

MANNING AMERICA:  
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, HOMO AFFECTIVE RELATIONS  
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

by

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VOL. I

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in English in partial fulfillment  
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Abstract

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The American Revolution freed the colonies from Great Britain, but the type of nation that America was to be and, consequently, the form of government appropriate to it, remained highly contested. As the numerous revisions to state constitutions, the debates over the federal constitution, and the split between Federalists and Democrat-Republicans demonstrate, independence ushered in large-scale conflict concerning competing definitions of republicanism and of the type of society that it engendered.

This dissertation argues that these questions of national identity were framed in part through textual representations of intimate male-male relations, expressed especially by the language of the affections as developed in the Scottish moral philosophy of Francis Hutcheson. I begin by arguing for the importance of recuperating Hutcheson's work, exploring his often unacknowledged centrality to eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought and the overlooked significance of natural philosophy to his construction of social systems. I then analyze the ways in which his ideas of the moral sense, and of the virtuous communities that its affectionate responses produce, were grounded in eighteenth-century models of bodily processes and materiality, particularly Locke's sensational psychology and Newton's theories of occult qualities. Utilizing a variety of critical models, including Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's paradigm of male homosociality, Alan Bray's and George E. Haggerty's analyses of male-male friendship,

and feminist work on the body, I link this corporeality to the affective premises of Hutcheson's communitarian ideals and to the gendered structure of civic power in eighteenth-century Anglo-America. Doing so enables me to theorize what I call "male homoaffective relations": intimate relations between men that produce the varying sociopolitical communities which underlie the differing visions of post-Revolutionary America. This model enables me to generate new readings of such foundational texts as *The Federalist Papers*, Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntly*, and James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans*.

## Acknowledgements

This dissertation has been a literal matter of life and death, permeated by issues of elder care that too rarely are talked about in graduate school. I began it in 2001, and shortly thereafter my father's health began to decline; I spent the next three years helping my mother to care for him while simultaneously trying to earn a living and to maintain something resembling satisfactory progress. I'm not sure that I would have made it had I not had tremendous support from both of my parents, from numerous friends, and from a dissertation committee that truly personifies humanitarianism.

It is, therefore, with extraordinary gratitude that I want to acknowledge the unwavering support I have received from my adviser, Joan Richardson, from my co-adviser Bill Kelly, and from Steve Kruger, who, although officially my third reader, has been a third adviser throughout the whole process. Their continued understanding of the complexities within which I wrote this dissertation, and their continued enthusiasm for my work, even when I meandered from nineteenth-century American literature to my present topic, made the process much more bearable than it would have been otherwise. I want also to acknowledge Susan Aiken, Roger Bowen and Tenney Nathanson of the Department of English at the University of Arizona, who enticed me into the Ph.D. Program in Literature there after I had completed my M.F.A. in Creative Writing; while I did not complete my doctoral work at the UA, if not for them I would not even have begun it.

A dissertation requires not only intellectual ferment and support, but other forms of ferment and support as well. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have friends who understood when I didn't speak to them for months and who understood when I would call in the midst of another intellectual or parental crisis needing to speak right

away. I especially want to thank Gennah Copen, Will Fisher, Liz Horwitt, Andrea Knutson, Paul Lind, Marah Loft, Nia Lourekas, Diana Polley, Mark Prezorski, David Robinson and Karl Soehnlein. Knowing that you were there helped me more than you can know.

Of course, dissertations are not written in monetary vacuums, so I want to thank as well Beatrice Krauss, the Executive Director of the Hunter College Center for Community and Urban Health, where I worked for almost the entire time that I was writing this dissertation. The flexibility and support you gave me when I needed it, and the laughter when I didn't, has been invaluable.

Finally, I want to dedicate this dissertation to my father, Harold Kaplan, who always wanted a Ph.D. in English, was never able to do so, and unfortunately did not live to see me complete mine. I dedicate it also to my mother, Lore W. Kaplan, who thankfully is still around to bug me and for me to bug her back.

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## Chapter One

### Hutcheson's Moral Sense Philosophy and Early National Formation

In his controversial book, *Inventing America*, Garry Wills challenged the canonical understanding of the philosophical framework within which Thomas Jefferson composed the Declaration of Independence.<sup>1</sup> Examining the draft that Jefferson submitted to the Continental Congress, Wills argued that the critical commonplace that Jefferson was influenced by the individualistic natural rights philosophy of John Locke in the *Two Treatises of Government* was wrong. Rather, he argued, Jefferson was influenced by the communitarian principles of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially by the moral sense philosophy of Francis Hutcheson. Questioning accepted scholarly notions concerning the genesis and rhetoric of one of America's foundational documents, as well as of the basis for the political ideals of one of the "Founding Fathers," if not of the Revolution itself, Wills' book inevitably prompted strong, and decidedly mixed, reactions from numerous historians of the American Revolutionary period.

Some of those reactions were quite positive. Gilman Ostrander, for example, noted several factual errors in Wills' analysis, yet also argued that Wills "has hit upon a genuinely important and genuinely neglected truth" (184), a viewpoint shared by, among others, Edmund S. Morgan, David Brion Davis, and Gordon S. Wood, all of whom observed that Wills' factual errors did not detract from the originality and significance of his work.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, in 1979, the Organization of American Historians awarded the book

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<sup>1</sup>Garry Wills, *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978).

<sup>2</sup>Edmund S. Morgan, "The Heart of Jefferson," *The New York Review of Books*, August 17, 1978: 38-40; David Brion Davis, "Jefferson Monument," *The New York Times Book Review*, July 2, 1978: 1, 17; Gordon S. Wood, "Heroics," *The New York Review of Books*, April 2, 1981: 16-18. See also John Howe, "Rev. of *Inventing*

the Merle Curti Award, an award given to the "best book in social, intellectual, and/or cultural history" (OAH).

Others, however, were not so impressed. Ronald Hamowy, for example, argued that those same errors erased any possible validity that the work might have had. While Hamowy acknowledged Wills' point about the important place of Scottish Enlightenment thought in the curriculum of colonial institutions of higher education, he acknowledged little else. Instead, he attacked not only Wills' methodology, but also his argument. Calling the book "speculative" and "unfocused," Hamowy concluded that it was simply wrong and, ultimately, of little value. He claimed that Wills had misread Hutcheson's political ideas, that they were in truth merely tempered versions of Locke's, and he then proceeded to restore Locke to his central, and, to Hamowy, his rightful, place in colonial political theory and writing.<sup>3</sup>

But while Hamowy acknowledged the political content of Scottish thought, John Patrick Diggins did not even do that.<sup>4</sup> Diggins instead argued that Scottish moral philosophy, with its emphasis on human sociability, could not have been used by the colonists in their struggles for the rights of Englishmen. At best, Diggins conceded, Scottish writers were perhaps ambiguous about the right of resistance—that is, when they were not being silent about it. He argued that the colonists could only have gotten

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*America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence*, by Garry Wills," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 36.3 (July 1979): 462-64; Stephen J. Whitfield, "The Pertinence of Garry Wills," *American Quarterly* 33.2 (Summer 1981): 232-42.

<sup>3</sup>Ronald Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment: A Critique of Garry Wills' *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence*," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 36.4 (October 1979): 503-23.

<sup>4</sup>John Patrick Diggins, *The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of Liberalism* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984).

inspiration for their revolutionary activity and its textual expression from John Locke because it was Locke, and Locke alone, who spoke the language of rights that they used in their struggles with England.

Putting aside momentarily the accuracy or inaccuracy of Hamowy's and Diggins' remarks concerning the political content of Scottish thought, their remarks, as well as the remarks of others,<sup>5</sup> point to a crucial element in the critical response to Wills: the place of John Locke in American intellectual history.<sup>6</sup> Viewed for many years as the undisputed father of colonial revolutionary thought and activity, by the late 1970s, when Wills' book was published, Locke's role as the sole philosophical author of the American Revolution increasingly was being challenged, and his supporters regularly were engaged in ongoing textual critical warfare. Beginning with Bernard Bailyn's *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, the argument that the colonial rebels instead had articulated and acted out of a republican ideology gained increasing strength, and the consequent dispute between those advocates and advocates of a natural rights genesis to the Revolution and

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<sup>5</sup>See, for example, Kenneth Lynn, "Falsifying Jefferson," *Commentary* 66.4 (October 1978): 66-71 and Harry V. Jaffa, "Garry Wills's *Inventing America* and the Pathology of Ideological Scholarship," *St. John's Review* (Autumn 1981): 3-19. J.R. Pole is decidedly mixed in his reaction to Wills' book, but decidedly less vituperative than Hamowy (J. R. Pole, "Rev. of *Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence*, by Garry Wills," *Journal of American Studies* 13.2 [August 1979]: 271-74).

<sup>6</sup>Ralph E. Luker, in his survey of the range of critical reactions to Wills' book, points to another element: that the negative responses were almost exclusively from critics identified with the American right-wing. Luker identifies Hamowy as one of those critics, which perhaps explains the vituperative tone of his review, a tone shared by both Lynn and Jaffa in theirs (see fn. #5), as Wills had been, at one time, a fellow traveler in conservative America who seemingly had abandoned its individualistic ethos for one more communally-based. Jaffa, in fact, ends his review by stating that he hopes that "the Right may become the Center of American politics" (19). Ralph E. Luker, "Garry Wills and the New Debate over the Declaration of Independence," *The Virginia Quarterly Review* 56.2 (Spring 1980): 244-61.

to Revolutionary texts raged for years through scholarly books and journals; indeed, with hindsight, one could even posit that it reached its apex in the late 1970s and early 1980s, just when Wills' book was published.<sup>7</sup>

Thus, it is not unreasonable to suggest that when Wills also questioned Locke's central place in colonial thought, his supporters, already feeling embattled, were quick to strike against what they perceived to be yet another attack from yet a different discursive direction; indeed, it is tempting to read those reactions, at least in part, more as statements of the strength of each individual critic's allegiance to that Lockean account than as evaluations of the accurateness or inaccuracy of Wills' assertion of a Scottish influence. For Diggins' remarks notwithstanding, as I shall discuss in Chapter Two, many historians of the Scottish Enlightenment have acknowledged the political content of Hutcheson's thought, noting its emphasis on moral virtue and its alignment with Country Whig ideology rather than with a Lockean ideology of individual rights. Indeed, Ostrander notes that Herbert Schneider had argued in 1946 for the primacy of the

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<sup>7</sup>Bernard Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard UP, 1967). The literature of this debate is voluminous, concerning as it does the origins and origin myths of our country. Thus, only a few of the large number of works can be mentioned here. For an analysis of republican thought in American politics of the period, see, in addition to Bailyn, the many works of Gordon S. Wood and J.G.A. Pocock. See also Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth Century Commonwealth Man: Studies in the Transmission, Development, and Circumstance of English Liberal Thought from the Restoration of Charles II until the War with the Thirteen Colonies* (New York, Atheneum P, 1959). For a Lockean viewpoint, see, in addition to the works of Joyce Appleby or Isaac Kramnick, Michael P. Zuckert, *The Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition* (Notre Dame, IN: U Notre Dame P, 1996) and Steven Dworkin, *The Unvarnished Doctrine: Locke, Liberalism, and the American Revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1990). See also the exchange between Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic," *WMQ* 3d. Ser. 43.1 (1986): 3-19, and Joyce Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," *WMQ* 3d. Ser. 43.1 (1986): 20-34.

Scottish Enlightenment in the development of the American Enlightenment, yet even though Schneider's book had been standard reading when many of those who critiqued Wills were themselves in graduate school, the Lockean thesis had become so well established that most critics reacted as if Wills was expressing ideas that were entirely new.<sup>8,9</sup> Ostrander's remarks, then, serve as apt reminders of the power of structures of belief to shape patterns of thought and debate, and the omnipresence, as well as perhaps the omnipotence, of John Locke in the critical imagination.

In fact, one characteristic of this debate was the exacting nature of its positions, especially in the late 1970s; one was a Lockean or one was a republican, an either/or condition that is a not uncommon marker of an early stage in any ongoing critical argument. Unfortunately, such a dichotomy meant that Wills' thesis, because it was outside such a structure, not only was dismissed by those who thought that it had no merit but, in addition, did not receive extensive critical engagement from those who thought that it did. There was no trail of articles and books through which ideas initially broached subsequently can be developed and refined, no back-and-forth that can lead to greater cultural and theoretical understanding. As Richard B. Sher noted years later:

If nothing else, Wills forcefully raised the issue of Scottish intellectual influences in America in the critical decades that preceded the institutionalization of common sense philosophy during and after the 1790s. But intellectual historians have frequently ignored that larger issue, preferring to engage in Wills-bashing rather than in carefully

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<sup>8</sup>Gilman M. Ostrander, "New Lost Worlds of Thomas Jefferson," *Reviews in American History* 7.2 (June 1979): 183-88.

<sup>9</sup>Herbert Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy* (New York: Columbia UP, 1946).

examining the impact of Scotland on the American Enlightenment. It is one thing, however, to expose Wills's careless claims and unfounded arguments on specific points; it is quite another to grapple seriously with his general, and quite plausible, thesis about the primacy of Scottish philosophical ideas and teachers in America during the second and third quarters of the eighteenth century. ("Introduction" 12)

Even today, this situation has not changed greatly. Although it is now more or less agreed that the colonists and early nationals were informed by multiple ideologies in their struggles against England, in their founding of the new nation and in their articulation of each of those long-term actions, this agreement sometimes reads as if it has been reached at least in part simply due to scholarly exhaustion.<sup>10</sup> On the one hand, such an agreement is important, whatever the cause, as it allows for a wider-ranging discussion of the interrelationship between liberalism and republicanism as those theories were understood in the eighteenth century as opposed to how they are understood today;

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<sup>10</sup>See Lance Banning's summary of these debates in his biography of James Madison. Banning argues throughout the book for Madison's abiding republicanism, but repeats his belief that the republican/liberalism dichotomy is false, all the while expressing his reservations about even revisiting, and potentially reopening, old points of contention. But see also Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, who insist that the language of republicanism faded in the post-Constitutional era, while that of liberalism did not, because the latter better suited the direction of the new nation, or Jerome Huyler, who argues that Lockean theory was the basis for the Revolutionary activities but that Locke's ideas have been misunderstood by contemporary critics. Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic* (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1995, esp. 428, fn. 3; Asher Horowitz and Richard K. Matthews, "'Narcissism of the Minor Differences': What Is at Issue and What Is at Stake in the Civic Humanism Question." *The World Turned Upside Down: The State of Eighteenth-Century American Studies at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century*. Ed. Michael V. Kennedy and William G. Shade (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh UP, 2001): 224-53; Jerome Huyler, *Locke in America: The Moral Philosophy of the Founding Era* (Lawrence, KS: UP of Kansas, 1995). See also Michael Zuckert, *Natural Rights and the New Republicanism* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1994).

it allows also for detailed analyses of other influences on the development of the idea of America as a discrete, independent entity.<sup>11</sup> Yet even though the parameters of this discussion have expanded, Wills' central proposition about the influence of Scottish communitarian ideas, especially Hutchesonian ones, on colonial political activity and expression remains at the margins of it.

For example, in a seminal article arguing for the importance of moving beyond the liberal/republican dichotomy, Isaac Kramnick notes that, "There was a profusion and confusion of political tongues among the founders. They lived easily with that clatter; it is we two hundred years later who chafe at their inconsistency" (4). In elucidating that "profusion and confusion," though, Kramnick names only work-ethic Protestantism and state-centered theories of sovereignty as additional discourses which he believes had a major impact on the thoughts and activities of the colonials and early nationals. Consequently, in an article dedicated to advocating for a more expansive theoretical overview of the field and written by a highly-recognized scholar in it, Kramnick only once mentions the possibility of a Scottish influence, and then only in a footnote. There he acknowledges the potential existence of three other elite influences on the political and social development of a new American identity in the pre- and post-Revolutionary

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<sup>11</sup>Even prior to the liberal/republican debate, there already had been a large body of work detailing the influences of religious beliefs, especially of Puritan covenant theology, on the American political thought of this period, although such work was often relegated to the sidelines while the debate raged. See Alan Heimert, *Religion and the American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1966); Edmund S. Morgan, "The Puritan Ethic and the American Revolution," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 24.1 (January 1967): 3-43; J. E. Crowley, *This Sheba, Self: The Conceptualization of Economic Life in Eighteenth-Century America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins U P, 1974); J. C. D. Clark, *The Language of Liberty, 1660-1832: Political Discourse and Social Dynamics in the Anglo-American World* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1994). There is also a growing recognition of the importance of non-elite discourses and activities in the pre- and post-Revolutionary era. See fn. #28 and #29.

eras, as well as on the political activities, both material and discursive, that surrounded the construction of the idea of America in those eras: "the 'language of jurisprudence,' 'scientific whiggism,' and the 'moral sentiment' schools of the Scottish Enlightenment"; however, he states that these influences are "less discernible" than the four about which he consequently elaborates, and that he will leave to others the task of illuminating their workings (4, fn. 2).

Kramnick's placement of this acknowledgment in a footnote, and his wording of the footnote itself, make clear that he believes that the effects of these three discourses on the social and political events of the time were, at best, minor, and certainly pale in comparison to the effects of the four that he analyzes so thoroughly. And clearly, at least in terms of "the 'moral sentiment' schools of the Scottish Enlightenment"—that is, the moral sense philosophy and theory of the affections espoused by Hutcheson and further developed by David Hume and Adam Smith, among others—Kramnick is far from alone in his presumption.<sup>12</sup> For even though his article was published almost twenty years ago, the result of this scholarly consensus then remains the same now: there has been only limited critical commentary devoted to Hutcheson's moral sense theory, and even less analysis of its effects on, and uses within, American colonial and early national political expression and formation. There are no grandiose texts, such as Gordon Wood's

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<sup>12</sup>In another now-classic article, James T. Kloppenberg argues that the liberal/republican debates focus on the wrong question. The colonists, he states, were arguing about autonomy and popular sovereignty, rather than about freedom *qua* freedom, and the critical discussion could more fruitfully examine how discourses were used toward those particular ends. Such questions were integral to the political philosophy of Scottish thinkers, but Kloppenberg, while agreeing that there were multiple elite discourses, names only religious, republican, and liberal. James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse," *JAH* 74.1 (June 1987): 9-33.

*Creation of the American Republic*, nor theorists, like Wood, Kramnick or Joyce Appleby, who have accumulated a consistent and sophisticated body of work. Instead, there is a small stream of journal articles and essay collections, some of which reference each other and some of which do not, that together document only the outlines, and few of the particularities, of the complex interrelationships between Scotland and the colonies and, within that context, of a specifically Hutchesonian influence on colonial and early national political thought.<sup>13</sup>

For example, as I discuss in Chapter Two, what has been called "the new Scottish history" has challenged Hugh Trevor-Roper's depiction of a barren and backwards Scotland dragged into modernity by the 1707 Act of Union with Britain. Instead, these new historians argue that Scotland, or at least Scottish elites, were very much integrated into transEuropean intellectual networks by the latter part of the seventeenth century, into transEuropean Protestant networks even earlier, and that a number of these elites had attempted to establish commercial enterprises in British North America prior to the Union as well. Consequently, such historians argue that, contrary to Whig

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<sup>13</sup>In addition to Wills' book, any research into the influences of Scotland on America should include Jay Fliegelman, *Declaring Independence: Jefferson, Natural Language, and the Culture of Performance* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1993); Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, ed., *Scotland and America in the Age of Enlightenment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1990); William R. Brock, *Scotus Americanus: A Survey of the Sources for Links between Scotland and America in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1982); Andrew Hook, *Scotland and America: A Study of Cultural Relations, 1750-1835* (Glasgow and London: Blackie & Son, Ltd., 1975); Douglas Sloan, *The Scottish Enlightenment and the American College Ideal* (New York: Teachers College P, 1971); and the special 1954 issue of the *William and Mary Quarterly* devoted to Scottish/American relations, *WMQ* 3d Ser. 11 (1954). For specific moral sense influences, see T.D. Campbell, "Francis Hutcheson: 'Father' of the Scottish Enlightenment." *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald P, Ltd., 1982): 167-85; and David Fate Norton, "Francis Hutcheson in America," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 154 (1976): 1547-68.

historiography, the era which we now know as the Scottish Enlightenment did not spring magically out of an empty landscape solely through the actions of an enlightened England and a few isolated great Scottish men. Rather, it developed, in no small part, as a result of the activities of Scottish elites who corresponded with each other and with elites elsewhere as equal participants in the intellectual ferment of the times; who were well aware of the growing transatlantic world; and who attempted to institute in Scotland, well before 1707, material structures that reflected and supported such intellectual and commercial endeavors. Their activities, as much as those of Hutcheson and others of his post-Union generation, created the conditions which made the Scottish Enlightenment possible.<sup>14</sup>

However, Hutcheson's position in that process has not been similarly recast. While individual critics have noted that he was not as isolated as that older historiography indicates, the evidence to that effect, including his involvement in the reforms at the University of Glasgow and in the Irish Enlightenment, as well as the mechanisms by which his ideas were transmitted beyond Scottish borders, is scattered

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<sup>14</sup>Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 57 (1967): 1635-58; "The Scottish Enlightenment," *Blackwood's Magazine* 322 (1977): 371-88. For a critique of that historiography, see Michael Fry, "The Whig Interpretation of Scottish History." *The Manufacture of Scottish History*. Ed. I. Donnachie and C. Whatley (Edinburgh: Polygon, 1992): 72-89. See also Hugh Ouston, "York in Edinburgh: James VII and the Patronage of Learning in Scotland, 1679-1688." *New Perspectives on the Politics and Culture of Early Modern Scotland*. Ed. John Dwyer, Roger A. Mason and Alexander Murdoch (Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers, Ltd., 1980): 133-55; David Armitage, "The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture." *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707*. Ed. John Robertson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1995): 97-118; and Fry, "A Commercial Empire: Scotland and British Expansion in the Eighteenth Century." *Eighteenth Century Scotland: New Perspectives*. Ed. T.M. Devine and J.R. Young (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell P, 1999): 53-69, and *The Scottish Empire* (East Lothian, Scotland: Tuckwell P, 2001). See also the many articles on Scottish intellectual history by Roger L. Emerson.

across multiple texts; to my knowledge, there has been no extended analysis of the interrelated social, political, intellectual and religious contexts within which his work developed and was disseminated.<sup>15</sup> Thus, while there has been ample criticism about later Scottish philosophers such as David Hume, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid, there has been, simply, much less work done on Hutcheson, even though his contemporaries viewed him as being one of the most important moral philosophers of the time. Furthermore, while some of the mid-eighteenth-century transmission routes of his philosophy to the colonies are known, there has been little analysis of what happened to and with it on this side of the Atlantic once it was so transmitted.

Finally, and for obvious disciplinary reasons, much of the new Scottish history generally has been concerned with analyzing larger historical processes rather than with performing a close reading of Hutcheson's texts and examining their discursive influences within Anglo-America. Yet most intellectual historians who have examined

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<sup>15</sup>For a further discussion of the omissions of this Whig history, see Devine and Young's "Introduction," fn. #14. For suggestive analyses of Hutcheson's wider activities and influences, see, e.g., James Moore, "The Two Systems of Francis Hutcheson: On the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment." *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1990): 37-59; M.A. Stewart, "John Smith and the Molesworth Circle," *Eighteenth-Century Ireland/Iris an dá chultúr 2* (1987): 89-102, and "Academic Freedom: Origins of an Idea," *Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy* 16.57 (1991/1992): 1-31. For Hutcheson's involvement in the Irish Enlightenment, see Ian McBride, "The School of Virtue: Francis Hutcheson, Irish Presbyterians and the Scottish Enlightenment." *Political Thought in Ireland Since the Seventeenth Century*. Ed. D. George Boyce, Robert Eccleshall and Vince Geoghegan (London and New York: Routledge, 1993): 73-99; Terry Eagleton, "Homage to Francis Hutcheson." Terry Eagleton, *Heathcliff and the Great Hunger: Studies in Irish Culture* (London and New York: Verso, 1995): 104-123; M.A. Stewart, "Rational Dissent in Early Eighteenth-Century Ireland." *Enlightenment and Religion: Rational Dissent in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Ed. Knud Haakonssen (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1996): 42-63. For discussions of Hutcheson's influences on British-American thought, see Robbins, "When It Is That Colonies May Turn Independent: An Analysis of the Environment and Politics of Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746)," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 11.2 (April 1954): 214-51 and Norton, "Francis Hutcheson in America," fn #13.

his writings more closely have tended either to misread them or to ignore their political and natural philosophical aspects, concentrating instead on their ethical/moral ones, a grouping I will henceforth term "the social," as each of these categories is concerned with different aspects of human relations in the sphere that we term "society."<sup>16</sup> While such a focus is clearly important to understanding crucial elements of Hutcheson's philosophy, as I discuss in Chapters Two and Three, it disregards those elements of it that are overtly political and ignores the centrality of eighteenth-century constructions of the human body and of bodily processes to Hutcheson's thought—indeed, to much of eighteenth-century social and political thought. It also misreads the relationship between the realm of the social and the realm of the political as they then were understood, transposing a modern conception of them as being distinctly separate onto an era that did not view them as such. Consequently, it disregards the political implications and dimensions of activities within that social realm.

Therefore, following Richard B. Sher's statement that much more needs to be done in order to fill in the gaps of our knowledge and to rectify the errors of older research concerning the full complexities of Scottish influences on the colonies and the new nation,<sup>17</sup> I shall return to Wills' claim about the influence of Hutcheson's communitarian moral sense philosophy on eighteenth-century American political thought

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<sup>16</sup>See, e.g., David Daiches Raphael, *The Moral Sense* (London: Oxford UP, 1947); Henning Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971); William Frankena, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 16.3 (June 1955): 356-75. For a critique, see David Fate Norton, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsidered," *Dialogue* 23.1 (1974): 3-23, "Hutcheson's Moral Realism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 23.3 (July 1985): 397-418, and *David Hume: Common-Sense Moralism, Sceptical Metaphysician* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1982), esp. Ch. 2, "Hutcheson's Moral Realism."

<sup>17</sup>Richard B. Sher, "Introduction." Sher and Smitten, fn. #13: 1-27.

and action so that this understudied aspect of our nation's foundational era can be more thoroughly understood. I shall argue that rather than being at best marginal to colonial and early national political expression and formation, Hutcheson's philosophy was one of the crucial discourses that helped articulate such activities; its language of the affections was more than simply that of an apolitical polite society which developed in the intellectual centers of eighteenth-century Anglo-America but was a political language as politics was then understood to be constituted. For, as Jan Lewis notes, "Affection . . . represented not simply the warm attachment of men and women for their families or of good friends for one another, but the cement that held people together in society. Affection was not simply a private or personal emotion, but a social one" (57). As the adhesive through which individuals conducted their personal associations, affection connected individuals with other individuals and thus constructed not just interpersonal relations but the society within which those forms of, and types of, relations existed and were interpreted.

Furthermore, I shall also argue that the affections are physical and physiological as much as they are emotional and political. Hutcheson, as I shall discuss in Chapter Four, claimed that they were invisible chains of relations that join each of us to others; calibrated by the responses of the moral sense to human intention, they are the basis upon which he articulates his vision of the ideal society. Such a conception of invisible attractive powers that influence the feelings and behaviors of others demonstrates Hutcheson's intellectual debt to early-eighteenth-century natural philosophy, which ascribed to physical objects the ability to act upon nearby objects through the actions of occult qualities—unseen forces such as *effluvia*, which were tiny particles, similar to vapors, that were given off by an electrical charge and that could affect anything

nearby.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, Hutcheson compares the operations of the moral sense to that of gravity; it is more powerfully attracted to, and impacted by, the human bodies closer to it than it is by those further away.

Yet, except for Hutcheson's clear intellectual debt to Locke's model of sense and sensation, the influence of natural philosophy, especially of Newtonian philosophy, upon his moral paradigm has not been examined. In fact, I shall argue in Chapters Three and Four that Hutcheson's application of Lockean epistemology has been misread, for it is generally thought that the moral sense is an analogy for a perceptive capacity that does not actually exist rather than, as I shall demonstrate, a real sense located in the biological heart. As the external senses respond to qualities in the external world, and through the pleasure or pain felt by them our bodies move either closer to or further away from the objects from which those qualities emanate, so too the moral sense responds to the qualities of beauty and virtue in human intention; we feel pleasure or pain accordingly, and move either closer to or further away from the human body from which those ideas emanate. I even shall argue in Chapters Four and Five that Hutcheson is significantly influenced not just by Locke and by Newton, but by a conception of the boundaries and powers of the human body that is radically different from our contemporary one. Bodies, in this eighteenth-century formulation, whether animate or inanimate, human or nonhuman, have attributes which can affect other bodies that we today simply do not ascribe to them; accordingly, we are not isolated individuals but are physiologically connected to those around us, even though such intimacy is not perceived by the external

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<sup>18</sup>For the invisible powers of objects, see, e.g., Isaac Newton, *Opticks* (1704), Query 31. For effluvia, see William Gilbert, *On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies, and On the Great Magnet the Earth: A New Physiology, Demonstrated With Many Arguments and Experiments* (1600).

senses. It is this inherent capacity of bodies to bond with other bodies, generated by the perceptions of the moral sense, which, Hutcheson claims, forms society. As that sense is located in the heart, the human heart itself is at the center of society.

Wood thus argues intriguingly, but all too briefly, that the language of the affections provided the pre-Revolutionary colonists with an alternative model of social adhesive in their struggles to break the existing adhesives that differentially bound a people to their superiors and, ultimately, to their monarch.<sup>19</sup> As his discussion illustrates, social relations, and the bonds formed by them, were perceived to be personal *and* political. The affections structured a society by binding its members to specific forms of relations within which they responded to each other in circumscribed ways; consequently, the language of the affections was crucial to the colonists' quest for large-scale social reorganization, an endeavor that was understood by them to have clear political ramifications.

Such an argument affirms that politics occurs not just in the development of, or in the relationships between, institutions or classes, but also, and perhaps even more so, in relationships between individuals, or between individuals and those institutions or classes. Even today, feminist theory argues that the personal is political; I would add that the political is interpersonal. Rights, for example, are predicated upon the creation of socially constructed identity categories through which an individual achieves a certain status and consequently either does, or does not, become a citizen. However, those rights do not exist in social isolation but, rather, take shape through interactions between that (non)citizen and the state, or between that (non)citizen and another, interactions that are

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<sup>19</sup>Gordon S. Wood, *The Radicalism of the American Revolution* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992): 213-25.

then articulated into an already-existing, or which create a new, framework within which to understand them. Similarly, nation-building is not simply the act of declaring independence but is, in greater part, the composite of all subsequent acts, after independence has been declared, that are taken by individuals in relation to others. Yet those interpersonal interactions, like those rights, only make sense through the discourses by which they are interpreted; the nation gets created, and rights become articulated, both through interpersonal acts and through the meanings ascribed to them.

Thus, if, as Benedict Anderson argues, the process of forming a nation is the process of imagining the community of that nation, Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, and the physiologically-based language of the affections with which it framed its understanding of human attachments, provided just such a discourse for communal formation, a discourse which not only enabled the imagining of affective communities but which also informed the social processes through which such imagined affective communities could become the basis for the imagined national one.<sup>20</sup> The language of the affections, as a language of relations, created and articulated not just social bonds but political bonds, not just social obligations but political obligations, not just social communities but political communities.

Here I want to make a distinction between the secular and the religious languages of the affections. One only has to recall John Winthrop's language in *A Modell of Christian Charity* or Jonathan Edwards' in *A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections* or Jonathan Mayhew's in *A Discourse Concerning Unlimited Submission and Nonresistance to the Higher Powers* to note the ways in which God's affections, located in the heart of

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<sup>20</sup>Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).

the saint, create intimate affective relations between the saint and God, or between saints themselves. These relations of the heart provide the basis for creating religious communities of the heart which can then act communally in the civic realm, creating, for example, a city on a hill or the obligation to disobey magistrates and monarchs whose edicts and laws are not consonant with those of Christ's justice.

At the same time, though, the eighteenth century was different. Just as, according to Newton, God had designed mechanical laws which enabled the universe to run on its own, so too, according to Hutcheson, God had implanted the moral sense in each of us to operate on its own through the physiological laws which He created. For Hutcheson, then, the capacity of the human body to form affective attachments was inherent to its God-given design and, thus, available to everyone; for Edwards, for example, that capacity was only enacted following justification. While religion, and the religious language of the affections, still held great sway, that impact was less visible in the political realm of the new nation than it had been prior to the Revolution or again would be until the Second Great Awakening and the growth of the abolitionist movement in the nineteenth century. With the rise of the civil state, it was the secular, rather than the religious, language of affections that became one of the important discourses through which questions of national identity were debated. It was, therefore, in the civil, not in the religious, realm that these questions mattered, and in civil affective communities, as opposed to in religious ones, that they were most fraught.

Therefore, rather than simply returning to Wills' specific arguments about the political elements of Hutchesonian moral sense philosophy and of the language of affections that it utilizes, I shall extend those arguments beyond the colonial period into the early national one, culminating in an examination of their application in *The*

*Federalist Papers* in the same way that Wills focuses on the Declaration of Independence as a fulcrum for his argument about Jefferson's Hutchesonian influences. As I shall discuss in Chapter Seven, the small amount of scholarly work on the presence of Hutchesonian affectionate discourses in the "American" part of Anglo-America has focused principally on the pre-Revolutionary colonies.<sup>21</sup> While this work is certainly important, such a focus carries with it the (presumably unintentional) implication that moral sense philosophy, as a social force and/or language, was therefore less significant, or perhaps disappeared altogether, in post-Revolutionary America. This implication is reinforced by the similarly small amount of work that does acknowledge a Scottish influence in the new nation, for there is almost no mention of Hutcheson as a direct or an indirect influence on its political debates.<sup>22</sup> Indeed, as Richard B. Sher notes, the well-known ascendance of common sense philosophy in American higher education in the late

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<sup>21</sup>Wills, for example, examines what he calls the "lost world" of Thomas Jefferson (169), a world based upon the communitarian notions embedded in Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy that, he argues, disappeared after the Revolution. Schneider's now-forgotten book focuses on the influence of Scottish thought on the pre-Revolutionary American Enlightenment (see fn. #9). Sher himself, while making a strong case for the need for further extensive work on Scottish influences, points that research toward the "second and third quarters of the eighteenth century" ("Introduction," Sher and Smitten, fn. #13: 12). Caroline Robbins claims that Hutcheson's political philosophy, as expressed in his posthumously published *System of Moral Philosophy* (1755), provided a theory for colonial resistance that justified the rebellion against England. See Robbins, fn. #15. David Fate Norton similarly argues that Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy had specific political elements that influenced many of the pre-Revolutionary elite, and traces the educational channels through which that philosophy was transmitted to that elite. See Norton, fn. #13.

<sup>22</sup>For example, Douglass Adair and Garry Wills have examined Scottish influences on the writing of *The Federalist Papers*, yet attribute that influence solely to David Hume. Douglass Adair, "'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth *Federalist*," *Huntington Literary Quarterly* 20.4 (1957): 343-60; Garry Wills, *Explaining America: The Federalist*. 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2001). See also Daniel Walker Howe, "Why the Scottish Enlightenment Was Useful to the Framers of the American Constitution," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31.3 (July 1989): 572-87.

eighteenth century sometimes has been extended back to a date that precedes the Revolution,<sup>23</sup> a move that makes Hutchesonian moral sense philosophy all but invisible within a realm where it was instead extremely visible<sup>24</sup> and elides the fact that Thomas Reid's thought developed directly out of, and in response to, Hutcheson's.

In fact, it is well known that discourses of sociability and of the affections were pervasive in the new nation, of which the eighteenth-century sentimental novel is only one manifestation, and feminist critics have examined how these textual discourses could be put to political uses by empowering women to act in ways that challenged their proscribed social roles. However, in the following chapters I shall elucidate the specifically Hutchesonian elements to such affectively-based political debates, for while later eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy, especially as articulated by Hume and Smith, developed in significant part from Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, that intellectual lineage is rarely discussed in literary examinations of the affections. Furthermore, as I shall discuss in Chapter Six, the affective powers Hutcheson ascribed to the moral sense differ specifically and importantly from those ascribed to sympathy; similarly, the physiological and political possibilities expressed by his communitarian formulation contained egalitarian prospects that in many ways ran counter to those later attributed to sympathy as well. Finally, I shall not examine only novels, for the vast majority of colonial and early national texts were not novels; as I shall discuss in Chapter

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<sup>23</sup>Sher, "Introduction," Sher and Smitten, fn. #13.

<sup>24</sup>Roy Branson, for example, asserts that Scottish philosophy was an important aspect of Madison's Princeton education, and ties it to his later political philosophy, yet in delineating the crucial role that John Witherspoon played in the institution of that Scottish element, he omits any reference to Hutcheson, even though it is commonly known that Witherspoon taught Hutcheson's moral philosophy extensively at Princeton, as I shall discuss in Chapter Seven. Roy Branson, "James Madison and the Scottish Enlightenment," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40 (1979): 235-50.

Seven, it is important not to limit ideological or intellectual analyses to a genre that, although becoming popular, shared the emerging sphere of print with other genres, such as pamphlets, sermons and captivity narratives, that equaled, if not exceeded, it in popularity.<sup>25</sup>

Extending this work into post-Revolutionary America, then, provides a fuller picture of the import and impact of affectionate discourses on the political questions of the time and on how such questions were linguistically framed, for the exigencies that propelled the colonists into rebellion did not end when the colonies became independent but, rather, took on new meanings, and, in some cases, new urgencies, that pushed and shaped this language into new directions under pressure from a changing social structure and political economy. While post-Revolutionary America was a period of great sociopolitical transformations and conflict, by definition this means that older social structures and belief systems still had resonance, or there would have been no conflict when such transformations occurred. Communitarian ideas, whether stemming from Hutchesonian or other forms of Scottish philosophy, from religious beliefs or from traditional agrarian and artisanal practices, clashed with the emerging individualistic ones that were acquiring growing sway among larger segments of the populace because, in the face of that emergent individualism, communitarianism still mattered.

For example, Jackson Turner Main argues that during the ratification debates for the proposed Constitution, the majority of Federalist support came from those segments of the white population connected to the emerging commercial, transatlantic economy,

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<sup>25</sup>See, e.g., Cathy N. Davidson, *Revolution and the Word: The Rise of the Novel in Early America* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), esp. Ch. 2, "The Book in the New Republic."

while the majority of Anti-Federalist support came from those segments of that population who lived at the margins of that economy and so were more attuned to older commercial forms.<sup>26</sup> While there are many rich aspects of that distinction, what is relevant to note here is that that newer economy stressed an individualistic ethos while the older one stressed an ethos which was more communitarian. Main's demographic breakdown has been challenged by Saul Cornell, who argues that there were in fact three types of Anti-Federalism, one of which was a powerful "middling" Anti-Federalism, espoused by artisans, small merchants and some farmers, whose proponents were squarely in favor of commercial development; yet even so, all Anti-Federalists, at any economic strata, promoted the benefits of a local government, focused on the community and on the forms of interlocking relations that it entailed, rather than on a distant national government which instead encouraged relations focused primarily on the individual representative.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, from the experience of those living at the time, it was by no means certain that those communitarian ideas would lose their impact. In post-Revolutionary America, as new nationals argued, in speeches and in print, about what it meant to be a republic, who was to have power in it, what type of power anyone was to have, what forms of government could best provide it, and what any of this meant for the daily life and larger destiny of America and Americans, the language of the affections was a key component of these arguments. In fact, the language of the heart, and its communitarian

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<sup>26</sup>Jackson Turner Main, *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1961), esp. Ch. 1.

<sup>27</sup>Saul Cornell, *Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828* (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the U North Carolina P, 1999), esp. Ch. 2 and 3.

basis, were crucial elements in the ideological struggles over American national identity that continued well into the nineteenth century.

As Main's and Cornell's data suggest, however, such affective communities were not imagined, or formed, in isolation from other social processes. Unfortunately, though, while there is now a substantial body of work on nonelite influences on American national formation,<sup>28</sup> Wills' discussion, similar to many other discussions of American intellectual history, does not place either moral sense philosophy or other elite philosophical influences into a dialectic with those other processes. Clearly, however, if moral sense philosophy was a crucial discourse in the formation of national identity, key to a full understanding of its impact and usage, as for that of any discourse, is that during and after the Revolution, nation-building had very different meanings, and allowed for very different activities, for white men than for white women, for the upper-classes than for the artisanal or lower-classes. It meant practically nothing for free blacks, certainly nothing for slaves, and nothing good for the native peoples upon whose land the nation was being built. The language of the affections, of necessity, was inculcated in these differences, for they took shape, in the end, through interpersonal relations, through the contact of one human being with another, contact that was structured by and through the social position of each person participating in it.

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<sup>28</sup>See, for example, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic* (Boston: Beacon P, 2000); Michael V. Kennedy and William G. Shade, ed., *The World Turned Upside Down: The State of Eighteenth-Century American Studies at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh UP, 2001); Eric Foner, *Tom Paine and Revolutionary America* (London: Oxford UP, 1976); as well as much of the work of Gary Nash. There is, in addition, a vast literature on the place of women in colonial and early national social structures; see fn. #29.

Therefore, in addition to extending my analysis into the early national period, I shall also argue that the secular language of the affections, as an elite discourse, reflected the structural basis for the sociopolitical interactions and institutions in and of the new nation, helping to shape the ways in which the stresses and strains to the post-Revolutionary social structure were understood and articulated. In particular, I shall build upon the work of feminist theorists who have examined the crucial role that gender played in the processes of national formation during this period and the ways in which the sentimental novel communicated social and political possibilities to women readers.<sup>29</sup> These theorists have discussed how the political aspects of affective bonds between women and men in the early republic marginalized women, as well as how affective bonds between women, especially between and among middle- and upper-class white women, provided alternatives to that politically marginalized status.

Such a focus, though, omits a sizeable segment of the population: men. For men, too, have a gender, and likewise are affected, albeit in different ways than are women, by the structural processes through which cultural meaning is made of and through human physiology. Feminist scholars, for understandable reasons, have focused on the status of women within that gendered and affective process, but there has been little comparable

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<sup>29</sup>See, e.g., Linda K. Kerber, *Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America* (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture by the U North Carolina P, 1980); Mary Beth Norton, *Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, and Co., 1980). See also Joan R. Gundersen's bibliographic essay in her book, *To Be Useful to the World: Women in Revolutionary America, 1740-1790* (New York: Twayne P, 1996). For the sentimental novel, see, e.g., Jane Tompkins, *Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1985); Davidson, *Revolution and the Word*, fn. #25; and Julia Stern, *The Plight of Feeling: Sympathy and Dissent in the Early American Novel* (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1997).

analysis of the sociopolitical aspects of affective bonds formed between men. Julie Ellison examines the political operations of what she calls "masculine sensibility" in pre- and post-Revolutionary Anglo-America, and links it to contemporary constructions of liberal guilt.<sup>30</sup> Caleb Crain argues that understanding the role of male-male sympathy is key to understanding the works of Charles Brockden Brown, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Herman Melville.<sup>31</sup> Ellison, though, focuses principally on gender constructs, while Crain primarily examines the private lives of these writers.

I instead focus on the public aspects of men's affective relationships with other men, the ways in which those relationships imagine particular constructions of the new American state. Analyzing such relations provides a deeper understanding of the politics of the early republic. In Chapter Six, I shall argue that such affective male-male bonds were crucial to the formation of the idea of "nation." In Chapter Seven and in a coda which follows it, I shall argue that they were critical specifically to early American national political formation, fraught with all the arguments about what type of nation America was, or was to be. What did it mean for the new nation to call itself a republic? What was the proper place of the federal government in the lives of its citizens? What type of economy would best strengthen it while enabling it to maintain its unique identity? What was that unique identity? How was that identity affected by all the gendered, racialized and classed noncitizens in its midst? Key to these and to other questions of national identity were relations between men: in the late eighteenth century, between elite men and, as voting requirements became increasingly expansive, between

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<sup>30</sup>Julie Ellison, *Cato's Tears and the Making of Anglo-American Emotion* (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1999).

<sup>31</sup>Caleb Crain, *American Sympathy: Men, Friendship, and Literature in the New Nation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).

and among other classes of white men as well—that is, between *citizens*, in the fullest meaning of that word. In order to fully understand the role of affectionate discourses and communities in those political concerns, I shall argue that it is necessary to foreground and to analyze the affective communities formed by such men.

Thus, it matters deeply that, in post-Revolutionary America, it was elite men who, at least initially, constructed the national image of America. It was they who, by law as well as by custom, occupied the positions of power and who, therefore, were the primary actors in the political issues of that time. They wrote the Articles of Confederation, they wrote the Constitution, they formed the national government and served that government both domestically and abroad. Clearly these activities were not uncontested, and equally clearly they did not, and do not, constitute the full history of American national formation. Yet, even so, it was, in the end, solely white men with a requisite amount of money or land who occupied the public realm of voting, representation, and government; it was they, and they alone, who constituted the body politic of the new nation.

But, of course, they were not alone; that national body politic, as is true for the body politic of any nation, consisted not of individuals isolated from others, defined only by their singular ideas, beliefs or social positions, but of individuals in relation to others, defined by those relations and the bonds formed by them as they acted out and through those ideas, beliefs, and social positions. Those relations formed interdependent webs of power which, as Foucault reminds us, both occupy and transcend institutions and modes of domination.<sup>32</sup> In the new nation, those "force relations," as he calls them, defined the limits to participation in the conversations and negotiations that constructed the "great

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<sup>32</sup>Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I. An Introduction*. Tr. Robert Hurley. (New York: Pantheon, 1978).

national discussion."<sup>33</sup> The gendered basis of those limits meant that the early national body politic was, quite simply, a fraternity, constructed by what Dana Nelson calls *national manhood*, an ideology through which the category of white male citizenship, in the turmoil of the post-Revolutionary era, was expanded to include white men of almost any amount of property as a means of stabilizing a governing class in an era when such men otherwise would be in increasingly destabilizing competition with each other. National manhood defined limits to that competition as a means of maintaining structural, and hence governmental, and therefore national, unity.<sup>34</sup>

Both Nelson, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, in a process which she terms "dis-covering," point to the ways in which such structural stability, in an era fraught with instability, was built by excluding women, blacks, natives, and poor white men from the body politic and from the discussions held within and by that body politic; it was that very process of exclusion which solidified the position of the white male citizen in the new nation.<sup>35</sup> However, such a gendered analysis, while extremely necessary and useful, omits the other relationship integral to that process: the one between the men doing such excluding. These men must come to some sort of tacit agreement with each other about who to exclude in order to maintain their dominant position. Ultimately, then,

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<sup>33</sup>Isaac Kramnick employed this term, originally used by Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist No. 1*, to title his now well-known intervention into the liberal/republican debates of the 1980s discussed earlier. Isaac Kramnick, "The Great National Discussion": The Discourse of Politics in 1787," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 45.1 (January 1988): 3-32. Carroll Smith-Rosenberg subsequently rereads and rewrites Hamilton's and Kramnick's terminology; Smith-Rosenberg, "Dis-Covering the Subject of the 'Great National Discussion,'" *JAH* 79.3 (December 1992): 841-73.

<sup>34</sup>Dana D. Nelson, *National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 1998).

<sup>35</sup>Smith-Rosenberg, "Dis-Covering the Subject," fn. #33.

foregrounding their relationships with each other makes clear that such an exclusionary process operates, in part, through the very mechanism of triangulation that Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues forms homosocial relations between men, relations that are more powerful than the relationship between either man and the third party: in Sedgwick's analysis a woman in a love triangle, here the noncitizens being excluded.<sup>36</sup>

For the process of exclusion documented by Nelson and Smith-Rosenberg meant, in the end, that such men were left only with each other. Within the body politic which they so forcefully circumscribed, the weighty matters of law, of economy, of policy, of all the issues that confront any government were determined solely by them, with a fierceness that betrayed the enormity of what was at stake: the meaning of the Revolution itself, the philosophical underpinnings to all their actions. These determinations occurred both inside and outside of government: in newspapers, in social clubs, in commerce, in all the various forms of public and private societies within which such men related to other such men. Joanne Freeman explains this fierceness by arguing that national politics at that time was personal, that Federalist and Democrat-Republican were loosely identifiable categories, not political parties in the way that we conceive of parties today.<sup>37</sup> As she makes clear, many of these men's interactions with each other were a far cry from the Hutchesonian ideal of a benevolent, affective community.

At the same time, though, there were limits to their interpersonal behavior; what Freeman calls "honor culture" separated elite men, no matter how combative with each other, from the mob. While Freeman does not discuss the homosocial aspect of this

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<sup>36</sup>Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1985).

<sup>37</sup>Joanne B. Freeman, *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2001).

honor culture, she makes clear that it was through those honor-bound relations that elite men of the early national period continually enacted and reenacted a nation of citizens, a nation comprised of men like themselves. It was their relationships with other citizens, and the community formed by them, which ultimately held together, or which threatened to split apart, the new American nation.

At the heart of my analysis of the political aspects of affectionate discourses, then, are these intimate relations between such men and the ways in which such relations were discursively portrayed. But my argument is that these relations were not solely homosocial; rather, they were physiologically intimate in a way that homosocial relations are not. For if Hutcheson's paradigm of the affections emanates from human physiological capacities, through which the moral sense responds to, and draws the body within which it is located closer to, benevolent human bodies, then the flesh-and-blood male body is central to that schema in a way that is different than its presence in a homosocial one. Consequently, I shall argue in Chapters Six and Seven that these relations are *homoaffective*, for they are based within, and structured by, the physiology of the affections, which join together human bodies, in this case male human bodies, into an ideal society. Male homoaffective relations are not homoerotic, for they do not stem from sexual desire, but they are physically and emotionally intimate, as they stem from eighteenth-century understandings of bodily operations. While male homosocial relations foreground the triangulation of power by which men's relations with other men become paramount, male homoaffective relations foreground the processes by which men's bodies attract other men's bodies, not by triangulation but by their benevolent intentions.

Ultimately, then, I shall argue that questions of national identity were contained not only in the daily interactions of such men with each other, but also through representations of male homoaffective relations. In this, I am again following the model of feminist, as well as queer, theorists who argue that the human body matters to the form and practices of political structures. When Publius, for example, states that Americans are "knit together as they are by so many chords of affection" (66), the nation that such a phrase envisions is radically different if the gendered (or racialized) body is, or is not, used as one of the analytic terms. Are *Americans* defined as all those who inhabit the territorial boundaries of the United States or are they defined as all those who inhabit the body politic of the United States? Clearly Publius, while addressing "the people," is appealing for votes; he is, then, ultimately appealing to other propertied white men, as they were the ones who could vote. Gender (or race), while unmarked, is ultimately present, as is the human body that is being affectionately knit to other human bodies; when that body then becomes marked, the nation that his phrase imagines is one of such men linked affectionately to other men like themselves. In his text, the affections unite the bodies of American men into the new nation. Those bodies, and their affective relations to each other, are the crucial building blocks that help determine the type of nation that that new nation will become.

But these chords of affection that knit together (voting) Americans are not simply rhetorical, for as Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy demonstrates, it was in the responses of these affective bodies to each other that the American nation would be formed and sustained; the social hierarchies embedded in the text also remind us that those affective bodies were solely white and male. These male homoaffective relations exclude other bodies from their perceptual purview, highlighting the importance of

horizontal intimate relations between particular classes of white men, not simply the vertical relations of such men to those below them in the social structure.

There is, then, a major tension inherent within affectionate discourses. While the language of the affections was available to women and to men, and expressed a form of relations available to both as well, it was also believed that men's affections were balanced by reason, while women's were not;<sup>38</sup> it was for this reason that white men, and only white men, were perceived as fit to serve in the government of the new nation—or, for that matter, of any nation at that time. Indeed, the emerging discourse of republican motherhood illustrates just that gendered dichotomy, seemingly expanding the space for women's authority even while limiting that authority to the home. In this sense, affectionate discourses, while expanding the possibilities of horizontal relations between men, did so only by expanding the subset of men to whom was granted social and political authority, not by challenging that vertical gendered and racialized social structure.

At the same time, though, affectionate discourses also contained within them other social and political possibilities. Just as religious affectionate discourses facilitated the formation of new communities of the heart which challenged local authority in the Great Awakening, so too secular affectionate discourses facilitated the formation of new communities of the heart which challenged other forms of authority; Hutcheson's egalitarian politics stemmed directly from his concept of an equality of the heart. Thomas Paine argued in *The American Crisis III* that: "We had no other law than a kind of moderated passion; no other civil power than an honest mob; and no other protection

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<sup>38</sup>See, e.g., G.J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1992).

than the temporary attachment of one man to another" (Avalon Project). According to Paine, it was affective relations (that is, *passion* and *attachment*, no matter how moderated or temporary) which held the nation together, thereby enabling the disparate pieces of colonial societies to see themselves as connected and therefore to act as one. While discourses of patriarchy bound the colonists to the king in a hierarchical web of male actors, affectionate discourses enabled those actors to create new bonds with each other, and to thus imagine, and ultimately to create, a new political entity out of such bonds.

The history of affectionate discourses, then, is, in part, the history of gender constructs, and of the political issues and concerns raised by and embedded within them. For example, Hutcheson does not argue that the moral sense of either men or women had stronger perceptive abilities as a natural attribute peculiar to their particular gender; however, as I shall demonstrate in Chapter Six, implicit in his affectional theory is an assumption that it is male affections and male affectionate relations which ultimately matter most. By the late eighteenth century, however, most critics agree that "the man of feeling" had begun to fade from the American cultural landscape; while still available to men, the affections were becoming increasingly gendered in a new republic that was creating a world of separate spheres which promoted republican motherhood as the highest form of service that a woman, especially a middle- or upper-class white woman, could provide her country.<sup>39</sup> This gendered world reached its apex in the mid-nineteenth century as the affections became sentimentality and sentimentality became fully

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<sup>39</sup>A corollary form of service was that of the republican wife. See Jan Lewis, "The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 44.1 (October 1987): 689-721.

associated with women, the sentimental novel with women readers, and the distinction between the sentimental world of home and hearth and the unsentimental world of commerce and politics with the separate worlds of middle-class women and men.

Yet, just as certain critics have argued that the discourse of separate spheres overstates gendered differentiations and minimizes the reality of women's political capabilities,<sup>40</sup> I shall argue here that male homoaffective relations retained significant potency in late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century America, even as emerging market economies were transforming perceptions of the human body's capacities and of appropriate male-male relations. Indeed, Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler point out that this narrative of an increasing cultural equation of sentimentality with femininity is not entirely accurate.<sup>41</sup> They argue that men, too, participated in nineteenth century sentimental discourse; it is not just that George Washington's famous tears moved the nation and then men stopped crying in public, but that the "American 'men of feeling' . . . [were] exemplary of the competing definitions of masculinity available in the pre-twentieth century United States" (8). While the self-made man who carried on independently and astutely in the world of commerce reflected the emergent individualistic ethos, his was but one model of masculinity and of gendered relations. Reading nineteenth-century discourses as they were perceived at the time demonstrates

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<sup>40</sup>See, e.g., "No More Separate Spheres," a special issue of *American Literature* (September 1998), published with additional essays as *No More Separate Spheres* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2002); Linda K. Kerber, "Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place: The Rhetoric of Women's History," *JAH* 75.1 (June 1988): 9-39; Jeanne Boydston, *Home and Work: Housework, Wages, and Ideology of Labor in the Early Republic* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990); Susan M. Reverby and Dorothy O. Helly, "Introduction: Converging on History," in *Gendered Domains: Rethinking Public and Private in Women's History* (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1992): 1-24.

<sup>41</sup>Mary Chapman and Glenn Hendler, ed., *Sentimental Men: Masculinity and the Politics of Affect in American Culture* (Berkeley: U California P, 1999).

that affective relations between men remained a powerful discourse, and the man who felt, who cried, who had affections for others remained a cultural option.

Yet there is a difference. As those market economies continued to take hold, and as older communitarian ones continued correspondingly to fade, the possibilities of male-male affective *communities* did begin to dissipate. Consequently, as demonstrated by texts of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, such as Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntly* or James Fenimore Cooper's Leatherstocking series, cultural critique increasingly was placed instead on the affective male couple. This shift away from the all-male community was fraught with potential dangers; as the history of sexuality demonstrates, male-male intimacy in the nineteenth century increasingly was elided with male-male sexual desire, and cultural attitudes toward it became correspondingly more negative, making male homoaffective relations, which by definition were centered as well in the intimacy of male bodies, increasingly difficult and suspect. Yet, in keeping with Chapman and Hendler's argument, E. Anthony Rotundo and Jonathan Ned Katz document alternative historical narratives. Rotundo illustrates that for northern, middle-class, white men, male-male romantic friendship was a socially acceptable form of relations during a specific period of their lives.<sup>42</sup> Katz painstakingly documents an intimate, romantic world of men that was structured in a very different fashion from our contemporary one, even while the possibilities of male-male eroticism were increasing in an urbanizing society.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>E. Anthony Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).

<sup>43</sup>Jonathan Ned Katz, *Love Stories: Sex Between Men Before Homosexuality* (Chicago and London: U Chicago P, 2001). See also William Benemann, *Male-Male Intimacy in Early America: Beyond Romantic Friendships* (New York: Harrington Park P, 2006); Katz, *Gay American History: Lesbians and Gay Men in the U.S.A.* 1976. (New

What these studies demonstrate is that there were conflicting cultural definitions of male-male intimacy that were part of, and reflections of, larger structural changes in American society from the Constitutional era to antebellum America. Older forms still resonated while newer forms emerged; the process is one of simultaneity, of overlap rather than of neat beginnings and endings. This is as true for the discourses of national political ideals as it is for the discourses of male-male intimacy within which such ideals were expressed. Examining the changing depictions of such male-male intimacy in crucial texts of the era, I examine the changing idea of America itself. Originating from Hutcheson's philosophic explorations of the role of the human body to the construction of *civil* societies, in both definitions of that term, the language of the affections helped shape and give expression to the nation, and to its multiplicity of ideals, that formed out of the American Revolution. Articulated between men, it bound those men to each other, publicly and textually displaying the male homoaffective bonds upon which the idea of America was constituted.

I therefore begin Chapter Two with a more detailed overview of Hutcheson's moral philosophy and review the literature on it in order to demonstrate how his conception of the moral sense, and, as a result, his moral philosophy itself, has been misread. By conducting an historically accurate accounting of Hutcheson's intellectual influences, as well as of his understanding of the human body and of human relations, I argue for the significant influence of natural philosophy on his work, and argue as well for the deep connections between its social, political and physiological components. In

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York: Meridian, 1992); and Clare A. Lyons, "Mapping an Atlantic Sexual Culture: Homoeroticism in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 60.1 (January 2003): 119-54.

Chapter Three, I discuss early-eighteenth-century conceptions of the operations and powers of the human body; because the body was seen by many as central to the construction of society, Hutcheson's claim that the key bodily organ is the heart (where the moral sense is located), not the head (where the understanding is located), led to the formation of a literal body politic which was dramatically different from Locke's. In Chapter Four, I demonstrate how Hutcheson applies Locke's model of sense and sensation to claim that the moral sense is a real internal sense, and I demonstrate as well how Hutcheson's claim is dependent upon eighteenth-century beliefs in occult qualities and in bodily capacities to which we no longer ascribe. I extend that analysis in Chapter Five to Hutcheson's use of Isaac Newton's theory of gravity to argue that the moral sense's perceptive powers are intrinsic to affective communal, including national, formation; in Chapter Six, I elucidate from that the centrality of male homoaffective relations to the creation and maintenance of any form of national identity. In Chapter Seven, I provide historical evidence of Hutcheson's importance to pre- and post-Revolutionary American discourse, and demonstrate how his moral sense philosophy provided a linguistic basis for conceptualizing the new nation as a male affective community; I demonstrate as well Publius's application of male homoaffective relations to his argument for ratification of the Constitution in *The Federalist Papers*. Finally, in a concluding Coda, I provide brief readings of Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntly* and of James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans* to outline a future project which will analyze the changing representations of male homoaffective relations in a commercial, nineteenth-century America in which understandings of male-male intimacy were changing as well.

Clearly, then, while my argument is that intimate relations between men, especially between elite men, were key to the idea of America emerging in the late eighteenth century, the majority of my chapters are devoted to an analysis of Hutcheson's thought. There is a very specific reason for this. As I noted earlier, and as I discuss more fully in Chapter Two, despite his perceived importance by his contemporaries, Hutcheson's philosophy has been analyzed less than that of many other eighteenth-century philosophers, and existing analyses often misinterpret his conception of the moral sense; it is therefore necessary to conduct such a detailed reading in order to construct accurately my argument about the ramifications of his ideas within Anglo-America and in the new nation. My focus primarily is on Hutcheson's first book, *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, as he here formulates those ideas, which he then develops further throughout the rest of his *oeuvre*; in Chapters Four and Five especially, I conduct a close reading of that book in order to establish Hutcheson's physiological framework upon which I then construct my argument.

This dissertation, then, is as much intellectual history as it is rhetorical and literary analysis. However, as I discuss in my Coda, it is my intention to extend this model of male homoaffective relations (indeed, even of affective relations, whether homo- or hetero-) to other Anglo-American writers and texts, both laterally across the eighteenth century and chronologically into the nineteenth; it is my hope as well that uncovering this model will have wider, interdisciplinary applications. Intellectual history, then, is a necessary first step in what I anticipate to be a significant long-term project.

## Chapter Two

### Francis Hutcheson: Background and Historiography

#### Overview

Francis Hutcheson was born in Ireland in 1694 to a Scots-Irish family; his father was a dissenting (i.e., Presbyterian) minister, as was his grandfather, who had moved to the northern part of Ireland as part of the early-seventeenth-century Scottish Presbyterian migration there after Charles I began to enforce Episcopalianism more strictly in Scotland. He was educated at an Irish dissenting academy and then, like many other Scots-Irish male youths who wished to continue their education, went to the University of Glasgow, for such youths, along with their English Presbyterian counterparts, were barred from attending Trinity College, Oxford or Cambridge due to their religious beliefs.<sup>44</sup> Hutcheson was an undergraduate at Glasgow from 1710-1712, and was then a graduate divinity student from 1713-1718. Returning to Ireland after graduation, he became a licensed dissenting minister but never took a position as one. Instead, after the Irish Toleration Act of 1719 legalized all forms of Protestant worship, he accepted an invitation to open a dissenting academy of his own in Dublin in 1720.<sup>45</sup>

During the 1720s, while running this academy, he published the two books that together established his reputation as one of the premier British moral philosophers of the time: *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue* (1725) and *An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the*

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<sup>44</sup>There was such a significant intellectual flow between Presbyterian northern Ireland and Scottish universities, especially to the University of Glasgow, that these Irish students were noted as *Scoto-Hiberni* in university records when they matriculated.

<sup>45</sup>For a more detailed account of Scots-Irish Presbyterianism during Hutcheson's time, see Ian McBride, "The School of Virtue," Ch. 1, fn. #15: 73-99; M.A. Stewart, "Rational Dissent in Early Eighteenth-Century Ireland," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

*Moral Sense* (1728). In each, he argued for the primacy of feeling, rather than of reason, as the basis for human motivation and action. Indeed, the latter book grew out of an exchange of letters between Hutcheson and Gilbert Burnet, who responded critically to an anonymous letter praising the *Inquiry* that Hutcheson had written and published in the *London Journal* in 1725. Burnet, the son of Bishop Gilbert Burnet, one of the Latitudinarians who were so admired for their views on the primacy of the affections by Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury (who, turn, was so influential for Hutcheson), disagreed with the *Inquiry's* attack on the centrality of reason, forcing Hutcheson to clarify and to elaborate. Their exchange of letters, called "one of the most sophisticated and interesting episodes in the eighteenth-century debate on the foundations of morals" (Turco 140), was published in that same periodical in that same year, and the letters were published as a collection in 1735. In addition, between 1725-1727 Hutcheson published six letters in the *Dublin Journal*, three critical of Hobbes' view that our actions derive from self-interest (published together in 1725 as *Thoughts on Laughter*) and three critical of Bernard Mandeville's view about the public benefits of self-interested actions (published together in 1726 as *Observations on "The Fable of the Bees"*).<sup>46</sup>

Both of Hutcheson's books were exceedingly popular, and the critical exchanges brought him even more renown; indeed, some critics have argued that his Irish works were actually his most original and important.<sup>47</sup> The *Inquiry*, for example, was published

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<sup>46</sup>All six were reprinted together in 1758 by the Foulis Press, the primary publisher of most of Hutcheson's work, as *Thoughts on Laughter and Observations on "The Fable of the Bees" in Six Letters*.

<sup>47</sup>See, e.g., Robert Wokler, "Projecting the Enlightenment." *After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre*. Ed. John Horton and Susan Mendus (Notre Dame, IN: U of Notre Dame P, 1994: 108-126; Terry Eagleton, "Homage

in four editions between 1725 and 1738, was translated into French in 1749 and into German in 1762. The *Essay* was published twice in 1728, once in 1730, and again in 1756, with a German translation published in 1760. Due to this growing reputation, Hutcheson was appointed Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in 1729 after the death of Gershom Carmichael, his former professor; he assumed the post in 1730, bringing more than 20 of his students with him (an action which demonstrated not just his popularity but also, and perhaps more importantly, his ability to bring monies into the university), and remained there until his death in 1746.

While at Glasgow, he wrote a pamphlet on patronage, which was published in 1735, translated Marcus Aurelius' meditations on natural law, which was published in 1742, and wrote *A System of Moral Philosophy*, which was published posthumously in 1755, as was a compilation of his lectures, *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, in 1747. The two latter works were also quite popular, going through multiple editions and translations.<sup>48</sup>

As a professor, Hutcheson was a leader of what is now known as the "Moderate Party," a group of Scottish professors and religious leaders who, in the first part of the eighteenth century, sought to free Scottish universities from the conservative religious and intellectual influence of the Scottish Kirk; his efforts in this regard were, in effect, a continuation of the New Light beliefs that had marked his religious and intellectual work

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to Francis Hutcheson," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>48</sup>For further information on Hutcheson's writings, and their publication history, see Bernard Peach's introduction to his edition of Hutcheson's *Illustrations on the Moral Sense* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1971).

and circles in Dublin in the 1720s.<sup>49</sup> As I shall discuss in greater detail in the last section of this chapter, the Kirk at that time was comprised primarily of Reformed scholastic clergy who adhered to medieval forms of thought about human nature, God's omnipotence and scientific endeavors. As Roger L. Emerson and Paul Wood note, this curriculum was premised on the notion of "[a] divinely created, unified and hierarchically ordered universe [, which] was taken to be the object of human knowledge, [and] which meant that what was known had to be presented as a system of integrated truths which described God's creation as humankind was privileged to know it" (89). These clergy therefore resisted quite strenuously the emerging, liberalizing philosophic and religious trends that we associate with the intellectual movements of the time, which were premised upon open exploration and inquiry, rather than upon transmitting received knowledge, and which Hutcheson and other Moderate individuals wanted to bring into Scottish university curricula.

In this endeavor, the Moderate Party was supported by Scottish Whig political leaders, who saw the universities as sites of patronage through which they could consolidate personal power while extending the influence of the Whig administrative state. This challenge to the Kirk, therefore, of which Hutcheson was a key figure, was not only academic and religious but also was deeply political, and was understood to be such by its participants, for it entailed potentially significant changes to the structural relations between religious and secular social institutions, to the amount of power that each of those institutions respectively held, and to the ways in which that power was

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<sup>49</sup>Michael Brown, "The Ministry of Ethics': Francis Hutcheson and the Language of New Light Theology." *Propagating the Word of Irish Dissent, 1650-1800*. Ed. Kevin Herlihy (Portland, OR: Four Courts P, Ltd., 1998): 95-113; Stewart, "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15: 45-6.

exercised by them. Hutcheson's philosophy made him attractive to those desiring to mount such a challenge in no small part because it espoused a particular political vision that would assist them in it. Indeed, his professorial appointment itself was part of that larger political challenge to the Kirk.

In fact, after his appointment, the majority of Hutcheson's efforts were to his pedagogical duties and their political ramifications rather than to writing and publishing, and he himself was charged with heresy by the Glasgow presbytery in 1738. The Kirk, however, had significantly less power at that point than it had had 10 years earlier, when John Simson, a Glasgow professor of divinity under whom Hutcheson previously had studied, was also charged with heresy, an event which, as I shall also discuss in the last section of this chapter, was a watershed moment in the changing relationship between the Kirk and the Scottish (and then British) state. Unlike Simson, who was unable to continue teaching after being so charged, Hutcheson was not affected. He was actually a very popular teacher, in part because he was the first professor at Glasgow to lecture in English rather than in Latin and in part because of his teaching style, which numerous former students and colleagues described as extraordinarily warm and engaged,<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup>See the comments of William Leechman, Adam Smith and Dugald Stewart in W.L. Taylor, *Francis Hutcheson and David Hume as Predecessors of Adam Smith* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1965), esp. pp. 13-16. While some of these comments must be taken a bit cautiously due to the close personal relationship between Hutcheson and those individuals (Leechman, for example, wrote the preface to Hutcheson's posthumously published *System*), their consistency must also be noted. Stewart, for example, wrote that "His talents, however, as a public speaker, must have been of a far higher order than what he has displayed as a writer; all his pupils whom I have happened to meet with (some of them certainly, very competent judges) having agreed exactly with each other in their account of the extraordinary impression which they made on the minds of his hearers" (qtd. in Taylor 15).

including those who disagreed with his moral sense philosophy.<sup>51</sup> Students continued to go to Hutcheson's lectures even after they had graduated, and his Sunday lectures, which were open to the general public, were always very heavily attended.<sup>52</sup> Richard Sher even argues that Hutcheson "was the embodiment of what a professor of moral philosophy was supposed to be" ("Professors of Virtue" 94), dedicated to his students and organizing his lessons in such a comprehensive and intelligible manner that the Edinburgh town council, once in the 1730s and again in the 1740s, tried to woo him to a professorship at the university there (99), an invitation which itself further demonstrates the weakened power of the Kirk. When Hutcheson declined, the council appointed Adam Ferguson, who was deeply influenced by Hutcheson's religious, academic, political and pedagogical principles, and who therefore met the requirements of that same model of the ideal professor of moral philosophy. Indeed, Sher argues elsewhere that it was Ferguson and the Moderate literati of Edinburgh (i.e., John Home, Hugh Blair, William Robertson and Alexander Carlyle), more than any other Scottish philosophers, who were most influenced *in toto* by Hutcheson's political and pedagogical principles (*Church and University* 177).

Yet it is for his key role in the development of the distinctive, emotive-based moral sense philosophy that emerged in Scotland in the eighteenth century and which proved to be so influential to Anglo-American, indeed to Western European, enlightened thought, not for his political ideas or actions, that Hutcheson is now best known, and for

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<sup>51</sup>Ian McBride quotes Alexander Carlyle praising Hutcheson's teaching, and notes the difficulties in following Hutcheson faced by Thomas Craigie and Adam Smith, the next two professors of moral philosophy at Glasgow, whose teaching styles were rather different. See McBride, Ch. 1, fn. #15: 88-89.

<sup>52</sup>Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, IN: U Notre Dame P, 1988): 279.

which he has been called the father of the Scottish Enlightenment.<sup>53</sup> However, perhaps because after he became a professor he emphasized teaching and "modernizing" the university curriculum more than he did writing, there has been significantly less study of his work than there has been of the work of David Hume or of Adam Smith, both of whom were heavily influenced by his moral sense thought, or of Thomas Reid, who developed common sense philosophy in the mid-eighteenth century as a response to it.<sup>54</sup> The unstated implication is that Hutcheson constituted more of a prelude to the real philosophical investigations conducted in Scotland after the last Jacobite rebellion of 1745 was defeated; he was someone who helped create the conditions which made those investigations possible, rather than an important figure in his own right, even though his contemporaries viewed him as an extremely important and original philosophical figure (Frankena 356).

It is, therefore, perhaps at least in part due to the fact that he has been understudied that, as I note in Chapter One, much of the critical work on Hutcheson misreads key elements of his philosophy. As I shall discuss in the next section of this chapter, many critics either impose twentieth-century meanings and viewpoints onto his eighteenth-century texts, analyze key elements of his philosophy in isolation from the intense social scrutiny that he placed upon human motivation and action, or examine that

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<sup>53</sup>See Gladys Bryson, *Man and Society: The Scottish Inquiry of the Eighteenth Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1945).

<sup>54</sup>As indicated, for example, by the fact that there is a David Hume Society, an Adam Smith Society and a Thomas Reid Society, but no Francis Hutcheson Society. See also the many essays in Alexander Brodie, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2003); while wide-ranging in their scope, and certainly discussing Hutcheson, much of the discussion centers on his theories of the moral sense, thereby missing many opportunities to also discuss his political, economic and social theories, especially as they relate to the moral sense.

scrutiny independently of his analysis of the origins of human behavior. But like other moral philosophers of his time, Hutcheson viewed the study of human nature, by definition, as a study also of the kinds of societies that that nature allows humans to create, and it was his vision of both individual behavior and of civic politics that led to the widespread influence of his writings on eighteenth-century Anglo-American social and political thought. This vision was radically different from the prevailing individualistic ones, stressing instead a communitarian basis for human nature and human actions. Consequently, rather than viewing the ideal society as a self-directed community whose members are bound together through their desire to preserve their own interests, and who therefore behave toward each other in ways that maintain those personal ends, he instead argued that the ideal society was an affective community whose members are bound to together through the benevolence of their hearts, and who therefore behave virtuously toward each other in order to maintain those affective bonds. While the possibilities of Hutcheson's vision are rooted in social norms and meanings that have long since disappeared, in the eighteenth century it presented an alternative vision of the potentialities in human nature, and therefore in human relations and societies, that had a significance, on both sides of the Atlantic, that today is often neglected, thereby diminishing our understanding of the wide-ranging impact of his philosophy and of the role of the affections in eighteenth-century social, political and national formation.

In his books, as well as in numerous articles and letters, Hutcheson engaged the ongoing debate about the primary state of human nature, a debate that had numerous implications for the political conditions of Anglo-America and, indeed, of other European nations and their colonies. Two then-prevalent schools of thought—the ego-

based philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville, and the rational-based philosophy of John Locke—argued that humans act solely out of self-interest. Hobbes and Mandeville painted a bleak picture of the possibilities of human nature; Hobbes claimed in *Leviathan* that only absolute government could curb our essential selfishness and Mandeville claimed in *The Fable of the Bees* that selfishness was key to a thriving economy, as noted by his subtitle *Private Vices, Public Benefits*. Locke argued in the *Second Treatise of Government* that that selfishness could be curbed by rationality (i.e., that we act out of a rational calculation of our interests), but he agreed with the underlying premise that our basic nature is to think first and primarily of ourselves. Thus, on the one hand, Locke's view potentially moderated Hobbes' and Mandeville's, as it implied that such a rational calculation could lead to a decision, in certain circumstances, that it was in our interest *not* to act selfishly; indeed, contrary to Hobbes, his conception of the ideal society was a representative one in which everyone's interests were perfectly and equally balanced. Yet even in Locke's theory of government, that balance was necessary to head off the very behavioral tendencies that stemmed logically from the basic qualities of human nature to which Hobbes' and Mandeville's humans gave full expression—only through that equitable balance could peace be maintained.

In contrast to these theories, which even at their best still argued that we are essentially selfish, and consequently must have complete independence to pursue our individual desires, Shaftesbury, who had been Locke's pupil, instead argued in "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit" that self interest is "contrary to our real interest" and that it leads us to "the greatest of unhappiness, that of a profligate and abject nature" (*Characteristics* 225). Shaftesbury claimed that humans are inherently ethical, moral and unselfish, seeking "[t]o love and to be kind, to have social or natural affection,

complacency and good will" (228). As I noted earlier in this chapter, he had been influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, the Latitudinarian Anglican ministers of the late seventeenth century who, in contrast to the sectarian religious figures of the sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries, believed that humans were naturally sociable and benevolent, and who therefore argued for a more tolerant Christianity.<sup>55</sup> However, Shaftesbury differed from them in that he used this conception of human nature to support a secular, Country Whig ideology that was based not on autonomous humans balancing their individual interests but on the maintenance and promotion of human virtue stemming from the mutual feeling that humans have for each other. Indeed, in his now famous letter to Michael Ainsworth, Shaftesbury wrote: "Twas Mr. Locke that struck at all Fundamentals, threw all *Order* and *Virtue* out of the World, and made the very *Ideas* of these (which are the same as those of God) *unnatural*, and without Foundation in our Minds" (qtd. in Moore 47).

Hutcheson agreed with Shaftesbury's assertion that so "much of our happiness depends on natural and good affection" (*Characteristics* 211) and also likewise insisted that human motivation stems from a disinterested idea of virtue; it is based not in self-interest, as Hobbes and Mandeville argued, nor in rationality, as did Locke, but instead in that affection. That Hutcheson saw himself as indebted to Shaftesbury is clear from the subtitle of the first edition of the *Inquiry*, which read, in part: "IN WHICH The Principles of the late Earl of Shaftesbury are Explain'd and Defended, against the Author of the *Fable of the Bees* [i.e., Mandeville]." However, he went much further, constructing on

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<sup>55</sup>See, e.g., R.S. Crane, "Suggestions Toward A Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" *ELH* 1.3 (December 1934): 205-230; Lawrence E. Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1994).

those principles an entire metaphysiology of moral philosophy that became one of the cornerstones of eighteenth-century Anglo-American thought.

Shaftesbury argued that each of us has a natural moral sense of right and wrong, but his reference to that moral sense was more of an allusion than an argument; he did not define it nor did he discuss its operations in any detail, although he argued quite specifically and elaborately in "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit" that a sense of right and wrong is innate to all humans. Hutcheson, however, defined the distinctive features of the moral sense in physiological ways that Shaftesbury did not; as I shall discuss in Chapter Four, he developed Shaftesbury's moral ideas and joined them to Locke's sensational psychology to argue that each of us has an internal sense, which he also called the moral sense, which is located in the heart and which responds to qualities in the external world just as the external senses do—in this case to the quality of virtue in human actions.<sup>56</sup> In the same way that the sense of sight responds to light and dark, or that the sense of touch responds to heat and cold, the moral sense responds to virtue because it, like illumination and temperature, is a quality which exists independently of us; consequently, it creates impressions on the internal moral sense in the same way that those other qualities create impressions on the external senses, from which simple ideas are formed. As we are averse to cold but respond pleasurably to warmth, as we are averse to loud noises but respond pleasurably to soft music, so too we are averse to

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<sup>56</sup>Indeed, Hutcheson argued in *Thoughts on Laughter* that, "It is unquestionable, that we have a great number of perceptions, which one can scarcely reduce to any of the five senses, as they are commonly explained; such as either the ideas of grandeur, dignity, decency, beauty, harmony; or on the other hand, of meanness, baseness, indecency, deformity; and that we apply these ideas not only to material objects, but to characters, abilities, actions" (20).

actions based upon self-interest but respond pleasurably to those based upon disinterested virtue.

Hutcheson argued that the operations of the moral sense, not, as per Locke, of the understanding, were key to human motivation and action. The moral sense, through its favorable or unfavorable responses to the moral qualities contained in the actions of others, provides the information necessary to respond to those actions and actors in the same way that the external senses provide the information necessary to respond to other qualities in the external world; we feel affection for those whose actions are virtuous and we do not feel affection for those whose actions are not. Our responses to human motivation, therefore, are an innate part of our bodies.

This schema, of course, differed from the theory of innate ideas against which Locke's sensational psychology had argued; Hutcheson agreed with Locke that virtue was not an idea inherent in us. However, he parted with Locke in that he saw virtue as a quality which acts directly upon the body's moral sense to create warm, benevolent feelings rather than as a complex idea which is learned through the operations of education or custom on the rational processes of the understanding.

Indeed, when, in the first part of the *Inquiry*, he discusses the innate sense of beauty, upon whose operations he subsequently bases his discussion of the moral sense, Hutcheson again follows Shaftesbury's argument, referring to the dangers of this aspect of Locke's legacy by stating that: "Nothing is more ordinary among those, who after Mr. Locke have shaken off the groundless Opinions about innate ideas, than to allege, 'That all our Relish for Beauty, and Order, is either from prospect of Advantage, Custom, or Education'" (81). He then notes an apparent contradiction in that Lockean-influenced stance, stating that "all allow our external Senses to be Natural, and that the Pleasures or

Pains of their Sensations, however they may be increas'd, or diminish'd, by Custom, or Education, and counterballanc'd by Interest, yet are really antecedent to Custom, Habit, Education, or Prospect of Interest" (81). That is, Hutcheson argues that while Locke is correct to dismiss the theory of innate ideas, it does not necessarily follow that we have no inherent qualities. As adherents of Lockean epistemology acknowledge that the external senses (the basis for human nature) are inherent to us, and thus "antecedent to Custom, Habit, Education, or Prospect of Interest," so too they acknowledge that education can only refine the attributes that stem from them; it cannot provide us with attributes that we do not already have. Consequently, as our moral responses of right and wrong stem from the moral sense, which like the external senses is inherent to us, those responses are not something we learn through education but are also antecedent to it because they are part of our bodies, and therefore of our beings.

But Hutcheson also argued that because we are born with this natural capacity to respond positively to disinterested actions and negatively to interested ones, we are inherently social creatures—i.e, we innately, through our physiology, respond to and initiate human interaction. Thus, while Hobbes and Locke believed that humans were born into a state of nature and made a decision to enter society after calculating their own self-interest, Hutcheson believed instead that we are born into society because our essential being is social. His ideal society, therefore, was one that stresses human interdependence and goodness rather than human independence or depravity.

In fact, in his inaugural lecture at the University of Glasgow in 1730, Hutcheson argued that the concept of the state of nature, as it was used to contrast with civil society, was wrong. Erroneously, it "excluded everything that is produced by human powers, application, and ingenuity, as well as all exercise not only of man's natural powers, but

even of many natural appetites" ("Inaugural Lecture" 130); it excluded our inherent abilities and qualities, and imagined humans as "naked, mute, wretched, solitary, filthy, uncouth, ignorant, repulsive, cowardly, petulant, rapacious, and unsocial brute[s] which neither love[...] nor [are] loved by anyone" (131). Instead, Hutcheson argued, the state of nature is "the most perfect condition that can be attained by means of the powers implanted in human nature" (131). Therefore, human vices are not part of the state of nature, nor are any other aspects of our postlapsarian corrupt being; they are the result of habit, custom and other elements of our fallen condition rather than part of "the original structure of our nature [, which] was destined by divine art and design for everything seemly, virtuous and excellent" (132). The state of nature, then, is the perfect condition for which God originally designed us, not some isolated existence steeped in misery.

After demonstrating why he believed that the state of nature had been defined wrongly, in that same address Hutcheson then drew a distinction between a state that is prior to *culture*, which he called an "*uncultivated* state" where our "natural powers have not yet been exercised (132, emphasis in original), and the traditional concept of the state of nature as one distinct from *society*. That latter concept of the state of nature, Hutcheson argued, was not only wrong but was an impossibility, for society is an inherent part of human nature. Building on the work of the "excellent Lord Shaftesbury" (136), he argued that sociability, including the moral sense, is part of our original constitution; by "the very senses antecedently implanted in us by nature [i.e., by God]" (143), we seek the society of others, gain pleasure from their company, feel love and affection. Part of our perfect condition, then, is expressed through the operations of the moral sense, which is an original part of our bodies as designed by God; from it stems the

innate desire to be with others, the innate affections we feel when we are in their company, and the innate longing we feel when we are not.

This difference was crucial. If society was natural, as opposed to a creation of self-interest (whether to stave off a perpetual state of war, as Hobbes posited, or to maintain a beneficial stasis, as did Locke), then that meant that all of its manifestations—conversation, marketplaces, indeed every form of human interaction, structured or unstructured—were characteristics of this natural impulse rather than the artificial creation of a self-interest, rational or otherwise. Given that this impulse leads us to respond naturally and favorably to moral virtue, Hutcheson therefore envisioned a society in which humans relate to each other benevolently, mutually working toward that greater good. Consequently, society's law and government necessarily must be structured in such a way as to strengthen those natural communitarian aspects of human behavior and relations, for to do otherwise would contradict the impulse to which human society gives expression.

Hutcheson's view of innate human sociability, and the consequent position that society is not formed by a social contract through which humans leave the state of nature but instead already exists in that state of nature (indeed, that the state of nature itself has been wrongly defined), became a key tenet of eighteenth-century Scottish philosophy.<sup>57</sup> Clearly, then, his vision of human nature, society and government was not only extremely influential, it was diametrically opposed to that constructed by Hobbes'

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<sup>57</sup>Hume, for example, went even further than Hutcheson, claiming not that the state of nature was wrongly defined but that it was a fiction altogether: "Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without government" (*Treatise* 402).

humans constantly seeking power, by Mandeville's humans constantly seeking wealth, or by Locke's humans constantly seeking their interests.

Yet, at the same time, it is also important to note that Hutcheson did share one key tenet with those other philosophers: they all presumed a link between the state of human nature, the forms of society that humans consequently create, and the governments that they then form to rule those societies. In truth, this presumed equation was quite common; Publius, for example, noted some 50 years later in *The Federalist* #51, "But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary" (262). The state of human nature determines the form of human society, and the form of human society determines the form of human government.

Key to this debate, then, was a definition of *society* which was different from our current one. While we tend to distinguish between the realm of the social and the realm of the political, as I discussed in Chapter One, this was not the case in the eighteenth century; Gordon Wood, for example, notes that "most people in that very different distant world could not as yet conceive of society as apart from government" (*Radicalism* 5). Rather, society was perceived to encompass all realms of human interaction; indeed, society *was* human interaction. It included what we today think of as economics, work, morals, customs, belief systems, as well as government, domains that we might think of as political but not as social, perhaps based upon largely impersonal forces but not upon such intimate matters as human relations. Indeed, while today's identity politics do connect those two realms (for example, the feminist expression that the *personal is political*), their fraught status in much contemporary thought demonstrates just the tenuous nature of that connection in our eyes.

In the eighteenth century, though, such relations were perceived quite differently. For example, while Scottish merchants dominated the Chesapeake tobacco trade prior to the Revolution, Jacob Price has pointed out that these mercantile exchanges, like many others, involved more than solely shipping tobacco; they also involved the transmission of "mail, news, reading matter, ideas, religion, [and] politics" that flowed from Glasgow to Virginia (Hook "Philadelphia," 198). Economics, in other words, as I shall discuss in Chapter Seven, entailed not just the exchange of a product for money but also the transmission of current events, of books, of thought. It was, in fact, interrelational; that transmission could occur because somewhere in that exchange network were members who had already established a personal relationship with each other and who therefore were able to make noneconomic, personal requests to and of each other. Indeed, given the realities of long-distance travel and communication at that time, economic exchanges, especially but not exclusively metropolitan/colonial ones, by necessity generally were based upon personal relations, as each party in the exchange had to trust the other to deliver a product, or to extend credit for the payment of a product, months in advance. These personal relations could be based upon family connections, religious connections, or recommendations made through other friendship networks, but they demonstrate the blurred lines between areas that we today think of as being much more distinct. In the eighteenth century, personal relations were, if not the *basis* for economy, certainly a key element of it, as they were for many other arenas that we today think of as being impersonal.

While there are clearly many more examples of the interpersonal nature of eighteenth-century economic exchange, as Habermas' influential theory of the public sphere articulates, such an expansive view of *society* similarly impacted other realms that

we also today think of very differently.<sup>58</sup> Habermas chronicles the emergence, beginning in the late seventeenth century, of a bourgeois society in metropolitan Western Europe which was initially outside the boundaries of, or at best at the margins of, official governmental power. The members of this society eventually were able to exercise enormous political power through their economic influence, yet much of this power circulated not through governmental settings but through the social settings within which they met and interacted (e.g., coffeehouses, taverns and salons), as well as through their correspondence with each other. While certainly those in positions of power have always interacted with their own kind, this newly established public sphere reversed a long-standing dynamic. In opposition to the medieval system whereby power was centered around the monarch, the aristocracy and those who served them, what arose was an alternative system, tied to the gradual shift from a land-based to a capital-based economy, in which nonaristocratic social settings and relationships became new seats of power. It is for this reason that Shaftesbury is often called the philosopher of this emerging public sphere, as he argued for the benefits of what in *Sensus Communis* he called *private society*: voluntary associations formed outside the purview of established state institutions whose social relations he saw as forming a community of conversation and fellowship that served as an alternative power base to the corrupting influence of the English Court.<sup>59</sup>

Habermas notes that by the 1670s, Charles I's government saw coffeehouses, and the discussions and relationships that they engendered, as political threats; what he omits,

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<sup>58</sup>Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, tr. Thomas Burger (Boston, MA: MIT P, 1991).

<sup>59</sup>See, e.g., Klein, fn. #12.

because that is not his focus, is that Charles was right, as demonstrated by the Rye House Plot and other Whig plots that together we call the Exclusion Crisis. Yet, as a newly-emerging phenomenon, the number of coffeehouses, and the number of individuals who frequented them, at that time was rather small. But Habermas points out that by 1709, when the *Tatler* was first published, the number of coffeehouses and their patrons had grown so large that the periodical itself was, in part, the means through which these patrons maintained conversations and contact with each other. Each week's edition contained letters to the editor written by previous editions' readers who were, generally, those very patrons. That is, the emerging print culture of newspapers and journals created a new form of social interaction between members of that emerging public sphere, who were also part of the newly-forming reading public, primarily urban and middle class, that has been documented by Ian Watt and other historians of the novel.<sup>60</sup> By making public a form of social interaction that previously would have been marked as private, as did the epistolary novel of the eighteenth century,<sup>61</sup> the medium of print enabled individuals who had never seen or met each other to engage in conversation and to create new social networks. Other journals engaged not just questions of taste, aesthetics and philosophy but also of contemporary politics, simultaneously expanding

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<sup>60</sup>Ian Watt, *The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding* (Berkeley, CA: U Berkeley P, 1957). It should also be noted that there is a difference between the "reading public," which implies the attainment of a certain economic level necessary to afford reading materials and the leisure time with which to read them, and literacy, which, while not widespread throughout the English population in the early eighteenth century due to the vagaries of schooling, did exist beyond that reading public, although this distinction itself began to narrow in the 1740s with the formation of circulating libraries, whose success Benjamin Franklin noted in his *Autobiography* as a model for starting such libraries in Philadelphia shortly thereafter.

<sup>61</sup>For further analysis of this eighteenth-century public/private split, see Elizabeth Cook, *Epistolary Bodies: Gender and Genre in the Eighteenth-Century Republic of Letters* (Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1996).

the subject matter of such newly-public interactions that the journals themselves were creating into a realm that, until the recent relaxation of the censorship, had been off-limits to all but an extremely small percentage of the population.<sup>62</sup>

Thus, as certain coffeehouses became meeting areas for specific individuals, and different individuals across coffeehouses entered into conversations with each other, either in person or in print, the *private society* that Shaftesbury championed emerged as an arbiter of taste, as a political force and, eventually, as "public opinion." As David Shields notes, these institutions of private society "seemed requisites of civil order, for in them persons entered into a sense of communal identity and found a happiness in society" (*Civil Tongues* xiv). Over the course of the eighteenth century, what Habermas calls "the social" emerged as a sphere separate from the state across Anglo-America,<sup>63</sup> and, by the nineteenth century, became its own distinct realm; however, that eventual separation, which looks so familiar today, would have looked quite foreign in the 1720s. Indeed, as I noted earlier in this section, it is in significant part through publishing letters in periodicals and journals in the 1720s (i.e., through entering into the relations supported by that emerging public sphere) that Hutcheson and his critics engaged with each other,

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<sup>62</sup>A similar process occurred in British North America, albeit later in the eighteenth century. Richard D. Brown documents early colonial governmental control over printers in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, while David D. Hall documents the loosening of that control as competing printers began to open shops in the same few colonial urban areas. See Richard D. Brown, "The Shifting Freedoms of the Press in the Eighteenth Century." *The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World*. Ed. Hugh Amory and David D. Hall (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2000): 366-76; David D. Hall, "The Atlantic World: Part One: The Atlantic Economy in the Eighteenth Century." Amory and Hall: 152-62; and David D. Hall, *Cultures of Print: Essays in the History of the Book* (Amherst, MA: U Massachusetts P, 1986).

<sup>63</sup>David S. Shields, *Civil Tongues & Polite Letters in British America* (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture by the U North Carolina P, 1997).

an activity that enabled his reputation to grow beyond Northern Ireland in ways that would not have been possible even 50 years prior. Furthermore, as I note in the last section of this chapter, it was through participating in the developing Irish public sphere of the time that he was introduced to Shaftesbury's writings and solidified the friendships that made such publication, and his eventual professorship, possible.<sup>64</sup>

While Habermas focuses in large part on the political power that the members of this private society were ultimately able to exercise in the eighteenth century, Shaftesbury ostensibly is concerned with perfecting and beautifying human relations in order to ultimately refine society. Yet clearly there are political aspects to such a project, seemingly contradictory ones, in fact. On the one hand, Shaftesbury, like Locke, was a Whig; indeed Shaftesbury was part of the Radical Whig, or Country, wing of the party that formed as the Whigs themselves split into two distinct camps once they achieved power in 1689. As such, Shaftesbury was intimately concerned with the corrupting effects of power and was a strong believer in the actions of a virtuous citizenry that would serve as a counterpoint to such tendencies. In keeping with his republican politics, he argued that the everyone has a moral sense, is potentially able to act through the powers of the natural affections, and has a natural "social affection as inclines him to seek the familiarity and friendship of his fellows" (215). Similarly, he stressed the importance of labor, even among the upper classes, who instead of toiling with their bodies should toil with their minds "to any sort of work such as has a good and honest end in society, as letters, sciences, arts, husbandry, public affairs, economy or the like" (214).

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<sup>64</sup>See McBride, "The School of Virtue," Ch. 1, fn. #15 and Stewart, "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

But at the same time, Shaftesbury also asserts that the pleasures of the mind are superior to those of the body. While he does not deny that "Indians, barbarians, malefactors and even the more execrable villains" are capable of the pleasures of the mind (i.e., honor, gallantry, revenge, gratitude) (201), his hierarchy of the operations of the mind over those of the body, coupled with his association of the labors of the mind primarily with the upper classes, is at one with the widely acknowledged class-based assumptions upon which republican ideology was based; the best society is one in which virtuous citizens put the common interest (or, in Shaftesbury's terms, the natural affections) above the personal interest (in his terms, the self affections), but they themselves are led by the virtuous elite in their determination of what constitutes that common interest. Indeed, as the very title of Shaftesbury's book suggests, his concern is with *manners*, and the relationship between them and *men, opinions* and *times*—i.e., between polite behavior and current ideology, or with what is now called the civilizing process.

For Shaftesbury, then, the civilizing process is the process by which a particular form of a virtuous, but genteel, sociability, which itself stems from our natural affections, "upholds communities, maintains union, friendship and correspondence amongst men, . . . by which countries, as well as private families, flourish and are happy, and for want of which everything comely, conspicuous, great and worthy must perish and go to ruin" (230). By theorizing such a communal sociability, he clearly moves beyond the Latitudinarians' ideas of the affections; while they claimed that the affections precede reason and are the basis for guiding proper human behavior, their concern was with the origins of human nature, not with an earthly society dependent for its proper functioning upon such feelings and actions, and they therefore argued that these affections reflect

God's divine purpose. Shaftesbury's outlook instead is much more secular, focused on the formation of communities which will promote an uncorrupted politics of taste and which builds upon our inherent sociable and affectionate natures by reforming manners.

Thus, Hobbes, Mandeville, Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and others, no matter their different interpretations of human nature and their consequently different political visions, all argued from a common conception of the crucial relationship of the social to both that nature and to the formation and structure of government. Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's sociable conceptions of human nature clearly led to a different understanding of human relations and of the proper form of government that humans establish based upon them than did Hobbesian selfishness; they led also to something different than did Lockean rationalism. Hobbes' view of human nature led to his argument in favor of absolute rule. Locke's led to his argument in favor of individual, autonomous consent. Shaftesbury's led to his argument for republican government.

But Hutcheson differed even from Shaftesbury in that his view of human nature led to his theory of a government based upon communitarianism. For if humans exist naturally in relationships with other humans, then the bonds which hold us together, rather than being extrinsic to human nature are intrinsic to it; as those bonds stem from the actions of the moral sense, and as the moral sense is part of our bodies, human society is rooted in human physiology and human government is potentially extraordinarily democratic. Not only is our very nature social and the bonds which we form with other humans natural, but government itself is simply a natural outgrowth of our social body and being, not something artificial that we form by mutual agreement for the protection of our individual interests; it is therefore strengthened through the multitudinous forms of daily interactions which then reinforce comparable modes of future interactions.

Government is not separate or separable from human relations or nature but is inherent to each. It is not an indication of our fall from autonomy but is instead a simple extension of our perfect condition.

Government's role, then, is not to prevent us from killing each other or from usurping power over others but is to maintain, and even to strengthen, those humane, social bonds, for it is only in that way that the fullness and goodness of our nature can be achieved. In other words, that government is best which maintains and promotes that natural sociability, those affections which each person naturally and physiologically has for others. When this natural sociability is allowed to flow freely, the community, and those who compose it, live and thrive within affective webs of human interrelations, what Hutcheson calls a "secret chain between each person and mankind" (*Inquiry* 121). When it is not allowed to flow freely, however, the opposite occurs.

The goal of government, then, is to enable humans to achieve happiness, the highest possible state that we can attain during our earthly lives. While Locke also argued strenuously for the pursuit of happiness, as I shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter Six, Hutcheson defined the term in a dramatically different fashion. On the one hand, he accepted, and built upon, the central Lockean premise that our bodies respond positively to pleasure and negatively to pain, and that we thus define happiness as that which gives us pleasure and unhappiness as that which gives us pain. Hutcheson argued that it is also through this pleasure/pain paradigm that the moral sense responds to the impressions made upon it by the qualities of beauty and virtue. Virtuous actions provide pleasure to the moral sense, and our bodies consequently respond favorably to them, as they do to any qualities which provide any of our senses with any form of pleasure; similarly, selfish actions pain the moral sense, and our bodies consequently respond

unfavorably to them for the same reason. Therefore, the Lockean notion, expressed in *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, that we constantly desire happiness (II.xxi.42) and that "[h]appiness, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleasure we are capable of, and misery the utmost pain" (II.xxi.43) was central also to Hutcheson's thought.

However, while Locke viewed pleasure, and hence happiness, in an individualistic fashion, Hutcheson viewed it in a communitarian one. Locke argued that the pursuit of happiness is key to the foundation of liberty, yet he also made it clear that happiness is different for different individuals: "All men seek happiness, but not of the same sort" (*Essay* II.xxi.56). Liberty, to Locke, consists in the degree to which each of us can pursue our individual happiness without causing others harm; it is, hence, a mutual balance of our individual self-interests. To the extent that that balance occurs, liberty exists and each of us is free.

Hutcheson, though, defined happiness in a communal, interrelational fashion. Unlike Locke, Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, continuously distinguished between private happiness and public happiness, between those actions that we take out of self-love and those that we take out of benevolent concern for the public good. He defined the former as "the ordinary occasion of Vice" (*Inquiry* 233) and the latter as "our greatest Happiness" (194). The moral sense, according to Hutcheson, feels the difference and responds accordingly. Therefore, while Hutcheson's pursuit of happiness can certainly improve the person who is pursuing it, it is only true happiness if it also improves all those with whom he or she comes into contact. Contrary to Locke's conception, the purpose of pursuing happiness is not to better ourselves but to improve the condition of others.

Ultimately, then, and also unlike Locke, happiness for Hutcheson is not different for everybody but is, in key ways, the same for everybody. As I shall discuss in Chapters Four and Five, Hutcheson attempted to affirm a Newtonian, scientific foundation for his moral philosophy in which moral laws operate in the same impersonal fashion that physical ones do; he established a mathematical basis for a happiness that is defined not by what gives one person their own specific pleasure but instead is defined as being always communal, always consisting of doing good for others, even noting in his subtitle to the first edition of the *Inquiry* that he would be defending Shaftesbury and attacking Mandeville through establishing "the Ideas of Moral Good and Evil . . . according to the Sentiments of the Ancient Moralists with an Attempt to introduce a Mathematical Calculation in subjects of Morality." He thus again displayed his fundamental disagreement with Locke, who argued in the *Essay* that morality cannot be so quantified: "Whether there be any such moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately conversant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys" (I.2.ii). While Locke was here arguing against morality as an innate idea, an argument with which Hutcheson would agree, Locke's argument clearly can be applied against any type of uniformity to it.

Hutcheson disagreed with that part of Locke's argument because he believed that the powers of the moral sense could be scientifically quantified in the same way that the powers of the external senses could be. Given that there were numerous studies of the operations of the external senses, so too he intended to study the operations of this internal one. From this premise, he ultimately argued that universal benevolence operates through the same natural principles as does gravity; both are stronger when the attractive objects are nearer to each other and weaker when those objects are further away

from each other. As Newton created measurements for the force of gravity, so Hutcheson created measurements for the force of benevolence.

However, in keeping with that eighteenth-century shift wherein private experience began to have public valence, Hutcheson does not keep moral experience private. After establishing the scientific parameters and principles of the operations of the moral sense, he discusses the nature of individual rights and governmental formation. While Haakonssen explains that Hutcheson, like Locke, was extremely influenced by the natural law tradition,<sup>65</sup> Hutcheson quite explicitly draws his political analysis directly from the functions of the moral sense, just as Locke's political analysis stemmed directly from the functions of the external senses. While I shall discuss the political physiology of his moral arguments in Chapters Five and Six, it is important to note here that although Hutcheson follows Locke in enumerating the rights that emerge from the operations of the senses, there are two significant and interconnected differences between his and Locke's positions. First, the information provided to us by the moral sense creates affections; it is, in Hutcheson's paradigm, through feeling, not through the understanding, that we come to our rights. Second, while Locke views our rights as that which we need to be able to protect our personal interest, Hutcheson instead views them as that which we need to be able to protect the public interest.

