“THERE’S A PLACE FOR US”: ETHNICALLY-RELEVANT ORGANIZATIONS AS A RESOURCE FOR IMMIGRANTS TO MANAGE COLLECTIVE IDENTITIES

by

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Abstract

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Shaun Wiley

Advisor: Professor Kay Deaux

This dissertation shows how immigrants' responses to low group status and uncertainty influence their political incorporation. Drawing on social identity theory, I examined whether intra- and intergroup social creativity strategies, defined as indirect ways of bolstering collective identity in the face of devaluation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), have inverse associations with collective action. Intragroup respect was expected to increase support for collective action by bolstering identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy. Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison was expected to decrease support for collective action by undermining organizational identification and suppressing perceptions of group efficacy. I also examined two ways immigrants maintain a sense of certainty (Hogg, 2007) in the new context: by emphasizing the familiar norms and values of ethnically-relevant organizations and affirming the status hierarchy in the new country by favoring higher-status outgroups. Which strategy they chose was expected to depend on perceptions of the intergroup context. Immigrants who endorsed meritocracy were hypothesized to identify more strongly with ethnically-relevant organizations, whereas immigrants who perceived low group status would favor higher-status outgroups.

Results from a survey of Dominican and Mexican immigrants recruited from ethnically-relevant organizations supported these predictions. Intragroup respect was

associated with greater activist identification among people who thought their group had low status, which was positively associated with support for collective action, a relationship mediated by group efficacy. Favoring alternative comparison dimensions, in contrast, was negatively associated with activist identification for people who thought their group had low status and negatively tied to collective action support. This relationship was also mediated by group efficacy. Furthermore, meritocracy and group status moderated the relationships between intergroup certainty and organizational identification and outgroup attitudes, respectively. When immigrants endorsed meritocracy, a belief threatened by the U.S. status hierarchy, they turned to ethnically-relevant organizations to maintain a sense of certainty. Immigrants also established certainty by affirming the social hierarchy through favorable evaluations of higher-status outgroups such as Whites and, for some, African Americans. Results illustrate immigrants' active role in their political incorporation and give insight into how and why responses to devaluation and uncertainty advance or impede social change.

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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Hierarchy (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and rapid social change (Amiot, de la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007) mark most modern societies. In the United States economic inequality has steadily increased since the 1980s and people in certain categories – Whites, the native-born, men – control a disproportionate share of resources, such as money, jobs, and real estate, as well as educational and occupational opportunities (Massey, 2007; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Individuals and societies across the globe also face social changes that range from large-scale migrations to nation building to unstable employment to natural disasters.

Inequality and social change often implicate collective identities, defined here as people's subjective sense of membership in a social category and the thoughts, beliefs, feelings, and behaviors that membership implies (see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004 for a taxonomy of the construct as well as an argument for the use of the adjective "collective" in place of the more common "social"). That people experience discrimination and devaluation based on social categories is a basic premise of social psychology extending from the early work on prejudice (Allport, 1954; Clark & Clark, 1947). Belonging to a devalued social category has been linked to how much people identify with their social groups (Ellemers, Spears & Doosje, 1997), how good they feel about them (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnx, 1994), and their willingness to act on their group's behalf (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Simon & Stürmer, 2003).

Furthermore, as people move across national borders and as new nations emerge, the stable hierarchies by which people understand intergroup relations are often

disrupted, leaving them to wonder where their groups stand in society. These changes implicate collective identities because belonging to groups can help provide people a clear and stable sense of where they stand in the world (Kinnvall, 2004). In fact, social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) postulates that a positive social identity must be grounded in a consensual status system; that is, beliefs about the group that are acknowledged, if not shared, by others. This is not to say that all groups must have equally positive evaluations of their group, but rather that all groups are likely to know their position. Rapid social change can disrupt the consensual systems on which collective identities are based, leaving people to wonder where their groups stand. Latinos entering an elite university, for instance, find ways of re-establishing their identities in the new setting, which provide them a link to some of the earlier social structures on which they built their self-understanding and also a supportive place in the new context (Ethier & Deaux, 1994).

Category-based inequality and rapid social change raise important psychological questions for those who experience them most acutely. First, how do members of devalued groups negotiate their collective identities in the face of low status? While researchers who have studied this question have established its implications for self-esteem and physical health (Major & O'Brien, 2005), I will focus on its implications for collective action. I will consider, specifically, how the experience of low status might influence people's identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and participation in actions aimed at changing the societal status quo. Large-scale social change is often spurred on by social movements organized by activist groups promoting collective action.

Therefore it is important that we understand the psychological processes involved in their recruitment and mobilization.

Second, how do people negotiate their collective identities when they are uncertain about their group's position in society? While this question, too, may have implications for self esteem (Major, Kaiser, O'Brien, & McCoy, 2007), I will consider its implications for intergroup behavior. More specifically, I will consider its implications for identification with the ethnically-relevant organizations that are often the vehicle for collective action and intergroup attitudes that are often the foundation for intergroup conflict and cooperation. Exactly because rapid social change is frequently a hallmark of modern societies, it is important to understand the relationship between intergroup certainty and how those who experience it evaluate the other groups in society.

The case of immigration

One global phenomenon, in particular, offers a window into how inequality and rapid social change relate to collective identity and intergroup relations: immigration. Immigrants, who make up an increasing proportion of the world's population, are often targets of inequality and face uncertainty about where their groups stand in their new societies. In recent years there has been a dramatic increase in people's movement across national borders. As of 2005, 191 million people lived outside the country in which they were born (United Nations Office of International Migration and Development, 2005). Many more are the children of immigrants. In the United States, immigrants and their children make up an increasing part of the population, representing 23 percent in 2002 (Bean, Lee, Batalova, & Leach, 2004). In cities like New York, immigrants constitute an even greater percentage. In 2000, 36 percent of New Yorkers were born outside of the

United States (New York City Department of Planning Population Division, 2004). Adding to this figure their second-generation children, first- and second-generation immigrants compose the majority of the population in the city (New York City Department of Planning Population Division, 2004).

Immigrants' positions in their new societies are hardly secure. Across countries, immigrants have lower status than the native-born population (Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Lee & Fiske, 2006). In the United States, immigrants of color are particularly aware that others hold them in relatively low regard (Wiley, Perkins, & Deaux, 2008). For many immigrants, the basis for group categorizations and the status structure changes drastically in their new country. West Indians, for example, experience race-based discrimination in the United States (Waters, 1999). In contrast, race is largely absent from daily interaction in their countries of origin (Vickerman, 1999). Immigrants also receive mixed messages from host societies that celebrate them for their hard work, but are also fearful of them for "stealing" jobs from the native-born (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001). The result of these two trends of increasing inequality and increasing globalization is that many people experience both low status and uncertain positions in the societies in which they live. Immigration, then, provides an opportunistic context in which to understand how people respond to inequality and social change, devaluation and uncertainty.

Immigration offers a real-world laboratory to extend social psychological theorizing in several other ways, as well. First, as immigration changes demographic patterns and increases social diversity, bipolar conceptions of intergroup relations modeled on the Black-White dichotomy in the United States must be reconsidered.

Largely as a result of post-1965 immigration, one particular group, Latinos, now represent a larger proportion of the U.S. population than Blacks. Social psychological theories of intergroup relations have not always been quick to reflect such societal changes. Although there are recent examples of research that has considered multiple groups – for example, the effect of contact on attitudes towards various ethnic groups on college campuses (Sidanius, Levin, van Laar, & Sears, 2008), the impact of multiple comparison targets on feelings of deprivation and satisfaction (Tropp & Wright, 1999), and the positive relationship that feeling one's group is respected in society has on attitudes toward multiple outgroups (Huo & Molina, 2006) – most social psychological work has focused on two-party systems of intergroup relations. Studying immigration adds to this growing literature on interactions between more than two outgroups.

From a practical perspective, immigrants and their children are likely to shape the U.S. political scene in the coming years. As the recent Democratic primaries for the 2008 U.S. election showed, attitudes between minority groups, particularly Latinos' attitudes towards African Americans, could influence political outcomes such as voting behavior. As the United States moves from a White-majority society to a majority-minority society in 2050 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004), a process hastened by immigration, attitudes between ethnic minority groups will be increasingly important. Furthermore, as the immigrant marches across the United States on May 1st 2006, showed, immigrants – particularly Latino immigrants – can be a powerful force in U.S. politics.

An overview of the research

Studying immigration can help us to understand how people respond to devaluation and uncertainty and its effects on political behavior and intergroup attitudes.

Immigrant political behavior is increasingly important as the number of immigrants in the United States increases. This research will examine how immigrants' responses to low status and uncertainty influence their political mobilization and their attitudes toward other ethnic groups. First, I will consider the extent to which different *social creativity strategies*, or indirect ways of bolstering collective identity in the face of devaluation (Jetten, Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 2005; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), increase the development of *collective action frames*, or shared sets of beliefs that explain social issues and suggest an appropriate collective response (Gamson, 1992). Second, I will consider the impact of a lack of *intergroup certainty*, or feeling unsure about where one's group stands in society, on *identification with the ethnically-relevant organizations* that are a vehicle for political mobilization and the *intergroup attitudes* that may impact relations between diverse groups in society. These analyses are based in the assumption that people are motivated to establish a sense of meaning in their social worlds and that they have many different resources with which to do so (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). In addition, this research takes that idea one step further, to examine how specific meaning-making strategies are related to intergroup relations.

Social creativity and collective action frames

Collective action frames, which provide the foundation for group political mobilization, are composed of three components: a sense of injustice, a sense of collective identity, and a sense of group efficacy (Gamson, 1992). Groups that believe that their disadvantaged position relative to others is unfair, who identify with other group members (particularly other activists), and who believe that together they can do something about their position are more likely to engage in collective action (Simon &

Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Among immigrants, such frames are likely to develop in the context of ethnically-relevant organizations. Immigrants rarely enter the political arena alone, but rather through the vehicle of ethnically-relevant organizations (Portes, Escobar, & Arana, 2008). Such organizations may provide the sense of collective identity and sense of group efficacy necessary to spur collective action. In other contexts, identification with specific activist groups, above and beyond identification with the overall social category, has been an important predictor of collective action (Simon et al., 1998). Therefore, in order to understand immigrant political behavior, it is also necessary to understand how and why immigrants identify with ethnically-relevant organizations.

What influences the extent to which immigrants identify with such organizations and participate in collective action? In this research, I argue that the extent to which immigrants identify with ethnically-relevant organizations depends on how they manage devaluation and uncertainty. Whereas some strategies for managing devaluation may increase the sense of collective identification and group efficacy that characterize collective action frames and support collective action, other strategies may decrease them. Within social identity theory, social creativity is the label applied to indirect strategies of shoring up collective identities in the face of devaluation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Social creativity strategies can be distinguished from other responses, such as internalizing negative views of the group, trying to leave the group either physically or psychologically, or actively trying to change the group's position in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This research will examine two specific social creativity strategies: (a) emphasizing intragroup respect and (b) favoring alternative dimensions of comparison. I

propose that the two strategies will have contrasting effects on immigrant identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and group efficacy and, by extension, collective action.

Emphasizing intragroup respect can allow members of low-status groups to manage their devalued position in society while maintaining collective identification (Jetten et al., 2005; Simon & Stürmer, 2003). For immigrants, ethically-relevant organizations may play a role in this process. Immigrants who experience low status in the United States bracket their position by participating in organizations that are oriented toward the country of origin (Jones-Correa, 1998). As such, emphasizing intragroup respect may be positively associated with immigrants' identification with the organizations that provide the vehicle for collective action.

Other social creativity strategies may, instead, decrease the likelihood of organizational identification and political mobilization. For instance, emphasizing important group values that are less relevant to the group's position in the United States, such as family and religion, may help immigrants to feel better about their disadvantaged position, while at the same time decreasing their need to identify with organizations and rectify their position through political action. In fact, emphasizing dimensions that are status-irrelevant, but on which the ingroup compares more favorably to a higher-status outgroup, has been shown to increase tolerance to inequality (Kay & Jost, 2003).

Thus, whereas some ways of managing low status in the United States, such as emphasizing the respect one receives from one's ingroup, are likely to increase organizational identification and collective action, others, such as emphasizing important group values that serve as alternative dimensions of comparison, are likely to decrease

both. One of the main aims of this dissertation is to understand immigrant political mobilization from this perspective. I will examine how immigrants deal with low status and uncertainty and the impact this has on their political mobilization.

Intergroup certainty, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, and intergroup attitudes

The second aim of this dissertation is to examine the impact of how immigrants maintain a sense of certainty about their position in the United States on their political mobilization. In this case, ethnically-relevant organizations may also play a key role. These groups, which frequently draw on the familiar norms, values, and structures of the country of origin, can help immigrants to establish a sense of their place in society. This may be particularly true for immigrants who endorse ideologies that the world has order and make sense, that hard work pays off, and that, in general, people get what they deserve. In fact one variant of these ideological beliefs, meritocracy, is a core component of the American dream, which many immigrants cite as a reason for coming to the United States (Hochschild, 1995).

Just as individual immigrants rarely enter the political arena as individuals, but rather as members of groups, so particular immigrant ethnic groups rarely reach their political goals by acting alone, but rather by developing alliances with other groups. Increasingly, social psychologists have acknowledged this fact, as theories of collective action and social change have evolved from two-party struggles between an ingroup and an outgroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) to multi-party struggles in which the groups in conflict fight to build alliances and gain support from other groups in society (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008). This research is informed by

the latter perspective, proposing that in order to understand immigrant political behavior it is important to understand the attitudes of immigrants and the predictors of their attitudes toward various groups in the United States, most notably African Americans, a lower-status group, and Whites, a higher-status group. To the extent that immigrants feel warm toward each group they are more likely to actively cooperate with them; to the extent that they feel cold, they are more likely to actively harm them (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007). In this research I propose that intergroup certainty, or the degree of clarity people have about their group's position in society, is an important positive predictor of intergroup attitudes.

Thus, this research will examine how Dominican and Mexican immigrants' responses to their low-status and the degree to which they consider their position in the United States uncertain influence their likelihood of political mobilization (via ethnically-relevant organizations) and attitudes towards African Americans and Whites. I begin by reviewing the social psychological literature on different responses to low status, or social creativity, and hypothesizing their relations to identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and collective action. Next, I consider immigrants' responses to their uncertain position in the United States and its implications for organizational identification and attitudes towards African Americans and Whites.

Dominican and Mexican immigrants in New York City

I will focus on two Latino groups in New York City: Mexican and Dominican immigrants. Dominican migration to New York has been consistent since 1965. Dominicans are the largest single immigrant group in New York City (New York City

Department of Planning Population Division, 2004), with estimates around 800,000 in the 2000 U.S. Census. In fact, New York has the second-largest number of Dominicans of any city in the world, following only Santo Domingo, the capital of the Dominican Republic. Despite their large numbers and historical presence, various reports suggest that Dominicans occupy a relatively low-status position in the city (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005) and face frequent discrimination in the United States based on their "black" or "mulatto" phenotype (Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991).

Mexicans, in contrast, make up more than half of the immigrant population in the United States, but a much smaller proportion in New York City, where the U.S. census numbered them at 250,000 in 2000, making them the city's third-largest, but second-fastest-growing, immigrant group (New York City Department of Planning Population Division, 2004). Mexican migration to New York City is more recent. Large numbers of Mexican immigrants began arriving in New York City in the early 1990s. Research with Mexicans outside of New York has shown that the group tends to hold a relatively low-status position (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). Mexican immigrants are not categorized as Black in the United States, but still face discrimination based both on their "indigenous" or "mestizo" phenotype as well as their association with "illegal" (undocumented) immigration.

I chose this sample because of the prominence of both groups in the New York City immigration landscape, because of my own facility with Spanish, and because both groups experience threats to their status and a lack of certainty about their position in the city.

Perceived group status and multiple comparison groups

Status comparisons are complex in a multicultural society. Immigrants can compare their position in the United States with a variety of groups of varying status, such as native-born Whites and other ethnic groups. Research with Black and Latino immigrants in New York City shows generational differences in the comparison groups that immigrants favor. First-generation immigrants primarily use their home country as a point of reference, a downward comparison in which their current status seems improved, but only among their ethnic group. Second-generation immigrants, in contrast, have turned their sights to the U.S. system, using native-born Whites as a point of reference to a greater extent (Wiley, Perkins, and Deaux, unpublished data). Asians in London and Turks and Ausseidlers in Germany prefer comparing with ingroup members and with their own position in the past, preference that are related to their perceived similarity and high level of contact with their ingroup (Zagefka & Brown, 2005).

What are the functions of different comparisons for intergroup relations? Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) can provide a guide. Comparisons with higher status groups can generate feelings of deprivation and encourage identity management strategies and collective action. Comparisons with lower-status groups, in contrast, can bolster how one feels about a group's position. Consistent with these ideas, Latinos and African Americans felt more deprived when comparing themselves to Whites than when comparing themselves to other minorities (Tropp & Wright, 1999). Downward comparison, or making a group's value conditional on the value of lower-status groups can increase how positively people feel about their group (Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987). In this research I will consider immigrants' comparisons with Whites, a high-status group, and African-Americans, a low-status group.

African Americans and Whites clearly represent opposite status poles for immigrants entering the United States. In order to fully understand how immigrants deal with low status it is important to consider both groups. First, I expect that immigrants will, on average, believe that they have low status compared to Whites, but similar or higher status compared to African Americans. Second, comparisons with each group will serve different functions. Comparisons with Whites will engage identity management strategies like favoring alternative comparison dimensions or identifying with immigrant organizations that respect them. Comparisons with Blacks, in contrast, will be linked to intergroup attitudes, and will be discussed in greater detail below.

Social creativity and collective action

How do threats to group value influence identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and political mobilization? To answer this question, I will first review the literature on social creativity and collective action, arguing that social creativity is likely to increase collective action only to the extent that it bolsters identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy. Second, I will make the case for the contrasting relationships of two particular social creativity strategies, emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, with collective action, arguing that the strategy that one uses to manage low status, rather than the perception of low status itself, influences the likelihood of organizational identification, group efficacy, and political mobilization. More specifically, I predict that immigrants who manage devaluation by committing themselves to ethically-relevant organizations that respect them are more likely to support collective action than those who value alternative dimensions of comparison (even though they may also take part in

the same organizations). I will also argue for the relevance of each strategy to Dominican and Mexican samples. Finally, I will present my theoretical model and review my hypotheses.

Social creativity and collective action frames

How do members of devalued groups manage their low-status position? When group boundaries are relatively permeable, members often try to leave the group physically or psychologically by joining or passing as a member of a higher-status group (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993) or selectively emphasizing non-stigmatized identities to protect their self-esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Pittinsky, Shih, & Ambady, 1999; Shih, 2004). For many groups, however, whose boundaries are defined by the impermeable categories of race, sex, or legal status, passing is not an option. When group boundaries are impermeable, members can establish a positive identity by changing the way they think about their group and/or fighting to improve their group's position in society (Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, and Hodge, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Within social identity theory, identity management strategies that change the way individuals think about a group are deemed "social creativity." They include selective interpretations of the intergroup context as well as a focus on intragroup factors (Jetten et al., 2005). Selective interpretations of the intergroup context include changing the comparison object (e.g., comparing to a lower- rather than a higher-status group) and changing the comparison dimension (e.g., comparing based on a favorable dimension, like family relationships or religion, rather than an unfavorable dimension like economic status; Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998). Downward comparisons can increase how positively people feel about their group (Crocker et al., 1987) and low-

status groups evaluate themselves more favorably on status-irrelevant dimensions than do high-status group members (Ellemers &Van Rijswijk, 1997). Group members can also maintain positive identities by focusing on the intragroup setting. Feeling respected by other members of an ingroup, for instance, increases identification and willingness to act on the group's behalf (Simon & Sturmer, 2003) and can suppress the desire to disidentify with a group in the face of devaluation (Jetten et al., 2005).

Group members can also establish a positive identity through more direct means, such as collective action, or actively fighting to change their group's position in society (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). People who perceive that their group is deprived, that is those who perceive that their group has low status relative to an important outgroup, are more likely to engage in collective action across a number of contexts (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999).

But what is the relationship between indirect strategies, such as social creativity, and more direct strategies, such as collective action? Early formulations of social identity theory considered social creativity and collective action to be two distinct ways of dealing with threats to group value (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Recently, however, social psychologists have started to reconsider this relationship on theoretical grounds.

First, social creativity can help immigrants to maintain a positive group identity while they wait to reap the fruits of collective action. Collective action is unlikely to be immediately successful in improving a group's status in society. In the interim, social creativity may bolster collective identification allowing immigrants to persist. Consider the case of the civil rights movement in the United States: members of the movement belonged to groups, most notably African Americans, who experienced high levels of

discrimination and devaluation and low levels of status, as evidenced by segregation. The movement aimed to change this situation and improve the status of African Americans in the United States through direct, collective action. But social change has not come quickly. In fact, the civil rights movement, which began before the Civil War (at least), continues to this day. In that period of two centuries, in which African Americans have attempted to remove prejudice against their group and improve group status, they also have been faced with the everyday realities of prejudice and devaluation. Participating in the movement may even make low status more salient and increase exposure to discrimination. Immigrants face similar issues while fighting for social change. As they fight to improve their group's status, social creativity strategies can help them to maintain the positive identities that make collective action possible.

As Margaret Shih (2004) has written,

> " . . . removing prejudices and changing social attitudes is a difficult task. It will take a great deal of patience and time before this goal can be realized. In the meantime, stigmatized individuals must find a way to live healthy, productive lives within these conditions," (pp. 183).

Given the persistent reality of devaluation, members of low-status groups must negotiate a positive identity at the same time that they work for social change. To the extent that people are unable to find ways to live "healthy, productive lives," social movement participation may be unlikely because people may find it difficult to sustain participation in a group that makes them feel bad. Thus, social creativity can be seen as the basis for the positive collective identity that facilitates collective action.

However, the relationship between social creativity and collective action is not clear-cut. Some ways of dealing with a group's low position in society can make

participation less likely, while others make it more likely. For instance, Jetten et al. (2005) write,

> "Social creativity strategies can help group members redefine their group in ways that suppress the negative impact of devaluation, but identification may be enhanced, paradoxically, at the expense of any motivation to engage in collective action . . . Social creativity strategies can also be seen, however, as an ideological counterpart to social change strategies. A greater awareness of groupness and group membership, due to an emphasis on intergroup differentiation and intragroup respect, may trigger challenges to the legitimacy of the group's devaluation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In such cases, social creativity strategies could become the driving force for collective action . . ." (pp. 213-214).

This quote suggests a moderated relationship between social creativity and collective action. Specifically, those strategies that encourage identification with action-oriented groups can increase collective action, whereas those strategies that decrease identification with such groups and distract from the need or capability of a group to change its position in society, may decrease collective action. Given that social creativity is a likely response to low status, even among people engaged in social change, this raises the following questions: (1) what forms of social creativity are likely to increase collective action; (2) what forms are likely to decrease it; and (3) why?

The literature on collective action offers one way to approach these questions. Collective action is more likely to the extent that group members develop collective action frames, or shared sets of beliefs that explain social issues and suggest an appropriate collective response (Gamson, 1992). Collective action frames are composed of three components: (a) a sense of injustice, or a feeling that one is somehow aggrieved relative to others; (b) a sense of collective identity, that one is aggrieved with others who belong to a particular group; and (c) a sense of group efficacy, that one's group is able to

do something about the group's position. These three factors have been linked to collective action across a number of studies (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a meta-analysis).

With respect to the collective identity component of collective action frames, Jetten et al. (2005),

> ". . . propose that an important factor in this process is the nature of the social creativity strategies—the more they strengthen the salience and clarity of a group's identity, the more likely collective action is to occur. In contrast, social creativity strategies that weaken a group's identity should make group members less willing to undertake collective action," (pp. 214).

