



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**A CASE STUDY OF PUERTO RICAN MIGRANT FARMWORKERS
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN NEW JERSEY**

City University of New York

Ph.D. 1986

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A CASE STUDY OF PUERTO RICAN MIGRANT FARMWORKERS
ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN NEW JERSEY

by

GLORIA BONILLA-SANTIAGO

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the re-
quirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1986

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of the Doctor of Philosophy.

November 22, 1985

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William Kornblum

Chair of Examining Committee

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Abstract

A CASE STUDY OF PUERTO RICAN MIGRANT FARMWORKERS ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS IN NEW JERSEY

by

Gloria Bonilla-Santiago

Adviser: Professor William Kornblum

Despite of the research done on social movement organizations in this country, there has been little systematic attention paid to documenting the historical development and effectiveness of grassroots organizations dealing with migrant farmworkers. This case study seeks to refine our limited understanding about Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers grassroots organizing on the mainland, specifically New Jersey.

More specifically, this case study examines the organizational effectiveness of a Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organization, called Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas (CATA), in New Jersey.

The case study focuses primarily on the relationship between change in organizational structure and effectiveness as CATA underwent development. Piven and Cloward and the Majkas' theoretical assertions are used to examine the

stages of organizational development, and this research serves as a case study through which to examine the theoretical conclusions of the authors. These conclusions are examined to determine which can be supported, qualified, and contradicted through a study of CATA. This case study develops new theoretical conclusions that can be added to those of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas. In addition, this case study compares certain features of CATA with features of the UFW.

A number of organizational conclusions can be made about the data on Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers grassroots organizations. Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey went through a series of grassroots organizational stages of development before they became effective. The organizations went through a series of internal and external organizational changes before they transformed themselves into a proletarian formation. The major obstacle found in the study to CATA's achievement of its organizational goals was the leadership ideology, which impeded the growth and development of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union.

CATA serves as a successful case study model, for it is able to have farmworkers participate and involve themselves in its organizational life. It appears that this organizational model serves as an alternative organization for organizing other farmworkers' groups.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I became involved and interested in the plight of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers as a result of having to live as a migrant farmworker child in labor camps during my early years. Throughout my school involvement and struggle to better myself, I met a mentor who introduced me to a better way of life. She provided me with the opportunity to grow, understand and learn about my own people. It was through her involvement in the struggle for social justice for migrant farmworkers that I became involved in organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in South Jersey at a very early age. Later, I was able to attend college and work part-time with two local farmworkers grassroots organizations. These organizations were META and Farmworkers Incorporated of New Jersey. I became very much involved throughout my college years in supporting and working closely with farmworkers support committees in South Jersey. My life experiences as a migrant farmworker child and an active participant in the struggle for social justice for farmworkers' rights inspired me to do this case study.

At the culmination of an arduous journey throughout my academic years, I owe many debts of personal gratitude;

consequently I shall restrict my words of appreciation to those individuals and organizations which have played a significant part in my academic years. My first words of appreciation go to faculty members in the Sociology Department at the City University of New York who supervised, trusted and allowed me, from the very beginning, to engage full time in this significant research task. These faculty members are Professor Kornblum, Professor Savage and Professor Steinberg.

I must offer many words of gratitude to Professor Kornblum for allowing me to do participant observation research under his supervision with the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in South Jersey. His trust and confidence in my academic progress allowed me to write about organizational effectiveness of grassroot organizations dealing with Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Abstract	iv
Acknowledgements	vi
Table of Contents	xi
List of Tables	xv
Chapter I: Introduction	1
A. Background of the Problem	3
B. Review of the Literature	7
C. Purpose of the Study	18
D. Statement of the Problem	22
E. Significance of the Problem	23
G. Overview	24
Chapter II: Farmers and Agribusiness in the Development of New Jersey Agriculture	26
Introduction	26
A. Brief History of Farmers in New Jersey	41
B. Demographics of New Jersey Agriculture	52
C. Historical Development of New Jersey Agricultural Labor	58
D. Seasonal and Migratory Agricultural Farmworkers in the Present	63
E. Early Settlement of Puerto Rican Migrant Farmworkers	73

F.	Characteristics and Working Conditions of the Puerto Rican Farmworker	83
G.	The Role of New Jersey Labor in Organiz- ing Puerto Rican Farmworkers in New Jersey	91
Chapter III:	History of CATA and Stages of Develop- ment as the Organization Underwent Change	106
	Introduction	106
	Stage I: CAMP (Comite de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno)	112
	Stage II: META (Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas)	113
	Stage III: ATA (Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico -- Farmworkers Association)	123
	Stage IV: ATA Merges with the United Farmworkers Union of the AFL-CIO	131
	Stage V: Northeast Farmworkers Support Committee (NEFSC)	139
	Stage VI: Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA)	144
Chapter IV:	Organizational Structure and Effectiveness of CATA	173
A.	Introduction	173
B.	Comite de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno	183
1.	Internal Characteristics	184
2.	Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages	185
3.	External Characteristics	188
4.	Conclusion	191

C.	Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas	192
1.	Internal Characteristics	192
2.	Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages	196
3.	External Characteristics	199
4.	Conclusion	203
D.	Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas	204
1.	Internal Characteristics	205
2.	Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages	210
3.	External Characteristics	213
4.	Conclusion	218
E.	North East Farmworkers Support Committee	220
1.	Internal Characteristics	221
2.	Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages	223
3.	External Characteristics	224
4.	Conclusion	226
F.	Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas	227
1.	Internal Characteristics	228
2.	Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages	231
3.	External Characteristics	234
4.	Conclusion	239
G.	Synthesis	241
	Chapter V: Conclusion	276

Appendices	310
Bibliography	318
Related References	334

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1	Total and Farm Populations of the United States: 1920-1983	29
Table 2	Regional Distribution of the Farm Population: 1983	31
Table 3	Total, Family and Hired Employment on Farms, 1940-1981	32
Table 4	New Jersey: Workers on Farms, By Quarters: 1975-1981	33
Table 5	New Jersey: Number of Farms, Land-in-Farms and Average Size of Farms, 1975-1983	34
Table 6	Number of Major Agricultural Industries in Southern New Jersey by Counties and Annual Gross Sales More than One Million	49
Table 7	Number of Major Agricultural Industries in Northern New Jersey by Counties and Annual Gross Sales More than One Million	50
Table 8	Rank of New Jersey Crop Production-1983 . .	53
Table 9	New Jersey Estimated Crop Value and Cash Receipts: 1981 and 1982	55
Table 10	New Jersey: Gross and Net Income From Farming: 1975-1982	56
Table 11	New Jersey: Value of Land and Buildings and Taxes Levied on Farm Real Estate, Selected Years, 1975-1983	57
Table 12	New Jersey Farm Labor Force Estimates (1970 and 1984)	65
Table 13	Number of Farms and Average Size of Farms in New Jersey: 1950-1984	70
Table 14	Puerto Rican Contract Workers in the United States, By State, 1948-1984	77

Table 15	Rank of New Jersey Counties and States for Selected Items, 1983	98
Table 16	New Jersey: Principal Vegetables Acreage, Production and Value, 1920- 1983	99
Table 17	New Jersey Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector (Excluding Farm House- hold), January, 1979-1983	100
Table 18	New Jersey Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector (Including Farm Households), January, 1979-1983	101
Table 19	New Jersey: Farm Wage Rates, By Quarters, 1977-1981	102
Table 20	Farm Residents 14 Years Old and Over Employed in Agriculture and Non- Agricultural Industries, by Class of Workers and Sex, for 1983 and 1980, and Region for 1983	103
Table 21	Income and Poverty of Farm and Non- Farm Families, by Race of House- holds, 1982	104
Table 22	Total and Farm Populations, by Race, 1920-1983	105
Table 23	CATA's Stages of Development--External Characteristics	242
Table 24	CATA's Stages of Development--Internal Characteristics	243
Table 25	Majkas' Criteria of Organizational Effectiveness Applied to CATA's Stages of Development	244

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Considerable research about migrant farmworkers has been written in this country. This research suggests that lower class ethnic migrant farmworkers, like immigrants, have attempted to advance their interests by forming and joining organizations.

Immigrants, including Jews, Poles, and Slavs, have utilized formal organizations, such as the labor movement as well as civic, religious, social, and athletic organizations, as a way to achieve economic and political hegemony. Nathan Glazer (1983) suggests that the Irish "reached the heights of political success" through political organizations and affiliations with the labor union. Jews became "prosperous" through the development of business organizations. Italians were remarkably poor, but through "mutual benefit societies and participation in church congregations," they were able to enter the mainstream of American society (Nelli, 1983). Italians and Poles used the ward organizations for "ethnic successions" as part of their neighborhood political mobilization (Kornblum, 1974).

Like immigrants, racial minorities in the United States have formed and joined organizations to advance their interests, but unlike the immigrants described above, these minorities have chosen not to form organizations that move into the mainstream but rather to set up mass-based organizations that are autonomous within this society. This model of mass-based organizations is defined by Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward (1979) as "formally structured organizations with a mass membership drawn from the lower classes" (p. 1). These organizations are movement oriented, autonomous, and bureaucratic in nature. The essence of this type of mass organization consists of political action, by which Piven and Cloward mean that formal organization is a "vehicle of power." The essence of this model of political action is that "formal organizations will ensure regular, disciplined, and continuing contributions and participation from its members," depending for its success "on the ability of organizations to secure incentives or sanctions that will command and sustain the required contributions and participation from masses of people" (1979, p. 1). Both Piven and Cloward (1979) point out that this type of organization has not succeeded in practice because it "is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be

used as resources to sustain oppositional organization over time" (p. 2).

Background of the Problem

Migrant farmworkers, largely composed of racial minorities, have chosen to form organizations that have acted as union organizations and as organizations of insurgent poor people. These organizations are viewed as "social movements," "mass-based organizations," and as "worker organizations," shaped by the exigencies of American labor struggles (Majka & Majka, 1982). These mass-based organizations have become mass-movement organizations as the only political tool available to lower class groups.

Black and Mexican farmworkers, to mention two of the largest groups, have at different times dominated the agricultural labor force through the development of mass-movement organizations in this country. These migrant farmworkers, "having been historically exploited by their fellow men, overwhelmed by powerful forces in the marketplace" and "ignored and disappointed by their representative in politics," often have "joined independent syndicates and mass-based organizations to act collectively in their own interest and to become social and political in their own right" (Goldfarb, 1981, p. 76).

Black farmworkers' first attempt to organize occurred as a result of the emancipation of slaves after the Civil War. One of the organizations growing out of the Black migrant farmworkers experience was the Southern Tenant Farmers Union set up with funds from the Socialist Party; it consisted of 25,000 members. This organization became one vehicle through which Blacks and Whites expressed the political will of sharecroppers for the first time in American agricultural history. Black farmworkers were harassed and convicts were used to replace them. This rural organization died out due to the competition with the bigger urban meat cutters' packing house workers union and with the early migrations of Black migrant farmworkers to the urban areas. These migrant farmworkers have formed organizations which were not designed to move into the mainstream and that are autonomous within the society.

The Southern Tenant Farmers Union was a mass-based organization in that it "secured better conditions for the cotton field workers, providing them with new incentives and greater hopes in the future" (Kester, 1969, p. 1). It has been described as a "truly interracial movement among the dispossessed of the South, both Black and White farmworkers," fighting for the interests of poor Whites and Blacks alike. In addition, it remained autonomous and political within society in that it "brought a new voice,

created a collective will, discovered a forgotten hope, brought to life new impulses . . . struggled heroically against tyranny and oppression, built a mighty union, forged a new dream for the oppressed and disinherited" (Kester, 1969, p. 1).

The Southern Tenant Farmers Union, unlike the organizations established by immigrants, was not an organization whose purpose was to help Blacks build political power within this society, but rather to organize a mass-based organization whose purpose was to build a movement.

Like the Black farmworkers, the Mexican farmworkers also developed mass organizations calling for better living and working conditions.

Following the Mexican Revolution in 1910, hundreds of Mexican farmworkers flooded California, settling into barrios and seeking work in the fields. Mexican farmworkers "organized mutual aid societies to cope with their problems through the development of agricultural workers organizations" (Goldfarb, 1981, p. 180).

Among the few organizations that organized the Mexican farmworkers was the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union led by Jack Hall in the 1940's. Hall was influential in the passage of the Employment Act, which gave farmworkers the right to unionize and provided them with welfare benefits. This union survived into the 1950's

and, as a result, migrant farmworkers had evidence that, if they organized and bargained collectively, they would be better able to insist on terms of work that would lead to a better life.

Another successful organization was the United Farmworkers Union (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). Their first organizational step came with the formation of the Agricultural Workers Association in 1958, headed by priests in California. In 1959, the AFL-CIO pledged to the Agricultural Workers' Committee that they would push an all-out drive to organize Chicano farmworkers.

Cesar Chavez came to California as a migrant farmworker. Chavez found work as a community organizer in California under Fred Ross, a veteran organizer and disciple of Saul Alinsky (Goldfarb, 1981, p. 186). In 1961, Chavez resigned from the Community Service Organization to begin the National Farmworkers Association (NFWA) which would be merged in 1966 with the United Farmworkers Union.

Both of these organizations were mass-based with a bureaucratic union structure. The ILWU and the UFW were autonomous and movement oriented organizations in that both used the same "tactics, namely mass agricultural strikes," and "boycotts aided by organized labor," and political demands supported by the liberal community (Jenkins & Perrow, 1977). Both organizations were organized in a

bureaucratic way by having similar goals and objectives set up to accomplish their aims through union contracts (p. 249).

Like the Southern Tenant Farmers Union, the International Longshoremen and Warehousemen Union, and the United Farmworkers Union were organizations set up to organize farmworkers for better living and working conditions. However, unlike the immigrants' organizations, the Mexican farmworkers' mass-based organizations were not set up with the main purpose of political hegemony.

Review of the Literature

The various mass-movement organizations established by the poor have been studied at some length by Piven and Cloward (1977, 1970's, 1960's & 1930's). They have been preoccupied for two decades with the question of "how movements of the poor can exert political influence and how they are organized" (Piven & Cloward, 1977, p. 388). They think some ways may be more effective than others, and their chief concern is about the "political effectiveness of different kinds of organizations" (p. 388). It is the goals and structures of organizations and the strategies they employ which Piven and Cloward critically evaluate.

Piven and Cloward's Poor Peoples Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail (1979) contains a detailed case analysis of four American poor people's movements. Two of these movements occurred in the 1930's, the unemployment workers and the industrial workers, and two in the most recent times of the 1960's, the civil rights and the welfare rights movements. Both authors challenged two basic assumptions concerning social movements of the dispossessed and the struggle necessary to win concessions capable of altering political and economic relationships. They argue that the primary means the poor possess to wrest concessions from the elites is insurgency. More significantly, they argue, attempts by leaders and other activists to build and sustain formal, mass-membership organizations of the poor are counter-productive, since they divert energies from mobilization for insurgency.

Theo Majka (1980) documents an extensive "synopsis" of Piven and Cloward's (1977) theoretical argument:

Thus, if Protests, especially by the poor, win reforms, they win what historical circumstances have already made ready to be conceded. Reforms, however, are not easily granted, rather they are forced, by people taking the only options available to them within the limits imposed by historical circumstances. The predominant error made by activists engaged in helping the poor win concessions is their lack of recognition of the structural and institutional constraints placed on poor people's movements. Activists instead attempt what is not possible: to build effective formal, mass membership, permanent organizations to sustain the political

power of the poor after periods of mass defiance subside. In so doing, activists assume that enough of the poor have the resources to contribute to a long-term strategy. The continual failure of this model to be realized in practice is due to an inherent flaw. It is simply not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used as resources for sustaining political mobilization over time. (1980, pp. 283-287)

Majka (1980) points out that when elites ask for input from activist organizations, they are only responding to insurgency, not to the organizational strength of the movement. As a result, when insurgency itself subsides, the organization deteriorates. Majka further argues that when mass movements attempt to organize themselves formally during times of insurgency and insurrection, organizers attempt to "escalate the momentum of mass defiance, collect dues, and draft constitutions" (p. 28).

Critics of poor people's movements concentrated in two fundamental areas: the politics of confrontation and what Piven called "dissensus," by which they mean refusal to be co-opted. Most critics of Piven and Cloward feel that they are only advocates for the poor rather than objective analysts of the poor people's movements. Michael Harrington (1977) implies that Piven and Cloward advocate disruptions from below as "the only right strategy" (p. 11).

Paul Starr (1978) sees Piven and Cloward as similar to older racial advocates of "spontaneity" (pp. 70-72).

Finally, Barton J. Bernstein (1978) conveys one of the strongest critiques:

The politics of dissensus polarize the working class, bring an outpouring of racist and anti-poor sentiments epitomized by a White backlash . . . sour urban politics, and helped elect Richard Nixon, but also helped destroy the poor movements in the longer run. (p. 20)

The second area of criticism deals with the authors' contention that collective defiance and insurgency, rather than organization building on conventional politics are responsible for political and economic concessions. Starr (1978) argues that the United States is such a stable society that disruptions are of little consequence, and that only organizations can articulate and negotiate the demands of the discontented. Criticisms of the Piven and Cloward approach to "social change" are also offered by the Capitol Kapitalistate Collective (1978) in which it is argued that Piven and Cloward are pessimistic in their attitude about the potential and necessary role of organization building." They (the Socialists) also argue that Piven and Cloward are in favor of an "anarchistic strategy" (pp. 195-202).

Piven and Cloward's responses to such allegations are dealt with, in my opinion, very responsibly. First of all, Piven and Cloward are writing about reforms, which contain the potential to "realign power relationships between dominated and dominant classes" (Majka, 1980, p. 293).

Harrington (1977) dislikes their argument because he believes that a full employment policy ought to be what the poor seek. Piven and Cloward (1979), as well as Majka (1980), indicate that Harrington, as well as other critics "simply assert their own beliefs" (p. 292). In relationship to responses concerning Starr's argument of the social change and the United States being a stable society, Piven and Cloward (1979) and the Majkas (1980) seem to be saying that, given

the reality of present divisions within the working class, most of those defined as the poor are incapable by themselves of initiating social transformations, no matter what goals they articulate, organizations they form, or strategies they employ. (p. 293)

Piven and Cloward (1977) demonstrate how class struggle is a primary force behind social change of historical consequence. What they emphasize are "the limitations placed upon protests by the poor, due to the weakness of their institutional position" (p. 293). In relationship to Piven and Cloward being "pessimistic . . . ," "anarchistic . . ." they argue that "socialists need to create organizations in which the objectives of protest movements are preserved, not to replace the drive for organizing with randomly orchestrated chaos and disruptive activity" (Majka, 1980, p. 292). What Piven and Cloward seem to be arguing against is the tendency to develop mass-based, formal

organizations that will necessarily dampen mass defiance and, with it, reduce the power to evoke concessions.

Piven and Cloward's ideas have been extended and developed further by the Majkas (1980). They, in fact, make a number of observations about what Piven and Cloward have said about mass movements and test them by applying them to a number of poor people's movements. The poor people's movement that they examined is the United Farmworkers Movement. They show evidence that supports "farmworkers as a successful poor people's movement combined with the ability of the UFW to both build itself as a permanent organization and to mobilize defiance" and indicate several qualifications of the Piven and Cloward theory (p. 306). They suggest that, without organizations, the poor face an inability to effectively resist effacement or changes after insurgency has subsided. They suggest further that, rather than accepting a "bureaucratic model," we need to address the issue of "what forms of organizations are most effective" (p. 306). They also argue that, rather than assume the inability of poor people's movements to sustain their organizations and dictate the forms of concessions, we need to ask why these patterns have predominated in the United States.

The Piven and Cloward theory tends to support the idea that mass-organization movements should be non-bureaucrat-

ic, autonomous and movement oriented. Within such organizations, the working class can act with defiance.

Although work has been done on the conditions of Mexican and Black migrant farmworkers, it has not addressed the issue of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers movement and mass-insurgent organization, especially the Puerto Rican farmworker with an organizational structure of this type. A serious analysis of the effectiveness of organizing the Puerto Rican farmworkers into a viable union or stable mass-movement organization on the mainland remains to be done.

Puerto Rican farmworkers constituted the first post-war group to arrive in the United States (Fitzpatrick, 1980). Although Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers began coming in the 1940's, it took until 1947-1948 for the Puerto Rico Department of Labor to provide them with the protection of a contract guaranteeing conditions of work, insurance and travel, and to enforce these agreements with a monitoring system. During the mid-forties, an average of 4,000 contract farmworkers came to the mainland every year. According to the Department of Labor, 20,000 men now leave their homes in Puerto Rico each year to spend a considerable part of the year living and working on the East Coast of the United States (P.R. Department of Labor, 1984).

At present, the only studies done of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers consist of two dissertations: Falcon (1975), "On the Conditions of Puerto Rican Migrant Laborers in Southern New Jersey," and Llamas (1977) "Puerto Rican Farmworkers in Massachusetts and Connecticut: A Case Study of Perceived Training and Service Needs." Falcon's study only documents conditions of migrant farmworkers in southern New Jersey and presents a comparative analysis of the perceptions of the community surrounding the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. The study consisted of five parts: (a) a brief examination of the Puerto Rican migration; (b) a narrative of the lived experience of interviewers and researchers during the investigation; (c) an analysis of the attitudes and perceptions of the community surrounding the migrant farmworkers; (d) a description of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' living conditions and, finally, a transcript of hearing of farmworkers who have refused to continue migrating.

Their sample consisted of 241 interviews. Major findings indicated that 72% of migrant farmworkers preferred to go back to the Island, 22% wanted to stay on the mainland, and 6% did not know whether or not to stay or leave (p. 33). In terms of the living conditions, 23% indicated that living conditions in New York were better than on the Island, 33% said the contrary, and 19% indi-

cated no differences in living conditions" (p. 34); 62% indicated that housing conditions in the labor camps were worse than those presently existing in Puerto Rico (p. 129).

In relationship to the interviewers' and the researchers' lived experiences, major findings showed that, in general, the major attitudes of the Anglo community was "hostile and prejudicial" toward the migrant workers and the interviewers who were from Puerto Rican descent. The Anglo community answers indicated that the Puerto Rican farmworkers' community was "ignorant," "inferior," "mentally retarded" and "timid" (p. 45).

General findings related to forming a farmworkers' syndicate showed that 52.5% were in favor, 23.6% were against, while 23.9% were undecided (p. 135).

Llamas' (1977) case study consists of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers living and working in labor camps in Massachusetts and Connecticut. It provides a description of living, working conditions, attitudes toward migrations, and preferences toward education and training. The major objective of this study consisted of obtaining information from Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers regarding the following issues: (1) their preferences toward working and/or living on the Island of Puerto Rico or in the United States; (2) their reasons for migrating to the United

States mainland, including both economic and non-economic reasons; (3) their self-perceived need for service; and (4) their familiarity with organizations and agencies that existed to help them (p. 137).

The most significant findings of Llamas' study indicate that: a high percentage of men who migrated from Puerto Rico to do farmwork would consider training for jobs other than farmwork; a high percentage of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers would consider attending a vocational training or skills development program; the highest preference for training for young migrants would be auto mechanics; a second important area of interest for training would be construction trades (p. 136). The men who migrated as farmworkers have a positive attitude toward education in general and toward adult education in particular; most of the men would prefer to live on the Island and would prefer to work on the Island, despite the fact that nearly half of the men interviewed thought the farmworker was better off on the mainland (p. 137). Regardless of the fact that a high percentage of men interviewed consider Puerto Rico to be their home, two-thirds of the men interviewed would consider migrating permanently if secure employment were available (p. 137). Economic factors, unemployment and low wages on the Island were major reasons for migration; there should be migrant farm-

workers' organizations on the Island to help migrants; more than one-half of the men interviewed identified the New England Farmworkers Council on Aging as one that helps farmworkers; none of the men interviewed identified an organization that helps farmworkers (p. 139).

His findings and conclusions indicate that the Puerto Rican migrant farmworker population is very young; most men are single. Most of the migrants are also not a population of farmworkers who migrate to the mainland to augment their income, but are rather a group of underemployed men for whom farmwork represents employment of last resort rather than avocation (p. 137).

The author concludes that Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers

ought to be provided, first, legal assistance, including assistance with their work contracts and their full civil rights; second, advocacy organizations should direct their resources toward seeing that the migrants receive social services in the areas of legal assistance concerning injustices. (p. 148)

Both of these dissertations provide us with excellent descriptions of conditions of Puerto Rican farmworkers on the mainland. Llamas' dissertation is the closest to the area of organizational studies. However, he fails to address the issue of success and failure of the advocacy organizations and fails to address the issue of organizational behavior in terms of structure and historical

stages of development in relationship to organizational aims and goals. The lack of literature review in his dissertation and the lack of any attention to mass-organizational behavior contribute to a general failure to examine the organizational questions which Piven and Cloward and the Majkas raise. What remains to be done is a case study concerning a Puerto Rican migrant farmworker organization and the relationship between organizational structures and the success of farmworkers' movements.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of this research is to do a case study of a Puerto Rican migrant farmworker organization; to examine the ideas of Piven and Cloward (1977) and Majka and Majka (1980); to determine if they are valid for this case. The primary focus of this case study is to examine the relationship between change in organizational structure and effectiveness of the organization as it underwent development.

The organization to be studied is called Comité de Apoyo al Trabajado Agrícola (CATA) (Farmworkers Support Committee). CATA began in the summer of 1979 with the purpose of giving support to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in problem areas of social and political isolation and human rights.

In July, 1979, CATA organized the First Annual Assembly with the intent of increasing Puerto Rican farmworkers' understanding of their rights. At their Annual Assembly, over one hundred farmworkers were present, and a commitment was made to develop a support committee composed of farmworkers and non-farmworkers (primarily lawyers, clergy, and social service people).

The CATA structure consisted of an annual assembly, an executive committee, a board of directors, a small program staff, and a membership of over one thousand Puerto Rican farmworkers. The organization is supported financially by religious foundations, labor organizations, and private foundations.

Perhaps the most important feature of CATA is the fact that it has evolved through a series of successes and failures over a period of fifteen years. Any effort to study and understand this organization will require a close study of its evolution over this past fifteen year period. In total, CATA has gone through six stages of development.

CATA's Six Stages of Development

Stage number one. In 1969, an organization of labor union people, called the Industrial Mission of Puerto Rico (principally from the Amalgamated Meat Cutters Union), concerned about the plight and powerlessness of migrant

farmers, brought union and religious leaders together to create an organization called Comité de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueño (CAMP), a coalition with plans to organize migrants on the Island and to inform public opinion.

Stage number two. During this period, as a result of the background assessment and contacts developed by CAMP, a religiously grounded group, the Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agrícolas (META) was created. With the formation of META, CAMP was dissolved, since many of the same people were the active agents in both groups. META's principal objective was the organization of migrant farmworkers on the mainland into a viable labor union.

Stage number three. In 1973, the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union was formed on the mainland called Asociación de Trabajadores Agrícolas (ATA), a farmworkers union which came into being because of META's support in helping to identify farmworkers' leadership to create such a union.

Stage number four. During the period of 1975, ATA merged with the Cesar Chavez group and the United Farmworkers Committee of the AFL-CIO and ATA became part of the Chicano farmworkers' agenda. At this time, priority was given to the West Coast issues affecting migrant farmworkers in those areas.

Stage number five. In 1978, a group of advocates from federally funded farmworkers' agencies interested in organ-

izing the migrant farmworkers got together to form a new organization called the North East Farmworkers Support Committee (NEFSC). This group lasted two years as a formal group, and it dissolved out of the need for an organized effort to form a farmworkers' union on the East Coast. The group split over differences on tactics of organizing and over ideological beliefs.

Stage number six. As a result of the internal split of the NEFSC, a new organization evolved, with five hundred farmworkers whose serious interest was to form a newly named organization, Comite de Apoyo al Trabajador Agricola (CATA). This organization developed an organizing strategy based on providing farmworkers with needed services in the areas of legal services, health, job relations, legislation, transportation, and education. Heavy emphasis on educational seminars about their rights and the importance of unionization has been a priority.

A study of this organization is significant, since the organization represents the largest Puerto Rican Farmworkers' constituency in the state of New Jersey. CATA consists of a membership and a board of directors which is very powerful. It is the Puerto Rican farmworkers' organization that has survived the longest time, providing social services to about one thousand members, as well as educating them about the right to unionize. CATA has been the

only farmworkers' organization that has served as the bargaining unit for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. It has also supported legislation through political representatives from their local areas. Therefore, a study of this particular organization will help to illuminate the nature of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' organization and how it achieves its goal. This study will provide us with the opportunity to examine Piven and Cloward's theory of mass insurgency in organizations, in order to help us understand the complexities and contradictions of the capitalist state and its relation to class struggle.

Statement of the Problem

Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' organizations are an under-studied minority among agricultural workers groups on the United States mainland, with their own particular organizational problems and needs. Therefore, this study will undertake to examine the following questions:

1. What organizational structures did CATA develop throughout each stage of development?
2. How effective were these organization structures in achieving its stated aims and goals?
3. Through what process did CATA re-direct its aims or re-define its goals as a result of its experience at each stage of development?

4. Utilizing criteria established by Piven and Cloward's (1977) theory of mass-insurgency organizations, how effective has CATA been as an organization?

Significance of the Problem

This study will help us understand a neglected, powerless group of Puerto Rican farmworkers. This group is isolated and relatively small. It will help us understand other farmworkers' ethnic groups who are trying to organize. It will contribute to the mass-based organizational theory, and it will make an attempt to make direct linkages for other poor groups to survive in this society. It will provide us with a framework on how to evaluate and understand mass-organizational behavior, dealing specifically with migrant farmworkers, powerless groups in the United States. A study of this kind will provide us with an analysis of why farmworkers' groups have failed and succeeded in organizing the migrant farmworker in this country. This case study will also serve as a model for organizational behavior as a field of study in relationship to migrant farmworkers' groups. It will serve as an alternative model to the mass-based membership organizations.

Overview

This study will be divided into five chapters. The first has introduced the topic and has described the theoretical framework which will be used. Chapter Two will present a brief description of the history of farmers and agribusiness in New Jersey. This overview of agriculture and of Puerto Rican farmworkers in New Jersey will serve as background for Chapter Three. Chapter Three will present the history of CATA's stages of organizational development as the organization underwent change. This chapter will describe the five phases that the Puerto Rican farmworkers movement underwent as it developed in New Jersey. It will further discuss what led to the formation of each of the organizations, some of the difficulties and problems faced by each organization and the reasons for their demise. Chapter Four will present an evaluation of the effectiveness of each of these organizational stages with a particular emphasis on CATA. This chapter will apply a number of the theoretical conclusions of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas to these organizational stages. Particular attention will be paid to the internal and the external characteristics of these organizations. The chapter will end with a synthesis which will consider some of the lessons to be learned about organizational effectiveness through exam-

ination of these different organizations. Chapter Five will be the summary and conclusion. This chapter will reconsider the theoretical conclusions of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas in the light of the preceding study of the development of CATA. It will determine which of these theoretical arguments are supported by this case study of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey, which need to be qualified and which are contradicted. In addition, new theoretical arguments will be presented based on a case study that might be added to those of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas. Finally, the research questions by which this case study began will be addressed.

The present study thus begins with a presentation of certain theories proposed by Piven and Cloward and the Majkas, then moves to a case study of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey through which to test these theories, and then concludes with an evaluation of the theories themselves.

CHAPTER II

FARMERS AND AGRIBUSINESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NEW JERSEY AGRICULTURE

Introduction

The present chapter serves as a background for an in-depth study of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers movement in New Jersey. This chapter presents appropriate data about the history and demographics of farmers and agriculture in New Jersey. It provides an overview of Puerto Rican seasonal farmworkers and migratory workers' conditions in the State of New Jersey. Furthermore, it presents the role of New Jersey labor in organizing Puerto Rican farmworkers. Having established this larger framework, the chapter looks at the specifics of the Puerto Rican farmworkers, the conditions under which they work, and some of the economic changes that have occurred over a period of time in New Jersey agriculture. This background will then frame an examination of the development of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers movement in New Jersey which will be undertaken in later chapters.

The United States agricultural sector has been undergoing radical changes over the last twenty-five years.

This sector is heading toward fewer but larger farms which are capturing a larger portion of total farm sales. The food system's dependence on increasingly fewer farmers, who in turn are dependent on a series of factors beyond their control, raises a basic question of farmers' ability to withstand the supply/demand fluctuation without increasing government assistance.

Today's farmer is being pushed away from the self-sufficient, independent land-owning model of yesterday into a commercial entrepreneur specializing in single crops. He is trapped in the trends of national and international economics, relying upon a variety of other specialists to provide capital, new technology, supplies, land, petroleum products, and marketing assistance. Land is no longer the farmer's primary production input, as productivity of the land presently depends upon the skills and knowledge with which capital is applied (Wilson, 1979).

Perhaps the greatest change in farming has been the diminishing number of family owned and operated farms. Farm numbers have dropped from a high of 6.8 million in 1935 to 2.34 million reported in the 1974 Census of Agriculture. Only 1.7 million farms are considered to be commercial, selling more than \$2,500 of goods per year (United States General Accounting Office, September 26, 1978). The 1983 estimates of the farm population are about

167,000 greater than the estimates of 5,620,000 for 1982, but this apparent increase is not statistically significant (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1980 Census). (See Table 1)

The number of farms in the United States steadily declined as smaller units were absorbed by large units, by corporations, and by non-farm uses. In most instances, the cause has been economic failure or the irresistible lure of easier alternative employment. In other words, the "inability of succeeding generations to pay death taxes, difficulties in borrowing money needed to expand or modernize, or the isolation of a farm in an urbanizing area are the key factors" (Wilson, 1979, p. 2). The Council of State Governments (1979) shows an increasing number of farms being sold to speculators, including foreign investors who offer prices well beyond the productive value of the land. This trend indicates that, as the number of farm families in an area decreases, smaller rural communities wither and the quality of rural life deteriorates.

According to the United States Agricultural Census (1983), farmers represent 2.5% of the total population. (See Table 1) Forty-four percent of the farm population lived in the Midwest region of the United States in 1983.

Table 1

Total and Farm Populations of the United States:
1920-1983

Year	Total resident population ¹	Farm population	
		Number of persons ²	Percent of total population
CURRENT FARM DEFINITION			
1983.....	233,206	5,787	2.5
1982.....	231,023	5,620	2.4
1981.....	224,064	5,777	2.6
1980.....	221,672	6,051	2.7
1979.....	219,611	6,241	2.8
1978.....	217,771	6,501	3.0
PREVIOUS FARM DEFINITION			
1983.....	233,206	7,029	3.0
1982.....	231,023	6,870	3.0
1981.....	224,064	6,942	3.1
1980.....	221,672	7,241	3.3
1979.....	219,611	7,553	3.4
1978.....	217,771	8,005	3.7
1977.....	215,966	7,806	3.6
1976.....	214,282	8,253	3.9
1975.....	212,542	8,864	4.2
1970.....	203,235	9,712	4.8
1960.....	179,323	15,633	8.7
1950 ³	150,697	23,048	15.3
1940 ³	131,669	30,547	23.2
1930 ³	122,775	30,529	24.9
1920 ³	105,711	31,974	30.2

¹Official census counts, except 1975-83, which are estimates.

²Farm population estimates for 1920 to 1970 from Farm Population Estimates, 1910-70, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Statistical Bulletin No. 523, July 1973; Current Population Survey five-quarter averages centered on April beginning 1960. See appendix A.

³Continous United States.

Note: From Farm Population of the United States: 1983, U.S. Department of Commerce and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1983, p. 1.

The South, which until 1965 had the largest share of the farm population, ranked second in 1983 with 35%. The West and Northeast regions contained just 15 and 6% of all farm residents (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Census Counts, 1975-1983). (See Table 2)

Employment in agriculture has declined dramatically over the past five years at the national level. Census of Agriculture data show that in 1940 annual farm employment averaged 11 million; by 1980 it had slipped to 3.7 million. Despite this decrease, readily available labor continues to be necessary to agriculture, especially during planting and harvesting (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1984). (See Table 3) However, for New Jersey the average annual farm employment estimates during the periods of 1975 to 1981 remained stable at a rate of 20,000 workers per year. (See Table 4)

According to national statistics, the decline in farm labor coincides with a drop in the number of farms. Census of Agriculture data show that the number of farms fell from 6.1 million in 1940 to 2.2 million in 1982. The projection, according to the Department of Agriculture (1984), is that by the year 2000, the number could drop to around 1.8 million, suggesting further reductions in workers. However, while New Jersey farm labor from 1975-1981 remained stable, the number of farms increased from

Table 2

Regional Distribution of the Farm Population: 1983

Region	Number ¹	Percent
Northeast	358	6.2
Midwest ²	2,548	44.0
South	2,035	35.2
West	846	14.6
Total	5,787	100.0

Note. From Farm Population of the United States: 1983, U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1984, Table B, p. 2.

¹ Numbers in thousands

² Formerly the North Central Region

Table 3

Total, Family and Hired Employment on Farms, 1940-1981

Total, Family, and Hired Employment on Farms, 1940-1981

Annual average farm
employment¹

Year	Total	Family Thousands	Hired	Percent hired Percent	Total hired farm work force, ² Thousands
1940..	10,979	8,300	2,679	24	n.a.
1950..	9,926	7,597	2,329	23	4,342
1960..	7,057	5,172	1,885	27	3,693
1970..	4,523	3,346	1,175	26	2,488
1971..	4,436	3,275	1,161	26	2,550
1972..	4,373	3,228	1,146	26	2,409
1973..	4,337	3,169	1,168	27	2,671
1974..	4,389	3,075	1,314	30	2,737
1975..	4,342	3,025	1,317	30	2,638
1976..	4,374	2,997	1,377	31	2,767
1977..	4,170	2,863	1,307	31	2,710
1978..	3,957	2,689	1,268	32	n.a.
1979..	3,774	2,501	1,273	34	2,652
1980..	3,703	2,402	1,303	35	n.a.
1981..	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	2,492

¹ Average of quarterly estimates of number of jobs on farms. Data collected after 1980 are not comparable with earlier years and are not included in table.

² Total number of persons employed for at least 1 day during the year. Beginning in 1977, these survey data were collected biennially.

Sources: Hired Farm Working Force Survey, ERS, USDA; Farm Labor Survey, SRS, USDA.

Note: From Hired Farm Working Force Survey, ERS, USDA;
Farm Labor Survey, SRS, USDA.

Table 4

New Jersey: Workers on Farms, By Quarters, 1975-1981

NEW JERSEY. WORKERS ON FARMS, BY QUARTERS, 1975-1981 1/					
Year	Jan.	Apr.	July	Oct.	Annual average
<u>FAMILY WORKERS (thousands)</u>					
1975	10	11	10	10	10
1976	8	10	12	11	10
1977	7	12	13	11	11
1978	8	13	13	12	12
1979	8	9	13	11	10
1980	8	10	13	10	10
1981	7	12			
<u>HIRED WORKERS (thousands)</u>					
1975	4	7	20	12	12
1976	5	8	22	11	12
1977	5	8	23	10	12
1978	5	7	19	11	11
1979	4	7	19	11	10
1980	6	9	20	10	11
1981	6	10			

1/ Persons employed during the last full calendar week ending at least one day before the end of the month for 1969 through 1974. Quarterly estimates of farm employment beginning in January 1975 covering the weeks which include the 12th of January, April, July and October.

NOTE: LABOR ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED SINCE THE APRIL 1981 SURVEY.

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Statistics Crop Reporting Service, 1981.

8,600 in 1975 to 9,500 in 1983. In addition, the trend for New Jersey seems to suggest no real reduction in the number of farmworkers employed. (See Table 3 and Table 4)

The decline in the number of farms nationally has been accompanied by an increase in average farm size. The Census statistics indicate that the average farm had 75 acres in 1940, but 439 acres in 1982, showing an increase in agriculture production in the larger farms. The Agricultural Outlook (1984) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture predict that by the year 2000, based on past trends, one percent of the farms will account for about half of all farm production. However, for New Jersey, while the number of farms increased during 1975-1983, there was a decrease in average farm size from 120 acres in 1975 to 108 acres in 1983 (See Table 5)

Table 5

New Jersey: Number of Farms, Land-in-Farms and Average Size of Farms, 1975-1983

Year	Number of Farms		Land-in-Farms		Average Size of Farm	
	New Jersey	United States	New Jersey	United States	New Jersey	United States
	-- number --		-- 1,000 acres --		-- acres --	
1975	8,600	2,521,420	1,035	1,059,420	120	420
1976	8,900	2,497,270	1,020	1,054,875	115	422
1977	8,600	2,455,830	1,008	1,047,785	116	427
1978	9,063	2,436,250	1,040	1,044,790	116	429
1979	9,600	2,429,960	1,030	1,043,195	107	429
1980	9,400	2,427,830	1,020	1,042,245	109	429
1981	9,500	2,434,010	1,030	1,042,100	108	428
1982	9,500	2,400,370	1,030	1,038,530	108	433
1983	9,500	2,369,790	1,030	1,035,160	108	437

1/ A farm is defined as a place having annual sales of Agricultural products of \$1,000 or more.

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Statistical Crop Reporting Service, 1983, p. 50.

According to the USDA's Hired Farm Working Force Survey results (1984), mechanization and improved fertilizers, pesticides, seed, and livestock have contributed to a substitution of capital for labor. The survey goes as far as to indicate that the total labor used for all farmwork (including hired and family labor) declined from 20.5 billion hours in 1940 to 4 billion in 1982.

