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PARMENIDES AND THE PROBLEM OF INQUIRY

by

ROSE M. CHERUBIN

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Philosophy in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor
of Philosophy, The City University of New York

1996

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Abstract

PARMENIDES AND THE PROBLEM OF INQUIRY

by

Rose M. Cherubin

Adviser: Professor Marx Wartofsky

In the fragments of Parmenides, a goddess tells a human of the "roads of inquiry there are for conceiving", and rehearses arguments to show why to eon (that which is) must be said and taken to be a certain way, on or for an apparently viable road of inquiry. These arguments invoke [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira - roughly, [J]ustice, [N]ecessity, and [F]air Portion - as binding to eon. There is no evidence that the goddess speaks of how to eon might be independent of inquiry, or across all contexts.

I show that in order for inquiry to be possible, to eon must be taken to be as the goddess says it must on or for that last road of inquiry; and that [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira as understood in the fifth century BCE can be seen to bind to eon to be that way. Paradoxes arise from this, in that what is needed in order to conduct an inquiry (e.g. distinctions and sequences) and in order to make the arguments the goddess does are incompatible with the way to eon must be taken to be in or for inquiry (e.g. unique, undivided,

unmoving). I investigate why these paradoxes arise, whether they can be resolved or avoided, and what their significance is with regard to inquiry and to its results.

I then examine the metaphysical and epistemological ramifications of Parmenides' fragments as thus elucidated, discussing implications for the possibility of inquiry, for conceptions of what is inquired into or sought, and for what inquiry may tell us. I show how the poetic form of the fragments reflects and illuminates these implications, and explore the roles of the human and the divine figures in the fragments. It can thus be seen that this comprehensive approach to the fragments provides a coherent reading of them in a way that others of more limited scope do not. Finally I look at the significance of the posing of inquiry as a problem.

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I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, Charles E. Cherubin.

To my immediate and extended family, and friends, I would like to express deepest thanks for their encouragement, patience, love, and support. At no time did any of them question whether I could complete this project, even when I wondered about it myself, and for that I will always be grateful.

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The Ph.D. Program in Philosophy at the Graduate School of the City University of New York took a chance in admitting a student with my academic background, and I am grateful for this. The faculty there always challenged me to

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Before I began to write the dissertation, before I had a clear idea of the project, I had the benefit of being able to work on a translation of Parmenides' fragments with the help of Professor David Sider of the Department of Classics at Fordham University. Professor Sider's philological insight, as well as his insistence on precision where it is possible and on being aware of where it is not possible, have been of enormous help to me. I feel very fortunate to have been able to have him on my examination committee; any infelicitous or inappropriate translations that might remain in this dissertation are my own.

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origin of this dissertation. He was willing to discuss questions, ideas, and problems in which I was interested, even after that class was over; and was so gracious, generous, and kind as to offer his assistance as a member of my committee even after he ceased to teach at C.U.N.Y. His subtlety of thought and observation, his moderation, and his commitment to discovering and acknowledging fundamental questions, have been of incomparable worth and meaning to me. For these things, and for his patience, understanding, good humor, honesty, integrity, and kindness, I must thank him many times over, and know that I owe him more than I could ever repay.

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In 1995 I was hired as an instructor by the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at George Mason University, with the understanding that I would

advance to the position of assistant professor on successful completion of this project. I would like to thank the department at George Mason for having enough confidence in me to give me this opportunity, and for affording the encouragement, assistance, and good fellowship that have enabled me to finish this dissertation in my first year of teaching.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
INTRODUCTION	1
Chapter	
1. TEXT, THEMES, QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS	17
2. <u>DIKE</u>	99
3. <u>ANANKE</u>	132
General Note	184
Supplementary Note: "Incompleteness"	185
4. <u>MOIRA</u>	192
' <u>Moîra</u> '	193
' <u>Noeîn</u> '	222
Interpretation of 8.34-38a	236
Content and Place of 8.34-41	257
5. PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BINDING OF <u>TO EON</u> .	274
Inquiry and the Binding of <u>To Eon</u>	310
<u>Themis</u>	355
6. CONCLUSIONS	374
BIBLIOGRAPHY	424

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this dissertation is to make a study of the fragments of Parmenides' poem, one that takes into account and examines their concerns regarding the issue of inquiry. Two main features of this study make it significantly different from other studies of the fragments, I think. The first is that it investigates inquiry as a thematic concern within the fragments. The second is that it endeavors to provide an account of what appears in the fragments as philosophically integrated. That is, I do not start by assuming that any part or aspect of the fragments is philosophically irrelevant, or solely a case of poetic embellishment, or detachable from any other part or aspect. I do not assume, for example, that the goddess who speaks is a mere mouthpiece for Parmenides' own views, that what she says can be taken as a direct statement of what he thinks. I also do not assume that what she says must be said and taken to be the case, in or for inquiry or at all, is what Parmenides believes is or must be the case. Neither do I assume that what is said in the other fragments can be understood in isolation from the tale of the journey in fragment 1. At the same time, I do not assume the contrary of any of these things. Rather, I try to look at each word and line in the context in which it appears, to bring out what might be the philosophically relevant connotations or

associations of these terms and especially of the more poetical-sounding ones (e.g. Dike, Ananke, and Mofra), to see whether anything that is said in the fragments gives any hint about the significance of the structure of the poem (in so far as this is visible in the fragments); and in general to investigate the meaning of the fragments, singly and together, in a way that respects the form in which they come down to us.

This approach is, as I have said, unusual, but I hope to show that it is a fruitful one. It has not been explicitly rejected by other commentators; it simply does not seem to have been chosen. For example, it is quite common for writers on Parmenides to take it that what the goddess says is what Parmenides himself believes; remarks made by the goddess are characterized by these authors as being made by Parmenides. Examples of that tendency appear in the work of Aubenque¹, Austin², Coxon³, Curd⁴, Ebert⁵,

¹Pierre Aubenque, Le Probleme de l'etre chez Aristote, 2e edition revue, Bibliotheque de philosophie contemporaine, histoire de la philosophie et philosophie general (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966). See e.g. page 84, "ainsi c'est parce qu'il est force de suivre les phenomenes que Parmenide est oblige, en depit des tendances propres de sa doctrine, de reintroduire la pluralite sensible au niveau de l'opinion;..." See also page 145, note 2.

²Scott Austin, Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). See e.g. page 65, "...Parmenides says not only how being is, but also - and, in fact, more importantly - how it is not, and succeeds in doing even the latter on the positive route and in a systematic way."

See also the discussion of fragment 8, lines 8-11 on page 13: "There is evidence in the poem to suggest that

Mourelatos⁶, Owen⁷, and Taran⁸, among others. In that

Parmenides meant to rule out other kinds of 'is not' besides the 'is not' which says that something does not exist."

³A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Phronesis Supp. Vol. III (Assen, the Netherlands and Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V. 1986). See e.g. Coxon's commentary on what he designates as fragment 3 (fragment 2, or B2, in the Diels-Kranz ordering), on page 178: "...in asserting that only two ways of looking for reality (aletheie) are acceptable to reason, Parmenides maintains that the assertion of the disjunction between being and not being is itself an exercise of reason and, since it defines the philosopher's procedure, its primary exercise...."

⁴Patricia K. Curd, "Parmenidean Monism," Phronesis 36, no. 3 (1991): 241-64. See e.g. pages 243 and 258.

⁵Theodor Ebert, "Wo beginnt der Weg der Doxa?" Phronesis 34, no. 2 (1989): 121-38. See especially pages 129 and 134. On 134, Ebert says that 8.34-38a concern "dem in Fragment 3 ausgesprochenen erkenntnistheoretischen Grundgedanken des Parmenides, der Zusammenhorigkeit von Erkennen und Sein, oder, wie Parmenides in Vers 34 formuliert, der These, dass Erkennen immer dann und nur dann vorliegt, wenn erkannt wird, dass etwas ist/existiert."

⁶Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971). Mourelatos does not consistently conflate what he considers to be Parmenides' own view with claims he considers to have been made by the goddess who speaks, but he sometimes does, for example in Chapter 3, on page 87: "The controlling insight behind Parmenides' rejection of me eon and of what I consider his cognate doctrine, that one of the forms posited by mortals [in fragment 8] is to be dropped (the other, consequently, redefined) is one that has received expression in a variety of ways in the history of philosophy."

⁷G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," Classical Quarterly n.s. 10 (1960): 84-102; also "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," Monist 50 (1966): 317-340. See e.g. "Eleatic Questions," page 100: "...Parmenides had argued that, since there is no change, there can be no way of distinguishing the past and the future from the present..." See also "Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present," page 325: "He goes on to maintain that what there is cannot have come into existence either from nothing or from something. And he gives two reasons for saying that it

Parmenides wrote the poem in which the goddess's speech appears, he is of course in one sense the source of her pronouncements. But this does not in itself imply that he must or even that he can profess what she would, nor that he thinks or claims to know that what she says is unconditionally true.

In fact, the approach I will take differs further from those of the other accounts just mentioned, in that those accounts do not take into consideration the fact that the goddess's remarks concerning to eon (that which is) frequently occur within the context of injunctions about

cannot have come into existence from nothing."

In both cases, the arguments in question are offered by the goddess; and in both cases, she is discussing signs on or toward a road of inquiry; she does not say that what is must be a certain way outside of contexts of inquiry. Moreover, in the verses (8.1-21) that Owen discusses in the second passage, the goddess says only that she will not allow her listener to say or to take it (noein) that what is came to be out of what is not, on the grounds that it is neither sayable nor conceivable (perceptible to noos) that (how) [it] is is not (or: that [it] is how [it] is not (8.7-9)). She does not say that what is cannot have come into existence from what is not, but only that it cannot be taken (by her listener, in or for inquiry at very least) that what is came to be from what is not.

⁸Leonardo Taran, Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). See e.g. page 43, in a discussion of fragment 3: "[An interpretation such as Untersteiner's], however, is untenable because Parmenides recognizes only unqualified Being and denies the reality of different existents."

Like Owen, Taran seems to take it that the injunctions in 8.7-10 are made because it is impossible for there to be that which the goddess says cannot be said or taken to be (in or for inquiry; but Taran does not mention inquiry). See also page 102: "The most important proof that Being cannot have come into being is the inconceivability of non-Being (lines 7-9) which was one of the points of departure."

what must be said and taken to be the case on or for a certain road of inquiry, and the fact that the remarks concerning to eon tend overwhelmingly (if not always) to appear within the contexts of discussions of roads of inquiry. That is, the commentators I have mentioned seem to take it to be the case that the goddess or Parmenides intends the pronouncements about to eon to be existential claims that apply across all contexts, or unconditionally⁹. However, consideration of the ways in which these pronouncements appear in the extant fragments suggests that that is not necessarily Parmenides' or the goddess's intention at all; and I will argue that it is in fact very unlikely to be his or her intention.

In general, then, I try always to understand what is said in each verse in the context in which it is presented, and then to take these contexts into account in investigating the meanings and implications of each statement that I examine. The context of a given remark within a fragment would include such things as who it is who appears to make the remark, roughly where in the poem the fragment seems to have occurred, whether the remark is part of a discussion of a road or roads of inquiry, whether it is or seems to be part of an argument, whether it falls within the scope of an injunction or a prohibition, and what its relationship might be to any beliefs or ideas or ways of

⁹See the examples in notes 1-8 above.

thinking that are known to have been current around the early fifth century BCE. Approaching the fragments in this way reveals that inquiry is a central theme in the passages that seem to be parts of the goddess's speech; and it is on this theme that I focus. I then draw out the implications of the discussion of inquiry, and examine its place within the whole of the body of surviving fragments, and discuss what that whole seems to imply.

Specifically, I argue that inquiry into what is is presented as a problem in the fragments of Parmenides. The goddess says in fragment 1 that her listener is to learn or to hearken to "everything,/ Both the...heart of...[T]ruth/ And the opinions of mortals..." (1.28-30), but then in fragments 2,6,7, and 8 she discusses roads of inquiry, and from 8.52 onward apparently through the rest of the extant fragments she presents what she says are opinions of mortals - although what she says does not match any beliefs known to have been expounded in the fifth-century Greek-speaking world. At no point does she catalogue, describe, or examine anything that she identifies as the "heart of [T]ruth". Evidently, then, her visitor is to learn in some other way. Her remarks concerning to eon, frequently taken to be something like a cataloguing of, or a set of criteria for determining, what exists or what can or must exist, in fact occur only within her discussions of roads of inquiry. These remarks often appear as injunctions or prohibitions: the

goddess tells her visitor that he can or cannot, or must or must not, say or conceive (noefn) something or other concerning to eon, on or for a certain road of inquiry. For its first forty-nine verses fragment 8 deals with a road that seems to be in some way a viable one (in some way viable for inquiry). On or toward this road are certain "signs", the goddess says (8.2), signs concerning to eon. If to eon is not said and taken to be as these signs indicate, she says, there is not a real road (8.17-18).

As the only roads that have been mentioned are roads of inquiry (cf. 2.1-2), the goddess would seem to mean that if to eon is said and taken to be other than what the signs would indicate, there is no real road of inquiry. If to eon is said and taken to be as the signs indicate, inquiry would at least seem to be possible. In other words, the goddess is discussing what she presents as conditions for the possibility of inquiry. She does not say whether these conditions hold or should hold independent of inquiry; that is, she does not say that we must say and take to eon to be a certain way because it is that way independent of inquiry or across all contexts or unconditionally. Rather, in her arguments or explanations for why to eon must be, or must be said and taken to be, a certain way on or for the apparently viable road, the goddess invokes [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]ofra, holding that these divinities or forces embody or ensure these restrictions on to eon. If we take these

divinities or forces to be in effect, then we can say and take to eon to be such that inquiry is possible; if they are in effect and if we say and take them to be in effect, then apparently inquiry will be possible, as I try to show. I also discuss whether we can tell whether to eon is a certain way, or whether it is bound to be a certain way, outside or independent of inquiry, and explore the implications of this problem.

More specifically, the structure of this dissertation is as follows. In the first chapter I present a translation of each of the fragments of Parmenides' poem, and point out major themes, questions, and problems that are to be treated in the subsequent chapters. I discuss the sources for the fragments, reasons for adopting or for rejecting certain ways of ordering the fragments, and problems associated with the text (problems of transmission, language, and translation) as these pertain to thematic questions. I also begin to look at contexts in which statements are made within the fragments, and at how certain broad patterns and themes emerge or arise there. From this I draw the problems and questions that guide the development of the rest of the investigation. These include the question of the unity of or connection between fragments: how might we understand the relationships among the several broad sections into which the fragments seem to fall (viz., the

introductory tale of a journey to a goddess; the speech made by that goddess; and within that speech, remarks on roads of inquiry and remarks on opinions of mortals)? What are we to make of the fact that all of the extant fragments contain statements and employ terms that seem to be fundamentally at odds with what the goddess says that to eon must be (or be said and taken to be) like on or for the road of inquiry discussed at 8.1-49?

It therefore becomes necessary to ask certain questions regarding the goddess's speech itself. First, it must be asked how the goddess supports her claims as to the characteristics of the road (or the characteristics associated with to eon on the road) she considers in 8.1-49. What might her invocation of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira mean, and what might it imply? Under what conditions could her arguments or explanations be understood to be valid and relevant support? These questions, and others they engender, are treated in the succeeding three sections, which deal with Dike, Ananke, and Moira respectively. A second important branch of questioning investigates what if anything can be discovered as to what it is that the goddess might find (and that we could see to be) wrong or inadequate or otherwise problematic in the opinions she says that mortals have. Hence it is also essential to ask whether or in what way mortals - readers of the poem, for example - can be seen to hold anything like the opinions she ascribes to

us. I treat these issues in the final two chapters, the first of which looks at some preliminary implications of what had been found concerning the binding of to eon by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra, and the second of which goes over further conclusions and examines the significance of the form of the extant fragments.

In the Dike, Ananke, and Moîra sections, I look first at the senses in which each term was used in and before the early fifth century, and at the implications of those senses and uses. I then consider the contexts in which each term appears in Parmenides' fragments. In the Ananke and Moîra sections, I also examine senses and uses of 'Peitho', 'pistis', and 'pistis alethes', within the fragments and otherwise. The Moîra section includes a discussion of the relationships between noein and to eon as they seem to have been understood about the early fifth century, and as they are presented, consonantly, in the fragments (primarily at 8.34-38). From these considerations, I argue, it can be shown that [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra, as understood about the early fifth century, would have to be in place in order for inquiry to be possible, and would have to be taken to be in place as well, if inquiry is to be able to be taken to be possible. That is, that which is said to be ensured or brought to bear by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra is that which seems (must be taken) to be required in order for inquiry (any seeking) to be possible. Moreover,

it can be seen that this provision or assurance of the apparent requisites of inquiry involves that - in or for inquiry at very least - to eon be bound to be (to be taken in inquiry to be) just as the goddess has said it is bound to be. For example, [D]ike can be seen to bind to eon so as to exclude coming to be and perishing; [A]nanke to bind it not to be lacking; [M]oira to bind it to be whole, unmoving, and unaccompanied. The significances of these three divinities or factors can also be shown to illuminate the other verses (outside of fragment 8) in which they appear, e.g. [D]ike at 1.14 and 1.28, Ananke at 10.6, moira at 1.26.

The next chapter considers some implications that can be drawn immediately from the findings concerning the binding of to eon in or for inquiry. I examine whether this binding can be known to be in effect outside of contexts of inquiry, or across all contexts, and show that this question is diverted or disabled by the need to employ inquiry in attempting to respond to it. I also consider the paradoxes that seem to arise from the fact that both distinctions and divisions, on the one hand, and a conception of to eon that is incompatible with the existence of distinctions and divisions, on the other hand, seem both to be required (and seem to be interdependent) in or for inquiry. In this chapter I consider as well the equivocations that seem to be involved in claiming that to eon "is" as well as that particular things said to be "are" or "are said to be"; and

the equivocations involved in speaking of what to eon is not or cannot be. I argue that these paradoxes, equivocations, contradictions, and incoherences are not avoidable, if we would say that anything is and would seek to inquire into or about it. The difficulties arise because of the apparent necessity of using indissoluble distinctions; we would seem to need these if any meaning is to be possible, or to be able to be taken to be possible. For this reason, it does not seem that we can know that what we say is is what is, independent of our conceptions or across all contexts or unconditionally. Parmenides himself does not make any unconditional existential claims, but puts remarks about to eon into a speech by a goddess concerning what must be said and taken to be the case on or for certain roads of inquiry. The nature and content of the goddess's speech, I show, not only avoid the perils of such unconditional claims, but also reveal the failings of such claims; I argue that far from espousing what would today be called "idealism", her speech shows the failings of "idealist" as well as "naive realist" views. In addition, this chapter includes a discussion of the source of our customary and problematic distinctions in themis (custom, ways deemed appropriate), and of why these distinctions - while not fully explicable or dissoluble - need not be taken to be arbitrary. For us to be able to use them in order to live and to seek, we cannot take it that they are entirely arbitrary.

Finally, the concluding chapter attempts to draw out the preliminary implications more extensively, to assess them together, and to see how they inform an understanding of the text as a whole. I consider the effects of the paradoxes and equivocations mentioned on the results of inquiry, and suggest that far from implying that what is given by themis is not to be investigated, or that inquiry is fruitless, the difficulties cited call for a deeper acknowledgment of what our distinctions and inquiries involve (and an acknowledgment of inquiry as context), and for a reflection of the relational nature of what we would call true. I suggest that the narrative frame of the poem allows the poet to acknowledge the role of themis in the starting-points of inquiry, and that the goddess character, because she would be taken not to need to inquire, and because what she says does not take the form of an inquiry (she describes what she will say as a 'muthos', and speaks largely in commands), does not assume what she is trying to show, nor is her speech necessarily undermined or mitigated by paradox in the way in which an inquiry might be. I also discuss what it is that she might find inadequate or erroneous in the beliefs she attributes to mortals, and look at what in present-day or fifth-century opinions and ways of thinking might fit what she describes. I also examine whether it seems to be necessary for mortals to hold such opinions, opinions involving oppositions, negations, and

complementarities.

Briefly, the main theses that I propose and defend are these:

- The goddess's speech after fragment 1 is first of all about, or first of all concerned with, roads of inquiry.

- Her remarks about to eon have to do with how to eon must be, or must be said and taken to be (for inquiry involves conceptions as to what is), on or for an apparently viable road of inquiry.

- The goddess argues that to eon is bound to be this way on or for this road of inquiry by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira.

- It can be seen that in order for inquiry to be possible, something like what [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira were supposed to have been must bind what we would call to eon, bind it to be as the goddess says it is bound to be. Or, a situation we would describe in that way must obtain. In order for inquiry to be taken to be possible (which would seem also to be requisite for inquiry), something effectively like the binding attributed to [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira must be taken to be in place.

- This engenders, or brings out, paradoxes and equivocations, for the terms and suppositions needed in order to draw this conclusion (about how to eon must be said

and taken to be, in or for inquiry) are incompatible with what was found to have to be said and taken to be the case concerning to eon, in or for inquiry. Moreover, inquiry itself would seem to require both the invocation of distinctions, divisions, and sequences, and a conception of to eon that is incompatible with them.

- These paradoxes and other problems do not seem to be eradicable or avoidable, at least for mortals, for they result from the fact that we apparently must employ divisions and distinctions, and invoke sequences or passages, in our inquiries or searches, or in order to identify anything at all. These distinctions and divisions cannot be fully analyzable or irreducible or dissoluble, if meaning is to be possible. The distinctions and divisions, and the awareness or conception of sequence, are given or manifest through themis, which allows us to live in such a way as to take it that seeking is possible. It is through themis that we take it that there is a to eon that themis reflects or addresses.

- For these reasons we cannot know that what we say is is what is, independent of our conceptions or unconditionally. This does not destroy the possibility of inquiry, but suggests that inquiry be considered and examined as problematic if we are to contemplate the meaning of its results, or to have any meaning at all.

- The structure of the poem reflects these

considerations, and by evoking a tension between myth or narrative and inquiry (or other aspects of inquiry), brings out questions about the contexts in which truth and meaning are possible, and about the roles of desire and purpose (and of being a mortal) in conceptions of what is.

CHAPTER ONE

TEXT, THEMES, QUESTIONS, AND PROBLEMS

This chapter will present the fragments of Parmenides' poem one by one, briefly outlining major themes, questions, and problems that will be developed in the chapters to follow. Its main concerns will be sources of the fragments; reasons for accepting or for questioning the customary arrangement of the fragments; problems of text, language, and translation as these bear on relevant thematic questions; contexts in which statements in the fragments are made; broad patterns or themes within what survives of the poem; and how these themes emerge or arise. The numbering of the fragments here will follow that of Diels and Kranz in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker¹ for their fragments B1 through B19. The fragment sometimes called "Cornford's fragment" will be called fragment 20.

The fragments of Parmenides' poem come to us from several sources. I will discuss sources only where there is some question about the authenticity, context, or wording of a fragment; or where sources disagree or do not fully match as to a fragment's context or verbal content (spelling, wording, and so on). Although we do not today have the whole

¹Diels, Hermann, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed., revised with additions and index by Walther Kranz (Berlin: Weidmann, 1951), 217-246.

poem and may have as little as about one-fourth² of it, we can tell that there were at least two major sections, namely an introductory story by a man about his journey to the realm of a goddess, and a speech by that goddess. This speech in turn appears to have at least two sections, the first including statements about "roads of inquiry", and what the goddess calls "my trustworthy speech and thought to you" (8.50); and the second including remarks concerning the opinions of mortals (8.53 on). Thus part of the importance

²On pages 25-26 of Parmenides Lehrgedicht (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), Diels remarks that we retain about nine-tenths of what he calls the "Aletheia" section, and perhaps one-tenth of what he calls the "Doxa" part. He does not explain how he arrives at these figures.

In Parmenides Lehrgedicht Diels uses a somewhat different assessment of the order of the fragments, and in some cases a different assessment of which lines belong in each fragment, from what he and Kranz would later adopt in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (op. cit.). On the arrangement in Parmenides Lehrgedicht, the "Aletheia" section would seem to be comprised of what I will call (following the numeration in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker) fragments 4,5,2,3,6, 7.1-2, and 8.1-49 - a total of 75 full or partial lines. The "Doxa" section would then include what I will call 8.53-61, plus fragments 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,15a,16,17,18, and 19, for a total of 49 full or partial lines. Added to the transitional lines 8.50-52 and to the version of the proem and introductory remarks by the goddess that are presented in Parmenides Lehrgedicht (fragments 1, 7.2-6, 8.1-2a), the combined length of the fragments as reported in that work is 165 full or partial lines, including apparent repetitions. (The arrangement I will follow in this chapter yields 163 full or partial lines, with no repetitions.) Based on Diels' estimate of the fractions of each part of the goddess's speech represented by the fragments he had initially reported, and based on his apparent assumption that the proem has survived essentially intact, we must conclude that he would estimate the original length of the poem to have been about 625 lines, or slightly less than four times the total length of the extant fragments.

of questions of fragment and verse order is their bearing on the broad context of a given line.

As will be noted below and discussed in the chapters to follow, at 8.50-52 the goddess distinguishes two sections of her speech. She announces a transition from one part to the other, and says that the two parts will differ not only in subject but also apparently in character: she will move from "trustworthy speech and thought...about/around/on both sides of [T]ruth" to presenting a "guileful (deceptive) order" which may be either the opinions of mortals or the goddess's speech about them, or perhaps both. Further, the goddess makes several different kinds of statements. She makes declarative remarks about roads of inquiry; she also issues commands, injunctions, prohibitions, exhortations, and statements about what she claims is or is not possible for her listener (or perhaps anyone) to say and to think or conceive. Many instances of the latter types of statement occur within the scope of declarations about roads. Some of the commands and some of the statements about what it is or is not possible to do are expressed in second person singular grammatical forms, and thus may apply only to the narrator or only to humans; other such remarks are not phrased in the second person, and so may have wider applicability.

In addition, the goddess's speech contains statements about that which is (to eon). For the most part

these are prefaced or framed by claims about what can or must (or cannot or must not) be said and thought or conceived (noein) - again, often on or with respect to a road of inquiry. The arguments adduced by the goddess for these claims about what is (or is not) to be said and thought or conceived may also be governed by this conception of roads.

Given the circumstances just described, it cannot be assumed that all of what is said in the fragments can be understood as if it is presented in a uniform way, or as if each statement or phrase serves all of the same purposes as its fellows. This chapter will begin to identify the various contexts, ways of speaking, and aims or directions that may be seen to appear within the fragments. Later discussions will explore the roles played by each aim, context, an way of speaking within the whole of what we have of the poem, in so far as these can be determined.

Fragment 1

The mares that carry me as far as my (their?) spirit might reach

Were conducting [me]; when leading (carrying) me they put me onto a many-voiced (famous) road

Of a goddess (daimon), who through all cities bears the man of understanding.

On this I was carried, for on this the much-indicating (wise?) mares were carrying me

Pulling the chariot at full stretch, and maidens led the way.

The axle in the wheel-boxes was sending forth the sound of a
surinx (panpipe), itself

Burning (Kindling itself), for it was being pressed down by
 its two turned

Wheels at both ends, as the Sun-maidens hastened to convey
 [me], leaving behind the houses of Night,

Into (For) [the] light, having pushed the veils from their
 heads with their hands.

There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day

And a lintel and a threshold of stone hold them [together]
 at both sides (top and bottom),

Themselves being filled by vast doors;

For (Of) these many-penaltied Dike holds the keys of
 exchange (alternation).

Her indeed the maidens blandishing (appeasing) with gentle
 words

Persuaded cleverly to push the bolted bar swiftly from the
 gates for them; and they of the doors,

Spreading, made a yawning gap, turning the much-bronzed
 (bronze-covered) posts in their sockets in turn

Closely fixed to them with pegs and nails. Right away
 straight through the gates

Along the carriage-road the maidens guided the chariot and
 mares.

And the goddess (thea) received me willingly, and took my
 right hand in hers, and spoke to me and addressed me
 thus:

"Young man in the company of immortal charioteers

And mares which carry you, arriving at our house,

Welcome, since no bad fate (moîra) (OR:...by no means a bad
moîra) has sent you forth to go

On this road - for truly it is far from the beaten path of
 humans - ,

But [rather] [T]hemis and [D]ike. You must hearken to (hear;

learn) everything,
 Both the unshaking heart of well-rounded (persuasive?)
 [T]ruth
 And the opinions of mortals, in (of) which there is no true
 assurance.
 But nevertheless you shall learn these things also, how the
 things that are believed (the things that seem)
 Must really be altogether [going] throughout all things (OR:
 Must really be accepted to be continually
 (continuously) pervading everything).

It is in Sextus Empiricus³ that we find the claim
 that Parmenides' poem began with the first thirty lines of
 this fragment. He is also our only source for the first
 twenty-seven and a half lines. As we have no means of
 certain corroboration, the question arises as to whether we
 can tell that Sextus was correct about how the poem began.

It is possible that Sextus had a faulty text of the
 poem; it seems to have been at variance, for example, with
 those that Simplicius⁴ and Plato⁵ had. The passage that

³Sextus Empiricus, Pros logikous [Against the
 logicians] 1.111-14 (=Pros matematikous [Against the
 mathematicians] 7.111-14), in Sextus Empiricus II: Against
 the Logicians, with an English translation by R.G. Bury, The
 Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
 University Press, and London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1935;
 reprinted 1983), 57-63 (page references are to reprint
 edition).

⁴Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's "On the Heavens"
 557; in A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Phronesis
 Supp. Vol. III (Assen, the Netherlands and Wolfeboro, New
 Hampshire: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1986), 48-51, 142-44.

⁵Plato, Sophist 237a, 258d, in Plato VII: Theaetetus,
 Sophist, with an English translation by Harold N. Fowler,
 The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Sextus cites as the opening of the poem includes as continuous the verses identified here as 1.1-30, 7.2-6, and 8.1-2a. Simplicius, on the other hand, quotes as continuous the lines identified here as 1.28b-32. Both Simplicius and Plato place 7.1, as opposed to 1.30, directly before 7.2.

The content of the other fragments suggests that the first thirty lines quoted by Sextus at least precede the rest of what we have of Parmenides, and that the verses that should follow them most closely are the two lines (1.31-2) that Simplicius cites as following them. I will try to show, that is, that Diels and Kranz designated as fragment 1 the thirty-two lines that seem to represent the earliest part of the poem that we retain. Whether Parmenides began the poem with these lines or with some that do not survive cannot be determined.

These thirty-two lines tell of a journey to a daimon, introduce a speech by a goddess (thea; she may be the daimon), and include her announcements about what her human visitor is to learn: "the unshaking heart of...truth/ And the opinions of mortals" (1.29-30). As I will attempt to show here, the rest of the fragments consist of statements that either announce themselves as or can most coherently be construed as prefatory comments in a speech, remarks on roads of inquiry and on the conceptions they involve,

Harvard University Press, and London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1921; reprinted 1987), 338, 420.

statements about a road that is in some way associated with truth or with "true assurance" (pistis alethes, 8.28; cf. 1.30), and a discussion of opinions attributed to mortals. Further, consistent with the view that the fragments that are held to follow fr. 1 are part of an address to one listener, second-person singular pronouns and/or verbs appear in frr. 2,4,6,7,8,10, and 19. Fragment 3, I will argue, is so ambiguous in both content and context that definite placement and interpretation cannot be offered; but nothing in it suggests that it could not be part of the goddess's speech. Fragment 5 is also rather ambiguous, but it may plausibly be seen to refer to a speech that is supposed to help its hearer grasp a whole of something. Fragments 9-18 appear to continue the cosmological discourse involving light and night that began at 8.55. Fragment 12 shows a transition or connection between light (or fire, associated with light in 8.56 and fr. 9) and night on the one hand, and the love, reproduction, and human development discussed in frr. 13,16, and 18 on the other. Fragment 19 returns to the theme of naming by humans, introduced at 8.53. Fragment 20, if genuine, appears either to rephrase, to continue, or to be a mistaken reading of, something in fr. 8, as will be discussed.

Thus frr. 2-20 can with consistency be seen as parts of a speech that begins at 1.24. There is no evidence to suggest that any other hortatory or instructive speeches

were made in the poem (by other figures, for example). Lack of evidence of other such speeches is of course not sufficient to show that there were none. It is, however, reason for subjecting to serious scrutiny any claim that part or all of fr. 1.24 through fr. 20 is a speech made by someone other than the thea of fr. 1. In particular, I would propose, it is reason for examining critically any assertion or implication that 1.24 through fr. 20 directly and literally states Parmenides' opinions or conclusions, so that what seems to be portrayed as a speech made by a divinity would be taken to be something Parmenides could have said directly in his own voice, i.e. without the use of the goddess character. As for whether 1.24 through fr. 20 can coherently and consistently be read as parts of a speech by this goddess, and whether or how such a speech can be seen as part of a coherent or consistent philosophical work, it is part of the present project to explore these questions.

As fragment 1 begins, the narrator is being carried along a road to (and of) a divinity (daimon, 1.3). It seems most likely that this divinity is female, for two reasons. First, at 1.22 the narrator says he is received by 'he thea', 'the goddess' (as opposed to 'a goddess', 'thea' without the definite article); this would appear to refer

back to the daimon⁶. Second, the feminine pronoun in 1.3 also seems to have 'daimon' as antecedent, given the word order, although it may be that 'hodon', 'road', is the antecedent. Now, the thea addresses the narrator as 'young man', 'koûre', at 1.24, so we can tell at least that he is male. The sexes of the figures may be of some significance for the interpretation of the fragments; I will discuss this in the chapters to follow. It should be noted as well that the identity of the goddess who speaks is not clear (see note 6 above). This and the other details of the young man's journey must be examined too, as they represent the circumstances under which the narrator comes to receive instruction, comes to hear about inquiry.

For example, the significance of the landscape and of the means of the young man's journey deserve consideration. Possibilities regarding the supposed location of the goddess's realm, and regarding the import of such things as the chariot, mares, sun-maidens, and Dike's unbolting of the gates - both in other poems and myths

⁶The only other possible antecedent for 'he thea' in what survives as fragment 1 is 'Dike' at 1.14. But it seems to me unlikely that Dike is the thea of 1.22, because there is no mention of Dike moving up the carriage-road with the chariot once she has opened the doors; the young man's chariot seems to move past her to get to the goddess of 1.22. A weaker, but perhaps still noteworthy point in this regard is that the thea speaks of Dike and [Themis in fragment 1, and of several other female divinities elsewhere (assuming that it is she who speaks in those fragments), always using third-person forms and never explicitly identifying any of these divinities with herself.

available in the early fifth century and as vehicles of a new conception - must be explored as far as these can be shown to be relevant.

In other words it must be noted that the opening section, 1.1-23, presents a tale, a narrative, a description of (or a description in terms of) a series of events - not, for example, a treatise or an argument. The ensuing speech by the goddess occurs within that context. To understand the speech as it is presented, it will help to understand what that context is; this may also shed some light on the motivation or aim of the poem itself. To these ends it may be noted that what determined the journey, gave impetus and evidently direction and range, is the narrator's (or the mares'?) thumos (spirit, will, heart). At the same time, the narrator is not seen to step out of the chariot; he is not seen to touch ground, and the journey is not made under his own power. Further, whereas the journey to the goddess is described in past tenses, line 1 states that the mares "carry" the narrator, implying perhaps that the visit to the goddess was only one part of the narrator's travels in the chariot, and that these travels continue even to the moment of speaking or writing the poem. In any case, these too are elements that frame and lead to the speech of the goddess, so their implications should be investigated.

When she begins to speak (1.24), the goddess

immediately remarks that although the young man is "far from the beaten path of humans (1.27), he has gotten there not because of any bad moira (fate, portion) but rather on account of [D]ike and [T]hemis. The notion that the usual paths of humans are in some respects deficient or problematic will be amplified in succeeding fragments. With respect to fragment 1, though, I think it is important at least to raise the question of how or in what sense [D]ike and [T]hemis may be thought of as bringing the narrator to his audience with the goddess. Other humans, quite possibly including those who beat the usual paths, certainly seem to believe that they are following or attempting to follow [D]ike (roughly, justice or right) and [T]hemis (roughly, custom, right, that which is laid down by custom, that which is appropriate).

The goddess goes on to declare that the young man is to learn or to hearken to "everything,/ Both the unshaking heart of well-rounded (persuasive?) truth/ And the opinions of mortals, in (of) which there is no true assurance" (1.28-30). It is especially important to consider what may be meant by "true assurance" (pistis alethes). The term recurs at 8.28, and pistis (assurance) and the related [P]leitho ([P]ersuasion), as they relate to [T]ruth ([A]lletheia), will figure significantly in fragment 2 and elsewhere in fragment 8. It is also worth noting that it is not at all clear that the goddess ever lists or describes directly, in the

surviving fragments, what the "heart of truth" might be supposed to comprise, or supposed to consist in. What she does is to discuss roads of inquiry. It is also not clear what she intends by 'the opinions of mortals'; the views she attributes to mortals do not on their surface seem to coincide with any that humans are known to have espoused in the Greek-speaking world by Parmenides' time.

As 1.24 marks the transition from the narrator's report of his journey to what he says is a recital or report of the speech of the goddess, some account will need to be made of the recurrence in subsequent fragments of certain figures and features from the story of the chariot ride. For example, the young man's chariot travels along a road early in fragment 1, and the goddess (if it is she who is speaking in these later fragments; I will argue that it is likely that she is the speaker) tells him about roads or paths of inquiry in fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8. Dike allows the narrator into the realm of the goddess who speaks, and is identified by that goddess as being at least partly responsible for his being able to travel on her road; Dike reappears in the goddess's account of the "remaining" road in fr. 8. The goddess's realm is past the gates of the paths of Night and Day, and the maidens travel away from night into light; light/fire and night are the two primary components in the world-view that the goddess attributes to mortals in fragments 8-12 and plausibly 13-19. [T]hemis was cited along

with [D]ike as having brought the young man to the goddess who speaks, and [T]hemis is invoked at 8.32 as having to do with the way to eon (that which is) is, or with the with the way to eon must be said and taken to be, on or for the road of inquiry in question (and perhaps otherwise).

A more complicated matter is the recurrence, or the use at all, of terms connoting multiplicity, change, and negation. The narrator calls the (multiple) mares "much-indicating" (poluphrastoi) and Dike "many-penaltied" (polupoinos); he mentions multiple cities, roads, gates, maidens, and so on. The goddess who speaks refers in fragment 1 to "everything" or "all things" (using 'panta', a plural form) and to mortals; and later to multiple roads of inquiry, to the "very many signs" (semata.../polla mal') of the final road to be discussed (8.2-3), to several divinities, and to the various components of the cosmos as she claims mortals see it - among other multiplicities. Yet in fragment 8, lines 1-49, she also declares that on or for the remaining road (at least), to eon must be (or must be said and taken to be) unique, indivisible, indestructible, ungenerated, and so on. Similarly, both the young man's tale and the goddess's speech invoke change and progress through time and space, and the goddess's remarks at 8.1-49 would seem to imply equally that these are not sayable or conceivable on the last road or account of a road. A careful study must be made of the specific statements involved and

of the contexts in which they appear, in order to see how if at all they might harmonize, and what they signify individually and as a group.

In addition, questions arise regarding the translation and significance of certain words and phrases in fragment 1. As has been mentioned, the meaning of 'true assurance' ('pistis alethes') in 1.30 must be explored; this should be of some value in trying to determine just what the goddess thinks is wrong with mortals' opinions, or with the meanings and uses these opinions have for mortals. In lines 31 and 32, concerning what the young man is to learn besides the "heart of [T]ruth", 'ta dokoûnta' could mean either 'the things that are believed' or 'the things that seem'; and 'dokimos' could mean 'really' or 'truly', or else it could be an adverbial form of 'approved', 'accepted', 'esteemed'. 'Dia pantos' in 1.32 may mean either 'altogether' or 'continuously' or 'continually' if 'pantos' is neuter, but if 'pantos' is masculine the phrase would mean 'going through each'.

Further questions that are suggested by fragment 1, and that I think must be borne in mind in studying other fragments, include the following. What is the role of the goddess who speaks; why might there be a speech by a divinity - or, why might this particular speech be portrayed

as made by a divine being? What if anything can be determined about the nature of this divinity? Is there some reason why a human character could not have been used in her place? What if any difference might be made in the meaning, significance, or implications of the speech, and of the sum of the fragments, if a human character had made the speech instead of the goddess? These questions will be among those investigated in the chapter on implications of the binding of to eon by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira; and in the concluding chapter.

Fragment 2

Come now, I will speak, and do you carry this speech away
with you once heard,

Just which are the only roads of inquiry (seeking) to
conceive [of] (for thinking):

The one, that (how) [it] is and that (how) [it] is not
[possible for it] not to be,

Is the path of [P]ersuasion - for [T]ruth attends (follows)
upon her (it);

The other, that (how) [it] is not and that (how) [it] is
necessary [for it] not to be (OR:...that (how) there is
necessity not to be),

This indeed I indicate to you to be an all-not-inquirable-
into (wholly unknowable?) straight track:

For neither would you know (understand) what is not (not-
being) - for that is not accomplished -

Nor would you indicate it.

As must be apparent from the look of this
translation, fragment 2 presents a number of problems having

to do with grammar and syntax. First, the word 'esti', 'is', appears in lines 3 and 5 without an explicit grammatical subject. Implied subjects are common in Greek; the problem here is that it is not clear what the grammatical subject is in either case, or whether in fact there is one to be supplied. Four possibilities present themselves. The first is that each subject is one of the roads of inquiry under discussion. Another possibility is that both subjects are to eon, that which is (also translatable as 'being'); to me eon is mentioned in as a kind of opposition in line 7. Or perhaps the subjects of the 'esti's are anything in general that is (or can be) said or taken to be. Finally, it is possible that there is not supposed to be a subject. Several other passages in the fragments have implied subjects that are difficult to identify, as we will see; and 'esti' in particular appears again without an explicit grammatical subject in fragments 6 and 8. Because of the fragmentation of the text, each of these cases must be treated as it arises, in whatever context can be discovered for it.

Another very important problem is the grammatical case of '[A]lletheie', '[T]ruth', in line 4. Many modern editors add an iota subscript to the final letter eta, so that the word is in the dative case. This emendation makes [T]ruth what is attended or followed upon and [P]ersuasion ([P]leitho) the logical candidate for the subject of 'hopedei', 'attends', 'follows'. However, ancient texts,

notably that of Simplicius, do not show the iota subscript.⁷ Without the emendation, '[A]letheie' is in the nominative case, and line 4 proposes that [T]ruth attends upon [P]ersuasion. Philosophical reasons for not making the emendation will be discussed as relevant material occurs.

Regarding the same line, it should be noted that Simplicius does not use initial capitals in 'peithous' and 'aletheie', so that it is not clear whether the divinities who bear these names are in fact being invoked at this point in the poem. There is no unambiguous identification of persuasion and truth as the goddesses of these names in the extant fragments. In the discussions that follow I will concentrate on what might be signified in any case by the claims that a certain road of inquiry is that of persuasion, and that truth attends upon persuasion - claims that would be in effect in the goddess's speech whether she were invoking divinities or not. In so far as characteristics usually associated with the divinities Peitho and Aletheie might be relevant to the discussions I will mention them,

⁷See e.g. Simon Karsten, ed., Parmenides Eleatae Carminis Reliquiae (Amsterdam: J. Mueller & Soc., 1835), who reports this line as appearing both in Proclus' commentary on Plato's Timaeus (I, 345) and in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics (116-7) without the added letter - i.e., with '[A]letheie' in the nominative.

David Sider and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., in their edition of the fragments (The Fragments of Parmenides, Bryn Mawr Greek Commentaries (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania: Thomas Library, Bryn Mawr College, 1986), 12), support the unemended reading with a parallel construction from Hesiod's Theogony 80, in which Kalliope attends upon righteous kings.

though necessarily in a hypothetical way.

Lines 2 and 7, respectively, mark the introductions of a word and a phrase that will recur throughout the poem, and whose senses are ambiguous and problematic. In line 2 we find 'noêsai', aorist infinitive middle of 'noeo', which may mean observe or notice; think, conceive, suppose; devise, contrive, intend; or conceive of, deem or take to be something or other. As will be seen, particularly in the chapter on Moîra, the second and fourth senses seem most likely in the contexts in which the words appear in the fragments. But the fact that a single word could be used in Greek in both (or all four) of these senses is of some importance in an interpretation.

Line 7 contains the first appearance of 'to...eon' in the surviving fragments.⁸ 'Eon', the neuter singular present participle of 'eînai', 'to be', usually appears in the fragments in the singular, and with 'to', 'the'. The

⁸First, of course, if fragment 2 should be placed before fragments 3-19 or 20. Since fragment 2 announces that roads of inquiry will be discussed, it would certainly seem logical to place fragment 2 before the other fragments that contain discussions of roads - viz., frr. 6-8. Fragments 9-19 would seem to follow fragment 8 because of their subjects and because of the terms in which these are described; this point will be treated later on. Fragments 3, 5, and 20, as has been noted and as will be discussed later, seem to resist definitive ordering. The appropriate position of fragment 4 is not obvious, but its topic could reasonably be taken to be an amplification or development of the pronouncements of fragment 2 concerning to eon; and fragment 4 in turn seems to be amplified or complemented in fragments 6-8. For these reasons, it seems plausible to put fragment 2 before fragments 4, 6, 7, and 8-19.

phrase 'to eon' is often translated 'being', but 'what is', 'the what is', or 'that which is' would be equally appropriate. What actually appears in line 7 is 'to me eon', and that would be translatable as 'not-being', 'what is not', 'the what is not', or 'that which is not'. Here too it should be of value to note that the phrase was used in what would customarily be identified in English, but not in ancient Greek, as at least two distinct senses.

Another word of broad or ambiguous meaning is 'muthos', the term that the goddess uses at 2.1 and 8.1 to refer to her speech. In Parmenides' time, particularly in epic writing, 'muthos' was used to refer to any kind of speech or talk; but it could also mean counsel or command; that which is spoken about; design or purpose; proverb; or tale or story. It did not generally, at any time, refer specifically to a reasoned account or explanation, though that reference would be within the scope of the first sense above. On the other hand, 'muthos' did not have the connotations of the English word 'myth' that is derived from it. In English today, to call a story a myth is to cast doubt on its veracity or support; but to call a story a muthos in ancient Greek had no such implication.

The topic of the goddess's speech in fragment 2 is roads of inquiry or of seeking (hodoi...dizesios) that are available for conceiving or being aware [of] (noêsai).

Especially in the chapters on Dike, Ananke, and Mofira, I will look at what would commonly have been meant by 'dizemai' ('to inquire', 'to search') in the early fifth century BCE. In this fragment all talk of not-being/what is not (to me eon), of [it] is (esti), and of [it] is not (ouk esti) appears within the discussion of the roads. Esti and ouk esti serve to identify the roads. What this identification may mean will be investigated later. Any analysis of the specific claims about to eon, to me eon, and so on must take into account that these do not appear independently of discussions of roads. In fact, claims about to eon, to me eon, esti, etc. in fragments 6 through 8 also appear only within the context of discussions of roads, or of comments about which roads are to be followed. Fragment 4 may also fit this pattern, depending on how its placement is understood. It will be of interest to consider the significance of the notion of roads, as well as to consider what inquiry might be seen as having to do with what is being identified as conceivable or not conceivable.

In line 6, the goddess calls a road "all-not-inquirable-into" (panapeuthea). She appears to begin to support this claim, in lines 7 and 8, by pointing out that "you" ('gnoies' and 'phrasais' are in the second person singular) would neither understand nor indicate to me eon, that which is not (not-being). We must ask, then, who it is that the goddess considers unable to inquire, understand, or

indicate. Certainly she refers to the young man, but does she intend him alone? Does she perhaps make these remarks about him in virtue of something that sets him apart from other humans, or from other mortals? Or does she speak of him as representative of humans or mortals in general? As a representative of humans or mortals as such? Do her words apply to all beings who are able to inquire or to seek - that is, to divinities as well as to mortals? (Greek divinities might not need to seek or to inquire, but that is not to say that they would be unable to do so.) It is also important to ask why and under what circumstances to me eon is being pronounced incomprehensible and unindicatable (unable to be indicated, apparently, even by the expression 'to me eon'). Similarly, we may ask why the roads of inquiry that are designated are said to be the only ones for conceiving (or among the only ones, if some are not enumerated in the fragments we retain, e.g. if there are branches to each road, or if the 'men...de' construction of 2.3-6 does not imply that there are only two possibilities). We should then ask for whom or under what circumstances these are supposed to be the only ones.

Also in line 6, the goddess calls the all-not-inquirable-into road a "straight track" (atarpon). The significance of this may have something to do with the circuit or closed system invoked in fragment 5, or with the "straight" movements of mortals' minds at 6.5; or with both.

Conceivably, it could also be taken to stand in contrast to the notion of to eon as unended and sphere-like (8.4, 8.42-43) on or for the road of inquiry that is considered in fragment 8.

Fragment 3

...for the same [thing] [there] is for conceiving (thinking; awareness; knowing?) [of] and for being
 (OR:...for the same [thing] is [there] to conceive (think; be aware; know?) [of] and to be)
 (OR:...for to conceive (think; be aware; know?) and to be are the same [thing])

This fragment, whose length is less than one hexameter line, is generally thought to follow immediately on fragment 2. One reason for this placement is that if fr. 3 is added to the end of 2.8, a complete hexameter line is formed. The word 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as'), the second word in fr. 3, usually indicates that some preceding claim is being supported or amplified. Before accepting the placement of fr. 3 as the second half of 2.8, it should be asked how if at all fragment 3 may be seen to support or to continue the claims of 2.7-8; and what the consequences of support, versus the consequences of taking fragment 3 to be independent of fragment 2, would be. It is possible that fragment 3 represents the end of a line other than 2.8, and also possible that it represents the middle or beginning of a line (while not the beginning of a sentence, and perhaps not the end of one).

We would do well too to ask in what context if any

the goddess might mean what she says in fragment 3. That is, is the sentence of which this fragment is a part an unconditional statement, or is it intended to apply specifically to inquiries, or to inquiries of a certain sort? Is it intended to apply under some other circumstances instead? Can we tell? In any event, the goddess is depicted as addressing someone who has traveled with a certain purpose or spirit or direction. For this reason, I would suggest, we cannot immediately assume that she means all of her remarks to hold under all circumstances.

Fragment 3 poses several problems pertaining to syntax or to word meanings. First, 'to auto' may mean "the same" or "the same thing". Then, as has been pointed out in the section on fragment 2 above, 'noein' may mean "to think [of]" or "to conceive [of]"; or "to take", in the sense of taking something to be a certain way, or taking it that some situation obtains. In their notes on fragment 3, Sider and Johnstone⁹ propose that the word may retain here its earlier sense, something like "to know the truth of a situation through instant apprehension". A discussion of possibilities for the meaning and sense of this and related terms in the fragments will appear in the chapter on Mofra. 'Esti' is a third word that presents translation problems; it may mean "is", "there is", or "is there". It may also have a sense

⁹Sider and Johnstone, 12-13.

close to "can be".

The syntactical problem involves the two infinitives, 'noein' and 'einai'. They can be taken as datives meaning "for thinking/conceiving/etc." and "for being", respectively. Or, they can be read as substantival, so that they mean "to think/conceive/etc." and "to be", and are the clause's subjects or predicate nominatives.

Because of the brevity of the fragment and of the lack of conclusive evidence as to its exact location with respect to the other fragments, I do not expect to be able to say anything definitive about these questions. My interpretations of other passages will not rely solely or crucially on my suggestions regarding the problems of fragment 3; I will use these suggestions mainly as hypotheses.

Fragment 4

Nevertheless (Equally) gaze (observe) steadily with noos
 [on] what is absent and [on] what is present;
 (OR:...gaze (observe steadily [on] what is absent to noos
 and [on] what is present [to noos];)

For it (you) will not sever [the] what is (being) from
 holding to [the] what is (being),

Neither by scattering it altogether in every way according
 to an order
 (OR:...in every way throughout the universe)

Nor by bringing it together.

Important difficulties for the interpretation of
 fragment 4 have to do with definitions, grammar, and syntax.

The first word in line 1 may mean either "observe" or "gaze on". The second word may be either 'hómos', 'nevertheless', or 'homôs', 'equally'. Further, it is not clear exactly what this word governs. It may govern the whole clause (all of line 1); the translation above reflects that reading. On the other hand, it also may govern 'apeonta', 'absent things', or else 'pareonta' ('present things').

Also in line 1 is 'nooi', dative of 'noos'. As with the occurrences of its correlate 'noein', the precise meaning of 'nooi' in this context is not immediately clear. It can mean "mind", "awareness", "heart", or "purpose". Neither is it clear to what 'nooi' is intended to be attached. If it goes with 'leússe', we should read "...gaze (observe) with (by means of) noos...". If it goes with 'apeonta', we would read "...gaze (observe)...[on] what is absent to noos and [on] what is present [to noos]." If 'nooi' goes with 'pareonta', we would read "...gaze (observe)...[on] what is absent [to noos] and on what is present to noos."

Further complicating these matters is 'apotmexei' in line 2. This form could be either the second person singular future ('you will not cut off for yourself (in your mind?)) or the third person singular future active ('it will not cut off', 'it' probably referring to noos).

'Kata kosmon' in line 4 is also ambiguous. It could mean "according to an order" or "in order"; or it could mean

"throughout the ordered universe", though both the context of the phrase and the date of the poem make this reading less likely.

In the case of this fragment as well, there may not be enough information to make possible a definitive or conclusive choice in the interpretation of each word or phrase. In the discussion of this fragment I will discuss the implications of the translation options I have mentioned only in so far as they bear on interpretations of other sections (e.g. by their being either incompatible or consonant with one or another interpretation of another passage), and especially in so far as they bear on the investigation of thematic questions about Parmenides' work, or of questions generated by it. These questions will be presented in outline at the end of this chapter.

An important question to ask regarding fr. 4 is why, and under what if any particular circumstances, the young man or his noos should not be able to "sever [the] what is (being) from holding to [the] what is (being),/ Neither by scattering it," etc. (4.2-4). This cannot be answered from fr. 4 alone, but a clearer conception may be suggested by a study of fragments 6-8.

Fragment 5

...It is the same (common) to me

From what place I should begin, for to that place I shall
come back again.

This fragment is generally presumed to be a statement by the goddess, and presumed to refer at least to her speech, or to some aspect of it. We do not have clear evidence in the extant fragments that she has begun any other activity besides speaking. Thus it is possible that this fragment could come as a sort of preface, before fragment 2. Line 5.1 is the second half of a hexameter line, and therefore there is a temptation to place it directly after 4.4, which is the first half of a hexameter line. Metrical fit, however, is far from a sufficient reason for accepting one fragment arrangement over another. If the position of fragment 5 is to be called into question, might fr. 5 not possibly go somewhere after fragment 8, so that it is applied only to the account (or to part of the account) of the opinions of mortals? Or perhaps fragment 5 is not part of the goddess's speech at all, but rather a comment by the narrator (or even some other character, though there is no evidence for or against the existence of a third speaker in the poem); then it might even precede fragment 1. There is, though, reason at least to suggest that fragment 5 is a statement by the goddess, and that it should be kept somewhere before fragment 6.

Fragment 5 suggests that the speaker's account, or some part of it, is going to be a sort of closed system, and possibly that what the speaker will account for or describe is in some sense a closed system. I intend to discuss in

what sense the goddess's account and possibly what she accounts for might be (or might have to be taken to be) closed, and what relationship there might be (or might be supposed to be) between the two. I will then investigate how or in what sense what the narrator presents might be (or might need to be taken to be) closed. I will look as well at why such closure(s) might hold or be said or taken to hold, and at what it (they) would imply. For example, does fr. 5 suggest that the goddess's account, or the narrator's story or journey, will be circular, and would circularity pose problems as to coherence or validity?

It will also be recalled in this connection that in fragment 2, the path that was labeled "all-not-inquirable-into" was called as well a "straight track" (atarpon). Then in fragment 6, mortals' "helplessness...drives their wandering noos straight" while "the path of all is back-turning" (6.5-6, 6.9). (As will be noted, it is not immediately clear whether 'panta', 'all', at 6.9 refers to all mortals or to all things in general.) Additionally, one might look for a possible tie between fragment 5 and 8.4, and between fragment 5 and 8.43-45. In 8.4, signs on the last road of inquiry indicate that something (probably, as we will see, to eon) is unended; in 8.43-45, something (probably to eon again) is likened in some respect to the bulk of a sphere - again, on or for a certain road of inquiry.

It is important to determine what the goddess's account is supposed to circumnavigate or to go through, if indeed it is the subject of fragment 5. Would she be speaking of her account of or pertaining to "the unshaking heart of...[T]ruth" in saying that she can always begin and end at the same place no matter what place she chooses? Or would it be her account of the opinions of mortals that would allow her to do this? Or perhaps she would be speaking of her account of both. The part of her account that survives has to do with roads of inquiry. Thus it may be asked whether the claim of fragment 5 would pertain to the goddess's speech as a whole; to her muthos of all of the roads; to her account of which roads of inquiry are possible for noein (frr. 2,6,7,8 at least); to her muthos of the remaining road (fr. 8.1-49); to her presentation of what she says are the opinions of mortals (fr. 8.53-61, frr.9-19, perhaps fr. 20 - these passages do not contain references to roads); or to some combination of these. On the other hand, if fragment 5 described the narrator's account or journey, we would do well to bear in mind the question (whether it can be answered or not) of the scope of the claim of fragment 5.

I call attention as well to the fact that the speaker in fragment 5 says that it does not matter where she (or he) starts, as she (he) will return there. Whether others might also be able to do this is not mentioned. I

will explore what it is possible to glean from other fragments about whether anyone else might be capable of doing what the goddess does (or what she says she is doing, at any point in the fragments), and why or why not. This is an important issue regardless of whether fragment 5 represents a statement by the goddess. I will examine what follows from the possibility that the goddess's pronouncements about specific speakers and thinkers/conceivers reflect a sense that (to her, at least, and perhaps to Parmenides as well) there are differences among these speakers or conceivers that affect what each can say and/or conceive or think, or that affect what is or can be meant by statements each may make.

Fragment 6

It is necessary for saying and noein and eon (being; what is) to be; for [there] [it] is (for this can be; for [it] is [there]) for being (to be),
 (OR:It is necessary to say and noein that eon is; for...)
 (OR:It is necessary for saying and noein that eon is; for...)
 (OR:...; for to be is,)

By no means is [it] not. These things I bid you to indicate to yourself;
 (OR:Nothing is not....)

For from this first road of inquiry I keep (bar) you,

But also from the road, [the one] on which mortals understanding nothing (understanding not at all)

Wander two-headed, for helplessness in their own breasts drives their wandering noos straight, and they are borne lurching along

Deaf and blind equally, dazed (amazed), a tribe without judgment (distinctions),

By whom it is held that pelein (to be; to go on?) and ouk eínai (not to be) are the same

And not the same, but the path of all is back-turning.

Problems of translation occur in lines 1,2, and 9 of fragment 6. The first sentence of the fragment, taking up line 1 and the first clause of line 2, has three clauses, each of which can be translated in several ways. I have presented the versions that I find to make the best combinations, initially, of grammatical sense and philosophical consistency within the fragment. In the final two chapters I will propose, discuss, and support what I think to be the most likely version or versions in each case, based on what I find to be the most likely sense or senses of this fragment as a whole. This characterization, in turn, must be based in part on considerations arising from other fragments, so that its justification may not be completely within the scope of an exegesis of fr. 6.

The problem in line 9 is the reference of 'panton', a masculine or neuter plural form meaning "all". The goddess¹⁰ may be referring to all mortals, or to all things

¹⁰As will be discussed, there is reason to suppose that fragment 6 is part of the goddess's speech. This and similar declarations that the speaker bars or prohibits the listener from some path or mode or way of noein or of inquiry would seem inappropriate or futile coming from a human. That is, one human would not be able to bar another from thinking, inquiring, or being aware in some particular way - at least, not merely by announcing a prohibition, and likely not even by argument or explanation. A divine being would be more likely (though not certain) to be able to do this, and would certainly be better able to tell when the prohibition was

in general. One significant way in which the import would differ with the reading would be the following. If the goddess is speaking of all mortals, then it may well be that the "path" (keleuthos) in line 9 is a road of inquiry, and the wandering of mortals has to do with their noos going "straight" (6.6) when their true or actual path is "back-turning" (6.9). That is, either mortals think they are going straight, whatever that would entail, when they are not; or else their problem is that they keep straying from the back-turning path on which they had set out, or on which they would have done better to have set out.