Consequently, as I shall also demonstrate in Chapters Five and Six, Hutcheson's discussion of rights is contingent on the attainment of public, not private, happiness. While both forms of happiness are determined by the information provided to us by the moral sense, the moral sense reacts positively only to public happiness. Thus, the moral

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<sup>65</sup>Knud Haakonssen, *Natural Law and Moral Philosophy from Grotius to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1996), esp. Ch. 2.

sense is the arbiter whereby we can immediately sense whether those rights, and hence "the general good," are being violated or supported, something which we know by how we feel; the political structures that we form, including government, also must be responsive to the powers of the moral sense, for that is how those rights are maintained. The entirety of his political vision, then, is generated from his theory of the moral sense, which is located in the body and which operates through feeling to determine the greatest public good.

Therefore, Hutcheson would agree with Locke that that government is best which promotes rights, but Hutcheson's government would do so by promoting universal benevolence and the affectionate bonds between humans through which that benevolence circulates rather than by promoting individual interest. Rather than being premised upon a Lockean doctrine of individual rights that balances each person's self-interest (i.e., each person's private happiness), as Hamowy claims, Hutcheson's definition of rights emerges directly from his communitarian vision of innate moral virtue and how best to engender it, through feeling, into the maximum manifestation of public happiness. Consequently, while one of the major concerns of the private society developing in the eighteenth century was how to create the proper parameters of *sociability*, Hutcheson's conception of that term clearly involved a definitive statement about its egalitarian political nature and about the rights and liberties that he claimed stemmed from it.

In this regard, Hutcheson's philosophy in part again displays a significant Shaftesburian influence, following Shaftesbury's promotion of taste not just as individual experience but also as public behavior, and therefore as a venue for his political agenda

of an emergent public sphere that served as a counterweight to a corrupting Whig junta.<sup>66</sup> However, Hutcheson departed from Shaftesbury in that his political vision was decidedly less dependent upon the proper breeding of an upper-class but was instead potentially much more democratic, as it was based upon the operations of an internal sense that is an inherent part of all human bodies.

While I shall discuss the physiological basis of Hutcheson's philosophy, and its political ramifications, in significantly greater detail in the chapters which follow, it is important specifically to note here the centrality of natural philosophy to Hutcheson's thought. For that influence is generally overlooked, even though the events which we today call the Scottish Enlightenment were in many key respects precipitated by developments within that field, as were many of the principles imbibed by Hutcheson while he was a student at the University of Glasgow. Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter, I first shall review the critical literature on Hutcheson and then shall discuss the relationship between natural philosophy and politics in early-eighteenth-century Scotland in order to contextualize my argument about what is missing from our understanding of his work.

### Reviewing the Literature

Several important aspects of Hutcheson's moral philosophy should by now be clear. One is that it was not simply the study of ethics that we today think of the field as encompassing, but was also the study of human social organization; indeed, in the eighteenth century, this was true for all moral philosophy. As Norman Fiering notes, in addition to morality, the field included society and politics, as well as what we now think

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<sup>66</sup>Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*, fn. #12.

of as psychology, sociology and economics;<sup>67</sup> to that Richard Sher adds epistemology, metaphysics, logic, jurisprudence, rhetoric and even literary criticism.<sup>68</sup> While to modern ears this might well sound as if the field was simply a morass of intellectual endeavors, in the eighteenth century these inquiries were not perceived as being distinct entities. Instead, they were interrelated elements of a singular scope of inquiry whose wide range was premised upon the notion that all forms of human knowledge and behavior were related, at their core, to the state of human nature. As David Hume noted in the Introduction to his *Treatise of Human Nature*:

'Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they will return back by one passage or another. Even *Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion*, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man; since they lie under the cognizance of men, and are judged of by their powers and faculties. 'Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, and cou'd explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our reasonings. (xv, emphasis in original)

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<sup>67</sup>Norman Fiering, *Moral Philosophy at Seventeenth-Century Harvard: A Discipline in Transition* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1980).

<sup>68</sup>Richard B. Sher, "Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century." *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon P, 1990): 87-126.

Indeed, Adam Ferguson, in his *Principles of Moral and Political Science*, published in 1792, clearly linked the study of moral philosophy (or, as he called it, and as it was often called, moral *science*) to that of history and political science. While his title hints at the atomization that the field would undergo in the nineteenth century, when the social sciences developed as discrete fields of inquiry, his linkage of the two scientific endeavors also indicates the continuing perception of their close interrelationship. Thus, in his introduction, Ferguson describes moral science as the study of what humans ought to be and political science as the study of how humans actually behave. Studying these two sciences together, he notes, enables us to understand better the human mind and human nature, for the latter is as much political and historical as it is ethical and personal.<sup>69</sup>

Therefore, while Habermas rightfully claims that eighteenth-century moral philosophy focused on the study of the social, he is wrong to state that, in so doing, it lost its political character, for as he himself points out elsewhere, the social was, at that time, by its very nature understood to be political. Yet he argues that:

In the eighteenth century the Aristotelian tradition of a philosophy of politics was *reduced* in a telling manner to moral philosophy, whereby the "moral" (in any event thought as one with "nature" and "reason") also encompassed the emerging sphere of the "social," its connotations overlapping with those of the word "social" given such peculiar emphasis at the time. It was no coincidence that the author of the

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<sup>69</sup>Adam Ferguson, *Principles of Moral and Political Science*. 1792. (New York: Garland, 1978).

*Wealth of Nations* held a Chair of Moral Philosophy. (103, emphasis added)

Habermas' not-to-subtly dismissive gesture toward moral philosophy as evidencing some type of fall from original political grace belies the deep interrelationship between the social and the political in the eighteenth century that he so carefully delineates elsewhere; it belies also the field's well-documented engagement with politics as well as the crucial nature of those political questions within Anglo-America at the time. For in the early eighteenth century, when the Glorious Revolution was only approximately 30 years old and the Act of Union between England and Scotland was much younger; when the split between Court and Country Whigs called into question the very nature and stability of Whig ideology and of the Whig historical narrative of that Revolution; when Jacobites continued to rebel in Scotland and in Ireland supported by nearby archrival France, with its absolute monarchy and with which England was in a more or less constant state of war for supremacy; understanding human nature, and understanding as well the societies which that nature enabled it to conceivably build, was not just an idle intellectual exercise. As witnessed, for example, by the popular run of *The Spectator*, *The Tatler* and other daily periodicals, the identity and stability of the British nation was a crucial point of discussion in the emerging public print culture in which moral philosophy participated. The field had ceased to be solely an academic or religious enterprise, and was becoming instead the province of men (and an occasional woman) who were neither academics nor ministers but who, through their economic status and/or personal relations, were members of the classes that made up what we now

call the emerging public sphere.<sup>70</sup> Moral philosophy did not cease to be political; if anything, its political scope widened, not narrowed. Hutcheson's move from the human body to the body politic was remarkable only in its unremarkableness.

Yet, as I have noted, this political component of Hutcheson's work is often overlooked by historians of philosophy, who generally have focused on the social and ethical aspects of his work in their analyses of it, placing contemporary conceptions of those terms onto an eighteenth-century context to assume that they are distinct from the political. Such an analysis limits the scope of his thought, diminishing its wide-ranging impact on Anglo-American eighteenth century enlightened belief and action; as David Fate Norton has argued cogently, it is also ahistorical, losing many of the concerns with which Hutcheson was deeply engaged.<sup>71</sup>

However, it is just this ahistoricity that is one of the hallmarks of much Hutcheson criticism. For example, from the 1940s through the 1980s, in part during the New Critical heyday but also afterward, critics debated whether Hutcheson was a cognitivist or a noncognitivist—i.e., whether he truly proved, or even perhaps actually meant, that the moral sense, on its own, without the aid of reason, provides us with the knowledge that we can use to state definitively whether or not something is either true or false. That this debate occurred at all demonstrates the extent to which such critics were unwilling to take Hutcheson on his own, eighteenth-century, terms, for those terms

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<sup>70</sup>See, for example, Lawrence E. Klein's introduction to his book, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*, fn. #12, and the references cited therein. See also Klein's introduction to his edition of Shaftesbury's *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2001).

<sup>71</sup>See, e.g., David Fate Norton, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsidered," Ch. 1, fn. #16; "Hutcheson's Moral Realism," Ch. 1, fn. #16; and *David Hume*, Ch. 1, fn. #16, esp. Ch. 2, "Hutcheson's Moral Realism."

evidenced a radically different understanding of the relationship between, and the operations of, emotion and reason in the formation and maintenance of knowledge than was common forty years ago or is common now. It also affirms the immense weight given to Lockean rationalism in the history of philosophy, not just, as I argued in my introductory chapter, in the historical understanding of American national formation. For Hutcheson does define moral judgments as true or false, but bases the definitions of those terms on the perceptions of the moral sense; it responds favorably to actions that are truly moral and unfavorably to those that truly are not. Truth or falsity, then, are inherent in the qualities to which the moral sense *as a sense* consequently responds; they are not qualities that we determine independent of its perceptions through rational thought. Yet because that truth or falsity is known through the affections rather than through the understanding, and because the powers and operations of the human body were understood differently in the eighteenth century than they are today, many such critics were unable to see the moral sense as a literal, biological entity.

D.D. Raphael, for example, states that Hutcheson's use of the word "sense" in the *Inquiry* is "confessedly arbitrary, and clearly begs the question whether the moral faculty be sense or rational intuition" (19), even though Hutcheson is quite explicit that the moral sense is an internal sense that operates in the same way as the external senses, that it functions independent of rationality, and that it specifically leads to feeling.<sup>72</sup> Raphael does acknowledge that Hutcheson, in his early works, conceives of the moral sense as a sense, but argues that in his later works he no longer sees it that way but, rather, under the influence of Butler, sees it only as a name for some type of ill-defined function.

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<sup>72</sup>David Daiches Raphael, *The Moral Sense*, Ch. 1, fn. 16.

While it is, of course, unremarkable for a person's views on a subject to evolve or shift over a 10-15 year period, in this case, Raphael is simply wrong, for Hutcheson writes in the *System* that "it is by the moral sense that actions become of the great consequence to our happiness or misery" (27) and "where the moral sense is in its full vigour, it makes the generous determination to publick happiness the supreme one in the soul" (77). In other words, he argues in the *System*, which was written in the latter part of his career, exactly what he argued in the *Inquiry*, which was written at the beginning of it: that it is through the operations of the moral sense that we determine the ability of human actions to promote public happiness—which, he remarks elsewhere in the *System*, he still considers to be the greatest good. In fact, Hutcheson also writes in that text that the moral sense is extremely powerful, "from its very nature . . . designed for regulating and controlling all our powers. This dignity and commanding nature we are immediately conscious of, as we are conscious of the power itself. Nor can such matters of immediate feeling be otherwise proved but by appeals to our hearts" (61). Rather than being ill-defined in the *System*, the powers and functions of the moral sense, indeed its very bodily location, are quite clearly delineated, as they are throughout Hutcheson's body of work.

Raphael further asserts that the *Inquiry* does not really argue against rationalism and that Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense is poorly argued because he does not distinguish between it and benevolence, or between "senses, desires, passions, affections and instincts, using any of these words with little discrimination for the things falling under all of those classes" (30-1). While Raphael does state that the *Illustrations* clarified Hutcheson's views on the moral sense, a not surprising occurrence given the reception history of the *Inquiry* (especially the subsequent exchange of letters with Burnet that forced Hutcheson to defend and hone his views), his argument about

Hutcheson's unclarity of terms belies the distinct difference that Hutcheson draws between the moral *sense*, which receives impressions from the qualities of beauty and virtue, and *desires, passions and affections*, which are the results of the impressions of those qualities acting upon the moral sense. Admittedly, Hutcheson does not draw a clear distinction between a sense and an instinct, but Raphael's criticism in this regard seems very much as if he is criticizing Hutcheson for not thinking in contemporary terms, where we do draw such clear distinctions, as opposed to thinking in eighteenth-century terms, when such distinctions were less clear, if for no other reason than that scientific understandings of the body were different from our own, as I shall discuss in Chapter Three.

Henning Jensen, like Raphael, also argues that the moral sense is not really a sense, does not really operate through feeling and, in the end, is "on the side of reflection, not sensation" (50).<sup>73</sup> Indeed, Jensen ignores completely the fact that Hutcheson, while disputing Lockean rationalism, premised his own theory of moral approval upon the Lockean epistemological tenet that sensation leads to action, stating instead that "approval as a kind of sensation is not an affection or passion or 'spring of action'" (Jensen 87). What Jensen, like Raphael, instead demonstrates is his unwillingness to accept Hutcheson on his own terms because those terms were premised upon a radically different worldview, going as far as to say that "It is hard to understand how Hutcheson or anyone else could maintain the extremely implausible view that what we ought to do is to perform acts from a benevolent motive," (91) when this is, of course, exactly what Hutcheson argued. Jensen claims that Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense can be

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<sup>73</sup>Henning Jensen, *Motivation and the Moral Sense in Francis Hutcheson's Ethical Theory*, Ch. 1, fn. #16.

directed anywhere, even toward genocide, omitting completely Hutcheson's clear argument that the moral sense responds favorably toward benevolence and unfavorably toward self-interest. As genocide and benevolence are diametrically opposed to each other, it is difficult to see how Jensen could make that claim; his assertion instead points to his misreading of Hutcheson.

William Frankena, in turn, presents a qualified counterargument.<sup>74</sup> He believes that Hutcheson is, in the end, a noncognitivist, stating that Hutcheson deserves "a higher place in the history of ethics than he has" (375); however, he still seems unwilling to admit the full scope of Hutcheson's separation of emotion and reason. In fact, Frankena argues that the *Inquiry* never fully refutes reason, claiming that Hutcheson never fully formulated the theory that a distinct sense is necessary for the reception of moral ideas. Not only is this contrary to Hutcheson's philosophy, Norton points out that the eighteenth-century did not make the distinctions between cognitive and emotive functions that we make today, where cognition has come to be associated with reason and emotion as its distinct opposite.<sup>75</sup> Hutcheson, he argues, instead views cognitive functions as those which provide us with information; the moral sense clearly does this, as do the external senses, by responding to the impressions of qualities, in this case to the quality of virtue. It is an active sense rather than a passive one. Ultimately, Norton argues, the twentieth-century debates about the characteristics of Hutcheson's moral sense impose our categories of causation, motivation, sensation, etc. onto a philosophy that does not share the same understanding upon which those categories are premised; although the information provided by the moral sense is not based on reason, that does

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<sup>74</sup>William Frankena, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory," Ch. 1, fn. #16.

<sup>75</sup>David Fate Norton, "Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory Reconsidered," fn. #28.

not mean that it is not crucial information to which we should not pay attention. The emotions which stem from the moral sense are the pieces of information from which we form judgments; from those judgments, we then take action.

Thus, when, in a later work, Norton claims that Hutcheson is a moral realist in that he perceives moral ideas as having a natural existence,<sup>76</sup> he is called to task by Kenneth Winkler, who argues that natural and moral are distinct categories and that therefore "[t]here is an objective difference between virtue and vice . . . [and that] difference can be apprehended by a creature without a moral sense, or by a creature with a moral sense of a different structure" (185).<sup>77</sup> This is, of course, not what Hutcheson argues, for while he would agree that there is an objective difference between virtue and vice, he also argues that the moral sense was placed in us by God so that we are able to perceive that objective difference. Natural and moral, then, are not distinct categories to Hutcheson but merely different descriptive terms for the same phenomena; the quality of virtue is both natural (i.e., it exists in the world independently of us) and moral (i.e., it creates an impression on the moral sense that leads that person to love the moral actor). Similarly, the quality of temperature is both natural (i.e., it also exists in the world independently of us) and active (i.e., it creates an impression on the sense of touch that leads that person to regulate his or her distance to its source). The internal moral sense, then, in its moral nature, like the external senses, is simultaneously natural, active and specific.

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<sup>76</sup>David Fate Norton, *David Hume*, fn. #28, esp. Ch. 2.

<sup>77</sup>Kenneth P. Winkler, "Hutcheson's Alleged Realism," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 22.2 (1985): 179-94.

Therefore, again contrary to Winkler, a creature without a moral sense could not achieve that public happiness because it could not perceive the difference between virtue and vice any more than a creature without a sense of touch could perceive temperature. Furthermore, a creature with a moral sense of a different structure is, according to Hutcheson's schema, an impossibility. As virtue and vice are not simply arbitrary names, but real qualities, with real differences, established by God, so too the moral sense is not an arbitrary name for a nonspecific entity but is a very real, and very specific, sense placed in us by God as part of our perfect condition in order to perceive those real differences. As Hutcheson notes in the first treatise of the *Inquiry*, when he argues for the existence of an innate sense of beauty, "we have got distinct names for the *external senses*, and none, or very few, for the *internal* . . . by this [we] are led, as in many other cases, to look upon the former as some way more *fixed*, and *real* and *natural*, than the latter" (82, emphasis in original). In other words, Hutcheson, building upon Locke's association of names with objects, argues that it is because of the inadequacy of language that people view the external senses as being more concrete than the internal ones, not because of any inherent physiological difference in the abilities of those senses or because of any misrepresentation of the body and its operations on his part. Indeed, as I shall discuss in Chapter Three, Hutcheson builds upon a longstanding history of the reality of internal senses in order to argue for the existence of the moral sense, a view held by Locke himself yet omitted by Hutcheson's critics.

But Hutcheson also notes that "all *beauty* has a relation to some *perceiving power*; and consequently since we know not how great a *variety* of senses there may be among animals, there is no form in *nature* concerning which we can pronounce, 'That it has not beauty'; for it may still please some *perceiving power*" (72, emphasis in original).

The internal senses, that is, just like the external ones, through their powers of perception, respond to very specific qualities. Our internal sense of beauty, according to Hutcheson, responds to uniformity amidst variety, but the internal sense of beauty in other creatures could well respond to, for example, a flat rock on a dirt path to which our sense of beauty is nonresponsive. Similarly, a creature with a moral sense of a different structure would perceive something different; it might also be a quality, but it would not be what we recognize to be the quality of either virtue or vice. Consequently Hutcheson, as Norton argues, can certainly be "both a naturalist and a moral realist, or a philosopher ill-suited to categorization according to certain fundamental categories of twentieth-century meta-ethical theory" (417).<sup>78</sup>

As should be clear, then, much of Hutchesonian criticism for a long time attempted to place his work into our contemporary philosophical and/or ethical categories, a move that effectively denied the real existence of the moral sense. As Bernard Peach, in an otherwise extremely valuable overview of Hutcheson's thought and influence, states, "According to a common interpretation of Hutcheson, the moral sense is directly aware of virtue or moral goodness in a person or action," but then argues that this interpretation is incorrect because it would then "conform to Hutcheson's definition of reason rather than to his definition of sense" (51). Yet that common interpretation is exactly how, according to Hutcheson, the moral sense operates *as a sense*—i.e., antecedent to reason. Peach illustrates well the unwillingness of many to grant Hutcheson's perspective of the moral sense as a literal sense, stating instead that it is "a noncognitive, *passive* receptivity to a special kind of pleasure or pain" (72, emphasis

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<sup>78</sup>David Fate Norton, "Hutcheson's Moral Realism," fn. #28.

added) when, in fact, according to Hutcheson, as Norton notes, the moral sense is active, not passive; it receives information from specific qualities in the physical world and then initiates the process whereby that information leads to bodily action, just as the external senses do. That active power of the moral sense makes it a source of information, and hence cognitive, but that cognition is based upon emotion rather than upon reason.<sup>79</sup>

This attempt in effect to rewrite Hutcheson is decried forcefully by Norton, who argues that language and meaning change over time, and that Hutcheson therefore must be understood on his own terms, not on ours. Norton analyzes Hutcheson's language to carefully delineate Hutcheson's argument about how the moral sense works—how it perceives, how it responds, how it compares to the external senses—an argument which, as I have already noted, transcends contemporary categorizations. Indeed, as Norton demonstrates, those critical categories in effect limit the powers of the moral sense by omitting functions which do not fit them, even when, according to Hutcheson, they are crucial to its operations. The result is to conduct what Norton elsewhere calls "a form of a priori construction" ("Hutcheson's Moral Realism" 397), in which Hutcheson's work is examined from our, rather than from his, perspective.

Yet even Norton, who is so careful to place Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense within eighteenth-century intellectual contexts, is ultimately unable to perceive that

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<sup>79</sup>See Peach, fn. #5. William T. Blackstone also argues that Hutcheson is a noncognitivist; see his *Francis Hutcheson and Contemporary Ethical Theory* (Athens, GA: U Georgia P, 1965). See additionally Rachael M. Kydd, *Reason and Conduct in Hume's Treatise* (London: Oxford UP, 1946), who seems unable to grant Hutcheson's basic premise that reason cannot determine whether or not an action is moral. Elmer Sprague, while noting that Hutcheson assigns both perceiving and approving powers to the moral sense, likewise argues that moral ideas are simply Lockean ideas of reflection—i.e., the mind reflecting on its own operations ("Francis Hutcheson and the Moral Sense," *The Journal of Philosophy* 51.24 (1954): 794-800).

Hutcheson conceives of the moral sense as a literal sense. Perhaps more than any other critic, Norton goes to great detail about the close similarity of the moral sense to the external senses, noting what he calls six points of likeness: (1) in the production of pleasure and pain; (2) in the involuntary nature of their perceptions; (3) in their universality to the human constitution; (4) in the immediacy of their operations, without the mediation of reason; (5) in the fact that their immediate perceptions may be mistaken, and thus may be subsequently corrected by reason, although their perceptive qualities exist independent of reason; and (6) in that their perceptions are aspects of objective reality that are directly presented to consciousness (*David Hume* 73-77). Yet, in spite of this extraordinarily detailed list of the moral sense's bodily processes, Norton cannot acknowledge that to which his analysis logically leads, and that which Hutcheson himself argues; he instead states that the moral sense is only analogous to the external senses and that there is no bodily organ known to correspond to it in the way that other bodily organs are known to correspond to the external senses. Such an unwillingness (or, perhaps, inability) highlights the power of structures of belief to shape our perceptions, even in the face of acknowledged contrary evidence. Even Norton, in the end, is unable to escape contemporary notions of the body and of bodily construction to view Hutcheson's thought in its full eighteenth-century context.

Terry Eagleton is one of the few critics who forthrightly acknowledges the moral sense's bodily aspect. He states that its "responses are rooted in the body—a body which is anterior to self-interested rationality, and which will force its instinctual approbations and aversions upon our social practice" ("Homage" 118-19) and also that "The body's affections are no mere subjective whims, but the key to a well-ordered state" (*Ideology* 34). In characteristically maddening fashion, however, Eagleton does not get any more

specific; it is therefore impossible to tell whether he thinks that the moral sense actually exists in a specific location within the body or whether, like Bernard Peach, who is perhaps the only other critic to acknowledge the moral sense's physicality, he believes that the entire body is its home—i.e., that the moral sense is like the sense of touch, which exists everywhere on our exterior (and interior) bodily parts.<sup>80</sup>

In even raising the question, though, Norton goes much further than most Hutcheson critics, who generally assume that the moral sense is analogical and, from that assumption, create the arguments which I have discussed above. In fact, Francis McKee explicitly states that Hutcheson would be certain to separate the moral sense from bodily operations because Mandeville explicitly links physiology to emotionality.<sup>81</sup> Such a reading diminishes Hutcheson's debt to Locke's epistemology, assuming instead that Hutcheson utilizes that epistemology only for its metaphorical qualities. It ignores as well Hutcheson's engagement with other branches of natural philosophy and, as I shall argue in Chapter Three, the perceived reality of internal senses at that time.

As I shall discuss in that chapter, the powers and structure of the human body were perceived quite differently in the eighteenth century than they are today. But the human body also was seen as being central to political theory in a way that we today do not see it. Thus, Hutcheson's deep engagement with natural philosophy needs to be examined in great detail, for his entire moral vision depends upon it in ways that have

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<sup>80</sup>Peach also, like Norton, states that he believes the moral sense is not truly a sense but is instead only analogous to one; however, he engages the question of physicality in a thoroughly detailed manner, arriving at his notion of the entire body as the moral sense by engaging the question of where Hutcheson thought the moral sense, even in analogous form, would be located.

<sup>81</sup>Francis McKee, "Francis Hutcheson and Bernard Mandeville," *Eighteenth-Century Ireland* (1988): 123-32

been neglected. Consequently, while historians of philosophy have tended to view Hutcheson theory as being ethical/moral, and historians of political theory have tended to view it as political, I argue instead that it is simultaneously both, and that that simultaneity hinges on the operations of the human body.

Norton, for example, recognizes the political elements of Hutcheson's work and their key role in his overall philosophy. He begins an article discussing the transmission of Hutcheson's thought to the American colonies by stating that "[t]here is an unfortunate tendency to think of Hutcheson as concerned only with the moral sense, or narrowly theoretical matters" ("Francis Hutcheson in America" 1555). In the next paragraph, he argues that it is important to note that Hutcheson was "a champion of human rights, and presents in his writings a careful defence of these rights against several forms of tyranny and autocracy" (1556). Yet Norton artificially separates those politics from the moral sense, never once discussing the interrelationships that Hutcheson saw between politics and ethics or morality; by making a separation that Hutcheson did not make, Norton in the end presents only a partial reading of Hutcheson's philosophy and of its complexities. This partial reading, while more accurate than many others, prevents a full understanding of Hutcheson's widespread influence in eighteenth-century enlightened thought, as it limits the purview of his philosophy to realms to which it was not, at that time, limited.

While more recent Hutchesonian philosophical criticism no longer engages in that earlier critical attempt of trying to understand him through inapplicable categories, it continues in large part to not discuss the political aspects of his moral philosophy. Indeed, Alasdair MacIntyre points out that almost five-sevenths of *A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, which was a compilation of Hutcheson's academic lectures, and almost six-sevenths of the much longer *System of Moral Philosophy*, concern questions

about the constitution of justice. Yet, as MacIntyre notes, "These parts of Hutcheson's work are almost entirely neglected by modern moral philosophers who write about Hutcheson, but they are clearly that for the sake of which the moral epistemology of the earlier parts of these two texts—and it is of course that epistemology upon which modern writers concentrate—was provided" (264). Such a misreading by omission, even if done with more sensitivity to Hutcheson's words than that done by earlier philosophical critics, continues to miss, and consequently to misread, significant elements of his thought.

Thus, Michael Brown states that "Hutcheson argued for a social rather than a political idea of moral virtue" (*FH in Dublin* 9), even though a few years earlier he had noted the "democratic potential of the moral sense" ("Francis Hutcheson and the Molesworth Connection" 66). Similarly, Susan Purviance, in an extremely thorough examination of the role of sociability in Hutcheson's thought, focuses on an apparent conundrum.<sup>82</sup> By arguing that feeling, not reason, is the criterion upon which our actions, as well as the actions of others, are to be judged, Hutcheson posits a benevolent society maintained through the emotional responses of each member of that society to the actions of those around him or her. Yet, as Purviance notes, Hutcheson's schema means that private experience is brought into the public sphere as the basis by which people both behave toward each other and judge each other's behavior. Thus, private moral judgments become public judgments, judgments agreed upon by individuals, each of whom is having his or her own private, subjective experience. There is, therefore, the necessity of explaining how such private ideas become communally accepted.

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<sup>82</sup>Susan M. Purviance, "Intersubjectivity and Sociable Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Hutcheson," *Eighteenth Century Life* 15.1-2 (February and May 1991): 23-38.

Purviance states that Hutcheson never really resolves this problem, arguing that the solution occurred only with the publication of Kant's *Critique of Judgement* in 1790. Yet she limits her analysis of Hutcheson's thought by looking only at its ethical and social aspects, never at its political ones, even acknowledging as much by stating that her goal "has been to examine the contribution of the moral sense to the social order," not to rights and duties (38, fn. 15). In so doing, she reinforces that same false distinction between the realm of the social and the realm of the political, as if "the social order" is not in many regards dependent for its very existence upon the execution of the different rights and duties that are given to, and required of, the people who are situated on different levels of it. She therefore misses Hutcheson's resolution of just the problem that she says he does not resolve: he brings his moral sense theory into the political by focusing on the question of happiness.

As I discussed earlier, Hutcheson argues that we desire to fulfill our personal happiness, yet that happiness may conflict with the happiness of others. But Hutcheson makes a crucial distinction between that personal, private happiness (which ultimately, he argues, leads to vice) and social, public happiness. Part of his solution is to postulate that we rely on our moral sense, rather than on our self-interest, to guide us to the fulfillment of that happiness. But as I also discussed earlier, and shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five, Hutcheson further argues that the social conditions under which that happiness can be achieved are, at their core, political conditions, for it is public happiness which, in the end, is true happiness. He states that each of us has certain rights to what is necessary for us to achieve that public happiness, and that a government must respect and maintain those rights. As our private happiness must be balanced against the private happiness of others, a law and a society are truly just only when they enable the

achievement of the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people—i.e., public happiness. As T.D. Campbell argues:

[Hutcheson's] general supposition is that men are happy only when they are able to follow out their natural desires, hence the significance of natural liberty, or the right of doing everything that does not contravene the rights of others. This gives him the basis for his most unshakable political conviction: the priority of liberty as a requisite for individual happiness. ("Francis Hutcheson" 177)

Hutcheson's strong belief in natural liberty, then, solves the conundrum that Purviance illustrates; it is through the rights given to each of us by our natural liberty that each of our private judgments and experiences can enter into the public realm and interact with the private judgments and experiences of other individuals. If one's pursuit of private happiness interferes with another's natural liberty, then public happiness is diminished. Unlike Lockean natural liberty, which seeks to balance the private happiness of each individual, Hutchesonian natural liberty focuses instead on the public happiness of the society, as each person's pursuit of public happiness enables the attainment of greater private happiness. Natural liberty, then, predicated upon the workings of the moral sense, becomes the common public judgment that maintains the common public happiness; our private experiences are judged by others on the basis of whether or not they sustain a society in which that natural liberty, and thus the freedom to pursue those private experiences, is also sustained. Private happiness, ultimately, is only possible when public happiness occurs.

On the one hand, Purviance seems to recognize this, discussing how the Hutchesonian ideal society "claims that the good of the individual will be realised in the

good of the whole, the public welfare" (36). Yet by limiting her analysis of Hutcheson's philosophy solely to the moral and ethical arenas, Purviance reduces her analysis of it; not only does she see conundrums that do not, in the end, actually exist, she omits from her analysis of Hutcheson's conception of sociability the very political structures that make such sociability (never mind such public happiness) possible. Hutcheson's sociability, in other words, is both interpersonal (or, as Purviance calls it, *intersubjective*), and interpolitical; it calls for the performance of duties that sustain the rights upon which those social relations are based and, on an even greater metalevel, for a political structure that supports those rights, duties and sociable relations. Thus, while her reading of Hutcheson is much more sensitive to the terms of his philosophy than are those of most earlier critics, the artificial boundaries that she places on his philosophy between the social order and the political order effectively perform the same a priori construction that Norton decries.

Similarly, John D. Bishop extensively analyzes Hutcheson's solution to the question of how the moral sense can motivate virtuous behavior without succumbing to egoism.<sup>83</sup> However, while Bishop's analysis, like Purviance's, shows great sensitivity to Hutcheson's terminology and does not attempt to interpret that terminology through anything other than an eighteenth-century lens, like Purviance he simultaneously limits

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<sup>83</sup>John D. Bishop, "Moral Motivation and the Development of Francis Hutcheson's Philosophy," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 57.2 (1996): 277-95; see also John Dwyer, "Enlightened Spectators and Classical Moralists: Sympathetic Relations in Eighteenth-Century Scotland," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 15.1-2 (February and May 1991). Dwyer discusses Adam Smith's theory of sympathy, which Smith developed from Hutcheson, and argues that sympathy is conceived wholly as an ethical/moral system of human relations. However, in a discussion of the *Wealth of Nations*, Russell Nieli notes that that distinction was not made by Smith's contemporary readers. Russell Nieli, "Spheres of Intimacy and the Adam Smith Problem," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 47.4 (October-December 1986): 611-24.

the scope of that very important question by not acknowledging that, according to Hutcheson, virtuous behavior is *political*. Thus, it is not simply, as Bishop argues, that the moral sense enables us to recognize and to approve of morally good actions and to cultivate virtuous character, although that is true as far as it goes. What Bishop omits is that the moral sense is the basis for, and cultivates, justice (that is, again, natural liberty) and consequently avoids being self-interested in that one's natural liberty is dependent upon the natural liberty of all. By focusing exclusively on character, Bishop keeps the operations of the moral sense solely within the realm of the private. To Hutcheson, though, such a private realm had direct public effects; the moral sense motivates virtuous behavior because it is toward those public effects (that is, toward happiness) that it, in the end, responds. Character itself then is public.

Discussion of Hutcheson's aesthetics also examines that realm as if it is separate from his political analysis, when Hutcheson most clearly links the two. For example, Peter Kivy argues that it is because of Hutcheson's *Inquiry* that aesthetics became a philosophical discipline.<sup>84</sup> Kivy notes that Hutcheson's argument about the existence of an internal sense of beauty already was being made in the seventeenth century, prior to Shaftesbury and to the Cambridge Platonists; Kivy traces this theory back to Lord Herbert of Cherbury's 1624 *De Veritate*, in which he argues for the existence of natural instincts, one of which is an aesthetic instinct, which perceive qualities in objects independent of reason. Hutcheson, though, according to Kivy, was the first philosopher to codify such instinctive responses to beauty into an actual sense: "Hutcheson's work in

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<sup>84</sup>Peter Kivy, *The Seventh Sense: Francis Hutcheson and Eighteenth-Century British Aesthetics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003).

aesthetics is the first fruit of a union of empiricism and English Platonism which the philosophy of Locke and his pupil [Shaftesbury] made possible" (25).

Yet, in spite of his extraordinarily detailed analysis of Hutcheson's construction of this sense of beauty, Kivy acts as if that sense of beauty in objects is, and must be, completely distinct from the sense of beauty in action, and that Hutcheson somehow falters by not maintaining that distinction at all times, stating that "Hutcheson is not altogether free of Shaftesbury's tendency to blur the distinction between the aesthetic and the moral" (107). By using the phrase "tendency to blur," Kivy distinctly implies that there is a clear difference between the aesthetic and the moral that Shaftesbury and Hutcheson fail to maintain. However, that difference is, again, a contemporary viewpoint imposed onto the eighteenth century. For the connection between beauty and morality at that time was perceived to be quite strong. From a religious perspective, if the world's beauty, indeed the beauty of the larger universe, is a reflection of God's grandeur, and if God is the arbiter of morality, then beauty and morality are much more closely linked than Kivy acknowledges. Those, like Shaftesbury, who were eager to create a secular, not a religious, moral state maintained that link. Indeed, Shaftesbury argues in *Sensus Communis* that "the most natural beauty in the world is honesty and moral truth. For all beauty is truth" (65). In other words, the aesthetic and the moral are inextricably intertwined.

Hutcheson differed from Shaftesbury in that, as a Presbyterian minister, he saw a more prominent role for God, who placed the moral sense in us and who calibrated it to perceive the quality of virtue that he established in the external world. Like Shaftesbury, however, Hutcheson believed in the necessity of establishing a secular, deductive foundation upon which to understand how that moral system operated; it was for that

reason that he identified, in the *Inquiry*, the mathematical formulas by which to quantify virtue in human action. Hutcheson also agreed with Shaftesbury that integral to the moral sense's operation was a deep connection between beauty and virtue; he demonstrated this connection not only implicitly by putting his treatises on each of those subjects together into one book, but also explicitly by stating in the preface to the *Inquiry* that God "has made Virtue a lovely Form, to excite our pursuit of it" by what he then calls "This moral Sense of Beauty in Actions and Affections" (xv). Indeed, he elaborates on this connection between beauty and virtue in the second treatise of the *Inquiry*, when he states that "This moral Sense, either of our own Actions, or of those of others, has this in common with our other Senses, that however our Desire of Virtue may be counterbalanced by Interest, our Sentiment or Perception of its Beauty cannot; as it certainly might be, if the only Ground of our Approbation were Views of Advantage" (126). In other words, those actions to which the moral sense responds *as* moral are, in part, perceived as such by it because they are beautiful, only the beauty is in human action, not in an inanimate object.

Hutcheson, therefore, following Shaftesbury, clearly links the moral beauty of objects to the moral beauty of virtue. In addition, given that, like Shaftesbury, his political vision grows out of his moral one into a politics of virtue, by extension that internal sense of beauty is also political. Those politics are not only moral, they are beautiful because they are moral, and we respond to them as such because the moral sense, which is the basis for that communitarian political vision, only responds favorably to those actions which are virtuous, actions which are, by definition, also beautiful.

While there has been even less criticism of Hutcheson's aesthetic theories than of his moral and/or ethical theories, Kivy is not alone in separating that aesthetic from

Hutcheson's political theories. Michael Brown argues that what brought Hutcheson and Robert Molesworth together in the 1720s was not republican politics, as Caroline Robbins argues,<sup>85</sup> but a shared interest in "the philosophy of beauty and the benefits of variety" ("Francis Hutcheson and the Molesworth Connection" 76). Brown notes the similarities between the two men's politics, noting as well the distinction between the class basis of republicanism and the democratic potential of the moral sense (although, as I noted earlier he sometimes denies its political aspects); however, he distinguishes between the moral sense and the sense of beauty in order to argue that, because there are no definitive records of the substance of Hutcheson's and Molesworth's conversations, given that political difference, it is more likely that what drew them together was their interest in aesthetics. Brown discusses the extensive improvements that Molesworth made to the gardens on his estate, and notes that Hutcheson often uses the example of gardens when discussing the workings of the sense of beauty. Based on this parallel, Brown makes a strong case for the role of aesthetics, not politics, in the "Molesworth connection."

However, such a shared aesthetic interest in no way negates a shared political one, especially as both men were concerned with a politics of virtue and interested in the writings of Shaftesbury (indeed, it is thought that Molesworth introduced Hutcheson to those writings); furthermore, even if their politics were not identical, they certainly were similar. As I shall discuss in the next section of this chapter, Molesworth was extremely interested in the political battles which Hutcheson and others in his circle fought at the University of Glasgow, and maintained contact with a number of the student radicals

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<sup>85</sup>Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthman*, Ch. 1, fn. #7.

with whom Hutcheson himself was involved. It is, therefore, extremely plausible that the situation at Glasgow was also a topic of their talks—indeed, it is highly unlikely that it was not. Given the significant overlap in their politics, and given also the deep relationship between their respective politics and their notions of beauty in action, it is implausible that what drew them together, and what kept them together, was simply and solely an appreciation of nature confined into orderly patterns.

Furthermore, Brown maintains a separation between the realm of the aesthetic and of the political that Hutcheson would not. Certainly it is possible that "[w]alking around Breckdenstown [Molesworth's estate] in the company of its proud owner" ("Francis Hutcheson" 76), Hutcheson discovered the blend of uniformity amidst variety to which, he argued, the internal sense of beauty responds. But as Hutcheson makes clear in the *Inquiry*, that aesthetic sense of beauty enters into those very political realms from which Brown wants to keep them. Brown therefore eliminates the possibility that, while walking through those very gardens, Hutcheson and Molesworth discussed the links between beauty and virtue.

Terry Eagleton, to the contrary, in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, sees a direct connection between eighteenth-century aesthetics and politics, reviewing not only Shaftesbury's deep intertwining of politics and aesthetics but noting also that Hutcheson "speaks of virtuous actions as beautiful and vicious ones as ugly or deformed" (37). Yet other than that one quote, Eagleton, in an extensive chapter entitled "The Law of the Heart," barely mentions Hutcheson, focusing instead on Shaftesbury and Hume in his argument that aesthetics was part of the civilizing process that inscribed a bourgeois order in eighteenth-century Enlightened Europe. In a sense, Eagleton is correct in omitting Hutcheson from his discussion, for Shaftesbury's politics of taste were

necessarily dependent upon a class-based social structure in a way that Hutcheson's were not. However, this omission also gives his analysis an overdetermined quality, as if that emergent order, and its link to the heart that he details, was inevitable. Indeed, Eagleton is short on historical specifics, eliding any possible distinctions between intentions and effects as if it is only the latter that matter.

It is, therefore, striking that several years later Eagleton not only reiterates what he recognized earlier—the Hutchesonian connection between aesthetics and virtue—but expands his analysis of the ideology of the aesthetic to include a discussion of Hutcheson's specific political vision.<sup>86</sup> Eagleton states that the "'Moral sense' yokes public and intimate spheres together, since it is just the kind of actions which are most socially benevolent which will win my most pleasurable individual approbation" ("Homage" 110-11). Like Brown, he also discusses the democratic potential of the moral sense, for as an inherent part of the human condition its virtuous faculties are available to everyone, no matter their place in the social structure; he argues that Hutcheson builds upon that democratic potential a utopic vision in which virtue is "the opposite of the marketplace, and disinterestedness is a politically radical attitude" (117). Indeed, while he does not say so directly, Eagleton implies that there is a clear distinction between Hutcheson's and Shaftesbury's moral politics; if Shaftesbury's helped inscribe an eighteenth-century bourgeois society, Hutcheson's critiqued it (116).

In so doing, Eagleton acknowledges what few other critics have acknowledged: that Hutcheson's ethics and morals are political, and that his politics are ethical and

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<sup>86</sup>Terry Eagleton, "Homage," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

moral.<sup>87</sup> Campbell, referenced above, is one of the few others to make such an assertion, noting, as I have, that philosophers tend to provide an ethical/moral reading of Hutcheson's work and historians a political reading of it,<sup>88</sup> thereby perpetuating that very split in Hutchesonian criticism. Thus, for example, Richard Sher argues that Hutcheson's *System of Moral Philosophy* was one of the texts most influential to the development of Scottish academic moral philosophy in the eighteenth century, and that part of its influence was its employment of Whig and republican political principles to dictate the parameters of everyday actions. Similarly, Thomas P. Miller locates the eighteenth-century Scottish study of rhetoric and moral philosophy within the civic humanist tradition of preparing educated citizens who could speak wisely about society's concerns and therefore could engage in sound political discourse; he then discusses the ways in which Hutcheson adapted that tradition to elucidate his political vision. Caroline Robbins examines Hutcheson's role as one of the eighteenth-century Commonwealthmen who kept alive the Harringtonian republican tradition, and argues that his discussion, in both his teaching and in his *System of Moral Philosophy*, of the conditions under which colonies could justifiably declare independence was a significant influence on the later calls for independence by the British-American colonists. Wylie Sypher argues that Hutcheson, especially in the *System*, was the first writer to attack the classical theory of slavery, in which Aristotle argued that one could be a slave either by nature or by conquest, an attack which Sypher notes was a piece of the larger critique by Country

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<sup>87</sup>See also James Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Knud Haakonssen, "Natural Law and Moral Realism: The Scottish Synthesis." Stewart, *Studies*: 61-85.

<sup>88</sup>Campbell, "Francis Hutcheson," Ch. 1, fn. #13.

Whigs of Court Whig actions and which, in the colonies, was one of the eventual rationales for colonial independence.<sup>89</sup>

However, *pace* Campbell, while these, and other, historians of the Scottish Enlightenment recognize the centrality of such politics to Hutcheson's thought, they do not link those politics to his conception of the moral sense; their focus has been elsewhere, examining instead the broader sweep of events and influences within which Hutcheson participated.<sup>90</sup> Certainly understanding the effects and nuances of that participation is crucial to any reading of his work, but by its very nature such a historical focus omits the close readings which would enable that understanding to be executed. As Campbell states, "Hutcheson's political theory requires to be set in the context of his meta-ethics" because "it may be that Hutcheson's political theory clarifies his views as to the extent to which moral considerations are determinants of human action" (168).

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<sup>89</sup>Richard B. Sher, "Professors of Virtue: The Social History of the Edinburgh Moral Philosophy Chair in the Eighteenth Century." *Studies in the Philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. M.A. Stewart (Oxford, England: Clarendon P, 1990): 87-126; Thomas P. Miller, "Francis Hutcheson and the Civic Humanist Tradition." *The Glasgow Enlightenment*. Ed. Andrew Hook and Richard B. Sher (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell P, 1995): 40-55; Caroline Robbins, *The Eighteenth-Century Commonwealthmen*, fn. #42; Robbins, "'When It Is That Colonies May Turn Independent,'" Ch. 1, fn. #15; Wylie Spyher, "Hutcheson and the 'Classical' Theory of Slavery," *Journal of Negro History* 24 (1939): 263-80. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, fn. #9, esp. Ch. 14, in which he analyzes the ancient and moral roots of Hutcheson's notions of justice; Robert Wokler, however, argues that MacIntyre minimizes Hutcheson's role as an academic reformer, depicting him incorrectly as an upholder of an older Scottish Reformed tradition of higher education (see fn. #4).

<sup>90</sup>The exception is Miller, who I would argue overemphasizes Hutcheson's turn inward through the ideation of the moral sense, an inner turn that Miller argues precipitated the process by which rhetoric and politics increasingly were seen as separate realms of inquiry throughout the eighteenth century. Miller, though, is very clear about the Whiggish nature of Hutcheson's political vision.

Locating Hutcheson's actions in their historical context is important, but does not illuminate how the moral sense itself leads to such political thought and action.

Indeed, Campbell argues that the continued separation of the ethical/moral and the political aspects of Hutcheson's thought limits our understanding of its complexities. He then discusses in detail "Hutcheson's moral epistemology and his political philosophy in the hope that the study of each will further our understanding of the other" (168). Yet while his reading, like Eagleton's, is clearly a critical advance that has not been developed further by others, he does not situate Hutcheson's work in its historical moment; the net effect is that Hutcheson's work is explicated in a vacuum, as if it is merely an intellectual exercise, rather than a philosophical system which responds intimately and immediately to specific intellectual, political and religious ideas and events with the intent to influence their outcome.<sup>91</sup> Similarly, although Eagleton, in his article, does historicize Hutcheson's work, he locates it primarily within the history of philosophy and of the philosophical debates of the time; he briefly discusses Hutcheson's role in the Irish Enlightenment of the 1720s, but does not discuss Hutcheson's role in Scottish intellectual politics, which were, by their very nature, simultaneously religious, national and transnational.

The net effect is that Hutcheson's moral sense theory has not been analyzed in a way that fully represents its complexities. It has been analyzed as an ethical/moral theory. It has, to a lesser extent, been analyzed as a political theory. Hutcheson's role in reforming Scottish universities has been discussed, and the connections between

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<sup>91</sup>McKee, fn. #38, suggestively argues that the *Inquiry* was written, in part, as a defense of the fledgling Irish Enlightenment of the 1720s, which was centered on Shaftesburian aesthetic notions of taste, from the attacks on those notions by Mandeville.

Presbyterian Ireland and Scotland have also been examined. Yet all of these inquiries, for the most part, have been compartmentalized. Historians of philosophy reference other historians of philosophy. Intellectual historians reference other intellectual historians. The influence of natural philosophy on his work either has been ignored or, in the case of Lockean epistemology, misread. What is needed is an analysis that links these pieces together: the ethical/moral with the political, the philosophical with the historical, the theoretical with the material. Not doing so provides as incomplete an understanding of the complexities and impact of Hutcheson's thought as would occur to the work of John Locke if it were viewed in such a fashion. While Campbell and Eagleton point the way toward a more integrated reading, much more needs to be done to execute it, and therefore to more completely understand the multiple facets of Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy.

Thus, in the next, and final, section of this chapter I shall situate Hutcheson's work within the history of the Scottish Enlightenment in order to demonstrate the ways in which science, religion and politics were all brought to bear on the development of his thought. Such a history, I shall demonstrate, does not solely concern the eighteenth-century challenge to Reformed scholasticism and to the Scottish isolation that it traditionally has been constructed to entail, but stretches back well into the seventeenth century; it thus places Hutcheson and the development of his ideas into a larger, and therefore more political and transnational, context. It also foregrounds the key role that natural philosophers played in the development of Scottish intellectual thought, and in the political upheavals which occurred within the Scottish universities, especially in the University of Glasgow, in turn deeply influencing Hutcheson's own philosophical development.

Following that section, in Chapter Three I shall detail eighteenth-century conceptions of human physiology, and shall examine their influence on Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense as a real sense. Understanding the moral sense in this way enables a fuller appreciation of the central place of the human body in Hutcheson's philosophy, especially in his political theory; I shall argue in Chapters Four, Five and Six that his conception of an ideal society is dependent upon the proper functioning of a physiological process by which the body responds to the bodies around it. Locating Hutcheson's physiology of the moral sense in the events and tensions of the early eighteenth century enables us to perceive the interrelationship in his thought between politics, society and human physicality that is otherwise lost to our modern sensibilities.

Science, Patronage and Student Activism: The Transformation of Reformed Scholasticism

Reformed Scholasticism was premised upon the Augustinian and Calvinist notion that humans are inherently sinful and that only an elect few will be saved; those regenerate few consequently are the natural rulers of the unregenerate many. Historians of the Scottish Enlightenment traditionally have claimed that long after it was being challenged in other Western European intellectual and academic centers, Reformed Scholasticism continued to exert a powerful influence on Scottish intellectuality. Nicholas Phillipson, for example, using slightly different terminology and focusing primarily on Edinburgh, states that its continuing influence was made possible by the economic poverty and political conditions in Scotland that led many members of the upper-classes to emigrate, primarily to London, especially after the Act of Union in 1707. As this was the very population which would most likely be exposed to, and influenced by, those new scientific and religious ideas, the gentry who remained were faced with the

task of creating a new Scottish identity—i.e., modernizing the universities, and forming the social networks and gathering places whose existence we now label as the emergent public sphere—with fewer numbers to do so.<sup>92</sup>

Yet while the events of 1707 were clearly crucial to the development of the various philosophical movements that now fall under the rubric of "the Scottish Enlightenment," it is also important to note here the workings of what Michael Fry calls the "traditional Whig historiography" of that Enlightenment: that Scotland, prior to 1707, was, like England's North American colonies, a poor, isolated, and provincial outpost on the periphery of the English empire, plucked from the Middle Ages by actions emanating out of London.<sup>93</sup> This Whig historiography owes much to the work of Hugh Trevor-Roper, who painted a picture of a backwards and isolated Scotland, brought into modernity by the Act of Union, whose enlightenment sprang, almost miraculously, out of a barren landscape.<sup>94</sup> However, recent early American historiography has demonstrated that those North American colonies were not as isolated as that traditional narrative indicates; there was, in fact, a seventeenth century religious, intellectual and economic transatlantic network in which they participated, even if that network was not as

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<sup>92</sup>Nicholas Phillipson, "Culture and Society in the 18th Century Province: The Case of Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment." *The University in Society, Vol. II*. Ed. Lawrence Stone (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1974): 407-48; see esp. 424-30 for a discussion of Edinburgh University. While Phillipson focuses on the social dislocations in Edinburgh after the Act of Union, and on the rise of a small elite of literati in the 1720s, he utilizes those religious, social and intellectual processes to draw conclusions about Scotland as a whole.

<sup>93</sup>Michael Fry, "A Commercial Empire," Ch. 1, fn. #14. For a further discussion of the omissions of this Whig history, see also T.M. Devine and J.R. Young's introduction to that collection, fn. #14. See also Fry, fn. #66.

<sup>94</sup>Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Scottish Enlightenment," Ch. 1, fn. #14. Cited in Roger L. Emerson, "Natural Philosophy and the Problem of the Scottish Enlightenment," *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 242 (1986): 243-91; see 276, fn. #137.

developed or as far reaching as the eighteenth century one. So too Scotland, prior to 1707, also participated in that transatlantic network, as well as in the existing European one, although again the extent of, and the effects of, that participation were more limited than they would be in the eighteenth century, as was the actual extent of that European network itself.

Therefore, while Reformed scholasticism clearly was a powerful intellectual, cultural and political influence in seventeenth-century, as well as in early eighteenth-century, Scotland, such a status does not mean that it was monolithic, nor does it mean that its university and other intellectual adherents were not aware of nor being influenced by other philosophical belief systems. As Roger L. Emerson notes, in addition to Calvin's works, "There were other currents of thought abroad in the land [in the seventeenth century] deriving from Geneva, the French Huguenot academies, England and Holland which prepared men to be rationalists although they may not have encouraged them to be such" ("Natural Philosophy" 260). Similarly, while there is no doubt but that Scotland was, in large part, an economically poor country, it is also true that numerous Scottish elites were making efforts, independent of any relation to, or actions stemming from, England, to remedy that condition; the disastrous Darien Scheme, in which the Scottish Parliament, in 1695, established a trading company which raised funds and then, in 1698, established an ill-fated colony in Panama, is only the most famous example of such efforts.<sup>95</sup> In fact, the roots of the Scottish Enlightenment, and of Hutcheson's particular role in it, predate not just the Act of Union, but even the Glorious

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<sup>95</sup>See, e.g., David Armitage, "The Scottish Vision of Empire: Intellectual Origins of the Darien Venture." *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707*. Ed. John Robertson. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1995): 97-118.

Revolution. The events of 1707 accelerated trends that were already in existence; they did not create trends where none before had been.

Thus, much of the work of recent Scottish historians has been aimed at recovering the events neglected by that Whig historiography and to place the Scottish Enlightenment in a larger intellectual context that is simultaneously Scottish, transcolonial and transnational. Through this undertaking, it is now clear that those seventeenth-century ideas whose development we associate as laying the groundwork for the enlightened eighteenth century already were germinating in various Scottish locales well before Hutcheson's 1729 professorial appointment and even well before 1707; similarly, the intellectual and religious fractures and fissures that signaled their emergence also had begun to appear in Scotland well before either event, although again to a lesser extent than they had in other European metropolitan and intellectual centers. For the post-Union Scottish intellectual movements which are now collectively known as the Scottish Enlightenment built upon already-existing pre-Union networks of Scottish *virtuosi* who were well aware of, and participated in, new scientific and intellectual developments, as well as in the transEuropean correspondence networks through which such developments were disseminated and discussed.

Understanding the social and political contexts within which those intellectual movements emerged, as well as their curricular impact on Scottish universities, provides for a richer understanding of the development, influences and complexities of Hutcheson's work. This in turn enables a more accurate reading of the assertions and implications of his moral sense philosophy as it was understood by his contemporaries and as it was transmitted to others on both sides of the Atlantic. For Hutcheson himself, of Scottish ancestry but born in Ireland, educated in both places and engaged as a teacher

and writer in both as well, was a product of those same transnational networks and cultural correspondences; he should be viewed as someone who existed inside, rather than outside, history. While the traditional historiography of the Scottish Enlightenment meant that the "enlightened ideas" of the academic generation of the 1730s "spr[un]g like Minerva full-blown from the head of Francis Hutcheson or David Hume or from that generation of virtuous civic humanists which flourished after 1735" (Emerson "Sir Robert Sibbald," 42), in actuality the events of the late seventeenth century initiated the intellectual, philosophical and political processes that helped make Hutcheson's ideas possible.

Indeed, Paul Wood notes that George Turnbull, who began teaching at Marischal College, Aberdeen in 1721, nine years before Hutcheson began teaching at Glasgow, held many views similar to Hutcheson about politics, religion, pedagogy and the roots of moral thought. Like Hutcheson, he corresponded with Molesworth, was influenced by Shaftesbury, and believed in religious toleration. Thus, rather than viewing Hutcheson as the key person in the formulation of the type of thought that we now think of as distinctively Scottish enlightened—indeed, as *the* person without whom such thought would never have come to fruition—Wood argues that it is more accurate to view Hutcheson as part of a larger cultural network which included members of Scottish private clubs in Edinburgh, Aberdeen and Glasgow, student activists in Glasgow, and Irish dissenters, primarily in Dublin, who held complementary views on political, moral and intellectual topics. Wood consequently states that, "Instead of focusing on single individuals, we must scrutinize the workings of this network as a whole in order to understand fully the impetus behind the rise of Scottish philosophy in the eighteenth century" (135-36). Doing so does not make Hutcheson less significant than traditional

historiography sets him out to be, but it does make him neither solitary nor as unique; he was not isolated, but came to Glasgow as professor of moral philosophy through the actions of members of a political and cultural network in which he was an active participant: as a student, as the leader of a dissenting academy, as a writer and as a professor. Placing his work, and the professorial appointment which resulted from it, in that larger context enables a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary issues with which he was grappling; the ways in which their intellectual, religious, scientific, political and physiological elements were deeply interrelated; and how they were encapsulated in his social philosophy of the moral sense.

To say this is not to criticize Phillipson specifically, for the historical narrative that he expressed in the 1970s continued to be, until recently, the critically accepted one. Indeed, it still carries significant weight and contains substantial truths. For example, Emerson examines Sir Robert Sibbald's attempts to establish a scientific society in Edinburgh in the late 1690s, modeled after the Royal Society of London and to be known as the Royal Society of Scotland. Sibbald's efforts grew out of a desire to build upon the nascent scientific community that had formed in Edinburgh in the 1680s; this community already had led to the formation of several scientific institutions under the patronage of James VII, who had traveled to Edinburgh in late 1679 to develop an alternative power base to the English Whig opposition to his succession and who remained there until 1682. Hugh Ouston argues that James' patronage enabled Sibbald to establish the Royal College of Physicians in 1681, and that James also played a key role in, among other endeavors, the founding of a medical library and garden:<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>96</sup>Hugh Ouston, "York in Edinburgh," Ch. 1, fn. #14.

Patronage [from James] was provided for surgery, cartography, mathematics and engineering, and individuals who benefited from the royalist regime were involved in the full range of seventeenth century intellectual activities, from the medicine of Harvey and the philosophy of Newton to numismatics and weather recording. (133)

Ouston makes clear that James did not initiate the patronage but responded to the needs and requests of the members of Edinburgh's already-existing scientific community, a community that Emerson argues existed in nascent form as far back as the 1650s.<sup>97</sup> While Ouston also argues that, because of its Royalist underpinnings, this community suffered after the Glorious Revolution, Emerson notes that scientific *virtuosi* were again meeting in Edinburgh in the late 1690s, providing the basis for Sibbald's Royal Society of Scotland efforts. Clearly, Edinburgh at least, counter to that traditional narrative, was home to men who participated in the emerging new science well before the Act of Union, and who participated as well in the transnational communications networks through which the achievements and theories of that new science were conveyed.

Yet not only was Sibbald unable to form the Society, as Emerson also points out, even if he had been successful, there were simply not enough men educated properly in the sciences in Edinburgh at that time for such an academy to have survived. Additionally, the poor means of communications in Scotland would have made it difficult for scientific men in other Scottish towns to have become active members of it;<sup>98</sup> while correspondence networks existed, their rudimentary nature meant that they lacked

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<sup>97</sup>Roger L. Emerson, "Natural Philosophy," fn. #51.

<sup>98</sup>Roger L. Emerson, "Sir Robert Sibbald, Kt, the Royal Society of Scotland and the Origins of the Scottish Enlightenment," *Annals of Science* 45 (1988): 41-72.

an immediacy necessary for men in other parts of Scotland to be other than outside observers. Thus, that traditional narrative is not completely inaccurate.

However, while Sibbald was not able to found the Royal Society of Scotland at that time, he did found a smaller society, the Society of Antiquaries, in 1703; the men who joined, and who would have joined the Royal Society of Scotland had he been successful in his efforts to found it, were already members of the Royal Society of London. Similarly, Emerson details the development of the Edinburgh medical school in the late seventeenth century.<sup>99</sup> He notes too that, in addition, Edinburgh historians and antiquaries had formed clubs by 1700, as had geographers, and that there was, by this time, extensive correspondence between *virtuosi* throughout Scotland and between those Scottish *virtuosi* and their European counterparts. Thus, although their numbers were small, these men were clearly involved with the intellectual activities associated with the early stages of the European Enlightenment.

Indeed, Emerson argues that the traditional focus on Scottish moral philosophy in the historical narratives of the Scottish Enlightenment has contributed significantly to the longstanding prominence of the image of a barren Scottish seventeenth century,<sup>100</sup> as in that area Reformed scholasticism's intellectual hold was still extremely strong. He states that a more accurate historical narrative would include also the development of natural philosophy, for not only is there a long Scottish scientific enlightened history that stretches back well into the 1600s, the separation that we today make between moral and natural philosophy is not one which was made in the eighteenth century. Integrating the

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<sup>99</sup>Roger L. Emerson, "Medical Men, Politicians and the Medical Schools at Glasgow and Edinburgh 1685-1803." *William Cullen and the Eighteenth Century Medical World*. Ed. A. Doig et al. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1993: 186-215.

<sup>100</sup>Roger L. Emerson, "Natural Philosophy," fn. #51.

history of the latter into the history of the Scottish Enlightenment creates a truer picture of its development, as well as of the development of Hutcheson's own moral thought.

Thus, Emerson notes that by 1656, if not earlier, Edinburgh surgeons had a botanical garden which they used to teach pharmacy to apprentices; that those same surgeons that same year were attempting, for the third time, to incorporate a Royal College that would regulate all medical practice across much of Scotland; that the University of Glasgow, in 1637, appointed a professor of medicine (which lapsed in 1646 due to clerical opposition); and that by the 1670s, much of the new seventeenth-century science was being taught in all Scottish universities except Glasgow, where religious conservatives were most powerful. Such developments, he argues, were crucial to the triumph of Scottish moral philosophy in the eighteenth century.

Similarly, Christine Shepherd examines available seventeenth-century student notebooks from scientific lectures and graduation theses at all Scottish universities to discover what was really being taught, as opposed to what official university documents said was being taught.<sup>101</sup> She finds that these notebooks and theses covered mostly Aristotelian science until the 1660s; Cartesianism appeared in the 1650s, but was not accepted until the late 1670s and early 1680s. In the 1680s, Newtonian ideas begin to show up, especially in notebooks and theses from Edinburgh, as did the ideas of other new scientists such as Boyle and Kepler. Glasgow, she notes, was the most conservative, Edinburgh the least conservative, and St. Andrews and Aberdeen somewhere in the middle, a point confirmed by her subsequent examination of student notebooks and

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<sup>101</sup>Christine M. Shepherd, "Newtonianism in Scottish Universities in the Seventeenth Century." *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. R.H. Campbell and Andrew S. Skinner (Edinburgh: John Donald P, Ltd., 1982): 65-85.

graduation theses at Aberdeen in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and by Paul Wood's examination of the scientific lectures and other scientific activities at Aberdeen at that same time.<sup>102</sup>

Even at Glasgow, though, changes began well before the Act of Union. Emerson and Wood demonstrate that in the 1680s and 1690s, new scientific and other intellectual activities began to emerge there, although unlike Edinburgh, no specialized academies formed and most such activities consequently were centered around the University.<sup>103</sup> Because of this focus, early Enlightenment Glaswegian activities faced an additional obstacle not faced by those located in Edinburgh: the Reformed scholastic-based university curriculum. On the one hand, there was no official room in this integrated system of ethics and metaphysics for new scientific discoveries or for "polite" subjects such as belle lettres or history; indeed, it is with the dismantling of this very curriculum that Hutcheson and others of his academic generation are often credited. Yet, as Shepherd's analysis bears out, the official curriculum and the actual one were not always identical; emerging ideas within the realm of natural philosophy were beginning to appear by the end of the seventeenth century.

In fact, the new Principal (i.e., college president), William Dunlop, while a Calvinist minister, was also interested in the new science; Emerson points out that

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<sup>102</sup>Christine Shepherd, "The Arts Curriculum at Aberdeen at the Beginning of the Eighteenth Century." *Aberdeen and the Enlightenment*. Ed. Jennifer J. Carter and Joan H. Pittock (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP, 1987): 146-54; Paul Wood, "Science and the Aberdeen Enlightenment." *Philosophy and Science in the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Peter Jones (Edinburgh: John Donald P., Ltd., 1988): 39-66. See also Roger L. Emerson, *Professors, Patronage and Politics: The Aberdeen Universities in the Eighteenth Century* (Aberdeen: Aberdeen UP, 1992).

<sup>103</sup>Roger L. Emerson and Paul Wood, "Science and Enlightenment in Glasgow, 1690-1802." *Science and Medicine in the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Charles W. J. Withers and Paul Wood (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell P, 2002): 79-142.

Dunlop corresponded with Sibbold, as did several other members of Glasgow's nascent scientific community in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Emerson even argues, as does Perry Miller in a very different context,<sup>104</sup> that Calvinism was not necessarily an enemy of science. Science could not explain all of God's mysteries nor would it suddenly make those who were fallen saved, but it could help us to stand in greater awe of God by better understanding the laws of his universe. Emerson notes that Calvin himself, in his *Institutes*, wrote that "'astronomy, medicine, and all the natural sciences,' as well as more ordinary and less rationalised experiences of nature, give us 'innumerable proofs' of the existence and attributes of God" (qtd. in "Natural Philosophy" 259-60). Thus, while on the one hand, many conservative Presbyterian ministers and professors resisted the emerging scientific ideas, some were more open.

In addition, a 1690 royal visitation commission removed a number of professors who were known or suspected Jacobites from all of the Scottish universities except Aberdeen; new Glasgow professors, who were now increasingly being hired to teach individual subjects rather than as Regents professors who taught all subjects (itself a mark of the emerging specialization required by the proliferation of new forms of knowledge), began teaching previously untaught or undertaught subjects such as history, rhetoric, mathematics and botany. Discussions began in the late 1690s of establishing medical education, including a physic garden, at the University. In 1703, the professor of mathematics was allowed to examine an English student in medicine, and in 1704, a

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<sup>104</sup>Perry Miller, *New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1939).

Keeper of the physic garden was appointed and authorized to teach botany, with the equivalent status of what we today would call a lecturer.<sup>105</sup>

By the 1710s, a number of Glasgow professors were deeply involved in new scientific methods and discoveries, and corresponded with other such professors and *virtuosi* within and beyond Scotland's borders. Gershom Carmichael, for example, one of Hutcheson's professors, taught Cartesian science, Lockean philosophy and natural jurisprudence; indeed, James Moore and Michael Silverthorne argue that Carmichael helped establish the natural law tradition in Scottish universities that was an important influence on Hutcheson's developing thought, and thus is a much more significant figure than he is often perceived to be.<sup>106</sup> Alexander Dunlop, who would be key to Hutcheson's election to the faculty after Carmichael's death and a crucial ally in Hutcheson's efforts to modernize the university, was appointed Professor of Greek in 1704.<sup>107</sup>

In fact, as Emerson points out, although the number of such men in Edinburgh, Glasgow and Aberdeen was small, these cities only were intellectually backwards when compared to the major metropolitan areas of the time (e.g., London or Paris), not to other cities of 30,000 people surrounded by poor and isolated countryside.<sup>108</sup> Tracing the changes in Scottish philosophical and religious concerns from the Restoration to the Act

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<sup>105</sup>Emerson, "Natural Philosophy," fn.#51: 253-54.

<sup>106</sup>James Moore and Michael Silverthorne, "Gershom Carmichael and the Natural Jurisprudence Tradition in Eighteenth-Century Scotland." *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff. 1983. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1985): 73-87.

<sup>107</sup>William R. Scott, *Francis Hutcheson*. 1900. (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, 1966), esp. chapters 3-5.

<sup>108</sup>Roger L. Emerson, "Scottish Cultural Change 1660-1710 and the Act of Union of 1707." *A Union for Empire: Political Thought and the British Union of 1707*. Ed. John Robertson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1995): 121-44.

of Union, he upends the traditional Whig historiographic narrative by arguing that by 1707, Scottish elites had much the same intellectual interests and outlooks as had elites in other metropolitan and academic centers, and that this commonality can be traced back to the international networks, especially between Scotland and the Netherlands, that began to form in the 1640s and 1650s. Thus, he states that:

It has often seemed as if . . . the Scottish Enlightenment was really a phenomenon which developed after 1707, 1715, *c.* 1735, 1745 or even as late as the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Those who hold these views seem to believe that seventeenth-century Scotland had no share in European developments either because Scots were cut off from them, or because they were too benighted, disturbed, and religious to be affected by the larger secular intellectual currents of a modernizing Europe. Scotland was never cut off from Europe. Moreover, after 1660 it was much affected by and shared in European currents of thought.

(Emerson "Sir Robert Sibbald," 42)

Other aspects of Scottish history have been rewritten as well to demonstrate that Scotland was not as isolated and backwards prior to the Act of Union as that traditional narrative would have it. Michael Fry, for example, argues that Scottish mercantilism, foreign trade and colonialism had all begun after the Union of Crowns in 1603. Ned C. Landsman notes that Scotland had attempted to establish a colony in Newfoundland in 1620, in Nova Scotia in 1622, in the Carolinas in the 1680s and in New Jersey in 1682, while David Hancock traces Scottish trade with British-America back to 1650 and Fry even earlier, to the 1630s. Indeed, Fry argues that the Darien Scheme was premised on the notion that Scotland could benefit from the global trade that was burgeoning at the

end of the seventeenth century, rather than continuing to focus solely on its traditional trade with European markets. Richard Saville argues that many Scottish Whigs participated at high levels of William's army and government during the Glorious Revolution, and that 1688 opened up new economic and intellectual networks between Scotland, England and the Netherlands that had been either suppressed or simply unavailable under Charles II and James II.<sup>109</sup>

Therefore, while it is certainly true that Reformed scholasticism continued to hold great academic and intellectual power in Scotland prior to and after 1707, and that it remained well-established there until the larger Scottish cities became firmly situated in the British imperial system, it is equally true that its hold was not monolithic,<sup>110</sup> that Scotland was not isolated, and that the Act of Union simply accelerated a process which was already underway. In this regard, the status of the traditional critical narrative of the decline of Scottish Reformed scholasticism is a piece with the status of the traditional critical narrative whereby the commercial networks formed through the Western

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<sup>109</sup>In addition to Fry, fn. #50, see also Fry, "The Whig Interpretation of Scottish History," Ch. 1, fn. #14; Ned C. Landsman, "Immigration and Settlement" and David Hancock, "Trade." *Scotland and the Americas 1600-1800*, Catalogue of an Exhibition at the John Carter Brown Library, Providence, RI, and the Forbes Magazine Galleries, New York, NY (Providence, RI: John Carter Brown Library, 1995); Richard Saville, "Scottish Modernisation Prior to the Industrial Revolution." Devine and Young, Ch. 1, fn. #14: 6-23. See also John G. Reid, "The Conquest of 'Nova Scotia': Cartographic Imperialism and the Echoes of a Scottish Past." *Nation and Province in the First British Empire: Scotland and the Americas, 1600-1800*. Ed. Ned C. Landsman (Lewisburg, (PA: Bucknell UP, 2001): 39-59.

<sup>110</sup>In addition to Phillipson, fn. #49, and Emerson's numerous publications on this matter, see, e.g., Richard B. Sher, "Commerce, Religion and the Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Glasgow." *Glasgow, Vol. I*. Ed. T.M. Devine and Gordon Jackson (Manchester, England: Manchester UP, 1995): 312-59; Phillipson, "The Scottish Enlightenment." *The Enlightenment in National Context*. Ed. Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1981): 19-40; Campbell and Skinner, ed., *The Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment*, fn. #58; Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

European imperializing process helped turn provincial outposts of empire into sites of protomodernity; here too, while there is clearly much veracity, it is also important to note the local differences that are otherwise obscured by that larger, transatlantic sweep.

Richard B. Sher, for example, points out that a significant number of Glasgow merchants (i.e., the aforementioned commercial agents of protomodernity) did not support either the University or other intellectual institutions (e.g., the Glasgow Literary Society), and notes that factors other than economics also were at work.<sup>111</sup> Indeed, Emerson claims that the University of Glasgow's emergence as a secular, as opposed to a religious, intellectual force in the eighteenth century was due primarily not to economics but to local elites aligning themselves with either the Whig Court or Country factions, respectively, of post-Glorious Revolution England; these elites then used those alliances to make patronage appointments that would, in turn, increase the local power of each faction, for "[i]n an age without telephones, reliable men on the spot to look after one's interests were important" ("Medical Men" 188).<sup>112</sup> Across a large body work, Emerson traces out the political complexities of Scottish university appointments, including Hutcheson's:

The first thing one must understand about Scottish university appointments in the eighteenth century is that they were politicized, and that the politicians concerned with them were intent upon controlling every office of profit and honour in the kingdom. The more one controlled, the greater one's prestige, power and ability to manage affairs

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<sup>111</sup>Sher, "Commerce," fn. #67.

<sup>112</sup>See Roger L. Emerson, "Politics and the Glasgow Professors, 1690-1800." *The Glasgow Enlightenment*. Ed. Andrew Hook and Richard B. Sher (East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell P, 1995): 21-39.

in ways useful to oneself and one's associates or masters in London.

("The 'Affair' at Edinburgh" 1)

The power of patronage gave elites enormous local control, for without their endorsement little could occur, especially with so many dependent for their livelihood upon elite goodwill.<sup>113</sup> Emerson's point, in effect, is that the processes by which Edinburgh, St. Andrews and Aberdeen became secularized occurred earlier at Glasgow than it did in those other locations, despite Glasgow's known religious conservatism. He traces these events to the emergence of two main political factions, the Squadrones and the Argathelians, the former associated with Country Whig politicians and dominant from 1707 until 1725 (and again briefly in the 1740s), and the latter associated with Court Whig politicians, especially Robert Walpole, and dominant almost exclusively from 1725 until 1760. Men of each faction were committed to wresting control from the Scottish kirk in order to improve Scotland, but they also fought each other politically in order to gain power. He argues that the Scottish Enlightenment was, in effect, made possible by the patronage of these powerful, and moderate, men.<sup>114</sup>

Both the Squadrones and the Argathelians saw the Scottish universities as sites through which they could further their multiple agendas. As Emerson highlights, professorial patronage appointments were a means to establish influence and to potentially solidify their position in the political circles emanating out from metropolitan

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<sup>113</sup>Roger Emerson, "The Contexts of the Scottish Enlightenment." *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Alexander Brodie (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2005): 14; "Politics," fn. #69: 21; *Professors, Patronage and Politics*, fn. #59.

<sup>114</sup>Emerson, "Politics," fn. #69: 22. For a further discussion of the powerful role of patronage in shaping the Scottish Enlightenment, see also Emerson, "The Founding of the Edinburgh Medical School," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 59.2: 183-218; and *Professors, Patronage and Politics*, fn. #59.

London, especially as the value of these university livings (i.e., professorships) increased. This point is also made by Anne Skoczylas, who details the early eighteenth-century Scottish ecclesiastical and intellectual crises surrounding the teachings of John Simson, Professor of Divinity at the University of Glasgow, who, as I noted earlier, was brought to trial on charges of heresy in the 1710s and again in the 1720s, the resolution of which highlighted the shifting power dynamics between the kirk and these secular elites.<sup>115</sup>

Indeed, Emerson states that:

University politics were seldom as simple as naming a new professor. Even if the post was a regius chair [i.e., royally appointed], the Crown had probably been solicited by several important people whose candidates had at least to be considered. Other chairs involved legal patrons jealous of their rights to appoint, who would take suggestions only if it were clearly in their interest to do so. The kirk everywhere had a right to inquire into the religious beliefs and morals of prospective professors. Professors whose incomes depended on fees could be expected to oppose appointees likely to diminish enrolments [sic]. ("Politics" 24)

This widening reach of Scottish Whig patronage, and its consequent conflict with the kirk, was both political (involving the power to control appointments) and intellectual, for both the Squadrones and the Argathelians were committed to the tenets

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<sup>115</sup>Anne Skoczylas, *Mr. Simson's Knotty Case: Divinity, Politics, and Due Process in Early Eighteenth-Century Scotland* (Montreal and Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen's University P, 2001). See also Sher, "Commerce," fn. #67.

of the scientific revolution.<sup>116</sup> Thus, they supported many of those same professors who, as I noted earlier, were involved in bringing new scientific ideas to bear on the curriculum. In fact, Hutcheson's appointment itself was, in part, just such a patronage appointment. Therefore, like other aspects of Scottish enlightened history, it is important to see the ways in which science, politics and religion intersect; rather than attempting to create from nothing an environment which would make such patronage possible, Scottish Whig leaders were able to support particular men who were already involved in scientific pursuits and in the national and international communications networks that grew out of them. Hutcheson, concurrently, emerged not from isolation but from those highly-charged and extremely visible networks. In those interweaving connections, he was actually quite ordinary.

During Hutcheson's student years at the University of Glasgow, chairs of law (1713), medicine (1714) and ecclesiastical history (1716) were created while the chancellor of the University was loyal to the Squadrone faction, as was a chair of botany after Hutcheson had graduated (1720); additionally, the University, in the early 1710s, acquired new botanical gardens and better scientific instruments. These appointments and actions clearly signaled the Squadrones' intent to use their political power to effect specific intellectual change and their view of the university as a corporate entity distinct from the kirk. When, in the mid-1720s, the Argathelians ousted them from power, the latter group continued that process of opening the University to newer scientific and philosophical ideas. Indeed, Emerson states that if anyone deserves the title "the father

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<sup>116</sup>See, e.g., Roger L. Emerson, "The Scientific Interests of Archibald Campbell, 1st Earl of Ilay and 3rd Duke of Argyll (1682-1761)," *Annals of Science* 59 (2002): 21-56.

of the Scottish Enlightenment," as Gladys Bryson famously has dubbed Hutcheson, it is the Duke of Ilay (or Islay), the leader of the Argathelian faction from 1725 until his death in 1761. An avid book collector, amateur scientist, and moderate and tolerant lawyer, the Duke provided patronage appointments for Hutcheson, Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, Henry Home and numerous others who were key to its development.<sup>117</sup>

Countervailing such political processes, of course, was the power of the Scottish Presbyterian kirk. While the kirk resisted the centralizing administrative tendencies that developed after 1688, even though the English ruler was ostensibly the head of both the Scottish and the Anglican Church, as I previously noted above, a parliamentary commission visited each Scottish university in 1690 and removed many of the most visible Jacobites and Episcopalians, beginning the process of instituting the new Whiggish order. The Act of Union made those centralizing tendencies even more powerful and thus that much more difficult to resist. Therefore, when, in the early eighteenth century, the Squadrones and the Argathelians challenged Reformed scholasticism much more directly than had occurred to date, that challenge, although focused primarily on academic issues and religious tenets, involved also the contested nature of local politics. Ultimately, it was made possible by the changes in community-based power structures that were brought about by the growth of a London-centered bureaucracy which increasingly moved to envelope outlying areas into its purview. While a part of that bureaucratic growth was commercial, a significant element of it was administrative, aligning the Protestant church, both English and Scottish, with the needs of the civil state.

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<sup>117</sup>Emerson, "Contexts," fn. #70; Bryson, fn. #10.

That struggle for power between religion and the state provided much more of the backdrop to the academic crises at the University of Glasgow of which Hutcheson was a participant, and which ultimately led to his professorship, than did the "civilizing" effects of commerce that the traditional historiographic narrative emphasizes. The Squadrones and the Argathelians were able to exert power because of laws passed in London which slowly rippled outward. For example, the Barrier Act (1697) significantly increased the influence and role of local religious officials at the expense of the national kirk by stipulating that the General Assembly of the Scottish Presbytery could not, by itself, make changes to Church policy but that such proposed changes also had to be approved by at least half of the local presbyteries and then reapproved by the Assembly. It was perhaps no coincidence that 1697 was also the last year in which a Scottish "sinner" was hanged for blasphemy. Similarly, the Toleration and Patronage Acts of 1712 allowed significantly greater freedom to Scottish Episcopalians, including the right to use English liturgy, while restoring to local nobles, in consultation with the English crown, the patronage right to appoint ministers. Together, these Acts significantly weakened the power of the kirk and increased that of local elites, who were able to begin appointing not only professors at the University but also ministers whose religious views were more moderate and who were more susceptible to the modernizing suasions of that emerging administrative state.<sup>118</sup>

The 1710s and 1720s, then, were a turbulent time in which the interrelationship between Scottish academics, religion and politics continued to shift. Importantly, it is within this turbulence that Hutcheson's intellectual formation took shape. For example, it

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<sup>118</sup>Emerson, "Contexts," fn. #70: 14; see also Emerson, "Politics," fn. #69: 21.

was during his graduate student years that the Squadrones began making the aforementioned professorial patronage appointments, although it is important to note that their ability to find men worthy of such appointments was made possible by the intellectual developments of the seventeenth century. Indeed, events that unfolded during Hutcheson's student life chart the emergence of that conflict. While his undergraduate professors, John Loudon and Gershom Carmichael, taught Locke's *Essay*, Puffendorf's respect for individual rights, and Cartesian physics, they framed their teachings through the Augustinian theology of the inherently sinful nature of fallen humans.<sup>119</sup> However, his graduate theology professor, John Simson, a minister and Professor of Divinity, was also extremely influential in the development of his moral thought, and pointed it in a very different direction.<sup>120</sup>

Prior to his professorship at Glasgow, Simson had spent time at Dutch universities in both Leiden and Utrecht, where he was exposed to Enlightenment religious and intellectual thought that he then conveyed to his Scottish students. Although he viewed himself as an orthodox Calvinist, he saw no contradiction between that stance and attempting to attain a more accurate knowledge of the physical world through studying Newtonian science. In this, he was simply following one of the tenets of traditional Calvinism. Yet, while he framed new scientific knowledge through the conception of a God intimately involved with the immediate consequences of human

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<sup>119</sup>See Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15: 43-45.

<sup>120</sup>In addition to Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15, much of the following information on Simson comes from Anne Skoczylas, *Mr. Simson's Knotty Case*, fn. #72. For a discussion of this period that covers Edinburgh and Aberdeen, in addition to Glasgow, see Peter Jones, "The Scottish Professoriate and the Polite Academy, 1720-46." *Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Istvan Hunt and Michael Ignatieff (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1983): 89-117.

behavior, Simson differed from his Scottish Reformed scholastic contemporaries in that he believed that part of God's glory was the cultivation of human happiness during this lifetime. Indeed, Skoczylas argues that Simson believed that Scholasticism had buried the truths about God's nature and that science could be used to recover those truths. His Creator, therefore, was distinctly more benevolent than that of other more conservative Reformed scholars, yet he believed that this God, not the scholastic one, was the true God of Calvin and of the Bible.

Thus, in the eyes of many Glaswegian religious conservatives, while it was dangerous enough that Simson taught Newtonian science, it was heresy for him to present a different image of God. They accused him of Arminianism, a charge that Skoczylas states was ultimately not true; she states also that part of Simson's "heretical" presentation was due to his perceptions of his role as a professor, which was to present multiple viewpoints in order for students to discover for themselves the truth about God's nature. As James K. Cameron notes, "For [Simson] the truths of the faith remained unalterable, but the way these were expounded and defended should, in an academic setting, be continuously brought under review in the light of the increase of knowledge" (119).

Simson defended himself against the heresy charges by arguing that he was simply following the dictates of the 1644 Westminster Confession, the first question of which, "What is the chief end of man?," was traditionally answered that it was to both glorify God and to enjoy him forever. Scottish Reformed scholastic conservatives emphasized the first part of that answer; Simson simply viewed the second part as being equally important. He essentially saw himself as following the Calvinist tradition of holding Protestant theology to the highest intellectual standards. As new knowledge

emerged, it should be used to illuminate God, but he had no desire to upend the existing social order or to introduce contaminating cultural mores and venues.

Yet even so, in 1717, while Hutcheson was still a graduate student, Simson was brought to trial by the local presbytery as being unfit to teach. However, he was only mildly censured—an action that was, in part, due to the fact that he was the brother-in-law of the university's president. But as Skoczylas notes, in addition to powerful personal relations, another element to Simson's basically harmless rebuke was the fact that the local presbytery was at that time losing its power to influence a wide variety of university affairs as the university increasingly saw itself as, and began to act as, a corporate entity in its own right, separate from the kirk. A key element of this process was the aforementioned increasing involvement of the local Squadrone elites in its intellectual life, exercised through the patronage power of professorial appointment. It was that shifting power, as much as Simson's familial connections, which was responsible for him not being removed from his teaching duties. Indeed, although Simson was again brought to trial in 1729 for religious transgressions and this time was suspended from his teaching and ministerial duties by the kirk's General Assembly, this action was protested by the university on the grounds that only it was entitled to judge its professors. Simson, in the end, was able to keep his academic salary; although permanently suspended from teaching, he was not expelled from either the university or the Church of Scotland and, because he was not removed, he could still tutor students privately and was still considered to be a member of the faculty.

Skoczylas argues that this decision was basically a compromise crafted by Glasgow's now equally powerful religious and secular leaders, whose influence continued to decrease and increase, respectively, as the century progressed, in order to

craft a settlement that was satisfactory to moderates on both sides of the issue, one that would stem further potential Erastian tendencies while simultaneously reducing the power of ultraorthodox clergy. Thus, although other Scottish faculty, including Hutcheson, were charged with heresy through the mid-eighteenth century, none were ever again brought to trial. Simson, in other words, "was instrumental in forcing the church to accept a more liberal form of Calvinism" (Skoczylas 129); the resolution of his "knotty case" signaled the now limited power of Presbyterian ministers who ascribed to older scholastic ideas and the solidifying presence of those who instead advocated for the modern notions of a benevolent and merciful God. Simson, therefore, is perhaps best seen as a figure reflective of the philosophical, religious and political tensions of the early eighteenth century; simultaneously medieval and modern, he was prosecuted for religious heresy, influenced future moderate thinkers, respected older forms of authority and was protected as much as possible by the emerging civil state of post-Union Great Britain.

Simson's emphasis on human happiness and on God's benevolence clearly influenced Hutcheson's thought. Later in life, when Hutcheson was a professor at Glasgow, he and Simson spoke quite approvingly of each other and Hutcheson quoted Simson in his lectures. Indeed, Skoczylas argues that Simson's teachings influenced an entire generation of moderate Presbyterian Scottish ministers who also stressed God's benevolence rather than His wrath.

At the same time, though, for all his "liberal" religious beliefs, Simson was not a political or social reformer; his liberalizing tendencies were strictly philosophical and pedagogical. While teaching potentially "dangerous" ideas about the possibilities of human improvement, rather than about the certitude of human sinfulness, he did not

support the activities of the other emerging source of social and structural unrest: students. For in the 1710s and 1720s, a number of Glasgow's students, many Scots-Irish like Hutcheson, also were deeply involved in efforts to "modernize" the University that ultimately contributed significantly to Hutcheson's professorial appointment.<sup>121</sup>

As M.A. Stewart discusses in great detail, this community of young male Presbyterian intellectuals, whose politics were republican and who maintained intimate ties with Glasgow after graduation, formed the Dublin nexus of a larger 1720s "Country" Scottish and Scots-Irish intellectual network.<sup>122</sup> Indeed, the history of that activism, in which Hutcheson himself was involved, including its transnational nature, illustrates the alignment of multiple forces that coalesced around him and made his budding professorship appealing to the Duke of Ilay. Stewart even argues that these events were "the first clear articulation of issues of academic freedom in the English-speaking world," which he defines as "the freedom of persons within an academic community to teach, study and research without substantial political or theological constraints" ("Academic Freedom" 1).

These student efforts were focused in several areas. One was an attempt to reassert their historic right to choose their own rector, the university official who was responsible for their legal and financial management. As Skoczylas notes, Simson and Hutcheson disagreed about this issue; not only was Hutcheson a participant in this effort, he was one of nine Glasgow students who, in 1717, collected signatures to take the University to court after the administration held an election for rector without any student

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<sup>121</sup>M.A. Stewart, "John Smith and the Molesworth Circle," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>122</sup>Stewart, "John Smith," "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15; "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15; "Academic Freedom," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

participation.<sup>123</sup> As the court was in Edinburgh, two students spent such considerable time there pressing their case that the University barred them from returning on the premise that they had missed too many classes; when they sued to be reinstated, Hutcheson signed as a witness supporting their suit.

Hutcheson graduated shortly thereafter and moved to Dublin, where in 1720, he opened his dissenting academy, an academy that McKee notes was the first of its kind in that city; in this endeavor he was assisted by Thomas Drennan, who had also been a student at Glasgow. Yet he remained very aware of the continuing events at the University through the communications of members of this network.<sup>124</sup> Although the University lost the suit, it executed numerous legal delaying maneuvers for several years. Students, looking for political allies and not finding one in Simson, did find an ally in the aforementioned Robert Molesworth. Molesworth promised that he would introduce a bill into the House of Commons supporting the student efforts should he win the 1722 election. Unfortunately, he lost and retired to Dublin, where, Peter Jones notes, "he devoted himself to his estates and to the patronage of a coterie of young men who shared his enthusiasm for philosophy and belles lettres" (93).

One member of this circle was John Smith, who had been expelled from Glasgow when he and a number of other students, in 1722, lit a celebratory bonfire when they heard a false report of Molesworth's electoral victory. Like his student predecessors pursuing the right to elect the rector, Smith took the University to court and won, but through legal maneuvering, the University again was able to delay for such a significant period of time that he gave up and moved to Dublin, where he became a bookseller. In

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<sup>123</sup>M.A. Stewart, "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>124</sup>McKee, fn. #38.

partnership with others, he commissioned the publication of Hutcheson's *Inquiry* (1725), and then the later publication of his *Essay* (1728).<sup>125</sup> Indeed, Hutcheson even dedicated the *Inquiry* to Molesworth, remarking that the book had been improved significantly through their frequent conversations. While such language is clearly in a sense *pro forma*, by acknowledging their considerable and significant contact, Hutcheson also acknowledged his intellectual debt to, and the influence of, Molesworth's frame of thought.<sup>126</sup>

Meanwhile, at Glasgow, other students, again primarily Scots-Irish, similarly to Simson were being accused by conservative ministers and professors of importing corrupting ideas into an intellectual environment that had been, until very recently, under their purview. Not only were many students agitating for a better curriculum, in 1724 several formed a literary club, the Trinamphorian Club, which met in a local tavern, just as other such clubs were developing in coffeehouses and alehouses in Edinburgh, Aberdeen and other European cosmopolitan areas.<sup>127</sup> These students corresponded with members of a similar club, the Rankenian Club, in Edinburgh, a correspondence which illustrates the geographic reach of that developing intellectual network. For in addition to Hutcheson and others in Dublin, as well as the activist students at Glasgow, this network included George Turnbull, who had just been appointed Professor of Philosophy at Marischal College, Aberdeen, and who was to be the teacher of Thomas Reid, and

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<sup>125</sup>Information about Hutcheson's Irish life is from Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Stewart, "John Smith," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Eagleton, "Homage," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Stewart, "Academic Freedom," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>126</sup>See my discussion in the second section of this chapter of Michael Brown's alternative interpretation of the Molesworth/Hutcheson friendship.

<sup>127</sup>Stewart, "John Smith," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15; McBride, Ch. 1, fn. #15: 84-5.

William Wishart, a young minister in Edinburgh whose father was the president of Edinburgh University and who was, in turn, himself to later become university president. Turnbull and Wishart were friends. They both corresponded with James Arbuckle, one of the aforementioned Glasgow students, whose efforts, Wishart claimed in a letter to Molesworth, indicated "the dawning of a revival of ancient virtue and the love of true liberty" (qtd. in Jones 94). Two years after writing that letter, Wishart left Edinburgh for Glasgow, where he was ordained and publicly defended both Simson and the student reformers. Arbuckle, in turn, moved to Dublin after graduation and became the editor of the *Dublin Weekly Journal*, Dublin's equivalent to *The Spectator*; he published a number of Hutcheson's letters and early essays in which Hutcheson argued against Reformed scholasticism and put forth, as an alternative, the broad parameters of his developing moral philosophy.<sup>128</sup>

There were, in other words, many cross-relations among the men who corresponded with Molesworth and for whom Molesworth served as a philosophical nexus; Hutcheson himself participated in and benefitted from such cross-relations, as they provided support and expression for his developing, and intertwining, religious and political ideas. Indeed, due to the religious pressures that I noted at the beginning of this chapter whereby English and Irish Presbyterian male youths had to study at Scottish universities, even prior to Molesworth's "retirement" an intellectual network of letters and personal relations existed between the metropolitan and intellectual centers of Ireland and Scotland, especially Glasgow, into which Molesworth was able to disseminate his republican ideals and in which Hutcheson already was situated. This network is

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<sup>128</sup>Phillipson, "The Scottish Enlightenment," fn. #67: 29-30.

receiving increasing attention as one of the key factors in the development of not just Hutcheson's specific philosophy but also larger elements of Scottish enlightened thought;<sup>129</sup> it is even argued that Irish dissenting students, such as Hutcheson, as a group came to Glasgow with more radical political ideas than did their Scottish contemporaries because the Presbyterian Church was barely tolerated in Ireland while being firmly entrenched in Scotland.<sup>130</sup>

This combination of administrative, legal, curricular and religious upheavals brought the University into the purview of the Argathellians, who by this time had gained control over Scottish patronage from the Squadrones. One of the student activists of the 1720s, William Robertson, was a nephew of the Duke of Ilay, a former student of Hutcheson's Dublin academy, and a correspondent with William Wishart; Robertson also was expelled from the university and settled in Dublin.<sup>131</sup> In part due to his communications with his uncle, Ilay in 1726 chartered a new royal commission to investigate the situation at the University; however, there is no doubt but that he used the turmoil at Glasgow to further his own political agenda. The commission sided fully with the students, and consequently reorganized some of the university's administrative structures to reflect their concerns (and, not uncoincidentally, to bring it more under the Duke's purview). The visit, then, signaled the intention of the political figures of metropolitan London to control events through the intercession of local moderate Whig elites.

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<sup>129</sup>See, e.g., McBride, "The School of Virtue," Ch. 1, fn. #15, and Stewart, "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>130</sup>Stewart, "Academic Freedom," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

<sup>131</sup>Stewart, "Rational Dissent," Ch. 1, fn. #15; Moore, "Two Systems," Ch. 1, fn. #15: 47; McBride, "The School of Virtue," Ch. 1, fn. #15.

These, then, were the conditions by which, Emerson argues, the Duke solidified his control as the primary venue for patronage within Scotland and which made possible his support for Hutcheson's appointment. While Carmichael's son was also a candidate for the position, the Duke pressured for Hutcheson to be appointed because of "[h]is intensive literary activity, the efforts and the protests of the students who found their way from Ireland to Glasgow, [and] the initiatives of his friends in the ministry . . . in visiting commissions . . . and in the faculty" (Moore 53-4). Hutcheson's appointment, in other words, was the result of the continuing efforts of those who wanted to bring to the intellectual life of the University the new philosophical, political, scientific, cultural and social developments of the Enlightenment, an endeavor in which they saw Hutcheson as a natural and ongoing participant.<sup>132</sup> Patronage, politics, intellectual thought and the scientific revolution were all factors, but even so, Hutcheson would not have been embraced by those actors had he himself not embraced such modes of thought.

Therefore, although not discussed in this fashion in the critical literature, Hutcheson's professorial appointment was clearly accomplished by the alignment of seemingly disparate actors, operating at different points on a spectrum of power, whose intentions were to effect philosophical, intellectual and structural change in an environment in which the conservative kirk still wielded significant influence; these actors perceived Hutcheson as a man whose views, as expressed in books, letters and

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<sup>132</sup>As I noted earlier, when Hutcheson came to Glasgow, not only did the majority of his pupils from his Dublin Academy come with him, but also about 20 English students came specifically to study moral philosophy with him. Although another, conservative professor initially claimed the right to teach it (Hutcheson was appointed professor of philosophy, not specifically of moral philosophy) the students made clear that if they would go to Edinburgh if Hutcheson did not teach the class, one that he then taught for the entirety of his career at the University. See Scott, fn. #64: 61-2.

essays, paralleled theirs and whose actions, to date, gave no indication that he would be anything other than the reformer that he indeed was.

Several points are important to note here. One is simply that this narrative illustrates yet again the now-familiar connection between religion and politics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; those whose religious beliefs were more medieval tended to have politics which were more autocratic, in keeping with the medieval notion of the importance of hierarchies, while those whose religious beliefs were more moderate tended to have politics that were less autocratic, in keeping with the notion of innate human possibilities that was becoming more prevalent through the new science of the times. Another point to be noted is Hutcheson's own membership in Country circles, even if he himself was not running for political office but was rather involved in "merely" philosophical pursuits. Yet, and this is perhaps the most crucial point, those philosophical pursuits were not seen by those living at the time as operating separately from either religious or political concerns. That is, not only was philosophy, as well as other intellectual pursuits, seen as inherently political, simply as a practice, Hutcheson's specific moral philosophy, centered in the moral sense, was seen by those on both sides of that intellectual conflict as having a very specific political standpoint: he was on the side of the "radicals." Hutcheson's language of the moral sense was recognized as a politically radical language.

A corollary point is that the bulk of what Hutcheson wrote in the 1720s, while clearly considered political, and politically radical, by those living at the time, was not concerned specifically with what we today would call politics. While he does end the *Inquiry* with a discussion of rights, a discussion that grows out of his earlier discussion of beauty and virtue, most of what he wrote at the time was concerned instead with the

motivation for human behavior, the basic notion of human nature upon which such motivation depended, and the types of social relations that humans consequently formed with each other. Hutcheson's philosophy, then, was overtly focused more on what we would today call the psychological and the social rather than what we today would call the political. That his writings were perceived differently by his contemporaries indicates quite clearly that those realms were perceived differently in the eighteenth century than they are today—that what was considered political was intimately concerned with social relations. As Hutcheson's view of human nature was primarily benevolent, so too his politics were primarily radical, for both human nature and human social organization, to Hutcheson, were full of the potential for human improvement; moral philosophy's role, as he conceived it to be, was to further that potential. That Hutcheson located that potential in the moral sense, rather than in rationality, and that both were located in the body, is, as I shall demonstrate in subsequent chapters, key to his political radicalism.

Indeed, while MacIntyre is right that the majority of the *System* is concerned primarily with arguments that we today think of as more traditionally political, that book was not written until well after Hutcheson's appointment to the faculty. Yet he was appointed to the faculty, in no small part, because of his political beliefs as he then expressed them. Clearly, then, to write about his discussion of the operations of the moral sense in any other way is to ahistoricize and to misrepresent the most crucial aspect of his structure of thought.

Yet, at the same time, it is also important to note again that none of this would have mattered, or even been possible, without the developing Scottish natural philosophic nexes of the seventeenth century, for such nexes created the groundwork upon which late

seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century political change could occur. While Hutcheson's debt to Shaftesbury is clear, those intersecting intellectual and political forces also created new modes of thought, and the language with which to express them, that, in turn, also helped shape his moral sense philosophy. Hutcheson's accomplishment was to build upon and to reshape the work of his intellectual and political predecessors, and to do so in ways that advanced the concerns of particular political forces. It is impossible to conjecture what he might or might not have been able to accomplish without them, but it is clear that he did not almost single-handedly create from nothing a new moral schema in complete opposition to that which preceded him. Instead, as I shall argue in Chapter Three, he joined existing natural and moral philosophy to more liberal forms of Protestant thought to reinforce the centrality of the human body to the science of human nature.

### Chapter Three

#### The Body Unbound: Affect and Physiology in Hutcheson's Thought

##### Rational Body and Rational Mind in Anglo-America

By the early eighteenth century, the human body was changing. Perceived for hundreds of years as humoral, sinful, a microcosm of the larger universe or a balance of fluids constantly threatening to become unbalanced, the scientific discoveries and social dislocations of the 1600s were transforming it from something capable even of altering genders into a contained, regulated, defined and quantifiable system.<sup>133</sup> For while Stephen Shapin claims that there was no Scientific Revolution, but rather multiple accretions of scientific knowledge in which older and newer belief systems consistently overlapped, still it is clear that conceptions of bodily structure, health and processes were

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<sup>133</sup>While the literature on the cosmological body is vast, a useful overview is Leonard Barkan, *Nature's Work of Art: The Human Body as Image of the World* (New Haven and London: Yale UP, 1975); for a more detailed analysis of the human body as encapsulating the body politic, see Ernst Kantorowicz, *The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1957). Indeed, as Barkan notes, the four humors (blood, phlegm, yellow bile and black bile) were originally associated with the four elements of the macrocosm: blood with air, phlegm with water, yellow bile with fire and black bile with earth. See Mary Lindemann, *Medicine and Society in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1999), Ch. 1, for a discussion of the precarious balance of the humoral body. For a discussion of bodies changing genders see Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality: Volume I. An Introduction*. Tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1978); see also Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1990) and essays by Elizabeth Castelli, Everett K. Rowson, and Ann Rosalind Jones and Peter Stallybrass in *Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity*, Ed. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (New York and London: Routledge, 1991). For an analysis of the cultural and political valences of the boundariless body in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, see Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1986), and Natalie Zemon Davis, "Woman on Top: Symbolic Sexual Inversion and Political Disorder in Early Modern Europe," *The Reversible World: Symbolic Inversion in Art and Society*, Ed. Barbara Babcock and Victor Turner (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977): 147-90.

significantly different at this time than they had been a mere 100 years earlier. By the late 1600s, the body no longer was seen solely as a metaphor for something else but increasingly was seen as a mechanical, laboring object in its own right; in the 1700s, that mechanical understanding of the body in turn would be challenged, but the body's object status would not be.<sup>134</sup> Indeed, it even can be said that the body was becoming a scientific object: already in existence, materially the same, but acquiring a new identity as it became the focus of new forms of natural and moral philosophical inquiry.<sup>135</sup>

Such a change, of course, was gradual; just as lay medical conceptions of the body generally remained grounded in older forms of physiological knowledge and worldviews until well into the nineteenth century,<sup>136</sup> so too elite scientific ones were not transformed overnight. William Harvey, for example, disproved the longstanding Galenic notion that the venous and arterial systems were completely separate and that consequently there were two types of blood: venous blood, which carried *natural spirit* and which was made by the liver after it processed nutrition from the alimentary tract, and arterial blood, which carried *vital spirit* and which was made by the heart after it

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<sup>134</sup>Stephen Shapin, *The Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1996); Jonathan Sawday, *The Body Emblazoned: Dissection and the Human Body in Renaissance Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), esp. Ch. 8.