The farm labor force in the United States is comprised of four major groups: farm operators and unpaid family members, domestic hired farm labor, foreign nationals brought into the country under the H-2 Foreign Workers Certification Program, and illegal aliens. The number of family workers, including farm operators and unpaid family members, has consistently declined, falling from 8.3 million in 1940 to 2.4 million in 1980. Even though farms have become larger and much more highly capitalized, the American farm is still primarily a family operation. The Census of Agriculture reports that "87 percent of the 2.2 million farms in 1982 were owned by individuals rather than by partnership or corporations" (U.S. Department of Agriculture, Division of Economic Indicators and Statistics, 1984, p. 23). It is true that farm operators and their families continue to account for the major share of farm employment in most states. The statistics of 1980 show

that family workers comprised about two-thirds of national farm employment.

Farmers are not a single class, and farmers as a whole do not share common interests. They are a set of classes that include both exploited and exploiters with strongly conflicting interests (Jenness, 1985, pp. 99-133). General characteristics and a general picture of the class structure of the United States farming are documented by Doug Jenness in the New International Journal (1985).

Large Capitalist Farmers

At one end of the spectrum are a very small number of large capitalist farms and ranches owned and operated by some of the country's largest corporations, such as Tenneco, Del Monte, and Cooke. Salaried managers are hired to run these farms, and wage workers are the exclusive source of labor. They are concentrated in fruit, vegetable, poultry, and beef production. These farms represent the involvement of big monopoly capital in direct agriculture production.

Small Capitalist Farmers

Most small capitalist farmers live on the land and see themselves as "family farmers." They include farmers who exclusively use wage labor, those who use both wage labor and family labor on a permanent basis, and those who use

primarily family labor, but depend on wage labor at least during certain times of the year. There is a wide variation in income among these farmers, ranging from millionaires to families who are deeply in debt. Some are real estate dealers, insurance brokers, local retailers or owners of grain elevators or small processing plants. They receive a substantial part of their income from renting out land or machinery.

As beneficiaries of wage labor, this group of farmers is hostile to the efforts of farmworkers to fight for their rights and a decent living. They support and want cheap labor and resist organized efforts by the exploited section of the working class to win higher wages, better conditions, and unemployment and health benefits.

Exploited Working Farmers

These are independent producers who employ little or no wage labor. More than half of them depend on off-the-farm jobs as wage workers to make ends meet. Some work in factories or mines; others as rail workers, truckers, or part-time workers for other farmers. Many farm women also hold jobs off the farm to supplement family incomes. They own their farms, although the land is usually mortgaged heavily to the banks. These working farmers often also rent some land in addition to their own. Others possess no land at all, producing as tenant farmers or sharecroppers.

Agricultural Wage Workers

Farmworkers are the most oppressed and exploited sector of the farm population and one of the worst off sectors of the farm population as a whole. Most suffer abysmal conditions since they are not organized. Wages are low, often averaging below \$20 a day. They are not covered by minimum wage laws and piece work is very common. Health and safety conditions are often terrible. There are virtually no unemployment, health, or disability benefits. They work as casual workers or on a seasonal basis.

Adverse work conditions are suffered by migrant workers who move from one part of the country to another following the harvest. According to the National Safety Council (1985), farm labor is the second most hazardous occupation after mining. Pesticides poison field workers, causing chronic ill health for thousands and killing many.

Doug Jenness (1985) reports that:

many growers still force farmworkers to use a back-breaking short hoe. Nor do most farmworkers benefit from the mechanization of planting and harvesting that does occur, increasing productivity and eliminating some of the arduous character of farmwork. (p. 109)

While agricultural workers are among the most heavily exploited of the working class, the form of their exploitation is fundamentally the same as that of their wage work-

ers. The wage they are paid for their hours of labor amounts to only a fraction of the value they produce during that time.

The big farm-implement manufacturers, seed, food companies, suppliers of pesticides and herbicides and the oils trust take a share of the profits extracted from working farmers through monopoly-rigged prices. Exercising monopoly control over markets, these suppliers of products that farmers need for production set prices above what they would be in a competitive market. For example, in 1972 the Federal Trade Commission found that in the animal feed industry, dominated by Ralston Purina and Cargill, prices were being rigged by collusion among the monopolists. Such companies, according to the FTC, were helping themselves to an extra \$200 million in annual overcharges at the farmers' expense. In the farm machine industry, John Deere and International Harvester (recently purchased by Tenneco) control 60% of the farm machinery market (Jenness, 1985).

Cargill and Continental handle all United States grain exports. They operate grain pipelines all the way from farmer to foreign commerce. They own seed and food subsidies, shipping companies, grain elevators, communication systems and processing plants. Food processing and distribution are becoming increasingly contracted in fewer hands. In every major food category in the United States, four or

fewer companies monopolize more than 55% of the market. The top 50 food processing companies, corporations such as Beatrice Foods and General Foods, realize about 75% of all the profits in the industry (Jenness, 1985).

One method food processors use to subjugate farmers is to get them to sign contracts rather than directly sell their own products on the market. Through these individual contracts, the processor exercises control over the production of the farms. When contracting becomes the prevalent market in any arrangement for a given commodity, traditional markets on which producers depend disappear. According to the United States Department of Agriculture estimates in 1981, about 25% of United States agriculture was controlled either through contracting or direct ownership of production (N.J. Crop Reporting Service, 1981).

Karl Marx some 135 years ago explained that independent commodity production on the land more and more becomes "the pretext that allows the capitalists to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving it to the tiller of the soil himself to see how he can extract his wages," that is, the income needed to support his family (1979, Vol. 2, p. 180).

In state capitals, critical farm issues have been regarded as national in scope and thus a federal responsibility. The state's attitude has been a relatively low

level of concern for agricultural problems, and until recently, most states have been detached and passive except in regulatory activity. When state officials have become involved with agricultural issues, it was usually on behalf of constituent farmers. This attitude is changing due to the growing realization of serious problems developing in agriculture. In recent years states have taken on responsibility for environmental and resource management, many aspects of which, such as air and water pollution, weed and predator control, and conservation of soil, energy and water, profoundly affect agriculture. This is the situation in New Jersey.

Brief History of Farmers in New Jersey

Since colonial times, New Jersey agriculture has been the custodian of much of the state's most valuable non-renewable resources, its land and water (Blueprint Commission on the Future of N.J. Agriculture, 1973).

Long before the first settlers stepped on New Jersey soil, the Indians had lived, cultivated their crops, and hunted game on the peninsula known as New Jersey. These Indians, called the Leani Lenape, were peaceful members of the large Algonquin tribe (N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1963).

The Indians had become quite efficient in the growing of certain crops by the time colonists came to the new country. They showed the newcomers how to grow corn, pumpkins, grounds, tobacco and beans.

In time, however, agricultural methods began to improve. The settlers could see which crops were best adapted to the land they had. The colonists also introduced new crops to the American soil during this time. By 1684, New Jersey had grown considerably in the agricultural field (N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1963).

In 1776, the Seal of New Jersey was designed. A plow, a horse's head, and a picture of Ceres, the goddess of grain were engraved on it. All are symbols of agriculture.

New Jersey's nickname of the "Garden State" has its roots in the state's location and function within the New York Metropolitan Area in the 18th and 19th centuries. Across the Hudson River, the New Jersey shore was green with farms and forests, and the rich farmland of Bergen and Essex counties provided fresh food for the population of New York (N.J. Department of Agriculture and N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, Feb. 1979, p. 7).

Since World War II, general inflation and rising costs of farm inputs have continually narrowed profit margins. To maintain income, the farmer increased his farm size, expanded production and sought off-the-farm income. While

the cost price squeeze during the 1950's and 1960's removed many of those smaller volume farmers who did not expand or improve production, even the most aggressive farmers of the 1970's were feeling economic pressures. This is because biological productivity per acre leveled and thereby limited future productivity increases to farm crop diversification. This cost price squeeze has inhibited the entering farmer whose land amortization costs alone can exceed over 40% of his gross income in an average production year.

In an attempt to maintain income through increased production, farmers made use of technological breakthroughs. They found themselves requiring more equipment and then more land, and still more powerful and faster equipment to stay ahead of narrowing profit margins, inflation and competitive pressures. Over the last two decades, farm product specialization increased farmworkers' productivity nearly twice as fast as that of the industrial worker. However, to maintain this productivity, the farmer became dependent upon petroleum-based inputs of fuel, fertilizer, and pesticides, as well as on other industrial services to operate his increasingly specialized farm (State Agricultural Land Issues, 1979).

New Jersey farmers find themselves today facing both opportunities and problems which are truly unique in all agriculture and which a few decades ago would have been

labelled unbelievable. They operate a business in the midst of the most urbanized area in the nation, where they are a minority. And yet, at their doorsteps is the largest single market in the western world, and additionally, they have access to other markets, both domestic and foreign (Blueprint Commission on the Future of N.J. Agriculture, 1973).

Since 1959, agriculture in New Jersey has undergone several changes and trends. According to the South Jersey Resource Conservation and Development Area Plan (1979) nearly 81,000 hectares (200,000 acres) of farmland have gone out of agricultural production. The rapid loss of farms and farmland which occurred during the 1960's has temporarily slowed down; crops have replaced livestock and poultry in economic importance; and important farmland which grew processing vegetables for many years is now growing grain. The exodus of the Ritter Stokely, Del Monte, Heinz, and Seabrook industries from New Jersey has reduced vegetable processing acreage by two-thirds in the last few years.

During the last 15 years, approximately 40% of the farmers have changed the type of crop grown or livestock raised. In a recent survey conducted by the South Jersey Resource Conservation Development Area Plan (1979), of these farm operators who changed operations, 58% reported

that labor was a factor influencing a change in type of agricultural commodities produced (p. 64). Of those farmers surveyed, 27% indicated regulations, 25% capital investment requirements, 23% age or health, and 8% taxes. Farmers often indicated that more than one factor influenced their decision to change (p. 64).

Some obstacles and needs that New Jersey agriculture and farmers faced according to the South Jersey Resource Conservation and Development Area Plan (1979) were:

Loss of agricultural acreage is a significant and pressing problem. Since 1959 the area of South Jersey has been losing farmland at the rate of 4,252 hectares (10,500 acres) per year. Stopping this trend is a must. . . . The public, planners, officials and developers do not fully recognize the environmental and aesthetic values of open agricultural land. . . . Very low fertility and water holding capacity are problems in some soils of central areas. . . . Poor drainage outlets and wetness are limiting the agricultural production of some of the area. . . . Irrigation water management and improved systems are needed on 12,500 hectares (30,000 acres) to aid in reducing soil erosion and excess water loss and to time water application to meet the crop's needs. . . . Agriculture operations are subject to several economic problems such as poor markets, lack of processing and storage facilities and high cost of production. (p. 65)

While the number of farms in New Jersey decreased from 24,900 in 1950 to 9,500 in 1983, this decrease stabilized itself to an average of 9,000 farms since 1978 (Census of Agriculture, USDC, 1982).

John Ripton (1982) reports that "the great threat to farming in New Jersey is not labor but the supply and market structures the farmers must operate" (p. 21). New Jersey's agricultural labor has suffered over the last decade in that many large processors have closed their plants in this state. These processors are H. J. Heinz of Salem County, Ritter of Bridgeton, Seabrook Farms of Seabrook, Del Monte of Swedesboro, and Stokely Van Camp of Trenton. Rising labor costs did not precipitate these closings. Arthur West (1962), President of the past Farm Bureau, in a testimony before the Governors' Task Force on Migrant Labor, clearly identified the situation:

You may wonder why farmers resist paying higher wages to workers. Some people evidently assume it is because of personal greed and hard heartedness. The answer is simple: We are part of a highly competitive industry that is controlled in large part by large corporate food chains. These chain buyers keep pressure on processors and other buyers of our fruits and vegetables, and these processors and buyers, in turn, keep the pressure on us to keep our prices low.
(p. 1)

While there is clearly no doubt that farmers, especially small farmers, must compete aggressively to stay in business, the agricultural industry is dominated by giant corporate agribusinesses which control the supply as well as the market end of agriculture. And these corporate giants, R. J. Reynolds, General Foods, Heinz and Ritter among them, control the markets and the farmers' access to

them. The agricultural industry, as a whole, is controlled by relatively few corporations in each product line.

One of the primary reasons why these large processors closed their plants in New Jersey was due to the nature of the supply and market structure of the farming industries. In addition to supply and market structures, Ripton (1982) documents that soaring energy costs, uncertain allocations of energy resources, inflation and a highly competitive northeast market were significant factors in the closing of these plants.

Early in 1977 the New Jersey Economic Development Authority, working with the New Jersey Department of Agriculture and the Department of Labor and Industry, arranged the funding for a consultant study to determine the feasibility of establishing a new vegetable processing operation in Southern New Jersey. The study was completed by Touche Ross and Company in August of 1977, and has served as the basis for the proposed financing of a new food processing plant in Cumberland County to be owned and operated by Seabrook Brothers and Sons, Inc. Seabrook Brothers and Sons, Inc. is one of the largest frozen vegetable processing plants in the country. In 1981 the family-owned company received a \$250,000 direct loan from New Jersey's Economic Development Authority to add spinach to its product line. As a result, it has extended its

packing season and employment opportunities by about four months. In 1983, the company sought to expand its operations again. This time, it secured a \$2.35 million industrial development bond from the Authority to construct a 20,000-square foot building and purchase equipment to process and package frozen peas and lima beans. Seabrook's industry operations has generated millions of dollars of income for farmers in Cumberland, Salem, Atlantic and Cape May counties and has boosted employment in the region. The Company employs 70 persons full time and provides 250 seasonal jobs during peak production times (NJEDA, Annual Report, 1983, p. 10). (See Table 6 and Table 7 on number of agricultural industries in South and North Jersey. Also refer to the MacRaes Industrial Directory, New Jersey, 1984 for further information.)

The New Jersey farm supplies costs of energy are rising much faster than labor costs. Farm labor costs doubled from 1970 to 1980. A rising minimum wage that did not keep pace with inflation can account for most of the increase in farm labor costs, but energy related costs far outpaced inflation (Ripton, 1982).

New Jersey labor problems contribute to some farmers' decisions to produce machine intensive field crops (soybeans, grains, etc.) rather than labor intensive vegetables and fruits. But even this trend, despite farm lobbyists'

Table 6

Number of Major Agricultural Industries in Southern New Jersey by Counties and Annual Gross Sales More Than One Million

MAJOR AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES IN SOUTHERN NEW JERSEY BY COUNTY AND ANNUAL GROSS SALES MORE THAN 1 MILLION DOLLARS

COUNTY	COMPANY NAME	SPECIALTY	ANNUAL GROSS SALES
Atlantic	C & E Cannery Hammonton	Canned Fruits & Vegetables	1-5 Million
Burlington	Stokes of Vincentown	Bottled & Can Fruit Juices Contract Packaging	1-5 Million
Camden	Campbell Soup Company Camden	Food Products, Tomato Juice	None reported
Cape May	Cape May Cannery Cape May Snow Food Products Cape May	Canned Sea Foods, Clam Juice Fish Products	None reported Exporters & Importers
Cumberland	Misset Food Packers Inc. Bridgeton	Cranberry Juice, Apple Juice	10,000 over Million
	Pape & Co., Inc. Clement Sea Brook	Cannery	10,000 over Million
	See Brooks Brothers & Sons Inc.	Frozen Foods Processing	10,000 Million
	Seabrooks Foods Inc. Sub. of Springs Hill Inc. Seabrook	Fresh Frozen vegetables & Fruits	10 Million
	Linsport Brothers Inc. Vineland	Fruits & flavors for ice cream and bakery	5-10 Million
	Progress Foods Corp. ODDER Products Corp. Vineland	Food Products	10 more Million
	Gloucester	Del Monte Seminoleboro Cult Enterprises Inc. Honey Williamstown	Tin Cans, Shearing & Enameling of tin plates Fresh & Frozen turkey & chicken specialties
Monmouth	Asbury Syrup Co. Asbury Park	Syrups of different fruits	1-5 Million
	Fast-A Heat Exterminating Inc. Asbury	Pesticides & Agricultural Chemical	1 Million
	Terris-Consolidated Indus- tries Asbury	Processing equipment for beverage chemicals & Dairy Plants	1-5 Million
	Christ Cross Products Inc. Shrewsbury	Soup & Sauces	1 Million
	Salem	Garden State Egg Co., Inc. Woodstown South Jersey Farmers Ex- change, Woodstown B & I Poultry Co., Inc. Morris Farmers Cooperative Assoc of Vineland Inc. Morris	Chicken Eggs, Process Eggs Chemical Fertilizers Process Canned fowl, poultry by products Poultry feed

NOTE: The counties missing in this table did not report annual gross sales of other Agricultural Industries in Southern New Jersey.

Source: MacRae's Industry Directory, New Jersey (1985),
MacRae's Blue Book Inc., New York.

Table 7

Number of Major Agricultural Industries in Northern
New Jersey by Counties and Annual Gross Sales More
Than One Million

MAJOR AGRICULTURAL INDUSTRIES IN NORTHERN NEW JERSEY BY COUNTY AND ANNUAL GROSS SALES
MORE THAN 1 MILLION DOLLARS

COUNTY	COMPANY NAME	SPECIALTY	ANNUAL GROSS SALES
Bergen	Spear Packing Corp. Caldwell	Canned Fruits & Juices	1-5 Million
	Delasco Foods Corp. East Rutherford	Pickled Fruits & Vegetables	10 Million
	USS-Agri-Chemicals Division South Hackensack	Related Safety Equipment	1-5 Million
	Farmland Dairies Wallington	Juice Processing Fruit & Milk Dairy	10 Million over
	Essex	Beet Provision Co. Newark	Sausages & all meats products
Hudson	Heinz Co., N.J. Hudson	Ketchup, pickles, beans, soyas, canned soups	1 Million more None reported
Union	Malden Farms Inc., Div. of MFI Union City	Green salads and nuts	5 to 10 Million

NOTE: The counties missing in this table did not report annual gross sales or other agricultural industries in Northern New Jersey.

Source: MacRae's Industry Directory, New Jersey (1985),
MacRae's Blue Book Inc., New York.

strenuous efforts to blame it on labor costs, appears more related to the rising price of grains in the mid-1970's than to labor costs. In the last few years the trend toward field crop production seems to have slowed and may be reversing. The per acre return on machine intensive grain crops was \$190 as compared to a \$1,196 per acre return on labor intensive vegetable crops in 1979 (Ripton, 1982, p. 21).

During January of 1981, a prominent South Jersey farmer explained the advantageous position in which farmers find themselves in New Jersey. This was reported in The Packer, a national agribusiness trade journal:

We can grow here for the cost of hauling from the West coast. We can haul as far north as New England and as far south as Florida. We are in an advantageous position. But, we don't have the fuel costs of cross country trucking the way California does and that is the major cost that cuts into our profits and it is not the labor cost. (p. 1)

John Ripton (1982) reports that New Jersey's agriculture is cost effective. Labor intensive fruit and vegetable production is now and will continue to be the key to the state's agricultural prosperity. Fresh market produce, which requires the most labor intensive production practices, returns 300% more per acre than does production for the processing market.

Contrary to the fallacy that labor costs are drawing New Jersey's farmers out of business, the economic conditions clearly indicate the need for a stable seasonal labor force to harvest the state's valuable fruits and vegetables. New Jersey farmers and the state in general would benefit more from a labor intensive fresh market agriculture than from a machine intensive grain market agriculture. Labor intensive agriculture means more jobs and wages paid to farmworkers living and working in New Jersey and will generate more secondary incomes in farming communities than will payments made to corporations whose manufacturing plants and banking arrangements may or may not be in New Jersey.

Demographics of New Jersey Agriculture

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Science and Education Administration, the country has 10 farm production regions and New Jersey falls within the tenth "Northeast" designation.

The Northeast as a region is known more for its cities and urban areas than for its farms, yet the 1974 census reported the market value of products sold in the region as approximately 5.5% of the national total. Yet the Northeast Region comprises 6.3% of the total population. The Northeast employs nearly 500,000 people in farming and

related businesses (N.J. Department of Agriculture, N.J. Department of Environmental Protection, 1980).

According to the New Jersey Crop Reporting Service (1979), the average dollar value of the agricultural product sold per acre in 1979 was \$373, almost four times the national average. According to the report:

It can be seen that the relatively high average production value per acre is due primarily to commercial vegetable and fruit production (\$120.5 million in value) since almost two-thirds of the state's cropland is devoted to the production of grain. (N.J. Department of Agriculture, October 31, 1980, p. 19)

Among all states, New Jersey ranks among the top five in the nation in the production of blueberries, cranberries, peaches, asparagus, snap beans, and tomatoes. (See Table 8)

Table 8

Rank of New Jersey Crop Production-1983

<u>Crop Production:</u>					
Snap Beans, processing.....	Wisconsin	Oregon	New York	Michigan	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Tomatoes, Fresh Market.....	Florida	California	South Carolina	Pennsylvania	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Peaches.....	California	South Carolina	Georgia	Pennsylvania	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Cranberries.....	Massachusetts	Wisconsin	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Washington	Oregon
<u>Other:</u>					
Taxes per acre.....	Rhode Island	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Michigan	Connecticut	Massachusetts
Average value of farmland and buildings per acre ..	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Rhode Island	Connecticut	Maryland	California

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agricultural Statistical Crop Reporting Service, 1983, p. 1.

The New Jersey Farm Income and Expense Summary (1982) indicates that the estimated value of all fruits, vegetables and field crops produced in New Jersey during 1982 was \$288.7 million. Field crops accounted for 41 percent of the total crop value. The value of the principal vegetables was \$95.7 million. The Garden State's principal vegetable crops accounted for just over 33% of the value of all crops in 1982 (N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1983, p. 41). (See Table 9) The estimated gross income of New Jersey farmers from livestock, poultry, and their products in 1982 was \$105.5 million. Leading categories, according to gross income, were milk in first place with \$69.7 million, followed by eggs at \$15.0 million, cattle and calves at \$13.1 million and hogs and pigs at \$6.8 million (N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1983, p. 41). Net farm income for 1982 was 108.1 million. The estimate of gross farm income was \$653.2 million. Farmland and buildings in New Jersey were valued at \$3,148 million in 1983 (N.J. Department of Agriculture, October, 1983, p. 42). (See Tables 10 and 11)

According to a Department of Agriculture preliminary report (1983), there has been a potentially significant increase in both the number of farms and farm acreage in New Jersey from 1974 to 1980. The number of farms of 50 acres or more in size decreased by one percent from 1974

Table 9

New Jersey Estimated Crop Value and Cash Receipts:
1981 and 1982

Crop	Value ¹		Cash Receipts ¹	
	1981	1982	1981	1982
Field Crops	130,897	118,798	90,925	86,075
Fruit Crops	64,453	74,173	62,128	75,143
Vegetables	89,916	95,749	106,665	119,856
Total of all crops	285,266	288,720	361,660	389,547

Note. From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Statistical Reporting Service, 1983, pp. 2, 3, 44.

¹ Numbers are in thousands of dollars.

Table 10

New Jersey: Gross and Net Income from Farming,
1975-1982

NEW JERSEY: GROSS AND NET INCOME FROM FARMING, 1975-1982								
Item	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
-- million dollars --								
Cash receipts from farm marketings	328.5	335.6	353.7	398.6	413.7	438.4	499.7	516.0
Government payments7	.8	1.1	2.0	.8	.9	1.5	1.1
Non-money income	52.4	64.8	70.9	82.9	96.5	114.4	118.3	127.7
Other farm income	5.1	5.0	5.2	5.2	6.4	6.6	8.0	8.5
TOTAL GROSS FARM INCOME	384.6	406.1	430.9	488.6	517.8	560.0	627.4	653.2
Farm production expenses	317.5	347.3	356.6	381.4	428.2	477.0	512.4	547.1
Realized net farm income	67.1	58.8	74.3	107.2	89.7	83.0	115.0	106.1
Net change in farm inventories	-5.1	5.8	-.9	3.4	4.1	-3.8	3.2	2.0
TOTAL NET FARM INCOME	62.0	64.6	73.3	110.6	93.8	79.2	118.2	108.1

NOTE: Totals may not add due to roundings.

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Statistical Crop Reporting Service, 1983, p. 42.

Table 11

New Jersey: Value of Land and Buildings and Taxes
Levied on Farm Real Estate, Selected Years, 1975-1983

NEW JERSEY: VALUE OF LAND AND BUILDINGS AND TAXES LEVIED ON FARM REAL ESTATE, SELECTED YEARS, 1975-1983					
Year	Value of land and buildings		Taxes levied on farm real estate		
	Total (million dol.)	Average per acre (dollars)	Total (million dol.)	Average per acre (dollars)	Average taxes per \$100 of full value (dollars)
1975	1,670	1,807	17.5	18.53	1.03
1976	2,148	2,106	18.6	19.78	.94
1977	2,211	2,211	16.9	18.05	.82
1978	2,481	2,386	17.0	18.22	.76
1979	2,782	2,701	17.4	18.57	.69
1980	2,984	2,926	18.9	20.35	.70
1981	3,088	2,998	20.4	21.77	.73
1982	3,212	3,118	22.0	23.48	.75
1983	3,148	3,056	1/	1/	1/

1/ Not available at time of publication.

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Statistical Crop Reporting Service, 1983, p. 40.

through 1978. This latest data corroborates the current assessment that the annual farmland loss rate, which had been running at 4,500 acres per year between 1974 and 1980, has been temporarily stabilized. The Grassroots Report, 1980, concludes that in the past several years, "the annual attrition of farmland in New Jersey has clearly moderated and should not be described in such terms as alarming" (p. 19).

Historical Development of New Jersey Agricultural Labor

Immigration to New Jersey agriculture began after the European colonists took over and enlarged the Indian fields. The Dutch and Swedish who settled in small areas in New Jersey prior to and immediately after the English conquest of 1664 became farmers after the failure of their fur trade. The New Englanders and the immigrants from the British Isles who together rapidly settled Northeast New Jersey and the English and Irish Quakers who migrated slightly thereafter to their "New Haven" in Southwest New Jersey were farmers when they came or were forced to become farmers. This was also true of the Germans (Schmidt, 1973). Agriculture became the only occupation of New Jersey settlers. After the Revolution, agriculture still dominated the economy of New Jersey. In the early part of

the 19th century the Industrial Revolution provided farmers with labor saving machinery and other equipment and with new markets in the growing industrial areas. After World War I, New Jersey agriculture, in order "to hold its own, was forced to adjust to many sweeping changes in technology, productivity, new sources of power and regional competition" (Schmidt, p. 2).

The English, Scottish, and Irish immigration to New Jersey was a continuous stream during the whole of the colonial period. These newcomers brought groups of "associates" who handled the land distribution of the various villages of the New Englanders or else received grants beyond the supposed limits of the village holdings. They, nevertheless, conditioned themselves to New Jersey agriculture rapidly (Schmidt, 1973).

Their immigration to New Jersey continued during the 19th century. In general, the numerous immigrants became "Americanized" through a process of adaptation and assimilation within a few generations.

During the Depression of the early 1930's, the Southern "Negro" migrant appeared on the scene. Many of them initially worked at harvesting oysters in the Port Norris-Shellpile area of Commercial Township, Cumberland County (one of the largest counties in South Jersey farming). Before World War II, Italian immigrants were the major

force of the seasonal farm labor. As Italian laborers were absorbed into the military services and war plants, the Southern "Negro workers" gradually took up the slack in the system (N.J. Commission on Post-War Economic Welfare, 1945, p. 45). Moreover, the Federal Government, under the Bracero Program, brought Jamaicans and Mexicans, as well as prisoners of war, into the state for both agriculture and railroad labor. They established central camps to house foreign workers. At the end of the war, the workers were transported to the private camps where farmers were unprepared to receive them. It was not until 1956, through the contract system established by the Department of Labor of the United States and Puerto Rico, that Puerto Rican contract workers began coming to New Jersey (P.R. Department of Labor, 1984).

As citizens from New Jersey came into contact with the migrant colonies scattered throughout New Jersey farming areas, they became knowledgeable of the deplorable and wretched conditions which migrant farmworkers faced. Several counties' grand juries in the state, along with various private organizations and religious groups, submitted a brief to Governor Walter E. Edge, documenting the acuteness of the problem and called for state control of farm labor camps. The Commission of Post-War Economic Welfare conducted public hearings and surveys and, as a result,

they recommended the creation of a state agency to regulate migrant farmworkers through the legislature. In 1945, the legislature passed the state's first Migrant Farmworkers Economic Welfare Commission for the establishment of state owned and operated central camps, but this proposal was never implemented.

Under the 1945 laws establishing an inspection and enforcement system and an independent regulatory commission known as the Migrant Labor Board, New Jersey quickly became one of the leading states in the fields of migrant housing regulation, health care and education. This law was considered a very progressive measure and a step forward toward improving policy for migrant farmworkers. Frances Perkins, then United States Secretary of Labor, referred to it as the "Magna Carta for migrants" (Governor's Task Force on Migrant Farm Labor, 1968, p. 10). The MLB was responsible for making policy and approving regulations which were enforced by the Bureau of Migrant Labor (Consumers League of New Jersey, 1944).

From 1945 to 1955, Jay C. Garrison served as the first chairman of the Migrant Labor Board, and John Scuhook succeeded him as second chairman, serving in that capacity for about twelve years (1955-1967) (Governor's Task Force on Migrant Farm Labor, p. 11). Among the MLB accomplishments during this period were the codification of a work-

able housing and sanitation code, the establishment of migrant summer schools, the inauguration of a State Crew Leader Registration Program, and the promulgation of heat and hot water regulations. These achievements resulted in better living and working conditions that, in turn, enabled the farmers to attract migrant farmworkers. During the same period, the State Health Department did pioneering work in setting up migrant health clinics. In 1956-66, the Bureau of Children's Service in the Department of Institutions and Agencies started a program of child day-care centers operating from mobile trailers in southern New Jersey. This operation was assumed later by the local anti-poverty agency in the area.

During the twenty-two years of the Migrant Labor Board's existence, most of its shortcomings may be traced to a passive enforcement policy and a relatively docile outlook by its membership. Furthermore, the Bureau's inspection force suffered from insufficient personnel and low rates of pay that made it difficult to hold the best qualified inspectors. A storm of protest arose over the Migrant Labor Board's promulgation of the hot water requirements in 1959. In the wake of this controversy, some farm elements wanted more representation and a stronger policy voice on the Migrant Labor Board. A legislative struggle on this issue ensued and it was fought to a

standoff. In 1963, a compromise solution was finally worked out. The number of lay members to be appointed to the Migrant Labor Board was increased from five to seven: The farm bloc and organized labor each gained one additional representative.

In 1966, the MLB came under heavy political attack by newspapers concerning "alleged inflammatory statements and activities concerning certain members" (Hogarty, 1966, p. 12). After a complete investigation, Governor Richard J. Hughes recommended the abolition of the MLB because of what he considered "a built-in potential for a conflict of interest" among its membership under existing law. He then announced the appointment of a Task Force to study the entire seasonal farm labor situation in New Jersey. At present (1985), there is no replacement for the Migrant Labor Board (Governor's Task Force on Migrant Farm Labor, 1968).

Seasonal and Migratory Farmworkers in the Present

Leslie Whitener (1984) and the data from the United States Department of Agriculture Hired Farm Working Force Survey provide us with a national perspective on the seasonal and migratory farmworkers' situation in this country. They indicate that the total number of farmworkers employed during a year has decreased by almost 40%, falling from a

high of 4.3 million in 1950 to about 2.5 million in 1981. According to Whitener and the survey, most of the losses occurred in the 1950's and 1960's. During the 1970's, the number of hired workers stabilized at 2.6 to 2.7 million annually. They indicate that the primary reason for the decline in numbers of farmworkers has been largely due to the adoption of new production and marketing technology on farms. However, the New Jersey farm labor force estimates show that the number of hired farmworkers increased from 14,600 to 25,600 in 1984. This was primarily due to the high unemployment in the United States and the even higher rate in Puerto Rico, in addition to the highly labor intensive character of farming in New Jersey and the need for a stable workforce. (See Table 12)

Despite the growing trend toward mechanization in United States agriculture, many of the major East Coast crops still remain highly labor intensive. True shakers can "pick" a whole tree of apples in a moment, but asparagus needs to be picked daily by growing size, and the picking of tomatoes and blueberries still requires thousands of migrant and seasonal farmworkers. Mechanization has been largely reserved for crops that are processed into apple sauce, canned tomatoes and the like. The technology needed to machine harvest efficiently with minimal product damage has not been developed (Whitener, 1984).

Table 12

New Jersey Farm Labor Force Estimates (1970 and 1984)

	1970	1984
Contract Workers	8,770 ¹	684 ¹
Non-Contract Workers	3,780 ²	15,000 ³
Day-Haul Workers	2,060 ²	10,000 ¹
Total	14,610	25,684

Note. These figures do not reflect the actual total number of migrant farmworkers in New Jersey. Due to the lack of available data on migrant farmworkers this table reflects estimated numbers of the decrease in contract workers in relationship to an increase in non-contract workers and day-haul workers.

From:

¹ Puerto Rico Department of Labor 1984 Reports (estimates), 1984.

² Annual Manpower Report, N.J. Department of Labor and Industry (estimates), Bureau of Rural Manpower Services, Annual Rural Manpower Report, 1970.

³ Informal Estimates Reports by Counties, Farmworkers Opportunities Inc. Vineland, N.J., 1983.

Unable to reduce their dependency on a sizeable work force, eastern growers have gone to great lengths to procure a supply of cheap and steady labor, and to keep it unorganized and tightly controlled.

According to the United States Department of Agriculture's biennial Hired Farm Force Survey (1984), there are two distinct groups of migrant farmworkers. The first group is those who are hired on a casual or seasonal basis and work less than 150 days during the year. They account for almost three-fourths of all hired farmworkers. Most of these workers are students, housewives and non-farmworkers with second jobs in agriculture who work on a few days or weeks during harvest or other peak labor periods. In 1981, casual and seasonal workers together averaged 36 days of farmwork and received average annual farm earnings of \$901 which accounted for 30% of their total annual earnings (p. 24).

The second group consists of regular and year round farmworkers who work 150 days or more. Their farmwork is their principal activity and their only employment. According to the United States Department of Agriculture Census data, regular and year round workers are older and more likely to be male. Often these farmworkers are household heads with responsibility for family support. In 1981, the workers earned \$7,398 in annual farm wages,

accounting for 95% of their total earnings (Whitener, p. 24).

Legally admitted foreign workers have been an important part of the farm labor force for years. Almost five million foreigners labored on United States farms between 1941 and 1964 (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1984). The Bracero Program (P.L. 78) was the major law allowing entry of these workers. The program was originally designed to meet the United States wartime need for farm labor and also to legalize and protect foreign workers from exploitation in this country. The number of legally admitted foreign workers reached 445,000 in 1956 and then declined to fewer than half that by 1964, when the program ended. According to Whitener, the reduction "was due to increases in farm mechanization, tightening of certification requirements, and more rigid enforcement of wage agreements and guarantees" (1984, p. 24).

The Immigration and Nationality Act (P.L. 414) has been the major mechanism for legally admitting foreign agricultural workers since the termination of the Bracero Program. This act authorizes the United States Attorney General to administer the Foreign Labor Certification Program, referred to as the H-2 Program, which allows employers to bring foreign workers into the United States to do temporary work.

According to the United States Department of Labor record, during the past five years less than 20,000 temporary agricultural jobs have been certified for foreign workers. The states where these workers do account for a significant portion of the labor force are Florida's sugar cane, Eastern and Northeastern apples, and Virginia's tobacco. The H-2 workers accounted for less than one percent of all hired workers in 1981, in comparison to foreign workers who constituted around 10% of hired farmworkers at the height of the Bracero Program.

These figures do not include the "illegal alien" farmworkers (Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1984). Over 100,000 undocumented aliens are apprehended each year in agriculture. Many observers of the farm labor market believe that the number of "illegal aliens" in agriculture is considerably higher, accounting for 10-15% of all hired farmworkers (Whitener, 1984).

According to the United States Department of Agriculture (1984), agriculture employs a substantial number of illegal aliens, mostly Mexicans who work on a variety of farms and in all regions. Their employment is fruit and vegetable production, specifically in the Southwest and Pacific coast states, and they lately also very commonly work on farms in the Midwest, Mid-Atlantic, and New England states as well. According to the study, most illegals who

work in seasonal jobs have permanent homes in northern Mexico and migrate regularly.

In New Jersey, farm labor has declined in the past, but currently is rising. Census Agriculture data for New Jersey shows the number of farms fell from 24,838 in 1950 to 10,641 in 1964, to 7,984 in 1978, then rose to 8,277 in 1982 (Census for N.J. Agriculture, p. 1). While the number of farms declined between 1950 and 1978 and showed a modest increase from 1978 to 1984, the average farm size has varied. Average farm size increased from 70 acres in 1950 to 130 acres in 1974, and then decreased to 103 acres in 1984. (See Table 13)

At present the total number of farmworkers in New Jersey appears to be increasing. According to the "New Jersey Agricultural Statistics," by the New Jersey Crop Reporting Service of the New Jersey Department of Agriculture (October, 1981), some 19,000 hired workers, as distinguished from family workers, were estimated to have been employed in New Jersey on farms at the peak of the season in July, 1979, which figure increased to 20,000 in July of 1980. (N.J. Workers on Farms by Quarters, 1975-1981, which shows that labor estimates have been discontinued since April, 1981, which month itself showed an increase over April, 1980.) (See Table 4)

Table 13

Number of Farms and Average Size of Farms in New Jersey:
1950-1984

	1984	1982	1978	1974	1969
Number of Farms ¹	9,400	8,277	7,984	7,409	8,493
Land in Farms ²	970,000	916,331	987,309	961,395	1,035,678
Average size of Farms	103	111	124	130	122

	1964	1959	1954	1950
Number of Farms ¹	10,641	15,459	22,686	24,838
Land in Farms ²	1,155,678	1,379,002	1,665,241	1,725,441
Average size of Farms	109	89	73	70

Note. From: (1) 1982 Census of Agriculture, N.J. State and County Data, Vol. 1., Part 30, Table 1; & (2) New Jersey Agriculture 1984, N.J. Department of Agriculture and N.J. Crop Reporting Service, October, 1984, p. 50.

¹ A farm is defined as a place having annual sales of agricultural products of \$1,000 or more.

² By acres

As for the total number of workers and dependents in New Jersey, a report prepared for the Legal Service Corporation in May of 1980, "an estimate of the number of migrants and seasonals in the United States and Puerto Rico" shows that the New Jersey population of migrants and their dependents was estimated at 19,227 and the population of seasonal workers and their dependents was estimated to be 33,844, totaling a population of 53,071 for migrants, seasonals and their dependents in New Jersey. Such data was prepared through the analysis of existing data and by on-site visits.

According to the New Jersey Department of Agriculture (1984), approximately 20,000 farmworkers are employed on New Jersey farms each year. They fall into four major categories: 5% are migrants from the Southwestern United States, 5% are contracted workers from Puerto Rico who arrive under an arrangement between the growers and the Puerto Rican government, 60% are non-contracted Puerto Rican migrants, and 30% are seasonal and day-haul workers, i.e., workers whose permanent residence is within a day's distance of the farm.

The majority of the farmworkers in New Jersey (approximately 70%) are Hispanic, primarily originating in Puerto Rico or Mexico. Over 75% of the Hispanic workers speak little or no English. Most have not completed a high

school education. (At the same time, as unemployment in Puerto Rico rises above the 40% level, increasing numbers of urban, educated workers are turning to migrant farm labor to earn an income.) The majority of the workers are male and most are not accompanied by their families.

The average income of these farmworkers is far below that of non-farmworkers in the United States. In 1984, the average annual income for a New Jersey farmworker's family of four was \$3,000--over 40% below the poverty level. Total annual cash income from all sources was typically \$2,000 for single seasonal farmworkers (N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1984). This figure applies to those migrants who work; many spend some or all of the season unemployed.

Those farmworkers who migrate from Puerto Rico each season do so because the yearly minimum wage offered for farmwork is still better than the unemployment shared by over 40% of the Puerto Rican labor force. Those who arrive undocumented from Mexico, Haiti, and elsewhere in the Caribbean and from Central America often are forced to accept illegally low wages.

There is no longer much farming in Puerto Rico. Agriculture is a dying industry there and this is why Puerto Ricans migrate to the Eastern United States to work on farms. Although there is a conservative estimate that over 80,000 migrant farmworkers leave the Island every year to

earn wages seldom higher than the minimum wage, there is a need to better determine how many Puerto Ricans migrate to states outside New Jersey.

Early Settlements of Puerto Rican Migrant Farmworkers

Puerto Rico is second only to Mexico as a source of cheap imported labor to the United States growers. Unlike Mexicans, however, Puerto Ricans do not worry about quotas or deportations. Puerto Ricans are "citizens" of the United States. The United States Department of Labor and the IRS consider them "domestic workers." Puerto Rican workers are referred to as "inter-state migrants," not "illegal" (NACLA, December, 1977, No. 1, Vol. 8).

In addition to the spontaneous migration of individuals who have moved toward the urban and industrial areas of the United States, there is an organized movement of seasonal Puerto Rican agricultural workers under a contract approved by the Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico. This is referred to as the Puerto Rican Interstate Agricultural Program.

Thousands of Puerto Rican migrants (estimates vary between 60,000 and 200,000) work in United States agriculture each year. Some come independently in search of work, while others are recruited on the Island by private agen-

cies, crew leaders or growers. Such recruitment is illegal under the Government of Puerto Rico law unless a written contract is first negotiated between the Puerto Rican Secretary of Labor and United States growers (NACLA, December, 1977, Vol. 11).

