). Despite treaty obligations, the Italians used mustard gas extensively in their determination to punish the Ethiopians (see Bennett, 1995:40). Emperor Haile Selassie fled into exile in Britain where he remained for several years until the Italians withdrew.

Mussolini’s invasion raised black mass consciousness worldwide, and particularly in northern U.S. cities.

The Ethiopian war became the main topic of conversation wherever blacks gathered. A championship boxing match took on mythic proportions as Joe Louis’s fists became the instruments of a race’s vindication as he delivered a beating to the Italian, Primo Carnera. In northern cities where black neighborhoods abutted Italian-American neighborhoods, un-refereed fist fights broke out. Volunteers were recruited to go fight alongside their African brothers. Black Americans united in the face of threats to the sovereignty of an African

nation (Dorn and Carrington, p.12).

Undoubtedly this invasion, and the manner in which Hitler treated black Olympic champions (notably Jesse Owens) in the 1936 Berlin Games, led many blacks to advocate confrontation of European fascism before Americans of German, Italian and Scandinavian descent were willing to do so.

Ethiopia had long occupied a special place in African Americans' international outlook and they had been seeking linkages with it since before the turn of the century. Apart from Ethiopia's biblical significance, it was the only independent black African state in 1935. Its defeat would symbolize the complete domination of the race by whites.

Yet, the African American relationship with Ethiopia had been quite one-sided before the invasion. The Ethiopian aristocracy had initially identified itself as Caucasian and was lukewarm toward black resettlement and technical assistance initiatives in the early decades of the century (Harris, 1994). However, Ethiopian diplomats who came to the United States in the 1920s and 1930s slowly recognized a mutual interest with local blacks when they repeatedly faced racial discrimination despite their diplomatic status (ibid.).

When Italy invaded, they discovered that black Americans (and other blacks in the African diaspora) were the only ones eager to provide material support -- and manpower, though the U.S. State Department forbade it -- for the fight to recover their country. Although the Italian aggression was a clear violation of the League of Nations charter, and the Great Powers had condemned it, they did little to aid Ethiopia. Nor could they muster the unanimity to impose and enforce real sanctions against Mussolini (Claude,

1984:264).

A significant consequence of this war was the development of a black international constituency across the U.S., the Caribbean, Europe, and Africa. Harris (1994:159) writes that this collaboration “. . . filled the vacuum resulting from the lull in the pan-African initiatives between the 1920s and 1945. Out of that seedbed emerged leaders for the black nationalist and pan-African movements.” Further, he stated that:

In the United States especially, the movement deepened the African sense of identity, quickened the pace of the civil-rights movement, and demonstrated the potential for African American influence on, and participation in, international affairs (p.159).

V. World War II

World War II found African American leaders quite sophisticated about the domestic consequences of U.S. military intervention overseas. They were determined to use their participation as leverage to prevent “the rebuilding of the structure of discrimination and exploitation that existed before the war,” in the words of Lester Granger of the Urban League (White, 1981:44). Thus, the period witnessed significant levels of black militancy as well as a resurgence in racial internationalism.

A. African American Military Service

Like World War I, this conflict presented African Americans the paradox of their treatment in the society and armed forces, and their willingness to fight to confirm their patriotism and entitlement to full citizenship. According to one historian, blacks went into World War II with low morale in regard to the war effort due to the grim lessons of

World War I. As the war crisis built, lynchings continued at a rate of one per week and the U.S. Congress would not pass an anti-lynching bill. Yet, three million African Americans registered for the draft in 1940 (Dalfiume, 1970).

Interestingly, the Roosevelt administration treated this as a manpower problem rather than as an asset. Determined to mirror the segregation of the wider society, the Army sought to maintain a 10 percent black representation in strictly segregated units and training facilities - despite the logistical difficulty. A special study group, the Advisory Committee on Troop Policies, was convened in 1942 to investigate this "race problem" in the armed forces, and make recommendations (Binkin et al., p.20). Nevertheless, by the end of the war about 909,000 blacks (less than the 10 percent quota) served in the Army, mostly in the non-combat service branches. About 167,000 served in the Navy -- about 4 percent of Navy strength -- and 17,000 joined the Marine Corps, accounting for less than 3 percent of all marines (ibid., p.24).

B. Participation in the Wartime Economy

Black leaders at home were less willing to de-link this war effort from personal concerns than they had been in World War I. This was most evident in the area of job discrimination. As industry geared up for war production after the Depression, it denied blacks access to jobs. This prompted sharp reaction from the black press, and in January 1941, A. Phillip Randolph, head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, announced plans for a massive march on Washington on July 1, 1941 (Mullen, p.53). Concerned about how Berlin would view this development, Roosevelt sent his wife Eleanor and New York Mayor Fiorello La Guardia to Randolph to persuade him to call off the march. At

the end of negotiations, Roosevelt agreed to issue Executive Order 8802 forbidding war industry discrimination. (but not to end segregation in the armed services) and the march was canceled (Ibid., p.54).

Many blacks felt that Randolph should have held out for an end to military segregation. Indeed, its persistence throughout the war created deep cynicism in the black community regarding U.S. war aims. As Dalfiume (1969:131) put it:

the hypocrisy and paradox involved in fighting a world war for the four freedoms and against an enemy preaching master race ideology, while at the same time upholding racial segregation . . . could not be overlooked. The war crisis provided American Negroes a unique opportunity to point out, for all to see, the difference between the American creed and practice . . .

C. Wartime Loyalties

Throughout the war, the home front witnessed race riots and clashes between black and white soldiers reminiscent of the summer of 1919. For instance, in the summer of 1943

troops were called out to put down a riot which started when Negro workers were upgraded at a Mobile, Alabama shipyard. Two persons were killed and martial law was declared in Beaumont, Texas on July 16. Thirty-four persons died in the bloody Detroit, Michigan race riot which started on June 20. Later that year, in August, there was a small riot in Harlem (Bennett, p.307).

One observer felt that this state of affairs led blacks, on the average, to “show less enthusiasm for the war than . . . whites, and manifest greater reluctance to go overseas, or to enter combat (Mandelbaum, 1952:95).”

The clearest indication that black frustration had led to unpatriotic expression comes from Dalfiume (1970). He notes that the African American community entered this war with such strong antagonism for Great Britain (because of its colonial history)

that it was "rather neutral toward the Nazis and Japanese, or in some extreme cases, pro-Axis (p. 221)." He adds that by 1940,

there were also Negro cults such as the Ethiopian Pacific Movement, the World Wide Friends of Africa, the Brotherhood of Liberty for the Black People of America, and many others, which preached unity among the world's darker people, including Japanese. Many of these groups exploited the latent anti-Semitism common among Negroes in the urban ghettos by claiming that the racial policies of Germany were correct (p.222).

Dalfiume himself is uncertain of the extent of pro-Axis support among blacks in these early years of the war. However he notes that it was significant enough to receive the frequent attention of the black press, and to cause the federal government to arrest several members of pro-Japanese cults in Chicago, New Jersey, New York, Newark and East St. Louis, Illinois (p.222). As indicated earlier, some pre-Pearl Harbor opinion polls did suggest that blacks might have been more sympathetic to Japan than white Americans [see Appendix III (a)].

There was other active opposition such as the group of young blacks in Chicago called "Conscientious Objectors Against Jim Crow," that encouraged resistance of the draft because of the segregation of the military (Mullen, p.55). This remained a burning issue throughout the war. As it drew to a close, the U.S. Army eventually allowed black troops to fight alongside whites in a few critical situations, e.g., the Battle of the Bulge, when there was a shortage of infantrymen. However, comprehensive integration had to wait for the next war.

VI. Summary: African American Internationalism up to World War II

Ordinary African Americans were reticent about getting involved in foreign affairs right up to World War II. At the turn of the century, the harsh realities of black life made such matters a luxury few could afford. It is hard to picture the average African American of that time as "internationalist" in any broad sense. Yet at the same time, influential leadership figures perceived opportunities for racial group advancement in America's major overseas interventions and resisted the isolationist temptation. Black leaders adopted pragmatic, interventionist postures during the world wars and encouraged the wider black community to support these causes.

However in the inter-war years, it was clear that their real interest was the establishment of a new moral basis for U.S. internationalism. This was the reason for Du Bois' extraordinary effort to participate in the Versailles peace conference after World War I. His world-view -- Pan-Africanism -- was predicated on the principle of self-determination and equity for oppressed nations of color. Later on, attempts to pressure the U.S. government into assisting Ethiopia to resist Italian aggression were motivated as much by those impulses as by spiritual attachment to that African state.

World War I

World War I provided a good illustration of African American pragmatism and reluctant internationalism. Clearly they only supported this "white man's war" in Europe because of the perceived risk of not doing so. Domestic circumstances for blacks were very grim at the outbreak of that conflict, and the last thing they wanted was a major distraction of government attention from those problems. However, black leaders

recognized the political opportunity and danger the war created: America's democratic crusade in Europe could be used to highlight its own suppression of individual freedom at home. At the same time, blacks could not run the risk of missing the opportunity to contribute to the national sacrifice to the cause of freedom. So, African American leaders urged support for the war effort to legitimize future claims for racial desegregation and opportunity.

This strategy was only modestly successful. For instance, the U.S. ended the war deeply ambivalent about meaningful African American involvement in the U.S. military. Blacks were permitted to serve in France because their manpower was needed, but were tightly constrained in segregated units despite their commendable performance.

Also, attempts were made to forestall black participation in the Versailles peace conference, though the U.S. failed to prevent the adoption of the pan-African "mandate" idea. In reality, the U.S. was not particularly concerned about the fate of African nations anyway, as it bore no responsibility for their futures and had not formally joined the League mandated to oversee these former German colonies.

Nevertheless, pragmatism paid off indirectly in other important ways. More and more ordinary African Americans began to see a connection between U.S. foreign policy and the domestic problems they faced, and many joined organizations. Two of the most influential, the NAACP and the National Urban League, were inspired by racial injustices during the war years, especially race riots sparked by white assaults on black servicemen before, during, and after the war. The publications of these organizations, and the black press in general, gave expression to black preferences and aspirations. And, though

leadership elites like Du Bois, Garvey, and Booker T. Washington continued to tower over the community, more ordinary blacks became attentive to politics because of these organizations.

Finally, it must be reiterated that ordinary blacks accepted the primacy of U.S. war aims over their own interests very grudgingly. As lynchings, riots and attacks on black servicemen worsened during the war, the wisdom of this pragmatic posture was often questioned. W.E.B. Du Bois himself, the same leader who patriotically urged blacks to “close ranks” with whites, helped the NAACP stage a distinctly unpatriotic “Silent Parade” in New York in July 1917 in protest of the wave of racial violence. Some 10,000 New Yorkers marched down Fifth Avenue carrying highly accusatory signs. According to Bennett (1966:294) “a large streamer preceded the American flag. Sewn on the streamer were the words: YOUR HANDS ARE FULL OF BLOOD.” He adds that:

Another brilliant young man, A. Phillip Randolph, was crisscrossing the country making radical speeches. He had a set piece that never failed to break up a crowd. “I want to congratulate you . . . for doing your bit to make the world safe for democracy . . . and unsafe for hypocrisy (ibid., p.195).”

Large rallies like these, and the subsequent popular appeal of Garveyism, revealed that fear of appearing “unpatriotic” would not necessarily coerce the black community into reluctant support of U.S. militant internationalism in the future.

World War II

World War II provided an even more severe test of African American pragmatism toward intervention and marked a watershed in the African American-foreign policy relationship. Again, blacks realized that the group had to contribute its fair share to the

war effort, but they no longer expected a “debt of gratitude” from white America for their sacrifice. The riots of 1919 and 1943 showed that there was more likely to be a racial backlash than concessions from the majority. All this contributed to a black ambivalence toward the war that ranged from disenchantment to outright support for the Axis, at least until Pearl Harbor. Hero’s World War II survey data [Appendix III (a)] show that:

Negroes were . . . less willing to lend money to Finland to purchase American military and other supplies to defend herself against the USSR in the winter war of 1939-40, less inclined to let Britain purchase similar supplies on credit and to modify the Johnson Act to do so, and less approving of the leasing of destroyers to the British and the passage of the Lend-Lease bill by Congress (Hero, p.224).

Black ambivalence was palpable enough for the federal government to launch an investigation into “Negro morale” in 1942, in order to learn what could be done to improve it (Dalfiume, p.228).

Politically, black leaders saw the political benefits of supporting intervention, though the temptations of isolation were strong. Military intervention promised to enhance black domestic leverage because, despite decades of stubborn refusal to face reality, the U.S. armed forces needed African American manpower. This leverage could be used in the struggle to democratize major institutions, starting with the military itself where the maintenance of Jim Crow interfered with effectiveness and modernization. The same was true of wartime industry, as exemplified by A. Phillip Randolph’s historic victory for black labor in 1943.

Dalfiume (1970) traces the origins of the civil rights movement back to the war years. He considers 1939-1945 “the beginning of the Negro revolution” pointing out that this period marked the beginning of black mass militancy, as symbolized by Randolph’s

March on Washington Movement. This militancy pushed traditional black organizations more to the "left" tactically and boosted their membership. He points out that

the NAACP underwent a tremendous growth in its membership and became representative of the Negro masses for the first time in its history. From 355 branches and a membership of 50,556 in 1940, the NAACP grew to 1,073 branches and a membership of slightly less than 450,000 in 1946 (Dalfiume, p.226).

Thus the important point here is not that blacks were remarkably more isolationist during World War II, but that African American leaders were less able to mute the voices of dissent. However, they were more successful in enlisting interventionism for domestic ends as, again, the government sought to use a national crisis to keep the domains separate.

African American reluctance to support American military internationalism became more and more apparent as the century progressed. However, blacks recognized two important realities: (a) they were vital to the success of these efforts and (b) participation was the inescapable price of civil rights on the domestic front. Thus, leaders reluctantly encouraged community support for the European interventions. However, the following chapter shows that as the struggle for those rights escalated into a full-fledged mass movement and blacks achieved full integration into the military, black leaders openly criticized militarism and were more likely to discourage support for those policies.

Chapter Four: CIVIL RIGHTS INTERNATIONALISM: African Americans and Foreign Policy From Korea to Vietnam

I. The Foreign Policy Context After War II

World War II ended the isolationist policies U.S. political leaders had promoted for decades. Even before the war ended, the U.S. had begun to orchestrate new postwar international security and economic regimes. Its unchallenged nuclear and economic superiority in 1945 encouraged this new internationalist impulse. Postwar U.S. internationalism had several broad objectives: Western European and Japanese economic reconstruction, institutionalization of collective security, promotion of free trade, and containment of the spread of Soviet communist ideology.

The latter became the primary basis of a new “cold war” with the Soviet Union. As the Soviets achieved their own massive retaliation nuclear capability during the 1960s, nuclear deterrence became a paramount U.S. security objective. By the 1970s, the enormous military power wielded by these two rivals had had the effect of greatly reducing the prospect of big power conflict. Their embrace of deterrence, arms control and detente principles brought welcome stability and predictability to European and bloc politics.

However, bipolarity’s other aspect was a proliferation of low-intensity conflict among superpower clients and surrogates in the Third World. Thus, from a U.S. perspective, the Cold War resulted in varying degrees of military involvement in Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East between 1950 and the late 1980s.

Vigorous postwar internationalism seemed to have the broad support of the American people. Opinion polls taken from 1945 through the 1950 consistently found more than 70 percent of the public agreeing that the U.S. should take an active part in world affairs (see Appendix IV).

II. The African American Response to Korea

The question of Korea once again presented African Americans with the dilemma of a foreign war that threatened to draw attention from their domestic quest for basic civil rights. But several domestic factors had changed since 1917 and 1939. First, the civil rights movement had become more mass-based during the World War II years, so that black elite preferences were less authoritative. Second, the perennial problem of segregation in the armed forces had been resolved -- at least by presidential decree, if not in spirit -- by the beginning of the Korean conflict. President Truman ordered the full integration of the military in 1948 (though it took another six years for all the services to be fully integrated). Army posts became "islands of integration in a sea of Jim Crow," and a black soldier in uniform ". . . has frequently been made to feel more at home overseas than in his hometown (Binkin et al., p.31)." Third, conceptual linkage between civil rights and Third World independence had become more pervasive within the African American community.

A. Peace and Third World Independence

During the 1940s and 50s, African American leaders had begun to articulate a foreign policy posture that might be termed "civil rights internationalism." For instance,

W.E.B. Du Bois' advocacy for the independence of African colonies derived not just from racial affinity, but from a broader conviction that colonialism and imperialism lay at the root of global conflict, which worked to the greatest detriment of the poor and oppressed worldwide. "So long as colonial imperialism exists," he said, "there can be no peace on earth nor goodwill toward men (Du Bois, 1952:25)."

Thus, when the atomic age dawned in 1945 and the Cold War commenced, Du Bois foresaw a resurgence of the kind of Great Power competition that had twice proven catastrophic in the twentieth century. He immediately threw himself (at the age of 80) into a new struggle for peace, and in 1949 participated in three peace conferences: the Scientific and Cultural Conference for World Peace, held in New York City; the Paris Peace Conference in April of that year; and the All-Soviet Peace Conference in Moscow, four months later.

Du Bois spoke out against the Truman administration's descriptions of the threat to democracy posed by problems in Korea and against a war solution. Just a few weeks before the Korean War began, he launched an organization called the Peace Information Center, which collected more than two million signatures in the U.S. in support of the Stockholm Peace Appeal (Jacques, 1982). This Appeal demanded the banning of nuclear weapons, strict international control to enforce the ban, and the designation of first-use of nuclear weapons as a "crime against humanity." Millions signed it in the Soviet Union and China, and Du Bois and other members of the Peace Information Center were indicted as "agents of a foreign principal (ibid., p.5)" by the U.S. government. To garner public support, Du Bois launched a major campaign that included a nationwide speaking

tour, and the case was eventually thrown out of court.

Actor/singer Paul Robeson, among others, defended Du Bois. Robeson was also prominent in the peace movement and was a vocal critic of U.S. involvement against liberation struggles in Africa. In 1948, he accepted the chairmanship of the Progressive Party which ran on a strong antiwar platform in the elections of that year. Jacques writes that:

When Robeson, speaking at the World Congress of the Defenders of Peace in April 1949, said that it was “unthinkable” that Afro-Americans would be convinced to support a third world war against the Soviet Union, the commercial media unleashed an unprecedented smear campaign against him. Despite the media’s charge of “treason,” tens of thousands of Afro-Americans came out to hear Robeson on a nation wide speaking tour. In cities like New York and Detroit, halls capable of holding thousands were too small to accommodate the audiences of Afro-Americans who wanted to hear this leader who spoke both his and their minds (p. 5).

Other sources like Foner (1978:201-211), the *New York Times* (April 25, 1949:25), and *Time* magazine (May 2, 1949: 25) attest to the impact Robeson had on the black, and wider, community. Robeson’s antiwar stance resonated among ordinary blacks and not just the intelligentsia. Perhaps for this reason he was made to pay a heavier personal price for his efforts that Du Bois; he was banned from stage and screen in the U.S. at the height of his career and lived under virtual house arrest for most of the 1950s.

As Du Bois’ activities indicated, black Americans did not support U.S. involvement in the Korean War in 1950. The black press and other leaders who did not necessarily object to the basic logic behind the Cold War, questioned the right of a racially segregated society -- and army (which still had 200,000 blacks in 385 all-Black

units until 1951) -- to wage war against people of color in Asia. The depth of this opposition was illustrated when Lieutenant Leon A. Gilbert, a career army officer, refused an order to go into battle and was court-martialed and sentenced to death. Black organizations, churches and community leaders collected more than half-a-million signatures on his behalf. His sentence was commuted to 17 years (Jacques. 1982:5).

By 1951, African American participation in the peace movement brought the black community squarely into the ideological struggle that was to define American foreign policy for the next forty years. Although Du Bois and many other leading figures were not communists (Du Bois joined the Communist Party in 1961), their basic foreign policy position mirrored that of the U.S. Communist Party. Essentially this position was that peace and freedom from growing corporate capitalism were inseparable prerequisites for the spread of democracy to the Third World.

However, some black leaders were Party members and paid a price for it. Eleven members of the National Board of the Communist Party of the United States of America were convicted of sedition under the Smith Act in 1951. Two of the eleven sentenced to five years imprisonment -- Henry Winston and Benjamin J. Davis -- were black, and the latter had declared the black freedom movement to be "objectively a movement for peace and against war (ibid., p.6)." In May of the same year, the government arrested and charged Roosevelt Ward -- a black, national leader of the Labor Youth League -- with draft evasion. The Supreme Court later unanimously threw out the conviction (*New York Times*, June 1, 1951).

As the 1950s drew to a close, the black freedom movement in America became

less clearly connected to the peace movement and international politics. The former was developing a new momentum of its own, and the latter had been neutralized by McCarthyism. Nevertheless, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. did sign an open letter in 1959 supporting the visit of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to the U.S. And his wife, Coretta Scott King, spoke at a number of pacifist rallies during this time (Jacques, p.8).

Also, African Americans supported the Cuban revolution in 1959, challenging the U.S. government's great disapproval of this development. Later, Fidel Castro's visit to the United States was warmly received by New York City's black community, and he stayed in Harlem's Hotel Theresa.

However, it must be noted that Martin Luther King, Jr. explicitly rejected violent revolution as a solution to the oppression blacks faced in America, stating that:

...few, if any, violent revolutions have been successful unless the violent minority had the sympathy and support of the nonresistant majority . . . it is perfectly clear that a violent revolution on the part of American blacks would find no sympathy and support from the white population and very little from the majority of Negroes themselves (Washington, 1986:249).

In sum, the afrocentricity that seemed to characterize black international interest and activity in the late nineteenth century and the pragmatism of the early twentieth century, evolved, by the 1950s, into a broader outlook that linked freedom, i.e., civil rights, with peace. Du Bois and a handful of other leaders did much to reshape this focus, and at the same time, cause U.S. militarism to become perceived as a civil rights issue by African Americans. By the 1960s, this posture placed African American leaders outside, and at odds with, the U.S. foreign policy "mainstream."

Interestingly, while black leaders in the 1960s were seen as foreign policy outsiders, they were becoming less marginal legislatively. The civil rights movement and other momentous events pried open the door to black political empowerment.¹ and by the following decade the total number of African American elected officials had increased by a factor of almost seven (Wilson, 1992:533).

B. Black Postwar Outlook From the Perspective of the Polls

Public opinion polls from the early post-World War II period shed further light on African American foreign policy postures. In general, they seemed to reinforce the impression of black resistance toward involvement in Western Europe. Racial differences in intensity appeared small, but African Americans were less interested in rebuilding European defenses to resist Communism, and less enthusiastic about the Marshall Plan.

Military and Economic Aid

Hero (1969:224-226) notes that until the late 1950s, blacks generally lagged behind whites in supporting Marshall Plan-like economic and military aid (see Appendix IVa).

He wrote:

In the mid-1950s Negroes were somewhat less willing to send economic or even

¹ Undoubtedly, the enormous efforts and sacrifices of blacks in the vanguard of the movement changed the entire political climate between 1960 and 1968. Public opinion grew more race-tolerant, media images of violent repression of peaceful black protest shocked the conscience of the nation, Martin Luther King's "March on Washington" in 1963 sent a moral message that could not be ignored, and the murder of (white) civil rights workers in the South embarrassed segregationists. However, it was the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963 that ultimately produced legislative breakthrough in the form of the Voting Rights Acts (especially the 1964 act that dealt with voting, employment, schooling, and public accommodations). Kennedy's assassination in a southern city in 1963 generated bipartisan support for Lyndon B. Johnson and his strong civil-rights bills because it was (wrongly) believed that the assassin was part of a right-wing conspiracy (see Wilson, 1992).

military aid to unnamed “allies,” “friendly countries,” “countries that have agreed to stand with us against communist aggression,” or the like (p.226).

This reluctance to send military aid to Europe in the Korean War period suggests that Du Bois’ peace efforts might have resonated among ordinary blacks.

What is interesting is that, at the same time, blacks seemed more prepared to send military aid to the Third World than whites. For example, while just 16 percent of whites thought it was “more important” for the U.S. to send military aid to Third World allies in 1956, 30 percent of blacks thought so. On the other hand, only 56 percent of blacks thought economic aid more important compared to 72 percent of whites. A similar pattern held for “sending military supplies to friendly Middle Eastern countries” versus “sending economic aid to these countries” in 1957 (Appendix IVb). In 1962, blacks surpassed whites 32 to 24 percent in favor of military and economic aid to Yugoslavia, and lagged behind in opposition 24 to 42 percent.

Greater enthusiasm for Third World military aid did not overshadow African American interest in helping underdeveloped countries economically, however. Hero observes that

by the mid-1960s, [blacks] appeared somewhat more likely to feel [the U.S.] had some obligation to help underdeveloped countries in general, to express satisfaction with our efforts to do so, to consider circumstances beyond their control rather than lack of effort the primary cause of their low standards of living, and to favor continuing aid even “to countries which fail to support the United States in major foreign policy decisions, such as Vietnam (p.227).”

By the mid-1960s when most of black Africa had gained independence and begun to request U.S. aid, African Americans seemed, on average, favorable toward these requests

(Appendix IVa). However, “the greater importance ascribed by Negroes than whites to military, as compared with economic aid, persisted as late as 1966 (Hero, p. 227).”

Immigration, Intercultural Exchanges and the United Nations

Responses to questions about immigration, intercultural exchanges and the United Nations posed in these postwar polls provide further insights about African American foreign policy internationalism. In these areas, blacks seemed somewhat more outward-looking and cooperative. In 1960, they seemed more favorable to the “Peace Corps” concept: 75 percent favored the idea of sending U.S. teachers abroad at federal expense in the summer, versus 60 percent of whites -- 33 percent of whom thought it a “poor idea” compared to just 8 percent of blacks (see Appendix IVa). Blacks were also slightly more willing to invite foreign teachers to the U.S.

When asked general questions about U.S. immigration policy in 1965, the races seemed equally ambivalent. But when more information was provided, that is, when respondents were apprised of the country of origin quota system, blacks were somewhat more inclined to favor changes that would allow more immigration [Appendix IV (b)]. As Hero notes (p.228), less-educated and lower-class Americans tend to be more nativist on such issues because of the perceived economic threat posed by immigrants. Therefore, the fact that African Americans were overrepresented in those roles in the 1960s suggests that, on the whole, they held more liberal views on these matters.

African American attitudes to the United Nations also seemed to become more liberal between the 1950s and 1960s, though not dramatically more so than white attitudes. In 1950, fewer blacks wanted American aid channeled through the U.N.,

preferring all of it to be handled by the U.S. government. For whites, preferences were reversed. Similarly, through the 1950s, blacks displayed less preference for the organization and less interest in having the U.S. support it. But this changed in the 1960s, presumably as more and more Third World states became U.N. members. By the end of the decade, African Americans were as favorable toward the institution as other Americans [see Appendix IV(c)].

Communism

Until about 1965, there were few consistent interracial differences in attitudes related to communism (Hero, p.230). Blacks did appear less inclined to prosecute the Korean war in 1952, but it would be hard to prove that this stemmed from greater communist sympathies on their part. Indeed, they differed little from white Americans in interest in blockading China in 1955 over Quemoy, Matsu, and the Formosa Straits.

Appendix IV(d) shows fairly even responses to a range of communism-related survey items from the 1950s and early 1960s. On containment issues ranging from Cuba, to Santo Domingo, to East Germany, to the Vietnam war, there is little in the poll data to suggest racial pro-communist tendency. Hero writes that “. . . Negroes have not on the whole harbored any more negative perceptions of the behavior and intentions of the Communist world or more belligerent attitudes toward it than have whites (p.229).” However, blacks were always somewhat more likely to see possibilities for peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union. And, they were more prepared to see communist China admitted to the United Nations.

While the poll data on racial views on the issue of internal Communism is

inconclusive. African Americans did seem less enamored of McCarthyism, even as they matched whites in perceiving American Communists to be a danger to this country.

However, as Hero states,

...by early 1965, Negroes had become significantly less inclined to consider "left wing groups, such as the Communist Party, here in America . . . a very great danger" or even a "considerable danger . . . to our country . . . at the present time (p.230)."

And, segregationist whites alarmed by the civil rights movement and general liberal trend in black international outlook, were inclined to blame these developments on communism. Such accusations gained greater currency during the Vietnam War protests.

Altogether, the early poll data support the view that African Americans at all levels had developed a distinct bias against military intervention and in favor of assisting developing countries. Also, it showed ordinary African Americans to be ambivalent, at best, toward communism. Communism's social values clearly intersected with the normative agenda blacks sought to advance domestically and internationally, but there is no evidence in these polls that the internationalism of the wider African American community was structured by communist ideology.

III. Vietnam: The Height of African American Civil Rights Internationalism

Given the general unpopularity of the Vietnam war in America after 1968, evidence of opposition within the black community seems unremarkable on the surface. However, the tone of black disapproval often differed dramatically from what was a largely a pacifist antiwar movement. Long before American involvement in Vietnam had

begun to register on the nation's consciousness and opposition had grown to significant proportions. African Americans were criticizing U.S. policy in civil rights language. By the war's end, black protest (within and outside the armed forces) would reach unprecedented levels of militancy. The anti-Vietnam War protest movement has been extremely well chronicled so what follows is just a sample of the numerous acts and statements of protest by African Americans.

A. African American Anti-Vietnam Postures

In 1954, the NAACP magazine, the *Crisis*, took a position opposing emerging U.S. policy in Vietnam just months after the Korea armistice. Essentially, the charge was that the U.S. was supporting colonialism in Indochina and Africa which would result in war against people of color, hindering their prospects for democracy (Jacques, p.8).

Other black voices linked the war to the civil rights struggle. At the turn of the sixties, *Freedomways* magazine, edited by W.E.B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois, published antiwar pieces by Martin Luther King, Jr., Muhammad Ali and others, early in the intervention. Robert Moses, leader of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) -- part of the vanguard of the later civil rights movement -- spoke at the first major antiwar march on Washington in April 1965. Later, in 1966, SNCC accused the U.S. government of violating international law and of employing a double-standard when it came to fighting oppression right here in America. Jacques (p.11) writes that:

SNCC offered encouragement to "those Americans who prefer to use their energy in building democratic forms within the country," calling work in the democratic freedom movement "a valid alternative" [that] . . . may cost people their lives "as

painfully as in Vietnam.”

He also mentions a leaflet, circulated by a group in McComb Mississippi in 1965, that listed the following reasons why blacks should refuse to fight in Vietnam:

- No Mississippi Negroes should be fighting in Viet Nam for the White Man's freedom, until all the Negro people are free in Mississippi.
- Negro boys should not honor the draft here in Mississippi. Mothers should encourage their sons not to go.
- We will gain respect and dignity as a race only by forcing the U.S. government to come with guns, dogs and trucks to take our sons away to fight and be killed protecting Miss., Ala., Ga., and La.
- No one has the right to ask us to risk our lives kill other Colored People in Santo Domingo and Viet Nam, so that the White American can be richer. We will be looked upon as traitors by all the Colored People of the world if the Negro people continue to fight and die without a cause.
- Last week a white soldier from New Jersey was discharged from the Army because he refused to fight in Vietnam . . . he went on a hunger strike. Negro boys can do the same thing. We can write and ask our sons if they know what they are fighting for. If he answers Freedom, tell him that's what we are fighting for here in Mississippi. And if he says Democracy, tell him the truth - we don't know anything about Communism, socialism, and all that, but we do know that Negroes have caught hell here under this American Democracy (Jacques, p.10).

Perhaps the most forthright articulations of the view that U.S. interventions against people of color such as the Vietnamese were synonymous with the oppression of African Americans, came from militant black nationalists. Their analysis of the problem was that the oppression facing nonwhite peoples stemmed not just from white racism and military dominance, but the amplification of these by with a capitalist system programmed for the relentless accumulation of power. Thus their call for “black power” arose in part from a realistic, zero-sum, conception of domestic and international politics that saw force as a legitimate option for people of color if they were to survive on their

own terms. In the 1960s, these figures were not on the fringes of black political thought: they spoke for a large segment of the black community.

This conception is well captured in the words of two such leaders, as cited by Essien-Udom (1971:254). In 1967, James Forman wrote:

Our liberation will only come when there is final destruction of this mad octopus-the capitalistic system of the United States with all its life-sucking tentacles of exploitation and racism that choke the people of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. To work, to fight and to die for the liberation of our people in the United States means, therefore, to work for the liberation of all oppressed people around the world . . . While such a task may be well beyond our capacity, an aroused, motivated, and rebelling black American population nevertheless helps in our indivisible struggles against racism, colonialism, and apartheid.

And Black Panther Party leader Eldridge Cleaver stated:

The black man's interest lies in seeing a free and independent Vietnam, a strong Vietnam which is not a puppet of international white supremacy. If the nations of Asia, Latin America, and Africa are strong and free, the black man in America will be safe and secure, and free to live in dignity and self-respect . . . The only lasting salvation for the black American is to do all that he can to see to it that the African, Asian, and Latin American nations are free and independent.

Also, Malcolm X and -- after his death in 1965 -- Stokely Carmichael, traveled around the Third World in the late 1960s seeking to internationalize the view that people of color should stand with black Americans and fight to overthrow American imperial capitalism.²

To reiterate, such militants did not speak for the entire black antiwar movement.

As mentioned above, Dr. King explicitly rejected the revolutionary prescription.

Furthermore, he "rejected as frivolous the argument that the freedom of black Americans

²As a secondary school student in Guyana in 1967, I vividly remember a captivating speech by Stokely Carmichael during a visit to my school, particularly his insistence that violent revolution was necessary. His theme was, "there can be no remission of sins without the shedding of blood."

is fundamentally linked with that of the people of the Third World (Essien-Udom, p.255).” King’s basic contention was that the grievously deprived and oppressed populations in such countries could never realistically be expected to amass the wherewithal to mount a violent international assault against white power.

However, King shared the belief that African Americans were called to lead the struggle. “The cold hard facts today indicate that the hope of the people of color in the world may well rest on the American Negro and his ability to reform the structure of racist imperialism from within and thereby turn the technology and wealth of the West to the task of liberating the world from want (ibid.. p.256).”

B. Economic Critiques

In a political sense, movement activists and the black press were most critical of the Vietnam war. Others, like organized black labor, were later and less political in their opposition. For instance when well-known labor leader A. Phillip Randolph, and Cleveland Robinson, secretary-treasurer of District 65, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Workers union, and a vice president of the Negro American Labor Council, called for an end to the war in 1965, their position was that war expenditure siphoned off money that could go to the fight against poverty in the U.S.

Martin Luther King, Jr. combined both the civil rights and economic antiwar arguments when he “broke his silence” on Vietnam in 1967. Speaking at the Riverside Church in New York City on April 4, 1967, he observed that there was “an obvious and almost facile” link between the war and the civil rights struggle in America. He pointed out that “a society gone mad on war” had squandered the opportunity for fighting poverty

at home, presented by the Johnson administration. King said that Vietnam was killing poor black men “crippled by our society” and that these troops would eventually realize that “we are on the side of the wealthy and the secure while we create hell for the poor.” He warned that this national “malady” would take us beyond Vietnam into other Third World countries. And, perhaps neatly capturing the essence of the African American leadership’s foreign policy outlook, he stated that “our only hope today lies in our ability to recapture the revolutionary spirit and go out into a sometimes hostile world declaring eternal hostility to poverty, racism, and militarism (Washington, 1986:231-244).”

In a speech delivered in Chicago in the same year, King used even more pointed language:

We are in an untenable position morally and politically. We are left standing before the world glutted by our own barbarity. We are engaged in war that seeks to turn the clock of history back and perpetuate white colonialism (King, 1967:33).

Washington (p.634) notes that King courageously continued to criticize the Johnson administration’s war policy despite criticism from black and white leaders who viewed this as anti-American and irresponsible.

C. Black Protest Within the Armed Forces

A good indicator of the depth and intensity of African American opposition to Vietnam and of the linkage between that conflict and domestic civil rights, is that black troops brought the political protest into the ranks of the military. A catalog of the numerous racial incidents that occurred could be found in many sources (e.g., see Mullen, 1973). Suffice it to say here that these ranged from racial epithets, to brawls, and even

murder -- though reports of the latter are largely anecdotal.

One remarkable aspect of the Vietnam-era military was that there were organized groups resisting racism and opposing the war within the armed forces. Mullen states that “these groups probably reached their high point in 1970 in Germany” where according to the commander of the Seventh Army, “black dissident organizations could turn out 1,500 soldiers for a demonstration.” Allegedly, twenty such groups existed in Germany, where they held protest marches, published underground newspapers and sometimes coordinated with radical German student groups. Most embarrassing to the U.S. was a petition sent by 200 black G.I.s to the Soviet and East German authorities in 1970, asking them to intervene to stop acts of discrimination against black soldiers in West Berlin (Mullen, p.81).

Similar organized activity -- demonstrations, rallies, and groups -- occurred at several Southern bases in the U.S. as well. These were relatively small and in some instances resulted in courts-martial of black troops. This was highly significant because it marked the first time in U.S. military history that African American troops did not suppress their domestic grievances because of a stronger pressure to “prove themselves” in the cauldron of war.

D. The Issue of Black Battle Deaths

Black resistance was fueled by a common perception that black troops were being singled out for combat duty and that blacks were suffering disproportionate numbers of combat deaths. Critics pointed out that between 1961 and 1966, black casualties were almost one-fourth of all losses of Army enlisted personnel in Vietnam, though young black

males were just 11 percent of the population (Binkin et al., p.32).

After many decades of struggling to serve in the military, the issue had become “equality of service.” Black leaders now questioned the military’s “special efforts” and methods to boost black recruitment (Ibid.). In his famous Riverside Church sermon, Dr. King said that “the poor fight and die in extraordinarily high proportions relative to the rest of the population,” reinforcing the popular sentiment that blacks were most likely to be drafted, sent to Vietnam, serve in combat units, and become casualties.

It should be noted here that while this perception might have been well founded at the time King spoke (1967), racial disparities in Vietnam battle deaths were not evident over the entire span of the conflict (1961-73). Though black casualties peaked to a disproportionate 16.4 percent of battle deaths in 1965 and 1966, this fraction steadily declined thereafter to reach 0.05 percent in 1973. For the entire war, black casualties did not exceed the percentage of blacks in the population (see Peterson, 1987:3).

Furthermore, careful analyses of the Vietnam-era draft found little evidence of institutional racism; rather the evidence suggested bias based on social or economic status (see Binkin et al., 1982). Lower income men were more likely to be in the military and African Americans were overrepresented in that economic class. Also lower levels of educational attainment among black men meant a disproportionate number could only qualify for less specialized infantry jobs within the military. This placed more of them in combat units.

E. African American Attitudes Toward the Military and U.S. Security Policy in the 1950s and 1960s as Reflected in the Polls

It is impossible to get an adequate picture of black attitudes during this period from the limited poll data, but it is likely that the masses lagged behind its leadership in opposition to Vietnam and the other military interventions of the 1960s. There is nothing in the opinion poll data showing definitively that the broad African American public was more anti-military or opposed to U.S. security policy (than whites) by the mid-1960s. Blacks seemed at least as favorable toward conscription, higher defense spending and military service generally [see Appendix IV(e)]. They appeared just as inclined to favor armed involvement in Southeast Asia, to say that it had not been a mistake to join the fighting with our own troops, that the U.S. should not escalate the bombing of North Vietnam, and that we should be willing to continue fighting alone if the South Vietnam government decided to stop fighting (Hero, p.231). By 1966, the one possible difference was that the African American public might have been less willing to support expansion of the war [see Appendix IV(d)].

An important finding was that the two races were similarly unenthusiastic in 1963 and 1965 about armed interventions in Cuba and Santo Domingo, and in the former case whites seemed more firmly against it.³

³ As mentioned before, higher proportions of black respondents usually expressed "no opinion" in these early polls. On the Cuba questions, blacks were almost three times as likely to withhold their views [see Appendix 4 (d)]. The assessments offered here generally do not take those respondents into consideration.

IV. The Early Post-Vietnam Period

Even for African American political leaders, however, the mid-1960s marked the beginning of the end of the “outsider” tradition, as civil rights gains allowed blacks to begin developing domestic political influence. Glen Hastedt (1991) points out that ethnic groups gain political clout when they develop three attributes: credible threat of switching allegiances at election time from one party to another or to another candidate in the same party, a strong and effective lobbying apparatus, and the ability to build their case around traditional symbols and ideals (p. 81). African Americans progressed in all three areas since the 1970s, though not in equal degrees.

A. Black Electoral Clout

For example, beginning with its insurgency during the 1968 Democratic convention, the African American voting bloc began to wield considerable influence over the Democratic Party. This grew in the post-civil rights period, though the Republican party’s disinterest in capturing black voters somewhat diluted this bloc’s national influence.

Nevertheless, we cannot overstate the real impact of this trend. Even after civil rights gains in the 1960s permitted significant growth of the black electorate, blacks remained unable to have an impact on foreign policy. Herchelle Challenor (1981) makes several points in this regard. First, blacks have never been a significant voting bloc in pivotal areas. Second, they could not make the high levels of political campaign contributions that allow smaller groups to compensate for their small number of voters. Thirdly, African Americans have not had influence in key sectors of the social strata such

as academia, the media, organized labor, and so on. Neither have they had the cultural solidarity of, say, the Jewish American community, in responding to policy issues. Finally, the goals of the black community have frequently been perceived as discordant with U.S. interests. This has prevented them from truly becoming “insiders” who could quietly influence policy (p. 17).