<sup>135</sup>Lorraine Daston, "The Coming into Being of Scientific Objects." *Biographies of Scientific Objects*. Ed. Lorraine Daston (Chicago and London: U Chicago P, 2000): 1-14. Daston attempts to break out of the realist/constructionist debate within the history of scientific inquiry—that is, the debate as to whether or not the objects of such inquiry are real or not real, discovered or invented. She argues instead that they are both real and historical. They become the focus of scientific inquiry (i.e., a scientific object) through an alignment of cultural forces which may be either momentary or long-term, but becoming a scientific object does not negate the material reality of the object, even if it ceases to be real to later generations.

<sup>136</sup>See, e.g., Roy Porter, *Disease, Medicine and Society in England 1550-1860* (London: Macmillan, 1987); *Patients and Practitioners: Lay Perceptions of Medicine in Pre-Industrial Society*. Ed. Roy Porter (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1985).

processed *pneuma*, the life spirit that is carried in the air.<sup>137</sup> Yet while Harvey demonstrated that blood instead circulated in one system throughout the entire body, he still structured his analysis of that circulation on the older notion that aspects of the human body correspond to aspects of the larger cosmos. For example, he wrote in *De Motu Cordis*, or *On the Motion of the Heart*, (1628) that the motion of the blood is "circular in the same way in which Aristotle says that the air and rain imitate the circular motion of the heavens" (qtd. in Sawday 23). As Jonathan Sawday points out, the verb "imitate" indicates that Harvey, while contributing significantly to more accurate knowledge of the body's processes, was thinking about what he saw occurring in the body within the framework of the metaphysical system in which the body, the world and the heavens replicate each other in a structured, analogical order (23). Thus, Francis Bacon may well have argued for the primacy of observation and deduction eight years earlier in *Novum Organum* (1620); however, Harvey's statement illustrates that the body was not yet simply being observed but continued to be read—indeed, that perhaps such a reading process never can be extracted fully from Bacon's call for detached observation.

A significant factor in this shifting perception of the body was the increased acceptance of human dissection, which not only enabled a different understanding of bodily processes but itself evidenced larger social and philosophical changes. No longer was the body seen solely as an interlocking piece of a larger system whose revealed mysteries unveiled the corresponding mysteries of that system; instead, it began to be seen as a self-contained entity which could be isolated and then observed without any co-

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<sup>137</sup>John D. Spillane, *The Doctrine of the Nerves: Chapters in the History of Neurology* (Oxford and New York: Oxford UP, 1981): 31. Spillane extensively discusses Galenic ideas of human anatomy; it is useful to note that Galen, in turn, had disproved the belief that the arteries carried only air, not blood.

occurring cosmological ramifications. Thus, in his examination of what he calls the "culture of dissection," Sawday notes that prior to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, "consider[ing] the body in isolation was not merely difficult but, strictly speaking, impossible, since the body's primary function, it was held, was to act as a vessel of containment for the more significant feature of the soul" (16). Galen, for example, dissected cats, dogs, mice, sheep, pigs, some apes and at least one elephant, but, because of Greek prohibitions, did not dissect humans (Spillane 13). In fact, such prohibitions carried over to early Christianity, and did not begin to relax until 1482, when Pope Sixtus IV ruled that human cadavers could be dissected for educational purposes as long as they were the bodies of convicted criminals and were given a Christian burial afterward.

As this Western European culture of dissection began to emerge in the 1500s and 1600s, it became fashionable to open up the human body in anatomy theaters: amphitheater-type structures which had a large table in the middle upon which the dissection would occur and around which ascended ever-higher rows of benches where the audience could sit and observe. Dissection, then, became a spectacle which attracted not just medical students and professionals, but also members of the court and of the upper-classes. Such a displayed and dismembered body, publicly cut open in order to further the scientific pursuit of understanding better its structure and operations, could only occur within a society that saw the body as an entity worthwhile of understanding in and of itself as well as an entity capable of being so understood; indeed, the theatrical nature of the event highlighted both the performance of the dissection and the social value of the scientific pursuit. Sawday argues that this culture of dissection emerged in early modern Europe simultaneous with the emergence of the concept of interiority,

facilitated in part by the rise of Calvinism, with its stringent demands for self-reflection; the separation of this interior self from the body that it occupied contributed both to the continued materiality of the body as an object worthy of study and to the Cartesian separation of an internal "I" from that material body.

But the Cartesian body, of course, was more than just material; it was a machine, as was the universe within which it existed, for it is by now a critical commonplace that the seventeenth century witnessed the beginning of the theological shift which posited a universe run by God's mechanical laws rather than by the immediate presence of God's will. Although older forms of Christianity still exerted great influence, especially in the New England colonies and in Scotland, the reconfiguring of God as a prime mover who had designed a clock-like universe reflected larger conceptual changes; order and structure now were beginning to be seen as the regulated movement of that system's individual parts, each with their unique design and operations, rather than as the interconnected relationship of harmonious, corresponding parts whose operational principles imitated that of all others. The mechanical body, therefore, could be isolated; it could be cut up and studied in ways that previously had not been possible, for it was, in many ways, becoming a discreet entity existing in its own individualized space.

Yet, at the same time, this new type of body still bore a conceptual relationship to the macrocosm. While each element of the universal machine was unique and worked in unique ways, as machines, they reflected in their mechanical qualities the qualities of the larger mechanical cosmos; they reflected as well the will of the orderly and rational God who designed them and that cosmos, and who then let them run by the very mechanical laws by which they had been established. In other words, while the body could now be isolated, it did not exist in isolation. Imitation may have begun to give way to

resemblance, but that did not mean that older belief systems about the place of the body were abandoned entirely in the face of new forms of knowledge; rather, belief and knowledge continued to operate in a dynamic interrelationship to and with each other.

This philosophical transformation of the human body into a scientific object both mirrored and produced comparable changes in philosophical conceptions of human nature. On the one hand, because philosophy was a wide-ranging field of inquiry which included what we today call both the hard and the social sciences, it was greatly impacted by the social and religious upheavals of the 1600s and by the emerging scientific method, which posited that objects could be (and, indeed, had to be) isolated within or from their environments in order to be studied and understood. Such an act of isolation, of course, was part of the ongoing separation of science from revelation. However, these isolated objects were not simply material; concomitant with the emerging concept of an interior self, human nature, while immaterial, also was beginning to be seen as something capable of being isolated and studied. It too was becoming a scientific object.

Yet just as the human body could be isolated but did not exist in isolation, so too human nature, Descartes notwithstanding, generally was perceived as intimately connected to a larger system: the material human body within which it existed, and ultimately the mechanical universe which contained them both. Consequently, changing conceptions of the structure and operations of that material object had significant implications for examining and understanding the immaterial one. For if the human body now was a machine, then human desires were simply the effects of the workings of that overarching mechanical system; longstanding Christian notions of human nature as forever corrupted by the fall, capable of redemption only through obedience to God's law or through the unfolding of God's unknowable plan for individual salvation, no longer

applied. Rather than being inherently and necessarily sinful, those desires, and the actions that humans took to fulfill them, instead were simply the effects of specific causes; just like the actions of any machine, they were, in effect, part of God's mechanical design. Like other elements of that design, they could be scientifically studied in order to understand those causes (and, additionally, to understand their relationship to those effects), but that was because human nature contained within it an inherent rational order, as did the human body out of which it developed, as did all machines.

Thus, the field of moral philosophy also was in the process of changing, for as the study of human nature, it too was deeply marked by ideas of the body and of bodily operations; change those ideas, and the object of study, as well as the assumptions of the field, necessarily begin to change as well. Long a religiously-inflected endeavor, it was in the process of becoming more of a scientifically-inflected one, a process which culminated later in the century with it becoming known as *moral science*, as I noted in Chapter Two. In keeping with these new understandings of the human body, theories of human nature increasingly began to utilize a mechanistic formulation which ascribed to the body operating principles similar to those of gravity and other such natural forces that operated in the external universe—principles whose causes and effects could be identified and quantified. Such a formulation marked that same shift in the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm as did the shift from imitation to resemblance; long anchored in notions of sin and of the sinful body, moral philosophy was becoming anchored instead in notions of mechanical order and of the rational, mechanical body.

One of the key components to this shift, and to the promulgation of this new body upon which it was based, was the publication of John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human*

*Understanding* (1690). Locke attacked the then-prevalent philosophical concept of innate ideas; simultaneously, he also rejected formulations of human knowledge which stemmed from scholastic principles of reasoning and which, as I discussed in Chapter Two, were grounded in deference to received authority. He proposed in their stead that knowledge stemmed from an analysis of concrete experience, and based his theory on the assumptions and methods of this emerging new science in order to attain what he considered to be a more accurate understanding of how we come to know what we know. Indeed, as he argued in his "Epistle to the Reader," he viewed his endeavor as part of that scientific activity:

The commonwealth of learning is not at this time without master-builders, whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity: but every one must not hope to be a Boyle or a Sydenham; and in an age that produces such masters as the great Huygenius and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with some others of that strain, it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little, and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge . . . (14)

Locke had been a student at Oxford of Thomas Willis, an anatomist who was one of the co-founders of the Royal Society. He also studied under Robert Boyle, another of the Society's co-founders, and became a member of the Society himself in 1668, eight years after its inception. While we today think of Locke primarily as a social and political empirical philosopher, his training actually was medical; he was physician to the first Earl of Shaftesbury, and it is through his knowledge of the human body, and his participation in the intellectual networks within which many of the leading philosophers

of his time circulated their ideas, that he created his anatomically-based philosophical treatise.<sup>138</sup>

Just as Boyle attacked Aristotle's idea of the four elements and revolutionized the field of chemistry, Willis studied the brain and the nerves and revolutionized the field of nerve theory. Dissecting humans as well as animals, he mapped out an anatomy of these bodily components which far surpassed any investigation that had been done to date.<sup>139</sup> From this anatomy, he developed an unprecedented understanding of the nerves as an entire physiological system, centered in the brain, that was the basis for bodily sensation; his work shaped the direction of future neurological research in the same way that Harvey's discovery that blood is pumped by the beating of the heart shaped the study of the pulmonary system.<sup>140</sup>

Willis disproved Aristotelian notions that the brain cools the heart; he also disproved Galenic notions that the brain was simply a pump which pushed the animal spirits (i.e., blood that rose from the heart to the head, where it was transformed into the agent responsible for bodily movement and sensation) through a system of hollow nerves—that is, the nerves were conceived as being hollow tubes, or there was no way for

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<sup>138</sup>See, e.g., G.S. Rousseau, "Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened England," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 3.1 (Autumn 1969): 108-35, esp. 109-14.

<sup>139</sup>In addition to Sawday (fn. #2), for further details about how attitudes toward dissection contributed to knowledge of human anatomy, see Roger French, *Dissection and Vivisection in the European Renaissance* (Hants, England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 1999).

<sup>140</sup>For more detailed information about Willis, see Carl Zimmer, *Soul Made Flesh: The Discovery of the Brain—and How It Changed the World* (New York: Free Press, 2004). See also Spillane, Ch. 3, note 4; and Rousseau, fn.#6.

the animal spirits to flow through them.<sup>141</sup> In this, he followed the work of Descartes, who already had posited that the nerves transmit information about the external world to the brain and then carry back to the appropriate bodily parts the brain's instructions on how those parts should respond. Descartes, though, envisioned the nervous system as a series of pulleys connected to the brain; akin to other bodily systems, it was, in his view, simply an additional manifestation of the involuntary workings of a mechanical body. While Willis believed in the accuracy of both hollow nerves and animal spirits, he demonstrated that Descartes' pulley system was incorrect and attributed to the brain a consciousness that Descartes did not by arguing that it, not the pineal gland, as Descartes had asserted, was the seat of the soul. As he also argued that the brain was the focal point of the nervous system, he thereby relinked the mind and body that Descartes had so recently and forcefully separated, and rejected the Cartesian model of a mechanical body which exists in opposition to that soul.

In this assertion, Willis entered into a longstanding philosophical debate about the location of the soul, and about the relationship between the soul and the body. He denied the accepted Christian notion that the soul was housed in the heart, the seat of the emotions, an intellectual move which clearly illustrates the changing relationship between science and religion at this time, which I shall discuss further in the last section of this chapter. Indeed, Willis argued that the beating of the heart was due solely to the operations of the animal spirits sent to it from the brain, not from any independent

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<sup>141</sup>See Edwin Clarke, "The Doctrine of the Hollow Nerve in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. *Medicine, Science and Culture: Historical Essays in Honor of Owsei Temkin*. Ed. Lloyd C. Stevens and Robert P. Multhauf (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins P, 1968): 123-41.

powers of its own, further promoting the primacy of the brain and of the consciousness that it housed over that of the heart in the workings of the human body.

Yet the implications of his theory to this longstanding debate were even greater. For if, as Willis argued, the brain was both the center of the nervous system and the seat of the soul, then it was responsible not just for bodily actions and reactions, but also for the development of human knowledge and identity; indeed, as the seat of the soul, it was the only organ so responsible. This meant that rationality, through a reconceptualized body, was key to what it meant to be human. It also meant that the nervous system was the system by which such rationality was transmitted throughout the body.<sup>142</sup>

G.S. Rousseau has demonstrated that Willis' reformulation initiated an enormous interest in, and research into, the workings of the nerves.<sup>143</sup> This research ultimately led to our modern understanding of nerve fibers and axons as being solid rather than hollow and as transmitting electrical charges instead of animal spirits; more importantly for the scope of this study, it also contributed to the development of the culture of sensibility that was so prevalent in the eighteenth century, even while that culture challenged the primacy of the brain that was so central to Willis' work. Rousseau therefore argues that Willis' physiological reconceptualization was a paradigm shift, to use Kuhn's

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<sup>142</sup>For a detailed examination of the relationship between Willis' conception of the soul and his dissections, see Robert G. Frank, Jr., "Thomas Willis and His Circle." *The Languages of Psyche: Mind and Body in Enlightenment Thought*. Ed. G.S. Rousseau (Berkeley and Los Angeles: U California P, 1990): 107-46. See esp. 129-43, which Frank has subtitled "The Soul on the Dissecting Table."

<sup>143</sup>G.S. Rousseau, "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibers: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility." *Studies in the Eighteenth Century III*. Ed. R.F. Brissenden and J.C. Eade (Canberra: Australia National UP, 1976): 137-57.

formulation,<sup>144</sup> as it made possible an entirely new understanding of human consciousness. For if the soul was housed in the brain, the one organ which was completely dependent upon the nerves for its operations, and if the nerves were the basis for sensation, then it was possible to unite the processes of the mechanical body with the consciousness of the soul by making the brain the central location through which we learn about the external world while simultaneously also being the central location through which we acquire our individual identities. Since these operations occur via the workings of the nerves, the nerves are, in effect, responsible for the workings of both the body and of the soul. Furthermore, given that the brain also was considered to be the seat of rationality, such a juxtaposition implied quite strongly that human rationality was key to human nature and identity.

Locke's significant contribution was to make explicit this implication of Willis' formulations. Indeed, the *Essay*, in many ways, established the parameters for moral science, building on Willis' nerve theories an entire philosophical doctrine of sensational psychology, a term which itself indicates the perceived interrelations between body and mind upon which it was based.

Locke claimed that we develop our ideas of the world from experience, a process which occurs in one of two ways. One is by the operations of the five senses, which respond to the qualities contained in external objects; each quality creates an impression on the sense that is capable of perceiving it, and that impression becomes a simple idea which that sense transmits through the nerves to the understanding (the power of thinking), which resides in the brain. The other method is by the mind reflecting on its

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<sup>144</sup>Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1962).

own operations and transmitting those simple ideas to the understanding, a process that Locke noted was akin to the workings of an internal sense. The understanding, after receiving these simple ideas, formulates them into complex ideas on how to act or react; these complex ideas, in turn, shape our behavior by being transmitted back through the nerves to the appropriate parts of the body. We thus develop our knowledge and beliefs about the world, as well as our individual identities, from a thought process which is based upon the scientific method of observation and conclusion.

In this formulation, Locke argued against the theory of innate ideas and against Descartes' distrust of the senses. He made clear that it is through the interactions of our bodies with the world around us that we become who we are. Such interactions are not simply needlessly repeated, but are processed through the understanding, which rationally reflects on the information given to it by the mechanically operating body and then transforms that bodily knowledge and experience into the knowledge necessary to develop the beliefs and ideals that enable each of us to become individuals. Bodily sensation and intellectual reflection are critical to this system, but it is the understanding which processes the information produced by them and which thus is the seat of a rationally-based individual identity.

Locke, therefore, used the new science of the human body to create a new science of human nature, restoring to the body the important role in the formation of human identity that Descartes had removed from it and given entirely to thought. Clearly, Locke was by no means the first philosopher of his era to incorporate this new science into his ideas. But he differed in that the way he reinstated the body ultimately meant that he reconceived of human nature as no longer being static. For if it is through our knowledge of the world that we become who we are, knowledge which is based upon our bodily

interactions with it, then the obvious conclusion is that if one changes the environment within which people live and with which they interact, then one changes the kinds of people that people become. This is, of course, the exact basis for the child-rearing philosophy he expressed in his extremely influential *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, where, Jay Fliegelman notes, Locke stressed the importance, above all, of developing a child's *reason* so that that child could grow up to be a fully participating adult member of society.<sup>145</sup>

Locke's notion of human nature as fluid rather than as static was a major shift, a mark of the loosening of older forms of deference and hierarchical social structures which was occurring in late seventeenth century Anglo-America and which led, in the eighteenth century, to the emergence of the figure of the self-made man. Christianity posited humans as inherently and unceasingly fallen, even if such conceptions were being softened by more liberal theologians, such as the Latitudinarians, whose Arminianism and insistence on the reasonableness of Christianity opened new possibilities. The theory of innate ideas was premised upon the notion that we already contain within us all knowledge and essence; thus our natures, like our knowledge, are predetermined, waiting to be released and revealed.

Indeed, even a philosopher such as Thomas Hobbes, who clearly was influenced by the new science in his ideas of human nature, still saw it as being inherently static. On the one hand, Hobbes argued in *Leviathan*, "For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheelles, giving motion to

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<sup>145</sup>Jay Fliegelman, *Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750-1800* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1982). See pp. 12-15 for Fliegelman's discussion of the connections between the *Essay* and Locke's child-rearing theories.

the whole Body" (81). Based on this construction of the body as a machine, he contended that humans exist in a state of war with each other; we are, in essence, simply machines constantly striving after power, because that is what we, as machines, in effect have been designed to do. Yet, at the same time, Hobbes also argued that humans can never change this attribute because it is an inherent part of our nature. Thus, even though he could write that "there is no conception in a man's mind, which hath not at first, totally, or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of Sense" (85), displaying his knowledge and awareness of emerging scientific tenets of nerve theory, his understanding was that those sensory-based conceptions, unlike Locke's, only extended so far; our basic behavior, and the attributes of our nature that lie behind it, do not and cannot change.

Locke, though, was writing some 30 years after Hobbes, when the emergent new science was establishing itself more concretely as an authoritative force of knowledge (as witnessed, for example, by the founding of the Royal Society nine years after the initial publication of *Leviathan*). Therefore, he was able to argue that we become who we are not because of some inherent, transcendent quality in human nature but because of the inherent qualities of human bodies and of human minds, as well as through the interactions between the two. Thus, while, like Hobbes, he viewed the body as crucial to identity formation, unlike Hobbes, he did not view us as slaves to our bodies. Rather, Descartes' rational mind, which was, in many ways, simply another expression of that emerging scientific mind, is very much in evidence, even while Descartes' dualism, and his distrust of the body, was rejected; we respond in and through our bodies to the environment around us, but we also learn from those responses by and through the active operations of this mind. Therefore, we do not simply careen from one stimulus to the

next but instead use rational awareness to cultivate rational internal controls which enable us to modulate and shape our behaviors in particular, and particularly rational, ways.

Thus, human nature, in Locke's conception of it, if it contains moral qualities, does not contain those qualities inherently because, in keeping with the new science, the body is neither morally good nor evil, a valuation that is itself a shift from older Christian conceptions of the body as something to be overcome. On the one hand, Locke argues in the *Essay* that our bodies respond positively to pleasure and negatively to pain, moving from a simple physiological construction of such sensations to a more complex metaphysiological one.<sup>146</sup> In this pleasure/pain paradigm, as elsewhere in the *Essay*, he implies that if human nature is anything other than a *tabula rasa*, it is good, not corrupted or power hungry or evil. Indeed, as Locke argues in the *Second Treatise of Government*, the state of nature is a state of peace, not a state of war.

However, while he also argues in the *Essay* that we pursue happiness, not power, as I noted in Chapter Two, he states that happiness is defined differently by each individual; we consider something to be good, and therefore as providing happiness, simply because it gives us bodily pleasure, and something evil simply because it gives us bodily pain, definitions that leave open the strong possibility of human conflict unless there is recourse to rational restraints. Furthermore, in the *Second Treatise* he argues that humans, in part, leave the state of nature for mutual protection *from each other*. What Locke displays, in the end, is an underlying ambivalence about the goodness, or lack

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<sup>146</sup>See, esp., Book II, Chapter 7, "Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection" for a discussion of pleasure, and Book II, Chapter 21, "Of Power," for a discussion of pain.

thereof, of human nature even while, throughout his *oeuvre*, stressing the crucial importance to society of virtuous behavior in which one acts toward the greater good. But Locke is not ambivalent about his conception of the human body as a rational machine, of human thought processes as rational, and of human nature as, if nothing else, also rational, for every attribute that we have, positive or negative, according to his sensational psychology stems from the actualization of the scientific principles, including the scientific method, upon which his sensational psychology is based.

This view of human nature is, perhaps, even clearer in the *Second Treatise* than it is in the *Essay*. The latter text concentrates primarily on the foundations of human knowledge and identity, and thus focuses primarily on the operations of the body and of the mind, as well as on the interrelationship between the two, although certainly such a paradigm quite strongly implies a rational basis for human nature. However, the former text, written more or less coterminously with parts of the *Essay*, draws out those implications by stating concretely that human society is formed by individuals rationally weighing their interests and, only after undertaking such a decision-making process, mutually contracting with each other to give up temporarily certain rights, but not others, in order to form a civil government which will protect their property. Society, that is, and the civil government through which it is regulated, results from a cost-benefit analysis performed by rational human beings; as such, by the very nature of its conception and of those who conceive of it, it has to contain certain attributes and it cannot contain others.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>147</sup>*Second Treatise*, IX.131, "Of the Ends of Political Society and Government":

But though men, when they enter into society, give up the equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of nature, into the hands

Yet, even here, Locke makes clear that this rational human nature is based not just on the decision-making processes of a rational mind but also on the relationship of that mind to the body—or, perhaps more accurately, on the needs and desires of the body as conveyed to and processed by that rational mind. For, in his definition of property, which is what civil government is designed to protect, Locke demonstrates that the interests that humans weigh prior to forming that civil government are grounded in the body; one of the key tenets of social contract theory, as he defines it in the *Second Treatise*, is that property is not simply material possessions but is, in addition and most crucially, the act of labor and the abilities of the body that performs that labor. Freedom, then, is the condition under which one owns one's own body, and slavery the condition under which someone else owns it; freedom allows one to own property, slavery does not. The body, then, is one of the core elements of Locke's definition of property, as well as of freedom.

Indeed, even land, one of the ultimate signs of wealth, according to Locke is only considered property when it is land upon which an individual body can actually labor; if one tries to accumulate more land than one can labor upon, such excess land is not to be considered one's property. It is labor that gives value to land; it therefore would not be

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of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative, as the good of the society shall require; yet it being only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no *rational* creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse) the power of the society, or legislative constituted by them, can never be supposed to extend farther, than the common good . . . (68, emphasis added)

This latter statement, following Locke's discussion of why we leave the state of nature to form society, implies quite strongly that that decision is a rational one, thought out and deemed beneficial by those who make it, or there would be no reason to do it. As Locke says elsewhere, "[W]e are born free as we are born *rational* (VI.61, emphasis added).

rational to allow someone to accumulate land that could not be improved by them through their labor while preventing someone else from doing just that. In the end, then, the operations of the body are crucial to the creation of interest. When humans weigh their interests, they are not simply making a rational decision using rational mind; the body's powers must be rationally defined and quantified in order to construct accurately the substance of, and the limits to, one's interest.

Consequently, Locke's definition of interest, as he explains and utilizes it in the *Second Treatise*, parallels his definition of happiness in the *Essay*. Each stems from the body—more specifically, from the pleasure that the body feels: interest because we can enjoy the fruits of our labors; happiness because it is, as Locke says, what makes each of us feel good. Each is premised upon a notion of freedom, or liberty, which is "power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of [one's] own mind" (*Essay* II.xxi.8). Thus, the epistemology of physical sensation that Locke constructs from nerve theory is as present in the *Second Treatise* as it is in the *Essay*, even though Locke makes no reference to it in the *Second Treatise* per se. For the rights that we have, and the interests that are rightfully ours, are rational outgrowths of the fact that we inhabit bodies that move, react, accumulate, enjoy, and do all the other things that bodies do as they experience the world.

These actions, in turn, are dependent upon the operations of the nerves. For it is the nerves which transmit bodily sensations and experiences to the understanding; the understanding then rationally processes the information provided to it and makes rational decisions about how best to balance our individual bodily needs and desires with those of the larger society in order to satisfy our bodies and the bodies of others within that society. Because each body has the ability to do this, because it is what each body does,

all of us have interests, all of us have rights, all of us are equal in the task of pursuing life, liberty and property. Thus, through the operations of mind and the interactions of mind with the body, we rationally strive to form a government that best protects each of our abilities to do what we, as bodies, do. The *Second Treatise* ultimately is, in many ways, the elaboration of the sociopolitical implications of Locke's epistemological theories of the human self as expressed in the *Essay*. The body that experiences the world, and the mind that reflects on those sensory experiences, are the bases for the social contract.

In this notion of a bodily-based and rationally-constructed social contract as the origin of society and government, Locke developed further ideas which had been gaining potency throughout the seventeenth century. In opposition to divine right theory, which still held great sway at that time, social contract theory instead emphasized the decision-making powers that human beings used to construct for themselves a society, including a government, which was not directly based on God's law (i.e., the Bible) but was instead based on natural law (i.e., human reason). Such a society again evidenced the emerging concept of God as a prime mover; he implanted reason in us, and then stepped back to let us use that reason in order to create a society which Lawrence E. Klein calls post-godly.<sup>148</sup> Such a contractually-based post-godly society triumphed, of course, with the

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<sup>148</sup>Klein defines "post-godly" as "within a regime in which religion has been subjected to new political and intellectual disciplines." He thus distinguishes it from "secular" in that in an era which is post-godly, such as the long eighteenth century, religion is still a major influence, although it no longer exerts the forms of social and political control that it once did through, for example, divine right forms of thought or the way that medieval natural law theorists, such as Thomas Aquinas, subsumed human reason to God's law. See *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness: Moral Discourse and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1994): 9.

success of the Glorious Revolution, which was the replacement, by human beings, of a king who considered his rule to be based on divine right (i.e., from God), and whose powers were therefore limitless, with a king whose rule was based upon an agreement with Parliament (i.e., with other human beings), and whose powers were therefore limited.

Locke, though, signaled the critical role that the body played in the construction of such a society. While it is now a commonplace that the *Second Treatise* was written as a Whig rationale for the events that became known as the Exclusion Crisis, not to legitimize the Glorious Revolution, Locke's bodily-based definition of interest acknowledged not only that it is human bodies that sign the contract upon which society is based but that the contract itself, in the end, demarcates the actions for which each body that so signs is responsible and the spaces, both social and political, within which, or between which, each body can have dominion. Therefore, as with his epistemology, key to his political theory is the autonomous human body which acts rationally, actions that can only be taken in conjunction with rational mind. In the *Essay*, each body responds to stimuli through the operations of the senses and of the nerves; by the rational workings of the understanding, which processes the information provided to it by those senses and nerves, it develops its individual identity. In the *Second Treatise*, each body contracts to protect its own private interests (i.e., the limits of its labors) by the mind's rational decision about which rights can be given up temporarily and which ones cannot. Virtue is when each member of society respects the bodily rights of others; tyranny is when some do not.

While Locke was not the first social contract theorist to acknowledge the importance of the body, he foregrounds it in ways that crystallize emerging notions of its

possibilities. Hobbes, for example, had also argued that society is formed by humans rationally weighing their interests and then contracting with each other; they leave the state of war by agreeing to relinquish their individual power in order to form a greater power (the state) that will ensure their very survival.<sup>149</sup> Yet in his conception, the bodies that constitute that society are static. Although they once were autonomous, indeed can only so contract because they were at that time autonomous, they give up that autonomy when they enter society; it is only by becoming static that they can remain alive. To Locke, though, the body does not lose its autonomy when it enters society; it labors, and it accumulates the fruits of its labors. Such an autonomy, coupled with the ability to

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<sup>149</sup>In Chapter XIV, "Of the First and Second Natural Laws, and of Contracts," Hobbes defines a contract as "[t]he *mutual* transferring of right" (192, emphasis added) and then defines two different types of contracts: a promise, in which both parties agree to perform some specific action at some later date, and a covenant, in which one party performs an agreed-upon action immediately and the other party is trusted to perform an agreed-upon action at a later date. Hobbes then builds on this notion of covenant in Chapter XVII, "Of the Causes, Generation, and Definition of a Commonwealth," in which he argues that:

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man, or assembly of men, to bear their person; and every one to own and acknowledge himself to be author of whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act, or cause to be acted, in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. This is more than consent, or concord; it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by *covenant* of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition; that thou give up, thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. (227, emphasis added)

rationally evaluate, is precisely why Locke's theory has often been described as the governmental theory of the emerging commercial classes, whose wealth was based on mobile money as opposed to immobile land and whose political aspirations triumphed with the Glorious Revolution.

However, even though Hobbes and Locke construct contrasting forms of government, their political theories posit that the government formed by the social contract is, at its core, the rational product of rational decisions made by rational human beings processing the information provided to them by their bodies. Thus, while they conceive of the social body differently, that wide difference demonstrates the prevalence of this conception of a rational human nature weighing its bodily-based interests through the processes of the brain in order to form human society and government. It therefore would be logical to assume that this particular construct of physical rationality would have become even more prevalent during the eighteenth century as scientific research continued to reveal the mechanical principles by which the human body and mind operated, even as the political ramifications of, and the political order generated by, such a physical rationality continued to be debated.

Yet what developed instead was a radically different notion of human nature, and the debates about political order and structure shifted accordingly. Although based also on nerve theory and other key tenets of the emergent scientific knowledge of the body, the new system that emerged used not rationality but emotionality as its key organizing principle. Reacting against the perceived "coldness" of the rationally-based theory of interests, such an emotionally-based paradigm led to a very different conception of human bodies and of bodily-based human identity, a change which in turn led to the development of new political constructs, especially as older, already-existing

terminology (e.g., *happiness*) took on new meanings under pressure of this emergent, emotionally-influenced body. Rooted in the Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, this new paradigm, and the body upon which it was based, challenged the very premises of this rationality. It did so by imagining a society based also upon the body and its processes, but organized by the operations of the heart, not of the brain, and therefore contingent upon the intertwining of mutual affections, and of the social obligations that stem from them, rather than upon the balancing of mutual interests and of the contracts that emerge from that balancing.

As I discussed in Chapter Two, Hutcheson rejected the notion of the rational self acting for its own personal interest, even when such actions lead to social good. He built upon Shaftesbury's arguments to claim that humans act out of a benevolent disinterest for the good of others. This disinterest is not the product of rational calculation but of a feeling self that receives pleasure from the beauty observed by virtue in action, and from the moral goodness contained therein, rather than from any extrinsic rewards gained for doing good deeds. He argued also that this benevolent, feeling self, rooted in the internal moral sense, is an inherent component of human bodies and therefore, of human nature, not, *pace* Locke, something learned through custom or education, for "[a]ll sects, except the Epicurians, owned that kind affections were natural to men; and that consulting the greatest public good of the whole . . . was the surest way for each individual to be happy" (*Observations* 77).

Given that Hutcheson argued that virtue is a quality, not a complex idea as Locke posited, the moral sense, by the nature of its physiology, responds to that quality by the same mechanisms through which the external senses, by the nature of their physiology, respond to qualities. Hutcheson therefore argued that virtuous behavior results from a

key attribute of the human body. Accepting the Lockean notion that the senses are the basis of human knowledge, identity and nature, that they transmit information about the external world through the hollow nerves, and that we respond positively to pleasure and are averse to pain, Hutcheson argued that it was the operations of the moral sense, not of the understanding, that was key to all human motivation and action.

This shift from the head to the heart had enormous ramifications. Rather than the understanding making rational calculations of interest based upon the information it received from the body, and from such calculations determining what is the individual, and sometimes the common, good, the moral sense instead bypasses those rational calculations of interest and enables us to respond to good simply because we receive physical pleasure from viewing it or from doing it. Yet, because the reception of that pleasure could easily be perceived as another form of self-interest (we do good because it makes us feel good, not because it is virtuous) Hutcheson also argued that true happiness is public (focused on others) rather than, as Locke posited, private (focused on self). Thus, while we receive physical pleasure from actions that produce private happiness, those actions do not activate the moral sense. Rather, the greatest pleasure we receive, because it does activate the moral sense, is from actions which produce public happiness; the greater the public happiness, the more the moral sense responds. This pleasure is, by definition, disinterested because it is a result of the activation of the internal moral sense to the quality of virtue that is embedded in the action, not from any possible gain, even in physical sensation, that such an action could provide to that individual. As the sense of sight, for example, is activated physiologically by specific qualities, without any assistance from human will, so too is the moral sense; therefore, the pleasure we receive

from its activation is simply physiological, not based upon any exercise of thought, intention or calculation of interest.

As a human parallel to the clockmaker God who establishes the universe and then lets it run by the laws which he himself has set up, Hutcheson argued that God placed this moral sense in each of our hearts and then let it operate according to the principles which He had established. But because the moral sense responds to the actions of others, as opposed to the actions of self, it necessitates that human identity is based upon sociability rather than upon individuality. Hutcheson thereby constructed a theory of human nature which was built upon feeling rather than upon thought as he redefined happiness to be dependent upon communal good rather than solitary interest. In so doing, he placed the heart at the center of society and at the center of the bodies upon which that society is built. As William Leechman, a Professor of Divinity at the University of Glasgow and a friend of Hutcheson's, wrote in his preface to Hutcheson's posthumously published *System of Moral Philosophy*:

He [Hutcheson] apprehended that he was answering the design of his office [i.e., his professorship] as effectually, when he dwelt in a more diffusive manner upon such moral considerations as are suited to touch the heart, and excite a relish for virtue, as when explaining or establishing any doctrine, even of real importance, with the most philosophical exactness: he regarded the culture of the heart as a main end of all moral instruction . . . (xxxix)

By postulating this culture of the heart, Hutcheson was able to theorize a society composed not of discrete, rational individuals but of individuals existing in a web of affections with each other. This web is, in effect, an extension of the web of affections

that runs through each of those individual bodies, for such bodies respond physiologically to any and all actions which serve to either weaken or strengthen the natural bonds that exist between human beings. Out of this new heart-centered body was born not just a new culture, the culture of sensibility, but also a new politics, one based upon the workings of an interdependent, interpersonal affection that created communities of the heart rather than of an independent, intrapersonal interest that created communities of the head.

Consequently, while Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy also utilized Lockean sensational psychology to conceptualize the operations of human nature, and it therefore also emphasized the key role played by bodily processes, including nerve theory, in the development of that nature, its focus on the heart meant that the body at the core of its conceptualization was different from the Lockean rational body; the shift away from the understanding, in other words, was more than simply one of philosophical emphasis. Maintaining the intricate correspondence between the human body and human nature, while simultaneously changing the structure of the latter, was possible only if the structure of the former was changed as well. For by arguing that the actions of the heart, not of the understanding, are key, and thereby emphasizing the importance of the affections rather than of thought, Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy shifted the hierarchy of information received by the body and rerouted the central locus of its information-processing. By placing special emphasis upon the body's intricate connections to other bodies, as well as upon the virtuous behavior required to maintain those connections, rather than upon the property that any one individual body could potentially accumulate and the rights to which it accordingly was entitled, Hutcheson reconceptualized nerve theory to respond not just to the material objects of the external

world but to the immaterial objects of that world as well; indeed, if anything, it elevated the importance of those immaterial objects in relation to the material ones that, for example, we can touch and see.

Therefore, in contrast to the Lockean rational body, which existed in a clearly defined space, boundaried from the other bodies with which it shared a society, this new emotional body existed in a semi-permeable space in which it was intimately sensitive to the actions and, even more importantly, to the intentions and emotions of the bodies around it. It was, thus, a fluid body rather than an inviolate one, responding emotionally, and therefore physiologically, to those other bodies and able to take on their emotional, and hence physiological, attributes as its own. In fact, it was toward such a breakdown between bodies, and the consequent merging of their physiological responses, that Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy aimed, as it argued that the achievement of such an interbodily state was crucial to the attainment of a virtuous, benevolent society.

While Hutcheson did not fully formulate such a theory of connectivity or of the refashioned body upon which it depended, his groundbreaking moral sense philosophy laid the foundation for such a development, reconceptualizing human nature out of its Lockean strictures and arguing for the body's interdependence rather than its independence, ideas that subsequently were developed further, most notably by David Hume and Adam Smith. Although Hutcheson, Hume and Smith each used that connectivity to reach differing political conclusions, such a reimagination led to new ideas about the nature of society and of the human relations upon which it is based, pushing then-current political thought to expand into new directions in order to encompass such emerging forms of relations. Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, then, created a new framework and language with which to theorize society by assuming the

centrality of the body that Locke granted to it while changing the structure and operations of that body from Locke's conception of it. Ultimately, Hutcheson theorized what I shall call an *affective body*, in contradistinction to Locke's rational one, upon which his vision of a benevolent and affective society, and the specific kinds of communal relations which it engendered, was premised. Just as the physiological operations of the Lockean rational body was the basis for a politic of mutual, but individual, interest, so too the physiological operations of the Hutchesonian affective body was the basis for a politic of communal good. His moral sense philosophy, therefore, theorized new relationships between humans by promulgating the primacy of the heart as the basis for all forms of such relationships, and thus laid the groundwork for what is now called the "culture of sensibility" in eighteenth-century Anglo-America.

#### Francis Hutcheson and the Construction of the Affective Body

Hutcheson began retheorizing the human body away from its Lockean, rational foundation in the *Inquiry*. As I noted in Chapter Two, he divides the text into two treatises. The first establishes the workings of what he calls an internal sense of beauty, and the second builds upon that internal sense to detail the workings of another internal sense: the moral sense. While Hutcheson's discussion of the moral sense ultimately supercedes his discussion of the sense of beauty (and is, indeed, the basis for his entire philosophical *oeuvre*), he makes clear that each of these two internal senses operate within and upon the human body in the same manner as do the external senses. They are not analogical or metaphorical but are real senses, existing within the body and responding to qualities in the external world through the same physiological mechanisms by which those external senses respond to qualities.

Yet at the same time there is a significant difference. As I noted in the previous section, while the external senses and Lockean epistemology focus on the qualities of material objects, the moral sense and Hutchesonian epistemology focus instead on the qualities of immaterial ones (in this case, of beauty in human action—i.e., virtue). Hutcheson in effect argues, contrary to Locke, that beauty and virtue are real entities which exist in the external world unperceived by the external senses; as such, they are not learned responses or behaviors formed by the operations of the understanding but instead precede those operations and, consequently, precede as well custom and education. Building on Locke's tenet that our knowledge of the world is limited to those aspects of it to which our senses respond, Hutcheson reshapes morality and human physiology to argue that the moral sense responds to the impressions made upon it by qualities to which our external senses do not respond. Our reactions to virtuous behavior, then, indeed our commission of it, are rooted in the human body, independent of our will or of rational thought.

To a modern reader, Hutcheson's task seems extraordinarily challenging, if not impossible; we do not believe that internal senses exist, so it is therefore difficult to conceive that he could believe that they do. In fact, as I indicated in Chapter Two, much of the critical response to Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense is influenced by this belief. Yet as I there discussed, it is important to note the presentist bias in this argument; ideas of human bodily structure and operations were significantly different in the eighteenth century than they are today, and therefore it is necessary to discuss the nature of the moral sense through an eighteenth-century lens rather than through a twenty-first-century one.

For in the eighteenth century, internal senses were perceived as being quite real, as were their powers; Hutcheson's innovation was to join Lockean epistemology, and the new science of the human body upon which it was based, to these already-existing conceptions of internal senses in order to create a new, "modern" understanding of an older form. He was therefore able to utilize that epistemology to distinguish between an internal sense and an innate idea, making clear that the "moral sense has no relation to innate ideas" (*Inquiry* xvi), and that "an internal sense no more presupposes an innate Idea, or Principle of Knowledge, than [does] the external [sense]" (*Inquiry* 82). The moral sense, then, functions just like any of the external senses; the only difference is its location in the interior, rather than on the exterior, of the human body. Like other internal senses, such as the sense of beauty, the moral sense is a literal sense.

But Hutcheson did more. By locating the moral sense in the heart, and theorizing the wide-ranging significance of the secular communities of the heart which were formed by its operations, he entered into the longstanding debate about whether the head or the heart was the most important organ in the human body. While Willis, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, asserted the primacy of the head, a primacy which Locke developed further, Hutcheson asserted instead the primacy of the heart. He did so by bringing to bear on the new science of the human body two further intellectual discourses in addition to the discourse of internal senses that I noted above: the Christian tradition of the religious affections, in which the true believer must open his or her heart to receive God's grace (what I shall henceforth call the spiritual heart), and the longstanding debate as to whether the head or the heart is the center of life in the human body (what I shall call the secular heart).

Hutcheson, then, drew upon key elements of each of these three discourses and applied them to Lockean epistemology in order to theorize fully the existence of an affective body, in contradistinction to the Lockean rational one, and to argue that such a body operates through a physiology of feeling which emanates from the moral sense, located in the heart, rather than through a physiology of thought which emanates from the understanding, located in the head. Ultimately, his construction of the moral sense as a real sense with a real existence is based upon a rich philosophical history which simply is lost by contemporary readings of the moral sense as being solely analogical.

Recapturing that history is a necessary precursor to mapping accurately the operations of Hutcheson's affective body, as it will enable a clearer understanding of Hutcheson's synthesis of such seemingly disparate concepts into a unitary system. It will permit also a clearer understanding of the ways in which the secular affective communities which emerged from his philosophy were based upon a peculiarly eighteenth-century interpolation of the new science of the human body with older forms of moral and physiological thought that created a unique vision of human social and political possibilities. For while Hutcheson asserted the primacy of the heart rather than of the head, he still maintained in his moral sense philosophy the central place of the body and of nerve theory that they enjoyed in Lockean epistemology and philosophy. Hutcheson used the new science of the human body to map the workings of an affective physiology by joining to that physiology elements of each of the three discourses that I noted above.

Consequently, in the remainder of this chapter I shall analyze the influence of those discourses on that physiology. As Hutcheson's affective body operated in ways radically different from the Lockean one out of which it emerged, doing so is key to

understanding fully the workings of his reconceptualized body. In Chapter Four, I shall examine that physiology itself, detailing its operations in order to map the affective body that is at the core of Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, for from this body emerge the benevolent communities of the heart that his philosophy argues construct the ideal society.

### The Internal Senses

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, belief in internal senses was quite common. Thomas Willis, for example, stated that as a professor of natural philosophy at Oxford, he had to lecture twice a week on "the Office of the Senses, both external *and also internal*, and of the Faculties and Affections of the Soul, and also of the Organs and various provisions of all these" (qtd. in Frank 107, emphasis added). Locke too noted the possibility of internal senses, stating in the *Essay*, when discussing how simple ideas affect the body, that "I have here followed the common opinion of man's having but five senses; though, perhaps, there may be justly counted more" (II.ii.3). While we today do not think of senses as existing inside the body (except perhaps the sense of touch, although it is not located in a specific organ), such definitiveness is a modern, not an eighteenth-century, construct.

Indeed, Locke even states in the *Essay* that reflection is like an internal sense, a comparison that would only make sense if his audience already understood their existence. Yet at the same time there are significant differences between Locke's and Hutcheson's conceptions of such a sense. For one, Locke states only that reflection is *like* an internal sense, not that it *is* one, whereas Hutcheson states definitively that the moral sense *is* an internal sense. Locke also locates his quasi-internal sense in the head, the seat of rational thought; Hutcheson, however, locates the moral sense in the heart, the seat of

emotion, a difference that is key to Hutcheson's reconceptualization of the body and of social formation. Furthermore, while Locke's internal sense focuses inward, on the intellectual operations of the mind ("perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing" (*Essay* II.i.4)), Hutcheson's moral sense instead focuses outward, on qualities that exist outside of the body. Hutcheson's conception of an internal sense, then, corresponds in its operations to those of the body's external senses in a way that Locke's does not; the only seeming difference between it and those other senses is its bodily location. Indeed, according to Locke's own definition of the term "sense," Hutcheson's moral sense truly is a sense in a way that Locke admits that reflection is not, for, as Locke notes, reflection "[has] nothing to do with external objects" (*Essay* II.i.4). However, the moral sense does have to do with external objects, albeit with external objects of a different type than the ones to which the external senses themselves respond.

Locke's ability to make such an analogy, or Willis to make such a reference, indicates that the concept of internal senses was not foreign to philosophical discourse at that time. In fact, Hutcheson's distinction between the internal moral sense, which perceives the simple ideas of immaterial objects, and the external senses, which perceive the simple ideas of material objects, built upon an already-existing distinction that had an extensive intellectual history. For ancient and medieval philosophers long had accepted that internal senses existed. They believed that these senses were located in different parts of the brain, and that each sense performed a specific function of the mind; they disagreed with each other only as to the number of such senses, the exact function that each sense performed, and where in the brain each sense was located. While Hutcheson relocates his internal sense from the head to the heart, that internal sense is not simply a

rhetorical or imaginative maneuver but rather stems from a rich philosophical understanding of human physiology.<sup>150</sup>

H.A. Wolfson notes that Aristotle, in *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* and in the third book of *De Anima*, distinguished between the external senses and the internal faculties of the soul (i.e., the general principle of life which exists in all living beings): the nutritive faculty, which is found in all living things; the perceptive faculty, which is found in animals and humans; and the rational faculty, which is found only in humans. Wolfson calls these faculties "post-sensatory" in that they are operations of the mind which function independently of any bodily organ.

Although Aristotle does not give these faculties a name *as a group*, medieval philosophers began to do so. They used the term "internal senses" (sometimes also "spiritual," "separable" or "cerebral" senses [Wolfson 70]) to distinguish between the external senses and those faculties. Augustine, for example, uses the term "internal sense" (as well as "internal faculty") to describe the same function for which Aristotle uses the term "common sense" (i.e., the ability of the perceptive faculty to compile the data received by the external senses and to create from that data a unitary concept about

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<sup>150</sup>My discussion of the internal senses is based, in large part, on the following texts: Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic, and Hebrew Philosophical Texts," *The Harvard Theological Review* 28.2 (April 1935): 69-133; David Ruel Foster, "Aquinas on the Immateriality of the Intellect," *The Thomist* 55.3 (July 1991): 415-38; A. Mark Smith, "Picturing the Mind: The Representation of Thought in the Middle Ages and Renaissance," *Philosophical Topics*, 20.2 (Fall 1992): 149-70; Deborah L. Black, "Imagination and Estimation: Arabic Paradigms and Western Transformations," *Topoi* 19 (2000): 59-75. See also Wolfson, "Maimonides on the Internal Senses," *The Jewish Quarterly New Ser.* 25.4 (April 1935): 441-67; "Isaac Israeli on the Internal Senses," *Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut*. Ed. Salo W. Baron and Alexander Marx (NY: Alexander Kohut Foundation, 1935): 583-598 ; and "Notes on Isaac Israeli's Internal Senses," *The Jewish Quarterly New Ser.* 51.4 (April 1961): 275-87.

specific entities). Other Arabic, Hebrew and European philosophers used the term “internal sense” to describe the immaterial operations of the mind that bridged what Deborah Black calls “the gap between knowledge of the particular and knowledge of the universal that is central to almost every aspect of Aristotelian epistemology” (69). If the external senses provide concrete data about the material world, how then do we come to know about the immaterial world, whether human (e.g., intention) or suprahuman (e.g., the properties of the universe)? It is in this immaterial realm that the internal senses operate, and for which they provide the appropriate forms of knowing and of knowledge.

As Wolfson, Black and Smith note, the organizing principle through which that gap was theorized (i.e., the concept of the internal senses as a specific grouping) came primarily from philosophers of the Arabic world, from which it then entered into Latin philosophy. Wolfson, for example, discusses the *Ihwan al-Safa*, a group of Muslim scholars living in Basra, in what is now Iraq, in the ninth and tenth centuries, who conceived of five internal senses: imagination (which receives the impressions of sensible objects from sense perception and assembles those impressions), cogitation (which distinguishes those impressions from each other and knows which ones are true, right and useful), memory (which preserves the judgments of cogitation until we need them), the speaking faculty (located in the throat, whose purpose is to communicate the contents of our minds) and the productive faculty (located in the hands and fingers, whose purpose is to enable the soul to communicate through writing and other arts) (77). Wolfson traces imagination, cogitation and memory to the operations of Aristotle's three faculties, especially to the rational faculty and to the perceptive faculty.

But while Wolfson also provides a useful genealogy of the speaking and productive faculties, linking them to then-existing scientific conceptions of

communication, his genealogy omits the fact that these latter two internal senses, unlike the first three, are not located in the brain and involve not an individual's abilities to perceive immaterial aspects of the external world but instead involve that individual's ability to communicate—that is, there is a social element at the core of those two internal senses that does not exist in the other three. In fact, while those two specific internal senses do not exist in later sensorial schemata, that social element is perhaps the defining feature of Arabic philosophy's influence on medieval European notions of the internal senses.

Black, in particular, argues for the importance of Avicenna, a Persian philosopher in the early 1000s, who argued that we have what he called an "estimative faculty"—an internal sense that enables us to perceive the intention of one who performs an action. Intention, accordingly, is distinct from external form, whose material qualities are perceived by the external senses. Animals also have an estimative faculty, for it is through this faculty, for example, that a sheep can sense that a wolf is dangerous. Indeed, Black notes that Avicenna argues that this estimative faculty can operate in opposition to reason, as when a person might judge that honey is repulsive because someone has remarked that it looks like bile, even though that person knows rationally that honey is sweet (61).

Thus, Avicenna's estimative faculty was a different type of internal sense; rather than simply being an aspect of the function of the mind regarding past events or present data about the external world, it was instead an internal power to perceive, distinct from reason, the internal state of an external object. Consequently, while Averroes, a Muslim philosopher who lived in Spain in the 1100s, rejected Avicenna's notion of an estimative faculty, arguing instead that its functions are actually performed by reason, Avicenna's

new form of internal sense, independent of reason and of other rational abilities, remained influential. Albertus Magnus, for example, also argued for the existence of an estimative faculty; while he initially limited its powers only to those intentions that result in bodily movement, he then later reconceived it as having an interpretive power through which it could apprehend the individual as a whole (Black 64-66). Aquinas too argues for an internal estimative power, which he calls a cogitative sense; he states that while animals also have such an estimative power, in humans it is more finely developed so that it "comes to know things that go beyond what it might be expected to know by sense perception" (Foster 432). It is therefore similar to the intellect, but does not operate through thought processes; as Foster notes, Aquinas conceived of the internal cogitative sense and the intellect as "two aspects of the thinking person" (432).

By the time of Descartes, then, two very different conceptions of the powers of the internal senses existed within Western European philosophical thought: one which viewed the internal senses as rational powers of the mind, and one which viewed them as operating in realms that extended beyond rational thought, involving instead a type of instantaneous knowing about the motivation of others that stemmed from some other type of perception or power. Wolfson therefore notes that while Descartes, in the *Principia Philosophiae*, states that there are two internal senses—one which consists of our natural appetites and one which consists of the passions—generally Descartes conceived of the internal senses as the imagination and memory—i.e., powers of the mind. Leibniz calls it simply "imagination," but his description of it is quite similar to that of Aristotle's common sense: "the place where the perceptions of the different external senses find themselves united" (qtd. in Wolfson 127). Locke, of course, defines the internal sense as reflection, a form of consciousness of our own internal intellectual

operations, a description that Wolfson points out matches one of the functions of Aristotle's common sense.

Yet that other, nonrational form of internal sense also remained in intellectual circulation. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Peter Kivy argues that "[i]n seventeenth-century British philosophy there were already full-fledged theories of inner senses and faculties, both moral and aesthetic" (3-4), and that these theories were developed further by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. While Shaftesbury significantly influenced Hutcheson, and was in turn influenced by the Cambridge Platonists, Kivy argues that the Cambridge Platonists themselves were influenced by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, who wrote in *De Veritate*, published in 1624, one hundred years before the *Inquiry*, that we have internal faculties, which he calls Natural Instinct, by which we perceive beauty and virtue. These internal faculties, implanted in us by God, operate independently of reason and are stimulated by Common Notions, which are the agreement between our faculties, whether internal or external, and the objects that they perceive:

[N]atural instincts are expressions of those faculties which are found in every normal man, through which the Common Notions touching the internal conformity of things, such as the cause, means, and purpose of things, the good, bad, beautiful, pleasing, etc., especially those Notions which tend towards the preservation of the individual, of species, of kinds, and of the universe, are brought into conformity independently of discursive thought. (Edward, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, qtd. in Kivy 4)

As Kivy notes, Lord Herbert does not describe the internal faculties as senses, yet they clearly have the perceptive power, and the moral and aesthetic responses, which are eventually ascribed to the internal senses. They are, in this way, quite similar to the

estimative faculty, with its ability to perceive intention in human action; both perceive some quality in humans, independently of reason, that our external senses do not perceive.

Kivy traces the development of this notion of internal senses through the latter part of the seventeenth century, both in England and on the continent. Consistently, throughout this trajectory, these internal senses are described as being distinct from reason, responding through some type of inner feeling to beauty and virtue (sometimes also known as taste); never are they described as responding to qualities in material objects or to other immaterial qualities. Indeed, both Norman Fiering and R.S. Crane argue that the ideas of the seventeenth-century Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians (the "great preachers of the social virtues" [Crane 211]) presaged the eighteenth-century's conception of the "man of feeling."<sup>151</sup> These Anglican ministers challenged Hobbesian self-interest and Puritan notions of natural depravity by proclaiming the existence of a natural benevolence. Emphasizing the pleasure received from acting upon that benevolence to do good, they claimed that it exists inside each of us as part of our inherent nature.

Henry More, for example, argued in 1666, well before the "age of sensibility," that what he called the "Natural and Radical Affections" are "in us antecedent to all notion and cogitation whatever. . . . [It is] manifest they are from Nature and from God," and therefore, "whatever they dictate as Good and Just, is really Good and Just" (Fiering "Irresistible Compassion" 199). Samuel Parker wrote in 1681 that:

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<sup>151</sup>Norman S. Fiering, "Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 37.2 (April-June 1976): 195-218; R. S. Crane, "Suggestions Toward A Genealogy of the 'Man of Feeling,'" *ELH* 1.3 (December 1934): 205-230.

Acts of Love and Kindness are in themselves grateful and agreeable to the temper of human Nature; and all Men feel a natural Deliciousness consequent upon every Exercise of their good-natur'd Passions; And nothing affects the Mind with greater Complacency, than to reflect upon its own inward Joy and Contentment. So that the Delight of every vertuous [sic] Resolution doubles upon it self; in that first it strikes our Minds with a direct Pleasure by its suitableness to our Natures, and then our Minds entertain themselves with pleasant Reflections upon their own Worth and Tranquility. (qtd. in Crane 228)

Parker, as Crane notes, was in essence stating the basic premise about the agreeableness of the affections, and of the bodily pleasure that we receive from their operations, that became such a commonplace half a century later.

Fiering similarly traces the development in the seventeenth century of the concept of "irresistible compassion," which asserts that humans, by our very nature, feel for others and out of that emotional response act for the social good. In France, for example, Nicolas Malabranche wrote in 1674 that it is "chiefly by the Passions . . . that the soul expands herself abroad, and finds she is actually related to all surrounding Beings" (qtd. in Fiering 201). By the end of the seventeenth century, then, the notion clearly existed that innate human affections and benevolent feelings operate beyond the scope of human reason and serve as a key form of and basis for human knowledge and action.

This newly developing theory of the affections found its fullest philosophical voice to date in the work of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury. As I discussed in Chapter Two, Shaftesbury disagreed with Locke's emphasis on human reason, believing that it was counter to the promotion of virtue, even though Locke

claimed that humans rationally agreed to place limits on self-interested behavior in order to maintain a state of peace. Shaftesbury instead claimed in "An Inquiry Concerning Virtue or Merit," that we have *natural affections*, which lead to public good, *self affections*, which lead to individual good, and *unnatural affections*, which do not lead to any good (196); all of these are implanted in our natures—i.e., they are not learned behaviors or responses. As I noted, Shaftesbury argued as well that human beings have what he called a natural moral sense of right and wrong, which responds to the beauty or lack thereof in human actions, just as our other senses respond to the beauty or lack thereof in external objects. However, he did not detail the mechanisms by which the moral sense perceives nor does he ascribe any place in the body to it; his focus is on the affective results of its activation. Hutcheson's contribution, then, was to make the physiological link that Shaftesbury did not. Thus, although Hutcheson did not originate the notion of internal senses, and although he worked with Shaftesbury's already-existing conception of the moral sense and of the affectionate communities that derive from it, his distinctive alteration lies in his joining together the theory of internal senses to the emerging science of sensation as a product of the operations of the nerves to create a new, emotive physiology of virtue which in turns leads to physiologically-based affective communities of the heart.

As this emerging science asserted that each sense responds to specific qualities in a particular fashion that is unique to that sense, Hutcheson's physiology asserted that this is also true for the internal senses of beauty and virtue; they respond to uniformity amidst variety and to benevolence in human action, respectively, through emotional feeling, which then becomes physical feeling, which then becomes human action. It is through affection that we know virtue, not through a rational weighing of interests, and it is

through affection, and its bodily components, that we form society. Thus, while Hutcheson, like Shaftesbury, is concerned with forming sociable and affectionate communities, he provides a bodily basis to the moral sense in a way that Shaftesbury does not; consequently, Hutcheson's communities, unlike Shaftesbury's, stem specifically and explicitly from human physiology.

Simultaneously, Hutcheson also returns to the religious element that Shaftesbury omitted by arguing that God placed the moral sense in each of us to let it then run by its own operations, just as He did with all other aspects of the material and immaterial world. By grounding that religious tradition in the newly-sensationalized physical body, Hutcheson effectively transformed both. He drew on religious discourses of the affections in order to create a secular affective body which reflected the perfection of God's mechanical design, intertwining God and human physiology in his vision of the affections and of the affective body in communal formation.

Thus, embedded in the very structure of his philosophical system is the increasingly complex relationship between religious and scientific tenets that was developing across enlightened Europe and its American colonies in the first part of the eighteenth century. As I noted at the beginning of this chapter, these tenets involved, in part, differing discourses of the body: in one, the body was a symbol of our postlapsarian condition; in the other, it was becoming a scientific object. While the emerging notion of God as a prime mover enabled these discourses to co-exist more readily, each still conceived of the body and its powers quite differently.

To a large extent, such differences were focused on the two bodily organs that were perceived to be key to human physiology: the head and the heart. Christianity, especially Protestantism, viewed the former organ as less significant than the latter; it is

through God's love, which fills the heart, that we redeem our fallen condition, not through human reason, which stems from the head. Conversely, while natural philosophy acknowledged the important role that the heart played in sustaining the human body, increasingly it viewed the head as the primary organ responsible for human life and functioning. There were, consequently, two competing discourses of the head and of the heart in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; Hutcheson, I argue, brought elements of each into his moral sense philosophy, utilizing tenets of natural philosophy to secularize those religious discourses which gave primacy to the heart while applying to moral philosophy the central role that the heart played in Christian theology. In combining elements of each discourse, he in effect combined elements of two different perceptions of the heart—what I am calling the spiritual heart and the secular heart—and applied them to the belief in internal senses. He thereby theorized the existence of the internal moral sense, a real sense located in the heart, by which he reconceived the physiological operations of the scientific body and of the nerve theory upon which it is based.

It is, therefore, to these two discourses of the heart to which I now turn briefly. While there is, of course, a wealth of literature on each, my purpose here is not to review that literature in its entirety but instead is to highlight the distinctive features of each discourse in order to demonstrate how Hutcheson applied those features to his moral sense philosophy. Doing so will enable me to demonstrate in Chapter Four the central place of the heart in that philosophy—a heart that is spiritual, secular and, as I shall demonstrate also in that chapter, anatomical.

### The Spiritual Heart

In 1630, when the Puritan ship *Arbella* hovered off the coast of what was to become the colony of Massachusetts Bay, it may very well have seemed to have been an act of God's providence that the emigrants had been able to depart from England and to safely cross the Atlantic. Having left behind the corruption and persecution of Archbishop Laud and Charles I, soon to disembark onto a strange new land, it was a moment to gather the flock in order to reflect upon the purpose and importance of their continuing journey. As John Winthrop reminded them in his now famous lay sermon, they were not simply to settle in the New World, they were to establish a righteous community, a city on the hill, which would be a model for the world, which would be watching them closely to see how humans peacefully and ideally could relate to other humans in their service of God. Winthrop argued that in this community of the godly, everyone would relate to each other in such a way that would demonstrate that:

[E]very man might have need of others, and from hence they might be all knitt more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection. From hence it appears plainly that noe man is made more honourable than another or more wealthy &c., out of any particular and singular respect to himselfe, but for the glory of his creator and the common good of the creature, man. (qtd. in Morgan 77)

The love and affection of one community member for another, as Winthrop elsewhere describes it, were the ligaments that held together the body of that community, for out of those feelings came proper modes of behavior, all of which demonstrated that this was a Christian community reflected in, and composed by, God's love rather than by worldly desires. All were equal in that love, as long as they truly surrendered themselves to Him,

and focused on Him rather than on those desires; for while the latter made them appear to be unequal in their social station, God loved all who loved Him, and all who did were equal in His eyes, which were the eyes that truly mattered.

Here, then, one hundred years before Hutcheson became Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, and eighty years before he was a student there, Winthrop uses the then-common metaphor of the body and of the bodily affections to join together his community in Christ. The love that each member of the community has for other members, the love that guides their behavior, is a reflection of their love for God and of God's love for them. Indeed, it is not their love for each other that is primary; it is through God's love of them, and their love for Him; that they are able to achieve and express their love for each other. God mediates earthly desires and earthly affections.

Yet as Winthrop makes clear, this affection is not diffused throughout the body but is instead housed in one particular bodily organ—the heart:

That which the most in their churches maintaine as truthe in profession onely, wee must bring into familiar and constant practise; as in this duty of love, wee must loue brotherly without dissimulation, wee must love one another with a pure hearte fervently. Wee must beare one anothers burthens. We must not looke onely on our owne things, but allsoe on the things of our brethren . . . (qtd. in Morgan 91)

The heart, in this cosmology, is the organ which, when functioning properly, will bind together the members of the community in the way that God demands of them; it is the seat of love, of God's love, through which humans also then will love each other and act for the good of the community. Indeed, elsewhere in his sermon Winthrop makes quite

clear that only love will bring someone to God, and through His presence, to the righteousness of proper behavior and of proper communal ties:

Haveing already sett forth the practice of mercy according to the rule of God's lawe, it will be useful to lay open the groundes of it allsoe, being the other parte of the Commandment and that is the affection from which this exercise of mercy must arise, the Apostle tells us that this love is the fullfilling of the lawe, not that it is enough to love our brother and soe noe further; but in regard of the excellency of his partes giueing any motion to the other as the soule to the body and the power it hath to sett all the faculties on worke in the outward exercise of this duty; as when wee bid one make the clocke strike, he doth not lay hand on the hammer, which is the immediate instrument of the sound, but sett on worke the first mover or maine wheele; knoweing that will certainly produce the sound which he intends. Soe the way to drawe men to the workes of mercy, is not by force of Argument from the goodness or necessity of the worke; for though this cause may enforce, a rationall minde to some present act of mercy, as is frequent in experience, yet it cannot worke such a habit in a soule, as shall make it prompt upon all occasions to produce the same effect, but by frameing these affections of loue in the hearte which will as naturally bring forthe the other, as any cause doth produce the effect. (qtd. in Morgan 83-4)

Reason will not bring a person to God's law and love; even if that person behaves righteously on all occasions, that person still is not a proper member of the community if he or she comes to that behavior solely through rational, intellectual processes. Instead,

it is through the stirring of the affections, which reside in the heart, that that person truly will perform works of mercy and love and therefore become a full, participating member of the community. It is the workings of God's love, which act upon the heart and not upon the head, that signal full membership in Christ.

In his differentiation between acts of rationality and acts of love, or the actions of the head from those of the heart, Winthrop utilizes a longstanding Christian metaphor, indeed a religious metaphor that transcends Christianity. For example, Robert A. Erickson notes that the word *heart* appears in the Hebrew version of the Old Testament over 1000 times, and only slightly fewer times in the King James version. He notes that this word seldom refers to the anatomical heart, but instead generally refers to what he calls the "inner resources" of a person: the ways in which they balance thought and emotion, body and soul (26). He notes further that the heart is the place in the human body which links the human and the divine, through which God knows the intentions of any one person and whether or not that person has truly imbibed His word. Erickson quotes David, from whose lineage came Christ:

I know also, my God, that thou triest the heart, and hast pleasure in uprightnes. As for me, in the uprightnes of mine heart I have willingly offered all these things: and now have I seen with joy thy people, which are present here, to offer willingly unto thee. O LORD God of Abraham, Isaac, and of Israel, our fathers, keep this for ever in the imagination of the thoughts of the heart of thy people, and prepare their heart unto thee: And give unto Solomon my son a perfect heart, to keep thy commandments, thy testimonies, and thy statutes, and to do all these

things, and to build the palace, for the which I have made provision. (1  
Chronicles 29:17-19)

The heart, then, is the place of the sacred in the human body; it is the place of the indwelling of the Lord in each of us, the spiritual center of the human body.

This notion of the spiritual heart as the link between the human and the divine is crucial to Christianity, which has long iconicized the body of Christ as the body of God on earth and the symbol of His suffering. My focus here, though, is on the heart of the true believer as the site of Christian conscience and community. The Christian spiritual heart becomes a symbol of the human self in relationship to the divine, for a sinner finds grace when he or she surrenders the self and opens his or her heart to God. God enters the heart, which is the home of the soul, and grace subsequently fills the body with God's love. God's love does not enter through the head, for His love transcends human will and fallen reason; it enters through the one organ that allows it to unite the body of the sinner with the body of Christ. Justification by faith occurs in and through the heart, and only the heart.

Two key figures in this doctrine of faith are, of course, the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine; the heart figures centrally in the religious cosmology put forth by each. In his Epistle to the Colossians, Paul states: "Let the word of Christ dwell in you abundantly: in all wisdom, teaching and admonishing one another in psalms, hymns and spiritual canticles, singing in grace in your hearts to God" (3:16) and "Whatsoever you do, do it from the heart, as to the Lord, and not to men" (3:23). In 2 Corinthians, he states: "Now it is God who makes both us and you stand firm in Christ. He anointed us, set his seal of ownership on us, and put his Spirit in our hearts as a deposit, guaranteeing what is to come." The heart, then, according to Paul, is the dwelling of God; it is the part of the

body through which God enters the body and by which the believer, as a believer, who truly has given himself or herself to God, gives over to God. God, in turn, places His mark on the heart of that believer; it is the organ through which we become one with God and become identified as such, marked by His love. The heart is the home of God's grace, the spiritual center of the human body. The spiritual heart is how God marks those who are saved. As Augustine cries:

Oh! that I might repose on Thee! Oh! that Thou wouldest enter into my heart, and inebriate it, that I may forget my ills, and embrace Thee, my sole good! What art Thou to me? In Thy pity, teach me to utter it. Or what am I to Thee that Thou demandest my love, and, if I give it not, art wroth with me, and threatenest me with grievous woes? Is it then a slight woe to love Thee not? Oh! for Thy mercies' sake, tell me, O Lord my God, what Thou art unto me. Say unto my soul, I am thy salvation. So speak, that I may hear. Behold, Lord, my heart is before Thee; open Thou the ears thereof, and say unto my soul, I am thy salvation. After this voice let me haste, and take hold on Thee. Hide not Thy face from me. Let me die—lest I die—only let me see Thy face. (*The Confessions* I.5.5)

It is, then, through the heart that the believer knows God; God speaks to the heart, shows His face to the heart. The spiritual heart is an organ with the power to perceive God, who is the object most worthy of perception. Indeed, it is the only bodily organ with such a perceptive power, and does so not through an act of will or reason but through a surrender of will or reason. It is that surrender which allows the heart to be entered by, and to embrace, God. The force of love, of God's love, is how the spiritual

heart knows that it has perceived God; as the eyes see, as the ears hear, the spiritual heart, functioning like an internal sense, feels the presence of God.

Thus, there is a long tradition of an iconography of the spiritual heart, for as Eric Jager notes, wounds on the anatomical heart are the marks of a saint, the signs of divine inscription on the bodily organ that turn the anatomical heart into a spiritual one.

Stephen Greenblatt argues:

Pious men and women in the Middle Ages were not content only to read the sacred book of Christ's wounded body; they longed for Christ to inscribe his truth on their own bodies and in particular on their hearts. According to the *Golden Legend*, the name of Christ was found written in golden letters on the heart of the martyred Ignatius of Antioch, and the nuns who cut open the body of Clare of Montefalco in 1308 found precisely figured in her massively enlarged heart not only the cross but also the scourge, the pillar, the crown of thorns, the three nails, the spear and the pole with the sponge. (223-24)

What these religious stories and iconographies highlight, of course, is the power of the spiritual heart. For the point that matters here is not whether Clare of Montefalco actually had those religious symbols engraved on her heart (an impossibility through the lens of current Western medicine) but is instead that religious beliefs were located in the human heart rather than in the human head—indeed, those beliefs could affect the heart so deeply that it became what Jager calls "bodily scripture." As bodily scripture it could be read; as in biblical scripture, the mark of God was written on the spiritual heart.

Furthermore, Jager notes that by the Middle Ages the heart was becoming the symbol of both religious and romantic love, a development that he correlates with the rise

of vernacular love literature in the twelfth century; while the heart, even in the Bible, had been the site of both forms of love, the genre became codified during the High Middle Ages with the development of medieval romance. There was, of course, a difference in the two types of love: romantic love was a love of this world while religious love was a repudiation of it. Such a distinction indicates an emerging difference between the realm of the secular and the realm of the divine, but what is clear is that the heart, not the head, was the locus for both types of love; human love is located in the heart, as is God's grace, for it is love which takes us out of ourselves and out of the reason which had been impaired by the Fall. Thus, while the Puritans, for example, were no enemy to reason, they believed that by itself, reason could discern only certain truths about God; it is from grace and grace alone that we truly can discover Him—that is, from God's love for us and our surrender to Him, which floods the heart. Human love may be a fallen version of God's love, yet it is the one channel through which we are able to transcend the body and become one with God and with others who also are one with Him.

Consequently, the spiritual heart marks both a relationship between the believer and God as well as a relationship between believers. That is, the spiritual heart is a social heart; as it fills with love, it turns the believer toward both God and toward those other believers, modulating the behavior of the person within whose body it lies. It is through this heart, then, that believers form proper spiritual relationships with each other; as the focal point of these relationships, the spiritual heart is the focal point of communities of the heart. Thus, even though Protestant theology is predicated upon the relationship that the individual believer has with God, unmediated by any third party, at the same time, even God had said that it is not good for man to be alone. We live, we love, we converse, we trade. We exist in society, and while in this postlapsarian world any society is, by its

very nature, fallen, if it is through our relationship with God that we are saved, then it is through our relationship with others who are also saved that we can come as close as possible to the kingdom of God on earth. Through the workings of the spiritual heart, we perform acts of love; we open our hearts not just to God but to the love of other humans, extending the bonds of affection from our hearts to theirs. As Winthrop's sermon illustrates, the spiritual community, formed by the hearts of its believing members, manifests itself in the myriad loving ways in which those members relate to each other; it is through the spiritual heart that they manifest their relationship with God, the divine intimacy that makes human intimacy possible.

This communal nature of the spiritual heart mirrors, in significant ways, the communal nature of Hutcheson's vision of the powers and operations of the moral sense; indeed, as the spiritual heart marks each of us as being equal before God, no matter our social station, so too, according to Hutcheson, the fact that each of us has a moral sense premises a democratic vision which is at odds with the hierarchical nature of society at the time. As the spiritual heart joins together the members of the community of believers through love, the moral sense, located in the anatomical heart, joins together members of society, for, as I noted in Chapter Two, Hutcheson calls the operations of the moral sense the "secret chain between each person and mankind" (*Inquiry* 121). Hutcheson, then, utilizes the communal nature of the spiritual heart to create his vision of egalitarian affectionate communities bound together by the moral sense.

Furthermore, Hutcheson even argues that the moral sense was implanted in us by God, stating that:

[A]s the Author of Nature has determined us to receive, by our *external senses*, pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects, according as they are

useful or hurtful to our Bodies; and to receive from *uniform objects* the pleasures of *Beauty* and *harmony*, to excite us to the pursuit of knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an argument to us of his *goodness*, as the *uniformity* it self proves his *existence*, whether we had a *sense of beauty* in *uniformity* or not: in the same manner he has given us a moral sense, to direct our actions, and to give us still *nobler pleasures*; so that while we are only intending the *good* of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest *private* good. (*Inquiry* 134, emphasis in original)

As God's design, the moral sense enables us to distinguish *moral* good and evil from *natural* good and evil; actions premised upon the former excite love toward those who perform them, while actions premised upon the latter do not (*Inquiry* 111). Such love occurs because moral good reflects obedience to God and to God's laws, while natural good reflects only human, not godly, desires (136-37). The former is characterized by the desire for public gain, while the latter is characterized by the desire for private gain. As the discourse of the spiritual heart distinguishes between acting in accordance with God's law through the use of reason and doing so through God's saving grace, which is love, so too an action may be socially beneficial but is morally good only if it is done solely from the desire to benefit others, and it is only toward such actors that we feel love.

Therefore, not only is the moral sense implanted in us by God, its status as part of God's design is reflected in the way it responds to human beings and actions. Like the spiritual heart, it responds with love only to those which contain moral goodness, for moral goodness itself reflects God's essence. The moral sense, designed by God,

implanted in us by God, guides our actions by responding to God-in-action. In this, Hutcheson draws significantly from the religious tradition of the spiritual heart that the Earl of Shaftesbury omitted from his secular theory of the affections.

Yet at the same time, there are significant differences between the God who enters us through the spiritual heart and the God who designed the moral sense. The former God is omnipresent in human lives, filling us with His grace so that we can best know Him and be redeemed by Him, rewarding those who are saved with eternal joy while punishing those who are not with eternal damnation. The latter God, however, is not as present in human lives. As Hutcheson makes clear, the moral sense is part of the frame of our nature; it is designed by God and implanted in us by Him, it responds to actions which contain moral good by producing feelings of love toward the actors, but in that very schema, Hutcheson has made two important distinctions from the God who fills the spiritual heart with His love.

One distinction is that the moral sense responds with love toward the actor, not with love toward God. While the operations of the spiritual heart form the basis for a spiritual community of believers, such a community, by definition, is mediated by God. It is God who fills the spiritual heart with His grace, God who marks those who are worthy members of the spiritual community from those who are not. Therefore, one can only be a member of the community if one makes primary one's relationship with God. The moral sense, however, while a reflection of God's design and of His benevolence, points not toward God but toward other humans. As Hutcheson consistently makes clear, the moral sense enables us to form affective communities with other humans which are based upon the moral relationships that those humans have with each other; the moral sense, to paraphrase Hutcheson, forms a chain between humans, it does not form a chain

between humans and God. While we reflect God's benevolence by acting virtuously, the result of such virtuous behavior is human love, not divine love. The moral sense forms secular, not spiritual, communities of the heart.

Such a distinction is itself a marker of a larger difference between the God of the spiritual heart and the God of the moral sense; the latter, rather than being omnipresent in human lives, is a prime mover God who sets up His mechanical design and then lets it operate according to the laws that He has established as part of that design. While Hutcheson's God is a benevolent God, unlike the older Reformed Scholastic jealous God, even if the Reformed Scholastic God had also been benevolent, that key operational difference would have remained.

For, as I noted in Chapter Two and as I shall discuss in Chapter Five, Hutcheson compares the operations of the moral sense to those of gravity (*Inquiry* 220); what is significant is not just that the moral sense has a stronger pull on those who are physically nearer to us, and that physical distance and emotional distance therefore are equated, but also that the moral sense operates as a force of nature, with laws of its own. Indeed, Hutcheson argues in the *Inquiry* that these laws can be mathematically quantified. Like the law of gravity or other laws of the universe which were designed by God and which then function on their own, without His further assistance, by the very mechanical operations which were part of His design, Hutcheson's *oeuvre* is geared toward understanding the mechanics of the moral sense, which operates under the same principles as do the external senses. As God does not interfere with the operations of those external senses, so too He does not interfere with the operations of the moral sense. He establishes the constitution of the human body, He equips that body with external and

internal senses, and then He steps back and lets that body conduct itself. The moral sense responds to moral actions, but it does so without the immediate presence of God.

In this conception of the moral sense, Hutcheson clearly is influenced by emerging natural philosophic principles and displays the shifting relationship between science and religion in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. As I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, such changing notions were reflected in attitudes toward the human body; under the influence of emergent science, the body was becoming a scientific object. Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy reflects that changing status of the body. While significantly influenced by the communal notions of the spiritual heart—indeed, by the very focus on the heart that was at the basis of spiritual communities—he also was influenced by the new tenets of natural philosophy, including the Baconian scientific method, and applied those tenets to his moral schema. Such an application is clearest in his study of the moral sense; like the spiritual heart, it forms affective communities, but unlike the spiritual heart, its operations are not mysterious but mathematical, not unknowable but quantifiable, not geared toward taking oneself out of one's body to become one with the body of Christ but instead are rooted in the operations of the body. In other words, the moral sense is influenced not just by the spiritual heart but also by emerging notions of the anatomical heart's role in bodily operations—what I call the secular heart.

### The Secular Heart

When Hutcheson asserted that feeling rather than rationality was key to human relations, and that the heart, not the head, was central to human nature, he was referring to specific bodily functions as well as to particular anatomical organs. A strong believer in the new sensational science of the human body, Hutcheson thoroughly agreed with the

premise underlying Lockean epistemology that there is an intimate relationship between the operations of that body and the workings of human nature. Consequently, his intent was to construct a system of moral philosophy which was an alternative to Locke's yet which also was scientifically accurate and, as such, was independent from what he considered to be a discredited scholasticism.

At the same time, it was no coincidence that he located the moral sense in the heart, any more than it was that Thomas Willis asserted that the soul was housed in the brain, for these intellectual actions signaled each man's participation in a longstanding debate about bodily operations which was in part scientific, in part cultural and in part political. While the terms of this debate had shifted by the eighteenth century, it was in essence a modern version of the question of where in the body the soul is located.

Engaged by philosophers for thousands of years, this question was aimed at understanding, and creating structure to, the interactions of human anatomical bodies with the external world, both seen and unseen. Thus, although it overlapped with inquiries about our abilities to perceive that world (i.e., the internal sense), and with those about the roles of faith and reason in knowing God (i.e., the spiritual heart), it ultimately pointed in a different direction.

For while the soul may be home to those internal faculties, and may also be the breath of God, it is, at the same time, the principle of life. As such, it is the central organizing principle of the body, the place where each of us, as individuals, in effect become individual. Consequently, the implication of this debate was that whichever organ housed the soul was also the organ which formed the basis for human identity. Determining its location, therefore, while clearly dependent upon a scientific analysis of the material body, was premised upon the assumption that the body and its parts are

analogical as much as they are anatomical. Each bodily organ performs specific biological functions, but certain organs are attributed ontological meaning that transcends biology.

Repeatedly, the two organs proposed as the home of the soul were the head and the heart, the two which appeared most crucial to bodily operations and to the maintenance of life. While Hutcheson did not argue that the moral sense was, or was the equivalent of, the soul, he did argue that it was the central organizing principle for the physiology and metaphysiology of the affective body, thereby utilizing key elements and assumptions of that longstanding philosophical inquiry to structure his epistemological argument. By locating the moral sense in the heart, he brought to bear on that argument discourses of what I am calling the secular heart. This heart contained characteristics of the anatomical organ, but contained additional characteristics which gave it specific cultural meanings. Interweaving corporeal observation with the act of interpretation, it highlighted the influence of religious and political practice on scientific understandings of the human body.

For example, R.K. French notes that one of the key tenets of ancient scientific perceptions of the body was that a life force inhabited it when that body was alive but that this force left the body when it died; indeed, the presence or absence of this force was by definition the very thing that made that body alive or dead.<sup>152</sup> This force was not dispersed throughout the body, but was thought to be housed in one specific organ. That organ had to be one that was crucial, if not perhaps the one that was most crucial, to keeping the physical body alive, for if this force itself *was* life, it was only logical that it

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<sup>152</sup>R.K. French, "The Thorax in History: From Ancient Times to Aristotle," *Thorax* 33 (1978): 10-18.

would reside in an organ from which it could emanate throughout the body; it was only logical that an organ so important biologically would be equally important in other ways as well.

Given that life was associated with warmth (i.e., a body that was dead rapidly became cold), given that the heart kept the body alive by pumping blood through it, and given that blood is warm, it was easy to posit that the heart was the house of both the body's warmth and of the breath of life. As French notes:

[T]he heart had what most of the early soul-searchers were looking for. It was at the centre of the warm body and was perhaps therefore the source of that heat; it was mobile with an innate mobility discoverable in the pulse, a mobility which increased with the motions of the body. The motion of the heart was also clear in anger and fear, and it clearly acted in surprise to sudden external changes. It seemed to share most of these characteristics with the life principle, the attributes of which had been arrived at from the physiological observations above. Was not the heart the seat of the soul? Most ancient societies thought so. (10-11)

Thus, ancient Egyptians saw the heart as the seat of one's spirit, the center of the will and consciousness, and hence of personal good and evil. According to Egyptian beliefs, when a person died, their heart would be weighed by Osiris, the god of the underworld, against the feather of truth. If the heart was heavier than the feather, it was a marker that that person had not been honest and good, and his or her heart would be eaten by the Eater of the Dead; however, if the heart weighed the same as, or less than, the feather, that person achieved eternal life. Therefore, Egyptians took great care to preserve the heart when embalming a body, either by placing it back into the body or by

keeping it separately, in a jar. In contrast, they considered the brain to be worthless, and removed it in small pieces with a hook through the nose (French 11).

In ancient Greece, however, the relationship between the head and the heart was more complex. In *Timaeus*, Plato argued that the creator located the immortal soul, which houses reason, in the head, closer to the heavens, thus giving it primacy; the mortal soul, which houses the affections, was placed in the heart.<sup>153</sup> Since the mortal soul was considered to be lesser than the immortal soul, the affections, correspondingly, were thought to be lower than reason. At the same time, though, anatomy dictated that the heart did not exist in some neat subordination to the head. While the appetitive soul, which lay in the belly and which was concerned only with bodily needs, was certainly inferior, the heart's standing was not so clearly delineated. As heat was crucial to life, and as all veins meet in, and lead out of, the heart, it was the heart which pumped heat throughout the body. Anatomically, therefore, if not philosophically, the heart was still primary. Indeed, due to that same anatomical structure, it was the heart, not the head, which pumped reason, as well as emotion, throughout the body. Thus, while Plato gave the head, the immortal soul, and reason primacy in one area, anatomy dictated something more nuanced; it was the heart that warmed the brain, enabling it to function reasonably, while the brain acted rationally on the heart, thus tempering our otherwise potentially heated and intemperate actions.

Yet even with the cooling function of the head, the heart could still get too excited, pumping out too much heat and overruling reason. It therefore had to be

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<sup>153</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, information on Greek conceptions of the heart is from Robert A. Erickson, *The Language of the Heart, 1600-1750* (Philadelphia: U Pennsylvania P, 1997); see esp. his Introduction.

counteracted by some additional cooling mechanism so that the body could remain balanced. This cooling function Plato attributed to the lungs, which, in conjunction with the brain, kept the heart at the proper temperature so that it could pump vital heat throughout the body and act in proper subordinate balance to the rational head.

Aristotle, however, viewed the relationship between the head and the heart differently. He agreed that the heart needed to be externally cooled, but theorized that that was the function solely of the brain, not of the lungs. Indeed, as Spillane notes, this was the primary function that Aristotle attributed to the brain; he saw it otherwise as having neither blood nor sensation (7). Instead, Aristotle argued that the heart, not the brain, was the seat of the body's intellect and of the soul; therefore, it was the most important organ, the one which organized the body and the individuality of the person within it.

Galen restored to the head the primary place that it had held in Plato's physiology. He argued that the head housed the animal spirits (i.e., rationality) while the heart housed the vital spirits (i.e., emotionality), and that the animal spirits were the governing part of the soul. Again, however, this superiority of the head was equivocal, for he also argued that the heart was the source of the body's innate heat; the heart thus was crucial to the body's existence, as heat gave the body life, and was pumped throughout the body by the heart. Furthermore, his medical writings, which were in Greek and Arabic, were not translated into Latin until the beginning of the thirteenth century, and were thus unknown to the West until then; consequently, as Scott Stevens notes, there were multiple and

conflicting theories about the primacy of the head or the heart throughout early modern Europe.<sup>154</sup>

Yet, while Plato and Galen, on the one hand, and Aristotle, on the other, disagreed about whether the head or the heart was primary, all three agreed that the body was a system of delicate thermal balances; too much heat or coolness was dangerous, as was too little. But heat and coolness were not simply physiological manifestations of the heart and the brain, they also were symbolic manifestations of gender and of gender differences. Heat was associated with the male gender, with perfection; coldness was associated with the female gender, with imperfection. Heat was active, moving outward; coldness was static, immobile. At the same time, too much heat was dangerous; as Erickson notes, Galen argued that "[t]he innate heat in man may be greater and thus more perfect, but that heat needs to be controlled and moderated or the animal will become disordered and eventually fly apart. Male heat can be too much of a good thing." Indeed, according to Galen, it was the female's coldness that allowed her to carry a fetus, for if she was too warm she would evaporate the nutrients necessary for the fetus to grow (2). Heat was good, but needed to be tempered so that it was not extreme.

There is, of course, an inherent contradiction in this paradigm. On the one hand, coldness is associated with the brain, which in Platonic and Galenic cosmologies is where reason is located; similarly, heat is associated with the heart, which is where the affections reside. Reason is more perfect than emotion, and thus the brain is the more important organ. But as Galenic notions of bodily heat indicate, the innate heat of a man

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<sup>154</sup>Scott Manning Stevens, "Sacred Heart and Secular Brain." *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporality in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. David Hillman and Carla Mazzio (New York: Routledge, 1997): 264-84.

is greater than that of a woman; consequently, bodily heat is also associated with activity and maleness, which is also more perfect, while bodily coldness is associated with passivity and femaleness. Furthermore, such a thermal/motion association is crucial to the theory of the four humors, which were not only determinants of one's personality, but also were related specifically to bodily temperature. Blood made one cheerful and enthusiastic and yellow bile made one quick to anger; both were warmer and more active. Black bile made one melancholic and suspicious, and phlegm made one slothful and indulgent; they were colder and more passive. As Gail Kern Paster argues, passive behavior was gendered female, while active behavior was gendered male; the one humor fully associated with women was phlegm.<sup>155</sup> Thus, the brain may be the cooler and more rational organ, but it is the body's vital heat, generated by the heart, which determines gendered destiny.

Indeed, as Galen's remarks indicate, the body's temperature was not necessarily static; the greatest danger was that it would shift too much in one direction or the other. Such potential shifts threatened not only the balance between reason and emotion, they too had significant gendered implications. Thomas Laqueur argues that Galenic medicine posited that superior male heat enabled women to sometimes turn into men while simultaneously preventing men from turning into women, but Patricia Parker notes other narratives of men becoming cold and thus changing gender as well (qtd. in Paster 417). Indeed, Paster argues that Queen Elizabeth's famous dictum that her body is that of a feeble woman but her heart and stomach are that of a King does not only mean that she sees herself as courageous (i.e., active, expansive, actions that are gendered male) but

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<sup>155</sup>Gail Kern Paster, "The Unbearable Coldness of Female Being: Women's Imperfection and the Humoral Economy," *ELR* 28.3 (Autumn 1998): 416-40.

that her biology, the source of her bodily heat, is itself male. If temperature makes gender, and if temperature emanates from the heart, it is the heart which makes male and female.

Thus, as the source of the body's vital heat, the heart was key to the power of the hot male body, even while the brain, as an organ, although cooler, was simultaneously associated with reason. Yet as Paster notes, and as I discussed at the beginning of this chapter, this theory of the humoral, thermal body began to break down in the seventeenth century; indeed, Willis' formulation of the superiority of the brain as the home of the soul resolves the very contradiction that I have discussed above. It associates with the cooler, more rational, organ the power to organize the entire body, giving it control over the amount of heat generated by the heart, which is now subordinate to it. Such a resolution is a piece with the new science of the seventeenth century, which operated logically through the framework of the scientific method to remove the errors in received knowledge.

Yet, as with perhaps all cultural discourses, this breakdown occurred gradually and over an extended period of time, as is illustrated by the writings of William Harvey. In his 1616 anatomical lectures, Harvey stated that "The brain is deemed the prince of all parts. However, there is no disputing the heart because its sway is wider, for the heart is seen in those creatures without a brain" (qtd. in Spillane 7). But after giving the heart sway over the entire body, Harvey then gave to the brain a unique power; he pointed out that it is the brain which makes us superior to all other animals, and thus "the head is the richest member of the body" (qtd. in Spillane 7).

Indeed, in his introduction to the 1628 edition of *De Motu Cordis*, Harvey called the heart "both the central organ of man's body and the likeness of your [King Charles I's]

royal power," reinforcing the then common trope that the physical body mirrored the social body so that the monarch both had the former and was the heart of the latter; Harvey then asked King Charles to "[a]ccept, therefore . . . this new account of the heart," the organ from which virtue and grace abound (Sawday "Transparent Man" 16). Yet in 1651, after Charles' execution, Harvey published an account of an actual observation of a beating human heart that he had performed with King Charles in 1640; that heart, he and Charles agreed, was "deprived of the Sense of Feeling" (Sawday "Transparent Man" 14). No longer was the heart the focal point of the physical and social cosmos; instead, as the king had been executed by humans, so too the heart was becoming merely a pump, superceded by the brain.

Harvey's perceptual shift from a magisterial heart to a deprived one mirrors not only the shifting English politics of the mid-seventeenth century but also the shifting perceptions of the human body and of its constituent parts that was occurring at that time. The emergence of dissection precipitated a rise in the perceived superiority of the head over that of the heart, a trend that culminated with Willis' nerve theories and his argument that the head is the seat of the soul. Coterminous with this philosophical shift is the now well-known entry of men into the predominantly female practice of midwifery and the emergence of the trope of intellectual work as a form of masculine birth, as symbolized by Francis Bacon's *Temporus Partus Masculus* or *The Masculine Birth of*

*Time*.<sup>156</sup> The cool, rational brain was becoming the new image of masculinity, and the controlling force of the masculine body.

Yet at the same time, even as a "mere" pump, the heart still was crucial to bodily operations, for in that very Harveian model, it was the heart which provided vital heat to the body. Erickson notes that the Latitudinarian John Norris wrote in *The Theory and Regulation of Love* (1688) that there is a strong parallel between love and physical motion (i.e., the law of gravity) as well as between love and the motion of the heart. For the heart, according to Norris, is

the great Wheel of the Human Machine, the Spring of all Animal and vital Motion, and the Head-fountain of Life . . . its Motion is the First and Leading Motion of all . . . it begins as soon as the Flame of Life is Kindled, and ends not till the *vital Congruity* be quite dissolv'd (qtd. in Erickson 186).

Clearly, in Norris' view, the heart is not at all secondary to the brain, but is instead the prime mover of the body. Implicit in his text is the assumption that if physical motion and the motion of the heart are comparable, then there must be some force which established those comparable operations. God, who is love, established the great

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<sup>156</sup>For the changing gendered dynamics of midwifery, see Elaine Hobby, "Gender, Science and Midwifery: Jane Sharp, *The Midwives Book* (1671)." *The Arts of 17th-Century Science: Representations of the Natural World in European and North American Culture*. Ed. Claire Jowitt and Diane Watt (Hants, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate P, 2002): 146-159. See Also Robert A. Erickson, "'The Books of Generation': Some Observations on the Style of the British Midwife Books, 1671-1764." *Sexuality in Eighteenth-Century Britain*. Ed. Paul-Gabriel Boucé (Manchester, England: Manchester UP, 1982): 74-94. For masculine births, see Ruth Gilbert, "The Masculine Matrix: Male Births and the Scientific Imagination in Early-Modern England." *The Arts of 17th-Century Science*: 160-176.

machine. We have entered the realm of the spiritual heart, whose powers intercede in those very mechanical, and very bodily, operations.

As I indicated at the beginning of this chapter, Hutcheson's formulation of the moral sense was, in part, a reaction to the very "coldness" of Lockean epistemology that I have noted here was associated with the rational brain; that coldness was, to a certain extent, quite literal, and certainly in contrast to the warmth and affection which stemmed from the moral sense and which filled the body when that sense responded to virtue. Thus, the moral sense recaptures the secular heart's ability to flood the human body, even if it is no longer with vital heat. Unlike that heart, however, which floods only the singular, individual body within which it beats, the responses of the moral sense extend to other bodies as well; while it does not flood those other bodies, it transcends that containing body, and links those other bodies through that very warmth and affection in ways characteristic of the communal capabilities of the spiritual heart.

We have, then, through the operations of the moral sense, not just a community of affective bodies but of warm affective bodies, joined together by and through their hearts in contradistinction to the cool, individualized brain-centered bodies that Locke posits rationally balance their interests to form society. With the emergence of the cool, rational brain, Hutcheson reasserts the warm, affective heart; he does not argue that this heart is the seat of reason, but instead, through the operations of the moral sense, bypasses reason to argue that the affections themselves, as the spiritual heart indicates, are a form of knowing—and a more powerful one at that.

Yet if the Lockean rational body redefines masculinity to be cool, the Hutchesonian affective body is not a feminine body. This does not mean that women do not have a moral sense, any more than it means that women did not have rational

capacities. However, as those capacities were thought to be weaker in women than in men, so too, Hutcheson's affective body is masculine in ways reminiscent of that older, Galenic notion of a vital heat that generates movement and activity. While I shall discuss in Chapter Four the affective process by which Hutcheson argues that the moral sense perceives virtue, and shall discuss in Chapter Five the natural philosophic principles by which those perceptions define the geographic boundaries of affective communities, I shall discuss in Chapter Six the gendered assumptions which frame Hutcheson's construction of the affective body. Even though the moral sense is part of human physiology, and Hutcheson's affective politics theoretically are available to everyone, I argue in that chapter that the communities formed by it ultimately are bound by the very gendered and racialized social structures within which power circulated in eighteenth-century Anglo-America. Hutcheson's ideal society is an affective community of warm, loving white male bodies, who act virtuously toward each other and who, from the perceptions of their individual moral senses, protect each other's rights.

## Chapter Four

### The Affective Body

#### The Materiality of "Immaterial" Qualities

As I discuss in the previous chapter, the Hutchesonian affective body is centered in the heart and guided by feeling, in contrast to the Lockean rational body, which is centered in the head and guided by thought. Although Hutcheson clearly was not the first moral philosopher to theorize the pivotal role of the heart and of the affections to human nature, he was the first to apply such a conception to the physiological operations and structure of the human body. Utilizing Locke's epistemology to build a moral philosophy which differs significantly from Locke's, the structure of his argument demonstrates that he clearly is a proponent of the emerging new science of the human body and, by implication, of the belief that human nature itself stems directly from its operations.

Yet as I discussed in Chapter Two, the physiological basis of Hutcheson's philosophy has been overlooked by critics who assume that the moral sense is simply an analogy, even though eighteenth-century conceptions of the body, indeed of materiality itself, were very different than ours. Thus, examining his moral sense theory through that eighteenth-century lens makes clear that the moral sense is a real sense and that the human body itself is as central to Hutcheson's social thought as it was to Locke's. In this chapter, then, I shall conduct a close reading of the *Inquiry* to argue that just as Locke's epistemology maps the rational body, Hutcheson utilizes natural philosophy to map the affective body.

Hutcheson begins his physiological mapping at the very opening of the *Inquiry*, implicitly and immediately asserting that body's centrality to his philosophic vision.

While he notes in the Preface that his book will be a study of human nature, he argues that we each have an internal sense of beauty and an internal moral sense, clearly focusing his discussion on the body and on bodily structure. Indeed, in the introduction to his analysis of the sense of beauty in the *Inquiry's* first treatise, he states:

To make the following Observations understood [i.e., regarding the internal sense of beauty], it may be necessary to premise some *Definitions*, and *Observations*, either universally acknowledg'd, or sufficiently proved by many Writers both ancient and modern, concerning our Perceptions called *Sensations*, and the Actions of the Mind consequent upon them. (1)

As that treatise lays the foundation for Hutcheson's claim in the *Inquiry's* second treatise that we each have an internal moral sense, a claim which in turn is the basis for his proposed theory of human nature, opening his book with the argument that the principles of perception and sensation underpin the sense of beauty makes clear his belief that the body is crucial to the construction of that nature. Furthermore, stating that his *Inquiry* can be understood only if the process of bodily sensation is first understood aligns Hutcheson with the basic tenet of Lockean epistemology and with the nerve theory upon which it is based: that the body and its processes are key to our natures, our identities, our characters, and our ideas of the world.

Thus, utilizing scientific traditions with which his contemporaries are familiar, Hutcheson defines, and distinguishes between, *sensation* and *sense*. He defines *sensation* as the process by which a simple idea is raised in the mind by the presence of an external object acting upon the body (1-2). *Sense* is the power within the body to perceive specific qualities of that object; furthermore, each sense has the power to perceive only a

specific type of quality (e.g., the sense of hearing perceives sound, the sense of sight perceives color). Each sense is "housed," as it were, in a specific bodily organ, except for the sense of touch which, Hutcheson notes, is spread throughout the body. The mind, he further notes, *pace* Locke, is passive in this process. It can neither encourage nor prevent a specific quality of any external object from acting upon the particular bodily sense which has the power to perceive that quality; additionally, it cannot influence in any way the process of sensation—i.e., its reception of information from a sense about a quality, information which it then turns into a simple idea.

This capacity for sensory perception, and the mind's transformation of that perception into an idea, is instead an inherent part of our physiological make-up. As Locke notes:

If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason . . . that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ. (*Essay* II.viii.4)

Furthermore, Hutcheson points out that the mind has no power to influence how long that quality will act upon the body; rather, "as long as we continue our bodies in a state fit to be acted upon by the external object" (2)—that is, as long as human physiology remains in its current form and our bodies remain within range of the power of the quality

emanating from that object—our bodily senses will continue to operate in the way that they currently do, independent of will.

In this sensational schema, then, Hutcheson closely follows Lockean epistemology and the distinction Locke makes between a quality and an idea. The former is that part of external objects which we can perceive through a specific sense; the latter is the information produced by that sense which is then furnished to the mind. Ideas, therefore, are internal to us while qualities are external to us. Specific qualities are perceived by specific bodily senses, which transmit the information about them through the nerves (via the animal spirits) to the mind; the mind, in turn, transforms that information into simple ideas and then combines those simple ideas into the complex ones upon which we build our concepts of the world. Qualities, therefore, from which ideas are produced, are the building blocks of our identities and characters, even ultimately of our societies.

Additionally, qualities, but not ideas, have material existence. Indeed, Hutcheson references Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities; the former, Locke argues, are in an object, while the latter are powers in that object to raise ideas in us. Primary qualities, therefore, according to Locke, are "original qualities," which exist in an object independent of our senses, while secondary qualities are those that our senses perceive as qualities. This does not mean that they also do not exist independently of us; while a blind person, for example, will not see colors in a particular object, a seeing person will. The difference is that the blind person has no power to perceive color, and thus no ability to know it, while the seeing person does.

At the same time, it is important to note here that Hutcheson does not always use the term *quality* in his treatise. While he sometimes does, he sometimes uses the term

*idea* to mean what Locke means by *quality*, while also using *idea* in its traditional Lockean meaning. This is only one example of Hutcheson's linguistic unclarity, which has made it easy for contemporary critics to disagree about so many aspects of his philosophy. Consequently, in order to maintain the distinction between those two concepts, a distinction with which Hutcheson clearly agrees and upon which he builds his particular epistemology, I am substituting the term *quality* for the term *idea* whenever Hutcheson uses that latter term to denote what the former one means: the specific aspects of external objects which are perceived by our senses.