It is certainly the case that people who strongly identify with a group are likely to maintain membership and even increase efforts on the group's behalf when group identity is threatened and when prospects for the group look bleak. They are also more likely to engage in collective action (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; de Weerd & Klandermans, 1991; Lalonde & Cameron, 1993; Simon et al., 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000). But, it may not only be the "salience and clarity" of the identities that result from social creativity strategies which influence their relationship with collective action; the type of identity that results may also play an important role. Research on the relationship between identity and collective action suggests that "politicized" identities, which are linked to activist groups as opposed to broad social categories, predict participation in collective action above and beyond identification with the larger social category (Simon, et al., 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2008). While all forms of social creativity are likely to increase identification with the larger social group, only some may increase activist identification. For immigrants, this issue could be

especially important. Whereas identification with the country-of-origin group may be high regardless, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations may lay the foundation for collective action.

Jetten et al. (2005) offer some support to the idea that one aspect of collective action frames, collective identity, plays a role in the relationship between social creativity and collective action. Another element of collective action frames, group efficacy, may also play a role, influencing why different socially creativity strategies have different relationships with collective action. Group efficacy, or the perception that people can work together to achieve their goals through coordinated action, is an important independent predictor of collective action across studies (van Zomeren et al., 2008). However, different researchers have thought differently about the relationship between group identity, group efficacy, and collective action. Some consider identity and efficacy to be independent predictors of action, as in Simon et al.'s (1998) studies of the grey panthers and gay men's movements. Others consider an interactive relationship between identity and efficacy, such that feeling empowered allows one to identify with a low-status group and feel angry about its position in society (Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000). Still others suggest that group efficacy mediates the relationship between identification and collective action (Mummendey et al., 1999; Reicher, 1996).

I favor the latter explanation for two reasons. First, more than group identity, which links the self to the group, efficacy implies behavior. That is, believing that a group will be able to act effectively to improve its position in society implies behavior more directly than simply feeling a sense of attachment to the group. It would follow then, that group efficacy would be a more proximal predictor of collective action than

group identity. Second, empowerment theories of collective action (e.g. Drury & Reicher, 2005; Reicher, 2001) argue that collective action and identity politicization occur when social identities move from mere descriptions of one's place in the social world (that is, "being") to what they want their position in the social world to be (that is, "becoming"). Conceiving group efficacy as the mediator in the relationship between group identity and collective action better represents that transition of identities from "being" to "becoming" than do the other proposed relationships.

Based on theory regarding collective action frames I argue that, when group status is low, two factors, identification with activist organizations and perceptions of group efficacy, will influence the relationships between strategies of social creativity and social change. But which social creativity strategies increase and decrease collective action via collective action frames? The sociological literature on immigration offers some clues as to which social creativity strategies Dominican and Mexican immigrants might use.[1] Below, I consider two forms of social creativity – emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison – both of which have parallels in the immigration and social psychological literatures and each having a different relationship with collective action frames.

Intragroup respect and collective action frames

Members of low-status groups can maintain positive identities in the face of devaluation by turning to groups that respect them (Jetten et al., 2005; Simon & Stürmer, 2003). Ethnographic evidence suggests that this social creativity strategy is present

[1] Because these group boundaries are marked by the impermeable categories of phenotype and legal status and leaving the group is not an option (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993), I focus my analysis on group-based strategies.

within immigrant organizations. Jones-Correa (1998) writes, " . . .the issue of status inconsistency . . . is set aside or bracketed – again, as long as immigrant men remain in the social environs of immigrant organizations," (pp. 333). Participating in political organizations tied to the country of origin can help Latino immigrants to manage threats to their status in the United States (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1998) by making them feel respected. Identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations, marked as they are by high degrees of interaction and an emphasis both on the U.S. community and the country of origin (Portes et al., 2008), allows them to gain a sense of respect and manage their low-status position. Such identification may ultimately move them on a path toward collective action.

Emphasizing intragroup respect, however, may be employed differently by Dominican and Mexican men than by Dominican and Mexican women in the United States. Both men and women experience devaluation in this country by virtue of their overrepresentation in low-skilled, low-wage jobs and belonging to a devalued group. For men, status is not only low in absolute terms, but also relative to their position in their countries of origin (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1998; Smith, 2005), due to employment that does not match their previous skills and work experience and to more equitable gender role expectations. Women, who no doubt also occupy a low-status position in absolute terms, may, nonetheless, experience a relative increase in the United States compared to the Dominican Republic or Mexico. Many join the workforce and some benefit from their adopted country's more equitable gender hierarchy. Because men's position in their national-origin group is newly threatened in the United States, they may benefit more than women from feeling respected by

ethnically-relevant organizations.

Emphasizing intragroup respect and, in turn, identifying with an activist group can increase collective action because it empowers individuals, giving them a stronger sense that other group members will support them in their actions and that, together, the group can achieve its goals. Intragroup respect may serve as an index of how much other group members will "have one's back" in the event of collective action. Perceiving action support, or that other ingroup members are willing to act to resist an outgroup, is predictive of collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Furthermore, the ability to communicate with other ingroup members is also linked to supporting group norms that are punishable by an outgroup (Spears, Lea, Corneliussen, Postmes, & Ter Harr, 2002). These studies provide evidence that group members' support for collective action (particularly punishable action) depends on their ability to gauge whether others are willing to support them in their action. Perceiving intragroup respect, in addition to increasing identification in the face of low group status, may let group members know that they have such action support. In so doing, it likely makes people feel empowered and believe that the group is more likely to achieve its goals. Thus, I expect that by identifying with an activist organization, immigrants realize their efficacy as a group and take a step towards social change.

Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and collective action frames

A second social creativity strategy that may be particularly relevant for immigrants is change in the comparison dimension. Reese (2001) has shown that Mexican immigrant parents criticize U.S. society, in which they feel marginalized, in terms of its morality. Although parents perceive some value in U.S. beliefs like the

endorsement of hard work and punctuality, they believe that people in the United States are overly permissive with their children and too focused on work, leading to a degradation of their moral values. They see themselves and Mexicans in general, in contrast, to be morally superior. Immigrants who perceive their group to have relatively low status may emphasize that their group excels on dimensions other than economic status, such as family relationships and religion, more than do Americans in general.

Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison may move one's attentions away from the sense of anger and illegitimacy that motivates people to engage in collective action (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008). Using alternative, status-irrelevant dimensions as a source of group value may lead group members to disidentify with status-relevant domains. This might lead them to divert their efforts from aspects of their lives, like economic status, in which their group is negatively valued, but in which, nonetheless, their group's status in society largely depends. Strategies like valuing alternative dimensions may serve, as Kay and Jost (2003) have argued about complementary stereotypes, a palliative function, making groups more amenable to a system that affords them low status. At a psychological level, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and endorsing complementary stereotypes may be indistinguishable.

Thus, favoring status-irrelevant dimensions, like family values and religion, more than status-relevant dimensions, like economic position, is likely to decrease collective action by decreasing identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy, two important aspects of collective action frames. Regarding the former, while affirming status-irrelevant dimensions may increase identification with the larger social category, its similarity to hierarchy attenuating or system-justifying

ideologies suggests that they will be negatively related to commitment to activist organizations. Regarding the latter, favoring status-irrelevant dimensions likely decreases perceptions of efficacy because it expresses an inability on the part of a low-status group to change their position, ceding, in essence, that the outgroup is likely to outperform the ingroup on status-relevant dimensions. The sum of these processes is that while social creativity strategies such as favoring alternative status dimensions may help individual group members to manage feelings of low status, they also make them feel that their group is less empowered to enact social change, decreasing the likelihood of collective action. In terms of managing low status, what helps the individual group member deal with devaluation makes fighting for actual change in group status less likely.

It is important to note that each of these instances of social creativity and their attendant associations with collective action should only be present with reference to higher-status groups, such as Whites. As will be described below, comparisons with lower- (or equal-) status groups, such as African Americans, may influence the relationship between intergroup certainty and intergroup attitudes, but because they are less likely to make devaluation salient, they are also less likely to spur social creativity.

Hypotheses 1 through 5

Figure 1 captures the hypothesized relationships between social creativity, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, group efficacy, and collective action (i.e., hypotheses 1-5). The model shows that the relationships depend on the social creativity strategy that group members use. First, I expect that for Dominican and Mexican immigrants who feel that they have low status in the United States, emphasizing

intragroup respect will increase identification with ethnically relevant groups (H1). This is based both on social psychological research demonstrating the effectiveness of emphasizing intragroup respect as a way to manage low group status (Branscombe et al., 2005) and the importance of respect as a predictor of collective identification (Simon & Stürmer, 2003), as well as sociological work demonstrating how ethnically-relevant organizations can help immigrants to "bracket their low status in the United States" (Jones-Correa, 1998). Also based on the sociological literature (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1998; Smith, 2005), I expect that the relationship between respect and organizational identification will be stronger for men, who experience a relative status loss in the United States compared to the country of origin, than for women, who sometimes experience a relative status gain (H1a).

Second, I expect that immigrants who perceive that their group has low status will engage in the social creativity strategy of favoring alternative (and status-irrelevant) dimensions of comparison, that is emphasizing that their group, in contrast to Americans in general, values family and religion over economic status (H2). This hypothesis is based on the articulation of changing the dimension of comparison as a way to manage threats to group status within social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In contrast to emphasizing intragroup respect, however, I expect that, when immigrants perceive their status to be low, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison will be negatively related to identification with ethnically-relevant organizations (H3). Favoring alternative dimensions may both decrease the need for individuals to resolve status threats by interacting with other group members and may also decrease the sense of injustice of one's low position in society that ethnically-relevant organizations address. Thus, these

two different socially creative strategies, emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, have opposite implications for identifying with organizations that are the basis for political mobilization among immigrants.

Third, I expect that favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations will have opposite indirect effects on support for collective action. In both cases, I expect that the relationship will be mediated by group efficacy. Immigrants who identify with activist organizations will be more likely to participate in collective action because they believe their group to be more capable of achieving its goals (H4). In contrast, immigrants who favor alternative dimensions of comparison will be less likely to engage in collective action because they believe their group will be less capable of achieving its goals (H5).

In sum, in hypotheses 1 through 5 I propose that immigrants' responses to their low-status position in the United States (or social creativity strategies), either emphasizing intragroup respect or favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, influence their identification with ethnically relevant organizations as well as their support for collective action. A further aim of this study is to show that perceptions of group efficacy mediate the relationship between identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and support for collective action. Those who identify with groups that respect them feel empowered and are more likely to engage. Those who favor alternative dimensions of comparison will be less likely to identify with ethnically-relevant organizations, feel less empowered, and will be less likely to engage. Generally speaking, the model suggests that social creativity strategies intervene to influence the relationship between low status and

collective action, and that how people negotiate their collective identity in the face of low status influences whether they will be willing to fight to change the status quo. Overall these hypotheses are important in that they show that immigrants' political mobilization depends not only on the degree to which they perceive having low status compared to important outgroups (i.e., relative deprivation), but also how they respond to their low-status position.

Intergroup certainty, organizational identification, and intergroup attitudes

How do Dominican and Mexican immigrants respond to a lack of certainty about their group's position in society? Here, too, I propose that people can draw on a number of resources to establish a sense of certainty about where their group stands in society. To answer this question, I will first review the social psychological literature on generalized uncertainty and apply it to the case of immigration. I will argue that, for immigrants and other groups experiencing rapid social change, uncertainty is derived from a lack of clarity about where one's group stands in society. Second, I will consider the consequences of a lack of intergroup certainty for immigrants' political mobilization and in particular their identification with ethnically-relevant groups, which can serve as their point of entry into the political arena, and their outgroup attitudes, which can influence their willingness to cooperate with other groups. Third, I will make the case that the effect of intergroup certainty on political mobilization depends on immigrants' beliefs about the status hierarchy. More specifically, I will argue that meritocracy, a belief about how the hierarchy operates, and perceived status compared to African Americans, a belief about where one's group stands in the hierarchy, moderate the

relationships between intergroup certainty and identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes, respectively. Finally, I will review my hypotheses.

Introducing intergroup certainty

Social psychologists have examined extensively how people respond to membership in low-status and/or devalued groups. Less studied is how people respond to membership in a group that has an uncertain position in society. Many groups lack certainty about their standing in addition to or instead of devaluation. Group members who are new to a setting – such as immigrants to a new country or subgroups after the merger of organizations or nations (e.g., East Germany) – face uncertainty about their position. Even groups that have long been part of an intergroup context may face uncertainty. Groups that are targeted by complementary or mixed-content stereotypes, which value them in some domains but derogate them in others (e.g., Asian Americans who are seen as cold, but competent; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005), for example, may also be unsure of where their group really stands.

Immigrants are likely to be uncertain about their position in the United States, where they encounter hierarchies and classification systems that are different from those in their own or their parents' country of origin. Dominicans who might consider themselves *indio* in the Dominican Republic, for instance, find that Whites lump them into the category of Black, one that is occupied almost exclusively by Haitians in the Dominican Republic (Itzigsohn, Giorguli, & Vazquez, 2005). Second-generation Dominicans negotiate a fine line in terms of ethnic identity, distancing themselves from the Black-White dichotomy of race in the United States, while still recognizing that they are excluded from White categories (Bailey, 2001). Other groups find that they occupy a

new position in terms of class, occupation, or ethnic label (e.g., the panethnic Latino label, which is not widely used in Latin America).

Feeling certain about where one stands in society is also an important determinant of intergroup relations. One reason that people join groups is to reduce uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Reid & Hogg, 2005). Being a part of a group helps to structure the world and give one a clear place in it. From the perspective of social identity theory, establishing a positive collective identity depends upon that identity's basis in a clear and consensual status hierarchy (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; van Knippenberg, 1984). Thus, intergroup certainty is not only related to identification with one's own group, but also with how one feels about outgroups. In particular, by evaluating outgroups with privileged positions favorably, people can reaffirm the hierarchy that orders their world, reestablishing a sense of certainty (Overbeck, Jost, Mosso, & Flizik, 2004). A dispositional lack of tolerance for uncertainty and uncertain conditions are both associated with favoring and identifying with ingroups that provide consensus, as well as favoring outgroups perceived to have higher status (Greive & Hogg, 1999; Overbeck et al., 2004; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998).

Social psychologists have examined certainty primarily at a general psychological level that may be relevant to intergroup attitudes, but does not necessarily derive from an intergroup context. This research has generally used either experimental manipulations such as time constraints (Shah et al., 1998; Experiment 2), highly complex and ambiguous tasks (Grieve & Hogg, 1999), or individual difference measures such as the need for cognitive closure (Shah et al., 1998; Experiment 1 & 3) to examine the

construct. None of these methods provides a differentiated view of what uncertainty is, nor do they capture the kind of intergroup uncertainty illustrated by the above examples.

As Mullin and Hogg (1998, 1999) note, lack of certainty can result from who one is, what one should do, or what one should believe. For immigrants it refers specifically to their group's position in the United States. One aim of this study is to develop a measure that captures this construct. A more central aim of this study, however, is to understand the relationship between intergroup certainty and political mobilization; specifically its relationship to identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, the vehicle by which immigrants often enter the political arena, and outgroup attitudes, the foundation for alliances with other groups. Although I will use my measure of intergroup certainty with a sample of immigrants in the United States, it should also be relevant to other national contexts, as well as other contexts in which intergroup relations change (either by the addition of new groups or a rapid change in social structure) or in which groups receive mixed messages about their position (as in the common case of complementary and/or ambivalent stereotypes).

How do immigrants respond to a lack of certainty about their group's position in the United States? Laboratory research has found that one way to reduce generalized uncertainty, particularly for low-status group members, is by increasing the importance of group identification (Reid & Hogg, 2005). For immigrants, identifying with an organization marked by high levels of interaction and linking the old social context of the country of origin to the new social context of the country of residence, might provide an anchor of certainty in the new society. Identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations linked to the country of origin may function to increase certainty of where one stands in

the United States. Reaffirming the status hierarchy by evaluating higher-status outgroups might serve a similar function. In fact, those high in social dominance orientation, which may reflect a dispositional intolerance for uncertainty, are more likely to manage it by justifying the existing status hierarchy (Overbeck et al., 2004).

The relationships between intergroup certainty, on the one hand, and identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes, on the other, may depend on people's beliefs about the status structure and their position in it. In some cases, intergroup uncertainty may be influenced by ideological concerns, or people's beliefs about how the U.S. status structure functions. It may also reflect status concerns, or people's position vis-à-vis relevant outgroups, and this should be particularly evident when that status comparison is unclear. For those with strong beliefs about how the U.S. status structure works, beliefs that may be threatened by everyday experience, identifying with groups that provide ideological clarity may re-establish a clear sense of one's place in the world. In the case of immigration, ethnically-relevant organizations might well serve this function, by drawing on norms and values from the country of origin. A favorable evaluation of higher-status outgroups might also be tied to a sense of certainty about where one stands as a group member. Whereas some groups, such as Whites in the United States, have unambiguously higher status compared to Dominican and Mexican immigrants, the relative status of other groups can be ambiguous. Immigrants might disagree, for instance, about their status compared to African Americans. Evaluating the former group favorably should be tied to a greater sense of certainty, whereas evaluating the latter group favorably should be tied to greater certainty only when relative status is perceived as low. I propose, therefore, two moderators of the relationship between

intergroup certainty, identification with ethically-relevant organizations, and outgroup attitudes. The first, meritocracy, is a belief about how the U.S. status hierarchy operates. The second, status compared to African Americans, is a belief about where one's own group stands in that hierarchy.

Meritocracy, intergroup certainty, and organizational identity importance

Meritocracy, the belief that higher status is possible for all and that individuals can get ahead through hard work (McCoy & Major, 2006), is the dominant example of a status ideology in the United States (Kleugel & Smith, 1986) and is a core component of the American Dream (Hochschild, 1995). It is also an important theme in America's national story of immigration. Many immigrants enter the United States in hopes of improving their economic status relative to their country of origin, believing that the American Dream will make this possible (Hochschild, 1995).

For members of poor and devalued groups, however, a belief in meritocracy can lead to confusion about where one's group stands in society. For those who do not believe that people who work hard can always get ahead, there is no contradiction with their group's low status in society. In contrast, for those who endorse meritocracy, the contradiction can be great. Group members may ask themselves why their position is so low, despite their hard work.

Major et al. (2007) examined how beliefs in meritocracy can influence self-esteem in the face of attributions to discrimination. Perceiving discrimination against one's group is positively related to self-esteem among those who reject meritocracy, but negatively related to self-esteem among those who endorse it. Group-based discrimination threatens the worldview of people who think that those who work hard can

get ahead, because it implies that the world is not fair and just. Being wrong about the way the world works, in turn, decreases self-esteem. In contrast, group-based discrimination confirms the worldview of those who reject meritocracy because it implies, in line with their expectations, that the world is unfair. Being right about the way the world works makes them feel better about themselves.

Meritocracy may also moderate the relationship between intergroup certainty and identification with ethnically-relevant organizations among Dominican and Mexican immigrants. Those who endorse meritocracy, who believe the world is fair and just and hard work can improve one's status, may experience contradictions of those beliefs on a daily basis. Immigrant organizations may be a context in which, even if contradictions are not resolved, a sense of certainty can be restored. Such organizations can provide a sense of place in a new society, linking the country of origin to the country of residence and offering a community in which social norms from the country of origin are understood, if not endorsed and applied. In others words, such organizations can function to give immigrants a clearer sense of their place in society. For those who reject meritocracy no such needs exist and their identification with other groups will not be linked to feelings of intergroup uncertainty.

Intergroup status, intergroup certainty,and outgroup derogation

Attitudes toward higher-status outgroups might also function to establish a sense of intergroup certainty. Immigrants may impose structure on the social world by endorsing existing status hierarchies and evaluating groups with privileged positions favorably. These intergroup attitudes, in turn, can form the foundations for mutual support and alliance.

To examine the relationships between intergroup certainty, status comparisons, and outgroup attitudes, it is first necessary to consider Dominican and Mexican immigrants' perceived status compared to different groups in U.S. society and second their attitudes towards these different groups. Immigrants' position compared to some groups in society, most notably Whites, should be relatively clear and consensual. Most Dominicans and Mexicans likely believe that their group has low status compared to Whites. It is unlikely that there is the same consensus about immigrants' status compared to other outgroups in the United States, most notably African Americans. Second-generation Dominicans, for instance, do not see themselves as Black, but they do recognize that they are excluded from the White category (Bailey, 2001) and many believe that others see them as Black (Itzigsohn, Giorguli, & Vazquez, 2005). This suggests that Dominicans might differ in their beliefs about whether their position relative to African Americans is low, equivalent, or high. Whereas they do not see their position as similar, many recognize that others do.

Sociologists have also painted a complex picture of Latinos' relationships with African Americans in the United States. Among Mexican immigrants, for instance, some of whom share schools and neighborhoods with native-born Blacks, attitudes towards African Americans vary widely (Smith, 2005). Whereas some identify with subsets of the African American community in New York, adopting, for instance, an oppositional stance to Whites in terms of political beliefs, music, and fashion, others actively separate themselves from African Americans and assume their low position in U.S. society to be justified.

Overall this sociological work gives evidence for relative agreement among Dominican and Mexicans regarding their low status compared to Whites, but relatively less agreement about their status compared to African Americans. Intergroup certainty may help explain some of the variation in attitudes for Dominicans and Mexicans who believe they have low status compared to African Americans. I hypothesize that nearly all Dominicans and Mexicans believe their group has relatively low status compared to Whites. Because of this consensus, certainty has a direct effect on attitudes towards Whites and does not interact with perceived status. The surer Dominicans and Mexicans feel about their position in the United States, the more favorable their attitudes to this higher-status group (Overbeck et al., 2004). In contrast, there is unlikely to be such consensus about immigrants' status compared to African Americans. When perceived status is low, the relationship between certainty and intergroup status should follow a pattern similar to that of Whites, a higher-status group. Greater certainty should be tied to more positive attitudes. When perceived status is high compared to African Americans, in contrast, evaluating the group positively will not clearly affirm the status structure and no relationship should be evident. In sum, I expect that the effects of uncertainty depend on relative and perceived group status.

This research addresses the paucity of social psychological research on intergroup attitudes among members of different minority groups. Most work has examined attitudes between minority and majority groups. However, as the diversity of societies increases, it is increasingly important to examine intergroup attitudes between different minority groups. Recently some research has addressed this question, examining the effects of contact on intergroup attitudes among members of different groups on a college

campus (Sidanius et al., 2008) and the impact of multiple comparison targets on feelings of (group and personal) deprivation and satisfaction (Tropp & Wright, 1999). The work here considers Dominican and Mexican immigrants' comparisons with and attitudes towards multiple outgroups.

Hypotheses 6 through 9

Some immigrants lack certainty about their group's position in their new country. Based on the above analysis, I make several predictions about the relationship between this intergroup certainty and political mobilization, specifically identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes. I also propose moderators of these relationships, based on beliefs about the status hierarchy. First, I expect that intergroup certainty will be positively linked to outgroup attitudes, specifically towards Whites and African Americans in the United States (H6).

Further, I expect that people's beliefs about the U.S. status hierarchy, both in terms of how it operates and where one's group stands in it, will moderate the association between intergroup certainty, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, and outgroup attitudes. With respect to the former, I expect that intergroup certainty and the importance of identification with ethnically-relevant organizations will be positively related among immigrants who endorse meritocracy, an ideology about how the U.S. status hierarchy functions (H7). For those who endorse this ideology, such organizations can provide a sense of ideological clarity.

With respect to immigrants' beliefs about where they stand in the U.S. status hierarchy, I expect first that Dominican and Mexican immigrants will see their status as low compared to Whites, but as roughly equivalent to African Americans (with

significant variation above and below that similar position) (H8). Second, I expect that perceived status compared to African Americans will moderate the impact of certainty on attitudes toward this outgroup. For those who believe that they have low status relative to this group the pattern observed with Whites should hold, such that greater certainty about one's position should result in more favorable attitudes. For those who believe they have higher status compared to African Americans, there should be no relationship between certainty and intergroup attitudes (H9). Positive outgroup evaluations will be linked to greater intergroup certainty only when those outgroups are perceived to have higher status and when favoring them can reinforce the existing status hierarchy.

These hypotheses regarding intergroup uncertainty are novel in several ways. First, they offer a differentiated view of uncertainty by considering a particular variety of the construct that, while psychological in nature, derives from the intergroup context. Uncertainty can vary depending on whether it is examined at the level of the individual or the group just as do other social psychological constructs such as self esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992), attributions to discrimination (Major, McCoy, Schmader, Gramzow, Levin, & Sidanius, 2002), and relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970). This research represents a first step in examining this possibility.