The first reliable statistics on hand show that workers were migrating to the continental United States as early as 1908. Migration of Puerto Rican agricultural workers, however, began as early as 1901, when around 1,000 Puerto Ricans went to Hawaii to work in sugarcane fields in that country (Study of Puerto Rican Migration, History Task Force, Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 1982).

The Puerto Rico Department of Labor reports that the origin of the present interstate program for the referral of Puerto Rican agricultural workers to the United States mainland under contracts approved by the Puerto Rico Secretary of Labor can be traced back to World War II. At that time the United States Manpower Commission was directing the distribution of the United States labor force by moving workers from agriculture and private industry to essential war industries. In 1943, the Governor of Puerto Rico, Rexford G. Tugwell, notified the Manpower Commission that there were 250,000 employable persons in Puerto Rico without work, and that unemployment was increasing day by day. As a result, small groups of Puerto Rican agricultural

workers began to move to the U.S. to work on farms or railroads and in some industries (P.R. Department of Labor, 1983).

This migration of Puerto Rican workers to the mainland was

controlled by private employment agencies from the U.S. The selection of workers and transportation was handled by private agencies, who charged the workers for securing jobs and received a commission from the airlines for the transportation of the workers. (P.R. Department of Labor, 1984, p. 225).

The selection of farmworkers and the number of workers transported were ignored by the Department of Labor. As a result, more farmworkers than the number of jobs available were recruited. When some workers arrived in the United States, they had no work, and no way of providing for their basic needs. Others found work for short periods and were forced to accept sub-standard employment to be able to subsist.

As a result of all the violations committed, in 1947, Jesus T. Pintero, Governor of Puerto Rico, requested an investigation. The report submitted by the Secretary of Labor to the Governor recommended the establishment of a Bureau of Employment and Migration in Puerto Rico to deal with unemployed people. This bureau was to coordinate its activities with appropriate United States agencies (P. R. Department of Labor Annual Summary, 1983-1984).

This investigation initiated the special legislation that was enacted on May 9, 1947 to improve the conditions of the Puerto Rican migrants in the United States.

By virtue of the provisions of this act, the Puerto Rico Department of Labor established adequate guidelines for the selection and contracting of workers. United States employers interested in using Puerto Rican agricultural workers were required to sign a contract with the workers and to post a performance bond with the Secretary of Labor as a guarantee to the contract.

On January 25, 1949, an agreement was signed between the Puerto Rico Secretary of Labor and the National Director of the Bureau of Employment Security expressing the United States Department of Labor's policy and channeling the migration of Puerto Rican workers through the Employment Services Offices of the various states, such as New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The first groups of workers to be covered by a master agreement with employers left for the mainland in 1948. A total of 4,906 workers were referred for employment during that year (P.R. Department of Labor, 1984). (See Table 14)

In 1948, New Jersey farmers went to Puerto Rico to search for a reliable supply of workers for the summer crops, since the German and Italian prisoners of war who had been used to harvest the crops during World War II were

Table 14

Puerto Rican Contract Workers in the United States,
By State, 1948-1984

Year	Total	N.J.	N.Y.	Penn.	Del.	Md.	Conn.	Mass.	N.H.	R.I.	Nich.	Ohio	S.C.	Other
1948	4,906	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1949	4,598	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1950	7,867	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1951	11,747	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1952	12,277	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1953	14,930	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1954	10,437	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1955	10,876	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1956	14,989	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1957	13,214	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1958	13,067	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1959	10,012	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1960	12,986	6,832	1,005	914	1,121	194	2,307	480	82	NA	16	7	NA	109
1961	13,785	6,749	1,498	913	1,294	254	2,049	547	49	11	6	NA	NA	95
1962	13,326	8,347	1,502	693	298	184	1,885	452	88	5	12	NA	NA	58
1963	13,116	8,022	1,475	414	348	106	1,832	409	51	20	103	NA	NA	54
1964	14,828	9,201	1,677	107	344	177	2,042	440	43	16	333	NA	NA	224
1965	17,385	10,095	1,577	138	314	30	2,243	423	38	14	613	NA	NA	906
1966	19,537	9,812	2,302	219	364	50	5,818	447	33	28	490	158	NA	7
1967	21,634	9,388	3,471	140	1,477	8	5,484	450	41	36	51	333	NA	389
1968	22,902	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
1969	21,864	9,442	2,188	655	1,032	511	4,113	486	54	105	171	289	192	43
1970	18,884	8,770	1,735	312	1,786	114	4,298	487	23	85	44	171	180	37
1971	14,119	6,836	1,237	151	1,543	68	3,668	387	10	61	16	NA	NA	27
1972	11,900	5,158	857	89	1,691	79	3,151	284	18	61	NA	NA	129	32
1973	14,441	6,255	1,375	134	1,434	114	4,337	289	27	93	NA	NA	304	80
1974	12,780	5,112	1,194	134	1,563	51	4,111	142	14	93	NA	NA	311	73
1975	5,439	3,398	743	112	1,077	NA	NA	108	81	43	NA	NA	32	5
1976	5,321	2,208	908	118	1,242	1	NA	190	7	30	NA	NA	180	101
1977	4,191	2,020	773	113	896	15	NA	31	34	NA	NA	NA	158	19
1978	4,439	1,737	1,114	282	NA	102	NA	8	41	NA	NA	NA	173	702
1979	3,872	1,867	777	294	NA	24	NA	46	8	42	NA	NA	458	354
1980	3,540	1,822	892	165	51	14	NA	40	30	41	NA	NA	332	193
1981	2,377	1,082	835	112	NA	29	NA	48	NA	41	NA	NA	349	37
1982	1,615	815	669	72	NA	24	NA	80	17	30	NA	NA	NA	158
1983	1,722	782	586	43	NA	14	NA	41	NA	23	NA	NA	269	28
1984	1,936	849	572	46	NA	123	NA	42	NA	36	NA	NA	403	87

Note: From Migration Division, Department of Labor, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Number of Agricultural Workers referred to United States mainland by state.

released after the war. This had left the farmers with a severe labor shortage. The son of a Gloucester County farmer who had been stationed in Puerto Rico during the war was familiar with its high unemployment rate and suggested that Puerto Rico would be a source of good, cheap labor. As a result, hundreds of workers were recruited from Puerto Rico and brought to New Jersey (American Civil Liberties Union, 1983).

From 1948 to the present, this recruitment continued and expanded. By 1968 more than 23,000 Puerto Rican contract farmworkers were being brought to the mainland.

Since the 1970's the number of Puerto Rican contract laborers working in New Jersey's fields has declined substantially. During 1977 only 2,020 Puerto Rican contract workers picked fruits and vegetables on New Jersey farms. This dramatic decline cannot be attributed to a decline in agricultural jobs. In 1969, when 9,463 contract laborers came to New Jersey, they were part of the 33,000 total force engaged in New Jersey's farming during the peak month of July. (See Table 14) In 1977, on the other hand, when 2,020 contract workers came to the United States, the total agricultural work force in the month was 36,000 (N.J. Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture, 1970-1977).

This decline was attributed to several factors. Since legal actions against the growers began in the 1970's, the number of contract laborers coming from Puerto Rico has declined by 80%. While the contract had remained generally unenforced, growers had found Puerto Rican workers an attractive labor force. They were eager to work, they spoke little or no English and they were generally unaware of their rights. They were far from home in a competitive alien environment and were therefore relatively docile and cheap to employ. When forced to honor the provisions of the contract, however, the growers looked for other labor sources (Ripton & Hall, July, 1978).

According to Angel Dominguez (1984), the decline of Puerto Rican contract workers is:

due primarily to the pressure put on by the employers that causes the workers to break before finishing the contract, thus saving money for the employer. . . . It is important to realize that this is a pattern, a behavior resulting from the experience of fifty years of emigration to the fields of the U.S. As a result, contacts with farms in the United States are through fathers, uncles, cousins, etc., who have already worked there. (Interview with CATA President, Claridad newspaper, March 15, 1984: The Nation, rough translation, p. 2)

Mr. Dominguez further argues that the differences between farmworkers with and without government contract is "minimal." He argues that the Puerto Rican government contract

does not resolve the problem of the farmworkers' working conditions.

Non-contract and independent Puerto Rican workers and day-haul workers are replacing the contract workers. In 1977, when the number of contract workers was the lowest it had ever been, about eight to ten thousand non-contract Puerto Rican workers came to New Jersey and ten to twelve thousand day-haul workers, mostly from the Philadelphia/Camden area were employed (Hall & Ripton, 1978). The total number of farmworkers in New Jersey is estimated from 14,610 in 1970 to 25,684 in 1985. The number of day-haul farmworkers increases as the unemployment conditions worsen in Puerto Rico and in local cities like Philadelphia and Camden. The American Civil Liberties Union from Glassboro, New Jersey (1984) reported that about 10,000 day-haul workers were employed in South Jersey fields. Due to the lack of accurate day haul farmworkers employment statistics, it is very difficult to account for this group of workers. (See Table 12)

During this period of dramatic growth in the use of Puerto Rican migrant workers, hundreds of complaints by Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers alleging abuses on the mainland began to be reported to Puerto Rican authorities. Faced with these complaints, the Puerto Rican government

enacted Law No. 87, which prohibited any private recruiting of labor in Puerto Rico unless the recruiters agreed to guarantee the workers minimum conditions of employment. The terms of the employment are formalized in a written contract negotiated by the Secretary of Labor, on behalf of the Puerto Rican workers, and the growers from New Jersey, as well as other states. Although the workers themselves do not participate in the negotiations, each worker individually signs a contract with the growers.

In this system of employment, Puerto Rican employment service offices are responsible for recruiting enough workers to fill the needs of New Jersey growers. As workers are needed during various times of the growing season, those workers who are registered with the employment service office are summoned to San Juan from over 100 towns and placed on a plane headed for New York. The workers are then bused from New York to Glassboro, New Jersey, where they are fed, numbered, and assigned to a farm. The labor distribution center in Glassboro is the Glassboro Service Association, which serves as the distribution center of workers and supplies them to its three hundred member growers.

The Glassboro Service members pay annual dues to cover the administrative cost of negotiating contracts with Puerto Rico, recruiting workers on the Island and maintain-

ing the headquarters and compound in Glassboro. Their offices are at the entrance of the compound. A sign at the entrance reads in English and Spanish: "Private Property. No Trespassing." The dozen or so long wooden buildings include the barracks, a commissary, and an infirmary. The compound is designed to house several hundred workers.

According to the Director of the Farmworkers Rights Project, Michael Berger (1982), the Glassboro Service Association has abused the Puerto Rican labor contract. He further argues that "the Glassboro Service Association will continue to violate the contract with impunity is questionable. . . . There is a definite need for legal representation. . . . Labor laws are violated on a daily basis" (Berger, July/August, 1982).

As the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico revised its contract, imposing stronger obligations upon growers who wished to hire Puerto Rican farmworkers, the number of contract workers declined from a high of 23,000 in 1968 to a low of 5,000 in 1975, and from 5,000 in 1975 to 1,958 in 1984 (P.R. Department of Labor, 1984). At the same time, the number of migrant seasonal farmworkers without contracts has increased tremendously. Puerto Rican officials reported that the number of seasonal workers migrating to the mainland United States in the 1970's and 1980's during harvest seasons under individual arrangements with American

growers has increased over the number of contract workers by three times (Interviews with P. R. Department of Labor staff, March, 1985).

Characteristics and Working Conditions of the Puerto Rican Farmworker

Historically, New Jersey farmers have utilized several sources of labor: southern migrants, Puerto Rican contract and non-contract workers, seasonal laborers from the rural towns near the farms, and workers bused in daily from the cities.

Twenty thousand migrant laborers enter the southern part of New Jersey each year to plant and harvest the crops during a season that lasts from April to mid-September. Vegetables are the principal crop, but fruits (blueberries, apples, peaches) and nursery stock are also produced. The size of the work force is dictated by the labor intensive nature of the industry. These migrant farmworkers are drawn from three sources: classical seasonal migrants, day haulers, and contract workers.

Classical Seasonal Migrants

Classical seasonal migrants are men and women following the agricultural cycle, residing in Florida, Texas, or Puerto Rico during the winter and working their way up the

East Coast (Florida to New Hampshire) the rest of the year. Typically, these migrants travel with a crew leader who lines up the work for them. (CATA's A Plan for Farmworkers Self-Determination in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico, 1984, estimated 15,000 seasonal farmworkers migrated to New Jersey.)

Day Haulers

Day haulers are individuals, usually residents of Philadelphia and South Jersey hired as needed on a daily basis to work on the farms of South Jersey. The day-haul labor system in South Jersey is an insidious form of exploitation. They usually come from Philadelphia and Camden and are transported as early as 4:00 a.m. to the fields of Southern New Jersey. Typically, they are Puerto Ricans and Blacks, women, children, and men; they come from poor families and usually are the unemployed of Philadelphia and Camden. Estimates of the numbers of these urban farmworkers range from 10,000 to 15,000. By dawn every summer morning, a loose caravan of school buses, bearing the words "Farm Labor Transport" moves these day haulers to the New Jersey fields (Hall, 1978). These day-haul farmworkers are very difficult to organize into a labor organization because many are either unemployed or receiving welfare benefits. The summer employment is not usually reported to these agencies and it would mean the end of economic sub-

sistence for their families. Growers have something to gain as well; they pay them cash and no tax is reported on these earnings.

Contract Workers

Contract workers are laborers hired in Puerto Rico during the winter to work in South Jersey under the terms of contracts negotiated on their behalf with growers' associations by the United States Secretary of Labor. (The Puerto Rico Department of Labor reported 1,958 contract workers for 1984.)

The Puerto Rican farmworker population in New Jersey has been characterized as being isolated by poverty and barriers to communication. Except for the day haulers, seasonal laborers are housed on the property of the farmer whose land he or she works. This housing is deep within the confines of the farms, obscured from view, inaccessible except to the laborers and the owner. The housing conditions are appalling. A typical camp houses 10 to 15 workers. Some are no more than cement shacks in total disrepair; others are wooden shacks with cement floors.

The nature of the work force reinforces the farmworkers' isolation. The crops require constant care; the seven day week is typical during the critical harvesting period; the work day is 15 hours long. The hours are even longer

for the day hauler. Hiring is done at three or four in the morning, and the day worker is bused home after the sun has set. For them, the work day consumes all but three or four hours.

Labor is hard, but the conditions are worse. Disputes over meals and rest breaks are common. Often drinking water is inadequately supplied. Federal law has yet to require that farm laborers have toilet facilities in the field (Porter, January 5, 1985).

New Jersey farmers have benefited from the diverse and ample work force these groups represent. Each group is organized into a separate labor system, and the farmer maintains these divisions by keeping the workers separated in the field. As a result, little progress in living and working conditions among farmworkers has occurred.

In recent years, despite a rising minimum wage, the income of farmworkers in this state has not improved. Currently, the minimum wage is \$3.10 per hour, but with today's rate of inflation, farmworkers have less purchasing power than they did in 1971, when their minimum wage was \$1.60 per hour. Moreover, enforcement of the minimum wage laws in New Jersey hardly guarantees that all workers on farms receive the minimum wage.

During one day of blueberry picking on a farm in Chatsworth, New Jersey, two investigative reporters in

July, 1983 cited "several major violations of State and Federal statutes" and reported that "the crew of about 250 workers . . . made (on the average) \$10 to \$12 for . . . ten hours of stoop-labor." If the crew had been paid the minimum wage of \$3.10 per hour, to which they were legally entitled, and the farmer was obligated to pay, the average pay would have been \$25-30 per day (Ripton, 1980).

The desperate conditions of farmworkers in New Jersey only begins with wages. Overtime pay for farmworkers does not exist, though workers may work up to 60-80 hours a week during peak season. Unemployment coverage hardly exists, even when farmers carry the coverage and workers pay into the fund. The migratory nature of agricultural employment and the limitations of the law prevent many from collecting.

Crew leaders continue to exploit the workers they recruit, using various physical and psychological means to do so. Living conditions in labor camps generally violate local and federal standards. Farmworkers are frequently isolated in camps without telephone or transportation.

While no investigation has adequately documented the consequences of the impoverishment of farmworkers in New Jersey, a recent national survey of the health of migrant farm laborers provides an indication of what would most likely be found: a work-related accident rate 300% higher

than the national rate; and incidence of infections, parasitic diseases and diseases of the respiratory and digestive systems 200-500% above the national average: a death rate from tuberculosis that is 25% higher; infant mortality is 125% higher; and a life expectancy of 49 years (Ripton, 1980).

The state and federal agencies responsible for maintaining and investigating farmworkers either neglect or have ignored the civil and human rights of the Puerto Rican farmworker. In the area of labor camp inspections, for example, legal protection from substandard housing has gotten progressively worse. Since the Occupational Safety and Health Administration took over the inspection of labor camps from the state in the early 1970's, the number of yearly camp inspections has drastically dropped (Ripton, 1980, p. 2).

The New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, responsible for enforcing the wage and work laws on farms, is also negligent in protecting farmworkers from the abuses and excesses of some growers and crew leaders. In 1978, the state Department of Labor and Industry Office of Wage and Hour Compliance inspected 600 farms, cited 275 of them for violations, but attempted to prosecute only three growers (Ripton, p. 3).

Farmworkers usually cannot turn to the local community for support. The residents of New Jersey's rural communities are generally suspicious and fearful of the workers. Local police and judges are too frequently blinded by the concerns of the local communities and the interests of the area growers. The local newspapers are filled with reports of violence involving farmworkers on and off the farm.

Considerable cultural and social barriers separate farmworkers from local residents. Most farmworkers in New Jersey are Puerto Ricans. The appearance, customs, language, and poverty of the workers set them apart from the local people. Farmworkers also encounter injustice at the hands of the police, in the local courts, and in the local public's estimation of them. Violence of all kinds breeds in these conditions.

The poverty and injustice surrounding farmworkers in New Jersey, or elsewhere, flows from their utter powerlessness. Historically, farmworkers have lacked organization and have never had representation at any level of government. Most farmworkers are not permanent residents of New Jersey and do not vote. They do not have enough wealth or enough organization to make their concerns known and felt. Economics, geography and culture too frequently divide the workers.

New Jersey farmers, on the other hand, have always been well organized and represented in Trenton and Washington. The Farm Bureau has been a strong lobby for the growers' interests. The New Jersey Department of Agriculture, whose Board is dominated by farmers, and whose Secretary is virtually appointed by farmers, along with the publicly-financed research/extension complex at Rutgers' Cook College, provides valuable services to the state's growers (Ripton & Hall, 1978).

Over the past few years, farmworkers in New Jersey have begun to awaken to political consciousness. In 1978, Puerto Rican farmworkers and their supporters staged a successful demonstration on the steps of the State House which, according to most observers, insured that for the first time in New Jersey history, farmworkers would receive minimum wage coverage equal to that of other workers (American Civil Liberties Union, 1978).

In 1984, the Coalition for the Rights of New Jersey Farmworkers, a public education lobbying group, reviewed and developed, with the participation of farmworkers, a lobbying campaign and organizing building strategy. At the same time, the *Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas* (CATA) began organizing self-help support committees on farms in New Jersey and in rural villages and barrios of Puerto Rico.

Most important, the first farmworker strike in New Jersey history occurred at the Sunny Slope Farms, Inc. near Bridgeton in August of 1980. Though Sunny Slope eventually broke the strike through a combination of contested legal maneuvers and the use of day-haul workers bused in from Philadelphia, neither the strikers nor their organization were broken.

New Jersey Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers are beginning to be organized through organizations such as CATA. Of course, the farm lobby is still much stronger and justice is a long way off in the future.

The Role of New Jersey Labor in Organizing Puerto Rican Farmworkers in New Jersey

Under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), originally called the Wagner Act, passed in 1935, which constitutes the statutory framework governing labor-management relations in the United States, New Jersey agricultural workers are excluded from coverage. There are several reasons why agricultural workers are excluded. According to NLRA, the agricultural interests (meaning farmers, not the farmworkers who were their employees) were adamantly opposed to the concept of unionization and collective bargaining. One observer, writing of agriculture's opposition to the NLRA labor codes, states: "Farmers as a class are

opposed to any form of labor organization. . . ." (NLRA, Wood Material, p. 45).

The second reason for ignoring labor in the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) was that the extent of unionization among agricultural workers at the time was negligible. Farmworkers' attitudes were not considered and no witnesses testified on behalf of farmworkers (Goldfarb, 1981).

Until the mid-twentieth century, there were few union successes in organizing field workers. Goldfarb (1981) indicates that the story of the numerous attempts during the first half of the twentieth century to begin a farmworker union in the United States is one of violence, frustration and failure. Meister and Loftis (1977) argued that time and again different unions attempted to organize farmworkers, only to be crushed by powerful landowners and their organization invariably supported by local power structures, including the press, police and politicians. It was not until the UFW success in California in the 1960's that farmworkers felt they had a union.

In New Jersey, seasonal Puerto Rican farmworkers, brought in to harvest intensive crops of fruits and vegetables, were controlled by labor contractors called "patrones" (crew leaders). Efforts to organize these workers were met with much opposition by hostile farmers (Goldfarb, 1981). The government of Puerto Rico, acting

like a union, provided growers with large numbers of farmworkers whose contracts they negotiated en masse. Union activity for Puerto Rican farmworkers in New Jersey (indeed in all East coast agricultural areas) has been minimal.

Crew leaders as independent labor contractors are employed by the growers as the middlemen to recruit and hire laborers. As a result of the decline of the contract labor system and the role of the Glassboro Service Association in recruiting workers, the crew leader system in New Jersey has increased. Under the New Jersey Crew Leader Registration Act (P.L. 1975, C-49), the crew leader means:

any person who transports, recruits, supplies or hires farm or food processing laborers and who, for any money or other valuable consideration paid, anticipated or promised to be paid, directly or indirectly by any farm operator or laborer, directs all or any part of the work of such workers, or any person who recruits, supplies, or hires farm or food processing laborers for any money or other valuable consideration paid, anticipated or promised to be paid, directly or indirectly by any farm operator or laborer, but shall not include any owner or lessee of a farm or food processing plant who recruits or hires laborers for work on his farm or in his plant provided, however that no such owner or lessee of a farm or food processing plant may employ as a supervisor or foreman any individual who is ineligible for licensing as a crew leader because of violations of any state or federal labor or criminal law. (p. 1)

The crew leader system in New Jersey has historically co-existed as an alternative system of recruiting seasonal Puerto Rican laborers. Their role as crew leader becomes increasingly important to growers as a result of the de-

cline of contract workers. Crew leaders usually recruit laborers in areas distant from farms and then provide transportation to the fields either daily or for an extended period, perhaps a season, moving from farm to farm, from state to state.

Farmworkers' attempts to organize have been stymied by growers, crew leaders and the New Jersey Farm Bureau which provides services for about 4,000 member farm families across the state (Lauren De Con, President of the New Jersey Farm Bureau, 1982). This Farm Bureau is a very strong political lobbying group which drafts legislation, maintains regular contact with legislators and has great influence with the state Department of Agriculture. The Department of Agriculture is under the direct control of the industry it regulates and promotes.

The Farm Bureau and the Department of Agriculture have teamed up to oppose virtually every legislative proposal for improving the living or working conditions of farmworkers in the state. Assistant Labor Commissioner Clark describes their power as such that "you cannot pass a farm labor bill in New Jersey" (Ripton, May, 1982, p. 19).

Seasonal farmworkers are among the most difficult to organize. Some of the major obstacles have been the fact that these workers are migrants from over a thousand miles away and from hundreds of farms; in addition, faces change

from one year to the next, and the slow task of educating and organizing must begin anew each season. The growers' opposition to unionization and the covert opposition of the Puerto Rican government also makes it difficult for unions to organize.

Despite many obstacles, attempts to organize the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers have been made. The success of these efforts in the past few years, however, has caused the contract workers' programs to decline.

In the early 1970's, the Connecticut Valley seemed to be the place most favorable for organizing on the East coast. Shade tobacco was growing under white cloth tenting to shield plants from the sun. Temperatures under the nets, where the workers spend most of their day, may reach 120°F accompanied by high humidity. The process has little potential for mechanization. Each plant requires human attention up to 15 times between spring and fall, or 930 million separate hand operations (NACLA, Nov.-Dec., 1977, p. 25).

Large labor camps, such as Camp Windsor, the largest labor camp in New England, housing 800 workers, corresponded to the concentrated pattern of land ownership and production in the valley. Family farming in this area had long since been replaced by corporate agriculture, dominated by such giants as Culbro Company, which was a subsid-

iary of the multi-billion dollar conglomerate, Gulf and Western. In 1941, the Shade Tobacco Growers Association kept a full-time recruiting staff in Puerto Rico and spent about half a million dollars each summer flying up to 6,000 workers from Puerto Rico to the fields (NACLA, Nov.-Dec., 1977, p. 25).

By relying on Puerto Rican workers during the busy summer months, tobacco growers thought they were protected from unionization. In August, 1973, the situation changed. One hundred Puerto Rican migrants gathered outside Camp Windsor and officially created the Association of Agricultural Workers (ATA).

ATA functioned on the Island and on the mainland. ATA concentrated on organizing efforts in the Connecticut Valley and New Jersey. In 1973, ATA had a membership of 1,500 members in New Jersey, Connecticut and Massachusetts (Nash, 1975, p. 65). It became successful in New England for a short time until it merged with the UFW.

ATA's organizing in New Jersey provoked a somewhat different response among growers. Contract workers were still a major factor in New Jersey agriculture, but their number had declined instead. Day haul workers were being brought from high unemployment areas in Philadelphia and Camden.

In 1976, ATA and the United Farm Workers Union, under a signed agreement, merged with the United Farm Workers and an office was opened formally in Vineland, New Jersey at the start of the 1977 season. A problem between UFW and ATA developed because the UFW concentrated its efforts of the West Coast. According to Angel Dominguez, former ATA organizer in New Jersey, the UFW refused to pay organizers, and, as a result, ATA disappeared.

Table 15

Rank of New Jersey Counties and States for Selected Items, 1983

RANK OF NEW JERSEY COUNTIES AND OF STATES FOR SELECTED ITEMS, 1983					
Item	1	2	3	4	5
NEW JERSEY COUNTIES					
Field crop production:					
Corn for grain	Warren	Hunterdon	Burlington	Salem	Monmouth
Wheat for grain	Salem	Monmouth	Burlington	Mercer 6/ Monmouth	Cumberland 6/ Mercer
Barley for grain	Burlington	Salem	Cumberland	Mercer	Burlington
All hay	Hunterdon	Sussex	Warren	Somerset	Burlington
Soybeans for beans	Burlington	Salem	Cumberland	Monmouth	Mercer
Potatoes	Middlesex	Cumberland	Salem	Monmouth	Mercer
Sweet potatoes	Atlantic	Gloucester	Salem	Cumberland	Camden
Vegetable acreage harvested:					
Asparagus	Gloucester	Salem	Cumberland 5/ Atlantic	Burlington 5/ Salem	- - - Gloucester
Cabbage	Cumberland	Atlantic	Gloucester	Salem 6/ Atlantic	Warren 6/ Monmouth
Lettuces	Cumberland	Atlantic	Gloucester	Salem 6/ Atlantic	Warren 6/ Monmouth
Peppers	Burlington	Monmouth	Salem	Camden 6/ Atlantic	Gloucester 6/ Burlington
Sweet corn	Burlington	Monmouth	Salem	Camden 6/ Atlantic	Gloucester 6/ Burlington
Tomatoes	Gloucester	Salem	Cumberland	Atlantic	Burlington
Fruits and berries:					
Apples, com'l production ...	Gloucester	Burlington	Monmouth	Atlantic	Salem
Peach production	Gloucester	Atlantic	Cumberland	Camden	Burlington
Blueberry production	Atlantic	Burlington	- - -	- - -	- - -
Strawberry acreage	Burlington	Camden 4/	Cumberland 4/	Gloucester 5/	Monmouth 5/
Certified nurseries:					
Nursery stock acreage	Monmouth	Gloucester	Middlesex	Cumberland	Hunterdon
Number of nurseries	Monmouth	Cumberland	Bergen	Gloucester	Burlington
Livestock and products:					
Milk production	Warren	Sussex	Salem	Hunterdon	Burlington
Number all cattle 1/	Warren	Hunterdon	Sussex	Salem	Burlington
Number sheep and lambs 1/ ..	Hunterdon	Sussex 4/	Somerset 4/	Warren	Salem
Number hogs and pigs	Gloucester	Burlington	Cumberland	Salem	Hunterdon
UNITED STATES					
Crop Production					
Snap Beans, processing	Wisconsin	Oregon	New York	Michigan	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Tomatoes, Fresh Market	Florida	California	South Carolina	Pennsylvania	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Peaches	California	South Carolina	Georgia	Pennsylvania	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>
Cranberries	Massachusetts	Wisconsin	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Washington	Oregon
Other:					
Taxes per acre 2/	Rhode Island	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Michigan	Connecticut	Massachusetts
Average value of farmland and buildings per acre 3/ ...	<u>NEW JERSEY</u>	Rhode Island	Connecticut	Maryland	California
1/ Data relate to January 1, 1984.					
2/ Data relate to 1982.					
3/ Data relate to 1984.					
4/ Counties tied for 2nd.					
5/ Counties tied for 3rd.					
6/ Counties tied for 6th.					

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 16

New Jersey: Principal Vegetables Acreage, Production and Value, 1920-1983

NEW JERSEY: PRINCIPAL VEGETABLES, ACREAGE, PRODUCTION AND VALUE, 1920-1983									
Year	Acreage Harvested			Production (tons)			Value (thousand dollars)		
	for fresh market	for processing	Total	for fresh market	for processing	Total	for fresh market	for processing	Total
1970	62,260	34,710	96,970	267,250	333,150	600,400	37,058	17,209	54,267
1971	60,780	33,120	93,900	249,900	264,550	514,450	36,874	14,091	52,965
1972	59,600	30,390	89,990	235,200	221,000	456,200	40,915	12,956	53,871
1973	55,880	32,050	87,930	240,950	222,290	463,240	49,177	14,196	63,373
1974	51,510	34,100	85,610	243,350	291,300	534,650	48,423	28,078	76,501
1975	47,740	27,570	75,310	217,300	210,750	428,050	48,435	17,748	66,183
1976	49,330	14,300	63,630	226,200	214,050	440,250	52,231	13,962	66,193
1977	48,430	14,800	63,230	219,350	163,450	382,800	56,119	10,694	66,813
1978	43,250	18,050	61,300	198,500	139,250	338,050	57,529	10,136	67,665
1979	44,990	16,600	61,590	196,650	133,610	330,260	61,905	10,800	72,705
1980	43,630	14,460	58,090	202,900	103,270	306,070	60,789	8,785	69,574
1981	43,200	15,290	58,490	222,450	146,690	379,140	78,539	13,323	91,862
1982	41,350	14,900	56,250 1/	224,200	131,930	376,230 1/	80,429	14,320	96,861 1/
1983	39,900	10,600	51,750 1/	197,000	80,360	288,460 1/	70,946	7,990	80,382 1/

1/ Totals include vegetable crops not published in fresh market or processing tables in order to avoid disclosing individual operations.

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 17

New Jersey Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector (Excluding Farm Household), January 1979-1983

NEW JERSEY - BALANCE SHEET OF THE FARMING SECTOR (EXCLUDING FARM HOUSEHOLDS), JANUARY 1, 1979--1983 1/					
Item	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 2/
			-- number --		
Farm.....	9,600	9,400	9,500	9,500	9,500
Assets			-- million dollars --		
Total farm assets.....	2,822.5	3,033.9	3,148.8	3,282.9	3,241.0
Real estate 3/.....	2,318.6	2,462.6	2,551.5	2,658.5	2,610.4
Livestock and poultry 4/.....	85.8	84.4	97.7	89.8	80.7
Machinery and motor vehicles 5/.....	254.3	288.0	309.3	334.2	343.3
Crops 6/.....	50.9	58.9	44.1	48.4	48.1
Financial assets.....	132.9	141.0	146.3	152.1	158.2
Claims					
Total farm debt.....	304.3	349.6	399.1	426.1	441.1
Real estate debt 7/.....	198.8	233.2	267.0	269.4	277.1
Nonreal estate debt 8/.....	102.5	113.4	129.1	150.7	158.0
CCC loans 9/.....	3.0	3.0	3.0	6.0	6.0
Equity.....	2,518.2	2,684.3	2,749.8	2,856.8	2,799.8
Ratios			-- ratio --		
Equity/assets.....	89.2	88.5	87.3	87.0	86.4
Debt/equity.....	12.1	13.0	14.5	14.9	15.8
Debt/assets, total.....	10.8	11.5	12.7	13.0	13.6
Debt/assets, real estate.....	8.6	9.5	10.5	10.1	10.6
Debt/assets, nonreal estate and CCC.....	20.9	20.3	22.1	25.1	26.0
Returns to operator/total debt.....	14.5	5.6	13.8	9.6	N.A.

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 18

New Jersey Balance Sheet of the Farming Sector (Including Farm Household), January 1979-1983

NEW JERSEY -- BALANCE SHEET OF THE FARMING SECTOR INCLUDING FARM HOUSEHOLDS, JANUARY 1, 1979-1983 1/					
Farms.....	-- number --				
	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980
Assets					
-- million dollars --					
Total farm assets.....	3,546.9	3,827.0	3,966.4	4,143.5	4,110.2
Real estate.....	2,782.0	2,984.5	3,087.9	3,211.5	3,147.7
Livestock and poultry.....	65.8	84.4	97.7	89.8	80.7
Machinery and motor vehicles.....	275.0	306.7	327.6	353.0	359.9
Crops &.....	50.9	58.9	64.1	48.4	48.5
Household equip and furnishings.....	136.8	148.4	157.5	178.8	201.2
Deposits and currency.....	153.5	154.0	158.2	166.1	172.7
U.S. savings bonds.....	15.1	14.2	13.5	13.0	12.5
Investments in cooperatives.....	67.6	75.8	80.0	83.0	86.6
Claims					
Total farm debt.....	348.7	404.6	461.5	490.6	506.8
Real estate debt.....	228.6	282.7	323.1	325.4	334.1
Nonreal estate debt 10.....	107.1	118.9	135.7	159.2	166.5
CCC loans 11/.....	3.0	3.0	3.0	6.0	6.0
Equity.....	3,198.2	3,422.4	3,504.6	3,652.9	3,603.4
Ratios					
-- ratio --					
Equity/assets.....	90.2	89.4	88.4	88.2	87.7
Debt/equity.....	10.9	11.8	13.2	13.4	14.1
Debt/assets, total.....	9.8	10.6	11.6	11.8	12.3
Debt/assets, real estate.....	8.6	9.5	10.5	10.1	10.6
Debt/assets, nonreal estate and CCC.....	14.4	14.5	15.8	17.7	17.9
Net farm income/debt.....	26.9	19.6	25.6	22.0	N.A.

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 19

New Jersey: Farm Wage Rates, By Quarters, 1977-1981

NEW JERSEY: FARM WAGE RATES, BY QUARTERS, 1977-1981						
Year Month and Survey week	All hired workers	Field workers	Livestock workers	Packing house workers	Machine operators	Supervisors
-- dollars per hour --						
1977:						
January 9-15	3.99	NA	NA	2.88	1/	5.17
April 10-16	2.79	NA	NA	1/	1/	1/
July 10-16	2.75	2.61	2.49	2.90	3.70	3.55
October 9-15	3.95	2.80	2.70	2.90	3.25	6.38
1978:						
January 8-14	3.23	3.00	2.60	2.83	1/	5.28
April 9-15	3.14	3.08	2.53	3.00	3.76	4.72
July 9-15	2.99	2.85	2.85	2.93	3.25	4.71
October 8-14	3.79	3.10	2.72	2.90	3.48	1/
1979:						
January 7-13	3.58	3.17	2.90	3.00	1/	5.50
April 10-16	3.35	3.14	2.92	1/	1/	5.67
July 8-14	3.38	3.25	3.00	3.30	4.74	5.00
October 7-13	3.41	3.37	3.20	2.92	1/	5.05
1980:						
January 6-12	3.65	3.40	3.25	3.20	4.00	5.75
April 6-12	3.59	3.30	3.40	1/	4.04	6.00
July 6-12	3.60	3.42	3.50	1/	4.30	1/
October 12-18	3.85	3.55	3.80	1/	1/	1/
1981:						
January 11-17	4.25	3.70	3.75	1/	1/	1/
April 12-18	3.68	3.33	3.60	1/	4.71	6.75

1/ insufficient data for this category. Data included in all hired farm workers.

NOTE: LABOR ESTIMATES HAVE BEEN DISCONTINUED SINCE THE APRIL 1981 SURVEY.

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J.
Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture,
Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 20

Farm Residents 14-Years Old and Over Employed in Agriculture and Non-Agricultural Industries, by Class of Workers and Sex, for 1983 and 1980, and Region for 1983

Table Farm Residents 14 Years Old and Over Employed in Agriculture and Nonagricultural Industries, by Class of Worker and Sex, for 1983 and 1980, and Region, for 1983

(Numbers in thousands. For meaning of symbols, see text)

Sex and class of worker	United States		North and West, 1983	South, 1983	Percent distribution			
	1983	1980			United States		North and West, 1983	South, 1983
					1983	1980		
TOTAL WORKERS								
Both sexes	2,862	3,037	1,913	930	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	1,336	1,193	779	336	39.8	39.1	40.7	37.3
Wage and salary workers	1,513	1,864	961	353	52.9	51.2	50.2	56.2
Unpaid family workers	213	297	173	43	7.5	9.7	9.0	6.5
Male	1,870	2,018	1,266	626	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	866	1,033	633	197	30.8	30.9	32.7	44.6
Wage and salary workers	862	809	527	315	45.0	43.8	42.4	50.3
Unpaid family workers	81	105	63	19	4.3	5.2	5.1	3.0
Female	992	1,029	666	336	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	167	162	123	62	18.9	13.7	18.7	19.1
Wage and salary workers	671	675	436	238	67.6	65.6	63.0	73.5
Unpaid family workers	134	192	111	34	13.5	18.7	18.6	7.4
TOTAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS								
Both sexes	1,371	1,662	1,121	430	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	991	1,036	609	301	83.1	63.0	61.5	66.9
Wage and salary workers	373	328	263	110	23.7	19.9	23.4	24.4
Unpaid family workers	207	302	168	60	13.2	17.2	15.0	8.9
Male	1,253	1,307	877	373	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	661	930	602	239	68.7	71.2	68.6	69.1
Wage and salary workers	312	276	216	98	26.9	21.0	26.4	26.1
Unpaid family workers	80	184	62	18	6.4	8.0	7.1	4.8
Female	318	336	262	75	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	130	103	88	41	60.9	31.4	36.4	36.7
Wage and salary workers	61	52	48	13	19.2	15.4	19.8	17.3
Unpaid family workers	127	179	105	21	39.9	53.3	43.4	46.0
TOTAL NONAGRICULTURAL WORKERS								
Both sexes	1,291	1,413	792	499	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	143	161	89	36	11.1	11.4	11.2	10.8
Wage and salary workers	1,140	1,239	697	463	88.3	87.6	88.0	89.8
Unpaid family workers	8	13	5	3	0.6	1.1	0.6	0.6
Male	616	739	366	190	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	85	103	53	33	13.8	14.3	14.5	13.2
Wage and salary workers	330	615	312	217	86.0	85.4	85.2	86.8
Unpaid family workers	1	2	1	-	0.2	0.3	0.3	-
Female	675	693	426	269	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Self-employed workers	58	38	36	21	8.6	8.3	8.3	8.4
Wage and salary workers	610	623	383	223	90.4	89.4	90.4	90.4
Unpaid family workers	7	16	4	3	1.0	2.0	0.8	1.2

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 21

Income and Poverty of Farm and Non-Farm Families, by Race of Householder, 1982

Table Income and Poverty Status of Farm and Nonfarm Families, by Race of Householder: 1982

(Families as of March 1983. For meaning of symbols, see text)

Characteristic	All races			White			Black		
	Total	Farm	Nonfarm	Total	Farm	Nonfarm	Total	Farm	Nonfarm
Total families.....thousands...	61,393	1,617	39,777	53,407	1,568	51,839	6,530	40	6,490
Percent of families by 1982 income...	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	(B)	100.0
Under \$2,500 or less.....	2.3	7.5	2.2	1.9	7.7	1.7	5.4	(B)	5.5
\$2,500 to \$4,999.....	5.7	3.7	5.7	2.7	3.3	2.7	11.6	(B)	11.6
\$5,000 to \$7,499.....	5.2	5.8	5.2	6.4	5.7	6.4	11.7	(B)	11.7
\$7,500 to \$9,999.....	5.4	7.9	5.3	4.9	7.5	4.8	9.1	(B)	9.1
\$10,000 to \$14,999.....	12.5	14.0	12.4	12.1	13.8	12.0	15.7	(B)	15.6
\$15,000 to \$19,999.....	12.1	14.1	12.1	12.3	14.3	12.2	11.2	(B)	11.3
\$20,000 to \$24,999.....	12.3	13.9	12.3	12.6	13.6	12.6	10.7	(B)	10.7
\$25,000 to \$29,999.....	10.7	9.2	10.7	11.0	9.2	11.1	8.0	(B)	8.0
\$30,000 to \$34,999.....	8.9	7.2	8.9	9.2	7.3	9.3	6.1	(B)	6.1
\$35,000 to \$39,999.....	6.9	6.6	6.9	7.2	6.0	7.3	3.9	(B)	3.9
\$40,000 to \$44,999.....	5.2	2.3	5.3	5.8	2.4	5.7	2.3	(B)	2.3
\$45,000 to \$49,999.....	3.9	2.5	3.9	4.1	2.6	4.2	1.5	(B)	1.5
\$50,000 and over.....	10.9	5.8	11.1	11.9	5.7	12.0	2.6	(B)	2.7
Median income.....dollars..	23,433	18,756	23,585	24,403	19,862	24,799	13,599	(B)	13,648
Mean income.....dollars..	27,391	21,480	27,541	28,403	21,884	28,807	17,259	(B)	17,793
Percent of families--									
Below poverty level.....	12.2	18.6	12.1	9.4	17.8	9.3	33.0	(B)	32.9
Above poverty level.....	87.8	81.4	87.9	90.4	82.2	90.7	67.0	(B)	67.1
Percent of persons--									
Below poverty level.....	15.0	22.1	14.8	12.0	21.0	11.7	35.4	51.4	35.3
Above poverty level.....	85.0	77.9	85.2	88.0	79.0	88.3	64.6	48.6	64.7

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

Table 22

Total and Farm Populations, by Race, 1920-1983

Table Total and Farm Populations, by Race: 1920 to 1983

(Numbers in thousands)

Year	White			Black		
	Total population	Farm population		Total population	Farm population	
		Number of persons	Percent of total		Number of persons	Percent of total
CURRENT FARM DEFINITION						
1983	193,423	5,363	2.8	27,206	162	0.6
1982	193,370	5,391	2.8	26,764	179	0.7
1981	189,056	5,486	2.9	25,930	227	0.9
1980	187,633	5,714	3.0	25,302	243	0.9
1979	186,080	5,891	3.2	25,104	280	1.1
1978	184,806	6,064	3.3	24,737	349	1.4
PREVIOUS FARM DEFINITION						
1983	193,423	6,729	3.4	27,206	218	0.8
1982	193,370	6,356	3.4	26,764	247	0.9
1981	189,056	6,364	3.5	25,930	278	1.1
1980	187,633	6,828	3.6	25,302	299	1.2
1979	186,080	7,111	3.8	25,104	360	1.4
1978	184,806	7,482	4.0	24,737	416	1.7
1970	176,661	8,773	5.0	23,972	649	2.7
1960	138,832	11,852	7.5	18,872	1,482	7.9
1950 ¹	134,942	19,713	14.6	15,042	3,167	21.1
1940 ¹	118,215	23,663	21.5	12,964	4,302	35.0
1930 ¹	110,287	23,228	22.9	11,891	6,661	59.4
1920 ¹	94,821	26,073	27.5	10,643	5,100	68.7

¹Continous United States.