On this reading, nothing in particular is being said directly about the nature of what is being inquired into (or about the nature of whatever else the path might have to do with, if it is not a path of inquiry). Nor is anything being said about the relationship between the roads of inquiry and what is inquired into. On the other hand, if 6.9 is read as saying that the path of all things in general is back-turning, then it would appear that something is being said about that which is inquired into, or perhaps about whatever mortals encounter. It is not clear what the "path" would be in this case, not why or in what sense "all things" should seem to have a path. Still, if line 9 is read in this second way, the contrast made will be between the movement or track of mortals' minds (or conceivings, grasps, awareness, etc.)

violated, and to exact retribution for violations.

and the path of whatever these inquire into or otherwise deal with. Of course, mortals' faculties, and mortals themselves, will also be part of the "all", so in a sense this reading as well implies that mortals' conceivings (awareness, etc.) diverge from the mortals' own real or actual routes (whatever being on such a route involves). The two readings would converge if the true or actual road of all mortals' conceivings etc. - perhaps, as would be consonant with fragment 8, within contexts of inquiry - were said or thought to be, or to resemble in shape (whatever that would mean), the path of all things, or perhaps the path that all things must be taken to have if inquiry is to be possible. This point will be explored in some detail in the chapters on Dike, Ananke, and Mofra, and treated more fully in the final two chapters. It does seem clear, however, that the straightness of the route of mortals' noos is presented as a defect or as the result of error; and since the narrator, poet, and at least some readers are mortals, the straightness of the route must also be presented as a problem .

The identification of the first road from which the goddess says that she bars the young man is also difficult to determine. It will depend on the translation of the first two lines, and on the reference of 'tautes' ('this') in line 3. For grammatical and philosophical reasons that will be discussed, I will take that reference to be "[it] is not"; I

will also explain what I think 'it' would then refer to.

It is also important to ask how and to what extent we can characterize the second road from which the goddess would keep the young man. What does the claim that mortals hold that to be (or to go on) and not to be are the same and not the same amount to? How might it be associated with the lacks and weaknesses attributed to mortals in lines 5 through 8?

Fragment 6 contains the first occurrence of a feature that will figure prominently in fragment 8. In line 1, we see a distinction made between saying (legein), thinking/conceiving/awareness (noein), and being/what is (eon). They are mentioned as distinct, but they are at the same time presented as linked. That is, the statement that the goddess makes has to do with all three, and with a relationship between each or both of saying (or perhaps what is said) and noein (or perhaps what is thought/conceived [of]) on the one hand, and eon on the other. I think it is essential to ask why, for whom, and in what cases or for what purposes (inquiry only, for example?) the claim of the first clause of line 1 is supposed to hold. The text that we retain is not explicit about these matters. For now, it should be pointed out that the connection represented by 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as') in the second clause of line 1 is not evident. Our interpretation of the goddess's

statements regarding legein, noein, eon, and their interrelationships must depend in at least some measure on our understanding of fragment 6, so ambiguities and uncertainties may remain. In discussing passages in fragment 8 that bear on this topic, I will offer suggestions as to what I think the goddess's implications may be, and as to what I think they cannot or are not likely to be. For example, I will argue in the "Preliminary Implications..." chapter that not only does fragment 6 not provide sure evidence of what would now be called "idealism" on the part of either the goddess or Parmenides, but that both the form of the poem and the content of the goddess's speech can be seen to imply an undermining of "idealism". Moreover, what we might today call "naive realism" is equally undermined. (In the "Preliminary Implications..." chapter I will provide a fuller characterization of the sorts of views that might be seen as examples of "idealism" or of "naive realism", and to which I find challenges in the fragments.)

Fragment 7

For never is this [to be] forced, that what is not (things that are not; me eonta) exist[s],

But [do you] keep your thought from this road of inquiry:

Neither allow many-experienced (much-experienced) habit to force you along this road,

To ply an aimless (heedless) eye and a roaring hearing (ear)

And tongue, but pick out (judge; distinguish; krinai) for yourself by means of reason (an account? a word? - logos) a much-contesting refutation

Out of my speech (Out of what I said).

Fragment 7 seems to fall somewhere between fragments 6 and 8, in that 6.3 proclaims a "first" barring, or a barring from a first road; and 8.1-2 announce that the one road that "remains", or the one account of a road that remains, is about to be treated. Sextus represents 7.3-6 as being followed immediately by the first sentence of fragment 8, but he may be incorrect in doing so¹¹. It is not clear how close fragment 7 was, in the poem as written, to either fragment 6 or fragment 8; and as has been noted, neither is it clear how much more than fragments 2, 6, 7, and 8 (and perhaps 3-5) was included in the poem's discussion of roads.

Several problems in interpreting fr. 7 have to do with ambiguities of word meaning or usage. The first line may be either declarative or effectively imperative, depending on whether one takes 'Never is this to be forced' to mean "This cannot be forced" or "Let this not be forced." It is also not clear, especially on the latter interpretation, whether the goddess means this statement to apply to all beings under all circumstances (or unconditionally), or whether she means that someone in particular (e.g. mortals), or someone or anyone under certain conditions (e.g. those who are involved in inquiry,

¹¹Sextus Empiricus, op. cit., 111.

or those who desire a stable mode of communication or a stable political state) cannot or must not force that things that are not, are.

Whereas the singular neuter participle 'eon' of the verb 'to be' had been used in fragments 2,4, and 6, the plural form 'eonta' is used, negated, at 7.1. It should be asked what difference is reflected by this usage, and how best to translate these participial forms. 'Eon' can be rendered in English as 'being', 'what is', 'that which is', or perhaps 'existing thing' or 'existent'. 'Eonta' would then be 'beings', 'those that are', 'things that are', 'existing things', 'existents'. It is important to consider that in Greek, these participles could be verbal adjectives or verbal nouns, and that the noun aspect (the "what") was not necessarily looked on as separate from the verb aspect (the "is"). That is to say, to assimilate an "eon" to a "thing" may be misleading; it may imply too much of a separation or distinction between a something conceived as "doing" the being, and the "being", the verbal aspect, that is involved. This consideration may help in bringing out the paradoxes, implied in fragment 8, of a conception that invokes both eon and negation or distinction.

'Noema', used in line 2, may mean either "thought"/"conceiving"/"awareness" (perhaps "grasping" or "realizing", "realization") - i.e., an awareness or consciousness or intellection - or else "what is thought

[of]"/"what is conceived [of]", that is, something like what we might today in English call the "object" or else the "content" of thought or awareness, or "what is thought [of]". As with the case of the participles, it is worth bearing in mind that English has a standard way of distinguishing between (and identifying) these senses that ancient Greek does not. Today's English also readily identifies as an "object" something that Greek does not necessarily identify as one.

'Askopon' (7.4) may mean either "heedless" or "aimless". The latter seems to me to be the preferable translation. It is not clear how or why eyes would be heedless, nor what it would be for them to be heedful. Eyes can be aimless in the sense of being, or of having to be, unfocussed, unaimed; and this would parallel the "roaring" ear/hearing and tongue of 7.4-5 as a representation of an organ that is filled incoherently, inchoately, or without distinctions. Deafness, blindness, and speech defects can take these forms; and deafness and blindness were mentioned along with an inability to discriminate and to guide oneself well, in fragment 6. Thus "aimless" seems to be an appropriate translation choice in that it is in keeping with, and can be seen as amplifying, the depiction of mortals that appeared in fragment 6.

'Krînai', in line 5, can be translated as 'pick out for yourself', 'distinguish for yourself', 'discriminate for

yourself', 'judge for yourself'. A word with the same root is used at 6.7, where mortals (at least those on the path being discussed at that point) are said to lack judgment, distinctions, or discrimination. Especially given the goddess's injunctions and warnings in fr. 4 and 8 about cuts and distinctions that mortals may mistakenly think are possible or permissible, it will be important to try to understand the significance of her statements about mortals' failures to judge or to distinguish. A further consideration is her use of the middle voice, "judge (etc.) for yourself", which may perhaps imply that most mortals do not judge (distinguish, etc.) for themselves, that they do not judge (etc.) for themselves by means of logos, or that the young man (and perhaps each hearer or reader of the poem) must make this judgment (distinction, etc.) for himself - i.e., that no one can help him to do it.

There has recently¹² been some controversy over the meaning of 'elenchos' at 7.5. The point of contention is whether in this context the meaning is closest to "refutation", "proof", "test", or "challenge". There may be a hint as to the resolution of this question in the goddess's description of the elenchos as "poluderis", "much-

¹²See e.g. David Furley, "Truth as What Survives the Elenchos," in Cosmic Problems: Essays on Greek and Roman Philosophy of Nature (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38-46; also J.H. Lesher, "Parmenides' Critique of Thinking: The poluderis elenchos of Fragment 7," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 2 (1984): 1-30.

contesting". This expression would seem to imply that something in what she is saying goes against (or can be taken to go against) many other things - plausibly, against the beliefs, conceptions, conclusions, or directions that she identifies in line 3 as resulting from reliance on habit. What kind of opposition the goddess proposes, and what specifically she thinks should be the results of her presenting it to the young man, are not immediately clear.

Also in line 5, the goddess bids the young man to come up with the elenchos by means of logos, [an] account, reason, word, or speech. A noun that appears in Greek without an article may be translated into English by a noun with an indefinite article, or else by a noun with no article, as in the cases of general, universal, or abstract terms. In poetry, there is a third translation option for this form; one may translate the noun as accompanied by the definite article. In the case of 7.5, it is not immediately clear which option is most appropriate. My discussion of this fragment will not depend on any particular choice regarding articles. As for 'logos' itself, the term presents difficulties in other authors as well. If it is taken to mean "reason", "a reason", "the reason", or even "an account", then the sense of 'elenchos' may tend toward "refutation". The other possibilities for the meaning of 'logos' would not rule that out, of course. The importance of the choice of translation for 'logos', if indeed the

choice can be made and supported, will affect the determination of what the goddess is asking the young man to do in order to stay off of a road that she proscribes. At stake here are the roles of reasoning and speech in the substance of her recommendations.

Aside from questions of word meaning and usage, a noteworthy feature of fragment 7 is that since the first line is meant as an imperative, then once again a claim about what exists and what does not, or about conceptions regarding these, is subordinated to or placed within the scope of a command. Indeed, the rest of the fragment is in the imperative mood. In any case, we may legitimately ask why it is "never to be forced" (by whoever is intended) that things that are not exist: because that is not true? because it cannot be true? because of some other consequence, such as a contradiction? We should also explore what would, or could, support any of these reasons, and whether the command is meant unconditionally or whether it applies only under certain circumstances (inquiry, for example). In addition, it is important to see what can be found out about just what is meant by "forc[ing] that things that are not exist" and, for that matter, by "things that are not" (me eonta).

Fragment 8

...One account (story; muthos) of a road yet
Is left: that (how) [it] is. Toward (On) this signs exist,
Very many, that (how) [it] is [a] being (eon) unborn and

indestructible,
(OR:...,that (how) what is (being; eon) is unborn and
indestructible,)

Whole (complete), unique and unmoving and complete
(unended);

Neither was [it] ever not will [it] be, since [it] is now
all [of it] together (common),
(OR:There is not was or will be, since...)

One, continuous; for what parentage (birth) will you seek
out for it?

How and whence grown? Nor will I allow you to say nor yet to
conceive (think, take it, etc.; noein) [that it was]
out of what is not (out of not being; ek me eontos);
for it is neither sayable (phaton) nor perceptible to
noos (conceivable; noeton)

That (How) is = is not. And what necessity would have
started it (this; min) going
(OR:[That] is [is] how (in the manner of) is not. And...)
(OR:That (How) it (sc. eon?) is = it is not. And...)
(OR:[That] it (sc. eon?) is how (in the manner of) it is
not. And...)
(OR:That (How) it (sc. eon?) is is not. And...)

Later or sooner, beginning from nothing, to spring up?

Thus it is necessary either to be entirely (wholly), or not
[to be].

Nor will strength of assurance ever allow, out of what is
not (out of not being; ek me eontos)

Something to come to be beside it; on account of (for the
sake of) this (it?) neither coming to be

Nor perishing does [Dlike allow by loosening the shackles,

But she holds; and in this (in the following?) is the
distinction regarding these:

[It (sc. eon?)] is or [it] is not; for it has in fact been
decided, just as is necessary,

To permit that one (the latter) [road] is unconceived [-of]
(anoeton) and unnamed (nameless) - for not a true
(genuine; real)

Road is it, and to permit that the other one (the former) is

to be and to be genuine (true).
 (OR:...to grant the other one (the former) to be thus: to be genuine (true).)

How could that which is (being; to eon) be after[wards]
 (come after)? How could it come into being (be born)?

For if it came to be, it is (was) not, nor if it is ever
 about to come to be.

In this way coming to be has been extinguished and
 destruction is not heard of.

Neither is it divisible, since it is all alike (like);
 (OR:..., since all is alike (like);)

Nor is it in any way more here (in any one place), which
 would keep it from holding itself together;

Nor is it in any way less; but all is full of what is
 (being; eontos).

Therefore all is continuous; for what is (being; eon) comes
 near to what is (being; eonti).
 (OR:Therefore it is all continuous; for...)

But unmoving in limits of mighty bonds

[It] is without beginning and without cease, since coming to
 be and destruction

Wandered very far off, and (but) true assurance pushed them
 away.

Remaining the same and in the same place (way), it lies
 (remains) by (according to) itself

And thus it stands fast on the spot, for mighty [Alnanke]

Holds it in bonds of limit, which shuts it in all around (on
 both sides).

Wherefore (Since) [it is] not right (lawful, meet; themis)
 for that which is (being; to eon) to be unfinished
 (incomplete):

(OR:Wherefore (Since) [it is] right (etc.; themis) for to
eon to be not unfinished (incomplete):)

For it is not lacking; if it were, it would lack everything.

The same [thing] is [there] for conceiving (thinking,
 awareness, etc; noein) [of] and [is] wherefore (for the

sake of which) [there] is that which is conceived
 (thought, etc.; noema) [of]
 (OR:...and is wherefore (for the sake of which) [there] is
 conceiving (thought, awareness, etc.; noema)
 (OR:The same [thing] is to conceive (think, etc.; noein) and
 [is] wherefore (for the sake of which) [there] is
noema)
 (OR:...and is wherefore (for the sake of which) [it (sc.
eon?)] is [a] noema)
 (OR:Noein is the same [thing] as wherefore (for the sake of
 which [there] is noema)

For not without that which is (being; tôu eontos), on which
 what is expressed (reported) depends
 (OR:..., dependent on which [it] (i.e., noein) has been
 expressed (reported))

Will you find [the] conceiving (thinking, awareness, etc.;
noein). For nothing either is or will be

Beside[s] that which is (being; toû eontos), since [M]oîra
 bound it

To be whole and unmoving; with respect to (for) this
 everything has been named (specified; reading
onomastai)
 (OR:...with respect to (for) this [it] has been named
 (reading onomastai) all things)
 (OR:...with respect to (for) this everything will be a name
 (reading onoma estai))

As many as (As much as) mortals having laid down trusting to
 be true

To come to be (Coming to be) and to be destroyed (being
 destroyed), to be and not to be,

And (Both) to change place and to exchange bright surface
 colors.

But since a limit is outermost, [it] has been (is?)
 completed (perfected),

From every side like the bulk of a well-rounded sphere,

In all ways equally balanced (well-matched) from the middle,
 for it is necessary that it be neither something
 greater nor something smaller in one way or another (in
 this or that);

Nor does what is (being; eon) not exist, which would prevent
 it from attaining

To the same [thing]; nor is what is (being; eon) such that it could be more than (of) what is (being; eon) in some way (place) and less in another, since it is all (since all is) inviolate.

For from all sides (in all ways) equal to itself, it is (turns out; proves to be) uniformly within limits.

At this point I [will] cease my trustworthy speech and thought to you

About (Around; On both sides of) truth. From this point onward learn by hearing from me in addition the opinions of mortals, a guileful (deceptive) order; (OR: ...From this point onward learn mortal opinions by hearing in addition from me a guileful (deceptive) order;)

For two judgments (opinions, marks) they laid down to name (specify) appearances (forms), (OR: For two forms they laid down to name (specify) judgments (opinions, marks),)

One of which it is necessary not (sc. to name? to lay down?) - in respect to this (it) they have wandered (been misled) - (OR: One of which one must not (sc. name? lay down?) - ...)

They distinguished (picked out; ekrinanto) for themselves opposites in [respect to] form and laid down signs for themselves

Separate (Apart) from one another; to the first [form; mark, opinion, judgment] (sc. they laid down the sign?) ethereal (high-up) flaming fire,

Being mild (A mild thing), extremely light in weight, the same as itself in every way,

And not the same as the other [one]. But that (the latter) one in conformity with itself

Oppositely (Contrariwise) (sc. is? sc. they laid down the sign?) obscure (unlearnable) night, a solid and weighty form.

I tell you about this whole likely (likely-seeming) arrangement

In order that at no time may any opinion (judgment, mark) of mortals overtake (surpass) you.

This fragment is generally accepted to succeed fragment 7. As we have seen, line 8.1 may or may not follow immediately on 7.6, but it seems reasonable to place fr. 8 last among the fragments that mention roads, given that 8.1-2 propose a discussion of the one road (or account of a road) that "remains". Simplicius¹³ is our only source for lines 1-52 and 50-61 as blocks; he is also the only source to report all of 8.34-41. Calogero¹⁴ and more recently Ebert¹⁵ have argued that the lines that are here (and generally) numbered 8.34-41 should be moved so as to follow immediately after the line generally numbered 8.52.

In my discussion of 8.34-41 in the chapter on Moîra I will consider these arguments for moving this group of lines. I will show that there are serious problems with these arguments, and that there are strong reasons for keeping the lines in their usual place. One of Ebert's more central reasons for thinking that the lines should be moved, though, is worth mentioning briefly here, for it reflects a conception of the fragments that I find to lack support.

¹³Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics", 145-46 (Parmenides 8.1-52), 38-39 (8.50-61); in Coxon, 61-79, 145-47, 151-53.

¹⁴Guido Calogero, "Parmenide e la genesi della logica classica", Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di letter e filosofia 5 (1936): 143-85. Calogero also discusses transposition of this group of verses in Storia della logica antica, Book I: L'eta arcaica (Bari: Laterza, 1967); see especially page 185, note 51.

¹⁵Theodor Ebert, "Wo beginnt der Weg der Doxa?" Phronesis 34, no. 2 (1989): 121-38.

Ebert emphasizes that his proposed revision would change the roster of lines to be included in what he calls the "Way of Doxa"; it would add to the "Doxa-part" of the goddess's speech and subtract from what Ebert calls the "Way of Truth". (Ebert does not specify where he thinks the discussion of the "Way of Truth" is supposed to begin or end; from what he says, I would gather that he takes this part to include at least 8.1-49, minus 8.34-41.)

It should be noted, however, that the extant fragments contain no explicit designation of anything as a "Way of Truth" or a "Way of Doxa". The goddess does not mention roads or paths in what we have of her treatment of the opinions (doxai) of mortals, i.e., from 8.53-61 and presumably frr. 9-19 and possibly 20. She does speak in fr. 6 of a road that she says is taken by at least some mortals, but the relationship between this road and the opinions described from 8.53 on is not entirely clear, and deserves further study. I will examine this relationship in the last two chapters.

As for a "Way of Truth", the goddess says at 8.50-51 that her speech has so far been "about (all around; on both sides of) truth", although she does not say that she has been speaking about, or giving, a "way of truth". The road she discusses from 8.1-49 may be the same as the "path of [P]ersuasion" of fragment 2 (this issue will be treated in the "Preliminary Implications" chapter), and at 2.4 [T]ruth

was said to attend upon [P]ersuasion. Thus I do not assert that the road spoken of from 8.1-49 has nothing to do with truth. Rather, I would suggest that it is not at all obvious that we should take the goddess to be describing or giving a "way of truth" or a "way of opinion"; nor is it obvious what such roads should be expected to contain or involve, or where they should be expected to lead. For these reasons, I would argue that further examination is required before conclusions may be drawn about the use and the references of the goddess's comments about roads. Some such examination will be found in the final two chapters.

Foremost perhaps among the problems of grammar, syntax, and general translation in fr. 8 are the occurrences of 'esti', 'is', without explicit grammatical subject. This difficulty appears in lines 2,3,5 (here also are occurrences of 'ên' and 'estai', 'was' and 'will be' respectively, without obvious grammatical subjects), 9,16,20,27,33, and possibly 25 and 34. Another verb with a related meaning, 'kurei', occurs without explicit grammatical subject at 8.49, but there the only possible candidate is 'eon', from line 47. Based on considerations stemming from frr. 2,4,6, and 7, and from some other passages within fragment 8 (e.g. 8.36-38), I will try to show that the most likely candidate for the subject of 'esti' in each of the cases cited - with two exceptions - is 'eon' or 'to eon'. (The

relationship between [to] eon and the road of 8.1 will then seem problematic, and will be investigated in the last two chapters.)

The two exceptions are lines 25 and 34. At 8.25, the subject of 'esti' may be either 'pân', 'all', or else 'eon', which appears in line 24 and in the other clause of 25. Even in the former case, the "all" would seem to refer to all of eon. At 8.34, the subject of the first 'esti' would seem to be either 'tauton', 'the same [thing]' or 'noein'. The subject of the second 'esti' may be 'eon', mentioned in lines 33 and 35; or it may be 'noema'; or '...esti noema' may mean "there is [a] noema". A section of the Mofra chapter will be devoted to a discussion of 8.34-38a.

Two further grammatical ambiguities hinder attempts to understand the goddess's transition to a discussion of the opinions of mortals. First, lines 51 and 52 do not make clear just what it is that is supposed to be a "guileful (deceptive) order" (kosmon...apatelon): the opinions of mortals, the goddess's speech regarding these opinions, or perhaps both. Second, line 53 may say either that two judgments (or opinions or marks; gnomas) have been laid down by mortals to name or specify appearances or forms (morphas); or that two forms (or appearances?) have been laid down by mortals to name or specify judgments (or opinions or marks).

A striking feature of fragment 8 is its use of what look like deductive arguments or explanations. This would seem to be the earliest recorded systematic use of such arguments in Greek philosophy. Moreover, there does not seem to be any precedent for divine beings giving deductive arguments, and there is no precedent for them giving arguments that have to do with conceivability or with logical implications.

A series of characteristics or signs of a road, or signs of what characterizes the road, are laid out in 8.3-6. Lines 6-33 seem by their wording to be concerned with the goddess's support for the claim that these are the hallmarks of that road, or the hallmarks of to eon on or for that road. (In this fragment too, the speaker seems most likely to be the goddess, at least partly for the reason that prohibitions such as that of 8.7-8 could not be made effective by a human.) Lines 34-49 also seem to lay out and then argue for or explain characteristics, features which may or may not be equivalent to those named at 8.3-6.

Especially interesting to me are the terms in which the arguments or explanations are conducted, the grounds and the kinds of thing adduced in support or explanation of claims. It may be noted that some of the statements that seem to be brought in as support are not themselves obviously or necessarily under all circumstances provable to be valid or true. I have in mind here in particular the

statements about divinities, or factors, such as [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. The import of these statements should become more clear, and I think more plausible, once the natures and roles of those figures or factors has been investigated. Another unusual aspect of the way in which the arguments or explanations in fr. 8 are presented is the fact that some of the remarks about characteristics indicated by the "signs" on the road appear to be backed by statements about what cannot be, or what is or is not permitted to be, said or taken (thought, conceived; noein) to obtain, on or for that road of inquiry at very least.

Let us consider first the matter of the invocation of divinities - or of what appear to be divinities, since the conventions for transcription did not always require initial capitalization for their names - namely [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oira, [T]hemis, and (though there is less evidence to suggest personification here) pistis alethes ("true assurance"). I would also include [P]leitho and [A]lletheie from fragment 2, and at another level the goddess who speaks, and the other divinities from fragment 1. Whether personified or not, their places in the argument are not immediately clear. For example, the goddess says that the first three are responsible for binding and limiting to eon. 'Dike' is usually translated, roughly, as 'justice' or 'right'; 'ananke', as 'necessity' or 'constraint'; 'moira', as 'fate', 'portion', 'lot'. I think it must be asked why,

in what sense and under what if any conditions, these three factors may be seen to bind and to limit - and the others to determine in other ways the characteristics (within parameters of the road under discussion) of to eon. I would ask as well why it is these factors in particular that are cited, and why they might be supposed to do what the goddess says they do. What exactly is it about that which is, that the goddess is referring to in these terms, and what are the ramifications of what she says?

I will discuss these questions both in light of some mythological and other poetic connotations of [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oîra, and so on that would have been current in the early fifth century, and from the point of view of the roles these figures or factors can be seen to play within fragment 8 and elsewhere in the fragments. I will try to suggest ways of understanding the two as related. That is, I assume neither that the references to [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oîra, and the rest are some sort of poetic coloring that is not essential to the meaning of the goddess's claims or to her support of them; nor that Parmenides is simply reflecting a view common in his time about certain divinities or "forces", such that the statements that he has his goddess make are supported by unexamined beliefs.

The second unusual feature of the goddess's argumentation and explanation was its use of statements about what can or cannot be said or conceived (thought;

taken to be so; noefn), and about what is and is not permitted to be said or conceived (etc.) regarding to eon, on or for the "remaining" road at least. That this is not a simple "idealism", or perhaps not "idealism" at all, is suggested by the references to what can or cannot be done, and to what the speaking goddess and the other divinities or factors will or will not allow. (As noted, a characterization and discussion of what is meant by today's term 'idealism' will follow in the chapter on implications of the binding of to eon, and in the concluding chapter.) For it remains to be asked why, or under what circumstances and by whom, the things the goddess says are proscribed might not be able to be said or conceived (thought, etc.), and why or under what circumstances or to what end the goddess might forbid and allow those things she specifies.

Similarly one may ask what is "as is necessary" about the "decision" of 8.16. Is simply making a decision what is necessary, or is it this particular decision that is necessary, or both? Can it be determined who or what made the decision? Further, is the decision necessary unconditionally or under all circumstances; or is it only necessary in a certain context or for a certain purpose? Is it necessary because it or its implications reflect or preserve what is true - or is there some other reason? (Under what if any conditions, for example, could a decision be called inevitable?) Is what is not allowed forbidden

because it is not true, or because it cannot be true, or because it must be inconsistent or incoherent, or because of something else? What if anything does this imply about what is not forbidden (the characteristics the goddess argues for)? Are the permissions and prohibitions made only within the context of the road under discussion; do they only make sense (toward some purpose) within such a context or parameter? What is the importance here of what is sayable and conceivable (thinkable, etc.); why mention these distinctly and in tandem? How does this emphasis relate to the goddess's injunctions?

Another problem for understanding 8.1-49 is determining what the goddess's various claims and arguments or explanations are supposed to do with respect to each other: is each argument supposed to support or to explicate an individual point, or are the arguments intended to work together to support some individual points, or (perhaps in addition) are they intended to cooperate in support of a complex or sum? The characteristics enumerated in 8.3-6 may be intended to go together, perhaps necessarily.

After this initial section, and the goddess's abrupt transition (8.50-52), she announces that she will tell of the opinions of mortals. The specifics of what she describes do not fit any theories or beliefs known to have been current in the Greek-speaking world in Parmenides' time. Moreover, despite the fact that the particular beliefs of

different mortals and groups of mortals appear to have diverged widely, her reference to "opinions (beliefs) of mortals" (doxas...broteias, 8.51) would seem to imply that she claims to be speaking not about any specific person or group, but rather about mortals in general or as such. What, then, is she offering, or claiming to offer, as a "likely (likely-seeming) arrangement" (8.60): a sort of analysis of mortals' opinions, an account of what she thinks mortal opinions come down to or have in common? Something that is supposed to be the best (if perhaps still flawed) account mortals could give? A reflection or representation of something that is necessary (why?) to mortals' conceptions or beliefs about what exists?

The interpretation of line 61, which presents its own difficulties, may have some bearing on this issue. If 8.61 is taken to mean "so that no opinion (judgment) of mortals may surpass you", i.e. so that none may be better than what you will have, we might take the goddess's intention to be to give her pupil the best cosmological account possible (within the scope of what a human could conceive). Whether a human could see why this account would be best remains a question. However, it must be pointed out that one who could show why all other opinions of mortals were wrong (or were worse in some way than what the goddess presents from 8.53 on) would also not be surpassed by those other opinions. Now, if line 61 were read as "...overtake

you", i.e. capture or convince you, we might infer that what the goddess will present is intended to be able to show, or to enable one to see, something of what is wrong with mortals' opinions. It should be noted that the goddess does not say that she will give a valid cosmological account, nor does she explain (in the extant fragments) the merits of her offering or the reasons for her giving this and not another account. Moreover, she calls what she will say or what she will talk about a "guileful (deceptive) order", and her earlier references to mortals' beliefs (1.30, 6.4-9) had characterized them as uncondusive to understanding and as lacking in "true assurance", pistis alethes. It should be asked, in this light, what is "likely" or "likely-seeming" about the "arrangement" she presents, and how and why it might be supposed to enable her student to avoid being surpassed or overtaken.

A further problem is the relation between what the goddess presents from 8.1-49, and what she presents after that point. This problem can be seen to extend or to be reflected beyond the poem, as I will try to show. For now we may note taht the terms and language in which the goddess speaks regarding to eon, and through which we try to inquire into what is, are not independent of the terms and language through which we refer (or try to refer) to the multiple things we commonly say exist. Yet if the ways in which we commonly speak or the ways in which we think or conceive are

fundamentally incoherent or inconsistent, or if we simply do not know that what we say or take to exist is what exists (if we do not know the relation between what we say and think is, and what is), then how is it possible for us to seek to understand what is (if that phrase is adequate to the use to which we would put it) in the terms we are accustomed to using? Nor is there an obvious way to seek new and better terms, as I will discuss in the final two chapters.

The problem is suggested within the poem in the following way. At 8.53, as she begins to present the "guileful order", the goddess starts to speak about multiple things commonly believed to exist (fire, night, etc.). Even if the "forms" or "opinions" mortals have "laid down" are without warrant, the goddess seems to be asserting that mortals are making some distinction, that it makes sense to say that they have two (main) beliefs or in some sense believe in two things. Indeed, she had referred earlier to multiple factors limiting what is, at very least on the road of inquiry she was discussing. But earlier in fr. 8 she had also admonished that on a (or the) road of inquiry that she appears to take to hold possibilities for inquirers, signs indicated that to eon is one and/or must be said and taken to be one, unique, and continuous (8.2-3, 7-8, 12-13, 22). In fact, the role of those limiting figures or factors was just to keep to eon that way. In what sense, then, are we to

understand the goddess's talk of different forms or bodies at 8.55-59, of "all things" in fr. 9, of various objects and figures in frr. 9-19? That is, if these things are just fictions generated by mortals' opinions, how are we to learn from what she says about them, or from what she uses them to talk about? Her earlier arguments would seem to suggest that speaking and conceiving (noein) [of] these things would not be compatible with conducting oneself on the road of inquiry of 8.1. Are speaking and conceiving (thinking, etc.) [of] these things incompatible with inquiry itself, or with inquiry in a certain direction or with a certain aim? Is inquiry possible without speaking and conceiving in that way? What can be determined about what the goddess refers to as inquiry?

Fragment 9

But since in fact all things have been named light and night
 And these each according to their own powers (qualities)
 have been given as names to these things and to those,
 All is full of light and invisible night together (at the
 same time)
 Both equally, since nothing has a share in neither one.

Fragment 9 would seem to follow very soon, perhaps directly, after fr. 8, since it continues the theme of naming after light (or fire; the relationship between these

will be explored) and night. Simplicius¹⁶, our only source for this fragment, says that it occurs a few verses after 8.59. Coxon¹⁷ would put it after the fragments I have numbered (with Diels-Kranz) 10 and 11, for two reasons. First, Coxon feels that the opening of the fragment I am calling fr. 10 looks as though it could be an introduction to an account of mortals' cosmological beliefs, an account that would be in keeping with the intentions announced by the goddess at 8.51-53 and 8.60-61. He also thinks that the fragment I am calling fr. 11 looks as though it might continue the structure of an outline begun in the fragment I have numbered as 10. This reasoning does not seem to me to provide decisive grounds for placing what I have called fragment 9 after what I have called 10 and 11. Fragment 10 could just as easily be a specific application of a general account begun in fr. 9, and hence plausibly placed after 9. In terms of overall meaning, in any case, Coxon's proposal does not seem to me to make a crucial difference - at least not yet, for we do not know on what plan the goddess's account was supposed to have been organized.

As far as translation is concerned, the main problem in fragment 9 comes in the first line. The reference of

¹⁶Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics", 179-80; in Coxon, 154.

¹⁷Coxon, 84-85 and 232-34.

'panta', neuter plural of 'pân', 'all', is not clear. The word could refer to the forms or bodies mentioned at 8.55 and 8.59, or to something the extant fragments do not identify. The word is also used as a general term meaning "all things" or "everything"; if that is its use here, we must ask what is being called "everything": all of what is not appearance? all of something underlying appearances? appearances and anything else that might be - as suggested, perhaps, at 1.28-32?

The question of the significance of this fragment, and indeed of the claim about mortals' use of light and night that begins at 8.53, deserves close consideration. One particularly difficult point is determining what conclusion is being drawn in 9.3-4. Theophrastus¹⁸ seems to associate it with a conception of the nature of perception that he attributes to Parmenides, basing his claims on his paraphrase of 8.56-59 and fr. 9, and on his understanding of fr. 16, which fragment he quotes. It is not clear whether Theophrastus makes use as well of any passages of the poem that are not available today. Reinhardt¹⁹ substantially

¹⁸Theophrastus, Peri Aistheseon [On the Senses] 1-4, in G.M. Stratton, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology Before Aristotle (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1917).

¹⁹Karl Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1916; reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1959). A selection of excerpts is reprinted as "The Relation between

accepts what Theophrastus suggests, finding in this something that would contribute to the connection between the part of the poem (or the surviving lines) before 8.50 and the part following that transitional point. I will propose an alternative way of using those aspects of each of these suggestions for which I can find support.

Fragment 10

You will know the celestial nature and all the
constellations in the sky and the destructive (unseen?)
deeds of the clear bright sun's torch and whence it
came into being,

And you will learn the wandering (revolving) deeds of the
round-eyed moon

And its nature, and also you will know whence the sky
holding (embracing) on both sides (all around)

Came to be, and how Ananke leading (guiding) it bound [it]
To hold in bonds (at ends?) of stars.

Fragment 10, along with fr. 11, seems to promise teaching or learning pertaining to the sky and heavens; frr. 12,14,15,15a (following Diels-Kranz numbering), and plausibly 13 in fact treat of the (actual or opined) origins and nature of astronomical features and gods, among other things.

Of especial interest in fr. 10 and subsequent fragments are verbal and imagistic parallels (or ties) with

the Two Parts of Parmenides' Poem," trans. Matthew R. Cosgrove with Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, in The Pre-Socratics, ed. Alexander P.D. Mourelatos (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor/Doubleday, 1974), 293-311.

the story of the narrator's journey and with the earlier parts of the goddess's speech. For example, at 10.4, 14.1, and 16.1, words connoting wandering occur. In the last case, the word's root is the same as that of words at 6.5 and 8.28. 'Amphis', 'on both sides', 'around', 'concerning', is used to describe the sky at 10.5. It had been used previously in reference to the situation of the goddess's lintel and threshold relative to the paths of Night and Day (1.12); to describe [Al]nanke's limiting bonds (with respect, apparently, to to eon) at 8.31; and to give the relation between the goddess's speech and thought on the one hand, and [T]ruth on the other, at 8.51. Limits and bonds had figured importantly in the first forty-nine lines of fr. 8, including in connection with [Al]nanke (8.30-31) and with "holding" (echein; 8.15, 8.31). In fr. 10, holding shows up in line 5, Ananke and binding in line 6, and limits in line 7.

What needs to be asked is what the significances of such parallels or ties could be, in so far as this can be determined. For example, what connections might the goddess, or Parmenides, be suggesting between the way(s) in which mortals think and speak (or must think and speak), or what they believe, and the way(s) in which they can inquire into that which is? Or is something being suggested about the way(s) in which mortals think (or can think) they must inquire? What if anything is being suggested about what is

possible (or what is said or taken to be possible) for mortals or for humans, and about what is 9or is said or taken to be) necessary for them?

Fragment 11

...how earth and sun and moon

And common aether and the Milky Way and furthest (eschatos, line 3) Olympus

And the hot force of stars were set in motion

To come to be.

It is worth noting that, as is clear from fr. 11, the parallels mentioned in the remarks on fr. 10 cannot be said to be exact. The bonds described in fr. 10 can now be seen to involve stars that move and are generated, and to limit a mobile and generated moon and possibly an aether that also had a birth. On the other hand, what is limited in fr. 8 is bound to be unmoving and ungenerated (8.13-14 and 36-37). These apparent conflicts, and the questions of when or whether they would be necessary, and why, will be discussed in the final two chapters.

Fragment 12

For the narrower (sc. rings) are filled with unmixed fire,

The ones near (next to) these are of night, and a portion of flame is discharged;

In the middle (center) of these is the divinity (daimon) who steers everything;

For she rules over the painful birth and mixing (mingling; coming together) of all,

Sending female to male to join together (in sexual intercourse) and then in turn contrariwise

Male to female.

Perhaps most striking about fragment 12 is the transition from astronomy to sexual reproduction, a transition brought about through the mention of an unnamed female divinity (the word translated as 'who' in line 3 is feminine) who is found at the center of some fiery cosmic rings, and who "steers everything". It should be asked, then, what if anything astronomical phenomena and sexual reproduction might be supposed to have to do with each other.

The divinity mentioned in fr. 12 deserves some examination. As was the case with the divinity whose road is traveled at 1.3 (and who may be the goddess who speaks), this one is called a daimon, and is referred to with a feminine pronoun, this time unambiguously. As was also the case with the daimon of 1.3 and the goddess (thea) who speaks, no definitive identification of this one survives. Even if there should be no conclusive evidence for any specific identification of the daimon of fr. 12, the fact that this is supposed to be a female divinity merits some discussion. The narrator and Eros (fr. 13) are the only male figures mentioned in the extant fragments. Not only are the sun-maidens, the mares, the goddess who speaks, and the daimons of 12.3 and apparently 1.3 female, but so are Dike,

Ananke, Moira, Peitho, and Aletheie, if indeed they are personified. In addition, the reference to Venus in fr. 18 may reflect a mention of Aphrodite in the Greek original. I think it is important to explore how much can be determined about the significance of this fact, and about the significance of the roles the various divinities play - both the roles they are described within the fragments as playing, and the roles they can be found to have played in fifth-century conceptions that might have informed or suggested their uses in the fragments.

Also of interest in fr. 12 are some apparent echoes of earlier philosophers. Anaximander had accounted for stars and their different visible "orbital" paths by proposing a set of concentric fiery rings, which could be seen only through small holes in the air or mist that enclosed the rings²⁰. Xenophanes had written of a single or greatest deity who "moves everything" (panta kradainei) with its noos (Xenophanes fr. 25); the daimon of Parmenides' fr. 12 "steers everything" (panta kubernai), which is not exactly the same but could plausibly be a related function. Xenophanes' deity is called 'theos', 'god', which may mean that it is male, but may also mean that it is of unspecified (or no) sex, as his fr. 23 may suggest. It may be of value

²⁰Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies I,6, 4-5; in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.; New York; and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 135.

in the interpretation of Parmenides' fragments to try to comprehend the place these ideas have in them, and to try to discover in what ways Parmenides' uses of them may be seen to differ from the uses of similar ones in other authors. Some hints that Parmenides' uses of such ideas may be different from those in other authors may be found in the fact that these ideas appear in the speech of a goddess, and the fact that at a most fundamental level any invocation of distinctions or multiplicity or change seemed to have been criticized, undermined, or transformed earlier in the goddess's speech.

Fragment 13

First of all the gods [she] devised Eros (Love).

Fragment 13 speaks of the generation of the god Eros as a "devising", metisato, an unusual choice of words. Who did the devising is not specified; the verb is in the third person singular, and Simplicius²¹ says that its subject is the daimon of fr. 12. There is no independent verification that Parmenides made this identification.

Fragment 14

A night-shining borrowed light wandering around the earth

Fragment 15

Always looking around for the rays of the sun

²¹Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics", 34.12, 37-39; in Coxon, 145-147.

Fragments 14 and 15 are both reported first by Plutarch, and are said to be about the moon. They seem to make a case for Parmenides as a very early Greek source for the notions that the moon shines by reflected light, and that the moon always turns the same face toward the sun. Again, the context in which these remarks occur must be taken into account in order to try to grasp how they are meant.

Fragment 15a

...rooted in water

Fragment 15a is supposed to be about the earth. It consists of one word, apparently coined by Parmenides. Hesiod (Theogony 728) and, according to Aristotle (On the Heavens II.13, 294a), Xenophanes, had also spoken of "roots" of the earth. That water should be the support for the earth may also recall Thales.

Fragment 16

For as on each occasion (each time) a blending (mingling, combination) holds of much-wandering limbs,

So noos is present to humans; for the nature (form) of limbs is the same [thing] that thinks (apprehends; phroneei) in (of, for) humans

(OR:...is the same [thing] that is thought (apprehended) in (of, for) humans)

Both for all together and individually; for the full (more) is conceived (thought; noema) [of].

(OR:...is what is conceived (thought) [of].)

Fragment 16 comes from Aristotle's Metaphysics IV.5, 1009b, where it is cited as an example (or parallel?) of the claim that when people change their condition, their knowledge changes. That claim, in turn, was brought into the discussion as an example of the kind of opinion that leads to the conclusion that the same thing must be and not be (1009a). There is not independent evidence that Parmenides conflated sensation and knowledge or understanding here, as Aristotle implies, nor is there any suggestion that Parmenides had in mind a human "nature" or "form" (phusis) that changed. However, if fr. 16 is part of the goddess's account of what mortals think of their own phusis, i.e. an account of some flawed notions, then it might well be that fr. 16 is supposed to entail the belief that the same thing must both be and not be. At 6.8-9, mortals who followed a road proscribed by the goddess were said to believe that to be and not to be were the same (and also not the same). In the last two chapters, I will explore whether, how, why, and to what extent the opinions the goddess attributes to mortals can be seen to place them on roads she proscribes. I will also look at the relationships between what the goddess says must be said and taken to be in or for inquiry, and the terms in which her speech, the proem, and mortals' opinions are expressed.

Fragment 16 seems to refer to a connection and a parallel between "blending" (krâsis) of human "limbs"

(meleon), and human noos (mind, consciousness, intelligence, awareness). (We may note as well that this fragment mentions "humans", anthropoi, as opposed to the possibly wider group "mortals", brotoi.) Theophrastus²² notes (or makes) a link between this fragment and fr. 9. He takes it that the "blending" (or combination) of 16.1 is of light and night, or that the blending/combination of light and night is what is relevant about the blending/combination of limbs. This idea is not made explicit in the text of the fragment (Theophrastus quotes the same four lines as Aristotle does). If we can be fairly sure that fr. 16 comes somewhere after frr. 8 and 9, though, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the blending or combining of human limbs or bodily parts would be understood by mortals to be at least partly a matter of some kind of mingling, blending, or combining of light and night; for in frr. 8 and 9 the goddess says that all things have been specified by mortals to be light and night. In any case, fr. 16 seems to try to account for some aspects of humans' opinions - or perhaps for humans' conceptions of their opinions or thought or awareness, or for how humans must talk or conceive or think of these. Thus an investigation of this fragment is important in any attempt to understand the passages in the fragments that pertain to the opinions of mortals, as well as in an exploration of the limits or conceived limits (which may

²²Theophrastus, 1-4; in Stratton, 66-68.

come to the same thing) of humans' capacity to conceive and to understand that which is (or what 'that which is' intends or addresses).

There are linguistic and grammatical difficulties for the interpretation of fr. 16. It is not clear what exactly are being referred to as "blending" (combining, etc.) and as "limbs" in line 1. Secondly, the entire section from the second clause of line 2 to the end of line 4 is difficult to grasp. 'To gar auto/ Estin' in lines 2-3 recalls fr. 3 and its grammatical problems. 'Hoper' in line 3 may be either the object or the subject of 'phroneei', 'thinks', 'apprehends'. '...esti noema' in line 4 recalls 8.34, and here again it is not obvious whether 'noema' means "thought/conception/awareness", or "that which is thought/conceived [of]", or both.

Fragment 17

Boys to the right, girls to the left

Fragment 17 is cited in Galen as having to do with human reproduction. Specifically, it is supposed to be an attempt to account for a child's sex according to his or her location in the womb before birth. Although there is no way of telling in what proportion these themes appeared in the poem originally, it is evident that sexual reproduction and oppositions or distinctions between the sexes were of some

concern, in some context, to Parmenides.

Fragment 18

When woman and man [together] mix the seeds of Venus (Love), the power which forms (sc. bodies) (OR: the power which is formed) out of the different blood, if it maintains proper proportion, produces well-formed (well-constituted) bodies. For if the powers, when the seeds are [being] mixed, fight and do not constitute (make) a unity in the body in which the mixture has taken place, then they will terribly (cruelly) torment the nascent (growing) sex with double seed.

Fragment 18 was translated into Latin in the fifth century A.D. It no longer exists in Greek. The translation I have given here is based on those of Freeman²³ and Taran²⁴.

An interest in sexual differences and reproduction is also visible from this fragment, which is purportedly an account of how those whom we would today call homosexuals are produced. We may note that the explanation has to do with a mixture of two elements, perhaps at least formally recalling fragments 9, 16, and 8.53-61.

Fragment 19

In this way for you these things arose according to opinion and now are

And from this point onwards will be completed after they

²³Kathleen Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A complete translation of the Fragments in Diels, "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1948; reprinted 1983), 46.

²⁴Leonardo Taran, Parmenides: A Text with Translation, Commentary, and Critical Essays (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 172.

have grown up;

Humans having laid down a distinguishing name for each.

Fragment 19 appears to point to a (possibly lost) kind of summing-up of statements about humans' opinions. The apparently connected references to "you" and "humans", and the fact that there has been no indication in the text that anyone else speaks after fragment 1, support the idea that the goddess is the speaker here, and perhaps in the rest of the account of the opinions of mortals. Here she associates humans' namings of some unspecified things with the way in which "for you" they have developed and continue to develop, according to opinion. The nature of this association is not clear.

An immediately noticeable difficulty in this fragment is that there is no antecedent noun for 'tade', 'these things', in line 1. Is the goddess referring to the contents (or purported contents) of the cosmos that she has mentioned - to light, night, stars, earth, humans, gods, and so on? Does she intend instead, or additionally, beliefs and conclusions about these? Further, are "these things" supposed or portrayed by her as something that exists or that can be referred to outside of or independently of human opinions, and that came to be, in fact, in conformity with opinion, for us (i.e. in our view or from our perspective) in some way? Or are the things themselves, according to the goddess, functions of those opinions, identified or in some

sense only existent because or through them?

Here two other ambiguities come into play. First, 'kata doxan', 'according to opinion/belief' (19.1), may mean either "in humans' opinion", that is, carrying the implication that humans' beliefs may not be accurate or warranted; or it may mean "just as humans believe", that is, that what humans believe obtains or applies in some sense to things that exist independently of what humans believe. Secondly, 'for you' may imply "as you happen to believe" or else "from your perspective; as you have to see things".

I think it must be asked, then, what the relationship might be between the statements of fr. 19 - and for that matter those of frr. 9-18 - and those pertaining to the "remaining road" of 8.1, namely 8.1-49. Why might the young man need to learn both; what might be the effect or the sum of the combination? What if anything can be learned about whether what we say is, is what is, independent of our conceptions? These questions will be addressed in the concluding chapter.

Fragment 20 ("Cornford's Fragment")

Alone and unmoving [it] is (comes to be; telethei), to be a name for that which [is] as a whole

Whether what I am calling fragment 20 is genuine, and whether it is too corrupt to be of use to interpreters of Parmenides, are very much in dispute. Diels-Kranz and some others consider it to be an inaccurate restatement, or

a misspelling, of 8.38. Even if it is genuine, its location within the poem, or with respect to the other fragments, is not evident. Moreover, the second clause is so ambiguous as to make it unclear what might be gained by accepting the fragment.

Conclusion

The discussions in the chapters that follow will be aimed at showing that Parmenides posed inquiry into what is as a problem; and at learning as much as is possible about the understanding and exploration that he presents of that problem and its consequences. An investigation of the implications of some main ideas presented in the fragments will be included. To these ends, the discussions will focus on or be organized around certain broad themes and problems.

In the fragments, statements about [to] eon occur within the immediate context of remarks by the goddess about roads of inquiry. These remarks include injunctions, prohibitions, commands, and sometimes what look like arguments or explanations for these. Most of the remarks have to do with what (according to the goddess, anyway) can, cannot, must, or must not be said or conceived (thought, taken, grasped; noefn), at very least by the narrator and in or for inquiry, concerning to eon. That is, these remarks do not explicitly, if at all, address to eon independently of such relations and contexts. I will look at implications of,

and possible reasons for, this feature.

The general contexts of the statements about to eon are that they seem to occur within a speech made, with a declared objective, by some sort of divine figure; and that this divinity is encountered on a journey that the narrator of fr. 1 says that he made or makes. This journey, its impetus, and the location of the goddess who speaks are described in some detail. In so far as these details comprise the circumstances within which the goddess's speech takes place, an interpretation of the speech will not be complete if it does not consider the goddess's words in light of the conditions under which they appear. By conditions I mean not only narrative details such as who the speakers are, but also the nature of what is presented by the totality of the extant fragments, as far as that can be determined. I think it can be agreed, for example, that the goddess's speech, with its orders, prohibitions, arguments, and explanations, is presented within a narrative, a tale. Parmenides' work was the whole poem, and it is important to try to understand, as much as is possible from the surviving fragments, what bearing the narrative setting, both as such and in terms of its particulars, could have on the meaning and on the significance of the goddess's speech and of the sum of the fragments.

There are other aspects of the text which pose problems for attempts to understand the fragments together

or as parts of a unity. First, the goddess's speech itself has more than one section. At some point after her introductory remarks in fr. 1, she starts a discussion of various roads of inquiry. This discussion seems to continue through 8.49 at least. At 8.50 she announces that she will switch to an account of the opinions of mortals, and this account appears, or can plausibly be taken, to continue through fr. 19 or 20. It is not clear what relations this latter account has to do with that of the roads. We might also distinguish two parts of the discussion of roads: in frr. 2,6,7, and possibly 4, the roads treated are barred or called untenable, while 8.1 begins the story of the "remaining" road (or the "remaining story of a road), which road is not explicitly proscribed in the extant fragments. It is especially important to try to understand how these sections might be connected, because it is not immediately evident just what the account of roads that begins in fr. 2 has to do with what the goddess promises (1.28-32) that her visitor will learn. That is, what is the relation between "hear[ing] (hearken[ing] to)...the unshaking heart of...[T]ruth" (1.28-30), on the one hand, and what the goddess says about roads of inquiry (frr. 2,6,7,8.1-49, and possibly 3 and 4) and about what mortals have "laid down" (8.53-61, frr. 9-19 or 20), on the other?

Secondly, there are several figures and images that appear in more than one place in the poem, and because of

this apparently in more than one context. For example, roads are mentioned by the narrator in the proem, and are also discussed by the goddess who speaks between fr. 2 and fr. 8.49. Dike is reported in the proem to have opened the gates to the realm of the goddess who speaks; this goddess says that [D]ike and [T]hemis have sent the narrator on his present road. At 8.14, the goddess invokes [D]ike as limiting to eon, and [T]hemis as relevant to [A]nanke's limiting of to eon. As another example, humans or mortals are mentioned in fr. 1, 6, 8, 16-19, and by implication 9 and 12. Now, something spoken of by the narrator may not have the same significance or reference as something spoken of in the same terms by the goddess in her description of untenable or barred roads of inquiry. And both of these could be different from that for which the goddess uses the same terms in her account of the signs of the remaining road at 8.1-49, and again from what is described in those terms in her statements pertaining to the opinions of mortals. In order to try to understand the fragments as much as possible as a unity, it will be important to consider in virtue of what these repetitions of terms might be made.

Another problem for understanding the extant fragments as parts of a unity or a whole is the relationship between the "signs" of the road of inquiry at 8.1-49, and the terms in which the goddess and the narrator speak. The "signs" are said to indicate (or to be?) that to eon is one,

single, undivided; that there is no "was" or "will be" (for it, or at all), and so on. Yet throughout the fragments there is talk of multiple things, such as the mares, roads, deities, light and night, signs, and so on. As far as past and future are concerned, we may note that the narrator recounts a series of past events culminating in his reception by the goddess; and that she tells him what he "will learn" and what has and has not "sent" him on the road to her. Moira is described at 8.37 as having already bound that which is. Fragment 10 promises a report on the genesis and past history of the sky. In other words, passages throughout the fragments contain statements that appear to be out of keeping with the characteristics of the road (or of the speech and noein associated with it) that is considered in 8.1-49. Is there in fact a conflict? If so, in what does it consist? Is it intractable? If there is no conflict or no necessary one, how is this so, or under what circumstances would there be no conflict, and why? In any case, what is the effect on the meaning or import of the fragments taken together? I will suggest that the facts that what is being discussed from 8.1-49 has been labelled a road of inquiry, and that the constraints affecting it frequently have to do with what can be conceived or thought (or grasped, taken to obtain, etc.) and what can be said in relation to what is (to what we call 'what is'), are of consequence for responses to these questions.

Turning to the goddess's speech, we may identify two related questions that can guide the investigation. First, what is the nature of the support that the goddess adduces regarding the characteristics of the road she discusses from 8.1-49, and why or under what conditions would this be valid and relevant support? Second, what if anything can be determined as to what it is that is supposed to be wrong or problematic about the opinions mortals have (or the opinions the goddess says mortals have)? To understand what drawbacks the goddess finds in the opinions of mortals, why these might be drawbacks, and why they would occur, should tell us something about the relative advantages (for certain purposes anyway) and possible limitations and conflicts that the road of 8.1-49 is supposed to have or to confer. This is not to say that any understanding we could gain of the deficiencies - from the goddess's point of view or otherwise - of the opinions of mortals would be sufficient to account completely for the motivation or validity of the road of 8.1-49 (or its presentation) as something that a person who is to learn of the "unshaking heart of truth" needs to hear. It also remains to be seen whether mortals could ever come to an understanding of mortals' opinions, or anything else, that did not depend on conceptions that might be responsible for the deficiencies in mortals' opinions. The goddess bars at least one road that she says at least some mortals travel or attempt to travel (frr. 6 and 7); in trying to grasp the

nature and import of the last, apparently unbarred road, we would do well to try to understand what it was that got the other roads barred or that made mortals' opinions untenable, and to look for how (and at what cost) the unbarred road might avoid or remedy these problems (or seem to do so).

There is another reason to pay close attention to the goddess's remarks pertaining to the opinions of mortals. At least, it is a reason for mortals to pay close attention to these remarks. It is surely relevant to ask whether any or all of the faults the goddess finds, or any of the features she identifies that could pose problems for or limitations on our ability to understand or to inquire, are necessary or inevitable (generally or under specific circumstances). If some of them are avoidable or remediable, then it will be important to try to see whether an interpretation of the road that is discussed from 8.1-49 can be found on which they do not or need not act. If they are not avoidable or remediable, or if relevant ones are not, or if we do not know whether we can speak and conceive in such a way that they are, or if we cannot tell or do not know whether we can tell, this fact will be something that we would have to take into account in interpreting everything the goddess says, and everything the narrator says.

These are to be the concerns, at the broadest levels, of the discussions that will follow. The present chapter, which has introduced more specific textual,

linguistic, and interpretive problems, has been intended to show how and in what forms the broader issues arise and become important for the understanding of the fragments and their implications. Later chapters will explore these issues as well as their consequences.

CHAPTER TWO

DIKE

Dike is mentioned three times in the extant fragments of Parmenides' poem. First, at 1.14-17, the narrator relates how the sun-maidens (Heliades) persuaded Dike to open the gates of the paths of night and day so that his chariot might pass through. Then, at 1.28, the goddess (thea, 1.22) who speaks declares that it was dike and themis (perhaps personified, Dike and Themis), and not a bad moira (fate, portion), that sent the narrator on his present road. Finally, at 8.14, the goddess invokes Dike (or dike) as shackling to eon, on or for a certain road of inquiry, at very least.

What I wish to ask is this: How might we understand [Dike] to function in Parmenides' fragments? What could be meant in referring to [Dike] in the ways Parmenides does, at the points at which he does this? In order to explore these questions, I will examine some prior and contemporary uses of 'dike', 'Dike', and related terms, in Homer, Hesiod, Anaximander, and Heracleitus. Based on these examinations and on investigation of the contexts in which [Dike] appears in Parmenides' fragments, I will suggest a way of understanding the roles of [Dike] in the fragments that I think is fruitful.

Several senses of 'dike' or 'Dike' can be identified

as having appeared in or before the first half of the fifth century (the approximate date of Parmenides' poem). I shall focus here on two of the earlier senses. The others seem unlikely for the contexts in which the term is used in Parmenides, for the following reasons. In one of these other senses, 'dike' refers to specific judgment rendered on a specific case, and tends to appear in plural or as the object of a verb, neither of which matches the uses in Parmenides' fragments. 'Dike' in this sense can also occur in other grammatical situations, but in that it refers to a specific judgment as rendered, seemingly it would not also refer to a deity, and hence this sense seems inappropriate for the interpretation of 'Dike' at 1.14, and possibly at 1.28 and 8.14 as well. Further, if we were to try to interpret 1.28 and 8.14 using this third sense of 'dike', we would seem to require some elaboration of what judgments were being mentioned; and that does not appear, nor can I see that it is suggested, within the surviving fragments.

In another sense, which seems to appear first in fifth-century writings, 'dike' refers to a punishment. This sense tends to occur either adverbially or as the object of a verb; '[d]ike' does not occur in either of these ways in Parmenides. The personified (she uses keys to open a set of doors) Dike is called "many-penaltied" (polupoinous) at 1.14. However, a punishment or penalty would not itself seem to be a deity. Here too, any interpretation employing this sense

would be informative primarily if we could find some further specification of what the penalty would be and of how or why it was incurred; I do not find anything in Parmenides' fragments that would provide such explication.

Similarly, 'dike' does not seem to be used to mean "judgment", "verdict", "legal proceedings", "lawsuit", or "exercise of justice" in Parmenides. His uses of the term do not fit the grammatical forms associated with these senses, nor is there any textual evidence (description of the terms of a lawsuit or of the case for which a verdict is rendered, for example) that he meant to invoke any of these senses.

The remaining early senses of 'dike', the ones I will discuss, are the following. First, it may mean or refer to custom, usage, normal course of nature; the "way of" a thing or person or group, or the "way of things" in general. Second, it may signify order, right, or due; that which is fit or appropriate (or, used adjectivally, simply "fit or appropriate"); a standard that renders decisions or accomplishes purposes in a way opposed to that of bia (might or violence); justice; or perhaps righteousness. It is mainly in the second sense that we find the personified Dike, as e.g. at Works and Days 213-85 (discussed below). To understand what such a figure might be doing in Parmenides 1.14, as well as to see whether any of these three senses hold possibilities for plausible, coherent, and supportable

interpretations of 1.28 and 8.14 in context, we must investigate further.

