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PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
NATIONALIST SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

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PROCESSES OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION
OF NATIONALIST SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

by

ORIT ICHILOV

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
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CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
PART I: BACKGROUND	
CHAPTER 2: THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT	28
CHAPTER 3: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, CULTURAL ORIGINS, AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PRE-STATE ERA	53
PART II: PROCESSES OF INSTITUTION- ALIZATION	
CHAPTER 4: MONOPOLIZATION	91
CHAPTER 5: LEGITIMATION	135
CHAPTER 6: INSTITUTION-BUILDING	180
CHAPTER 7: THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY IN THE INSTITU- TIONALIZATION OF NATION-STATES: THE CASE OF THE EMERGING ISRAELI CONSTI- TUTION	224
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS	261
BIBLIOGRAPHY	280

LIST OF TABLES

	<u>PAGE</u>
TABLE 1: STATISTICAL DATA ON THE ALIYAS, OR "WAVES" OF IMMIGRATION	63
TABLE 2: GROWTH OF CITIES AND AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS IN JEWISH PALESTINE	64
TABLE 3: DEVELOPMENT OF JEWISH INDUSTRIES AND HANDICRAFTS 1921/22-1937	75
TABLE 4: NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA	153
TABLE 5: OWNERSHIP OF DURABLE GOODS	154
TABLE 6: MAIN BRANCHES OF ISRAEL'S INDUSTRY	156
TABLE 7: VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION	158
TABLE 8: RESULTS OF ELECTIONS TO THE KNESSET, 1949-1969	191
TABLE 9: YEAR OF IMMIGRATION OF KNESSET MEMBERS	193
TABLE 10: EXPORTS OF ISRAEL	203
TABLE 11: TOTAL INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION 1948/49-1964/65	204
TABLE 12: NUMBER OF STATE EMPLOYEES AND SALARIES IN THE YEARS 1948/49-1957-58	205
TABLE 13: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES BY GRADES	214
TABLE 14: RESPONDENTS BY PERSONAL RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE AND BY OPINIONS CONCERNING TIES BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND RELIGION	246

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since World War I some fifty former colonial or dependent territories have become independent nation-states,¹ many of them having emerged as the product of nationalist movements. While new nations, especially in the developing areas, have been the subject of numerous studies that have stressed processes of modernization,² there is a dearth of literature on the institutionalization of nationalist movements -- those movements that have resulted in the formation of new nation-states.

In the present work we shall analyze the transformation of a nationalist movement into a new state as the result of the institutionalization of such a movement. On the theoretical level we shall focus upon the central processes that are the essence of this transformation; and on the empirical level we discuss the emergence of the State of Israel as a product of the Zionist movement.

The Institutionalization of Social Movements

In sociological literature, the concept of the "institutionalization of nationalist movements" may relate to two different phenomena. On the one hand the concept is used to refer to the crystallization of the movement's ideology, objectives, and organization;³ on the other hand it refers to the processes that take place with the ascent of the movement into power.⁴ Most theorists analyze the development

of the movement from an amorphous kind of association into a crystallized entity from the ideological and organizational points of view. In the study of the "life cycle" of movements, violent outbreaks, or the "reign of terror,"⁵ or other dramatic events have won the most attention, while the stage of routinization or institutionalization has been inadequately treated. This failure to emphasize the processes of institutionalization, which begin with the attainment of power by the movement's leadership, is far from new. Such was also characteristic of earlier sociological theories.

In his treatment of charisma, Max Weber⁶ considered institutionalization the anti-climax of charismatic domination. The charismatic message, Weber argued,⁷ loses its vigor and becomes a legal regulation or part of a tradition. Compared with previous stages of creativity, enthusiasm, and excitement, routinization is marked chiefly by a freezing of the new ideas and forms into permanent structures. Weber's analysis points out that the legal and traditional conceptions of a social order differ from those characteristic of a charismatic order in both their symbolic and their organizational senses. However, apart from the fact that his typology does not exhaust all the possible variations, Weber also neglected to discuss the actual processes that occur in the transformation of one order into another.

In his discussion of revolutionary movements, Parsons⁸ stresses innovation and change. Parsons considers the

institutionalization of a movement: "The process by which such a movement [revolutionary] once in the ascendancy comes to adapt to the exigencies of long-run continuance as 'setting the tone' for the society."⁹ Also, "The 'system' is no longer 'theirs' but 'ours.'"¹⁰ Thus, institutionalization is a change in the personnel structure of the elite, a change that enables the leaders of a movement to implement their ideas and policies.

Park and Burgess,¹¹ Dawson and Gettys,¹² and Blumer,¹³ all representatives of the "natural history" approach to social movements,¹⁴ consider institutionalization of social movements to be marked by crystallization of the more amorphous forms of collective behavior into permanent structures. There is an awareness of the fact that social movements are instruments of change,¹⁵ as indicated in the argument that "Fundamental social change comes about through the progressive uni-lateral transformation wrought by a social movement. Its [the movement's] termination in a new social order or a single institution indicates that the change is complete."¹⁶ However, there is no discussion of the actual processes that take place during institutionalization. Brinton¹⁷ and Edwards,¹⁸ who are also representatives of the "natural history" approach, discuss the outcome of specific revolutions, but, again, not the institutionalization of such revolutions.

Smelser's study of collective behavior¹⁹ does not

explicitly examine the stage of institutionalization. This stage falls beyond the scope of collective behavior, which focuses on disturbances in social patterns and on the actual behavioral patterns of masses of people under "abnormal" conditions. Yet Smelser's view with respect to the institutionalization of social movements is implied in his discussion of successful and unsuccessful social movements. Smelser indicates that social movements "...continue to stay alive for long periods after the phase of active agitation. Furthermore, both successful and unsuccessful movements tend to accumulate new functions...in addition, or even in place of their original purposes."²⁰ This indicates that institutionalization enables a movement to continue to exist as a movement, perhaps by changing its objectives and functions or by engaging in ritualistic behavior --i.e. adhering to older symbols despite changes in the conditions.

The theories we have referred to are rooted in different intellectual traditions and are illustrative of the major theoretical approaches to the institutionalization of social movements. However, these are of little utility for understanding the transformation of nationalist movements into nation-states. This is the case, first, because these formulations are too vague and general and, second, because they do not deal with the actual processes of institutionalization.

In addition the literature dealing with nation-building provides us with few adequate conceptions in our effort to

formulate a theoretical framework within which to study the emergence of a nation-state out of a nationalist movement. If this literature does not confine itself to historical description of developments in specific countries, its focus is upon the processes of modernization. Representative of works dealing with modernization are those of Eisenstadt²¹ and Shils.²² Eisenstadt attempts to present a sociological approach to problems of modernization in general and to problems of political modernization in particular through an analysis of modern and modernizing societies. Central to his approach is the assumption that the major problem facing such societies is the development of an institutional framework capable of continuously "absorbing" the various social changes inherent in the process of modernization. He also analyzes modernizing societies in terms of their different degrees of ability to develop such institutional frameworks. The major concern of Eisenstadt's work is to understand the conditions under which modernizing and modern societies develop such an institutional structure, in contrast to those conditions in which "breakdown," or "regression" of modernization occurs. Modernization is defined by Eisenstadt as "...the process of change towards those types of social, economic, and political systems that have developed in Western Europe and North Africa from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth and have then spread to other European countries and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to

the South American, Asian, and African continents."²³

Modern or modernizing societies have developed from a great variety of different traditional, premodern societies. According to Eisenstadt, however, modernization is characterized by increased social differentiation and by a separation among the roles carried out by actors within a social system. In the economic sphere modernization refers to the development of a high level of technology and industrialization, and in the political sphere it marks the decline in the traditional legitimation of rulers and the introduction of democratic or populist governments. Modernization is also accompanied by expansion of the various media of communication. Moreover, Shils argues that sovereignty is required as part of the process of modernization; "National sovereignty means, to the elites of the new states, not only internal autonomy from foreign rule or independence; it also means playing a part in the larger arena of world politics."²⁴

These two processes, modernization and institutionalization, should be treated separately for analytical purposes, although institutionalization might be accompanied by modernization as certain societies achieve political independence. In other words, while efforts to achieve modernization have an impact upon institutional patterns, logically and empirically they are not a necessary accompaniment of institutionalization.

There are also numerous works which deal with the emergence of specific nation-states and focus upon historical developments. For example, Coleman²⁵ discusses the social and historical background of the emergence of nationalism in Nigeria, while Halstead²⁶ in his work on Morocco, presents a study in ideas -- of how these ideas emerged, the men who entertained them, and the institutions and movements that embodied them. However, Coleman points out: "Any study of the recent political history of an emergent African state, at this stage can be no more than exploratory...Data are too fragmentary and contradictory, passions are still too intense and perspectives too distorted to permit broader generalizations and final conclusions."²⁷ This may be one reason why studies of specific nation-states have not attempted to present a broader theoretical frame of reference for the analysis of the processes of institutionalization in nationalist movements.

Bendix's approach²⁸ falls between those two examples mentioned above. Bendix re-examines the European experience with emphasis upon the analysis of authority relationships. He then uses his findings as a vantage point for comparative study of the preconditions of political modernization in Japan and the current attempts at nation-building in Africa. However, Bendix's approach is an evolutionary one; he seeks to demonstrate that Western societies have been transformed from the estate societies

of the Middle Ages to the absolutist regimes of the eighteenth century and thence to the class societies of plebiscitarian democracy in the nation-states of the twentieth century.

It is our contention that despite the differences among nationalist movements stemming from their varying historical backgrounds (as well as more basic cultural differences) and to differential interplay of contemporary forces, certain uniformities in the institutionalization process do exist --e.g. the final emergence of a nation-state. As we have seen, the sociological literature on social movements, as well as on nation-building, cannot provide us with an adequate approach to understand the institutionalization of a social movement into a nation-state. As a result, it becomes necessary for us to draw upon general sociological literature, the sociological literature on social movements, and the literature of nation-building in order to formulate our theoretical framework.

The Institutionalization of Nationalist Movements

The present work limits itself to analysis of the processes of institutionalization in nationalist movements, not of other types of movements; nor does it deal with the general processes of institutionalization. On the theoretical level we analyze the processes of institutionalization; specifically we are concerned with modern nationalist movements whose emergence has been influenced by the doctrine

of nationalism²⁹ of nineteenth-century Europe, and with modern nation-states.³⁰ On the concrete level we discuss the Israeli experience.

According to Blumer, "Movements of nationalism... represent efforts of a given people sharing some sense of common identity and historical lineage to gain independent status inside an international order of sovereign bodies."³¹ The actual conditions against which nationalist movements revolt vary -- e.g. colonialism, imperialism, the Diaspora in the case of the Zionist movement. However, what is unique to all such movements is the fact that they are above all politically oriented.³² In other words, although they may be engaged in cultural revival and in the creation of symbols to unite the people and to arouse their national consciousness, they are primarily seeking self determination and political independence. We therefore argue that the essence of the institutionalization of nationalist movements, which begins with their attainment of power, is their transformation into nation-states. In the present work we propose to examine the central processes through which this transformation takes place. In order to understand the nature of the shift from movement to state, it becomes necessary to outline the major characteristics of these two entities.

Social Movements and Nation-States

Social movements³³ are massive instruments of social change. They are in opposition to an existing order or

existing institutions, seeking to implement their own ideas and values. By definition social movements are of temporary duration. They are ad-hoc organizations which are dissolved or transformed once their mission is completed. Membership in social movements is voluntary in the sense that one can choose to join them or to stay out. The movement chooses its members mainly on the basis of their ideological conformity. Social movements usually manifest sect-like characteristics.³⁴ They focus upon setting themselves apart from other groups. Also they tend to adhere to absolute values and are unwilling to compromise. As they mature, social movements "...acquire organization and form, a body of customs and traditions, established leadership, an enduring division of labor, social rules and moral values..."³⁵ Despite this organization, relations to a large extent are personal rather than anonymous. This manifests itself in the fact that no clear-cut separation exists between the office and the holder of the office. The legitimacy of the movement for its adherents is based on its negation of existing values and institutions on the one hand, and on the cultivation of a future image of society on the other.

The modern state is a compulsory organization³⁶ which has a territorial basis, functions as a continuous organization for the systematic treatment of problems and needs, and wields a monopoly over the use of legitimate power. Membership, or citizenship, in a state is determined by ethnic,

historical, and legal criteria. The legitimacy of the state is based on a legal definition, is rooted in a system of values, and is supported and reinforced by the ability of the polity to respond adequately to the various needs and interests of the constituency. The state represents an impersonal order, based on separation of the office from the holder of the office.

To summarize in outline form:

	<u>Movement</u>	<u>Nation-State</u>
Organization:	voluntary	compulsory
	temporary	permanent-continuous
	in opposition	in power
	no territory	territorial basis
Membership Criteria:	voluntary, ideological	ethnic, cultural, legal
Ideology:	sectarian	more universalistic
Bases of Legitimacy:	negation plus articulation of future image	legal system, values and accomplishments

The comparison of movements and nation-states indicates that they are nearly antitheses of one another. It follows that the transition of a movement to a nation-state involves a change in the movement's location in the power structure, a change in its symbolic claims for legitimacy, and a modification of its sectarian nature. Also, in order to respond to the problems and needs of the various segments of the constituency, an institutional framework has to be developed.

Our central hypothesis is that the key processes involved in the institutionalization of nationalist movements are:

1. Monopolization: This refers to a change in the movement's position in the power structure of society. The movement shifts from the "periphery" of society into its "center." The leadership of the movement becomes the leadership of a nation and is endowed with the power of decision-making, the exercise of power, and the allocation of the various social resources.

2. Legitimation: This process refers to the attempts of the new polity to mobilize the support and approval of the various segments of society for its monopoly over the exclusive right to use power, to make certain decisions, and to allocate major social resources.

3. Institution-Building: This can be defined as the process of creating the necessary mechanisms for the orderly functioning of society.

In the chapters on each of the aforementioned processes the literature pertaining to the problem at hand will be briefly reviewed and then empirical data drawn from the case study -- i.e. the emergence of Israel as a nation-state will be used to illustrate the significance of each process for the institutionalization of a social movement into a nation-state. In the conclusions we shall relate these processes to one another. Although these processes can be distinguished analytically, it is clear that on an

empirical level they overlap with one another. Although monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building seem to occur in the order listed, there is a feedback effect, so that while monopolization is a precondition for legitimation, legitimation is also a precondition for the maintenance of monopolization.

A second major hypothesis of this study is that ambiguity is essential to the maintenance of monopolization, legitimation, and the formation of institutions. Little if any attention has been given to the role of ambiguity in the institutionalization process, let alone in nation-building. We shall seek to show that without ambiguity it would not have been possible for the nation-state of Israel to sustain itself.

Throughout this study we recognize that institutionalization is accompanied by tensions and conflicts. Our theoretical framework falls within the "conflict model" tradition because we take into account the dual nature of reality during the period of institutionalization. Although our focus is upon the processes of institutionalization that served to facilitate the emergence of a new social order and its attainment of stability, we have also discussed the tensions and conflicts that were an integral part of this transition period.

The Case Study

We shall argue that the emergence of the state of Israel represents the institutionalization of Zionism as a

nationalist movement. The Zionist movement continued to operate after the establishment of the state, but it explicitly re-defined its objectives and functions. The overall aim of Zionism as formulated in the first Zionist Congress of 1897³⁷ was to create a home for the Jewish people in Palestine secure under public law. The 23rd Zionist Congress of 1951³⁸ explicitly recognized that this initial aim of Zionism was realized with the establishment of the state, and it therefore redefined the aims of the post-state Zionist movement to include the mobilization of financial, political, and moral support for the state, as well as organizational and educational work among Diaspora Jews. A clear-cut definition, separating the sovereign state from the movement on the one hand, and establishing their mutual interrelations on the other, has been made in the Law of the Zionist Movement-The Jewish Agency for Palestine of 1952,³⁹ and in the Covenant between the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency.⁴⁰ The establishment of the State of Israel was clearly a turning point in the history of the Zionist movement.

In the present work we shall not be concerned with the Zionist movement that continued to exist after the establishment of the state. Instead, we propose to analyze certain key post-independence developments -- developments which, in our view, enable us to probe into the dynamics of the processes of institutionalization in nationalist movements.

We have for a variety of reasons chosen to analyze the Zionist movement rather than any other nationalist movement. The Zionist movement represents a genuine nationalist movement -- i.e. a movement which sought to recapture the missing elements in order for Jews to become a nation in the fully modern sense. It is also a successful movement, or a movement which has realized the aspirations for sovereignty of the Jews. In the analysis of the emergence of most other new states that were the product of nationalist movements, there are many intervening variables which must be dealt with and which overshadow the processes of institutionalization per se. One cannot adequately deal with nations in the "developing areas" without considering their transition from pre-modern societies to modernizing social orders; their attempts to create national unity in the face of tribalism, regional differences, and linguistic diversity; and their attempts to rid themselves of the negative heritage of colonialism. These factors represent the specific conditions under which institutionalization in these countries must proceed rather than a necessary element of the processes of institutionalization in general. The necessity to deal with this complexity of factors makes it difficult to clearly see the more universalistic aspects of the processes of institutionalization. Also, many new nations are the product of revolutionary movements, and thus the processes of institutionalization are overshadowed by more dramatic and violent

events. The Zionist movement, although revolutionary in its aims, acted primarily in the political arena, rather than on the barricades, and therefore the processes of institutionalization were not overshadowed by more dramatic events. In its early stages the Zionist movement did not seek to remove colonial powers, although later the Yishuv (the Jewish population in Palestine in the pre-state period) struggled to expel the British from the country. The Zionist movement developed during the Diaspora, and its focal concern was the transplantation of the Jewish people from the Diaspora to Palestine. The movement from the outset was geared to the creation of institutions and a search for legitimacy. Moreover, since the tradition of Israel as an independent state was interrupted by many centuries of exile, institutions were started in a sense from scratch. Few, if any other movements provide us with the unusual opportunity to study the emergence of institutions. In addition to the above advantages, the Zionist movement is probably one of the best documented of all nationalist movements.

The foregoing advantages, as well as my personal commitment, led me to choose the Zionist movement as the case study in analyzing the institutionalization of nationalist movements. I have approached this task from the vantage point of a sympathizer of the Zionist movement and the state of Israel, not from the perspective of an outside critic of the movement. The internal debates within the movement,

however, have been taken into consideration and are discussed.

Methodology

Each of the various processes of institutionalization of nationalist movements -- namely, monopolization, legitimation, institution-building, and the role of ambiguity in the institutionalization of nation-states -- will be discussed on two different levels: first, analytically, and secondly, on a concrete level, through the discussion of the various case materials.

As we saw earlier, none of the theoretical approaches to the processes of institutionalization is in itself sufficient to provide us with a frame of reference for the analysis of such processes. It therefore became necessary to integrate these various intellectual traditions -- namely, general sociological theories, theories of social movements, and the literature on nation-building -- in order to formulate our analytical frame of reference. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to integrate these various intellectual traditions.

Each of the theoretical dimensions of the processes of institutionalization was then illustrated through the analysis of relevant case materials drawn from the Israeli experience. In analyzing these data we relied heavily upon historical and sociological works on Zionism and Israel, on the writings of some key leaders, as well as on documentary material. Wherever possible, we tried to approach

issues from the leadership's perspective as expressed in their writings. Where such writings were not relevant, as in the case of institution-building, we have relied upon statistical data and the documentary materials. In general our selection of the relevant materials was guided by theoretical considerations.

Since institutionalization is a process over time rather than a single event, a time perspective is needed in order to see more clearly its consequences and the processes involved. Wherever possible we have tried to limit our case materials to the early and mid 50's, the period in which the initial institutionalization occurred, according to our analysis. There were, however, cases in which our analysis was carried into the late 50's or even into the 60's in order to get a better perspective of the processes of institutionalization.

The Flow of the Argument

Our work begins with two background chapters, one dealing with the development of the Zionist movement, the other with the population's characteristics and the social organization developed by the Jewish population in Palestine in the pre-state era. These two background chapters should furnish the reader with some basic facts necessary for understanding the discussion of the emergence of Israel as a nation-state. Not only have developments in the Zionist movement and the Yishuv influenced developments in

the State of Israel, but, as we shall see, the foundations for the institutional structure of Israel were actually laid in the pre-state period. The background chapters are also needed in order to show that the Zionist movement was a genuine nationalist movement despite its cultural and religious overtones. The emergence of the State of Israel represents the institutionalization of Zionism as a nationalist movement, although the movement was not dissolved with the establishment of the state but took on new goals.

The chapter on the Zionist movement sketches in broad outline the development of the movement as it evolved from a vague idea and an abstract aspiration into a crystallized movement in both the ideological and the organizational senses. Special attention has been given to factions within Zionism, since some of the issues raised in the Zionist arena are still very much alive in the state of Israel itself (the issue of state vs. church, for example). The Zionist organizations which operated in Palestine prior to the establishment of the state and the major activities of the movement abroad are also discussed.

In the chapter dealing with the developments that took place in Palestine in the pre-state period, the major characteristics and contributions of the various "waves" of immigrants (Aliya) are discussed. We also survey the major trends of development in each of the institutional spheres that have served as the basis for the Israeli institutional web.

The second part of the work is devoted to development of the theoretical arguments, and to their illustration through the use of case materials drawn from the Israeli experience. The order of the chapters reflects the order in which the processes of institutionalization occur. In each of these chapters -- those on monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building -- we begin with a theoretical analysis of the dimensions of each of those processes and then proceed to analyze case materials which bring into focus the theoretical arguments that we have established.

We begin with the chapter on monopolization, with monopolization being treated as a change in the power structure of society after the attainment of power by a nationalist movement.

The process of legitimation is then treated; this basically represents the attempts of the leadership to win the support and the approval of the constituency for its monopoly over the use of power, and over the allocation of the various social resources.

The third chapter of this part of the work is devoted to the analysis of institution-building, which is the process of creating the necessary structural arrangements and mechanisms for the orderly functioning of society.

The next chapter in this section deals with the role of ambiguity in the institutionalization of nation-states. Ambiguity, it is argued, is a factor which supports the

various processes of institutionalization -- namely, monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building. After developing this argument on the theoretical level, we again proceed to analyze the case of the emerging Israeli constitution, which dramatizes the central role of ambiguity in the institutionalization of nation-states.

The final chapter, the conclusions, tries to inter-relate the various processes that have been dealt with separately, and to show how they support one another.

NOTES

1. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley, 1964), p. 1.
2. To mention only few, S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Growth and Diversity (Bloomington, Indiana: Department of Government, Indiana University, 1963). S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966). Edward A. Shils, Political Development in the New States (The Hague and Paris: Mouton and Co., 1966). For more references see our bibliography.
3. Park and Burgess, for example, deal with social movements as the crystallization of the more amorphous instances of collective behavior. (See chapter 13 in Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921). Weber's familial charisma and the charisma of office are also "routinized" forms of the pure charisma in the sense that an element of orderliness and regulation has been introduced in their organization. See Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1962), pp. 308-314. See also Blumer's analysis of the crystallization of movements in, Alfred McClung Lee (ed.) Principles of Sociology (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939), pp. 99-120.

4. For example, Weber's analysis of the transformation of the charismatic domination into a traditional or a legal-rational order. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 363-373.
5. For an analysis of the stage of "reign of terror" see, Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1938), pp. 217-244. Also Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 156-186.
6. We must differentiate between Weber's explicit arguments, and the implications of his interpreters. For example, while Eisenstadt tries to show that the charisma and the routine in Weber's writings are a continuous process rather than a dichotomy (Max Weber, On Charisma and Institutional Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. ix.), Reinhard Bendix shows that for Weber the institutionalization of charisma marked the anti-climax of the charismatic domination. (Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait, op. cit., p. 304).
7. Ibid., p. 304.
8. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1951), pp. 525-535.
9. Ibid., p. 521.
10. Ibid., p. 527.
11. Park and Burgess, op. cit., chap. xiii.

12. Carle A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (New York: Ronald Press, 1929), pp. 763-811.
13. Blumer, op. cit.
14. The "natural history" approach maintains that social movements follow a fairly uniform pattern in the process of their development, and vary mainly as to the details of the pattern. Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 787.
15. In this connection it is interesting to note that Sorokin is totally sceptical of the ability of revolutionary movements to achieve change. The essence of revolution according to Sorokin is the release of all moral, social, and psychological "breaks", resulting in the "biologization" of human beings. The essence of institutionalization becomes then, the curbing of these animal-like behavioral manifestations, and the re-establishment of social and cultural "breaks". See, Pitirim Sorokin, The Sociology of Revolution (Philadelphia and London: J. B. Lippincott, 1925).
16. Dawson and Gettys, op. cit., p. 804.
17. Brinton, op. cit.
18. Edwards, op. cit.
19. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962).

20. Ibid., p. 306.
21. Eisenstadt, op. cit.
22. Shils, op. cit.
23. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change, op. cit., p. 1.
24. Shils, op. cit., p. 9.
25. James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965).
26. John P. Halstead, Rebirth of a Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).
27. Coleman, op. cit., p. vii.
28. Bendix, op. cit.
29. For a definition of the doctrine of nationalism see, Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchison University Library, 1960), p. 9.
30. See Weber's discussion of the modern state in The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., pp. 33, 154-156.
31. Blumer, op. cit., pp. 119-120.
32. Weber differentiates between political action which is the corporate action of political groups which are the agents of the legitimate use of power, and politically oriented action of groups seeking power, or seeking to influence the actions of the bearers of legitimate power. Ibid., p. 156.

33. For a definition of social movements see, Ibid., p. 99.
34. For a discussion of the characteristics of sects see Ibid., pp. 84, 115-16. Also, Park and Burgess, op. cit., pp. 204-5, 872.
35. Blumer, op. cit., p. 99.
36. According to Weber, the compulsory nature of the state manifests itself in the polity's claim for binding authority over all action taking place within its area of jurisdiction. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., p. 156.
37. Raphael Patai (ed.) Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 114.
38. Ibid., I, p. 211.
39. Government of Israel, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953), p. 2.
40. Covenant Between the Government and the Jewish Agency, session of the Zionist General Council, Jerusalem, July 21-29, 1954 (Jerusalem: Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1954).

PART I

BACKGROUND

CHAPTER 2

THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT

This chapter focuses upon the milestones in the development of the Zionist movement as it has evolved from an abstract hope and a vague idea into a crystallized movement in both the ideological and the organizational senses. No effort will be made to detail all the many aspects of the movement; we shall merely sketch the broad outline. The purpose of this historical survey is twofold. First, we would like to provide the reader with some basic information that we consider to be essential for an understanding of the case studies which will be analyzed in the following chapters. Secondly, we will seek to demonstrate that the Zionist movement has been a genuine nationalist movement and that the State of Israel marks the institutionalization of that movement. Presenting these basic facts is necessary to make our case studies valid illustrations of the processes of institutionalization within nationalist movements. That Zionism is a nationalist movement and that the State of Israel marks its institutionalization is far from self-evident. For Zionism has cultural and religious overtones and thus has been considered by some observers to be a cultural revivalist movement. Also, the Zionist Movement has continued to exist after the establishment of the State of Israel, whereas institutionalized movements are usually transformed into permanent structures.

Zionism as a Nationalist Movement

The nineteenth century has often been named "the era of nationalism," inasmuch as the doctrine of nationalism became a key factor during this period. In the words of Kedourie "...the doctrine holds that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained, and that the only legitimate type of government is national-self government."¹ In order to understand the principle of nationalism, it is necessary to examine the concept of nationality upon which this principle is based.

Znaniiecki treats nationalities as cultural units. He contends that the "national culture society"² "...has a common and distinctive secular, literary culture and an independent organization functioning for the preservation, growth, and expansion of this culture..."³ This "national culture society" according to Znaniiecki, is irreducible to political structure, in the sense that it has the capability of maintaining active solidarity in a group independently of political sovereignty.⁴ National cultures evolve gradually; "Thus in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century common national culture was already a powerful bond uniting Frenchmen, Englishmen..."⁵ In other words, according to Znaniiecki, nationalism was the product of the gradual growth of national cultures which found their expression in the nineteenth century.

Whereas Znaniiecki stresses the cultural attributes of

nationalities, Louis Wirth emphasizes their political nature as well, arguing that

"A nationality may be conceived of as a people who, because of the belief in their common descent and their mission in the world, by virtue of their common cultural heritage and historical career, aspire to sovereignty over a territory or seek to maintain or enlarge their political or cultural influence in the face of opposition."⁶

Ideally, then, a modern nation possesses a culture of its own, a land of its own, and exercises independent sovereignty. Nationalities that have a "consciousness of kind" but lack one or another of the above attributes or possess them only in part have been prone in modern times to develop nationalist movements, with the aim of acquiring or recapturing the missing elements and raising the people to the status of a nation in the fully modern sense. The dual nature of nationalist movements, being political and cultural organizations simultaneously, was recognized by Blumer, who has shown that

"Movements of nationalism...represent efforts of a given people sharing some sense of common identity and historical lineage to gain independent status inside of an international order of sovereign bodies. They seek to guide their own destiny in place of being subservient to the control of an alien group... This type of movement has its source in distressing personal experiences in which individuals are made to feel inferior because of the subordinate status of the people to which they belong. They seek accordingly, to raise the status of their group... One should note, in addition, the strong revivalist slant that nationalist movements usually take; such movements seek to glorify the past of the people and eulogize the distinctive culture of the people, particularly their language."⁷

Zionism emerged as a nationalist movement in the above mentioned sense. Judaism has existed as a special culture

since the Diaspora. Although different cultural variations developed according to the different places of residence, religion served as the important common bond. Moreover, the Jewish community maintained solidarity through its spiritual ties to Zion -- the ancestral homeland. The territorial tie is unique in the sense that

"Judaism knows nothing of a 'new Jerusalem' which exists only in Haven... In the course of centuries of exile Palestine has become spiritualized -- but spiritualized in the Jewish sense. It has never become, and never can become, an abstraction or a symbol. It is the actual physical bond that matters, though its geographical position and its physical features are absolutely unknown to the millions of those who pray for it. If once the masses of Jews were to abandon their belief in the future restoration of Palestine in favor of a belief in a 'spiritual Zion,' to be realized in the world to come, the principle of Jewish cohesion would be gone, and the Jews would soon cease to exist as a distinctive human group."⁸

The uniting power of the territory was explained by Martin Buber, who has shown that it is this motive of the homeland which has provided the literal "ground" for the integration of Judaism as a nationality, a culture, and a religion. Recognition of this has been fundamental to Jewish thought throughout the centuries of "exile." The territorial tie is one of the central themes running through the Bible, the Talmud, the Sidur (prayer book), and Jewish literature as a whole. Zionism as a nationalist movement became the basis for translation into political action of the traditional ideas of self-determination of the Jewish People in their ancestral land.

Zionism was not created in the abstract but was initiated

as a solution to the "Jewish problem." As we shall see further on, each of the factions within Zionism emphasized different aspects of the Jewish condition and consequently ascribed different priorities to objectives and called for different courses of action. The "Jewish problem" was first diagnosed as such in eighteenth century Europe, with the decline of religion as the major factor determining the political and social status of people and with the emergence of the legal concept of citizenship. As the doctrines of Emancipation and Enlightenment became articulated, many intellectual Jews came to feel that the traditional restrictions on the Jews, which have been partially self-imposed in order to maintain isolation from the Gentile milieu, were obsolete. They considered integration of the Jews in terms of full citizenship in their respective countries as the vital step to reform of the status of Jews.¹⁰ In Western Europe Zionism emerged in part as a means of implementing the doctrines of Emancipation and Enlightenment, for in some countries these were not applied to Jews or, where they were, they did not automatically solve all problems of social rejection of the Jews. In Eastern Europe, as Ahad Ha'am has pointed out,¹¹ the "Jewish Problem" in the first instance was simply that of physical survival. The call for a specifically national solution to the Jewish problem especially gained momentum with the pogroms in Russia (1881) following the ascent of Alexander III to the throne.

The idea of the restoration of Jewish sovereignty was

developed by persons from a great variety of backgrounds. Rabbi Judah Alcalay and Rabbi Zvi Hirsh Kalischer were early representatives of orthodox Zionists. Rabbi Kalischer¹² called for the establishment of a society to organize migration into Palestine. This society would acquire funds, assist the settlers with loans, and help them to organize their self-defense. Moses Hess, on the other hand, was a Marxist. Buber¹³ referred to Hess as "the first religious socialist in the history of Judaism." Hess felt that Jews "...will always remain strangers among the nations which might well emancipate us [Jews] out of humanitarianism and a feeling of justice but will never, never respect us as long as we ignore our great national tradition..."¹⁴ Hess considered religion and politics to be inseparably bound together, and in his famous work, Rome and Jerusalem (1862), he advocated that for the sake of both, Jews should return to their homeland. According to Hess, "Only from the national rebirth will the religious genius of the Jews draw new powers, like that giant who touched the mother earth, and be again animated by the sacred spirit of the Prophets."¹⁵

Zionism as an alternative to Emancipation was most explicitly proposed and best articulated by Leo Pinsker in his book, Auto-Emancipation (1882). According to Pinsker, the kernel of the Jewish problem was that "...the Jews comprise a distinctive element among the nations under which they dwell, and as such can neither assimilate nor be readily digested by any nation."¹⁶ Pinsker pointed to what he

considered the fallacy of Emancipation, showing that "The legal emancipation of the Jews is the culminating achievement of our century. But legal emancipation is not social emancipation, and with the proclamation of the former the Jews are still far from being emancipated from their exceptional social position."¹⁷ Pinsker's basic idea was that instead of begging for emancipation, Jews should take the initiative and mobilize their resources to achieve their own redemption. He called for national revival, saying that "We must seek our honor and our salvation not in self-deceptions, but in the restoration of our national ties."¹⁸ Pinsker's ideas inspired the Hovevei-Zion movement (Lovers of Zion), which was popular in Eastern Europe in the 1880's and 1890's. The Hovevei-Zion ideology plus the pogroms of 1881 gave birth to the organization of students and Russian youth for immigration and settlement in Palestine, a group which went under the name of BILU (an abbreviation for the saying, "the house of Jacob, let us go").

The idea of the Jewish state was articulated in great detail by Herzl. There was little in Herzl's early background to mark him as Zionism's Man of Destiny. Herzl was born to a well-to-do family which was loosely bound to Jewish tradition. He seems to have been attracted to Judaism mainly by the need to find a solution to the plight of the Jews. In his famous work, A Jewish State, Herzl wrote "No one can deny the gravity of the Jews' situation. Wherever they live in perceptible numbers they are more or less

persecuted. Their equality before the law, granted by statute, has become practically a dead letter. They are debarred from filling even moderately high positions, either in the army, or in any public or private capacity."¹⁹ As a solution to the Jewish problem, Herzl suggested, "Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy the reasonable requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves."²⁰ Herzl went beyond the articulation of the idea, and in his work he set forth a program specifying the media through which his idea could be realized and calling for the establishment of the Society of Jews and the Jewish Company.²¹ Herzl went into great detail in his description of the actual work that had to be done. He dealt with the need to purchase land, wrote about training programs for the unskilled laborers, and proposed a seven-hour work day. Moreover he dealt with the development of commerce and the promotion of industry. Herzl was also aware of the need for a banner, and he proposed a white flag bearing seven golden stars. "...the white field symbolizing the pure new life; the seven stars, the seven golden hours of our working-day."²² In Herzl's mind the image of the future state was clearly a secular one. "Shall we end by having a theocracy?" Herzl asked, and he answered, "No indeed. Faith unites us, knowledge gives us freedom. We shall therefore prevent any theocratic tendencies from coming to the fore on the part of our priesthood. We shall keep our priests within the confines of their

temples in the same way as we shall keep our volunteer forces within the confines of their barracks."²³ Herzl did not forget to include his ideas of the type of government and constitution of the Jewish state. "I believe," he wrote, "that a good constitution should be of moderate elastic nature...I think a democratic monarchy and an aristocratic republic are the two most superior forms of States, because in them the form and the principle of government are opposed to one another, and thus preserve a true balance of power."²⁴

The above writings represent the development of the idea of Jewish nationalism. Zionism as a nationalist movement sought to recapture the missing elements that were needed so that the Jews would become a "nation" in its fully modern sense.