B. Black Lobbies

Since the early twentieth century African Americans understood that organized pressure groups were necessary if Africa was going to get a better deal from the major powers. Several lobbying groups were formed between 1937 and the early 1960s as anti-colonial agitation in Africa grew and resonated with American blacks. For example, the Council on African Affairs (CAA), the first black-led Africa lobby, was organized in 1937. Later, the American Society for African Culture (AMSAC) and the American Negro Leadership Conference (ANLCA) were created in the 1956 by black intellectuals and civic leaders, respectively. AMSAC coordinated conferences on African issues, published a journal, Africa Forum, and helped black colleges develop African programs and courses. ANLCA lobbied the White House, Congress, and the State Department through an office in Washington (Dorn and Carrington, 1991). McCarthyist and other pressures caused most of these groups to fade by the late fifties. Moreover, domestic civil rights gradually overshadowed foreign affairs issues as the priority of black leadership.

However, they were prototypes for TransAfrica, an organization founded in 1977, which grew to become the organizational base that blacks long needed for foreign policy lobbying. TransAfrica now has more than 10,000 members and an annual budget of over

\$1.4 million. This lobby's growing proficiency was illustrated by the Somalia and Haiti cases mentioned earlier. In Hastedt's view this success would be attributable mostly to TransAfrica's ability to demonstrate the congruence of black foreign policy concerns with broader American interests and values.

C. Use of Universal Appeals

The focus of U.S. foreign policy shifted from western Europe to the "diaspora" lands of Africa and the Third World in the 1960s. Coincidentally, this was also the time when black nationalism in the U.S. was at its most militant. "Self-determination" was steadily becoming a reality for European colonies in Africa and other regions, and had also become the preferred paradigm of many black leaders in framing the race problem in the United States. But the resistance of communist influence, not the promotion of self-determination, was the main U.S. motive for its foreign policy shift. Thus, the leftist tendencies of national liberation movements made them anathema to policy makers.

D. Apartheid

The battle between African Americans and Washington over South Africa policy that intensified in the 1960s reflected these clashing issues. However, black leaders strategically framed the issue as principally one of civil rights, rather than racial self-determination. They demanded a principled, moralistic, unambiguous stance against racial oppression regardless of U.S. geopolitical concerns, and regardless of the pro-communist philosophy of the indigenous South African liberation movement.

Without doubt this fledgling anti-apartheid movement of the 1960s gave the strongest indication that there might be a broad-based African American racial

internationalism. Ordinary blacks understood and embraced the issue because it was clear, and because they could relate it on a personal level: it closely mirrored domestic civil rights problems. For this reason it was highly salient within the black community. In contradiction to previous observations of low levels of post-World War II black foreign policy awareness of Africa (Hero, 1969), a Carnegie Endowment survey found a short time later (1979) that:

Compared to their white counterparts, blacks evidence a higher interest in world affairs [and] a particular interest in Africa (shorn of the negative stereotypes of primitive natives still prevalent in the white community) . . . ⁴

At first glance, South Africa's appeal to American blacks seems unambiguously racial, but we have to be cautious in coming to this conclusion. Several factors make the South African case extraordinary. First, there was a fortuitous confluence of historical developments in the 1960s: the proliferation of Third World liberation movements, and a successful American civil rights movement that empowered black Americans enough to have an effective voice in foreign policy.

Second, by the late 1960s, most of the world had conceded that apartheid was a moral outrage. This principle was universalized by a series of United Nations resolutions that resulted in the political, economic and social isolation of the Afrikaner regime. Never before in history had such comprehensive sanctions been applied to a state outside the context of naked territorial aggression. All these factors - combined with persistent media coverage of Pretoria's efforts to stifle dissent, a variety of international artistic

⁴ Quoted in White, p.43.

projects with anti-apartheid themes, and a “civil society” anti-apartheid crusade on a world scale - began to socialize and reinforce the issue throughout the black community in an unprecedented way by the late 1960s.

The point here is that although black leaders mobilized very strongly against apartheid, it is doubtful that they would have been as successful in generating mass interest were they not prepared to broaden participation by reaching out to the external supports just mentioned. External supports helped broaden the appeal (in both mass communication and issue definition⁵ terms) and thus engaged many more ordinary blacks and whites.

V. Summary

The limited scope of the review of African American internationalism in this and the foregoing chapter cautions against overinterpretation. Several contextual issues critical to the success (or failure) of African American efforts to influence U.S. policy or to establish international linkages outside the official framework were not explored. Three of these were (a) government control of the scope of African American international activity, (b) American constant involvement in major wars, and (c) the role of class in black internationalism.

To what extent were African Americans encouraged or coerced into emigration in the late nineteenth century? Though never amounting to a full-blown government policy,

⁵ For instance, external supporters tended to oppose apartheid on universalistic grounds: it infringed upon basic human rights and upon the right of a majority to some degree of political self-determination.

whites of various motivations in the North and South before and after emancipation actively promoted “return” to Africa and “resettlement” in the Caribbean with tacit government approval.⁶ Before long, some black leaders coopted the idea and supported it with rationales of their own. Eventually, this movement conflicted with U.S. diplomacy and efforts were made to restrict African American foreign involvements.

Government-sponsored restriction of African American activity in foreign affairs in this century is another area not to be overlooked. There is ample evidence that it was a reality well into the 1960s. White’s (1980: 48-50) summary of the official (and private) strategies employed to that end since the 1930s include:

- the U.S. government’s attempts to restrict Marcus Garvey’s activities in West Africa at the behest of the British and the French;
- the ‘Red-baiting’ of the Council on African Affairs during the 1940s and 1950s that undermined its influence;
- CIA compromise of the American Society of African Culture by funneling funds to it, then revealing this information;
- the virtual exclusion of blacks from the foreign policy bureaucracy until the Carter Administration;

Other hindrances included statements from prominent liberals, the *New York Times*, and others during the 1960s to the effect that African American concern about foreign policy (as exemplified by Martin Luther King’s condemnation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam) diverted attention from the more relevant issue of civil rights.

⁶ See Franklin (1988) for accounts of 19th century attempts to resettle blacks in Haiti and Cuba.

However, a more detailed treatment of this issue would be appropriate for another study.

Another contextual factor deserving separate treatment is the role that war and intervention played in advancing African American interests in the twentieth century. Geoffrey Perret's social and military history of the United States, *A Country Made by War* makes the point that war has been a constant factor in the evolution of American life. At critical junctures throughout the century the U.S. government's need for African American military manpower gave blacks important political leverage.

In effect, this allowed them to penalize anti-democratic elements in the U.S. for the strategic error of not playing the European colonial game. For almost a century, Great Britain, France, and other colonial powers used black colonial subjects to fight their wars while denying them citizenship in (or even access to) the "mother country." This strategy was very effective for dissipating post-military-service claims for equality and self-determination. By choosing not to emulate European colonialism, and by establishing its own black second-class citizenry in the U.S., America was less able to ignore the claims of those who served in its armed forces.

Third, the pervasiveness of early black foreign policy opposition to mainstream preferences across class lines is open to question. Despite sporadic episodes of seemingly widespread engagement, it is impossible to speak definitively about black mass opinion on the international issues of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A northern elite of intellectuals and church leaders shaped opinion and controlled the emigrationist and early nationalist movements, in concert with elites in the black press. Elite organizations with black and white leadership, like the NAACP, were extremely

influential through their activities and publications after the turn of the century.

Marcus Garvey's UNIA was the first (and probably only) African American mass organization with an explicit internationalist agenda. Though it faded in the 1930s, the UNIA inspired several other organizations with more socially diverse membership in later years, particularly those affiliated to the black labor movement. Du Bois and others unsuccessfully attempted to build a mass movement around the peace issue after World War II, but Du Bois remained the dominant figure in these matters for much of the century.

Characterization of the degree black community engagement and identification of the most influential leadership on foreign affairs in the turbulent Vietnam period is also difficult. Various leadership figures stand out -- some accommodationist and some nationalist -- and indisputably each appealed to a particular segment of the community. But it is not easily possible to tell how much mass interest related to foreign policy, compared with domestic issues, and exactly which foreign policy prescriptions were most appealing. Quite likely, militant nationalist leaders often might have been way ahead of the community in their foreign policy radicalism.

This protest elite gave way to a more mainstream leadership cadre of black elected officials and advocacy organizations by the 1970s, notably the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica. Thus, there was a virtually unbroken stream of elite dominance in the framing of foreign policy issues, the only variant being the constitution of this elite. Perhaps like most communities, the African American masses appeared to have been most stimulated to focus overseas when elites were most effective in defining their

personal interests in international terms, and when domestic circumstances were most dire.

Despite these outstanding questions, this review showed that African Americans held deeply conflicting images of the United States that, at times, caused them simultaneously to oppose and support U.S. foreign policy. Morgenthau (1985) stated that

any segment of the population which feels itself permanently deprived of its rights and of full participation in the life of the nation will tend to have lower national morale, to be less "patriotic," than those that do not suffer from such disabilities. The same is likely to be true of those whose vital aspirations diverge from the permanent policies pursued by the majority or by the government. Whenever deep dissensions tear a people apart, the popular support that can be mustered for a foreign policy will always be precarious . . . (1985:155).

African Americans always debated whether or not group interests should precede the "national interest" in their foreign policy calculations. Often, they handled this dilemma by vigorously opposing U.S. policy on the home front while participating in large numbers in its execution overseas. The two World Wars and the subsequent wars in Asia were opposed by black leaders because of the hypocrisy inherent in their objectives -- freedom from tyranny, and democracy -- yet it was only in the last of these, Vietnam, that they objected outright to the use of black troops. Morgenthau may only have been half right: while there is little doubt that African Americans did not share the dominant patriotic self-image of America throughout this century, their tangible support was "precarious" on only a few occasions. The issue of black affect for the U.S. versus nations of color is further explored in a later chapter.

Scarcity of foreign policy opinion data for the six decades prior to Vietnam

prevented a more extensive comparison of racial preferences. The next chapter takes advantage of the availability of such information in the post Vietnam period to compare black and white preferences over a range of military intervention and cooperation areas.

Chapter Five: BLACK AND WHITE FOREIGN POLICY ATTITUDES IN THE LATE POST-CIVIL-RIGHTS PERIOD (1980-1995).

I. Introduction

Probably the most substantial progress in race relations in United States history occurred between the late 1960s and mid-1970s. To the extent that the federal government embraced the value of racial equality and sought to establish racial equity as a public principle, a new civil rights regime¹ was recognizable by 1980. Although civil rights gains faced serious reactionary assault in the 1980s, most Americans continued to profess commitment to the idea of equal opportunity. That a good portion of this was merely rhetorical is undeniable. Resistance to affirmative action and other remedial strategies intensified after 1980 under three successive conservative Republican presidential administrations.

Nevertheless, many measures of racial disparity were smaller by the 1980s than in previous decades. The magnitude and causes of these changes are subjects of ongoing debate (e.g., see Wilson, 1978; Massey and Denton, 1993; Clayton, 1996; Patterson, 1997) but few would argue that nothing had changed for blacks in America by the 1980s.

Assuming that successes and gains attributable to civil rights positively affected African Americans' patriotic self-image, were there indications to this effect in the opinion poll data relating to international affairs? Using statistics derived from national

¹ "Regime" is used here in the sense offered by international regime theorists such as Stephen Krasner: i.e. the principles, norms and decision-making procedures around which expectations converge in a given issue-area. See Krasner (1986): "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in *International Regimes*, Stephen D. Krasner, ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). p. 2.

opinion surveys -- mainly the Gallup Poll -- this chapter compares black and white opinion toward salient military interventions, immigration policy, foreign aid and the United Nations between 1980 and 1995. To put these data in perspective, brief preliminary outlines of the policy environments for military force and cooperation are presented as well. Earlier chapters showed how African Americans progressed from relative isolationism to a somewhat more liberal internationalism than whites as the civil rights struggle intensified. By the early 1970s -- the high point of both the black civil rights movement and anti-Vietnam War protest -- many influential African Americans expressed radical opposition to U.S. foreign policy, though the representativeness of their views is a matter of speculation.

Straightforward racial comparison over a wide range of foreign policy events and issues has been rare, even for the more contemporary period. In their book, *The Rational Public*, Page and Shapiro (1992) provide some insight into the proximity of racial foreign policy attitudes between 1972 and 1990. Kinder and Sanders (1996) also touch lightly on this area in *Divided by Color*. However, both projects were much more concerned with attitudes toward domestic policy, where differences in preferences sometimes seemed unexplainable by factors other than race. Nevertheless, Page and Shapiro concluded that viewed over time, the opinion trends of the two communities differed consistently on foreign policy issues of racial significance to African Americans. As examples, they cite “distinctively strong reactions by blacks against the Vietnam War (in which black casualties were especially heavy)” and “. . . blacks lesser increase in opposition to arming Arab nations between 1973 and 1978, conceivably because of declining rapport between

blacks and Jews in the United States and more identification by blacks with the Palestinians' cause (Page and Shapiro, 1992:300).” Their primary conclusion was that in the aggregate, even on those “special issues,” racial opinions tended to move in parallel rather than converge or diverge.

Kinder and Sanders do not say much about racial trends in foreign policy views. However, they did note that 1986-1992 National Election Study data did sometimes show racial gaps in foreign policy opinion. Where race was an implicit issue, as in the matter of support for sanctions against South Africa, they noted that African American views diverged from whites by almost 20 percentage points. When race was not obviously significant, foreign policy differences were less consistent and more modest. These authors note that U.S. Central America and Soviet policies had little racial impact, but defense spending was noticeably less popular with blacks. On the other hand, blacks were much more favorable toward free trade, and much more in opposition to the Persian Gulf War (Kinder and Sanders, pp. 29-30). Also, they found that immigration policy elicited more favorable black attitudes, though blacks were not too far behind whites in interest in restricting immigration (*ibid.*).

Identification of racial trends and attitudinal patterns for “racially-significant” foreign policy events between 1980 and 1995 are not the goals here. The goal of this secondary analysis is to provide some sense of the proximity of opinions in the force and cooperation data in the manner of Hero (1969) and Broom and Glenn (1966), who focused on the immediate post-World War II years.

II. The Political Context for Military Force since 1980

A. International

In the early post-Vietnam War period, American security policy continued to be broadly shaped by East-West concerns, although regional threats largely unrelated to the Cold War -- such as terrorism and drug trafficking -- also grew in prominence. Altogether, these concerns led to a great deal of emphasis on coercive action, direct and indirect, in U.S. foreign policy behavior. During the 1980s, there were military interventions of varied scale in the Middle East, Central America, and the Caribbean (see Table 5.1, next page). At the same time, the 1980s witnessed the largest U.S. peacetime military build-up in its history, a build-up extended into outer space with the funding of research into space-based, anti-ballistic missile defense systems.

During the early 1990s, after the collapse of communism, U.S. forces were dispatched to the Middle East, the Caribbean, Africa and the Balkans. Two striking aspects of these post-communist interventions were, first, that the U.S. preferred to act within multilateral frameworks, and second, that some actions (e.g., in Iraqi Kurdistan, Somalia and, arguably, Haiti) were seemingly motivated more by humanitarian than political concerns. These latter initiatives often blurred the distinction between force and cooperation.

Table 5.1: Selected Instances of American Use of Force since 1980.

YEAR	EVENT
1980-91	Arms and military assistance to government of El Salvador against leftist insurgency.
1980-90	Arms and military assistance to 'contra' insurgents against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
1982	Deployment of U.S. Marine peacekeeping force in Lebanon.
1983	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - More than 1,600 U.S. troops participate in Nicaragua war games near Honduran border. - First instance of U.S. naval shelling of Moslem positions in the hills above Beirut - Invasion of Grenada. - Targets in Syria are bombed by U.S. planes. Two U.S. aircraft are shot down. - American ships attack Syrian positions near Beirut. - The U.S.S. <i>New Jersey</i> shells Syrian antiaircraft positions. - Reagan announces U.S. intention to develop and deploy space-based missile defense system.
1984	U.S. Navy planes shoot down Libya fighter planes over Gulf of Sidra in dispute over Libyan territorial boundaries.
1986	U.S. bombs Libya in retaliation for terrorist attack on American personnel in Germany.
1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - After U.S. Navy frigate hits underwater mine in Persian Gulf. U.S. bombs Iranian offshore oil platforms. - Missile from the U.S.S. <i>Vincennes</i> downs Iranian commercial airliner.
1989	Invasion of Panama to overthrow government of General Manuel Noreiga
1990	Deployment of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to forestall Iraqi attack on oil fields.
1991	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - War with Iraq (Operation 'Desert Storm'). - U.S., French and British troops enter northern Iraq to secure 'safe area' for 850,000 Iraqi refugees, including Kurds.
1992	U.S. Marines begin oversight of famine relief operations in Somalia.
1994	U.S. troops arrive in Haiti to consolidate civilian control of its government.
1995	U.S. participation in NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serbs; U.N. peacekeeping force.

B. Domestic Context

Another important difference was in the domestic political contexts before and after the 1990s. From 1980 to 1988 the Republican Reagan presidency emphasized foreign policy. It defined security in terms of military strength, and aggressively sought to roll back perceived Soviet encroachment in its spheres of influence (see Langley,

1989).

A succeeding conservative Republican administration also emphasized foreign policy. However, the Bush administration was less ideological and more pragmatic on security matters, especially toward Latin America. For instance, it presided over an anti-narcotics (rather than ideologically inspired) military intervention in Panama and supported aggressive drug suppression strategies Latin America (Pastor, 1992). Arguably, Bush's massive Saudi Arabia/Iraq operation in 1991 was similarly driven by pragmatism and a vaguely defined interest in a "new world order." Vulnerability to disruptions in the flow of Persian Gulf oil, and the related interest of preserving a balance-of-power in the Middle East, were the immediate American interests.

The Clinton administration basically continued to manage foreign policy pragmatically, although by 1995 it seemed more committed to multilateralism in trade and other non-security areas.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of domestic political climate over the study period to racial opinion was its division into Republican and Democratic presidential administrations. The American electorate is very sharply polarized by race: African American voters overwhelmingly identify as Democrats while whites distribute more evenly among Republican, Democratic and Independent identifications. This is the factor to be most strongly borne in mind when assessing racial attitudes during this period.

III. Racial Attitudes Toward Uses of Force in the Middle East

A. Overview: Mid-East Interventions

Most of the U.S. military interventions of the 1980s sought to deter or punish challenges to American influence in the Middle East. Security issues in this region were shaped by various permutations of the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli struggle, civil war in Lebanon, and the Iran-Iraq war. At various times, and in varying degrees, the United States, Syria, Israel, Iran, Libya, the PLO, and a complex web of surrogates and sympathizers were involved in these struggles. Hitherto, the United States had refrained from direct military intervention in this region, investing instead in the security of its main allies: Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the smaller oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf. The U.S. also invested heavily in the institutionalization and maintenance of an Arab-Israeli peace process.

However, the U.S. dispatched peacekeeping troops to Lebanon in 1982. When terrorist attacks on U.S. military and civilian personnel escalated in the mid-1980s, the U.S. conducted punitive naval raids and air strikes against Libya and Syria -- the states allegedly directly responsible for the attacks. Later, the U.S. committed its navy to the protection of commercial traffic in the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq war. Then in 1991- 1992, the U.S. first deployed a large force in Saudi Arabia to deter Iraqi aggression, and subsequently led a major international military offensive to evict Iraq from Kuwait, which the former had invaded in August 1990.

B. Racial Opinions

In general, Americans seemed racially divided over Middle East interventions (see

Table 5.2).

Table 5.2: Dissimilarities in Racial Attitudes Toward the Use of Force in the Middle-East.

Item	(%) Whites	(%) Blacks	Index of Dissim- ilarity* (Whites- Blacks)
Deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon in 1982 a "mistake."	49	61	12
Libya bombing in retaliation for anti-American terrorism in April 1986 justified	75	49	26
Syria. Iran should be bombed if guilty of terrorism	66	57	9
U.S. Navy should protect Kuwaiti oil tankers during Iran-Iraq war (1987)	50	25	25
U.S. Navy should destroy attacker of tankers under escort	63	51	12
*An index of dissimilarity (ID) is the percentage of respondents of either category (whites or blacks) whose responses would have to be different in order for the percentage response distributions of the two categories to be equal (see Broom and Glenn, 1966). As such, the sign associated with the ID is irrelevant.			
Source: Gallup (see text for specific references)			

In an October 1983 national survey, the Gallup organization found that 51 percent of Americans thought the deployment of a Marine peacekeeping force to Lebanon in 1982 was a "mistake," and that 37 percent supported it (cited in the *Gallup Report*,² February 1984, p. 16). But while 49 percent of whites polled called it a mistake and 39 percent were in favor, the ratio among African Americans was 61 percent to 23 percent. A month later, the same question found fewer critical (43 percent) than supportive (48 percent) whites, but a slightly larger proportion of blacks than the previous month (62 percent) thought the policy mistaken. This apparent gap in racial perception seemed to close only

² This publication underwent two name changes in the 1980s. Until Jan. 1981 it was the *Gallup Opinion Index*; from Feb. 1981 to Nov. 1981 it was *The Gallup Report*; from Dec. 1989 to 1995 it was *The Gallup Poll Monthly*. Hereafter, it is referred to as "Gallup."

after the devastating car bombing of the Marine barracks on October 23, 1983: seventy-three percent of whites, and 78 percent of blacks polled, opted for removing the remaining troops four months later (*Gallup*, February 1984, p. 17).

Targets in Libya were bombed by U.S. warplanes in April 1986 because of its supposed culpability in an anti-American terrorist incident. Most Americans polled approved (71 percent) of the action, with whites again displaying a much higher approval level (75 percent) than blacks (49 percent) in April 1986. When asked whether or not this raid against Libya should have been conducted even if it did not reduce future terrorism, 71 percent of whites felt that it should have been; but only 54 percent of nonwhite agreed with that proposition. Most whites (80 percent) felt that the U.S. should take military action in the future if Libya “conducts or sponsors terrorist acts against the U.S.....” compared to 67 percent of blacks (*Gallup*, April 1986, pp. 3-8).

Given a choice of specific future U.S. actions, blacks and whites distributed fairly similarly: most favored the instigation of a military coup and economic sanctions against Libyan leader Gaddafi, and only small minorities (whites 10 percent; blacks 3 percent) wanted future bombing. Slightly smaller majorities favored bombing raids against Syria and Iran, should they be guilty of terrorist acts against Americans. Again, whites seemed slightly more in favor of this option than blacks (whites, 66 percent; blacks, 57 percent) [*ibid.*].

Half (50 percent) of all whites surveyed in June 1987 approved (A) and 37 percent disapproved (D) of plans to provide American naval protection to Kuwaiti oil tankers traveling through the Persian Gulf in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war. Blacks (A: 25

percent; D: 61 percent) reacted in the opposite direction (*Gallup*, Jun. 1987, p. 33). Also, blacks were less willing (51 percent) than whites (63 percent) to destroy an attacker of the ships being escorted, and were more uncertain (18 percent) than whites (11 percent) as to whether the U.S. should confine retaliation to the attacker, or hit the mainland of the attacking nation (p. 34). The idea of preemptive destruction of Iranian land-based missiles capable of threatening tanker traffic drew an ambivalent response from both groups, but again, African Americans were marginally more likely to oppose than favor such a policy (p. 35).

Table 5.2 shows racial dissimilarity indices ranging from single- to double-digits for these Middle East interventions. All of them (and the average ID of 16.8) are small enough to fall within the range of sampling error. However, the fact that the direction of difference in support for force favors whites by a fairly consistent margin might be significant.

C. The Persian Gulf War: Operations "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm"

The Persian Gulf crisis and War has been the biggest U.S. military operation since Vietnam. Since it generated considerable polling of racial attitudes, it is given extended treatment here. The polls found that most of the American public expressed conditional support for military intervention and economic sanctions against Iraq after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. Most also felt that war was inevitable (*Gallup*, August 1990, pp. 22-23). However, in response to more detailed questions African Americans were (a) less clear-cut in their support than whites, and (b) were far less willing to support any aggressive U.S. action.

When asked by if they favored (f) or opposed (o) a ban on Iraqi imports, the percentages of answers given by whites (f: 74: o: 16) and blacks (f: 55: o: 25) were quite different. This pattern held up for sending the U.S. Navy to the Gulf, though not as clearly with regard to the bombing of military targets, and for the sending of ground troops. However, blacks appeared significantly less likely to support an Allied oil boycott (whites, f: 79: o: 11 - blacks, f: 59: o: 23).

Table 5.3: Approval Percentages for Bush Middle East Policies During August 1990.

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way George Bush is handling this current situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and Kuwait?

	August 3-4			August 9-12			August 16-19			August 23-26		
	<i>Appr.</i>	<i>Disapp.</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>Appr.</i>	<i>Disapp.</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>Appr.</i>	<i>Disapp.</i>	<i>DK</i>	<i>Appr.</i>	<i>Disapp.</i>	<i>DK</i>
National	52	16	32	80	12	8	79	14	7	76	17	7
Race												
<i>White</i>	53	15	32	82	10	8	82	12	6	78	14	8
<i>Black</i>	41	21	38	62	28	10	60	33	7	56	36	6
<i>Other</i>	49	23	28	77	17	6	66	28	6	70	23	7
(ID)*	12	6	--	20	18	--	22	21	--	22	22	--

* Index of dissimilarity (whites - blacks).
Source: *The Gallup Monthly*, August 1990, 22-23.

Table 5.3 shows that as the crisis escalated, black levels of disapproval of President Bush's management steadily rose, while whites registered less disapproval. Note that dissimilarity indices of racial support for Bush remained constant over successive polls during the month of August 1990. The average IDs for approval and disapproval for the month were 19 and 16.8, respectively, and again reflected a consistent racial gap.

Over the months directly preceding the war, racial differences widened. By December, six weeks before the Allied offensive began, 69 percent of African Americans

avored a non-military solution compared to 49 percent of whites, and only 28 percent of blacks wanted war, compared to 48 percent of whites.

In January 1991, four days after the fighting had begun, *CBS News* and the *New York Times* interviewed 3,000 Americans and found “. . . blacks expressing less support and much less positive views about the war in general [than whites] (*CBS News/New York Times* Poll News Release, 21 Jan. 1991, p. 2).”

After the conflict ended, despite the spectacular triumph of U.S. arms at remarkably low cost (158 combat deaths out of a force totaling 250,000), blacks remained ambivalent about its value. While 74 percent of whites and 72 percent of the nation as a whole felt that the war was worthwhile, only 46 percent of blacks agreed (*Gallup*, June 1991, p. 50). Unlike whites, blacks in this case seemed largely immune to the national tendency to evaluate military interventions mainly according to outcome, duration and level of casualties sustained.

The Gulf War and Black Leadership Opinion

These empirical surveys did not single out African American leadership opinion, but the actions of many black leaders suggested that opposition to this war crossed social and professional status lines in the black community. Congress had voted in favor of intervention after weeks of impassioned debate, during which the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) argued strenuously for economic sanctions against Iraq, rather than war. Remarkably, a number of black legislators broke with tradition by keeping up their vocal opposition even after Congress voted in favor of White House interventionist policy and after the U.S. had begun bombing Iraq (see *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, Jan.

19, 1991). These critics included many of the most respected and senior black lawmakers: Ron Dellums (California), John Conyers (Michigan), Charles Rangel (New York), John Lewis (Georgia) and Cardiss Collins (Illinois). Hitherto, dissident members, black and white, tended to stop open criticism and “rally around the flag” once the nation had committed troops to combat.

Several organized antiwar groups emerged in 1991. *New York Newsday* reported on February 15 that “a broad spectrum of the loosely knit network of grassroots and national organizations, civil rights and church leaders, activists and professional associations” were scheduled to meet at the Abyssinian Baptist Church in Harlem to map a national antiwar strategy. According to the report, a major topic of debate was to be resistance to service in the Gulf, by blacks in the military and reserves. Certain churches had already been designated as sanctuaries to shelter conscientious objectors (*Newsday*, Friday, Feb.15, 1991).

One of the most radical antiwar groups, the National Coalition to Stop U.S. Intervention in the Middle East, led by African American Dick Gregory and former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark, refused to denounce the Iraqi invasion and opposed economic sanctions against Baghdad. In her analysis of African American attitudes toward this crisis, Jacqueline Howard-Matthew (1993:29) points out that “black veteran committees formed to oppose the war, community development groups, and students orchestrating demonstrations on historically black college campuses, were more prone to affiliate with the National Coalition.” She also noted that:

As the immensity of the bombings became increasingly evident, national black

leaders, including Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Ben Chavis met with the aim of demanding an immediate cease-fire and reevaluation of the agenda of the American-led forces. More than fifty leaders attended the last such meeting . . . a few days before Iraq met the stipulations of the United Nations resolution on the removal of its military from Kuwait (p.30).

This intensity, depth, and persistence in African American opposition to U.S. military intervention had not been seen since Vietnam. To reiterate, black and white Americans differed noticeably in assessments of the appropriateness, mode, and value of

Table 5.4: Racial Approval of Major Participants in Persian Gulf War

	Gorbachev	Schwartzkopf	Powell	Cheney	Baker	U.S. News Media
<i>National</i>	44%	88%	87%	85%	84%	71%
<i>Whites</i>	44	90	89	87	86	72
<i>Blacks</i>	45	78	78	75	73	64

Source: *Gallup Poll Monthly*, March 1991, p. 22

forcibly evicting Saddam Hussein's army from Kuwait.

Another illustration of the difference can be seen in racial approval levels of the principal "handlers" of the crisis (see Table 5.4 above). Note that black approval of African American General Colin Powell is 11 percentage points less than white approval, despite his race and effective leadership. Finally, a majority of whites polled (57 percent) in April 1991 felt " . . . that the U.S. and its allies should have continued fighting until Saddam Hussein was removed from power . . . " compared to 43 percent of African Americans. A majority of the latter (55 percent) felt the conflict should not have continued (*Gallup*, April 1991, p. 5)

D. Racial Attitudes Toward Hypothetical Mid-East Force Scenarios

The postures mentioned above are consistent with racial responses to hypothetical Middle East scenarios presented to survey respondents in various polls during the 1980s. For example, in a 1981 Roper survey 73 percent of blacks opposed the idea of using U.S. troops to defend Israel if Arabs invaded, compared to 56 percent of whites polled (*Roper Report* 81-3, February 14-28, 1981). Indeed, the national posture toward this scenario was solidly against intervention: just 26 percent of the national sample avored sending troops. But while 28 percent of whites would do so, only 12 percent of blacks agreed.

Similarly, in a 1988 Americans Talk Security (ATS) poll, respondents were asked to recommend the strongest action that the United States should take if Iran invaded Saudi Arabia, and 48 percent of blacks said “stay out” compared to 31 percent of whites. Some 38 percent of whites preferred a military option (19 percent said “send troops” and 19 percent said “send military supplies”) while 24 percent of blacks did, with 11 percent opting for troops. The statistics were almost identical for a hypothetical Arab invasion of Israel. Here blacks were even less favorable to the use of diplomatic pressure (17 percent) against the aggressor than they were in the previous scenario (24 percent). In each case, the survey question was “ . . . *which of the following four options is the strongest action that the U.S. should take -- stay out of the conflict entirely, use only diplomatic and political pressure against the aggressor nation, send military supplies and aid to the country under attack, or send American troops to assist the attacked country* (ATS, No.9, September 1988).”

What makes these findings interesting is that other surveys have shown African

Americans to be less friendly to some of the “aggressor” countries. For instance, blacks consistently expressed more favorable views of Israel and lesser warmth for Iran and Palestinian Arabs. In February 1989, *Gallup* found more than three-quarters of whites and blacks expressing an “unfavorable” opinion of Iran (*Gallup*, March 1989, pp. 5-6). A previous poll (December 1988) found both races with sympathies “. . . more with the Israelis [than] with the Palestinian Arabs” (whites: 48 percent; blacks: 42 percent); just 24 percent of whites and 16 percent of blacks preferred the Palestinians (*Gallup*, December 1988, p. 21). A few years later another poll found 74 percent of whites, but 65 percent of blacks, favoring Israeli withdrawal from Arab land in return for Arab recognition of Israel’s right to exist (see *Gallup*, March 1991, p. 42).

It should be noted that the degree of racial difference has remained quite steady for other regional invasion scenarios presented in the ATS survey [see Appendix V(a)]. Blacks show a distinct preference for not getting involved in these situations in any way, with the possible exception of communist attack on western Europe. (These scenarios are discussed at greater length in Chapter Seven). Also, this impression is reinforced by Reilly’s (1995) analysis of quadrennial Chicago Council of Foreign Relations opinion data. He found that “. . . striking differences are evident along racial lines, where the differences of opinion between whites and nonwhite parallel those between men and women. Whites are more willing than nonwhite to use troops to defend Western Europe, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Israel (Reilly, p. 88).”

IV. Racial Attitudes Toward Uses of Force in Central America and the Caribbean

A. Overview: Central America and Caribbean Interventions

El Salvador and Nicaragua were principal foci of U.S. efforts to counter Soviet influence and leftist ideology in Central America the 1980s. The government of El Salvador received extensive military advice and material aid to help it defeat a leftist guerrilla movement, and in Nicaragua the U.S. developed, maintained and clandestinely led a proxy guerrilla force seeking to overthrow the leftist Sandinista government. Along with these efforts -- which spanned the decade of the 1980s -- the U.S. invaded Grenada after its moderate leftist government, the New Jewel Movement, was violently seized by a radical faction. From time to time during the decade, the U.S. collaborated with regional allies to mount war games and military exercises clearly intended to pressure these leftist regimes.

Political support for coercive Central American policies waned in the late 1980s and virtually ended with the second Reagan Administration. The "Iran-contra" scandal of 1987 heightened congressional skepticism about funding and supporting covert operations in Nicaragua, as did military stalemate in the case of El Salvador.

Strategic interest in the Panama Canal and concern about growing corruption and drug trafficking led the Bush Administration to invade its main Central American ally, Panama, in 1989. Since then, American forces have only intervened in the region as part of multinational forces seeking to stabilize Haiti's political and humanitarian crises.

B. Racial Opinion

Americans were ambivalent about using force in Central America in the early years of the Reagan Administration, though a majority were uncomfortable with perceived communist advances in El Salvador and Nicaragua, and considered the situations in those countries to be threats to U.S. security. Approval for the use of force decreased steadily from 1983 to 1986 (Sobel, 1989:115).

Whatever support there was for using force came mainly from white Americans. Of those saying they were informed on the issue in 1981, 29 percent of whites and 12 percent of nonwhite approved. Whites were almost twice as likely (32 to 14 percent) to "agree with the U.S. position" on El Salvador (*Gallup*, March 1981, pp. 36-37). Disapproval was more the norm for both racial groups, but while just 48 percent of whites disapproved of President Reagan's handling of the situation in El Salvador in early 1982, a 65 percent majority of blacks did.

Similarly, larger majorities of blacks (B) than whites (W) disapproved of sending additional military aid (B: 78 percent; W: 66 percent) or U.S. military advisers (B: 68 percent; W: 57 percent) to support the Salvadoran government. And in general, a larger majority of blacks felt that the United States should not get involved in the internal affairs of Central American countries (B: 55 percent; W: 48 percent) [*Gallup*, March-October 1983; April 1984].

As the Reagan administration drew to its end, the decline in popular support for the use of force in this region was highlighted by public reactions to the thinly-disguised policy of financing and directing a guerrilla army in Nicaragua. Of whites and blacks

aware (52 and 54 percent, respectively) of the U.S. embargo against Nicaragua in May 1985, only 49 percent of whites approved of it, compared to 18 percent of blacks (*Gallup*, May 1985, p. 12).

By 1987, both groups were heavily opposed to continued Congressional spending on the “contra” war, but blacks were more so. In January 1987, Gallup found little white, and almost no black support for a \$40 million military assistance package for the contras, that had been approved by Congress in June of the previous year. About a year later, on the eve of a proposed Central American peace plan, the vast majority of Americans also generally were inclined to postpone Reagan’s request for \$270 million in additional U.S. contra aid. But while a handful of whites (21 percent) still wanted to continue aid, just a few blacks (10 percent) favored this strategy [see Appendix V(b)].

Revelations in late 1986 of a covert, possibly illegal, White House strategy for financing the contra war, undoubtedly played a role in heightening public skepticism about U.S. military aid. Appendix V(b) shows the extent of public disapproval of the idea of using arms sale profits surreptitiously to finance the Nicaragua war. Again, blacks and whites differed in intensity of opposition to this action and in willingness to criticize President Reagan.

C. Grenada

The U.S. invasion of Grenada in late 1983 also met with great African American disapproval but significant white support. An overwhelming 74 percent of blacks reported disapproval to Gallup in the month following the invasion, while 65 percent of whites “approved of the way Reagan was handling the situation (*Gallup*, November 1983,

p. 29).” (Five years later, 58 percent of whites polled said that the U.S. should have invaded and 31 percent opposed the action. Blacks split evenly: 47 percent for, and 44 percent against, with 12 percent unsure.³)

D. Panama

On December 20, 1989, at one o'clock in the morning, President Bush sent 24,000 American troops into combat in Panama to overthrow the regime of General Manuel Noreiga and arrest him on international drug charges. Despite its obvious violation of both the tenets of international law and U.S. treaty commitments in the region (see Maechling, Jr., 1990) Americans (and Panamanians) overwhelmingly supported this action. Two months later, an 18 percent plurality said they thought Panama was “President Bush’s greatest achievement to date.” However, blacks (10 percent) were half as likely as whites (20 percent) to rate Panama so highly: indeed, a larger plurality of blacks (16 percent) thought Bush’s anti-drug efforts were most impressive (*Gallup*, Feb. 1990:21).

E. Haiti

The Clinton Administration intervened in force in Haiti in September 1994 to consolidate civilian control of the Haitian government whose elected head had been living in exile in the U.S. for several years. A full-scale invasion was narrowly averted by last-minute diplomacy, and the subsequent American intervention was more a police and humanitarian action.

On the eve of the intervention, the American public appeared ambivalent about

³ ATS #9, September 1988, Q. 23.

sending troops to Haiti. However, majorities agreed with the President's contention that stopping human rights abuses, reducing the flow of Haitian refugees to Florida, and the restoration of democracy in that country, justified military action. Overall, two-thirds (66 percent) of those who saw Clinton's televised speech on the issue on September 14 favored those arguments (*Gallup*, Sept. 1994). But polls taken shortly after the intervention suggest that nonwhites and blacks accounted for much of this support. Asked whether or not they "approved of the way Bill Clinton is handling his job as president," 64 percent of nonwhites, compared to 41 percent of whites, expressed approval. A more specific question about his handling of the Haiti situation found 64 percent of blacks and just 45 percent of whites in approval (*ibid.*). Political partisanship probably played a role here, as 70 percent of Democrats and only 45 percent of Republicans said they approved of the presence of U.S. troops in Haiti (*ibid.*).

In sum, although U.S. intervention in its Central American "backyard" from 1980 onward received modest and declining support from the American public, a consistent racial intensity gap was apparent. Table 5.5 shows that, for the most part, blacks and whites almost always demonstrated a dissimilarity of 10 points or more. On a few items there appeared to be clear racial divergence.

Table 5.5: Dissimilarities in Racial Attitudes Toward the Use of Force In Central America

Item	(%) Whites	(%) Blacks	Index of Dissimilarity (Whites- Blacks)
Disapprove of Reagan's handling of situation in El Salvador in early 1982	48	65	17
Disapprove of U.S. military aid to El Salvador	66	78	12
Disapprove of sending U.S. military advisors to El Salvador	57	68	11
U.S. should stay out of affairs of Central American countries	48	55	7
Approve 1985 U.S. embargo against Nicaragua	49	18	31
Despite impending Central American Peace Plan (1988) U.S. should continue 'contra' aid	21	10	11
Disapprove of U.S. invasion of Grenada (1983)	27	74	44
In retrospect, U.S. should have invaded Grenada (1988)	58	47	11
Panama invasion was Bush's "greatest achievement to date"	20	10	10
Approve of Clinton's use of U.S. troops in Haiti in 1994	64	45	19

Source: *Gallup* (see text for specific references)

V. Racial Attitudes and U.S. Intervention in Somalia

"Operation Restore Hope" sent U.S. Marines to Somalia in December 1992 in the context of a U.N. effort to deliver humanitarian relief in the midst of famine. At the

outset, this was not intended to be a coercive use of force. The Somalia famine was exacerbated by an ongoing civil war and the outgoing Bush Administration described the mission of U.S. troops to be protection of the humanitarian relief operation from local warring factions.

With this understanding, 64 percent of the American public perceived little risk, and three-quarters supported the dispatch of Marines (*Gallup*, December 1992:18). Appendix IV(c) shows that whites and non-whites shared roughly equal degrees of high confidence that the operation would not be costly, though whites were more confident (54 percent) than non-whites (45 percent) that U.S. troops would be withdrawn in a few months, as planned.

Twelve U.S. soldiers were killed in Mogadishu on October 4, 1993 and President Clinton announced a March 31, 1994, deadline for the withdrawal of most American troops from Somalia. Overall, public reaction was mixed: roughly equal segments wanted immediate withdrawal, a six-month delay, and U.S. troops to remain until completion of the humanitarian mission. However, a majority (54 percent) disagreed that immediate withdrawal would “undermine American leadership in world affairs, and aggressors would conclude that the best way to get the U.S. to change its policies is to kill Americans (*Gallup*, October 1993, p. 28).” Non-whites, however, seemed less likely than whites to believe that American prestige was at stake. Also, they seemed more interested in completion of the humanitarian mission [see Appendix V(c)].

Since separate data on African American Somalia attitudes were not presented by Gallup, dissimilarity indices are not computed.

VI. Racial Attitudes and U.S. Intervention in Bosnia

Throughout 1993, conflict in the former Yugoslavia dominated the news. From the beginning of this crisis roughly one-third of Americans expressed opposition to active U.S. involvement in the region. Intense media attention to the region and to U.N. efforts to end the crisis since the latter part of 1992, led to a slight majority (53 percent) of American voters favoring U.S. participation in either U.N.-backed air strikes or ground action against Serbian forces. Americans seemed to find Serbian “ethnic cleansing” strong justification for military intervention, but other reasons -- such as, the prevention of a wider European war -- less persuasive (see *Gallup*, February 1993, pp. 12-13).