Before looking at examples of Homer's uses of '[Dike]', I would like to note an interesting feature of the lists of occurrences of 'dike' that can be classified under "custom"/"usage". This feature is that some passages in Homer seem to refer to customs or usages established or enforced by human institutions or conventions, some may refer to the way things work independent of human conventions (i.e., to the way things work or the way things are as established by the gods, or out of habit, or - as might be said today - "in nature", whatever these might amount to), some are ambiguous, and some may refer to a combination of factors. In addition, 'dike' in Homer can refer both to what custom prescribes as right or fit or appropriate for a human to do or to be allowed to do; and to what is taken to be the way something or someone is supposed to be or to function according to what has been laid down by the gods, or according to a "natural" order. That is, dike in Homer is associated with what we might today call humanly prescribed standards, standards we can choose to follow or not to follow; as well as with what we might call standards or patterns "in nature" or in a divinely prescribed order of things, standards or patterns we do not prescribe but which we may hope to describe or to evoke in our words,

conceptions, and beliefs.¹

Let us now examine some examples of Homer's uses of 'dike'. At Odyssey 11.218, Odysseus encounters the spirit of his dead mother in Hades. Seeing his mother in the form of a fleeting shade, he asks whether what he is seeing is a phantom sent by Persephone to deceive him. The shade of his mother responds by telling Odysseus that it is the dike of mortals to become (for their souls to become) shades after human death. Here, 'dike' would seem to mean "lot" or "way", as determined by gods or at least by something independent of or beyond human agency. That is, the passage seems to say that it is the way or lot of dead mortals for their bodies to be consumed or decomposed by fire; and for their spirits (thumo[i], line 221), which have left the bodies at death, to become shades.

At Odyssey 24.255, we see 'dike' used in a somewhat different situation. There Odysseus finds his father Laertes working in a garden, poorly dressed and dirty. Laertes does not recognize him. Odysseus says that Laertes is being badly cared for; and that despite Laertes' condition it is clear that there is nothing slavish about him, that he still seems kingly - that he seems like "such a one who, after he has

¹What might appear from this description to be somewhat divergent senses of "custom"/"usage" dike may have a significant point of connection in at least some cases. For example, at Iliad 16.384-93, discussed below, Zeus is depicted as using hurricanes and floods in retaliation against those (or the cities of those) who misuse themistes (decrees, customs) and who do not respect dike.

bathed and eaten/ Should sleep softly, for this is the dike of old men." Clearly that is not the actual way of all old men, for Odysseus is contrasting it with the way in which Laertes has lately been living. Thus 'the dike of old men' must refer rather to something like the right, the prerogative, or the appropriate way or thing for old men. On what basis (custom? a wider order? both?) Odysseus makes his claim is not made clear by the context. I think it can be said, though, that Odysseus' statement seems to reflect a sense or a belief on his part that there is something that is appropriate for old men to do or to have, something that especially those of a kingly character should be able to have or to do.²

The second sense, or type of use, of 'dike' in Homer that I would like to consider is that of "justice" or "righteousness". In this sense dike is often presented in opposition to bia, violence or force, as at Iliad 16.388. In the passage from 384 to 393, Homer likens the noise of the Trojans' horses to the hurricanes that he says Zeus sends in

²Other examples of dike as the actual or as the optimal way of some thing or person or group can be found at Odyssey 4.691, 14.59, 19.43 (of gods), 19.168, and 18.275 (here seeming to refer to a wont or habit). It can be seen that in all of these cases, dike is taken to apply in virtue of a thing's or a personage's belonging to a certain group or being (being said to be) of a certain kind. In other words, what dike dictates or is associated with in a particular case has to do with what groups or classes or species (social or other) the individuals involved are said to belong to. Relevant characteristics are those that an individual shares with others.

summer to humans who pass crooked themistas (decrees) by violent means or by force (bie), who do not care about respect for the gods, and who drive out dike. From the context, 'dike' here would seem to mean something like "justice" or "righteousness"; or perhaps "right" or "that which is right". We may note that the passage describes a type of situation or a group of situations - not a unique incident - to which Zeus has purportedly responded by sending hurricanes. That the humans involved are passing "crooked themistas" indicates that it is not custom itself that they are driving out; what they are doing to custom, evidently, is perverting or abusing it. They are using the institution of the themistes, established by themis, custom; but they are using it in improper ways. What these humans drive out (elasosi), then, would be what is just or right, or what is sanctioned by the gods - that which we show our respect for the gods by heeding.

In at least one other place, namely Odyssey 14.84, Homer has a character say that the gods love dike (in human actions), but an interesting feature of Iliad 16.384-93 is the connection that passage invokes between human behavior in a social sphere, and what might today be called "natural" meteorological phenomena. Transgression of certain social standards of behavior is presented as being answered by harsh weather whose devastation is represented as diminishing (or wiping out; minuthei) the works of humans.

Homer is depicting the social order, then, as being intimately connected with, or perhaps part of, an (the) extra-social order, with respect to, or in virtue of, dike.

We may note as well the association of punishment with actions that go against dike - punishment of a sort that seems in some sense to balance the transgression. When humans act in a way that indicates that they hold their preferred deeds or works (erga), or what they wish to accomplish through these, to be more important than conformity with dike or regard for the gods, Zeus responds, according to Homer. Zeus does not respond, however, by doing something such as summarily killing the offending humans and leaving it at that. Rather, his hurricanes show them that their efforts cannot succeed without his sufferance; and he does not tolerate that which flouts dike. Without knowing the specifics of what Homer might think that dike involves, I think we can still say that dike here is emblematic of a certain balance or order within the cosmos, or that it is crucial in determining the form of that order.

At Iliad 19.180, 'dike' is used to mean "one's right" or "one's due". At this point in the story, Patroclus is dead and Achilles wants to start into battle immediately. Odysseus and Agamemnon try to convince him to hold off until proper preparations are made, preparations such as making sure the soldiers have eaten, and allowing Agamemnon to make appropriate restitution so as to end his dispute with

Achilles. Agamemnon's apology will involve giving Achilles certain gifts and promises that acknowledge Achilles' position in the time (roughly, honor) hierarchy; in fact, much of what Agamemnon will give to Achilles will be what Achilles had been demanding all along - demanding on the basis of Agamemnon's birth and power in relation to Achilles' birth, power, and deeds. What is "due" Achilles, what it is claimed that he has a "right" (dike) to, is determined according to strict rules of time that prescribe different sorts of thing as due those in different categories of birth, power, and accomplishment. A warrior in a different category of nobility, or one with two human parents, would not expect to receive exactly the things that Achilles takes as his due for a given accomplishment.

The phrase that Odysseus uses in his speech to Achilles is 'hina me ti dikes epideues echeistha', 'so that you may not have any want of dike' or 'so that you may lack nothing of dike'. Here 'custom' or 'usage' would not seem to be a good translation for 'dike', though it should be noted that at least part of what determines just what Achilles can expect from Agamemnon is custom. What will be awarded Achilles "so that he may lack nothing of dike" are prizes and honors, and what they represent. These in a sense ensure that Achilles lacks nothing of dike; what he felt (and what Agamemnon now acknowledges) he had lacked was that which was due him from earlier exploits (see e.g. Iliad 1.161-68).

Here too, dike seems to have to do with relations between types or classes of persons or of things. Lower-ranking soldiers do not get prizes or feasts like those of Achilles or Agamemnon; and the dispute between the two men began when Agamemnon claimed that his higher rank entitled him to the captive Briseis, against Achilles' insistence that his own deeds made him worthy of keeping her as a prize (see also 1.118-60). We can see as well that dike is being portrayed here as functioning in situations of reward, restitution, and requital; situations that involve balancing one thing with another, or maintaining a certain disposition of elements within a system.

Hesiod presents a much more explicit version of the way in which human actions may be answered by eventualities in all aspects of our environment, where Dike is concerned. In Works and Days, the poet attempts to persuade his kinsman Perses, as well as local lords, to live and to pursue their goals in accordance with dike, instead of ignoring or disregarding reverence for the gods, and instead particularly of using bribery, deception, crooked judgments, false promises, and the like. According to Hesiod, thirty thousand immortals go among humans and note wicked deeds, and the goddess Dike cries out to Zeus when she finds out from them that humans have harmed "her" ("min") in that way.

Zeus then makes whole communities suffer for the misdeeds of a few (248-64).

This punishment is described in detail, and is contrasted with the fate of those humans whose cities are not deemed worthy of punishment (213-47). Hesiod's stated goal in presenting this is to show that dike wins out over bia; that hard as it is to follow, dike leads to better results in the long run. While Hesiod does mention that Zeus's retribution might take the form of bringing destruction on ships in open water (247), many of the other things Hesiod offers as befalling cities where [D]ike was not heeded sound like things we might today trace along other lines to just the human deeds that Hesiod decries. We might equally feel that we could trace, in ways accepted today, some of the supposed results of concord with [D]ike to the kinds of actions that Hesiod says that concord would involve. He asserts that when the people of a city deal fairly with fellow-citizens and with strangers, issuing "straight" judgments, they and their city flourish. Among the benefits incurred in this way are the escape of famine and of internecine problems, and the birth of children who resemble their (dike-abiding) parents. Zeus's punishments, or retributions, for failing to uphold dike include famine, disease, infertility, and the dying out of families in cities where some have committed crimes or have tried to gain things by force instead of going through sanctioned

channels. (See also 320-41.)

From Hesiod's account of the way in which Perses (or any farmer) should conduct his life, the requirements imposed by Dike would not seem to be wholly extrinsic or unconnected to the needs and wants of humans. Thus the results of different sorts of conduct do not seem necessarily, or perhaps at all, to be rewards and punishments whose forms were chosen arbitrarily; nor do the exigencies of Dike seem inconsistent with those of human flourishing (as that state is conceived by Hesiod, and perhaps by the framers of custom, as at 297-80). Hesiod's specific instructions to Perses (324-828) are on subjects ranging from how to treat friends, neighbors, employees, and family members, to what weeks are best for each farm activity; from how to make winter shoes to how to make offerings to gods; and more. Much of this instruction in how to live in accordance with dike consists of what would be acknowledged today as practical suggestions for increasing farm production given a certain sort of technology, or for establishing good relations that should enable one to enjoy the benefits of living in a cooperative and peaceful community. Other suggestions may seem to us less apt or less obviously valuable. For example, Hesiod takes a view of prospective wives and of hired laborers that is perhaps less generous than may be warranted; and it is hard to see the efficacy, when it comes to avoiding ill fortune, of such

things as making sure that no wine-ladle is on top of the mixing-bowl when people are drinking (744-45).

However, it can still be seen that all of the suggestions are presented as instructions for how to prosper (or at least not starve) while - and by or because of - living in consonance with dike. To transgress the standards of [Dlike], as Hesiod sees it, is to invite disaster; but he does not seem to conceive of that as arbitrarily or capriciously determined disaster. The discord engendered by the flouting of agreed-upon and viable social standards can diminish cooperation; allowing dishonest dealings to prevail can lead to a lack of trust and an unwillingness to work hard that could put a community in danger of starvation or foreign takeover. The measures that Hesiod urges on Perses are all aimed at affording Perses peace and as much prosperity as possible, while he acts consistently with or respectfully of [Dlike].

Once again then we see dike applying to things or actions in virtue of the classes into which they fall. Hesiod instructs Perses in what kinds of things to do and not to do, what characteristics to look for in employees, and so on; he does not mention specific incidents or individuals. We also see Hesiod's dike to tie, or to describe a bond or connection between, human actions in a social/political sphere and events that are on some level not in or due to that sphere, events that are not themselves

human actions. (Some human actions can lead to starvation or the spread of disease, for example, but human actions are not responsible for the fact that humans need food in order to live, or the fact that diseases exist.) Dike seems then in Works and Days to describe, or to be, a kind of link between various (or all?) aspects of the cosmos. Dike is of a certain character; it (she?) prescribes or enforces a certain character to what exists. It functions in virtue of certain constant relations between different (stable) kinds of thing; the relations it takes advantage of are perhaps causal, and certainly regular.

These features are taken up, in a most general way, in the surviving fragment of Anaximander. Grammatically and contextually, Anaximander's use of 'dike' does not match any of those in Parmenides, but in combination with his use of 'adikia' (opposite of 'dike', indicating transgression of dike), it reflects something that I find to be significant for the study of Parmenides.

What has separated off from the apeiron - probably things, or opposites such as "the hot" and "the cold" - is said by Anaximander to pay penalty and restitution (dike and tisis) to each other for their adikia "according to the assessment of [T]ime." The process of payment of reparations results in a return of everything to the apeiron, wherein there are no distinct things or qualities in the way in

which we are familiar with them.³ We do not know why things or opposites are supposed to separate off from the apeiron, but Anaximander says that they do, and he finds adikia in this.

What seems clear, or as clear as anything can from a half-sentence fragment, is that Anaximander takes dike to apply to or in the cosmos as a whole. He presents relationships between entities in so far as they are not socially constructed - e.g. between "the hot" and "the cold" - as subject to regulation according to dike. Dike seems to enforce or to represent a certain standard for what is appropriate for each kind or group of entities (as distinguished in everyday language); its effect is to maintain (or represent or be) a certain order. Put another way, if Anaximander holds that there is penalty and restitution to be paid for adikia (generally, transgression of dike), he must take it that some sort of dike is in

³That the enforcement of dike, or the redress of adikia, leads to some kind of unification of all that exists may seem to make Anaximander's account sound somewhat similar to that of the binding effects of dike in Parmenides' fragment 8. However, it is quite possible that Anaximander saw the process of separation off from and return to the apeiron as a cycle that repeated itself. Parmenides' goddess, on the other hand, refers to [Dike's binding of to eon as something that is ever in effect and that precludes generation, destruction, and multiplicity, at very least as far as the road of inquiry she is discussing is concerned.

A comparison of some ancient accounts of Anaximander's ideas appears in G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.; New York; and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 106-108.

effect. Otherwise, there would seem to be no point or meaning in calling something an example of adikia. The transgression was apparently a change in the relationships among certain entities or characteristics or aspects of the cosmos; and Anaximander says that these relationships are regulated such that the changes are negated (all returns to the apeiron) and restitution is made.

Dike seems to function quite similarly in some fragments of Heracleitus. B94 states that the sun will not overstep its (his) measures; if it (he) did, according to this fragment, the Erinues (Furies), allies or assisters of [D]ike, would find it (him) out. Dike, then is implicated in the regulation of the sun's behavior, and consequently in the regulation of whatever is due to the workings of the sun (plant growth, for example). We may remark here as well that the fragment reflects a sense that there are metra, standards or measures, for the sun's behavior or movements, and that [D]ike is responsible for keeping them in place, or for enforcing them.

Dike is portrayed in fragment B80 too as contributing to making things in general the way they are. In this fragment Heracleitus says that "it is necessary to understand that war is common to all existing things (eonta), and [that] strife ([E]ris) is [D]ike (OR: [D]ike is [E]ris) and all things have come to be in accordance with

[E]ris." Hence [D]ike as [E]ris is being said to be that according to which that which exists comes to be.⁴

I do not purport here to discuss Heracleitus' overall cosmological or other metaphysical vision; nor do I claim to be giving a thorough account of the place that his notion of [D]ike occupied within his thought. I think it is evident, though, that for Heracleitus as well [D]ike has a function involved with regulation and with the existence of standards (with determination of what is appropriate). In fact, Heracleitus portrays [D]ike as being involved with the maintenance of a certain cosmic order. He represents it (her?) as applying, we can see, even to such things as the sun, whose workings humans cannot control, and cannot determine entirely by legislation - things whose workings or activities transcend the dictates of any human society.

The several uses of '[D]ike' that I have considered are not identical. However, they seem to have some elements in common. First, all seem to allow that there is at least some level or kind or aspect of [D]ike that is not solely, or not at all, the result of a decree by some social or political institution. In the passages I have cited, [D]ike

⁴Whether either [D]ike or [E]ris is intended by Heracleitus to be taken as a sort of model or standard, as the source of models or standards, or as some active entity that makes things work a certain way - or whether these distinctions are appropriate or of any importance to Heracleitus - is not clear, and is beyond the scope of the present discussion to investigate.

is always somehow, to some degree, and for some reason (divine or other) connected to the workings or changes of the cosmos, or of what is as a whole.⁵ Hugh Lloyd-Jones asserts in The Justice of Zeus⁶ that "[D]ike means basically the order of the universe", maintained, according to Greek religion, by the gods. Lloyd-Jones does not argue for this point directly. I hope to have shown here that Dike is at least integrally connected with the order of the cosmos. Whether Dike is that order, or brings about that order, or represents it, or has some other relationship with it, is not evident from the texts I have cited.

Lloyd-Jones goes on to say that the gods maintain the cosmic order "by working through nature and the human mind, and not by means of extraneous interventions" (162). The second element that I think all of the uses of 'Dike' considered in this chapter have in common is that all show Dike, or its enforcement, functioning or acting in the cosmos with respect to or in virtue of the kinds or classes that things are supposed to belong to, or the general

⁵Thus the usual translation of 'Dike' when it appears in Parmenides' fragments, namely translation as '[J]ustice', may be misleading. It may be misleading, that is, if justice is understood only as social justice, or understood solely in terms of phenomena and ideas that pertain to what is conceived of as a social sphere or as created or determined only socially. At the same time, it may be difficult for the Western reader of today to comprehend precisely what might be meant by a "justice" that extends beyond the realm of human social interactions.

⁶Hugh Lloyd-Jones, The Justice of Zeus (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 161.

characteristics things are supposed to have. Moreover, [D]ike is supposed in these texts to work in regular ways. That is, [D]ike is described as applying to a thing not one time only, nor at random, but in virtue of the kind of thing it is, the kind of action or situation in which it has been involved, and the relations between these and the other features of what exists that contribute to the balance that is to be maintained. Further, the cosmic workings associated with [D]ike in these passages are described as regularities: Homer's Zeus did not simply send one hurricane to one group of people who have made crooked decrees, but sends hurricanes to any place that has such people. Perses is not being given instructions that pertain only to him, nor is he being told what will happen to him alone if he fails to follow the principles outlined (something which would not be likely to befall another Boeotian farmer who did not follow them); rather, Hesiod is telling him what Perses as a Boeotian farmer should do, given the general character of the exigencies posed by climate, custom or religious belief, human needs, human social tendencies as Hesiod sees them, and so on.

In the passages cited there is a third common element that should be taken into account, namely the notion of an order or standard. Without the presence of a sense that there is a certain constant or consistent way that the cosmos (or what exists, as such or in general) is, a certain

equilibrium or a certain set of regularities in or according to which that which exists functions, there would not be a notion like the conceptions of [D]ike that have been discussed here. One does not have to be able to articulate exactly what the cosmos or the total of what is is like, nor to demonstrate in detail a set of (possibly causal) principles by which it is supposed to work, in order to conceive of what exists as a closed system that works within certain parameters. (In fact, the latter may be a prerequisite for the former.)

I will now examine what is implied by the features that I have outlined above as being associated with notions of [D]ike, and I will show how they may be found to illuminate Parmenides' references to [D]ike. First, there is the fact that [D]ike is presented as applying to all of what is or to all of what is said or thought to exist. This is explicit in Anaximander and Heracleitus, and I would suggest that it is implicit in Homer and Hesiod. This makes the application of [D]ike to to eon (what is; that which is; being) in Parmenides' fragment 8 seem less unusual than it otherwise might. Jane Harrison points out in Themis⁷ that Hesiod identified the goddess Dike as one of the Horai, the

⁷Jane Ellen Harrison, Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion, 2d ed., with an excursus on the ritual forms preserved in Greek tragedy, by Gilbert Murray, and a chapter on the origin of the Olympic Games, by F.M. Cornford (London: Cambridge University Press, 1927), 515-18.

Seasons (Theogony 901). Harrison asserts that this identification makes it quite appropriate (she also cites some examples from the painting of the time, in support of her claim) for Dike to be the goddess presented in Parmenides' proem as guarding the gates of the paths of [N]ight and [D]ay, and so as regulating the operations of sun and seasons (lengths of days, and so on). Thus in this capacity Dike might be seen as representing a source of why things are the way they are.

Further, Parmenides portrays Dike at 1.14 as holding keys "for exchange/alternation", amoibous. I would suggest that this might plausibly be taken to intend keys that enable her to open the gates to allow passage from one side to the other (exchange or alternation of place on or from the paths of [N]ight and [D]ay). 'Ameibein', the infinitive active form of the verb from which 'amoibous' comes, can mean "to change" or "to exchange"; or, in its middle voice form, "to answer", "repay", "requite". Requit, as we have seen, is frequently a duty of Dike, and penalties, a form of requital, are associated with Dike at 1.14. Thus both senses of 'ameibein' can be linked to Dike; we should note, though, that there is no immediate evidence for any requital taking place in fragment 1.

What might be the significance within fragment 1 of Dike opening the gates? A preliminary response might be this: The fact that Dike opens the gates and allows the

young man to go through would seem to suggest that she has been convinced by the Heliades (sun-maidens) that allowing this passage is consistent with what [D]ike is supposed to permit; that retribution will not be necessary in order to restore things (including people) to their proper relationships (whatever these may be) if the young man should enter the realm of the goddess who speaks.

Consonantly with this idea, the Heliades are said to persuade Dike to open the gates by "blandishing her with soft (gentle) words" (ten...parphamenai...malakoîsi logoisin/ peîsan), quite the opposite of using force, bia.

Indeed, the goddess who speaks remarks that it was [T]hemis and [D]ike that (who) sent the narrator on his present path, though that be far from the beaten path of humans (1.26-28). This would seem to imply, based on the foregoing examination of earlier and contemporary uses of '[D]ike', that this goddess is declaring the narrator's itinerary to be wholly appropriate, despite its divergence from what humans usually do (which is not to say that none of these humans think that they are following [T]hemis and [D]ike). The young man's path might have been deemed appropriate either because he is unusual among humans, or because humans tend not to succeed at following (or at recognizing) what [T]hemis and [D]ike prescribe; or both. To get an idea of what the goddess might be referring to, it will I think be helpful to look at the occurrence of

'[D]ike' in fragment 8.

Let us consider first what is happening in fr. 8. The goddess is telling the young man about a road (hodos) or an account of a road, presumably one of the "roads of inquiry" (hodoi...dizesios) she had proposed discussing at 2.1-2. In 8.3-6 she lists a number of "signs" on or towards this road, the signs being (or indicating?) that, or how, something - 'estin' without obvious grammatical subject - is ungenerated, indestructible, whole, singular, unmoving, and complete (or unended; ateleston). I would suggest that the "something" is likely to be eon or to eon. The word 'eon' appears in 8.3 and could very plausibly be taken as the subject of the 'estin' in that line. In addition, the entity being talked about at 8.3-6 certainly seems to be the one being talked about in 8.19 and 8.25, both of which lines refer explicitly to to eon. There is no indication that the subject of the discussion changes between 8.6 and 8.25. [D]ike appears in 8.14, then, as part of an argument or explanation for why to eon cannot be (or cannot be said and taken to be) generated or destroyed, and for why nothing could come to be in addition to that which is, on or for this road of inquiry at least.

The word I have translated above as "inquiry" is 'dizesis'. This word could equally be translated as "seeking" of any sort. Seeking or inquiring is a deliberate activity for humans; it requires decisions and actions on

our part. For inquiry or seeking to be possible, we must conceive or think and speak (where the object of the search must be articulated, or where questions are employed) in a certain way regarding what exists, or what we take to exist. We cannot seek a thing if we cannot be sure of what any of its characteristics are, if we do not know in terms of what kinds of thing to look for or to ask about it, if we have no stable criteria for recognizing it, or if we cannot know any valid principles that govern its relationships through all of its changes. We cannot seek a thing without stable parameters for evaluating or for identifying what we come upon; if we do not know what kind of thing we are looking for, we cannot ask questions. Some sort of order must be conceived, must be taken to obtain, it seems. In order to be able to ask questions or to direct our seeking, it must also be the case that the general characteristics we identify in order to describe or to evoke things always bear the same relationships to each other.

For example, we could not seek caterpillars, or seek to understand about caterpillars, if to be a caterpillar had no consistent set of characteristics. We can study caterpillars despite their tendency to become butterflies, because there is a consistent and stable set of characteristics associable with being a caterpillar. These characteristics stand (or appear and are taken to stand) in certain stable relations with each other and with other

characteristics of the observable world, such that (we say) we can determine or discern regularities in the genesis and metamorphosis of caterpillars. Caterpillars, we say, are related to butterflies in particular, recognizable, articulable ways.

Further, the characteristics we invoke (or say we invoke) in our inquiries must not randomly come to be, change, or perish; or else the terms we use in order to inquire, indeed the use of terms itself, would be meaningless. Those general characteristics, those standards, must stand, and must be taken to stand, in certain stable relations to each other, if inquiry is to be possible. One reason we think we can inquire about ephemeral or mutable things is that the characteristics through which we say we invoke them are supposed to be stable in their meanings and their relations. If we can inquire about things that change, the characteristics they have must be recognizable and stable in their meanings and relations. For example, no matter what existed, we might hold that in order to ask about it, we must take it that nothing can be a certain way and not that way in the same respect at the same time (e.g. that nothing can be both red all over its surface and not red all over its surface at the same time). Or we might say that in the material world, nothing comes from nothing. It is just this sort of situation, this consistency and stability of relations among general characteristics, that

we have seen associated with or attributed to [D]ike.

There are further implications which should make clearer the relevance of these observations for the investigation of Parmenides' fragment 8. If it is the case that inquiry requires that stable principles be in effect, that stable relationships obtain between what we conceive or take to be the characteristics of existent things, then what is (as a whole, or, as it will be seen, at all) cannot come to be. It cannot come to be out of nothing, for if it did then it would not be the case that its internal relations always held (and in that case they may cease to hold). Also, if what is had come to be out of nothing there would have been a time when it did not exist, and we would have no way of accounting (using the terms that we use for talking about what exists) for its current existence and characteristics. They would be discontinuous with - lacking relation (or discernible, existent relation) to - the prior state. Our understanding of those current characteristics would be unfounded, baseless.

Nor could what is, to eon, have come to be out of something else. For if the genesis could be depicted in terms of constant relationships between currently valid characteristics, then the two together (generator plus generated) would constitute what is. If the genesis could not be so depicted (if it could not be depicted or noted, or if it could only be invoked by recourse to characteristics

that are incoherent or that are not commensurable or compatible with any we could now conceive of or take to obtain), then the generator and the generated cannot be known to be connected to or continuous with each other; and again our (purported) understanding of the current characteristics and their relations will lack foundation. We will not be able to assert that our claim to understanding is valid, that those relations really obtain.

The characteristics of what is in general or as such, and their relations, must include some which are, and some which account for, the characteristics of and relations between individual things that we say exist. As has been stated above, the characteristics by which we identify or describe the things we say exist, and the relations between these characteristics, must be stable and consistent, if inquiry is to be possible. (Not only must they be held to be stable and consistent, if inquiry is to be possible and to be taken to be possible, but they must also be stable and consistent. For if they were - or are - not, we would at best only think we were inquiring.) Thus if we are to be able to seek anything purposively, neither what is as a whole or in general or as such, nor particular things said to exist, can be held to come to be out of nothing or to come to be out of something other than what is. If we did hold that anything could come to be otherwise than from what is, we could not also with consistency claim to have terms

with stable meanings, with which to identify anything. Seeking would evidently not be possible. Similarly, if inquiry is to be possible, we cannot hold that what is can perish utterly (i.e. that something can become absolutely nothing), nor that what is can generate something besides what is, nor that what is can come to be out of what is (for that would mean that what is, or some aspect of it, must become other than what is, which we have seen to be ruled out). Indeed, we might even say that if inquiry is to be possible then what is cannot become nothing, and cannot generate anything in addition to what is (since whatever was generated would have to be; and we have already seen that there can be no extrinsic source, and no ancestor, for what is; compare 8.6-7). These are exactly the conditions that Idlike is supposed to enforce or impose in its (her) shackling of to eon at 8.12-14.

So far it has seemed that the various characteristics of what is were involved with Idlike. Parmenides' goddess had said at the beginning of fr. 8 that on or for the road (or the story of a road) that she is discussing, what is must be one (again, if to eon is the subject of 8.3-6, as seems most likely). In fact the very considerations that have been under examination here as pertaining to Idlike also support the goddess's pronouncement concerning the unity of what is, on or for the road in question. First, what we have seen implies that what

is cannot be multiple, nor can it have discontinuities. In addition, we can see some incompatibility between the claim that there are multiple things, on the one hand, and what would have to be the case were Dislike in effect, on the other.

For if there are multiple things, each with various characteristics, then there are, we way, distinctions between them. We may distinguish the things, or identify the distinctions, by referring to aspects that the things do not (or are not said or taken to) have in common, or by referring to boundaries, to intermediary entities, to explanations or accounts of differences. We may try to distinguish or to pick out things that are supposed to exist in space or time, for example, by their locations relative to other such things, or by reference to the locations of boundaries they are supposed to have. In order to delineate a spatially or temporally present thing completely, to know its exact extent and to know that it is in fact a discrete and present thing, it would seem necessary to determine just where its boundary or its limit leaves off and where its neighbors, or neighboring areas, begin. Or we would have to ask what lies or comes between the thing we are trying to distinguish and what is next to it. Now, there could not be said to be no existent space or time between the two, since a non-continuous space or time would make it impossible to locate or to measure things consistently (and we have seen

that a non-continuous space or time would be incompatible with both [Dlike and inquiry); and if there were no existing space or time between two things that were supposed to lie or to occur in a continuum, we could not hold that the two were discrete (in the sense of being spatially or temporally distinct). However we also could not say that something lay between a thing and its nearest neighbor, for then that intermediary would become the nearest neighbor. If there could not be zero space or time between that intermediary and the thing, we would have to say that something came between them, and so on infinitely, with the result that the distinction between the thing and what is around it would never be fully realized or achieved. In that case we would not have warrant to say that the thing is distinct, or a particular thing, at all. Similarly, if we tried to determine the very outer limit of a thing, or its boundary, in space or time, we would find that any point at which this seemed to fall could always be subdivided or made more precise, so that the exact extent or location of the thing, and its point of separation from its neighbors, would never be known, and never be known actually to exist at all.

Something like a parallel, and equally problematic, situation can be found to obtain for non-spatio-temporal things that we say exist. We may propose to identify a thing in terms of what it is not, that is, "negatively", in terms of its relations to other things or to their

characteristics; or we may try to identify it in terms of specifics that are unique to it. We could not define or identify everything solely in terms of other things, and still maintain that things had stable identifiable features (as IDlike and the possibility of inquiry would demand, since the process would be circular. Even if only one thing were to be, or to have to be, distinguished negatively, the process of doing so would seem to be inconclusive, unless we could already claim to know everything about what is as a whole. Attempts at negative identification will prove infinite (non-terminating) or imprecise if we do not already know exactly what there is to be left after all other things and combinations of characteristics are identified and eliminated. But if we do know that, inquiry would not be needed. If there is something we would inquire about or seek, we do not yet know about the natures and all of the relationships among things we say exist.

Yet if we try to distinguish a thing we say exists in terms of aspects not shared by any other, different problems arise. As far as these aspects (including combinations of aspects, if the combination is what is said to be unique) of things are not shared, they cannot be members of all of the same classes, or of the same classes in all respects, and are not related. For example, if A and B are sticks, that which each does not share with the other or with any other stick - this aspect or characteristic or

group of aspects or characteristics, or whatever it is that distinguishes A and B from each other and from other things, or in virtue of which they are distinct - cannot belong to the same class[es] in all respects. Otherwise A and B would share something of that aspect, and it is precisely what is not shared that distinguishes them. Now, just in so far as a thing has an aspect that is unique, that is not and does not render it part of a class (of things having a certain characteristic), it is not an object for [D]ike. Thus from this perspective also the claim that there are multiple things and the claim that [D]ike is in effect (and contributes to things being the way they are) do not jibe, for investigative purposes at very least.

In fact, the things and characteristics we say we invoke in our investigations are those we say exist; we have not proven, and do not know that we could prove, that we have adequately captured what is (or whatever we intend by 'what is'; or whatever we address in using the expression 'what is' or 'is') through the terms we use. However, if any conclusions can be drawn and tested, then it would seem that stable relations (though not necessarily the ones we might take to obtain) exist on some level among the characteristics we say we identify, if we hold that what is is. If it seems that conclusions can be drawn and tested, then it seems that such stable relations exist. For these stable relations to exist there would have to be underlying

continuity, a continuous web of relations perhaps, as is suggested by the goddess's remarks at 8.21-22. Whether these relations exist, and whether we can tell whether they exist, will be explored in the chapter on preliminary implications of the binding of to eon in or for inquiry.

Further, only if there are stable relations among characteristics of what exists can anything be true - can there be or be said and taken to be truth at all perhaps. (The goddess says at 8.50 that her speech so far has been "about (all around; amphis) [T]ruth.) [D]like and truth, at least so far as the latter can be deliberately sought, thus go together, in or for inquiry. But what is implied if, as I have tried to show that the goddess infers, to eon is one and continuous, or must be said and taken by us to be so, in or for inquiry at least? I would suggest that an investigation of the multiple characteristics that we usually attribute to what is, and that are supposed to manifest [D]like, has led to conclusions that call into question the nature of our conception of what is in terms of these characteristics. These tensions will be explored and examined in detail in the final two chapters.

CHAPTER THREE

ANANKE

Ananke is the second of the three figures or factors that Parmenides' goddess portrays in fragment 8 as shackling or binding what is (to eon). The function that [A]nanke performs (8.29-31) in binding to eon is characterized differently from that performed by [D]ike (8.13-15), and neither of these is exactly the same as the job of [M]oira (8.36-38). I will attempt here to show that the relevant differences and similarities are consistent with features that would seem to have been understood around the early fifth century as appertaining to the functions of each of these figures or factors; and to show that the combination of these features is indeed significant as far as inquiry or seeking (dizesis) is concerned. (Whether the goddess is saying that this binding occurs only on or for purposes of the road of dizesis she describes in fragment 8, or whether the binding is rather supposed to be in effect more generally; as well as what implications this might have in any case; will be discussed in the final two chapters.)

The language in which the goddess describes the function and effects of [A]nanke in 8.29-31 is ambiguous. She could be saying, "Remaining the same and in the same place, it (sc. to eon) lies by itself/ And thus it stands fast on the spot; for mighty [A]nanke/ Holds it in bonds of

limit, which shut it in all around (on both sides; apart; separately)." Or she could be saying, "Remaining the same and in the same way, it lies (remains) according to itself/ And thus it stands fast (remains steadfast), etc." Perhaps she intends some combination of these. The first rendering makes evident reference to spatial relations; in the second the focus is less clearly spatial, or perhaps not spatial at all. In either case it is also possible that terms are being used in something like a metaphorical or analogical way, or that they are meant somewhat broadly. Based on the discussions that follow, concerning the senses and uses of '[A]nanke' and their possible application with respect to inquiry, I will make some proposals for reading Parmenides 8.29-31.

Three main senses or uses of '[A]nanke' can be found to have appeared by the fifth century. The first is "force", "constraint", or "necessity". In this sense the phrase 'ananke esti' may appear with an infinitive, and would be rendered as 'it must be that...' or 'it is necessary that...' In its second sense, 'ananke' is often translated as "natural need"; it refers to need that is considered bodily or phusis-related. The third sense or use is Ananke as daimon, or as from gods, often associated with fate or destiny, or moira. Like Dike and Moira, the daimon Ananke is female.

Parmenides' goddess may be referring to a daimon, to a personification of ananke, at 8.30; the goddess portrays [Alnanke] as constraining to eon; and the third constrainer (or the third aspect of the constraint) of that which is will be [M]oîra. Moreover, in some of the passages from other authors that will be examined here, [Alnanke] is specifically associated with binding or shackling. At least on the surface, then, Parmenides' employment of [Alnanke] appears to have some precedent. Further investigation is needed if we are to discover anything or to make any suggestions about the nature of the function or tasks that he gives it (her) in the speech of the goddess. For that we will need to look first at the workings elsewhere ascribed to [Alnanke], and at the contexts in which those workings are said to occur. If a set of salient characteristics and associations of [Alnanke] can be identified, we can move on to consider how these might find application in Parmenides' fragment 8.

The force/constraint/necessity sense of ananke seems to have wide application. At Odyssey 7.217, Odysseus speaks of the ananke imposed by his stomach, viz., hunger, saying that his stomach "commanded" (ekelousen) him to think of it even when his mind or heart was full of other pressing matters. (This example may overlap with the second sense to be discussed.) Elsewhere, humanly-imposed restrictions impose or carry or provide the context for ananke: At

Odyssey 19.156, Penelope explains that once her ruse (for postponing indefinitely a decision to marry one of her suitors) was exposed, it was brought to an end, against her will, by ananke. She has no way now to escape remarriage, she says. In the sixth book of the Iliad, Hector worries about the burdens his wife Andromache will have to bear if Troy is defeated. he tells her of the pain he feels when he thinks that she would be enslaved, that she would be constrained ('epikeiset' ananke', 'ananke will be laid on you', 6.458) to weave or to carry water under orders from another.

Ananke in this sense can also pertain to events and situations that are attributed to divine or superhuman sources. At Odyssey 10.434, Odysseus recounts how Eurylochos tried to stop other crew members from accompanying Odysseus to the house of Circe. He says that Eurylochos reminded them that Circe might turn them into pigs or wolves or lions, and that as such by ananke they would guard her house. The connection between being a pig, wolf, or lion and guarding Circe's house is not clear; but we can discern a general sense that when Circe exercises her powers on a human, the human cannot overcome their effects.

At Persians 293, Aeschylus has Atossa remind herself of ananke's connection to the divine, when she must face what she describes as unspeakable suffering. She says that for mortals ananke is (or, that for mortals it is necessary)

to bear miseries given by gods. (The word order may also suggest that the ananke is given by gods.) In Prometheus Bound, Prometheus says that he is bound by (enezeugmai) ananke, and that the might of [Ananke]¹ is unconquerable (lines 108 and 105, respectively). The precise role that [Ananke] plays in Prometheus' situation is unclear: Does [Ananke] ensure that he cannot escape his fetters? That he suffers pain from his punishment? Did [Ananke] play any part in commanding or ordaining or requiring that he be punished in the first place - that is, could Zeus be said to have acted in concert or in conformity with some dictates of [Ananke] in ordering this punishment? Or is [Ananke] responsible for some combination of these? What is evident is that since [Ananke] has something to do with Prometheus' present situation (108), he cannot escape or change that situation for the duration of his term of penalty; [Ananke], he says, cannot be overcome (105).

Aeschylus also has Prometheus put forth a more remarkable claim. At 518, Prometheus asserts that in so far as Zeus cannot escape that which is destined or allotted (pepromenen), Zeus is less powerful than the steerers of Ananke (ananke?), who are identified in 516 as the Moirai and the Erinues. There are certain events or consequences that even Zeus cannot avoid or prevent, on this view. When

¹The context does not make clear whether the reference is to the daimon Ananke or to unpersonified ananke.

the Chorus says at 519 that Zeus is supposed to hold sway eternally (aei krateîn), and calls him the dispenser of all things (ho panta nemon) at 526, Prometheus does not tell it outright that its beliefs are false. In his subsequent (756-62) conversation with Io, though, he says that Zeus will be deprived of or thrown out of (ekpesein) his rule by "himself and his own empty-minded purposes" (autos autoû kenophronon bouleumatôn).

The second sense of 'ananke' was the one that might be characterized as "natural need". An example, from Aeschylus' Agamemnon 726, is the expression 'gastros anankais', 'by ananke of the stomach', i.e. out of hunger, compelled by hunger. This use is similar to that of Odyssey 7.217, discussed above; here too the emphasis seems to be on inescapable (for a human in this case) compulsion or constraint. If there is a difference between the two senses or uses, it is perhaps that the first focuses on the command or compulsion itself, while the second applies to a more limited range of cases (cases involving bodies or other forms in "nature") and focuses on "natural" entities as immediate sources of compulsion or constraint.

The third sense or use is that of Ananke as daimon, as divine being or as coming from divine beings. Examples from the early fifth century and before include the apparent one at Prometheus Bound 105, noted above, and 'Ananke d' oude theoi machontai', 'But even gods do not fight against

Ananke', Simonides 5.29². There as well we can see a reference to the irresistibility of Ananke as imposer of constraints. In the preceding clause Simonides has said that he commends all who do nothing shameful (aischron) willingly. His remark about Ananke seems meant to explain or to amplify this assertion. Earlier in the poem (that is, earlier according to the account of the placement of lines that is given by Socrates in Plato's Protagoras), the poet had proposed that a man cannot but be kakos (bad) when helpless against irresistible misfortune, and (this part is given as a paraphrase in the Protagoras) mainly the best are those whom the gods love. Ananke then appears as a further, more powerful restriction on human possibilities, for according to the poet it (she) restricts gods as well. That is, the irresistibility and restrictive capacity of Ananke would seem to be what make it relevant to Simonides' (or Plato's Simonides') concerns about the possibilities humans have for goodness or excellence. In restricting what humans (there seems no reason to suppose that Ananke does not

²The source for this fragment of Simonides is Plato's Protagoras 345d. The fragment is one of several that are presented in the dialogue as quotations from a poem of Simonides; it is not clear how much of the poem these quotations might represent. It is possible that the quotations contain some inaccuracies or inventions on the part of Plato or of his characters, or even that what Plato has given us are not quotations from Simonides at all. Certainly, without knowledge of the whole poem, or knowledge that what we have is the whole poem, we cannot know the contexts in which the quoted lines, if they are that, appear. I present this fragment in case it either belongs to Simonides, or is relevantly similar and not anachronistic.

affect women as well as men) can do, or what they can effect, Ananke affects what a human is or can be in terms of his or her relations with others, with the wider environment, and so on.

The pictures of [A]nanke generated by these examples are not especially detailed. However, they can be seen to share certain salient features, or to overlap in some ways. First, [A]nanke is always represented as something humans cannot resist, and sometimes as something gods cannot resist either. Ananke's enforcing function is completely binding, sometimes literally so. What [A]nanke ordains or enforces or ensures is by that token inexorable or inevitable for whomever or whatever the [a]nanke applies to in a given context.

We might also note that [A]nanke is shown as constraining the people or divinities it affects such that they cannot do something or obtain a result or maintain a condition that they would wish or prefer; or such that they must do something or accept results or be in circumstances that they do not want, that they seek to avoid or prevent. The emphasis on dislike of, and on actual or desired attempts to resist, [a]nanke, seems to me to point up [A]nanke's restrictive character: [A]nanke prevents arbitrary or capricious change. Ananke "locks in" a certain set or range of relationships or consequences, and excludes

others.

For example, Hector predicts that once enslaved, Andromache would be constrained to do certain things for her mistresses, presumably on pain of death or injury. Slavery, for as long as it lasts, involves just this loss for the slave of some or all of his or her possibilities for determining his or her own goals and courses of action. For the slave, slavery also means being bound to certain relationships with one's master, and thus being bound to certain relationships with other people, with the environment at large, and with the needs and dispositions of one's own body. The slave generally cannot without the master's approval choose whether or whom to marry, whom to associate with (and in what ways to do so), nor what and how much to eat; with the master's okay other parties can give orders that the slave must obey; and so on. While the master can dissolve this bond voluntarily, the slave cannot rid him- or herself of it except by death, or sometimes (and constrained by some risk) by escape, or in certain cases by fulfilling the requirements laid down by legal stipulations - another form of constraint.

Similarly, the ananke imposed by Odysseus's stomach restricts and to some extent determines what he thinks or is aware of, what he does, and what happens to him. He must temporarily suspend his other concerns, perhaps at the cost of impairing his ability to do other things important to

him, for his appetite for food serves as a reminder. If he persists in defying the warnings of his appetite, he will weaken and die. He has no choice in the way these matters are. His actions regarding his stomach are bound to a certain limited range of consequences; he himself may also be said to be bound to stand in certain relations to other people and things, as is suggested by his remarks about the necessity of delaying his discussion and address of his other problems.

Prometheus' statements about Zeus and [Alnanke] imply that what Zeus can do, and/or what effects he can produce, are at least in some cases limited, even determined, by [Alnanke]; that Zeus cannot at will control all of the outcomes of his actions. Zeus's relations to other beings, and to the universe at large, are restricted by or through what is called '[Alnanke]'. There seems to be an implication that [Alnanke] is binding in all situations and on all consequences - not only on the ones Zeus would like to avoid, but also on those he seeks. That is, if [Alnanke] (or its/her "steerers") is more powerful than Zeus, then those projects that he is able to realize would be fulfilled only with the sufferance of [Alnanke] (unless there is something more powerful than either Zeus or [Alnanke], or unless the power of [Alnanke] does not apply to everything - possibilities that are not mentioned, and which might be ruled out by line 105 and by Prometheus' apparent

qualification on Zeus's ability to "dispense all things".)

In the preceding examples [Alnanke is conceived as inexorably binding on someone or something, with respect to that individual's relationships to other people, gods, and things. One feature of this restriction is limitation of what the affected individual can do, of what changes it/he/she can undergo, and of what can befall it/him/her. When, or inasmuch as, one is bound by [Alnanke, one cannot change one's circumstances or situation completely at will; and there are consequences and eventualities that one cannot escape. This feature is emphasized in the passages that connect [Alnanke with the Moirai, the Erinyes, or divine ordination, e.g. Persians 293-94 and Prometheus Bound 103-5 and 510-18. One's possibilities are circumscribed by [Alnanke; certain things must be the case, happen, or be done (if one is to survive, or in any case). Other things cannot or will not be or happen or be done; still others can or will be, happen, or be done only under certain conditions - which limitation would not be in effect but for - and enforced by - the imposition of [Alnanke. The circumscription can apply largely in virtue of social concerns, as in the passage on Andromache (although it should be noted that slaves who tried to escape could be killed; the social institution of slavery relies on the existence of certain human attributes that are not socially imposed, such the fact that humans are mortal and able to

kill each other). Circumscription by [Alnanke] can also, or additionally, apply in virtue of material or in general non-social concerns, as in the case of Odysseus' hunger. Limitation by or through [Alnanke] can be attributed to divine ordination, or it can be said to be more powerful or authoritative than gods and thus to apply to all within a god's purview, or to even more.

We can see as well from these examples that [Alnanke] does not apply only in cases of spatial circumscription. What then can be said about the context in which [Alnanke] appears in Parmenides 6.29-31? I would suggest that there is no conclusive indication that we should assume that the context does refer only or mainly to spatial concerns. The words in 8.29-31 that can have spatial connotations are 'menon' and 'menei' (from 'meno'), 'keftai', 'empedon', 'aûthi', and 'amphis'. If these are taken to refer to spatial relations, 'en tautôi' may be taken to mean "in the same place". Similarly, 'eergei' may refer to spatial barring if 'amphis' is taken spatially. Then 'peiratos' will refer to spatial limits, and 'en desmoisin' possibly to bonds in space. However, an examination of some examples of usage in or before the early fifth century shows that none of these words and phrases were used exclusively to refer to spatial phenomena or exclusively non-metaphorically.

It will be generally acknowledged, I think, that the

'meno' forms and 'keítai' were often used to express actions or conditions that do not have or do not emphasize a spatial aspect. While 'meno' forms could mean "stand fast in battle", "remain where one is", or "stay in a place", they could also mean "abide", "remain as one is (was)", "be lasting", or "wait". At Iliad 11.666, Nestor asks whether Achilles (menei) until the Argives are completely devastated. At 19.263 Agamemnon swears that he has not touched the captive maiden Briseis, that she has remained untouched, undefiled (emen' aprotimastos) while in his custody. If she has been in Agamemnon's custody, she certainly has not remained in one place. In Aeschylus' Eumenides, Apollo tells Athena at 672 that he has sent Orestes so that the pledge between Orestes' line and her city would abide (menoi) always. In Seven Against Thebes, the Chorus notes at 742 that an ancient transgression (Laius' defiance of Apollo), or its punishment, abides or remains (menei) into a third generation.

'Keítai' was most frequently used to mean "is laid" in a place or "lies" somewhere, and a number of other pre-fifth-century uses also have to do with spatial situations. But at Iliad 23.273, Achilles offers prizes to the charioteers, saying that these prizes keít' en agoni. This might be taken to mean that they lie on the field of the contest, but in fact that is not where they are; the expression seems rather to mean that the prizes for (in) the

contest are established or set up. A figurative use of 'keítai' occurs at Iliad 17.514, where Automedon says that the results of a battle rest with, lie on the knees of (en gounasi keítai) Zeus. While the expression describes a location, its import is not entirely or even mainly spatial.

'Empedon' comes from 'en pedon', 'in the ground', and often means "firm-set" in a place or object. But as early as Homer it is regularly used to mean "steadfast" or "without fail". This word seems to me at least equally likely to connote something non-spatial as to connote something spatial.

'Aûthi' presents a more difficult case. A shortened form of 'aûtothi', it usually means "on the spot", "here", "there". In at least one case, though, 'aûtothi' seems to have the connotation or even the meaning "as is". At Iliad 5.847, Ares is described as ceasing to strip the armor from the fallen Periphas. Upon seeing Diomedes, Ares "aûtoth' ease keísthai, hothi prôton kteinon" - he lets Periphas lie aûtothi, where he first killed him. Certainly Ares is letting Periphas lie in a place. But the change in Ares' actions that is described with this expression seems to be from stripping Periphas to letting him lie unmolested, not from moving him to letting him lie in one place. This is not conclusive evidence that 'aûthi' has the sense "as is", but it does suggest that possibility. Again, there is always the possibility as well that Parmenides innovates by using the

term in a way that we might call figurative.

'Amphis' can mean "on both sides", "all around", "round about", "apart", "asunder", all in spatial senses. However examples of uses with no obvious spatial import exist as early as Homer. At Iliad 2.13, Zeus orders a dream to indicate to Agamemnon that the Olympians are no longer "amphis", for Hera has convinced them all. The gods had been "divided" or "apart" in opinion; Zeus wants Agamemnon to believe that they are now in agreement. 'Amphis' was also used to describe anything that stands apart figuratively, in the sense of standing out. In the besieged city described in Iliad 18.519 as depicted on the shield of Achilles, Ares and Athena lead the defending army. By their size, nobility, and armor, Homer says, the two gods are distinguished from or stand conspicuous from (amphis arizelo) the smaller (olizones) humans. In addition, 'amphis' could be used to indicate that individuals are being dealt with one at a time, or separately. At Odyssey 19.46, Odysseus says that he wishes to let Penelope ask him questions "amphis hekasta", one at a time. At Iliad 18.502, in the peaceful city portrayed on the shield of Achilles, a dispute between two men has drawn a crowd who "epepuon, amphis arogoi", cheer in support of one side and the other.

Thus 'amphis', like the other terms (with 'aûthi' remaining questionable) used in Parmenides 8.29-31, is not used only in discussions of spatial matters. This suggests

that we cannot immediately assume that Parmenides intended to cast to eon as spatial, or as necessarily spatial in some respect. There is another more general objection that may be made about several of these terms, as well as about other terms that occur in fragment 8. The use of 'amphis' in the remarks about [A]nanke illustrates the problem concerning such terms.

The objection is that even non-spatial uses of 'amphis' seem to involve contexts of multiple things (e.g. gods' opinions or purposes, Penelope's questions), whereas the goddess had announced that a "sign' of or on the road of inquiry she is discussing is that what is is unique (mounogenes, 8.4). She has also asserted that strength of assurance will not allow anything to come to be beside(s) what is (8.12), that what is is not indivisible (8.22), and so on. This is not to say that a spatial interpretation of 'amphis' would allow us to avoid the problem; if nothing could come to be beside(s) what is, for exaple, there would be no space outside of it in which to bind it, nor anything for it to be "apart" from. Moreover, 'meno' and 'empedon', and sometimes 'keimai' and 'amphis', have temporal connotations or implications. Yet with respect to this road of inquiry (at least) the goddess seems to warn against attributing change or temporal succession to that which is (fr. 8 lines 8, 13-14, 21, 27, etc.). I would propose that an exploration of the place of [A]nanke, as well as those of

[D]ike and [M]oira, with respect to inquiry, and a discussion in this context of "true assurance" or "true persuasion" (pistis alethes, 8.22) and of what is or is not conceived or named (8.17), is called for in preparation for addressing these problems. This will take place in the chapter on the preliminary implications of the binding of to eon by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. Part of the difficulty, I will suggest, is the tension that obtains between what can be said and conceived (taken to obtain), in seeking, of the particular things we hold to exist; and what can be said and conceived, in seeking, regarding to eon.

Let us now consider the context in which '[A]nanke' appears in 8.30. The goddess has announced that one account of a road (evidently a road of inquiry) remains, and has listed some "signs" on or of it. At least some of these signs she appears to attribute to or to associate with the operation of ananke (8.16) or [A]nanke (8.30). The latter occurrence will be discussed first, as it is the more detailed of the two. It should be asked, then, what if anything the features we have found so far to be characteristic of the reputed effects of [A]nanke can have to do with inquiry (seeking) or its requisites; and to what extent this could account for any of the "signs" the goddess mentions.

It is not immediately clear at what point the

goddess starts to discuss features of to eon that are to be attributed specifically to [A]nanke, nor is it clear whether some features are to be associated with two or more of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. Therefore I will begin with the sentence in which the binding effects of [A]nanke are specifically mentioned, namely 8.29-33: "Remaining the same and in the same way (place), it lies (is) by (according to) itself/ And thus it stands fast (remains) on the spot (as is?); for mighty [A]nanke/ Holds it in bonds of limit, which shut it in (off) all around (on both sides; apart),/ Wherefore it is not right (meet; lawful; themis) for to eon to be incomplete (OR:...it is right for to eon to be not incomplete);/ For it is not lacking; if it were, it would lack everything."

We have already seen [A]nanke described as constraining people and things to remain as they are, or (and this would apply to gods as well) to remain in a particular condition or set of circumstances. Ananke is also frequently depicted as binding or limiting, as in the case of Prometheus. Now, Parmenides' goddess asserts that to eon is constrained to stay as or where it is. This assertion evidently obtains on or for purposes of the road of inquiry she discusses in fragment 8, or at least there. What, then, might the relationship be between inquiry (dizesis), and to eon's remaining the same and in the same situation?

I would suggest that in order to be able to inquire

about, or to seek, something that we say exists, that thing cannot be conceived of or taken as passing into or out of existence at random, nor as changing states in inconsistent or non-regular ways; something similar was noted in the [D]ike chapter. (In order to be able to know that our inquiries could consistently find things we seek, those things would have to be known not to pass into or out of existence or of their various reported states at random.) If what we sought seemed able to change into absolutely any state or to begin to exist or cease to exist at unpredictable or unaccountable times and in unpredictable or unaccountable manners; if what we sought were held to be able to come to be anything else no matter what the circumstances (i.e., even under the very same circumstances under which at other times a different change or no change occurs); then there would be no way at all, no steps we could take, to seek the thing. we would not be able to identify what to look for; in a sense there would be no such "what".

Then it would seem that in order for us to be able to seek a thing that we say or hold to exist, we must also conceive or take it that what is as a whole or as such does not change, nor come to be or cease to exist at random (or that something about it, some fundamental feature, does not change, nor randomly come or cease to exist). For if what is as a whole or what is as such were taken to be capable of

arbitrarily changing so fundamentally as to abrogate the sets of conditions that are conceived as governing the occurrences of a thing sought (or to abrogate the validity of any particular set of conditions as governing those occurrences), then we could not take steps to seek the thing. What affects the occurrences of one thing involves occurrences of others, so that becoming unable to seek one thing, due to conceived instability of underlying conditions or factors as conditions or factors, calls into question our potential for seeking anything. To look at this another way, we might note that in order to be able to seek something that is changeable, we must take the relationships between that thing in its various states and other things to be stable. Or, if those relationships are not seen as stable (and eternal), something that accounts for or underlies them must be seen as persistent, stable, and eternal. Without this, we would seem to lack grounds to seek a thing, or to assert that it exists and is identifiable. It can be said, then, that in order for it to be possible to seek something, what is as a whole or as such must be conceived and said to remain stable in its fundamental features (or identity) and relations. What is as that which is, to eon, must be taken to be, and indeed must actually be, stable, persistent, and eternal if the notion that anything "is" is to have any grounds or support at all, in or for inquiry.

I do not assume here that all that is true regarding

inquiry about particular things said to exist, is also true regarding inquiries into what is as a whole or as such (to eon). But it certainly seems that if we are to be able to inquire about, or even to address, to eon, we must consider it to be fundamentally stable. Something, or some aspect, must be taken to remain through any changes, or there could not be said to be a "what is" into which to inquire, or in which inquiry may take place. (Strictly speaking, the persistent stable aspect would be what is.) Nothing external to it or arbitrary with respect to it may be conceived to influence what is, if inquiry is to be able to take place. For first, no thing or factor said to exist would be (could consistently and coherently be taken to be) external to that which is as a whole or as such; all would be included or accounted for by it. Second, were anything (perhaps, e.g., a no longer existent aspect of what is that is not able to be accounted for in terms of what is as it is conceived now to be) conceived as influencing that which is so that the latter changed fundamentally in a way that is alien to its conceived character, then we could not claim to be able consistently to recognize or to identify what is. (Were that influence instead conceived to persist, or to be traceable through what persists, and conceived to function in a consistent way, then it would be conceived in fact as an aspect of what is as a whole or as such.) What is as a whole or as such, then, must be said and taken to "be" always "by

itself" or "according to itself" (a translation of 'kath' heauto...keftai', 8.29), if inquiry is to be taken to be possible. It must actually be by/according to itself, if inquiry is actually to be possible. Whether we could verify that to eon is that way, independent of our conceptions, is another matter, and the question will be examined in the final two chapters.

To eon must also be taken to "remain the same" and to "remain in the same way" or to "remain in the same place" (spatially or otherwise) in terms of whatever relations it may be considered to have, in order for us to be able to hold that we can inquire or seek. Thus one might account for "tauton t' en tautôï te menon", the rest of line 29. For should nothing underlying be conceived to persist through all changes that are taken to go on, no relationship can be shown to be non-arbitrary. In that case, it would seem, we would lack the tools with which to identify and to seek anything; and to lack a basis for claiming that any statement was true.

So far, then, 8.29 can be seen as presenting something about restrictions (conceptual or other) on what is that conforms with other descriptions of the functions of [Alnanke], and that is relevant with regard to the possibility of inquiry. Questions about the relations between conceptions of to eon and conceptions of a universe of particular things will be addressed in the last two

chapters.

Continuing into line 30, if we read 'empedon' as "steadfast" and 'aûthi' as "as is", we certainly obtain an assertion that would follow from or elaborate consistently on (the line begins with 'choutos', 'and thus') the claims of the previous line: to eon remains steadfast(ly) as it is. Even if my proposal about 'aûthi' is not accepted, that is, if the word must at least on the surface have a spatial connotation, line 30 may be able to be interpreted in something very like the way just offered. Words or phrases that primarily refer to that which we consider to be located in space may be used in what would today be called broad or figurative manners.

Within Parmenides' poem, for example, it is not at all clear that the goddess's talk of roads (hodoi, 2.2, 6.3, 7.2, 8.1, etc.) and of a path (keleuthos, 6.9) refers primarily, or at all, to trails through space. The "two-headed" (dikranoi) mortals of 6.5 do not necessarily, or very probably, have two material, space-occupying heads. The "wandering" (plankton, 6.6) of their noos, and the straightness of its being driven (ithunei), need not be - certainly nothing in the poem suggests that they are - mainly, or at all, spatial phenomena.

Thus we can see that Parmenides seems sometimes to extend the uses of terms that in their basic senses refer to the spatial; he may well be doing this in 8.29-31. He could

be using 'empedon aûthi menei' to have the goddess refer, for example, to the "position" of to eon with respect to the various relations it is conceived to have for purposes of investigation or otherwise - relations that must be in place if we are to be able to claim coherently to look for what is real or true. Or 'empedon aûthi menei' could have to do with the "position" or "place" of to eon relative to the road of inquiry under discussion, or even relative to what can be or is conceived, as suggested in 8.34-36, which lines will be discussed in the Môira chapter.