Zionist Organization: Early Developments and Activities

The abstract idea of Zionism was translated into action by the World Zionist Organization created by Herzl in 1897. The WZO was itself preceded by some abortive or partially successful attempts at such organization. Some of these organizations were philanthropic rather than motivated by the idea of national revival. For example, in 1860 the Alliance Israelite Universelle was organized by a group of French Jews, as an internationally based organization for the following objectives: "1) To work everywhere for the emancipation and moral progress of the Jews. 2) To lend affectual support to those who suffered through being Jews.

3) To encourage every publication intended to bring about this result."²⁵ The interest of the Alliance in Palestine was first manifested in 1870, when the organization opened the country's first agricultural school. Later on the organization established schools, kindergartens, and apprentice shops in many parts of Palestine and made French the language of instruction. Eleven years after the foundation of the Alliance a similar organization, The Anglo-Jewish Association, was formally constituted in England.²⁶ Unlike the Alliance, which drew its membership from all over the world, the Anglo-Jewish Association was confined to the British empire. An organization that was Zionist oriented was the Jung Israel, which in 1895 attempted to organize Jews by calling a congress in Berlin to formulate goals and to coordinate and organize the activities of the various Zionist groups. The attempt was not successful.

Finally, under Herzl's dynamic leadership, the First Zionist Congress was convened in Basel in 1897. This event gave birth to the World Zionist Organization. The First Congress formulated what is known as "The Basel program" stating the aims of Zionism and the means to be employed for its realization. It was declared that "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. For the attainment of this aim the Congress envisages the following means: (1) The promotion, on suitable lines, of the settlement of Palestine by Jewish agriculturists, artisans and tradesmen. (2) The organization

and unification of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate local and general institutions in accordance with the laws of each country. (3) The strengthening of Jewish national sentiment and national consciousness. (4) Preparatory steps toward securing consent of governments to obtain the aim of Zionism."²⁷ The Basel program became the authoritative pronouncement of the aims of Zionism, and it remained unchanged for more than fifty years, until the adoption of the "Jerusalem program" in 1951, after the establishment of the State of Israel.²⁸

The agenda of the First Congress was devoted also to the formulation of the organization of the Zionist movement.²⁹ The WZO was organized on a territorial basis. The Shekel (the equivalent of one German mark) served as a certificate of membership, as a voting card, and as a basis for congressional representation. Seats in the Congress were apportioned among the various countries on the basis of the total number of Shekel holders. The Congress became one of the permanent organs of the movement. It was the Parliament of the WZO which symbolized and represented the self-determination sought by the Jewish people and their sense of national unity. The executive organs of the WZO included the General Council, also known as the Action Committee, and the Inner Action Committee. The office of the President and the Comptroller were created, as well as the judicial organs which consisted of the Congress Tribunal and the Attorney of the WZO. The various financial organs of the

WZO were created later. The first financial instrument, the Jewish Colonial Trust, established in accordance with the decisions of the First and Second Congresses, was created in 1898 and was registered in London in 1899.³⁰ The Jewish National Fund³¹ (Keren Kayemet) was established by the Second Zionist Congress of 1898, and the Foundation Fund³² (Keren Ha'yesod) was established in 1920 as an immigration and colonization fund. The great significance of the First Congress was best described by Herzl himself, who wrote in his diary:

"If I said that aloud today, I would be met by universal laughter. Perhaps in five years, certainly in fifty, everyone will see it. The State is already founded, in essence, in the will of the people to the State; yes, even in the will of one individual, if he is powerful enough ('l'Etat c'est moi' of Louis XIV). The territory is only the concrete manifestation; and even it possesses a territory, the State is always something abstract. The Church State, too, exists without territory, or else the Pope would not be sovereign. In Basel I created this thing which is abstract and which is therefore invisible to the great majority of people."³³

Major Interpretations of Zionism and Major Controversies within the Zionist movement

One of the early controversies within Zionism focused upon the issue of the location of the Jewish national home. That Zion was essential to that enterprise was not clear to all early Zionists. Pinsker, for example, was ready to accept Argentina or any other suitable territory as an alternative to Palestine. In his work, Auto-Emancipation, Pinsker wrote:

"The goal of our present endeavors must not be the 'Holy Land,' but a land of our own. We need nothing

but a large tract of land for our poor brothers, which shall remain our property and from which no foreign power can expel us. There we shall take with us the most sacred possessions which we have saved from the ship-wreck of our former country, the God-idea and the Bible. It is those alone which have made our old fatherland the Holy Land, and not Jerusalem or the Jordan. Perhaps the Holy Land will again become ours. If so all the better, but first of all, we must determine -- and this is the crucial point -- what country is accessible to us..."³⁴

Pinsker, then, advocated a sovereign Jewish state at any available location. Herzl, too, adopted the same practical approach when his efforts to obtain a "charter" for the colonization of Palestine were not successful. However, he first tried to achieve the rebuilding of the national home in Palestine. During the Third Zionist Congress (1899) Herzl declared: "Our efforts are directed to the purpose of obtaining a Charter from the Turkish Government which then occupied Palestine, a Charter from his Majesty the Sultan. Only when we are in possession of this Charter, which must contain the necessary rights secured by public law, can we commence practical colonization."³⁵ In his endeavors to obtain the Charter, Herzl met kings and heads of government. First, in 1898 he met the German Kaiser Wilhelm II in Constantinople and in Jerusalem.³⁶ He wanted the Kaiser to exert his influence upon the Sultan of Turkey in favor of Jewish settlement in Palestine. In 1901 Herzl was received by the Sultan, and, as he reported at the Fifth Zionist Congress (1901), was impressed that the Sultan was a well-wisher of the Jewish state.³⁷ During the first visit, the Sultan offered Herzl facilities for Jewish settlement in

Mesopotamia, Syria, or Anatolia, but these offers Herzl rejected. On his return to Constantinople in 1902, Herzl was unable to offer the loan that the Sultan requested in return for the charter for Palestine, because not enough money had been collected, and therefore nothing came out of these negotiations. Herzl then appeared in 1902 before the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, which was deliberating in London, and proposed that the Jews be given a charter in a territory in the vicinity of Palestine. He suggested either Cyprus or El-Arish in the Sinai Peninsula.³⁸ The El-Arish plan was rejected because of the Egyptian Government's opposition. Instead the British Colonial Secretary, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, outlined a proposal for the settlement of Jews in Uganda. Herzl submitted the Uganda offer at the Sixth Congress (1903). Opposition was strong, especially on the part of representatives of East European Jewry who only a few months before had been victims of the Kishinev pogroms and for whom Herzl was willing to accept Uganda as a "night shelter." Despite this opposition, Herzl succeeded in obtaining a majority of 295 votes to 177 in favor of a resolution authorizing the dispatch of a Committee to inquire into the East African proposal, while reserving the final decision to the next Congress. The opposition then left the Congress hall, and it was only after Herzl's personal intervention that they returned. As a result, Herzl tried again to exert pressures on the Sultan, and he also went to Rome to talk to the King of Italy, Victor

Immanuel III, and Pope Pius X. Although, because of his failure to obtain a charter for Palestine, Herzl was ready to accept another territory instead, he came to realize that a Jewish state without Zion "is a power without faith, is life without meaning".³⁹ In 1904 Herzl admitted: "I presented myself as a supporter of a Jewish State anywhere, but in the course of time I have learnt to recognize that a solution for us is to be found only in Palestine."⁴⁰ Since that time the WZO concentrated its efforts upon rebuilding the Jewish national home in Palestine.

Another early controversy in Zionism involved the question of priorities as between "cultural Zionism," whose most prominent exponent was Ahad Ha'am,⁴¹ and "political Zionism" as articulated by Herzl. Whereas the "political Zionists" were more concerned with the Judennot (the Jewish plight), the "Cultural Zionists" worried more about the future of Judaism. For Ahad Ha'am, the "internal process of decay," which manifested itself in part through the cultural assimilation of Jews, presented a problem even more acute than the physical suffering of the Jewish masses in Eastern Europe. In his famous article, "The Spiritual Revival" (Tchiat Ha'ruach), Ahad Ha'am wrote,

"I maintain, then, that Zionism cannot confine itself to the material work of rebuilding Palestine. We must advance along both lines at the same time. While making every effort to create a large Jewish settlement on sound lines, we dare not neglect to do what is necessary to make Palestine a permanent and freely developing center of our national culture, of our science and scholarship, our art and literature. While

gradually assembling the skilled labor that is needed to repair the ruins of our country and restore its past glories, we must also assemble the forces of heart and mind and brain that will repair our spiritual ruins and restore the Jewish people to its rightful place of honor in the community of human culture."⁴²

Ahad Ha'am was aware of the fact that the WZO had its hands full with activities that were germane to its outlook and purpose, and he therefore called for the establishment of a parallel organization that would be devoted exclusively to the work of spiritual revival.

"The business of such an organization should be to acquire the necessary resources for the conservation of our spiritual energies, to support every cultural activity which promises to be of benefit, and, above all, to work for the gradual realization of the main aim -- the establishment of a spiritual center in Palestine."⁴³

However, "Cultural Zionism" never found organizational expression outside the WZO.⁴⁴ Though the Zionist Organization did not set up a parallel body to deal with the cultural problem, as Ahad Ha'am suggested it should, it has recognized that cultural work is part of its own proper functions. Herzl, on the other hand, had one paramount goal in mind, namely to obtain a Charter giving political recognition to the colonization of Palestine. As we saw earlier, Herzl was convinced that such a charter would create secure conditions for Jewish settlement. Herzl's political Zionism was also challenged by Zionists who believed that the attempts to obtain a charter should be accompanied by colonization efforts which would support the Jewish claim for political recognition. This viewpoint gained momentum as the obstacles

in the way of securing a charter became increasingly obvious and as anti-Semitism became ever more virulent, making the escape of Jews to some haven essential.

The religious "stream" in Zionism had interpreted national revival as the affirmation of a historic, traditional, and eschatological myth which had too long been neglected. They therefore opposed any definition of Zionism that did not include religion as a major ingredient. Conflicts between the religious and the secular interpretations had begun in the Hovevei-Zion movement, and were carried on into the WZO arena. As early as the First Congress, Herzl was approached by Rabbi Cohen, who expressed his concern, on the behalf of orthodox Jews, that the rebuilding of the national home might result in the weakening of the religious spirit of Jewry, and in particular the sanctity of the Shabbat. Herzl assured him that Zionism envisages no action "which might wound the religious susceptibilities of any group in Jewry."⁴⁵ In 1901 religious and traditionalist Jews organized as a separate faction under the name Mizrachi (an abbreviation for "Merkaz Ruchni," or spiritual center).⁴⁶ The cleavage between the orthodox and the non-orthodox factions came to a crisis in 1911, causing part of the Mizrachi group to desert the WZO. Together with other orthodox groups they formed the Agudat Israel, which developed a clear anti-Zionist ideology and which considered Zionism to be secular threat to religion. The gap closed only after the establishment of the state, when Agudat Israel

joined the governmental coalition. As we shall see further on, in our discussion of the emerging Israeli constitution, religious groups have not neglected their fight for full domination of the traditional law in Israel. In other words, the issue of church and state is there still very much alive.

The World Zionist Organization also included a left-wing faction of so-called labor Zionists who considered socialism as the key to social reform. This idea was hardly new. The Bund, a socialist organization of Jews in Russia and Poland, established in 1897, the year of the first Zionist Congress, proposed socialism as an alternative to Jewish nationalism. Its founders were radical Jews who participated in overthrowing Russian despotism. To them Zionism meant the creation of a new Ghetto, and they advocated instead the triumph of international socialism to transcend the boundaries of nation-states.⁴⁷ The Zionist-socialists were confronted by the challenge of integrating nationalism and socialism. An excellent example of the attempt to reconcile these two elements can be found in the writings of Ber Borochov, a Marxist-Zionist ideologist. The Jewish problem, according to Borochov, was a result of the exclusion of Jews from control over the means of production, which in turn had prevented them from taking part in the dialectics of the class struggle. A state with a majority of Jews controlling the means of production, he claimed, would give rise to a Jewish proletariat, allowing

the Jews once more to participate in the making of history through the dialectics of class struggle.⁴⁸ As part of his economic analysis Borochoy considered Palestine as the necessary location for the Jewish state, arguing that

"Jews will have to direct their wandering to a land where they will be able to enter all branches of production without any great difficulties. This land will have to be able to give the petty Jewish capitalist an opportunity to invest his capital in industry and agriculture; it will have to be able to give the Jewish worker the opportunity to engage in basic industries or to transfer from industry to agriculture without undue difficulty. This land must be semi-agricultural, thinly populated, fitted for the immigration of the petty bourgeois and his small investment, where neither the Jewish capitalist nor the worker will meet with national competition in their efforts to enter the basic industries. This land is, of course, Palestine."⁴⁹

There were other interpretations of Zionism within labor Zionism, but we cannot discuss all of them in the present work.

One of the controversies within Zionism which gained momentum, especially during the 30's, was that between "organic Zionism" as advocated by Weizmann, and "monolithic Zionism," whose most famous exponent was Jabotinski. The major issues on which their opinions differed concerned the strategy for the colonization of Palestine and the boundaries of the future state. Among the Zionist leaders of his time, Jabotinski was the only one to be actually aware of the momentous significance of the time factor in Zionism. In the beginning, the reason for his impatience was the need to create a Jewish majority in Palestine, a situation that was vital to his interpretation of Zionism. He wrote:

"I do not think it is desirable that the constitution of any State should contain specific paragraphs explicitly safeguarding the 'national' character of it; I think the less such paragraphs we find in a Constitution the better. The best way, and the natural way, is that the 'national' character of a State should be guaranteed ipso facto by the presence of a certain majority: if the majority is English, the State is English, and it does not need any special guarantees. So that when I pronounce the words 'a Jewish State' I think of a commonwealth, or an area, enjoying a certain sufficient amount of self-government in its internal and external affairs, and possessing a Jewish Majority."⁵⁰

In other words, what gives a state its national character is a majority of people sharing a "consciousness of kind." Jabotinski therefore urged a greatly accelerated pace of Jewish settlement for the purpose of speedily converting Palestine into a predominantly Jewish State. In the middle thirties, his concern regarding the time factor began to be diverted from Palestine to the Diaspora. Anticipating a major disaster, Jabotinski called for mass evacuation of the European Jews as the primary strategy of Zionism. He called this approach humanitarian Zionism, and warned that "We are facing an elemental calamity, a kind of social earthquake... Of course, there are ups and downs; but there are moments, there are whole periods in history when this 'xenophobia of life itself' takes on dimensions which no people can stand, and that is what we are facing now."⁵¹ He therefore felt that the actions of the WZO were important but fell far short of meeting the most urgent need -- i.e. saving Jewish lives through mass immigration of European Jews to Palestine.

Weizmann, on the other hand, believed that the foundation of the state should be created gradually by ideologically inspired individuals who would pave the way for mass immigration. In 1927 he argued that:

"It is irrelevant to ask how many Jews will be in Palestine in one hundred and fifty years...What matters is that this joy of creation which the Jews are tasting for the first time in many, many centuries shall become a primary force in order that there may arise in Palestine something worthy of an old civilization...the country becomes a key, a golden key, to a door that opens up for Jewish endeavor vast fields able to absorb all the people who would like to go there."⁵²

Without such a foundation of immigrants paving the way for more immigrants, Weizmann believed, the whole Zionist enterprise was doomed to failure.

The issue of the boundaries of the future state was also an important one. To the Revisionists the ultimate goal of Zionism was a Jewish state within its historic boundaries, embracing the entire Mandate area and including Trans-Jordan. According to Jabotinski,

"...the colonization of Trans-jordan is, for the Jewish future, even a greater necessity than the settlement of the land west of Jordan. Transjordan is more than three times the size of the Western part, with only a quarter of the Western part's population. The real solution of the Jewish problem, the gradual repatriation not of one and a half but of many millions, can only be dreamed of if Transjordan is opened to Jewish settlement."⁵³

The WZO, traditionally more willing to compromise than the Revisionists, accepted the excision of Trans-Jordan, the Peel Partition Plan of 1937 and other measures.⁵⁴ In 1935, with the rise of Nazism, the Revisionists split from the WZO and established the New Zionist Organization; they

rejoined the WZO only in 1946 after the adoption of the Biltmore program of 1943.⁵⁵

Zionist Institutions in Palestine

The World Zionist Organization succeeded in obtaining legal international recognition for its work in Palestine only when the British Mandate over Palestine was ratified by the League of Nations in 1922.⁵⁶ Prior to that, the WZO, as distinct from its local branches, was not a legally recognized body. Its financial institutions, for example, were registered British companies, and were protected prior to the Mandate by the British consular authorities.⁵⁷ It was not until 1908 that the WZO opened an office in Palestine. During Herzl's presidency (1897-1904), the WZO was preoccupied with the paramount aim of obtaining a charter, and there were differences of opinion, as we have seen earlier, with reference to the choice of a location for the National home. The WZO consequently began to operate in Palestine only after its decision to reject any other territory in place of Palestine, and after the failure to obtain a charter. Moreover, Herzl's successors, David Wolffsohn who presided over the WZO between 1904-11, and Otto Warburg (1911-20), were "practical Zionists" who urged that the task of obtaining political recognition be accompanied by actual settlement. Considerable emphasis therefore was placed on practical work in Palestine during that period.

The WZO office in Palestine also furnished the Zionist world with information concerning Palestine and purchased land and engaged in agricultural colonization on a small scale. In 1918, the Zionist Commission (Vaad Ha'zirim)⁵⁸ took over the political activities of the Palestinian Office, which continued to take charge of the agricultural, educational, and relief work. The various departments of the WZO in Palestine were engaged in a variety of activities. Its political Department was especially active in scrutinizing every piece of legislation promulgated by the British, making sure that they did not endanger the rights of Jews. The Department of Immigration was active in obtaining certificates for Jews to immigrate to Palestine. The Labor Department took care of the training of workers, relief for the unemployed and the like. There were also a Public Welfare Department, a Colonization Department, and a Department of Education. These executive bodies were organized and operated as a government, but they lacked the authority of a government.

In addition to these executive bodies, there were also Zionist financial institutions. There was the Jewish National Fund (Keren Kayemet), which was established by the Second Zionist Congress of 1898 in order to collect money for the purchase of land.⁵⁹ It was also engaged in colonization, afforestation, and reclamation work on its lands. The Foundation Fund (Keren Ha'yesod) was established in 1920 as an immigration and colonization fund, and its office was moved from London to Jerusalem in 1926.⁶⁰

Besides these bodies certain Zionist-affiliated organizations operated in Palestine. Some of them were organized on an international basis, as for example, the Mizrahi World Organization and the WIZO (Women's International Zionist Organization). Others were locally based, such as Hadassah, The American Women's Zionist Organization.

The groups we have enumerated do not exhaust the Jewish organizations that at one time or another participated in the work of national revival. They are, however, some of the most significant ones which were affiliated with the WZO.

Summary

This chapter has presented a brief survey of the development of the Zionist movement, focusing upon its ideology, its major factions, and its institutions in Palestine. As we have seen, the Zionist movement was far from homogeneous. It consisted of many factions which were organized around issues concerning the interpretation of Zionism, the priority of objectives, the image and location of the future homeland, and the techniques that should be employed for its realization. However, the various factions were united by the overall goal of national revival -- the attempt to capture the missing elements that were needed in order to transform the Jews from a cultural unit into a modern nation in the full sense of the term. Zionism, therefore, emerged as a genuine nationalist movement.

Generally speaking, the WZO exhibited remarkable

flexibility in its ability to contain within itself a broad spectrum of opinions. As we have seen, conflicts over issues did occur, but these were not serious enough to destroy the organization.

NOTES

1. Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchison University Library, 1960), p. 9.
2. Znaniecki distinguishes four types of societies, "First, the old, preliterate tribal society... Second, the political society, or state, which has a common legal system and an organized, independent government controlling all the people who inhabit a definite territory. Third, the ecclesiastical society, which has a common and distinctive literary, religious culture and an independent, organized church. Fourth, the national culture society..." The latter was coined by Znaniecki to replace the term "nationality" which he considers to be ambiguous. See, Florian Znaniecki, Modern Nationalities (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1952), p. 21.
3. Ibid., p. 21.
4. Ibid., p. xi.
5. Ibid., p. 23.
6. Louis Wirth, "Types of Nationalities" American Journal of Sociology, vol. 41, No. 6, May 1936, p. 723.
7. Herbert Blumer "Collective Behavior" in Alfred McClung Lee (ed.), Principles of Sociology (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1939), pp. 119-20.
8. Leon Simon, Studies in Jewish Nationalism (London: Longmans, Green 1920), p. 103.

9. Martin Buber, Israel and Palestine (London: The East & West Library, 1944), p. 1.
10. Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 3.
11. Ahad Ha'am, Kol Kitvei Ahad Ha'am (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Hozaah Ivrit, 1947), p. 135.
12. Lotta Levensohn, Outline of Zionist History (New York: Scopus, 1941), p. 17.
13. Buber, op. cit., p. 119.
14. Moses Hess, Rome and Jerusalem (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958), p. 34.
15. Ibid., p. 37.
16. Leo Pinsker, Auto-Emancipation translated by D.S. Blondheim (New York: ZOA Pamphlet Series No. 3, 1916), p. 3.
17. Ibid., p. 10.
18. Ibid., p. 20.
19. Theodore Herzl, A Jewish State (New York: Federation of American Zionists, 1917), p. 8.
20. Ibid., p. 11.
21. Ibid., p. 11.
22. Ibid., p. 39.
23. Ibid., p. 38.
24. Ibid., p. 37.
25. Moshe Burstein, Self Government of the Jews in Palestine Since 1900 (Tel-Aviv: Divan Books, 1934), p. 27, Also Halpern, op. cit., p. 14.

26. Burstein, op. cit., p. 28.
27. Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 114.
28. The "Jerusalem Program" was formulated by the 23rd Zionist Congress in Jerusalem (1950). The program outlines the new tasks of the Zionist movements following the establishment of the state, which represented the realization of the Basel program. See, Ibid., I, p. 211.
29. Our analysis of the organizational structure of the WZO is based on Ibid., II, p. 1234.
30. Ibid., I, p. 206.
31. Burstein, op. cit., p. 42.
32. Ibid., p. 44
33. Raphael Patai (ed.), The Complete Diaries of Theodore Herzl (5 vols.; New York & London: Herzl Press & Thomas Yoseloff, 1960), II, p. 581.
34. Pinsker, op. cit., p. 23.
35. S. U Hahon, Theodore Herzl (Jerusalem: Executive of the WZO, 1954), p. 7.
36. Ibid., p. 6.
37. Ibid., p. 7.
38. Ibid., p. 9.
39. Buber, op. cit., p. 142.
40. Hahon, op. cit., p. 11.

41. Ahad Ha'am ("one of the people"), pseudonym for Asher Ginzberg, was a Hebrew editor and publicist. His ideas on Zionism have been articulated in Al Parashat Drachim (At the Cross-Roads), (4 vols.; Berlin: Juedischer Verlag, 1930). For the complete collection of his works, see Ahad Ha'am, Kol Kitvei Ahad Ha'am (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Hozaah Ivrit, 1947).
42. Leon Simon (ed.), Ahad Ha'am: Essays, Letters, Memoirs. (London: East & West Library, 1964), p. 97.
43. Ibid., p. 100.
44. The nearest movement was the Bnei-Moshe (Sons of Moses) secret society organized by Ahad Ha'am himself in 1889. Halpern, op. cit., p. 26.
45. Alex Bein, Theodore Herzl: A Biography, (Trans. by Maurice Samuel) (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1940), p. 242.
46. Lotta Levensohn, op. cit., p. 21. Also, Halpern, op.-cit., p. 17.
47. Halpern, op. cit., p. 18.
48. Abraham G. Duker, "Introduction" in Nationalism and the Class Struggle by Ber Borochoy (New York: Poalei Zion of America, 1937).
49. Borochoy, op. cit., pp. 38-39.
50. Vladimir (Zeev) Jabotinski, Evidence Submitted to the Palestine Royal Commission (Tel-Aviv: The New Zionist Organization in Palestine, 1937), p. 5.
51. Ibid., p. 7.

52. Chaim Weizmann: excerpts from his historic statements, writings and addresses, a biography (New York: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1952), pp. 54-55.
53. Vladimir Jabotinski, "Foreword" in The Ten Year Plan for Palestine by C. Klinger (London: New Zionist Press, 1938), p. 3. TransJordan is spelled in two different ways in the original.
54. It is interesting to note that the issue of boundaries has been activated again after the Six-Day War of 1967. The Land of Israel Movement, which was organized after the war, considers the conquered areas as the liberated territories of the historic promised land, rather than as "bargaining cards" in exchange for peace.
55. Halpern, op. cit., p. 39.
56. Article 4 of the Mandate for Palestine stipulated that "An appropriate Jewish Agency shall be recognized as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social, and other matters as may effect the establishment of the Jewish population in Palestine, and subject to the control of the administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country. The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency," League of Nations, Council, Mandate for Palestine (London: 1922).

57. Burstein, op. cit., p. 37.
58. Ibid., p. 40.
59. Ibid., p. 42.
60. Ibid., p. 44.

CHAPTER 3
POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS, CULTURAL ORIGINS, AND
SOCIAL ORGANIZATION IN THE PRE-STATE ERA

Even prior to the immigration of groups inspired by the idea of national revival (beginning in 1882), there existed for centuries a small Jewish population in Palestine. The old Yishuv (the Jewish population of Palestine prior to the establishment of the state) consisted of orthodox Jews who spent their days at sacred studies and prayers and were maintained primarily by Jewish charity funds raised abroad. These Jews, who were committed to a strictly religious way of life, showed no interest in developing institutions of self-government. The old Yishuv was made up of Sephardi (Oriental) and Ashkenazi (Western) communities; these had little contact with each other and maintained their own religious and charitable institutions. The Sephardim accepted the authority of the Chacham Bashi, their chief religious dignitary, who was recognized by the Turkish government.¹ The Ashkenazim were organized mainly on the basis of Landsmannschaften -- groups of persons coming from the same town in Europe -- and were supported by funds raised in their hometowns. This division of Sephardim and Ashkenazim was maintained within the Chief Rabbinate after the establishment of the state. Two chief Rabbis, a Sephardi and an Ashkenazi one, are elected.

The period which begins with the first Zionist-inspired immigration and ends with the establishment of the state

(1882-1948) is known as the new Yishuv period, or the period of the Yishuv. During this period the foundations for the institutional web of the state were laid through the activities of both Zionist and locally organized institutions.

In this part of the study we briefly survey the major contributions of each wave of immigration, or Aliya, and the resulting development of the various institutional spheres. We shall also describe the major trends of development in the various institutional spheres prior to the establishment of the state.

Immigration and Demographic Growth

The first significant "wave" of immigration inspired by Zionist ideology is known as the "first Aliya" (1882-1903).² This immigration consisted of groups organized by the Hovevei-Zion and the BILU (an abbreviation for the saying "the house of Jacob, let us go") movements in Russia and Rumania. Most of them consisted of students and young people who laid the basis for the new Yishuv by establishing the first agricultural settlements in Palestine. However, since they were not trained farmers, they encountered many problems which they were unable to handle because of a lack of resources and knowledge. Their attempts might have failed completely had it not been for Baron Edmund Rothschild, who stepped in to assist the settlers with funds and professional guidance.³ This dependency on Rothschild's philanthropy probably saved the settlements but at the same time led to demoralization and a cooling of ideological fervor among the settlers.⁴

The ideological spirit gained momentum with the "second Aliya" (1904-1914), which was composed of young **socialists** from Russia, many of them disillusioned by the new wave of pogroms that followed the 1905 revolution. According to Eisenstadt's analysis,⁵ the major contribution of this Aliya was in the articulation of the basic values, symbols, and ideological orientations which guided and influenced the activities in the various institutional spheres. These ideas found their symbolic expression in the ethos of the "Chalutz" or pioneer;⁶ The Chalutz was willing to sacrifice his own comfort and self-interest for the achievement of collective goals. He was actively involved in seeking national revival through work, cultural contributions, and defense functions. The Chalutz worshipped work as both a means of self-realization and the road to future national revival. His activities were geared mainly not to the fulfillment of the immediate needs of the small population in Palestine but rather to the anticipated future needs of a growing population.

During this period the first Hebrew high school in Tel-Aviv, the first technical school, numerous elementary schools and kindergartens, the first teachers' seminary, as well as many collective settlements and other kinds of agricultural settlements were established.

The second Aliya was assisted by the WZO, which opened its Palestinian Office in 1908. Unlike the support of Baron Rothschild, this help was not philanthropic in nature;

rather, the settlers were able to press their demands through the various institutions of the WZO.

The "third Aliya" (1919-1923) brought mainly young Chalutzim (pioneers) from Russia, Poland and Rumania. This Aliya continued the work of the second Aliya. In 1922 a basic new element was introduced when Britain obtained the Mandate over Palestine. The idea behind the Mandate system was to provide nations in the process of becoming states with the assistance of older members of the "family of nations" who were willing and able to help. The British administration was supposed to assist the Jewish population of Palestine in organizing and developing various institutions and services which would lead to the assumption of independence in the future. They were also to encourage and assist Jewish migration to Palestine.⁷ Instead, many segments of the Jewish population felt that the British actually interfered with these objectives and regarded Britain as a colonial power rather than as a benevolent nation. Resistance took many forms from political action to terror and passive resistance.

Members of the "fourth Aliya" (1924-1931) were mainly middle-class immigrants who left Poland in the wake of economic measures adopted by the Polish government against the Jewish middle-class.

The "fifth Aliya" (1932-1947) was initiated by the severe persecution of the Jews in Germany, and developed into a Jewish exodus from all the countries of Central Europe.

The fourth and fifth Aliyas differed from the previous ones in their composition and motivations. Many of the immigrants were middle-class people. Some of them had capital of their own, and many were workers and professionals. They were not necessarily inspired by the Chalutz ethos; rather, many of them were inspired by the "spirit of capitalism."

TABLE 1
Statistical Data on the Aliyas, or
"Waves" of Immigration

	<u>Year</u>	<u>Estimated No. of Immigrants</u>
First Aliya	1882-1903	20,000-30,000
Second "	1904-1914	35,000-40,000
Third "	1919-1923	35,000
Fourth "	1924-1931	82,000
Fifth "	1932-1947	265,000 (to the end of 1944)

Source: S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1967), pp. 8-9.

TABLE 2
Growth of Cities and Agricultural Settlements
in Jewish Palestine.⁸

Year	Cities and Urban Settle- ments	Moshavot	Moshavim (Middle- Class)	Moshavei- Ovdim	Kibbutzim
Population					
1922	68,870	11,540	550	860	1,190
1931	136,160	27,740	2,350	3,400	3,800
1936	315,360	59,530	5,830	9,910	11,840
1945	439,200	80,700	13,200	18,000	37,400
No. of Settlements					
1922	8	34	3	8	19
1931	19	42	14	16	31
1936	27	46	27	44	47
1945	27	44	35	63	116

Source: S.N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1967), p. 27.

Despite the varied background of the immigrants during the Yishuv period, Zionist ideological motivation played an important role in structuring the immigrants' frame of reference. Collectively oriented goals served as a principal

source of motivation for much of the voluntary immigration which took place between the end of the nineteenth century and the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948.⁹ Ethnic tensions were, therefore, minimized during that period.

With the establishment of the state, mass immigration to Israel began under the auspices of the government of Israel. Between May 15, 1948, and the end of 1952 entire Jewish communities, from 70 countries, were transplanted to Israel. Between May 15, 1948, and December 31, 1966, 1,231,023 Jews arrived in Israel.¹⁰ Unlike the immigrants of the pre-state period, these immigrants were mostly refugees who lacked Zionist motivation. According to Eisenstadt,¹¹ the basic problem facing these immigrants was to secure the essential facilities such as housing, and once this is achieved, the problem becomes that of achieving social status. Since the state took upon itself the burden of providing the immigrants with the basic facilities, tensions were relatively weak in the beginning. Tensions seem to be growing as the immigrant population begins to adopt the veteran population as their comparative reference group. Overall, however, the Israeli government was successful in responding to the needs of the newcomers.¹²

Institutional Structure and Development

The expulsion of the Turks from Palestine, the issuance of the Balfour Declaration (1917),¹³ and the establishment of the Mandate, which committed the British to place Palestine

"under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as will serve the establishment of the Jewish National Home,"¹⁴ opened a new chapter in the institutional development of the Yishuv. Political, economic, and cultural institutions were created which served as the foundation for Israel's institutional web. As we shall see, developments in the various institutional spheres were influenced by the dominant ideological orientation, which was articulated mainly by the second Aliya.

The Political Sphere. In the pre-independence period, several centers of power were operative within Palestine. There were the institutions of the British Mandatory administration, the various executive and financial institutions of the World Zionist Organization,¹⁵ the Jewish Agency, and the various organs created by the local Jewish community.

In the Mandate for Palestine, the WZO was recognized as "the proper Jewish Agency...for the purpose of advising and cooperating with the British administration" to develop the country, establish a Jewish national home, and advance the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine.¹⁶ The World Zionist Organization, however, did not represent all sectors of the Jewish people. There were non-Zionist Jews who were nevertheless concerned with the future and fate of the Jewish people. In 1929 the Jewish Agency for Palestine was created "to give adequate representation to non-Zionists to enable them, jointly with the Zionist Organization, to participate in the privileges and responsibilities

of the Jewish Agency."¹⁷ The Jewish Agency was to be based on the principle of parity between Zionist and non-Zionists; that is, prominent Jews and organizations supported the building of a National Home without identifying themselves with the political aspirations of Zionism. Therefore, the governing bodies of the Jewish Agency were composed 50 per cent of Zionists elected by the Zionist Congress and 50 per cent of non-Zionists from 26 countries. The constitution provided that the president of the WZO should be the president of the Jewish Agency. The WZO together with the Jewish Agency represented the interests of World Jewry in Palestine.

After World War I a statutory community, Knesset Israel,¹⁸ was created to organize the Jewish community residing in Palestine. This organization was preceded by several unsuccessful attempts toward the same end.¹⁹ On October 7, 1920, representatives of the various segments of the Yishuv met and attempted to establish the organizational framework for the Yishuv and draft its basic regulations. It was the first time that the old and new Yishuv, the orthodox and the secular, the Ashkenazim and the Sephardim, had met in a democratically elected gathering. The Elected Assembly of the representatives of the Yishuv decided to elect a National Council (Vaad Leumi) as the executive organ of the Elected Assembly (Asefat Ha'nivcharim), with the duty of conducting the affairs of the Yishuv between the sessions of the Assembly, and preparing a drafted constitution for the semi-

autonomous Jewish community.