Despite repeated NATO, U.N., and official American threats of intervention, the civil war continued through 1994. Ordinary Americans appeared to want U.S. involvement to be restricted to humanitarian relief to Bosnia. Otherwise, they saw no moral or practical reason for the U.S. to assist the Bosnian Muslims -- the group most victimized -- even to the limited extent of lifting an arms embargo that restricted their ability to defend themselves.

As with the Somalia polls, Gallup often disaggregated this data into “whites” and “non-whites” only. From this perspective, non-intervention seemed to be the shared preference of both groups, as only small percentages called for higher levels of U.S. involvement. However, about half of all non-whites, compared to only 27 percent of whites, thought that the U.S. needed to be involved to protect its own interests [see Appendix V(d)].

Throughout the conflict , however, there was a strong consensus that the U.S.

should help the U.N. in its peacekeeping efforts. Consequently, President Clinton's plan to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of an international effort to enforce a peace agreement received majority support in late 1995. Asked whether or not they favored the sending of U.S. troops in such a context, half of those surveyed in October 1995 were in support. Most people, however, did not believe the Clinton Administration's statement that troops would be withdrawn within a year.

Racial attitudes displayed similar ambivalence and skepticism: 50 percent of whites and 49 percent of blacks agreed with sending troops, and over 60 percent of each group expressed little confidence in the one-year time frame [Appendix V(d)]. After the troops were actually sent overall approval (41 percent) dipped slightly, yet majorities in both groups seemed prepared to support the decision on patriotic grounds, i.e. because the President, as Commander-in-Chief, had made that decision (ibid).

VII. Foreign Aid, Immigration and the United Nations (1980-95)

A. Political and Historical Context

An important difference between this study period and the more distant past is that, hitherto, cooperation and multilateralism were less controversial aspects of American foreign policy. After World War II, early Cold War internationalism encouraged a higher degree of political consensus around these approaches. In sharp contrast, U.S. administrations later on openly challenged the efficacy of such policies and, in the post-Cold War climate, the influence of pro-cooperation constituencies diminished considerably.

Cooperative strategies faced steady attack by political conservatives during the 1980s. As a result, U.S. foreign aid programs, immigration policy and commitment to international organizations like the United Nations, became partisan political issues to a degree far exceeding previous levels. Between the 1950s and 1970s fear of expanding communist influence overcame skepticism about assistance to, and cooperation with, many states and actors that did not necessarily reflect American interests. The disappearance of the communist threat and Republican takeover of the U.S. Congress in 1994 made it harder for advocates of cooperative and multilateral strategies to find support.

Economic and Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign aid has never been overwhelmingly popular with the broad American public, though elites have traditionally been quite supportive (see Rielly, 1987: 26). Only the smallest majorities in the general public have favored giving economic aid to other countries in recent decades. On the other hand, their generous responses to humanitarian crises like floods, earthquakes, famine and other natural disasters have been documented in many surveys.

What seems to have shifted since the 1970s, however, is elite consensus regarding the efficacy of economic aid. Referring to Chicago Council on Foreign Affairs quadrennial survey data, Rielly (p.27) observed that:

...a major and negative change appears to have been under way in leadership attitudes. The proportion of leaders [supporting aid to less developed nations] has dropped below 50% for the first time in these Council surveys. In 1978, 64% of the sample of leaders endorsed this goal; in 1982, 55%; and in 1986, only 46%. There is a smaller but comparable progression that is visible in the decline of

leadership support for “combating world hunger” as a very important foreign policy goal (from 67% in 1978 to 61% in 1986).

Today (1995-96), anti-aid conservative elites essentially argue that (a) U.S. taxpayer dollars are wasted on third world recipients lacking the basic technical and bureaucratic infrastructure necessary for economic development; (b) many of these recipients have been unreliable as U.S. allies in international organizations; and that (c) foreign aid creates dependency, rather than stimulate indigenous growth, because it strengthens the role of recipient governments in the local economy. Liberal elites have not really challenged these assertions, so there has been a tacit anti-aid consensus at the decision level. Consequently, most forms of foreign assistance now come under closer “cost-benefit” scrutiny. There is still a consensus favoring humanitarian aid, but non-military economic assistance, immigration policy, and contributions to international organizations have been under constant critical review since 1980.

The Clinton administration committed to “reforming” its main bilateral aid institution, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). USAID closed some overseas missions and eliminated funding to 50 countries deemed incapable of utilizing U.S. assistance effectively. Nevertheless, the United States’ FY95 foreign aid budget stood at \$13.7 billion -- a figure not too distant from levels of spending in past years, when costs such as peacekeeping operations and export promotion are factored in (see Vasquez, 1995:321).

In the past, aid dollars were allocated by country. Current aid strategies emphasize broad objectives like humanitarian assistance, promotion of democracy and

market reforms, prosperity, sustainable development, and peace, rather than a strictly bilateral framework. Nevertheless, some regions continue to receive the lion's share of U.S. aid. The largest recipient region remains the Middle East, with Egypt and Israel alone receiving \$5 billion annually in U.S. economic and military assistance. By comparison, total humanitarian assistance - food aid and other forms of disaster relief - has accounted for just under \$2 billion per year.

Immigration

U.S. immigration policy -- here considered a form international cooperation -- is another increasingly contested area. Americans have been caught in a dilemma of conflicting attitudes on this issue. The country is proud of its heritage as an immigrant society and remains committed, at least in principle, to liberal immigration policies for humanitarian reasons. However, there has been widespread uneasiness about the implications of large-scale immigration. Every session of Congress since 1972 has had this issue on its agenda, and committees in both houses, as well as various presidential commissions, have conducted studies aimed at immigration reform.

Illegal immigration has been considered a threat to jobs and a burden on social welfare resources, especially by southern and western border state governments. Social welfare and unemployment were leading national issues during the 1980s and 1990s, and in addition, major immigration states like Florida and California have grown in national political significance. The result: immigration, unemployment and social welfare have become conflated in national policy debate.

Immigration politics often ignores the facts, which are worth mentioning here.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau well over 7 million immigrants entered this country between 1981 and 1990. Some came as skilled workers, others to reunite with family members, some as refugees fleeing religious and political persecution -- and some, illegally. But contrary to one of many immigration myths, illegals constitute only a small fraction of all arrivals. In 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau placed the number of illegal residents at three to four million, or approximately 1.5 percent of the total population of 260 million, a far cry from the 6 to 8 million in the public imagination (see U.S. Census Bureau, 1990 and Moore, 1995:149).

Many other myths abound. The reality is that immigrants benefit the economy rather than depress wages and consume more social services than they pay for in taxes. They also create as many jobs as they take, are more likely to have intact families and college degrees, and are no more likely to commit crimes than native Americans (Moore, 1995:146-149).

The United Nations

America's ambivalent relationship with the United Nations over the last fifteen years illustrates its uneasy relationship with many international organizations over the study period. For much of 1980-1995 the U.N.'s authority and influence were in decline, due largely to lack of American leadership. However, the end of the Cold War led to a cautious U.S. re-acceptance of a leadership role in the organization, and a dramatic restoration of the U.N.'s importance in the 1990s.

Nonetheless, this 50-year-old organization is no longer as warmly embraced by its leading founder and historically biggest supporter. The fiftieth birthday led to many

evaluations of the U.N.'s effectiveness, and many recommendations for its future (e.g., Carlsson, 1995; Mendez, 1995). Suffice it to say that there is a fairly even division among those favoring the organization and celebrating its achievements (e.g., Luck, 1992; Russett and Sutterlin, 1991) and those who see it as a largely irrelevant, bloated, super-bureaucracy that has accomplished little (e.g., Bandow, 1992; Crozier, 1991). These different assessments generally correlate with views of the benefits/problems that the U.N. system brought the U.S., particularly since the 1970s.

What is beyond debate is that the United States (when it pays its bills) makes the largest financial contributions to this organization. Traditionally, the U.S. has provided 25 percent of the U.N.'s regular two-year budget; it also contributed an additional amount equal to 30 percent of U.N. peacekeeping expenses. The contributions of other major states do not even come close: Japan gives 12.5 percent, Russia contributes 9.4 percent, Germany - 8.9 percent, France - 6 percent; ten other countries contribute from 5 percent to 1.1 percent of the two-year budget. All other member states give less than 1 percent each. Almost half of all U.N. member states make only the minimum contribution - 0.01 percent of the two-year budget (Bennett, 1995:499-507).

Needless to say, these seemingly great disparities have made U.N. funding a perennial budget issue in Washington. The strongest U.N. opponents in the 104th Congress would like to prohibit U.S. troops from serving in U.N. military operations, scrap the Law of the Sea Treaty, reduce U.S. funding by 50 percent - and have even deeper cuts in the future, and shrink both the U.N. bureaucracy and current role (Conry, 1995: 285).

Each recent presidential administration has made or considered cuts in foreign aid appropriations, attempted to tighten immigration policy, and challenged United Nations leadership. These postures seem congruent with recent trends in public opinion. According to a January 1992 Gallup poll, four in five Americans (82 percent) wanted the U.S. to concentrate on internal issues, and scale down international involvements (*Gallup*, January 1992, p. 12).

In summary:

- The political context for cooperation was less favorable in the waning years of the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, than in previous years.
- Economic recession during the 1980s weakened support for developmental assistance. However, humanitarian aid remained extremely popular.
- Over the study period public approval of military aid weakened due to Vietnam, the decreasing likelihood of communist expansion, and eventually, the disappearance of the Soviet Union altogether.
- Ambivalence toward the United Nations in the 1980s -- encouraged by the open hostility of the Reagan administration -- evolved toward a degree of warmth in the 1990s as the U.S. rediscovered the benefits of multilateralism, especially in the security area.
- Immigration became less desirable with the recession and rising unemployment. Illegal immigration also became a "hot button" electoral issue in key states. The fact that the bulk of new arrivals in the 1980s and 1990s came from the Third World, rather than Europe, also contributed to its growing unpopularity.

VIII. Racial Perspectives on Foreign Aid in the 1980s

On occasion, African Americans seemed slightly more favorable toward economic aid than whites in the 1980s, but for the most part, racial patterns were unclear. For instance, although 21 percent of blacks and 19 percent of whites said they wanted aid to the Philippines increased in 1986, a larger fraction of whites opted for maintenance of current levels (*Gallup*, March 1986). However, the same poll found that whites were more willing (82 percent) than blacks (52 percent) to link the continuation of aid to a Philippine agreement to keep U.S. military bases. A National Opinion Research Council (NORC) survey found 33 percent of blacks and 28 percent of whites saying U.S. foreign aid expenditures were “about right” or “too little (NORC, 1988).” In the following year, the racial responses this item were blacks: 25 percent; whites: 27 percent. Interestingly, when NORC framed the question as “assistance to other countries” blacks seemed marginally more generous -- by a 5-point margin in 1988, and a 3-point margin in 1989 (NORC, 1988-89).


Another 1988 poll of foreign aid attitudes (*Americans Talk Security*, No.8, July-August 1988) uncovered a great deal of ambivalence toward aid (see Fig.5.1, next page). In the aggregate, race did not appear particularly associated with aid outlook in this survey; blacks and whites shared contradictory postures. For instance, whites (W) and blacks (B) mostly agreed that the U.S. could not afford to help so many countries (W: 57 percent; B: 54 percent), that aid was mostly wasted or stolen (W: 87 percent; B: 82 percent), that too many countries were unappreciative (W: 78 percent; B: 79 percent), and that the U.S. did not have a moral responsibility for aid (W: 67 percent; B: 68 percent).

Yet majorities wanted to continue aid to 'non-vital' countries (W: 68 percent; B: 58 percent), considered aid a good U.S. investment (W: 68 percent; B: 77 percent), and wanted to maintain or increase (W: 90 percent; B: 81 percent) levels of humanitarian assistance.

Two areas of clear racial consensus were evident in this sample: military aid was least popular and economic and humanitarian aid had large majority constituencies. Identical racial percentages (61 percent) thought that economic, not military aid, best served the national interest. Perhaps for this reason, Japanese aid -- which is entirely non-military -- was viewed by 69 percent of each racial group as more likely to "gain future respect" than American aid.

Fig. 5.1: Racial Positions on Various Foreign Aid Issues: 1988

Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.21



As Fig. 5.1 shows, 58 percent in each group favored a decrease in military aid while there was extraordinarily high support for humanitarian aid.

Overall, foreign aid did not seem to divide Americans by race in the late 1980s. Racial dissimilarities averaged 5.08 over the ATS survey items and no single index exceeded 10 points (Table 5.6, below). In fact, one of the lowest indices corresponded with the only item that mentioned the Third World explicitly, and thus might have been expected to resonate more with African Americans.

Table 5.6: Racial Dissimilarity on Foreign Aid Items in ATS #8

Item	Index of Dissimilarity (Whites-Blacks)
Aid was a good US investment	9
US had no moral responsibility for aid	1
Increase/maintain humanitarian aid	9
Too many countries were unappreciative	3
Aid to non-vital countries should not be cut	10
Decrease military aid	0
All aid should be humanitarian	10
Aid helps the Third World	1
Aid is a good place to cut spending	10
The US can't help so many countries	3
Aid is often wasted/stolen	5
Economic, rather than military aid	0
Average ID	5.08
Source: ATS #8, 1988. (White N=879; Black N=72)	

IX. Race and Immigration

Survey data spanning the study period show both black and white apprehension toward immigration. Gallup immigration polls taken in 1984, 1992 and 1993 show a pattern of increasing public concern about immigration levels from all parts of the world. As seen in Appendix V(e), this rising apprehension was greatest for arrivals from Africa and Latin America (about 16 percentage-points for each), though Asia (13 percentage-points) and Europe (about 10 percentage-points) also showed notable increases.

However, immigration perceptions differed somewhat between blacks and whites.

Whites seemed more likely than blacks and others to feel there had been too much immigration from all quarters, except Europe (*Gallup*, July 1993, pp. 3-16).⁴ And except for Europeans, blacks always seemed more likely than whites to think that the numbers of immigrants were “too few or about right.”

Table 5.7: Immigration Prejudices - Selected Regions

	<i>Latin American countries</i>		<i>Asian countries</i>		<i>African countries</i>		<i>European countries</i>		<i>Arab countries</i>	
	Too many %	TF/AR* %	Too many %	TF/AR %	Too many %	TF/AR %	Too many %	TF/AR %	Too many %	TF/AR %
Whites	64	33	64	31	47	24	32	63	66	28
Blacks	42	48	48	41	45	68	49	42	51	35
ID**	22	15	16	10	2	44	17	21	15	7

* Too few/about right
 ** Index of Dissimilarity

Source: *Gallup Poll Monthly*, July 1993, p. 13.
 The question was: “Do you think the number of immigrants now entering the U.S. from each of the following areas is too many, too few, or about the right amount...?”

Table 5.7 shows that the dissimilarity indices in the latter case were modest, except for African immigrants where it equaled 44. While whites clearly favored more European immigration, and blacks less, however the racial dissimilarity index (21) was much smaller in this case.

By their responses to survey questions, majorities of Americans seemed to view immigration unfavorably. However, the race of the respondent also seemed to matter in several instances. Table 5.8 shows that over a range of items posed by Gallup in 1993,

⁴ Until otherwise indicated, all following statistics are from this source.

whites were consistently more negative, despite the fact that they were less likely to

Table 5.8: Racial Postures on Various Immigration Issues

Survey Item	Whites %	Blacks %	Index of Dissim- ilarity (Whites - Blacks)
<i>(Source: Gallup Poll Monthly, July 1993; white n=879; black n=190)</i>			
Decrease present level of immigration	66	46	20
Diversity of immigrants mostly threatens American culture	57	49	8
Immigrants cost taxpayers too much by using public services	57	51	6
Immigrants of past 10 to 15 years less likely to make good US citizens	46	19	27
Stop or reduce immigration until economy significantly improves	77	65	12
Immigrants take unwanted, low-paying jobs	67	56	11
Immigrants hurt economy by driving down wages	64	73	9
US government can do more to significantly reduce illegal immigration	71	60	11
I'd be more likely to vote for a tough anti-immigration candidate running for Congress	49	27	22
I often/sometimes have to deal with immigrants who speak little or no English	54	63	9
Agree with US decision to refuse to allow Haitian refugees to immigrate to the US (<i>Gallup, March 1992</i>)	70	42	28

come into direct contact with recent immigrants, and more likely to believe that immigrants took the jobs Americans did not want. As will be seen later, the 1984 National Black Election Study found a sizeable majority of blacks agreeing that immigrants from Third World countries were “taking jobs away from black people (see Chapter 6).”

Black postures are intriguing since this group obviously perceived immigration as a “pocketbook” issue in the 1990s. Seventy-three (73 percent) said they thought low cost immigrant labor mostly hurt the economy by driving down wages. And, 65 percent of

blacks (and 77 percent of whites) felt all immigration should be “stopped” or “reduced” in 1993, until the economy improved (*Gallup*, July 1993, p. 10). Yet, blacks seemed much more likely than whites to consider new immigrants good candidates for U.S. citizenship (ID=27). They were also much less likely than whites (ID=22) to support a Congressional candidate because he or she was running on a tough anti-immigration platform.

Blacks also held slightly different opinions about the qualifications for

Table 5.9: Qualifications for Immigration, by Race

Factors determining whether people from other countries should be admitted to live in U.S. (Percentages saying “very important”)	Whites %	Blacks %	Index of Dissimilarity (Whites - Blacks)
<i>(Source: Gallup Poll Monthly, July 1993; white n=879; black n=190)</i>			
Have occupational skills	77	76	1
Are facing religious persecution	65	65	0
Are facing political persecution	65	64	1
Have relatives who are American citizens	56	62	6
Have money to invest in business in the U.S.	49	59	10
Are suffering from economic hardship	46	69	23

immigration to America (Table 5.9). While agreeing with whites on most criteria, the two groups diverged sharply on the question of economic refugees. A sizeable majority of African Americans thought that “suffering from economic hardship” was a qualifying factor (ID=23).

This difference in outlook probably explains the sharp racial divide over the April 1992 deportation of Haitian “boat people” by the U.S. Seventy (70) percent of whites,

compared with 42 percent of nonwhite, approved of the decision to return them to Haiti on grounds that they were “economic” rather than “political” refugees. (These Haitians fled after the U.S. and its allies imposed economic sanctions on Haiti in response to a domestic military overthrow of the elected government in 1990). This difference is consistent with historical black disapproval of (in their view) a double-standard in immigration policy pertaining to Haitian and Cuban refugees (see *Focus*, February 1983).

Table 5.10: Immigration Prejudices toward Selected Nations, by Race

	Irish		Poles		Mexicans		Haitians		Iranians	
	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad	Good	Bad
White	76%	10%	67%	14%	27%	62%	18%	67%	17%	71%
Black	57	18	51	16	44	39	31	40	27	50

Source: *Gallup Poll Monthly*, July 1993, pp. 14-15. Item: *I'm going to read you a list of people of various nationalities who have immigrated to the United States. For each, please tell me whether you believe their presence has generally benefited the country or generally created problems for the country . . .*

Postures on immigration also provide some insight into differences between white and black Americans' perceptions of the Third World. Table 5.10 (above) shows how immigration prejudices varied with immigrant nationalities. Here are some additional statistics from the same source:

- While most blacks (82 percent) thought Latin American immigrants “worked very hard,” only 62 percent of whites shared this impression;
- While 72 percent of blacks felt that this group “does very well in school,” just 39 percent of whites did;
- And, while 63 percent of whites believed that Latin Americans “significantly

increase crime,” 52 percent of blacks did not attach this characteristic to them.

In sum, the preponderance of opinion during this study period was against prevailing levels of immigration into the U.S. Economic concerns seemed to underlie this mood. However, though racial and cultural prejudice also seemed to be likely factors as the majority of immigrants were from less developed countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, Asia and Africa.

White and black Americans diverged significantly in their impressions of immigrants. African Americans -- despite feeling more threatened by immigrant competition for lower wage jobs -- seemed less inclined to evaluate immigration policy solely on the basis of economic self-interest. On the other hand, whites consistently displayed higher rates of hostility to Latin American, African and Middle Eastern immigrants, even though these newcomers had little direct impact on their lives.

X. Race and the United Nations

Assessments of racial opinion in this area present the greatest challenge to the assumption of comparable racial levels of knowledge and attentiveness presented in the first chapter. African Americans were far more likely to give a “don’t know” response to survey questions about the United Nations. For instance, 24 percent of blacks and 12 percent of whites said “don’t know” when asked if they felt the U.N. was doing a good or poor job in trying to solve the problems it faced; and, 20 percent of blacks and 9 percent of whites didn’t know whether or not the U.S. should give up its U.N. membership (*Gallup*, October 1983)

In the following year (1984) a staggering 80 percent of blacks polled reported that they had not heard about the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Sixty-two (62) percent of whites were also unaware (*Gallup*, May 1984). Misconceptions about the role, mission and capabilities of the United Nations also seemed racially skewed. A later survey found 33 percent of blacks polled (but only 11 percent of whites) unable to suggest "...the general purpose of the United Nations (*ATS*, No. 12, December 1988, Q.79)."

Therefore racial opinion data on the U.N. offered here must be weighed against this apparent⁵ knowledge gap and, I submit, widespread misunderstanding of the nature and functions of the organization. Casual observers tend to conceptualize the U.N. as an independent actor when in reality it is more of a set of mechanisms for cooperative action by member states. Regrettably, politicians and news media often give the impression that it as an autonomous, sovereign actor with its own agenda.

Thus, ordinary citizens' consciousness of the U.N. probably relates to its controversies and higher profile operations, e.g., peacekeeping. Early in the 1980-1995 period, Americans heard many complaints about the organization from Washington. Among conservatives, the general tenor of the dissatisfaction was that U.S. contributions to the organization were not adequately recognized and rewarded by the General Assembly. Some Congressional critics escalated anti-U.N rhetoric to the level of threats of the removal of U.N. headquarters from U.S. soil, and/or the unilateral slashing of U.S.

⁵ It is possible -- as is often the case with male and female respondents -- that African Americans might be simply more willing to confess ignorance on these matters than equally ignorant white respondents, especially for closed-ended questions that allow respondents to pick a response.

dollar contributions. The U.S. actually did withdraw from UNESCO in 1984.

More recently, the salient issue has been U.N. management of humanitarian and peacekeeping operations in Africa and the Balkans.

So for what it is worth, the racial opinion data tends to depict African Americans as slightly more satisfied with the U.N. than whites.⁶ In the 1983 and 1984 Gallup polls cited above, 52 percent of whites but just 39 percent of blacks thought it was doing a poor job solving problems it faced; whites were also 9 percentage-points more likely to think that the U.S. should give up its U.N. membership. In the same vein 56 percent of blacks that had heard of UNESCO felt the U.S. should not withdraw from the agency, compared with 47 percent of whites.

In 1988, white and black Americans seemed to be very similar in direction and intensity of opinion related to the U.N. A large majority wanted to see the U.S. play a leading role in the organization; slightly smaller majorities approved of U.N. peacekeeping, and had a "favorable impression" of the institution as a whole (*ATS* #6, May 1988, Q. 39-41). Seven months later *ATS* found over 90 percent of blacks and whites polled agreeing that continued American participation in the United Nations was important (*ATS*, #12, December 1988, Q.78).


Support for U.N. efforts in specific areas was less intense, but racially even in the May survey. As Fig. 5.2 shows, just over half of each group thought the agency

⁶ As noted in the previous chapter, this has been a consistent feature of African American opinion historically. Broom and Glenn (1966: 192) found that like most highly educated people surveyed, blacks tended to be less "moralistic" regarding the admission of "good" and "bad" nations to the U.N. in the 1950s.

performed well in “promoting communication and understanding between countries.” but almost one-third consistently criticized its efforts in other functional areas. A combined 52 percent of whites and 51 percent of blacks thought the U.N. was “not good” or “poor” at “combating

international hunger and disease.” About 53 percent of whites and 58 percent of blacks were unimpressed with its efforts in helping poor nations become self-sufficient.

Fig. 5.2: Perceptions of U.N. Operations, by Race



Given the openly anti-U.N. posture assumed by the Reagan Administration, it was interesting that an equally solid majority of Americans -- white and black -- thought the U.N. General Assembly was either “neutral” or “favorable” toward the United States, rather than “against” it. This body had been portrayed as a captive of states unfriendly to U.S. interests and a series of harsh measures had been taken by the U.S. by 1988 (Luck, 1984:155). For example, the U.S. had:

- withdrawn from UNESCO at the end of 1984;
- voted in its Senate to slash U.S.-assessed contributions unilaterally;
- through its U.N. representative, had called the United Nations “a dangerous place”

and had spoken of bidding a “fond farewell” to its New York headquarters;

- turned its back on the World Court and on the Law of the Sea Treaty.

Undoubtedly, the tough official U.S. posture and the decline of Soviet influence made the U.N. more acquiescent to American demands during the 1980s. This probably accounts for the favorable public consensus regarding the organization seen in the poll data from the late 1980s.

Finally, the 1988 data suggest that although blacks and whites were equally favorable toward the organization, their conceptions of its purpose differed somewhat. Only 19 percent of blacks, compared with 32 percent of whites, identified the U.N. with its primary mission: promotion of peace and prevention of war by providing a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Approximately 40 percent of each group, however, felt it existed to provide an open forum or facilitate communication among countries (ATS #6. Q.42).

However, over-interpretation of these statistics is a danger. Blacks often seemed more approving but less knowledgeable, and whites more skeptical, but certain, in their views of this institution. A later chapter will take a closer look at the impact of socioeconomic factors on racial views about this body.

XI. Discussion

A. Summary

According to the national polls between 1980 and 1995, white and black Americans seem to agree with the principle of supporting U.S. allies facing military

crisis, yet were skeptical about sending American troops overseas. However, blacks seemed even less enthusiastic about using force, even where American power was directly challenged. This seemed to hold for all forms of military intervention. "Surgical" aerial or naval raids (Libya, Syria, Iran), brief, low cost ground interventions ("Desert Storm," Panama, Grenada), and deterrent deployments (Persian Gulf naval escort, "Desert Shield") all met with higher levels of black disapproval. Moreover, blacks were less persuaded by the technical successes or low costs of coercive action, and were less convinced that military force taught U.S. adversaries the desired "lessons," or brought about long-term change in behavior.

Blacks and whites were closer on the use of the American military in peacekeeping or humanitarian contexts. Nevertheless, African Americans were stronger supporters of the ill-fated Lebanon peacekeeping mission in 1982-83 and the humanitarian actions in Somalia and Haiti a decade later.

In a similar vein, there was slightly greater black support for humanitarian and economic aid, though on the whole neither group seemed particularly favorable toward foreign aid in general.

The clearest appearances of a race gap related to immigration attitudes. Blacks seemed much warmer toward Third World immigrants than white Americans, despite being just as apprehensive about the U.S. economy and just as alarmed by a perception of rising illegal immigration.

B. Questions Raised

Nevertheless, these broad conclusions probably understate differences within the


black community itself. Statistics on African American elite and mass attitudes over the range of events were unavailable for this secondary analysis, but media accounts of developments in the African American community during the Gulf War were illustrative. There, African American leaders were much more firmly against military intervention than any other opinion public. This seemed well within a pre-civil rights tradition of strong black elite opposition to involvements likely to take a heavy toll on black troops, divert federal spending away from domestic needs, and generally distract the nation from issues of racial equity. The problem is that the Gulf War occurred in 1991, almost three decades after the passage of *Brown* Supreme Court decision, the Voting Rights Act, affirmative action, and other civil rights milestones.

Hence, these data raise more questions about racial postures than they answer. For example, did racial divergence mainly reflect political partisanship? Did it persist more strongly among better-educated, higher-status African Americans than among the black masses? Did the fact that U.S. mainly intervened in the Third World after 1945 slow racial convergence on force and cooperation? And, despite civil rights, was the African American patriotic self-image challenged automatically by the prospect of U.S. coercion in the Third World?

Of these possible factors, political partisanship might have been least important. True, Ronald Reagan presided over most of the study period and was deeply unpopular among African Americans. African Americans were (and still are) mostly Democrats; over 90 percent consistently identified themselves as such to pollsters throughout the study period. Even as Reagan enjoyed some of the highest presidential popularity ratings

in history, blacks gave him failing grades. Similarly, his Republican successor's big military triumph in the Middle East -- the nation's first unambiguous military victory since Vietnam -- received only lukewarm black support while the rest of the country celebrated. However, African American reactions to Republican policies may have had little to do with knee-jerk partisanship.

Several factors caution against a facile "political partisanship" explanation. For one thing, blacks tended to disagree more than whites with wars fought during prior Democratic administrations as well. Asked to assess the "justness" of America's major wars retrospectively in 1991, African Americans lagged behind whites in calling a war "just" in almost every instance (see Fig. 5.3).



were harmed, similar majorities (52 percent) of blacks and whites so stated; however, whites (37 percent) seemed slightly more favorable than blacks (34 percent) toward using

military force under those circumstances (*Gallup*, January 1980). African Americans were similarly less supportive of draft registration: 60 percent of whites thought it necessary compared to 49 percent of blacks (*Gallup*, July 1980).

Attitudes toward Cuban refugees did not seem particularly susceptible to racial partisanship during Carter's tenure either. Blacks were well ahead of whites in opposition to the evacuation of thousands of Cubans to Key West, Florida that began in April 1980: 79 percent wanted the flow halted "until the unemployment rate in the U.S. fell below 5 percent. in comparison to 64 percent of whites (*Gallup*, May 1980).

In 1997, the Clinton administration had not yet provided a real basis for comparison, but reticent African American attitudes toward Bosnia intervention, noted above, did not reflect their overwhelming Democratic partisanship and electoral support for this president. In searching for the attributes of race differences over 1980-1995 foreign policy, disproportions in racial party identification cannot be overlooked entirely. Nevertheless, the subsequent discussion will concentrate on other likely sources, beginning with the important question of African American affinity for the Third World.

Chapter Six: RACE AND AFFINITY: The United States, Africa and the Third World in the Minds of African Americans.

I. Introduction

This chapter looks at empirical evidence from the 1980s relating to how African Americans viewed people of color in other societies, and to their self-identification within American society. It is meant to add to the earlier discussion of African Americans' historical relationships with Africa and their reactions to U.S. policies toward nonwhite nations. Taken together, these chapters contribute to the interpretation of contemporary black foreign policy opinion by dispelling some of the uncertainty surrounding the national and international allegiances of African Americans.

Chapter Two mentions earlier research that found African Americans holding more non-interventionist attitudes about the use of force and more "liberal" attitudes about foreign aid than white Americans. Hero (1969) found that for the 1937-1967 period, blacks seemed more likely than whites to favor traditional aid assistance and non-conflictual relationships with other states, even those commonly held to be U.S. adversaries. Hero also suggested that civil rights, increasing educational levels and urbanization, and the rise in significance of Third World states, would accelerate black foreign policy liberalism. The implication was that political and socioeconomic advancement would encourage a greater African American "cosmopolitanism" that would facilitate identification with Third World struggles for self-determination.

If indeed this was Hero's meaning, the logic is not altogether clear. Why would African Americans continue to be more liberal on foreign policy than whites when a

fundamental basis of this outlook had changed in their favor? Was there something inherent in African Americans as a race that would cause them to be stronger advocates for international cooperation than whites? Was black racial solidarity so strong that it transcended national borders and overpowered privatism? Absent evidence of a “civil rights internationalism” that overshadowed domestic individual and group interests, an equally reasonable expectation might have been for black Americans’ attitudes to converge with those of white Americans over time. If lack of civil rights was the wedge issue underlying divergent racial attitudinal patterns, then conceivably its resolution might not accelerate that trend, but reverse it. It seemed just as likely that blacks might develop more conservative foreign policy attitudes as they became better able to identify positively with American society.

The unstated assumption behind Hero’s postulate was that African Americans invariably held stronger psychological attachments to African and Third World states (and weaker attachments to the United States) than whites. However, we know little about how contemporary African Americans’ views of Africa and the Third World compared with their views of the United States. This is an issue that deserves particular attention because, historically, black leaders justified their stances on international issues in terms that were either afrocentric, nationalist, or sympathetic to Third World self-determination efforts. Nineteenth century “back-to-Africa” initiatives, the Pan-African movement and Garveyism in the early 20th century, and the identification of black nationalists and civil rights activists later on with Third World liberation movements, all suggested an African American affinity for the U.S. that was tenuous. At the same time,

the suggestion was that psychological linkages with Africa were strong.

There is no way to verify absolutely the depth and breadth of past afrocentrism, and we cannot simply assume that it retained the same level of potency over many decades. Black Americans had good reason to embrace their ancestral homeland in past years. But even if African Americans did have stronger psychological linkages with Africa and other societies prior to gaining civil rights at home, such gains could have weakened this affinity because they ameliorated the most severe grievances of the black community. While much remains to be done to bring about racial equality in America, the acute domestic pressures of political disfranchisement, official segregation, legal discrimination, and anti-black violence that led African Americans to seek the embrace and solace of other states in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, were largely absent in the 1980s and 1990s.

In light of these the following questions are relevant:

- (a) Was African American affinity for foreign societies of color so evident in the 1980s and 1990s that it could not be ignored as a possible factor influencing foreign policy attitudes?
- (b) Have African American attitudes during this period been especially favorable toward the kind of “redistributive” and cooperative U.S. policies commonly perceived to benefit such countries?
- (c) Were particular demographic or socioeconomic characteristics associated with the attitudes African Americans held toward their own society, non-white societies abroad, or cooperative foreign policies in general?

Two empirical studies shed light on these questions. The National Black Election Study (NBES) tapped the political attitudes of national samples of African Americans in 1984 and 1988 (see Jackson, Gurin, and Hatchett, 1989; Jackson, 1993). NBES 1984 contains 1150 interviews before and 872 reinterviews after the 1984 presidential election, and NBES 1988 tracked those respondents after the election of that year [see Appendix VI (a)]. These surveys focused mainly on domestic attitudes and political preferences in the context of Jesse Jackson's presidential campaigns rather than on foreign policy, so only a few of the items included bear on the questions above. Nevertheless, as a national survey of a large African American sample, it is a valuable resource.

In 1991, the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (JCPS) published a study of the attitudes toward Africa of a national sample of 150 African Americans prominent in economic, political or social spheres [see Appendix VI (b)]. This leadership survey included some relevant items.

II. African American "Closeness" to the United States, Africa and the Third World in the 1980s and 1990s?

A. African American Identification with American Society, 1984-1988

One analysis of the NBES data found strong evidence of black group identification, solidarity, and a sense of a common fate (see Gurin, Hatchett and Jackson, 1989). Appendix VI © shows that majorities told NBES in 1984 (58 percent) and 1988 (54 percent) that they were conscious of their racial identity, and of sharing a lot in common with other blacks. In 1984, 74 percent of respondents thought that what

generally happened to blacks in this country would affect their lives in 1984: eighty-three percent thought so in 1988. Respondents were also asked: “*which would you say is more important to you -- being black, or being American, or are both equally important to you?*” and the large majority (74 percent) said “both equally.” This strong evidence of black group identification stands in contrast to other indications in the surveys that blacks identified only weakly with American society in general.

Indeed, the statistic just cited could also be interpreted as a sign of overwhelming black ambivalence toward America. Only 14 percent actually thought of themselves as “Americans” first. NBES elicited many other responses suggesting psychological distance between African Americans and the mainstream of society [see Appendix VI (c)]. Between 1984 and 1988, few blacks - less than 30 percent - said they trusted the federal government. Also, there was a strong suggestion of alienation from government: an average of 73 percent felt that it was run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, rather than for the benefit of all the people. Large majorities (81-87 percent) felt they were faring worse in terms of influence (i.e., politically) and economically (about 68 percent) than whites. Only 33 percent felt that whites “wanted to see blacks get a better break”; forty-one percent felt whites didn’t care either way, and 27 percent - that whites “wanted to keep blacks down.”


On the other hand, African Americans did largely identify with the black civil rights movement. As noted earlier, sixty-one (61) percent told NBES 1984 that this movement “affected [them] personally,” And, 66 percent of those tracked and asked the same question four years later gave the same response.

B. Identification With Foreign Non-Whites

A revealing finding by NBES was that there was no indication of exceptional African American warmth toward Africans or people of color in other societies. Figure 5.1 shows how African Americans responded to the NBES 1984 question “*how close do you feel in your ideas and feelings . . . ?*” toward each of the groups depicted.

Surprisingly, after their own group, more blacks (64 percent) reported feeling closer to white Americans than to black Africans (56 percent), or black people from the West Indies (47 percent), or people from Spanish-speaking groups (44 percent). Also, when

Fig. 6.1: African American Affinities for Various Groups, 1984



asked whether or not black children should study an African language, 63 percent disagreed in 1984, and when tracked and reinterviewed in 1988, 70 percent of the same respondents disagreed.

Personal

identification with the civil rights movement, or the conviction that there had been progress in getting rid of racial discrimination in the U.S., did not appear to be positively associated with “closeness” to these groups. As Table 6.1 shows, conviction that progress had been made in ending discrimination since the 1960s seemed to have little

influence on feelings of closeness toward West Indians, black Africans, or Latinos.

A sense of personal benefit from the civil rights movement seemed a little more likely to predict closeness, but the fractions of African Americans feeling distant

Table 6.1: African Americans' Closeness to Various Groups, by Views on Discrimination and Civil Rights

	<i>Percent feeling "not too close" or "not close at all" to . . .</i>				
	West Indians (N=787)	Black people in Africa (N=803)	Spanish speaking groups in the U.S. (N=803)	White Amer- icans (N=818)	Black Amer- icans (N=825)
There has been a lot of progress in getting rid of discrimination over the last 20 years . . .	53%	46%	54%	30%	7%
There <u>hasn't</u> been much real change in ending discrimination over the last 20 years . . .	53	43	57	45	7
The black civil rights movement has affected me personally . . .	49	38	52	38	4
The black civil rights movement has <u>not</u> affected me personally . . .	59	53	62	33	10

(Source: NBES, 1984)

remained quite large in each case. Interestingly, only a third of those African Americans perceiving no personal effect of the civil rights movement said they felt distant from white Americans.

Race consciousness and perceptions of racial solidarity seemed similarly distributed among blacks whether or not they felt close to people of color abroad [see Appendix VI (d)]. Those feeling close were only slightly more likely to feel personally linked to the civil rights movement, and slightly more likely to "think about being black" than those not close to Africans, etc.

Among those feeling distant from foreigners, African American women were more than twice as likely (70 percent) to be represented than men (30 percent). Also, more than half (51 percent) of those feeling “not close” reported that they “hardly ever” thought about race, or about being black, on a daily basis. Otherwise, there were no glaring differences in the internal characteristics of the two “affinity” groups [see Appendix VI (e)]. Their members were just as likely to be of the same economic class, age group, educational level and “urbanicity.”

These data suggest that African Americans, in general, might have been ambivalent about their relationship with American society in the 1980s. Nevertheless, there was little indication of affinity for other societies, and to the degree that it existed, feelings of closeness to foreigners did not seem particularly associated with political outlook, i.e., civil rights consciousness.

C. Attitudes of African American Leaders

The JCPS leadership survey did not investigate affect for American society, nor did it explicitly measure feelings of closeness to Africa and the Third World. Nevertheless, several responses might be relevant here. First, black leaders were strongly internationalist, with 87 percent “agreeing” and “strongly agreeing” that “. . . *black Americans don't pay nearly as much attention to foreign affairs as they should,*” and 99 percent disagreeing “. . . *that they should focus exclusively on domestic issues such as education and civil rights . . .* (Dorn and Carrington, 1991:31-40).¹ Africa was an important focus of this internationalism; fifty-six percent agreed that black Americans

¹ Until otherwise indicated, all subsequent JCPS statistics are taken from the same source.

should be more concerned about Africa than about other world areas. Also, they (89 percent) felt that black political leaders had an obligation to influence U.S. foreign policy on behalf of Africa.

Yet, Africa was not their only concern, nor did the leaders feel that ordinary blacks were particularly close to that continent. A majority of leaders (60 percent) disagreed with the proposition that African Americans had more in common with Africans than they had with white Americans. They split fairly evenly on the question of whether or not “*very few black Americans feel any really close connection to Africa*” with 50 percent agreeing and 45 percent disagreeing.

Dorn and Carrington (1991:22) surmise that these responses might be considered indicators of latent Pan-African sentiment, “the belief in a common culture and political interests” as well as of “American-ness.” Black leaders in the 1990s were just as ambivalent in their identification with Africa as was suggested by the NBES samples.

A sizeable fraction (36 percent) felt that “*black Americans focus too exclusively on Africa*” and should pay more attention to other world areas. Asked to recommend one major change in U.S. foreign policy, only 26 percent said “more focus on Africa” and only 15 percent wanted “more focus on the Third World.” Instead, black leaders seemed more strongly issue-oriented: 59 percent wanted other changes, including reallocation of foreign aid, a stronger U.S. role in the Middle East, improved trade relations, etc.

Finally, the JCPS survey findings were notable for the diversity of concerns held by black leaders in addition to their interest in greater attention to Africa.

III. Were African Americans More Favorable to International Cooperation in Areas Where Race Seemed Salient?

In the domestic context, African Americans strongly felt that their government should support policies of distinct benefit to their group. Including those that were somewhat ambivalent. 61 percent of blacks polled in the 1984 NBES felt that the government in Washington should make some effort “. . . to improve the social and economic position of blacks and other minority groups” in this country. To cite attitudes toward just two related domestic policy areas, African Americans displayed strong support for federal spending on public schools (98 percent wanted spending increased or kept at current levels) and food stamps (89 percent favored increases or maintenance).

A. Aid and Immigration

In contrast, there was less support for policies that would benefit people of color in other states -- assuming that blacks (like Americans in general) mostly believe that the bulk of foreign aid goes as economic assistance to nonwhite Third World states. More than half (57 percent) of those surveyed in the 1988 NBES wanted federal spending on aid to foreign countries decreased (see Table 6.2). Only 11 percent favored an increase, with one-third opting for maintenance of past levels of spending. By contrast, almost 90 percent wanted domestic spending on food stamps either increased or maintained. Whether or not respondents were aware that a good portion of federal defense spending directly benefits other countries, they were three times more likely to favor increases in this area than foreign aid.

