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**The dominance of power—prospects for an Israeli withdrawal  
and the establishment of a Palestinian state: An examination of  
a zero-sum conflict**

**Ayed, Omar M., Ph.D.**

**City University of New York, 1987**

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


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THE DOMINANCE OF POWER  
PROSPECTS FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND THE  
ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE:  
AN EXAMINATION OF A ZERO-SUM CONFLICT

by

OMAR M. AYED

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
in sociology in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for a Doctorate in Philosophy, The  
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1987

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To all those who died for Palestine.  
To all those who die to achieve their  
just goals

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## Abbreviations

AIPAC	American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement
ARAMCO	Arabian American Oil Company
ASP	Arab Socialist Party
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
Ba'ath	The ruling party in power in Iraq and Syria
BSO	Black September Organization
CPL	Communist Party of Lebanon
CPP	Communist Party of Palestine
CPS	Communist Party of Syria
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
ECM	European Common Market
EEC	European Economic Community
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
HKJ	Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
JPS	Journal of Palestine Studies
NLF	National Liberation Front
OAPEC	Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PASC	Palestine Armed Struggle Command
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PDP	Popular Democratic Party
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-- General Command
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PMDs	Palestinian Minimum Demands
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNF	Palestine National Front
PNLM	Palestine National Liberation Movement/ Fateh
PNLM	Palestinian National Liberation Movement
PRM	Palestinian Resistance Movement
RDF	Rapid Deployment Force
Sa'iqā	Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War
SSNP	Syrian Socialist National Party
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN/UNO	United Nations Organization
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
U.S.	United States of America
WZO	World Zionist Organization.

## INTRODUCTION

This introduction will explain the reasons for conducting this study. It will also explain the importance of, and the need for researching the Arab-Israeli conflict. Other important aspects of this study included here are the need for a specific methodology that can explain the complex factors and their interrelatedness; and the effect of internal, regional, and international events on the development of the conflict and their implications for its solution.

Hundreds of books and articles were published in the last four decades examining the Arab-Israeli conflict. Some of them tried to understand and explain its roots, development, and dynamics. Others suggested solutions and advocated a peaceful settlement, whereas others examined the roles of the local, regional, and international powers in the continuation of this conflict.

This analysis tried to explain how important and how dangerous the situation is in the Middle East. This point is emphasized in this study which demonstrates that unless there is a solution that will satisfy the Palestinian's legitimate Minimum Demands the conflict will continue. Hence it might take on different forms and dimensions that could force the superpowers to get involved.

From the political point of view, this study is important for many reasons. The conflict is still going on, with all the dangers that may lead to. It is true that the Arabs have

given up their participation for now<sup>1</sup> but there is no guarantee that they will not change or that the Arab people may not turn against their governments in the future which could create radical regimes that will reemphasize the Arab-Israeli conflict for domestic reasons.

With the problem as hot as it is even after the dispersion of the PLO forces, given the indifference<sup>2</sup> internationally about the sufferings of the Palestinians, the problem is dangerous to all involved. The continuance of this conflict has very serious negative implications on the regional and international situations.<sup>3</sup>

#### 1. General View and Background:

1. The conflict has most severely affected the Palestinians. They are the ones who have been dispersed and who have endured suffering from the Israelis, Arabs, and Americans. They are still homeless and stateless. They are still not living as a people. They are represented by different people who themselves participated in increasing their suffering. Suffering and misery lead to discontent, rebellion, and revenge.

There is a moral consideration also. The Palestinians are being treated unfairly by being denied a nation state on the lands of their their forefathers. When people are treated unfairly and unjustly, they tend to be revolutionized.<sup>4</sup>

2. This unfair treatment of the Palestinians by the world has

threatened the peoples of the world. One hears often about a bomb or an attack in very diverse countries of the world. The world reacts with shock and surprise. Regardless of how one thinks of these actions by the Palestinians, their actions should and must have been expected., That is the only way left for the Palestinians to show the world that they are still there. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not at all different from what Fanon describes in The Wretched of The Earth. The goal of the oppressed "sets out to change the order of the World [which] is, obviously, in complete disorder."<sup>5</sup>

3.The events just mentioned, could start a war. The U.S. bombing in Libya, which was a result of one of these events, could have led to a war with the Arabs, particularly, Syria and Libya and the superpower that supported them, the Soviet Union. In another example, Israel used the attack on its ambassador to England as a pretext to invade Lebanon. The continuation of the conflict generates even more opportunities to allow this: "Sharon and others have accused the PLO offices in Jordan of directing the attacks on Israeli Jews and urged the government to attack Amman."<sup>6</sup>

4.From a purely political and social perspective, this continuation will ultimately lead to further troubles for the countries involved. With a large percentage of their national budgets devoted to military spending,<sup>7</sup> their development plans and systems will suffer. If we examine the budgets of the participating countries we see that their

development plans are failing or have been postponed or ignored altogether . All these problems are bound to remain and increase as long as the conflict is not solved.

This study attempts to clarify, examine, and assess the chances for solving this conflict. It attempts to examine the reasons why it was not solved so far and the factors that continue to prevent its solution. These reasons range from internal local and regional factors to global and international interests.

## 2.The Importance of The Study:

The elements listed above clarify the dangers on a practical level. Now I will examine the importance of this study from the academic, intellectual, and conceptual point of view. Because peoples' actions are an outcome or a byproduct of their opinions, this study aims to identify some of the conceptions that the involved parties have about each other as well as their misconceptions and the opinions.

1.It was found here discovered that there are many misconceptions on the part of the Arab people, governments and rulers about important and decisive aspects of the nature and structure of the American, Israeli and European societies and their political systems.

An example of these beliefs is the Arabs' idea of dealing directly with the administrations of the U.S. government<sup>8</sup> or the American public<sup>9</sup> forgetting that it is

"The power elite today [that is] the sole proprietor of the U.S. strategic policy.

Therefore any reference to the predominance of public opinion or pressure groups ...seriously underestimates the organic nature of American interests in this relationship [with Israel], just as it overlooks Israel's value to the elite as a strategic ally"<sup>10</sup>

Many also believe that there is a real difference between Likud and Labor in regard to the solution of the conflict.<sup>11</sup> These and other misconceptions determine the Arabs' view of the elements of the conflict that give direction to their political and diplomatic efforts and expectations will be examined carefully in the coming chapters. This research attempts to clarify and correct these beliefs and explain how the system works in these countries<sup>12</sup> which should help ruling groups in the Arab World rethink their decisions and beliefs and redirect their emphasis on the real targets of their influence.

Of course, this will not solve the problem, since "For in the long run even skillful diplomacy cannot completely compensate for great weakness"<sup>13</sup>

Most of the current literature about the conflict disregards these aspects of the conflict those who do (Mehdi, Said, Chomsky, Crawford, etc...)<sup>14</sup> deal with it on the basis that the Arabs can use their economic power to "convert" Americans, Europeans, and Asians to support their cause. Thus they disregard institutional and structural factors that preclude such attempts to influence these countries. This subject will be dealt with in the chapter about the United States' and Europe's roles in the conflict.

2. Like Chomsky, O'Brian and Hudson<sup>15</sup> this study incorporates an examination of all the factors that affect the conflict and all of its dimensions. The study also examines all participants' views and potential role in the creation of the problem and in their possible role for a settlement.

Most of the other studies emphasize only a few aspects of the conflict. The Arab's role<sup>16</sup> or Israeli peace groups and peace activities,<sup>17</sup> or Rafael's Destination Peace, or the Israeli internal political dispute as an indicator of the limit a government can go<sup>18</sup> Others study Camp David and its impact<sup>19</sup> and many others studies of Lebanon and its conflicts.<sup>20</sup> Very few take a more general and multidimensional approach to give the study a strong and complete perspective.

3. This study seeks to reemphasize elements of the conflict that have been intentionally ignored, dismissed, and/or forgotten, for example, the scope and territory of the Palestinian Demands. Most studies (1967-) treat the problem as if it is only referred to territories occupied after June 5, 1967,<sup>21</sup> only one study reemphasized the organic connection between the pre-1967 and the post-1967 territories viewing them as occupied territories. I will deal with this subject in the definition section and in the conclusion, where I will reemphasize this connection between the West Bank and Gaza and the rest of Palestine. I will

also examine the consequences of this reemphasise. It is important to keep that connection in mind. It is to be taken for granted that the Palestinians are seeking the return, and not the liberation, of the "occupied territories". This means the lands occupied since 1967 and not those occupied before, as if they were not occupied also.

4. This study also makes a strong contribution in defining the Palestinian Minimum Demands (PMDs) i.e. that the PLO would accept to allowing them renounce hostilities and recognize Israeli authority over the rest of Palestine.

After a systematic research and investigation of all the literature and events concerning the PMDs this study outlines, in the definition section, the clear and final geographical and political minimum demands. One of the major contributions of this study is that it will allow us to talk about Palestinian demands and know what they really include. In most other studies, even in pronouncements and speeches of PLO leaders, these demands are not made clear for a number of reasons: politics, public relations want of a clear perception<sup>22</sup> of what it is that the Palestinians really demand as a minimum for renouncing the rest of Palestine.

Researching the differences between the PLO organizations, their ideological and military strengths and weaknesses, their announced goals and commitments, and their local, regional and international support, I was able to extract the total sum of their minimum demands. Hence the

study can set forth a clear idea and precise demands that if met would lead to a solution of the conflict.

5. The institutional, structural, and objective factors that determine the development and outcome of the conflict are also examined. In other words, unlike most studies that deal with the conflict, this study emphasizes the role of the established institutions in the societies of all parties involved that have greater impact on the possible development of the conflict. Subjective declarations of leaders and policy-makers are not given the same weight that other studies or analyses give them because I think it is mostly the structural and institutional aspects of the nature and structure of each of the participating parties that either facilitate or hinder the accomplishments of peace rather than the beliefs and announcements of the leaders of those countries.

The Arabs, for example, always talk about liberating their lands and liberating Jerusalem. Their declarations and pronouncements and even intentions, are not supported with systematic and institutional structures to help them achieve their goals. Their desires will be considered as representing what they would like to do, but it does not mean, if we carefully study their societies, that they can do it. In each society there are institutions and objective, i.e. independent, systems and/or agencies that work independent of the ideas, beliefs, and goals of the

leadership. In this study these institutions are given their real weight in the way and scope of their impact on the conflict and its outcomes.

An example of this structural and institutional objective factor is the emergence of a strong Israeli army and military industry that requires the existence of an ever-ready armed society that will keep wake industry and its institutions important at all times. With a large percentage of the labor force employed in the military industries the chances are very slim that any government will be able to overcome this structural institutional barrier without losing the peoples' confidence and, therefore, its power.

Some of the governments of the countries involved have ignored these structural and institutional barriers to peace and think that if Israel did withdraw from the Sinai, it is capable as well of withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza, ignoring the objective and structural difference between the two areas.

This new emphasis on the institutional structures does not mean that the subjective declaration of the leaders of the governments or parties will be ignored. It means only that these institutions will be given a similar weight in determining the objective possibilities of peace in the region. Hence this study also examines the role of each, how each views the other, how each thinks that the conflict should and could be solved.

Because this study combines the political and historical examination of social and political events that effect the international and regional balance of power, it is, therefore, a comparative interdisciplinary study that bridges the formal gaps between the social sciences.

### 3. The Method Of Analysis:

This is a historical comparative study of a regional conflict that has survived for seven decades and it is still as violent as it was since its start. Involved in this conflict are local, regional, and international powers that have interests in the conflict, its outcome, and in the region itself. Changes inside the region are very important affecting international political, economic, and military forces and could generate unforeseen consequences that might endanger the whole world. Hence there are many factors not just one, that determines the situation. To account for all of these factors a multidimensional approach is necessary to analyse all relationships among the different factors. Because they are so interrelated, it is hard sometimes to notice which led to which.

In defense of this approach I would list the following observations that underline, determine, or accompany the actions of the participating forces:

1-On the socio-psychological level, we still see that it is the individual leaders or personalities that still determine most, if not all, of the major policies and actions in the

Middle East. Peres tried to minimize this (see his interview with Ted Koppel in Nightline October 17 1985).<sup>23</sup> In other words, kings, princes, leaders, and presidents, "personally" decide and determine what steps, strategic and tactical policies, should be made to deal with a national or international questions.

A good example is Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and Arafat's shift at the end of 1983.<sup>24</sup> This "personal" rule applies not only to the Arab side. It also applies to the Israeli "democratic" system. Although I will give more attention to this subject later when I talk about the Israeli political system,<sup>25</sup> the example of "Sharon's war" illustrates the point.

One implication of such personal power is that greed, hunger for power and prestige on the part of each individual leader may be all important and this makes the situation unpredictable. Very few, if any, had predicted Sadat's move in 1973 or 1977. This event alone gives credibility to this approach.

Another implication of the importance of the psychological and personal rather than the political and ideological commitments, is that it becomes harder to predict or anticipate their future actions or the limit to what they might do to perpetuate their physical, psychological, and political power. This fact could be overlooked if we were to dismiss the announcements and declarations of the leaders. That's why this study

emphasizes both structural objective realities and personal subjective decisions.

It also follows that personal and political competition between states and leaders becomes a major factor in creating a dramatic shift in the attitudes, tactics, and strategies of those leaders. In the case of Israel, the competition between Labor or Likud might force one of them to do the unexpected as in the case of Likud, which has been known to reject any compromises with the Arabs and any withdrawals from any occupied lands. Therefore, the belief that Labor is dovish or moderate could turn out to be wrong and costly. <sup>26</sup> To put it in a different way, Begin's "easy" acceptance of Sadat's initiative immediately after his election as a prime minister was, I think, a way to demonstrate to the Labor leaders and to the Israeli society that he is not less "dramatic" as a leader and can, unlike what was known about him, compete with the more "dovish" labor leadership. I don't believe that the Israelis became peace lovers immediately after and because of Begin's election. The peculiar circumstances that shaped Begin's political past and present, i.e. his personal experiences, and, of course, political and ideological challenges from Labor, led to this shift and a change in the Israeli public's attitudes towards Egypt. Sharon, Peres, Dayan, or any other could have done that if they were "personally" ready for this. It was not the readiness of the Israeli public.

A more recent movement was Peres' visit to Morocco, which was evaluated by many and found to be aimed at internal Israeli competition between the two major political parties to win the support of the large Moroccan community in the next elections.<sup>27</sup>

2-On the political level, what is called democracy in Israel or the United States is not, as I will show in the chapters on the Israeli and American political systems, at all true when it comes to representing the interests or attitudes of the public at least on the international level.<sup>28</sup>

This is important in the the Middle East. For example, representatives do what they think is good for the national interest and not what their constituents really think or want. The views of these two groups may differ widely and, therefore, people should not rely on the public polls or the public's perception of their own interest or role in steering the politics of their government.<sup>29</sup> From my research about the Israeli public's reaction to the Invasion of Lebanon, that if the Israeli public had the right to vote before the invasion of Lebanon they would have voted negatively but this did not prevent or stop the war. If the people, in Israel or America, do not want a war this does not mean that their leaders will not get involved in one.

The fact that there is a gap between the people's attitudes and the views and their leaders' decisions and actions, led the Arab leaders to give too much weight and importance to the American and Israeli publics'

demonstrations, strikes, and polls. that led them to reshape their policies and tactical actions, statements and thinking. They ignored the fact that the American and Israeli publics cannot influence the American and Israeli governments' policies all of the time.

The Vietnam experience, and the role played by the American public, is still alive in the minds of the Palestinians and the Arabs. They see it as a victory of the public over the government and a democratic condition that could be used against the American government, or at least to reshape it. Arabs and Palestinians gave so much weight to this idea that it gave rise to the policy of trying to influence American public opinion to achieve a similar goal.  
30

3-on the social level, this methodology recognizes that the structure of all of these societies had an important role to play in determining how far their leaders could go in carrying out governmental decisions that might contradict goals and interests within their society.

If a government decides to take a policy that contradicts the interests of the major classes in a society, these classes will resist the government's policies and will force a change of those policies. This does not contradict the fact that a government can pass any laws that are beneficial to the society or the government even if there was a strong resistance from the people. The critical line

between the two aspects is not easily found since these matters are dealt with on individual basis.

For example, The Egyptian rich and powerful class, as Salah Khalaf realized, has interests in the maintainance and expansion of the Camp David agreements and hence, will resist any governmental attempts to cancel them.<sup>31</sup> Their interests go beyond the state or the governmental policies. The rich classes of all the countries have similar interests and the political and ideological commitments of their respective governments do not interfere with these interests.

The role played by public opinion is also exemplified by the Israeli public. Unlike the Arabs or the Americans, they are willing to step in and demand that the government to explain and change its policies. This is due to their role in the defense of the country. Since every Israeli citizen is a member of the Israeli army, in a way or another, the government takes their opinion into consideration. Thus comes the importance of public opinion.<sup>32</sup> The American public is less aware and less interested in foreign affairs. Between the two extremes comes the European public.

4-The other level or dimension of the study is the regional level. The Arab-Israeli conflict is a regional conflict that has wider global impact. At the same time regional events and alliances are important. Some regional powers have interests that coincide with those of the interests of the

countries involved in the conflict. For example, Turkey and Iran, just like Israel, would like to see a weak and divided Arab nation than see a strong unified one.

With the Shah in power, Iran had a close relationship with the U.S. and Israel. They had a common interest: to threaten the Eastern Flank of the Arab World and thereby reduce pressures on Israel. Now, with the war between Iran and Iraq, Israel's interests are greatly served by this dramatic event. These two countries, Israel and Iran, have an important common interest: weaken, and if possible destroy Iraq's power to prevent it from participating in any potential Arab-Israeli war.

It is no surprise that Israel attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor during its war with Iran. Neither is it a surprise that Israel worked so hard to provide the Iranians with American weapons that led to a scandal on the American scene to achieve its goal of weakening Iraq. This regional "cooperation" did not even take into account the possible consequences on the internal American system. They were concerned only about their own interests. They were willing to jeopardize American interests to service and further their own. This incident makes McHenry's conclusion that "The simple and sad fact is that the United States today is unable to pursue its own interests in the Middle East"<sup>33</sup> sound very true.

Consequently, it is easy to see how in the West the Gulf War became more important than the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Gulf war distracted the world's attention from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its aftermath.

This shows that the regional conflicts, and alliances do have a very strong impact on the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Iranians are supposed to be the natural allies of the Arabs and the Palestinians if it were not for the war with Iraq. Iran was advocating the liberation of Jerusalem through Tehran. This war further divided the Arabs and precluded any Iranian or Iraqi influence in the situation. It made the world watch the Gulf to see if their oil would reach them or not.

5-The last level of analysis is the international level. Events that happen anywhere in the world have their impact on the issues of the Middle East conflict. The Afghani problem is one that redirected American interests to the Russian role there. The arms-reduction talks also became more important in the eyes of the superpowers than the conflict in the Middle East.

The relations between the superpowers have their strongest impact on the conflict. Because each of the superpowers has an interest in maintaining the conflict<sup>34</sup> and in keeping the countries of the Middle East under their control the two powers had agreed in 1972 not to jeopardize international peace because of the conflict of the Middle East. With the U.S. backing Israel strongly and with Russian

influence weakened by this agreement the Arabs have no chance of successfully fighting and defeating Israel.

The events of October 1973, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union put their nuclear forces on alert, did not change the situation in the Middle East. I believe it was no more than a demonstration for conflicting powers to restrain themselves if they do not want to see a nuclear war between the superpowers.

It is clear that the superpowers have opted not to fight over the Middle East. Detente was more important for both of them than to sacrifice it over the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Hence this is an interdisciplinary study that accounts for psychological, social, political, regional, and international aspects of the conflict. It is the nature of the subject under investigation that dictates the type of methodology that is to be used. It uses a historical comparative analysis methodology to examine the historical facts that resulted from the interactions of the countries involved. It determines the role of the subjective and objective structural and institutional factors that directed the development of the conflict and led to its outcomes.

#### 4. The Thesis:

The Arab-Israeli conflict has been going on for seven decades. Many powers, forces, and factors were involved in its creation, development, direction, and outcomes. In this

section I will list the forces and factors that led to the conflict reaching the stage it did and how the involvement and nature of each of the forces led to the continuation of the conflict.

The major theme of this study is that because of the nature and structure of the international, regional, and local powers, the conflict remains unsolved. Only dramatic changes in these structures would lead to the solution of the conflict. However, there are strong indicators that lead us to conclude that such changes are not forthcoming. Institutional structures have been developed to achieve the purpose of not allowing the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the minimum demand that would permit the PLO to give up its struggle and accept and recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist within secure borders.

A major purpose in this study is to examine the reasons why Israel will not withdraw from the occupied territories in spite of the desires of all the Arab countries, the Soviet Union, Europe, and the U.S. Will these forces be able one day to make Israel withdraw and allow the Palestinian to establish their independent state on the occupied territories? And if not, why not? To put it a different way: The U.S., the Soviet Union, Europe, the Arab states, the UN, and the Israeli peace groups have tremendous political, economic, and military power. How come they will not or cannot force Israel to give up the lands it occupied in 1967 to the Palestinian to build up their state.

The answer to these very important questions make up the main body of the this study. Each chapter of this body will deal with one actor or force and explain why that state or force is unable to pressure Israel to withdraw.

Chapter 1 is a historical review of the conflict. It discusses the origin of the conflict and how it came about, the ways each country now involved became involved. It also examine the important questions of right and the historical existence of the two groups in the land of Palestine.

Chapter 2 examines why the Palestinians cannot force Israel to withdraw. Chapter 3 will examine why the Arab countries cannot and would not do that either. Chapter 4 will examine the characteristics of the Israeli society that make it a very strong force to be pressured. Chapter 5 will examine why the United States cannot and would not, with all its power and influence, achieve this. Chapter 6 will examine why the Soviet Union cannot do that either, with all of its powers. Chapter 7 examines the failures of Europe to do it. And finally chapter 8 examines why the UN is still unable to do what the majority countries of the world decided to be right and fair for the Palestinians.

The main answer to all the questions is that Israel has the power withstand all these pressures. This is what that allows her to continue the occupation and refuse to withdraw. This power is the result a combination of military, diplomatic, political, and societal institutions

and structures that enables Israel leaders to withstand any pressures from any quarters including the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Implicated in this is the structure of the international system which neutralizes the power of other forces to produce any change.

The answer is also to be found in the Arab states' systems; in the internal and structural conflicts within the PLO; in the weakness and disinterest of Europe and the U.S.; in the Soviet Union's inability and lack of commitment to exert any pressures; in the need to preserve and protect the interests of all these forces which are better served by the continuation of the conflict.

## Notes

1

Don Peretz , "Israeli Approaches to a Solution" in Hudson, Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the Principle Actors, 1984, p. 59.

2

Hisham Sharabi "The Palestinian Approach to Negotiations" in Hudson, op. cit., p. 63.

3

Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Settling the Conflict: Arab Approaches." in Hudson, op. cit., p. 104.

4

Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, p. 36.

5 Ibid, p. 36.

6Joel Beinin, "Marching Toward Civil War" in Merip Reports #136-137, 1985, p. 5.

7

The yearly (1984) military and military-related estimated and rounded expenses of the major confrontation countries as quoted from The Military Balance The international Institute for Strategic Studies and their estimated GNP/GDP are as follows :

1.Iraq.....	\$7.7 billion	with	\$032 billion	GNP
2.Jordan.....	\$936 million	With	\$004 billion	GNP.
3.Libya.....	\$700 million	with	\$025 billion	GNP.
4.Saudi Arabia..	\$22 billion	with	\$152 billion	GNP.
5.Syria.....	\$2.5 billion	with	\$016 bilion	GNP.
6.Egypt.....	\$3 billion	with	\$030 billion	GNP.
7.Israel.....	\$6 billion	with	\$021 billion	GNP.

8See Khalid Al-Hassan in Al-Sakhr #105,, September, 1986

9See Mehdi, op. cit., and Edward Said, The Question of Palestine.

10

Ibrahim Ibrahim "The American-Israeli Alliance " in JPS #59, 1986, p. 18.

11

Saniora, in an interview by Khalil Shikaki in the JPS #57, 1985. Saniora believes that, unlike Likud, "Labor has in its platform the Jordan Option.", p. 8.

12

For a good example of this tendency see Mehdi, Peace in Palestine, New World Press, NY, 1976.

13

Hudson , op.cit., p. 106.

14

See Mehdi op.cit., Said, op.cit., Noam Chomsky The Faithful Triangle and William Crawford, Palestinian Exodus (in Arabic), England, 1981.

15

See Chomsky, op.cit. and Hudson, op. cit..

16

See Ajami, The Arab Predicament, 1982, and Tariq, The Arab Left, Syracuse University Press, 1982.

17

Examples of these accounts are Dayan's Breakthrough, Weizman's, The Battle For Peace, and Rafael's, Destination Peace, and Saunders, The Other Walls Among many others.

18

Curtis and Chertoff, Israel: Social Structure and Change, Transaction Books, NJ, 1973.

19

See Jureidini and McLaurin, Beyond Camp David: Emerging Alignments and Leaders in the Middle East, 1981.

20

There are many books that examine the Lebanese Crisis and the situation before and after 1982. See bibliography for titles.

21

See Muslib "Moderates and Rejectionists" in MEJ.

22

These demands range between total and complete liberation of all of Palestine to the acceptance of a state on the West Bank and Gaza, to the participation in an international conference on the conflict. Israel agreed to accept this conference to "make it easy for King Hussein, But for us [Peres said] we do not need it" from an interview in Akher Sa'ah (in Arabic), 2,26, 1986.

23

See ABC News for Nightline Ted Koppel's interview with Peres on October 17, 1985.

24

He decided to go to Egypt as soon as he left Tripoli to tilt the "balance" against Syria.

25

See Joacobo Timmerman's The Longest War, among many others.

26

See note # 12 on Saniora.

27

See New York Times (July, 27, 1986), PP. 23E and Al-Sakhras #104, August 1986, p. 24.

28

This theme was repeated by many. A short list will be provided here. See first, Ibrahim's op. cit quote about the role of the Power Elite and the weakness of the public's role in international and foreign policies of the West. Second, Chomsky's statement that the average American citizen is not seen marching demanding change in U.S. Middle East Policies. This was also clear in the interviews of Findley and Neumann in JPS # 57 and 59 respectively. A major study by Horowitz' Utopia and Ideology in the United States, p. 15, where he emphasizes the gap between the

rulers and the electors. Another is a summary of a study in the New York Post that states "that the leaders of the major Civil Rights and Black political organizations now hold ideas and attitudes that differ dramatically from those of the people whom they are presumed to speak for" (November, 12, 1985). This is, in fact, true of most leaders and representatives in this country.

29

See, for example, Fouad Mughrabi's article, "The International Consensus on the Palestine Question" in JPS #63. A close look at the percentages show that the governments of the United States, Canada, and England do not represent the beliefs and attitudes of the majority of their people. Another complementary study in the same issue is Chomsky's "The U.S. and the Middle East" which shows that the American government and media "controls and directs" the information they want their people to know. pp. 25-42.

30

Mehdi and Said, op.cit., for example.

31

Al-Sakhras #135, 1987.

32

Foud Mughrabi, op. cit. Another dimension of his percentages is the percentage of the respondents' who either have no opinion or do not know, which is a very strong indicator of the lack of knowledge and/or interest in the situation in the Middle East.

33

Findley's interview in JPS #57, p. 111.

34

For a clear discussion see Sims' article on "The Soviet Approach to Conflict," in Hudson, op. cit., pp.137-151.

## DEFINITIONS

This section defines and/or redefines the terms, names, and concepts that are used throughout this research. Some of the redefinitions are necessary to stress the subject under consideration, others are needed to clarify and emphasize a relationship or a point that was missed or given less importance in the past.

### 1-"THE ARAB-ISRAELI ALLIANCE:"

There is a strong belief among non-Palestinians, and especially Americans and Israelis,<sup>1</sup> that the Arabs support the Palestinians without reservations, resulting, of course, from the rhetoric of the Arab leaders, their press, and their radio stations.<sup>2</sup> In this section it will become clear that the Arabs' support is neither real nor active and that it is, indeed, least forthcoming when it is most needed. In fact, it will be argued that there is a kind of an "alliance," or a common interest, between most Arab nations and Israel. Examples demonstrating this "relationship" are plentiful.

Hence, "The Arab-Israeli Alliance" means the material, active or passive, participation of the Arabs and the Israelis in controlling, fighting, and defeating the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM). At times this action participation was carried out by both parties, Israel and the Arabs, as in the case of the Lebanese government in 1982.<sup>3</sup> Again, it might involve the agreement, permission,

acceptance, or non-interference of others, as in the cases of 1970 in Jordan by the King's army;<sup>4</sup> and the case of 1976 in Lebanon and especially in Tel Al-Zater<sup>5</sup> by the Syrian Army, or as in the 1982 Israeli invasion, when the Palestinians were to stand alone against Israel as Syria accepted a ceasefire as soon as Israel mentioned it. This Syrian acceptance of a ceasefire while the Israelis were still attacking the Palestinians will be considered an alliance.

In other words, whether the Arabs themselves actually fought the Palestinians or "let" the Israelis do that job for them will be called "alliance." The mere absence of positive participation from the Arab countries against an Israeli attack on the PRM will be called an alliance regardless of the real intentions and goals of the Arab states.<sup>6</sup> For example, Egypt's inaction during the 1978 and the 1982 invasion of Lebanon will be called alliance. This, of course, implies that I consider the Arabs to be responsible for the defense of the Palestinians and for the Liberation of Palestine! The Arabs made themselves responsible in many ways: one of them is that the Palestinians believe that the Arabs are responsible.<sup>7</sup> Second, the Arabs forced themselves into the conflict when they participated in the 1948 war. And third, the Arabs lost the last part of Palestine to the Israelis in 1967 in a war they initiated. Therefore, they are responsible for these losses. Of course they could retract, as did Sadat. But this

does not relieve them of the responsibility for losing Palestine.

The Iraqi inaction during the fighting in Jordan in 1970, for example, while the Iraqi soldiers were in Jordan and near the "front" will be called an alliance too. The "Arab-Israeli Alliance," as we see, is a reality and has great consequences for both the direction of the conflict and its development. One of these consequences is that the Palestinians became sure that they have to rely on themselves if they want to achieve anything at all.

## 2-THE PALESTINIAN RESISTANCE MOVEMENT: (PRM)

It is usually understood that only those who fight Israel from the outside and who are members of the PLO make up the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM).<sup>8</sup> Here, this definition will be extended to include the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, not only of their actual resistance to the Israeli occupation but because of the potential of resistance they could carry out.<sup>9</sup> I will count the actions, active or passive, of the West Bank and Gaza residents, who are represented in the PLO,<sup>10</sup> as an intrinsic part of the PRM. In this sense, the PRM includes the PLO. Excluded from the organizations that make up the PLO, are those organizations who advocate a solution that does not coincide with the minimum demands presented or accepted by the PLO. These I will call:

#### 4-THE RADICALS:

The radicals are all the Palestinian organizations that do not accept the Minimum that is accepted by the majority of the Palestinians<sup>11</sup> not only by saying so, but by acting in that manner also. The "dissidents" (who were a group from Fateh - the largest PLO group - and Arafat's faction) are an example of this group whereas the participants of the 17th. PNC, whether they are independents or belong to a previously-named radical group or organization, do not.

It is true that the most important issue in the 17th. PNC was not what was passed, but who attended as, Khalidi<sup>14</sup> correctly states. It is important to identify the groups, or new groups, that do not accept the Palestinian Minimum Demands (PMD). The mere attendance of the 17th. PNC is sufficient to classify those who attended as mainstream PLO even if they were previously classified as radicals or still claim that they are members of a radical group. All those who reject the Palestinian Minimum Demands, as presented by the Fateh-dominated PLO on the basis of being insufficient to meet their view of the PMDs or to reject them on the basis of the method of achieving those demands will be called Radicals. Thus, if a group of Palestinians believes that the PMDs presented by the Fateh-dominated PLO amount to less than their demands,<sup>13</sup> or that the methods followed in achieving these Demands do not follow their thinking of how those Demands might be achieved, its members will be called Radicals. The criteria for distinguishing between radicals

and nonradicals are the "size" of the demands and the methods of achieving those demands, i.e. the minimum they advocate and the method by which they desire to achieve that minimum.

#### 5-THE PALESTINIAN MINIMUM DEMANDS: (PMD)

There is a strong positive correlation between the minimum declared demands the Palestinians say they will accept and the strength of Arab support for them and acceptance of the military power of the PLO.<sup>14</sup> And there is a strong negative correlation between these minimum demands and military strength of the Israeli army and the Israeli political party in power.

There is also a continuous shift in the PLO's<sup>15</sup> formally declared minimum demands. This shift is a result of many factors, especially the nature and structure of the PLO and the PRM. Other important factors, which will be examined later: the PLO's dependence, at least for territory and finance, on more than one Arab state; the wide spectrum of ideologies and alliances within the organization; Israel's military power, which is a constant factor; the ruling party in Israel; ...etc.

There is, however, a constant factor since 1968 that gives a degree of stability to the PLO and the PRM and their demands. This is the dominance of Arafat and Fateh within the PLO and the PRM. This stability at the top and the power of Fateh and its control of the Movement is a very strong

indicator of what could be passed on by the Movement. Keeping this in mind, one could see a pattern in the declarations of the PLO with its strong Fateh dominance. Following this pattern one could determine and predict the direction of the organization. This direction is a political one. In other words, there is a tendency within the PLO and the PRM for the politicization or demilitarization of the conflict which may be seen in the declarations, actions, and attitudes of the PLO leadership. If we follow the "formal" declarations of the PLO executive committees and the PNC's declarations, we can notice that the development of the PLO and the PRM is a process of deradicalization and politicization.

By "politicization" I mean the shift of the PLO's tactical and strategic options to a political, as opposed to a military solution to the Palestinian problem.<sup>16</sup> In other words, Political means are becoming more important in solving the conflict. If we follow the declarations, actions, and attitudes of the PLO, we can see this politicization process very clearly.

A comparison, for example, between the Palestinian National Charter (PC) and the declarations of the PNCs since 1968 will lead, especially if we carefully read the resolutions of the last two PNCs (16th and 17th), to a clear understanding of this shift, not only in tone but also in tactics and strategies. The acceptance of the PLO of the Fez Summit's resolutions is another indicator of not only the

politicization process but also of the minimum that the Palestinians (and the Arabs) are willing to accept and support. The dealings of Arafat with King Hussein and Mubarak after his expulsion from Beirut and Tripoli and his ability, after all this, to convene the 17th PNC are other strong indicators of this process of politicization and of the dominance of Fateh and Arafat.

So, what is it that satisfies the Palestinian minimum demands? What could be acceptable to the majority of the Palestinians? Should we take Fateh as representing the majority of the Palestinians and that what Fateh accepts the majority of the Palestinians will accept? Is Fateh's strength within the PLO and the PRM sufficient to make inferences for the Palestinians as a whole? Is it significant enough to use the holding up of the 17th PNC as a measure to infer the power of Arafat and Fateh even after the mutiny within Fateh? Was the members participation in the 17th PNC a genuine one or was it just a reaction to the success of the Syrians to attract members of Fateh? <sup>17</sup> Did the participating members really believe that Arafat and Fateh still have the power and the legitimacy to hold up this council or was it a way of telling the Syrians that the PRM or a large part of it is still "independent" regardless of whether the members believe in Fateh's and Arafat's role, ability, and legitimacy?

The major concern here is to answer an important question: what are the minimum demands that the Palestinians would accept to give up their armed struggle and recognize "Israel's right" to exist within "secure and defensible borders"? To answer this question we have to answer the other questions posed above, relating to whether Fateh really represents the power (the only or major power) that determines what the Palestinians (and the rest of the Arabs) <sup>18</sup> may or may not accept and support.

We should keep in mind the following political and historical realities:

1-Fateh is the largest (80% of the PLO size) and least dependent group among those composing the PLO and PRM. It has a wide range of supporters within the Arab governments. It is supported by most of the Arab states (and therefore has greater ability to maneuver) and it does not depend, financially or otherwise, on one or two of them as is the case with other groups. Fateh could turn to governments for financial and political support. Its tactics and strategies reflect its own goals rather than the goals and strategies of the supporting countries. The most recent example of this tendency is Arafat's dealing with Egypt and Jordan after expulsion from Tripoli, in response to Syria's pressures on him.

2-Fateh is the most popular organization among the Arab states, and Arafat has strong positive relationships with most of the Arab heads of states. And since we know that

most of the Arab states have no objection, in principle, to the idea of a peaceful settlement, as was clear at the Fez summit, we could understand that if Arafat were to advocate such a solution he would be "praised" and supported by most of the Arab states. We have seen more than one example like that since 1982.<sup>19</sup>

3-The events of June 1982 and its aftermath were to reveal that the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians were very supportive of Arafat in his "struggle" against Syria and the Fateh faction that rebelled against him.<sup>20</sup> The demonstrations of the West Bank population after they knew about Arafat's plans to deal again with King Hussein and deal with "Egypt of Camp David"<sup>21</sup> could be considered as a strong sign of their acceptance of his plans and actions.

4-The holding of the 16th PNC in Algiers after the expulsion from Beirut and the participation of all the groups and organizations composing the PLO with all of what had happened and been said by Arafat during the siege of Beirut<sup>22</sup> is still another strong indicator of Fateh's dominance and its ability to pass the resolutions of that Council.

The resolutions of the 16th PNC are still another stage in the process of politicization that the PLO and PRM is undergoing. The justifications and excuses given by Arafat for his declarations during the siege of Beirut ( that he

had a letter from the US that guaranteed him a fast solution to the Palestinian problem and that the Palestinians in Lebanon will be protected, that they, the Americans, will "talk to him," and that they will exert pressure on Israel to recognize the PLO) <sup>23</sup> were known to be false (or at least not carried out by the Americans) by the other groups who accepted and passed the resolutions of the 16th PNC and those of the Arab summit at Fez. This indicates that Arafat and Fateh are capable of passing resolutions even if the other PLO groups reject them on tactical or strategic bases.

5-Arafat's success in holding the 17th PNC in Amman in 1984 with the objection and boycott of other more radical groups is still another sign of Fateh's and Arafat's strength and position. The threats of assassination, the assassination of Hamami, Sartawi, Kawasmi, and Al-Masri and the objection of Syria and the other members of the PLO were not strong enough to prevent him from signing the Amman agreement.

We can see that Fateh and Arafat are capable of carrying out their actions independent of the attitudes, actions, and threats of the other members of the PLO, Syria, and Libya. The support of the Arab states, the West Bank population, the majority of the PNC members, and the approval of the U.S. leads us to conclude that Fateh, if needed, could, indeed, carry out a peaceful agreement with Israel without fearing much from the Palestinians' opposition. This means

that Arafat and Fateh are ready to deal with Israel if Israel accepts their conditions and minimum demands. But the problem is that Israel, as I want to argue, is not willing to do that. Therefore, we, justifiably, could conclude that if Fateh accepts a plan for the solution of the conflict, the plan could be carried out with the support of the moderate Arabs, the U.S., Israel, and the West Bank population.

These historic and political experiences are so recent they allow us to reach this conclusion without speculation and with great certainty. To predict that this will continue to be the case is also justifiable because the power of the "Rejection Front" and the Salvation Front with Syria's support is not organized or strong enough to stop the actions of Fateh and the participants of the 17th PNC.

One is allowed to wonder, what is it that King Hussein has to do to make Arafat and Fateh either accept Security Council Resolution 242 or radically refuse to deal with King Hussein. One thing is sure, it is still Arafat who has the power to do any of these things.

Keeping in mind that Fateh and Arafat can carry out a peaceful plan for the solution of the conflict, one could predict that if peace depends on Fateh's or Arafat's acceptance, then peace will be achieved right away. This, of course, requires Israel's acceptance and willingness. (But as I argue, there are many indications that allow us to

argue that Israel is not willing and is unable to withdraw.)

What is the minimum that this group (hereafter called the "Acceptance Front" which includes the majority of the West Bank and Gaza population, Jordan, Lebanon and Fateh) will be satisfied with to end the hostilities and conduct a peaceful settlement with Israel?

If we follow Arafat's and Fateh's demands since 1968 we see, as mentioned above, a continuous shift to conciliation, politicization, and deradicalization. From the strong demands of having the full right to carry out operations against Israel 1965-1969 to the conciliation with the government of Lebanon; to the acceptance of the constraints on military actions from the Syrian Borders since Assad came to power, to the dealings with King Hussein after the September of 1970; up to the acceptance of a Palestinian-Jordanian joint committee in 1985, we see that the PLO's, and especially Fateh's demands, have moderated. These demands were reduced from liberating all Palestine through armed struggle in 1965 to the mere participation in a joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee.

From this "peace conference" "Arafat's Fateh and PLO" expect the Israelis to give up parts of the West Bank and Gaza to Jordan, and then Jordan will, in accordance with the 1974 Arab Summit resolutions, "hand the returned parts" to the Palestinians represented by "Arafat's PLO." In other words, what Arafat and his "present PLO" now demand is that Israel give back to Jordan what it wants to give back<sup>24</sup> and

then Arafat will settle the rest with the King. Or, as in the new version, Israel will give back all the lands occupied during the 1967 war to the Palestinians who, by their own will and after they establish their own independent state, will join in a confederacy with King Hussein's Jordan.

The "size" of the lands Arafat and the King expect to get back from Israel is in a way outlined in the Allon Plan.<sup>24</sup> Arafat, expectedly, includes Jerusalem in this scheme. In short, the PMDs are mentioned by Arafat and the PLO in almost every opportunity they find to do that. These minimum demands are:

The return of all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip including Jerusalem to Jordan and the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian Confederation or a union between the two countries where the Palestinians will have a stronger voice in the new country. This conclusion was very clear in the Amman agreement. Arafat's signing of the agreement was a strong indicator that he does not expect more than this. Arafat and King Hussein are aware of the United States and Israeli objection to the creation of an independent state<sup>25</sup> between Israel and Jordan

## NOTES

1

During the examination of the Arab countries responses to the American Raid on Libya, it was emphasized that Saudi Arabia was one of the countries that came out against the raid and that it was one of the most active supporters of the PLO.

2

During the siege of Beirut the Arab radio and TV stations echod the usual declarations of support and the victory over the enemies of God and the Arabs. Neither help came nor support was forthcoming. For a "sample" of these declarations see the Arab newspapers and recordings of the radio stations during the period.

The most appealing song that appeared after the 1982 war says:

"Only with their voice (broadcasts) they were with us Oh Beirut, and the picture (TV) dissolved in the waters." This song was sung in Eden for Arafat and his evacuated comrades. See Arafat, in JPS #48 , pp.159-168.

3

The Lebanese government's and the Lebanese militias' involvement in the Israeli preparation and execution of the 1982 invasion does not need any proof now especially after the massacres. Recent connections with Amal and the other Lebanese factions to move the camps' residents to the north and out of Lebanon are even more to the point. See Al-Sakhras #111, 112, and 113 (in Arabic). See also Jansen's The Battle Of Beirut, p. 1,107.

4

See Quandt in The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, p.127. Also see Kissinger's memories regarding this period and the role assigned to Israel.

5

The arguments that erupted after the 1982 massacres made it clear that the Labor party was as involved in Lebanon as much as -if not more than- the Likud. The question asked by Sharon before and during the trial: "Where were your -the labor- generals during Tel- Al-Zater?" was more than enough to indicate that the goals of the Israelis and the Syrians were in harmony regarding the defeat, expulsion, and killing of the Palestinians.

In fact, more recent information shows that the Syrians were supposed to prevent the Palestinians and the LSP (the Lebanese Socialist Party) fighters from defeating the Christians if they, the Syrians, did not want the Israelis to do that job.

6

The Arab states were concerned only about their own security. Syria's ceasefire agreement with Israel during the heat of the invasion could have no better name than collaboration and complicity. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim in Hudson, Alternative Approaches to the Arab Israeli Conflict:

A Comparative Analysis of the Principle Actors, 1984, p. 101.

7

The Arab countries, especially Egypt, was behind the loss of Palestine. It was Egypt's attack on Israel in 1948 and in 1967 that led to the loss of the Arab part of the country. The Palestinians strongly believe that if it was not for Egypt, they would not have lost the land... and Sadat comes and makes separate deals with Israel .

8

For a complete list and inter-PRM alliances see Quandt in The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism.

9

Nabih Birri was the one who reemphasized the idea that it is the role of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians to fight Israel and liberate their country from the inside. In an interview that was reprinted in the JPS # 57 he, states that "Now let them fight for themselves in West Jordan. Thank you very much. They just must take note of this. They must learn from the history of all the peoples of the world, and from us. Resistance comes from the inside", p. 148

10

The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza are represented in the PLO by members of the labor unions and independents.

11

These are the PFLP, ALF, Sa'iq, and the Fateh dissidents.

12

See Khalidi's "The Palestinian Dilemma: PLO Policy after Lebanon" in JPS #57, p94.

13

For a full examination of the different views and demands of each of the organizations see Quandt op. cit., pp. 111-112, 154-156.

14

From a research paper on "Social and Political Change in the Palestinian National Liberation Movement" for a course in Social and Political Change in the Third World by this author 1984.

15

Ibid.

16

See Abu Jihad and Abu Iyad in Al-sakhr expressing the dual functioning of the PLO as a military and political movement.

17

There were strong indications that some of the organizations went to Amman as a reaction to Syria's pressures to prevent the holding up of the 17th PNC, See Khalidi op. cit.

18

Most of the Arab states are not against a peaceful settlement and most of them "do deal with Israel." See Merip Reports #131, 1985, p.12.

19

See Merip Reports #119, p. 8 and King Hussein's Address to the 17th PNC in JPS # 60, pp. 206-232.

20

This was clear from the demonstrations and rallies carried out in the West Bank and Gaza during the crisis.

21

There were no strong negative reactions to this movement coming from the occupied territories.

22

Especially declaration to recognize Israel's right to exist.

23

Arafat claimed that he was presented with a written document by the U.S. that assured him of the protection of the Palestinians in Beirut and that they will speed up the talks with the PLO after his withdrawal.

24

Israel was alarmed to such a possibility, i.e., that Jordan will not hand the lands it receives from Israel to Arafat?

25

See Neumann's interview in JPS #59, p. 6.

## Chapter 1

### THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT: A HISTORY

Unlike all other conflicts in the world today, the conflict in the Middle East has many old roots in strong religious, national, historical, and psychological attachments. All world powers, "old" and "new" have influenced and still influence the conflict and its outcomes. In this chapter I will briefly examine the roots of the conflict, its development, and its outcomes. I will also examine the role of the international, regional, and local powers that initiated and influenced the development and outcomes of the conflict.

#### 1. THE ORIGINS AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM:

When the Jews of Eastern Europe started searching for their national origins - as did the Europeans themselves a few decades before- they discovered that they were nationless, that they were living under the rule of governments that they believed did not represent them. The development of this trend led to the creation of the Zionist movement, a response to the emergence and development of European nationalism which sought to make a nation out of a group of people who were almost assimilated with the populations of Europe at that time. To start their own nation, they made a connection between being nationless, their religion and their past. The creation of a political organization was, I want to stress, an imitation of the

existing European nationalism.

It was, what I would call a "style" that every national, ethnic or religious group would follow when it became popular at that time. The Jews were a religious minority but had the same national origins as did the indigenous population. Most of them identified themselves as Polish, Germans, or whatever, and spoke the country's official language. Some of them in fact did not speak<sup>1</sup> Hebrew.

This need to "follow the existing style" and to form a nation became very strong. The first Zionists accepted forming their nation anywhere in the world, including Brazil and Uganda.<sup>2</sup> This urge, of course, was not real in that the constituents of this group were not aware of the needs or desires of the Zionist leaders, who probably did know that their "nation" was missing the other components to make up their "new" nation. Therefore they resorted to previous historical periods and to religion to hold the components of this "nation" together and create it. This led them to eventually choose Palestine since it could support and substitutes for the missing components needed in a nation.

Palestine has historical and religious significance for the Jews and fills the requirements such as common language, territorial integrity, common historical experiences, living on a land for generations, all of which which were missing from the Zionist "experience."

So, as I said, Palestine would substitute for all of those. They could claim that their forefathers lived there two thousand years ago. The emphasis on the commitment to "Eretz Yisrael" and the return to Zion, the uninterrupted living in the Holy Land, the external powers that forced them out of "their land" over the centuries, and many other claims were reemphasized to help satisfy the missing requirements of a nation. These substitutes were utilized by the Zionists and were immediately put into use when the first settlers started to come to the Holy Land.

The same justifications, which had rarely been needed, were, of course, the justifications Europeans used for the creation of their own nations. In the Zionist case the Zionists could add the side effects that accompanied the emergence and creation of European nationalisms. These effects, produced with the help of the Zionists themselves, like their Ha'arava agreement with the Third Reich are still successfully used until this day; the most important of which are antisemitism and the holocaust.<sup>3</sup>

So, they made the problem look like this: They are a people without a land and a land without people.<sup>4</sup> Each perfectly fits the other. By this the Jews of Europe justified settling the "nation", the Jews of Europe, in the land that "had no people," Palestine.<sup>5</sup>

This was the origin of the problem; European nationalism accompanied by European colonialism that allowed itself to conquer Palestine and declare it a national

homeland for the "scattered" Jews of the World. In other words, the origins of the conflict are nationalism- European and Jewish (Zionism)-, and British colonialism .<sup>6</sup>

With this in mind as well as the fact that Palestine was not an empty land , as the Zionists wanted to believe,<sup>7</sup> and that the Palestinians and their ancestors had been living there for centuries, the nature of the problem stands out clear: each of these two national groups claims that the land is his. Each of them truly and strongly believes, or at least made itself and its members believe, that the land, all of it, is theirs and theirs only.<sup>8</sup> Giving up any part of it is against the "internal and inherent historical" laws of the group and is a weakness of that group in the face of the other.

Zionist justifications were that their grand grand parents and their prophets used to live there. That they had their state established their except. But were forced out of there against their will and power by external forces. Palestinian justifications were and still are, not very surprisingly, that their grand grand parents used to live their and that they were forced out of their against their will and power by external forces.