The difficulties of drafting a constitution which would serve as the legal framework for the Yishuv sprang from two sources. First, there was a lack of unity within the Jewish community. The ultra-orthodox group of Agudat Israel refused to accept female suffrage, and insisted that the supremacy of Jewish orthodox law be recognized. Also, the Rabbinical Council, which was officially recognized by the British²⁰ as having exclusive authority in matters of Jewish personal status, insisted that it be granted preferred status in the organs of the Knesset Israel. Second, the British Administration insisted on treating the Jewish population in Palestine as a religious rather than a national entity. This despite their earlier recognition "...that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917 The Balfour Declaration, by the government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a Jewish national home for the Jewish people..."²¹ Finally, on December 30, 1927, the British High Commissioner promulgated the Knesset Israel Regulations, which were published in the Official Gazette of January 1, 1928.²² Of the several organs within the Jewish community, the first two organs to be dealt with by the regulations were the Rabbinical Council (Part B of the regulations), as the central ecclesiastical authority, and the local rabbinical authorities.²³ The budget for the Rabbinical Council

was to be drawn up jointly by the Council and the Vaad Leumi. The regulation next provided for an Elected Assembly as the democratically elected body of Knesset Israel (Part C).²⁴ The Elected Assembly was to hold office for three years; its functions were to determine policy, approve a budget, and provide for taxation to cover the budget. The Executive organ of Knesset Israel (Part C) was the Vaad Leumi (National Council), elected annually and allocated an annual budget by the Elected Assembly. The budget had to be approved by the British High Commissioner as well. Finally, the regulations dealt with local communities (Part D). It stated that "There shall be not more than one local community in each town or village, but any section of such communities comprising not less than 30 adults may claim the satisfaction of its religious and cultural needs according to its religious and cultural needs according to its own principles."²⁵

Although, in accordance with the regulations, the community was constituted the Community of Jews in Palestine, membership was not obligatory, for Jews could have requested that their names be added or struck off the list. A person not included in the register of Knesset Israel was exempt from paying communal taxes.

The Regulations (or Constitution) of Knesset Israel reflected a compromise between the conflicting interests of the British Administration, of the orthodox Jews, and of the secular majority of the Yishuv. From the British

vantage point, the prominence given to the Rabbinate, and the duty imposed on the community to maintain the rabbinical establishment, detracted from national orientation of the organization. The extent to which the British administration was determined to go in its treatment of the Yishuv as a religious rather than a national entity was seen in its insistence on using the words "General Council" as its official translation of the Hebrew "Vaad Leumi" which literally means "National Council." It was only by way of compromise that the British agreed to have the Hebrew "Vaad Leumi" follow the English "General Council" in brackets in the English version of the Regulations.²⁶

The ultra-orthodox and anti-Zionist Agudat Israel succeeded in obtaining a provision that enabled any Jew who so desired to decline membership in the Zionist-oriented Knesset Israel. Indeed, Agudat Israel proclaimed a fast day on the date of the promulgation of the regulations (January 1, 1928) and issued a call for its followers to drop out of Knesset Israel. The Agudat Israel appealed to the British High Commissioner for recognition as a separate community with its own regulations, but its appeal was rejected. Non-extremist religious groups were satisfied by the prominence given to the Rabbinate, while the general population was not too enthusiastic because of the mild nationalistic flavor of the regulations.

Despite the constraints set up by the Mandatory Administration and the attitudes of the ultra-orthodox groups,

which somewhat hindered the development of Jewish self-government, many significant steps were taken. In 1933 the administration of Jewish education in Palestine, which was the responsibility of the WZO (from 1929 also of the Jewish Agency), was transferred to the Vaad Leumi, which set up an Educational Department. The Vaad Leumi also had a Political Department which was concerned with the relations of the Yishuv and the Palestine administration. There existed in addition a Department of Social Welfare, a Department in charge of Local Communities, and others.

Although it was not a sovereign government because its activities had to be approved by the British and by the WZO, Knesset Israel performed numerous governmental functions and actually laid the basis for the political institutions of the future state. In fact, with the establishment of the state, the National Council and the Elected Assembly were dissolved, and the departments of which the National Council was in charge were transferred to the Provisional Government of the new state.

Since the organs of the Jewish semi-autonomous government had only limited coercive power, their effectiveness depended largely upon voluntary cooperation between the various groups. This experience of self-government endowed the State of Israel with a democratic tradition of cooperation among widely differing groups. As far as the religious life went, the pattern established by Knesset Israel of a rabbinical establishment which is tax supported and

which exercises exclusive jurisdiction in matters pertaining to personal status was maintained.

A very powerful institution in Palestine was the Histadrut.²⁷ It was established in 1920 as a labor union organizing workers and professionals; nevertheless, it was also involved in many educational, economic, and political activities not usually undertaken by labor unions. Among other activities, the Histadrut set up classes for teaching Hebrew to newcomers, provided its members with medical and financial assistance, and owned and established farms and factories and some of the largest cooperatives in Israel.

The foundations of the military were also laid during the Yishuv period.²⁸ From the beginning of Jewish settlement in Palestine there were voluntary organizations engaged in the protection of the lives and property of the settlers. Hashomer (The Guard), a self-defense organization of the pioneers of the second Aliya, which was formed in 1909, can serve as an example. Also, Jewish units fought in the two World Wars. (These were the Jewish Legion in World War I and the Jewish Brigade in World War II). A significant development took place in 1920²⁹ when the Haganah (literally, Defense) was organized by the quasi-government as a secret militia; it soon became virtually the official army of the Jewish population in Palestine. In addition to the Haganah there existed the Palmach, which officially was a branch of the Haganah but actually was an independent unit with its own command. There were also two dissident guerrilla groups

(Etzel and Lechi) which were affiliated with the Zionist Revisionist party. Lechi was a more militant group which split with Etzel during World War II over the issue of continued opposition to the British rule. All these units served as the nucleus of the Israeli Defence Army.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note that the main criteria for selection into elite positions were creativity on the national scene and close association with the ethos of the Chalutz and its dominant ideology, rather than education, ethnic background, or socio-economic origin. Since the collective agricultural settlements were considered to be most closely associated with the ethos of the Chalutz, it is not surprising that in the political elite, agriculture was strongly represented.³⁰ According to Etzioni,³¹ agrarianism has continued to be of great significance in the political life of Israel, mainly because in the past, ideology and prestige sided with agriculture. Zidon³² shows that of 120 Knesset (Parliament) members, 20 First Knesset members listed their occupation as agriculturalists, 28 in the Second and Third Knesset did so, 27 in the Fourth Knesset, 25 in the Fifth Knesset, and 27 in the Sixth Knesset. In addition to the elite, the population itself was highly active politically through the institutions of Knesset Israel and through a great variety of voluntary associations.³³

The Economic Sphere. A major portion of the investment during the Yishuv period was used for the establishment of settlements.³⁴ Seventy per cent of all the investments

of the various Zionist organizations went into agricultural settlements.³⁵ Economic activities, like activities in other spheres of social life, were guided and influenced by the dominant ideology, which stressed agriculture as a symbol of national revival and social reform. "Urban" economic activities, especially those motivated by profit rather than by their contribution to collective goals, were alien to the dominant ideology and to the ethos of the pioneer.³⁶ In agriculture there was hardly any specialization of settlements in crops or livestock.³⁷ On the contrary, "Meshek Meorav" (mixed farming) was the dominant pattern. Its logic was that in order not to depend on outside communities for the supply of daily needs each settlement should raise a variety of crops and livestock. Life in the Kibbutz was highly regarded because of its close association with the dominant ideology, and because of its members' participation in numerous national tasks.³⁸ Within the various elite groups of that period, Kibbutz members were overrepresented. . . Although the major concern of the various organizations has been with the development of the agricultural sector of the economy, industrial development also succeeded albeit against heavy odds. In the first place, the British Mandatory administration was reluctant to promote industrialization. Its tariff system was designed rather to provide revenue. Also, banks were skeptical of industrial venturers, thus contributing to failures among the early industrial pioneers. With the fourth and the

fifth Aliyas, industry began to gain in significance. In 1924 Jewish immigrants from Poland initiated a change, for including as they did persons with industrial experience and some financial means they were able to form a number of industrial enterprises. In 1926 their financial backing was cut off as a result of an economic crisis in Poland, and industrial progress was slowed. Nonetheless, their ventures created a shift in public opinion that induced the WZO to provide some financial facilities for industry, and the Mandatory government began gradually to adjust its fiscal policy to the needs of the local industry. The growth of industry was slow but steady. (See table below).

TABLE 3
Development of Jewish Industries and
Handicrafts 1921/22-1937

	1921/22	1930	1933	1937
Establishments	1,850	2,475	3,388	5,606
Personnel: Workers and Owners	4,750	10,968	19,595	30,040
Value of Annual Output (lp)	500,000	2,510,000	5,352,000	9,109,000
Capital Invested	600,000	2,234,000	5,371,000	11,637,000
Electric Power Installed (hp)	880	10,100	50,500	106,495

Source: A.M. Marcus, Industry in Israel (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest," 1959), p. 5.

During the 1920's and 1930's some of Palestine's larger industrial establishments were formed. The events in Germany in 1933 and subsequently in Austria and Czechoslovakia brought about important industrial development and growth. First, the Jewish immigrants from Central Europe created a larger and a more sophisticated market, and secondly, they included industrialists with capital and know-how.

Also, the Histadrut began to be involved in industry and became an important factor on the economic scene. In 1943 it owned 70 per cent of the mixed farming, two-thirds of the building industry, 10 per cent of the industry, 6.8 per cent of the citrus industry, and two-thirds of the transportation industry.³⁹

In the pre-state period the ideological orientation supported a particular type of economic organization with its emphasis upon agrarian culture, whereas the state period has seen an increased emphasis upon industrialization and professionalization.⁴⁰ This can be considered an ideological shift from the ethos of the pioneer and agrarian virtues to a stress upon modernization and economic independence.

The Cultural Sphere. Apart from the impact of the cultural sphere upon the development of economic and political institutions, the pre-state period was characterized by strong emphasis on cultural creation and innovation: e.g. the development of a Hebrew school system, a Hebrew theater, Hebrew literature, etc. The most dramatic single event in this context was perhaps the revival of the Hebrew language,

which had ceased to be spoken at the time of the Diaspora. Its main use was in ritual and prayer and in the various branches of Jewish scholarship.⁴¹

Modern Hebrew literature was revived during the eighteenth-century period of Hebrew Enlightenment (Haskala), which began in Germany and Austria then flowed over into the major Jewish centers of Russia and Western Europe.⁴² The immediate purpose of the Enlightenment was emancipation and the achievement of full civil rights for Jews -- something for which its advocates were ready to relinquish all claims to national and political identity and to rest content with merely Jewish culture. The Enlightenment, therefore, generated a literary renaissance using Hebrew as its medium in prose, poetry, philosophy, and scholarship in general. However, during this period in which Jews took full citizenship in their respective countries as their ultimate goal, the cultivation of a separate spoken language seemed unnecessary. Only when it was seen that the solution of the Jewish problem must come from within was the importance of Hebrew and its revival as a spoken language recognized. The need to revive Hebrew as part of the task of national rebuilding was recognized by Ahad Ha'am who wrote:

"We Jews have unfortunately been compelled by circumstances to give up Hebrew and speak every language under the sun; but Hebrew is rooted in our very being, and neither has been nor will be ousted by any other language...There is one language, and one only, that always has been, is, and will be forever bound up with our national existence, and that is Hebrew."⁴³

The ideas of Ahad Ha'am strongly influenced the Hovevei-Zion movement, and Hebrew became the official language of the pioneer movement. When the pioneers of the first Aliya arrived in Palestine in the 1880's, Hebrew was their spoken language. The schools of the pioneer settlements in Palestine, as early as 1890, were largely conducted in Hebrew.⁴⁴ As a result, the generation that grew up in these schools later formed the first genuinely Hebrew-speaking families, whose children were the first sizable group of native Hebrew speakers in modern times.

The revival of Hebrew involved serious practical difficulties because of the vocabulary gap between a language which for centuries had been used mainly as a literary vehicle and the requirements of daily life. The restoration of Hebrew as a living language is closely associated with the name of Eliezer Ben-Yehudah. Ben-Yehudah came to realize the importance of Hebrew as part of the national solution to the Jewish problem. He confessed that:

"As my national consciousness grew stronger, I began to feel more and more the importance of the language for the nation. I came to the conclusion that while Jews cannot become a living nation without returning to their ancestral land, they also cannot become a living nation without returning to their ancestral language. This involves the usage of Hebrew not only in sacred studies and scholarship, but as a spoken language in all spheres of life, by women, elders, and children, day and night. Like all other nations, we must have a language of our own. Arriving at this idea was a crucial turning point in my life."⁴⁵

In 1881 Ben-Yehudah arrived in Palestine and became a crusader for the revival of Hebrew. Hebrew was the only language

he used at home and with his friends, who vowed to speak the language daily. Ben-Yehudah and his collaborators set out to broaden the language, coining new words on a large scale, mostly based on roots already existing in the language. Ben-Yehudah himself contributed significantly to the new vocabulary, seeking in the Hebrew literature of all ages for little-known expressions that could be invested with new life. He published a sixteen-volume dictionary which included old and new Hebrew words. In 1889 Ben-Yehudah, with several collaborators, established the Vaad Ha'lashon Ha'ivrit (Council of the Hebrew Language), among whose tasks was coining new Hebrew words. Ben-Yehudah served as the chairman of the Council until his death.

The establishment of all-Hebrew kindergartens and schools of all kinds by dedicated teachers served as an important instrument for the revival of Hebrew as a spoken language. It is largely for this reason that teachers were regarded as cultural pioneers during that period.⁴⁶ In 1913 the question of the language of instruction to be used at the Haifa Technion, which had been established by a German organization, unleashed a violent dispute that became known as the Language War. The struggle, which ended with the victory of the Hebraicists, resulted in a large-scale extension of the all-Hebrew school network.

In 1921, the British Mandatory Administration recognized Hebrew as one of the three official languages of the country.⁴⁷ With the establishment of the state, Hebrew

became its official language. The mass immigration following upon the attainment of independence presented a challenge, and many Ulpanim (language-teaching centers) were established. Also, there are newspapers in simple elementary Hebrew, and special radio broadcasts for learners, to impart the language to the newcomers. The Council of the Hebrew Language, which became, with the establishment of the state, the Academy of the Hebrew language, is engaged mainly in coining new words according to the needs of modern times.

The pioneers were largely involved in the revival of secular Hebrew culture. Nevertheless, as we have seen earlier, the orthodox sector of the Yishuv was engaged in sacred studies and Jewish scholarship, and, as will be demonstrated later, it had its own educational system which emphasized traditional way of life.

The Establishment of the State

On May 14, 1948, a proclamation declaring the establishment of a sovereign Jewish state in Palestine was issued and signed by 37 representatives of the Palestine Jewry and the Zionist movement.⁴⁸ It set forth the claim of the Jewish people to a homeland in Palestine, called the new nation "The State of Israel," and vested the People's Council (Moatzat Ha'am) and the executive People's Administration (Minhelet Ha'am) with authority to act as the Provisional Council of the state and Provisional Cabinet until the election of a Constitutional Assembly. The decision to establish an independent sovereign state

on the date of the termination of the Mandate was preceded by the Partition Resolution of the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947. During the months intervening between the adoption of the U.N. partition resolution and the termination of the Mandate (May 15, 1948), the authorities of the Yishuv, the Jewish Agency, and the Vaad Leumi gradually took over control on such vital services as defence, security, information, and food distribution in the areas assigned for the Jewish state in Palestine. On April 6, 1948, the Zionist General Council convened in Tel-Aviv to set up a provisional Cabinet of 13 and a Council of 37. By early May, many of the functions of the British administration had been taken over by the Yishuv authorities. The only question that remained to be decided was whether the Jewish authorities should declare Israel a sovereign state or whether it should be made subject to the U.N. trusteeship. The latter course had been proposed by the United States at the U.N. General Assembly meeting earlier that spring because of the fear that the declaration of a Jewish State would lead to war with the Arabs and perhaps even world conflict. On May 13, 1948, three days before the termination of the Mandate, members of the Provisional Council met and decided in favor of declaring Israel as a sovereign state.

Problems arose also during the drafting of the proclamation when religious groups insisted that the preamble to the declaration stress the fact that Palestine had been

promised to the Jewish people in the Bible and that the phrase "with trust in the Almighty" be included. As a compromise the phrase "Tzur Israel" (literally, the rock of Israel) was adopted.

The establishment of the state marked only the very beginning of the process of institutionalization. The major challenges facing the new polity were to continue the work begun in the pre-independence period and to assert its sovereignty vis-a-vis the numerous organizations that operated in Palestine. In the second part of this study we present selected case materials which serve to illustrate the institutionalization process.

The establishment of the state also affected the WZO. Recognizing that the establishment of the state of Israel marked the realization of the Basel Program of 1897, by providing a national home secured by law, the Twenty-third Congress convened in Jerusalem (1951) to frame a new statement of the objectives and tasks of the Zionist movement. It presented the so-called Jerusalem Program, declaring that "The task of Zionism is to strengthen the State of Israel, to gather the exiles in the Land of Israel, and to guarantee the unity of the Jewish people."⁴⁹ Recognizing the sovereignty of the state, the Congress called upon Israel to enact appropriate legislation recognizing the WZO as the representative of the Jewish People in all matters that involved the organized participation of Diaspora Jewry in the development of Israel.⁵⁰ As we shall see further on,

in 1952 the Israeli government adopted the Law of the Status of the WZO, The Jewish Agency for Palestine. In addition, a so-called covenant was made between the Israeli government and the Jewish Agency. Thus the establishment of the state marked its detachment from the WZO in the organizational and legal senses, although the state and the WZO continued to cooperate in matters concerning the state and World Jewry.

Summary

We have attempted briefly to survey the major developments in the various social spheres in Palestine during the pre-independence period. Special attention was given to the contribution of the various "waves" of immigrants to institutional developments. The roles (positive and negative) of the British Mandate, of the semi-autonomous government of the Yishuv, and of various Zionist groups were also stressed. As we have seen, the institutional developments during this period laid the basis for the institutional framework of the state of Israel.

NOTES

1. Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; (New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), II, p. 1246.
2. For an analysis of the five "waves" of immigration in the pre-state period, see S.M. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1967), pp. 10-29. Also, Alex Bein, History of the Zionist Settlement from Herzl till our Time (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Massada, 1954). Statistical data is available in David Gurevich, Aaron Gretz, and Roberto Bachi, The Jewish Population of Palestine: Immigration, Demographic Structure, and Natural Growth (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for Palestine, (1944).
3. The WZO did not operate in Palestine at that period and was in its initial stage of organization. It was not until 1908 that the WZO opened its Palestinian Office.
4. For the negative consequences of Baron Rothschild's philanthropy, see Eisenstadt, op. cit., p. 10. Also, Bein, op. cit., p. 11.
5. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 11, 13.
6. For the analysis of the ethos of the Chalutz, see Ibid., pp. 13-14.
7. League of Nations, Council, Mandate for Palestine (London: 1922).

8. For the analysis and statistical data concerning the growth of population and settlements, see Aaron Gretz, Statistical Handbook of Jewish Agricultural Settlements in Palestine (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1945). Also, Gurevich, Gretz, and Bachi, op. cit.
9. Judith T. Shuval, Immigrants on the Threshold (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 46.
10. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, op. cit., I, p. 538.
11. S.N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1955), p. 139.
12. For greater details, see Chapter 5, the part dealing with the pragmatic basis of legitimacy of the Israeli government.
13. The Balfour Declaration was an official statement issued on November 2, 1917, by British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour declaring that "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object..." (Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel op. cit., I, p. 103). The declaration actually realized Herzl's attempts to obtain a Charter for the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine.
14. Mandate for Palestine, op. cit., Article 2.
15. Moshe Burstein, Self Government of the Jews in Palestine Since 1900 (Tel-Aviv: Divan Books, 1934), pp. 23-65.

16. Mandate for Palestine, op. cit., Article 4.
17. Constitution of the Jewish Agency for Palestine (London: The Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1929), Article 4.
18. For the history, organization, and structure of the institutions of Knesset Israel, see Moshe Attias, Knesset Israel Be'eretz Israel (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Department of Press and Information of the National Council, 1954).
19. For example: in 1903, Menachem Ussishkin developed a plan for a nation-wide organization of the Yishuv. This organization would have excluded the old Yishuv, by agreeing that eligibility to vote would depend upon residence in Palestine for at least one year, and upon not living on charity. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, op. cit., II, p. 1247.
20. The Palestine Order in Council - 1922, Article 53, in Yehezkel Dror and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.) The Government of Israel: A Collection of Readings (Jerusalem: The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, 1961), p. 22.
21. Ibid., p. 15.
22. Attias, op. cit., p. 232.
23. Ibid., pp. 232-234.
24. Ibid., pp. 234-236.
25. Ibid., p. 236.
26. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, op. cit., II, p.1249.

27. See Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 34-35. Also see "Histadrut" (The General Federation of Labor), in Encyclopedia Hebraica (in Hebrew) (22 vols.; Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv: Encyclopedia Publishing Co., 1949), pp. 26-63. Also see Aharon Baker (Secretary General of the Histadrut), Histadrut in Changing Times, an opening address delivered at the 76th. National Council of the Histadrut, Tel-Aviv, April, 1964.
28. For an analysis of the military in Israel, see Shaul Ramati, The Israel Defence Forces (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest", 1961). Also, J.C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969). We shall discuss the military in greater details in the chapter of monopolization in the section dealing with the banning of competitive groups.
29. Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 365.
30. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., p. 137.
31. Amitai Etzioni, "Agrarianism in Israel's Party System," Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics, XXXIII, No. 3, 1957, p. 371.
32. Asher Zidon, Beit Ha'nivcharim (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Achiasaf, 1964), p. 393.
33. S.N. Eisenstadt, "Theoretical Conditions of the Development of Voluntary Associations - A Case Study of Israel," In Roberto Bachi (ed.) Scripta Hierosolymitana, III, pp. 104-126 (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1956).

34. For statistical analysis of the development of settlements in the Yishuv period, see Gretz, op. cit.
35. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., p. 60.
36. Development of private entrepreneurship gained momentum with the fourth and fifth Aliyas. See Ibid., pp. 25-26, 63.
37. Avshalom Rokach, Regional and Rural Development (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest", 1964).
38. On the status of the Kibbutz, and changes in its status with the establishment of the State, see Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., pp. 130-133.
39. Ibid., p. 61.
40. For a survey and analysis of the major economic developments in Israel's first decade, see Don Patenkin, The Israeli Economy in the First Decade (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Falk Institute, 1960).
41. For an analysis of the revival of the Hebrew language, see Ben Halpern, The Idea of the Jewish State (Cambridge, Mass; Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 5, 70-72, 118-119. Also, Chaim Rabin, The Revival of Hebrew (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest", 1968). Also, Ariel, a quarterly review of the arts and sciences in Israel (Jerusalem: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cultural and Scientific Relations Division, No. 25, Winter 1969).

This is a special issue "The Revival of the Hebrew Language." Also see William Chomsky, Hebrew, The Eternal Language (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1957), pp. 231-245.

42. Ariel, op. cit., p. 35.
43. Leon Simon (ed.), Ahad Ha'am: Essays, Letters, Memoirs (London: East & West Library, 1964) p. 94.
44. Ariel, op. cit., p. 39.
45. Eliezer Ben-Yehudah, A Complete Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Hebrew (Jerusalem: Ben-Yehudah Hozaa-La'or, 1940), Prolegomena, p. 2.
46. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., p. 135.
47. Mandate for Palestine, op. cit., Article 22.
48. Israel, The Provisional Government, Official Gazette No. 1, May 14, 1948: "Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel".
49. The 23rd. Zionist Congress 14-23, Aug. 1951 (Jerusalem: Executive of the Zionist Organization, 1951), p. 583, Stenographic Report.
50. Ibid., p. 583.

PART II

Processes of Institutionalization

CHAPTER 4

MONOPOLIZATION

In this chapter we propose to analyze the major dimensions of monopolization, which, according to our argument, is one of the central processes in the transformation of movements into nation-states. In essence, monopolization follows the transformation of the movement's position from opposition into power. It is therefore consequent upon a change in the power structure of society and results from the attainment of power by the movement. Monopolization is a process rather than a single act. The major dimensions of this process are: the banning of competitive groups, the redefinition of the boundaries among the various social groupings, and a change on the part of the leadership from a "movement" frame of reference to a "national" one. The first two represent structural changes. The third is a necessary concomitant of monopolization, and represents an ideological change.

Monopolization as Structural Change

The structural change in a movement's position can be analytically described as a shift from the "periphery" of society to its "central zone." According to Shils,¹ who has developed the concepts of center and periphery in the analysis of social structure,

"There is a central zone in the structure of society that impinges in various ways on those who live within the ecological domain in which society exists...the center of the central zone is a phenomenon of the realm of values and beliefs. It is the center of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs which govern society...It is also a phenomenon of the realm of action. It is a structure of activities, roles and persons within the network of institutions."²

Although Shils uses the concepts of center and periphery in his attempt to construct an abstract model of society, we shall apply these concepts to changes that occur in the power structure of society after the achievement of power by nationalist movements. Some modification of the concepts therefore becomes inevitable. The stress on values leads Shils to ignore the problem of action. He assumes that unity of values leads to unity in the sphere of action. Thus Shils does not discuss differences in the power held by the various elite groups of which the center is composed. On the contrary, power would appear to be evenly distributed in Shils' model, with each elite group regulating its specific social sphere. Shils argues that the elites of the economy "affirm and observe certain values which should govern economic activity. The elites of the polity affirm and observe certain values which should govern political activity...The values of the different elites are clustered into an approximately consensual pattern."³ According to Shils' analysis, harmonious relations exist among the various elite groups who both consider themselves and are considered to serve as custodians of the central value system. According

to this model, the periphery⁴ is the only source of dissent. Tensions might arise between the center and the periphery but not within those groups occupying the center. Shils' failure adequately to consider the realm of action leads him to ignore the problem of power struggles among the various elite groups who occupy the center. Such power struggles are likely to occur during periods of institutionalization and de-institutionalization when the criteria for slicing the "social pie" are undergoing change.

Furthermore, far from occupying positions of equal power with other elites, the elite of the polity holds a monopolistic position in the central zone of society. To clarify why this is so, it becomes necessary to examine the concept of monopoly, originally developed in economic theory but since applied to the analysis of other spheres of social life. In its strict sense monopoly refers to "...a situation in which a seller is the sole source for an economic good that has no significant substitutes."⁵ This, of course, is a very rare situation. In its broader sense, however, monopoly does not refer to the total absence of competition but rather to the imposition of "...any artificial restrictions [i.e., other than the "natural" market forces of supply and demand] on their [the sellers] number or on the quantities they are permitted to sell."⁶

When it comes to the analysis of the power structure of society, there have been two opposing approaches to the

concept of monopoly, as can be illustrated by the position taken by Parsons and C. Wright Mills. According to Parsons, "a monopoly of the use of power in governmental hands would be a definition of the ideal type of a totalitarian regime."⁷ For Parsons, then, the concept of monopoly would describe the power structure only in extreme situations. In analyzing the power structure in non-totalitarian regimes he relies heavily upon the parallel between money as a generalized medium and power as a circulating medium. Parsons treats the power of governments as a "political bank." According to his analysis,

"the hallmark of the money bank is the fact that the dollars, as we have noted, do double duty, remaining at the disposal of the depositors while they are also at the disposal of the borrowers. In the case of power, commitments to the performance of binding obligations are the analog of dollars and may be said to do double duty...Members in their capacity as voters may be said to have entrusted power ("deposited" it) to elect leadership, power that they reserve the right to withdraw, if not on demand, at least at the next election."⁸

Power, then, is described as a circulating rather than as a cumulative medium, and the power structure is described as a "perfect market" in the sense that the power of the polity is reducible to the power of each individual voter.

For C. Wright Mills, on the other hand, monopoly of power can characterize formally democratic regimes as well.⁹ His "power elite" actually possesses a monopoly of political power in the strict sense. The power elite, according to Mills, is composed of political, economic, and military men

and "...has been shaped by the coincidence of interest between those who control the major means of production and those who control the newly enlarged means of violence... from the absence of any genuine civil service of skills and integrity, independent of vested interests."¹⁰ Unlike Shils, who maintains that the cohesion of the various elite groups is the product of their role as the custodians of the value-system, Mills argues that they are united by the coincidence of their own interests. Mills' analysis has been made with reference to the power structure of American society, but the concept of "power elite" has become an analytical concept to describe situations wherein the "political market" is fixed and the influence of the constituency is minimal. Parsons and Mills seem to rely on the economic models of "perfect market" and "monopolistic market" in their analyses of the power structure. The major variable which they are treating seems to be the existence of or the lack of competition in the "political market."

More helpful in the analysis undertaken here is the approach taken by Weber, which falls between the extreme opposite positions assumed by Parsons and Mills. According to Weber, "A compulsory political association with continuous organization will be called a 'state' if and in so far as its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical power in

the enforcement of order."¹¹ Monopoly, then, is part of the definition of the modern nation-state. Weber does not elaborate on the concept of monopoly, nor does he define it. By implication, however, monopolization refers to the exclusive use of legitimate power. Weber does not differentiate analytically between monopolization and legitimation. To him the ascent into power is always into legitimate power. Monopolization and legitimation are processes which may overlap and reinforce one another in reality, but for analytical purposes we prefer to study them separately. We maintain that it is through the process of monopolization that nationalist movements shift from the periphery of society into its central zone. The movement is transformed from an oppositional force which impinges on the system from the outside into the polity of a nation-state. As Weber has observed, the polity has a monopolistic position in the central zone of society.

Clearly, the amount of competition permitted in the "political market" varies from one regime to another, with democracy allowing for greater freedom of competition than totalitarian regimes. However, regardless of the amount of competition, the polity of a nation-state in any regime has a monopolistic position. We use the concept of monopoly in its moderately economic sense and apply it to the political sphere. The power of monopoly of the polity refers to the fact that the polity can impose restrictions on the other

institutional spheres and determine their policies and actions. Moreover, the polity has the exclusive power to allocate resources which are necessary for the operation of the economy, the educational system, etc. This does not deny the fact that the polity is influenced by the demands of the various groups. Even so, it has the exclusive power to make decisions in certain areas and to allocate certain resources. As we shall see in the chapter on legitimation, the polity's monopoly of power must be related to and supported by the legal and value systems of the society.

The Major Dimensions of Monopolization

There are three major dimensions, we argue, to the institutionalization of the polity's monopoly over the central zone of society. The first two refer to structural changes, whereas the third refers to changes in the ideological orientation of the leadership.

The Banning of Competitive Groups. In contrast with Shils, who assumes harmonious relations among the various groups within the "central zone" of society, we maintain that monopolization is typically accompanied by power struggles among various elite groups. This fact has been recognized by Edwards and Brinton. Edwards describes the monopolization of power as a ferocious struggle among conservative, moderate, and radical elements, a struggle for existence in which the fittest remains in power.¹²

Brinton, too, considers monopolization to be marked by power struggles between moderates and extremists.¹³

Although Brinton and Edwards are discussing power struggles in revolutionary situations, the principle of power struggle, perhaps in muted form, also applies to other types of movements. The struggle can take many concrete shapes and forms, and in each specific case different groups are involved. In essence, however, the struggle concerns both rival claims to control the various institutional spheres and rival claims for dominance among the various spheres.

The actual techniques used by the polity vary, as we shall illustrate from the case of institutionalization of the Zionist movement, from the use of legal means defining certain groups as illegal, to actual physical battles.

Redefinition of "Boundaries." Parsons considers social systems to be "boundary-maintaining" units in the sense that they maintain a certain consistency of pattern even when environmental conditions change.¹⁴ While Parsons uses the concept of boundaries in an analytical sense, we maintain that the polity, in order to establish, assert, and secure its monopoly over the "center," has to redefine the boundaries among the various organizations and groups in society. There is a need to outline the responsibilities and functions of each institution, as well as the inter-relationships among different institutions, especially with

reference to the new polity. This redefinition of boundaries is typically accomplished through the writing of a constitution.

Changes in the Orientation of the Polity from a "Movement Orientation" to a "National Orientation." The transition from a nationalist movement to a nation-state involves for the leadership a three-step process: from the leaders of a sect to the leaders of a party to the leaders of a nation. A sect, by definition, operates outside a given system. In terms of its organization and structure, it is a closed group whose attitude toward outside groups represents negation of the latter's right to exist.¹⁵ The concept of a political party, on the other hand, is used by Weber "...to designate an associative type of social relations, membership in which rests on formally free recruitment. The end to which its activity is devoted is to secure power within a corporate group for its leaders in order to attain ideal or material advantages for its active members."¹⁶ A party, unlike a sect, operates within the corporate group rather than being engaged in the rejection and negation of other groups. The willingness to operate within the corporate group necessitates a major modification of the sectarian nature of a movement. Political parties, however, take care of and represent the interests of only specific segments of the corporate group.

It is our argument that the emergence of a nation-state calls for the creation of national unity, and thus a further step is required beyond the transformation of a sect into a political party. The leaders must be able to conceptualize the structural shift in their position, and they must act as representatives of the nation rather than as representatives of any particular segment or group. This involves the ability to give priority to the interests of the corporate group as a whole over, and sometimes even against, their own partisan interests. This shift has been described by us as a transformation from a "movement orientation" to a "national orientation."

Leaders exhibiting a "movement orientation" perceive movement and nation as overlapping, if not identical. Such leaders do not recognize that what is good for the movement is not necessarily good for the nation. The failure to realize that a movement and a nation represent two different bonds of associations whose goals are not necessarily in harmony with each other makes leaders reluctant to act in any way that might jeopardize partisan interests. Leaders with a "national orientation" are able to transcend partisan and sectarian interests for the benefit of the nation as a whole. During the period of institutionalization it is important that leaders adopt a "national orientation." That the new polity be representative of the nation is vital both for its relations to its constituency and for its relations with other nation-

states. The inability of the leadership to adopt a non-partisan approach could undermine efforts to create national unity, leading to more upheavals which in turn would jeopardize the monopoly of the polity over the use of power.

Let us proceed to analyse cases drawn from the Israeli experience which are illustrative of the major processes of monopolization.

Monopolization in Israel

In the first part of this work, which dealt with developments in the pre-state era, we saw that a semi-autonomous Jewish community (Knesset Israel) existed in Palestine. Although it engaged in numerous governmental functions, it was not sovereign because its activities had to be approved by the British administration and by the WZO. We also saw that a plurality of power centers existed in Palestine. There were the various institutions of and organizations associated with the World Zionist Organization, the various institutions of the Jewish Agency which represented non-Zionist Jews as well, the institutions of the statutory community of Knesset Israel, the Histadrut, and numerous voluntary organizations. These various organizations and groups were engaged in many civic and military activities which laid the foundations of the institutional framework of the state. With the establishment of the state, it was

clear that a sovereign nation could not continue to operate on the basis of voluntarism carried out by a plurality of "centers." It also became clear that the local institutions representing the people who actually live in the country should be given priority over institutions representing the interests of World Jewry. In the pre-independence period the situation was reversed, and local institutions had only modest influence within Zionist institutions representing World Jewry. There was a need to create one effective center of power, to replace the many centers which operated in the pre-state period, and to redefine the relations of the various groups with reference to the center.

Monopolization in Israel was a highly delicate and complex task. In the case of revolutionary movements whose major objective is the removal of existing institutions, the legitimacy of the old "center" expires when the movement takes over. In Israel the situation was different. The various institutions and groups were all engaged in the task of national revival, and their right to exist did not, therefore, expire with the establishment of the state. Monopolization in Israel proceeded through the banning of certain groups and through the redefinition of boundaries among organizations and groups. It was greatly assisted by the ability of the key leaders to adopt a non-partisan approach, as we shall see further on.

The Banning of Competitive Groups: The Case of the Military.

We will focus upon the military, since it brings into focus the issue we seek to demonstrate. Also, in Israel no banning of dissident political groups took place. Moreover, the anti-Zionist Agudat Israel participated in the governmental coalition. Not all parties are members of the governmental coalition, but they all are represented in the Knesset.