Table 6.2: African American Preferences for U.S. Spending on Various Types of Assistance.

	Increased (%)	Kept same (%)	Decreased (%)
Federal spending on foreign countries should be...(n=448)	11	33	57
Federal spending on military defense should be...(n=441)	31	38	31
U.S. spending on the United Nations should be...(n=442)	16	62	22
Federal spending on public schools should be...(n=825)	84	14	2
Federal spending on food stamps should be...(n=815)	49	40	11

(Source: NBES, 1984 and 1988)

Here, however, the possible influence of political context must be acknowledged. The Reagan Administration had been making strenuous efforts for over a year to convince the public of the existence of a “window of vulnerability” in national defense status. This very likely had some impact on blacks, despite their intense disapproval of this president.

While direct foreign aid seemed to have had a weak constituency among blacks, they seemed more generous in another area of cooperation where race is less salient: the U.N. A combined 78 percent wanted federal spending on the United Nations increased or kept the same, and responding to a follow-up question, more than half of those favoring increases (55 percent) said they wanted U.N. spending “increased a lot (NBES, 1988).”

Immigration to the United States in the 1980s was largely a nonwhite phenomenon. Unfortunately, NBES did not extensively probe attitudes in this area and clear immigration preferences are not apparent. However, 78 percent agreed that “people who come to the United States from places like Mexico, Cuba, Haiti and Vietnam are taking jobs away [from black people](NBES, 1984).” This posture among African Americans seemed to mirror generally held attitudes at the time as captured by other polls

(see Chapter Five).

South Africa

Moreover, in the one area related to cooperation where race was clearly the issue in the 1980s--U.S. posture toward South Africa's apartheid regime -- African American opinion displayed only modest intensity. Only a slim majority (55 percent) felt that it was "very" or "somewhat" important "...for black people to bring pressure on Congress to change U.S. policies toward South Africa" in NBES 1984. A surprising 45 percent of respondents either had not thought much about it, or thought such tactics "not too important."

Did Racial "Affinity" Make a Difference?

Feelings of closeness to black Africans, West Indians and Latinos did not appear

associated with

support or non-

support for the

"pocketbook"

cooperative foreign


policies covered by

the NBES. As Fig.

6.2 illustrates, the

distributions of

preferences for U.N.



spending, direct aid and immigration are almost identical for racial identifiers and non-

identifiers.

However, closeness seemed to make a difference to levels of support for political pressure on South Africa to end apartheid. In that case, 66 percent of racial identifiers thought increased U.S. pressure “important,” in comparison to 44 percent of non-identifiers.

Impact of Civil Rights

Were African Americans more sensitive to the personal impact of black civil rights more likely to be “liberal” regarding these areas of government assistance? NBES 1984 found that 64 percent felt that the movement affected them personally and 36 percent did not.

Table 6.3: Preferences for Government Spending Among African Americans, By Personal Identification With the Civil Rights Movement

	<i>Increase spending</i>		<i>Keep it the same</i>		<i>Decrease spending</i>	
	Those Feeling Personal Impact	Those Feeling No Impact	Those Feeling Personal Impact	Those Feeling No Impact	Those Feeling Personal Impact	Those Feeling No Impact
Federal spending on foreign countries should be...(n=439)	8 (%)	16 (%)	30 (%)	37 (%)	62 (%)	47 (%)
Federal spending on military defense should be...(n=805)	23	31	35	39	42	30
U.S. spending on the United Nations should be... (n=433)	14	21	63	61	23	19
Federal spending on public schools should be...(n=825)	86	79	12	17	1	4
Federal spending on food stamps should be...(n=815)	48	52	42	38	11	10

Source: NBES, 1984 and 1988.

Table 6.3 above suggests that civil rights identifiers were slightly less likely to be

favorable toward aid spending, or any of the other areas shown. This contrasted sharply with their position on domestic government action to improve the economic and social lives of African Americans: 56 percent thought that government should play an active role, as compared to 37 percent of those who thought the movement did not affect them personally.

On sanctions against South Africa too, a sizeable majority (64 percent) of “identifiers,” as compared to 45 percent of “non-identifiers,” wanted Congress to do more to oppose apartheid. Civil rights consciousness seemed negatively associated with support for more “redistributive” forms of international cooperation, i.e., outright spending on aid and the U.N., but more positively with political or ideological support.

This pattern is somewhat supported by another question tapping views about progress made over the previous twenty years in ending racial discrimination. (An assumption here is that those reporting “a lot of progress” in this area were more aware of the role of civil rights legislation than those saying “not much real change” had occurred). Slightly larger percentages of those feeling that progress had been made, favored increasing or maintaining levels of spending on the U.N. and foreign aid. Eighty percent of those seeing little change wanted U.N. spending increased or maintained (compared to 75 percent of the others) and 46 percent wanted aid spending increased or maintained, compared to 42 percent of those seeing progress (NBES, 1984).

Domestic “Liberalism”

Half of all African Americans surveyed (50 percent) described themselves as “liberal when it comes to politics” in the 1988 NBES. Indeed, strong preferences for

“liberal” positions on issues like defense spending, government jobs for the unemployed, day care, food stamps, affirmative action, busing and so on, emerged from the survey. For instance, 57 percent of black liberals wanted defense spending cut or kept the same in 1984, compared to 41 percent of black conservatives.

However, domestic liberalism did not seem to translate to foreign policy. NBES 1988 found that 60 percent of black liberals wanted decreases in foreign aid expenditure, with 31 percent opting for maintenance of existing levels and only 9 percent favoring increases. Conservatives actually seemed less intolerant: 51 percent wanted decreases, 37 percent wanted maintenance, and 12 percent wanted aid spending increased.

B. Attitudes of African American Leaders Toward Aid and South Africa

The JCPS leadership sample were substantially favorable toward current (1991) foreign aid expenditures and overwhelmingly interested in a reallocation of aid dollars. Seventy-one (71) percent were at least comfortable with the \$15 billion spend annually on foreign aid -- 37 percent of those wanted increases, and 34 percent thought this spending to be “about right.” When asked to consider that the bulk of this foreign aid budget went to a half-dozen countries, 45 percent thought it should be spread around more evenly among poor countries, and 45 percent that spending should be redistributed and increased.

The survey was conducted shortly after the release of Nelson Mandela from imprisonment in South Africa and the unbanning of the African National Congress. Despite the remarkable progress this signified in the battle to end apartheid, 22 percent of these leaders wanted U.S. sanctions against South Africa strengthened, and 74 percent

wanted them maintained. This stands in contrast to the somewhat lukewarm interest in sanctions within the representative African American samples of the NBES taken years before.

IV. Age, Education, Urbanicity and African American Attitudes

To extrapolate from Hero's insight, age, education and urbanicity are the demographic and socioeconomic factors most likely to liberalize African American foreign policy attitudes in the post-civil rights period. Higher levels of educational achievement and the greater exposure to international affairs and immigrants that comes with urban living, would likely engender the enlightened self-interest that leads to support for foreign aid, U.N. funding, immigration, and so on.

Logically, these attributes should be most evident in the younger, post-civil rights generation. (Indeed, 48 percent of NBES respondents less than 32 years of age either had finished high school or had acquired some college education, compared to 5 percent of those 65 years and older). By similar logic, this younger generation also should identify more strongly with the United States than their elders.

A. How "Ethnocentric" or "Internationalist" Were Younger African Americans?

To take the last of these factors first, there were no indications that youth had an effect on preferences in the foreign policy areas covered by the NBES. Nor was it apparent in identification with American society, or in "closeness" to Africa and the Third World. In fact, younger blacks -- those not yet 18-21 years old in the late 1960s at the height of the civil rights movement -- (i.e., those less than 32 years old when polled in

1984) -- seemed less likely than seniors to feel that the movement made a personal impact.

Table 6.4: African American Closeness to Foreigners of Color and Support for Various Cooperative Policies, by Age Group

<i>Age Group</i>	Close to West Indians (N=800)	Close to Africans (N=818)	Close to Spanish-speakers (N=816)	Increase/maintain UN spending (N=442)	Increase/maintain foreign aid (N=448)	Important to pressure S. Africa (N=840)	Immigrants take jobs from blacks (N=829)
< 32	46%	54%	43%	78%	48%	47%	78%
32-64	47	57	46	77	39	62	71
65 +	53	57	47	79	48	53	64

Source: NBES, 1984, 1988

And, as Table 6.4 shows, young African Americans were as moderately close to foreigners of color, and as moderately supportive of foreign aid as were older blacks.

And, they surpassed their elders in intensity on the issue of the jobs threat posed by immigrants. However, younger blacks were least likely (47 percent) to think it important that efforts be made to apply greater pressure to South Africa in comparison to majorities of older adults (62 percent) and seniors (53 percent).

On the issue of identification, younger and older blacks again appeared to share only a weak to moderate likelihood to think of themselves in racial terms, though each of the age groups shown in Table 6.5 (next page) strongly believed that what happened to other blacks affected their own lives. The table also shows that few in any age group put race above national identity. Interestingly, although younger blacks were roughly similar to their elders in assessment of the importance of the civil rights movement, and of

progress in ending discrimination, they felt less close to whites than seniors who, by virtue of age, were more likely to have experienced personal discrimination.

Table 6.5: African American Racial Group, and American Identification, by Age Group

<i>Age Group</i>	<i>Common Fate: "what happens to other blacks affect me"</i> (N=1079)	<i>Race Consciousness: "I think about being black a lot/often."</i> (N=1116)	<i>Trust govt. only some of the time</i> (N=1115)	<i>Think of self as "black" only, not "American"</i> (N=839)	<i>Feel close to whites</i> (N=834)	<i>Civil rights movement affected me</i> (N=1105)	<i>A lot of progress ending discrimination</i> (N=830)
< 32	72%	30%	74%	14%	59%	56%	52%
32-64	75	32	74	11	65	63	50
65 +	69	20	61	12	77	53	58

Source: NBES, 1984

B. Urbanicity

The following tables reveal that spatial setting influenced some of the distributions of the foreign policy attitudes measured by NBES. On the whole, rural blacks seemed no more parochial or narrowly self-interested than their big-city counterparts. Africans and West Indians were of the same significance to them as was true of urban blacks, though their affinity for Spanish-speaking people was noticeably less - probably due to less exposure to immigrants than city dwellers. But rural blacks were just as intense in supporting UN spending and registered the only majority support for foreign aid (57 percent) of all the settings.

The foreign policy difference that stands out is the much stronger urban interest in applying pressure to South Africa (Table 6.6). Indeed, rural blacks seemed a bit less race-

conscious and politically attuned: they were 10 percentage points less likely than city and

Table 6.6: Spatial Setting and African American Foreign Affairs Outlook, 1984

<i>Location</i>	Close to West Indians (N=803)	Close to Africans (N=821)	Close to Spanish-speakers (N=819)	Increase/maintain UN spending (N=442)	Increase/maintain foreign aid (N=448)	Important to pressure S. Africa (N=843)	Immigrants take jobs from blacks (N=832)
<i>Rural</i>	41%	54%	29%	80%	57%	29%	68%
<i>Small town</i>	47	63	45	79	39	54	65
<i>Small city</i>	47	57	42	78	36	53	67
<i>Suburb</i>	55	51	45	78	48	59	68
<i>Large city</i>	48	54	47	79	44	59	70

Source: NBES, 1984, 1988

suburban dwellers to think often about race, and almost 20 points less likely to identify with the civil rights movement (Table 6.7). Along with small-city blacks.

Table 6.7: Spatial Setting and African American Identification and Political Outlook, 1984

<i>Location</i>	Common Fate: "what happens to other blacks affect me" (N=336)	Race Consciousness: "I think about being black a lot/often." (N=1122)	Trust govt. only some of the time (N=1119)	Think of self as "black" only, not "American" (N=841)	Feel close to whites (N=834)	Civil rights movement affected me (N=1110)	A lot of progress ending discrimination (N=833)
<i>Rural</i>	38%	19%	63%	12%	58%	44%	59%
<i>Small town</i>	50	30	73	15	64	56	56
<i>Small city</i>	36	32	75	11	61	61	44
<i>Suburb</i>	52	32	74	6	67	64	57
<i>Large city</i>	47	29.	72	13	66	60	50

Source: NBES, 1984

rural dwellers appeared somewhat less likely to identify with the race group, lagging about 10 points behind in agreement with the “common fate” measure. Also, they appeared more likely to trust government than other African Americans.

Whether these indications of less political sophistication among rural African Americans are attributable to place, education, access to information, or other factors is an open question. Relative racial isolation might be another important factor; rural blacks registered the least closeness to whites. There is little here to suggest, however, that rural and urban blacks differ greatly in foreign policy preferences.

V. Summary

The two studies examined in this chapter were not tailored to the needs of this project and thus are of only limited value. However, they provide some insight into the world-views of a cross-section of the African American community in the post-civil rights period. While Africa and the Third World seemed to figure prominently in the foreign policy thinking of black leaders, mass outlook was less Afrocentric. On the whole race, in a narrow sense, had little influence on African American judgments of policies involving those regions.

Similarly, the insignificance of civil rights to the distribution of attitudes toward foreign aid, the United Nations and other cooperative policy areas of benefit to underdeveloped states and peoples, indicated an absence of the “latent Pan-Africanism” Hero thought would increasingly liberalize black foreign policy preferences over time.

If African Americans did differ from whites over these foreign policy areas in the

1980s and 1990s, the NBES data suggest that simple racial affinity may not have been a driving force. A degree of racial identification is probably inevitable, but it might be a serious mistake to approach African American foreign policy attitudes entirely from this premise. Very likely, African Americans link historical, political and contextual factors with race in complex ways as they assess U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter Seven: CONSENSUS, POLARIZATION OR WHAT?: A Comparison of Black And White Assessments of Past and Prospective U.S. Uses of Military Force

I. Introduction

Chapter Four's cursory review of post-1980 poll data showed that although attitudes were rarely polarized sharply by race, the intensity with which they were held seemed race-related. Since U.S. coercion and cooperation in that period almost always involved nations of color in the Third World, the previous chapter explored the possibility that racial affinity might have been an important influence on African Americans. However, the data suggested that this was not likely to have been a significant factor. The 1984-88 NBES studies also suggested that civil-rights consciousness did not dramatically shape the attitudes of African Americans surveyed. This chapter uses a survey focusing exclusively on foreign policy attitudes to see whether socioeconomic and political factors other than race promise better explanations of racial intensity differences.

The American Talk Security (ATS) project of 1987-88 surveyed voters' attitudes toward the use of force in United States foreign policy. One set of questions elicited retrospective assessments of the use of force, and another, attitudes toward the prospective use of force to defend friends and allies of the U.S.¹

¹Actual surveys were ATS #9, conducted in Sept. 1988, and ATS #12, completed in December of that year. However, only a few items in #9 were repeated in #12. The relevant survey items are attached in Appendix VII (a).

II. The use of military force in retrospect.

In his landmark book *War, Presidents and Public Opinion*, Mueller (1973) observed that the major feature of retrospective assessment of wars was its “sensitivity to events occurring at the time of the poll (Mueller, p.168).” Military conflict was very topical during the months preceding this survey (done in Oct. 1988). Iran and Iraq were at war and the U.S. Navy had been actively engaged in safeguarding international shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf. Since April of that year there had been several violent incidents involving the U.S. Navy, the worst of which was the accidental downing of an Iranian airliner, killing 290 passengers. Aside from these immediate events, the U.S. had been particularly active militarily in various regions during the 1980s. Most of these actions, and the president who initiated them, were well supported by the general public.


A. Race and Military Force: The Post-World War II Period and the 1980s

President Reagan’s own popularity undoubtedly affected popular judgment of force used in the 1980s. A combined 70 percent felt that either “too little” or the “right amount” of force had been used in the “past few years,” while 65 percent gave a similar response for the entire post-world War II period (ATS #9, 1988: Q.17-18).

There seemed to be a consensus between white and black Americans as to military force used since World War II. This survey item did not name specific conflicts, but only about 20 percent of either group thought too much force had been used. Given the generally militaristic prevailing climate, this retrospective popularity was not surprising (see Mueller, p. 172.)

However, Figs. 7.1 and

Fig. 7.1: Retrospective View of Overall Use of Force (Blacks, N=92)
 Source: ATS #9: Q.17, 18.



7.2 indirectly illustrate another contextual factor. Reagan's greater support among white Americans. Blacks were more critical in assessing the 1980s. Altogether, 58 percent were pro-force: 28 percent thought that the "right amount" of force had been used, and 30 percent said "too

little." In contrast, more than 70 percent of whites polled either favored the force used, or thought it inadequate.

Fig. 7.2: Retrospective View of Overall Use of Force (Whites, N=849)
 Source: ATS #9: Q.17, 18.



Questions about specific interventions revealed consistency in racial differences in support. Disregarding the ambiguous Lebanon mission, blacks were almost always more likely lag behind whites in enthusiasm for the interventions of the 1980s. Indeed, blacks

seemed almost twice as likely to oppose the 1986 Libya bombing, and much more

Table 7.1: Attitudes Toward Past Uses of Force, by Race

Military force since WWII*	<i>Too much:</i> Whites: 27% Blacks: 22%				
	<i>Right amount:</i> Whites: 34% Blacks: 33%				
Military force in the past few years (1980s)**	<i>Too much:</i> Whites: 19% Blacks: 27%				
	<i>Right amount:</i> Whites: 47% Blacks: 28%				
<i>Specific Event</i>	<i>Should Have (%)</i>		<i>Shouldn't Have (%)</i>		<i>Index of Dissimilarity [Should have]</i>
	(Whi)	(Blks)	(Whi)	(Blks)	
U.S. participation in Korean War	62	53	23	39	9
Cuban blockade during missile crisis in 1962	78	70	9	14	8
U.S. participation in Vietnam War	29	29	64	62	0
Sending of peacekeeping force to Lebanon in 1982	55	58	35	33	3
Invasion of Grenada in 1983***	58	45	31	44	13
Bombing of Libya by U.S. Navy and Air Force in 1986****	67	52	24	40	15
Shootdown of Iranian civilian airliner in 1988^	68	53	22	32	15
<p>For race: * Chi-square= 3.99, $p=.40718$; ** Chi-square= 14.8633, $p=.00499$; *** Chi-square= 7.2560, $p=.06417$; **** Chi-square= 20.4698, $p=.00014$</p> <p>^Source: ATS #8, Q.35. (White N=879, Black N=72). The question was: "do you think the U.S. ship was justified in shooting down the airliner, or not?"</p> <p>Source of other statistics: ATS #9, Q.20-24A. (White N=849, Black N=92).</p>					

ambivalent about the Grenada invasion, as well as the USS *Vincennes* shootdown of the Iranian civilian airliner in 1988.

Statistically, race seemed weakly associated with judgments of events in the distant past, but more strongly associated with assessments of more recent events (see Table 7.1). On the other hand, this was not so apparent for Grenada despite the fact that

the observed responses showed more pronounced black disapproval.²

B. The “Lessons” of Vietnam

Public attitudes toward the Vietnam War have been analyzed contemporaneously (e.g., Mueller, 1973) and retrospectively (e.g., Holsti and Rosenau, 1984). Many of the latter studies distilled “lessons” for future policy makers. For instance, Holsti and Rosenau surveyed large samples of American leaders in 1976 and 1980, and posed about thirty lessons “often cited in debates about the implications of the war and the future conduct of American foreign policy (Holsti and Rosenau, 1984:187). Based on the responses, these authors were able to rank the Vietnam lessons.

In essence, three conclusions have become widely accepted. First, the war was fought for political purposes never really made clear to the American public, hence, they never committed to the effort. Lesson: the goals of future interventions must be explained, and public support enlisted. Second, democracies do not like to fight long wars. Support invariably erodes over time and as casualties mount. Television journalism is a major catalyst in this regard. Lesson: the U.S. should either avoid open-ended interventions, or intervene with decisive force to end the war quickly. The third lesson is that there should be an intimate understanding of the situation -- the underlying historical, political and cultural issues -- prior to involvement. Depth of local resistance and appropriate war-fighting tactics could then be identified (see Snow, 1987:139).

² Since tests of statistical significance, such as the chi-square used here, are not very discriminating for samples larger than 100. Weak relationships may seem statistically significant in typical national samples 1,000 or more (see Weisberg and Bowen, 1977: 166). Thus, measures of association given in this and later chapters should be seen as more advisory than explanatory.

ATS #12 tested statements related to the first two “lessons” of Vietnam and a few others. Table 7.2 (next page) shows that while blacks and whites generally agreed with the main lessons, and to a lesser extent with others mentioned, racial opinions differed in intensity in some cases.

Blacks were less convinced that the U.S. should refrain from supporting an undemocratic ally. They were also more skeptical of information provided by policy makers involved in conducting a war, and doubted that future involvement in a ground war in Asia was prudent. Whites more strongly rejected the latter, as well as the general notion that the U.S. could not prevail in guerrilla conflicts (57 percent disagreed).

Table 7.2: Racial Reactions to Statements About the Vietnam War


“Lessons of Vietnam”	% Agree		Dissimilarity (Whi - Blk)
	Whi.	Blks.	
<i>... that the U.S. govt. must have the support of all its people in order to wage a war against another country.</i>	75	69	6
<i>...that we should NOT send troops to support an ally govt. that does not have the support of most of its own people.</i>	75	60	15
<i>We lost the Vietnam war because American political leaders did not give U.S. armed forces the full support they needed to win.</i>	69	60	9
<i>...that U.S. officials deeply involved in conducting the war cannot be trusted to give reliable information to the public.</i>	68	78	-10
<i>...that the U.S. should not fight a war except to repel an invasion of our own country.</i>	46	50	-4
<i>...we should never again fight a ground war in Asia.</i>	40	55	-15
<i>The Vietnam war showed that the U.S. cannot fight and win a guerilla war.</i>	38	46	-8
<i>... that if we are ever again to fight a tough war, we will maintain the resolve necessary to win only if we STOP TV from bringing the horrors of combat into the living rooms of America.</i>	36	44	- 8
			Av: - 1.9
Source: ATS #12, 1988, Q.38-45. (White N=862; Black N=80)			

Blacks and whites took the same ambivalent stance on the isolationist proposition that the U.S. should only fight to defend its own borders. And also like whites, African Americans engaged in the paradox of criticizing political leaders for failing to prosecute the Vietnam war vigorously, and at the same time for conducting the war without sufficient public support.

Overall, African Americans seemed to derive two “lessons” to a greater extent than whites: the U.S. government’s official justifications for the use of force could not be trusted, and the U.S. lacked the capacity to win a Vietnam-type ground war.

III. Prospective Uses of Force: Defending Friends and Allies.

Confirming the findings of other research (e.g. Rielly, 1987), the ATS surveys found both blacks and whites strongly disinclined toward military intervention on behalf



of endangered friends and allies.

Majorities consistently opted to “stay out” when presented

hypothetical scenarios involving

the invasion of close allies such

as Saudi Arabia, Israel, or

Honduras by states often

portrayed as unfriendly, or even

hostile, to the United States. Only

small minorities would recommend sending U.S. troops (Fig. 7.3). Slightly larger

percentages would send military supplies, and the majority of interventionists would only go as far as application of diplomatic pressure to the aggressor.

However, in his analysis of 1981 data, Benson noted that “anti-interventionist sentiment is far from uniform among demographic groups...and whites [were] more likely than blacks to opt for the use of troops (Benson, 1982: 594).” Confirming this, African Americans seemed much more non-interventionist in 1988 as well. Almost half of the black ATS sample consistently wanted to “stay out” of each hypothetical conflict, and those for intervention lagged behind whites in willingness to send U.S. troops (Fig. 7.3). Also, whites were almost always more likely than blacks to favor diplomacy and the provision of military supplies.

A supposed Warsaw Pact invasion of the West elicited the most interventionist responses, though considering America’s historical commitment to defend West Berlin, support was weak. Overall, 38 percent of Americans told ATS #9 that a Soviet/East German invasion would warrant sending U.S. troops, but while 41 percent of whites would support this option, only 26 percent of blacks would do so (ATS #9, Sept. 1988: Q.41). [As will be seen later, this was the only scenario under which a higher ratio of blacks (27 percent) than whites (23 percent) favored the use of diplomatic pressure].

Other allies fared quite poorly, as Fig. 7.3 illustrates. Making little distinction among our friends, over 80 percent would neither send troops to help Israel repel Arab invaders, Saudi Arabia fight an Iranian invasion, nor Honduras resist an invasion by Nicaraguan government forces. More distant allies like Poland, Taiwan and Pakistan were even less likely to gain military support if invaded; indeed in each of these three

cases, more than three-fourths of either race said that, at most, the U.S. should use diplomacy, if not stay completely uninvolved (ATS #9, Q.36, Q.39, Q.40). Once again, African Americans typically opposed sending troops to a greater degree.

Table 7.3: Whites and Blacks Willing to Send Troops to Defend Allies, 1981 and 1988

	Soviets invade W. Berlin	Arabs invade Israel++	Soviets invade W Europe	N.Korea invades S.Korea	Cubans take over C.Amer. state	US Embassy employees again held hostage	Soviets invade Poland
	1981 88	1981 88	1981 88	1981 88	1981 88*	1981 88	1981 88
Whites	51% 41%	28% 19%	56% -	22% -	44% 19%	66% -	26% 8%
Blacks	15 26	12 16	17 -	10 -	23 9	44 -	8 13

Source: Benson (1982: 595) and ATS #9. 1988. Benson's statistics are from a Feb.14, 1981 Roper survey, where the item was: "There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations..."

++ Race was weakly associated with these items in ATS #9. e.g., for Israel and race, chi-square = 13.8819, p=0.01638


* The ATS #9 scenario was a Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras to attack contra bases.

Comparison with Benson's 1981 data suggests a racial trend. As Table 7.3 (above) shows, even a 1981 "hot button" issue like the taking of American embassy personnel as hostages failed to arouse comparable racial support for using U.S. troops. Though that scenario drew a plurality of black (44 percent) support for force, they still fell 22 percentage-points behind whites.

A. Impact of More Information on Willingness to Send Troops

When (in ATS #12) four of these scenarios were made more realistic -- that is, with the allies requesting U.S. assistance, and information about possible negative

Fig. 7.4: Effect of Information on Willingness to Send U.S. Troops
 Sources: ATS #9, Q.35-41 (little inform.); ATS #12, Q.33-36 (more inform.)



consequences of U.S. inaction -- there was slightly greater willingness to send troops overall (see Fig. 7.4).

However, this did not always eliminate racial differences over sending troops. The prospects of “Arab forces invad[ing] Israel with the intention of establishing an Arab state...” and “Nicaraguan troops cross[ing] the border into Honduras to destroy Contra rebel bases....” combined with pleas for U.S. help, encouraged about 40 percent of blacks and whites to support sending troops. On the other hand, knowledge that (hypothetically) “Iran invade[d] Saudi Arabia to gain control of Persian Gulf oil supplies...” found black support for using troops lagging behind that of a slim white majority (50 percent). This racial gap seemed even wider when the situation was “Soviet and East German forces invad[ing] West Berlin to make West Berlin part of the communist bloc...”: 58 percent of

whites opted for sending U.S. troops, compared to 35 percent of African Americans (ATS #12, Dec. 1988). While in the more informed Israel and Nicaragua scenarios similar fractions of blacks (b) and whites (w) determined that sending troops would not be “worth the costs (Israel: b-46 percent; w-44 percent, Nicaragua: b-54 percent: w-49 percent)” the percentages were (b) 53 and (w) 28 for the West Berlin case (ibid.).

The fact that better information caused convergence in racial support for using force in all but the Berlin scenario raises interesting questions for other research. A relevant issue here is whether, given better information, membership in particular socioeconomic or other sub-groups tended to be more significant to the level of support for force than race.

IV. Impact of Socioeconomic and Political Factors on Retrospective Views of Force ³

One of the axioms about public attitudes is that they are influenced by socioeconomic and political factors. In a summary statement in his landmark *The American People and Foreign Policy*, Gabriel Almond concluded that:

one may classify young people, women, the upper-income groups, the college-educated, and the urban population as more inclined to foreign policy idealism, optimism, and internationalism. The older generations, the males, the lower-income groups, those with grade school education, the rural population, tend to be more inclined to cynicism, pessimism, isolationism, and nationalism (Almond, 1960:134).

Of course Almond meant this as a generalization, noting that age, sex, class, and other


³ Since these attitudes are explicitly retrospective, “age” is one of the analytical categories included in this section. However, subsequent socioeconomic analyses will not include age. Political party will also be omitted in future due to very small Republican representation among African Americans.

influences greatly overlapped and that, in the aggregate, members of these categories display more similarities than differences in attitudes (ibid.). Nonetheless, if one's research focus is the social or political group such differences become important. In general, higher-income, better-educated liberals tend to be more internationalist and less militaristic than other Americans. Men tend to favor force more than women, and whites more so than blacks (see Wittkopf, 1982:286). The issue here (and in the following chapters) is the extent to which social and political constraints hold for African Americans.

A. Income

Fig. 7.5: Opposition to Past Uses of Force, by Race and Income

Source: ATS #9, (Q.17-24A).



The higher the income category of white Americans, the less was the likelihood that they would oppose force. This trend in opposition to force did not always hold for blacks (Fig. 7.5). The tiny subsample of blacks earning \$50,000 or more (seven, compared to 131 whites) limits speculation, but when we exclude that category, income trends in

black opposition seemed less predictable. Regarding past uses of force, moderate-income blacks (earning \$26-50,000) frequently seemed more likely to oppose intervention than those with lower incomes (< \$26,000). As Fig. 7.5 illustrates, this was never true of whites surveyed by ATS. More detailed income statistics are presented in Appendix VII (b).

Education

At each educational level, and in virtually every case, white Americans surpassed African Americans in levels of support for force.⁴ The pattern was more apparent among the better-educated than among those with, at most, a high-school education (see Figs. 7.6 and 7.7, next page). The cases of Vietnam and Lebanon proved to be exceptions, however.

Although the Vietnam war received the least support in each educational category, less-educated blacks far outstripped similar whites, and better-educated blacks and whites, in support for U.S. involvement. The Lebanon troop deployment of 1982-83 created another anomaly. This ATS survey came five years after the devastating October, 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Polls taken right after the event (e.g., *Gallup*, Oct., Nov., 1983; CBS News/ *New York Times*, February 1984) found whites divided, while 60 percent majorities of blacks considered the deployment to have been a mistake. Yet this survey found less-educated blacks almost twenty percentage-points more likely than similar whites to support the mission, while better-educated

⁴ In ATS #9, the chi-square association between education and the item measuring attitudes toward force used since 1980 was 33.9505, $p=0.0006$.

blacks appeared less supportive than comparable whites.

Fig. 7.6: Support for the Use of Force, by Race and Education
 Respondents with High School Education, or Less (White N=341; Black N=48)





Fig. 7.7: Support for the Use of Force, by Race and Education
 Respondents with Some College Education (White N=389; Black N=36)



As the following table shows, whites of different educational levels recorded negligible dissimilarities on these items while blacks differed by 27 points on Vietnam

Table 7.4: Dissimilarity Indices Relating to Retrospective Support For Force, by Race and Education

Survey Items (8)	Whites vs. Blacks	High* Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
"Right amount" of military force since WWII	1	-5***	-11
"Right amount" of military force in the 1980s++	19	-3	-6
Support U.S. participation in Korean War	9	6	-7
Support Cuban blockade during missile crisis in 1962	8	1	5
Support U.S. participation in Vietnam	0	-1	-27
Favor sending of U.S. peacekeeping force to Lebanon in 1982	-3**	1	-17
Support invasion of Grenada in 1983	13	2	0
Support bombing of Libya by U.S. Navy and Air Force in 1986	15	7	9
Averages	7.8	1	-6.8
<p>++In the sample, the chi-square association between race and this item was 14.8633, $p=0.0049$. * Here, and in subsequent dissimilarity tables "high education" means attainment of more than high-school education; "low education" means high-school or less. (Postgraduates are omitted because of small African American representation in ATS samples). ** Negative signs in this column indicate differences favoring blacks. *** Negative signs in the education columns indicate differences favoring less-educated respondents.</p>			

and 17 points on Lebanon. It also illustrates that internal differences by education among African Americans were comparable, on average, to differences between the racial groups on the whole.⁵

⁵ Statistically, education seemed significantly associated with views on past force, e.g., the Grenada invasion Chi-square=22.7000, $p=0.0061$; the Libya bombing - 21.1159, $p=0.0121$; force since WWII - 32.8403, $p=0.000$.

The pattern just described applied more strongly to assessments of the lessons of Vietnam. Table 7.5 shows that, on average, lesser- and better-educated African Americans were almost twice as likely to disagree over these lessons as comparable whites. And, they were more than five times as likely to disagree compared to whites and blacks in general.

Table 7.5: Dissimilarity Indices Relating to “Lessons” of Vietnam, by Race and Education*

Survey Items (8)	Whites vs. Blacks	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
... that the U.S. govt. must have the support of all its people in order to wage a war against another country.	6	-6	-11
...that we should NOT send troops to support an ally govt. that does not have the support of most of its own people.	15	-3	-5
We lost the Vietnam war because American political leaders did not give U.S. armed forces the full support they needed to win.	9	1	-14
...that U.S. officials deeply involved in conducting the war cannot be trusted to give reliable information to the public.	-10	1	-7
...that the U.S. should not fight a war except to repel an invasion of our own country.	-4	-16	2
...we should never again fight a ground war in Asia.	-15	-13	-22
The Vietnam war showed that the U.S. cannot fight and win a guerilla war.	-8	-1	-9
... that if we are ever again to fight a tough war, we will maintain the resolve necessary to win only if we STOP TV from bringing the horrors of combat into the living rooms of America.	-8	-9	-17
Average	-1.9	-5.8	-10.4
* See notes in previous Table.			

One lesson that seemed to divide Americans more along educational than racial lines was that the U.S. should never again fight a ground war in Asia. Less-educated


respondents were much more likely to hold this view, particularly blacks. The latter also felt most strongly that (a) the U.S. government should seek their support before waging war, (b) the U.S. lost the war because political leaders failed to support the military fully, and (c) that television coverage of the conflict undermined public support.

C. Sex

White men appeared more likely to support force than black men. Fig. 7.8 illustrates this difference in every instance except the Lebanon mission -- a mission that the Reagan administration described to the public in non-coercive terms.

As might be expected, men generally were more likely to opt for force than women. Still,

while this was invariably true for the white sample, African American women occasionally displayed greater preference for force. Fifty-two



percent of black men opposed the Grenada invasion and 43 percent supported it; only 36 percent of black women opposed it and 46 percent were in support, with 18 percent saying “don’t know.” Similarly, there was a seventeen-percentage-point difference in

gender opposition to Vietnam: 54 percent of black women said the U.S. should not have participated, while 71 percent of black men gave that response. Again, a sizeable fraction of black women -- 16 percent -- expressed uncertainty, so these "differences" are open to question.

Indeed, the gender gap for both groups seemed more attributable to greater female willingness to give a "don't know" response. Whether this was more a result of unawareness, rather than informed judgment, is hard to say. All that can be noted is that women of neither race displayed a consistently greater tendency to give "don't know" as an answer.

D. Party Identification/Political Viewpoint

Again as might be expected, Republicans and conservatives showed higher levels of support for these ventures than Democrats and liberals. The latter were more likely to assert that too much force had been used in the past. Confirming a well-known fact, most of the ninety-two blacks surveyed (72 percent) identified themselves as Democrats; only 7 percent claimed to be Republicans. A slightly larger fraction (15 percent) said they were Independents. On the other hand whites (n=849) distributed more evenly by party -- 35 percent Republican, 30 percent Democrat, and 28 percent Independent. Given subsample sizes, the only useful racial comparison here might be between black and white Democrats.

White and black Democrats (see Table 7.6) reacted to the general retrospective questions on past uses of force in patterns consistent with the broad postures of their

Table 7.6: Attitudes of White and Black Democrats to Past Uses of Force


	"Too little" force since WW II	"Too little" force in the 1980s	"Should have...."			
			Participated in Vietnam	Sent Marines to Lebanon	Invaded Grenada in 1983	Bombed Libya in 1986
Whites (n=252)	29%	26%	26%	51%	49%	56%
Blacks (n=66)	36	33%	35	59	53	53
Source: ATS #9. 1988, (Q. 17-24A)						

racial groups (as shown in Figs. 7.1 and 7.2). However, for the specific events cited, the intensity of black Democrats' pro-force attitudes sometimes seemed slightly greater than white Democrats' and closer to those of whites in general.

Unlike party identification, numerical distribution in the sample by political viewpoint -- liberal, conservative and moderate -- was racially quite similar. Almost half of each racial group described themselves as "moderates," about 30 percent said they were "conservatives," and a minority (about 17 percent) described themselves as "liberals." These ideological labels appeared more significant than race to views about U.S. participation in Vietnam. Just 16 African Americans called themselves "liberals" in contrast to 150 whites, and they seemed more pro-force than whites.

White liberals were twice as likely as black liberals to say that "too much" military force had been used "since World War II," and "in the last few years." Just 27 percent of white liberals thought "too little" force had been used compared to almost half (44 percent) of black liberals, who were also more likely to state that the "right amount" of force had been applied.

Black and white moderates and conservatives were more alike on these questions, except that black conservatives displayed a much greater tendency toward ambivalence (Fig. 7.9). Fifteen (15) percent of black conservatives chose the conditional response “depends” for the WW II question, compared with just 3 percent of whites. More than twice as many (11 percent) gave this answer to the ‘use of force in the past few years’ question (ATS #9, Q. 17, 18). Evaluations of the Cuban naval blockade of 1962 showed a similar non-racial, ideological trend.



However, the influence of a political viewpoint was not as noticeable for other actions. The Korean intervention, Grenada invasion, Libya bombing, and Lebanon peacekeeping mission all encouraged somewhat divergent racial responses. In the three clear cases of coercive intervention, white support across viewpoints displayed the expected gradient: liberals were most likely to oppose force, conservatives were most likely to be supportive and moderates fell somewhere in between. Not only was the ideological gradient less apparent for blacks, they also registered double-digit differences

Table 7.7: Race and Past Uses of Force, By Political Viewpoint

	Korea Intervention			Grenada Invasion			Libya Bombing			Lebanon Peacekeeping		
	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK
<i>Liberals:</i>												
White (n:150)	53	31	15	44	45	11	58	35	7	43	46	11
Black (n:16)	50	31	19	44	56	--	56	44	--	75	19	6
<i>Conservatives:</i>												
White(n:295)	66	19	15	69	23	8	76	15	9	62	29	9
Black (n:27)	59	33	7	44	33	22	59	30	11	56	26	19
<i>Moderates:</i>												
White (n:368)	62	24	14	55	32	13	64	29	8	52	36	11
Black (n: 44)	52	36	11	46	46	9	48	46	5	55	41	2

(Source: ATS #9. Q. 20, 21, 23, 24).

in support and opposition within ideological categories (see Table 7.7 above).⁶

E. Region

On the whole, southerners in this sample were more likely to favor past uses of force than respondents from other states. In racial group terms, southern whites tended to surpass everyone else in this regard. However, there often seemed to be a clearer difference between southern blacks (n=30) and other blacks (n=62), than between southern (n=181) and non-southern whites (n=668).

For instance, a combined 73 percent of southern blacks thought the U.S. had used either “the right amount” or “too little” force since World War II, in contrast to 64 percent

⁶ It is important to note that statistically, political viewpoint was consistently associated with force preferences in ATS #9. For example, for the “force since WWII” item chi-square was 45.1574, DF: 16, p=.0001; for Libya, it was 41.8061, DF: 12, p=0.0000; and for Grenada, 36.3112, DF: 12, p=0.0002.

of other blacks surveyed. For white Americans, the corresponding values were 64 percent and 65 percent, respectively. On the "Cuba," "Grenada," and general "recent use of force" questions, southern blacks also showed a greater likelihood to support force than other blacks (though they did lag behind on the "Libya" and "Vietnam" questions).

On the other hand, while a slim majority of whites (southern: 54 percent, others: 55 percent) supported the Lebanon peacekeeping mission of 1982, a majority of southern blacks (50 percent) said they did not. Sixty-five (65) percent of other blacks favored the mission.


F. Age

For white Americans, disapproval of past uses of force tended to be low to moderate (except for Vietnam) in all age groups, with youths and seniors slightly more likely to disapprove. Majorities in each age range opposed the Vietnam intervention and those older and younger again seemed to hold this view more strongly. Also, young whites were about 10 percentage points more likely than older whites to oppose the Lebanon deployment.

Age did not appear to be associated with black opposition in the same way. Young blacks and whites seemed similar on the summary questions and on Korea and Cuba. But young blacks more intensely disapproved of Grenada and Libya, and far less intensely of Vietnam, than young whites (Fig. 7.10). Young blacks also lagged behind in rejection of the Lebanon operation. Older blacks sometimes seemed more intense than younger blacks in their opposition to force -- particularly to Vietnam -- but overall, differences are not strongly suggested [see Appendix VII (b)]. The only consistency was

in the stronger likelihood of greater African American disapproval rates in each age range and circumstance (with the exception of Lebanon, where the opposite appeared true).

Fig. 7.10 illustrates the lack of a consistent age trend among African Americans.



V. Impact of Socioeconomic and Political Factors on Views Toward Prospective Uses of Force

Of the factors examined, willingness to approve of the use of U.S. troops in the hypothetical crises posed in the ATS surveys seemed most consistently associated with race. Presumably, the West Berlin and Israel scenarios would have been most resonant across the two groups so they are singled out for closer scrutiny here.