To put it in other terms, the conflict is between two well-developed national groups who claim that all of the land belongs to them only and that the other group has nothing at all to do with that land and any attempt of any

of the groups to control the land is inherently an attack on the national and human rights of the other group. What made the problem last this long was the inability of one group to totally suppress the other group and I predict that the problem will never be solved as long as one of the groups has the power , theoretical or practical, to at least claim that the land belongs to it. The problem then, is the desire of each group to control all the land land and not Israel's "legitimate security needs" as Schultz put it.<sup>9</sup>

This is a very important and crucial statement which must be remembered throughout all of this research. The strong belief of each group that the land belongs to that group only, means that the members of the group will never accept the idea -or the fact- that the other group already controls the whole land. In fact this is one of the dialectical twists of the situation. When one of the groups feels that the other tries to control more of the land it steps up its resistance. Power, arms, fire and the danger of national destruction were not enough to make any of them concede even part of the land. But, power, arms and fire, among many other things, were enough to make one part of one group change its tactical, and I stress tactical, stand on who and how much could be controlled .

As a summary to this part I would say that the origins of the problem are nationalism and colonialism and the nature, which did not change with the shifts of the PLO positions, is a struggle between two developed and distinct

national groups that have strong and serious claims to a common territory.

## 2.WHY IS IT A PROBLEM:

This conflict between Palestinians and Israelis has many effects on the security of the region and the whole world. Military attacks on international targets, the continuous threat of the break out of war, the permanent unsettling of a whole nation with its negative political and human consequences, the continuous danger of conflict over the control of energy sources and introduction of nuclear arms into the region- all these are serious threats that should be dealt with and solved if the world is to be a little safer than it is, not only for Arabs and Palestinians but also for Jews and the other neutral and uninvolved countries that get blown every once in a while by military attacks of Palestinian or Muslim groups.

It is a problem because it destabilises the regional and the international balance of power. Its a problem because the superpowers benefit from creating, maintaining and developing it. Its a problem because they so define it and use it as such for their own power struggle. Its a problem because there are millions of Palestinians who suffered, suffer and are unsettled because of the continuation of the conflict. Its a problem because one group or nation exploits another group or nation and its land.

I will deal with the problem on these basis. In other words I will treat the conflict as a problem that needs to be solved for all the reasons mentioned above but particularly because:

1-There was an injustice done to the Palestínians and that it must be corrected.

2-because of the national and human needs and rights of the Palestinian Arabs who suffered alot and who deserve to have their state on their land.

3-It drains the energies of the countries involved which should be used for development projects to better serve the people of the Middle East.

4-It destabilises the whole region of the Middle East because of the continious threat of war.

5-Because of the Jews who have lost their children in a war that was not necessary at all but is a function of their generals and politicians who control the situation.<sup>10</sup>

### 3. THE PROBLEM OF HISTORY:

Now, these problems exist and are experienced daily by the people of the Middle East and the Palestinans. Their suffarage was initiated and lengthend because the Zionists resorted to history to justifying Israel's "liberation" of its land from the Palestinains and by the strengthening of Israel's military power and its use against the Palestinains and the Arabs. In regard to the second, Israel's military power, I will explain later. Now I will examine the first.

Regardless of who came first to Palestine and regardless of who maintained an uninterrupted existence on the land, history helps only in raising and justifying the feelings of each group. And regardless of whose feelings are aroused stronger, an argument about history or historical originality is not the aim of this research. In fact I think that this is one of the issues that was used perfectly by the Israelis and their Zionist predecessors to make the issue look as if it is a historical issue (rather than a socio-political and economic one) it was as if by proving or disproving that a national group was in the land before the other the whole problem could be solved.<sup>11</sup>

I don't have to argue that, even if the Israelis proved that they were living in Palestine before the Palestinians or if, in the other hand, the Palestinians proved that they lived there before, longer and/or constantly, none of the groups will give up its right to live their. What has happened between the Arabs and Palestinains and Israel since 1917, I will argue, is enough to justify the determination of each group to fight for, and settle in, Palestine. The sacrifices, suffarings, blood, and sweat that each group put into the creation, maintaining, and development of the whole conflict up to now, I think, justify, in their minds, and explain the positions they are taking. Therefore I will dismiss this issue as unimportant for this research. In other words, it helps nothing to examine the issue any further not only because it was exhusted but also because it

has no practical significance on the future outcome of the conflict or on any of the parties.

In other words, resort to history was needed to establish and justify the creation of the state. With the state established and strong, Israel does not need history, right, or any other justification. Its power and international support are enough.<sup>12</sup>

Now I come to the other factor or issue, power. One of the things that characterizes the conflict in the Middle East is the continuous shifts and imbalance of power. Despite their large population, wealth, and their huge military expenditures, the Arab countries were, and still are, unable to shift the balance of power to their side at any time during the existence of the Zionist state. What determined the whole outcome of the Zionist experience was the power relationship between them and the Arab countries. What determines it now is also the power relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.

By power I mean both political and military power. By political I mean Israel's ability to affect, manipulate and /or use external powers against the Arabs and the Palestinians. In other words, Israel uses its relationship with the West and especially the USA to prevent the US, for example, from selling arms to the Arab countries<sup>13</sup>. In this case Israel is using its political power to further its interests against the will and power of the Arab states. Many

examples could be listed here to show Israeli political power.

By military power I mean the ability of Israel to use its physical and material forces and ability to achieve its goals and interests against the will and power of the Arabs and the Palestinians. This relationship between power, military and political, is continuously on Israel's side. Israel, with the help of the U.S., whose interests coincide with those of Israel in the present, permanently increase that power to make sure that the Arabs will not be able to match her military power since its survival, depends totally on this power and since its political power over the US may weaken or stop one day.<sup>14</sup> The Israeli response is that Israel cannot leave its defence to somebody else. "Only<sup>15</sup> Israelis can defend Israel.

From this, it looks that historical originality has nothing to do with the real development and outcomes of the conflict except in that it motivates and arouses the feelings of the believers.

#### 4. THE PROBLEM OF RIGHT:

What applies to historical originality and permanency, i.e., the continuous uninterrupted existence of the Jews in Palestine, applies also to the issue of right since they are connected together, that is, if one lives in the area continuously then he has the right, or more right, to live in it than another who comes at a later stage. In other words, those who came to Palestine first (historical

originality) have the right to live their "more" than those who came later in history. Force has a use too. Those who were FORCED out of their land by external powers (the Jews were driven out of the Holy Land at least twice by the imperial powers in 70 AD) have "more" right than those who sold their lands to the Zionists and the Jewish Agency (the Zionists claim that the Palestinians sold their land to them therefore they have no right to the land).

The Jews, the Zionist claim, would have stayed in Palestine if they were left to do so. Only external powers disturbed their permanent and continuous stay in Palestine and they should not be blamed for ejecting the Palestinians.

Since the problems of historical originality and permanency in the land and that of right are connected and are made to depend on each other in this particular conflict I will dismiss this issue too as irrelevant to the whole conflict and its outcome except for its ability to motivate and arouse the national or religious feelings of those who believe in them. This is very important aspect of these issues, but it has no immediate bearing on the actual initiation, development, and outcome of the conflict.

The actual initiation, development, and outcome of the conflict did not depend on the belief in historical originality, but this idea has been used to get to another goal that has nothing to do with historical originality.

It is a very complex issue to examine since the actual use of an idea or belief to achieve a goal is very different from the idea or belief. In this case I dismiss the issue here because right and historical originality are not known or decided, and most important, the belief could be used by both sides equally. Many religious groups have religious claims to the Holy Land which will disturb our ability to judge the issue itself.

Now, if we dismiss the problems of historical originality and right we will be forced to examine other external and more objective factors that led to the continuation of the conflict. If historical originality and right could be used to explain part of the initiation of the conflict, it cannot explain its development and continuation. The rights of the Jews or Palestinians, as I said above, have no bearing on the direction of the conflict or its solution.

When the Israelis examine the problem of the Palestinians, they examine it from their own point of reference, this is, what benefits they will gain by solving the Palestinian problem as a moral, and not a national problem.<sup>16</sup> Resorting to solve the Palestinian problem on the basis of rights, Palestinian or human, will not be used by the Israelis because it threatens the basis of their justifications. If the Israelis allow the Palestinians to form theihat the Palestinians should return to their homes. None of them think that those Israelis who

entered Palestine illegally should leave the country. This shows that it is power and realpolitik that governs the situation and not right or history. It is might and right.

The problem now is not a problem of right. It is a problem of nationalism, a conflict between two well-defined and strongly motivated national groups, and t right to a part o This subject will be examined at length in chapter 4.

It is a mistake to judge the future directions of the conflict depending on a small powerless group of pacifists who, at best, start "counting" from 1948 and not from 1917, as if the Palestinian problem started only after the establishment of the state of Israel. And these groups do. None of them think that the Palestinians should return to their homes. None of them think that those Israelis who entered Palestine illegally should leave the country. This shows that it is power and realpolitik that governs the situation and not right or history. It is might and right.

The problem now is not a problem of right. It is a problem of nationalism, a conflict between two well-defined and strongly motivated national groups, and therefore it is an irrational conflict.<sup>17</sup> It is a conflict between struggling groups over the same piece of land that is the only land that was supposed to satisfy their national needs and rights. Giving part of it threatens to destroy the integration of the national group and the basic requirements of the rights and existence of that national group. No one

group can keep all the land without forcing a fight on the other group and no group can give part of it without upsetting the whole logic and consistency of its ideology. The ideology of each group comes from its being totalistic and wholistic<sup>18</sup> a belief that the sacrifice of any part of the land necessarily means the acceptance of the existence and right of the other group. If the Israelis accept the fact that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, then, automatically, it does not belong to the Jews. The same, of course, applies to the Palestinians.

This is becoming less problematic for the Palestinians as I will show in chapter 2. It is easier for both of the groups, therefore, to claim all of the land rather than part of it. It is easier to reject than to compromise since compromise means the threat of irrationality and inconsistency of both groups. The conflict is an irrational and inconsistent one.

The rest of this chapter examines the historical development of the conflict. To do this I divided the period from 1897 up to the present into five major periods characterising the conflict:

The emergence and reaction of Zionism 1897-1917.

The Internationalization of the conflict 1917-1947.

The Arabization of the conflict 1947-1967.

The Palestinization of the conflict 1967-1982.

The dePalestinaization of the conflict 1982 to the present.

## 1. The Emergence and Reaction of Zionism: 1897-1917.

When Hertzels quest for buying parts of the Holy Land from the Turkish Sultan was rejected, the Zionists organized the Jewish agency to buy lands from individuals in Palestine. The Jewish agency helped many of the Jews to come to Palestine and settle in the lands that it started to buy.

Not until 1917, after the Balfour Declaration, did the Jews start to demand and act in a manner of settlers when they started organizing militia to train and fight with the British as part of its army. They used this tactic, of forming divisions within the British army, to further their role in the British efforts for war and to win British favor when the war ended. Another important aspect of this enrollment was the practical training they achieved during their service with the British which appeared to be very helpful during the 1948 war when they were able to defeat regular and more organized Arab armies.

Between the years of 1917 and 1948 the Zionists achieved a lot of their objectives representative of their overall and continuous objectives until today. Some of these were, and still are, the terrorizing of the Palestinian Arabs out of their land. The basic assumption that governed the Zionists' land plans depended, as put in Hertzels manuscripts for the "New Nation," on the claim that Palestine was scarcely populated<sup>19</sup> and that the people in Palestine have enough room in many neighboring Arab countries were they can take refuge in and live with their

brothers. This assumption is still alive in the Zionist mentality of the present Israeli leaders, but most clearly in Sharon's. He declared that Jordan is the Palestine that the Palestinians are trying to "liberate"<sup>20</sup> and he threatened in a speech in 1982 that if the Palestinians so want, he could get rid of King Hussein for them to "rule themselves"<sup>21</sup> in their country (meaning Jordan).

Another Zionist assumption is that the Arab countries have enough room and are very close to the Palestinians, and that the Arabs should allow the Palestinians to live with them in their countries. Although this assumption appeared to be very wrong from the beginning, the Israelis still believe in it. They hope it will become a fact so they be done with the Palestinians. If other Arabs advocating Arab unity could convince the Palestinians that any Arab land is theirs, therefore, they will stop fighting for "their" land. The permanent Israeli claim that the Palestinians always have a place to go to if forced out of Palestine is a strategic assumption in the Zionist mind. This assumption proved wrong from the beginning, and especially in 1970, when King Hussien drove the Palestinians "out of their country-Jordan".

<sup>22</sup>  
The failure of Pan Arabism was not all that made the Palestinians reject the idea that any Arab land is theirs. The actual experience they went through from 1948 up to the present proves that it is not at all true. The 1970 civil

war in Jordan, the 1971-1972 Lebanese dissatisfaction with the Palestinians existence, Syria's prevention of any Palestinian crossing of the line between itand Israel, the Syrian tight control of the Palestinians within Syria and in Lebanon are very true and recent examples of the fact that any Arab land is not the Palestinians. Even more significant was the lack of any Arab support for the Palestinians in 1982. In fact, some of the Arab countries refused to accept the Palestinian fighters expelled from Beirut.

This is a brief summary of the first period, the emergence and reaction of the Zionist movement that became the major actor in the Middle East.

## 2.The Internationalization of the Conflict: 1917-1948

England was the most powerful country in the world in the early 20th century and it controlled lands hundreds of times larger than its own land. One of those lands that it occupied in its war against Turkey was Palestine, which had been a Turkish territory for four centuries; 1517-1917. England declared in 1917 that Palestine would be used as a national homeland for the Jews of the world . On the demands of the Zionists, Britain gave them a land that they occupied by force from the Turks and that belonged to people who had been in their lands when the British occupation started and until now.

The two injustices that happend to the Palestinians at the hands of the British in this case were, first, that their land was occupied by force by an external power, and

second, that their lands were given by this occupying power illegally and without their consent to a different national group who did not live in that land when the occupation occurred. The illegality of these actions is clear. This illegality, of course, is as unimportant as are the questions of right, morality, and historical originality. None of them has any bearing on the continuation of the conflict any more. But it is very important to keep in mind that the British actions and decisions were illegal and were against the will of the people. However, legality, right, and morality are irrelevant, or at least should be treated as such, in this case.

The Palestinians resisted British occupation, the Balfour Declaration, and Jewish colonization. The task they faced was great. They had to fight the strongest country in the world and prevent the Jews and Zionists from achieving their goals of controlling the land. It was a very hard job to do and they failed in both.<sup>23</sup>

The riots of 1921-1922, 1929, 1936-1939, and the fighting against the Zionists all through the three decades from 1917-1947 were an expression of the attitudes of the Palestinians against the British and the Zionists. This form of expression was the only means to let the British and the Zionists know of their rejection of occupation, colonization and of the Declaration. For many reasons, the British wanted to have a Jewish state in Palestine.<sup>24</sup> Two issues are

important to note when examining this period. One of them is why the British helped, or, used, the Zionists. The other is why the Zionists depended, or used, the British. Answers to these questions are found in many books that deal with this period.<sup>25</sup> But I want to add the following: Israel, now, does what its predecessor, the Zionist movement, did forty and more years ago. That is, it clings to the most powerful country in the world, it uses it for achieving its plans and to threaten the Arab countries with this alliance with that world power. In the twenties it was England and since the late forties and after it is the United States.

The United States appeared as the strongest country after 1945. The Zionists break with Britain was at that time too. Of course, there was a mutual interest between the British and the Zionists when their relations were good and there are mutual interests, now, between the State of Israel and the United States. These mutual interests will be examined fully later, in the chapter concerning the role, or potential role of the United States.<sup>26</sup>

It suffices here to say that this strategy of aligning itself with the world's greatest power is a characteristic of the Jewish state and, of course, it is understandable. Israel, even with its great military power always feels insecure because the Zionists know that they have taken the Palestinians' land and that they, the Zionists, have to maintain their power and might to transform it into right, if they can, to legitimize taking the land. Why do we see

that the most important issue Israel needs is Arab recognition of its existence and legitimacy? In regard to the Palestinians, Israel does question their legitimate right to have a state because that state, if to be realized, will mean the disappearance of Israel itself. ; 27

The main actors in this period were the British. Their interests shaped their policy during those three decades. The few shifts in their policy (especially in the White Papers of 1921 and 1929) explain only the exception and not the norm. The important role played by the British was their support and commitment, official and unofficial, for the creation of a Zionist state for the Jews in Palestine, knowing that there was a well-developed national group in that land and that that commitment and support with their consequences will have to clash with the interests of the existing national group. Ironically, the development of the Palestinian Arabs' national feelings was, to a great degree, enhanced by British and Jewish actions themselves during this period.

The multiple trials to find a peaceful solution to end the hostilities between the Arabs and the Zionists during this period were lost because of the unwillingness of the British to use their power to control the Zionists when they started to become a truly independent actor in the scene. When their real intentions of expelling the Arabs from their lands became clearer than ever, when their attacks against

England itself started to mount daily, and when their relations with the Nazi regime were shaped and became more determined to fill the Holy Land with Zionists and Jews it was too late for England to stop them .

Another factor that explains, in part, the causes for the failure of the peaceful proposals in the early stages was the failure of the Palestinians to systematically organize themselves either for war or for peace. As in the present situation, there is always a disagreement among the Palestinians of which route to follow to achieve the maximum of their national demands. Usually, nobody wins. Not even those who believe that they should use both routes.

Still another factor was the changing international balance of power. The United States was becoming the strongest country in the world and the genius calculations of the Zionists to ally themselves with the U.S. proved to be perfect. It answers the problems of both at the same time -Israel's security, since legitimation was not coming, and United States' interests in the region and the world.

When the British decided to withdraw from Palestine in 1948, and when they withdrew, the realities of 1917 were changed to the degree that armies of four Arab countries were unable to defeat the new small state of Israel.<sup>28</sup>

### 3. The Arabization of the Conflict: 1947-1967.

Soon after the British occupation of Palestine and other Arab lands the Arabs felt they had to fight together against the common enemy. The success of the Zionists in

establishing their state in Palestine even with the involvement of other regular Arab armies, made the Arab regimes "get stuck" in a situation they later preferred not to be in.<sup>29</sup> They committed themselves in 1948, thinking they would defeat Israel. A characteristic of the Arab regimes in that period was their blind competition with the other Arab countries.

It is important to note that the Arab's commitment to Palestine, then, was not for the Palestinians, it was, rather, for the Arab land of Palestine. This is still true, at least in their propoganda. When they talk, they speak of liberating Palestine or the occupied lands and not to liberate the Palestinians or the people of the occupied lands. From what I understand about the Arab mentality, their concern is the land and not the people. Therefore, people will be amazed at how much support the Palestinians get from their Arab "brothers" whereas, when it comes to actions, they are left alone. This explains the well-known rhetorical Arab support to the Palestinians . What happend in 1982 is a good example of this attitude and so was that of Sadat's withdrawal from the field in 1979. The Arabs could have helped establish an independent Palestinian state in The West Bank and Gaza before they were lost to Israel in 1967.

The Arab encouragement of the Palestinians to reject

the 1947 UN resolution for partitioning Palestine, and their actual participation in the 1948 war against Israel, are indicators of their belief that the Palestinian problem is a problem for all the Arabs and that it should be treated that way. Their retractions lately are a sign of a change in the Arab political attitudes toward the Palestinians and their land. The main feature of the conflict during this period was that the conflict was dealt with as an Arab conflict and not a Palestinian.

The conflict now is only a Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The defeats of 1948 and 1967 were a result of the imposed supervision of the Arab countries, of their belief that the problem is theirs. The Palestinians were under tight Arab control, as they are still now. The Palestinians acceptance of this imposed supervision was due to many local and regional factors but most importantly by their weakness and their belief in Pan-Arabism. A serious look at the Palestinians attitudes in this period explains why they did no more than wait. It was very clear for them that Nasser alone with his Pan-Arabist designs could liberate Palestine from the Zionist power and that this liberation was a liberation of an Arab land and not a land for the  
29  
Palestinians. In other words, Pan-Arabism was taken so seriously that the Palestinians themselves never thought of liberating the occupied territories to establish their own separate state on it but to unite with other Arab states in a larger Arab country.

The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan in 1951 was not viewed by many Palestinians as an attack on Palestinian nationalism.<sup>31</sup> They believed in Pan-Arabism to the state that they did not seriously resist the idea. Of course King Abdullah's designs were different but did not exceed the limit that the Palestinians will accept, even if it meant a Hashimite kingdom involving both Iraq and Jordan, or even if it meant a united Fertile Crescent with Syria and Lebanon. The unity between Egypt and Syria between 1958-1961 was viewed by Palestinians as the best means to liberate Palestine.

The creation of the PLO in 1964 started the whole process of the Palestinization of the conflict which was the major characteristic of the fourth period, 1967-1982. Nasser's goals from this creation were clear for everybody then: to control and use the Palestinians for internal Arab struggle and competition.<sup>32</sup> The PLO remained under control until the defeat of 1967 when their belief in the Arabs ability to liberate Palestine was shattered both by the scale of the defeat and the weak reactions afterwards. Nasser lost his power to control, direct, or use the Palestinians. It was his defeat.

As Jordanians, most of the Palestinians blamed King Hussein for the defeat, and the King blamed Nasser for involving him in a war he never wanted to participate in because of his fear of a civil war in Jordan.<sup>33</sup> Of course he

couldn't have avoided it. If he tried not to participate, he would have been blamed for the defeat anyway. At least he wouldn't have lost the West Bank; one argument goes that King Hussein "gave Israel the chance to invade Jordan and occupy the West Bank and Jerusalem.<sup>34</sup> Israel would have attacked Jordan anyway, even if King Hussein did not participate. Didn't they attack Syria two days later after they had "finished" with Egypt?

The creation of the PLO, the crushing defeat of 1967, the weak reaction of the Arab countries after the defeat, and many other factors that I will examine in the next section were behind the change and development that took place in the Middle East that led to the emergence of the fourth stage.

#### 4. The Palestinization of the Conflict: 1967-1982.

There were many local, regional, and international factors that led to this transformation of the scope, direction, and dimension of the conflict. The most important among these was the crushing defeat of the Arab armies in 1967, significant because of Palestinians disappointment at the poor performance of the Arab armies the great hopes the Palestinians had that the Arab armies could liberate Palestine were also crushed. The experience of 1948 had not taught the Palestinians a good lesson of not building their hopes on the Arab armies and their leaders. If all these armies could not defend themselves or save any more lands how could the Palestinians depend on them to liberate

Palestine?

Another important factor was the weak response the defeated Arab armies applied against this defeat. The Palestinians, again, expected sweeping and strong reactions from both the Arabs and the Russians. None of these was forthcoming. The war of attrition was not sufficient to produce any heat or confidence in the Arab leaders and their armies. It was "the least" they could do to reassure their people of their ability to continue. Internal Palestinian conflicts and developments had their impact too. Every one of the groups that started to emerge in response to the Arabs' weakness wanted to prove its authenticity and ability for leadership of the Palestinians to "liquidate the effects of the Israeli aggression"<sup>35</sup> and to liberate the "occupied territories."

They started their operations against Israeli targets within the occupied land. This lent credibility to their actions and slogans and started the idea that only the Palestinians could liberate "their" land, especially after the success and publicity of some of those operations. All the Arabs need to do, the Palestinians thought, is to let them use their borders to cross to the occupied land

This slogan, that only the Palestinians can, if left alone, liberate their land grew stronger and credible until it led to the conflict with King Husien and his army in 1970. The great publicity the Palestinians made of the

battle of Karameh in 1968 with their determination to challenge the Arab governments and especially king Hussein and his army led to the increase of recruits for the military branches of the Palestinian organizations. It also led to the strong belief that the Palestinians could successfully stand for the Israeli army as they did in Karameh. They could succeed in what all the Arab armies were unable to.

The Palestinians' attacks on Israeli targets led to strong Israeli retaliation on Jordanian civilian targets. This, further, led to a Jordanian reaction against the Palestinians' operations. King Hussein and his army were strongly against any Palestinian crossing of the borders. The best way to stop Israeli retaliation on Jordan, the King and his army thought, was to prevent the Palestinians from attacking Israeli targets. This of course goes contrary to the Palestinians' new and strong belief that they only can liberate Palestine and that the King and his army should not interfere in their operations. Wasn't it enough that he is not fighting to liberate Palestine? Wasn't enough that he and his army lost the rest of Palestine? This, as we know, led to the Civil war in Jordan and eventually to the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan.

Another important reason for this development was the acceptance of Jordan and Egypt of the Rogers Plan. This plan was to reinforce 242 in that it proposed the settlement of the conflict on the basis of "land for peace." Israel,

according to the plan, would withdraw to the pre-June, 1967 borders in exchange for Arab recognition and acceptance of Israel. Israel rejected the Plan and the United States was unable to force it on her.<sup>36</sup> The Arabs, especially Nasser and Hussein, wanted to prove to the U.S. that they are ready for peace and they are willing to accept the American role. This acceptance was supposed, according to the Arabs, to please the United States and therefore the United States would pressure Israel as it had thirteen years before.

The Palestinian' fury over this acceptance led them to attack Egypt and Jordan since this Plan did not give them anything. It gave the West Bank and Gaza back to those who held them before and the end result of the 1967 war was directed towards reviving a situation the PLO was unwilling to accept any more. Thus the fierce fighting and resistance to the King. The least the Palestinians could expect as a result of the war would be an independent Palestinian state in the "liberated" parts of Palestine and not a return to the old situation. The 1967 war ended all possible Palestinian acceptance of any none-Palestinian sovereignty. From this point of view, then, Arab supervision over the Palestinians have been lost and for ever. This also explains the strong internal turmoil within the PLO as a response to Arafat's conducting of the Amman Agreement since he was giving up hard-won Palestinian independence and sovereignty. Or, according to Peres, "Arafat was signing his death

Or, according to Peres, "Arafat was signing his death sentence when he signed the Agreement."<sup>37</sup>

The most important consequence of the expulsion from Jordan was that it reinforced the Palestinians' belief that they, and only they, can and should fight for the liberation of their lands. Jordan, its king and its army were unwilling and unable to do that job. They would have to do it themselves. This of course, led to the strong belief that the Palestinians should become independent of any Arab government that restrains them from attacking Israeli targets especially by crossing the borders. The Palestinians intended from crossing the borders also to involve the Arab armies in a war against Israel. This never worked, of course.

What happened to them in Jordan happened again in Lebanon. The Israelis used the same method of strong retaliation against Palestinians and the Lebanese villages to make it clear to the Lebanese government that they would have to stop the Palestinians if they want to remain sovereign and avoid a similar September like the one in Jordan in 1970.<sup>38</sup> The Lebanese learned fast but were unable to control the Palestinians as King Hussein did. Strong restrictions were imposed on the Palestinians in Lebanon by the Lebanese government with the agreement of other Arab countries, especially Egypt. But Lebanon was different from Jordan.

The continuation of the Palestinians's resistance, the continuous Lebanese complaints, and the continuous Israeli retaliation led the Arabs to believe that the best way to end their responsibility for the Palestinians was to formally acknowledge that the PLO represents all the Palestinians and that it, the PLO, should follow and carry out strong diplomatic efforts to gain international recognition and use it to pressure Israel to negotiate. The Arabs thought that responsibility may moderate the PLO's course and outlook. In a way, it did, but not to the degree that the Arabs wished, since this Arab recognition came after an Arab "victory" in October of 1973. This "victory" reinforced the PLO's belief that the Arabs can win a war and have done so in 1973. Why moderate then?

The Arabs thought that if they made the PLO responsible for the Palestinians and for the liberation of Palestine, the Arab rulers and their governments would not be held accountable for the loses of the Palestinian's lands . The occupation of Palestine and the West Bank and Gaza, therefore, could not be blamed on the Arab governments.

One of the most important resolutions an Arab summit produced was to declare that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. By this the Arabs satisfied themselves and satisfied the PLO leaders. The price the Palestinians paid for this was all their land and all the Palestinian and Arab soldiers who died for Palestine

since the Balfour Declaration. A very heavy price. This explains how important this representation is to the Palestinians. This recognition of the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians was immediately used and incorporated into the slogans and political and military actions of the PLO.

They started to behave as a state<sup>39</sup> within a state, especially in Lebanon. The restrictions that were imposed on the PLO in the early 70s in Lebanon were still hindering the PLO's free movement into the occupied lands and this led to more hostilities between the Palestinians and the Lebanese, who were becoming less tolerant of the Palestinian existence there but were unable to resist them because of many internal and regional alliances.<sup>40</sup>

The most important characteristic of this stage is that the Arabs endowed the PLO with the required local, regional, and international legitimacy to moderate them and have them produce or accept a responsible solution. Coupled with this is another important characteristic; the PLO did not, as the only representative of the Palestinians, produce any<sup>41</sup> systematic plan for liberating the occupied territories. This was true for many reasons but mostly because of Israel's continuous ignorance of the PLO. The PLO's inability to liberate the occupied territories will be discussed in the next chapter. But suffice it here to say that this lack of a systematic plan led to a great confusion within the PLO and among the Arabs. This failure to respond

led also to the continuation of the conflict and to the present stalemate,

The Lebanese civil war did not change much of the situation. The Palestinians, in fact, enjoyed a better position in Lebanon because of the war. They became partners of the Socialist Party in Lebanon. Syria had to deal with the Palestinians as an independent group for the first time. Other Arab and international actors started to give more weight to the PLO than to the Lebanese government. The PLO established political offices in most of the countries of the world. They were admitted to the UN as an observer. Arafat was invited to the UN as a leader of a state in 1974. As a summary of the development in this stage, all this did not lead to any change on the ground. The Palestinians started to act independently and to become more protective of their independence until 1982.

The Palestinians were unable to successfully use their independence to further their rights on the ground basically because of the absence of a territorial base to act from. They were theoretically independent, but in practice they were dependent on everybody; the Lebanese for land and support, the Syrians for military and political support, the Egyptians for political support, the Libyans and the Saudis for financial support. The 1982 war changed all this to an even worse situation.

5-The De-Palestinization of the Conflict: 1982 to the Present.

If we look back at what happened to the Palestinian conflict we see that it lost all of its previous important and clear characteristics. The conflict is not an Arab-Israeli one anymore, this is clear. It is not an international conflict. It is not a purely Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It is not even a Jordanian-Israeli conflict. It is all of these together. Now Everybody has a say in how it should and could be solved. The only characteristic that applies to it now is that it is becoming less of a Palestinian issue. DePalestinization is the only characteristic of the conflict now. Since 1982 we have heard of the Fahd Plan, the Reagan Plan, the Fez Plan, and the Camp David agreement surfaced again. The United Arab Kingdom surfaced, too, the Hussien Arafat (or the Amman) agreement was born, and so on .

This, as I said, is the major characteristic of conflict at this time. Everybody is trying to play his card and trying to make the Palestinians do what they refused to do upto now. All have in mind the fact the Palestinians were defeated badly in 1982; this defeat, they think, is sufficient to break the Palestinian resistance to a peaceful solution on the terms of Israel and the Arabs to the degree that some Arabs have suggested that the PLO recognize Israel<sup>42</sup> unilaterally.

As far as Arafat's actions are concerned, one could say that things are going in the direction that the Israelis have planned and demanded in the direction of the application of the Israeli rules rather than the direction of the Palestinian-Jordanian demands. What' is happening now is a process of convincing Arafat and Hussien that their only chance is to play by the Israeli rules. They will get what Israel gives.

My argument is that Israel is unwilling and incapable of giving Arafat or King Hussein anything for several and very important internal Israeli reasons and because of the regional and international power structure. This argument will be preented and examind in chapter four.

## Notes

1

Most of the Jews did not speak Hebrew. In fact most of the "Zionist writers" wrote in languages other than Hebrew. In The Zionist Idea, Hertzberg himself had translated some of the writings that he included in the book.

2

Herzel in "Palestine or Argentina" in Hertzberg, op.cit.,, also in Zionism published by Keter Books, pp. 85-86., 1973. See also Faris Glubb in Zionist Relations With Nazi Germany, New World Press, NY 1979.

3

See Glubb, op. cit., , p. 19.

4

See Rodinson's Israel Colonial-Settler State, Monad Press, Ny,. 1973, pp. 15-16. Also Hertzberg's Diary where he states that:

"Between ourselves it must be clear that there is no room for both people together in this country... We shall not achieve our goal of being an independent people with the Arabs in this small country. The only solution is Palestine, at least Western Palestine without Arabs... And there is no other way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries; to transfer all of them; not one village, not one tribe should be left."

5

Peters, Joan. From Time Immemorial, Harper and Row, NY, 1984. and Hertzberg, op. cit., .

6

Rodinson concludes that "The creation of the state of Israel on Palestinian soil is the culmination of a process that fits perfectly into the great European-American movement of expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries whose aim was to settle new inhabitants among other peoples or to dominate them economically and politically.... It is obvious that this is a colonial process with its own special characteristics " , p. 91.

7

See Said's review of of "From Time Immemorial" in JPS58, pp. 144-150.

8

See The Political programme of the PLO established in Cairo in 1974> It states that

"It is impossible for the a permanent and just peace to be established in the area unless our Palestinian people recover all their national rights and, first and foremost , their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their homeland (emphasise mine)

And the Israelis are not in a better situation. They too claim that all the land is theirs: Porat ,. a member of the Knesset, declared that :

"We are not prepared to to compromise on anything, not Jordan , not south Lebanon, or the rebuilding of the Temple in Jerusalem. We will achieve it all: The entire land of Israel, the Temple, everything." in Israel After Begin by Daniel Gavron, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1984 p. 57-58. Or even Begins remark that Israel does not need to to annex "Judia and Samiria: because they already are part of Israel They have been "liberated". Or see his statement gouted by Wright in After the Palestine-Israeli War: Limits to U.S. Policy, Institute of Arab Studies, Mass., 1983, p. 87.

Another example is gouted by Zeiv Scheff in an article in Haartz ans translated in AlQuds , August 26, 1985. It goutes Neiman who declared that the Palestinan reugees in the West bank and gaza... will be forced to find a permanen residence in one of the Arab countries. (emphasis mine).

A better and more official statement comes from Shamir who declared that " We do't say 'not one inch'. We have no need of suich slogans. We say 'Eretz Yisrael'... as we learned of it, yearned for it, lived it. And we shall live it in the future, we shall settle it, and it shal all of it be ours" Jerusalem Post, January 5, 1983 and many other examples especially Israel's formar Chief of Staff Eytan who declared that " We will not return Judia and Samaria, just like we are not planning to withdraw from my village, Tel-Adashim, or from Beer Sheva, for Jewish national and security reasons... The State of Israel cannot exist with the '67 borders, and all those who are speqack aboutv returning Judea and Samaria for peace are suggesting to the Jewish people to return to the Diaspora" in Maariv , January 6, 1983.

9

See Stoddard as in Hudson , p. 181. where he goutes George Schultz declaration in the U.N.

10

See Simha Flapan in JPS #57 where he states that: "There is aconsensus in iIsraeli peace groups that an end must come to the occupation and to the rule over the Palestinians because it leads to brutality on all levels of Israeli society and erods the human and moral values from which Zionism draws its strength",(emphasis mine) p. 39. This shows that the Israeli peace groups, and only peace groups, did not want the occupation just becuae it erods the human values of Zionism. Their concern is not the Palestinians, their rights, national and human, it is rhather their human values. This also clear in Timermans The Longest War: Israel in Lebanon , Vintage Books, 1982. His fears and cries were not for the palestinians. It was for the "image of the Jewish State", for the "bad economic situation", for the "Jewis young men who are killed in the war."

11

See Peters, op. cit.

12

Israel managed to colonize Palestine and maintain its occupation and expand its territory because of its strength and because of U.S. support and help. See King Hussein's address to the 17th. PNC in JPS #60, p. 214.

13

See Ted Koppel's interview of Peres on ABC Nightline on October 17, 1985, p. 4 where he "pleads" with Peres to allow the U.S. to sell arms to Jordan. The way the question was put is a strong indicator of the influence Israel has over the media also.

14

Israelis make it clear that they are afraid that one day the Arabs will attack them and threaten their existence. Whether this belief is true, real, or not does not make a big difference since this influences their policies.

15

Sharon made it clear that "Here in Israel, the only people who can defend the Jews are only the Jews themselves" in Ted Koppel's interview with Peres, op. cit., p 3.

16

See note # 10.

17

Breuilly, John. Nationalism and the State, St. Martin Press, NY, 1982, p. 355. where he concludes that nationalism is a fiction.

18

Harakabi, Y., The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning, Valentine, Mitchell, 1979.

19

See note #4 above.

20He ment that the West Bank and Gaza are not Palestine and that Jordan is supposed to be the land the PLO need to liberate in live in.

21

See Nakhleh and Wright, op. cit.,

22

See Ajami, f. The Failure of Pan-Arabism.

23

For more detailes about this period see the 1936-1939 Revolution (in Arabic).

24

See Rodinson op. cit., pp. 90-91.

25

Many books deal with the internationalization of the Palestine question. Some are related to the serach for peace and harmony, others examine the role of the British and the development of the Jewish colonization.

26

This will be examined carefullu in chapter 5 below.

27

Yousif Al Abid " Israel exists because there is no Palestine".

28

In fact, Israel occupied more than its allocated "share" after the break of the war.

29

Sadat decided that the Egyptians have paid the price for Palestine. The feeling that the Egyptians felt about the Palestinians and Palestine was clearly put by Amin as quoted by Karem Yehia in his article on "The Image of the Palestinians in Egypt, 1982-85" in the JPS #62, Winter 1987, p. 47.

30

The Palestinians did not demand that they establish their independent state before 1967.

31

Sinai and Pollack (eds.) The Hashemite Kingdome of Jordan and the West Bank : A Handbook American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, p. 27.

32

Kerr, Malcolm , The Arab Cold War, Oxford University Press, London, 1971, p. 115.

33

See King Hussein Mehnatu Kamalik (My Proffession as a King) in Arabic where he states that if he did not participate in the 1967 war against Israel there would have errupted a civil war in Jordan. P.209

34

Moskin, J. Robert. Among Lions, Ballentine Books, NY, 1982, p. 10

35

This phrase was used after the 1967 war to avoid using strong words like liberate or fight. It was used to imply the possibilty of using peaceful means to do the liquidation.

36

See Nakhgleh and Wright, op. cit, p. 26, 45, 50, and 107 for examples of the way Israel's leaders and politicians think of U.S. potential pressuers.

37

Peres as quoted by Freedman in the NYT, March 9, 1986, p. E3.

38

This is an Israeli strategy that they successfully used and advised their friends to use it. It worked very well with Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, and even Tunisia.

39

Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad) Falasteeni Bela Hawiyyah (A Palestinian Without an Identity),

40

For more details about the PLO's role in Lebanon see Halim Barakat, Lebanon in Strife, University of Texas Press, 1977; David Gordon Lebanon: The Fragmented Nation

Croom Helm, London, 1980; and Walid Khalidi, Conflict and Violence in Lebanon: Confrontation in the Middle East, Harvard University, 1979.

41

Except for the two state solution which was presented in the early 70's and accepted by the PLO . For an examination of this solution see Jureidini and Hazen op. cit., p. 99 and also see Alan Gresh The PLO: The Struggle Within , Zed Books Ltd, London, 1983, p. 120-125

42

This was not the first time Egypt suggest a similar actions. Sadat suggested in 1983 that the PLO form a state in exile. In 1982 Egypt suggested that the PLO recognize Israel's right to exist unilaterally thinking that this will lead to international and especially U.S. recognition of the PLO and pressures on Israel.

## Chapter 2

### The Palestinian National Liberation Movement and the failure of the "Conventional Military Approach"

The major theme of this chapter is that the PLO, because of its present nature and structure, is militarily incapable of defeating Israel and politically too weak to influence other regional and international forces to force Israel to withdraw at least from the lands that constitute the PMDs and to establish a Palestinian state.

Before I explain what I mean by the nature and structure of the PLO I want to list the assumptions behind this theme.

The first assumption is that the nature of political organizations -what they are and what they represent- change; and that any change in the nature of an organization leads to a change in its structure. Second, any change in the nature and the structure leads to a change in the relations of the organization with outside forces and factors. Third, nature and structure and their determination of relations determines abilities and directions. This is to say that the present nature and structure of the PLO determine its relations, abilities and direction. A change in the nature and structure will necessarily lead to changes in its relations, abilities, and direction. The nature of the PLO determines its goals, alliances, and direction. Its structure determines how it operates, sets the limit on what the leadership can or cannot do or accept. Therefore the nature and

structure are very interrelated.

To go back to what we mean by the nature and structure of the PLO. When we talk about the nature and structure of the PLO we mean what it is made of and what makes it what it is. It is made of the following:

- 1- The groups that compose it and the people they represent.
- 2- The ideologies and interests of these groups.
- 3- The goals of these groups.
- 4- The methods of achieving those goals.

These four components that make up the PLO are interrelated. Each one of them enhances and determines the others. Any change in anyone of them will necessarily and automatically lead to changes in all the other components. An example of this interrelatedness is the case of the admission of new groups within the PLO in 1970. This led to the introduction of new "methods" for the liberation of Palestine and the war with King Hussain's army later that year. In other words, the admission of new groups led to a change in "ideologies", goals, and in "methods".

Another example was the introduction of the "Democratic secular State 'idea'" with the "methods" accompanied by it led to a strong and "violent" debate within the PLO. We know that the PLO is an organization composed of a large number of small groups and factions that represent different ideologies and "methodologies". Some of them represent regional and/or international forces. The number of these

groups changes, as mentioned above, with the changes in the PLO's announced policies. A recent example was the 17th. PNC. IN this council few of the organizations did not attend protesting Arafat's and Fateh's policies of dealing with King Hussein.

Although the number of the participating members in the Council was sufficient to hold the meetings, the split of the other groups, the PFLP, ALF, and the DFLP and the establishment of the National Salvation Front (NSF) to "replace" Arafat's Fateh-Dominated PLO (of course with Syrian encouragement<sup>2</sup> was a significant movement that demonstrates this point, i.e. that the change in policies, "tactical" or "strategic",<sup>3</sup> leads to a change in the number and/or the groups composing the PLO.

#### THE NATURE OF THE PLO:

The PLO is a national liberation movement<sup>4</sup> that is made up of several groups that strive at achieving their minimum demands either by armed struggle or by political means from under the Israeli "colonial"<sup>5</sup> occupation of the land that they believe to be their land and to establish their own independent state on that land .

This statement summarizes the nature of the PLO. Now we have to examine each part of the components of this nature.

#### The groups that make up the PLO

The PLO's executive committee represents the major groups that make up the PLO. The number of representatives is determined by the size of the group including

independents.<sup>6</sup> The Palestinian National Congress is supposed to be, is, and is considered, to represent all the Palestinian people especially the West Bank and Gaza palestinians, the palestinians of Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Therefore, the resolutions of the PNCs are considered to represent the attitudes of the majority of the Palestinians since they are represented in those PNCs.

The diversity and the differences of priorities of each group is apparent within the PLO to some degree. The priorities of the West Bank and Gaza population,<sup>7</sup> are in a way different from those of the Palestinian population of Jordan and/or Lebanon. The goals are of course similar -the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza- but the priorities are different. For the West Bank and Gaza population the end of the occupation is paramount and of first priority. For the Palestinians of Lebanon, in the other hand, the end of the war waged against them in Lebanon is more important. It has an immediate threat than the somewhat "distant" Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

These priorities are supposed to be integrated and harmonized within the PLO to achieve the ever-sought national unity and to satisfy the large number of constituent groups.<sup>8</sup> The new emphasis of Arafat before and during the talks with King Hussain reflect the change of priorities of the PLO to the West Bank and Gaza population.

The pressures on the PLO to satisfy the demands and priorities of the different Palestinian constituents, to say nothing about the regional and international pressures, which are part of the self-held responsibilities of the PLO and which, at the same time, are intrinsic part of the nature of the PLO that we are talking about, are most important in determining and limiting the PLO's options. In other words, the nature of the PLO -in this case its responsibilities as a national liberation movement made up of several groups to represent and satisfy the social and political needs of all the Palestinians and their representative military organizations regardless of their priorities and interests-determine the course and limits the operation and movement of the organization.

If, for example, the PLO represents the Palestinians of Jordan or of Lebanon only, its ability to achieve the specific goals and priorities of this or that group will then increase. But since it has to satisfy the wide range of interests and priorities of ALL the Palestinians, its ability to address, to say nothing about achieve, all the goals and different priorities decreases sharply and sharply will the pressures on it increase.<sup>9</sup>

It should be kept in mind that the differences in the priorities among the palestinians in the different parts of the Arab World are crucial not only in the "pre-state" or "pre-liberation" period but also for the "after-liberation" period. New palestinian classes and status groups have been

formed with connection to different , and sometimes, antagonistic, forces in the regional and international spheres. These connections are and will continue to be problematic for the Palestinian representatives. In other words, the formation of new classes and interest groups within the Palestinian community is forcing new pressures over the PLO.

To summarize this part we are saying that the groups that represent the Palestinian people within the PLO have differences and different immediate interests that do not go along with the interests and priorities of the other groups and this is due to the nature of the PLO itself. This also leads to internal pressures that the PLO leadership has to deal with and respond to. This need for immediate responses to the internal differences and priorities of the constituent groups and their representatives is part of the nature of the PLO and determines, as mentioned above, the limits and direction of the organization's movement.

Another dimension of the importance of this part of the nature of the PLO -the existence of too many groups with too different interests and priorities- is the emergence of a successful attempt of external forces to influence and direct the PLO.

The talk about Syrian, Iraqi, Jordanian, etc.. influence within the PLO is not new. It was well-known from the beginning -even designed according to many analysts -

that the PLO was established to serve the interests of Nasser or this or that Arab leader . This situation continued for a while; now it still works but in a different form. Instead of controlling the PLO as a whole, each, or almost each, Arab ruler controls or "creates" a group of his own and forces this group to reject the PLO's policies that do not serve the interests of this regime. Recent examples of this trend are the mutiny of Abu Musa in 1983 and the refusal of the PFLP to attend the Algerian "national unity" conference which was called for by the Algerian president. Another, and more recent, example is Abu Al-Zaeem's mutiny against Arafat in Jordan to protest Arafat's refusal of Security Council resolution 242.<sup>10</sup>

The significance of this trend, and it is a trend indeed is that the PLO's policies will be colored by the interests of the external forces. This will make it difficult to tell which of the policies are genuinely Palestinian and which are not. Another, is that the palestinian interests are not necessarily served better this way, as has been the case since the establishment of the PLO. Another, Still, is the ideological and long-term interests and goals of each of them. Syria and Iraq for example advocate an Arab Unity among all the Arab countries. Arafat and the PLO's believe that this could happen only after the establishment of an independent Palestinian state which will, then and of its own choice and national will, join other Arab countries in a union. The more important

consequence of this trend is the fear of a Syrian, Iraqi, Libyan, etc... interference or influence of these groups during and after the formation of an independent Palestinian state with the threat of the inability of Arafat or Fateh to control these groups which will lead to the threat of an Israeli or Jordanian control of the new state. I will come to this in the conclusion.

To summarize this section, we will say that the pressures on the PLO that emerge from its being made up of many groups with different interests and priorities, which is an intrinsic part of its nature, are internal and external. Internal in that each group represents its own interests and priorities; and external because of the strong influence of the external powers on these groups. In other words, the dependence of the PLO groups on external powers for either basis, funding, protection, training, or support influences these groups' goals and methodologies and these will be reflected on the total political outlook of the PLO and its political programs.

#### The Ideologies of the Groups

It is important to keep in mind that these components are interrelated and that each of them determines the others. The goals and methods of each group is usually and supposed to be determined by its ideology. In some cases the line between goals and methods is blurred and the determination of each part is reversed. In other words,

instead of ideologies determining goals and methodology (tactics and strategies) tactics and strategies come to determine ideologies and alliances. A recent example was Arafat's "tactical" move towards Egypt to counterbalance Syria's rejection which was transformed into an important political strategic issue in the 18th. PNC.<sup>13</sup>

The emergence of the "Secular State Solution" as a goal for example, led to changes in tactics and alliances within the PLO. Arafat was able to establish contacts with what is still called "peaceful or moderate Jewish groups and parties" and call this as a new tactic while armed struggle remains a strategy. The approval of the "use of any means including political and peaceful means to achieve the Palestinian rights" by the 16th. PNC, and the acceptance of the Fez Plan was called a new strategy.<sup>14</sup>

It is true that goals shape and are shaped by the realities and by the ideologies of the group, but in this case, and especially after the First Defeat of the PLO<sup>15</sup> in 1970 in Jordan, as we want to demonstrate, ideology became the least important factor in determining the direction, goals, and/or the alliances of the PLO.

Although the intellectual and ideological debate raged at the beginning and during the formation of the present-day PLO, its heat cooled down by the realities of the attacks on and the defeats of the PLO especially in Jordan, 1970 and in Lebanon, 1976, 1982 . Political and physical survival became the most important goal and strategy and then national unity.<sup>16</sup>

The groups that make up the PLO represent ideologies that range between a fundamentalist-religious belief to a Marxist-Leninist ideology. Within the PLO, and especially in specific times, these ideologies flourish both intellectually and politically and get stronger. At other times, especially when the Israeli military threat is immanent, these ideologies and their importance diminish. It is important to note also that the PLO has maintained an ideology-free stand<sup>17</sup>. But we know that nationalism is an ideology<sup>18</sup> and it also shapes the PLO's goals and tactics.

The importance of these ideologies are in their representation of outside forces within the PLO (it is not to say, of course, that they are not important in themselves or that those who believe in them do that for tactical reasons). The subscription to such ideologies helps in maintaining an international and regional connection for the groups which give them prestige and strength. Some of the groups are ideologically "mature" and behave accordingly. But when it comes to national (Watani) liberation they almost do nothing since it either contradicts their ideology of internationalism<sup>19</sup> and/or it is secondary to national unity.<sup>20</sup>

The other dimension of their, the ideologies, importance is the way these ideologies and the people who believe in them will be represented in the shaping of the PLO's policies and, in the future, in the governing of the new "state".