The first clause of 8.31 is 'peiratos en desmoisîn echei', 'Holds [it] in bonds of limit'. The holder is kratere [Alnanke, mentioned at the end of line 30; "it" (the verb seems to have to have a direct object in this context) would seem to be to eon, as suggested by 8.19, 8.25, 8.35, possibly 8.3, and the apparent relationship between 8.1-6 and fragment 7 (and perhaps less directly fragments 2, 4, and 6). We have seen that [Alnanke is often portrayed as constraining or binding, and that one way in which it does this is by imposing limits on what someone or something can do or become, or on how the person or thing can act or change or be affected, given a particular situation. Specifically, as noted above, as regards to eon with respect to inquiry, arbitrary change would have to be (or be taken to be) ruled out (barred) if we are to see inquiry as feasible. What is must be taken to be constrained to remain

in some sense as it is; and it must be that way if inquiry is in fact to be possible. If the particular things we say exist are to be conceived to change at all, we must also take it that there must be some constraint on the conditions and results of the changes. We must conceive in this way of what is or of the things we say are, that is, if inquiry is to be possible, and if it is to be seen consistently to be so. If things, or what is, were understood to be able to change arbitrarily, we could not say we could recognize or identify them at all. We could not say we knew we were aware of them, or that we had them in mind. And as we have seen, if those changes are taken to be, and to have to be, non-arbitrary, some underlying feature or aspect must be taken to be stable, persistent, and eternal.³

The next clause, 'to min amphis eergei', 'which hold it (shut it in) all around (on both sides; separately;

³To speak of "aspects" of to eon would seem to be to invoke multiplicity; the same could be said of references to "limits" and to persistence in time or through change. All of these ways of speaking, then, would seem to be at odds with the way in which the goddess says that to eon must be, or must be said and taken to be, in or for inquiry. This problem will be treated in the chapter on preliminary implications of the binding of to eon by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. In the present chapter, I am concerned to show that given the ways in which particular things are conceived, the ways they are supposed to be, to eon must evidently be (and be said and taken to be) a certain way if inquiry is to be possible. That its being this "way", and speaking of this "way" and of to eon's "being", appear to manifest paradoxes, is not to be ignored. The discussion of these problems will be undertaken only once their extent, background, and import have been brought out, and so must be postponed until after the Moira chapter.

apart)', poses other problems. As I have noted, 'amphis' is sometimes used to refer to spatial and sometimes to non-spatial relationships, and in any event Parmenides may be having his goddess use it broadly or figuratively. Whether the word is being used to refer to something spatial or not, a question arises as to just what it is being used to describe. What would "all around" to eon mean? Or, what two "sides" could to eon have? What could it be "separate" from? What would count as its being "apart"?

I see no clear indication in the text as to what a literal reading of 'amphis' might refer to. A suggestion for a non-literal reading (or what might get that name today) of 'amphis' as "all around" might be "in all respects (aspects, relations)". Using this reading, the second clause of line 31 says that [Alnanke] shuts in to eon in all respects or in all its relations. Certainly this is consistent with to eon "remaining the same" and being or lying "according to itself", traits line 31 is in fact supposed to explain or to illustrate, given the 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as') in 30b. Also, in order for [Alnanke] to control one aspect or set of eventualities of to eon, it must control all others to which those are connected, and hold off connection with any to which they are not connected, if any such aspects exist. In this way, [Alnanke] would have to constrain or "shut in" to eon in all respects. The goddess's claims that what is is continuous (suneches; 8.6, 8.21-25) would seem to support

this point. In turn, 8.31 might then give a clue as to why, as per lines 32-33, what is is not incomplete or lacking. If we thought some of the associations or eventualities or aspects prescribed according to [Alnanke] were not realizable and could not be accounted for within to eon, we could not say that inquiry was possible, since some of what makes to eon what it is for us, some of what we take it (or must take it) to be constrained to be, in its being constrained to be or to lie "according to itself" and to "remain the same" would not be conceived to be in place. I will discuss 8.32-33 in more detail below. As for possible questions as to whether what is has multiple aspects or relations, or as to in what sense it might, I would suggest that "all around" or "on both sides" might be meant figuratively, as something along the lines of "entirely". I would note as well that discussion of what is, or of what we say is, and of how it is spoken and thought about involves multiple words and ideas, as well as sequences of time for presentation; I will examine this situation in the chapter on preliminary implications of the binding of to eon.

'Amphis' as "separate" or "apart" poses similar problems, at least at first, because the goddess had previously described what is as having to be (or to be said and taken to be, on or for the road of inquiry under discussion, at very least) unique (8.3), one (8.6), continuous (8.6, 8.25, etc.), unaccompanied (8.13), and

indivisible (8.22). Thus, if she is to be understood to be consistent, there is nothing for to eon to be separate or apart from. The only possibility I can see for 'amphis' to be employed in this sense would be through its apparent connotation, in some cases, of distinctiveness, distinctness, or perhaps independent identity. A case in Homer in which I would suggest there are such connotations is that of Iliad 18.519, mentioned above. There Ares and Athena are said to stand out from the humans around them; they are distinctive, clearly different from the humans. They are distinguishable, and distinguished, from the humans by their size, armor, nobility, and general mien, not by their location. Of course the parallel is not exact; Ares and Athena are being described as standing out from others, whereas to eon was supposed to be unique and unaccompanied. But perhaps the situation in Parmenides 8.32 is that [Alnanke] holds to eon so that it is distinct as itself - not distinct from anything else, but unambiguous and stable, and consequently recognizable and of clear identity. This too would seem to fit the functions ascribed to [Alnanke], in that [Alnanke] limits change and enforces a very specific set of possibilities.

I am not aware of any strong criteria by which I might choose between the interpretation of 'amphis' as "all around" and that as "separate, apart". If coherence with other of the goddess's points and with other uses of

'[A]nanke' are the criteria, a case can be made for either interpretation, but neither case seems to be conclusive. Neither have I found textual reasons to insist that one interpretation or the other was intended. I offer these interpretations as suggestions that seem both plausible within the fragments and in keeping with some uses of 'amphis'.

Let us now move on to the rest of the sentence about [A]nanke, namely 8.32-33. There the goddess seems to draw a conclusion (she uses 'houneken', which I think should be translated as "wherefore" or "because of this" in this context): "Wherefore it is not right (meet; lawful; themis) for to eon to be incomplete (OR:...it is right for to eon to be not incomplete);/ For it is not lacking; if it were, it would lack everything" (reading 'eon' in 8.33 as syntactically equivalent to 'ei ên', with Sider and Johnstone⁴, and Taran⁵).

I propose that 'incomplete' ('ateleuteton') might be understood here in something like the following way. We often call "incomplete" something which we say lacks an element or a piece that would make the thing fully what we say it is supposed to be. A thing will be called "complete"

⁴David Sider and Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., editors and commentators, The Fragments of Parmenides, Bryn Mawr Greek Commentaries (Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania: Thomas Library, Bryn Mawr College, 1986), 18.

⁵Leonardo Taran, Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 86, 115.

when it is seen as having, or when it is seen to have, all that is taken to be needed for it to be what it is supposed by us to be.

To eon, on this proposal, could be said to be "complete" if all causes, ramifications, associations, implications, or products considered to have to belong to it, or anything we say must pertain to it, are found in it or traceable through it. It would be "incomplete" if some undeniable consequence, aspect, cause, association, etc. of what is did not or could not exist or obtain. If some attributes that a thing would have to have in order to produce the consequences it does (or is seen or taken to) produce could not in fact exist (because they would contradict other attributes of the thing or other actual circumstances, or would be self-inconsistent); or if what is needed to produce a thing that exists (or that is taken to exist) does not itself exist or could not consistently be taken to exist; or if the effects that something would have to have (or that it is or must be taken to have to have) under a possible set of circumstances could not be realized, then we might say that what is is incomplete. If something could appear or disappear at random, in a way that is impossible to account for with coherence or consistency on the basis of what is, we might call what is "incomplete". Or, if some aspect or ramification of what is could not be accounted for solely on the basis of ("through" and

"within") what is, we might say that what is is "incomplete".

(If these situations seem implausible, or hard to comprehend, or not consistent as conceptions, that might well be an indication that in at least some contexts one does not conceive of what is as "incomplete" in the sense just outlined. That is, if what we took to be needed to produce a thing that we said and took to exist did not or could not be conceived to exist, we would call what is - as we conceived it - "incomplete", and so on. One's conception of what is, or one's awareness of its implications, may or may not be such that the "incompleteness" would be apparent. My aim at this point is to describe what the goddess might mean by saying that on or for a certain road of inquiry and possibly otherwise, it is not appropriate for to eon to be "incomplete", or that it is appropriate for it to be "not incomplete". Whether it can be shown or proven that to eon unconditionally is "not incomplete" is another question, and one that will be discussed in the chapter on the preliminary implications of the binding of to eon.)

From what we have seen of [A]nanke, I would suggest, it would indeed seem appropriate, even right or lawful (i.e. in accord with restrictions), that under constraint by [A]nanke, to eon should not be "incomplete". As we have seen, [A]nanke often ensures or "locks in" a certain set of possibilities, and "locks out" or bars other would-be

possibilities, for that on which it is said to act. It limits not only in the negative sense of excluding certain things that might under other circumstances be possible, but also in the positive sense of ensuring that a particular thing or situation does ensue or obtain. (This is particularly evident in Prometheus Bound 516-18 and 756-62, discussed above; there Zeus is portrayed as apparently unable to avoid certain consequences or effects of his actions.) In some way, then, [Alnanke] and "completeness", or at least "non-incompleteness", can be seen to go together, in or for inquiry. If we read 'houneken' (8.32) as 'wherefore', the implication is that [Alnanke] ensures, or is in some other way closely associated with the fact, that it is right or lawful that to eon not be (or not be taken to be) "incomplete", on or for the road of inquiry discussed in fr. 8, at very least. [Alnanke] would then be assuring that it is right or lawful that whatever to eon needed in order to be to eon would be in place, or that whatever had to be in place in order for there to be to eon was in fact in place, in or for inquiry at very least.

But in what sense, or in what contexts, would this "non-incomplete" to eon be what is appropriate, and why? Under what circumstances must we take it to be, or say that it is, what is right or appropriate, and why? Could we not claim or imply or imagine that what is does not and need not fit this picture of "non-incompleteness"; or could we not

simply ignore the issue? I think that in fact we can and sometimes do imply that, or proceed as if, what is could perfectly well and appropriately be such as has been characterized here as "incomplete".⁶ However, I would suggest that we cannot do this if we wish to be able truly to seek anything, if we want inquiry to be possible. If we wish to seek anything, if we would like even potentially to be able to hold with consistency that anything is true or real, it seems we must conceive of that which is as "non-incomplete". Otherwise any path we would take in trying to inquire would be discontinuous, that is, it could have gaps, or "places" where the trail must end but questions remain. There would always be the possibility that some of anything could not be found, or even identified, and certainly could not be explained. That this possibility existed would mean that we could not with any assurance, or reasonable persuasion, say that we knew or could identify what (or that) anything was. Even these statements would not be known to be true, or known to make sense. (I do not assert here that we know that what is is not "incomplete", independent of our conceptions; nor that any particular conception of what exists is in fact consistent and without discontinuities. I will discuss these matters in the

⁶The Supplementary Note at the end of this chapter suggests and discusses examples of conceived or implied "incompleteness", or of "incompleteness" that some might conceive or imply to be appropriate.

"Preliminary Implications" chapter.)

These, I propose, would be the consequences for inquiry if to eon were not taken to be "non-incomplete"; and the consequences for the results of inquiry if to eon were not "non-incomplete". Or, so it seems these must be thought to be the consequences, if true statements are to be a possibility, and if indeed I can have some appropriate conception of this (for I do not assume that what exists is for any reason the way I might say or think it is; nor do I assume that what - if anything - is independent of my conceiving is the way I might think it is). What, though, are we to make of the goddess's assertion in 8.33 that if to eon were lacking, it would lack everything? The 'gar' ('for'; 'since'; 'as') in 8.33 suggests that the goddess means to equate or to connect "incompleteness" and lack, at least in the case of to eon, on or for a certain road of inquiry. I will now look at that connection, and explore what would follow were to eon to be, and were it taken to be, lacking in some way. In the Moirā chapter I will look at the role that 8.34 suggests is played by noein (thinking, conceiving, awareness, realizing, etc.) in to eon's relations (and vice-versa), in or for inquiry.

Suppose now that to eon was in some way lacking. In keeping with the interpretation offered for "incompleteness", I would propose that this lack would involve that some of what was needed for to eon to be to eon

would be missing. What to eon needs in order to be to eon is what to eon needs in order to be at all. If that which is lacked the wherewithal to exist, to be what exists, it would "lack everything" in the sense that there would then be no "what is". If to eon is taken to be all existence, or existence as such, we might say that if it was lacking there would be no "is".

To see this more clearly, we might consider that for purposes of inquiry to eon could not lack, and could not be taken to lack (if inquiry is to be taken to be possible), any aspect, cause, or consequence of anything real or existent, because it is supposed to be what is. In other words, if some aspect, cause, or consequence that in any capacity was supposed to belong to to eon (or to anything said or taken to exist) in order for it to be to eon (or the thing said to exist) was not and could not be actual or conceived to be actual, then whatever that aspect, cause, or consequence was supposed to be associated with would not be as it had been thought to be. Then nothing that is supposed to depend on or to be affected by what was found to be "lacking" would be quite as it was supposed to be; and neither would anything on which the thing was supposed to depend or by which it was supposed to be affected (because the effects could not be ascertained to be, and in some sense would not be, given the uncertainty or indeterminacy, as supposed). If there are, or are conceived to be, no

discontinuities among things, or among what exists, the "lack" will mean that nothing will be (or can be conceived with consistency to be) as supposed to be. Or, nothing supposed to be (nothing we had identified as being) will be, or be conceived to be. If there are or are taken to be discontinuities, on the other hand, there will be other lacks, with implications similar to those we are now examining.

Now, as we have seen, to eon was not to have (or to be said or taken to have) external causes or effects, at least not on the road of inquiry treated in fr. 8. All of it was supposed to be accounted for by and according to itself, on that road. To lack one aspect would then mean that no other would be as supposed or taken to be, and all would then be missing. Therefore a lack would mean here that to eon was not as supposed to be; it would not be what is as conceived. Thus it would not be, as to eon was to be what is. This result is very much in keeping with the goddess's description of the path of [P]ersuasion at 2.3-4 (if, as seems most likely, the subject of 'esti' at 2.3 is to eon). It also accords with 6.1 if that line is translated either as "It is necessary to say and noefn that what is is;..." or as "It is necessary for saying and noefn that what is is;..."

Of perhaps most immediate importance is the fact that this understanding of why having a lack would mean that

to eon lacked everything, and thus of why to eon cannot be conceived to be lacking, on or for a certain road of inquiry, conforms as well to the initial description of the road at 8.2 (if, of course, the subject of 'estin' there is to eon). It also begins to show why, for purposes of inquiry at least, that which is must be (and be taken to be) whole (oûlon, 8.4) and continuous (suneches, 8.6) - or why these conceived characteristics would be "signs" (semata, 8.2) of the road, or of its viability or appropriateness. For we could not seek something that is taken at the same time to be existent and to lack that which it needs in order to be what it is, nor something whose relations with other things were all indeterminate, ambiguous, or vacillating, or taken to be that way. Certainly we could not ask about what is if we were to consider it able to be lacking, and hence to be missing.

To summarize, then, [Alnanke] was found to have been associated, in or before the early fifth century, with compulsion or constraint. This compulsion or constraint was generally seen as irresistible or invincible for those affected by it, and those affected by it were often portrayed as "bound" by it. An important aspect of the constraint was that it limited the possibilities of those it affected, possibilities of change, action, affecting others, and being affected by others. Binding, limitation, holding,

and shutting or barring appear as functions of [Alnanke] in Parmenides 8.31. We have seen that to eon must be taken to be limited in the ways described in 8.29-33 if inquiry is to be understood to be possible. It must also be as described in 8.29-33 - or so it seems we must hold - if inquiry is to be potentially able to find its objects. That is, for inquiry or for seeking anything to be possible and to be held to be so, to eon must be held to remain as it is or stable in its relations, and must be held to be according to itself or not dependent on anything else, and must be held not to change randomly nor to change as a consequence of something not traceable (or due) to what is fundamental to what is. It must remain ever in these relations, the relations deemed crucial to it. None of its relations, aspects, causes or consequences (in whatever wise these might be said to be or to obtain), and so on may be conceived to be lacking, if we would have inquiry. None may be lacking, if inquiry is to be viable. If to eon could, or if it were held to, change in a way not "according to itself", or if some of it (or of what was supposed to be it) could be or be taken to be missing, no investigation - no deliberate attempt to act to find or examine something - could go on. This is because in those cases it would seem that nothing could be said, or known to be coherently held, to be anything, including itself. There would in some sense be, or have to be said to be, no "itself" for anything -

including to eon - to be. All bets would be off.

Let us look at this from another perspective. The possibility of inquiry would seem to involve, or to be intertwined with, the possibility of truth or genuineness. We say that we inquire after what is true or real, or that that is an aspect of what we seek to find. If I am looking specifically for salamanders, finding a lizard or a picture of a salamander will not be my object; I must find a genuine salamander if my search is to be concluded successfully. If I seek the solution to an algebraic equation, I seek a numerical value that will make the equation true. If I am looking for my aunt in particular, I cannot accept Groucho's offer of "someone just as good"; I look to find the person who is really my aunt. In order for inquiry to be taken to be possible, we must hold that there are ways of determining and identifying that which is really what we seek, and of distinguishing it from all other things that might exist. We must take it that what we seek actually exists, or could exist, and that we can identify it should we come upon it. In order for inquiry to be viable in fact, that which we seek must actually exist, and there must be ways of identifying it and of distinguishing it from other things. There must be ways of telling when we have truly found that which we seek.

Then [Alnanke], or the situation it confers, will need to be said and conceived to obtain if we are to hold

that there is such a thing as truth (or that there are true statements), or if we are to have such a notion as "the real thing". For we distinguish what we call "the truth" from what we call "that which we happen to want to say or believe". Or at least, for purposes of inquiry we try to draw and to apply such a distinction. If we thought there was no such thing as truth, or that nothing was or could be true, or that there was no difference (not even a conceptual one) between what was taken to be true and what was held to be something we wanted or had come at random or arbitrarily to believe, or if what counted as true or real was considered or implied to be able to change arbitrarily or at random; if any of these was the case, then the distinction of "truth" would have little or no use with regard to inquiry or seeking. It might indeed lose all meaning, in that should any of the situations just listed be (or be taken to be) the case, one could not know that one could say anything true about the situation. But in fact, if we say that inquiry is possible, we hold that there are constraints on what is to count as true or real (and we say that some things, conditions, etc. do so count), some constraints said to be general and some associated with particular circumstances. If we think we can inquire, we take it that there are limitations on what kinds of things or relationships may count as true or genuine (and limitations on the circumstances under which they may be considered true

or genuine); and that there are limitations on what can occur if these truths are to be preserved. This appears to be well in keeping with what has been cited as proper to [Alnanke]. (Whether what we take to obtain, so that inquiry seems possible, is in fact known or knowable to obtain independent of our conceptions is another matter, one that will be discussed in the final two chapters.)

As we have also seen, if what is could change arbitrarily or at random (or perhaps at all, as we will see from the Mofra chapter), or cease to exist entirely, or come to be; or if we conceived or implied that it could; inquiry would not seem to be possible. As can be seen from the examination of its "non-incompleteness" and from the Dike chapter, what is as a whole or as such cannot be taken to come to be or to cease to exist at all, if inquiry is to be seen with consistency as possible. What is as a whole or as such could not be held to change fundamentally or to go into or out of existence; and particular things said to exist could not change, or go into or out of existence arbitrarily or at random, or come from or perish into nothing; if we wish to assert that conditions are in place for anything to be true, or for there to be truth. If that which is were able or were taken to be able to change, appear, disappear, or undergo substitution at random, we could not be aware that anything was true; and we could not be aware of what anything ultimately was, nor could we know (or have reason

to think) that any truth was possible. That which is could be conceived to change so as to preserve the possibilities of truth and inquiry, perhaps, if all of its states had to be said and conceived to be governed by, and traceable to, some stable entity. That stable entity, then, would properly be to eon, or what is fundamental to it. What is as a whole or as such could not, it seems, be conceived to change into anything else, or to change in some way that is not "according to itself", if inquiry and truth are to be possible and to be taken to be so, for otherwise neither to eon nor anything "else" said to exist would be anything in particular. No characteristics would be stable; nothing could properly be called a characteristic. Nothing would have an identity; there would be nothing to be. To eon itself could not be said to be.

Thus there must be, and be conceived to be, limitations on what is said and thought to be, if we are to be able to seek anything. Certainly this includes having a conception of to eon as in some ways limited. (Again, whether this conception is correct or true, what it would take for it to be correct or true, and whether or how we could tell that we knew what those conditions were and that we knew that they were fulfilled, are other questions, to be explored in the final two chapters. I am not asserting here that this conception of to eon is - or is not - viable, accurate independent of our conceptions, or unproblematic.)

These limitations cannot be transgressed and do not relax, if inquiry is to be possible. Otherwise, we could not identify anything found as that which we had looked for, or as not that which we had looked for.

This summary brings out a point which will be addressed in the chapter on preliminary implications of the binding of to eon: I would submit that there are dissimilarities, and even tensions, between what apparently must be said and conceived, on or for the road of inquiry described in fr. 8, regarding the particular things we say exist; and what apparently must be said and conceive on or for this road regarding to eon as such.

We can see an example of the difference when we look at the occurrence of 'ananke' at 8.16. From 8.12 to the first clause of 8.15, the goddess has asserted that strength of assurance will not allow something to come, from what is not, to be beside(s) what is; and that on account of or for the sake of (heineken) this [Dlike] does not allow coming to be or perishing. The goddess who is speaking adds, "and in this (the following) is the distinction regarding these: / [It] is or [it] is not; for it has been decided, just as [is] (as per; hosper) ananke, / To permit that the latter is unconceived (anoeton) and unnamed (nameless) - for not a true (genuine) / Road is it, and to permit that the former is to be and to be genuine (OR: to grant the former to be thus: to be genuine)." If there is an "it" that is or is not in

line 16, "it" is most likely to eon, given the remarks about me eon in lines 7 and 12, and those about to eon in line 19. Thus the goddess seems to be saying that on a real or genuine road of inquiry (a road that can actually be used for inquiry, at least up to a point, one would suppose), to eon first of all cannot both be and not be (or cannot be taken both to be and not to be). Nor, on a real or genuine road, can it not be (or not be taken to be); a road on which it is not is apparently something we do not or cannot conceive. In addition, to eon cannot be found, on the apparently viable road, to be able to perish; and nothing else other than it can be taken to come to be.

Yet our inquiries are often about particular things said to exist, many of which are taken to come to be and to perish, and all of which are supposed to be distinguishable from others (i.e., none of which are supposed to be the sole existent). For it to be possible to seek or to inquire about anything in particular that is said to exist, we apparently need to be able to conceive of, and to conceive such that we apparently can consistently identify, what counts as an instance of that thing, and what does not. We need to be able to say when the thing is there, and when it is not.⁷ Also, as long as we are aware of parameters for changes we

⁷And also when it is present to noog (awareness, consciousness, mind), and when not: 8.34-36, and Fragment 6, suggest that noefn always involves that to eon be conceived [of]; that there can be no noefn without noefn regarding to eon. I will discuss this further in the Mofra chapter.

say go on, and as long as we are clear on what counts as a thing's coming to be and its passing, it at least seems quite possible to seek or to inquire about a particular thing that is taken to come into being, to change, to pass away, to be one of several, to be discrete, and to be divisible. In fact, the presence of at least some of these aspects, such as some form of discreteness and determinateness, would seem to be requisites for a particular thing's investigability. The language we use to talk about "things", the notions it invokes, and even the goddess's speech with its references to distinctions and pluralities even as it implies the incoherence and inconsistency of aspects of its own terminology, are evidence of our reliance on these suppositions about what we call and take to be the existence of particular things. Still, as we have seen, the goddess shows that these characteristics (multiplicity, change, etc.) cannot apply to to eon on or for purposes of the road of inquiry treated in fr. 8.⁸

At this point it should be asked what exactly it is that the goddess declares to be "just as [is] (as per)

⁸Whether, under what conditions, for whom, how far, and in what senses inquiry into particular things said to exist can be fruitful, are questions that must be postponed until the last two chapters. That there are problems concerning inquiry into particular things is a point made by Zeno's paradoxes, and one I take very seriously. The discussion of them will examine both the roots of the problems, as far as these can be identified, and the implications of the problems.

ananke", at 8.16. That is, is she saying that it is necessary that some decision, any decision, be made? Or does she mean that it is necessary to choose the alternative described in lines 17-18? I would propose that in or for inquiry, or in order to allow inquiry, it seems to be necessary to make a decision; and that it seems to be necessary to select (to have a conception that permits) the alternative "to eon is". Further, the decision could be seen as explicating the inference that "strength of assurance" will permit an ungenerated, indestructible, unaccompanied to eon (as the hallmark or guiding conception of a road), whereas it will not permit (8.12-13) that to eon come to be, perish, or have counterparts originating from what is not (or any counterparts at all).

The remark about "strength of assurance" in 8.12 is somewhat ambiguous. It could mean that no matter how strongly assured one might feel, this sense of certainty alone is not enough to allow or to grant that anything should come to be from what is not, anything other than to eon (and to eon itself was barred in 8.7-8 from being taken, on the road of inquiry in question, to have come from what is not). This reading takes 'assurance', 'pistis', to refer to a feeling or sense of surety. But like 'assurance', 'pistis' can also refer to surety or certainty that is not felt, or that is not only felt, but is in some further way valid or viable. On this second reading, the remark would

mean that really strong assurance, assurance that is not undermined by inconsistencies or otherwise compromised, will not permit that anything come to be from what is not, etc.

For the matter with which I am concerned here, namely the nature of the "necessity" of the decision to permit that "to eon is" be a genuine road and so on, the two readings have similar implications. We are evidently constrained to accept the decision because of the relationship conceived or determined to exist between to eon (and how it is conceived and spoken of) and inquiry.⁹ For we must allow that what is is, if we are to take inquiry to be possible. We say that we seek existent things, or matters that obtain; or we say that we look to find "the way things are" or "the truth about what is". We may seek to find out something about that which is supposed to be ephemeral or about that which is said no longer to exist or not to exist yet, but even then we seem to be seeking to discover a relation or principle or fact that we would say is real or actual even after the thing is gone or before it has come to be.¹⁰ If we do not say and conceive that something that is

⁹For whom (mortals? gods?) this relationship might be seen to obtain, and whether and why or in what sense it must, will be discussed in the final two chapters.

¹⁰For example, we might inquire today as to the facts of Abraham Lincoln's life, or as to the bases of his political decisions. What we would be looking for in these cases would seem to be events of kinds that can be recognized today, and that can be said to stand in certain identifiable relations, temporal and other, to what is said to exist today; or for political and ethical principles and considerations we can

stable and persistent or that is atemporally in effect continues through these changes and appearances and disappearings, and that it connects them in some way so that they are not seen as wholly arbitrary and random, we cannot take inquiry to be possible.

That is, were nothing conceived to persist and to be in some way stable, this would include not conceiving that any relations persisted. That would leave no way to conceive of any non-instantaneous truths, and hence no way to be aware of having truths at all, no way to have truths at all. If some things were taken to persist without connection to some other elements or aspects of what we hold to exist, the result would be the (conceived) "incompleteness" of to eon described earlier, which was found not to provide the requisites for inquiry, and hence not to be viable for inquiry. If to eon were taken not to exist at all, if there were or were conceived to be no "what is", inquiry would seem to fail from the outset, in that asking about what is would seem to be futile or unintelligible if one simultaneously holds that there is no "what is". Following out a conception or an implication that what is is not would not constitute a road of inquiry, precisely because inquiry would seem to ask about and to aim for what is taken to be in some way; we could not conceive of asking or seeking, as we construe these now, if we held that there was nothing to

try to express and to contemplate today, or at any time.

be, if we conceived that there was no what is, or even if we did not say and take it that what is is.

Inquiring under those circumstances, in other words, would be inconceivable or unintelligible, as 8.16 suggests. As that line also suggests, non-existence of what is as a whole or as such will not be named if naming is to make any sense and if it is to be able to be of any use in inquiry. (In this way it is different from what might be seen as cases of non-existence of particular things, as in e.g. "colorlessness".) We may use the phrase 'what is not', but that is not necessarily the same as calling the phrase a name for something. What I suspect the goddess might mean in saying that as per ananke it has been decided to permit that to eon not existing be unnamed, would be that to give that situation a name would be to go against the strictures ananke places on to eon or its conception, with respect to inquiry. This might work in the following way. To give a name to to eon's non-existence might appear to make a mockery of naming. Such a name, or use of such a name, would have no meaning, since there would be nothing to be named. Indeed, to say that what is does not exist makes what is, and existence, unintelligible; the non-existence of what is would seem not to be something we could conceive if we wish to allow the possibility of inquiry into what is.

I should note here as well that the goddess does not seem to be saying directly and without qualification or

context that "[to eon] is or is not". She speaks of this as a "distinction" (krisis, 8.15) which is due to or explained by a decision as to what to permit - apparently, as to what to permit at least for or in context of inquiry. She is not, that is, obviously or directly or necessarily at all giving an unconditional taxonomy or set of specifications for what exists. This is not to say that she does not reveal anything about what is, but rather that we must investigate the circumstances and reasons for the "permission" ('eân', 'allow', 'permit', 8.17), and especially the relations among noeîn, legein, to eon, roads, and inquiry, as the goddess portrays these. What if anything the goddess or Parmenides will reveal or lead us to discover about what is will be within that context, and on the road of its investigation.

The final extant occurrence of '[A]nanke' in Parmenides is at 10.6. The speaker, most likely still the goddess if she is here fulfilling her promises of 1.31-32 and 8.51-61, is proposing that the hearer learn of the nature, workings, and origins of various celestial phenomena. After enumerating what he (there is no reason to think that the young man of the chariot is no longer the audience) is to hear about the sun and the moon, she announces in the second part of 10.5 that "also you will know (eideseis) whence the sky holding it (sc. the moon) all around (amphis)/ Came to be, and how [A]nanke guiding

(leading, agous') it constrained (bound, epedesen) [it]/ To hold limits (ends, peirat') of stars."

It is not clear from this exactly what the overall astronomical conception is that is being invoked. However, we can see that [Alnanke] is once again being depicted as enforcing (and enacting) a binding or constraint, and as setting up or maintaining limits or endpoints. The sky appears to be the thing that is being said to be bound in fr. 10. Either its own limits, which it is constrained to hold, are being identified as stars; or else it is being said to hold the stars' limits.¹¹ At least some of the stars, as well as the moon, were known by the Greeks of the early fifth century to "travel", to appear to move across the sky, in fixed, regular, cyclical and in some cases circular paths. If one takes the sky (ouranos) to surround the earth, and if one observes that stars that are not visible for part of the year disappear beyond one horizon and reappear on the opposite horizon just where they had appeared a year ago, then one might hypothesize that these

¹¹If the account in Aetius is correct, the stars or their limits, or the stars as limits of the sky, might have been construed in this part of the poem as fiery rings that surround the earth, perhaps as in the account generally attributed to Anaximander. The bits of light we usually refer to as "stars" would be "exhalations of fire" visible to us through holes in the dark rings that cover or alternate with the fiery ones. Relevant passages from Aetius are reprinted in A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Phronesis Supp. Vol. III (Assen, the Netherlands; and Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Van Gorcum & Comp., B.V., 1986), 111-12.

stars had gone "behind" or "under" the earth during the time when they could not be seen. That is, one need not believe that the stars had ceased to exist, or that they had left the sky, in between their periods of visibility. Just as it would the stars that are visible all year, and just as it would the moon, the sky could be taken to "hold" the periodically invisible stars, to hold them in place, and to fix or enforce the limits of these stars' travels.

Another possible way to understand this fragment involves noting that stars can also be taken to mark the visible limits of the sky. If we can see any further than the stars (or, today, any further than what reflects their energy), we cannot tell. Black, unlit space two inches away looks the same as black, unlit space two light-years away. When we look into the night we cannot tell how far we are seeing, if we have no illuminated landmarks.

These, then, are ways in which the description in fr. 10 fits, and may be elucidated by, other uses of 'Alnanke'. Inquiry is not mentioned in this fragment; it is not clear by what means (inquiry? memorization of a speech? something else?) and in what sense (obtaining a complete explanation? obtaining an explanation that leaves some questions unanswered? acquiring an account by rote? something else?) the goddess's auditor is meant to "learn".

General Note on Chapter Three

Throughout this chapter, and to some extent the previous one, I have mentioned "conceiving [of]" things, "conceiving" and "holding" that something exists or obtains or is the case, "taking" something to be or to be the case, and so on. I see these as related to, or factors in, noein; no single English term seems to me to capture the focus(es) or the range of 'noein'. In a section of the Moirā chapter, I will explore more fully the possible ways in which 'noein' and related terms may be understood in Parmenides. Also in that chapter, as well as in the final two, I will discuss the relations, as portrayed or implied in the fragments, between noein, legein, to eon, and inquiry.

Supplementary Note to Chapter Three

"Incompleteness"

These three cases seem to me to be examples of conceptions involving or implying "incompleteness" in the sense addressed in this chapter; or examples conceptions involving or implying the notion that such "incompleteness" is acceptable or appropriate.

(a) Suppose that one asserts that existent things, or even existent spatial things, must be discrete. Suppose also that the way in which one thinks that this is to be explained, accounted for, or justified, is by finding the ultimate dimensional units of which these things are supposed to be composed or constituted, or which they are supposed to comprise. These units could not be said to have zero dimension, or they could not be said to compose objects of positive dimension. (If they were said to be non-dimensional, in the sense of being incompatible or incommensurable with dimensionality, a new supposition for explaining the existence of dimensional objects would be needed.) If one asserted that the fundamental units had some determinate positive dimension, one could be asked to demonstrate that this was so. To locate the exact borders of this fundamental unit would require the use of smaller units, whose exact extent could only be made manifest

through the use of even smaller units (units of the "stuff" that was said to exist, or even units of measure), and so on. Then it could not be finitely shown that the fundamental units were determinate, or that there were fundamental units, or that what we say exists is discrete). (If we say that what exists is indeterminate or not discrete, justification for saying that what is is multiple, or even that it is countably singular, would seem problematic.)

This does not show that discrete things do not exist, but only that the conception that there are discrete things cannot be accounted for according to the conceptions with which we might wish, or with which in some contexts we are forced, to try to account for them. This combination of conceptions, then, seems to pose that which is as "incomplete".

(b) Suppose we say that the beginning of an event is to be determined by observing what the event precedes (what is taken to occur after the event can be said to be already going on) and what it succeeds (what is taken to have occurred when the event would be said not yet to have taken place or to be in progress). Suppose that we hold that the beginning of the event may be pinpointed by trying to ascertain what was the last thing to happen when the event would be said not yet to have taken place or to be in progress, and to ascertain what was the first thing to

happen once the event could be said to be underway. The "beginning" would be said to lie between these points or occurrences.

Aside from problems involving continuity and discreteness (or notions of these) of the sort mentioned in (a), another difficulty arises if one wishes also to assert that there was a "beginning of time", because there would be no "preceding" without time. Also, if time is to have a beginning, one could ask how and why it came to be when it did, or at all. This too could not be answered in the same way as questions about the origins of events that are supposed to be "in" time. If it could be answered in another way, one would then need to show why it was correct to locate and to account for events supposed to be "in" time in the way described above (or any way that depends on the identification of "points in time", e.g. the use of clocks), for in this situation the way described above could not any longer be assumed to be definitive or correct. If the question of the origin of time could not be answered in another way, the correctness of the original suppositions (or other ways that assume an ability to identify "points in time") about how to determine the beginnings of events "in" time would also be susceptible to doubt.

Once again, this does not show that events do not have beginnings, or that there are no events, but only that a way in which events and their temporal situations are

commonly conceived apparently is not and cannot be accounted for either within or compatibly with that conception, and thus that this way relies on a conception that is necessarily "incomplete".

(c) Suppose that one asserts that questions of what exists are to be answered by or in the manner (on the suppositions) of scientific or technical pursuits, and that questions of purpose, goal, and meaning are beyond the scope of these pursuits - perhaps within the scope of religious thought, faith, belief, ethics, or art. One could then reasonably be asked on what grounds, and from what standpoint, this assertion could be justified, or even made. If the assertion were to be made or justified from one of the two standpoints (the scientific/technical on the one hand, and any of the others on the other) that it mentions, it would be false - in that it would have to account for one side by means of a standpoint it asserts to be incompatible with that sided - or else circular (by assuming that the side on which it is taken to fall is an appropriate one for making the assertion about how questions are to be answered). If a third standpoint could be found which could account for both sides, that third would seem to have to be able to address or to comprehend both questions of existence and questions of purpose or meaning (perhaps not separately), and thus would appear to render the original

supposition false (there would be an underlying compatibility or connection between the original two sides), or at best conditionally true (a situation which would also seem to defy the notion of mutual exclusivity of questions of existence and questions of purpose).

This is not at all to say that any sort of reductionism (or purposes and meanings to something said to be the province of systematic science, e.g. to something such as what is called "matter" in any natural science; or of questions of existence to questions of "will") would fare any better or be less dependent on "incompleteness" of what is (or of conceptions of what is). For one could ask the reductionist about the basis for his or her assertion that what is is what he or she says it is. One problem here, as in all of the cases cited in this supplementary note, is that the assumption that what is is what we say is, or that what is (or is supposed to be) independent of what we think is indeed the way we say it is, cannot be argued for or explained verbally or by means of the system of conceptions we used to frame it. For example, the assumption that all that is is, say, "matter" and "energy" cannot be justified or proven scientifically; modern science takes the atomic theory, through which the relevant notions of "matter" and "energy" are defined or delineated, as a hypothesis to be corroborated or disproven by research. Psychology, to use another example, takes as hypotheses or even as axioms

certain claims about will and consciousness; and so on.

Nor, I would argue, could any reductionist assertion (or any declaration that what is is what we say it is, and that nothing of which we are not aware affects or compromises it in any way) be self-evident or find other justification at a fundamental level. For to make a claim about the nature of what is, or about how questions are to be answered, is surely to make a claim about the nature of the claimer (about what or who is said to make the claim) and about the nature of the claim. We could not observe ourselves so as to provide an empirical justification of claims about our nature or existence, since we could not determine whether there was anything affecting us (or forming part of us) of which we are not aware. Nor could we be assured that there was nothing of which we had not conceived or could not conceive that might be affecting us. Hence proof of our statements about what what is is, or about what is comprised by that which is, is not forthcoming, and self-evidence is not discoverable.

I would note that if Parmenides' fragment 16 is taken to be part of the goddess's speech about the opinions of mortals, and especially if Theophrastus' commentary (see Chapter 1; a more substantial discussion appears in the final two chapters) on it amplifies it accurately, fr. 16 pertains to beliefs and conceptions very much like the modern ones I have just mentioned. We could also see fr. 9,

and 8.54-61, in this way. That is, these fragments seem to detail a conception, attributed to mortals, that is in form very like some conceptions that prevail even today, viz., a conception that attempts (or is used to support attempts) to account for what is by speaking of (thus assuming we can identify) what is supposed to make it up (materially or otherwise). The problems with these conceptions lie less in terms of practical usefulness than in terms of conceptual "completeness", and in terms of respect for the contexts in which they address to eon.

CHAPTER FOUR

MOIRA

Moira is the third and last of the divinities or factors that are depicted as binding or holding to eon, on or for the road of inquiry discussed in fragment 8. It (or she) appears in this capacity at 8.37, and moira is mentioned as well at 1.26. In this chapter I shall begin by examining occurrences of 'moira' and 'Moira' in other authors of the early fifth century and before, and on the basis of the results of this examination I will offer some suggestions as to how [M]oira might be taken to function, or what she/it might be doing, in the contexts presented by Parmenides' fragments. I will focus here on trying to discover how [M]oira, along with [D]ike and [A]nanke, might be seen - as her/its place in what look like arguments or explanations by the goddess who speaks would seem to suggest - as supporting or as explaining the assertions of 8.1-6 concerning the nature of to eon with respect to the "remaining" road. I will defer discussion of the fragment 1 reference to moira to the concluding chapter.

In the second and third sections of the present chapter, I will discuss the fact that the clause in which '[M]oira' appears at 8.37 is evidently part of a sentence that begins at 8.34 with statements about noein and noema. The second section will look at uses and meanings of 'noein'

and related terms in and before the fifth century, and will begin to examine some relationships that would have been taken to obtain between noein and to eon. The third section will explore how this might inform 8.34-38a. The shift in topic that the remarks about noein (and about mortals' ways of designating what exists, in 8.38b-41) might seem to reflect, is part of the reason why Theodor Ebert claims that it would be more appropriate to place 8.34-41 in what Ebert calls the "Way of Doxa", the section of the goddess's speech that is concerned thematically with the opinions of mortals. In the fourth section of this chapter, I will argue that there are good reasons to think that verses 8.34-41 should remain where they are.

'Moîra'

Four main senses or uses of 'moîra', and one of 'Moîra', can be identified as having appeared by the early fifth century. One sense of 'moîra' includes "part", as opposed to a whole, and "portion", as of land or of a country. A second includes "lot", "portion", or "share" which falls to one, especially in the distribution of a meal or of spoils; and generally "part" or "lot" as the part one has in or of some thing or some condition. The third sense or use includes one's "portion in/of life", "lot in life", "destiny", "measure of life", "appointed doom" (death), or "cause of death". The fourth is "that which is meet and

right" (hence perhaps the association with [D]ike in fragment 1), with the additional non-Homeric sub-sense or use of "respect" or "esteem". As a proper noun, 'Moîra' designates a goddess of moîra (often glossed as "fate" in this context). Once in Homer and often elsewhere there are said to be several Moîrai.

An example of the first sense or use of 'Moîra' appears at Odyssey 4.97. There Menelaus says that he wishes that he had "even a third share" (tritaten per moîran) of what lies in the houses. He also wishes that the Argives who had died in Troy were safe and sound. He seems aware that neither of these wishes is very likely to be fulfilled. What is in the houses has not actually been divided into thirds; but it is such that in principle it could be divided and distributed. Another example of this sense or use occurs at Iliad 15.195. Poseidon is angered, thinking that Zeus is overstepping his bounds. Poseidon recalls to Iris that he and his brothers Zeus and Ares had drawn lots and divided amongst themselves "all things" (panta), save Earth and Olympus. He would like to warn Zeus to stay within the bounds of his assigned "third portion" (meneto tritategi eni moîrei). In this case, the division and allotment have been carried out (and the aggregate of "all things" is understood to be divisible). In this case at least, the basis for the division or allotment seems to be some sort of agreement. The first sense or use of 'moîra', then, seems to refer to

the result of a potential or actual division and apportionment of something that is conceived to be a whole.

For the second sense or use of 'moîra', emphasis is on the aspect of assignment, allotment, distribution, or shareholding. At Odyssey 20.171, Odysseus says that he wishes that the gods might exact retribution against Penelope's suitors, men who "despitefully...contrive wicked things in the house of another, and do not have a moîran of aidôûs (respect, reverence, shame)." Their shameless behavior shows Odysseus that the suitors do not partake of respect for humans, nor of reverence for gods. At Theogony 413, Hesiod describes Hekate as holding a moîran of earth and sea, and as being allotted (the term used is 'emmore', from the same root as 'moîra') time (honor, esteem, prerogative) from the sky as well. While Hekate does not control or determine all that goes on in these realms, Hesiod goes on to note that humans sacrifice to her in times of need; she has a certain province of or share in what goes on, a certain power of dispensation.

The third sense or use of 'moîra' might perhaps be thought of as pointing to the overall or most general or most basic share one might be supposed to have, namely one's share of life, or one's lot, destiny, or fate (one's share of life and death, perhaps); or to one's "appointed doom". At Odyssey 19.592, Penelope remarks that it is not possible for humans to be forever sleepless, for certainly, she says,

the immortals have laid down a moïran upon each mortal on the earth. (Here 'moïra' does not seem easily to mean "fate" if that meaning would imply something beyond, or something closing, an earthly embodied life.) Penelope is speaking of the condition of humans in general, of something that goes along with being a human, not only of the situation of one human.

However, 'moïra' in this sense can also be used to speak of those aspects of his or her lot that are peculiar to one individual. At Iliad 16.434, Zeus expresses regret that the human Sarpedon has the moïra to be overcome by Patroclus, and the god debates with himself about whether to allow this moïra to be fulfilled. The alternative would be for Zeus to pluck up Sarpedon and carry him far away from the battle in which he would face Patroclus. While Zeus may be considering making Sarpedon immortal, it is also possible that he is thinking only of ensuring that Sarpedon's death is not at the hands of Patroclus. The passage does not make clear who or what it was that originally set or determined Sarpedon's moïra, but Hera's response (440ff.) suggests that Zeus can change or upset moïrai that are already supposed to be in place, or set. Zeus himself describes allowing Patroclus to kill Sarpedon as Zeus's own subduing or conquering (damasso) of Sarpedon.

Hera's reply can also be seen to give us some hints about the functions of moïra. She indicates that people's

moîrai are part of a certain balance or arrangement of what exists or occurs, and warns that changing Sarpedon's moîra will have repercussions that Zeus might not be willing to live with: dissent by other gods, resentment on the part of those gods whose half-human sons are fighting and are liable to be wounded or killed, and possibly continued life for someone who was supposed to have been a mortal (Hera does not elaborate on why Zeus should find the last troublesome). Zeus then decides against removing Sarpedon from the battle. I would not go so far as to assert that the passage suggests that it is exactly in order to preserve a certain order of things, or in order to prevent certain consequences from occurring, that Sarpedon's moîra has been laid down to be what it is (to be killed by Patroclus). It does seem, though, that what convinces Zeus not to spare him is reflection on the probable consequences of doing that. (As was the case in Prometheus Bound, discussed in the previous chapter, Zeus does not seem here to have the option, or else the power, of changing the consequences of a given act or event to suit his preferences.) This passage brings out, then, that one's moîra has links to other events, roles, and functions within the universe. It characterizes, or determines, one's part in (or of) what is.

In at least one instance, Homer suggests that gods too can have a moîra: Ares considers his at Iliad 15.117. Hera reports that Ares' son Ascalaphus has been killed, and

she holds accountable Zeus's insistence on letting the battle rage without allowing the other gods to help the Danaans. Ares announces that he will defy the ban and avenge the death of Ascalaphus, even if it should be his "moîra to be struck by Zeus's thunderbolt/ [And] to lie together with the dead amid blood and dust." It is not clear whether Ares thinks he will be killed or whether he anticipates only severe injury. However, he does think he has a moîra, a certain set of possibilities and eventualities peculiar to him; and he thinks that despite being a god he may not be able to influence what that moîra is.

In Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound, Prometheus goes so far as to hold that in some sense the balance of power favors the Moîrai over Zeus. As I have noted in the Ananke chapter, when the Chorus asks Prometheus at 515 who the "steerer" (oiakostrophos) of [A]nanke is, he replies that it is the Moîrai and the Erinues. He also notes at 518 that even Zeus cannot escape what is foredoomed or fated (pepromenen). Ananke is associated with the inevitability or the enforcement of what is foredoomed. Zeus cannot avoid the fact that some of his actions have consequences, and at least some of the time he is not able to change the order of things so as to change those consequences; too much hangs in the balance. Moîra or the Moîrai have to do with determining and/or enforcing consequences, and thus have to do with the future situation of each individual thing (and human and

god) that exists.

The fourth sense or use of 'moîra' has two sub-heads, namely "that which is meet and right" or "that which is one's due", and "respect, esteem". (The former would seem to connect moîra to dike.) I think that the two sub-senses can be seen to be linked, in the following way. We speak of the respect or esteem that is due (or that is taken or agreed or claimed to be due) someone, and say that to show respect or esteem involves giving someone what is due him or her. Therefore I would suggest that the two sub-senses can be treated together. It can also be observed that this fourth kind of sense or use preserves the connotation of share or allotment, the portion given to or claimed by someone. Perhaps it also invokes the notion of division or part, in that what is (or is taken by someone to be) meet and right in each case is some selection from all that might possibly be.

One example of this sense or use can be found in Iliad 19, where Achilles has finally agreed to accept whatever gifts Agamemnon would offer, and then to fight. He wants to go into battle immediately. Odysseus points out that several other things need to be done first, apparently both for effectiveness in battle and so that the trouble between Agamemnon and Achilles can be put entirely to rest (which requires that they come to treat each other in appropriate fashions, and that each feels that they are both

treating each other appropriately). Among other things, the soldiers must be fed and Agamemnon is to swear to Achilles that he has not touched the prisoner Briseis, who is to be handed over to Achilles. Agamemnon agrees with Odysseus, telling him at 185-8, "I am glad, hearing what you say, son of Laertes;/ For en moirai have you gone through everything and recounted it at length./ And I am willing (I wish) to swear to this, and my thumos urges me on,/ Nor will I swear falsely before a divinity..."

'En moirai' in this passage seems to mean something like "rightly", "duly", "appropriately", or "in the right way". Agamemnon is expressing his approval of Odysseus' presentation of the matters that need attending, and is indicating his intention to comply with the conditions Odysseus has laid out. He seems at last to accept Odysseus' (and Achilles') account of what it is that is due Achilles. Implicitly he is also accepting Odysseus' account of what is due Agamemnon himself, since Agamemnon does not feel that the gestures requested of him and of Achilles are insulting to, unworthy of, or inadequate in acknowledging the king's stature.

Another example, this one emphasizing more the "respect, esteem" aspect, appears at Prometheus Bound 294. There Okeanos arrives at Prometheus' side, announcing that he has come voluntarily to offer his aid - out of kinship, and because he thinks that "there is not anyone to whom/ A

greater moîra I distribute than to you." Okeanos is apparently referring to the respect or esteem with which he regards Prometheus, and he certainly conveys the idea that different personages are (and are to be, or ought to be) due or given or shown different amounts or degrees of this. The sense of distribution, apportionment, or allotment is strengthened by Aeschylus' use of 'neimam', which comes from 'nemo', a verb whose primary sense is "deal out", "distribute", "dispense".

The final sense appearing by the early fifth century involves 'Moîra' as a proper noun, the name of a goddess. In Homer there is usually only one such divinity, but starting with Hesiod there may be several, generally three. Sometimes, as in Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound and Eumenides, the Moîrai are associated or even identified with the Erinues (often translated as "Furies"). As can be seen from the discussions of Prometheus Bound that I have offered here and in the Ananke chapter, the personified Moîra or Moîrai is associated with bringing or enforcing the occurrence (or retaliating for a circumventing) of the eventualities that are supposed to be assigned to someone - often the final or culminating events in someone's life, his or her destiny or fate, his or her peculiar death. (The Moîrai are sometimes called "The Fates" in English.) Whether Moîra, or the Moîrai, also determines, ordains, or assigns the destinies is not clear from the texts; but as we have also seen, the

gods themselves often seem to be subject to [Alnanke] and to what is pepromenen, whether they are the authors of these or not.

These, then, are the senses or uses of '[M]oîra' that appear to have been current in and before the early fifth century. At this point we must ask what if anything might be found in them that could be of help in interpreting Parmenides' uses of the term(s); or what about one or all of them might lend itself to a plausible and fruitful interpretation of the passages in which '[M]oîra' appears. I would suggest that there are certain characteristics or aspects that are implicated in one way or another in most or all of the senses or uses explored here. First, all invoke the idea of division or partition - of goods, land, food, life circumstances, behavior, gestures of respect, and so on. In some cases this division or partition may be the result of a human action or a custom or agreement between humans; in others it may originate with gods; and in still others (e.g. Ares' remarks about his moîra) the source is not clear, and may be beyond the power of at least some gods to control. Second, all also seem to have to do with shareholding, sharing, allotting, distributing, or partaking. That is, the divisions or results of divisions are associated with, or are seen as corresponding to, individuals or what is taken to be proper to each individual. The personified Moîra or Moîrai is (are)

generally seen as determining and/or enforcing the allotment or fate or portion assigned to people or divinities.

In other words, [M]oîra seems always to involve that some thing or complex is in some way conceived as a divisible whole, and that some (other) thing is in some way conceived as a part of a whole; and generally [M]oîra also involves that the part(s) be assigned to or claimed by what are taken to be distinct individuals. Even in the case of Penelope's suitors who "have no moîra" of aidos, the intention of Odysseus' statement seems to be that these men do not "take part in", "partake of", or "have" shame or reverence where they should. One does not have to assert that shame, reverence, or respect is measurable in order to claim that a person should partake of or have it; 'having' and 'partaking' do not necessarily refer only to possession of something that can be measured.

Several of the senses of [M]oîra discussed here also invoke passage of time. They refer to the assignment of certain eventualities or outcomes to an individual, or refer to the occurrence of these eventualities. While 'moîra' does not always refer to temporal relationships or events in time, the analysis offered here will always take into account that it does have the capacity for such reference. The use of a term that seems always to invoke division and correspondence and sometimes to invoke time, in a discussion that has to do with something (to eon) that the goddess has

earlier in fragment 8 said we must take to be whole, not susceptible to past or future existence as such, unmoving or unchanging, indivisible, and incompatible with coming to be and destruction (8.4, 8.5, 8.26, 8.22, 8.21, etc.), presents problems that will be explored after the analysis of the fr. 8 [M]oîra passage as such.

Let us return to Parmenides' fragment 8. 'Moîra' appears in line 37, as part of a clause that runs from 8.36 to 8.38. This clause is in turn part of a sentence that runs from 8.34 to 8.41. The [M]oîra clause begins with 'epei', 'since'; evidently it is being evinced as support for the preceding clause. What is said about [M]oîra is not presented as dependent on any other things said to be the case between 8.34 and 8.41 (or directly preceding or following these lines). Rather, other things spoken of in the sentence are presented as dependent on, or as explained or explicated by, that which [M]oîra is being said to do. For this reason I propose to begin the investigation of [M]oîra's possible functions or roles in fr. 8 by examining the clause in which it (she) is mentioned. From there I shall work outward to the beginning and end of the sentence.

The clause in which '[M]oîra' appears is 'epei to ge [M]oîr' epedesen/ oûlon akineton t' emmenai'. I would translate this as 'since [M]oîra bound it/ To be whole and unmoving (unchanging)'. The 'it' that [M]oîra is being said

to have bound would seem to be to eon, which is mentioned in the preceding clause, 'For nothing either is or will be/ Beside(s) (Another thing outside of) to eon'. 'To eon' also agrees in gender with the pronoun used.

It is also important to notice that there has been no indication that the speaker (apparently still the goddess) has stopped talking about the road introduced at 8.1-2. Evidently, then, whatever is being said about Moîra and about to eon is supposed to obtain at least within the context of that road of inquiry; perhaps it also obtains under other circumstances, but that is not immediately assured. Another aspect of the context of the '[M]oîra' clause is that the beginning of its sentence, at 8.34-36, has to do with noeîn, noema, and pephatismenon - thinking/conceiving/awareness/realization, thought/conception/etc. or that which is thought/conceived/etc., and that which is expressed or declared; respectively (and roughly) - in their relation to to eon. The succeeding clauses of the sentence, including the clause in which '[M]oîra' occurs, begin with the connectives 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as'), 'epei' ('since'), and 'tôi' ('with respect to this'), respectively. This suggests that each of these succeeding clauses aims to support, explicate, or amplify what precedes it. Thus the overall context of the '[M]oîra' clause has to do with what is, or must be, said or conceived (thought, realized, taken

to be the case) with regard to to eon, on or for the "remaining" road of inquiry, and perhaps otherwise as well.

We may now ask what it might mean to say that [M]oîra bound to eon to be whole. Why or in what sense, on or for this road of inquiry (or at all) might to eon have to be, be bound to be, whole? What could [M]oîra have to do with this binding? In what might the binding consist? What might be meant by "whole" (oûlon)?

Let us take up the last question first. 'Oûlon', like the English 'whole', can signify "entire" or "complete"; it can also signify or emphasize the aspect "intact", "not divided", "not in pieces". (The difference between these senses may perhaps be seen from the fact that while having all of the pieces of a broken dish is having materially the "whole" dish, it is not the same as having a functionally "whole" dish.) We have already seen in the Ananke chapter why to eon might have to be conceived or taken to be "whole" in the first sense, on or for the relevant road of inquiry. We should now consider what [M]oîra could have to do with this, and then look at what [M]oîra might have to do with an undivided or intact to eon.

We have seen that [M]oîra may be taken to concern the assignment or fulfillment of eventualities or relationships. In this aspect its connection to that kind of wholeness that would count as the "non-incompleteness" discussed in the Ananke chapter will be similar to

[A]nanke's connection: to eon will need to be taken to be, and to be taken to have to be, whole or "non-incomplete" if inquiry is to be conceived so as to be viable; and [M]oira would seem to require that to eon, that which is, be or be conceived or taken to be whole. Without the (apparent) reliability and conceivability of a regular, or at least a determinable, set of relationships and unrolling of eventualities, it would seem we could not have or conceive inquiry.¹ Were to eon, that which is, not whole or not said or taken to be whole, we would not be able to take it that the consequences or effects or relationships a thing or event said to exist or to take place was supposed to have ("supposed" such that to suppose otherwise would be to suppose the thing or event to be otherwise than it was originally taken to be) would come to be or be in effect. We would not be able to take a certain set of circumstances or features to be the appropriate "portion" of someone or of

¹Inquiry would seem to involve that there are or can be systems of relations, and temporal sequences, in two ways. First, as discussed in the rest of this paragraph, we take it that at least some things said to exist are invested with and identifiable or discernible through these. Second, as noted two paragraphs later, inquiry itself would seem to rely on the notions (and the actuality, if inquiry is to be possible as we conceive of it) of temporal sequences and systems of relations. At the same time, on the road of inquiry in question, the one that the goddess hints is most viable, to eon must be taken to be whole, undivided, unaccompanied, ungenerated, indestructible, and so on - characteristics which would seem incompatible with the existence of temporal sequences and systems of relations. This apparently paradoxical situation will be investigated in the next chapter.

something, if it were possible that some of the relations thought necessary to apply to that thing or person (in order for the thing or person to be what or who it/he/she is) could not or did not in fact exist, or were not in place. That possibility would be a real one if it were the case that what is could be, or could coherently and consistently be taken to be, other than whole or "non-incomplete". Were it not taken or conceived, or were it not the case, that a thing was not and could not be associated with a specific set of either constant or predictably varying features, characteristics, relations, or effects, that thing could not be sought or used in inquiry.

Further, if there were even one such thing conceived as thus indeterminate in its characteristics or relations, it would seem that no inquiry into anything said to exist could be conceived to be possible. For one could not in that situation be sure of what, if any, might be the relations between anything one had proposed to inquire about, and the indeterminate thing. If one could not be sure that one could tell, or even consistently conceive, what the "part" (or "portion", "place", "role", etc.) of something was, one could not be sure of being able to tell what if any the relations were between that thing and anything else; in some sense, all of what is would be conceived as indeterminate, and nothing could (with any assurance) be identified.

We may note as well that [M]ofra may have some

significance for the process of inquiry itself. In order to be able, or to conceive or take it that it is possible, to seek or inquire into something, it would seem that we must take what is (to eon) to be such that conclusions can be drawn and inferences made - and so, to be such that consequences ensue in regular, recognizable, potentially predictable ways. (This is not to say that we must hold that we know or will know in all cases just what these ways are. Neither is it to say that what it seems we take or must take to be the case in order for inquiry to be possible, is in fact the case, or is known to be the case, independent of our conceptions.) In order to be able to conduct an inquiry, or to be able to seek something, we must be able to identify what it is we say we are looking for; to tell what it is not, or what is not it; to tell when to count something as evidence (for the presence or absence of something; for the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a determination); to tell what possibilities a given set of circumstances involves or engenders; and to tell when a possibility can or has been or should be (given the parameters of the inquiry) eliminated. If we cannot do these things within our conception of what is, or if we are not sure that we can, inquiries cannot proceed. In seeking anything said to exist, we use principles such as the process of elimination, the principle of excluded middle, the principle of non-contradiction, and other principles of inference. We must

use some such principles in order to determine what the information encountered in seeking means or implies within the context of the inquiry, and in order to determine what steps to take to continue the inquiry or to consider it completed. Without such principles, we would seem to have no regular way of identifying and choosing among the alternatives presented by the information we discover.