Table 7.8: Racial Dissimilarities in Support for Intervention Scenarios

	N		<i>If Warsaw Pact invades W. Berlin..</i>				<i>If the Arabs invade Israel...</i>			
	Wh.	Blk	Stay Out	Diplo- macy	Military Supplies	Send Troops	Stay Out	Diplo- macy	Military Supplies	Send Troops
Education			%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
H.S. or less	373	52	17*	0	0	6	22	12	6	1
Coll. grad or less	357	32	17	4	5	20	9	6	1	7
Income										
Under \$15,000	132	31	16	5	4	14	18	5	16	6
\$15-25,000	166	27	16	9	4	17	6	9	5	1
\$26-50,000	329	22	1	5	10	2	20	11	2	6
Over \$50,000	131	7	5	23	1	25	3	1	15	10
Sex										
Male	402	42	5	6	9	13	13	7	4	1
Female	447	50	15	2	5	15	22	14	9	3
Viewpoint										
Liberal	150	16	10	2	11	4	13	6	2	5
Conservative	295	27	22	14	8	28	27	15	2	18
Moderate	368	44	10	2	8	13	11	8	11	11
Region										
South	181	30	6	9	1	12	8	6	1	2
All other states	668	62	21	1	1	26	24	11	7	6

Source: ATS #9, Q. 35, 41
* For clarity, dissimilarities due to higher black response are highlighted; other s denote higher white response.

Table 7.8 shows racial dissimilarities in responses to all the intervention options presented in ATS #9 -- troops, diplomacy, military aid, non-involvement -- in each socioeconomic and political category. Assuming that these statistics accurately reflect the two communities, the overall picture is one of pervasive African American preference for non-involvement, and greater white willingness to send troops.

The West Berlin scenario generated more consistent racial divergence. Across socioeconomic and political lines blacks disproportionately favored staying out, while

whites opted for sending troops by similar margins. Though not shown above, this was also apparent in ATS #12 where more detailed scenarios were provided. There, white men (65 percent) surpassed black men (47 percent) and white conservatives (64 percent) surpassed black conservatives (18 percent) in willingness to send troops to defend West Berlin.

In the Arab-Israel scenario, African Americans seemed more strongly in favor of remaining uninvolved, but were not too distant from whites on sending troops.

Table 7.9: Dissimilarity Indices Relating to Sending Troops to Defend Allies, by Race and Education

Survey Items (7)	Whites vs. Blacks*	High vs. Low Educ. Whites	High vs. Low Educ. Blacks**
Soviets invade West Berlin	15	10	-4
Arabs invade Israel	3	7	-1
Nicaraguan invasion of Honduras to attack <i>contra</i> bases	10	3	-1
Soviets invade Poland	-5	-3	8
Iran invades Saudi Arabia	8	4	8
People's Republic of China invades Taiwan	1	0	0
India invades Pakistan	1	0	4
Average	4.7	3	2
* Negative signs in this column indicate differences favoring blacks.			
** Negative signs in the education columns indicate differences favoring less-educated respondents.			

Finally, taking all the intervention scenarios into account, education appeared to have little impact on the internal distribution of willingness to send troops to help U.S. allies, for either blacks or whites (Table 7.9). The average racial dissimilarity score (4.7) was actually higher than either racial score for educational dissimilarity. Nevertheless,

the pattern of dissimilarities again confirm that African Americans were generally less supportive of sending troops overseas.

VI. Summary

Few sweeping observations can be made about these racial data as patterns of African American opinion were not readily discernible. Statistically, associations between race and the force variables in ATS #9 were a mixed bag.

Yet white attitudes seemed to fit into familiar molds: Men and conservatives favored military force more than women and liberals: Vietnam was a mistake -- its lessons for the U.S. were "don't go to war without the full support of the American people." "make sure that the ally being defended has full domestic support." and "don't send the U.S. military to war and then tie its hands:" and, better-educated whites seemed more willing to use the military to protect strategic interests.

Ostensibly, African American assessments sometimes fit these patterns, but frequently varied as well. Taken altogether, comparisons of the racial data seemed to reinforce Page and Shapiro's observation that whites and blacks were "parallel publics," in that their views displayed similar direction on most foreign policy issues. There appeared to be neither consensus nor sharp polarization, but rough congruence. However, on the basis of simple percentage point dissimilarities, the gap widened and narrowed somewhat, depending on the issue.

Assessments of past uses of force saw several fluctuations in its magnitude. The groups were quite close in their evaluations of pre-Vietnam militarism, but that conflict

and the interventions of the 1980s strained and occasionally disrupted racial congruence. While African Americans disapproved of the Vietnam intervention to the same degree as whites, they seemed to draw slightly different lessons from it. Those were that the U.S. government could not be trusted to “level” with the public in those situations, and that the U.S. could not win such wars in the Third World. Whites tended to believe that the problem was more a matter of national resolve.

Events such as the Grenada and Libya interventions and the Iranian airliner shootdown appeared to divide blacks to a greater extent than whites, majorities of whom supported these actions. And on the whole, it was not so obvious that racial views of these more recent events shared a common direction.

When socioeconomic factors were controlled, several “anomalies” emerged. For instance, while African Americans disproportionately identified as “Democrats” and “liberals” these labels did not seem to carry the same significance as they do for whites. In fact, these blacks frequently seemed more interventionist in the 1980s than similar whites -- during conservative, Republican presidential administrations.

Also, youth and older age appeared associated with greater white willingness to challenge the propriety of military force. Whites in the middle age ranges -- where pragmatism tends be stronger -- were more likely to support military solutions. Yet such patterns were not as evident for African Americans. Finally, educational attainment often seemed to divide African Americans more sharply than it did whites. Indeed, in some cases, such as assessments of the Vietnam conflict, differences between better- and less-educated blacks appeared to account for much of the overall racial difference.

**Chapter Eight: COGNITIVE CORRELATES OF RACIAL SUPPORT
FOR THE USE OF FORCE**

I. Introduction

Aside from scenarios involving specific allies, the ATS surveys probed attitudes toward the appropriateness and costs of using force to defend other American strategic interests, attitudes toward involvement in Third World conflicts, and views on the effectiveness and morality of various U.S. force options. Other researchers have investigated attitudes related to some of these issues. Rielly (1987; 1991) and Schneider (1992) have used quadrennial surveys of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) to describe trends in public and leadership attitudes toward intervention, and to identify the public's foreign policy priorities. However, ATS is particularly valuable for its probes of intervention preferences from cost, morality and effectiveness standpoints.

This chapter examines how race related to preferences for defending established U.S. interests and responding to conflicts in the Third World. It also examines racial attitudes toward the various costs associated with using force, as well as assessments of the effectiveness and morality of the various coercive foreign policy options available to the U.S. [see Appendix VIII].

II. Defending Established Interests

The public appeared more willing to use military force when U.S. territory or well-known interests were at stake, than in defense of strategic allies. For instance, 71 percent of Americans would commit the military to defend the Panama Canal, 67 percent

would do so to preserve naval access to the Persian Gulf, and 57 percent would send troops to defend minor American possessions (with small populations and no military bases) in the Pacific (ATS #9, Q42, Q44, and Q45). (The latter scenario was posed to test a hypothetical

situation similar

to the British

defense of the

Falklands in

1982). In


contrast, there

was little

appetite for

defending

military bases in nations that did not want them there.



As Fig. 8.1 shows, almost two-thirds of whites (60 percent) and blacks (69 percent) stated that those bases would not be worth the cost (Q.46). Racial preferences for most of the other scenarios were also similar. One possible exception was the Panama scenario where although racial attitudes about sending troops were quite similar -- more than half of whites and blacks were in support, and about one-third of each group felt it was "... not worth the cost in money and lives" -- a much larger majority of whites (73 percent) than blacks (58 percent) would send the military to Panama to secure the Canal. Twenty-seven (27) percent of blacks viewed it as too costly, compared to just 16 percent

of whites.

Preservation of U.S. naval access to the Persian Gulf also drew slightly different racial reactions. About 68 percent of whites would commit the military for this purpose compared to 54 percent of African Americans. Also, the latter seemed much more likely (36 percent) to consider such action not worth the cost than whites (21 percent).¹

III. Appropriate U.S. Responses to Third World Conflicts.

The survey data revealed little appetite for direct military involvement in conflicts in Third World countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, even if “key American officials believed that our interests...were seriously threatened (ATS#9, Q.60-64).” Whites and blacks were very close in showing a high level of support for humanitarian, diplomatic, and indirect military involvement (see Fig. 8.2). Humanitarian and diplomatic strategies elicited close to 90 percent support from each group.

The two races also were not far apart in more modest support for joint military intervention, i.e., intervention as part of a coalition of allies. Sixty (60) percent of whites and 59 percent of blacks were prepared to consider joint intervention (14 and 9 percent, respectively, gave conditional approval).²

Both groups (whites: 70 percent; blacks: 78 percent) would “send American military advisors to help the side we support recruit and train local troops (ATS #9,

¹ For the most part, statistically, race seemed only weakly associated with these preferences in the sample. The strongest chi-square measure was for Panama (11.1277, DF: 4, p=0.0251)

² In ATS #9, race and these intervention preferences were weakly related statistically. The strongest association was between race and the item for sending U.S. troops (chi-square=10.7143, DF: 6, p=0.0976).

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
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Q.63).” Similar majorities would send military supplies and advisors solely to help with maintenance and use of equipment (Q.62).

However, each firmly drew the line at private or foreign sponsorship of Third World factions favored by the U.S. Perhaps reflecting awareness of the Iran-contra affair, both groups rejected (whites: 70 percent; blacks: 77 percent) the proposition that the unpopularity of such Third World wars with the American public, and their brutality, justified such strategies (ATS #9, Q.67).

The interesting differences were that blacks were 48 percent in favor of sending



U.S. troops to the Third World compared to 36 percent of whites, and while blacks were split over seizing opportunities

for “easy victories” in these regions (40 percent for, 49 percent against, 9 percent undecided) 72 percent of whites did not see this as “good idea.” On balance, African Americans appeared less reluctant to use military force in less developed countries. A solid majority (61 percent) agreed with the proposition that the U.S. invest several billion dollars in “equipment that could give us the winning edge in jungles, deserts, or


mountainous areas -- the kinds of areas where these wars are often fought (ATS #9. Q.69)."

IV. Costs of military intervention

At the aggregate level there was close to racial consensus on the importance of cautionary and risk factors presented in ATS #9 as likely public considerations when the

use of force was imminent. Almost everyone in the sample felt that the prospect of American casualties, and the likelihood of civilian casualties in the conflict area, would be

**Fig. 8.3: Considerations for Using U.S. the Military, by Race
Percent saying "very important" (ATS#9, 1988)**



"somewhat." or "very" important factors in their own decision-making (see Fig. 8.3). The length of the conflict, the prospect of involvement by another superpower, and support by the American public, were other important factors for well over 80 percent in each group. As Fig. 8.3 illustrates, equally sizeable majorities would also consider violations of international law, the possibility of mission failure, and the posture of the

U.S. Congress, if they had to make a decision about military intervention.

The illustration also reveals that the hierarchy to these critical factors differs by race. American casualties and the lives of civilians in the combat zone are most important to both, although black concern (92 percent - U.S. casualties; 85 percent - civilians) is a bit more pervasive than among whites (85 percent - U.S. casualties; 78 percent - civilians). Public support for using military force is next for both groups: about 70 percent considered it "very important." However, African Americans seemed to attach the same high level of importance to the prospects that the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China might get involved (blacks: 72 percent; whites: 67 percent), or that the conflict might become protracted (blacks: 70 percent; whites: 59 percent).

One interesting racial difference related to cost in dollars. Both races largely viewed this as important, but 63 percent of blacks thought it "very important" compared to just 41 percent of whites. Blacks were also more concerned about the dollar implications of mission failure than white Americans: 55 percent of whites thought the possibility of failure very important compared to 64 percent of blacks. For African Americans, financing and failure surpassed questions of allied support and international law in importance.³

V. The Effectiveness and Morality of Coercive Options

ATS #9 presented a range of force options for dealing with other nations, and

³ Dollar cost was the only variable significantly associated with race (chi-square= 17.2935, p=0.0039). The "mission failure" item was relatively unrelated (chi-square= 4.2399, p=0.5154).

asked respondents for assessments of their effectiveness and moral acceptability. In general, Americans were more prepared to view diplomatic, political and economic measures, rather than force, as effective strategies. Majorities or large pluralities felt that cutting aid (Q.31), imposing trade restrictions (Q.27), getting the help of allies to apply pressure (Q.32), and working through U.S. ambassadors or representatives (Q.34) were very effective ways of exerting influence on other nations. Naked force, such as various military options, covert activities and the threat of nuclear weapons, were rated less effective.

All the options considered very effective were also largely viewed to be moral. Not surprisingly, nuclear threat, covert operations and bombing raids received the highest moral unacceptability ratings. Fig. 8.4 (below) shows black and white effectiveness ratings from both moral acceptability and unacceptability standpoints.

Racial trends were similar: blacks and whites thought direct force to be less effective and moral than other means. However, African Americans appeared slightly more convinced than whites of the efficacy of military force (like bombing and sending troops) than of less drastic measures (such as diplomacy and international sanctions).⁴

Interestingly, despite a greater reluctance to send troops overseas (noted earlier), African Americans were somewhat more likely to feel they would be effective.


When all “effective” responses were combined, blacks and whites

⁴ Statistically, race seemed weakly associated with these items. For troops, chi-square was 4.1751, DF: 8, $p=0.8409$, and for international sanctions, 11.3452, DF: 7, $p=0.1242$

overwhelmingly thought applying trade sanctions and allied and diplomatic pressure on

Fig. 8.4: Effectiveness and Morality of U.S. Coercive Options, By Race.

Source: ATS#9, 1988, Q25-34 (White N=849; Black N=92)



adversaries would yield results. Yet interestingly, larger fractions of blacks felt moral qualms about those options. Though the numbers were small, African Americans displayed twice as much moral discomfort or uncertainty with these less violent coercive options. In contrast, they matched whites in moral discomfort with the military options.

For the use of allied diplomatic pressure the “immorality” ratio was: whites 7 percent, blacks 14 percent; for diplomacy, it was: whites 6 percent, blacks 11 percent; for international sanctions: whites 7 percent, blacks 16 percent; for trade sanctions, the ratio was: whites 8 percent, blacks 16 percent, and for ending aid: whites 14 percent, blacks 23 percent. Comparable statistics for more forceful measures were all much closer racially, as illustrated by Fig. 8.4.

VI. Impact of Socioeconomic and Political Factors on Force Considerations

A. Defending U.S. Interests

Socioeconomic status and political ideology appeared to make little impact on the previously observed pattern of willingness to send troops to defend U.S. interests. The perceived vital interests -- Middle East oil and the Panama Canal -- were more likely to lead blacks and whites in all categories to support intervention, than more remote ones (e.g., America's Pacific possessions). And in most categories, blacks were moderately more likely than whites to say armed intervention was not worth the cost. Nevertheless, taken altogether, the indices of dissimilarity (IDs) revealed some interesting patterns. Looking at the double-digit IDs (Table 8.1, next page), three trends seem important.

Firstly, there was a noticeable gap between blacks and whites over Panama in every category. Whites in this survey considered the Panama the most defensible of the U.S. strategic interests presented, African Americans seemed more prepared to say this interest was not worth fighting for. Seemingly black posture had little to do with black liberalism or Democratic partisanship.⁵ In fact, black liberals were almost four times less likely than white liberals to advocate non-intervention. Lower education was associated with the largest disparity (ID=22) between the races.⁶ Table 8.2 presents a more complete breakdown of the Panama data.

⁵ Political viewpoint appeared statistically independent of this Panama item (Chi-square =14.2927, DF: 16, p = 0.1691).

⁶ Attitudes toward defending U.S. interests in Panama appeared associated with education (chi-square = 21.2489, DF = 12, p = 0.0468) in the sample, though the strength of association could be debated.

Table 8.1: Willingness to Commit Military to Defend American Interests, by Race and Socioeconomic Status

	Percent saying "not worth the cost" to send U.S. military to . . .								N W (Blk)
	(a) Defend unwanted military bases		(b) Protect Mideast oil supply		(c) Protect US Pacific possessions		(d) Protect US interests in Panama		
	%Wh	%Blk (ID)*	%Wh	%Blk (ID)	%Wh	%Blk (ID)	%Wh	%Blk (ID)	
Sex									
Male	58	64 (6)	31	36 (5)	31	38 (7)	15	26 (11)	402 (42)
Female	60	72 (12)	35	38 (3)	28	32 (4)	17	28 (11)	447 (50)
Income									
< \$15,000	61	68 (7)	38	39 (1)	27	39 (12)	18	29 (11)	132 (31)
\$16-25,000	66	59 (7)	40	37 (3)	28	30 (2)	14	26 (12)	166 (27)
\$26-50,000	61	82 (21)	30	41 (11)	32	27 (5)	17	27 (10)	329 (22)
Party									
Democrat	67	68 (1)	33	32 (1)	33	36 (3)	21	27 (6)	252 (66)
Viewpoint									
Liberal	64	56 (8)	41	13 (28)	35	31 (4)	23	6 (17)	150 (16)
Conservative	54	85 (31)	28	41 (13)	28	30 (2)	13	33 (20)	295 (27)
Moderate	65	64 (1)	34	43 (9)	30	36 (6)	16	30 (14)	368 (44)
Education									
HS or less	59	69 (10)	30	40 (10)	26	33 (7)	13	35 (22)	373 (52)
Some coll.	59	69 (10)	35	31 (4)	31	38 (7)	18	19 (1)	357 (32)
Post-grad.	67	63 (4)	35	38 (3)	37	38 (1)	17	13 (4)	111 (8)
Region									
South	32	50 (18)	53	53 (0)	85	87 (3)	76	73 (3)	181 (30)
Other states	43	69 (26)	56	69 (13)	84	95 (13)	78	90 (12)	668 (62)
* Index of Dissimilarity									
(Source: ATS #9, Q. 42-46)									

Table 8.2: Racial Dissimilarities in All Responses to Panama Scenario

	Commit U.S. Military to protect Panama Canal...					
	Not Worth Cost	Depends	Send Troops	Not Worth Cost	Depends	Send Troops
Education				Political viewpoint		
H.S. or less	22	0	23	Liberal	17	8 24
Coll. grad or less	1	6	7	Conservative	20	1 25
				Moderate	14	4 23
Income				Political Party		
Under \$15,000	11	1	11	Democrat	6	2 13
\$15-25,000	12	1	18			
\$26-50,000	10	0	6	Region		
Over \$50,000	31	4	33	South	3	4 15
				All other states	12	1 16
Sex				Highlighted dissimilarities denote greater black preference; others indicate greater white preference. Note: Racial Ns for each ATS #9 sub-category are presented in Fig. 8.3		
Male	11	1	15			
Female	11	3	16			
(Source: ATS #9, Q. 42-46)						

A second striking feature in Table 8.1 is the counterintuitive pattern in ideological responses. As just noted, black liberals were overwhelmingly interventionist on Panama. This held true for Mideast intervention as well. Black liberals exceeded white liberals -- 69 percent to 42 percent -- in willingness to commit the U.S. military to protect Mideast oil supplies, surpassing even white conservatives (56 percent) in intensity on this issue. Curiously, it was blacks labeling themselves conservative who often seemed most opposed to these intervention scenarios. In the Panama case, black conservatives were twice as likely as whites to oppose sending troops. For all the scenarios, black liberals and conservatives disagreed among themselves to a greater degree than white liberals and conservatives.

Thirdly, regional differences seemed to matter. Southerners were less likely to

diverge in the intensity of their isolationism in these cases, even over Panama (ID=3). On the other hand, blacks and whites in other states displayed racial gaps similar to the national racial distributions. Overall, the degree of regional disagreement was consistently greater among African Americans, than among southern and non-southern whites.

B. Third World Intervention

From the percentage distributions, militaristic posture toward developing countries in general did not seem somewhat associated with race, but not in the expected manner. Blacks surpassed whites in preference for forceful U.S. intervention in Third World low-intensity conflicts in almost every socioeconomic and demographic category. Responses to the two most militaristic Third World intervention options posed in ATS #9 -- introduction of U.S. combat troops, and the seizing of easy military victories (such as in Grenada) when the opportunity arose (Q.64, 66) -- illustrate this racial pattern (Table 8.3, next page).⁷

Self-identified black liberals seemed particularly hawkish. They were the most likely to approve of sending U.S. troops, surpassing white liberals (ID=36) and white and black conservatives by roughly the same margin (about 20 points). However it was black conservatives who most thought it a “good idea” to grab easy military victories.

More than half of black Democrats surveyed (53 percent) approved of sending troops, far surpassing similar whites (ID=20) and exceeding even white Republicans.

⁷ For “seizing easy victories” and race, the chi-square association was 10.9712, DF: 4, p=0.0268; for “troops” it was 10.7143, DF: 6, p=0.0976.

Table 8.3: Distribution of Approval for Using U.S. Troops and Seizing Easy Military Victories in the Third World, by Socioeconomic Status, Politics, Region & Race

	Approve sending U.S. troops			Good idea to grab easy US victory				Approve sending U.S. troops			Good idea to grab easy US victory**		
	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)		%Wh	%Blk	(ID)	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)
Sex							Viewpoint						
Male	38	41	(3)	24	45	(21)	Liberal	27	63	(36)	23	38	(15)
Female	35	54	(19)	26	49	(23)	Conserv.	41	44	(3)	24	52	(28)
							Moderate	37	46	(9)	26	36	(10)
Income							Education						
<\$25,000	39	50	(11)	29	48	(19)	HS or less	41	52	(11)	31	40	(9)
\$25-50,000	37	46	(9)	24	36	(12)	Coll. or less	34	42	(8)	21	47	(26)
> \$50,000	28	29	(1)	21	0	(21)	Post-grad	25	50	(25)	21	13	(8)
Party							Region						
Republican	46	50	(4)	25	33	(8)	South	36	43	(7)	25	50	(25)
Democrat	33	53	(20)	28	36	(8)	Other states	36	50	(14)	25	36	(11)
Independ.	30	36	(6)	24	50	(26)							

** Viewpoint and this item seemed statistically related: chi-square = 58.0895. p = 0.0000.
Source: ATS #9, Q. 64, 66. (See Fig. 8.1 for Ns.)

The other striking difference was that African American women seemed most pro-force on this issue; almost half preferred that option, handily surpassing white men and women, and exceeding black men by a smaller margin.

African American enthusiasm for these Third World options should not be overstated despite its consistency. Intensity of approval ranged from low to moderate in most social and political categories. Nevertheless, white support for these options was consistently low. Altogether, this picture contradicts earlier impressions of racial interest in fighting wars in the Third World. According to the two groups' interpretation of the Vietnam lessons, their preferences should have been reversed.

C. Cost Factors

Social location and political outlook seemingly had little impact on racial assessments of the human costs of using force. There was the appearance of racial consensus on the importance of avoiding casualties both among U.S. military personnel and innocent civilians in the Third World. Apart from a few exceptions, the racial intensity gap on these items appeared to be small: IDs ranged from 0 to 14, for the most part.

Socioeconomic variables appeared more strongly associated with the distribution of racial attitudes toward the more "bottom line" issues of the dollar costs and mission failure. Between the racial groups, there were consistent gaps. Table 8.4 shows that most of the IDs on that item were larger than 20.

The price tag for intervention in a Third World conflict was not very important to a majority of whites in categories other than the very poor and the least educated. And even in those cases, white majorities were slim, as Table 8.4 shows (next page). On the other hand, African Americans were quite cost-conscious. Blacks in every sub-group were very likely to care about intervention dollar costs, and though internal income and education effects seemed evident, they appeared weak.⁸ For instance, while there was a 21-point dissimilarity between low and moderate income whites over the importance of cost, there was just a five-point difference between similar blacks. Between blacks and whites in the lower-to-moderate income range (\$16-25,000) the ID was 30. However,

⁸ As noted above, race and the views relating to the cost of intervention seemed related (chi-square: 17.2931, p: 0.0039). Income and education showed very strong association with this intervention variable as well (income: chi-square=62.7727, p = .00004; education: chi-square = 51.4673, p = .00001)

low education did seem strongly associated with dollar-cost concern (and concern about mission failure) among African Americans.

Table 8.4: Selected Factors and Costs in Using Force, by Race and Socioeconomic Categories

	(a) % saying "cost in dollars very important."			(b) % saying "possibility of failure very important."			(c) % saying "U.S. casualties very important."			(d) % saying "civilian casualties very important"		
	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)	%Wh	%Blk	(ID)
Sex												
Male	36	62	(26)	55	67	(12)	81	88	(7)	73	74	(1)
Female	46	64	(18)	55	62	(7)	88	96	(8)	82	94	(12)
Income*												
< \$15,000	57	61	(4)	58	61	(3)	83	87	(5)	85	87	(2)
\$16-25,000	40	70	(30)	60	74	(14)	83	93	(10)	78	82	(4)
\$26-50,000	36	55	(19)	57	59	(2)	86	96	(10)	78	77	(1)
Party												
Democrat	44	65	(21)	59	65	(6)	90	92	(2)	84	86	(2)
Viewpoint**												
Liberal	43	75	(32)	46	69	(23)	89	94	(5)	81	94	(13)
Conservative	41	63	(22)	59	59	(0)	82	89	(7)	72	82	(10)
Moderate	39	59	(20)	56	66	(10)	86	96	(10)	82	86	(4)
Education***												
HS or less	50	71	(21)	62	71	(9)	87	92	(5)	80	88	(8)
Some college	37	56	(19)	54	58	(4)	83	92	(9)	76	78	(3)
Post-grad.	23	50	(27)	39	50	(11)	81	100	(19)	75	100	(25)
Region												
South	32	50	(18)	53	53	(0)	85	87	(2)	76	73	(3)
Other states	43	69	(26)	56	69	(13)	84	95	(11)	78	90	(12)
<p>* The association between income and item (a) was 62.7727, DF: 25, p= 0.0004 ** The association between viewpoint and item (a) was 37.3187, DF: 20, p= 0.0107 ***The association between education and item (a) was 51.4673, DF: 15, p= 0.0001</p>												
Source: ATS #9, Q. 64, 66. (See Fig. 8.1 for Ns)												

Finally, the political picture was again curious. Black liberals (71 percent) appeared almost far more cost-conscious as white liberals (43 percent) and there were 20-point racial gaps between conservatives and moderates as well.

D. Effectiveness and Morality of Force

It was difficult even to speculate about the impact of socioeconomic and political factors on differences in racial views of the efficacy and morality of military versus non-military coercion. Earlier, I observed that blacks as a group appeared to favor military force over diplomatic and other forms of pressure to a greater degree than whites, but this seemed to vary when factors in addition to race were controlled. On the surface, the racial pattern seemed to hold strongly within sex, regional, political viewpoint and party categories, but not as clearly within educational and income groups.

When education was controlled, blacks with no more than high-schooling appeared less enthusiastic about sanctions and diplomacy than similar whites, and the two groups held about the same posture on force. But college-educated blacks appeared more favorable to sanctions and diplomacy, and less likely to approve of more violent measures, than similar whites (Table 8.5, below). The Table shows that education might be strongly associated with these variables in the public.

Within income groups, lower-income whites and blacks seemed to share a consensus of ambivalence toward sanctions and solid approval of diplomatic pressure. But for blacks, skepticism about sanctions persisted across incomes, while the likelihood of white approval increased with income. However, confidence in air raids and sending U.S. troops remained modest across racial and income groups.

Viewed from most of these sub-group perspectives, blacks seemed only marginally more likely than whites to accept and approve of air raids and the use of

Table 8.5: Percentages Saying “Very Effective and Morally Acceptable” to Various Force Options, by Race and Socioeconomic Categories

	(a) International sanctions		(b) Diplomatic pressure		(c) Air raids*		(d) Send troops+	
	%Wh	%Blk(ID)	%Wh	%Blk(ID)	%Wh	%Blk(ID)	%Wh	%Blk(ID)
Sex								
Male	52	50 (2)	70	60 (10)	38	41 (3)	73	74 (1)
Female	59	46 (13)	71	62 (9)	27	34 (7)	82	94 (12)
Income								
< \$16,000	49	48 (1)	68	71 (3)	29	42 (13)	36	45 (9)
\$16-25,000	63	48 (15)	74	48 (26)	31	41 (10)	42	44 (2)
\$26-50,000	60	41 (19)	70	68 (2)	31	32 (1)	41	32 (9)
Party								
Democrat	62	44 (18)	70	59 (11)	33	42 (9)	39	49 (10)
Viewpoint								
Liberal	63	44 (19)	70	63 (7)	29	3 (2)	28	56 (27)
Conservative	53	37 (16)	71	59 (12)	36	33 (3)	48	44 (4)
Moderate	59	57 (2)	72	64 (8)	30	43 (13)	38	37 (1)
Education								
HS or less	30	19 (11)	42	29 (13)	21	33 (12)	28	31 (3)
Some college	31	33 (2)	41	44 (3)	23	17 (6)	24	17 (7)
Post-grad.	30	38 (8)	38	38 (0)	19	0 (19)	20	0 (20)
Region								
South	32	37 (5)	45	37 (8)	20	20 (0)	27	17 (10)
Other states	30	21 (9)	40	36 (4)	22	26 (4)	24	26 (2)
Associations with race: (a) Chi-square = 11.3452, p = 0.1242 (b) Chi-square = 19.2265, p = 0.0075; (c) Chi-square = 4.4188, p = 0.8175, (d) Chi-square = 4.1751, p = 0.8409 *Association with education: Chi-square = 42.0322, p = 0.1280 +Association with education: Chi-square = 41.3880, p = 0.1510 Source: ATS #9, 1988, Q. 25 - 24.								


troops. Again, however, black liberals stood out, recording the only majority finding (56 percent) that using U.S. troops was effective and moral. In this regard they showed twice the intensity of white liberals, and surpassed all conservatives.

Another finding deserving comment was that although white women strongly agreed (82 percent) that troops were an effective and moral foreign policy option, African

American women were almost completely supportive (94 percent).

Effectiveness, Morality and Gender

“Morality” and “effectiveness” are complex, normative concepts which, though not defined in the ATS survey protocol, were used in a seven-point scale [see Appendix VIII]. Whatever their understanding of the scale gradations, two-thirds of blacks and




whites seemed to feel that non-military approaches were moral and effective. Among the more “hawkish” one-third of Americans, however, blacks seemed a bit more favorable toward direct military force. And, much of this was attributable to black females.

Fig. 8.5 illustrates that black men were least confident about the effectiveness of American troops, and black women, most confident. Unlike white women, black women matched men in general in positive assessment of bombing raids, and surpassed everyone else in confidence in the effectiveness of foreign troops. Nuclear coercion was the only

strategy for which their effectiveness rating lagged behind the others.

However at the same time, African American women were among those most likely to state that force was morally unacceptable (Fig. 8.6). The diagram also suggests



that African American men and women were more likely to view most of the coercive options as “immoral.” By gender, whites surpassed blacks in moral disapproval of only three of the ten options presented: white women registered the highest levels of disapproval of U.S. troop deployment and nuclear threat, and also exceeded black women in disapproval of covert operations. Otherwise, gender seemed less relevant to these normative judgments than race.

VII. Summary

Looking at the surface distributions, there appeared to be enough racial variation within socioeconomic and other categories to justify investigation of the possibility that assessments of the strategic, cost and normative implications of U.S. coercion were shaped by race, to some degree. ATS #9 confirmed the American public's reluctance to send troops or use force in most scenarios and majorities of blacks and whites took that stance. It is important to reiterate that to the extent that force was recommended, African Americans did not lag far behind whites in willingness to use it.

However, black support was lower in intensity than whites' by small but consistent margins, independent of most constraining factors examined. African Americans were less prepared to send U.S. troops to secure American possessions and protect interests "important to American prosperity and security." The clearest illustration of this related to possible intervention in Panama.

However, there is an important qualification. In the handling of Third World conflicts, diplomatic, humanitarian and other non-force options received high approval by all. The idea of sending U.S. troops into those situations was much less popular, but African Americans appeared less reticent. Putting aside possible reasons for greater white reluctance, the fact that black approval was almost 50 percent calls for a closer look at their motivations. One observation is that even if African Americans did identify with the Third World on racial, cultural or political levels, that did not eliminate a predisposition to use force in those regions.

Indeed, ATS #9 indicated that blacks may have been more prone to base their

assessments on pragmatism in these cases. They were much more concerned about the dollars gambled on such operations, and somewhat more concerned about getting into protracted conflicts, and about mission failure. Furthermore, African Americans solidly favored investment in the kind of military force that could win such wars.

Another set of cautionary findings relate to normative views of the range of U.S. coercive options. Although the meanings attached to these values are not obvious, both groups considered indirect coercion more “effective” and “moral” than outright military force. But blacks were consistently more prone to viewing all force options as immoral, even when they surpassed whites’ in judging an option effective.

A final general observation is that military coercion resonated differently with black and white liberals. Since, statistically, political viewpoint appeared strongly associated with some of these force options, understanding this difference is important. Given the common conception of the label, black “liberals” often contradicted expected patterns by seeming the most militaristic. This was also observable in their assessments of past uses of force (Chapter Seven). Past research has shown that standard ideological dimensions are less useful explanations of foreign affairs attitudes. Perhaps race, with its unique domestic and international implications, is one important reason.

Education and The Racial Intensity Gap

Dissimilarity measures bolster the impression education did not influence willingness to use U.S. troops overseas more strongly than race, though again, education and several of these variables were somewhat associated in the sample. The individual and average racial IDs reflected stronger white preference in this regard. The average

score (7.6) was approximately four times the size of white ID by education (2) and eight times the one for blacks (0.8). However, the individual scores show that education was more likely to divide blacks than whites.

Table 8.6 Indices of Dissimilarity Between (a) Blacks and Whites and (b) Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Education, by Willingness to Commit Military to Defend U.S. Interests

Survey Items	Whites vs Blacks	High* Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
U.S. military bases in unfriendly nations	6	-3	-3
Mid-East oil	-1	-1	8
U.S. Pacific possessions	4	-2	-13
U.S. access to the Persian Gulf	14	-1	-2
Defend the Panama Canal	15	-2	14
Averages	7.6	- 2	0.8

Indices in Table 8.7 support observations that whites were more reticent about using force in the Third World. The average racial intensity gap (ID=6.6) was solidly in the direction of blacks. However, the education indices also hint at an overall education, rather than race effect in this area. The less-educated were more pro-force and may have been more represented among African Americans.

Table 8.7: Indices of Dissimilarity . . . by Support For Military Options in Handling Third World Conflicts

Survey Items (5)	Whites vs Blacks	High* Educ. vs Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
Send military advisors to help side we support train local troops	-8	-5	-11
Send U.S. troops	-12	-7	-10
U.S. intervention as part of allied coalition	-4	-5	-10
U.S. should seize opportunities for easy military victories	-15	-10	7
Private/foreign sponsorship of pro-U.S. factions	6	-2	-11
Averages	-6.6	-5.8	-7
* See Table 6.7			

Table 8.8: Indices of Dissimilarity . . . by Moral Acceptability of Force Options**

Survey Items (5)	Whites vs. Blacks	High* Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
International sanctions	6	1	14
Diplomatic pressure	5	-1	15
Air raids	-3	2	-16
Using U.S. troops	3	-4	-14
Using foreign troops to fight in place of Americans	-5	-7	-7
Averages	1.2	-1.8	-1.6
** Respondents saying option was "very effective and morally acceptable."			

However, note that better- educated blacks exceeded less-educated blacks in willingness to grab easy Third World victories.

Table 8.8 (above) suggests that these judgments also might be driven more by

education than race among African Americans. Average dissimilarity indices show little variation, but less-educated blacks differed in direction from those with at least some college.

Taking the diplomatic and military options separately, whites showed no variation by education on diplomacy and those less-educated were only slightly more pro-force, on average. But for blacks, the corresponding differences were quite sharp: a diplomacy ID by education would equal almost 15, and a force ID slightly more than 12 points.

Education seemed an important factor in cost judgments. On average, less-educated respondents seemed more dollar-cost conscious. Yet by race, the gaps between them and the better-educated were not of the of same magnitude. Less-educated blacks attached more significance to cost than similar whites and seemed largely responsible for the large racial difference overall (ID=22). The pattern was similar, though less pronounced, for the “mission failure” factor.

Table 8.9: Indices of Dissimilarity . . . by Costs of Using Military Force**

Survey Items (4)	Whites vs. Blacks	High* Educ.. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ.. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
Cost in dollars	-22	-13	-25
Possibility of failure	-9	-8	-13
U.S. casualties	-7	-4	0
Civilian casualties	-7	-4	-10
Averages	-11.3	-7.3	-12.0
**Respondents saying cost “very important”			

Together, these divergences over expenditure and failure contributed significantly to a


sizeable average ID of 11.3 (Table 8.9).

Chapter Nine: THE APPROPRIATE USES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

I. Introduction

In the previous chapter black and white Americans ranked the use of nuclear threat lowest in effectiveness and moral acceptability as a foreign policy tool. Three kinds of nuclear scenarios were posited in ATS #9, and three months earlier, in ATS #6: (a) retaliation for an attack on the U.S. itself, (b) retaliation for an attack on an ally, and (c) tactical or strategic use of nuclear power to determine the outcome of a military conflict (see Appendix IX). Predictably, support for using these weapons was strongest in the first instance, when American soil or troops were attacked or endangered, and


weakest in the second, where American allies were the ones attacked (see Fig. 9.1).



There was popular reluctance to employ this type of force even in the face of aggravating and seemingly justifiable

circumstances, such as a nuclear strike on one American city. Only full-scale nuclear attack on the United States seemed likely to move a sizeable majority to call for nuclear

retaliation: under virtually every other scenario, majorities or pluralities wanted the government to “use other means” to resolve the problem.



However, a majority perceived deterrence value in having nuclear weapons. ATS #12 found that 59 percent of Americans (whites - 60 percent, blacks - 54 percent) believed that the only purpose


of the United States’ nuclear arsenal is deterrence. Larger majorities thought nuclear weapons had been essential in preventing a major world war (whites: 75 percent, blacks: 66 percent). Still, more than one-third in each group did not believe the deterrence argument, with blacks (40 percent) finding it slightly less credible than whites (35 percent)[ATS #12, Q.46 and 47].

Interestingly, even a scenario reminiscent of the U.S. war in the Pacific in 1945 did not resonate strongly with whites or blacks in ATS #9. Presented the option of using nuclear weapons to end a drawn-out, costly war 58 percent of whites and 63 percent of blacks recommended “other means (Q.82).” Though, when the issue was framed in ATS #12 as “do you feel it was necessary and proper for the U.S. to drop atomic bombs on

Japan during World War II, or do you think we were wrong. . .”, a large majority of all Americans (65 percent) said it was necessary (ATS #12, Q.57). Still, whites (68 percent) were more likely than blacks (56 percent) to hold this view, and less likely to say that it was wrong (whites - 22 percent, blacks 34 percent).

II. Use of Nuclear Force In the Third World

There was only one more instance of apparent racial difference in these surveys.



Black Americans in ATS #9 were nearly twice as likely as whites (40 percent to 24 percent) to recommend nuclear force if a “Third World nation, which is an American ally, is attacked by

another Third World nation with nuclear weapons (ATS #9, Q.85).” ATS #6 (Q.45d) posed a slightly different Third World scenario that also drew greater African American support for nuclear strikes: “the U.S. is involved in a long, drawn-out war fighting communism in a Third World country. Some advisors think using nuclear weapons will end the conflict quickly and decisively in our favor...” This proposition drew 31 percent

white and 59 percent black support. Fig. 9.2 illustrates the racial distributions on this issue in the two surveys.

III. The Impact of Socioeconomic and Other Factors on Racial Nuclear Force Attitudes

The socioeconomic breakdown in Table 9.1 (next page) reinforces the impression that there was little enthusiasm for using nuclear weapons even in the most tempting circumstances. Yet, when racial dissimilarities were sizeable, African Americans tended to be more in favor of this option. Controlling for education, gender, political posture and region found that blacks seemed more likely to want retaliation in kind if an American ally in the Third World was attacked with nuclear weapons by another Third World state. Across all categories racial IDs were 11 or more, suggesting a distinct gap. African American men and women also seemed more interested in retaliation if U.S. troops were attacked with tactical nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, in response to another Third World item -- willingness to use nuclear weapons to end a protracted Third World conflict -- race appeared largely insignificant. Better-educated blacks may have been less likely to find the option acceptable than similar whites (ID=12), otherwise dissimilarities seemed negligible. Basically, this was the World War II - Japan scenario, though the question was framed in the abstract: "should the U.S. use nuclear weapons to end a long, costly war (ATS #9 (Q.82))." When the issue was posed with specific reference to Japan in another survey

Table 9.1: Willingness to Use Nuclear Weapons in Selected Scenarios**

			<i>Use nuclear weapons if....</i>							
			(I) US ally attacked with nuclear weapons by another Third World nation		(II) US city destroyed in nuclear attack, but attacker will NOT use any more nuclear weapons		(III) US troops subjected to limited nuclear attack in combat		(IV) US in costly, long war in the Third World	
			%Wh	% Blk (ID)	%Wh	% Blk (ID)	%Wh	%Blk (ID)	%Wh	% Blk
Sex	Ns									
Male	402	42	28	43 (15)	39	45 (6)	43	60 (17)	32[76] 29[70]*	
Female	447	50	21	38 (17)	28	26 (2)	28	44 (16)	25[60] 24[46]	
Education										
HS or less	341	48	27	46 (19)	31	33 (2)	43	44 (1)	30[66] 31[60]	
Some Coll.	386	36	23	36 (13)	36	39 (3)	48	56 (8)	31[70] 19[44]	
Viewpoint										
Liberal	150	16	20	31 (11)	29	44 (15)	41	13 (28)	25 31	
Conserv.	295	27	26	59 (33)	35	33 (2)	52	59 (7)	32 22	
Moderate	368	48	24	36 (12)	33	34 (1)	45	64 (19)	28 30	
Party										
Democrat	252	66	22	42 (20)	31	33 (2)	43	46 (3)	26 32	
Republican	298	6	27	33	38	67	53	83	32 17	
Region										
South	181	30	19	43 (24)	34	33 (1)	48	47 (1)	37 30	
Other sts.	668	62	26	39 (13)	33	36 (3)	46	53 (7)	26 17	
<p>[]* percent saying it was necessary for the U.S. to drop atomic bombs on Japan in WWII (ATS #12, Q.57. (White males: n=417; white females: n=445; black males: n=36; black females: n=44 White "HS or less": n=377; black "HS or less": n=47; white "college or less": n=398; black "college or less": n=25)</p> <p>** <u>By race</u>, Chi-square for item (I): 20.0941, p= 0.0004; (II): 3.1597, p= 0.5314; (III): 6.8151, p= 0.1459; (IV): 6.1625, p= 0.1873 <u>By education</u>, Chi-square for item (I): 20.5260, p= 0.0577; (II): 33.9869, p= 0.0006; (III): 35.0457, p= 0.0004; (IV): 24.5632, p= 0.0170</p> <p>Other data source: ATS #9, 1988, Q. 78, 79, 80, 85</p>										

(ATS #12) the responses were largely very supportive (see Table 9.2). Again, though, educated blacks differed, this time a bigger margin (ID=26).