It is qualities, then, which act upon those senses. However, our senses are not completely static; as Hutcheson points out, our sensory perceptions of an external object may change simply due to a change in our bodily organs, and he provides an example of water which feels cold to a warm hand and warm to a cold hand, even though it is the same temperature in both situations. He makes clear, though, that such changes in our experiences of the world are based upon changes in the body, not in the external world or in any process of the mind; in that example it is, after all, body temperature which has changed, not water temperature or mental condition, and the information that the body sends to the mind differs accordingly. Furthermore, sensory perception can also change as a person ages and matures, or even through the actions of some limited powers of the mind (i.e., if we get sick once when drinking wine, we may from then on associate wine with illness and no longer get pleasure from drinking it).

Continuing to follow Lockean epistemology, Hutcheson notes also that some of these sensations are pleasant and others are painful. Again, however, this pleasure or pain is a bodily state which bears no relation to the powers of the mind. For "the most accurate knowledge of these things [would not] vary either the pleasure or pain of the

perception, however it might give a rational pleasure distinct from the sensible" (4). That is, intellectual study of any qualities of objects which cause pleasure or pain does not influence the amount of pleasure or pain received from them by the body, even if the mind enjoys that act of studying. Rather, those object qualities, as well as sensation itself, are strictly bodily experiences by which we encounter the world.

Given the purpose of Hutcheson's book, his immediate focus on the qualities of objects and on the operations of the senses makes clear his agreement with the Lockean premise that the senses are the building blocks upon which human nature is formed; humans are born a blank slate, with no innate ideas, and it is through the senses, which receive information about the external world directly from the external world, with no input from the mind, that we become who we are. For as Locke argues that the senses shape our identities and characters, Hutcheson states that there is a uniformity of human sensory processes, so that "there does not seem to be any ground to believe such a diversity in human minds, as that the same simple idea or perception should give pleasure to one and pain to another, or to the same person at different times" (6). In other words, our bodies are constructed to respond similarly to the same, or to the same types of, stimuli; any differences that occur do so because of bodily experience, not because of bodily structure or because of the operations of the senses or as a result of any communications between those senses and the mind.

In this formulation, then, the body and its experiences are key. The mind has no direct contact with the world, but instead is always mediated by the body. Although this sensational process occurs so rapidly that it appears as if we perceive objects immediately in the mind, with all of their complexity, Locke points out that, "Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united and blended, that

there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed" (*Essay* II.ii.1). Thus, while the mind seems to be constantly active due to the speed with which such conversion of sensory perceptions into ideas occurs, it actually passively receives individual perceptions through the nerves from individual senses; only after such reception does it actively turn those perceptions into simple ideas and, likewise, actively compare and combine those simple ideas into complex ones, an intellectual process during which the senses, in turn, are passive.

It therefore is possible to divide the active powers of the body and of the mind into two distinct realms: the material and the immaterial, respectively. The mind takes the material information provided to it by the body and turns that information into the immaterial building blocks by which we become individuals; however, that individuality is, in the end, always dependent upon the operations of the body, not of the mind, for it is the body which provides the information to the mind by which we become who we are. This does not mean that the mind's operations do not affect our material existence, but that it only interacts indirectly, not directly, with that material realm. As Locke notes, "it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to *invent* or *frame* one new simple idea in the mind" (*Essay* II.ii.2, emphasis in original). The mind can only work with the sensory perceptions provided to it by the body, perceptions which in turn are based upon the qualities existing in the external world with which that body comes in contact.

Until this point, Hutcheson clearly follows Lockean epistemological precepts. However, his purpose in the *Inquiry* is not to write a physiological treatise, any more than was Locke's in the *Essay*, but instead is to write a study of human nature, which, like

Locke, he clearly believes is physiologically-based. Unlike Locke, though, Hutcheson focuses specifically on the moral components of that nature, articulating from Locke's physiology of knowledge a paradigm for our capacity to make moral judgments. Locke argues that these judgments are made solely in the immaterial realm; our bodies provide simple ideas to the mind, which then creates complex ideas of morality and of a consequent ideal society, an argument which is in keeping with his belief that there are no innate ideas. Yet, as I noted in the previous chapter, such a belief is tempered by his argument that we are inherently rational creatures who act in our own self-interest. Morality, then, for Locke, is a complex, immaterial idea which stems from an intellectual calculation based upon that self-interest, prior to action and the determinant of action.

Hutcheson, though, believes that our moral nature is internal, not external, to us; he also disagrees with the equation of morality with self-interest, even when, as in Locke's conception of it, such reflection leads us to act for the greater good. As I discussed in Chapter Two, he argues instead that we are inherently benevolent and disinterested, created in the image of a kind and just God. As such, we do not come to our moral judgments through the processes of the mind; rather, as part of that creation, our capacity for making these judgments precedes both interest and the intellectual operations upon which the calculation of that interest is based. But he accepts the new science of the human body and of the larger physiological paradigm within which those Lockean precepts operate, agreeing with Locke that there are no innate ideas. Thus, rather than arguing that the Lockean division between the powers of the body and those of the mind is incorrect, he argues instead that it is correct but that our moral capacity has been demarcated erroneously. Morality, he believes, is neither an innate nor a complex idea, but rather is an external quality perceived by a sense; like all qualities, its

perception then becomes a simple idea. He therefore asserts that our benevolent nature is part of our physiology as it was designed by God, not dependent upon the functions of will or reason.

However, qualities, as I noted earlier, by definition have material existence. Hutcheson's assertion, therefore, means that morality must be material as well. Clearly, such an argument is not one which would be made today; indeed, it can be made only if materiality is understood in a way that is significantly different from our contemporary conception of it. Yet this was exactly the case in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries; due to the methodology and discoveries of the emerging new science, especially the chemical studies of Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton's experimental calculations of unseen forces, the existence of material entities which could not be perceived by any of the five known external senses was being given a sound natural philosophic basis.

As Keith Hutchison argues, new definitions of materiality were being established, replacing the Aristotelian-based conception that material existence was limited to those entities which could be perceived by one or more of the external senses and that anything else was simply occult. Rather than distinguishing between manifest qualities, which are perceived by the senses and therefore are corporeal, and occult qualities, which are hidden from the senses and therefore cannot be corporeal, natural philosophers instead argued that occult qualities can be corporeal, even if they are unperceived by our external senses; the "problem," then, is the limitation of our external senses.<sup>157</sup> As Montaigne

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<sup>157</sup>Keith Hutchison, "What Happened to Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution?," *Isis* 73.2 (June 1982): 233-53. See also John Henry, "Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory," *History of Science* 24 (1986): 335-81.

claimed: "The properties which in many things we call secret [*occultes*] . . . is it not likely there should be sensitive faculties in nature able to judge and perceive them, the want whereof breedeth in us the ignorance of the true essence of such things?" (qtd. in Hutchison 235). The *Principia*, in fact, is based upon the presumption that occult qualities exist, unperceived by the senses, whose effects can be measured scientifically and, hence, be known:

For since the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we are to hold for universal all such as universally agree with experiments . . . We no other way know the extension of bodies than by our senses, nor do these reach it in all bodies; but because we perceive extension in all that are sensible, therefore we ascribe it universally to all others also. That abundance of bodies are hard, we learn by experience; and because the hardness of the whole arises from the hardness of the parts, we therefore justly infer the hardness of the undivided particles not only of the bodies we feel but of all others. That all bodies are impenetrable, we gather not from reason, but from sensation. The bodies which we handle we find impenetrable, and thence conclude impenetrability to be an universal property of all bodies whatsoever. (*III*, 398-99)

Materiality, in other words, was in the process of being distinguished from perception.

As a result of his chemical experiments, Boyle argued against the traditional viewpoint that material substances are made up of three principles: mercury, sulphur and salt. Instead, he stated that they are composed of corpuscles: minute particles of matter which, like all matter, have the properties of shape, size, texture and motion. These

corpuscles are so small as to be unobservable by our senses, yet they are still material.

As Boyle describes them in *The Origin of Forms and Qualities*:

These two grand and most Catholick [i.e., universal] Principles of Bodies, Matters, and Motion, being thus establish'd, it will follow both, that Matter must be actually divided into Parts, that being the genuine Effect of variously determin'd Motion, and that each of the primitive Fragments, or other distinct and entire Masses of Matter must have two Attributes, its own Magnitude, or rather *Size*, and its own *Figure* or *Shape*. And since Experience shews us (especially that which is afforded to us by Chymical Operations, in many of which Matter is divided into Parts, too small to be singly sensible,) that this division of Matter is frequently made into insensible Corpuscles or Particles, we may conclude, that the minutest fragments, as well as the biggest Masses of the Universal Matter are likewise endowed each with its peculiar Bulk and Shape. For being a finite Body, its Dimensions must be terminated and measurable: and though it may change its Figure, yet for the same reason it must necessarily have *some Figure* or other. So that now we have found out, and must admit three Essential Properties of each entire or undivided, though insensible part of Matter, namely *Magnitude*, (by which I mean not quantity in general, but a determin'd quantity, which we in English oftentimes call the *Size* of a bodie,) *Shape*, and either *Motion* or *Rest*, (for betwixt them two there is no mean:) the two first of which may be called *inseparable Accidents* of each distinct part of Matter: *inseparable*, because being extended, and

yet finite, it is Physically impossible, that it should be devoid of some Bulk or other, and som determinate Shape or other; and yet *Accidents*, because that whether or no the Shape can by Physical Agents be alter'd or the Body subdivided, yet mentally both the one and the other may be done, the whole essence of Matter remaining undestroy'd. (307, emphasis in original)

Although lengthy, Boyle's statement is worth examining closely. He argues that corpuscles have *bulk and shape*; that each corpuscle is a *finite body* with [*d*]imensions that are *measurable*. While these particles are *insensible*, they are still *part[s] of Matter*; that is, although none of our external senses are capable of perceiving them, they still have material existence.<sup>158</sup> Boyle is quite clear, then, that, contrary to Aristotle, materiality is not dependent upon the external senses, but exists independent of us and of our bodies. While our knowledge of it is limited to the perceptive powers of our bodies, knowledge and existence are distinct. As Boyle notes in his Preface, "the Knowledge we have of the Bodies without Us, being for the Most part fetched from the Informations the Mind receives by the Senses, we scarce know any thing else in Bodies, upon whose account they can worke upon our Senses save their Qualities" (298). In other words, what we know about the world we know through our senses, which perceive specific qualities in external objects and provide that information to our mind; if our senses do not perceive something, we cannot know about it. Thus, because corpuscles cannot be

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<sup>158</sup>Similarly, in Query 31 of *Optics*, Newton states, ". . . it seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, moveable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties, and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which he formed them; and that these primitive particles being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them" (541).

perceived by the senses, we cannot know about them, but not knowing about them (i.e., not perceiving them) does not mean that they do not have material existence.

How then can we know that corpuscles exist, and that they exist materially? Through their effects. Although we cannot have direct knowledge of them, by their actions upon other bodies, which we can perceive, we can have indirect knowledge of them. As Boyle notes in *The Sceptical Chymist*:

[T]here may be several sorts of bodies which are not immediate objects of any one of our senses; since we see, that not only those little corpuscles, that issue out of the loadstone, and perform the wonders, for which it is justly admired; but the effluvioms of amber, jet, and other electrical concretes, though by their *effects* upon the particular bodies disposed to receive their action, they seem to fall under the cognizance of our sight, yet do they not as electrical immediately affect any of our senses, as do the bodies, whether minute or greater, that we see, feel, taste, etc. (qtd. in Alexander 64, emphasis added)

Thus, corpuscles do not simply exist in a material realm beyond the perceptive abilities of our senses, they act upon bodies in ways which can be perceived by our senses. They are emitted by bodies, interact with other bodies, and through those interactions create changes in those bodies which our senses can and do perceive. Corpuscles, therefore, while existing in some material netherworld, can be identified by the scientific method of observation and conclusion. Boyle's theory, in effect, stresses both the materiality of the external world and the limited extent of our immediate knowledge of that world and of those material qualities, a belief that was then commonly held by adherents of the scientific method. For if knowledge can be based only upon the operations of the senses,

Boyle assumes that material substances exist even if we can not perceive them (i.e., occult qualities), and then proves that assumption by utilizing the operations of the very senses whose abilities limit our knowledge of that materiality.

Boyle's corpuscular theory significantly influenced the development of Locke's epistemology; indeed, as I noted in the previous chapter, Locke studied under Boyle at Oxford, and both were members of the Royal Society.<sup>159</sup> For example, Boyle's argument that bodies emit corpuscles, which interact with other bodies and which can then be known by the results of those interactions, is clearly the basis for Locke's argument:

And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies [i.e., their primary qualities] of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us. (*Essay* II.viii.12)

Locke, in other words, builds upon Boyle's conception of corpuscles the paradigm whereby those corpuscles are emitted from an external body and press against a particular sense, producing a sensation which is transmitted to the mind, where it becomes a simple idea; the mind combines simple ideas to produce complex ideas about the external object from which the corpuscles were emitted. Yet the actions of these corpuscles lead to the production of simple ideas without the corpuscles themselves being perceived, for as Locke notes, there are "bodies and good store of bodies, each

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<sup>159</sup>See, e.g., Peter Alexander, *Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles: Locke and Boyle on the External World* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1985). In addition, Alexander notes that Locke reviewed some of Boyle's manuscripts prior to their publication, and assisted Boyle with some of his experiments (6).

whereof are so small, that we cannot by any of our senses discover either their bulk, figure, or motion" (*Essay* II.viii.13); even though they exist, our senses cannot perceive their primary qualities.

But by attributing to them *bulk, figure, or motion*, Locke signals his agreement with Boyle that corpuscles are material, as only material objects contain those primary qualities. Thus, if corpuscular bodies move through the air, emanating from external objects unperceived by the senses but activating those senses, and thereby leading through the process of sensation to the mental production of simple ideas about the objects from which the corpuscles emanated, then Locke, like Boyle, argues that materiality exists in part beyond our sensory perception of it. Indeed, like Boyle, he consistently reiterates that our knowledge of the world is limited, stating repeatedly that there may well be aspects of that world about which we cannot know or be certain because they are not experienced by any of the five known external senses, and thus are

beyond the limits of our knowledge.<sup>160</sup> Due to those sensory limitations, for example, he argues, following Boyle:

From all which it is evident, that the *extent of our knowledge* comes not only short of the reality of things, but even of the extent of our own ideas. Though our knowledge be limited to our ideas, and cannot exceed them either in extent or perfection; and though these be very narrow bounds, in respect of the extent of All-being, and far short of what we may justly imagine to be in some even created understandings, not tied down to the full and narrow information that is to be received from some few, and not very acute, ways of perceptions, such as are our senses . . . (IV.iii.6, emphasis in original)

Consequently, while our senses do not perceive the particles which trigger the ideas, those particles exist and have the primary qualities of *bulk, figure, or motion*, even though those qualities lie beyond the limits of our sensory capacity. That sensory

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<sup>160</sup>In his discussion of the origin of simple ideas, Locke argues that our inability to conceive of qualities in the external world other than the ones already perceived by the five known external senses is simply a limitation of how we come to knowledge rather than a lack of such qualities; we cannot conceptualize that which we do not experience:

This is the reason why—though we cannot believe it impossible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are usually counted, which he has given to man—yet I think it is not possible for any man to imagine any other qualities in bodies, howsoever constituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, besides sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four senses, the qualities then which are the objects of the fifth sense had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a sixth, seventh, or eighth sense can possibly be;—which, whether yet some other creatures, in some other parts of this vast and stupendous universe, may not have, will be a great presumption to deny. (II.ii.3)

capacity, however, Locke clearly distinguishes from what he calls *the reality of things*—i.e., the actual qualities of the external world.

Indeed, Locke even believes that the air itself, perhaps to us the epitome of a seemingly immaterial entity, consists of corpuscles, and therefore has material qualities; when demonstrating that our ideas of complex substances of body are as unknowable as those of spirit, he states that:

For though the pressure of the particles of air may account for the cohesion of several parts of matter, that are grosser than the particles of air, and have pores less than *the corpuscles of air*; yet the weight, or pressure of the air, will not explain, nor can be a cause of the coherence of the particles of air themselves. And if the pressure of the aether, or any *subtiler matter than the air*, may unite, and hold fast together the parts of a particle of air, as well as other bodies; yet it cannot make bonds for itself, and hold together the parts that make up every the least corpuscle of that *materia subtilis*. So that the hypothesis, how ingeniously soever explained, by showing, that the parts of sensible bodies [i.e., bodies perceived by our senses] are held together by the pressure of other external insensible bodies [i.e., bodies unperceived by our senses], reaches not the parts of the aether itself; and by how much the more evident it proves, that the parts of other bodies are held together by the external pressure of the aether, and can have no other conceivable cause of their cohesion and union, by so much the more it leaves us in the dark concerning the cohesion of *the parts of the corpuscles of the aether itself; which we can neither conceive without*

*parts, they being bodies, and divisible*; nor yet how their parts cohere, they wanting that cause of cohesion, which is given of the cohesion of the parts of all other bodies. (*Essay* II.xxiii.23, emphasis added)

While the latter part of the above quote again illustrates Locke's belief that our capacity for sensory knowledge is limited, what is notable here is Locke's statement concerning the material presence of the air and of the ether; not only do their corpuscles have the power to affect other bodies, but the very fact that they contain corpuscles (*they being bodies, and divisible*) means that they have materiality.

Yet Locke's belief in the materiality of what we today would consider to be immaterial entities was very much part of the scientific mainstream of the time. Pierre Gassendi argued in the mid-seventeenth century that electrical attraction was due to "certain small *Lines* or *Threads*" which emerge from a rubbed electric body (qtd. in Freudenthal 163). Freudenthal argues that the theory of elastic electrical threads was the most commonly accepted theory of electricity in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, especially in Britain; these electrical threads were seen as material, not metaphorical, and were premised upon an older, Aristotelian conception of unctuous moisture, "an incorruptible fat moisture, which resists evaporation and thus confers cohesion" (165). Descartes believed that a fluid, invisible matter moved around the Earth.<sup>161</sup> Newton argues in the *Principia*, similarly to Locke, that the "crassitude [i.e., crudeness] of the solid particles of the air" creates sound instantaneously (II, 383); he

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<sup>161</sup>Gad Freudenthal, "Clandestine Stoic Concepts in Mechanical Philosophy: The Problem of Electrical Attraction" and Roberto de A. Martins, "Huygen's Reaction to Newton's Gravitational Theory." *Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, Craftsmen and Natural Philosophers in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. J.V. Field and Frank A.J.L. James (Cambridge, England: Cambridge, UP): 161-72 and 203-13.

argues in *Optics* that bodies can change into light and light into bodies (Query 30), and also argues in the *Principia* for yet another type of material presence, similar to Locke's subtle matter:

And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and action of which spirit the particles of bodies attract one another at near distances, and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighboring corpuscles; and light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the command of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things that cannot be explained in few words, nor are we furnished with that sufficiency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates. (III, 549)

By conceiving of a spirit which lies hidden in bodies, and whose power and motion affects the particles of those bodies, yet which, like Gassendi's threads, is also *electric and elastic*, Newton again demonstrates his agreement with the prevalent belief of the time that materiality exists in realms and forms of which we, living on the other side of multiple scientific revolutions, cannot conceive. While the above quotes from both he and Locke demonstrate the also-prevalent belief that those subtler forms of matter exist at the boundaries of what had been revealed by scientific experimentation to

date, and that therefore they perhaps someday might be better understood, it is clear that natural philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries operated within a paradigm which did not include what we conceive today as being the seemingly distinct boundary between the material and the immaterial.<sup>162</sup>

In this paradigm, therefore, tiny bodies, which are material but unperceived by our external senses, are emitted by entities which are themselves material, even if not perceived as such by us (e.g., air). These corpuscles float from those bodies and ultimately press against other bodies. If they press against a sense which is capable of perceiving them, they trigger a process whereby information from that sense travels to the mind, where it becomes a simple idea (i.e., the process of sensation); such simple ideas are then transformed by the mind into our complex ideas of the world, enabling us to know, in its multiple qualities, the body from which those corpuscles were emitted. If they press against other bodies (i.e., any body other than our own), they interact with that body in such a way that we can observe their effects, and thereby can scientifically conclude and calculate their existence.

Clearly, Locke builds his sensational psychology in significant part upon corpuscular theory, combining it and nerve theory to create his epistemological paradigm. Utilizing the principles of these two scientific modes of inquiry, he argues that our identities and our societies are created through two interlocking mechanisms: (1) bodily interactions with the external world, including the expansive conception of materiality posited by corpuscular theory, in conjunction with (2) the internal bodily processes which occur as a result of such aforementioned interactions, as detailed by

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<sup>162</sup>See also R.W. Home, "Newton's Subtle Matter: The *Opticks* Queries and the Mechanical Philosophy." In Field and James, fn. #5: 193-202.

nerve theory, and which culminate in the activities of the understanding. Hutcheson, in turn, elaborates upon Locke's model in order to argue for a different conception of moral human nature than Locke's rationally-based one posits. Building upon the premises of corpuscular theory, Hutcheson utilizes that eighteenth-century conception of materiality to claim that beauty and morality are qualities and therefore are perceived by specific senses; building upon nerve theory, he argues that those aforementioned senses transmit information to the mind about each of those two qualities through the process of sensation (i.e., through the nerves and animal spirits) that Locke had delineated, and that that information then becomes a simple idea. He therefore utilizes the precepts of the emerging new science to construct a radically different conception of morality and of human nature.

As I discussed in Chapter Two, the emergence of what we now know as the Scottish Enlightenment was due in significant part to the scientific inquiries and endeavors of a small number of Scottish *virtuosi* who participated in the transnational intellectual networks through which natural philosophers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries exchanged ideas, manuscripts, friendships and rivalries. I also discussed how the religious conflicts at the University of Glasgow need to be seen, in part, as an outgrowth of the influence of this emerging new science on that university's curriculum, as well as of the interplay between science and politics that was a significant element of the expanding administrative British state. While Hutcheson, unlike Locke, was not a natural philosopher, he was a key member of the modernizing faction at Glasgow; in fact, his *Logicae Compendium*, a handbook most likely compiled by him for his students at his dissenting academy in Dublin, specifically names Newton, Galileo, Kepler, Bacon, Descartes and Locke as men who have made significant contributions to

human knowledge (Winkler "Hutcheson and Hume," 10). Clearly, Hutcheson knew about, admired and was a follower of this new science and of its underlying philosophical and methodological principles; indeed, as I shall examine in Chapter Five, the mathematical formulas that he creates in the *Inquiry*'s second treatise to quantify the amount of benevolence in any given action are themselves rooted in that natural philosophic tradition of attempting to measure the operations of occult forces which cannot be directly observed.

Since materiality was conceptualized differently in the early eighteenth century than it is today, and since the natural philosophers whom Hutcheson most admired stated definitively that much about it was not yet understood, it is then perfectly reasonable for Hutcheson to argue that beauty and virtue are qualities, not ideas. Furthermore, given that premise, it is logical to argue that as their materiality is not perceived by any of the five known external senses, and as specific types of qualities can be perceived only by specific senses, there must be additional senses which perceive each of those material entities. In Chapter Three I discussed the history of the internal senses, and their capacity for perceiving internal states (e.g., intention). In arguing that beauty is a manifestation of the intention behind God's design and that morality, as "beauty of action" (106), is a manifestation of the intention behind that action rather than a manifestation of its results, Hutcheson therefore signals his acceptance of the emerging new science,<sup>163</sup> his perception of his philosophical inquiry as participating in the expansion of human

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<sup>163</sup>In its "design theory," it parallels Newton's that "[t]his most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful Being" (*Principia* 544)—i.e., that our solar system is a manifestation of God's intention.

knowledge that was a crucial element of that endeavor,<sup>164</sup> and his participation in that longstanding tradition of the perceptive powers of the internal senses, especially the capacity to perceive intention.

Hutcheson's innovation is to bring to bear on Lockean epistemology the belief regarding the operations of the internal senses and the material premises of corpuscular theory to argue that the manifestation of this intention (i.e., the beauty or the morality) is not simply the recognition of an internal state but, rather, is the perception of a material quality, which in turn then produces a simple idea. Such a perception, of course, can only occur by a sense, not by the mind. Thus, his schema builds upon the emerging scientific conceptions of the external world to increase the number and kind of material qualities in that world while simultaneously utilizing nerve theory to increase the number of senses in the body. He therefore maintains the relationship between the body and mind delineated by Lockean sensational psychology while expanding the perceptive powers of the body.

Ultimately, Hutcheson reconfigures the body in two significant ways. First, he add two new senses to it, as only senses can perceive material qualities, and none of the known existing external senses perceive either the quality of beauty or the quality of morality. Secondly, he highlights the power of emotion to our understanding of morality,

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<sup>164</sup>In his Preface to the second edition, Hutcheson states: "In the former Edition of this Book there were some Mistakes in one or two of the Instances borrowed from other *Sciences*, to a perfect Knowledge of which the Author does not pretend . . . (xxiii, emphasis added). Clearly, Hutcheson's use of the word "other" indicates his perception of his work as a science; while it is tempting to see in his usage of that term an early manifestation of what Hume would call "moral science," it is just as likely that it is instead a manifestation of Hutcheson's perception of his allegiance with natural philosophers, such as Newton, whose work, based upon the Baconian method, was expanding the parameters of human knowledge.

delineating the affections as the physiological response of the moral sense to moral qualities. His major contribution is to conceive of a restructured body, what I call the *affective body*, which operates through the same epistemological principles as does the Lockean rational body but which has the power to shape our moral capacity, a power which Locke had attributed solely to rational mind. Consequently, in Hutcheson's paradigm, the body, rather than the mind, is central to human nature and to human communal formation.

I shall demonstrate in the rest of this chapter how Hutcheson argues that we come to moral knowledge through feeling, not through thought—i.e., through the operations of this affective body. But it is important to state here that such a paradigm means that his argument concerning the scope of the body's active powers is not simply an analogical metaphor, as critics generally assume. Rather, it builds upon the premises of nerve theory and corpuscular theory to explain the sensational processes of the internal sense of beauty and of the internal moral sense, each of which are located in the heart and each of which respond emotionally to the qualities that they, and only they, are capable of perceiving. Hutcheson's affective body, therefore, is based upon then-current constructions of the materiality of the external world—a materiality which exists, in part, in realms beyond the perceptive powers of our five known external senses—in order to expand the capacities of our bodies to interact with that world.

Furthermore, as corpuscular theory argues that all bodies, including our own, emit tiny particles of matter which are, in effect, tiny particles of themselves, it ultimately posits that all bodies, including our own, while seemingly discrete, are actually less so, for in the end they exist, in part, in spaces that are beyond what appear to be their actual bodily boundaries. Since these corpuscles cannot be perceived directly but only can be

perceived indirectly (i.e., by their effects) corpuscular theory also posits that all bodies exist, in part, in material realms beyond the direct perceptive powers of the five known external senses. Thus, our bodies, like other bodies, are able to come into contact with, and affect, other bodies in ways that are beyond the direct perceptive powers of those senses—i.e., our bodies, like other bodies, have occult powers.

Yet these corpuscles do not just float freely; for example, Boyle and Newton, among others, argue that each body attracts corpuscles of some bodies while repelling those of others. As I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, Hutcheson utilizes this theory of corpuscular attraction to argue that the affective body, like any other type of body, also has attractive powers which operate within the parameters of those same occult principles: affective bodies draw other such bodies to them, and those bodies consequently exist in affective relations to each other, touching each other, even entering into each other, through the power of benevolence to create an interlocking nexus of bodies exchanging pieces of themselves upon which Hutcheson constructs his notion of affective communities.

#### Treatise I: The Internal Sense of Beauty

Since Hutcheson builds his moral argument upon his construction of the affective body, and since he conceives of that body's functions through the paradigm of Lockean epistemology, he logically begins delineating its operations and parameters in the *Inquiry's* first treatise, laying there the groundwork for his subsequent, and significantly more detailed, treatment of that body in the second treatise. As I have noted, he begins the book by arguing for the existence of an internal sense of beauty, a claim which is crucial to his moral philosophy; morality (or virtue), he states, is "Beauty in Actions and

Affections" (xv), and he subsequently builds upon that internal sense of beauty his case for the existence of the internal moral sense.

But in order to make such assertions, he also must prove the existence of the material qualities of beauty and morality, respectively, for if such qualities do not exist, there is nothing for those internal senses to perceive. Therefore, after establishing the Lockean basis for his moral theory at the beginning of the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson continues by distinguishing beauty from the perceptions of the five known external senses. He points out that the senses of seeing and hearing, the two external senses most closely associated with beauty (e.g., we see beautiful vistas or hear beautiful music) do not actually perceive beauty, which he defines as "the idea raised in us" (7). Rather, he argues, those two senses perceive other aspects of the external world. Standing on the top of a hill, for example, enables one to see a great distance, but the sense of sight does not make that view beautiful. We must, therefore, have a distinct sense of beauty, what he calls: "[O]ur power of receiving this idea" (7).

However, Hutcheson further states that we also can perceive beauty in theorems, in universal truths, in general causes and in some principles of action (i.e., in mathematics, philosophy, religion and science). Certainly, none of these realms are ones that we today would call material. Yet he claims that each of them contains beauty and that that beauty is perceived by a sense—a process which, according to Lockean epistemology, occurs only with qualities, which by their very nature *are* material. Furthermore, this beauty is not perceived by any of the known external senses, so there must be an additional sense which perceives it. What becomes clear, then, is that Hutcheson extends his argument about beauty into the occult realm of materiality that

Locke, Boyle, Newton and other natural philosophers noted existed beyond the direct perceptive capacities of the five known external senses.

Consequently, even though Hutcheson here refers to the idea of beauty as both internal *and* as external to us—the latter, of course, being what Locke would refer to as a *quality*—he clearly distinguishes between the perceptions of the external senses and the existence of beauty; on the basis of that distinction, he begins his argument for the existence of the internal sense of beauty. Yet despite that linguistic unclarity, the very language he uses to make that distinction alludes to the exact process by which sensory perceptions of external qualities are sent to the mind and there turned into simple ideas. While he does not here use the term *simple idea*, but rather the term *idea*, and furthermore, as I noted, uses that term to denote both what Locke would call an *idea* and a *quality*, Hutcheson repeats the same terminology that he used at the beginning of the treatise when he discusses that process of perception within the framework of Lockean epistemology, making clear that he continues to utilize that epistemology to build his argument here, even if he sometimes does not follow Locke's exact language.

As I noted in the previous section, Hutcheson begins the *Inquiry* by stating that sensations are ideas which are "raised in the Mind" (1) by the presence of external objects, and that senses are "the Powers of receiving . . . Perceptions" (2). To then here define beauty as "the idea raised in us" (7) echoes exactly the language he used six pages earlier to describe sensation, the process by which external qualities become internal simple ideas, implying quite strongly that he conceives of beauty as becoming known through that process. Similarly, stating that the sense of beauty is the "power [to] receiv[e] this idea," while seemingly implying that ideas, not qualities, are external to us, also echoes his earlier definition of a sense: the power in the body to receive a perception

of (i.e., to perceive) something that is outside the body. As qualities, not ideas, are external to us and, hence, are perceived by the senses, the implication is that Hutcheson, despite his language, conceives of beauty as a quality in external objects (which then becomes the simple idea), for it is only through the senses that we can receive (or perceive) such qualities in and of the world, and it is qualities, not ideas, which exist in that world. Indeed, as I shall discuss below, this implication becomes explicit when Hutcheson *does* state that beauty is a quality. Here, though, he at least strongly signals his extension of Lockean epistemology to our concept of beauty, even if his language is a bit slippery; he simultaneously begins to define beauty in a way that is different from Locke's definition of it.

Ultimately, Hutcheson argues that while our external senses can provide us with precise knowledge about the outer dimensions and measurements of the material world, it is only our sense of beauty which allows us to know other aspects of that world:

Our External Senses may by measuring teach us all the Proportions of Architecture to the Tenth of an Inch, and the Situation of every Muscle in the human Body; and a good Memory may retain these: and yet there is still something further necessary, not only to make a man a complete Master in *Architecture, Painting* or *Statuary*, but even a tolerable Judge in these Works; or capable of receiving the highest Pleasure in contemplating them. Since then there are such different Powers of Perception, where what are commonly called the *External Senses* are the same; since the most accurate knowledge of what the External Senses discover, often does not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony, which yet one of a *good Taste* will enjoy at once without much *Knowledge*; we

may justly use another Name for these higher, and more delightful Perceptions of Beauty and Harmony, and call the *Power* of receiving such Impressions, an *Internal Sense*. (10-11)

Thus, he states that beauty is distinct from exterior structure or design. As such, it is the same quality across entities, just as the quality of color is the same whether that color appears on a couch or a skyscraper. Consequently, as our external senses perceive qualities in the external world without any assistance from our rational functions, so too does our internal sense of beauty. For example, we feel the heat of a fire with no knowledge of the principles of combustion or of the financial gains to be had if we corner the market on firewood; similarly, the pleasure that we receive from this internal sense of beauty "does not arise from any knowledge of principles, proportions, causes, or of the usefulness of the object" (11) nor is it influenced by any "prospect of advantage or disadvantage" (11). Like the operations of the external senses, the sense of beauty functions distinct from knowledge and from interest. It is a physiological response to something which is external to us; like other such sensational responses, it leads to the formation of a simple, not a complex, idea.

Additionally, as the above quote indicates, Hutcheson equates beauty with pleasure and delight. This equation is significant for two reasons. First, his argument that objects seem advantageous to us because we perceive them as being beautiful, rather than the other way around as is often supposed, clearly follows Locke's precept that our bodies respond favorably to pleasure and are averse to pain. The sense of beauty responds to objects from which the beauty emanates by initiating a physiological process through which we feel good; due to that pleasure, we desire to have more of such objects or to be around them more or we simply desire them more. The desire, though, stems

from the beauty; the beauty does not stem from the desire. The beauty, and our bodily response to it, makes us want, or want to be around, that object through no function of will; our desire does not stem from intention or mind, but instead is rooted in bodily operations and therefore is disinterested.

Hutcheson thus uses Locke's epistemology to argue against Locke's notion that beauty is a complex idea formed by the understanding based upon a rational calculation of our interest. He instead argues that it is a simple idea based upon the perception of the beauty by the sense of beauty prior to the formation of interest—indeed, that that interest is based upon the perception of beauty and the formation of that idea. He even argues that such a physiological response to beauty, and our consequent desire to be around it, is part of God's larger design: God implanted our internal sense of beauty in us, an act which demonstrates His benevolence, for only a kind God would design our bodies for the reception of pleasure from beautiful objects. Consequently, our sense of beauty is a manifestation of God's intention, a paradigm which, as I shall discuss below, parallels other intentional aspects of Hutcheson's divine creation regarding beauty and our perception of it.

However, it is not enough for Hutcheson to state that beauty is a distinct simple idea which is the end result of our perception of beauty; he must demonstrate the existence of the material quality of beauty. If there is no such quality, there is nothing for the internal sense of beauty to perceive nor is there any such simple idea; indeed, his conception of God's design demands that beauty be a quality. And Hutcheson does state just that. Yet he seems to vacillate as to whether it is a primary or a secondary quality; prior to defining what constitutes the quality of beauty, he first states that beauty is a

quality, and seemingly states also that it is a secondary quality, utilizing the exact criteria by which Locke defines such qualities:

Only let it be observ'd, that by *Absolute* or *Original* Beauty, is not understood any Quality suppos'd to be in the Object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any Mind which perceive it: For Beauty, like other Names of sensible Ideas, properly denotes the *Perception* of some Mind; so *Cold, Hot, Sweet, Bitter*, denote the Sensations in our Minds, to which perhaps there is no resemblance in the Objects, which excite these Ideas in us, however we generally imagine that there is something in the Object just like our Perception. (14, emphasis in original)

Yet Hutcheson then states that, "The Ideas of Beauty and Harmony being excited upon our *Perception* of some *primary Quality*, and having relation to *Figure* and *Time* [which Locke states are primary qualities], may indeed have a nearer resemblance to Objects, than these Sensations, which seem not so much any *Pictures* of Objects, as *Modifications* of the Perceiving Mind" (15, emphasis in original). Beauty, then, in Hutcheson's conception of it, seems to exist somewhere between Locke's construct of primary and secondary qualities; it has materiality, as do all qualities, but of some perhaps not quite determined type. This unclarity may be linked to its status as an occult quality, or it may be because it is the manifestation of an internal quality rather than of an external one.

It is clear, however, that beauty is not the result of the actions or powers of the mind, but, like all qualities, has a distinct and independent existence:

Since it is certain that we have *Ideas* of Beauty and Harmony, let us examine what *Quality* in Objects excites these Ideas, or is the occasion

of them. And let it be here observ'd, that our Inquiry is only about the *Qualitys* which are beautiful to *Men*; or about the Foundation of their Sense of Beauty: for, as was above hinted, Beauty has always relation to the *Sense* of some Mind; and when we afterwards shew how generally the Objects which occur to us, are *beautiful*, we mean that such Objects are agreeable to the Sense of *Men*: for as there are not a few Objects, which seem no way beautiful to Men, so we see a variety of other *Animals* who seem delighted with them; they may have *Senses* otherwise constituted than those of Men, and may have the Ideas of Beauty excited by Objects of a quite different Form. (16, emphasis in original)

Referencing specifically, rather than indirectly as he had done previously, the Lockean concept that external qualities are perceived by our senses and are transformed by our minds into simple ideas, Hutcheson thereby ascribes materiality to beauty; such materiality, however, occurs not from his use of the term *objects*, for he has already referred to, and will later discuss, beauty in theorems and philosophical principles, but from his use of the term *quality*. He therefore makes explicit that which was initially implicit: that there is a quality in the external world which is perceived by our sense of beauty. As it is a quality, it must have material existence, or it would not be so perceived. Indeed, Hutcheson makes clear that his argument is based upon the accepted paradigm that human knowledge is not just based upon, but is defined by and limited to, that which is perceived by our senses. There may well be additional qualities in the world which are beautiful to animals, but those qualities exist beyond the perceptive power of our sense of beauty. We perceive how animals react to them, and like other

occult qualities we therefore indirectly know that they exist, but they do not add to our own experience of the beauty in the world.

Finally, after stating explicitly that there is a quality which is perceived by the internal sense of beauty, Hutcheson defines it as uniformity amidst variety. It is this which we perceive in sunsets, in theorems, in a pleasing vista or building. Thus, beauty is not something multifaceted which is subjectively different for everyone but, like all qualities, is instead something singular which is objectively the same for everyone. Consequently, as other qualities can be scientifically measured, so too can it; beauty is "a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Variety*: so that where the *Uniformity* of Bodies is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the *Variety* is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity*" (17).

Hutcheson then gives several examples, in several different realms (e.g., geometry, buildings, nature), of how what he calls the mathematical basis of uniformity amidst variety operates; while he does not here create mathematical formulas, as he does in the second treatise when discussing the quantity of morality contained within any action, it is clear that he is claiming that his philosophic inquiry can meet the scientific standards used by the natural philosophers of his time whom he admires. As beauty is a quality, as all qualities are material, and as material qualities can be measured and quantified, so too, Hutcheson argues, can the quality of beauty.

But Hutcheson does not draw solely from contemporary natural philosophy to argue for the existence of the quality of beauty. He draws as well upon the conception of the internal senses first delineated by Avicenna, which I discussed in Chapter Three; they have the power to perceive intention, and do not stem from the rational processes of reason. The quality of beauty, he claims, is the result of intention—primarily, but not

exclusively, of God's intention. He spends many pages arguing that the beauty we perceive in the world is the execution of God's benevolent design, stating for example:

And therefore the Beauty apparent to us in *Nature*, will not of itself prove *Wisdom* in the *Cause*, unless this *Cause*, or Author of *Nature* be supposed Benevolent; and then indeed the Happiness of Mankind is desirable or *Good* to the Supreme Cause; and that Form which pleases us, is an Argument of his *Wisdom*. And the Strength of this Argument is increased always in proportion to the Degree of *Beauty* produc'd in *Nature*, and expos'd to the View of any *rational Agent*; since upon supposition of a *benevolent* Diety, all the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give him the Pleasures of *Beauty*. (67, emphasis in original)

In other words, Hutcheson argues that the beauty of the world is a reflection of God's benevolence. Elsewhere, he argues that we receive pleasure from perceiving uniformity because God has designed us to do so; other animals may perceive uniformity, but not receive pleasure from that perception. Thus, God has created a world which exhibits the beauty of His design, and has created us so that we receive pleasure from perceiving it; our constitution, just like the constitution of the external world, is a reflection of God's intention and of its goodness:

This *Beauty* arising from Correspondence to *Intention*, would open to curious Observers a new Scene of *Beauty* in the Works of Nature, by considering how the *Mechanism* of the various Parts known to use, seems adapted to the Perfection of that Part, and yet in Subordination to the Good of some *System* or *Whole*. We generally suppose the Good of

the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the Author of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any part of this *Design* executed in the *Systems* we are acquainted with. (45-6, emphasis in original)

Such an equation of beauty with intention is crucial to Hutcheson's argument about the material quality of beauty and about the reality of the existence of the internal sense of beauty (and, by extension, of the internal moral sense). Indeed, one could even say that the very existence of our internal sense of beauty is also the manifestation of intention, since, as I noted earlier in this section, Hutcheson argues that it was placed in us by God so that we could receive pleasure from our perception of beauty. Beauty, then, is a system in which the perception, the quality, and the perception of the quality are all a result of God's design, a reflection of His benevolent intention to enable us to enjoy disinterestedly the world in which we live. As this is, of course, the world that He created, the system of beauty is very much like the system of gravity; both are manifestations of God's intentional design, the experience and knowledge of which give us pleasure.

Yet while Hutcheson clearly draws upon the tradition of internal senses, he does not simply apply that tradition here, but instead updates it to meet the parameters and requirements of the new science. Unlike earlier conceptions of those senses' perceptive powers, Hutcheson ascribes to the perceived beautiful entity a materiality which earlier theorists of the internal senses did not; he is quite clear that beauty is a quality, not simply a state, even if it does not fit exactly into the Lockean schema of primary and secondary qualities. Thus, the quality of beauty, which is uniformity, is the external

manifestation of that intention. As such, it has material existence and, like other material qualities, is perceived through the corpuscular process:

But in all these Instances of *Beauty* let it be observ'd, That the Pleasure is communicated to those who never reflected on this general Foundation; and that all here alleg'd is this, "That the pleasant Sensation arises only from Objects, in which there is *Uniformity amidst Variety*:" We may have the Sensation without knowing what is the Occasion of it; as a Man's *Taste* may suggest Ideas of Sweets, Acids, Bitters, tho he be ignorant of the *Forms* of the small Bodys, or their Motions, which excite these Perceptions in him." (29, emphasis in original)

Just as qualities are perceived by the external senses through the motions of bodies which are too small to be perceived by those senses (i.e., corpuscles), yet which emanate from those objects to activate the perceptive powers of a particular external sense (e.g., the sense of taste), so too the quality of beauty is perceived by the internal sense of beauty in that same fashion, whether or not one is aware of the dynamics of that corpuscular/sensory process. The quality of beauty emits corpuscles which enable the entity emitting those small bodies to be perceived by us as beautiful. Hutcheson, therefore, argues that intention is a quality with the corpuscular materiality that all qualities have. Although an internal quality, intention manifests itself materially as beauty. It is perhaps even possible to say that intention is a primary quality while beauty is a secondary quality for, as I shall demonstrate in the next section of this chapter, Hutcheson argues that morality itself is defined by intention. Both beauty and morality stem from intention; it is the perception of the latter which enables us to know the former.

Thus, Hutcheson's paradigm, like Locke's, exists at the nexus of corpuscular theory and the new science of the human body. He uses Locke's physiological model that there are no innate ideas but that we learn about the world from our experience of it to argue that there is an internal sense of beauty which operates through that same paradigm by which the external senses operate. This internal sense of beauty "no more presupposes an innate idea, or principle of knowledge, than the external [senses]" (82); it is, quite simply, a part of each of our bodies. Beauty is a quality perceived by a sense whose operations are part of the building blocks upon which our individual natures, indeed human societies, are formed, not a complex idea formed through custom or education.

In fact, Hutcheson claims that custom builds upon the bodily sensations that this sense of beauty provides us; it does not create bodily sensations independent of it:

Were our *Glands* and the Parts about them void of Feeling, did we perceive no Pleasure from certain brisker Motions in the *Blood*, *Custom* could never make stimulating or intoxicating Fluids or Medicines agreeable, when they were not so to the Taste: So by like Reasoning, had we no *natural Sense of Beauty* from *Uniformity*, *Custom* could never have made us imagine any *Beauty* in Objects; if we had had no *Ear*, *Custom* could never have given us the Pleasures of *Harmony*.  
When we have these *natural Senses* antecedently, *Custom* may make us capable of extending our Views further, and of receiving more complex Ideas of *Beauty* in Bodys, or *Harmony* in Sounds, by increasing our Attention and quickness of Perception. (89, emphasis in original)

Custom, he argues, can only work with the body's structure; it cannot create sensations which do not already exist in the body or which the body cannot feel, nor can it implant in us ideas which have no basis in the experience of the senses. It is, therefore, similar to education, which "never makes us apprehend any qualities in objects, which we have not *naturally* senses capable of perceiving (91, emphasis in original). This is as true for the operations of the internal sense of beauty as it is for the operations of any of the external senses. For, as Hutcheson makes clear, pleasure, which is the response of the body to the perception of beauty, quickens the blood, stimulates glands to secretion (88). It acts upon the body, but does so after the internal sense of beauty perceives the quality and sends the information to the mind, just as the external senses do; the mind, in turn, processes that information, and as it does with the information from those external senses, sends ideas back out to the body, which responds accordingly.

Hutcheson does not state how information gets transmitted from the sense of beauty to the rest of the body, nor does he discuss the role of the mind in the process of knowing beauty; that is, while he consistently reiterates that beauty is not a complex idea, he does not eliminate the mind from his sensational paradigm. It is, therefore, quite possible that the internal sense of beauty perceives the external quality and then transmits that information to the mind just as the external senses transmit the information resulting from their perceptions. Indeed, as he is using Locke's sensational psychology to argue for the existence of the internal sense of beauty, and arguing also that this internal sense operates in the same manner as do the external senses, it is reasonable to assume that he accepts the tenets of nerve theory upon which Lockean epistemology is based. He certainly does not argue against it, nor does he propose a different mechanism whereby such a transmission could occur. Although Hutcheson's task clearly is philosophic rather

than scientific (i.e., he is not writing to prove that nerve theory is accurate or inaccurate but to argue that we are inherently benevolent), because he so carefully foregrounds the operations of the bodily senses, and because he likewise so carefully delineates his substantial agreement with the sensational structure of Lockean physiology in order to be able to provide the basis for his specific disagreement with it, it seems reasonable also that he accepts this newly-emerging conception of the body, and does not discuss it only because he perceives no need to do so.

Indeed, Locke himself rarely mentions nerve theory in the *Essay*, yet intellectual historians would never venture to argue that it is not crucial to his philosophical undertaking. I would propose that his omission is because Locke's purpose, like Hutcheson's, is elsewhere; as Locke makes clear in the *Essay*, he intends to counteract the theory of innate ideas, not to advocate for the accuracy of Willis' natural philosophy. For as Locke notes in the Introduction to the *Essay*:

This, therefore, being my purpose—to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent;—I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine where in its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon (Introduction).

In fact, while Locke states that the external senses are key to "the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge" (Introduction), he simply does not examine in any detail the process by which they "convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them" (II.i.3). He links each sense to the perception of specific qualities and to the production of specific simple ideas, states that our knowledge of the world is therefore limited to the powers of those senses, and adds that there therefore may well be other aspects of the world which we cannot experience because the five known external senses cannot receive those qualities (a statement which further confirms Locke's agreement with the potential existence of internal senses). Yet rarely does he allude to the physiological process by which those qualities are transmitted from the senses to the understanding, by which the understanding produces the simple ideas, or by which simple or complex ideas are transmitted from the understanding to the body.<sup>165</sup> Given his focus, this omission is

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<sup>165</sup>One such allusion occurs in Book II, Chapter III, "Of Simple Ideas of Sense," where Locke notes, "And if these organs, or the nerves which are the conduits to convey them from without to their audience in the brain—the mind's presence-room (as I may so call it) . . ." (II.iii.1). Two others occur in Book II, Chapter VIII, "Some Further Considerations Concerning Our Simple Ideas of Sensation":

If it were the design of my present undertaking to inquire into the natural causes and manner of perception, I should offer this as a reason why a privative cause might, in some cases at least, produce a positive idea; viz. that all sensation being produced in us only by different degrees and modes of motion in our animal spirits, variously agitated by external objects, the abatement of any former motion must as necessarily produce a new sensation as the variation or increase of it; and so introduce a new idea, which depends only on a different motion of the animal spirits in that organ. (II.viii.4)

If then external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas therein; and yet we perceive these original qualities in such of them as singly fall under our senses, it is evident that some motion must be thence continued by our nerves, or animal spirits, by some parts of our

understandable; his concern is with the relationship between the senses, the understanding and the external world, not with nerve theory.

Yet it is fully accepted that nerve theory underlies Locke's entire philosophical formulation.<sup>166</sup> He consistently reiterates that the mind receives information about the external world from the five known external senses, that it processes that information, and that as a result of such processing it develops our ideas of the world, a proposition which is only possible if there is some way to transmit such information within the body. Since he does not go into detail about that transmission process, it seems clear that he is not putting forth some new concept about it nor is he arguing against some already-existing one. Rather, in consonance with his social and intellectual networks and influences, and with his medical training, he assumes the validity of nerve theory and of the consequent physiological processes that it delineates, makes occasional allusions to it, as would be expected if it were a given, and proceeds to construct his new philosophy upon that underlying assumption.

Hutcheson, like Locke, also makes clear that his purpose is to argue morality, not human physiology, and then makes clear as well that he is arguing for a morality which is based upon the physiological processes of the human body as delineated by Locke; consequently, there is no reason to assume that his silence about nerve theory means

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bodies, to the brains or the seat of sensation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness, may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion; which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.  
(II.viii.12)

<sup>166</sup>See, e.g., Rousseau, "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibers," Ch. 3, fn. #11, Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, Ch. 1, fn. #38, and Alexander, *Ideas, Qualities and Corpuscles*, fn. #3.

anything different than does Locke's, especially since Hutcheson clearly is capable of arguing against anyone with whom he disagrees. Furthermore, if Hutcheson was not only rejecting the belief that beauty is a complex idea formed by the operations of the understanding, but was rejecting also Locke's physiological model of the senses, what would be gained by not detailing an alternative model by which such an internal sense would work, especially as it was accepted that internal senses existed? Do internal senses operate through different physiological principles than external senses do? If so, then Hutcheson would need to detail what those principles are in order to make his schema plausible. His silence in that regard, indeed his entire sensational schema, indicates that they do not. While Hutcheson did not have Locke's medical training, he clearly was informed about early-eighteenth-century natural philosophy, and thus was knowledgeable enough to build upon Locke's already-delineated premises.

Alternatively, if the internal sense of beauty is only *like* a sense rather than actually *being* one, as critics of Hutcheson's work have argued, there would be no bodily basis for it to operate in the way that it does; the very epistemology that Hutcheson accepts means that we can only perceive those aspects of the external world for which we have corresponding senses. If the sense of beauty is only metaphorical, then there is no power of perception, and Hutcheson cannot make his argument for the inherent benevolence of human nature, for that benevolence, which, in Hutcheson's construction, is dependent upon human physiology, would itself be only analogical, as would the benevolence of the God who designed the system. Consequently, and given especially that eighteenth-century conceptions of the body and of materiality were different from our contemporary ones, it stands to reason that Hutcheson conceives of the sense of beauty as a real sense, not as an analogy for one.

Yet it does seem striking that Hutcheson barely indicates where in the body he believes this internal sense of beauty is located. If it is a real sense, it obviously needs to be somewhere, and he seemingly weakens his argument by not demonstrating conclusively where that is and why he believes that that bodily location is accurate. While Hutcheson, in the second treatise, addresses the question of where in the body the moral sense is located in a more detailed fashion, his discussion of that issue in the first treatise is minimal.

Only on two occasions does he suggest a bodily location for the sense of beauty. One occurs when discussing the delight that we feel when we perceive the uniformity at the core of scientific theorems. Hutcheson states that that delight "may really be call'd a kind of *Sensation*" (36, emphasis in original), and contrasts that sensation to intellectual knowledge:

And however Knowledge enlarges the *Mind*, and makes us more capable of comprehensive Views and Projects in some kinds of Business, whence *Advantage* may also arise in us; yet we may leave it in the Breast of every Student to determine, whether he has not often felt this Pleasure without any such prospect of Advantage from the Discovery of his *Theorem*. (36, emphasis in original)

Hutcheson in part simply repeats here his earlier argument that interest or advantage stem from the operations of the mind based upon bodily responses to pleasure, and that the pleasure we receive from perceiving beauty operates independently of, indeed prior to, those mental operations. In so doing, he also implicitly distinguishes between physical and intellectual pleasure, reinforcing the earlier distinction he had made between such forms. Similarly, embedded in that distinction is his argument that the

pleasure of beauty, which stems from the internal sense of beauty, is the attainment of God's design, for as I noted, the above passage is preceded by a discussion of the delight we feel upon discovering universal theorems, a delight which Hutcheson argues stems from the operations of the sense of beauty regarding the uniformity of the sciences.

Yet, at the same time, Hutcheson does more, stating that each of us, by consulting our own breasts, can determine whether or not we have felt this pleasure without any idea of advantage. It is in the area of the breast where that pleasure is located, and by noting the bodily response located there, we know whether or not we are in the presence of beauty. The implication, therefore, is that the internal sense of beauty itself is located in the breast.

According to the *OED*, in the eighteenth century the word "breast" had multiple meanings, including "The front of the thorax or chest, the fore-part of the body, lying between the neck and the belly" and "The seat of the affections and emotions; the repository of consciousness, designs, and secrets; the heart; *hence*, the affections, private thoughts and feelings" (emphasis in original). While it is certainly possible that Hutcheson is stating that we can consult the front of our upper bodies to feel that pleasure, such a generalized statement is highly unlikely. As I shall demonstrate, it is much more probable that he is utilizing the second meaning of *breast*: the specific area of the heart.

I discussed in Chapter Three the association of the heart with both religious and secular love and affection, as well as with responses to religious and secular good and evil, a tradition with which Hutcheson, whose father was a Presbyterian minister and who was trained as one himself, would certainly have been quite familiar. While that tradition is extremely important to the physiology of the moral sense, as I shall discuss in the next

section, it is not completely irrelevant here. Pleasure, of course, is different from those emotional responses, but it is not that different. Hutcheson claims that pleasure is how we recognize God's design of the universe and therefore love Him; indeed, he argues in his second treatise that love and affection are pleasurable, and pleasure is the response of the moral sense by which we desire to be in the presence of moral actors.<sup>167</sup> As I noted in Chapter Three, the emotional responses of the heart have long been contrasted to the rational responses of the brain, a contrast that Hutcheson echoes and reinforces here; it is through the heart that we come to know God, and it is through pleasure that we participate in God's plan.

Thus pleasure, Hutcheson notes, is *felt*, and that felt pleasure is in distinct contrast to the "Knowledge that enlarges the *Mind*" (36, emphasis in original). The mind, of course, is where the understanding lies, which is the center of Locke's rationally-based human identity and, according to Locke, where we form our complex ideas of beauty. According to Hutcheson, though, the internal sense of beauty perceives the quality of uniformity amidst variety, and responds to that quality through pleasurable feeling; that feeling is distinct from rational mind, and operates separately from the calculations of interest which that mind makes. Implicit, then, is a physiological paradigm wherein the internal sense of beauty is located in the heart. It, and only it, perceives the uniformity

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<sup>167</sup>On one other occasion in the first treatise Hutcheson uses the word "breast," linking it specifically to morality and presaging his physiology of morality, based in the heart, that is so key to the second treatise:

And further, thro Consciousness of our own State, we are more nearly touch'd and affected by the *imperfect Characters*; and since in them we see represented, in the Persons of others, the *Contrasts* of Inclinations, and the *Struggles* between the Passions of *Self-Love* and those of *Honour* and *Virtue*, which we often feel in our own Breasts. (42, emphasis in original).

that is beauty, which is the manifestation of God's, and sometimes of human, benevolent intention; from that perception, we feel physiological pleasure.

In fact, that relationship between the sense of beauty and the divine is itself suggestive that Hutcheson locates the sense of beauty in the heart; as I discussed in Chapter Three, the spiritual heart is integral to human relations with God and, of course, Hutcheson is quite clear that God has created us with a sense of beauty so that we can respond favorably to His creation. Thus, while the *OED* notes that this meaning of the word "breast" can be figurative or analogical rather than literal, there is no doubt but that Hutcheson is clearly pointing toward the inside of the body, either figuratively or literally. Given the history of the heart, both religious and secular, as a site of love, affection and knowledge, both secular and religious, and given also Hutcheson's association of the sense of beauty with the divine, it is unlikely that his reference here is general or analogical.

Finally, in a discussion later in the first treatise about the role of the internal senses to human life, Hutcheson argues that some of the entities to which they respond can be enjoyed by anyone, regardless of wealth, especially the beauty in nature; other entities, such as music, gardening or painting, need the wealth that enables ownership for a full response to their beauty to occur. But, he states, this distinction is often taken too far, "And there are some confus'd *Imaginations*, which often lead us to pursue *Property*, even in Objects where it is not necessary to the true Enjoyment of them" (98); this false distinction is often the ultimate motive of pursuing wealth. He then continues:

This is confirm'd by the constant Practice of the very Enemies to these *Senses*. As soon as they think they are got above the *World*, or extricated from the Hurrys of *Avarice* and *Ambition*; banished *Nature*

will return upon them, and set them upon Pursuits of *Beauty* and *Order* in their *Houses, Gardens, Dress, Table, Equipage*. They are never easy without some degree of this; and were their Hearts open to our View, we should see *Regularity, Decency, Beauty*, as what their Wishes terminate upon, either to themselves or their Posterity; and what their Imagination is always presenting to them as the possible Effects of their Labours.

(98, emphasis in original)

Here, perhaps most specifically, Hutcheson locates the sense of beauty in the heart. While it is, of course, possible that his statement is meant to be metaphorical rather than literal, the then-current discourse of internal senses makes that highly unlikely. Furthermore, Hutcheson's allusion to the practice of dissection ("were their Hearts open to our View"), an allusion which reinforces his awareness of, and utilization of, scientific practices of the time, supports that literal interpretation. The heart, and the body of which it is part, in his philosophical paradigm truly does feel and respond to beauty.

This is, however, the only occurrence in the first treatise of the word *heart*, and the word *breast* only occurs twice. Any arguments about the location of the internal sense of beauty, therefore, must be tentative, as Hutcheson simply does not provide enough information to locate it with absolute certainty. Yet that very lack of concrete information is itself suggestive. As with his lack of discussion of nerve theory, it is likely that Hutcheson does not provide further evidence of the location of the internal sense of beauty because he does not feel the need to do so; he was drawing on an intellectual tradition that was quite well known and accepted at the time.

Furthermore, as I also discussed in Chapter Three, that aforementioned tradition of the heart existed within the context of an additional, and perhaps even more encompassing, philosophical and religious tradition which viewed the human body itself, as well as specific bodily organs, including but not limited to the heart, as the physical home of various aspects of human nature. The body, that is, was not then perceived as the discrete, depersonalized system that much of contemporary Western medicine generally now sees it as being. While the emerging conception of the mechanical body clearly pointed in that direction, in the early eighteenth century, that conception co-existed with other intellectual traditions which instead saw the human body as being metaphysiological, not physiological; indeed, the metaphysiological body was often apparent in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings about the physiological one.

Having said that, it is also important to note that the *Inquiry* was Hutcheson's first book, one in which he was just beginning to work through the ideas which he would continue to develop and refine throughout his academic and philosophical career. Additionally, the first treatise is just one-half the length of the second treatise; while Hutcheson certainly argues quite strenuously for the existence of an internal sense of beauty, it is clear too that such an argument is in many ways a structural and thematic prelude for what he considers to be the more important argument, which he makes in the *Inquiry's* second treatise, that there is an internal moral sense. For it is the moral sense which is the focus of his life's *oeuvre*. Thus, while it is possible, although unlikely, that Hutcheson conceives of the sense of beauty as analogical, or if literal as permeating the entire body the way the sense of touch is located in multiple bodily locations, it is also quite plausible—indeed, potentially more plausible—that Hutcheson intends only to establish in the *Inquiry's* first treatise the parameters by which an internal sense *can*

work, and intends then to specify in greater detail in his second treatise how such an internal sense *does* work, building upon his notion of a quality of beauty, which is perceived by an internal sense, a physiology of morality in which the quality of intention in human action is perceived by yet another internal sense, also located in the heart.

### Treatise II: The Internal Moral Sense

At the outset, it must be stated that while Hutcheson is somewhat more detailed about human physiology in the *Inquiry's* second treatise than he is in the first, he again argues primarily through inference for the material existence of an internal moral sense which responds to the beauty, or lack thereof, in human action. He makes more references to the human heart than he did in the first treatise, and clearly utilizes the same epistemological paradigm through which he theorizes the operations of the affective body. However, he never straightforwardly states that which contemporary scholars seem to want him to state for them to accept that he sees the internal moral sense as a real, physiological sense. Such a rhetorical strategy raises important questions not simply about Hutcheson's moral philosophy, but also about how we, reading it today, can recapture, as fully as possible, the contexts within which he wrote in order to recapture, as fully as possible, his and his contemporaries' understanding of that philosophy. Consequently, it is crucial to examine not only the structure of Hutcheson's argument, but also the ways in which the physiological assumptions upon which it is based influence that structure.

The very first two sentences of his introduction to this second treatise immediately outline the parameters of such a moral physiology, making it evident that he intends to build upon the already-delineated operations of the internal sense of beauty:

The Word Moral Goodness, in this Treatise, denotes our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action.*

Moral Evil, denotes our Idea of *a contrary Quality, which excites Aversion, and dislike toward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern'd in its natural Tendency.* (111, emphasis in original)

Clearly, Hutcheson here signals his intention to continue to work within the framework of Lockean epistemology. Moral goodness and evil, he states, are ideas formed by the perception of a quality in human actions. By claiming that our ideas of morality stem from a quality, Hutcheson argues that, like our ideas of beauty, they stem from a material entity which is external to us; as such, that entity, by definition, can be perceived only by a sense, not by the mind. Thus, just as there is a sense of beauty which perceives the quality of beauty, from which we then form the idea of beauty, so too there must be a sense which perceives the quality of morality. As with any other sense, whether external or internal, by definition it must respond specifically to the quality which it, and only it, is physiologically capable of perceiving. Furthermore, as the response of each sense is specific to that sense (e.g., the response of the sense of sight is visual, that of the sense of sound is aural), so this sense responds emotionally, producing a feeling of love or aversion, like or dislike, toward the person whose action contains the moral quality of goodness or evil, respectively.

Hutcheson therefore, claims that morality is a quality rather than the complex idea that Locke sees it as being. But as with his argument concerning beauty, in order to disagree with Locke's conception of morality while agreeing with his epistemological paradigm, Hutcheson must prove that such a moral *quality* exists, distinct from us, and

that our perception of it, just like our perceptions of other qualities, is physiological and therefore independent of our will. Only in that way will the moral quality be separate from any "advantage" (i.e., self-interest) we might gain from the action which contains it, and only then will his moral epistemology differ from that of Locke or of Mandeville, both of whom state that self-interest leads to public good.

Hutcheson begins this process in the introduction's second paragraph, immediately following his statement about moral qualities with a statement that our initial response to morality is physiological, not intellectual:

These Descriptions seem to contain an universally acknowledg'd Difference of *Moral Good* and *Evil*, from *Natural*. All Men who speak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures Love toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas *Natural Good* does not. In this matter Men must consult their own Breasts. How differently are they affected toward those they suppose posses'd of *Honesty, Faith, Generosity, Kindness*, even when they expect no Benefit from these admir'd Qualitys; and those who are possess'd of the *natural Goods*, such as *Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sagacity?* We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no Love at all toward the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of *Envy* and *Hatred*. (112, emphasis in original)

Hutcheson, then, distinguishes moral good and evil from natural good and evil on the basis of the response of an observer. As he states in the opening paragraph of this treatise, moral good enables the observer to feel love toward the person who possesses it,

while natural good often makes that observer jealous; as Hutcheson also notes in that opening paragraph, we dislike those who are morally evil. Thus, even though he begins this treatise by discussing the quality of moral actions ("our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions*"), what becomes clear here is that that moral quality, contrary to Locke and Mandeville, while contained in the action, is not perceived in the effects of that action. For rather than stating that the two forms of good always and necessarily produce different results and that that is how we know their difference, or indicating in some other way that the results of actions based upon moral or natural good or evil are the distinguishing factor, Hutcheson instead states that moral and natural good exist in a person (i.e., "possessed of it"), preceding action and presumably independent of it. He states further that such a difference is apparent when we consult our own breasts, echoing language he used in the first treatise concerning the responses and location of the sense of beauty.

As I discussed previously, Hutcheson's reference to the breast can be an allusion, but it is much more likely, indeed highly probable, that he instead refers to the literal place of the heart. Such a literal interpretation is strengthened by Hutcheson's language; we feel love toward those who possess the quality of moral good, we feel envy toward those who possess the quality of natural good, and these emotional feelings are the result of the perception of external qualities. Such an emotional response would be highly unlikely if Hutcheson was referring either to the general area of the thorax or simply speaking figuratively. However, it follows clearly from the longstanding religious and intellectual traditions of the literal organ of the heart that I discussed in Chapter Three: as the site of love, both secular and divine, in the human body and in human experience; as

the organ which responds to religious and secular good and evil; and as the physiological home of envy, lust, jealousy, hatred and other such emotions.

Thus, it is quite reasonable to assume that Hutcheson's use of the word "breast" here and elsewhere in the second treatise means the same thing that his use of it in the first treatise does: the internal place of the heart. When he therefore states that we must consult our own breasts to note the difference in how we respond to moral and natural good, he points to the literal heart as the bodily location to which we must look. His use of the model of sense and sensation implies that those emotional responses, located in the heart, are the end result of a perceptive process by which we recognize the difference between those two qualities.

In fact, when discussing our reaction to the quality of moral evil later in that same paragraph, Hutcheson notes that it "raises our Hatred toward the Person in whom we observe it" (112); he contrasts that reaction to our response to those exposed to natural evils, such as pain or poverty, whom we "*heartily* love, esteem, and pity" (112, emphasis added). Hutcheson's pun, deliberate or not, again illustrates that, as with beauty, by consulting our breast to determine how it is affected (i.e., by acknowledging the emotions that are occurring in our heart), we become aware that our bodies are physiologically providing us with moral information.

Consequently, within the first two paragraphs of this second treatise, Hutcheson uses Lockean epistemology to set himself in opposition to Locke's conception of morality. He states that we come to know morality through an emotional feeling which is located in the heart, rather than through the intellectual processes of the understanding. Applying the Lockean tradition that the senses, not the mind, are the mechanism through which we perceive external qualities, Hutcheson states that morality is a quality external

to the observer, although internal to the actor. As none of the known external senses perceive this moral quality, and as Hutcheson states that it is by the emotional response of the heart that we know whether we are in the presence of the quality of moral or natural good or evil, he in effect implies that the sense which perceives the external quality of morality is itself located in the heart. Furthermore, as each sense has a distinctive response to the perception of the quality that it, and only it, can perceive, this sense's response to the perception of that quality must also be distinctive; as Hutcheson makes clear, that perceptual response is emotion.

This sense is, of course, the moral sense, which Hutcheson names in the first section which follows this treatise's introduction. He begins that section by reiterating, and expanding upon, the distinction he made in that introduction between our responses to natural good and to moral good, stating quite clearly that the difference in those responses stems not from the results of any action but from the intention behind that action:

Suppose we reap the same *Advantage* from two Men, one of whom serves us from *Delight* in our Happiness, and *Love* toward us; the other from Views of *Self-Interest*, or by *Constraint*: both are in this Case equally beneficial or *advantageous* to us, and yet we shall have quite different Sentiments of them. We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions* than those of Advantage . . . (119, emphasis in original)

Thus Hutcheson returns to the revision of the internal sense tradition that he began in the previous treatise. There he had argued that the intention behind beauty is a quality by joining the older premise that intention was a state perceived by an internal

sense to the new knowledge of the human body and of bodily processes developed by nerve theory and by corpuscular theory, as well as to the new, material conception of occult qualities. While he here does not use the term "intention" or "quality" to describe morality, it is clear that, for Hutcheson, morality is perceived not in the results of an action but instead is perceived in the intention with which that action is conducted. As he argues, two different actions from two different people from which we reap equal advantage produce two different "perceptions of moral actions" (119) because of the differing motivation behind each action: delight in our happiness versus self-interest. Our moral perception, then, is not of the result of action but of the motivation behind each action; as it is our senses which perceive, as it is qualities which the senses perceive, and as sensory perceptions are specific and unique to each sense, the implication is that intention is a moral quality which is perceived by a specific sense.<sup>168</sup>

Thus, prior to naming the moral sense per se, Hutcheson defines the parameters of that perceived moral quality. As his above distinction between delight in our happiness and self-interest indicates, he sees the two different intentions behind those equally beneficial actions as the desire to promote public good and the desire to promote private

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<sup>168</sup> Although he does not always do so, Hutcheson does use the word *intention* elsewhere in this treatise when discussing the moral qualities of human actions. See, e.g., "Nay, as was before observ'd, the Actions which in fact are exceedingly useful, shall appear void of *moral Beauty*, if we know they proceeded from no kind Intentions toward others; and yet an unsuccessful Attempt of Kindness, or of promoting *publick Good*, shall appear as amiable as the most successful, if it flow'd from as *strong Benevolence*" (162-63, emphasis in original); "The *moral Beauty* of *Characters* arises from their Actions, or sincere Intentions of the *publick Good*, according to their Power" (191, emphasis in original); and "In short, let us honour other Qualitys [sic] by external Shew as much as we please, if we do not discern a *benevolent Intention* in the Application, or presume upon it; we may look upon these Qualitys [sic] as useful, enriching, or otherwise advantageous to any one who is possess'd of them; but they shall never meet with those endearing Sentiments of *Esteem* and *Love*, which our *Nature* determines us to appropriate to *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*" (229, emphasis in original).

good; the former intention is morally good and the latter intention is not. For his statement that we have a different response to each actor based upon our perceptions of each actor's intentions echoes his previous assertion that, "We are all then conscious of the Difference between that *Love* and *Esteem*, or Perception of *moral Excellence*, which *Benevolence* excites toward the Person in whom we observe it, and that Opinion of *natural Goodness*, which only raises *Desire* of Possession toward the good Object" (118, emphasis in original). In other words, the perception of benevolence (what he then calls "delight in our happiness"), which is the intention to promote public happiness, leads us to respond by feeling love and esteem for the person so perceived. As he states that the response to a self-interested action is different, and sets up self-interest as a direct contrast to that delight or benevolence ("As to the *Love of Benevolence*, the very Name excludes *Self-Interest*" [140]), the implication is that the perception of self-interest leads us to feel something for that person which is the direct contrast of love and esteem.

Hutcheson, then, not only defines morality in opposition to Locke and Mandeville, their definition (i.e., the promotion of self-interest, or private happiness) is, to Hutcheson, the very definition of moral evil. For if benevolence excludes self-interest, and if "Love, or Benevolence, is the Foundation of all apprehended Excellence in social Virtues" (140), then the equation of benevolence with moral good leads to a similar equation of self-interest with moral evil. Indeed, as Hutcheson notes later in that same section, ". . . *Self-Interest* will make us only esteem Men according to the *Good* they do to our *Selves*, and not give us high Ideas of *public Good*, but in proportion to our Share of it" (125, emphasis in original). Clearly there are shades of moral evil, just as there are shades of moral good, but actions taken out of self-interest only make us feel positively

toward the actor when those actions benefit us—i.e., when they appeal to our own self-interest.

Self-interest, in other words, breeds self-interest. However, actions taken out of benevolence make us feel positively toward the actor even when we are not affected by them ("Nay, our *Sense* shall operate even where the *Advantage* to our selves does not hold" [133]). Benevolence, therefore, breeds benevolence. In Hutcheson's schema, actions taken out of self-interest reinforce the actor's and observer's own sense of self, whereas those taken out of benevolence take the actor and the observer out of his or her self. As I shall discuss in Chapter Five, morally good actions break down the boundaries between observer and actor through the affective bonds formed by that love and esteem, while morally evil ones reinforce those boundaries.

Additionally, Hutcheson's statement implies that our moral perceptive abilities extend into the actor's body—indeed, that it is within that body where those moral qualities lie. For in being able to perceive that actor's intention, Hutcheson intimates the possibility that we also perceive the internal bodily processes by which that intention is formed and situated. Love (which is benevolence) clearly is an emotion, and as such is located in the heart, while self-interest is the product of a rational calculation of the mind. Yet each of these intentions forms prior to action, is what initiates that action, and is perceived either when that action is occurring or after it already has occurred. As I also shall discuss in Chapter Five, it is this perceptive power, residing in the heart of the observer, to discern the internal physiology of the actor's intention that Hutcheson argues joins human bodies together into the affective relations which form his the ideal affective community. While human dissection enables the internal perception of a heart that no longer beats, the heart of the observer has the capacity to perceive internally a beating heart.

Consequently, prior to defining this perceptive ability as the moral sense, Hutcheson defines the quality of morality which it perceives as well as the reaction to its perception; this is, of course, the process of sense and sensation. He also locates that perceptive ability in the heart, providing a bodily location to what he then states is "a Determination of the Mind, to receive any Idea from the Presence of an Object which occurs to us, independent on our Will" (119)—i.e., the moral sense. While Hutcheson's language again betrays the unclarity he demonstrated in his definition of the sense of beauty (ideas, after all, in Lockean epistemology are internal, not external, to us), despite that unclarity his definition continues to follow the parameters of Lockean epistemology: (1) that there is an entity external to us which we perceive as morality, and (2) that our perception of this entity's presence occurs without any conscious desire or effort on our part to do so.

Indeed, just prior to that definition of the moral sense Hutcheson makes clear that the process by which the mind receives such an idea is that very process of perception. He states: "We must then certainly have other Perceptions of *moral Actions* than those of *Advantage*: And that Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a Moral Sense" (119, emphasis in original). It is the senses, of course, not the mind, which have the power of perception; equally importantly, Hutcheson's language here echoes the language he used at the very beginning of the *Inquiry*, when he states that sensations are ideas which are "raised in the Mind" (1) by the presence of external objects, and that senses are "the Powers of receiving . . . Perceptions" (2). To then state here that the "Power of receiving these Perceptions may be call'd a Moral Sense" (119) recalls precisely his description at the beginning of the *Inquiry* of the process by which senses perceive external qualities, which then, through the process of sensation, become simple ideas.

What becomes clear, then, is that despite some linguistic unclarity in which he seems to collapse his earlier definitions of sense and of the process of sensation, Hutcheson conceives of morality as a quality which exists in the intention which generates the action; that moral quality is perceived by the moral sense, which then transmits sensory information to the mind, where it becomes a simple idea. In other words, he reiterates for morality and moral perceptions the exact sensory model that he had constructed for the quality of beauty.

Consequently, even though Hutcheson does not state definitively that the moral sense is located in the heart, his statement in the introduction that we know the difference between moral good and evil by consulting our own breasts, followed by his perceptual schema, point to the heart as the home of that sense and, therefore, the repository of our responses to moral qualities (i.e., emotions). Similarly, later in that same first section, he elaborates on his argument that we do not perceive the moral good, or lack thereof, in an action based upon whether or not we gain advantage by that action by citing the difference between our response to the actions of a refugee useful to our country and our response to the actions of a public-spirited burgomaster of a neighboring country (124). This difference, Hutcheson states, becomes apparent when we consult our own breasts (124), echoing exactly the phrasing he used earlier in both this treatise and in the first one that we look inside of ourselves to see our emotional reactions.

Similarly again, later in the second treatise, when discussing the power of oration, Hutcheson claims that "the Passions which the Orator attempts to raise, are all founded on *moral Qualities*" (258, emphasis in original). He states that an orator who represents actions as promoting public good creates a feeling of love and esteem in the audience, while one who represents actions as barbaric or cruel "raise[s] an Abhorrence of it in the

Breasts of the *Audience*, tho they were not the Persons who would have suffer'd by it" (259, emphasis in original). Hutcheson's language here clearly points to the breast as the physiological home of that abhorrence and, by extension, of the love and esteem as well; it is the location of our emotional response to the moral quality of that action. The listeners are able to perceive, and react to, that moral quality even if they are not affected by the action that it produces, because the moral quality exists independent of action; a sense other than the sense of hearing (which perceives only sounds) perceives it, and that sensory perception provides the information for an emotional response. If we "consult our breasts," we can tell what that moral quality is by how we emotionally respond.

As I discussed concerning the physiology of the internal sense of beauty, given that the word "breast" was often used in the early eighteenth century to mean the heart, Hutcheson's continued imperative that we consult our breasts is simply another way of stating that we must pay attention to the different emotional responses to different human actions that we have in our hearts, the physiological home of the emotions. By those responses, which are the product of the perceptions of the moral sense, we know the moral qualities of any action. From that knowledge, we act accordingly. For he states:

[A]s soon as any action is represented to us as flowing from *Love*, *Humanity*, *Gratitude*, *Compassion*, a *Study* of the good of others, and a *Delight* in their Happiness, altho it were in the most distant Part of the World, or in some past Age, we feel Joy within us, admire the lovely Action, and praise its Author. And on the contrary, every Action represented as flowing from *Hatred*, *Delight* in the Misery of others, or *Ingratitude*, raises Abhorrence and Aversion. (121, emphasis in original)

Perception leads to emotion, which leads to action. The perception of moral excellence leads us to praise the person, while the perception of moral evil leads us to stay away from him or her. That distinction between moral good and evil, as Hutcheson again makes clear, is in the intention with which the action is undertaken, not in the results which stem from that action. And that ability to perceive intention is located in the heart.

For unlike the first treatise, Hutcheson in this second treatise does make multiple references to that bodily organ. As he states early in the treatise, when arguing that we do not perceive actions as moral based upon our self-interest:

It is an easy matter for Men to assert any thing in Words; but our own Hearts must decide the matter, "Whether some *moral Actions* do not at first View appear *amiable*, even to those who are unconcern'd in their Influence? Whether we do not sincerely *love* a generous kind *Friend*, or *Patriot*, whose Actions procure *Honour* to him only, without any *Advantage* to our selves?" (132-33, emphasis in original)

Clearly, Hutcheson here argues that it is through the actions of the heart that we can determine the moral qualities of the actor: we feel love toward one whose actions we perceive as morally good even when we do not benefit from those actions (which is his earlier definition of benevolence). The unstated implication, of course, is that the opposite reaction is true for those actors whom we perceive as acting in a morally evil fashion (i.e., through self-interest). Thus, Hutcheson makes similar rhetorical gestures as when he discusses the breast, furthering the implication that he uses those two words interchangeably.

But by saying that "our own Hearts must decide the matter," Hutcheson specifically attributes agency to that organ, for it is through its decision-making powers

that we come to know moral qualities, just as it is through the decision-making powers of other senses that we come to know the qualities that each of them perceive. He is very clear; such decisions are not made in the mind. It is in the heart (or the breast) where we perceive moral qualities to which we respond emotionally; we therefore must consult the heart in order to become cognizant of our emotional responses and to determine their valence. From that consultation, we gain knowledge and then act accordingly, for those emotional responses, and the actions which stem from them, are the end result of the perceptive process initiated by the moral sense. As Hutcheson argues:

Love of *Complacence*, *Esteem*, or *Good-liking*, at first view appears to be *disinterested*, and so the *Hatred* of *Displacence* or *Dislike*; and are entirely excited by some *moral Quality*s, *Good* or *Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects; which *Quality*s the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to *love* or *hate*, to approve or disapprove, according to the *Moral Sense* above explained. (139, emphasis in original)

By stating that such a schema is part of the "frame of our nature," Hutcheson states that it is part of the construction of our bodies. For the *OED* notes that in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the word "frame" meant not only a scheme or system but also had structural connotations, just as it does today: the constitution of the human body or of the heavens, the skeleton of a building. Thus, by stating that the very frame of our nature responds to the qualities of moral good or evil according to the operations of the moral sense, Hutcheson demarcates the operations of the living, breathing human body whose moral sense perceives qualities, and from its perception guides our actions, just as is the case with any other sense and its perceptions. In his physiology the moral sense responds to the moral qualities in objects (i.e., in the actions

of others); based upon its perception of those qualities, we have a corresponding emotion. That emotion, then, is the end result of that sense's perceptive powers, and provides us with moral information through the physiological process of sensation.

That the moral sense is located in the heart, and that this heart is the literal human organ, is reiterated by Hutcheson's subsequent language. He follows the above quote with a discussion of how differently we respond to the actions of another, depending upon the character of that person. He then states:

[R]epresent a Character as *generous, kind, faithful, humane*, tho in the most distant Parts of the World, and we cannot avoid *loving* it with *Esteem*, and *Complacence*. A *Bribe* may possibly make us attempt to ruin such a Man, or some strong Motive of *Advantage* may excite us to oppose his Interest; but it can never make us *hate* him, while we apprehend him as *morally excellent*. Nay, when we consult our own Hearts, we shall find, that we can scarce ever persuade our selves to attempt any Mischief against such Persons, from any Motive of *Advantage*, nor execute it, without the strongest Reluctance, and Remorse, until we have blinded our selves into a bad Opinion of the Person in a *moral Sense*. (139-40, emphasis in original)

Not only does his use of the phrase "consult our own Hearts" echo his earlier language that we must "consult our own Breasts," he also again refers to the agency of human action which is located in the heart. As we love a person who is morally excellent, an emotional response which is predicated upon the perception of that person's character by the moral sense, so we can never act toward that person in a way that is anything other than reflective of that love, even if it is in our own self-interest to act badly toward him or

her, unless our moral sense is blinded to that person's character. Just as the sense of smell, for example, propels us to action if we are in a building and smell fire, so too the moral sense provides sensory information which guides the body and its actions.

Ultimately, then, at the core of Hutcheson's moral philosophy is the human heart, in which the moral sense resides, and through whose emotional responses we know moral qualities. His language, referring both to the specific organ and to the physiological structure of the human body, reinforces the notion that he conceives of that heart and body literally, not figuratively, and that he sees the moral sense as a real sense, with all of the perceptive powers of the external senses and of the internal sense of beauty. In fact, even when he does not refer directly to its operations, the human heart appears as a referent, consistently denoted by him as the emotional home of the human body and, therefore, as the bodily location of the moral sense.

For example, as I noted in Chapter Two and shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five, as part of his efforts to create a sound scientific basis for his moral philosophy Hutcheson famously creates formulas which measure the moral qualities contained in human actions and which thereby measure the operations of the moral sense, providing for it the same calibrations that the scientific method of observation and deduction provides for the operations of any of the external senses. After detailing these formulas, Hutcheson then states, "The sixth Axiom only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge [the moral quality of any action], who do not see into each others Hearts" (186). By this statement he again references the role of intention as the determinant of the moral quality of human action, for it is in the realm of the internal, where the action originates, not of the external, where the results of the action are perceived, that such moral quality lies. Additionally, he again equates that intention, and

that moral quality, with the human heart, the real human heart, which could be "see[n] into" through dissection but which of course cannot be "see[n] into" in living human beings, except, that is, by the moral sense. In fact, in strikingly similar language, he elsewhere states:

In like manner, no good Effect which I did not actually foresee and intend, makes my Action *morally Good*; however *Human Laws* or *Governours*, who cannot search into *Mens Intentions*, or know their secret *Designs*, justly reward Actions which tend to the publick Good, altho the Agent was engag'd to those Actions only by *selfish Views*; and consequently had no virtuous Disposition influencing him to them. (189-90, emphasis in original)

By juxtaposing the repetition of that gesture of the secret internal place, out of human view, where our true intentions lie, and of the heart, which none of our external senses can perceive, what becomes clear is that, in Hutcheson's schema, it is the human heart where the moral qualities (i.e., the intentions) of the actor lie and where the moral sense, and only that sense, can perceive those moral qualities in action.

Hutcheson therefore uses the same epistemological map of the external senses to chart the bodily workings of the internal moral sense as he did with the internal sense of beauty; just as those external senses respond to qualities through bodily sensation, so too the internal moral sense operates on and in the body through this same map:

[T]he Author of Nature has determined us to receive, by our external senses, pleasant or disagreeable ideas of objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our bodies; and to receive from uniform objects the pleasures of beauty and harmony, to excite us to the pursuit of

knowledge, and to reward us for it . . . in the same manner he has given us a moral sense, to direct our actions, and to give us still nobler pleasures; so that while we are only intending the good of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest private good. (134-35)

Reiterating once again that the moral sense is a real sense, Hutcheson also reiterates again the physiology of virtue; through the moral sense's bodily response, we follow God's plan.

In sum, then, the moral sense, located in the heart, operates within the body through the same physiological basis that the external senses do. As the sense of sight allows us to perceive physical objects, as the sense of hearing allows us to perceive sounds, the moral sense allows us to perceive benevolence in human action. As the perceptions of each external sense is unique to that sense, the moral sense's perceptions are unique to it; it operates through the affections—that is, through emotional feeling—which in turn leads to bodily feeling.

Yet there is one particular way in which that physiology of virtue is distinct from other sensory operations: through the operations of pleasure. While I shall discuss those operations in greater detail in Chapter Six, it is necessary to discuss them briefly here, for as we feel pleasure from the perception of beauty—indeed, we know beauty by that pleasure—so too we feel pleasure from the perception of morality. As Hutcheson notes earlier, "The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good*, or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately Good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from *Self-Love*" (113, emphasis in original). Such a statement clearly references Locke's analysis

of pleasure in the *Essay*; our bodies respond to those objects which provide pleasure by desiring them and they respond to those which cause pain by wanting to stay away from them. Hutcheson alludes to that distinction here; those objects which we call naturally good are those which provide us with physiological pleasure, while those which we call naturally evil are those which cause us physiological pain. Natural good therefore stems from the physiological response of physical pleasure, while natural evil stems from the physiological response of physical pain. Our responses to natural good become self-interested when we consciously desire more of those objects which are naturally good in order to feel more of the physiological pleasure that they bring us.

However, moral pleasures are different. Hutcheson makes clear that the pleasure felt by the moral sense is a "durable pleasure" (244) felt in the human heart. When discussing our perceptions of different people, and how perceptions of physical beauty are in many ways dependent upon perceptions of moral beauty, he states that:

This same Consideration may be extended to the whole Air and Motion of any Person. Every thing we count agreeable, some way denotes *Chearfulness, Ease, a Condescension, and Readiness* to oblige, a *Love of Company*, with a *Freedom and Boldness* which always accompanys an *honest, undesigning Heart*. On the contrary, what is shocking in *Air, or Motion*, is *Roughness, Ill-nature, a Disregard* to others, or a *foolish Shame-facedness*, which evidences a Person to be unexperienc'd in *Society, or Offices of Humanity*. (254, emphasis in original)

Here again he repeats his earlier assertion that moral qualities are physiological, only here he locates them in the heart of the actor, a gesture that follows from his earlier implication that intentions are located in that organ. But he then states:

This powerful Determination even to a *limited Benevolence*, and other *moral Sentiments*, is observ'd to give a strong bias [sic] to our Minds toward a *universal Goodness, Tenderness, Humanity, Generosity*, and *Contempt of private Good* in our whole Conduct; besides the obvious Improvement it occasions in our *external Deportment*, and in our relish of *Beauty, Order, and Harmony*. As soon as a Heart, before *hard and obdurate*, is soften'd in this Flame, we shall observe, arising along with it, a Love of *Poetry, Musick*, the *Beauty of Nature* in rural Scenes, a *Contempt* of other selfish Pleasures of the *external Senses*, a *neat Dress*, a *humane Deportment*, a *Delight* in and *Emulation* of every thing which is *gallant, generous and friendly*. (257, emphasis in original)

In Hutcheson's schema, then, the heart of the observer can be affected and changed by the moral qualities of the actor. Once so softened, that heart instinctively delights in the higher pleasures, which are generous and friendly, and instinctively recoils from the lower ones, which are the selfish pleasures of the external senses. Such a change in the heart is only possible if the heart itself contains the power to perceive, and to respond to its reception of those perceptions.

Consequently, there is a clear physiological component to moral pleasure. Yet at the same time, it would be inaccurate to state that moral pleasure is purely physiological, for as the above quote demonstrates, the higher pleasures in part transcend the body. Hutcheson notes, for example, that something distinguishes the pleasure of marriage from simply sensual delights. For the paradox is that although moral pleasure feels good, if we act for the public good simply because of the feeling we get from that moral pleasure, our intention is actually to promote private pleasure (i.e., that pleasurable

feeling) and the moral quality of that intention will be felt accordingly by those who observe our action. In fact, we must do just the opposite. By acting solely for the public good, we feel good and promote our private happiness, but the actor must, in effect, transcend his or her body in order to feel that highest pleasure of the body.

Thus, it is no accident that Hutcheson places great emphasis on the affections, with all of the emotional- and heart-based functions encapsulated in that term, for, as I discussed in Chapter Three, the affections join us with our fellow human beings but also join us with God, who is both within and without our bodies. As I shall discuss in Chapters Five and Six, the affections are the glue which link the body of the actor with the body of the observer. For as Hutcheson points out, "Every Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always suppos'd to flow from some *Affection* toward *Rational Agents*; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *Affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it" (136, emphasis in original). That is, there is a moral aspect to the affections; we respond with love toward one whose intentions are morally good, and with dislike or worse toward one whose intentions are morally evil. By our affectional response, we can consult our heart and know the quality of the morality in our presence.

Although Hutcheson sometimes uses the word "sentiments" rather than "affection," that term simply reinforces his assertion that the result of this moral perception is emotional; the moral sense perceives moral qualities, and through its emotional sensation we recognize the differences in those qualities. For while the *OED* notes that the term "sentiment" had multiple meanings in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, its primary meaning was emotional; even those intellectual thoughts which were termed "sentiments" generally were those which stemmed initially from

emotion rather than from a rational calculation. Furthermore, the term also had a physiological meaning, as in a sensation or a physical feeling. Hutcheson's use of that term, then, again has a bodily connotation, implying that the moral sense is located in the heart, for it is in the heart where sentiments (i.e., emotions) originate and are felt.

Yet, at the same time, as I discussed in the previous section of this chapter, Hutcheson never once definitively states that the moral sense is located in the heart, but instead assumes that location and refers to it throughout his treatise as a given. Numerous critics have argued that this silence indicates that the moral sense is not a real sense. I would argue instead, as I did regarding the location of the sense of beauty, that it indicates that Hutcheson saw no need to make that argument. For as I have already demonstrated, while Hutcheson was clearly extremely influenced by Shaftesbury's moral philosophy, his conception of the powers of the heart went well beyond Shaftesbury's to incorporate wide-ranging and longstanding intellectual traditions of the human body. Given that those traditions were well known at the time, what reason would he have for making an argument where none needed to be made? Thus, while Hutcheson never states that the moral sense perceives the moral qualities of human actions and then transmits those perceptions through the nerves and fibers via the animal spirits to the understanding (presumably the type of anatomical statement that critics today would need in order to see his conception of the moral sense as literal rather than figurative), such a statement was not required in the early eighteenth century.

Indeed, as I shall discuss further in Chapter Five, Hutcheson also was deeply influenced by the work of Isaac Newton, especially, I would argue, by the *Principia*, in which Newton calculated mathematically the operations of unseen forces and occult qualities. In Hutcheson's schema, a prime mover God places the moral sense in the

human frame. As we open our hearts to the moral quality contained in human action, each of us responds with love and affection to those who act out of benevolence, attracting us to such persons. At the same time, we respond with dislike or hatred to those who act out of self-interest, repelling us from them. Just as God established the mechanical laws of the universe and then stepped back to let it run by those laws, so too he established the laws of affective virtue, by which we know morality through feeling, and then stepped back to let us establish societies which, when proper, are based upon those laws. As Newton provided the mathematical basis for the laws of motion and of gravity, so too Hutcheson provides the mathematical basis for the laws of virtue and affection. Hutcheson utilizes design theory to envision human bodies attracting or repelling other human bodies, based upon the affective powers of the moral sense, upon which human societies are formed.

Yet as Hutcheson acknowledges, those affective relations are structured through the unseen operations of moral qualities, allowing those who disagree with his moral philosophy to doubt its physiological reality:

This *natural Determination* to approve and admire, or hate and dislike Actions, is no doubt an *occult Quality*. But is it any way more mysterious that the Idea of an Action should raise *Esteem*, or *Contempt*, than that the motion, or tearing of Flesh should give *Pleasure*, or *Pain*; or the Act of Volition should move *Flesh* and *Bones*? In the latter Case, we have got the Brain, and elastic Fibres, and animal Spirits, and elastic Fluids, like the *Indian's* Elephant, and Tortoise, to bear the Burden of the Difficulty: but go one step further, and you find the whole as difficult as at first, and equally a Mystery with *this Determination* to

love and approve, or hate and despise *Actions* and *Agents*, without any Views of *Interest*, as they appear *benevolent*, or the contrary. (271-72, emphasis in original)

As I discussed in the first section of this chapter, and shall discuss in greater detail in Chapter Five, by stating that the operations of the moral sense are an occult quality, Hutcheson argues that they function in exactly the same way that other occult qualities do. Consequently, in his paradigm, an observer is involved in moral operations in ways that that observer would not be involved in Locke's moral paradigm, for it is in the visible reaction of the observer to the invisible intention of the actor, not in the visible results of that actor's actions, that morality can be perceived. It is for that reason that Hutcheson creates his mathematical formulas by which the occult quality of morality can be quantified, just as Newton created his mathematical formulas by which the occult quality of gravity can be quantified: to demonstrate their "real" existence.

Hutcheson, therefore, structures his moral philosophy on the workings of natural philosophy; his affective body operates through the principles of Lockean epistemology and corpuscular theory, while the relations that one affective body has with another operate through the principles of corpuscular theory and Newtonian philosophy. The affective body responds to the moral sense's perceptions of benevolent human actions by feeling pleasure, and through such pleasurable responses to virtue, connects with the affective bodies of others. Upon those affective relations Hutcheson establishes his ideal society, an affective community whose members act benevolently toward each other and who consequently build affective bonds based upon the love and esteem generated by those virtuous actions. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter Five, this affective community is not only the basis for Hutcheson's social vision but for his political one as well, and in

turn forms the basis for the homoaffective desire and communities upon which the ideal nation is formed.

## Chapter Five

### The Quality of Moral Attraction

#### The Natural Philosophy of Benevolence

In Chapter Four I argued that Hutcheson conceives of moral knowledge as being attained through the processes of what I call the affective body, which operates through the same epistemological principles as does the Lockean rational body but does so through the functions of the heart rather than of the head. Key to this Lockean paradigm are the senses, which perceive external qualities. As each sense is constructed to perceive only a specific type of quality, and as Hutcheson is an adherent of the new science of the body, he claims that morality is a quality embedded in the intention which generates human action, not in the result of the action; it is perceived by the internal moral sense, which is located in the heart and which operates through the same sensational paradigm as do the external senses. The affective body feels in the heart the moral quality of the action that it perceives, and it knows from its feeling whether that moral quality is good or bad.

However, qualities have material existence. Therefore, to say that morality is a quality perceived by the moral sense means that morality itself has material existence, a statement which only makes sense if materiality is defined in a manner significantly different than the way in which we do so today. In fact, this was exactly the case in the eighteenth century; as I also discussed in that chapter, Robert Boyle's corpuscular philosophy provided a scientific basis for the existence of occult qualities. Intention, the basis of morality, Hutcheson claims, is just such an occult quality; while its materiality cannot be perceived directly by the external senses, it can be perceived indirectly by them, through its effects on the affective body.

In this chapter I shall demonstrate that these effects are the movement of human bodies toward the bodies of benevolent actors and away from the bodies of self-interested ones. I shall argue that in this endeavor, Hutcheson was influenced significantly by Isaac Newton, whose *Principia*, published initially in 1687, accomplished for the unseen force of gravity exactly what Hutcheson attempts to do for the unseen force of intention. Hutcheson draws a direct parallel between the operations of morality and the operations of gravity. As gravity is an attractive force, so too, Hutcheson argues, is intention, creating through its occult powers affective communities whose members act for the greater good as long as they remain within a geographic distance small enough for that occult quality's powers to operate. Such communities are dependent for their existence upon the physiological structure of the affective body, which is designed by God to respond to benevolence in ways which join affective bodies to other affective bodies.

As I discussed in Chapter Four, Hutcheson states that we respond with love toward a person who acts out of benevolence and respond self-interestedly toward one who acts out of natural goodness. This analysis, though, focuses solely on the observer's response to the actor's benevolent intention; it omits any discussion of the motivation behind that actor's intention. But given Hutcheson's larger aim in the *Inquiry*, it obviously is crucial that he explain why we act in this fashion. Furthermore, his explanation needs to not reinscribe self-interest but, rather, must complement his analysis of our response to benevolence, for a wise and just God would not design a system at odds with itself.

Thus, as we respond disinterestedly with love only toward those who act out of kind affections, and as such a response results from the divinely constructed frame of our nature, it cannot be that we act benevolently simply to receive that love, for such an

intention would be self-interested and would be perceived by the moral sense as such, thereby preventing the very response of love desired by the actor. Rather, a disinterested benevolence itself must be a motivation for human action, for if the moral sense only responds positively to virtuous actions and actors, and if, as Hutcheson argues, we are born already belonging to society, then those social bonds—indeed, society itself—can be sustained only by virtue. As Hutcheson notes:

It may perhaps also appear, 'That what excites us to these Actions which we call *Virtuous*, is not an Intention to obtain even this *sensible Pleasure*; much less the *future Rewards* from Sanctions of Laws, or any other *natural Good*, which may be the Consequence of the *virtuous Action*; but an entirely different Principle of Action from *Interest* or *Self-Love*' (116, emphasis in original).

Therefore, an additional element of Hutcheson's argument in the *Inquiry* concerns "the immediate Motive to virtuous Actions" (136), in which he discusses why we act for the greater good. In keeping with his moral sense paradigm, he argues that virtuous actions spring from a "*disinterested Affection*" (155, emphasis in original), which in turn stems from "*some Determination of our Nature to study the Good of others; or some Instinct, antecedent to all Reason from Interest, which influences us to the Love of others*" (155, emphasis in original). He then adds that the moral sense "determines us to *approve* the Actions which flow from this Love in our selves or others" (155, emphasis in original).

Hutcheson here makes two significant points, each of which demonstrates the consistency of his moral argument and its continued reliance upon the emerging principles of natural philosophy. First, he states that there is a complementary

relationship between the motivation behind virtuous actions and the perception by others of those actions as virtuous; the motivation stems from a disinterested affection, and the approval of the action is based upon the perception of that affective motivation. Love, in other words, begets love, and God's design works seamlessly. Secondly, and key to that complementary relationship, Hutcheson unveils another critical piece of his benevolent paradigm by stating that such a motivation to act virtuously originates in the same location as does our positive response to benevolent actions: the human body. For while the *OED* notes that the word "instinct," in the early eighteenth century, could mean an inclination or innate impulse to act in particular ways, which would parallel Hutcheson's phrase "some Determination of our Nature," it also notes that the word could mean "the faculty supposed to be involved in this operation," a definition which points toward a bodily-based meaning for that term. Additionally, by calling that instinct a "Determination," and then repeating that very word when stating that the moral sense, which is a part of the human body, "determines" us to approve moral actions, Hutcheson further implies that the operations of the former parallel those of the latter; if the latter is a part of the human body, then the former likely is as well.

Consequently, Hutcheson's schema of the relationship between the body and benevolence is dependent upon his belief that our "instinct" for benevolence is physiological, just as he believes that the moral sense is physiological, thereby again demonstrating his agreement with the early-eighteenth-century conception of human nature as bodily-based. As the human body is designed to feel a disinterested, physiological pleasure from perceiving moral actions, and therefore to love those moral actors, so too it is designed physiologically to love others disinterestedly and to act benevolently toward them as a result of that disinterested love.

Yet, at the same time, it must be noted that Hutcheson places significantly less emphasis in the *Inquiry* upon the physiological operations of this instinct to benevolent action than he does upon the physiological operations of the moral sense. There is, I propose, a specific and significant reason for this disparity. While the study of the physiological basis of perception had at that time a long intellectual history, the same was not true for the study of the physiological basis of motivation; instead, the latter had long been the province of religion, not of natural philosophy. As I have discussed, by the early eighteenth century, natural philosophy was being used increasingly to understand human society, human relations, and even human morality, but even so, there was then, quite simply, neither the knowledge nor the language through which Hutcheson could articulate a physiology of motivation in the same way, and to the same degree, that he is able to articulate a physiology of perception.

Even Lockean epistemology, which certainly had created a more secular framework within which to understand the principles of human motivation, does not provide Hutcheson with the scientific grounding needed to make such a claim. For while Hutcheson is indebted to Locke in many ways, Locke, of course, saw humans as acting out of self-interest, a viewpoint to which Hutcheson is adamantly opposed. Not only does Hutcheson see humans as inherently benevolent, in Locke's paradigm self-interest leads each actor to calculate the value of an action through the operations of reason, a viewpoint consistent with his argument that the powers of the understanding are paramount. But this means that the motivation for any action is not bodily-based but instead is intellectually-based, mediated from immediate sensory perception by rationality, even while the decision about whether or not to do something is based upon

the computation of benefits accruing from that action to the actor's property—i.e., to the fruits of, and to the extent of, the labor of that actor's body.