Military activities were organized from the beginning of settlement in Palestine by the first Aliya. As early as 1909, Hashomer (literally, the Guard) was formed by the pioneers of the first Aliya, to protect the lives and property of the settlers. Later, after the outbreak of World War I, with the initiative of Jabotinski, Weizmann and Eder, the British government consented (in 1917) to the formation of the 38th. Battalion of Royal Fusiliers, also known as the Jewish Legion. These Jewish units fought with the British to overthrow the Turks.¹⁷ During World War II the Jewish Brigade was formed by a decision of the British War Cabinet (1944), in response to the demands of Jewish leaders for an all-Jewish military corps under Jewish insignia to assist the Allied Powers against the Nazi regimes.¹⁸ Although it was formed five years after the outbreak of the war, its origins go back to the autumn of 1939, when 130,000 Palestinian Jews registered as volunteers for military service against the Axis. With the establishment of the state, volunteers of the Jewish units

provided the young Israeli army with a nucleus of experienced officer personnel and veteran fighters. A significant military development took place with the establishment of the Haganah (literally, defense) in 1921. As part of the Yishuv, the Haganah reflected the strains and stresses of its political life, and its formation and early development were accompanied by intra-Zionist debates. While Jabotinski advocated an official Jewish force subject to British command, other leaders of the Yishuv, and particularly those of Achdut Ha'avoda (United Labor Party), were in favor of an unofficial (if necessary, underground) force, independent of the British authorities. At the beginning the Haganah was under the exclusive control of Achdut Ha'avoda; with the establishment of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) it came under the control of the latter, although admission was open to all. In 1931 the non-Histadrut elements (mostly Revisionists) seceded from the Haganah and formed a separate force which remained independent until 1937, when, under the impact of Arab riots (1936-39), it merged with the Haganah and was placed under the control of the Executive of the WZO. The Haganah was managed by a directorate composed of Histadrut and other elements. Under the control of the WZO it soon became the all-but-official army of the Jewish population in Palestine. The Haganah put up resistance to Arab attacks, first in 1921, and later in 1929 and 1936-39. From 1945-47 the

Haganah was the instrument of Zionist policy in bringing and protecting illegal immigrants, survivors of concentration camps, whom the British refused to let into the country. Following the U.N. Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, Haganah moved from the underground into the open and tried to establish control over the area allotted to the Jewish State. In addition there existed the Palmach (Striking Forces). The roots of the Palmach go back to 1938, when the British Army authorized Capt. Orde Wingate to organize special Night Squads trained in night fighting. The Palmach was formed in 1941 as a special unit of the Haganah. In 1942 Palmach members received intensive military training from British officers in forming guerrilla units behind German lines, in the event that Palestine was conquered by the Germans. The Palmach was distinguished by its superior training. From 1943 it was a permanently mobilized unit, with its members stationed in Kibbutzim where they worked for 14 days a month and received training 10 days a month. Palmach members also assisted illegal immigrants in entering Palestine and played an important role during the War of Independence of 1948. The Palmach was an elite corps, both as a fighting force and as a closely knit community which developed into a sub-culture with its own stories,

songs, and myths. In addition to the Haganah and the Palmach, both of them "labor" oriented, two small dissident guerrilla groups existed. The National Military Organization (Irgun), officially affiliated with the Zionist Revisionist party, which opposed the politics of the World Zionist Organization, took shape in 1938, and the more militant Fighters for Israel Freedom (Lechi) was formed in 1940.¹⁹ These organizations challenged the policy of the quasi-government, especially with reference to the British and the Arabs, by demanding a more aggressive approach to replace the official policy of "Havlagah" (literally, "restraint"). They advocated and carried out a policy of retaliation and terror against the Arabs and the British. The more moderate leaders regarded the activities of the dissident groups as irresponsible and harmful and tried to curb them. The "season" is the name given to the period between November, 1944, and August, 1945, when the Haganah went so far as to engage in the policy of turning over Irgun and Lechi members to the British. There were attempts to set up a unified defense force prior to the establishment of the state, and for some months cooperation was developed between the Haganah and the dissident groups. However, this cooperation did not last, and a unified defense force emerged only after the establishment of the state and did not proceed without serious difficulties.

As we have seen, in 1948, with the establishment of the

state, a hodgepodge of military units existed. One of the first steps taken by the government of the newly established state was to depoliticize and unify the various military units through the creation of the Israel Defense Forces as the national army subject to the authority of the government alone. The Israel Defense Forces was created by a special ordinance issued by the Provisional Government on May 26, 1948. The ordinance declared that "Zva Ha'haganah Le'Israel (I.D.F.) is established, consisting of infantry, navy and airforce," and that "it is forbidden to establish any other armed force in addition to Zahal (I.D.F.)."²⁰

Hand in hand with this, the underground armies were declared illegal and had to surrender their weapons and ammunition.²¹ While the ordinance declaring terrorist organizations illegal did not name such groups, a special notice was issued by the Provisional Government on September 20, 1948, stating that "according to regulation No. 8 of the emergency regulations for the prevention of terror, 1948, the Provisional Government decided to declare the group known as the Fighters for Israel's Freedom and the group known as the National Frontier as terrorist organizations."²² The militant groups, although accepting in principle the authority of the government, did not consent to their dissolution easily. They felt that fierce action should be taken in the Jerusalem area to assure Jewish control of the entire city, and they therefore, defying orders, continued

independent action there.

The climax of the struggle between the government and the dissident military units came with the incident of the "Altalena."²³ The Altalena was a ship loaded with military supplies which the Irgun had managed to accumulate abroad and bring to the shores of Israel. The ship arrived during a cease-fire period (in the War of Independence of 1948) which had been declared by the U.N. The government felt that its sovereignty was being challenged. On one level, the ship had violated the government's commitment to observe the cease-fire by bringing arms into the state. But more important, it violated the monopoly of the government over the conduct of military affairs.²⁴ The government demanded the immediate and unconditional surrender of the ship and its cargo, and when this was refused it had the ship blown up.

Another struggle concerning the unification of the military involved the abolition of the Palmach,²⁵ which was an independent unit officially linked with the Haganah. The commanders of the unit wished the Palmach to continue its existence as one of the formations of the Israel Defense Forces, but defense secretary Ben-Gurion decided against it saying that the Palmach was perhaps needed as part of the Jewish underground struggle; however,

"...within a unified army, there cannot exist a separate authority; each soldier is subject to the authority of the state, and only to the authority of the state. The general regulations of the army apply to all units, and the army should not reflect the political and ideological segmentation which exists outside it...Some of the members of

Palmach are still living in the pre-state and pre-national army period, and do not understand that what was justified and useful seven years ago [In 1942] is neither justified nor useful today."²⁶

Ben-Gurion also argued that the Palmach was closely associated with the Achdut Ha'avoda party, and in the name of depolitization it had to be dissolved. He also objected to the idea of a privileged military unit within the I.D.F., insisting that equality among soldiers was essential for morale. Members of the Palmach, on the other hand, felt that its dissolution marked a change in the leading values of the military and in its spirit. The struggle to maintain the Palmach, they argued "...was not a struggle for 'privileges' but a struggle which concerned the social and educational character of the army and its professional level..."²⁷ With the dissolution of the Palmach headquarters, the depolitization of the military and its monopolization by the government was complete.

In Israel the struggle for monopolization was weakened by the dissident groups' acceptance of the legitimacy of the polity. As we saw earlier, the army, despite being organized on a voluntary basis, was under the authority of the WZO and the leaders of the Yishuv. The members of military units considered themselves as instruments for the realization of certain policies and for the protection of the life and property of the people. The military in Israel has never sought to obtain power for itself. The conflicts

emerged basically as a product of the shift from voluntarism and decentralization to centralization and the compulsory authority of the government. The nation's military groups challenged the decision to dissolve them, not the legitimacy of the government.

Redefinition of the Boundaries: The Case of the Status of the Zionist Movement in Israel. As we have seen in the chapter dealing with the development of the Zionist movement, the authoritative pronouncement of the aims of Zionism was made during the first Zionist Congress, which declared that "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."²⁸ The establishment of the state clearly marked the realization of the central dream of Zionism, and a new definition of goals was needed. Moreover, in the pre-state era the World Zionist Organization was organized as a federation of world Jewish communities, and the Yishuv was only one of the communities represented. With the emergence of Israel as an independent state, relations with the WZO had to be redefined. The problem was compounded by the fact that a plurality of executive and financial institutions, affiliated with the WZO and the Jewish Agency, existed and operated in Israel itself, and their jurisdiction overlapped with that of government ministries which had been established to deal with the same spheres of activity.

The need to establish a clear separation of functions between the future sovereign state and the Zionist organizations, was recognized before the establishment of the state. A month before the declaration of independence, the Zionist General Council resolved that after the formation of the provisional government of Israel: "the jurisdiction of the Zionist Executive should comprise settlement, immigration and all related matters including Youth Aliya, Zionist information, organization, propaganda and culture, education in the Diaspora, youth and Hechalutz (pioneering movements), the development of Jerusalem and the National Fund."²⁹ This principle of separation of functions between the state and the Zionist organizations operating within it was confirmed in a somewhat modified form by resolutions of the subsequent sessions of the Zionist General Council in August-September 1948, and by the 23rd Zionist Congress of 1951. In the 23rd Zionist Congress, the first to be held in the State of Israel, general agreement was expressed by state and Zionist leaders that the bond between the state and the movement should continue to exist. It was stated that

"the state of Israel is the product of the aspirations of generations for redemption in the ancestral homeland; the product of the efforts of builders and pioneers, and the blood of fighters and guards from Ha'shomer to Zahal, and the product of the efforts of World Jewry...The political activity of the WZO since the first Zionist Congress in Basel was geared to obtaining international recognition for Zionist programs and for the events in Palestine. It achieved its central goal with the recognition of the state of Israel by the majority of nations and with Israel's acceptance as a full fledged member of the U.N. With the establishment of the state the Israeli

government undertook the responsibility for conducting the nation's affairs and its relations with other countries. This policy...enjoys and will enjoy the full support of the Zionist movement and World Jewry."³⁰

The Congress adopted the "Jerusalem Program," which came to replace the "Basel Program" of 1897, stating that "the task of Zionism is to strengthen the State of Israel, to gather the exiles in the Land of Israel, and to guarantee the unity of the Jewish people."³¹ The Congress also set forth the following program for the WZO: "encouragement of 'Aliya', strengthening of Chalutzit (pioneering) and Hachshara (agricultural training), supreme efforts to enlist funds for the realization of the Zionist aims, promotion of private capital investment in Israel, developing the Jewish consciousness, mobilization of world public opinion of Israel and Zionism, participating in the organization of Jewish communal life on a democratic basis, and the safeguarding of Jewish rights."³² The Congress proposed that the state of Israel enact appropriate legislation recognizing the WZO as the representative body of the Jewish People in all matters involving the organized participation of World Jewry in the development of Israel.

The mutual relations of the state of Israel and the WZO and the Jewish Agency were put on a firm legal basis by the Law of the Status of the World Zionist Organization, the Jewish Agency for Palestine 1952, article 4 of which declares: "The State of Israel recognizes the WZO as the

authorized agency that will continue to operate in the State of Israel for the development and settlement of the country, the absorption of immigrants, and the coordination of the activities in Israel of Jewish institutions and organizations active in those fields."³³ The law draws the line between two different domains, Israel and abroad. The Israeli government is the representative of the people who reside in Israel, and it carries the responsibility for policy and decision-making concerning its citizens. The approval of the government is needed in order for the WZO to operate in Israel. Abroad, however, when dealing with World Jewry, the Israeli government has to work in collaboration with the Zionist Organization.

The details of the status of the WZO and the Jewish Agency and the forms of collaboration between its Executive and the government of Israel were, as provided by article 7 of the above mentioned law, to be determined by a covenant, which was entered into in 1954. The covenant laid down that the government was to "consult the Executive in regard of legislation especially impinging on the functions of the Executive before such legislation is submitted to the Knesset."³⁴ The covenant also redefined the tasks and responsibilities of the Executive, elaborating rather than changing the definitions in the Status Law. For the coordination of joint or related activities of both

partners (the Israeli government and the WZO and the Jewish Agency) a Coordination Board, consisting of an equal number of ministers and executive members, was set up.

The establishment of the State of Israel involved for the WZO not only restatement of its goals but also reorganization of its departments. Some of the departments maintained during the mandatory period were abolished, since their responsibilities were taken over by the government of Israel, among them the Labor Department, the Department of Trade and Industry, the Department of Artisans and Small Trade, and the Maritime Department. The functions of the Political Department were entrusted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The WZO carried out its assigned tasks in Israel mainly through its following departments:³⁵ the Department for Immigration and Absorption of Immigrants, was formed by the amalgamation of the former separate units for immigration, absorption of immigrants, and economy. Its task is to encourage, organize, and carry out immigration to Israel, to take care of the reception of immigrants on their arrival, and to assist them in their economic, social, and cultural absorption. The Youth Aliya Department was established in 1934 to rescue Jewish children from Nazi Germany. After World War II Youth Aliya cared mainly for orphans. During the years of mass immigration of 1948-52

it provided special training and education for immigrant children. The task of the Agriculture and Settlement Department is not only to set up agricultural settlements of various types but to provide the settlers with housing, livestock, and equipment, establish economic and social institutions in the villages, train the settlers, and organize marketing and supplies.

The financial organs of the WZO not only its executive branches had to be regulated as well. This was the case, for example, with the Jewish National Fund (JNF) which was established by the 5th Zionist Congress (1901) to purchase land in Palestine. The land to be bought by the JNF could be neither sold nor mortgaged, thus remaining in perpetuity the property of the Jewish people. The land was to be leased to settlers for 49-year period.

With the establishment of the State, a certain overlap was created in the work of the JNF and of the State of Israel. The issue was first resolved in 1953 when the Law of the Jewish National Fund³⁶ was passed, and later on, in 1960, when the Law of the Lands of Israel³⁷ was legislated. The above provided for two separate bodies: a Government Land Authority headed by the Minister of Agriculture, which was to manage all State and JNF lands in accordance with a unified policy, and a Land Development Authority, set up within the JNF, which was to be in charge of land reclamation and afforestation. Under this arrangement the

JNF remained under the control and authority of the WZO, but its functions vis-a-vis the sovereign state were redefined.

The status granted to the Zionist institutions won the unanimous support of all parties, since basically it maintained the status quo, continuing from the pre-state era, as well as recognizing the WZO and the Jewish Agency in the Mandate for Palestine. Also, the approval was based on a feeling of partnership between the state and the movement and recognition of the important role that the movement had played. The bond between the state and the movement also represented the ties of the state to World Jewry. The only objection was voiced by the Communist Party, which considered this status a sign of American intervention in Israel.³⁸

Our analysis thus far has revealed that one can separate rather clearly the notion of banning of competitive groups from that of the redefinition of boundaries on an analytical plane. However, it is difficult to separate the two empirically. Actually, we could have reversed the case materials and could have discussed the military in Israel with respect to the redefinition of boundaries, and the status of the Zionist movement as an illustration of the banning of competitive groups.

Change from a "Movement Orientation" to a "National Orientation'." In order to demonstrate the differences between the

movement and the national frames of reference, the writings of some key Zionist leaders who represent left-and right-wing ideologies have been investigated. These leaders not only were influential in the articulation of ideas but they occupied key positions in the Zionist arena or in Palestine and later in Israel. Not all of them lived to see the establishment of the state. Jabotinski died in 1940, Berl Katznelson in 1944. Weizmann, who was the first president of the state of Israel, died in 1952. Ben-Gurion is the only one alive at present but he has retired into private life. It is hard to predict what influence the establishment of the state might have had upon those who died prior to that event or shortly thereafter. From their writings it seems clear that Berl Katznelson represented a "movement orientation," while Ben-Gurion and Jabotinski, despite the entirely different ideological traditions they represented, shared a "national orientation". Weizmann shared to some degree in both the movement and the national orientations. These leaders will now be discussed in detail.

Berl Katznelson (1874-1944). Katznelson was a leading organizer and ideologist of the Israeli labor movement. At an early age he became active in Jewish Socialist groups in Russia. In 1909 he settled in Palestine, as a farm laborer, and participated in forming the Agricultural

Workers' Federation. He was one of the founders of Ha'mashbir Ha'merkazi, an agricultural cooperative. After serving in the Jewish Legion during World War I, Katznelson helped to establish the Achdut Ha'avoda party (united labor) in 1919, the General Federation of Labor (Histadrut) in 1920, and the party of Mapai in 1930. In 1925 he founded Davar, the first daily paper of the Palestinian workers' movement, remaining its chief editor until his death. Katznelson was labor's outstanding spokesman in the Yishuv. He perceived national revival as the realization of the ideology of the labor movement. For him the emergence of the state was not an end in itself, but rather a means for realizing the ideal society as pictured by the movement. "Our movement is revolutionary in its fundamental aims," he wrote. "Its social and national aspirations are the full redemption of the nation and the working class; creation of collective work free of exploitation...our special problem is the creation of national community and economy by the working class."³⁹ Katznelson admitted that "Our [the working class'] national consciousness and our class consciousness overlap."⁴⁰ The image of the state to come is clearly that of a working society based on socialism, wherein the various social activities are carried out voluntarily by devoted and ideologically inspired individuals. Fulfillment of this dream can come only through conflict with the "middle class," especially as embodied by the Revisionist

party, which Katznelson accused of failing to understand what national revival meant and of being motivated only by selfish interests. He wrote: "Revisionism to us is totally negative. It manifests a total lack of understanding of the creative work in Palestine, and it is hostile to the labor movement."⁴¹ In other words, national revival was for Katznelson synonymous with the triumph of the labor movement. He openly admitted that "...we [the labor movement] want to become the majority in the Yishuv... when we shall be the majority, we shall have a Zionist president from amongst us..."⁴² Katznelson did not conceive of national revival as involving coexistence of the various groups affiliated with the WZO and local institutions in Palestine.

In his writings, there is no conceptualization of differences between the pre-state and post-state situations. No consideration is given to the possibility that a state might have different objectives than those proposed by the movement, and that a state, unlike a movement, cannot operate on the basis of voluntarism alone. In the midst of World War II, he objected to Dr. Magnes' proposal to establish compulsory military service, arguing that there are certain functions that can be carried out only by devoted individuals, not by those who are compelled to perform them. Katznelson was against the unification of the educational system, which was composed of various

independent segments linked to political parties. "I object to the parties' monopoly in educational matters," he wrote. "...the parents should organize and elect the boards of education. Objecting to this means that one wants to impose himself in educational matters upon the other parts of the Yishuv."⁴³ Katznelson was opposed to centralization in general, arguing that efficiency cannot be achieved through administrative means; rather it depends completely on the spirit and motivation of the people.⁴⁴ He was against "nationalism" in the organizational sense as well, and objected to the external symbols of statehood, regarding ranks, insignia, etc., simply as toys. "What was the essence of Herzl's 'Jewish State'?" he asked. "Was it the distorted image of national decorations, national toys and insignia of the officers and the army? The essence of the Herzelian idea of "state" was that of Jewish masses working and creating forms of government and life."⁴⁵

Vladimir (Zeev) Jabotinski (1880-1940). Jabotinski was a writer, an orator, a poet, and a Zionist leader. In 1908 he was put in charge of several Zionist periodicals published in Constantinople and of Zionist political work there. After the outbreak of World War I, he promoted the idea of a Jewish Legion as part of the British Army and joined it when it was formed. After the war Jabotinski became a member of the Zionist Commission and for a time headed its

political department. In 1921 he joined the Zionist Executive, from which he resigned in 1923, dissatisfied with the politics of the British in Palestine and the lack of resistance on part of Zionist leaders. In 1923 he founded Betar (the Revisionist youth movement); and in 1925 the World Union of Zionist-Revisionists was formed with Jabotinski as president. With the outbreak of World War II, he advocated the creation of a Jewish army to fight Nazi Germany.

Jabotinski's approach has been described by us as "nationalist" in spite of his partisan affiliation as the founder and leader of the Revisionist Zionist Organization.⁴⁶ Although he was considered a spokesman of the middle class, Jabotinski felt that when the good of the corporate group was at stake all sectarian interests must be forgotten. For example, he felt that the economy was not stable enough to survive strikes and called on employees and employers alike to submit labor disputes to compulsory national arbitration, for he felt that when collective goals are at stake, unity is required. He wrote, "Compulsory arbitration means that neither lockout nor strike can be tolerated in a well-ordered process of colonization, neither before the arbitrator's award nor after it. Industrial conflicts should be treated just as all other conflicts in civilization -- something to be solved not by force but by fair trial."⁴⁷ Jabotinski was opposed to the view of the labor

leaders that the foundation of the state must be laid by ideologically inspired and dedicated individuals willing to sacrifice themselves for the future of the people. To him this was an elitist approach. In giving evidence before the Palestine Royal Commission Jabotinski said,

"The conception of Zionism which I have the honour to represent here is based on what I should call the humanitarian aspect. By that I do not mean to say that we do not respect the other, the purely spiritual aspects of Jewish nationalism, such as the desire for self-expression, the rebuilding of a Hebrew culture, or creating some 'model communities of which the Jewish People could be proud. All that, of course, is most important; but as compared with our actual needs and our real position in the World today, all that has rather the character of luxury..."⁴⁸

Anticipating the holocaust, Jabotinski urged WZO leaders to organize mass immigration from European countries into Palestine. Unlike labor leaders, he did not fear that mass immigration would overburden the weak economy and end in mass hunger and poverty, which would disillusion Jews and Gentiles alike. He thought that freedom from fear and persecution could change the masses, straighten their backs, and enable them to contribute their share to national revival. In the spring of 1934, after the rise of Nazism, the Revisionist Zionist Organization organized the "Petition Movement," calling on Jews who wished to immigrate to Palestine to sign petitions addressed to the British Parliament, to the King of England, and to the Polish government. In Poland alone 700,000 Jews signed. One cannot turn back the pages of history, but it is painful to

consider that many Jews might have escaped the holocaust had the WZO, the British Administration, and the European countries taken a different course of action.

Jabotinski also called for greater centralization of government and for the mobilization of resources to achieve national goals, as opposed to the decentralization and voluntarism advocated by Katznelson. For example, he called for the "nationalization" of the money-collecting machinery of the Zionist Organization, proposing that "the 'funds' must, naturally, be 'nationalized'; instead of being controlled by the Old Zionist Organization they must be taken over by the National Assembly..."⁴⁹ The economy, Jabotinski argued, could not be based on small agricultural settlements alone. Industries had to be developed and intensive agricultural techniques adopted, in order to provide employment under conditions of mass immigration. Jabotinski called for greater governmental intervention in protecting the young economy. Unlike Katznelson who spoke about class-struggle, Jabotinski advocated that "...In Palestine, higher and mightier than class-interests, the common interest of rebuilding the Jewish State rules supreme. Consequently, there should be no talk of class-war, a pattern whose harmful tendencies are manifested when one side threatens the other by means of strikes or lockouts..."⁵⁰ In short, Jabotinski was both a movement leader and a national leader, who realized that the achievement of collective goals might require the sacrifice of sectarian interests.

David Ben-Gurion (1886-). Ben-Gurion, a former labor leader, is a Jewish statesman, who is referred to many times as "the Architect" of the state. Immigrating to Palestine in 1906, he helped in 1915 to organize the Hechalutz (the Pioneer), an organization of young Jews who did pioneering work in Palestine. Ben-Gurion was one of the founders of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and also its Secretary General (1921-1935). In 1930 he became the leader of the Palestine Labor Party (Mapai). From 1935 until the establishment of the State in 1948, Ben-Gurion served as chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and in this capacity he assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the politics of the Yishuv and the Zionist movement. With the establishment of the state, he served as its first Prime Minister and its Defense Secretary.

Apart from their widely disparate ideological backgrounds, Ben-Gurion and Jabotinski differed in that Jabotinski did not live to see the establishment of the state, while Ben-Gurion was able to implement his ideas as the leader of the emerging nation. As a labor leader Ben-Gurion had become convinced that the work of dedicated pioneers was essential in paving the way for national revival. However, with the establishment of the state, he argued that there were massive national goals demanding partnership between the various groupings in Israel, on the one hand, and

between the state and World Jewry on the other.

"...the state is the product of the pioneering work of a few decades, and the worker played a central role in this enterprise and headed it. However, now that we have a state and the working class has attained power, we must know that the power of the state alone, or the power of the workers alone, is not sufficient to accomplish our mission. We now need, more than ever, partnership, double partnership, between Israel and World Jewry... and in the state, partnership between the workers and the other creative powers.... The task is so big and so difficult, and time is so pressing, that we are not allowed to ignore the constructive powers which exist outside the working class." ⁵¹

Ben-Gurion was one of the architects of "mamlachtiut" (statehood) in the sense of centralization, the creation of an effective "center," and transcendence of partisan interests. He called for the abolition of what he considered to be political over-segmentation, and he attacked the sectarianism of political parties, saying that

"one of our weaknesses is that we have too many political parties and too much partisanship with relation to the state and its citizens. These are the sources of weakness, shame, and crises; they serve as bad educational examples, hinder the integration of immigrants and the achievement of national unity, distort public opinion, and destroy the democratic foundations of the state....The state and the nation need only two parties: a united labor party, which focuses on the workers, and a conservative party, which considers private enterprise to be the major vehicle for nation-building." ⁵²

Ben-Gurion argued that there were too many political parties, with the unfortunate consequence that the government lacked unified support for its actions, and the parties lacked a sense of collective responsibility, each party seeking to promote its interests through political bargaining.

Ben-Gurion was a crusader for the unification of the military. He fought for the abolition of Palmach, and as the Minister of Defense he did not hesitate to order the destruction of "Altalena" in the name of national unity. He fought for the unification of the segmented educational system, saying,

"I do not believe that parents should have exclusive rights in educational matters, and I do not think that the state should have no say in education, and that the parents can do as they please. The state has to determine a minimal educational goal which will apply to all schools. I assume these common educational materials will include the best traditional values of Judaism and will be guided by the future and present needs of nation-building, security, development, health..."⁵³

He also demanded that the Kibbutzim hire and train new immigrants. On these two issues he was opposed by his own party members, who wanted to maintain their own educational system and regarded hired labor as a violation of one of the most sacred principles of the Kibbutz. Ben-Gurion argued that violating the taboo of hired labor as a means of training new immigrants "...will not destroy the Kibbutz but will rather improve its reputation. Any institution which does not make itself available for the central call of our generation -- that of the ingathering of exiles, will not be able to survive..."⁵⁴

Chaim Weizmann (1874-1952). Weizmann was a chemist, president of the WZO, and the first president of the State of Israel. He began to engage in the Hovevei-Zion movement at an early age. In 1901 Weizmann helped to form the Democratic

Faction within the Zionist movement, a group that emphasized cultural, educational, and practical Palestine settlement activity. At the 9th Zionist Congress (1907) he proposed the notion that political activity to obtain a charter should be supported by constructive pioneering and cultural work in Palestine. In 1916 he moved to London to become director of the Admiralty Laboratory, where his connections with British officials led to the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. In 1920 he was elected president of the WZO, an office which he held during the periods 1920-1931 and 1935-1946. In 1948 Weizmann was elected the first president of the State and held this office until his death in 1952.

Weizmann was not a "movement man" in the strict sense, because he tried to avoid identifying himself with any one party in the Zionist movement. Nevertheless, his ideas of national revival were close to those of the labor movement in the sense that he supported the idea that mass immigration should be preceded by the devoted work of the pioneers. "There are two kinds of immigrants in the world," he argued:

"...the immigrant who bars the way for the next comer, and the immigrant who paves the way for the next. I have very often seen it happen that people ...are very glad to have found a place for themselves and are not too keen to have other people in the same category follow in their footsteps.... In Palestine there is a fundamental difference. The one aim in life of the immigrant who comes here is not only to make himself useful, but to create opportunities for other people to come."⁵⁵

Moreover, Weizmann believed that national funds should create the conditions for the successful operation of private investment: he therefore argued that they should precede the flow of private money into the country.⁵⁶ However, Weizmann did not start his career at the movement level. In 1902, as the leader of the "Democratic Faction" in the WZO, he considered himself to be the spokesman of East European Jewry rather than of any particular sector. Most of Weizmann's activity took place in the Zionist arena. He was the president of the WZO and was valued for his efforts to influence members of the British administration to support the idea of a Jewish state.

Although Weizmann was the first president of Israel, this was essentially an honorary position, not a powerful one. Weizmann's orientation cannot be regarded as sectarian. However, we did not classify his approach strictly as "national" because there is no conflict in his writings between movement and nation. This may have been because he stood outside the sectarian struggle in Israel, his chief attention being focused upon the organization of World Jewry and his role as interceder with the British government. The positions of the leader and of his ideas seem to be interrelated. Certain positions apparently enable their occupants to adopt a broader approach to the various issues than to others. It is difficult, however, to determine whether the approach determines the selection of a leader for a position, or vice-versa.

Overall it seems that Katznelson was opposed to monopolization (as involving the banning of competitive groups, and the redefinition of boundaries), advocating pluralism and voluntarism, while Ben-Gurion and Jabotinski were in favor of monopolization. The view point of Weizmann on this issue was not clearly expressed, but it seems logical to assume that it would be closer to the position taken by Ben-Gurion and Jabotinski than to that taken by Katznelson.

Summary

In this chapter, monopolization has been discussed as the shift of a movement from the periphery of society into its central zone. In the central zone of society the polity has a monopolistic position.

The major dimensions of monopolization that have been discussed are: the banning of competitive groups, the redefinition of boundaries, and the development of leadership capable of thinking in terms of "national" categories transcending partisan interests.

The structural aspects of monopolization and its dimensions have been demonstrated through the analysis of selected cases from the Israeli experience which are illustrative of our theoretical arguments.

Monopolization is only one of the central processes which operate during the institutionalization of nationalist movements. As such, it does not operate in isolation. The

relation of monopolization to the other processes that will be analysed will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

NOTES

1. Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery," in The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays presented to Michael Polanyi (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), pp. 117-131.
2. Ibid., p. 117.
3. Ibid., p. 119.
4. Shils does not formally define the "periphery," nor does he analyse it explicitly. By implication, however, the periphery seems to be composed of actors, non-elite members who are located at various distances from the "center" and who accept the legitimacy of the existing distribution of roles and rewards on the basis of the central value system, which, according to Shils, is located at the "center." The attitudes of the "periphery" to the "center" range between hyper-affirmation of some of the major central values to an extreme denial of the center's components, Ibid., p. 118.
5. Robert L. Bishop, "Monopoly," in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan Co. & Free Press, 1968), X, p. 458.
6. Ibid., p. 458.
7. Talcott Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 289.
8. Ibid., pp. 287-88.
9. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

10. Ibid., p. 276.
11. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 154.
12. Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927), pp. 127, 156.
13. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: W. W. Norton, 1938), p. 179.
14. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 482.
15. For a definition and analysis of a sect, see Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921), p. 872.
16. Weber, op. cit., p. 407.
17. Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 597.
18. Ibid., I, p. 618.
19. J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 365.
20. Yehezkel Dror and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.), The Government of Israel (Jerusalem: The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, 1961), p. 526, Articles 1 and 4.
21. The dissident groups were declared illegal in the Provisional Government, Official Gazette No. 22 of September 20, 1948.

22. Ibid., No. 22 of September 20, 1948.
23. Our analysis of the "Altalena" case is based on:
David Niv, Maarachot Ha'Irgun Ha'zvai Ha'Leumi (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Mosad Klausner, 1965). Shmuel Katz, Days of Fire (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Karni Publications, 1966). David Ben-Gurion, Behilachem Am (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Mapai publication, 1950), pp. 165-66.
Yigal Alon, Maarachot Palmach (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Ha'kibbutz Ha'meuchad, 1965), p. 244. Eliyahu Lankin, The Story of Altalena (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Hadar publications, 1967). (Lankin was the commander of the ship). Menachem Begin, Ba'machteret (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Hadar Publications, 1959).
24. This represents the version of the leadership. According to Katz, op. cit., pp. 387, 403, who tells the Revisionist side of the story, the Irgun had reached an agreement whereby 20 per cent of the arms would go to the Irgun members in the Jerusalem area. The destruction of the ship is explained by Katz as the result of the government's fear that the Irgun would become strengthened and constitute a threat to the power position of the leaders. Either way, the issue has clearly been that of the banning of competitive groups.
25. Our analysis of the Palmach is based on: David Ben-Gurion, Zava U'bitachon (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Zahal,

Maarachot Publications, 1955), p. 94. Yigal Alon, op. cit. David Ben-Gurion, Be'hilachem Am (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Mapai Publications, 1950), p. 158. Zrubavel Giladi (ed.), Sefer Ha'palmach (Tel-Aviv: Ha'kibbutz Ha'meuchad, 1956).

26. Sefer Ha'palmach, op. cit., p. 984.
27. Ibid., p. 79.
28. Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, op. cit., I, p. 114.
29. Ibid., I, p. 613.
30. The 23rd Zionist Congress stenographic report.
(Jerusalem: The Zionist Council, 1951), p. 584.
31. Ibid., p. 583.
32. Ibid., p. 583.
33. Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1952), p. 2.
34. Covenant between the Government of Israel and the Jewish Agency, Session of the Zionist General Council, Jerusalem, July 21-29, 1954. (Jerusalem: Organization Department of the Zionist Executive, 1954), pp. 106-108.
35. Based on: Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel, op. cit., I, p. 615.

CHAPTER 5

LEGITIMATION

Legitimation and monopolization have traditonally been dealt with as two processes which occur simultaneously, or as two aspects of the same process. For example, Parsons' analysis of political power¹ suggests that when a voter "deposits" his power to elect a leader, he simultaneously grants the leader permission to use this "deposited" power. According to Weber, one of the basic characteristics of a state is the ability of its leadership to "...successfully uphold a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical power in the enforcement of its order."² In other words monopoly, by definition refers to the exclusive use of legitimate power.

There have, however, been attempts analytically to separate monopolization and legitimation. The most explicit of such effort has been that of Ferrero, who writes: "Legitimacy...is preceded by a preparatory condition, which may be called prelegitimacy. Prelegitimacy is legitimacy still in its cradle. Every government begins by being a government that had not yet won, but was attempting to win..."³ Consequently, Ferrero argues, "...during the period of prelegitimacy, the principle of legitimacy, instead of supporting the government, needs to be supported by it against the open or concealed opposition it encounters".⁴ According to this analysis it follows, logically and empirically, that

legitimation and monopolization do not have to overlap. As an example, Ferrero discusses the Weimar Republic. Since a large part of the German population refused to accept the democratic form of legitimacy on which the Republic was based, Ferrero considers it to have been a prelegitimized regime. In other words, its leadership obtained a monopolistic position without the regime's legitimacy having been established. A government in exile could serve as another example, since it might be considered by a people as a legitimate government, although one obviously lacking a monopolistic power position. In the case of the Weimar Republic, legitimation was supposed to follow monopolization, whereas in the case of a government in exile, legitimation precedes monopolization. We shall follow Ferrero in arguing that the period of institutionalization of a nationalist movement is a period of prelegitimacy. It is, therefore a period in which the polity is intensively engaged in attempting to build and reinforce its claim for monopoly.