In other words, the ideologies and beliefs of the groups that compose the PLO used to have more importance and weight during the "power struggle" within the PLO and will have much more weight and importance during the formation of a Palestinian state. In the meantime they could be dismissed as "background" guidelines. They have no more bearings on the present situation or the outcomes of the present palestinian-Israeli struggle especially after Arafat's success during the 16th. and 17th. PNCs to solicit the approval of all groups -including the most ideological and radical, the PFLP- to "use any means -including political means- to achieve the MPDs which were lowered to a minimum to maintain Palestinian national unity, at least during the 16th. PNC.

There are many ways in which the existence of all these different ideologies weaken the PLO and prevent it from achieving its goals . One of them is the distrust of Israel and the United States of the ability of Arafat or Fateh to control the other factions that are ideologically committed to more than the PMDs and who are supported by strong or rich regional and/or international forces.<sup>21</sup>

Another way is by the continuous interference of non-palestinian forces and/or forces that does not recognize the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" in the affairs of the PLO. This in itself and because of its consequences, i.e. the struggle

within the PLO, weaken the PLO internally and expose it externally.

This is another aspect of the PLO's nature that, as we have demonstrated, leads to its weakness and hinders its ability to direct all its resources to achieving its national goal. Internal struggle and the continuous need to defend its legitimacy and representativeness weakens the PLO and limit its power to address itself to the real and serious issues of national liberation.

The Goals of the Groups:

Though the PMDs are the minimum official and present goals of all the Palestinian factions and groups as represented in the PLO and as was clear after the 16th. PNC and the Fez Summit, each of them has long-term, ideologically-motivated goals that differ from the main goal set herefore as the PMDs.<sup>22</sup> These goals range from a democratic secular state that combines Muslims, Jews, and Christians of Palestine as advocated by the DPFLP and by the PLO itself at one time<sup>23</sup>, to a "two-state solution" where the Palestinians will have their own independent state in the West Bank and Gaza, which was for a long time the PMD; or to a state confederated with Jordan.<sup>24</sup> Other "long-term" goals exist where all Palestine has to return to the Palestinian Arabs<sup>25</sup>.

These long-term goals or objectives have either changed by the reality of the situation, or have submerged -to reappear later in different forms or different levels of

intensity, or to be included in a speech by the spokesman of this or that group which will be later denied or illustrated by a higher official and dismissed as a tactical and not strategic and not goal.<sup>26</sup>

What is needed to be stressed here is that there are declared PMDs which are officially accepted by the PLO who represents the Palestinian Resistance Movement. These demands, it has to be noted, represent only the Minimum that the Palestinians will accept. Other long-term and broader goals do exist, especially if we know that the PRM, with its broad ideological spectrum, was forced to curb its rhetoric and declared intentions of its long-term goals in exchange for international recognition and regional survival.<sup>27</sup> Some groups, for example, believe in changing the whole political and social order of the Arab countries and their people as part of their Palestinian-oriented goals. The PFLP believes that Arab unity is the way to the Liberation of Palestine. Others believe that the Arab rulers have to be eliminated to allow for the true and free social and political participation of the Arab masses which are hindered by the threat of persecution by their military governments if they try to show their support of the PRM.

The conclusion that we can get from this section is that these goals of some of the Palestinian groups do exist and will have an important effect on the Palestinian Movement and its ability to achieve national unity or a

unified minimum demand lower than the one mentioned above -A Palestinian confederacy with Jordan in the West Bank and Gaza including East Jerusalem.

However, at the present, the problem of the ultimate goals of each group, thanks to the continuous stress on national unity, were left to the groups themselves to decide for the future. While the "maximum" demands were left to the future and to the abilities of the PLO and its factions, the minimum demands have never been officially set by the PLO. This, of course, is due to the political and geographical situation the PLO is in. In this sense, the goals of the groups as a component of the PLO's nature have the least effect on weakening the PLO now. At the same time they have the strongest potential to erupt in a civil war if the PLO happens to achieve the PMDs.

Another conclusion is that even if the Palestinians were able to achieve their Minimum Demands, the long-term, ideologically-motivated goals which are of minor importance now will have tremendous impact and effect on the stability of the new regime whether it be Palestinian-Jordanian, Jordanian, or Palestinian, since these groups will try to resort to their "old" goals to either restore their power, to achieve more power, or to destabilize the new regime to force it to work to achieve their ideologically-motivated goals which, as mentioned above, will have greater importance then.

In other words, the strongly-ideological but presently unpopular and militarily weak groups will resort to their strong ideologies and their regional and international supporters to achieve their long-term ideological objectives. The new regime, which would be expected to be dominated by Fateh, will not be strong enough, as it always was,<sup>29</sup> and as it is expected to be at this stage, to prevent these groups from disturbing the situation [if a situation like this is ever to be] to the degree that will lead either to a new Israeli occupation,<sup>30</sup> or to a civil war, or for Jordan to take over the new state.

These are the components of the nature of the PLO and how they are interrelated. It was demonstrated how each of them affects the others and determine the direction of the PLO and the limits it imposes over the abilities of the organization to achieve its goals and the PMDs. It was also demonstrated that any change in one of them leads to a change in the other components.

In other words, the people who give the PLO its strength, are the same people who create its weakness. By adhering to take the responsibility of the Palestinian people, the PLO subjects itself to the demands, interests, and priorities of those peoples and their representatives. Being a national liberation movement that aims to liberate its people and lands and placing national unity in the highest order, even over the major goal, i.e. the achievement of the PMDs by any means including political

means as the 16th. PNC legislated, limits the organization's options, abilities, and direction. Therefore, one can see how the nature of the PLO determines its abilities and weakens it. The answer to how this could be overcome will be dealt with in the conclusion.

#### THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLO

The major theme of this part in this chapter is to examine the structure of the PLO and determine if there is any relationship between the structure of the PLO and its ability to achieve the PMDs. Also it intends to examine in what ways does this structure determine, weaken, and limit the PLO and its options for the restoration and achievement of the PMDs. It also intends to demonstrate whether any change could be induced in this structure; and if change could be induced, how could that happen and what could the consequences be.

By the structure of the PLO is meant the way the groups are related to each other and how each of them uses its power and authority to achieve the goals; the way decisions are made and carried out; what agencies do what, how goals are established; maintained, changed or rectified; how the constituents are represented and what means they have to have their demands reach the authorities and what means they have to insure that the executives do and achieve what the legislator (the PNC) legislates.

The PLO is organized and structured in a way that, theoretically, enables all the political and military groups and the Palestinian social and economic institutions to participate in the decision-making process or at least the directing of the PLO. This type of organization, as shall be demonstrated here, has a strong effect on the operations and abilities of the whole Organization.<sup>31</sup> In other words, because of the type of organizational structure -with connection to the nature of the organization-, the PLO has limited options and directions that it can take without, necessarily, breaking up the coalition of the organization. Any tendency to deviate from the unwritten national consensus and any acceptance of less than the acceptable minimum will lead to the break up of the organization, as happened in 1983. The fear of this break up, with the "holy" advocacy of the PLO on National Unity, prevents the PLO from taking any workable direction or policy. At the same time, the desire and need to keep national unity could lead, as in 1970, to dangerous consequences. Arafat wanted to maintain his control over the organizations was "dragged" into a war with King Hussein to satisfy the PFLP and maintain its membership in the PLO.

From this point of view, we can see that the PLO has a very complex structure. This complexity stems from the nature of the Organization itself and from the complexity of the Palestinian society and its needs. Added to this is the interference of Arab and foreign countries.

In this way we see that the structure of the PLO, i.e. its form of organization, levels of authority (the executive committee, central committee, and the Palestinian National Council with their respective functions and authorities); the means of expression of political views' and opposition (there are no political and peaceful means to voice opposition outside of the PNC which meets irregularly to do that); the dispersion of the constituents over a vast and different territories and which are under unfriendly rule (which hinders the organization's ability to resort to public opinion and to systematic and representative polling or survey of the constituent's views and attitudes).

Examples of this structure and how it effects the operation and direction of the PLO are both plenty and clear, especially if we look at recent events. Immediately after the expulsion from Bierut, a split within Fateh took place. Although Syrian and Libyan role was clear,<sup>32</sup> the causes of this split within Fateh, to say nothing about the PLO as a whole, was essentially Palestinian, i.e. internal. The initial events were inter and intra-Fateh and PLO rivalries. Organizational and leadership changes are paramount but aside, basic goals and tactics played a major role in this split. There was a rejection of Arafat's move to deal with King Hussein and Mubarak. This, the dealing with King Hussein and Mubarak, is a basic issue of survival and national unity that combines both the PLO's structure

and nature. But because of the structure of the PLO, its make up of all those diverse groups and the representation of each group of a different "style" for the liberation of the Occupied Territories; because of the lack of the means of peaceful expression of political opposition within Fateh<sup>33</sup> and because of the form and structure of the chain of command within Fateh and the PLO.

Because of the lack of "enough" military power in the hands of the leadership to silence the opposition (and this is due to the nature and structure of the organization as mentioned above) the organization cannot control, to say nothing about eliminate, the opposition and, therefore, has to accept the limits, constraints, and the pressures the other, though minor, groups put on it.

The resort to "structure" to explain the PLO's weakness is important not only because it brings to the fore the need for structural change within the PLO but also because it explains the internal factors for this weakness.

If, as will be demonstrated in this research, the nature and the structure of the PLO has a significant effect on the ability and direction of the PLO, and if these structures could be changed, it will become easier then to prescribe changes that should take place within the structure of the PLO to eliminate the weaknesses that stem from structural causes and establish new structures that will strengthen the Organization.

This belief that structural changes could be induced into the structure of the PLO and that these inductions will lead to the strengthening of the organization will solve only one of the PLO's problems, i.e. the internal problems. The regional and international dimensions for the weakness of the PLO will remain and will be examined later in the research.

Now we come to another question: How could a structural change take place or be made and how will this change lead to a change in the position of the PLO?

If, for example, Fateh was militarily stronger than it was during and after 1970 it could have resisted the temptations to pressures from the PFLP to revolt against king Hussein's army and continued its presence in Jordan with all the consequences that could have emerged from this continued existence. In other words , if the structure of the PLO was different than it was, i.e. that the power relationship among the groups composing the PLO was different, then Fateh could have dominated the PLO. With its "moderate" attitudes, it could have accomplished its goals at that time. It could, of course, have done worse damage to the Palestinian cause, depending on the consequences and use of its power. But what I want to make clear here is that if the structure was different, then the outcome of the relationship of the PLO and the other parties could have changed, i.e. a change in the structure could lead to a change in the events and outcomes of the relationship.

Now, as we are sure that a change in the structure could, and does lead to a changes in the outcomes, what are the parts of the structure of the PLO could be changed and what could the outcomes be?

The PLO is structured, as mentioned above, in a way to allow maximum representation of the majority of the Palastinian national, social and labor institutions. The PLO always emphasized national unity to its top priority. This emphasis on national unity was accomplished, maintained and at sometimes strengthened on the expense of a bold and strong determination of a political direction and of policy towards ending the Palestinian problem. National unity became and still is the most important goal for the PLO. It stopped being a means to achieving victory or liberation. It became <sup>34</sup> the goal of the PLO.

No PLO leader is capable to ignore the importance and consequences of national unity. It is the only guarantee for the support of the Palestinians. Any cracks in this unity will lead to a disarray among the palestinians and their "representative" guerrilla groups.

The emphasis on National unity is an outcome of the structure of the PLO. If the PLO was composed of one group only, or one strong group that can control and direct the other groups then this one group could decide, present and execute its goals in a much easier way than having to accomodate other groups and in the process loose the

boldness and the consensus over that goal that is required in a national liberation movement.

The PLO's executive committee, though has great powers to execute whatever the PNC decides upon, it lacks the execution agencies and institutions to carry out these decisions. At the same time, the problem is even worse in the PNC, the decision-making body of the PLO. Being composed of a large number of politically and ideologically diverse groups that participate in democratic-like system of decision-making, it, like any other democratic and multi-partisan decision-making system, lacks a consensus over both tactical and strategic policies and goals.

What makes things even worse, is that each of these group is equipped with the necessary arms to fight for their ideologies and policies. The differences on the meeting floor could be carried out on the "battle field" if there was a need for that, i.e. if there was a disagreement.

The arming of the groups and the ultimate need for a consensus (or national unity) become an obstacle in the way of decision-making, presentation, and execution.

This is only one dimension of the relationship between the structure and the nature of the Organization. But it shows how the structure of the PLO, with its present form, hinders the decision and execution of the policies of the PLO . These policies may not be a representation of the attitudes of the majority of the palestinian people - there is no way to measure their attitudes anyway, which is

another structural handicap- but it would be the attitudes of the strongest groups nevertheless.

The emphasis on national unity, which implies democracy and Palestinians are, and have the right to be, proud of it, is in itself valuable and should be kept. But if it becomes an obstacle it should be dismissed for the meantime. There is, of course, no assurance that it could be ever restored, as is the case in all the Arab countries, but that is the dilemma of the PLO. The PLO is too democratic for national liberation movement. The problem then is the inappropriate political system of the PLO which is a result of both the nature and the structure of the Organization.

The PLO as a whole, or the majority of the groups that could decide on one direction and can carry it out should control, and if necessary dissolve the minor groups that require, pressure, and "force" the majority to bend for their demands. This is ultimately and admittedly an undemocratic statement and has disastrous consequences both materially and ideologically, but it is the only way the PLO can decide and execute decisions that are approved by the majority.

The restructuring of the PLO, in other words, the elimination or the control of the smaller groups, is the only way the PLO can use to eliminate its internal weakness.

This can be done by following a tough and militant posture against any possibility of a rejection or opposition

from the minor groups. This demands, of course, a change in the priorities of the PLO. national unity should continue to be a top priority, but as a means and not as an end in itself at this stage. National unity should also mean the silencing of any group that threatens this national unity [call it "forced" national unity if you like] but it is the only way internal problem could be avoided and for the strongest group to achieve something.

This solution may not enjoy the approval of many Palestinians. But it certainly will give the Organization a stronger posture. One of the common claims, is that the PLO should prove that it is cable of restraining its own groups before it could stop the Arabs or the Israelis from fighting it. The Palestinians should stop killing each other before they fight Israel. Or, the palestinian killed more Palestinians than Israel did.

The task of controlling the other minor groups is not an easy one. For one reason, most of these groups are attached to other strong and influential external Arab states like Sa'iqā and the ALF. Another reason is the distaste of the Palestinian people for force to settle internal problems. Third and most important, the PLO wants to maintain its stand and posture as a democratic movement to gain the support of its constituents especially in the West Bank and Gaza.

From all of this we can conclude the following:

- 1-The structure and nature of the PLO determine its operation, direction, and ability.
- 2-The nature and structure of the PLO are a result and a reflection and outcome of the nature and structure of the Palestinian society.
- 3-The ideology of the PLO stems from the nature and structure of the Palestinian society.
- 4-The nature and structure of the Palestinian society are changeable
- 5-The PLO's emphasis on national unity is forced over the PLO by its nature and structure. This emphasis is the most important goal of the PLO and the palestinians.
- 6-This same emphasis and the perceived need to maintain national unity is done on the expense of the probable achievement of the PMDs.
- 7-Only by controlling, and the ability and willingness to eliminate the minor groups pressures over the major group's goals and decisions could the PLO eliminate its internal weakness.

We see then that the PLO, because of its nature and structure is weak. This weakness preclude any strong influence over the direction of the conflict. Because the PLO is weak militarily and politically it has no chances of either forcing Israel to withdraw nor does it have any strong political influence to influence the Arabs, the West, or the Soviet Union to pressure Israel to withdraw.

Not even its "peaceful" gestures and contacts with the "peace forces" in Israel will help. The methods that worked in the Algerian case, i.e., to appeal to the French citizens to persuade the French government to leave Algeria, do not work in this case for many reasons that I will examine in chapter four. The "peace force" are too weak to survive to say nothing about influence the government.

In a sentence, the PLO cannot force Israel to withdraw neither politically nor militarily neither by itself, nor with the help of others. They have to search for other means. These means will be examined in the conclusion.

## Notes

1

See Jureidini and Hazen in The Palestinian movement in Politics, Lexington Books, Mass., 1976, pp.98-99 and Gresh in The PLO: The Struggle Within, 1983, pp.122-125.

2

Gresh, op. cit., pp.236-7 and AlSakhrah #96, 97.

3

Ibid, p. 133-146 and Jureidini and Hazen op. cit., pp.34-37.

4

In his article "The nature of a National Liberation Movement" in the Middle East Information Series, (Fall) 1973 pp. 42-46. Merhave claims that the PLO is not a NLM since it fights against Arab-Jewish Cooperation and not against a colonial power that occupies their land. A very simplistic and ignorant view. It seems that Merhave had never read the Arab view of the nature of the state of Israel. and that they consider Israel as . When he compares between the PLO and the FLN or the Viet Kong he states that the "so-called 'National Palestinian Liberation Movement' is fighting against a neighboring people! What a misreading.

5

Rodinson, Maxime. Israel A Colonial Settler State, Monad Press, 1973.

6

For further information on the PLO and its groups and structure see William Quandt., et al, The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, University of California Press, Berkely, 1972.; and Cheryl Rubenberg The Palestine Liberation Organization: Its Institutional Infra-Structure, IAS, 1983; and Gresh, op. cit., . And for information on the West Bank role, input, and attitudes on the conflict which became more important after 1982 see JPS #62, pp.196-207. This was a summary of the poll conducted September, 1986 of the West Bankers that can be summarized this way:

1. Over 90% believe that the PLO is their sole and legitimate representative .
2. 80.6% refuse U.N. Resolution 242 as the basis for the solution.
3. 6.8% refuse resolution 242 because it requires the recognition of Israel.
4. 78.4% believe that the use of force is justified, However,
5. 79.3% oppose using force against civilians (placing bombs on civilians airlines.
6. 3.4% felt that the U.S. played a positive role. However;
7. 60.8% feel that the U.S. can play a positive role.
8. 79% support Arafat
9. 6% support Habash.
10. 5% support Hawatmeh. and
11. 1% support Abu Musa.

7

See Al-Masri's interview in JPS #59, pp.156-7 demanding the acceptance of 242 since "other workable" processes do not exist as if the Israel will withdraw if the PLO accepted 242.

8

The problem with the constituents is that they are as dispersed as the leadership itself which makes it so hard to communicate either among the constituents or between the constituents and the leadership.

9

This was very clear especially after the break with King Hussein in 1986 as he closed the PLO offices.

10 See Al-Sakhrah 77 & 78.

11

For a detailed examination of the possibilities and consequences of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state see Plascov's A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives, Adelphai Papers #163, 1981.

12

Sa'iga, the ALF for example are controlled by other Arab countries, Syria and Iraq respectively which may influence these organizations to undermine the Palestinian government's positions for their interests as happened before in 1983.

13

See Al-Sakhrah 138 & 139. The 18th. PNC could very well be called the National Unity PNC.

14

See resolutions of the 16th. PNC in JPS #47 and Abu Lughod's report on the Council in JPS #48, pp.25-40.

15

For more detail about this issue see Mark Bruzonsky's article "The Second Defeat of Palestine" in JPS #59, pp.30-52.

16

Arafat and other Palestinian leaders declared in 1983 and 1986-7 that their political and physical survival is at stake in Lebanon. This important issue superceded National Unity. See Al-Sakhrah 129 for example.

17 Rubenberg, op. cit., p. 16.

18

See Breuilly's Nationalism and the State, p. 355 and Rubenberg, p. 16.

19

The best example of this situation is the case of the admittance of the PCP (Palestine Communist Part) in the 18th. PNC. The Communists demanded to be admitted to the PLO and their application was accepted as long as they withdraw their recognition of Israel and as long as they proved their armed struggle record against it. Proving both, the Communists became a member in the PLO. for further details

see Al-Sakhras #138 & 139, Spring, 1987.

20

See Rubenberg op. cit., p. 16.

21

Peres put this to King Hassan of Morocco when he complained that he "did not see what point there would be in agreeing to deal with the PLO since it is so divided, that he didn't know which PLO the Arabs had in mind" Flora Lewis in the New York Times, 2/7/87, p. 23E.

22

See definition section above.

23

See Jureidini and Hazen, op. cit., p. 32 and Gersh, op. cit., p. 237. In 1983 Abu Musa came back to the old idea of having to liberate all of Palestine and expelling the Jews who came after 1948 out of Palestine. p. 237.

24

See the Amman Agreement of February, 1985.

25

See Abu Musa as quoted in Gersh, p. 237; also see, Harakabi Arab Attitudes to Israel; Alsakhras 96&97 and Falasteen Althawrah.

26

Al-Masri suggested this in 1985 as a solution. It is usually advocated to recognize Israel and have the world put the pressure on Israel. But this will not lead, according to Harakabi Arab Attitudes to Israel, The Palestine Covenant and its Meaning, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response; or O'Brian The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, 1986, to any Israeli withdrawal since they still mistrust the Palestinians and they think it is a way the Palestinians use to force Israel to withdraw and because the PLO cannot fight Israel. Anything the Arabs and the Palestinians may do now will be rejected on the basis that since they cannot fight Israel, they will try to undermine it by peaceful means as Harakabi states.

27

Some countries in Europe advised the PLO to moderate their positions and public stands for them to recognize the PLO.

28

See Plascov . op. cit., pp. 38-39.

29

Rubenberg, p. 16.

30

This was declared by Begin in October 1983 that a state "under the leadership of Arafat and his cohorts..[the Israelis] will be forced to occupy again"as quoted in Nakhleh and Wright op. cit., p. 46.

31

See Rubenberg op. cit., and Gersh op. cit..

32

See Gresh op. cit., pp. 235-240.

### Chapter 3

#### The Failure Of The Arab Approaches

The first part of this chapter will examine how the Arab countries became involved in the creation of the present situation and their role in creating, maintaining, and extending the Palestinian problem. The second part of this chapter will examine the reasons that prevent the Arab rulers from helping the Palestinians achieve their Minimum Demands. The third part will examine the role the Arab countries can play, if they so wished, to change the present situation. The last part will suggest some measures the PLO can take to reverse , win, or at least neutralize the negative effect of the Arab countries' negative impact on its political and military course.

#### 1. ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM:

As mentioned in the chapter one, the Arabs felt in 1948 that Palestine and the Palestinian people are their responsibility. They wanted to resist colonial expansion in the Middle East and, encouraged and motivated by the mood of the time- National Liberation- and Arab Nationalism and Arab Unity, wanted to practice their self-determination and liberty.

Faced with the reality of their world, the strength of the new state of Israel, and the collaboration of the West including the U.S. against them,<sup>1</sup> they even pressed harder and insisted more on the liberation of Palestine until this, the liberation of Palestine became the overriding theme in

33

Ibid, p. 238.

34

A good example is the 18th. PNC where some of the organizations did not participate.

achieving any political stability in each of the Arab countries. The leaders of the Arab countries did- and still do- keep up their rhetoric about liberating Palestine until they believed in it and went through a lot to fulfill their own rhetoric which, as I believe, they never intended to do in the first place.<sup>2</sup> The rhetorical commitment of the Arab rulers was and still is a "public" relations scheme they use to satisfy the publics' feelings and calm their desire for justice and revenge and to control the masses and prevent them from rebelling against their illegitimate and weak authority.

This trend of paying lip service to the Palestinian cause has continued and is still successful in all of the Arab countries except Egypt. Sadat succeeded, for good or bad, to rid himself -and his followers- from having to go through all of the rhetoric others had to go through including himself at the beginning of his takeover. His claim that he is working for the Palestinian cause<sup>3</sup> using a different method, still is a proof of the need of the Arab rulers to pay that lip service.

Sadat's need to justify his Camp David Agreement by saying that he is working for the Palestinian cause is a continuation of this trend though on a different scale. But it shows that this trend will continue. Mubarak's limited action during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 is a testimony to the fact that an Arab ruler may shake the earth with his hot speeches for the Palestinian cause and

practically do nothing when the need comes.

The significance of this trend, which the PLO has never acted upon or responded to clearly, is that the PLO will be handicapped in the face of the Palestinian, and Arab masses. How can the rulers of a "revolutionary" organization be associated and in harmony with rulers of countries who only claim to be working for the cause of that revolution and do nothing when the situation for their action comes? <sup>4</sup> The PLO has to accomodate the needs and demands of the Arab rulers to get their support and they can never be able to stand and demand that they, the Arab rulers, fulfill their promises and act upon their rhetoric.

The result of this will be the alienation of the PLO and the withdrawal of the support of those rulers. Examples of this trend are plenty and occurred since the establishment of the PLO and almost every Arab ruler had his own demands from the PLO. From Qathafi's (Qadafi) expulsion of some PLO organizations, to the Iraqi's, Jordanians, Syrians, etc. When the PLO stands and demands that these rulers do what they say they would do, the rulers create an issue to justify the expulsion of or withdrawal of any aid to the PLO or to the faction of the PLO that stands up and demands.

This is one of the chronic problems of the PLO. Since it has to live at the expense of others, in the lands of others, and on the support of others, it had to pay a price.

This price is to accept almost anything a ruler gives in exchange for the silence of the PLO.<sup>5</sup> This compromise of the PLO's demands and conditions from the Arab rulers is caused by the problem of survival that the PLO always suffered from and was threatened by.

The continuous emphasis of the PLO on non interference in the internal affairs of the Arab countries contradicts, under these circumstances, its revolutionary rhetoric and implicates it in the camp of the politicians that it claims to want to convert and revolutionize. In other words, the PLO never achieved or fulfilled its revolutionary rhetoric.<sup>6</sup> Just like every Arab government.

The consequences of this were clear from the beginning. For one, the PLO lost its credibility to become the leader of the Arab revolutionary movement that Al-Azem once claimed it will assume.<sup>7</sup> Another was the absence of a massive public Arab support for the PLO. The Arab masses raised no voice to demand their governments to act in any credible way during the 1982 invasion while tens of thousands of Americans and Europeans even Israelis marched in the streets to demand an action from their governments to help the PLO and stop Israel from entering Beirut.

It is not only the lack of any initiative from the Arab masses and the repressive regimes in the Arab countries, it is also the total absence of PLO-initiated mass Arab support. It is because of the PLO's commitment not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab countries that

it subjected itself to the will of the Arab leaders. The PLO never went "down" to the Arab masses. They always wanted to deal with the rulers and always suffered from the fear to lose their support. They lost both, the leaders and the masses.

Still another consequence is the loss of a large sector of the Arab revolutionary forces. Since the Arab governments have strong restrictions against the revolutionary forces, and since the PLO want to deal with the power holders of those countries, they alienated these revolutionary forces. Since the PLO was associated, from the revolutionaries' viewpoint, with the oppressive system, a system that prevents them from practicing their political rights, they come to associate the PLO with those repressive regimes and deny it their support which is usually attached to the masses.<sup>8</sup>

But the most important consequence was that of the politicization of the PLO. The PLO itself, for several serious reasons, rhetorically and practically abandoned its revolutionary goals and methodologies. This fact, of the politicization of the PLO, raised many serious questions about the goals of the PLO and about its seriousness and commitment.<sup>9</sup>

This Arab involvement in the Palestinian problem is withering away since Sadat's Camp David. Sadat, as mentioned above, allowed himself and others to detach himself and

Egypt from the responsibility for the Palestinians. This is a trend that is growing. A better example was very clear in 1982 when no Arab country came to the aid of the Palestinians. This time it should have become clear to the leaders of the PLO that they should never expect or wait for any Arab help , to say nothing about Arab participation in the assault on the Palestinians.<sup>10</sup>

The best lesson that the PLO could have learned from the 1982 invasion , which I believe it never had, was supposed to be not to trust or deal with any Arab ruler or government and to plan to go to the masses to gain their support. This, of course, will lead to the closing of the PLO offices, as happened in Jordan and other places, and will also lead to the harassment of any PLO sympathizers which the PLO cannot afford now. It would have opened many other fronts it did not need at the time. But still, this would have created tremendous problems for the rulers of those countries and it would have uncovered their false commitment to the Palestinian cause.

To qualify what was mentioned in the chapter on the development of the Palestinian problem, a new phase is now taking shape. This phase is the second "De-Arabization" of the problem. The Arab rulers are trying to rid themselves of any responsibility for the Palestinians and their fate. The dispersion of the PLO fighters all over the Arab countries is the best indicator of this trend or phase.

With the commencement of th 18th. PNC in Algiers in

April, 1987, the PLO starts a new phase of its development and struggle. It assumes, for the second time, its own fate and proves its ability to withstand Arab , and especially, Syrian pressures and interference. It also proves that the PLO is capable of maintaining its political independence.

All indicators show that this trend will continue. In other words, the PLO will be left to deal with its problems alone on the premise that " the Palestinians should decide what they want and we should respect their wishes" <sup>11</sup> .

In summary, the Arab rulers and governments are disassociating themselves of the responsibility of liberating or helping the PLO liberate its land and achieve its minimum demands and that the PLO is still, for different but serious reasons, associate itself with the same rulers <sup>12</sup> who let them down more than once.

The 1948 war was initiated by the Arabs to prevent the Zionists from taking part of Palestine. The result was that Israel took more land than it was supposed to be given by the UN. From this we see that Arab involvement created more problems to the Palestinians than did it solve.

In 1967 Nasser's threats and actions brought more troubles not only to Egypt and the Palestinians, but also to Syria and Jordan and with the consequences of the war, to all the Arab countries. Jerusalem was lost, Sinai and the Golan were also lost. The Palestinians now lost everything they could have had or dreamed of.

In 1973 Sadat and Assad tried to make up for the 1967 losses. It eventually worked for Egypt and Syria was stuck again in an even worse situation, especially without Egypt and Jordan in the battlefield. The elimination of Egypt from the equation, which represented one of Israel's strategic goals,<sup>13</sup> did more harm to the Palestinians than did the 1967 war. The 1967 war created a viable, active and militant Palestinian national front, the Camp David Accords started a split not only among the Arab countries but also among the Palestinians themselves.<sup>14</sup>

From this point of view, we see that Arab involvement and participation in protecting and helping the Palestinians led to the opposite of what it was supposed to achieve. The Palestinians still think that only Arab participation, involvement and commitment can help them liberate Palestine and achieve their minimum demands.<sup>15</sup>

This would be true if the Arab rulers do seriously intend to liberate Palestine and help restore Palestinian rights and demands. This leads us to the second part of the chapter, what are the objective reasons that prevent the Arab rulers from helping the Palestinians achieve their Minimum Demands. In this part I will briefly examine the causes of the lack of serious Arab commitment to the liberation of Palestine. The reasons are divided to three types; internal, external, and psychological, or perceived reasons, i.e. unreal ones.

## 2-OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR THE LACK OF SERIOUS ARAB COMMITMENT:

There are many internal and external reasons that prevent the Arab countries and their rulers from fully supporting a militant PLO. Some of these reasons are examined below.

### 1-Internal Struggle Within the Arab Countries:

One question that was and is still been asked is why don't the Arab countries help the Palestinians? There are 150 million Arabs and the Arabs are very rich can't they fight a small country with less than 4 million people and defeat them? Can't they do that and they buy weapons with billions of dollars and have the oil of the world? Why don't they help the Palestinians? These questions are asked by the Arabs and the non Arabs.

This part of the chapter will examine the validity of these questions and examine the possible answers.

First, it is true that the Arabs are even more than 150 million and that they spend more on buying arms than do most of the Middle Eastern or Third World countries. But it is usually ignored that these are 22 Arab countries and not "an" Arab country. In other words, the inhabitants of the Arab countries are not united and the resources of their countries are divided as they are. What Libya buys goes only to Libya and not to Lebanon or Syria. The Algerian army does not go and defend Jordan or Lebanon. The simple answer is that the Arabs are not united and their efforts, when existed, were never coordinated to the level that is

supposed to exist in a situation like the one on hand.

Not only this, most of the Arms that the Arabs buy and the training they spend on their soldiers goes to fighting the other Arab countries and the Palestinians. Recent history of the Arab countries shows that the Arab countries had more wars among themselves than did they have with Israel. A small list will show this trend: The Jordanian-Palestinian conflict in 1970; the Syrian-Jordanian conflict in the same incident; The Syrian Palestinian conflict in 1976; the Lebanese-Palestinian war; the Moroccan-Algerian war; the Libyan-Tunisian war; The Yemeni-Saudi war; The Egyptian-Saudi war in Yemen, to say nothing about Palestinian-Palestinian wars in Tripoli in 1983.

The lack of unity among the Arab countries, therefore, is one major reason that prevent all the Arabs from supporting the Palestinians. The Arab countries will deny their aid to the PLO if the PLO happened to refuse the proposals of that country for a settlement to the conflict. Or, if two Arab countries are in conflict over an issue, the PLO will lose the support of the country that it does not side with.<sup>16</sup>

From this, we see that the use of the word "Arabs" when used to indicate a whole, one, or a unity is misleading and incorrect. This explains part of the question. We find that the Arabs do not spend all their money on the Palestinians, neither do they direct and/or employ all their resources and arms to defend the Palestinians or to liberate Palestine.<sup>17</sup>

In fact, as mentioned above, some of these arms and money are employed and used to kill the Palestinians and to prevent them from liberating Palestine. <sup>18</sup>

In summary, we can say that the disunity of the Arab countries and the internal struggles among them lead to the wasting of the material and blood of the Arabs on a struggle that is not directed towards the liberating of Palestine. The initiation of the Iran-Iraq war is a better example of how the Arabs spend their money, the lives of their soldiers, and the arms they buy. They don't go to help the Palestinians or to the Liberation of Palestine.

In fact this war led to more internal struggles among the Arab countries. Libya and Syria support Iran against the Arab country, Iraq. The Palestinians were caught in this war. Their allies were in conflict; Syria and Libya support Iran and they did not know what to do. If they support Iraq they will lose Syria and Libya. If they follow Syria and Libya they will lose Iraq's support. Their delima lasted up till now.

## 2-Fear of the Consequances for Supporting the Palestinians:

As mentioned above in this chapter, Arab participation to help the Palestinians led to their loss of land, men and power. In 1967 they lost huge parts of their lands and their peoples' support dignity. This fear of losing even more, as in the case of Lebanon in 1967 <sup>19</sup> and Jordan in 1973 <sup>20</sup> led to the absence of any meaningful participation from these

countries in the war efforts. King Hussein , I am sure, did not want to put himself in the same situation he was put into in 1967 when Nasser convinced him to open another front in the east.

Egyptian withdrawal from the whole conflict in 1977-79 is another example of not willing to lose any men, money or land for the Palestinians. Since he could return the lands that belong to Egypt he would be satisfied. This also allows us to predict that in case of war between Syria and Israel, Egypt will not participate. Not only because Egypt is willing and ready to uphold the Camp David Treaty, but because it fears it does not need to lose any of its lands, resources, and soldiers. The Egyptian "mild" response<sup>21</sup> to the Israeli invasion and destruction of Lebanon in 1982 is a perfect indicator.

Another dimension of this fear is the fear to lose the support of the local and international powers. Some of the Arab governments depend on the West and especially the US for survival<sup>22</sup> and for the control of their masses. Egypt gets 2.5 billion dollars from the US every year. The US has advanced basis in Egypt and Oman that could interfere for or against a government or a ruler who refuses their demands.<sup>23</sup> Therefore, fear of losing their power prevents the Arab rulers and their governments from completely and fully supporting the Palestinians. What happened on June 8-9 of 1967 may not happen again. If sadat completely lost the 1973 war, there was no guarantee that the Egyptian would have

wanted him to stay in power like they did with Nasser six  
24  
years before.

In summary, the fear of losing more lands, i.e. defeat, and/or power prevented and will continue to prevent the Arab rulers and their government from openly and fully helping and supporting the Palestinians to achieve their Minimum Demands, the establishment of an independent state on parts of the West bank, Gaza and Jerusalem even if they, the Arab rulers truly want to do so.

Another important reason that explains the lack of serious Arab commitment and support for the Palestinians is the lack of a strong incentive or the lack of potential gains. In other words, there is nothing that the Arab rulers and their governments will gain by the victory of the Palestinians or by the establishment of an independent Palestinians state. In fact their might be more problems for  
25  
many of them.

The benefits that the Arab rulers and their governments may gain from helping and supporting the Palestinians establish an independent state will be one of the following:  
1-They will rid themselves of the fear of an Israeli attack for their support. This was clear in the Tunisian response to the Israeli attack on the PLO headquarters. The result was that the PLO moved its military offices to Iraq. In fact, Iraq itself was not safe from Israeli attacks as we know. Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Other examples are too fresh not to take into account the

least of which, but the clearest, is what happened in Jordan in 1970. The king had to get rid of the Fedayeen to avoid more Israeli pressures and threats.

26

2.They will also rid themselves from a potential internal criticisms from the revolutionary forces and the supporters of the PLO. Many Arab governments put strict restrictions on the movements of the Palestinians and their leadership. They also put strict restriction on the freedom of the PLO to recruit Palestinians or other Arabs to their organization in these countries. The establishment of an independent Palestinians state will free them from all of these fears, fears of an alliance between the indigenous nationalist revolutionary groups and the PLO . In fact examples to the opposite exist <sup>27</sup> the disappearance of the leader of the main Saudi opposition leader.

In other words, they will end the potential role of the PLO and the Palestinians as a destabilizing force in their countries.

3.Another benefit some of the Arab rulers might gain from supporting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is the withholding of the large sums of money they have to pay for the PLO, Jordan, and other "confrontation" states. This relief from paying their dues for the "restoration of Arab rights to Palestine" may still have to be paid to the new poor and weak state that they helped create. Therefore it may not be very important in their calculations.

The losses the Arab countries face in the case of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state outweigh these benefits. If we consider the possible losses and compare them with the benefits, we will find that the incentives for supporting the creation of an independent Palestinian state are not very strong and the gains are very minor compared to the losses.

The possible losses that many of the Arab countries may face with the establishment of an independent Palestinian state could range between the following extremes.

1. For some of them, especially in the Gulf states, the losses will range between losing a strong professional Palestinian community and working force that helped build these countries. These professional Palestinians may leave to live in their newly established state striving for a government position, unite with their families and help build "their" country at last .

2. The fear of the idea that the new state could become a Soviet base does not frighten Israel and the US only. <sup>28</sup> It frightens many Arabs also. The fear of an independent Palestinian state committed to the Soviet Union outweighs the fear of a group of Palestinian organizations dispersed all over the Arab World with no permanent and stable base. The calculations of the Arab rulers, at least the conservatives among them, will tend to prefer the second option.

3. There is also the fear that the Palestinians with their more democratic style of political system and radical views of the Arab World may create more problems for these rulers and their governments. The Palestinians may not stop at their borders. They may think of supporting the revolutionary forces within those conservative Arab countries. Proud of their achievements, the Palestinians may seriously think to "export" their victory and political "life-style" to the other countries.

Jordan could be the first target of any changes that the new state wants to achieve. Jordan, someone may argue, is the "backdoor"<sup>29</sup> to Palestine and it should be controlled by sympathetic forces if not by the Palestinians themselves. Jordan also has a large "Palestinians" population that should not be allowed to have dual loyalty. Furthermore, somebody may, with the enthusiasm of victory, claim that the Palestinians were the ones who built Jordan and demand to control it.

This trend is real and it exists even now and before the creation of the Palestinian state and some of the Arab rulers are aware of it<sup>30</sup> The Jordanian fear is real and legitimate especially if the new state had good relations with both Syria and Iraq who intend to unite but think that Jordan is geographically and politically in the way.

4. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state will make 23 Arab countries. From the viewpoint of the "Unionist" Ba'thist Nationalist groups and parties this will

waste more time to achieve their goal of uniting the Arab countries. They need less independent countries and rulers so their job will become easier and faster. The actions of the Syrian leadership towards the PLO and the Palestinians especially since 1982, though could not be totally explained by this fact, could still shed some light on the possible responses and/or reservations of the Syrian Ba'thist party towards the establishment of an "independent" Palestinian state.

As a conclusion to this section we find that the Arab rulers and their governments have no real incentives and serious interest in fully supporting the creation of an independent Palestinian state. The objective reasons will compel these Arab rulers to continue to prevent, as they still do now, the Palestinians from achieving their Minimum Demands, to say nothing about liberating Palestine. The Palestinians did not threaten the existence of the Arab regimes and when they did, these regimes aligned themselves with Israel and the U.S. to crush the Palestinians.

The PLO's expectations that the "heat that will be generated by their attacks on Israel on the battlefield will force the Arabs to participate on their side"<sup>31</sup> has proven to be wrong and the reality was that the Arabs joined Israel in its attack on the Palestinians.

### 3. The Potential Role of the Arab Countries:

Because of their fear, disunity and disinterest, the Arab rulers have left the Palestinians alone and let them down more than once. Their fear of Israeli retaliation and losses was greater than their fear of their people and the Palestinians. It is greater than the sufferings of the Palestinians and the just rights of the Arabs of Palestine.

In the past section of this chapter the reasons for this trend was examined and the conclusion was that the Arab rulers did that and will continue to do that as long as their immediate and short term interests are not violated or threatened. The Arab rulers believe that the Palestinians want to get what they want in the manner they want and that they, the Arab rulers, should not jeopardize their "national" interests and resources for the sake of achieving the Palestinians Minimum Demands especially if the Palestinians are not willing to accept the methods that these rulers want to use to achieve these Demands.

The problem now is a problem of who wants to convince who about the proper and fastest methods to achieving the Palestinians Minimum Demands. The Palestinians believe that diplomacy is incapable of doing the job because the Arabs are not strong enough to pose a credible threat if negotiations fail.<sup>32</sup> The Arab rulers, thinking of Sadat's success, believe that good diplomacy and US support can do what wars failed to achieve. With the conflict at this stage, the Arabs could still do the Palestinians a great

help if they use their economic, military, and diplomatic resources for the achieving of the PMDs.

The ways and methods the Arab rulers and countries can follow to do this are varied and, together, they can produce tangible results. The most important factor is the use of the Arabs economic power for achieving different objectives.

The Arab rulers' most popular method of helping the Palestinians remains the economic and verbal support. The Arab rulers have spent billions of dollars supporting all factions of the PLO. All the Arab countries support the PLO financially. This support helped the PLO establish itself, recruit more fighters, buy weapons and establish the richest political organization in the history in the Arab World .

The financial support was forthcoming because other means of support were not. The Arab rulers would rather give the PLO the money it demands than commit themselves and their populations to liberate or help liberate Palestine. It is much easier and less dangerous to give the PLO the money it needs than to fight with the PLO against a country that reaches Baghdad and Tunisia. The most important reason for this was that Israel did not make an important issue of and did not retaliate against countries that financially supported the PLO.

The financial support that the Arab countries gave to the PLO was intended to give them a leverage to control and moderate the Organization and use it for the achievement of

local and inter-Arab political bargaining. This trend continued for a long time until the PLO became a very well established and rich organization. Still some of the Arabs do try to use their money to control, or at least avoid conflict with, the PLO. In fact, the PLO now uses its financial power to try to change the attitudes of local and regional powers like Lebanon<sup>33</sup>. Arafat's visits and generous support for some African nations is also another goal that the PLO uses its financial support for.<sup>34</sup>

The use of financial support have little influence on the PLO's policies now because of the attitude of the Arab countries and their rulers. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the other Gulf states, and some North African Arab countries decided that it is more secure to announce that they should respect the desires and demands of the Palestinians and allow them to decide whatever they think is good for their cause.<sup>35</sup> This, as mentioned above, relieves these Arab countries from the need to pressure the PLO and to get involved in the Palestinians internal struggles. It is cheaper.

The rich Arab countries can help the PLO with their money and this can be achieved in many ways. First, by maintaining the PLO with a steady and secure income, the rich Arab countries will allow the PLO to remain more independent from the less rich but more radical and aggressive Arab countries who have interest in politically and militarily controlling the PLO.

Since the Saudies, the Kuwaities and the other Gulf rulers are not very much interested in politically controlling the PLO, their support help the PLO resist the attempts of other poorer Arab countries' to control the PLO. This, of course works in a two-way manner., The PLO is not really totally independent of the control and manipulation of these sound-innocent rich Arab countries. The PLO does depend on them and, in fact, suffers from their help in the manner explained at the beginning of this chapter.<sup>36</sup> With their support, the rich Arab countries expect, at least, a complying PLO. The PLO can never antagonize a financial supporter and this, as mentioned earlier, increases the PLO's vulnerability for attack from more radical forces for their compliance and association with the conservative regimes of the Middle East.

Second, by supplying non interested or marginal countries the rich Arab countries can win support for the Arabs against Israel and the West. The rich Arab countries can influence the governments of the poor and needy countries and prevent them from dealing with Israel and help keep it as isolated as possible. They also can influence the governments who support Israel. By denying these governments any financial assistance and/or by supporting the opposition groups in those countries. If the united States does that why can't the Arab countries? With their money, the Arab countries can in fact change the attitudes of the West and the US also.

According to Mehdi it is possible, with \$250.000 , to change the positions of two Idaho senators to make them support the Palestinians rights. Although I agree with his final conclusions ,i.e. that influencing and changing the political leadership of the democratic countries can be done, I think that he is being too simplistic and the time this takes is much longer and the impact is less lasting than he really expects. In other words, changing a senator's attitude about an issue may not be lasting and permanent, neither is the senator himself. But, it can be done and the Arabs should try this as part of a strategic plan to influence the governments of the world but not as a major option or policy.

Third, The Arab countries can, with their tremendous purchasing power if well-organized and executed , force any government to change their policies concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict. The amount of money the Arab countries spend in the West on Arms, manufactured goods, and loans can certainly threaten the economies of these countries. By threatening to buy from other more friendly countries, the Arab countries can affect the industrial, economic, and political stability of that country.

What characterizes the 80s and 90s will continue to be the need for raw materials, military basis, markets and consumers. It is true that the West consumes most of its products, still they will need the other countries for

markets. The products range from light cheap goods to heavy, expensive and sophisticated technologies including weapons and satellites.

Knowing this, we will be able to predict that the Arab countries will continue to be a target for arms shipments, i.e. as a market for modern technologies and weapons and depending on this we can predict the strengthening of the Arab countries over the producing powers. This true because the producing countries' need to sell their products to these countries. If the buying countries knew who to buy from and when to buy they can control the exporting countries. Without someone to buy these products, the products will be a problem for these countries. From this point of view we can see how strong and effective consumption could be.

The other aspect of the Arab countries' use of their economic power which proved to be very effective but lost its effectiveness since, is the oil power. In 1973 the Arab countries' use of the oil power proved to be a lethal weapon that effected the governments and populations of the targeted countries, the supporters of Israel. The effectiveness of this "weapon" has been lost since because of the lack of complete cooperation and of because the fear of American retaliation against the major oil-producing countries. This was very clear in Kissinger's threats and movements of the American fleet in and around the Mediteranean.<sup>39</sup>

Still, with all the supply of oil in the world now, A carefully planned and carried out plan to use the oil as it was used in 1973 could work and it will have the same effects it did then. What prevents the Arab Oil-producing countries is, among many other things, the lack of the will to stand for Israel and the US and the disinterest of these countries to help the Palestinians achieve their national goals.

The use of the oil weapon combined with the use of their consuming power, the Arab countries can definitely interrupt the world's economy and force new alliances and shake older ones all over the world.

By refusing to buy from the US or other countries that support Israel, the Arabs could buy from the other countries who are willing to cooperate with them. This , eventually, will create a split among the NATO nations who will fight among themselves, as started to happen with France for example, for the markets and the whole Organization may suffer from that.

Added to this, the Arab countries could allow the Soviets to use their ports facilities for training, loading and unloading, and refueling. Or, they could deny the US and its allies to use these ports. By doing this the Arabs will antagonize the US and force it to realize that for the system to work properly, the US has to change its attitudes towards the conflict. In other words, the Arabs need to show

the US the costs of its assumed role as the supporter of the aggressor.

The other thing that the Arab countries can do is to release their pressures over the Palestinians in their countries and allow them to recruit fighters from these countries. The Arab countries do allow the PLO to keep in them some forces either for training or as fighting units under the tight control of the military leadership of these countries. But still all of them have prevented the Palestinian fighters from crossing the borders into the occupied lands or prevented them from initiating any plans or attacks from these lands.

The example of Tunis is the most recent but not the only one where Israel's threat and use of force prevented the Arab rulers, even the so-called radical and revolutionary countries and governments, from allowing the PLO from using their lands.

This does not only describe the predicament of the PLO, it also shows the predicament of all the Arab countries. Arafat claimed that one of the major reasons for not holding the 18th. PNC is the location.<sup>40</sup>

One of the ideas that I wanted to mention here was to suggest that the Arab countries could fight for the Palestinians except that experience shows that with their help the Arabs lost the rest of Palestine. I am afraid a similar suggestion will make them lose other parts of the Arab lands. But my last suggestion is that the Arabs should

at least and at last leave the Palestinians alone . Not to fight with them but at the same time not to fight against them. many Arabs claim that they, especially Egypt has done more than its share for the Palestinians. I believe the Palestinians will be served better if the Arabs just leave them alone.

The major thesis of this chapter was that the Arab countries, busy with their internal cold and "hot" wars and with achieving their individual "national" goals are least ready to help the Palestinians fight for their land and establish their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. It was also found that the Arabs' fear of any territorial losses of their land or national authority by an Israeli attack as a retaliation on these lands for helping the Palestinians will even do more than their internal fights do. In other words, the fear of an Israeli attack on their lands for helping the Palestinians has more effect than the internal Arab struggle and has more power to prevent these rulers from even thinking to militarily aid the Palestinians to achieve their Minimum Demands.

Another major finding was that the Arabs can, if they so want, i.e. if the will to stand against Israel and the US exists, do a great help for the Palestinians by using their arms, military, economic, political, and diplomatic powers to help the Palestinians achieve their goals. But as mentioned above, there are no signs at all that suggest that

such a behavior will happen. With the lack of any real help for the PLO from the Arabs , a suggestion not to interfere in the Palestinians internal struggle should be respected by the Arab rulers.