If, for instance, we cannot identify (or cannot so conceive what is so that we would be able to identify) the possibilities regarding the subject of inquiry that are offered by a given set of circumstances - the part or share of what exists, we might say, or that which is associated with the subject, under these circumstances - the inquiry cannot go on. If, given several possibilities, we do not or cannot say that any of them can be eliminated; or if we do not or cannot say that if two possibilities are conceived or taken to be mutually exclusive then they cannot both be in effect for the same thing in the same way at the same time; then in these cases too inquiry cannot proceed. Thus we can see that features associated with [M]oîra are significant requisites with respect to conceptions of what is, in or for inquiry. It appears that we cannot take to eon to be and at the same time take it to be something we can inquire into and about, without taking these features to be in place. This does not mean that these requirements will not be problematic or paradoxical, as will be seen from the next

chapter.

So far we have considered 8.38's 'oûlon' as if tis sense were "complete", "not missing anything". But we can also look at 8.38 from the perspective of other senses of the word. Taking 'oûlon' to mean "not a part" can be seen to yield similar results to those of taking it to mean 'not lacking or missing anything', in that that which lacks something it would need in order for it to be considered a whole fish, say, might be considered to be a part of a fish. This is not to say that all inquiries treat the same things as wholes and the same ones as parts, but only to bring out that when we inquire about or seek something that we say exists, we conceive of it as in some sense whole and not a part. It must have "everything" - all characteristics, parts, and features - that within the context of the relevant inquiry is taken to be needed in order for it to be the thing it is supposed to be. (We have seen already that this must be the case with respect to to eon as a whole or as such.) Without any stable conception of what counts as a "whole" one of the sort of thing we are looking for, we cannot look for it. To know what part of something is or looks like, or to know what that which is considered to be a part of something is or looks like, does not necessarily tell us what the whole is like.

In so far as inquiry requires some conception of the thing sought as a whole, 'oûlon' might also plausibly be

taken to mean "not divided", "not in pieces". The analysis, in the Dike chapter, of 8.25 supports the notion that in or for inquiry, to eon must be said and taken to be continuous. Also, it is not always the case that a whole is the same as just any sum of all appropriate parts. To have all pieces of a broken dish is not the same as to have a "whole" dish if one seeks something on which to place food; to have these pieces glued together in a reconstituted version of the original dish may also not be the same as having a "whole" dish if one seeks that which will be considered suitable as a dish for serving food under certain social circumstances. To have a car some of the parts of whose exhaust system have been removed and placed in the trunk is not to have a "whole" car in the sense of what is sought by the Department of Motor Vehicles as legal for driving. In order to conceive or to take something to be a part of something else, or to conceive of that something else as having parts (or even features or aspects), one must have a conception of the intact or complete or undivided something else (or a conception of what it is supposed to be).

What has [M]oira to do with any of this? We have seen that [M]oira is associated with division, allotment, and shareholding. For [M]oira to be in effect would seem to involve that there are parts of something; that each part is related to the others and to the whole in specific, recognizable ways; and that there is a whole. (For [M]oira

to be taken to be in effect, we must take it that these things are the case.) Nothing can be conceived to be a part except in relation to a conceived whole; and it would seem impossible to determine which part something is without reference to a conceived whole. Thus, what binds the parts to be parts (and to be the parts they are) also binds the whole to be a whole (and to be the whole that it is). On the analysis that I have given, it would be (or would have been taken in or before the early fifth century to be) [M]oira who (or that) accomplishes, or perhaps constitutes, this binding.

If [M]oira binds to eon to be whole, should we say that the "lot" or "portion" of to eon is to be whole? I would suggest that that assertion would involve a use of "portion" or "share" or "lot" that is different from that which is applied to particular things said to exist. The particular things, as we have seen, must be conceived as wholes from one perspective, and must be conceived as parts (or not-the-whole) from another. Each such thing must be conceived as whole in the sense of being conceived to have exactly all that is needed in order to be a thing of a certain kind. However, no particular thing is everything; for each one, there is always supposed to be also that which is not that thing. Each particular thing said to exist is supposed to be distinguished by its having certain characteristics, features, aspects, and relations, and not

others. Each is supposed, conceived, taken to be such that to have certain characteristics, features, aspects, etc. precludes having certain others. If a thing is conceived to have a completely blue surface, it cannot, we hold, also be conceived to have a completely yellow surface (or an uncolored surface, or no surface) in the same respect, at the same time, under the same lighting conditions, from the same perspective, and so on. If we hold that there are just two kinds of people in the world (e.g., the kind who say, "There are just two kinds of people in the world," and the other kind), then we do not at the same time and by the same criteria also conceive that there are greater or fewer than two kinds. Or rather, we do not and cannot hold or conceive these things simultaneously in or for purposes of inquiry. (It seems possible that the distinctions invoked by these restrictions might not apply with respect to myth, for example.)

In contrast, what is as a whole or as such, that which is conceived to be the "whole of" what is, is not and cannot also be conceived to be a proper part of something else (again, I refer at least to contexts in and for inquiry or seeking). What is as a whole or as such is supposed to be such that there is nothing more; there is to be no further whole or no more of being of which it may be taken to be a part. Then, too, there is not conceived to be anything categorically or conceptually separable from it, or outside

of it, that might be its "share". Whereas particular things said to exist are said to have portions of or shares in what is, or they are said to be parts of the sum total of things that are, to eon (as a whole or as such) could not be said to have a "portion" of anything beyond it, nor to be a part or aspect of anything beyond it. We have seen this, for example, in the Dike and Ananke sections; again I speak at least of contexts in or for inquiry. Thus it seems that we cannot speak, in these contexts at very least, of to eon's having a portion in the same way as we speak of a particular thing's having a portion. No particular thing is the whole of what is, and particular things may have portions (portions or shares of the whole range of circumstances taken to exist or to be able to exist) that are not included within themselves. We cannot say that to eon is in any way a part of anything, or not a whole. Its range of possibilities is or must be taken to be itself.²

These considerations suggest a way of understanding the statement in 8.37-38 that [M]ofra binds to eon to be whole: to eon is exactly that which is conceived to have to

²A question that may arise here is whether particular things said to exist are, or should be said to be, "parts" or "elements" or "aspects" of to eon. That is, should we take it, in or for inquiry, that to eon is partially or entirely composed or constituted of the things that are said to exist? On one hand, to eon is not supposed to have parts, internal divisions or distinctions, or degrees. On the other hand, "that which exists" or "being" would seem in some way to include the things said to exist, or their existence. This problem will also be treated in the next chapter.

be a whole, that which is conceived not to be, or not to be able to be, in any way a part. As we have seen, in order even to conceive of particular things as not being all of what is, or as being parts of anything, we must have reference to some conceived whole. What binds that which is (or is supposed to be) particular to be the particular thing that it is, binds the whole to be a whole, and to be the whole to eon. Nothing can be, or be taken to be, bound to be a particular thing without the binding of to eon to be to eon, and to be whole, unaccompanied, and so on.

I would propose that this may be why the goddess says at 8.36-37 that there is "nothing/ [Other] Beside(s) to eon". That is, if to eon is and must be a whole and not (i.e., not also) a part, there could not be anything else beside it, or beyond it. To eon is that which is; nothing that is could be conceived to be beyond it. Thus in so far as anything is to be the moira of anything, the things (including events, situations, conditions, etc.) will be conceived to be "covered" by to eon. In so far as we might try to inquire about something said to exist, all those of its associations, characteristics, and eventualities that we might consider would have to be conceived to exist, or to obtain as proper to what exists. All of that something's associations, characteristics, and eventualities would need to be taken to exist in some way if we were to go about inquiring about the thing, since if some could not be

conceived to exist and yet were taken to be integral to the thing's identity, or taken to have some effect on the thing, we could not hold that we had nor that we could have determinate conclusions, answers, or findings in our inquiry. Thus to eon must be held to "cover" all connections, characteristics, and eventualities pertaining to particular things said to exist ("must", again, at least in or for inquiry). If we are indeed to have determinate conclusions and findings, it would seem that to eon must in fact "cover" all of those things, connections, and so on. (Again, whether to eon indeed does this, and whether we can tell, are matters that will be discussed in the final two chapters.)

Why might this be so? Could there not be said or conceived to be anything beyond to eon that could be shown to be associated either with to eon itself or with particular things said to exist? The problem that arises in trying to consider this question is that in order to be able to determine or to identify such an association, so as to seek or to ask about it, there would seem to have to be, or to be taken to be, some ground or aspect common to what is and that which is not what is (which would seem to be that which is not, if to eon is that which is). That is, we would apparently need to be able to grasp or to recognize the terms of such a relationship. We could not simply say that such a relationship existed, or that it would be included in

or represented in terms of that which exists; nor could we assume we could cast it in terms not included under that which is, or in terms of non-existence or of what is not. For the very question we are trying to settle is that of what that which is and that which is not (or that which is not what is) could be conceived to have in common. (It is not at all clear that "have" would mean the same thing, or be applicable, for both "sides".) To cast the possible relationship in terms of that which is would mean that the question must be posed again: In what terms could the supposed existent relationship, or the relationship that had been supposed to obtain of to eon or for existent things, extend to or be shared by that which is supposed to be exclusive of it (them), or that which is not? The same trouble would arise if the relationship were cast in terms of that which is not what is, or that which is not, whatever those might mean. This situation is not like that of two existent things said to be mutually exclusive, for those things are both supposed to exist. What is beyond to eon might not even be able to be said to "be" beyond to eon, or beyond the existent. Is there a third alternative, a possibility of commonality that is conceived to be included neither under what is nor under what "is" not what is? Here again the problem repeats itself. In order to check out this alternative, we would seem to need to be able to find out or to conceive of terms it could share with that which is and

that which is supposed to be beyond what is; and so on.

Thus it seems that for purposes of inquiry, and perhaps otherwise, the possibilities of that which is are conceived to be limited to that which is. This may account for the goddess's statement at 8.38 that to eon is bound to be "akineton", unmoving or unchanging. We have seen that to eon cannot be taken to shift, if inquiry is to be possible. First, there cannot be taken to be a shift in those characteristics, associations, eventualities, and relationships in general without which a particular thing said to exist could not be said to be what it is supposed to be. If there could be such a shift, nothing would be able to be inquired into or used in an inquiry. There could not be said to be any identifiable "things". Second, the aggregate of all things said to exist, and of all relations and contexts considered to be fundamental to the things' being what they are supposed to be, could not be held to shift either, if inquiry is to be conceived as possible, for in such a case inferences could not be made. Third, to eon as such could not be taken to shift if inquiry is to be possible and indeed if we are to think that claims such as these could make sense at all, for as we have seen to eon must be conceived to hold, or to be, its own range of possibilities, if inquiry is to be able (and to be taken to be able) to take place. There is no "room" for it to change, nowhere for it to "go", if there is to be inquiry. (I do not

see any clearly spatial connotation for 'akineton' in 8.38, and I do not find any indication that it must have one.) Thus too, nothing "will be" outside of or beside(s) what is (8.36-37).

This interpretation would seem to show that that which is associated with [M]oira would account for the claims about to eon in 8.36b-38a; namely that at very least on or for a viable (or apparently viable) road of inquiry, to eon must be said and taken or conceived to be whole, unmoving or unchanging, and unaccompanied. (For such an inquiry to produce understanding, I would suggest, to eon would have to be as we say and hold it to be. Whether it is that way and whether we can tell, again, will be examined in the next chapter.) We have seen as well that the first two of the characteristics just mentioned (appearing in 8.38) would seem to support or to amplify the third (8.36-7), and in fact the goddess introduces those two with 'gar', 'for', 'since', 'as'.

8.36b also contains a 'gar'. How might the absence of anything beside(s) or outside of to eon support or explicate the assertion of 8.35-36a, viz., "For not without to eon, on which that which is expressed (declared; pephatismenon) depends, / Will you find noein (roughly: thinking, conceiving, awareness, realizing, taking to be the case or to be something)." The word 'aneu', which I am

translating as 'without', can mean either "without" (i.e., "not with", "minus") or "far from", "away from". From what has been seen so far, surely noein will not be able to be held to "be away from" to eon, because nothing can be held to be "away from" to eon, in or for inquiry. (At the same time, I would not maintain that the apparent overlap or co-extent of noein and to eon will not raise some difficulties pertaining to the context, content, and potential results of inquiry; these questions will be discussed in the next section and in the final two chapters.) I would propose, though, and will show in the next section, that a case can be made for interpreting 'aneu' to mean "without", and that this interpretation makes 8.35-36a a somewhat stronger claim than would the other interpretation.

Certainly, noein is said to be, and it is attributed to things in so far as they are supposed to exist - when a dead person's noein is mentioned in ancient Greek authors, what is being referred to is either something that is supposed to have gone on when the person was alive, or else something that is supposed to be engaged in by his or her still-existent soul. So in this way to eon (or an eon, a being) is supposed to be required for noein. Noein does not go on, we say, without eon. But there is more to the relationship than this. 'Noein' has several senses, and all of them express a response to or an orientation toward that which is, or to[ward] what one construes that which is to

be. I will try to show here that given the way in which 'noeîn' and 'to eon' (or 'finding to eon') seem to have been understood by the early fifth century, they would have to be taken to be something like complementary in order for inquiry to be (and to be taken to be) possible. I will try to show as well that this complementarity is a function of a kind of conceived interdependence.

'Noeîn'

In "NOOS and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems"³ Kurt von Fritz identifies two "basic meanings" or main categories of senses for Homer's uses of 'noeîn': "to realize a situation" and "to plan or have an intention". As will be seen from the examples provided here, 'noeîn' in the first sense is often best translated 'to notice', 'to be aware' (by means of the senses or otherwise); and especially 'to notice', 'be aware', or 'realize' that something is the case or is a certain way. Von Fritz's second meaning seems to cover cases where an appropriate translation might be 'plan', 'devise', 'think out', or 'conceive', as well as cases where the translation might better be 'have in mind', 'intend'. I do not assert that Parmenides uses 'noeîn' in only one of these basic meanings or senses throughout the fragments. I will argue that the senses cited here seem to have some

³Kurt von Fritz, "NOOS and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems," Classical Philology 38, no. 2 (April 1943): 85.

relationship to one another, or to have something in common; and I will discuss what this aspect might suggest toward the interpretation of Parmenides 8.35-36.

Examples of 'noein' in von Fritz's first meaning include the following. At Odyssey 4.116, Menelaus tells Telemachus and Peisistratus of his travels, and notes that he especially mourns the loss of Odysseus. Telemachus begins to weep, and Menelaus "noese...min". 'Min', and accusative pronoun, would refer to Telemachus, but the situation described is not one of Menelaus noticing, or being or becoming aware of, Telemachus in the sense of noting his presence or existence, or in the sense of just coming to see him. Menelaus has been addressing Telemachus, and doing so intentionally, all along. The point of the statement seems rather to be that Menelaus notices Telemachus crying, notices that Telemachus is crying.

A similar case, also involving weeping (though this is not the only context in which 'noein' is found), occurs at Odyssey 8.94. Odysseus, hearing songs about the Achaeans, begins to weep and tries to conceal this by covering his face with his cloak as new songs or verses begin. Alcinous "min...enoesen", for he hears Odysseus groaning, and proposes to change the company's activity from music to athletic contests. In this case as well the point cannot be that Alcinous saw Odysseus, or that he noticed that Odysseus was there; the feast at which these events occur is in

Odysseus' honor, and Odysseus is not concealing or trying to conceal all of himself, but only from time to time covering his face. What is being depicted instead, it seems, is that Alcinous notices that Odysseus is trying to hide his tears. This understanding of the expression is corroborated, I would suggest, by the mention of Alcinous' offer to start athletic contests; this indicates that Alcinous has noticed that Odysseus' behavior is a reaction to the singing.

In both of these cases, then, 'noein' would seem to refer to a realization, an awareness or a coming to awareness, or perhaps a kind of understanding about what exists (or about what seems to exist; for example, Alcinous notices that his guest is crying, but he is not aware that this is the man Odysseus whose deeds figured in the songs and who is now widely presumed to be dead). This realization may be a taking notice of a new phenomenon, or a first noting of something; it may also go beyond, or develop, an awareness that one had had prior to the noein.

Realization or understanding of what lies behind words or appearances can also be spoken of as noein. At Odyssey 6.67, a disguised Athena had come to Nausicaa in a dream and told her to wash her family's clothing in preparation for her wedding, which Athena said would be soon to come (despite the fact that there is no prospective bridegroom as yet). Athena requested that Nausicaa get a wagon and mules for this task. On waking, Nausicaa asks her

father Alcinous for the wagon and mules, explaining that she wishes to do the laundry so that her father and brothers will look proper for what they do; but she is "ashamed" or "embarrassed" (aideto) to mention marriage to her father. Alcinous "panta...noei" and gives her the wagon and mules. The context seems to indicate that 'panta noei' here means "understood everything" or "realized all that was going on", i.e., realized or apprehended or grasped what was behind Nausicaa's request. Alcinous would be well aware that a wedding required clean clothes, and that the prospect of a wedding would be something that would prompt a young woman to make a sudden request to do laundry. Further, had Alcinous been meant to be described as simply granting his daughter's request on the basis of the considerations she mentioned, he could just have been said to have agreed, or perhaps to have realized "this" or "these things" (the things Nausicaa brought up). The use of 'panta' ('all', 'everything') suggests, I think, that Homer intends to show that Alcinous has become aware not just of some facts, but of the entire situation.

Another case of awareness or understanding of something that is not immediately apparent is mentioned at Odyssey 21.257. At Athena's suggestion, Penelope tells her suitors that if one of them can string Odysseus' bow and shoot an arrow through twelve axes, that man will win her hand. Each of the suitors repeatedly fails to string the

bow. One of them, Eurymachus, sees this failure as a reproach on all of them for generations to come. Another, Antinous, says that that will not happen, and that Eurymachus "noeeis"; and Antinous proposes to postpone the contest, certain that someone will succeed. Antinous seems to be saying that Eurymachus knows, realizes, understands, or is aware that some suitor will succeed and that it will not be said that there was none among them who even came close to being a match for Odysseus.

What happens in fact is that all of the suitors agree to postpone the contest; when it is finally held, the disguised Odysseus enters and strings the bow, and then none of the original crowd of suitors gets a chance to touch it. Now, if Antinous was right and Eurymachus "realized" or "was aware" or "knew" that one of the suitors would succeed, that "realization" turned out to be false. (I would not consider this to be a reason not to associate 'noein' with what English calls 'realization' or 'awareness', since we can say in English that a realization, or what seemed to be and was called a realization when it occurred, turned out to be false or mistaken.) The fact that 'noein' can be used in such a context, one in which someone's "take" on a situation could be or is discovered to be false, should be of some importance for the interpretation of the goddess's admonitions concerning what her pupil can or cannot, and what he must or must not, say and noein regarding to eon.

Von Fritz's second "basic meaning" of 'noein' was "to plan or have an intention", and this can be found to include such sub-senses as "to purpose", "to think out, devise, conceive", and "to be minded". In Works and Days, at line 286, Hesiod tells Perses, "Soi d' ego esthla noeon ereo, mega nepie Perse." 'Mega nepie' means "you big fool" or "you great child" or, at best, "you who are greatly lacking in forethought". Therefore it seems unlikely that 'esthla noeon' in this context would mean "I am thinking good things about you". Rather, with the dative 'soi', the phrase is much more likely to mean something like "I intend good things for you". Indeed, the next lines show that Hesiod is trying to help Perses. From 287 to 292 Hesiod speaks of how much harder the road of honest work is, at least most of the time, than its alternative; but then from 298 on, he explains why this harder road is worth taking: according to Hesiod, it is the way to avoid famine. Depending on how we understand 'esthla', 'goods' or 'good things', 'esthla noeon' might refer to Hesiod's present good will or good advice, or else to the future benefits he has said he wants Perses to have.

Some uses of 'noein' seem ambiguous; their exact shades of meaning are difficult to determine. At Odyssey 2.122, the suitor Antinous tries to pressure Telemachus to get Penelope to marry, by pointing out that her stalling tactics are having the effect - because the suitors will not

leave her house and Telemachus cannot drive them off unaided - of consuming the family's livelihood. Antinous says that Penelope generally thinks wisely, but that in this matter her thoughts go astray, atar men toûto g' enaisimon ouk enoese. It is not clear whether he refers specifically to her plan or intention to hold off the suitors, or to her understanding of her situation, or to both.

At 3.26, the disguised Athena has urged telemachus to speak to Nestor. When he says that he does not know how to approach and to speak to Nestor, Athena tells him that some of what he needs in order to do it he autos eni phresi sêsi noeseis, will devise (or see, or become aware of, or realize?) within his own wits, and some will come to him from the god(s). It is not clear whether Athena means that Telemachus will figure out or hit upon a plan for how to speak or for what to say to Nestor, whether she means that he will have a realization of how one is in general to speak to such an elder, or whether she means that he will come to recognize or to conceive of the situation in a new way. Perhaps she intends some combination of these, for example, that Telemachus will come to a new awareness or realization about the situation, and that in so doing he will see what to do next.

At Odyssey 2.382, the use of 'noein' is much less ambiguous. There the verb is used of Athena herself, and the reference seems most likely to be to planning. She is

described as enoese, and then immediately as acting. Nothing is mentioned that could be the object of a new perception of hers.

Just as the English 'have in mind' can refer either to an intention for the future or to a conception or understanding regarding the present or regarding a notion in general, so it seems that 'noein' can do either in Greek. At Iliad 5.665, Sarpedon's companions carry him away from the battle, and have such a hard time of this that oud' enoese..., exerusai doru, none think of pulling the spear out of his leg. It is not that they do not intend or plan to pull it out; they wish to help him. Rather, what seems to be meant is that all his friends can think of at this time is getting Sarpedon to safety as quickly as possible (speudonton). It does not even occur to them to remove the spear first. In contrast, at Iliad 24.560, Achilles says that he is minded to release Hector's body to Priam (noeo de kai autos Hektora toi lusai), since Zeus sent Thetis to urge him to give up the body for ransom. Here the sense of 'noeo' seems to be one of plan or intention, for Achilles hands over the body a few lines later.

At Iliad 22.235, the case is more ambiguous. Athena appears to Hector in the guise of his brother Deiphobos, and Hector says that he is "minded all the more in his heart (wits)" (nûn d' eti kai mallon noeo phresi) to honor Deiphobos given what has happened. Hector could mean that he

intends to make some future gesture that will honor his brother, or he could mean that he is additionally or more strongly disposed toward honoring him, that he now thinks of Deiphobos in a way that honors him or is meant to honor him more.

Thus we see that both of the main senses of 'noeîn' address what is, or what one takes to exist or to be the case. That is, neither refers to fantasy, imagination, or dreaming as such. Were there no to eon, or were there taken to be no to eon, 'noeîn' would not refer to what we have seen that it is taken to refer to; or, there would be no such thing (there would not be taken to be any such thing) as what is now called 'noeîn'. If one were to hold, to believe, or to think that (or such that) there was no such thing as that which is called 'to eon', one would, I think, be holding as well that there was no such thing as that which is called 'noeîn' in the senses in which we have seen that the term is used. If one were to hold that to eon did not exist, or that there was no such thing as what is called 'to eon', one would in effect have to hold that 'noeîn' in the senses in which we have seen it to appear also did not exist or occur.

Even where an exercise of noeîn produces a realization or conception that turns out to be mistaken or inappropriate, as for example Antinous claims that

Penelope's has done, it is precisely comparison with what actually exists that is supposed to show the mistake. One does not "find noein" (Parmenides 8.36) "without to eon" (8.35), at least on or for the road of inquiry under examination, because noein is supposed to address - as subject, as object, as point of reference in devising a plan or in having an intention, as that which is confronted in a realization, etc. - just that which is. Noein might be said to be aimed at that which is. It may address something that is taken to be absent, but only in so far as the absent thing has palpably present effects or in so far as it is "present to mind" (is conceived [of], is considered in thought or feeling).

I would like to propose, though, that the connection between noein and to eon, or between the operative notions of them, is even more intimate. If we claim that there is noein, we claim as well that to eon is. But if we claim that to eon (or anything) is, can we deny noein? If we wish to say that the claim that to eon is is supported by any sort of awareness whatsoever, I would suggest that we cannot deny what is called 'noein'. (Whether or under what circumstances it might be valid or demonstrable to say that there was such support is another question, one that will be discussed in the next chapter. I do not assert here that this support is unconditionally, or at all, in place.) That is, given the relationships between what is meant by 'to eon' and what is

meant by 'noein', or the relationships between the way in which to eon is thought or taken to be and the way in which noein is thought or taken to be, for inquiry at the very least support for claims about to eon (or about anything said to exist) must involve noein. If there is, or is conceived to be, any of to eon that is in principle inaccessible to noein, then we cannot claim to have awareness or understanding of it; it would be unconceived, inconceivable; and for inquiry at the very least the claim that such a part or aspect of to eon existed or was in effect would seem impossible to support (or to deny). It may be relevant to note here that the goddess does not say, "not without to eon...is there noein," but rather, "not without to eon...will you find noein". She leaves open the questions of whether someone other than a human, or other than the narrator, could find noein without to eon; of whether independently of the way in which we think or conceive, noein exists without to eon or vice-versa; and of whether our notions of noein and to eon are adequate and accurate in addressing that which we would use them to address.

Further, it can be seen from the passages of Homer and Hesiod discussed above that the two main senses of 'noein' have some features in common. Both are used to speak of an awareness of something (a situation, an intention, a plan). Both often refer to a realization or grasp - or to what is believed at the time it occurs to be a realization

or a grasp; one can seem to have realized something when in fact one has come to a false or mistaken understanding or conception of a situation.

In addition, as we have seen, both senses are supposed to address that which is. Specifically, both seem integrally to involve taking or coming to take what is, or something that is (or that is supposed to be), to be a certain way. This is especially clear for the "awareness/realization of a situation" sense. In the case of the "plan/intend/have in mind" sense, we may note that the person (or divinity) who has noeîn in this way would seem to be taking some future or general condition of to eon to be a certain way. One cannot plan to go skiing, for example, if one does not take something like gravity (or the tendency of objects heavier or denser than the atmosphere to descend through it until they encounter resistance greater than their own downward tendency) to be in effect on Earth generally. Noeîn in this second sense seems always to involve an awareness or understanding or realization about what needs to be or should be done in order to fulfill an aim.

Von Fritz explicates the connection between the two main senses of 'noeîn' in this way:

The realization of a situation, even when it strikes us with a sudden impact which causes strong emotion, often raises us above our ordinary abilities, makes us see all the implications and consequences of the situation with unwonted clarity, and makes us act with unusual determination and foresight....In this case the emotion

helps the transition from a vision of the present to a vision of the possibilities of the future - or, in other words, from noein in the sense of realization of a present situation to noein in the sense of planning or vision of the future.⁴

While this sketch shows an important connection between the occasions in which each sense would be said to occur, there is more to explore as to why it might seem appropriate to speak of the two kinds of occasions in the same terms. Von Fritz hints at a point of commonality when he speaks of both as "visions", and on page 91 he notes that "Stress is then always laid on the visualization of the situation as a whole, not on the process of reasoning by which we may gradually arrive at this realization." Something that the two senses of 'noein' have in common, I would suggest, is this "visualization", awareness, grasping, or presence-in-mind of a situation, be that situation something present or some set of requisites for the future. (In that 'noein' can thus refer to the recognition of consequences, requisites, and associations, [M]oira is well-suited to supporting noein in its connection to to eon.)

Indeed one could say that one factor involved in having a plan is having a realization about what is present - events and characteristics that one encounters, as well as one's present needs, wants, and reactions, the designs and actions of others, and so on - as far as what is present can

⁴Von Fritz, "NOOS and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems," 87-88.

or will affect what is to come. Now, in order to realize or to take it that what is (or something that is, or that is supposed to be) is a certain way, one must have a certain very general conception or awareness of what that which is can be like or involve. In order, for example, for Alcinous to understand what is behind Nausicaa's request, he must see the request in the context of the circumstances under which it might be urgent for a well-born, unmarried young woman to do her family's laundry. He must think that her wedding would be a subject of primary concern for his daughter or for a young woman like her, and he must take weddings to demand clean clothes. Were he not to conceive of the elements of the situation in the way in which he apparently does, Alcinous would likely not come to the realization that he does come to. That is, he might have the idea that Nausicaa was getting ready to be married, but the idea would have to be called a guess, a fantasy, or an inspiration (a sudden revelation or presentation by gods; here let us recall Athena's dichotomy of Odyssey 3.26: Telemachus will noei some things within himself, and have others put into him by gods). If Alcinous had no conception of weddings (if hsi people had no such custom, e.g.), or if his conception or awareness of them was one according to which Nausicaa or young women generally would not seek them, he would not have seen or taken it that his daughter was thinking of preparing for one.

Interpretation of 8.34-38a

We have seen that 'noein' in both of its main senses is supposed to involve coming to some sort of realization about that which is. Even that which is commonly taken to lie in the future is supposed to be a function of what is. Without what is, or without the claim that something is, there would be nothing to call 'noein' in the ways that 'noein' has been shown to be understood. I intend to show in what follows that this point in itself depends on the way in which noein and to eon are conceived or taken to be (or the way in which they must be conceived or taken to be if inquiry is to be conceivably possible). Later, I will discuss why or under what circumstances this might be so.

First must come a discussion of the rest of 8.35-36. The whole clause reads, "For not without to eon, on which pephatismenon depends,/ Will you find [the] noein". 'Pephatismenon' in this grammatical context is the neuter nominative perfect middle/passive participle of 'phatizein', 'to express', 'report', 'say'. Thus it might best be translated 'what is (has been) reported', 'what is (has been) expressed', 'a reported thing', or even 'a report' where this denotes the content of the report, as opposed to the act of reporting. As was the case for 'noein', 'pephatismenon' is always associated with that which is (or that which is supposed to be): to make a report or to express something is to state that something is the case,

that that which is is a certain way. Utterances that are not intended to assert (or to appear to assert) that something is the case, that that which is is some way or other - utterances such as jokes, stories intended as fictional, and so on - are not spoken of with 'phatizein' in Greek just as they are not called 'reports' in English.

Therefore I would suggest that pephatismenon, that which is reported or expressed, could be said to "depend upon" to eon in the following way. Without to eon, there would be nothing appropriate to be called a 'pephatismenon', since 'phatizein' is supposed specifically to address to eon, that which is. Without the claim that to eon, or even an eon (which as we will see will seem to suppose to eon), exists, we could not presume to have anything to call or to understand to be a pephatismenon. Were we not to consider (noein) there to be any such entity as to eon, or were we unsure, we could not with assurance call (phatizein) anything a pephatismenon, at least not within contexts of inquiry.

For noein and phatizein would both seem to be necessary, even indispensable, for inquiry. In order to consider anything to be true or real, and in order to make or to be able to make any discoveries, and in order to seek at all, we would seem to have to be able to conceive and to take or realize that what is is some way or another, and to identify that which we seek and that which is not it. I

speak here of inquiry regarding particular things said to exist; inquiry (or findings) regarding to eon as a whole or as such would seem to have similar requisites, but - in that we have seen that (for inquiry at very least) to eon must be said to be one, indivisible, unaccompanied, and so on - special difficulties will arise, and these will be discussed in the next chapter. This much, I think, can be offered here: any consideration of to eon in the context of any inquiry would seem to require the conception, realization, and assertion of, or the ability to recognize, the existence and identity of to eon. That is, our ability to seek, as we have seen, appears to depend on our conceiving of and discerning a to eon, and on our holding that it is to eon that we address.

At the same time, to eon must be considered to exist and to be unaccompanied and whole, to be continuous, complete, unborn, unperishing, undivided, unmoving or unchanging, and so on, if inquiry is to be considered possible, and if noein and phatizein are to be considered to be possible tools of inquiry. That is, in order for it to seem to us that we can inquire, given what inquiry seems to involve (identification of things searched for, the ability to pose and to understand questions or aims, etc.), we must take it that what is is a certain way; and the goddess presents hallmarks of that way. For example, we could not with assurance claim that noein addressed (or involved

awareness of) to eon, much less that noein could provide true information or the prerequisites of true information about what is, if it might be the case that there was something outside to eon that could affect to eon or noein. If we thought that it might be the case that something outside to eon could affect to eon or noein, we could not at the same time and with consistency believe that we could be sure that noein provided accurate information about to eon, or information exactly about to eon. Similarly, we could not with assurance claim that noein addressed or involved awareness of to eon if it might be the case that to eon were "incomplete" in the sense discussed previously, and characteristics or consequences that were supposed or that had to be supposed to pertain to something said or conceived to exist might not be in place, undermining the capacity noein would have for intention and for realization of what went on or existed. In that case, too, meanings and references would be made inherently so ambiguous and mutable that phatizein would cease to have content. Dike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, as we have seen, assure that to eon does not have these problems; or, taking [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira to be in place for inquiry allows inquiry to be (and to be taken to be) possible.⁵

⁵As for why noein and phatizein are discussed in the poem with reference to [M]oira in particular, I would offer these suggestions. First, [D]ike and [A]nanke have already been discussed, and the goddess may in fact be taking into account their effects as already in place. Second, although

Now, the 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as') in 8.35 suggests that 8.35-36a is intended to explain, support, or amplify 8.34. Line 34 is particularly difficult to translate; I will offer a translation that I think makes sense in the context of fragment 8 and that seems in fact to be explicated or amplified by 8.35-36a (and, by extension, amplified further by 8.36b-38a, as the grammatical structure implies that it should be. Line 34 reads, 'Tauton d' esti noeîn te kai houneken esti noema'. As has been mentioned, finite verb forms in Greek sentences sometimes appear without nouns or pronouns, generally where it is clear what the verbs' subjects should be understood to be. This occurs in Parmenides at 1.4, for example, with pheromen ('I was carried'), and seems to occur in several places with 'esti' ('he/she/it is'), notably at 8.2, 8.5 (there also with the past and future forms 'ên' and 'estai', respectively), and 8.33. In each of these fragment 8 passages, the grammatical subject seems from the context to be to eon. In line 33 this is especially clear, because the clause begins with 'gar' and 'to eon' is the subject of the previous clause. I propose that the second 'esti' in 8.34, the line now under

the significances and associations of [Dlike, [Alnanke, and [Mloira overlap, their emphases seem to be somewhat different. Mofra seems to be oriented especially towards division and towards consequences, effects, and correlations as such. We have seen that phatizein requires distinctions and thus divisions, and that noeîn involves making or becoming aware of distinctions; in its "intention/plan" sense noeîn deals with recognition of consequences, effects, and correlations.

discussion, may also be intended to have 'to eon' as its subject. (It seems to me most likely that the first 'esti' has 'tauton' as its subject.) Therefore I would like to suggest that 8.34 can be translated as 'The same [thing] is noein and is why (wherefore) it (sc. to eon) is [a] noema'. 'Noema', before the early fifth century, generally meant "that which is perceived; perception; thought", "thought; purpose; idea; design"; or (which seems less likely here, as it would have no obvious precedent) "mind; understanding".

In one sense, of course it must be the case that noein is the grounds for anything's being a noema: 'noema' is formed from 'noein'; without noein (perception, awareness, conceiving, realization, planning, taking to be a certain way, etc.), nothing would be able to be considered an idea; or a thing planned, perceived, conceived, or realized; or a realization, conception, etc. But we can also understand 8.34, in this rendering, to be saying something further. Let us recall that noein is taken to pertain to to eon; one is said to [have] noein regarding what is supposed to be a real or actual thing or situation. When what is supposed or taken to be a real thing or situation is grasped, noein is what is said to be in effect; and when noein is said to be in effect, a real thing or situation is supposed to be grasped. We have also seen that if there is to be, or if there is to be conceived to be, any inquiry at all, there must be (or be conceived and taken to be) some

way of grasping or realizing that which is, i.e., to eon.⁶ Noeîn is crucial to inquiry, and for inquiry it seems that that which is, to eon, must be taken to be a (or the?) noema.

Part of what 8.34 would be asserting, then, is that what a noema, or noema in general, is supposed to address, what we say it is "about" or "of", is to eon; and that what noeîn is supposed to pick up or to address is to eon and not something else (or not merely some particular things that are supposed to exist but that do not fulfill the conditions established for to eon as regards inquiry at least). This assertion would be supported by 8.35-38a, as in fact the grammar of 8.35-36 suggests: noeîn will not pick up or address anything outside of or except to eon, nor will noeîn be found outside of to eon; as we have seen from 8.36b-38, there will be nothing at all outside of or besides to eon.⁷

⁶It is true that noeîn is commonly said to address particular things said to exist; and that in inquiry, we employ distinctions. But as has been shown here, in or for inquiry to eon must be understood to be quite different from (even, as will be seen in the next chapter, in some sense incompatible with) particular things said to exist, and noeîn must be considered to address to eon - either only, or also. The difficulties resulting from this will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁷There will be nothing outside to eon, that is, if noeîn and to eon are as we say they are (if that can be said), if they adequately and accurately address what we take ourselves to address, and if there is in fact any "addressing" going on - if, in other words, what is is what we say is and the notions of "what" and "is" are in any way viable. In trying to show what the goddess's meaning might be here, and in showing that it draws out the conceptions and claims or conditions that seem to be required in or for

Moreover, noeîn will evidently not be limited to any subset of to eon, nor to any particular thing(s) said to exist, for these possibilities seem to be precluded by 8.38. There to eon is said to be whole and unmoving, attributes no particular thing and no subset of to eon (should such things exist) can be seen to share, as will be evident from the earlier discussion of 'oûlon', 'whole'. Thus it would seem that these can be eliminated as purportedly other than to eon. In this way, then, 8.34 can be seen to be supported by 8.35-38a.

There is another facet of the claim of 8.34 that bears exploration. The line also asserts that it is noeîn (i.e., and not something else instead, or not nothing) that is responsible for to eon's being noema, or a noema, or the noema. Why might this assertion be so? I would suggest that the reason might be as follows. If to eon could get to be [a] noema by some means other than noeîn as we have seen noeîn to be understood - if some idea of to eon could yet enter one's awareness and be susceptible of later noeîn, perhaps noeîn that would be used in an investigation of what

inquiry, I am not asserting that what we take, and seem to need to take, to be in place for inquiry has any independent veracity. I am not claiming that what is taken to be in place in or for inquiry is indeed in place, much less known to be in place, independent of inquiry or independent of our conceptions; I am not claiming that what we say is true, for purposes of inquiry, is known to be true independent of the way in which we think, or at all. Neither am I asserting that the conceptions that seem to be requisites for inquiry are unproblematic, or consistent.

is; if 'noema' were to be understood to intend something like what might today be called a content or object of awareness, but not necessarily a product or result of noein - if these conditions were in place, we would have no assurance or reason to think that to eon had come to be a noema by a veracious or a truth-compatible means. In that case, it would be hard to see how noein could be employed in inquiry, and at least as hard to see what could be put in its place. There would be no assurance, and no clear suggestion, that inquiry was possible.

For example, if we could hold that a noema could come about by means of imagination alone, then perhaps it would not be certain that noein (used later) would enable us to learn what was true or real (or just not imagined) regarding to eon. One might ask here too whether a noema that was supposed to grasp or to "be about" to eon should be counted as veracious, or as at all addressing that which is, if this noema could have been the product solely of what is called imagination. If what was supposed to have gotten to eon to be a noema was guesswork, dreams, or hearsay, the situation would seem to be the same as in the case of imagination. Perhaps what we would have become aware of in these cases would not or should not have been said to be to eon at all, given the way in which we have seen the terms 'to eon' and 'noema' to be used. (A person might be said to have dream-images as noemata, but these would only be said

to be noemata as awareness of a dream as dream.)

What if a factor that was not something generally considered to be involved with awareness were to be considered to be responsible for to eon's being a noema? Once again, I think, we would not have (and would not know that we had) any assurance or strong suggestion that anything comes to be a noema by truth-compatible means. If, for example, what was supposed to be a noema could occur via some means or through some source of which we were not aware - if we could have what seemed to be (or what we called) a noema but could not say that it was a matter of, or a result of, having noticed something; or could not say how it was supposed to have entered our consciousness - we could not be sure that this purported noema revealed anything of that which is (whatever we might take that to be). In order for inquiry into that which is to be considered to be possible, it would seem that we must take it that both noein and the noema we would have to consider in an inquiry must address or show that which is. (Again, whether taking noein and the noema to do that is in any way justified or independently justifiable is another matter, and will be taken up in the next chapter.) In order for inquiry to be possible, in the sense of there being some possibility that inquiry will be at all effective in uncovering or helping us to understand that which is, noein and noema must address or show that which is. (Here as well, whether in fact these conditions

are fulfilled is another issue. In anticipation of the discussions of the next chapter, I will note that to ask whether they are fulfilled, or to try to find out, would involve taking it that the conditions that make inquiry possible and viable are indeed in place.)

Before looking at 8.38b-41, the last clause of the sentence in which '[M]oîra' occurs, let us summarize the interpretation of 8.34-38a. The translation I offer, again, is this:

The same [thing] is noeîn and [is] wherefore (why) [it
(sc. to eon)] is [a] noema;

For not without to eon, on which pephatismenon depends
Will you find noeîn; for nothing either is or will be
Beside(s) to eon, since [M]oîra bound it
To be whole and unmoving (unchanging);...

This passage argues that there is nothing spatially, temporally, conceptually, or otherwise outside of or besides to eon; at very least on or for the road of inquiry under consideration. That will be the case because [M]oîra has bound to eon to be unmoving (or unchanging) and whole (not lacking, not a part of anything else, and not divisible into disjoint pieces).

For example, if to eon were to be able to move in the sense of changing place, some place outside of it would have to be available; to eon would have to start by occupying only some of the space in existence. But if any

space is, it would seem to have to be included by, or "in", to eon, that which is. If to eon were to be able to move within a space - by rotating, say, or by having internal components change places - there would seem to have to be some void areas within to eon to allow the movements to go on, and that would seem to be precluded by the need (demonstrated earlier) for to eon to be continuous. In either case, it would also have to be said that to eon did not at any point include every state; and thus that it would not (in contradiction of what we has been demonstrated of it) at any time be whole or complete, for there would always be some condition in which to eon had been or would be and was not now, and so on. The same result obtains if we translate 'akineton' as 'unchanging' instead of 'unmoving'. In or for inquiry at very least, then, to eon must be (and be taken and said to be) whole and unmoving or unchanging.

In other words, if to eon is bound to be akineton, it will have no need for additional states, locations, or moments in time. This by itself does not imply that the additional states and so on cannot or do not exist, and in that case there might be such (unused) possibilities outside of to eon. But that case is ruled out by [M]oira's binding to eon to be whole, oûlon. If to eon has and can have no lacks, as we have seen that [M]oira must ensure (at very least in or for inquiry), then there is, was, and will be no existing thing, no existing at all, outside of or besides to

eon. If we cannot coherently and consistently take to eon to have lacks, in or for inquiry, we must take it that there cannot be any existing besides or outside of to eon. (If some thing X is said to have a lack, then there is, was, could be, or is conceived to be some thing or feature Y that could be part of X or that could be joined to X. Y would have to be the sort of thing or feature that could with X form a complete thing, or a thing taken to be complete. A missing sleeve on a dress, for instance, cannot be replaced by a truck tire to form a complete dress. The sort of thing that could be said to join with an incomplete to eon to form a complete to eon would have to be an existing thing or feature, a thing or feature said to exist. But anything that exists is supposed to be counted in or comprised by to eon.)

Similarly, if to eon is to be whole in the sense of not being able to be considered to be a part of anything else, there will be nothing else but to eon. As we have seen, particular things said to exist and to be whole are in fact only taken to be relatively whole; they can always be said to form parts of groups or sums, for example. To eon cannot be or be taken to be like that, in or for inquiry.

If 'whole' is understood to mean "not divided or divisible into distinct parts", then as well there could not be (or be taken to be) anything beside(s) to eon, at very least in or for inquiry. For if to eon were or could be divided, there would or could be something other than to eon

that separated the parts of it; and that something could in principle be considered in isolation from to eon. But the possibility that to eon is divided or divisible has been ruled out by 8.22 and 8.25, which established that to eon is and must be taken to be indivisible and continuous, on or for the road of inquiry in question. We have also seen why [M]oîra would have to be found to bind to eon to be whole in any of the senses just discussed, in or for inquiry; and hence have established that there will then (in or for inquiry at least) be - or have to be said and taken to be - nothing but to eon.

Therefore noeîn cannot be something outside or independent of to eon. It cannot grasp or address or show anything other than to eon, in or for inquiry at very least, for in or for inquiry we cannot take it that there is anything other than to eon, and must take it that there is only to eon. Noeîn will then not be found without to eon. Pephatismenon (8.35), that which is expressed or reported or said, will also rely on to eon, for as we have seen, reports or expressions are supposed to be made exactly with respect to that which is.

Why would the situation of pephatismenon be brought up in this context? For one thing, the goddess has already made a number of statements concerning what must be, or must not be, or can be, or cannot be, said and conceived/taken/thought (legein, usually, and noeîn)

regarding to eon. Examples include 6.1, 7.2-5, 8.7-8, 8.17, and, later, 8.50. These remarks and injunctions by the goddess consider noefn and some aspect of speech together. Both are integral to inquiry, for we must be able to symbolize and to indicate, as well as to conceive or to be aware of, that which is not now and that which perhaps may never be present or distinguishable by the sense, if we wish to inquire into that which is. It is through symbols such as words that we are able to point out, isolate, and recall our focus to anything considered as thing. It is at least partially through word use that there are taken to be things as such, or that there are what are coceived to be things. It is through symbols that we identify what we are considering and what we are seeking, and through words that we do any asking at all.

This suggests another reason for the mention of pephatismenon in 8.35. That which is reported or expressed depends upon that which is. However, that which is is named, identified, and in some sense defined by means of language used declaratively. Noefn too is defined and identified by means of words; and so is pephatismenon. It is by means of language use that we consider all of these, or identify them for consideration. What it is that we are identifying, as it might exist independently of language use; or what it might mean to identify something; it seems we could not say. That is, it would seem we could not identify, except by means of

symbols, that which is (or is held to be) symbolized. So to ask what the symbolized is like - or whether or in what sense it exists - independent of symbols, or to ask where the symbol leaves off and the symbolized begins, would be either incoherent or generative of an infinite regress. If to eon is named, identified, and considered only by means of noeîn and pephatismenon, it would seem that we could not ask what it is like independent of them, or independent of what is given by them. The three are in some way complementary and independent (or so they are said and conceived to be, at least in and for inquiry). To consider one, in contexts of inquiry at least, is to consider all three; a system or conception that includes one is a system or conception that includes all three - or so must evidently be the case if inquiry is to be and to be taken to be possible. More will be said in the last two chapters on the significance of the goddess's admonitions regarding legein, noeîn, and to eon.

To return to 8.34, we can see that noeîn must be why to eon is a noema, since to eon is supposed to be what noeîn grasps or addresses; and since grasping, realizing, becoming aware of, conceiving, or taking to be the case something about to eon is called 'noeîn'; and since in or for inquiry at very least there cannot be taken to be anything outside of or beyond to eon. But there is more to the sentence under study; so far we have not considered 8.38b-41.

I will translate those lines as follows:

...; with respect to (for) this everything has been
named (specified)

As many as (as much as) mortals having laid down
trusting to be true
To come to be (Coming to be) and to be destroyed (being
destroyed), to be and not to be,
And (Both) to change place and to exchange bright
surface colors.

'To eon' is the only grammatically appropriate candidate for the reference of 'tôî', 'with respect to this', in 8.38. It is also appropriate in meaning. We have seen that (in or for inquiry at least) there cannot be (if inquiry is to be able to be known to be successful, and at any rate cannot be taken to be, anything besides to eon. So what mortals must be applying or "laying down" names with respect to, if the goddess is at all consistent, must be to eon. These mortals may trust that their (our?) categorizations are accurate or that what they purport to name is really as the names' use implies; but not all trust (the word the goddess uses is 'pepoithotes', a form of 'peitho') is well-placed. The goddess has already (1.30) described the opinions of mortals as lacking "true assurance", pistis alethes. And in fact, the things the mortals are described as trusting in at 8.40-41 are in conflict with the very characteristics of to eon that were supposed to have been established between lines 34 and 38a, and in conflict as well with some features argued for earlier in fragment 8.

For instance, coming to be and destruction (line 40) are changes of a sort, changes in the tally of what exists.

Also, if nothing but to eon ever was or will be (8.36), to eon cannot have come to be and will not be destroyed. (8.7-21 might also be relevant for comparison here.) If to eon has no lacks (8.33 and 38), it cannot fail ever to be.

The mortals' credence in being (40b) would not at first seem problematic. But the goddess's words suggest that mortals understand being in tandem with or in relation to not being, whereas to eon was shown to have to be or to be taken to be (in or for inquiry at very least) whole and unaccompanied, and to be unable to include, or to support or subsist with, not being. Not-being is said of particular things that are said to exist, but as we have seen, these are not and cannot consistently be taken to be as to eon is, or what to eon is.

Changing place (41) is movement, ruled out for to eon in 8.38. Exchanging surface colors is change, and may involve movement. It also seems to involve incompleteness, in the following way. That which is one color is not another color; that which can take on a new color is not all that it will be or will have been; and a complex that can undergo or support such changes is also not all that it will be or will have been. Then, too, color is only one aspect of a thing, and "surface color" certainly seems to apply only to one part of a thing; thus to speak of "exchanging...surface colors" seems to imply a belief in division or divisibility of what exists, and those were ruled out in line 38.

This suggests the following preliminary conclusions about what the goddess's account of mortals' opinions is. First, she does not seem to allow that (in or for inquiry) the individual things mortals say exist and the events they (we) say occur might (or can be taken to) co-exist with to eon. These things and occurrences will not be found outside of to eon, not will they be parts or components or, strictly speaking, aspects of to eon. That is, particular things said to exist or to occur will not be able to be considered parts of to eon in the way that cut slices or crust and filling are considered parts of a pie, nor in the way that organs or limbs or blood are considered parts of a body. Neither, I think, will they be able to be considered to be aspects of to eon in the way in which we might consider equality of basic civil rights or opportunities to be aspects of democracy: such equality can be articulated and conceived independently of conceptions of democracy, and can be removed from an actual democracy, creating a lack that would be seen to destroy the democracy. To eon, however, cannot change or come to lack; it can have no separable parts (separable conceptually or otherwise). When mortals talk of multiple, changeable things, and of things that are temporally or spatially determinate (or that invoke time or space at all), the goddess is saying, we are addressing or trying to address to eon, perhaps not especially effectively or appropriately. According to her, we are speaking with

respect to to eon, although it is in some ways fundamentally dissimilar to our determinations. There is nothing else to address but to eon, she says, at least in and for inquiry.

At the same time, the goddess is using plurals and multiple words which we apparently must read or hear over time, in space. She also speaks of 'mortals', 'brotoi', beings whose lives are supposed to have beginnings and ends; and she uses negations. The problems embodied in this practice of hers will be discussed in the next chapter. It should be noted here, though, that this to eon with respect to which mortals name and characterize all things is represented by the goddess as bound (at least on or for the road of inquiry she discusses, and possibly otherwise) by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. These three divinities or factors are commonly said to apply to or to affect particular things said to exist, and to apply to or affect them in ways that involve or invoke change, multiplicity, coming to be, destruction, not being (or being and not being), and other features that are proscribed for (or by to eon, on or for the road of inquiry the goddess discusses in fragment 8. As we have seen, that which is (or is said or taken to be) the case when particular things are said to be affected by [D]ike, [A]nanke, or [M]oira is not the case, is often contrary to what must be taken to be the case, for to eon under [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira; at least with regard to inquiry. The goddess indicates that the three

divinities or factors are responsible for, or at least definitive or indicative of, the characteristics or features properly associated in thought and speech with to eon (in or for inquiry, on the road in question). She implies, then, that [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira reflect, reveal, and determine the apparent incongruence between what is (and what needs to be) said and conceived (noein) regarding particular things said to exist, and what is to be (and what cannot not be) said and conceived regarding to eon, in or for inquiry at least.

Conversely, the fact that the goddess invokes the three divinities or factors in her speech concerning to eon and roads of inquiry suggests that speaking and conceiving in terms of or by means of particular things and distinction is also crucial to inquiry at some level. Put another way, [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, as the goddess portrays them, show how in or for inquiry, and in order for truth to be conceivable or taken to be possible, to eon and the "world" of particulars and distinctions must be taken to be equally necessary, interdependent, and incompatible. In the next chapter, I will try to show that acknowledgment of this situation and its paradoxes is not an end or a hindrance to understanding, but something more like a first step. Inquiry without [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira (or without what fifth-century Greek views would attribute to them) cannot be taken to be an option we can pursue. To inquire into that

which is said to be is to invoke [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, as I will show. To be able to inquire into whether the three are really in effect, in any sense of 'really', I will argue, requires that they be taken to be in effect.

Content and Place of 8.34-41

In what has preceded I have offered an interpretation and an account of lines 8.34-41 in general, and in particular of the possible meaning and function of [M]oira in this context. I believe I have shown that on the interpretation of '[M]oira' presented here, the passage can coherently be understood as continuing the discussion of the binding of to eon that began at 8.12. The [M]oira passage rehearses several characteristics that must be ascribed to to eon if inquiry is to be taken to be possible, and that apparently must belong to to eon if inquiry is to be possible. Some of these characteristics have not been mentioned previously in fragment 8 and are established in the passage under consideration. Other characteristics have been mentioned earlier and appear to be reinforced or to be looked at from a different angle in 8.34-41. I have also tried to show that these characteristics evidently must be taken to be in place in order for inquiry to be taken to be possible, and that they evidently must be in place in order for inquiry to be possible.

In addition, lines 42-48 can be seen to offer

something of an elaboration of how and why to eon (or what must be said and thought of to eon, in or for inquiry; or what to eon must be like in order to allow inquiry) differs from the description that mortals' layings-down would suggest. For if to eon is to be understood as completed or perfected (tetelesmenon, line 42), and if it cannot be greater or smaller in one way or another (44-45), then it has no room and no capacity for change of any kind. That which is completed needs no further change (40-41) in order to be what it is or what it is supposed to be, has no [more] potential for change, and would no longer be its completed "self" if it did change. That which does not have more of one color than of another, or to have more color (or more of some color) in one place than in another, cannot be said to be able to undergo an exchange of colors. That which is not found in one place and not in another (i.e. so that one place contains more and the other less) cannot be said to be able to undergo a change of place. If to eon cannot fail to exist (46), or if it cannot be found to be able to fail to exist, it will not be able to be said to come to be or to be destroyed; nor will it be able to be said not to be (or to be and not to be) (40). Line 49, another sentence, continues the discussion of points raised in 42-48, points such as to eon's homogeneity or condition of being everywhere, or in all ways, equal to itself; and such as its confinement within limits (peirasi).

I mention the connections between the content of 8.34-41 and those of the lines immediately preceding and succeeding it partly because in a recent article⁸ Theodor Ebert argues that the lines that I have referred to (following Diels) as 8.34-41 should be placed between 8.52 and 8.53. I do not think that the transposition Ebert proposes is warranted, in part because I do not find his arguments to be conclusive, and in part because as I have tried to show here, the lines commonly known as 8.34-41 can be seen to make sense and to fit well in the position assigned to them by Diels.

What makes it possible for there to be a question about the proper location of these lines within the fragment is the fact that the lines appear as a group, and positioned relative to other lines of fragment 8, in only one source, namely Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's Physics. Lines 34, 37, and 39-41 do not appear in any other sources at all. Thus it is only Simplicius, who quotes what are now known as lines 8.1-52 together in one place and some smaller sub-groups of these lines in others, who gives a location for

⁸Theodor Ebert, "Wo beginnt der Weg der Doxa?" Phronesis 34, no. 2 (1989): 121-38.

Ebert says that he is expanding on and adding to suggestions made by Guido Calogero in Storia della logica antica, vol. 1, L'eta arcaica (Bari: Laterza, 1967). Calogero raises similar issues in "Parmenide e la genesi della logica classica," Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di lettere e filosofia 5 (1936): 143-85. The responses I will make to Ebert's proposals will also address those of Calogero.

34-41 in relation to lines that are supposed to precede or succeed them directly. Simplicius lived about a thousand years after Parmenides, and Ebert feels that the text or texts of the poem to which Simplicius had access may have been fragmentary, incomplete, or incorrectly copied or edited. (Ebert does not claim that there is any clear evidence as to the state of the texts Simplicius used.)

As for why 8.34-41 in particular might be suspected to have been incorrectly placed, Ebert offers two lines of argumentation. First, he tries to show that these lines cannot be found to have a meaningful function (or perhaps to make sense generally) within the poem if they are left in their standard position. Then he attempts to show how the transposition he suggests would allow the lines to make good sense and to form part of a smoother and clearer text.

Ebert's arguments for why the group of verses does not fit well in its standard position suppose that there are only two possible functions that it could serve there.⁹ These arguments are intended to show that the group of verses does not fulfill either of these functions, and that it is not evident that it is supposed to fulfill either of them. The two possible functions Ebert identifies are that of recapitulating or summarizing conclusions reached so far in the poem (mainly in fragment 8), and that of establishing or proving some of the "predicates" (Ebert's description of

⁹Ebert, 126.

the characteristics that are called 'semata', 'signs', at 8.2) that are ascribed at 8.3-4 to "being" (Ebert translates 'to eon' as 'das Sein'). Since I have argued that 8.34-41 establish some points that had not been demonstrated earlier in fragment 8 (or, in some cases, that had not yet been considered in all relevant respects - a function that Ebert does not look into), I will focus on Ebert's arguments pertaining to this second alternative.

As examples of accounts that understand 8.34-41 as demonstrating what was presented in 8.3-4, Ebert considers those offered by Taran¹⁰ and Heitsch¹¹, and concludes that both accounts are inadequate. Where he finds the two wanting, he does not explore whether there might be another account that would interpret 8.34-41 as establishing those previously-named aspects of to eon and that would not have the defects he finds in the two accounts he considers. Thus on page 129, Ebert rightly points out that Taran does not make clear "what task the explanations about the humans' name-setting should have in an argument for the uniqueness of being" (translation mine), but Ebert does not investigate whether there is anything that would connect 38b-41 with 34-38a. Nothing along the lines of the argument and analysis concerning this connection that I have proposed in the

¹⁰Leonardo Taran, Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

¹¹E. Heitsch, Parmenides: Die Fragmente, herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert (Munich 1974).

present chapter (pages 251-52) is mentioned in the article.

Another difficulty that I find with Ebert's argument is that he makes several assertions (pages 128-29) about which lines of fragment 8 support, or are intended to support, each of the "predicates" of to eon enumerated in 8.3-4; but he does not argue for these assertions. Therefore it is not clear in what he thinks the support consists. These statements also indicate that he does not think, regarding the cases that he mentions, that support for one "predicate", or for one aspect of a "predicate", might overlap with support for another. He adduces different groups of verses as supporting each. He also holds that both Taran and Heitsch fail to show that 8.34-41 explain or are meant to explain the claim in 8.4 that to eon is mounogenes (single, singular, unique), and concludes that finding valid support for that claim remains a problem. However, he does not try to provide an alternative account of how and where (or whether) in the fragments that claim of 8.4 is explained or supported.

Ebert feels that only Heitsch even tries to deduce from 8.34-41 a "proof for the uniqueness of being" (130). According to Heitsch,

To the action of [the] noein corresponds [the] einai alone, because the eon is the ground, the whereupon of [the] noein. Hence there cannot be noein without einai...; alongside the eon is hence nothing else. Thus the uniqueness of the being establishes in it the fact that the action of noein always only encounters being (or: that recognizing (Erkennen) and being (Sein) are identical), and it establishes further how Parmenides

adds (37-38) in the totality and immovability of being.¹²

While I would agree with Heitsch that noeîn is understood to address exactly to eon, and that noeîn cannot be taken (in or for inquiry at very least) to be external to to eon, I believe Ebert is right to argue that Heitsch has not demonstrated in this passage that to eon is unique, or that the goddess has proven it to be so. (I also do not think that Heitsch is justified in concluding, from the verses he cites, or at all, that noeîn and to eon, or noeîn and eînai (to be), are identical. That issue will be treated in the next chapter.) Heitsch has not shown here, for example, that to eon could not be divided or that it cannot have more than one part; he has not said or shown that noeîn's relationship to to eon precludes that, nor that anything else does.