For Hutcheson, however, it is unmediated feeling, both emotional and physiological, stemming from our essentially social nature, which matters most. It therefore would be an imperfect system if the perception of the motivation behind human actions was grounded in human physiology while the motivation itself was not, as such a system would contradict Hutcheson's argument that we are designed by God to be inherently (i.e., physiologically) good. Since God's design, by definition, must be perfect, our motivation to benevolent action also must be physiologically inherent to us, and Hutcheson consequently claims that our acting for the greater good stems from an instinct which, like the moral sense, operates prior to, and therefore independent of, reason:

Surely, the Supposition of a *benevolent universal Instinct*, would recommend *human Nature*, and its Author, more to the *Love* of a *good Man*, and leave room enough for the Exercise of our *Reason*, in contriving and settling *Rights, Laws, Constitutions*; in *inventing Arts*, and *practising* them so as to gratify, in the most effectual manner, that *generous Inclination*. (193, emphasis in original).

However, while our motivation to act benevolently and our perception of the motivation behind the actions of others may each be part of the human body, given the intellectual limitations within which he is working, it is not surprising that Hutcheson does not state definitively where in the body this instinct to benevolence is located nor does he go into significant detail about how it operates within and upon the body. While he also is somewhat unclear as to where the moral sense is located, the history of the

study of perception and the premises of Lockean epistemology make it possible for him to detail its workings specifically enough for us to surmise that he assumes that this sense is located in the heart and that it functions through the processes of the nerves.

Regarding the physiological location and functions of our instinct to benevolence, though, he is virtually silent, a silence which presumably is a piece of, and a result of, the very constraints I noted above.<sup>169</sup> But given that he sees this motivation as stemming from what he repeatedly calls a disinterested affection; given that he equates such motivation with love; and given the long history of the affections and of love as being associated with, and even as generated by, the human heart, I would argue that Hutcheson sees this instinct, as he sees the moral sense, as also located in the heart.

Indeed, the few times that Hutcheson does seem to locate this instinct more specifically, it is in the heart; thus, even though he never alludes to any functional processes through which it operates (that is, it is unclear whether such an instinct generates action in the body through the nerves, as the moral sense does, or whether it functions through some other bodily mechanism), such a location highlights further the consistency of God's schema, as He provides the same physiological home for our motivation to benevolent action as He does for our ability to perceive the moral qualities of actions. It highlights as well the distinction between Hutcheson's conception of human beings as inherently benevolent creatures who know morality through feeling, a conception which contributed to what became known, later in the eighteenth century, as the culture of the heart, and the countervailing conception of human beings as self-

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<sup>169</sup>I would like to thank Joan Richardson, whose discussion about Jonathan Edwards during a talk at The CUNY Graduate Center upon the publication of her book *A Natural History of Pragmatism* (Cambridge, England and New York: Cambridge UP, 2007) began a series of thoughts which led me to this point.

interested creatures who know morality through rationality, creating what similarly can be called the culture of the head.

However, this does not mean that Hutcheson is unable to utilize natural philosophy to give this instinct to benevolence a bodily basis. While his conception of the operations of the moral sense clearly is indebted to Locke and Willis, it also is indebted to the eighteenth-century theories of occult qualities. This debt extends beyond Robert Boyle's corpuscular theory to include Isaac Newton's analysis, in the *Principia*, of the mechanisms by which such qualities influence the interactions of bodies with each other. Even though Newton focuses on bodies in general, not on the human body specifically, his work provides Hutcheson with a natural philosophic discourse through which he can argue that the behavior of humans toward and with each other is determined by the interactions of one human body with another, as influenced by the powers of the occult, external quality of intention.

As I discussed in Chapter Four, Hutcheson's argument about our physiologically-based proclivity for the greater good is a crucial element of his larger argument that we are essentially social creatures, born into society rather than entering into it through a mutually agreed-upon contract. That is, society, at its core, consists of human interactions, and Hutcheson's claim about the physiological basis for benevolence, both in its activation and in its perception, is in the end a statement about the origin of those interactions; we are born with a physiologically-based desire to act for the greater good and we are born with a physiologically-based love for others who so act. As these predispositions stem from the design of the human body, they clearly precede any form of custom or education; we come into the world looking and loving outwardly, and we act accordingly.

Thus, the bonds of affection which exist between people are natural, emerging from and sustained by the human body rather than formed by society. While socializing processes can influence us (Hutcheson, after all, does not deny that self-interest can motivate human behavior) they merely build upon that preexisting bodily design; they do not, indeed cannot, create intentions to act benevolently that do not already exist within us. This means that self-interest, which by definition is the opposite of benevolence, cannot be the prime motivation for human behavior, as our bodies are simply and naturally structured differently. Society, therefore, is at its core naturally good. As self-interested actions would turn observers away from the actor, thereby weakening the very bonds which Hutcheson values so greatly, and as benevolence strengthens those bonds, it is benevolence, and benevolence alone, which forms and reinforces society. One physiologically-based affection generates benevolent action out of a disinterested love for others, and another physiologically-based affection leads us to love disinterestedly such benevolent actors, linking the actor and the observer to each other through those physiologically-based bonds of love, or what Hutcheson calls a "*secret Chain between each Person and Mankind*" (121, emphasis in original).

Newton's *Principia* provides the secular, natural philosophic framework within which Hutcheson can discuss the role of this social adhesion, and the role of the body in that adhesive process, in his analysis of human relations and societal construction. For to claim, as Hutcheson does, that our bodies are hard-wired to act benevolently out of love for others as well as to respond with love toward benevolent actors could imply that benevolence is something inside of us, inherent to our bodies and ultimately dependent upon them for its existence. Such an implication is perilously close to stating that

benevolence (or, for that matter, self-interest) is an innate idea, a statement which is clearly antithetical to the entire epistemological basis of his moral philosophy.

It is for just this reason that Hutcheson states that "these two Principles [benevolence and self-interest] may jointly excite a Man to the same Action; and then they are to be consider'd as two Forces impelling the same Body to Motion" (141), and elsewhere states that "in most Actions we must look upon *Self-Love* as another force, sometimes conspiring with *Benevolence*, and assisting it, when we are excited by Views of *private Interest*, as well as *publick Good*; and sometimes opposing *Benevolence*, when the good Action is any way *difficult* or *painful* in the Performance" (184, emphasis in original). Benevolence and self-interest, according to Hutcheson, are not innate ideas, but rather are forces which propel our bodies into motion, sometimes acting in concert with each other to push us toward a particular action and sometimes acting at cross purposes with each other so that we feel conflicted about whether or not to pursue or conduct that action.

While forces either can be internal to us (e.g., the passions) or external to us (e.g., the wind), even internal forces are different from innate ideas. Yet it is clear that Hutcheson sees benevolence as an external force, for to view it otherwise would be inconsistent with his view that intention is a quality. At the same time, different external forces act upon the body in different ways. Some influence it in a more generalized fashion; the wind, for example, pushes our bodies to one side or another but does not affect specific organs. Others have more precise effects, stimulating particular bodily components and, by so doing, causing the entire body to react in specific, almost proscribed, and certainly measurable, ways. Hutcheson makes clear that he views benevolence as that latter type of external force by comparing it to gravity, utilizing

Newtonian principles to map both geographically and mathematically the powers of benevolence to stimulate the human body to action through a physiological, not a rational, response to it that is based upon the interaction of benevolence with specific bodily elements:

This *universal Benevolence* toward all Men, we may compare to that Principle of *Gravitation*, which perhaps extends to all Bodys in the *Universe*; but, like the *Love of Benevolence*, *increases* as the Distance is diminish'd, and is *strongest* when Bodys come to *touch* each other.

Now this *increase of Attraction* upon nearer Approach, is as necessary to the *Frame of the Universe*, as that there should be any *Attraction* at all. For a *general Attraction*, equal in all Distances, would by the Contrariety of such multitudes of equal Forces, put an end to all Regularity of Motion, and perhaps stop it altogether. (220, emphasis in original)

While Hutcheson here notes only that benevolence interacts with bodies in the same way that gravity does, but omits any specifics of how such an interaction occurs, as I shall discuss in the following section of this chapter, Newton conceives of gravity as functioning through the powers of the sympathies and the antipathies, occult qualities which interact with specific aspects of the body. Through their operations, bodies either are drawn toward or pushed away from each other because an internal element of one body attracts or repels an internal element of another.

Consequently, the sympathies and the antipathies are dependent upon particular characteristics of two or more bodies, each of which must exist in some type of interdependent relationship to and with the others in order for those occult forces to

work. Hutcheson draws upon that selfsame system to delineate the manner in which benevolence operates upon and within the human body; he argues that those operations are dependent upon our instinct to act for the greater good being activated in one body and upon our moral sense being activated in another. The two bodies, therefore, are joined to each other through that occult power (or, as Hutcheson calls benevolence, a force) whose effect manifests itself in their interdependent relationship, one which draws them closer together or further apart depending upon the moral quality of the action—i.e., whether the action is undertaken out of love or out of self-interest. Just as Newton argues that the movement of bodies makes visible the occult quality of gravity, so too Hutcheson argues that the movement of bodies makes visible the occult quality of benevolence.

#### The Sympathies and the Antipathies

As I discussed in Chapter Four, in the eighteenth century it was commonly believed that all bodies, human and nonhuman, or, to use our contemporary distinctions, animate and inanimate, were subject to the influence of occult forces, two of which were the sympathies and the antipathies: the former that mysterious force which draws bodies toward each other, and the latter that mysterious force which pushes them away from each other. Like other occult forces, the sympathies and the antipathies could not be perceived directly but could be perceived indirectly through their effects—in this case, by the bodily movement which occurred by dint of their influence.

However, it is important to note that these two occult forces influenced only very specific types of bodies. Magnets, for example, whose powers often have been described as the primary representation of sympathy, attract bodies which have iron in them, but they do not attract those which do not; similarly, bodies with iron in them are attracted to magnets but not, for example, to paper. Within the very terms *sympathy* and *antipathy*,

then, is embedded a mutual relationship between very particular types of bodies, a relationship which exists due to the frame of each body's nature: those which have the inherent power to draw specific bodies to them and those which have a similarly inherent power to be so drawn; those which have the inherent power to repel specific bodies away from them and those which have the inherent power to be so repelled. The terms also indicate that bodies which exist in such a sympathetic or antipathetic relationship with each other are physically close enough for such forces to affect them, implying therefore that there is a direct relationship between the strength of such forces and the distance between such bodies.

While much has been written about the emotional component of eighteenth-century constructions of sympathy in human relations, and much also has been written about how sympathy at that time was perceived to operate within and upon the human body,<sup>170</sup> less attention has been paid to the ways in which this eighteenth-century construct drew upon that older occult system of sympathies and antipathies. For the double meaning of the term *sympathy* is neither an accident nor simply a metaphor, but instead reinforces the then prevalent conception of the human body as an entity subject to the same principles of natural philosophy to which all bodies are subject. Indeed, the very term *body* itself obviously contains a multiplicity of meanings; it can refer to any

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<sup>170</sup>In addition to Rousseau, "Nerves, Spirits, and Fibers," Ch. 3, fn. #11 and Crane, "Man of Feeling," Ch. 2, fn. #12, see, e.g., Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, Ch. 1, fn. #38; Christopher Lawrence, "The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment," *Natural Order: Historical Studies of Scientific Culture*. Ed. In Barry Barnes and Steven Shapiro (Beverly Hills, CA and London: Sage Publications, 1979): 19-40; John Mullan, *Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1988), especially Chapter 5, "Hypochondria and Hysteria: Sensibility and the Physicians"; Ann Jessie Van Sant, *Eighteenth-Century Sensibility and the Novel* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1993); and Janet Todd, *Sensibility: An Introduction* (London and New York: Methuen, 1986).

material object or to the specifically human body, which is itself material, having, like other bodies, the primary qualities of "bulk, figure, number, situation, and motion or rest" (Locke, *Essay* 2.8.23), and therefore subject to the same sympathetic and antipathetic forces to which other bodies are subject. As Gaspar Schott, S.J., a seventeenth-century Jesuit German natural philosopher who disseminated Boyle's investigations on the air pump, wrote: "Sympathetic effects arise from a friendly *affection*, or coordination and innate relation, of one thing to another . . . , so that if one is *acting*, or *reacting*, or only just present, the other also acts or is acted upon. . . . It originates directly from the particular *temperament* of each thing, being nothing but a certain natural *inclination* of one thing towards another" (qtd. in Heilbron 26, emphasis added). In Schott's formulation, then, a body (i.e., a *thing*) has *affections*, *temperaments*, and *inclinations*, *acts* and *reacts*, a common perspective of the time, which draws attention to the perceived likeness, or at least perceived similarity, of various types of bodies, whether human or nonhuman.

It is, of course, possible to argue that statements such as Schott's ultimately demonstrate only the linguistic and intellectual limitations within which natural philosophers of an earlier time worked—i.e., that they could only explain such seemingly inexplicable phenomena using terminology which to us seems simply anthropomorphic. Yet even if this is so, anthropomorphic terms are chosen for specific reasons; they make sense to the person or persons using them because, on some deeper level, they give expression to a form of relationship perceived to exist between the object which is being anthropomorphized and the object embedded in that anthropomorphic equation and terminology. Thus, to state that a *thing* has *affections* and *temperaments*, *inclinations*

and *relations*, indicates a belief in a similarity between the human and the nonhuman, at least in that occult realm, that we ostensibly do not hold today.

Andrew G. van Melsen, for example, notes that Boyle, in the *Origin of Forms and Qualities*, argues that the diversity we see in bodies stems not from matter ("Because this matter being in its own nature but one"[461]) but from motion. Matter, according to Boyle, and the corpuscles which comprise it, by its nature is the same in whatever body it forms; bodies become distinctive only through motion, which divides matter into size and figure (100). Indeed, Gassendi compares atoms to letters, arguing that as letters form different words, which then form different sentences and larger texts, so too atoms (or corpuscles) form different molecules, which then form larger and different bodies (van Melsen 92).<sup>171</sup> While such a formulation clearly alludes to the multiplicity of possible bodies, inherent in Gassendi's comparison is also the likeness of all such bodies; the irreducibility of letters across words (e.g., the letter "a" will always be the letter "a"

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<sup>171</sup>Andrew G. van Melsen, *From Atomos to Atom: The History of the Concept Atom* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960). Similarly, Erica Fudge argues that the seemingly distinct differences between animal and human were not always perceived as being so distinct; see *Brutal Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England* (Ithaca and London: Cornell UP 2006) and *Perceiving Animals: Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan P, Ltd., 2000); see also Brian Cummings "Animal Passions and Human Sciences: Shame, Blushing and Nakedness in Early Modern Europe and the New World." *At the Borders of the Human: Beasts, Bodies and Natural Philosophy in the Early Modern Period*. Ed. Erica Fudge, Ruth Gilbert and Susan Wiseman (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London: MacMillan P, Ltd., 1999): 26-50. While Fudge's work is focused primarily on the early modern period, the continuing debate about the constitution of this distinction well into the eighteenth century illustrates the ongoing anxiety about whether or not such a distinction ultimately exists, an anxiety that Descartes' mechanical philosophy, of course, did nothing to calm. See Yolton, fn. #3, pp. 32-35, and the enormous literature on the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century belief in the gendered mutability of biological human bodies, a belief which further highlighted the potential lack of distinctiveness between "naturally" distinct categories.

whether it is part of the word "apple" or of the word "bear") implies a corresponding irreducibility of corpuscles across bodies. Thus, Walter Charleton, physician to Charles I and Charles II and a founding member of the Royal Society, wrote in 1652:

Atoms, in the instant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of self-motion, and consequently of concurring, crowding, justling, repelling, resilitio [sic], exsilitio [sic], and reciprocal complectence [sic], concatenation [sic], revinctio [sic], etc. according to the respective preordination in the Divine Intellect (qtd. in Henry 350).

Atoms, in other words, or corpuscles, as they came to be known, inherently, by their very nature, as created by God, are endowed with certain active powers; Charleton, however, does not specify the type or types of bodies to which these active atoms belong. The implication, then, is that all atoms have such powers and, consequently, that any body potentially can exhibit the same active powers as can any other type of body, an argument similar to that of vitalism (the belief that all material substances have their own internal motive power) or even to Locke's conception of thinking matter, which posited a further similarity between seemingly dissimilar material and immaterial substances.<sup>172</sup> Consequently, as magnets and humans are both composed of corpuscles, their essential powers can be, and indeed are, somewhat similar.

While this statement clearly is one that many would dismiss today, I would argue instead that our very language betrays the resonance of that older conception; we say that two people are *attracted* to each other, or that there is some type of *magnetic attraction*

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<sup>172</sup>See John W. Yolton, *Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Minneapolis, MN: U Minnesota P, 1983).

between them, to describe that unseen force which draws particular people inexplicably, and usually sexually, toward each other. Of course, such terms also describe that unseen force which draws together magnets and objects which contain iron; while we would not call the attraction between such objects sexual, in all cases, the objects so attracted to each other, both human and nonhuman, "come to touch each other," to quote Hutcheson, as a result of the influence of that sympathetic force. Additionally, in both cases, the force is perceivable only by its effects—i.e., by the actions of the bodies which gravitate toward each other under the influence of its powers. The sympathies and the antipathies, then, two such unseen forces through which corpuscles move, were the qualities that made such seemingly anthropomorphic terms possible and sensible.

Indeed, the susceptibility of humans to occult forces is displayed as well by the influence of the imagination on human actions. Francis Bacon, for example, claimed in the *Advancement of Learning* that the "imagination carries messages from the senses to the mind, messages which reason interprets to provide understanding (qtd. in Cocking 268). G.S. Rousseau documents the extensive eighteenth-century scientific inquiries in the powers of this invisible force, while its ability to affect the gender and/or health of the fetus and/or newborn child led to numerous proscriptions for the proper and improper fancies and thoughts of pregnant women.<sup>173</sup>

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<sup>173</sup>G.S. Rousseau, "Science and the Discovery of the Imagination in Enlightened England," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 3.1 (Autumn 1969): 108-35. See also Lorraine Daston, "Fear and Loathing of the Imagination in Science," *Daedalus* 127.1 (Winter 1998): 73-95; and Daston and Katharine Park, *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750* (New York: Zone Books, 1998). For the imagination's powers during pregnancy, see, e.g., Wendy Doniger and Gregory Spinner, "Misconceptions: Female Imaginations and Male Fantasies in Parental Imprinting," *Daedalus* 127.1 (Winter 1998): 97-129; Paul-Gabriel Boucé, "Imagination, Pregnancy Women, and Monsters, in Eighteenth-Century England and France. *Sexual Underworlds of the Enlightenment*. Ed. G.S. Rousseau and Roy Porter (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1988): 86-100; and

Like other occult forces, the sympathies and the antipathies did not disappear with the rise of experimental philosophy but instead were incorporated into it to explain the otherwise inexplicable attractions or repulsions between objects.<sup>174</sup> Thus, in Book II, Aphorism 50 of the *Novum Organum*, Francis Bacon states that "those so-called occult properties, and specifics, and sympathies and antipathies are for the most part corruptions of philosophy" (285-86). However, in keeping with his aim of utilizing the scientific method to separate such corruptions from accurate and true information about the external world in order to advance human knowledge about the workings of that world, his phrase "for the most part" suggests an acknowledgment that not all references to the powers of sympathy and/or antipathy are necessarily a corruption. Indeed, later in that same Aphorism Bacon states:

But the internal consents and aversions of bodies, or their friendships and enmities (for I am somewhat weary of the words *sympathy* and *antipathy*, on account of the superstitions and meaningless ideas associated with them) are either falsely ascribed, or mixed up with fables, or through lack of observation, very rare. For if anyone should assert that there is a disagreement between the vine and the cabbage, because if planted near together they never thrive, the real reason is

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Dennis Todd, *Imagining Monsters: Miscreations of the Self in Eighteenth-Century England* (Chicago and London, U Chicago P, 1995).

<sup>174</sup>In addition to my discussion in the previous chapter, for a detailed examination of the continuities between experimental philosophy and earlier sciences concerning the existence of occult qualities, see Ron Millen, "The Manifestation of Occult Qualities in the Scientific Revolution." *Religion, Science, and Worldview: Essays in Honor of Richard S. Westfall*. Ed. Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1985): 185-216; and Simon Schaffer, "Godly Men and Mechanical Philosophers: Souls and Spirits in Restoration Natural Philosophy," *Science in Context* 1.1 (1985): 55-85.

clearly that both plants are succulent and voracious, so that one robs the other. . . . There does remain, it is true, a small number of these consents, which have been proved by reliable experiment, such as those of a loadstone and iron, also gold and quicksilver, and the like. And in chemical experiments with metals, some others are found that are worth noticing. But they are most frequent (though still only few) in some medicines which through their so-called occult and specific properties affect either the limbs, or the humours or the diseases, or sometimes individual natures. Nor must we overlook the consents between the motions and states of the moon and the behaviour of lower bodies, as far as these can be gathered and accepted, after strict and impartial selection, from experiments in agriculture, navigation and medicine, and so on. And the fewer instances there are of the more secret consents, so much the more carefully should they be looked for, by traditions and reliable and faithful reports; provided that this is done without any levity or credulity, but in a diffident and almost sceptical spirit. (288-89)

Two things are worthy of note here. One is Bacon's use of terms like *friendships*, *enmities* and *consent* to describe relationships between *bodies*. In fact, Bacon makes clear that those bodies can be either nonhuman (e.g., loadstone, iron, the moon) or human (e.g., his reference to medicines, humours and individual natures), exhibiting clearly the belief that different forms of bodies are inherently similar, equally susceptible in the same way to the same occult influences and thereby capable of forming similar types of relationships with each other. But, in addition, Bacon claims here that once the scientific method of observation and deduction is utilized to eliminate superstition and false beliefs

from natural philosophy, some true sympathies and antipathies remain, and that it is possible to determine their scientific basis. Thus, he does not argue that all sympathies and antipathies are inherently and completely unscientific, but rather that they, like many other then-current elements of knowledge and/or belief, need to be, and indeed can be, critically examined to separate out that which is fable from that which is verifiably demonstrable.

In fact, even Descartes, the penultimate mechanical philosopher, believed in their existence, claiming in the *Principia Philosophiae* that, "there are no powers in stones or plants so occult, no sympathies or antipathies so miraculous and stupendous, in short, nothing in nature (provided it proceeds from material causes destitute of mind and cognition) that its reason cannot be deduced from these [i.e., mechanical] principles" (qtd. in Millen 198). Descartes' statement, Millen argues, indicates not that he did not believe in sympathies and antipathies, as is often assumed to be the case, but instead that he presumed their existence and argued that even they could be explained by the principles of his mechanical philosophy.

Millen further argues that this attitude was not at all unusual. In addition to his statement on atoms I quote above, Walter Charleton claimed:

We acknowledge also that *Sympathy* is a certain *Consent* and *Antipathy* a certain *Dissent* betwixt Two Natures from one or both of which there ariseth some such Effect as many seem to deserve our limited Admiration; but is it therefore reasonable for us to infer that those Natures are not subject unto, not regulated by the General and Ordinary Rules of Action and Passion, whereto Nature hath firmly obliged

Herself in the rest of Her operations? (qtd. in Millen 200, emphasis in original)

Millen points out that, again, contrary to general critical opinion, Charleton is not denying that sympathies and antipathies exist, or stating that they are not "real"; instead, Charleton argues that they, like other occult qualities, operate within the same principles as do sensible qualities, and that they therefore likewise can be studied in the same way. I would simply add that Charleton refers to *Natures* in the same way that Schott refers to a *thing* or Bacon refers to *bodies*. As this terminology consistently indicates, the sympathies and the antipathies were believed to be qualities which affected multiple types of physical entities; as such, they do not recognize any distinction between the human and the nonhuman in terms of their powers or operations.

Indeed, Charleton translated Johannes Baptista Van Helmont's *De Magnetica Vulnerum Curatione (Magnetick Cure of Wounds)*, in which Van Helmont discusses the powder of sympathy, which had the power to cure human wounds through magnetic principles that Charleton, in his preface to his translation, stated were "imperceptible Emissions steaming in a semi-immaterial thread of Atomes" (qtd. in Henry 341). In part, Charleton's theory simply voices the belief that the human body exists within a radically different conception of materiality than does our present-day body. But it also again demonstrates the belief that sympathy (and, by extension, antipathy) exists within that paradigm whereby the human and the nonhuman, either of which were susceptible to occult principles, were perceived as being distinctly similar. Indeed, this powder of sympathy was later popularized by Sir Kenelm Digby, another founding member of the Royal Society, who argued that it worked by being spread on the instrument which had caused the injury rather than on the injured part of the body.

Isaac Newton, of course, incorporated occult qualities into his natural philosophy by creating specific, quantifiable equations through which their effects could be measured. Indeed, the *Principia* is, in many ways, the definitive assimilation of the sympathies and the antipathies into eighteenth-century scientific inquiry; Newton makes sweeping claims about the scope of their powers, displaying the emerging faith in the explanatory powers of natural philosophy. For example, in his Preface to the first edition, Newton writes:

[B]y the propositions mathematically demonstrated in the former books in the third I derive from the celestial phenomena the forces of gravity with which bodies tend to the sun and the several planets. Then from these forces, by other propositions which are also mathematical, I deduce the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon, and the sea. *I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually impelled towards one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are repelled and recede from one another.* (2, emphasis added)

Newton states here his belief that all "phenomena of Nature," at their core, can be traced back to sympathy (i.e., "mutually impelled towards one another") and antipathy (i.e., "repelled and recede from one another"), and states additionally his wish that all aspects of nature influenced by those forces be subjected to the same mathematical reasoning by which he has "deduce[d] the motions of the planets, the comets, the moon,

and the sea" (2). Newton, therefore, creates mathematical formulas, derived through observation and deduction, by which the powers of sympathy and antipathy can be calculated and quantified, marking especially how such powers increase or decrease as the distance between sympathetic or antipathetic bodies increase or decrease, and thereby establishes the paradigm which can then be applied to the study of those powers' other areas of influence.

For as he also states in the Preface, "I consider philosophy rather than arts and write not concerning manual but natural powers, and consider chiefly those things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of fluids, and the like forces, whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore I offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy" (1). His mathematical principles may be focused on attractive or impulsive forces, but as those forces explain many other phenomena of nature, his paradigm clearly can be applied to other branches of philosophy, as that term was understood in the early eighteenth century, and thus has an immensely broad, wide-ranging scope. While Newton does not use the term *sympathy*, but instead here uses the terms *impelled* and *attractive*, and more generally uses the term *attraction*, it is clear that by those latter two terms, he means precisely what purveyors of the former mean.

The *Principia*, then, can be said to be Newton's mathematical analysis of the forces which enable particles and bodies, both small and large, to approach each other, to touch each other, to move away from each other, or to stay equidistant from each other. While these forces originate from God's design, and much about them remains unknown, they are the forces which keep the moon from crashing into the earth or from spinning away from it, the earth from crashing into the sun or from spinning away from it, the stars and other planets in their alignment and in the solar system:

I have hitherto been treating of the attractions of bodies towards an immovable centre; though very probably there is no such thing existent in nature. For attractions are made towards bodies, and the actions of the bodies attracted and attracting are always reciprocal and equal, by Law III; so that if there are two bodies, neither the attracted nor the attracting body is truly at rest, but both (by Cor. IV of the Laws of Motion), being as it were mutually attracted, revolve about a common centre of gravity. And if there be more bodies, which either are attracted by one body, which is attracted by them again, or which all attract each other mutually, these bodies will be so moved among themselves, that their common centre of gravity will either be at rest, or move uniformly forwards in a right line. (111)

Sympathy, and by extension antipathy, according to Newton, are the forces through which systems of bodies are organized and maintain themselves; these forces are not random but instead have an order and regularity to them about which consistent and demonstrable claims can be made.

Consequently, Newton's statement that the "rest of the phenomena of Nature" are also influenced by the sympathies and the antipathies, which guide the motions of bodies and of the particles of bodies, is highly significant. First, it reiterates that Newton, like other natural philosophers, does not distinguish in his formulation between human bodies and nonhuman bodies. Indeed, earlier in his career, as he was developing his theories of attraction, Newton used instead the term *sociability*, highlighting even further the existing belief that multiple types of bodies, human and nonhuman, contained common

elements and hence were subject to common occult influences. In a letter to Boyle, written in 1679, Newton stated:

When any metal is put into common water, the water cannot enter into its pores, to act on it and dissolve it. Not that water consists of too gross parts for this purpose, but because it is *unsociable* to metal. For there is a certain secret principle in nature, by which liquors are *sociable* to some things, and *unsociable* to others. Thus water will not mix with oil, but readily with spirit of wine, or with salts. It sinks also into wood, which quicksilver will not; but quicksilver sinks into metals, which, as I said, water will not. . . . But a liquor, which is of itself *unsociable* to a body, may, by the mixture of a convenient mediator, be made *sociable*. So molten lead, which alone will not mix with copper, or with regulus of Mars, by the addition of tin is made to mix with either. And water, by the mediation of saline sprits, will mix with metal. (Cohen 251-52, emphasis added)

While, by the time he published the *Principia* in 1687, Newton was instead utilizing the term *attraction* to discuss the same phenomenon, *sociable* clearly has many human, humanizing, and even societal connotations that I would argue are never fully lost. To say that certain bodies are sociable to each other, and that others are unsociable to each other, brings into full focus the perceived similarities between the human and the nonhuman—that all such bodies exist in potential relationships with each other, liking some and disliking others, open to some and repulsed by others, and that these sociable relations are inherent to those bodies' nature, just as Hutcheson later argues that human sociability is inherent to the frame of the human body.

Consequently, Newton's statement, quoted above, that all "phenomena of Nature" depend upon the sympathies and the antipathies, or, to use his earlier terms, upon sociability and unsociability, coupled with the fact that the term *Nature* itself has multiple meanings, makes extraordinarily clear his and others' conception that the essential role of the sympathies and antipathies encompasses not only human and nonhuman bodies but is indeed not necessarily limited to the external world in which those bodies are located. Rather, it encompasses as well human nature, which can also influence the movement of specifically human bodies and therefore the tenor and quality of human relations. For as Newton states in Query 31 of *Optics*:

And if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method [i.e., the scientific method], shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will be also enlarged. For so far as we can know by natural Philosophy what is the first Cause, what Power he has over us, and what Benefits we receive from him, so far our Duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the Light of Nature. (543)

Thus, according to Newton, moral philosophy is deeply affected by natural philosophy, for if the latter enables us to know God and His design better, we shall then better be able to worship Him and to follow His precepts, thereby relating to each other in ways that faithfully reflect Him. While all bodies, of every type, have, for example, inclinations, affections, attractions, only we, as humans, have the capacity to know morally how best to act toward each other; while we, like other bodies, can be subject to sympathetic and antipathetic influences, unlike other bodies, we also have duties, toward God and toward each other, which potentially mediate and/or moderate those very influences. As natural philosophy teaches us more about the sympathies and the

antipathies, which, according to Newton, are what the phenomena of Nature rest upon, it teaches us also more about God. By learning more about the forces of attraction and repulsion, of sociability and unsociability, and how they bind and organize bodies, human and nonhuman, in relation to other bodies, we learn more about the deity who implanted those qualities in all bodies and who designed the systems to be maintained by them. Science brings us closer to God, enabling us to be more of whom God intended us to be.

Consequently, Hutcheson's comparison of the operations of benevolence to those of gravity was consonant with the perceived overlap in the early eighteenth century between the principles of natural philosophy and of moral philosophy, as well as between the operations of and influences upon nonhuman bodies and human bodies. Indeed, even though numerous natural philosophers had written about attraction between bodies long before Newton had done so, his mathematical principles revolutionized the study, measurement and understanding of bodily attraction and movement, as well as of their societal consequences. Those principles envisioned an orderly universe in which bodies move through space under the influence of quantifiable, if invisible, forces which draw corpuscles together or apart and which enable the planets to circulate in regularly schematized patterns, a display of uniformity amidst variety, to use Hutcheson's definition of the quality of beauty, which is the result of the design of the frame of the universe by a wise, just and benevolent God:

*The uniform Principle of Gravity preserves at once the Planets in their Orbits, gives Cohesion to the Parts of each Globe, and Stability to Mountains, Hills, and artificial Structures; it raises the Sea in Tides, and sinks them again, and restrains them in their Channels; it drains the*

*Earth* of its superfluous Moisture, by *Rivers*; it raises the *Vapours* by its Influence on the *Air*, and brings them down again in *Rains*; it gives an *uniform Pressure* to our *Atmosphere*, necessary to our *Bodys* in general, and more especially to *Inspiration* in Breathing; and furnishes us with an *universal Movement*, capable of being apply'd in innumerable Engines. How incomparably more *beautiful* is this Structure, than if we suppos'd so many *distinct Volitions* in the Deity, producing every particular Effect, and preventing some of the accidental Evils which casually flow from the *general Law!* (*Inquiry* 70, emphasis in original).<sup>175</sup>

Certainly this image of a smoothly running and well-regulated system, both natural and moral, was enormously appealing to large segments of an elite Britain just emerging from the religious and political upheavals of the previous century, as well as to members of the ascendent Whig administrative state who were attempting to establish their vision of an improving and well-calibrated social and political order onto peoples and lands, such as Scotland, which traditionally had been independent.<sup>176</sup> But Newton's

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<sup>175</sup>See also, "Further, to pass by the less obvious *Uniformity* in the Proportion of their *Quantitys* of Matter, *Distances*, *Times* of revolving, to each other; what can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*, around its *Axis*, and the central Fire or Sun, thro all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit?" (*Inquiry* 21, emphasis in original).

<sup>176</sup>In addition to my discussion in Chapter 2 of the confluence of natural philosophy and the expanding Whig administrative state in Scotland, for a discussion of the difference in the reception of the *Principia* in Britain and the Continent, especially France, see, e.g., John Henry, "Occult Qualities and the Experimental Philosophy: Active Principles in Pre-Newtonian Matter Theory," *History of Science* 24.66, December 1986: 335-81, or Roberto de A. Martins, "Huygen's Reaction to Newton's Gravitational Theory." *Renaissance and Revolution: Humanists, Scholars, Craftsmen and Natural Philosophers in Early Modern Europe*. Ed. J.V. Field and Frank A.J.L. James (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 1993): 203-13.

belief that "the rest of the phenomena of Nature" also derive from those same occult forces of attraction and repulsion, and therefore can be measured by those same mathematical principles of natural philosophy, highlights the parallel belief which enabled moral philosophers to argue that, as part of God's universal design, those external forces influence as well human bodies, human behavior and, ultimately, the construction and form of human societies.

George Berkeley, for example, in an essay forthrightly called "The Bond of Society," published in 1713, made the very same argument that Hutcheson slightly more than ten years later makes in the *Inquiry*: that the Newtonian principle of attraction upon which the universe is structured also structures human relations and society; indeed, such an argument is dependent upon that very double meaning in the term "body." Thus, Berkeley also links together natural and moral philosophy, stating that:

And as the larger systems of the universe are held together by this cause [i.e., attraction], so likewise the particular globes derive their cohesion and consistence from it. Now, if we carry our thoughts from the corporeal to the moral world, we may observe in the Spirits or Minds of men a like principle of attraction, whereby they are drawn together in communities, clubs, families, friendships, and all the various species of society. As in bodies, where the quantity is the same, the attraction is strongest between those which are placed nearest to each other, so is it likewise in the minds of men, *caeteris paribus*, between those which are most nearly related. (226)

Newton's philosophy, in other words, theorized society not as the singular body of John Winthrop's *Model of Christian Charity*, but as a design of attractive forces through which

individual bodies formed relationships with and to each other and thereby bonded together into a larger, cohesive system.

But in addition to enabling the bonds of society to be described, Newton's work provided a model through which they could be quantified. While Berkeley does not build upon Newton's mathematical principles, Hutcheson does, arguing not only that occult forces influence human beings and human societies but that such influences can be gauged utilizing the principles of the scientific method. He therefore creates his moral philosophy in part by utilizing the paradigm of Newton's natural philosophy, as expressed in the *Principia*, to argue that society itself is a system, held together by the sympathetic, occult force of benevolence, which operates under consistent, measurable and verifiable principles, just as the universe is held together by the sympathetic, occult force of gravity, which operates also under consistent, measurable and verifiable principles. Like natural philosophy, moral philosophy is, according to Hutcheson, what we would now call a science, one whose tenets can be applied to the study of benevolence and its power to affect social formation by affecting the movements of human bodies.

Hutcheson's system, then, is a pointed observation about the operations of benevolence itself. As Newton argues in the *Principia*, gravity is an occult quality which draws bodies toward each other through the power of sympathy; this attractive quality is stronger as bodies move closer toward each other, and is weaker as they move further away from each other. Therefore, while gravity itself is not visible, its presence is made known by this movement of bodies. By equating benevolence with gravity, Hutcheson argues that it, as a social force, operates under the same sympathetic principles as does gravity, a universal force. It is, as he states, stronger as bodies move closer to each other ("*increases* as the Distance is diminish'd" [220, emphasis in original]), and is "*strongest*

when Bodys come to *touch* each other" (220, emphasis in original). Similarly, as self-interest is a force often counterposed to benevolence, it is like the antipathies, pushing human bodies further away from each other.<sup>177</sup> Neither benevolence nor self-interest are directly perceivable, but, like sympathy and antipathy, their presence and power can be perceived by the movement of bodies, in this case specifically human ones. Thus, it is no accident that Hutcheson's statement that benevolence, like attraction, is "*strongest* when Bodys come to *touch* each other" (220, emphasis in original) is a clear echo of Newton's definition of attraction in the *Principia*:

I here use the word *attraction* in general for any endeavor whatever, made by bodies to approach to each other, whether that endeavor arises from the action of the bodies themselves, as tending to each other or agitating each other by spirits emitted; or whether it arises from the action of the ether or of the air, or of any medium whatever, whether corporeal or incorporeal, in any manner impelling bodies placed therein towards each other. (130-1)

By stating that benevolence, as a force which affects specifically human bodies, is like gravity, which is a force which affects all bodies, Hutcheson aligns himself with Newton's and other natural philosophers' emergent experimental program, and reinforces his argument that through moral philosophy the human body, soul, passions, affections, ethics, etc. can be carefully and systematically studied, just as can the operations and relations of any other type of body.

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<sup>177</sup>"And as in algebra, where affirmative quantities vanish and cease, there negative ones begin; so in mechanics, where attraction ceases, there a repulsive virtue ought to succeed" (Newton, *Optics*, Query 31: 539).

Thus, when Hutcheson opens the *Inquiry's* second treatise by stating that moral goodness, "denotes our Idea of *some Quality apprehended in Actions, which procures Approbation, and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the Action*" (II.Introduction, emphasis in original), a statement he repeats consistently throughout that treatise, and indeed throughout his *oeuvre*, implicit in that conception is the much larger process of sympathetic attraction. Benevolence, which is an occult force, activates our instinct to act for the public good, which is located in the heart and which motivates us into loving action. That motivation is perceived by the moral sense of an observer of that action, which is also located in the heart and whose perception initiates a process in that person's body which follows the principles of Lockean epistemology, ultimately leading that observer to love the actor. The heart of the actor and the heart of the observer, therefore, act out of love, and through the force of benevolence are drawn toward each other. The bodies which contain those hearts literally move closer and closer, feeling increasing love and attraction until they come to touch each other, for our bodies, like other bodies, are designed to respond to the occult power of sympathy when in the presence of a particular kind of body which contains the material quality which is its corollary—in this case, another human body which contains another human heart.

This is the model of human relations that underlies Hutcheson's text and his concept of an ideal society, just as a similar model of object relations underlies Newton's *Principia* and his concept of the structure of the solar system. Consequently, as Newton constructs mathematical equations which measure the force of gravity on and in various constellations of objects, Hutcheson constructs equations which examine the extent, quantity and force of benevolence, illustrating his belief that the affections can not only

be studied, as had been done by many philosophers previous to him, both secular and religious, but, in addition, that there is a mechanism and regularity to them by which they can be observed and measured. His assertion of the validity of such a mathematical approach to moral philosophy is a sweeping statement about the order and structure of the affections, of human sociability and of human social relations (indeed, of human love and attraction), illustrating the shifting perceptions in the eighteenth century of the role and place of God; no longer seen solely as the continuously omnipresent center of the moral universe, He is now a prime mover who establishes moral laws and then recedes into the background to let society (i.e., human relations) run as a self-sustaining system based upon those laws in the same way that He establishes the physical laws upon which the planets and other elements of the material world then self-sustainingly run. As those physical laws are being studied with increasing precision, Hutcheson claims those social laws can be too.

#### The Mathematical Principles of Benevolence

By attempting to conduct the type of mathematical charting for benevolence that Newton conducts for gravity, Hutcheson tries to quantify the social principles of human actions and interactions through establishing "a *universal Canon* to compute the *Morality* of any Actions, with all their Circumstances, when we *judge* of the Actions done by our selves, or by others" (182, emphasis in original). Clearly, Hutcheson does not create the vast number of equations that Newton does; Hutcheson's emphasis is elsewhere and he is not, in the end, a natural philosopher, no matter how much natural philosophy influences his work. He even admits that creating such calculations to quantify human nature might seem strange, writing that "The applying a *mathematical Calculation* to *moral Subjects*, will appear at first *extravagant* and *wild*; but some Corollarys . . . may shew the

Conveniency of this Attempt, if it could be further pursu'd" (*Inquiry* 194, emphasis in original); however, that acknowledgment does not deter him from creating numerous axioms in which he identifies the formulas whereby one can quantify the amount of virtue in any action so that a universal canon could be established through which the morality of any action easily could be computed (*Inquiry* 180). Indeed, his statement that it would be good if his attempt here can be pursued further by others echoes Newton's statement about pursuing further, in additional philosophical explorations, the attractive and repulsive principles behind other phenomena of nature. While it is quite likely that each statement is, in many ways, simply a rhetorical device to explain why what is not being covered is, in fact, not being covered, their similarity suggests that each additionally reflects the increasingly widespread belief in the early eighteenth century in the explanatory powers of the principles of natural philosophy, and the work that many philosophers believed still needed to be done (and in fact could be done) when those principles are applied to various areas of inquiry.

Furthermore, in this endeavor, Hutcheson was simply following Grotius who, Knud Haakonssen states, had an "ambition to use mathematics as the guiding ideal for natural law, an ideal mostly submerged by his humanist learning" (*Natural Law* 37); it is also significant that Hutcheson was very familiar with, and greatly admired, the work in geometry being done by Robert Simson, his colleague at the University of Glasgow.<sup>178</sup> Haakonssen additionally notes that Hutcheson was guided as well by the Pufendorfian ideal that moral philosophy can and should follow the deductive principles of the scientific method, what would later become known as the *science of human nature* or

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<sup>178</sup>MacIntyre, Ch. 2, fn. #9: 266, note 8.

*moral science*, illustrating Alexander Broadie's argument that well before Hume published his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-1740), the science of human nature was a common philosophical enterprise.<sup>179</sup>

For now, though, Hutcheson states, his calculations lead to one incontrovertible conclusion: "That no external Circumstances of Fortune, no involuntary Disadvantages, can exclude any Mortal from the *most Heroick Virtue*" (194, emphasis in original). Anyone, no matter how rich or how poor, can act benevolently according to his or her material ability to do so, for while such abilities most likely will determine the extent of the public benefits of an action, they do not determine the extent of the benevolent intention. Thus, they do not determine how moral one can or cannot be. As morality, according to Hutcheson, is based upon the force of benevolence interacting with particular components of the human body, and as we all exist in bodies, morality, and the capability of being moral, according to Hutcheson's physiological paradigm, is extraordinarily egalitarian:

For how small soever the *Moment of publick Good* be, which any one can accomplish, yet if his *Abilitys* are proportionately small, the *Quotient*, which expresses the Degree of *Virtue*, may be as great as any whatsoever. Thus, not only the *Prince*, the *Statesman*, the *General*, are capable of *true Heroism*, tho these are the chief Characters, whose Fame is diffus'd thro various Nations and Ages; but when we find in an *honest Trader*, the *kind Friend*, the *faithful prudent Adviser*, the *charitable* and

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<sup>179</sup>Alexander Broadie, "The Human Mind and Its Powers." *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment*. Ed. Alexander Broadie (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2003): 60-78, esp. 60-63.

*hospitable Neighbour, the tender Husband and affectionate Parent, the sedate yet chearful Companion, the generous Assistant of Merit, the cautious Allayer of Contention and Debate, the Promoter of Love and good Understanding among Acquaintances; if we consider, that these were all the good Offices which his Station in the World gave him an Opportunity of performing to Mankind, we must judge this Character really as amiable, as those, whose external Splendor dazzles an injudicious World into an Opinion, "that they are the only Heroes in Virtue."* (194-95, emphasis in original)

In creating this universal canon, Hutcheson creates several axioms through which he constructs his measurements of the potential equality of morality in human actions. As he predicates morality upon the operations of the occult quality of intention rather than upon the external results of an action, these measurements do not quantify the amount of goodness resulting from that action but instead, like Newton's mathematical principles, attempt to quantify the manifestation of that occult quality, a figure distinct from that amount of public good. In other words, only by measuring the effects of that occult quality's powers as it triggers the instinct to benevolence, which lies in the heart, can Hutcheson, like Newton, then measure the strength of those powers.

These effects primarily are the perceptions of the moral sense of an observer to that action, and the resultant movement of that observer's body toward or away from the actor. I term this effect the "geopolitics of benevolence," and shall discuss it in the next section of this chapter; as the perceivable movement of bodies is the indirect effect of the occult power of gravity, so too the perceivable movement of bodies is the indirect effect of the occult power of benevolence. However, as Hutcheson argues that everyone can be

equally benevolent, and that everyone has a body and thus can equally accomplish public good to the extent of their ability to do so, in order to establish a method by which to calculate the extent to which each person enacts his or her capacity for benevolent intention, his mathematical formulas must also measure the interaction between benevolence and abilities, just as Newton's measure the interaction between gravity and the weight or size of bodies.

Hence, Hutcheson begins his axioms by stating that "[t]he *moral Importance* of any *Agent*, or the *Quantity of publick Good* produc'd by him, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Benevolence* and *Abilitys*" (183, emphasis in original), an axiom he quantifies with the equation  $M = B \times A$ ; that is, the Moment of Good = Benevolence x Abilitys. He then follows with the axiom, "In like manner, the *Moment of private Good*, or *Interest* produc'd by any Person to himself, is in a *compound Ratio* of his *Self-Love*, and *Abilitys*" (183, emphasis in original), which he renders as the equation  $I = S \times A$ ; that is, Interest = Self-Love x Abilitys. Public good or private good, according to Hutcheson, is the quotient of one's intention multiplied by one's abilities; the moral capacity of any human actor equals the sum total, large or small, of that equation. Public good, therefore, is not the sum total of the number of people who benefit from an action but is instead something different: the sum total of the intention behind an action multiplied by one's ability to effect it. Hutcheson defines morality as something other than the external results of an action but in part points inward, toward the motivation which generates it.

Yet what also should be immediately apparent about these formulas is that by arguing that the ability of a person to carry out that benevolent intention ("the *Quantity of publick Good* produc'd by him," [183, emphasis in original]) is, in part, an indicator of that person's moral importance, Hutcheson seemingly contradicts his repeated assertions

that moral goodness is dependent solely upon the intention itself. For it is one thing to claim that one's abilities determine the extent of the public benefits of one's actions; an action's public benefits, according to Hutcheson, are distinct from the moral qualities of the person producing the action. Thus, as different persons have different abilities to effect public good, moral qualities in part depend upon how much each person utilizes the abilities he or she has, not upon the quantity of public good created; the greater the exercise of one's abilities to produce an action which stems from a moral intention, the greater the manifestation of the intention behind the action, and the more virtuous that person.

However, it is quite different to claim that the quantity of public good produced by a person's actions equals their moral importance, and to claim further that said moral importance is in part dependent upon that person's ability to produce such good, both of which Hutcheson claims here. Simply put, a rich person has greater abilities to produce a larger amount of public good than does a poor person, not in every particular instance (a poor person, for example, has the ability to step in front of a moving weapon and to save someone's life) but in the sum total of instances. By making that latter claim, Hutcheson appears to contradict his above-stated conclusion about the egalitarian nature of benevolence as well as his essential premise that the moral quality of any actor or action is dependent solely upon that actor's intention prior to committing such an action. While Hutcheson does make clear that the intention behind an action figures into its moral quality, he seemingly focuses, at least in part, on the external effects of that action as an additional determiner of the actor's moral virtue, rather than solely on internal motivation as its determiner.

Hutcheson continues this apparent contradiction in his third and fourth axioms. In his third axiom, he states that comparing the amount of virtue contained in any two actions produced by two different persons can be accomplished by calculating the abilities of each person to produce such an action; if their abilities are equal, the moment of public good produced by them in similar circumstances is equal to each person's benevolence, or the intention of each to act for the public good, an axiom which is consonant with his moral philosophy. However, in his fourth axiom he states that if instead their benevolence is equal, and the circumstances within which they act are equal, the moment of public good is determined by the amount of their abilities to produce public good, an axiom which instead seemingly returns him to his contradictory stance that public good is, at least in part, determined by one's capacity, rather than by one's intention, to produce it; if public good is determined solely by intention, then two actors with equal benevolence will be equally moral, unless one utilizes a lesser amount of his or her abilities to produce good, a stance distinct from simply factoring the amount of abilities that each actor has in order to determine moral virtue.

Indeed, Hutcheson continues this contradiction in the fifth axiom, stating there that the benevolence of any two persons is always directly equal to the moment of good produced by their actions and is inversely equal to their abilities to produce that good. In other words, he states that each person's benevolence, which is an occult quality, is measured by the results of his or her action divided by his or her ability to produce those virtuous results. Yet, according to his moral philosophy, benevolence instead should be measured by the intention behind the action divided by the amount of total abilities utilized to manifest it, regardless of the action's results or of the actual amount of abilities that each person ultimately has.

It appears, then, that Hutcheson is of two seemingly different minds regarding how to measure, indeed even how to define, moral qualities. On the one hand, he argues for the importance of benevolence to determine the moral quality of any action; on the other hand, he argues for the importance of abilities to make such a determination. While benevolence is, of course, an occult quality, perceivable and measurable only by its effects, which are in part determined by one's abilities to produce such effects—or, more accurately, by the percentage of one's abilities that one uses to produce such effects—focusing on abilities to the extent that he does, and in the way that he does, pushes Hutcheson perilously close to defining moral qualities as the results of an action: the greater one's abilities to produce moral good, the larger the amount of moral good one produces and, therefore, the greater the moral quality of the action and the moral importance of the person who produces it.

It is, of course, quite possible that Hutcheson is simply writing unclearly here, a not unlikely possibility given the other examples of unclarity I elsewhere have noted (see, for example, my discussion in Chapter Four about Hutcheson's linguistic slippage between the terms *quality* and *idea*). Indeed, in the equation he creates from that first axiom, Hutcheson defines M not as "moral importance" but instead as "moment of good," even though he begins the axiom with a definition of "moral importance." Is "moment of good" therefore the same as "moral importance?" If so, then the moment of good produced by an actor, and that actor's moral importance, equals the quantity of public good produced by the action; in other words, it is marked solely by the results of the action, not by the actor's intention, and is at odds with Hutcheson's principle premise. But if "moment of good" and "moral importance" are not the same, then why does Hutcheson equate "moral importance" and "quantity of public good," why does he do so

prior to introducing the "moment of good" as a unit of analysis, and why does he introduce the "moment of good" as a unit of analysis in the same axiom in which he equates "moral importance" and "quantity of public good?"

In addition, if the "moment of good" does equal an action's results, Hutcheson's third axiom, which I argued above is consonant with his principle moral premise about the definition of true virtue and our equal capacity to act for it, is in actuality not consonant with it. As I noted, that axiom states that if the abilities of two actors are identical, and if the circumstances within which they act also are identical, then the moment of good produced by them is simply a manifestation of their benevolence, regardless of the amount of good so produced. However, if the moment of good equals an action's results, as my reading above indicates it seemingly can, then that axiom argues instead that the amount of public good produced by such an action (i.e., its results) is a measure of the actor's benevolence, which of course is contrary to Hutcheson's principle moral premise.

While it is clearly not possible to know for certain if such potential contradictions are simply a result of Hutcheson's ambiguous writing, or even are perhaps the inevitable byproduct of a text which breaks new intellectual ground and whose ideas then are further refined over many subsequent years of revision, debate and conversation, I would argue that they, at least in part, highlight an unresolved tension in Hutcheson's moral philosophy. On the one hand, Hutcheson clearly argues, here and throughout his *oeuvre*, that the heart's intention, not an action's results, is the true barometer of morality. By this barometer, anyone, no matter their social or economic standing, can be benevolent, for anyone can generate an action with the intention to promote public good. On the other hand, Hutcheson also argues that the moral quality of an action is not based upon the

intention to promote public good but instead is based upon an accounting of the number of people expected to be positively affected by that action:

In comparing the *moral Qualities* of Actions, in order to regulate our *Election* among various Actions propos'd, or to find which of them has the greatest *moral Excellency*, we are led by *our moral Sense* of *Virtue* to judge thus; that in *equal Degrees* of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, the *Virtue* is in proportion to the *Number* of Persons to whom the Happiness shall extend; (and here the *Dignity*, or *moral Importance* of Persons, may compensate Numbers) and in equal *Numbers*, the *Virtue* is as the *Quantity* of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the *Virtue* is in a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the *moral Evil*, or *Vice*, is as the *Degree* of Misery, and *Number* of Sufferers; so that, *that Action* is *best*, which procures the *greatest Happiness* for the greatest Numbers; and *that, worst*, which, in *like manner*, occasions *Misery*. (177-78, emphasis in original)

Here, in what is now famously seen as a precursor to utilitarianism, Hutcheson argues that morality is based upon an action's expected results rather than upon the motivation which produces it, returning even to a moral ranking of individuals which his philosophy elsewhere disclaims. Indeed, he later states that the moral sense perceives those actions as "most *perfectly Virtuous*" which "appear to have the most universal unlimited Tendency to the *greatest* and *most extensive Happiness* of all the *rational Agents*, to whom our Influence can reach" (180, emphasis in original). Thus, rather than simply perceiving a person's heart to judge the moral quality of an action, as he generally

claims it does, Hutcheson here states quite clearly that the moral sense counts numbers; virtue, he asserts, is "a *compound Ratio* of the *Quantity* of Good, and *Number* of Enjoyers" (177, emphasis in original), whether the act was undertaken solely for public good, solely for private good, or for some combination of the two.

Such an argument implies quite strongly that those with greater standing have a greater potential to be more virtuous, for they have a greater ability to affect more people positively by their actions, an implication which is completely at odds with Hutcheson's statements elsewhere that we are all equally designed to be benevolent. Indeed, even his statement that we best achieve our private happiness by focusing on public happiness does not fully resolve this contradiction. For while such a statement stems from Hutcheson's belief that anyone, regardless of abilities, can truly be benevolent, by stressing as well that utilitarian argument Hutcheson in effect states that actions which result in greater amounts of public happiness are more virtuous than those which result in lesser amounts, even when both actors are focused solely on public, not private, happiness; the results of the pursuit of happiness, in other words, rather than the intention which motivates the undertaking of it, is ultimately what matters. Thus, even if happiness is defined to be larger than solely material goods (to include, for example, rights), a definition with which Hutcheson himself would agree, the fact remains that the result of that intention to act for public happiness is emphasized at least as much as, if not more than, the intention itself.

In fact, this contradictory definition of moral virtue continues through the rest of Hutcheson's axioms. In the sixth axiom, for example, he states that "the natural Consequences of our Actions are various" (184), sometimes benefitting the actor and not the public, sometimes benefitting the public and not the actor, and sometimes benefitting

both or neither; such a statement, of course, clearly focuses on the external results of actions rather than on the internal motivations behind them, potentially setting up mathematical analyses of that crucial distinction. And, indeed, Hutcheson follows this statement with one which discusses those motivations as sometimes rooted in benevolence, sometimes in self-interest, and sometimes in a combination of the two, and he creates equations which calculate the moment of good stemming from any of those situations. He even then states that "when the *Moment of Good*, in an Action partly intended for the *Good of the Agent*, is but equal to the *Moment of Good* in the Action of *another Agent*, influenc'd only by *Benevolence*, the former is less *virtuous*; and in this Case the *Interest* must be deducted to find the true Effect of the *Benevolence*, or *Virtue*," (185, emphasis in original), presumably reiterating his original premise that benevolent intention, not public good, constitutes true virtue, and that his equations are aimed at mathematically quantifying that occult quality's external effects. Indeed, such an interpretation is not dependent upon a particular definition of "moment of good," as utilizing either of the two definitions discussed in this section still points, in this instance, to intention as the sole determiner of moral good.

Yet, at the same time, Hutcheson's language and equations in this sixth axiom betray a potentially greater linkage between the results of an action and the moral quality of that action than his statement above seemingly would indicate. Hutcheson begins the axiom with the words "But as," and then discusses the various consequences and motivations to actions paraphrased above. However, that entire discussion is actually one long sentence, the two seemingly distinct thoughts joined together by a semi-colon, as are other elements of that sentence. Consequently, it is also possible to read that sentence as stating, literally, that given that there are various consequences to our actions,

our motivations to act are rarely either purely benevolent or purely self-interested; in other words, Hutcheson states both that our motivations to act influence, at least in part, the moral results of our actions (which is in keeping with his argument about the primacy of intention) *and* that those results therefore must be included in any mathematical equation which attempts to measure the moral qualities of the motivations (which is contrary to his overall moral argument).

In fact, the formulas that Hutcheson uses in this axiom to calculate benevolence demonstrate that moral results are deduced in just this latter way. As he notes, many times actions are taken in part out of benevolence and in part out of self-interest; sometimes, he further notes, the two forces work together, and sometimes they do not. In the former situation, the moment of good can be quantified by the equation  $M = B+S \times A = BA + SA$ , in which that moment of good is equal to the sum of benevolence combined with self-interest, multiplied by the actor's material abilities. In the latter situation, the moment of good can be quantified by the equation  $M = B-S \times A = BA-SA$ , in which that moment of good is equal to the sum of benevolence minus self-interest, multiplied by the actor's material abilities. In either situation, the moment of good is equal to the total sum of the motivation to action, benevolent and/or self-interested, multiplied by the actor's abilities. The moment of good, then, which, as Hutcheson earlier stated, could also be the moral importance of the person who acts, is a quantification of the actor's intention—no matter whether that intention is benevolent or self-interested—and is also, in part, a quantification of that actor's ability to effect that intention, which of course significantly influences that action's material results. Consequently, those who have a greater ability to effect moral good will most likely have a greater amount of moral

importance and virtue, even if they use less of that ability than does a person who has a smaller amount of ability and utilizes more of it.

Indeed, even benevolence itself, Hutcheson states in that axiom, is not simply measured by one's intention to act but instead is measured by the external effects of the action; he uses the formula  $B = \frac{M-I}{A}$  to calculate the amount of benevolence in an action when it and self-interest work together, and the formula  $B = \frac{M+I}{A}$  to calculate the amount of benevolence in an action when they do not. Benevolence, then, according to these equations, is not simply the measurement of the external manifestation of an occult quality but is, in part, a measurement of the amount of good produced by an action. While benevolence and self-interest working together may produce a greater moment of public good than will benevolence and self-interest working at cross purposes, according to the principles of Hutcheson's moral philosophy, a person who creates such a greater moment of good should not be considered to be more benevolent than one whose action creates a lesser moment of good.

But here he states just the opposite—that benevolence is determined not only by intention but by the extent to which that intention is manifested in the world, a number which is surely, at least in part, influenced by the quantity of abilities possessed by the actor. Indeed, it is entirely conceivable that a person acts with a completely benevolent intention and produces no public good at all, through no fault of his or her own.

According to Hutcheson's formulas in this axiom, that person's benevolent intention will be smaller than the intention of another person who acts in part out of benevolence and in part out of self-interest, but whose action produces a large amount of public good.

Thus, even though Hutcheson then states that an actor who gains an unintended personal benefit from an action is no less benevolent than one who does not, as such

personal gain was not the intention behind the action, and even though he then follows that statement with the remark that his sixth axiom "only explains the external Marks by which Men must judge, who do not see into each others Hearts" (186), returning again to his original philosophic argument that true morality is not based upon the results of an action (the external marks) but upon its intention (the heart), his text, indeed his very equations, demonstrates something somewhat different. Consequently, when he states that, "Since then *Benevolence, or Virtue* in any *Agent*, is as  $\frac{M}{A}$ ,<sup>180</sup> or as  $\frac{M+I}{A}$ , and no *Being* can act above his *natural Ability*; that must be the Perfection of *Virtue* where  $M=A$ , or when the *Being* acts to the utmost of his Power for the *publick Good*; and hence the Perfection of *Virtue* in this Case, or  $\frac{M}{A}$ , is as *Unity*" (187, emphasis in original), stating that what matters is not the amount of that agent's abilities but how much of those abilities he or she utilizes in action, such a formulation must be read alongside his statements to the contrary. For it is not just that his pre-utilitarian statement that that action is best which produces the greatest amount of happiness posits a different viewpoint; throughout his axioms runs an alternative reading which focuses on results (i.e., the greatest amount of happiness), not on intention. Hutcheson's formulas demonstrate that his philosophy contains internal contradictions; indeed, his formulas calculate the very manifestations of those contradictions in human interactions.

My intention here is not to argue that the contradictions in Hutcheson's work undercut his moral philosophy, but rather is to understand their existence, for his emphasis on benevolent intention to produce public happiness, even with his utilitarian

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<sup>180</sup>This is probably an uncorrected printer's typo for  $B=\frac{M-I}{A}$ , as in the sixth axiom Hutcheson creates that equation to calculate the amount of benevolence in an action when it and self-interest work together, and  $B=\frac{M+I}{A}$  when they do not.

statements about results, is clearly distinct from an emphasis solely on individual advantage. Indeed, part of the difficulty of Hutcheson's mathematical and philosophical argument is simply the difficulty inherent in measuring occult qualities. Newton, for example, for over twenty years prior to the publication of the *Principia*, had been working out the problems of explicating the mathematical principles necessary to achieve such an end; twenty years prior to the publication of the *Inquiry*, Hutcheson was eleven years old, and it is highly doubtful that he was thinking then in the way, and with the sophistication, in which he was thinking in the 1720s.

In fact, such a contradiction may be inevitable given what Hutcheson is trying to accomplish. By defining morality as the intention to produce a greater good—that is, as something which occurs prior to action—rather than as the results of that action, he defines morality as that which is hidden, and which, like other occult qualities, only can be made visible indirectly. He therefore attempts to measure it in the only way possible—by its effects. But, according to his moral philosophy, those effects cannot be simply the quantity of public good produced by an action, for such a quantity could be produced by a self-interested intention as much as it could be produced by a benevolent one. What, then, can those effects be? Hutcheson attempts to answer that question by stating that true virtue is acting to the best of our abilities to promote the good of the public, and that we actually promote our private interests by doing so. But in so stating, he in part elides the distinction between our motivation to action, no matter the results, and the concrete results of that action, for his ideal society contains both: it is important to act for the greater good, and as much as we can do that, our actions produce good. Hutcheson's moral philosophy, that is, focuses necessarily not just on each individual's heart but also on the circulation of happiness in society, for a truly moral society is one

whose members look to each other, not to themselves. Thus, while the intention to act for public happiness may well be the most moral intention, unless that public happiness is to a certain extent actualized, such a society will not be able to remain morally virtuous.

It is just this dual focus of benevolence in human action which Hutcheson's equations attempt to quantify, demonstrating his belief that morality is a system, with an inherent regularity and order, whose effects can be captured and studied through the mathematical principles of natural philosophy, as can the effects of any other system. He thus states that "[t]he same Axioms may be apply'd to compute the *moral Evil* in Actions" (187, emphasis in original), as his system is one in which the scientific study of any form of morality is possible. For if, as he says, benevolence and self-interest are forces which operate equally upon the human body, then it stands to reason that the computations used to measure the effects of one force on the body would be the same computations used to measure the effects of the other.

In fact, Hutcheson even uses mathematics in part to explain the powers of the sense of beauty, stating in the first treatise of the *Inquiry*:

But what we call Beautiful in Objects, to speak in the Mathematical Style, seems to be a compound *Ratio* of *Uniformity* and *Variety*: so that where the *Uniformity* of Bodys is equal, the Beauty is as the *Variety*; and where the *Variety* is equal, the Beauty is as the *Uniformity* . . . (17, emphasis in original)

He then discusses the beauty of mathematical figures and theorems,<sup>181</sup> noting that this beauty is directly proportional either to the increase of variety while uniformity is equal

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<sup>181</sup>Section 3 of the first treatise is entitled "Of the Beauty of Theorems."

(so that a square is more beautiful than an equilateral triangle), or of uniformity while variety is equal (so that a square is more beautiful than a rhombus, because the four corners of the former are all the same).

Yet Hutcheson also notes that either variety or uniformity can increase so much that figures are no longer beautiful, as the sheer number can overwhelm our perception. Furthermore, as he consistently argues throughout the *Inquiry* that the pleasures of the internal senses are more powerful than those of the external senses, he thereby implies that that pleasure is in part mathematical, an argument in keeping with the pleasure we feel when we perceive the beauty of God's design of an orderly universe, structured by universal forces, such as gravitation, the knowledge of which we find beautiful:

[W]hat can exhibit a greater Instance of *Uniformity amidst Variety*, than the constant Tenour of Revolutions in nearly equal Times, in each *Planet*, around its Axis, and the central Fire or Sun, thro all the Ages of which we have any Records, and in nearly the same Orbit? by which, after certain Periods, all the same Appearances are again renew'd; the alternate Successions of *Light and Shade*, or *Day and Night*, constantly pursuing each other around each *Planet*, with an agreeable and regular Diversity in the Times they possess the several Hemispheres, in the *Summer, Harvest, Winter and Spring*; and the various *Phases, Aspects*, and *Situations*, of the *Planets* to each other, their *Conjunctions* and *Oppositions*, in which they suddenly darken each other with their Conick Shades in Eclipses, are repeated to us at their fixed Periods within variable Constancy: These are the *Beautys* which charm the

*Astronomer*, and make his tedious Calculations pleasant. (21, emphasis in original)<sup>182</sup>

Consequently, Hutcheson follows Newton in his attempts to quantify the material effects of this beautiful occult. If benevolence and self-interest are forces which act upon the body, and if the operations of benevolence are like those of gravity, that means that Hutcheson must conceive of benevolence as an attractive, occult force which affects human bodies by stimulating them to action, just as Newton claims that gravity is an attractive, occult force which affects all bodies by stimulating them to action. Furthermore, Hutcheson must conceive of benevolence as a force which, like gravity, establishes order out of potential chaos (in this case, out of the social chaos of unregulated self-interest) to create a well-run and smoothly-regulated society, an argument which, intriguingly enough, places him in agreement with Hobbes, who also sees self-interest as leading to social chaos but who obviously proposes a radically different solution to that problem. Hutcheson argues that benevolence does this by operating under the same principles throughout societies, throughout the planet and, indeed, throughout the solar system, enabling it to be mathematically studied just as Newton argues can and should be done with any and all external forces, whether or not they are occult. While his equations do not show the results of those effects on the human body, they imply that the greater the M or B from or of an action, the closer bodies will be to each other: the body of the person who acted, and the body or bodies of the person(s) who witness(es) or receive(s) the action. By examining more closely these

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<sup>182</sup>See, also: "In the search of *Nature* there is the like *Beauty* in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do flow. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir Isaac Newton's Scheme . . ." (34).

principles, and their relationship to the movement of physical bodies, as well as to the increase or decrease of the physical distance between those bodies, the operations of Hutcheson's ideal, affective society in the physical world become clear.

#### The Geopolitics of Benevolence

Hutcheson's statement that benevolence is stronger between two people who are geographically closer to each other, strongest when those two people touch each other, and weaker between people who are further away from each other means that benevolence, like gravity, is a sympathetic, centripetal force, while self-interest is an antipathetic, centrifugal one.<sup>183</sup> In fact, by arguing for the similarity between these two occult qualities, Hutcheson implies also that benevolence, again like gravity, is never so weak that it has no effect; people can never become completely self-interested, as society then would disintegrate into anarchy, just as gravity can never cease, as the planets then would fly out of the solar system. This means as well that our instinct to benevolence is never so weak that it cannot respond, in at least some degree, to that occult quality, for that instinct, like the moral sense, is part of the frame of our nature—designed by God and therefore, to a certain degree, immutable. As Hutcheson states, the moral sense, "like our other Senses, tho counter-acted from Motives of *external Advantage*, which are stronger than it, ceases not to operate, but has Strength enough to make us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd*

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<sup>183</sup>See, e.g., the *Principia*, Book I, Section II, "The Determination of Centripetal Forces, Proposition 4, Theorem 4:

[I]f a body by means of its gravity revolves in a circle concentric to the earth, this gravity is the centripetal force of that body. But from the descent of heavy bodies, the time of one entire revolution, as well as the arc described in any given time, is given (by Cor. IX of this Prop.). And by such propositions, Mr. Huygens, in his excellent book *De horologio oscillatorio*, has compared the force of gravity with the centrifugal forces of revolving bodies.

with our selves; even as the *Sense of Tasting* makes us loath, and dislike the nauseous Potion which we may force our selves, from Interest, to swallow" (198, emphasis in original); he claims also that while the moral sense may be weakened, "it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it" (267). Similarly, our instinct to benevolence, also part of our bodies, never ceases to function, even when another person is far away or when we seemingly succumb to self-interest, for the "*Frame of our Nature . . . is wonderfully adapted to promote Benevolence*" (163, emphasis in original); our bodies are designed to act for the greater good.

Hutcheson thus further contrasts his moral philosophy with that of Hobbes and of Locke, for he argues that it is benevolence, not self-interest, which provides the necessary social glue between human bodies and which thereby holds society together. In fact, just as the order and structure of the universe is dependent upon the attractive powers of gravity becoming increasingly stronger as the distance between two bodies diminishes, rather than being constant no matter the distance between them, so too the order and structure of society is dependent upon the attractive powers of benevolence operating in this selfsame fashion. For the loving bonds that it creates between people leads those who are physically closer to each other, and who therefore presumably have greater contact with each other, to feel a greater love for each other, and consequently to feel as well a greater desire to act for each other's good, than do those who are further away from each other and who therefore presumably have less interpersonal contact, especially in a time preceding email, the internet, instant messages, blackberries, airplanes and other forms of immediate communication and travel:

Now because of the vast Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habitations,  
and the Incapacity of any one to be remarkably useful to vast

Multitudes; that our *Benevolence* might not be quite distracted with a multiplicity of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or become useless, by being equally extended to Multitudes at vast distances, whose Interests we could not understand, nor be capable of promoting, having no *Intercourse* of Offices with them; Nature has more powerfully determin'd us to *admire*, and *love* the *moral Quality*s of others which affect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of *Good-will* toward those who are *beneficent* to our selves. This we call *Gratitude*. And thus a Foundation is laid for *joyful Associations* in all kinds of *Business*, and *virtuous Friendships*.  
(218-19, emphasis in original)

Thus, the occult quality of benevolence, through its interactions with the frame of our nature, enables the formation of societies whose members' innate, physiologically-based instinct for acting for the greater good and whose innate, physiologically-based moral sense are both stimulated with increasing strength as the geographical distance between such members decreases, drawing people closer together until they come to touch each other through the same sympathetic, attractive powers by which gravity operates. Physical distance between bodies is the direct determiner of, and perceivable indicator of, the strength of benevolence and of societal formation, just as it is of the strength of gravity and of the structure of the solar system. Hutcheson argues that benevolence, like gravity, is strongest when bodies touch, a touch which makes benevolence most visible.

The difference, of course, is that Hutcheson, unlike Newton, analyzes the operations of human bodies specifically rather than the operations of bodies in general; in

Hutcheson's schema, it is human bodies which are drawn increasingly closer to each other through the power of benevolence. In part, such human contact is simply the pleasures of society, pleasures which reinforce the desire to act for the public good and which clearly result most often from interactions among those with whom we come into the most frequent contact; our inherent social nature makes benevolence act more powerfully upon those who relate to each other regularly, for Hutcheson makes clear that the pleasure we feel from human interaction precedes any type of social learning: "[O]ur *Nature* it self leads us into *Friendship, Trust, and mutual Confidence* (209, emphasis in original). Indeed, as I discuss in Chapter Six, he claims that the pleasures of society are greater than the pleasures of the external senses,<sup>184</sup> displaying in this argument one of Shaftesbury's principle influences upon his philosophy.

I shall discuss at greater length in Chapter Six the key role of pleasure in Hutcheson's affective schema, especially of the bodily effects of social pleasure, and how such pleasure is crucial to his utilization of the sympathies and antipathies in his moral and social vision. It is, in fact, this physical and physiological grounding of social pleasure which I call affective desire: the stimulation of our internal instinct to benevolence and of our internal moral sense, both of which reside in the heart, by the occult quality of benevolence, a stimulation which leads to a physiological pleasure by which human bodies not only come to touch each other but act in the particular ways necessary to initiate and to continue such contact. Affective desire, I shall argue, creates Hutcheson's ideal society.

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<sup>184</sup>This is, in effect, Hutcheson's argument in II.6., "*Concerning the Importance of this moral Sense to the present Happiness of Mankind, and its Influence on human Affairs*" (emphasis in original).

What is crucial to discuss here is the relationship between love, geography and societal formation. For if benevolence acts more powerfully upon the bodies of humans who are physically closer to, or who are in physical contact with, each other than it does upon those who are further away from each other, and if society itself is inherent to us, that means that the bonds of society are stronger between those who are geographically closer to each other and that those bonds are strongest between those whose bodies are touching; society, in other words, is an affective community whose members love each other and who act benevolently toward each other, an emotion and a force which stem from, and which interact with, each member's instinct to benevolence and each member's moral sense—i.e., each member's body. For as I discussed in Chapter Four, in Hutcheson's affective body, the emotional feeling of love and the physiological feeling of love, for all intents and purposes, are simultaneous. Indeed, as I noted earlier, Hutcheson claims that there is a "*secret chain* between *each Person* and *Mankind* (121, emphasis in original), whereby the actions of one are felt by all others who witness them, hear about them, read about them or find out about them in some other way, and who then respond by feeling love for those who act out of such love. That secret chain, hidden like all occult qualities are from direct perception, is formed by the bonds of benevolence.

But since Hutcheson claims that benevolence, as an attractive force, is stronger the closer that human bodies are to each other, and is weaker the further away they are from each other, such affective communities have clear geographic limitations:

*This increase of Love toward the Benevolent, according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits, is observable in the high degree of Love, which Heroes and Law-givers universally obtain in their own Countrys, above what they find abroad, even among those who are*

not insensible of their Virtues; and in all the strong Ties of *Friendship, Acquaintance, Neighbourhood, Partnership*; which are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society. (220, emphasis in original)

As Hutcheson argues, the physically nearer we are to those who act benevolently, the more our love for them increases. That love, of course, is dependent upon the moral sense's perception of such persons' benevolent intentions; love is the emotional and physiological end product of such a perception. But, as is the case with gravity, this occult quality operates within particular spatial parameters. Benevolent heroes and lawgivers are greatly loved by residents of their same country but are less loved by those who live in other countries, even when those foreigners are cognizant of their good qualities, because the capacity of the occult quality of benevolence to act upon the human body diminishes as the distance increases between the benevolent actor and those who perceive that actor's benevolent intentions, just as the capacity of the occult quality of gravity to attract bodies diminishes as the distance between those bodies increases. While residents of another country are still capable of perceiving the benevolence of such heroes and lawgivers and of responding accordingly, the perceptions of their individual moral senses are not as powerful, and the resultant love therefore is not as strong, as is the perception and the love that heroes and lawgivers receive from their compatriots who are literally geographically closer to them.

In this schema, the moral sense acts no differently than does, for example, the sense of hearing, whose perceptions are weaker the greater the distance from the entity making a sound. Thus, the love which in part stems from the moral sense's perception of benevolent actors, and which additionally in part stems from the benevolence of those

actors, also underlies all other forms of human relations, strengthening the social bonds we have with those with whom we are geographically close enough to come into regular contact, and thereby structuring and ordering society accordingly; the greater the proximity, the greater the contact, the greater the increase in love, and the greater the force with which bodies come to touch each other.

While Hutcheson does not focus extensively on the spatial implications of his argument, he does make clear that benevolence operates and extends through geographic circles of intimacy, just as gravity operates and extends in a similar geographic circumference. The strongest bonds are between members of one's immediate family, who all live in the same household, whose children presumably come from the same body, and who theoretically have the most contact with each other day in and day out; the next strongest bonds are between one's neighbors and friends:<sup>185</sup>

If we observe any *Neighbours*, from whom perhaps we have receiv'd no good Offices, form'd into *Friendships*, *Familys*, *Partnerships*, and with Honesty and Kindness assisting each other; pray ask any Mortal if he would not be better pleas'd with their *Prosperity*, when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own, than with their *Misery*, and *Ruin*; and you shall find a *Bond of Benevolence* further extended than a *Family* and *Children*, altho the Ties are not so strong. (158, emphasis in original)

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<sup>185</sup>"There are some nearer and stronger Degrees of *Benevolence*, when the Objects stand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtained distinct Names; such as *natural Affection*, and *Gratitude*; . . . there is the same kind of *Affection* among *collateral Relations* [as of parents to children], tho in a weaker degree" (216-17, emphasis in original).

Hutcheson here clearly states that witnessing a benevolent group of people who live geographically close to the observer, and who have established ongoing virtuous relationships with each other, leads that observer to desire their prosperity and to feel, as well as presumably to act, benevolently toward them, individually and collectively. Thus, while his statement "when their Interests are no way inconsistent with his own" can be read to mean that the observer will only be so pleased when the interests of the observer and the interests of the neighbors align, the text immediately preceding and following this quote indicates just the opposite. For Hutcheson introduces this scenario by stating:

If then the observing a *moral Capacity* can be the occasion of increasing Love without *Self-Interest*, even from the *Frame* of our *Nature*; pray, may not *this* be a Foundation of *weaker* degrees of Love where there is no preceding tie of Parentage, and extend it to *all Mankind*?

And that this is so in fact, will appear by considering some more distant Attachments. (158, emphasis in original)

Hutcheson, therefore, in part introduces this scenario of the neighbors by simply repeating his argument that observing morality in action can lead the observer to disinterestedly love the moral actor. But he here goes further, placing this love within a larger analysis of loving human attachments, which can exist in forms other than that of parent/child and which, though weaker than that familial bond, are still strong enough to unite all humans through bonds of benevolence. Indeed, the word "distant" itself has a double meaning, both of which are relevant here; it refers to attachments that are not part of the nuclear family as well as to attachments that span a greater geographic area,

highlighting the connection between the strength of the benevolent bond and the magnitude of the physical space that such a bond must travel. He then uses the scenario of the neighbors to prove that argument, following it by stating, as I quoted above, "[A]nd you shall find a *Bond of Benevolence* further extended than a *Family and Children*, altho the Ties are not so strong" (158, emphasis in original), essentially returning to his original introductory statement.

Hutcheson's point, then, is clear: observing bonds of benevolence between people, whether those bonds are based upon familial or nonfamilial relations, and observing as well the virtuous ways in which those joined by such bonds act toward each other, brings out in the observer a desire for those actors' happiness, whether or not the interests of the observer and the interests of those moral actors are aligned. In fact, even if they are aligned, and the observer potentially could benefit from those actions or even could be at a disadvantage because he is in competition with those actors for the same interest, the observer still, no matter any possible gain or loss, desires the happiness of those actors because the observer's moral sense responds with love for those actors upon perceiving the benevolent bonds between them. Observing a group of people acting morally toward each other leads the observer to desire that each member of the group thrive, creating a bond of love between that observer and all such group members.

While Hutcheson consistently states that such a bond of love between the observer and the actors is not as strong as is a familial one, his choice of comparison indicates just how strong such a bond of benevolence actually is. For by choosing to make that particular comparison, Hutcheson, through metonymy, provides further evidence of the power of benevolent bonds between people. The strongest are those of the immediate family; move beyond the family and the bonds are still strong between

those with whom one comes in regular contact. As people are further away from each other, and have less contact with each other, the bonds of benevolence are weaker, both because of that reduced contact and because they have a further geographic distance to travel; however, to say that they are weaker does not mean that they are weak:

Again, suppose a Person, for Trade, had left his *native Country*, and with all his Kindred had settled his Fortunes abroad, without any View of returning; and only imagine he had receiv'd no Injurys from his Country: ask such a Man, would it give him no Please to hear of the *Prosperity* of his Country? Or could he, now that his Interests are separated from that of his Nation, as gladly hear that it was laid *waste* by *Tyranny* or a *foreign Power*? I fancy his Answer would shew us a *Benevolence* extended beyond *Neighbourhoods* or *Acquaintances*. (158-59, emphasis in original).

In a sense, Hutcheson simply repeats, on a literally larger scale, a point he consistently makes through the *Inquiry*: that perceiving benevolence produces in the observer, through the process of sense and sensation, a physiologically-based, disinterested love for the moral actor. Yet such a paradigm does not fully support his ultimately social vision, as it maintains such moral love between two, and possibly three, people: the actor, the observer and, perhaps, the recipient. While such a figuration is important, it has the ultimate effect of keeping such moral love private. Hutcheson, though, in spite of his inconsistent definitions of moral good, does consistently argue that what matters is public good, not private good. Consequently, crucial also to his moral vision are the ways in which benevolence forms bonds between moral actors as well as,

presumably, between the actor and the observer, so that virtue and love circulate among multiple bodies to form moral, affective communities.

In the above scenario, for example, not only does the observer's moral sense respond to the benevolent actions of his or her neighbors, it responds as well to their benevolent attachments to each other that result in the creation of such affective communities. Benevolence, then, for Hutcheson, is not only the disinterested virtue to which the moral sense of the observer responds most positively and pleasurably; it is also the social glue which brings together those benevolent actors by creating closer attachments between them. For as Hutcheson states at the end of that scenario, "*Benevolence* [is] in some degree extended to all Mankind, where there is no *interfering* Interest, which from *Self-Love* may obstruct it (159, emphasis in original). Benevolence, in his schema, crosses geographic barriers, linking all human beings in those bonds of love and affection.

Yet, although benevolence is "extended to all Mankind," as Hutcheson's qualifying phrase "in some degree" reminds us, such extended benevolence is weaker than that which has less distance to travel. It is for this reason that Hutcheson argues also that benevolence is the foundation of national identity, rather than arguing for an eighteenth-century version of a one-world nation. For if love is the basis of human ties, if such love is dependent upon human proximity for its strength, and if those ties "are exceedingly necessary to the Order and Happiness of human Society" (220), then it stands to reason that the very concept of "country," or even of civil society, is workable only within set geographic parameters; if a country is too big, the occult quality of benevolence has too far to travel and those necessary ties will be too weak to be operative, just as the pull of the sun's gravity does not extend to solar systems beyond our

own. In such a situation, the happiness of human society will not be fulfilled, and the country cannot reinforce the necessary acts of love. Thus, Hutcheson contends that it is benevolent and pleasurable social interactions which form the nation, for it is those interactions which provide the happiness of human society:

Whatever place we have liv'd in for any considerable time, there we have most distinctly remark'd the *various Affections of human Nature*; we have known many *lovely Characters*; we remember the *Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural Affections*, and other *human Sentiments*: our *moral Sense* determines us to approve these *lovely Dispositions* where we have most distinctly observ'd them; and our *Benevolence* concerns us in the Interests of the Persons possess'd of them. When we come to observe the like as distinctly in *another Country*, we begin to acquire a *national Love* toward it also . . . (160, emphasis in original)

The nation, accordingly, is a large-scale affective community, comprised of individuals who act benevolently toward each other and who consequently form loving emotional attachments with each other. It is for this reason that the benevolent heroes and lawgivers of one country will be loved less strongly by citizens of a different country, for the geographic distance separating them means that there are fewer, if any, interactions between them, and thus fewer, if any, opportunities for social bonds to develop; the moral senses of the foreign observers will respond to those benevolent actors, but as there are likely to be hardly any associations, friendships or other human relations between them, that love will be less powerful than will the love of those benevolent actors' compatriots, who either directly form such relations with them or who directly benefit from their benevolence. Benevolence, in other words, is not only

stronger between bodies which are physically closer to each other, the increased human interactions enabled by such increasing proximity makes benevolence stronger still; as such interactions stem from our social nature, the more we engage with others the more we become who God intended us to be, and the more we then physiologically respond, through our hearts, to that external, occult quality. Geography, therefore, impacts the strength of benevolence not only through distance but also through association; the geographic limits of association form the geographic limits of the nation.

Yet as we will of course not have contact with everyone within that national state, and therefore not love every member of it, the nation itself is dependent for its very existence upon the benevolent social relations occurring in the more locally-based affective communities within it, whose members do form those loving attachments with and to each other. These smaller-scale communities, in turn, presumably develop social, affective and benevolent relations with each other through the regular contact of commerce, travel, letters and other ongoing forms of human interactions, all of which must occur frequently enough for benevolence to operate with sufficient attractive force to pull them toward each other. Should such communities be at too great a distance for these interactions to occur, or be at a distance whereby they can only occur infrequently, benevolence will not have sufficient power to stimulate love and affection, these communities will not feel connected to each other, and they therefore cannot be part of the same nation, as such a nation will not retain the love and affection of all its citizens. The nation, therefore, can only exist and function in a geographic area small enough for such social bonds to form between those citizens' bodies, whose physiological bonds in turn hold the nation together.

Although not the ostensible focus of his treatise, Hutcheson's argument about the relationship between geography, benevolence, and social and national formation clearly is one which recurs throughout eighteenth-century political philosophy—for example, in Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* and in the debates over the ratification of the Constitution—and is the argument to which I shall return in my analysis of *The Federalist Papers* in Chapter Seven. What is important to reiterate here, though, is the central place of the human body in Hutcheson's schema. For Hutcheson insists that our social nature is an inherent part of our bodies, and insists that benevolence, as an external occult force, stimulates particular elements of the human body, attracting bodies toward each other and becoming strongest when those bodies come to touch each other. From its power to draw bodies together, benevolence forms the affective relations which underpin society. Societies and nations, according to Hutcheson, are dependent upon one human body feeling a disinterested love for, and consequently being physically drawn toward, another human body; like the solar system, they are formed by the operations of an attractive, occult quality. The smaller the society or the nation—i.e., the closer bodies are toward each other—the stronger the bonds which hold it together.

It is here, then, that Hutcheson's image of the secret chain which connects all humans to each other takes on fuller resonance. Evelyn L. Forget discusses briefly the German Jesuit natural philosopher Athanasius Kircher's study of magnetism, *Magneticum Naturae Regnum sive Disceptatio Physiologica*, published in 1667. According to Forget, the frontispiece of Kircher's text depicts Platonic rings emanating from God's hand, stringing themselves out into chains which unite all the pieces of a harmonious universe; the Latin motto reads "The world is tied by secret knots" (296-7). This literal picture of secret chains of Platonic rings which are invisible to the human eye

yet which, through their occult force, link together seemingly disparate entities to express God's design clearly is an earlier manifestation of Hutcheson's image by which humans are linked to each other through the occult quality of benevolence. Both instances of this image give expression to the then-common conception that material entities exist in the world, unperceived by our external senses, which join all bodies to each other so that the actions of one perceptibly impact the actions of all others. Indeed, Hutcheson even calls the moral sense a "secret sense" (122), which acts imperceptibly to form such a secret chain, again mirroring linguistically, as well as scientifically, the operations and the powers of Kircher's secret knots.

At Kircher's and Hutcheson's images illustrate, and as the natural philosophic principles upon which they are based demonstrate, these secret entities have a power which, in many respects, is greater than that of entities which we can perceive, for it is in this unperceivable realm that the ties that bind us exist; as Hutcheson states, it is in this realm that each of our interests is connected to the interests of everyone else to form friendships, associations, partnerships, nations and, indeed, cross-national affections. Thus, not only does our personal interest become the personal interest of all humanity, reinforcing the essentially public nature of what is ostensibly not public, that interest joins all of humanity together, for Hutcheson's secret chain extends to every human being, anywhere on the planet, whether alive or dead, whether real or fictional, like Kircher's secret knots tying together the world: "Whence this *Love, Compassion, Indignation* and *Hatred* toward even *feign'd Characters*, in the most distant Ages, and Nations, according as they appear *Kind, Faithful, Compassionate*, or of the *opposite Dispositions*, toward their imaginary Contemporaries?" (121, emphasis in original).

Thus, while Kircher discusses the magnetic qualities of bodies to attract or to repel each other, Hutcheson works with that already-existing image to argue that it is specifically human bodies which are joined together through the powers of a universal benevolence, thereby demonstrating again the assumed commonality of different types of bodies as he utilizes the principles of natural philosophy to develop his moral argument. Following the laws of attraction, human bodies move closer to the bodies of those persons who act for the greater good, for the heart of one attracts the heart of another. It is that love which forms the social bonds which in turn form local and national networks of association. Each of us, Hutcheson claims, is part of an invisible web of relations which connects us to every other human being. This connection is moral and emotional, and as such, takes us out of our individual selves and places us within the largest possible social context. From the human heart, where our instinct to benevolence and our moral sense lie, our social being extends outward.

Thus, those who live greater distances from each other still feel the operations of benevolence, for benevolence is a force which creates the interconnections by which they can feel familiarity, and hence attachments and identifications. That is, when the counterposing, centrifugal force of self-interest does not weaken either the actions of the moral sense or of our instinct to benevolence, benevolent affections circulate throughout the planet. The power of such affective bonds is weaker the further the affections must circulate, again both because of the distance they must travel and because they engender fewer associations between moral beings, but they can still regulate the order and structure of human relations—e.g., through the form of treaties, trade relations and other types of friendly associations into which nations, or individuals within each of those nations, can and do enter. Indeed, Hutcheson even states that, "had we any Notions of

*rational Agents*, capable of moral Affections, in the *most distant Planets*, our *good Wishes* would still attend them, and we should *delight* in their Happiness" (159, emphasis added). The power of benevolence to form bonds of affection between beings capable of moral action can even travel through outer space.

Hutcheson's second treatise, then, is in part a study of this transplanetary, or at least transnational, circulation of affection between benevolent beings, even while it is simultaneously a study of the effects of this circulation to the formation of individual, affective societies. This circulation is not at all random but rather is quite orderly, for "wherever we find a Determination among several rational Agents to *mutual Love*, let *each Individual* be look'd upon as a *Part* of a great *Whole*, or *System*, and concern himself in the *publick Good* of it" (157, emphasis in original). His use here of the word "system" simply reinforces the notion that he perceives such circulation as part of a structured design in which affection travels between the bodies of all benevolent humans who are working for the greater good in the exact same way that other phenomena of nature, to use Newton's language, are created and sustained by the sympathies and the antipathies. The very acts of disinterested kindness we perform for each other are not solely individual acts, privately done and privately received, but have a public role in sustaining that larger good and in strengthening the links of that secret chain which ultimately form human society. As elements of a design, it is possible to utilize the scientific method to study the workings of the system as a whole, as well as of its individual elements, in order to understand better how each part interacts with other parts to maintain that larger system.

Therefore, while Hutcheson is perhaps best known for his theorizing of the moral sense, it is important to note that such theorizing is in fact part of a larger theory of

human behavior and relations which is based upon the operations of benevolence. Benevolence, in Hutcheson's paradigm, is a material presence in the world, joining together through the kind affections the heart, and therefore the body, of the actor and the heart, and therefore the body, of the observer. It has "*universal Extent*" (155, emphasis in original), circulating far and wide to create affective relations between human beings whose bodies are stimulated to act virtuously. There is, therefore, in Hutcheson's schema, an abundance of love directed at others, a love which stems from moral actions and from our physiological responses to those actions. These multiple affective bonds are created and strengthened through benevolence, a circulation of outwardly-focused affection which is key to Hutcheson's social vision.

It is here, perhaps, that Hutcheson's break with orthodox Calvinism (whether, for example, Puritanism or Scottish Reformed Scholasticism) is most apparent. In that orthodox view, human nature and the desires of the human body are inherently sinful as a result of the Fall, and the best we can hope for in this postlapsarian world is the beneficence of God's grace, a saving gesture which he bestows only upon a select few. In Hutcheson's philosophy, however, all of us have received God's grace, for the sign of that grace is that very same human body, which He designed to respond initially, and most strongly, to the love of and from others. As God designed the forces of the universe, and then left them to run under the principles that He established, so too He designed benevolence as a force which affects human bodies through the same principles by which other external forces affect bodies. Hutcheson applies the tenets of the scientific method in order to study the principles by which the force of benevolence operates.

But benevolence, in Hutcheson's schema, is not only geographical, physiological and social, it is also political. For as I argued in the first section of Chapter Two, in the

early eighteenth century, the definition of *social* or of *society* was different from ours, encompassing multiple realms of human interaction, including those which we today instead would consider to be *political*. As benevolence engages our bodies to shape the rules of conduct upon which affective communities are founded, it forms not only the parameters of social interactions but, as well, the basis of natural law; Hutcheson argues: "From this Sense [i.e., the moral sense] too we derive our Ideas of Rights" (277), and states also that "our *moral Sense* . . . may adjust the *Rights of Mankind*" (288, emphasis in original). From the perceptions of the moral sense, which leads us to love, both emotionally and physiologically, the benevolent actors with whom we form an affective community (that is, through feeling), civil society is founded.

Hutcheson, thus, like Locke, argues that our rights stem from our bodies. Unlike Locke, however, who sees rights as anchored in the private realm of property, Hutcheson instead sees rights as anchored in the public realm of benevolence:

Whenever it appears to us, that *a Faculty of doing, demanding, or possessing any thing, universally allow'd in certain Circumstances, would in the whole tend to the General Good*, we say that any Person in such Circumstances, has *a Right to do, possess, or demand that Thing*. And according as this Tendency to the *publick Good* is *greater or less*, the *Right* is *greater or Less*. (277, emphasis in original)

This distinction between Hutcheson's and Locke's conceptions of the origins of our rights is of enormous consequence. As I argued in Chapter Two, Hutcheson's political theory, to a large extent, has been ignored or, at best, misunderstood; generally, his moral philosophy has been perceived as being apolitical (i.e., concerned solely with ethics), or as containing a political element which is understood to be either Lockean or republican.

As should by now be apparent, Hutcheson's philosophy is anything but apolitical. But while he clearly owes a significant intellectual debt to Locke, Hutcheson's claim that our rights stem from the perceptions of the moral sense (i.e., "Whenever it *appears* to us," emphasis added) is a radically different conception of the origin of our rights than is Locke's argument that they stem from our desire to protect private property.

Locke's political theory, as I have argued, is founded upon self-interest; it is in our interest to protect the fruit of our labors, and we balance our individual interests with those of others in order to form civil society. Hutcheson, though, states that the right to do, possess or demand a thing is greater or lesser as such doing, demanding or possessing tends to the greater good; rights, in other words, stem from benevolence. Self-interest, in his natural philosophic conception, tears society apart. As the occult quality of benevolence stimulates our instinct to act for the greater good, and as it stimulates as well our moral sense's perceptions of actions as either intended or as not intended for that greater good, it literally moves our bodies to act and to interact in particular ways. But as Hutcheson argues that "there can be no *Right*, or *Limitation of Right*, inconsistent with, or opposite to the greatest publick Good" (298, emphasis in original), he in effect argues that there can be no right or limitation of right inconsistent with the design of our bodies. The societies and nations formed by benevolence protect our rights when they enable our bodies to act in the ways in which they were designed to act: to love, and to literally move closer to those who love.

Hutcheson and Locke, therefore, each argue that our rights stem from our respective abilities to realize the frame of our nature; however, their conceptions of how that frame is designed are diametrically opposed. It is for this reason that Hutcheson examines at length the effects of the fruits of our labors, highlighting his differences with

Locke, for whom labor is central, and stressing in contrast the communitarian nature of his moral philosophy. Hutcheson agrees with Locke that these fruits are critical to a healthy and functioning society, but claims that they are important not because they promote self-interest but because they promote the greater good.

As part of his argument, Hutcheson states that rights are perfect or imperfect.<sup>186</sup> The former are essential to the functioning of society,<sup>187</sup> and violating them leads necessarily to a state of war (e.g., "the Rights of *punishing criminals*," [278, emphasis in original]); the latter are important but not crucial to public happiness,<sup>188</sup> and their violation does not constitute a state of war. Indeed, punishing someone for violating imperfect rights as if they have violated perfect rights is itself a greater evil than is violating imperfect rights. As our rights stem from benevolence, and as Hutcheson's ideal society is an affective community whose members all act for the public good, perfect rights are those essential to the ability of our bodies to act in the ways in which they were designed to act, while imperfect rights are useful, but not necessary, for our bodies to so behave.

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<sup>186</sup>Hutcheson also states that there are external rights, which are those rights of an individual to assert a claim which might violate the imperfect rights of another; denying the ability to assert such a claim is actually more injurious to that individual than is the violation of the imperfect right. However, he spends very little time discussing these rights, so I am omitting them from my discussion here.

<sup>187</sup>Perfect rights "are of *such necessity to the publick Good, that the universal Violation of them would make human Life intolerable*; and it actually makes those miserable, whose *Rights* are thus *violated*" (277, emphasis in original).

<sup>188</sup>Imperfect rights "are *such as, when universally violated, would not necessarily make Men miserable*. These *Rights* tend to the improvement and increase of *positive Good* in any Society, but are not *absolutely* necessary to prevent universal Misery" (279, emphasis in original).

Hutcheson states that the fruits of our labors is a perfect right (278). But he gives these fruits a very different import than does Locke; they become a perfect right not because they protect our self-interest but because each of our interests is interlocked with those of everyone else with whom we form a society. They enable us not to remove property from society but to promote benevolence through the circulation of property. Hutcheson uses the same language as does Locke to argue a radically different purpose:

It is well known, that *general Benevolence* alone, is not a Motive strong enough to *Industry*, to bear *Labour* and *Toil*, and many other Difficultys which we are averse to from *Self-love*. For the strengthening therefore our Motives to *Industry*, we have the strongest Attractions of *Blood*, of *Friendship*, of *Gratitude*, and the additional Motives of *Honour*, and even of *external Interest*. *Self-love* is really as necessary to the *Good* of the *Whole*, as *Benevolence*; as that *Attraction* which causes the Cohesion of the Parts, is as necessary to the *regular State* of the *Whole*, as *Gravitation*. Without these additional Motives, *Self-love* would generally oppose the Motions of *Benevolence*, and concur with *Malice*, or influence us to the same Actions which *Malice* would. (284-85, emphasis in original)

Hutcheson here argues that benevolence alone, as a force of nature, is not strong enough to promote industry, which, he claims, is necessary for human survival.<sup>189</sup> Yet

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<sup>189</sup>The preceding quote is in a section which Hutcheson has entitled "The Foundation of Property." That section begins with a statement explaining why industry is critical:

That we may see the Foundation of some of the more *important Rights* of *Mankind*, let us observe, that probably nine Tenths, at least, of the things

contrary to Locke, Hutcheson argues that industry is strengthened not by the protection of our individual self-interest but instead by the attachments which form society (i.e., *blood, friendship, gratitude*). He in effect returns to his original argument that benevolence and self-love are two occult qualities, each of which can act upon human bodies and therefore can influence human behavior. As these two forces are of equal strength, the social attachments which are activated by benevolence, and which in turn strengthen it, are what keep us from potentially acting out of self-love.<sup>190</sup> Actions which promote self-love destroy the bonds of benevolence, and are therefore destructive to the larger social fabric.<sup>191</sup>

It is for this reason that Hutcheson states that the fruits of our labors are a perfect right; they are the results of industry, which promotes the public good. Without the greater ties of benevolence, "*Industry* will be confin'd to our present Necessitys, and cease when they are provided for" (285, emphasis in original), and we would never prepare for the future or donate goods to "friends, children, relations" (286); in other words, we would not engage in or with society, doing only what we needed for ourselves

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which are useful to Mankind, are owing to their *Labour* and *Industry*; and consequently, when once Men become so numerous, that the *natural Product* of the Earth is not sufficient for their Support, or Ease, or innocent Pleasure; a necessity arises, for the support of the increasing *System*, that such a *Tenour* of Conduct be observ'd, as shall most effectually promote *Industry*; and that Men abstain from all Actions which would have the contrary effect. (284, emphasis in original)

<sup>190</sup>See, e.g., "The tie of *Gratitude* is stronger indeed than bare *Benevolence* . . ." (301, emphasis added). Gratitude, of course, stems from an individual acting for someone else's good; it is, therefore, the result of benevolent human interactions, which strengthen that force as it draws bodies together.

<sup>191</sup>"That *Tenour* of Action then, which would take away the stronger Ties of *Benevolence*, or the additional Motives of *Honour* and *Advantage*, from our *Minds*, and so hinder us from pursuing *industriously* that Course which really increases the *Good* of the *Whole*, is *evil*; and we are oblig'd to shun it" (285, emphasis in original).

and not acting to promote the public good. Depriving someone of the perfect right of the fruits of their labors, therefore, deprives their industry "of all the Motives of *Self-love*, *Friendships*, *Gratitude*, and *natural Affection*" (286, emphasis in original); in effect, it deprives them of the pleasures of society, which are the pleasures for which we were designed by God.