Legitimation is a twofold process. On the one hand it involves ".../the/ justification of power, that is of the right to rule /our emphasis/,⁵ and on the other hand it involves ".../the/ claim of the ruling power for obedience /our emphasis/." In other words, from the leader's point of view, legitimation represents an attempt "...to establish

a basis on which he is trusted by a 'constituency', in the symbolic sense /Our emphasis/ of this discussion..."⁷

In other words, the trust should be independent of the direct use of power and threat. From the constituency point of view, legitimation involves a commitment to comply. It follows that legitimacy actually sets the boundaries to the ability of the polity to exercise power, to make decisions and to carry out policies. It also follows that delegitimation would necessitate the increased use of coercive means in order to restore the compliance of the constituency.⁸

The Major Dimensions of Legitimation in the Nation-State

Our analysis of the major dimensions of legitimation constitutes a modification of the Weberian approach. According to Weber, "Action, especially social action which involves social relations, may be oriented by the actor /Our emphasis/ to a belief in the existence of a 'legitimate order'."⁹ The perception of an order as a "legitimate order" can be by virtue of tradition, or a belief in the legitimacy of what has always existed; by virtue of affectual attitudes; by virtue of a rational belief in the absolute value of the social order, and by virtue of the fact that the order has been established in a manner that is recognized as legal.¹⁰ Weber clearly stresses the constituency's point of view in discussing "legitimate order" as a subjective phenomenon whose existence depends on the

perception and motives of the constituency. We propose to study the dimensions of legitimation mainly from the vantage point of the leadership.

These dimensions are: The value dimension, the legal dimension, the charismatic-personal dimension, the pragmatic dimension, or the success or failure of the leadership to respond adequately to various problems.

The Value Dimension. According to Parsons, "Value implies a code or a standard which has some persistence through time, or, more broadly put, which organizes a system of action. Values, conveniently and in accordance with receiving usage, place things, acts, ways of behavior, goals of action on the approval-disapproval continuum."¹¹ In "normal" situations, values are taken for granted and serve as an important element in the organization of social action. However, as Eisenstadt observes,¹² the values and symbols of society are especially articulated on those occasions most clearly related to individual and collective "rite of passage," or periods of crisis, transition, and change. Such periods are characterized by confusion and insecurity. In order to restore the solidarity and cohesion of the collectivity, and the security and sense of direction of individuals, ceremonial occasions are held, during which the symbols and central values are articulated and reaffirmed.

We argue that the period of institutionalization can

be considered as a "rite of passage" from the point of view of both the leadership and the constituency. For the leaders, institutionalization marks a transition from a position of marginality to a central position in society. As leaders of a movement they enjoy the approval of their disciples. However, as leaders of a nation they cannot take it for granted that compliance will be forthcoming. As leaders of a movement their legitimacy is based on the negation of existing values and institutions and on the articulation of a future vision of society. Persons who become the leaders of a nation-state have to win over the various segments of the population and retain the approval of their disciples in spite of the change in their position and in the bases for their claim to legitimacy. The situation produces considerable insecurity on the part of the leadership.

The emergence of a nation-state also marks a "rite of passage" from the point of view of the constituency. It involves the transformation of loyalties from kinship, tribal, and class units to a new social entity. This involves the introduction of new relations and modes of behavior that cannot be adequately guided by the old systems of values and symbols. The values that have been held as ultimate and irrefutable suddenly prove to be inadequate. Such creates a strong sense of insecurity and loss of sense of direction.

It is therefore not surprising that new regimes engage intensively in various ceremonial activities. Declarations are made, the symbols of national unity -- the flag, emblem and anthem -- are formed, parades are held, etc. The contribution of ceremonial behavior and rites in the development of an esprit de corps in social movements was recognized by Blumer, who recognized that "The value of mass meetings, rallies, parades, huge demonstrations and commemorative ceremonies has been apparent to those entrusted with the development of a social movement: the value is one that comes from large assemblages, in the form of the sense of vast support that is experienced by the participants."¹³ In addition to developing an esprit de corps, these ceremonial occasions have a variety of purposes: articulation of the central value system of society and the symbols of national unity, defining the new polity as custodians of the value system, and creating a "value orientation" or "value commitment" on the part of the constituency to the new value-system. According to Parsons, "Value orientation refers to those aspects of the actor's orientation which commit him to the observance of certain norms, standards, criteria of selection, whenever he is in a contingent situation which allows (and requires) him to make a choice."¹⁴ In terms of this approach, the value aspect of legitimation involves the attempt of the leaders to articulate the central value system as part of their attempt to build and reinforce their

claim for monopolization of the use of power.

The Legal Dimension. In addition to constituting a political unit, the modern nation-state represents a legal order. This holds first in the sense that the nation-state has its roots in international law, and its claim to legitimacy rests to a great extent upon recognition by other nations. Secondly, the legal system serves as one of the most important regulative mechanisms within the nation-state, especially with reference to the interrelations of the polity and the constituency. "In a nation-state each citizen stands in direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country in contrast with the medieval polity in which the direct relation is enjoyed only by the great men of the realm. Therefore, a core element of nation-building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens."¹⁵ The existence of a legal system is involved in the definition of a modern nation-state. And is in fact one of the basic characteristics distinguishing it from other types of social order. This system is usually defined via a constitution or some other legal arrangement created for the organization and regulation of the political sphere. Such arrangements serve as guidelines to the polity and to the citizens in their interrelations with one another, and as a basis for legitimizing the polity's use of power.

The legal and the value aspects of legitimation are not mutually exclusive. The value system sets the general

direction for the development of the legal system, and the adequacy of the legal system is measured in part by its conformity with the central value system of society. However, since they represent two different levels of regulative mechanisms, it seems plausible to deal with them separately.

The Charismatic-Personal Dimension. We mentioned earlier that the period of the emergence of nation-states is a time of transition and change and is marked by insecurity on the part of the leadership and the constituency alike. "...charismatic leadership occurs most frequently in emergencies, it is associated with a collective excitement through which masses of people...surrender themselves to a heroic leader."¹⁶ Where the value and legal systems are still in the process of emergence, it seems logical to assume that a leader's "charisma" plays an important role in the acceptance of his regime as legitimate. While the personality of the leader has relevance in "normal" situations as well, extra weight is attached to factors of personality during periods of change and insecurity.

The Pragmatic Dimension. The pragmatic factor in legitimacy is often overlooked. Yet, the performance of the leadership in responding to everyday problems, as judged by the constituency, is an important element in legitimation. At times, performance may carry more weight than the other elements of

legitimation. For example, in 1966 Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown by a military coup basically because of his inability to cope with the country's economic crisis despite of his charismatic qualities and his reputation as the founder of the nation.

Leaders of movements who have become the heads of nations often find it difficult to adopt a pragmatic approach to issues. For leadership in a movement requires a certain degree of utopian orientation -- that is what is important is the articulation of ideas in the abstract, and not in the implementation of those ideas. Thus the translation of these abstract principles into policies is a difficult task. Also, the transition to leadership of a nation requires response to a wide range of new issues, and the fulfillment of the needs of the various segments that were not part of the movement. Such requires abandonment of the sectarian approach and the adoption of a more universalistic one that transcends partisan interests.¹⁷ In the final analysis the ability of the polity to respond adequately to emerging problems seems to be crucial in the legitimation of a regime, and in its attaining the support and approval of the constituency.

Processes of Legitimation in Israel

The Value Dimension... Establishing the value aspect of legitimation was facilitated in the case of Israel by the

existence of two factors -- Zionism and religion -- which served as a common denominator. Since immigrants were motivated by Zionist ideology, the Jewish population of Palestine in the pre-independence period could be considered to have been established by a process of self-selection. However, beyond the acceptance of Zionism in its broad sense, sharp differences prevailed with respect to the actual image of the state and the values on which it should be based. These imagined orders ranged from a primary socialistic to a capitalistic order, from a theocratic to a purely secular one. Images varied from that of a Jewish state embracing all of historic Palestine including present day Jordan, to a bi-national Jewish-Arab state in Western Palestine.

In order to avoid conflicts and splits in a period when national unity was still in its cradle, the articulation of the central value-system remained on a very general level, focussing on elements concerning which general consensus existed.¹⁸ The central values of the state were first explicitly formulated in the Declaration of Independence.¹⁹ The declaration begins by stressing the right of Jews to self determination, emphasizing that historically there has existed a cultural, spiritual, and national bond between the people and the land which has never been forgotten. The declaration also mentions the fact that the right of Jews to self-determination had been recognized by the

United Nations, and it calls upon the nations of the world to recognize the newly born state.

The basic image that emerges in the Declaration of Independence is that of a state based on "...liberty, justice and peace; on social and political equality of all citizens regardless of religion, race or sex. On that guarantees freedom of language, religion and conscience, freedom of education and culture; a country which respects and protects the sacred places of all religions, and which abides by the principles of the United Nations charter."²⁰ In other words, Israel emerges as a democratic state. However, beyond these very broad principles, which can actually apply to any democratic state, there is no articulation of the more specific aspects of the state.

A second priority of the new polity was to adopt a national flag and an emblem. In October 1948, the Flag and Emblem Law²¹ was adopted, describing those symbols of national unity and independence, and stating clearly their uses and misuses. It was not feasible to hold mass meetings, rallies, and parades, inasmuch as the state was attacked by its Arab neighbors immediately after its establishment. This war, in a way, provided a shared experience of defending the existence of the collectivity, an experience that is ultimately based upon identification with the values and the symbols of the state.

The leadership of the new state did not encounter

difficulties in associating itself with the central value system. As we have seen, the polity was formed by the leaders of the local institutions of Knesset Israel and the leaders of the Zionist institutions in Palestine. These persons had long been associated with Zionist ideology and national revival.

The Legal Dimension. The legal system began to develop only with the establishment of the state. Unlike other institutional spheres, which were developed and organized by the Jewish population even before the establishment of the state, the making of laws and the enforcement of laws were exclusively in the hands of the British.²² The only exception was that the rabbinical courts were given "exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce, alimony and confirmation of wills of members of their community rather than foreigners as defined in Article 9."²³ Also, the rabbinical courts had "exclusive jurisdiction over any case as to the constitution or internal administration of the Wakf [the Jewish community as a religious entity] or religious endowment constituted before the Rabbinical Court according to the Jewish law."²⁴

With the establishment of the state, the sovereign government took upon itself the exclusive right to legislate and implement laws. The emergence of an independent legal system resulted in a drastic improvement in the social status of lawyers,

which had not been very high in the pre-state period compared to some other professions.²⁵ The first legislative action of the new government was known as Minshar.²⁶ In order to avoid a period of legal "vacuum," this document declared that the legal system that had existed in Palestine prior to May 14, 1948 (the date on which the state was declared) would remain in effect so long as it did not contradict the establishment of the state and other related issues. This legal system, which represented a combination of Ottoman and British legislation, was to gradually be replaced by Israeli legislation.

In the absence of a constitution, the governmental institutions were regulated in the beginning by ad hoc laws. There were, for example, so called Transitional Laws²⁷ which regulated the transition from one Knesset (Parliament) to another when its term expired. Later on, the decision was reached that the Israeli constitution should emerge out of a set of "basic laws" to be gradually legislated. Through the years such laws have gradually replaced the ad hoc laws and today the Cabinet (Memshala), the Knesset, and the Presidency are regulated by them. These laws provide the legal basis upon which the legitimation of the polity rests.

The Charismatic-Personal Dimension. The personality of the leaders and their "charisma" have no doubt contributed to national unity and to the legitimation of the polity in Israel. The central leadership consisted of people who earned

the respect and trust of the people through their activities on the local scene in Palestine and/or through their activities in the Zionist arena.

Ben-Gurion was one of the central figures who was considered a charismatic leader. One reason for his reputation is to be found in his long association with Zionist ideology and activities. As early as 1904, Ben-Gurion joined the Poale Zion in Poland, and became active during that period in opposing any territorial solution of the Jewish problem outside Palestine. Immigrating to Palestine in 1906, he joined Ben-Zvi (who later became the second president of Israel) in 1910 in editing He'achdut, the Poale Zion periodical. In 1913 Ben-Gurion attended the eleventh Zionist Congress in Vienna and was elected to the Central Committee of Poale Zion.

Arriving in New York in 1915, Ben-Gurion and Ben-Zvi set out to organize He'chalutz, an organization of young Jews who would do pioneering work in Palestine. In 1918 he supported the recruiting in the United States of a Jewish Legion that was to be part of the British Army and fight on the Palestinian front against the Turks. He himself enlisted in this battalion. While still a soldier, Ben-Gurion was active in campaigning for the formation of a united labor party. His initiative led to a conference at which Poale Zion and nonaffiliated laborists joined in forming the new party of Achdut Ha'avoda in 1919. With the merger of Achdut

Ha'avoda and Ha'poel Ha'zair in 1930, he became the leader of the Palestine Labor Party (Mapai).

Ben-Gurion was also one of the founders of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and served as its Secretary General during the years 1921-1935. From 1935 until the establishment of the State in 1948, Ben-Gurion served as the chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency in Palestine, and in that capacity he assumed an increasingly important role in shaping the policies of the Yishuv and of the Zionist movement.

When the British policy of appeasing the Arabs culminated in the anti-Zionist White Paper of 1939, which aimed at reducing the Yishuv to the status of a permanent minority within an Arab-dominated Palestinian state, Ben-Gurion led an uncompromising opposition to this policy. At the outbreak of World War II, however, he advocated an all-out mobilization of the Yishuv for the Allied war effort and the formation of Jewish units in the British Army. His policy was "to combat the anti-Zionist White Paper as though there was no war, and to fight the Germans on the side of England as though there was no White Paper."²⁸ After the war, recognizing that the British would not implement the Balfour Declaration as provided in the Mandate for Palestine, Ben-Gurion saw the establishment of a Jewish state as the major objective of Zionist policy. When it became apparent that the British Labor government, which assumed office in

in 1945, was bent on enforcing the White Paper, Ben-Gurion initiated a resistance policy that in the first stages assumed the form of promoting illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine. When the British reacted vehemently against illegal immigration and employed force to prevent it, Ben-Gurion went so far as to authorize the Haganah to cooperate with the Revisionist dissident groups, Etzel and Lechi, and to mount a country-wide attack upon British installations.

It is through these activities that Ben-Gurion came to be associated with Zionist ideology and national revival, and with the struggle for independence. His long-standing links to the Zionist movement and his activities in Palestine provided him with the necessary political bases for taking over the leadership in Israel. It is, therefore, not surprising that on May 14, 1948, he chaired the session of the People's Council, read the Proclamation of Independence, and assumed the office of Prime Minister, as well as of Defense Minister, in the Provisional Government in Israel. Following the elections to the First Knesset (1949), he headed a coalition government and held the offices of Prime Minister and of Minister of Defense, until his first retirement in 1953. In 1955 he was called from his retreat at the Kibbutz of Sde-Boker to serve as Minister of Defense, and following the elections he again assumed the premiership and the post of Minister of Defense until his final retirement in 1963.

Ben-Gurion was also valued as a scholar and as an intellectual combining Jewish scholarship with general philosophy. A prolific writer and publicist, he published a number of studies on the Jewish labor movement and on the revival of Israel. Ben-Gurion devoted much of his time to historical studies, and he stressed the importance of the Bible as the principal source of inspiration and guidance for the nascent Jewish culture in Israel. He also published a study of the classical Greek language and literature as well as a study on Indian philosophy.

Ben-Gurion's reputation and achievements were in no small measure made possible by his undisputed leadership and control of Mapai (the dominant party in Israeli politics) at least until the Lavon Affair in the early 60's. His position in the Jewish Agency also provided him with a power basis. Ben-Gurion's uncompromising firmness where the public good was concerned, his association with Zionist ideology and with national revival, and his eminence as a scholar and as a labor leader, were integral parts of his "charismatic" reputation, and enabled him to carry out many controversial policies. As we saw earlier in this work, Ben-Gurion with firmness, and in the teeth of opposition from both left and right, eliminated the dissident armed units Lechi and Etzel, and abolished the special status enjoyed by the Palmach. He was the one who ordered the destruction of "Altalena" in his capacity as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, and he was the one who fought for

unification of the military and of the educational system, sometimes against the opposition of his own party members. Ben-Gurion's foreign policy was also criticized. The ties he established with West Germany in 1960 were opposed by many Israelis, many of whom had escaped the Nazi holocaust.

Ben-Gurion became almost a father figure to many Israelis who worried what might happen when "the old man" went. He is referred to many times as the architect of the State. This reputation no doubt helped him in his struggles to create an effective "center," to strengthen the legitimation of the polity, and to establish institutions.

The Pragmatic Dimension. The initial legitimation of the polity was constantly reinforced by its ability to respond adequately to the numerous problems that confronted the new state.

The first problem was that of sheer survival. The state's existence was threatened immediately after the declaration of independence by the invasion of the armies of seven Arab states. Israel's victory in the subsequent wars of 1956 and 1967 served to strengthen the trust of the people in the polity and thus contributed to its legitimation.

Another major problem which confronted the new state was that of the absorption of mass immigration most of which lacked Zionist motivation. The flood of new arrivals doubled the Jewish population during the first four years of 1948-51, with immigration reaching its peak in 1949 when 240,000

TABLE 4
NATIONAL INCOME* PER CAPITA (IL)

<u>Year</u>	<u>National Income Per-Capita</u>
1952	570
1953	685
1954	862
1955	1,036
1956	1,184
1957	1,286
1958	1,417
1959	1,578
1960	1,713
1961	1,956
1962	2,190
1963	2,555
1964	2,850
1965	3,345
1966	3,553
1967	3,582
1968	4,100
1969	4,512

*National income is being defined (Ibid., p. 1, XXXVII)
as: "the sum total of income supplied by residents to pro-
duction factors before the reduction of direct taxes."

Source: Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel
(Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), pp. 136-137.

TABLE 5

Ownership of Durable Goods

Commodity and Period	No. of Families (thousands)	%	Commodity and Period	No. of Families (thousands)	%
<u>Gas range for cooking and baking</u>			<u>Electric washing machine</u>		
1958 ii	168	35.0	1968 ii	44	9.1
1960 vii-ix	306	59.3	1960 vii-ix	82	15.8
1965 vii-ix	527	85.5	1965 vii-ix	176	28.5
1967 vii-ix	556	84.3	1967 vii-ix	209	31.8
1968 vii-ix	599	85.5	1968 vii-ix	247	35.2
1969 vii-ix	617	88.0	1969 vii-ix	271	38.7
<u>Electric range for cooking and baking</u>			<u>Vacuum cleaner</u>		
1969 vii-ix	261	37.2	1963 vii-ix	52	8.7
<u>Electric refrigerator</u>			1964 vii-ix	61	10.3
1958 ii	164	34.0	1965 vii-ix	85	13.8
1960 vii-ix	242	46.8	1967 vii-ix	119	18.1
1965 vii-ix	479	77.6	1968 vii-ix	135	19.2
1967 vii-ix	546	82.9	1969 vii-ix	148	21.2
1968 vii-ix	600	85.6	<u>Sewing machine</u>		
1969 vii-ix	621	88.6	1969 vii-ix	263	37.6
<u>Mixer</u>			<u>Telephone</u>		
1962 vii-ix	53	9.2	1969 vii-ix	217	31.0
1964 vii-ix	86	14.4	<u>TV set</u>		
1965 vii-ix	109	17.7	1965 vii-ix	14	2.4
1967 vii-ix	143	21.8	1966 vii-ix	22	3.4
1968 vii-ix	153	21.8	1967 vii-ix	32	4.9
1969 vii-ix	185	26.4	1968 vii-ix	74	10.5
			1969 vii-ix	210	30.0

(continued)

(continued)

Ownership of Durable Goods

Commodity and Period	No. of Families (thousands)	%	Commodity and Period	No. of Families (thousands)	%
<u>Gramophone</u>			<u>Private car</u>		
1959 viii	60	11.8	1962 vii-ix	23	4.1
1960 vii-ix	72	13.9	1964 vii-ix	41	6.9
1965 vii-ix	137	22.2	1965 vii-ix	47	7.7
1967 vii-ix	161	24.4	1967 vii-ix	85	13.3
1968 vii-ix	179	25.6	1968 vii-ix	92	13.1
1969 vii-ix	188	26.8	1969 vii-ix	110	13.9
<u>Tape recorder</u>			<u>Commercial vehicle</u>		
1963 vii-ix	19	3.2	1968 vii-ix	17	2.4
1964 vii-ix	23	3.9	1969 vii-ix	28	4.1
1965 vii-ix	41	6.7			
1967 vii-ix	60	9.2			
1968 vii-ix	64	9.2			
1969 vii-ix	82	11.6			
<u>Radio (incl. transistor)</u>					
1969 vii-ix	630	89.7			
<u>Camera</u>					
1969 vii-ix	174	24.8			

Source: Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), pp. 183-184.

TABLE 6

Main Branches of Israel's Industry

Branch	No. of Enterprises		No. of Workers Employed		Gross Output in Thou-
	1946	1958*	1946	1958*	sands of Israeli Pounds
Processing of food-stuffs, tobacco & beverages	392	1,380	7,100	25,000	420,000
Textiles	(	1,020	(	16,000	310,000
Clothing	(530	1,070	(13,100	9,000	120,000
Metal, engineering and electrical goods	449	1,610	8,800	30,000	380,000
Woodworking	210	1,000	2,620	8,000	90,000
Diamond working	38	180	2,110	5,000	60,000
Tanning and leather	144	370	11,900	4,000	30,000
Chemicals, pharmaceuticals, colors	154	260	1,480	10,000	110,000
Building materials, glass, ceramics	146	330	4,800	12,000	70,000
Rubber and plastic products	11	150	160	7,000	60,000
					(continued)

(continued)

Main Branches of Israel's Industry

Branch	No. of Enterprises		No. of Workers Employed		Gross Output in Thou-
	1946	1958*	1946	1958*	sands of Israeli Pounds
Paper, cardboard and printing	190	460	2,650	10,000	40,000
Mining (including Dead Sea products)	(	115	(	9,000	140,000
Various	(183	540	(2,240	6,000	70,000
	(		(		
Total	2,447	8,485	46,960	151,000	1,900,000

* Estimates based on "sampling" census taken by the Central Bureau of Statistics and on figures published by The Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

** 1946 output is not comparable with that of 1958.

Source: A. Marcus, Industry in Israel (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest," 1959), p. 17.

TABLE 7
VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
(IL. Million at current prices)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Grand Total</u>
1948/49	44.4
1949/50	56.3
1954/55	377.4
1959/60	749.8
1964/65	1,354.8
1966/67	1,614.8
1967/68	1,755.1
1968/69	1,882.2

Source: Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), p. 324.

immigrants entered the state.²⁹ The immigrant population in the state period consisted of hundreds of thousands of refugees who had either escaped the European holocaust or fled from Arab countries in Asia and Africa. Most of the immigrants had no means at all, and the government (with the help of the Jewish Agency and World Jewry) had to assume the entire responsibility and cost of their absorption. This included the creation of housing facilities, jobs, and the supply of foods and services. Since most of the immigrants came from traditional societies, the legal and value bases of legitimation did not mean much to them. The success on the pragmatic level of the government is indicated by the fact that although immigration could have drastically changed the power relations in Israel it did not do so to a significant extent. This continuity in the power structure occurred despite the growth of the population from 650,000 in 1948 to 1,404,000 in 1951, and to 2,435,000 in 1968.³⁰

Economic development and growth was another major issue confronting the Israeli polity. The costs of the absorption of mass immigration and maintaining an adequate defense force called for immediate economic solution. The government responded successfully to the resulting economic pressures. The real per capita income (adjusted for price change) rose at an average of 5 to 6 per cent annually during most years of Israel's existence.³¹ (See Table 4). This rate

of growth was one of the highest among both developed and undeveloped countries. From the mid-1950's on, Israel began to show all the characteristics of a country with rapidly rising personal incomes. And as a result a rise in the standard of living. One of the significant indications of the rapid growth was the widespread acquisition of household appliances and durable goods. (See Table 5) Amenities virtually unknown in the early 1950's became prevalent and in some cases (for example, radios and gas ranges) reached near-saturation. The proportion of Jewish families owning radios rose from 80 per cent in 1959 to 91 per cent in 1965; of those owning electric refrigerators from 37 per cent in 1958 to 84 per cent in 1965; gas ranges and cooking stoves, from 38 per cent to 90 per cent, and washing machines, from 10 to 31 per cent.³² The refrigerator, the first major appliance to become a mass consumption item, practically eliminated the old-fashioned icebox. Ownership of other appliances (including electric mixers, vacuum cleaners, air conditioners, television sets, etc.) also increased, particularly in the 1960's, but it embraced only a relatively small share of the families in the country (5 to 20 per cent).³³ Two other indicators of the standard of living -- ownership of the cars and telephones -- also showed substantial increases, even though these "luxury items" were subject to heavy taxes or fees. The number of cars owned per 1,000 inhabitants rose from 6.0 in March 1951,

to 11.4 in March, 1960, and to 34.8 in December of 1966. The number of direct telephone lines increased annually by 8,000 in the 1950's, by 16,000 in 1961-64, and by 35,000³⁴ in 1965-66.

The rise in the absolute level of private consumption and particularly the ownership of appliances embraced all sections of the population regardless of ethnic origin or length of residence in Israel. The percentage of Afro-Asian immigrant families who owned refrigerators increased from 8 per cent in 1958 to 67 per cent in 1965; those who owned gas ranges, from 14 to 85 per cent; and those who owned washing machines increased from 3 to 23 per cent. By comparison, the percentage of European-American immigrant families who owned gas ranges rose from 49 to 92 per cent, while Israeli-born families who owned gas ranges increased from 51 to 96 per cent.³⁵

The fact that the rise in the standard of living embraced almost all segments of the Israeli population was of great importance to the legitimation of the polity.

This rise of the standard of living was made possible by the rapid growth of the economy (See Tables 6 and 7). Israel's economic growth was one of the world's highest. According to Israel's Economic Planning Authority, in the period between 1950-67, the real gross national product (GNP), or the total value of goods and services produced at constant prices, rose at an annual average of 9.3 per cent.

Only a very few countries, notably Japan, exceeded this growth rate during the entire period. This record of economic growth can be attributed to four factors: A growing labor force, full employment, high rate of investment in capital goods (i.e., factories, machinery, and power plants), and the rising productivity of both labor and capital.

The civilian labor force grew from 450,000 in 1950 to 927,000 in 1967.³⁶ Although a large part of the labor force consisted of new immigrants, many of them initially untrained for the job requirements of a modern industrial economy, there was little unemployment, particularly during the years 1955-65. From May 15, 1948, to the end of 1951, 685,000 immigrants arrived in Israel, well over half of the total number that had come as of the end of 1967 (1,253,000).³⁷ Unemployment reached a high of 11.3 per cent in 1953 but then declined almost steadily until 1964.

The increase in the input of labor was accompanied by a proportionately greater increase in the input of capital goods. Productive capital stock per gainful employer worker increased fourfold between 1950 and 1967. During this period gross investments totaled IL 32,300,000,000 (at 1966 prices); about one-third of the total investment was in housing.³⁸

About two-thirds of the growth in output resulted from an expansion in the inputs of labor and capital, and one-third from the steady improvement in the productivity of the

labor force. The greater efficiency was the result of better management, higher skills, large units of production, improved technology, and a higher rate of utilization of plant capacity. It was also due to improvements in the outside services to enterprises such as transportation and communication, power supply, finance, and marketing facilities.

The government was also engaged in providing social security and welfare services. One of the ways in which minimum living standards have been assured for the majority of the population is the provision of adequate housing at reasonable cost. During the years 1948-66 the government built 375,000 permanent housing units; it was responsible for three-quarters of residential construction in the 1950's and for two-thirds in the first half of 1960's.³⁹ The policy has been to enable both immigrants and veteran residents to buy government-built and other housing through easy-term state financed mortgages or a combination of government and bank loans, with the result that a large part of the population owns its housing, mostly apartments. New immigrants and low-income families have rented government housing at modest rates.

To be sure, Israel is still far from being economically independent, even though the economy has grown significantly. Actually, much of the strength of the economy has resulted from the ability of the Israeli polity to establish and

sustain its legitimacy on the world scene. Israeli foreign policy has constantly been geared to establishing social, political, and economic ties with other countries as both a means of broadening its legitimacy and a means of breaking the isolation of Israel, which faces the sea on one side and hostile Arab nations on the others.

In our discussion of the bases of legitimation in Israel we have stressed the factors that have contributed to supporting the polity's legitimation. This does not mean, of course, that the Israeli government enjoyed the unanimous support of all segments of the constituency. Dissent, opposition and criticism existed and were expressed. Taking into account the magnitude of the problems, the lack of experience and means, and the fact that in many cases a new approach had to be adopted, the Israeli polity seems to have been generally successful in responding to many problems. We have also seen that the claim for legitimacy was supported by a value and a legal basis, and was reinforced by the "charisma" of the leaders.

Legitimation and Political Socialization

Effective authority depends upon the cumulative individual acts of compliance of the constituency. In "ordinary" situations, the polity can proceed on the assumption that compliance is forthcoming. However, during the period of institutionalization, in which legitimation has not yet

been established, "...the principle of legitimacy, instead of supporting the government, needs to be supported by it..."⁴⁰

So far we have dealt with the attempts of the polity to establish the various bases for its legitimacy. However, legitimation cannot be built or maintained without the support of political socialization. We therefore propose to analyze the major ways in which political socialization has contributed to legitimation. We shall focus solely on the attempts of a regime to perpetuate and legitimize itself through the manipulation of the educational system.

Political socialization is the process through which people are socialized into a specific political culture, usually referred to as the political regime. According to Easton and Dennis⁴¹ a political regime consists of rules and norms which set minimal constraints on the general behavior of individuals; it refers to a specific structure of authority and also involves patterns of interaction between the polity and the constituency. All these aspects of the political regime must be learned. Easton and Dennis show that the child's awareness of the political system, and the formation of his political dispositions begin at an early age.⁴² This suggests that the informal setting of the family and the peer group plays an extremely important role in political socialization. By the same token it suggests that in newly emerging nations, or in the case of mass immigration, formal education bears a very heavy burden of

responsibility for political socialization. Not only is the family incapable of socializing the young into the new value and legal system but it might interfere with such processes, and the older generation itself has to be re-socialized. It is therefore not surprising that "the governing elites of the 'new states' are engaged in the development and strengthening of system-wide secondary structures that not only impinge directly upon the individual but also penetrate the primary socializing structures. They are seeking to create, by an act of will, an integrated process of political socialization in which at all levels, there is an inculcation of positive sentiments of respect, loyalty and pride in new policies."⁴³

Political socialization through manipulation of the formal educational system supports processes of legitimation in many ways. First, it helps to establish a "value commitment" both to the central value system and to its symbols and legal norms. In that sense it also inculcates a sense of national unity. Secondly, it supports the pragmatic aspect of legitimation as measured by the success of the polity in responding to the various problems and needs. The successful operation of the polity depends heavily on the existence of highly skilled manpower, and on the creation of attitudes that provide the social climate for modernization and progress.

The manipulation of the educational system for purposes of political socialization is one of the major concerns of

any regime if it wishes to maintain at least a minimal level of support. Such manipulation is even more crucial during the period of institutionalization.

The Educational System and Political Socialization in Israel

The educational system of Israel was created prior to the establishment of the state and changed hands several times. The establishment of schools was an accompaniment of the Zionist colonization of Palestine from the beginning. In the initial stage, schools were organized and operated mainly by Jewish philanthropic organizations. (The German "Ezra", the French "Allinace", the Anglo-Jewish Association of Britain, etc). The language of instruction in these schools was that of the country-base of the organization. There were also Zionist schools operated by the Hovevei-Zion.⁴⁴ These, in contrast with the philanthropic ones did not emerge as a traditional - parochial system for the purpose of transmitting existing values but were geared to the socialization of the young into the values of the new social reality that the immigrants were seeking to create. The first attempt to impose some regulation on this essentially anarchic system came in 1918, when the Zionist Commission (Vaad Ha'zirim) began to operate in Palestine, and undertook the administrative and financial burden of education. This gave a boost to the Zionist educational system. A department of education was organized which dealt with

matters concerning curriculum and the salaries and working conditions of teachers.⁴⁵ The link between politics and education was made while the WZO was in control of the educational system. Historically, the first link was made in the 1920 Zionist Congress in London, when the orthodox party, Mizrachi, threatened to split the movement unless it was granted control over religious education in Palestine.⁴⁶ Later, the left-wing parties organized a department of culture in the Histadrut, one function of which was control over schools affiliated with working parties' ideology. This arrangement was formally recognized by the Zionist Congress of 1926.⁴⁷ In 1929 a so called "educational constitution"⁴⁸ recognizing three "streams" in education was ratified by the 16th Zionist Congress. There was the Workers' Stream, the Orthodox-Mizrachi Stream, and the General Stream. In order to complete the politicization of education, the General Stream was linked to the General Zionist party. The fourth type of school which existed was that of Agudat Israel. This ultra-orthodox group considered itself and was recognized by the British as being the representative of orthodox, non-Zionist Jews in Palestine.⁴⁹ Also, some of the philanthropic schools continued to operate too, but were of little significance. Jewish education changed hands again in 1933,⁵⁰ becoming the responsibility of the Vaad Leumi, an organ of the local Jewish population in Palestine. The WZO, however, continued to provide

financial assistance, and the "streams" continued to operate. All these "streams" were purely voluntary in the sense that school attendance was not compulsory and was not enforced by law. Also the schools were closely affiliated and ideologically influenced by political parties.

With the establishment of the state, Israel, unlike many developing countries, inherited a modern educational system. The major problem was not transforming an educational system based on traditional parochialism into a modern one but integrating the various segments of the educational system, for it was felt the existing system could not adequately serve an agency for socialization in the state period. As we have seen in the discussion of monopolization, the leadership was engaged in the creation of an effective "center" and in fostering a sense of statehood and nationhood that would transcend partisan interests and affiliations. The differing "streams" in education, instead of supporting this trend, reinforced partisanship by transmitting it to the younger generation. Furthermore, the educational system in the state period had to serve a large and a more heterogeneous population. The longer-established Israeli population was outnumbered by immigrants from a great variety of cultural backgrounds, many of whom were completely unfamiliar with Zionist ideology. Most of the immigrants also lacked the necessary skills for absorbing into a modern economy. As a result, there was a need to reduce the gap between the immigrants and the older

population in both values and skills. In addition, the educational system in the pre-state era was strongly influenced by the dominant ideology, which stressed Hebrew cultural revival. The teachers were admired as cultural pioneers contributing to this revival.⁵¹ Since the dominant ideology did not emphasize the acquisition of suitable skills, many segments of the established population had to be trained as well.

Formal education in Israel became the major source for political socialization in the broad sense. In most cases, the family could not socialize the young into the new value system. Families of the established population could only transmit sectarian images, while families among the newcomers were unfamiliar with both values and legal norms. The lack of a political culture and lack of a tradition of independence also weakened the informal agencies of socialization. It is therefore not surprising that the leadership of Israel reorganized the educational system as one of its first priorities.

One of the first laws to be legislated was the Compulsory Educational Law of 1949.⁵² The law made school attendance free and compulsory for children ages 5-14. This included a year of kindergarten and eight years of elementary school. The law increased the availability of education, but did not change the segmentation of the educational system, and the political nature of education, since the

"streams" were not eliminated. The de-politicization of the educational system was formally achieved only in 1953, when the State Educational Law⁵³ was legislated, following opposition and conflicts.⁵⁴ The basic argument of those who objected to the unification of the educational system was that it violated the rights of parents to raise their children according to their ideology and values. In essence, the State Educational Law has changed the "ownership" and the political nature of education. The educational system was centralized administratively, and was dissociated from the various political parties with which it was previously linked.

In spite of the organizational unification of the educational system, great diversity of curriculum continued to exist, and political influences were not completely eliminated. The law differentiates between State Schools and Religious State Schools. Both types of school provide state education, but the religious schools are in the words of the legislature, "observant of orthodox precepts in their way of life, curriculum, teachers and inspectors."⁵⁵ The law also provides for "recognized" schools that are not official, but receive partial financial support from the state. Most of the "recognized" schools belong to the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel. The Kibbutzim⁵⁶ too, have a unique educational system. Furthermore, even with respect to the "streams" of labor and general Zionism, which were formally

integrated, differences in educational approach continued to characterize these schools for some time. The same teachers, the same administrators, the same constituency were involved, and thus true unification was considerably postponed even in the formally unified part of the educational system.