From all of this, it should be clear for the PLO and the rest of the Palestinians that they should abandon their hopes of any Arab help to regain their lost lands and to establish their independent state. In other words, the Palestinians should drop the hopes of using or effecting the Arab rulers to help them achieve their Minimum Demands not only because the Arabs cannot but also, and most importantly, because they do not want to help.

The main goal of this chapter was to examine, explain, and show that the Palestinians can not and should not depend on the Arab rulers to achieve the PMDs. If the Palestinian leadership recognized this fact long ago, and it is still not too late, they would not have gone through what they have especially during 1982. In 1982 the Palestinians counted on the Arab support. They were wrong and that was the price they had to pay for not learning fast from their previous mistakes.

One of the principles of the main PLO groups, Fateh, was - and still is- to attack Israel, Israel will then retaliate, its retaliation will force the governments and rulers of the Arab countries, with the pressure from the masses, to fight against Israel and defeat it in a long war where the advantage is on the side of the Arabs, i.e.,

numbers and ability to withstand a long war. This belief or doctrine has not been abandoned by the main PLO factions. The result as we have seen, was that the Arabs lost all of Palestine, and the PLO was defeated for the second time<sup>41</sup> and was expelled out of Lebanon and now is targeted all over the Middle East.

The major conclusion the PLO may derive from this chapter is to change their doctrine and exclude from it any Arab military help not only because the Arabs are not willing and incapable of fighting Israel but also for fear of further losses to the PLO and further humiliation for the Arabs.

In short, the PLO should exclude any plans that will attempt to involve the Arab countries in a showdown with Israel.

The major conclusion of this chapter is that the Arab rulers are not interested, not willing, and not capable to defeat Israel and help the Palestinians achieve their Minimum Demands. Therefore, the Palestinians should make new plans that will minimize, if not eliminate, the active role of the Arab rulers in their struggle with Israel to achieve their Minimum Demands.

Without the fear of Arab interference and losses, the Palestinians can start rebuilding their national institutions and fighting power. The problem is that they will still be on the mercy of the Arabs, for their

infrastructure, land, communication, training, support and survival. And the Arabs will be on the mercy of Israel for allowing the Palestinians to operate on and from their lands. The answer to this problem will be presented in the conclusion of this study.

## Notes

1

The Arabs and the palestinians perceive the role of the West to be the cause of their troubles especially the West's support for the Partition Plan of 1947 and the recognition of Israel in 1948.

2

Nasser was not really ready for the war. For more light on this period see Anthony Nutting, Nasser, E.P. Dutton and Co. Inc., New York, 1972, pp383-401.

3

See Sadat's speech in the Knesset in Laqueur and Rubin (editors), The Israel-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict, Penguin Books, 1984, pp.592-600.

4

This trend was clear in Arafat's move to deal with Egypt and Jordan after his expulsion from Tripoli on the hands of the Syrian Backed secessionists. This makes it clear that the PLO does associate itself with the rulers of the countries that make deals with Israel.

5

It was reported that the PLO participated in fighting the Saudi opposition and the kidnaping of the leader of that opposition. Merip Reports, February 1985, p.18.

6

This is not true of some of the PLO groups who suggested and later advocated the overthrow of the Arab governments as the way to free the masses for the long social revolution. Groups like the PDFLP and the PFLP are examples. For further readings see Quandt The Politics Of Palestinian Nationalism and Gresh, The PLO: The Struggle Within.

7

Jalal Sadiq Al-Azem in Naqd AlFikr Al-Thati Ba'd AlHazamah (Self-Criticism after the Defeat), 1968, Beirut.

8

The PLO's good relations with the governments and rulers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt alienated the revolutionary groups in those countries.

9

It was clear since the 16th. PNC and the acceptance of the Arab Fez Plan that the PLO is well in the route for a political solution. See Gresch for further discussion.

10

Among those who fought the Palestinians were the "revolutionary and radical" Syria and Libya especially in 1976 and 1983.

11

The Arab rulers use a very good and effective technique to avoid participating in the liberation of Palestine. They stress their refusal to interfere in the internal affairs of the PLO. Examples of this trend are found in the Kuwaiti governments responses, the Saudis, Algerians and others. See Al-Sakhrah for more recent examples. This trend was also

exposed by the PFLP in its Political Report in Tariq Ismael's The Arab Left, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1976, PP.156-177.

12

See Chapter 2 for further information.

13

Ajami, Fouad. The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 120. See also Flapan in JPS #57, P. 35.

14

This was clear from the establishment of the Arab Steadfastness Front in 1978 and the beginning of the split in fateh after the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Gresch p. 235-6.

15

This trend of connecting the Arabs to the Palestinian problem is widespread. It is used by every Palestinian leader. For examples see Arafat in "Falasteen Al-thawrah" "The roots are Arab and the dimension is Palestinian".

16

Examples of this delimma were when the PLO was supported by Libya and their relations with Egypt were cool and in the present the situation is similar with Iraq and Syria.

17

In fact The saudi AWACS did not help when Israel attacked the nuclera reactor in Iraq.

18

Jordan in 1970 and Syria in 1976.

19

Lebanon did not participate in the 1967 war.

20

It was reported that Jordan asked Israel through the U.S. if it can send a division to participate in the war against Israel to avoid opening another front on the East and to prevent Israel from attacking Jordan as happened in 1967.

21

Mubarak's responses against Israel's invasion of Lebanon were not strong as Jansen reports in The battle Of Beirut South End Press, Boston, Mass.1982, p. 134.

22

Golub In When Oil and Politics mix: Saudi Oil Policy 1973-1985 , Harvard Middle East Papers , #4, 1985, p.47. concludes that "the Saudi regime is so concerned about its survival that its decisions are almost unceasingly risk-averse. The case studies illustrate not only how vulnerable the regimes perceives itself to be but also how its sense of vulnerability affects its approach to decision-making" . This is true of the other Arab countries, Jordan in 1970, Egypt in 1977.

23

The U.S. Used its basis in Egypt and Oman for its attack on Tehran to release the hostages.

24

When Nasser submitted his resignation the Egyptian masses marched to the streets demanding his stay in power.

25

Plascov A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives, Adelphi Papers # 163, 1981. p. 40-41 concluded that if an independent Palestinian state was to be established Jordan will either lose its Palestinians and/or the Arabs' monetary support that it now gets for being a "confrontation state".

26

King Hussein states in his Mehnatu Kamalik (My Profession as A King), 1975 that 'Jordan is determined to hit with a hand of iron all those who give Israel by their actions the justification to attack our country" p.230.

27

See not #5 above.

28

See Plascope Op. cit., p. 40-41.

29

Hassan Bin Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan Palestinian Self-Determination: A study of the West Bank and Gaza, Quartet Books Inc., New York, 1981,

30

Ibid. See aslo Plascov op. cit.

31

This was clear from the Arab governments' responses to the admission of the PLO fighters after their expulsion from Lebanon.

32

Saad Eddin Ibrahim "Settling the Conflict: Arab Approaches" in Hudson Alternative Approaches to the Arab - Israeli Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the Principle Actors, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1984, p. 104.

33

Abu Musa reported in an interview that Arafat helped Gemayel in Lebanon to maintain their banks for exchange for the reenterence of the PLO fighters to Lebanon. Al Quds, 1985.

34

bid

35

The PFLP Political Report in Ismael op. cit.

36

That is the loss of the help of the Arab masses .

37

For a very detailed program about how to convert American politicians to help the Arabs by the use of Arab money see Mehdi, Peace for Palestine, p. 44 and 59.

38

This method was somewhat successful with France and Italy.

39 Kissinger threatened that the U.S. "would have to consider its options if the Arab measures continued unreasonably and indefinitely." in Golub op. cit., p. 14.

40

This was clear in Arafat's statement that the location of the Palestinians meetings is a problem because they fear an Israeli attack on their meeting place. JPS #59, p.155.

## CHAPTER 4

### The Dominance of Power:

The main theme of this chapter is to present the role of the Israeli political and military power in determining and shaping the outcomes of the Middle East' conflict. What will be examined here is how much does Israel's power affect the development and outcomes of the conflict.

It will be proposed here that it is, basically, Israel's military power with the help and support of the United States that determined the developments and outcomes of the conflict in the way Israel, the stronger, liked and wished.<sup>1</sup> In short, it is the military power of Israel that shapes the conflict and its outcomes. It is might and not right or "international attitudes" that keeps the Palestinians from achieving their Minimum National Demands. And it is the theme of this study to emphasize that it is basically power, political and military, that the Arabs and the Palestinians need to to any changes in the Israeli positions because in the present international system the powerful extracts as much as they can and the weak give up<sup>2</sup> as much as they can .

These themes will be accomplished by examining how the nature and structure of the Israeli society work against the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on them. In other words, this chapter will examine whether and how

do factors like the military strength of Israel, the Jews' experiences of recent history, the relations with the Arab countries, military-civilian relations in Israel, level of economic development in Israel, etc..., strengthen Israel's position against the withdrawal from the West Bank and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

The main thesis that will be advocated here is that there are many strong internal and external, subjective and objective, structural and perceptual factors within the Israeli society that allow us, as researchers and analysts, to conclude that with the existence of these factors in the form and intensity they do, the chances are that Israel, without any strong military pressures from the Arab side, will not withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and allow the Palestinians to establish an independent state on them. To still, put it in a different way: there are strong objective indicators that Israel will not withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza and allow the Palestinians to establish their state there as long as the present situation with all its complexity exists. These complexities are

-The military strength of Israel

-The nature of the Israeli society and the experiences that shaped and still shape the attitudes of the Israelis toward their Arab neighbors and the Palestinians. This will include an examination of the way Israelis think of themselves, others, and how things should be. It will also include an examination of the effects of the teachings of the modern

Israeli political leaders and theorists.

-The structure of the Israeli society: The existence of three major "ethnic" groups; Arabs, Arab Jews, and Ashkinazi Jews with all the dynamics that are generated by this structure. This also includes the type of the relationship between politics, the military, and society.

-the type of political system that Israel has: a parliamentary multi-party system that restricts the abilities and freedom of action of their leaders.

-The recent relations with the Arab countries.- continuous wars and distrust, peace and diplomacy. This section will also include the way the Israelis perceive and think of the Arabs, their governments and their rulers and their view of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.

The first part of the chapter will examine the relations between Israeli military strength and the development and outcomes of the conflict.

It is to be assumed in this chapter that in international relations each country will try to improve its positions in accordance with its national interest regardless of the needs, demands and/or rights of the other countries. From this point of view, it is true that the United Nations' charter is an exercise in Utopia<sup>3</sup>. It will also be assumed here, as mentioned in chapter 1, that no government will allow itself to give up its holdings if this

may jeopardize its national security however it is defined. In regard to the subject under consideration, it is assumed that this also applies to Israel and that under no circumstances will an Israeli government give up its holdings if this might lead to endangering its national security in any way it defines its national security.

The attempt of many analysts<sup>4</sup> and politicians<sup>5</sup> to use the returning of Sinai as a precedent in Israel's history to show that Israel could and did return Sinai to Egypt against its national security needs will be discussed briefly later in this chapter and at length in the conclusion. But it is sufficient to say that national security is a variable term and it is a changing one. What could be of importance to national security now could be of no importance at all at another time.

Now, if we come to the relationship between Israel's military strength and capabilities and the continuation of its occupation of the Arab lands, it becomes clear that it is basically Israel's superior military power and U.S. support that made this continuation possible. For if Israel<sup>6</sup> was not strong enough the Arabs would have "returned" these lands either by force or by a negotiating settlement. Or, in fact, Israel could not have been able to occupy these lands in the first place. Therefore, the role of military power and strength and the will and efficiency of using them is the major reason for the emergence and development, and continuation of the conflict.<sup>7</sup> The importance and scope of

this subject will become more apparent during the presentation of this chapter.

The rest of this chapter will examine the other factors that influence Israel's attitudes and decisions about not withdrawing from the west bank and Gaza and "allowing" the Palestinians to establish their independent state on them.

#### 1. The Nature of the Israeli Society:

The first factor that will be examined and evaluated here is the nature of the Israeli society. By the nature of the Israeli society I mean the internal dynamics and the beliefs of the Israeli people in their cause, distinctiveness, national pride, challenges, experiences, goals and hopes. These beliefs and experiences shape and determine how the Israelis think, perceive and react to interaction with the external world and especially the Arabs and the Palestinians. In other words, the explanation to the political behavior and attitudes of the Israelis and their governments could be and is found in the experiences that the Israelis went through during their statehood and before.

Examples of the relationship between their experiences, goals, hopes and fears and how these fears, hopes, goals and experiences shape and determine their reaction are plenty. The strong connection between these reactions and the experiences is very apparent in all of them. One example (others are listed in the notes to this chapter) is Israel's insistence on its independence with regard to its security

is a very strong, and I could say overemphasized reaction, to their fear of being weak and for their desire and hope to be in control of their fate. Their experiences of being betrayed, humiliated and ignored, forces them to strongly depend on themselves for defense and to try to control others and manipulate other powers against each other to remain in control<sup>8</sup>

This is, of course, very easy to understand both intellectually and politically. Still this does not explain why does not the very strong and aggressive Israel allow the weak and fragmented Palestinians to establish their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza. Does Israel really fear a very small weak Palestine?

The answer is yes. And for many different reasons that will be explained later in the conclusion to this chapter. For now, it is important to note that if Israel gives in to the Palestinians' demands to return to their lands it would have no "excuses" or justifications for not returning the rest of the land. But the question now is what it is in the nature of the Israeli society that determines Israel's attitudes towards not allowing the Palestinians to establish their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza? What hopes, fears, experiences and goals does Israel and the Israelis have that explains this?

The Israelis come from different backgrounds and cultures and they are supposed to melt into the new society. They brought with them all their fears and hopes when they came

to live in the new state. These hopes and fears generated and will continue to generate and perpetuate further hopes and fears and interests. It is to be shown here that these ideas, fears and hopes, which make up the largest part of the nature of the Israeli society, did and will continue to have a very strong impact on the way and the limits of Israeli possible acceptance of any changes in their geographical, political and social environments. In other words, it will be shown that because of their experiences and the way Israelis are brought up and taught, they have no tolerance for any changes that will allow any hope for the Palestinians to establish their independent state in the West Bank and Gaza as a minimum demand for relinquishing "armed struggle." Among these hopes, fears, and interests are:

1-The Israelis hope that they will not have to go through all the things that they went through during their diaspora including discrimination, humiliation and anti-semitism, or the fear that they may go through those events again . They want to establish a strong state for the Jews of the world so they can live like any other nation in the world with their government, borders, and army. In their "own" state they do not have to worry about any of this happening formally or legally. In a state of their own, they will be secure of the dangers of living in someone else's country. Of course, and as all of us know, the Israelis did to the

Palestinians what other people did to them. The Israelis have the right to have their own state, except that it should not be in somebody else's land and/or on their expense.

1-As an extension of the first hope, the Israelis have a strong urge to create a very strong, rich, and proud society among the nations of the world. They want to become the best example of a nation. Zionism was supposed to make Israel the most vital and humane nation in the world. Social and political justice, harmony, cooperation among the citizens of the state were supposed to reflect the goals and ideals of a new energetic state.

All these hopes started to fade away after the state was established, but it is still there and many Israelis believe that the political and social environments did not allow this to happen but it does not mean that it is going to be abandoned. These hopes and ideals still shape and affect the Israelis. These ideals and ideas were transformed into a structural apparatus that started, in its own way, to determine and change the nature itself. In other words, with their goals and hopes, the early Zionists started establishing institutions to help them achieve these goals and ideals. These institutions became independent of the original goals they were created to achieve and, structurally now, they generate their own "independent" goals that sometimes lead to incidents and events that contradict the goals they were originally established for.

Their Kibutzim and settlements are very good examples of this trend. At the beginning the settlements were supposed to provide economic, military and political support for the Zionist establishment. Later, as in the case of the Sinai settlements, and even more for the West Bank settlements, these settlements are a cause of distress and worry for the Zionist establishment.

Instead of providing security and economic vitality, these settlements became an economic drain and a cause for hostile contact with the West Bank and Gaza residents. And it is my contention that they will be a major cause for internal Israeli, Arab-Israeli and American-Israeli conflict as the events of evacuating Sinai had shown.<sup>9</sup> The American presidents threaten and demand from Israel to "freeze" the settlements, the Israelis build more.<sup>9</sup> Sadat requested that they be stopped. So does king Hussein. The official Israeli policy is to continue the settlement policies for economic and security reasons<sup>10</sup>, to say nothing about religious and nationalist reasons<sup>11</sup>. This shows that all schools of political thought in Israel demand the continuation of settlements for their own reasons; military, economic, religious, national, and historical.

The settlements do prevent the establishment of peace. Israel, I think is aware of this and that is why it continues to build them<sup>12</sup>

3-Another dimension of the nature of the Israeli society is their strong belief, whether fabricated or not, that Palestine belongs to them and that they are going to stay there. The importance of this belief was examined in the historical background and the development of the conflict chapter 1.

It was concluded that first, for the present discussion and examination of the problem, it really makes no difference whose land is Palestine. Second, as far as the present situation is concerned, Israel does exist in that land and this is what have to be dealt with. Whether this existence is legitimate or not is not really a problem now. As Harakabi claims the Arabs may not accept the legitimacy of the establishment of Israel but they have to accept its existence.<sup>14</sup> Third, the only importance of this belief is in how did it and it still does and will continue to shape the Israelis views and attitudes towards the establishment of an independent Palestinians state.

In other words, the importance of the Israelis belief in the belonging of Palestine to them comes from the way and intensity of how they react to others' claims to the same land. If the Palestinians are going to march unarmed to Palestine, as Crawford suggests<sup>15</sup> way and intensity of the Israeli response is the most important factor that counts and this factor is mostly determined by the strength of the belief that Palestine belongs to them. Therefore, the belief in Palestine belonging to them makes the Israelis

react strongly and forcefully to any attempt by any power to control part or all of this land. The creation of the strong Israeli army is just one tangible outcome of this belief.

In summary we could say that this belief, which is an important part of the make up and nature of the Israeli society, did and will continue to have a very strong impact on the solution of the conflict. If, as mentioned in chapter 1, the Israelis believe so strongly in that Palestine belongs to them, then we can see how beliefs, hopes, and ideals lead to the establishment of strong institutions that led and will continue to lead to the continuation of the conflict.

4-Another aspect of the make up or nature of the Israelis is that they will never trust any country to defend them. They depend only on themselves in matters of defense and armament.<sup>16</sup> Their experiences with the British before 1948 and their lessons from being unarmed or depending on other countries for supply of weapons during the time when they most needed help, support, and defense. All these lessons taught them that they must depend totally on themselves.

Feeling totally defenseless and insecure, the Israeli governments started doing anything to collect arms and technological expertise to avoid being caught unarmed again. It also started its own arms industry which became so successful that they started exporting arms to other countries in the world. This new, government-controlled

industry employs 49.000 workers.<sup>17</sup> The arms or military-based and /or directed industry started to attract army generals<sup>18</sup> who serve as their executive directors now.

All this led to the establishment of a strong economic sector that depends on war and war materials production. This sector is too large and very strongly established and needed that the thinking of neutralizing it economically becomes impossible.

The establishment of this institutional structure with all of its structural consequences as a result of the fear of being dependent on other countries for defense is another example of the strong relationship between the fears and hopes of the Israelis and the development of strong and inherently self-perpetuating institutions that will hinder, among many other important things, the possibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza . It also led to the establishment of a strong secret intelligence agency, the Mossad, that proved its importance, success, and reliability not only to Israel but also to other countries<sup>19</sup> in the world especially the United States.

The success stories of the Mossad led to the establishment of a strong trust by the Western powers to the degree that they started to depend on Israeli intelligence not only to believe Israel but also for their own operations<sup>20</sup> and also for their tactical and strategic calculations. This trust started to lead to the manipulation<sup>21</sup> of the Western powers by Israel. . Israel now supplies the

world with weapons and with intelligence information and it has been rewarded for its efforts and "supplies. Israel provides information not only about the Arab countries, but also about the rest of the world including its best friend, the U.S. itself<sup>22</sup>

5-Another consequence that resulted from the Israeli successes and experiences is their sense of arrogance. The easy , fast, and overwhelming victory in 1967 led to the emergence of a strong feeling of greatness and the ability to do and accomplish almost anything. This feeling, though disturbed by the 1973 war and the 1983-1985 resistance in Lebanon,<sup>23</sup> still exists among Israelis to the degree that some T-shirts in Jerusalem read: "American don't worry, Israel is behind you."

This feeling started to develop immediately after the war when Israel refused to withdraw or to even recognize that it occupied Arab lands especially in the West Bank. They declared that this land, Jerusalem and the West Bank, are their lands that they "liberated" from the occupying Arabs. Declarations of not returning these lands continue until this day.<sup>24</sup>

Even their peaceful "gestures" are being used to show their arrogance and the tendency to put the Arabs down. This was clearly used by every Israeli leader the last of which was Peres's declaration that Israel agreed to the international conference to make it easy for king Hussein<sup>25</sup> because Israel does not need it.

All this shows that some hopes and fears of the Israelis may, and in most cases did, lead to the establishment of very strong and vital institutional structures that have become very independent. These structures could eventually lead, and in fact did lead, as in the Jordan valley's settlements, to the hindering of the establishment of peace and of an independent Palestinian state. In other words, some of the goals and ideals of Zionism and the Israelis did and will continue to lead to the creation of structural institutions that does not and will not permit the Israelis themselves to withdraw, accept or allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian state even if this establishment is to the Israeli advantage in a way or another.

Therefore, one could conclude that there are some internal tendencies and structural developments in Israel that create the moods and the institutions that will hinder withdrawal of Israel from the occupied Arab lands and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on them.

The Israeli economy, military, and public opinion are manipulated and structured to exclude the possibility of withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza and the acceptance of the creation of an independent Palestinian state.<sup>26</sup>

This Israeli rejection to withdrawal and to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, is not only a public opinion matter that could be overcome by well organized public relations campaigns to show the

Palestinians' good well and worthiness. It is structurally ingrained within the Israeli society and state that it needs very systematic and well planned structural and systematic "operations" to induce the desired changes in the Israeli society and state.

This requires a very long time indeed. But the problem is not an Israeli public Opinion . Neither is it a personal matter that will disappear by the disappearance of that individual or group. It is a structural problem.

In other words, the changes that happened in Israel as a result of the Jews' experiences have become too strong to be wiped out by any public relations campaigns or demonstrations of good well as Sadat thought. The Israeli economy and military now require the continuation and development of the situation for their own growth and survival. "They cannot afford peace. This means that there is a structural contradiction between peace (or the establishment of a Palestinians state) and the existence of these vital and strong institutions.

Strong interest groups and classes have developed depending on these institutional structures. It is against the interests of these groups that the lands be returned and peace be achieved. The Military, large section of the industry, the occupied territories administration, construction companies, transportation, etc... have a strong interest in keeping these territories. Giving them up will mobilize all of these groups against any government that tries to achieve peace.

Other than these interests, Israel "fears" a Russian-backed Palestinian state that may endanger the existence of the state of Israel. And it is better for Israel to live in danger than not to exist<sup>27</sup>

## 2. The Structure of the Israeli Society:

In the previous section of this chapter the nature of the Israeli society was examined and it was determined that there is a strong relationship between the make up or nature of the Israeli society and the development of many strong institutional structures that started, in their turn, to influence the nature and the structure and the direction of that society.

In this section of the chapter, these structures will be examined, evaluated, and a conclusions will be drawn to determine whether these structure are strong enough to support the argument that the present structure of the Israeli society allows for the possibility of the establishment of an independent Palestinians state and the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The importance of the consequences and interrelationships of thsee structures will also be underlined.

The way the institutions of the society are arranged to work with each other will be defined as the structure of the Israeli society. In other words, How the institutions that were created to satisfy the needs and achieve the goals of the new society are arranged to work with each other will be

called the structure of the Israeli society. The economy, government, military, political organizations, etc... that were established to maintain, direct, defend, and represent the hopes and fears of the Israeli society and the relations between them make up the structure of the society.

The only structures that will be examined here are the economy, military, and the political system . The last institution, the political system , will include an examination of the "peace groups" that emerged before and during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon. These structures or institutions will be examined in regard to their function, goals, and importance in shaping the country's attitudes toward peace.

#### 1-The Israeli Economy:

The main theme of this section is to examine the development. structure of the Israeli economy. Then it will determine how its structure determines the country's stand in regard to peace with the Arabs and the Palestinians. What role does the way the economy of Israel is formed have in shaping Israeli attitudes towards withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. How was the West Bank and Gaza integrated into the Israeli economy to the degree that giving them up will constitute an economic loss that no Israeli legislature will be willing or capable to vote for its relinquishing and..... to the Palestinians.

Since the establishment of the state, Israel depended on foreign countries for its economic and political survival. One characteristic of its economy is its dependence on external powers for sustenance of a consumer-based but still defense-oriented structure. This was due, to many reasons. The most important were 1) the need to satisfy the needs of a westernized citizenry with high demands and higher quality of life to attract them to live in the country and 2) the need to spend huge amounts of money on defense and war preparations.

This characteristic of depending on foreign countries continues and increases with time instead of decreasing.<sup>28</sup>

The reasons are still the same, war costs and higher life quality.

Among the most important reasons that necessitates the annexing or keeping or "not returning" the west Bank and Gaza, to say nothing about Jerusalem, is the need, from the economic point of view yet, for the resources of these territories. These resources range between the cheap labor of the Palestinian Arabs, the water resources, to the use of these territories as markets for Israeli products. The other reasons for withholding the territories, religious, military, and political, will be dealt with later in this chapter.

One of the most important economic advantages the Israeli economy had since occupying the West Bank and Gaza was the use of these territories for the exploitation of its water

resources. The Israelis started digging wells and created a supply system for the settlements and the frontline towns that were built on these territories.<sup>29</sup>

Knowing the shortage of the water supply in Israel and knowing the dryness of the weather in the long Summer months we can predict that Israel will, more and more, need the water resources of the territories. Also, the rise in the health standards will require and lead to more consumption of water. This does not mean, of course, that Israel will not withdraw just because it needs the water resources of the West bank. But, this reason together with the others that will be listed below can make a strong argument for this position, i.e., that Israel will not and cannot withdraw.

This will be more convincing especially if we remember that the 1967 war was waged in part because of Israel's attempt to convert the Jordan River waters. This indicates that Israel may, and as mentioned here, did in fact go to war in part because of its need for water supply.

Another economic reason for holding or keeping the West Bank and Gaza is the richness of the Dead Sea and the potential use of its resources and minerals and the plans for a canal that connects the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean that will achieve very important economic and military goals.

On the economic level it will generate electrical energy that will substitute, in part, for oil imports and create a cheap alternative for other expensive energy generators. On the military level, on the other hand, it will ensure the widening of the area that separates between them, Israel and the Arab countries to the East. By filling the whole Jordan valley with water, which will cover tens of villages and towns on both sides of the Jordan river, the water barrier between Israel and Jordan will be unbridgable from a military perspective in a way that will ensure Israeli security and ease its defense. We see, therefore, that there are very important reasons that will make any Israeli withdrawal unlikely.

The other factor is the creation and availability of a cheap labor force from among the Palestinian Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>30</sup>

The economic and political advantages of the availability of a large and cheap working force have been strong. In the economic sphere they allowed the production of cheaper commodities because of the cheap costs of production using Palestinian Arab workers who are underpaid.

From a political point of view, this employment of Palestinians Arabs weakened the Israeli labor and union movements since Arabs could be taken to substitute for unionists, and cheaply. This, in a way, explain the absence of a strong labor and union oriented political action and influence on the political machine in the parliamentary

system especially if we know that Israel has a strong labor movement that has moderate and socialist views which was one of the reasons that encouraged the Soviet Union to support the partition Plan of 1947 recognize the State of Israel in 1948.

Whereas labor has strong influence on the politics of the governments of the most parliamentary systems, it almost disappears in Israel after the 1970s. We see then how the use of the Palestinians Arabs working force, among other things, led to the maintenance and growing of their, the Palestinians, problem.

Another aspect of this advantage is the freeing of tens of thousands of Israeli laborers for the military force whenever they are needed. This is very important. If, in case of a war with the Arabs, Israel will have more free soldiers to use than if the Palestinian Arabs were not their. In the 1973 war the Palestinian Arabs who worked in Israel did not stop doing its vital job of building, manufacturing, driving, collecting crops, etc... while the people who were supposed to be doing those jobs were fighting the Arab soldiers on the Northern and Southern fronts. Israel would not have had it better. Another major

Another advantage for keeping or not returning the West Bank and Gaza is the use of these territories as a market place for Israeli products. <sup>31</sup> Because of the Arab boycott of Israeli products, and because of the distance of Israel from

the more industrialized and consumer-oriented societies and the extra costs exporting those goods will create, Israel would prefer an underdeveloped industrial society to "dumb" its industrial surplus into.

Israel does use the West Bank and Gaza as a market and it gains a lot from this trade. There is no indication that Israel or its manufacturers are willing or able to relinquish this market. History teaches us that even great countries could go to war for markets and lands of supply.<sup>32</sup>

The last important economic advantage that keep Israel in the territories is the land and the immigration question. Knowing the size of Israel and its Zionist ambitions and designs for "gathering" the Jews of the world into Israel, we will immediately realize the connection between the size of the state and the Zionist goals and designs. With its 1947 or pre-1967 size, Israel will never be able to hold all the Jews of the world. In fact, one could even argue that not even with the present size would Israel be able to do that. But it is very important to have enough room for those who may be attracted to come now. One explanation for the lack of massive Jewish immigration could be attributed to the small size of Israel.

With the addition of the West Bank and Gaza Israel almost doubled its post state size which may attract some more immigrants. In other words, the availability of most of the territories (more than half of it has been taken by Israel now either for "military" purposes or for settlements) for

settlement and use will, according to the Zionist planners, lead to more immigration and will enable their absorbence into the "greater Israel". This is to say nothing about the already existing system of settlements which will be discussed and examined in another section of this chapter.

From all of this we can see that there are many strong institutional and structural economic reasons for the dismissal of any argument that states that Israel could withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. In other words, the organic connection of the economies and structures of the West Bank and Gaza and Israel are too strong to be dissolved by the willingness of an Israeli government to achieve peace. The West Bank and Gaza are more integrated into the economy of the state than one can imagine and more than a vote in the Knesset can change.

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If we add to these structural and institutional "obstacles" that other political, and military obstacles -as I intend to do in the next part of this chapter- we can see how naive anyone who thinks that there is any possibility for any Israeli withdrawal from the territories.

## 2.Military Reasons:

Other than the reasons that were mentioned in passing when discussing the economic reasons which have military significance, the most important military reason that will not allow any Israeli government to approve the withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza is the importance of these

territories for the defense of the country as a whole. In other words, the fear of exposing the population to any Arab attack from the east is the major military reason that determines Israel's responses to demands for withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. This has been the major reason given by the Labor party for not withdrawing. The Likud adds to this the historical, religious and national factors for justifying the continuation of the occupation and for not returning the "administered territories".

The reasons that the Israeli officials give for not withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza are mainly military related. They claim that they cannot live safely in the pre 1967 borders.<sup>34</sup> They also claim that they fear an Arab<sup>35</sup> attack on them. Reality shows that the opposite is true.

But from a geographical and theoretical point of view, it is true that a strong, well-planned and executed Arab attack will threaten and endanger the Israelis. The solution is, of course, not in taking more Arab lands since Israel will always demand some more Arab lands to feel secure. In other words, even if Israel keeps the West Bank and Gaza there are Arabs still to the north and east. Who will "protect" Israel then.... and now? And if Israel can protect itself from those potential attacks why can't they protect themselves from the others? Did not Israel occupy the lands of three Arab countries in 3 days?

In this research, military "excuses and justifications" will not be taken seriously and as important as the Israelis

make them sound for many reasons.

- 1-The Israelis threaten every Arab country. They could and did reach as far as Tunisia and Baghdad.
- 2-Israel has defeated three Arab countries together even before the accumulation of more sophisticated weaponry.
- 3-Israel has nuclear weapons and is willing to and capable of using them while none of the Arab countries has any.
- 4-Israel has the strongest backing of the strongest country in the world, the U.S., which did and will continue to guarantee its survival and security.

For these and many other reasons we can dismiss the Israeli claim that they "fear" Arab attacks. We also can conclude that Israel can defend itself within any border arrangements<sup>38</sup> and that their strong claims are just a cover for other reasons (which will be discussed later) but not military. In a summary, Israel does need the extra land the West Bank and Gaza provide but it is not mainly for military reasons. Israel, Of course, will be defended easily with the present borders but it was also defensible without them.

The analogy that some people make between the withdrawal from Sinai and a possible withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza is totally invalid for reasons that I will discuss hereafter. This analogy is the major question that require a defense here.

The claim of the "pacifists",<sup>39</sup> that Israel withdrew from Sinai and it could, if there was a similar move like Sadat's

among the Arabs , then Israel will withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza, is not true for many reasons among them are the following:

1-Even if we take the military explanation to justify Israel's insistence on keeping the West Bank and Gaza we will see that there is a big difference in defense utilities provided by the West Bank and Gaza and Sinai. In other words, the value of the West Bank and Gaza from the military defense point of view is more than that of Sinai since without the West Bank Israeli main cities and population will be in the range of Arab artillery<sup>40</sup> while in Sinai there are hundreds of miles before any Egyptian canon can reach an Israeli populated city on the border. Therefore, it is easier for Israel to give up Sinai and eliminate Egypt from the war equation than to give up the West Bank and expose their populated areas.

2-Furthermore, Israel does not have any strong historical or religious claims for the Sinai<sup>41</sup> as it does for the West Bank. Geographically and emotionally, Israel and the Israelis are more connected and attached to the West Bank than to Sinai. Israelis feel that the West Bank is their backyard now. For the settlers, it is their home. If the settlers in Sinai rebelled against the Likud government the settlers of the West Bank and Gaza will fight the government, whichever government. There are in fact<sup>42</sup> indications to this effect

3-Israel is a very strong country. It has one of the strongest armies and it is very well-equipped and organized. It is setting an example in military action and war. Its army is very prepared and its leaders<sup>43</sup> are preparing it even more everyday. This preparation is not for nothing. With all this preparation comes expectations and operations. With peace there will be no need for this very well funded and organized "business"<sup>44</sup> of war. What will all those generals and officers do if there was no war or no expectations of war?

A large and very well organized class has developed that live off the war efforts. This class has been growing with every war. It is to the interest of this class that war or the threat of war should continue.

This class includes former generals, present army generals and reserves. Recent studies<sup>45</sup> show that most of the former and reserve generals work in the top management positions in the large Israeli corporations. Another group work in the military industry which consists of the largest share of the Israeli industry.

Still another aspect is that the largest number of the industrial working class that is employed in the military industry. Even Israel's exports depend to a large degree on military exports. Any changes in these ratios will definitely disrupt the economy and standard of living for many Israelis.

4-The third and most important reason is the fear of any Paletinian or Arab claims to the rest of Palestine if they withdrew. If Israel withdrew from the West Bank and Gaza on the pretense that it is withdrawing from the "occupied" territories, then it has first to withdraw from the Goalan hights which was also "occupied" it annexed. Second it will have to explain why it should not withdraw from the rest of the West Bank and Gaza especially Jerusalem and the "minor" changes in the borders since they too were occupied. There will be no explanation for not withdrawing from those lands. Third, still it will have to explain why not withdraw from the rest of Palestine especially the territories occupied beyond the 1947 partition lines . They too were "occupied" in deviance of international laws.

In other words, if Israel is going to withdraw from "all or some of the occupied territories" then the problem that will arise, and it is a very serious problem, which Israel will want to avoid, is the problem of defining which lands are not occupied lands.<sup>46</sup> Still in other words, since all of Palestine was occupied, Israel wants to avoid withdrawing from any occupied lands because it will have no logical and reasonable defense against any potential Paletinian demands that Israel withdraw from the "rest" of the "occupied " territories since the rest are also occupied. Further discussion of this will be made in the concluding chapter.

### 3.The Political system:

One of the major reasons for keeping the West Bank and Gaza is political . This means that there are internal Israeli political dynamics that prevent any Israeli government from attempting to discuss the returning of the West Bank and Gaza.

The first "political", in fact ideological, reason is the commitment of some Israeli political and religious parties to retaining the territories as being Israeli lands. In other words, some of the Israeli political parties strongly believe that the West Bank and Gaza, to say nothing about Jordan<sup>47</sup> are part of "greater Israel" and that giving any of it away is against the Jews and Zionism. This trend is shared by the majority of the political parties in Israel. Whether their commitment and rhetoric is real or not, as was mentioned in the introduction, is of little importance. That is what they use when they go to the polls and they get elected on these basis among other things.

This is a subjective commitment that I am not going to dwell much on since every party leader could, for election purposes, claim or announce that they will not return the territories.

Regardless of their consistency in advocating a strong line on the problem, the return of the West Bank and Gaza, the Israeli political parties who advocate keeping or annexing the West Bank and Gaza could change, or may be forced to change, their views if the real opportunity comes

to settle the problem. This could be not true of some of the hardline and religious parties. Because of their subjectivity, these rhetorical announcements and claims will be examined only insofar as they show the ideological spectrum of the Israeli political parties .

The important aspects of the nature and structure of the political and governmental systems in Israel are shown in the way the elements of these systems work and the parties involved in directing and controlling the way the system works and the outcomes of this dynamism. In other words, it is more important and significant to examine the way the system is organized and how it works to determine the possibilities of any Israeli political attempt to examine the possibility of withdrawal than to take the announcements of the political parties leaders as the most important indicators of their strategic views and attitudes.

In the rest of this section the elements of the political system of Israel will be examined together with the structure of those elements and how each of them effect the other. After this it will be argued that these elements and the way they are structured determine the possibilities of any withdrawal from the territories. In short, this part is an examination of the relationship between the type of the political system and its structure and the possibility of withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.

1-The first element in the political system of Israel is the existence of a large number of political parties. These parties represent their political and ideological spectrum that exists in Israel. The spectrum is so wide that it includes communists in the left to religious nationalists in the right. Between these two relatively small groupings there exists the two largest political groupings that dominate, theoretically, the Israeli political and ideological debates and attitudes.

The existence of this large number of parties, at least 17 of which have seats in the Knesset at one time, deconcentrates the power of the larger parties, i.e. the smaller parties take almost one third of the seats in almost all elections. This leaves the other two thirds to be shared by the larger parties. But this in itself is the cause of the weakness of the larger groups because, as usually happens, they will have almost equal seats. This fact, having equal seats for the larger parties will require these parties to form collations with smaller parties to achieve a majority in the Knesset.

In this type of parliamentary system where smaller parties are needed "badly" by the larger parties to make up the majority seats needed to control the government, the smaller parties will automatically have more power than their actual numeric representation really is. In other words, the conditions that these parties impose on the larger parties to participate with them in creating a

majority determine and limit the power of the larger party which is very significant in a state like Israel especially if we know that the smaller parties that usually align with the larger parties are either religious or nationalistic or both. This gives a strong influence for these parties in determining the direction of the large parties in case of a discussion of the possibilities of withdrawal<sup>48</sup>. These parties, as known about them, are against withdrawal<sup>49</sup> and they strongly believe of a larger and stronger Israel.

This, of course, does not mean that the large parties are interested in withdrawal or peace. It means, rather, that even if these parties were to become interested they will be controlled, because of the nature and structure of the parliamentary system of Israel, by the smaller parties who are strongly against these options.

Examples of this relationship and the effects of the smaller parties on the policies of the larger parties are plenty, the most significant is the dissolving of the Rabin government in 1974 because it approved the reception of American airplanes on a Saturday. Another is the secession of Techya party as a result of their disagreement with the Likud for their acceptance of the Camp David Accords with Egypt. Therefore, if a small party can break a government for a reason like the first example above I am sure they will break it for a more important and significant reason, withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza.

Another aspect of the Israeli parliamentary system is the lengthy process of debate and the need for majority vote and ratification. This aspect was clear in many decisions that the Israeli parliament wanted to solve a problem. The closest to the mind are the talks at Camp David. Weizman states and uses this fact <sup>50</sup> whenever he talks with Sadat. He always presses Sadat by saying that Sadat can give more concessions since he is the only one who decides while Begin has to refer and go back to his party members and the Knesset to have matters approved.

This shows that there are some aspects within the system that hinders the possibilities for achieving any negotiations.

2-The second element is the existence of 2 national groups in the state. One is Arab and is not fully represented or treated as an equal, the other is Jewish which is also divided into at least 2 groups ; Oriental and Ashkinazi. The political and ideological representation of these groups and subgroups is not equal. There are strong arguments about the relationship between Oriental Jews and European Jews and about the position of each within the state's top officials and representatives. A further discussion of this issue will be found later in this chapter.

The other aspect of this element is the existence of over one and a half million Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza who are not represented at all. Their existence is creating a nightmare for the Israeli policy makers and ideologists

from every camp. Israelis fear that the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza will lead to the absorption of these large numbers of Arabs into the "democratic" political system which will eventually lead to the dominance of the Arabs because of their higher birth rates. For many reasons, Israel will not allow that to happen. It will use any means<sup>51</sup> to prevent this from happening.

The major problem that faces Israel now, in fact, is not the West Bank and Gaza population. But the "Israeli-Arabs" who are Israeli citizens and who, with their current birth rates will equal the number of the Israelis at the beginning of the next century. Israel has found no solution until now, except may be Kahane's solution which sounds very logical: send them across the Jordan.

According to the policies of the rest of the parties there will still be a problem in Israel even if the West Bank and Gaza become the base for a Palestinian state. This problem is that the Palestinian Arabs who are now Israeli citizens are going to remain inside Israel and the fear of them outnumbering the Jews will continue to exist. Therefore, the creation of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza will not solve this problem. The Arabs are still going to be there. The existence of a Palestinian state next to Israel with a large sympathetic and politicized Palestinian community inside Israel will create a problem for Israel. Israel will want to trade the

expulsion of "its Arabs" for the solution of the conflict.

We see then that the existence of more than one national group and subgroups demands that the Israeli political system accounts for and accomodates these differences. In other words, being a democratic parliamentary system, the system allows for the existence, maintenance, and functioning of initially antagonistic groups that may create problems for the system in the long run.

Since returning the West Bank and Gaza does not solve one of Israel's major social and political problems, the existence of a large number of Palestinians who can legally and "internationally" demand to remain in their places and who will be loyal to "the enemy", Israel hasave no real solution to the conflict. It does not want to and cannot annex the territories for fear of tilting the demographic and political balance; neither can it withdraw for fear of the establishment of an independent palestinian state and for fear of opening the subject of the legality of Israel's holding of the rest of Palestine. The solution Israel has is to maintain the status quo. It is the least dangerous. It is a dilemma that Israel does not have a solution for and that is one reason for its inability to meet the PMDs.

We see then that the system creates obstacles for the possiblities of any withdrawal. No Israeli will vote for a government that will give up the West Bank and Gaza and keep the Arabs in their places. "At least" some may suggest "let them take the territories and take their people with them".

Some of the objections to this thesis, that Israel will not withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza , come from those who believe that one reason that will make the Israelis withdraw is the large population of the West Bank and Gaza. They argue that the future demographic<sup>52</sup> imbalance will pressure Israel to withdraw since Israel cannot deny the Palestinians in Israel their political rights and at the same time it does not want to create a binational state .

The answer to this is that it is in fact not the population of the West Bank and Gaza that worries Israel now, it is rather, the Arab citizens of Israel. And since these are citizens, Israel is unable, legally, to revoke their citizenship and therefore will continue to be one of Israel's major problems.

In the case of an Israeli decision to annex the West Bank and Gaza, the population of these lands is not going to be a problem. Israel in fact created a solution for this, autonomy. The West Bank and Gaza Arabs could still live there but they have no right to vote for the Knesset.

And if that does not work, Kahane and his party have other options : deport them across the Jordan river.<sup>53</sup> If somebody claims that Kahane is "irrational and crazy" and that he does not represent the majority of the Israelis, as they do,<sup>54</sup> lets read what Sharon says<sup>55</sup> . And if some still<sup>56</sup> consider him to be a hawk, lets read what Dayan says

This idea of establishing a Palestinian state in Jordan is strong and widespread. A Zionist ideologue stated, among other things, that Israel have to dismantle the present Arab world's superficial political structure.<sup>57</sup>

From all of this we can conclude that first, the existence of more than one national group does create obstacles for the governments of Israel in case of a decision to withdraw. Second, the existence of Israeli-Arabs is the problem that the Israelis mean when they discuss the demographic Issue, it is not the population of the West Bank and Gaza. Third, the population of the West Bank and Gaza does not create any problem insofar as their political participation is concerned. Israel denies them that anyway. Fourth, Israel is not short of solutions to the existence of the West Bank and Gaza population. The expulsion to the east is not untypical thinking of Israeli politicians and ideologues as we have seen. Further discussion of the other aspects will be provided later in the chapter and in the concluding chapter.

3-The third element in this context is the absence of a constitution for the state of Israel. Constitutions determine the way a government operates and it decides the basic laws of the state. The absence of a constitution gives the government flexibility and allows it to enact and carry out laws that may endanger the welfare and freedom of the people.

As it is in Israel, Israel has laws from the Ottoman, British, and Jordanian rules. This, of course, allows the Israeli authorities to use "any" law to prosecute "any" offense. In the West Bank and Gaza for example, the Jordanian and British rules and laws apply. They do not apply in the pre 1967 borders.<sup>58</sup> People could be arrested and detained for a non-specified time under British Emergency Laws which were adopted.

The Arabs claim that since Israel does not have a constitution it does not have defined borders was and is still used to show that Israel is planning for expansion, to say nothing about withdrawal. They connect between the absence of a constitution and the need and desire for further occupation. Being that way, Israel does not violate any internal laws when it annexes the West Bank and Gaza. In this sense, the lack of a constitution and the absence of a defined border allows Israel to keep the occupied territories which, in turn, leads to the point under examination, not withdrawing from the West Bank and Gaza.

Regardless of the reasons that Israel did not have a constitution and did not carry out the laws of the provisional government to create a constitution, it is to the benefit of the government of Israel that this constitution does not exist; it frees the government from the pressures of a constitution. And as it really was, it was the government of Ben-Gourion that rejected the establishment of a constitution.<sup>59</sup>

Another element in regard to this fact, the lack of a constitution, is the exposition of the strength and influence of the religious parties. The account of Sager<sup>60</sup> on how strongly the religious parties opposed the writing of a constitution shows their influence since the establishment of Israel. The religious parties believe that Israel has a constitution, the Torah, and therefore, there is no need to create another one. The religious parties are still strong and the system provides them with extra strength in the way that was described above; by having two large opposing parties each of them will need one or more smaller parties to achieve the simple majority required to lead the Knesset. By choosing and imposing their demands the smaller parties share power with the party that accepts their terms. This shows that the smaller parties still have enough power to prevent the drafting of a constitution. This ability has a very strong indication to what the larger groups can or can not do.

Except in the cases where the two large parties make a coalition does the role and influence of the smaller parties get minimized. This, in itself, as we have seen, has no implications whatsoever either in 1967 or in 1984-1987 since the smaller parties are still allied with them.

### 3. The Israeli View of the Arab Governments and their Rulers:

This part of the chapter will examine the way the Israelis and their governments perceive the Arab countries,

their rulers, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. The importance of this part comes from the fact that peoples and governments views determine their opinions and their opinions determine policies and actions. ( This is what Sadat called th psychological factor)<sup>61</sup> In this sense, Israel's policies and actions are determined by the way Israel perceives the Arabs, their rulers, and their intentions.<sup>62</sup>

It is important to state that the Israeli views and opinions could be wrong or unrealistic, but still they are important because they are perceived as being true. Therefore, some of their perceptions are false but it does not matter since they believe they are true and that still determines the way they react.

One of the major perceptions of Israel about the Arab governments and rulers that determine Israel's stand from the issues of withdrawal, peace, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state come from the Israeli claim of the lack of stability and lack of democracy in the Arab World.

One of the major claims Israel and the U.S. has against the Arab governments and their rulers is their lack of stability and democracy and the fear that they could be changed or overthrown very fast and without any warnings. This means that neither Israel nor America trust these states. They are afraid that if they made any treaties with

any of these Arab states, one day an officer or a major can seize the power and stop all previous commitments of the previous government and the situation will go to the stages before those accomplishments.

The connection between instability and the lack of democracy becomes clear especially if we know that Israel and the United States claim that the lack of democracy will lead to instability.<sup>63</sup> In other words, the government cannot rule without the people's consent and participation and that the people will one day take the matters into their hands when the government does things that the people refuse or do not accept the government's actions. Cases of this fact are plenty; Egypt, the Sudan, Iraq, etc... .

The real problem is that instability, that is created by Israel and the U.S.<sup>64</sup> leads to the tight rule by the Arab governments. This is not an apology for their actions. The Arab rulers are the ones to blame for this. But it is instability that leads to the absence of democracy and not the opposite.

These Israeli and American fears are real since the Arab world has not settled yet. There are many grievances and conditions that promote instability. The religious revival, the unity drive is still strong which may lead to more upheavals. Certainties do exist in this regard and America and Israel and the Arab rulers themselves should be aware that the Arab people may force new changes if things remain the same.

At the same time the Arab governments have been relatively stable since the beginning of the 1970s. Syria, Libya, Jordan, Iraq, and others have faced no serious changes or threats. Except for Egypt, Sudan and Yemen, there were no major changes in the leadership. Egypt is a different case altogether since the reasons for the assassination of Sadat were due to an old and still a potentially strong condition that threatens more upheavals and assassinations. The continuation of the Palestinian problem did and will continue to cause more upheavals in the Middle East. Israel occupies the Arab lands, keeps them, is not willing to return them with imposing dangerous conditions and expects the Arab world to be stable and quite! One of the reasons of the instability of the rulers and governments of the Arabs countries is the existence of Israel itself and its aggression. The best example of this relationship is Egypt's Sadat.

The argument continues that why should Israel trust the PLO? Who can make sure that one of the very radical leaders may not take control the movement or the new state and create more problems for Israel than it now has?<sup>64</sup>

As mentioned above, these fears are real and should be taken seriously. Of course Israel is still capable of defeating a new small Palestinian state if it was to be formed and established in the West Bank and Gaza.