Second, these hypotheses are novel in that they differentiate the moderators of the relationship between intergroup uncertainty, as a predictor, and ingroup identification and outgroup derogation as outcomes. Other research has differentiated these two variables (see McGregor, Haji, & Kang, 2008 for an example); however, to my knowledge, no work has considered that the moderators of each relationship may be different. Specifically, I expect that whereas ingroup organizations can be a resource to manage

ideologically-based uncertainty, outgroup derogation, particularly to societal outgroups such as African Americans, can be a resource to manage status-based uncertainty.

Correspondingly, these hypotheses are unique in that they consider that the status of the outgroup, in this case Whites versus African Americans, can impact the effect of uncertainty on intergroup attitudes. Whereas I expect that perceptions of low status compared to African Americans, a similar-status outgroup, will moderate the relationship between certainty and intergroup attitudes, I expect no such relationship in terms of low status compared to Whites, a higher status outgroup. As I argue with regard to identity management strategies, as societies become increasingly diverse, researching the effects of comparisons with multiple outgroups becomes increasingly important.

Finally, these hypotheses also have important practical implications in terms of immigrant politics. Because ethnically-relevant organizations are often the vehicle by which immigrants enter the political arena and because intergroup attitudes may lay the foundation for conflict and cooperation between society's different subgroups, this research promises to shed light on both the shape and scale of immigrants' political mobilization.

Summary

This research examines how Dominican and Mexican immigrants respond to low group status and lack of intergroup certainty, with an emphasis on how these responses influence identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, collective action, and outgroup attitudes. Specifically, I propose that if immigrants perceive that their group has low status compared to Whites, their feeling of being respected by an activist organization will be tied to increased identification with the activist group. In contrast,

favoring alternative dimensions of comparison will be tied to decreased identification. Similarly, identifying with activist organizations will be linked to increased endorsement of collective action goals, whereas favoring alternative comparison dimensions will be linked to decreased endorsement of such goals. In both cases, these relationships will be explained by perceived group efficacy. Generally these hypotheses point to the idea that the relationship between identification and collective action depends on the creation of collective action frames, that is, responses that increase ties to activist groups and feelings that together the group will be able to achieve its goals.

In addition to examining the relationship between social creativity and social change, this study will explore responses to lack of intergroup certainty, predicting, in line with previous research (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Jetten, Hogg, & Mullin, 2004), that perceptions of uncertainty will be tied to greater identification with entitative groups (in this case ethnically-relevant organizations) and more positive attitudes toward higher-status outgroups. I also propose that meritocracy and perceived status compared to African Americans moderate these relationships. Specifically, I propose that intergroup certainty will be tied to greater levels of identification only among those who endorse the belief that people who work hard will get ahead, and that certainty will be linked to more positive attitudes toward African Americans only among those who believe their group has relatively low status in comparison. This provides initial support for the more specific construct of intergroup certainty, which derives from the intergroup context and is influenced by one's beliefs about the status structure.

CHAPTER 2: METHODS

The main aim of this research was to understand how Mexican and Dominican-American immigrants negotiate their collective identities in the face of low group status and uncertainty in the United States and the implications of these identity management strategies for social change and intergroup relations. This research was designed to establish, first, that how immigrants deal with low status influences their willingness to participate in collective action. Specifically, the methods of this study were intended to examine the proposition that immigrants who manage low status by committing themselves to ethnically-relevant organizations are more likely to support collective action than those who value alternative dimensions of comparison. A further aim of the study was to show that the effects of different social creativity strategies on collective action are mediated by perceptions of group efficacy; that is, identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations increases support for collective action because it increases one's sense of empowerment as a group member, whereas emphasizing alternative dimensions of comparison, while managing low status, decrease support for collective action because it diminishes this sense of empowerment.

This research was also designed to establish the importance of intergroup certainty as an influence on immigrants' attitudes toward their own group and toward high- and low-status outgroups, and to explore how the impact of certainty on group identity and intergroup attitudes could be moderated by common ideological beliefs (e.g., endorsing meritocracy) and status concerns (e.g., position of the group relative to African Americans.

To examine these propositions, I first identified and recruited Dominican and Mexican organizations to participate in the study. Immigrants and other members of low-status groups do not generally enter politics on their own, but more often through the vehicle of ethnically-relevant organizations that provide the basis for collective action (Portes et al., 2008). To understand the context of the organizations in New York City and their main goals and challenges, I conducted participant observation at their offices, at meetings, and at rallies and demonstrations, speaking at length with organizational leadership about their concerns regarding membership, funding, and strategies. Finally, to test the hypotheses laid out in the introduction, I recruited members of these organizations to complete a paper-and-pencil questionnaire that I developed based on focus groups, social psychological theory, and existing measures and translated into both English and Spanish.

Recruitment

I recruited members of three Dominican and four Mexican ethnically-relevant community organizations (that is, organizations whose mission statements, newsletters, and/or flyers made some reference to a common "Dominican" or "Mexican" descent or culture) to complete a paper-and-pencil survey in the first half of 2008. I identified groups by following the procedures of Portes, Escobar, and Radford (2007), obtaining lists of immigrant-serving organizations from the Dominican and Mexican consulates, from pan-immigrant groups like the New York Immigration Coalition, and from the New York Mayor's Office of Immigrant Affairs. In addition, I contacted researchers and centers that have links to Dominican and Mexican communities in New York City (e.g., the Dominican Studies Institute at City College) to draw on their networks.

Once I had identified several organizations, I contacted them by phone, visited their offices in person, or attended events they held that were open to the public (e.g., a talk at Hunter College on the Antorcha Guadalupana, a religious event organized by Tepeyac, a Mexican American group). I provided them with letters that described the research, offered to volunteer, and explained that members would be paid $10 for participating in the study, which they could keep for themselves or donate to the organization. I also told them that I would like to share with them the results of the research – if they were interested – without identifying any individual members. Three organizations asked me to share my results, each in a different format, in ways that complemented their specific goals and needs.

To different extents, all of the organizations asked me to volunteer. For some this meant being at the office to file papers, answer the phone, and call members for meetings, for others it meant giving presentations on community organizing, teaching ESL classes, and designing a flyer for a fundraiser. Volunteering allowed me to attend meetings, talk with members, staff, and Executive Directors and to get a sense of how each organization functions, their main challenges, and the main concerns of their administration and membership.

Of the nine organizations I contacted, two opted not to participate. One was undergoing an audit and was concerned about having an outsider present in the office on a regular basis. Another declined because their resources were stretched very thin and they did not believe that participating would be worth the effort for members.

In the seven organizations that agreed to participate, I recruited members to fill out the questionnaire in a variety of contexts. Some completed questionnaires at general

meetings, before or after events or classes, or over lunch. Others completed the questionnaire while they waited for services provided by the organization, such as citizenship assistance, tax help, and tutoring. I initially attempted to distribute surveys at large events such as rallies and performances; however, these settings were far too distracting, and I did not pursue this strategy. In all cases participants had the option of completing the questionnaire in Spanish or English, and someone who spoke both languages (either myself or a research assistant) was present to answer any questions they had.

All of the organizations included in my study are formal non-profits with 501(c)3 status. As a result, they tend to be larger and (relatively) better funded than others in the Dominican and Mexican communities[2]. Of the groups with which I worked, two of the Mexican organizations were of medium size (under 100 members and occasional members) and two were large (with more than 500 members and occasional members); one Dominican organization was small (with fewer than 50 members) and two were large.

All of the groups involved in my study were active in both domestic and transnational arenas, focusing their efforts in the United States as well as in their countries of origin. For example, one Dominican organization had recently hosted the President of the Dominican Republic and one Mexican organization had recently hosted

[2] Previous research has identified differences between Dominican and Mexican organizations in the northeastern United States (Portes et al., 2007). Dominican organizations tend to be larger and better funded than their Mexican counterparts. Two reasons for this are the greater proportion of well-heeled social-service agencies in the Dominican community and the greater number of home-town associations in the Mexican community. Home-town associations, which are particularly common among Mexicans with low levels of education, tend to be small and informal.

the Mexican first lady. Another organization had organized a drive to send computers to schools in the Dominican Republic; still another was starting a program to provide legal assistance to people who had recently been deported. At the same time, organizational goals were very much aimed at the U.S. context, participating in protests and marches and offering English classes and citizenship assistance. This fits with Portes et al.'s (2008) finding that differences between transnational and U.S.-based organizations are exaggerated and that most ethnic organizations are involved in both contexts.

All of the organizations that agreed to participate in this research were also, to varying degrees, involved in civic, cultural, social service activities. Frequently organizations started by focusing on one area, adding others as they grew and as the needs of funders and their communities changed. One, *Esperanza del barrio*, began as a group of Mexican street vendors who want New York City to raise the cap on vending licenses and to protect vendors from harassment by police. As it sought external funding *Esperanza* was obliged to add social services that are priorities for funders, such as English classes, tutoring, and tax assistance. The second-generation youth who were part of the tutoring, in turn, encouraged an emphasis on culture, painting murals in the community and starting a video project to document their lives in the United States and their visits to their parents' country of origin. Similarly, another Mexican group, *Calpulli*, started as a folk-dance company. In an effort to link with the Mexican community in New York, it started traditional dance classes for youth of Mexican descent. As the program has grown, it has become more political, making presentations at schools that celebrate Mexican identity and give Mexican students a more positive view of their culture that combats their experience of discrimination in the United States.

Currently, they are seeking funding to run after-school programs throughout the city. This process of development, by which funding pressures and opportunities, healthy growth, and changing needs in the community have led organizations to add to or divert from their original mission, is a common theme. As a result, all of the organizations perform multiple roles, from encouraging civil society, to celebrating Dominican/Mexican culture, to providing important social services.

Participants

Information on the participants in this study offers insight into the nature of immigrant organizations in New York City. Relatively little research has studied Mexican and Dominican organizations in the city (or, for that matter, in general) and the research that has examined them has either not made a demographic description of their membership a point of emphasis (Jones-Correa, 1998; Smith, 2005) or has gathered information from organizational leaders as opposed to contacting members directly (Portes et al., 2007). The accuracy of such information may be questionable. My experience volunteering with the various organizations in my study showed that many have trouble keeping detailed and updated records of their membership. Further, they are often (understandably) motivated to overestimate their membership numbers for funding and public relations purposes. Such fudging is a classic strategy of community organizers (Alinsky, 1971) and is something executive directors discussed openly with me. They may overstate numbers of members whom funding agencies seek out (e.g., youth) and understate other membership groups in order to protect them and gain political favor (e.g., undocumented members). The demographic information presented here, while by no means representing a random sample of Dominican and Mexican

organizations in New York City, is nonetheless instructive for understanding who belongs to these groups.

A total of 210 people agreed to participate in the study. After excluding participants with significant amounts of missing data (including demographic data on own and parents' countries of origin), 198 useable surveys remained (95 Dominican Americans, 93 Mexican Americans, 10 other). Participants were assigned to an ethnic[3] category on the basis of their participation in an ethnically-relevant organization, their and their parents' country of origin, their self-categorization as Dominican, Mexican, or some combination of each with American in an open-ended measure, and their completion of the identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem (CSE) scale (Crocker et al., 1994) implicating Dominican or Mexican identity[4]. By categorizing participants on the basis of these variables, I can have at least some level of confidence that the labels I use here, in my analyses, and throughout the paper, have some basis in participants' own self-categorizations. Because questionnaires were oriented toward either Dominicans or Mexicans, the ten individuals belonging to the "other" category, which was composed

[3] It is with some trepidation that I use the term "ethnic" as opposed to "cultural" or "national" to describe participants' categorizations. My use of the term "ethnic" and the procedures by which participants' categorizations were chosen is supported, however, by the criteria laid out Zagefka (in press). She argues that, ". . . ethnic groups often – but not always – adhere to beliefs about a common culture and myth of common descent. There often – but not always – exists a geographic territory important for the group's self-definition, and there are often other characteristics that coincide with the same group delineations, e.g. language and/or religion. Ethnicity necessarily presupposes that members self-ascribe to the ethnic group."

[4] Participants also completed a version of the CSE scale implicating American identity. Although scores for American identity importance (M=3.90, SD=1.44) were lower overall than were scores for Dominican/Mexican identity importance (M=4.80, SD=1.39), $t(187)$, $p<.001$, it is still at the midpoint of the scale, suggesting that, at least on average (but of course to varying degrees), respondents saw themselves as both Dominican or Mexican and American.

(on the basis of self-categorization and their or their parents' countries of origin) of Ecuadorans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans, were excluded from the analyses, leaving a total of 188 respondents.

First-generation immigrants represent 83.4% of the sample (n=156) and there was a slightly higher proportion of first-generation Mexican (89.1%) than Dominican (77.9%) immigrants, $\chi^2 = 4.27$, $p < .05$. This difference is to be expected given that large-scale Mexican immigration to New York City is a more recent phenomenon than Dominican immigration and thus the proportion of second-generation Mexicans in the city is smaller. Previous research on Dominican and Mexican organizations in the northeastern United States has estimated similar numbers of second-generation immigrants in organizations, ranging from four to fourteen percent (Portes et al., 2008). Although generational differences are not a focus of this research and thus the low number of second-generation immigrants is not a major issue, the small number of second-generation immigrants does limit my analyses. For this reason, I chose to combine the 1.5-generation (i.e., immigrants who came to the United States before age 10) and second-generation immigrants in all generational analyses, following Smith (2005). Using this definition, the proportion of first-generation immigrants dropped to 68.4 % (n=128), and there was no significant generational difference between Mexicans and Dominicans $\chi^2 = 2.50$, *ns*. Although earlier research has not addressed the proportion of 1.5-generation immigrants in Mexican and Dominican organizations directly, it has found that three-quarters (more, for Dominicans) of members have lived in the United States for more than ten years (Portes et al., 2007). One would expect that some proportion of those members fall into the 1.5 category.

Women represented 62.4% of the sample (n=116). This proportion was significantly higher among Dominicans (71.0%) than among Mexicans (53.8%), $\chi^2 = 5.86$, $p < .05$, but did not vary across immigrant generations, $\chi^2 = .57$, *ns*. This gender difference is also reflected in the leadership of different organizations. Woman ran all three of the Dominican organizations that agreed to work with me, compared to only two of the four Mexican groups. Although this difference is not a major focus of my research, it represents an interesting finding in its own right.

Why might women make up a greater proportion of members and leaders of Dominican, as opposed to Mexican community and cultural organizations? One reason may be the different characteristics of female migrants from each group. In Mexico, female householders show low levels of outmigration compared to men, whereas in the Dominican Republic female householders, particularly those who are unmarried, are more likely than men to migrate to the United States (Massey, Fischer, & Capoferro, 2006). Marriage practices, furthermore, tend to be less patriarchal in the Dominican Republic than in Mexico, in general. Massey et al. (2006) found that the rates of legal marriages among Mexican women (81.1%) were nearly double that of Dominican women (45.1%) among those samples, whereas the rates of consensual unions were almost five times as high among Dominican (26.3%) as compared to Mexican (5.4%) women. These data present very different pictures of the attachments of Mexican and Dominican women. Dominican women, who are more likely to be part of less traditional (and likely, less patriarchal) partnerships than their Mexican counterparts, are also more likely to enter the United States unencumbered by spouses. The combination of coming from what Massey et al. (2006) have labeled matrifocal societies and of being more

independent in the United States increases the likelihood that Dominican women have the time, freedom, and gender ideologies that would support participating in and leading community and cultural organizations.

Questionnaires could be completed in either Spanish or English. 75.5% of respondents completed the questionnaire in Spanish. There were differences in selected language according to ethnicity and generation. Mexicans (86.0%) were more likely than Dominicans (65.3%) to complete the questionnaire in Spanish, $\chi^2 = 10.96$, $p < .001$. Again, this probably reflects the longer history of Dominican migration to New York City and the higher levels of education among Dominicans in the city. First-generation immigrants (81.2%) were also more likely to complete the questionnaire in Spanish than were their second-generation counterparts (62.7%), $\chi^2 = 7.48$, $p < .01$. There were no gender differences in language choice.

It should be noted that a small but substantial number of immigrants were unable to complete the questionnaire because of low levels of literacy. This was particularly noticeable among Mexicans. For instance, as I recruited at one meeting of a Mexican organization, I noticed that about a quarter of the 60 members present were unable to fill out the survey because they were not sufficiently literate in either Spanish or English. In a handful of cases this was because of their indigenous background – Nahuatl, not Spanish, was their first language.

The average age of participants was 33.16 (SD = 11.01). (Thirteen participants refused to give their age.) Overall, participants who were born outside the United States had lived in this country for an average of 16.02 years (SD = 10.84, n = 130), having come to the United States on average at age 19.21 (SD = 9.42, n = 136).

Participants rated their level of education on the following scale: 0="Less than high school"; 1= "High school"; 2="2-year college"; 3="4-year college"; 4="Postgraduate." Respondents' average level of education was between high school and a two-year college (M=1.72, SD=1.35), although the range of educational experiences was quite large and differed for both ethnicity and generation. Dominicans (M=2.11, SD=1.26) had higher levels of education than Mexicans (M=1.31, SD=1.32), F=8.72, p<.01, and second-generation immigrants (M=2.17, SD=1.25) had higher levels of education than first-generation immigrants (M=1.50, SD=1.34), F=7.18, p<.01. Neither difference is particularly surprising given Dominicans' greater establishment in New York City and second-generation immigrants' better language skills, which may give them greater access to the U.S. education system. Furthermore, the fact that Dominicans' levels of education are higher than that of the Mexican population (Stone, 2004), whose social capital is relatively low, has been well documented (Massey, Nolan, & Duran, 2002).

Participants rated their socioeconomic status on the following scale: 1="My family has a hard time buying the things we need,"; 2="My family has just enough money for the things we need,"; 3="My family has no problem buying the things we need and sometimes we can also buy special things,"; 4="My family has enough money to buy pretty much anything we want." Overall, participants believed that they had enough money to buy the things they need (M=2.29, SD=.93). There were no differences according to ethnic group, gender, generation, nor were there interactions between the three variables.

Questionnaire development

In the process of developing this research plan, I arranged four separate focus groups in which first- and second-generation Dominican and Mexican immigrants discussed in English issues of group membership and collective action, transnationalism, discrimination, and reference groups. These discussions established the relevance of the issues that I wished to explore for the population of interest. I also asked members of those groups to go through a preliminary version of the questionnaire and to discuss their reactions to that material. As a result, several additions and revisions were made to the questionnaire. The need for cognitive closure scale, for instance, which I planned to use to examine the need for certainty, appeared vague to participants, and I revised it to better assess the underlying construct of interest, participants' certainty about their groups' positions in the United States (see the measures section). In sum, the focus groups helped me create a questionnaire that more realistically represents the intergroup structure in which Dominican and Mexican immigrants live.

Once I had finalized the English version of the questionnaire, it was translated and back translated by two professors of Spanish literature. A native-Spanish speaker from Mexico translated the survey and a native-English speaker from the United States back-translated it. I then made minor changes to the Dominican version of the questionnaire, based on conversations with a native-Spanish-speaking Dominican research assistant to ensure that the Spanish translation was equivalent for Mexican and Dominican Spanish speakers.

Measures

Organizational Identification. This four-item scale was adapted from the identity subscale of the Collective Self-esteem scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). Items

included: “Overall, my organization has little to do with how I feel about myself,” (reverse-scored) “The organization I belong to is an important reflection of who I am,” “My organization is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am,” (reverse scored) and “In general, belonging to my organization is an important part of my self-image.” All items are assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). The reliability of the scale for this sample was $\alpha = .70$.

Intragroup Respect. This three-item scale devised by Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting (1999) assesses the value, respect, and treatment one receives from other members of one’s organization. The items are as follows: “In general I feel valued by others in my organization,” “Others in my organization treat me positively,” and “I feel respected by others in my organization.” All items are assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Reliability for this scale was $\alpha = .82$.

Group Status. Based on the procedures of Zagefka and Brown (2005), participants were asked to compare the status of their group to the status of Whites and African Americans in the United States on two single-item measures. Specifically, they were asked, “Compared to [Whites/African Americans] in the United States, Dominicans in the United States have. . .” Responses were assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1 = very low status; 4 = same status; 7 = very high status). The two items had a moderately positive correlation, $r\ (187) = .33$, $p < .001$.

Favoring alternative comparison dimensions. In this measure, adapted from Blanz et al. (1998), participants were asked to rate how important they thought each of several comparison dimensions was to their ethnic group and also to Americans in general. The measure includes economic status, a dimension relevant to group status on

which group disadvantage is, in part, based (Tajfel, 1978). It also includes family relationships and religion, two dimensions that were identified in focus groups to reflect important ingroup values, but that are not relevant to the group's standing in the U.S. hierarchy. Specifically, my aim was to assess the extent to which each participant believed that their group, in relation to Americans in general, favored alternative (or status-irrelevant) dimensions of comparison to status-relevant dimensions. This index was obtained, by first calculating a difference score between the average value of the importance of the two alternative comparison dimensions (i.e., family relationships and religion) and the status relevant dimension (economic status) for the participant's own group and for their perceptions of Americans in general. Once these two scores were obtained, ratings of how much participants thought Americans favored alternative dimensions over status-relevant dimensions was subtracted from ratings of how much participants thought their own group valued alternative comparison dimensions over status-relevant dimensions. The resulting score indicates the degree to which participants think their own group values alternative dimensions of comparison compared to how much they think Americans favor alternative dimensions of comparison. Higher scores indicate greater value of alternative dimensions relative to status-relevant dimensions for their own group relative to Americans in general.

Group Efficacy. The group efficacy measure is adapted from van Zomeren et al. (2004). It includes four items that assess the degree to which people believe their group will be able to improve its position in society. Examples are, "I think together my group will be able to change our situation," and "My group will be effective in improving our

position in society." All items are assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1= strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). Reliability for this scale was $\alpha = .86$.

Collective Action Goals. Seven items adapted from Lalonde and Cameron (1993) concerned how important it was for participants to act to address a variety of issues relating to Dominicans' or Mexicans' social position in the United States. These items were: ". . . getting more Dominicans/Mexicans elected in U.S. government," " . . . sharing Dominican/Mexican culture with people from other groups in the United States," ". . . making sure others treat Dominicans/Mexicans with respect," ". . . getting more Dominicans/Mexicans in high positions of U.S. companies," ". . . showing people the ways in which Dominicans/Mexicans are like other Americans," " . . . fighting bias against Dominicans/Mexicans," and ". . . increasing the power of Dominicans/Mexicans in the United States." All items were assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1= not at all important; 7 = very important).

To make sure that the items on the scale formed a single, reliable measure, they were first subjected to a principal components analysis. Each item was significantly correlated with every other item, but none of the correlations were greater than .9, suggesting reasonable factorability and making it unlikely that problems could arise because of singularity. Furthermore, the determinant of .075 is greater than .0001, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem for these data. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy was .88, above the recommended value of .6 and great according to the standards set forth by Hutcheson and Sofroniou (1999). Bartlett's test of sphericity was also significant, $\chi^2 (21) = 470.41$, $p < .001$, rejecting the null hypothesis that the original correlation matrix was an identity matrix. The first

factor had an eigenvalue of 3.71 and explained 52.96% of the variance. All other eigenvalues were less than .78 and the scree plot showed a leveling off after the first factor, suggesting a one-factor solution. For this reason no rotation was performed. Loadings on the single factor ranged from .62 to .85 and together formed a reliable scale $\alpha = .84$.

Intergroup certainty. This scale is adapted from the most commonly used individual difference measure of uncertainty, the Need for Cognitive Closure scale (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Whereas the original scale addresses one's overall need for certainty as an individual, my modified version addresses how sure one is about where one stands in the United States in terms of group position, understanding important values, and being sure of how others view one's group. The scale was composed of five positively-worded items: "I am confident about how I fit into U.S. society," "I know what kind of person I want to be in the United States," "I am certain of where I stand in the United States," "I have a good sense of the core values of U.S. society," and "I am confident in knowing how Americans view my group." All items are assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).