The overall objectives of the educational system, as stated in the State Educational Law,⁵⁷ are "...educating the young according to the cultural values of the People of Israel and in general scientific knowledge; teaching the young love for their country and loyalty to the state and the People; training them in agriculture and work in the spirit of the pioneers, and creating in them aspirations for a society based on liberty, equality, tolerance, mutual help and love of mankind." This statement does not represent a coherent set of educational objectives but rather a mixture of religious, socialist, and Zionist ideas, plus general democratic and humanistic values. This is hardly surprising. As we have seen earlier, the central value system has not yet been fully articulated, and in the absence of an articulated value-system, the educational objectives cannot be specific either.

These general educational objectives become more specific when translated into a curriculum which has included study of the Bible, Hebrew language and literature, Jewish history, and citizenship. In teaching the Bible, the ties of the Jews to the land of Israel and the basic values of

Judaism have been emphasized. The study of Jewish history highlighted both periods of glory and periods of distress, and has focused upon the struggle of the Jews to maintain their identity and to achieve independence. The study of Hebrew literature has laid emphasis upon national writers and poets such as Bialik, Ahad Ha'am, and Tshernichovski. There have been special classes in citizenship in which the basic ideas of Zionism, the struggle for self-determination and the structure of the Israeli institutions have been given special consideration.

Special attention has been given to the celebration of national holidays in the schools. These have served as ritualistic occasions to strengthen the students' identification with the past and the present of the Jewish people. The Gadna (discussed in the chapter on institution-building) has provided premilitary training for high school students and has served to socialize the young into the values and institutions of the state. Although attention has been given to the study of the sciences and the transmission of general humanistic values, the curriculum has stressed the development of patriotism and good citizenship and the development of Jewish identity.

In addition to the education of the young, programs for massive adult education were organized. Classes in Hebrew, in specific skills, and in general education became available. The army too was engaged in educational programs and served as an important instrument in the integration of

the newcomers. As Eisenstadt observed, the army "...does not function (as the educational system does) within the ecological framework of immigrant settlements but takes the immigrants out of these settings and brings them into a new social organization totally distinct from the old ones and common to them and to the old inhabitants alike."⁵²

Summary

In this chapter legitimation has been discussed as an attempt of the polity to justify its claim to monopoly over the use of power, to achieve internal and external recognition, and to assure the compliance of the constituency.

The major dimensions of legitimation that were discussed are the value dimension; the legal dimension; the personal or charismatic dimension; and the pragmatic dimension, or the success or failure of the polity in responding to emerging needs.

We have dealt with political socialization as a process that helps to build and support these various dimensions of legitimacy.

One must also keep in mind that legitimation involves tensions and conflicts. The attempts to establish a value system in the face of rival images of the state embodied by various groups (this will be discussed at length in the chapter on the role of ambiguity), the attempts to build a legal system that will reflect these values, and the attempts to respond to the needs of various segments of the population, frequently are at odds with one another, clearly involving certain strains.

NOTES

1. See Parsons' analysis of political power in, Talcott Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 264-355.
2. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 154.
3. G. Ferrero, Principles of Power (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1942), p. 139.
4. Ibid., p. 140.
5. Ibid., p. 22.
6. Weber, op. cit., p. 249.
7. Parsons, op. cit., p. 372.
8. For example, Chalmers Johnson argues that "When a power deflation occurs, the system's integration rests increasingly on compulsion, the elite has greater need for, and hence must expand, the system's armed police." Johnson, therefore, considers an increase in the ratio of the military in the general population to be indicative of de-legitimation and deflation of the polity's power. Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 126-27.
9. Max Weber, On Charisma and Institutional Change (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1968), pp. 11.
10. Ibid., p. 12.
11. Talcott Parsons, Toward A General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), p. 395.

12. Weber, On Charisma and Institutional Change, op. cit., p. xxvii.
13. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Alfred McClung Lee, (ed.), Principles of Sociology (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939), p. 107.
14. Parsons, Toward A General Theory of Action, op. cit., p. 59.
15. Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 74.
16. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 300.
17. See our discussion of the change in the leaders' orientation from "movement orientation" to "national orientation," in the chapter on monopolization.
18. It is important to stress here that we are referring to the central value system of the state. This does not mean, of course, that other value systems do not exist. Religion provides a comprehensive value-system, and so do the various traditions of the sub-cultures of which the population is composed.
19. Provisional Government of Israel, Official Gazette, No. 1, 5.4.1948.
20. Ibid.
21. The Flag and Emblem Law-1949, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1949), p. 37.

22. The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, especially part III on the legislature, and part V on the judiciary, in Yehezkel Dror and Emanuel Gutmann, The Government of Israel (Jerusalem: The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, 1961), pp. 12-26.
23. Ibid., Article 53 (i).
24. Ibid., Article 53 (iii).
25. S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1967), p. 135.
26. Minshar, Official Gazette, op. cit., p. 3.
27. For the Transitional Laws and their amendments see Dror and Gutmann, op. cit., pp. 91-97.
28. Rapael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 121.
29. State of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), vol. 21, p. 4.
30. Statistical Abstract of Israel, op. cit., p. 25.
31. Patai, op. cit., II, p. 1068.
32. Ibid., p. 1068.
33. Ibid., p. 1068.
34. Ibid., p. 1068.
35. Ibid., p. 1068.

36. Ibid., I, p. 265.
37. Ibid., p. 265.
38. Ibid., p. 265.
39. Ibid., II, p. 1070.
40. Ferrero, op. cit., p. 140.
41. David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficiency," American Political Science Review, lxi, no. 1, March, 1967, pp. 25-38.
42. David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361, Sept. 1965, pp. 40-57. This whole issue of the Annals is devoted to political socialization.
43. Gabriel Almond, The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 545.
44. Moshe Attias, Knesset Israel Be'eretz Israel (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Department of Press and Information of the National Council, 1954), pp. 154-55.
45. Ibid., p. 106. See also Joseph Bentwich, Ha'chinuch Bi'mdinat Israel (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv: Joshua Chachik, 1960), pp. 35-39.
46. Ibid., p. 37.
47. Ibid., p. 38.
48. Ibid., pp. 39-41. Also, Attias, op. cit., pp. 171-72.

49. Bentwich, op. cit., p. 41.
50. Ibid., pp. 49-53. Also, Attias, op. cit., p. 158.
51. Eisenstadt, op. cit., pp. 182, 183. Also Ben David has shown that teachers are very active politically, not only culturally, and represent a high percentage of the members of the legislature in many new African countries. Joseph Ben-David, "Professions in the Class System of Present-Day Societies," Current Sociology, xii, no. 3, 1963/4, p. 368.
52. Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1959), p. 287.
53. Ibid., 1953, p. 137.
54. For the analysis of the positions taken by the various parties with reference to the adoption of the law see, Bentwich, op. cit., pp. 70-74.
55. Sefer Chukim, op. cit., p. 137.
56. For an analysis of the educational system of the Kibbutz see, Bentwich, op. cit., pp. 74-75.
57. Sefer Chukim, op. cit., p. 137.
58. S. N. Eisenstadt, The Absorption of Immigrants (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954), pp. 181-82.

CHAPTER 6

Institution-Building

Our analysis of the processes of monopolization and legitimation has been facilitated by the existence of a sizable body of literature on which we could draw. Institution-building, however, has received less attention, especially on the theoretical level, than all other aspects of the institutionalization of social movements. To be sure, the fact that social movements may terminate in the form of lasting organization has been recognized.¹ However, the emergence of institutions has been taken for granted, and social scientists have not attempted to analyze the processes and dimensions of institution-building. The literature on nation-building,² as we saw earlier in this work, cannot be of assistance to us in our attempts to formulate a theoretical frame of reference for dealing with the emergence of institutions. This literature has focused on the analysis of historical developments in specific countries or in specific types of societies.

Our argument is that monopolization and legitimation necessitates the building of institutions. As Weber observed,³ one of the basic elements of the modern nation-state is in its provision of a continuous organization for the systematic treatment and control of the various spheres of social life. It is the institutional web which makes it

possible for the leaders of the nation to translate their ideas, policies, and programs into social action, thus increasing their ability to systematically treat emerging problems and needs. Moreover, pragmatic success leads to the legitimation of the regime. Institution-building thus contributes to the legitimation of the leadership. Monopolization, or the actual attainment of power and control, does not exist in the abstract; it is made possible only through institutions. On the other hand, the task of institution-building is facilitated by the attainment of monopolization and by the achievement of legitimacy. Monopolization indicates that the leadership is in charge of the allocation of the various social resources and thus can utilize the necessary means (financial, manpower, etc.) for the development of institutions. Legitimation assures the leadership that compliance is forthcoming and makes the emergence of institutions smoother and freer of opposition and conflicts. In other words, feedback relations exist among the various processes of institutionalization.

Pye⁴ has shown that patterns of institutional development vary from one society to another, depending on the general status of the society, its historical heritage, and on the interplay of contemporary social forces. However, regardless of the actual forms taken by emerging institutions, new regimes are actively engaged in institution-building as a means for achieving monopolization and legitimation and

for establishing the necessary mechanisms for the orderly functioning of society. This does not mean, of course, that no arrangements existed in the past, nor does it suggest that the leadership will "erase" everything and "start from scratch." This is not the case even when the attainment of power by the polity involves a sudden break in the existing patterns (in the case of revolutionary movements, for example).

Dimensions of Institution-Building

In his discussion of institutions, Eisenstadt⁵ regards them as regulative principles which organize most of the activities of individuals in society into definite patterns. Institutions, it appears, have three major characteristics: they are organizational patterns, their activity is guided by a set of principles, and individuals are considered in their capacity as role occupants.

We can delineate three basic dimensions of institution-building utilizing three characteristics of institutions.

Institutional Continuity. This aspect of institution-building refers to the continuous operation of an institution's organizational patterns, leading orientations, and personnel over time. Continuity does not necessarily represent total acceptance of existing institutions. It could result from the leaders' fear that alteration of existing patterns might bring about opposition, which in turn could jeopardize their monopoly of power and their claim to legitimacy. It could

also represent a temporary strategy of the polity: the leaders may be awaiting the emergence of social conditions which would permit the introduction of modification and change and the creation of new institutional patterns.

Modification and Change in Existing Institutions. Modification and change can be introduced into existing institutional patterns, altering their central orientation, their organizational structure, and/or their personnel. These changes could result from the inadequacy of existing institutions in dealing with newly emerging problems, or from the attempt of the leaders to implement their ideological orientation through the introduction of changes into existing institutional patterns. Changes of personnel could also stem from the ruling group's fear of counter-elites, which could emerge out of the "established" personnel and challenge the existing leaders' claim to monopolization and legitimation.

Institutional Innovation. This pattern refers to the emergence of new organizational patterns, new institutional orientations, and new personnel. Institutional innovation in the developing countries often involves the adoption of Western technology and institutions.⁶ The adoption of Western patterns is regarded by some leaders as the magic formula for modernization and the emergence of national unity. Unfortunately, however, tensions have generally arisen between Western patterns and the rooted traditions.

Institutional growth is typically accompanied by bureaucratization, which we propose to treat as a form of innovation. Bendix⁷ has shown that one attribute of all governments is the implementation of commands through the administrative staff of bureaucracy, and he defines bureaucratization in the Weberian ideal-type sense. Thus bureaucracy becomes "...the means for carrying 'community action' into rationally ordered 'social action'."⁸ According to Weber, bureaucracy would be an attribute of rationally based regimes only. Its emergence, therefore, marks a change from traditional and charismatic organizational patterns. Bureaucratization involves the emergence of new organizational patterns, new orientations, and new criteria for the selection of personnel. It is, therefore, a form of innovation. Weber has shown that charismatic authority, or for that matter any kind of sectarianism, is sharply opposed to rational authority in general and to bureaucratic authority in particular. "Both rational and traditional authority," Weber argues, "are specifically forms of everyday routine and control of action; while the charismatic type is the direct antithesis of this."⁹ The transition from a movement into a nation-state, which involves bureaucratization, therefore marks an organizational innovation. Bureaucratization involves changes in the value system on the part of the leadership. The value changes are a sign of the willingness of former movement leaders to come to grips with

everyday demands.

Bureaucratization also involves the transition from social relations that are strictly personal and involve the total status of the individual¹⁰ to those characterized by abstract regularity in the execution of authority.¹¹ In other words, the office has an existence independent of its incumbent. The above orientational changes manifest themselves in both organizational patterns and the criteria for the selection of office holders. According to Weber,¹² bureaucracy as an organization is based on the separation of office and incumbent, in the sense that the office was not made to fit any specific incumbent and is defined independently. The definition of the office is guided mainly by rational and legal considerations, and includes rules of conduct, rights and duties, and fixed salaries. The office is the smallest unit of bureaucracy, and bureaucracy is made up of offices arranged in hierarchical order. The vertical movement of an individual from one office to another constitutes that individual's "career." Ideally, bureaucrats as a group resemble professional groups (lawyers and physicians, for example). For one thing they are selected on the basis of their technical qualifications as proved by examinations or guaranteed by diplomas. Also, bureaucrats have an ethical code, which regulates their relations with the public on the one hand and with the polity on the other. The office is considered primarily as an occupation, involving only part

of a person's time and constituting only one element of his overall status. The office is filled through free contractual relations. Since bureaucratization can be considered the antithesis of charismatic and traditional institutional patterns, we regard the introduction of bureaucracies into former traditional or charismatic orders as an innovation.

Although Weber¹³ argues that this type of organization is in principle applicable to a wide variety of different fields, we shall confine our discussion to the analysis of political bureaucracy.

According to Weber's ideal type, a bureaucracy should satisfy the needs of both the incumbents of office and the general public. However, Kirk-Green¹⁴ has shown that bureaucratic cadres in a traditional milieu can be frustrated. Bureaucrats can be disturbed on the one hand by the curbs on individualism imposed by the ideologically oriented regime, and on the other hand by their rejection of the rank patterns of traditional society. The polity's attitude to the bureaucracy is an ambivalent one. The leadership has to rely on this new class of technicians and managers, inasmuch as its legitimacy cannot be endorsed continually on the basis of past events such as "the struggle for liberation" or "the revolution." At the same time the polity fears the emergence of counter-elites out of the bureaucracy, for such might result in displacement of the polity or a reduction in its influence.¹⁵ Bureaucratization thus provides no golden

key to institution-building.

Institutional continuity, modification and change in existing institutions, and institutional innovation represent "ideal type" patterns of institution-building. In reality, however, similar institutions can be built through a combination of different elements. An institution can, for example, retain its organizational pattern while modifying its central orientation and changing its personnel. There are, of course, many possible variations and combinations.

Institution-Building in Israel

In Israel, institution-building per se -- i.e. the formation of various structural arrangements -- did not involve the kinds of struggles that we have seen in the case of monopolization and legitimation. One reason for that is that the institutional framework of Israel emerged in the pre-independence period. Institutional growth was guided by Zionist ideology and by a strong emphasis on the anticipated needs of the future state, rather than on the immediate needs of the Jewish population. As a result, the State of Israel inherited a modern institutional framework that had already won the recognition and approval of the Jewish people in Israel and abroad. It is, therefore, not surprising that continuity had an unusually important role in the process of institution-building in Israel. And continuity usually involves fewer conflicts than the introduction of change.

The apparent lack of conflicts may also result from

our analytical separation of monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building. In reality, however, monopolization and legitimation have their organizational manifestations, and the conflicts that were discussed with reference to these processes are in fact applicable to institution-building as well. On the organizational level, monopolization manifests itself by greater centralization, the introduction of new criteria of selection into office, and the leadership's adoption of a non-sectarian approach in its relations with its constituency. Legitimation, which is supported by efficiency and by the ability of the leadership to adequately respond to the needs of the constituency, also requires special institutional arrangements in order to achieve greater efficiency.

As we shall see, continuity was of considerable significance in Israel. Such might not have been the case with nation-states which emerged in traditional societies or which developed after the expulsion of colonial regimes. In these instances, organizational modification and change, as well as innovation, might have been of greater significance than institutional continuity, as part of the leaders' attempts to bring about modernization and change.

Institutional Continuity. The political sphere is the major area in which continuity has been maintained. Matras¹⁶ has shown that the most remarkable and significant characteristic of Israel's political structure has been the stability and

continuity of its institutions, of the power relations among its various political parties, and of its national leadership -- in the face of dramatic changes in the population's size and composition.

As evidence of this continuity, Matras demonstrates that during the first seventeen years of its existence Israel had only three Prime Ministers, three Ministers of Finance, two Foreign Ministers, and three Ministers of Defense.¹⁷ The pattern of allocating ministries and portfolios in the Cabinet remained stable too, especially in the case of the most powerful ministries.¹⁸ The portfolios of Defense and Foreign Affairs, Finance, Police, and of course the office of Prime Minister, were constantly held by Mapai, which traditionally drew between 33 and 39 per cent of the vote. The Ministry of Industry and Commerce was in the hands of Mapai most of the time. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Ministry of Welfare have been filled by Mafdal (a religious party), while the Post Ministry has changed hands between Mafdal and Mapai. The Ministry of Health changed hands between Mapam (the United Labor Party) and Mafdal, and the Ministry of the Interior between Mafdal and Achdut Ha'avoda (the Unity of Labor Party). The Ministries of Development and Housing shifted hands between Mapai and Mapam, and the portfolios of Labor and of Transportation between Mapai and Achdut Ha'avoda. The Progressive Party held the Justice portfolio until its departure from the governmental coalition in 1961, only to return in 1966 as the

Independent Liberal Party, holding the portfolios of Development and of Tourism. The General Zionist Party participated in the government for a short period of time (1952-55) and held the portfolios of Health, Commerce and Industry, and Transportation.

In the Knesset (Parliament), too, power relations among the various parties have remained essentially the same (see Table 8). The party of Mapai has never drawn less than 33 per cent of the vote and never more than 39 per cent. The religious parties have drawn between 11 and 15 per cent of the vote, and the right wing parties between 20 and 27 per cent.¹⁹ Moreover, the Knesset retained the same composition of personnel, any changes being due primarily to the illness or death of its members. The following table shows that the legislature in Israel is composed mainly of people who immigrated prior to the establishment of the state. The representation of the post-1948 immigration and of native-born Israelis is relatively small. (See Table 9)

TABLE 8

Results of Elections to the Knesset, 1949-1969 (Percentages)

List	1st Knesset 1/25/1949	2nd Knesset 7/30/1951	3rd Knesset 7/26/1955	4th Knesset 11/3/1959
Valid Votes	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
AMT-Alignment	--	--	--	--
AM-State List	--	--	--	--
AT-Alignment	--	--	--	--
KA-Israel Work- ers Party (RAFY)	--	--	--	--
M-Mapam (United Labor Party)	14.7 (1)	12.5 (1)	7.3	7.2
A-Mapai (Israel Labor Party)	35.7	37.3	32.2	38.2
TW-Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labor)	--	--	6.6	6.0
B-Mizrahi and Mizrahi Workers (Religious)		8.3	9.1	9.9
G-Aludat Israel (Ortho- dox Religious)	12.2	3.6	4.7	4.7
D-Agudat Israel Workers				
HL-Gahal (Herut- Liberal Block)	--	--	--	--
T-Free Center	--	--	--	--
H-Herut (Free- dom Party)	11.5	6.6	12.6	13.5
L-Liberal Party	5.2	16.2	10.2	6.2
LN-Independent Liberals	4.1	3.2	4.4	4.6
K-Communists	3.5	4.0	4.5	2.8
W-Jew Communist List	--	--	--	--
S-Ha'olam Ha'ze	--	--	--	--
Minority Lists	3.0	4.7	4.9	4.7
Other Lists	10.1	3.6	1.9	2.2

(1) Achdut Ha'avoda included in Mapam.

(2) Progressive Party included in Liberal Party.

Source: Statistical Abstract of Israel, no. 21, 1970 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), p. 617.

(continued)

(continued)

Results of Elections to the Knesset, 1949-1969 (Percentages)

List	5th Knesset 8/15/1959	6th Knesset 11/2/1965	7th Knesset 10/28/1969
Valid Votes	100.0	100.0	100.0
AMT-Alignment	--	--	46.2
AM-State List	--	--	3.1
AT-Alignment	--	36.7	--
KA-Israel Workers Party (RAFY)	--	7.9	--
M-Mapam (United Labor Party)	7.5	6.6	--
A-Mapai (Israel Labor Party)	34.7	--	--
TW-Achdut Ha'avoda (Unity of Labor)	8.2	--(1)	--(1)
B-Mizrahi and Mizrahi Workers (Religious)	9.8	8.9	9.7
G-Agudat Israel (Ortho- dox Religious)	5.6	3.3	3.2
D-Agudat Israel Workers			
HL-Gahal (Herut- Liberal Block)	--	21.3	21.7
T-Free Center	--	--	1.2
H-Herut (Free- dom Party)	13.8	--	--
L-Liberal Party	13.6(2)	--	--
LN-Independent Liberals	-- (2)	3.8	3.2
K-Communists	4.2	1.1	1.1
W-Jew Communist List	--	2.3	2.8
S-Ha'olam Ha'ze	--	1.2	1.2
Minority Lists	3.9	3.8	3.5
Other Lists	0.3	1.3	1.1

(1) Achdut Ha'avoda included in Mapam.

(2) Progressive Party included in Liberal Party.

Source: Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1970), p. 617.

TABLE 9

Year of Immigration of Knesset Members

Year	1st Knesset 1949	2nd Knesset 1951	3rd Knesset 1955	4th Knesset 1959	5th Knesset 1961
1909-1914	19	15	12	8	9
1915-1923	24	19	13	12	12
1924-1932	31	35	38	32	30
1933-1939	18	25	27	27	29
1940-1947	9	6	8	11	12
1948 on	1	--	4	8	9
Native Born	16	18	17	22	19
unknown	2	2	1	--	--
Total	120	120	120	120	120

SOURCE: Asher Zidon, Beit Ha'nivcharim, (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Achiasaf, 1964), p. 369.

This continuity in the political sphere after the creation of the state can be partially explained by the fact that Israel's institutions and leadership have their roots in the pre-state period. As we observed in the background chapters, the statutory community of Knesset Israel, which operated in the Yishuv period, consisted of an Elected Assembly and an executive organ called the National Council. This tradition of a democratically elected representative body, as well as an executive one, was maintained during the state period. During the state period the Knesset (Parliament) was the house of representatives in the state period, and the Memshala (the Cabinet) was the executive body.

The Israeli government is also based on a coalition of parties, for no party has ever won a majority. Structural continuity has been maintained, inasmuch as the Israeli Cabinet emerged out of the Provisional Government, which in turn consisted of the National Council and the Palestinian members of the Jewish Agency Executive, plus representatives of each of the Zionist and non-Zionist political parties not already represented by virtue of membership in one of the other bodies. Cooperation among the various parties was also a feature of the pre-state period.

The fact that political institutions were carried over from the pre-state period provides a partial explanation for their acceptance by the longer established population, which had resided in Palestine in the Yishuv period and had participated in the Knesset Israel. Acceptance of the political

institutions on the part of the newcomers, who in term of their numbers could have changed power relations in Israel, is explained by Horowitz²¹ as the result of pressures to conform exerted by the veteran population. In the beginning the new immigrants, who were homeless and lacking in financial means, were receptive to these ideas mainly because of their dependence upon the "absorbing" population for housing, jobs, and various other facilities and services. Later on, Horowitz argues, the newcomers came to adopt the norms of the established population; this was reflected, for example, in the fact that the power structure continued practically unchanged.

Continuity of the leadership must also be explained by the fact that with the establishment of the state many of the political leaders, including those of the second and third echelons, were relatively young. This had a strong effect upon their approach to the preparation of leadership cadres. According to Dagan's analysis,²² the leaders paid little if any attention to the training of successors. Since the road to a political career in Israel leads through the party hierarchy rather than through independently running for office, this factor was crucial. The election system in Israel is such that each party represents the voters with a "list" (reshima) of candidates. The Election Law of 1959 provides that "Any 750 people who are eligible to vote, and any party of the Knesset, can form their own "list" of

candidates...A list of candidates should not include more than 120 names /the number of Knesset members/ of people who consented to have their names on the list..."²³ The voters cannot split their votes; nor do they have any direct influence over the composition of the "list" or the ordering of candidates within it. When it comes to the allocation of seats in the Knesset, only the parties that have obtained at least one per cent of the valid vote are eligible to participate.²⁴ As a result "lists," which are organized independently of the existing political parties, have a very slim chance of representation in the Knesset. If a party wins five seats in the Knesset, for example, the first five people on the "list" become members of the Knesset. It follows that in order to achieve a political position, one must start at the party level and show loyalty to the older leaders and conformity to the party line. In this way ideological continuity within the various parties has been maintained. One indication of the prevailing attitudes, as Dagan shows, is that the term "political career" is still used interchangeably with "political opportunism." Politics is regarded as a vocation and a call, not a profession -- an approach clearly carried over from the Yishuv period.

Modification and Change in Existing Institutions. Despite the unusual importance attached to institutional continuity in Israel, modification and change have played an important role. For with the establishment of the state, new problems

have emerged. First, there was the need to secure the physical existence of the state, which was threatened immediately after its establishment by invasion from neighboring Arab states. To be sure, conflicts with the Arabs were part of the social reality of the Yishuv period, but because of the presence of the British no full-scale war resulted. Secondly, the state was confronted by the challenge of absorbing and integrating, socially and economically, a large number of immigrants from European, African, and Asian countries. The problem was compounded by the fact that most of the immigrants lacked financial resources and had to be taken care of by the government. Many of them also lacked the skills and the cultural and ideological orientation that could facilitate their integration into a modern state. The heavy cost of defense and of the absorption of immigrants called for immediate economic growth and to a modicum of economic independence. The need of the polity to achieve monopolization and to legitimize its position also called for modifications in the decentralized and voluntaristic institutional structure that had existed during the Yishuv period. As we saw earlier in this work, the major organizational change that ensued was that the achievement of collective goals became the exclusive concern and responsibility of the government. The various civic and military activities in which many organizations had engaged independently and voluntarily became centered in the government. As a result, some of the bodies that had existed and operated in the pre-state

era survived not as independent organizations, but rather as the nuclei of new institutional frameworks. The educational system and the military, discussed in earlier chapters, serve as examples.

The Israel Defense Forces, which emerged out of existing military groups, represent the centralization and the depoliticization of existing nuclei in a governmental ministry. The educational system, which in the pre-state era was segmented and affiliated with political parties, became the exclusive responsibility of a governmental ministry that took charge of all educational matters.

The aforementioned structural changes were accompanied by modifications in the value orientation as well. The basic change in the political sphere was that the central leadership adopted a broader national approach that transcended partisan interests. As a result of the growing centralization of civic and military activities in governmental ministries, voluntary associations became increasingly associated with social and recreational activities rather than with civic ones.²⁵ Also, individuals became increasingly motivated, according to Horowitz,²⁶ by hopes for personal success rather than by the need to achieve collective goals. Another change in value orientation observed by Horowitz is that the Israeli patriotism that has emerged is not necessarily tied up with Zionist ideology, whereas in the Yishuv period identification with the collectivity was closely associated with Zionist ideology. These trends are

indicative of a transition from a "pioneering" society to a "normal" one.

We shall now briefly discuss the introduction of pre-military training into secondary education, and emphasize changes in agriculture as illustrations of modifications in the institutional patterns.

Changes in Education: In addition to the key changes in the educational system discussed in the chapter on legitimation, an important change was the introduction of the Gadna (the Youth Battalions) into secondary education. The Gadna existed in the pre-state period as one of the formations of the Haganah. With the establishment of the state, the Israel Defense Forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Education and Culture became jointly responsible for the Gadna. The Gadna provides high-school students between the ages of 14 and 18 with premilitary education and training, with stress upon such factors as good citizenship. In addition specialized Gadna branches offer preliminary technical training to students who plan to enter such highly technical services as the air force, the navy, the signal corps, and the armoured troops. These branches of the Gadna draw their members -- all of them volunteers -- from secondary schools, youth organizations, and immigrant villages. The Gadna can be considered a structural arrangement that serves to socialize the youth into the institutional framework of the state and by so doing, supports the polity's

monopolization and legitimation.

Changes in Agriculture: As one of the examples of change we give special attention to changes in agriculture as both a sector of the economy and as a form of settlement and a way of life. The state period has seen the introduction of new techniques, new policies, and new forms of settlement in agriculture. Agriculture, which was valued ideologically in the pre-state period, became an important branch of the economy in the state period. The changes that were introduced into agriculture reflect the flexibility of the polity and its ability to respond to emerging needs. In the first place, there was the need to develop and expand the economy of a country that is poor in natural resources and skilled manpower. The dominant ideology during the pre-state period did not stress technical-industrial skills but rather emphasized agriculture as a way of life and as a symbol of national revival. In addition, most of the newcomers lacked the technical skills needed for an industrialized society. The changes that were introduced into agriculture led to expansion of the economy and the development of industry based on the processing of agricultural goods -- despite the lack of natural resources and skilled manpower. The need to supply the ever-growing population with food was also an important consideration. A new form of settlement (as regional development), discussed further on, served as an important factor from the social and the economic points of view for it served as a mechanism for assimilating newcomers into

the values of Israeli society, at the same time that it provided them with housing and jobs and transformed them into productive citizens. The developments in agriculture also helped to provide a rationale for the ideological emphasis upon agriculture. In these respects, the developments in agriculture supported the leaders' claims to monopolization and legitimation and facilitated its efforts at institution-building.

Agriculture was of central importance during the time of the Zionist settlement in Palestine during the 1880's and the beginning of the twentieth century. For the Zionist ideology envisaged the establishment of a society that would be self-sufficient in all its economic and social functions. The role of agriculture was also emphasized by the Socialists, who since 1918 have played a central role in the Yishuv. The Zionist-Socialists have created the Kibbutz as a new social form, combining Zionist pioneering values with Socialist ones. In addition to these ideological factors, other factors helped to elevate the agricultural groups to their pre-eminent position in the Yishuv. In the first place, the agricultural settlements served as the principal means of increasing land-holding in Palestine and thus broadening the territorial basis of the Yishuv. In the second place, the agricultural settlements served as the major bases and arms depots of the Jewish underground forces.

However, a dramatic change has occurred: with the establishment of the state, agriculture came to play a much less

important role in defense and in other spheres. Moreover, collective agriculture did not surpass any other sector in the implementation of the "ingathering of exiles," -- i.e. the economic, social, and cultural absorption of the immigrants. On the contrary, a major portion of the immigrants were absorbed into cities and townships, and only a fraction of the post-state immigration was absorbed into collective agriculture. The share of agriculture in the national income declined from 18.5 per cent in 1939 to 17 per cent in 1950, and to 12.9 per cent in 1955.²⁷ This decline is also expressed in the agriculture's diminishing share in the national expenditure. In 1953 not less than 32 per cent of the total investment was still devoted to agriculture. In 1954, the sum was reduced to 27 per cent, and in 1955 to 22.5 per cent.²⁸ In 1965 only 10 per cent of Israel's national income derived from agriculture, which employed 13 per cent of the country's labor force.²⁹

Nevertheless, the role of agriculture was more important than it would appear from these figures. First, of the 875 towns and villages in Israel in 1965, more than 750 were agricultural settlements³⁰ whose inhabitants were engaged primarily in farming. Agricultural settlements thus constitute a principal factor in the distribution of the population, the adequate dispersal of which was a main objective of the government policy. Secondly, agriculture played an important economic role. One of Israel's major problems in

the economic field was the excess of imports over exports. This problem had been temporarily met by imports of capital in the form of contributions and German reparation or loans. However, the country's main efforts were directed toward increasing its exports and thereby improving the balance of payments. Here agriculture played a major part. In 1963 agricultural exports accounted for one-third of Israel's total exports, and in 1965 for about one-fourth (See the following table).

TABLE 10

Exports of Israel
(in millions of dollars)

<u>Category</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1965</u>
Agricultural Produce	68.4	89.2	86.8
Industrial Products	117.6	139.6	181.2
Diamonds	83.9	104.0	131.7
Miscellaneous	1.5	3.2	3.7
Total	271.4	336.0	403.4

Source: Raphael Patai (ed.) Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 7.

Because of its relatively low import component, in actual fact agriculture's share in Israel's total exports was greater than the latter would seem to indicate. Agriculture, moreover, was an important factor in many other areas of the economy. A considerable section of Israel's industry was

TABLE 11

Total Increase in Agricultural Production 1948/49 - 1964/65

	1948/49	1954/55	1957/58	1959/60	1961/62	1964/65
Index of production (1948/49 = 100)	100	240	366	439	526	610
Value of production at 1948/49 prices (in millions of IL)	44.4	106.5	162.5	184.9	233.5	271.1
Value of production at current prices (in millions of IL)	44.4	337.4	657.8	747.5	968.0	1,345.9

Source: Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 8.

TABLE 12

Number of State Employees and Salaries
In the Years 1948/9-1957/8

	1948/49	1949/50	1950/51	1951/52	1952/53
<u>Compared to the General Population</u>					
No. of State employees (thousands)	15.1	17.5	21.4	32.5	33.9
General population (thousands)	1,040	1,260	1,490	1,600	1,650
Percentage of State employees of the population	1.40	1.38	1.44	2.30	2.05
<u>Compared to General Employment</u>					
No. Employees (thousands)	--	--	--	--	--
State employees as percentage of employed	--	--	--	--	--
<u>Compared to National Income</u>					
Salary expenses of State employees (millions of IL)	--	--	--	--	--
National income (millions of IL)	--	--	1,739	2,304	1,970
Salary expenses of State employees as percentage of the national income	--	--	--	--	--

(continued)

(continued)

Number of State Employees and Salaries
In the Years 1948/9-1957-8

	1953/54	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57	1957/58
<u>Compared to the General Population</u>					
No. of State employees (thousands)	36.2	37.8	39.3	40.2	42.1
General population (thousands)	1,680	1,750	1,820	1,930	1,990
Percentage of State employees of the population	2.15	2.15	2.15	2.09	2.10
<u>Compared to General Employment</u>					
No. Employees (thousands)	513	588	574	639	645
State employees as percentage of employed	7.0	6.4	6.8	6.2	6.5
<u>Compared to National Income</u>					
Salary expenses of State employees (millions of IL)	115	123	140	152	157
National income (millions of IL)	2,092	1,990	2,172	2,322	2,639
Salary expenses of State employees as percentage of the national income	5.5	6.2	5.95	6.1	5.95

Source: Government of Israel, Annual Report of the State Comptroller for the fiscal year 1958/9 (Jerusalem: Government Printers, 1959), p. 31.

based on the processing of agricultural produce (e.g. vegetables and fruit preserves, textiles, etc.), while other industries were engaged in supplying agriculture with the required means of production (fertilizers, tools, etc.). Agriculture thus provided employment both for persons engaged directly in farming and for those contributing directly to the process of agricultural production.

Agricultural development was also stimulated by the need to supply the ever-growing population with fresh food products that could not be imported -- such as milk, fruits, and fresh vegetables. Prior to the establishment of the state a considerable part of these goods had been either imported from the neighboring Arab countries or produced locally by Arab peasants.

To summarize, apart from the ideological emphasis upon the "return to the soil," agriculture played an important economic and social role during both the Yishuv period and the State period. For these reasons special stress was laid on agricultural development. During the years of mass immigration many newcomers were settled in agricultural communities. Also, special emphasis was placed on the development of water resources, which constitute the very basis of intensive agriculture in the country. This was made possible through extensive engineering projects, culminating in the completion of the National Water Carrier Project for the diversion of large quantities of water from

the Jordan River and Lake Kinneret to the arid southern part of the country.