Source: New Jersey Crop Reporting Service, N.J. Department of Agriculture (1983), New Jersey Agriculture, Trenton, New Jersey.

CHAPTER III

HISTORY OF COMITE DE APOYO A LOS TRABAJADORES AGRICOLAS
(CATA) AND STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT AS THE ORGANIZATION
UNDERWENT CHANGEIntroduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical analysis of CATA and each of its stages of development as the organization underwent change. In this particular chapter the history of each organizational stage of development, namely, CAMP, META, ATA, NEFSC and CATA will be presented. The successes and failures of each organizational stage of development will be examined, as well as the conditions that brought the organization into existence, the way the leadership went about organizing, and how they reached out to the workers. A close evaluation of the organization's evolution during each stage of organizational development will be provided. Once this history is presented in some detail, the stage will be set in the next chapter for evaluation of each of these stages and for examination of the internal and external organizational

characteristics in relationship to the organizational structures and effectiveness of CATA.

Cata Historical Stages of Development Chart

- 1969-1971 CAMP (Comite de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno)
(Puerto Rican Migrant Farmworkers Support Committee)
- 1972-1973 META (Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas)
(Ecumenical Migrant Ministry)
- 1973-1977 ATA (Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas)
(First Puerto Rican Farmworkers Union)
- 1977-1978 NEFSC (North East Farmworkers Support Committee)
- 1979-present CATA (Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas)
(Farmworkers Support Committee)

During 1969, close to 50,000 Puerto Rican farmworkers migrated to the East Coast of the United States. The same year, alarming reports appeared in the Puerto Rican press about the working conditions, health, low salaries, contract violations and gross violations of civil rights concerning the inhuman exploitation to which Puerto Rican farmworkers were exposed during the six or seven months of spring, as well as summer and fall seasons in the United States.

The Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers suffered many indignities, but none more dehumanizing than that resulting

from being subject to the paternalistic system established by the federal government and, before it, by religious institutions. Senator Mondale refers to this in the following statement: "I have a lot less hope that the bureaucracy is going to be truly meaningful and relevant in their effort to respond to migrants than do people who have studied this problem. I think that the migrants have suffered from an overdose of malignant paternalism. It is a wonderful way for the White people to work off their guilt feelings" (U.S. Senate Sub-Committee on Migratory Labor 1970, Senator Mondale). The paternalistic Government had its antecedents in the paternalism of Protestant and Catholic institutions.

Both Catholic and Protestant institutions on the Island have been involved historically with the moral, sacramental or institutional needs of the farmworkers in the context of their theological and organizational framework. However, in spite of church renewals, ecclesiastical institutions were not able to cope efficiently with the real situation of the "campesinos" (peasants). Instead, the North American Catholic Church in Puerto Rico and in the States was very paternalistic in its dealings with migrant farmworkers. The distribution of used clothing and vitamins, the traditional European worship service in the camps, the distribution of Bibles to a 75% illiterate group

(as a conservative estimate) and the preaching of the gospel from a white-middle class point of view was a desperate effort by local churches to do something. Because the majority of the trained Puerto Rican ministers came to serve "the churches that can pay," they usually went to the cities, where a larger concentration of Puerto Ricans resided. In many areas, the National Migrant Ministry of Churches chose Cuban refugees to minister the Puerto Rican migrants in their behalf. This complicated the situation, since the Cubans' condition of refugee neutralized their willingness to face the dangers and hazards that the social and economic injustices facing the migrant farmworkers demanded (META Proposal, 1970, p. 1.)

In 1969, when reports appeared in the local press about the working conditions of Puerto Rican farmworkers on the mainland, the religious institutions responded in a very different way. A group of church and union leaders, under the sponsorship of the Industrial Mission of Puerto Rico and the Episcopal Church, met to plan an effective way to create the condition by which thousands of Puerto Rican migrants could empower themselves with the means to solve their own problems.

One can hypothesize that the Episcopal Church responded in this way at this time for a number of reasons. First, the Episcopal Church has had a longstanding

relationship with America's farmworkers. Although the Church is an integral part of the societal structures which have kept farmworkers among the most disadvantaged in the nation, during the past fifty years it also has been one of the few institutions which has produced a measure of personal care for them. Second, the Episcopal Church in Puerto Rico has always been known to be somewhat more progressive and liberal than the Catholic Church. Third, so much was being told about the deplorable working conditions that it suddenly evoked a strong response. Last, and most important, 1969 was the Vietnam era and the era of political activism; organized labor and church leaders thus became more concerned with the issues of justice and dignity for farmworkers. During this same time, Cesar Chavez was being publicized as the grassroots leader of the migrant farmworkers movement, along with the National Migrant Ministry of Churches. Chavez's non-violent struggle had convinced scores of churchmen of the necessity of the Church to support the movement.

As a result of this initiation on the part of the Episcopal Church, a Committee was formed to deal with some of the problems facing the Puerto Rican migrant farmworker. This Committee went through a number of organizational stages.

The organization to be studied, known as the Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas (CATA), has evolved through a series of successes over a period of fifteen years. Any effort to study and understand this organization will require a close evaluation of its evolution during CATA's six stages of development. Stage I, Comité de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueño (CAMP), consisted of a Steering Committee whose purpose was to form an organization for migrant farmworkers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. Stage II, Ministerio Ecuménico de Trabajadores Agrícolas (META), was a religious support organization whose primary purpose was to form a migrant farmworkers union. Stage III, Asociación de Trabajadores Agrícolas (ATA), was the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' union. Stage IV, ATA, merged with the United Farmworkers Union of the AFL-CIO. Stage V, North East Farmworkers Support Committee (NEFSC), was an organization of advocates from federally funded farmwork agencies. Stage VI, Comité de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas (CATA), was a grass-roots organization whose purpose has been to provide social, educational and labor advocacy services to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

Each of these stages of organizational development requires a careful analysis and explanation of each of its organizational structures, functions, how they

were carried out, why they disintegrated and what was important at each stage of development.

Stage I: CAMP (Comite de Apoyo al
Migrante Puertorriqueno)

In 1969, a Steering Committee was created which hired a staff of organizers then known as CAMP. The staff developed an organizing network in New Jersey, Connecticut, Long Island and Puerto Rico.

According to Reverend Alberto Gonzalez, Field Coordinator of CAMP (1972), CAMP was the "supporting committee" for the Puerto Rican farmworkers that migrated each year to the farms on the East Coast of the United States. The contact person in Puerto Rico and Coordinator of CAMP was Juan Reyes Soto, who was a member of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. The religious contact agency in the United States was the National Migrant Ministry who hired Reverend Wilmer R. Silva in 1972 as Director of the Puerto Rican Farmworkers Ministry in Vineland, New Jersey. The purpose of this agency was to provide support and coordinate efforts for CAMP and to do an assessment of the migrant farmworkers in the United States (Alberto Gonzalez, 1972).

CAMP was primarily a steering committee. Its primary purpose was to develop an organization, which was eventually called META, that would represent the interest of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. In 1970, Juan Reyes Soto visited New Jersey, Connecticut, and Massachusetts to assess the farmworker situation and to formalize and plan to begin this future organization of farmworkers.

In October, 1972, Reverend Wilmer Silva resigned with four of his co-workers from the Community Migrant Ministry "to start a new, real and genuine farmworkers ministry for the Puerto Ricans in Vineland, New Jersey" (Silva, October 14, 1972). This ministry was called META. According to the Reverend Silva (1985), the reason for his resignation from the Community Migrant Ministry in 1972 was the lack of "the Episcopal Church involvement in developing consciousness raising for farmworkers. The Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers needed an organization that was going to advocate for their needs" (Interview, Reverend Wilmer Silva, September 13, 1985).

Stage II: META (Ministerio Ecumenico
de Trabajadores Agricolas)

The Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas, Inc. (META) (Ecumenical Farmworkers Ministry, Inc.) was organized during the fall of 1972 in Vineland, New Jersey.

This city was crucial because it had the largest Puerto Rican farm working population, both seasonal and residential, in all South Jersey and Connecticut. The Board of Directors in New Jersey was composed of ten Puerto Ricans and North Americans who lived and worked in the area. (The author of this dissertation was then one of the members of the Board of META in New Jersey.)

In Connecticut, another similar board operated in the same manner as in New Jersey. The Director in Connecticut was Reverend Wilfredo Velez, also a Puerto Rican, who was a "Disciple of Christ Pastor" in Bridgeport, Connecticut. All Board members, although not necessarily farmworkers themselves, were persons who had demonstrated their commitment and support to the farmworker organization (Silva, 1972).

Church and private foundations provided funding to this relatively militant group for a physical base on the Island, where the farmworkers lived when not migrating to the mainland and where the strongest opposition to migrant farmworkers' advocacy existed. META, a year-round organization in New Jersey and in Connecticut, performed services of

. . . support to the farmworkers' organizations such as camp visitations, distribution of literature, public exposure of the conditions of migrants, meetings with farmworkers for the discussion of their problems, labor education, advising in regard to the legal as-

pects of their contract, and support of individual cases related to the organizational process (Silva, META History, 1972, p. 1).

The staff was composed of six full-time college students who were trained and supervised by the Director and some Board members in New Jersey. In Connecticut, they had a number of full-time and volunteer staff personnel working.

During its brief existence, from 1972 to 1973, META was involved in three major areas involving Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. First, it established connections between itself and other farmworkers organizations. These connections helped to draw national attention to the organization and allowed it to form bonds with other workers in other parts of the country. Second, META was involved in a number of legal issues between Puerto Rican farmworkers and the Puerto Rican government. They also provided leadership to farmworkers in their attempts to form a union. Eventually, META in New Jersey came into conflict with META in Connecticut, and as a result of this conflict, it was dissolved and incorporated into a new organization known as ATA.

META established early relationships with the United Farm Workers Union in California in mutual support of migrant farmworkers. The National Farm Workers Ministry

and the National Council of Churches founded META in New Jersey and in Connecticut (Silva, META, Inc., 1972, p. 1).

In his letter of October 18, 1972, to Reverend Paul Stagg, General Secretary of New Jersey State Council of Churches, Silva documented the relationship between META and the UFW:

META has negotiated its co-existence with the National Farm Workers Ministry and the United Farm Workers. Cesar Chavez personally and his people support us and they will contribute also economically to our efforts to organize the Puerto Rican farmworkers. We will help them in the organization of Puerto Rican farmworkers in the West exchanging organizers and in the production of materials. (Silva, p. 1)

The staff and organizers of META concentrated in three strategic areas: Connecticut, Puerto Rico and New Jersey. They were funded by private foundations from various individual churches committed to the farmworkers' cause. According to Mr. Silva (1972) "the Catholic Church allocated money for META and they assigned Father William Loperena to work full time in the Connecticut area." The "Methodist Church assigned Reverend Alberto Gonzalez full time in Puerto Rico and Reverend Silva full time assigned from funds of the Episcopal Church to New Jersey" (Silva, p.1).

In February, 1973, META concentrated its principal efforts in the Connecticut Valley. Support committees were formed in seven Connecticut communities and in three Southern New Jersey communities.

On February 12, 1973, Reverend Silva wrote to Ruben Berrios Martinez, President of the Independence Party of Puerto Rico (PIP), informing him of the work he and his colleagues were doing in relationship to organizing migrant farmworkers. He asked for Berrios' support in a class action suit against the Farm Bureau, due to the fact that the Puerto Rican Farm Bureau was engaged in chartering flights "with private airlines to bring 4,000 to 5,000 farmworkers at no cost to the Department of Labor." Silva indicated that "there (was) fraud involved in terms of money of the airline tickets" because under the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico the regulation governing yearly contracts stipulates that air line tickets for contract workers could not be used for transporting non-contract workers (Silva letter to Ruben Berrios, February 12, 1973, p. 1). He explained that the Office of Legal Services of Bridgeton "feels this [was] a legal civil action suit and that this case can be used in Puerto Rico for the Partido Independentista (PIP) to discredit the farmworkers' contract of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico" (Silva, 1973). During this time Ruben Berrios, President of the Independence Party in Puerto Rico, was too occupied with other political issues and he "neglected to respond to my letter and, as a result, the legal civil action suit was dropped" (Interview, Reverend Wilmer Silva, September 13, 1985).

During this same winter, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund from New York City issued a suit on behalf of all Puerto Rican contracted farmworkers against the Governor and Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico, the Director of the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the United States, and the New Jersey Department of Labor. Their claim was that the defendants had violated the Federal, New Jersey State and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico laws in regards to the working and living conditions of these farmworkers. The newly appointed Director of the Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in the United States, Marcos Rigau, a young, wealthy lawyer, became very interested in seeking justice for the farmworkers. The defendants accepted the charges and agreed to negotiate with the workers in order to remedy the situation. The condition stated by lawyers consisted of a nonprofit private organization dedicated to the service of farmworkers be contracted to choose and train farmworkers in each camp for the enforcement of the farmers' association. META, Inc. was the name of the organization that the lawyers asked to perform these tasks. The proposed arrangement was brought by Marcos Rigau back to the Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico. The result of the opposition of the Secretary, Luis Silva Recio, and the firm position of advocacy for the workers by Marcos Rigau caused the firing of Rigau

from his position (Puerto Rican Legal Defense Fund v. Luis A. Ferre [and his successors in office] [class action suit] 1972).

According to Reverend Silva (1973), the purpose of the legal action was to "take to court the evidence that was available about abuses concerning farmworkers and expose it to the public" (p. 1). The conclusion of the case was that the inspectors of the Commonwealth fired the "bad guys responsible for the situation and hired new personnel with a different attitude toward the defense of the farmworkers" (p. 1).

This issue of the legal case and the META educational program in the three different states awakened the migrant farmworkers. META helped identify farmworkers leadership and supported those leaders in their attempts to form a union.

META appeared to have two functions, one of advocacy and networking with farmworkers and religious organizations, and the other consisting of syndication of farmworkers and litigation. New Jersey META's overall thrust was directed by religious and social reformers; Connecticut META's emphasis consisted of political activists who sought to "organize the working class," meaning Puerto Rican farmworkers, and to advocate for the Independence of Puerto

Rico. These ideological differences brought about a clash between both of these groups.

On July 15, 1973, a conflict that had been growing between the Connecticut and New Jersey Board Members of META erupted. On that day, an important document was drafted by David Lillesand, member of META, to all members of the META Board concerning "important issues" and "extremely difficult times facing META" (Memo, David Lillesand, July 15, 1973). During this time, a meeting between the Boards of the two META's from New Jersey and Connecticut was scheduled, with representatives from both groups. Mr. Wilfredo Velez, Juan Irizarry and Sister Betsy were present from Connecticut. Representing New Jersey were Board Members Martha Benavides, Luis Figueroa, Gloria Bonilla, David Lillesand, and Reverend Silva. This meeting lasted 7 1/2 hours with no breaks. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the problem of coordination between the two groups.

Most of the problems "stemmed from the fact that Juan Irizarry was a member of the PSP (Puerto Rican Socialist Party)" and "Wilmer Silva was a member of PIP (Puerto Rican Independence Party)" (Memo, David Lillesand, 1973, p. 4). The two political parties played an important role in the Puerto Rican political spectrum during the 1970s. Wilfredo Velez was not a member of either, but he felt he was being

accused of being a "dupe of the PSP" by Reverend Silva. Reverend Silva apparently "felt that the PSP was manipulating the struggle for an organization of farmworkers in Connecticut so that the PSP [would] use these workers as cadres in support of their part" (p. 4). Juan Irizarry denied all of this.

The Connecticut group (META Board Members) charged Reverend Silva had "deviated from a March 9, 1970 document (a work plan which had been presented to church groups in New York and agreed to by both groups)." They were specifically "concerned that Wilmer was straying from the mission to organize farmworkers to include non-farmworking Puerto Rican workers in general" (p. 4). In support of this, they referred to page three of Wilmer's letter under the heading "how we conceive META." The people of Connecticut indicated that concentrating on the "working class was not designed to mean farmworkers and the unemployed" (Memo, David Lillesand, 1973, p. 3).

The two groups met and agreed not to break off at that time, but both Boards had some difficult questions and issues with which to deal. The Connecticut group wanted Reverend Silva fired, and both groups wanted to subscribe to the March 9 document (the work plan to form an organization or union that would represent the interest of the farmworkers.) The wars between the leaders of PIP and PSP were the

cause of Reverend Silva's resignation. META continued to be, under Mr. David Lillesand, a support group to farmworkers' movements in New Jersey.

At the same time that the conflict between the two Boards was coming into the open, events were occurring in Connecticut that would eventually undermine META altogether. The events that occurred involved the organization of the union bargaining with the Shade Tobacco Growers Association, the demonstration at Camp Windsor in Connecticut, the disappearance of META and its transformation into ATA. In April, 1973, about thirty workers, along with META representatives, staged a demonstration at Camp Windsor in Connecticut over the quality of meals provided for the workers. Consequently, during May and June, META workers were allowed only extremely limited access to the camps. The Association also limited META workers by defining and delineating how many men could gather together, where they might meet, and what might be discussed.

As a result of this demonstration by META organizers against the Shade Tobacco Growers Association, a number of legal actions arose, public awareness increased, and migrant farmworkers officially organized to create the first Puerto Rican union called Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas (ATA).

Stage III: ATA (Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas
de Puerto Rico -- Farmworkers Association)

On August 5, 1973, the Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico (ATA) was officially created by some one hundred migrants outside Camp Windsor, despite the climate of violence and fear engendered by the demonstrations. Juan Irizarry was elected the Interim President of ATA. According to Juan Irizarry, ATA's purpose was to generate public support and recognition as a labor union and to represent the farmworkers in contract negotiations between the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico and the contracting employers. It also attempted to represent all farmworkers whether contracted or not (ATA, Document of Purpose, November 7, 1983, [translation mine]).

ATA was extremely successful in that it organized tremendous numbers of workers. Secondly, because it received the backing, sometimes qualified, sometimes unqualified, endorsement and support of a lot of prominent people and of a lot of very influential religious and labor organizations, ATA was very successful in winning legal actions against the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico. ATA became the only bargaining agent for the farmworkers migrating from Puerto Rico and, as a result,

gained recognition and respect from the Government of Puerto Rico and organized labor in the United States. As the only Puerto Rican farmworkers union, ATA improved wages, negotiated health insurance plans for the migrants and, in general, improved the lives of hundreds of farmworkers. As a result of these successes, it became a threat to New Jersey and other East Coast farmers and farm bureaus.

By the end of 1976, ATA consisted of a membership of approximately 9,000 farmworkers from Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey (ATA, Document of Purpose, 1973, p. 1). The principal offices of ATA were in Hartford, Connecticut, near the Connecticut Valley where an intensive campaign was launched to organize the workers in the heart of Shade Tobacco country. In New Jersey, ATA offices were located in Glassboro and in Vineland, New Jersey.

The Puerto Rican Farmworker Association (ATA) was engaged in seeking support from the workers' movement in Puerto Rico and in the United States, especially from the United Farmworkers Union. Since its establishment, ATA had received support from various progressive unions in the United States.

Cesar Chavez, President of the United Farmworkers of America (UFW), applauded the efforts of the Puerto Rican

Farmworkers Association (ATA) to organize tobacco workers of the Connecticut Valley into a union. Chavez, who is nationally known for his leadership over the last decade in boycotts against non-union grapes and lettuce, stopped short of fully endorsing ATA. "We can't endorse them until the workers decide for themselves to endorse them . . . but we do applaud their work" (Hartford Times, July 31, 1974, p. 14).

Chavez declined to indicate whether he believed ATA should carry out its threats of a general strike against the growers, explaining "I don't know if ATA is ready at this stage to strike" (Hartford Times, p. 14). He further indicated that "the issue is whether they [ATA] are at a point where they can strike. It takes a tremendous amount of sacrifices," referring to his efforts in a 1968 fast to publicize his collective bargaining rights for Chicano workers.

Chavez said he felt one major obstacle to ATA's organizing efforts was the fact that most tobacco workers in the Valley were students whose lives were not immersed in agriculture and who had little interest in joining a union or striking (Chavez Press Conference, Hartford Times, 1974).

On November 15, 1973, Cesar Chavez wrote a letter to Dr. Luis Silva Recio, Secretary of the Department of Labor

of the Government of Puerto Rico, stating his support of
ATA:

We are writing on behalf of the officers and members of the United Farmworkers of America, urging you to permit Puerto Rican workers to have a voice in determining their working conditions, their wages, and their lives. We urge you to permit Puerto Rican farmworkers, working in the United States, to have a voice in contract negotiations with their employers. (Cesar Chavez, President of UFW, November, 1973)

On May 9, 1974, Leonard F. Dube, President of the Connecticut State United Automobile Workers Community Action Program Council, wrote a letter to Juan Irizarry, President of ATA, stating his support. On May 2, 1974, the Connecticut State UAW CAP Council Executive Board meeting, "voted unanimously to support the ATA efforts and cause" (Leonard F. Dube, President of Connecticut, UAW, May 9, 1974).

The Council of AFL-CIO and John J. Driscoll (1974) passed a resolution endorsing ATA. "The Labor Council endorses and supports a strike by Puerto Rican Farm Workers [ATA] members if the growers refuse the elections . . . the state AFL-CIO and its thousands of members will support that strike and assist the ATA in whatever ways are open to us" (Hartford Times, August 3, 1974).

The Puerto Rican Congress of New Jersey passed a resolution in support of ATA. Alfonso Roman (1974) in a letter sent to Angel Dominguez, organizer of ATA, dated March 11, 1974, writes "la Junta de Directores del

Congreso Boricua paso una resolucioin reconociendo a ATA en sus esfuerzos para mejorar las condiciones de los trabajadores agricolas y apoyando . . . las gestiones de los contratos que anualmente firma el Secretario de Trabajo de Puerto Rico. . . ." (Roman, 1974).

Pedro Grant, President of MOU (Movimiento Obrero Unido) (The United Workers Movment of Puerto Rico), in a letter sent to Luis Silva Recio, Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico, asked the Department of Labor to permit Puerto Rican farmworkers to have a voice in contract negotiations with their employees. "El MOU va a respaldar a la Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico en sus gestiones y . . . solicitamos de su senoria toda la cooperacion . . . para que aquellos pueden cumplir con sus objetivos" (Pedro Grant, President of MOU, Puerto Rico, October 15, 1973). Other unions, such as the United Electrical Workers, the 1199, also expressed support to ATA.

By November, 1973, ATA had more than 2,500 registered members in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New Jersey. An ATA delegation of seven farmworkers traveled to Puerto Rico to meet with the Governor and Secretary of Labor to demand the right to negotiate their own contracts. Hundreds of letters by farmworkers and unions demanded that ATA be recognized.

On December 18, 1973, ATA and three Puerto Rican farmworkers brought a suit on behalf of themselves and other migrant workers against Puerto Rico's Governor, Secretary of Labor and the Director of the Migration Division of the Department of Labor. This civil rights action, filed in the United States District Court for Puerto Rico, sought to convene a three-judge panel to determine the constitutionality of Law #87. Under Law #87 the Secretary of Labor of Puerto Rico, by authority granted in June, 1963, established the minimum requirements that must be met by mainland employers before an order extended to Puerto Rico could be accepted. The employer is required to sign a contract with the workers guaranteeing a minimum term of employment, payment of not less than the minimum wages approved by the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico, or prevailing wages in the work area, whichever are higher (Puerto Rico Annual Farm Report, 1969, p. 1). In addition, ATA petitioned the Labor Relations Board for recognition as the sole bargaining agent for the farmworkers migrating from Puerto Rico. This legal action was referred to the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico and at this time neither of these cases were resolved (ATA et al. v. Rafael Hernandez Colon et al., 1973).

As a result of all this litigation, organization, and attendant publicity, the Government of Puerto Rico, in attempting to negotiate a contract for the 1975 growing season, assumed a stronger position for the farmworkers than it had in the past. However, because of the severe economic conditions on the mainland, the growers decided to reject the Puerto Rican Government's demands and to rely on local labor. No contract was signed in 1975. (Llamas, 1977.)

Manuel A. Bustelo (1975) in the San Juan Star reported the feelings and opinions of growers:

Naturally, the executive directors of growers associations began to feel the pressure from their board of directors to look for an alternate source of labor. They had tried for certification of foreign workers in the past and had not obtained it, and they had to comply with the requirements of the Wagner-Peyser Act; unless, of course, they could obtain a ruling that the contract program effectively removed Puerto Rico from the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act. (Migrant Farmworker, San Juan Star, October 5, 1975)

The Wagner-Peyser Act regulates the system for the interstate recruitment and employment of migrant farmworkers and provides minimum standards of housing, health and welfare enforceable for migrant farmworkers. It uses its networks of farm labor offices around the country to recruit and place migrant workers at the request of the farmer.

This ruling was obtained in the case of Galon v. Dunlop, a case against the U.S. Secretary of Labor, involving the attempt to hire Jamaican pickers to harvest the apple crop in Vermont (Galon v. Dunlop, Civil Action, 1975). This ruling states that if a grower cannot come to contract terms with the Puerto Rican Government contract negotiators, those workers represented by the Puerto Rican Government are effectively not available as domestic labor, and, therefore, foreign, i.e., cheaper labor, may be hired.

Thus, the Puerto Rican Law #87, initiated to improve the position of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworker, was eventually used to control the Puerto Rican migrant farmworker and finally used to exclude the Puerto Rican migrant farmworker.

On December 30, 1974, ATA petitioned for a certified representation of the migrant workers who left the United States every year. The petition was presented before the Labor Relations Department of Labor in Puerto Rico. Hundreds of letters were presented to the Department, signed by the workers in farm camps in the United States, asking the ATA to represent them before the farmers.

This was the first time a union had asked for representation of the migrant workers through legal procedures in Puerto Rico. The Secretary of Labor, in an official

notice from the Puerto Rican Government, declared in favor of syndicalization of the migrant workers under Puerto Rican laws. In a message to all migrant workers dated July 22, 1974, the Secretary of Labor, Dr. Luis Silva Recio, proposed that "there only be one organization representing all migrant workers, and this organization must have the authority of representation through a petition to the Labor Relations Department of Puerto Rico" (Department of Labor, Migration Division, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, July 22, 1974).

Stage IV: ATA Merges with the United Farmworkers

Union of the AFL-CIO

In the meantime, ATA had received tremendous publicity and endorsements from labor unions in the United States. The United Farmworkers Union asked ATA to become part of the UFW on the East Coast. ATA agreed to merge with the UFW to gain the organizing strength the United Farmworkers Union could offer. ATA needed financial resources to organize on the East Coast as well as to call strikes against canneries. It also needed the AFL-CIO's strong organizing efforts, support and reputation to organize and negotiate with the farmers on the East Coast. This merger with UFW caused fear among the New Jersey farmers. Opposition against ATA representing the

migrant workers came from New Jersey farmers. Arthur West (1976), the President of the New Jersey Farm Bureau, the leading state farmers' organization, informed the Secretary of Labor that if a union was present during this year of negotiations he would not hire laborers from Puerto Rico (New York Times, June 26, 1976). Due to this threat by the American farmer, the Department of Labor agreed to sign contracts in 1976.

In October, 1975, ATA became very active in New Jersey. Angel Dominguez, organizer of ATA, indicated that "the union had attracted about 8,000 farmworkers in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Connecticut." Dominguez, in an interview with the Gloucester County Times, said that the ATA had three major goals for its members in New Jersey: "to improve wages, negotiate a health insurance plan, and eliminate crew leaders who hire and pay the workers. The ATA would like to see them replaced with union representatives" (Gloucester County Times, October 19, 1975).

Arthur West, President of the New Jersey Farm Bureau, was opposed to unionization of farmworkers in New Jersey. He said at an interview conducted by the Gloucester Times, "unionization of farmworkers would kill farming in South Jersey" (Gloucester County Times, October 19, 1975).

Phillip Alampi, New Jersey Secretary of Agriculture (1975), voiced his concern against New Jersey unionization. He said to farmers at a New Jersey Farm Bureau meeting, "you have a strike at harvest time and your whole crop is gone" (New York Times, January 26, 1976).

The concern among farmers and their spokesmen stemmed from plans of the United Farm Workers Union of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations to expand organizing efforts beyond California.

During January, 1976, the American Civil Liberties Union joined the ATA union organizing effort in New Jersey by opening a Farmworkers Rights Project in Glassboro, New Jersey. This office was near the large farm labor camps of the Glassboro Service Association, an organization of some 500 New Jersey farmers which imported laborers from Puerto Rico and still presently engages in this type of activity.

Despite West's opposition, ATA was successful in organizing Puerto Rican farmworkers in South Jersey. The New York Times reported that "the United Farmworkers Union has announced that the union has merged with an independent Puerto Rican farmworkers union based on the Eastern coast" (New York Times, June 21, 1976).

Dolores Huerta, UFW Vice President, said that the merger meant "quite a bit in terms of progress towards a

national union of agricultural workers" (New York Times, June 21, 1976).

Until then, the UFW was based primarily in California, with some organizing and legislative activity in Florida. The union activities in other parts of the country were largely focused on boycotts of table grapes, lettuce and Gallo wines.

Mark Gramman, Administrative Assistant to Union President Cesar Chavez, said "now we have a firm organizing base on the United States East Coast" (New York Times, June 21, 1976).

Juan Irizarry, President of ATA, said "now we can organize one movement of every simple farmworker, no matter what nationality" (p. 1). He also said that on the East Coast there were no field workers working under union contracts, since farmworkers were specifically excluded from the National Labor Relations Act and California was, and still is, the only state that has a law giving farmworkers the right to vote for a union and bargain collectively. (See New York Times, June 21, 1976.)

Despite ATA's success in merging with UFW on the East Coast, ATA as a union began to decline. Disputes and ideological differences over organizing tactics between UFW and ATA leaders began to surface. Chavez's movement believed in resorting to non-violent actions as the only

way to obtain farmworkers' liberation against poverty. Juan Irizarry, political activist and a supporter of Puerto Rican independence, believed in organizing the working class through whatever necessary means, including direct violent confrontations and insurgency actions. These ideological differences brought disruption and divisions amongst ATA and UFW organizers and their membership. As a result of these disputes and problems, Juan Irizarry resigned from ATA and the UFW. The UFW refused to continue supporting and working with the ATA. As a result, ATA farmworkers in New Jersey continued to receive legal and social services under the American Civil Liberties Union Project, a legal organization that was initially created to support the ATA-UFW in New Jersey.

Disputes and ideological differences between UFW and ATA leadership existed not just for a period of time but continues to this present day. This is well documented by Juan Irizarry in a letter sent to Cesar Chavez on May 13, 1974, where Juan Irizarry said to Cesar Chavez that the relationship between ATA and UFW "will depend for now on the way the UFW will consider supporting our goals and objectives." Juan Irizarry was concerned with a dispute concerning Law #2324 in the Massachusetts legislature concerning Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers and their right to unionize. According to Juan Irizarry, UFW was not

supportive of this legislation and, as a result, the law did not pass in the Massachusetts legislature. Concerning this issue, Juan Irizarry said the following:

. . . las relaciones de ATA y la UFW dependeran de ahora en adelante de la forma en que se nos trate y oiga . . . y que tomen en consideracion nuestro objetivos y tacticas. . . . Exijimos una rectificacion. (Juan Irizarry, 1974)

After that event, Chavez's attitude in support of the ATA was minimal. Chavez's agenda in 1976 was "to consolidate UFW and the West Coast" (Ahora, Vol. 1, Number 1, 1976). Because of political and ideological differences between Chavez's movement of resorting to non-violent action as the only way to obtain farmworkers their liberation from poverty, ATA leader Juan Irizarry left both organizations.

During this time, Cesar Chavez and the UFW were completely dedicated to the United Farm Workers Union elections and their war against the Teamsters in California. Such election "gave California farmworkers the right to choose their union" (Ahora, Vol. 7, 1976).

According to Angel Dominguez, former organizer of ATA, "UFW refused to pay ATA organizers salaries for organizing on the East Coast. Therefore, ATA as a union did not survive" (Interview, Angel Dominguez, 1984).

At the same time, ATA organizers were losing members; some began to resign. On July 10, 1976, the Daily

Hampshire Gazette in Massachusetts reported that "two General Cigar, Inc. employees said that the ATA is an offshoot of the Socialist Party in Puerto Rico and that one of its tenets is the support of Puerto Rican independence" (p. 17). Also, in addition, some Puerto Rican workers felt that Juan Irizarry, President of ATA, "[had] never worked in a tobacco field." Others said that they did not want to "be used for political ends" (p. 17). At the same time, letters of resignation dating from February and March, 1975, from ATA support Committees from Boston were received, stating similar complaints to the ATA Support Committees. One letter indicated that ATA was a political front of the PSP, "dado que la ATA es un frente del Partido Socialista Puertorriqueno seria imposible criticar el trabajo de la ATA." (Given that ATA is a political front of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party it would be impossible to criticize their work.) Another letter of resignation from the Committee indicated that "the ATA has failed to maintain communication with us. . . . ATA has failed to provide us with material they promised. . . . Juan Irizarry's approach is very nationalistic" (Letters of Resignation to ATA Support Committee, February and March 1975).

In the meantime, in New Jersey, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers relied heavily on the only organization left

to provide legal services, the American Civil Liberties Union. The American Civil Liberties Union opened the Project Office in Glassboro in 1975. Glassboro was selected because it is the central point from which migrant workers were assigned to farms in Southern New Jersey. It is the base of operations of the Glassboro Service Association, an employment consortium of over three hundred growers.

At the outset, the Project relied upon litigation, the traditional tool by which civil rights were vindicated. The Project Director, an attorney, brought law suits that would demonstrate to migrant workers that the processes of the law could be used to alter the condition of powerlessness. Many legal projects sponsored through Legal Services Incorporated throughout the East Coast specialized in providing services to migrant workers.

In the meantime, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers on the East Coast continued to receive legal representation and social services from the Migrant Social Services Divisions. In Connecticut, an organization called the New England Farmworkers Council, a service organization designed and developed to identify and serve the needs of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers were established. In New Jersey, labor organizing efforts, in conjunction with legal efforts from ACLU and the Farmworker's Corporation

of New Jersey, initiated the North East Farmworkers Support Committee.

Stage V: Northeast Farmworkers Support Committee (NEFSC)

During the apple harvest of 1978 in New York State's Catskill Mountains, approximately 500 Puerto Rican contract workers were illegally fired by the apple growers. (At this time, there was a contract between the Apple Grower Association and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, more or less the same type of contract that the Glassboro Service Association negotiated with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.)

The reason behind the firing was that the apple growers wanted to replace the Puerto Rican contract workers with Jamaican workers. The Mid-Hudson Valley Legal Services called the Farmworkers' Division (Vineland Office) and requested assistance. A group of Legal Services staff went to New Paltz, New York to help out.

Out of this emergency situation, a new group was organized -- the Northeast Farmworkers' Support Committee. The majority of the members of this Committee were farmworker advocates from federally funded agencies and Legal Services Programs. These people were political activists, lawyers, and social reformers who were committed to create social change through the development of grassroots

organizations. Also out of this situation people, who at one point were organizing farmworkers from 1973 to 1976 in New Jersey and Connecticut, were motivated to organize again.

The NEFSC met many times, but there were too many chiefs and not enough Indians to do the follow-up work. So, a discussion came about to develop a Workers' Committee within NEFSC. Strong opposition came from different people, but eventually the most aggressive and strong-minded people won. A committee within NEFSC was elected to form a Workers Committee. During the growing pains of organizing a Workers Committee, an important opportunity for action developed in the New Jersey State Assembly. A bill to increase the minimum wage of all New Jersey workers so as to equal the Federal standard was being discussed, but the Farm Bureaus' forces wanted to eliminate farmworkers from being included under the protection of the Minimum Wage Bill. The NEFSC organized a major march to protest the exclusion of farmworkers from the state minimum wage law. Approximately 200 workers and supporters were mobilized and won passage of the Minimum Wage Bill. These major campaigns became a victory for the NEFSC and, consequently, the right tone was set to organize a strong farmworkers' committee in New Jersey.

The word "organize" sounded very attractive to members of NEFSC. Many members of NEFSC who at one point were interested in organizing farmworkers, did not like the tedious work that needed to be done in grassroots organizing. Therefore, the Farmworkers' Organizing Committee ended up with just two individuals (CATA Documents, First Farmworkers General Assembly, 1980).

After a long discussion, a meeting was called to invite local farmworkers to get involved in the groundwork of formalizing a Farmworkers' Organizing Committee that would not have any ties to the NEFSC or any other organization. During the months of March and June of 1979, a questionnaire was given to approximately 500 farmworkers. The questions were designed to find out the priorities of the farmworkers and also to see if, in fact, there were farmworkers interested in creating a new organization.

The analysis of the questionnaire showed that there was a tremendous need to explain to the farmworkers their basic legal rights. The need to organize was there, but it did not come as a priority. The members of that committee, the majority of which was, by now, farmworkers, decided to organize an assembly where workers could be given lectures on their basic rights. The farmworkers were not ready for the union yet. They wanted to learn about their legal rights as well as how to establish a

support group. Farmworkers, when asked about the formation of a syndicate, thought it was too early. They were suspicious and afraid of being fired by the farmers. Participating in an organization that would teach them basic rights was the only possible way they would get involved. Therefore, the First Informative Farmworkers' Assembly was organized, and the theme was "Knowing Your Rights." Over 150 farmworkers were registered. The speakers at the Assembly were very effective. (See Interview, Angel Dominguez, 1984.) Topics included pesticides, housing, wages, and the right to organize. At the Assembly, a discussion developed as to the need to formalize a committee of workers that would be dedicated to the organizing of farmworkers into a viable labor organization.

During this time, the Farmworkers Rights Project, ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) in Glassboro, New Jersey was inactive, mainly because it did not have a Project Director, and the attorney who was the founder of the Project left the Project to go to work with the Federal Department of Labor. The state office of the ACLU was thinking of closing down the office. A group of people met with the State Director of the ACLU and were able to work out an agreement. The Farmworkers' Rights Project, instead of being an input litigation office, was

changing into an educational workers' project. The new Director of the Project was not going to be an attorney, but instead was going to be an organizer with previous experience in farmworkers' issues. This organizer was Angel Dominguez, whose major task was to develop a farmworkers' grassroots organization called CATA.

With the hiring in 1979 of Angel Dominguez, an experienced organizer, as Project Director, the program began to emphasize worker education and the development of an indigenous migrant labor institution to be called CATA.

The NEFSC had a very important influence on the development of CATA. If the "rescue mission" of NEFSC had not taken place, the stage for organizing farmworkers in New Jersey probably would not have come, not at least during the 1980's. This is because the "rescue mission" group had been connected with organizing migrant farmworkers before, guaranteeing food, social services and shelters. This case was not an isolated case. Migrant workers have gone through that many times before. That same year, on August 28th, CATA was funded as an organization of farmworkers (Claridad Newspaper, March 9-15; The Nation, rough translation, p. 4).