Once again, I conducted a principal components analysis to ensure that the new scale formed a single, reliable construct. The five items composing the scale were all significantly correlated with each other, but none greater than .9; the determinant of .326 was greater than .0001, allaying concerns about multicollinearity. The sampling adequacy was good (KMO = .73) and Bartlett's test of sphericity was significant, χ^2 (10) = 206.93, $p < .001$. Only one factor had an eigenvalue greater than one (2.45), explaining 49.0% of the variance; a scree plot illustrated that eigenvalues leveled off after this first

factor. As such, no rotation was performed and a single-factor solution was retained. Item loadings on that factor ranged from .58 to .79; together, the items formed a reliable scale $\alpha = .73$.

Meritocratic ideology. Meritocratic ideology was measured with an eight-item scale developed by Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, and Federico (1998). The measure is defined by two subscales. The first assessed the belief that individual advancement in U.S. society is tied to hard work and includes the following four items: "If people work hard in the United States they almost always get what they want," "Most people who don't get ahead in the United States should not blame the system; they really only have themselves to blame," "In the United States, getting ahead doesn't always depend on hard work," (reverse-scored) and "Even if people work hard in the United States, they don't always get ahead," (reverse-scored). The second assessed the belief in individual mobility and included the items: "The United States is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status," "Advancement in U.S. society is possible for all individuals," "Individual members of certain groups have difficulty achieving higher status in the United States," (reverse-scored) and "Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in U.S. society," (reverse-scored). All items are assessed on seven-point Likert scales (1= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). Because previous research has found the subscales to be highly correlated (Levin et al., 1998; Major et al., 2002), because there was no theoretical reason to separate the scales in this research, and because the eight items taken together resulted in a reliable scale $\alpha = .72$, a single scale score was used rather than two separate subscales.

Intergroup Attitudes. Intergroup attitudes were measured using three separate feeling thermometers (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) for the participants' ingroup (either Dominicans or Mexicans) and for African Americans and Whites. Instructions read, "Imagine that your feelings are arranged on a thermometer where 0 means you feel very cold or unfavorable toward the group and 100 means you feel very warm or favorable toward the group. Temperatures in the middle mean different levels of warm or cold feelings toward the group. Place a check to the left of the thermometer to indicate your personal feelings." Respondents were then provided with an image of a thermometer and asked to indicate how warm they felt to each group on a scale of 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm).

Demographic information. The questionnaire also contained various demographic indicators including own and parents' country of birth, age, age at immigration, languages spoken, level of education, and socioeconomic status.

CHAPTER III: RESULTS

The results are organized into three sections. Section one examines the descriptive statistics for the study's key variables, as well as differences in their means according to ethnicity, gender, and generational status. Section two tests hypotheses related to social creativity and collective action, that is, how the strategies immigrants use to manage their low-status position in the United States relate to their political mobilization. Section three tests hypotheses related to intergroup certainty and intergroup attitudes, specifically, how immigrants manage being unsure of where they stand as group members in their new society and the relation of certainty to identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes. Unless otherwise noted, all statistical tests are two-tailed.

Intergroup beliefs, social creativity strategies, and political incorporation: Comparing group means

An analysis of the means of the key variables in this research, as well as how they differ by ethnicity (Dominican, Mexican), generation (first, 1.5 & second), gender, and their interactions, sets the stage for understanding the relationships between social creativity and collective action, intergroup certainty and intergroup attitudes. Means of all key variables broken down by ethnicity, generation, and gender are presented in Tables 2a-c. Degrees of freedom may vary as a result of missing data. In addition, correlations for all key variables are presented in Table 1.

The analyses in this section illustrate, first, how different immigrants understand their group's position in the United States, including how they see their status compared to African Americans and Whites; how sure they feel about their group's position

(intergroup certainty); their beliefs about how the U.S. status system operates (meritocracy); and whether their group can work together to address their position (group efficacy). They show, second, the degree to which immigrants employ social creativity strategies to manage their low-status position, including emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison. Third, they paint a picture of immigrants' political incorporation. This includes how much they identify with ethnically-relevant organizations that serve as an entrance into the political arena, how much they support collective action on behalf of their ethnic group, and how positively they feel about other groups in the United States, specifically African Americans and Whites. In sum, these descriptive data illuminate the intergroup beliefs of those Dominican and Mexican immigrants who participate in and use the services of ethnically-relevant organizations.

Beliefs about group position: Group status, intergroup certainty, meritocracy, and group efficacy

How do respondents think and feel about their group's position in the United States? The analyses below address this question in four parts. First, how do they see their status relative to outgroups, particularly Whites and African Americans? Second, how certain do they feel about their group's position in society? Third, how do they understand the way the U.S. status hierarchy operates? Specifically, do they endorse the American-dream belief that individual members of groups can improve their position through hard work? And finally, do they believe that, together with other group members, they can do something to change their group's position? In answering each of these questions, I examine the social categories and experiences that organize

immigrants' lives: ethnicity, gender, and immigrant generation. As such, each variable was subjected to a 2 (ethnicity: Dominican, Mexican) x 2 (immigrant generation: first, 1.5 and second) x 2 (gender: women, men) ANOVA. Means and standard deviations for these variables can be found in Table 2a.

Evaluation of group status was analyzed compared to a high-status target, Whites, and a lower-status target, African Americans. Overall, respondents thought that their groups had roughly equal status to African Americans (G_M = 3.81, SD =1.50). There was a marginally significant main effect of ethnicity on status compared to African Americans, $F(1, 176)=3.54$, $p=.06$, such that Dominicans (M=4.09, SD=1.43) believed that their group had somewhat higher status compared to African Americans than did Mexicans (M=3.53, SD=1.52). No additional main effects or interactions were evident, $Fs \leq 2.04$, *ns*. Respondents, overall, believed that their groups had somewhat lower status than Whites (G_M = 2.73, SD =1.63). In this case, Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was significant, $F(1, 176)=3.10$, $p<.01$, indicating that error variance on status compared to Whites differed across groups. Inspection of the frequencies demonstrated a positive skew in the data (the modal score was 1, accounting for 28% of responses, followed by 2, accounting for 25 % of responses). To account for this and so I could compare mean differences across groups on this variable, I performed square root, logarithmic, and inverse transformations, which are appropriate for positively skewed data. None of the transformations succeeded in decreasing the value of *F* above the level of significance, making it impossible to conduct means testing. Overall, the available statistics showed that on average Dominican and Mexican immigrants believed that their

status was somewhat lower than that of Whites and roughly equivalent to African Americans.

Understanding where one's group stands in the social hierarchy is one important set of intergroup beliefs. Also important is how sure one feels about where one stands. This is especially relevant for immigrants, many of whom are adapting to an unfamiliar hierarchy based on conceptions of race and class that operate differently than they do in the country of origin. Overall, respondents felt somewhat certain, as members of their ethnic group, of their position in the United States (G_M=5.41, SD=1.11), although there was a marginally significant interaction for ethnicity and generation, $F(1, 177)=3.37$, $p<.07$. Decomposing the interaction shows that second-generation Dominican immigrants (M=5.07, SD=1.21) are somewhat less certain about where they stand than their first-generation counterparts (M=5.59, SD=1.30). There is no corresponding difference between first- (M=5.40, SD=.91) and second-generation (M=5.43, SD=.94) Mexican immigrants. A Tukey HSD post hoc test found no significant difference between those in the Dominican second generation and all other groups *p*s>.05. A difference between first- and second-generation Dominicans was apparent, however, employing LSD, a less conservative test, $p<.05$. There were no significant mean differences according to ethnicity, generation, gender, or any other interactions (all other *F*s<1.76, *ns*).

While not much should be made of this unpredicted and only marginally significant difference, it should be noted that it is consistent with the sociological literature on which my theorizing was based. I argued that intergroup uncertainty might result from not knowing one's position in reference to the Black-White dichotomy in the

United States. Whereas not much work has examined this question, Bailey (2001) found evidence for a similar phenomenon among second-generation Dominican immigrants, who don't believe themselves to be Black, but also recognize that others categorize them that way. This is the same group who appears to score slightly lower on intergroup certainty. More research with a larger, more representative sample would be necessary, however, to establish this effect.

I also examined respondents' beliefs about how the U.S. status system operates, specifically their endorsement of meritocracy, the American Dream-like belief that by working hard individuals can get ahead regardless of their group membership. Overall respondents neither endorsed nor did not endorse meritocracy, as is evident from a grand mean that is located on the midpoint of the scale (G_M=3.91, SD=1.15). Mexicans endorsed meritocracy less than Dominicans $F(1, 177)=5.64$, $p<.05$, women less than men $F(1, 177)=16.25$, $p<.001$, and second-generation immigrants less than the first generation $F(1, 177)=5.65$, $p<.05$. These main effects were qualified by a marginally significant two-way interaction between ethnicity and generation, $F(1, 177)=3.50$, $p=.06$, and a significant two-way interaction between gender and generation, $F(1, 177)=7.12$, $p<.01$. Neither of the other two interactions reached significance, $Fs<1.67$, *ns*.

Post hoc analyses (Tukey's HSD) demonstrated the importance of generational status in endorsement of meritocracy, particularly among Mexican immigrants and immigrant women. Specifically, the marginally significant interaction between ethnicity and generation showed that second-generation Mexican immigrants (M=2.95, SD=1.18) endorsed meritocracy less than first-generation Mexicans (M=4.24, SD=.94, $p<.001$), whereas there was no corresponding difference among first- (M=4.10, SD=1.12, $p<.001$)

and second-generation Dominicans (M=3.67, SD=1.14, *ns*). Similar analyses on the significant interaction between gender and generation showed that second-generation women (M=3.12, SD=1.29) endorsed meritocracy less than first-generation women (M=4.18, SD=1.06, $p<.001$), whereas there was no parallel difference between first- (M=4.13, SD=1.02, $p<.001$) and second-generation men (M=3.88, SD=.82, *ns*). These unexpected findings speak to the importance of generation in influencing legitimizing ideologies, particularly for Mexicans and women.

Fourth, and finally, I considered how respondents understood their group's position in society by analyzing the degree to which they thought that their group could improve its status. With respect to group efficacy, there were no differences according to ethnic group, generation, gender, or any of their interactions Fs(1, 175)<2.58, *ns*. Overall, respondents were somewhat confident that their groups would be able to do something about their status in the United States, as is indicated by a grand mean of 5.20 (SD = 1.45).

These analyses paint a picture of first- and second-generation Dominican and Mexican women's and men's beliefs about the U.S. status hierarchy, at least among those who participate in ethnically-relevant organizations. Overall the groups have similar beliefs about their lower-status position compared to Whites and their equivalent (but somewhat more ambiguous) position relative to African Americans. They also feel somewhat certain about where they stand in the United States and about their ability to do something about their position. The groups do differ with respect to their beliefs about how the U.S. hierarchy operates. Here generation plays an important role. Whereas those in the first generation are neutral about the idea that by working hard individual

group members can get ahead, those in the second generation, particularly Mexicans and women, seem to have rejected such beliefs or been disabused of them by virtue of growing up in New York City. These beliefs set the stage for later analyses that address how perceptions of the U.S. status hierarchy interact with immigrants' socially creative responses to influence their intergroup attitudes.

Social creativity strategies: Intragroup respect and alternative comparison dimensions

The second set of analyses concerned the degree to which different immigrants employed the social creativity strategies of intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison. Both strategies were subjected to a 2 (ethnicity: Dominican, Mexican) x 2 (immigrant generation: first, 1.5 and second) x 2 (gender: women, men) ANOVA to examine differences based on relevant social categories and experiences. Means and standard deviations for these variables can be found in Table 2b. While no specific hypotheses were made about whether different groups would favor different strategies, it should be noted that sociological support for the use of the intragroup respect strategy was culled from research with Dominican immigrants (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005), whereas sociological support for the use of alternative dimensions of comparison came from research with first-generation Mexican parents (Reese, 2001). These previous findings allow for the possibility that specific strategies may vary with respect to ethnicity and generation.

There were no significant differences with regard to ethnicity, generation, or gender, nor were there any two-way interactions with intragroup respect, the first of the social creativity strategies, $Fs \leq 1.46$, *ns*. Respondents generally felt respected by their organizations ($G_M = 5.65$, SD =1.37). A marginally significant three-way interaction

emerged among ethnicity, generation, and gender $F(1, 175)=3.54$, $p=.06$, however. Not much weight should be given to this interaction given small sample sizes in several cells (e.g., only 10 second-generation Dominican and Mexican men). The pattern of relationships, however, suggests that first-generation Dominican women (M=6.14, SD=1.27) feel more respected by their organizations than do first-generation Dominican men (M=5.39, SD=1.58), whereas there is no corresponding difference between Dominican women (M=5.39, SD=1.37) and men (M=5.50, SD=1.57) in the second generation. A similar pattern is evident among Mexicans, although the generations are reversed. Whereas first-generation Mexican women (M=5.31, SD=1.41) and men (M=5.67, SD=1.41) do not differ in how respected they feel by their organization, second-generation women (M=5.98, SD=.86) feel somewhat more respected than do second-generation men (M=5.47, SD=1.29). These results, at least in the first generation, are consistent with the demographic finding that Dominican organizations have more women than men, that the women occupy leadership positions more often, and that the organizations are more likely to have more matrifocal than patriarchal gender ideologies (Massey et al. 2006). It could be that demographic and ideological differences lead to first-generation women feeling more respected by their organizations – a difference that disappears in the second generation as women and men across groups adapt to a U.S.-based gender system. The samples here, however, are extremely small in the Mexican second generation with only 14 women and 10 men.

Regarding the second strategy, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, Mexicans (M=2.05[5], SD=2.61) believed that their group valued religion and family relationships over economic status more than Americans in general to a greater extent than did Dominicans (M=1.11, SD=2.46), $F(1, 176)=12.44$, $p=.001$. In addition, second-generation immigrants (M=2.16, SD=2.82) believed that their groups valued alternative comparison dimensions more than Americans in general to a greater extent than did those in the first generation (M=1.31, SD=2.41), $F(1, 176)=4.90$, $p=.05$. There was also a marginally significant main effect for gender, $F(1, 176)=3.28$, $p=.07$, such that women (M=1.73, SD=2.70) believed that their group valued alternative dimensions of comparison to a greater extent than did men (M=1.33, SD=2.35). None of the remaining interactions were significant $Fs(1, 176)<2.83$, *ns*. This pattern of results, particularly with respect to ethnicity and generation, is consistent with the sociological literature supporting the use of this strategy, in which first-generation Mexican parents acknowledge their lower-status economic position vis-à-vis White Americans, but emphasize the moral superiority and cultural values (Reese, 2001).

To varying degrees immigrants participating in ethnically-relevant organizations from both groups, both generations, and both genders make use of the social creativity strategies of intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison. The extent to which they use each appears to depend on their access to community and cultural resources. For instance, those in the first generation, with their stronger links to

[5] Scores approaching 0 mean that participants believe that their ethnic group values alternative dimensions of comparison to the same extent that they believe Americans in general do. Positive values signify that they believe that their group values alternative dimensions of comparison more than do Americans in general and negative values signify that they believes their group values such dimensions less than do Americans in general.

cultural the values of the country of origin, are more likely to draw on these resources to reframe their position in the United States. Likewise Mexicans, whose (patriarchal) cultural values emphasize familial respect and obedience to authority (Massey et al., 2006; Reese, 2001), draw on these resources to a great extent. Previous research fails to offer a clear guide to understanding the marginal difference between women and men, which will be discussed in the next chapter. Taken together these results suggest both psychological similarity, with respect to the use of social creativity strategies, and contextual variation in the extent to which different strategies are employed, depending on ethnicity, generation, and gender.

Political incorporation: Organizational identification, collective action goals, and intergroup attitudes

The final set of means analyses concerned political incorporation. Whereas the first two sets of variables illuminated how immigrants understand the U.S. status hierarchy and their place in it, as well as their use of social creativity strategies, this final set considered how immigrants' behavior can feed back on the status hierarchy. Specifically, I examined whether Dominicans and Mexicans, men and women, and first- and second-generation immigrants differed in the importance they attached to identification with the ethnically-relevant organizations that can serve as a point of entry into politics, the degree to which they support collective action, and the positivity of their intergroup attitudes, which can influence whether immigrants form alliances and/or distance themselves from other groups in society. Means and standard deviations for these variables can be found in Table 2c.

Being part of an ethnically-relevant organization was marginally more important to the identities of Mexican (M=4.99, SD=1.42) than Dominican (M=4.53, SD=1.43) respondents, $F(1, 175)=3.74$, $p=.05$. There were no significant differences for the importance of organizational identification by generation, gender, or any of the possible interactions $Fs<1$. For members of all groups, organizations were only somewhat important to their identities ($G_M = 4.75$, SD =1.44), despite the fact that they were recruited from the organizations themselves. This is consistent with the observation that while many who are involved in the organizations are active members, many others come to offices and attend meetings only to have their taxes done, deal with tickets from the police, sign up for citizenship classes, or learn English. It is also consistent with the demographic finding that nearly a quarter of respondents describe themselves as only occasional members and 42.6 % of respondents date their membership to a year or less.

The picture is different, however, with respect to collective action goals. Respondents, overall, found addressing collective action goals to be important (G_M = 6.05, SD =.97). With few exceptions, variations in support were on the upper end of the scale, ranging from somewhat to very important. If anything, this constricted variance might lead one to underestimate the effects of the hypothesized predictors on collective action. Regarding mean differences among ethnicity, generation, gender, and their interactions, Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was significant, $F(7, 175)=3.13$, $p<.01$, indicating that error variance differed across groups. Inspection of the frequencies demonstrated a negative skew in the data. To account for this, I inverted the variable and then performed square root and logarithmic transformations, respectively, which are appropriate to transformations for negatively skewed data. Neither transformation,

however, succeeded in decreasing the value of *F* above the level of significance. Since mean differences were not of central concern, I proceeded to further analyses, making note in interpretations that differences in collective action would be, for the most part, among people who supported it completely, believing it to be very important, and those who supported it less than completely, finding it to be at least somewhat important. Because collective action requires such high degrees of time and energy, however, seemingly small variations on a scale may make the difference between action and inaction.

Intergroup attitudes towards African Americans, Whites, and one's own ethnic group, which may provide the foundation for future alliances and conflicts, paint an interesting and complicated picture. First, a repeated measures ANOVA with target group (African Americans, Whites, Ingroup) as a within-subjects factor and ethnic group, generation, and gender as between subjects factors shows, as might be expected, that attitudes towards one's own group (M=84.28, SD=17.24) are warmer than attitudes towards Whites (M=67.48, SD=23.89), which are warmer than attitudes towards African Americans (M=59.47, SD=29.35), $F(2, 344)=59.25$, $p<.001$. This is qualified by a target group by generation interaction, the means for which are presented in Table 3. Whereas there are no significant effects of generation on attitudes toward African Americans or one's own ethnic group, there is a significant generation effect for Whites, such that attitudes towards this group are much cooler in the second than in the first generation, $F(1, 173)=11.28$, $p=.001$. Examining the between-groups effects for Whites by themselves in a three-way (ethnicity, generation, and gender) factorial ANOVA qualifies the main effect for generation with a marginally significant interaction with ethnic group.

First-generation Dominicans (M=75.36, SD=22.15), it appears, have more positive attitudes toward Whites than their second generation (M=57.43, SD=26.61) counterparts, Tukey HSD $p<.01$.

There were also significant main effects of gender on attitudes toward Whites and on one's own ethnic group. Women (M=69.63, SD=22.97) felt marginally warmer toward Whites than men (M=64.24, SD=25.36), $F(1, 173)=3.38$, $p=.07$, a result consistent with social dominance theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). There was no similar main effect for gender on attitudes toward African Americans, $F(1, 175)=2.05$, *ns*, a lower-status outgroup. Women also felt significantly warmer towards their own ethnic group than did men, $F(1, 175)=4.58$, $p<.05$, a main effect qualified by an interaction with immigrant generation, $F(1, 175)=10.06$, $p<.01$. Second-generation men (M=73.50, SD=18.14) had significantly less warm attitudes toward their own group in the United States than either second-generation women (M=88.46, SD=12.26), or first-generation women (M=83.29, SD=19.62) and men (M=86.25, SD=14.53). This finding should be interpreted cautiously, however, due to the relatively small number of second-generation men (n=20) included in this sample. No other significant main effects or interactions were observed regarding intergroup attitudes, Fs<2.68, *ns*.

Through their identification with activist groups, support for collective action, and intergroup attitudes, immigrants feed back on the U.S. status hierarchy, advocating social change, building alliances, and/or sowing the seeds of conflict. Whereas identification with activist groups and support for collective action were similar across ethnicity, gender, and generation – and quite high in the case of collective action – attitudes towards ingroups and outgroups varied sharply. Second-generation immigrants had

much less favorable attitudes towards Whites, a higher-status outgroup, perhaps reflecting their socialization into the American racial hierarchy. What is more, women had marginally warmer attitudes toward Whites and significantly warmer attitudes toward their own group, perhaps reflecting the gendered nature of race-based discrimination.

Summarizing the results of means analyses

Means analyses paint a picture that is largely similar for first- and second-generation Dominican and Mexican men and women who are part of ethnically-relevant organizations. In general they see their status compared to Whites as low and their status compared to African Americans as roughly equivalent. They feel somewhat sure about where they stand in their new country and are confident that they can do something to improve their standing. All groups employ social creativity strategies, identify with ethnically-relevant organizations, and support collective action. In addition to these overarching similarities, there are also differences that are related to the experiences and resources afforded by different members' positions in society. Attitudes toward Whites and endorsement of meritocracy are lower in the second than in the first generation, presumably as a result of their different experiences with status hierarchies in the United States and their countries of origin. Similarly, social creativity strategies that employ alternative dimensions of comparison are endorsed more strongly in the first generation, likely due to these immigrants' greater ability to draw on cultural resources from their countries of origin. These differences, however, underscore some of the broad similarities between how the groups understand their position in the United States, manage that position, and choose to respond.

Having set the stage for how Dominican and Mexican immigrants recruited from ethnically-relevant organizations understand and manage their position in the United States, it is now possible to consider how these beliefs and perceptions relate to their support for collective action and their intergroup attitudes. In the next two sections, I examine these questions. In the first section I consider how and why different social creativity strategies are inversely linked to support for collective action. In the second section, I examine how immigrants manage a lack of intergroup certainty and its implications for identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes.

Social creativity and collective action: Hypotheses 1 through 5

Hypotheses 1 through 5 concerned ways in which Dominican and Mexican immigrants manage their low-status position in the United States and the implications of these social creativity strategies for collective action. In particular, I investigated the relationship between two strategies that appear both in the social identity tradition and the immigration literature, emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, and two components of collective action frames, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy, as well their association with support for collective action goals. Together, these hypotheses predicted that support for collective action depends not only on the degree of group-based disadvantage one perceives, but also on how one manages it.

Intragroup respect and organizational identification

The first hypothesis concerned the relationship between a particular social creativity strategy, drawing respect from the ingroup, and a proposed antecedent of

immigrant political behavior, identification with ethnically-relevant organizations. Specifically, I predicted that intragroup respect would be positively linked to organizational identification only for those who believe that their group has relatively low status compared to Whites. For these immigrants only, emphasizing intragroup respect would help to negotiate a threatened identity, reinforcing the importance of organizational identification. For those who believe that they have relatively better status compared to Whites, intragroup respect should have no impact on organizational identification. In a corollary to this first hypothesis, I also predicted that gender would moderate the relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identification. Specifically, I expected that Latino men, who experience a relatively greater loss of status in the United Status as compared to Latina women, would turn more strongly to organizations for respect. Both hypotheses emphasize the important role of intragroup respect as a social creativity strategy to manage perceptions of low group status, as well as its link to ethnically-relevant organizations, which may serve as the foundation for immigrant collective action.