During the state period, major changes were introduced into agriculture. Whereas during the first years of the state's existence efforts were directed mainly toward the production of fresh food for local consumption, stress was later placed upon export crops and the replacement of imports, leading to the development of new branches of agriculture. In 1953 the cultivation of cotton and sugar beets was started, and by 1959 Israel was able not only to produce all its cotton requirements but also to export considerable quantities of raw cotton and finished products.³¹ During that period (1953-1959), locally grown sugar beets were able to satisfy about one-third of the local needs. Agricultural exports, which formerly consisted solely of citrus fruits, expanded to include peanuts, cotton, vegetables, and other fruits such as avocados, melons, and bananas (See Table 11).


Certain changes also took place in the patterns and systems of settlement adopted. In the early days of the state, when agricultural production was still mainly concerned with supplying fresh products to the local population, most farms were planned as mixed farms, whose principal products were vegetables, milk, and other fresh produce. For the transition to exports and industrial crops new farm types were evolved: field crop farms cultivating mainly industrial crops; citrus farms cultivating mainly citrus crops; and,

subsequently, export farms engaging chiefly in the production of export vegetables. These farm types were set up in both Moshavim (cooperative villages) and Kibbutzim (collective villages).

Concomitant with the changes in types of farming were modifications in the settlement system itself. In the past each settlement was isolated from the others. In 1954 the regional system was introduced: here a large number of agricultural villages were to be integrated into a planned regional system that would be based on a hierarchy of settlements, with clearly defined functional divisions.³² There were to be three levels, with centers at each, serving different purposes. First, the village itself with an A center (see diagram); at the second level, a rural center B to provide services to a group of villages, together forming a "composite rural structure"; and at the third level, a regional town C to serve the village groups of the entire region. Each village was to provide primarily everyday service facilities, a grocery, a synagogue, a kindergarten, and a dispensary. The rural center was meant to provide various types of producer and consumer services that are better shared by a large number of families, such as a primary school, a clinic, a cultural center, a general store for agricultural supplies, and a tractor station. It was situated within walking distance of each village that it served. The county town (center C) was meant to provide

Diagram Showing the Interrelationship
Between:

Village Center A
Rural Center B
Regional City C



Source: Aushalom Rokach, Regional and Rural Development (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest", 1964), p. 11.

services of a more elaborate nature such as can only be organized and maintained for a population larger than that catered to by the rural center. First, the town was to absorb the agricultural produce of the region that needed primary processing -- such as cotton, sugar beets, and peanuts -- and a cotton gin, a sugar refinery, etc. were to be constructed. The town was also to contain all the administrative, economic, and cultural apparatus for the entire region, local government offices, banks and credit institutions, a shopping center, a hall for concerts and theater performances, a secondary school, and the like.

The centralization of services for a number of villages was intended, first, for greater efficiency and lower costs, and secondly, to encourage the process of integration of different ethnic communities. Although each village was meant to be homogeneous in terms of the cultural background of its inhabitants, in order to make for greater stability, the centers provided an opportunity for intermingling. Children from all villages attended the same school, and adults met at various social events as well as at communal institutions such as the clinic, the tractor station, and the sorting shade. In the middle 1960's the regional settlement system embraced widespread parts of the country and was being expanded to new areas with a view to promoting social and economic consolidation and agricultural development.

Agricultural development during this period, unlike the

Yishuv period, does not serve as a symbol of pioneering and the "pure" life. Instead, it was geared to catering to the new social and economic needs of the population. Agriculture, thus, began to give priority to economic considerations over ideological ones, as can clearly be seen from the adoption of new types of farms and new forms of settlement.

Institutional Innovation. In one sense, all of Israel's institutions were the product of innovation, inasmuch as the political tradition of Israel as an independent nation was broken by 2,000 years of exile. The pioneers actually started to build the institutional framework from scratch. Most of the work was accomplished in the pre-state era, with the result that the state of Israel inherited an almost complete institutional framework. The judicial branch of the government was the only one to emerge after the establishment of the state which did not have roots in the semi-autonomous institutional framework of the Jewish population in Palestine. Only the rabbinical courts, as we saw earlier, operated in the Mandate period as well and had exclusive jurisdiction in areas concerning the personal status of individuals and internal Jewish affairs.³³ The civil judiciary system was handled exclusively by the Mandatory authorities. With the establishment of the state, courts of different instances were established and were granted jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases.³⁴ The rabbinical courts

retained the exclusive right to deal with matters of personal status of members of the Jewish community. The creation of the judicial system was accompanied by upward mobility on the part of lawyers.³⁵ In the pre-state era, lawyers were marginal compared to other professional groups, because they could not participate in and contribute to national revival and innovation in their professional capacities. In the state period, however, they became one of the most respected professional groups. We shall proceed to discuss bureaucratization in Israel as an illustration of innovation.

Bureaucratization in Israel: Earlier we have argued that bureaucratization can be treated as a form of innovation, since it constitutes a new organizational pattern, introduces new criteria for the selection of personnel, and fosters new types of social relations between the leadership and the constituency.

In Israel, institution-building was accompanied by a strong trend toward bureaucratization of both the government and other organizations and institutions. The governmental bureaucracy in its beginning drew mainly on the staffs of the Mandatory administration and the Jewish Agency, and it grew constantly (see Tables 12 and 13). Table 12 shows that up to 1953/54 the rate of increase of the administrative staff was higher than the growth rate of the population. Since 1953/54 the ratio of bureaucrats to the general population has been stabilized. Eisenstadt,³⁶ too, indicates

TABLE 13
Government Employees by Grades*

Year**	Workers		Professional Employees		Administrative Employees		Total	
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
1955	8,852	28.67	3,731	12.08	18,289	59.25	30,872	100.0
1957	9,297	28.27	4,454	13.54	19,138	58.19	32,889	100.0
1959	10,325	27.77	7,001	18.83	19,849	53.40	37,157	100.0
1960	10,880	28.12	8,174	21.12	19,637	50.76	38,691	100.0
1961	10,701	26.77	8,815	22.04	20,462	51.19	39,978	100.0
1962	10,489	54.74	10,084	24.71	20,165	49.50	40,738	100.0
1964	11,313	25.21	11,274	25.84	21,042	48.25	43,629	100.0

*Does not include policemen and prison warders

**End of March of each year

Source: Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract of Israel (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1965), p. 340-341.

that the number of government employees increased 1.6 times in the first twelve years of independence. The above data indicates great quantitative growth of the administrative governmental staff. However, compared to the general labor force the ratio of the government employees has remained unchanged over the years, and the salaries of government employees continue to represent six per cent of the national income (see Table 12).

Apart from the quantitative growth of the bureaucracy, an important aspect of bureaucratization in Israel was the attempt to establish a skilled and neutral body of bureaucrats, selected according to the relevant qualifications and without regard to their political affiliation. In order to create such a highly qualified administrative staff, the government introduced a variety of measures. A series of laws were adopted dealing with the various aspects of administrative staff, from the establishment of responsible bodies in charge of the administrative staff, to laws regulating appointments, dismissals, retirement, ethical standards of behavior, and the rights and duties of government employees.³⁷

Considerable stress has been laid upon training and guidance.³⁸ As early as 1953 Dr. Orvill E. Ault, a United Nations expert, served as a consultant to the government on training programs for employees. Today a great variety of courses are offered, and government employees are given financial incentives to participate in them. A series of tests have been devised to determine the qualifications of applicants

for vacant positions. Vacancies in the lower echelons of the administrative staff are filled through competition, while the higher positions are filled by political appointment. (For example, the Director General of each ministry is appointed).

The creation of an ethical code and behavioral standards for government employees was also one of the major concerns of the government. In 1956, with the initiative of the State Comptroller, a "Committee for the Investigation of Principles and Standards of Behavior of Public Employees" was established.³⁹ Its purpose has been to recommend guidelines for the behavior of government employees. The committee's recommendations for an ethical code included loyalty to the state and its laws, refraining from actions which might impair the employee's ability to act impartially (such as dealing with relatives or with corporations with which the employee was previously associated), maintaining secrecy, and refraining from public participation in political activities.

In addition to these trends, there has been a growing professionalization of the administrative staff. Eisenstadt⁴⁰ has demonstrated that the percentage of professionals among government employees has increased (see Table 13). Four scales for classifying public employees are in existence: the general administrative scale, the professional scale, the workers' scale, and a separate scale for policemen and prison warders. In 1960 professionals represented 21.1

per cent of all government employees, the administrative staff 50.8 per cent, and the workers 28.1 per cent. In 1961, professionals formed 22 per cent, administrative staff 51.1 per cent, and workers 26.7 per cent of state employees. In 1964, the proportion of professionals among government employees rose to 25.8 per cent, the proportion of administrative staff was reduced to 48.2 per cent, and the percentage of workers remained more or less stable (see Table 13). Professionals were not evenly distributed among the various ministries. There were ministries which by their very nature absorbed more professionals than others (the Ministry of Justice, for example). Despite attempts to create a neutral civil service, complete depoliticization has not been achieved, especially in the higher echelons of the administrative staff. As we saw earlier, the pattern of allocation of ministries and portfolios remained very much unchanged over the years. This "monopoly" of certain parties over certain ministries has led to purely political considerations in the allocation of the top positions in the administrative staff of these ministries, which in some cases has reduced the efficiency and lowered the quality of the services. It seems that ministries which, by the nature of the services they provide, must rely on professionals are more successful than the more political ministries in introducing bureaucratization in the Weberian sense.

The governmental administration was not the only agency

in which bureaucratization took place. With the establishment of the state some of the departments of the Jewish Agency were abolished. Later on, the Jewish Agency took charge of the absorption and settlement of immigrants. As a result, the number of Jewish Agency employees increased from 759 in 1946 to 4,437 in 1951, and to 4,444 in 1956. In 1960, the number of employees was reduced to 4,153, and it has not changed significantly since.⁴¹ The administrative staff of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) has increased from 6,000, with the establishment of the state, to 24,816 in 1961.⁴² The political parties, the municipal authorities, and many other organizations and institutions also show a trend of growing bureaucratization.

The introduction of a bureaucratic system in Israel clearly marks a shift from the voluntarism, decentralization, and the "ethos of the pioneer" which dominated institutional development in the pre-state period. Office holders are not selected for their "charisma" but rather by tests or on the basis of professional qualifications. Bureaucrats are more concerned with their own careers than with the achievement of collective goals.

Summary

We have discussed institution-building as logically and empirically involving three dimensions: institutional continuity; modification and change of existing institutions, and institutional innovation. It has been argued that each

of these dimensions could refer to any of the aspects of institutions, namely, to their organizational patterns, their personnel, and their central orientation. We have focused on bureaucratization as a form of innovation which involves changes in the organizational pattern of institutions, in the criteria of recruitment into office, and in the orientations which guide interaction between the bureaucrats and the constituency.

The various dimensions of institution-building were then illustrated through the analysis of cases drawn from the Israeli experience. As we have seen, continuity and the modification of existing institutional patterns have played an important role in institution-building in Israel, but innovations have also been introduced.

The general trend of institution-building in Israel is in the direction of normalization. There is a growing trend toward centralization, bureaucratization, and professionalization as a means of replacing decentralized voluntaristic organizations. But institution-building in Israel has not been free of conflicts. As we saw earlier, the centralization of the military and of the educational system was challenged by persons who opposed such a changed orientation. Opposition has also been voiced to certain patterns representing continuity, especially the issue of formal separation of state and religion, as we shall see in the next chapter. Nevertheless, despite some tensions and weaknesses, Israeli institutions have been successful as instruments for the implementation of the government's policies.

NOTES

1. See, Carl A. Dawson and Warner E. Gettys, An Introduction to Sociology (New York: The Ronald Press, 1929), p. 803. Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 58. Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior" in Alfred McClung Lee (ed.), Principles of Sociology (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1939), p. 99.
2. Examples of such works are: Reinhard Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964). James S. Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965). Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960).
3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 154-155.
4. Lucian Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), p. 16.
5. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Institutions," in The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: The Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), vol. 14, p. 409. This idea is also expressed in Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 52.

6. Almond and Coleman, op. cit., pp. 99-106.
7. Bendix, op. cit., p. 107.
8. Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, op. cit., p. 75.
9. Ibid., p. 51.
10. Ibid., p. 54.
11. Ibid., p. 70.
12. The characteristics of bureaucracy as an ideal type are discussed in Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, op. cit., pp. 333-334.
13. Ibid., p. 334.
14. Anthony H. M. Kirk-Green "Bureaucratic Cadres in Traditional Milieu," in James S. Coleman (ed.), Education and Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 372-407. See also Coleman's introduction to the book.
15. Ibid., p. 358.
16. J. N. Matars, Social Change in Israel (Chicago: Adline, 1965), p. 86.
17. Ibid., p. 86.
18. Asher Zidon, Beit Ha'nivcharim (the House of Representatives) (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Achiasaf, 1964), pp. 321-337, 498-500.
19. Matras, op. cit., p. 86.
20. Asher Zidon, op. cit., pp. 382-391, has shown that out of 58 cases of changes in the personnel composition of

the Knesset, from the first to the sixth Knesset (1949-1966) 28 cases were due to death.

21. Dan Horowitz, "Bein Chevra Chalutzit Le'kechol Ha'goyim," (Between "pioneering" society and a "normal" one) Molad, vol. 19, no. 146/7, Oct. 1960, pp. 413-432.
22. Daniel Dagan, Maariv, 1.12.1971, p. 17.
23. Election Law for the Knesset, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1959), p. 114, Article 18.
24. Ibid., Article 37.
25. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Theoretical Conditions of the Development of Voluntary Associations - A Case Study of Israel," in Roberto Eachi (ed.), Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1956), vol. 3, pp. 104-125.
26. Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 413-432.
27. Amitai Etzioni, "Agrarianism in Israel's Party System," Canadian Journal of Economics and Politics, vol. xxiii, no. 3, 1957, p. 370.
28. Ibid., p. 370.
29. Raphael Patai (ed.), Encyclopedia of Zionism and Israel (2 vols.; New York: Herzl Press and McGraw-Hill, 1971), I, p. 6.
30. Ibid., p. 6.
31. Ibid., p. 8.
32. Avshalom Rokach, Regional Rural Development (Jerusalem: "Israel Digest, 1964), p. 9.

33. The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, Article 53. In Yehezkiel Dror and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.), The Government of Israel (Jerusalem: The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, 1961), p. 22.
34. Law of the Courts, 1957, Sefer Chukim, op. cit., 1957, p. 148.
35. S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1967), p. 135.
36. Ibid., p. 245.
37. Dror and Gutmann, op. cit., pp. 330-402.
38. Annual Report of the State Comptroller, no. 10, for the fiscal year 1958/59 (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1959).
39. Dror and Gutmann, op. cit., pp. 344-348.
40. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., p. 247.
41. Ibid., p. 248.

CHAPTER 7

THE ROLE OF AMBIGUITY IN THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF NATION-STATES: THE CASE OF THE EMERGING ISRAELI CONSTITUTION

The institutionalization of nationalist movements marks the emergence of a new social order. A basic assumption of sociological theory is that the existence of specific and explicit guidelines for the operation of individuals and groups is an essential element of the social order. Ambiguity, or the lack of such explicit guidelines, is held to result in deviancy, "collective behavior," and the malfunctioning of individuals and institutions.

Durkheim, for example, assigns to society the role of controlling the unlimited desires of individuals by setting explicit limits. This is important, according to Durkheim, because unlimited desires are insatiable, and insatiability is a sign of morbidity.¹ According to Durkheim men could never consent to restrict their desires. Therefore, "Either directly or as a whole, or through the agency of one of its organs, society alone can play this moderating role; for it is the only moral power superior to the individual, the authority of which he accepts. It alone has the power to stipulate law and to set the point beyond which passions must not go."² It is through the imposition of explicit boundaries that society exercises moral authority over individuals and regulates their activities and expectations, thus maintaining social order. Durkheim says concerning

anomie, which is the opposite of social order, "...when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or by beneficent but abrupt transition, it is momentarily incapable of exercising this influence..."³ Clear and explicit guidelines, then, are essential for the maintenance of social order, and the lack of such limiting guidelines will result in anomie.

The idea that explicit and specific guidelines are essential for restoring the social order is also emphasized by Parsons. The social order, according to Parsons, is maintained by the existence of a shared value orientation, an institutionalized set of role-expectations which regulates interaction among actors, and by the commitment of actors to the fulfillment of relevant expectations. Anomie, which is the polar antithesis of social order, is the result of "...the absence of structural complementarity of the interaction process [lack of clearly defined role expectations] or...the complete breakdown of the normative order..."⁴ In other words, the social order is based upon complementarity, and complementarity is based on the existence of a clear and explicit definition of norms, roles, etc.

Coser,⁵ when discussing the positive functions of conflict, submits that conflict with outgroups usually strengthens group cohesiveness by emphasizing the group's separateness vis-a-vis other groups. In other words, conflicts are helpful in clearly defining the boundaries between groups, thus contributing to cohesion, unity, and conformity of a group's members. Clarity of boundaries among groups

becomes an important ingredient of the social order.

The view that explicit guidelines are essential becomes even more pronounced when analysis is focused on elements of the social order. Eisenstadt⁶ regards institutions as regulative principles which organize most of the activities in a society into definite patterns in terms of some of some of the basic problems of any society. Berger and Luckmann express the same idea: "Institutions also, by the very fact of their existence, control human conduct by setting up pre-defined patterns of social conduct which channel it in one direction as against the many other directions that could theoretically be possible."⁷

In discussions of the concept of role, the notion of clarity is again stressed. Turner⁸ emphasizes roles as providing a comprehensive pattern for behavior and attitudes, a strategy for coping with recurrent situations; a major basis for the identification and placement of individuals in society, and a basis for evaluating the performance of individuals. Linton, too, stresses the regulative function of roles, arguing that they provide "...models for organizing the attitudes and behavior of the individual so that these will be congruous with those of other individuals participating in the same expression of that pattern."⁹

Znaniecki also emphasizes that a role involves "...definite duties which participants in his social circle expect him /the role occupant/ to perform."¹⁰ Role theories in the symbolic interaction tradition allow for somewhat greater

flexibility. Instead of suggesting that the individual plays a role defined exclusively by society, Baldwin, Cooley, Mead, and more recently Goffman, suggest that the individual imagines himself to be the kind of person that he believes others judge him to be, and he acts out his roles accordingly. In other words, an individual can play the same role in different ways depending on his "audience." While a certain amount of ambiguity with reference to mutual expectations exists at the beginning of the interaction process, these mutual expectations are revealed and articulated through interaction. Although clarity is not a pre-condition to interaction according to this approach, it is still important for the success of the process and for the satisfaction of the people involved.

Sociologists have recognized the positive role of ambiguity in certain cases as an exception to the rule. Parsons is aware that ambiguity "...can provide loopholes for those whose motivational pattern leans to non-conformity, in that the very indefiniteness of expectations makes it impossible to draw a rigid line between conformity and deviance, since this is a matter of 'interpretation'."¹¹ The same idea is expressed by Newcomb, who considers ambiguity to be a "...phenomenon permitting wide latitude of sanction-free behavior."¹² Ambiguity thus makes roles more flexible and less of a straight jacket for individuals, and it serves as a safety valve allowing some "steam" to escape. Ambiguity is also considered an important innovative mechanism, in

that it enables a person to be defined as an innovator rather than as a deviant, and it allows widespread acceptance of the innovator's behavior.¹³

More appropriate than the traditional approach, which views clarity and ambiguity as dichotomous, is an approach that considers degrees of clarity and ambiguity. This latter has the advantage of allowing us to examine and seek to determine the positive and negative consequences of clarity and ambiguity, depending on the specific situation. For it is impossible to state as a rule that clarity always has positive consequences and ambiguity negative ones. And it is difficult to correlate different degrees of clarity and ambiguity with their consequences under a variety of conditions. The problems of measuring clarity and ambiguity are compounded by the fact that they are not merely structural but also psychological phenomena in the sense that identically structured situations may be perceived differently by different individuals or differently by the same individual at different times.

In our analysis of institutionalization thus far the importance of clarity has been emphasized. We have stressed the attempts of the leadership to direct the emergence of a new social order by establishing clear and specific guidelines. In discussing the process of monopolization, we stressed the importance of setting clear boundaries among various organizations and groups as a means of achieving monopoly of the polity and as a way of banning competitive

groups. In analyzing legitimation we pointed up the need for an explicit statement of the central values of society so as to foster their universal acceptance within it. The role of the legal system in explicitly defining the relations between the polity and the constituency was also emphasized. And in our discussion of the process of institution-building, we stressed the regulative function of institutions in organizing the various spheres of social life.

Clarity thus plays a central role in the institutionalization of nationalist movements. It is our argument, however, that ambiguity also supports the emergence of a new social order, and that, in fact, the processes of institutionalization cannot be fully understood without discussing the function of ambiguity. There are a variety of reasons for this situation. During the period of institutionalization there are many rival groups sustaining different sets of values and norms and differing images of the emerging social order. Often, old and new legal codes exist simultaneously. Ambiguity is functional in enabling these contradictory elements to co-exist without serious conflict. Thus ambiguity contributes to the unity of action and to the inculcation of a sense of national unity among rival groups; in so doing ambiguity supports the monopoly and legitimacy of the polity as it attempts to build institutions.

We propose to illustrate the positive and negative consequences of ambiguity during the period of institutionalization through the analysis of the case of the emerging

Israeli constitution. A constitution, we argue, is a legal document whose major function is to provide clarity and order in social life. Constitutions typically begin with a declaration of the fundamental principles and values of society, which serve as the basis for the development of the legal system and other institutional spheres. Constitutions also define the boundaries among the various branches of government and formalize the rights and duties of the citizens in their relations with the polity, and those of the polity in its relations to the constituency; these broad principles are translated into laws. The struggle over whether or not to promulgate a written constitution in Israel represented a conflict between those who sought to maintain ambiguity, through fear of the conflicts that might be generated by clarity, and those who insisted upon the need for clarity.

History of The Struggle Over the Constitution in Israel

Recognition on the part of the polity of the dangers involved in clarity came only gradually. In Israel, realization of the need for a constitution was widespread after the Declaration of Independence. It was generally agreed at that time that the adoption of a constitution was one of Israel's first tasks as an independent state. Indeed, the First Knesset (Parliament) was elected by the people to serve as a Constitutional Assembly for the purpose of drafting a written constitution, as is clearly stated in

the Transitional Ordinance to the Constitutional Assembly - 1949.¹⁴ Instead, it changed its own status to that of a legislature and did not draft a written constitution. The Transitional Law - 1949 states that "The legislature of the State of Israel will be called 'the Knesset', the Constitutional Assembly will be called 'the First Knesset', the members of the Assembly will be called 'Knesset Members'".¹⁵ The legal right of the Assembly to change its status was based on Article 3 of the Transitional Ordinance to the Constitutional Assembly - 1949 which states that "The Constitutional Assembly will have the same authority held by the Provisional National Council, so long as it does not decide otherwise." In other words, the Constitutional Assembly was regarded as a sovereign institution which could decide upon its own status.

Following the decision of the Constitutional Assembly to convert itself into the Legislature, passionate debates took place both in the Knesset and in public, focusing on the issue of whether or not Israel should adopt a comprehensive written constitution as one of its first priorities. The basic difficulty in drafting a constitution in Israel was the variety of many controversial issues upon which a constitution would have to take a stand. The image of the state and its central values was the most controversial issue. As was noted earlier, different images of the state were held by different groups. While religious groups sought full domination of traditional law, non-religious groups

urged full separation of church and state. Left-wing parties wanted to affirm socialist principles, while the right wing hoped for the emergence of a capitalist society based on private enterprise. The debate over the constitution, then "...touches upon the nature, the essence, and the spirit of the Jewish people; it involves a discussion of the past and the present of the people and of its aspirations for the future. In other words, it is a debate over what makes a conglomeration of individuals into a united nation."¹⁶ Again, as noted earlier, there was the issue of establishing the sovereignty of the polity and its monopoly of power in the face of the plurality of organizations that were involved in various activities voluntarily and independently. A constitution should have drawn the boundaries between groups, decided on the continuation of some and abolition of others, and have regulated the activities of those which continued to exist. Our discussion of the unification of the military and of the educational system¹⁷ provided examples of the controversial issues involved in monopolization.

Moreover, as we saw in the historical chapters, these issues were not new but represent the revival of old controversies that had existed in the WZO. The co-existence of opposing ideas in the WZO was also facilitated by ambiguity--by the adoption of broad and general resolutions. The approach ultimately taken by the Knesset resembles that taken in the past by the WZO. The debates in the Knesset were not focused on the controversial issues themselves

but rather on the issue of whether or not Israel should have a constitution at all, and, if so, how soon and through what procedures.

Let us summarize the major arguments that have been raised in support of and in opposition to the drafting of a constitution.¹⁸ Those in favor argued that the U.N. General Assembly Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, called for the adoption of a constitution. Article 9 of the resolution states that "The provisional Government of each state should hold democratic elections for a Constitutional Assembly, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the British,"¹⁹ and Article 10 specifies that "The Constitutional Assembly of each state should draft a democratic constitution for its state..."²⁰ Israel had accepted this resolution and in its Declaration of Independence stated that "...until the establishment of the permanent and elected authorities according to a constitution which will be drafted by the elected Constitutional Assembly not later than October 1, 1948, the National Council will operate as the Provisional State Council, and its executive body will operate as the Provisional Government of the Jewish state which will be called Israel."²¹ Furthermore, Israelis had gone to the polls to elect a Constitutional Assembly on the understanding that its function would be the drafting of a constitution. It was thus a failure of the Assembly's responsibility to the electorate if it neglected to perform the task for which it had been elected.

This argument was stressed by one Knesset member, Begin, of Cherut (literally, freedom), a right-wing party:

"We [the members of the Knesset] were elected to serve as a Constitutional Assembly, and the concept of a Constitutional Assembly is not an abstract one, it is clearly defined from both the historical and the legal perspectives. The primary function of any Constitutional Assembly is to draft a constitution. Upon the completion of this task, the Constitutional Assembly dissolves, and on the basis of the constitution which was drafted, a Parliament is being elected... If members of the government changed their minds with respect to having a constitution, the only right course of action would be to hold a referendum, asking the authorization of the public to refrain from drafting a written constitution."²²

A constitution, it was also argued, would prevent the usurpation of power by any branch of the government by setting boundaries of authority and responsibility, and thus would guarantee the fundamental freedoms and the basic rights of individuals. This view was also stressed by Begin, who argued: "We want a law based on freedom and justice, a law which will serve as a barrier to arbitrariness in dealing with citizens irrespective of their life philosophy. We want a law which will stand above the government and even above the legislature. This is the essence of a constitution, and we shall therefore struggle to have a written constitution."²³ Those favoring a constitution also stressed that a constitution would symbolize Israel's national unity in the face of the great diversity of ideologies, sub-cultures, and ways of life of the population. The educational value of a constitution was also emphasized. A constitution would educate citizens in respect for the law and the state's institutions, and in understanding their obligations and

rights as citizens. This was of special importance in Israel, many of whose immigrants had not traditionally participated in the political process in their countries of origin. It was also argued by leftist party members that a constitution should "...socialize the generation which will have to combat the counter-revolution."²⁴ Those who favored a written constitution were aware that such could not be written without internal struggles. They argued, however, that it was best to have one major fight and settle things once and for all. The alternative would be a series of small battles over each emerging issue.

Those who argued against the adoption of a constitution (especially members of Mapai and the religious parties) were afraid that it might precipitate a "Kulturkampf," aggravating hostilities at a time when national unity was the first requirement. Rabbi Isaac Meir Levin remarked that he found it strange "that many members of the Knesset believe that this is the right time to draft a constitution, and this is the right time to create conflicts, while we are struggling with military, political, economic, and organizational problems."²⁵ Ben-Gurion urged that the drafting of a constitution should await the "ingathering of exiles." The Jewish population of Israel, he argued, represents only a small part of World Jewry, and it must not impose its ideas on the future "ingathered" population. The extremist orthodox Jews argued that the only constitution Israel required was the Torah (the Bible). Rabbi Isaac Meir Levin argued

that the religious Jews do not object to the idea of drafting a constitution; however "...the constitution of the State of Israel should be an Israeli constitution. It should be our own, not borrowed from others...it is better not to have a constitution at all than have a constitution based on elements which are alien to the spirit of Judaism."²⁶ A more extremist position was taken by Knesset member Zerach Varhaftig who submitted that "We are known as the People of the book throughout the world, and no other 'visiting card' is needed."²⁷ The most militant position was adopted by Knesset member Meir David Levinstein, who demanded "...Let us all rise and declare that the Torah (Bible) of Israel is the constitution of Israel...From the historic and eternal viewpoint of Judaism, any other constitution is unacceptable."²⁸ Others, (mostly members of Mapai) felt the benefits were illusory, dangers real. Pointing to countries which nominally possessed democratic constitutions that were not applied in reality, and to the rise of Hitler in Weimarian Germany and facisism in the constitutional monarchy of Italy, they asserted that a constitution had no real value in preventing the usurpation of power and guaranteeing the freedoms and rights of individuals. It was also argued that the basic values and laws guiding the operation of various institutions had been defined. The Declaration of Independence asserts that the state will be based on freedom, justice, and peace; that it will insure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion,

race, or sex; that it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture. If individual freedom was secured by the Declaration of Independence,²⁹ the basis for the machinery of legislation and government had been laid by the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948, and by the Transitional Law of 1949 with its various amendments. The Law and Administration Ordinance - 1948³⁰ regulated the various spheres of social life until the emergence of permanent and elected authorities and until the legislation of various laws. It dealt with the various branches of government, the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with budget and taxation, the municipal authorities, and the armed forces. The laws embodied in the volume, Transitional Laws,³¹ regulated the transition from one Knesset to the other and this set of laws was later replaced by that contained in Fundamental Law: The Knesset - 1958.³² On these grounds, therefore, some felt that it was not urgent to draft a constitution. Overall, the right and the extreme left were for the adoption of a constitution, while Mapai and the religious parties were against its adoption.

On June 13, 1950, a resolution was adopted to the effect that

"The First Knesset commissions the Committee on Constitution, Law, and Justice ~~one~~ of the permanent committees of the Knesset/ to prepare a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution should be constructed in Chapters in such a way that each of them should be a fundamental law in itself. The chapters should be brought before the Knesset as the Committee

finishes its work on each, and all the chapters together should be combined into a constitution for the state."³³

This resolution represented a compromise. It could not antagonize any of the groups with different images of the state for it says nothing about the expected nature of the constitution. It satisfied both those in favor of the adoption of a constitution and those in favor of postponing the issue by actually favoring both courses simultaneously.

In spite of the above resolution, in 1971, twenty-three years after the establishment of the state and twenty-one years after the adoption of the resolution, Israel has only four fundamental laws.³⁴ The first, published as Fundamental Law: The Knesset, was adopted in 1958, ten years after the establishment of the state. The second, appearing in Fundamental Law: The Lands of the State of Israel, was adopted in 1960. The third, published as Fundamental Law: The President of the State, was adopted in 1964, and in 1968 the fourth was embodied in Fundamental Law: The Government and passed. These laws basically reaffirm the status quo as constituted in the earlier laws that were replaced. The law embodied in Fundamental Law: The Lands of the State of Israel declares that the people own the land and that this ownership is not transferable. Basically then, controversial issues have thus far been avoided. Those persons who pressed for the adoption of a comprehensive written constitution are disenchanted with the pace of adoption of the fundamental laws, and their disenchantment is

typically expressed during discussions over proposed laws in the Knesset, in the opening session of each newly elected Knesset, and during the election campaigns.³⁵

In effect, persons who advocated maintaining ambiguity have triumphed over those who fought to establish clarity through the writing of a constitution. However, despite the absence of a written constitution one cannot say that total ambiguity prevails. Traditions of self-government emerged in the pre-state period through the operation of the semi-autonomous institutions of the Jewish population of Palestine. There were also widely shared values rooted in Zionist ideology, in the dominant ideological orientation as articulated by the Second Aliya, and in the Jewish religion. In addition, the Israeli Knesset has legislated to regulate the various spheres of social life and to replace Ottoman and British legislation. Only with reference to controversial issues, especially those concerning the status of the Jewish religion in Israel, has ambiguity been maintained.

The Social Significance and Consequences of the Struggle

In Israel, the attempt to avoid certain controversial issues and to maintain ambiguity in reference to them has had both positive and negative consequences. The main positive result has been the contribution to unity and stability. The government's stability has in turn supported its claim to monopoly over the use of power and its attempts to erect institutions. This unity, in any case crucial

during the period of institutionalization, is of special significance in Israel, where no party has ever won a majority, (The largest part, Mapai, has drawn only between 33% and 39% of the vote, and the Cabinet (Memshala) is thus necessarily based on a coalition of a wide spectrum of parties.) Ambiguity in the Israeli Cabinet, just as earlier in the WZO, has enabled opposing parties to co-exist and has permitted unity of action. The specific conditions under which the state existed have also functioned to maximize the positive consequences of ambiguity. The Arab threat and the struggle for existence, as well as the unplanned flood of immigrants into the country, along with other economic, social, and cultural problems, have all created urgent problems which have had to be given highest priority. These issues have had to be dealt with through the united efforts of the collectivity, and controversial issues have therefore been necessarily postponed. External pressures explain the fact that ambiguity has persisted so long without resulting in major tensions and widespread alienation.

Since the postponement of issues does not always eliminate them, ambiguity in Israel has had negative consequences as well. In Israel the struggle shifted from the Knesset to the "political market" in the sense that instead of pressing for the inclusion or the exclusion of certain principles in a constitution, a process of political bargaining was substituted through which each party tries to obtain a larger slice of the "social pie." Each party

conditions its participation in the governmental coalition upon the acquisition of certain benefits or threatens to leave the coalition unless certain demands are met. It is our argument that through such a process of political bargaining situations are created which, once the external pressures are removed, constitute potential foci for future conflicts and struggles. In other words, while ambiguity in Israel has its positive consequences as far as short-term goals are concerned, problems are initiated with respect to long-term goals. As we shall see, the problems created have the potential of alienating large segments of the population, whose dissatisfaction in turn may threaten the legitimacy of the government.

Let us illustrate the above argument by discussing "facts" created through political bargaining with reference to the issue of state and religion in Israel. It seems clear that once external pressures are removed, major conflicts will arise with relation to this area.

State and Religion in Israel

Religion in Israel performs a positive unifying function in providing Jews of different ethnic and cultural backgrounds with a common bond, and in serving as a common denominator for Israelis and World Jewry. However, religion also operates as a tension-creating factor. The conflict is basically between non-religious segments, who regard religion as a private individual matter rather than as an

integral part of the state institutional web, and the religious sector, whose goal is domination of traditional law in Israel. This controversy, as we have seen, is not a new one. Conflicts between religious and secular interpretations of Zionism arose in the Hovevei-Zion movement, which operated in Russia in the 1880's and 1890's, and continued in the WZO, where religious Jews organized as a separate faction under the name Mizrachi. The cleavage within orthodoxy led to a crisis in 1911, and as a result part of the Mizrachi split from the WZO and together with other ultra-orthodox groups formed the Agudat Israel, which developed a clear anti-Zionist ideology. Conflicts between religious and secular groups also took place in Knesset Israel. The gap closed only after the establishment of the state, when the Agudat Israel joined the governmental coalition, only to fight for full domination of the traditional law in Israel within the system.