There are many elements in that situation that will bring problems to the fore. Some of these elements are the lack of complete control by Fateh over the other extreme organizations, the influence of other Arab countries like Syria and Libya, the experiences of the Palestinians with Jordan, and the experiences of the populations of the West Bank and Gaza with Israel. All these elements could lead to actions that Israel cannot help but reoccupy the West Bank and Gaza as did begin once declare<sup>66</sup>

All these elements will be discussed in the conclusion. It is important, however, to state that these elements are a result of the historical "process" that led to emergence and development of the conflict. They exist and they have to be dealt with.

To conclude this section one would realize that there are legitimate fears of the instability of the Arab rulers and regimes that is used by Israel to dismiss even serious attempts by the Arabs and the Palestinians to solve the conflict.<sup>67</sup> Israel uses these "fears" to convince itself and the world that they should not deal with these governments and rulers since they either can not "keep their word" or they cannot protect themselves. Unfortunately, this scheme worked until now even after some of the regimes had survived longer than the state of Israel itself.

Regardless of how serious Israel takes these fears and threats, it succeeded in using them and continues to do so. The other part of the problem is that the United States has

blindly accepted this premise and responds in a similar manner to the same "fears".<sup>68</sup> It also succeeded in convincing some of the Arab government and rulers that it is for their own good not to help the Palestinians achieve their goals because after the achievements of their goals, if they ever do, the Palestinians will cause more troubles for these countries than they do now.<sup>69</sup> The discussion of this aspect will lead us to the next part of this chapter.

#### 4. "The Arab-Israeli Alliance!":

The major point that will be discussed here is how and why did Israel succeed in aligning the Arabs against the Palestinians and how does this alliance hinder the return of the occupied territories and became an obstacle in the formation of an independent Palestinian state on them.

To achieve this goal, the goal of having the Arab countries consider the PLO as their enemy, Israel employed few tactics that helped her do exactly that job.

1-Israel mounted sever reprisals against the civilian populations of the host countries where Palestinians' attacks originated from. From 1948 until now Israel bombards any country that allows or cannot control the Palestinians in their territories. This tactic worked very effectively especially with the strong countries , Syria and Jordan. But it failed in a fragmented country like Lebanon because the government is not that strong.

Therefore, Israel threatened the rulers and governments

of those countries and succeeded in getting their help to control, fight, and capture any Palestinians who tried to operate across the borders. This happened in Jordan but it was more successful in Syria. In this sense, Israel won itself an Arab Alliance to fight and control the PLO fighters.

2-The second tactic that Israel used and is still using is to frighten the Arab countries of the consequences of supporting the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This approach, though not well developed yet, led to Prince Hassan of Jordan to want Jordan to "develop its own identity" that will save it from the "actions of the Begin government."<sup>70</sup>

This shows that Israel uses its power to have the Arabs withdraw their support for an independent Palestinian state.

Jordan now has doubts about the consequences of the creation of an independent Palestinians state. These doubts stem from the responses of the West Bank and Gaza population and their support of the PLO. It also stems from the aforementioned fear, inability to control the Palestinians if Jordan to be united with a Palestinian state and the possible results of Israeli attacks if it failed. Another is the fear of the neighboring Arab countries, Especially Syria and Iraq since they will have a strong influence on the Palestinian leadership. All these fears will be examined in the concluding chapter. It is important here, however, to show that these fears hinder the solution of the conflict

in that it pushes Jordan to withdraw its support for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

From this section we see that Israel is using its power to prevent the Arabs from supporting the PLO which is required at this stage more than any other time . The U.S. also requires Arab consent when it comes to problems of the PLO.

From this point of view it is certain that Israel will continue to use its military power to achieve its goals as it did since the establishment of the state.

#### 5. The Israeli Peace Groups:

One of the more recent strong arguments that became influential in the conflict is the Palestinian emphasis on the existence and availability of a peace movement in Israel. The Palestinians are building great hopes on this movement thinking that it is capable of influencing the Israeli governments policies toward peace and withdrawal.

The resolutions of the last three PNCs emphasize this trend. Arafat himself met with members of these groups in Europe.

The Palestinians argue that by contacting these groups they will be able to present their case inside Israel by the Israeli representatives themselves. Another argument is that these contacts with the debate they are going to generate inside Israel will expose the real Israeli views about the conflict and will force the presentation of a more

realistic and moderate view toward the Palestinians. Still another argument is that the events that happened during the Israeli invasion; the massacres in Sabra and Shatella, the Israeli people's demonstrations, the refusal of some Israel soldiers to serve in Lebanon, and the criticisms of the government will be reinforced and have a stronger impact now with the situation being presented by the Israelis themselves. Another argument is that the Palestinians will present the U.S. with a chance to contact the PLO since members of the Israeli Knesset are meeting with them why should not the United States?

All these arguments are very interesting and important. Similar experiences of the Algerians during their struggle have produced a tangible outcome. Many analysts suggested such contacts.  
72

The problem with such a policy is that it assumes many things that could not be true. All the PLO's arguments stem from assumptions and not from facts.

They wrongly assume that the Israeli demonstrations against the war in Lebanon mean the emergence of a peace group in Israel and that this group or movement is interested in peace or in defending the Palestinians. These groups were demonstrating against the killings of the Israeli soldiers because their government lied to them. The "struggle" that the PLO wants to see inside Israel is an internal struggle for domestic reasons and the Palestinians are not the target of this struggle. The PLO  
73

wants to see more than there really is.

Another misconception or misreading of the events in Israel is the PLO's belief that there will be a strong debate inside Israel over the contacts with the peace groups and whether this debate will lead to moderate responses or to U.S. contacts.

In regard to the emergence of a strong debate, events showed that this was not forthcoming. Shamir wanted to prosecute those who met with "terrorist organizations" who threaten the state of Israel<sup>74</sup>. The Israeli government and media was capable of silencing this trend that was supposed to emerge. The debate did not stand on its feet to generate positive and moderate Israeli presentations. In regard to the U.S., it is clear that the U.S. wants to avoid any interference in the internal Israeli affairs since it did not respond to any of these incidents including the assassination of Hammami, Sartawi or Qawasmi. There are no indications that the U.S. is going to respond. And even if the U.S. responds, past experience show that it was not up to the expectations of the Palestinians and far below the Israeli responses themselves.

The last wrong assumption that will be examined here is the belief that if a large number of the Israeli public would vote for peace, the government will follow suite.

Like all democratic governments, the Israeli government does not represent the actual interests of the majority of

the people. The elected representatives do represent their constituents numerically but not substantially. In other words, every voter does lead to the election of a representative but the views of the representative do not represent the views of the voters. The representatives will present his views and at most what he thinks the voters' views were. This gap between representatives and represented are real and understandable.

The objections to the PLO assumptions are that one, The Israelis did not come to streets protesting the invasion or the massacres as such. They were protesting a governmental technical and procedural problem. They were protesting the killing of their soldiers because of the government's misleading them. If the Israeli soldiers did not die they would not have responded negatively.<sup>75</sup> Second, the demonstrations did not signal a shift in the Israelis rejection to the PLO or to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Third, even if the Israelis did change their views about the creation of the Palestinian State, the chances that these changes will be represented in the Knesset or the government are, as we so above, are very poor because of the type of the governmental and political systems.

We see then that the PLO has misread the events of 1982-1983 in Israel and tried to see in them more than there really were. The Israeli peace movement, if it exists in the sense that the PLO tries to presented in, is too weak to

survive, to say nothing about force a change in the Israeli governmental level. The dependence on this movement reinforces the PLO's weakness to take any strong and bold measures. It is easier and safer to think this way and to have others fight your battles for you.

Conclusion:

The facts that were presented range from the subjective declarations of the Israeli leaders and the leaders of the various political parties to the objective economic institutional and structural elements show that :

1-There are very strong indications in the declarations of the Israeli leaders that they are not going to withdraw from these territories and that they are not ready to allow the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on them. Though subjective, these announcements and declarations are strong enough to indicate that most of these groups and parties are strongly against these possible policies of the government and they threaten to resist them if necessary.

2-More important still are the structural and institutional infrastructures that, in the way they are arranged, permit us to conclude that even if the Israeli leaders do intend to withdraw or declare that they want to withdraw it will be very hard to believe that they will be able to do that. The dependence on the West Bank and Gaza for resources, labor, marketing, the fear of further claims from the Palestinians for the rest of Palestine; the fear of the settlers who

indicate that they are ready and willing to resist any governmental concession or withdrawal from these territories are strong enough to permit us to conclude that the chances that Israel may withdraw are very poor if not-existent.

3-External reasons are also used by Israel to hinder the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories. Other than their sheer force to determine the level of support of the Arab countries for the Palestinians, they use their good relations with the U.S. to prevent the Arab countries from fully supporting the PLO.

Israel succeeded in driving a wedge between the Arab countries and the PLO. Examples are seen in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and of course, Egypt. Israeli force, in fact, is preventing the PLO from meeting and holding their councils as Arafat indicated <sup>76</sup>. Fearing an attack on their meeting place since, according to Arafat, Israeli planes are roaming the skies of the Arab world freely.

4-The Israeli "peace movement" is too weak to produce any change on the governmental operational level which makes it valuable only as a moderating factor from the PLO's point of view. This means that the PLO will be able to claim that they have contacts with Israelis and it is the Israeli government that stands in the way of peace and not the Israeli public. This only good for public relations campaigns and has no real impact on the Israeli government which holds all the cards.

5-The most important conclusion that is reached here is that without power the Arabs and the Palestinians are not going to get anywhere. All the facts show that it is basically Israeli power that determines the development and direction of the process of "peace" in the Middle East.<sup>77</sup>

From all of this we can see that the prospects of peace in the Middle East are practically amount to nothing. There are very strong indication from within Israel that show that Israel is not going to withdraw.

## Notes

1

Hudson. "The Ineffectiveness of the Arab States' Diplomacy on the Palestinian-Israeli Issue: An Inventory of Explanation" in Hudson . ed. Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the Principle Actors, 1984. Hudson states that "One cannot , of course, simply dismiss the assertion that Israel, with its U.S. backer, has been able to have its way because of superior power", p. 105.

2

Abdel Monem Said " U.S. management of the Conflict: The Reagan Era" as in Hudson op. cit, p. 203.

3

Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, Palestine and the United nations, Quartet Books, New York, 1981, first page.

4

Paul Jureidini and R.D. McLauren in their Beyond Camp david: Emerging Alignment and Leaders in the Middle East Syracuse, 1981.

5

Examples of those who believe that since Israel returned Sinai then it would return the West Bank are plenty, Sadat, Dayan, King Hussein, Saniorah, the Americans, and many others.

6

See definition section." Liberation"

7

This does not mean that Israel is not interested in controlling these lands. But it is its power that allowed to do this and if the Arabs have the power they too will regain these lands as harakabi determines in Arab Strategies and Israel's Response, Free Press, New York, 1977, pp.112-113.

8

As Rokach uncovers in her Israel's Sacred Terrorism, 1980, Dayan and the Israeli government at the time (that happened after 1978 with Haddad) were interested in find[ing] men in Lebanon or in exile from it who will be ready to mobilize for the creation of a Maronite state, p. 25-6. Or according to dayan, ' The only thing that is needed is to find an officer even just a major[ and he found him in Sa'ad Haddad] We could win his heart or buy him with money , to make him agree to declare himself the savior of the Maronite population. The the Israeli army will enter Lebanon, will occupy the necessary territory, and will create a Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel"p. 29

9

This was clear from the way the Yamit settlers reacted to the evacuation. The Israelis responded negatively to the government's request to withdraw. "Ariel Sharon and others denounced the government for pursuing "policies reminiscent of the [British] White paper" of 1939, which restricted Jewish settlement to certain parts of Mandate Palestine."

Merip Reports.No.136-137, Oct-Dec 1985. P.4 Other voices came from the Deputy minister of agriculture Dekel when he stated that " In Opposition to the political thesis of Reagan we answer with the erection of political facts in the area. Reagan pushed and we push back" Nakhleh and Wright in After the Palestine-Israel War: Limits to U.S. and Israeli Policy, p. 50. Threats to disobey the government were heard. Even more serious commitments have been established "reports mention not only private real estate companies, but also insurance companies willing to ensure the land against its return to Jordan. 129" (see, for example, Maarive, October 15, 1982, and the six-part series of "Who and How They Are Building Samaria?" by Eliezer Lavin, Haaretz, December 17-24, 1982. as quote by Nakhleh, op. cit., p.52

10

Ibid, p. 50.

11

For more details about these schools see Harakabi Arab Strategies and Israel's Response, Free Press, 1977, PP. 127-152.

12

The Labor party rationalized its policy of unilateral settlement in the occupied territories by arguing it would prompt the Arabs to negotiate peace out of fear that loss of time would mean loss of territory." Semha Flapan JPS 57, p.33

13

See Harakabi op. cit., p. 104.

14

Ibid., p. 104.

15

See Willy Crawford, Palestinian Exodus, London, 1981, p. 21-22 (in Arabic).

16

See Nightline October 17, 1985 when Sharon reemphasized that in Israel only Israelis can defend the state.

17

That is 49% of the total industrial workforce. MERIP Reports #136-137, October-December 1985, p. 23.

18Ibid., 23.

19See Blitzer Between Washington and Jerusalem for the "services" the Israel does for the U.S.

20

See New York Times Magazine , February 22, 1987 where North explained that "Israeli intelligence pin pointed Qaddafi's exact Location during the long night of April 14, ..... The last fix on Qaddafi's location came at 11:15 PM Libyan time, two hours and 45 minutes before the first bomb fell."

21

A recent example of this "service" is the incident in England's Hethrew airport where a Palestinian was accused of giving his girl friend a bomb when she took ElAl to Jerusalem. The direction of the blame was to Syria and England did believe the Israeli intelligence reports. Israel's goal, as I see it, was to encourage England and the U.S. to attack Syria since they, the Israelis could not do that with strong justifications. I believe that the reports connecting this story to Syria was masterminded in Israel and I tend to believe the whole story was just an Israeli plot to implicate Syria with this incident to generate British and American attack on Syria. If Israel could do things like those in Egypt in the 1950's and the 1960's I believe it could do these things too.

22

The Pollard case is the best and most recent example of this Israeli use of its intelligence gathering power. For the statement of the Federal Government see JPS #61, pp.229-234

23

This was the first Israel withdrawal from an occupied Arab land by force and without conditions. See Khalidi in MERIP Reports #131 who states that "The Israeli withdrawal from Sidon and its surroundings is not an ordinary event. For the first time in the history of the conflict, Israel has withdrawn unconditionally from Arab land, its army in defeat. [and] "Sidon today enters our history as the first city liberated from the Israeli occupation...It is our first victory through mass armed struggle." 1985. P.21 .

24 Examples of these statements are in almost every speech each of the major Israeli leaders gives; from Dayan to Peres to others.

25

Peres stated that Israel "agree to an international conference to make it easy for King Hussein, but for us we do not need it" as quoted in Akher Sa'ah February 26, 1986, p. 11 (in Arabic)

26

Israel is aware of the fact that Harakabi mentioned in his Arab Strategies and Israel's Response that "Public Opinion is fickle and volatile, sometimes resigning itself to the accomplished fact, thus endorsing it" , p. 89.

27 Ibid. p. 87

28

See Al-Khawas and Abed-Rabbo in their American Aid to Israel: Nature and Impact, Amana Books, 1984. Se also "The Revolution in U.S.-Israel Relations " by Thomas Dine Executive Director of the AIPAC in JPS #60, pp.134-143 who states that the U.S. aid to Israel will be \$3 Billion a year in grants and not loans anymore P.135

29

For more detail about the water resources see Schwarz's article "Water Resources in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza

Strip" in Elazar (ed.) Judea, Samaria, and Gaza: Views on the Present and Future, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, 1982, pp.81-102.

30

See Lavine's article "Social Services in the Administered Territories" in Ibid., pp.145-167.

31

Ibid., Sandler and Frisch "The Political Economy of the Administered Territories", pp.123-144.

32

Lenin, V. Imperialism The Highest Stage of Capitalism, International Publishers, New York, 1939.pp.96-97.

33

Begin stated: "anybody who removes Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza District from the jurisdiction of Israel is giving his agreement...to the establishment of an independent palestinian state, under the leadership of Arafat and his cohorts... Such a state we will be forced to occupy again." as quoted in Nakhleh op. cit., p.46

34

See Secure and Recognized Boundries: Israel's Right to Live in Peace Within Defensible Frontiers, Carta, Jerusalem, 1971. and Harakabi, op. cit., pp.111-112.

35

The attacks on Iraq and Tunisia are very good examples of the opposite.

36

See Moskin Among Lions, Ballentine Books, New York, 1982.

37

"For thirty years we have stood at the side of this proud and independent nation of Israel. I can say without reservation, as the President of the United States, that we will continue to do so not just for another thirty years, but forever." in Gazit, "America And Israel", Partisan Review March, 1982, p.370.

38

Israel thought that the Suez Canal will be a secure and defensible border. It spent Millions of dollars on building the Bar-Lev line. The 1973 war proved that they were not secure or defensible borders. Israel uses this security and defense issues to justify its occupation and exapansion.

39

By this I mean the people who think that the conflict could be solved by political means, Hussein, Saniora, etc...

40

Moskin, op. cit., and Secure and Recognized Boundries: Israel's Right to Live in Peace Within Defensible Frontiers.

41

In fact, the Jews' memorable history of Sinai was that they were lost there for fourty years.

42

There are reports from the West Bank settlements that they are preparing to fight the government that will approve of any compromise in the West Bank.

"Reports in the Israeli press concerning the extensive arsenal of the settlers accompanied published discussions of "civil rebellion" should the government consider any territorial compromise." Occupied Territories: Report, JPS #60, p. 122" "As for the settlers themselves, in an attempt to forestall the government from repeating what happened at Yamit (the Jewish settlement that was dismantled before returning Sinai to Egypt), two recent bodies were formed: first, the Citizens' Movement for Stopping the Returning Settlements in Judea and Samaria to Jordan, and second, the Return to Sinai, a body that will attempt disruption of the peace agreement with Egypt in order to create opportunities for Israel to return to Sinai." as quoted by Nakhleh op. cit., P.51

43

Examples of these preparations and the attitudes of the leaders are presented here: "When asked why the IDF should attack, General Eitan replied quite simply, 'Since I have built an excellent apparatus by the investment of billions of dollars, I must make use of it'. Another is Sharon's statement that, "nine years after the 1973 war, there was a whole generation of Israeli soldiers who had no experience of battle and who needed to be given it." as in Jansen The Battle of Beirut, p.7

44

More than one fourth of the Israeli Budget \$4 billion goes to war efforts and according to a report in MERIP Reports, this number could total \$8 Billion, that is 40% of Israel's budget especially if we consider the military related expenses, i.e. payment of military loans, military industry, etc.. "The main budget component is military. In addition to the regular defense budget of more than \$4 billion, military expenditures also appear in many other categories. Some are hidden in the budget of various ministries-police and municipalities, for instance. A sizable sum appears in the external debt and interest payments for loans taken in the past to finance the defense budget. The acceptable estimate among Israeli economists is that the real defense budget amounts to about \$8 billion, some 40 percent of the budget. This unparalleled sum is the largest defense budget in the world per capita, even counting countries currently engaged in wars, such as Iran or Iraq." Merip Reports. No.136-137. Oct-Dec 1985. P.23

45

Ibid., p. 23-4

46

Rodinson, Israel A Colonial Settler State? Monad Press, New York, 1973, p. 13.

47

See Jansen op. cit., p. 122-123.

48

The relations between the large and small parties is discussed in Sagar op. cit., p. 41.

49

An example of this fact was the secession of the Techya Party from the Likud because of its approval of the Camp David Accords.

50

Ezer Weizman The Battle for Peace, Bantam Books, Toronto, 1981, pp. 163-165.

51

The incidents of 1983-4 when the settlers spread chemicals on the windows of the girls' schools to affect their ability to have children are a good example of this belief.

52

Israel does, among other things, deny its Arab citizens from bearing arms and/or being drafted into the army.

53

See Nightline on October 15, 1985.

54

Ibid.

55

Sharon's success in 1982 to lead Israel into a war that it did not need and was not imposed on it leads us to estimate his power. The failure, few days later, of the Israeli Communist party to solicit enough votes for the breakdown of the Begin government with 94 to 3 votes shows how strong was the Israeli society and governments support for the war. For his view, this quote from Al-Quds Newspaper gives the best attitude: "It is better for those who do not use the political methods to know that any success they achieve in their actions will bring closer the moment of explosion in Israel, which will force us to do what we have done in 1948" Sharon as quoted in Haartz's article translated into Arabic in Al-Quds of Aug. 26, 1985 by Zeiv Scheff.

56

Dayan stated that " We are the landlords there[ in "Judea and Samaria- The West Bank]... and we are the ones who make the decisions" as quoted in Hudson, op. cit., 49

57For a good example of the way some Zionist leaders and ideologues think and plan this quote will fit:

"The author, Oded Yinon, a former senior officer of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, begins by arguing that all the states of the Middle East are fragile because within their artificial frontiers are grouped antagonistic racial and religious communities who really do not want to live together. This presents Israel with 'far-reaching opportunities for the first time since 1967...today we

suddenly face immense opportunities for thoroughly transforming the situation and this we must do in the coming decade, otherwise we shall not survive as a state." "Sinai must be regained because of its oil and mineral wealth, and this will be possible because 'Egypt is already a corpse, all the more so if we take into account the growing Muslim-Christian rift.' So 'breaking Egypt down territorially into distinct geographical regions is the political aim of Israel in the 1980s on its western front'. These 'regions' would be 'a Christian coptic state in Upper Egypt alongside a number of weak states' for the Egyptian Muslims." ..

As regards Jordan:

"Israel's policy, both in peace and in war, ought to be directed at the liquidation of Jordan under the present regime and the transfer of power to the Palestinian majority."...

"Iraq is 'a definite candidate as one of Israel's targets', with the higher aim of breaking Iraq up into its demoniations, a provincial division on ethnic religious grounds' into 'three or more states around Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, and the Shiite areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north'. 'The entire Arabian peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution', though Yinon does not provide a detail forecast."

As quoted by Jansen in The Battle of Beirut , pp.122-123

58

The Israeli laws do not apply in "Judea and Samaria".  
(West Bank and Gaza)

59

Sagar, op. cit., p. 35

60

Ibid., pp. 35-36.

61

Sadat, In Search of Identity, Harper and Row, New York, 1977P. 302.

62

For a good examination of Arab attitudes see harakabi Arab Attitudes To Israel Keter Publishing House, Jerusalem, 1972 and Arab Strategies and Israel's Response, Free Press, New York, 1977, and The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning, Vallentine Michell, London, 1979.

63

It was reported that the success of the Iranian revolution led to the reinforcement of the belief that the Arab States and their regimes are neither safe nor secure. This fact was also realized by Jon Kimche in "The Peres Legacy" in Midstream, December, 1984 where he states that "Nothing was static: no ruler and no regime was secure. Not Assad in Syria nor Mubarak in Egypt; Neither Jordan nor Iraq.", P. 4.

64

One of Israel's goals was and still is to destabilize the Arab countries and "break the confidence of the West "

in the Arab Regimes as is clear in Rokach's conclusions from the Diary of Moshe Shareet. Rokach, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, American Arab University Graduates, Boston, p. 38

65

See Plascov. op. cit., p. 41-3.

66

See Nakhleh's quote of Begin from Maariv of October 19, 1982. 'The Establishment of an independent Palestinian state, under the leadership of Arafat and his cohorts...Such a state we will be forced to occupy again" p. 46

67

See Harakabi in Arab Strategies and Israel's Response and O'Brian The Siege: The Saga of Israel and Zionism, London, 1986. They conclude, in a way or another, that there is no sense of dealing with the Arabs since they are not going to accept what Israel is going to demand.

68

Sadat, op. cit., p. 278-9.

69

Even Sadat himself was against the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In the meetings at Camp David he said that " I have crossed the PLO out of my lexicon." [and] Hearing the Egyptian president express himself so vehemently against Arafat's Organization, Weizman tried to cash in on the opportunity: "Does that mean that you accept our opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state?" Sadat: " That is so, but under no circumstances are you to say that to Begin, because he will immediately announce that to the whole world." Haber, Schiff and Yaari The Year of the Dove, Bantam Books, 1979, p.189.

70

Merip Reports # 131, March-April 1985, p. 4.

71

Hani El-Hassan reports that the Arab leaders never informed Carter that they were interested in the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Al-Sakrah No. 136, 1987.

72

Crawford, op. cit., p. 26.

73

The Arabs think that since the Israelis demonstrated against their government that means that the Israelis are not accepting the establishment of their state in the West bank and Gaza. The real reasons for their demonstrations are:

"While the Israeli demonstrators were above all expressing their doubt about policy issues and a military action that claimed many more lives than anyone had expected, their "friends" abroad were much more interested in relieving the stress engendered by Israel's struggle for survival, a struggle labeled as an "imperialist aggression" by the propaganda of the international Left." Midstream Dec

"Declaration of the Members of Yesh Gvul,.. but there is no military solution for the problem of a people. You want to impose a 'new order' on the ruins of Lebanon, spill our blood and the blood of others on behalf of the Phalangists. It is not for this that we were mobilized for the Israeli army... You have lied to us... There is no national consensus about this war, about these lies, about this occupation...." As quoted in JPS #60, p.159.;

74

"Foreign Minister Shamir described them as "the enemies of the state and the enemies of democracy who stooped to the lowest rags by meeting with the head of the murderers." He advocated at a cabinet meeting that they should have been brought to trial." [Another was] Yuval Neeman:... "it should not be possible for Israeli citizens to meet freely with the enemy. If the law is not clear on that it should be changed." Nakhleh, op. cit., p.57.

75

Sharon as quoted above in note # 55.

76

See JPS #59, p. 155.

77

I Agree with Saad Eddin Ibrahim that "What the Arabs have not tried is to approach the conflict with equally credible options of war and peace. Only then would there be hope of attaining justice for the peoples, security for the states, and peace for the Middle East." Hudson , op. cit., p. 104.

## Chapter 5

### The American Perceived Role:

The aim of this chapter is to examine the role of the United State in creating, maintaining, and complicating, the conflict. It will also examine the potential role of the U.S. in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first part of the chapter is intended to examine and determine the way the United State became involved in the conflict. In this part a brief history of the way the U.S. became involved in the Middle East and its interests in controlling this vital region will be laid out. An examination of the U.S. insistence on remaining the sole superpower in control of the region will also be explained and how this determination effects U.S. perception of the conflict.

The second part will examine how the Arabs perceive the Role of the United States and how they "wish" it could have been. It will be shown here how the Arabs think the U.S. should deal with the conflict and especially with Israel. The Arabs and the Palestinians think that the U.S. can play the most important role , even more than the Soviet Union. They want the U.S. to stop supporting and arming Israel and they want the U.S. to pressure Israel into withdrawing. They still believe that it is the U.S., and only the U.S. that can do this.

The third part will discuss the U.S. role from the Israeli point of view . It will be examined here how Israel

thinks the U.S. should act in relation to the conflict. The most important thesis is that Israel thinks that the U.S. needs Israel in the region and that the U.S. should pay for this by economic, military, and political support. The U.S. should not, according to the Israeli perception, force Israel to withdraw or even stop erecting more settlements since the interests of Israel are the interests of the U.S. Another important point is that Israel wants the U.S. to learn that only Israel is responsible for its defense and security and Israel is the only side that can determine what Israel's security needs are.

The fourth part will examine whether the U.S. has the abilities and willingness to influence Israel and help bring an end to the conflict. It will be argued that , because of the structure of the U.S.-Israeli relationship and the relative independence and strength of Israel among many other things, the U.S. is incapable and unwilling to pressure Israel to withdraw and as long as the U.S. interests are not threatened they will not need to change their policies toward the conflict.

The last part of this chapter will examine the direction of U.S. political moves towards the Middle East . It will be argued that because of the structure of U.S. domestic politics the international power relationships, and the weakness of the Arabs, there will be no change in American policy in the foreseen future. And unless some structural changes happen in the U.S. political and economic

systems, coupled with internal changes in the Arab World, the U.S. will not need to create any changes or impose any pressures on Israel. In short, without Arab economic and political pressures on the U.S. the U.S. will have no reason to change its positions.

1-The American involvement in the Middle East Conflict:

After the end of World War II, the U.S. was the strongest power in the world. It wanted to express its power by all means. In the Middle East it was interested in the oil, the geographical location for military basis, and in the exclusion of the Soviet Union from controlling any part of the region.

The events in Iran in 1953 and in Egypt in 1956 proved that the U.S. had consolidated its power and pressed its claims for an important role in the Middle East. The U.S. supported the Shah to regain power in Iran while it was supposed to be a British domain. It also forced the Israelis out of Sinai although it was also a British domain. This showed very clearly that the U.S. takes its role in controlling the Middle East seriously and promptly.

The reasons for U.S. intervention in these cases, among others, were clear; project its power, make clear its dominance in the region, substitute for the British, control the region's resources, and give a strong signal to the Russians to "stay away" from the region. These reasons still determine U.S. policies towards the Middle East.

The insistence of the U.S. on complete Israel withdrawal from Sinai in 1956 was not due to U.S. respect for Arab power or fear of Arab reaction. It was clear that the U.S. insisted on complete Israeli withdrawal fearing a Russian intervention. This also shows the way the U.S. thought of its role in the Middle East and the elements that determine its role and operations in the Middle East. In other words, it was the Soviet Union's threats and moves that led to the U.S. insistence on the Israeli withdrawal. This means that the U.S. deals with the Middle East as a plain for struggle with the Soviet Union and not as a region with independent states that have their own interests, needs, and demands. This also means that the demands of the governments and countries of the Middle East are not going to be recognized and respected by the U.S. unless these demands receive Soviet approval or sense of urgency.<sup>1</sup>

An almost similar incident happened 17 years later. In 1973 the U.S. and the Soviet Union almost clashed over the Middle East. It was due to Soviet pressures that the U.S. insisted on Israel's acceptance of the ceasefire with Egypt and Syria. Both countries, the U.S. and the Soviet Union escalated their military and nuclear preparedness to a full mobilization stage. But it was this urgency that prompted the U.S. to pressure Israel to accept the ceasefire.

The conclusion that I want to get from these examples is that it needs and takes a Soviet counter balance to affect U.S. actions. This role of the Soviet Union, as I

want to argue in the next chapter, is almost absent now because of many important reasons. Nevertheless, it is still important that the Soviet Union remains in the Middle East.

The U.S. entered the Middle East long before the 1953 Iranian crisis but not as a power that has interests that opposes the interests of the individual countries and their governments. The most dramatic and consequential event was when the U.S. recognized the state of Israel in 1948.<sup>2</sup>

The direction of U.S. interests and operations were always affected by its cold war policies and in many cases by regional events. The recognition of the State of Israel in 1948 was the first U.S. step into effecting and directing the conflict. Other actions were to influence the belief that the U.S. is ever present in the Middle East and is always needed. The 1956 intervention in Egypt, the 1958 intervention in Lebanon, the 1967 support of Israel, the 1970 posture in Jordan, etc... are examples of this need and presence.

These actions were stimulated in almost all the cases by inter-regional events and not by U.S.-Soviet rivalry. Soviet interests, however, were always present in the American mind when these events happened. The U.S. always thought of how the Soviet Union could benefit from these events and these fears determined the way, intensity, and promptness of U.S. intervention. In other words, there is a strong correlation between the U.S. fears of the Soviet presence and the degree, volume, and speed of U.S.

interventions. the 1983-1984 U.S. intervention in Lebanon is just one example of this relationship.

U.S. interests in the region which range, as indicated above, between securing the flow of mineral resources especially oil, geographical location with the availability of military basis, the exclusion of the Soviet Union, and the stability of the region are going to continue to determine the U.S. role and operations in the region. U.S. interests now determine the way it responds to problems and conflicts in the region. As mentioned above, its these interests and the degree and intensity of Soviet actions that may lead to any significant change in U.S. policies .

This U.S. intervention was not without losses and problems. Not only did this intervention alienate many Arab governments and rulers which led to further attacks on U.S. interests in the region, it also led to direct U.S. intervention at times and to losses in life and property. The events of the Iranian revolution and the attacks on U.S. embassy and marines in Lebanon and other countries of the Middle East are just a part of the side effects of U.S. intervention. This trend of attacking U.S. interests in the region will continue as long as the problems that led to this intervention exist. This is not a slogan, it is a fact of the region's and the conflict's existence.

We should keep this in mind since many of the Arab rulers and governments think that there are internal American (vs. regional) reasons that determine the U.S. role

in the region. This aspect, the internal American reasons for intervention will be examined in the next section.

To summarize the arguments and the ideas presented in this part, we can see that the U.S. entered the Middle East theater between the two World Wars and it established its strong and influential role as a result of the weakness and expulsion of the French and the British in the late 1940s. Since then, the U.S. became the most influential country in the region. It continues to influence the outcomes of most conflicts and determines the results of any regional dispute. This role is influenced in turn by two major themes; one is the perceived Soviet threats and interventions; second, genuine U.S. interests. These interests include among other things, the survival and strengthening of the state of Israel.

#### 2-Arab and Palestinian Views on the United States Role:

In this part of the chapter the way the Arabs perceive the U.S. role will be considered and examined. This part will show why and how the Arabs think the U.S. should interfere to solve the conflict. The first aspect is that the U.S. should interfere on the side of the Arabs because the U.S. is the leader of the "Free World", it has many common interests with the Arabs and in the Arab World, and most importantly, the U.S. is the only country that can force Israel to withdraw. This aspect will be examined here.

First I will list the reasons that the Arabs think that

the U.S. should interfere on their side. Second, I will explain how the Arabs think that the U.S. can achieve Israeli withdrawal. Israeli withdrawal, therefore, is the the goal and the means for better U.S.-Arab relations. These themes are present in every major deal with the U.S.

1-The Arabs' View of Why the U.S. should Interfere on their Side:

The relations between the Arabs and the United States went through 3 stages since the emergence of the U.S. as the strongest country in the world. Their views of the United States' role in solving the Middle East conflict was also colored by these stages. In fact it was the interaction concerning the conflict that colored the Arabs-American relations. The three stages are clear from the expectations of the Arabs of an American intervention to their side. Their announcements and interactions are the best indicators of the stage of the relationship. The first stage was the stage of support, respect and willingness to approve of, accept, and follow any American decision. This lasted from the first U.S. relations with the Middle East until 1967 when the U.S. supported the Israeli occupation of the Arab lands.

The Arabs never had any bad experiences with the U.S. in this stage. In fact their first contacts with the U.S. were positive; the U.S. ability to force Israel out of Sinai in 1956-1957; its ability to constrain England and France in the same year, and its will to cooperate with the Arabs

still have their impact on the attitude of many Arabs, public and official.

The Arabs always believed that the U.S. can help in solving all of their problems; economic, technological, and political. In fact, the Arabs thought of the U.S. as the saviour from British and French colonialism. Some of them now think the U.S. helps in counterbalancing the existence of the Soviet Union , as does Saudi Arabia and Sadat after 1974. Even Qadafi, who is now America's enemy number one in the Middle East, indicated in his writings that the U.S. was a great nation because it developed itself on its own from its own power and resources. It did not colonize other countries to become powerful and great like England and France.

Many Arabs think of the U.S. as a country that they should do anything to please. The behavior of the Saudies, especially clarifies this point. The Saudies are willing to do almost anything to please the U.S. not only because they expect something in exchange (protection and security)<sup>3</sup> but also because they never had any major problems with the U.S. and because of an emotional attachment to the West<sup>4</sup>

The Arabs feel that they can depend on the U.S., that the U.S. can and in fact should hear their side of the story and help them in achieving their goals. Sadat was willing to throw out the Soviet Union on the assumption that the U.S. will come and help.

The U.S. did help the friendly and moderate Arabs who did what she expected them to do. The U.S. wanted their support, oil, and prevention of the Russians from entering to the region. many of them have done this, and in exchange they received support and protection. It gave them Israeli withdrawal from Sinai which non or all of them were capable of getting done. The U.S. did this, of course, not to please the Arabs but to protect its interests in the Middle East.<sup>5</sup>

Therefore, it was this fear of the loss of the Middle East that led president Eisenhower to approve the sending of a message to Ben Gurion demanding "prompt and unconditional" withdrawal.<sup>6</sup>

During this period also, the Arabs witnessed a more serious U.S. complicity with Israel. The U.S. informed Egypt just before the 1967 war that they will make sure that Israel will not attack before the meeting between president Johnson and the Egyptian minister to solve the conflict. During this "waiting period" the Israelis attacked with U.S. knowledge and support.<sup>7</sup> U.S. participation in this war was clear. The U.S. used its "Liberty" to monitor Egyptian communications and it relied them to the Israelis.<sup>8</sup>

It was partly this knowledge of U.S. complicity with Israel and the crushing Arab defeat in 1967 that introduced the second stage. After 1967, the Arabs resented the U.S. and lost most of their respect for it.

The second stage was between 1967 and 1973 when the

U.S. carried out an around the-clock re-armament of Israel during the October War. During this war the Arabs were , for the first time, united in their view of the U.S. \*\*comlicity with Israel against them. Even the Saudies mounted their oil embargo against the U.S. and any country that supported Israel. This stage was the only stage, as mentioned above, in which the Arabs had a common view of the U.S. role . Even Saudi Arabia who "is able to tolerate a breach with the U.S. only for a short period of time<sup>9</sup> , and participated in these views since as Golub correctly noticed that during a crisis, the Arab countries will have to show hostile attitudes against the U.S.<sup>10</sup>

The first response of some of the Arab countries after the 1967 defeat was to sever political and diplomatic relations with the U.S. Iraq and Syria were the first to do this . It was their way of rejecting the U.S. and its role in any future negotiations. This happened to prove ineffective as later events led both of them to restore these relations on the assumption that only when they can talk and deal directly with the U.S. can they affect its policies in the region and also as a result of the reluctance of the Soviet Union to fully and powerfully support the Arabs.

The Arabs started to think of the reasons that make the U.S. support Israel especially after it became clear that the U.S. is unwilling and incapable to make Israel withdraw from the occupied territories as happened in 1956. The Arabs

hoped that the U.S. will help them by forcing Israel to withdraw. They also feared that without the U.S., who supported Israel completely, they will not be able to do anything on their own.<sup>11</sup> This hope and fear colored the Arabs' responses and relations with the U.S. during this stage. These hopes and fears explain the weak but serious complaints from the Arabs.

The U.S. tried to help the Arabs in 196970 when it issued the Rogers Plan which declared that Israel should withdraw from "occupied Arab lands in exchange for peace and recognition."<sup>12</sup>

During this period also, some Arab countries became aware of the fact that the U.S.-Israeli relations are more solid and strong to be weakened or manipulated. This led some of them, especially Libya, Syria, the PLO, and Iraq to carry out policies that consider the U.S. to be a participant in the attack on them.

This view was reinforced at the start of the 1973 war when the U.S. openly and aggressively supported Israel and put its nuclear force on alert. This was the beginning of the third stage.

The third stage, in which the Arabs returned to their differences of the way they should accept U.S. intervention, was from 1973 to the present. This stage represents a more realistic view. The Arabs came to recognize that the U.S. has interests in the Middle East and that it is going to

13

support Israel to the end. The best way to deal with the U.S., many of the Arabs thought, is by "winning America's heart" and by dealing with it on mutual basis. They thought a fair deal with the U.S. would be to trade basis, political and financial support, oil, and recognition of its power and role for U.S. understanding of the Arab view of the conflict, support in solving the conflict and technological and political help.

The major characteristics of this stage is the emergence of a rational dialogue between the Arabs and the U.S. The Arabs understood the U.S. commitments to Israel and started thinking of ways to counter these commitments and improve their relations with the U.S. by showing their understanding of U.S. commitments and interests. This was partly due to the weakness of Pan Arabism and to the realization that to fight Israel means to fight the U.S. as did Sadat and even Nasser before him concluded.

This realization of the strong connection between the U.S. and Israel led many Arabs to think of ways to attract American interests the way the U.S. is interested in Israel. Of course this failed for many reasons. One of them is the U.S. belief that the Arab regimes are insecure and unstable. (see chapter 4). This was due to deliberate Israeli designs.

15

It is also clear that Israel is still acting on the belief that she "must prevent American-Arab communication that does not take into consideration Israel's positions and

interests."<sup>16</sup> These interests include preventing arms sales to the Arabs, recognition of the PLO etc...

In this stage the Arabs started questioning the nature of the political system of the U.S. They also continued to believe that it is only the U.S. that can solve their problem, Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories. At the same time the rest of Palestine was ignored and never mentioned as if the problem now is only the territories occupied in the 1967 war.<sup>17</sup>

Rational and business-like attitudes and plans became numerous in explaining how the Arabs should deal with the U.S. Examples of this "debate" came from all sides and all ideological and political parties and organizations including the PLO, Syria, and of course, the Egyptians and the Saudis. Rationals like Mehdi's became acceptable.<sup>18</sup>

Another aspect of this new relationship was the new and strong emphasis on the use of Arab oil and money to change internal political policies in the U.S. itself. Mehdi also goes into details drawing how the Arabs can do this.<sup>19</sup> He also declares that "the Arabs' economic and political power should be used totally in the interest of regaining Arab rights in Palestine."<sup>20</sup>

These rationals led many Arabs to believe that they can change American policies towards the Arabs. To the question of whether the U.S. could be separated from Israel, Mehdi answers with a positive "'yes' America is an open

society."<sup>21</sup> The truth is that Mehdi is overestimating the possibilities of the use of Arab political and economic power as will be shown later in this chapter. But it is important to note that there is a strong belief now that the U.S. policies can be changed. The belief that the U.S. may change its policies is also clear in an article by Leibowitz. He states that "There is always the possibility<sup>22</sup> that the U.S. may pressure Israel by cutting back aid."

Further developments in the Arabs views about the U.S. role have occurred especially after Camp David, where the U.S. supported Egypt's positions in the negotiation. These views, however, were shattered by the complicity of the U.S. with Israel in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.<sup>23</sup> The Arabs knew that the U.S. did give the "go ahead" light to Israel to carry<sup>24</sup> out their invasion.

In their search for a way to effect the U.S. policies, the Arabs came up with many ways they think they could use to achieve that goal. The aim of this change is still the separation between the U.S. and Israel to achieve the ultimate goal of having the U.S. make Israel withdraw from the Arab lands occupied in 1967. In short the goal is the returning of the occupied lands to the Arabs.

One of the assumptions that the Arabs have about the U.S. political system is that it is open and that congress and senate are available for their constituency of responses and directions. They are there to serve their constituency.

Another assumption is that these representatives are the ones who make the laws and they can determine what the executive branch can or can not do. These representatives, the Arabs continue, need finances to be able to run for office and win. This money must come from the state and the public who support them. They also assume that these representatives determine the U.S. policy on every aspect of the U.S.' relations with the world.

To the Arabs, then, it is very simple to control or at least effect U.S. policies. Their argument goes like this: If we can affect the American public by appealing to their dignity and sense of responsibility and justice, these people will then elect representatives who will support the Palestinians because they have a just and legitimate cause. These representatives will make laws that prevent the U.S. government from helping the aggressive Israel and will support the return of the Arab occupied territories. After this the Palestinians can establish their independent state on the lands that Israel withdrew from and the conflict will be easily and peacefully solved.

That's why we see someone like Edward Said, who knows the American public and the political system, writing in the introduction to his famous book that the American public does not really know what is going on and that the facts should be presented with them.<sup>25</sup>

This feeling of the Arabs' ability to effect changes in

U.S. policies grew also because of the strengthening of the Arabs' economic and political power. The Arabs started thinking seriously about using their economic and political power to achieve that goal. The use of the oil weapon in 1973 taught the Arabs that they can do that and succeed. The Arabs know that the U.S. wants their trade and markets. According to Koppel; "The U.S. wants very much to sell almost \$2 billion worth of weapons to Jordan"<sup>26</sup>

The Arabs also realized, as indicated in the third stage, that the U.S. has interests in the region and that for the U.S. to protect and keep these interests it has to reciprocate by considering Arab interests. If the American interests are to be fulfilled, then the U.S. must fulfill Arab Interests.

To achieve this change in American policies, the Arabs are supposed to use all their economic, political, and even military means. They started giving the U.S. basis in Egypt and Oman, which the U.S. used in its unsuccessful attack to release the American hostages in Tehran, they agreed to U.S. demands on oil prices especially the latest in 1986, all this on the expectation that the U.S. will pressure Israel to withdraw.

This "system" of influencing American policy will work effectively if the assumptions were correct. They sound very correct but there are some aspects of the "system" that works only in theory and not in practice. Therefore, there are some faulty assumptions in the Arab logic of how the

American system works.

1-The American people are not interested in international politics and are least interested in foreign policy. It is true that they are willing to pressure their representatives on domestic and local issues but they really do not care about what happens to the Afghannies, Palestinians, or Nicaraguan. This fact was captured by many Arabs especially Ibrahim.<sup>27</sup>

This lack of interest to the level of apathy is clear among the American public. Important international issues do not directly affect the Americans. They will react only if these issues become to threaten their immediate day-to-day lives. This shows that one of the Arabs' basic assumptions is precluded by the nature of the American public. This eliminates the basis for the rest of the Arabs' argument.

2-The power elite is the main and exclusive actor that influences all decisions concerning foreign policy in the U.S.<sup>28</sup> This means that the people who have interests in maintaining the conflict are the people who make the decisions or influence them and not the American public.

This argument about the foreign policy decision-making bodies is valid not only because of the nature of the political system of the U.S.<sup>29</sup> but also because of the past experiences and events that shaped American foreign policy in general. The government as such, as Neumann, a former U.S. ambassador, reports in an interview,<sup>30</sup> does not have a policy.

Neumann also makes it clear in the same interview that the role and influence of what he calls "the pro-Israel groups" are very strong and effective in shaping U.S. policies on the conflict. Findley, a former Republican congressman from Illinois, also maintains that these "forces" have "friends in every office of any important Capitol Hill as well as elsewhere in government especially in the executive Branch."<sup>31</sup> It could hardly be put in any other less dramatic way, but it is true, as Assad also noted,<sup>32</sup> that in the region, Israel "makes" U.S. foreign policy.

We see then that the theoretical logic that the Arabs follow in achieving their goal for changing U.S. policies on the Middle East does not happen in reality the way they think or wish it would happen. The connection they assume between the public and their representatives, and the connection between the representatives and the actual policy-makers does not exist at least on foreign issues. It is the American governmental and political system that allows such a gap.<sup>33</sup>

Therefore, the Arab and Palestinian logic to carry out "educational activities"<sup>34</sup> or to "put before the American reader"<sup>35</sup> the truth of the just cause of the Palestinians does not really work since it does not reach the offices or ears it was supposed to reach.

Neither resolutions of associating Zionism with racism

nor massacres that are supposed to influence the public's decisions will reach the offices of the people who make or allow the making of such decisions about the Middle East.

Assad and Arafat, as was clear from their statements, were able to identify this issue although in a negative way.<sup>36</sup>

Thinking that the American public really cares or is interested in foreign affairs and morality and justice, Arafat questioned "How can the American public allow their government to accept only the second half of the (181) UN Resolution and refuse the rest of it."<sup>37</sup> This leads us to conclude that the American people do not know about the real situation<sup>38</sup> or if they do they do not care<sup>39</sup> and even if they care their voices and attitudes are either not heard or considered by their government.<sup>40</sup> All there interest is directed to domestic and local interests and issues, if there is any at all.

From all of this we can reach the following conclusions about the way the Arabs and the Palestinian view American foreign policies concerning the Middle East.

First, the Arabs' view of the U.S. role went through three stages until it reached this stage of accepting the U.S. interests and existence in the region. The Arabs started to deal with the U.S. on the basis of mutual interest and started to match their interests with those of the U.S. to bring about a solution to the conflict.

Second, the Arabs are now aware that the U.S. is not a neutral "peace broker" in the conflict. While Argentina dismissed any U.S. participation in solving its conflict with England during the Falklands War because they realized that the U.S. is not neutral, the Arabs, on the other hand got more attached to the U.S. which automatically undermined their efforts. If the U.S. can get all it wants from the Arabs and at the same time maintain its policies, why should it change them because the Arabs demand so without exerting any pressures? This leads us to the second fact or conclusion.

Third, the Arabs need the United States much more than the United States needs them. The survival of some Arab regimes is maintained by the U.S. of its "agent", Israel.<sup>41</sup> The Arabs also believe that it is only the U.S. that can pressure Israel to withdraw which leads most of them to need it more than ever before to help them achieve that goal.

Knowing that they cannot fight Israel and that they have to confront America if they do, they decided that they rather keep America on their side trying to "work from within" by continuing their communications and by not antagonizing the U.S. by continuing "talking" with her. This also failed as the events have shown so far. The prospects of this tactic, working from within and trying to persuade the U.S. from supporting Israel wastes the Arabs time, efforts, money, and respect.

The fourth conclusion is that the U.S. is not really interested in solving the conflict. The Arabs do not present their case so urgently and with with credible conditions to make the U.S. take them and their condition seriously. The United States is not interested in solving the conflict because, among other things, her interests are not being threatened. They receive their oil, they pay the prices that they want,<sup>42</sup> they maintain their basis. Why would the U.S. need to change its policies?

The tactics that the Arabs think of using are theoretically sound but practically false and meaningless. The gap between the governed and the rulers, even in the U.S., is so wide that could not be bridged when it comes to foreign policy.

Other than the disinterest and apathy of the people, the system is handicapped in the face of very well organized interest groups who have a great influence on the foreign policy of the U.S.

The fifth fourth conclusion is that the major goal of the Arabs and Palestinians actions is to have the U.S. use its power to pressure Israel to withdraw as if the U.S. is capable or willing to do that. This last point will be examined carefully in the third part of this chapter.