To examine the hypotheses that status compared to Whites as well as gender would both independently moderate the impact of intragroup respect on the importance of organizational identification, I conducted a three-step hierarchical regression analysis following Aiken and West (1991). In the first step, I regressed intragroup respect, status compared to Whites, and gender on importance of organizational identification. Both continuous predictors were mean-centered. The three predictors in Step 1 accounted for 5% of the variance in the importance of organizational identification, $F(3, 179)=3.41$, $p<.05$. Intragroup respect, $\beta=.23$, $t(185)=3.00$, $p<.01$ was a significant predictor of

importance of organizational identity. As expected, immigrants turn to ethnically-relevant organizations as a source of respect. Neither status compared to Whites, β=-.07, t(185)=-1.10, *ns* nor gender, β=-.16, t(185)=.744, *ns* were significant predictors of the importance of organizational identification.

In the second step, I added to the model the three two-way interaction terms. These products explained an additional 5% of the variance in the importance of organizational identification $\Delta F(3, 176)=3.31$, $p<.05$. As predicted, status compared to Whites moderated the relationship between intragroup respect and the importance of organizational identification, β=-.11, t(185)=-2.20, $p<.05$. Figure 2 shows the relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identification at one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the mean of group status compared to Whites. Analyses of the simple slopes show that when immigrants believe they have low status compared to Whites, emphasizing intragroup respect positively predicts the importance of identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, β=.41, t(185)=3.91, $p<.001$. When they believe that they have relatively higher (that is, similar) status compared to Whites, there is no such relationship, β=.02, t(185)=.21, *ns*. This lends support to hypothesis one, that the social creativity strategy of emphasizing intragroup respect is positively related to identification with ethnically-relevant groups, which may provide a point of entry for immigrants into politics.

Also as predicted, gender independently moderates the impact of intragroup respect on organizational identity importance, β=.29, t(185)=1.86, p=.07, although the effect is only marginally significant. As shown in Figure 3, analyses of the simple slopes show that intragroup respect is positively related to the importance of organizational

identification for immigrant men, β=.41, t(69)=4.05, p=.001, but not women, β=.10, t(115)=.91, *ns*. Immigrant men, but not women, turn to organizations as a source of respect.

In the third step, I entered the three-way interaction of intragroup respect, status compared to Whites, and gender. No three-way interaction was hypothesized and none was found. The addition of the three-way-interaction term did not explain any additional variance $\Delta F(1, 175)<1$ and was not a significant predictor of organizational identity importance, β=.04, t(185)=.34, *ns*.

Drawing on social comparison theory, I also predicted that perceived status compared to Whites, a high-status group, but not African Americans, a lower-status group, would moderate the positive relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identification. To examine the second half of this proposition, I computed a two-step hierarchical regression. In step one, I regressed status compared to African Americans and intragroup respect on organizational identification. Both variables were mean centered. In step two, I added the product term of the two predictor variables. The two predictors in step one accounted for 5% of the variance in the importance of organizational identification, $F(2, 182)=4.50$, $p<.05$. As in the previous analysis intragroup respect, β=.23, t(185)=2.98, $p<.01$ was a significant and positive predictor of importance of organizational identity. Status compared to African Americans was not related to organizational identification, β=-.04, t(185)=-.54, *ns*. The addition of the interaction term in step two did not account for additional variance $\Delta F(1, 181)=2.13$, *ns* and was not a significant predictor of organizational identity importance, β=-.07, t(185)=-1.46, *ns*. Whereas status compared to Whites, a high status group, moderates the positive

relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identification, status compared to African Americans, a lower status group does not.

Favoring alternative comparison dimensions and organizational identification

Hypothesis 2 predicted that those who believed that their group had relatively low status in the United States would engage in the social creativity strategy of valueing alternative dimensions of comparison, such as family relationships and religion, over status-relevant dimensions of comparison, such as economic status, to a greater extent than do Americans in general. The hypothesis was derived both from research on social creativity within the social identity tradition as well as qualitative research with Mexican immigrants. Furthermore, I hypothesized that the relationship would only be relevant with reference to upwards comparisons with Whites, which would be threatening to group value, and not with reference to horizontal or downward comparisons with African Americans, which would be less threatening.

To examine hypothesis 2, I conducted a two-step hierarchical regression. In the first step I regressed mean-centered status compared to Whites on the extent to which immigrants believed their group favored alternative dimensions of comparison. Consistent with hypothesis 2, there was a significant negative relationship between the variables, β=-.54, $t(185)$=-5.02, p<.001 accounting for 12% of the variance in favoring alternative dimensions, $F(1, 183)$=25.17, p<.001. Immigrants who believed that their group has relatively low status compared to Whites were more likely to emphasize the extent to which their group, in contrast to Americans in general, favors alternative dimensions of comparison such as family relationships and religion, over status-relevant dimensions, such as economic status. In the second step I added the additional variable

of mean-centered status compared to African Americans to examine whether comparisons with this lower-status group explained any additional variance in the social creativity strategy of favoring alternative dimensions of comparison. As expected, this variable was not significantly related to favoring alternative dimensions, β=.08, $t(185)$=.65, *ns*, nor did its addition explain any further variance $F(1, 182)<1$, *ns*.

Hypothesis 3 examined the relationship between a social creativity strategy, in this case favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, and the importance of identification with ethnically-relevant organizations. Whereas the analysis of hypothesis 1 showed that one form of social creativity, intragroup respect, could bolster identification with activist groups, hypothesis 3 predicted that another form of social creativity, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, would be *negatively* related to organizational identification. It was also expected that just as status compared to Whites moderated the effect of intragroup respect on organizational identification, such that it was evident only among immigrants who believed that their group had relatively low status compared to Whites, so too would it moderate the negative relationship between favoring alternative dimensions and organizational identification, although in this case in the opposite direction. For immigrants who believe they have low status compared to Whites, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison was expected to be negatively related to the importance of identification with an ethnically-relevant organization.

Once again to examine these predictions, I conducted a two-step hierarchical regression. In the first step I regressed favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and status compared to Whites on organizational identification. The two predictors in step one accounted for 3% of the variance in the importance of organizational

identification, $F(2, 180)=2.69$, $p=.07$. Consistent with hypothesis 3, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, $\beta=-.10$, $t(183)=-2.19$, $p<.05$ was a significant and negative predictor of importance of organizational identity. Organizational identification is less important the more immigrants believe that their group values alternative dimensions of comparison to status-relevant dimensions of comparison more than Americans in general do. Once again, status compared to Whites, $\beta=-.10$, $t(183)=-1.45$, *ns* was not a significant predictor of the importance of organizational identification.

In the second step, I added the two-way interaction term to the model. This product explained an additional 5% of the variance in the importance of organizational identification $\Delta F(1, 179)=10.29$, $p<.01$. As predicted, status compared to Whites moderated the relationship between favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and the importance of organizational identification, $\beta=.09$, $t(183)=3.21$, $p<.01$.[6] Figure 4 depicts the simple slopes of the relationship between favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and organizational identity importance at one standard deviation above and below the mean of status compared to Whites. Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison negatively predicts the importance of organizational identification only for those who believe they have low status compared to Whites, $\beta=-.22$, $t(183)=-3.80$, $p<.001$. For those who believe they have relatively higher (that is, similar) status compared to Whites, there is no such relationship, $\beta=.07$, $t(183)=1.06$, *ns*.

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[6] Predictors from hypotheses 1 and 3 were also run simultaneously on organizational identification, yielding nearly identical results, explaining a total of 15% of the variance in organizational identification, $F(5, 177)=6.43$, $p<.001$. Included in the same model, main effects for intragroup respect, $\beta=.23$, $t(183)=3.02$, $p<.01$ and favoring alternative dimensions, $\beta=-.10$, $t(183)=-2.28$, $p<.05$ maintain their significance in step 1. Furthermore, the interactions of intragroup respect and status compared to Whites, $\beta=-.12$, $t(183)=-2.47$, $p<.05$ and favoring alternative dimensions and status compared to Whites, $\beta=.09$, $t(183)=3.24$, $p=.001$ maintain their significance in step 2.

Because I also predicted that perceived status compared to Whites, a high-status group, but not African Americans, a lower-status group, would moderate the positive relationship between favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and organizational identification, I ran a similar two-step hierarchical regression, substituting status compared to African Americans for status compared to Whites. In the first step I regressed favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and status compared to African Americans on organizational identification. The two predictors in step one did not account for a significant portion of the variance in the importance of organizational identification, $F(2, 180)=1.69$, *ns*, however favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, $\beta=-.08$, $t(183)=-2.19$, $p=.07$ was a marginally significant negative predictor of organizational identity importance. Status compared to African Americans, $\beta=-.03$, $t(183)=-.43$, *ns*, in contrast, did not significantly predict the importance of organizational identification. In the second step, I added the product of the variables in step one to the model, which accounted for an additional 2% of the variance and, surprisingly, a marginally significant increase in the variance explained by the model, $\Delta F(1, 182)=3.48$, $p=.06$. Contrary to expectations, the interaction of status compared to African Americans and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison was a marginally significant predictor of organizational identification, $\beta=.06$, $t(183)=1.87$, $p=.06$.

One possible explanation for this unexpected result is that status compared to African Americans shares variance with status compared to Whites – indeed, they are positively correlated $r(187)=.33$, $p<.001$ – and that, when included in the same model, the latter may account for the former's variance. To test this possibility, I ran an additional hierarchical regression, entering the main effects of status compared to Whites, status

compared to African Americans, and favoring alternative dimensions in step one, and the two interactions in question, as well as the interaction between status compared to Whites and status compared to African Americans in step two. The results are as expected. In step one, which accounts for only 3% of the variance in organizational importance, $F(3, 179)=1.79$, *ns*, only favoring alternative dimensions, $\beta=-.10$, $t(183)=-2.19$, $p<.05$ is a significant predictor of organizational identity importance. In step two, which accounts for an additional 7% of the variance, $\Delta F(3, 176)=4.79$, $p<.01$, only the interaction of status compared to Whites and favoring alternative dimensions is a significant predictor, $\beta=.09$, $t(183)=3.06$, $p<.01$. When the interaction of White comparison and favoring alternative dimensions is included in the model, the interaction of status compared to African Americans and favoring alternative dimensions is no longer even marginally significant, $\beta=.01$, $t(183)=.42$, $p=.67$.

Hypotheses 1 through 3 demonstrate that different forms of social creativity – emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative comparison dimensions – have inverse relationships with identification with ethnically-relevant organizations, one component of collective action frames. Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine when and why these different social creativity strategies bolster or diminish support for collective action.

Social creativity, group efficacy, and collective action goals

Hypotheses 4 and 5 examine the relationship between two socially creative strategies, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and increasing identification with ethnically-relevant organizations that offer respect and collective action goals. Specifically, I expected in hypothesis 4 that organizational identification would be positively related to collective action goals. Furthermore, I expected that this relationship

would be mediated by group efficacy. In other words, I predicted that identifying with an organization increases one's support for collective action because it increases one's feelings of empowerment as part of a larger group that can take effective action to change their position. I expected in hypothesis 5, in contrast, that favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, a different social creativity strategy that is negative linked to organizational identification (see the results from hypothesis 3), would be negatively linked to collective action goals. Again, I expected that group efficacy would mediate this negative relationship. In other words, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison would be related to lower support for collective action is because it emphasizes status-irrelevant dimensions that make one feel that their group will be less effective in changing their position in society. Findings consistent with these hypotheses would lend additional support to the proposition that how immigrants manage low status will influence their political mobilization. Forms of social creativity that increase identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy, two elements of collective action frames, are more likely to increase support for collective action than forms that decrease them.

To test these hypotheses that group efficacy mediates the positive relationship between organizational identification and collective action, as well as the negative relationship between favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and collective action, I followed the procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) for testing statistical mediation. The results of these analyses can be seen in Figure 5. After all predictor variables were mean centered, I conducted a series of four regressions. First, I tested the relationships between organizational identification and favoring alternative dimensions,

respectively, and support for collective action goals, hypothesizing that both would be significant predictors, though the relationship would be positive for organizational identification and negative for favoring alternative comparison dimensions. Together, organizational identification importance and favoring alternative comparison dimensions accounted for 5% of the variance in support for collective action goals, $F(2, 179)=4.71$, $p=.01$. Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison was negatively associated with collective action goals, $\beta=-.06$, $t(182)=-2.07$, $p<.05$, such that the greater immigrants' belief that their groups place greater relative value on religion and family relationships than Americans do, the less their support for collective action. In contrast, organizational identity importance was positively and nearly significantly related to collective action goals, $\beta=.10$, $t(182)=1.96$, $p=.052$[7], such that the more important ethnically-relevant organizations are to one's identity, the greater one's support for collective action.

Second, I tested the relationship between the initial predictor variables and the mediator, group efficacy. Whereas I expected that organizational identification would be positively linked to group efficacy, I expected that favoring alternative dimensions would have a negative relationship with group efficacy. Organizational identification and favoring alternative dimensions accounted for 16% of the variance in group efficacy, $F(2, 179)=17.07$, $p<.001$. As expected, organizational identification was positively related to group efficacy, $\beta=.32$, $t(182)=4.49$, $p<.001$, such that the more important ethnically-relevant organizations were to the immigrants, the more effective they believed their group would be in improving its status. In contrast, and also as expected, favoring

[7] It is important to note here that while I am reporting the results of two-tailed statistical tests in these analyses, my directional hypotheses justify one-tailed tests. With an alpha level of .05, one-tailed, these results clearly support the hypothesis four.

alternative dimensions of comparison was negatively related to group efficacy, β=-.12, t(182)=-3.08, p<.01, such that the more immigrants believe that their group, in contrast to Americans in general, value alternative dimensions over economic status, the less effective they believe their group will be in improving its status.

Third, I examined the relationship between the hypothesized mediator, group efficacy, and the outcome, support for collective action goals, expecting them to have a significant and positive association. Group efficacy was positively related to collective action goals, β=.21, t(182)=4.39, p<.001, such that the more effective immigrants believed their groups would be in achieving their goals, the more they supported collective action. Group efficacy explained 10% of the variance in collective action goals, F(1, 180)=19.30, p<.001.

Finally, I included both of the initial variables, organizational identification and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, in the same model as the mediator, group efficacy, hypothesizing that, when accounting for group efficacy, the positive effect of organizational identification and the negative effect of favoring alternative dimensions of comparison, respectively, would be diminished. In contrast, group efficacy itself would remain a significant and positive predictor. Together, the predictor variables accounted for 11% of the variance in support for collective action, F(3, 178)=7.29, p<.001. When controlling for group efficacy (which remains positively associated with collective action, β=.18, t(182)=3.44, p=.001) the effects of organizational identification, β=.04, t(182)=.81, *ns*, and favoring alternative comparison dimensions, β=-.04, t(182)=-1.31, *ns*, are no longer significant. To test whether indirect effects of organizational identification and favoring alternative dimensions, respectively, on collective action goals via group

efficacy is significantly different from zero, I conducted two Sobel tests (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982). The positive indirect effect of organizational identity importance on collective action via group efficacy is significant, z=3.13, p<.01, as is the negative indirect effective of favoring alternative dimensions, z=2.50, p=.01, offering support for the hypothesized mediation.

In sum, results from tests of hypotheses 4 and 5 show that group efficacy fully mediates the positive association between organizational identification and collective action goals, as well as the negative relationship between favoring alternative comparison dimensions and collective action goals. Taken together with findings related to hypotheses 1 through 3, these results show that different forms of social creativity have inverse relationships to support for collective action. Specifically, intragroup respect, which is positively related to identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy, two elements of collective action frames, is positively related to support for political mobilization. In contrast, favoring alternative comparison dimensions is negatively linked to elements of collective action frames and, as a result, support for political mobilization. More broadly, the results support the idea that how immigrants manage their status, not just how they perceive it, is related to their political attitudes.

Hypotheses 1 through 5 examined the relationship between how immigrants manage their status position and political mobilization. The next hypotheses examine how they manage another key element of the immigrant experience, lack of intergroup certainty, and its relationship to intergroup attitudes.

Intergroup certainty and intergroup attitudes: Hypotheses 6 through 9

In hypotheses 6 through 9, I investigated the impact of a new construct, intergroup certainty, on intergroup relations. I hypothesized that a lack of intergroup certainty, defined as clarity about where one stands as a group member in the United States, has important implications for identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and outgroup attitudes. I also considered (a) how ideological beliefs, such as endorsement of meritocracy or the belief that the world is generally fair and just and that individuals can get ahead by working hard, and (b) how perceived group status relatively to outgroups such as African Americans, can moderate the effects of intergroup certainty.

Intergroup certainty, intergroup attitudes, and organizational identification

Hypothesis 6 concerned the relationship between intergroup certainty and outgroup attitudes. Drawing on theories of uncertainty reduction and system justification that suggest that favoring (higher-status) outgroups functions to give people a clear sense of their place in the world, I predicted that intergroup certainty would be positively related to outgroup attitudes.

To test hypothesis 6, I computed two separate multiple regression analyses. Consistent with my predictions, intergroup certainty was positively related to both attitudes toward African Americans, β=6.40, t(181)=3.19, p=.01, R^2=.05, and attitudes toward Whites, β=5.22, t(181)=3.21, p=.01, R^2=.05. The less certain immigrants felt about where they stand in the United States as members of their ethnic group, the more tepid their attitudes toward high- (Whites) and lower-status (African Americans) outgroups.

Meritocracy, intergroup certainty, and the importance of identification with ethnically-relevant organizations

Hypothesis 7 concerned the relationship between intergroup certainty and organizational identification. Unlike the previous hypothesis, which proposed a direct link between the variables, in this case I proposed that meritocracy would moderate the association. Specifically, I predicted that there would be a positive relationship between intergroup certainty and organizational identification only for those who endorse meritocracy. People who endorse meritocracy believe that the world has order and makes sense and that individuals can improve their status based on hard work. For these individuals, belonging to a low-status group such as Dominicans or Mexicans can pose a conflict. Identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations may help to resolve this conflict, restoring a sense of certainty about where one stands in society.

To test hypothesis 7, I conducted a two-step hierarchical regression. In the first step I regressed intergroup certainty and meritocracy on organizational identity importance. (Both variables were mean centered.) The two predictors did not account for a significant proportion of the variance in organizational identity importance, $F(2, 183)=1.21$, *ns*. Neither intergroup certainty, $\beta=.14$, $t(186)=1.41$, *ns*, nor meritocracy, $\beta=.03$, $t(186)=.30$, *ns* was a significant predictor. In the second step, I added the product of these variables to the model, which now accounted for 4% of the variance in organizational identity importance $\Delta F(1, 182)=5.52$, $p<.05$. As expected, the interaction between intergroup certainty and meritocracy was significantly associated with the importance of organizational identification, $\beta=.20$, $t(186)=2.35$, $p<.05$. An analysis of the simple slopes at one standard deviation above and below the mean of meritocracy (Figure 6) shows that intergroup certainty is positively related to the importance of organizational identity when immigrants endorse meritocracy, $\beta=.37$, $t(186)=2.68$, $p<.01$,

but not when they do not endorse the ideology, β=-.07, t(186)=-.56, *ns*. In a world filled with contradictions, organizational identification can offer a degree of certainty about one's status as a group member, particularly for those who believe the world is fair and just and that by working hard individuals can get ahead.

Relative group status, intergroup certainty, and outgroup attitudes

Hypotheses 8 and 9 examined the relationship between perceptions of intergroup status, intergroup certainty, and outgroup attitudes. Specifically I proposed that favorable evaluations of higher-status outgroups can help immigrants affirm the existing status system and establish a sense of intergroup certainty. Status compared to some groups, such as African Americans, however, is ambiguous. Immigrants may disagree as to whether they occupy a higher- or lower-status position. In such cases, the relationship between intergroup uncertainty and outgroup evaluation depends on perceptions of relative group status. When perceptions of relative group status compared to African Americans are high, then certainty would bear no relationship to attitudes. In contrast when they are low, evaluating the group positively can impose a sense of structure and order on the status hierarchy.

To examine these propositions, it is first necessary to consider the difference between Dominican and Mexican immigrants' perceived status relative to African Americans and Whites. (Similar means analyses reported above, which suggested that Dominican and Mexican immigrants saw their status as lower than Whites and roughly equal to African Americans, did not test the difference between these two variables directly.) In hypothesis 8, I predicted that Dominican and Mexican immigrants would see their groups' status as lower compared to Whites than compared to African

Americans. The results of a paired-samples *t*-test support the hypothesis, $t(187)=-8.22$, $p<.001$. Immigrants perceive their groups' status compared to Whites (M=2.73, SD=1.62) as significantly lower than their groups' status compared to African Americans (M=3.82, SD=1.49). Underscoring the mean differences is the variation between the comparison groups on either side of the scale midpoint. Seventy-one percent of participants thought that they had lower status than Whites, 14.4% thought they had equivalent status, and 13.8% thought they had higher status. When making a comparison to African Americans, 22.5% thought that they had lower status than African Americans, 34.8% thought they had the same status, and 26.7% thought they had higher status. Whereas most participants believed that their group has lower status than Whites, participants' perceptions of their group's status compared to African Americans were more distributed across the scale. This shows that immigrants disagree as to whether their group's status relative to African Americans is high or low, whereas most agree that their group has low status compared to Whites.

Finally, to examine hypothesis 9, I conducted a two-step hierarchical regression. In the first step I regressed mean-centered group status compared to African Americans and intergroup certainty on attitudes toward African Americans. The two predictors in step one accounted for 5% of the variance in attitudes toward African Americans, $F(2, 182)=5.06$, $p<.01$. As in hypothesis six, intergroup certainty was significantly and positively linked to attitudes toward African Americans, $\beta=6.17$, $t(185)=3.17$, $p<.01$. Status compared to African Americans was unrelated to attitudes toward the outgroup, $\beta=-.93$, $t(185)=-.64$, *ns*. To test for moderation, in the second step I added the product of group status compared to African Americans and intergroup certainty to the model. This

variable accounted for an additional 9% of the variance, $\Delta F(1, 181)=6.38$, $p<.05$ and, consistent with hypothesis nine, was a significant predictor of attitudes toward African Americans, $\beta=-3.16$, $t(185)=-2.53$, $p<.05$. An analysis of the simple slopes (Figure 7) shows that intergroup certainty is positively related to attitudes toward African Americans only for who believe that their ethnic group has relatively low status in comparison, $\beta=10.98$, $t(185)=4.06$, $p<.001$, and not for those who believe their group has comparatively high status, $\beta=1.59$, $t(185)=.60$, *ns*. When status compared to African Americans is low, evaluating African Americans positively functions to establish a sense of intergroup certainty. In contrast, when status compared to African Americans is high, outgroup attitudes serve no such function.

I also tested a similar model for attitudes toward Whites, a higher-status group. Once again, only intergroup certainty, $\beta=4.65$, $t(183)=2.89$, $p<.01$, was a significant predictor of attitudes toward Whites, accounting for 6% of the variance, $F(2, 180)=5.80$, $p<.01$. Group status compared to Whites was unrelated, $\beta=1.55$, $t(183)=1.45$, *ns*. The addition in step two of the product of the two variables from step 1 did not account for any additional variance, $\Delta F(1, 179)=1.45$, *ns*. Furthermore, as expected, the product term was not a significant predictor of attitudes towards Whites, $\beta=1.19$, $t(183)=1.20$, *ns*. This suggests that the moderating effect of status compared to low-status groups on the relationship between intergroup uncertainty and intergroup attitudes is limited to those groups for which status comparisons are less consensual.

CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION

Immigrants and their children now represent one fifth of the U.S. population (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001); globally, over 191 million people live outside the country where they were born (United Nations Office of International Migration and Development, 2005). These demographic realities make immigration one of the most important social phenomena of our time. Based on their ethnic group memberships, immigrants face a number of challenges. Some occupy low-status positions with access to fewer resources like money and jobs than the native-born and more privileged groups. Many find the stable hierarchies by which they understood intergroup relations in their countries of origin disrupted in the course of migration, leaving them to wonder where their groups stand in their new society. How immigrants face these challenges, and in particular, how they engage politically will have the power to reshape societies across the globe.