While Locke stresses the ability to own what our bodies produce, Hutcheson stresses the circulation of that production among others. The fruits of our labors is only a perfect right as long as it promotes benevolent social interactions, the very interactions upon which Hutcheson's ideal, affective society is formed. In fact, Hutcheson states that violating perfect rights stems from the desire to promote one's private good over that of the public good; should we use these fruits to protect our private property, as Locke argues, we promote our private interest rather than that of the public, and have violated the perfect rights of others.<sup>192</sup>

As Hutcheson's language of rights makes clear, what matters most is not the promotion of self-interest but the promotion of public happiness; indeed, Hutcheson states that, "as this Tendency to the *publick Good* is *greater* or *less*, the *Right* is *greater* or *less*" (277, emphasis in original). While Locke, of course, does not argue for the unbridled promotion of self-interest, he focuses on the private realm, and on the protection of each person's private property, including his or her body, from the encroachment of others. Hutcheson, though, consistently argues that what matters is

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<sup>192</sup>Those who violate perfect rights "shew [them] selves to entirely negligent of the *Misery* of others, that Views of increasing [their] own *Good*, overcome all [their] *Compassion* (280, emphasis in original), while who violate imperfect rights demonstrate "a weak *Desire* of *publick Happiness*" because their "*Self-love* overcomes only the *Desire* of *positive Good* to others" (280, emphasis in original).

public good; the greater an action will promote public good, the greater the right, indeed the necessity, to perform it. Our rights stem from the operations of the moral sense, which perceives the benevolent intention behind an action—that is, they stem from the heart. Actions which promote public happiness promote the rights of every member of society, for the secret chain which links all of us together means that our rights are interconnected, joined to those of everyone else. Acting for our own self-interest, then, breaks the chain and violates the rights of everyone. In Hutcheson's ideal society, we labor, and through that labor we share, and through that sharing we benevolently act for the greater good and promote each other's freedom.

It is here as well that Hutcheson's political theory departs from republican theory. Republican theory maintains the traditional social hierarchy in order to promote that good; members of the upper-classes are raised and educated to be able to determine what constitutes that good, and the rest of society are raised and educated to follow their lead. Hutcheson, however, claims that our rights stem from our moral sense, which is part of our bodies; as each of us exists in a body, and must, by the very fact that we are alive, have a heart, each of us has a moral sense and, consequently, has perfect and imperfect rights. Hutcheson's ideal society, therefore, is significantly more egalitarian than the one envisioned by republicanism; it is one in which everyone promotes everyone else's rights by equally participating in the production of that good and of everyone's rights.

It is for this reason that Hutcheson also states that everyone has alienable rights and unalienable rights. Alienable rights are those which we can give up in order to constitute civil government, while unalienable rights are those which we cannot (e.g, private judgment, freedom of religion); they are "*essential Limitations* in all Governments" (295, emphasis in original), and no government can take them away. In

fact, if a government tries to do so, there is a "*perfect, or external Right to Resistance*" (294, emphasis in original). Yet while this again reads, in many respects, like standard Lockean-influenced eighteenth-century social contract theory, Hutcheson also states that our inward sentiments and internal affections are unalienable, returning again to the operations of our internal instinct to benevolence and to our internal moral sense in order to distinguish his political theory from Locke's. For it is through these organs that the occult quality of benevolence draws closer together the bodies of all moral actors to form affective communities. The right to benevolence, Hutcheson argues, to the love which stems from it and to our bodies which feel and act out of such love, can never be taken from us. While Locke too argues that our bodies are unalienable, and that we are slaves if our bodies are owned by someone else, the argument also advanced by republican theory, in these two conceptions our right to our bodies stems not from love, not from benevolence, but in the former from the promotion of private good and in the latter from the promotion of an enlightened elite's conception of public good. Locke argues that the right to rational private good is unalienable; republican theory argues that the right of well-intentioned elites to decide the public good is unalienable; Hutcheson argues that the right to a feeling public good in which everyone lovingly participates is unalienable. Thus, while Hutcheson does not discuss the system of government which he considers to be a proper manifestation of his theory of rights, it is clear that his political theory is more democratic than either Lockean or republican theory, and therefore that the form of government appropriate to it would presumably also be more democratic.

It is here, then, that Hutcheson's geopolitics come fully into view. Benevolence is an occult quality through which we form affective communities and which forms the basis for our rights. As affective communities protect and promote the public good, it is

through their formation that our rights are protected. Such affective communities, though, have clear spatial limitations; they can only exist within geographic spaces small enough for benevolence to activate the internal instinct to benevolence and the internal moral sense to a degree sufficient to literally move, in the fullest meaning of that word, the body of each member toward each other. It is, therefore, within such geographically-defined spaces that political societies can protect the public good *and* protect our perfect and unalienable rights. If Hutcheson's ideal society, indeed Hutcheson's ideal nation, is such an affective community, then his ideal nation, by definition, is geographically small enough so that benevolence can circulate through it, each member can act for the public good, and the government which runs it can promote public happiness, thereby protecting the rights of all who reside within its borders. Geography not only demarcates the power of benevolence, geography also demarcates the limits of civil society and of the ability, indeed the right, of each member of that society to act for the greater good and to protect everyone's perfect, unalienable rights.



MANNING AMERICA:  
FRANCIS HUTCHESON, HOMO AFFECTIVE RELATIONS  
AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC

by

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## Chapter Six

Homoaffective DesirePleasure and Pain

In Hutcheson's affective schema, therefore, human physiology is divinely constructed so that the internal instinct to benevolence, located in the heart, and the internal moral sense, also located in the heart, respond to the divinely constructed occult quality of intention. Through the favorable responses of the former, we act for the greater good, and through the favorable responses of the latter, we love those who so act. These responses strengthen the benevolent bonds between actors and observers; as a result, their bodies move closer together, sometimes even coming to touch each other, a movement which makes visible that occult quality's existence by demonstrating the influence of its attractive powers upon the human heart. Consequently, benevolent intention joins humans to other humans in a secret chain which links together each of our bodies through the perceptions of our hearts, for the heart is the center of the affective body and of the affective communities which those bodies form. The bonds of society, then, in significant part are based upon the physical feelings and movements of the human body, all of which make visible God's plan.

But while Newton's *Principia* provides the natural philosophic framework through which Hutcheson can argue for the crucial role of bodily attraction to societal formation, that philosophy focuses solely on the external causes of such attraction. It therefore only partially explains the phenomena upon which Hutcheson's physiosocial paradigm is based; as Newton himself states in the General Scholium with which he ends the *Principia*, attraction is as dependent upon forces acting within bodies as it is upon forces acting without them:

Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of the heavens and of our sea by the power of gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of this power. This is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the very centres of the sun and planets, without suffering the least diminution of its force . . . But hitherto I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. (371)

It is in this context that Newton famously suggests the possibility of a "subtle spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies" (372). By the force and action of this spirit within the body, particles attract and cohere to each other (372); by that spirit's internal bodily operations, that is, bodies come to touch each other externally. Newton even states that it is possible that this spirit operates in animal bodies (i.e., in the bodies of living beings) through the principles of Lockean epistemology, "namely, by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propagated along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles" (372).

However, he also acknowledges that this is simply an exploratory gesture, concluding that "these are things that cannot be explained in a few words, nor are we furnished with that sufficiency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and demonstration of the laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates" (372). In other words, despite the knowledge of the internal workings of living bodies that has emerged from Locke's studies, too little is known about the operations of

this spirit within any type of body, and about how it stimulates corpuscles, and thus moves bodies toward or away from each other, for Newton to make a definitive statement about whether it is or is not the internal cause of the bodily movement which stems from attraction in living, never mind in nonliving, entities.

Yet as his statements here indicate, Newton recognizes that those internal causes exist, and that it is important to study them and to understand them, as doing so will enable us to understand better all of the ways in which attraction operates upon bodies, and thus to understand better the workings of God's design. For even though the sympathies and the antipathies influence only those bodies whose internal attributes enable them to be so affected, clearly something occurs inside such bodies in order for that occult-influenced movement to be initiated. Magnets, for example, as I noted in Chapter Five, only attract to them bodies which contain iron, but how does a magnet's sympathetic power move closer to it the body which contains the iron? In other words, what happens within that body when sympathy and the iron meet? There must be some event, some internal interaction between the occult quality of sympathy and the corpuscles of the iron, which pulls the iron, and the body which contains it, toward the magnet.

Similarly, given that the external quality of intention acts upon the moral sense, something must occur within the heart to trigger the affective body into motion. This is, of course, as Newton suggests, exactly what the Lockean model of sense and sensation predicates; while Newton's natural philosophy focuses on the external causes of attractive movement in all types of bodies, Lockean epistemology focuses on the equally crucial internal causes of such movement in living bodies. Such an explanation is key to Hutcheson's schema, for the affective body, like the rational one, exists in a nexus of

external and internal forces and processes. Hutcheson, thus, melds together Newton's and Locke's philosophical paradigms in order to establish the scientific basis for his moral and social vision.

However, as I discussed in Chapter Four, Hutcheson rejects the critical role that Locke ascribes to rationality even while he is silent about key aspects of the affective body's physiology. Do the moral sense's perceptions travel through the nerves to the understanding, there to be combined into complex ideas, or are they processed in the heart, where they are initially received, and perhaps therefore are a different type of complex idea or remain a simple idea or even are a different type of idea entirely? Hutcheson does not say; on the one hand, he does state that ideas are presented to the mind, but his emphasis on emotion, rather than on reason, suggests the possibility that moral perceptions are processed differently than are the perceptions of the external senses. Yet Hutcheson is clear that the moral sense perceives, that its perceptions are simple ideas, and that these simple ideas, like those produced by the external senses, provide us with crucial knowledge of the world through which we then act in specific ways.

How, then, do the moral sense's perceptions translate into bodily action? Once again, Locke's epistemology provides Hutcheson with the mechanism by which that can occur. For while Locke is best known for his focus on the operations of the understanding, a focus which Hutcheson rejects, he discusses as well another process by which the senses inform the body about the external world: through our physiological capacity for pleasure and pain. It is through this sensational process, Hutcheson claims, that the moral sense's perceptions are able to affect the human body in the exact same way that the perceptions of the external senses do. Locke's epistemology of physical and

emotional pleasure provides the scientific foundation for Hutcheson to claim that the moral sense's pleasurable response to the perception of benevolence, and the love we feel for benevolent actors consequent to that response, is not only part of human physiology but of God's design by which society is formed and maintained. As the pleasure provided by the moral sense is bodily, as that pleasure stems initially from perceiving the moral intention of the actor, and as benevolence operates through the same principles as does gravity, we wish to be physically closer to those who act benevolently, and to be physically more distant from those who do not.

While one of the primary tenets of Lockean epistemology is that each sense produces simple ideas particular to it, Locke also claims that certain simple ideas are common to all of our senses. Two of those simple ideas are pleasure and pain; indeed, Locke argues that pleasure and pain are perhaps the most all-encompassing, and perhaps the most important, simple ideas:

Delight or uneasiness, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas both of sensation and reflection: and there is scarce any affection of our senses from without, any retired thought of mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain, I would be understood to signify, whatsoever delights or molests us; whether it arises from the thoughts of our minds, or anything operating on our bodies. For, whether we call it satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, etc., on the one side, or uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, etc., on the other, they are still but different degrees of the same thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain,

delight or uneasiness; which are the names I shall most commonly use for those two sorts of ideas. (*Essay* II.vii.2)<sup>193, 194</sup>

Locke further argues that we pursue objects which provide us with pleasure and avoid those which cause us pain (II.vii.3). As we desire pleasure because it makes our bodies feel good, we desire to be in the presence of those objects which lead our senses to produce it; we call those objects *good*, and that desire we call *love*. As we desire not to be in pain because it makes our bodies feel badly, we desire not to be in the presence of objects which lead our senses to produce that sensation; we call those objects *evil*, and that desire we call *hatred* (II.xx.4-5).

Thus, Locke claims, our emotions arise either from pleasure or from pain. He states that, "Pleasure and pain and that which causes them,—good and evil, are the hinges on which our passions turn" (II.xx.3), clearly foregrounding the centrality of the body to our emotional lives. He also states that, "we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately. In fine, all these passions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain some way or other annexed to them" (II.xx.14). Locke even implies that if pleasure and pain form our emotions, then love and hatred, the two which arise from them, are our primary emotions, and all others are simply subsets

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<sup>193</sup>See, also, II.xx.1, "Amongst the simple ideas which we receive both from sensation and reflection, *pain* and *pleasure* are two very considerable ones. For as in the body there is sensation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, so the thought or perception of the mind [i.e., reflection] is simply so, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you please."

<sup>194</sup>Unless indicated otherwise, all references to Locke in this chapter are from the *Essay*.

of them. All of our emotions, he indicates, stem from the epistemological process of sense and sensation by which the body feels pleasure or pain.

But immediately following, or perhaps even simultaneous to, this emotional reaction we have another physiological one. For as Locke notes, we do not simply emote in response to pleasure and/or pain, our bodies move in response to those simple ideas; just as our emotions result from them, so do our physical actions. We move, or wish to move, closer to those objects which provide us with pleasure and for which we feel love; we move, or wish to move, further away from those objects which lead us to feel pain and for which we feel hatred (II.vii.3-4). Inherent to love and hatred, then, is bodily movement aiming for physical proximity to or distance from the object for which we have that emotional feeling. Love and hatred, in other words, are not simply emotions but, like the sympathies and the antipathies, to which they are intimately related, are markers of our bodies' physiological interactions with the material world.

In Locke's schema, then, pleasure and pain originate in the body through the operations of the external senses, which perceive the qualities of objects and by the process of sensation transmit information about them through the nerves to the understanding.<sup>195</sup> We then react emotionally toward and about those objects as a result of that sensational process. We love those which provide us with pleasure, and move closer to them to continue feeling that pleasure; we hate those which cause us pain, and move further away from them to reduce or eliminate feeling that pain. Emotions stem from the interactions of external qualities with the physical body; feeling, accordingly, is

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<sup>195</sup>Locke also argues that pleasure and pain can stem from reflection, but since Hutcheson rejects the primacy that Locke gives to rationality, my discussion here focuses solely on Locke's analysis of the role of the external senses in the pleasure/pain paradigm.

concurrently physical *and* emotional. An internal physiological process (the perceptions of the senses) leads to emotions; those emotions signal the beginning of a new, this time external, physiological process (bodily movement toward or away from the object which produces pleasure/love or pain/hatred, respectively); that physiological process initiates a new iteration of the initial perception, in turn leading to a more powerful feeling of the initial emotion, as that quality continues to draw the body closer to it or to repel it further away from it. This process repeats itself until the power of that quality to so draw or repel the body has reached its apex, a moment achieved by the number of, or perhaps the strength of, the corpuscles which it emits and which are perceived by that sense.

Clearly, this epistemological paradigm of physical feeling, emotional feeling and bodily movement, all stemming from the pleasurable or painful perceptions of the senses, is the very essence of Hutcheson's schema of how we respond to the moral qualities of actors, and, ultimately, of how we form moral societies. For as I discussed in Chapter Four, Hutcheson claims that we feel first bodily, then emotional, pleasure when the moral sense perceives benevolent intention; that pleasure is the internal mechanism by which we experience that attraction to moral actors, and by which we consequently establish the physical, emotional and social intimacy with them which Newton's theory of external bodily movement postulates. Similarly, Hutcheson claims that we feel first bodily, then emotional, pain when the moral sense perceives self-interested intention; that pain is the internal mechanism by which we establish physical and emotional distance between ourselves and such immoral actors.

It is for this reason that I argue in Chapter Four that Hutcheson's conception of the human body is *affective*; the perceptions of the moral sense are known directly through feeling, both physiological and emotional, independent of the operations of the

understanding. Furthermore, as I argue in Chapter Five, the motivation to act by which the instinct to benevolence triggers our behavior is known solely through both types of feeling as well. Indeed, following Locke, Hutcheson also notes that, "There is scarcely any Object which our Minds are employ'd about, which is not thus constituted the necessary occasion of some Pleasure or Pain" (xiii). Although Hutcheson does not detail the epistemology of that process, his focus on it, and his usage of Locke's language, make clear that he utilizes Locke's analysis for the internal physiological structure of the affective body, just as he utilizes Newton's analysis for its external physiological structure.

However, as with his application of other aspects of Locke's epistemology, Hutcheson does not simply adopt this pleasure/pain paradigm as is but instead makes two significant changes to it even while maintaining its overall integrity: (1) he focuses primarily on the bodily operations of pleasure, and much less so on those of pain, and (2) he distinguishes between the perceptive capacities for pleasure of the internal senses and those of the external senses. These changes highlight the differences between Hutcheson's conception of human nature and those of Locke and of orthodox Scottish Presbyterianism; they highlight also Hutcheson's differences with the latter in terms of his conceptions of the deity and of the consequences of the Fall. Furthermore, they demonstrate again the influence of Shaftesbury and of the emerging "culture of politeness" upon Hutcheson's philosophy, even while displaying Hutcheson's differences with both; moral pleasures, Hutcheson makes clear, are available not only to gentlemen and women, but to everyone, no matter their class or their education, by dint of the very frame of our nature. For as I discussed in Chapter Four, Hutcheson argues that our perception of beauty and of morality stems from the same sensory/corpuscular process as

does any other sensory perception. Therefore, the pleasure we feel from the perception of either, just like the pleasure we feel from any other sensory perception, is also based solely in the processes of the human body. "Taste," then, is not simply a matter of breeding; as we each have a heart, we each have a sense of beauty and a moral sense, from whose perceptions we each feel physical and emotional pleasure, antecedent of any social differences.

Yet while Locke analyzes the operations of both pleasure and pain on and within the human body, he gives greater weight to pain, stating that "pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain" (II.xx.15). Indeed, as I shall discuss in the next section of this chapter, Locke's definition of desire, in fact his theory of labor and of rights, is based upon uneasiness, which he states is a form of pain. Hutcheson, however, argues extensively for the power of pleasure to influence human moral behavior, and bases his social and political theories almost exclusively upon its influences. For ultimately his aim is to assert the primacy of virtue in human relations and to the formation of human society, all as designed by a benevolent God; pleasure, he claims, is integral to that design, to the human body at its heart, and to the benevolence which sustains it.

As I noted briefly in Chapter Four, from the very opening of the *Inquiry* Hutcheson emphasizes the key role of pleasure to his moral philosophy. He begins by stating in the Preface that the study of human nature is the most important goal of philosophy. However, he notes that much philosophy has been focused lately instead on the operations of the understanding and on the means by which it attains truth. This focus on means, he claims, is ultimately less important than is one on ends (i.e., understanding better the effects of truth once it is attained): "We generally acknowledge, that the Importance of any Truth is nothing else than its Moment, or Efficacy to make

Men happy, or to give them the greatest and most lasting *Pleasure*; and Wisdom denotes only a Capacity of pursuing this End by the best Means" (ix, emphasis added). Hutcheson therefore distinguishes between those Lockean-induced efforts of how we come to truth, which are pursuits of wisdom, and efforts, such as his, to know more about how truth is pleasurable; it is more important, he states, "to have distinct Conceptions of this End it self" (x), both about how truth provides us with pleasure and about how our capacity for feeling that pleasure functions. Additionally, if we recognize truth by the pleasure that it provides us, then it is more fruitful to "find out which are the greatest and most lasting *Pleasures*" (x, emphasis added) than it is to focus on the operations of the understanding; pursuing the former line of inquiry will enable us to know better human nature (the goal of philosophy) than will studying the operations of human reason. Understanding human nature, according to Hutcheson, means understanding the dynamics of pleasure.

Consequently, Hutcheson states that his purpose in the *Inquiry* is to "inquir[e] into the various *Pleasures* which Human Nature is capable of receiving" (x, emphasis added); little has been done in this area, he claims, beyond the division into sensible pleasures (those of the body) and rational pleasures (those of the mind). Yet such an inquiry is especially important in the area of morals; Hutcheson argues that the well-documented weakness of human reason, even with the increased knowledge recently attained about it through Locke's analysis of the understanding, means that God has provided us with an alternative, and stronger, capacity for knowing morality. This is our capacity for pleasure, which stems solely from the operations of the human body; consistent with Hutcheson's conception of the body as affective, those pleasurable bodily processes are more powerful, and more informative, than are rational ones:

In reflecting upon our external Senses, we plainly see, that our Perceptions of Pleasure, or Pain, do not depend directly on our Will. Objects do not please us, according as we incline they should. The presence of some Objects necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases us. Nor can we by our Will, any otherwise procure Pleasure, or avoid Pain, than by procuring the former kind of Objects, and avoiding the latter. By the very Frame of our Nature the one is made for the occasion of Delight, and the other of Dissatisfaction. (xii)

Clearly, Hutcheson's conception of pleasure and pain is Lockean, for as Locke notes, pleasure and pain are perceptions of the senses, independent of volition. Hutcheson here similarly argues that they stem from the frame of our nature, not from our will, utilizing slightly different language to demonstrate his reliance upon Locke's physiological paradigm. But while Hutcheson refers specifically to the mechanisms by which the perceptions of the external senses provide us with pleasure, his larger argument about the genesis and purposes of pleasure stems from his belief that this bodily capacity for it is key to the study of moral behavior; indeed, it is more important to that study than are the operations of the understanding, as the latter, being part of human reason, are necessarily weaker than are those of the body.

It is, then, through the operations of the affective body, not through those of the rational understanding, that we come to know morality, and thus enact God's design. The love we feel for moral actors, and the consequent desire we feel to be in their continued presence, is not an act of conscious thought about what makes us feel good—i.e., it does not contain any element of interest. It results solely from bodily pleasure, which itself

stems directly from sensory perception; as the desire to have food when hungry is not a form of interest, neither is the desire to be in the presence of moral actors nor is the love we feel for those actors when they act benevolently. That love is simply the moral form of the bodily pleasure which Locke argues stems from that sensational paradigm. The corpuscles which emanate from a moral intention press against the moral sense, which responds by stimulating our bodies to feel pleasure, both physiological and emotional; we react to that quality, just as we react to any other quality which stimulates us to pleasure, by moving closer to it. As Newton demonstrates, and as Hutcheson argues, the closer we therefore move to that moral actor the more powerfully that benevolent intention operates upon the human heart: the stronger the pleasure, the stronger the love, and the more powerful the movement, until we come to touch him or her, which is when such pleasure and love are at their strongest. Hutcheson applies Locke's physiology of pleasure to explain the internal experience of how that external bodily process occurs.

While Hutcheson broadly outlines in the *Inquiry's* Preface the critical role that pleasure plays in the development of morality, he more thoroughly details that role in the *Inquiry's* second treatise, in which he analyzes the workings of the moral sense and grounds that sense's perceptive and sensational capacities in Locke's epistemology of the body. But that argument itself builds upon Hutcheson's discussion in the *Inquiry's* first treatise about the distinction between the perceptions of the external senses and those of the internal senses, a distinction which is Hutcheson's other significant modification to Locke's pleasure/pain paradigm. Hutcheson frames that discussion by reiterating Locke's argument that pleasure and pain are ideas of the body, independent of any operations of the mind, expanding his analysis of that paradigm that he began in the *Inquiry's* Preface:

Many of our sensitive Perceptions are pleasant, and many painful, immediately, and that without any knowledge of the Cause of this Pleasure or Pain, or how the Objects excite it, or are the Occasions of it; or without seeing to what further Advantage or Detriment the Use of such Objects might tend: Nor would the most accurate Knowledge of these things vary either the Pleasure or Pain of the Perception, however it might give a rational Pleasure distinct from the sensible; or might raise a distinct Joy, from a prospect of further Advantage in the Object or Aversion, from an apprehension of Evil. (4)

Hutcheson states that, for example, one person can hear musical notes without feeling pleasure from the music, or can see an open field without feeling pleasure from the view, while another person will hear the same notes or see the same view and feel distinct pleasure from such an experience. And yet pleasure, according to Locke, is a simple idea (as is pain), and therefore is dependent upon the perception of a sense, independent of the operations of the mind. Therefore, if it is not produced by the perception of one of the external senses (here either the sense of hearing or of sight), and if, as Hutcheson claims, the human body is affective—that is, it acquires knowledge through feeling, not through reason—then there must be an additional physiological capacity by which we can feel that pleasure, "since the most accurate knowledge of what the External Senses discover, often does not give the Pleasure of Beauty or Harmony" (10).

That capacity, Hutcheson claims, stems from our internal sense of beauty, designed by God to enable us to perceive the beauty of His creation and to feel pleasure from that perception: "[A]ll the apparent *Beauty* produc'd is an Evidence of the Execution of a *Benevolent Design*, to give him [i.e., humans] the Pleasures of Beauty" (67,

emphasis in original). The pleasure we feel from beauty, therefore, is not the result of God's ego (i.e., to demonstrate His power), which would simply be another form of self-interest, but is instead a result of God's beneficence; He has provided us with this internal sense of beauty so that we can know and enjoy His creation more thoroughly than we would be able to do if we were dependent solely upon the perceptions of the external senses to feel simple pleasures and upon the operations of the understanding to combine those simple pleasures into complex ones.

Furthermore, in keeping with that benevolent intention, the pleasure we feel from the perception of beauty is antecedent to advantage, as is the pleasure we feel from the perceptions of any of our external senses. It is, in other words, a capacity of the human body, just as God designed our bodies so that we feel pleasure from those external sensory perceptions:

And further, the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are *necessarily* pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of *Interest* will make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment* distinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense . . . (11-12, emphasis in original)

Yet, at the same time, there are two clear distinctions between the perceptive capacities of the sense of beauty and those of the external senses. One difference is that while we can feel either pleasure or pain from the perceptions of the latter, we feel almost exclusively pleasure from the perceptions of the former. As Hutcheson claims, "Our *Sense of Beauty* seems design'd to give us positive Pleasure, but not positive Pain or

Disgust, any further than what arises from disappointment" (73, emphasis in original). While "[m]any Objects are naturally displeasing, and distasteful to our *external Senses*" (73, emphasis in original), qualities that are void of beauty are only displeasing if we have perceived a similar quality which is beautiful. Such qualities can still be enjoyed by those who have never perceived a similar beautiful quality; but, for example, as "[d]eformity is only *the absence of Beauty*" (73, emphasis in original), those who have had such a beautiful perception generally feel only disappointment, not pain. Our internal sense of beauty, in other words, was implanted in us by God so that we can almost exclusively feel pleasure from the beauty and harmony of the external world—i.e., the uniformity amidst variety which, as I discussed in Chapter Four, is the marker of His system—and therefore can learn truth.

But Hutcheson also claims that the pleasures we receive from the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty are higher and more delightful than are those we receive from the perceptions of the external senses. He states that, "[t]he only Pleasure of Sense which our Philosophers seem to consider, is that which accompanys the simple Ideas of Sensation: But there are vastly greater Pleasures in those complex Ideas of Objects, which obtain the Names of *Beautiful, Regular, Harmonious*" (7, emphasis in original). These greater pleasures, Hutcheson claims, are not produced by the perceptions of the external senses, either singly or in tandem with each other or in concert with the understanding, but rather are produced solely by the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty, which has a more complex perceptive capacity:

Thus every one acknowledges he is more delighted with a fine Face, a just Picture, than with the View of any one Colour, were it as strong and lively as possible; and more pleas'd with a Prospect of the Sun arising

among settled Clouds, and colouring their Edges, with a starry Hemisphere, a fine Landskip [sic], a regular Building, than with a clear blue Sky, a smooth Sea, or a large open Plain, not diversify'd by Woods, Hills, Waters, Buildings: and yet even these latter Appearances are not quite *simple*. So in Musick, the Pleasure of *fine Composition* is incomparably greater than that of any one Note, how sweet, full, or swelling soever. (7, emphasis in original)

By the frame of our nature, and by the entire epistemological model of sense and sensation which stems from it, the perceptions of the external senses are simple ideas, and can only become complex ideas by the operations of the understanding. By that very frame, though, the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty are complex, for it must perceive both the uniformity and the variety in order to perceive that the former exists in the midst of the latter. However, those perceptions are produced independent of the understanding; as the pleasure we feel from them occurs without any intervention from rational processes, that means that those beautiful complex ideas are formed solely by that internal sense. Thus, that pleasure is greater, for the perception is more complex.

Beauty, thus, as I discussed in Chapter Four, is a quality which exists somewhere between Locke's conception of primary and secondary qualities; it is not of the object itself (i.e., it is not a primary quality) but it is not quite *not* of the object either (i.e., it is not a secondary quality). Hutcheson thus either elides Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, or he creates a new category of qualities altogether. While Hutcheson does distinguish between simple beauty, which is perceived by an external sense, and complex beauty, which is perceived by the internal sense of beauty, complex beauty is not a Lockean complex idea; as "uniformity amidst variety"; it is the

manifestation of the singular quality of intention, perceived by that internal sense without the understanding participating in any way.

This process means that the pleasure produced by the perception of the internal sense of beauty is simply a pleasure produced by the body, just as is any other pleasure produced by the perception of any other sense:

[T]he Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are *necessarily* pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any *Prospect* of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of *Interest* will make an Object grateful, nor View of *Detriment*, distinct from immediate *Pain* in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense . . . (11-12, emphasis in original)

As sensory perception occurs solely through physiological processes, the internal sense of beauty's capacity to perceive a complexity that the external senses cannot perceive is a mark of the power of the affective body to know the world through feeling rather than through rationality. Furthermore, as the pleasure we feel from those complex perceptions is greater than that which we feel from the simple perceptions of any of the external senses, it is a mark as well of the crucial role of pleasure to that affective process and to God's benevolent design, through which feeling and pleasure operate more powerfully upon us than does reason.

This distinction between the perceptive capacity of the internal sense of beauty and that of the external senses, and the distinction between the pleasure we feel from the perceptions of either, is crucial to Hutcheson's argument about the perceptive capacity of, and the pleasure we feel from, the internal moral sense, as well as to his larger argument

about the formation of benevolent societies. For a key component of his paradigm is, simply, that public happiness is crucial to societal formation, and that that happiness depends upon the pleasures we feel from the perceptions of our internal senses. Again, these pleasures are not a form of interest but are physiological processes of the affective body; as that body is the manifestation of God's intention, Hutcheson argues that God has designed a system of the world, both material and social, which we recognize and enjoy through our internal capacity for pleasure:

To conclude this Point, however these *internal Sensations* may be overlook'd in our Philosophical Inquiries about the human Facultys, we shall find in Fact, "That they employ us more, and are more efficacious in *Life*, either to our *Pleasure*, or *Uneasiness*, than all our *external Senses* taken together." (99)

Thus, Hutcheson creates a hierarchy of pleasure; the pleasure which we feel from the perceptions of the internal senses is greater than that which we feel from the perceptions of the external senses. Yet within this hierarchy, he argues that the perceptions of the moral sense provide us with a pleasure greater even than that provided by the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty, implying that the moral sense has an even greater capacity to perceive particular types of complexity on its own: "Let us even join with the Pleasures of the *external Senses*, the Perceptions of *Beauty*, *Order*, *Harmony*. These are no doubt more *noble Pleasures*, and seem to inlarge [sic] the *Mind*; and yet how *cold* and *joyless* are they, if there be no *moral Pleasures* of *Friendship*, *Love* and *Beneficence*?" (244, emphasis in original). Hutcheson even states that moral pleasures "are the *most delightful Ingredient* in the ordinary Pleasure of *Life*" (242, emphasis in original). For while the sense of beauty enables us to know, to enjoy and to

love the world created by God far more deeply than do the external senses, the "still nobler Pleasures" of the moral sense (100) enable us to know, to enjoy and to love the people in that world. The perceptions and pleasures of the sense of beauty are individual, but those of the moral sense are social.

This does not mean that the pleasures of the sense of beauty keep us isolated from each other; its pleasures, while not social in the ways in which those of the moral sense are, do have a element of sociality to them. For example, Hutcheson states that there is "Beauty in the Knowledge of some great *Principles*, or universal *Forces*, from which innumerable Effects do show. Such is *Gravitation*, in Sir Isaac Newton's Scheme" (34, emphasis in original), and states as well that we feel pleasure from perceiving the beauty in theorems. Clearly, multiple people can perceive these theorems, either simultaneously or at different periods of time, and similarly many can perceive the operations and effects of gravity in the world and in the heavens:

The Objects which furnish this Pleasure [of the sense of beauty], are of such a nature, as to afford the same Delights to multitudes; nor is there any thing in the Enjoyment of them by one, which excludes any Mortal from a like Enjoyment. . . . The same *Regularity* or *Harmony* which delights me, may at the same time delight multitudes; the same *Theorem* shall be equally fruitful of Pleasure, when it has entertain'd thousands. Men therefore are not ashamed of such Pursuits, since they never, of themselves, seduce us into any thing *malicious*, *envious*, or *ill-natured*; nor does any one apprehend another *too selfish*, from his pursuing Objects of unexhausted universal Pleasure. (236, emphasis in original)

As we each feel pleasure from such perceptions, this shared experience of pleasure does have indirect social effects; it enables us to have common conceptions of the deity, of the world that is His creation, and, indeed, of the ideal society. For Hutcheson states that we feel pleasure as well from "the Knowledge of the Original of *Rights, perfect and imperfect, and external; alienable and unalienable, with their manner of Translations*; from whence the greatest Part of moral Dutys may be deduc'd in the various Relations of human Life" (34, emphasis in original). While, as I discussed in Chapter Five, Hutcheson claims that those rights stem from the moral sense, the knowledge of their origin stems from the sense of beauty, whose perceptions provide us with the pleasure that Hutcheson claims is God's mechanism for enabling us to perceive truths that our reason does not and cannot perceive.

Thus, while the perceptions of the moral sense are the crux of Hutcheson's moral philosophical paradigm, which ultimately is concerned with the form of society which best will promote virtue, those of the sense of beauty, and the pleasures we feel from them, are also crucial. They delight us so much that we continue to pursue the knowledge which provides us with that pleasure, as we do with any object for which we feel pleasure, a pursuit which enables us to learn more about the principles of the world that structure God's design. This pursuit, like other such pursuits, is disinterested, for "we enjoy [this pleasure] even when we have no Prospect of obtaining any other *Advantage* from such Manner of Deduction, than the immediate Pleasure of contemplating the *Beauty*" (34-5, emphasis in original); that is, it stems solely from the body's pleasurable response to the perception of beauty, a bodily response by which we desire to continue pursuing knowledge, rather than through any process of human reason:

It remains then, "That as the Author of *Nature* has determin'd us to receive, by our *external Senses*, pleasant or disagreeable Ideas of Objects, according as they are useful or hurtful to our Bodys; and to receive from *uniform Objects* the Pleasures of *Beauty* and *Harmony*, to excite us to the Pursuit of Knowledge, and to reward us for it; or to be an Argument to us of his *Goodness*, as the *Uniformity* it self proves his *Existence*, whether we had a *Sense* of *Beauty* in *Uniformity* or not: in the same manner he has given us a Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still *nobler Pleasures*; so that while we are only intending the *Good* of others, we undesignedly promote our own greatest *private Good*." (134-35)

Hutcheson therefore establishes in the first treatise the centrality of pleasure to the frame of our nature and to our pursuit of knowledge about the world. But while he discusses at great length the pleasures we feel from the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty, he does not explicate in any detail the physiology of Locke's pleasure/pain paradigm to it, a virtual silence consistent with his general lack of discussion of that sense's physiology which I discussed in Chapter Four. However, just as I argued additionally in that chapter that Hutcheson is significantly more detailed in the second treatise about the physiology of the moral sense, he is significantly more detailed as well about the physiology of the pleasure we feel from that sense's perceptions, and about how Locke's epistemological paradigm explains the internal operations of such pleasure within and between human bodies.

Following Locke, Hutcheson claims in the second treatise that we know moral actors not only through pleasure, but also through the love for them that Locke argues is

the physioemotional response to pleasure, stating that: "All Men who speak of *moral Good*, acknowledge that it procures Love toward those we apprehend possess'd of it; whereas *natural Good* does not" (112, emphasis in original). Unlike his discussion of the sense of beauty, Hutcheson repeatedly states that the perceptions of the moral sense lead us not only to feel pleasure in the company of moral actors, but, in addition, to call those objects good and to love them. It is through love, Hutcheson claims, that we know that we are in the presence of benevolent intention; through love that we desire intimacy with the benevolent actor; indeed, he contends that it is through love that we experience the power of benevolence to draw bodies together until they come to touch each other.

In the second treatise, then, but not in the first, Hutcheson mirrors Locke's argument about the preeminence of love and hatred. He states that the affections are key to morals, "since all *Virtue* is either some such *Affections*, or *Actions* consequent upon them" (138, emphasis in original), and that all our emotions are simply subsets of the two considered by Locke to be primary: "The Affections which are of most Importance in *Morals*, are Love and Hatred: All the rest seem but different Modifications of these two *original Affections*" (138, emphasis in original). In fact, consistent with his conception of the body as affective, Hutcheson argues that all moral actions, of any caliber, stem from the affections, and therefore, by implication, from either love or hatred:

Every Action, which we apprehend as either *morally good* or *evil*, is always suppos'd to flow from some *Affection* toward *rational Agents*; and whatever we call *Virtue* or *Vice*, is either some such *affection*, or some *Action* consequent upon it. Or it may perhaps be enough to make an Action, or Omission, appear *vicious*, if it argues the Want of such Affection toward rational Agents, as we expect in Characters counted

*morally good*. All the Actions counted *religious* in any Country, are suppos'd, by those who count them so, to flow from some Affections toward the Deity; and whatever we call *social Virtue*, we still suppose to flow from Affections toward our *Fellow-Creatures*: for in this all seem to agree, "That external Motions, when accompany'd with no Affections toward God or *Man*, or evidencing no Want of the *expected* Affections toward either, can have no *moral Good* or *Evil* in them." (136-37, emphasis in original)

As Locke links love and hatred to the perceptions of the external senses, Hutcheson claims that they stem from the perceptions of the moral sense, expanding upon Locke's analysis just as he expands upon the sensory capacity of the human body. Love and hatred, Hutcheson states, "are entirely excited by some *moral Quality*, *Good* or *Evil*, apprehended to be in the Objects; which *Quality*s the very *Frame* of our *Nature* determines us to *love* or *hate*, to approve or disapprove, according to the *moral Sense* above explained" (139, emphasis in original). These emotions, and by extension all others, originate in the moral sense's perception of the intention behind a person's action (i.e., the moral quality of that action), not through the operations of our will but through the operations of the body.

Thus, just as Locke argues that we call objects either good or evil, and either love them or hate them, respectively, based upon the perceptions of the external senses, Hutcheson argues that in that same way we love or hate personal objects (i.e., other human beings), based upon the perceptions of the moral sense: "[W]e do not love because it is *pleasant* to love; we do not *chuse* this State, because it is an *advantageous*, or *pleasant* State: This Passion necessarily arises from seeing its proper Object, a *morally*

*good Character*" (154, emphasis in original). A morally good character, of course, is one which acts out of benevolent, not self-interested, intention; the moral sense perceives that benevolence, and as a result of that perception, we love that moral actor.

But as Locke's paradigm indicates, an internal physiological process occurs after that perception and prior to that love; that physiological process, of course, is pleasure. Hutcheson follows that paradigm, stating that we first feel pleasure from that perception and then, and only then, do we feel love for that person:

[S]ome Actions have to Men an *immediate Goodness*; or, that by a *superior Sense*, which I call a *Moral one*, we perceive Pleasure in the Contemplation of such Actions in others, and are determin'd to love the Agent, (and much more do we perceive Pleasure in being conscious of having done such Actions our selves) without any View of further *natural Advantage* from them. (116, emphasis in original)

Moral perceptions, consequently, lead to pleasure, just as do perceptions of the external senses. Moral pleasure, in turn, just like any other type of pleasure, acts upon the body, producing love in the same way that Locke claims that pleasures produced by the perceptions of the external senses produce love. We therefore do not love "because it is *pleasant to love*" (154, emphasis in original) but because that love is the disinterested emotional result of physiological pleasure, as that system has been designed by God.

Hutcheson thus distinguishes his conception of morality from that of Locke; while the latter claims that morality is based upon the operations of reason, Hutcheson instead claims that it is based upon human physiology, again stressing the primacy of pleasure over human reason as the measurement of truth. The moral sense, he states, not rational thought, is the basis for our moral judgments; we know those judgments through

the pleasure or pain, and the consequent love or hatred, that we feel when in the presence of moral or immoral actors, for the moral sense "gives us more *Pleasure* and *Pain* than all our *other Faculty's*" (242, emphasis in original). Indeed, as I have discussed previously, Hutcheson claims that morality is not based upon self-interest, but rather precedes reason and, therefore, precedes that very interest. But, as he states in the Preface, pleasure precedes interest as well; following Locke, he reiterates in the second treatise that it is rooted in bodily processes, and is integral to our conceptions of good and evil:

The Pleasure in our sensible Perceptions of any kind, gives us our first Idea of *natural Good*, or *Happiness*; and then all Objects which are apt to excite this Pleasure are call'd *immediately Good*. Those Objects which may procure others immediately pleasant, are call'd *Advantageous*: and we pursue both Kinds from a View of *Interest*, or from Self-Love.

Our *Sense* of Pleasure is antecedent to *Advantage* or *Interest*, and is the Foundation of it. We do not perceive Pleasure in Objects, because it is our *Interest* to do so; but Objects or Actions are *Advantageous*, and are pursu'd or undertaken from *Interest*, because we receive *Pleasure* from them. Our Perception of Pleasure is necessary, and nothing is *Advantageous* or *naturally Good* to us, but what is apt to raise Pleasure *mediately*, or *immediately*. Such Objects as we know, either from Experience or Sense, or Reason, to be *immediately*, or *mediately Advantageous*, or apt to minister Pleasure, we are said to pursue from

*Self-Interest*, when our Intention is only to enjoy this Pleasure, which they have the Power of exciting. (113-14, emphasis in original)

Hutcheson therefore mirrors Locke's claim that pleasure is an idea perceived by a sense. It makes the body feel good, the object which produces that pleasure is deemed good, we say that we love it, and our bodies move closer to it, or attempt at least to be in its continued presence, in order to continue to feel that pleasure. Moral pleasure provides the internal experience, both physiological and emotional, of the external movement between bodies which, as I discussed in Chapter Five, leads to the social formation of affective communities. This is what Hutcheson calls an "*increase of Love toward the Benevolent, according to their nearer Approaches to our selves by their Benefits*" (220, emphasis in original). That love, he claims, stems from disinterestedly perceiving the act of benevolence, not from interestedly being the recipient of it; the nearer we are to the benevolent, the greater our love for them.<sup>196</sup> This is, simply, the emotional response to the physiological pleasure which precedes any form of rational calculation; it stems solely from an action of the body, independent of mind, for our bodies are designed so that actions taken out of self-interest could never make us "approve, and love *another* Person for the like Actions (129, emphasis in original).

For if pleasure precedes interest, and if perceiving moral actions provides us with the greatest amount of pleasure, then it is not simply that the actions of the moral sense precede interest, as Hutcheson states elsewhere. The pleasure we feel when in the presence of moral actors, and the wish to continue to be in their presence, also precedes interest, for it is based solely upon the pleasurable responses of the moral sense to the

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<sup>196</sup>"*Beneficence* then must raise our *Love* as it is an amiable *moral Quality*: and hence we love even those who are *beneficent* to others" (147, emphasis in original).

objects which produce that pleasure; it is not predicated upon a rational calculation of what is or is not good, or of what does or does not feel good, but is an action of the body, dependent upon the frame of the body's nature, out of which our conceptions of good or not good consequently emerge. We wish to be physically close to moral actors, for their actions are physiologically pleasurable to us, just as we wish to be physically close to any other object which provides us with pleasure. This wish is felt by the human body and is consequently responded to by that body. It is a disinterested pleasure, a disinterested love, and a disinterested wish to move closer to the body which produces it: a body (or, perhaps more accurately, a person) who we then label as good, and worthy of our love.

Thus, Hutcheson mirrors Locke's claim about bodily pleasure, goodness and love (and, by implication, his claim about bodily pain, evil and hatred), using it to argue that such pleasures are designed by God to be the basis of morality: "Not that we can be *truly Virtuous*, if we intend only to obtain the Pleasure which accompanies *Beneficence*, without the *Love of others*: Nay, this very Pleasure is founded on our being conscious of *disinterested Love to others*, as the *Spring* of our Actions" (194, emphasis in original). Pleasure, Hutcheson argues, both our bodily ability to feel it and our bodily response to it, is designed by God to be the measure of our moral knowledge, a statement in keeping with his claim in the *Inquiry's* Preface that God designed our bodies to respond to moral pleasure due to the weakness of human reason. Our bodies can tell the difference between someone who does good to feel the bodily pleasure which stems from benevolence and someone who does good to do good. The former will be acting interestedly, an intention which ultimately weakens social bonds, and consequently we will not feel pleasure from perceiving their actions; the latter will be acting

disinterestedly, an intention which ultimately strengthens social bonds, and we will feel pleasure from that perception.

Any God who would construct such a system must be a benevolent God, clearly not omnipresently observing and judging our every action to see where we have failed. Rather, He is the early eighteenth century prime mover, who designs a system, in this case the human body and human society, and then allows both to operate through the very principles and structures upon which that system is based. For as Hutcheson states:

We generally suppose the Good of the *greatest Whole*, or of *all Beings*, to have been the *Intention* of the Author of *Nature*; and cannot avoid being pleas'd when we see any part of this Design executed in the Systems we are acquainted with. The Observation already made on this Subject are in every one's hand, in the Treatises of our late Improvers of *mechanical Philosophy* (45-6).

God designed pleasure to be our measurement of moral knowledge. Therefore, moral pleasure, the presence of moral actors, our love for them and our wish to move closer to them are manifestations of God's intention on earth.

Thus, it is the pleasures of society which are the highest pleasures, for those pleasures are moral, by their very nature as designed by the deity. The pleasure that we feel from acting for the greater good, or from perceiving such actions in others—that is, the very pleasures through which we love and move closer to those whom we love—are only possible if we act in accordance with our physiology, not for the pleasure such actions provide (an intention which will result in no pleasure at all) but simply because it is in the frame of our nature to do so. By so acting, and by witnessing such actions in others, we form the social bonds which, by their very nature as well, are our happiness:

Now should we imagine a *rational Creature* in a sufficiently happy State, tho his Mind was, without *Interruption*, wholly occupy'd with pleasant Sensations of *Smell, Taste, Touch, &c.* if at the same time all other Ideas were excluded? Should we not think the State *low, mean* and *sordid*, if there were no *Society, no Love or Friendship, no good Offices?* What then must that State be wherein there are no Pleasures but those of the *external Senses*, with such long Intervals as *human Nature* at present must have?" (243, emphasis in original)

The physiological, emotional and social operations of pleasure, in the eighteenth-century definition of the term *social*, and the physical and emotional intimacy which they create between benevolent actors and observers, enable us to form the affective communities which are the manifestation of virtuous societies on earth.

In this pleasurable social schema, Hutcheson clearly displays the influence of Shaftesbury's argument for the primacy of the social pleasures. But, in addition, Hutcheson exhibits here as well the effects of his own participation in early eighteenth century "polite society." Thus, Addison's statement at the beginning of the ninth issue of *The Spectator* that "Man is said to be a Sociable Animal, and, as an Instance of it, we may observe, that we take all Occasions and Pretences of forming our selves into those little Nocturnal Assemblies, which are commonly known by the Name of Clubs," is simply a shorter form Hutcheson's declaration that:

In the same manner [as marriage] we are determin'd to common Friendships and Acquaintances, not by the sullen Apprehensions of our *Necessitys*, or Prospects of *Interest*; but by an incredible variety of little agreeable, engaging Evidences of *Love, Good-nature*, and other *morally*

*amiable Qualityys* in those we converse with. And among the rest, none of the least considerable is an Inclination to *Chearfulness*, a *Delight* to raise *Mirth* in others, which procures a secret Approbation and Gratitude toward the Person who puts us in such an *agreeable, innocent, good-natur'd*, and *easy state* of Mind, as we are conscious of while we enjoy pleasant Conversation, enliven'd by *moderate Laughter*. (258-59, emphasis in original)

Yet as I also discussed in Chapter Two, polite society was primarily a phenomena of the emerging urban bourgeois classes; it was a form of individual social improvement as much as it was an ideal of socially benevolent behavior. Shaftesbury argued for the importance of proper breeding in order to live a moderate, affectionate life;<sup>197</sup> as John Brewer notes, Addison and Steele "fabricat[ed] an ideal of polite conduct and good taste developed in a convivial environment" (39). It is, therefore, no accident that republicanism, in both its Whig or Old Whig form, was a popular ideology among many of this society's members, for while it set itself in opposition to the corruptions of the Crown, republicanism's very principles placed the polite elite as the arbiters and proper representatives of the common good.

However, by grounding the affections in the human body in a way that Shaftesbury and other theorists of polite society do not, just as he provides a physiological basis for the moral sense that Shaftesbury does not, Hutcheson argues that the potential for virtue and delight is available to anyone, across all classes. Although he does not completely escape these class biases, as I shall discuss in the last section of this

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<sup>197</sup>See, e.g., Klein, *Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness*, Ch. 2, fn. #12.

chapter, he stresses repeatedly that the moral sense precedes custom and education; its perceptions, and the pleasures we feel from them, including the consequent love of moral actors and the desire to be physically closer to them, are not due to manners or experience. While Hutcheson is cognizant that people can and do act immorally, he argues that such actions are not due to a lack of taste or breeding but, as I discussed in Chapter Five, occur because self-interest, like benevolence, is a force which affects us all and which can become momentarily stronger. As both forces originate in the occult quality of intention, self-interested action does not mean that the moral sense does not exist,<sup>198</sup> any more than acting foolishly means that our capacity for reason does not exist.<sup>199</sup> Instead, it means simply that the moral sense, like any other sense, can be weakened, but even in this weakened state, it still functions:

And *this Sense*, like our other Senses, tho counter-acted from Motives of *external Advantage*, which are stronger than it, ceases not to operate, but has Strength enough to make us *uneasy* and *dissatisfy'd* with our selves; even as the *Sense of Tasting* makes us loath, and dislike the nauseous

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<sup>198</sup>"But to prove that Men are void of a *moral Sense*, we should find some Instances of *cruel, malicious Actions*, done, and *approv'd* in others, when there is no *Motive of interest, real or apparent*, save gratifying that very *Desire* of Mischief to others: We must find a Country where *Murder* in cold blood, *Tortures*, and *every thing malicious*, without any *Advantage*, is, if not *approv'd*, at least look'd upon with *indifference*, and raises *no Aversion* toward the Actors in the unconcern'd Spectators . . . " (199, emphasis in original).

<sup>199</sup>"And it is strange, that *Reason* is universally allow'd to Men, notwithstanding all the stupid, ridiculous *Opinions* receiv'd in many Places, and yet absurd Practices, founded upon those very *Opinions*, shall seem an Argument against any *Moral Sense* . . . Our *Sense of Virtue*, generally leads us exactly enough according to our *Opinions*; and therefore the absurd Practices which prevail in the World, are much better Arguments that Men have no *Reason*, than that they have no *moral Sense* of *Beauty* in Actions" (204-6, emphasis in original).

Potion which we may force our selves, from Interest, to swallow. (198, emphasis in original)

It is here perhaps where Hutcheson's optimistic view of human nature, of our physiologically-based capacity for joy and love, and of the integral role of the social pleasures to the divine design most clearly displays itself. He consistently argues that "*human Nature* is a lovely Form; we are all conscious of some *morally Good* Qualitys and Inclinations in our selves, how partial and imperfect soever they may be: we presume the *same* of every thing in human Form, nay almost of every living Creature" (143, emphasis in original). Certainly Hutcheson is aware of the possibilities and the dangers of faction, the antithesis of the sociable affections propounded by polite society and a clear concern to an educated Britain emerging from decades of civil war as well as to an "enlightened" Scotland still significantly engaged with the proponents of a more orthodox Presbyterianism. Yet he argues that faction stems not from hatred of others but from nothing deeper than self-love, an external quality which can temporarily affect the moral sense:

And for that Hatred which makes us oppose *those* whose Interests are opposed to *ours*, it is only the Effect of *Self-Love*, and not of *disinterested Malice*. A sudden Passion may give us wrong Representations of our Fellow-Creatures, and for a little time represent them as *absolutely Evil*; and during this Imagination perhaps we may give some Evidences of *disinterested Malice*: but as soon as we reflect upon *human Nature*, and form just Conceptions, this *unnatural* Passion is allay'd, and only *Self-Love* remains, which may make us, from *Self-Interest*, oppose our Adversarys. (143-44, emphasis in original)

Given the physiological structure of our bodies, self-love (or self-interest) is but a impermanent state, not, as Hobbes, Mandeville or Locke argued, the basic attribute of human nature.<sup>200</sup> Consequently, even though Hutcheson distinguishes between "Factions [which] are taught to look upon each other as *Odious, Contemptible, Profane*, because of their different Tenets, or Opinions" and those "Associations for innocent *Commerce*, or *Manufacturers*; Cabals for Defence of *Liberty* against a *Tyrant*, or *Improvement* by Conversation" (207, emphasis in original), all factions, he states, stem not from malice but from the operations of the moral sense. For that sense, "altho it is often directed by very partial imperfect views of *publick Good*, and often overcome by *Self-love*" (242, emphasis in original), invariably leads us to the pleasures which stem from loving attachments to others:

All strict Attachments to Partys, Sects, Factions, have but an imperfect Species of *Beauty*, unless when the *Good* of the *Whole* requires a stricter Attachment to a *Part*, as in *natural Affection*, or *virtuous Friendships*; or when *some Parts* as so eminently useful to the *Whole*, that even *universal Benevolence* would determine us with special Care and Affection to study their Interests. (180, emphasis in original)

Grounding his moral philosophy, with all of its sociopolitical ramifications, in the human body enables Hutcheson to combine Locke's epistemology of pleasure and pain with Newton's system of attraction and repulsion to claim that affective communities are

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<sup>200</sup>See, e.g., "[T]here is *naturally* an *Obligation* upon all Men to *Benevolence*, and they are still under its Influence, even when by false, or partial Opinions of the natural Tendency of their Actions, this *moral Sense* leads them to *Evil*; unless by long inveterate Habits it be exceedingly weaken'd. For it scarce seems possible wholly to extinguish it" (267, emphasis in original).

the ultimate realization of God's design on earth, even when, like factions, they appear to form only for the part, for "our *Nature* it self leads us into *Friendship, Trust, and mutual Confidence*" (209, emphasis in original). Such communities originate not in breeding but in the internal bodily processes by which pleasure, both physiological and emotional, makes possible the external bodily movement by which we come to love and to touch each other. The benevolence of the moral actor draws to that actor the bodies of those who observe such moral actions, joining them together in a secret chain of affection, a chain which joins the hearts, and therefore the bodies, of the members of a *society* (in both the private and public meaning of that word) to form a community of moral actors who feel, physiologically and emotionally, pleasure in, and love of, each other's presence. From the human heart, where the moral sense and our instinct to benevolence each lie, our social being extends metaphysiologically outward, held together by the affective body of each moral member of that community, who at any moment can be either an observer or an actor, and who, through pleasure and through love, feels each member's affective bodily presence and thus desires, as we do with all things for which we feel pleasure and love, to become physically closer to, indeed to have physical contact with, that moral body.

### Affective Desire

This wish to be as physically close as possible to other moral actors, indeed to come to touch them, is what I call *affective desire*, as it stems from the affective body's physiologically-based feelings for pleasurable objects, as theorized by Locke and Newton, independent of any operations of the will or of reason. For while *desire* is an extraordinarily complex term, filled with multiple meanings which in our post-Freudian society generally are perceived as being sexual at their root, the term also describes

bodily impulses which are grounded in human physiology but are distinct from genital arousal. The *OED*, for example, notes that in addition to meaning simply "lust," throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries *desire*, as a noun, also could mean "that feeling or emotion which is directed to the attainment or possession of some object from which *pleasure* or satisfaction is expected" (emphasis added); as a verb, it could mean simply "to have a strong wish for." These definitions clearly situate it within the Lockean realm of sense and sensation, as well as within the Newtonian realm of attraction and repulsion, within which pleasure and pain operate.

Desire, then, is our bodily wish to be physically closer to, even to come into contact with, an object which provides us with pleasure; that wish stems from physical feeling for, and then leads to emotional feeling about, the object of our desire. It is an internal bodily process which is expressed through external emotion and motion toward another entity, whether that entity is, for example, food or another person, whether that desire is genital or, as Hutcheson argues, moral. Indeed, while my focus here is primarily on the *Inquiry*, in his *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions*, Hutcheson himself states that: "Desires arise in our Mind, from the Frame of our Nature, upon Apprehension of Good or Evil in Objects, Actions, or Events, to obtain for our *selves* or *others* the *agreeable Sensation*, when the Object or Event is good; or to prevent the *uneasy Sensation*, when it is evil" (18, emphasis in original). While his definition clearly encompasses Locke's pleasure/pain paradigm, Hutcheson equally clearly expands upon that paradigm to include within its scope human bodily reactions to the perceptions (or "apprehensions") of the internal senses (i.e., to external actions or events); we perceive moral qualities as being good or evil, we desire to be in the presence of benevolent actions or events which are morally good and which therefore make us feel good, and we

desire to be further away from self-interested actions or events which are morally evil and which therefore cause us pain.

Such a broader definition of desire, one which incorporates the human body within a larger compass than we generally would ascribe to it today, is especially appropriate when discussing early-eighteenth-century conceptions of human nature, human interactions and human society; as I discussed in Chapter Five, at that time all bodies, both human and nonhuman, were thought to be influenced by the same sympathetic and antipathetic forces, internal as well as external, occult or material, thereby reinforcing their perceived commonality. All felt *friendships* or *enmities*, *consents* or *aversions* toward other bodies which had the particular internal attributes necessary to stimulate those feelings. All moved closer to, or further away from, those other bodies accordingly; all had *affections* and *temperaments*.

Desire itself, therefore, must be understood within this larger physiological and emotional, but not necessarily sexual, paradigm. All bodies, it can be said, human and nonhuman, have desires to be physically closer to some bodies, even to touch them, which originate in the operations of the sympathies; in fact, it could be argued as well that all have desires to be physically distant from others which originate in the operations of the antipathies. These desires are grounded in bodily construction, as conceived by God, who created all bodies, as well as the internal and external systems and principles by which they operate and relate to each other, and who provided us with the capacity for pleasure by which we best can recognize and realize the beauty of His design in the heavens and on earth.

Indeed, as I shall discuss in the final section of this chapter, historians of human friendship and sexuality also have demonstrated that desire once had a much more

inclusive meaning, incorporating the human body and human emotions through an expressed physical intimacy which did not necessarily involve genital contact or sexual arousal. But the term has as well religious connotations, hearkening back to a conception of the spiritual heart and of spiritually-based affective communities which I discussed in Chapter Three. For while I have argued extensively for the key role of Locke and Newton in Hutcheson's physiomoral paradigm, it is important to reiterate that that paradigm does not diminish the role of God even though it relocates Him from being omnipresent to being a prime mover. As such, He is still at the center of both scientific and moral knowledge; it is He, after all, who designed the natural philosophic systems, nonhuman and human, that Locke and Newton then explicate. Hutcheson clearly sees his paradigm as a reflection of God's intention:

It is certain, there is nothing in this surpassing the natural Power of the Deity. But as in the first Treatise, we resolv'd the Constitution of our present *Sense of Beauty* into the *divine Goodness*, so with much more obvious Reason may we ascribe the present Constitution of our *moral Sense* to his *Goodness*. For if the Deity be really *benevolent*, or *delights* in the Happiness of others, he could not *rationally* act otherwise, or give us a *moral Sense* upon another Foundation, without counteracting his own *benevolent Intentions*. (302, emphasis in original)

Therefore, our love for moral actors, even while originating in the human body and operating in accordance with Lockean and Newtonian principles, ultimately is a gift from God, enabling us to realize more accurately and more fully the perfection of His creation and of His goodness, bringing us closer not just to each other but also to Him. Consequently, it is a direct expression of God's benevolence. God, of course, is the

penultimate moral actor; thus, desire, while being the human body's expression of the pleasure it feels when in the presence of moral actors, and of the love which such actors feel for each other, as a product of the divine is also an expression of our love for Him.

Finally, while desire, by definition, originates in the body, and therefore in feeling, independent, as Hutcheson would say, of custom or education, our desire for moral objects at the core of his vision is specifically affective, for it enables us to know virtue, and therefore to know human nature, through the processes of the heart. As a result of the perceptions of the moral sense, the body in its heart feels and responds to the pleasurable and sympathetic quality of benevolence emanating from another human heart in the exact same manner that any body of any type feels and responds to the pleasurable and sympathetic quality to which it is designed by God to be so influenced. Through its operations, that first body is drawn closer to that second one and, through the Lockean and Newtonian principles I have discussed, continues to be drawn closer and closer to it, depending upon the strength of that sympathetic power—here, the amount of morality in that human action—until such bodies touch. It therefore serves as the basis for Hutcheson's conception of the ideal society: the closer these moral bodies are to each other, the stronger is their affective desire for each other, until such desire reaches its satisfaction.

This means that while affective desire can culminate in the contact of skin to skin, a contact which occurs when moral virtue is at its greatest, it is not driven by the sense of touch but, rather, like any other desire which originates from the perceptions of a particular sense, is driven by the processes of the sense from which follow from that perception. Just as the desire for sweets is satisfied not by candy touching the skin of one's fingers but by placing the candy in one's mouth, where the sense of taste becomes

activated after "Particles of such a Form [i.e., corpuscles] enter the Pores of the Tongue" (82-3), affective desire is satisfied specifically by the perceptions of the moral sense.

Consequently, while in part based upon sympathy, affective desire encompasses a broader social and physiological scope than does sympathy alone; unlike the former, which is grounded solely in the constitution of a body, human or otherwise, the latter incorporates multiple discourses of the heart, including but not limited to physiological ones, to articulate that organ's central role in the attraction of moral bodies to each other as well as in each of those body's internal experiences of that external attraction. Sympathy enables individuals to feel in their bodies the physical and emotional experiences of others, joining human bodies into a social web which originates in the transmission of feeling through the nerves.<sup>201</sup> These feelings can be of joy or of sorrow, of love or of hatred, of pleasure or of pain; the very nervous structure of the human body enables that body to be a mirror of and for public viewing and expression. As Adam Smith argues in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, it accomplishes this through the powers of the imagination, which, as I discussed in Chapter Five, in the eighteenth century was believed to be quite powerful, capable of working with the perceptions of any of the external senses to create ideas and thus serving as a source for human feeling and action:

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by

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<sup>201</sup>For a useful overview of the medical basis of sympathy, especially its transmission through the nerves, see Christopher Lawrence, "The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment," Ch. 5, fn. #1. For a dramatic, even spectacular, first-person account of the perceived power of the nerves to affect the human body, see George Cheyne, *The English Malady: Or, A Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds*. 1733. The Classics of Neurology & Neurosurgery Library. New York: Gryphon Editions, 1992.

conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. . . . It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation . . . we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. (9)

As I also argued in Chapter Five, the imagination, unlike intention, is not an occult quality, for rather than being an entity which exists solely in the external world, it exists simultaneously inside and outside of human beings. Yet it is quite similar to occult qualities, for while not perceivable directly by any of the external senses, its effects, like those of occult qualities, are quite concrete. Sympathy, therefore, is a physiological act of imagination, allowing for the psychic, and in part physical, merging of two or more people, whose bodies then become harmonious and connected.

Consequently, the sympathetic body, like the affective body, exists in a semi-permeable space, intimately sensitive to the bodies around it; it is this sensitivity which enable both types of bodies to form the organic bonds by which civilized peoples create communities. The affective body, though, differs from the sympathetic one in that it responds to the perceptions of the moral sense about the moral qualities of human actions, rather than to the interactions of the imagination with the perceptions of any of the external senses. Affective desire, then, emerges directly and unmediated from the process of sense and sensation, while sympathy does so only indirectly, mediated through the powers of the imagination.

In addition, affective desire specifically links the heart of the observer with the heart of the actor, for it is concerned not with that actor's sorrow or joy but with that actor's intention. Its emotional scope is more focused, and therefore more powerful. Sympathy links bodies to each other through a commonality of feeling; affective desire brings them together through a sensational process which joins the human body to the other forces and principles of God's design, demonstrating, for example, the similarities between society and the planets. In the end, affective desire theorizes a more multifaceted physical and emotional intimacy between moral actors and observers than does sympathy, incorporating natural philosophic and religious discourses to place human bodies, human relations and human society within a larger, more universal context. Generated by the heart, which is located well within the human body, it is the end result of an "opening up" of our bodies to display that heart and the intention emanating from it in a way that sympathy cannot do.

Although critics tend to associate this belief in sympathy's social powers with the works of Hume, Smith and other mid- and late-eighteenth-century philosophers and medical practitioners, as well as with the sentimental Anglo-American literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,<sup>202</sup> it is clear that earlier in that century Hutcheson already had incorporated it into his own bodily-based theories of societal formation even while he extended his theories beyond its purview to incorporate as well the powers of desire. For in this display of the heart, as I argued in Chapter Four, Hutcheson draws

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<sup>202</sup>There is, of course, a vast body of critical work on eighteenth-century Anglo-American social and literary conceptions of sympathy. See, e.g., the references in Ch. 5, fn. #1; see also Evelyn L. Forget, "Evocations of Sympathy: Sympathetic Imagery in Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and Physiology," *History of Political Economy* 35 (2003, Annual Supplement): 282-308.

upon what Jonathan Sawday calls the "culture of dissection" to claim that the moral sense perceives what I call in that chapter that "secret internal place, out of human view, where our true intentions lie." It thus operates at the nexus of those same eighteenth-century conceptions of materiality and immateriality at which occult qualities operate, generated by the capacity of the occult quality of intention to touch the human heart and thereby to affect it in such a way that the moral sense can perceive the distinction between a benevolent heart and a self-interested one, with the resultant emotional and motional reactions I previously have discussed.

Affective desire, then, originates in an eighteenth-century, natural philosophically influenced version of the medieval iconography of the spiritual heart which I examined in Chapter Three; as the external manifestation of internal affective "bodily scripture," it demonstrates Hutcheson's conception of the affective body as simultaneously internally visible while externally touching. That body exists in a web of emotional and physiological relations to the bodies around it, held together by the human heart and by the perceptions of the moral sense, which calibrates the actions and reactions of the body within which it lies, drawing that body closer to those which give it pleasure, and which it therefore loves, and, unlike sympathy, moving it further away from those which give it pain, which it therefore hates. Out of that desire of the heart emerges the secret chain which joins together the interiors of moral human bodies in a loving embrace unperceived by our external senses, even while the exteriors of such bodies perceptibly touch. As the experience and expression of that internal feeling and sensation which result from the operations of those external forces upon the human body, we yearn for the bodies of moral others and thereby experience the central, binding force of affective communal formation which Hutcheson argues creates a virtuous society on earth.

Affective desire is ultimately how we know benevolence; it creates the bonds between moral actors which is the visible expression of God's physiomoral intention.

Yet while Hutcheson's paradigm of such an affective community is in many ways built upon Locke's sensational epistemology, especially upon Locke's conceptions of pleasure and pain, it is here, in Hutcheson's argument that the most benevolent society on earth is one in which human bodies desire to be as physically intimate as possible with each other, that his departure from Locke perhaps becomes most apparent. As affective desire stems from the perceptions of the moral sense, it is dependent upon the moral actor being within the field of the observer's perceptive capacities. Moral pleasure, to use Hutcheson's language, or affective desire, to use my extrapolation of it, is based upon a bodily presence in which affective bodies perceive the intention in each other's hearts; it finds its ultimate resolution in the touch between loving human bodies. While I noted earlier in this section that Hutcheson does acknowledge that desire can stem as well from a wish to prevent bodily pain, both pleasure and pain, by definition, necessitate the presence of the object which causes either of those bodily feelings.

Locke, however, defines desire solely as bodily absence. He states that it is "[t]he uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of *anything* whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it" (II.xx.6, emphasis added)." Thus, while pleasure clearly is also crucial to his definition of desire, for Locke desire manifests itself as uneasiness, the bodily pain we feel when in the absence of that which has provided us with pleasure. Desire, therefore, for Locke, originates not just in lack but in pain, a viewpoint which Hutcheson acknowledges but which clearly is contrary to the thrust of his social vision; it is a physiological drive to ward off pain by experiencing pleasure rather than a drive to increase a pleasure which one is already experiencing.

Locke does state, though, that uneasiness has larger social functions; in the *Essay*, he claims that it is the basis for human industry: "For whatsoever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure or pain with it, if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it . . ." (II.xx.6). However, such an endeavor occurs only with feelings of displeasure or pain because, as I noted earlier, Locke claims that "pleasure operates not so strongly on us as pain" (II.xx.14), a claim with which Hutcheson again obviously differs. Human industry, of course, is the expression of the labors of the body, through which, Locke argues in the *Second Treatise*, our rights are grounded. Our rights, then, at least in part, according to Locke, are formed by our desire, which is our effort to ward off uneasiness and pain. Civil government, then, indeed the social contract itself, in Locke's schema stems at least in part from our body's desire to no longer feel physiological pain.

Hutcheson, too, sees our rights as formed by our desire. However, as I discussed in Chapter Five, he sees human industry as an expression of our essentially social nature; rights stem from the moral sense and from the circulation of property among a society's members, rather than from the removal of property from social circulation. As property extends to our bodies, Locke's civil society is based upon the separation of bodies from each other, while Hutcheson's is based upon the movement of bodies toward and amongst each other. Locke's bodies form an ideal civil society by remaining in clearly defined spaces, distinct from other bodies; Hutcheson's form an ideal civil society by opening up to each other within common, shared spaces.

Consequently, as I discussed in the previous section, that sociality originates in, and furthers the experience of, pleasure; rather than laboring to ward off pain, Hutcheson instead claims that we labor to increase those neighboring and pleasurable ties. Industry,

then, for Hutcheson, and the civil society which occurs from it, is a clear product of affective desire, for it emerges out of, and reinforces, the very social bonds, and the resultant pleasures of society, through which our bodies draw closer to, feel love for, and ultimately touch those which experience the circulation of property, as demonstrated by the mathematical principles of benevolence. As society is the common, shared space within which affective bodies open up to each other, affective desire is the bond of society, the secret chain which produces it, for through that desire humans act morally and benevolently toward each other, thereby forming the physically and emotionally intimate relations, as well as the laws and government, necessary to fulfill that very desire.

#### Homoaffective Desire

What should be clear, then, is that affective desire is not simply rhetorical but is in fact the physiological and emotional basis of Hutcheson's sociopolitical schema; through its operations, moral bodies come to touch other moral bodies as the most perfect expression of God's design on earth. It is for this reason that I have argued that Hutcheson's political theory is significantly more democratic than either Lockean or republican theory; as affective desire stems from the perceptive capacities of the moral sense, as the moral sense is located in the heart, and as we all have hearts, by the very definition of being alive the design of the human frame means that each of us is capable of affectively desiring or of being affectively desired. This affective schema, I also have argued, enables Hutcheson to make political claims which are significantly more egalitarian than are those made by many of his contemporaries. Indeed, Aaron Garrett argues that Hutcheson even claimed in the *System* that not only human beings but

animals as well have a natural right to happiness, and therefore to be treated humanely.<sup>203</sup> Although, as I discussed in Chapter Five, animals were perceived as being "lower" than humans because they lacked the capacity for reason, and thus for morality, Hutcheson stated that they too ought not to be deprived of pleasure or unnecessarily to be caused pain.

Human bodies, however, do have the capacity to act morally, and therefore all such bodies can be joined together by the secret chain through which human touch forms the affective bonds upon which society is built. In this argument, Hutcheson effaces social class or station to envision an intimacy of undemarcated bodies which desire each other through the operations of the occult powers of benevolence interacting with and transforming each body's heart. Such a schema clearly is in stark contrast to the civic and political structure of eighteenth-century Anglo-America, where power, even if it was no longer held by a patriarchal monarch, was still almost exclusively held by men of the upper classes. Indeed, Hutcheson himself, while not a member of the class of men who served in Parliament, was certainly a member of the lettered class of men who educated them and who engaged many of them—through conversations, through letters and through print—in the philosophical debates which marked much of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century elite Anglo-America.

It is, therefore, perhaps inevitable that despite the democratic sentiments of his physiologically-based argument, Hutcheson's conception of such an affective society ultimately exhibits a number of the biases of his social station, in particular a Shaftesburian-like conception of breeding that is at odds with his thesis that virtue, and

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<sup>203</sup> Aaron Garrett, "Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of Animal Rights," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 45.2 (2007): 243-65.

thus a virtuous society, is dependent solely upon the pre-custom or -education human frame. This disparity is, in many respects, much like that found in Protestant theology, of which Hutcheson's moral philosophy can be seen as a semi-secular version.

Protestantism professes an unmediated relationship between each individual and God but then erects a ministerial structure to mediate that very relationship, a structure which Hutcheson himself claimed is necessary in the 1735 pamphlet *Considerations on Patronage*, as I shall discuss below. Similarly, Hutcheson states that the human body provides each of us with equal membership in his affective society; however, embedded in his argument are discourses which argue for an alternative, and significantly more qualified, view of social membership which moderate the ramifications of that humanity. While my focus here is on the *Inquiry*, which was written well before that pamphlet, uncovering those discourses demonstrates that the bodies which comprise Hutcheson's ideal affective society are not as undemarcated as they initially appear to be; rather, they, and their desire for each other, are marked by the very social categories, especially of class and gender, and by implication of race, that his democratic politics seemingly belie.

For example, to illustrate his point that there are no qualities which are naturally displeasing to the internal sense of beauty, Hutcheson states in the *Inquiry* that "*bad Musick* pleases *Rusticks* who never heard any better, and the *finest Ear* is not offended with *tuning* of Instruments if it be not too tedious, where no *Harmony* is expected; and yet much smaller *Dissonancy* shall offend amidst the Performance, where *Harmony* is expected" (73, emphasis in original). While the *OED* defines the term *rustic* as simply someone who lives in the country, it states in addition that the term is somewhat interchangeable with the term *peasant*, making it clear that it is used to describe someone of the lower classes living in the country, not a member of the gentry who has a country

estate; for that reason, the *OED* notes as well that the term can have pejorative meanings, such as "lacking in elegance, refinement, or education; sometimes, devoid of good-breeding, clownish, boorish" or "unmannerly, unrefined; rough," as well as just "plain and simple; unsophisticated; having the charm of the country." Thus, although Hutcheson's use of the term is not *prima facie* derogatory, his scenario establishes parallelisms which set up two diametrically opposed perceptions of music, lower-class and upper-class, and validate the perceptions of the latter over those of the former. It therefore is dependent upon the very class-based structure that his moral philosophy theoretically contradicts.

Implicit in the phrase "bad Musick pleases Rusticks who never heard any better" are two very different meanings of the word "bad": (1) that which anyone would state merits the term, because it is a quality inherent to the music which is perceived by the sense of beauty; and (2) that which would be so labeled by someone who had heard better and could recognize that other music as being better. Clearly, the first possible meaning is inapplicable; following Hutcheson's sensational paradigm, if that "badness" were inherent to the music, the rustics' sense of beauty would perceive it and they would not be pleased by it, even if they had never heard any better. That is, of course, not the scenario which Hutcheson describes; the music is pleasing to those rustics, even, one could argue, is beautiful to them, while to others, who have heard better, it is bad. Indeed, I would include Hutcheson among those others, as he does not qualify his statement with a phrase such as "music which some say is bad" but instead simply labels the music "bad," as if there is an unspoken agreement about the categories of "good" and "bad" music which is known to some, not known to the rustics, and yet still needs no further explanation.

What then is it about that other music which enables those who have heard it to label the music which is pleasing to the rustics as "bad?" While Hutcheson here equates "bad" music with lack of harmony, his specific identification of rustics as enjoying that "bad" music, even as not perceiving it as being "bad," carries with it the implication that they cannot perceive either harmony or the lack of it because, by dint of their peasant status, they cannot have the "finest Ear," or what he elsewhere calls a "good Ear." Yet according to his moral argument, the sense of beauty, even in rustics, should perceive that lack of harmony. As it does not, but the rustics instead are pleased by the music, it must be that their sense of beauty does perceive a quality of beauty in it, even though the music is supposedly "bad." Thus, the identification by Hutcheson of the music as such implies that its "badness" is not a quality inherent to it but is instead perceived only by some who hear it, presumably those who have developed the finest Ear. It is, in other words, socially constructed, and, I would argue, subjectively defined by breeding—or, more specifically, by educated breeding, that distinctive mark of republican, polite society.

This lack of breeding on the part of the rustics is conveyed not so much by the image of a group of musicians tuning their instruments prior to a performance, an image which also could apply to a group of rustic musicians, but by the specific identification and use of the term "rustic" itself. For the one other time Hutcheson uses that term in the *Inquiry*, he states that:

As to *Dress*, we may generally account for the Diversity of Fancys from a like Conjunction of Ideas: Thus, if either from any thing in Nature, or from the Opinion of our Country or Acquaintance, the fancying of *glaring Colours* be look'd upon as an evidence of Levity, or of any other

evil Quality of Mind; or if any *Colour* or *Fashion* be commonly us'd by Rusticks or by Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper . . ." (6, emphasis in original)

By formulating an equivalence between "Rusticks" and "Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper" (as well as implying an equivalence between rustics, frivolity, and an "evil Quality of Mind"), Hutcheson clearly claims for those rustics a lower status of economy, class and taste, a claim which is in keeping with the socially negative implications of the term "rustic" noted by the *OED*. As rustics have a less refined sense of taste, it would make sense that they would be pleased by "bad" music, not because there is something inherently "bad" about it but because, due their status, they have not been educated properly and therefore cannot recognize "good" music as "good," or perceive the difference between "harmony" and dissonance.

However, as Hutcheson notes in the *Inquiry's* Preface, his intended audience are members of the educated classes:

Whatever Faults the Ingenious may find with this Performance [i.e., the *Inquiry*], the *Author* hopes no body will find any thing in it contrary to *Religion* or to *good Manners*: and he shall be well pleased if he gives the learned World an occasion of examining more thoroughly these Subjects, which are, he presumes, of very considerable Importance.  
(xxii, emphasis in original)

These members of the "learned World," who have cultivated "good Manners," are the opposite of the "Men of any disagreeable Profession, Employment, or Temper" with whom the rustics are associated; indeed, Hutcheson himself, as a member of that "learned world," including the transatlantic world of print of which it was part, spent most of his

time not among rustics but among and in conversations with members of those well-mannered classes. Not only do they have the vocabulary to understand Hutcheson's text, the classical education to comprehend the import of its many Latin phrases and Greco-Roman references, and the leisure time to read it and to engage in the larger philosophical disputes with which it participates, they have the breeding and taste which comes from that class status to recognize, without further elaboration, the distinctions between "good" and "bad" music. Thus, while the *Inquiry* envisions an affective community of unmarked virtuous bodies as the organic construction of the ideal society, and therefore argues strenuously that happiness is public, not private, and that anyone is capable of acting for the greater good, at the same time it also contains an internal paradigm of good and bad which is based upon the very breeding that is the antithesis of its expressed affective politic. This is, in fact, the very contradiction which I argued in Chapter Five is illustrated by Hutcheson's mathematical principles of benevolence.

Similarly, in his pamphlet *Considerations on Patronage addressed to the Gentlemen of Scotland* (1735), Hutcheson argued that the "vulgar" (i.e., the common people) "are by no means the fittest and best judges of ministerial qualifications" because they "chiefly admire . . . those who strike their *outward senses* in the strongest manner, such as have the most noisy and strange vociferation, use the most violent action and gestures . . ." (qtd. in Brown "Ministry of Ethics," 111, emphasis added). The vulgar, in other words, or rustics, to use Hutcheson's earlier language, have not developed their inner senses sufficiently to be able to counterbalance the "misinformation" provided to them by the perceptions of the five external (i.e., "outward") senses. Yet, as I discussed in the first section of this chapter, Hutcheson claims in the *Inquiry* that those inner senses are more "efficacious in *Life*" (99, emphasis in original) than are the external ones; the

dependence of the vulgar upon the external senses to judge ministerial qualifications demonstrates their lack of moral development and, consequently, the need for those of higher moral status, who are, quite simply, the nonvulgar, or the social elite, to exercise their better judgment.

Hutcheson's statement in that pamphlet, of course, contradicts his physiological paradigm, which claims that all of us, no matter our social status, have an internal sense of beauty and an internal moral sense which enable us to perceive more deeply than the external senses do. Furthermore, Hutcheson's argument in that pamphlet about the vulgar's lack of inner sensory development, and hence their lack of judgment, seemingly contradicts as well his statement in the *Inquiry* that the power of the orator stems from the moral sense; as everyone has a moral sense, everyone, no matter their social status, can be so affected:

Now, are the *Learned* and *Polite* the only Persons who are mov'd by such Speeches? Must Men know the Schemes of the *Moralists* and *Politicians*, or the *Art of Rhetorick*, to be capable of being persuaded? Must they be nicely conversant in all the Methods of promoting *Self-Interest*? Nay, do we not see on the contrary, the *rude undisciplin'd Multitude* most affected? Where had *Oratory* so much Power as in *popular States*, and that too before the Perfection of the Sciences? *Reflection*, and *Study*, may raise in Men a Suspicion of Design, and Caution of Assent, when they have some knowledge of the various Topicks of Argument, and find them employ's upon themselves: but *rude Nature* is still open to every *Moral* Impression, and carry'd

furiously along without Caution, or Suspense. (260, emphasis in original)

Yet as Hutcheson makes clear even in this passage, the "vulgar," or the "rude undisciplined multitude" are susceptible to being ill-persuaded by unmediated sensory perception—here of the moral sense and, in *Considerations on Patronage*, written a decade later, of the external senses—while the "learned and polite," who have proper breeding and education, have more balanced perceptive capacities. Thus, while the form of sensory unbalance changes, a change which could perhaps be due to the shift in Hutcheson's own social position from being a member of the University of Glasgow "radical" student and post-student circles when he wrote the *Inquiry* to being the University of Glasgow Professor of Moral Philosophy when he wrote that pamphlet, the basic dynamic remains the same: the lower classes do not have proper sensory balance and thus do not have proper taste. As Hutcheson's argument for affective communal formation is based upon the commonality of human sensational capacity, what becomes clear is that his claim that virtue is universal does not escape fully the same class-based assumptions upon which republican theory is based. It is, Hutcheson here claims, necessary to breed proper and good sensational subjects.

In fact, Hutcheson's entire argument about the existence of the sense of beauty is in significant part dependent upon that very same breeding. As Michael Brown notes in his analysis of the friendship of Hutcheson and Molesworth which I discussed in Chapter Two, Hutcheson repeatedly refers to the beauty of gardens and of gardening in his discussion of this sense in the *Inquiry*, distinguishing between the possession of them and

the observation of their beauty as evidence for the existence of that internal sense.<sup>204</sup>

While the *OED* notes that *gardens* can be simply small enclosed spaces, such as the small plots that many rustics had by their homes, separate from the commons, the term also has a much more formal meaning, as in the laying out of planned and designed plantings; *gardening*, of course, is associated with horticulture, or what the *OED* states are "grounds laid out as gardens." It is an image of nature as something to be trained and then admired, not the fields where rustics work, a distinction made by Hutcheson himself;<sup>205</sup> *gardens* and *gardening*, then, are associated with the country estates of the gentry, who of course are members of the polite society whose breeding enables them to properly mediate their sensory perceptions and consequently to make proper social judgments.

As I noted in Chapter Two, Brown argues that Hutcheson's connection with Molesworth was not political. Molesworth, Brown states, had a keen interest in formal gardening, and spent years designing his estate at Breckdenstown (also spelled as Brackenstown), County Dublin, with vistas and tree-lined avenues and artificial waterworks; he and Hutcheson shared deeply "a mutual intellectual concern for the philosophy of beauty and the benefits of variety" ("Molesworth" 76) that was reflected literally in Molesworth's project of redesigning nature. It was by seeing Molesworth's aesthetic vision actually brought to life, and through the long walks that the two men took together through the grounds and gardens of that estate, Brown claims, that Hutcheson was able to develop and to work through his ideas about the aesthetics of beauty, as perceived naturally by an internal sense.

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<sup>204</sup>Michael Brown, "Francis Hutcheson and the Molesworth Connection," *Eighteenth-Century Ireland* 14 (1999): 62-76. See especially pp. 73-76.

<sup>205</sup>"Or can any one say he only loves the *Beneficent*, as he does a *Field* or *Garden*, because of its *Advantage*?" (147, emphasis in original).

Brown's essay is in part conjectural, and while I argued that he downplays the significance of Molesworth's and Hutcheson's shared political sympathies, his essay also importantly points to, although it does not elaborate upon, a key geopolitical dynamic underlying the development of their aesthetics: the well-documented conversion of rural land to *landscape* by well-bred estate owners, painters, and travelers occurring at that time which was part of the ongoing enclosure movement and which led to the Claudean and Picturesque movements later in that century.<sup>206</sup> For while the wealthy certainly had had country estates for hundreds of years prior, those estates for the most part had existed in the context of longstanding feudal relations between the lords and the local population (i.e., Hutcheson's rustics) which, no matter how economically and socially one-sided, did not involve widespread physical transformation of the countryside. However, the economic changes which underlay the emergence of a bourgeois polite society in the late seventeenth century, and which led to the valorization of the particular form of upper-class breeding and social fashioning which I have been discussing here and discussed in Chapter Two, involved as well a refashioning of nature to be both polite and profitable.

Thus, Brown states that Molesworth envisioned the gardens in his estate as being part of what was then called the new Dutch style, which "depended upon its imitation of nature for its aesthetic effect" (76). But what Brown does not discuss is that Molesworth, whose father had been a wealthy merchant, was himself a commissioner for trade and plantations on the Irish Privy Council and, in 1723, published a pamphlet which argued for the promotion of agricultural policies, including enclosure of the commons, to improve the capacity of farm production in rural Ireland and to bring it into the emerging

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<sup>206</sup>See, e.g., Raymond Williams, *The Country and the City* (New York: Oxford UP, 1973).

market economy.<sup>207</sup> Molesworth argued that this "improvement" would reduce Irish poverty, not that it would increase his wealth, but its publication serves as a reminder that while he is best remembered as being one of the Commonwealthmen who served the Old Whig cause, he also was invested in, and profited from, the new system of production and trade that was changing the face of British agrarian society.

In this new system, nature was no longer something simply to be worked upon; instead, it was becoming something to be reworked, both physically and perceptually. As John Barrell notes in his analysis of eighteenth-century polite British notions of landscape, to see nature as something pleasing was dependent upon not only an external refashioning of landscape but, as well, upon an internal refashioning of the self which views that landscape:

The contemplation of landscape was an activity with its own proper procedure, which involved recognising the stretch of land under your eye not, simply, as that—as an area of ground filled with various objects, trees, hills, fields—but as a complex of associations and meanings, and, more important, as a composition, in which each object bore a specific and analysable relationship to the others. (5)

The upper-class, properly-trained eye recognizes landscape by changing the objects within its frame from being objects which exist independently of each other to being those which exist within a relationship to each other. This relationship, though, is defined not by the objects but by the observer; while the observer does not have to

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<sup>207</sup>Molesworth, Robert Molesworth, Viscount. *Some Considerations for the Promoting of Agriculture, and Employing the Poor*. Dublin, 1723. Eighteenth Century Collections Online. Gale Group. <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO>. Accessed January 19, 2008.

literally possess them, it is the ability to gaze at them and to create that relationship which marks that observer as being properly trained and, indeed, as participating in that larger class-based possessive transformation of nature:

The contemplation of landscape was not, then, a passive activity: it involved reconstructing the landscape in the imagination, according to principles of composition that had to be learned, and were indeed learned so thoroughly that in the later eighteenth century it became impossible for anyone with an aesthetic interest in landscape to look at the countryside without applying them, whether he knew he was doing so or not. (Barrell 6)

While Barrell is discussing a moment in the eighteenth century well after Hutcheson's death, the social, physiological and political dynamics he analyzes already were operative when Hutcheson was writing the *Inquiry*. I would argue that it is therefore no accident that Barrell's description of the upper-class perceptive process of aesthetic landscape is strikingly similar to Hutcheson's argument about the internal sense of beauty's perceptive process of that same landscape (i.e., its ability to perceive *uniformity amidst variety*). Barrell discusses a learned internal process which appears to be innate and Hutcheson discusses an innate internal process which, his assertion to the contrary, appears to have a learned component, but both processes depend, for their very meaning, upon a conception of objects as existing within some kind of relationship (or what Barrell calls "associations") with each other. Thus, while Hutcheson claims that the design perceived by the sense of beauty is divine, not human, and while the argument that the universe was designed by God has an intellectual history which long precedes the early-eighteenth-century act of contemplating landscape, I would argue that his claims

about the perceptive capacity of the sense of beauty incorporate, indeed to a significant extent are informed by, that upper-class aesthetic of what is considered to be proper, balanced, and, as his references to rustics and the vulgar indicate, good:

It is true indeed, that the Enjoyment of the noblest Pleasures of the *internal Senses*, in the Contemplation of the Works of *Nature*, is expos'd to every one without Expence; the *Poor* and the *Low*, may have as free a use of these Objects, in this way, as the *Wealthy* or *Powerful*. And even in Objects which may be appropriated, the *Property* is of little Consequence to the Enjoyment of their Beauty, which is often enjoy'd by others beside the *Proprietor*. But then there are other Objects of these *internal Senses*, which require *Wealth*, or *Power* to procure the use of them as frequently as we desire; as appears in *Architecture*, *Musick*, *Gardening*, *Painting*, *Dress*, *Equipage*, *Furniture*; of which we cannot have the full Enjoyment without *Property*. (97-98, emphasis in original)

While Hutcheson here seemingly simply acknowledges that socioeconomic distinctions influence our ability to access the different types of entities which contain beauty, his repeated references throughout the *Inquiry* to the very entities to which the upper-class alone almost exclusively have access as being the primary representations of beauty reinforces a particularly well-mannered perception of beauty and of what qualifies as beautiful. Indeed, given that the pleasures provided by the sense of beauty are key to our knowledge of the world, the pursuit of knowledge itself—or, more accurately, the pursuit of what becomes classified as the knowledge that is thereby worthy of being pursued—reveals itself to be class-based as well:

It is easy to see how Men are charm'd with the *Beauty* of such Knowledge [i.e., universal forces such as gravity, or the origins of our rights], besides its Usefulness; and how this sets them upon deducing the Property of each Figure from one *Genesis*, and demonstrating the mechanick Forces from one *Theorem* of the Composition of Motion; even after they have sufficient Knowledge and Certainty in all these Truths from distinct independent Demonstrations. (34, emphasis in original)

Theoretically anyone could be charmed by the beauty of gravity, but the education required to understand the principles involved, never mind the time necessary to devote to such study, presupposes, except in extraordinary cases, membership in the educated classes. This is true as well for many of the other forms of knowledge which Hutcheson describes at great length as being perceived as beautiful: geometric shapes, mathematical theorems, philosophical principles, the motions of heavenly bodies, and the structure of the bodies of plants and animals, including the system of classification by which we recognize different species. As Hutcheson makes clear, the sense of beauty enables us to perceive the design of the world; knowledge, therefore, is that which enables us to understand the principles of that design. By defining knowledge in large part as that which is upper-class, natural philosophic, and specifically comprised of the developing Enlightenment system of thought, Hutcheson elevates a particular type of perceptive process while marginalizing other, often lower-class, even rustic, forms of knowing (e.g., "folk" medicine) and of perceiving the world.

Hutcheson thus exhibits traces of what Mary Louise Pratt calls the "anti-conquest."<sup>208</sup> Pratt argues that the natural histories and travel writings of eighteenth-century Europeans, defined by her as "a network of literate Northern Europeans, mainly men from the lower levels of the aristocracy and the middle and upper levels of the bourgeoisie" (38), participated in the European conquest of the rest of the world by mapping and classifying that nonEuropean world in a way that "asserted an urban, lettered, male authority over the whole of the planet" (38). Natural history, Pratt claims, composed order out of what it perceived to be chaos by metaphorically removing life forms, both plant and human, from their surroundings, as well as from the relationships that they had with other life forms in those same surroundings, and placing them within an imposed, global systematic unity (e.g., Linnaeus' *System of Nature*). Pratt coins the term "anti-conquest" to describe the actions of the naturalist who either went off by himself to explore nonEuropean lands and to write ostensibly politically neutral accounts of them and of his adventures in them, or who accompanied military figures on their voyages of conquest in order to study, categorize and write about the flora, fauna and peoples encountered during those voyages. The naturalist therefore is "innocent" in that he does not militarily participate in that European conquest, yet he is not innocent in that his work makes those lands and their resources (both nonhuman and human) better known and therefore available to metropolitan readers back home whose business and financial ventures support and depend upon that very conquest.

But Pratt also states that this conquest/anti-conquest dynamic occurred on the continent of Europe itself; it was not solely a focus of the overseas colonial enterprise,

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<sup>208</sup>Mary Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

but was, at its core, "an urban discourse about non-urban worlds, and a lettered, bourgeois discourse about non-lettered, peasant worlds" (34-5):

Within Europe, the systematizing of nature came at a time when relations between urban centers and the countryside were changing rapidly. Urban bourgeoisies began to intervene on a new scale in agricultural production, seeking to rationalize production, increase surpluses, intensify exploitation of peasant labor, and administer the food production on which the urban centers utterly depended. The enclosure movement was one of the more conspicuous interventions, which threw many peasants off the land and into cities or squatter communities. . . . As differences between urban and rural lifeways widened, European peasants came to appear only somewhat less primitive than the inhabitants of the Amazon. (35)

This intraEuropean process occurred in Southern Europe, as well as in nonmetropolitan parts of Northern Europe (e.g., the Lake District or Ireland) for much of the same time period during which it was occurring on other continents. Consequently, while Pratt's argument is focused primarily on events that occurred in Africa and in the Americas during the latter half of the eighteenth century, by so doing she captures a later stage in the very process of enclosing and aestheticizing the landscape which influenced Hutcheson's discussion of beauty; the perceptual system that she analyzes by which natural history "removed" flora and fauna from their surroundings is part of the same upper-class process of perceiving landscape that Barrell discusses and upon which Hutcheson to a significant degree appears to base his perceptually aesthetic philosophy of knowledge formation. Her geopolitical arguments, therefore, encompass the effects of

the belief systems of early eighteenth-century polite society and of its enclosing and refashioning of nature within Great Britain itself which influenced Molesworth's arguments about improving Irish agriculture, his redesign of his country estate, Hutcheson's relationship with him, their aesthetic theories, and Hutcheson's development of his ideas concerning the perceptions and functions of beauty. All are inculcated in the urban, primarily male, upper-class economic and printed, if not military, "conquest" of the rural.

Indeed, Pratt states that the later eighteenth-century's "planetary consciousness" (i.e., its construction of what constitutes knowledge about the world) had its antecedents in two earlier navigational projects: (1) the circumnavigation of the globe (both sailing around the world and writing about it) that began with Magellan's voyage in the 1520s, and (2) the mapping of coastlines, and the printing of those maps, so that by the early eighteenth century, it was possible to "make a tour of the world in books [and to] . . . master . . . the geography of the universe in the maps, atlases [sic] and measurements of our mathematicians" (Defoe qtd. in Pratt 15). As Defoe's statement indicates, the science of exploration was deeply interconnected with other forms of natural philosophy; for example, the art of mapmaking, an integral element of Pratt's second form of metropolitan planetary consciousness, is dependent upon an accuracy of astronomical knowledge which was not truly available until the early eighteenth century.<sup>209</sup> Although mapping latitude can be done by anyone who has the requisite time to learn the positions of the stars, mapping longitude is a significantly greater and more difficult scientific

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<sup>209</sup>See, e.g., Dava Sobel, *Longitude: The True Story of a Lone Genius Who Solved the Greatest Scientific Problem of His Time* (London: Fourth Estate Limited, 1995), from which the following discussion is based.

project; at the same time, it was the very project upon which accurate exploration and colonial claims—that is, the very process of conquest and anticonquest that Pratt critiques—were dependent:

The measurement of longitude meridians . . . is tempered by time. To learn one's longitude at sea, one needs to know what time it is aboard ship and also the time at the home port or another place of known longitude—at that very same moment. The two clock times enable the navigator to convert the hour difference into a geographical separation. Since the Earth takes twenty-four hours to complete one full revolution of three hundred sixty degrees, one hour marks one twenty-fourth of a spin, or fifteen degrees. And so each hour's time difference between the ship and the starting point marks a progress of fifteen degrees of longitude to the east or west. . . Those same fifteen degrees of longitude also correspond to a distance traveled. (Sobel 4)

It was for this reason that the British Parliament in 1714 passed the Longitude Act, providing a large monetary prize for the development of a time-keeping mechanism which would enable the accurate mapping of longitude. Yet it was only because of the Cartesian and Newtonian natural philosophic explorations of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as the improvements in the literal mechanics of time-keeping pieces, that John Harrison, an English clockmaker, was able to construct a clock which could keep time accurately over a period long enough to conduct overseas voyages and to measure horizontal distance from Britain.

Planetary consciousness, then, is made possible by the mapping of the operating principles of the known universe that other natural philosophers were conducting at that

time; as I noted in Chapter Three, there is a significant body of critical literature about the almost identical processes by which elite forms of perceiving and knowing in those areas of inquiry were replacing nonelite forms of perceiving and knowing as part of that same structural shift.<sup>210</sup> Indeed, Pratt begins her book with a description of a 1735 international scientific and geographic expedition, organized under French leadership, which was charged with determining if the earth was spherical, as Descartes had argued, or if it was a spheroid, as Newton had argued, illustrating the overlapping regions, both literal and of inquiry, of this metropolitan, globalizing process.

But Pratt states that her primary area of focus is a third form of planetary consciousness, which was an outgrowth of the prior two: the mapping of continental interiors that could occur only after exterior boundaries were formulated. Clearly, this process occurred simultaneously with that of dissecting and mapping the interior of the human body; for example, as I have argued throughout, the scientific process of mapping interiors with which Hutcheson was engaged was itself grounded in Lockean and Newtonian principles of qualities, which by definition are entities or forces which exist outside the body but which influence its internal processes.

Thus, by constructing his argument that the perceptions of the internal sense of beauty enable us to know the universe upon primarily elite definitions of design and of knowledge, which themselves are embedded in a larger, planetary web of economic and territorial restructuring, Hutcheson exhibits his own participation, however unwitting, in that metropolitan process—or, at the very least, exhibits the ways in which he was

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<sup>210</sup>See, e.g., Chapter Three, fn. #4. See also Elaine Hobby, "Gender, Science and Midwifery: Jane Sharp, *The Midwives Book* (1671)." *The Arts of 17<sup>th</sup>-Century Science: Representations of the Natural World in European and North American Culture*. Ed. Claire Jowitt and Diane Watt (Hants, England: Ashgate P, 2002): 146-59.

influenced by, and internalized, its systems of thought. Having said that, it is also important to reiterate that his text in many ways argues against the system of power relations which that metropolitan process created and strengthened. Furthermore, he clearly was aware of the genre of travel writing that Pratt critiques, and points out some of the biases contained within it as part of his argument concerning the universality of the internal senses:

A late ingenious Author [i.e., Shaftesbury] has justly observ'd the Absurdity of the *monstrous taste*, which has possess'd both the *Readers* and *Writers of Travels*. They scarce give us any Account of the *natural Affections, the Familys, Associations, Friendships, Clans*, of the *Indians*; and as rarely do they mention their Abhorrence of *Treachery* among themselves; their *Proneness* to mutual Aid, and to the Defence of their several *States*; their Contempt of Death in defence of their Country, or upon points of *Honour*. . . . But a *Human Sacrifice*, a Feast upon Enemy's Carcases, can raise an Horror and Admiration of the wondrous Barbarity of *Indians*, in Nations no strangers to the *Massacre at Paris*, the *Irish Rebellion*, or the Journals of the *Inquisition*. These they behold with religious Veneration; but the *Indian Sacrifices*, flowing from a like Perversion of *Humanity* by *Superstition*, raise the highest Abhorrence and Amazement. (204, emphasis in original)

Certainly, Hutcheson here argues for the commonality and common humanity of all peoples. Yet, at the same time, as Pratt demonstrates, this is exactly how the process of the anti-conquest operates. Individual writers can be more or less sympathetic to the nonEuropean (in Pratt's usage of that term) individuals contained in their texts, yet the act

of traveling and then writing for that metropolitan audience, or, in Hutcheson's case, of incorporating and to a significant extent universalizing aesthetic perceptions of nature and forms of knowledge which are, in fact, shaped by and specific to that audience, inculcates that writer, no matter how personally innocent, in the very power structure of the larger dynamic of that European planetary conquest.

This is not to say that Hutcheson did not believe his democratic theories, or that they were written in bad faith. Rather, it is to demonstrate the ways in which he is influenced intellectually, and perhaps inevitably, by a geopolitical process which reinforces the very class-based elements of political, social and cultural power that he is arguing against. That influence, in turn, creates a tension in his work between its celebration of a universal affective desire and the presence of a more discrete and localized form of that desire which is its antithesis.