The main conclusion of this part is that the methods that the Arabs use to change U.S. policies on the Middle East to pressure Israel to withdraw from the occupied Arab lands are unworkable because of several internal and

institutional reasons within the U.S. itself and because of the weakness of the Arabs themselves.

### 3-The Israeli View of the United States Role:

In this part of the chapter, the reasons and the ways Israel perceive and want the U.S. to act in the Middle East conflict will be examined. The first section will deal with why Israel needed U.S. help and support. The second section will examine the regional and international events that led to the solidifying of the common interests of the two countries. This section will also include an examination of the methods that Israel used to achieve and succeed in securing the United States' help and support. The Third section will examine the way Israel perceives the U.S. role in the region. The last section will try to project the future of this "unique " relationship.

The U.S. was one of the first countries in the world to recognize Israel when it was established. Before that the U.S. was one of the major influential countries to lobby for the partition plan of 1947. The future events brought these two countries very close together for many reasons, the most important of which is the compatibility of interests on the regional and international spheres. There are some analysts who disagree with this assessment and claim that the U.S.-Israeli relations are built on "cultural, geographic, and moral values and basis" rather than strategic interests.<sup>43</sup>

In no place were cultural and ideological defined in the

text that included the argument.

The United States' relation with Israel started officially at the times of the Jewish Agency when they tried to gain U.S. support for the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. This relation continued through this stage until the time when the question of Palestine was brought into the UN after England's withdrawal from Palestine. The way the U.S. acted since then will be examined in the next part of this chapter.

In the first section of this part of the chapter I will examine and analyze the reasons that made Israel need and seek U.S. help and support. It will be argued here that Israel sought U.S. help to undermine any British counter balance in supporting the Arabs since England was still in Egypt and in Jordan. The Israelis believe that they decolonized Palestine from the British and therefore, they needed some protection by becoming close to the U.S. It is part of Israel's strategy to "cling" to a superpower, in this case the U.S.

Another reason is that the U.S. itself was interested in taking over any British colonies to prevent the Russians from filling in these "vacuum" places. The Americans found an opportunity in supporting Israel and in having a foothold in the region. Their major goals were, as mentioned above, to prevent Soviet advances into the region and to secure its regional alliances and resources especially oil and basis.

The developments of the region during the fifties and the sixties and especially the growth of Pan Arabism and nationalism in these countries started threartning U.S. interests. Nasser's and Karim's ascending to power in Egypt and Iraq respectively proved to the U.S. that its peaceful existence in, use, and exploitation of the Arab World is not going to continue to be unthreatened after Nasser's refusal and opposition to form the Pact with the pro-American regimes in the region.

The Aswan dam negotiations and the events thereafter proved to the U.S. that they need to get rid Nasser since he was leading the wave of Arab nationalism against the U.S. in the Middle East. This major issue even strengthened the growing Israeli-American relations. This was the major common interest both of them had as will be shown in the next section. Therefore, it was these interests that brought the two countries closer.

In this section I will examine the methods Israel used to secure U.S. help, support and commitment to have its way in the Middle East. Though it was U.S. interests that brought the U.S. into the region, Israel presented itself as the defender and promoter of these interests. The way Israel presented its "services" to the U.S. changed the nature of the relationship from two different parties seeking similar interests into partners getting and sharing these interests together.

One of the reasons that made England "create" Israel was that England needed a reason to maintain its presence in the region. This need was taken and accepted by the U.S. The existence of Israel made this goal easier to achieve. Israel itself worked hard to present this goal and its achievability. Israel did this by exaggerating the revolutionary tendencies of the Arab countries.<sup>44</sup> It also amplified the "threats of Arab Nationalism" to the free world and the West.<sup>45</sup>

This section will examine the regional and international events that strengthened the U.S.-Israeli relations. It will also examine the methods that Israel used to attract the U.S. in participating and sharing its interests with Israel.

The major assumptions are that Israel realized that it needed the U.S. Events in the region, sometimes created and planned by Israel, provided enough reasons for U.S. interference and presence in the Middle East which eventually led to the establishment of a systematic and common interest for both of them to support each other. The Most important events were:

1-The ascendance to power of very popular and charismatic nationalist leaders in major Arab countries like Egypt, Syria and Iraq. these leaders started advocating nationalist ideologies that resented colonialism, imperialism and any form of external domination and exploitation. This emergence

threatened the colonial imperial powers interests in the region and prompted plans from these powers to end the rule of these leaders and their governments.<sup>46</sup>

These actions, in fact, led to the increased popularity of the leaders and further strengthened their stands against the external colonial and imperial powers. Nasser's stand against the Americans, for example, was strengthened very much by the later's desire to put strong conditions.

The connection between these external powers' threats and the Israeli participation led to the recognition of Israel as part of, or tool for, these powers. The 1956 attack on Egypt was a typical example. The United States' strong response in 1956 was the best indicator of U.S. power and control over the whole world. Israel, England, and France responded positively to the American demands. It never happened again. It is true that the U.S. did not send or sell arms to Israel, but it did in authorize France in late 1956 to sell Israel Mirage planes earmarked for NATO.<sup>47</sup>

Therefore, Blitzer's indication in that the U.S. had an embargo on arms sale to Israel<sup>48</sup> is incorrect since the U.S. allowed other NATO allies to supply Israel with those arms. In fact this is a trend that U.S. governments have followed. Since it is hard for the U.S. to sell arms to countries because of congressional restrictions, the U.S. permits other friends to do this for it. Israel later became one of these states that the U.S. uses for conducting such

"operations" and "services."

The reasons for the U.S. "positive" <sup>49</sup> actions, i.e. forcing Israel to withdraw from Sinai, in 1956-1957, which, according to George Ball "the present U.S. policy in the Middle East should emulate" <sup>50</sup> were partly due to Russian demands and threats to interfere. The U.S., at the same time, thought it will "look good" in the eyes of the Arabs whom she helped, <sup>51</sup> Which eventually happened. But later American demands and conditions to finance the Aswan Dam put the Americans in the same position that England, France, and Israel were in when the U.S. intervened. This event strained the Egyptian-American relations, and because of Nasser's popularity all over the Arab world, it restrained <sup>52</sup> general Arab-American relations.

2-The second major event was the participation in the creation of the Non-Alligned Nations where Egypt was an establishing member and the results of the conference, i.e., the Egyptian-Russian arms deal.

Knowing the United States' reservations about the entrance of the Russians into the Middle East, the U.S. resented this move by Nasser and started thinking of a way to stop this from happening or continuing. The two countries, Israel and America, among many others, did not want to see this happen and established and reinforced one of their common interest, the prevention of the Soviet Union from entering or interfering in the Middle East.

This Egyptian-Russian deal and the "betrayal of the West" by Egypt represented the needed incident for the U.S. to give Israel the "free hand" to deal with Egypt. As the diary of the then Israeli Prime Minister Shareet indicates <sup>53</sup>

3-The third was the Egyptian support of the Algerian revolution against France. Although this event had little to do with the U.S., except in its relation with France, France and Israel were having a common interest in stopping Nasser from becoming the leader of the Arab World and this led France to strongly support Israel. This French response was matched by Ben-Gurion's fear that Nasser might lead the Arabs and make them a strong nation as did the prophet <sup>54</sup> Mohammad in the Seventh century.

France was the country that helped Israel establish its nuclear industry and supported her with the most advanced weapons until 1967. This shows that Israel will help and support any country that have a similar interest and that Israel is willing to carry out operation with and for other those countries where these countries may lend Israel any help and support it needed. This is also true of the U.S. Israel would have done all the U.S. needed as long as the U.S. helped and supported Israel with the required financial, economic, diplomatic and , of course, military support.

4-The fourth major event was the Egyptian-Syrian union agreement that lasted from 1958-1961. This union of two

bordering and nationalist countries threatened Israel's and U.S. interests. This union threatened to increase the power of the new country against Israel. The geographical location of this union, north and south of Israel endangered it especially since these countries were outspoken against Israel; threatening to invade it and liberate Palestine that Israel occupied with the help of the colonial European powers.

The strengthening of Egypt, by adding Syria to it, also threatened some Arab pro-American countries. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and , at that time Iraq, were strongly against any strengthening of Egypt and Syria especially if we remember how strong the Arab public support in these countries for the union was.<sup>55</sup>

5-The fifth event was Israel's operations to divert the Jordan River's waters and the series of events that followed up including the 1967 War.

The Arabs refused to allow Israel to use the Jordan River waters. By this the Arabs antagonized Israel. Israel thought that it has the right to use the Jordan River's waters. The Arabs insistence on rejecting Israel's rights to the waters, and their creation of a fund to build their own system for water exploitation of the same river led to the escalation of tensions on the borders between Israel and the Arab countries especially Syria. This escalation, and internal Arab rivalries<sup>56</sup> led, eventually, to the closing of

straights of Tiran, Israel's only entrance to the Red Sea, by Egypt antagonized Israel even more.

The withdrawal of the UN forces from Sinai under Egyptian demands and threats and the failure of the diplomatic and political negotiations to prevent the war led to the losses of the Arab lands in 1967 that became the focus of Arab international and regional political and military activities that produced nothing.

6-The complicity of and/or the inability of the U.S. to control Israel in 1967 led to the Six-day War. President Johnson was expected to discuss the Egyptian closing of the straights with the Egyptian envoy on the June 9. Israel attacked on June 5th. This "arrangement" led many leaders and analysts to draw the connection between the United States' willingness and promises to Egypt not to allow Israel to carry out any military actions until after the meeting and the Israeli attack just 4 days before.<sup>57</sup>

If the U.S. could not restrain Israel in June, 1967 then we can conclude that the U.S. was either unable to control Israel, or that the U.S. was able to control Israel but did not. Given its promises to Egypt, the U.S. will be identified with Israel. Whichever the reason that resulted in the attack, and I give more weight to the first -knowing Israel's strategic goals.

7-The last event that I want to mention here is the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the rejection of the U.S. to recognize the PLO. The U.S. policy in regard to the Israeli

invasion was a typical U.S. Middle Eastern policy were Israel decides and controls instead of the U.S. The U.S. then comes to cover for Israel and to claim, as president Reagan himself did, that "... today has been a day that should make us proud". This day "marked the end of the successful evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Beirut, Lebanon"<sup>58</sup>. I really do not know what interest does the U.S. have in evacuating the PLO fighters from Lebanon. I do not see any U.S. interests threatened directly by the existence of the PLO in Lebanon.

With all the available literature about the U.S. complicity before and during the invasion of Lebanon, one needs say very little<sup>59</sup>

In regard to the U.S. recognition of the PLO, it is well known that Kissinger, in 1975 was the mastermind of the U.S. guarantee to Israel who wanted to protect Israel and assure her of the fact that the U.S. will not recognize the PLO until the PLO renounced violence and accepted Security Council Resolution 242 and 338. This "understanding" continued since then. These conditions , i.e. renouncing violence and accepting 242 are Israeli demands that the U.S. took it on herself to put the same demands and conditions that Israel does.

These common interests continued and will continue. One of the thesis here is that at later stages the United States' interests in the Middle East were supplanted, when

it came to the direct Arab-Israeli conflict, by those of Israel's. In other words, the Israeli interests in the Middle East took precedence in U.S. Middle Eastern policies before those of the United States' themselves.<sup>60</sup>

A more recent account of how Israel did "damage" American national interests in the Middle East and how Israel "dictate" American policy in the region came from George Ball.<sup>61</sup>

As a conclusion to this section, we can see that if we look closely at the American demands and conditions we find that they are also Israeli demands and conditions. The U.S. demands that "it is clearly on the public record that the PLO has accepted resolution 242 and 338, is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel, and has renounced terrorism "for the U.S. to "accept the fact that an invitation will be extended to the PLO to attend an international conference."<sup>62</sup> The other American requirement " is also an Israeli one that there should be only one state east of Israel, and not two. It is now accepted as a doctrine in both the U.S. and Israel that there should be only one state."<sup>63</sup>

We see then as Assad did that "there is no American policy in the Middle East; instead, there is an Israeli policy carried out by the U.S."<sup>64</sup>

To go back, then, to how Israel views the U.S. role in the Middle East we will find that the main Israeli demand is that the U.S. supports Israeli policies and does not

pressure Israel into doing things that threaten, according to Israeli measures and standards, its security.

First, Israel wants U.S. help and support of its policies and demands. These demands are always colored with false security issues and the U.S. responds favorably to strengthen Israel on the assumption that if the Israel felt that it was strong enough it will withdraw. Jackson, the Democratic candidate believed that "Israeli security is important."<sup>65</sup> Others had the same view.<sup>66</sup>

Kissinger himself gives the best example of how Israel uses its security "problem" to achieve U.S. arms and support. He related that " I ask Rabin to make concessions, and he says he can't because Israel is weak. So, I give him more arms and he says he can't because Israel is weak. So I gave him more arms and he says he doesn't need to make concessions because Israel is strong."<sup>67</sup>

Israel also wants a United States that approves of all of its policies regardless of the United States' own interests in the region or in the world. The U.S. must, it seems, sacrifice its interests with the Arabs to satisfy Israel. This attitude is clear in the way Israel expects the U.S. to respond when it deals with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The quote that was used from ABC's Nightline in October 1985, is a very indicative one. Koppel asked Peres if he would allow "the sale of \$2 billion worth of U.S. arms to Jordan" This does not only show that Israel determines

U.S. policy in the Middle East, the way the question was phrased shows how the U.S. sees and perceives this determination, which is more important than Peres' answer.

Second, Israel wants to prevent any American-Arab understanding and communication. In fact, Israel wants to prevent any Arab communication with the rest of the world, especially the West, if it can.

If Israel succeeds in preventing Arab-Western communication, it would dominate the Western sphere and impose its own views and policies. It succeeded in doing this in the U.S. but it did that to a lesser degree in Europe. This Israeli goal is true since the establishment of the state. Other examples of this "old" Israeli strategy is quoted from the diary of the Israeli Prime Minister.<sup>69</sup>

The U.S. gains a lot from the existence and actions of Israel. These short term gains determine the immediate U.S. attitudes and responses to the conflict in the Middle East. The way the U.S. perceives and deals with the situation will be examined in the next section.

Depending on the information that was presented above, we can conclude that Israel has succeeded in making the U.S. "work" for it and that it has been capable to resist any U.S. pressures as we shall see in the next section. At the same time the United States is satisfied with Israel's "services". This is the kind of relationship and mutual interests that are important and these are what should worry the Arabs.

We see then that the the U.S.-Israeli relation stemmed from common regional and international interests that developed in later stages to Israeli policies and conditions that were accepted and acted upon by the U.S. as if they were genuine U.S. interests and demands. Israel, in other words, succeeded in transforming its conditions into those of the U.S. It was successful to the degree that during the negotiations with the PLO in 1982 Habib was instructed to present the Israeli demands as the official American demands.<sup>70</sup>

Even Kissinger himself "advocated the rejectionist position: a "greater Israel" should refuse any accomodation, and should maintain control over the occupied territories."<sup>71</sup>

The U.S. now acts as if it has real and legitimate national interests in what Israel wants and needs. The U.S., as mentioned above, does have some gains from Israel's existence and actions, but these gains should not supplant U.S. legitimate and authentic interests. The United States' blind support for Israel's demands shows that the U.S. is either controlled by Israel or that its interests do really match and are identical with those of Israel.<sup>72</sup>

#### 4-American Inability and Unwillingness:

The aim of this section is to examine whether the U.S. is willing, interested and/or capable to confront Israel and pressure it to withdraw and solve the conflict. The argument here is that because many internal American reasons and

international situations and for reasons from inside Israel itself, the U.S. is unable, unwilling and disinterested in pressuring Israel to withdraw. Therefore, It will be argued, that the Arabs and the Palestinians must stop looking to the U.S. to solve their problems for them. This section will show why and how the U.S. cannot solve their problems.

#### Unwillingness and Disinterest:

The elements in the American position that will be examined here are the disinterest and unwillingness of the U.S. to pressure Israel to withdraw. Another is that the United States cannot -because of internal pressures on the U.S. governments and the relative Israeli independence- pressure Israel

One of the major attributes of U.S. policy regarding the conflict in the Middle East is that it does not have an approach to solve the conflict.<sup>73</sup> The second is that it is not really pressured enough by the Arabs or the circumstances to solve it. In other words, The Arabs and the Palestinians have not presented their case for the U.S. in an urgent, organized, systematic and in pressing a way to make the U.S. take the issue seriously enough to solve it. The lack of seriousness on the part of the U.S. government was also realized by other analysts.<sup>74</sup>

If we remind ourselves of the U.S. interests in the Middle East<sup>75</sup> we see that non of these interests was

threatened. If we exclude the enterence of the Soviet Union into the region, maintaining oil and the shipment of other resources' out of the Middle East and the use of the regions' markets have not been threatened. The Soviet presence does not really present any real threat to the U.S. or her interests in the region as we will see below.

This Soviet presence in Syria does not really constitute a threat. The Russians have learned that the U.S. can and does manipulate the Arab countries. Syria also does not believe that it can defeat Israel,<sup>76</sup> therefore, it is not going to initiate any military action which keeps the Soviet Union away from any possible confrontation with the U.S. In other words, Israel's projection of its power and its ability and willingness to use it when needed prevents the Syrians from even thinking of carrying out any military operations or support any Palestinian operations across the borders.

This automatically excludes any possible Soviet-American confrontation over the Middle East. This means that the U.S. interests are really protected. There is no real danger of the U.S. and the Soviet Union fighting over this issue especially if we keep in mind the American-Soviet understanding in 1972 . The two countries agreed not to confront each other over the Middle East and that they have to inform each other before of any escalation. This precludes any soviet involvement in the region which ensures the U.S. interests.

Knowing all this, what in the problems of the region is so urgent and pressing that will make the U.S. come to help and solve the conflict? Oil shipments and prices are controlled by the U.S. The Soviet Union has been weak in most of the Arab countries except Syria and South Yemen- and Israel is sure willing and capable of interfering when necessary. The Arabs are not threatening or marching to the White House demanding immediate Israeli withdrawal. Why would the U.S. then pressure Israel?

In fact, the Arabs themselves , as has been concluded in chapter three, are not interested in the Israeli withdrawal. They are satisfied with U.S. initiatives. Hudson realized this when he wrote that the president's Initiative "gives the 'moderate' Arabs something to hang on to for the time being, and in time the Arabs might offer more concessions for Israel."<sup>77</sup>

The Arabs are divided and have not decided what they themselves really want? Then, again, why would the U.S. pressure Israel to withdraw if the Arabs are not willing to do that? The situation is tolerable and "everything is going well", Why should the U.S. do that? Because of its fear for the Palestinians? We read what the president of the U.S. said on the day of the evacuation of the PLO from Beirut. He is proud for their evacuation! The United States' claim to protect and care for human rights, which could be the only thing that the U.S. could claim it wants to solve the

conflict for, is just a cover for U.S. support of the governments that do not respect human rights. It is well known that the U.S. supports governments who bluntly violate human rights.

We see then that there is no reason that urges the U.S. to solve the conflict. Not even the massacres of Sabra and Shatilla. Furthermore, the Arabs themselves are killing the Palestinians, why then should Israel be punished for this alone? Why antagonize Israel for the Arabs who themselves do the same things that they want the U.S. to punish Israel for? Illogical, to say the least.

Israel's dependence on the U.S., the Arabs think, gives the U.S. enough reason and power to pressure Israel. But they do not realize that although " The degree of dependency of Israel on the U.S. was, and is, much more significant than the later's dependency upon the former. ... yet U.S.-Israeli relations do not reflect this imbalance of dependency." <sup>78</sup>

In conclusion we see that the U.S. has no pressing or urgent need to do more than it does because of the division among the Arabs and most importantly because its interests are not threatened.

The other element of this relationship between the U.S. and Israel that will be examined here is the fact that the U.S. gains from the Israeli presence and actions. This means that the U.S. , in some ways and at some times, needs Israel and therefore, is not willing to jeopardize its relations

with it. The following section will examine how the U.S. needs Israel and how does this need give Israel a strong opportunity and leverage over the U.S.

There is a strong argument about Israel being a "strategic alley" for the U.S. or that Israel is a puppet of the U.S. In fact this extends sometimes to question who needs the other most. In Jerusalem some T-shirts have this message to the U.S.: " America don't Worry, Israel is behind you". We know why and how Israel needs the U.S., but Let's examine how and why the U.S. needs Israel .

## Why and how the U.S. Needs Israel:

The U.S.-Israeli relationship stemmed, among other things, from the Israeli need to have a superpower support and because 6 million Jews (more than the Jewish population of Israel itself!) live in the U.S. The U.S. on the other hand, needed a foothold in the region to protect its interests and to improve its image as a superpower.

The U.S. has certain interests in the region. Some of these interests are sometimes threatened because of the contradictions between these interests and the independence of the countries of the region. In other words, some of the U.S. needs and demands may contradict the needs, independence, and/or the security of these states. To solve this problem, the U.S., as a superpower that has global strategies and designs may find that the actions and demands of the rulers and governments of these countries interfere with its global designs. When this happens, the U.S. tries to dissuade these rulers from acting upon their needs and security. It either interferes directly, as happened in many cases before, or it interferes indirectly and lets another client to carry out the needed operations to fulfill its interests.<sup>79</sup>

The U.S. has done both. The events in Iran in 1953, Guatemala in 1954, Chile in 1975, to name just a few, are clear indicators to the extent that the U.S. may go to achieve its interests and support its clients. The U.S. always needed a state that is willing and capable of doing

its job for it especially with growing public U.S. awareness and resistance to direct U.S. intervention.<sup>80</sup> The last incident was not of this type. The U.S. itself attacked Libya to get rid of its leader!

In this design Israel has all requirements, adventurism, ability, willingness, common interests, and "security". From this point of view the U.S. needs Israel as much as, if not more than Israel does the U.S. Examples of this "type of relationship" between the two states are plenty. Israel is doing for the U.S. the things that the U.S. government is unable to do.

The Vietnam experience taught the Americans that the best policy their government should take is not to interfere directly and commit its troops into dangerous regions.<sup>81</sup>

Congress has put strict conditions on the areas and events that the U.S. president can commit American troops. It also put strong restriction on U.S. dealings and arms sales to countries that have a record of conflicts and behavior. These limits prompted the governments of the U.S. to find other countries that are ready to do these "dirty" jobs for her. It was Israel.

Israel can do all of these "jobs" for the U.S. for the price of U.S. support of their policies in the region and for a specific sum of money annually.<sup>82</sup> Israel, in fact succeeded in doing more than this. It started its own initiatives to reach its own goals that led to internal U.S.

troubles. One of the incidents is very recent, the Iran Arms Deal. The Israelis wanted to have the war continue between Iraq and Iran wishing that Iran will defeat Iraq and achieve some of its interests and goals, i.e. the weakening and defeat of Iraq. To do this Israel had to convince the U.S. to rearm Iran. It succeeded as usual. We see then how Israel could transform its own interests into those of the U.S. and convince the U.S. to act upon them. Some of the ways and incidents that the U.S. needed and used Israel's help will be listed and examined below:

1-The U.S. needs a strong reliable country in the Middle East to be a back up station for U.S. troops in case of any need to protect its allies and supplies. <sup>83</sup> Israel is there to serve U.S. interests in the region. The claim that Israel is part of the U.S. strategic, i.e. anti-Warsaw, design is concluded to be faulty. If NATO cannot protect Europe and the U.S., I do not believe that Israel <sup>84</sup> would.

We see then that Israel has a role within the U.S. global designs for the region and that Israel has been supported by the U.S. to achieve its goals. Israel had been "used" by the U.S. to do even more and the U.S., in turn, "works" to help Israel achieve its goals.

2-Another function that Israel performs for the U.S. is the supplying of arms and money for governments or groups that the U.S. cannot, because of the structure of its political system. Examples of this activity are plenty the last of

which, as we mentioned above, is the Iran-Contra connection operation. Israel wanted to help Iran defeat Iraq, the U.S. president wanted to send money and arms to the Contras against laws passed by the congress, Israel was willing to do the two jobs in one operation and it was able to "drag" the government of the U.S. into this with all the consequences. Israel is willing to do and is doing a job significant enough to make the United States policy-makers decide that Israel is "a strategic ally."<sup>85</sup>

The question, again, is why should the U.S. change its policy? The answer is that It does not have to of course, because there is no real pressure to do that. Israel is becoming more important and vital for America. It can sell arms, train armies, and carry out operations that no other country dares to do. Its role in south American , as elsewhere, is becoming determinant to the governments of those countries as was the U.S. 30 years ago. Israel is taking the U.S.' role as military supplier and trainer. The U.S., as mentioned above, needs and is willing to pay for this.

An example of the role Israel is playing in South America was clear from the response of "A government functionary [in South America who to stated that ] Sharon's visit was 'more positive' than Reagan's shortly before, since Sharon 'sold us arms' while Reagan only uttered platitudes, explaining that Congress was preventing him from doing more."<sup>86</sup>

3-Another function that Israel carries out is to support U.S. client governments in the region. The best example of this activity is the Israeli presence during the 1970 Civil War in Jordan that prevented the Syrians from helping the PLO to overthrow the Hashimite Regime. This role was assigned to Israel by the U.S. Without this "service" the U.S. would have had to either interfere itself with all the possible consequences, or have to let the Jordanian regime fall.

These Israeli "services" led to the confirmation of Israel's role and position of the thesis that Israel is a strategic ally that the U.S. could depend on.<sup>87</sup>

4-Another important function that Israel fulfills is the military intelligence-gathering and information collection. Israel had provided the U.S. with very important information about the capabilities and distribution of many Soviet weapons and radar systems. In 1970 Israel was able to capture a whole radar system and carry it into Israel from an Egyptian defense base in the Canal Zone. This was a very valuable "service" that helped the U.S. to plan its offensive weapons .

The U.S. does appreciate this help from Israel and many American strategists, it seems, think that what Israel gives them in intelligence reports and information is worth hundreds of times the money the U.S. gives Israel. An example of this recognition is Blitzer's account of the

view of some generals and commanders in the U.S. One of them, General Keegan told Blitzer that the intelligence they receive from Israel is worth 5 CIAs.<sup>88</sup>

Another estimation of the worth of Israel's "contributions" to the U.S. is calculated in Midstream.<sup>89</sup>

There are many "testimonies" and statements that indicate to the great and strong contributions of the Israeli military and intelligence services to the armies and intelligence of NATO . What is important here is that many important strategists and policy makers believe that this contribution is worth this U.S. backing of Israeli policies and conditions in the region. These policy makers and strategists decide the fate of nations in the Middle East.

5-The last function that will be examined here is the economic function that Israel performs for the U.S. industries especially the military industries. Auri Avneri, a Knesset member describes this function of Israel best.<sup>90</sup> This is true especially if we know that "Almost all the dollars stay in the United States. In effect, the U.S. treasury writes a check in Israel's name and gives it to the Israeli military attache in Washington. The attache simply endorses the check over to a variety of U.S. weapons industry, complete with customary overcharges,<sup>91</sup> plus interest."

All these functions that the U.S. needs can be carried out only by Israel. The U.S. does need Israel to do these activities that the U.S. system itself prevents the U.S. from doing. Therefore, the U.S. need for Israel is so great that every government will need to deal with it since changing the system of the U.S. is very hard especially when it comes to U.S. direct involvement outside the U.S. The price the U.S. pays for these services, is to say the least, cheap. It is "a bargain."<sup>92</sup>

This, in a way, explains part of this seemingly "blind" U.S. support and commitment to Israel. The Arabs still think that they do not understand the secret behind this U.S. support and if they do, they want to perform some of them. Some of the Arab countries project their regimes stability to attract U.S. "assignments" of the kind Israel is performing.

The net result is that there are very important reasons that make the U.S. support Israel. The most important among them that Israel performs important functions that are very vital for the interest of the U.S. and its global strategies. Will the Arabs understand?

Why Cannot the U.S. Pressure Israel?

From the previous two sections we concluded that the U.S. is neither interested nor willing to pressure Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza. Another conclusion was that the U.S. needs the "services" that Israel performs and that the U.S. does not need to pressure and antagonize

Israel. The thesis of the next section, which is one of the most important contributions of this study, is that the U.S. cannot pressure Israel to withdraw even if she tried.

Nowhere in the literature did I find any systematic argument about the inability of the U.S. to pressure Israel. In fact the opposite was true. Most of the arguments were supporting the idea that the U.S. is Israel's patron and that the U.S., with its huge aid bill to Israel can dictate whatever it wished. The United States' military, economic, and diplomatic support to Israel was taken to mean that the U.S. has a free hand in forcing Israel to withdraw if it so wished more than Eisenhower who did not have the present Israeli dependence on him. The question that most of these studies ask and try to answer is: why does not the U.S.-Israeli relations reflect this dependency? Why does not the U.S. use all its power over Israel to make her withdraw and protect American interests and citizens? The question of whether the U.S. can do this or not was never asked.

The aim of this part of the chapter is to try to answer this question and the reasons that prevent the U.S. from using its "power" over Israel.

There are several reasons that weaken the U.S. authority and influence over Israel, and therefore, show the U.S. handicapped in front of an Israeli rejection. These reasons range from systematic American political structures which include national and local institutions and interest

groups that determine U.S. policies to internal Israeli ideological and structural reasons. In other words, the system of the U.S. government is open to the degree that some interest groups can use it to achieve their goals within the legal system.

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In regard to the Israeli side of the question, Israel is becoming a very strong and militarily independent country that can resist U.S. pressures because of its almost total independence in the military sphere. Israel, as indicated in chapter 4, does not trust any country or side for her security and survival. This belief, as we mentioned above, prevents any compromises when it comes to its security which led to its strengthening of its armed forces to the degree that it does not need any outside help if she was to be put under any pressures.

The first element in this section will deal with the system of the U.S. government and especially its openness and responsiveness to the influence of certain pressure groups.

The structures of the U.S. political and governmental systems, its division between the powers of the government, which is one of the very important strengths of the system has, some "side effects" that sometimes leads to emergence of the problems that the system wanted to avoid, particularly, the dominance of groups that have a majority in the House of Representatives. Therefore, if you have enough representatives supporting you for whatever reason

and whatever goal, you can rule the country. In this case, if a group that has strong influence over a majority of the representatives, this group is liable, because of the nature of the system, to achieve all its goals even if they contradict the interests of the nation or the public as a whole. This is due to the assumption that if a majority of the people think that something is good then it must be good for the nation. This is, of course, not true. "What is good for General Motors" is not necessarily good for America.

This "systematic" problem exists in every democratic system. It is true that the majority of the representatives think that what they advocate helps the nation but this does not necessarily mean that it is good for the nation or that the majority of the people think it is good for them. My argument here is about the gap between the representatives' views and those of their constituency.

Here, the most important issue is that the system may have built-in faults that does not preclude the endangering of the national or public interests.

Concluding this, we then come to the American system and how it provides such a possibility. If the majority of the House of Representatives members approve of a policy, then this policy will go through unless it proves to be unconstitutional. The Executive branch cannot prevent a two-third majority from passing any laws they think are good for the nation . It is even more dangerous when the Executive

and Legislative branches believe or are made to believe that a policy is good for the nation.

In the case of the U.S., it is well known that interest or pressure groups can lobby for their interests. In this case the system is almost totally handicapped. Findley's and Neumann's accounts and statements describing the legal obstacles of the system make a best presentation of this thesis.

In an interview with the Journal of Palestine Studies, Neumann stated that the U.S. system is organized in a way that allows and permits a greater role for interest groups, in his words, lobbies, to deal directly with congress members who fear for positions. A threat of defeat is enough to make the congressman/woman to go back in line. He also stated that the system was not created for a brilliant foreign policy, rather it was created to ensure maximum freedom for the citizens.<sup>94</sup>

Findley's statement also describes the internal problems of the system. He explains that the system does not allow a popular and free discussion of the interests of the U.S. in the Middle East.<sup>95</sup>

These two statements, among many others, explain how the system works and make very clear that the system is available for those who have enough lobbying power to pass laws that satisfy them.

These statements also show how the "pro-Israeli" lobby successfully and lawfully uses these attributes of the

system to promote their interests. The legality of these uses is, of course, not in doubt since the system itself provides for such "uses". The problem is that the system does not place any checks on these uses, which is what Neumann was referring to.

The American Jews and the pro-Israel groups have organized themselves to perform the most advanced and well organized pressure groups in regard to foreign policy in the U.S. Most of the American officials were aware of the strength of the Israeli lobby since almost the establishment of the state of Israel. Most of them also were responsive to this fact and had to take the lobby very seriously.<sup>96</sup>

This leads us to conclude that the Jewish lobby in the U.S. has a strong influence that no other group has. This determines the U.S. policies in the Middle East. If a president of the U.S., a congressman, or a secretary think that they have to take into consideration what this group demands, then it should be enough to realize that this group is powerful enough to control the country's foreign policy on the region.

These two aspects of the internal U.S. governmental system, i.e., the system itself and the role of the pro-Israel lobby are enough indicators to how and why the U.S. cannot pressure Israel. Again, to make the point even clearer, the U.S. system allows the executive and legislative branches to respond to pressure groups. The

second point is that some of these pressure groups are willing and capable of using their "legal" power to force the legislative branch to pass laws favoring their own needs and interests even if they violate the interests of the nation. The system does not prevent this and it does not impose any checks on these activities.

The second element of this section deals with the power and independence of Israel and how these characteristics of the Israeli society and its system make it even harder, if not impossible, for the U.S. to influence or pressure it when it comes to withdrawal from the occupied territories. In other words, the fact that Israel is relatively independent and that it is structured the way it is described in chapter 4 creates strong checks on the ability of the U.S. to pressure it to withdraw.

The Israeli independence is a fact that no one can deny. By independent I mean that it creates and has its own political and social agenda that it is willing and capable of pursuing regardless of the wills of the others including the U.S. An example of this power or independence is the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The U.S. may have known about this but it is doubtful that the U.S. approved this attack or that it was capable of preventing it if it wanted.

From the beginning, the Israelis tried to avoid becoming independent on any other nation for their defense and security. This led to the emergence of a very strong army. With this in mind, and with the military support and

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help of the U.S. Israel disregarded, and in fact challenged, any U.S., Russian, or Western pressures to withdraw.

Indications of this independence, power, and rejection existed since the establishment of the state. Dayan even resisted a defense pact with the U.S. even before Israel was sure of its power.<sup>98</sup> These ties to the U.S. , he argued, will prevent Israel from carrying out reprisal actions that are important to the security and welfare of the state.<sup>99</sup>

Later and more recent statements come also from prominent Israeli leaders when the U.S. threatens or mentions sanctions or conditions. These statements show clearly that the U.S. "can not impose on us [Israel] such a plan, just as they could not impose on us the Rogers plan."<sup>100</sup>

Among the most outspoken Israeli leaders about resisting U.S. pressures is Sharon. In more than one occasion he "Vowed to resist U.S. pressures for quick withdrawal by inviting the Russians to talk with Israel"<sup>101</sup>

All this evidence show that Israel is capable of and willing to resist U.S. pressures even if that will lead to inviting the Russians.<sup>102</sup> This means that they are willing to use any means to prevent the U.S. from pressuring them. Of course, the U.S. never attempted to do that in a meaningful and serious way. This also shows that even if the U.S. wanted to do that it will not succeed.

Another aspect of Israel's ability to sustain U.S. pressures is the way Israelis perceive the U.S. and its pressures. When the U.S. attempts to pressure the Israeli governments, the Israeli public stands by their government and will take these pressures as if they were directed against them individually.<sup>103</sup>

Knowing that the U.S. "does not dare" to pressure them, depending on their lobby, independence and power, leads the Israelis to project and present stronger rejection and resistance to almost any U.S. pressures. If the U.S. attempts once to use its economic and military aid "cards" then Israel will respond in a very strong way. Blitzer gives an interesting detailed scenario of how and what steps Israel might take to counter this pressure.<sup>104</sup> To his "scenario" I will add that Israel, if faced with serious U.S. attempts to pressure it, Israel might strike at the oil fields in all of the Middle East and create a world wide crisis.

We see then that Israel's power and adventurism is helping her control the U.S.' Middle Eastern policy. In fact it is not only the Israeli power, independence and adventure, it is all the factors together that lead to the emergence and continuation of this situation. These factors are Arab weakness, U.S. governmental system, U.S. disinterest and lack of seriousness, and of course, Israeli "bad faith."<sup>105</sup>

The U.S. thought that Israel will understand its position and interests which "the U.S. today is unable to pursue in the Middle East"<sup>106</sup> and that a Jordanian agreement to recognize Israel and negotiate with it will create Israeli domestic political pressure that might "force the Begin government into peace talks, into a freeze on settlements, and into recognition of Palestinian rights [but] this logic was based on neither a firm understanding of Israeli domestic politics, nor a grasp of Zionist ideology generally."

From all of these facts one can conclude that Israel is able to resist any U.S. pressures to withdraw because the U.S. is not interested, unwilling and incapable of doing that either because of its system or because of the strength and independence of Israel or both.

#### 5-Ideology and Economics:

This last part of the chapter is a summary and a conclusion of the United States' role in solving the conflict. It is an assessment of the factors that determined and still determine the United States' role. Are these interests ideological or economic? Are they strategic or tactical? Or are they a combination of all of these ?

The main theme of this part of the chapter which is a result of the whole study of the role of the United States in the Middle East is that the United States does not have a coherent, strategic, and consistent strategy in the Middle East. This sounds too sweeping but it is the conclusion that

the above data leads to.

This feature of American policy, the lack of a coherent and consistent strategy is true, in fact, not only of the Middle East but also in other parts of the world. This conclusion was reached also by Amos Perlmutter in 1973<sup>107</sup>

The United States has interests in the Middle East , of course. The problem is whether it has a strategy to preserve and protect her interests in the region. The tactics and policies that the United States uses to achieve these interests are variable and inconsistent. The reasons for the United States inconsistency are basically regional.

The United States cannot "please" its partners who are enemies at the same time. The U.S. is in a very peculiar situation. It is aware that the "Basic question, the president noted, was how to reconcile Israel's legitimate security concerns with the legitimate rights of the Palestinians."<sup>108</sup> The answer is in no way can these be concealed since, as mentioned in the introduction and in chapter one, the conflict is a zero-sum conflict. The gains of one party are considered the losses of the other. Israel's "legitimate security concerns" which are rejected by the Palestinians are going to lead to the annexing of parts of the lands that are supposed to be part of the independent Palestinian state which is, in turn, part of the "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" that Israel reject and deny.

The conclusion that one can reach is that the motivations for the United States' policies in the Middle East are both ideological, i.e. denying the Soviet Union any foothold in the region, rejecting and resisting Arab Nationalism and supporting its client, and economic, i.e. preserving and protecting United States oil supplies and markets. The problem is that these interests become secondary to other immediate ones that the United States clients tend to consider primary and more urgent. These clients, as in the case of Israel, "dictate" or "shape" their "interests" in a way that make them look as if they are real American interests.

This leads to another major conclusion; the way the Arabs present their case and their lack of sincerity and seriousness to use their political and economic power is another important reason for the lack of U.S. seriousness to help solve the problem. If the United States' interests were threatened by the Arabs, the United States then will have to give more weight to the Arab side than it does now. This is an old argument but it is still valid.

It is true that the oil embargo did not prevent Nixon from supplying Israel with all her losses even during the war and the embargo, but the Arab embargo was effective enough to produce massive internal American and international crisis that led to serious considerations of the Arab view of the conflict and of the United States role.

## Conclusion:

To summarize the findings of this chapter we will say that there are internal American, regional, and international elements that prevent the United States from assuming its role as a superpower and its strong influence in the Middle East. The United States has interests in the region that makes it willing to protect them. These interests coincide with those of Israel to the degree that made Israel an indispensable ally to the United States. Israel's relative independence, power, and willingness to do things that the United States, because of public consideration, cannot do gave Israel even more weight in shaping United States interests in the region to the degree that made Findley state that: "if they [the American people] had any idea of the grip this lobby has on their government, they'd rise up in arms."<sup>109</sup>

There is no doubt then that the United States allows Israel to "dictate" its policy in the Middle East and that it is willing to sacrifice its own interests to satisfy those of Israel. This is going to continue until the Arabs learn how to use their political and economic powers or until the American people "get tired of supporting our [Israel's] dirty policies."<sup>110</sup>

None of these two assumptions or conditions, Arabs learning of how to use their powers and the American peoples' getting tired of Israeli policies, is going to happen because these two "groups" Arabs and American people,

have the least to say or effect the United States policies as argued above. In regard to the Arabs, they too are not interested.

The conclusions that one can draw from this examination and assessment are the following:

1-The United States has a great role to play in solving the conflict of the Middle East. All the parties agree that the United States is the most important actor in determining the outcome of any decision in the region. <sup>111</sup>

2-There are internal American institutions that prevent the United States from pressuring Israel to withdraw. Systematic and institutional aspects of the system of the United States government preclude the pressure and power needed for carrying out such a policy of pressuring Israel. The U.S. administration itself is taking steps to ensure continuous United States-Israeli cooperation and permanent support for whatever Israel does. Shultz's statement to the AIPAC declaring that "the point of strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States is " To build institutional arrangements so that eight years from now , if there is a secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the United States that we have established." <sup>112</sup>

3-Another important conclusion is that Israel succeeded in shaping the United States' interests not only because of

the type of system the United States has but also because of the power and organization of its supporter, i.e. the Jewish Zionist lobby in the United States. It is this lobby using and exploiting the gaps in the governmental system to achieve these goals that has very strong effects on the United States policies in the region.

4-Another conclusion is that the United States itself benefits from Israel' existence and activities. The United States industrial complex gains from the Israeli purchases and the United States military and intelligence receives very important information that is badly needed and valuable. <sup>113</sup> Why should the United States pressure Israel and waste all of this. Israel carries out very important American needed operations and activities that the system of the United States prevent the government from carrying out; selling arms and sending support to countries that the United States congress prevents the government from doing.

5-Still another conclusion was that the United States administration is not really interested or pressed hard enough to move and solve the problems even if it can. The Arab and Palestinian pressure is not strong enough to make the United States spend some more time or effort to achieve peace. In other words, Arab pressures are non existent or too weak to effect any policy changes on the region.

6-Israel's strength and independence also effects the United States policy. Israel is capable of resisting U.S. pressures. They can do that despite the general view that perceive Israel as very dependent on the United States. In this case also, it is the type of the system that allows such an activity to happen. The Israelis have showed that they can take care of themselves without direct United States help. They still can do. They strengthened themselves technologically and militarily to the degree that they can live without the American or any other country's military help.

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7-The Arabs belief that they can influence the United States' policy by using their oil and money either by influencing the public to choose representatives sympathetic to the Arab cause or by supporting certain officials and representatives did not and will not work because there is a gap between what the people want and what there representatives do especially when it comes to foreign policy where Americans and Europeans are really not interested and try not to get involved in. IN other words, because of the lack of interest among the American public in foreign policy, the Arabs cannot "use" the American people to influence their representatives' decisions and voting.

8-On the international level, the United States and the Soviet Union have, it seems, dismissed the option of confronting each other because of the Middle East. And

with the international system the way it is at the present, i.e. United States-Soviet understanding while the United States is strongly backing Israel, the chances that the superpower relations lead to any tangible solution amount to nothing.

In short, "the United States holds very few cards , because it is unable to convince Israel to do what United States policy makers want without exerting the kind of pressure that is precluded by the United States domestic political considerations." <sup>115</sup> Therefore, the Arabs and the Palestinians should find another way to either effect the United States policies in the region or deal directly with the problem. The United States is not interested, not willing and incapable of doing the things that they think it should to solve the problem.

## Notes

1

An example of this urgency was the Russian position and demand during the 156, 1973 Israeli attack on Egypt. The Soviet Union demanded that the U.S. pressure Israel to withdraw. The U.S. did that fearing that "if we don't do it [force Israel out of Sinai] the Russians will do it" as Dulles explained in Neff Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America into the Middle East, New York, The Linden Press, 1981, P. 433.

2

The Arabs resented this U.S. move and associated the U.S. with the other colonial powers who approve of the colonization of one "race" over another. The shock was strong because of the U.S.'s support of national self-determination.

3

Golub was correct when he stated in When Oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy 1973-1985, Harvard Middle East Papers # four, 1985, that "The Saudi regime is so concerned about its own survival that its decisions are almost unceasingly risk-averse. The case studies illustrate not only how vulnerable the regime perceives itself to be but also how its sense of vulnerability affects its approach to decision making. The regime appears to make decisions by analyzing the dangers associated with each of its possible options. This balance-of-dangers approach transforms all decisions into dilemmas-dilemmas that are best solved by determining the least dangerous course of action." p.4

4

A good representation of this attitude toward the West is clear in King Hussein's statement in his biography My Profession as a King, 1987. King Hussein states that he would have been so happy if a British student would answer his greetings when he was at Sand Hirst. P57-62.

5

The U.S., as we now know, made the Israelis withdraw because the U.S. was afraid that if it did not do that this will be the end of hopes for the U.S. in the Middle East. Neff, op. cit., p. 183 .

6

Ibid, P. 432.

7

Sadat, In Search of Identity, Harper Colophon Books, New York, 1977, P. 173-174.

8

Nutting, Nasser, Dutton, 1972. It was determined that the Liberty, was relying on information to the Israelis. p. 421.

9

Golub, op. cit., p. 48.

10

"During crisis periods, other Arab states can succeed in using the Arab-Israeli conflict to force the regimes hand against the U.S." Golub , p.48

11

Both Nasser and Sadat claimed after the 1967 and 1973 wars that the U.S. was supporting Israel and they did not prepare for a war with the U.S.

12

Gazit, in "America and Israel", Partisan Review, March, 1982 Gazit considered the Rogers Plan as if "the" Nixon administration dealt Israel a severe blow when, in December 1969, Secretary of State Rogers declared that Israel would have to withdraw completely from the Sinai and almost completely from the West Bank" p. 369.

13

"For thirty years we have stood at the side of this proud and independent nation of Israel. I can say without reservation, as the President of the United States, that we will continue to do so not just for another thirty years, but forever." "America And Israel" in Gazit op. cit., p. 370.

14

Golub, op. cit., agrees that the Saudi regime agreed to separate between oil and politics, p. 41.

15

It is on the record now that "Israel organized terrorist cells within Egypt to carry out attacks on the U.S. installation in an effort to drive a wedge between Egypt and the U.S., intending that these acts would be attributed to ultranationalist Egyptian fanatics" as in Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & The Palestinians, South End Press, Boston, 1983, p. 20> Similar quotations are found in Rokach, Israel's Sacred Terrorism, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Ma, 1980, P. 38.

16

Nakhleh and Wright, After the Palestine-Israel War: Limits to U.S. and Israeli Policy, Institute of Arab Studies, Mass., 1983, P. 42.

17

Samy Mansour, "Looking for a New Beginning", in Hudson, ed. Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Comparative Analysis of the Principal Actors, Center for Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. Mansour, as I found, was the only one who mentions the lands occupied before 1967 as part of the conflict. All other studies and writings deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict as if it is related only to the post 1967 occupied lands. p. 75.

18

Mehdi argued that To expect the Arabs to provide America with oil so that it could help Israel to kill Arabs and occupy Arab lands, would mean expecting the Arabs to engage in the irrational act of self-destruction. The Arabs

may be an emotional people, but they are not irrational- or at least not that irrational" Peace in Palestine, New World Press, 1976, p. 47.

19

Ibid., p. 59

20

Ibid., p. 83.

21

Ibid., p. 25.

22

From an interview with Yeshayahu Leibowitz: "Liberating Israel from the Occupied Territories" in JPS #58, (Winter, 1986, p. 105.

23

President Carter was quoted in Nakhleh and Write op. cit., p. 71, to have insisted that the U.S. has given Israel the Green Light to invade Lebanon and he accused Haig of doing this.

24 See Jansen The Battle of Beirut p. 74 and Nakhleh and Wright, p. 71.

25

A good example of this Palestinian-Arab Attitude is seen in Said's The Question of Palestine, Times Books, 1979. Said states that "My aim has been to write a book putting before the American reader a broadly representative Palestinian position, something not very well known and certainly not well appreciated even now, when there is so much talk of the Palestinians and of the Palestinian problem" P. ix

26

Koppel on Nightline, October 17, 1985, p. 4.

27

This fact was captured by Ibrahim in his article "The American-Israeli Alliance" in JPS #59, (Spring), 1986 when he wrote that "Public opinion in the U.S., indeed throughout Western democracies, is amorphous and less interested in foreign affairs than in domestic issues except in times of crisis affecting society at large. Otherwise, foreign policy remains the exclusive domain of the power elite that is Michels' Oligarchy" p. 19.

28

Ibid., "The power elite today remains the sole proprietor of U.S. strategic policy. Therefore, any reference to the predominance of public opinion or pressure groups in the formulation of the Middle East policy seriously underestimates the organic nature of the American interest in this relationship, just as it overlooks Israel's value to the elite as a strategic ally", p. 18.

29

See Neumann's interview in JPS #59, p. 12.

30

He says that "Our problem is that we don't really have

a decision." JPS #59 , p. 13

31

See Paul Findley: "Congress and the Pro-Israeli Lobby" in JPS #57, (Autumn), 1985, pp. 110-111.

32

See Assad's interview in JPS #60, p. 9.

33

Numann in JPS #59, pp. 12,13.

34

Mehdi, op. cit., p. 22.

35

Said, op. cit., p. xi.

36

See Arafat's and Assad's interviews in JPS #60, pp.3-33.

37

Ibid., p. 28.

38

Findley's interview in JPS #57, p. 112. Findley states that Admiral Thomas Moore told him in an interview that "The American people today don't know what is going on... If they had any idea of the grip this lobby has on their government, they'd rise up in arms."

39

Edward Glick was very correct when he noted that "We find that the average American citizen is not carrying out and demanding the cutting of of the very generous military and economic loans and grants that America continues to give to Israel" in "What Binds America to Israel" in Midstream, #10 December , 1984, p. 21.

40

Data about the attitudes of the Americans, Canadians, and Europeans was presented in Fouad Mughrabi's "The International Consensus on the Palestine Question" in JPS #63, (Spring), 1987, pp.115-133. His data and tables show that 36% in 1977 and 46% in 1982 approve of the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state. While those who do not were 29% and 23%. This was not reflected in the official U.S. attitudes which proves the fact that there is a gap between what the public thinks and what the government does even in a "democracy" like the United States.