A second important criticism of Ebert's is that Heitsch seems to understand the statement of 8.36-37 ("...nothing either is or will be/ Beside(s) (Outside of) to eon,...") as a conclusion based on line 34. (Heitsch renders 8.34 as "the act of noeîn always only encounters being (Seiend)"; as we have seen, a more literal reading would be "the same [thing] is noeîn and is wherefore [it (sc. to eon)] is [a] noema".) In fact, as I have shown earlier in the present chapter (pages 219-20 and 239-42), the uses of 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as') in lines 35 and 36 indicate

¹²Heitsch 173; quoted in Ebert, 130.

that the statement in 36-37 is intended to support or amplify 35-36, and that 35-36 is intended to support or amplify 34 - the reverse of the relationship suggested by Heitsch.

Again, though, Ebert neither addresses an account of these lines that is faithful to the relationships between them that are indicated by their grammar and syntax, nor shows that no such faithful account could make 8.34-41 coherent and at the same time supportive of anything mentioned in 8.3-4. Hence I find that Ebert does not criticize or comment upon an account along the lines of the one I have offered. Nor does he provide arguments to show that such an account is impossible or inadequate. For these reasons I would suggest that he has not shown that it is impossible or unlikely that 8.34-41 fit, make sense, and provide something of significance, in their standard location. Importantly, too, Ebert does not explore the meaning or possible role of [M]oira (8.37).

The fact that Ebert does not make this exploration may have something to do with the conclusions he draws from another of his criticisms of Taran. Taran suggests¹³ that the goddess's discussion of the uniqueness of to eon was placed where it is because it relies on what has already been shown about other characteristics of to eon that were mentioned in 8.3-4. Taran does not discuss in any detail the

¹³Taran, 140-41.

nature of [M]oîra or its relationship to to eon. Nor, as Ebert notes, does he give conclusive evidence for his suggestion, nor explain what "task the humans' name-setting should have in an argument for the uniqueness of being" (Ebert, 129).

As I have shown, though (see e.g. pages 205-7 and 251-52), some of the arguments for the uniqueness of to eon (again, in or for inquiry - a qualification neither Ebert nor Taran discusses in this context) can be seen to rely on points that were established earlier in fragment 8. Other aspects of the argument, I find, come from analysis of [M]oîra and noeîn; some of what [M]oîra's binding can be found to do overlaps with the effects discovered for [D]ike and [A]nanke, though not all can. The reference to mortals' namings (see pages 251-55) can be understood as a way of clarifying the point about to eon's uniqueness, in the following way. Mortals use multiple names, and speak of things coming to be, being destroyed, changing, and so on. It might appear, then, to those who read or hear the goddess's speech, that since to eon has been shown to be single, unchanging, imperishable, ungenerated, and so on (on or for the road of inquiry the goddess is discussing, at very least), then the mortals must be talking about something(s) that exist outside of or besides to eon. However, the goddess seems to argue, the mortals cannot coherently be taken to be speaking of something other than to eon - that

is, we' cannot coherently take them (ourselves) to be doing that, if at the same time inquiry and truth are to be possible for us. The reference to mortals' namings and opinions might also be foreshadowing the more comprehensive discussion of these that follows in 8.53-61 and, conceivably, in fragment 9. It may additionally be meant as amplifying the description of mortals' beliefs given in fragment 6, where mortals are said to hold that "to be and not to be are the same/ And not the same..." (6.8-9).

These, then are reasons why I think Ebert's criticisms of Taran and Heitsch do not provide strong evidence that the group of verses from 8.34-41 does not work well, or well enough, in its currently accepted position in the fragment. I have also shown earlier in this chapter why and how the group of verses can be understood to be coherent in itself and coherent as part of a chain of reasoning that extends from 8.5 to 8.49, and I have demonstrated in this chapter (see e.g. pages 205-7, 213-14, and 256-57) that these verses have clear argumentative or expository connections to the verses that directly precede and follow them in the standard ordering.

I will now consider Ebert's reasons for suggesting that 8.34-41 should be placed after 8.52 in particular. His first reason (132) is that he thinks that verses 29-33 and 42-49 form one continuous argument; and that 32-33 and 42-43 form a uniform train of thought together. The credence that

one gives to this depends in part on what one thinks the goddess is reying to show, and Ebert does not give an overview of his account of the poem, or of the fragment. He does say (138) that he agrees with Reinhardt's¹⁴ account of the role of the goddess's statements after 8.52 concerning the opinions of mortals. But he does not tie this to a more comprehensive view of the fragments, and it should be noted that Reinhardt himself accepts the standard positioning of 8.34-41.

I would not deny that 8.29-33 and 42-49 form, or contribute to, a coherent argument. I suggest, though, and have shown a way for it to be seen, that lines 34-41 amplify, enrich, illuminate, and futher advance this argument; and that 34-41 individually and as a group show strong connections to the surrounding lines.

As for where Ebert would like to place 34-41, he argues (132) that there is a "clear break" between 8.52 and 53, and that this is a likely new home for the verses he would displace. The "break" is suggested to Ebert by two things. First is the fact that the verb 'katethento' ('laid down', 'laid down for themselves') in 8.53 lacks an obvious grammatical subject, coupled with the fact that 'protoi' ('mortals') - already associated with that verb in 8.39 -

¹⁴Karl Reinhardt, Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1916; reprint, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1959), 69 (page reference to reprint edition).

would fit the bill. Second is the fact that in the standard arrangement of the verses the function of the 'gar' ('for', 'since', 'as') in 8.53 is not obvious either.

Against the first suggestion, I would note that 'katethento' in 8.53 could take 'doxas proteias' ('mortal opinions'), in line 51, as its subject. It would not be implausible, I think, to say that opinions in some sense lay down certain claims, conceptions, views, judgments, or conventions ('gnomas', 8.53, can mean 'judgments', and can plausibly be taken to be the object of 'katethento'; 'morphas', 'forms', 'appearances', in the same line, is also a viable object). Ebert holds (132) that it is only humans themselves, and not opinions, that can make such layings-down; but he does not elaborate on this point and appears to be basing it on the fact that so far (once) in fragment 8 mortals have been named as the layers-down.

I would suggest, though, that it could also be the case that the goddess means to say that mortals do the laying-down, and that the 'proteias' in 8.51 refers to them (us), so that they are the implicit subject of 'katethento'. Ebert notes that 'doxas proteias' means "mortal opinions" and not "mortals' opinions". However, it could be that the goddess is using 'doxas proteias' in something like the way we in which we use 'human opinions' or 'automotive technicians' in English. We use these phrases to mean "opinions held by humans" and "technicians who work on

things that are automotive", and not, in general, to mean "opinions that are themselves human" and "technicians who are themselves automotive". In this way, then, the phrase 'doxas proteias' could conceivably invoke the presence of mortals such as those mentioned in 8.39, and the layers-down in line 53 could be intended to be those mortals.

The 'gar' in line 53 is troublesome to Ebert because it does not seem to be used to establish anything. While he admits that the word can be used in other ways, he finds that it is generally used in an establishing sense in fragment 8, and that the use in 8.53 also does not seem to him to serve the amplificatory or explanatory function that he feels it serves in such lines as 1.4, 1.7, 12.1, and 16.1. But there seem to me to be plausible suggestions, not considered by Ebert, as to what the role of this 'gar' might be. I would propose that the 'gar' in 8.53 might serve to amplify or to explain what it is that her pupil is to "learn from" the goddess (8.52). Or, it might introduce an amplification or explanation of how and why what she will say, or the "mortal opinions", constitutes a "deceptive order" (also 8.52). The aside in line 54, to the effect that at least one of what the mortals have laid down should not have been named, would support the second reading (it adds that mortals have erred); the goddess's statement at 60-61 that she is telling the young man these things so that no opinion of mortals might surpass or overtake him would

support either reading. Therefore I find Ebert's argument to be overly hasty in its conclusions.

The positive reasons Ebert evinces for the relocation of 8.34-41 are these. First, if the group of lines is placed in between 8.52 and 53, the mortals mentioned in 8.39 can easily be considered to be the subject of 'katethento' in 8.53. The 'gar' in 53 can readily be understood to introduce an explanation for the layings-down by mortals mentioned in 8.39. In addition, 'onomazein' ('to name' or 'specify') in 8.53 echoes the 'onomastai' or 'onom'estai' ('has been named' and 'to be a name', respectively) in 8.38; with Ebert's transposition these two lines are closer together.

But as I have argued, the transposition is not necessary in order to achieve the first result, namely the association of mortals with the line 53 'katethento'. Or, as I have also argued, the subject of that verb could quite coherently be taken to be the "mortal opinions" of 51. In the case of the second of Ebert's positive reasons, the 'gar' of line 53 may be understood as explaining what it is that the hearer or reader is to learn next, or what it is about mortal opinions or about the goddess's speech regarding them that is a "deceptive order". That is, the standard verse order offers a quite appropriate role for this 'gar'. As for the last advantage that Ebert hopes to gain with his transposition, I cannot see that it has weight

as an argument for that transposition. The mention of names or naming at 8.38 might equally well be seen as a foreshadowing of a direction that will be followed later. There might also be seen to be two ways or contexts in which names or namings are relevant to the issues the goddess raises.

Perhaps the most substantive argument Ebert makes is that the discussion of noeîn in 34-5, and its support in 36-38a, is at too great a "thematic distance" (134) from what is treated in the lines usually taken to precede and to succeed it, too great a distance to warrant leaving 34-41 in their usual place. As I have shown in this chapter, however (pages 237-52), the relationships presented in the fragment as holding between noeîn, [M]oîra, and to eon (in or for inquiry at least) controvert this claim of Ebert's. It is also worth noting that noeîn has already been mentioned in some relation to to eon several times in the fragments, perhaps most relevantly at 8.7-8 and 8.17. I would point out here as well that Ebert does not discuss the role of [M]oîra in the verses in question, and that he does not say anything about the context of these verses as part of a speech about roads of inquiry. He simply does not bring these issues to bear on his subject, and I would argue that I have shown that as aspects of the goddess's presentation they must be taken into account, and that they are significant.

Ebert feels that the remarks about noeîn are meant

to pose a yardstick for that which noein can be (or for that which can be noein); and says that this enables the goddess to show that the layings-down of mortals are mere names.

(The idea that noein is meant to contrast with namings by mortals may be getting some help or some direction from the fact that Ebert discusses noein in translation, as Erkenntnis, and the two are not necessarily equivalent.)

It seems plausible that the goddess intends some contrast between what mortals claim and to eon, or between claims mortals make and what the goddess says must be said and conceived to be the case regarding to eon (in or for inquiry at least); and it seems plausible that this contrast must in some way invoke noein. I do not see, though, that such a contrast could not be supported by leaving 8.34-41 in their usual places. Indeed, I believe that I have shown that the additional evidence provided by leaving the verses there, evidence associated with [M]oira and with developments from earlier in the fragment (from which 34-41 would be cut off if placed after the goddess's change of subject at 8.50-51), sharpens and illuminates the contrast and its paradoxes. (Ebert also does not discuss paradoxes.)

Finally, I think that the mention of [M]oira provides strong motivation for keeping 8.34-41 within the goddess's "trustworthy speech and thought", that is, before 8.50. Moira, like Dike and Ananke, in case they are personified here, is a feminine deity associated in or

before the early fifth century with binding or limiting. The mention of [M]oîra, and the way in which it (she) seems to be invoked or understood in the fragment, seems to match the treatment of [D]ike and [A]nanke earlier in the fragment. In addition, the features or effects commonly ascribed to [M]oîra and exhibited in fr. 8 in some ways overlap, and in other ways complement (with respect to inquiry) those ascribed to and exhibited by [D]ike and [A]nanke. Together, the three provide a series or system of constraints on to eon (or on to eon as it is said and taken to be) that must be in place, and said and taken to be in place in order for inquiry and truth to be possible, and to be taken to be so. The force of that 'must' is just the force of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra.

CHAPTER FIVE

PRELIMINARY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BINDING OF TO EON

The preceding chapters have examined how [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira can be shown to bind to eon, in or for inquiry, so that to eon can and must be (and be taken to be) unique, undivided, not incomplete, ungenerated, indestructible, unaccompanied, and so on. We have seen that in order for inquiry to be taken to be possible, these hallmarks of to eon must be in place; and that for inquiry to be possible they must have to be in place. (Whether or under what circumstances they must have to be in place, and how or whether we can tell, have yet to be discussed.) These hallmarks, again, are the very characteristics that the goddess had put forth at 8.3-6 as signs of the "remaining" road or account of a road, with the addition or amplification of the characteristics she had mentioned in the discussion that ended (or changed its focus) at 8.50.

In the present chapter I will look at the implications of this situation. First, I will outline the context in which the statements about the binding of to eon occur. I will then discuss some of the difficulties, alluded to in earlier sections, that appear when one considers and speaks of to eon (in or in relation to inquiry, or perhaps at all) as so bound. This part will include an examination of whether to eon is or must be said and taken

to be bound only in or for inquiry, or also in other contexts or in general; and an examination of whether we can be sure of answering this question. Finally, I will attempt to draw out the special significance, if any, of the context of the remarks about the binding of to eon, especially as that context might bear on the difficulties and other implications explored in the earlier parts of this section.

Context

The remarks about the binding of to eon appear in Parmenides' fragments within a certain context. They are part of a discussion of the semata, signs, on or of a certain road. This road is most likely a road of inquiry, since fragment 2 announced an account of "the only roads of inquiry there are to think/conceive [of]" (hodoi moûnai dizesios eisi noêsai); three roads of inquiry are treated of in fragments 6 and 7; and the road or account mentioned at 8.2 is referred to as the one that "is left" (leipetai). The discussion in fragment 8 seems to be given by a goddess who has received the poem's narrator as a visitor. The speaker associates the binding of to eon with the workings of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira; and after this changes subject abruptly to talk about "mortal opinions", or opinions of mortals (8.50-52).

It is by no means evident that this context lacks philosophical significance, nor that the import of the

statements about the binding (or for that matter anything in the fragments) can be understood without an exploration of the context in which they occur. One thing that distinguishes the present effort from most other interpretations of the fragments is that it attempts to understand in a philosophically integrated way the framework in which the statements about to eon appear; it asks what if any might be the philosophical import of the framing elements and the imagery or characterizations, and asks also about the significance of the fact that the remarks about to eon appear in that context.

That is, I would suggest that to look at what is said in fragment 8 in a philosophically integrated manner requires that one take into account the setting within the poem in which the goddess's statements about the binding of to eon seem to occur; as well as the range (so far as it can be determined) of early fifth-century significances for the terms and figures used in the fragment; and the philosophical or argumentative context in which such figures or factors as [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]ofra appear. Part of the difference between this and other accounts, as can be seen from the preceding sections, comes in the treatment of the roles and functions of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]ofra as reported by the goddess, or within the fragments generally.

Many commentators¹ interpret the fragment without saying anything about these three figures. Rather, they look only at the goddess's apparent conclusions (frequently taking these as unproblematically Parmenides' final position) and at the parts or aspects of her argument or demonstration that may not immediately seem to invoke figures from mythology, poetry, or religious lore. Some other commentators, such as Mourelatos², Austin³, and Fraenkel⁴, do discuss the binding of to eon, but do not investigate systematically why it is specifically [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira that (who) are associated with this binding. That is to say, these commentators do not try to show how or why the specific phenomena or features generally associated in Parmenides' time with each of the three would yield the specific implications for to eon (in or for inquiry at very least) that are attributed to each in fragment 8. Further, none of these writers focuses attention on the relationship

¹Examples include G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," Classical Quarterly n.s. 10 (1960): 84-102; Theodor Ebert, "Wo beginnt der Weg der Doxa?" Phronesis 34, no. 2 (1989): 121-38; Patricia Curd, "Parmenidean Monism," Phronesis 36, no. 3 (1991): 241-64.

²Alexander P.D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides: A Study of Word, Image, and Argument in the Fragments (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

³Scott Austin, Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

⁴Hermann Fraenkel, "Parmenidesstudien," in Wege und Formen frühgriechischen Denkens, 2d ed., expanded (Munich: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandeln, 1960).

of inquiry to the goddess's conclusions.

For example, Austin gives a translation for each of '[D]ike', '[A]nanke', and '[M]oira'. He mentions that pre-fifth-century connotations and uses of each term are consonant in a general way with their association, in Parmenides' fragments, with requirements, limitations, and/or that which is supposed to be appropriate. But Austin does not look at the how the specific characteristics associated with each of the three might account for the specific effects attributed to each by the goddess - e.g., how [A]nanke might be tied to to eon's not being "incomplete", or not being able to be taken to be so (in or for inquiry, or at all). Nor does he consider what that which is said or held to be the case of [D]ike, [A]nanke, or [M]oira as they apply to particular things said to exist might imply regarding to eon (that which is) taken as a whole or as such, as far as inquiry is concerned, or at all. Despite an evident respect for the text's emphasis on roads, Austin pays little attention to, and makes no thematic investigation of, the fact that the roads in question are identified in the text as roads of inquiry, of seeking.

Mourelatos gives accounts of the pre-fifth-century uses and associations of '[D]ike', '[A]nanke', and '[M]oira' that are much more detailed than Austin's. Also more detailed is Mourelatos's attempt to apply these accounts to the statements in Parmenides in which the terms appear.

However, his analysis of the verses in question depends on certain interpretive conclusions which I find he does not adequately support. He asserts that to eon, that which is, is equivalent to aletheia, [the] truth or genuineness; and he holds, without adducing textual evidence, that Dike, Ananke, Moira, and Peitho (Persuasion, mentioned in fr. 2) are in Parmenides four "faces" of one divinity. In addition, he accepts an unfounded (if frequently suggested) textual emendation in fragment 2, making Persuasion follow Truth instead of the other way around; and he claims that the dizesis (seeking, inquiry) mentioned in the fragments is a "journey to Truth", when the text merely has the goddess say that there are some associations between truth, or the true, and the road discussed in fragment 8. Mourelatos also seems to be concerned mainly with associations or connotations of what he sees as images (as opposed to philosophical elements, or to features whose significances and roles need to be determined) presented in the poem. These claims are fundamental to Mourelatos's analysis, and because of this I find both his direction and its conclusions to be problematic. Moreover, Mourelatos does not explore what inquiry (or truth, or "true persuasion", pistis alethes) might require of to eon, nor what [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira might have to do with inquiry or seeking.

Fraenkel looks at some aspects of the binding of to eon by [D]ike, but he does not explore the ramifications of

[D]ike. More importantly, he does not examine in any systematic way the specific remarks about [D]ike's binding of to eon. He does not show how the philosophical impact of binding by [D]ike might relate to inquiry, or to a road of inquiry.

The examination and analysis I will offer here do not assume that there is a clear demarcation, within Parmenides' fragments, between elements that are (or that are to be considered) strictly philosophical, or part of an argument, and elements that are only or mainly poetic trappings, traditional imagery, allegory, background, of subordinate significance, not of philosophical significance or interest, or without bearing on other elements. I do not assert that what appears in the fragments can or should be divided into philosophical and non-philosophical parts at all. I will pay careful attention to the structure indicated by the fragments, and to the narrative and/or argumentative contexts in which statements appear. I would contend that investigating the text in a thorough and fair manner requires that the terms in which the text presents itself be sought for and respected; and it is with this in mind that I have offered the preceding considerations.

This approach has not prevailed among commentators on Parmenides. For example, it is frequently assumed (or at least not questioned) that for Parmenides (and/or the goddess; conflation of the two is also common), that which

must be said and taken to be the case on the road of inquiry treated in fragment 8 is simply that which is true of to eon in general or independent of context. Such commentaries (see e.g. Austin, Curd, Ebert, Mourelatos, Owen, Taran) do not discuss the assertions the goddess makes in terms of her announcement that she is considering a certain road (of inquiry, it seems) and its "signs". One also does not find in these commentaries any investigation of why (for Parmenides, or the goddess, or at all) certain things must or must not, can or cannot be said and taken to be the case regarding to eon in or for inquiry, or at all. What one does find are attempts to give an argument or an explanation for why Parmenides (or the goddess) would think those things are true of to eon in general or across all contexts. Yet the goddess does not say that one must say and think certain things because they are universally or at all true. Where she does give reasons, they have to do with [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, and are mentioned only in support of the "signs" the goddess claims mark the "remaining" road of inquiry. We should note as well that in fragments 2, 6, and 7, statements about to eon and to me eon (what is not) also appear within the context of discussions of roads. Only in fragment 4 and possibly the first line of each of fragments 6 and 7 do remarks about to eon seem possibly to lack such a context, and there we lack any conclusive indication about what immediately preceded those lines in the original poem.

Therefore we would not be justified in assuming that the goddess or Parmenides meant those assertions to be taken universally or across all contexts.

It is by no means obvious, then, that the goddess's statements in fragment 8 represent a cataloguing of the attributes that she (or Parmenides) thinks to eon has independent of or across all contexts or conditions, or tout court. The account that I will offer here differs from the prevailing trend also in that I do not assume that such a cataloguing is intended.

What can be said, then, about the context in which the discussion of the binding of to eon appears? First, it seems to be part of what is said in fragment 1 to be a human's report of a speech made to him by a goddess. It seems to be part of this speech not only because we have no evidence that there was another character in the poem who made a speech (we have no evidence that there was not), but also because the way in which the speaker addresses the hearer seems consistent throughout the fragments, and because the immediate speaker of fragment 8 mentions not allowing the hearer to "say nor yet to conceive" (out' ...easso phasthai s' oude noein) that to eon came to be out of to me eon. A human could certainly forbid another human to say or to conceive something, but it is hard to see how such a prohibition could be enforced. Moreover, 'easso' may mean something more like "allow to occur", in which case the

speaker would not be forbidding but preventing the hearer from some noein, and that does not seem to be something that one human can do to another simply by making this injunction. Similarly, if 'eirgo' at 6.3 means "bar" or "keep [from]", its use seems to indicate that the speaker has the capacity to prevent the hearer from pursuing a certain road of inquiry, or to prevent him from certain noein. I would suggest, then, that the character who makes (as opposed to reports) the speech of fragment 8 is most likely divine, and the goddess who welcomes the narrator in fragment 1 is a plausible candidate. This identification is supported and even strengthened, I believe, by considerations I will rehearse below regarding fragments 1 and 2.

Fragments 2, 6, and 7 contain references to "roads of inquiry", and as we have seen, the remarks of fragment 8 are described at 8.1-2 as the "remaining" account (muthos) of a road, most likely then an account of the last road that is supposed to be possible or conceivable (2.2). The goddess had said in fragment 1 that her pupil was to "hearken to" or to "learn" "everything, both the...heart of...truth and the opinions of mortals" (1.28-30). I would suggest that this does not necessarily mean that she is going to tell him these things in the sense of naming, enumerating, cataloguing, or elaborating, directly or literally, what the heart of truth is, or which are the opinions of mortals. (We

will see below that to do that, to have the narrator "learn" such things by enumerating them to him, would require or assume that what is can be specified independent of context, or that what is is adequately and accurately captured by what we say; and that the terms fundamental to inquiry are coherent and non-contradictory. We will also see below that the account of the binding of to eon calls these assumptions into question; the discussion of noefn and to eon in the previous section has already suggested this.) What the speaker, presumably the goddess, does say, in fragment 2, is that she will tell "which are the ways of inquiry that are for noefn (thinking, conceiving, being aware)". In fragments 2, 4, 6, and 7 she enjoins the narrator to stay off certain roads; as we will see in the exegeses of these fragments, inquiry along the lines of these roads seems to violate the conditions for the possibility of inquiry brought out in the previous examination of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira.

In fragment 2, the goddess distinguishes two roads, "that (how) [it] is and that (how) [it] is not [possible for it] not to be" (or "...and that (how) [it] is not is not to be"), and "that (how) [it] is not and that (how) [it] is necessary [for it] not to be" (or "...and that (how) there is necessity not to be"). The latter she calls panapeuthea, literally "all-not-inquirable-into", while she characterizes the former as "the path of [P]ersuasion ([P]leitho), for [T]ruth attends upon her." I would suggest that the "[it]",

the unspecified subject of 'estin' ('is') and 'ouk esti' ('is not'), is most likely to eon, what is. This would provide a continuity between fragment 2 and fragments 4, 6, 7, and 8; we have also seen several instances where to eon had to be the subject of occurrences of 'estin' that had no explicit grammatical subject. Further, if we read fragment 2 in that way, it can be seen that the "path of [P]ersuasion" has a strong possibility of being the road treated in fragment 8.

To be more specific, the hypothesis about the subject of 'estin' and 'ouk esti' in fragment 2 is based on an examination of similar constructions referring to roads in fragments 6, 7, and 8⁵. The most grammatically plausible readings of the notoriously vexed 6.1a make to eon the accusative "subject" of 'emmenai', so that 'eon emmenai' means "what is is" or "what is [is] to be". This would make 'to eon' the unspecified grammatical subject of 'esti' at 6.1b and 'ouk estin' at 6.2.⁶ 'Me eonta', 'what is not' or 'the things that are not', is the accusative "subject" of 'einai' ('to be', 'being') at 7.1, but what the goddess says in this fragment is "Never is this to be forced, that what

⁵See the discussion of 8.34-38a in the Mofra chapter, sections C and D.

⁶'Esti' and 'estin' are orthographic variants of the same word, the third person singular present active of 'to be'. 'Estin' is used before vowels and at the ends of sentences, 'esti' otherwise. 'Qu' or (before vowels) 'ouk' means "not".

is not is (eīnai me eonta)/ But do you keep your noema (thought) far from this road of inquiry." This would seem to make it unlikely that 'me eonta' is what in fragment 2 is being said to be and not possibly not to be - if such being and not possibly not being is to be the path of [P]ersuasion and a pre-requisite for [T]ruth. For although one may become persuaded of things that turn out not to be accurate or viable, at 2.7-8 the goddess had said that to me eon, that which is not, cannot be understood or indicated by the human visitor. Thus a road on or for which what is not is taken to exist would seem to be one whose direction (or features) could not be understood or indicated, and thus would not be one on which truth (which would seem to require or to rely on indications and determinations) could be identified, nor even one on which that of which one was persuaded would be clear or sure.

Other support for the hypothesis that the path of [P]ersuasion is, or is consistent with, "that (how) to eon [as opposed to something else] exists" may be found in fragment 8. For one thing, 8.2 identifies the road to be discussed in fragment 8 as "how [it] is". 'Eon' is the subject of 'esti' in 8.3, and as we have seen, it is also the most coherent and consistent choice for the unspecified subject of the clause 'hos estin' ('that (how) [it] is') in 8.2. This seems to be corroborated as well by the 'to eon' at 8.19. 'To eon' appears again as an accusative "subject "

of 'einai' ('to be') at 8.32; this makes the unspecified subject of 'estin' in 8.33 once again 'to eon'; and lines 33b and 35 also confirm that what is being talked about is eon, or to eon.

What is said in fragment 8 about to eon with respect to the road treated there is thus consistent with the characteristics associated with the unspecified subject of 'estin' and 'ouk esti' on the path of [P]ersuasion at 2.3. Further, to hold - as on the other, "all-not-inquirable-into" track mentioned at 2.6 - that to eon is not and must necessarily not be, is shown in fragment 8 to be inconsistent and incompatible with inquiry (and with holding that to eon is and must be). For example, we have seen that on the road considered in fragment 8, in and for inquiry at very least, to eon cannot be taken to be able to be generated or destroyed (8.6-21), cannot be taken to move or change (8.35-38), and cannot be taken to be one part or component of anything taken to be a larger whole (8.30-32). On this road, then, it must be taken to exist, and to exist necessarily - that is, there must be taken to be nothing else on which its existence depends. This in itself would be incompatible with to eon's non-existence, but further confirmation comes in 8.16, where the goddess asserts that "[it] is rather than is not" (estin e ouk esti).

For these reasons, then, I suggest that the road of inquiry that is treated from 8.1-50 is compatible and

consistent with, and possibly identical to, the path of Persuasion spoken of in fragment 2. Importantly, as previous sections have shown, it is [D]like, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra that enable and ensure that to eon must be (or must be taken to be) as the "signs" on the road of 8.1-50 indicate, in or for inquiry at least; and thus it would seem that [D]like, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra bear some relation to [P]ersuasion and the [T]ruth that attends upon it (her).

Let us attempt to sketch what can be brought out at this point about that relationship. We have already seen that [D]like, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra seem to be presented as conditions or prerequisites for the possibility of inquiry, or for truth in inquiry. To be more precise, we have seen that to eon must be said and taken to be as [D]like, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra were shown to bind it to be (viz., ungenerated, indestructible, unique, unaccompanied, not incomplete, and so on), if inquiry is to be possible, or if we are to be able to identify coherently and consistently, and to tell and to show whether we have found, that which we seek in any given instance. It seems to be [D]like, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra who (or that) allow the drawing of conclusions, and the conceiving of anything as the consequence of anything else; it is apparently they who allow and enforce the "musts" or "necessities" that are involved or invoked in such features of searches as the process of elimination, transitivity and commutativity (of identity, equality,

etc.), and so on.

For example, in order for something to be taken to be the necessary consequence or conclusion of something else, the two must be understood or taken to have stable (or regular) recognizable identities, to stand in stable (or regular) recognizable relations to each other, and to be such that when the "antecedent" or "premiss" is held to obtain, the "consequent" or "conclusion" cannot coherently or consistently be said or taken not to obtain. The possibility of inquiry relies upon the conception that such relationships of necessity do not fail to apply. Were to eon subject to fundamental change, those relationships could fail to apply, and there would not be stable principles that would enable us to tell when if at all they did apply; necessary relationships would not even be consistently conceivable. We could not conclude, when one of ten candidates was the object of our search and nine were eliminated, that the tenth was what we had looked for. Ananke (8.29-33) and [M]oira (8.36-38) ensure that to eon is not subject to this problem, in or for inquiry.

To take another example, conceived gaps or lacks in to eon would also undermine the possibility of anything "having" to be a certain way, and this in turn would undermine (or make doubtful, and thus in effect eliminate for us) the possibility of inquiry and the potential for truth. For as we have seen from our examination of the

goddess's assertion in line 32 that on the remaining road of inquiry to eon cannot be "incomplete", such gaps or lacks would seem to involve that some relationships between things cannot be found, that some things cannot be understood in their relations to others; or that some things that must be conceived to exist in order for others to be as they are taken to be are in fact found not to exist, or found to be ruled out. Or, "incompleteness" could involve that what must be conceived to be a consequence or result of something conceived or taken to exist, in fact did not or could not exist or take place, or could not coherently or consistently be taken to exist or take place. Any of these functions of "incompleteness" of to eon would mean that the identities or characteristics of things conceived to exist would remain indeterminate, and therefore that what is sought (and what is examined) in inquiry would not be known to be able to be identified, recognized, or understood. If, as would then be the case here, that on which something was conceived to depend could not be found, could not exist, could not coherently and consistently be taken to exist, or could not be traced from what is conceived to exist, then that which was taken to depend upon it could not be shown to be as it was taken to be (or necessarily to exist at all); the ostensible dependent's relations to other things could not be specified, and deductions involving it could not be made. Similarly, if what were taken to be necessary consequences

or concomitants could not be coherently or consistently taken to exist, no deductions could be made, and no search could be concluded. That to eon, on the road of inquiry in question, cannot be taken to suffer from this sort of "incompleteness" was shown to follow from its being bound (there at very least) by [Alnanke], and perhaps from the binding by [Dlike] as well, in that one way in which to eon might have been conceived as "incomplete" would have been if it was taken to have come to be or to be able to perish at some time - circumstances [Dlike] was shown to obviate (8.6-14).

Without [Dlike], [Alnanke], and [Mloîra], then, it would seem that we could not determine when a statement was true, or when a thing was (or was not) really that which we were seeking. Nothing, it would seem, would be consistently identifiable, and nothing could be checked. This implies that if we do not take to eon to be bound to be as the goddess says [Dlike], [Alnanke], and [Mloîra] bind it - on the relevant road at very least - to be, we cannot conceive of inquiry as possible. Further, if we do not take to eon to be as she says it is bound on that road to be, we would seem not to be in a position to claim that (or to ask whether) anything is true or real, for we would not necessarily be able to say (we would have no reason to think we could say) what something is, what it is different from and how it is different, whether it has a stable identity, and so on.

Thus we have just brought out one aspect of the relationship between [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oira, and truth (aletheia, aletheie) or the true (alethes). The goddess announces at 8.50-51, after the discussion of the binding of to eon by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, that she is ending her "trustworthy speech (logon) and noema to you/ About (All around, On both sides of; amphis) truth".⁷ But in fragment 2, [T]ruth had been characterized as attending on [P]ersuasion ([P]eitho), and indeed the two are indirectly associated in several locations in fragment 8. 'Pepoithotes', 'trusting', and 'pistis', 'trust', 'assurance' - both of which come from 'peitho' - each appear in some connection with 'alethes' or 'aletheia' in fragment 8. The word I am translating as 'trustworthy' in line 50 is 'piston', an adjective formed from 'pistis'. What then might be the relationship between [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oira, and [P]ersuasion ([P]eitho); and how if at all might this pertain to truth?

The reference to persuasion that comes earliest in the standard ordering of the fragments occurs at 1.16. There the narrator reports that he gained entry to the realm of the goddess when the sun-maidens persuaded Dike to open the

⁷This remark in itself might be taken to suggest that for the goddess, having her pupil learn "the...heart of...truth" does not necessarily mean enumerating a series of true things (especially a series of unconditionally true things), nor enumerating a series of characteristics of truth or of true things - assuming any of these could be found; nor does it necessarily mean analyzing "truth".

doors of the gates of the paths of Night and Day. This suggests that Dike is susceptible to, or can be motivated or gotten to act by, persuasion. It also suggests that persuasion alone is not sufficient in attempts to accomplish certain tasks. To be more specific, persuasion seems to be portrayed in fragment 1 as something that can affect divinities as well as humans, and as insufficient on its own (i.e., without Dike) to allow humans to find an alternative to their standard opinions and ways, something the narrators is going to be enabled to do thanks to the sun-maidens and Dike. We may note here as well that both [D]ike and [P]leitho are frequently posed as opposite to bia, force or violence.

Persuasion or assurance appears again in fragment 1, in the expression 'pistis alethes', 'true assurance', in line 30. This expression is also used at 8.28. Its meaning is not immediately clear. At 1.30, the goddess declares that there is "no true assurance" in the opinions of mortals. It seems unlikely that she would mean that humans do not feel or claim to feel assured or persuaded of their opinions, for if they did not, there would be little if any reason for her to argue that these opinions (or trust in them) are flawed. Also, at 8.39-41 she speaks of what mortals lay down "trusting (pepoithotes) to be true", and these things (generation and destruction, being and or along with not being, change) turn out, as we have seen, to be contrary to the way [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira bind to eon to be, in

and for inquiry. At 8.27-8, in fact, it is exactly "true assurance" that is supposed to have "pushed away" coming to be and destruction for to eon, on or for that road of inquiry at very least. Therefore "true assurance" seems not to be a matter simply of real feelings of trust.

There is also not enough evidence to conclude that "true assurance" means "assurance of what is true" or "being convinced by the truth", although it may involve something like this. Grammatically, 'alethes' is an adjective, meaning "true", "genuine", or "real" (as opposed to "of the true" or "of reality"); its case matches that of 'pistis'. Line 8.12 does not say that it is truth that ensures that on the road of inquiry described, nothing can come to be out of what is not. Rather, this line offers that "strength of assurance", pistios ischus, does not allow something to come to be out of what is not. Then, too, we have seen that the possibility of inquiry, and the possibility of truth (or at least of awareness of truth) seem to depend on [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira binding to eon. We have no evidence that "true assurance" is dependent on, or that it follows, truth; it may just as easily be coeval with or even prerequisite to [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira (or to the conception of to eon as bound by them). Or, "true assurance" may follow on [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, but still be a prerequisite for truth. And in fragment 2, it was truth or Truth that (or who) followed [P]leitho, not the other way around. It is not,

I think, necessarily circular to use the term 'true assurance' of something that may be a ground for truth or realness; we are speaking, after all, from a standpoint that is supposed already to have conceived of truth. Also, we sometimes speak of things as "prototypes" of others that have not yet and that may never come to be.

Another clue to the meaning of 'pistis alethes' may lie in the way the goddess frames her assertions in fragment 8; she speaks this way also to some extent in fragments 2, 4, 6, and 7. She does not say, "Here is what is true about to eon." Instead, she either says that the human before her (and the rest of us?) can or cannot say, conceive or be aware of/that (noein), or inquire into something; or else she enjoins, commands, or forbids saying something, noein something, or inquiring into something.⁸ For example, in fragment 2, she warns that the road "that/how [to eon] is not) is an "all-not-inquirable-into (panapeuthea) straight track." At 8.5, she supports - or challenges her listener to support - the claim that to eon never was or will be "since it is now all of it together" by asking what parentage or development her listener would seek out for it. She appears to imply that no such history or future can conceivably be

⁸In some places, e.g. at 8.16-18, she speaks of what "is permitted" without making explicit who or what does the permitting. As the goddess states at 8.7-8 (compare also 6.3) that it is she herself who allows the young man to say and noein certain things and not others, the "permission" of 8.16-18, which may be traceable to saying and noein, may be hers as well.

sought, or perhaps that none can be taken to exist, on the road of inquiry in question. We might also note in this connection the imperative she offers at 7.5-6: "...but distinguish for yourself a much-contesting refutation/ Out of what I said."

Examples of the other sort of remarks, namely the prohibitive or injunctive, include 6.1-5, where the goddess "bids" the young man to "indicate to [him]self" certain things about to eon and then "bars" him from two roads of inquiry. At 7.2-3, she admonishes the narrator to keep his noema far from the road of inquiry that what is (are) not exist(s), and also not to let habit "force" him along that road. At 8.7-8, she says she will not "allow" him to say or to conceive (noein) that what is came to be out of what is not. Further statements that appear to make declarations about to eon appear as deductions from or amplifications of the statements about what can, cannot, must, or must not be said and conceived (taken to be so) regarding to eon on the roads discussed.

The goddess does not say that the young man must (or can) say and noein certain things because they are true; nor that he must not (or cannot) say and noein certain things, or go along certain roads, because they are false or involve falsehood. Rather, in each case, she either does not address the issue; or invokes the workings of [D]ike, [A]nanke, or [M]oira; or appeals to conceivability (or to that which is

"necessary" regarding conceiving, noefn, 8.16-17) itself.

We have examined what [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira might be supposed to do or to allow, and we have seen that this is what enables inquiry and truth to be conceivable. There is no evidence that it is because it is (independently) true that to eon is a certain way, in or for inquiry or unconditionally, that [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira enforce or enable that to eon is that way in or for inquiry. Indeed, if the three figures are taken to be what allow, enforce, or enable that inquiry and truth are conceivable, then to claim that they do so because it is true that inquiry and truth are conceivable or actual would be circular, or self-contradictory. The goddess in fact makes no such claim.

The other kind of reason that the goddess gives for her restrictions on what is to be said and conceived on or for the remaining road of inquiry can also be seen not to rely on claims that something is to be said or conceived because it is true. To try to understand what she is saying about the conceivable we must recall what has been found here concerning the relationship between noefn and to eon. From the Moira chapter's examination of 8.34-38a, it became apparent that noefn and to eon were in some sense complementary or interdependent. We saw that noefn was understood as pertaining (as realization, grasp, or awareness) exactly to what was supposed to be real or

actual, i.e., to what was supposed really to exist; and that to eon was understood to be grasped or realized only by noein. In order for noein to be possible, or to be supposed to happen, one would have to hold that to eon (or what to eon is said to be) exists; and in order to be able to hold (or even to conceive) that to eon exists - in order for to eon to be taken to be, or in order for it to be taken to be possible as such - one would have to have (or to hold that one had) noein. As we saw in addition, to ask whether these relationships hold true independently of what we say and conceive; or to ask whether to eon is as we take it to be or whether it exists at all, independently of our conception or apparent awareness of it; or to ask whether noein really addresses or "picks up" to eon; would seem to be to call for an inquiry that requires us to look at or to conceive of something beyond or outside of our awareness or thought. Put another way, it does not seem that we could ask about or inquire into what might be beyond or independent of our notions (e.g. "being") of what is, without employing those notions. In that way, we would not in fact be looking beyond, or investigating, all of those notions.

Hence an argument from what is or can be conceived (noema) is not necessarily an argument from what is true, nor is it necessarily based on claims about what is true. Rather, what is conceived (or taken to be) must itself be a basis for what is true. That is, we could not claim that

anything was what we call true without supposing that we had something that was effectively what is called noein, that only noein addressed what is (to eon), that what is is (that "is" makes sense or has meaning), and that only to eon is addressed by noein. And as has just been shown, our notions of noein and to eon are such that we cannot prove that noein or to eon exists independent of our conception of it; we cannot prove anything about either of them without employing these conceptions. Thus the goddess's restrictions on what is to be said and taken to be, on the remaining road of inquiry, do not in this respect either rely on claims about what is true.

What then could 'pistis alethes', 'true persuasion' mean? 'Alethes' can also be translated as 'real' or 'genuine'. At 8.16-18, the goddess says that "it has been decided, just as per ananke, to permit" that the road [of] "is not" (or "to eon is not") is unconceived and nameless because (or as) not alethes; and to permit that the road [of] "is" (or "to eon is") is "to be and to be alethes". Here too being alethes seems to be portrayed as a function of divine or at least non-human determination or restriction, determination or restriction that appears most likely to be due either to [D]ike (invoked earlier in the same sentence, at 8.14) or to the goddess who speaks⁹. In

⁹Humans would seem to be ruled out as "deciders", or at least as non-self-contradictory deciders, in the basis of the goddess's characterizations of their (our) other

what sense, then, might one road be true/real/genuine, and the other not be so?

'Alethes' is often used, in or before the early fifth century, in opposition to a sense like "lie", "falsehood", or "mere appearance". There is no indication in the fragments that in the process of their inquiries humans

opinions; a decision that contradicts itself is not an effective one. In fragment 6, mortals are said to hold that "to be and not to be are the same/ And not the same", which would seem incompatible with thinking that "[to eon] is not" is unconceived and nameless. At 8.39-41, mortals are said to believe in change, coming to be, and destruction, none of which, as we have seen, is conceptually compatible, in or for inquiry, with holding that "[to eon] is not" is not real or viable as a road. Humans, mortals, may claim to believe, or the underlying suppositions of some of our beliefs may be, that "[to eon] is" rather than "[to eon] is not" and that the only real road (whatever that would mean) is "[to eon] is"; but we also believe or claim or imply things that contradict these.

It may seem that humans make the decision, in that we may decide whether or not to use a certain language or set of conceptions, ideas, ways of thinking, and so on. However, we do not decide what all of the ramifications or consequences of doing this will be; we do not decide whether what we have adopted will be coherent or consistent, nor what it will give us (or bar us from) the capacity to grasp or to do or to find. We are what we would describe as mortal. This would seem to mean that no matter how we would describe it, there are decisions that we cannot make effective, situations or features or contexts that are beyond our control.

One reason why the goddess refers to us as "mortals" (brotoi) so much more often than as "humans" (anthropoi) may be that she wishes to draw attention to this. That is, I would suggest that being what is called "mortal", or what is called "being mortal", involves that there are circumstances that are, and that apparently cannot but be taken to be, things that are and must be beyond our control or understanding, or consequences we cannot prevent or avoid. Taking ourselves to be mortal involves taking this situation to be actual and ineluctable. As we have seen, taking anything to be true or to be able to be true involves acknowledging (or some sort of noein) that this is our situation.

lie or deliberately misrepresent things; the goddess attributes their (our) errors instead to confusion and lack of understanding (see e.g. 6.4-7, 7.4-5). The second possibility, "real/true/genuine" as opposed to "merely apparent", seems much more plausible. Perhaps no one would say outright that what is is not, but as we have seen, some common assumptions or ways of thinking imply or entail that to eon does not exist, or does not exist in a way that would enable inquiry to be possible - and people try anyway to employ these assumptions or ways of thinking in inquiries. These could therefore perhaps be said to present illusory roads: paths on which inquiry was impossible or on which it could not be found to be possible, or steps that only seemed to form paths.

An example of the kind of belief that would be associated with such an illusory road might be the belief that to eon came to be at some point, or the belief that it will or could cease to be. Both of these share the underlying claim that nothing encompasses all. In other words, if to eon can be said to have come to be, there would seem to have to be said to have been some entity and/or some time that preceded it; if it can be said to perish, there would seem to have to be said to be some entity and/or some time to succeed it. In either case, there would then have to be said and taken to be some distinction between the predecessor/successor and to eon, for if there is not said

and taken to be some distinction, we could not say that there was anything other than to eon. If there is taken to be such a distinction, this must be either different from to eon and its predecessor/successor (or preceding/succeeding time), or else "something" that does not exist. If the former, that entity (the distinction) must be distinguished from the other two either by a non-existent, or by another entity, and so on. If the latter, we cannot say that there is a distinction between to eon and something else at all. If there were to be taken to be a distinction between to eon and some predecessor or successor, then it seems we would have to hold either that to eon is not all that can be said to be (which should mean that it is not all of to eon, that which is), or that the whole concerned is to eon but that to eon includes gaps of non-existence where distinctions occur - i.e., that some of to eon does not exist (which would also seem to imply that to eon is not entirely that which is, or that some of to eon is not). In either case, we would conclude that to eon at least some of the time is not, which would seem to mean that there is no to eon as such, that nothing is exactly or unequivocally and only to eon, or that nothing exactly or unequivocally is. As we have seen in the Ananke and Mofra chapters, one consequence of this is to render inquiry unsupportable.

We have seen why a road that involves believing that to eon came to be or will perish does not allow inquiry. In

that way, it would not be a "real/true/genuine road" of inquiry. It could be said to appear to some people to be a road because these people think on some level that its fundamental assumptions or ways of thinking are viable in inquiry, but the present analysis shows that these assumptions and ways of thinking are in fact on their own terms incompatible with inquiry.

I would propose a similar way of reading 'alethes' when it modifies 'pistis'. 'Pistis', like the English 'persuasion' or 'assurance', can be used in more than one sense. In or before the early fifth century, one use or sense referred to a feeling or sense of trust or faith in someone, of persuasion of something, of confidence or assurance. It could be said that all sincerely felt pistis of this type is real or true or genuine, whether it is justified or not. However, it seems to me that there could be a way in which some pistis of this sort might be able to be considered other than alethes. I am thinking of cases in which one has become persuaded of something, or has come to trust in or to feel assured of something, or has come to trust someone, without adequately considering or thinking through the nature, associations, and implications of that of which one has become persuaded or in which one has come to trust. Of such cases, the goddess (if this is the sense of 'pistis' she is invoking) would be focussing on those which, had they been considered thoroughly, would be found

to be incompatible (in or for inquiry, or at all) with a thoroughgoing conviction. She speaks at 1.30 of opinions in which there is no pistis alethes at all, and presumably these would not be opinions, doxai, if no one believed in them; and at 8.28 she identifies coming to be and destruction as having been "pushed away" by pistis alethes. Belief in to eon's (or any) coming to be and destruction might fail to be in accordance with pistis alethes in that it entails incoherences and self-contradictions, or other assumptions that are incompatible with it - in or for inquiry, at very least¹⁰. In fact, belief in coming to be and destruction entails incoherences and incompatibilities that would effectively block inquiry. It does not have to be the case that that in which there is not pistis alethes can be shown to be unconditionally false, nor does it have to be the case that we must know what is true (or know that something can be known to be true) in order for us to be able to have pistis alethes. It may be important to note

¹⁰It is not clear from the context of 8.28 whether the goddess is speaking of pistis alethes only on or with regard to a road of inquiry, or whether she speaks generally or unconditionally. This is not to imply that Parmenides would mean these remarks to be taken unconditionally; he has after all placed them in a certain context by making them part of a speech by a goddess who is described as having been encountered in a certain way, etc.

As for 1.30, since its immediate context is a description of what the narrator is to learn or to hearken to, and since what will follow will be or include these discussions of roads of inquiry, it is quite possible that the goddess means that the opinions of mortals lack pistis alethes when they are used in inquiry, at very least.

here that the goddess does not, in the extant fragments, make any mention of anything in which she thinks that there is in fact pistis alethes. She does call some of her own speech and noema "trustworthy", piston, at 8.50, but she does not make clear what about it, or what that is supposed to be gleaned from it, is worthy of trust, nor why. I would note here as well that the implications of the binding of to eon and those of its analysis are themselves somewhat paradoxical, or not lacking in apparent contradictions. For example, inquiry would seem to invoke both the unitary, unique, indivisible to eon, and distinctions. However, as I will attempt to show below, these conflicts or apparent conflicts seem to be necessary to inquiry, forming something of its content, or of the content of what is found or sought. That is, a certain conception of to eon evidently allows inquiry to go on; we need not conclude that it allows inquiry to go on in an unproblematic and unlimited way, or at no price.

Now, the second, mainly fifth-century and later sense of 'pistis' is something more along the lines of "that which gives (or is worthy of) confidence", "guarantee", "assurance" given by another. It is less difficult, I think, to see how there might be pistis of this sort that is and pistis that is not alethes: there could be some things that are real guarantees or assurances, in the sense of being effective, trustworthy or secure when put to a test, or

viable for something; and there could be others that only appear to be so. But with regard to 1.30 and 8.28 one might ask, guarantee or assurance of, or as to, what? The answer to this question is not immediately apparent from the text. However, in light of the sweepingness of these statements by the goddess, one answer that seems likely is that there is no assurance or guarantee of anything in (from) mortals' opinions, at least in or for inquiry. At 1.30 she says that there is no pistis alethes at all in mortals' opinions; and at 8.28 she notes an utter repulsion between pistis alethes and a certain opinion or kind of opinion. While it is not necessarily the case that she means to say that holding the opinions in question provides no security in social situations, she could well intend that because of the incoherences, infinite regresses, and self-contradictions that the beliefs were shown to involve or to imply, the beliefs do not afford any security in contexts of inquiry. For one thing, if belief in coming to be and destruction precludes an unequivocal use of 'is', or if it involves abrogation of all relations and precludes grounds for accounting for this, or if terms invoking belief in coming to be and destruction involve contradictions, then no secure identifications or determinations of anything would seem to be able to be made. Either sense of 'pistis', then, could allow a plausible and meaningful reading of 1.30 and 8.28.

These are the suggestions I would offer for the

interpretation of the goddess's statements about pistis, "persuasion" or "assurance". It can be seen from this, I think, that there is no reason to assume that the goddess understands pistis as dependent on truth or genuineness (aletheia/e), and especially not on unconditional or context-independent truth. I would like now to show that she could indeed be meant to hold that [T]ruth ([A]letheie) follows [P]ersuasion ([P]leitho), as the unemended text of 2.4 has it.

Recall that in order for inquiry and truth to be possible, to eon had to be (and had to be taken to be) as [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra were said and shown to bind it to be. At the same time, we have seen that we do not know to eon to have to be that way outside of contexts of inquiry, and that we do not know (and we may not be able to conceive a way to determine) that to eon exists or is any particular way independent of what we call noein. On what basis, then, can conclusions about to eon in or for inquiry be drawn? How are the terms of the discussion determined and understood? What incurs the distinctions we use; what tells us what we mean by them, e.g. by 'to eon'? How do we come to find them useful and valuable? Put another way, it is through the use of terms such as 'what', 'is', 'not', 'one', 'many', 'before', 'after', and so on that inquiry is to function; and it is on these terms that such truth as we might seek would have to stand, or out of them that it would have to be

at least in part framed. What then is the status of such terms, and of that which we intend or claim to intend by them? How and why do they come to be considered reliable or valuable in inquiry?

It is here, I would offer, that persuasion has a role. Simply put, we have no proof that the basic terms we use and the ways of thinking or kinds of awareness they reflect are true or verisimilar or accurate, in the sense of capturing faithfully (and the comparison this would imply would seem beyond our power to make) what is independent of our thinking. In fact, as we have seen, to speak of "what is" is to use terms that invoke a conception or a way of thinking of ours, as does speaking of the complementary "noein", conceiving, realizing; whether these adequately reflect anything independent of our conceiving or thought or awareness, what that would involve, and whether the distinction between what is part of our conceiving and what is "independent" of it makes any sense, are not clear. Thus our use of such basic terms and notions must have some footing other than some sort of knowledge that what we say with them is true independent of the ways of thinking they reflect. Any purported support for a claim to that sort of knowledge would have to use those same terms and notions, and to take inquiry and truth to be possible; that is, it would on two fronts have to assume what it was intended to try to prove. The footing, then, which our basic terms and

notions would seem to have is that they are persuasive. At least on one road, they would seem to have the potential to be used to permit inquiry; they help us to live and to thrive in other ways too; for yet other purposes they can have drawbacks. Why they are viable for various of our purposes, and why in the company of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira (conceived with their help, or as their complements) they enable inquiry to be taken to be possible, are other matters. That her formulation reflects these as a problem suggests that if the goddess does not provide an ontological catalogue or a summary of what is now called metaphysics, it is not because she is interested "only" in speech or thought, or "only" in inquiry, separated from concern with "what is", and without acknowledgment of the framework in which these appear. Rather, I think, her presentation suggests that she would draw our attention to the complex or system of conceptions and uses invoked by dealing in terms of to eon and noein - drawing our attention among other things to the fact that this is or does appear as a system - in contexts of inquiry. She thus invites us to consider as well the relationships between to eon and noein (and what must be said and taken to be the case regarding them), and inquiry. One might also recall here that the goddess usually speaks of inquiry in terms of roads or paths. To take a road or path is to make certain choices, to take one direction rather than another, to have some (possibly changeable) goal

or direction in mind or thumos, and to be in some sense constantly changing - in a way that is taken to have some unity - one's relationships to some other things¹¹.

Inquiry and the Binding of To Eon

The binding of to eon on or for the road characterized in fragment 8 seems to have to do with what (according to the goddess at very least) must or must not, should or should not, can or cannot be said or taken to be the case, in or for inquiry. However, the goddess says nothing directly about whether or under what circumstances the binding itself must, should, or can be said and taken to be in place. Questions also remain about the relationship between what is supposed to be necessary or what the goddess says is or must be the case, what the goddess says she will allow or permit, and binding by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. It may be asked whether or under what conditions [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira must be in place (or must be said and taken to be in place); how they can be known to be

¹¹What is said in this paragraph should not be taken to imply that the goddess is advocating a view of the sort that would be called "idealism", i.e., that she is implying that what is is what we say or think is, or that there is nothing independent of our thought or ideas or awareness. As I will show later in this section, what the goddess says reveals a serious flaw in the claims of such views. What she says shows that the claim that what is is what we say or think is and that nothing is independent of our thought or awareness, and the claim that there is in fact something independent of our thinking or awareness, both rest on the same or similar unwarranted and unsupportable assumptions.

(or known to have to be said and taken to be) in place; and what the goddess's statements imply about what has been or can be discovered, and about to eon.

I will ask first what might be the relationships between inquiry and the binding of to eon. Does the binding only hold for or apply to inquiry? Can we tell? The importance of these questions will I hope become more apparent from the discussion later in this chapter of the implications of the binding of to eon as regards multiplicity, unity, change, time, division, and distinctions.

[D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira have been shown above to support, result in, and/or enforce the characteristics "of" to eon with which the goddess associates them - to ensure these characteristics in or for inquiry at very least.¹² These characteristics or features make to eon, as it is described and conceived to be in or for inquiry, incompatible with particular things, as they are described and conceived to be in or for inquiry. That is, particular things could not be (or could not coherently be taken to be) parts of to eon, for the latter has been shown to have to be indivisible, in or for inquiry at very least. There could

¹²I use quotation marks around the 'of' because as we have seen, to eon cannot coherently be taken to have characteristics, in the sense of distinct identifiable aspects, in the manner of multiple (particular) things that are said to exist. This problem is one that I will explore below.

not be (or be coherently taken to be) things that exist in addition to to eon, because to eon has been shown to have to be unaccompanied, in or for inquiry. Particular things could not be to eon's predecessors, successors, or sources, or results, as to eon has been shown not to be able to have these, as far as inquiry is concerned. Moreover, a conception of particular things would not seem to be able to function as any sort of alternative way of conceiving to eon (nor vice-versa, nor both as alternative ways of conceiving some other identifiable entity), since the characteristics or features that must be associated with particular things said to exist are incompatible with the conception of to eon that the goddess describes: fundamental distinctness and multiplicity versus what must be called continuity and unity; the possibility of sequences versus the impossibility of succession; and so on. Indeed, the unity and uniqueness attributed to to eon are in important ways incompatible with what would be called unity or uniqueness in particular things. A particular thing is supposed to be a unit among many; we can at least conceptually get outside of it to count it; it is what it is in contradistinction to others. There are no others and no distinct characteristics for to eon, as the goddess has shown that it must be taken to be in or for inquiry.

Yet at the same time, inquiry regarding particular things said to exist requires to eon to be as the goddess

depicts it. Otherwise, as we have seen (e.g. if to eon could be incomplete or ephemeral), inquiry evidently could not go on. Or, if we took to eon to be otherwise, we could not coherently take inquiry to be possible. The reasoning used in deriving these conclusions uses multiple words and distinctions, conceptions of particular things, sequences (logical or temporal), and other features that are at odds with what has been discovered to characterize to eon in or for inquiry. Inquiry itself would seem to require divisions, distinctions, negation, and the possibility of sequences or passages. Thus in or for inquiry at very least, particular things said to exist, and to eon as such, have been found to be inextricably linked and also conceptually incompatible with each other.

To eon and particular things are linked, and bound to be as they are (or bound to be taken to be as they are taken to be) by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. It may now be asked whether this linkage and incompatibility, the conclusions about to eon, and the binding by [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira are (or must be) in place only in or for inquiry, or whether they are also in effect in any - or all - other contexts.

We may observe, though, that to ask whether [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira are in place outside of or independent of inquiry, or to seek to find out, is at the same time to invoke them. For in order to seek an answer to these

questions, one must take to be in place all that must be in place for inquiry to be possible; and that which must be in place or in effect in order for inquiry to be possible has been shown to be that which is associated with [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. Similarly, to ask about what to eon might or must be like outside of or independent of inquiry would seem to involve relying, in order for one's search to be possible, on the kind of conception of to eon that we have seen to be requisite for inquiry. (To reject this conception, or the conception of particular things that is required for inquiry, would estrange us from inquiry as it is practiced. For example, we could not distinguish anything.) [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira appear to be conditions for the possibility of truth, and the sources of the "musts" in inferences.

Thus it is not necessarily the case that the account of to eon that appears in fragment 8 is intended to apply independent of contexts of inquiry; nor is it obvious that we can tell whether the account applies independent of inquiry. Another obstacle to our drawing conclusions about the nature of to eon across all contexts (and to ask in which contexts something applies would seem to require that one be able to regard to eon from a vantage point that took in all contexts in a way not affected necessarily by any of them) is this. We have seen that several of the goddess's arguments about how to eon must be on or for the road of

inquiry in fragment 8 have to do with what can or cannot, must or must not be said or taken (conceived; noeîn) to be the case. We may note too that to be on a road of inquiry, or to engage in inquiry, involves taking the objects of inquiry, and taking that which is (or that which is said to be) to be a certain way. If inquiries are to be able to be successful, if goals are to be able to be (and to be known to be) attainable, conceiving alone would seem not to be all that is required; what is would seem also to have to be a certain way. Another facet of the question under study then comes to the fore: can we know that what is is a certain way, independent of our conceptions or awareness? Does the goddess suggest anything about this? What if anything can we tell about whether and when [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira hold?