Stage VI: Comite de Apoyo a los
Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA)

In August of 1979, a group of 28 farmworkers met in Vineland, New Jersey, and called the newly born organization El Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas (CATA). CATA began in the summer of 1979 with the purpose of giving support to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in problem areas of social services, political isolation and human rights. During this same year, CATA organized its First Annual Assembly, with the intent of increasing Puerto Rican farmworkers' understanding of their rights. At this Assembly, a support committee composed primarily of lawyers, clergy, social service people and non-farmworkers was formed.

CATA's structure consisted of an Annual Assembly, an Executive Committee, a Board of Directors, a small program staff, and a large membership in 1980 of 1,000 farmworkers.

From 1979 to 1980, CATA staff consisted of a group of professionals, i.e., one Project Director, one Administrative Assistant, two legal counsels, one social worker and secretarial support. On the non-professional staff level, CATA had employed six farmworker organizers, two paralegals, one support network coordinator, and a group of

part-time volunteers. From the start, CATA received consultant support from private groups, such as Legal Services, other farmworkers' support networks, local colleges and universities, and state and local government agencies.

The organization was supported financially by religious foundations, legal services and other private foundations. Foundations such as Campaign for Human Development, the American Civil Liberties Union - Civil Liberties Education and Action Fund (CLEAF), Discount Foundations, Homeland Ministries, the Communications Workers of America (CWA) - New Jersey Chapter, the National Council of Churches, the ARCA Foundation, the Marianist Sharing Fund and the Global Ministries of the United Methodist Church. Other public and governmental agencies, such as the Division of Youth and Family Services and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act, supported CATA financially.

They received in-kind supportive services from labor education projects from universities such as Rutgers University, the Migrant Legal Action Program in Washington, D.C., Legal Services of Puerto Rico, University of Puerto Rico - Labor Center, Scope, American Friends Service (Quaker organization), and other local community agencies. They received endorsements and resources from the ACLU, District 65, Food and Commercial Workers, the East Coast Farmworker Support Network, Farmworkers Justice Fund

and the New Jersey Citizens Pesticide Right to Know Coalitions. Religious institutions in New Jersey and New York have also been very supportive. (See A Plan for Farmworkers Determination in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Puerto Rico, 1979-1985, Budget Summary, 1985.) It is the only Puerto Rican farmworkers' organization that has survived the longest, providing social services to farmworkers as well as educating them about the right to unionize.

CATA has been very successful in the last five years. It has gained national recognition through involvement in litigation cases, educational labor education projects, legislation (i.e., policy making at the State Legislature), the securing of unemployment and employment benefits for migrant farmworkers. It has developed a new organization concept by organizing in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. It has placed migrant farmworker organizers in the both New Jersey and the Island for six months to do organizing work. (Interview with Angel Dominguez, June 24, 1984.) CATA organizational concept is new in that no other farmworker movement in the United States has used the tactics of forming an independent grassroots organization with organizing units in Puerto Rico and in the mainland. The organization's tactics that led them to provide services to migrant farmworkers and organize them

effectively into a farmworker's syndicate came as a result of a number of reasons. First, CATA's membership overwhelmingly resides in Puerto Rico for approximately six to nine months out of the year. Second, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers while on the island do not feel the time constraints nor the fear of retaliation that they face in the labor camps. Third, the political conditions for CATA to establish itself as the organization representing seasonal migrant farmworkers in Puerto Rico were there. The number of seasonal farmworkers has increased while the number of contract workers has decreased. The Puerto Rico Department of Labor is not concerned with the number of seasonal farmworkers coming into the mainland. This is because seasonal workers do not have to register with the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico. Fourth, after carefully analyzing the successes and failures of previous organizational attempts of organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, the leadership of CATA realized that a new organization with farmworkers' direct involvement needed to be established. Fifth, CATA began its plans of forming such an organization after the First Farmworkers' Assembly where farmworkers voiced their needs. Such an Assembly is held yearly to guarantee farmworkers' input. CATA has been involved in several successful labor disputes and strikes. After so much success as a grassroots

organization, CATA has begun plans to form a union of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. CATA will continue as a grassroots organization providing social services, while a group of farmworkers have formed an organizational unit called COTA (Comite Organizador de Trabajadores Agricolas), which deals with the formation of a farmworkers' union.

During the harvest of 1980, CATA was involved in the Sunny Slope strike in Gloucester County. A workers' committee called El Comite de Trabajadores Unidos de Sunny Slope was formed at the Sunny Slope Farms as a result of farmworkers having inadequate time for lunch breaks, a lack of drinking water in the fields, and no rest periods. The workers' committee asked CATA for assistance. CATA, on behalf of the workers, asked for a meeting with the farmer and the farmer failed to attend. The leaders from the committee were fired. As a result of this, all farmworkers in the camp went on strike. On behalf of the workers, CATA filed El Comite de Trabajadores Unidos de Sunny Slope, et al., v. Sunny Slope Farms, et al., Docket No. C-4631-79E, C-4632-79E, Chancery Division of the New Jersey Superior Court, 1979, contending that the laborers had been fired because of their organizing activity. Sunny Slope filed a series of counterclaims, alleging that the organizing and strike threats violated the employment contract. Once the trial judge expressed his conclusion

that the right to organize was protected by the New Jersey Constitution, the case was quickly settled. Sunny Slope agreed to a consent order that reinstated the fired workers and affirmed the grower's respect for the workers' organizing rights. In return, the laborers pledged that there would be no violence on the farm, and no strike before August 1980.

The Committee of workers marked the first occasion in New Jersey in which an organized group of laborers compelled a grower to rehire farmworkers. It is also the first court order in which a grower conceded that farmworkers are legally entitled to organize.

The initial settlement of El Comite spurred continued organizing. The farmworkers decided to move on their demands in early August, the crucial time for harvesting peaches, the chief Sunny Slope crop. Eventually, the Committee voted to seek a wage increase and an end-of-season bonus as reimbursement for food cost. The organizing focused upon a wage increase to \$4.00 per hour, additional compensation for the extra hours devoted to the crops in August (when the laborers spend over eighty hours a week in the fields), and the inequity of the Glassboro Service Association's deducting forty-five cents an hour from wages as a charge for employment services. After

the Service Association deduction, seasonal workers earned less in 1980 than they had in 1979.

Leaders of the Committee and CATA lawyers opened negotiations with attorneys representing Sunny Slope Farms and the Glassboro Service Association, but those attorneys took the position that the contract covering the laborers precluded negotiation and strike activity.

When Sunny Slope Farms and the Association refused to talk, fifty farmworkers voted to strike. On August 13, 1980 they refused to go into the fields, the first organized strike in New Jersey's long agricultural history.

CATA lawyers represented the workers in a suit brought against them the night the strike began. That suit, Sunny Slope Farms v. Acevedo, maintained that the strike was both violent and illegal, sought an order permitting Sunny Slope to evict the strikers from the farm, and a prohibition on organizing and picketing. Even though the trial judge found that no violence had ensued, he actually went beyond the defendant's request. The order forbade communication with Sunny Slope laborers off the premises of the farm.

CATA organized transportation and emergency housing for the strikers and administered a food bank. Thirteen of the strikers returned to work, but thirty-seven remained on strike. In fact, picketing continued and the

local authorities did not enforce the ban on communications. Although CATA lawyers took an emergency appeal, the lower court orders remained enforced.

CATA turned to the Federal courts for an order prohibiting the Glassboro Service Association from replacing the strikers, for the hiring of replacements, violated the anti-strike breakings provisions of the Wagner-Peyser and the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Acts. Preliminary relief was denied, but under pressure of the suit, the U.S. Employment Service refused to permit the Glassboro Service Association to negotiate new contracts in Puerto Rico. (El Comite de Trabajadores Unidos de Sunny Slope, et al. v. Glassboro Service Association, Inc., Docket No. 8-2682, United District Court for the District of New Jersey, 1980).

In a narrow sense, the El Comite action failed; the workers were replaced, and no changes were made at Sunny Slope. After the strike, the CATA membership concluded that in order to strike a South Jersey grower, "one must be financially solid, i.e., with money to support the strikers, and, most importantly, one must have a follow-up plan. One must have a strong support among progressive New Jersey labor organizations, and a much better equipped legal advice group" (CATA History Report, 1979, p. 2). Out of this learning experience, the strikers learned

that, although they had lost the first round, the opportunity was still there. After the strike, CATA's efforts to organize in Puerto Rico came out of the First Assembly. The concept of town delegates was introduced at the Assembly, i.e., workers were to be responsible for organizing town assemblies in Puerto Rico. According to membership records, town assemblies were held in Puerto Rico during 1980 and 1981.

In the harvest of 1981, CATA's purpose was to continue to organize farmworkers into a viable organization capable of representing its own interests.

Having changed the focused of its resources, time and energy from major litigation actions only toward the development of a migrant labor institution, CATA sought to address a multitude of issues affecting farmworkers, including unpaid minimum wages, poor living and working conditions, and problems with the Puerto Rico contract. CATA had recognized that such issues stemmed from the workers' powerlessness, and that beneficial change could be gleaned for the average farmworkers through the development of an organization composed of farmworkers themselves which would work toward a system by which workers could more actively participate in the resolution of their own problems.

In this area CATA sought to represent individual workers with wage and other claims, but had more importantly provided legal backup for groups of farmworkers who had sought to deal in a collective concerted way with their work-related problems.

In 1981, a suit was brought against Glassboro Service Association for sending strikebreakers to a Southern New Jersey farm where other farmworkers were already striking because of the farm's refusal to even discuss with them the terms and conditions of employment. There had been a prior action against the farm where workers who had been fired for having attended an organizational meeting were quickly rehired because the grower was compelled to do so as a result of the court's view of their right to organize. But in this suit against Glassboro, there were alleged violations of the Wagner-Peyser Act, the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act, the New Jersey Anti-Strikebreaking Act, and the New Jersey Constitution because Glassboro had replaced strikers at the farm without first having properly informed them of the existence of the strike. Counterclaims were brought by Sunny Slope and the Glassboro Service Association against the American Civil Liberties Union, CATA and Camden Regional Legal Services, as well as employees of both, alleging that they had conspired to organize the strike and had threatened

farmworkers with loss of employment, monetary fines, and physical violence if they did not strike. Both actions were resolved: the counterclaims were dismissed and initial claims settled for an agreement to pay the farmworker plaintiffs \$1,000. (El Comite de Trabajadores Unidos de Sunny Slope v. Glassboro Service Association, Inc. and Glassboro Service Inc. v. El Comite de Trabajadores Unidos de Sunny Slope, Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc., Michael W.L. McCrory, Arthur N. Read, Jesus Ambert, the American Civil Liberties Union, and Angel Dominguez, U.S. District Court of the District of New Jersey, Docket No. 80-2682, 2981.)

These actions were important in that they demonstrated to farmworkers that their rights to freedom of association and to organize were real, and ones which can be protected against violation by their employers.

CATA vindication of workers' rights to organize and associate was again demonstrated in Rivera et al. v. Vasques, U.S. District of New Jersey, Docket No. 82-2798-SSB, 1981. Workers had met to discuss complaints they were having against a farmer and his crewleaders, including the complaints that one of the labor contractors was operating without a license, that they were not provided with written disclosures as provided by federal law, that checks were illegally signed on their behalf, that deduc-

tions were illegally taken from their paychecks, and that they were housed in a camp that did not meet federal and state standards. They were subsequently fired because of their crew leaders' perceptions of their organizing activities. The crew leaders were in violation of both FLCRA as well as the New Jersey Constitution's protection of the right to organize. Settlement was reached by which the labor contractors paid \$400 to each plaintiff and offered re-employment to each of the plaintiff workers who desired it. The settlement also provided for their registration as labor contractors and the posting providing of terms and conditions of employment and other disclosures under FLCRA.

These actions have had demonstrable effects upon local area farmers and crew leaders such that they recognized their workers' rights to meet, discuss common problems, and even the possibility of organizing themselves into a labor organization. (American Civil Liberties Union, Farmworkers Rights Project, Summary of Recent Cases Highlights, 1980.)

CATA has developed an organizing strategy based on providing farmworkers with needed services in the areas of legal services, health, job-related legislation, transportation, and education. Heavy emphasis on educational seminars about their rights and the importance of unioni-

zation has been a priority. This has resulted in an organization capable of quickly and effectively mobilizing its membership around key issues of concern. During 1983-84, CATA mobilized over one thousand farmworkers in the first march of its kind in Puerto Rico to press for governmental support. It introduced three bills in the legislature of Puerto Rico (El Mundo Press, 1983).

In New Jersey, CATA has been very successful, mobilizing farmworkers four times during the peak season to demonstrate and participate at public hearings held by the legislature on two issues, unemployment and pesticides. In December of 1984, the Governor of New Jersey signed an emergency unemployment bill allowing farmworkers special exceptions for their eligibility and the legislature created a commission to study the economic problems of farmworkers and to report back proposed legislation for 1985 (ACR, 151, Assembly Committee Resolution, December 1984).

Although the pesticides bill "Right to Know" was enacted, specifically excluding farmworkers, CATA, as a member of the New Jersey Campaign Against Toxic Waste, which had lobbied for passage of the bill, convinced the latter group to renew its efforts until agricultural workers were included. (Community and Workers Right to Know, Bill S-1670, A-3318, June, 1983.)

CATA has represented large numbers of farmworkers who had problems with receipt of unemployment insurance benefits. Farmworkers rely on unemployment benefits during winter off-season months when most farmworkers are unable to find work in Puerto Rico, which has a 40% or higher rate of unemployment. They also represented farmworkers with respect to appeals (most often revolving around the voluntary quit issue) through the Department of Labor and Industry's administrative process. Most workers who return to Puerto Rico must have their claim processed through the Interstate Claims Office. Even during the winter months, CATA kept a large caseload of clients who reside in Puerto Rico, and maintained close contact with those workers with whom it had established a rapport during the season. (ACLU, Farmworkers' Rights Project, Highlights of Cases, 1984.) They assigned two full-time farmworkers organizers in the island.

CATA representation of individual workers in this area also helped to maintain some control over the Interstate Claims Office in general. Toward the beginning of 1983, a much greater number of individuals with unemployment problems was seen. Attorneys from the ACLU-CATA and the Camden Regional Legal Services met with representatives of the Department of Labor and Industry to discuss the large numbers of claimants who had failed to receive

benefits. It was discovered that, although the law requires a "compliance rate" of some 70% of interstate claims to be paid within 14 days of the date of application, the compliance rate for interstate claims from Puerto Rico had dropped to 19%. The administrative delay had caused hardship among migrant farmworkers who had returned to Puerto Rico with little or no savings.

One example should serve to illustrate some of the problems migrant farmworkers faced in the area of unemployment compensation, as well as the role that CATA has played in revolving some of these problems. The example involves Pablo Garcia, an elderly farmworker who has migrated from Puerto Rico to New Jersey for many years. Pablo applied for and received unemployment insurance benefits, but was denied extended benefits upon his return to New Jersey in 1982. The unemployment office had disqualified him from receiving any extended benefits because he had added two employers (of the required five employer contacts) to his work search card at the time of his interview rather than listing them beforehand, reasoning that he had failed to make a "systematic and sustained effort" to find other work, and also because his search had been confined to agricultural employers.

CATA and their legal staff appealed the examiner's decision to the Appeal's Tribunal, which granted their

request for a hearing, but affirmed the examiner's decision. CATA again appealed, this time to the Board of Review of the New Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, contending that Mr. Garcia had, in fact, furnished the unemployment office with "tangible evidence" of a systematic and sustained effort to obtain other work, regardless of the time at which he listed such prospective employers, that his employment contacts had not been shown to be fictitious, and that agricultural work was a predominant industry in the claimant's labor market area. The Board of Review agreed, reversing the Appeal Tribunal decision, and held Mr. Garcia qualified to receive all of his extended benefits. (In the matter of Pablo Garcia, N.J. Department of Labor and Industry, 1983.)

In the area of housing, one of the major problems faced by farmworkers has been safety. CATA has had a fair degree of success in obtaining prompt inspections of camps by OSHA, and has made complaints to OSHA after workers' efforts to resolve such grievances with their crew leader or farmer have failed. Used in this way, CATA has sought to make local growers more responsive to workers' demands relating to their housing conditions. One such condition arose in Visconti (1982), where the farmer had been attempting to remove the recently fired employees before the Project Director (Angel Dominguez) visited the camp, and

ultimately secured their reinstatement. Numerous other similar situations have occurred, where CATA insistence upon workers' right to remain in his camp for a reasonable time after termination of employment in order to secure alternative employment and housing has had great success.

When some nineteen migrant farmworkers employed at the Visconti Farm in Carmel, New Jersey, realized that they were not being paid minimum wage and instead they were being paid on a piece rate basis, they met to discuss their common problems. Shortly thereafter, they were fired by the farmer who indicated that they were being fired because he didn't like union organizing. Angel Dominguez, Director of the CATA-ACLU, went to the farm to assist the farmworkers, talked with the farmer, and was arrested for trespassing by the New Jersey State Police. After being released from custody, he immediately returned to the farm and negotiated with the farmer, who agreed to re-hire the workers. However, even after they were re-hired, the plaintiff-farmworkers were assigned less work than other workers and continued retaliation and discrimination eventually forced most of them to leave the farm and seek re-employment elsewhere, causing them to lose time and earnings from work.

The lawsuit charges that Visconti failed to pay plaintiffs the minimum wage while working on piece rate as

required by the Fair Labor Standards Act, that transportation costs were deducted from the wages of some of the plaintiffs, that Visconti fired the workers in retaliation for their exercising their rights under the Fair Labor Standards Act and in retaliation for meeting and organizing themselves in an effort to bargain collectively with Visconti regarding their minimum wages in violation of Article 1, Section 19, of the New Jersey Constitution, and the resulting irreparable harm.

Relief requested includes damage in the amount of double the amount of unpaid minimum wages, damages for all time lost from work due to the unlawful firings, punitive damages for the violation of their rights under Article 1, Section 19, of the New Jersey Constitution and Section 215(a)(3) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as injunctive relief for all Plaintiffs and class members that defendants refrain from violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, from interfering with Plaintiff's rights to organize themselves. (Benitez et al. v. John Visconti and John Visconti Farms, U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey, 1982).

In the area of disability and related matters, CATA has dealt with referrals of workmen's compensation cases to private attorneys, but its quick intervention sometimes speeds up the payment of temporary disability benefits.

In those situations, the CATA project staff assisted such farmworkers in making application for state disability benefits or under private plans, if available.

In addition, farmworkers residing in isolated temporary labor camps were particularly susceptible to physical attack or robbery by persons to prey upon them. In such situations, the Project assisted such workers in attempting to recover money from the State's Violent Crimes Compensation Fund. (CATA Legal Report, 1984.)

For those workers requiring hospitalization, the Project has had success in arranging for hospitalization, with the coverage through the Hill Burton Act. The CATA Project also represented individuals in the appeals process for Social Security disability benefits. Most recently, the Project won an appeal of the denial of such benefits to someone who had been a farmworker for fifty-some years until arthritis, a wrist injury, lack of education and inexperience in other employment areas made it impossible for him to find other employment.

In the criminal area, CATA staff represented farmworkers charged with a variety of offenses in municipal courts, including theft, assault, resisting arrest, trespassing, and a host of others. Most cases involving very serious charges are referred to the Public Defender's Office. It has sought to do this because farmworkers were

far less able to cope with arrest, incarceration, and their own defense than others. Language barriers can prove to be a cumbersome obstacle, and in some situations can even contribute to the arrest itself when a farmworker is unable to explain his whereabouts. Farmworkers, whose friends and families may be thousands of miles away, are often arrested and jailed for days before they are discovered. Since they are often deemed transients, bail is frequently exaggerated and impossibly high for most workers. In addition, police harrassment of migrant farmworkers is not uncommon in rural communities, even today. CATA thus provides service to the individual farmworker as well as gaining the rapport and confidence of the farmworker community by representing farmworkers in criminal contexts. (ACLU-CATA Highlights of Legal Cases, 1983-1984.)

CATA's representation of farmworkers in this area is also important since farmers can sometimes use the criminal process against workers who may seek to vindicate other rights, such as the right to access or to have visitors. One such instance arose at the beginning of the Visconti action when criminal charges were brought against Angel Dominguez, Director of the Farmworkers' Rights Project for trespass when he went to visit the farm after the workers were fired and under threat of removal. Project

attorneys represented Mr. Dominguez, contending that the right of access enunciated in State v. Shack in 1971 provided that his right to visit the farmworkers was not dependent upon the farmer's consent, but rather upon the consent of the workers. The Court agreed, finding Mr. Dominguez not guilty of the criminal trespass charge. There have been other instances. In State v. Pablo Garcia, a farmer brought a trespass action against a farmworker who refused to leave his labor camp at the insistence of his crew leader and farmer. CATA obtained a dismissal of the charges. In State v. Gonzales, a farmer brought criminal charges of improper behavior by starting a fight against a worker who had simply and repeatedly asked for his wages. Here, too, the charges were dismissed.

Presently, CATA has a membership of 6,000 here and in Puerto Rico. It has been the only group who successfully lasted more than three years organizing farmworkers and the only one that has been able to form a strong base organization to provide services and, through those means, organize the Puerto Rican farmworker.

Despite many successes, CATA is confronted with some of the problems organizations and organizers have faced in developing a grassroots organization for migrant farmworkers in this country. The lack of funding, the lack of


training for staff, the lack of organization and communication between areas, especially in membership development; the general lack of leadership; making decisions based on the moment and events as opposed to well-directed and conscious acts, implementing a plan of action geared towards specific ends; the lack of an orientation for the mass work of the organization. CATA needs to overcome these organizational problems if it wants to continue to be successful. The most important problem is the lack of farmworkers' leadership to build and sustain a farmworkers' union. Developing a farmworkers' leadership has been very difficult since Puerto Rican farmworkers are not stable, in one place of work, and they lack the necessary skills for organizing and dealing with growers. CATA labor educational seminars have been effective in raising the consciousness and training a group to lead strikes and lead the organizational meetings. But the problem of farmworkers' leadership continues to be a major one. Some farmworkers have overcome being afraid of the growers and have joined the organization and are very active in the daily functions. Still other members are very much afraid to take the necessary risk that is needed to strike. Many are afraid of losing their jobs and, as a result, play a passive role. Many are afraid to openly disagree with strategies of organizing in meetings as well as to take

individual initiative. Sometimes the farmworkers are so busy and tired from long day hours that they do not want to deal with meetings and the necessary local organizing that needs to be done in the labor camp. Historically, the lack of charismatic leaders in the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' organizational development has been a significant element in the Puerto Rican farmworkers' movement. CATA has been successful in bringing about its leadership out of a series of organizational stages of growth.

For the past five years, CATA has held an Annual Organizational Assembly of all members at the end of the growing season in order to obtain feedback from the membership regarding the work already accomplished. The Assembly also develops and approves the work plan for the following year and elects its Board of Directors. (See Organizational Chart.)

The seventeen member Board is composed of farmworker members who make CATA decisions. The Board selects fifteen CATA members to serve as organizers. During the 1984-1985 year, CATA has been assigned organizers full-time every season to four major areas of South Jersey and two areas in Pennsylvania. Two members work all year in Puerto Rico. Other members have the responsibility of

CATA ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



Note: Broken lines denote proposed organization additions.

Source: CATA Organizational Chart as of September 12, 1985, Proposal for Funding, 1985.

dealing with outside organizations and problems, as well as organizing work. For every nine CATA members in a municipality, one town delegate is elected. These elected town delegates then meet and elect from among their members six members to the Board of Directors. (CATA, Siembra, June 1985, English Edition.)

CATA's organizing strategies for the past five years have been to provide supportive services to farmworkers so that, in turn, they will see CATA as a friendly organization and a strong advocate of farmworker rights. According to Angel Dominguez, President of CATA (1985), the supportive services' mechanism has been very effective in the recruitment of new members and a way to be able to visit workers at the labor camps. (Plan for Farmworkers Self-Determination in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Puerto Rico, 1984.)

Presently, CATA's organizers are not only responsible for the organizing activities at designated labor camps, but are also responsible for the supportive services for the workers at those camps (food stamp appointments, trips to the airport, doctors, hospitals, etc.). By the time an organizer has provided the services at a particular farm, he does not have time to do the hard-core organizing (briefing with committee members, listening to the problems faced by farm organizers, setting up strategies,

etc.). Not only is much time and momentum wasted, but their limited organizer resources are spent providing services.

During the 1984 harvest season, the CATA Board of Directors met to discuss and evaluate the organizing objectives and goals of CATA. One of the problems discussed by the Board was "the role of the organizers, and it was concluded that, in order to be more effective in setting up the workers' farm committees, CATA needed to establish a more structured organizational division within CATA" (CATA Board Minutes, June, 1984). This would entail separating the support services from the organizing aspect. The organizers would then be able to concentrate their efforts on the formation of a labor organization which can effectively organize farms, confront growers and crew leaders, and eventually negotiate contracts.

Thus, the support component has been divided into providing supportive services and attracting new members; the organizing piece is concentrated on leadership development and setting up organizational structures within the labor camp.

A second problem identified by the 1984 evaluation by the Board of Directors was the need to bring together the support network that CATA has been developing through the

years, particularly in its work on pesticides and unemployment.

CATA has entered a new stage in its organizational development. It has begun to join other citizen groups in an effort to form a support coalition for farmworkers. This support has been both financial and issue-oriented. It is fairly clear that their legislative efforts would not have succeeded without the support of these other organizations.

Up to this point, CATA's attempts to improve the conditions of employment on South Jersey farms have been structured by these support committees. These committees have engaged primarily in the following activities: membership recruitment, social service referral, transportation of workers, litigation and negotiations of various problems between farmers or crew leaders and workers. According to Angel Dominguez, the long term goal of groups like CATA has "been the unionization of farmworkers in the state and the establishment of a hiring system" (Angel Dominguez, Interview, July 12, 1984).

On July 12, 1984, Angel Dominguez documented the "formation of a formal union structure" strategy in which he concludes that "the time has come for the formation of a pure labor organization which can effectively organize farms, confront growers and crew leaders, and negotiate

contracts" (p. 1). Among many reasons, Dominguez believes that the creation of a farmworkers union is essential because CATA, in its present form, cannot direct sufficient resources at employers to engage in bargaining, CATA is not funded as a labor organization, and a significant change in focus could jeopardize its funding, . . . the recently passed Simpson-Mazzolli immigration bill could offer farmers a method of using temporary alien workers who will be extremely difficult, at best, to organize" (Angel Dominguez, Interview, July 12, 1984).

On July 20, 1984, the CATA Board of Directors voted to officially recognize "Comite Organizador de Trabajadores Agricolas, COTA" as CATA's organizing affiliate.

In identifying larger growers and crew leaders, targeting farms and camps for organizing, the Plan targeted six of the largest farms in Gloucester, Cumberland, and Salem counties in South Jersey. According to the plan, once the authorization process and recognition of the union was targeted for organization, "CATA representatives will visit the farm and/or camps and prepare a list of all workers" (Dominguez, Interview, July 1984).

COTA, CATA's organizing affiliate, "is in the midst of a major campaign organizing workers at CAMSCO Produce Company in Reading, Pennsylvania. CAMSCO, a subsidiary of Campbell Soups, employs 300 farmworkers in two plants,

preparing mushroom soil, table mushrooms, and related products. (CATA Newsletter, June, 1985, p. 2.) According to CATA, they have organized over half of the workers in the South Jersey and in the Pennsylvania plants. Most of the farmworkers have signed union cards already accepted by the National Labor Relations Board and Supreme Court of the United States. (NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 295 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct., 1989.) This card "will authorize the farmworkers union to represent . . . the workers for collective bargaining purposes" (Id., at 597, 89 S.Ct. at 1931) on all matters pertaining to any terms or conditions of employment.

COTA has been endorsed in their efforts by the District 1 of the United Electrical Workers and has received promises of endorsements from AFSCME District Council 47 and the Hospital Workers Council 1199C. The United Steel Workers have discussed working with COTA as well. (CATA Newsletter, June, 1985).

CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CATA

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the mass-based organizational structure and effectiveness of CATA and its four predecessors, namely Comité de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno (CAMP, 1969-1971), Ministerio Ecu-menico de Trabajadores Agrícolas (META, 1972-1973), Asocia-cion de Trabajadores Agrícolas (ATA, 1973-1977), North East Farmworkers Support Committee (NEFSC, 1977-1978), and Co-mite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agrícolas (CATA, 1979-present).

The theory of Piven and Cloward (1979) and the Majkas' (1980) theoretical arguments will be used to look at these organizational stages of development. We will examine these organizations using Piven and Cloward and the Majkas' criteria for organizational effectiveness. We will be looking at the internal and external characteristics of organizational structures and effectiveness of CATA. The purpose is neither to support, qualify, or contradict the ideas of Piven and Cloward or the Majkas, but merely to see

in what ways the ideas are applicable to the organization described. Once this is being done in the next chapter, we will then present which of the ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas are supported, qualified, and contradicted. We will also develop some of my own ideas.

Piven and Cloward's criteria for evaluating mass-movement organizations' effectiveness is characterized by two larger categories: internal and external environmental factors. The Majkas' ideas of organizational effectiveness consist of two premises: the building of permanent mass-movement organizations, and the ability of mass movements to mobilize defiance. A brief summary of the ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas is therefore required.

Piven and Cloward challenge those who advocate the organization of permanent membership-based organizations among the poor. They challenge those individuals who led the campaign that began in the mid-1960's to establish community organizations as the remedy for the problems of the poor. They question the Alinsky school of community organizing by arguing that "it is not possible to compel concessions from elites that can be used to sustain oppositional organizations over time . . . insurgency is always short lived . . . whatever the people won was a response to their turbulence and not their organized members." As for those organizations of the poor that do survive, they do so by becoming "more useful to those who control the resources

on which they depend (i.e., elites) than to the lower-class groups which the organizations claim to represent" (pp. xi-xii). Movement and organization are viewed by Piven and Cloward as opposing one another. They seem to be saying that membership-based organizations actually draw the life "out of the movements which gave birth to them, diverting mass insurgency into comfortable channels siphoning off dissident leadership and . . . creating mass illusions about the responsiveness of the political system" (Jenkins, 1983, p. 223). Both Piven and Cloward apply this basic argument to four mass insurgencies--to the movement of the unemployed, the industrial union movement during the 1930's, and the civil rights and welfare rights movements during the 1960's.

The main argument in their theory is that it is impossible to build mass-membership organizations among the poor that can secure important victories. They offer several reasons for this: First, poor people lack resources to initiate and sustain effective political organizations; second, the system of social controls built into the everyday lives of poor people is too potent, guaranteeing that disruptive action will be rare and short lived; third, measurable victories, entailing elite concessions, could only come from mass defiance, precisely the kind of action which organizations are unlikely to encourage and squelch when bureaucratic administrations develop (Jenkins, p. 233).

Piven and Cloward's general argument is that limited gains that movements have obtained develop entirely from mass insurgency (strikes, riots, demonstrations), not organization. Effectiveness of insurgent actions depends on two dimensions: (1) mobilization or the extent to which categories of actors become committed to collective actions, and (2) the structurally defined potential power of that category of actors as set by their functional importance to the political economic system. Piven and Cloward subscribe to the political effectiveness of different kinds of organizations. They relate the issue of movement organization to the issue of power. For them, power is different from the traditional definition of power as valued assets or traits they control. They indicate that the poor, by definition, control few of these things by specifying a theory of potential power as one that can be used to estimate the outer boundaries of insurgent challenges (Jenkins, 1980, p. 226). Power refers to the ability of poor people at the bottom to mobilize or to withhold or to disrupt. Piven and Cloward suggest that social change, especially economic change, may weaken hierarchical controls of mass-based organizations. They determine success or failure of movements by the "effects of disruptive protest on institutions and on the responses of state leaders to disruption" (Piven & Cloward, p. 590). Power helps them account for the transitory character of disruptive movements (Piven & Cloward, p. 590).

Piven and Cloward's theory consists of the notion that a formally structured mass-membership organization was unsuited to "marshalling disruptive resources, that, in fact, the model was predicated on very different resources for influence that were not available to low income people" (Piven & Cloward, p. 596). According to Piven and Cloward, low income groups exerting influence through disruption and social dislocations had much to do with the release of those disruptive resources. Piven and Cloward argue for the alternative of cadre organizations as best suited to mobilizing those resources, and that the periods in which disruptions could be mobilized never lasted because disruptions are transitory. They are transitory because they precipitate government responses through either repressions, concessions, or both. This will eventually demobilize the poor. They argue, therefore, for organizers to attempt to "build enduring membership organizations of the poor, especially if the effort drains organizing resources away from the mobilization of the disruption itself" (Piven & Cloward, p. 596).

Piven and Cloward's ideas have been extended and developed further by the Majkas (1980). The Majkas developed Piven and Cloward's theories by presenting evidence that shows that farmworkers have been successful in creating poor people's movements. They do this by examining the ability of the United Farm Workers Organization to build

itself as a permanent organization and to mobilize defiance (p. 306). Their ideas provide a theoretical framework for looking at the effectiveness of organizations.

The Majkas present numerous examples of workers' defiance by reviewing four agricultural labor organizations in California. These organizations were: the Japanese Labor Associations (1907), which were very successful in winning concessions in wage gains; the International Workers of the World (IWW or Wobblies), which was concerned with building itself as a formal, mass-membership, dues-collecting organization (instead, emphasis was on promoting mass defiance); and the Cannery and Agricultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU), an outgrowth of the Communist Party's Trade Unity League. This organization led the larger spontaneous strikes of mass defiance and won concessions. CAWIU never developed as a formal organization. The last major attempt was made from 1937-1940 by the CIO-affiliated United Cannery Agricultural Packing and Allied Workers America (UCAPAWA). This organization was a mass-based formal membership organization. Throughout the history of each of these organizations, mass defiance was the vehicle which won workers higher wages and better working conditions. Labor organizations which coordinated successful actions did not attempt to construct large membership associations or gain political influence through lobbying and endorsing candidates. The last case the Majkas' review deals with is the unionization efforts by the UFW, directed by Cesar

Chavez. This organization was successful and effective in creating a crisis in agricultural production through organizing defiance and then directing government responses to that crisis (Majka, p. 303). The Majkas find the UFW experience "is considerably at odds with Piven and Cloward's findings concerning poor people's movements," which indicate shortcomings of promotion of insurgency and building a formal organization as a "contradictory process." The Majkas provide evidence on the history of the UFW to challenge this claim by showing how the UFW as an organization has been the major force in stimulating defiance "on a scale unprecedented in U.S. agricultural history." They show evidence that insurgency has been stimulated, coordinated, and sustained by the UFW as an organization, rather than insurgency independently producing the mass-based union. The UFW has used defiance to get political strength to channel government's responses into concessions (Majkas, p. 303). According to the Majkas, the UFW did pursue unionization of agricultural workers by attempting to "build itself up as a membership organization as a prerequisite to mobilizing defiance" (p. 303).

The Majkas believe that the success of poor people's organizations, i.e., farmworkers movements, has been effective due to four reasons:

The first is the building of permanent organizations. They present evidence in support of the ability of UFW to build itself as a mass-based organization. At the same

time, the UFW directs questions at the framework for organizing poor people's movements. The Majkas' findings suggest that, when any organization does not institutionalize itself, limitations occur. The Majkas suggest that without permanent organizations, the poor are unable to resist effectively enforcement of changes after insurgency has subsided. According to the Majkas, organizations are the most feasible means available to defend gains on a continuous basis. They show evidence that suggests legitimate reasons for the erosion of concessions with the unions established as permanent organizations. Part of the reasons for this was because some concessions became permanent and their beneficiaries were capable of fighting back their destruction. According to the Majkas, what is needed is to explore the tensions between winning concessions and maintaining organizations. They suggest this can be done by analyzing the specific "responses by the State during crises which attempt to channel insurgency into manageable forms and promotes strategies which render organizations less effective, but also may contain contradictory possibilities" (Majkas, p. 295).

The second reason is the creation of non-bureaucratic structures. By this, the Majkas argue that, rather than to accept bureaucratic models or structures, it is important to evaluate new forms of organizational structures that are being successful and effective. For example, they study the

UFW structures and conclude that the reason why the UFW has been effective and successful is due, in part, to its "non-conformity" to the traditional bureaucratic model (Majkas, p. 306).

The third reason the Majkas point out for the success of organizations is that they use mass defiance as part of mobilization techniques.

In their fourth reason, they argue that "rather than assume the inability of poor people's movements to sustain their organizations and dictate their forms of concessions, what is needed is to ask why these patterns have predominated in the United States" (p. 307). They argue finally for "alternative forms of organizations through which working class people can act together in defiance of their rulers in ways that are more congruent with the structure of working class life and with the process of working class struggle and less susceptibility to penetration by dominant elites" (Piven & Cloward, p. xiii).

The Majkas agree with Piven and Cloward's main argument that alternative organizations are needed. However, the Majkas differ with Piven and Cloward in two ways: First, they do not believe that mass-insurgency movements began to deteriorate when they became organized; instead, they show evidence that insurgency is stimulated, conducted and sustained. Second, they believe that organizations are necessary in mobilizing defiance activity. Nevertheless,

these organizations must be consistent with structures of the working class poor.

As has been noted, Piven and Cloward present two larger categories as criteria for evaluating organizational effectiveness. These criteria can be examined in terms of two larger categories: internal and external environmental characteristics of the organization studied. The internal and external characteristics refer to politics of goals, political power structure, political organizational support, leadership, membership, and resources (Interview, Piven & Cloward, April 22, 1984). External environmental characteristics refer to mobilization, power of the grassroots-membership organizations, commitment of the grassroots-membership organizations, linkages and dependency on resources, complexity, stability, and uncertainty.

The Majkas present four more criteria for evaluating organizational effectiveness. Their ideas are: building permanency in organizations, mobilization of mass defiance, non-bureaucratic organization, and new forms of organizations that could be stable with patterns of sustainment. Piven and Cloward and the Majkas' ideas will be used for evaluating organizational structures and effectiveness of CAMP, META, ATA, NEFSC, and CATA during its stages of development.

Comite de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno

CAMP was started in 1969 by the leadership of labor unions and religious organizations. It began the first attempt to organize a mass-based farmworkers organization with the purpose of creating insurgency and defiance.

As it will shortly become clear, CAMP was successful in accomplishing the first goal which was to develop a structural basis for a steering committee. The steering committee established the basis for a plan action in which it documented the needs of the workers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. They were also successful in informing and educating the general public about the conditions of migrant farmworkers. This was done through the media, newspapers, and mobilization of activities concerning pieces of legislation.

As it will also become clear, CAMP was unsuccessful in that it did not meet its second goal--to establish a farmworkers organization controlled and directed by farmworkers. In trying to meet the second goal, CAMP was unsuccessful because of ideological differences among the leadership of CAMP. Some members of the leadership belonged to two outstanding left wing parties, the Puerto Rican Independence Party and the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. Problems began to arise concerning different styles of work, tactics of organizing, different ideologies concerning theological and political philosophies.

Internal Characteristics

Political goals of the organization. CAMP was the first mass-based group which established its first organizational structures to organize the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in Puerto Rico, Connecticut, and New Jersey. CAMP had two major goals: first (the short-range goal) was to develop the structural basis through a steering committee to find alternative solutions to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers plight; second (the long-range goal) was to develop an organization controlled and directed by farmworkers that would eventually represent their interests (Interview with Rev. Wilmer Silva, Long Branch, N.J., September 15, 1985).

Structure. The structure of CAMP consisted of a general assembly held once a year, and an executive committee composed of a president, treasurer, secretary and committees. These committees were responsible for developing the structural basis for the development of the "first Puerto Rican migrant farmworker organization or union" (CAMP By-Laws, Bonilla-Santiago trans., 1970, p. 3). In terms of structure, CAMP became "the supporting committee" for the Puerto Rican farmworkers. It also became part of a farmworkers movement organization forming linkages and networking with other labor and religious groups on the East Coast of the mainland. Groups like the UFW, National Migrant Ministry, and others were a few of many supporters.

Leadership. The leadership of CAMP consisted of a group of individuals whose philosophy was liberal and theological in nature. Their means for creating change was through utilizing mass-defiance approaches. For the leadership, mass defiance meant engaging in educational projects, public meetings, demonstrations and advocating for the farmworkers. For them, this was the way to empower migrant farmworkers to know their rights and create defiance against the state. This style of mass defiance has been the same model used in the Civil Rights Movement organization and the Cesar Chavez farmworkers' movement during the late 1960's.

Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages

CAMP's politics of organizational support came directly from the National Migrant Ministry, the Industrial Mission of Puerto Rico, and the Chavez movement. They provided monetary support, as well as other immediate resources, such as salaries for CAMP staff. They set up bureaucratic structures first with a plan of action divided by geographic areas on the mainland. These leaders or activists engaged themselves in helping the farmworkers through "developing a formally structured organization that will eventually consist of a mass membership" (Piven & Cloward, p. 14). This organization was to serve as a "vehicle for power" and for "political mobilization" over time. It was also going to permit the intelligent and

strategic use of these resources in political conflict (Piven & Cloward, p. xx). They also concentrated their efforts on organization-building during periods of "insurrection." They based their support on concessions from the church as a state institution.

Membership. CAMP never consisted of a large membership of farmworkers. Its membership consisted of religious individuals and political professionals whose interest and philosophical concern rested with "commitment to social change" (CAMP minutes, July 15 & 16, 1972). Most of these professionals came from labor organizations, such as MOU (Movimiento Obrero Unido), and religious liberal institutions. The lack of farmworker membership was clearly demonstrated when, in their first assembly ten months after CAMP was established, the participation of farmworkers was limited, if any. The majority of members who came from the three regions (New Jersey, Connecticut, and Puerto Rico) were advocates and supporters of the farmworkers' issues (CAMP minutes, July 15 & 16, 1972).