Since the state of Israel does not have a constitution, the relations between state and church are not formally defined. To a large extent the situation which existed during the Period of the British Mandate has been maintained.³⁶ During the period of the Mandate (1920-1948) recognition was given to various religious groups, allowing them control over matters related to the personal status of their members. Article 51 of The Palestine Order in Council, 1922 clearly states that

"Subject to the provisions of Articles 64 to 67

inclusive jurisdiction in matters of personal status shall be exercised in accordance with the provisions of this Part by the Courts of the religious communities established and exercising jurisdiction at the date of this order. For the purpose of these provisions matters of personal status mean suits regarding marriage or divorce, alimony, maintenance, guardianship, legitimation and adoption of minors, inhibition from dealing with property of persons who are legally incompetent, successions, wills and legacies, and the administration of the property of absent people."³⁷

Presently in Israel there is no formal separation of state and religion; on the other hand there is no "state religion" which might give its adherents certain benefits. This is the official situation; however, the political parties, through a process of bargaining, achieved certain benefits which affect not only the religious segment but in some cases the broader secular population as well. First of all, the rabbinical courts have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce. No civil marriages are available in Israel. This situation is considered by some individuals to be an impingement on privacy. In 1950 the Anti-religious Coercion League was formed,³⁸ one of whose demands was that civil marriages be made available for people who wish to take advantage of them. In the absence of civil marriages, until the middle of 1970, 384 couples married in Cyprus, about 214 underwent a "Mexican marriage" (obtaining a marriage certificate from Mexican rabbis), 100 couples married through private ceremonies in the Kibbutz, and about 50 couples signed a private marriage contract.³⁹ Most of the people who took advantage of the possibility of civil marriage in Cyprus could not marry according to the Jewish orthodox

law, which does not permit "mixed marriage," or the marriage of a Jew and a non-Jew, the marriage of priests to divorcees, etc.

Not only the rabbinical courts, but also religious education enjoy benefits in Israel. As we saw earlier, the State Educational Law of 1953 depoliticized the educational system. However, the law distinguishes between State Schools and Religious State Schools. "'Religious State Education' is State Education, but its schools are observant of orthodox precepts as to way of life, curriculum, teachers, and inspectors."⁴⁰ This arrangement provides for the comprehensive religious education of children from orthodox families, while on the other hand it does not impose religious instruction upon those who do not want it. To regulate State religious education the law states that

"A Council on Religious State Education will be formed. Members of the Council will be appointed by the Minister of Education with the authorization of the government for a period of four years. Two members will be appointed by the Minister; six members will be selected from a list of twelve candidates which will be submitted by the Minister of Religious Affairs; three members will be chosen from a list of at least six candidates submitted, according to regulations, by orthodox teachers' organizations, and three members will be chosen to represent the religious members of the Educational Committee."⁴¹

It is within the powers of the Council on Religious State Education "...to reject on religious grounds alone the appointment or the continuation of service of principals, inspectors, and teachers in State Religious Educational Institutions..."⁴² In other words, religious education

enjoys great autonomy, and despite the attempts to depoliticize the educational system, political influence can be indirectly applied. Moreover, similar benefits were denied to the "workers' stream" of education, which was eliminated altogether in the cities. Only the collective settlements continued to maintain their unique educational system and educational practices. The State Educational Law also provides for so-called "recognized" schools. These are not State Schools but rather private parochial schools, most of which are affiliated with the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel. These schools receive partial financial support from the state. In other words, private parochial schools are supported by public funds, supported by taxpayers, who have no say in the expenditure of these funds.

The religious parties were also successful in obtaining certain advantages with respect to military service and the promotion of religious tradition in public life. Girls who are religious and wish to be exempt from military service can simply declare that they are orthodox; also, male students of Yeshivoth are very rarely drafted. This is in spite of the fact that facilities for religious observance exist in the army: these include Kosher kitchens, synagogues, and permission for observance of Shabbat and holidays, subject to the exigencies of security. Exemption is not on the basis of conscientious objection to war and indeed, conscientious objectors are jailed. The religious parties also pressed for the adoption of certain laws which are in

accord with the orthodox image of the state. To mention only a few, the raising of pigs (which are not Kosher) has been restricted to areas where the non-Jewish population is concentrated. On Shabbat and on Jewish holidays there is no public transportation (with the exception of Haifa which is a "workers fortress"), and all businesses except for restaurants and recreational facilities are closed by law. Many segments of the population reject the government's support of religious tradition in public life, as indicated by the following table. (Table 14)

TABLE 14

Respondents by Personal Religious Observance and by Opinions
Concerning Ties Between Government and Religion
(Percent Distribution)

	Favor Government Promotion of Religious Tradi- tion in Public Life	Reject Government Promotion of Religious Tradi- tion in Public Life	Total
Personally Religious	22	6	28
Personally Secular or Partially Observant	19	49	68
Total	41	55	96

Source: A. Antonovsky, "Israeli Political-Social Attitudes,"
Amot, No. 6, June-July 1963, p. 12.

The table shows that 55 per cent of the respondents rejected the promotion of tradition in public life and considered religion to be a private sphere. Moreover, Matras⁴³ presents some data to support the contention that a secularization trend of considerable proportions is developing in Israel in the traditional segments of the population.

The above analysis shows that through the process of bargaining in the political arena, religious parties have been able to promote religious traditions in public life, despite the growing trend to secularization in traditionalist segments of the population. It is our argument that major conflicts may emerge once external threats are removed. Eisenstadt stated that, following the Six Day War, "...people have not become more religious. The religious groups have become more aggressive. They try to cash in on the war as the custodians of God and say 'this was such a great Miracle'." ⁴⁴

Apart from the anticipated struggles, actual ones have already taken place as a result of the absence of a definition of the status of religion in Israel. The conflicts have touched upon the very definition of the collectivity, or, as the problem has been stated, "Who is a Jew?" ⁴⁵

According to Jewish orthodox law, religion and nationality are inseparable. In other words, the status of a Jew represents simultaneously religion and nationality. According to the Halacha, (Jewish orthodox law) a person is considered to be Jewish only if his mother was Jewish (and even if the father was non-Jewish), or if he converts to Judaism

according to orthodox procedures. The problem first emerged when the categories of religion and nationality were separated for the purpose of the 1948 census where respondents were asked to state their religion and nationality. Members of the Provisional State Council were obviously unaware at the time that the category of nationality would involve complex juridical problems and conflicts between orthodox and non-orthodox definitions of the collectivity. The separation of the two categories was made essentially for administrative purposes. From the administrative point of view, this information was necessary in order to determine the status of individuals with reference to the Law of Return - 1950⁴⁶ and the Law of Citizenship - 1952.⁴⁷ The Law of Return grants the Jews Israeli citizenship almost upon arrival; it recognizes their historical right to return to their homeland. The Law of Citizenship, deals with other procedures for obtaining Israeli citizenship, which apply mostly to non-Jewish immigrants and to non-Jewish minority groups. It was also necessary for security reasons, as expressed by Ben-Gurion that "Our special conditions, which do not allow for full control of infiltration from hostile neighboring Arab countries, makes it necessary that each legitimate resident of the state should be able to identify himself by a certificate given to him by the authorized agency."⁴⁸ Israeli residents are required to carry with them at all times "identification cards", which among other things, state their religion and nationality.

The religious parties constantly objected to the administrative regulations for registration, demanding to adopt the religious criteria for determining of "Who is a Jew?" On January 10, 1958⁴⁹ it was decided that those born to Jewish mothers who did not practice another religion, or those properly converted to Judaism, would be registered as Jews. However, on March 1958, Ben-Yehuda, then Minister of the Interior, suggested that any person who honestly declared himself to be a Jew would be registered as Jew without demanding any further proof.⁵⁰ Since this version was unacceptable to the religious parties, a modified version was adopted on June 22, 1958,⁵¹ stating that a person honestly declaring himself to be a Jew, who is not a member of another religion, will be registered as a Jew. The government also decided that if father and mother declare their child to be a Jew he should be registered as a Jew. However, this modified version was also unacceptable to the religious parties which left the government coalition. At that point, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion felt that the issue is more than a political or an administrative one, and he sent a letter to Jewish intellectuals, writers, Rabbis and non-orthodox Jews all over the world, seeking their advice with reference to the issue of religion and nationality. Out of forty-five responses, thirty-seven clearly objected to the separation of religion and nationality in Judaism.⁵² Simultaneously with requesting the advice of prominent Jews, and in order to deal with the

governmental crisis, the government decided that

"A committee of three (The Prime-Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of the Interior) will be formed to examine the regulations for the registration of children born of 'mixed marriages' whose parents wish to register them as Jews. The committee will seek the advice of the 'Sages of Israel' in Israel and abroad, and will form registration regulations which will satisfy the various religious and non-religious segments of the population, and which will be suitable for the special conditions of the state of Israel as a Jewish sovereign state which guarantees the freedom of religion and conscience, and which serves as the center for the 'ingathering of exiles'."53

After the election to the fourth Knesset, a new government was formed on December 16, 1959 by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion. The Ministry of the Interior, which is in charge of registration, passed from the hands of left-wing party (Achdat Ha'Avoda-Poalei Zion) to the hands of the religious wing, and remained the domain of the religious parties ever since. On January 10, 1960 the new Minister of the Interior, Chaim Moshe Shapira, issued registration regulations which overlapped completely with the Halacha. These regulations stipulated that with reference to the items of religion and nationality, a Jew is a person whose mother was Jewish and who does not practice another religion; or, a person who converted to Judaism according to orthodox procedures.⁵⁵ In other words, while the status of religion in Israel was not determined in principle, religious parties through the exertion of political pressures have gained a key position in determining the boundaries of the corporate group. The power of the Ministry of the Interior to determine "Who is a Jew?" obviously is more than administrative power.

The problem of "Who is a Jew?" was not an academic one. Since among immigrants there were cases of "mixed marriages" and various other problems concrete cases were repeatedly tried by the courts. Typically the issue has been the claim of individuals that injustice was done to them by expelling them from the collectivity and by denying them the rights granted to Jews upon the Law of Return. One of the most significant and interesting cases, which focused attention on the issue of state and religion, was that of brother Daniel,⁵⁶ a Jew who fought the Germans and saved many Jewish lives and who converted to Catholicism, became a monk and joined a monastery in Israel. Upon arrival (1958) he asked for Israeli citizenship on the basis of the Law of Return which grants automatic Israeli citizenship to Jews. Brother Daniel claimed that his nationality was Jewish, although he had converted to another religion. The Ministry of the Interior refused to register him as a Jew, and his appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected on the basis of the administrative regulations of July 20, 1958 which recognize as being Jewish people who honestly declare themselves to be Jewish, and who do not practice another religion. Shulamit Alony, a lawyer and a Knesset member tells in a recent book about more cases which are related to the definition of the collectivity, and which resulted in frustrations of individuals and families. One such case is that of a person born in Rumania to a Jewish father and a non-Jewish mother, who raised him as a Jew. Moreover,

he was treated by the Nazis as Jewish and suffered in concentration camps for being a Jew. In Israel the Ministry of Interior refused to register him as a Jew. According to Alony's account, the person's reaction was "I'll never carry a passport or an identification card which states my religion or nationality to be other than Jewish. I have lived my whole life as a Jew and was persecuted for being Jewish, and I don't want to become an outcast again."⁵⁷

There are many such cases which represent the same issue: should the boundaries of the collectivity be determined by religious orthodox law or by secular criteria. It seems that a large segment of the population feels that, in view of immigration from many different countries and a great variety of backgrounds, it is necessary to be more flexible and that the subjective feelings of the individual and his identification with the collectivity should count more than strict orthodox laws. The religious segment feels that the orthodox definition of the collectivity maintained and preserved the Jewish people throughout the centuries and should be maintained.

As we have seen, one of the major negative consequences of ambiguity in Israel will be conflicts between religious and secular trends. This ambiguity has already culminated in conflicts, and through the creation of facts which alienate large segments of the population, will most likely result in more conflicts in the future.

Summary

Counter to the general approach taken by sociologists that the emergence and the maintenance of the social order are greatly assisted by the existence of specific and explicit guidelines, and are disturbed by ambiguity, we have shown that ambiguity plays a central role as well. Ambiguity, it has been argued, supports monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building especially in so far as it permits rival orientations and groups to co-exist and to act for common goals. Throughout the work we saw that institutionalization is accompanied by tensions and conflicts. Ambiguity, thus, becomes a central mechanism for coping with tensions, enabling the emergence of a new social order to proceed.

The role of ambiguity in the institutionalization of nationalist movements and its positive and negative consequences were demonstrated through the analysis of the case of the emerging Israeli constitution. We saw that while ambiguity maintains unity among rival groups, issues are being postponed not eliminated. Postponing issues does not necessarily maintain the status quo. On the contrary, the absence of fixed principles permits the creation of facts through processes of political bargaining, facts which could result in future conflicts.

In general, ambiguity seems to have positive consequences in social spheres which are both central and controversial, whereas clarity or specificity appears to be

workable in areas which are relatively marginal and/or over which a wide consensus exists. These areas vary from one society to another depending upon the specific conditions within each society. From the Israeli case it appears that ambiguity is especially functional under conditions of great segmentation and diversity. The maintenance of ambiguity in Israel was greatly assisted by the existence of external pressures and a variety of internal problems which focused attention on more urgent issues.

NOTES

1. Emile Durkheim, Suicide (New York: Free Press, 1951), p. 247.
2. Ibid., p. 249.
3. Ibid., p. 252.
4. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 39.
5. Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1956), p. 31.
6. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Institutions," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), XIV, p. 409.
7. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966), p. 52.
8. Ralph Turner, "Role," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. cit., XIII, p. 552.
9. Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936), p. 114.
10. Florian Znaniecki, Social Relations and Social Roles (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965), p. 119.
11. Parsons, op. cit., p. 270.
12. Theodore B. Newcomb, Social Psychology (New York: Dryden Press, 1956), p. 208.
13. Ibid., p. 208, also, Irwin Press, "Ambiguity and Innovation: Implications for the Genesis of the Cultural Broker," American Anthropologist, vol. 71, No. 2, 1969, pp. 205-18.

14. Transitional Ordinance to the Constitutional Assembly-1949, Provisional Government of Israel, Official Gazette 1949, p. 165, supplement 1.
15. Transitional Law-1949, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1949), p. 1.
16. Government of Israel, Divrei Ha'Knesset (The proceedings of the Knesset) (in Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1950), IV, Second session of the First Knesset, meeting No. 117 of February 20, 1950 p. 808.
17. See our discussion of the unification of the military in the chapter on monopolization and our discussion of the unification of the educational system in the chapter on legitimation.
18. For the various arguments for and against the drafting of a constitution see Divrei Ha'Knesset, op. cit., III, Second Session of the First Knesset, 88 meeting, November 20, 1949.
IV, Second Session of the First Knesset, 112 meeting, February 5, 1950.
IV, Second Session of the First Knesset, 113 meeting, February 7, 1950.
IV, Second Session of the First Knesset, 115 meeting, February 13, 1950.
IV, Second Session of the First Knesset, 117 meeting, February 20, 1950.

- V. Second Session of the First Knesset, 134 meeting, May 2, 1950.
- V, Second Session of the First Knesset, 136 meeting, June 5, 1950.
- V, Second Session of the First Knesset, 150 meeting, June 13, 1950.
19. The U. N. General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, in Yehezkiel Dror and Emanuel Gutmann (eds.), The Government of Israel: A Collection of Readings (Jerusalem: The Eliezer Kaplan School of Economics and Social Sciences, 1961), p. 31. This resolution called for the partition of Palestine and for the establishment of two sovereign states: an Arab and a Jewish state.
20. Ibid., p. 31.
21. Provisional Government of Israel, Israel's Declaration of Independence, Official Gazette, 1948, No. 1.
22. Divrei Ha'Knesset, op. cit., III, second session of the First Knesset, meeting 88 of November 11, 1949, p. 133.
23. Ibid., IV, second session of the First Knesset, meeting 113 of February 7, 1950, p. 740.
24. Ibid., p. 735.
25. Ibid., second session of the First Knesset, meeting 117 of February 20, 1950, p. 808.
26. Ibid., p. 808.
27. Ibid., second session of the First Knesset, meeting 113 of February 7, 1950, p. 731.

28. Ibid., p. 744.
29. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled with reference to specific cases, that the Declaration of Independence is of great significance, but does not have the legal power of laws. Citizens, therefore, cannot legally press charges against any organization or institution arguing that their rights as stated in the Declaration were violated. It follows that the Declaration of Independence does not legally guarantee the freedoms and rights of individuals. In this connection see Government of Israel, Rulings of the Supreme Court, 1948, cases No. 7, 10.
30. The Law and Administration Ordinance-1948, in Dror and Gutmann, op. cit., p. 47.
31. The Transitional Law-1949 and its various amendments, Ibid., pp. 90-97.
32. Ibid., p. 131.
33. Out of 120 Knesset members, 50 voted for the resolution, 38 against it, 3 abstained, 16 were absent and one died.
34. The difference between a fundamental law and a regular law is that a regular law can be adopted and amended by the majority of the Knesset members who are present during the vote. A fundamental law, on the other hand, is adopted and amended by a majority of two thirds of the house.
35. For example, see Divrei Ha'Knesset, op. cit., XV, 1953, pp. 63, 70; XX, 116 meeting of the Third Knesset,

- 5.1.1956; XXVIII, meeting of the Fourth Knesset,
2.9.1960, XXXII, 2nd meeting of the Fifth Knesset,
9.4.1961; XXXXII, 451 meeting of the Fifth Knesset,
2.23.1965.
36. The Palestine Order in Council, in Dror and Gutmann,
op. cit., pp. 21, 22, Articles 47, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 56.
37. Ibid., p. 21, Article 51.
38. S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem:
The Magnes Press, The Hebrew University, 1967), pp.
263-4.
39. Shulamit Alony, Ha'hesder: Mimdinat Chok Limdinat
Halacha (in Hebrew) (The Arrangement: From a State of
Law to a State of Halacha) (Tel-Aviv: Otpaz, 1970),
p. 143.
40. State Education Law-1953, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the
State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government
Printer, 1953), p. 137, article 1.
41. Ibid., Article 13.
42. Ibid., Article 18.
43. J. N. Matras, Social Change in Israel (Chicago: Adline,
1965), p. 100.
44. S. N. Eisenstadt in an interview for LOOK magazine of
April 30, 1968, p. 44.
45. A summary of the various regulations for the registra-
tion of the population in Israel with respect to
religion and nationality is available in Shulamit Alony,

- op. cit., pp. 41-115, Appendix 4, pp. 133-42.
46. Law of Return-1950, Sefer Chukim (Laws of the State of Israel) (Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1950), p. 159.
47. Law of Citizenship-1952, Ibid., 1952, p. 146.
48. Shulamit Alony, op. cit., pp. 139, 140.
49. Ibid., p. 50.
50. Ibid., p. 134.
51. Ibid., p. 134.
52. Ibid., p. 136.
53. Ibid., p. 135.
54. Ibid., p. 135.
55. Ibid., p. 136.
56. Ibid., pp. 54-55, also S. N. Eisenstadt, Israeli Society, op. cit., pp. 256-260.
57. Alony, op. cit., p. 11.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSIONS

In this work an attempt has been made to draw on and to integrate general sociological literature as well as the more specific sociological literature dealing with social movements and institution-building into a theoretical framework that could be used to analyze process of institutionalization of a nationalist movement. This integration has been necessary because none of the above mentioned intellectual traditions itself provides an adequate framework for understanding the institutionalization of social movements.

We saw that through institutionalization nationalist movements are transformed into nation-states. It has been argued that the transition from one type of association to the other, namely, from social movement to nation-state, is accomplished through three central processes: monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building.

We discussed monopolization as the process which involves a shift in the position of the movement in the power structure of society, or as we referred to it, a shift from the "periphery" of society into its "central zone". In the central zone of society the polity has a monopolistic position relative to other elite groups, in that it has the exclusive right to the use of power, and to the allocation of the various social resources.

We have treated legitimation as involving the attempt of the new polity to mobilize public support and approval, for its monopolistic position in the power structure of society. We then proceeded to analyze the process of institution-building, or the creation of the necessary structural arrangements for the orderly functioning of society.

These various processes have been dealt with from the point of view of the leadership, not from that of the constituency or from that of any minority group.

Special attention has been given in this work to the role of ambiguity in supporting and facilitating the attempts of the leadership to establish monopoly and legitimacy, and to the role of ambiguity in permitting institution-building to proceed.

The processes of institutionalization, and the dimensions of each, have been dealt with on two different levels. First, on a theoretical level we attempted to create an analytical frame of reference for the analysis of each process. Secondly, on a more concrete level, we analyzed the case study of the emergence of the State of Israel as the product of the Zionist movement. The case study lent support to our theoretical arguments.

The Interrelations Between the Various Processes of Institutionalization

So far, each of the processes involved in the institutionalization of nationalist movements has been dealt with

separately. We must proceed now to analyze the various processes and to examine in what ways they support one another.

Monopolization serves in many cases as a pre-condition of legitimation. Monopolization indicates that the polity is in a position to make policies and to allocate the necessary resources for the implementation of these policies. Since the ability of the movement to respond adequately to the various problems and needs serves as an important element in its attempts to achieve legitimation, the successful implementation of the government's policies supports the pragmatic aspect of legitimation. The successful implementation of policies, in turn, supports monopolization. Moreover, one of the dimensions of monopolization involves the banning of competitive groups which jeopardize the position of the polity by presenting rival claims for its monopolistic position. By banning these competitive groups the polity eliminates dangerous opposition, and thus broadens the acceptance of its legitimacy. Furthermore, we saw that monopolization involves, on the part of the leadership, a shift from a "movement orientation" to a "nationalist orientation". In other words, the leadership must be able to conceptualize the structural change in its position, and act on behalf of the various segments of the population, transcending sectarian and partisan interests. The ability of the leadership to adopt a broad "national" approach facilitates the mobilization of the approval and the support

separately. We must proceed now to analyze the various processes and to examine in what ways they support one another.

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of the constituency. Thus, monopolization serves as an important element in the attempts of the leadership to obtain legitimation.

Monopolization is also important in supporting the process of institution-building. Monopolization means, among other things, that the polity is in command of the social resources. The polity is, therefore, able to allocate the necessary resources for the creation of institutions needed to sustain the nation-state. The importance of monopolization for institution-building is apparent in our case study. In the Yishuv period the development of the semi-autonomous institutions in Palestine was hindered by the narrow scope for action and decision making provided by the British. With the establishment of the state and the attainment of monopoly by the polity, institutional development gained momentum. Institutional spheres previously held by the British were transferred to the Israeli government, which was able to make new policies in response to the needs of the population, and to implement its policies and plans. The success of the Israeli government in doing so was one of the factors that supports the remarkable continuity of the political establishment that we have witnessed in Israel, and which contributed to its legitimation.

Legitimation, which we discussed as an effort by the leadership to obtain the support, approval, and the compliance of the constituency, supports both monopolization

and institution-building. Legitimation is a twofold process. On the one hand it involves the justification of the polity, that is, of its right to rule. Legitimation also involves mobilizing the commitment of the constituency to comply. It follows that legitimation actually sets the boundaries of the ability of the polity to exercise power, to make policies, and to carry them out. Success in legitimation not only assures the polity that it has secured the compliance of the constituency, but it also reduces the scope of opposition which might jeopardize the monopolistic position of the polity, and thus supports monopolization. The compliance of the constituency permits unity of action, which in turn facilitates the task of institution-building. The importance of legitimation in this respect was clearly seen in our analysis of the Yishuv period, where the semi-autonomous Jewish government of Knesset Israel had only a limited coercive power. Civic and military activities, therefore, largely depended on voluntary action and on the voluntary cooperation of individuals and groups. This cooperation was rooted in the acceptance of the authority of the various organs of Knesset Israel, which were based on Zionist ideology. This case reveals that legitimation is important in providing for unity of action, even when the polity has a limited amount of coercive power; in other words, before monopoly is achieved. The unity of action facilitated by legitimation, supports

institution-building. Moreover, legitimation involves the creation of legal arrangements for the operation of various institutions. These legal arrangements support both the definition of boundaries among various institutions and groups, which is part of the process of monopolization, and institution-building, which is based upon legal definitions.

Institution-building, or the creation of the necessary apparatus for the orderly functioning of society, also provides support for monopolization and legitimation. First, monopolization, or the actual attainment of power and control, does not exist in the abstract, but is made possible only through the existence of institutions. As we have seen from our case study, monopolization clearly affects the organizational structure of institutions. The monopoly of the government, in the case of Israel, could not be based upon de-centralized, autonomous and voluntaristic facilities which were created in the pre-state period. Monopolization in Israel, therefore, involved the centralization of various spheres of social life, as both part of institution-building and as a means of supporting the monopoly of the polity. Institutions are also essential in order to provide a continuous organization of the various spheres of social life, and in enabling the polity to systematically respond to the various problems and needs of the population. It is the institutional web which makes it possible for the leaders of a nation to translate their

ideas, policies, and programs into political action. As we have seen earlier, pragmatic success leads to the legitimation of the regime.

Although the processes of institutionalization typically occur in the order in which we have dealt with them, namely, monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building, feedback relations exist among these processes which support and reinforce one another.

Moreover, the various processes of institutionalization are interrelated not only on a theoretical plane but also on an empirical one. Our case materials revealed that it is difficult to isolate the various processes on an empirical level. In reality, efforts to establish the monopoly of the polity simultaneously involve the need to obtain legitimation and the formation of the necessary structural arrangements. Attempts to establish legitimacy are facilitated by and are closely related to monopolization and institution-building; and attempts at institution-building involve monopolization and legitimation.

Our analysis of the various processes of institutionalization stressed the importance of clarity, or the existence of specific and clearly defined guidelines for the operation of individuals and groups. We have noted the attempts of the leadership to direct the emergence of a new social order by establishing clear and specific guidelines. Thus, in discussing monopolization, we stressed the importance of setting clear boundaries between various organizations and

groups as a means of achieving monopoly by the polity, and as a way of banning competitive groups. In analyzing legitimation, we emphasized the need of explicit statement of the central values of society so as to foster their universal acceptance within it. The role of the legal system in explicitly defining the relations between the polity and the constituency was also recognized with respect to institution-building. We examined the regulative functions of institutions in organizing the various spheres of social life. Clarity thus plays a central role in the institutionalization of nationalist movements. However, ambiguity also supports the emergence of a new social order by facilitating monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building. The period of institutionalization is characterized by the existence of many rival groups carrying different sets of values and different images of the emerging social order. Often, old and new legal codes exist simultaneously. Ambiguity, or the lack of clearly defined values and norms; becomes functional in enabling these contradicting elements to co-exist without, or with fewer, highly divisive conflicts. Ambiguity thus contributes to unity of action, and to the inculcation of a sense of national unity among rival groups. In so doing, ambiguity supports the monopoly and the legitimation of the polity, and its attempts at institution-building. The lack of conflicts facilitates monopolization; the co-existence of different values and legal codes supports legitimation; and unity of action

supports institution-building. The importance of ambiguity was clearly seen in our analysis of the Zionist movement and developments in Israel. The Zionist movement was far from being homogeneous. It consisted of many factions which were organized around issues concerning the interpretation of Zionism, the priority of objectives, the image of the future homeland, and the techniques which should be employed for its realization. However, the various factions were all united by the overall goal of national revival, seeking to recapture the missing elements which were needed to transform the Jews from a "national society" into a modern nation in the full sense of the term. This unity of the Zionist movement was largely made possible by the ambiguity of the very broad and non-specific resolutions adopted, which were acceptable to the most of the large variety of factions of which the movement was composed.

In the State of Israel, too, attempts have been made to avoid controversial issues and to maintain ambiguity in reference to them, as we saw from the emerging constitution. The basic positive consequence of ambiguity in Israel has been the contribution to national unity and stability. The government's stability in turn supports its claim for the monopoly of the use of power and its attempts to build institutions. This unity, in any case crucial in the period of institutionalization, is of special significance in Israel where no party has ever won a majority (the largest party, Mapai, has drawn between 33 and 39 per cent of the

vote), and the Cabinet (Memshala) is thus necessarily based on a coalition of a wide spectrum of parties. Ambiguity in the Israeli Cabinet, just as earlier in the WZO, has enabled opposing parties to co-exist, and permitted unity of action. We saw that in terms of long-term objectives, ambiguity might have negative consequences as well, by creating facts which might alienate certain segments of the population. However, in terms of the immediate objectives of institutionalization -- monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building -- ambiguity is of central importance.

Generally speaking, ambiguity seems to have positive consequences in social spheres which are of central importance and over which a lack of consensus exists. Attempts to resolve issues in these spheres by adopting a policy of clarity could result in severe conflicts, and could alienate many segments of the population, thus undermining the efforts of the polity to establish its legitimacy. Areas which are not of central importance and/or over which a wide consensus exists, can perhaps best be approached by an attempt to establish clarity. The spheres which are both central and controversial must be identified in each individual case. While in Israel the issue of state and religion seems to be central and controversial, in other societies other issues might be the center of tension or conflict.

Important in the foregoing discussion is another theme which runs through this study, namely that institutionalization is accompanied by struggles, tensions, and conflicts. We saw that during the period of institutionalization there exist rival groups in society, different sets of values, and sometimes different sets of legal codes. The attempts of the polity to establish its monopoly and its legitimacy and to build institutions, therefore involves power struggles as well as ideological conflicts. The efforts to establish one effective center of power are accompanied by the banning of competitive groups and by a struggle to redefine the boundaries of authority and of responsibility among the different groups and institutions.

The struggle over the constitution in Israel served as an example of an ideological conflict over the image and the central values of that society. In other words, the transition of a movement from the "periphery" of society into its "central zone" does not automatically secure the power monopoly of the polity and its acceptance by the constituency. Efforts must be made on the part of the polity to secure its central position in society, efforts which characteristically involve conflicts and struggles. It is in this context that ambiguity comes to the rescue in sustaining stability.

Implications and Applicability

In our introductory chapter we saw that the various

sociological theories tend either to neglect the stage of institutionalization, or to analyze it inadequately. The major handicap of such theories, is their failure to discuss the actual processes through which a movement is transformed into a permanent structure.

One of the contributions of the present work lies in its attempt to close this gap on a theoretical and on an empirical level by providing a scheme for the analysis of the transition from a social movement to a nation-state.

Although we focused upon nationalist movements, the implications of the framework presented in this work for existing theories dealing with social movements are worthy of attention. For instance, our theoretical orientation can serve as a basis for modifying Weber's theory of the routinization of charisma and Smelser's theory of the institutionalization of social movements. We have chosen to discuss Weber and Smelser because they are widely cited with reference to the analysis of social movements.

In his discussion of the routinization of charisma, Weber shows that through institutionalization the charismatic domination, which is transient in nature, terminates in the form of a permanent structure. The charismatic order can be transformed into a familial or an institutional type of charismatic domination, or into a traditional or a legal-rational domination. The familial charisma (a dynasty, for example) is based on the belief that extraordinary qualities can be transmitted through blood ties, and it represents a

mixture of charismatic and traditional elements.¹ The institutional charisma, on the other hand, is believed to be rooted in an institution (the church, for example) rather than in a kinship unit, and is transmitted through ceremonies rather than through blood ties. This type of charisma represents a mixture of charismatic and of legal-rational elements.²

While Weber (unlike Smelser) is clearly aware of the fact that a charismatic order is transformed into a permanent structure through institutionalization, his explanation of this transformation is based chiefly on psychological factors rather than on structural ones. Weber maintains that "the following are the principle motives /our emphasis/ underlying this transformation: (a) The ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual recreation of the community, (b) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interests of the members of the administrative staff ..."³ Routinization, according to this analysis, is also attributed to the problem of succession once the charismatic leader is gone. Weber's analysis does not deal with the structural processes of institutionalization which follow changes in the power structure within a given social order.

With respect to Weber's analysis of the routinization of charisma, our work provides a theoretical framework for the analysis of the structural processes which are involved

in institutionalization. Monopolization, legitimation, and institution-building were analyzed by us as structural processes since we have focused upon the arrangements created by the polity in the process of transformation from a movement into a nation-state.

Weber's analysis of the motives of the leadership suggests that the leaders seek to fulfill their self-interests through institutionalization. Counter to this approach, our analysis of the change of the ideology of the leaders from a "movement orientation" to a "national orientation" has established that the adoption of a non-partisan approach by the leadership is crucial in its attempt to establish monopolization, legitimation, and in its effort to build institutions.

Smelser distinguishes between two types of social movements, norm-oriented and value-oriented, according to the scope of change that they seek to create. Norm-oriented movements are defined as

"an attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief. Participants may be trying either to effect norms directly (e.g., efforts of a feminist group to establish a private educational system for women) or induce some constituted authority to do so (e.g., pressures from the same group on a governmental agency to support or create a public co-educational system). Any kind of norm-economic, educational, political, religious - may become the subject of such movements. Furthermore, norm-oriented movements may occur on any scale - for instance, agitation by a group of nations to establish an international police force; agitation by groups of businessmen for tax legislation...."⁴

A value-oriented movement has a broader scope of action representing "a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalized belief. Such a belief necessarily involves all the components of action; that is, it envisions a reconstruction of values, a redefinition of norms, a reorganization of the motivation of individuals, and a redefinition of situational facilities."⁵ In view of our analysis, this typology of social movements seems to be too broad to provide for a meaningful classification of social movements. In reality, any change in norms seems to be rooted in changing values. To use Smelser's example, the attempts of women to establish feminist schools is clearly related to their attempt to change the image of women and their role in society. Also, our analysis of the Zionist movement reveals that nationalist movements represent a combination of value and norm-orientations. The supporters of the Zionist movement attempted to revive or to create new symbols, on the one hand, and attempted to establish an institutional framework, on the other. Our analysis suggests that a more meaningful criteria for the classification of social movements is the type of organization or institution in which social movements seek to terminate.

A more serious gap in Smelser's theory involves his argument that movements continue to stay alive for long periods after the phase of active agitation, with or without

changing their functions and goals.⁶ According to his analysis, movements tend to decline if they are unsuccessful or they continue to exist as movements.

Our analysis clearly indicates that movements that are successful in achieving power do not continue to exist as movements but rather are transformed into new entities. While successful nationalist movements terminate in the form of a nation-state, other movements terminate in other forms of institutions. A religious movement, for example, might terminate in the form of a church.

Our theoretical framework calls for the modification of Smelser's typology of social movements as well as for the consideration that successful social movements do not continue to exist as movements. Our analysis also reveals the need to discuss the processes through which movements are transformed into new entities, a problem area that was neglected by Smelser.

Although our theoretical framework seems to have important implications for existing theories of social movements, its applicability should be examined on several levels. First, it seems that a further study is needed to test the applicability of our theoretical framework to the analysis of other nation-states that have emerged as the product of nationalist movements. Such a project would involve a comparative study of such nation-states in Africa, Europe, South America, and South East Asia. In each case the cultural,

social, and historical conditions must be taken into account. Such a study might result in some modifications of the theoretical framework which was introduced in the present work.

The applicability of our theoretical framework to processes of institutionalization of other than nationalist movements must also be examined. Tentatively, however, it seems to apply to other types of movements as well. In the case of religious movements, for example, which terminate in the form of a church, monopolization would refer to the attainment of power within the institutional framework of the church. Consequently, legitimation would refer to the attempts of the ecclesiastical authorities to win the support and approval of their disciples for their preferred position within the church. Institution-building in that case might involve the creation of structural arrangements, or the modification of existing ones, so as to support the position of the new clergy. In principle, therefore, it seems that our theoretical framework might well apply to processes of institutionalization of social movements which terminate in the form of a single institution, rather than in the form of a complete social order.

Our theoretical framework, in a modified form, might also be relevant in the analysis of general processes of institutionalization, such as the processes of evolutionary change in society inasmuch as these processes tend to have a cumulative effect. But, again, the applicability of our

framework with respect to these processes must be examined through further research.

NOTES

1. Reinhard Bendix, Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 330.
2. Ibid.
3. Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 364.
4. Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 270.
5. Ibid., p. 313.
6. Ibid., p. 306.

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