In the next table we also see that 59% of the respondents think that the U.S. should negotiate with the PLO. This percentage drops to 42% when the objection of Israel is added to the condition of negotiating. But still, this is a large percentage that was not represented ion the American official view.

41See Blitzer Between Washington And Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 8.

42

Vice president Bush was able in 1986 to convince the Saudis to lower the prices of oil. And when the American oil

companies complained about their losses from this movement he was able, within few weeks, to convince the Saudis again to raise the prices of oil again . This shows that the U.S. controls Saudi oil prices even more than the Saudis themselves disregarding Saudi national interests.

43

in Gazit's words, "America's commitment to Israel is strong, but it is based on cultural, ideological and moral affinity- not on strategic interests" ,p 367.

44

See Harakabi in Arab Attitudes to Israel, Jerusalem, 1972.

45

Ibid.

46

See Melvin Gurtov The United States Against the Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention, Prager University Series New York, 1974 especially Chapters 1 and 2.

47

In 1956 the United States did authorize France to sell Israel Mirage Airplanes because the United States was unable, because of congressional prohibitions, to do that itself.

48

Blitzer, op. cit., P. 6.

49

See George Ball in Error and Betrayal in Lebanon : An Analysis of Israel's Invasion and the implications for the U.S.-Israel Relations, Washington D.C., Foundation for Middle East Peace, 1984, p. 26.

50

Ibid., p. 31.

51

The Arab leaders always used this incident to justify their acceptance of any U.S. conditions and resolutions thinking that the other presidents will do what Eisenhower once did.

52

See Nutting, op. cit., p. 84-85.

53

Rokach op. cit., quotes this statement from the Diary to present how the Israeli government then was interested in blocking any Arab-America communications. Isser [Harel, Shin Bet chief] likewise concludes that the U.S. is hinting to U.S. that as far as they are concerned we have a free hand and God bless U.S. if we act audaciously".. Now the U.S. is interested in toppling Nasser's regime... but it does does not dare at the moment to use the methods it adopted to topple the leftist government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala [1954] and Mossadegh in Iran [1953]... it prefers its work done by Israel. p. 55

54

This statement shows the fear of Israel of the emergence of a charismatic leader in the Arab World.

55

See Kerr The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-1970, Oxford University Press, London, 1971.p. 62.

56

Ibid., p. 125-128.

57

Sadat, op. cit., p. 188-189.

58

Nakhleh and Wright, op. cit., p. 127.

59

Ibid., p. 71 and Jansen op. cit., p. 74-75.

60

This was clear in Assad's interview in JPS #60, where he stated that "There is no American policy in the Middle East"; Assad declared, "instead, there is an Israeli policy carried out by the U.S. All American actions in this area are carried out according to Israeli decisions affected by the Zionist lobby and other Zionist influences. What matters to U.S. is that all American deeds in this area are in the service of Israeli Zionist aims.", p. 9

61

Ball op. cit., p. 63.

62

See King Hussein's address to the 17th. PNC in Amman in JPS #60, p. 228.

63

Numann in JPS # 59, p. 6.

64

Ibid., p. 9.

65

Jessi Jackson in JPS #58, p. 8.

66

Shai Feldman, believes that "The way to go about this [solving the conflict] would be to boost Israel's security, thereby allowing her to dispense with these elements of her present policy...By enhancing Israel's role in the Western alliance system while facilitating her withdrawal from the West Bank and a solution to East Jerusalem, the U.S. could approach the answer to her present dilemma." From "Peacemaking in the Middle East: The Next Step" Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1981. p. 764

67

Quoted in Ali Hilal Dasuki " The Politics of Strategic Imbalance: Israel and the Palestine Question" in Hudson op. cit., p. 23.

68

We see that in the fifties Israel's goal was and still is "to break the West's confidence in the existing [Egyptian] regime... The actions [that must be taken by Israeli agents in Egypt] should cause arrests,

demonstrations, and expressions of revenge. The Israeli origin should be totally covered while attention should be shifted to any other possible factor. The purpose is to prevent economic and military aid from the west to Egypt. Rokach op. cit., p. 38.

69

It states that the agents should achieve the following goals: "One: start immediate action to prevent or postpone Anglo-Egyptian Agreement. Objectives are: one, cultural and information centers; two, economic institutions; three, cars of British representatives and other Britons; four, whichever target whose sabotage could bring about a worsening of diplomatic relations" Ibid. p. 38.

70

This was clear from the instructions to Habib "to represent the maximalist Israeli positions official U.S. policy - an order against which he repeatedly submitted an official protest" Jansen op. cit., p. 81-83.

71

Chomsky, op. cit., p. 43.

72

It also illustrates" as Findley puts it "the powerful momentum on Capitol Hill in support of whatever Israel wants, no matter what other considerations might be involved in an issue. If it is for Israel, it goes through. It also illustrates the effectiveness of the lobby network" Findley's interview in JPS #57, p. 109.

73

See Abdel Monem Said "U.S. Management of the Conflict: The Reagan Era" in Hudson op. cit., p. 214.

74

For example see Wright, op. cit., p. 116, where he states, for example, that "there has been a lack of seriousness and interest at the highest levels of policymaking -this has its effects in the resulting diplomacy."

75

See Gurtov op. cit., chapter 1.

76" Syria wants to achieve Parity" to prevent further Israel attacks and to project a strong posture to make Israel withdraw from the Golan and not to liberate Palestine. See Assad's interview in JPS #60, PP. 3-16.

77

See Abdel Monem Said "U.S. Management of the Conflict: The Reagan Era" in Hudson op. cit., p. 213.

78

Ibid., p. 207.

79

Gurtov, op. cit., p. 11.

80

Rokach, op. cit., P. 55.

81

"Since the U.S. found it could not commit its troops directly to far-flung enterprises, its strategists shifted to the idea of "Vietnamization," substituting the power of local countries-subject to overriding American influence-for direct U.S. involvement in strategic regions of the world." Ibrahim "The American-Israeli Alliance." JPS #59, p.26.

82

This amounts to over \$3 billion dollars a year. For further readings on U.S. aid to Israel see El-Khawas and Abed-Rabbo, American Aid to Israel, Amana, 1984.

83

This view is also shared by Chomsky op. cit., who realized that "Israel is surely regarded as a crucial part of the elaborate U.S. base and back up system for the Rapid Deployment Force ringing in the Middle East oil producing regions [Therefore,] if U.S. interests in the Middle East were threateened, it would take months to mount a significant presence there. With Israel as an ally, it would take only few days" p. 22

84

Ibrahim, in "The American-Israeli Alliance" also believes that Israel "is not there [in the Middle East] to confront the Soviet Union nor to protect NATO in Europe. Rather its role in the Middle East itself, where it can serve the U.S. as a listening post, an intelligence agent, and a force of considerable power to help promote the fragmentation and disunity in Arab countries and thereby prolong their dependence on the U.S." JPS #59, p.27

85

Leibowitz op. cit., p. 105.

86

Chomsky, op. cit., p. 24.

87

Ibid., p. 22.

88

Blitzer op. cit., p. 90.

89

The estimation of the worth of Israel's help and support for the U.S. was calculated here to be : " Israel's contributions was worth \$1.000 for every dollar's worth of aid we have granted her." Glick in Midstream, NO 10, 1984 p. 19.

90

Avneri states that "If Israel did not exist the American industrial complex would have to invent it . It is American money given to Israel that is used by Israel to buy weapons from the American arms industry, funds that the U.S. Congress would be reluctant to grant to the U.S. Armed Forces. Not least among the arms supplied by the Americans to the Israelis airburst bombs and shells and, possibly, the vacuum bomb." Jansen op. cit., pp.4-5.

91

Shlomo Frenkel "Israel's Economic Crisis" In MERIP Reports #136-137 October-December , 1985, p. 23.

92

Blitzer op. cit., p. 6.

93

Numann, JPS #59, p. 12.

94

Ibid., p. 12.

95

Findley op. cit., p. 111. and Chomsky "The U.S. and the Middle East" in JPS #63, pp.25-42

96

The following statements by many American congressmen and secretaries illustrates the powerful lobby since the establishment of the state of Israel .

Secretary of State Dulles was quoted to have said " I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to carry out a policy not approved by the Jews.... I am going to try to have one" Neff, op. cit., P. 433.

Another is Findley's previously quoted statement about the effectiveness of the lobby. Still his account of how seriously these groups take their role is interesting. He states that the members of the lobby are ready to pounce on and defeat legislators who have a 99 percent record of supporting Israel. They want 100 percent. They select their targets carefully, of course. They decided that I was vulnerable; they decided that Percy was vulnerable. They don't waste their money on elections they can't possibly win." JPS #57, p.110

Another quote is President Carter's "apology" to a member of the Egyptian delegation to Camp david, Usama Al Baz. "President Carter explained that if he insisted on the addition of a clear statement about the Palestinians self determination he would lose his presidency" Usama Al Bazz in Al-Quds of August 26, 1985 as quoted from Abu Dhabi TV as in Al-Quds

Still another is Goldmann's as quoted in the Journal of Palestine Studies. He states that "in American decision making concerning Jewish and Arab problems, the six million Jews residing in the United States exert an influence which it would be unwise to underestimate... . This fact holds true as well, to lesser degrees, in numerous other countries." A History of the Zionist Movement p. 161

97

Flapan in "Israelis and Palestinians: Can They Make Peace?" in JPS #57, argued that Massive U.S. economic and military aid hastend a militarization of Israel's political thinking and self-image as an indispensable U.S. ally and a mini-superpower" p. 32.

98

Dayan insisted that "We [Israel] do not need a security pact with the U.S.: such a pact will only constitute an

obstacle for U.S. We face no danger at all of an Arab advantage of force for the next 8-10 years. Even if they receive massive military aid from the West, we shall maintain our military superiority thanks to our infinitely greater capacity to assimilate new armaments." Rokach, op. cit., p.46.

99

The militarization of Israel serves many purposes as Dayan noted . A U.S.- Israeli pact will prevent Israel from carrying out reprisal action that "are our vital lymph... they make it possible for U.S. to maintain a high level of tension among our population and in the army. Without these actions we would have ceased to be a combative people and without the discipline of a combative people we are lost. We have to cry out the the Negev is in danger, so that young men will go there." Rokach , p.46.

100

Moshe Zak's "Reagan's Missile fell in Naharya" as quoted in Nakhleh,op. cit., p. 45.

101

New York Times , November 30, 1982.

102

This is one of Israel's strategies as have been mentioned before. It will use the superpowers against each other to get its needs.

103

According to Stoddard " The U.S. Approach Today" in Hudson, op. cit., "Pressure tactics [against Israel] tend to be viewed in these [Israeli ] circles as arousing hostile reaction in Israel and as leading Israelis to back their government against the U.S." p. 183.

104

Blitzer op. cit., p. 6-10.

105

Wright, op. cit., p. 73 and Hudson "The Ineffectiveness of the Arab States' Diplomacy on the Palestine-Israel Issue: An Inventory of Explanations" in Hudson ed. op. cit., p. 108.

106

Donald McHenry as quoted by Findley in JPS #57, p. 111

107

Perlmutter "American Strategic and Economic Interests in the Area" in Finger ed. The New World Balance and Peace in the Middle East: Reality or Mirage, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, New York, 1973, p. 143-154

108

Stoddard op. cit., p. 177.

109

Findley JPS #57 , p. 111.

110

Leibowitz, JPS #58, p. 105 .

111

This view that the United States can help is shared by

many politicians and analysts. Among these are Jansen , op. cit., p. 85 and Flapan JPS #57, p. 38 and Leibowitz JPS #58, p. 105, and Stoddard in Hudson op. cit., p.200

112

Thomas Dine "The Revolution in U.S-Israel Relations" JPS #60, p. 139.

113

Frenkel, op. cit., p. 23.

114

See MERIP Reports 143 for information about Israel's military independence and nuclear capability .

115

Mansour, in Hudson op. cit., p.80.

## Chapter 6

### The Limits Of Alliance

This chapter will examine the role of the Soviet Union in the creation and development of the Middle Eastern conflict. It will also assess the role the Soviet Union can play in the future, and the reasons for its failure to implement any significant activity to insure the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. It will also examine the way the Arabs and the Israelis view the role of the Soviet Union and the impact of the detente on Russian attitudes towards the conflict.

#### 1. The Soviet Union in the Middle East:

The first section will deal with the reasons and the circumstances that led to the Soviet Union's involvement in the conflict and its interests in the region. This section will explain when, why, and how the Soviet Union became involved.

1-The Soviet Union was one of the first countries of the world to recognize the newly established state of Israel in 1948. Their vote in the U.N. the year before on the partition plan was also an important and significant action that seems surprising now.

The Soviet Union's recognition of Israel was due to many reasons. One of them is the strength of the Israeli labor movement with its socialist-leaning parties. Mapam and Mapai were very strong and they had controlled the new state since its establishment. The socialist tendencies of the

Israeli labor parties encouraged the Russians to support them. The Soviet Union thought that there was a strong chance that they could influence Israel and have it as a regional ally in their global competition with the Western powers.

Another reason for the Soviet recognition was the Russian desire to weaken the British and to reduce their colonial power . If Israel had become independent and succeeded in expelling the British, the Russians thought, England would lose a colony in a geographically important part of the world close to the Suez Canal and to the rich oil fields nearby in Saudi Arabia.<sup>1</sup>

Still another reason was the Soviet objective of outbedding the United States for influence in the region, reflecting the Soviet Union's ideological commitment to national liberation and decolonization. Therefore, the Soviet Union recognized and supported the independence of Israel from the beginning . The question that remains to be addressed in this section is "what interests did and does the Soviet Union now have in the region?"

Like the United States, the Soviet Union has global interests in the Middle East region. Among the most important interests are the following:

The Soviet Union's main interest is to have a foothold in the region.<sup>2</sup> They want to deny the United States complete dominance over the Middle East. By having access to the region they can force the United States to accept and recognize their interests there.

The implications of such a policy would be that the United States would have to accommodate the Soviets in the region, and it would have to restrict the bargaining power the Soviets could use against the Americans.

In an international system ruled by the interests of the superpowers, the region would become a bargaining item that each would use to gain something in exchange from the other. Therefore, the main interest of the Soviet Union, just like that of the United States, is the need to present its interests in the region to be able to use if needed to bargain with the other superpower.<sup>3</sup>

2-Another factor is that the United States wants an advanced station in the region for its global military uses. The Soviet Union needs transit stations and ports for its fleet in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean near the oil fields. Without these ports and stations the Soviets would have to go through the trouble of referring their fleet to return to its Russian bases, consuming critical time and energy which is essential especially in a case of war or the threat of war.

3-The Soviets also need to have stations near the oil fields themselves, because in case of war or the threat of war they will need access to these fields either for their own use or to deny the other party to have access to them. If the Soviet Union can control the oil fields, a situation<sup>4</sup> which the United States would never accept short of war, they would be able to dominate the West European and

Japanese industrial and economic systems, which would affect the U.S. directly. Therefore, it is very important to have access to those fields.

4-The last factor that will be discussed here is the Soviet Union's desire to spread its ideological and political beliefs. The internationalism of the Communist doctrine is a basic tenet of their political belief that Communism should be spread to other peoples and regions.

This belief, which is like Islam in this sense, is a strong determinant of Soviet foreign policies since the Russian Revolution. This is an ideological commitment that the Soviet Union has to carry out regardless of external powers and pressures. This aspect of the Soviet policy is a dominant factor in influencing Russian demands and political and military limits in the region. It is understandable that the Soviet Union has these interests and that they conflict with those of the United States and of NATO.

As a summary of this section, it is important to note that the Soviet Union has important interests in the region and that it is willing to undertake serious steps to protect them. these interests include the gaining of access to the region for advanced stations close enough to the oil fields to threaten the west. The Soviet Union also has ideological and political commitments that are inherent in the Communist doctrine itself. All of these direct and influence the Soviets' policies towards the region.

## 2. The Arabs' View of the Soviet Role:

This section will examine the way the Arabs view the Soviet Union's role in solving the conflict. It will also examine the activities that the Arabs think the Soviet Union should take to help them achieve their goals of having Israel withdraw from the occupied Arab territories .

1-The Arabs believe that the Soviet Union is a superpower that has a strong influence all over the world. They also believe that the Soviets, like the Americans, have global interests and that they and the Americans have an understanding that they do not need to get involved in a war because of the Middle East.<sup>6</sup>

The Arabs think that, with this kind of understanding between themselves the two superpowers can arrange a solution to the conflict. The Soviet Union, in other words, can either convince the United States of the importance of the achievement of a solution to the conflict, or it can threaten to use other measures either against Israeli or against United States interests in the region or anywhere else.<sup>7</sup>

The United States, the Arabs also believe, would have to respond favorably to the Soviet Union since it does not want a conflict with the Soviets. If the Soviet Union were serious and firm in presenting these demands to the United States and if it accompanies these demands with mild tactical or strategic offers, the United States would have to accept. But why don't the Russians do that?

We see then that the best way the Soviet Union can help the Arabs is by convincing or pressuring the United States to act in the Arabs' favor. Doing this, the Russians could easily induce the Americans to pressure Israel and the conflict would be solved without having to fight.

2-The other method by which the Arabs believe that the Soviet Union can help them is by their directly exerting pressure on Israel. The Soviet Union could threaten Israel as it did in 1956-1957<sup>8</sup> by exerting that same type of pressure which at that time prompted Dulles to say that "If we cannot get Israel out of Egypt the Russians will get them out and in the process we will lose the whole Middle East."<sup>9</sup>

The Arabs keep raising this question; "Why was the Soviet Union able to do this in 1956 and is unable to do it in 1976, 1986, etc.? The answer to their question will be presented later in this chapter. However, it is important to say the following now; theoretically the Soviet Union could still do this; in practice it cannot. There have been too many changes in the last 30 years that preclude similar Soviet pressures.

Another aspect of this direct pressure is that of denying the Russian Jews emigration to Israel. The Arabs had the idea long ago.<sup>10</sup> The Soviet Union has been restricting Jewish emigration for a long time. The problem with this policy is that the Soviets are not presenting it with any conditions. They do not demand that for the release of the

would-be emigrants Israel would have to withdraw from this part or that part of the occupied territories. They are restricting emigration without demanding anything in exchange for their release. If they should do so I think internal Israeli pressure, pressure from American Jewry, and pressure from the Jews in the Soviet Union itself would force the Israeli government to take some action.

This does not necessarily mean that the Israeli government will give in. National security and the rejection of any "blackmail" are far more important to the Israelis than what could be called an "international blackmail". Furthermore, Israel could use other methods to secure the release of these Jews, including the use of its power in the United States.<sup>11</sup>

Still another way of direct Russian pressure that could be brought upon Israel would be that of arming the Arabs. The Russians have been doing this since 1955. But they are arming them with defensive arms only.<sup>12</sup> If the Russians would supply the Arabs with offensive and advanced weapons as the United States does with Israel the Arabs contend that they would then be able to "eliminate the consequences of the Israeli aggression."<sup>13</sup> The fact that Soviet participation in the war of attrition showed that the Russians were unable to match the Israelis minimized the Arabs' strong belief that they themselves would be able to use Russian weapons to defeat Israel. The issue was put in a form of questioning the ability of Soviet arms rather than

the Arab fighters. Israel and the U.S. started to degrade Soviet technology and weapons as if they were the reason for the Arab defeats.<sup>14</sup>

The other aspect of this pressure, which the Arabs have no problem with, is Soviet support in the U.N. The Soviet Union has always supported the Arab case in the U.N. except in the instances of the Partition Plan and of recognizing Israel. It even severed its relations with Israel after the 1967 war. even when the Arabs restored their relations with the United States, the Soviet Union still did not resume its former ties with Israel!<sup>15</sup>

As a summary to this section it is important to note that the Arabs believe that the Soviet Union can help them achieve their goals either through pressuring Israel indirectly by influencing the United States to affect Israel's policies or directly by imposing conditions on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. One direct method of pressuring Israel is by arming the Arabs with advanced offensive weapons to be able to defend themselves and to liberate their lands. Another is by supporting them in the U.N., which the Soviet Union does anyway. The problem that the Arabs face with these alternatives is that the Soviet Union seems unwilling or incapable of carrying them out.

### 3. The Israeli View of the Role of the Soviet Union:

With the break of the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel a new stage between both of them had

started. From the immediate recognition of Israel in 1948 to the ending of diplomatic relations the two countries went through two decades of sharp fluctuations in their relations. At some times especially during 1955 at the time of the Soviet arms deal with Egypt, relations were severely strained. The arms deal prompted Israel to attack Egypt so Egypt would not be able to "absorb the new arms."<sup>16</sup> The 1956 attack was followed by Soviet pressure to force Israel out of the Sinai.

The Israeli view of the Soviet role could be summarized in two major points:

1-One of the most important aspects of the Israeli view of the Soviet role is that if it were not for the Soviet's arming and instigating of the Arabs,<sup>17</sup> the Arabs would have accepted Israel's existence. This is especially true in the period after the 1967 War when all the participating Arab armies were destroyed. If the U.S., the Soviet Union and the rest of the world, the Israelis argued, the Arabs would not have been able to fight or their spirit of fighting without the material power to do that would have died out.

Therefore, it has been Soviet influence and its arming of the Arabs that, basically, kept up the Arabs' spirit and will to fight. The Israelis think that the Soviet Union should stop arming the Arabs and arousing their desire for revenge and liberation. If the Arabs knew that they were not going to be able to defeat Israel they would not fight, nor would they resist its continued existence, especially if

the United States continues its support for Israel.

2-Another aspect is the Israeli belief that the Soviet Union could influence the Arabs to become more moderate. The Soviet Union could let the Arabs know that without accepting Israel's right to exist, they would end up losing more than gaining. It could, someone could also argue, put conditions on its arms sales to the Arabs by demanding their recognition of Israel if they wanted those arms. With this moderating effect, the Soviet Union could help the Arabs even more than by supplying them with arms.<sup>18</sup>

These are the most important aspects of the Israeli view of how the Soviet Union should act in the region. They basically stem from the Israeli belief that because of their dependence on the Soviet Union for arms, the Arabs would follow any Russian diplomatic and political line in the conflict. The Israelis are wrong in their assumptions. The Arabs have been acting independently just as Israel did.<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, neither Israel nor the Arabs are going to follow the policies of their patrons if these policies do not suit them.

#### 4. The Reasons for the Soviet Union's Inability to help the Arabs achieve their goals:

This section will examine the reasons for the Soviet Union's inability to either pressure Israel directly to withdraw or to influence the United States enough to have her pressure Israel to give up the lands it seized from the

Arabs in 1967. The main arguments that we will examine here are the following:

1-The Soviet Union and the United States agreed in their 1972 conference, among other things, not to go to war over the Middle East.<sup>20</sup> This agreement was tested in 1973 and found to be not as strong as it should have been. The Americans accused the Russians of knowing Egypt's plans for war and did not, as indicated in the agreement, inform the them.<sup>21</sup> The two countries raised their military preparedness to the nuclear level during this war. This meant that these two countries could be dragged into war in the region even though their stated policies and agreements indicate otherwise.

However, I still believe that their demonstration of their nuclear preparedness was itself just a show for the countries that were involved in the war that their conflict could lead to a war between the superpowers. They, the Soviet Union and the United States, were trying to "frighten" the Arabs and the Israelis by showing how close to nuclear war the Russians and the Americans were. The conclusion from this is that the two countries do have plans and agreements of not going to war over the Middle East.

It is my belief that the two countries are not going to risk fighting over the Middle East and that this puts a limit to the extent to which the Soviet or American policies can go in the region. This means that the Soviet Union is not totally free to pressure Israel or the United States to

force them to withdraw from the occupied territories.

In short, the Soviet Union's relation with the United States, i.e., detente, is more important and vital to the Soviet Union than its support to the Arabs who believe that, and want, the Soviet Union to do more for them. Therefore, the events that happened in the 1950's which allowed the Soviet Union to pressure the United States to force Israel to withdraw from the Sinai cannot be repeated in 1967, 1977, 1987 or any other time. The Arabs have to learn that United States-Soviet relations are more important to them, the United States and the Soviet Union, than their relations with their clients.

2-Another important reason for the Soviet Union's failure to pressure the United States or Israel is the strong United States backing for Israel and the later's strength and power.<sup>23</sup> The events of 1956-7 were allowed to happen because the United States did not have strong relations with the state of Israel. The development of these relations over the past three decades have changed the United States's strategic position visa-a-vis Israel. Israel now is truly thought of as a United States ally.<sup>24</sup> The United States will protect Israel as it does its NATO allies even though Israel is not a member of the Treaty Organization.

Another aspect of this subject is that Israel has also grown stronger and more independent over the last thirty years. Israel's independence which led to its adventurous

policies and actions and its ability and willingness to carry them out create serious problems for all the countries involved including the United States. Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, its Entebbe Operation to free the hostages, and lately, its attack on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia create a serious problem for all involved to the degree that they will tend to believe that Israel can and would carry out operations to threaten the oil fields in the region or to attempt to assassinate, just as it tried to do in its raid on Tunisia, and as the United States raid on Libya attacking the leaders who reject its proposals or who threaten its resources or existence.

24

All this shows that the situation has changed since 1956 and that the Soviet Union has less and less power to exert over Israel and the United States.

3-Another reason for the lack of an active and aggressive role by the Soviet Union is the weakness of the Arabs themselves. Their lack of an organized approach to the solution of the conflict is an important weakness.

The Arabs themselves do not have a clear view of what they want and how they want to achieve what they want. Do they want all the occupied territories after 1967? Do they want all of Palestine? do they want Sinai and the Golan Heights? Or do they want all of them "with minor changes in the borders in the West Bank"? With regard to the ways of achieving these goals they do have neither a clear idea nor a methodology. Do they want to achieve their objectives,

whatever they are by war, by peace, or by both. Do they want to do it themselves or do they want the Russians to do it for them?

It is a serious problem to which the Arabs themselves do not know the answers. However, the way they deal with the issues they confuse themselves, their people, their allies, and even their enemies.

This lack of a clear consistent view of how and what they want to achieve, just as is the case with the Palestinians, is very dangerous and distracting. The Russians do not know what the Arabs really want. Therefore, why would they get involved in a situation where their "clients" do not know what they want so that they could coordinate plans and carry them out.

I believe this explains the reluctance of the Soviet Union to arm the Arabs. The Arabs did not show a consistent goal that they wanted to achieve. It is true that in a situation like that of the Middle East it is difficult to keep up the developments. It is also hard in our international system, with alliance shifts and technical developments, to have a rigid methodology or goal. The Arabs have to respond to new changes and to be flexible enough to expect changes at the highest levels. However, it is possible to formulate a basic line for guidance in the operation of your cause. The Arabs have failed to do this and they still do.

The Arabs also have disappointed the Russians militarily. They have lost major battles and wars using Soviet arms leading some analysts to conclude that it was the Soviet arms that failed and not the humans. Regardless of who or what failed, the Arabs' performance exposed Russian military secrets when Israel was able to capture all kinds of Soviet weapons and radar equipments which it gave to the United States. This established a U.S.-Israeli advantage over the Soviet Union and threatened the Soviet defenses<sup>25</sup>

This Soviet fear of arming the Arabs with advanced weapons becomes meaningful especially if we know that the Russians consider the Arab regimes to be unstable and unreliable. Also Israel's proud of its role and ability to capture these weapons for use against the Russians, and to prove to the United States that she is an important and valuable strategic ally.

The Arabs have to prove that they can defend themselves and protect the military and security secrets of these weapons which they receive from the Soviet Union if they are to obtain the arms that they need. The Soviet Union is not willing to give its military secrets if they are going to end up falling in the United States hands through Israel.

4-Another important argument that is raised all the time is that the Soviet Union has an interest in maintaining the state of Israel. In this way the Soviet Union makes the Arabs rally behind them and keep the Arabs in permanent need

of Soviet help.

This "theory" is valid as long as the conflict is not solved. Since the Arabs need the Soviets as long as their lands are occupied. if they liberate or regain their lands there would be no need for them to invite the Soviets. Or, if the U.S. was able to convince the Arabs to force Israel to withdraw from their lands in exchange for the Arabs' expelling of the Soviets, the Soviet Union existence will be threatened.<sup>26</sup> This also shows that the United States does not really have a problem in expelling the Soviet Union from the region if it knows that the only way to do that is to satisfy the Arabs by giving them their lands through pressuring Israel.

In other words, if one of the United States's objectives in the Middle East is to expel the Soviets from the region, and if the easiest and fastest way would be to help the Arabs regain their control over their former territories now occupied by Israel, assuming that the United States is capable of pressuring Israel to give these territories back, the United States then will be capable of expelling the Soviet Union from the region. It follows logically that the Arabs would not need the Soviet Union any longer because their previous reason for needing her to help regain their occupied lands has disappeared. This explains the tendency of the soviet's need to maintain the conflict.

Therefore, the Arabs should not be surprised if the Soviet Union insists on preventing them, if they are able, from "liquidating" Israel<sup>27</sup>. The Arabs should also learn that the Soviet Union needs Israel in their midst because it "serves as a rallying point for potentially anti-Western forces in the Arab World."<sup>28</sup> This is also clear from the Soviets refusal to deal with the PLO "if the PLO enters into direct negotiations with the United States or Israel." However, "since the United States insists on direct negotiations,"<sup>29</sup> the PLO, then, is in a serious dilemma.

We see then that the Soviet Union, just like the United States, ignores the needs of the Middle East adversaries to satisfy its own interests. The Soviet Union does not want to see the United States taking complete control of the situation and evicting it from the region. To achieve this, the Soviet Union, again, just like the United States, subordinates the needs and the interests of the other parties to maximize its own gains and to achieve its own ends. This means that the two superpowers are willing to achieve their ends at the expense of the local parties. There is no reason to believe that they are not going to advance the regional interests of the parties ahead of their own.

From all of these facts we can conclude the following:

1-The Soviet Union is not willing to Jeopardize its relations with United States because of its clients in the Middle East. Detente is more important than the PLO.

2-The Soviet Union is unwilling and unable to convince or pressure the United States and/or Israel because they have recognized each other's common interests in the region. This makes it very hard to pressure the, United States, since great pressure would lead to conflict that both of them strongly want to avoid.

3-Israel's strength and willingness to use this power limits the Soviet Union's ability to exert pressure against her. This becomes even more important due to the fact that the United States is still maintaining and increasing its support and strategic cooperation with Israel. Therefore, strong Soviet pressures are precluded because of these facts.

4-The Arabs weakness and inability to defend themselves and protect the Soviet military secrets and equipment entrusted to them prevents the Soviet Union from arming the Arabs with advanced weapons, fearing their fall into Israeli and American hands.

Another important point in this regard is that the Arabs have neither a clear strategy nor the practical tactics necessary to achieve their unclear goals and demands. The Soviet Union has the right to expect a more clear and consistent strategy and set of goals if it were to successfully and positively help.

All these factors lead us to believe that the United States has achieved what Kissinger planned for the Middle

East. It is a fact now that the Soviet Union is neither willing nor able to achieve the goals of the Arabs, nor is it capable of helping the Arabs achieve their own goals. These facts should lead the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular to dismiss their belief that the Soviet Union is totally free, willing and capable of helping them. The Soviet Union has its own interests to achieve and protect and expand. If these interests contradict the needs and/or the interests of their clients, they are going, just like every other country in the world, to protect their own interests first even if this were to be at the expense of the interests of their clients.

The Arabs and the Palestinians should take note of this, and should use these facts to plan their future dealings with the Soviets. They should reevaluate their priorities and interests, and examine their compatibility with those of their allies.

The structure of the international system, including as it does, the global interests of the superpowers precludes the taking of an active positive role by the Soviet Union for the achievement of Arab and Palestinian demands and interests.

The Arabs have two choices. They can either wait for the present international power structure to change or they can interfere with it to change it themselves.

## Notes

1

The idea that the Soviet Union wanted to antagonize and weaken England by its recognition of the State of Israel is well known. An example of this idea is presented in John Donovan (ed.) U.S. & Soviet Policy in The Middle East 1945-1956, Facts on File, New York, 1972. See also Robert Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, Prager, New York, 1975, p. 10

2

The Egyptian officials were aware of this fact and they submitted a letter to Sadat demanding that Egypt "decrease its dependence" on the Soviet Union and take a more neutral approach in their international relations. Robert Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, Prager, New York, 1975, p. 75.

3

An example of the superpower competition could be clearly seen in the United States' "entereence" into Greece and Turkey to check possible Soviet "entereence". Another was the American overthrow of Mossedeq in Iran in 1953. In fact Truman was reported to have recognized Israel even without his U.N. ambassador knowledge to prevent the Soviet Union from being the first state to do that. Donovan, p. 43-44.

4

This was clear from many statements of American officials and major U.S. doctrines. The Truman Doctrine was very clear in this regard.

5

John Stoessinger in "The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict" in Seymour Finger (ed.) The New World Balance and Peace in the Middle East: Reality or Mirage, Carnegie Endowment for Internationl Peace, New York, 1975, P. 87.

6

See Freedman op. cit., pp.113-114.

7

Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook, Oxford University Press, New York, 1985, pp.6-7, 10-12.

8

The Soviet Union warned the French and the British "to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East by force" Bulganin also suggested the formation of an American-Russian force to restore peace in the region Donovan p, 257.

9

Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower Takes America to the Middle East, Linden Press, New York, 1981, P. 432.

10

Freedman, op. cit., P. 101.

11

Israel and its U.S.-Jewish Community have been working hard to mobilize the U.S. and its people to pressure the

Soviet Union to release the Soviet Jews. Its success is noted in some important cases but not as a general rule.

12

Joan Garratt "Euro- American Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1970-80: The Pervasive Crisis" in Steven Spiegel (ed.) The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1982, P. 88, 89.

13

Mohammad H. Haykal The Autumn of Furrý, ( in Arabic) 1982, p. 231.

14

The Russians lost five Russian-manned MIGs to the Israelis in 1969-70 when they tried to defend Egypt themselves. This incident had important consequences on the Egyptian reactions to the Soviet presence and power.

15

Israel demands now that for Russian participation in the proposed international conference that the Soviet Union resumes its relations with Israel. Also it implied its intention that the U.S. would demand Soviet recognition of Israel in exchange of American potential recognition of the PLO.

16

Livia Rokach Israel's Sacred Terrorism: A Study Based on Moshe Sharett's Personal Diary and Other Documents, Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Mass., 1980, p. 44.

17

This idea of the Soviet's role in "pushing" the Arabs into the 1967 War by Russian reports about Israeli preparations to invade Syria has been discussed and quoted very often.. In fact it was taken so seriously by the Arabs and used very well by Israel to make it sound true. Israel was massing its army on the Syrian borders. Nasser wanted to relieve the Syrians by massing his army in the Sinai. Israel used this as a pretext for the war. A complete and genius plan. For an example see Leonard Davis, Myths and Facts 1985: A concise Record of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Near East Report, Washington, 1985, P. 32.

18

Ibid., p. 33.

19

Freedman op. cit., shows that the superpowers have no real control over their clients which is true of both Russia and America. He states that the United States and the USSR "have learned over the last two decades that the mere provision of military and economic aid is no guarantee that the client state will do the superpower's bidding in either its foreign or domestic policies, particularly when the client regime's leadership is making decisions of great importance." P. 1 . Examples of this fact are numerous; Egypt's expulsion of the Russian experts, Syrian interference in Lebanon, etc...

20

Ibid., P. 104.

21

The U.S. complained to the Soviet Union about not informing her about the Egyptian preparation for the war which, according to the U.S., was "in violation of the 1972 agreement."

22

This was apparent in many cases. The Soviet union tried in 1967 to follow its previous attempts that it used in 1956-7 but failed for the reasons that are mentioned in the chapter.

23

In many instances and occasions the United States' leaders expressed their support for Israel and their willingness to insure its safety and security. Examples of the latest among these statements are those of President Reagan and his Secretary of State. The president stated that "For thirty years we have stood at the side of this proud and independent nation of Israel. I can say without reservation, as the President of the United States, that we will continue to do so not just for another thirty years, but forever." as quoted in Gazit, "America And Israel" Partisan Review, 1982. p.370.

Another important statement is that of Secretary of State George Shultz who said that the point of strategic cooperation is "to build institutional arrangements so that eight years from now, if there is a secretary of state who is not positive about Israel, he will not be able to overcome the bureaucratic relationship between Israel and the U.S. that we have established" as quoted by Dine in "The Revolution in U.S.-Israel Relations", JPS #60, p.139.

24

Israel was reported to have helped the U.S. during its attack on Libya in April, 1986. New York Times Magazine, February 22, 1987.

25

Military History lecture at CUNY-Graduate Center 1986. "The Israeli Air Force."

26

This happened in 1972 in Egypt when Sadat dissatisfied with the lack of Soviet military aid, expelled the Soviet experts thinking that this would bring U.S. actions to solve the problem.

27

Freedman, MERIP Reports #XVII, p. 22.

28

Ibid., p. 22.

29

Arafat in an interview in JPS #57, p. 143.

30

Kissinger's stated that "My strategy would be to frustrate the Arab-Soviet relationship. Then once the Soviets were frustrated with the Arabs we could begin a

process toward peace in the Middle East...In the various crises that occurred in the Middle East, in the Jordanian crises and in the Suez missile crises, we adopted a posture that was very provocative in order to demonstrate the limitations of the Soviet influence." , "Conversation with Kissinger", JPS # 39 "Spring" 1981, p. 186

## Chapter 7

### The European Role

This chapter will examine the role that Europe played and can play in the conflict. The first section will examine why the major European countries get involved in the Middle Eastern conflict. The second section will explain how the Arabs view the European role and how they think that the major European countries should help. It will also examine how Israel thinks of Europe's role. The third section will examine the reasons that prevented and still prevent Europe from pressuring Israel. The study will argue that Europe has not pressured Israel because of internal European and European-American relations. Europe did not pressure Israel also because of the Strength of Israel and the weakness of the Arabs.

The main theme of this chapter is that, although Europe had a strong influence in the creation and development of the conflict, it lost most of that influence to the U.S. and now Europe has very little to offer to help solve the conflict because of its dependence on the U.S. for protection and because of the strong U.S. support for Israel and Israeli military independence. Another major idea that will be examined here is whether Europe has an option and/or the power to enact it if it had one or wanted to.

## 1-When and how Europe became involved:

The first part of this chapter will deal with the role Europe had in creating and maintaining the conflict. By Europe I mean the major countries of Europe that had colonies and influence in the region; England, France, Germany and to a lesser degree Italy. These countries had a great influence over the Middle East at one time. In fact most of them had colonies in the Middle East. Palestine was a British colony since it was occupied in 1918 and officially mandated to England by the League of Nations in 1920. The Balfour Declaration, surprisingly was issued in 1917 just before England reached Palestine and occupied it and before it had a mandate over the country.

England gave up its authority over Palestine to the United Nations to solve the problem because England was unable to solve the problem of Palestine. The solution was to create two separate states one for the Arabs and the other for the Jews. The end result was that Israel now controls all of Palestine.

As mentioned in chapter one, it was England that had the power in 1917 to determine who gets what. England declared that :

"H.M.Government, after considering the aims of the Zionist Organization, accepts the principle of recognizing Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish people and the right of the Jewish people to build up its National Home in Palestine under a protection to be established at the conclusion of peace..." 1

In 1947 England knew that the Israelies were planning to control the lands the British will evacuate. This complicity of the British led to the control of the new state of even more lands than they were proportioned by the UN.<sup>2</sup>

France, on the other hand supported and armed Israel from the beginning. Most of Israel's armaments came from France. Even Israel's first nuclear reactor was supplied and established by the French. Not until the 1967 War did France alter its attitudes towards Israel. But not to the point to confront it or to tilt the power in any way. In 1967 France started an embargo on arms sale for the Middle East countries involved directly in the conflict. France now has more balanced policies in the region this is due in part to ideological and political commitments and to the need for Arab markets and oil.

Germany helped create the conflict by providing Israel with the emmigrants that it needed to establish the state. It is true that Germany had no intentions to do that, nevertheless, indirectly, it did the most important job in the creation of that state. Germany , as mentioned above, provided the manpower for the state. Later, Germany paid Israel for the losses of the lives and property of the Jews.

2-What is Europe Expected to do?

The two sides of the conflict, the Arabs and the Israelis, have their own views about the role Europe should play. Both of them think that Europe can help in solving the

conflict. The rest of this section will be an examination of how the two sides think that Europe should act in regard to the conflict.

The Arab countries believe that Europe can play a very strong positive role. They think that the U.S. needs Europe and Europe's consent to use its NATO's power and basis to confront the Soviet Union and to use European soil to deploy its missiles. This argument is invalid because the Europeans really believe that the Soviet Union is threatening them and that it is Europe who needs the United States' help, support, and protection.<sup>3</sup> Still, this has more significance if we realize that the U.S. still has to acquire Europe's consent to deploy its missiles and therefore, Europe can demand something in exchange and that "something" should be, according to the Arab-Palestinian formula, U.S. recognition and negotiations with the PLO . If Europe does recognize the PLO and influence the U.S. to do the same, then Europe could achieve the goal that the Arabs failed to do dealing directly with the U.S.

In other words, the Arabs believe that with their purchasing power, oil, and diplomatic and financial power they can pressure Europe, and especially France to demand U.S. consent to negotiate with them in exchange for whatever the U.S. demand from the Europeans.

This wishful thinking on the part of the Arabs is typical of how they conduct their relations with the West.

Europe might have an influence on both Israel and the U.S. However, the problem is whether Europe is willing and/or capable of influencing or pressuring them at this age and under the present circumstances. The Arabs did succeed in achieving some of their goals. They succeeded in convincing France to supply Iraq with the nuclear reactor and to support the Arabs in the United Nations.<sup>4</sup> They succeeded also in preventing the French from selling arms to Israel. This, of course, is not enough, since with complete U.S. support, Israel could withstand any French "measures". It would like to have good and positive relations with France and the rest of Europe but if French help and support was not forthcoming, Israel can still survive.

Another way the Arabs think that Europe can help with is if Europe arms them. The Arabs always need new weapons to match Israel's advanced weapons supplied by the U.S. The Soviet Union does not supply the Arabs with offensive weapons capable of making them achieve a victory over Israel.<sup>5</sup> With the U.S. continuously supporting Israel with the most advanced weapons and with the Soviet Union supporting the Arabs with defensive weapons only, the Arabs needed Europe even more. They have the money to pay for it, Europe needs the money and the oil, some very important deals were achieved especially with Libya and Saudi Arabia. These countries were chosen because France can justify its sales to them since they are not in direct war with Israel. This, of course, antagonized Israel and the U.S., but it

went through. The main actor in this sphere was France. Some of those arms ended up in the hands of the Egyptians (when it had good relations with Libya) and the Syrians. The question that remains unanswered is: Why wouldn't Europe help and support the Arabs?

### 3-The reasons for the lack of European support:

The Arabs' assumption that Europe can and need to help solve the dispute is a wrong assumption as we will see in the last part of this chapter. Europe has a very weak chance to produce any changes in the situation in the Middle East. The problem is that the Arabs, as have been found in this study, do not fully understand the implications of these facts. They think, as we have seen above, that Europe can pressure the U.S.; that it can pressure Israel, that it can sell them arms and nuclear reactors, support them in the U.N. and in the Security Council. The historical realities and Europe's responses are also clear. Europe has not done this. It did not pressure the U.S.; it did not pressure Israel either; it did not, and still not willing to, arm the Arabs and supply them with nuclear reactors. It did not fully support the Arabs at the U.N. The reasons for Europe's inability and unwillingness to do that are examined below.

Europe cannot and is not willing to help solve the problem because, first, Europe is not united, i.e. it does not have a common view of how to solve the conflict. Second It is also because Europe needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs Europe, especially for trade and defense. Third, is

that Israel is supported by the U.S. and Europe has no way of compelling Israel to accept their judgement and authority. This means that since Israel is powerful enough, by its connections to the U.S. and by its own political and military powers, Europe has almost no chance of pressuring her. And fourth, because the Arabs have not presented their case strongly and urgently enough with strong and credible conditions to show their seriousness.

1-The Lack of a common European view:

Europeans have dealt with the Arab-Israeli issue for a long time. Some of them, as we have indicated above, were former colonial powers and they know the dimensions of the conflict first hand. This, one thinks, could enable the Europeans to have at least a minimum of a common view and direction for its solution.

The countries of Europe have a general view of how the conflict should be solved but they do not have the mechanisms that will help them apply these views or convince the U.S. to do that. Their views range between a comprehensive settlement with comprehensive participation of all parties including the PLO to minimal bilateral and step-by-step solutions. The advocates of the first are France, Italy, Austria, and Germany, while the advocate of the other is England which supported Camp David very strongly. This lack of cohesive united view for all of Europe is a result of Europe's experience in the region and

in part to its political and ideological "maturity" and independence.

Since Europe knows that it is incapable of pressuring the U.S., basically because of their dependence on it, the Europeans try to pronounce their views often enough to remind the U.S. and the countries of the region of the role that they can play and of their value as an interest group that has solid and legitimate interests that should be taken into consideration. However, these pronouncements lead to nothing more than a vague reaction.

The basic differences between the European countries are those between France and England. Germany belongs in the middle between these two.<sup>8</sup> These differences are not really substantial. They reflect the degrees of these countries' willingness to take a path that is not completely approved and dictated by the U.S. In other words, France's position is the most unacceptable and unapproved of by the U.S. While Britain's is the most representative of the U.S. This is due to many internal and international reasons. This prevents the more independent countries of Europe from carrying out the more positive proposals.

England's reasons for the refusal to recognize the PLO, for example, is similar to those of the U.S., except that in the case of the U.S. it was due to the personal influence of Kissinger<sup>9</sup> who assured Israel of the refusal of the U.S. to recognize the PLO until the PLO accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. An incident that shows this close

similarity between England's and the U.S.'s views in this regard was the refusal of the British representatives to meet with the PLO's representatives in London because the PLO representatives, on the day of the meeting, refused to acknowledge their acceptance of Security Council's Resolutions 242 and 338.<sup>10</sup>

Internal national interests and political and ideological difference between the European countries explain their attitudes and the limits each of them is willing to go to.<sup>11</sup> France's almost total dependence on Middle Eastern oil for its energy needs and arms deals with the rich Arab countries influence its attitudes and willingness to recognize the PLO. This is also true of Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. But since England is almost independent in its need for oil and has its own "terrorist" group, the IRA, it has the leverage to reject the Arabs' demands to recognize the PLO and support their case. It does not need them as badly as France and the other European countries. It still needs their markets and trade but the price it has to pay for that is not high. England can afford to say no. They can get away with distancing themselves from the French, Italians, and the Germans who need the Arabs and their oil.

On the ideological and political level, France, with its socialist tendencies and commitments and with its emphasis on social, political and human aspects is more

willing to support the Arabs and the PLO than England which, itself, was the main creator of the problem. France wants to distance itself from the Suez debacle that it was "dragged" into and wants to reemphasize its picture as a democratic liberal leader for the developing countries. It wants to reemphasize its leadership of the "third way" that it commits itself to.

Another reason is an intra-alliance one. With the U.S.'s strong control of NATO and with its expectations that the NATO governments should respond to its demands and interests favorably in exchange for its huge finances of the Organization.<sup>12</sup> France, unlike most of the other members, is trying to assert its independence since it is not a member of the military wing of the organization.

As a conclusion to this section, Europe's internal disagreement on how the conflict should be solved and the substance of the solution is reflected in its inability and disinterest in actively working to achieve a solution. Europe's internal and inter-alliance disputes and power struggle supersedes the urgency of solving the Middle Eastern conflict the way it is presented by the Arabs and the Palestinians.

## 2-Europe and the U.S.:

One of the important actions that Europe can do is to try to convince the U.S. that it is against their, Europe's and NATO's interests that the conflict continues. However, Europe has no power to pressure the U.S., nor does it have

the power to threaten or influence Israel to withdraw. Therefore, Europe's role remains mostly in the sphere of public relations than in the political domain. All this and many people still believe that Europe can play a very significant role.<sup>13</sup>

The United States used all its resources after the war to rebuild Europe and to build with this Europe's dependence on it. The United States made an enemy out of the USSR to threaten Europe and to keep it under control. This process of making part of Europe depend on the United States and the other part on the USSR has succeeded in reducing the influence of Europe not only in the Middle East but in Europe itself to the degree that the U.S. is now free to deploy its missiles with great ease on European soil. The U.S. also goes over the heads of the European governments to make deals with the Soviet Union.

This shows that Europe has to submit to almost any American demands since the threat, a manufactured or a perceived threat at best, of a Russian invasion is believed to be so close to Europe. Of course, "poor" and "weak" Europe has to submit and accept the American demands and let the US use its soil to plant American missiles. In fact, the United State is becoming more demanding. It is interfering in the way the Europeans are conducting their international relations.<sup>14</sup> Now Europe is caught between the U.S. and the USSR. It cannot abandon the United States because it seriously believes that if the US leaves Europe, the Soviet

Union will "jump in" and occupy the rest of Europe.

Europe wants to develop itself and wants to compete with the rest of the world for economic power. It also wants to raise up the standards of living of its inhabitants. It does not want to spend its resources on armament and war efforts and industries therefore it accepts US protection and support and with this comes dependence and dictation. This is due, as mentioned above, to the problems and sufferings of the two major wars they fought in less than 40 years. The US provided the money and the technology and , in exchange, demanded the use of the European lands, seas, and skies for its claimed war with the Soviet Union. Europe had to accept.

Whenever Europe tries to assert its independence and when it tries to distance itself from the U.S. positions towards the Middle East as it did after 1973 as a result of the oil embargo and after the 1972 summit which "overlooked the European regional interests for achieving its global interests"<sup>15</sup> , the U.S. steps in and frightens Europe and reminds the Europeans about all the "good things" it did for them. The Marshal Plan, the defense against the Germans, and the protection from the Soviet Union which is waiting for the U.S. to leave Europe and occupy it.