The present work was concerned with how immigrants manage their low-status and uncertain positions in the United States and the implications of these strategies for intergroup relations. Not only does this research illuminate the process of immigrant political incorporation, it also adds to existing theories of collective identity and social change. By examining the operation of social categories in people's lives under unstable conditions, we can better understand the ways people maintain meaning about their place in the social world (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). The two groups I studied – Dominican and Mexican immigrants to New York City – both experience devaluation and uncertainty related to their group memberships. Due to their sheer numbers, both groups are likely to play an important role in New York politics in the years to come.

This chapter reviews the main hypotheses and summarizes the related findings with respect to how immigrants manage their low-status and uncertain position in the United States. In addition, I consider how these results relate to existing research as well as the directions they suggest for future studies. I then consider the particular sample of immigrants and organizations who participated in this research, focusing on how it differs from the Dominican and Mexican population in New York City at large, and what an emphasis on these groups and organizations can tell us about collective identity and social change. I finish by considering the study's limitations and offering a brief conclusion.

Social creativity and collective action

How immigrants deal with low status, that is, the form of social creativity they employ, was expected to influence identification with ethnically-relevant organizations that would serve as the entry point into U.S. politics. Social creativity strategies allow group members to maintain identification in the face of devaluation (Jetten et al., 2005), but few studies have examined their link to collective action.

I emphasized two contrasting ways immigrants can deal with threats to their group's status in the United States: emphasizing the respect they receive from their ingroup and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison with outgroups. I reasoned that intra- and intergroup social creativity responses to devaluation would have inverse associations with collective action. Intragroup respect was expected to increase support for collective action by bolstering identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and perceptions of group efficacy. Because of the high degree of face-to-face interaction involved, these organizations were seen as an excellent source of respect. I expected,

furthermore, that the value of intragroup respect as a predictor of organizational identification would be greater for men, who experience a relative status drop in the United States, than for women, some of whom may experience a relative status gain. In contrast, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison was expected to decrease support for collective action by moving one's attention away from the sense of anger and illegitimacy that may drive one to identify with ethnically-relevant groups and thus suppressing perceptions of group efficacy.

The results of the study supported these predictions. Immigrants who felt their group had low status in the United States turned to ethnically-relevant organizations as a source of respect. This association not only "bracketed" feelings of devaluation in the intergroup context by focusing on their value in an intragroup context, but it also fostered feelings of group efficacy and, through it, support for collective action. In sharp contrast to suggestions by political commentators that ethnic and U.S. politics are at odds (Huntington, 2004), but consistent with sociological research showing that immigrant leaders see participation in both as complementary (Portes et al., 2007), these results demonstrate that participation in ethnically-relevant organizations for respect facilitates immigrants' entry into the U.S. political arena. Further, the results offer a psychological explanation for why this might be. Organizations help immigrants manage threats to their group status in the United States, affirming the group in a world that devalues it and maintaining a sense of meaning about their place in the world. In so doing, they empower immigrants to support actions that make their political voice heard. It is worth noting that the types of collective action for which immigrants expressed support in this research were very much tied to the U.S. context. They involved addressing the group's

position in the United States through the democratic and non-violent means that are the cornerstones of U.S. democracy.

Results also supported the different role that ethnically-relevant organizations play in the lives of immigrant men and women. Intragroup respect was related to organizational identification for the former, but not the latter. Dominican and Mexican men and women all experience devaluation in the United States by virtue of their membership in low-status groups. But men also frequently experience a loss of status relative to their country of origin, whereas women often find more employment opportunities and more equitable gender roles in the new country[8] (Itzigsohn & Giorguli-Salcedo, 2005; Jones-Correa, 1999; Smith, 2005). For men, identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations that respect them helps to regain some of their lost status. That gender moderates the impact of intragroup respect on identification with ethnically-relevant groups demonstrates that the effectiveness of various social creativity strategies depends on the position of different group members in society. Immigrant men's and women's use of a given strategy depends on the different challenges, opportunities, and cultural expectations that migration affords each group. Collective identification is not one-size-fits-all; it is an active negotiation between the individuals and the world around them.

As expected, immigrants also made use of a second social creativity strategy, that of favoring alternative comparison dimensions. When perceiving low economic status relative to Whites in the United States, immigrants were more likely to emphasize that, in

[8] This may be truer for Mexicans, who come from a highly patriarchal society, than for Dominicans, whose society is more matrifocal (Massey et al., 2006). However, the current sample size did not permit me to test this possibility.

contrast to their perception of Whites, family and religion are much more important for them in assessing value than is economic status. This observation offers additional support to the proposition from social identity theory that people can maintain a positive identity by changing to a dimension of comparison other than the one on which devaluation is based (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As predicted, this social creativity was also related to collective action, but in the opposite direction as emphasizing intragroup respect. Immigrants who favored alternative comparison dimensions reaffirmed their ethnic identity, but they did so at the expense of taking action to improve their group's position in society. They were less likely to identify with the ethnically-relevant organizations, less likely to feel empowered and, as a result, less likely to support collective action. Somewhat ironically, perhaps, the actions that immigrants take to reaffirm their group's value in light of their low-status can prevent them from supporting action aimed at changing that status. Some forms of multiculturalism that celebrate immigrants' cultural values without respect to inequality may serve a palliative function, similar to that of complementary stereotypes (Kay & Jost, 2003).

Together, these results illustrate the importance of the form of social creativity response, either intra- or intergroup, in mobilizing collective action. It is not just *whether* immigrants perceive their position in the United States to be low that influences their political support, it is *how they deal with it*. Immigrants do not passively respond to their status in the United States; they actively negotiate their collective identities in ways that have important implications for their political incorporation. Furthermore, how they negotiate their identities and maintain meaning in the United States depends on their social position, specifically with respect to gender and generation.

Several aspects of these results warrant further consideration, including the processes underlying the relationship between the two social creativity strategies and collective action; the relationship of between social creativity and group affirmation; the ways that immigrant women and men manage devaluation in the United States; and the various forms that immigrant collective action can take. The next four sections address each issue in turn.

Social creativity strategies and collective action

What processes explain the negative relationships between the two social creativity strategies examined in this study, identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations that proffer respect and favoring alternative comparison dimensions? For immigrants who perceived their group to have low status, favoring alternative comparison dimensions and identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations were negatively related. That is, under threatening conditions, employing one intergroup social creativity strategy makes the use of another less likely. I have suggested that this may be because favoring alternative comparison dimensions reduces the sense of anger and injustice that drives people to join activist organizations (Kay & Jost, 2003).

There exists, however, another likely possibility. Different social creativity strategies may be substitutable, an important feature of motive systems (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations that offer respect and favoring alternative dimensions both address the need to establish a positive identity in one's new country. Consistent with Tesser's (2000) self-evaluation maintenance model, to the extent that one strategy is engaged – and a positive identity is achieved – the other may become redundant. Future work should examine the mechanisms behind the

relationship between different social creativity strategies. Are they negatively related because of their effects on intergroup emotions or because they are substitutable? Answering this question would improve our understanding of the motivational processes underlying the collective self.

Why do different social creativity strategies have inverse relationships with collective action? One reason, supported by the findings in this study, involves group efficacy. An unintended consequence of turning to an ingroup for support in the face of devaluation is that one interacts with other group members, increasing the chances of successful collaborations and, over time, increasing the feeling that the group really can work together to achieve its goals. In contrast, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison requires no such ingroup interaction because its focus is on the intergroup context. In fact, favoring alternative dimensions of comparison effectively cedes status-relevant dimensions to higher-status group members. Because status-relevant dimensions are likely to be related to perceptions of competence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), they decrease a sense of efficacy, an important predictor of collective action.

Group efficacy is only one of the predictors of collective action subsumed under collective identities; the other is a sense of injustice (van Zomeren, et al. 2008). Recent research has shown the important role of intergroup emotions, and in particular intergroup anger, in mobilizing collective action (Smith, Kronin, & Kessler, 2008). In this case, as well, it is likely that emphasizing intragroup respect and favoring alternative dimensions of comparison will have inverse effects. Focusing on intragroup respect may allow members to reaffirm group value without changing their perception of status relations. Group members can recharge their collective batteries in the intragroup setting,

giving them the sense of respect and strength that allows them to focus on, feel angry about, and effectively face their group's low-status position. Favoring alternative comparison dimensions, in constrast, moves one's attention effectively away from intergroup inequality, likely decreasing the sense of anger and injustice that may motivate collective action. In the future, researchers should examine intergroup anger as an additional mediator of the relationship between social creativity and collective action.

This leads to a somewhat ironic conclusion. For low-status groups, collective action, an intergroup strategy, may be more likely when people manage devaluation by turning to their ingroup than when they manage devaluation by focusing on outgroup comparisons. This may extend beyond the two forms of social creativity addressed here to other forms, such as downward intergroup comparisons and perceptions of group entitativity. An examination of other social creativity strategies, as well as how people choose which strategy they will employ, merits future research.

Social creativity and group affirmation

Favoring alternative dimensions of comparison that are rooted in important group values has similarities with another identity management strategy, group affirmation. When people experience a threat to the self, for instance poor performance on a test, they can restore their sense of integrity and worth by affirming values unrelated to the threat, for instance focusing on how kind or moral they are (Steele, 1988). These self-affirmations help them respond to threatening information in a more positive way (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). Recently, several studies have examined whether a similar process is present at the group level, linking it theoretically to the social creativity strategy of favoring alternative dimensions of comparison (Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers,

2006, 2009; Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, & Prenovost, 2007). Consistent with the results of this and other research (Crocker et al., 1994; Schmitt, Branscombe, & McKimmie, 1999; Wiley, Perkins, & Deaux, 2008), these studies have found that collective self-worth, like individual self-evalaution (Tesser, 2000), is plastic and that people can draw on it in numerous ways to respond to identity threats.

More relevant to the current research, however, are the implications of these studies for the relationship between social creativity and collective action. Here the results are mixed. On one hand, Sherman et al. (2007) found that members of an intramural basketball team made fewer group-serving attributions following group affirmation, accepting responsibility for defeat as much as for victory. This result is consistent with the findings of this study. While affirming important group values may help individuals to manage threat positively, it may also reduce the "adversarial" attributions that are necessary to generate the sense of anger and illegitimacy that motivate people to engage in collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Smith et al, 2008). On the other hand, Derks et al. (2009) found that when group value was affirmed in an alternative domain, members were more motivated to work together to improve the group's position. Alternative dimensions of comparison, in other words, were an antecedent of collective action. This is at odds with the results of this study.

What might account for the inconsistent findings? One possibility relates to the operationalization of the social creativity strategies. Drawing on self-affirmation manipulations, Sherman et al. (2007) gave participants the opportunity to write about a value they deemed important to their group. In contrast, Derks et al. (2009) informed participants that their group, which had performed poorly on a status-relevant dimension

of comparison, had performed better on a status-irrelevant dimension. They then told them that an authority would value both dimensions in performance-related decisions.

Neither experimental manipulation is analogous to the measures used in this research or to the hypothetical construct described in Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Group affirmations involve an alternative dimension, but unlike change in the comparison dimension they do not involve comparison with an outgroup. Future research may consider whether the outgroup comparisons are necessary components of social creativity responses. Derks et al.'s (2009) manipulation is an even more significant departure from how changing the comparison dimension has been conceptualized. In all other studies on the topic, it has been the low-status group members themselves who favor or affirm the alternative dimension of comparison. In these studies, in contrast, an authority defines and then affirms the alternative dimension. What differs is *who* initiates social creativity and affirms identity – the threatened group member or a higher-status authority. This difference may explain the contrasting effects.

Future research should consider the importance of audience reaction to favoring alternative dimensions as a moderator of its relationship to collective action. Who affirms alternative dimensions of comparison, the ingroup member, an outgroup authority, or both? When higher-status outgroups acknowledge and value alternative comparison dimensions, group members may feel invited into the political arena. In contrast, when they show no regard for them, group members may push away from U.S. politics. In fact, research with ethnic minorities suggests that respect for group identities is positively linked to immigrants' outgroup attitudes and perceptions of U.S. institutions

(Huo & Molina, 2006). It may follow, then, that respect for important ingroup values engages a similar process.

Gender, social creativity, and social change

Women are often expected to be the carriers of "traditional" and essentialist notions of ethnic identity in the context of immigration (Clément, Singh, & Gaudet, 2006; Dion & Dion, 2001; Mahalingham & Leu, 2005). This role becomes more important in the second generation as direct links to the country of origin decrease (Dion & Dion, 2004) and as identification with the country of residence increases (Clément et al. 2006). The results of this study support this perspective, showing that second-generation women have warmer feelings about their ethnic group than do second-generation men. However, there may be limits to women's positive feelings about their ethnic group. Whereas women may experience familial pressure to represent ethnic identities in ingroup contexts, they might react against those identities in public contexts where outgroups are present (Clément et al. 2006). Future research should consider the role of audience in influencing male and female immigrants' enactment of their ethnic identities.

More interesting from the perspective of the hypotheses of this study, however, are men's and women's different use of social creativity strategies. Men were more likely than women to emphasize the respect they receive from immigrant organizations when their perceived group status is low, perhaps as a way of "bracketing" their loss of status in the United States. This finding is consistent with sociological research that shows that Latino men turn to immigrant organizations to manage their status (Jones-Correa, 1998). It is also consistent with psychological research with Latino immigrants at an Ivy League university. Ethier and Deaux (1990) found that a strong cultural

background protected Latino men, but not women, from experiencing a personal threat to their ethnic identity in the early stages of their college experience. Having a strong cultural background, similar to identifying with an ethnically-relevant organization, may afford immigrants the resources to emphasize their respect in an intragroup context in the face of the loss of status they face in the intergroup context.

Women, in contrast, were slightly more likely to favor alternative comparison dimensions, such as family values and religion, over economic status and to emphasize that they endorsed these values to a greater degree than Whites. This is consistent with research and theory demonstrating that idealizing cultural values relative to dominant groups is a common response to devaluation, particularly among ethnic minority women (Mahalingham & Leu, 2005). These values can bolster ethnic pride and resilience (Mahalingham, Balan, & Haritatos, 2008).

Idealizing cultural values has both costs and benefits for women, however. On the one hand, it helps establish a positive ethnic identity relative to their marginalized status vis-à-vis Whites. On the other hand, it reinforces male privilege and creates a set of gendered expectations that no one can live up to (Mahlingham & Leu, 2005). Idealizing family values can lead women to be less vocal within their communities when a positive image of the family is violated. South Asian immigrant women who endorse the "model minority" myth, for instance, are less likely to seek help in cases of domestic violence, lest they tarnish the community's idealized image of "family values" (Abraham, 2006). Furthermore, as this research has shown, favoring the alternative dimensions of comparison that are based in idealized cultural values can also make participation in collective action less likely. Taken together, then, the use of this social creative strategy,

while effective in managing societal devaluation, can have real consequences for whether immigrant women actively fight for a better position within and outside their ethnic communities. The extreme consequences of this analysis call for additional research on how men and women deal differently with social marginality and the implications it has for intra- and intergroup relations.

Why do immigrant men and women tend to favor different social creativity strategies? Just as differences in managing threats to Latino identity were not attributable to the strength of ethnic background in Ethier and Deaux's (1990) research, they cannot be attributed to strength of organizational identification in this study. Men and women did not differ in terms of the importance of their organizational identification, despite the fact that identification appears to serve a different function for men. It may simply be that, in the context of low group status, expectations of men and women are quite different. In his work with the Mexican community in New York City, Robert Smith (2005) has noted,

> "Men tend to participate more in transnational public life than women do, while women tend to do more of the everyday settlement work in New York, especially things like enrolling children in school, and private transnational life, such as caregiving for the third generation. Settlement activities can increase women's power and autonomy in the United States, while public, transnational activities tend to create institutions that reproduce or create arenas over which men have power. . ." (pp. 122).

Men can turn to organizations to buffer their devalued position. Women, at least women who endorse idealized cultural values, experience a very different set of expectations. They may be expected to attend to the needs of others in their family and their community, performing idealized cultural identities that are expected of them and leaving little time for participation in ethnically-relevant organizations. These activities

may give them a sense of autonomy and respect in the United States, at the same time as they reaffirm essentialized notions of gender. This research is only a starting point to examine how gendered cultural expectations influence the way that immigrant women and men manage threats to group status. It calls for more work on the intersections between culture and gender in the process of immigration and social marginality, similar to the recent and important contributions of Mahalingham and colleages (2005, 2008) and Sirin and Fine (2008).

Forms of collective action

Finally, it should be recognized that this research considered a small range of the spectrum of collective action. Participants reported on their willingness to engage in collective action to improve their group's position in society. Such action was focused on the United States (more specifically, New York City), was based in ethnic group membership, involved contact with outgroups, and was legal and non-violent. Understanding this kind of action is undoubtedly important. It is also important to note, however, that other forms of collective action exist that may have different relationships to social creativity. Some minority organizations view contact with higher-status outgroups as the only way to improve their position, whereas others see such contact as futile, believing that higher-status groups will only try to co-opt their members (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006). Some forms of collective action are undertaken in the presence of other group members (e.g., attending a demonstration), whereas others are taken alone (e.g., writing a letter to a Congressperson). Some forms of collective action violate laws and social sanctions against violence, whereas others work within the rules of the game (Wright, 2001). In some cases, how groups enter politics has more important

implications for social change than whether they enter politics. For this reason, examining how different ways of managing devaluation are linked to these different forms of collective action is a topic that merits additional research.

Intergroup certainty, organizational identification, and intergroup attitudes

Immigrants not only encounter low group status in the United States, but frequently they also experience a lack of certainty about where their group stands. Studies on uncertainty reduction (Mullin & Hogg, 1999) and the need for closure (Kruglanski et al., 1993) have both shown that uncertainty can derive from a lack of social consensus. In their new country, immigrants often feel detached from traditional hierarchies and ways of doing things that bound their community together and gave them a sense of their place in the world (Kinnvall, 2004). They find that members of the host society disagree with them about how to categorize the groups they belong to, where their group stands, and how the society functions. For instance, Dominican immigrants who are *indio* in the DR learn that others see them as black in the United States (Itzigsohn et al., 2005); West Indians discover that privilege that was a matter of class in the country of origin becomes a matter of race in the United States (Waters, 1999); and immigrants who expected to encounter some version of the American Dream instead have those expectations called into question by discrimination and devaluation. These experiences raise the question of how immigrants maintain a sense of intergroup certainty in the new country.

In this research I emphasized two ways in which immigrants can manage a lack of intergroup certainty. One is by turning to ethnically-relevant organizations. These organizations can help immigrants to maintain a sense of certainty by consensually

validating familiar norms and values from the country of origin (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004; Mullin & Hogg, 1999). Certainty is an important motivation for group identification, particularly for low-status groups (Reid & Hogg, 2005). A second way that immigrants can manage a lack of intergroup certainty is by supporting the U.S. status hierarchy (Overbeck et al., 2004). In particular, by evaluating higher-status outgroups favorably, immigrants affirm the social system that imposes a sense of structure and order on their new society. These different ways of establishing intergroup certainty – turning to an ingroup or selective perceptions of the outgroup context – parallel the different social creativity strategies immigrants use to manage low status. In both cases social categories can fulfill psychological functions by intra- and intergroup means. These strategies also indicate that immigrants can manage intergroup certainty in ways that affirm the clear meanings and structures of the two different societies – their country of origin and their country of residence. They can restore meaning about one social location by emphasizing their place in another.

A great deal should depend on how immigrants perceive the intergroup context. I proposed that the way that immigrants manage their intergroup certainty, and its implications for intergroup relations, depends on their beliefs about how the U.S. hierarchy operates and their position in it. One common notion regarding the status hierarchy in the United States is meritocracy, the idea that by working hard, individual group members can improve their position (McCoy & Major, 2006). Meritocracy can be particularly salient for immigrants who arrive in the new country expecting to achieve some version of the "American Dream." In fact the results of this study show that first-generation immigrants endorse meritocracy to a greater degree than do those in the

second generation. In a society in which individual outcomes are often tied to race, language, and documented status, however, a belief in meritocracy may be difficult to sustain. To do so, and to re-establish a sense of intergroup certainty, I expected that immigrants would strengthen their ties with immigrant organizations, with their familiar norms and values from the country of origin.

Whether favoring outgroups affords a way to establish a clear sense of one's place in the world depends on one's position in it. Group members adhere to the social systems that impose certainty and order on the world by valuing outgroups at their pinnacle. Immigrants to New York City, however, enter a context with multiple outgroups whose status is not always clear cut. Some groups, such as Whites, clearly have high status. The status of other groups may be less clear. Immigrants may disagree, for example, about whether their groups' status compared to African Americans is high, equivalent, or low. I expected that the relationship between intergroup certainty and outgroup attitudes would depend on perceived status. Favoring groups that are perceived to have higher status would be related to greater intergroup certainty. Favoring Whites, whom I thought would be seen as having clearly higher status, would be tied to a greater sense of intergroup certainty because it reaffirms the existing social hierarchy. Favoring African Americans, whose status position is more ambiguous, would only affirm the social system (and be tied to greater certainty) when their relative status compared to immigrants was seen as high. Thus, I expected that the implications for intergroup relations of how immigrants manage intergroup certainty – specifically their identification with ethnically-relevant organizations that foster collective action and their

attitudes towards native-born outgroups – depends on their perceptions of the intergroup context.

The results of the study consistently supported these predictions. Ethnically-relevant organizations were a source of intergroup certainty for Dominican and Mexican immigrants who endorsed meritocracy. This suggests that immigrants join these organizations not only as a source of respect, or to "bracket" their low status in the United States, but also to help them establish a familiar place in the new country. It also suggests, perhaps somewhat ironically, that immigrants may enter the U.S. political arena by joining organizations that re-establish the familiar norms and values of their country of origin.

Intergroup certainty was also linked to more favorable evaluations of higher-status groups. With respect to Whites, compared to whom nearly all immigrants perceived having lower group status, this resulted in a main effect. Favoring Whites, a higher-status outgroup, reaffirmed the social hierarchy that imposes order on the world. With respect to African Americans, compared to whom immigrants disagreed about their status, this resulted in moderation. Evaluating African Americans was linked to greater certainty only when immigrants thought that their status compared to the group was low. This shows that it is not the group itself that helps immigrants gain a sense of certainty about their place, but it is the position that group occupies. Order is restored by honoring groups that occupy high-status positions. This work shows that the same psychological processes that influence the relationship between intergroup certainty and intergroup attitudes can be applied to multiple outgroups – an important point as our societies increase in diversity. That these effects were so large also suggests that, at least among

immigrants, intergroup certainty is an extremely important predictor of intergroup attitudes. These attitudes may serve as the foundation for future intergroup relations, ranging from cross-group alliances and cooperation to intergroup antagonism and conflict.

Immigration and intergroup certainty

The results of this research complement those of another study on immigration and epistemic motives. Kosic et al. (2004) examined how need for cognitive closure, a dispositional intolerance for uncertainty, was related to immigrants' acculturation strategies. In samples from three different countries, they found that reference group orientation at entry (i.e., whether immigrants interacted mostly with co-ethnics or native-born members of their new country) moderated the relationship between need for cognitive closure and acculturation. As in the research presented here, they examined certainty management strategies linked to immigrants' societies of origin and residence. Immigrants with a low tolerance for ambiguity cleaved to whichever group they were closest to on entry. If they were surrounded by co-ethnics, they showed an increased tendency to favor their country of origin group. If they were surrounded by members of the host society, they embraced views related to that group. Kosic et al.'s (2004) findings offer parallel support for the importance of intergroup certainty in how immigrants engage with their new society. However, my results add to this earlier work in several ways.

First, the research presented here focused on the migration of Dominicans and Mexicans to New York City, where a large number of co-ethnics are present. Furthermore, I sampled from ethnically-relevant organizations, all but assuring that the

country of origin is an important reference group for participants. One would expect, then, based on the work described above, that immigrants would establish a sense of certainty by identifying with groups tied to their country of origin. Indeed, there is clear evidence for this pattern. However, I also found, in contrast to what Kosic et al. (2004) might predict, that immigrants established a sense of certainty by reaffirming the U.S. social hierarchy and evaluating native-born outgroups favorably. This suggests that both kinds of strategies – those that involve turning to the country of origin and those that involve turning to the country of residence – are present among immigrants with a country of origin reference group.