The strategy to recruit and organize the farmworker membership was one of inviting the farmworkers to be insurgents against the state. Defiance ultimately became the method of approach to organizing. In New Jersey, CAMP organizers began to engage in labor educational activities with other local organizations. Some of these organizations were: Puerto Rican Youth in Action, Legal Services,

Farmworkers Corporation of New Jersey, and New Jersey Migrant Ministry. The purpose of these organizations was to provide social services, i.e., transportation, and legal and emergency services to farmworkers. CAMP organizers began to integrate and some members even became employed as organizers as a means to reach the migrant farmworkers.

It was through these interrelationships with other local grassroots-based organizations that CAMP began to gain success in the labor camps. They provided films, meetings on labor history, as well as discussions of local farmworkers' problems. CAMP leaders "instead of attempting to escalate the momentum of mass defiance, enrolled farmworkers in an organization building and drafted constitutions" (Piven & Cloward, p. xxii). CAMP as an organization began to have problems of communication concerning the administrative structure of the organization, coordination of work among the leadership (some members were engaged in activities of religious matters, while others were involved in politicizing the workers), lack of understanding of the working conditions of farmworkers and lack of farmworkers' representation in the mobilization of insurgent activities (demonstrations and meetings) (CAMP Evaluation, 1972). There were no incentives or rewards offered to farmworkers which would induce them to become active participants.

Resources. Resources, such as time, money, and staff, placed severe constraints on CAMP's ability to organize farmworkers. They were concerned that CAMP could no longer

continue surviving with the limited funding from various support groups. CAMP was seen as a radical left-wing group by other local grassroots organizations. This affected the organizing of farmworkers as well as religious institutions supporting CAMP financially. Their methods of organizing the farmworkers through mass defiance as well as forming a bureaucratic structure organization were also affected by the lack of resources.

This continuous dependency on outside resources from the church, governmental, and other private foundations led them to change the focus of the organization. The CAMP leadership became co-opted by political parties as they received concessions from the church and other non-profit government institutions.

These external and internal conflicts led CAMP leaders to call a meeting right after their assembly to evaluate their work. They decided that what was needed was a "real organization" with the necessary funding to educate the farmworkers. This new organization was going to be called META (Farmworkers Migrant Ministry).

External Characteristics

CAMP mobilizing versus organizing. CAMP's strategy of mobilization was composed of students, churchmen, and activists. They used the strategy of disruption to mobilize for meeting and workers' demonstrations. Such a strategy consisted of farmworkers having to affiliate with

the organization and participate regularly. Farmworkers worked all day and little time was available to eat and sleep. Piven and Cloward's theory of mobilizing versus organizing relates to this issue. They advocated that the masses of people be mobilized to engage in disruptive action, but not necessarily to "participate or affiliate with an organization" (p. 284). To mobilize a crisis, CAMP leaders used network and "cadre organizations." This method was effective in that it provided external support and awareness about the farmworkers' conditions to the general public. First, the perspective was that the farmworkers had a right to run their own organizations and to determine their own "policies and strategies." Second, the staff felt they needed to subordinate themselves to policy-making bodies composed exclusively of farmworkers. A staff that would contribute technical skills to the work of the organization, such as running workshops and seminars on how to negotiate with the farmers and how to organize demonstrations, was needed. Third, they cultivated those with the leadership potential, tutoring them in techniques of leadership, with the expectation that the role of the organizer would wither away (Piven & Cloward, p. 285).

Power of the grassroots-membership organizations. The power of the grassroots membership in CAMP was characterized by the UFW and Cesar Chavez movements, as well as the involvement of CAMP with the Movimiento Obrero Unido (MOU--United Workers Movement of Puerto Rico). First, CAMP began

its involvement with the UFW by establishing early relations and supporting the "boycott" of the UFW and opening a UFW office in Puerto Rico. Second, the CAMP organizers empowered farmworkers through their involvement in insurgent organization activities (e.g., boycotts, strikes) on the mainland. CAMP organizers were also very active in creating awareness and educating the general public about the general conditions of migrant farmworkers through public hearings, the media, and newsletters.

Commitment of grassroots-membership organizations.

CAMP was committed to creating awareness among the religious institutions and labor organizations. The masses for CAMP were the general public on the mainland who would, in turn, become committed to supporting boycotts and strikes concerning the migrant farmworker situation. This would happen after an organization of migrant farmworkers was formed.

Resources. CAMP's external resources consisted of religious institutions, organized labor and personal contributions. The external support of CAMP was limited, since the organization was new and the work was more research and church oriented. CAMP received external support from labor organizations, such as MOU, UFW, Industrial Mission, National Migrant Ministry, and other religious organizations. Objectives were very clear. They started with two goals and were able to meet one of them. The

conditions and circumstances in which they met were set up to solve crises. Their organizational structure was one that led them into a better organized organizational structure, META.

Stability and uncertainty. Their stability and uncertainty was based on their goals and bureaucratic structures. They were stable as their goals were being met. Uncertainty was an issue with which CAMP never dealt. They were uncertain about organizing a movement of Puerto Rican farmworkers. They were uncertain about their future, since they knew that the poor farmworkers could not be liberated from poverty until they were liberated as a nation first.

Conclusion

CAMP was effective in establishing the organizational structures for the first steering committee. The committee was successful in developing a plan of action which documented the needs of the workers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. This committee was effective in meeting the first goal, which was to inform and educate the general public about working conditions of migrant farmworkers.

The committee was unsuccessful in meeting the second goal, which was to establish a farmworkers' organization controlled and directed by farmworkers. Therefore, CAMP, as an organization of organizers, began to make plans to establish roots and structures for the first Puerto Rican farmworkers' organization, to be called META.

CAMP was able to create patterns of sustainment to further the creation and development of other grassroots organizations for Puerto Rican farmworkers, such as Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas (META).

Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas

META was a non-profit religious organization. The purpose of this organization was to develop interest among all religious denominations concerning the problems of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers and to provide services and support in the areas of legal problems, camp visitations, and distribution of leadership. It also provided farmworkers with educational and labor meetings. META as an organization only lasted one year. It was effective and successful in three major areas involving the Puerto Rican farmworkers: First, it formed organizational linkages and resources through the use of mobilization techniques; second, it represented Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in a number of legal battles between the government of Puerto Rico and migrant farmworkers; and third, it provided leadership to farmworkers in their attempt to form the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union.

Internal Characteristics

Political goals of the organization. META had two political goals: to develop interest and support among all

religious denominations concerning the problems of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, and to provide an instrument through which churches of all denominations could channel their resources and efforts to eliminate poverty and social, economic, and educational deprivation of migrant seasonal farmworkers (META, Certificate of Incorporation, 1972).

META was effective in drawing support and organizational linkages with other national workers groups on the mainland. This type of linkage brought recruitment of members to META, money, communication, and, in part, goal attainment. Linkages brought success in that META developed relationships with other groups and individuals who provided internal support through periodic donations and occasional statements of support favorable to the organization of migrant farmworkers.

META was not effective in the second goal, even though it received monetary and in-kind support from the National Migrant Ministry and other local churches. It was not effective in achieving such goals due to various internal reasons. First, the organizational leadership philosophy was in conflict with the paternalistic role of the church. Second, there were political differences among the membership and leadership. One group was pro-independence of Puerto Rico; the other was pro-socialism, and there were individual ministers whose commitment was to their religious church institutions. Third, META as an organization was not able to eliminate poverty for Puerto Rican

farmworkers because they encountered many obstacles and problems in working with each other. They did have differences of opinion about the issues that affected migrant farmworkers and about the way to organize migrants.

Structure. META, Inc. consisted of a board of directors (ten Puerto Ricans and North Americans who lived and worked in the local areas), and two area directors for New Jersey and Connecticut, one of whom was a minister and the other a political activist. The staff consisted of six full-time college students who were trained and supervised by the director. In Connecticut, additional religious church volunteers and students became part of the staff.

The political structure of META, which was incorporated with tax exempt status, was bureaucratic and formal. As it has been defined by Piven and Cloward, politics of structure is a significant characteristic of movement organizations like META. This is significant in that both Piven and Cloward defined politics of structure as having to look at the strategy of the politics. In META's case, their politics of structure consisted of one movement organization with internal bureaucratic structures. META used the strategy to educate and organize the farmworkers through consciousness-raising tactics, seminars, educational projects, involving farmworkers in insurgency protest activities against the state.

Leadership. In a movement organization such as META, the organization of leadership consisted of ministers and

political activists. These were the sources of life leadership during the 60's and the early 70's. The leaders of META became the same as leaders of CAMP. Their political ideology was nationalistic in nature; some were political left extremists and some were theologian in nature. Power was a necessary resource for survival and influence. As it has been noted, the META leadership was split into two factions, the New Jersey religious ministers and supporters, and the Connecticut branch who were political activists and advocates of Puerto Rican rights.

META leaders in New Jersey were influential and powerful through the use of their religious insurgency tactics. These tactics consisted of religious activities, educational projects, as well as cultural events. META leadership was also influential in seeking organizational support from other religious and non-religious organizations. The organization leaders in New Jersey represented farmworkers many times on occasional matters pertaining to the movement organization. They were brought into the organization on a continual basis as advisors to resolve daily crises of the migrant workers. The leadership was involved in litigation cases, advocating the migrant farmworkers' rights, as well as building organizational support for the movement of farmworkers.

The leadership of META was influential and powerful in utilizing insurgency tactics of protest. They used strikes,

demonstrations, and very little emphasis was placed on organization-building. Instead, emphasis was given to the formation of mobilization of resources and organizing workers. (For example, the political activists engaged in mobilizing support from farmworkers against the Shade Tobacco Growers Association.) They also mobilized other labor organizations into getting support for the strike against the Tobacco Growers and into forming the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union. The leaders' strategy of organizing farmworkers was one based on union-building and not a social-service-organization-building. They used litigation of cases against the state (Case of Governor of P.R. and Growers).

The two leadership styles conflicted with each other. This conflict led META of New Jersey into political and ideological differences with META of Connecticut. As a result of this conflict, META leaders of New Jersey resigned in 1973.

Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages

META's internal and external politics of organizational support was based on its organizational linkages and resources. Piven and Cloward address the importance of the politics of organizational support on the basis of resources and linkages. They argue that politics of organizational support is an important criteria in achieving success for the new cadre organizational development. How-

ever, they both argue that this model depends for its success on the ability of organizations to secure incentives of sanctions that will command the required contributions and participation from masses of people. META had six major resources which provided maintenance for their organizations. First was membership. This membership base was important in its early phases of organizational development: META relied upon this base for manpower. The second resource was legitimacy. Since META was formed from the very beginning to promote social change concerning the conditions of migrant farmworkers, it invariably encountered opposition. In order to survive under opposition, it was important that it be seen as legitimate, at least by sectors of their community. Third, money was important because it was needed as a resource for survival. Fourth, prestige was a necessary resource because it did help to build membership, gain funds and exercise influence. Fifth, social conditions surrounding META as a movement organization were going to be changing; therefore, those leading the organization needed to have access to information about its environment. Finally, power was a necessary resource. They exercised power directly or indirectly by influencing those who had the power to make decisions. These were META's major resources.

META received other financial and in-kind resources and support from the Spanish Commission of the Episcopal

Church, USA; the New Jersey Council of Churches; Rutgers University (Puerto Rican Studies); the United Farmworkers Union, California; National Farmworkers Ministry of the National Council of Churches; and the Roman Catholic Churches from Connecticut and New Jersey.

META's politics of organizational support consisted of a religious, non-violent philosophical foundation.

Membership. META's membership consisted of supporters and the migrant farmworkers who received services. It never gained large farmworker membership. Rather, its membership was composed of religious individuals and political professionals who were concerned about the social plight of migrant farmworkers (META minutes, July 12, 1973). The internal membership was based on organizational support through volunteers, college students, religious ministers, legal aid lawyers, and missionaries. The membership came to New Jersey from two regions: Connecticut and Puerto Rico. They were mainly advocates and supporters of farmworkers' rights. META was the first Puerto Rican farmworkers organization officially organized to create the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union.

Piven and Cloward have pointed out that the poor are "mobilized" and not organized (p. 284). They consider mass movements organizations to mobilize cadre organizations to insure change. However, Piven and Cloward provide two external characteristics for evaluating organizational effectiveness. These are mobilizing versus organizing.

External Characteristics

META mobilizing versus organizing. META mobilization tactics were characterized as being organized by the leadership of "cadre organizations." Farmworkers were asked to join META so that they could engage in a defiant act against the growers. Farmworkers did not enjoy incentives for organization-building. They did enjoy participating in mobilization. This gave them a sense of identity and a sense of participation in fighting for better wages. As an organization of migrant farmworkers, META's main emphasis was on building mass mobilization along with other "cadre organizations" (p. 284). This organization of organizers, composed of students, churchmen, political activists, etc., concentrated on bringing support groups together with the purpose of building support for a Puerto Rican farmworkers union. Their tactics for organizing included confrontations with the farmer, information campaigns, the use of networking and linkage of clergymen to exhort farmworkers to seek the rights that were theirs, and to hold demonstrations to build organizations among farmworkers.

The organizers of META defined two roles for themselves as outsiders in a farmworkers organization. First, they acted like staff, subordinating themselves to a board of directors exclusively composed of professionals and non-farmworkers. They provided information on the technical aspects of issues which were the organizational dealings,

in this case the incorporation and structure of the program. They also ran training programs in methods of dealing with demonstrations and leadership potential as a whole area of concern. They provided these trainings to farmworkers in order to prepare them for insurgency activity and organization-building.

This model of organizing META led to conflict among META leadership. Some members thought organization-building was needed, because traditionally it has been the only method available for the political activists to organize labor groups; others thought that what was needed was to educate the farmworkers through a political education project, using the church institutions as the main center of attraction. This was due to the philosophy and strategy used by the non-traditional liberal church institutions and ministers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland.

Divisiveness was a problem which weakened the organization. Leaders or organizations, especially church institutions, were dependent on receiving monetary support from their national officers. Even though these funding sources made it possible for farmworkers to receive special grants for protest, the protest was not controlled or directed by farmworkers but by organizers of the "organization of cadres."

Power of the grassroots-membership organizations.

META as an institution believed in the ability of the poor

or the masses to use their power to create social change. In this case, META was concerned with migrant farmworkers' ability to go on strike and use defiance against the farmer. Farmworkers did use their power in their legal battles when gaining support against the Governor of Puerto Rico and the Department of Labor. META organizers were able to influence farmworkers to strike for one afternoon concerning the Shade Tobacco Cigar Incorporated in Connecticut. But farmworkers, while being members of META, never went on a national strike; neither did they join forces with the UFW farmworkers to gain support or recognition for their small victories.

Commitment of the grassroots-membership organizations.

META organizers were committed to educating farmworkers about the colonial situation of Puerto Rico and about the need to become independent as a nation first.

Their commitment to create awareness in the general public about the migrant farmworkers was a vital issue to the organizers. Nevertheless, there was no commitment from the Puerto Rican government for endorsing or changing the laws to better conditions for the migrant farmworkers. However, the colonial government of Puerto Rico was supportive of the Department of Labor and, therefore, refused to become a participant actor in the struggle against the displacement of farmworkers. This made the situation worse for migrants and helped to raise awareness among farmworkers. META was committed to creating awareness among some

30 farmworkers to prepare them to become active leaders of the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union.

Resources. META's external resources consisted of religious institutions, organized labor, and various in-kind donations from personal contributions. META was the first church-oriented group to become structurally bureaucratic, set up for providing supportive services for migrant farmworkers. META's external resources consisted of the UFW, Industrial Mission, National Migrant Ministry, and other religious denominations.

Complexity. As an organization, META was complex in its structure. It consisted of organizers who were religious leaders and political activists. However, their ideology was in conflict with their own plan of action. Both groups wanted to organize the farmworkers with different styles of politics: one with insurgency tactics, and the other with reformist tactics. The organization was complex in that it did not use the economic and political support of resources to become a stable movement. The hierarchy of the organization was never clear. It was set up to be a temporary, transitory organization with the purpose of preparing migrant farmworkers to form the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union.

Stability. META was set up to be an unstable organization. This was because their political and religious goals were in conflict with each other. The leadership had

problems defining its role among the farmworkers working class. Both META groups had conflicting ideas about styles of mobilizing and organizing.

Conclusion

META was successful and effective as a transitory organization as well as a "cadre organization." META was an organization of organizers. It was effective in accomplishing its main goal of building support for an organization of migrant farmworkers.

META was effective in mobilizing support as well as in organizing support. Piven and Cloward (1979) speak to the idea of mobilizing versus organizing. In this argument, META as an organization was able to become effective using both strategies. It was effective in mobilizing one group of supporters in Connecticut against the Shade Tobacco Growers and during the legal case against the Governor of Puerto Rico. They were effective in organizing a group of cadre organizers to support META's work in New Jersey.

The Majkas' ideas have been extended in analyzing META's internal and external characteristics. They seem to be applicable in evaluating META's organizational effectiveness. As it has been noted previously, the Majkas advocate organizational permanency, patterns of organizational sustainment and mobilization. META as an organization was able to be transitory instead of permanent. The pattern of sustainment of building a strong organization was initiated by CAMP and followed by META. Such strategy

indicates that social-movement organizations go through a set of stages and patterns of organization-building. Each step has required a detailed analysis and close evaluation. In the case of META, the Majkas' ideas can be applied and extended beyond the creation of "cadre organizations" to define the different types of strategies which are needed in social-movement-organization-building.

Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas

ATA was the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. ATA was formed in 1973 as a result of two previous organizations (CAMP and META) which tried to organize and set up roots for forming the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union. It was officially created by some one hundred migrant farmworkers in Camp Windsor, Connecticut. Its main purpose was to represent migrant farmworkers in contract negotiations between the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico and the contracting employers.

ATA was very effective in that it organized a tremendous number of workers. It received endorsements from various prominent labor organizations and religious institutions. ATA was the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union that was able to bargain for the farmworkers migrating from Puerto Rico. In addition, ATA gained recognition from the Government of Puerto Rico and organized

labor in the United States. It was very effective because it improved the lives of hundreds of farmworkers.

On the other hand, it was not effective in securing its independence and survival from other labor unions. When it merged with the UFW, ATA began to lose its identity because the leadership was not politically sophisticated enough to overcome individual and ideological differences. Therefore, the organization was left without a charismatic leader to lead such a movement.

Internal Characteristics

Political goals of the organization. ATA's major political goal consisted of the building of a farmworkers union to represent the farmworkers in contract negotiations between the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico and the contracting employers. It also represented all farmworkers, whether contracted or not. According to the Puerto Rican Socialist Party (1974), this political goal was part of an effort to organize the Puerto Rican working class in Puerto Rico and on the mainland (Agosto, Summer, 1974).

Structure. ATA structure consisted of one president of the union, in this case Juan Irizarry, political activist and active member of the Puerto Rican labor movement. ATA as a union functioned through support committees. These support committees were divided by five states on the East Coast: New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, New York and Puerto Rico. The primary task of the support

committees was to raise the community's consciousness in relation to the workers' struggles. The work was directed and coordinated through a central coordinating committee, a regional coordinating committee, and a local support committee.

The functions of the central committee were: to supervise and implement the agreements reached, to analyze the prevalent situation and formulate policy with the approval of the union, to direct the overall policy, and to carry out immediate objectives of the union.

The functions of the regional committee were: to establish relationships with other unions and other fraternal organizations that might aid the union's struggle; to create local support committees; to raise sufficient funds to enable the union and the committee to carry out its task; to establish a massive propaganda campaign through all available media, such as radio, television, and the sale of buttons and bumper stickers; to stimulate the creation of local committees; to create a directory of people and organizations that might assist through donations or the use of existing facilities; and to develop educational materials about the union.

The functions of the local support committees were: to bring the migrant workers' struggle to the community level, to organize fund-raising activities, to participate directly in demonstrations and mass functions in coordina-

tion with the union, to structure organizing activities directed toward the day-haul workers; and to involve all community organizations in activities supporting the union.

Finally, finances were coordinated by the central committee, which received 10% of all money collected; the rest went to the union. An important component of the structure was membership. ATA consisted of a membership of 9,000 farmworkers, mostly Puerto Rican farmworkers from the East Coast (ATA Plan of Action, 1974).

Leadership. The leadership of ATA consisted of the support committees' leaders, mostly political activists who survived CAMP-META and who were militant members of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party, clergy, students, and volunteers. Their philosophy was militant, left-oriented, and grounded in the belief in social change. The leadership of ATA was effective in directing its support committees toward mass-insurgency activities (strikes, work stoppages, protest to force compliance to obtain more just contracts for farmworkers and litigation activity). The major strikes were held against the Shade Tobacco Growers Association in Connecticut and Green Giant in New Jersey. Daily confrontations in the fields were held against the farmer during working hours by organizers and leaders of the union.

The leadership of ATA received political direction from the MOU (Organized Workers Movement in Puerto Rico). Some were professional militants of the Puerto Rican So-

cialist Party, the Independence Party. Some were clergy whose philosophy was "popular" in nature. Very few, if any, were farmworkers. Their philosophy was based on organizing the Puerto Rican farmworkers as the first step in organizing the Puerto Rican working class. The style of organizing was mass defiance against the colonial government and against the agricultural corporations. Their political ideology was very nationalistic and very sectarian in nature (Interview with Rev. Wilfred Velez, September 7, 1985).

ATA's leadership was very influential and powerful in the development of union tactics of insurgency and protest. Most of the emphasis of organizing was given to the development of linkages with other social movement organizations. Social discontent among farmworkers was a factor that contributed to the leadership's ability to confront and organize against the colonial government of Puerto Rico.

ATA leadership became part of the UFW and came under the leadership of Cesar Chavez in 1976. Cesar Chavez's style of mobilizing and Juan Irizarry's method of organizing were very distinct. Both leaders functioned on the basis of different premises of mass-organizing strategies. Cesar Chavez believed in non-violent insurgency actions. He used farmworkers' discontent to organize his UFW union. As a leader, he was very charismatic. His method of organizing came from the Alinsky school of thought. His political philosophy was based on the readings of Gandhi.

He was a migrant farmworker with many years of experience in working and living on the farms. Juan Irizarry, on the other hand, believed in the unionization of migrant farmworkers, a process for organizing the working class to create social transformation into a new society. Juan Irizarry was a political activist and a member of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. His political ideology was nationalistic and one which was based on a Marxist perspective. Irizarry believed in mass-insurgency actions as necessary steps in organizing a farmworkers movement. His ability to confront growers and his technique of quickly forming demonstrations and strikes demonstrated his capacity to organize.

The differences between ATA and UFW, as well as between Irizarry and Chavez, led to a number of problems. According to Juan Irizarry, ATA wanted to be the union of farmworkers on the East Coast. Before the merger with UFW, ATA and UFW leaders began to have differences on styles of organizing. UFW believed in concentrating efforts on the West Coast because the environmental conditions to fight the Teamsters Union were a priority. ATA wanted jurisdiction and freedom to organize the Puerto Rican migrants on the East Coast. Besides organizing, there were philosophical differences in styles of organizing insurgency actions (strikes, riots, demonstrations, etc.). Problems began to arise between UFW and ATA. Some of these problems were reflected in the quality of organizing and in the attitudes

reflected by support committees. The UFW leaders felt that ATA was receiving external support from other political labor organizations which created conflict of interest for them. As a result of these differences, ATA leaders resigned from the UFW. ATA lasted one more year before it disappeared.

Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages

ATA's internal and external support was based on its ability to maintain organizational linkages and resources for its own maintenance. Linkages and resources are significant and of special value to social movement organizations because, without movement organizations, social discontent could not be coordinated and given the continuity that distinguishes social movements from simple collective outbursts (Aveni, 1978). However, effectiveness and success for ATA depended upon the relationship it developed with the UFW and other groups in society.

ATA had five major resources. The first was a membership base. The membership of ATA was based on the organizational strength and ability to become independent and organize the workers. The membership of 9,000 farmworkers supporters illustrated the effectiveness of the organizations's ability to mobilize.

The second resource utilized by ATA was the minimum amount of legitimacy. ATA as a union was formed to promote social change concerning the conditions of Puerto Rican

farmworkers, but it was impossible for them to be seen as a legitimate organization because ATA encountered opposition. ATA survived under opposition from the growers, regardless of organized labor, political influence, and their national recognition. Being legitimate sometimes in their tactics of insurgency made them a very powerful group within their support network.

The third resource was money. This resource was important for ATA because, even though ATA's structure was non-traditional in nature, it needed money to run its union. Its money came from union dues, the United Farmworkers Union, religious institutions, labor organizations in Puerto Rico and on the mainland.

The fourth resource was prestige. This resource was very necessary for ATA. It merged with the UFW mainly to get recognition, to be known, to get the respect it needed as a union. It also merged to receive the monetary support for the calling of national strikes. Even though ATA had received recognition and it was well known, it did not have the prestige to call national strikes like the UFW.

The fifth resource dealt with the organization's ability to have access to information about its environment. ATA's networking among its support committees and community linkage was one of the strongest areas of the union. ATA was able to use its power to influence the UFW leadership to agree to the merger. The ATA union exercised power

indirectly when it began to organize farmworkers in the five states against the growers' will. It exercised its power to mobilize external support to gain recognition from the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico.

ATA's politics of organizational support came mainly directly from the support committees in five states and from the Puerto Rican Organized Labor Union (MOU). They provided training to organizers of organized labor, as well as education about the colonial conditions on the Island. ATA set up a non-traditional bureaucratic structure with a plan of action divided among five states. The leadership and activists involved themselves in organizing rather than mobilizing farmworkers, through the development of a formally structured organization that consisted of a mass membership. ATA was to serve as a vehicle for power and political mobilization over time, in support of the independence of Puerto Rico, as well as in support of migrant farmworkers. ATA, like the two previous organizations, concentrated its efforts on organization-building during periods of "insurrection." It based its political organizational support on the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and other organized labor unions from the mainland. ATA's most important and powerful resources were its membership, its ability to gain financial support, and its ability to be legitimate at times when protest activity was the ultimatum. Linkages and resources were very significant in ATA's organizational support.

Membership. ATA's membership consisted of outside supporters, professionals, clergy, organized labor, and student volunteers. It had a large farmworker membership, but few farmworkers became organizers. The internal membership was based on volunteers, members of cadre organizations such as ministers, political activists, lawyers, missionaries and college student volunteers. The membership came from the previously mentioned five states. They were characterized as supporters of the union as well as committee members who mainly organized monetary as well as insurgency-activity support. Eventually these supporters became advocates and organizers of migrant farmworkers.

External Characteristics

ATA mobilizing versus organizing. ATA used strategies of mobilization which were structured and mobilized by the leadership of support committees. These five state support committees were involved in: mobilizing support for the union in different geographical areas; developing relations with other local unions; contacting legislators for support of legislation and bills; contacting community based groups such as poverty programs, churches, student organizations, political groups; and, in general, obtaining support for ATA. However, ATA did not organize but mobilized support for the union. ATA emphasized building an organization for all agricultural workers, with emphasis on the day-haul worker. In addition, ATA also mobilized around issues

concerning the U.S. and Puerto Rican courts. It mobilized groups of workers to solve immediate grievances of the workers through direct negotiations with the growers. Moreover, ATA established direct relations with unions and developed and consolidated broad-based support. One of these unions was the UFW. The UFW did organize and mobilize. In a press conference with the Hartford Times, Cesar Chavez indicated that one of the major obstacles in organizing ATA was that most "tobacco workers in the valley were students and not immersed in agricultural and . . . have little interest in joining a union" (1974, p. 1). Puerto Rican farmworkers were never organized or mobilized into the union. They became members temporarily, while support committees were being mobilized into forming an organization.

Power of the grassroots-membership organizations.

ATA's leadership believed in the ability of the poor to create social change. They did this by improving wage negotiations, health insurance plans for the migrants, and, in general, improving the lives of hundreds of farmworkers. The farmworkers who participated in strikes and legal battles, locally and nationally, were able to use the power to stop work and gain better wages. This stoppage of work was done through the mobilization of farmworkers and support from various support committees. ATA leadership never allowed the farmworkers to take group actions on their own

in the camps. The actions of insurgency needed to be mobilized first and planned ahead of time. However, many times ATA workers in different camps won small victories. These workers organized these insurgency acts and were condemned for not following the union plan of action.

Commitment of the grassroots-membership organizations.

ATA support committees were committed to creating change in the migrant farmworkers' conditions. The leadership of ATA was committed politically to seeking solutions for the colonial situation of Puerto Rico. Their commitment to creating the support and awareness among the general public about Puerto Rican farmworkers was a priority as well. There was no commitment from the leadership of ATA to seek the independence of the union. They wanted ties with UFW for the purpose of prestige and recognition. There was a commitment to mobilize Puerto Rican farmworkers, and no commitment to organize other ethnic migrant farmworkers. This was clearly the case when the union merged with the UFW. ATA leaders only saw the importance of giving priority to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Ethnically, the leaders of both groups gave preference to organizing their own groups. This strategy created divisiveness among the leadership and among its support base. It made the situation difficult for migrant farmworkers because it did not help to raise unity and awareness among farmworkers. The lack of commitment was also shown when the Boston

Committee leadership resigned due to ATA's present nationalistic approach of mobilizing farmworkers.

Resources. ATA's external resources consisted of organized labor support, private labor foundations, religious institutions, membership dues, and political parties. ATA's strategy was based on inter-organizational linkages with unorganized individuals. ATA relied heavily on organizations which owned or controlled large amounts of resources. These resources consisted of organizational leaders. These resources were important to ATA, in that the organization's leaders often were capable of directing organizational policy and funds toward ends beneficial to ATA. For example, the political leaders of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and the Independence Party were influential within the government of Puerto Rico in obtaining grievances and winning legal cases for migrant farmworkers. ATA was successful in using legislators to support pieces of legislation concerning farmworkers' rights (Interview with Rev. Velez, September 10, 1985).

ATA also depended on a second category of persons assessing larger amounts of resources, individual groups from the general public. These professionals, student volunteers, labor organizers, religious individuals, political activists drawn from the general public, brought to the organization legitimacy, prestige and power. The amount of in-kind support and resources provided by the

general public was limited by the number of persons who supported ATA.

Complexity. As a labor union organization, ATA was complex, in that it was difficult to define exactly where it wanted to lead the farmworkers movement after important victories. ATA found itself losing the most important organization that represented Puerto Rican farmworkers' interests. This happened because ATA leaders were preoccupied with ideological and political differences with UFW leaders in seeking correct strategies concerning insurgency acts. These differences brought destruction to the union. The power struggle among both organizations' leaders made it difficult to continue the mobilizing and organizing that needed to be done on the East Coast. The complexity of ATA rested on the differences of ideology of the union between ATA and UFW structure, lack of farmworkers' input, and on the politics of the leadership of organizational support. Shortly after it became part of UFW, ATA disappeared.

Stability. ATA was a stable organization for the first three years. It became a mass-movement organization composed of mass-based support. It became stable in that it formed a non-traditional structure with support committees. ATA sustained itself quite well for three years until it decided to merge with the UFW because it needed monetary resources, prestige and recognition. ATA lost its

stability and identity when it began to make concessions to the UFW-AFL.

Conclusion

ATA was an organization of organizers and supporters. It accomplished important victories which contributed to the organizational development of farmworkers' insurgencies against growers. ATA was very effective as the first Puerto Rican farmworkers organization. It was the first organized attempt to form a union which represented the interests of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

ATA was effective in mobilizing support for the union, but not in organizing farmworkers. It failed to organize migrant farmworkers because it gave priority to organizational building. In doing this, ATA neglected to deal with obstacles in the way of organizing. ATA confronted many obstacles: first, the growers' opposition and legislative aide in this opposition; second, the distance between permanent residence and place of work of farmworkers; third, the increased use of local labor (day haulers and walk-ins) to replace the Puerto Rican migrants; fourth, the fact that farmworkers cannot organize a union unless they become sponsored by a large recognized union in New Jersey and in many other states.

ATA was also unsuccessful in that it did not build patterns of organizational permanency for the Puerto Rican farmworkers union. As a union, ATA did not organize the

Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers as one class of oppressed people.

ATA built support and raised awareness through the winning of legal cases and protest. Nevertheless, ATA was not successful in identifying moments of discontent by the farmworkers. Therefore, the organization relied on spontaneous insurgency tactics (e.g., strikes, demonstrations) as a way of creating impact and change in dealing with emergencies. Spontaneity was the criterion for protest. On the other hand, ATA's leadership was busy building the organization of agricultural workers. Its leadership failed to organize a permanent organization, due to two basic reasons: First, ATA leaders were very nationalistic and politically sectarian about organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Second, they failed to mobilize the farmworkers themselves into the union; instead, they built an organization of supporters.

The ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas can be applied to ATA organizational development. In terms of ATA, Piven and Cloward's theory works best in relation to the issue of mobilizing versus organizing. Piven and Cloward show evidence that poor people should be mobilized, not organized. When one applies this theory to ATA, one finds that ATA's mobilization techniques worked best for building organizational support, networks and linkages. Organizing was a factor undermined by ATA leaders. They

thought that, by mobilizing support, organizing would happen. Farmworkers were left totally out of this organizational process.

North East Farmworkers Support Committee

The NEFSC did not develop out of ATA. The NEFSC grew out of a group of advocate supporters and previous organizers of ATA who got together for an emergency situation dealing with Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

The North East Farmworkers Support Committee was established in 1978 as a result of farmworkers' insurgency against growers in the Catskill Mountains in New York. During the apple harvest of 1978, approximately 500 Puerto Rican contract workers were illegally fired by the apple growers. Farmworkers were fired because growers wanted to replace Puerto Rican contract workers with Jamaican workers. Out of this emergency, this newly formed group was established. The NEFSC as a committee was effective in that it organized and mobilized to deal with one specific purpose. It became successful in supporting legislation and in organizing farmworkers' protests to support new policies and bills in the legislature. The NEFSC was very important in the development of CATA as an organization. It was known as the "rescue mission" group. This rescue mission group began organizing farmworkers in New Jersey during 1978 by providing emergency services to farmworkers (Interview with Angel Dominguez, June 19, 1984).

As will become clear, the NEFSC was successful and effective in organizing a support committee composed of cadre leaders from other social service organizations. Part of the reason it was successful was because it only provided rescue support to the farmworkers when needed. The committee was set up on a temporary basis. The leadership knew that they had limitations. They knew when to get out and allow farmworkers to continue with their daily struggles. The committee only lasted for one year.

Internal Characteristics

Political goals of the organization. The NEFSC's short-range goal consisted of providing rescue support to migrant farmworkers. It also established patterns for organizational development as long-range goals when a group of farmworker supporters formed an organization called CATA. The NEFSC support committee consisted of members from different political and religious angles. Their politics of organizational support were based on humanitarian beliefs. This was a group of organizers who got together to advocate and provide social services to farmworkers.

Structure. The structure of the NEFSC was based on cadre organizations dealing with migrant concerns. Leaders from social-movement organizations, such as Legal Services, National Farmworkers Opportunities, National Migrant Ministry of Churches, SCOPE, New England Farmworkers Opportunities, ACLU-Glassboro, and other local organizations estab-

lished a support committee to rescue farmworkers through a displacement program of workers.

Leadership. The leadership of the NEFSC was started by Angel Dominguez, a previous ATA organizer and META worker. Dominguez was working for the Philadelphia Farmworkers Opportunities when he was called about the "rescue mission" of Puerto Rican farmworkers. He was able to mobilize a group of supporters to form the NEFSC. He was effective in providing leadership to the group. Puerto Rican farmworkers were rescued and the NEFSC was formed. Angel Dominguez, along with other members of the NEFSC, organized a major march and protest as a means to win legislation concerning minimum wage legislation. This major victory established the NEFSC as a strong group in New Jersey. Dominguez, as leader of the support committee, saw the possibility to re-organize a new group for the purpose of forming the union that farmworkers needed the most. He began to provide leadership to the committee in the area of organizing farmworkers. Some members of the NEFSC committee did not like the idea of organizing because they were concerned with what had happened with ATA. Some resigned, and a few decided to stay with Dominguez. Dominguez called a meeting during June of 1979 with local workers, to initiate plans for the First Farmworkers General Assembly. At this General Assembly, for the first time, five hundred farmworkers participated and agreed to estab-

lish CATA as their mass organization of support to farmworkers.

Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages

The NEFSC's politics of organizational support was based on sharing resources, networking, and forming linkages of support.

The NEFSC was a legitimate committee which survived financially on in-kind support. It used its organizational resources to support and rescue farmworkers. The method of "cadre organization" was used for political mobilization in raising issues to the migrants. The leaders of these cadre organizations controlled resources such as funding, which they used as a vehicle for power. They used the power as cadre organizations to create input in the legislature, as well as educating the general public through political campaigns, the media, and protests.

Membership. NEFSC consisted of a membership of organizations which served as a rescue group to farmworkers. The membership was not composed of farmworkers but of political activists, social service supporters, and legal advisors. The membership's political philosophy was based on anti-poverty programs, social-service leaders, and labor organizations.

The strategy the membership used to mobilize farmworkers was one of workers' defiance against the state. They

mobilized protest activity for specific activities. Farmworkers' insurgency was effective in getting farmworkers to participate in protest events.

External Characteristics

Mobilizing versus organizing. NEFSC strategy of mobilization was one of mobilizing cadres of farmworkers' organizations and supporters to focus on getting farmworkers to participate in insurgency protests as a means for social and political change. They used the strategy of disruption to mobilize meetings, demonstrations and networks. They did not ask farmworkers to become part of any organizational structure. Farmworkers became part of the immediate insurgency protest. The cadre organizations used farmworkers' discontent as a strategy for mobilizing disruption. This method worked for the cadre organizations, as well as for the farmworkers involved. Farmworkers wanted action and became participants of such activity. Cadre organizations wanted to create change in the legislation. Some members of the NEFSC were not interested in organizing farmworkers. The majority was interested in mobilizing support to change conditions. This conflict made the cadre organizations' leaders and other members of the NEFSC split from the committee. As a result, those who wanted to organize continued with their plans to organize a migrant farmworkers organization, later to be called CATA (Interview with Angel Dominguez, July, 1984).

Power of the grassroots-membership organizations. The NEFSC believed in the power of the masses to create social change. They knew that, by advocating unity through a support network, the farmworkers could empower themselves to change their own environment. First, the committee members began to create awareness among the general public through media campaigns, hearings and demonstrations. However, few farmworkers had the power to participate and influence policy. The NEFSC members were very active in creating awareness about migrant farmworkers among the Anglo community.

Commitment of the grassroots-membership organizations. The NEFSC was committed to supporting the farmworkers' struggle for better working conditions. The committee did not represent the interests of the general public, but those of farmworkers. The committee was set up as a transitory organization of cadre supporters. It served as an advocate for migrant farmworkers.

Resources. The NEFSC external resources consisted of cadre organizations and in-kind support. It also received financial assistance from social-service organizations. The internal and external resources consisted of money, the ability to mobilize, the ability to do networking, and the ability to make decisions in influencing legislation.

Complexity and stability. The NEFSC was not a complex organization. Its goals were clear and temporary. It was set up to be a support group of cadre organizations.

The NEFSC was temporarily stable as a group of cadre leaders. It became unstable when the need for organizing the farmworkers into a permanent organization became the priority of the remaining members of the committee.

Conclusion

The NEFSC was effective in that it provided the temporary means for farmworkers' survival. The organization was set up to serve as a network group providing organizational linkages to empower Puerto Rican farmworkers.

It was effective in setting up a rescue mission and establishing structures of organizational support to do networking and advocating. The ideas of Piven and Cloward can be applied in this organizational setting. It met the criteria of insurgency and protest as important characteristics in building a transitory committee.

The NEFSC did not meet the Majkas' ideas for organizational effectiveness. The NEFSC used mobilization techniques in farmworkers' protests against the state. The committee did not establish organizational structures. Instead, it provided temporary support as a transitory group. The NEFSC was an important step in setting organizational structures for the building of an organization like CATA.

Comite de Apoyo a los Trabajadores Agricolas

CATA can be defined as a movement organization. The leadership directs organizational policy and provides political direction to the organization. However, the leadership of CATA believes in mobilizing protest, as well as organizing organizational support. The leadership of CATA is characterized as having two roles: one of organizing migrant farmworkers to take charge of their own situation, and the other of mobilizing farmworkers to create insurgency activity as a strategy for changing external social and economic conditions affecting migrant farmworkers. The political philosophy of the leadership came directly from the leader, Angel Dominguez, who is a follower of the Alinsky school of organizing. The leadership of CATA has been effective in that it has built organizational support through their involvement in strikes, work stoppages, protests to force legislation, and litigation success.

CATA was a group that was established in the summer of 1979, with the purpose of giving support to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in different areas of social services. CATA has been very effective, in that it has gained national recognition through its involvement in the labor organization of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers on the East Coast. CATA has been the organization that has lasted the longest time organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

It has gained power and recognition through the establishment of educational labor projects and new legislation pertinent to migrant farmworkers and has secured unemployment benefits and employment for migrant farmworkers. It has developed a new organizational concept of organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. This new organizing concept has allowed CATA organizers to spend six months of the year in Puerto Rico training and organizing migrant farmworkers. CATA has been very effective in winning several major labor disputes and strikes. As a grassroots organization, CATA has been very effective in providing social services to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. CATA has been effective in using the strategy of organizing insurgency events with farmworkers, as well as in providing immediate social services to workers. CATA has been very successful in initiating patterns for establishing a migrant farmworkers syndicate.