Once again, black liberals stood out. They seemed extraordinarily disinterested in retaliation for an attack on U.S. troops despite responding “normally” to the other scenarios. Southern blacks and black conservatives also handily exceeded similar whites (ID=24 and 33, respectively) in willingness to retaliate unconventionally in the Third World.

IV. Deterrence and “First Use”

Obviously, there is a contradiction between white Americans’ firm agreement with the bombing of Japan and equally firm disagreement with a nuclear solution to a hypothetical, but similar, situation. An obvious explanation is that Japan attacked the United States in World War II. Another could be that the global nuclear context was different; there was no danger that the Japanese could retaliate in kind against American cities. Once the nuclear age reached maturity, however, the American public rejected the idea of first use of nuclear weapons, a posture quite inconsistent with actual deterrence policy.

In the 1980s the American public seemed to understand nuclear deterrence differently from nuclear strategists. A 59 percent majority believed that the only purpose of nuclear weapons was to deter war, i.e., they would never be employed deliberately by the U.S. for tactical advantage. The racial distribution here was even: 60 percent of whites and 54 percent of blacks saw nuclear weapons in this light. Even larger majorities

attributed the absence of major world war to their existence, and ruled out the possibility of nuclear war (ATS #12, Q.46, 47, 48).

Survey respondents felt that the only plausible scenarios under which nuclear weapons might be used were those involving terrorists, non-superpower nations, or due to human or mechanical error. Scenarios suggesting American or Soviet use of these weapons were much less credible (ATS #12, Q.51-55).

In reality, most of the scenarios involving U.S. allies or troops posed by ATS could elicit a U.S. nuclear response given the inescapable logic of the security dilemma in the nuclear age. In fact, President Carter's adoption in 1980 of "countervailing" and "counterforce" strategies (when he signed the famous Presidential Directive No.59) meant implicitly that military aggressions short of nuclear attack on the U.S. could draw nuclear retaliation (see Jordan and Taylor, 1981; Wittkopf, 1982). Yet a Public Agenda Foundation survey in 1984 that found a majority of Americans, by 69 percent to 29 percent, disbelieving that U.S. policy called for nuclear retaliation against a conventional Soviet attack on Western Europe or Japan (see Martila and Kiley, 1988:6).

However, ATS found that there was strong overall public rejection of "first use" in 1988. "First use" policy was presented (in ATS #9) as follows: "The United States should pledge only to use nuclear weapons against other nations if they use nuclear weapons against us first. To make the pledge credible, we should pull back all short-range nuclear weapons from the front lines and replace them with strengthened non-nuclear forces (Q.71)."

As already seen, African Americans sometimes surpassed whites in willingness to

use the nuclear option first. i.e.. in situations that did not include an initial strike on the U.S. However, other than in the Third World scenarios discussed above, there was little indication that race might be significant. African Americans appeared more likely to believe (55 to 47 percent) that it was “official U.S. policy never to be the first country to use nuclear weapons...(ATS #12. Q.56).” They also seemed very confident (91 percent) that deterrence would succeed in nuclear preventing war (as did 88 percent of whites)[*ibid.*. Q.48].

Socioeconomic Factors and Deterrence

Table 9.2 shows signs of a modest racial gap in intensity of belief in deterrence.¹ African American women lagged behind white women by a consistent margin on the deterrence items. Similarly, moderate-income and better-educated blacks were less accepting of deterrence logic than white counterparts. For the former sub-group, the IDs were over 20. However, it must be noted that by sex, income and education, differences among blacks on this issue were equally sizeable, and exceeded internal white differences.

As expected white conservatives and Republicans appeared to have most faith in nuclear deterrence. White liberals lagged behind, but black liberals in the sample appeared close to whites in the other political camp on this issue.

¹ Statistically, the associations with race were weak, however. For item (A) the chi-square was 1.5177 ($p=0.6781$); for (B) it was 7.1174 ($p=0.06825$).

Table 9.2: Views on Nuclear Deterrence, by Race and Socioeconomic Factors

	(A) Believe purpose of nuclear weapons is deterrence only			(B) Believe nuclear weapons essential for preventing world war			(C) It was necessary and proper to use nuclear weapons on Japan in WWII*			Ns	
	%Whi	%Blk	(ID)	%Whi	%Blk	(ID)	%Whi	%Blk	(ID)	Whi	Blk
Sex											
Male	66	61	(5)	80	81	(1)	76	69	(7)	417	36
Female	59	48	(11)	70	55	(15)	60	46	(14)	445	44
Income											
<\$25,000	53	60	(7)	72	71	(1)	67	64	(3)	298	42
\$25-50,000	62	35	(27)	78	55	(23)	68	45	(23)	311	20
Over \$50,000	68	60	(8)	76	80	(4)	74	40	(34)	118	5
Education**											
HS or less	59	62	(3)	77	70	(7)	66	60	(6)	377	47
Some coll., at least	60	44	(16)	74	60	(14)	70	44	(26)	398	25
Party											
Democrat	51	53	(2)	64	66	(2)	63	55	(8)	240	47
Republican	68	63	(5)	82	75	(7)	73	63	(10)	336	8
Independent	60	53	(7)	75	79	(4)	67	58	(9)	239	19
Viewpoint											
Liberal	46	62	(16)	61	73	(12)	59	54	(5)	166	26
Conservative	74	53	(21)	83	64	(19)	74	66	(8)	324	11
Moderate	55	53	(2)	73	68	(5)	66	54	(12)	320	34
Region											
South	61	56	(5)	76	66	(2)	72	63	(9)	291	41
All other states	60	51	(9)	74	68	(6)	66	49	(17)	571	39
<p>* For race, chi-square = 5.8193, p = 0.1207 ** For education and item (A), chi-square = 64.1051, p = 0.0009; (B) chi-square = 30.6068, p = 0.0003; © chi-square = 13.2323, p = 0.1523</p>											
Source: ATS #12, Q. 46, 47.											

Table 9.2 contrasts these postures on deterrence and first-use with attitudes toward the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. It is very evident that Americans share a consensus favoring this action in spite of their contemporary distaste for actually using nuclear power. Of those expressing the belief that nuclear weapons are for deterrence

only, 72 percent of whites and 65 percent of blacks favored the Japan strike. Only 20 and 28 percent, respectively, thought that first-use was wrong. The level of black support was slightly lower there, and within most of the socioeconomic categories in Table 9.3, nevertheless it always close to 50 percent.

As might be expected, Americans with adult memories of World War II strongly favored the Japan bombing: 73 percent of whites 60 years of age and older in 1988, and 69 percent of similar blacks though it was necessary to use the bomb. Younger Americans were not far behind, however: 66 percent of whites under 60, and 53 percent of blacks, were also in favor.²

V. Star Wars


An issue closely related to nuclear deterrence in the 1980s was the Reagan Administration's proposed space-based missile defense system (the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars"). Whether or not this concept was offensive or defensive is debatable, but its introduction threatened to change the calculus of nuclear deterrence in favor of the United States. As such, even the funding of initial research in this area could be seen as a form of U.S. nuclear coercion.


Star Wars always enjoyed modest public support, despite concerns about the federal budget deficit and excessive defense spending. Approval, tracked across several ATS surveys beginning in late 1987, generally amounted to slightly more than half the

² In ATS #12, white N for the older group was 215; black N was 16. For the younger group, white N was 627, black N was 60.

public. And in ATS #12, taken in December 1988, 53 percent of Americans said they were interested in continuing Star Wars research until a system better than the one currently designed could be developed. Only 19 percent would stop the research altogether (ATS #12, Q.65).

On average, African Americans seemed a bit less enthusiastic about the project than whites (see Fig. 9.3 and 9.4 below), probably more because of its perceived price tag than judgments about its significance and effectiveness. Whenever the issue of cost was raised, blacks surpassed whites in opting for reduced spending (ATS #11, Q.13).





"Star Wars": Impact of Socioeconomic Factors and Political Posture

In 1987, SDI did not have a particularly strong constituency in most socioeconomic or political circles. Even white Republicans were ambivalent about its feasibility (Table 9.3, next page). Better-educated African Americans seemed most likely to think it affordable in ATS #1, though they registered the strongest preference for decreasing SDI spending in a poll taken in the following year (ATS #11, 1988). The fact that the latter mentioned a specific dollar cost -- \$4 billion -- probably affected responses significantly.

Political posture and gender, rather than race, seemed most associated with patterns in SDI preferences. Democrats, liberals and women were most likely to oppose this controversial Republican project by the end of 1988. Indeed, the latter group were less likely to accept dubious rationalizations of the SDI in every instance (see Table 9.4).

Table 9.3: Preferences for Decreased “Star Wars” Spending, by Race and Other Factors

	“Star Wars costs too much to build and deploy [since] the federal deficit is at an all-time high (ATS #1. 10/87, Q.25e).”				“The \$4 billion currently being spent on SDI should be decreased (ATS #11, 11/88, Q.12).”				
	%Whites (N)		%Blacks (N)		%Whites (N)		%Blacks (N)		
Sex									
Male	54	(413)	55	(31)	30	(439)	35	(34)	
Female	61	(437)	68	(53)	42	(436)	65	(49)	
Education									
HS or less	58	(102)	68	(61)	34	(352)	41	(46)	
Coll. or less	54	(179)	27	(11)	36	(413)	67	(30)	
Party									
Democrat	69	(336)	67	(58)	58	(327)	58	(62)	
Republican	48	(366)	36	(11)	20	(411)	20	(10)	
Viewpoint									
Liberal	70	(234)	54	(35)	63	(233)	61	(44)	
Conservative	51	(401)	61	(23)	24	(508)	31	(26)	

Table 9.4: Assessments of Opinions of “Star Wars”, by Race and Sex

	“If we build a Star Wars system, the Soviets will just start building more and better nuclear weapons...”		“Star Wars is the kind of bold new step we need to lead us away from the arms race.”		“Star Wars will make nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.”		“Star Wars has already proved to be an effective bargaining issue, in getting the Soviet Union to negotiate [on arms control].”		Would approve development of Star Wars system “knowing that in its initial phase it would not be more than 20% effective as a shield...”	
	%Whi.	%Blk.	%Whi.	%Blk.	%Whi.	%Blk.	%Whi.	%Blk.	%Whi.	%Blk.
Males	71	71	51	48	36	38	72	65	57	61
Females	80	75	36	42	26	36	52	43	39	32

Source: ATS #1, 1987, Q.25. (Male Ns: whites - 413, blacks - 31; Female Ns: whites - 437, blacks - 53).

VI. Summary

Two aspects of the racial patterns in willingness to use nuclear force stand out: greater black support for nuclear retaliation, in general, and greater black willingness to

Table 9.5: Indices of Dissimilarity Between (a) Blacks and Whites and (b) Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Education, by Willingness to Use Nuclear Weapons.

Nuclear Use Scenarios (5)	Whites vs. Blacks	High* Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
US Third world ally attacked with nuclear weapons by another Third World nation (ATS #9)	-16	-4	-10
US should use nuclear weapons to end drawn-out war fighting communism in a Third World country (ATS #6).	-18	-3	-4
US city destroyed in nuclear attack: attacker will not use more nuclear weapons (ATS #9)	- 2	5	6
US troops subjected to limited nuclear attack in combat (ATS #9)	- 5	4	7
US is in a long costly war that could be ended with nuclear strike (ATS #9)	3	1	-12
Average	-9.6	0.6	-2.6

use nuclear force in the Third World. The dissimilarity indices in Table 9.6 support the possibility that, on average (ID=9.6), African Americans were more likely than whites to favor using such weapons. In two Third World scenarios posed to different black and white samples, the racial difference in support of nuclear force was consistent and sizeable. Otherwise, racial differences were negligible. Education appeared to be more significant to the direction of black preference in two cases, but on average did not seem to matter much more than it did for whites.

Characterization of attitudes toward using nuclear weapons should not overlook

the fact that for almost every scenario, majorities of both groups opted for “using other means” to resolve crises, even when U.S. assets were attacked first. Indeed, this observation probably most reflects public attitudes.

**Chapter Ten: RACE AND COOPERATION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY:
Attitudes Toward the United Nations and Foreign Aid**

I. Introduction

Historical accounts have often shown a strong African American impulse toward cooperation with Third World peoples. Yet, while there is much evidence that black political and intellectual elites -- past and present -- may have viewed this as an obligation, the posture of the wider African American public is less well known. Hero's 1937-1967 national poll data hinted that blacks favored foreign aid and U.S. involvement in international organizations to a greater degree than whites. But similar polls since 1980 show little racial difference.

Chapter Six revealed that both racial groups strongly supported the idea of humanitarian assistance and disapproved of military and developmental aid. Furthermore, it showed that economic assistance to the Third World and immigration from those regions into the U.S., did not have a particularly strong African American constituencies (notwithstanding the fact that blacks generally were "warmer" toward such immigrants than whites). This corroborates Rielly's (1987) finding that "there was no great support among the American people for the principle of foreign aid," and while humanitarian and disaster assistance are popular "...Americans ...put much less emphasis on the more far-reaching and difficult goal of improving the standard of living in less developed nations (Rielly, 1987:25-26)."


However, before claiming a post-civil rights racial consensus on cooperation, this

chapter looks more closely at some of the racial postures captured by ATS # 6 and 8. The objective is to see how racial views of the United Nations and foreign aid compared across socioeconomic and political lines.

Two issues related to the United Nations are examined: (1) American perceptions of the U.N. and its performance, and (2) the preferred extent of American involvement in its operations. And for foreign aid, attitudes toward (a) the efficacy of foreign aid expenditure, and (b) preferences regarding future aid spending, are analyzed [see Appendix X (a)].

II. Racial Perceptions of the United Nations

As indicated in Chapter 5, ATS found Americans fairly knowledgeable about and favorable toward the U.N. ATS #12 (Dec. 1988) found that a 78 percent majority could



give a fairly correct definition of the role of the organization. Forty-three (43) percent saw it as an international forum, and 35 percent saw it as an instrument of world peace (Q.78).

Six months earlier (May, 1988) ATS #6 found that Americans favored the U.N. by a margin of 61 to 33 percent.

As shown in Fig. 10.1, blacks and whites differed little in positive views of the organization.

With the exception of very generous support for peacekeeping operations, support for U.N. efforts in specific areas tended to be modest across racial lines, however (see Chapter 6). Apart from peacekeeping, just over half of each race sampled thought the agency performed well in “promoting communication and understanding between countries,” and in “helping solve regional conflicts through negotiations rather than war (ATS #6, Q.42).” But at least one-third consistently criticized efforts in these functional areas. A combined 36 percent of whites and 38 percent of blacks thought the U.N. was “not good” or “poor” at “combating international hunger and disease.” And, 53 percent of whites and 58 percent of blacks were unimpressed with the organization’s efforts to “help poor nations become self-sufficient (Ibid.).” Among other things, these ratings suggest that unawareness of the details of the U.N.’s substantial work in promoting social and economic progress is evenly distributed by race.

The surprising finding that an equally solid majority of Americans -- white and black -- thought the U.N. General Assembly was either “neutral” or “favorable” towards the United States, rather than “against” it, was also noted earlier. Overall, 58 percent said it was neutral, 8 percent said it was pro-U.S., and 26 percent anti-U.S., and for the two races the distribution of opinion was almost identical.

Indications that Americans did not automatically see the organization as hostile was reinforced by 82 percent support for the idea of a U.N.-based international court to deal with hijackers and terrorists (ATS #6, Q.44). Eighty-one (81) percent of whites and 88 percent of blacks favored this idea. Given the Reagan administration’s unfriendly portrayal and harsh treatment of the U.N. in the 1980s, this preference was remarkable.

However, Americans seemed less favorable to the concept of a broader legal regime, as embodied by the World Court. This body was described in ATS #8 as a part of the U.N. that “tries to settle conflicts peacefully (Q.38).” Asked whether or not they thought the U.S. ought to abide by the Court’s decisions even when they went against American interests because it sets an example for other nations to follow, blacks (n=72) mostly disagreed and whites (n=879) were divided. Fifty-eight (58) percent of blacks said the U.S. should not feel bound by such decisions and 33 percent thought otherwise. Whites were 44 percent in concurrence, 45 percent in opposition and 11 percent undecided.

III. Education, Income, Politics and Racial Perceptions of the U.N.

Were there any indications in these data that race may have been associated with attitudes about the U.N.? Favorable views of the United Nations seemed to hold across most socioeconomic as well as racial lines, except perhaps for income. Lower income blacks seemed more likely than poor whites to perceive the organization favorably. While poor whites lagged behind higher-income whites in this regard, there was little difference between poor and better-off blacks (see Table 10.1). For blacks, however, there seemed to be little income effect; the organization was more likely to be favorably viewed by African Americans in all income brackets. Nevertheless, these were differences in majority intensity; blacks and whites clearly favored U.N. activity in the three areas cited. As Table 10.1 shows, their weak statistical associations with education, race and income were also very probably due to chance.

Table 10.1: Effect of Socioeconomic Factors on Perceptions of the U.N.*

	Ns		(A) UN favors/neutral toward U.S.			(B) Favors World Court for hijackers/terrorists			(C) Favors UN peacekeeping		
	(Whi)	(Blk)	(Whi)	(Blk)	(ID)	Whi	(Blk)	(ID)	(Whi)	(Blk)	(ID)
Education											
HS or less	405	40	63	60	(3)	81	90	(9)	69	75	(6)
Coll. or less	395	37	69	71	(2)	83	84	(1)	72	70	(2)
Post-grad.	67	8	63	63		75	100		64	75	
Income											
< \$25,000	385	36	51	67	(16)	61	89	(28)	53	69	(16)
\$26-50,000	332	30	70	75	(5)	79	90	(11)	69	73	(4)
>\$50,000	151	8	62	88		84	75		74	63	(11)
Party											
Democrat	617	52	65	72	(7)	81	89	(8)	73	69	(4)
Viewpoint											
Liberal	388	38	66	61	(5)	82	87	(5)	73	71	(2)
Conservative	150	14	70	64	(6)	80	92	(12)	72	71	(1)
Moderate	166	24	65	76	(11)	77	92	(15)	66	71	(5)
<p>For <u>education</u> -- (A) Chi-square=7.8960, p=0.5446; (B) Chi-square=2.5482, p=0.8630; © chi-square=4.7092, p= 0.5816.</p> <p>For <u>race</u> -- (A) Chi-square=0.4685, p=0.9254; (B) Chi-square=3.0278, p=0.2200; © chi-square=0.3730, p= 0.8298.</p> <p>For <u>income</u> -- (A) Chi-square=16.7948, p=0.1574; (B) Chi-square= 5.1112, p=0.7456; © chi-square=5.6818, p= 0.6828.</p> <p>Source: ATS #6, 1988, Q.40, 43, 44. * Gender data unavailable for ATS #6.</p>											

Similarly, assessments of U.N. performance in the peace promotion, development and social progress areas seemed racially consistent within most categories except income. Here, white Americans also differed by income across the board. Poorer whites appeared distinctly less likely to find the U.N. effective in its operations than similar blacks (see Table 10.2 below). While a majority of poor blacks thought it was making a difference in almost all the areas cited, only about one-third of poor whites said so. Again, white approval rates tended to rise with income while there was no obvious income trend among blacks.

White liberals were most approving of U.N. efforts in the functional areas

Table 10.2: Race, Socioeconomic Factors and Political Viewpoint in Assessments of U.N. Performance in Selected Areas*

		The UN is doing an excellent/good job in...											
		"...promoting communication and understanding between countries."			"...helping solve regional conflicts through negotiations rather than war."		"...combating international hunger and disease."		"...helping poor nations become self-sufficient."				
		Whi.	Blk.	(ID)	Whi.	Blk.	(ID)	Whi.	Blk.	(ID)	Whi.	Blk.	(ID)
Education	Ns												
	<u>Whi</u> <u>Blk</u>												
HS or less	405 40	55	56	(1)	49	45	(5)	39	48	(9)	39	33	(6)
Coll. or less	395 37	59	57	(2)	54	62	(7)	43	46	(3)	38	44	(6)
Post-grad.	67 8	52	63	(11)	57	50	(7)	46	13	(33)	43	25	(18)
Income													
< \$25,000	385 36	42	67	(25)	41	64	(23)	29	53	(23)	30	42	(12)
\$26-50,000	332 30	60	54	(6)	53	50	(3)	42	33	(9)	40	37	(3)
>\$50,000	151 8	55	51	(5)	47	63	(16)	54	38	(16)	36	25	(11)
Party													
Democrat	617 52	57	60	(3)	54	58	(4)	44	39	(5)	39	41	(2)
Viewpoint													
Liberal	388 38	60	58		56	37	(19)	44	50	(6)	40	34	(6)
Conservative	150 14	57	50		52	75	(23)	36	50	(14)	40	42	(2)
Moderate	166 24	53	58		51	57	(6)	40	25	(15)	39	50	(11)
Region													
South	70 7	50	42	(8)	51	43	(8)	38	14	(24)	41	14	(27)
Other states	799 78	58	58	(0)	53	54	(1)	42	46	(2)	39	38	(1)
Source: ATS #6, 1988, Q.40. *Gender data unavailable.													

shown in Table 10.2, though this was generally modest. White conservatives and moderates did not lag far behind. African American attitudes were less uniform across the ideological spectrum in most of the cases shown. Black liberals seemed least convinced (37 percent) that the U.N. performed well in solving regional conflicts through negotiations, and promoting self-sufficiency (34 percent), and on the former issue, were


19 points less likely than similar whites to think that the agency did a good job. Once again though, the significance of these ideological labels across racial lines seems a relevant question.

IV. United States Future Involvement in the United Nations

A large majority (over 90 percent) of white and black Americans in 1988 felt it was important for the U.S. to continue its participation in the United Nations (see ATS #12. Q.78), but did not necessarily think that current levels of U.S. involvement should increase. In ATS #6, a 45 percent plurality preferred that it be kept the same and another

12 percent wanted less involvement, even though this survey cited several positive developments before posing the issue.¹ Fig. 10.2 illustrates the similarity in these racial postures.

Fig. 10.2: Racial Preferences for Future U.S. Involvement in the U.N.
 Source: ATS#6, 1988, Q.41 (White n=869; Black n=85)



The apparent uniformity is interesting given the racial disparity in conceptions of the

¹ The preamble to the ATS item was: "As you may know, the U.N. is changing. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have started working together more often in the Security Council; Gorbachev has proposed strengthening the U.N. and using it more; Reagan says its doing a better job; and Congress has initiated a new study of how to improve it... (ATS #6, 1988, Q.41)."

organization also suggested by the data. Only 19 percent of blacks, compared with 32 percent of whites, identified the U.N. with its primary mission: promotion of peace and prevention of war through the provision of mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes. Approximately 40 percent of each group, however, felt it existed to provide an open forum or facilitate communication among countries (ATS #12, Q.79).

V. Socioeconomic Factors and Future U.S. Involvement in the U.N.

Across all categories shown in Table 10.3 (below), about one-third of white and black respondents in ATS #6 thought the United States should become more involved in the U.N. Solid majorities that wanted current levels of involvement maintained, at the very least. Six months later, a similar item in ATS #12 reinforced this impression of racial consensus in favor of renewed American leadership within the organization.

Again, however, political viewpoint produced apparent intensity gaps between the races. In ATS #6, blacks in each ideological group, particularly liberals, seemed less enthusiastic about greater American involvement in the U.N. than similar whites. Interestingly, most (89 percent) blacks who reported uncertainty about their political viewpoint favored more involvement, compared to just 36 percent of similar whites [ATS #6, Q.41]).

Interest in cooperation here seemed to increase with education and decrease with income for the two groups. But contrary to typical gender patterns related to cooperative policies, black women seemed less favorable to U.N. cooperation than black men (or white women) in ATS #12 (see Table 10.3). It is possible that gender and education

Table 10.3: Future U.S. Participation in the U.N., by Race and Socioeconomic Factors

	ATS #6. 5/88. Q.41.* "As you may know the U.N. is changing. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have started working together more often in the Security Council...Reagan says its doing a better job...With this in mind, do you think the U.S. should get more...less.. involved in U.N.. or keep level of involvement the same?" "More involved" % Whi. % Blk. (ID)			ATS #12. 12/88. Q.78 "Do you think our [U.S.] continued participation in the United Nations is very...somewhat...not very important?" "Very important" % Whi. (N) % Blk. (N) [ID]		
Sex	Data not available					
Men				60 (417)	79 (36)	[19]
Women				68 (445)	57 (44)	[11]
Education						
HS or less	39	33	(6)	67 (377)	62 (47)	[5]
Coll. or less	39	38	(1)	65 (398)	72 (25)	[7]
Income						
< \$25,000	31	33	(2)	63 (298)	69 (42)	[6]
\$26-50,000	35	37	(2)	64 (311)	70 (20)	[6]
>\$50,000	40	38	(2)	59 (118)	40 (5)	
Political Viewpoint						
Liberal	41	26	(15)	73 (166)	62 (26)	[11]
Conservative	53	43	(10)	57 (324)	55 (11)	[2]
Moderate	42	29	(13)	69 (320)	71 (34)	[2]
Party Identification						
Democrat				70 (240)	70 (47)	[0]
Gender/Education						
Men- No College	Gender data not available			59 (180)	71 (24)	[12]
Women- No College				67 (197)	52 (23)	[15]
Men- College				60 (237)	92 (12)	[32]
Women- College				70 (248)	62 (21)	[8]
<p>ATS #6 item For <u>education</u> -- Chi-square= 9.1464, p= 0.4236; for <u>race</u> -- Chi-square=0.2763, p=0.9644; for <u>income</u> -- Chi-square=10.7432, p=0.5510.</p> <p>ATS #12 item For <u>education</u> -- Chi-square= 48.5479, p= 0.0000; for <u>race</u> -- Chi-square=1.0217, p=0.9064 for <u>income</u> -- Chi-square=39.7866, p=0.0005 for <u>viewpoint</u> -- chi-square=104.3900, p=0.0000</p> <p>*See Table 10.2 for Ns.</p>						

were more strongly related for blacks. i.e., black women in this sample might have been less educated and perhaps less knowledgeable about the U.N. However, when gender and education were combined, college-educated women were quite similar regardless of race, and there seemed to be little distance between less educated white and black women.

Also, black men continued to appear more “cooperative” than white men (original ID=19; men, no college ID=12; men, college ID=32). Furthermore, the racial contrast in the gender gap remained: while white women consistently surpassed white men in support for U.N. participation, black men at each educational level seemed more likely than black women to do so.

VI. Views of the Efficacy of Foreign Aid and Preferences for Future Expenditure


Perceptions of the usefulness of different types of foreign aid, its cost effectiveness for the U.S., and assessments of current and future levels going to primary recipients were probed in ATS #8 (1988, Q.21-29). Overall, both racial groups supported the humanitarian and pragmatic arguments for U.S. foreign aid, but felt that aid never reached the needy for whom it was intended (see Chapter Five).

Also, most people doubted that recipient states appreciated American generosity. And, after learning that the total U.S. foreign aid program amounted to

\$13 billion and about one percent of the federal budget, about one-third of each racial group wanted aid spending decreased. Only a small fraction of blacks and whites called for increased spending (Q.23). Nevertheless, foreign aid appeared to have a modest constituency as racial pluralities of just under 50 percent wanted current levels maintained (Fig. 10.3).


Whites and blacks also shared a preoccupation with the cost-effectiveness of foreign aid that seemed to conflict with their conviction that the U.S. had a moral

Fig. 10.3: Impressions of U.S. Foreign Aid, by Race.
 Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.21. (White n=679; Black n=72)



responsibility in this area. Sixty-two (62) percent of blacks and 71 percent of whites agreed with the proposition that foreign aid “...reminds other nations that the U.S. is a

Fig. 10.4: Racial Preferences for Foreign Aid Spending
 Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.21. (White n=879; Black n=72)



strong moral force in world

affairs (Q.21k).” Blacks (B) and

whites (W) were also equally

likely (B: 60 percent; W: 58

percent) to agree that aid was

“...effective in improving poor

peoples’ lives in the Third World

(Q.21f).” Yet, equally large

majorities (blacks: 68 percent;

whites: 67 percent) disagreed that “the U.S. had a special moral responsibility to help the disadvantaged of the world, even if [it meant] putting off spending on some of our own domestic problems (Q.21d).” About one-half of each racial group (see Fig. 10.4) agreed that the U.S. could not “help so many countries, no matter how worthy and important this help may be” and that “foreign aid was one of the best places” to cut federal deficit spending (Q.21a and Q.21g).

Undoubtedly, the economic recession of the late 1980s contributed to this ambivalence. However, as Rielly points out, “reluctance to give economic aid does not flow simply from adverse economic conditions; resistance to aid has persisted practically throughout the decades in which polls have been taken, except in times of war (Rielly, 1987:26).” Despite their interest in moral leadership, Americans hold a deep skepticism

about what economic aid can actually accomplish, and about the actual benefits derived by the U.S. (Ibid.).

Yet, when asked specifically about future American aid to the eight main country recipients in 1988¹ – Egypt, Israel, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Pakistan, the Philippines and Turkey -- majorities of 80 percent or more opted for either maintaining or increasing current levels (ATS #8, Q.22). And in the aggregate, whites and blacks appeared share a consensus of support.

That posture revealed either a contradiction in attitudes or widespread unawareness, however. Most of the assistance going to these countries was military, rather than economic or humanitarian. As noted earlier, the public strongly favored military aid reductions, with many suggesting that all aid should be humanitarian (Fig. 10.3). Indeed, the public has had little sympathy for military assistance throughout the 1980s, with about two-thirds consistently favoring decreases throughout the Reagan-era increases in this area (Rielly, p.27).

Rielly's 1982-86 data showed that even in the case of Israel, generally acknowledged to be a vital U.S. ally, 21 to 33 percent of the public wanted military aid decreased or stopped altogether. Leaders were solidly in support of maintenance of current levels, but even here, about one-fifth called for decreases (Rielly, p.28).

Black and white Americans alike seemed unenthusiastic about economic assistance to the Third World, and strongly against military aid. The unpopularity of the

¹ Altogether, they received about \$8 billion of the \$13 billion the U.S. spent on aid in 1988. The rest was shared by over 90 other countries (see ATS #8, Q.23)

Reagan Doctrine -- especially its effect of drawing the U.S. militarily into Central American conflicts -- probably contributed to the latter posture. Still, in responding to ATS #8, African Americans were somewhat more likely to see aid as a good investment and to oppose military aid more strongly. Thus, a closer examination within various social and political groupings is necessary before drawing conclusions about the proximity of racial attitudes.

Particular attention must be given to the groups most traditionally associated with cooperative internationalism. Rielly (p.26) identifies these as the college educated, those most attentive to foreign news, people in business and professional occupations, and those who have traveled abroad. ATS gathered education, attentiveness, and income data and these are used below to further examine the effect of race.

VII. The Impact of Attentiveness and Socioeconomic Factors on Aid Attitudes

A. Attentiveness to News About World Affairs and Foreign Policy Issues

Looking at a selection of survey items capturing the main foreign aid issues, people who followed international affairs closely seemed more likely to favor foreign aid, but be more critical of its impact. However, Table 10.4 shows that among attentive and less attentive whites and blacks knowledge sometimes appeared to have perverse effects on racial attitudes. Attentive blacks seemed more likely than similar whites to consider aid a good place to cut federal spending, while inattentive blacks seemed more generous than inattentive whites. (Note that this was the only item in the table for which there appeared to be a significant statistical association with attentiveness in the sample).

A similar pattern seemed to hold for views of the U.S.' moral responsibility for

Table 10.4: Foreign Aid Attitudes, by Race and Foreign Policy Attentiveness

	US can't afford to help so many (%) [*]	Aid is one of best places to cut spending (%) ^{**}	Aid has been effective in Third World (%) ^{***}	U.S. has moral responsibility to help disadvantaged (%) ^{****}
(Whi. N/ Blk. N)	Whi Blk(ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)
<i>Attentiveness</i>				
Follows news/world affairs:				
Very/ sw. closely (717/ 54)	56 56 (3)	46 54 (8)	57 57 (0)	31 28 (3)
Not too/ at all closely (162/ 18)	63 50 (13)	60 44 (16)	62 67 (5)	26 39 (13)
[*] Chi-square= 6.2974. p= 0.3913 ^{**} Chi-square= 10.7523, p= 0.0046 ^{***} Chi-square=2.0478. p=0.3580 ^{****} Chi-square= 2.0004. p= 0.3669 Source: ATS #8. 1988. Q.21a, 21b, 21f and 21g.				

providing aid. Moral concern seemed generally unrelated to attentiveness, but attentive whites seemed more likely to feel a moral responsibility than similar blacks, while among the less attentive the racial distribution was reversed. To support this (though not shown in Table 10.4) attentive blacks were less likely to disagree with cutting aid to "non-vital" countries (whites: 70 percent; blacks: 59 percent).

Attentiveness and Main Aid Recipients

With regard to the main countries receiving American assistance at the time, there seemed to be a distinct race gap in intensity of preferences for decreasing aid. In seven of the eight cases shown in Table 10.5, blacks attentive to international issues were more likely to favor decreases than those less informed. Whites consistently registered the opposite pattern: greater attentiveness seemed related to weaker interest in reducing aid

levels.² Also, among the better-informed, blacks consistently exceeded whites in interest in aid reductions, while less-informed blacks seemed more generous.

Table 10.5: Racial Preferences for Decreasing U.S. Foreign Aid to Main Recipients *

	Egypt		Israel		El Sal.		Guat.		Hond.		Paki.		Phil.		Turke y	
Attentiveness	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B
<i>Follows news/world affairs:</i>	(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)		(%)	
Very/ sw. closely	33	44	41	48	38	57	29	26	34	39	37	44	27	35	37	48
Not too/ at all closely	42	17	42	22	48	44	36	44	46	17	46	28	28	28	43	33
* See Table 10.4 for racial Ns. (W=whites; B=blacks) Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.22.																

B. Income, Education and Political Views

Viewpoint

For the most part, the racial consensus of weak support for foreign aid appeared to persist across income and political lines. Also, looking through the domestic ideological prism, neither liberals nor conservatives seemed especially favorable or unfavorable in their views (see Table 10.6). Perhaps the best indicator of this latter consensus was the almost identically low level of agreement across ideological viewpoints that the U.S. had a moral responsibility to provide aid assistance.

² In the ATS sample attentiveness appeared to be statistically independent of aid preferences for country recipients. For example, the chi-square for Israel was 2.5172, $p=0.4721$

Table 10.6: Foreign Aid Attitudes, by Race, Income and Political Viewpoint

		US can't afford to help so many (%)	Aid is one of best places to cut spending (%)	Aid has been effective in Third World (%)	U.S. has moral responsibility to help disadvantaged (%)
	(Whi. N/ Blk. N)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)
<i>Income</i>					
less than \$25,000	(289 / 30)	61 53 (8)	50 57 (7)	55 63 (8)	27 43 (16)
\$25-50,000	(372 / 30)	54 60 (6)	45 47 (2)	64 53 (11)	31 20 (11)
Over 50,000	(114 / 5)	55 20	49 40	70 60	31 40
<i>Political Viewpoint</i>					
Liberal	(239 / 23)	57 61 (4)	47 44 (3)	59 61 (2)	32 35 (3)
Moderate	(194 / 16)	57 56 (1)	53 50 (3)	55 50 (5)	26 19 (7)
Conservative	(422 / 31)	59 48 (11)	48 65 (17)	59 61 (2)	31 32 (1)
The only statistically significant association was between viewpoint and aid effectiveness: chi-square - 19.1477. p=0.0032. (Source: ATS #8. 1988, Q.21a, 21b, 21f and 21g).					

Income

Confirming the view that those with higher incomes tend to be more internationalist, white skepticism about aid appeared to decline as income rose, and their assessments of its effectiveness and their moral responsibility also rose with income levels. But the races showed little difference in the lower income ranges. Lower-income blacks might have been more likely to see aid as a moral obligation, but this was offset by their seemingly greater likelihood to believe that the U.S. could not afford to help so many foreign countries.

Statistically, income was significantly associated with attitudes toward cutting aid spending, but seemed independent of the other variables in Table 10.6.³

³ Chi-square: 16.8563. P=0.0098.

Education

Controlling for education (Table 10.7, below) found the least-educated whites appearing more convinced than similar blacks (ID=13) that aid spending was a drain on U.S. resources, and was a good place to cut federal spending (ID=12). On the other hand, college-educated blacks were particularly favorable to cutting aid spending (ID=21) and surpassed their white counterparts in thinking that the U.S. could not afford to spend so much on foreign aid (ID=10). Otherwise, racial views were quite similar.


Table 10.7: Foreign Aid Attitudes, by Race and Education

(Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.21a, 21b, 21f and 21g).		US can't afford to help so many (%).	Aid is one of best places to cut spending (%)	Aid has been effective in Third World (%).	U.S. has moral responsibility to help disadvantaged (%).
<i>Education</i>	(Whi. N/ Blk. N)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)	Whi Blk (ID)
HS or less	381 / 39	62 49 (13)	57 49 (12)	55 59 (4)	30 28 (2)
Coll grad or less	411 / 28	54 64 (10)	43 64 (21)	61 60 (1)	28 28 (0)
Post-grad.	85 / 3	46 40	40 40	57 60	41 60

Both groups were moderately convinced that aid helped the Third World, but were overwhelmingly convinced at all educational levels that much of it wound up “in the hands of corrupt foreign government officials (ATS #8, Q.21e).” Similarly overwhelming was the consensus that “too many countries we help never seem to appreciate our efforts (Q.21j).”

Types of aid preferred also did not seem to vary significantly with education. Support for economic and humanitarian aid was generally high at each level of educational attainment and seemed to intensify as levels rose: the more educated the

respondent, the more likely their preference for economic and humanitarian assistance.⁴ Support for military aid was generally lower, but also rose with educational attainment.



blacks, however, (those with between “some college” and “postgraduate” schooling) seemed more intense in their acceptance of economic and humanitarian aid

and in their rejection of military aid, than educated whites. And, less educated blacks seemed most favorable to military aid. Forty-six (46) percent of whites (W) with “some high school” favored a decrease in military aid levels compared with 20 percent of similar blacks (B); for high school graduates the gap closed (W:54 percent; B:59 percent), but widened again with the races reversed for those with ‘some college’ (W:59 percent; B:74 percent). However, black and white college graduates (W:68 percent; B:68 percent) and

⁴It should be noted that although approximately 65 percent of all U.S. foreign aid was military in 1988, with the remainder going to humanitarian and development assistance, almost half of each racial group thought the distribution was more lopsided in favor of military assistance (ATS #8, Q.24). Undoubtedly, this misperception fueled strong preferences for increasing humanitarian and development aid at the expense of military aid.

post-graduates (W:67 percent; B:60 percent) appeared to prefer decreased military aid at similarly high rates (see Fig. 10.5).

Blacks and whites at all educational levels largely agreed with the utilitarian proposition that foreign aid, wisely invested, was a good way of making friends in a dangerous world (ATS #8, Q.21h). Similarly, large majorities in all groups -- except for black high school graduates who split evenly -- felt that U.S. aid helped reduce Soviet influence around the world (Q.21b). These groups also agreed strongly with the statement that "our foreign aid program reminds other nations that the U.S. is a strong, moral force in world affairs (Q.21k)."

Gender and Education

However, white men with less than college education were almost 20 percentage points more likely to say that foreign aid was too costly and should be a prime target for budget cutting. As Table 10.8 shows, the racial gap between less-educated women was smaller in this regard. College education appeared to reduce the likelihood that either group would hold this view. But while college-educated white men seemed least likely (40 percent) to want aid cut as a way to reduce the federal deficit, similar black men were most likely (69 percent).

Yet black men, regardless of education, seemed more convinced of the effectiveness of Third World aid than everyone else except college-educated white women. Well-educated blacks were the only subgroup that mostly viewed aid as an

Table 10.8: Racial Foreign Aid Attitudes, by Gender and Education

	US can't afford to help so many (%).		Aid is one of best places to cut spending (%)		Aid has been effective in Third World (%).		U.S. has moral responsibility to help disadvantaged (%)*	
	Whi.	Blk.(ID)	Whi.	Blk. (ID)	Whi	Blk (ID)	Whi.	Blk (ID)
	Whi. N / Blk. N							
Men - No College	(187/ 21)	61 48 (13)	62 43 (19)	52 67 (15)	33 24 (9)			
Women - No College	(194 / 18)	64 50 (14)	52 56 (4)	57 50 (7)	27 33 (6)			
Men - College	(102 / 13)	50 54 (4)	40 69 (29)	58 69 (11)	36 39 (3)			
Women - College	(242 / 20)	55 65 (10)	44 55 (11)	64 55 (9)	24 30 (6)			

* Note that this item was significantly associated with gender in the sample: chi-square - 9.5890, DF - 2, p=0.0082. (Source: ATS #8, 1988, Q.21a, 21b, 21f and 21g).