Indeed, this pattern was evident in Kosic et al.'s (2004) work as well. Among immigrants who had a high need for cognitive closure there were clear differences in preferences for turning to the ethnic or host group only, depending on reference group at entry. However, among immigrants with both reference-group orientations, attachment to *both* the country of origin *and* the country of residence was also evident. In fact, it was the favored strategy for those with a co-ethnic reference group upon entry. What does this mean? Along with the research presented here, it suggests that the difference between certainty management strategies that focus on the country of origin versus residence may be overstated and that most immigrants likely use strategies that draw on both groups.

Second, the dependent measures used in this study have clearer intergroup implications than those used in the previous work. Whereas acculturation measures simply show a general affinity for ethnic and national groups, the measures used here are more specific antecedents of immigrants' intergroup behaviors. Moving beyond national

affinities, I examined immigrants' identification with specific ethnically-relevant organizations that can serve as the foundation for collective action and their attitudes towards different outgroups in the country of origin. This latter point is extremely important in diverse societies such as the United States. It is not clear, for instance, whether "becoming American" would result in more or less positive views of African Americans. On one hand, the group might be seen as a co-national subgroup. On the other hand, "American" has been synonymous with discrimination against people of African descent for centuries. To understand the intergroup implications of immigrants' identity management strategies, it seems best to use more specific measures of attitudes towards and identifications with various societal subgroups than with a general category whose meaning is likely to vary substantially across those groups.

Ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes

In addition to the similarities and contrasts between this work and the only other study to examine the uncertain position of immigrants in their new society, these results have several additional implications. First, they show that research on intergroup certainty must differentiate between its effects on ingroup identification and outgroup derogation (or attitudes; Brewer, 1999). Research on uncertainty reduction within a social identity perspective has primarily emphasized the importance of ingroups as sources of certainty (Grieve, & Hogg, 1999; Mullin & Hogg, 1999). The present findings clearly support this position. However, much of the work in uncertainty reduction has also emphasized that intergroup discrimination could result from the same processes (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). This proposition is not supported by the current results. Consistent with a system justification perspective (Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Pelham, &

Carvallo, 2002), immigrants appear motivated to evaluate higher-status outgroups favorably in order to affirm the existing social hierarchy and impose order on the social world. These processes, which have different implications for immigrant political behavior, operate independently of one another (the correlations between identification with ethnically-relevant organizations and attitudes towards African Americans and Whites are $r(187)=.07$, *ns* and $r(187)=.00$, *ns*, respectively).

Immigrants establish feelings of certainty in ways that increase the likelihood of their participating in social change (i.e., by identifying with ethnically-relevant organizations) or in ways that are likely to decrease it (i.e., evaluating higher-status outgroups favorably). Future research should examine when and why immigrants make use of each of these strategies, whether they are used in conjunction or separately, and the effects they have on intergroup behavior. One important factor to consider in future research, as suggested by Reid and Hogg (2005), is the ideological environment of the group in question. They argue that because collective action can decrease certainty about where a group stands in society, organizations may be most effective in promoting action when they outline strong ideologies that define intergroup relations in clear terms and include specific reasons and actions for changing the status quo. For instance, fundamentalist organizations may be successful in organizing action in part because they combine the drive for change with rigid ideological orientation that combats the uncertainty raised by fighting for change. Organizations also may be able to mobilize action and fight for social change by framing outgroup relations in different ways. Some ethnically-relevant organizations may promote cooperation with higher-status outgroups,

viewing them positively, whereas others may promote collective action against them, viewing them more negatively (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2006).

Consider the following two organizational narratives as an illustration. The first comes from a newsletter from a Dominican organization in New York City. The newsletter begins with letters, in English and Spanish, from the executive director, the chairperson, and the co-chairperson. The chairperson and co-chairperson frame the organization as a refuge against uncertainty. They write,

> "[The organization] places a significant emphasis on family. . .Today, we live in a complex and dangerous world. Many of the issues our communities are confronted with daily leave them with a sense of alienation and hopelessness. [We] provid[e] the families of the community with workshops, classes, and support groups where they can express their concerns and feelings and receive the information and advice they need."

This quote emphasizes how organizations help immigrants manage a complicated and threatening world by offering them familiar (literally) norms and values, such as family, as well as informational and social support. In addition to portraying itself as a bastion against an uncertain world, the organization also frames attitudes toward members of outgroups. After thanking a list of contributors and volunteers, the executive director writes,

> "They have helped our community regardless of our ethnic backgrounds. Whether our community is made up of Hispanics, African Americans, Whites, or Asians, or whatever our sexual orientation may be, these wonderful people have identified great needs in our community and would like to take action to make things better."

This quote emphasizes the positive contributions of members of societal outgroups to the community and identifies them as a source of community improvement. Interestingly, Dominican identity is not mentioned, nor is the need for the community to

unite in collective action. Rather, status improvement is depicted as being facilitated by other groups in society.

Other organizations, however, define the basis for collective action in a very different way, while still emphasizing the functions that they serve for individual immigrants. The mission statement of a local Mexican organization reads,

> "The [organization] responds to those needs by organizing Mexicans to defend their human rights, educate them concerning these rights, as well as foster a sense of community through social, economic, and cultural activities. Additionally, [the organization's] monthly publication serves to inform members about their rights, services that [the organizational] and other organizations in the city can offer them, and empowers their Mexican identity. Clearly immigrants know that the [organization] is here to serve them."

Similar to the previous quote, this mission statement emphasizes how the organization meets members' needs by establishing an ethnically-based community. In contrast to the previous example, however, it also strongly emphasizes immigrants' needs to "defend their human rights", implying that these rights have been violated, and to "empower their Mexican identity," implying that it is through this ethnically-relevant identity that immigrants can raise their political voice. Thus, while these very different organizations both emphasize the ways that they meet members' needs by establishing a familiar community, they differ in whether they favor outgroups and see the ethnic group as a platform for collective action. Such organizational frames may provide the ideological context that does or does not link the functions of organizational identification to the form of political participation and intergroup conflict.

Conceptualizing group status

A second important theoretical implication of this research concerns how group status has been conceptualized in social identity theory. Generally the theory has conceptualized group status as a fixed element of the social environment. Some groups have high status because they have objectively greater access to resources and opportunities and face fewer challenges such as stereotypes and devaluation. There is little doubt that groups differ in terms of their status on objective characteristics. Studies that have viewed status this way have often been based on two-group models (e.g., Blacks and Whites in the United States, Catholics and Protestants in Ireland, Turks and Dutch in the Netherlands). As a result of immigration, however, many societies (including all of those mentioned above) are composed of more than two ethnic and/or religious groups. As is the case in this research, whereas status compared to some groups may be relatively unambiguous (e.g., Whites in the United States, Dutch in the Netherlands), status compared to other groups may be less clear (e.g. African Americans and Latinos in the United States). In such cases, it may be worthwhile to examine lay theories of status relations between groups. Consistent with this approach, rhetorical psychologists drawing on the social identity perspective have examined majority or minority status (which they link as much to power as numerical representation) as something that groups achieve rather than something that is an empirical given (Stevenson, Condor, & Abell, 2007). The findings from this study suggest that while intergroup status may be an interactional accomplishment, its effects on intergroup relations may be similar across settings once it is set.

Understanding intergroup certainty

Future research could improve our understanding of intergroup certainty. The results reported in this study conform to experimental findings that uncertainty motivates group identification. At the same, it extends this research outside the laboratory (and the minimal group paradigm), distinguishing between ingroup identification and outgroup attitudes and suggesting important ideological and status moderators of the relationship between certainty and intergroup attitudes.

This research, furthermore, reports initial evidence for the internal and predictive validity of a new measure of intergroup certainty. Previous work has manipulated certainty primarily in terms of the clarity and familiarity of experimental procedures and outcomes, making field research on the topic difficult. For instance, uncertainty has been induced by leading people to believe that their attitudes and beliefs may be incorrect (Mullin & Hogg, 1999), by asking them to complete confusing tasks that are unrelated to the rest of the study in which they are participating (e.g., NASA survival tasks; Hogg & Grieve, 1999), or by increasing the complexity of an estimation task (Reid & Hogg, 2005). In this study, intergroup certainty was conceptualized as an individual difference variable derived from one's experience with a given social context. In particular, lack of certainty was theorized to derive from the very experience of immigration through which the validity of an individual's ideological beliefs, the applicability of group norms, and certainty of their group's position in society all become unclear. This remains a largely theoretical proposition, however. The source of immigrants' lack of certainty about their groups' position in society as well as the relationship between this variable and other, potentially similar individual difference measures such as social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallwort, & Malle, 1994) and need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski &

Webster, 1996) remain to be explored. In addition, it remains to be seen whether and how intergroup certainty, as I have described it here, differs from more generalized feelings of subjective uncertainty manipulated in research on social identity research (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Mullin & Hogg, 1999; Reid & Hogg, 2005) or, even more broadly, social cognition (see Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009 for an example of the relationship between uncertainty and emotion more generally).

Our understanding of intergroup certainty in the context of immigration and other cases of rapid social change brought about by globalization and democraticization (Kinnvall, 2004) could be improved by answering the following three questions. First, how does intergroup certainty relate to other personality and/or individual difference measures with which it shares theoretical ground? Overbeck et al. (2004) have suggested that people high in social dominance orientation may have a greater need for certainty about the social structure and their place in it. Intergroup certainty should also be linked to need for cognitive closure, which represents a dispositional intolerance for ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). To demonstrate both convergent and discriminant validity with these personality variables, intergroup certainty must be shown to have unique effects even when these other constructs are controlled.

Second, how is intergroup certainty similar to or different from more generalized feelings of subjective uncertainty? In social psychology uncertainty is generally described as an aversive state in which one lacks the information necessary to construct a meaningful and predictable world (Anan, Wilson, & Gilbert, 2009; Hogg & Mullin, 1998; Knight, 1921). This general definition matches its operationalization in most experimental research, where manipulations include unfamiliar stimuli or experimental

procedures (Grieve & Hogg, 1999; Jetten, Hogg, & Mullin, 2000; Mullin & Hogg, 1999; Reid & Hogg, 2005). However the causes of uncertainty can often be found in broader social forces. Theorists have argued that uncertainty can result from globalization that ruptures traditional systems of meaning (Kinnvall, 2004), social turmoil marked by widespread disagreement about important issues, or a lack of recognition for one's own identity (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). One key question for future research is whether these social forces give rise to similar forms of subjective uncertainty as those manipulated in experimental research. In the laboratory, participants are made unclear about the operation of a minimal group context or novel stimulus. In the outside world, people are unsure of who they are, where they stand, or what they believe. It may be that these types of uncertainty differ only as a matter of degree. However, they may also be qualitatively different. Additional research in non-minimal contexts is required to sort out this question.

One difference in forms of certainty, which I have begun to address in this research, is whether they operate at the individual or group level. A growing body of social psychological research has shown that various perceptions (e.g., efficacy) and emotions (e.g., anger and guilt) operate at both the individual and group levels (Mackie & Smith, 2004)). The consequences of these emotions depend on the level at which they operate. For instance, collective anger at group-based deprivation is linked to support for collective action, whereas personal anger and individual-level deprivation is not (Runciman, 1966; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Similarly, a lack of certainty about where one's group stands in society may be a more reliable predictor of intergroup behavior and

attitudes than a feeling of personal uncertainty, which may be more predictive at the interpersonal than intergroup level.

Third, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions to give rise to intergroup uncertainty among immigrants and other groups that are experiencing rapid social change? I have suggested that, for immigrants, a lack of intergroup certainty stems from their participation in an unfamiliar status hierarchy, in which the meaning and status for their group identity is unclear. I offer no direct evidence, however, that these conditions are the causes of intergroup uncertainty in this study. In future research, it will be important to test whether having one's collective identity miscategorized or unrecognized, being exposed to an unfamiliar status hierarchy, or being exposed to new cultural practices can decrease feelings of intergroup certainty.

Answering these three questions could lend additional support to my theoretical proposition that intergroup certainty is derived from the social context and differs from more generalized feelings of uncertainty. Specifically, evidence that it can be systematically manipulated by varying people's experiences with how others categorize them or where their group stands in society, while controlling for individual differences such as social dominance orientation and need for cognitive closure, would support the idea that intergroup uncertainty is derived from the social context and not reducible to personality. In addition, evidence that it differs between high and low identifiers or that it produces unique effects above and beyond the effects of subjective uncertainty would add to the construct's discriminant validity. These are all promising lines for future research.

Immigrant generation, meritocracy, and intergroup attitudes

One last aspect of the results that warrants further consideration relates to immigrant generation. Mean analyses showed that 1.5 and second generation immigrants had less favorable attitudes toward White Americans and endorsed meritocracy less than their first-generation counterparts. What explains these findings? Second-generation immigrants – particularly immigrants of color living in low-income, urban neighborhoods – face a combination of rising expectations and sinking opportunities. Their exposure to U.S. media, schools, and peers leads them to develop different expectations about their standard of living in the United States (Gans, 1992). They may not be willing or able to work the same hours, in the same conditions, or in the same industries than their parents, whose expectations were shaped by life in the country of origin (Gans, 1992). At the same time, their opportunities are limited by their low-income communities (Massey & Denton, 1993) and race-based discrimination (Waters, 1999) and the attendant limited opportunities and surveillance. This combination of rising expectations and shrinking opportunities may lead them to reject ideologies of individual mobility such as meritocracy and to feel alienated – and perhaps excluded – from White, middle class society.

Furthermore, as a result of factors such as their presence in U.S. schools, interactions with police and the social service system, and greater facility with English, 1.5- and second-generation immigrants may have greater (though not great) contact with native-born Whites than their first-generation counterparts. This is unlikely to be high-quality contact and certainly not equal-status contact (Allport, 1954). Immigrants of color, in particular, face discrimination and devaluation from Whites and observe White privilege firsthand. Compared to those in the first generation, second-generation Latina/o

immigrant college students in New York City believe that Whites view their group less favorably (Wiley, Perkins, & Deaux, unpublished data). As a result of this increased exposure, they may develop less warm attitudes toward the group.

It is also possible that immigrants' beliefs about meritocracy and attitudes towards Whites are influenced by secondhand accounts. Second-generation Mexicans in New York City, in particular, have relatively high levels of contact with African Americans (Smith, 2005), a group that has been shown to endorse meritocracy less than others in the United States and who have experienced several centuries of discrimination and oppression at Whites' hands. To the extent that immigrants establish relationships with the African-American community, their attitudes towards Whites and beliefs in meritocracy may come to reflect similar views. In addition, 1.5 and second-generation immigrants' attitudes may also be influenced by their observations of their parents' experience in the United States. Viewing their parents' advancement and treatment through the lens of their own expectations and experience in the United States may lead them to sour on their endorsement of meritocracy and evaluation of higher-status groups.

Generational differences in immigrants' attitudes towards Whites in the United States and endorsement meritocracy also interacted with immigrants' ethnicity and gender. This suggests that key differences within immigrant generations are based on the intersecting disadvantages and privileges afforded immigrants occupying different social positions. For instance, cooler attitudes towards Whites were more pronounced among the Dominican than the Mexican second generation, likely reflecting the former groups' higher exposure to race-based discrimination (Bailey, 2001). In addition, lower endorsement of meritocracy in the second generation was more pronounced among

women than men, perhaps suggesting that women's opportunities for mobility in the United States may be limited by gender as well as race. While the current study cannot address these possibilities, they are promising lines for future research.

Representativeness of participants and organizations

Participants

There are clear benefits to having conducted this research in a community sample and allowing participants to complete the questionnaire in either Spanish or English. Segments of the Dominican and Mexican communities that would not have been reached by sampling English-speaking college students participated in this study. In fact, sampling English-speaking college students alone would have excluded the majority of Dominicans and Mexicans in New York City, as only 27.8% of Dominicans and 8.2% of Mexicans ages 18-24 are enrolled in bachelor's degree programs (Stone, 2004). Further, although it is difficult to know what proportion of Dominicans and Mexicans do not speak English, data from the 2005 American Community Survey indicates that only 67.4% of Dominicans and 56.8 % of Mexicans speak English "well" or better (Barrera-Tobón, 2005). At best, then, sampling from English-speaking college students excludes a significant proportion of Dominicans and Mexicans and, at worst, it excludes most of them.

There are also limitations to the sample recruited for this study, which is not representative of the Dominican and Mexican communities in New York City as a whole. First and most important, participants were recruited from ethnically-relevant organizations. People who participate in these organizations are likely to differ from the population at large in a number of ways that are relevant to collective identity and

political mobilization. They are likely to be more identified with their ethnic group than immigrants who do not participate in organizations, for instance. People with higher levels of ethnic identification are more likely to participate in collective action on their group's behalf (Deaux, Reid, Martin, & Bikmen, 2006; de Weerd & Klandermans, 1991; Lalonde & Cameron, 1993; Simon, et al., 1998; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000) and are more likely to stick with their group and even increase commitment in the face of threats (e.g. perceiving low group status; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Both of these factors may decrease the generalizability of these results to immigrants who do not participate in ethnically-relevant organizations.

At the same time, it should be noted that many participants were not extremely active members of the organizations. Respondents were only moderately identified with their organizations on average, many described themselves as only occasional members, and many had participated in their organization for a year or less. In reality, many of the "members" recruited to participate in this research see the organizations as a source of services more than as a way to enact their ethnic identity. While the organizations in this study started primarily with the mission to promote Dominican or Mexican culture or to improve the lives of Dominicans and Mexicans in New York City as well as in their countries of origin, most have added to their mission over the years in an effort to attract grant funding. Organizations now offer English classes, citizenship services, legal and tax assistance, and tutoring. Many participants were recruited while they waited for such services, participated in classes, or when they came to pick up their children from cultural events. Therefore, it should not be assumed that the participants in this research are hardened activists. This diversity of organizational participation and identification

mitigates somewhat against threats to external validity that arise from recruiting participants from community organizations. This is not to say that the sample is representative or that random sampling would not have improved the study's external validity. It is only to point out that the study represents an improvement over other social psychological research on immigrants that is conducted with college students and that the restricted range of the sample is not as extreme as it initially appears.

In order to understand the immigrants' political incorporation into the United States, a focus on members of ethnically-relevant organizations may also be desirable from a theoretical perspective. It is uncommon for immigrants to enter politics on their own. Since Thomas and Znaecki's (1918/1920) landmark study of Polish immigrants, social scientists have recognized the importance of ethnically-based organizations in immigrants' acculturation to their new societies. As such, a focus on the functions that these organizations serve for their members and the ways members are mobilized and de-mobilized makes an important contribution to the understanding of immigrant politics even if it does not generalize to entire immigrant communities.

Sampling members of ethnically-relevant organizations may also be desirable from the perspective of social identity theory. Reicher and colleagues (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001) have argued that far from being social givens, collective identities – their boundaries and their content – are actively constructed by "entrepreneurs of identity" to further political projects and mobilize group members toward their goals. Ethnically-relevant organizations can serve as identity entrepreneurs in immigrant communities. In this respect, they are the perfect location in which to understand the role of collective identity in social change. By understanding the impact

on political mobilization of how members of these organizations frame the group's position in society, we may learn about more general processes of how collective identities are constructed by identity entrepreneurs to achieve specific political ends. In this study, for instance, we can see the different political implications of the different ways in which members of immigrant organizations manage their low status and uncertain position in society. By emphasizing intragroup respect, groups empower members and mobilize collective action. In contrast, by emphasizing alternative dimensions of comparison, ways in which the group is good apart from economic status, they achieve inverse effects. Similarly, immigrant groups may mobilize and/or de-mobilize their members by managing uncertainty in different ways. When members manage uncertainty by emphasizing how organizations can give a sense of structure and order to the world, they can further collective action goals. In contrast, they may diminish collective action goals when they manage uncertainty by evaluating higher-status outgroups positively, reaffirming the existing status system. These different ways of managing low status and uncertainty are tied to very different views of the relationship between groups in society and very different forms of political mobilization. Understanding their dynamics may go beyond the psychology of immigrant organizations to the psychology of social change.

It is worth noting, however, the ways in which the sample of this study differs demographically from the overall Dominican and Mexican communities in New York City. Not only does it allow an assessment of the generalizability of the findings, it also speaks to the question of who participates in Dominican and Mexican organizations. One way this sample differs from the Dominican and Mexican communities in New York City

overall concerns immigrant generation. There was a higher proportion of foreign-born (first-generation) respondents in this research than in the Dominican and Mexican communities in New York City at large (Caro-Lopez, 2005). This may be related to the age distribution of the communities. Sixty-seven percent of domestic-born (second-generation) Mexicans and 60% of domestic-born Dominicans were 14 years of age or younger as of 2005 (Caro-Lopez, 2005). Because I only recruited participants who were 18 years of age and older, this means that the majority of second-generation Dominicans and Mexicans in New York City were not eligible to participate in this study. Future research on social creativity and political incorporation among immigrants could be improved by placing a greater emphasis on second-generation immigrant youth. In just a few years this cohort has the potential to reshape the politics New York City. This fact is not lost on the community organizations who participated in this research. Of the seven groups included in this study, four have active youth organizing programs.

The participants in this study also differed from the Dominican and Mexican communities overall with respect to gender. Although the greater proportion of Dominican than Mexican women in the sample reflects the greater proportion of Dominican women (at least in the first generation) overall in New York City (Caro-Lopez, 2005), women are still oversampled in this study. One consequence of oversampling women and first-generation immigrants is that it makes it difficult to fully explore how the results with respect to gender and social creativity operate differently among Dominicans and Mexicans. This is an important limitation because we know from other research that Dominican and Mexican communities differ with respect to gender ideologies. Compared to Mexican society, Dominican society tends to be less

patriarchal. For instance, Massey et al. (2006) found that the rates of legal marriages among Mexican women (81.1%) were nearly double that of Dominican women (45.1%), whereas the rates of consensual unions were almost five times as high among Dominican (26.3%) compared to Mexican (5.4%) women. Differences in gender ideology influence which Dominican and Mexican women come to the United States, who they come with, and why they come. These differences can also influence the degree to which men and women make use of particular social creativity strategies. It is likely that women from more patriarchal societies will idealize cultural values related to family (and thus favor alternative dimensions of comparison) to a greater extent than those from less patriarchal societies. All of these differences can lead to different patterns of political incorporation among men and women from the two groups. Such questions of intersectionality (Mahlingham et al., 2008) should be tackled more directly in the future.

Organizations

It is also important to consider the theoretical implications of the types of ethnically-relevant organizations that were included in this research. Specifically, none of the sampled organizations was a hometown association, the most common form among Mexicans (Portes et al., 2007; Smith, 2005). Because of their small size and informal character, such organizations can be difficult to contact. Hometown associations represented just 5.5% of Portes et al.'s (2007) sample, for instance, despite the fact that their own inventory pegged their proportion as 63.8% of Mexican organizations. All of the organizations included in this study can be identified as civic/cultural, which Portes et al. estimate represent about 45% of Dominican organizations and 7 % of Mexican organizations nationally and are more involved in

U.S.-based political activities than other groups. Because the primary focus of this research was on U.S.-based political incorporation, the choice of such groups seems appropriate. It should be noted, however, that U.S.-centered political behavior does not exclude transnational behaviors because most organizations engage in a mix of political involvement in the United States and the country of origin.

From a psychological perspective, civic/cultural organizations may differ from other kinds of groups such as hometown associations, economic organizations, professional associations, and exclusively social service agencies in terms of the functions they serve for their members. Deaux, Reid, Mizrahi, and Cotting (1999) found evidence for seven different functions of identity, each related to different kinds of groups. Some groups served individual needs like self-insight, understanding, and downward social comparison. Some served interpersonal needs like social interaction and romantic involvement. Others served group-level needs like collective self-esteem, ingroup cooperation, and intergroup comparison and competition. Johnson, Crawford, Sherman, Rutchick, Hamilton, Ferreira, and Petrocelli (2006) also found that different kinds of groups fulfilled different functions. Small intimacy groups like families or clubs were characterized by high levels of interaction and entitativity and fulfilled affilliation needs; task groups like unions or trade associations were characterized by high degrees of interaction and cooperation among members and fulfilled achievement needs; and social category groups like race and gender were long lasting, had impermeable boundaries and fulfilled identity needs. Going beyond the work of Deaux et al. (1999) and Johnson et al. (2006), Aharpour and Brown (2002) have shown that the functions endorsed by groups influence the relationship between identification and group bias. Groups that emphasize

interdependence, for instance, show a strong relationship between levels of identification and outgroup stereotyping. In other words, different kinds of groups fulfill different kinds of needs among their members and are related to different forms of intergroup relations.