Relevant to all of these questions is the series of remarks on noeîn at 8.34-36. In our consideration of this passage, we saw that noeîn (being aware, realizing, thinking, conceiving, taking to be) and to eon were in a sense complementary and interdependent. What noeîn is supposed to be the grasping or conceiving or awareness "of" is precisely to eon, that which is; and noeîn alone is supposed to be the awareness or realization or conceiving of what is. Without the one, we do not find the other, on this conception; without the one (without each) the other is not said or taken to be. Noeîn is supposed to be the grounds for

anything's being a noema, something thought or taken to be or realized; and without to eon, nothing would be considered available to be a noema, or for that matter a pephatismenon, something expressed or declared.

Therefore, if noein is taken to be our only access to that which is (or if 'noein' is taken to name our only access to that which is, or to what we call 'that which is'), it would seem that we could not find out what to eon might be like independent of noein. Similarly, if noein is defined or taken to be that which addresses that which is, and if noein is taken to be or to go on, then we could not without employing (staying within what are supposed to be the parameters of) noein seek to discover whether noein is "really" as it is taken to be, namely our sole awareness of to eon, that which is. To inquire into or about the "real", the alethes, would seem to depend, as we have seen, on our taking noein and to eon to be in place in the relations described here. Thus it would seem also to depend on our taking [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira to bind to eon. For these dependencies to function as we would have them do, in or for inquiry (to make inquiry possible), something that does what the complex of noein, to eon, the alethes (and the notion of the alethes), [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira are taken to do would seem (again, under our operating conception or way of taking things) to have to be in place. The force of that "have to be" would again be that of

[D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira.

There is a further complication. [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira are usually said to apply to particular things said to exist; to enjoin certain consequences, invoking time or sequences or order; to invoke or involve division (especially in the case of [M]oira); and so on. These were among the basic connotations and meanings used by writers of the fifth century BCE and earlier, and adduced in previous sections of the present work in an attempt to interpret the goddess's remarks about the binding of to eon. Further, even statements about [D]ike, [A]nanke, [M]oira, and to eon involve or employ distinctions, sequences, multiple words and meanings; and the poem itself uses a narrative frame, and thus invokes time, change or sequence or order, distinctions, and so on.

At the same time, in order for [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira to do what they are described in fragment 8 as doing, and, as we have seen, in order for them to do what they are generally supposed to do and so to allow inquiry, to eon must be said and taken to be one, continuous, ungenerated, antithetical to change, and so on as described in e.g. 8.3-6. In order for [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira to function as they are supposed to, and in order for inquiry to be (or to be coherently taken to be) possible, to eon must be said and taken to be generally and fundamentally opposed to and prohibitive of characteristics (change,

multiplicity, etc.) that are invoked by the poem, its arguments or explanations, and the initial or traditionally basic conceptions of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. These characteristics, though, were invoked exactly in deriving or leading to (and discovering and indicating) the conclusions about to eon (or about what must be said and taken to be the case as regards to eon, in or for inquiry at very least).

That is, paradoxes arise because of inquiry's requisites. Inquiry would seem to require division and distinctions. It also seems to invoke and to use ordered sequences: some steps must come before others; we begin by noting certain conditions or making certain observations, and proceed or try to proceed toward consequences or conclusions - we take there to be consequences or conclusions from our initial conditions or premisses or observations. Inquiry therefore seems to require that there be movement or change and passage of time. In addition it calls for negation: we must be able to identify what is not that which we seek, in order for inquiry to be able to be other than a course of arbitrary steps. In general, inquiry would seem to require that particular and distinguishable entities be said and taken to exist.

But inquiry would also seem to require, as has been shown, that to eon be (or be said and taken to be) unified, unique, not incomplete or divided, unchanging (and hence incompatible with passage of time, in that the restrictions

imposed by the binding do not allow to eon to go through successive stages, and passage of time necessarily involves some sort of change), and so on. To eon must then also be said and taken to be incompatible with particular things, for reasons already discussed. Thus inquiry (seeking) would seem to require or to involve conditions that are fundamentally antithetical to each other; yet examining or adopting either of the antitheses would seem to imply or to lead to the other.

Let us see what can be illuminated concerning the roots of this paradox. To say that to eon is (or that it is said or taken to be), or to say that it is [said or taken to be] one, unchanging, continuous, etc.; and to say also that particular things are [said or taken to be, or to be some way]; presents problems. For it is not necessarily the case - it would seem in some crucial sense not to be the case - that the "two" can coherently or consistently be spoken of in the same way, that the "existence" associated with one has anything in common (or is at all compatible) with the "existence" associated with the other. (The same would go for features attributed both to to eon and to a given particular thing, features such as unity, uniqueness, continuity, and stability.) Further, to describe to eon negatively with respect to certain characteristics (multiplicity, change, etc.) that are associated with particular things said to exist would also seem problematic

in that to eon was found to be bound, in or for inquiry at very least, to be "non-incomplete" and by implication to preclude parts or complements, divisions or distinctions. The very phrase 'ouk ateleuteton to eon themis efnai', 'it is not right for to eon to be incomplete' or 'it is right for to eon to be not incomplete', seems at odds with itself. It would seem that all possible choices for inquiring into to eon (and into particular things) present serious problems.

For example, we have seen that to speak of both particular things and to eon as "being" or "existing" would seem to be to use the same term in ways that are incompatible with each other, or to use the same term to try to do things that are incompatible with each other. Now, it might be objected that the use or meaning of 'being' is simply different when the term is applied to to eon from what it is (or what its range might be) when applied to particular things. But this would involve an equivocation untenable for inquiry. One use would make the other induce contradictions. It is true that a determinate predicate may have meanings or uses that conflict with each other, or that vary with the application. All such uses, though, invoke or imply claims of existence, i.e., that which is said to have a certain characteristic is said to exist in some sense.¹³

¹³Although unity, imperviousness to change, continuity, and the other characteristics we have seen applied both to to eon and to particular things seem to be finite

They have (or are supposed to have) this as a common ground. Uses of 'being' that are incompatible with one another could not have that common ground. It might then be asked what if anything the two purported or attempted uses of 'being' that are in question might have in common, or what if anything they could be understood to have in common. What would each use involve or indicate? Could that be delineated in terms common to or compatible with both?

To look for some underlying feature common to to eon and particular things said to exist would seem merely to move the problem from questions of commonality of existence to questions of commonality of something else. However, to be able to find such a commonality would seem to be to deny the distinctions which would have made the commonality identifiable or able to be sought.

For in speaking of particular things said to exist, we refer to limitations on, or conditions or contexts for, the existence of those things. That is, for particular things said to exist, being some thing is said to be being

characteristics, and dependent on existence, applying them in both kinds of case still leads to equivocation unacceptable in or for inquiry. The reason, I think, is that these are characteristics that something must be said and taken to have in order for it to be (or to be taken to be) a unit. What is not said or taken to be a unit cannot be said or taken to be an eon, a thing or being; what is said and taken to exist is said and taken to be a unit, an exister, in one sense or another. It must be identified, at least conceptually, as a unit, even if in some ways it is also taken to be divided or indefinite. Thus ascribing existence and characterizing as unit seem to go together.

something in particular and not another thing, or being some way in particular and not another. Each thing is supposed to stand in certain relations to others. This would seem not to be the case for to eon. To eon is not supposed to be anything that is different from or related or relative to some other thing. Yet in order to try to refer to or indicate it - as we would seem to be driven to do in considering the implications of our conceptions of particular things, and in considering the requisites for inquiry - we would seem to have two choices, neither of which is satisfactory, for reasons that should become apparent presently. One choice is to portray to eon negatively (e.g. as unchanging or ungenerated) with respect to characteristics usually attributed to particular things. Otherwise, we must present it somewhat equivocally: to say that to eon is one, for example, is to use a term that is primarily used of what is supposed to be countable and therefore in some way distinct from its environment and from the counter. The term is also used of what is supposed to be in some respect free of internal divisions. However, we have found that if we say that to eon is, we must not allow (in or for inquiry) that we or anything else is, has been, or will be distinct from to eon, nor that we as such are included "in" it as element or component.

The negative characterizations ("unmoving" or "unchanging", "undestroyed", and so on) seem to present to

eon in relation to some other thing or possibility (mobility or changeability, etc.) Or at least, that is what negation does with respect to particular things said to exist. A particular thing is said to be this thing and not that thing, or to be one way and not another, or to be of one kind and not another. In contrast (even this phrase is problematic here), in and for inquiry to eon was supposed not to be accompanied, and not to admit non-being (these 'not''s point to their own troubled status). If what negation is supposed to do or to mean with respect to particular things said to exist is not what negation is supposed to do or to mean with respect to to eon, we must ask what it is supposed to do or to mean in the latter case and why that should be taken to be a case of negation. Moreover, the use of negative terms does not avoid the use of 'is', but rather requires it, on or for the road of inquiry in question; and we have just seen that 'is' and 'existence'-related terms seem also to have differences in meaning or use between their application (or attempted application) to to eon and their application to particular things said to exist. In the case of 'is' and 'existence'-related terms too we should also ask why or whether the two situations or applications ought to be considered to be two sets of meanings or uses of the same term or thing, or of fundamentally related ones, at all.

To answer these questions, and even to investigate

and to pose them, presents problems. First of all, we would seem to have to use or to invoke 'is' and 'not', or the notions of being and negation, in order to ask whether these very words or notions are being use in the same way in addressing both to eon and particular things said to exist. This in itself would seem to mean assuming that 'is' and 'not' do in some way apply to to eon - assuming this just in order to ask. Similarly, any analysis of or search for the prerequisites of claims to existence would have to use or invoke 'is' and 'not' or the notions of being and negation - not to mention invoking both particular things and the bound to eon (which were linked but mutually incompatible), if previous findings are correct. Perhaps even more troublesome is the question of whether we can be sure that there is some feature or characteristic or aspect or other commonality that underlies all that is to be considered in any sense to exist (or one that underlies all that is considered to be a case of negation); or of whether there is some criterion of existence (or negation, or not-being) that we could use to tell whether "both" particular things and to eon exist. If there is not some such criterion or underlying feature, or if we cannot be certain that there is; and if no other reason (besides convenience or arbitrary choice or uninvestigated assumption) can be found for using the same terms or ideas in these apparently disparate cases; then we do not know that the paradoxes can be resolved, nor that the

reasoning that generated or uncovered them involved no equivocations.

Now, it would seem that anything one might suggest as a criterion or underlying commonality of existence (or of negation) would have to be said either to exist or not to exist.¹⁴ If it is said to exist, we would need to ask why it should be said to exist along with the other two factors (to eon and particular things) we have seen that we must, in or for inquiry, say exist. Then the same set of questions and problems that we had sought the criterion or underlying feature in order to solve would arise again, and another commonality would have to be sought, and so on. On the other hand, if at first or at some point in the chain just mentioned a criterion or commonality were said not to exist, two possible conclusions present themselves. The first would be to say that something that apparently does not exist or does not fully exist (whatever that could mean) accounts for what is said to exist - a thesis both forms of which we have seen to be incompatible with inquiry, and incoherent (see e.g. 8.7-10, 20-21, 35-38, 46-48). The other possibility

¹⁴We might want to propose that the criterion or underlying commonality could not be said either to exist or not to exist. But then we would have to come up with additional criteria or commonalities to explain its connection or relevance to being and not-being; and then we would have to account for the connections between these and each side of the earlier divisions, etc. - repeating at each stage the problem we started with.

Neither of course could we propose that a criterion or commonality both existed and failed to exist; this would simply repeat the original problem at the outset.

would be that we would have to give up claiming that there was known to be any commonality between what is called the existence of to eon and what is called the existence of particular things.

As for a criterion or underlying commonality pertaining to negation, let us recall that we would need this in order to be able to reconcile the negative characterizations of to eon with the conclusion that in or for inquiry at least, to eon does not admit of not being, nor of division or lack. But to say that such a criterion or commonality existed would require us to say that some further sort of negation set the criterion off from (for want of a better expression) that which is not understood negatively. And this would lead to a search for a further criterion or commonality, and so on. To say that negation exists, or that it has hallmarks or underlying features that exist, would also seem to violate the goddess's warnings about the incompatibility, as far as inquiry is concerned, of not-being and being.¹⁵ To say that a criterion or

¹⁵These remarks of the goddess's are of course themselves problematic, even paradoxical, but it is in virtue of this that they are instructive and illuminating. If we take what she says to be true, as regards inquiry at very least, she should not be able to say anything (or we should not be able to understand anything from her), or anything coherent, about to me eon, that which is not, or about nonexistence generally. In that case we cannot tell whether these same statements of hers are true. If we cannot tell whether they are true, we cannot tell whether inquiry is possible, and cannot claim to be able to investigate her pronouncements. But if on the other hand we take her remarks about to me eon to be false, then either inquiry becomes

commonality did not exist would mean that we could not claim to know that there is one, nor to know that to eon can coherently be characterized negatively.

From these considerations we can see that it is not at all clear that what evidently must (in or for inquiry at very least) be said and taken to be the case regarding particular things said to exist, and what evidently must (in or for inquiry at least) be said and taken to be the case regarding to eon can be reconciled with each other - even though, as we have seen, the conclusions about to eon describe what apparently renders inquiry possible, and even though the conclusions about to eon as regards inquiry were derived partially from what evidently must be said and taken to be the case concerning particular things held to exist. Thus, too, we find that the notions of existence and negation are problematic or paradoxical, as well as mutually complementary; and that they appear (in or for inquiry at least) to be incompatible with analysis. However, the goddess does not say, and we need not conclude, that these are primitive (absolutely and unconditionally fundamental) or ineluctable (universally necessary or unavoidable) notions, nor that the notions of existence and negation are known (or knowable) to be adequate to the tasks for which

impossible, for reasons presented in the discussions of [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira; or we wind up with the infinite regresses or circularities we have come upon in the last few paragraphs.

they may be intended or to which they may be assumed to apply.

The preceding observations do not necessarily undermine the viability of the road in question with respect to inquiry. They do point to a need to examine what it is that inquiry employs, what it may discover (what such viability gets us), what goes on when we talk of "that which is", and what it means to talk that way. Several considerations that I think contribute to such an investigation can be found in what has been developed here so far. They are the apparent inevitability of certain paradoxes in contexts of inquiry; the fact that the goddess's speech represents neither a "naive realist" nor a "naive idealist" perspective; and the significance of the goddess's invocations of [T]hemis (roughly, [C]ustom or [R]ight) along with [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra. These considerations are connected to each other, I will try to show, in ways that strongly affect the meaning and content that inquiry can be found to afford.

We have seen that the goddess's characterization of how to eon must be (or be said and taken to be) in or for inquiry required, and indeed was derived based on, the use of distinctions, divisions, conceptions of time, and so on. However, the presence of these features was shown to be incompatible with what to eon was supposed to be, or to be

"like", in or for inquiry. That is, everyday things, which were supposed to be characterized by or according to these distinctions and so on, were shown to have to be said and taken to be incompatible with to eon given what must be taken to be the case if the everyday things are taken to exist. Even the description we would have to give of the way to eon would have to be (or had to be said and taken to be) in or for inquiry would seem to pose problems. In addition, we have seen some of the pitfalls of the use of 'not' and 'is' with regard to to eon; and we have noted that to call to eon "one" is not at all the same as to call a particular thing said to exist "one". Still, it seems that given what is said and taken to be the case concerning particular things, we could not claim to inquire into particular things, much less hold that truth is possible or findable, without invoking such an incompatible to eon.

Then it can be seen that the conclusions about to eon follow from, or are to be true based on, the use of distinctions, divisions, conceptions of time or sequence (hence the possibility of deriving or finding that which is true also seems to presupposed these), and so on. The contradictions, paradoxes, and incongruities that we have seen are also fostered by the use of distinctions, divisions, etc. Yet it would not be possible to ask whether any of this was true of to eon, or whether paradoxes, contradictions, or incongruities arise, independent of these

distinctions etc. For example, neither could we ask without invoking distinctions, for we need them in order to identify anything; nor could we be sure of indicating or conceiving of to eon independently of all distinctions - for to do that we would have to be able to be sure of identifying to eon as such.

Why, though, do the paradoxes, contradictions, and incongruities arise? I am not asking here what to eon must be independent of inquiry or of our conception of it. Rather, I look to outline some of the requisites of inquiry, or some of the choices involved in inquiry.

Let us observe first that when we inquire or seek, we inquire about or seek something; that is, we claim to identify or to indicate some thing which is in principle distinguishable or separable from others, and we must be able to hold that we can identify steps, or a sequence, or a directioned pattern in time, in order for what we call 'inquiring' or 'seeking' to be held to be able to go on. Inquiry - like (and in part because of, as I will show below) custom and narrative - requires the adoption of a set of distinctions, in so far as anything is to be identified or indicated (or taken to exist) at all. To consider to eon is itself to employ distinctions, and as we have seen, inquiry and reasoning regarding it relied (were taken to rely, and were taken to have to rely) on the employment of distinctions, even as to eon was shown to have to be, or to

have to be taken to be, incompatible with such distinctions.

Is this conflict necessary - or, must it be taken to be necessary (in or for inquiry, or at all)? Inquiry does seem to require a sense of sequence, or a sense that there are identifiable sequences; without this, one could not mark that what had been lacked was noticed, looked for, or found. The notion or conception of inquiry invokes that of sequence or that of series. A sequence or series involves steps, divisions, and thus distinctions. Hence either in the inquiry itself, or in that which the inquiry uses or claims to invoke, distinctions evidently must appear. If it were not necessary to employ distinctions, or if the distinctions we do employ were reducible to something that did not require them, then the conflict would not arise. But we cannot hold (in or for inquiry, or perhaps at all) that the distinctions we use in identifications and in following or being aware of sequences are reducible to, or derivable from, what we call to eon; nor can we hold the converse to be true. For in either of those cases, the distinctions would no longer be distinctions, would no longer have meaning. Similarly, we could not hold (in or for inquiry, or perhaps at all) that to eon and the distinctions were both reducible to a third entity, without rendering meaningless the identity of that third thing, or that which would distinguish it. Looked at another way, that which all things that are said or taken to exist have in common cannot be

coherently taken to be continuous with, reducible to, or derivable from their differences alone, or from what is taken to differentiate one such thing from another, without the differentiation, and hence the identification of things, losing all meaning. Simply to try to indicate to eon, or to claim that we can do so, is to introduce a distinction and hence a paradox, in that what is to be indicated there could never be given or analyzed completely by means of distinctions, and yet could not be said to exist, to be itself, or to be indicated, otherwise.

For this reason among others I would propose that noein and to eon cannot coherently be held to be the same, nor can either be coherently held to reduce to the other. The use of distinctions of course does not imply that none are irreducible, that all mean what we think they do, that all have meaning in some or all contexts, or that we must claim that any of these things are true. However, if any distinctions are to be able to be taken to have meaning, then these will not be able to be analyzed completely (dissolved), or they will not all be irreducible; that is, we ought not to be able to dissolve them completely by means of noein, or their dissolution should not be compatible with noein. Something must remain apparently intractable, or noein will be able to indicate or grasp nothing, and it would seem in that case that to eon would be lost to us. (Whether to eon exists independently of noein is

as we have seen a question we could not answer within the to eon/noeîn framework. Similarly, whether the to eon/noeîn scheme or way of looking is avoidable could not be determined within that scheme, nor could we thus discover whether the question makes sense outside of it.)

Without something opaque to or not wholly analyzable by noeîn, inquiry evidently could not go on, and nothing could be said to be. But if we take it that something is opaque to noeîn, or not controlled or understood by noeîn, then we cannot take it that that which is is that which we think is¹⁶; and we cannot take it that what is is merely what is thought. This would seem to be one reason to suspect that what is now called "idealism" (see page 338) is not only not implied, but even is undermined, by what the goddess says. I will offer other reasons for this suspicion presently. Now, it must be acknowledged that the fact that part of the goddess's speech seems incompatible with "idealism" does not in itself imply that she (or Parmenides) does not at any point say or mean something that supports a form of "idealism". Therefore I will also endeavor to show that the goddess cannot be found indisputably at any point to offer support for "idealism". (As for Parmenides' role or position in all of this, I will offer some suggestions in

¹⁶As we will see below, if we take it that something is or may be opaque to noeîn, we also have no grounds for holding that what is is not that which we think is, or that something must exist that is independent of or outside of noeîn.

the concluding chapter.)

Another way to look at the problem of the relationship between to eon and the distinctions used in inquiry would be to note that our ways of identifying things involve presuppositions: that there are distinguishable things, that there is passage of time, that we are talking about something when we use such terminology, that the notion of existence makes sense, and so on. To notice that there are presuppositions, or to investigate their meaning or basis, itself requires the use of presuppositions: that presuppositions could exist, that we can identify them, that we can specify them adequately, that the notions of existence and supposition make sense, and so on. Thus it would seem that no investigation completely removes all presuppositions. This is not to say that investigations are or must be useless, or that they do not show us anything of importance. It is only to say that we cannot coherently hold or claim to know that any investigation will show what that which is is, independent of what we say and conceive; and this is because none will show us that what we say is is what is, or that "what is" can be understood to "be", or that being is a category or notion that is valid or adequate or accurate for the purposes to which we put it, or that we can know what a valid or adequate or accurate notion is, independent of what we say and conceive.

This is not as much of a problem within (i.e. for

the purposes of) specialized fields of research such as sociology or geometry¹⁷, for such fields function predicated on the agreement that certain principles or categories or ideas are fundamental or definitional. Geometrical investigations do not ask whether points and lines exist, but rather explore the properties of points and lines said

¹⁷Compare Aristotle's remarks about Parmenides' ideas (or' ideas he attributes to Parmenides) and the possibility of what Aristotle calls "physics", in the second chapter of the first book of the Physics (184b15-185a21). There Aristotle attributes to Parmenides and Melissus the view that there is only one principle or source (arche), and that this principle or source is unmoving or unchanging (akineton). He appears to have arrived at this claim by inference from another proposal that he associates with them, namely the view that what is is one.

Aristotle does not say that Parmenides and Melissus held the view that there was only one source of what he calls phusis (roughly, "nature"); he does not say in this passage that they mentioned or meant phusis at all. However, he is concerned to consider the viability of the application of the views he attributes to them to the study of phusis, and points out at 184b25-185a5 that "to investigate (or contemplate; skopein) whether what is (to on) is one and motionless is not to investigate about nature (peri phuseos)". Aristotle holds that to take the views he associates with Parmenides and Melissus is to deny that there are archai at all, saying that a principle must be a principle of some thing or things, and that there is thus no principle if only one [entity] exists. He likens trying to discuss phusis with one who subscribes to the ideas attributed to Parmenides and Melissus to trying to discuss geometry with one who denies geometry's archai (presumably its axioms at very least).

We may note, though, that Aristotle does not claim here that the principles of geometry or of "physics" are unconditionally true or valid. In fact, he suggests that there might be some other episteme (science, body of demonstrable knowledge) whose concern it would be to contemplate whether what is is one and motionless. "Physics", Aristotle is saying, is predicated on the proposition that what is is not one and motionless, and hence does not investigate whether or under what conditions this its basis is true or valid or viable, or what any of those would mean.

to exist. Non-Euclidean geometries may redefine what it is to be a line, or offer a new way of understanding lines, but they do not ask whether it is appropriate to suppose that some sort of lines exist. In sociology, one does not ask whether there are societies or groups or people, although one may call into question some beliefs about attributes that these are said to have.

But in considering what is as such, the issue of the acceptance of presuppositions or of unexplained or unsupported agreements becomes a problem. By drawing our attention to roads of inquiry, the goddess shows us the importance of investigating to eon, and what is said and taken to be the case concerning to eon; and she hints at what investigations in specialized fields fail to do, or cannot do. That is, she shows the requisites for inquiry in a way that points up the roles that legein and noein seem to play in our consideration of what is. What is, to eon, is supposed to be that which noein and phatizein address - in other words, it is what presuppositions, realizations, categories, and words are said and taken to "refer to" or to "point out things about"; it is supposed to be what they mean or intend. Or, whatever they are supposed to mean or intend is supposed to be comprised under to eon. There is the problem: If we cannot say what what is is independent of what we say and think or conceive, if we cannot say or grasp whether "is" makes sense independent of what we say and

think or conceive, then our consideration of to eon does not get beyond all suppositions, beliefs, uninvestigated or unsupported agreements, and so on; more investigation can apparently always be called for. Each of these investigations effectively will have the limitations of the first. While to eon is supposed to be that which what we say and think is "about", this supposition is not and apparently cannot be proven; it is more like a definition or an axiom of sorts. We will need to say more below on the possible role of inquiry in the discovery of meaning.

Thus to eon is taken to be as a function of what we say and think or conceive (noeîn). But I would argue that this statement should not be taken as necessarily representing a view that today would be called "idealism". For what we say and conceive cannot be shown to be arbitrary or wholly a matter of choice; neither can it be shown to be wholly not a matter of choice. Nor does the apparent impossibility of discovering what if anything "is" independent of what we say and conceive imply that there is nothing outside of our conceptions, much less that there is nothing outside of whatever it is that is supposed to be a seat of these conceptions, i.e. "mind". I will try to show that some statements the goddess makes suggest that she acknowledges these things, and, later, that some evidence for this view is to be gleaned from her remarks about [T]hemis and [D]ike.

First we must consider whether the goddess can be shown to be espousing or implying any version of what would today be called "idealism". By "idealism" I mean any view to the effect that all existence depends (only) on thinking or "mind"; or that what exists does not exist independent of our thought or awareness; or that to be is to be thought or perceived; or that thinking or awareness is the ground or source of existence; or that what we think is, is what there is, because we can coherently think it. Here I think it is appropriate to recall the earlier observation that it is by no means evident that the goddess is trying to provide any kind of enumeration, cataloguing, characterization, or analysis of what exists. Rather, she says several times that she is talking about roads of inquiry, and about signs that appear on or towards one road in particular. This is not the same as making claims about what must ultimately or unconditionally be.

All the same, a number of commentators do assert that the goddess or Parmenides is giving an "idealistic" account of what is, and I certainly acknowledge that some of the verses that have been adduced to support this assertion are not clearly identified as pertaining to roads of inquiry. Still, I will try to show that the ascription of "idealism" to the goddess or Parmenides not only lacks support but is undermined by what appears in the fragments, and that the verses used to support that ascription either

fail to do so, or cannot now be known to be sufficient to do so. I will focus here on the arguments presented by G.E.L. Owen in "Eleatic Questions" (see note 1 above) and by A.H. Coxon in The Fragments of Parmenides¹⁸.

Owen (94-5) asserts that for Parmenides, "[w]hat is declared to exist in [fragment] 2 is simply what can be talked or thought about; for the proof of its existence is that, if it did not exist, it could not be talked or thought about." This in itself, of course, does not assert that for Parmenides (and Owen seems to assume that what the goddess states is what Parmenides believes or would himself say) what is is entirely a matter of thought or awareness. But Owen goes on to say that "it needs no proving that the subject of the argument [viz., that which is said in fragment 2 to exist; Owen identifies this as "that which can be spoken or thought of"] can be talked and thought about, for we are talking and thinking about it." That is, Owen seems to take it that for Parmenides or the goddess at least, what we say and think is going on when we claim that we are talking or thinking about some thing is in fact what is going on; or that if we say or think that we are talking about something, we really are talking about that thing; and that if it can be spoken or though of, it must exist.

Owen had concluded that what is said in fragment 2

¹⁸A.H. Coxon, The Fragments of Parmenides, Phronesis Supp. Vol. III (Assen/Maastricht, the Netherlands; and Wolfeboro, New Hampshire: Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V., 1986).

to exist is not to eon but "what can be spoken or thought of", and this conclusion was based in part on his translation of 6.1-2.¹⁹ The Greek is 'chre to legein te noeîn t' eon emmenai; esti gar eînai, meden d' ouk estin'. Owen adopts Burnet's translation, 'What can be spoken and thought of must exist; for it can [italics in Owen] exist, whereas nothing cannot.' This translation makes it seem that the goddess or Parmenides is contrasting "what can be spoken or thought of" with "nothing", and saying that the only thing(s) that can exist is (are) what can be spoken or thought of. This coextensiveness of what is and what is taken to be is not portrayed by Owen as coincidental or unexplained; rather, as we have seen, he thinks that for Parmenides, the proof of the existence of what we speak and think of is the fact (or apparent fact) of our speaking and thinking about it. Owen does not consider, or does not think that Parmenides considers, whether our claims to be speaking or thinking "about" something can be known to be accurate. (Owen does hold, though, that on the view he attributes to Parmenides or the goddess, some claims to be talking about something can be shown to be inaccurate, e.g. those that contradict themselves or each other.)

¹⁹It should be noted here as well that Owen does not discuss the fact that the passages of fragment 2 in which he is interested are described by the goddess as characterizing roads of inquiry. Also, what is described at 6.1 is contrasted with roads from which the goddess bars her pupil, making it plausible that what is described at 6.1 might also be taken to characterize a road.

There are however certain problems with the translation Owen uses, and I would suggest that these seriously undermine his conclusions. First, 'legein' and 'noein' (6.1-2) are active infinitives, not passive participles; they would normally and more plausibly be translated, respectively, as 'saying/speaking' and 'thinking/conceiving/realizing/being aware [that]/etc.', rather than as Owen's and Burnet's 'what is spoken of' and 'what is thought of'. If then we do not take "what is spoken and thought of" to be the subject of 6.1-2, there seems to be no reason to believe that it is the subject of 2.1-3. Owen offers no independent reason for doing so. (I have argued in previous chapters that the subjects of the grammatically subjectless 'esti's in fragments 2 and 6 are both most likely 'to eon'.)

Owen's translation also does not account well, or necessarily at all, for the 'eon' in 6.1. The 'emmenai', Owen seems to agree, looks like the predicate of 6.1 (infinitives could be used in that way); this appears to leave the 'eon' untranslated. He might be taking it to be a participle that is modified by the 'legein' and the 'noein', but this is syntactically very unlikely, and still does not yield the translation he adopts, for the reasons rehearsed in the previous paragraph. In addition, the 'esti efnai' of 6.1b could mean '[it] can be', though it is at least as likely to mean '[it] is to be', and there is no indication

that the 'can' is to be emphasized. It should also be noted that 'meden' in 6.2 can mean 'never' as well as 'nothing'.

Now, Owen holds further that his interpretation of fragments 2 and 6 "provides a context for [fragment] 3". In Greek, this fragment reads '...to gar auto noeîn estin te kai eînai'. Owen translates this as "what can be thought is identical with what can (not must) exist" (italics Owen's). With this, there is for Owen's Parmenides no possible ambiguity in which what is called in English thinking "of" something could be taken to refer to the contemplation of something believed to be independent of thought (or not known not to be independent); here the focus is on the thought. The possibilities in thought are identified with the possibilities of existence.

Concerning fragment 3, it should be noted that this fragment is less than a full line in length, and that we have no specific indication of where or in what context it originally appeared in the poem. While this fragment does seem to identify noeîn and eon in some way or aspect, we do not know what the rest of the line and the surrounding verses said. Perhaps the identification was criticized; perhaps it was proposed in a limited context (e.g. perhaps noeîn and some particular reputed aspect of what is were being identified with each other); perhaps the terms 'noeîn' and 'eon' were being said to have the same focus. We may also note that 'noeîn' is an infinitive and 'eon' a

participle; the grammatical difference may or may not have been intended to signal some sort of lack of symmetry. Given these considerations, I feel that there is not enough information to support any particular interpretation of fragment 3. Its many tantalizing possibilities are a spur to further investigation, so its contribution is not small.

Owen's interpretation thus seems to make the goddess or Parmenides take it that what we say or think exists really does exist; that what exists is what we claim exists, at least in those cases where our claims do not contradict themselves or each other. (Evidently Owen does not think that Parmenides or the goddess holds that all claims about the existence of particular things involve contradictions or paradoxes, nor that we may not be able to know that any of them are coherent. Owen tries to argue that the goddess is not saying that only a singular, homogeneous, indivisible to eon exists or can be taken to exist, in contexts of inquiry or otherwise. He does not, in his discussion of fragments 2, 3, and 6, look at all at the arguments regarding to eon's uniqueness etc.; and he does not mention roads of inquiry at all.)

I have argued above, however, that the goddess does not insist that it is because what is is a certain way that we must say and take it (in or for inquiry, or at all) that what is is that way. I have also argued that the unemended wording of 2.4, according to which the goddess says that

[T]ruth follows [P]ersuasion, is entirely plausible and - unlike the emended version - very much in keeping with other important points of her speech. And, as we have seen, the goddess makes her remarks about to eon as part of a discussion of roads of inquiry, as opposed to making them unconditionally or without a context. It does not appear to be possible to separate the "effect" of this context from her pronouncements or conclusions. Then, too, we should note that the goddess introduces her discussion of roads of inquiry, at 2.2, by saying that she will tell "which are the only roads of inquiry for conceiving (or, to conceive/ think/ realize/ etc.; noêsai)", 'haiper hodoi moûnai dizesios eisi noêsai'. Taking one road or another would seem to be portrayed here as largely or crucially (though not necessarily only) a matter of noeîn. Then the "signs" on the road discussed in fragment 8 would be signs for noeîn; and to say that the signs indicate that to eon is a certain way on this road (8.2) would imply that on this road to eon is taken to be a certain way; that on this road to eon is that way for noeîn, in the sense that it is through noeîn (and through a decision about its exercise) that we would be on this road at all.

There is no implication in all of this that to eon must be completely dependent on, or a function of, noeîn; nor is there any necessary implication that on this road we must take to eon to be a certain way because it is that way

independent of inquiry. The fact that the goddess speaks of to eon in the context of roads of inquiry that one chooses and follows, and her claim that [T]ruth follows [P]ersuasion, both suggest that to eon may not be, and is not known to be, dependent on noein alone; and that in fact we do not know that to eon is any particular way independent of inquiry. Indeed, as we have seen, her reasons for enjoining a mortal to follow one road rather than another have to do with what [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira make possible and enforce that makes inquiry able to be taken to be possible.

A.H. Coxon in The Fragments of Parmenides (22-26, 178-81, and 206-7) cites sources other than Parmenides in support of his contention that "the neoplatonic belief that Parmenides identified Being with Mind was well-founded" (181). Coxon does not think that fragment 3 (fragment 4 in his numeration) is sufficient to establish this. However, he does not address any of the considerations raised here. Leaving aside the question of whether the goddess was talking about anything that should be identified as "Mind", not to mention what neoplatonists would call 'Noûs', I do not find his arguments convincing.

Coxon holds that since Anaxagoras describes his cosmic "noûs" (usually translated as "mind" or "intelligence") in terms that echo Parmenides' goddess's description of how to eon must be on the road of inquiry

described in Parmenides' fragment 8, therefore Parmenides' to eon must be identical to, or identifiable with (as), noûs for Parmenides as well. Coxon thus assumes that Anaxagoras was using Parmenidean language to describe something that Parmenides would also have used that language, those very phrases, to describe.

Not only is this assumption unwarranted (and unsupported by Coxon), but there is also evidence against it. I would not dispute that Anaxagoras seems at least in some respects to be responding to Parmenides and/or Zeno. There are too many instances of similar or identical, and unusual, phraseology to be entirely coincidental. In addition, certain considerations that were raised by Parmenides and/or Zeno are addressed thematically by Anaxagoras, for example the questions of whether or how multiple discrete things could exist, whether there could be a smallest thing or portion of a thing and whether the existence of multiple discrete things would require that there be a smallest thing or portion, and how things could appear to come to be and to perish without something having to come to be from or perish into nothing. However, Parmenides' goddess's remarks about to eon occur within the context of discussions and injunctions about roads of inquiry; Anaxagoras appears from the extant fragments to be speaking in his own voice, and to be making unconditional declarations about the nature of what is, or about the

nature of some aspect of what is. This in itself indicates a serious divergence, in that as we have seen, the goddess's remarks call into question our ability to support or fully understand or coherently make such unconditional statements. Also, in what we have of Anaxagoras' work, he appears to be talking at least in part about cosmology and cosmogony, the nature and development of the cosmos and the things we commonly consider to be its contents. The lines of Parmenides' fragment 8 that use similar terminology do not refer to something so restricted, and suggest that the common claims about what exists are contradictory, incoherent, and unsupportable. I would also point out that the word 'noûs' (spelled 'noos' in Parmenides) appears only in fragment 6, where the goddess criticizes the wandering or erring noos of mortals - a noos that does not regard appropriately, or that has not grasped, to eon. At no point does the goddess say that noos and to eon are the same.

Coxon uses Xenophanes in much the same way that he uses Anaxagoras: Xenophanes proposes a fundamental deity that he says is unmoving and able to affect all things by its noos alone, while at Parmenides 8.28 the goddess calls to eon "unmoving". Coxon cites this as a reason to think that Xenophanes' deity's noos and the to eon in Parmenides must be equivalent. However, differences in what else is said of each entity in the respective sets of fragments are I think too significant to allow us to assert that such an

equivalence obtains. At very least, these differences should restrain us from embracing the equivalence without further evidence; and very likely they should keep us from embracing it at all.

For one thing, Xenophanes does not as far as we know make his remarks in the context of a discussion of, or in relation to the subject of, inquiry, although evidently he does not speak unconditionally either. He qualifies what he is saying, and proposes at least some of his remarks as "opined as [seeming] like what is true/ real/ genuine" (taûta dedoxastho men eoikota toîs etumoîsi, fragment 35; see also fragment 34).²⁰

Importantly, too, we have no evidence that Xenophanes ever used the phrase 'to eon' - it does not appear in the extant fragments - or that he thought in such terms about what exists. He mentions panta, all things, in plural, and in fragments 25-26 characterizes the deity he introduces as able to move or shake (kradainei) these things by means of the noos in his (its?) phrenes (wits, diaphragm - although fragment 23 suggests that in this case a physical location or organ may not be meant). Thus for Xenophanes, the unmoving deity is presented as in some sense (or perhaps

²⁰It seems likely, but is not certain, that the remarks about the unmoving deity in Xenophanes fragments 23-26 are among those Xenophanes would consider to be opined as likely but not known to be true. Each of the fragments in question comes down to us either from a different later author or (in one or two cases) from different works or different sections of works by the same author.

all senses) compatible with the existence (or conceived existence) of multiple things. As we have seen, this is not the case for Parmenides' goddess's to eon, on or for the road of inquiry of Parmenides' fragment 8. Xenophanes' deity seems to be described in connection with the cosmos, or with the various things we take to exist (whatever these might turn out to be), and is said to be able to move or shake things. The to eon of Parmenides fragment 8 is not only not described in such a context, but appears to be incompatible with movement and a cosmos (or multiplicity), in or for inquiry. This is not to say that Parmenides could not have had Xenophanes' characterization of the unmoving in mind. I suggest only that no matter where Parmenides got the notion from, he is not necessarily, not apparently, and most likely not at all, using it in the same way or in the same context or with respect to the same things as Xenophanes is.

There are at least three further reasons why it would be inappropriate to assume that the goddess espouses any "idealism", and why it might be appropriate to think that what she says undermines "idealistic" claims. First, we may observe that at 8.35-36 she says that "not without to eon...will you find noein". "Idealism" would claim that not only do we not find noein without to eon, but we do not find to eon without noein, and to eon does not exist without noein. What the goddess says differs from this in two important ways: she is saying that noein is not found (by

her listener, or by humans; she does not say what might be the case for others) without to eon - the converse may or may not be true; and she is talking not about whether to eon and noeîn exist independently of each other, but about whether one will be found (by a mortal, anyway) without the other. What we find depends in part on what we take to be the case in our searches.²¹

We should also bear in mind that 'noeîn' is not exactly, or not always, the same as the English 'think'. What noeîn presents us with is supposed to be to eon; it is not that noeîn cannot give us mistaken impressions or realizations or conceptions, but rather that the situations in which we would call noeîn mistaken would be exactly those in which we had believed that it was making us aware of what is but in which in fact it had failed to do so. Thinking, on the other hand, need not be supposed to be strictly complementary to what is, and need not be understood as giving us an immediate grasp or realization of what is. Thinking need not be either accurate or mistaken; and it is not necessarily limited or restricted by what is. "Noeîn" as it is usually understood would then seem incompatible with "idealism" in a way that "thinking" would not necessarily be.

²¹The goddess goes on to say that (on the road treated in fragment 8 at least) nothing exists outside of to eon; at the same time, we have seen that it would be incoherent and/or contradictory to assert that noeîn is a part or aspect or form of to eon - or vice-versa.

The earlier discussion of the conflicts between the goddess's conclusions about to eon and the terms on which these were derived suggests a second reason for holding back from asserting that the goddess is an "idealist", or for that matter a "naive realist". (By "naive realism" I mean any view that holds that what we say and think is, is what there is, independent of thought; or that what is is the way we say or take it to be, independent of our thought or awareness.) The problems that arise in trying to indicate or to talk about to eon suggest that we have no warrant to assert that the conceptions and terms we use to try to evoke it can be known to capture or identify or express it adequately or accurately. In fact it would be problematic to understand what such adequacy or accuracy should entail. We do not know that the terms and ideas that we use are appropriate to present what it is that we say they present, nor whether what we say they present is as we say it is, in or for inquiry or at all. We could not try to gain such knowledge without using the very terms and conceptions we would have to investigate. Noefn, as 8.34-36 remind us, is taken to be in some respects complementary to to eon. So we do not now have grounds for saying, or for claiming that we know, what to eon fundamentally is.

These observations undermine not only "idealism" but also any other view that implies that we can be sure that what we say or take to be is what is, or that what is is as

we say or take it to be, independent of our saying or taking it to be so. "Idealism" shares with "naive realism" the belief that what we say or think or conceive (e.g. that there exist entities of the sort we call "being" and "things" and "awareness") adequately and accurately presents what is. Both appear to assume that nothing of which we are not aware could actually be affecting our conceptions (for if it were, we would not be entitled to say that our conceptions are exhaustive and apply where and how we say they do). Both are called into question by what the goddess brings out. She therefore also problematizes the conclusions drawn here; but the very pronlematization suggests their appropriateness. More will be said on this topic in the concluding chapter.

Finally, let us recall how to eon was bound to have certain characteristics on the road of inquiry discussed in fragment 8: it was through [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira. Nowhere does the goddess suggest that these three are derivable from noein alone. While they may be discoverable through the noein - einai (to be) scheme that we use, they were also shown to be (or to have to be taken to be) integral to why anything would be (or is to be taken to be) discoverable at all. Thus in taking [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira to be in effect, we invoke something not known to be derivable from or entirely due to noein. In fact, at 8.37, the discoverability of noein is said to depend at least in

part on the binding of to eon by [M]loira; and the "decision" at 8.16-17 to permit that a certain road is anoeton and unnamed is described as "just as is (as per) ananke".

I would propose, then, that there is no reason to conclude that the goddess is necessarily espousing a view that would today be called a form of "idealism". Neither is there reason to claim that she is necessarily espousing a "naive realism". In fact, there are good reasons to suspect that she is undermining both sorts of views. Both seem to rest on assumptions to the effect that what is is exactly what we say is - in the case of "idealism", "thought" and "things" or "being", which are then said to coincide; in the case of "naive realism", some scheme of "things" and "thought" or "awareness" in which these do not coincide. Both also seem to rest on the assumption that we can specify what is independent of all contexts and unanalyzed distinctions or presuppositions. The goddess shows that we cannot know that these assumptions are true.

Both "idealism" and "naive realism" have something important and deeply problematic in common with the beliefs that the goddess associates with mortals in fragments 8 (lines 53-61) and 16. All three of these views address the question of the makeup of what is said to exist, and all three include in that an account of the makeup of the inquirer, or the makeup of what the inquirer is taken to be. Indeed, such an account of the inquirer would seem to be

necessary if the account of what is is to be complete; it would seem to be necessary both as a part of an overall account of all the things said to exist (if any part were unaccounted for, the validity and viability of the account of the rest would remain in question), and as an elucidation of one's vantage or starting point (without this, the context of the rest of the account would not be presented, and hence its meaning would not be clear and its validity and viability would again be in question). But all three views manifest problems in that they do not examine the fact of inquiry - that is, they do not acknowledge their own contexts - and in that their account of the makeup of the inquirer leaves crucial questions unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable. For example, suppose that we are what we say we are: light fiery stuff and heavy dark stuff as the goddess says that we say or imply we are; thought; matter and energy; etc. We might well ask how we know that there is nothing of which we are not aware that might be affecting what is, affecting us. How do we know that that which we say we are does not produce or present us with or limit us to unprovable or deficient or erroneous notions about what is, about what we are? We cannot within a given instance of awareness (noein) at the same time grasp what it is that is going on in (or to make) that awareness; we cannot get outside of all awareness to try to find what it is, and still be aware. There is no vantage point outside of

awareness; and there is no vantage point outside of noein from which we could scrutinize what "really" goes on in noein, for noein is taken to be our way of addressing the real. As we have seen, we cannot claim to dissolve the distinction between inquiry and what is inquired into, nor that between what we call what is (to eon) and what we call grasping or conceiving or awareness (noein), nor that between what we call what is and what we call word use (legein or phatizein or phemi) without ceasing to be able to inquire, to see meanings, or to make claims at all.

Themis

On what basis, then, can we conclude that in order for inquiry regarding to eon (or anything said to be) to be possible, [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]ofra must be (and must be taken to be) in effect? Has this not itself been concluded by means of inquiry? We have seen that to inquire as to whether [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]ofra are in place in fact relies on their (or something that does the jobs associated with them) being in place - at least in or for inquiry. But how then can we support such an assertion without engendering a circularity or an infinite regress, and without making unwarranted and unsupported assumptions about what is and about what we are as inquirers - and without claiming to be able to dissolve or to analyze away all distinctions at once? That is, what supports the conclusions

reached so far, and what do they mean? How can we take into account the fact of inquiry - or, what happens if we do?

Other problems arise from the drawing of implications that has gone on so far in this chapter. We have seen that if we would say that anything is, and if we would inquire about anything said to be, we must take it that [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira are in place. We have also seen that on the apparently somewhat fruitful road of inquiry described in fragment 8, these three bind "what is" to be conceptually incompatible with particular things said to be - the very things in light of which [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira were articulated and characterized, the very things in terms of which the three are expressed or exhibited or in some sense brought to be or to appear. Particular things, with their incommensurabilities and gaps, cannot be called upon to provide an account of what is as a whole or as such, an account of the "existence" they are supposed to have. As we have also seen, identification and meaning seem to require that something be, and be taken to be, unanalyzable in a given inquiry. To be sure, the goddess did warn that [T]ruth attends upon [P]ersuasion, i.e., that persuasion is a sort of prerequisite for truth (or for genuineness). But what does this involve? How are any implications to be drawn, or what goes on in drawing them? What do we have when we draw them; and what can they tell us about?

I would like to suggest that as far as we can respond to these questions, our answers will have to do with something like what is called '[T]hemis'. I will try to show briefly here that in some ways [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra (and certainly our conceiving them or taking or realizing them to be in effect) may be said to depend upon [T]hemis; in some ways also they may not. While [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oîra may be seen to have to be and to be taken to be in place in order for inquiry and truth to be possible, yet this is not something that is to be said unconditionally. At the same time, statements about or invoking [T]hemis should not be taken to be unconditional, for reasons that should soon become apparent. I will also try to show why this situation does not plunge us into relativism or loss of meaning.

The goddess does not say outright that there is any specific relationship between [D]ike, [A]nanke, and/or [M]oîra on one hand, and [T]hemis on the other. However, she does mention [T]hemis twice in the fragments we have, and it can be seen that what she says there is consonant with the ways in which [T]hemis was characterized in or before the fifth century. Some of these characterizations tie Themis to Dike at the least, and may tie her to the other two as well. Parmenides' goddess's speech seems to link Themis with Dike, and themis with ananke and probably with [M]oîra; I will briefly explore what the nature and implications of these

links might be.

'Themis' had several interrelated senses or uses by the early fifth century. It could mean "custom", "right", "justice", or "that which is customary (right, just, appropriate, meet)". The term could also be used adjectivally, as seems to be the case at 8.32; it would then be translated as 'right', 'meet', 'appropriate', etc. Personified, Themis is a female divinity, the goddess of custom or right, or of that which is appropriate or right. Finally, a themis could also be a civic or public judgment or decision; the contexts in which 'T]hemis' appears in Parmenides' fragments seem to rule out the possibility that the goddess is emphasizing this sense. In Might and Right in Antiquity²², Hartvig Frisch notes considerable overlap between the sense of [D]ike and the senses of [T]hemis. This can easily be seen for example at Iliad 16.384-393 (a passage already discussed in the Dike section of the present essay), where "skolias themistas", "crooked judgments" (or possibly "crooked ways") are said to drive away the dike of the gods. Themis, then, can be seen to be associated with choices and purposes, with questions of right or appropriateness, and with determining a direction to take and with taking the steps to follow it.

As a goddess, Themis has also been portrayed as

²²Hartvig Frisch, Might and Right in Antiquity, Humanitas Series, no. 2, trans. C.C. Martindale (Copenhagen: Gyldendal boghandel, 1949).

closely tied to Dike; at Theogony 901, Hesiod identifies Themis as the mother of the Horai (Hours or Seasons) Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene; the father is Zeus.²³ Parmenides' goddess makes further connections. She declares at 1.26-28 that "no bad moira has sent you.../ On this road.../ But [rather] [T]hemis and [D]ike." Here [T]hemis and [D]ike are portrayed as working together, and as being in harmony with [M]oira, [P]ortion or [F]ate. At 8.30-32, the goddess says that it is on account of [A]nanke that it is not themis (right, appropriate, meet; perhaps customary) for to eon to be incomplete (or that it is themis for to eon to be not incomplete).

We have seen something of the relationships that are supposed to obtain between [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira; in some ways, the differences among them are differences of emphasis or focus: [D]ike seems to emphasize balance or order, [A]nanke constraint or consequence, [M]oira consequence or apportionment; but each has some link to the force of each of the others. The place of [T]hemis in this scheme is less clear. Why might Parmenides' goddess want specifically to connect the workings of the other three with [T]hemis in this way? The connections she draws seem especially troublesome when we observe that [T]hemis is supposed to hold within human communities but not in the

²³Pindar also mentions this relationship; see the discussion in Jane Harrison, Themis, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1927), 514-18, 531-35.

rest of the cosmos, or in other aspects of the cosmos (and not necessarily between different human communities). [Dike, [Ananke, and [Mofra, in contrast, are supposed to be or to hold of features of all kinds of goings-on, within communities as such and without. For this reason too Themis might at first appear to be more limited or circumscribed in her domain than is her daughter Dike; how then could [Dike be taken to depend on [Themis for her (its) being? And if [Ananke and [Mofra are so closely related or even intertwined with [Dike in their functioning, what roles might they play with respect to [Themis?

All of the female divinities (if indeed they are personified) named in the surviving fragments seem to have been associated, in or before the early fifth century, with cooperation, communication, and the orderly or lawful running of a community - or with the possibility of maintaining a community at all. All were seen as opposed to the use of force or might in civil contexts. Whereas Dike, Ananke, and Mofra were also associated with the order or balance and maintenance of the universe at large or as a whole, the other two, namely Peitho and Themis, seemed to have been seen as peculiar to human communities. (More will be said below on possible connections between [Peitho and [Themis.) That is, the last two are said not only to be proper to humans (and in a somewhat different way to gods), but to be proper to them only in so far as they live in

communities, in groups larger than a family.

In the case of [T]hemis, we might look at Odyssey 9.105-115, where the Cyclopes are described as being "athemiston" and as lacking "themistes". This is elaborated upon by saying that they do not have agorai boulephoroi, public assemblies for council, but rather live one family to a cave, where each head of household themisteuei (governs, declares or lays down law and right for) his own family. Beyond the family, they are said not to care for (oud' alegousin) each other, although this does not preclude their aiding each other on an informal and possibly ad hoc basis, as when Polyphemus is injured; the force of the description seems to be that a Cyclops is under no legal or customary obligation to help anyone outside of his or her own family. (As for whether Cyclopes are to be considered human, let us note that the Cyclops Polyphemus is referred to by Odysseus as "aner", "man", at 9.187; and that in many respects - use of spoken language, awareness of if not necessarily respect for gods, and the practice of sheepherding - the Cyclopes seem in relevant respects to be much more like humans than like gods or non-human animals.)

Themis appertains to humans, not to non-human animals or to plants; and only to humans as members of communities. Something further seems to distinguish themis from dike, I think, and that is the role that awareness plays in each. In the last chapter of Themis, Jane Harrison

begins to address this, but seems to me to stop too soon.

She notes that

We speak of the dike of a wolf, a foal, a torrent, not of its themis; but man, as well as nature, has his ways, his habits, so we speak of the dike of men;...

...A lonely beast in the valley, a fish in the sea, has his Dike (sic), but it is not till man congregates together that he has his Themis (sic). (517)

I will not consider here whether the Greeks would have been likely to have opposed "man" to "nature" in the way that Harrison does here (or whether they would have been likely to have conceived each to entail what Harrison takes them to entail). I will also not discuss whether themis needs to be traced, or whether it should be traced, as Harrison asserts that it must, to "collective conscience" or "herd instinct"; nor whether these purported sources are known to exist at all. The objection to Harrison's account with which I shall be concerned has to do instead with the sense in which non-human animals are said to "have" dike, in comparison with the senses in which humans are said to be able to "have" dike.

Now, as we have seen, Harrison is surely correct in saying that for every kind of thing said to exist, and for the cosmos as a whole, there is supposed to be a dike, a way or appropriate way of that thing (or way for that thing to be).²⁴ Dike on the cosmic level enforces, ordains,

²⁴Examples of dike being taken to apply to things other than humans, or to things in general, include Odyssey 11.218, discussed in the Dike chapter, where becoming a shade is said to be the dike or way of mortals after death.

regulates, and/or manifests the balance or order of the dikai of all things. But how then are we to understand Works and Days 277-278, "For fish, on the one hand, and animals of prey and flying birds of prey/ To eat one another, since there is not dike among them;"?

In fact the context of that statement hints at an important qualification. Hesiod is telling Perses (275-276) to heed dike and forget about violence; the implication is that Perses is able to become aware of dike as it pertains to social dealings, and that he can choose whether or not to do what it ordains as preserving of a community. The other creatures Hesiod mentions are not generally thought to have this ability and awareness; Hesiod is clearly contrasting them with human adults. It is not that these creatures do not follow the overall dike of the cosmos, or that they have no dike in the sense of "way" (their dikai in that sense are to act as they do); they are just (apparently) not aware of it as such, or cannot - either because of cognitive incapacity or because they would die - choose whether or not to do what it demands toward a particular goal.

The shade in question is that of a human, but the process described is one in which souls (psuchai) escape from bones and sinews; as non-human animals were supposed to have all three of these, there seems no reason to think that they do not become shades as well.

In Seven Against Thebes, Aeschylus has the chorus at 85 say that hoofbeats roar dikan, in the manner of, a torrent lashing a hillside: torrents would in this sense be taken to have a dike. Similarly, at Pythian 2.84, Pindar speaks of acting lukoio dike, in the manner of a wolf, tracking prey closely over its paths.

Themis, on the other hand, seems always to involve some awareness; and as we have seen it seems always to invoke the existence of a community. To be part of a community requires the acceptance of certain customs, goals, systems of relationships, decisions, and ways of identifying and communicating about what one encounters. Whether one likes these or not, one must agree to live by them or to use them, if one wishes to be part of the community; for otherwise one is punished or banished, or else the community is (or is taken by members to be) undermined or destroyed. Or, if 'themis' is considered in its sense of "right/ meet/ appropriate", we might say that in order to live in a community, or in order for a community to exist, a group of people must agree that there are right and wrong or appropriate and inappropriate things to do in certain situations (right, wrong, etc. in relation to some accepted goal or context or way of life); and they must at least provisionally accept a certain set of judgments as to which things are right, which are wrong, etc. It is not necessary that those who accept a social order or a set of values or beliefs or customs understand what it means for something to be appropriate in a given context, or why something should be considered appropriate, or what the best life might be, or how that might be determined. Rather, the customs and ways we live with and through, the systems of identifications and distinctions through which we learn and

communicate and make decisions - all included under themis - are that which we must interrogate in order to investigate those issues. They are that through which we identify problems and questions, that through and in some measure because of which we have questions and problems. This, we might say, might be one way in which [Themis and [Dike could have "sent" the narrator forth to go to the realm of the goddess. At the same time, though, I would argue that it would be wrong to assume that themis is wholly arbitrary, or founded entirely on arbitrary choices. Themis has some basis in choices, and it is itself a foundation for other choices, but as I intend to show below, these choices are not solely a matter of whim nor are they traceable entirely to need; and there is an important and inseparable aspect bound up in themis that is not arbitrary.

To begin to see this, we might do well to recall that Parmenides' goddess makes a point of mentioning both [Dike and [Themis, even naming them together at 1.28. We do not know whether Parmenides accepted Hesiod's claim that Themis is the mother of Dike. In any case, though, we have seen that dike would seem to have a wider application or domain than themis; and this would make it seem unlikely that themis could be a source or dike or even a factor on a par with dike. If [Themis is found only in a subdivision or a special case of the domain of [Dike, if the former applies only to a limited portion of what the latter applies

to, why mention [T]hemis at all? Moreover, the goddess does not otherwise seem to make much of the idea of community (although the narrator describes her - or what seems to be her - as bearing the man of understanding "through all cities", if our text is correct at 1.3). What is agreed to in a community does not immediately look like the source of a wider order, an order that encompasses both the community and what is taken to exist beyond or independent of it.

In some ways, however, themis is the source of a wider or more comprehensive order. In a sense, it is the source of the fact that there is order at all. That is to say, it is the source of our awareness of order, and of our idea of order; and it is a source of the ordering that we become aware of. In some ways, it is the source of the ordering, for it is through themis that we make identifications and distinctions, through themis that we divide up the world as we do. It is through themis that we hold that there is a "world" as such, and through the same themis that we describe it, ascribe meanings to it, and act "in" it.

Themis would seem to have arbitrary and non-arbitrary elements, and perhaps also elements whose status and basis we are not certain about. It must also be taken to include factors we seem to be able to choose or to control and factors that seem to be beyond our control or grasp or comprehension. Every community has its own customs, and

these may vary so widely from one place to another that in some cases communication between one community and another is very much limited. But in each case the customs had to be chosen at some point and agreed upon, or agreed to, by each generation that preserves them, and the initial agreement would seem to have had to be made without humanly understandable confirmation that the beliefs and customs or norms adopted would be efficacious or good or effective in helping the community live as well as possible (whatever it takes that to mean).²⁵ Before adopting a custom or belief, we do not know how viable it will be for the purposes toward which we use it.

Customs remain customs in part because they "work" - they help us, or enable us, to do things we set out to do, things from learning to growing crops to making war. The basis for adopting a set of customs therefore cannot be whim or momentary preference, nor even the desires or needs of one person. For example, different communities might have quite disparate notions as to what the best sorts of life might be, and might have different ideas or beliefs about the value of or need for someone's survival. They might have different understandings of what "life" involves, or some might not have a notion that corresponds exactly to our idea

²⁵Divine assurances may be invoked as the authority for the adoption of certain customs, but these are not analyzable, and certainly are not taken to be analyzable, and their bases are not supposed to be understandable, by humans.

of "life". There might be different ways of dealing with one's needs for food and shelter, and different senses of the importance and significance of these needs. However, no one can decide whether food is needed for bodily survival, or in which climates shelter is needed for this.

Those customs and beliefs that are retained by a community, or by what takes itself to be a community, bind it politically, socially, emotionally, intellectually, and often religiously. Through them, desired outcomes or directions are or seem to be ensured or at least possible without leading to social or extra-social (e.g. soil depletion, material or other pollution, epidemics) imbalances that would destroy the community or its environment. Or, put another way, customs survive either until the community that holds them is destroyed, or until there is a strong enough sense in the community that change is called for (change may of course be gradual). Thus something in the workings of what we would call the universe, something non-arbitrary and evidently not within our control or understanding, would seem to be tapped into or invoked by themis. We exert what control or influence we can by observing themis - which is an acknowledgment that something is not or does not seem to be arbitrary and is not or does not seem to be under our control. That is, we cannot change the way things are overall (or what we call "the way things are overall") such that what we want to be true is

true, or such that what we want to work does work. We do not by choice or preference alone cause something to be what we would call "good" or "right".