American obligation. Aside from these college-educated blacks, approximately six out of ten blacks and whites at each educational level saw no moral responsibility.

Moral Responsibility and Aid Preferences

Yet surprisingly, educated “black moralists” (BM), i.e. those who did see a moral responsibility for providing aid, were more likely than “white moralists” (WM) to opt for cuts in aid expenditure (BM:73 percent; WM:40 percent), more likely to feel that the U.S. could not help so many countries (BM:55 percent; WM:49 percent), and more prepared to cut aid to non-vital countries (BM:36 percent; WM:22 percent). They were only slightly more favorable (BM:64 percent; WM:59 percent) toward increased levels of humanitarian aid and were eight percentage points more in favor of decreasing current levels than similar whites.

Education and Specific Aid Recipients

Finally, when asked about each of the eight main foreign aid country recipients in

1988 majorities in each educational category opted, at a minimum, for keeping current aid levels. However, while whites and less educated blacks appeared to share modest levels of disenchantment with aid levels, there was fairly strong interest in decreasing aid to some countries among better educated blacks. On average, close to a majority of better educated blacks would cut aid to El Salvador, Israel, Pakistan and Turkey, as Table 10.9 shows.

Among those favoring aid only to countries “vital to our national security,” all blacks (100 percent) with more than a high school education in the sample

Table 10.9: Percentages Favoring Decreased U.S. Aid to Main Recipients, by Education and Race

	<i>Percent favoring <u>decrease</u> in the amount of U.S. aid to...</i>															
	Egypt		El Salvador		Guatem.		Honduras		Israel		Pakistan		Philip-pines		Turkey	
	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B	W	B
<i>Less than college*</i>	39	34	42	41	34	28	40	28	40	36	38	33	28	36	37	39
<i>Some college+</i>	33	39	39	67	28	33	33	39	41	49	39	49	27	30	39	52
* Includes those without high school diplomas and high school graduates. + Includes those with technical/vocational training, some college, college graduates and post-graduates. Source: ATS #8, Q.22. (Ns: Whites-no coll.=381; coll.=495. Blacks-no coll.=39; coll.=33)																


wanted U.S. aid to Israel reduced, while 47 percent of those with high school diplomas or less shared this view. Educated black “aid pragmatists” also seemed to want reductions for the other seven country recipients, though less intensely.

Education appeared to be less of a factor among whites favoring aid only to “vital” countries. Across educational categories white preferences for decreased aid

averaged about 45 percent, and about 37 percent for maintenance at current levels.

C. Aid Preferences Among Those Most Likely to Favor Cooperative Internationalism

Better-educated, attentive, middle-class Americans are more likely to favor cooperative internationalism, as noted earlier. Here they are termed “potential



internationalists.” Fig. 10.6, which includes all college-educated, moderate-income (\$25-49,000) whites and blacks who reported following international affairs “closely” or “somewhat closely” in ATS #8, suggests a clear lack of racial consensus on country aid within this group.

Majorities of African Americans seemed to want reductions for most of these primary aid recipients, but white interest in reductions never exceeded 40 percent. The race gap in this regard was widest for El Salvador, Turkey, Pakistan and Israel.

On the range of foreign aid issues explored in the survey, potential internationalists also showed some signs of racial divergence. As Table 10.10 shows, there appeared to be three areas of majority consensus: skepticism that U.S. aid ultimately went to those most in need, a preference for humanitarian over military assistance, and strong rejection of moral responsibility for aid.

Table 10.10: Preferences of “Potential Internationalists” on Various Foreign Aid Issues, by Race.

	% Whites	% Blacks
U.S. aid is often wasted, stolen	84	87
Too many countries are unappreciative of U.S. aid	77	73
The U.S. can not afford to help so many countries	48	67
Foreign aid is a good place to cut federal spending	40	47
U.S. aid reduces Soviet influence in the Third World	61	27
Foreign aid has been effective in the Third World	64	47
Economic aid best serves the national interest	91	87
The U.S. has a moral responsibility for aid	30	20
Aid reminds the world that the U.S. is a strong moral force	72	33
All aid should be humanitarian	46	66
Increase the level of humanitarian aid	58	53
Increase the level of military aid	6	0
Source: ATS #8, 1988. (White N=201; Black N=15)		

However while blacks also rejected the notion that U.S. aid reminds the world of its moral authority, whites seemed to embrace it despite the inherent contradictions.

Otherwise, the two groups often differed sharply. Whites were more likely to think aid effectively served U.S. economic and security interests in the Third World, and less likely to believe that it was too heavy a financial burden for the treasury.

D. Geographic Regions

Regardless of region, whites and blacks appeared equally favorable (approximately 60 percent) to economic aid and less supportive of military assistance (approximately 23 percent). Solid majorities (around 58 percent) in each regional and racial category opted for decreased military foreign aid.

Majorities in each category also supported the idea that foreign aid should be all humanitarian and non-military, but southern and non-southern blacks seemed slightly

Table 10.11: Foreign Aid Preferences, by Race and Region

	<i>South</i>			<i>All Other Regions</i>		
	%Whites (n=357)	%Blacks (n=24)	ID	%Whites (n=522)	%Blacks (n=48)	ID
Economic aid best	63	58	5	61	63	2
Decrease military aid	57	58	1	59	58	1
Aid should be all humanitarian	51	61	10	56	65	9
Increase humanitarian aid levels	50	38	12	50	54	4

Source: ATS #8, Q.21, 28 and 29

more in favor of this (by about 10 percentage points) than similar whites. However, southern whites and blacks differed in their support for changes in levels of humanitarian assistance: half the whites surveyed wanted it increased, but just 38 percent of blacks. Altogether, 58 percent of blacks wanted it either decreased or kept at the current level.

Slight regional differences were also suggested regarding the cost effectiveness of

Table 10.12: Racial Views on Cost Effectiveness of Foreign Aid, by Region

	<i>South</i>		<i>All Other Regions</i>	
	%Whites	%Blacks	%Whites	%Blacks
Aid often wasted/stolen	98	80	87	87
Aid is a good strategic investment	70	62	66	86
U.S. aid helps reduce Soviet influence	63	46	59	58
Too many countries unappreciative	78	80	78	79
Aid a good place to cut federal spending	50	71	48	46
U.S. can't afford to help so many	56	50	57	56

Source: ATS #8, Q.21 (Same Ns as in previous Table)

U.S. aid (Table 10.12). Huge majorities of the two races in each region felt much of foreign aid was misappropriated by corrupt officials, with southern whites showing the greatest intensity (98 percent). Yet there was strong regional support for the notion that aid is a good strategic investment for the U.S., despite the majority perception that too many recipients are unappreciative. Southern whites in particular seemed most likely to see foreign aid as a means of reducing Soviet influence around the world. Perhaps the most significant regional difference was that southern blacks (71 percent) seemed much more agreeable than the rest of the country to cutting foreign aid as a means of reducing federal spending.

The view that the United States does not have an obligation to assist other states was quite strong across racial and regional lines (Fig. 10.13). But, as mentioned earlier, this posture seemed at odds with the equally widespread belief that aid reminded other countries that the U.S. was a strong moral force in world affairs. If this were true the U.S. would, by any reasonable moral standard, indeed be obligated to assist needy states.

Table 10.13: Racial Views on U.S. Foreign Aid Obligation, by Region

	<i>South</i>		<i>All other regions</i>	
	%Whites	%Blacks	%Whites	%Blacks
U.S. has no moral responsibility for aid	68	62	66	71
Aid reminds that U.S. is moral force	72	63	71	77
U.S. can't afford to help so many	56	50	57	56
<i>Source: ATS #8, Q.21</i>				

Finally, African Americans living in the South were the most likely to be favorably disposed to increasing aid to the eight country recipients named in the survey,

and least likely to be interested in maintaining the aid status quo (see Table 10.14, below). In every case southern blacks surpassed southern whites in this respect; in the rest of the country, only El Salvador, Israel, the Philippines and Turkey drew such a response. On the other hand, non-southern blacks consistently appeared to exceed similar whites in interest in reducing aid to these recipients.

Table 10.14: Racial Preferences for Future Aid to Selected Countries, by Region

Country	Increase aid					
	South			All other regions		
	% Whi	% Blk	(ID)	% Whi	% Blk	(ID)
<i>Egypt</i>	34	49	(15)	35	33	(2)
<i>El Salvador</i>	42	63	(21)	39	48	(9)
<i>Guatemala</i>	31	42	(11)	30	25	(5)
<i>Honduras</i>	38	42	(4)	35	29	(6)
<i>Israel</i>	41	42	(1)	41	42	(1)
<i>Pakistan</i>	38	46	(8)	39	38	(1)
<i>Phillippines</i>	27	38	(11)	27	31	(4)
<i>Turkey</i>	38	54	(16)	38	40	(2)

(Source: ATS #8. Q.22). (Ns as above)

VIII. Summary

The United Nations

ATS filled an important information gap by measuring opinions in these two neglected foreign policy areas, there are several reasons for not reading too much into these data. Statistical reliability is one caution already mentioned, but there are others.

First, more detailed information about the public's conceptions of the United

Nations, particularly beliefs about U.S. influence within and upon this organization, is essential. Second, there is the attentiveness issue. Only a handful within the public pay close attention to U.N. activities, especially to its lower-profile economic and social activities. With these qualifications in mind, I present some of the tendencies in the ATS data.

Table 10.15: Indices of Dissimilarity Between (a) Blacks and Whites and (b) Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Education, by Assessments of the U.N. and Support for Foreign Aid

The United Nations (7 items)	Whites vs. Blacks	High* Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
The US should be more involved with the United Nations (ATS #6)	2	0	5
Favors UN international court for terrorists/hijackers	-7	2	-6
Favors UN peacekeeping	-3	3	-5
UN doing good job promoting international communication and understanding	1	4	1
UN doing good job solving regional conflicts peacefully	0	5	17
UN doing good job combating hunger and disease	-1	4	-2
UN doing good job helping poor nations become self-sufficient	2	-1	11
Average	-0.9	2.7	3.0
Foreign Aid (4 items)			
US cannot afford to help so many countries	3	-8	15
Foreign aid is one of the best places to cut federal spending	-5	-14	15
Aid has been effective in the Third World	-2	6	1
US has a moral responsibility to help the disadvantaged	0	-2	0
Average	-1.0	-4.5	7.8
* See Table 6.7.			

Poorer blacks, black liberals and black women sometimes varied from their white counterparts in assessments of the organization. It may be that ideological views, income and gender were all be related to educational attainment for African Americans, creating disguised education effects. Yet if this were so, less-educated blacks and black men, in general, often displayed disproportionately high appreciation of the organization.

According to the dissimilarity measures shown in Table 10.15, neither race nor education seemed to be major sources of cleavage in attitudes. Nevertheless, the racial indices for education are, on average, three times larger than the one for race alone. Furthermore, while better-educated whites were almost always more supportive of the U.N., educational division among blacks was less consistent. Nevertheless, African Americans markedly diverged by education on two items -- belief in the efficacy of the U.N.'s work to peacefully resolve disputes and belief that helped poor nations become self-sufficient. And in these instances, it was better educated blacks that were more favorable. All that can be concluded from this is that the significance of education needs much more research attention.

Sharp gender differences among blacks require further attention as well -- especially in light of atypical sex distributions seen earlier in attitudes toward military force. A more detailed understanding of gender perceptions of the utility of the U.N. and of the costs of U.S. involvement would be useful. In similar vein, the meaning of standard ideological labels should be investigated in this context.

Foreign Aid

In attempting to make sense of racial attitudinal patterns toward foreign aid

recipients, a guiding factor once again must be the reality that few Americans really know who receives U.S. aid and for what purposes. Possible exceptions in this study period might have been Israel and El Salvador because of media focus on events in those regions in the 1980s. But even in those two cases, opinions may have been largely uninformed. Sobel (1989:115) noted that in May 1984, only 45 percent of Americans knew the U.S. supported the government of El Salvador in that state's civil war.

Nevertheless, there was a consistently positive racial consensus over giving aid to these states. At the very least whites and blacks wanted to maintain current aid levels and interest in reducing aid amounts rarely exceeded 20 percent. Contrary to expectations, Southern blacks seemed distinctly more generous than any other group despite appearing the least likely to see foreign aid either as a U.S. obligation, or as a particularly cost effective foreign policy strategy. Indeed, Southern blacks were no more favorable than anyone else to replacing military assistance with humanitarian aid.

Higher levels of educational attainment among African Americans, in general, seemed associated with preferences for aid reduction and a tendency to feel that the U.S. could not afford to be so "generous." The dissimilarity indices for aid (Table 10.15) suggest racial education gaps, but with reversed polarities: educated blacks and less-educated whites appear most consistently against foreign aid. In the chapter, this pattern was observed among men. College-educated white men appeared more enthusiastic about foreign aid than those without college, while for blacks, less-educated men seemed most generous.

Did whites with better education share a different understanding of aid's strategic

benefits, overshadowing suspicions that much of it is wasted on ungrateful, corrupt Third World recipients? Or, were educated blacks more conscious of the manipulative and self-serving aspects of U.S. developmental aid programs? Also, the possibility of different interpretations of the foreign aid questions and issues posed in the survey can not be overlooked. Even for potentially more knowledgeable respondents we need to know, for example, about their perceptions of the actual number of U.S. aid recipients, aid expenditures, the distribution of awareness of conditions governing foreign aid transactions, awareness of the heavy concentration of aid to a few countries, and the proportion devoted to military assistance. Broad similarities in education, income and attentiveness to the news are useful but not sufficient "controls" for non-racial attributes.

Despite these caveats, the data reviewed in this chapter permit speculation: Whites and blacks did not consistently share a consensus in these areas of foreign policy cooperation in the 1980s, and for foreign aid in particular, African Americans seemed to share a less internationalist outlook than whites.

Chapter Eleven: CONCLUSION

I. Introduction

In response to historical indications of divergence in racial outlook, this dissertation explored a wide array of secondary data from the 1980s for insights into the proximity of contemporary African and white foreign policy attitudes. Historical accounts showed that institutionalized racial inequality was the fundamental influence on African American conceptions of U.S. foreign policy prior to civil rights. Given the resolution of basic civil rights issues by the mid-1980s, the working hypothesis here was that, by this juncture, the society evolved politically and socially to permit racial foreign policy consensus. Consequently, African American images of the U.S., and conceptions and the international system, should have evolved to a degree that made racial attitudinal convergence more of the norm.

The expectation at the outset was not that race would have become completely irrelevant to foreign policy cognition by the period covered in this study. Race clearly remains an underlying source of the more generally acknowledged attributes of contemporary American political conduct -- domestic and international. Nevertheless, it was posited that because of the strong historical link between civil rights discrimination and foreign affairs for African Americans, the demise of legalized, overt discrimination should have been significant to racial consensus.

Before commenting on the research findings, I would stress my efforts to ground this analysis in a coherent, historically-based, cognitive framework. Like all opinion,

foreign policy opinion is the product of cognitive processes defined by the mechanics of memory and the cognitive templates therein. Such templates, or schema, are structured by immediate context and past experience. African American foreign policy outlook in the 1980s was, like whites,' influenced by the domestic and international context of the period. But unlike white Americans, blacks could have been expected, also, to tap unique historically-based cognitive schema related to their status in America, and related to perceptions of the state's treatment of people of color abroad. Historical evidence of divergent racial postures prior to the 1960s make this a reasonable assumption.

Alfred Hero noted some divergence in early racial foreign policy attitudes: blacks often appeared disproportionately liberal in their preferences, particularly on the eve of civil rights and the eve Third World independence. He posited that as these trends continued African Americans would surpass whites in foreign policy liberalism as they gained more education and awareness of international affairs.

But theoretically, it is just as plausible that over twenty years of civil rights may have fundamentally altered those cognitive schema in a manner that allowed the two races to come closer to sharing a common national self-image. While this is not the research question, interest in whether or not the civil rights revolution has "mainstreamed" black foreign policy cognition was one motivation this project. Assuming civil rights had this effect, how would this have been manifested in foreign policy opinion?

One sign would be attitudinal convergence. Arguably, there were empirical indications from the mid-1980s that some convergence may have occurred. Civil rights

consciousness among African Americans was low in National Black Election Studies (NBES) conducted in 1984 and 1986. Along with this, the two NBES projects found that African Americans held no particular affinity for Africans and people of color in other countries. Black Americans reported feeling closer to whites than to any other group besides their own. This finding set the stage for measuring racial proximity over a range of foreign policy attitudinal data pertaining to force and cooperation, primarily involving less-developed, non-white states.

II. Strengths and Limitations of the Data and Methodology

Some final comments on the data and approach taken are necessary. Aside from the issue of convergence or divergence, gaining insight into African Americans' reactions and preferences over many aspects of the U.S. use of military force and cooperative strategies was an important goal. The main intention was to offer more than the racial snapshot or isolated case study typical of the scholarly and journalistic literatures. Though valuable, those treatments have been devoid of insights into black attitudes toward the less-prominent issue-areas, e.g., nuclear weapons, the United Nations, foreign aid, or the lessons of Vietnam. More critically, even less is known about the relationships between education, income, gender, political viewpoint and African American foreign policy postures. The intention was to shed light on some of these.

However, breadth came at the expense of depth. Working with the ATS surveys proved a great advantage because of their detailed probes relating to military force options and foreign aid. But, their samples included too few African Americans for

conclusive socioeconomic analysis. Analytically, the most that could be done credibly was description of patterns in the intensity of racial responses to the survey items. Even this was difficult because large intensity differences by race are rarely found in opinion research. Throughout the analysis, racial dissimilarities in responses were the basis for comparison, but undoubtedly, finer tools are required. Nevertheless, double-digit dissimilarities were treated as potentially meaningful intensity differences.

Considerable attention was devoted to dissimilarities related to education, and to a lesser extent, political viewpoint, in the belief that these variables probably best capture civil rights sensibilities. Of course, this itself is a research question. Civil rights attitudes and foreign policy outlook have never been extensively explored in a single survey.

Otherwise, statistical treatment was confined to examination of general associations between race, education, income and political viewpoint and some the force and cooperation variables. Inferences made on the basis of dissimilarity indices could be compared against the backdrop of statistical associations present in the sample. Most of the time, race did not seem as strongly associated with force and cooperation preferences as social and political factors, but again this is a problem requiring original research using adequate samples.

Another (minor) limitation was that the scope of the analysis was captive to the design of the ATS survey items. This was most apparent for the scale devised to measure the effectiveness and morality of various coercive U.S. options in ATS #9. There, a short preamble in the item explaining what the study meant by “effective” and “moral” would have been helpful. Similarly, neither ATS’ nor the respondents’ conceptions of “Third

World” is obvious. It would have been valuable to see how racial force preferences differed with more specific country references than “Africa,” “Central America,” or “Southeast Asia.”

For foreign aid, some baseline questions tapping perceptions of how much the U.S. budget went to economic assistance, and of which regions are primary recipients, would have been valuable. And, probes of what respondents thought to be the responsibilities and capacities of the U.N. would have placed those data in better context. Given these various limitations, the overall value of this analysis is provision of insights for more tailored racial research.

What follows are observations of promising areas for such research.

III. Findings

A. Military Force

(a) White Americans were generally more favorable toward the use of military force, but many differences in racial intensity may have been attributable to education.

In virtually all the assessments of military force used in the 1980s, and of hypothetical intervention scenarios involving U.S. allies, whites were more likely to approve or to recommend sending American troops. As a group, blacks were less persuaded by strategic justifications, the “need” for reprisals, or suggestions of imminent threat to the U.S. But, as the summary Table below illustrates, racial differences were often matched and surpassed by dissimilarities between African Americans at different levels of education. At the same time, the education gap for whites tended to be

narrower.

Yet, there were exceptions to this pattern, Vietnam being the most dramatic.

Overall, blacks and whites concurred in low retrospective support for U.S. involvement but less-educated and younger blacks (those under 30 years old in 1988) were distinctly more supportive than better-educated blacks. The two education sub-groups also attached much different importance to some of the lessons of that conflict. Essentially,

Table 11.1: Summary of Dissimilarities Between (a) Blacks and Whites and (b) Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Education, by Support for Force+

Themes	No. of Items	Average Index of Dissimilarity*		
		Whites vs. Blacks	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites**	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blacks
Willingness to Send Troops to Defend Allies	7	4.7	3.0	2.0
Retrospective Support For Force	8	7.8	1.0	-6.8
Agreement with "Lessons" of Vietnam.	8	-1.9	-5.8	-10.4
Willingness to Commit Military to Defend U.S. Interests	5	7.6	-2.0	0.8
Support For Military Options in Handling Third World Conflicts	5	-6.6	-5.8	-7.0
Moral Acceptability of Force Options	5	1.2	-1.8	-1.6
Costs of Using Military Force	4	-11.3	-7.3	-12.0
Willingness to Use Nuclear Weapons	5	-9.6	0.6	-2.6
	47	Av. -6.3	Av. -3.4	Av. -5.4

* This index is the percentage of respondents of one category who would have to respond differently in order for the percentage response distributions of the two categories to be identical.

** "High education" means attainment of more than high school education, but no more than a college degree; "low education" means high school or less. Postgraduates are omitted because of small African American representation.

less-educated African Americans believed more firmly that the U.S. government needed to seek popular support before waging war, and that politicians and the media tied the hands of the military in Vietnam. On the other hand, to a disproportionate fraction of similar whites, Vietnam meant that the U.S. should fight only to repel invasion.

Despite impressions created by the averages in Table 11.1, there was only one theme on which there seemed to be near racial consensus on each item: (un)willingness to send troops to defend U.S. allies. Apart from a Soviet invasion of West Berlin, no other scenario elicited notable differences in racial (non-)support for sending U.S. troops.

(b) Dollar cost and the possibility of mission failure were more important to African Americans than whites in judgments relating to the use of military force.

While African Americans appeared slightly more concerned about all the costs and risks associated with using the U.S. military, their interest in the price tag for intervention seemed to far exceed whites.' The possibility that such ventures might fail also mattered more to blacks, who again differed internally by education to a greater extent. The sizeable overall racial gap reflected the disproportionate apprehensiveness of less-educated, lower- and moderate-income African Americans about the prospect of wasted expenditures. Whites in these income ranges lagged well behind in levels of concern about financial cost.

(c) African Americans were more prepared to use military force, including nuclear weapons, in the Third World.

Not only was there scant evidence of significant identification with Africa and other regions for which they supposedly have "natural" affinity, African Americans also seemed more prepared to use force in the Third World. However, this tantalizing

observation must be weighed against several other factors and contradictions in the data.

First of all, the framing of these survey items was important. Direct questions about actual Third World interventions (e.g. Grenada, Libya, Iraq) and potential ones (e.g. Panama, Nicaragua, the Persian Gulf) uniformly drew greater black disapproval. This was also amply illustrated in the review of Gallup opinion data from 1980 to 1995. There, virtually all the interventions and military actions involved countries commonly understood to be part of the Third World. As noted above, the immediate question is: for ATS, what specific countries did each racial group have in mind regarding the Third World? ATS did refer to regions -- Africa, Latin America and Asia -- in its preamble to these items, but did not name specific countries, nor did it say whether or not the Middle East was included. If the Middle East was, African Americans seemed no more prepared than whites to intervene in hypothetical scenarios involving allies in that region.

Secondly, racial differences in support for military options in handling Third World conflicts were often matched, and sometimes exceeded, by differences by education among blacks. The closeness of the average racial and educational dissimilarities for this theme in Table 11.1 probably explains a great deal. On the other hand, blacks at all educational levels¹ seemed fairly enthusiastic about taking opportunities to seize easy military victories when they presented themselves in the Third World. They were also more likely to favor sending U.S. troops. In these respects they surpassed whites at each educational level.

Conceivably, cognitive ambiguities deriving from the survey may have crept into

¹Black and white postgraduates were excluded from the analysis.

some responses pertaining to the Third World. However, it is hard to imagine that there were too many shades of meaning when it came to the use of nuclear weapons. Here, African Americans clearly surpassed whites in willingness to use nuclear force in the Third World. On average, the internal racial differences on nuclear force scenarios were negligible, but less-educated blacks were notably more favorable on items explicitly involving Third World targets. The probable existence of an education effect among African Americans is reinforced by the distinct disapproval of the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan by better-educated blacks. In contrast, a substantial majority of less-educated blacks (like whites at all educational levels) thought this action necessary.

(d) While whites and blacks preferred indirect and non-military forms of coercion to direct force, African Americans were more likely to view the latter as effective and moral.

There were two patterns in these data. First, though support for non-violent coercion came from majorities of blacks and whites, the former consistently exceeded the latter in tendency to consider those measures effective and morally acceptable. Trade sanctions, diplomatic pressure, indirect pressure through allies, threat of aid reduction and sanctions by international organizations were the non-military options identified.

The other consistent trend was greater African American support for military options -- the use of U.S. troops, the use of surrogate forces, bombing raids and nuclear threat. Support for these options never amounted to majorities; at around 40 percent, black support for using American troops exceeded all the others, and nuclear threat was favored by only 20 percent of African Americans. Nor were racial gaps remarkable; all seemed well within the range of sample error.

Another tendency was for larger fractions of blacks than whites to state that the non-violent options were effective, but not morally acceptable. This was particularly true for the use of foreign aid as a bargaining tool. Both groups gave the outright force options higher effectiveness and immorality ratings, with the highest going to nuclear threat. In almost every case, slightly larger proportions of blacks gave this judgment on the direct force options.

Closer scrutiny of only those saying “very effective and morally acceptable” found negligible dissimilarities between blacks and whites, and between whites at different educational levels. Once again though, there were fairly sizeable education gaps among African Americans -- the more-educated favoring diplomacy and non-violent methods, and the less-educated favoring direct force. Thus if the direct and indirect force items were grouped separately, the average black educational dissimilarity for direct force would be about 12 (in the direction of the less-educated) and about 15 for indirect means (favoring the better-educated). This is not evident in Table 11.1, which gives an average (1.6) based on all options.

B. Cooperation: Immigration, the U.N. and Foreign Aid

(a) Blacks and whites shared a consensus of concern about immigration as a potential threat to the economy, but the former expressed more liberal attitudes toward immigrants and appeared more prepared to accept them as Americans.

Immigration data were largely unavailable in the manipulable datasets, so this concluding observation is based mainly on the NBES and aggregate poll data. Review of immigration-related responses left the impression that there was a significant tolerance gap between blacks and whites regarding Third World arrivals. African Americans

appeared just as apprehensive about immigration's economic impacts but expressed far more positive views of immigrants as members of American society.

This is notable because, as mentioned above, black Americans told NBES that they did not feel particularly close to foreign non-whites. In fact, over half of African Americans surveyed reported feeling "not close" or "not too close" to Spanish-speakers -- the typical immigrants of the 1980s. Furthermore, they overwhelmingly expressed the view that immigrants from Haiti, Mexico, Cuba and Vietnam were "taking jobs away from black people." Yet, whites were far more willing to act on their apprehensiveness about immigration, i.e. deport illegals, vote for anti-immigration candidates, deny education and other benefits to immigrants, and so on. And, unlike blacks, majorities consistently stated that Third World immigrants were a detriment to American society.

There can be little doubt that this unmistakable race gap in levels of hostility to immigration in the 1980s was directly related to negative racial stereotyping by whites. In every instance where comparison was solicited, whites gave overwhelmingly positive reviews of European immigrants and negative ones of immigrants of color. Yet, in those situations blacks were more even-handed: majorities often expressed positive opinions of Europeans and modest approval of Third World immigrants.

(b) Blacks and whites shared a consensus of moderate-to-strong overall support for the U.N. as an organization, and a consensus of ambivalence toward its performance in specific functional areas.

The United Nations may have been one source of attitudinal convergence between blacks and whites. The historical evidence is sketchy, but Hero's analysis found African

Americans more conservative than whites about U.S. reliance on the U.N. in the 1950s. In the polls, blacks expressed less preference for the organization and less interest in having American aid channeled through it; they wanted this function handled by the U.S. government. For whites, preferences were reversed.

By the end of the 1960s, however, African American posture toward the U.N. had become more liberal and more in line with whites.' It may have been that blacks identified more closely with the organization after Third World states began to achieve international "civil rights," i.e. gain independence and secure equal membership in the U.N. General Assembly.

The 1980s data gave few indications that this consensus had broken down racially. or across socioeconomic lines. The average racial dissimilarity (0.9) in Table 11.2 (below) is probably realistic, as is the closeness of the average educational dissimilarities within each racial group.

(c) Inadequate black sample size was a critical limitation in the foreign aid analysis. Nevertheless, there were hints that among those demographically most likely to favor foreign aid, African Americans were consistently less favorable than whites.

After digging well into sub-samples of ATS #8 that inevitably included too few African Americans, some signs of racial dissimilarity over foreign aid were suggested. These are presented very tentatively. Otherwise, like U.N.-related attitudes, racial foreign aid attitudes seemed to be in near-consensus in the 1980s (see Table 11.2). take this view, and college-educated blacks were more likely to do so than white counterparts.

Black and white Americans did not have very high opinions of aid recipients

either. Majorities felt that much U.S. aid was wasted or stolen by corrupt officials, and that recipients were not appreciative. Like whites, blacks were ambivalent about their moral responsibility in this area. Equal majorities wanted the U.S. to be seen as a moral

Table 11.2: Summary of Dissimilarities Between (a) Blacks and Whites and (b) Blacks and Whites Differentiated by Education, by Support for Cooperation+

Themes	No. of Items	Average Index of Dissimilarity*		
		Whites vs. Blacks	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Whites**	High Educ. vs. Low Educ. Blks.
Assessments of the United Nations	7	-0.9	2.7	3.0
Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid	4	-1.0	-4.5	7.8
	Total: 11	Av. -1.0	Av. -0.9	Av. 5.4

* This index is the percentage of respondents of one category who would have to respond differently in order for the percentage response distributions of the two categories to be identical.

** "High education" means attainment of more than high school education, but no more than a college degree; "low education" means high school or less. Postgraduates are omitted because of small African American representation.

force in this respect, as long as it did not affect their own pocketbooks. About one-half of each group felt that the U.S. "could not help so many countries" and that the foreign aid budget was a good place to make needed budget cuts. Yet, large majorities wanted current aid levels to eight named major recipients maintained, probably reflecting equal unawareness that most of the aid they received was military, not humanitarian.

Signs of racial divergence emerged when the opinions of attentive, middle-income, college-educated respondents on these items were compared. The problem here was that there were just 15 blacks in the sample. Nevertheless, huge racial differences appeared over the amounts of aid that should go to major recipients in the future. Also, these African Americans were much less inclined to believe in the effectiveness of

foreign aid in the Third World, that it improved the U.S.' moral standing, and that the U.S. could afford to help so many countries.

IV. Other Areas Requiring Future Attention

Black "Liberalism"

As with foreign aid, sample constraints limited exploration of other interesting findings. For instance, the relevance of traditional political labels, like "liberal" and "conservative," to African American outlook frequently came into question. The NBES data suggested that for blacks, self-identification as liberal in the domestic context did not necessarily transfer to foreign affairs preferences in expected ways. In NBES, the majority of liberals were less favorable to foreign aid to the Third World and larger fractions of conservatives called for increases. Moreover, on many of the ATS force items, black liberals seemed most militaristic.

Who were these black liberals? Table 11.3 presents some characteristics of all

Table 11.3: White and Black Liberals in Five ATS Surveys, by Education and Income

	ATS #6		ATS #8		ATS #9		ATS #11		ATS #12	
	Whites n=388*	Blacks n=38	Whites n=245	Blacks n=22	Whites n=150	Blacks n=16	Whites n=233	Blacks n=44	Whites n=166	Blacks n=26
Education										
HS or less	43%	58%	41%	46%	36%	63%	31%	48%	49%	62%
Coll. Grad or less	51	37	25	27	47	31	53	39	39	35
Post graduate	5	5	34	27	16	6	16	11	13	4
Income										
< \$25,000	31%	42%	31%	28%	34%	88%	33%	57%	40%	62%
\$26-50,000	42	29	51	50	43	13	43	18	32	19
over \$50,000	18	13	14	14	14	0	18	11	13	8
Source: ATS Surveys		*Note: Ns are the numbers of liberals in each sample.								

liberals in the ATS samples. Comparison by income and education makes it clear that black and white liberals were not interchangeable. In the five surveys used in this dissertation larger fractions of black liberals were in the least-educated and low-income categories. This was particularly so in ATS #9, the survey concentrating on military force attitudes. Black “liberalism” may well be a more accurate indication of poverty and lack of education and information. than anything else.

This is certainly an area for further investigation. Statistically, political viewpoint frequently seemed associated with many of the ATS variables, but without knowing what these labels mean to all those included in national samples, few meaningful inferences can be drawn.

African Americans and the Third World

Of all the provocative issues uncovered by this project, none seem more pressing than the task of defining African American post-civil rights postures toward the Third World. African Americans were often more willing than whites to use military force in the Third World, including nuclear weapons, in the 1980s. Moreover, they seemed at least as skeptical as whites about the efficacy of developmental aid and America’s moral obligation to provide it. This contradicts the early history of African American cooperative internationalism toward Africa and the Third World.

Here, a good question for future research is whether contemporary African American perceptions of Africa and the Third World could actually lead to greater interest in coercion. Could it be that African Americans are more willing to apply “tough love” measures to resolve conflicts seen as debilitating to those societies, while whites

view Third World problems as intractable and not worth American lives, effort and dollars? Or, do less-educated blacks hold particularly unsophisticated views of these problems and unrealistically high confidence in the U.S. military, leading them to think that military intervention would be cheap and decisive?

Signs of African American “nuclear militarism” toward the Third World also bear closer scrutiny. Though consistent with indications of black Third World militarism, more questions than answers are raised by this “first-strike” nuclear posture. Were African Americans simply more prepared to come to the defense of a Third World ally? Or, were they less troubled by the consequences of using nuclear weapons on a Third World state, than on the USSR? Could it be that blacks simply believed that Third World states lacked the capacity to retaliate in kind and thus were being more pragmatic? Did whites share this outlook but feel more pressured to give a “politically-correct” answer? If the latter were not true, it would suggest a racial “morality gap” regarding use of these weapons.

Furthermore, indications that educated blacks and whites diverged in acceptance of official nuclear deterrence arguments and, to some degree, in judgment of the bombing of Japan, appear to resonate with currents of black elite dissent dating back to W.E.B. DuBois’ leadership of the early anti-nuclear movement. Needless to say, all this calls for much closer investigation of larger African American samples.

In summary, while race clearly mattered in evaluations of forceful and cooperative U.S. foreign policy actions over the first half of this century, its impact over the second half is less obvious. Before 1970, African Americans certainly were more reticent about

the major military interventions and more “liberal” toward foreign assistance. Black intellectuals, community leaders and the black press epitomized these postures and quite probably had the support of the black masses. Between slavery and civil rights, African Americans simultaneously held positive and negative images of the United States. Elites consistently articulated this dichotomy when domestic and international issues illustrated the failures of American democracy. Preoccupation with rights, equality and justice led African Americans to display what Hero called “foreign policy liberalism.” And, by the 1960s and the Vietnam War, blacks were more likely than whites to oppose military intervention rhetorically, and favor economic and technical assistance to poorer countries.

Data limitations make it impossible to reject the possibility that this racial gap in assessment of foreign policy issues persisted well into the 1980s. Yet the racial picture seemed complex and full of paradoxes. From a historical standpoint, civil rights made a difference, yet it is doubtful that African Americans’ cognitive schema ceased to reflect the grim social realities of the immediate past and the subtler inequalities of the present. Black and white postures were rarely incongruent in the 1980s. Yet traditional class, education, political viewpoint and other variables alone seemed incapable of accounting for all of the differences between blacks and whites. Like other studies of racial opinion, this dissertation uncovered “anomalies” that call for more analysis.

African Americans seemed to embrace the armed forces, favor force over diplomacy in principle, and lack romantic or nostalgic attachment to the Third World. Yet they consistently surpassed whites in intensity of opposition to military coercion in the 1980s and 1990s. The polls showed that African Americans were not more pacifistic,

yet they seemingly had a harder time authorizing U.S. coercion. They seemed quite willing to recommend force in the abstract. However, the reality of U.S. intervention aroused greater black skepticism. Black opposition to the Persian Gulf war reinforces the idea that suggest that black foreign policy cognition is shaped by unique schema related to equality, racial equity and other values. Future foreign policy opinion should not only be more race-conscious, it also should have much more of a cognitive focus.

APPENDIX I: Data Sources

The two primary data sources are polls conducted by the Gallup organization and a series of foreign policy surveys commissioned by the 1987-88 “Americans Talk Security” project.

A. Gallup

The Gallup Poll gathers information both in personal and telephone interviews. Though the method for selecting households differs in each case, the common goal is to provide representative samples of adults living in the U.S. Samples are weighted so that the demographic characteristics of the total weighted sample of respondents matches the latest estimates of the demographic characteristics of the adult population available from the U.S. Census Bureau. For telephone surveys, samples are also weighted to compensate for differences in access to a telephone, and for the kinds of people more or less likely to be found at home.

Data Limitations

Standard national Gallup samples are around 1,000, thus when only sampled in proportion to their national population size (about 12-14 percent), African American representation rarely exceeds 200. Furthermore, Gallup does not always present separate statistics for blacks, but rather includes them in a larger “non-white” group. For the most part this research only reports instances where blacks are presented as a separate group. In any case, the dominance of African Americans in the non-white population means that they typically account for about 90 percent of that group.

Small sample sizes mean that statistics related to African Americans are subject to

the possibility of double-digit error. Therefore even at an aggregate racial level, this survey has limited usefulness as a comparative tool. However, Gallup's value is in its frequency, timeliness, and consistent question format. Also, racial foreign policy opinion research rarely finds the differences in opinion exceeding the typical Gallup error margin (at least 10 percentage points).

B. Americans Talk Security

The Americans Talk Security (ATS) series consists of twelve studies conducted on national security issues during the 1988 Presidential campaign and transition by the following organizations:

Market Opinion Research

Martilla & Kiley

The Daniel Yankelovich Group, Inc.

The Public Agenda Foundation

ATS #8, conducted in July-August, 1988, mainly focused on U.S. foreign aid policies and the United Nations. ATS #9, done a month later, concentrated on the American use of force. Some other surveys in the series included a few items related to these areas.

Themes

For military force, the items included fit the following themes:

1. The appropriateness of using military force in the past.
2. The effectiveness of force compared to other means of influencing other nations.
3. Defending friends and allies/isolationism.

4. The importance of cost factors in military use decision-making.
5. The appropriateness of using force in developing or Third World countries.

And for cooperation, the themes were:

1. Foreign aid.
2. Immigration
3. The United Nations

Methodology

These surveys were based on 30-minute interviews of random samples of at least 1,000 registered voters. Respondents were chosen from among all households in the contiguous 48 states on the basis of random probability sampling procedures which took into account unlisted telephone numbers. The samples were stratified by census regions, states within census regions, and counties within states. Interviewers observed gender quotas (52% women; 48% men) and screened for voting status. Only registered voters were allowed to participate. Samples were checked against census data and previous survey results and only small discrepancies by race within region, and age within gender, were found.

Data Limitations

In the ATS surveys only registered voters were polled, and since voter registration rates are lower among blacks, this sub-sample might be less representative of African Americans than is true of the white sub-sample.

Small sample size is a more serious limitation. Like Gallup, national samples range between 1,000 and 1,500 so that while white representation was reasonably large,

black samples tended to be less than 200. As with the Gallup data, sampling error is highly probable. Differences between racial sub-samples have to be extremely large in order to be reliable 95 percent of the time. As noted above, differences in excess of 10 percentage points are very unlikely, so confidence can only be derived from the consistency of these findings across surveys.