What functions do different immigrant organizations fulfill? Economic organizations and professional associations would appear to be most like task groups in Johnson et al.'s (2007) taxonomy, and thus related to achievement needs. Hometown associations would appear to be most like intimacy groups and related to belonging needs. Agencies that exclusively provide social service may not be seen as group at all, any more than a hospital or a tax agency is seen as a group.

Cultural/civic organizations have elements of various group types, and thus fulfill a variety of functions for their members. Because they are based in collective identities, they can fulfill identity needs similar to those fulfilled by social category groups. Indeed, the organizations with which I worked emphasized the value of social category membership. Mexican organizations offered traditional dance classes, organized events to venerate the Virgin of Guadalupe, and celebrated Día de los Muertos. Dominican organizations offered classes in merengue, held prayer vigils, and named their programs after important national icons like the Mirabal sisters. At the same time, unlike social category groups, their boundaries are permeable. Whereas immigrants may have difficulty exiting Dominican or Mexican social categories, they would have little difficulty leaving an organization. In fact, the results presented here demonstrate that, for many, organizational membership is transitory.

For active members, however, civic/cultural organizations also function like intimacy groups, fulfilling needs for affiliation and respect that may inculcate members against some of the ontological uncertainties of living in a new society (Kinnvall, 2004). For example, I attended an organizing meeting of a Dominican organization in Manhattan composed of people who were part of each other's churches and families, or who were from the same hometown. The topic of the meeting was deportation. Chairs were arranged in a circle and each member spoke of a friend or family member who had been deported. Members cried as they spoke and the other attendees were there to support them, giving hugs and commiserating, offering resources and support. The tone of the meeting was so familial, so intimate, that I felt embarrassed to be there, as if I had walked unannounced into someone's apartment and sat down at their kitchen table as their family discussed their anxieties and hopes. In fact, the results of this study demonstrate how the intimacy that I observed within organizations interacts with the social category threats outside them. It is the high degrees of interaction and familiarity that these groups afford that allows immigrants to use them as resources by which to manage threats to their impermeable social category memberships.

Civic and cultural organizations are also related to achievement functions. Most have paid staff that work together and with volunteers to write grants, plan rallies, and organize new recruits. Within organizations, members achieve individual goals, such as gaining citizenship or learning a new language, as well as collective goals, such as engaging in coordinated action to garner more favorable citizenship and labor policies for the group. It is indicative of this achievement function that organizational identification is linked to perceptions of group efficacy. Research on collective action with more

general social category groups has found no such relationship (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008).

Part of the importance of immigrant civic and cultural organizations may be in their ability to fulfill multiple functions for different members and at different points in one's organizational career. At the same time, the analysis of immigrant civic and cultural organizations blurs some of the boundaries between group types outlined by Johnson et al. (2007), showing that, at least for experiencing devaluation and uncertainty based on the groups they belong to, social category groups may provide the foundation for intimacy and task groups.

This is not to say that we should forgo an analysis of the different kinds of functions that groups serve. As I suggested above, the kinds of functions groups serve may be central to the processes that drive collective action. For instance, research with social category groups has shown that level of group identification moderates the antecedents of collective action (van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). For high identifiers group-based anger increases action support, whereas for low identifiers group efficacy increases support. This makes sense in the context of a group that has little face-to-face interaction and in which members do not have the opportunity to work together on a regular basis. People will only feel angry about the group's position if it is important to their identity. People who do not identify with the group will only work on its behalf when it looks like things could go well and the group could benefit them as individuals. In groups that are based on social category memberships but that also serve affiliative and achievement functions, however, the relationship between efficacy, identity, and action may be quite different. As the results in this study suggest,

identifying with such groups can increase the sense that the group can accomplish its goals, bolstering support for collective action.

What is important to note is that this study focused on one kind of immigrant organization that fulfills a range of functions for its members. It should not be expected that other kinds of immigrant organizations that fulfill fewer or different functions – professional associations, social service agencies, etc. – will fulfill similar needs, nor should it be assumed that a focus on civic/cultural groups exhausts the list of functions that immigrant organizations serve for their communities.

Potential limitations

Although the results of this study offer clear support for the hypotheses, several potential limitations should be considered in evaluating the conclusions and in designing future research. Foremost among these are the cross-sectional nature of the design, which makes causal inference impossible, and several aspects of the survey design and implementation within an immigrant population in New York City. In this section, I consider each issue.

Causal Inference

The mediation and moderation models presented in this cross-sectional study cannot establish causal direction among the variables. For instance, the moderation models related to intragroup respect and organizational identification could be interpreted in the light of group protoypicality. Under conditions of low-group status, for instance, highly-identified group members might receive more respect from their ingroup because they are seen as more prototypical (Hains, Hogg, & Duck, 1997). Similarly, men may receive more respect from the ingroup than women because they are seen as more

prototypical members (Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). However, there is also experimental evidence supporting the interpretation made in this study, that group identification can be a source of intragroup respect for members who feel that their group is devalued in society (Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Simon & Sturmer, 2003).

High identifiers may also be less likely to rationalize the position of the group under conditions of threat and thus more likely to engage in action on the group's behalf. This is a potential alternative explanation for the relationship between organizational identification and favoring alternative comparison dimensions. It is also possible that supporting and participating in collective action gives people a stronger sense of group efficacy, increasing their identification with activist groups and decreasing their need to rationalize their group's position (Drury & Reicher, 2005). In all of these cases, additional experimental and longitudinal research is needed to sort out the causal relationships among the variables.

Survey design and implementation

The survey design and implementation of this study also carry with them several limitations that are instructive for future work on collective action and with immigrant populations.

Collective action measure. One limitation related specifically to hypotheses four and five concerns the attitudinal measure of collective action used in this survey. Although similar measures are commonly employed in studies of collective action (see van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008 for a meta-analysis), they have important drawbacks. In this study, for example, support for collective action was quite high and

variability was mostly concentrated at the upper end of the scale. That is, differences in support were mostly between people who supported action somewhat and those who supported action strongly. These findings are consistent with research on the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977). Attitudinal measures, such as support for collective action, are often overly optimistic, and they are indirectly related to behavioral via intentions. Behavioral intentions, such as willingness to engage in collective action, are more proximal predictors of behavior and are often more realistic, taking into account potential contingencies of action. Using a measure of collective action intentions might have improved this research by offering more accurate assessments of people's actual behavior and also increasing variability in the measure.

Better yet would be use of a behavioral measure of collective action. Such measures are not commonly employed in research in collective action, although work by Simon and colleagues (2007, 2008) and by De Weerd and Klandermans (1999) represent notable exceptions. In cross-sectional studies such as this one, participants could be asked to report on their past involvement in collective action. Researchers could also utilize longitudinal designs that include both action intentions and behaviors. This would be advantageous in several ways. First, several theories of collective action suggest that it may be driven, at least in part, by non-conscious processes such as deindividuation (Postmes & Spears, 1998). Such processes may influence collective action apart from intentions to participate. Second, studying the relationship between action intentions and behaviors would help us to understand what sorts of structural and psychological variables intervene in this relationship. For instance, what processes can sidetrack group members' intentions to participate and how might other people find themselves caught up

in actions they had never planned to undertake? Third, and most importantly, longitudinal designs using behavioral measures would address what interests most social psychologists studying collective action, namely the specific behaviors that support social movements.

None of this is to say that the results of this study are invalidated by the use of an attitudinal measure of collective action. Van Zomeren et al.'s recent meta-analysis (2008) found similar predictors of attitudinal, intentional, and behavioral measures of collective action (although relationships with the former were stronger than relationships with the latter two). Support for collective action is also important in its own right. For social movements to be successful they need the support of what Richard Nixon (1969) called "the great silent majority" in a society. In fact a recent model of social change conceptualizes the process as a competition between authority and minority groups over the support of this majority as opposed to a two-party contest for power (Subašić et al., 2008). Likely the effectiveness of social movements depends on their ability both to mobilize a small cadre of ardent activists to take direct action as well as to gain the support of a much larger group of more passive supporters.

Survey length and levels of literacy. Many of the respondents remarked that the survey, which took approximately half an hour for most to complete, was too long and too repetitive. Even among traditional college student samples a 30-minute survey can cause fatigue. For a sample with lower levels of literacy and who are less accustomed to participating in psychological research where multiple questions address the same construct (a handful of participants remarked that they had already answered questions on the survey),fatigue is an even greater risk.

The survey could have been designed differently to address some of the population's low levels of literacy. Many members of immigrant organizations have not had formal schooling beyond the primary level in the United States or their country of origin. A handful of potential respondents could not complete the survey because they were not functionally literate in either English or Spanish, their first language being Nahuatl or some language indigenous to what is now identified as central Mexico. Although it is not possible for me to estimate the number of participants who could not complete the survey for this reason, the anecdotal evidence suggests three important points. First, although my sample excludes some participants because of literacy requirements, it is a great improvement over samples of Dominicans and Mexicans drawn from college populations. Therefore, despite its limitations, my sample is more representative of the total population than are many other studies of Latinos.

It is also important to address the methodological implications of doing social psychological research with populations that have low levels of literacy. We must reconsider, in some cases, our overreliance on textual methods such as questionnaires and experiments in which instruments and manipulations are written. So that a greater proportion of the sampled population can participate with greater ease, future research might make use of some form of structured or semi-structured interviewing technique. One possible solution is to make greater use of qualitative methods for which literacy is not required, such as interviews, focus groups, and ethnography. When research questions do require quantitative methods, however, we might use mixed approaches. The ethnosurvey methodology used by Massey et al. (1987), in which interviewers are given freedom on how to elicit a list of data points over the course of a natural

conversation, could provide the foundation for an effective approach. For the most part social psychologists have used these methods. But as we conduct research with more diverse communities who are not familiar with our esoteric methods, we must expand our methods as well as our theories. If social psychology is serious about crossing boundaries of class and culture, such methodological questions must be given greater weight.

Third, the reliability of my data suggests that it is possible to conduct questionnaire studies of large proportions of communities with low levels of education and social capital. Although my methods did exclude some participants who were functionally illiterate, they also included many participants with elementary levels of education who could probably not have completed a social psychological survey in English. Drawing on the local knowledge of Mexican and Dominican college students and organizational leadership made this possible. In focus groups and informal conversations, college students and organizational leaders responded to drafts of my survey, revising instructions and scales that might give their families and communities trouble. Their responses allowed me to translate the questionnaire into a language that was more relevant, understandable, and clear to a broad range of the Dominican and Mexican communities.

Conclusion

This research examined how Dominican and Mexican immigrants manage low-group status and establish a sense of intergroup certainty in the United States. In the process of migration and acculturation, immigrants negotiate new meanings about their relationship to the social world – who they are, where they stand, and what they believe.

This study demonstrated the consequences of different ways of maintaining meaning, specifically for immigrants' political incorporation into the United States. In managing low group status, for instance, immigrants find respect through ethnically-relevant organizations, increasing their sense of empowerment and fostering support for collective action. They also reframe the intergroup context, emphasizing domains in which their group compares favorably to outgroups, which in turn dampens support for collective action. In maintaining intergroup certainty, immigrants find meaning and order in ethnically-relevant organizations. They also affirm the social system in the new country by favoring high-status outgroups. Overall, the work showed that it is not enough to understand *that* immigrants are motivated to maintain a sense of meaning in their new context and *that* they can draw on many different resources to do so, including immigrant organizations. To have a fuller account of immigrant political incorporation, we must also understand *how* immigrants maintain meaning – the different consequences of the strategies they choose and why they choose the ones they do.

This research has implications in many domains. From a practical perspective, it suggests that immigrant organizers can meet their members' psychological needs, while at the same time bolster organizational commitment and support for collective action, by respecting them and emphasizing familiar norms and values. It also suggests strategies they might avoid, such as affirming alternative dimensions of comparison, which undermine organizational commitment and collective action. From a policy perspective, it suggests that ethnically-relevant organizations are not barriers to immigrant political incorporation, as some have assumed (Huntington, 2004). Rather they are the vehicle

through which immigrants enter the political arena and become participants in U.S. democracy.

Finally, from a social psychological perspective, this research offers an extension to work on how people maintain meaning in their lives. It shows that immigrants have many resources on which to draw in order to maintain a positive view of their groups and sense of certainty about where they stand in society, ranging from support from ethnically-relevant organizations, to important values linked to the country of origin, to the status hierarchy in their new country. Not only is this consistent with social identity theory's proposition that self-esteem and certainty are two of the functions of collective identities (while also showing how these functions can be achieved in other ways; Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg, 2001), it also shows that meaning maintenance is plastic (Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006). But the work presented here goes beyond demonstrating that people are motivated to maintain meaning in their lives and that they are quite flexible in doing so. It also shows that the strategies that people use to manage low status and uncertainty have important consequences for political behavior. These results force us to look at immigrant responses to low status and lack of certainty as an active process.

Table 1. Correlations for main study variables.

	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	*6*	*7*	*8*	*9*	*10*	*11*	*12*
1. Importance of organizational identification	1											
2. Intragroup respect	.21**	1										
3. Perceived group status compared to African Americans	-.02	.07	1									
4. Perceived group status compared to Whites	-.07	.07	.33***	1								
5. Favor alternative dimensions of comparison	-.13^	.00	-.07	-.35***	1							
6. Group Efficacy	.35***	.36***	.04	.19*	-.24***	1						
7. Collective Action Goals	.17*	.16*	.09	.16*	-.17*	.31***	1					
8. Intergroup Certainty	.11	.09	.10	.11	-.05	.13^	.23**	1				
9. Meritocratic Ideology	.05	-.01	.14*	.25***	-.35***	.17^	.13^	.23***	1			
10. Attitudes towards African Americans	-.07	.05	-.02	.01	.07	.04	.02	.22**	.02	1		
11. Attitudes towards Whites	.00	.12	.06	.13^	-.04	.07	.18*	.22**	.08	.38***	1	
12. Attitudes towards ingroup	.05	.08	-.01	-.05	.03	.02	.07	.18*	.02	.45***	.30***	1

^ $p < .1$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 2a. Means and standard deviations of beliefs about position in United States by ethnicity, generation, and gender.

			Group status				
Ethnicity	Generation	Gender	African Americans	Whites	Intergroup certainty	Meritocracy	Group efficacy
Dominican	1st	Women	4.10(1.37)	3.02(1.68)	5.64(1.12)	4.30(.93)	5.71(1.35)
		Men	4.00(1.54)	3.12(1.90)	5.47(1.69)	4.07(.97)	4.76(1.60)
		Total	4.0(1.41)	3.05(1.73)	5.59(1.30)	4.24(.94)	5.44(1.48)
	1.5/2nd	Women	4.08(1.22)	2.52(1.36)	5.21(1.21)	3.50(1.18)	4.77(1.63)
		Men	4.20(2.04)	2.90(1.52)	4.72(1.22)	4.11(.91)	4.93(1.48)
		Total	4.11(1.47)	2.63(1.40)	5.07(1.21)	3.67(1.13)	4.81(1.57)
	Total	Women	4.09(1.31)	2.83(1.57)	5.48(1.16)	4.00(1.10)	5.36(1.52)
		Men	4.07(1.71)	3.04(1.74)	5.19(1.55)	4.09(.93)	4.82(1.53)
		Total	4.09(1.43)	2.89(1.62)	5.40(1.29)	4.02(1.05)	5.20(1.54)
Mexican	1st	Women	3.88(1.70)	3.24(1.97)	5.39(.90)	4.04(1.19)	5.35(1.31)
		Men	2.91(1.40)	2.12(1.39)	5.42(.94)	4.16(1.06)	5.26(1.33)
		Total	3.40(1.62)	2.69(1.79)	5.40(.91)	4.10(1.12)	5.31(1.31)
	1.5/2nd	Women	3.79(1.19)	1.71(.83)	5.46(1.03)	2.46(1.23)	5.02(1.54)
		Men	4.00(1.15)	2.90(1.10)	5.54(.85)	3.64(.68)	4.83(1.43)
		Total	3.88(1.15)	2.21(1.10)	5.49(.94)	2.95(1.18)	4.94(1.47)
	Total	Women	3.85(1.56)	2.79(1.84)	5.41(.92)	3.58(1.39)	5.26(1.37)
		Men	3.16(1.41)	2.30(1.35)	5.45(.91)	4.04(1.00)	5.15(1.35)
		Total	3.53(1.52)	2.56(1.64)	5.43(.91)	3.80(1.24)	5.21(1.36)
Total	1st	Women	4.00(1.52)	3.12(1.81)	5.53(1.02)	4.18(1.06)	5.55(1.34)
		Men	3.28(1.53)	2.46(1.63)	5.44(1.23)	4.13(1.02)	5.09(1.43)
		Total	3.71(1.56)	2.86(1.76)	5.49(1.11)	4.16(1.04)	5.37(1.39)
	1.5/2nd	Women	3.97(1.20)	2.23(1.25)	5.30(1.14)	3.12(1.29)	4.86(1.58)
		Men	4.10(1.62)	2.90(1.29)	5.13(1.10)	3.88(.82)	4.88(1.42)
		Total	4.02(1.35)	2.46(1.29)	5.24(1.12)	3.34(1.20)	4.86(1.52)
	Total	Women	3.99(1.42)	2.82(1.69)	5.45(1.07)	3.82(1.24)	5.31(1.46)
		Men	3.51(1.59)	2.59(1.55)	5.35(1.19)	4.06(.97)	5.03(1.42)
		Total	3.81(1.50)	2.73(1.63)	5.41(1.11)	3.91(1.15)	5.20(1.45)

Table 2b. Means and standard deviations of social creativity strategies by ethnicity, generation, and gender.

Ethnicity	Generation	Gender	Emphasizing intragroup respect	Favoring alternative comparison dimensions
Dominican	1st	Women	6.14(1.27)	1.07(2.23)
		Men	5.39(1.58)	.62(2.95)
		Total	5.92(1.39)	.94(2.44)
	1.5/2nd	Women	5.39(1.37)	1.84(2.45)
		Men	5.50(1.57)	.30(2.38)
		Total	5.42(1.41)	1.40(2.49)
	Total	Women	5.85(1.35)	1.36(2.32)
		Men	5.43(1.55)	.50(2.71)
		Total	5.73(1.41)	1.11(2.46)
Mexican	1st	Women	5.31(1.41)	1.69(2.93)
		Men	5.67(1.41)	1.56(1.57)
		Total	5.48(1.41)	1.63(2.35)
	1.5/2nd	Women	5.98(.86)	3.73(3.15)
		Men	5.47(1.29)	2.80(2.74)
		Total	5.76(1.07)	3.33(2.95)
	Total	Women	5.51(1.30)	2.24(3.10)
		Men	5.62(1.37)	1.85(1.94)
		Total	5.56(1.32)	2.05(2.61)
Total	1st	Women	5.76(1.39)	1.36(2.58)
		Men	5.57(1.46)	1.24(2.16)
		Total	5.69(1.41)	1.31(2.41)
	1.5/2nd	Women	5.60(1.23)	2.49(2.81)
		Men	5.48(1.40)	1.55(2.81)
		Total	5.56(1.28)	2.16(2.82)
	Total	Women	5.71(1.33)	1.73(2.70)
		Men	5.55(1.43)	1.33(2.35)
		Total	5.65(1.37)	1.58(2.57)

Table 2c. Means and standard deviations of antecedents of political behavior by ethnicity, generation, and gender.

Ethnicity	Generation	Gender	Organizational identification	Collective action goals	Intergroup attitudes: African Americans	Intergroup attitudes: Ingroup	Intergroup attitudes: Whites
Dominican	1st	Women	4.65(1.63)	6.21(.91)	63.54(31.43)	84.88(19.76)	77.07(19.40)
		Men	4.75(1.09)	5.96(1.33)	62.50(27.20)	85.63(17.11)	70.67(28.65)
		Total	4.68(1.48)	6.14(1.04)	63.25(30.07)	85.09(18.91)	75.36(22.15)
	1.5/2nd	Women	4.25(1.36)	5.50(1.21)	66.40(27.67)	88.00(13.23)	62.00(25.33)
		Men	4.35(1.25)	5.61(1.40)	47.00(29.08)	80.00(16.33)	46.00(27.57)
		Total	4.28(1.31)	5.53(1.25)	60.86(29.04)	85.71(14.41)	57.43(26.61)
	Total	Women	4.50(1.53)	5.94(1.08)	64.62(29.88)	86.06(17.53)	71.36(22.86)
		Men	4.60(1.14)	5.82(1.34)	56.54(28.42)	83.46(16.72)	60.80(30.27)
		Total	4.53(1.43)	5.91(1.15)	62.34(29.54)	85.33(17.25)	68.46(25.38)
Mexican	1st	Women	4.90(1.29)	6.26(.76)	52.29(30.11)	81.43(19.58)	67.91(23.59)
		Men	5.07(1.49)	6.24(.66)	55.00(29.29)	86.56(13.35)	69.03(19.89)
		Total	4.98(1.38)	6.25(.71)	53.58(29.53)	83.88(16.96)	68.44(21.77)
	1.5/2nd	Women	5.20(1.81)	6.11(.87)	65.71(22.77)	89.29(10.72)	65.71(22.77)
		Men	4.73(1.20)	5.96(.57)	55.00(33.42)	67.00(18.29)	58.00(27.00)
		Total	5.00(1.57)	6.05(.75)	61.25(22.55)	80.00(17.94)	62.50(24.36)
	Total	Women	4.98(1.44)	6.22(.78)	56.12(28.64)	83.67(17.76)	67.29(23.14)
		Men	4.99(1.42)	6.17(.64)	55.00(29.90)	81.90(16.71)	66.34(22.00)
		Total	4.99(1.42)	6.20(.72)	55.60(29.07)	82.86(17.21)	66.86(22.51)
Total	1st	Women	4.76(1.48)	6.23(.84)	58.36(31.14)	83.29(19.62)	72.86(21.77)
		Men	4.96(1.36)	6.14(.93)	57.50(28.55)	86.25(14.53)	69.57(22.80)
		Total	4.84(1.43)	6.20(.87)	58.02(30.05)	84.44(17.82)	71.61(22.13)
	1.5/2nd	Women	4.59(1.58)	5.72(1.13)	66.15(25.71)	88.46(12.26)	63.33(24.21)
		Men	4.54(1.21)	5.79(1.06)	51.00(30.76)	73.50(18.14)	52.00(27.26)
		Total	4.57(1.45)	5.74(1.10)	61.02(28.20)	83.39(16.04)	59.49(25.62)
	Total	Women	4.70(1.51)	6.06(.97)	61.00(29.53)	85.04(17.59)	69.63(22.97)
		Men	4.84(1.32)	6.04(.98)	55.59(29.14)	82.50(16.61)	64.24(25.36)
		Total	4.75(1.44)	6.05(.97)	58.99(29.42)	84.10(17.23)	67.66(23.94)

Table 3. Intergroup attitudes by immigrant generation.

	1st generation		2nd generation	
Feeling thermometer	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
African Americans	58.72	29.98	61.02	28.20
Whites	71.38	22.07	59.49	25.62
Ingroup	84.71	17.85	83.39	16.04

Figure 1. Social creativity and social change: predicted model for hypotheses 1 through 5.



Figure 2. Status compared to Whites moderates the relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identity importance (H1).



Figure 3. Gender moderates the relationship between intragroup respect and organizational identity importance (H1a).



Figure 4. Status compared to Whites moderates the relationship between favoring alternative dimensions of comparison and organizational identity importance (H3).



Figure 5. Group efficacy mediates the relationships between organizational identity importance and favoring alternative comparison dimensions on collective action goals (H4 & H5).



* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Figure 6. Meritocratic ideology moderates the relationship between intergroup certainty and organizational identity importance (H7).



Figure 7. Status compared to African Americans moderates the relationship between intergroup certainty and attitudes toward African Americans (H9)



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