Internal Characteristics

Political goals of the organization. CATA's political goals were to establish the necessary organizational structures whereby Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers could organize into a labor union. The political goals of the organization were based on two strategies of intervention: first, the building of an organization with membership drawn from the farmworkers' community and outside supporters; second, mobilizing farmworkers to engage them in pro-

test activity against growers and the state.

Structure. CATA's structure consists of an annual assembly, an executive committee, a board of directors, a program director, a small staff, and a farmworkers membership of 5,000 in 1984.

The organizational structure of CATA consists of having three full-time organizers in Puerto Rico and three full-time organizers in New Jersey. This is the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organization that has involved farmworkers in its structure of decision-making and planning. CATA consists of professional and non-professional staff. This staff is trained to deal with the social-services component of the structure. The consistent support group deals with litigation advice, educational support, and administrative support.

The mobilization component of the structure has dealt with the organizing and mobilizing of farmworkers into protest activity in Puerto Rico and on the mainland.

An important component of the structure was the administrative assistant, who dealt with the finances of CATA. This component was financially supported by various important foundations and governmental agencies, such as Campaign for Human Development, National Council of Churches, and other religious organizations previously mentioned.

Leadership. The leadership of CATA has been based on one program director, the general assembly, and the board of directors. The director of CATA has been a previous la-

bor organizer with a lot of experience in organizing migrant farmworkers. He has been the only organizer who survived META, NEFSC, and ATA as previous organizations that failed to organize migrant farmworkers. He is not a charismatic individual, but is hardworking and truly committed to the Puerto Rican farmworkers' struggle.

The board of directors has been made up of some day-haul farmworkers' families who reside in the local township area, migrant workers and professional friends of CATA. The board has the power to influence evaluations and planning, and develops policies and provides organizational direction to the organization. The board has been effective in dealing with formally internal crises-oriented organizational matters. The membership in the board has functioned more on a crises-spontaneous situation than on a formally monthly basis situation. The structure of the board is flexible and meetings are run and decided through a collective decision-making approach. CATA's leadership of farmworkers is its strongest internal characteristic in organizing migrant farmworkers. This is in New Jersey and in Puerto Rico. The organizers in Puerto Rico are all farmworkers, with the exception of one minister, Reverend Wilfredo Velez, one-time META Director and ATA organizer, and presently a CATA supporter.

CATA leaders in New Jersey and Puerto Rico have been very successful in organizing and in mobilizing migrant

farmworkers. They have organized migrant farmworkers around litigation cases and have won important legal battles against farmers. They have mobilized migrant farmworkers around legislation issues, protest against farmer abuses (e.g., pesticides, etc.), and have engaged in strike activity. Organizing and mobilizing strategy for the leadership has been effective in creating social and economic change for migrant workers.

The leadership of CATA has given priority to organizing and mobilizing protest activity as a means of creating economic, political and social change for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Organization-building has become a less important secondary priority, but a recognized necessary one.

Politics of Organizational Support: Resources and Linkages

CATA's internal and external politics of organizational support has been based on the "open system" which consists of linkages and resources (Thompson, 1967, p. 67). CATA's politics of organizational support needs to be viewed from the perspective of external influences which manipulate the environment of CATA. In this case, linkages are an important element because they constitute one of the main vehicles through which CATA's interests are mediated. Gerlach and Hine (1970) have noted the importance of linkages for recruitment, money, communication and goal attainment. More recently, McCarthy and Zald (1979) have agreed

that institutional sources of support (e.g., linkages with large organizations) have become a major factor in movement survival and growth. However, the success or failure of CATA has depended upon the type of relationship it has developed with other groups and individuals in the networking among supporters.

CATA has six major resources which provide maintenance for the organization. The first is membership. The membership of CATA is characterized as a group from the farmworkers' community and as a group of supporters who are the staff and volunteers of CATA.

The second resource is legitimacy. CATA consisted of a minimal amount of legitimacy. Legitimacy was used to promote economic change for migrant farmworkers. It has survived by receiving protection from the American Civil Liberties project and by securing monetary support from private and government foundations. As a result, CATA is seen as a legitimate group.

The third resource is money. Money has been a major factor in CATA. This is because money has been converted into other types of resources, such as salaries and incentives for organizers, and has provided access to continue educational programs and social services.

The fourth resource in CATA has been prestige. This resource has helped CATA recruit membership, gain funds, and exercise influence.

The fifth resource has been access to information concerning social conditions surrounding CATA's environment. The leadership of CATA has been effective in maintaining a close relationship with its environmental conditions in their community. This has become a strong resource for external support.

The sixth resource has been power. CATA has used the ability to exercise power directly and indirectly by influencing supporters and non-supporters in powerful positions. For example, CATA was directly influential in creating change in the legislation concerning unemployment compensation, pesticides, and initiating better wages for migrant farmworkers. CATA has become very powerful in influencing politicians, legislators, and religious institutions to promote change concerning farmworkers' rights. Organizational leaders of "cadre organizations" have become a very powerful tool for CATA organizational development. These organizational leaders from private foundations, religious institutions, educational institutions, and governmental agencies are persons who have donated large sums of monetary support to CATA's cause. These organizations have higher amounts of prestige, and have transferred their prestige to CATA by publicly supporting them. Some of these organizations' leaders have advised CATA regarding political, economic, and social matters.

Membership. CATA membership consists of a large farmworkers group and a few supporters from "cadre organiza-

tions" who provide social services and mobilize support for CATA. Some of the cadre organizations' membership came from organized labor, religious institutions, private institutions, such as American Friends Service Committee, and other major organizations. This is the first time in the history of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organizations that farmworkers are directly involved in decision-making, participating, and providing leadership in protest activity, as well as in organizational development. The membership of farmworkers comes directly from Puerto Rico and New Jersey. The external support comes also from both territories. CATA membership continues to grow, due to its farmworkers' participation and input.

External Characteristics

Mobilizing versus organizing. CATA has mobilized and organized support through the use of organizational network and linkages. They organize farmworkers through the use of legal representation in various successful cases with migrant farmworkers. These organized legal actions were very important in that they demonstrated to farmworkers their right to freedom of association and their right to organize. Their organizing strategies have also consisted of providing social services to farmworkers, so that, in turn, they will see CATA as a friendly organization and a strong advocate of farmworkers' rights. CATA has been very effective in pro-

viding services as a mechanism in the recruitment of new members and a way to win farmworkers' trust. CATA organizers have organized labor camp activities, as well as provided supportive services at the camps.

CATA has not been effective in doing both activities, due to a number of reasons. First, by the time an organizer provides immediate social services at a particular farm, he does not have time to do organizing (e.g., briefing with committee members, sitting and planning strategies, listening, and discussing problems faced by the farm organizers). During this time of organization, time and momentum are wasted, but limited resources as organizers are used in the provision of services.

CATA's mobilizing effectiveness has come about due to the leadership of CATA involving farmworkers in direct insurgency activity and protest. It came about due to the involvement of farmworkers in decision- and policy-making about their organization. Farmworkers in CATA have successfully mobilized protest through the use of popular strategies and tactics. These protests of farmworkers' discontent have taken place against the growers, against the state, and against the colonial government of Puerto Rico. It is in this type of insurgent mobilized activity that migrant farmworkers in New Jersey have been the most successful and effective.

Power of the grassroots-membership organizations. CATA membership and leadership believe in the ability of the poor

farmworkers to promote social and economic change. The migrant farmworkers do this by involving themselves in protest activities, educational labor activities, and by engaging in wage labor negotiations through the courts against growers. The farmworkers involve themselves in strikes, legal battles, and demonstrations as means of mobilizing insurgent activity. Farmworkers participate in the involvement of recruitment for mobilizations of protest, as well as for the planning of insurgent activity. Farmworkers' discontent is a strategy CATA uses for mobilizing farmworkers to win important victories. CATA is powerful in gaining such victories for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers.

Commitment of the grassroots-membership organizations.

CATA leadership has been committed to changing the economic and social conditions of migrant farmworkers. They have done this by involving themselves in supporting farmworkers' protests, as well as by providing technical resources.

The leadership of CATA has been committed to the struggle for farmworkers' rights. Farmworkers were committed to forming a farmworkers union that would represent their interests. They were committed to gaining the general public's awareness and support concerning the economic conditions of migrant farmworkers. CATA was very effective in doing both, organizing and mobilizing farmworkers into a labor syndicate. This syndicate is called COTA.

Resources. CATA's external resources consisted of federal government agencies, religious institutions, organized labor, and a volunteer support network of "cadre organizations." The external resources of the organization were based on the previously mentioned organizational networks and linkages. These resources were important to CATA in that they provided support for continuation of organizational effectiveness. They maintained the organization's operational support functioning for a few years. They improved the morale and attitudes of organizers towards the work of the organization.

CATA, as well as ATA, depended on a category of persons possessing larger amounts of resources. These individuals basically came from various fields of interest. Some were professional labor organizers, political labor activists, and religious individuals.

Complexity. CATA as a labor organization is complex in that it has confronted some organizational problems in developing a grassroots organization with strategies of insurgency against the state. Some of the major internal problems deal with the continuation of necessary funding, the need to continue staff, and maintaining its organizational structure, composed of farmworkers, without outside involvement. Some major external problems consist of: the extent of concessions received by CATA as an organization

and the limits and choices the organization is beginning to make, due to the concessions won for the farmworkers; the need to establish a formal, organized labor union as the only strategy to solve farmworkers' problems; the organizing unit in Puerto Rico confronting political problems in considering economic alternatives for migrant farmworkers; and the colonial political question of Puerto Rico which causes migration.

Stability. CATA has been the most stable organized movement of farmworkers' insurgency in New Jersey. It has been able to maintain stability, due to its effectiveness in mobilizing farmworkers' support as well as organizing the resources of "cadre organizations." It has begun to recognize the need to organize a syndicate whereby farmworkers can be represented through grievances and bargaining procedure. Its stability as an organization continues to grow, and by adding the syndicate unit, CATA is becoming more structurally formalized.

The Majkas' theoretical arguments: CATA. CATA's theory of organization-building is consistent with the Majkas' ideas. CATA built organizational structures with bureaucratic strategies of mobilization in building such a movement. In doing this, CATA built cadre support for the organizing of farmworkers. It recruited membership through defiance and protest activity. After a few mobilizing

events, CATA began to bring farmworkers to be part of the structure of decision-making. The structure was non-bureaucratic, but one of collective participation, of direct involvement in planning the insurgency events. When farmworkers participated in planning, the results and rewards toward organization-building were major. It took CATA five years of training farmworkers to both mobilize mass-insurgent activity and build a strong organization. The process of organization-building for poor people and migrant farmworkers, when their involvement and input is demanded, takes the investment of political internal and external resources (e.g., time, money, rewards, commitment, prestige, power, sensitivity, political sophistication, legitimacy, access to information and labor education).

CATA has established patterns of sustainment in that it has already built steps toward forming a farmworkers syndicate. These patterns of organizational sustainment in CATA have been led by the farmworkers' leadership of CATA.

Conclusion

CATA continues to grow as an insurgent organization providing social services and also mobilizing support for farmworkers. It has been effective in winning significant victories for migrant farmworkers. It has established organizational patterns to represent grievance and bargaining rights as a labor organization. It has established nation-

al recognition through its involvement in legislative policies at the state level and in Puerto Rico; it has built a strong Puerto Rican farmworkers' support network of "cadre organizations" on the East Coast, as well as in Puerto Rico; it has built the first farmworkers syndicate to guarantee farmworkers representation on the East Coast and in Puerto Rico; it has also been effective in maintaining CATA as an organization providing the necessary social services needed in order to mobilize farmworkers' insurgency. CATA has been successful and effective in maintaining its collective organizational structures, receiving concessions in the form of governmental support from the state and, at the same time, developing the necessary organizational unit to build a syndicate structure to organize migrant workers.

The ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas have been applied to CATA's organizational development. In terms of CATA, Piven and Cloward's theory has been extended to describe what is needed to develop an organization where the poor can dictate organizational structures suitable to their needs and still win significant victories.

In terms of the Majkas' theoretical assertions, CATA proves to be successful in designing the organizational model which the Majkas advocate. CATA goes beyond organizational building and establishes units of insurgency as a

process, whereby farmworkers can still receive necessary social services and use the strategies of the union as another vehicle for grievances and representation.

Synthesis

The ideas of organizational effectiveness of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas have been used to examine CATA's five stages of organizational development. Each stage consisted of a pattern of interlocking internal and external environmental linkages. These organizational developmental linkages were called, CAMP, META, ATA, NEFSC, and CATA. A brief overview of the effectiveness of each of these organizations will be followed by a more thorough overview of each of these organizations, using Piven and Cloward. (See Tables 23, 24, and 25 on criteria of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas for organizational effectiveness.)

CAMP, as the first organizational development stage, was significant and important for two reasons. First, it created the necessary organizational set-up as a committee to document and study the needs of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in Puerto Rico and on the mainland. Second, it was a transitory committee set up of cadre organizational leaders with the purpose of mobilizing support among the

Table 23

CATA's Stages of Development--External Characteristics

EXTERNAL					
CATA'S STAGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT					
Characteristics	CAMP	NETA	ATA	NEFSC	CATA
POWER OF THE MEMBERSHIP	-Affiliation with church and labor unions (MDU) -Insurgent activities	-Ability to initiate strikes and legal battles -Little involvement at the national level	-Leadership ability to initiate strikes -Legal battles to gain better wages -National level recognition	-Media campaigns -Public hearings -Political demonstrations -Insurgency protest	-Promote social and economic change -Protest activity -Educational labor negotiation through suits against growers -Strikes
COMMITMENT	-Create awareness among religious, labor groups and the general public	-Educate farmworkers about Puerto Rico's colonial situation -Prepare a core group as founders of first "union"	-Create economic change for farmworkers -Seeking solutions for the colonial situation of P.R. -Build support & awareness	-Better farmworkers conditions -Public policy change	-Changing the economic and social conditions of migrant farmworkers
RESOURCES	-Limited, though consisting of religious, labor and personal contributions	-Same as CAMP -UPW, Industrial Mission of P.R.	-Organized labor -Membership dues -Political parties -Religious institutions	-Money -Ability to mobilize -Networking -Ability to influence legislation	-Federal government -Religious institutions -Organized labor -Volunteers support network of cadre organization -Networks and linkages
STABILITY UNCERTAINTY	-Stability as goals were met -Very uncertain	-Unstable due to conflict in goals -Uncertain due to its transitory nature	-Stable for three years -Stability when merged with UPW	-Temporary -Stable group -Unstable after organizing became a priority	-Stable organized movement -Effective mobilizing and organizing farmworkers -Continue to grow as insurgent grassroots organizations
MOBILIZATION vs. ORGANIZING	-Disruption as primary means of mobilization -Organizing by developing farmworkers leadership -Provide technical support	-Develop farmworker leadership -Provide technical support	-Effective in mobilizing not in organizing -Mobilized national support through winning legal battles -Insurgency tactics -Build organization of supporters	-Farmworker protest -Mobilization of hearings -Developing networks	-Use of organizational networks and linkages -Legal representation -Social services provider -Union organizing

CATA's Stages of Development--Internal Characteristics

LIBERAL					
CATA'S STAGES OF ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT					
Characteristics	CAMP	MFA	ATA	MIFSC	CATA
POLITICAL GOALS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Develop executive committee -Develop a farmers or- ganiation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Develop broad religious base -Develop a farmers or- migrant ministry organi- tion 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Building a Puerto Rican farmworkers union -Build support for the indepen- dence for Puerto Rico -Organize the work- ing class 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -To raise a support mission -Provide advocacy -Provide social ser- vices -Recruiting -Provide policy at the legislature 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Building of grassroots organizations with mem- bership drawn from farm- worker community and out- side supporters -Mobilize and organize farm- workers -Establish a labor union
STRUCTURE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -General Assembly -Executive Committee -Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Board of Directors -Two area directors (M.J. & Connections) -Bureaucratic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Union President -Five Support Committees -Bureaucratic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Cate leaders organizations -Support Committee -Informal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Annual General Assembly -Collective structure -Executive Committee, Board of Directors -Program Director -Staff-Organizers
LEADERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Liberal -Theological, men of some influence -Political Activist -Ministers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Liberal -Theological -Split into two factions (MFA in N.J. Wilmer Silva) (MFA in Comp. Jose Lirio) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Political Activists, former members of CAMP/MFA -Military, Infanter, trained in social change (PSP, MDD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -From cate organi- zations -Previous CAMP, MFA, ATA organizers 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Alinsky School of Thought philosophy -Labor, legal union related -Farmworkers direct involve- ment in the Board of Directors -Mobilizing and organizing techniques
MEMBERSHIP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Non-farmworker -Religious & politi- cal activists 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Minimal farmworker in- volvement -Religious & political professionals -Farmworkers advocates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Minimal farmworker involvement -Political activists of PSP -Ministers -Student volunteers -Farmworkers advoca- tes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Political activists -Social services sup- porters -Legal advisors 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Large farmworker membership -Supporters of Cate Organi- zations -Organized Labor -Religious Institutions -Private Institutions -Social Service Organizations
ORGANIZATIONAL SUPPORT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -National Hispanic Ministry -Industrial Mission of F.L. -Cuba's movement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Episcopal Church -N.J. Council of Churches -UPV -National Farmworkers Ministry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -MDD (Movimiento Obrero Unido) -UPV (United Farm Workers Union) -PSP (Partido Socialista) -National Hispanic Ministry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Legal Services -Farmworkers Organiza- tion -National Hispanic Ministry -MCLB -Others 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Cuba programs -Lithography -Membership -Legitimacy -Money -Prestige -Changing Social Conditions -Power
RESOURCES	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Limited funding -Lack of overall re- sources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Membership -Legitimacy -Money -Prestige -Changing social conditions -Power 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Membership -Power -Money -Legitimacy -Prestige -Changing social conditions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Cate organizations -Funding -Power -In-kind support -Networking & Liaison with other social service organizations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Membership -Legitimacy -Money -Prestige -Changing social conditions -Power

Table 25

Majkas' Criteria of Organizational Effectiveness Applied to
CATA's Stages of Development

MAJKAS' CRITERIA OF ORGANISATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS APPLIED TO CATA'S STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

Criteria	CAMP	META	ATA	NEFSC	CATA
PERMANENCY OF ORGANIZATION	XX	XX	XX	XX	-Builds and established units of insurgency and social services -Provides strategies for union organizing
MOBILIZATION OF MASS SUPPORT	XX	XX	XX	XX	-Mobilises support for the organization -Organises farmworkers -Legislation and policy making
NON-BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION	XX	XX	XX	XX	-Features of collective structures with farmworkers involvement -General Assembly -Formal organisational structures
NEW FORM OF ORGANIZATION	XX	XX	XX	XX	-Begins patterns of organizational working class structures -Successful in doing mobili- zing and organizing

NOTE: Majkas criteria only applies to CATA stages of organisational development.

general public concerning the socioeconomic and political conditions of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. It was effective in establishing the first transitory steps and organizational structures for an organization of organizers to be called META.

META was the second organizational linkage. As the first bureaucratic Puerto Rican farmworkers organization, META was effective in drawing grassroots organizational support from national religious congregations on the mainland and in Puerto Rico. META's strategy of gaining organizational support consisted of one major external goal--to develop a cadre organization of religious leaders from different congregations to channel their resources and efforts to eliminate farmworkers' economic and social poverty. As the first step, META began to gain support and formed organizational linkages with other religious congregations. Organizational linkages brought immediate success to META, in that it received monetary support to begin the internal recruitment of staff. It became effective in that it gathered religious leaders together in seeking solutions for a common cause.

It was not effective for a number of reasons. First, META leadership was divided along political and religious philosophical lines. The leadership of META was divided geographically into two major areas, New Jersey and Connec-

ticut, where farmworkers resided temporarily. Both leadership styles were distinct and contradictory. One style used strategies of organizing support and the other used strategies of mobilizing support. Second, META in New Jersey was not able to establish patterns for organizing or mobilizing farmworkers' protests, due to the idealistic and paternalistic attitude of the church in providing religious services, as well as supplying emergency food and shelter for farmworkers. The leadership of META in Connecticut was effective in organizing and mobilizing farmworkers in that it used strategies of protest and farmworkers' discontent towards an organized and mobilized action. The use of organized strategies in providing consciousness-raising tactics, seminars, educational projects, and demonstrations led META in Connecticut to begin to form organizational structures and linkages for the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union. This union was called ATA.

ATA was the first Puerto Rican farmworkers organization that established patterns of farmworkers' insurgency through the use of strikes. It was successful in recruiting farmworker support. Its leadership was politically committed to union formation as the only organized strategy and solution for solving the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' plight. It was effective in organizing support and endorsement from national prominent labor organizations. It

maintained geographical offices in six states where farmworkers' migration resided every six months, and it also had a very large constituency of non-farmworker support on the East Coast. Overall, ATA improved the conditions and lives of many Puerto Rican farmworkers. It used strategies of mobilizing support in forming the union. The main focus of the union was to build organizational patterns for establishing the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union. It failed for a number of reasons: It used a traditional bureaucratic model of union formation; its structure was based on working committees without much involvement of farmworkers' organizing; and its leadership was sectarian as well as non-charismatic.

The leadership depended upon the labor movement of MOU, which was set up to organize industrial workers in Puerto Rico. Its conditions and styles of organizing were structured around the political and colonial situation of Puerto Rico. The migrant farmworkers' situation was different in that it faced agricultural labor problems concerning issues of survival, living and working conditions, cheap labor, and it demanded an organized leadership with an understanding of the agricultural workers' problems. The politics of the leadership were based on the Puerto Rican Socialist Party strategy of organizing the working class. The need to understand the differences between

agricultural and industrial workers was one of the main causes of ATA's failure in organizing migrant farmworkers.

The merger of ATA with the UFW was a significant accomplishment for ATA. This merger brought resources such as national recognition, labor support, as well as national prestige. The leadership styles of Cesar Chavez and Juan Irizarry conflicted along ethical and political lines. Irizarry was nationalistic, as well as committed to forming a political union of farmworkers on the East Coast that would be independent from Cesar Chavez's movement. Irizarry's political ideas and strategy of organizing farmworkers was one of insurgency and direct confrontation with the state. Chavez's political strategy was based on non-violent insurgency and on strongly Catholic religious ideas. The farmworkers were very supportive of Chavez's style of organizing, while Irizarry's strategies were seen by farmworkers as disrupting and not organizing. Chavez involved farmworkers from the very beginning as tactics of mobilizing, while Irizarry built organizational support of cadre leaders and organizers as the strategy for forming the union. When ATA merged, the UFW had been in existence for quite some time. It was already the union of migrant farmworkers, even though Puerto Rican farmworkers were not a significant number in the membership. The merger meant alot for the UFW in terms of expansion and in terms of East

Coast organizing. The UFW did not foresee the Puerto Rican farmworkers organizing as fast as the Chicano farmworkers, due to the cultural differences, styles of organizing, and lack of political understanding about union organizing.

The UFW did not foresee that the Puerto Rican farmworkers would get organized under Irizarry's leadership, for two major reasons: First, the UFW felt that farmworker membership was essential in building a union and that time and planning were needed to develop a farmworkers union that was going to represent farmworkers' interests. Second, Cesar Chavez felt that a union of farmworkers needed to go through a series of organizational stages and to achieve significant gains.

The fact that ATA merged with the UFW brings to mind certain similarities and differences between the UFW and its efforts to organize Chicano farmworkers and the organizations which attempted to organize Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey.

Some of the similarities between ATA and the UFW revolve around the fact that farmworkers, whether Chicano or Puerto Rican, face a multitude of problems, most of which are derived from powerlessness and which have continued in similar form for the past forty years. Both groups of farmworkers have been omitted from the progress on economic, legal, and social fronts in which workers (and

American in general) have shared. Economically, both groups of farmworkers are at an exceedingly low level. In 1984, the average annual income for a farmworker family of four was \$3,300.00, over 40% below the poverty level. Wages have not increased as rapidly as prices have gone up. The wages of both Puerto Rican and Mexican-American farmworkers have increased as required by the Minimum Wage Law while inflation has continued to go up. Both groups of farmworkers have been subjected to economic or physical exploitation by crew leaders or farmers. Both groups of farmworkers lack protection and enforcement of federal and state agencies concerning statutory protection of some basic minimal rights. Both groups escaped from their homeland or ghetto unemployment conditions just to earn wages seldom higher than the minimum wage. Both groups' race, culture, and poor class status serve as barriers to upward mobility and mainstreaming. Both organizations wanted independent unions to represent their own ethnic groups. In addition, ATA and the UFW used support groups to organize networks and resources.

Some of the differences between ATA and the UFW as farmworkers organizations are based on major political and ideological structural problems. According to Reverend Wilfredo Velez (1985), ATA and the UFW were very distinct, with significant ideological differences in ways of organ-

izing. The major differences between both groups consisted in the fact that ATA as the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union was controlled by members of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and not by farmworkers or by a charismatic leader, while the Mexican-Chicano farmworkers movement was controlled and directed by Cesar Chavez. He was charismatic, and very well supported financially by the Catholic and Protestant Churches, as well as by other major labor unions. Chavez's leadership style and ideology of non-violence was in conflict with the way ATA's leader, Juan Irizarry, organized. Juan Irizarry was very much a political activist, and very much involved in the Central Committee of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. His philosophy was Marxist and sectarian. He was very nationalistic and believed in creating change for farmworkers by forming a union that would merge with Cesar Chavez only if Cesar Chavez recognized its identity and independence. Another major difference between both organizations dealt with the political support and endorsements of both groups. Chavez's endorsement by and affiliation with the AFL-CIO brought the UFW national recognition, power, and most importantly, resources to win significant victories. By way of contrast, ATA was very small in number, powerless in comparison to the UFW, and with very few resources to organize. ATA membership was based on support groups from

outside and on cadre organizations. Farmworkers' involvement was limited to a small number. This is because Puerto Rican farmworkers were more difficult to recruit since they were not a stable group and always travelled as a single group leaving their families behind. In addition, Puerto Rican farmworkers' conditions for organizing were premature. The level of political awareness was low; they were afraid and lacked a charismatic leader. They knew Juan Irizarry, the President of ATA, was not a farmworker. His attitude and style of organizing was very dictatorial to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Although Chavez was a charismatic leader to the Chicano farmworkers, he was not so to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers on the East Coast. Even though he could relate to the economic problems of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, he was reluctant and non-committal about getting involved with the organized Puerto Rican Labor Movement (MOU), which was politically directing ATA from Puerto Rico. MOU was then the political labor branch of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party on the Island.

Another significant difference between the UFW and ATA dealt with the issue of contract farm labor versus non-contract labor. During 1973 to 1976, contract Puerto Rican farmworkers were pretty much a large number of workers. The Puerto Rico Department of Labor contract for Puerto

Rican farmworkers indicated clearly that farm labor organizing was illegal, limiting ATA then to organize only those day-haul workers and seasonal workers. The UFW did not deal with contract workers, nor did they have the problem of farmworkers residing in one place for a short period of time. On the contrary, Mexican and Chicano farmworkers always resided with their families and when they went out on strike, the whole family became involved in organizing during every crop season. This was a tremendous strength for the UFW.

Another major difference was that Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey enjoyed much more limited coverages under the State Unemployment Compensation Laws than the UFW farmworkers. In New Jersey, in order for a farmworker to qualify, his farmer-employer had to have a payroll of 20,000 or more in any of the five preceding calendar quarters. Other workers could qualify as long as their employer had a payroll of 1,000 or more in the preceding year. Farmworkers also enjoyed only restricted coverage under the Workmen's Compensation Law and under the Social Security Act. The situation of the UFW Chicano workers was completely different in that the State of California did guarantee migrant farmworkers the right to enjoy Workmen's Compensation laws under the Social Security Act.

Because ATA was a small group of workers in comparison to the UFW, the UFW was able to absorb its support, leaving ATA on the East Coast without much political clout. As a result of both leadership (UFW and ATA) differences and the struggle to take over the East Coast, ATA as an organization was dissolved.

After the merger, ATA disappeared as the only organization that represented the Puerto Rican farmworkers' interests on the East Coast. The UFW continued to organize Chicano migrant farmworkers on the West Coast. The organizers of ATA who resided in New Jersey continued to engage in farmworkers' support through the involvement in social and legal service programs. One of these organizers was Angel Dominguez, who continued to seek support for migrant farmworkers under the auspices of social service programs in New Jersey. Angel Dominguez was called to participate in a rescue mission of migrant farmworkers, along with farmworkers' social-service leaders in 1978. As a result of this rescue mission, the North East Farmworkers Support Committee was formed. This organizational effort was transitory in nature and mobilized by cadre leaders for one specific purpose.

After the rescue mission, the NEFSC established its structures in New Jersey, where it won important and significant legislative victories for farmworkers. The NEFSC

mobilized support of organizations dealing with humanitarian concerns to gain support for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in areas of unemployment, wages, housing, and, in general, seeking solutions to the problems of migrant farmworkers.

This committee was successful in using strategies of political mobilization of farmworkers to win legislative victories. However, the NEFSC used farmworkers' discontent to mobilize support for policy implementation, as well as for insurgent activity. It used organizational linkages as a political and transitory strategy for building an important organizational concept to be called CATA.

CATA has used an organizational concept that has been effective in mobilizing organizational support, as well as in organizing migrant farmworkers through farmworkers' participation and involvement. It has been effective in that it has involved farmworkers in planning its structure from the very beginning. The structure was formulated in a general assembly of workers when farmworkers' participation and input was exercised in a collective manner. Such tactics and strategies of collective decision-making in the first farmworkers' assembly have served as a mechanism for farmworkers' input and decision-making in formulating CATA as an organization of migrant farmworkers during its existence.

CATA has a structure where farmworkers are the majority and supporters are a less important secondary component. Farmworkers' organizers have trained to become organizers through daily involvement in the field work organizing demonstrations, confronting farmers, and, in some cases, going on strike against local industries. They have been effective in winning important legal battles and legislative policies in areas of employment compensation, unemployment insurance, and environmental health. It has the largest farmworkers representation in South Jersey and has formed a farmworkers syndicate to guarantee grievance and bargaining rights for migrant farmworkers.

CATA has developed strategies and organizational structures different from bureaucratic ones as a poor working people's organization. It has built strategies of insurgency by farmworkers' participation in labor education activities, provided immediate solutions to crises, provided social services to daily needs, as well as established organizational patterns through the raising of farmworkers' awareness and their direct involvement. Both strategies of building an organization through the involvement and participation of farmworkers in insurgency protest and activity have been essential for CATA's effectiveness in meeting its main goal.

Its leadership's commitment to the organizational development has come from farmworkers' involvement, seeking small victories which served as incentives and rewards for recruiting members to the organization and winning larger victories. It has maintained collective organizational structures, receiving some concessions in the form of government support, and, at the same time, it has mobilized the organizational structures to organize farmworkers.

It is appropriate to point out certain similarities and differences between CATA and the UFW. Some of the similarities between CATA and the UFW continue to relate to the environmental historical conditions in which the organizations came about. The UFW came about during the 1960's, whereby organized attempts by minorities were being brought from virtually all sides. CATA was also brought about after a period of organizational development whereby the environmental conditions and time were much different than the 1960's. In both instances, the cadre leadership came from outside the farmworker community; both movements continue to confront similar obstacles to mobilizing a social base and mounting effective strikes; and both have resorted to political protest and boycotts.

What has produced sharp differences between CATA and the UFW has been the differences in political environment encountered by both organizations. The UFW began to organ-

ize at times when the national picture for farmworkers was very much for the agribusiness. Regardless of this major political environmental difference, CATA has been successful in winning significant victories. It is important to note that CATA is not a union but a farmworkers grassroots organization. It has been recognized by the farmworkers as the organization that represents their interests. CATA has developed massive organizational contributions to sustain support for the organization in New Jersey and in Puerto Rico. In addition, CATA has gone through a series of organizational successes and failures in trying to build a grassroots organization with working class structures. Through these tactics CATA has encountered a balanced response from state legislators and the courts. In contrast, the UFW has received massive support for its boycotts and has encountered resistance from the Teamsters Union and other major labor organizations. The UFW has lacked farmworkers' direct input in the structure of decision-making of the organization. Most of the external support has come from outside political organizations. The UFW also has confronted major acts of resistance by public authorities. Furthermore, the UFW has been limited in the amount of resources it has gathered from its membership. It has lost many members and more recently has gone back to the initial

boycott of grapes as the only alternative to keep the union alive.

During 1983, the UFW contributed about \$750,000 to state candidates. It:

launched a \$1 million direct mail campaign to strengthen its boycott of Lucky Stores Inc. which sells non-union Bruce Church's Inc. lettuce . . . the union is making contingency plans for more boycotts as a means of organizing or winning contract gains if the Agriculture Labor Relations Board is weakened further.

Paul Chavez (Cesar Chavez's son), head of the UFW legislative branch, said, "We're back to the situation in the 60's and 70's" (Business Week, September 26, 1983, pp. 84-87).

Another major difference between CATA and the UFW is that CATA has been able to survive as an independent grassroots organization without giving political concessions to the state and has not been endorsed by a large political labor union. Contrary to the UFW, CATA has built a mobile organizational structure whereby Puerto Rican farmworkers are followed each crop season. This organizational structure has proven to be effective in the organizing of a farmworkers labor syndicate. Furthermore, CATA has used the educational-seminars approach to develop farmworkers leadership in the organization. It continues to provide emergency services to farmworkers as a means of support to Puerto Rican farmworkers. CATA as an organization breaks the chain of isolation and brings the necessary information

and resources to advocate the rights of farmworkers. It also provides farmworkers with the organizational structure to represent them as a group and enables them to bear on those that would not be responsive to their individual problems and grievances.

In addition, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers are a very isolated community of workers without much outside access to the labor camps. Furthermore, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers are seasonal migratory workers, very tightly attached to the homeland situation. Contrary to CATA, UFW Mexican-Chicano farmworkers are a more stable community of farmworkers in the place of residence.

CATA as a grassroots organization needs to continue to grow in areas of social service, labor education, and representing migrant farmworkers in grievances and labor disputes. The new farmworkers syndicate (COTA) needs to continue to have farmworkers leadership in its structure. The syndicate will not survive without CATA's organizational strength supporting and providing the other necessary resources for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Both organizational labor units are a must for CATA to continue its organizational effectiveness.

The above review of the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of these organizations serves as a background to a more in-depth analysis, using the ideas of Piven and

Cloward and the Majkas. The major ideas of Piven and Cloward consist of the following: First, they believe that it is impossible to sustain permanent-membership organizations among the poor, and at the same time, secure important victories. According to them, this is because poor people lack the resources to initiate and sustain effective political organizations. The system of social controls built into the everyday lives of poor people is too potent, they argue, guaranteeing that disruptive action will be rare and short-lived; measurable victories, entailing elite concessions, can only come from mass defiance. This is precisely the kind of action which organizations are unlikely to encourage and are prone to squelch.

Second, Piven and Cloward advocate cadre organizations which activate pre-existing networks. They further argue that "formal mass membership organizations are organized, but disruptions are mobilized," and they are best mobilized by cadre organizations (Piven & Cloward, p. 595).

Third, Piven and Cloward show evidence that disruptions are transitory because they precipitate government responses (whether repressions, concessions, or both) that effectively demoralize the poor. Fourth, they further argue that it makes more sense for organizers "to attempt to build enduring membership organizations of the poor, especially if the effort drained organizing resources away

from mobilization of the disruption itself" (p. 596). Some ideas of Piven and Cloward about building alternative cadre organizations and advocating ideas of limited gains by special movements developed entirely from mass insurgency activity (strikes, riots, demonstrations) are useful in explaining CATA's stages of organizational effectiveness.

The idea of building cadre organizations and limited gains can be best used to explain and account for how the North East Farmworkers Support Committee was established. This organizational stage was mobilized by a disruptive act of migrant farmworkers in upstate New York. Such a disruption was transitory in nature, in that it only lasted for a short time. It was a cadre organization composed of leaders and supporters of migrant farmworkers who came together as a result of a disruptive event and mobilized around the event to form an organization of supporters. The NEFSC became a significant and effective organization in that it precipitated government concessions through the use of legislative policy and support in representing farmworker issues. The NEFSC also began to establish important steps in building an enduring membership organization of farmworkers. This organization was called CATA. In doing this, the NEFSC drained organizing resources from the mobilization of the disruption and established patterns for an organization-building of migrant farmworkers.

The ideas of cadre organization and limited gains being mobilized as a result of disruption do not seem to be very applicable to the organizational development and effectiveness of CAMP, META, or ATA. In the case of CAMP and META, organizational stages of development were set up by cadre leaders from major labor organizations. However, these two organizations were set up as a result of external political pressure from religious leaders and labor organizers from political organizations on the Island. Nevertheless, organizational gains made by these two groups did not develop entirely based on disruptive activity or mass insurgency activity, but rather through a series of organizational supports and networks. These supports were based on internal and external resources that each organization had developed. One important and similar internal characteristic was leadership. The leadership of these two cadre organizations gathered together mainly as a result of having an interest in planning strategies for organizing the Puerto Rican working class, and not necessarily as a result of mobilized disruptions. In fact, mobilization of disruption did not occur in the organizational stages of development of CATA and META, but rather as an organized group of professionals and religious cadre leaders planning and forming organizational structures for the first Puerto

Rican migrant farmworkers organization of supporters to be called later ATA.

Piven and Cloward argue that mobilizing the poor is a better strategy of insurgency than organizing. These ideas are at odds with the organizational effectiveness of CAMP and META. Their ideas do not seem to be applicable for two reasons: First, CAMP and META were effective in bringing about patterns of organizational development. They were also effective in mobilizing supporters and resources to establish social-movement organizations. Second, both CAMP and META were effective in dealing with short-range solutions to the problems of migrant farmworkers. This organizational development led to the first Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organized labor union, ATA.

Piven and Cloward's ideas do help to account for ATA as an organization that built traditional organizational mass-membership structures. ATA was effective for a short period of time. However, it could not survive as a permanent organization because the leadership misled the union into a premature merger with a large organized structure of a Mexican-Chicano farmworkers union, the UFW. In addition, ATA and other previous organizations of migrants failed because they did not take into account the fact that migrant farmworkers would not be permanently located in one geographical area and instead stayed in one place for only

a period of time. Since the farmworkers were transitory and the organizations were stationary, the organization never established a firm attachment to migrant farmworkers. In addition, ATA was not successful or effective in maintaining patterns of organizational sustainment because it continued to build the traditional bureaucratic model of organization. What was needed was a different structure of organization that would follow the migrants to different areas of work. However, ATA did not function under such a structure. Neither did it develop further structures to follow the migratory streams of farmworkers' lives. ATA relied on support committees in different regions to be supportive to the migrant farmworkers. This is a traditional bureaucratic old union strategy.

Piven and Cloward's argument that mass-membership-movement organizations work best through disruption that takes place by an organization of cadre leaders does not help to account for ATA's effectiveness. This is because ATA's structure consisted of building a stable membership of organizational committees at the local level and then uniting them through a national structure. This was done by bringing large numbers of people together that would represent ATA's interests. ATA used this same political and economic mass-based-organization structure for building and organizing cadre supporters organizations. For ATA to

be effective in its disruptive activities, it depended on its leadership's ability to induce farmworkers to participate in strikes and run the risk of being fired. However, ATA leaders did not involve farmworkers in planning their strikes or demonstrations. In addition, farmworkers were afraid of repression by the growers and afraid of being co-opted by an ATA leader who was being accused of being a member of the Puerto Rican Socialist Party. For the farmworkers, this meant getting fired, and they were very concerned already with having to secure a job. Farmworkers did what was most secure for them to keep working in the fields and followed orders from the growers (Interview with Wilfredo Velez, Sept. 7, 1985).

ATA as an organization of supporters became very enthusiastic about its recognition and acted very quickly to establish itself as the union of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. The leadership talked about conditions and moments for organizing farmworkers, but many times organizing was done on the spur of the moment, creating insurgencies (demonstrations) against growers without much farmworker involvement and much outside support. Political activists and supporters became excited as a result of dramatic demonstrations which created attention from the media and major local business institutions, but not enough excitement was created to educate and involve farmworkers.

Such disruptions did not build enough farmworkers' awareness, but created public concern about the migrant farmworkers' working conditions. This support was not enough to call a strike, nor was it enough to get farmworkers' participation. Nevertheless, ATA leadership merged with Cesar Chavez and the UFW to quickly seek support, prestige, and resources without the strong base of farmworkers' support. Piven and Cloward's ideas about the disruptive power of the poor did not work best for ATA because, in this case, the ability and power of farmworkers was ignored by ATA's leadership. ATA's tactics of disruption and organizing were geared to involved political activists and supporters of the farmworkers' movement. In this case, ATA leadership called it the "working class." These organizing tactics were pluralistic in that they reflected the American labor politics of the time of organizing.

The most significant reason why ATA's arguments were at odds with Piven and Cloward's ideas of "disruptive power of the poor" is because, in organizing migrant farmworkers, it was important to take into consideration a number of significant conditions and factors. Farmworkers as a group of displaced workers arrived from a place (Puerto Rico, in their case) where unemployment has been very high, weakening the power and their ability historically toward a

collective action. In addition, farmworkers have no other skill but farmwork, forcing and limiting them to low wages, poor working and living conditions, as well as subjugating them to growers' demands. Also, Puerto Rican farmworkers come from a colonial territory where agricultural development is devalued and industrialization is highly at its peak, causing organized labor to limit its organizing to industrial workers. Furthermore, once on the mainland, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers have historically faced problems such as isolation, discrimination, language, health, unemployment, and cultural deprivation. These have been important obstacles in organizing and mobilizing farmworkers as a group.