APPENDIX II (a): American Public Preferences For Involvement in World Affairs

	Active Part	Stay Out
October 1945	79%	21%
August 1947	71%	29%
January 1950	74%	26%
March 1955	77%	23%
June 1965	83%	17%
Spring 1973	68%	32%
Spring 1975	63%	37%
Spring 1976	66%	34%
Spring 1978	67%	33%
November 1980	66%	34%
Spring 1982	64%	36%
January 1992	53%	44%
October. 1994	65%	--

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization (Gallup), October 1945 and August 1947; National Opinion Research Center (NORC), January 1950 - June 1965; NORC, General Social Surveys (GSS), Spring 1973 - Spring 1978; Louis Harris and Associates, November 1980; NORC, GSS Spring 1982; Gallup, January, 1992; John E. Rielly (1995). Typical question: *Do you think it would be best for the future of this country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we (stay/stayed) out of world affairs?*

APPENDIX II (b): Foreign Policy Goals: U.S. Public and Opinion Leaders (1974-1990)

(Percentage saying "very important goal")

<i>1990 Rank</i>	<i>Public</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>Change. 1986-1990</i>
1	Protecting U.S. jobs	74%	78%	77%	77%	65%	-12%
2	Protecting U.S. business interests abroad	39	45	44	43	63	+20
4	Securing adequate energy supplies	75	78	70	69	61	-8
9	Matching Soviet power	na	na	49	53	56	+3
11	Containing communism	54	60	59	57	56	-1
12	Worldwide arms control	64	64	64	69	53	-16
13	Strengthening the U.N.	46	47	48	46	44	-2
14	Helping improve the standard of living of less developed nations	39	35	35	37	41	+4
<i>1990 Rank</i>	<i>Opinion Leaders</i>	<i>1974</i>	<i>1978</i>	<i>1982</i>	<i>1986</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>Change. 1986-1990</i>
1	Preventing spread of nuclear weapons	na	na	na	na	94%	--
2	Worldwide arms control	na	81	86	82	80	-2
5	Securing adequate energy supplies	na	88	72	72	60	-12
8	Helping improve the standard of living of less developed nations	na	64	55	46	42	-4
9	Strengthening the U.N.	na	26	25	22	39	+17
10	Protecting U.S. jobs	na	34	43	43	39	-4
12	Protecting U.S. business interests abroad	na	26	25	32	27	-5
14	Matching Soviet power	na	na	52	58	20	-38
15	Containing communism	na	45	44	43	10	-33
Source: Derived from Schneider (1992: 42-43)							

APPENDIX III (a): Foreign Policy Opinion in the Early 20th Century

AIPO 149A, Date: 2-22-39	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(20)	(1508)
Prefer Japan win if Soviet-Japanese war	20%	9%
Prefer USSR win	40	51
Neither, no choice	30	29
No opinion	10	11
AIPO 181, Date: 1-10-40		
(N)	(100)	(3031)
Change U.S. Constitution to require national vote before Congress could draft Americans for war overseas	64%	60%
Disapprove	29	35
No opinion	7	5
Approve lending Finland \$60 million to help fight USSR	50	55
Disapprove	37	39
No opinion	13	6
AIPO 214T, Date: 10-5-40		
(N)	(42)	(1595)
Sell Britain military aircraft on credit if it can't pay cash	48%	57%
Do not	43	34
No opinion	9	8
AIPO 213, Date: 9-30-40		
(N)	(57)	(1557)
Let Japan control China rather than risk war	33%	30%
Other isolationist replies	14	15
Risk war to stop her	25	29
No opinion	28	26
Embargo munitions to Japan	72	83
Do not	14	9
No opinion	14	8
<i>Source: Hero, (1969: 235-23)</i>		

APPENDIX IV(a): Aid Since 1956

SRC 417, Sept.-Oct., 1956	Negroes	Whites	AIPO 596, Date: 3-4-58	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(147)	(1609)	(N)	(162)	(1447)
- Strongly agree US should help poorer countries	29%	21%	- In general for foreign aid	47%	51%
- Strongly agree should help even if not as much against Communism as we	15	12	- Against it	27	33
			- Congress should appropriate less than President requested	32	35
NORC 404, Date: 4-26-57			AIPO 639, Date: 12-6-60		
(N)	(117)	(1162)	(N)*	(371)	(2475)
Very important to help Africa improve living standards	56%	39%	New President should increase foreign aid	7%	7%
Roper 939, Date: April 1957			AIPO 640, Date: 1-10-61		
(N)	(145)	(1361)	(N)*	(244)	(2405)
- Economic aid to Africa and Asia should be..... increased	10%	3%	- Favor Peace Corps for technical assistance to less developed world	79%	71%
.....kept at current levels	27	24	- Opposed to Peace Corps	6	19
.....cut a little	28	31			
.....cut drastically	17	29			
.....stopped completely	4	3			
- Increase military aid	10	5	AIPO 641, Date: 2-8-61		
.....keep at current levels	46	47	(N)*	(256)	(2617)
.....cut a little	21	20	US should offer surplus food to famine-wracked Communist China	62%	52%
.....cut drastically	10	14			
.....stop completely	1	2			
AIPO 593, Date: 12-31-57			AIPO 646, Date: 5-26-61		
(N)	(190)	(1332)	(N)*	(281)	(3241)
- Willing to have taxes raised to meet Soviet econ. competition and promises of econ. aid to Africa and Asia	38%	32%	- Willing to make personal sacrifices, including higher taxes, for foreign economic aid	14%	22%
- Not willing	41	56	-for military aid	9	9
Roper 963, Date: Jan., 1958			AIPO 652, Date: 11-15-61		
(N)	(149)	(1344)	(N)*	(410)	(2355)
Expand econ.aid to Asia, Africa	27%	17%	-US/West doing enough for less developed countries	52%	70%
Keep at current levels	36	43	- Not doing enough	18	14
Cut it back or terminate it	19	22			
* Weighted N's herein were approximately twice actual N's among whites and 2.3 times those among Negroes					

APPENDIX IVa: Aid to Europe and the Third World: 1945-1957 (contd.)

AIPO 652, Date: 11-15-61	Negroes	Whites	AIPO 706, Date: 2-17-65	Negroes	Whites
(N)*	(410)	(2355)	(N)*	(386)	(3120)
Foreign aid of last five years has helped US interests	43%	52%	More important to send allies: economic aid	56%	72%
			military aid	30	16
AIPO 678, Date:10-9-63			- Continue econ. aid to nonaligned countries	43	48
(N)*	(432)	(2905)	- Stop aid....	54	47
Volunteered foreign aid as something on which govt. spends too much money	27%	43%	NORC 399, Date 11-15-56		
Very great deal of trust in Kennedy's handling of aid	33	16	(N)	(127)	(1158)
AIPO 682, Date:12-10-63			Give econ. aid to Poland	37%	55%
(N)* (no Democrats included)	(101)	(1340)	Disapprove of Poland aid	48	38
- Keep US aid abroad at current level at least	58%	31%	NORC 401, Date12-28-56		
- Reduce aid	19	51	(N)	(113)	(1119)
POS 655, Date: 2-15-65			Continue aid to nonaligned countries	46%	53%
(N)	(182)	(1438)			
- US spends too much on foreign aid	18%	36%			
- Too little	18	9			
- Should spend most on:					
..... Latin America	14	45			
..... Asia	8	9			
..... Africa	33	10			
- Have obligation to help underdeveloped countries	46	49			
- No obligation.....	27	24			
- Extremely satisfied with US help to poorer countries	25	20			
- Well satisfied.....	36	25			
- Somewhat satisfied.....	27	29			
			<i>Source: Derived from Hero (1969:239-241)</i>		

APPENDIX IV(b): Preferences For Economic and Military Aid in the 1950s

	Negroes	Whites		Negroes	Whites
AIPO 506, 10-7-52			NORC 329, 8-28-52		
(N)	(247)	(2879)	(N)	(116)	(1176)
US should train and equip S. Korean army of 2 million	68%	70%	- More important to send allies military aid	52%	35%
			- economic aid	33	47
NORC 386, 4-20-56			AIPO 577, 1-15-57		
(N)	(109)	(1115)	(N)	(160)	(1334)
Good idea to build up armies in friendly countries	62%	67%	- Send military supplies to friendly Middle Eastern countries	54%	52%
			- Send econ. aid	64	70
NORC 404, 4-26-57			Source: Derived from Hero (1969:240-242)		
(N)	(117)	(1162)			
- More important to send allies military aid	20%	16%			
- economic aid	62	70			

Immigration Preferences, 1965

AIPO 713, 6-22-65	Negroes	Whites
(N)*	(425)	(3111)
Increase number of foreigners permitted to immigrate to US	9%	7%
Keep at current level	35	39
Reduce immigration	23	35
No opinion	33	18
Favor changing from country of origin quota system to one based on skills	55	50
Oppose	20	34
No opinion	25	16
*Weighted Ns were approx. Twice actual Ns among whites, 2.3 times among Negroes. Source: As above		

APPENDIX IV (c): Attitudes Toward the The United Nations (1950- 1966)

NORC 280, 4-17-50	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(114)	(1153)
-At least some US aid to backward countries should be spent through UN	18%	35%
-All US aid should be handled bilaterally by the US government	24	34
-No opinion	5	5
-Against aid generally	34	30
-No opinion on aiding backward countries	19	6
AIPO 541, 12-29-54		
(N)	(166)	(1280)
-US should give strong support to the UN	67%	73%
-Should give only a little or no support	17	16
-No opinion	16	11
AIPO 631, 7-14-60		
(N)	(365)	(2418)
-Good idea to build standing UN Emergency Force to deal with small wars	64%	73%
-Poor idea	13	12
-No opinion	23	15
AIPO 654, 1-9-62		
(N)	(421)	(2991)
-US should withdraw from UN	7%	9%
-Should not	75	87
-No opinion	18	4
AIPO, 679, 11-8-63		
(N)	(651)	(3630)
-US should withdraw from UN	7%	8%
-Should not	69	80
-No opinion	24	12
AIPO, 680, 11-20-63		
(N)	(442)	(2942)
-UN doing a good job	54%	51%
-Fair job (volunteered)	32	27
-Poor job	2	8
-No opinion	12	14
-Very important to try to make the UN a success	79	79
- Fairly important	15	8
-Not so important	1	4
-No opinion	5	9

APPENDIX IV (c) (contd.): Attitudes Toward the The United Nations (1950- 1966)

AIPO 695, 7-21-64	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(447)	(3068)
-Good idea to build standing UN emergency Force to deal with small wars	69%	66%
-Poor idea	5	18
-No opinion	26	16
-Approve of UN army dealing with problems of S.E. Asia and Vietnam	60	57
-Disapprove	8	21
-No opinion	32	22
AIPO 712, 6-2-65		
(N)	(475)	(2875)
-If UN had not existed. would likely have been another world war	57%	59%
-No difference	22	26
-No opinion	21	15
AIPO 715, 8-3-65		
(N)	(361)	(3166)
-Approve of asking UN to try to work out formula for peace in Vietnam	60%	76%
-Disapprove	14	12
-No opinion	26	12
AIPO 723, 12-29-65		
(N)	(303)	(3225)
-Good idea to submit Vietnam case to UN or ICJ and accept the decision	38%	50%
-Poor idea	33	36
-No opinion	29	14
AIPO Survey of August 1966 (Gallup Opinion Index, Sept. 1966)		
-Good idea to submit Vietnam to UN and accept decision	51	50
-Poor idea	28	34
-No opinion	21	16

APPENDIX IV (d): Attitudes on Policies Toward Communist Powers(1949- 1966)

AIPO 439, 3-17-49	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(189)	(2004)
-US should join defense pact with W. Europe	75%	78%
-Should not	11	13
-No opinion	14	8
<u>Roper 694, August 1952</u>		
(N)*	(398)	(3556)
-Support further negotiations over Korea	36	29
-Want Korean War carried further	20	38
-Withdraw from Korea	27	16
-No opinion	17	17
AIPO 517.7-2-53		
(N)	(128)	(1417)
-Favor meeting of leaders of West with those of USSR	42%	56%
-Oppose	20	30
-No opinion	38	14
AIPO 526, 8-3-65		
(N)	(361)	(3166)
-Approve of asking UN to try to work out formula for peace in Vietnam	60%	76%
-Disapprove	14	12
-No opinion	26	12
AIPO 723, January 1954		
(N)	(72)	(1421)
-US and USSR should work out business arrangement to buy and sell goods	46%	41%
-Should not	29	45
-No opinion	25	14
AIPO 541, 12-29-54		
(N)	(166)	(1280)
-Should blockade coast of Communist China	27%	35%
-Should not	31	39
-No opinion	42	26
AIPO 648, 7-25-61		
(N)*	(308)	(2828)
-Should keep US forces in Berlin with British and French forces, even at risk of war	75%	85%
-Should not at risk of war	10	5
-No opinion	15	10

APPENDIX IV (d) (contd.): Attitudes . . . Toward Communist Powers(1949- 1966)

AIPO 650, 9-19-61	Negroes	Whites
(N)*	(347)	(2685)
-Try to fight way into Berlin with allies if roads and airways blockaded by Communists	68%	70%
-Do not	12	19
-No opinion	20	11
AIPO 668, 2-5-63		
(N)*	(418)	(3234)
-US should send armed forces into Cuba to overthrow Castro	15%	20%
-Should not	46	65
-No opinion	39	15
AIPO 526, 8-3-65		
(N)*	(361)	(3166)
-Approve of asking UN to try to work out formula for peace in Vietnam	60%	76%
-Disapprove	14	12
-No opinion	26	12
AIPO 684, 1-28-64		
(N)*	(369)	(2740)
-Admit China (to UN)	18%	14%
-Do not	50	72
-No opinion	32	14
POS 655, 2-15-65		
(N)*	(182)	(1438)
-Invade Cuba and overthrow Castro	13%	13%
-Continue current policies	39	44
-Set up a Cuban government in exile	19	32
-No opinion	29	11
AIPO 706, 4-21-65		
(N)*	(386)	(3120)
-Admit China (to UN)	28%	21%
-Do not	41	66
-No opinion	31	13

APPENDIX IV (d) (contd.): Attitudes . . . Toward Communist Powers(1949- 1966)

AIPO 710, 4-21-65	Negroes	Whites
(N)*	(388)	(3111)
-In light of developments, should have become involved with US military forces in S.E. Asia	45%	53%
-Should not	20	27
-No opinion	35	20
AIPO 668, 2-5-63		
(N)*	(418)	(3234)
-US should send armed forces into Cuba to overthrow Castro	15%	20%
-Should not	46	65
-No opinion	39	15
AIPO 713, 6-22-65		
(N)*	(425)	(3111)
-Continue war alone if S. Vietnam government decides to end war and stop fighting	16%	19%
-Stop fighting ourselves too	63	65
-No opinion	21	16
AIPO 719, 10-27-65		
(N)*	(369)	(3056)
-More inclined to vote for Congressional candidate advocating sending a great many more men to Vietnam	36%	47%
-Less inclined	40	30
-No opinion	24	23
-More inclined to vote for Congressional candidate advocating trying harder to reach a compromise settlement in Vietnam	77	65
-Less inclined	9	20
-No opinion	14	15
AIPO 720, 11-16-65		
(N)*	(371)	(2903)
-US right in sending troops into Santo Domingo	50%	53%
-Wrong to intervene militarily	17	22
-No opinion	33	25
AIPO 710, 4-21-65		
(N)	(388)	(3111)
-Admit China (to UN)	28%	21%
-Do not	41	66
-No opinion	31	13

APPENDIX IV (d) (contd.): Attitudes . . . Toward Communist Powers(1949- 1966)

AIPO 725, 3-1-66	Negroes	Whites
(N)*	(249)	(3309)
-In view of developments. US made a mistake sending troops to fight in Vietnam -Not a mistake -No opinion	18% 50 32	26% 59 15
AIPO 724, 2-8-66		
(N)*	(400)	(3117)
-Favor bombing big cities in N. Vietnam -Oppose -No opinion	25% 55 20	29% 60 11
AIPO 713, 6-22-65		
(N)*	(425)	(3111)
-Continue war alone if S. Vietnam government decides to end war and stop fighting -Stop fighting ourselves too -No opinion	16% 63 21	19% 65 16
AIPO 726, 3-22-66		
(N)*	(385)	(3139)
-Admit China to UN -Do not -No opinion	30% 35 35	24% 58 18
AIPO Survey of September , 1966 (Gallup Release, 9-21-66)		
(N)	(385)	(3139)
-Approve way President Johnson is handling Vietnam -Disapprove -No opinion -Begin to withdraw from Vietnam -Carry on -Expand our military effort there -No opinion	48% 32 20 20 18 50 12	42% 41 17 17 18 56 9
*Weighted Ns were roughly 2 times and 2.3 times actual white and Negro Ns respectively.		

APPENDIX IV (e): Attitudes on Toward National Defense (1960- 1966)

AIPO 439, 3-17-49	Negroes	Whites
(N)	(371)	(2475)
-The new President and Congress should spend more money to strengthen national defense than recently	30%	28%
POS 655, 2-15-65		
(N)	(182)	(1438)
-Extremely well satisfied with US military strength	31%	30%
-Considerable well satisfied	50	45
-Somewhat satisfied	13	17
-Not at all satisfied	0	6
-No opinion	6	2
AIPO 712, 6-2-65		
(N)	(475)	(2383)
-Every able-bodied male aged 18 years should be required to serve in the armed forces for one year	62%	66%
-Should not	31	30
-No opinion	7	4
AIPO Survey of September, 1966 (<i>Gallup Political Index</i>, Oct. 1966)		
-Every able-bodied male aged 18 years should be required to serve in the armed forces for one year	69%	69%
-Should not	22	24
-No opinion	9	7

APPENDIX V(a): Racial Preferences for U.S. Intervention

Scenario	Preferred Options							
	Stay out (%)		Diplomatic pressure (%)		Send military supplies (%)		Send troops (%)	
	Whites Blacks		Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks
<i>Peoples Republic of China invades Taiwan</i>	37	60	35	20	13	8	9	9
<i>Nicaraguan troops enter Honduras to destroy Contra bases</i>	27	40	24	21	23	22	19	9
<i>India invades Pakistan</i>	41	55	34	25	12	13	4	3
<i>Soviets occupy Poland after strikes/protests weaken government</i>	26	41	48	32	12	11	9 (26) 8)*	13 (
<i>Soviets and East Germany invade West Berlin</i>	16	33	23	27	13	12	41 (51) (15)*	26

* denotes responses to similar question in 1981 Roper survey cited above.

Source: ATS, No. 9, September 1988. Questions 36, 37, 39-41.

APPENDIX V(b): Central American and the Caribbean --Nicaragua Contras

Gallup #272-G, 1-16-87	Blacks	Whites
Congress should vote to give additional \$40 million aid to contras.	9%	23%
Gallup #281-G, 5-11-87		
The Reagan Administration has requested \$270 million in additional aid for the contras. Do you think the U.S. should continue aid or wait to see if peace plan is successful? [Continue aid to contras...]	10	21
Gallup #272-G, 1-16-87		
Approve of Reagan Administration using profits from sale of weapons to Iran for military support to Nicaraguan contras, though Congress voted against such support.	5	16
Feel that Reagan is holding back information related to the Iran-contra affair from the public.	88	74
Would be worse if the president knew and approved Iran-contra connection	51	34
Would be worse if National Security Council ran operation behind president's back	29	51
Source: <i>The Gallup Poll</i> , 1987, pp. 9-16		

APPENDIX V(c): Somalia Intervention

Gallup 322036, Date: 12-4-92	Non-whites*	Whites
(N)	(98)	(897)
Very confident U.S. will accomplish goals in Somalia with few/no casualties	33%	27%
.....somewhat confident	29	38
.....not too confident	23	22
.....not at all confident	9	10
Very confident that troops will be withdrawn in few months	14	19
.....somewhat confident	31	35
.....not too confident	38	27
.....not at all confident	9	15
Very confident that U.S. effort would end widespread famine	19	13
.....somewhat confident	44	24
.....not too confident	19	30
.....not at all confident	13	18
Gallup 422018, Date: 9-8-93		
(N)	(133)	(878)
U.S. should withdraw all troops in Somalia now	37%	36%
.....should withdraw troops over the next 6 months	18	29
.....should keep troops in Somalia until humanitarian mission is accomplished	40	30
"Pulling out troops would undermine U.S. leadership in world affairs and send wrong the message to aggressors"		
.....Agree	34	41
..... Disagree	62	53
* Includes all other minorities sampled.		

APPENDIX V(d): Bosnia

Gallup 9506004, Date: 6-6-95	Non-whites*	Whites
(N)	(125)	(874)
U.S. currently too involved in Bosnia situation	29%	34%
.....not involved enough	21	17
...level of involvement about right	48	42
U.S. needs to be involved to protect interests	50	27
U.S. doesn't need to be involved.....	45	66
Gallup 9508017, Date: 9-19-95		
	Blacks	Whites
(N)	(321)	(883)
Favor U.S. contributing combat troops to international peace-keeping force in Bosnia	49%	50%
.....oppose sending U.S. troops	46	44
Very confident that Clinton Administration would withdraw troops within one year as planned	7	8
.....somewhat confident	27	23
.....not too confident	32	30
.....not at all confident	32	38
Gallup 9512023, Date: 12-18-95		
	Non-whites*	Whites
(N)	(128)	(866)
U.S. should not send troops to Bosnia as part of international peacekeeping force	36%	36%
.....shouldn't send troops. but I support President's decision	27	27
...U.S. should send troops and I support President's decision	29	34
* Includes all other minorities sampled.		

APPENDIX V(e): Trend in Attitudes toward Immigration Levels, by Region

<i>Source of Immigration</i>	<i>June 1984</i>	<i>February 1992</i>	<i>July 1993</i>
European countries			
Too many	26%	36%	33%
Too few	11	7	10
About right	50	52	52
No opinion	13	5	5
Latin America			
Too many	53%	69%	62%
Too few	5	5	5
About right	30	22	29
No opinion	12	4	4
African countries			
Too many	31%	47%	44%
Too few	12	10	9
About right	37	36	40
No opinion	20	7	7
Asian countries			
Too many	49%	58%	62%
Too few	6	4	4
About right	33	32	29
No opinion	12	6	5

Source: Gallup Poll Monthly, July 1993, p.5.

The question was: "Do you think the number of immigrants now entering the U.S. from each of the following areas is too many, too few, or about the right amount...?"

APPENDIX VI (a): The National Black Election Study

Principal Investigators: James S. Jackson
 Patricia Gurin
 Shirley J. Hatchett

In the Spring of 1984, a national study of black Americans, the National Black Election Study (NBES) was funded by the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Carnegie Corporation. Data were collected by the Program for Research on Black Americans at the Institute for Social Research, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. The NBES contains 1150 interviews of eligible black voters before and 872 reinterviews after the 1984 presidential election.

The study design was chosen for comparability with the Center for Political Studies' 1984 National Election Studies. The NBES was conducted by telephone. Respondents had achieved an average of 12 years of education, the vast majority of them having a high school diploma or its equivalent. Roughly 30 percent of respondents reported household incomes of less than \$10,000 per year, 32 percent reported incomes between \$10,000 and \$20,000, 28 percent had incomes between \$20,000 and \$30,000, and 10 percent reported incomes of \$40,000 or more. Thirty-eight percent of the respondents were men and 62 percent were women.

In 1988, a similar study was done focusing on the attitudes and political preferences of the Black electorate during the 1984 and 1988 presidential elections. Questions regarding party identification, political interest, and preferences and choices for president were asked. In addition, respondents were asked about their feelings concerning Jesse Jackson's campaigns for the presidency in 1984 and 1988 and the effect his campaigns had on the elections. Information on race and gender issues, economic matters, quality of life, government spending, political participation, and religion and church politics is also included. Demographic information on respondents includes sex, age, education, marital status, income, and occupation and industry codes.

APPENDIX VI (b): The Joint Center for Political Studies (JCPS) Black Leadership Survey¹

In 1991, JCPS published a report “Africa in the Minds and Deeds of Black American Leaders” based on a target sample of 150 black Americans prominent in economic, political or social spheres. The target sample included elected officials, heads of civil rights organizations, business executives, religious leaders, scholars and educators and was designed to ensure representation by professional/institutional background and geographic region.

Professional background included several categories:

- Politics (black elected officials)
- Business (heads of black-owned enterprises)
- Education and research (scholars, presidents of historically black colleges and universities, and experts on foreign policy, or Africa).
- Civic and social (civil rights leaders, foundation executives, religious leaders).

Eighty (80) interviews were completed by telephone based on a 32-question survey that covered the following areas:

- Personal interest. Was the respondent personally interested in international affairs; did he/she focus on particular topics or geographic areas; how did he/she pursue those interests?
- Professional activities. Did respondent’s job responsibilities include international affairs, which issues and geographic areas; how much time was devoted to foreign affairs?
- Information and leadership. How did the respondent keep track of international/African issues; what did he/she think of the mass media’s news coverage of Africa; who did he/she regard as effective advocates for Africa?
- Attitudes toward foreign policy issues. What did the respondent think about U.S. defense spending, foreign aid?
- Blacks and international affairs. Did the respondent believe that African Americans, as a group, were interested or involved in international affairs?
- Bush administration foreign policy. Was the respondent familiar with current U.S. foreign policy priorities, did he/ she support them, how should they be changed?

¹This description is derived from the report by Dorn and Carrington (1991), Appendix B, pp. 41-43. See report for actual survey questionnaire.

APPENDIX VI (c): Responses to Selected NBES Items in 1984 and 1988.

	1984	1988
	(% in agreement)	
Economic position of blacks worse than that of whites	68	67
Disapprove of way Reagan is handling job as president	83	--
If blacks vote they can make a difference in who gets elected	89	--
White government officials and politicians will always get their own way	48	50
Poor people as a group have too little influence	92	90
Blacks as a group have too little influence	81	87
Whites as a group have too much influence	62	58
What generally happens to blacks in this country affects my life	74	83
I think about being black, and about what I have in common with other blacks, once in a while/a lot	58	54
I feel I can trust the government in Washington to do what's right only some of the time	73	73
Government is run by a few big interests looking out for themselves, not for the benefit of all the people	74	71
The civil rights movement affected me personally	61	66
Source: NBES, 1984 and 1988.		

APPENDIX VI (d): Closeness to Foreigners, by Assessment of Civil Rights Movement

	Percent feeling <u>not</u> close to....				
	West Indians	Africans	Spanish-speakers	Whites	Blacks
Movement affected me	49	38	52	38	4
Movement had no effect	59	53	62	33	10
There has been progress re: racial discrimination	53	46	54	30	7
There has been little progress re: racial discrimination	53	43	57	45	7
Source: NBES, 1984					

APPENDIX VI(e): African American Affinity for Africans, West Indians and Latinos, by Selected Characteristics Source: NBES, 1984	<i>African Americans who feel . . .</i>	
	"Close" to Africans, West Indians, Latinos.	"Not close" to Africans, West Indians, Latinos.
<i>Age Group</i>		
<21	12	11
22-39	47	52
40-64	29	28
65+	13	9
<i>Economic Class</i>		
Poor	22	14
Working class	21	32
Middle class	53	47
Upper middle	3	5
Upper class	1	2
<i>Education</i>		
<High school	12	8
9-12 grade	16	11
HS/GED	29	39
Some college	25	27
College degree	18	16
<i>Civil rights sensitivity</i>		
Movement affected me personally	67	50
Movement did not affect me personally	33	50
<i>Common fate</i>		
What happens to blacks in U.S. will affect me	79	70
What happens . . . will not affect me	22	30
<i>Race consciousness</i>		
I think about being black a lot	21	10
.....fairly often	14	14
.....once in a while	28	25
.....hardly ever	37	51
.....never	--	--
<i>Sex</i>		
Male	48	30
Female	53	70
<i>Urbanicity</i>		
Rural	6	10
Small town	13	11
Small city	15	16
Suburb	8	9
Large city	56	54

APPENDIX VII (a): Items Related to Retrospective and Prospective Uses of Force in ATS #9.

The appropriateness of using military force in the past

Q17. Thinking back over the past few years, do you think that the U.S. has used too much military force, too little military force, or the right amount of military force throughout the world?

Q18. And, from what you remember or have heard or read, do you think that the U.S. Has used too much military force, too little military force, or the right amount of military force since World War II?

For each [of the following questions] please tell me if you feel we should have, or should not have used our military the way we did.

Q20. The bombing of Libya by the U.S. Navy and Air Force in 1986.

Q21. The U.S. military intervention as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon in 1982.

Q22. The Naval blockade around Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962.

Q23. The invasion of Grenada by U.S. forces in 1983.

Q24. American participation in the Vietnam War.

Q24A. American participation with other United Nations members in the Korean War.

Defending friends and allies.

For each of the following hypothetical cases please tell me which of the following four options is the STRONGEST action that the U.S. should take -- stay out of the conflict entirely, use only diplomatic and political pressure against the aggressor nation, send military supplies and aid to the country under attack, or send American troops to assist the attacked country.

Q.35. Arab forces invade Israel.

Q.36. The People's Republic of China invades Taiwan.

- Q.37. Nicaraguan troops cross the border into Honduras to destroy contra rebel bases.
- Q.38. Iran invades Saudi Arabia.
- Q.39. India invades Pakistan.
- Q.40. The Soviet Union occupies Poland after strikes and protests weaken the Polish government.
- Q.41. Soviet and East German forces invade West Berlin.

Items related to retrospective and prospective uses of force in ATS #12.

Defending friends and allies.

Here are some situations where our military forces might be used. For each one, please tell me if we should send troops or if the situation is not worth the cost in money and lives.

- Q.33 Arab forces invade Israel with the intention of establishing an Arab state, and Israel says it cannot defend itself unless the U.S. sends troops.
- Q.34 Nicaraguan troops cross the border into Honduras to destroy contra rebel bases, and Honduras says it cannot repel the attack without the help of U.S. troops.
- Q. 35 Iran invades Saudi Arabia to gain control of Persian Gulf oil supplies and Saudi Arabia says it cannot stop Iran without the help of U.S. troops.
- Q. 36 Soviet and East German forces invade West Berlin to make West Berlin part of the communist bloc, and West Germany says it cannot free West Berlin unless U.S. troops are used.

Lessons of Vietnam

Since the American involvement in Vietnam ended in 1973, there has been a lot of discussion about the possible lessons the United States learned from the Vietnam War. Here are some statements about the Vietnam War, and for each one, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

- Q. 38 We lost the Vietnam War because American political leaders did not give the U.S. armed forces the full support they needed to win.
- Q.39 The Vietnam War showed that the U.S. cannot fight and win a guerilla war.
- Q.40 The Vietnam War showed the American people that U.S. officials who are deeply involved in conducting the war cannot be trusted to give reliable information to the public.
- Q. 41 The Vietnam War showed that the U.S. should not fight a war except to repel an invasion of our own country.
- Q. 42 The Vietnam War showed that the U.S. government must have the support of all the people in order to wage a war against another country.
- Q.43 The Vietnam War showed that we should NOT send troops to support an ally government that does not have the support of most of its own people.
- Q.44 The Vietnam War showed that if we are ever again to fight in a tough war, we will maintain the resolve necessary to win if we STOP TV from bringing the horrors of combat into the living rooms of America.
- Q.45. The Vietnam War showed that we should never again fight a ground war in Asia.

APPENDIX VII (b): Racial Attitudes toward Past Uses of Force, by Income

HOUSE- HOLD INCOME	<i>U.S. use of force since WW II</i>	<i>U.S. use of force in the 1980s.</i>	<i>Korean War</i>	<i>Block- ade of Cuba, 1962</i>	<i>Viet- nam War</i>	<i>Lebanon peace- keeping mission 1982</i>	<i>Gren- ada invasi on 1983</i>	<i>Bomb- ing of Libya 1986</i>
	Too much (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Too much (%) (Whi) (Blk)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)	Shdn't Have (%) (Whi) (Blks)
< \$15,000 (w:132; b:31)*	31 13	24 23	32 48	15 10	63 68	39 26	38 52	33 52
\$15-25,000 (w:166; b:27)	21 19	17 22	24 30	10 22	65 44	36 33	30 33	28 37
\$26-50,000 (w:329; b:22)	26 32	18 36	21 27	8 9	63 86	33 36	28 55	23 27
> \$50,000 (w:131; b:7)	31 43	18 57	20 29	8 29	30 43	32 57	30 43	15 43
* denotes racial Ns. (Source: ATS #9, Q.17-24A.)								

APPENDIX VII (b) (contd.): Race and Past Uses of Force, By Political Viewpoint

	<i>Korea Intervention</i>			<i>Grenada Invasion</i>			<i>Libya Bombing</i>			<i>Lebanon Peacekeeping</i>		
	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK	Shld Have	S. Not Have	DK
Liberals												
White (n:150)	53	31	15	44	45	11	58	35	7	43	46	11
Black (n:16)	50	31	19	44	56	--	56	44	--	75	19	6
Conservatives												
White (n: 295)	66	19	15	69	23	8	76	15	9	62	29	9
Black (n: 27)	59	33	7	44	33	22	59	30	11	56	26	19
Moderates												
White (n: 368)	62	24	14	55	32	13	64	29	8	52	36	11
Black (n: 44)	52	36	11	46	46	9	48	46	5	55	41	2
(Source: ATS #9, Q. 20, 21, 23, 24).												

APPENDIX VII (b) (contd.): Race and Past Uses of Force, by Age Group

AGE GROUPS	U.S. use of force since WW II	U.S. use of force in the 1980s.	Korean War	Blockade of Cuba. 1962	Vietnam War	Lebanon peace-keeping mission 1982	Grenada invasion 1983	Bombing of Libya, 1986
	<i>Too much</i>	<i>Too much</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>	<i>Shdn't Have</i>
	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)	(%) (Whi) (Blks)
Under 30 (w:142; b:24)*	34 21	21 25	29 38	13 17	68 42	44 33	35 46	23 42
30-49 years (w:344; b:43)	24 23	18 28	17 28	8 14	62 72	33 35	31 40	22 37
50-64 years (w:214; b:14)	28 14	18 29	25 43	8 14	62 64	33 29	29 50	22 43
Over 65 (w:139; b:11)	26 27	23 27	32 45	9 9	71 64	34 27	30 46	37 46
* denotes racial Ns. (Source: ATS #9. 1988. Q.17-24A)								

APPENDIX VIII: ATS #9 items measuring cognitive correlates of the use of force.

The effectiveness of force compared to other means of influencing other nations.

I'm going to read you some options that the U.S. has used in the past or could use in the future to influence another nation. For each please tell me if you think that the option could be very effective, somewhat effective, or not very effective. (If "VERY EFFECTIVE" or "SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE") do you think that this option would be morally acceptable or not morally acceptable?

- Q. 25. Threaten to use nuclear weapons.
- Q. 26. Use foreign troops to fight in the place of Americans in that nation.
- Q. 27. Impose trade restrictions on the nation.
- Q. 28. Ask international organizations such as the World Court or the United Nations to pressure the nation.
- Q. 29. Conduct air raids on its key economic or military targets.
- Q. 30. Use secret operations to undermine their government.
- Q. 31. Cut off foreign aid to that country.
- Q. 32. Ask our allies to help us pressure the nation.
- Q. 33. Send as many of our troops as necessary and have them remain until we meet our objectives.
- Q. 34. Have our ambassador or others representing the U.S. try to obtain the cooperation of the nation's leadership.

Cost factors

I'm going to read you some items that might be seen as important to American prosperity and security. For each please tell me if we should be prepared to commit our military strength to protect that interest if the item in question is not worth the cost in money and lives.

- Q. 42 The Panama Canal

- Q. 43 Our military bases in countries that don't want them there.
- Q. 44 The tiny islands in the Pacific that are American possessions, but have small populations and no military bases.
- Q. 45 The supply of oil in the Middle East.
- Q.46 The right to send our ships into the Persian Gulf.

No one wants our nation to get into any conflicts in the future, but as in the past, our leaders may some day decide to use our armed forces in hostilities because our interests are jeopardized. I know this is a tough question, but, if you had to make a decision about using the American military, how important would be each of the following to you -- very important, somewhat important, or not very important?

- Q.47 The possibility of failure.
- Q. 48 The cost in dollars.
- Q. 49 The number of American lives that might be lost.
- Q. 50 The fact that we might break international laws or treaties with other nations.
- Q. 51 The likelihood that our allies and other nations will support the action.
- Q. 52 The likelihood that the American people will support the action.
- Q. 53 The length of time that we would be involved in the fighting.
- Q. 54. The number of civilians that might be killed in the area of combat.
- Q. 55 The likelihood that another major power like the Soviet Union or China might get involved.
- Q. 56 The likelihood that the U.S. Congress will support the action.

Moral Obligation

Now I'm going to list some arguments for and against the idea of defending only our own borders. For each tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree.

- Q. 57 We can't afford to defend so many nations.

- Q. 58 If we pull back from defending other countries, many of them would feel insecure and build their own nuclear weapons.
- Q. 59 We have a moral obligation to defend freedom around the world no matter what the costs.

The Third World

Turning specifically to conflicts in developing or third world countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. . .

Many wars in the third world last for years and are fought at low intensity . If key American officials believed that our interests in some third world nation or region were seriously threatened by a conflict there they would have a variety of options for U.S. involvement. I'm going to read you some of those options, and for each one, please tell me if you would strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of using that option in dealing with a third world conflict.

- Q. 60 We should try to resolve the problems in that country using diplomatic or political means.
- Q. 61 The U.S. should send humanitarian aid such as food, clothing and medical supplies.
- Q. 62 The U.S. should send military supplies and American advisors whose only purpose would be to help the nation use and maintain the equipment.
- Q. 63 The U.S. should send American military advisors to help the side we support recruit and train local troops.
- Q. 64 If the side we support can not win without outside support, we should send as many American troops as are needed to win.

Here are some other ideas that people have had about dealing with wars in the third world. For each, please tell me if you think it is a good idea or a bad idea.

- Q. 65 We should ask our allies to help us in these conflicts and, if they refuse, we should not get involved.
- Q. 66 We should not get involved in conflicts unless we can win easily.
- Q. 67 Because wars of this type are very brutal and seldom popular among Americans, our government should try to get private and foreign sources to supply money and

equipment so that there will be no direct U.S. involvement.

- Q. 68 If our President and military are involved, they should keep their assistance to these countries secret, even if it means withholding information from Congress, the media, and the public.
- Q. 69 The U.S. should invest several billion dollars , which would be about one percent of the annual military budget, to develop equipment that could give us the winning edge in jungles, deserts, or mountainous areas -- the kinds of areas where these wars are often fought.

Appendix IX: ATS #6 and #9 Survey Items Related to “First Use” and Appropriate Uses of Nuclear Force.

ATS #9: First Use

- Q. 70 Have you seen, read, or heard anything about a proposed policy for using nuclear weapons called “NO FIRST USE”?
- Q. 71 This policy states that the U.S. should pledge to only use nuclear weapons against other nations if they use nuclear weapons against us first. To make the pledge credible, we should pull back all short-range nuclear weapons from the front lines and replace them with strengthened non-nuclear forces. Would you support or oppose such a policy?

ATS #6: Appropriate Uses of Nuclear Weapons

Now I want to ask you about nuclear weapons. Lately, there's been some controversy about when it might be appropriate for the United States to use nuclear weapons. I'm going to read you several situations, and after each one please tell me whether the U.S. should initiate the use of nuclear weapons. . . Or try to resolve the situation through other means. . .

- Q. 45a The Soviets have invaded Western Europe and are winning without using nuclear weapons.
- Q. 45b American military forces are subjected to a limited nuclear attack while they're in combat.
- Q. 45c One American city is destroyed in a limited nuclear attack.
- Q. 45d The U.S. is involved in a long, drawn-out war fighting communism in a Third World country. Some advisors think that using nuclear weapons could end the fighting quickly and in our favor.

ATS #9

Lately, there has been some controversy about when it might be appropriate for the United States to use nuclear weapons. I'm going to read you several situations, and after each one, please tell me whether the U.S. should use nuclear weapons or try to resolve the situation through other means.

- Q. 78 One American city is destroyed in a limited nuclear attack. There is sufficient evidence that the attacking country will NOT use any more nuclear weapons against us.
- Q. 79. American military forces are subjected to a limited nuclear attack while they are in combat.
- Q. 80 The Soviet Union uses nuclear weapons against one of our NATO allies.
- Q. 81 The Soviets and their allies have invaded Western Europe and are winning without using nuclear weapons.
- Q. 82 The U.S. is involved in a long, drawn-out war which is very expensive in terms of dollars and lives. Some advisors think that using nuclear weapons could end the fighting quickly and in our favor.
- Q. 83 A full scale nuclear attack is launched against our country.
- Q. 84 A fight breaks out between NATO forces and Warsaw Pact forces near the border between East Germany and West Germany. After NATO forces push into East Germany, the Soviets counter by using a nuclear attack to destroy one West German city.
- Q. 85 A third world nation, which is an American ally, is attacked by another third world nation with nuclear weapons.
- Q. 86 Soviet forces that are invading Western Europe, and winning without using nuclear weapons, are surrounding an entire American division. The American commanding officer believes that if he does not use short-range nuclear weapons, the entire division will be wiped out.

APPENDIX X: Survey Items Related to the United Nations and Foreign Aid.

ATS #6

- Q. 39 . . . Do you have a very favorable, favorable, unfavorable, or very unfavorable impression of the U.N.?
- Q. 40 From everything you have heard, would you say the U.N. General Assembly is biased against the United States, biased in favor of the United States, or is pretty much neutral?
- Q.41 As you may know, the U.N. is changing. Both the U.S and the Soviet Union have started working together more often in the Security Council; Gorbachev has proposed strengthening the U.N. and using it more; Reagan says it's doing a better job; and Congress has initiated a new study of how to improve it. With this in mind, do you think the U.S. should get more involved in the U.N., less involved, or keep its level of involvement about the same as it is now?
- Q. 42 *Now I'm going to read you several different things the United Nations does. After each one, please tell me whether you feel the U.N. is doing an excellent, good, not so good, or poor job in that particular area.*
- a. Promoting communication and understanding between countries.
 - b. Helping solve regional conflicts through negotiations rather than war.
 - c. Helping poor nations become self-sufficient.
 - d. Combatting international hunger and disease.
 - e. Established standards for global commercial services such as telephone, postal services, and air travel safety.
- Q. 43 Would you favor or oppose having the U.N. create a standing peace-keeping force to help resolve regional conflicts?
- Q. 44 And, would you favor or oppose creating an international court within the U.N. to deal with hijackers and terrorists?

ATS #8

- Q. 21 Now, I'd like to get your reactions to . . . statements about U.S. foreign aid. Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each statement I read. . .
- a. The U.S. can no longer help so many countries around the world, no

matter how worthy and important this help may be.

- b. United States' foreign aid helps reduce the Soviet Union's influence around the world.
- c. We should cut all foreign aid to countries which are not vital to our national security.
- d. The U.S. has a special moral responsibility to help the disadvantaged of the world, even if this means putting off spending on some of our own domestic problems.
- e. All too often, U.S. foreign aid, which is meant to help needy people around the world, winds up in the pockets of corrupt foreign government officials.
- f. Foreign aid has been effective in improving poor peoples' lives in the Third World.
- g. The U.S. foreign aid program is one of the best places to cut federal government spending.
- h. Foreign aid is a very good investment for the U.S. If we implement our aid programs wisely, the countries that we help will become more friendly and helpful to us in a dangerous world.
- i. All U.S. aid should be humanitarian in nature; none of it should be military assistance.
- j. Too many countries we help never seem to appreciate our efforts. They act as if U.S. foreign aid is there right.
- k. Our foreign aid programs reminds other nations that the U.S. is a strong, moral force in world affairs.

Q. 22 *Next, I'm going to read you the names of eight countries which received the most foreign aid from the U.S. in 1988. For each country, please tell me whether you think the amount of aid should be decreased, increased, or kept the same.*

- | | |
|--------------|--------------------|
| a. Israel | e. El Salvador |
| b. Guatemala | f. Turkey |
| c. Egypt | g. The Philippines |
| d. Pakistan | h. Honduras |

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





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