It is the existence of that alternative discourse, and its moderating influence upon Hutcheson's political theories, which makes the *Inquiry*, in particular ways, a philosophical treatise of the anti-conquest, for it posits an aesthetic narrative of upper-class breeding to be the normalizing narrative of beauty and knowledge: as we perceive, respond to and know nature, so we perceive, respond to and know other aspects of the world. Furthermore, it is as well metropolitan, upper-class bodies which are the repositories of the requisite forms of knowledge upon which benevolent societies are based. For while Hutcheson does not differentiate a class-based virtue to the extent that he does a class-based sense of beauty, his argument about the existence of the moral sense depends, for its very rationale, upon the existence of that sense of beauty. By implication, then, virtue may well be available to anyone, regardless of station, but the ability of those with the proper breeding to best judge what is "bad" and what is "good"

means that it is their internal senses which can best perceive intention, whether of design or of action. As they also have the proper training necessary to balance their sensory perceptions, affective desire, then, is itself influenced by breeding, for upper-class affective bodies are better able than are lower-class ones to structure the world in a way which is both pleasing and moderate; they therefore desire intimacy with other bodies most worthy of that desire—i.e., with other upper-class bodies—for it is those bodies whose intentions provide their internal senses with the greatest amount of pleasure.

But as Pratt indicates, in addition to being a class- (and race-) based enterprise, the expansion of metropolitan European planetary consciousness was also gender-based, an attribute which has as well a significant influence on the parameters of affective desire. It was, Pratt notes, primarily white European men who embarked on voyages of conquest or anti-conquest; not until the early nineteenth century did more than an occasional white European woman travel and write about that travel for a metropolitan readership. While Pratt does not elaborate upon the homosocial (or homoerotic) aspects of this male-centered European travel and exploration, her point about the gendered nature of conquest and anti-conquest activities and narratives mirrors the well-known and much discussed gendered nature of knowledge production and political participation in Anglo-America. While there were of course individual women who served in positions of power and authority, what Carole Pateman calls the "sexual contract" clearly was the predominant pattern of sociopolitical construction; as Mary Beth Norton succinctly states, "[S]ociety conceptualized [women] as dependents whose menfolk would speak and act for them in economic, political, and legal affairs" (4).

Pateman analyzes the underlying assumptions of social contract theory, of which Locke's *Two Treatises* was perhaps the most influential manifestation, to argue that most

contemporary examinations of it overlook the centrality of gender to its construction. She claims that while the classic accounts of how people enter into society, primarily but not exclusively Locke's account, place both men and women in the state of nature, they posit that societal entrance as something available only to men. For while Locke clearly discredits Filmer's patriarchal theory that paternal power equals political power, he does so by separating what he calls "conjugal society" from "civil society"; he claims that mothers have some power within the former, although there is still a "foundation in Nature" for the wife to be subject to the husband, and no power within the latter.<sup>211</sup>

Thus, Pateman asserts, Locke does not argue for the equality of women. Rather, he states that within conjugal society a husband is not an absolute monarch, and that a wife can have "full and free possession of what by contract is her peculiar right," but, in the end, the power that women have within that society stems either from a contract made prior to marriage (which concerns only the parameters of that marriage) or from the caring of the children when they are young. Conjugal power, therefore, is particular only to conjugal society. The mother, like the father, is owed something from her children, but the labor she expends to raise them does not involve the creation of property, which is the basis of civic participation. Instead, it is the labor of men's bodies which creates property, thereby providing them and only them with rights within civil society: "Only masculine beings are endowed with the attributes and capacities necessary to enter into contracts, the most important of which is ownership of property in the person; only men,

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<sup>211</sup>Locke, *First Treatise* ¶47, qtd. in Pateman 52. As Pateman notes, Locke also states in the *Second Treatise*: "But the husband and wife, though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings, will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being necessary that the last determination, i.e. the rule, should be placed somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger" (¶82).

that is to say, are "individuals" (Pateman 5-6). As the labor of women's bodies does not create civil property, women have no civil rights, and therefore remain subjects.

Pateman's argument about the clear distinction between the limited power that women have in conjugal society and the lack of power that they have in civil society has been modified by feminist social historians who have documented the ways in which women were able to act indirectly in the political realm. Norton, for example, argues that gossip enabled women to identify violators of community norms, who could then be punished by the courts; while her analysis focuses on the North American colonies, the dynamics she discusses would be the same in any small community in Anglo-America.<sup>212</sup> Yet even so, the fact that these women's actions, out of necessity, occurred extrajudicially ultimately reinforces Pateman's point; it was men, or at least a certain class of men, who voted, passed laws, made contracts, owned property—that is, it was men, or at least a certain class of men, who were citizens.

Hutcheson, of course is not a social contract theorist. Yet even so, Locke's separation of the conjugal and civil realms, and his distinction between the gendered nature of power within each, illuminates a similar dynamic central to the structure of Hutcheson's affective society. For Hutcheson states in the *System* that women have rights within conjugal society, perhaps claiming even more rights for them within that society than Locke does:

The tender sentiments and affections which engage the parties into this relation of marriage, plainly declare it to be a state of equal partnership or friendship, and not such a one wherein the one party stipulates to

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<sup>212</sup>Mary Beth Norton, *Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).

himself a right of governing in all domestick affairs, and the other promises subjection. Grant that there were generally superior strength both of body and mind in the males, this does not give any perfect right of government in any society. It could at best oblige the other party to pay a greater respect or honour to the superior abilities. And this superiority of males in the endowments of mind does not at all hold universally. If the males more generally excel in fortitude, or strength of genius; there are other as amiable dispositions in which they are as generally surpassed by the females. (III.1.vii)

Such a statement, though, does not mean that Hutcheson sees women as having the same rights as men do in civil society but, rather, that he advocates for companionate marriage; as Pateman demonstrates, marriage equality does not equal political equality. Thus, although Hutcheson does not discuss gender relations in great detail in the *Inquiry*, indeed perhaps makes a smaller number of gender-based references in the text than he does class-based ones, the few he does make reveal a belief that no matter his profession of the equality in personal relations between men and women, political participation is solely a male province.

For example, although Hutcheson does not devote detailed attention to marriage in the *Inquiry*, as I noted in Chapter Five, he does discuss it in order to compare differing degrees of benevolence in human actions and to argue for the geopolitics of benevolence. Yet, in a telling statement, he claims that "Marriage must be so constituted as to ascertain the Offspring; otherwise we take away from the *Males* one of the strongest Motives to *publick Good*, viz. *Natural Affection*; and discourage *Industry*, as has been shewn above" (286, emphasis in original). The gendered emphasis here is quite clear; Hutcheson states

that marriage is important so that men know who their children are, because if they have that knowledge they will work hard, circulate property and do good deeds. Yet as I discussed in Chapter Five, Hutcheson views the circulation of property, and the resultant acting for the public good, to be the basis of our rights. His statement here then is a claim about the impulses behind actions in the civic realm that do or do not lead to a politically just society: if men do not know who their children are, they will have less motivation to act for the public good—i.e., they will have less motivation to participate in civil society. Such a statement implies that this knowledge is useful solely for men, presumably either because only they have the capacity to act within the civic realm or because women will act for the public good even if they do not know who their children are.

Although Hutcheson here apparently contradicts his repeated assertions about the strength of universal love, it is consonant with his other statements that self-interest can also be a force which acts upon the human body in the same way that benevolence does. But the implication of that statement bears further scrutiny, as it matters greatly if civic power is available only to men or if it is available to both men and women. That closer look reveals the gendered nature of Hutcheson's political vision. For while seemingly a throwaway remark, the phrase "as has been shewn above" at the end of the quote refers to Hutcheson's statement two paragraphs prior: "And hence appears the *Right* which Men have to lay up for the *future*, the Goods which will not be spoil'd by it; of alienating them in *Trade*; of Donation to *Friends, Children, Relations*: otherwise we deprive *Industry* of all the Motives of *Self-love, Friendship, Gratitude, and natural Affection*" (286, emphasis in original). While his use of the term "men" in this latter quote can be seen as simply another example of that assumed, but gendered, universality whereby what matters for

literal, biological men matters also for literal, biological women, and therefore the right to which he refers is one available in actuality to both, his statement about the benefit of marriage to males makes such an assumption impossible; if the two statements are linked, as Hutcheson's phrase "as has been shewn above" indicates they are, then it is clear that Hutcheson is discussing the rights and abilities only of biological men to act in the civic arena because only they have the capacity to act there. It thus demonstrates the pervasiveness of Locke's distinction between the power available to women and the power available to men in both conjugal and civil societies. Political rights, according to Hutcheson, only are available to, and only are a concern for, men.

Indeed, Hutcheson immediately follows his statement about the benefits of marriage to males with another statement which further demonstrates the gendered basis of his views about access to the civic arena: "The *Labour* of each Man cannot furnish him with all Necessarys, tho it may furnish him with a needless Plenty of one sort: Hence the *Right of Commerce*, and *alienating* our Goods; and also the *Rights* from *Contracts* and *Promises*, either to the *Goods* acquir'd by others, or to their *Labours*" (287, emphasis in original). While again, his use of the term "Man" in isolation could be explained by the standard implications of the term I discussed above, read in concert with the other quotes, all of which appear within one page of each other, the conclusion is clear: Hutcheson's civil society, like Locke's, is populated solely by biological men. Locke's men create civil society, and have civil rights within it, because only they can remove property from it; Hutcheson's men populate civil society, and have rights within it, because only they can circulate property throughout it. However, in both forms of civil society, only men have access to property and therefore only men have rights.

Furthermore, when referring to marriage and the family as a means to discussing the strength and extent of universal benevolence, Hutcheson states that within and between the "nearer attachments of Nature" (181), benevolence operates on a smaller geographic scale: "These strong Instincts are by *Nature* limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as *our Wives* or *Children . . .*" (181, emphasis in original). As his use of the word "our" here indicates, Hutcheson perceives his audience as being male, a perception of course furthered by the word "wives" which immediately follows it. For while individual women participated actively in the philosophical disputes of the early eighteenth century, philosophy, both natural and moral, was primarily a male preserve. Not only were universities closed to women (although some upper-class women had access to private education), as were most forms of public (in Hutcheson's sense of that term) employment, Hutcheson himself states that men, as men, are better disposed to being educated: "How independent this Disposition to *Compassion* is on *Custom, Education* or *Instruction*, will appear from the Prevalence of it in *Women* and *Children*, who are less influenc'd by these" (241, emphasis in original).

On the one hand, such a statement furthers Hutcheson's argument that the sense of beauty and the moral sense function independently of custom and education, and that anyone thus can pursue knowledge about the world or act for the greater good regardless of their gender or social station. At the same time, it is impossible to read Hutcheson's statement and not see in it the then prevalent attitudes about the differences by nature between male and female intellectual capabilities: men have greater access to and capacity for reason than do women, who in turn tend to act more particularly from emotion; therefore it is men, and men alone, who can and should operate in civil society. While Hutcheson argues that we know morality not through reason but through

emotional feeling, as his class-tempered arguments concerning the perceptual capacities of the lower classes indicate, he also argues that unmoderated feeling, to which members of those classes are particularly susceptible, can lead one astray. Thus, Hutcheson sees his audience as male not only because it is mostly men who participate in the philosophical debates with which he himself is engaged, he also sees it as male because men are the ones who can balance emotion with reason—which is, in part, why they are the ones generally who are participating in those debates. They are best qualified to exist within civil society because they have cultivated the capacity to filter their perceptions of beauty and morality to the degree necessary that they are not swayed precipitously by them.

Consequently, as it is about civil society—its structure, its treatment of its citizens, and its very reason for being—with which he is ultimately concerned, the bodies at the heart of Hutcheson's social schema are not as undifferentiated as they first appear to be, but instead bear significant traces of the very hierarchies that his physiology of the internal senses theoretically transcends. His arguments are, ultimately, arguments made to and about polite men, as the interactions that such men have with each other form the bonds upon which that society is created and maintained. For if, as Hutcheson argues, we are born into society, and if society is preserved by our relations with each other, then not only is affective desire integral to societal construction (indeed, it is upon affective desire that we effectuate God's social design), such a class- and gender-based construct means that those desiring and desired bodies are solely well-bred and male. At its core, Hutcheson's ideal society is an affective community of upper-class men who desire, physiologically and emotionally, to be as close as possible to other men like them until, as Hutcheson says, "their bodys come to touch each other."

It is, then, not simply affective desire but what I call "homoaffective desire" which is central to Hutcheson's sociopolitical vision. The moral sense in the heart of each of these well-bred male bodies perceives the intentions in the hearts of other such male bodies; it responds with love toward those whose intentions strengthen the public good and responds with hatred toward those whose intentions weaken that public good. Love leads each observing male body to feel good and to desire to be closer to the male bodies whose virtuous intentions initiated that perception; hatred leads each observing male body to feel pain and to desire to be further away from the male bodies whose self-interested intentions initiated that perception. As the power of the occult quality of benevolence operates just like the power of the occult quality of gravity, homoaffective desire is stronger the closer virtuous well-bred male bodies are to each other, a feeling which reaches its apex when those bodies touch.

Like affective desire, then, homoaffective desire is not simply rhetorical but is, in fact, rooted in the sensational processes of the physical body within which Hutcheson grounds his moral philosophy; as he argues that human physiology is central to virtuous actions and to the perceptions of those actions, the human body itself is central to his moral vision. The human body feels, and through feeling it interacts with, and comes to knowledge about, the world around it; it is through the human body that we form the social attachments upon which a moral society is built. Consequently, like affective desire, homoaffective desire is a physiological possibility for any grouping of, in this case same-gendered, bodies.

Yet as Hutcheson's seemingly democratic vision is in part tempered by the very conditions which at that time limited civic participation, in his schema it is the feelings of virtuous, well-bred male bodies for similar bodies that ultimately matters; in the end, it is

their homoaffective desire for each other which is key to social formation. They desire to be both physically and emotionally intimate with other virtuous, well-bred male bodies, a desire which stems from the internal and external bodily processes delineated by the principles of Lockean epistemology and of Newtonian natural philosophy. As their desire for that touch stems from the heart, their homoaffective desire for each other is physical, it is intimate, it is love.

It is not, however, erotic. While homoaffective and homoerotic desire both involve the pull of one body toward another body of the same gender, homoaffective desire stems from a benevolent intention while homoerotic desire stems from a sexual intention. Consequently, although both reach fruition with the touch of two same-gendered bodies, homoaffective desire does so with emotional love and a generalized physical contact while homoerotic desire does so with or without emotional love but with a physiologically specific, erogenous contact. For homoaffective desire stems from the secret chain of benevolence joining the heart of the well-bred male observer to the heart of the well-bred male actor; it is that linking of hearts which is key, not the actual place on the surface of the body where the observer and the actor touch. As benevolence operates like gravity, that contact can occur anywhere on the body, just as Newton's formulation does not specify which part of a feather touches the earth when it falls to the ground, for that bodily movement is simply the physical manifestation of each occult quality. Homoerotic desire, however, whether or not overtly genital, whether or not emotional, whether or not conscious, stems not from the attraction of character but from sexual arousal. The physiological place where those two bodies touch matters greatly; indeed, it is the whole point. While it may be physically generalizable to a certain extent,

it is the goal of specific body parts touching which initiates that desire and the physical contact of those specific body parts which satisfies it.

To make this distinction is not to say that homoaffective and homoerotic desire can not overlap or coexist, for the intricacies of any intimate relationship rarely fall within clean theoretical boundaries, nor is it to make a statement about the comparative social valence of either (or any) type of male-male intimacy; as George E. Haggerty argues, and as my discussion of the homoaffective suggests, the question of whether or not two men had a sexual relationship with each other does not prove or disprove anything about the importance of male-male relations, or of particular male-male relations, or even of sexual relations, in eighteenth-century Anglo-America.<sup>213</sup> However, it is to say that in spite of their apparently similar physical trajectories there are clear qualitative, if not experiential, differences between the two forms of desire which are rooted in particular eighteenth-century class and gender constructs. For while the erotic, homo- or hetero-, is a powerful social and political force, indeed could be said to be the force behind the establishment of the Church of England itself, homoaffective desire clearly is a powerful force as well, although of a different kind, for the bonds of society depend upon its ability to penetrate into, circulate through and move outward from the physical body.

In fact, it is that very power of homoaffective desire which solidifies the relations between men that Pateman argues construct the patriarchal sexual contract which underlies civil society. But that communal politic is perhaps the most distinctive marker between the homoaffective and the homoerotic. The homoaffective attraction of one

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<sup>213</sup>George E. Haggerty, *Men in Love: Masculinity and Sexuality in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: Columbia UP, 1999). See especially his introduction.

virtuous male body for another builds a social network of such bodies who desire, and thus move closer to, each other. It thereby constructs a virtuous, affective *public* community; indeed, it was designed by God to do just that. Conversely, the homoerotic attraction of one male body for another, virtuous or otherwise, may or may not be part of or build a social network of men who find each other desirable, but even if acted out publicly, even if done in defiance of mores or legislation against it, it remains still, at its core, a private matter between them. There are no laws concerning equity and justice which get created from it, no rights protected by it, no idealized behaviors from which to draw lessons about the limits of a ruler's power or upon which to construct a social and political theory. In fact, while aristocratic privilege enabled upper-class men to display publicly their erotic attractions to other men, the molly houses of the early eighteenth century, no matter their open displays of same-sex desire, still were private locations wherein such men could be publicly and erotically affectionate with each other.

Homoaffective desire, then, by its very definition is not only physiological, it is communal and public rather than coupled and private; in the intimacy that it creates between well-bred male bodies it casts those bodies as the ones best able to form and to maintain the civic and nation state. It is therefore especially similar to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's paradigm of the homosocial, which Sedgwick argues is a particular form of male-male intimacy that solidifies men's social and political power through the active exclusion of women.<sup>214</sup> She emphasizes the public dimension of this desire while simultaneously analyzing the ways in which it specifically affects private relationships between men. Thus, while the term has taken on a theoretical life of its own since the

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<sup>214</sup>Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia UP, 1985).

publication of *Between Men* to become a kind of catch-all term used to describe a form of (almost always male) same-gender intimacy that is not overtly sexual but which contains an erotic element, Sedgwick's initial formulation of it is, I think, especially relevant here: that male homosocial desire, like male homoaffective desire, reinforces a public, patriarchal social structure.

Yet while Sedgwick states that homosocial desire exists in close relational proximity to the homoerotic and to the homosexual on a continuum of same-gender physical and emotional intimacy, it is clear that that does not necessarily mean that the relationship between two men is affectionate: "For historical reasons, this special relationship may take the form of ideological homophobia, ideological homosexuality, or some highly conflicted but intensively structured combination of the two" (25). Thus, as her formulation indicates, both homoaffective and homosocial desire have similarly important public and political components; there are, however, clear differences between them. The most obvious, and perhaps the most critical, is that homosocial desire does not necessarily involve a positive emotional attachment between men; conversely, homoaffective desire necessarily involves love. For homosocial desire can be predicated upon male rivalry as well upon male intimacy, while homoaffective desire is predicated solely upon the active pursuit of physical and emotional intimacy between virtuous male bodies. While both forms of desire have the effect of solidifying male power, homoaffective desire necessarily leads to a loving, public community of virtuous men while homosocial desire does not necessarily do so.

This substantive difference in emotional valence points to another significant difference in the formulation of these two forms of desire; while both exclude women, homosocial desire crucially generates its force through its circulation between men, or

what Gayle Rubin famously calls the "traffic in women."<sup>215</sup> In fact, Sedgwick introduces her argument by discussing Rene Girard's *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, in which he analyzes the literary depictions of erotic triangles in which two men compete for the love of the same woman and argues that the bond between the two male rivals is as, if not more, powerful than is the bond between either rival and the woman herself, the supposed love object; extrapolating that schema to social systems, Sedgwick states that "large-scale social structures are congruent with the male-male-female erotic triangles described most forcefully by Girard and articulated most thoughtfully by others" (25). Within the scope of homosocial desire, then, is not only some form of male-male attachment, but is as well the specter of the female body whose present absence makes that homosocial bond both possible and potent.

While certainly male homoaffective desire involves the exclusion of women, the ways in which it excludes them are markedly different. As I have noted, it is based upon the physiological perception and attraction of intention; benevolence is its driving force. The attractive power of that occult quality draws closer together virtuous, well-bred male bodies, thereby creating the social adhesives which sustain the ideal society. That this society is necessarily dependent upon the intimate relations of these men has the clear effect of excluding women. But those intimate male-male bonds are not formed through the circulation or triangulation of women or of men's relationships with them; instead, they are formed between men within a social sphere where women are absent. It is for this reason that Pateman's notion of the sexual contract is so useful, for it demonstrates

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<sup>215</sup>Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex." *Toward an Anthropology of Women*. Ed. Rayna R. Reiter (New York: Monthly Review P, 1975): 157-210.

that the gendered separation of spheres of influence and/or power and/or contact leads to a distinctly different form of male-male intimacy than does the circulation of women between men: when men gaze solely upon each other, it is not just that their interrelations are most paramount (the argument of homosocial desire), but that their interrelations are the only ones which exist.

Consequently, while the relationship within the homosocial dynamic which matters most is the one between two men, and while homosocial desire itself can certainly develop within a group of men (e.g., a fraternity), it is primarily, although not exclusively, more private than is homoaffective desire, even though it has the effect of reinforcing public gendered structures. In addition, unlike homoaffective desire, homosocial desire draws male bodies to each other primarily, or at least initially, through an emotional or psychological form of male-male attachment which then may or may not also become physical. Homoaffective desire, however, draws those bodies together directly and immediately through the workings of human physiology. It is, first and foremost, a public, communal form of physiological attraction; initiated by the perceptive/feeling capacity of the human body, it only then acquires its emotional/social valence. As its goal is the sustenance of a virtuous community, not the particular intimate relationship of two individual well-bred men, it is performed most thoroughly in public, displaying for that observing public the male body and all of its feelings, both physiological and emotional, so that that public can love the bodies which its occult powers draw together.

It is this communal aspect of male homoaffective desire which ultimately distinguishes it as well from male-male friendship. For while clearly political power in eighteenth-century Anglo-America, like political power in earlier centuries, in part

functioned through the public valence of private male friendships, homoaffective desire can be said to be the physiological basis by which those friendships join together to form the body politic rather than being solely the individual expressions of male-male love from which political effects ensue. Such a distinction is the difference between the physical and emotional power of an intimacy which circulates through a small, semiprivate geographic space and that of an intimacy which circulates through a space wide enough to form the boundaries of the nation state. Thus, although *The Spectator* states that, "[f]riendship is *a strong and habitual Inclination in two Persons, to Promote the Good and Happiness of one another*" (qtd. in Haggerty 11, emphasis in original), Hutcheson, following Shaftesbury, makes clear that the happiness that matters most is not that of two persons but of the greatest number of them. Both male-male friendship and male-male homoaffective desire involve the intimacy and the body of the desiring and desired male. However, the latter publicly displays not just those bodies and the bonds between them but also the larger sociopolitical community which those bodies mutually create and uphold, while the former displays the individual relations of individual men who have greater or lesser degrees of power, or greater or lesser degrees of access to power, depending upon their individual social stations.

Friendship today generally is perceived as a private relationship whose obligations and intimacies are somehow lesser than those of a sexual relationship; someone is deemed to be single if he or she is not partnered in an erotic, "binding" way, even if he or she has many intimate friends, even if perhaps those friendships have lasted years longer than has an erotic partnering. Yet as historians of friendship have demonstrated, such a distinction between friendship and marriage, between "bound" and "unbound" relations, is a distinctly modern phenomenon. Indeed, because of the gender-

based restrictions on social and political power in many Western cultures and societies, male-male friendship in particular long has been perceived to be the highest and most intimate form of social (and sometimes sexual) relations. As Ivy Schweitzer notes, "[i]n ancient Greece and in the Roman Republic . . . friendship among free-born male citizens was the basis of the polis and all communal civic life. Plato considered friendship synonymous with the very activity of philosophy, while Aristotle asserted that ties of friendship, because they define what is just, precede and are necessary for justice" (9). Male-male friendship, she adds, is idealized in Cicero's *De Amicitia* because it mutually and freely joins together equals, while marriage joins together a man and a woman in an asymmetrical imbalance (36). Montaigne claims that "brotherly affection" is moderate, freeing, spiritual, warm and gentle, and that affection for women is fickle, scorching and fleeting; this difference is because "the ordinary capacity of women is inadequate for that communion and fellowship which is the nurse of this sacred bond; nor does their soul seem firm enough to endure the strain of so tight and durable a knot" (137-38).

Intimate male-male friendship, then, is similar to male-male homosociality in that it derives its power, at least in part, from the perception of women as being lesser than men. Yet the obvious difference is that intimate male friends are drawn to each other for each other, while homosocially attached men may be drawn to each other for a multitude of reasons, only some of which are predicated upon a desire for mutual intimacy. In this, intimate male friendships are significantly more like male homoaffective desire; both are predicated upon an intimacy which precludes women altogether rather than upon one which involves some form of female exchange. Montaigne even states that the one thing such friendships lack—sexual relations—is the one thing that keeps them perfect. He first states that, "[I]f such a relationship [i.e., male-male friendship], free and voluntary, could

be built up, in which not only would the souls have this complete enjoyment, but the bodies would also share in the alliance, so that the entire man would be engaged, it is certain that the resulting friendship would be fuller and more complete" (138). However, such an erotic friendship is an impossibility, for that would be like the "licentious Greek love" which "is justly abhorred by our morality" (138). Montaigne exalts male-male intimacy because it transcends the human body; it is, instead, a relationship of the soul in a way which neither marriage nor sodomy can ever be: the latter because it is, by definition, of the human body and the former because it, by definition, involves women.

Yet, Montaigne's moral claims of bodily transcendence notwithstanding, Alan Bray demonstrates that the body of the friend is always a presence in intimate male-male friendships. In his history of the changing contours of such friendships in Europe from the year 1000 through the nineteenth century, Bray notes that they had a clear public function in what he calls "traditional society," and that it is only with the advent of modern civil society in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that they instead begin to take on the private characteristics which are so familiar to us today.<sup>216</sup> Bray states that in traditional society, "the ethics of friendship operated persuasively only in a larger frame of reference that lay *outside* the good of the individuals for whom the friendship was made" (6, emphasis in original). This ethical dimension was friendship's formal, public context.

For example, Bray discusses the common relationship of "sworn brothers," who are joined together through a church ceremony, generally the eucharist (i.e., the taking together of communion), and who, whenever possible, are laid together at death. The

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<sup>216</sup>Alan Bray, *The Friend* (Chicago and London: U Chicago P, 2003).

ceremony binding the two men to each other, indeed sworn brotherhood itself, is in many ways indistinguishable from a wedding ceremony and subsequent marriage in that both are "constructed in binding oaths and ritual acts made before witnesses, human and divine" (29); as with a marriage, that public ceremony not only solemnizes the relationship but solemnizes as well an alliance which serves in what we would now call the civic realm by perhaps bringing together a truce between warring families or servicing the nobility or the Crown. Friendship, then, bound men together in public gestures that reinforced social bonds, joining families and kin to create an interlocking web of mutual obligation and affection. That these are upper-class functions does not necessarily mean that "sworn brotherhood" was solely an upper-class phenomenon, but means instead that the historical record preserves the actions and mores of the upper classes more completely than it does those of the lower classes.

Yet as Bray notes, such intimate male-male friendships were not only a touching of souls but were also a touching of bodies, both symbolically and literally. Friends embraced each other in public, shared tokens of their friendship in public, wrote letters to each other, ate together in public, shared beds together in private but made such sharing publicly known. Friends, in other words, loved each other, emotionally, physically and publicly. This does not mean that such friendships were necessarily sexual, although some presumably were, but that they were necessarily physically *intimate*, in the way in which that term has been used here, and that it was this physical intimacy, whether or not it was sexual, which was a key component of its emotional and cultural power. For as Bray notes, "beds are not only places where people sleep; they are also places where people talk, and the epithet 'bedfellow' readily suggested the influential intimacy of a

friend" (153). Beds are, of course, also places where bodies can be touched, where bodies are perhaps consistently most vulnerable and open.

Thus, Montaigne's distinction between the sexual and the nonsexual, or between the friend and the sodomite, in many ways not only breaks down, it is in many ways beside the point, for the sharing of the body between two friends was as familiar a gesture and action as was any sharing of bodies between either of those male friends and a woman. It was, in fact, perhaps even more intimate, for it had attached to it potentially greater social significance; it was, after all, in relations between men, by and large, that the state was served. Friends, Bray argues, *desired* each other, and that desire was as much for the touch of the friend's body as it was for the public benefits that the friend could offer.

Here, too, then, intimate male friendships and homoaffective desire are very much alike, as both are grounded in the physiological and emotional love that men have for each other. Indeed, Haggerty highlights the erotics of male-male intimacy in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century aristocratic English culture in ways which dismantle further Montaigne's distinction between the intimate and the sexual; male friendship, Haggerty claims, is more than platonic and male love is more than sodomitical (38). What he calls "heroic male friendship" points to the paradox at the heart of that which Montaigne and others want to keep separate, especially when the presence of mollies and molly houses serves as a constant reminder of what is at stake: physical affection is contradictorily what joins two men together in an erotic intimacy which is, perhaps, that culture's highest value while also being what joins two men together in an erotic intimacy which is, perhaps, that culture's biggest fear.

Yet even though Bray and Haggerty each emphasize the emotional, physical and political components of male-male friendship, all of which also are components of male homoaffective desire, their analyses ultimately illuminate as well the differences between such friendship and such desire. Both critics analyze the ways in which private intimacy between men has public consequences, and both demonstrate the ways in which the presence of the male body complicates Montaigne's seemingly clear distinction between the affections and that body, arguing instead for a continuum rather than a discreteness of male-male desire. Ultimately, however, their focus is on the relationships between individual men, no matter those relationships' public effects.

This is, in fact, as it should be. Male-male friendship highlights the public nature of private relations, displaying for public consumption the body of the friend, the forms of intimacy between male actors, and the support that intimacy provides to the workings of society or even of the nation state. Yet it is, in the end, personal; two men become intimate friends with each other because they desire each other for each other, choosing to be together in ways perhaps indicative of companionate marriage. While that friendship has significant public elements, it is based upon, and ultimately returns to, the couple.

Male homoaffective desire, however, while clearly involving the male body and displaying for public view the intimate relations between male bodies, is predicated upon such relations being possible between multiple male bodies; an actor, after all, can be and generally is observed in action by more than one person. Just as our sense of sight enables us to see multiple objects simultaneously, so too our moral sense enables us to perceive multiple acts of benevolence simultaneously or for a single act to be perceived simultaneously by multiple persons. What this highlights, then, is not relations between

two men but relations between many men; homoaffective desire is composed of, and consequently foregrounds, the interconnecting bonds which make the attachments between the individual and the community, not those between two men, the ones that matter most.

This is also as it should be. For as much as male friendship is personal, male homoaffective desire is not; it is not based upon the wish of two men choosing to be together but instead is based upon the perceptions of the operations of benevolence by the moral sense and upon the physiological responses which then occur. Yes, those responses lead to love, to desire, to physical contact—that is, they lead to emotional and physical intimacy between men—but that intimacy is oddly impersonal; it can sustain relations between men, lead men to extol each other's character and to make professions of love for each other, but none of these responses are limited to a particular number of men. As long as each man continues to be benevolent, the moral sense will perceive them as such and will respond accordingly.

In fact, Hutcheson states that benevolence increases the weaker the preexisting attachment is between the actor and the recipient:

This Increase of the *moral Beauty* of Actions, or Dispositions, according to the *Number* of Persons to whom the good Effects of them extend, may shew us the Reason why Actions which flow from the *nearer Attachments* of Nature, such as *that* between the *Sexes*, and the *Love* of *our Offspring*, are not so *amiable*, nor do they appear *so virtuous* as Actions of *equal Moment* of Good towards Persons less attach'd to us. The Reason is plainly this. These strong Instincts are by *Nature* limited to small Numbers of Mankind, such as *our Wives* or *Children*; whereas a

Disposition, which would produce a *like Moment of Good* to others, upon no special Attachment, if it was accompany'd with natural Power to accomplish its Intention, would be incredibly more fruitful of great and good Effects to the *Whole*. (181-82, emphasis in original)

As the moral beauty of actions is the amount of virtue produced by them, "moral beauty" is simply another term for benevolence—which, by definition, is acting with the intention to effect public, rather than private, good. It therefore makes sense that those actions which are based upon a strong attachment to another person have a greater amount of self-interest in them; even if they produce public good, by Hutcheson's definition, they are less benevolent than are those actions which produce an equal amount of public good but which are based upon a weaker, and therefore less self-interested, attachment.

Benevolence, therefore, is greater the less personal the attachment between the actor and the recipient, and the desire for the observer to be close to the actor is concomitantly greater or lesser as well. The actions taken by either of two men in an intimate male friendship, then, are to a certain extent self-interested, for they are based upon a preexisting love, and will be perceived by any observer accordingly.

Of course, Hutcheson illustrates his argument about the inverse relationship between benevolence and personal attachment with the very image of heterosexual desire: the nuclear family. Yet as Bray's richly detailed history of male-male friendship clearly illustrates, as indeed do ancient Athenian conceptions of the *polis* or Montaigne's argument about friendship, intimate male relations did not preclude marriage; indeed, it was rare for such friends not to be simultaneously married to women and to have children. At the same time, those friendships, whether or not they were sexual, were physically intimate, emotionally powerful and culturally potent. They existed in a

personal and cultural space distinct from male-female relations, a space of binding intimacy, often public, that generally was greater and deeper than that attributed to the often private space of the family.

Homoaffective desire exists in that same male-male space which Pateman argues constructs society, distinct from male-female space. Yet rather than being an attachment between two men which is almost certainly stronger than the attachments any of those men have with any woman, it is in fact a weaker personal attachment which simultaneously leads to stronger social bonds; the less one is personally attached to people, the more one can do good for them and be loved by them. As homoaffective desire stems from the operations and perceptions of benevolence, that desire is simultaneously less personal and more powerful; it is focused upon the community rather than upon the individual. Its effects draw men together, creating an intimate society of men who love each other both physiologically and emotionally but who do so in a way which illuminates and strengthens the bonds between all of them rather than between any two of them; it is dependent upon their degrees of benevolence toward each other, not upon their personal attachments to each other. Rather than the relations within a nuclear family or a male couple, the members of which are less capable of acting benevolently toward each other, it is the relations of men for other men outside their private lives which, in the end, matter most.

## Chapter Seven

### Homoaffective America

#### Introduction

Overview. Hutcheson's claim that benevolence operates like gravity means that the distance between moral actors marks the strength of their mutual affective desire; the physically closer they are to each other, the stronger their attraction, until their bodies touch. While this desire is not sexual, it is physiological, as it stems from the body's pleasurable responses to perceiving benevolent actors and its wish to continue to be in the presence of, indeed to move closer to, that which provides it with pleasure.

Furthermore, as I discuss in Chapter Five, Hutcheson also claims that the distance which affective desire can travel marks the boundary of the nation-state; moral actors who are physically too far away from each other will not desire each other, and therefore will not share any sense of virtuous communal identification, as there is simply too great a distance between them for benevolence to travel. The body's affective desire for other bodies, then, is the social glue which binds together the idea of nation, for what become demarcated as national boundaries are the geographic limits of its powers. Within those boundaries operates the physical attraction which stems from doing and perceiving good, as well as the psychic attraction necessary for different people to feel that they belong to a singular group, the members of which look out for each other's mutually agreed-upon common good.

However, as I note in Chapter Six, in the eighteenth century the nation state was ruled almost exclusively by upper-class men. Thus, it is more accurate to state that the true form of social and bodily relations upon which the nation is formed and maintained is through the desire of these men for each other. Homoaffective, not affective, desire

enables government to function; without it the nation either would descend into anarchy or would be ripe for a Hobbesian leviathan to keep it from descending into that anarchy. If self-interest is a centrifugal force and benevolence is a centripetal one, then it is the desire of elite benevolent men for other such men which enables a society to have both a unitary identity and a political system which protects the rights, and circulates the property, of all of its members. Hutcheson argues for a social structure based upon the perceptions of the heart, from which homoaffective desire forms and maintains the ideal society.

Clearly, Hutcheson's sociopolitical model is distinct from Locke's conception of rights and of private property as founded upon interest. It is distinct as well as from republican notions of virtue founded upon disinterest. In fact, while Hutcheson's argument about the geographic limits of benevolence's centripetal powers is seemingly quite similar to that of the Antifederalists' argument about the geographic limits to the size of a republic, as I note in Chapter Five, there is one crucial difference. The implication of each claim is that the distance between benevolent elite men will determine the boundaries of the nation state; for Hutcheson it is because that distance determines the limits of the power of their homoaffective desire for each other, but for the Antifederalists it is because that distance determines whether or not their interests can be held in common. Hutcheson argues that people naturally act for the greater good while the Antifederalists argue that people naturally do not.

As I discuss in Chapter Two, Hutcheson's belief about this innate human goodness, and the moral philosophy he creates based upon it, was extremely influential to social and political thought throughout the eighteenth century, and he himself was widely perceived as being one of the preeminent British philosophers of the time. However,

intellectual historians of the Scottish Enlightenment have tended to focus their attentions instead primarily on David Hume, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid. In a narrative straight out of Whig history, Hutcheson's significant contributions to the development of Scottish Enlightenment thought are readily acknowledged, especially the ways in which he systematized Shaftesbury's moral arguments, but his moral philosophy itself has been understudied. This paucity of critical analysis of his work, coupled with the widespread acknowledgment of his influence on other, albeit chronologically later, philosophers, leads to the almost inescapable conclusion that Hutcheson today generally is seen as important more for the philosophical insights that his ideas subsequently enabled others to achieve rather than for the insights that his ideas themselves generated.

In addition, as I have argued throughout, Hutcheson's moral philosophy has been misread. While it is unclear how much of this misreading is a result, and how much is a cause, of this Whig historical narrative, what is clear is that it at least in part stems from the difficulty contemporary critics have conceiving of internal senses as being anything other than figurative. Consequently, the widespread agreement that Locke's model of sense and sensation helps structure Hutcheson's paradigm extends to a further agreement that his use of this model is analogical, not literal. Coupled with the omission of the influence of Willis' nerve theory and of Newton's theory of gravitation on his work, the result has been to neglect Hutcheson's engagement with early eighteenth century natural philosophy, to minimize his contributions to the "science of human nature," and to needlessly separate the ethical and political aspects of his moral philosophy.

However, uncovering these intellectual influences, especially the rapidly changing knowledge in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries about the structure and operations of the human body, foregrounds the importance of British scientific

inquiry to Hutcheson's integrated moral and social schema, as well as to the forms of affective and homoaffective desire which emerge from it. My argument, then, is that rather than simply paving the way for the "real" philosophical work done by others later in the century, Hutcheson himself was instrumental in articulating what we now think of as one of the dominant features of eighteenth-century British, indeed of Anglo-American, social discourse: the central place of the human body in constructing the bonds of a "secular" society, as that term was understood in the early- and mid-1700s.

By combining religious and natural philosophic paradigms of the body, what I call in Chapter Three the languages of the "spiritual heart" and of the "secular heart," Hutcheson developed a physiologically-based model of affective societal formation designed by a prime mover God which was distinct from Christian models of affective societal formation designed by an omnipresent God. That his model was refined throughout the eighteenth century is without question. Yet not only did it contribute significantly to the understanding of affect, especially sympathy, as a material experience that is simultaneously emotional and bodily, the conception of society as a network of affective bonds, while increasingly prevalent throughout the century, continued to retain specific Hutchesonian characteristics, separate from those of, for example, Hume or Smith, even while it also took on new meanings through the force of their philosophical arguments.

As I discuss in Chapter Six, sympathy stems from the interaction of any of the external senses with the imagination. It thus can be generated from multiple bodily locations and from multiple forms of perception; in turn, it can produce multiple emotional and physical feelings. However, affective desire is generated specifically from the heart and from the moral sense's perception of benevolence, unmediated by any

powers of the imagination; consequently, it produces only love for, and physical movement toward, the moral actor. Thus, while the possibilities for bodies to psychically and physically merge with each other expanded over the course of the eighteenth century, this expansion never precluded the affective desire we feel for another person as a direct response of the heart to its sense-specific perceptions. Affective desire is the particularly Hutchesonian model of communal formation which coexisted with a more generalized sympathetic one in eighteenth-century Anglo-America; homoaffective desire locates that community within the gendered, racialized and economic circulation of power existing at that time.

Yet if Hutcheson's influence on eighteenth-century political and social thought in Great Britain has been understudied, his influence on such thought in British America and in the United States of America has been examined even less. As I discuss in Chapter One, while the standard narratives of the intellectual influences on pre- and post-Revolutionary ideas of liberty, independence and national formation have expanded their scope significantly over the last 30 years, even that expanded scope has tended to focus primarily on an English, or on an English-influenced, lineage. And, when Scottish influences are acknowledged, they again tend to be presented primarily as originating in the works of either Hume, Smith or Reid.<sup>217</sup> For example, Elizabeth Maddock Dillon examines the Scottish concept of sociality to trace the impact of differing ideas of public and private in various eighteenth- and nineteenth-century American texts; she proposes the social as an alternative theory of citizenship to either Lockean liberalism or republican theory, and provides a detailed analysis of how those texts utilize Smith's

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<sup>217</sup>See, e.g., Ch. 1, fn. #22, 23 and 24.

theories of sociality to publicize the private and to privatize the public.<sup>218</sup> Yet despite the cogency of her argument, as well as its obvious agreement with mine about the significance of, and one of the primary focuses of, Scottish thought, she hardly mentions Hutcheson's theory of sociality and does not discuss Smith's indebtedness to him and to it.

Similarly, Roy Branson traces the influence of James Madison's exposure to Scottish philosophy when he was a student at the College of New Jersey (Princeton University) to his later political ideas, and states that "[w]hen the definitive book on the ideological origins of the American Constitution is written it should not ignore the remarkable similarities between the political and social theory of Madison and that of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers" (235). Yet, as I shall discuss in the next section of this chapter, Branson completely omits the central place in the College's curriculum that Hutcheson occupied when Madison studied there, focusing instead solely on those later Scottish thinkers, such as Smith, who were proponents of the "four stages" theory of society: that human societies advance through four different, and increasingly complex and sophisticated, economic systems: hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce.<sup>219</sup>

Even Cathy Davidson, whose study of the novel in early America has done so much to revolutionize the field, ignores Hutcheson's influence on British-American social thought, attributing to common sense philosophy a significantly greater impact within colonial educational institutions and public life than it actually had;<sup>220</sup> as I note in

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<sup>218</sup>Elizabeth Maddock Dillon, *The Gender of Freedom: Fictions of Liberalism and the Literary Public Sphere* (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford UP, 2004).

<sup>219</sup>Roy Branson, Ch. 1, fn. #24. See the next section of this chapter for a discussion of Hutcheson's philosophy in the College's curriculum.

<sup>220</sup>Cathy N. Davidson, Ch. 1, fn. #25.

Chapter One, common sense philosophy was much more prevalent in post-Revolutionary America than it was in the colonies. Consequently, I also shall argue in the next section of this chapter that colonial teachers to whom Davidson attributed a common sense philosophical influence, such as William Smith at the College of Philadelphia (University of Pennsylvania) and John Witherspoon at the College of New Jersey, were in fact heavily influenced by Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy, and that, as a result, his ideas were central to elite ideas of national formation.

Clearly, tracing such influences does not mean that instruction in moral sense philosophy and in common sense philosophy was mutually exclusive, and clearly also, Hume, Smith and Reid were extraordinarily important philosophers whose ideas had wide-ranging influence on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, as Norman Fiering points out, "Hutcheson was probably the most influential and respected moral philosopher in eighteenth-century America, both through his own writing and that of his followers, such as David Fordyce" (*Jonathan Edwards* 199). He argues that Hutcheson's moral philosophy bore an especially close affinity to Puritan religious thought, and argues elsewhere that Hutcheson's conception of the moral sense deeply influenced Jonathan Edwards.<sup>221</sup> But even tempering slightly Fiering's estimation of Hutcheson's American influence to account for that estimation's New England bias, it is clear that stepping away from that Whig historical narrative provides a greater understanding of the complex and multiple ways in which elite colonial and early national discourses of American identity were based, in part, upon a conception of society as structured upon attachments that

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<sup>221</sup>Norman Fiering, *Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context* (Chapel Hill, NC: Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture, Williamsburg, VA, by the University of North Carolina Press, 1981).

were both emotional and physiological, a conception that was distinct from notions of disinterest and civic virtue. Communitarianism, specifically a Hutchesonian, bodily-based one, as much as liberalism, republicanism and other strands of thought, including other strands of communitarian thought, helped shape the idea of America emerging in the 1760s and 1770s.

In the next section of this chapter, then, I shall synthesize the small amount of historical work that has been done on the transmission of Hutcheson's philosophy to the colonies; while further research is necessary to demonstrate fully his importance to early American intellectual discourse, that which already has been conducted is highly suggestive of a wide reading audience for his work among colonial male elites. Yet as I discuss in Chapter One, current research on Hutcheson's influence on this side of the Atlantic stops at the American Revolution, subsumed narratively by the ascendance of common sense philosophy that I note above. Culminating in Garry Wills' controversial argument about the Hutchesonian influence on Jefferson's composition of the Declaration of Independence, the implication is that Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy helped form the pre-Revolutionary idea of America but had no influence in the formation of the new nation's process of conceptualizing itself.

But as I also discuss in that chapter, numerous critics have examined the centrality of feeling and of emotional bonds to the expression of post-Revolutionary American identity, including the feeling bonds between elite men.<sup>222</sup> I shall argue in the

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<sup>222</sup>In an odd twist on this Hutchesonian narrative, Peter Coviello, in an otherwise astute essay arguing that Jefferson used affect as a way to create and organize the nation in the Declaration of Independence, not only fails to mention Wills' book in anything other than a footnote, in that footnote he does not mention Wills' argument about Jefferson's Hutchesonian influence, an argument which clearly precedes and agrees with Coviello's own. See "Agonizing Affection: Affect and Nation in Early America," *Early*

final section of this chapter, then, that Hutcheson's philosophy, and the language of affective desire through which it articulates its vision of a benevolent society, was crucial to the debates about national identity in the newly independent nation, helping to define the geographical limits of the idea of what I call "homoaffective America." For as social and political power in the eighteenth century was held by elite men, the benevolent bodies whose attraction to each other formed those limits were exclusively male.

This desire of benevolent male bodies to touch each other, I claim, was critical to the imagination and implementation of the differing visions of America emerging in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in part framing the political debates of the early republic and helping to influence the rhetoric and sociopolitical culture of post-Revolutionary America. In fact, I shall argue in the next section that as Hutcheson's thought was disseminated predominantly through educational institutions that were open almost exclusively to upper-class men, that transmission itself enacted the very male-male affections that his philosophy theorizes made such a nation possible.

Influence, of course, is as much discursive as it is educational, if not even more so. For example, locating Madison in a classroom at the College of New Jersey where the *Inquiry* was read and discussed does not necessarily mean that he was influenced by it; for that, we must look at what he said, how he acted and what he wrote—in other words, at his self-created historical record. Furthermore, as I shall discuss in the last section of this chapter, tracing that influence means as well distinguishing between expressions of sympathy and of affective desire, a task made more difficult, yet more important, by the commonality of language utilized by these two related but distinct

modes of emotional articulation. Therefore, recapturing Hutcheson's centrality to the formation of early American national identity requires not only discussing the routes by which his ideas were transmitted across the Atlantic but requires also interpreting the debates about the idea of America in the early national period—the arguments put forth, the assumptions made, the terms used—to discern the continuing existence of a Hutchesonian-inflected benevolence-based nation. Foregrounding the centrality of male homoaffective desire to that national identity provides a deeper understanding of the ways in which the formation of the new nation, perhaps of any nation, is a gendered construct, here shaped through the articulations and actions of white male intimacy.

For if colonial America as a country emerged textually, declaring independence both on the page and through physical action, then it is accurate to say that independent America did so as well, declaring its self-identity first through the Articles of Confederation and then through the Constitution. In the traditional origin narrative, these documents signal the country's agreement to a set of laws and proscriptions which bound first the states and then, more importantly, Americans to each other. The Constitution thus is celebrated as demonstrating the genius of the founding fathers; as the hero of that triumphalist narrative, it balanced the sparring factions that had been strengthened by the Articles, enabling the country to unite and to thrive, and thereby providing the framework for the birth of a uniquely American national self.

As many historians have noted, though, the Constitution did more, proscribing as well for the new nation the proper forms of social relations—which, in the eighteenth century, as I have argued throughout, were simultaneously both personal and political. Indeed, it is over the proper forms of those relations that the ratification of the Constitution was fought; the Antifederalists feared that it would establish an aristocracy

while the Federalists claimed that it was republican. I shall argue in the last section of this chapter that this disagreement was, in part, articulated and debated through the discourse of male homoaffectivity. For as the term "founding fathers" implies, and as participation in the Convention at Philadelphia demonstrates, the Constitution, indeed one could say Constitutional America—that is, the America that has been celebrated for over two hundred years—was a masculine birth, formed through the calm, measured and benevolent actions, interactions and interrelations of elite men.<sup>223</sup> As benevolence's attractive powers have geographic limits, it was the affective bonds of these men with each other which marked the parameters of their vision of this newly-birthing nation. One could even argue that part of the Constitution's triumphalism was its rewriting of that geographic argument; as conceived by its fathers, it allows new states to enter into that nation, and therefore for the nation's geographic limits to expand, while still maintaining its masculine-influenced benevolent character.

It is for this reason that my analysis of male homoaffectivity's influence on early American national identity focuses not on the Constitution but on one of the texts associated with it: *The Federalist Papers*. For while the Constitution reflects the thoughts and arguments of those who created it, as do the debates during the Convention which in effect are its ghost text, *The Federalist Papers* represents it and its vision of America to the nation and world at large in words carefully chosen for particular purposes. Key to this vision is male homoaffective desire. As Wills examines the Declaration of Independence to argue that it creates the new American nation as an

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<sup>223</sup>See, e.g., Ruth Gilbert, Ch. 3, fn. #24. Gilbert contrasts the representations of textual masculine births as clean and neat with those of bodily feminine births as grotesque.

affective community, in the last section of this chapter I shall examine *The Federalist Papers* to argue that it articulates the masculine birth of the Constitutional nation as being performed through the affective bonds of benevolent men. *The Federalist Papers* claims that the emotional attachments between these men codify and maintain America.

Genre and Homoaffective Desire. To date, however, much of the textual criticism on the centrality of emotion to early national formation has focused primarily on novels, especially but not solely on the sentimental novel. For example, Elizabeth Barnes examines the politics of sympathy in *Common Sense*, but she primarily examines such early American novels as *The Power of Sympathy*, *Wieland*, *Charlotte Temple* and *The Coquette*, while Julia A. Stern provides readings of *The Power of Sympathy*, *Charlotte Temple*, *The Coquette* and *Ormond*.<sup>224</sup> This current interest in early American novels stands in marked contrast to the pre-1980s critical view of them: that little of literary value was produced prior to the early nineteenth century with, perhaps, the exception of Charles Brockden Brown's work. And there is, certainly, a very good reason for this new view; as Cathy Davidson has argued, the novel was not only the most popular genre in post-Revolutionary America, the genre itself captured the turmoil of the period and the multiplicity of voices that the elites, in a process culminating in the Constitution, sought to unify, marginalize and leave voiceless. Similarly, Barnes claims that the cultural work of these novels was to make public social possibilities that the elites tried to silence, leading, Stern notes, to "a collective mourning over the violence of the Revolution and the preemption of liberty in the wake of the post-Revolutionary settlement" (2).

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<sup>224</sup>Elizabeth Barnes, *States of Sympathy: Seduction and Democracy in the American Novel* (New York: Columbia UP, 1997); Julia A. Stern, Ch. 1, fn. #29.

Davidson asserts that novels were seen as dangerous because they had the power to stir readers' imaginations and therefore to take them out of their lives, making them either less productive members of society because they were "idle" while reading or less responsive to received authority because that imagination raised the possibility of other forms of social relations. To counter this perception of their chosen genre, early American novelists often prefaced their works by stating that they were writing about true events in order to morally instruct their readers; their intent was to engage in the pressing issues of the day by presenting the lives of their characters in a way that would educate those readers, a process which in turn would create a better nation, for the novel's readers were the nation's members.

In their depiction of individuals and of the lives that they lead, these authors claimed, novels have larger social and moral utility. But underpinning that argument is the assumption that individual lives and relationships have political consequences for the nation because they are part of the political fabric of the nation. Politics, early American novelists argue, does not exist in impersonal institutions but in human beings and in human relations. These novelists, in other words, argue for the primacy of the social, the realm theorized by Hutcheson as encompassing the structure, organization, valence and government of human society.

In fact, Gordon Wood writes that the American Revolution was a radical social revolution as much as it was a radical political one, and that this radicalness stems from the way that the social and the political were perceived at that time, as I discussed in Chapter Two:

[The American Revolution] was as radical and social as any revolution in history, but it was radical and social in a very special eighteenth-

century sense. No doubt many of the concerns and much of the language of that premodern, pre-Marxian eighteenth century were almost entirely political. That was because most people in that very different distant world could not as yet conceive of society as apart from government. . . [W]hen Anglo-American radicals talked in what seems to be only political terms—purifying a corrupt constitution, eliminating courtiers, fighting off crown power, and, most important, becoming republicans—they nevertheless had a decidedly social message. In our eyes the American revolutionaries appear to be absorbed in changing only their governments, not their society. But in destroying monarchy and establishing republics they were changing their society as well as their governments, and they knew it. (*Radicalism*, 5)

Thus, Wood reiterates the point that social relations and political relations were two facets of the same schema. It is for this reason that early American novelists consciously saw themselves as being political as that term was then understood; by depicting personal struggles and interpersonal relations, they commented on, and potentially influenced, political debates about how the country should be organized. By engaging politically, they justified the form of the novel and participated in creating the parameters of the new nation. By writing novels, they helped create a distinctly American identity.

Yet I would argue that no matter that political content, and despite their significance to political debates, novels do not codify the nation. They can influence action, can argue for or against certain political positions or policies, can even envision their own ideal version of that nation. But by that very engagement with the imagination

which made them appear to be so dangerous, and which in fact is part of their allure, novels are not only more than the sum total of their political messages, those messages themselves often can be read in very different political ways, depending in part, as reception theory has taught us, on who is doing the reading. By definition as a textual form, novels are slippery, multivocal, polyphonous.

But the political debates of the early republic were not open to multiple interpretation. Clearly, there were many nuances, many differences of opinion, yet ultimately positions had to be taken, decisions had to be made, or the nation could not move forward. Novels were ardent participants in arguing about who could participate in that "move forward" and what it actually entailed, but for all the readers and for all the opinions, in the end only a small percentage of those inhabitants of the United States mattered: those who could vote, and those who represented them. For no matter the breadth and depth of what Davidson calls "the riot of American life in the aftermath of its Revolution" (9), and what Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist #1* calls the "great national discussion," the reality is that votes occurred, laws were passed and the consequences which then followed followed for everyone, whether or not they had the right to participate in that final conversation. The people out of doors might well make their opinions known to the people in doors, but it was the decisions of the latter, not of the former, that served as the endpoint of the political process.

There were, then, in effect, two Americas: one comprised of citizens, and one comprised of everyone else. Certainly, within each of these Americas were further degrees of social and political power and separation; in citizen America, for example, elite men had more power than did the men of the middling classes who met the property qualifications necessary for entrance into it, while in noncitizen America, elite women

had more power than did slave women. Certainly, there were as well multiple forms of communication between those two Americas—textual, oral and bodily. And, certainly, novels were one of the key modes through which politics and political arguments circulated throughout and between both nations, giving voice within citizen America to the concerns of members of that noncitizen one. Yet, as I discuss in Chapter One, it was citizen America which ultimately created the "official" documents that defined both Americas' place in the world. It was through the conversations and relationships of citizens with each other that America, as a body politic, was formed. In the end, America was created through the bonds of elite men.

Thus, if novels were, in part, the texts of noncitizen America, informing the world at large of its hopes, thoughts, fears and desires, documents such as the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, the Bill of Rights and *The Federalist Papers* were the texts of, and performed the same work for, citizen America, illuminating a particular perspective on the scope and parameters of relations between men of a particular economic status and race at that time. I would argue therefore that beyond the difference in genre and authorship, the two textual forms emerge from similar psychic and relational spaces. Both give expression to the realm of the social, even while representing different subject positions within it.

Consequently, reading the documents of citizen America through the same critical lens as reading novels demonstrates the relationship between genre and homoaffective desire in the early national period. Indeed, such a form of reading is historically appropriate and, hence, especially necessary. For as Davidson has stressed, although both poetry and drama have a long colonial discursive history, in the late eighteenth century novels were a new form of American writing. William Hill Brown's *The Power*

*of Sympathy*, widely regarded as the first American novel, was published in January 1789, two years after the Constitutional Convention and six months after the last of *The Federalist Papers* appeared in print; all prior novels read in America were European imports. But there were many forms of "home-grown" writing that had long been published in what was now an independent America: captivity narratives, religious tracts, political pamphlets and broadsides, for example.<sup>225</sup> Indeed, Richard Buel notes that the late eighteenth century was "an age where there was little distinction between culture and politics" (xi). The Congressional debates between Federalists and Republicans, "were widely read. Certainly the newspapers of the period, even the less prominent ones, devoted an unusual amount of space to them" (xi).

Given that print history, then, there is no reason to privilege novels when analyzing the role of affect in early American national formation. Yet while many literary critics and historians have noted that the Constitution attempted to constrain the promise of a more widespread liberty inherent in the Declaration of Independence and in the Articles of Confederation (although the extent of even that liberty itself rather restricted), most analyses of the means by which citizen America effected that constraint have been performed by historians. Less attention has been paid to the rhetorical techniques by which the "official" documents of the time presented that Constitutional nation to its two different audiences: citizen America, which was, in the end, the America that would vote yay or nay, and noncitizen America, which inhabited so many aspects of

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<sup>225</sup>In addition to Davidson, for a detailed examination of the history of the book and the development of print cultures in the colonies and the new nation, see, e.g., David Hall, *Cultures of Print: Essays in the History of the Book* (Amherst, MA: U Massachusetts P, 1986) or Hugh Amory and David Hall, ed., *The Colonial Book in the Atlantic World* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP, 2000).

those citizens' lives. I argue here that in *The Federalist Papers*, the textual voice of citizen America uses affect just as the textual voice of noncitizen America does—to create particular responses among its readers—and, indeed, that all texts of all Americas can and should be read accordingly.

In fact, the history of American rhetoric again demonstrates the historical necessity of this affective application. David Daiches states that in the eighteenth century, "rhetoric was viewed as a social phenomenon, deeply rooted in human relationships and capable of significantly affecting, even altering, the structure of those relationships on the level of individuals as well as on the level of social and political organization" ("John Witherspoon," 164). It is within this context that Jay Fliegelman argues that eighteenth-century elite culture promulgated "a natural spoken language that would permit universal recognition and understanding" (1-2) as one aspect of a movement toward a more enlightened political theory that did not rely on the elite language of classical rhetoric, through which the gentry talked to each other, but relied instead on a language that could be addressed to a nongentry audience. Natural language was expressed not so much in words as in tones, gestures and facial expressions. It was a language of performance in which the emotional credibility of the speaker, rather than the logical force of argument, became the basis upon which that speaker's veracity was to be judged. Through this natural language, the speaker conveyed not his<sup>226</sup> thoughts and feelings but his experience of those thoughts and feelings; the more sincerely he could convey that experience, the more effective a speaker he became.

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<sup>226</sup>While such natural language was available to either men or women, the majority of public speakers, as actors in the emerging public sphere, were men.

But basing a speaker's credibility upon his emotional sincerity—or, at least, upon the performance of the proper physical expressions of that emotional sincerity—meant that to be effective, a speaker had to convince his audience of his sincerity and had to establish an emotional bond with them. Speaker and audience were imagined to be on an equal, rather than on a hierarchical, footing; through the persuasive power of his emotional sincerity, the speaker and audience would arrive at a shared common knowledge. A successful speaker achieved a mutual, emotional consent with his audience rather than simply proving rationally to them why they should be persuaded by his logical arguments. Fliegelman calls this consent *affective* because it appealed not just to the listener's head but also to the listener's heart.

This search for a natural language, and the affective consent to which speakers were to aspire, was one aspect of Scottish moral philosophy's influence upon eighteenth-century culture and discourse. But in its emphasis on the sincerity of the speaker's feelings as perceived by the heart of the listener, that influence is clearly in part Hutchesonian. For although Fliegelman discusses affective consent as operating through the principles of sympathy, I would argue that it operates through the principles of affective desire; the heart only responds affirmatively if it perceives that there is a true desire for the audience's enlightenment behind the gestures, not simply a rhetorical and physical performance. It is, therefore, not the listener's imagination which matters but the listener's moral sense.

Fliegelman additionally notes that this natural language and emotional bonding also became important for writing. Furthermore, Cathy Davidson and Christopher Looby point out that the boundaries between print and oral culture were less distinct in the eighteenth century than they are today; printed texts, for example, were often read aloud,

whether novels, broadsides, pamphlets, or proclamations.<sup>227</sup> This porous boundary gives extra significance to Locke's argument in the *Essay* that words have sense impressions; in consonance with eighteenth-century conceptions of materiality which construct a physical world radically different from ours, words are signs of the ideas of the person using them, implying the presence of that person's physical body, from whose senses all ideas originate.<sup>228</sup> A writer's appeal to the sincerity of feelings, then, or simply to the experience of feelings, makes the writer's instinct to benevolence (that is, the writer's body) a presence in the text, and enables that writer, through "gesture," to establish an affective bond with his or her reading audience in ways that our contemporary culture, which firmly separates speech and print, can never experience. Fliegelman thus notes that Joseph Priestley, who was a grammarian, rhetorician and chemist as well as a political radical, saw figures of speech as "the gesturing body on the printed page" (55). Indeed, Fliegelman begins his book by arguing that Thomas Jefferson intended the Declaration of Independence to be read aloud, not just silently on the page, while Looby argues for "the intimate association between the revolutionary founding of the United States and acts of voice" (3).<sup>229</sup>

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<sup>227</sup>Davidson, *Revolution and the Word*, Ch. 1, fn. #25; Christopher Looby, *Voicing America: Language, Literary Form, and the Origins of the United States* (Chicago and London: U Chicago P, 1996). For an alternative view on the "differentness" of print culture from oral culture, see Michael Warner, *The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1990).

<sup>228</sup>See Book III, "Of Words."

<sup>229</sup>Anne Kibbey discusses John Cotton's use of the classical concept of the *figura* as a rhetorical gesture, on the page, of the material shape of, for example, the body of Christ or the body of the "speaker": bodies that could gesture, that could express, and that could be the means of conversion. It was out of this earlier form of printed rhetoric as speech that eighteenth century notions of print as something separate from speech were still emerging. See *The Interpretation of Material Shapes in Puritanism: A Study of*

In order to construct his argument about the importance of achieving printed, not just oral, affective consent, Fliegelman builds upon Robert Darnton's argument that a new type of writing began to appear in the latter part of the eighteenth century; Darnton traces this new writing to Rousseau's *Emile* and *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, and Rousseau's desire to make writing the "art of speaking to those who are absent . . . communicating without any mediation our feelings, wills, desires" (58). This new type of writing, speaking directly to the reader's feelings, required in turn a new type of reading in which reading became an emotional experience through which the reader arrived at a new understanding of him or herself and of the world around him or her. Fliegelman describes this new approach to literature as "[a] new model of representation that defines truth as truthfulness to feelings rather than to facts [and that] subordinates history to the word pictures of romance. What happens within the text is judged by what happens within the reader" (60-1).

Given, then, the porous boundaries between various types of writing at this time, as well as between print and oral cultures, it stands to reason that affective consent would have been used in various types of texts, just as it would have been used in various oratorical situations. I thus shall argue in the last section of this chapter that Publius, as part of his strategy for presenting his Constitutional nation to citizen America, uses affective consent to establish a homoaffective bond with the residents of that America (which is, after all, comprised solely of white male voters) in order to claim that it is that very bond which the Constitution will strengthen as it strengthens America itself. Additionally, given the print history of the *Papers*—in newspapers, alongside other essays

of various viewpoints on the subject, during a time of great debate—it is reasonable to assume that individual *Papers* were read out loud as well as on the page. Publius, in effect, has multiple audiences—citizen America and noncitizen America—and, within each America, has two additional audiences: one written, and one oral. While neither audience can see him "speak," both can "see" him speak. Publius' body gestures rhetorically to appeal to their emotions so that they can feel in their hearts the "truths" he is trying to convey; the address form that Publius adopts is itself a written form of speaking. Consenting on an emotional level, the men of citizen America enter into his homoaffective nation, and vote to create a new, Constitutional one.

#### The Transmission of Hutcheson's Thought to the Colonies

Overview. As I note above, I have argued throughout that in eighteenth-century Anglo-America the realm of the social was perceived as encompassing many forms of human relations that today we see as being distinct from it. While I have focused primarily upon the deep interconnections between personal relations and political relations, I note in Chapter Two that the realities of long-distance travel and communications meant that transatlantic trade also was perceived as existing within the purview of the social; not only did trading ships carry personal letters for individuals who were not part of the economic exchange for which each of those ships was engaged, the exchanges themselves were sustained by letters written between, for example, merchants and suppliers or merchants and creditors, all of whom had to trust, based upon past experience and/or upon knowledge of or recommendation of each other's character, that each party would perform the duties and obligations which he said he would perform. Economics, in other words, both structured and was structured by human relations, not simply by the movement of goods.

Economics, of course, is only one example of how transatlantic systems of exchange constituted what David Hall calls the most consequential form of sociability in the eighteenth century ("Learned Culture" 411). For as Toby Ditz notes, until the late eighteenth century transatlantic trade was "highly dependent on personal networks" because there were no fully developed bankruptcy or liability laws; similarly, "the flow of credit depended primarily on personal ties and recommendations" because there were no commercial banks (56). Ditz analyzes the correspondence of a number of Philadelphia's largest merchants at that time and argues that these men consistently were concerned with issues of reputation and deceit. While his focus is on demonstrating how their letters display the merchants' fragile sense of masculinity, his analysis highlights the degree to which a morally good character, or at least the perception of having one, mattered within the exchange networks which shaped so much of eighteenth-century life, especially when members of the same network lived long distances from each other and, indeed, in many cases had never met and might never do so.

This significantly more expansive view of the social means that studying the transmission of Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy to the colonies is itself a study of multidimensional channels which were in part intellectual, in part economic, in part religious, in part personal, and in all ways shaped by the class-, race- and gender-based social interactions of eighteenth-century Anglo-America. Hutcheson's philosophy, that is, was transmitted through the very operations of the interrelational world that it theorized. For as Andrew Hook points out in his examination of Philadelphia's centrality to the development of Scottish thought in the colonies, analyzing influence means more than examining solely the movement of bodies or of books; there must be some form of interaction between the agent of influence and the object of potential influence for a

change to occur.<sup>230</sup> That is, to say that a type of influence presumably occurred means that there must be an interaction between that agent and object, as well as something which the object then does as a result which is both documented and documentedly different from what the object was doing prior to that interaction.

Hook argues for the primacy of educational instruction as an agent of influence; David Daiches, in fact, claims that "[t]he most direct and powerful Scottish influence on the Founding Fathers came through education" ("John Witherspoon," 164). I argue here that while Hutcheson's ideas may well have been transmitted almost entirely in just that way, that instruction itself took place within the larger social contexts through which the exchanges that established a literary and transatlantic colonial American and early national culture occurred; in other words, it took place primarily, perhaps exclusively, within the contexts and contours of social relations within citizen America. For as Hall, David Shields and Richard Bushman have extensively documented,<sup>231</sup> by the middle of the eighteenth century a transatlantic genteel society had become well established in colonial urban areas and plantations; while there were, of course, regional differences, this society, like other manifestations of Shaftesbury's private society, required specific refined codes of behavior from each its members:

By the Revolution, it was incumbent upon all gentlemen broadly defined—the great merchants and planters, the clergy and professionals, the officers of the courts and government—to live by the genteel code.

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<sup>230</sup>Andrew Hook, "Philadelphia, Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment." Sher and Smitten: 227-41.

<sup>231</sup>David D. Hall, "Learned Culture in the Eighteenth Century." Amory and Hall, fn. #9: 411-33; Richard L. Bushman, *The Refinement of America: Persons, Houses, Cities* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993); David S. Shields, Ch. 2, fn. #20; see Chapter 4 for a discussion of the female genteel world of the tea table and the salon.

Lesser people might look on with envy, awe, or hatred, they might imitate or borrow, but they were onlookers, thought to be presumptuous if they assumed the manners or showed the possessions of a gentleman.

(Bushman xiii)

While Bushman is here discussing male genteel culture, there was as well a female genteel culture of the tea table, documented by Shields, with its own forms of etiquette, fashion and discourse, which was able to exert significant degrees of social power. But as this gendered distinction of activities indicates, the elite realms within which Hutcheson's philosophy circulated had clearly demarcated boundaries between male and female spaces. Indeed, Shields notes:

By the 1730s women had access to a range of public spaces theretofore restricted. They had succeeded in forming a widespread feminine interest in fashion and its material manifestations, an interest that would subvert the old sumptuary customs and lead to a demotic form of gentility– respectability. They had organized a network of polite circles that by conversation policed the reputations of members of the genteel classes; scandal could be said to have a punitive power upon violators of social convention equal to Christian admonition. There were, however, limits to the influence of circles organized primarily among women. Men still determined politics, dominated the arts, and determined much of the exercise of commerce. (119)

Although Shields does not discuss the role of education in this gendered process, schooling and literacy were marked by those same gender, class and racial boundaries. While it was quite common for both white boys and girls to attend elementary schools,

especially in New England and in the mid-Atlantic colonies, pursuit of higher education was solely a male province. Many elite women did receive further education through private tutors, but much of this was focused on making them properly refined ladies, not on educating them to act appropriately in the worlds of commerce, politics or the ministry. Consequently, although Shields elsewhere remarks that "[o]ver the course of the [eighteenth] century, learning became less a marker of gender and more one of gentility," ("Eighteenth-Century," 451), he focuses on the development of a transatlantic literary culture of *belles lettres* in which manuscripts were circulated throughout a polite society populated by both elite men and women, not on the distinctly separate male culture of educational institutions of higher learning which prepared elite men for the distinctly male worlds they would inhabit as adults.<sup>232</sup>

Hence, not only was moral philosophy (especially, on this side of the Atlantic, Hutcheson's moral philosophy<sup>233</sup>) an integral part of the elite education that certain members of citizen America received, it was almost exclusively elite men who imparted and who received that education, for moral philosophy prepared these men to act properly within those male realms. Consequently, it was the relations of these men with each other that were the primary vectors of transmission by which Hutcheson's ideas circulated. Those intellectual and interpersonal exchanges helped to build and to reinforce the masculine social web which birthed homoaffective, Constitutional America;

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<sup>232</sup>Sloan, Ch. 1, fn. #13.

<sup>233</sup>See, e.g., Fiering, Ch. 2, fn. #24. David Daiches states that "the combination of Francis Hutcheson's idea of the 'moral sense,' Hugh Blair's view of rhetoric and its relation to virtue and Thomas Reid's 'common sense' philosophy became a central element in the thought of most college-educated Americans in the latter part of the eighteenth century and indeed well into the nineteenth." David Daiches, "John Witherspoon, James Wilson and the Influence of Scottish Rhetoric on America," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 15 (February and May 1991):165.

Hutcheson's philosophy provided one of the discourses by which the individuals linked within that web were able to conceptualize such a nation.

For while Ditz's focus is on mid- to late-eighteenth-century elite male constructions of gender, he also argues that for these merchants, "What mattered most in safeguarding reputation was the judgment of other men" (53). Even though women, especially white women, participated in the exchange networks which marked early American economic life, as did men of the middling and lower classes, these merchants, and other elite men like them, were the primary transatlantic movers of goods; it was through their relationships with each other upon which the wealth of individual colonies, and then of individual states, and finally of the nation, primarily was built. Indeed, as Ditz's quotes above regarding transatlantic finance make clear, credit itself flowed through the enactment of male-male intimacy.

Consequently, although Ditz does not use the term "homosocial," he intriguingly argues that "as the merchants negotiated a rather elusive masculinity with each other, they frequently triangulated their position with reference to a heavily symbolized femininity" (53-4), which is, of course, exactly how Sedgwick's theory of homosociality works. Although his focus is on gender construction and on the merchants' fears of being unmanned, his analysis makes clear that the relationships of these men with each other was extraordinarily significant to them, not only for the obvious reason of their financial survival but, just as importantly, to maintain their social status as elites. For while that status was clearly in large part dependent upon finances, it was also in large part dependent upon how they were perceived by their social equals—i.e., by other men like themselves—not just by those below them on the social scale. Their concern with each other's behavior, then, highlights Ditz's argument about eighteenth-century notions of

masculinity and highlights as well the implication of that argument: that men's relationships with other men were critical to their public status as men.

Similarly, as I discuss in Chapter One, Joanne Freeman foregrounds the crucial role that the public relationships of elite men with each other played in the political culture of the new nation. Yet while her book is highly suggestive of the homosocial, and perhaps even the homoaffective, nature of those public relationships, she does not conduct such an analysis. But as feminist historians and historians of other marginalized groups have demonstrated, focusing on the horizontal relationships that members of such groups had with each other provides a very different historical narrative than does focusing solely on the hierarchical relations that they had with those who had greater social and political power; while it does not mitigate the effects of that power, it provides a more nuanced view of the role of agency in daily life. Similarly, focusing on the same-gender basis of the transmission of Hutcheson's thought demonstrates the public effects of men's private attachments to other men, whether or not those attachments were remarked upon as being anything other than the ordinary course of human events—indeed, I would argue, especially when they were not so remarked.

While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an exhaustive study of the ways in which those solely male relationships were key to that transmission, I shall provide here the outlines of a speculative history that argues for the centrality of male-male intimacy to it. While this history is largely unwritten, it requires demonstrating the actual points of transmission of Hutcheson's thought as well reading those points as relational; they create and extend elite male bonds of affection for other elite men that transfer information while simultaneously drawing those men closer to each other. Thus, if higher education was the primary mode by which Hutcheson's thought was transmitted,

as Hook and Daiches argue, and if that world was almost exclusively populated by genteel men, then research which already has been conducted on the curriculum of colonial and early national educational systems (both institutional and private) and that which has already been conducted on student notebooks needs to be placed alongside archival research yet to be conducted on the correspondence on both sides of the Atlantic between male teachers and male students, between male students and other male students, and between male teachers and other male teachers to analyze how these male youth and adults articulated and understood their educational relations with each other.

For as Ditz's article demonstrates that the realms of the economic and of the personal were, in fact, two aspects of the realm of the social, I would argue that the realms of the educational and of the personal were structured and perceived similarly. Clearly, without the evidence of letters it is impossible to substantiate that claim beyond that which we already know about the far reach of the social at that time, but that is exactly the speculative nature of what I shall discuss in the following subsection. In it, I shall argue that were those letters to be found and read, it would be clear that the educational relationships through which Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy was transmitted from men to men were articulated through the language of homoaffective desire, building the very male-male bonds which made possible the idea first of an America, and then of a Constitutional America. For as I argue in Chapter Six that Hutcheson's philosophy theorizes the necessity of such intimacy to the idea of nation, I shall argue here that that transmission, in effect, performs that very process of male communal formation that is one pathway through which such nation-building occurs.

Male-Male Intimacy and the Routes of Transmission: A Speculative History.

Like many other eighteenth-century Scottish-British American exchanges, the intellectual

ones by which Hutcheson's philosophy was disseminated to and throughout the colonies occurred in large part separately from any exchanges that either partner had with London. For as I discuss in Chapter Two, the new Scottish history has removed the gloss of Whig historiography to demonstrate the depth and breadth of Scotland's economic and intellectual development independent of English influence; as a nation with a long history and identity, even after (and, in certain ways, especially after) the Union of 1707, its elites actively sought to participate in transatlantic networks that would situate Scotland within the modernizing and enlightened developments of the century distinct from England and from the expanding British administrative state. Furthermore, over the course of the century, beginning with events that I also discuss in Chapter Two, Scottish universities themselves became intellectually renowned focal points of exchange, drawing elite male students from throughout the republic of letters, including British-America, who then returned to their homelands, deeply influenced by particularly Scottish modes of thought and putting that thought into practice.

That these elites were male does not mean that they were the only historical actors whose actions matter. Yet contextualizing their relationships with each other within the smaller-scale eighteenth-century world of exchange demonstrates the wide scope of their influence. For example, in 1750 the entire white population of British America (approximately 1.2 million) was slightly less than double that of London alone (approximately 675,000).<sup>234</sup> Given the hierarchical structure of social and political power

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<sup>234</sup>For the American colonies, see "Estimated Population of American Colonies, 1630-1780," (<http://merrill.olm.net/mdocs/pop/colonies/colonies.htm>) Accessed May 4, 2008. For London, see F.M.L. Thompson, ed., *The Cambridge Social History of Britain, 1750-1950, Vol. 2: People and their Environment* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UP) : 5.

at that time, elite men were able to affect events and modes of thought far beyond their actual numbers within areas of small population, such as the colonies' plantations and urban areas.<sup>235</sup> That they were able to do so largely in concert with other elite men demonstrates the importance of elite male-male horizontal relations, and calls for a deeper examination of how power travels through, and is reinforced by, systems of male-male intimacy.

Hook, for example, argues that the desire of Edinburgh and Philadelphia elites to create enlightened societies was, in part, made easier because of the smaller size of the cities themselves:

The very smallness and compactness of the intellectual society in cities such as Philadelphia and Edinburgh made such a coherence of purpose and sharing of aims easier to achieve. . . . neither city was large enough to sustain a series of separate intellectual groups; the pattern in both was rather for the same range of individuals to be involved in a variety of intellectual and cultural activities. ("Scottish Thought," 230)

He claims elsewhere that it was through these interconnected networks of elites that Benjamin Franklin was able to become one of the key figures in the construction of a Scottish-British American transatlantic flow, developing numerous Scottish contacts while a printer in Philadelphia which he then further developed when he became a colonial agent in London.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup>See, e.g., Wood, *Radicalism*, Ch. 1, fn. #19: 57-77, for a discussion of the personal basis of many forms of colonial social, economic, and political structures.

<sup>236</sup>Andrew Hook, "Philadelphia, Edinburgh and the Scottish Enlightenment," fn. #14.

While Hook does not discuss Franklin's activities in this fashion, a brief summary highlights the role of male-male relations to them. For example, in 1748, twenty years after opening his first print shop, Franklin entered into a printing partnership with David Hall, a Scotsman who had emigrated to Philadelphia in 1743 and who was a journeyman in Franklin's shop from his arrival until Franklin made him a partner. Hall had worked in London with William Strahan, who also was Scottish and already was a friend of Franklin. Richard B. Sher notes that Strahan recommended Hall to Franklin, and that Franklin wrote to Strahan in 1744 that Hall "answer[ed] perfectly the Character you had given of him" (182). In that same letter, Franklin also wrote that he had "long wanted a Friend in London whose Judgment I could depend on" (182), and the three men remained close friends, correspondents, and business collaborators for many years.<sup>237</sup>

Franklin's letter is highly suggestive of the multiple interconnections between transatlantic exchanges and male-male relations which I am arguing need to be explored further; in its positive reference to his relationship with Strahan, Franklin in effect gives voice to a different emotional aspect of the male-male relations with which the merchants whose correspondence Ditz analyzes struggle. In fact, one could even say that Hall was exchanged between Strahan and Franklin. Yet ultimately Hall, like Franklin before him, became an agent rather than an object of exchange; he not only became Franklin's partner, he was one of the 25 men who in 1747 founded the St. Andrews Society of Philadelphia, a charitable and social club for Scots living in Philadelphia. Although Franklin knew other founders of the Society independently of Hall, through him, he became even more intimate with Scottish political and philosophical ideas, and through

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<sup>237</sup>Richard B. Sher, "An 'Agreeable and Instructive Society': Benjamin Franklin and Scotland," *Eighteenth-Century Life* 15:1-2 (February and May 1991): 181-93.

Strahan he became familiar with many of the most important Scots living in London. Indeed, as a colonial agent in London, Franklin made two trips to Scotland, one of which was to receive an honorary Doctor of Laws degree from the University of St. Andrews for his work in electricity.

While in Scotland, Franklin established, and subsequently maintained, contact with many members of the Scottish intellectual elite, including Lord Kames and David Hume, and thus was able to provide letters of introduction for a number of male British-American students who traveled to Scotland in order to study in its medical schools, which were renowned as being the most advanced in Europe at the time. For example, in a letter to Jonathan Potts and Benjamin Rush when they were inquiring about studying medicine at Edinburgh, Franklin wrote: "You have great Advantages in going to study at Edinburgh at this Time, where there happens to be collected a Set of as truly great Men [sic], Professors of the several Branches of Knowledge, as have ever appeared in any Age or Country" (Hook, "Philadelphia, Edinburgh," 236).

In fact, the first colonial medical school was established by John Morgan, a Philadelphia physician who had studied at the University of Edinburgh, in 1765 at the College of Philadelphia, which Franklin had helped to found ten years earlier.<sup>238</sup> The new school's curriculum was modeled after Edinburgh's and the three other original members of the faculty (William Shippen, Benjamin Rush, and Adam Kuhn) also had studied there, as had ten out of its first 12 professors. Ultimately, more than 130 British-

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<sup>238</sup>See Deborah C. Brunton, "The Transfer of Medical Education: Teaching at the Edinburgh and Philadelphia Medical Schools." *Sher and Smitten*: 242-58. Additionally, Brunton explains in great detail the influence of Scottish medical theories and educational practices on the faculty and curriculum of the College of Philadelphia's medical school, as well as American innovations.

American medical students studied in Scotland prior to the Revolution, a number that does not appear to be large until one recognizes that, in 1776, it is estimated that perhaps 2,500 colonists were college-educated; thus, approximately 5% of the college-educated colonial elites were educated in Scotland's medical schools alone (Ostrander *Republic* 6), a figure which does not include those who were educated by Scottish tutors who had emigrated to the colonies after receiving their university education in Scotland or who received other, nonmedical forms of Scottish higher education.

That these college-educated elites were all male is a fact that is so well-known that it often goes unremarked; however, as I am arguing here, it is important that it be remarked. Highlighting the gender exclusivity of higher education at the time foregrounds the process by which these intellectual exchanges were exchanges between men. As I noted previously, while certainly some elite women were very well educated, they were educated through private tutors, not by participating in academic institutions or in the nascent eighteenth-century system of colonial higher education. Furthermore, as Ditz's article makes clear, and as the exchange between Franklin, Hall and Strahan further indicates, interactions between men that ostensibly occurred within one realm (e.g., the economic) were in fact multidimensional, operating interpersonally as well and thereby simultaneously strengthening multiple bonds between men. It is therefore quite likely that intellectual exchanges functioned quite similarly; in fact, given what we know about the scope of the social at that time, there is simply no reason to believe otherwise.

While clearly further research needs to be done in this area, I would argue that it is because of the cultural work of these interpersonal male-male bonds that the first colonial medical school was established in Philadelphia; as Hook argues, Philadelphia was not only the largest colonial city, it had a highly developed Scottish and Scottish-

influenced intellectual community that, since the 1740s, had placed great value on education. But as Deborah C. Brunton notes, the curriculum of the College of Philadelphia's new medical school not only mirrored the curriculum of Edinburgh's medical school, it "also borrowed Scottish Enlightenment ideology. American professors praised Enlightenment virtues of rationality and progress, and adopted the 'synthetic' method of teaching that embodied these values, with lectures proceeding from general principles to specific phenomena," a teaching method that she identifies as specifically Scottish (247-48). In fact, Sher discusses the numerous ways in which Scotland provided an intellectual model for Franklin's ideas of improving Philadelphia, especially its educational institutions.

But there was as well a specifically Hutchesonian influence to the College of Philadelphia's medical education, illustrating further how structures of male-male relations come to bear on the transmission of his thought. William Smith, the College's first Provost, had been appointed head of the Philadelphia Academy in 1753, two years before the Academy became the College, in large part due to Franklin's influence; Hook states that Smith appealed to Franklin because of his innovative and progressive educational ideas which derived from his experiences as a student at the University of Aberdeen, where George Turnbull taught.<sup>239</sup> As Peter J. Diamond notes, Turnbull was significantly influenced by Hutcheson's moral philosophy; indeed, as I discussed in Chapter Two, Hutcheson, as a student at Glasgow, was part of the same intellectual network of Scots-Irish radical men to which Turnbull belonged.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>239</sup>Andrew Hook, "Scottish Thought and Culture in Early Philadelphia." Sher and Smitten: 227-41.

<sup>240</sup>Peter J. Diamond, "Witherspoon, William Smith and the Scottish Philosophy in Revolutionary America." Sher and Smitten: 115-132.

In particular, Smith stressed the importance of education as a means of developing the power of moral reasoning; he thus argued that college was necessary not only for future members of the clergy, but for anyone who was to be a future leader of civic society, or who was of the class (and, I would argue, of the gender) from which those future leaders would come. Peter J. Diamond states that even though Smith attributed a greater rationality to the moral sense than did Hutcheson and thus, in certain ways, prefigured Thomas Reid's argument about the common sense, the moral reasoning that Smith stressed was in large part Hutchesonian. Indeed, Ian McBride points out that Smith's educational vision, as detailed in his *A General Idea of the College of Mirania* (1753), was "'one great school of virtue' where students would study Hutcheson in conjunction with Pufendorf and Locke" (90).

In addition, Francis Allison, the College's first Vice-Provost and first Professor of Moral Philosophy (also appointed, in part, by Franklin), was a Scots-Irish Presbyterian who was deeply committed to Hutcheson's conceptions of the moral sense and to Hutcheson's teaching practices:

Alison appears to have adopted Hutcheson's moral philosophy totally and uncritically. In having his students make abridgements of important authors, Alison was following one of the teaching devices popularized by Francis Hutcheson. It was apparently Alison's practice in his moral philosophy course to have his students prepare abridgements of Hutcheson's *Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*, usually referred to simply as the *Compend*. In his metaphysics course, too, Alison drew heavily upon Hutcheson (Sloan 88).

Prior to accepting this position, Alison had established an academy in New London, Pennsylvania, that later became the University of Delaware; at both this academy and at the College, he lectured extensively on Hutcheson's theories. It is conjectured that he studied under Hutcheson at Hutcheson's Dublin academy,<sup>241</sup> and Elizabeth Nybakken suggests that he patterned the New London academy after Hutcheson's;<sup>242</sup> he and Hutcheson corresponded concerning books, potential philosophy teachers, and curricular and organizational advice, and Nybakken notes as well that he taught moral philosophy based upon Hutcheson's *Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy*. David Fate Norton additionally states that Hutcheson's philosophy was taught during all three years of students' College study, and that Alison embraced Hutcheson's political ideas *in toto*.<sup>243</sup>

Norton points out that of the 46 known biographies of Alison's students either at the academy or at the College, five signed the Declaration of Independence (a sixth would have signed but resigned from the Continental Congress in order to shore up the patriot cause in the New Jersey Assembly), 15 served in the Continental Congress, 25 served in the Continental Army, 16 held various official positions in the states after the Revolution, and five received executive appointments from the Continental Congress. While obviously some of these former students fall into more than one of the above categories, and obviously there were other political influences and currents at that time,

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<sup>241</sup>William Brock instead states that Alison attended Hutcheson's lectures at Glasgow. Either way, it is clear that Alison studied under Hutcheson, and then brought Hutcheson's philosophy and educational techniques to the colonies. Brock also notes that Hutcheson's philosophy was taught at King's College. William R. Brock, *Scotus Americanus: A Survey of the Sources for Links between Scotland and America in the Eighteenth Century* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1982): 92.

<sup>242</sup>Elizabeth Nybakken, "In the Irish Tradition: Pre-Revolutionary Academies in America," *History of Education Quarterly*, 37:2 (Summer 1997): 180-82.

<sup>243</sup>David Fate Norton, Ch. 1, fn. #13.

the fact that only five of the 46 are known to have become Loyalists is, according to Norton, at least partially due to the effects of Hutcheson's moral philosophy on the political thought of Alison's students. Furthermore, although he does not mention it, the gendered social structure of the time means that Norton in effect argues that Hutcheson's moral philosophy was one of the discourses through which colonial male elites acted in concert and in correspondence with each other to make the colonies independent; put another way, independence was in part a result of an educated class male-male web of ideas and relations through which Hutcheson's ideas circulated and generated specific action.

Furthermore, if Scottish, and Hutchesonian, ideas were diffused throughout the College of Philadelphia, and subsequently, throughout the colonies by male networks of intellectual (and, presumably, personal) exchange, they were perhaps even further diffused in this way due to the appointment of John Witherspoon, a Scottish Presbyterian clergyman, to the presidency of the College of New Jersey in 1768, a position he held until his death in 1794. Douglas Sloan details the large role that Scottish philosophical thought played in the College's curriculum as it developed under Witherspoon; he updated the College's library by adding to it almost all the works of the Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and he lectured extensively on both Hutcheson's moral philosophy and on Thomas Reid's common sense philosophy.<sup>244</sup> In fact, Diamond states that even though Witherspoon viewed Hutcheson as too much of a "New Light" theologian, he relied significantly more on Hutcheson's philosophy than he did on Reid's;

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<sup>244</sup>Douglas Sloan, Ch. 1, fn. #13.

like William Smith, however, he tempered the powers of the moral sense somewhat by according to reason a role as well in the development of morality.

At the College, Witherspoon taught the new Scottish theories of rhetoric developed by Hugh Blair and by himself, theories which broadened the field's focus beyond simply the art of persuasion to include the interrelationship between speaking and virtue that I discussed in the first section of this chapter when examining Fleigelman's analysis of eighteenth-century notions of affective consent.<sup>245</sup> While Blair's rhetorical theories ultimately stressed the importance of polite style and letters, Witherspoon instead stressed the Aristotelian and Ciceronian ideals of "the good man speaking well"—the civically engaged, biological male whose virtuous speech parallels his virtuous actions for the public good, an ideal that was the embodiment of Hutcheson's moral sense teachings; although Miller argues that Witherspoon was more ambivalent about Hutcheson's philosophy than does Diamond, he agrees that Witherspoon accepted, and conveyed to his students, Hutcheson's civic stances, following closely the arguments in the *System* concerning natural rights and the right of resistance.<sup>246</sup>

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<sup>245</sup>See Thomas P. Miller, "Witherspoon, Blair and the Rhetoric of Civic Humanism." Sher and Smitten: 242-58. Miller notes that Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* also was extensively studied in many other colonial and American colleges, and remained in great use through the middle of the nineteenth century. Indeed, David Daiches argues that Blair's ideas of eloquence, expressed through *style périodique* (sentences composed of clauses linked together, with the full meaning of any sentence coming at its end) and *style coupé* (sentences composed of short, independent propositions, often connected by words such as "and" or "but") influenced the writing of the Constitution, especially the revisions made by the Committee of Style, as well as Jefferson's original draft of the Declaration of Independence and Madison's *Federalist* #10. In opposition to Miller, Daiches also argues that even though Blair opposed the Revolution, his theory of rhetoric as freedom and virtue informed American political theories, not only in terms of how they were written but what was written. See David Daiches, "Hugh Blair and the Rhetoric of American Independence." Sher and Smitten: 209-226.

<sup>246</sup>Miller, fn. #29: 107-109.

This aspect of Witherspoon's curricular and institutional improvements becomes crucial given the importance of the College of New Jersey, under his tenure, to the future of colonial and early national politics. Thirteen of his students became college presidents, six became members of the Continental Congress, 20 became U.S. Senators, 24 became U.S. Representatives, 13 became governors, three became Supreme Court justices, and one, James Madison, became an author of *The Federalist Papers* and a president of the United States (Martin 6). Indeed, Miller argues that Witherspoon's rhetorical theories directly influenced Madison's conception, expressed in *Federalist* #10, of an American political consensus that balances competing interests in order to uphold the shared interest. Again, while there clearly were multiple sources of pre- and post-Revolutionary War politics, it is extremely plausible that Witherspoon's Hutchesonian teachings and influences flowed, like Alison's, into his students and helped to shape how they, as male political and social actors, initiated and responded to the events of the late colonial and early national periods. As with Alison, Witherspoon can be seen as a transmission point, communicating Hutcheson's philosophy to his students who then graduate and enter into adult male public life throughout the colonies, thereby building and reinforcing the elite male-male relations which in the end form citizen America.

In fact, Nybakken details the importance of a large number of Irish Presbyterian academies to colonial education, of which Alison's New London academy is only one example; some of these extended to the collegiate level and some did not, but all, she claims, served as an additional mode of disseminating Hutcheson's thought. I would additionally argue that they served as well as facilitators of a colonial social web of male-male intimacy, reinforcing the simultaneous nature of the transmission of Hutcheson's thought and the performance of it throughout citizen America. Nybakken states that the

existence of at least 44 of these academies can be documented, run by Irish Presbyterian ministers but open to male students who were not Presbyterian or who did not desire a career in the ministry, especially as there were few institutions of higher education in pre-Revolutionary America.

Building upon Douglas Sloan's examination of colonial academies,<sup>247</sup> Nybakken argues that he and other mistakenly claim that they all were modeled on English dissenting ones. Instead, she states that a significant number of these ministers had never been to England but, like Hutcheson, were part of the Scots-Irish Enlightenment. They were educated in the same milieu of dissenting academies within which Hutcheson was educated, and many followed the same educational trajectory as he did: attending a Scottish university for a couple of years after graduating and then returning to Ireland either to open an academy or emigrating to British America and opening one there. Thus, their tenets and pedagogy which were quite similar to his, for they all emerged from the same religious, political and intellectual background. Nybakken even claims that Hutcheson was, in fact, very typical of these ministers: "Hutcheson might have been unique [in the renown that he achieved], but being a porous man who absorbed and reacted to the intellectual currents around him, his work is equally reflective of Irish pedagogical theories in general" (167). It is likely, then, that not only was Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy taught at the upper levels of these academies, but that they incorporated throughout their teachings similar practices and ideologies.

In fact, while Nybakken provides detailed information only about Hutcheson's influence on Francis Alison, the clear point of her discussion is that Alison's teachings

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<sup>247</sup>Sloan, Ch. 1, fn. #15.

were by no means singular. Instead, while the historical record of what was taught in many of these academies is sparse, she indicates that his teachings were characteristic of most. I would argue, then, that they, like the College of Philadelphia and the College of New Jersey, served as vectors of transmission of Hutcheson's thought throughout the colonies:

As the [eighteenth] century progressed, more and more of the tutors, masters, and professors were the students of the original Irish schoolmasters and continued to disseminate the tenets of the Scots-Irish Enlightenment using the pedagogical practices of their mentors. One such educator credits Alison for this "happy contagion" spread by his students as they fanned out to become public school teachers, assistants to established teachers, tutors in both academies and colleges, and professors so that "almost all men [sic] of real learning in these parts of the world, who are natives of the country, were either taught by him, or his pupils, or their scholars." For sheer numbers, Alison might hold the record because of his long career in higher education at schools with large numbers of students. Yet the alumni of the smaller academies and the College of New Jersey followed a similar pattern and probably formed the majority of the teachers and masters in Virginia and southward. (182-83)

Nybakken states that changes in the nation's educational needs after the Revolution led to the demise of these collegiate academies; although she does not note it here, it was at that time also that common sense, rather than moral sense, philosophy became ascendant within American higher education. But as she documents, prior to the

Revolution graduates of these academies spread throughout the colonies, and those who themselves became teachers generally used the Hutchesonian-/Scots-Irish-influenced educational methods and philosophical instruction which they themselves had been taught. Thus, while the academies disappeared after independence, the men who had been educated in them and influenced by them obviously did not. What becomes clear, then, is that these academies were part of that expanding web of men who instructed other men by which Hutcheson's thought, like much other colonial thought, was transmitted throughout citizen America. His philosophy was disseminated widely as these men entered into the world of adult daily life that was structured, at its core, by the exchange of relations between men.

Without conducting extensive archival research, it is possible only to speculate as to the affective quality of those various intellectual relationships. However, known testimonies of colonial elite men about their teachers, even if not Scots-Irish Presbyterian, are highly suggestive of their nature. James Madison, for example, prior to attending the College of New Jersey, was schooled in an academy run by Donald Robertson, who had studied at both Aberdeen and at Edinburgh. Archie Turnball points out that Madison clearly noted his moral and intellectual debt to Robertson, stating, "All that I have been in life I owe largely to that one man" (138). Similarly, in his *Autobiography* Thomas Jefferson wrote about his studies at William and Mary:

It was my great good fortune, and what probably fixed the destinies of my life that Dr. Wm. Small of Scotland was then professor of Mathematics, a man profound in most of the useful branches of science, with a happy talent of communication, correct and gentlemanly manners, & an enlarged & liberal mind. He, most happily for me,

became soon attached to me & made me his daily companion when not engaged in the school; and from his conversation I got my first views of the expansion of science & of the system of things in which we are placed. Fortunately the Philosophical chair became vacant soon after my arrival at college, and he was appointed to fill it per interim: and he was the first who ever gave in that college regular lectures in Ethics, Rhetoric & Belles lettres. He returned to Europe in 1762, having previously filled up the measure of his goodness to me, by procuring for me, from his most intimate friend G. Wythe, a reception as a student of law, under his direction, and introduced me to the acquaintance and familiar table of Governor Fauquier, the ablest man who had ever filled that office. With him, and at his table, Dr. Small & Mr. Wythe, his amici omnium horarum, & myself, formed a partie quarree, & to the habitual conversations on these occasions I owed much instruction. Mr. Wythe continued to be my faithful and beloved Mentor in youth, and my most affectionate friend through life.<sup>248</sup>

While extensive, Jefferson's quote illustrates perfectly my speculative argument about the simultaneous nature of intellectual and personal relations between the men of citizen America. Not only did Small educate Jefferson in academic subjects, he educated Jefferson as well in becoming a proper gentleman, establishing deep personal bonds with his student and introducing the young Jefferson to other properly situated men who could educate and intimate with him as well (a gesture perhaps also contained within Madison's

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<sup>248</sup>The Avalon Project, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/jeffauto.htm>. Accessed May 8, 2008.

remarks about Robertson). While it is necessary to be a bit skeptical about the exact nature of those relationships, as Jefferson's language is likely at least in part simply participating in the well-known and well-established affectionate discourses of the eighteenth century, at the same time, given the self-constructed nature of an autobiography, it is instructive that he writes in this way about his former teacher. Thus, in spite of, or perhaps even because of, its rhetorical maneuvers, Jefferson's writing suggests what may well be found throughout the writings of many eighteenth-century genteel men about their fellow students and teachers: that the "happy contagion" of such relationships, as quoted by Nybakken, spreading throughout citizen America, was not simply intellectual but was deeply emotional as well.

In sum, then, the existing research, while sketchy, demonstrates the importance of intellectual male-male relationships within citizen America to the transmission of Hutcheson's thought throughout the locales which that America occupied in the colonies. It suggests as well that Hutcheson's philosophy was one of the influences on those elite male colonists who argued and acted for independence; certainly, Wills' analysis of the Declaration as a moral document reinforces that possibility. But I am arguing here that, in addition, those intellectual exchanges reinforced the bonds of affection between elite men which made independence not only possible, but also achievable and sustainable.

While clearly the language of the affections was prevalent throughout the eighteenth century, as I discuss in Chapters Five and Six and shall reiterate below, Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy would have provided a specific discursive subset of it by which these male-male affectionate relations could strengthen the intertwining intimacies of the men who inhabited citizen America, enabling the public creation of an American identity and the public birth of a new American nation. Although such an

assertion is, as I have stated, speculative, the known evidence highlights the potential outlines of such a homoaffective birth, and suggests the importance of further archival research that can illuminate, in their own words, how these elite men understood their relationships with each other during and after those educational experiences.

Indeed, that very prevalence of affectionate discourses points further to the likely existence of such multidimensional forms of male-male intimacy, to their impact on early American national identity, and to their Hutchesonian character. Consequently, even without that archival research it is possible to argue for the centrality of male homoaffective relations to the actors of the Revolution and of the new nation, and to argue also for the relationship between male homoaffectivity and national formation, because public documents which were written within citizen America demonstrate the key role that these relations played in creating the nation which presented itself to the world in the 1780s.

I am, of course, referring to *The Federalist Papers*, which were written in the tumult of the post-Revolutionary period, when the forms of social and political controls which enabled elite men to maintain their elevated standing were fraying and, in certain cases were rupturing altogether, as men from the middling sort entered into citizen America in increasing numbers, expecting the rights and privileges that such membership brings. It was in part in reaction to this post-Revolution revolution that the Constitution was designed; *The Federalist Papers*, in turn, were written to sell it to a nation that had not asked for it. Birthed by the elite men of the Constitutional Convention, who disregarded the instructions that had brought them to Philadelphia, the Constitution envisioned a new relationship between the electors and the elected than that which then existed, redefining citizenship to reaffirm the privileged status of the very men who

brought it into the world. Led by the rightful sort, who would relate to each other calmly, purposefully and virtuously, Constitutional America would heal the turmoil of the period and thereby enable the country to take its proper place among nations.

As I shall discuss in the next, and final, section of this chapter, such an argument depends upon the homoaffective relations of elite men for its social and political vision. But by the very rules of political participation for which the Revolution in part was fought, which the states codified under the Articles of Confederation, and which the Constitution itself sought to uphold, it required as well the approval of the other members of citizen America in order to be effected, or at least the approval of those from nine of the 13 states. It is therefore no accident that Publius uses the attractive powers of those relations to claim that the Constitution will reinforce the bonds of national affection which the Articles of Confederation have weakened. Contrary to Antifederalist claims that a republic is possible only in a geographically small location, Publius asserts instead that homoaffective desire forms the intimate bonds between men that are capable of holding together a geographically large republic. In this final section, I shall examine how he utilizes the powers of that desire to claim that all male citizens participate in Constitutional America while simultaneously reinforcing the centrality of elite male intimacy to that America's very existence.