Piven and Cloward's argument of "discontent" does not seem to be applicable to a group of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers who are displaced from an advanced industrial colonial perspective to a more advanced industrial economy. Discontent, they argue, stems from profound social dislocations that dislodge people from their everyday routines, simultaneously releasing them from "regulatory controls inherent in the structures of institutional life" and building deep frustrations (p. 10). In general, Puerto Rican farmworkers had not necessarily remained "quietly in place, blaming themselves for their own misery and accepting the privileges of elites," but rather as displaced

workers, they have been conditioned to live under the worst economic conditions in order to support their families. They have not remained in silence or blamed themselves, but instead have migrated to other places of work where they have engaged in labor disputes, legal battles, grievances, and have won significant and important victories. Take, for example, the organizational victories of CAMP and META. CAMP and META leadership failed to organize Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, not because farmworkers' discontent was not present, nor because farmworkers lacked confidence in taking insurgency actions, but because the leadership of their organizations was so involved in gaining organizational victories to satisfy their own sectarian political beliefs. In addition, the leadership inhibited organizational growth as their only alternative and solution to migrant farmworkers' problems. Because of the organizational disarray of CAMP, META, and ATA, migrant farmworkers used other vehicles to express their discontent concerning daily social and economic issues affecting their lives. Many times migrant farmworkers took upon themselves the negotiation of contracts by seeking advice from legal services and other local social services programs. Farmworkers' discontent brought them together to their First Assembly of Migrant Farmworkers, where farmworkers established

organizational structures suitable to their needs. This organization was called CATA.

Piven and Cloward's ideas of organizational effectiveness have been particularly helpful in understanding the successes and failures of organizational structures of previous farmworkers' social-movement organizations before CATA. Some of their ideas in Poor People's Movements served as a mechanism for understanding farmworkers organizations' effectiveness and ineffectiveness.

The Majkas' (1980) ideas of social movement organizational effectiveness can best help account for CATA's organizational effectiveness. The Majkas' ideas consist of an extension of Piven and Cloward's ideas. Some of the Majkas' most useful ideas concerning effectiveness in a social-movement organization are that a social-movement organization is most effective when it builds organizations, when it sustains organizational patterns that mobilize defiance as a strategy for social change, and when it builds non-bureaucratic structures. These ideas are based on observations about internal and external resources as necessary components in evaluating a social-movement organization, such as CATA.

The Majkas' idea that mass-movement organizations are most effective when they build permanency in organizations and at the same time mobilize defiance activity, can be

best applied to CATA's organizational effectiveness. However, this organizational effectiveness draws out of a long struggle of successes and failures in trying to build an organization of farmworkers with the necessary working "class structures, class life and process of working class struggles, and much less susceptible to penetration by dominant elites" (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Majkas, 1980). In building organizational structures of working class life suitable to farmworkers' lives, CATA has been effective because it has been involved in a number of prolonged organizational building struggles. In establishing such structures, CAMP, META, and ATA played a significant role in building organizational structures which were more in agreement with mass-based membership organizational model theory. Each of these organizations became significant regardless of their successes and failures in establishing organizational patterns of development for CATA. What makes CATA different from other previous organizations is that CATA has formed organizational structures along with farmworkers' participation and collectivity.

The Majkas' theoretical arguments of the UFW building permanency in organizations and mobilizing defiance as a successful poor farmworkers movement indicates several similarities and differences between CATA and the UFW.

Some of the similarities dealt with CATA's organizational characteristics. Both CATA and the UFW have been successful in building permanency and mobilizing defiance for farmworkers. Both organizations have been effective in forming administrative structures whereby farmworkers stimulate defiance.

Some of the significant differences concerning the Majkas's assertions of building permanency and mobilizing defiance in a farmworkers movement dealt with the way the UFW and CATA structured their administrative apparatus. The UFW built bureaucratic structures and hierarchies. Contrary to the UFW, CATA built collective structures and hierarchies to stimulate defiance. CATA's organizational structures address the Majkas' questions concerning the effectiveness needed for poor farmworkers movements. CATA is beginning to develop structures of working class life and is beginning to consider alternative forms of organizations after a series of organizational successes and failures.

Another significant difference concerning the Majkas' ideas on mobilizing dealt with the way the UFW mobilized its support for boycotts and work stoppages. The UFW, contrary to CATA, resorted to tactics of national political strikes and general boycotts. CATA resorted, after a series of organizational gains, to mobilize tactics of defi-

ance through public hearings, protests, use of the media, and the development of a farmworkers newspaper as a vehicle for mobilizing defiance.

The Majkas evaluate organizational effectiveness and success based on the ability of the organization to use external and internal resources. External resources that have contributed to CATA's success in forming patterns of organizational sustainment have consisted of: its structure; its political alliance, initiated and sustained with other labor and religious groups; the ability to use the media to their organizational advantage in moments of insurgency; the ability to create awareness among the general public; and the ability to persuade funding sources to be of economic support; and the ability to withstand political pressure on the agricultural interest groups. Internal resources that have contributed to CATA's organizational effectiveness in forming non-bureaucratic structures consist of: the collectivity of the organization in terms of planning realistic goals; decision-making; and overall planning strategies to mobilize a constituency of supporters. In mobilizing a constituency, CATA used strategies dealing with issues and events, in particular, legal battles and unemployment compensation cases related to farmworkers. In addition, CATA also evaluates its internal structures regularly to guarantee farmworker input. Its

leadership utilizes strategies of division of labor among its staff to secure successful gains in the administration of programs. Farmworkers' input in the division of labor has been essential to the overall internal organizational effectiveness. However, time available for farmworkers to do mobilizing for an activity has been limited, since farmworkers work long hours. The only way CATA gets farmworkers' involvement is through the nights, weekends, and by the hiring of farmworkers as organizers. At times, when farmworkers were involved in a mobilized insurgency activity, they either took off from work as a group or they did it at times when work was low and they knew there were no growers' reprisals involved. Another important external resource has been the presence of Puerto Rican culture and heritage as an effective resource in getting farmworkers organized and mobilized. The fact that farmworkers, organizers, and staff understand their common situation as having to come from the same place of work and social class backgrounds with common cultural characteristics has been a significant factor in CATA's achieving farmworker solidarity. The availability of money to pay organizers, staff, and to run the organization effectively has been an important reward and motivation factor in getting farmworkers to engage in cooperation and collective endeavors (Bonilla-Santiago, April-August, 1984).

In general, the Majkas' assertions help to account for CATA's effectiveness. However, the Majkas' theoretical arguments only seem to be applicable in this case study in relation to CATA's stage as an organizational development. In addition, the Majkas' theoretical arguments do not help to account for the previous organizational steps necessary to achieve an organization of working class structures. Furthermore, the Majkas' ideas only seem to help account for building organizational structures that are bureaucratic, without providing the necessary social-movement organization framework for building such a movement.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The previous analysis of the development of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organizations in New Jersey serves as a case history through which to examine the theoretical assertions of Piven and Cloward as well as that of the Majkas. The present chapter will examine these ideas. First, it will determine which of these theoretical conclusions are supported, which are qualified and which need to be challenged. It will also determine whether new theoretical conclusions and ideas can be added to those of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas. Furthermore, it will examine in which ways the Majkas' case study of the UFW can be said to parallel this case study of CATA. Next, the questions asked in the beginning of this dissertation will be answered in light of this examination of the ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas. Finally, a number of concluding remarks will be offered about the various organizational stages through which Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers have gone in the effort to achieve their organizational goals.

The theoretical conclusions of Piven and Cloward consist of two assertions. First, Piven and Cloward claim that the primary power the poor possess to wrestle concessions from elites is insurgency. Second, they argue that attempts made by leaders and other activists to build and sustain formal mass-membership organizations are counterproductive, since they divert energies from mobilization for insurgency.

Piven and Cloward's theoretical conclusions have been extended further by the Majkas. The Majkas offer evidence from farmworkers' poor people movements, namely the agricultural labor in California from 1900 to the United Farm Workers Union Movement. They show evidence that the UFW was a successful organization. The Majkas' ideas are at odds with Piven and Cloward in that the Majkas argue that mass-membership organizations are effective when they follow a series of organizational steps. First, the organization must build patterns of organizational sustainment; second, these patterns of organizational sustainment must be able to mobilize defiance; third, they must be non-bureaucratic in their structure; fourth, in building alternative forms of organizations, one must consider the conditions and structures of working class life. Furthermore, these types of alternative organizations must not be

"susceptible to penetration by dominant elites" (Piven & Cloward, p. xiii).

The circumstances of Puerto Rican migrant labor in New Jersey's agriculture provide evidence which supports, qualifies and, in some cases, contradicts the ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas. Piven and Cloward's theory of organizational effectiveness is very useful in clarifying CAMP, META, and ATA mass-membership organizational structures in general. The leaders of these organizations chose organizational structures to sustain formal mass-membership for farmworkers. In addition, these mass-membership structures did not work in some cases because the leadership began to build organizations to provide social, political and religious services while Puerto Rican farmworkers needed immediate solutions to their economic problems. Some of the tactics for mobilizing farmworkers insurgency became counter-productive in that they lacked farmworkers' involvement. Furthermore, CAMP and META's lack of organizational effectiveness is consistent with the Piven and Cloward ideas of building formal mass-membership organizations. Furthermore, Piven and Cloward's theory of organizations worked best in this case study for certain stages of organizational development of CATA. These organizational stages consisted of the NEFSC as an organizational committee set up as a

transitory insurgency action organization, and ATA as an organization that built transitional organizational mass-membership structures. However, ATA in certain ways not only supports, but qualifies Piven and Cloward's ideas by being effective for a short period of time. ATA's strategies of insurgency and building transitional mass membership structures became counter-productive because ATA did not survive as an organization of the poor: ATA died out as a result of its internal conflicts with its leadership.

Piven and Cloward's theory of organizational effectiveness needs to be qualified when studying the case of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. The first ideas to be qualified state that the primary power the poor possess to wrestle concessions from elites is insurgency. In the case of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' organizations, these migrant farmworkers lacked institutional leverage for using disruption to influence public policy and economic changes. As a result, organizations such as CAMP and META were not significantly effective. In addition, CAMP and META's leadership attempted to build effective, formal mass-membership organizations to sustain political power of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers during periods when farmworkers' mass defiance was premature. The leadership of CAMP, META and ATA assumed that Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers would engage in mass defiance and

insurgency activity since in the West Coast the UFW was involved in organizing and mobilizing. This was an important time in that the UFW and Cesar Chavez's farmworkers movement actively engaged in insurgency and mass defiance against the Teamsters Union. Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers were not ready to strike or engage in demonstrations at the risk of losing their only means of survival, their livelihood. In addition, these migrant farmworkers were a group of displaced farmworkers who came from an economically oppressed colonial territory to an isolated place where farm labor, crew leaders and the farmer served as the only means of communications. This made it difficult for farmworkers at first to engage in organizational insurgency activity, other than to adjust to social services and religious services.

Piven and Cloward's argument that when elites solicit input from mass-membership organizations, they are responding to insurgency, not to the supposed strength of the organization itself, is contradicted by the ways CAMP, META and ATA strategized for mass defiance and insurgency. They argue that when insurgency subsides, most organizations also disappear. Those able to survive abandon their militancy and instead become dependent on elites, rather than on a mass base. CAMP, META and ATA's mass-membership organizations' disappearance did not occur when organiza-

tion subsided nor did they become dependent on elites rather than on a mass base. Instead, these organizational stages and linkages became significant in bringing about patterns of mass-membership organizational structures of working class life, to be applied later in CATA. In addition, CAMP, META and ATA served as organizational units by which groups such as organized labor from Puerto Rico, religious institutions, and the political activists from the left political organizations in the Island became aware of the working and living conditions of Puerto Rican farmworkers on the mainland. Moreover, ATA served as an organizational mechanism to create national awareness among the general public in Puerto Rico and in the mainland concerning the migrant farmworkers' problems. The militancy of CAMP, META and ATA did not become dependent on elites; rather these organizations dissolved as a result of political and religious differences, and members of its militancy joined forces with other farmworkers social service organizations. Farmworkers social service organizations do not qualify as elites, but rather as other grassroots membership organizations providing social services to assist farmworkers with their problems.

Piven and Cloward's main focus has been on the political effectiveness of its different kinds of organizations and the nature of its movement power. They have

been concerned with the external environmental conditions of the social movement organizations and not with examining internal organizational structures that can best work for the poor. Both Piven and Cloward de-emphasized the overall importance of developing organizational structures of the working class poor with working class life. In doing this both authors placed organizational development as a secondary contingent issue. Piven and Cloward and the Majkas agreed that the organizational vehicle most suitable to exercise power by those at the bottom is membership organizations with working class life. However, neither Piven and Cloward nor the Majkas describe a framework to be used to build alternative working class organizations. Piven and Cloward only suggest "cadre organizations" composed of cadre leaders. By "cadre organizations" they mean the development of a national network of cadre organizations rather than a national federation of welfare recipient groups. They describe this organization of organizers as one "composed of students, churchmen, civil rights activists, anti-poverty workers and militant AFDC recipients . . . These groups of people would in turn seek to energize a broad loosely-coordinated movement of variegated groups to arouse hundreds of thousands of poor people to demand aid" (Piven & Cloward, pp. 275-88). Instead of having these organizations building membership

roles, the purpose would be to build large campaigns consisting "of influential people in the slums, ghettos, involving clergymen to exhort potential recipients to seek the aid that was rightfully theirs . . . the mobilization of marches and demonstrations to build indignation and militancy among the poor" (pp. 275-288).

The model of cadre leaders of organizations has proven not to be applicable in this case study of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organizations. These organizational stages are called CAMP, META and ATA. The model was ineffective in that cadre leaders from religious institutions tended to avoid the social and political problems confronted by migrant farmworkers. Instead, they believed in social reforms by providing farmworkers religious services, clothes, food, shelter and trips. The leaders of Puerto Rican labor organizations and left political parties' main concern was organizing the working class on the mainland. Each of them had a different political ideology and sectarian commitment for his/her political party. Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers issues such as better wages, better working and living conditions became secondary issues while union organizing became the priority as the only solution to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Social services approaches were condemned as reformist and pacifist to migrant farmworkers' problems.

Thus, cadre leadership was not effective in this case study dealing with CAMP, META and ATA; cadre leadership organizational support became an effective tool for other grassroots labor organizations. One of these grassroots organizations was the UFW. During this time the UFW built a national farmworkers movement. The leadership of the UFW was, at this time, too busy organizing on the West Coast and fighting the Teamsters Union. Even though they supported the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers East Coast merger, their commitment was on the West Coast with Chicano and Mexican farmworkers. Puerto Rican labor organizations from the Island and those leaders organizing on the mainland had political and nationalist differences with the way Chavez organized Chicano farmworkers. As a result, the cadre leadership of farmworkers failed in some of their organizational stages to organize the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. The leadership of these organizations used the same traditional 1960's organizing tactics that were used in the urban areas.

In sum, as has been noted, a number of ideas presented by Piven and Cloward have been supported by this case study, a number have been qualified, and a number has been contradicted.

Similarly, the ideas of the Majkas tend to be supported and qualified by this Puerto Rican migrant farm-

workers organization case study. The Majkas' ideas are not applicable to CAMP, META, ATA and the NEFSC as organizational stages of development. Their ideas that organization building and mass defiance are possible and successful when applied to the United Farm Workers seem to be only applicable to CATA. However, the Majkas' ideas that organizational building with mass defiance must be non-bureaucratic needs to be qualified when applied to this case study.

CATA has been effective in organization building and in planning strategies for mass defiance. These strategies have been effective in the empowerment of Puerto Rican farmworkers' lives to affect economic and political change. CATA's organizational structures are non-bureaucratic in nature with little elite class influence. Because of this, CATA has outgrown the Puerto Rican left organizational doctrine, which tended to avoid organizing outside the ranks of labor.

The Majkas' ideas that organizational building and mass defiance are successful when applied to a migrant farmworkers' movement are not applicable to CAMP, META, ATA and the NEFSC. This is because Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organizations did not grow out of a series of insurgency and mobilized activities but rather through a series of transitory developmental organizational stages.

Such organizational stages were made up for the most part of cadre leaders, professionals, college students and very few farmworkers. As a result, they failed to mobilize farmworkers' support.

Some of the Majkas' ideas that need to be qualified involve arguments about building alternative forms of organization within structures of working class life. According to the Majkas these organizational structures must be non-bureaucratic in nature and less susceptible to elite class influence. In this case study, CATA became effective when it developed structures of working class life with collective structures of decision making. Elite's involvement has been influential at the level of organizational maintenance and little involved in the decision- and policy-making of the organization. Elites have become an important organizational resource for CATA's organizational effectiveness. However, these elites in CATA's organizational effectiveness have played a temporary role. They rotate their roles and they serve as transitory external resources whenever they are needed.

In applying the Majkas' ideas to CATA as a social movement organization, six significant findings tend to emerge. First, building, sustaining and organizing CATA as a social movement organization began to occur when a series of organizational stages and organizational vic-

tories had been achieved. Second, CATA has been effective because it has established close and intimate bonds with Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. Third, once these workers arrived at the agricultural camps on the mainland, they experience problems of isolation, poor living and working conditions, cheap labor, language difficulties, growers' opposition to organized labor, discrimination and many other related environmental health problems. Such conditions force Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers to seek some kind of organizational involvement. CATA as a social movement organization became significantly important to their survival in a foreign place of work. Fourth, the fact that Puerto Rican farmworkers could relate to the same cultural pattern of traditions and working class life made it significantly important for farmworkers to trust CATA's organizers and staff. Fifth, CATA has developed organizational structures in places of work where Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers travel all year around. Sixth, they have considered the place of work and the environment to be a significant factor in contributing to farmworkers' solidarity.

The data presented thus far suggests that the ideas of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas can be extended in a number of ways. Social movement organizations related to Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' protest has gone through

a constant evolutionary process and changes. Before such revolution occurs and we begin to see effective organizational results, bureaucracy becomes an obstacle to organizational development. In this organizational case study, bureaucracy at the early stages of organizational development of CAMP and META impeded and resisted economic and social change, thus presenting a challenge to these early organizations' religious and labor leaders. The challenge was not only maintaining the daily operation of their grassroots organization, but also administering in such a way that the organization remained viable as the environment around it changed. It demanded cadre leaders from religious and labor organizations to develop knowledge, skills and commitment for coping with social movement organizational change. In addition to CAMP, META and ATA adapting to external environmental changes, they needed to learn how to bring positive and constructive renewal of a Puerto Rican farmworkers social movement organization. What was needed on many occasions were new ideas of mobilizing and organizing, new people, new resources, new methods to renew and enrich the social movement organization continually. When these possibilities were ignored, these social movement organizations became stagnant and in some cases fell behind and disappeared.

The leadership in an organization with working class people needed to broaden their vision toward the organization's progress and long-term viability. As this case study made clear, a new form of organization and a new way of thinking about farmworkers' problems was needed. CATA altered the basic structures of previous organizational stages to build such an organization. They began by creating migratory organizational structures with units of working class life where farmworkers migrated. Farmworkers' input was to be part of the problem-solving and goal-setting in the organization's structures and units in each migratory state or city. Efforts were made to provide social services and organize farmworkers. Rewards were given to farmworkers by paying them minimal salaries and taking care of health benefits for them and their families.

In order for CAMP, META and ATA to have become more effective, it would have been necessary to change the organizations in three particular ways. First, they needed to change the bureaucratic structures to collective working class structures, something difficult to do with leadership whose main concerns were to develop a political union. CATA has functioned better under collective structures and has survived the longest. Second, they would have had to change their resources. They depended finan-

cially on concessions from religious institutions and at the same time they condemned their pacifist strategies in creating insurgency. They relied on left political parties' philosophies, and their organizational goals became secondary and displaced many times. They wanted to build mass-movement organizations and, at the same time, mobilize defiance. It became very difficult for them to do all these and still survive. Third, the leadership's attitudes and behavior would have to be changed. The leadership failed to change because they operated under a misconception of the reality experienced by Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers and, as a result, applied traditional and improper strategies for organizing the workers. The most difficult of these changes was having to deal with the leaders' behavior concerning the need for non-traditional labor organizing structures. Their leadership needed training about developing organizations with working class life, farmworkers input and participation. The leaders also needed to stay away from political parties and religious philosophies as their main strategy for creating organizations for farmworkers. When NEFSC and CATA began to get organized, they used cadre leaders organizations to be supportive and farmworkers' protest to create insurgency. Puerto Rican farmworkers were ready to protest after a series of social and political confronta-

tions with the farm growers. Employment conditions were worse, living conditions were devastating and crises and protest was their only alternative.

Farmworkers' discontent needed to be focused and channeled through the collective structures of working class life. Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers needed immediate solutions to their problems, and, instead, the leadership provided them with political education, ideological discussions, study groups, consciousness-raising sessions, newsletters and political tactics frequently intended to promote collective responses. These educational sessions failed to get farmworkers involved; rather, the sessions pushed them away from the groups and organizations. Only through the provision of social and legal services could they have gotten farmworkers' responses. In a case study, Alinsky (1971) advises organizers that "since people understand only in terms of their own experience, an organizer must have at least a cursory familiarity with their experience. It not only serves communication, but it strengthens the personal identification of the organizer with others" (p. 84). Kahn (1970) also contributes to ideas about the role of organizers by explaining that "the main job in the community in the early stages of organizing is simply to make friends with people there . . . Generally an effective organizer will have a good

deal in common with people he is working among . . . If an organizer does not share knowledge and experiences with people with which he is working, he will have a hard time communicating with them" (pp. 5-26).

One reason why the leaders of CAMP, META and ATA continued to use their ineffective organizational strategies was because their political philosophy was geared to the leftist Puerto Rican parties' doctrine which seemed at that time the best strategy of organizing. Some leaders were proven unsuccessful in that they became frustrated and many left these organizations and went on to traditional stable jobs. There were few exceptions; one of them was Angel Dominguez, a long-time supporter of farmworkers' rights, who continued patiently to work with farmworkers, providing social, legal and labor education to migrant farmworkers. He has spent at least fifteen years working, living and organizing Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. He has been successful after fifteen years in building and organizing with working class life and structures. This organization is called CATA.

The preceding discussion of the way in which a case study of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey organized supports, in certain ways, the theories of Piven and Cloward, but also qualifies and contradicts them. It must be noted that the Majkas in their case study of the

UFW also found that their data supports, qualifies and contradicts some of the theoretical conclusions of Piven and Cloward. It would be useful to examine in which ways the present case study of CATA parallels the conclusions drawn by the Majkas.

In their case study of the UFW the Majkas find considerable support for a number of the critical conclusions of Piven and Cloward. One conclusion that they support is one that deals with mass defiance being the vehicle through which the workers win higher wages and better working conditions. The present study also supports this idea. CATA has won significant gains for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in New Jersey through the use of farmworkers mass defiance against growers and state institutions.

Another idea that supports the Majkas' findings deals with the granting of concessions throughout California's agricultural labor insurgency history. The Majkas indicate that growers and the government throughout agricultural labor history have reacted to mass organizations of workers when they granted concessions. The concessions granted by growers or the government forcing growers' compliances were temporary ones. After labor acquiescence was restored, gains were erased by further manipulation of the labor market, persecution of leaders, and repression of

organizations. However, it was found in this case study of CATA's early stages of organizational development and effectiveness in New Jersey that Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers did not use the power of insurgency to win back concessions from elites. Contrary to Majkas' ideas, this case study of CATA found that Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' early stages of organizational insurgency and defiance was premature. In addition, Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' economic conditions did not allow them to strike or engage in demonstrations at the time the UFW and Cesar Chavez' farmworkers movement was actively engaged in insurgency and defiance.

Another significant finding that supports the findings of the Majkas' study is that they support Piven and Cloward's general concluding argument, namely, the need to "begin to consider alternative forms of organizations through which working class people can act together in defiance" (Majkas, 1980, p. 307). Similarly to the Majkas' findings in support of Piven and Cloward's concluding theoretical arguments, this case study of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers supports the kind of organization through which working class people can act together in defiance of their rulers. Furthermore, CATA has begun, after a number of organizational stages and evolution, to transform into an organization that has been able to

effectively involve working class life into its organizational structures.

The Majkas in this case study of the UFW also find several qualifications of Piven and Cloward's theoretical conclusions. The first qualification that the Majkas make is that the UFW has been able to build itself as a permanent organization and to effectively mobilize defiance. In this case study of organizational stages of development CATA also has been successful in doing both, namely building an organization, which have been able to effectively mobilize defiance. Contrary to the CATA, the UFW attempted to build itself up as a mass-movement organization as a prerequisite to mobilize defiance through the building of the National Farm Workers Association (NFWA) which later merged with the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee of the UFW. The NFWA did not emphasize trade union goals; instead, it focused on community organizing. In addition, the UFW operational bases have been centralized in agricultural states and cities throughout the West Coast. Contrary to the UFW, after a number of successes and failures, CATA succeeded in building a number of grassroots membership organizations as prerequisites to the formations of mass-movement cadre organizations to mobilize defiance. CATA's organizational bases have been centralized in two major areas: in small vil-

lages in Puerto Rico, where the migrant farmworkers reside, and in New Jersey, where the majority of Puerto Rican farmworkers travel six months of every year.

The second major qualification that the Majkas make in their UFW study is that they find evidence which suggests limitations in not forming organizations. The Majkas found that without organizations the poor face an inability to effectively resist changes. Similarly, in this case study of CATA's stages of organizational development, we found that grassroots organizations were significantly important to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. This was because grassroots organizations provided a series of necessary social services. In addition, farmworkers saw grassroots organizations as a support group to which to relate their problems in their first attempt to create economic change. The importance of grassroots organizations in CATA's stages of organizational development helped them to establish long-term affiliations with farmworkers throughout each stage of organizational development.

In this case study of the UFW, the Majkas find contrary theoretical conclusions concerning Piven and Cloward's theories. Piven and Cloward imply that promoting insurgency and building a formal organization are a contradictory process. The Majkas' findings challenge

this claim. They find evidence that the UFW, since 1965, has stimulated, coordinated and sustained insurgency, rather than insurgency independently producing a mass-based union. The UFW attempted to build itself as a mass-membership organization as a prerequisite to mobilizing defiance. In addition to this, Cesar Chavez worked for ten years with the Community Service Organization in California, which was affiliated with Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation. Chavez' organizing strategies stem from Alinsky's style of community organizing. Contrary to the UFW study, the CATA organizational case study finds that CATA has attempted to build itself after a series of grassroots organizational gains. Similar to the UFW, insurgency begins to occur after it has been stimulated, coordinated and sustained by CATA's leadership. The major difference between the two organizations is that the leadership of CATA has never been charismatic with strong religious philosophical foundations like Cesar Chavez. In contrast to Chavez, Angel Dominguez' organizational experiences come out of a series of organizational involvements with the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. In his struggle to organize Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, he previously joined the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and other labor organizations to find out later that these organizations were not committed to the farmworkers or-

ganizing. Rather, they were interested in using his organizing skills to represent their political parties or labor organizations. Unlike Dominguez, Chavez has continued to face organizational difficulties with long-time UFW organizers because of political affiliations with the Democratic Party. The leadership of Chavez' union continues to have serious organizational disputes between the union and several other agricultural labor organizing committees in Florida, Arizona and Texas. Chavez' union has been charged with being too dependent politically on the AFL-CIO. Other agricultural labor organizing committees are becoming much more independent organized groups in states where agricultural labor organizing is permitted. Like Chavez, Angel Dominguez believes in unionizing farmworkers. But unlike Chavez, Angel Dominguez believes that the union needs to be directed by the farmworkers themselves. His theoretical assertions concerning CATA as a successful organization are that CATA must continue to exist as a support organization to the union whenever the Puerto Rican farmworkers are ready for such a move. This is beginning to happen slowly in New Jersey whereby Puerto Rican farmworkers, members of CATA, have demanded the right to be unionized at the Levin's Farms in South Jersey. Levin Farms Brother and Sons, Inc. refused to accept union representation and, as a result, CATA farmworkers

took Levin's Farms to court. The court declared in favor of the CATA farmworkers, giving them the right to unionize and hold elections. Levin Farms continued not to warrant the rights of farmworkers to unionize and, as a result, the Levin Farms' son and father went to jail. More recently, the court released them from jail to allow farmworkers elections. The case is still pending allowing for farmworkers to vote for their union (Siembra, New Jersey, September 1985).

On September 29, 1985 a most important victory came when fourteen migrant workers from the Levin farms successfully unionized. The workers unanimously voted to be represented by the Comite Organizador Agricolas (the Farmworkers Organizing Committee), the syndicated wing of CATA.

In sum, as we have noted, a number of theoretical conclusions presented by the Majkas in their case study of the UFW supports, qualifies and contradicts Piven and Cloward's theoretical conclusions. In addition, it was useful to examine in which ways the case study of CATA parallels the conclusions drawn by the Majkas. Having applied the theoretical conclusions of Piven and Cloward and the Majkas to the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers, we can now undertake to answer questions raised earlier in this case study concerning the study of organizational

structures. The following questions concerning this case study will be answered. First, what organizational structures did CATA develop throughout each stage of development? Second, how effective were these organizations' structures in achieving their stated aims and goals? Third, through what process did CATA redirect its goals as a result of its experience at each stage of development? Fourth, utilizing criteria established by Piven and Cloward and the Majkas about organizational effectiveness, how effective has CATA been as an organization? In undertaking to answer the questions concerning the effectiveness of organizational structures, we must begin with CAMP, as the first organizational stage of development. In the first stage, CAMP developed organizational bureaucratic structures with less working class life and with structures based on support committees. CAMP was not effective in meeting its organizational goals since the leadership was ineffective in developing working class structures.

As a result, a new organization of organizers was established. This organization was called META. META's organizational structures were bureacuractic in nature. It was the first mobilized and organized formal group of religious individuals who incorporated as the Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas. META, Inc. consisted

of a Board of Directors in New Jersey and Connecticut. The staff consisted of volunteers and college students supervised by two Directors in each geographical area.

The politics of the organizational structures were religious and bureaucratic. The leadership used strategies of seminars, educational labor projects and social service approaches as means for providing solutions to migrant problems. These organizational structures were proven to be ineffective in New Jersey because the leadership of CAMP confronted political difficulties in establishing organizational patterns with other local religious institutions and because the leadership of META had ideological and political differences with the group from Connecticut about organizational strategies for organizing migrant farmworkers.

The organizational structures built in Connecticut was effective in that the leadership was able to mobilize farmworkers' support by forming a group of cadre organizers to support META's work. META built structures that were transitory and not permanent. They knew that the goal was to build a union of farmworkers and they wanted to go beyond a social service organization of providers. The leaders of META in Connecticut and New Jersey in the interest of their political philosophies began to struggle with each other to create a farmworkers union. New Jer-

sey's leadership decided to organize through reformist organizational strategies while the group in Connecticut decided to mobilize around building farmworkers' support and creating moments of insurgency without much farmworkers' support. They assumed that once supporters and public media made the farmworkers' issues and problems public, farmworkers' protest would occur. However, the farmworkers' protest was limited and the leadership of Connecticut went on with establishing the first farmworkers union called ATA. Nevertheless, these organizational structures formed in META were temporarily effective since they helped to create awareness among the general public and to get attention from the local media. They were also significant for establishing the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union. However, these organizational structures were not effective overall in achieving or redefining their main goal. The establishment of a Puerto Rican farmworkers union that could survive on the mainland in competition with the UFW and resist the political and economic pressures by other larger unions was largely a problem for the leaders of ATA.

ATA was effective temporarily. It achieved mass-membership organizational structures that were mainly bureacuractic. Its structure and leadership were socialistic in nature. It was established through a set of

working committees in different geographical areas through the East Coast. However, ATA's organizational structures failed overall to organize the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers union. The farmworkers' issues and need for organizing the union were there, but more than a need and support were necessary to be effective. ATA needed the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers to be supportive and committed to the union. Instead, ATA began to organize external support and hired outside supporters to be organizers of the union. These organizers came from the United States leftist organizations, religious groups, Puerto Rican Socialist Party militants and a few college students. Their philosophy was on many occasions peti-bourgeoise, without much enthusiasm about resolving migrant farmworkers' problems. ATA needed economic and labor organizing training from the UFW, which was then the only successful Chicano farmworkers organization. The UFW was not ready to provide it, because they were formalizing and strengthening their own struggle in California. The political and ideological differences among the leaders of these organizations was an important obstacle in getting ATA to build a strong base in the East Coast. Growers' opposition was also an obstacle that contributed to the lack of unionization, but not a significant one in New Jersey.

ATA's organizational structures were not effective overall in achieving their stated goals. However, after ATA's leadership split from the UFW, the leadership left the union and other organizers in New Jersey decided to join social service agencies to continue the work with migrant farmworkers. In addition, ATA was not able to redirect its aims or redefine its goal as a result of its experiences, but one of the organizers, Angel Dominguez, did. He continued to work in New Jersey with the goal of reorganizing a group of migrant farmworkers again. This time the organizing occurred through a series of farmworkers' protests on the East Coast of New York. A committee of cadre supporters was formed to rescue a group of Puerto Rican farmworkers who were fired. The support group placed them in safe working conditions. This committee, called the NEFSC, was very effective in channeling and sustaining Puerto Rican farmworkers' protest. It allowed farmworkers to become active participants in insurgent events. It knew when to get out and when to allow farmworkers and other individuals to continue organizing farmworkers. Angel Dominguez through the NEFSC focused on the proliterianization of the organization, i.e., the ideological consolidation and transformation of its composition to a majority of farmworkers class members was in particular a difficult task, but not an impossible one.

By 1979, Angel Dominguez had made a conscious effort to involve Puerto Rican farmworkers in the formation of an organization with working class life and structures. If there is not a conscious and honest effort to carry this out, then an organization easily succumbs to the political and organizational practices, characteristic of petty-bourgeois formations which tend to be bureaucratic and undermine working class life participation.

CATA's organizational effectiveness has served as a case history through which to examine the ideas of Piven and Cloward as well as the Majkas. So far it has been the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organization that has survived the longest, organizing migrant farmworkers with working class organizational structures. CATA has been very effective in achieving its stated aims and goals. It has gone through a series of organizational stages, some successful and some unsuccessful. These organizational stages have been through a series of organizational linkages and networks.

CATA has been effective in winning significant victories for Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers. It has established organizational patterns from which to represent grievance and bargaining rights as farmworkers labor organization. It has become nationally known through its involvement in the development of legislative policy at

the state level and in Puerto Rico. It has built a significant constituency of support of "cadre organizations" on the East Coast and in Puerto Rico. CATA has been successful and effective in maintaining its collective organizational structures, receiving concessions in the form of governmental support from the state and developing the necessary organizational units to build a farmworkers syndicate structure to organize migrant workers.

In examining and applying Piven and Cloward's ideas of organizational effectiveness and organizational structures to CATA's organizational development, two important observations can be made. First CATA can be extended in terms of Piven and Cloward's theory to be the organization where Puerto Rican farmworkers can dictate organizational structures suitable to their needs and still win significant victories. Second, CATA can be described in terms of the Majkas' ideas to prove effective and successful in designing the organizational model which the Majkas advocate. CATA has gone beyond organizational building and begun to establish units of insurgency, whereby farmworkers can still receive social services and use strategies of grievances to meet farmworkers' needs. Furthermore CATA has developed an organizational syndicate through which farmworkers can bargain collectively.

A number of concluding remarks can be made about the data on Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers organizational structures examined thus far. It is my view that the organizational process of CATA and previous stages of organizational development were characterized by a struggle to transform the organizations of CAMP, META, ATA and NEFSC into a Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers proletarian organization formation. The main obstacle to this goal was the ideology of the leadership of these organizations. This ideology and its implications were inconsistent with the stated objective of the organization. In addition, this ideology proved to be an obstacle to the growth and development of the Puerto Rican farmworkers union.

The history of CATA's previous organizational stages of development has shown the conflict between the following: first, democracy versus centralism, theory versus practice, and nationalism versus paternalism. The dynamic democracy versus centralism in ATA was characterized by commandism of the leadership, bureaucratism, passivity of the membership, and emphasis on political issues over the organizational issues. The dynamic theory versus practice conflict was characterized by the minimal ideological and political preparation by the leadership of CAMP, META and ATA about agricultural labor organizing and the conditions of the Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers' reality. The nationalism

versus paternalism conflict was characterized by both the labor activists and the church activists in that they tried to organize and mobilize farmworkers' support. The labor activists were very nationalistic about the organization's political goals and the right to self-determination for the Independence of Puerto Rico, while the church activists were very paternalistic in their strategies of organizational mobilization and organizing.

Of all the theoretical organizational ideas argued by Piven and Cloward and the Majkas, when applied to CATA's previous organizational stages of development, none deal with the objectives and subjective political reasons for the establishment of these organizations of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers in the mainland. There seem to be objective and subjective reasons for establishing mass-base organizations on the mainland. First, the population of Puerto Rico in the United States was rapidly increasing and it was equal to the population of the Island. Second, the colonial relationship of Puerto Rico and the United States meant, among other things, a considerable flow of Puerto Rican farmworkers from the Island to the mainland. Third, the militancy of the mass struggle of the late 60's and early 70's and the revitalized independence movement on the Island gave rise to a movement of Puerto Ricans in the United States struggling for democratic rights and

supporting the independence struggle in the Island.


Fourth, the class struggle during this period focused mainly on democratic rights, student and anti-imperialist demonstrations. Thus, the class character of these movements was poorly understood by its participants. Many political activists and labor organizers saw Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers not as agricultural workers but solely as members of an oppressed group. They paid little attention to building militant local farmworkers class unity.

Fifth, the reactionary role played by many unions in the civil rights and anti-war movements along with the racist responses of many white workers against farmworkers unionization undermined and left out totally efforts to conceive a united farmworkers' movement. Sixth, nationalism in its various expression during these years of organizational development was primarily a positive trend, an affirmation of Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers culture and history of resistance, a recognition of the collective need to struggle against oppression and exploitation.

This nationalism is at odds with the emergence of a multinational organization capable of organizing minority sectors of the working class.

APPENDICES


Appendix 1

North East--1983 Farm Expenditures

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Crop Reporting Service, 1984, p. 47.


Appendix 2

New Jersey Cash Receipts: 1983



Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Crop Reporting Service, 1984, p. 39.

Appendix 3

Gross Income, Production Expenses, & Net Income:
1976-1983

Note: From New Jersey Agriculture, N.J. Department of Agriculture Crop Reporting Service, 1984, p. 48.

Appendix 4

Definition of Terms

To facilitate reading the remainder of the analysis, terms are defined below that either are unique to the system language used in plain literature, or are operationalized for the proposed study.

1. Puerto Rican Migrant Farmworkers

Puerto Rican migrant farmworkers are Puerto Rican agricultural workers whose primary residence is Puerto Rico and who leave the Island of Puerto Rico to perform agricultural work on the mainland on a seasonal basis.

2. Social Movement

A social movement is a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the society and/or reward distribution of a society (Wilkinson, 1971).

3. Social Movement Organization

A Social movement organization "is a complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counter movement and attempts to implement those goals." (McCarthy and Zald, 1977, Vol.82, pp. 1212-34).

4. Power

Power "is interactional; it is embedded in patterns of social relationships. It derives from the patterns of interdependence that characterize all of social life and from the leverage that inheres in these interdependent relations." (Piven and Cloward, 1984, Vol. 13, p. 588).

5. CAMP (Comite de Apoyo al Migrante Puertorriqueno)

CAMP is an organization of people, mostly labor and religious leaders who organized in Puerto Rico in 1969 to develop the first Puerto Rican farmworkers union. It lasted until 1971.

6. META (Ministerio Ecumenico de Trabajadores Agricolas)

META is an organization founded in Puerto Rico in 1972 by a group of church leaders to begin the process of organizing Puerto Rican farmworkers. It lasted until 1973.

7. ATA (Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico)

ATA is a Puerto Rican farmworkers union founded in Connecticut in August, 1973. It lasted until 1978.

8. NEFC (New England Farmworkers Council, Inc.)

NEFC is a private, non-profit corporation established in 1971 to represent farmworkers in Massachusetts and Connecticut.

9. NEFSC (North East Farmworkers Support Committee)

NEFSC was formed in 1978 in New York State (Catskill Mountains). Members of this committee were farmworkers' advocates from federally funded agencies.

10. CATA (Comite de Apoyo al Trabajador Agricola)

CATA is a farmworkers' support committee. It was founded in 1979 by a group of farmworkers in Vineland, New Jersey.

11. GSA (Glassboro Service Association Camp)

This is the former WPA camp in Glassboro. In 1946, the first Puerto Rican farmworkers passed through this camp.

12. Shade Tobacco Growers Agricultural Association

The association is located in Windsor, Connecticut. Organized in 1942 by the 16 largest tobacco growers in Connecticut. This organization oversees the recruitment and development of seasonally unskilled farm labor in Connecticut and Massachusetts.

13. Contract Worker

A contract worker is a farmworker recruited by, and registered with, and protected by the contract negotiated by the Department of Labor of Puerto Rico.

14. Farm Operators

Farm operators are large capitalist farms and ranches owned and operated by some of the country's largest corporations, such as Tenneco, Del Monte, Castle, Cooke, and Campbell. (Jenness, Spring, 1985, Vol. 2, pp. 107-108).

15. Effectiveness

This measures the accomplishments of the recognized objectives of cooperation action. The degree of accomplishment indicates the degree of effectiveness (Barnard, 1983, p. 35).

16. Seasonal Puerto Rican Day-Haul Farmworkers

These are day-haul workers who reside in urban areas and travel daily to work on farms.

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