The main idea that I want to clarify here is that because of many internal and international structures the U.S. is able to control Europe's responses and actions in regard to the conflict.

### 3-Israeli Power and Independence:

Another reasons for Europe's inability to exert any pressures and influence on Israel is the strength and independence of Israel coupled with unlimited U.S. political and military aid. Israel does not need Europe anymore. In fact Israel was warshipping planes to Argentina during the Falkland war with England . In other words, Israel is less susceptible to European pressures than before. The stronger Israel is the less influential the world becomes.

Just as is the case with the U.S., Europe is unable to exert any effective pressure on Israel. The time when Israel needed British and French support and permission to attack Egypt or other Arab countries has ended. In 1967 Israel did not even consider European reaction. France's response was to start an embargo of all arms shipments to the region. That is all they can do.

U.S. political and military support for Israel is unprecedented . This comprehensive support precludes any European ability to use their arms trade with Israel as a pressure element since Israel's need for European arms does not exist and even if does, it is not crucial to Israel's security. The U.S. substituted for all of Europe's arms deals with Israel. Israel also has a very strong and developed arms industry.

However, unlike the situation in the U.S., Europe does not have a strong pro-Israeli pressure groups to influence the foreign policymaking bodies. This aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship does not have the same effectiveness in Europe. Europe, therefore, does not have to respond or account to pro-Israel pressure groups as does the U.S. This is supposed, according to Arab calculations, to give Europe a better chance to pressure Israel or at least to adopt policies that may not please or satisfy Israel or its not-very-strong supporters. But we still see that Europe has not taken those measures or policies. Or, in the cases that it did, like France's recognition of the PLO and its nuclear help for Iraq, it did not create any changes in Israeli policies.<sup>16</sup>

Israel's attack on the Iraqi French-supplied nuclear reactor did not get the strong French response the Arabs expected. The French response, regardless of its strength and/or scope, would not have changed Israel's later actions or alter her policies in any way.

Europe cannot even use any moral pressures on Israel. If Europe tried to complain about the Israeli mistreatment of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, Israel would respond with the fact that it is using British Emergency laws and applies them to the same Arabs that England used them against. England also has the IRA, which Israel could use to equate its actions and responses against the Palestinians in the same way England responds to the IRA.

France, Germany and/or Italy are in no better position in this regard. In fact neither is the U.S. for that matter. The U.S.'s war and activities in Vietnam and its position in Puerto Rico and its support for the South African regime, among other things, is a weapon that Israel uses to silence Europe and the U.S. when they try to use their "Human Rights" slogans to deter Israel from doing what it does in the occupied territories.

As a conclusion to this section, Europe is unable to exert any pressure on Israel to withdraw. Neither is it in a position to influence the U.S. to exert any pressures on Israel. The elements that Europe has that it could use to pressure Israel are precluded by the nature and structure of the Us-Israeli relationship and by the military power of Israel. Therefore, Europe's ability to pressure Israel is almost not existing.

#### 4-The weakness of the Arabs' case:

The last important element in Europe's disinterest and inability to use its political and diplomatic powers to pressure Israel or to influence the U.S.'s policies is the weakness of the Arabs and the weakness of the way they present their case to the world and especially to Europe.

The Arab countries themselves, as argued in chapter three, are not interested in helping the Palestinians achieve their goal of liberating the occupied territories. This lack of strong interest and commitment to the

Palestinians is apparent in their unwillingness and inability to commit and use all their political, diplomatic, economic, and military resources and power to solve the conflict.

Seeing that the Arabs themselves are not helping the Palestinians, Europe is reluctant to use its power and resources to help them. Why should Europe Jeopardize its relations with Israel and the U.S. to do the Arabs' job?

In short, the Arabs have not presented their case in a way that will force Europe, the U.S., or the rest of the world to choose between their oil, markets, and political and geographical weight and the support for Israel. This, of course, does not mean that Europe or the U.S. will respond positively to such pressures as happened in 1973-1974. These countries have their own ways of getting the Arabs to submit to their needs. Trade, for example, is a two-way-street that Europe and the U.S. can use against the Arabs too.

The U.S. and/or Israel can pressure the Arabs as happened before.<sup>17</sup> The Arabs need the West more than they think and more than the West needs them. Some of the Arab governments and rulers, in fact, survived and still survive only because of the presence of the U.S. and Israel.<sup>18</sup> Many of the Arab states need the West more than they need the other Arab countries. How can they be able to pressure the West?

As a conclusion we see that:

1. Europe had a strong connection to the Middle East conflict and to the parties involved in it. England, Germany and France had a strong role in helping establish and strengthen an aggressive Israel.
2. Europe lost most of its influence to the U.S. as a result of its weakness after the Second World War. Because of the U.S. leadership of NATO in defending Europe, the U.S. was able to substitute for Europe's role in the region. The United States' global interests in the region superseded Europe's regional interests which antagonized Europe.
3. The Arabs still believe that Europe can help through influencing U.S. decisions and policies or by pressuring Israel through the U.N., trade, Military, and/or moral pressures.
4. Europe is disinterested, unwilling, and unable to influence the U.S. or Israel because of its need for the U.S. protection, and also because of U.S. complete and unconditional support for Israel, and because of Israel's strength and relative military independence.
5. Europe is in no need to use any of its resources and powers to exert any pressure over Israel since the Arabs themselves are not using all their resources either. Europe and the Arabs are in need of U.S. support and protection to the degree that their ability to influence or pressure the U.S. is precluded.

6. All these factors exclude any potential positive strong and effective role by Europe in solving the Arab-Israeli conflict. This should lead the Arabs and especially the Palestinians to think of more practical ways to concentrate on issues other than requesting that Europe do their job for them.

If Europe is not willing nor is it capable of influencing the U.S. or Israel then the Palestinians should search for different means to achieve their goal to liberate their lands and to establish their independent state on them.

## Notes

1  
Fisher and Krinsky, Middle East in Crisis: A Historical and Documentary Review, Syracuse University Press, NY, 1959, p. 83.

2  
Israel occupied in 1948-1949 parts of the lands that were designated for the Arab state in Palestine especially in the North, center and the southwest.

3  
See French Foreign Minister's statement about the relation between Europe and the U.S. in Gross Stein "Alice in Wonderland: The North Atlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli Dispute" in Steven Spiegle (ed.), The Middle East and the Western Alliance, p. 81.

4  
Examples of French participation in the U.N. on the Arab side were clear in the Egyptian-French proposals to the U.N. after the Invasion of Lebanon and Soviet-French proposal for an international Conference.

5  
This notion of Soviet refusal to arm the Arabs with offensive weapons is very clear and was emphasized in Sadat's In Search of Identity, Haykal's Autumn of Fury, and many other places.

6  
See Dominique Moisi "Europe and the Middle East" in Spiegle op. cit., , pp.23-24, for England's position toward the Camp David Agreements.

7  
Joan Garratt , "Euro-American Energy Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1970-80: The Pervasive Crisis", in Spiegle, op. cit., p. 88. Garratt makes it clear that Europe does not have a common view for the solution of the conflict neither does it have the mechanisms to solve it .

8  
For a complete analysis of the European countries positions on the conflict see Moisi, op. cit., pp. 18-32.

9  
See Stein op. cit., p 66 and note # 46 in Spiegle.

10  
This happened when the British representatives requested the PLO representatives to state their acceptance of the U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338 as a condition for his meeting with them as part of the Jordanian team to the U.K. Their refusal led to the cancelation of the meeting.

11  
A look at the tables furnished in Fouad Mughrabi's Special Report "International Consensus on the Palestine Question" in JPS #63, shows that although there is a tendency for the positions of the governments of Europe, in this case Greece, Great Britain and the Netherlands, tend to reflect the positions of their public, this tendency is not

completely representative. This means that the governments general positions are in line with those of the public, still it goes far beyond it.

12

The U.S. spends over \$80 billion a year on NATO. as quoted in Blitzer Between Washington and Jerusalem: A Reporter's Notebook, New York, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 7.

13

Not only do the Arab rulers and governments believe that Europe can still play an important role in solving the conflicts -which they do to avoid "liberating their occupied lands themselves-, other non-Arabs also believe that. Flapan in an interview with the Journal of Palestine Studies (JPS) stated that radical change will happen as a result of , among many other things, "the pressure of Europe and international public opinion" JPS #57, p. 38. Another is Crawford in Palestinian Exodus, (in Arabic), 1981, P. A. He states that "The truth is that the best hopes at the for achieving a kind of s Palestinian self-determination at this time through diplomatic means rests either in a strong European initiation or a change of government in Israel."

14

See Feldman in "Peacemaking in the Middle East: The next Step" , Foreign Affairs , (Spring, 1981), p. 765. Feldman clearly shows that the U.S. " is becoming increasingly intolerant of the Europeans habit of striking their own deals while enjoying the protection of America's defense umbrella. The Europeans are aware of this and are likely to refrain from further straining already precarious intra-alliance relations. Europe would murmur and complain, but in the end it would support this proposal."

15

Garratt, op. cit., p. 90.

16

As Crawford and many others believed. See note # 13 above shows.

17

An example of this pressure was Kissinger's "threat" to the Arab countries who led the oil embargo in 1973 as is clear in David Golub's When oil and Politics Mix: Saudi Oil Policy, 1973-1985, Harvard Middle East Papers # 4, P. 14.

18

This belief of the dependence of some of the Arab regimes on the presence U.S. and Israel is clear in Nadav Safran's books and in Blitzers "Notebook" that is mentioned above.

## Chapter 8

### The Role Of The United Nations

Since the U.N. was established in 1945 it became involved with the Palestine Question. In 1945 England was preparing to leave Palestine and submit its mandate that it "received" from the League of Nations to the United Nations. The U.N. has made many important political and economic contributions by its resolutions. The literature that dealt with the conflict is multiplied by the addition of the U.N. resolutions to the degree that no one can examine the Arab-Israeli conflict without considering the UN and its role. Even now, after all of its practical failures, the parties of the Middle East consider the U.N. to be the umbrella that they should negotiate their problems under.<sup>1</sup>

This chapter is going to examine and assess the role of the U.N. The first section will examine the timing of its involvement and the reasons and circumstances that led and accompanied this involvement. The second section will examine how the Arabs perceive the U.N. and its role. It is an important fact to note that the Arabs have changed their view towards the U.N. since its partition resolution in 1947. They consider it one of the most important pillars of international diplomacy nowadays, like every weak nation.<sup>2</sup>

The third section will examine Israel's view of the U.N.'s role. Israel's view of the U.N. changed too. From the birth place of Israel in 1947; to the recognition of

the PLO and the Palestinians rights to Zionism as Racism in 1975; and to the possible repartition in the 80's.<sup>3</sup>

The fourth is an examination of whether the U.N. can play any role at all because of its structure and system. The main argument is that the U.N. is a great waste of time and efforts and a distraction since it cannot, again because of its dependence and because of the nature of its duty, achieve any of the resolution it itself makes. My suggestions will be to dismiss it altogether as an arena for solving the conflict. Its security council, the strongest, but still ineffective, is divided between the superpowers who use it to control their spheres of influence and promote their national interests on the expense of the poor, weak and small countries of the world.

#### 1. The United Nations' Involvement in the Conflict:

This section will examine the timing and the circumstances that surrounded the U.N.'s involvement in the conflict. It will also examine the factors that influenced its continuation in taking the role that it did.

As we have mentioned above, the U.N. became involved in the Palestine question since it was established in 1945. Before this, the League of Nations dealt with the question when it gave the mandate of Palestine to England. England had occupied Palestine since 1918 and became the mandating power through the League of Nations, which it participated in establishing. In the late 1930s the Arab and Jewish

populations were trying to influence England to give them the right to control the country. England was not willing to do that.

The Second World War, with its toll on the British, forced the British to realize that they cannot keep Palestine without maintaining a large and strong army which they did not want to do nor were they capable of.<sup>4</sup> Internal colonial pressures also forced the British to give the U.N. the authority to solve the conflict that has risen in the country.

The U.N. sent several representatives and committees<sup>5</sup> to decide the best solution for the conflict. The final solution that the U.N., with the Western powers including the Soviet Union, found was to divide the country into two parts. One Arab and another Jewish. In 1947 the partition was concluded at the U.N. and the Arabs, feeling betrayed by the British and the World, rejected it.

When England left the country in 1948 the Jewish Organization in Palestine was ready to take their part and more. The 1949 armistice lines were far beyond the lines drawn by the U.N. resolution. Israel was able to defeat all the Arab armies. This only ended one stage of the role of the U.N. However the U.N. continued to play an important pacifying role and an important economic role in the refugees camps that resulted from the war.<sup>6</sup>

By following up on the situation, and through strong Arab demands to solve the problem, the U.N. kept its role vital to the conflict and to the parties involved in it. Through the U.N. the Arabs were able to extract very important resolutions from the General Assembly. The acceptance of all the Arab States into the General Assembly as soon as they became independent and the admittance of many Third World and Non-Allied countries that supported the Arabs, the Arabs had a significant support base in the General Assembly. They were able to use all of this support to extract strong and important resolutions on the conflict.

The Arabs, with the support of the other Third World and Eastern Block countries, were able, between 1967 and 1987, to produce very important resolutions at the U.N. By establishing these resolutions, the U.N. strengthened its position and became an indispensable element and actor in the resolution of the conflict.<sup>7</sup> The U.N. created conditions that will allow it to continue its role in solving the conflict. The U.N. too has a benefit in the continuation of the conflict in one way or another.

The continuous need for U.N. troops to man the armistice lines between the Arabs and Israel also meant the continuation of the role of the U.N. This role was also strengthened because of the Arabs perception of the role of the U.N. They kept the conflict alive by demanding further resolutions thinking that the U.N. is the place that the world gives its opinions and support. These resolutions

became, it seems , a goal in themselves for the Arabs, especially since the Arabs know that these resolutions are not going to be enacted.

## 2. Arabs' Perception of the United Nations' Role:

This section will examine the way the Arabs perceive the role of the United Nations in solving the conflict. It will also examine how, by becoming a focal point for Arab political activities and a center for conducting international policies, the U.N. became a real distraction from solving the real issues that the Arabs were and still are supposed to deal with and solve.

The Arabs' view of the U.N.'s role has changed dramatically since its approval of the Partition Plan in 1947. At that time the U.N. represented the world's rejection of the Arabs' demands and rights. Its resolutions were an injustice on top of the injustice of the British Declarations and activities. This view of the role of the U.N. has changed after the Arabs had a strong backing from the world and after having 22 Arab nations who, with the rest of the Third World Countries, formed a very strong block that, at least in the General Assembly, will win the passage of almost any proposal they put for debate.<sup>8</sup>

One of the strong beliefs of the Arab governments and their rulers is that it is very important to gain the support of the world even if it was only verbally. They believe that the U.N. represents the "honest" voice of the

world and therefore, if the U.N., which represents this "honest" world supports them this means that the world supports them. They are willing to do almost anything to gain this support just for the sake of it.

Whenever the Arabs had a problem with Israel, the first thing they will do, "just like they are supposed to do", they follow the book of the U.N., they "run" to the U.N. file a complaint and wait for justice to be distributed from an unjust irrational world system, the Security Council, where the "big" and powerful countries have a veto. One of them can veto the consideration of any question or problem! The strength of the Arabs' belief is clear from the way the Arab countries react when in a crisis. Several quotations represent the strength and seriousness of how the Arab countries take the U.N. <sup>9</sup> If the U.N. was able to create and strongly back the state of Israel, they argue, it can also create and back a state for the Palestinians.

The problem, as we will see below, is that the U.N. can do nothing to help either the Arabs or any other nation solve any of their grievances. All the U.N. can do is issue a resolution in favor of this or that view of a conflict which, materially, is worth nothing. The moral impact of U.N. resolutions is very significant and important. However, in an international system of competing states where the strong extract all they can and the weak protect all they can, morality is meaningless, in fact, it is a sign of weakness.

The Arabs expect the U.N. to do for them what they cannot do themselves. They want to show, through the acceptance of its resolutions, that they are peaceful and they are willing to cooperate with the international system. Accepting and referring to the U.N. resolutions, from the Arabs point of view, is a sign of political maturity and understanding. The fact of the matter is that the Arab countries use the U.N. since it is the safest path they can take. Through the U.N. they are sure that they will not lose any lands or become threatened by Israeli retaliation.

The importance of the U.N.'s support is only in the "moral edge" that it gives the Arabs against their adversaries which is, worthless as mentioned above. They expect that this moral support will weaken the enemy and force it to give in to their needs and demands as a result of international political and moral pressure. With Israel, and may be any other country, this does not work. In international disputes what counts is only real power and the will and the ability to use it.

As a conclusion to this section, it is easy to note that the Arabs want the U.N., with its international representation, to do for them what they cannot do by and for themselves. They expect that the world's support will force Israel to yield and give them what they want.

By following all U.N. procedures in trying to solve their problems, the Arabs expect the world to respect them

for their peaceful gestures and orientations. This expectation of the world's support is thought to have a strong impact on the enemy. They forget that the U.N. can do nothing other than the verbal support and understanding.

### 3. The Israeli View of the United Nations' Role:

This section will examine the way Israel views the U.N.'s role. Their view also have changed dramatically with the admittance of a large number of nations that supported the Arab case. Israel's creation was legitimized by the U.N. in 1947. At that time Israel looked up to the U.N. as the Arabs do now. It was weak and illegitimate, it needed the U.N., just like the Arabs now.

Later when Israel became strong enough and since it guaranteed Western and U.S. support it did not worry much about what goes on in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. The U.S. would use its veto. Israeli strength allowed her to disobey and refuse United Nations resolutions including Security Council Resolution 242 and many others. If it was not for its military strength and for the direct and strong U.S. backing Israel would have been expelled from the U.N. long ago.

The Israelis do not share the Arabs the same views of the U.N. For Israel, the U.N. does not represent the "honest" voice of the world. Israel knows that there is a strong and large block in the U.N. that will vote on the Arabs' side whenever the Arabs had a case regardless of the issues involved. This makes Israel resist the resolutions of

the U.N. more vehemently. It is true that there are countries that will vote for the Arabs just because they are part of a block that represents a forum for the weak countries. But it is also true, on the other hand, that there are some countries that support Israel regardless of the real situation especially the U.S.<sup>12</sup>

Since Israel thinks that the U.N. is not a fair and just representation of the world's opinion, it disregards its resolutions. Israel expects the U.N. to pressure the Arabs to become more moderate and accept Israel's definitions and assessments of the situation. Not in any way better than the Arabs. An important difference between the Arabs view of the role of the U.N. and that of Israel is that Israel knows, believes, and actively acts upon the belief that the U.N. can do nothing practical. The U.N., Israel believes, can not pressure the Arabs to accept the U.N.'s resolution of the establishment of the state of Israel. They do not recognize Israel. There are also many grounds, just as in the Arab case, where the Israelis think that the U.N. is not a place where, or a force that, one can count on.

This means that since the U.N. cannot enact its resolutions, then it should be ignored, except in the cases where the U.N. have historically succeeded; refugee problems, U.N. forces to man the armistice lines, education and health. In fact even these aspects of the U.N.

achievements are objected to by Israel when these aspects are related to the Palestinians. Israel believes that the U.N. support for the Palestinians in Lebanon and elsewhere is against Israel and against the U.N. charter, thus the Israeli successful demand that the U.S. not finance U.N. suborganizations that support the Palestinians.<sup>13</sup>

In conclusion, Israel does not think that the U.N. is the fairest organization where the Arab-Israeli conflict can be fairly and justly discussed and voted upon, because of the existence of a strong pro-Arab block. Israel also does not accept the U.N. resolutions depending on the count of vote. The U.N. is becoming more an arena of Arab political and diplomatic activities that precludes any Israeli significant role, therefore, Israel disregarded U.N. resolutions totally. With its power in the field and with the guaranteed U.S. military, economic, and political support, Israel does not even need to listen to the U.N.

#### 4. The Reasons for the failure of the United Nations:

This section will examine the reasons that prevent the U.N. from carrying out its very important resolutions. If the U.N. was able to carry out all its resolutions, the conflict could have been solved for a long time, though not to the satisfaction of all parties involved.

One of the reasons for the inability of the U.N. to carry out its resolutions is that it is controlled by the big powers for its financial and military existence. In other words, the U.N. does not have its own financial system

to generate its own resources and expenses. It depends on the goodwill of the rich countries to finance its operations. Cuts in these finances is one of the U.N.'s recent crisis.

If the U.N. tries to enact resolutions that do not satisfy the countries that finance its operations, these countries can withdraw, as some of them already have withdrawn, their financial support to its organizations. This was done even by the U.S. under Kirkpatrick who resented the U.N.'s votes on issues that displeased the  
14  
U.S.

Another example of how this fact affects the U.N.'s resolutions is when the U.S. threatened to withdraw its support if the General Assembly voted on dismissing Israel from the U.N. for its actions in Lebanon in 1982-1983. This control of the U.N. by the financing powers is a strong sign of the U.N.'s weakness and inability to be independent. This independence is a cornerstone in an organization that is supposed to solve international disputes. The U.N. loses most of its credibility on this issue. Another aspect of this problem is the dependence of the U.N. on the armies of the participating nations to protect or enact its resolutions. Since the U.N. does not have an independent army of its own, it remains under the mercy of the nations that would lend some troops to man the armistice lines between the warring countries. The countries that provide

these soldiers can at any time withdraw them. <sup>15</sup> And still, these troops are not really independent. They do not have an allegiance to the U.N. If their countries demand that they take part in the action, they would, since they are soldiers of their country and not of the U.N.

This lack of financial and military independence weakens the U.N. very much and precludes any serious help or support from it. This gives more power to the argument that the strong can still get away with what they have under such an international system.

Another important aspect of the U.N.'s weakness and inability to carry out its resolutions is its own system and structure. <sup>16</sup> The U.N. Not only lack the power and the resources to survive and enact its resolutions, it also created systemic and structural institutions that preclude its proper and just operations. With the Veto right for its permanent members of the Security Council it negates the democratic form that it pledges to enforce. The ability of one of the five permanent members to veto a resolution, regardless of how vital it is for millions of people, is a weakness that cannot be corrected in the General Assembly.

This "systemic error" has allowed the prevention of the passage of very important resolutions. This veto right is unjustified. There is no reason to have two forums in the U.N. system if one of them is capable of doing the main functions and duties of the organization. If the General Assembly is supposed to decide on the major international

issues , and if it represents the world's nations why then have another forum to block the activities of the first with veto power granted to specific nations only?

These two aspects of the U.N.'s structure and system, lack of independence and the existence of powers with veto rights, destroys the credibility and ability of the U.N. and precludes any serious role to be taken when it comes to solving serious and major problems like the one in the Middle East especially if you have superpower countries with veto power supporting the two sides.

The conclusion that one can get from this section is that because of this system and structure of the U.N. it is unable to achieve any serious and meaningful resolutions on the conflict. Even if it does, its system precludes its ability to carryout these resolutions which makes it a place for discussion and argument rather than a place for solving problems that affect millions of people in the world.

As a summary to this chapter it is found that:

- 1.The U.N. had a very significant effect on the Middle East conflict since its establishment. This role was strengthened by the enactment of important resolutions that were voted upon at the U.N.
- 2.The two parties to the dispute, the Arabs and the Israelis, had changed their views about the role of this international organization as a result of regional and international developments. These changes have effected

the operations and resolutions of the U.N.

3. Both parties believe that it is important to have the moral support of the international community represented in the U.N. but realpolitik precludes any major influence of the Organization on the future of the conflict because of internal systemic and structural problems in the organization itself.

4. These organizational and systemic problems are very serious and their existence threatens the operations and survival of the organization itself. The ability of the members to withdraw their financial support threatens the survival and operation of the Organization. The lack of an independent and strong army for the U.N. puts it under the mercy of the nations that provide these services.

Furthermore, the establishment of the right of certain powers to have a veto power is a further handicap for the organization's operations and decisions. The ability of the five powers to veto any resolution proposal automatically precludes the organizations's ability to make laws and/or carry them out.

5. The U.N. Has been a distraction for the Arabs . Since they strongly believe that the U.N. can help them achieve their goals, they spent and still spend too much political and diplomatic efforts to this end. These efforts are wasted because they will discover one day that the U.N. is unable to achieve their goals for them.

All these facts lead us to conclude that the U.N. , with its present system and structure is incapable of carrying its resolutions out which excludes its activities from the arena of exerting any pressures on any of the participants. This conclusion should lead the Arabs and especially the Palestinians who enjoyed a great political support at the U.N. to search for other avenues to solve their problems. The U.N. cannot do that for them.

## Notes

1

The latest example of this tendency to refer to the U.N. after all of its failures is the Soviet-French proposal to hold an international Conference under the supervision of the U.N. to solve the problem of the Middle East.

2

That was what Israel did in 1947-1948 when it was weak and needed international support and legitimacy.

3

The latest versions for the solution came from Tunisia's president who advised the Arabs in 1965 to accept the 1947 partition and, recently, to demand repartition under the U.N.

4

John Donovan, U.S. & Soviet Policy in the Middle East 1945-56, Facts of File, 1972, p. 46.

5

For detailed information see Fred Khuri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma, 3rd. edition, Syracuse University Press, 1985.

6

The U.N. is facing financial problems in its attempt to support the Palestinian refugees partly because of the U.N.'s systemic and structural problems.

7

See Gross Stein "Alice in Wonderland: The North Atlantic Alliance and the Arab-Israeli Dispute" in Spiegel The Middle East and the Western Alliance, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1982, pp. 72-75 for a spectrum of U.N. resolution on the Middle East.

8

The Arab countries tried in 1982-3 to mobilize other countries to vote for expelling Israel from the U.N. This move failed because of U.S. threats to withdraw from the U.N. if Israel was expelled. This shows both the degree of U.S. support for Israel and the U.S. control over the U.N.

9

Hazem Zaki Nuseibeh, Palestine and the United Nations, Quartet Books, New York, 1981. Nuseibeh quotes statement before the Security Council on April 11, 1976 stating that "Because the Jordanian troops were disciplined and respected U.N. resolutions, they withdrew a day before the end of the mandate" (emphasise mine)

10

The reference of all Arab rulers and governments to the U.N. has become a subject for jokes among the Arabs. The best example of the way the Arabs and especially the PLO view the U.N. was Arafat's statement in Al-Sakhrah, that "it is enough to have the U.N. support me." as if the U.N. is liberating Palestine for him.

## Conclusion

### What Is Left?

The goal of this chapter is to summarize the findings of the previous chapters and present the logical conclusions that can be drawn from the information the historical facts presented. The first part of this chapter will be a summary of the findings. The second will be an examination of the major conclusions. A third part will examine the implications and consequences of these conclusions. The last part will provide some suggestions for further research.

1. The problem as defined in the introduction has been to examine the reasons why there has not been an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Palestinian lands. That withdrawal constitutes the minimum demands for their renunciation of violence and the acceptance of Israel's right to exist. The major two Pillars of the Middle East conflict are the return of the occupied lands to the Arabs and the recognition of Israel's right to exist.

It is concluded here that the Palestinian are willing to recognize Israel's right if the latter promises to give up the occupied Arab lands. Israel demands recognition before relinquishing territory and it is unwilling to promise to do that. It is a Zero-Sum conflict since what one party demands means the elimination of the other.

2. One of the major findings of this study is that neither the Arabs nor the Palestinian have a clear view and solid

strategy for achieving their goals, Neither the goals nor the methods to achieve them are clearly or carefully stated. While it is true that the Arabs tried to confuse the Palestinians, this is no reason for the Palestinians not to have a clear strategy and/or goals.

For example, the definition of the Palestinian Minimum Demands that the Palestinians are willing to accept to enter into negotiations with Israel or the U.S. Another is the continuous use of the words "liberation," "liquidation of the consequences of aggression," "return of occupied lands."

In the definition section I defined these important terms. I also outlined, at least intellectually and conceptually, what the Palestinians are willing to accept as a minimum. Without that, this or any other study cannot be meaningful since the PLO itself does not have a defined minimum goal that could be acceptable.

This minimum includes the "return" and necessarily the liberation of the all the lands occupied by Israel during and after the 1967 war and not "all the occupied lands," which could mean all of Palestine or all of the Arab part of Palestine allocated the Palestinians by the UN in 1947.

These are very important differences and clarifications that the PLO either intentionally or unintentionally failed to define. I tend to accept the first, that the PLO intentionally failed to clarify the situation.

The conclusion therefore is that the PLO will not accept fewer than all of the Palestinian lands, i.e., the West Bank and Gaza, that were occupied during the 1967 war including the demand of Palestinian sovereignty over East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state with a connection, federation or confederation, with Jordan.

This is an important conclusion that we should keep in mind all the time while examining the Arab and the Israeli views of the limits they are willing to accept or give.

3. The first chapter examined the historical background of the conflict. It stated the historical development of the conflict since 1917, the date of the Balfour Declaration. It examined the role of the European colonial powers in Europe and in the region in creating the conflict. It also examined the the positions of the Arab countries before, during, and after the creation of the state of Israel.

It was found that historical and religious justifications aside, power is the only factor that determined the creation of the State of Israel. It was also determined that the historical and religious justifications for the settlement of Palestine should be dismissed because each group can produce emotional and national connections to the land. It was also found that the claim of each group to the land is exclusive and that the gain of one of them is necessarily the loss of the other.

It was determined that Israeli power shaped the conflict and that its use of its power to solve the problem

resulted in the creation of its antithesis, the Palestinians, and that, according to the nature of the conflict and the nature of the social and political evolution of any conflict, the result must be a synthesis of the positions of the two parties. The conflict will remain a zero-sum conflict as long as this synthesis is not reached.

Whether or not this synthesis is fair and just is not in question here. Just like the issue of historic "ownership" of the land, fairness in the outcome will not be examined here.

In the first chapter also it was explained that this study is an intellectual and conceptual study, that the views and conclusions of this study are totally academic and theoretical, and that they are not the result of the author's political or ideological commitments or understandings. Nevertheless, it sends a political message to Arabs and Palestinians who have not had a clear view of the real structures and realities of the situation and of the factors that determined and will continue to determine the developments and outcome of the conflict.

4. Another conclusion reached in the second chapter is that because of internal, local, regional, and international situations the PLO is unable to free itself from Arab dominance and is incapable of defeating Israel and pressuring her to withdraw from the lands that constitute their minimum demands. The Palestinian themselves are

incapable of achieving their Minimum Demands.

The reasons for this inability as examined in the first chapter are as follows. First, the Palestinian have no permanent, secure, and independent territorial base where they can train, plan, and rule freely without external Arab and or Israeli pressures or threats.

Second, the lack of a secure and permanent territorial base led to the ability of the host countries to dominate the PLO and fight it if it refused to follow the rules of these host countries. The experiences of Lebanon and Jordan are just examples of this tendency. The final outcome of these two facts was the dispersion of the PLO fighters and departments all over the Arab World, with all the negative political, operational, and military setbacks and that accompanied such dispersion.

Third, as stated above, the Palestinians have no clear goal that they want to achieve nor do they have tactical plans to achieve the goals they set for themselves. This is reflected in many contradictions in their statements and resolutions and in the continuous shifting of the small organization and their alliances inside the Organization.

A fourth and important weakness of the PLO is lack of access to its constituents in the West Bank and Gaza and in Jordan and the other Arab countries to recruit and train them and build a direct connection between the PLO and its logical supporters. This was, of course, due to the lack of trust between the Arab regimes and the PLO. They fear that

the PLO will use these people to overthrow or threaten the regimes in their countries. This resulted from a PLO mistake that occurred early in the 1970s.

All these weaknesses and shortcomings have strong negative effects on the PLO and its struggle. The PLO has ended up becoming a tool in the hands of the Arab regimes that have borders with Israel and have large Palestinian populations.

These "facts" help us to make sense of the relations between all parties and analyse the possibilities of an Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state connected to Jordan.

5. In the third chapter we have seen that the Arabs, fearing Israeli reprisals and loss of land, have tended to restrict the PLO operating from their lands and have started some contacts with Israel or the U.S. to try and solve the problem peacefully. Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, Assad's restriction of Palestinian use of the Syria-Israeli borders, Jordan's and Lebanon's attack on the Palestinians, all are very important and significant examples of this tendency.

The military weakness of the Arab countries and the weakness of the PLO and capacity strength of Israel to achieve U.S. support made the Arabs disregard their military option. With the absence of a military option, the Arab's political and diplomatic options become even weaker. The lack of an Arab unity or minimum understanding and

commitment to present their case clearly and seriously has also resulted in the world's disregard for the Arab grievances. If the Arabs are not very interested and are not willing to fight and present their case effectively and with conditions using all the resources at their disposal, why should the U.S., the Soviet Union, Europe, or any country in the world be more interested or willing? It is in part due to this weakness in the Arab stance that the situation has worsened.

Another finding was that the Arab system of government, which excludes the people from the decision-making process, weakens Arab governments and their rulers generating constant threat from below. This requires them to seek support and protection from the outside, mainly from the U.S. In this context it was found also, that internal Arab competition is far more decisive in defining foreign policy decisions than real foreign policy issues including the Arab-Israeli dispute. Their fear of each other pushes them into the arms of the U.S. to guarantee their survival and existence.

The lack of a real Arab commitment to liberate Palestine creates a harsh situation for the PLO. If the PLO cannot do it, and if the Arabs are neither willing nor capable of achieving the Palestinian minimum demands, who will ? how?

6. The fourth chapter examined the Israeli position regarding withdrawal. It examined the structure of the Israeli society

and the effect of this structure on the Israeli policy.

We saw how so-called "peace groups" are just a small fraction not really interested in saving the Palestinians but think that Israel should stop its policies of occupation. They want to be relieved of the "hazards and negative aspects" of the conflict. If Israel can do that without subjecting them for military services and losses of life it could well continue. Their reactions are not to support the PLO but rather to exempt them from the consequences of the government's goals and their achievements.

It was also found that the Israeli governments are not under any pressure to give up the West Bank and Gaza either to Arafat or to Hussein.

Another important conclusion is that the structure and the development of the Israeli society requires the occupation and/or the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza for political, religious, military, and economic reasons. There were no indications that the Israelis or their government might be willing to give up these territories. The most amusing reason we observed is fear of a Palestinian state next to Israel. The existence of any forces and/or factors that may prevent the Israeli governments from keeping the West Bank and Gaza were found to be minor and have no real effect in shaping or influencing, the Israeli government's positions and policies.

Factors such as possible American pressures, demographic factors in the occupied territories, possible Arab attacks, the frequent uprisings in the West Bank and Gaza and their consequences, and differences between Likud and Labor, were found to be of least importance in shaping Israeli policies in regard to the conflict solution. Israel, it was found, can survive and prosper under all these minimal pressures. It, with its powerful army and active society in fact needs these challenges to survive.

In regard to the demographic factor, Israel has lived with an Arab minority since it was created. The West Bank and Gaza Palestinian do not create a major threat. Given the continuation of settlements, the grand Zionist designs for Israeli power, the existence and influence of people like Kahane and experiences like Dir Yasin, Israel will find a solution for its Palestinians just like every other Arab country!

The Arab belief that the internal Israeli struggle between Eastern Jews and Western Jews is irrelevant in the conflict. In fact, it is found that Eastern Jews are more hostile to the Arabs than the Western Jews. Data from the ethnic background of the voters for the Likud were found to support this finding.

The most decisive factor in shaping Israel's rejection of any compromise with the Arabs was its military power and the unconditional military, economic, and political support in the U.S. Depending on this and securing its relations

with the U.S., and given the lack of any serious and strong Arab threat or pressures, Israel is in no mood and has no need to compromise.

7. The fifth chapter examined the role of the U.S. in the region and its role in a possible Israeli withdrawal. It also examined the Arab's and Israel's views of this role.

Factors like U.S. interests in the region and the services that Israel provides the U.S. with were also considered and examined. The impact of U.S.-Soviet Union relations was also discussed and the possible Arab pressures on the U.S. were also evaluated and assessed.

The major findings of this chapter should be known to the Arabs and the Palestinians. The Arabs have a misconception about the nature and the structure of the American political system. They think that they can influence the American public who will in turn exert influence on their representatives to pressure Israel and support the Arabs.

A related assumption is the idea that the Arabs must use their political and economic power and resources to influence American policies. The use of oil, money, trade, and military basis were suggested as means to achieve this end. These beliefs and ideas were rejected in this study for a simple reason, that the nature of the American political system precludes this type of influence. The belief that U.S. democracy allows the input of constituents was seen to

be erroneous. First, Americans, like Europeans, are least interested and least influential in foreign policy. Second, the theoretical fact about the relation between elected and the electors is not valid in reality, especially when it comes to foreign policy. This sphere of policy is totally controlled by the power elite that has its own views and understandings of the situation in the Middle East. The end result of this finding is that the Arabs are mistaken in their assumptions that they can influence U.S. foreign policies through American policies.

Another important finding was that the Arabs have not really presented their case strongly enough to threaten U.S. interests in the region. They still export their oil and provide military bases in exchange for funds and protection. The Arab rulers and their governments need the U.S. more than the U.S. really needs them. They need its protection and support. The Arab countries do not pose any threat to U.S. interests. Why should the U.S. do something that it is not forced to do?

The U.S. needs Israel and its services in the region. It needs it as a listening and spying post. It needs it as an advanced base in case of a war. It needs it for weapons testing and for the protection of United States clients. It also needs it to carry out services and operations that the U.S. itself, because of internal restrictions, cannot carry out. Why would the U.S. threaten its own interests by siding with and supporting the Arabs? The interests that

Israel serves and furthers are too important to be jeopardized for the Arabs.

Moreover, the pro-Israel and Jewish lobby is so strong in shaping the U.S. policy in the region that it has forced presidents, secretaries of state, and members of congress to refrain from proposing any laws that might threaten Israeli security. This pressure group is powerful enough to preclude any attempts by the administration to exert pressure on Israel.

In fact it is found that the U.S. government leaders are themselves interested in strengthening the connections and their dependence on Israel and its lobby in Washington, as the quotation from Shultz demonstrates.

The final important finding in this chapter was that the U.S., just like the Soviet Union, cannot pressure its clients, especially when it comes to important and vital national decisions. It is found that with all its power and with the strong Israeli dependence on it, the U.S. cannot pressure Israel to withdraw since the territories and the settlements are defined in national security terms.

Israel, as explained by Blitzer could threaten U.S. interests itself more than the Arabs can. Israel is also willing to use superpower differences and competition for its own advantage.

All these facts determine U.S.'s policies in the region and they show very clearly that the U.S. does not have any

pressing reason for abandoning or pressuring Israel to satisfy the Arabs or to solve the conflict in a politically or morally satisfactory way.

8. Chapter six examined the role of the Soviet Union since the creation of the state. It also examined the reasons that prevent the Soviet Union from taking bolder measures to pressure Israel or convince the U.S. of the necessity for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

This study shows that the Soviet Union has important interests in the region and that it is willing to protect them by any means. Some of these interests include the establishment and maintenance of access to the ports of the region, to threaten the sources of oil and energy of the West and the U.S. The Soviet Union may need to use these posts and footholds for bargaining purposes in the future if the need for this develops. The Soviet Union, it is concluded here, is willing, just like any superpower, to sacrifice its client's needs and interests for securing and protecting its own interests. If these interests clash, the Soviet Union will disregard the other party's interests and secure its own.

This should warn U.S. that if the Soviet Union's interests were to be threatened due to its inability to control its Arab clients in the region, for example, should they start a war, the Soviet Union will not sacrifice its most important interest: peace with the U.S. The Arabs should not totally rely on the Soviet Union's support. If

they were to pressure Israel to the degree that will force the U.S. to interfere, they will be left alone. For example, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Russians did nothing to protect their "friends."

Another finding in this chapter is that the Soviet Union is unable and unwilling to fight the Arabs' battle. The Arabs did not present their case with any degree of urgency and did not do anything themselves to show that they really are interested in pressuring Israel and/or the U.S. They have good relations with the U.S., which supports Israel. Countries as radical as Iraq and Syria have resumed their diplomatic relations with the U.S. Even the PLO is pleading with the U.S. to establish "contacts," with the Palestinians even if these contacts were unofficial. The PLO does this as if the U.S. has all the answers. There are no indications that the Arabs are serious about "liberating" the occupied lands.

Another important conclusion is that Arab demands for Soviet pressures on the U.S. or Israel were found to be meaningless because the Soviet Union does not have the power or the will to do that. Total U.S. military and political support of Israel and Israel's strength preclude any Soviet pressures.

The final conclusion in this chapter was that the Soviet Union needs the existence and actions of Israel. These actions force the Arabs to resort to the Soviet Union

and, therefore, the Soviet Union will have the opportunity to get involved in the region. If Israel goes and its threats do not exist there is no need for the Arabs to request any Soviet help or presence in the region.

These conclusions lead us to believe that the Soviet Union is interested in the continuation of the conflict and that it is against the Soviet Union's interests to see the conflict solved. This, I believe, should awaken the Arabs to the real intentions of the Soviet Union and to deal with it on this basis to reorganize their strategies and deemphasize the role that they have given the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not going to subordinate its interests to those of the Arabs. One of its main interests as examined in this study proves that they are not interested in having the problem solved.

9. Chapter seven examined the role that Europe is expected to play since its role in the creation of the problem was very strong. Both the Arabs and the Israelis believe that Europe can play an important role in solving the problem. Europe's relations with the U.S. and its dependence on it for protection and trade were also examined and their effects on the conflict weighed.

It was discovered here that Europe cannot bring any pressures on the U.S. as the Arabs thought it could. This is true because of Europe's strong need for U.S. protection, a need that was manufactured by the U.S. to control Europe and prevent it from turning to the Soviet Union. This need is

becoming very significant in determining the European-American relations. Their relations preclude any significant pressure from Europe.

Similarly, the question of exerting U.S. pressures on Israel. Israel, unlike the Arabs, does not need Europe's weapons and arms. The Arabs' idea about preventing Europe from selling arms to Israel becomes meaningless if we know that the U.S. provides Israel with the most advanced weapons and that makes Israel's need for European weapons a very minor issue to use for pressure purposes

Another conclusion that is common to all participants is that Europe's interests in the region have not been threatened seriously enough to prompt them to take stronger measures. Why should they threaten their relations with the U.S. and Israel if they can go along unpressured or unthreatened? The end result of this chapter is to disregard Europe's role in solving the conflict.

10. The last chapter examined the role of the UN. The Arabs emphasized on the UN's role and resolutions because they believe that its resolutions represent the world's views towards the conflict and its solution.

However, the UN is not independent nor does it have the power to enact its resolutions. The UN has produced excellent resolutions that if carried out would provide important steps for the solution of the conflict. However, its lack of power and authority to carry out these

resolutions means they are no more than diplomacy and legal talk.

The UN's system provides the big powers with veto power in the Security Council is not only unfair. This is also impractical, and gives them so much power that they can control the resolutions of the Council, which has strong implications for the role of the UN.

This also leads us to dismiss the ability of the U.N. as a practical influence in the conflict. All the U.N. can do is make perfect resolutions that will be added to its files and keep its role as a distracting organization to which the weak look for solutions, but only get resolutions.

From all these conclusions we can come up with the following summary of the real situation in the Middle East, one that could be used also to project the possibilities for Israel's withdrawal and the peaceful ending of the conflict. The summary concludes :

- 1.The Palestinian are disorganized , disunited, and weak to the degree that they cannot fight Israel or pressure it in any way other than through the immediate military operations they carry out.
- 2.The Arab countries are also disunited, disorganized, disinterested and unwilling to fight Israel on behalf of the Palestinian. They are also an obstacle in the way of the Palestinian to carry out their operations against Israel. To prevent Israeli reprisals against themselves and their countries th Arab rulers have massacred the

Palestinians and expelled them from their countries. There is also no hope for the Palestinians in present Arab systems and regimes. This should lead the PLO to disregard their reliance on the Arabs.

3. Israel is strong enough being supported by the U.S. to keep the occupied territories indefinitely because of the lack of any serious military and/or political pressures from all the participants in general. Israel is under no threat to evacuate the territories. The Palestinians should dismiss all talk of negotiations with Israel because it does not need them. Israel can survive without negotiating with the Palestinians or the Arabs.

4. Neither the U.S., the Soviet Union, Europe, or the U.N. can pressure Israel to withdraw and allow the Palestinians to achieve their Minimum Demands and establish their state on the lands that must be evacuated by Israel. These parties, the U.S., the Soviet Union, Europe, and the U.N. have no urgent reasons, interest, will, or power to pressure Israel. They also must be dismissed as forces to depend on for the withdrawal of Israel.

The Palestinian should have learned all these facts by now. They should not have built their hopes on these forces. This shows us that the conflict is a Palestinian-Israeli conflict and not an Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arabs have no conflicts with Israel; both of them benefit from the situation as it is.

Then, if all these facts are true, and this study found them to be so, including the fact the Palestinians cannot defeat Israel or resist the Arabs when they attack them, nor can they convince the Arabs to allow them to use their borders to cross into their occupied lands, what is left? What can the Palestinians do? What should they do ?

The Palestinians are not willing to give up their fight and their legitimate national rights. The Palestinians are not willing to yield their right to represent all Palestinians either. In fact, they are not ready to share this representation. The majority of the Palestinians fully support the PLO. It still can lead. But, again, what can the Palestinians do? What can they do without an army, without a stable, safe base in the region?

The possibilities for a solution of the conflict range between a Palestinian diaspora and the establishment of a "real" Palestinian state. Some of these solutions are examined below.

The possibility of a superpower imposed solution:

Is there any possibility of a U.S-Soviet participation to enforce a solution they think is fair and much safer for them. The U.S. and the Soviet Union might decide that the situation in the Middle East is getting too dangerous and is slipping out of hand and decide that they themselves have to control it by being there and forcing the two parties to accept a solution not very different from the one the two superpowers agreed to in 1967, i.e. U.N. Security Council

Resolution 242 which provides land for peace. This solution could be accepted by most parties especially King Hussein and it would be favored by Egypt.

However, there are many problems with this scenario. First, There are no indications that the U.S. and the Soviet Union are interested in getting closer to each other or in working together fearing that a closer contact might lead to further friction. The Middle East might be the ground where they want to avoid having real "physical" contacts by deploying their troops. Second, The very nature of the conflict and the vulnerability of the situation is beyond the control of any power including Israel and the Arabs. This includes the fear of "terrorist" activities that may lead to a war as happened in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon on the pretext of an assassination attempt of its ambassador in England.

Therefore, it is very unlikely that the superpowers will impose a solution on the parties involved in the war. Being there, the U.S. and the Soviet Union might find themselves dragged into a fight they were supposed to prevent. However, the two countries are, as mentioned before, not interested in solving the conflict. Both of them benefit from the conflict and think that solving it will threaten some of their global interests. To them, the Middle East is just a region that fits into their grand design of the world and not a place for living, as the region is viewed by the warring factions.

In another example, it is clear that a Soviet presence would reassure the Palestinians and some of the PLO factions might use this existence to carry out more attacks that nobody might be able to control short of war.

The possibility of an Austrian-type solution:

Could a demilitarized state for the Palestinians guaranteed and protected by international and/or superpower agreements be stabilized. This idea was examined by Plascov in A Palestinian State? Examining the Alternatives. Plascov argues that this would be the least-rejected solution for Israel and Israel would demand such demilitarization whatever the solution was. As in the Allon Plan, Israel sees a demilitarized zone in all the lands that fall west of the Jordan River as it does at present in the Sinai and in Southern Lebanon. Whatever the solution might be, Israel is going to demand a demilitarized zone in all the areas it is going to evacuate. International and superpower guarantees were also mentioned in this context and there is nothing new about the possibility of such a solution except to reemphasize that it was rejected by the Arab side. The Arabs, and especially the Palestinians think that in their state, just like every state in the world, they ought to be free to do whatever they think fits. No one can tell them what to do, or not to do, otherwise it would not be a sovereign state.

This emphasis on sovereignty is due to present international practices and guarantees. The U.N., which the Arabs are fond of quoting and referring to, guarantees all nations sovereignty over their territories. The new state, if it is to exist, should be sovereign too. Otherwise, why not make Israel demilitarized zone too? It is the Arabs' and, especially, the Palestinians' belief that a "just and permanent solution" should include and guarantee the sovereignty of the new state over all of its territories and that no country should interfere in the internal affairs.

The question still remains unanswered. What is to be done if the Palestinians are to liberate their occupied land? This research finds that the only alternative that the Palestinians can pursue is to work with Jordan. The Palestinian with their representatives in the PLO have to work with Jordan to secure a territorial base in spite of all the unhappy incidents that have taken place. Neither the International Conference nor Camp David with its Autonomy can work.

The advantages of working with Jordan are manifold. Most of the Palestinian population lives in Jordan. The PLO will also be close to its support base in the West Bank and Gaza. The PLO has dealt with the Jordanian authorities before. One of their major goals is to establish a state on the West Bank and Gaza in connection with Jordan. Hence the PLO must work with Jordan to achieve its goals.

### Suggestions For Further Research

In this research I found a shortage of studies about some important aspects of the internal structure and institutional system of the nations involved. Some of the materials and the data was out of date or inaccurate. More research is needed on the connection between domestic American politics and American foreign policy, the reasons for the lack of interest among American people in foreign affairs. No recent studies were found to examine the nature of the passivity of the Arab masses and the lack of any initiative on their part to influence their governments. It seems as if the Arab rulers and their governments rule totally independent of their masses' views and attitudes. The lack of any major survey of the Arab people's attitudes of the role of the PLO makes political analyses very difficult.

Similarly, there were no serious studies of the opinions of the Palestinians in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Consequently, the views of Palestinians in these countries have been ignored. What do they think is a good solution for the conflict? What are their views about returning to their homes in case of a solution? Would they like to return or be reimbursed? Would they be willing to remain where they are if a Palestinian state was formed or would they move and live in the new state?

These and similar studies are very much needed to construct a clear picture of the factors that influence the

PLO's actions and demands. The Al-Fajir survey in the West Bank and Gaza, which examined the population's views about very important issues such as Palestinian representation, their national demands, armed struggle, Palestinian leadership, and many other important aspects of the conflict had great impact. We need more studies like this.

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