Two points, however, first need to be made. One concerns the relationship between Hutchesonian communitarianism and republicanism. My argument throughout has been that not only was Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy one of the discourses used by the colonists in their struggle with Britain, but that it was used as well by newly-independent Americans as they attempted to create social and governmental structures appropriate for the new nation. Yet as I note in the paragraph above, and as I shall

discuss in greater detail in the final section which follows, the conflict over the Constitution in which those Americans were engaged was framed in significant part by the language of republicanism, and in significant part was an argument about the nature of republicanism, seemingly indicating either that my argument about the importance of Hutchesonian communitarianism is incorrect or that I am shifting my focus away from it.

But as I note in Chapter One, political theories and discourses that today we see as being singular and distinct were not perceived as such in the eighteenth century.<sup>249</sup> Thus, while communitarian beliefs, both religious and secular, still held significant sway in the latter part of the eighteenth century, especially in the smaller-scale world of travel and communications that all but the most cosmopolitan of elites inhabited at that time, those beliefs were often expressed through what we would consider today to be a republican framework, even though closer examination indicates the deep interrelationship between those two discursive approaches.

In fact, republicanism and Hutchesonian communitarianism shared many linguistic and philosophical similarities; both were concerned with the relationship between virtue and the public good, and both utilized almost identical terms to theorize that relationship. Although they came to somewhat different answers about its proper form, the more democratic impulses in Hutcheson's philosophy were in fact tempered by the very social structure which republican theory sought to uphold; it is for this reason that I argue that homoaffective desire does not challenge, but instead reinforces, the status of the elites who, under republican theory, are the sole rightful elected. Similarly, both republicanism and Hutchesonian communitarianism were concerned with the

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<sup>249</sup>See, e.g., Kramnick, Ch. 1, fn. #33.

geographic limits within which people would act for the greater good; as I discuss in Chapter Six, however, the answers, while seemingly similar, originate from different sources and therefore ultimately point to different conceptions of the human capacity for benevolence.

Thus, although Publius counterargues Antifederalist claims to demonstrate that the form of government envisioned by the Constitution is in actuality republican, and although republicanism was, at least at first blush, a significantly more influential, and more utilized, discourse than was Hutchesonian communitarianism, I shall argue below that Publius uses Hutchesonian communitarianism to make his republican argument. He asserts that the capacity of Constitutional America to heal the fractious passions unleashed by the Articles of Confederation is based upon a conception of that America as an egalitarian community of white male bodies, bound together through their mutual love and affection, an assertion which is a direct application of the Hutchesonian model of national formation which I explicate in my two previous chapters. That sense of community is, in fact, what makes Constitutional America republican. Consequently, while the content of Publius' argument is, in many respects, straightforwardly republican, its rhetorical maneuvers, and its underlying assumptions about what makes it possible for Constitutional America to be republican, are dependent upon a notion of affective communal bonds between men which stem directly from Hutcheson's conception of the perceptive powers of the moral sense. Publius uses the language of homoaffective desire to republican ends.

However, as I discuss in Chapter Six, that language itself is a very particular derivation of the more generalized language of the affections. While it is now a critical commonplace that the eighteenth century was as much the age of feeling as it was the age

of reason, not all usage of the affections was specifically Hutchesonian; in fact, much of it was not. As I discuss in Chapter Six, the language of sympathy and the language of affective desire share many common traits, the two most important being their mutual basis in feeling and in the capacity of the human body to feel beyond its perceived physiological boundaries. But as I also discuss in that chapter, sympathy incorporates the interactions between the imagination and many different possible bodily and emotional feelings, while affective and homoaffective desire stem specifically from the love we feel for benevolent actors as that quality is perceived by the moral sense. Thus, while the language of sympathy encompasses the language of affective and homoaffective desire, the two languages use the same words to achieve very different meanings.

To say, then, that Publius uses the language of homoaffective desire to present his vision of republican America requires analyzing his rhetorical uses of a desire that is seemingly expressed through the language of sympathy. My argument, however, is that Publius' notion of a bodily-based male community stems specifically from the perceptions of the heart, where the moral sense is located, not from more generalized and sympathetic bodily powers and feelings. From those moral perceptions is generated the love for benevolent actors that Hutcheson claims binds those actors into an affective community of men which can quell the fractious passions of the 1780s. While sympathetic bonds can draw people to each other, Hutcheson's science of human nature explicates the attractive powers of a very particular bond which underlies Publius' rhetoric about the ideals and possibilities of Constitutional America. Analyzing *The Federalist Papers* therefore involves uncovering the bodily heart which generates the specifically Hutchesonian conception of that America, which is comprised of male citizens whose love for each other makes it republican.

## Publius' White Male Bodies and the Politics of National Consolidation

Overview. Numerous historians of the post-Revolutionary period have noted that victory in 1783 ushered in great celebration and great social turmoil. Domestic and international markets began to open that had been closed under the English mercantile system, accelerating the rise of commercial market economies and the fracturing of older agrarian ones that already had begun prior to the Revolution. Larger numbers of white Americans began to move into lands on the western side of the Appalachians that the British earlier had tried to keep closed to the colonists. Traditional social adhesives, such as church, town and family, began to break down, as did older forms of deference based upon hierarchical notions of social order and authority. Liberalism, with its focus on self-interest, gained increasing traction against republicanism, with its focus on virtue and disinterest, as well as against other forms of communitarianism, whether affective- or religious-based. Increasingly, white men were in competition with each other for goods, services, money and power in a society that, for them, was becoming more and more fluid. As Gordon Wood notes:

The most pronounced social effect of the Revolution was not harmony or stability but the sudden appearance of new men everywhere in politics and business. . . . The emigration of thousands of Tories, the intensification of interest in politics, the enlargement of the legislatures and the increase in elections, the organization of new militia and political groups, the breakup of old mercantile combinations and trade circuits, the inflation and profiteering caused by war—all offered new opportunities for hitherto unknown but ambitious persons to find new places for themselves. (*Creation*, 476)

The Revolution, that is, as I quote Wood in the first section of this chapter, was a social revolution as much as it was a political one—or, perhaps more accurately, the Revolution was simultaneously social *and* political, as those terms were then understood, for the changes it wrought in one realm mirrored the changes it wrought in the other. These changes, in turn, raised new questions about what independence entailed, just as the Revolution had answered questions about whether or not it was even possible. What did it mean for the young United States to call itself a republic? Who was included within that republic? Who was excluded? What type of government was most appropriate for it? Precisely for what, or for whom, had the Revolution been fought? These were not simply rhetorical questions, or questions for idle speculation, but instead were constant sources of debate in the emerging public sphere of taverns, coffeehouses, newspapers, etc. as the new nation struggled to create a workable form of American culture, American politics, American society, and American national identity that claimed a direct lineage to the principles of the Revolution in a world that, to many, seemed instead to be turning into something almost unrecognizably new.

For while the Declaration of Independence had initiated the break with Great Britain, the country which then was born was, in many respects, less a country than, as the very name of the Articles announced, a confederation of loosely-allied states. In fact, the Declaration even claimed that the 13 colonies were now 13 independent states, each with "full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce & to do all other acts & things which independent states may of right do." This statement, and the post-Revolutionary political arrangement which followed, was, of course, quite purposeful, as the then generally-accepted notion was that republican government was possible only within a geographically small country whose populace thereby shared a

common interest. Consequently, as Wood points out, seven states even enacted the Declaration after the Continental Congress did in order to reinforce their power to enact their own laws.

But as Wills notes, there were proprietary reasons for the Declaration's statement as well. Prior to the Revolution, elite colonists often had closer ties with Britain than they had with each other, and most members of the Continental Congress were as concerned with protecting their regional status, where they, as elites, held sway as they were with resolving the latest political crisis. Yet after the Revolution that very status, and the assumptions upon which it was based, came under attack. While the literature on the changes in post-Revolutionary America is vast, there is widespread agreement that independence accelerated the unraveling of the traditional social hierarchy that had already begun in the pre-Revolutionary period.

Indeed, the very contradictions within republican theory itself provided a discursive framework by which nonelites, especially male nonelites, could argue that they too should be represented in the state legislatures. Thus, in 1780s America, this class-based political system was breaking down as members of the intermediate sort entered state governments in ever larger numbers, arguing that they could be, and should be, equal participants in them. Part of the "crisis," according to the Federalists, was that members of these classes were exceeding their rightful place by entering realms for which they were not properly educated and trained; by definition, they were no longer being virtuous, no longer being properly deferential to their social superiors.

Yet this crisis in social relations was based upon gender as well as upon class. Whether the many could be only electors or whether they could be both electors and elected, the elected could be solely white men with a requisite amount of financial

resources. Indeed, "the people of the State of New York" whom Publius addresses—that is, those who could vote for delegates to the state ratifying convention—were solely such white men. The contradiction that Publius faces, then, one of several at the heart of republican theory, is in part a contradiction of gender. He must convince this all-male electorate to return to a system of government run by the better sort of men which will teach the intermediate sort of men how to be proper republicans: simultaneously virtuous and deferent. The move to the Constitution is an effort to restrain that emergent class of men and to restore a more hierarchical form of male-male relations. The Constitution attempts to restore proper gendered relations between and among different classes of white men.

But Publius cannot argue openly for such a restoration, for to do so would affirm the Antifederalists' argument that the Constitution is a return to the system of aristocracy that the Revolution was fought to overthrow. Thus, Publius' address to these new citizens demonstrates the importance of men's relationships with other men to their public status as men. For as male homoaffectivity constructs the body politic which binds together that polyvocal and fluid nation, even when, or perhaps especially when, new men enter into the realm of that national corpus, Publius appeals to the vision of male-male love—a love which is emotional, physical and benevolent—to imagine a Constitutional America to which the male body is central, even while restricting the psychic boundaries within which that love circulates. If the corporeality of Hutcheson's moral sense philosophy constructs the nation as a bodily-based affective community built upon intimate relations between elite men, *The Federalist Papers* represent the apex of a vision of white fraternal intimacy that is already disintegrating, even while giving voice to an imagined nation designed to resist that very movement.

*The Federalist Papers and Male Homoaffective Desire.* Consequently, *The Federalist Papers*, as an exposition of the Constitutional mind, displays all the seeming contradictions of republican theory: a rhetoric and ideology of equality between and among a virtuous and selfless people who can only be virtuous and selfless if they remain in their proper social station. My concern here is how Publius uses linguistic representations of male homoaffective relations within citizen America to negotiate these contradictions in his argument for ratification. For the individual papers were not written simply to explain the proposed Constitution to the voters of New York State; they were written to defend it against the attacks of the Antifederalists and to persuade voters to elect delegates to the state ratifying convention who favored it. That is, *The Federalist Papers* are political essays written as an integral part of a political campaign. As campaign literature, they exist to convince, to cajole, even to charm, an effort accomplished less by explanation than by interpretative and rhetorical strategies. Indeed, as Douglass Adair notes, "*The Federalist* . . . was not a scholarly commentary on the meaning of an established Constitution; it contained special pleading designed to secure ratification for a Constitution still untested" (30).

This "special pleading" took several forms. One was to deny the validity of specific Antifederalist claims, even if they contained potential truths. For example, Publius states that the Constitution will not undermine the state governments, but that the states will be equal partners with the new national government. However, after ratification, Alexander Hamilton attempted to do just what he had stated the Constitution would not permit; he tried to consolidate as much power as possible in that national government, as illustrated by his arguments and actions in favor of a national bank. James Madison twice proposed to the Constitutional Convention that the federal

government be granted a legislative negative: the power to veto any state law. Defeated, Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson in October 1787 that the Constitution's proposed national government was too weak. Yet a month later, in his now-famous *Federalist #10*, he argued that the genius of the newly-conceived national government was that it would be distant from local interests, and therefore strong enough to eliminate the effects of faction; either he had a change of heart regarding the potentiality of the powers of the national government, or Madison was not as forthcoming with "the people of the state of New York" as he was with his friend and colleague.<sup>250</sup>

Another form of "special pleading" was to emphasize the egalitarian aspects of republican theory upon which the Constitution was structured while deemphasizing its inegalitarian aspects. Thus, Publius argues that the basis for the newly-proposed national government is the people. He acknowledges that shifting power from the states to the national government means that the people are more removed from that power, but this is an advantage; decisions made by the latter can be more reasoned and rational and, hence, more beneficial to those very people. The effect is to elide the fact that while the people vote for their representatives, the distance of the national government from many of the states, and the means of transportation and communication then available, meant that the lines of contact between the people and their representatives, and the people's consequent ability to express their concerns to those representatives, would be weaker under the Constitution than under the Articles.

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<sup>250</sup>Charles F. Hobson, "The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, and the Crisis of Republican Government," *WMQ* 3rd Ser. 36.2 (April 1979): 215-35.

A third form of "special pleading" was rhetorical, and it is here that Publius' negotiations of those republican contradictions, and his use of male homoaffective desire, are most revealing. As I have noted, the Antifederalists claimed that the nation under the Constitution would no longer be a republic, often arguing that the Federalists wanted to establish an aristocratic form of government, while the Federalists claimed that the Constitution was republican. Key to this dispute was the possible size of a republic; the Antifederalists claimed that a republic, *by definition*, could only cover a small geographic area, while the Federalists claimed that a republic, *by definition*, could cover a large one. Thus, as Terence Ball points out, these debates were not simply conducted through language, they became debates *about* language.<sup>251</sup>

Ball focuses on the ways in which the Federalists and Antifederalists argued over the definitions of words—*republic*, but also *virtue* and *liberty*—in order to demonstrate how debates about political structures became debates about the language used to describe those structures. He analyzes the interrelationship between politics and rhetoric during the debates by building on Gordon Wood's point that the definitions changed over time as the exigencies of the debates forced each side to modify the assumptions upon which their arguments were based.<sup>252</sup> Ball states that the debates took a "linguistic turn," becoming debates about the meaning and utility of specific words, and that this linguistic turn was a crucial aspect of the conceptual changes that occurred during the ratification debates regarding the possible forms of government.

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<sup>251</sup>Terence Ball, "A Republic—If You Can Keep It." *Conceptual Change and the Constitution*. Ed. Terrence Ball and J.G.A. Pocock (Lawrence, KS: UP of Kansas, 1988): 137-164.

<sup>252</sup>Gordon Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic: 1776-1787*. 1969. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972). See his discussion in Chapter 13 about the changing intellectual world, and the consequent linguistic changes, of the 1780s.

Ball's analysis of the Federalists' and Antifederalists' linguistic arguments highlights their beliefs about proper political structures in the new nation; words, such as *republic*, which had been defined as one type of government now began to be defined in a new way. Yet these beliefs were not only political, they also were social; as I previously have discussed, the two were, in effect, different aspects of the same realm. For in addition to focusing on the proper structure of the national government and on the proper relationship between the state governments and that national government, these beliefs encapsulated as well the proper relationship between the electors and the elected. However important Ball's point about the role of definitions to the idea of America emerging in the late eighteenth century, the rhetoric of the debates concerned not only the political relations contained in those definitions but the social relations contained in them as well.

It is in this interplay between the political and the social that Publius' rhetorical "special pleading" is best displayed. He uses homoaffective desire to create a rhetorical nation that is structured upon an egalitarian male polity bound together through the intimacy of its individual members with each other. This rhetorical nation, he claims, is the true America. America has become unbalanced under the Articles of Confederation, but the Constitution will restore that balance; in so doing, it will return America to that state of egalitarian, affectionate relations between men, the source of its strength and greatness, to which it originally conformed.

Such a nation, however, is strictly a performance. The Constitution, by shifting power from the state governments to the national government, shifts power from the intermediate class of men back to elite men; while the Articles expanded the boundaries of citizen America, the Constitution tries to move them back to more "appropriate"

levels. But this shift does more than attempt to restore to elite men their proper social place and the deference they are to be shown. While certainly such a deferential, hierarchical social structure was crucial to that older model of the "proper" workings of government, crucial also are the relations of elite men with each other; deference keeps intermediate men in their place, but the hierarchical system that makes deference make sense sustains itself only if elite men do not compete, beyond proscribed bounds, for the allegiances of their social inferiors. That older model of male hierarchical relationships is ultimately dependent upon homoaffective relations between male elites—their recognition of, and their community with, each other. It is, in effect, dependent upon a homoaffective America comprised solely of upper-class, white male citizens.

Thus, central to *The Federalist Papers'* vision of Constitutional America is not Publius' homoaffective nation of an expanded male-male polity. Rather, this imagined nation is a rhetorical device which functions solely to allay fears of a reemergent hierarchy while simultaneously disguising the social and political effects of the Constitution's shift of power from the states to the national government. At the core of Publius' Constitutional vision is a citizen America in which male elites reassert their position at the top of a fracturing social structure as the true benevolent men of the new nation. Only if these men relate to each other in proper affective fashion will the promise of that America be sustained. While Publius cannot argue openly for such a return, he uses one form of male homoaffective relations to persuade his male audience to vote for another.<sup>253</sup>

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<sup>253</sup>My argument here is similar, in certain ways, to that of Dana Nelson's *National Manhood*, Ch. 1, fn. #34, where she argues that *The Federalist Papers* attempts to counteract this emergent individual, who carries with him the potential for a disruptive male rivalry, by bringing the newly-expanded white male polity into the political nation

Publius' gendered meanings are deeply embedded in the text, structured into the very definitions of concepts, such as *republic*, over which the Federalists and Antifederalists argued, as well as into the definitions of concepts, such as *polity*, about which they agreed. For Publius' text, and the Federalists' and Antifederalists' arguments of which it is part, concerns the social alignments and realignments of power; in late-eighteenth-century America, this power was based upon class and race, and upon gender. These gendered systems of power were built into the language, as they are in any language; the word *representative*, for example, was, at its core, male and white, even if Federalists and Antifederalists disagreed over the class status of that white male.<sup>254</sup> Therefore, to uncover fully the male homoaffective basis of Publius' national vision, it is necessary first to discuss what he says, secondly to explore the assumptions upon which his position is based, and thirdly to expose the deep structure of gender that lies behind those assumptions.

The major arguments of *The Federalist Papers* are well-known and will be reviewed only briefly here. As Publius states in *Federalist #1*, the nation is currently in "crisis" (2); the national government under the Articles is inefficient (2); there is a direct correlation between the current state of affairs and the current form of government

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as equals of the elite. However, while Nelson astutely articulates the ways in which male-male relations circulate through *The Federalist Papers'* rhetorical equality, she errs in taking Publius too much at his word; his response to threatened patriarchal relations is not to bring intermediate class white men into the fold but to reassert the homoaffective relations of, and, therefore, the dominance of, elite white men over those intermediate class men.

<sup>254</sup>There is, of course, a tremendous body of feminist criticism about the gendered structure of language as it reflects the role and place of women in the social structure of the new nation. See, e.g., the works of Linda Kerber, Mary Beth Norton or Carroll Smith-Rosenberg.

because "the vigour of government is essential to the security of liberty" (4).<sup>255</sup> Indeed, not only should government be "energetic" (5), but those who advocate for the "energy and efficiency of government" are enlightened (4) and heedful of "the danger to the rights of the people" (4), while those who oppose it are narrow-minded men looking out for their own self-interest. The more energetic the government, Publius argues, the more the people will have liberty. But such a government can be energetic only if it has centralizing powers. Therefore, according to Publius, the Federalists, in promoting energy in a national government, are the true defenders of republican liberty, looking out for the nation by proposing a system of government that will rescue it from its current malaise.

Yet in proposing a change in the form of government, Publius is also proposing a change in the system of electoral relations—which are, by definition, male-male relations, as only white men of a requisite amount of financial resources could participate in the electoral system.<sup>256</sup> Chilton Williamson discusses the expansion of the franchise after the war as property or monetary qualifications were reduced or as states shifted to a tax-paying qualification; while no state had universal white manhood suffrage, the electorate

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<sup>255</sup>All citations are from Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. Garry Wills (New York: Bantam Books, 1982).

<sup>256</sup>In New Jersey, women were allowed to vote from 1776-1807. This opportunity existed not because of a change in social constructions of gender, but because of language. The New Jersey Constitution of 1776 gave the right to vote to all inhabitants worth fifty pounds, without specifying gender or race, even while specifying that only men could be representatives—that is, only men could be voted for. This linguistic "slip" was rectified in 1807 when the New Jersey Legislature passed a law that specified that only free white male citizens worth fifty pounds could vote.

expanded greatly as a result.<sup>257</sup> Christopher Collier points out that by the time the Constitution was ratified:

[A]bout 90 percent of the adult white males met eligibility requirements in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, North and South Carolina, New Hampshire, and most towns in Massachusetts. In Virginia, historians estimate that the proportion of the population eligible to vote ranged from 70 to 90 percent; in Maryland about 70 percent; in New York perhaps 60 percent. In Rhode Island and Connecticut virtually all adult white Protestant males who owned any property at all were permitted to vote, though large numbers continued to content themselves with voting in local elections only. (26)

But it was not just the size of the male electorate that grew after the Revolution. Jackson Turner Main notes that the size of state legislatures also grew, and that white male artisans and farmers, who before the war often had voted for elite men to represent them, instead now were more likely to vote for other white male artisans and farmers.<sup>258</sup> The confluence of this expanded franchise and of the increased willingness of intermediate class men to vote for men like themselves meant that the proportion of state legislators from the upper classes dropped significantly while that of legislators from the intermediate classes increased equally significantly. Prior to the Revolution, fewer than one in five were either yeoman or artisans, while after the Revolution, that figure had

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<sup>257</sup>Chilton Williamson, *American Suffrage from Property to Democracy, 1760-1860* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1960). See especially Ch. 7 for a discussion of post-Revolutionary War changes in voting requirements.

<sup>258</sup>Jackson Turner Main, "Government by the People: The American Revolution and the Democratization of the Legislatures," *WMQ* 3d Ser. 23.3 (July 1966): 391-407.

more than doubled; such men were the majority in the northern legislatures, and even in the South, the state legislators, as a collective body, owned approximately half the property that the smaller, pre-War collective body of legislators had owned (405).

As the Articles placed most of the power in the states, such an arrangement meant that intermediate class men had an increasingly significant voice in the affairs of the entire nation. Gordon Wood points out that this increased voice also took the form of a willingness of electors to directly instruct their representatives on how to vote,<sup>259</sup> which was, in effect, another enactment of male-male relations. Wood, Main and others have argued that such expansion of intermediate class power was a crucial aspect of what the Federalists perceived to be the roots of the current national crisis: that the older system of deference had broken down and the wrong type of people were now involved in the decision-making process.<sup>260</sup> Yet it is important to note what the class-based analysis omits: that these "people" were, in truth, the wrong type of men.

It is here, then, that the gendered aspect of Publius' vision begins to emerge. The question of representation had been a key point of contention between the colonists and England; the colonists had argued that the virtual representation under which Parliament claimed its authority did not extend to them, and Wood and Jensen discuss the move toward actual representation in the new state constitutions and legislatures during and after the Revolution as an implementation of what radical Whig theory saw as a more acceptable form of representation. Yet, as Wood notes, by withholding the franchise

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<sup>259</sup>Wood, *Creation*, fn. #36. See especially Chapters 10 and 11 for his discussion of the "critical period."

<sup>260</sup>See, e.g., Jackson Turner Main, *The Anti-Federalists*, Ch. 1, fn. #26, and Merrill Jensen, *The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation, 1781-1789* (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

from women, blacks (free or not), Indians, and lower-class white men, those white men who did have the franchise implicitly agreed that they could virtually represent the interests of others. While representation and the franchise were expanded, and, in that sense, did become increasingly actual, they only were expanded to include more white men.

But Publius argues that even so, this so-called actual representation has enabled men to come into power who are acting out of self-interest, as opposed to disinterest; not having proper republican training and education, these men, when they achieve power inappropriate to their station, act in ways inimical to the public good. In this, Publius echoes Benjamin Rush, who was a medical doctor as well as one of a leading Federalist; in an essay entitled, "An Account of the Influence of the Military and Political Events of the American Revolution Upon the Human Body," Rush wrote:

The termination of the war by the peace in 1783 did not terminate the American revolution. The minds of the citizens of the United States were wholly unprepared for their new situation. The excess of the passion for liberty, inflamed by the successful issue of the war, produced, in many people, opinions and conduct, which could not be removed by reason nor restrained by government. (qtd. in Looby 31)

Rush's attitude, of course, was prevalent in post-war Federalist circles: that the Articles of Confederation placed insufficient controls on individual behavior, and thereby threatened the ideals for which the Revolution had been fought. Publius, for example, asserts that self-interest, combined with the power to advance it, has led to increased faction; repeatedly, *The Federalist Papers* argue that the Articles of Confederation has bred faction and disunity. Such individual behavior is also political; it was the requirement of

government to breed rational citizens, the Articles are unable to do so, and therefore the Constitution is necessary.

That very term *citizen*, though, as used by Rush, similarly to the term *people*, as used by Publius, also contains within it specifically gendered implications. Rush argued that it was not simply that the Constitution was necessary, but that new systems of education were necessary in order to create "republican machines": citizens who were independent, attached to personal liberty, yet aware that such liberty required selfless, virtuous behavior in order to maintain and sustain the republic.<sup>261</sup> Rush's theories of education were predicated upon the then commonplace notion that its purpose was to teach factual *and* social knowledge. That is, not only was the process by which one was educated dependent upon one's social status, that education taught one how to be a proper occupier of that status; for example, teaching slaves how to read was, in many regions, considered a dangerous, if not an illegal, act, for it could give them a sense of agency that could lead them to question, and perhaps to act against, their status. Indeed, as I argued in the previous section of this chapter, it was due to that very relationship between education and status that the intellectual transmission of Hutcheson's thought to the colonies performed the particular act of male-male intimacy within citizen America by which homoaffective desire creates and sustains the ideal national community. Similarly, Rush proposed a different education for girls than for boys; while advocating for a female education that was more rigorous than previously had been conceived proper or necessary, he aimed to prepare girls for Republican motherhood, not for electoral

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<sup>261</sup>For a full discussion of Rush's terminology, see Melvin Yazawa, *From Colonies to Commonwealth: Familial Ideology and the Beginnings of the American Republic* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1985), especially 141-65.

politics.<sup>262</sup> As the term *people* ultimately meant white men of at least a certain amount of property or income, Rush's paradigm of citizenship, and of republican machine, was different for white women than for white men.

But Rush's model, and the Federalist fear upon which it was based, was gendered in an additional way as well. For, in terms of the electoral system, what Rush called "[t]he excess of the passion for liberty" was not slave uprisings or women agitating for the right to be part of the electorate, but simply the expansion of the electorate and the entrance into the state legislatures of the "wrong" class of men. In this, Rush mirrors Publius' argument about the dangers of passion; indeed, Publius claims that reason should regulate government and that the passions should be regulated by government (*Federalist #49*). Publius ultimately focuses more on *faction*, but that itself stems from unbridled passion; therefore, the implication is the same: what is missing is rational restraint, and even when a new educational system trains the people to act virtuously and appropriately, it will be according to their station. The only men who properly can provide that restraint are and will be men of the upper-classes. They must be returned to power in order for the nation to survive and to thrive. They are the ones who, disinterestedly and reasonably, can look after the nation's long-term stability and prosperity.

This *faction* and *excess of passion*, then, is a symptom of the breakdown of that older model of male-male relations, which required suppressing self-interest for the good of the larger community and behaving properly as befitting one's class—a breakdown that Rush's educational system, like Publius' Constitution, is designed to ameliorate. For the

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<sup>262</sup>See, for example, Linda Kerber, *Women of the Republic*, Ch. 1, fn. #29.

men of the intermediate classes, even if acting out of self-interest, could only further that interest if they allied with each other. Although certainly men of such classes had done so during numerous pre-Revolutionary crises (for example, during the Stamp Act protests), those actions had been managed by men of the upper classes and, hence, could be properly contained; if, like the Regulator Movement, they were not led by elite men, they were put down. Indeed, Publius uses the specter of Shays Rebellion to illustrate the anarchy that could result when intermediate class men allied with each other without the controlling restraint of upper-class men. Now that these men had the political power to act independently of the better sort, they could form relations with each other that threatened the interests of upper-class men and, by extension, of the nation. The wrong sort of men, in attaining newfound power, were no longer being properly deferential to the better sort of men.

Thus, not only were the wrong type of men in power, the inappropriate ways that they acted when in power were threefold: in their self-interest, in their alliances with each other, and in their lack of deference to male elites. All of these inappropriate actions were, at their core, gendered. From Publius' perspective, the proper forms of male-male relations were being upended. Representation symbolized and symptomized what had become imbalanced between men. Publius means to rebalance it, and by doing so to restore citizen America to its rightful place, as such a balance is crucial to the stability of the nation itself.

Publius begins this rebalancing effort by constructing an imagined pre-Revolutionary colonial unity that existed prior to the fall into disunity under the Articles. In *Federalist #1* he begins to sketch out the scope of the current crisis; in *Federalist #2*, he provides a retrospective American history in order to prove that the crisis is not

endemic to the character of the American people or nation but is, instead, specifically related to the form of government under which the people currently live and the nation currently operates. He states that:

To all general purposes we have uniformly been one people—each individual citizen every where enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a nation we have made peace and war—as a nation we have vanquished our common enemies—as a nation we have formed alliances and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with foreign States. (7)

This picture of national unity and equality, of course, belies the extremely well-documented internal dissension prior to, during, and after the Revolution: for example, the disputes between Patriots and Loyalists; between conservative, moderate, and radical Whigs; between advocates and opponents of paper money. It also belies the fact that there was not a uniformity, but rather, a hierarchy, of "rights, privileges, and protection" based upon gender, class and race in both the colonies and in the new nation, of which the restrictions on the franchise was only one manifestation. Publius constructs a rhetorical nation radically different from the material one.

Indeed, the passage quoted above builds upon a preceding one in which Publius states that the people of this nation are "a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs" (7). As Christopher Looby points out, this passage is a "casual erasure of obvious facts" (250) about the ethnic and linguistic diversity of the colonies and the new nation, the multitudes of religions, the

internal political conflicts, and the different "manners and customs" of those from different ethnic groups and different regions of the new nation itself.

Yet Publius' act of what Looby calls "disinformation" (250) has a rhetorical purpose. By constructing a history of a people who fought "side by side throughout a long and bloody war" (7)—even when they were often fighting each other or deserting the Continental Army—and who now "have nobly established their general Liberty and Independence" (7), Publius creates a history of a unified people with a unified purpose that existed prior to the disunity of the present "critical period"; in this history, the faction and passion currently threatening to tear apart the body politic stems specifically from the type of behavior that the Articles of Confederation, as a form of government, has engendered, rather than from some quality inherent in the people themselves or even in the nation itself.

Of course, such a united colonial society as Publius creates never existed. The Antinomian crisis of the 1630s illuminated the religious and social splits in the Puritan corporate body, splits that Bernard Bailyn argues reached a crisis point with the emergence of a transatlantic New England merchant class in the late seventeenth century.<sup>263</sup> The Great Awakening ruptured hierarchical relationships throughout the colonies, and led to the growth of Baptism as a religious force that rivaled other forms of Protestantism. Gary Nash documents the continual political dissent in Pennsylvania between Quakers and non-Quakers,<sup>264</sup> as well as the social unrest of the urban laboring

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<sup>263</sup>Bernard Bailyn, *The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1955).

<sup>264</sup>Gary Nash, *Quakers and Politics: Pennsylvania, 1681-1726* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1968).

classes in Boston, New York and Philadelphia.<sup>265</sup> Jack P. Greene argues that the planter class which emerged in the Chesapeake in the eighteenth century out of the chaos of the seventeenth occurred concurrent with land speculation, foreign immigration, and population movement, both before, and especially after, the Seven Years War, that led to sectional conflicts which presaged many of the Federalist and Antifederalists splits in the 1780s.<sup>266</sup> Indeed, Wood notes that many colonial Whig gentry worried in the 1760s and early 1770s that the rise of royal patronage, and the susceptibility of colonists to it, meant that the colonists were not being truly virtuous and hence did not merit the Enlightenment vision of America as the location to which the human possibilities of an untainted moral freedom had fled the corruptions of Europe.

Yet to focus on the lack of truthfulness in Publius' description of historical unity is to miss the point; Publius creates this united nation in order to allude to a mythic time in the past when everyone knew his place, acted accordingly, and therefore acted as one, appealing to the republican vision of the people as a corporate body: unitary, virtuous, and homogeneous. Indeed, as numerous historians have argued, republicanism was as much a system of moral philosophy that attempted to regulate proper behavior and thought—a secular form of Christian righteousness—as it was a theory of government; in fact, as a form of government, it could only exist if the people possessed the proper virtuous spirit. Publius' unified rhetorical nation, unlike the material one, clearly

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<sup>265</sup>Gary Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1979).

<sup>266</sup>Jack P. Greene, *Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture* (Chapel Hill: U North Carolina P, 1988).

possesses that spirit: its people have sacrificed their personal interest for the good of the whole.

However, not only must the people sacrifice their personal interest, republican theory also requires that they be led by the better sort of men, who, as part of their education as gentlemen, have learned to place the public interest above personal interest. It is in this relationship between a virtuous people and a virtuous male gentry that republicanism simultaneously allows for human improvement and for a social hierarchy. And it is in this interrelationship that the ideal of virtual representation can function; while power ultimately originates in the people, when every social entity is in its proper place there is presumed to be a single, mutual public interest. It is for this reason that colonial leaders claimed that Parliament could not virtually represent them; their interests, and Parliament's, had diverged. But Publius imagines a colonial republic in which a virtuous, unified people are led by disinterested, unified elites toward and into the Revolution. In it, the people and the elites share a single interest in a way that Parliament and the colonies cannot. It is the Articles of Confederation that are at fault, not the people, not the new nation, and not the republican vision of the possibilities of human improvement as embodied in America. Publius hides the Federalists' fears of the democratizing tendencies of the Articles behind a republican call to the people that is dependent upon a hierarchy of male-male relationships.

Ultimately, then, what matters is not the lack of truthfulness in Publius' rendering of colonial America but the proper forms of male-male relations that its rhetorical maneuvers envision. He reasserts a threatened social hierarchy both by looking back to a period when the people, at least rhetorically, were a unified corporate body willingly led by a unified elite as well as by distinguishing between the spirit of America and the

actions of intermediate class men in the 1780s under the Articles. It is, thus, in part dependent upon a willful nostalgia for its imaginative and rhetorical possibilities, retrospectively illustrating Wood's point that:

In the eyes of the Whigs the two or three years before the Declaration of Independence always appeared to be the great period of the Revolution, the time of the greatest denial and cohesion, when men ceased to extort and abuse one another, when families and communities seemed particularly united, when the courts (many of which were closed) were wonderfully free of that constant bickering over land and credit that had dominated their colonial life. At the height of the prerevolutionary crisis with Britain, when it seemed that an internecine struggle that Englishmen had not seen for a century might break out at any moment, the American Whigs appeared strangely happy. . . . Those few years before the actual conflict marked the time and spirit which best defined the Americans' Revolutionary objectives and to which they clung throughout the war with increasing nostalgia. (*Creation* 102)

This nostalgia creates a golden past by omitting the turmoil in that past—the dissension between those colonists who wanted independence and those who did not, as well as among those who did. It offers up this period as a golden age of colonial unity from which Americans have now fallen and to which the Constitution can restore them. As nostalgia, it rationalizes what Publius sees as the roots of the current crisis and provides a solution to it: a return to unity, which means a return to an older republican construct of the people as a corporate body led by the better sort.

But in Publius' rhetorical schema, it is not only the colonies that were united, underneath the dissension caused by the Articles, the nation itself is united: by a common purpose, by a common sacrifice, and *affectively*. Publius consistently distinguishes between the faction under the Articles and the capacity of America to be a virtuous and unified independent republic, held together by affective bonds. For example, in *Federalist #5*, Publius argues the dangers of the current Confederation dividing into several nations, as then was being discussed; as part of his reasoning, he quotes from a letter that Queen Anne wrote to the Scottish Parliament in 1706, when that Parliament was debating the proposed union with England:

Should the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them. (19)

Similarly, in *Federalist #14*, Publius sums up his claims in the previous papers that a republic is different from a democracy, and that therefore it is possible to have republican government over a large geographic area. He first reviews each of the Antifederalist arguments and his counterarguments to them, and then changes his

rhetorical style from logos to pathos, appealing directly to the people themselves and to his vision of a unified affective America:

Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.

Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible to accomplish.

No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this unhallowed language.

Shut your hearts against the poison which it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies.

(66)

Clearly, there is an element of standard rhetorical flourishes and gestures in Publius' language; as I discussed in Chapter Three, the idea that the body of the people are knit together through chords of affection has a longstanding history stemming from both religious and secular perceptions of the human heart and body. Yet it is because of that history that it is a mistake to dismiss passages such as these simply as rhetoric, for rhetoric only has power when it taps into one or more assumptions mutually held by both the speaker and by the audience, thereby joining them together in ways that extend

beyond words. In the first section of this chapter, for example, I discussed Fliegelman's notion of affective consent, which itself is based upon the then-accepted notions of the perceptive abilities of the heart. Consequently, I would argue that Publius' images of a united American body whose constituent parts are bound together through bonds of affection draws upon, and reinforces, the very philosophic and religious conceptions of the affective body upon which Hutcheson constructs his moral philosophy. For by asking his readers to shut their hearts, Publius appeals to the ability of each of their moral senses to perceive the intention behind the petulant voice of the Antifederalists and to respond to that intention in the very fashion by which the moral sense is designed to respond; as he states in *Federalist #1*, the utility of Constitutional union is "deeply engraved on the hearts of the great body of the people" (5). Their affective unity, then, is something physiologically inherent to them, and they therefore respond to the intention of the Antifederalists perceptually, emotionally and bodily.

But it is not simply the bodies of Americans which are affectively joined together, the physical body of the American nation is as well. Publius creates a new affective geography that effaces local differences and binds together those specific interests into a new, national one that reconceptualizes distance, thereby enabling those affective bonds to encompass a large geographic area. In *Federalist #2*, for example, he claims that the states, contrary to Antifederalist claims, are not distant and separate but geographically bonded together, accessible easily from one to another:

It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular manner blessed it with a variety of

soils and productions, and watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together; while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their various commodities. (7)

This "connected country," as Publius then calls it, leads naturally to a united people (7) who make republican government in a large geographic area possible, as they do not look after their personal interest but instead share a common interest. Such descriptions of geographic unity occur elsewhere in *The Federalist Papers*, where rivers and streams, for example, join together the different states and regions in the exact same way that the bonds of affection connect the American people to each other, thereby constructing the image of a multifaceted, affectively-united body politic.

By arguing that the American people, as a people, are bonded together not just through the affections but also geographically, Publius' affective geography redefines interest from a Lockean private space to a Hutchesonian public one, enabling affection to travel along "navigable waters" and Constitutional republicanism to become possible. Indeed, as I shall discuss below, it is in part through affective geography that Publius can argue that a republic is possible in a nation of great physical distances, thereby enabling homoaffective desire to join together the bodies of intermediate- and upper-class men across the nation into his vision of homoaffective America.

Here, though, it is important to note that this affective construct leads inevitably to the proper form of government: one with a strong national focus. For, as part of his creation of a unified people with a singular purpose, Publius writes that:

A strong sense of the value and blessings of Union induced the people, at a very early period, to institute a Federal Government to preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they had a political existence; nay at a time, when their habitations were in flames, when many of their Citizens were bleeding, and when the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those *calm* and *mature* enquiries and reflections, which must ever precede the formation of a *wise* and *well balanced* government for a free people. It is not to be wondered at that a Government instituted in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer. (7-8, emphasis added)

Here, too, Publius' omits dissension: the debates within the Continental Congress during the Revolution about the proper basis of taxation through which each state would support the common treasury, the land speculation, the conflicts between states with western land claims and those without that for four years held up the ratification of the Articles of Confederation. Again, though, to look only at its willful historical inaccuracy is to miss the point of its rhetorical moves.

While the passage above equates the Articles with disunion, both because the times were fraught with tensions and dangers, and because a proper government requires certain conditions suitable to its birth and stature that did not exist in 1776 when a new national government had to be formed, the conditions that Publius says are necessary to

form a proper government, and the qualities of that government itself, do not simply repeat standard republican theory; they also state the proper relations between men. *Calmness, maturity, wisdom and balance* are the qualities of good government and of disinterestedness; they are the very qualities that republican gentlemen are to have, both individually and in their relations with others, and are the very opposite of passion. On the one hand, the Articles can be excused because they were created during a time when it was impossible to display, and to act out of, such attributes. That period of time has since passed; the Articles, however, remain. They continue to breed self-interest, which comes from a lack of calm, a lack of maturity, a lack of wisdom, a lack of balance and an excess of passion; they encourage the wrong sort of men to act self-interestedly while providing them with the power to exercise that self-interest. Publius' argument, then, is not solely a nostalgia for a period of unity prior to the Articles, a golden era in which all members of the body politic related to each other in proper republican fashion; it provides a blueprint for solving what the Federalists see as the political problems of the 1780s and for the type of government that will do so. In order to have the proper sort of men exercising power in a proper, disinterested fashion, America must ratify the Constitution, which will give it a strong central government that will encourage proper, disinterested behavior from proper, disinterested elite men.

An integral component of this properly structured government is a system of virtual representation in which the elite few serve in the legislature, where they can represent the interests of the non-elite many, as all parties have forfeited their personal interests for those of the greater, common good. They are linked to each other through their mutual interests, which is the national interest. Of course, it was this very system against which the colonists so recently had rebelled. Publius, thus, is proposing a return

to a representative, and a social, system that had been repudiated during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods—rhetorically and, to a certain extent, materially, as the franchise in all states had been extended to significantly more white men and as increasing numbers of intermediate class white men were being elected to state legislatures.

Publius makes this return explicit in *Federalist #3*, stating that "once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it" (11). Indeed, he distinguishes clearly between the men who serve in the state governments and those who serve in the national government; the latter "will be more wise, systematical and judicious, than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as more *safe* with respect to us" (11, emphasis in original). The Federalists attempt to ensure that these proper men will serve in the national government by creating large electoral districts for that government, removing the local interest, and thus the power of the wrong sort of men, from undue influence in national affairs, thereby ensuring that the proper sort, whose interests transcend the local, can rule without interference as befitting their station. Large electoral districts will not reduce the franchise but will reduce the pool of the elected, for competing local interests within each national electoral district will cancel each other out, enabling disinterested men—that is, the right sort of men—to rise to the top. As Publius states in *Federalist #10*, when he is arguing that a republic works better, as a republic, when it is larger rather than smaller:

[A]s each Representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small Republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which

elections are too often carried, and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters. (47)

The older, proper, hierarchical system of male-male relations will once again emerge and America can take its rightful place among nations.

Of course, such a shift means not just that the right sort of men will regain their proper power, but, as mentioned, it means reinstating the very system of representation that was one of the reasons that the colonists, a mere 11 years earlier, had declared independence from England. Yet Publius argues that this very system will heal, not increase, the passion, faction and disunity that he claims the Articles of Confederation breeds. For, as I noted above, Publius distinguishes between the unity of America and the dissension of the Articles; the faction strengthened by the Articles is not a quality inherent in the nation itself. It is that affective republican unity, which joins the bodies of the people, the geographic body of the nation and, ultimately, the two to each other, which makes virtual representation benevolent instead of corrupt, marking the new nation as benefitting from, as opposed to being harmed by, such a system.

Clearly, though, it is only Publius' rhetorical nation that is unified. The publication history of *The Federalist Papers* evidences the very lack of unity that its contents addresses; they were printed in New York newspapers alongside other essays, some favoring the Constitution and some not,<sup>267</sup> as part of a national debate involving the elite men of the Constitutional Convention and the larger male electorate. Publius, then, must not only argue for the Constitution and demonstrate why opposing arguments are

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<sup>267</sup>See, e.g., Albert Furtwangler, *The Authority of Publius: A Reading of the Federalist Papers* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1984).

wrong, he must bring that electorate into his unified rhetorical nation. According to Publius, that nation existed in a mythical, golden past; as the character that it exhibited in that past still exists, albeit more mutedly, he now attempts to restore it in the present in order to resolve the tumults of the present.

Such a restoration means that the wrong sort of men will lose their improper power. Yet, due to the expanded franchise, these men will be voting in the elections to the New York State ratifying convention. Publius must convince them that although the Articles enable them to act in their own self-interest, it is in that very self-interest for them to give up that power for a system of representation that recently had been repudiated as antithetical to American interests and identity.

It is here, then, that Publius' makes his major claim, one which goes to the heart of the differing forms of male-male relations then circulating in society, about how the shift to virtual representation will not be a shift to hierarchy or aristocracy. As the interests of Americans, unlike those of the colonists and Parliament, are aligned with each other, virtual representation will not exacerbate faction but instead will heal the faction under the Articles by extending the aforementioned affective bonds of society into a unitary bonding of interests. Male homoaffective desire will make virtual representation, which looks hierarchical, become egalitarian. Publius uses the corporeal basis of Hutcheson's moral philosophy to create the rhetorically egalitarian and united nation that makes virtual representation republican; in his schema, virtual representation is constructed as a web of male homoaffective relations in which the bodies of white male voters draw closer to each other to uphold the republican nature of the Constitution.

Yet it is important to note that while Publius draws upon Hutcheson's schema, Publius' conception of human nature is decidedly more mixed than is Hutcheson's.

Rather than believing that people are naturally benevolent, Publius, as I noted in Chapter Three, argues in *Federalist #51* that government is necessary because men are not angels; in *Federalist #6* he states that "men are ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious" (22). In fact, it is because of his distrust of human nature that Publius argues throughout *The Federalist Papers* that it is necessary to spread power equally among the three branches of the federal government so that they can exist in a relationship to each other that creates counterpoise, or what we now call checks and balances. As he states in *Federalist #10*, "The inference to which we are brought, is, that the *causes* of faction [i.e., human nature] cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its *effects*" [i.e., the form of government] (45), thereby also displaying the then-current belief in the interrelationship between the realm of the social and the realm of the political.

At the same time, however, even if Publius' conception of human nature differs from Hutcheson's, it is clearly not as dark as Hobbes'. As I discuss above, Publius argues that the excess of passion generated by the Articles is not the true nature of America, but that that true nature is instead more balanced, virtuous and affective. While that assertion is clearly in part solely rhetorical, serving to distinguish the people from the intermediate class of men whom the Federalists believe have overstepped their social station, it also serves to bring those men into homoaffective America, for it is not their nature but external influences which have led them to act self-interestedly. Thus, in *Federalist #76* Publius notes that:

The supposition of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude.

The institution of delegated power implies that there is a portion of

virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence. And experience justifies the theory: It has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most corrupt governments (387).

All humans, then, in Publius' conception, clearly have the capacity for goodness, especially when reason is not overruled by passion, or, as he says in *Federalist #49*, when the public tranquility is not disturbed by "interesting too strongly the public passions" (256). The intermediate class men themselves are not naturally overwrought by passion, it is simply that the Articles have strengthened that part of their character by enabling them to enter realms for which they are not properly trained.

But while Hutcheson also acknowledges that benevolence and self-interest can both affect human behavior, as I discuss in Chapter Five he claims that they are like external forces; we are physiologically designed by God to love good and to hate evil, thus human nature itself—i.e., our internal capacity—is inherently good. Publius, though, sees human nature as inherently both good and evil; either can gain the upper hand within any individual. Consequently, the then-current conception of government as a reflection of human nature means that there is a dynamic relationship between a government and the bodies of its citizens: the form and quality of the former, just like the form and quality of education, affects the form and quality of the latter. Thus, he not only consistently claims that the Articles breed faction and passion, thereby destroying the bonds between men, he similarly claims in *Federalist #55* that republican government breeds the better aspects of human nature, arguing specifically against Hobbes' notion that authoritarianism is necessary by nature:

As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another. (284)

Although he acknowledges in *Federalist #7* and *#9* that Sparta, Athens, Rome and Carthage also were republics, and that they too fell victim to rampant self-interest, Publius states as well in *#9* that the science of politics "has received great improvement" (38) since then, the most significant of which is the Constitution's capacity to make republican government possible in an expanded geographic area. This capacity stems from the Constitution's interactions with the people who live under it, through which it reduces their inclination toward self-interest and increases that toward disinterest. The Constitution strengthens the affective bonds between men, thereby making virtual representation republican rather than aristocratic. For as Publius argues in *Federalist #27*:

[T]he more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the

further it enters into those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. (132)

The knowledge formed by the moral sense emanates out of the hearts of American citizens (who are, of course, intermediate- and upper-class men) to circulate within and between their bodies. The moral sense perceives the actions of the federal government as constructed by the Constitution and, as it does with all entities whose intentions are good, it responds with love and affection, in contrast to its response to the aforementioned petulance of the Antifederalists. The more it continues to perceive the same intentions, the more it builds the bonds which join those citizens to that government and, in effect, to each other; as "[man] is very much a creature of habit," the more the national authority "circulates through those channels and currents, in which the passions of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients and compulsion" and the more "the affections of the citizens towards it, will be strengthened rather than weakened" (132). Echoing his earlier images of affective geography, Publius claims that the Constitution, through repetition and habit, strengthens the bonds of affection, and thus the homoaffective desire, of citizens for the nation and for each other, joining them to each other even over great physical distances. As Hutcheson claims that the proper form of government stems from the relationship between human physiology and human nature, as Rush claims that the American Revolution similarly affected both as well, so too Publius claims that the Constitution will breed affection in its (male) citizens by consistently interacting with their individual bodies in a way that reinforces those very affections. By so doing, it will simultaneously

weaken passion and self-interest, which will be tamed and balanced by the Constitution and by the desire of those citizens for it and for each other that it breeds.

It is this power of the Constitution to extend the calm affections across a large geographic area, and to shape its citizens accordingly, which enables Publius to argue that it is republican, as is the system of virtual representation through which it functions. Thus, while it is now well established that he uses David Hume's theory that a republic works better, as a republic, in a large geographic area to counter the Antifederalist claim that the Constitution is not republican, rhetorically he does more: Hutcheson's theory of the affections, and of the desires which stem from the perceptions of the moral sense, provides Publius with an additional language by which he can make his claim about the republican nature of virtual representation and, ultimately, about homoaffective America.

As I discuss in Chapter Five, Hutcheson states that benevolence operates in expanding geographic circles of intimacy; it is most powerful among one's immediate family, then among one's friends and neighbors, then among one's nation. The nation, thus, is the largest geographic area within which benevolence has the attractive power to draw people together; its boundaries are the boundaries of benevolence's ability to so function. However, Hutcheson does not state whether this means that the nation must, by necessity, be either small or large; in fact, by stating that benevolence works like gravity, he implies that the nation can be large, for gravity, according to Newton, is one of the occult powers which maintains the order and structure of the entire universe. This implication is furthered by Hutcheson's additional statement that the powers of benevolence, and the perceptions of the moral sense, can even extend to other planets.

Thus, while the Antifederalists, *pace* Montesquieu, argue that a republic can only survive within a small geographic area, as I discussed in Chapter Six this argument,

seemingly similar to Hutcheson's, ultimately differs: the Antifederalists base their argument on the power of interests, not on the power of the affections. As George Clinton, then the governor of New York and an ardent Antifederalist, argues in the third of a series of essays that he wrote under the pseudonym Cato:

The strongest principle of union resides in our domestic walls. The ties of the parent exceed that of any other; as we depart from home, the next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state, where acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and attachment; enlarge the circle still further, &, as citizens of different states, though we acknowledge the same national denomination, we lose the ties of acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, and thus, by degrees, we lessen in our attachments, till, at length, we no more than acknowledge a sameness of species. Is it therefore, from certainty like this, reason to believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, of New-Hampshire, will have the same obligations towards you as your own, and preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care and attachment? Intuitive reason, answers in the negative. (17)

Throughout the essay, Cato makes a geopolitical claim that a consolidated national government cannot work due to the new nation's size; not only is travel difficult, but different people, in different climates and in different geographic regions, inherently have different interests which can be represented only by their respective state legislatures. Ultimately, even some of the current states might be too large to contain solely one common interest; like Publius, he uses Shay's Rebellion to argue a deficiency in the new nation. Unlike Publius, though, for whom Shays Rebellion is a specter of the

kind of unvirtuous behavior and relations that the Constitution will prevent, Cato instead uses it to note that there may very well come a time when a number of states, as currently constructed, will have to subdivide into smaller, and hence more republican, governmental and geographic units.

Publius, however, uses Hutcheson's argument about the geopolitical powers of benevolence, and its implication that those attractive powers can function over a large area, to claim instead that the Constitution, and the system of virtual representation which is key to it, joins American citizens into a homoaffective republic whose interests operate through the affections. For example, in *Federalist #35*, he discusses the number of representatives in the House of Representatives. He notes that his opponents argue that the House is undemocratic because that number "is not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens; in order to combine the interests and feelings of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its constituents" (166). Publius then argues that such "actual representation of all classes of the people" is not necessary. Merchants, he says, are the natural representatives of mechanics; the landed gentry are the natural representatives of the middling farmers. For all classes, by occupation, have common interests, and "common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy" (167). This bond of sympathy therefore repudiates one of the colonists' major arguments with England—that because they were not actually represented in Parliament, they could not be taxed—and reasserts the social hierarchy.

Yet, this social hierarchy is not the corrupted English one but instead is one held together through bonds of affection. Arguing that someone of the right tenor can represent a locale even if he does not live there, Publius writes also in *Federalist #35*:

Is it not natural that a man who is a candidate for the favour of the people and who is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow citizens for the continuance of his public honors should take care to inform himself of their dispositions and inclinations and should be willing to allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself and his posterity by the laws to which he gives his assent are the true, and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the representatives and the constituent. (168)

Sympathy, then, flowing between intermediate and elite men, makes those vertical relations interdependent and the seeming privilege of the merchant and the gentry disappear.

In *Federalist #57*, Publius discusses the Antifederalist claim that the members of the House of Representatives will be chosen from "that class of citizens which will have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of the few" (289)—in other words, that Representatives will be solely members of the elite, who will solely look after their own particular interests. Publius responds by saying that the Representatives will be elected by the "great body of the people of the United States" (290), who will ensure that Representatives do not act self-interestedly. Of course, the electors are not so widespread as Publius claims, yet his argument about the relationship between the elected and the electors demonstrates exactly the homoaffective basis of virtual representation.

Publius even argues in *Federalist #57* that the act of entering public service produces "a temporary affection at least to their constituents" (290), and then states that because every law passed by the House of Representatives affects the elected as well, this

bond of human policy connects them with the electors, "creat[ing] between them that communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments of which few governments have furnished examples; but without which every government degenerates into tyranny" (291). Consequently, the sympathy between elected and the electors—that is, between the men of citizen America—creates common interests and common bonds through which flow the affections generated by the Constitution.

As I argued in Chapter Six, sympathy and (homo)affective desire are distinct forms of bodily attraction. Yet I argued in the previous section of this chapter that the language of sympathy and of (homo)affective desire are often either very much alike and sometimes even synonymous. Thus, while the language of interests is seemingly Lockean, and is very much so in the Antifederalist argument that a republic can only be geographically small, Publius instead equates commonality of interest with sympathy, demonstrating the Hutchesonian potentiality for interest to bind people together rather than to separate them into their own private spaces. Publius uses the language of sympathy to discuss the attractive, nationalizing powers of homoaffective desire.

Publius' images of sympathetic bonding replicate and build upon his other images of Constitutional homoaffective bonding and of affective geography. Indeed, he specifically links those images to each other by arguing that through the Constitution,

[T]he intercourse throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order; accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout, or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and between

different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has intersected our country, and which part finds it so little difficult to connect and complete. (65)

Thus, Publius uses the language of sympathy to argue that the affective perceptions and bonds of American citizens together construct the national bonds of homoaffective America, turning those individual or group interests into a national public interest which circulates through those bonds across the geographic entirety of the American nation. He thereby draws on that specifically Hutchesonian conception of the nation as an affective community whose members love and desire each other through the very repudiation of self-interest, an act which, in turn, strengthens those bodily-based interpersonal bonds of sympathetic, affectionate interest. As those members are specifically men (it is, after all, only men of the intermediate- and upper-classes who vote for representatives), Publius uses homoaffective desire to argue that virtual representation is republican. Rather than operating solely within the boundaries of a small republic, homoaffective desire joins together the citizens of a large one. Through affective bonds and through affective geography, Publius effaces local differences and binds together those specific interests into a new, national one that reconceptualizes distance, thereby enabling those male homoaffective bodies to "come to touch each other."

In a famous passage in Federalist #38, Publius states that the Constitution will heal the sick body of the nation. While, in that passage, America, the sick patient, is female, that standard iconographic gendering cannot obscure the fact that the political communal body is male. Indeed, Publius states several times that the spirit of the people of America is manly. Thus, when he consistently argues that the Constitution will fill the

national body with sympathy, it is clear that sympathy, or, as I argue, homoaffective desire, will heal that body by uniting the male bodies of its citizens into an affective community in which interests are effaced through the intimacy of relations between men.

Consequently, Publius, as part of his strategy for bringing his intermediate-class male readers into his rhetorical nation, appeals to their moral senses in order to establish a homoaffective bond with them prior to arguing that it is that very bond which make virtual representation different in the new nation than in the former colonies. Consenting on an emotional level, they enter into his homoaffective nation, and vote to remove themselves from the seats of power to become equal partners in the creation of the new, Constitutional one.

However, as I argued in the beginning of this section, this homoaffective nation composed of equally participating intermediate class and elite men is solely rhetorical, thereby demonstrating the very fears of affective consent which Fliegelman discusses: How does one distinguish between the performance of the affections and their reality? For while the affections will flow between voting men and representative men, and thus circulate through that political body, it still allows the men of merit, who are, of course, the merchants and gentry, to rise to the top; it is they and they alone who have the true republican training which enables them both to feel and to reason. Removed from the fractious passion fostered by the Articles, these men will temper their affections with the power of reflection out of their mutual love for what is best for the nation. Through their affectionate and judicious relations, the nation itself will become wise and judicious.

These men are the heirs to the men of the Constitutional Convention, the doctors who heal the sick patient. And it is the Constitutional Convention, and the men who comprised it, that is at the core of this affectionate vision. When Publius first introduces

the Convention, he states that it was "composed of men . . . many of whom had become highly distinguished by their patriotism, virtue and wisdom in times which tried the minds and hearts of men. . . ." (8)—that is, the American Revolution. These are the same class of men who formed the Patriotic Congress of 1774: "wise and experienced" (12). Indeed, Publius links the Constitutional Convention to the Patriotic Congress by stating,

that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress, who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political information, were also members of this Convention and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and experience. (12)

These wise, patriotic men, according to Publius, "passed many months in cool uninterrupted and daily consultations and finally, without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous counsels" (8). Indeed, Publius argues in *Federalist #37* that their actions demonstrate the exceptionalism of the Convention and, indeed, of America itself:

The history of almost all the great councils and consultations, held among mankind for reconciling their discordance opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and disappointments; and may be classed among the most dark and degrading pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is presented, they serve only as exceptions to

admonish us of the general truth; and by their lustre to darken the gloom of the adverse prospect to which they are contrasted. (181)

Of course, we know that the Constitutional Convention was anything but cool, that the final product dissatisfied many, and that it was not even signed by everyone, even though Publius claims in *Federalist #37* "that all the deputations composing the Convention, were either satisfactorily accommodated by the final act; or were induced to accede to it" (181). Yet Publius presents an origin myth of great men acting out of what he describes as "a deep conviction of the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good" (181-82). Such behavior enables these men to maintain their status as the natural leaders of the nation, a status that is as dependent upon their benevolent behavior and homoaffective desire toward each other as it is upon their virtuous behavior toward those below them. Out of this origin myth emanates the Constitution, which will tame the fractious passions unleashed by the Articles and will allow the same group of men, or their descendants, to continue furthering that good. As long as these men properly relate to each other, the promise of America will be sustained. *The Federalist Papers* argues that that can only occur if America becomes a republic of homoaffective men.

## Coda

Post-Homoaffective America and the Post-Constitutional Nation

Overview. America in the 1790s was a country in "social" flux, in the eighteenth-century definition of that term. Under increasing pressure from emerging market economies, the fraying of traditional communal bonds that already had begun prior to the Revolution, and that had accelerated in the turmoil of the 1780s, continued apace.<sup>268</sup> By the mid-eighteenth century, a shrinking amount of arable land to inherit or even to work had forced increasing numbers of eastern farmers to move west for inexpensive property, separating extended families and disrupting the traditional household economy. The post-Revolutionary opening up of western territories intensified this process, but also moved the cheap-land frontier even further west, making migration increasingly difficult while the amount of unoccupied, productive eastern land simultaneously continued to diminish. Ultimately, a significant percentage of these farmers lost all of their remaining holdings and either drifted between small, local towns or moved to larger seaport communities to seek employment as day laborers.

There the commercial revolution already was in full swing, disrupting traditional artisanal socioeconomic relations in the same way that agrarian ones elsewhere were being transformed. As the British/French wars of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth

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<sup>268</sup>The literature on the economic and social changes of post-Revolutionary period is vast. The following discussion in this "Overview" is based primarily upon Charles Sellers, *The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1991) and from Gordon S. Wood, *Radicalism*, Ch. 1, fn. #19. See also Drew R. McCoy, *The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America*. 1980. (New York: Norton, 1982); Sean Wilentz, *Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984); and Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800* (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1993).

centuries forced the two European nations to trade extensively with American merchants for American food which was carried on American ships, enormous profits were to be made and urban populations increased dramatically. While the monies flowed predominantly to the mercantile few, not to the laboring many, these expanding markets also presented financial opportunities for mechanic/entrepreneurs who had ready access to mercantile capital; rather than taking in apprentices and employing the highly-skilled journeymen who themselves later would become master mechanics, many instead began to "put out" work as cheaply as possible by paying piece rates to unskilled laborers, thereby increasing profit margins through the export of low-cost goods. As a result, urban poverty increased and urban rioting became more frequent, paralleling the agrarian riots of the 1780s, such as Shays Rebellion, which had spurred the Federalists to push for the Constitution, or other, more contemporaneous ones, such as the Whiskey Rebellion, all of which were part of the lower classes' response to the economic policies and actions of those with more wealth.

Thus, while the Constitution in part was meant to check the upheaval of the 1780s, as I discussed in Chapter Seven, in this endeavor it must be judged a failure. In fact, after ratification there was constant conflict between the Federalists, who favored an activist national government with a strong mercantilist economic policy, and the Democrat-Republicans, the heirs of the Antifederalists, who favored a more restrained national government with an agrarian economic policy. This conflict came to a head in 1798 when the Federalists, who controlled both Congress and the Presidency, passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which declared that writing, printing, uttering or publishing "any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the

United States,"<sup>269</sup> or giving any assistance to do so, was a crime punishable by fine and/or imprisonment, a law which led to the closing of a number of Democrat-Republican newspapers and to talk of secession in Kentucky and Virginia.

While the terms were somewhat different, then, the question of what it meant for the young United States to call itself a republic was as pressing in the 1790s and in the early 1800s as it had been during the Constitutional debates of the 1780s. As growing commercialism and self-interest continued to weaken the communal basis of much of American "society," and continued to weaken as well the republican conception of the country as comprised of a disinterested few and a disinterested many who together shared the goal of a common interest, the very basis for America's national identity became increasingly fragile. It is for this reason that Thomas Jefferson's election as president in 1800 is sometimes called the third American Revolution, for it was viewed even then as a repudiation of Federalist mercantilist policies and politics, and an attempt to create a republican, communal political economy that reflected, but contained, the rapid socioeconomic changes then occurring.

Yet while much has been written about numerous aspects of the upheavals of the period, as I note in Chapter One, little has been written about the changes wrought in relationships between men, especially concerning their social boundaries and political effects. I have argued throughout that male homoaffective desire is a particular form of masculine emotional and physical intimacy which holds together the idea of a nation. It is for this reason that I claimed in my previous chapter that Publius uses this conception of men's desire for other men to support his pro-ratification position; the wish of these men

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<sup>269</sup>The Avalon Project, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/statutes/sedact.htm>. Accessed June 3, 2008.

"to come to touch each other" binds geographic and virtuous America into a homoaffective community of benevolent men.

But if male homoaffective desire is dependent upon a longing for the common good, what happens to it as that conception of a moral nation, bound together by a unitary definition of that good, begins to fracture under the social, economic and political pressures of that emerging market economy? While a full answer to this question is beyond the extent of my reach here, I want to close by briefly examining how two important late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century novels, Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntly* and James Fenimore Cooper's *The Last of the Mohicans* address it; my intent is to suggest the outlines of a more extensive reading of the changes in representations of that desire, indeed of male-male intimacy itself, as the idea of America, and of the appropriate individual male behaviors which sustain it, begins to change in the face of an emerging commercialism which values masculine competition rather than masculine benevolence.

For if Publius' rhetorical construction of Constitutional America represents the apex of the vision of the possible unifying power of male homoaffective desire, and if the events which followed the Constitution's ratification demonstrate the decline of that possible power in a changing world, Brown's novel, I argue, demonstrates that even the perceptions upon which that desire is based can no longer be trusted. Yet the central place of the human body in *Edgar Huntly* largely has been missing from the critical discussion, as has the equally central role of male-male physical and emotional intimacy to its narrative. While there has been much analysis of Huntley and Edny as doubles, that analysis generally has occurred within the psychoanalytic context of Edny being a

representation of Huntly's internal conflicts about adulthood.<sup>270</sup> More recent criticism locates the novel at the nexus of the psychological and the political—to state it broadly, that the novel is concerned with the creation of a new American self in the context of the social and economic turbulence of the late eighteenth century<sup>271</sup>—and feminist critics have

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<sup>270</sup>See, e.g., Leslie Fiedler, *Love and Death in the American Novel* (New York: Criterion Books, 1960); Sydney J. Krause, "Historical Essay." *Edgar Huntly*. Ed. Sydney J. Krause (Kent State, OH: Kent State P, 1984); Marietta Patrick, "The Transformation Myth in *Edgar Huntly*," *Journal of Evolutionary Psychology* 10.3-4 (August 1989): 360-70.

<sup>271</sup>Jared Gardner, for example, reads the novel within the context of the Alien and Sedition Acts as advocating for purging the alien (whether foreign or native) to create an American identity; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg argues the novel states that this process is impossible, while Paul Downes claims that the novel, however fragilely, proposes the possibility of a radical democracy emerging from the political crises of the period. Sydney Krause places the novel's narrative within the history of native/white relations in Pennsylvania, beginning with William Penn's treaty with the Lenni Lenape in 1682 (whose ancestors attack Huntly's neighborhood), signed under what became known as the Treaty Elm, and broken through the infamous Walking Purchase Treaty of 1737. Similarly, Matthew Wynn Sivils argues that Old Deb is a representation of Native American sovereignty, not simply of Native American revenge; Gesa Mackenthun, conversely, sees Brown as reinforcing American expansionism on Native American bodies and land. See Jared Gardner, "Alien Nation: Edgar Huntly's Savage Awakening," *American Literature* 66.3 (Sept., 1994): 429-61; Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, "Subject Female: Authorizing American Identity," *American Literary History* 5.3 (Autumn 1993): 481-511; Paul Downes, "Sleep-Walking Out of the Revolution: Brown's *Edgar Huntly*," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 29.4 (1966): 413-31; Sydney Krause, "Penn's Elm and Edgar Huntly: Dark 'Instruction to the Heart,'" *American Literature* 66.3 (Sept. 1994): 463-84; Matthew Wynn Sivils, "Native American Sovereignty and Old Deb in Charles Brockden Brown's *Edgar Huntly*," *ATQ* 15.4 (2001): 293-304; Gesa Mackenthun, "Captives and Sleepwalkers: The Ideological Revolutions of Post-Revolutionary Colonial Discourse," *European Review of Native American Studies* 11.1 (1997): 19-26.

argued that the novel reinforces the construction of that self as male,<sup>272</sup> yet the crucial role of relations between men in the formation of that self largely has been ignored.<sup>273</sup>

From its very opening, however, the novel foregrounds the centrality of male homoaffective desire to that social and socializing process. Set in 1787, the year of the Constitutional Convention and the beginning of the ratification debates, it opens with Huntly walking home through the night after visiting his fiancée, Mary Waldegrave, whose brother, Huntly's most intimate friend and, according to Huntly, a paragon of benevolence, recently has been murdered. Huntly, well-versed in the eighteenth-century language of enlightened sensibility, walks through countryside that he describes as "romantic and wild" (6) and, correspondingly, he becomes more and more reflective, his "sensations [sinking] into melancholy" (7). Indeed, Huntly has specifically chosen to make this journey at night, partly to spend more time with Mary but partly also, he states, because such a nighttime journey "was more congenial to my temper than a noon-day ramble" (7).

Thus, in the opening pages, Brown establishes a dichotomy between the world of day and the world of night, a dichotomy which he builds upon throughout the rest of the

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<sup>272</sup>Elizabeth Jane Wall Hinds discusses the centrality of competing notions of property at the heart of the novel: an older, agrarian order represented by Huntly Farm, and the newer, commercial order represented by Sarsefield, an order which she argues is figured as male. See "Charles Brockden Brown's *Revenge Tragedy: Edgar Huntly* and the Uses of Property," *Early American Literature* 30 (1995): 51-79; and *Private Property: Charles Brockden Brown's Gendered Economies of Virtue* (Neward, DE: U Delaware P, 1997). See, as well, Smith-Rosenberg, fn. #4, for a discussion of the novel as authorizing a fragmented male, Euro-American subject.

<sup>273</sup>Dana Luciano analyzes the centrality of what she calls the "carnal body" to *Edgar Huntly*, and includes Huntly's desire for Edny within the scope of that body, but ultimately claims that novel almost resists meaning. See "Perverse Nature": *Edgar Huntly* and the Novel's Reproductive Disorders," *American Literature* 70.1 (March 1998): 1-27.

novel. The rational world of day, in which objects are exposed to the light of the sun, and consequently to the "proper" workings of our external senses, is not *romantic* or *wild*, to use Huntly's terms. In the world of night, however, other modes of being and feeling become possible. The sense of sight, for example, perhaps the most privileged external sense, becomes distorted, sometimes making out only the outlines of objects. Sometimes the outlines themselves are indistinct. Sounds become detached from sight, distance is harder to judge. In eighteenth-century discourse, our mind, our power of reflecting upon and combining simple ideas, acts differently at night, in ways that it would not during the day, for the ideas it receives at night are different from those it receives during the day. Consequently, because we have a different awareness of the world at night, we have a different awareness of ourselves. Or, perhaps, if Lockean notions of identity are taken to their logical conclusion, we are different selves at night than we are during the day.<sup>274</sup>

Huntly, therefore, because of his torment and grief over Waldegrave's death, wants to be in a physical landscape that mirrors his emotional state, one that allows him to reflect and to remember. Which is exactly what, once on his journey, he begins to do. He states:

As the darkness increased, and I advanced on my way, my sensations sunk into melancholy. The scene and the time reminded me of the friend whom I had lost. I recalled his features, and accents, and gestures, and mused with unutterable feelings on the circumstances of his death. (7)

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<sup>274</sup>For an extended reading of the novel's critique of Lockean rationality, see Beverly R. Voloshin, "Edgar Huntly and the Coherence of the Self," *Early American Literature* 23, 1988: 263-79.

Yet Huntly's seemingly rational choice soon slips out of rational control. Soon he is no longer remembering Waldegrave and what happened to him, but moves past memory, beginning to reflect, once again, on the mysteriousness of Waldegrave's murder.

However, romantic reflection is different from rational reflection. Huntly begins to relive the events of that night, not merely conjuring up images but instead he "hear[s] the discharge of the pistol . . . witness[es] the alarm of Inglefield [a neighbor] . . . hear[s] his [i.e., Inglefield's] calls to his servants, and [sees] them issue forth, with lights and hasten to the spot whence the sound had seemed to proceed" (7). Huntly once more sees Waldegrave "stretched upon the earth, ghastly with a mortal wound, alone, with no traces of the slayer visible" (7). He again hangs over his dying friend, tends the sacred spot where Waldegrave was murdered, and, as he has done numerous times already, tries to decipher its mysteriousness. Huntly feels the experience and feels the *feeling* of the experience; under the influence of romantic nature, time disappears, the world peels back, and Huntly's emotions stop the clock-like laws of a mechanical universe.

Thus, while the world of the romantic is not the same as the world of the affective, the two share one significant feature: in either, the perceived external boundaries of the human body melt away. As I have discussed throughout, the affective is dependent upon a belief in the power of occult qualities to influence a semi-permeable human body and thereby to join it to other such bodies. The romantic, similarly, operates outside the realm of Lockean rationality, dissolving the boundaries between the present and the past so that Huntly relives the murder in his body as if it is right then occurring in his body's presence. If that rational realm of day symbolizes how we are when we exist within a distinctly defined body, the nighttime realm of the romantic symbolizes how we are when we exist within a body which transcends time and space. Within that realm,

logic is suspended, coincidences occur on a noncoincidental basis, events repeat themselves, boundaries break down between human bodies and nature, or even between human bodies. This is, in fact, the narrative of the novel. Edgar Huntly, the character, enters this realm when he sets off on his journey home, and although he reaches home, he never leaves that realm behind.

Yet that romantic narrative is itself precipitated by the workings of the affective—or, more accurately, of the homoaffective—for if Huntly did not love Waldegrave, he would not have walked home at night, he would not have entered the realm of the romantic, and none of the events of the novel would then have occurred. As Brown makes clear, it is Huntly's capacity for male homoaffective desire from which everything else stems; his desire for Waldegrave leads to meeting Edny, and his subsequent desire for Edny is one of the dominant narratives of the novel. But in the world of post-Revolutionary America, when men are increasingly in competition, rather than in cooperation, with each other, the perceptions of the moral sense from which that homoaffective desire stems are no longer as accurate as they once were. While still sufficiently powerful to prompt Huntly to love Edny and to feel that he is acting for the greater good, they instead produce the opposite of that good; his desire to merge with Edny results not in Edny's redemption but in his death and in Mrs. Lorimer's miscarriage. The novel thus addresses questions central to late eighteenth-century America: What happens when the power to transcend the boundaries of the male body results not in national formation but in something beginning to resemble national disintegration? When the chaos which the Constitution's homoaffective vision was meant to contain instead overflows its legalistic and rhetorical constraints, what remains?

For when Huntly approaches the elm under which Waldegrave was murdered, he finds a mysterious, half-naked man, whom he later discovers is Clithero Edny, digging a hole. Huntly is convinced that this man is Waldegrave's murderer, but is afraid to get too close for fear that the man will run away. Yet while watching him dig, he sees the man put down his shovel and begin to sob, loudly. Huntly's first reaction is astonishment, and then:

Every sentiment, at length, yielded to my sympathy. Every new accent of the mourner struck upon my heart with additional force, and tears found their way spontaneously to my eyes. I left the spot where I stood, and advanced within the verge of the shade. My caution had forsaken me, and instead of one whom it was duty to persecute, I beheld, in this man, nothing but an object of compassion. (10-11)

From that moment on, Huntly's attitude toward this mysterious man changes. No longer accusatory, he now wants to console. Indeed, Huntly is now a man possessed. He decides that he must talk with Edny, must find out why he murdered Waldegrave. Huntly does not, however, seek revenge, but instead feels only sympathy and compassion.

Yet although Huntly, like Publius, uses the language of sympathy, his feelings, and his resultant impetus for action, do not stem from the interaction of the imagination with the perceptions of one of the external senses, but, also like Publius, instead stem specifically from the perceptions of the internal moral sense. As Huntly notes above, Edny's sighs and sobs under the elm strike upon his heart, which is, of course, the bodily organ within which the moral sense lies. Yet while the heart is also the site of love and tenderness, Huntly's tears do not stem from feeling Edny's "heart-bursting grief" (10), as

they would if his response was sympathetic, but instead stem from the compassion he feels upon perceiving the grief behind Edny's mysterious digging. Huntly's moral sense perceives Edny's intention, and it is at that moment that Huntly's motivation (that is, his own intention) changes; initially wanting to accuse Edny, he now wants to console him. As Huntly himself says, after observing Edny he wants "to convince him of the rectitude of [Huntly's] intentions" (24). Huntly wants to exercise his benevolence by acting with compassion to "restore this unhappy man to purity, and to peace" (32).

It is, then, through the workings of the romantic that Huntly returns to the elm; through the workings of the affections that he knows that Edny is the murderer; and through the affections that he is able to forgive, to understand and to love. Yet when Edny does finally talk, he first tells Huntly of the errors of his affections—that while Huntly may "boast the beneficence of [his] intentions" (35), his perceptions are incorrect and destructive. For the truth is that while Huntly wants to provide Edny with the possibility to confess and to release his sufferings, that desire for Edny's confession is not for the greater good but instead is so that Huntly can "embrace the assassin as [his] best friend" (31). It is talk therapy that Huntly wants, but it is Edny's talking that Huntly believes will provide the therapy. Thinking that he acts out of beneficence, Huntly instead acts out of self-interest. Because that is his intention, his moral perceptions of Edny's intention, and of the cause of Edny's grief, are incorrect.

Huntly, though, does not learn the difference or the lesson. After Edny tells his story and disappears into the hostile wilderness, Huntly travels through that wilderness to achieve union with Edny, and through that union to rescue him. When he finally finds Edny lying on some distant rocks, Huntly calls out to him, and then, when Edny runs away, Huntly thinks:

Could I arrest his foot-steps and win his attention, I might be able to insinuate the lessons of fortitude, but if words were impotent, and arguments were nugatory, yet to set by him in silence, to moisten his hand with tears, to sigh in unison, to offer him the spectacle of sympathy, the solace of believing that his demerits were not estimated by so rigid a standard by others as by himself, that one at least among his fellow men regarded him with love and pity, could not fail to be of benign influence. (102)

Indeed, Edny has so completely overtaken Huntly, and Huntly is so consumed with his desire to utilize "[t]he magic of sympathy [and] the perseverance of benevolence" (107) in order to demonstrate to Edny that "he is worthy of compassion" (111), that now Huntly himself starts to sleepwalk. He wakes up in a dark pit in a dark cave, at which point the novel turns into a wild captivity narrative; however, when he finally returns home, beaten and bruised, he still feels affective tenderness toward Edny, and still seeks to release Edny's guilt, only to continue to act out of his misperceptions, which leads to the novel's final disastrous events.

What the novel illustrates, then, is the failure of male homoaffective desire. Huntly's feelings for Edny, and the actions that he takes based upon them, do not join the two men together; rather, they lead to Huntly's "misreading" of Edny, and destroy each of them in the process. Indeed, it is no accident that, in *Edgar Huntly*, the relationships that drive the narrative forward, the ones that really matter, are relationships between men: between Huntly and Edny, between Huntly and Waldegrave, between Huntly and Sarsefield. White women exist as objects of exchange between men: Mary between

Huntly, Waldegrave and Sarsefield; Mrs. Lorimer between her brother, Edny and Sarsefield; Clarice between Edny, Sarsefield and Huntly.

Yet Edny himself is not a white man of property; he is Irish, in late-eighteenth-century Anglo-America little better than just another Indian. Thus, it can be argued that he is not a subject, but simply an object of exchange between Sarsefield and Huntly, whose own social position is precarious at best. Additionally, the one woman who is outside that male system of exchange is the one woman who is clearly a subject: Deb, an old Delaware woman who, in spite of her Anglicized renaming, insists upon her Indianness, and who sets into motion the Indian war narrative that collides full force with Huntly's homoaffective narrative, and, in due course, with Huntly's body.

Central to the novel, then, is a system of exchange and a simultaneous breakdown of that system that reflects the breakdown of older forms of homoaffective relations in late-eighteenth-century America in the face of an emerging market economy that enables men to make, or to remake, themselves—to create new selves—and thus to create new modes of behavior and/or to change their position in the sociopolitical hierarchy. As the novel demonstrates, these new selves were not necessarily ones that could be controlled rationally. This lack of control mimics the movement of non-elite men forcing their bodies into the political process and mimics also the intense ferocity of much of the relations of elite men with each other that Publius' vision is meant to obscure, as I discussed at the end of Chapter Seven.

Yet the novel does more than this. It foregrounds the importance of the male body to this schema; Huntly's homoaffective desire for Edny is the main relation of the novel, a relation that, by definition, sets off an elaborate process of actions that signal Huntly's desire to merge his body with Edny's and through which Huntly takes on some

of Edny's attributes (e.g., sleepwalking). Furthermore, it serves as a reminder that while white women's bodies are exchanged, it is the relation of white male bodies to each other that form the primary narrative. Indeed, Huntly has learned enlightened sensibility, and the affective relations that form a key part of it, from Sarsefield, who rejects Huntly not for his male homoaffective desire but for allowing it to become passion, not balanced by reason, and therefore inaccurate.

It is easy to say, then, that in a time of major social, political, and economic upheaval, the novel uses this breakdown of traditional relations to create a picture of an America unloosened from its moorings and mired in uncertainty. And certainly this is true. But in its urgent insistence on the processes of one male body focused on and wanting to merge with another, and on the male-male intimacy that is such an integral part of that process, the novel also highlights the anxiety that lies behind those power relations: the fear of the chaos that only the union of male bodies can stave off. It therefore speaks to the very impetus of Publius' Constitutional vision, and casts significant doubt on the ability of that vision to accomplish its goal. Indeed, Huntly's desire for Edny illustrates that male homoaffectivity is, in crucial ways, at least by the late eighteenth century, not about intimacy but about control; Huntly wants to bring Edny back into society, Edny is not a willing participant in Huntly's desire, so Huntly simply desires him more.

Yet, as Edny's successful resistance and the Indian war narrative both demonstrate, Brown realizes the limitations of such unions and of such desires—that the power invested in them is a fantasy. His novel, then, is not simply a nostalgic yearning for an earlier era of a more virtuous America; it illustrates that the relations of elite men to each other in the new nation have already descended from the male homoaffective

ideal that was the true mark of a benevolent society and to which Huntly thinks he is striving, even while his actions say otherwise. The failure of male homoaffective desire then, to Brown, is the failure of the nation. As the intensity of politics in the late eighteenth century indicate, that virtuous America is gone, if indeed it ever existed. Indeed, in 1799, a mere 16 years after the end of the Revolution, and the nation nothing more than a second-rate power torn by internal dissension and caught between the first-rate powers of England and France, it was not even clear that the nation would survive. Huntly's insistent desire, then, is ultimately a warning. For when it breaks down, as it does here, it signals that that dream of a benevolent nation, one built upon the intimate relations of men's bodies with each other, is simply a dream, nothing more than the folly or fancy that overtakes Huntly in the novel's opening pages, from which the nation, if it is to survive, must wake up.

Yet if the centrality of man's desire for his fellow man is in large part missing from literary readings of *Edgar Huntly*, as it is in large part missing from historical readings of the political debates of late-eighteenth-century America, in contrast the relationship between Natty and Chingachgook has been analyzed extensively as one of the iconic pairings of nineteenth-century American literature. But while it is unlikely that any contemporary critic would call Natty lonely in the way that Leslie Fiedler did in *Love and Death in the American Novel*, as Ivy Schweitzer documents, the centrality of that relationship to the concerns raised about American society by the Leatherstocking series is still contested.<sup>275</sup> Indeed, even critics like Joseph Allen Boone and Robert K. Martin, who, while not writing about Natty and Chingachgook, have tried to rescue other

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<sup>275</sup>Ivy Schweitzer, *Perfecting Friendship: Politics and Affiliation in Early American Literature* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 2006); see esp. 141-42.

interracial nineteenth-century American male-male pairings from the homophobic underpinnings of Fiedler's famous thesis, still see those pairings, although capable of commenting on society, as only able to do so from an outsider position.<sup>276</sup>

Schweitzer instead claims that Natty and Chingachgook's relationship incorporates the essential characteristics of Aristotle's theory of friendship, and argues that Cooper establishes their affiliation as an emotional and political counterpart to the Leatherstocking series' heterosexual relationships; as such, the two men's relationship is as fully engaged in that series' political ruminations as are any of those others. Yet as I discuss in Chapter Six, her analysis, while rightfully locating the potency of male-male intimacy within the narrative trajectory of the series, neglects the central place of the male body to that intimacy, thereby reinforcing the primacy of sexual relations over other forms of physical and emotional affection. The result is to inadvertently reinforce as well the prevalent conception of Natty as chaste and inviolate,<sup>277</sup> even if no longer lonely, and of Chingachgook as a noble accessory rather than, like Old Deb, as an actor in his own right.

Clearly, the presence and powers of the male body were different in 1826, when *The Last of the Mohicans* was published, than they were in 1799, when *Edgar Huntly* was published, for the nation itself had changed considerably during those years. While the idea of a communal America still held significant potency, as Andrew Jackson's election

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<sup>276</sup>Joseph Boone, *Tradition Counter Tradition: Love and the Form of Fiction* (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987); Robert K. Martin, *Hero, Captain, and Stranger: Male Friendship, Social Critique, and Literary Form in the Sea Novels of Herman Melville* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1986).

<sup>277</sup>See, e.g., David Greven, "Troubling Our Heads about Ichabod: 'The Legend of Sleepy Hollow,'" *Classic American Literature, and the Sexual Politics of Homosocial Brotherhood*, *American Quarterly* 56.1 (March 2004): 83-110.

and presidency demonstrates, the market revolution had accelerated, as had the process by which it was weakening those communal bonds while simultaneously strengthening the emerging philosophy of individualism. As Sellers notes, the mythos of the American middle class emerged in the 1820s, virtuous in its busyness and in its capacity to make and to remake itself, even while the nation at the same time was beginning to experience the widest financial gap yet between rich and poor (237-38). Consequently, the capacity of male homoaffective desire to hold together the idea of the early- to mid-nineteenth century nation needs to be examined closely, for if *Edgar Huntly* demonstrates that the moral sense's perceptions were no longer valid at the end of the eighteenth century, and if the social forces which had weakened its powers continued to strengthen, how could that desire operate either physiologically or politically thirty years later, especially when, as I discuss in Chapter One, newer, and more suspect, forms of male-male intimacy were emerging at this time?

While I therefore argue that the male human body is still a presence in *Mohicans*, that presence is very different than that of the male body which stalks across the narrative of Brown's novel. On the one hand, the human body in its entirety is seemingly absent from Cooper's landscape; to paraphrase Fiedler, no one ever gets bit by mosquitos, no one ever has to run into the bushes to relieve themselves, the characters may stumble through brambles and thickets but, miraculously, no one ever gets cut or bruised (198). Of course, such an absence is ultimately an impossibility, as the novel carefully tracks the movement of bodies across upstate New York. Yet it is clear that although Cooper's novel is set in 1757, when the power of the moral sense to perceive intention flourished, as did that of affective and homoaffective desire to draw benevolent bodies together, the physiological capacity of the nineteenth-century male body was different than that of the

eighteenth-century one. As I discuss in Chapter One, the chronologically later body could feel emotion, but it did not have the internal ability to perceive intention; simultaneously, the distinction between male-male affective and sexual intimacy was becoming less distinct, and thus male-male intimacy itself was becoming more suspect.

Such a difference was reflected as well in changing conceptions of masculinity, as I note in Chapter One. My argument about the foundational powers of homoaffective desire indicates that through the late eighteenth-century, the dominant social model of white manhood was communal-based; men felt publicly and bodily for each other and for society. In fact, Publius' rhetorical use of homoaffective desire is predicated upon a conception of a communal manhood that is key to American identity, for the republic itself was the community that every man was now obligated to serve. That web of male-male relations—what could perhaps be called republican brotherhood—held together what was to become the virtuous nation; as each man acted for the greater good, he was loved by his fellow men accordingly.

In the nineteenth century, however, largely under the pressure of the rapidly expanding market economy, these character- and communal-based notions of manhood began to collapse. As society became more mobile, a white man's ability to take individual initiative and to achieve monetary prosperity began to take precedence over his public character. The very originating idea of America itself became threatened as the cultural appropriateness of competition, rather than cooperation, between men continued to increase. Like *Edgar Huntly*, the *Leatherstocking* series examines the dangers presented by this social fracturing of male relationships and male identity, as well as of the communal ideals upon which they were based, to the concept of the nation.

But homoaffective desire does not operate in *The Last of the Mohicans*; rather, a different form of male-male physiological and emotional intimacy does, one that is predicated upon changing notions of the capacities of the male body and through which an alternative form of national formation can be argued. For example, while Natty consistently reiterates his theology of each race's separate gifts, that theology breaks down whenever the Native American male body intrudes upon his consciousness. One famous moment is when Natty and Duncan have freed Alice from the Hurons and Natty has set them on their path to escape; when he turns back to the Huron camp to try to free Uncas, Duncan tries to stop him but Natty says he must go, comparing his relationship to Uncas to "a feeling in youth which binds man to woman closer than the father is tied to the son" (315).

Schweitzer, among others, has noted how this passage identifies the romantic, heterosexual love of Duncan and Alice as belonging to the settlements, not to the masculine world of the wilderness; the implication is that Natty rejects that love, indeed that he rejects any form of physical passion. But what that reading omits is Natty's own awareness of Uncas' body, and the parallel he makes between that awareness, the resultant feelings he has for Uncas and the actions he therefore must take, to that heterosexual love:

I have fought at his side in many a bloody scrimmage; and so long as I could hear the crack of his piece in one ear, and that of the Sagamore in the other, I knew no enemy was on my back. Winters and summers, nights and days, have we roved the wilderness in company, eating of the same dish, one sleeping while the other watched; and afore it shall be said that Uncas was taken to the torment, and I at hand—There is but a

single ruler of us all, whatever may be the color of the skin; and him I call to witness—that before the Mohican boy shall perish for want of a friend, good faith shall depart the 'arth, and "Kill-Deer" becomes as harmless as the tooting we'pon of the singer! (315)

While the male body here is not the body of romantic love or of homoaffective desire, I have argued throughout that that desire is the physiological and emotional feeling which results from the perception of the moral sense of one man to the intention of another. Natty's awareness of Uncas' body, although not homoaffective, functions similarly. He is aware of the body that is next to him in wartime and in peace, in sleep and in wakefulness; indeed, it is because of Uncas' body that Natty is alive. Natty, therefore, perceives Uncas' intention as much as he perceives Uncas' body, for that intention is contained within and propels the movements of that body, and it is the combination of the two which leads to Natty's feelings and actions. Just as Duncan's awareness of Alice's body justifies his decision to rescue her, Natty's awareness of Uncas' body justifies his decision to effect that rescue. Through that physiological awareness, he transcends the boundaries of the very racial ideology that he other times argues is paramount.

Certainly, such an assertion of the Native American male body occurs at the end of the novel as well, along with a similar transcendence of Natty's racial ideology; indeed, the novel ends with an interracial touching of male bodies. In language that predates Hester Prynne's famous words to Arthur Dimmesdale in *The Scarlet Letter*, Natty tells Chingachgook that he will not be alone, grasps Chingachgook's hand, and the two men lean into each other and hug, weeping together over Uncas' grave. Natty's love

for Chingachgook, and Chingachgook's for him, is idealized in that image of two touching, emoting men.

Thus, while it is important to take note of the nineteenth-century American literary tradition of the marriage solution to social problems (e.g., Oliver Effingham and Elizabeth Temple in *The Pioneers*; Alice and Duncan in *The Last of the Mohicans*; Everell and Hope Leslie in *Hope Leslie*; Charles Brown and Mary Conant in *Hobomok*), as Geoffrey Rans points out, Cooper's audience, while reading his novels, would know that those solutions were failures, as would Cooper himself while writing them. The problems that these male-female pairings were supposed to solve had not disappeared in the period between the historical time in which the novels are placed and the real world time in which they were written and read—if anything, those problems had only become accentuated.<sup>278</sup> These marriages, in other words, while perhaps producing children, don't produce much else. They are, simply, fantasy solutions. They demonstrate the imaginative power of male-female unions and of biological determinism, but their failure to produce social change highlights the gap between that imaginative power and that "real world" lack of effectiveness. While Natty and Chingachgook's relationship doesn't change anything either, that means simply that all of those relationships, whether male-female or male-male, are equal, bodily-based fantasy failures. Rather than reading their male-male relationship as a mythological impossibility—poignant, perhaps, in that final scene, but of no avail other than in its poignancy—it is both possible and necessary to examine it on terms equal to the other relationships—that is, on the terms that the novels themselves deem most important.

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<sup>278</sup>Geoffrey Rans, *Cooper's Leather-Stocking Series* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1991).

If central to the Leatherstocking series is the question of what kind of America is emerging out of the "wilderness," then the gap between the historical time within which the novels occur, and the real world time within which they were written, highlights the gap between the rhetorical promise of the eighteenth-century virtuous American republic, and the actual practices of the nineteenth-century American nation. Nature, in other words, is central to the Leatherstocking series' moral and political concerns in a way that is different from its role in Brown's novel. Given that Natty and Chingachgook are aligned with nature, and given that nature stands in opposition to what Natty calls the "wasty ways of the encroaching settlements"—that is, human society not based upon natural law—it is even more imperative that Natty and Chingachgook's relationship be viewed not as marginal in the face of biological productivity or sexual passion, but as equal in the face of bodily attention and of political failure.

Stating that the Leatherstocking series manifests a yearning for an older, more virtuous America that is disappearing in the rise of the market economies of the nineteenth-century is nothing new. I want to argue, though, that it was not simply that the imagined landscapes of the Leatherstocking series make that older America seem virtuous. Rather, they make possible a post-homoaffective relationship between men which draws upon the very notion of republican brotherhood in the midst of a newer America which fostered instead individualistic relations between men.

Unlike Duncan, for example, neither Natty nor Chingachgook are concerned with personal glory in battle (although Natty is clearly enthralled with his shooting abilities), while it is only after Duncan loses his false notions of chivalry and heroism (i.e., of

individual achievement) that he is able to become an effective fighter.<sup>279</sup> Indeed, one could say that Uncas dies because of those same false notions. Both Natty and Duncan have somewhat racist ideologies: Natty with his notion of the separate gifts for each race; Duncan with his unwillingness to consider Cora as a romantic interest because of her mixed blood. Yet through his awareness of the male body and of its nonindividualistic intentions, Natty is able to transcend his ideology, while Duncan's awareness of the female body instead reinforces his, leading him to fix his romantic desires on Alice, the prototypical weak, fainting white woman.

Furthermore, concurrent with the fracturing of that older social web was a fracturing of an older view of nature itself; once imagined as integral to America's virtue, as the wasty ways of those settlements indicate, it was beginning to be perceived as a commodity that could increase America's wealth. There is, therefore, a dialectic created between the Natty/Chingachgook relationship and the virtuous imagined landscape: their relationship can exist only in such a landscape, but the landscape itself is made possible only by such a relationship. It is this dialectic, I argue, that contains the critique of the changing social structure. The Natty/Chingachgook relationship, which is the literary manifestation of a nineteenth-century version of male homoaffective desire that calls upon eighteenth-century republican brotherhood for its resonance, and the imagined landscape within which it can exist, form what I call *intimate geographies*: sites of nostalgic longing for that rapidly disappearing republican America. In these intimate geographies, Cooper can critique current American society for its increasing failure to

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<sup>279</sup>See, e.g., William P. Kelly, *Plotting America's Past: Fenimore Cooper and the Leatherstocking Tales* (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1983); see esp. 56-9.

meet that republican ideal; rather than escaping society, as Fiedler argues, Natty and Chingachgook are integrally involved with it.

My argument about their relationship's political critique builds upon Marilyn Farwell's paradigm of "lesbian narrative space": a textual space, created by the allegiance of two women, that opposes a narrative's hierarchical power structure—what she calls the narrative of heterosexuality.<sup>280</sup> Farwell uses Adrienne Rich's model of a lesbian continuum, in which any allegiance between two women in a patriarchal culture breaks through what she terms "compulsory heterosexuality" and, hence, becomes lesbian. Lesbian, then, to Rich, is about power; for both her and for Farwell, the bond between two women is lesbian when the women make their relationship primary in the face of a power structure that would deem it otherwise. Their desire for each other is not necessarily sexual but is instead what Audre Lorde calls erotic: "the sharing of joy, whether physical, emotional, psychic or intellectual" that diffuses itself throughout the entire body and forms a bridge between the sharers.<sup>281</sup> Desire, thus, extends far beyond the sexual act itself.

Lorde's definition of the erotic clearly parallels my analysis of affective and homoaffective desire, as well as of Natty's awareness of Chingachgook's (and of Uncas') body. Expanding Farwell's application of the term "lesbian," then, I want to argue that Natty and Chingachgook's relationship within these intimate geographies creates a space, both geographic and rhetorical, that opposes the individualistic, hierarchical power

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<sup>280</sup>Marilyn R. Farwell, "Heterosexual Plots and Lesbian Subtexts: Toward a Theory of Lesbian Narrative Space." *Lesbian Texts and Contexts: Radical Revisions*. Ed. Karla Jay and Joanne Glasgow (New York and London: NYU P, 1990).

<sup>281</sup>Audre Lorde, "Uses of the Erotic: The Erotic as Power," *Sister Outsider: Essays & Speeches by Audre Lorde* (Freedom, CA: Crossing P, 1984): 53-9.

dynamics of the emergent market economy as represented in the narrative. In this nineteenth-century affective space, the male body retains its presence, albeit one that reflects then-current notions of its physiological capacities, sensory perceptions and possibilities of and for male-male physical intimacy.

Ultimately, though, the Natty/Chingachgook relationship creates an imagined racial harmony that never existed. Slavery was legal, Native Americans increasingly were being removed; indeed, as I intimated in Chapter Seven, republican brotherhood included in its framework only white men of the artisan class or higher. Cooper's appeal to republican virtue, then, like Publius' to a united pre-Revolutionary colonial America, is a nostalgic gesture to something that, except perhaps for brief moments, had never occurred; furthermore, the vision of American nature upon which it relies was itself highly contested.<sup>282</sup> Indeed, nostalgia, as Janice Doane and Devon Hodges point out, is an imaginative vision of a golden past that critiques the present by eliding the divisions that existed in that past.<sup>283</sup> Therefore, while the Natty/Chingachgook relationship can be read as an appeal for a racial equality that did not generally exist—and, as the death of Cora and Uncas demonstrates, cannot exist—that appeal operates within the binary of a pure, uncivilized wilderness and a civilized, but corrupt, society that numerous critics

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<sup>282</sup>The critical literature on the contrasting views of American nature, as represented by William Bradford's "howling wilderness" or Mary Rowlandson's "vast and desolate wilderness," on the one hand, to the nature represented by J. Hector St. John De Crevecoeur in *Letters to an American Farmer*, on the other, is enormous. See, e.g., Annette Kolodny, *The Lay of the Land: Metaphor as Experience and History in American Life and Letters* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1975) and *The Land Before Her: Fantasy and Experience of the American Frontiers, 1630-1860* (Chapel Hill, NC: U North Carolina P, 1984); or Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration Through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600-1860*. 1973 (New York: HarperCollins, 1996).

<sup>283</sup>Janice Doane and Devon Hodges, *Nostalgia and Sexual Difference: The Resistance to Contemporary Feminism* (New York: Methuen, 1987).

have shown was built on the geographic imagination of white men.<sup>284</sup> Cooper's intimate geographies, then, are only made possible by the very racial hierarchies that they decry. The Natty/Chingachgook relationship, although engaged in the politics of the moment by yearning for a supposedly purer age, reflect the ideological limits of that age and of Cooper's own.

Within those limits, however, their relationship stands as the clear moral alternative to the wars of white men who want control over geography simply for the sake of their own power and glory: the ultimate manifestation of a society that is not based on natural law and, hence, is immoral. Yes, Natty and Chingachgook participate on the periphery of those wars, and, in that sense, their passivity (or, rather, their narrative passivity) is a result of the bleakness of Cooper's vision of the impossibility of the survival of moral republican virtue. When, for example, near the end of *The Deerslayer*, a young Natty, on the peak of his life, rejects Judith's marriage proposal by pointing to the lake and forests around them and telling her that there—in the air, on the branches of trees—is his bride, it is not just a moment of Natty rejecting a potentially "real" heterosexuality for a metaphorical one. It is, as Geoffrey Rans notes, a moment where we, as readers, know what Natty, the character, cannot: that what lies before him is the death of the men he loves, the destruction of the nature he cherishes, the disintegration of the natural moral life he holds dear to his heart. It is that double-consciousness, what we know and what he does not, that provides that scene with its poignancy, but it is solely a poignancy that we, as readers, feel, not one within which he, as a character, participates.

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<sup>284</sup>See, e.g., Kolodny, fn. #14, and Robyn Weigman, *American Anatomies: Theorizing Race and Gender* (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1995).

At the end of *The Last of the Mohicans*, however, Natty feels nothing but loss and love—loss and love of Uncas, love for Chingachgook—and it is the overwhelming humanness of those emotions and the physicality of the male body that breaks apart his philosophy of the separateness of the races and transforms it into a vision of one God—a God for everyone. Yet Natty is not simply repeating Munro's earlier words over Cora's grave; his God is not the Christian God of the settlements but is a nondenominational personification of the spirit of nature. What Natty learns is that each race may have their own gifts according to that nature, but ultimately we are all united in nature, and it is in that moment, symbolized by the gesture of interracial male-male love, that the novel ends. But that moment is, finally, a double moment as well, with the sighting of the possibility of what could have been and the mourning of what will never be: the loss of the virtuous republic based in nature; the loss of the male-male bodily community upon which that virtuous republic was built.

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