Themis can (or, in or for inquiry, must) be seen to be the source of the order of what is in at least two ways. First, it is that through which we say and mean that there are the things that we take to exist; and it is that through which we identify the relationships that we take to obtain among those things. It is that through which we identify "things" at all; it is because of our themis that we believe that there are "things", or that anything "exists". Themis incorporates language use, gesture, value, purpose or direction, and belief or opinion as they interact or are manifest in life within a society. It is this system of aspects, not any one or any combination in isolation, that allows (or gets) us to become aware of order, but it is also what orders, or what allows order as we are aware of it to exist. For it is themis that is responsible for the distinctions we make, and at the same time for prescriptions as to how those distinctions are to be addressed. As we have seen, themis cannot rightly be said to be entirely a matter of socially determined structures; its prescriptions cannot be said in the current phrase to be wholly "social constructions" or "socially induced norms".²⁶ Rather, themis

²⁶An illustration might be found in the Eastern European Jewish folktales about Chelm, an apparently mythical town of fools. The stories are intended to be funny, and frequently

is part of the way in which what are called societies are created, and involves elements that are chosen as well as some that are not. (Themis itself is not and does not impose social or political tyranny, though it can make these things possible.)

Themis therefore is responsible for order in another way: it provides the conditions under which dike, ananke, and moira can work to maintain or be or enforce order. In this sense dike, ananke, and moira can at the same time be

the subject of the humor has to do with the town's customs, or with the rulings (like the Greek themistes) and interpretations of custom and law laid down by the town's elders.

For example, in one story the elders advise the townspeople to throw all of their gefilte fish into the lake. Gefilte fish is a mixture of several types of ground, cooked fish, with spices and vegetables added. This takes a great deal of time and effort to prepare, so the wise men reasoned that much labor could be saved if gefilte fish could be caught pre-mixed. Not surprisingly, no gefilte fish are caught the next year.

A large carp is caught, though, and is tried for the crime of stealing (or, in another version of the story, murdering) baby gefilte fish. The elders find him guilty and sentence him to death by drowning in the lake. (In another version, the sentence is life imprisonment, which involves putting the carp in a tank of water in the town jail, and feeding him only water and stale bread.)

These stories illustrate the non-arbitrary nature of actual themis, I think, in two ways. First, no town could survive if it was like Chelm; any livelihood would almost certainly be destroyed either by robbery or cheating by out-of-towners, or by the effects of the elders' decisions and the town's standard practices. Second, carp do not drown in lakes, and they love bread. That is, much of the stories' humor seems to have to do with the divergence between the way the townspeople's ideas, customs, and rulings imply that things work, on the one hand, and the way the intended audience (residents of other Eastern European towns between the Middle Ages and the twentieth century) would take or observe the world to work, on the other.

seen to preserve or allow themis. This is not as much a circle, I think, as a matter of aspect or level. It is only once we have themis that we can be aware of the other three as such, and one of the functions we can then be aware that they have is that of maintaining what we call "what is" in such a way that themis can be in effect. Why our situation could be this way, could allow these four to be (and to have to be) found to be in effect with regard to what we call "what is" at least in or for inquiry, is another issue, one that will be touched upon later.

Themis, then, embodies certain choices, exigencies, possibilities, and directions, and each of the distinctions it grants will reflect these. They will be inseparable, at least in use, from the distinctions themselves, and this system as a whole will go to generate (and will be reflected in) the meanings or ranges of meaning that the distinctions have, and that they can be used to present. In order for us to be able to indicate anything in a meaningful way, or in order for meanings to be recognized, the distinctions we use cannot all be interdissoluble, and some relatively stable system of relations among them must be taken to be possible. Themis provides this. In so far as the choices, exigencies, etc. that it embodies or manifests are what are needed in order to allow the distinctions that allow us to indicate anything (or to take it that we do), those distinctions are "opaque" - if we were to inquire into them, we would have to

use them. It is only by having such distinctions, distinctions that embody and reflect some sort of presupposition or implicit direction, that meaning and inquiry (not to mention deliberation and choice for action) are possible at all. Yet it is on account of the same features that the paradoxes and incongruities that we have encountered arise. In the concluding chapter, I will explore the implications of this finding.

A further suggestion that the goddess, or Parmenides, may have something like this situation in mind is the fact that in fragment 1, the young man never steps out of his chariot to touch ground: sent toward the goddess by [D]ike and [T]hemis, he does not set foot in her realm at all. He does not come in contact with the road independent of [T]hemis and [D]ike, and he does not stand directly on the ground that the goddess touches. In fact, he does not travel under his own power at all; the initial impetus for the journey was apparently his own thumos, and the mares seem to have been harnessed in service of this, but it is the mares who provide the power and possibly some of the direction, and the sun-maidens who guide the chariot once it is on its way. The goddess's instruction is provided through a speech, not a demonstration or a revelation. All of this, I suspect, presents inquiry as in some respects dependent on something indirect, on some sort of mediation. Divine beings are things whose nature and ways are not supposed to be

known to mortals; we cannot dissolve what they are. Put another way, they reflect our limitations or mortality. Inquiry is then a human thing, but then so must meaning be. That we can discover paradoxes through inquiry (and in inquiry) is perhaps a sign of that which supports the chariot, that which reflects back our awareness. As such, I will argue, it need not be taken as a signal that inquiry is worthless or so deeply flawed that it cannot go on; it can instead be seen as an indication of a need for us to look more deeply at our roads.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The interpretation of Parmenides' fragments that I have offered so far, and the implications I have drawn under it, have centered on the remarks in fragment 8 concerning the binding of to eon. I will now endeavor to show briefly how this interpretation contributes to a way of accounting for and explicating the maximum number of fragments in a coherent and plausible manner. (I say "the maximum number" because there are some fragments - we have seen that fragment 3 has these difficulties, for example - whose meanings and/or original contexts in the poem are so unclear as to preclude the offering of a definitive interpretation. This is not to imply that these fragments may be dismissed, but only that any interpretation advanced for them must be taken as conjectural and problematic.) From there, I will move on to some more general conclusions, based on a reading of all of the fragments.

We may with some confidence, I think, divide the fragments into two major sections: a human's tale of his journey to the realm of a goddess, and a speech by that goddess. There is no evidence that any other character is supposed to speak any of the surviving verses. There is also no evidence that no other character speaks. Some fragments

cannot clearly be attributed either to the human narrator or to the goddess, but could belong to either.

The goddess's speech may in turn be divided into at least three sections, namely some introductory programmatic remarks, a discussion of roads of inquiry, and some sort of account of the opinions of mortals. Again there are some fragments that seem to be part of the goddess's speech but whose location within it cannot be determined conclusively. None of these problems of fragment location are peculiar to the reading of the fragments offered here; rather, the sources in which the fragments are found do not offer sufficient evidence for a more precise arrangement.

This way of dividing the fragments is admittedly quite different from what appears in the work of many contemporary commentators, and as we will see, this difference has serious implications. One frequently sees the fragments or the poem divided into a "proem" or "prologue" (generally fr. 1, lines 1-23 or 1-32), a "Truth" or "Aletheia" section of the speech of the goddess, and an "Opinion" or "Doxa" section of her speech. Although commentators are not always explicit about which verses are supposed to be included in each of the sections of the goddess's speech, it seems generally to be assumed that the "Truth" section includes fragments 2 through 7, 8.1-50 or 51, and sometimes 1.24-32. The "Opinion" section is supposed to include 8.51-61 plus fragments 9-19 or 20. Commentators

who accept this division include Curd¹; Owen²; Kirk, Raven, and Schofield³; and to some extent Austin⁴.

I believe that it is fair to characterize the goddess's speech from 8.51-61 as in some way addressing the opinions of mortals. That is what she says at 8.51-2 that she will do. It also seems to me likely that the fragments usually arranged after fragment 8 would appear under that heading. However, it is not immediately clear what the relationship is supposed to be between what the goddess presents and what mortals believe. For example, there is no evidence that any mortal in Parmenides' time would have claimed explicitly (or at all) that all things that appear are essentially light fiery stuff and dark heavy stuff (8.54-59), or that all things are (or are to be) named light and night (fr.9). I will examine below what the goddess's statements on this subject might mean, but for now I will note that it should not be assumed at the outset that she is

¹Patricia Curd, "Parmenidean Monism," Phronesis 36, no. 3 (1991): 241-64.

²G.E.L. Owen, "Eleatic Questions," Classical Quarterly n.s. 10 (1960): 84-102.

³G.S. Kirk, J.E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers: A Critical History with a Selection of Texts, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.; New York; and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 239-62.

⁴Scott Austin, Parmenides: Being, Bounds, and Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986). Austin sees the remarks pertaining to truth and the remarks pertaining to opinion - and sees truth and opinion themselves - to be interrelated for the goddess, so that any divisions made would have to be fluid in some respects.

simply rehearsing a catalogue of things that mortals believe or opine.

It is much more problematic, I think, to label the other section of her speech the "Truth" part. At 2.3-4, the goddess says that of the roads of inquiry that are to be conceived (or taken to be), the one "that/how [to eon] is and that/how it is not [possible for it] not to be" is the "path of [Pleitho] ([P]ersuasion), for [Alletheie] ([T]ruth) attends upon her". As we have seen, there are neither grammatical, textual, nor philosophical reasons for accepting the frequently-made emendation that would reverse the relationship between [Pleitho] and [Alletheie]. In fact, as has been shown in the chapter on implications of the binding of to eon, other remarks that the goddess makes would seem to support the idea that truth attends upon persuasion. The preliminary identifications and definitions that we need in order to delineate relations and to become aware of situations that could be real or true, cannot themselves have been known or proven to be true at the outset. Through themis and observation we are presented with a system of ways of indicating things as we agree that they are, and we employ this system in our attempts to inquire. Therefore we do not initially know that what themis and observation appear to reveal is the "truth"; we must inquire in order to try to discover that. And as we have seen, we must employ our customary divisions and identifications in

order to investigate, so that we cannot claim that our inquiries enable us to discover what is true independent of what we say or think.

Thus it is somewhat misleading to call the part of the goddess's speech that is concerned with roads of inquiry the "Truth" section. In so far as it treats of the road described at 2.3-4 - and we have seen that there are good reasons to suspect that the "remaining" road of 8.1-49 is this one - and conceivably in so far as it identifies problems that undermine other roads or would-be roads, this part of the speech might be called first the "Persuasion" section, and secondarily the "Truth" or "Potential Truth" section. (Just because truth is supposed to follow on persuasion does not mean that everyone who is persuaded or who feels assurance actually finds truth, as we have seen in the discussions of 1.30 and 8.28; cf. also 8.12-13.) It might be objected here that the goddess does mention [A]lletheia without mentioning [P]leitho, at 8.50-51, when she announces that she is about to change the subject of her speech. But she does refer to what she has presented up to that point as a "trustworthy (piston) speech and noema"; we have seen that 'piston' is a form of a word that has the same root as 'peitho'. Moreover, she says that this thought and noema were "amphis aletheies", "all around/ on both sides of truth". This does not necessarily imply that she would hold that she has been presenting truth (although the

commentators I have cited, with the exception of Austin, do not consider this), and for that reason labeling this section "Truth" is ambiguous and potentially misleading.

Another common way of grouping fragments or verses claims that the goddess gives or discusses a "way (road, path) of Truth" and, in some commentaries, one of "Doxa" or "Opinion". Among those who use this framework are Ebert⁵, whose title question depends on his acceptance of this arrangement; and O'Brien⁶. I would suggest that this characterization is also inaccurate and in some ways misleading. As we have seen, the road named at 2.3-4, which seems likely to be the "remaining" road identified at 8.1-2, is first of all the path of [P]ersuasion. This road does have some association with [T]ruth, but this is as we have stated secondary or dependent on [P]ersuasion; to entitle this path the "way of Truth" may make the connection between following the path and finding truth seem closer or more direct, and less problematic, than the goddess would have it be.

As for the claim that the goddess discusses or

⁵Theodor Ebert, "Wo beginnt der Weg der Doxa?" Phronesis 34, no. 2 (1989): 121-38. Ebert explicitly mentions a "Weg der Wahrheit", "Way of Truth", as well as a "Weg der Doxa", "Way of Doxa"; see e.g. page 126.

⁶Denis O'Brien, "Temps et intemporalite chez Parmenide," Les Etudes philosophiques no. 3 (1980): 257-72. In this article O'Brien mentions only a "Chemin de la Verite", "Road of [the] Truth"; he looks mainly at the first 21 lines of fragment 8.

points out a "way of Doxa", it must immediately be noted that she never uses this phrase. She does indeed discuss the opinions of mortals in fragment 8 and apparently also in the fragments usually arranged as following fr. 8, but she does not say that these opinions constitute, contribute to, or are signs of a road; she does not mention roads at all after 8.50. It is true that fragments 6 and 7 describe roads that mortals follow or try to follow, and the notions about light and night that are presented in fragments 8 and 9 have the potential to be used on or for such roads: light is not night, and vice-versa, and if mortals take these to be exhaustive then all that is not or does not contain one must be or contain the other, and this seems to be a case of saying that what is not is (cf. 7.1). Also, any distinction between them, as we have seen, would seem to have either not to exist, or to be a third entity which would have to be distinguished from the first two either by not existing or by generating an infinite regress - and thus never achieving distinct existence at all. Or, light and night and any distinction between them would have to be said both to exist and not to exist, and thus in some respects existing and not existing would be taken to be the same (what is light is not night, and if these are taken to be exhaustive then being light is not being night, and neither light nor night is all that exists; existence involves more than either and thus "is" cannot be the same as [being] light or [being] night or

both) - and yet not the same, for mortals must claim to be able to distinguish the "two" in order to be able to claim to identify "both"; cf. 6.4-9.

It should not be surprising, if we allow that what the goddess says is at all coherent or consistent, that the opinions she attributes to mortals should be consonant with the conceptions associated with a road or roads that she says that mortals follow, or try to follow. But this does not mean that she is describing a road in fragment 8 after line 49, or in whatever fragments follow 8.61. I do not rule out the possibility that she is describing a road there, but I think that there is reason to suspect that she may not be doing that. After all, she has said that she "bars" her pupil from the roads she names in fragments 6 and 7. We have seen that anything other than the conception and grasp of to eon developed from 8.1-49 will not be viable in or for inquiry.

Moreover, at 8.15-18, a (or the) road of "is not" (or "to eon is not") is described by the goddess as "not a true/real/genuine (alethes) road". To attempt to inquire using the opinions of mortals characterized in 8.52-61 might be an example of an effort to follow such a non-road or non-real road. For the belief that there are two distinct and complementary components of what is implies a belief that some things in some way "are not": What is light is not night; where a bit of night is, there is not also at the

same time light; etc. Hence if the non-genuine road is "is not", the opinions ascribed to mortals cannot but place the would-be inquirer on it. If the non-genuine road is "to eon is not", the attempt to use those opinions of mortals in inquiry might still mean trying to follow such a road. The opinions described do not explicitly deny to eon existence, but they are incompatible with its being as we have seen it to be bound to be in or for inquiry. For these reasons, then, it seems unlikely that the goddess would present a set of opinions of mortals as a road of inquiry; and she has not made specific reference to any roads that are not (or that do not purport to be) roads of inquiry. We will see below in what other contexts or for what other purposes she might be rehearsing these opinions of mortals.

There may not be any "way of Doxa" part of the goddess's speech, especially if any such part is taken to come after 8.49. (There are of course some comments by the goddess on roads of inquiry that mortals take or try to take, in fragments 6 and 7, but these are not generally what commentators refer to as the "way of Doxa" section.) However, I would not dispute that the goddess discusses a road of inquiry on or for which, she appears to assert, persuasion and truth are possible. At the same time, I would not hold that she is "giving" (outlining, rehearsing, presenting, representing) a road of truth or of persuasion. That is, I would not claim that she is attempting to portray

the road in words, nor that she is herself tracing or following it. What she says, in the opening lines of fragment 8, is that there are certain "signs" on or towards or of the road; and these she describes and discusses. It is not necessarily the case that she is engaging in inquiry during the course of her speech, so there is no reason to assume that she is following a road of inquiry. Indeed, as we have seen, much of her speech consists of injunctions, with no indication that these are posed in service of any inquiry of the goddess's.

It may be objected here that the injunctions pertain to the following or the avoidance of certain roads or pseudo-roads of inquiry, and that because of this the goddess's remarks should be consonant or consistent with the parameters of the road of persuasion: otherwise, the objection goes, the way in which the orders or commands are given would contradict and undermine the characteristics of the path onto which these very orders steer the goddess's visitor. In that case, the goddess would effectively not be able to enjoin the "young man" to follow one road or to stay away from another; the inconsistency between her remarks and their implications would undermine either the injunctions or the road or both. In fact, though, it can be seen that there is some discrepancy between the characteristics that to eon must be said and taken to have on the road of inquiry described in fragment 8 on the one hand, and the apparent

implications of the terminology and conceptions employed in enjoining and even in describing the road (multiplicity, distinctions, sequential statements) on the other. I would suggest, however, that this does not render the injunctions (or the road) useless or meaningless - though as we have seen, it does seem to bring to light some paradoxes that seem to embrace the heart of inquiry. The implications of these paradoxes will be explored further below. At this point, though, I will only point out that if the goddess were posing her injunctions as part of an inquiry of her own (one that was compatible with humans' inquiries), or if they were supposed in some way to be continuous and compatible with the inquiry in which humans can engage, then they would not be effective as injunctions, or would not be injunctions at all. That is, if it were the case that the expression of the goddess's injunctions were consonant with what is to be said and taken to be on the road of inquiry in fragment 8, then either the injunctions would be impossible to make and also unnecessary, or they would not have a determinable meaning because they would presuppose that which they are intended to establish or to delimit (namely the parameters of inquiry). Therefore it would seem to be appropriate that the goddess's injunctions and even her descriptions be made from a standpoint that must be taken to be distinct from the operation of inquiry. We may note in addition that it is not at all clear that divine beings have any need or desire to

seek anything.

So far in this chapter I have presented reasons for declining to accept several common characterizations of what it is that Parmenides' fragments present. I will now summarize some important features of what I think the fragments do give us. First I will describe briefly what I take to be "going on" in each of the groups of fragments that I have identified, and will discuss the significance of these features both within the fragments and in general; then I will draw conclusions about the overall implications of what appears in the whole of the extant fragments.

Fragment 1 opens with the tale of a chariot journey to the realm of an unnamed goddess, a realm that lies beyond the "gates of the paths of [N]ight and [D]ay" (1.11) and that is reached by following a road that is "far away from the beaten path of humans" (1.27). This tale sets the stage for a speech by the goddess, and that speech appears to comprise the rest of the extant fragments (with the possible exceptions of 3, 5, and 20, whose meanings and placement are as we have seen unclear). I would suggest that the story of the journey not only sets the stage for the goddess's speech in a narrative sense, but it also provides a context for her meaning in a philosophical sense. Moreover, I would propose, the use of the tale of the journey and the goddess character reflects concerns raised within her speech. In other words,

it can be seen that the use of the narrative form, and the particular narrative that appears, are neither cosmetic trappings nor simple allegory; they cannot be separated from the meaning of the fragments, and vice-versa. The presentation of the story of the journey, and the fact that the discussion of roads of inquiry, to eon, etc. occurs within a speech by a certain goddess, reflect philosophical concerns, and have significant philosophical implications. I will now attempt to draw out what these concerns and implications are, by focusing on how they are reflected.

We may begin with the first line of fragment 1, "The mares that carry me as far as my (their?) spirit (thumos) might reach," for here we find the first indications of several important themes. For one thing, the fact that the indicative verb is in the present tense would seem to imply that the narrator's journey continues; no ultimate destination or terminus is mentioned. When the goddess will counsel him regarding roads of inquiry, she will not identify anything specifically as an endpoint to any of them, nor will she represent her own advice as the goal of the narrator's journey.

We should also note that the narrator is being carried; he does not move under his own power. The initial impetus for the voyage does seem to originate within him; it comes from thumos, spirit or perhaps desire. (This might be the mares' thumos, but the term is more frequently used with

respect to humans.) The human as a whole, or the other parts or aspects that a human is supposed to have, cannot necessarily control or exert influence on the thumos, but nonetheless to attribute a human's direction to the thumos would be to imply that this direction is not wholly determined by forces other than that human. Yet in fragment 1, we see a case where following such a direction involves the assistance and guidance of other, non-human and superhuman (divine) beings, namely the mares (which from their description and from the path they take seem not to be ordinary horses), the daimon of the road the horses follow (1.3; this figure may be identical with the thea, the goddess, who speaks), the sun-maidens (Heliades, 1.9), Ilike, Themis, and the goddess who speaks. Not only does the narrator not travel under his own power, but he seems not to step out of his chariot; it appears that he never touches ground in the domain of the goddess (there is no mention of his getting out of the chariot when she takes his hand, 1.22-23), and that he does not set foot on the road that carried him there.

The pertinent implications of this striking feature, I think, are these. Although the impetus and initial direction of the journey come from the narrator in some sense, the specific path taken and the movement itself depend on other factors. The voyage is not made through human effort or action, or not through that alone. What the

"young man" (koûr', 1.24), the narrator, undergoes, perceives, and accomplishes is not simply a matter of work done by him. Where he goes, what happens to him, and what he becomes aware of are due largely to the influence of entities other than himself, entities he does not control or influence, and which (in that they are superhuman) he most probably does not understand. Because he also does not touch the ground over which he is conducted, nor the ground on which he receives the counsel of the goddess, he does not directly perceive, or is not in direct contact with, that which supports his movements or that which fosters the activities and speech of the goddess. What he will learn, and the information he will receive, will therefore be in some sense mediated; he is not in direct contact with all of that on which they are based. If he goes on to pursue inquiries in a way that takes into account the goddess's injunctions, there will be something in his efforts that he does not make or control, and something in what he learns that he will not understand - namely its basis or source.

But why not? Why might the goddess's speech be presented in such a context? Why a speech by a goddess at all? I will discuss presently what I think are some ramifications of the uses of different and "opposite" sorts of characters (immortal and mortal, superhuman or divine and human, female and male) in the fragments. First, though, I wish to look at the narrative context of the goddess's

speech, and at the fact that the fragments involve such a speech with such a context at all.

As we have seen, the goddess makes her presentation to a human who has been brought by chariot to where she lives. The human is apparently male, for she addresses him as "koûr'", "young man", at 1.24⁷. The dwelling of the

⁷This expression need not be taken to imply that the narrator is young in age, nor that the poet was young when he wrote, nor that the poem recounts an experience that the poet had in his youth. As Matthew Cosgrove points out in "The Koûros Motif in Parmenides: B 1.24" (Phronesis 19, no. 1 (1974): 81-94), the term 'koûros' may mean something like "initiate", or else "inexperienced one"; Cosgrove finds in Parmenides' narrator a contrast with Homer's Odysseus, who is often described as having seen and borne a great deal.

I cannot agree with Cosgrove that the goddess's injunction at 7.2-6 not to allow "much-experienced habit" (ethos polupeiron) to force him along a certain road must imply that the narrator has not (or that the goddess considers that he has not) had much experience of that habit. Indeed, her calling the habit "polupeiron" may indicate that the goddess thinks that the human has had quite a bit of involvement with the habit. Or the expression may simply be a reflection of the fact that something that one has done once or twice, that one has not become accustomed to doing, is not a habit, not an ethos. To have, or to live according to, an ethos involves that one act in a certain way repeatedly or continually. If something is an ethos, it would seem to have to be polupeiron.

The goddess could be enjoining her visitor not to develop a certain habit. But her language seems more likely to be suggesting that she is telling him to resist habit, or the effects of habit, that is already in place. (She does not say, "Do not get into the habit of following this road," but rather, "Do not let habit force you along this road.") This may be a clue as to senses in which the narrator might be considered a koûros: First, he would seem to lack experience in, and perhaps prior awareness of, the ideas to which the goddess will expose him and the road of inquiry she will discuss in fr. 8. With respect to those things, he would seem to be new and uninitiated. Second, let us suppose that he does resist the force of more usual human habit, that he does not accept what that habit suggests he do or conceive, that he does not assume that what he gathers from observations and custom gives him an accurate and adequate

goddess is some distance beyond (i.e. on the other side from where humans live) the gates of the paths of night and day (1.11), and according to the goddess "far away from the beaten path of humans" (1.27). Unusual as it is for a human to arrive in this place, the goddess considers that "no bad moîra.../ But [rather] [Themis and [Dike" has sent him on this road. Indeed, in order for him to be able to reach the goddess, Dike had to allow him to pass through the gates, and this the Heliades were able to persuade her to do (1.14-17).

With respect to their roles as the "opposites" of one another, night and day will be discussed below. Here, though, I will look at their general status as entities that humans might think of as fundamental to the composition and ordering of the universe and of lives within it.

At 8.53-61 and in fragment 9, the goddess identifies night and light (which admittedly is not the same as day, but which would seem to have some intimate connection with day) as two entities that mortals invoke in order to name or indicate what appears to them. In fragment 9, she says that all things have been named light and night, and that all things contain or involve both. I have found no evidence that any person or group in or known to the Greek-speaking

account of what goes on. Then he will not be functioning like a "man of experience" or like one whose awareness is informed by accepting observations and customary assessments at face value.

world of the early fifth century is known to have made explicit a view such as the goddess depicts⁸. However, I think it can be said that for the Greeks as well as for others of their acquaintance, light/night and day/night distinctions were of considerable importance. We cannot see in unbroken darkness, and what breaks darkness is light, the most powerful and revealing version of which occurs during the day. We also cannot see in undifferentiated illumination; we see objects only when something darker than the light blocks some of it. We could not touch or move anything without both the solidity the goddess associates with night (8.59) and the presence of something ethereal and

⁸While humans may tend to take light and night, or day and night, as fundamental features in their (our) lives, this of course does not imply that they believe - as the goddess says in fragments 8 and 9 that they do or did - that light and night are basic (the most basic?) factors or forms of all things. In the "Preliminary Implications" chapter I have argued that the view of inquiry and its requisites that the goddess presents can plausibly be understood to imply a criticism not only of the specific beliefs that she attributes to mortals, but also of all beliefs of certain kinds. I have also argued there that at least some mortals have held beliefs of the relevant kinds.

The aspects of these beliefs for which I have found implicit or explicit criticism in Parmenides' fragments include the assumption that we can know and describe how that which is is independently of our conceptions of it, or across all contexts, or unconditionally; the assumption that the way in which we conceive and describe that which is will enable us to give an accurate and adequate account of that which is; and the assumption that we can provide a unified account of that which is, in such a way that we can at the same time and in the same terms account for our own makeup and perspective. I think that I have also shown that these criticisms have some justification. Later in the present chapter I will examine other problems that beset the view that the goddess attributes to mortals, and which also beset other, relevantly similar views.

"mild" (unresistant?) of the sort the goddess connects with light (8.56-58). These may be among the reasons why the goddess might identify "light" and "night" as fundamental to mortals' ways of addressing what is (or what we say is); in that we identify "seeing" and "things seen", "touching" and "things touched", and some version of what the goddess calls "light" and "night", that "light" and "night" seem to be fundamental to what we say goes on.

Night and day (and light as an indicator or crucial feature of day) may also be seen as fundamental to our conception through the roles they play in the ordering of our lives. Each is associated with certain activities and tasks, and frequently what is to be done during the day is not to be done during the night and vice-versa. Sometimes these divisions are made on the basis of a need for light (as in sewing), for darkness (as in sneaking into an enemy camp), for warmth (outdoor work in cold climates), or for coolness (outdoor work in hot climates may take place at night or twilight). In other cases the reasons for and the significance of an activity's association with day or with night may be more complex if equally strong, and there the roles, in our sense of what is right or appropriate, of custom and belief are perhaps more evident. An example of this might be the fact that some customs and religious traditions specify that a given day of the week runs from sunset to sunset, others from sunrise to sunrise, still

others from sunrise to sunset (a night is not considered to be part of a "day" in any sense); some operative agreements that we might call customs, e.g. postmarking in the U.S., take a "day" to run from 12:01 AM to the following 12:00 AM, and a "night" to run from 5:01 PM to 8:59 AM.

In all of these cases, though, it has been deemed essential to identify something as "night" and something as "day", and to make sure that certain activities are uniquely associated with each one. This assessment can safely be said, I think, to involve themis (custom, the articulation of right, the invocation and agreement on of an idea of the appropriate) integrally. We may see the involvement of themis more clearly if we consider that the activities assigned to day and those assigned to night tend to be assigned at the same time to a particular group or person within a society. Not only might planting be assigned to "day" or to "night", but there tend as well to be rules as to who should or who may do it. In some societies, only men may plant, in some only women; in some only women who are (or who are not) pregnant; in some it is children, in some the elderly; in some this varies by crop; in some a combination of these groups will plant.

Thus in going beyond the gates of the roads of night and day, and in getting far from the beaten path of humans, the narrator is going to a source of some fundamental human beliefs and customs, to a source of something that is

significant in our lives and our awareness and that we distinguish as something to which our customs are a response. He is also going beyond the habitations where these customs and beliefs arise and are used for living, for inquiry, and so on. In fact, he seems to have traveled beyond all human cities, and thus does not find himself in the milieu of any of the various systems of customs and beliefs that have arisen. He has traveled the road of a "daimon who through every city bears the man of understanding" (1.3); this description would seem to imply that the daimon's action is not dependent on or tied to anything (e.g. a system of beliefs or mores) that pertains to a particular city and not to others. (This daimon may or may not be the same as the goddess (thea) who speaks; we do have a pronoun in 1.3 that seems to indicate that the daimon is female.)

Yet the koûros is admitted to the realm of the goddess by Dike, and the goddess assures him that she welcomes him as one who has been sent on the road to her by [T]hemis and [D]ike. The first inference that I think we may draw from this is that she, and perhaps Parmenides, considers the narrator's journey to be something that is appropriate or right or good for him to be engaging in, something that does not attempt to flout or to sabotage the order of what is. That he has gone far away from the beaten path of humans would seem to indicate that according to the

goddess at very least, either humans' notions of what it is right or appropriate for them to do are inaccurate or incomplete or both; or else the narrator is a rare or unique human, for whom things are appropriate that would not be so for others. Or perhaps the goddess means both of these things. At any rate there seems to be a challenge to examine traditional beliefs (or one's understanding of them and of their implications) about what is right or appropriate, and even - in that the day/night distinction can be traced or surpassed - beliefs about what exists at all. The challenge would in part be to try to understand the meanings of these beliefs and conceptions, and to see what they do and what they do not do; and in part to try to see whether they can and whether they should be extended or modified.

The goddess's language in fragment 1 may suggest that her meaning is something stronger than this. I would like to propose that there may be a second implication of the portrayal of the koûros as having been "sent forth" (not just suffered or allowed) by [D]ike and [T]hemis to travel a road far from humans' more usual ways. It is that in some way [D]ike and [T]hemis not only allow journeys beyond what human life and awareness usually focus on, but can also point the way, or even send a person, beyond the usual. That is, I would offer that [D]ike and [T]hemis might be understood not merely to permit that "movement", but to foster it or even to help bring it about. For one thing, the

goddess (and perhaps Parmenides by having her say what she does) might be implying that it is the dike (appropriate way, proper prerogative) of mortals to seek and to inquire, and to desire to do so. In that we are mortals, it is our dike to have lacks, needs, and desires; but we also have the ability to inquire, and the ability to see where at least some inquiries have failed. Perhaps these are what have brought the koûros to where he can hear a discussion of inquiry and its requisites.

In the context of the "sending" of the young man by [T]hemis and [D]ike we may note as well that it is through themis that we articulate and realize our notions of the divine, of the mortal, of the relations between the two, of what we are to do in light of these things, and of what the meaning of these actions could be. I do not suggest here that themis reveals to us all that we can know about these issues, but only that it presents them initially. Certain remarks that the goddess makes seem to hint that she too thinks that her auditor can go further in his learning than the point to which [T]hemis has brought him: she announces at 1.28-32 that he is to "hearken to everything,/ Both the ...heart of...[T]ruth/ And the opinions of mortals", but then does not in the extant fragments, or perhaps at all, enumerate any such thing. Rather, she speaks of roads of inquiry, which suggests that he is to do some seeking of his own. At 7.5-6, she tells him to "distinguish (judge) for

yourself by means of logos a much-contesting refutation/ Out of what I said." Especially in that it follows an injunction against following habit, this seems a strong indication that the goddess thinks it not only tolerable but appropriate and needful that the young man go beyond what he has been told and what he might already have accepted. His doing this is evidently due at least in part to his own efforts and capabilities. We should not forget that the impetus for the journey seems to have come from the human's thumos.

As we have seen, though, the goddess is herself in some sense a figure of themis. That is, a person from a place that did not share the sort of customs and beliefs of fifth century Greeks might not conceive of goddesses, or might not in a situation similar to the narrator's take it that he or she was encountering a goddess (or passing through the gates of the roads of Night and Day, etc.), or might not come to be in a similar situation at all. And someone with radically different customs and beliefs, and with a different way of conceiving of what was appropriate, might be far from writing (and from seeing a reason or need to write) a poem like that of Parmenides. No one would be without themis, in the sense that all of us who would inquire have been raised or educated with a set of ways of identifying things, rules of conduct, social goals and standards, forms of and strictures on expression, and so on. Whether we are comfortable with these or not, we must make

use of them in daily living, and they have effects on us to which we react in some way or other.

We might seek to investigate, to understand, and to evaluate these customs and beliefs through philosophy. But as we have seen, this poses some problems. Indeed, the need to investigate what we get from themis can arise even in inquiries that do not start as investigations of themis, because our identifications of the things we investigate - the preliminary or most basic identifications that we must agree on in order to have any field of research at all - must be accepted before investigation of them. That is, we do not before beginning our research know the ultimate meaning and validity of the categories and principles we will use in the research. We could not investigate those categories by using the same ones, for that would evade the question, and to investigate them by means of others would move the question. As we have seen, we do not know that what we say is is what there is. Moreover, if the goddess is correct, the most basic suppositions required for investigation (that we can identify what is sought and what is not that, e.g.) would seem to engender paradoxes. For in or for inquiry we must apparently make use of distinctions, yet we must apparently also hold that something that does what is attributed to [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira is in effect, and this would bind to eon to be (or to have to be said and taken to be) one, continuous, whole, devoid of

divisions, etc. And this conclusion would be derived by making use of distinctions, sequences, and all of the things that the binding would have to be taken to preclude. In her discussion of the requisites of inquiry, the goddess seems to imply that what appears to be the basis of inquiry, namely our customary distinctions, is also the basis of its limitations and a source of paradox. Yet she herself, or her appearance in the fragments, is also presented through themis.

I would like to propose that the structure of the poem (in so far as we can see it in the fragments) reflects an acknowledgment of the role and effects of themis, and that is so doing it allows us to confront inquiry as a problem. I would like to suggest as well that the context in which this structure presents the goddess's speech reflects considerations that we have seen to be implied by or consonant with her speech. If we are to try to find out as much as we can about what Parmenides might have meant, or what he might have been interested in, we must look to the totality of the fragments.

Simply put, the goddess's speech appears within a narrative, a story. This story is apparently told by a human: 'koûros' generally refers to a human, and in any case the goddess discusses roads of inquiry for the koûros to follow or not; divine beings, including the goddess herself, would tend not to be supposed to be involved in seeking, as

they are supposed to be self-sufficient. The human narrator uses language and invokes beliefs and customary attitudes that would be familiar to residents of fifth-century Greek cities. As would not be unusual for a character in such a story, so does the goddess. (It may even be the case that the narrator himself is a character in a story, if fragment 1 does not mark the beginning of the original poem.) Thus the content of the goddess's speech must be understood to have a context: it is given in a speech attributed to a goddess. The speech itself, or the recital of the speech, also has a context, as given by the narrative.

Therefore there is no reason to assume that we should take the speech to have been meant unconditionally or across all possible contexts. (As we have seen, what the goddess says points up fatal problems for the belief that we can know that what we say and take to be the case is in fact the case independently of our conceptions and across all contexts.) We would do well to recall that in order to understand what the goddess says in any degree at all, we must employ a certain language and a certain set of beliefs or conceptions. These are the language and conceptions that inform the framing narrative. What I am suggesting is that the framing narrative gives the reader, or reminds the reader of, or focuses attention on, that language and set of beliefs. Parmenides does not present the content of [what is presented as] the goddess's speech all by itself; instead,

he places it within a milieu constituted by the kind of framing or foundational assumptions that people accept (or at least use) before inquiring. These beliefs, expressions, and ways of thinking are examples of the starting-point or background for inquiry in two ways. First, they include the language, definitions, and identifications that we are to use in inquiring. Second, they include assumptions about what is that appear to leave something to be sought, that do not immediately reveal all to us; and that may themselves become subjects of inquiry.

What might be the effects of framing the goddess's speech in this way? For one thing, the goddess would not have to worry about whether the form of her injunctions and arguments (use of multiple words, etc.) conflicts with what she says must be said and taken to be the case in or for inquiry; as we have seen, she does not seem to be engaged in inquiry herself, and at any rate divine beings would seem not to need to inquire (thus she is unlikely to have discovered by means of inquiry that which she will present to the narrator). As she does not seem to be using inquiry to provide an argument about the foundations of inquiry, no circularity or infinite regress must be implied. In addition, if she is not engaged in inquiry, the conflicts between what she enjoins as requisite for inquiry and truth and the form in which she expresses these things need not make what she says meaningless or invalid. We have already

seen that if we were to investigate whether what she says about inquiry or about [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira is true or valid, we would have to engage in inquiry ourselves, and would therefore have to take to be the case all that makes inquiry possible. In this way some assumptions would always be left uninvestigated, and the requisites for inquiry would not be shown unconditionally. That is a problem for mortals, but not necessarily for the goddess.

But the goddess is a figure in a poem written by someone who presumably was a human, a mortal. When humans conceive of goddesses, these conceptions are informed by customs, traditions, and common beliefs. Therefore, it may be observed, the paradoxes and incoherences that arise because of the relationship between that which inquiry seemed to require and that which is presented by the terms used to discover and to express those requisites - these problems are not obviated or avoided for the narrator or the poet just because it is a goddess who discusses the roads of inquiry. In fact, as I will argue below, these problems are not obviated or avoided at all. At the same time, the use of the narrative form does seem to avoid one problem, and in so doing it illuminates others.

The fact that the goddess's speech is embedded in the tale of the journey means that this speech need not be understood as applying, or as being meant to be valid (and known to be valid) across all contexts or independent of the

way in which we conceive of what is, or independent of any particular system of beliefs or language. In this way the presentation of the speech allows it not to encounter the pitfalls that we have seen to plague declarations (on the part of humans) that were supposed to be unconditionally true or valid. We need not presume that the assumptions and structures and beliefs invoked in the goddess's remarks are known to be true, or that the poet believes that they are known to be true. The goddess's remarks are presented within a narrative that invokes or that has its foundation in certain human ways of thinking or of conceiving of what is; moreover, they appear within an account, within something that is a production in words. The context in which the speech is situated within (or as part of) the fragments reveals something of the conceptual context in which it is based.

Thus the fragments do not seem to ask that we assume that what the goddess says is true or valid or viable independent of all ways of conceiving and across all contexts, nor that we assume that the beliefs and conceptions which it uses or on which it is based are known to be true or valid independent of the way in which we construe things. Instead they show us within a narrative form (where contradictions and paradoxes do not necessarily undermine a story as story) some ways of looking at what is that afford us notions of what we inquire about.

Put another way, the basic identifications, distinctions, and assumptions that we use in inquiry, and the beliefs about what there is to inquire about, are things we originally accept in that they seem plausible, allow us to communicate, form the basis of what is shared within a community, and seem to afford some predictive success. Perhaps they express what some or all in a community want in a universe. It is only once we have accepted the use of such a system that inquiry can or may begin. In thinking about what might be required for inquiry, we would also be using that system. Inquiry and the problem of inquiry are presented in the fragments as arising (or at least as being subjects of discussion) from and within such a system - indeed, from and within a system exemplified by the conceptions that appear in the framing narrative. Instead of taking foundational assumptions or customs or linguistic relationships for granted, and instead of dismissing the possibility or importance of their potential effects, Parmenides seems to be acknowledging them, and to be calling his readers' attention to them. As we have seen, this acknowledgment and focus would be consonant with an acknowledgment of the reasons why paradoxes and incoherences arose when customary (or any) distinctions were used to derive an idea of what must be said and taken to be the case in or for inquiry.

Simply acknowledging one's beliefs (in so far as one

is aware of them and can articulate them) and acknowledging the fact that they are beliefs does not make the paradoxes and incoherences disappear, nor does it enable one's inquiries to avoid them. I would not assert that Parmenides intended to give us a way to overcome or to avoid these difficulties, nor (as we have just seen) that he would claim to have overcome or avoided them himself. I will now look briefly at what Parmenides has the goddess identify as that which mortals believe, and to show briefly what might be the problems inherent in such beliefs. I would like to suggest that these problems are bound up with the source of the paradoxes and incoherences, as much as they are bound up with the grounds of and reasons for inquiry.

It is in fragment 8 after line 50, and in whatever fragments succeed 8, that the goddess presents what she describes as the opinions of mortals. As we have seen, while the view she portrays is not one that anyone known to fifth-century Greeks can be shown to have stated explicitly, it does have some things in common with fundamental conceptions and assumptions that would have been familiar to fifth-century Greeks, and that would arguably be familiar to us today. It is noteworthy, I think, that the tale of the journey in fragment 1 invokes day and night and hence light and night, the features the goddess says that mortals take to be fundamental; as well as male and female (the koûros along with the mares and female divinities). The goddess

mentions male and female beings in fragment 12, apparently in a discussion of reproduction and birth; and mentions Eros, who is associated with romantic or sexual attraction, in fragment 13.⁹

It seems to me that light and night as they are described in fragments 8 and 9 have something in common with what is suggested about male and female in fragment 12 and conceivably 13. Each pair seems to be understood (by the mortals the goddess refers to) as a pair of opposite and in some way complementary entities that comprise or exhaust something. Animals that are not born male are born female, we say, and vice-versa. (Earthworms, which have two sets of reproductive organs each, are said to be both male and female - not neither.) If "all things have been named light and night" (9.1) and "nothing has a share in neither [light

⁹It might be objected here that Eros has to do with all romantic and sexual attraction, not just that between individuals of different sexes. I do not by any means dispute this. My point is not that attraction or sexual relations requires participants of opposite sexes, but rather that what is required is that participants be of some sex or other. That is, the attraction associated with Eros seems to be something felt by someone of a particular sex, as (though not necessarily only because of being) one of that sex, for someone of a particular sex, as (though not necessarily only because of being) one of that sex. Eros seems to be associated with sexual specificity. Moreover, it is often said that participants in a relationship of the sort associated with Eros take parts that are in some way complementary to one another; or that each participant desires the other as complementary. The notion of complementarity, or of opposing parts that are supposed to exhaust or to compose a whole, is one that I will show to be crucial to the kind of view that the goddess attributes to mortals.

nor night]" (9.4), then those aspects or parts of things that are not of or do not contain light are of or contain night, and vice-versa. What might be the problems with these conceptions? Why might the goddess consider the opinions of mortals (or her account of these) to be a "deceptive order" - and in what sense or context might her view be plausible? Why might she claim that there is "no true assurance" (1.30) in mortals' opinions? Put another way, why might these opinions ascribed to mortals not be able, or not be able to be taken, to be in keeping with (or to form the basis of) a viable road of inquiry?

We have already seen one problem with the notion of exhaustive complementary opposites: If we assume that we are comprised or constituted by such opposites, the question arises whether we could know that the assumption was true. For it could be the case that whatever comprises us causes us to be mistaken as to what we are, or as to what anything is, or as to the adequacy and accuracy of the notion that "things" "exist" (or that subject-predicate formulations allow us to conceive of that in relation to which we wish to use them). Or, put another way, to claim that we know what it is that causes or constitutes our awareness would seem to require that we be able to grasp and inquire into that awareness independently of that awareness, which would seem to be impossible or at least inconceivable.

However, there are other and I think more

fundamental problems with the claim that what is is comprised of or constituted by exhaustive complementary opposites. Let us consider first the goddess's remark at 8.54 concerning an error that she says mortals have made. They have laid down two opinions or judgments to specify appearances or forms, and one of these, she says, "necessarily is not [to be named]". She may mean that either light or night in particular is inappropriate to specify; or she may mean that naming or asserting the existence of even one of them is an error. The surviving text does not provide any clear evidence of a problem pertaining to either light or night in particular, although in 8.59 night is called "adae", "obscure" or "unlearnable", for reasons that are not stated. However, if light, or naming light, is acceptable, night or something like it would seem to have to be invoked, as we have seen. That is, if we are to be able to claim that we see anything, that there are or seem to be things that have weight or solidity or opaqueness, or that light can be distinguished at all, it seems that we must claim that something like what is called "night" exists. Similarly, if night or naming night is not a problem, then it seems we must also name light or something like it.

This suggests that it is not correct, or not part of the right path, to name either light or night. At least part of the problem with naming either one, or with specifying that either one exists, is that if we specify one, we must

also accept the other, and that duality or distinction is a problem, as we have seen. In or for inquiry, we must say and take it that what is is (and where light is, night cannot at the same time be, and vice-versa), and that it is one and without divisions, distinctions, or companions. For reasons having to do with [D]ike, [A]nanke, and [M]oira, nothing divided or non-single can be, or be said and taken to be (in or for inquiry), all that is. A further difficulty has to do with complementarity or the implied negation. To distinguish anything means that it is not all that is, and the basis of the distinction cannot be articulated in terms of the entities distinguished by that distinction, for they depend on the distinction's being in place. For that reason it seems we could not know whether in fact the complementaries were exhaustive or even coherent; we could not say exactly what they were at all. Put another way, a distinction that is taken to be unconditional, or to hold or to be in effect unconditionally or independent of our conceptions, would not be able to be accounted for or explained completely, for it would not depend on anything else nor reduce to anything else. (It could perhaps be re-expressed in terms of other unconditional distinctions, but then these would have the same problem.) On the other hand, if all distinctions were taken to hold only conditionally then we could not know that any had been achieved, or that they could be achieved. In some sense, we would have to say that they could not be

achieved.

These then are problems that arise from the general structure, the underlying conceptual scheme, of the kind of opinions the goddess attributes to mortals. If we do not wish to use these opinions or their conceptual framework in or for inquiry, we may not encounter the problems, or it may be acceptable for us to evade or ignore them in some way. For example, our customary categories and kinds, and uses of negation, may well serve (or may appear to serve well enough) the purposes associated with myths, histories, and cookbooks. It is when we try to use terms and ways of conceiving such as the goddess mentions in or for inquiries, when we try to use them to seek truth, that the problems become problems.

But we use distinctions all of the time in inquiry, and complementarities (invoked by negations) must then be involved too. As we have seen, we could not identify a subject of inquiry, nor follow steps in inquiring, without such things. I have been using them in writing this. The goddess's arguments to the effect that in or for inquiry to eon will not abide (or cannot be taken to abide) such distinctions relied on distinctions and negatives. Paradoxes arise on at least two levels. First, the arguments for why it is that on the apparently viable road of inquiry, to eon must be or be taken to be one, continuous, incompatible with

time progression, etc., are presented in terms that involve (or depend on notions of) multiplicity, change, negation, and so on. If we suppose that things are the way we normally say they are, it seems that in order for inquiry to be (or to be taken to be) possible, we must suppose that what is is incompatible with those things (which we had taken to comprise or to constitute it). If we suppose that inquiry is possible, that to eon is such as to render it possible, then we will need to be able (or to take it that we are able) to identify what we are looking for, what we are looking at, what is not that which we are looking for, etc. We will need to be able or to take it that we are able to pass through steps or stages in our inquiry; and so on. Moreover, merely to say that "what is is" would seem to invoke distinctions and multiple words. Thus if we take it that to eon is as the goddess says it is bound to be on that road of inquiry, we must also use terms and conceptions that are incompatible with that. What then could the goddess mean in apparently exhorting her pupil to follow that road? Or, what might Parmenides mean in portraying her as doing so? In what sense could the road be viable for inquiry?

Let us now outline a second level of paradox which seems to follow from the first. As was discussed at some length in the chapter on preliminary implications of the binding of to eon, the incompatibility between the way to eon as such must be taken to be in or for inquiry, and the

nature of the particular things generally said to exist, means that any term used to describe both is used ineluctably equivocally. This is the case because the verb 'to be' must be used equivocally if we would use it in reference to to eon as well as in reference to particular things said to exist - as we have seen that we must, in or for inquiry. To eon must be taken, in or for inquiry, to be unique, undivided, and unaccompanied, for example. Not only is it the case that particular things said to exist are supposed to be multiple, and in most cases divisible (and certainly the totality of them must be said to be divisible), but given the binding of to eon they cannot be taken to be parts, aspects, or companions of to eon. In order to be a particular thing said to exist, then, a thing must be able to be distinguished from others (that which is not it must also be said to exist and to be conceivable), whereas in or for inquiry to eon cannot be like that. In order for to eon to be taken to be, in or for inquiry, it must not be taken to be like particular things. And to eon cannot be taken to exist alongside of, or in a way that includes, particular things, because it must be taken to be unaccompanied, uniform, and continuous.

It might be objected here that perhaps there is a sort of commonality between the being of to eon and the being of particular things said to exist; or that perhaps they are both like the same other entity (but in different

ways). I do not think that either of these suggestions gets rid of the equivocation; they merely try to move it. If we said that there was some commonality between the being of to eon and that of particular things, we would then have to try to account for the existence of that commonality as well as for the other "two"; we would have to find a fourth term common to all three, and so on, as we saw in the case of negation. And at any rate, nothing could coherently be said to be an ingredient or element of to eon, in or for inquiry. The same thing would happen if we were to say that the being of each was like the same other entity; we would have to account for the relationships among the three, which would require further terms which would themselves have to be accounted for through other terms, and so on.

It should also be remarked that simply to say that to eon is, that what is is, might also be taken to involve an equivocation. First, 'to', 'the', is a neuter singular article; as we have seen, to eon cannot be taken, in or for inquiry, to be singular in the ways that particular things are taken to be singular. Second, it seems that the second 'is', or 'esti' in the Greek, is distinct (at least conceptually) from the first 'is' (which itself is presented as distinguishable from the 'what') or the 'eon'. Yet to eon as that which is, as all that is, cannot coherently be taken to admit of, let alone to derive or to be the source of, such distinctions, if inquiry and truth are to be taken to

be possible (much less if they are to be possible).

Thus the paradoxes are paradoxes, and not avoidable contradictions. (This may be part of why Parmenides presents the discussion of inquiry in the speech of a goddess - whose understanding need not, or should not, depend on inquiry - within the framework of a narrative. Narratives can mention things that may be contradictory or paradoxical or fantastic. Also, the fact that the remarks on inquiry are not stated directly, e.g. as a treatise, means that the poet need not himself present them as the result of inquiry.) If we would inquire into anything said to be (including to eon itself), we must employ distinctions, identifications, steps, and so on. At the same time, in order for inquiry to be taken to be possible, we evidently - on the basis of reasoning that employs distinctions - must take it that to eon exists and is utterly incompatible with distinctions, steps, and so on.

Moreover, this study has used distinctions and reasoning that invokes them. It has also attempted to discover and to present what might be called true or valid relationships. Does this undermine its conclusions? I would propose that in calling these conclusions into question, it reinforces or illuminates them. That is, if I were to hold that I can know that what I say is is what is, independent of my conceptions, or across all contexts, then my conclusions would be incoherent or contradictory. But I do

not hold that view, nor does anything I have said here imply it. Rather, I would suggest that if the conclusions about ineluctable paradoxes are considered problematic because of what has been said about the nature and implications of the invocation of distinctions, then the paradoxes remain. The problems would be evidence of the paradoxes.

Put another way, if all distinctions could be completely accounted for, they would all dissolve. But then no account would remain, and no identifications would be possible, as we have seen. On the other hand, if we accept distinctions in order to make identifications or indications for purposes of inquiry, some must remain intact at any given stage in the inquiry. As we have seen, we cannot coherently claim to know that the distinctions we invoke are valid, or they reflect accurate or adequate conceptions of anything, independent of our conceptions or across all contexts or unconditionally. Something must always remain opaque if meaning is to be possible. And if that is the case then the paradoxes must remain, or must be taken to remain.

How then could meaning be taken to be possible? Let us examine the sources of our distinctions and of the uses to which we put them. I have argued that the distinctions and identifications that we use in inquiry come to us through Themis, custom or what we take to be appropriate for living. Themis reflects some choices, desires, and exigencies, and we use it in service of others as well; it

is a kind of currency. It allows us to seek, by identifying things and showing them as ranged in certain relations and directions. It is a vehicle of the awareness of our needs and desires, in both senses: what we call our needs and desires seem to demand the possibility of identifying and seeking; and at the same time we would not be aware of needs and desires as such without the identifications and the evocations of direction. In some sense, it is through Themis that we take ourselves to be mortal, to be lacking; the opacities in our distinctions reflect this. (I do not imply that if we rejected themistes we would no longer be lacking.) Thus they reflect our desires (and hence our sense that there is complementarity, or that negation is meaningful) and needs, as well as a demand for seeking.

It may be, I think, that this sense is reflected in the characterizations that Parmenides uses in the fragments, especially in those of fragment 1. The horses, the sun-maidens, the goddess who speaks, Dike, Themis (if the reference in 1.28 is to the divinity), and apparently the daimon of 1.3 (who may be the goddess who speaks) are all female. Although the narrator is not portrayed as encountering any other figures directly, it is perhaps worth noting that all but one of the others mentioned in the fragments are female: Peitho, Aletheie (it is not clear whether these two are personified), [Alnanke], [M]oira, the daimon who "steers everything" in fragment 12, and

apparently whoever it is who does the creating or devising in fragment 13 (likely the daimon of fragment 12). The mares may be divine or immortal (they are evidently unusual), and the others certainly are. The narrator is male and human - opposite to the other characters and complementary at least as far as sex and social role. The only other male figure to appear in the extant fragments is Eros in fragment 13 (whose creator is said to be female), and he is generally associated with certain kinds of attraction, need, and desire. He is associated with perceived lacks and with seeking; what is taken to fill a lack is often felt to be that which is in some way complementary to what the seeker is or has.

It is not necessarily the case that the opposition or complementarity between the narrator and those he encounters must be meant to be romantic or sexual, although it may include that aspect or its possibility. However, it can be seen that humans of each sex customarily had roles, tasks, and/or spheres of activity that were distinct and often separated from those of the other sex in fifth-century Greek cities. To some extent this was also supposed to be true of divinities. In addition, immortals or divinities occupied a realm or dimension of existence different from that of humans, or did quite different things from mortals. What mortals could not do, immortals often could; and frequently if not always, the reason why something would be

impossible for mortals had to do with what immortals had laid down or done or created. Where some immortal could not or felt constrained not to do something (as we saw in the discussion of Prometheus Bound in the Ananke section), the reason tended to be the influence of another immortal, especially that of Ananke, Necessity or Constraint. We might perhaps say that Ananke is what determines the boundaries of (and between) the spheres of mortals and those of immortals.

I would suggest, then, that the narrator's journey beyond or toward the source of the usual sources of distinctions (cities, day and night) brings him to a realm that is in important ways outside of and opposite to that in which he would customarily or normally be involved. This brings his lacks or his impetus for seeking, and his mortal status, into focus. At the same time, it may hint that if the narrator would inquire into what is, or even if he would seek anything at all, he should not assume that his customary experience or his usual ways of construing it give him all that is relevant. Instead, it seems to be hinted, he should look also at that which his usual experience and awareness might not give him, at that in contrast to which his customary ways are set up or defined. This would be all the more important in that the divinities associated with the possibility of inquiry, and with the establishment and maintenance of the sort of society in which inquiry can

occur - Dike, Ananke, Moira, Peitho, and Aletheie

- were taken to be female. To travel outside of one's customary sphere or ways or focus of awareness should allow one to come to contemplate that which distinguishes that sphere from anything else, and hence perhaps to ask about what one means by "what is", to contemplate the roles of themis and habit in one's conceptions and actions, and to consider one's own role in inquiry.

But do the paradoxes suggest that the goddess (or Parmenides) would, or should, condemn inquiry as hopelessly compromised and counsel us to resign ourselves to some kind of acceptance of some uninvestigated themis? I do not think that we need to draw such a conclusion. She has presented conditions under which she says that inquiry can be taken to be possible; the question remains as to what the results of inquiries might be or mean. That inquiry is or seems to be possible does not necessarily imply that its results will be non-paradoxical, or that they will present to us unconditional truths or relationships that we can be certain obtain independent of our conceptions.

If the distinctions we must use in inquiry lead to paradoxes or involve opacities, then the results of inquiries will be in some way conditional or relational; they will depend on the conceptions and ways of thinking that are used. What we discover will be discovered

contingent on, or in the context of, the themis in which our identifications and distinctions originate. But we need not cease to investigate on discovering this. We can look into those contexts; we can acknowledge them and try to find out what they presuppose and what their effects are. This may involve further inquiries, and it can also involve other activities and ways of being aware. In so far as further inquiries are called for, it does not seem that any will yield uncontextualized results, and therefore no particular end for the series of inquiries may be in sight. (It may be relevant to note here that the narrator of fragment 1 implies that his journey is still in progress after he has heard what the goddess has to say.) However the cumulation of the various inquiries would be a calling into question of some contexts from the points of view of others, and therefore would provide a reflection of a complex of relations and perspectives that would illuminate far more than a single inquiry could.

An important implication of this acknowledgment of the role of themis is that it poses what we would call matters of what exists (what might today be called the "metaphysical") and what we would call matters of purpose or direction or choice (the "ethical", perhaps) as in some ways interrelated, interdependent, and coeval or of the same origin. On the one hand, as we have seen, our identifications and distinctions, as well as the existence

of contexts in which inquiry might be possible, are embodied in themis. Even our distinction between what we say is and what we say should be, or between questions of what is and questions of right or of purpose, come from or through themis, through our customary ways of construal. And themis was associated with right or appropriateness. However that does not mean that questions of right, or humans' choices, are in all ways more fundamental, in our conception of what is, than anything else. Themis itself may be seen as reflecting wants, needs, and purposes, which themselves in some ways reflect what we take to be. Themis is only effective in that it does not violate, or try to ignore or contradict, or fail to reflect, that which we call what is. In these senses, then, concerns of right or purpose or choice or desire, and concerns pertaining to acknowledgment of what exists, are necessarily linked.

We may contrast this with the position taken by Descartes in Part Three of the Discourse on Method. There he assures the reader that during his attempt to doubt all that can be doubted, he will retain certain moral precepts. He does not consider whether in order to do that, he will have to retain any particular conceptions of what is, in order either to follow the moral precepts, or in order to be able to recognize those circumstances under which the precepts would demand some action on his part. Not only Descartes but anyone who thought that he or she was able through inquiry

to discover unconditional truths that could nonetheless be expressed in some language or other such that others could recognize the unconditional truths, would be subject to the same questions. That is, they could be challenged to say how they could be sure that they had put aside all conceptual conditions, and to say how, if they had done so, they could be sure that this had no effect on what they discovered. I am suggesting that Parmenides shows, in both the content and the structure of the fragments, the need for investigating the conditions under which we inquire.

The relational or contextualized quality of what we might discover was already suggested by the goddess's remark that on a road on which inquiry is possible, we must say and take it that what is is. She said that on such a road, a sign or signs indicate that what is is one, and that there is nothing else. We have seen that these ascriptions of existence seemed to involve equivocations. From this we can see as well that conceptions of totality, uniqueness, and unity invoke distinctions and divisions. To say and take it that what is is, and that it is one, is in important ways dialogical: it involves distinctions and a distinguisher; it involves speech or signs and conceptions, as well as a conceptual separation of the conceiver and what is conceived or indicated. Parmenides shows, I have argued, that in order to find out, or even to acknowledge or contemplate, what it means to say and take it that what is is, or what it means

for what is to be in any sense, we must take our own role in these conceptions into account: we must pose inquiry as a problem. If there is perhaps a loss of innocence involved, there is also a gain, not in experience necessarily, but in meaning.

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